Eurocentric Archival Knowledge Production and Decolonizing Archival Theory

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Abstract

This dissertation is interested in how archival theory—the theoretical work of archiving produced by archivists and, to a lesser extent, the modes of doing archival research deployed by researchers—tackles the colonial roots and routes of archives, archivists and archival theories and practices. At the base of this examination of archival theory is the assumption that theory produces the object it evaluates. Thus, as opposed to interrogating a pre-existing archive, archival theory produces imaginative and material archival spaces in which archivists and researchers labour. In this dissertation, then, I examine the ways in which Eurocentric intellectual frameworks continue to frame archival theory and, thus, delimit how archivists and researchers produce knowledge about and through archives. In particular, this dissertation is interested in how the Eurocentrism underwriting archival theory as much shapes archivists’ understanding of colonialism and colonial archives by establishing the archive’s and archival theory’s geography, history and future trajectory as covers over the archives’ and archival theory’s colonial history. With an eye to the work of contemporary archivists and theorists who critically interrogate the ways archives and archivists reproduce unequal social relations of power, the following chapters negotiate the tension within these critiques between developing more democratic, socially just and postcolonial archives and archival theory, and the Eurocentric intellectual frameworks that reiterate the divisions between West and non-West, modern societies and traditional communities, literate and oral, and between reason and feeling. The works of Canadian archivists and scholars figure prominently in my dissertation as they both shape my analyses of the effects of Eurocentrism and continuing settler colonial relations on archives, archiving and archival research, and also become objects of analysis through which I trace out the discourses that work to secure and trouble settler title and entitlement to Aboriginal land by erasing or nullifying Indigenous sovereignty in and through Canada’s archives. The aim of my dissertation is to propose modes of archival knowledge production that trouble, if not displace, these Eurocentric and settler frameworks to decolonize archives and archival theory.
This dissertation is dedicated to my daughter Ellie.

In memory of Barbara Godard.
I still miss you.
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**Introduction**

This dissertation is interested in how archival theory—the theoretical work of archiving produced by archivists and, to a lesser extent, the modes of doing archival research deployed by researchers—tackles the colonial roots and routes of archives, archivists and archival theories and practices. At the base of this examination of archival theory is the assumption that theory produces the object it evaluates. As Walter Mignolo (1993, p. 127) argues, “theories are not instruments for understanding something that lies outside of the theory: rather, theories are instruments for constructing knowledge and understanding” that something. Thus, as opposed to interrogating a pre-existing archive, archival theory produces imaginative and material archival spaces in which archivists and researchers labour. In this dissertation, then, I examine the ways in which Eurocentric intellectual frameworks continue to frame archival theory and, thus, delimit how archivists and researchers produce knowledge about and through archives. In particular, I am interested in how the Eurocentrism underwriting archival theory as much shapes archivists’ understanding of colonialism and colonial archives by establishing the archive’s and archival theory’s geography, history and future trajectory as cover over the archives’ and archival theory’s colonial history. With an eye to the work of contemporary archivists and theorists who critically interrogate the ways archives and archivists reproduce unequal social relations of power, the following chapters negotiate the tension within these critiques between developing more democratic, socially just and postcolonial archives and archival theory, and the Eurocentric intellectual frameworks that reiterate the divisions between West and non-West, modern and traditional, literate and oral, and between reason and feeling.

In the last few decades, archivists and non-archivists have produced significant work on the archives and colonialism and colonial archives. These scholars have worked to develop critical reading practices for interrogating the records of colonial regimes, exploring archival institutions as sites of colonial knowledge production, and interrogating the archival logics that govern these institutions and their use. By briefly outlining what has already been written, I will situate my approach to colonial archiving as both an extension of this scholarship and how, where and why it diverges from it.
Not surprisingly, non-archivists have primarily approached the archives from a researcher’s perspective. As a result of what Ann Laura Stoler (2002; 2009) calls the “archival turn” in the humanities and social sciences that saw anthropologists, sociologists, cultural theorists and others, examine the archive as an object of study while using the archives as a resource, many of these non-archivists have tackled colonial archives as technologies and techniques of colonial regimes. That is, many researchers have come to examine the colonial archives as “artifacts of colonialism rather than simply the repositories where the data pertaining to the colonial past is stored” (Ballantyne, 2004, p. 31). Thus, colonial archives were—and in many ways continue to be—tied up in and integral to colonial knowledge production as far as colonial “knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it” (Dirks, 1996, p. ix). In addition to providing administrative support to colonial regimes, as the authorized repository of official documents colonial archives “bolstered the production of [colonial] states themselves” (Stoler, 2002, pp. 97-8) by bestowing colonial documents with objective authority despite the often-piecemeal way such documents were produced and the biases that underwrote them. Indeed, tied up in colonial-imperial panoptic fantasies in which agents of empire were imagined to produce a total archive where nothing is left out (Richards, 1993; Burton, 2003a; Arondekar, 2009) and the work of colonial administrators who dreamt “that world-mastery might come about through documentation” (Ballantyne, 2004, p. 24), colonial archivists’ everyday work reasserted the authority of colonial agents as authorities on the colonies by transforming colonial records—and not other documents or sources of knowledge—into trustworthy evidence.

Colonial archives are, of course, not simply the product of the colonizer. Colonial “archives were produced by the colonial state's ability to solicit Indigenous opinion, textualise traditions and compose detailed pictures of the Indigenous communities that were drawn into its ambit” (Ballantyne, 2004, p. 24). As part and parcel of various colonial projects to pacify Indigenous populations through coming to know as much about them as possible, knowledge produced from and with native informants carried out the epistemic violence of colonial regimes that worked to produce the colonized subject as a parasubject—or the European’s shadow—through modes of representation and inclusion that sublated (erased or subordinated) the difference of the colonial subject’s
alterity (Spivak, 1988). Through colonial archives, Indigenous subjects became known and subordinated in a way that re-affirmed the colonizer’s mode of knowledge production. As a result of such epistemic violence, the colonial archive is full of records that represent Indigenous traditions and customs within familiar Western knowledge frameworks while also characterizing Indigenous populations by their “lack” or as problems to be solved. As Gayatri C. Spivak (1985) argues, there are no unmediated colonized individuals residing in the colonial archives because the colonized subject often only appears in that archive when colonial administrators need that subject to appear and according to terms laid out by those administrators.

The archival turn has been productive in mapping out how colonial knowledge created the colony through the production and circulation of records. By tracing out the ways documenting colonial subjects silenced them and transformed them into subaltern para-subjects, this turn has also thought through the troubled work of recovering the silenced voices and sublated traces in the archives by reading against the grain. Further, through the archival turn researchers have gained some purchase on the role official—if not colonial—archives play in producing and securing disciplinary boundaries and hierarchical structures in academia (Burton, 2003a; Trouillot, 1995). Indeed, by critically evaluating the everyday positivist-inspired work of “mining” archives for facts and scientifically reading records, theorists are unraveling the psychic and material investments researchers have in archives as spaces where they can stake their claims to be legitimate academics through processes of objectifying records and fantasies that the past can be known—and historical subjects produced—from the proper reading of textual remnants (Freshwater, 2003).

However, as productive as this return to the archives has been, as Anjali Arondekar (2005, p. 10) argues, through the archival turn scholars have made the archive “the register of epistemic arrangements, recording in its proliferating avatars the shifting tenor of academic debates about the production and institutionalization of knowledge” to understand the politics of knowledge production: what we know and how we know it, and the ways certain modes of knowing become or do not become authorized. Even in cases where archives are more a metaphor than archival institutions, in very real ways the archival turn re-centres the very colonial institutions and modes of knowing that they
purport to challenge. This return to the archive—even a critical return—often ends up subordinating or marginalizing other modes of knowing and institutions, if not transforming an-archival sites into archival-like figures. To challenge the colonial and imperial relations of power that benefit from the valorized place of official archives in knowledge production, historian Antoinette Burton (2003a) and other researchers advocate working from sources gathered outside of official archives to produce knowledge about the past in addition to new modes of reading the archives. Without suggesting that all archives are basically the same or that all non-archival sources fall absolutely outside archival modes of knowledge production, looking to other sources nonetheless opens up new and unfamiliar ways of imagining knowledge, and introduces new authorities over knowledge production.

Challenging the authority of the colonial archives is nowhere more important than in the ongoing legal and moral battles Indigenous people in settler nations face to demand justice for past and ongoing wrongs and enforce their rights as Indigenous people. Even as colonial archives have become important sources or legal evidence of historical injustices, treaty violation and other acts of political violence, Indigenous scholars and allies have worked to critique the written bias that underwrites the authority of colonial archives and settler colonial law over and against oral modes of remembering and testimony and Indigenous legal principles. Canadian historian Adele Perry (2005a) argues that the privileged position of the written archival record as the most reliable record of the past over other modes of transmitting knowledge such as myth, songs, stories, and oral histories has less to do with the written records material qualities than it is the result of the long history of subordinating Aboriginal authority and worldviews to settler authority and capitalist relations so as to secure settler title and entitlement to stolen Native land. That is, the authority of written records is part and parcel of settler processes that delegitimize non-archival sources: often feminized, “private” sites of remembering and oral modes of transmission. In other words, the objectivity and reliability of archives in settler nations like Canada comes about through modes of comparison that figure non-archival sources as already too ephemeral and subjective. Decolonizing the written archives requires displacing settler investments in written
records, reading written records against the “written” grain, valorizing Indigenous modes of remembering, and recognizing the authority of Aboriginal remembrancers.

To a large extent, researchers caught up in the archival turn have ignored or, at best, only gestured towards the work archivists are doing to understand the archives as a place and set of processes of acquiring, conserving and making records available. Even though archivists’ critical approach to archives and archiving builds on an archivist-produced literature that pre-dates the most recent iteration of the archival turn that followed Jacques Derrida’s *Archive Fever* (1995), archivists have nonetheless become caught up in the archival turn. Indeed, according to archivist Joan Schwartz (2006, p. 8), archivists can benefit by taking up the archival turn as it offers

archivists perceptive insights into the workings of power, and prompt serious consideration of archives as spaces of power: spaces where the archives of the powerful reside; spaces where the power of the record is preserved; but more importantly and less well recognized, spaces where archivists and their institutions exercise power – power over what is and isn’t selected for permanent retention…; power over the way records are described and over the systems of description which privilege some information and some media, and marginalize others; power over what is copied, scanned, and made available on-line; power over the choice, content, and presentation of everything

and a model for critically assessing the archival profession.

Focusing on archiving and the archives as modes of communication that mediate what can be known through them (Nesmith, 1999; 2002), what became known as the “postmodern” camp in archival theory has done more than other strains of archival theory to interrogate the power relations that underwrite the work of archiving. Interrogating what Brien Brothman (1991, p. 82) calls the “orders of value” that shape how something is acquired, preserved and made available, postmodern archivists map out how these orders of value made some records archivable by relegating others to the garbage heap according to shifting configurations of social, cultural, political, economic and religious factors (Nesmith, 1999; Ketelaar, 2001). Critical of the modern, custodial record keeping model that hid—if not outright negated—the politics of archiving behind a custodial archivist imagined to be the passive filer of records (Harris, 2007), postmodern archival theorists accept that archivists produce archives by determining what will be archived and, thus, how it will be remembered, and that this affords
archivists with enormous amounts of power over social memory (Nesmith, 2002; Cook and Schwartz, 2002). For postmodern archivists the point is not to try to divest themselves of that power but, instead, work to orient the archivist’s power towards more democratic and socially just ends (Cook, 1997; 2001a; Carter, 2006).

As a “pervasive mindset” (Cook, 2001b, p. 19) of different approaches built on “situated knowledge, alterity, hybridity, liminality, and plurivocality” that recognizes the “Other” (Schwartz and Cook, 2002, p. 9), postmodern archival theories understand themselves as being more open to other forms of knowledge production than modern, custodial archiving. Terry Cook and Joan Schwartz (2002, p. 182) argue that postmodern theories provide archivists with “a new openness, a new visibility, a willingness to question and be questioned, a commitment to self-reflection and accountability” because it requires “archivists to accept their own historicity, to recognize their own role in the process of creating archives, and to reveal their own biases.” By valuing the “margins as much as the centres, the diverse and ambiguous as much as the certain and universal,” this pervasive mindset creates the basis for transgressive performances that create spaces for new archival practices and theories (Cook and Schwartz, 2002, pp. 178-9). Open to working with communities—especially marginalized communities—to better archive their records and, thus, counter the likelihood that archivists will further marginalize these others by misrepresenting them and their archives, what can be called postmodern hospitality calls on archivists to share the archives with others in the work of developing these transgressive archival performances (Ridener, 2009; Carter, 2006). Thus, while Derrida, Michel Foucault, and other academics are identified as the intellectual touchstones for producing postmodern archival theories, new archival practices and theories are meant to also arise out of the relationships postmodern archivists form with marginalized others.

Despite its turn to the Other, marginalized others and otherness, colonial archives and the problems of colonial knowledge production have not been central to postmodern archivists’ interrogations of modern, custodial archiving on the whole. Loosely associated with the postmodern camp, archivist Jeannette Allias Bastian (2006) argues that because archivists are inheritors and promoters—intentionally or not—of a colonial world, archival practices and theories are not neutral but participate in a continuing colonial
order of things. Echoing postcolonial non-archivist scholars, Bastian argues that the problem of the colonial archive concerns its role in producing silences: absences and absent presences. Even though the records produced by the colonial state often excluded and marginalized colonized subjects, Bastian is concerned that contemporary archival practices and theories are intensifying these silences. While archivists should seek “to confront the documentary imbalance” by including more diverse groups of record producers in their archives, Bastian (2006, p. 268) argues they must also treat records “as obstacles to be overcome, predicaments to be resolved and mazes to be negotiated rather than sources of enlightenment and memory” if archivists are to tackle the problems of colonial archival silences.

Even though archives have become important sources for revealing the historical injustices inflicted upon Indigenous populations by colonizers, as well as important sources for memory-work carried out by Indigenous peoples and other marginalized communities, archivists working to decolonize archival discourses and the work of archiving continue to work to displace the written bias that valorizes archival records in bringing about justice and remembering the past. To do this decolonizing work, many archivists deploy the distinction between oral and written records in order to frame the violence of the colonial archives on Indigenous communities as the marginalization and destruction of Aboriginal oral modes of remembering and communicating as part of the work of subordinating Indigenous populations to colonial rule. However, even as they trace out the long history of systematic attacks on Aboriginal sovereignty and modes of knowledge production by imperial and colonial authorities, archivists working to decolonize archives and archival discourses nonetheless argue that Indigenous oral modes of remembering have not disappeared. In this way, decolonizing archives and archival discourses requires that archivists acknowledge the colonial violence that continues to reduce modern memory to archival, written records while also building on the oral, Indigenous traditions that persist. As New Zealand archivist Evelyn Wareham (2002, p. 198) argues, renegotiating “memory, both oral and written, is a core aspect” of decolonization and re-empowering Indigenous communities.

Decolonizing archives and archival theory, then, means troubling the written bias by developing what Bastian (2013, p. 124) calls a postcolonial approach to archiving
“that privileges a myriad of voices and expressions, both textual and non-textual.” While turning to the non-textual memories that persist in colonized communities can be a way of filling in what is often perceived as an absence in the records concerning colonized populations, postcolonial approaches to archiving that attend to stories, myths and so on are concerned less with filling in gaps in the archives than in critically re-imagining archival theory. Indeed, postcolonial approaches to archiving are not limited to instances when archivists are faced with non-textual records or written records that reference Aboriginal communities but, instead, calls on archivists to take up Indigenous “oral” rules and frameworks to archive all records. Even though adopting Indigenous modes of archiving may seem to be only one of the “myriad of voices and expressions” available to archivists, doing so is part and parcel of larger projects to change the legal, political and professional structures that marginalize Indigenous communities through archives. In settler nations, postcolonial archiving has the potential to open up archives and archiving to the authority of Indigenous title and entitlement to the archives (Wareham, 2001; McRanor, 1997; McKemmish et al, 2011).

Respecting and mobilizing Indigenous oral criteria for acquiring, preserving and providing access to records is difficult because such criteria are complex in that they are not “necessarily fixed and immutable or uniform across all Aboriginal groups” (Berzins, 1991, p. 201). Instead, definitions and rules of access change and differ across Aboriginal groups. However, turning to non-textual modes of archiving poses other theoretical problems because what constitutes oral modes of communication is in numerous ways the product of colonial administrations. Indeed, it is because the relationship between oral and written modes of transmission remain caught up in the Eurocentric distinctions between oral and literate mentalities that Sue McKemmish, Shannon Faulkhead and Lynette Russell (2011, p. 226) argue that the work of decolonizing archival discourses and theories require that archivists not simply turn to oral sources but also challenge “the linked dichotomies of orality–literacy, myth–history, savagery–civilisation and tradition–modernity, and the consequent positioning of Indigenous voices and narratives as inferior.” If decolonizing archival theory means taking up postcolonial approaches to archiving, postcolonial archivists must also put the very terms and categories they draw on to orient their work: oral and written; and textual and non-textual, under critique.
Arising in the agonistic place of working with marginalized communities as well as taking up “non-Western” traditions and discourses, this critique of familiar terms and categories will also challenge the archivist’s authority over the archives and colonial forms of hospitality.

My approach to archival theory takes up this task of decolonizing archival discourses by considering the problem of archival theory as a problem related first and foremost to the coloniality of modernity. As Walter Mignolo (1993; 2000; 2001; 2002a; 2002b), Samir Amin (1989), Anibal Quijano (2000), Enrique Dussel (1993; 1995; 1998) and others argue, modernity is colonial. Colonialism was not a side issue happening in the colonies while modernity proper was born and shaped in Europe. Indeed, modernity is neither a product of an isolated Europe nor is modern thought the result of European Enlightenment thinkers talking amongst themselves. Instead, modernity was a way of thinking the world that emerged after and because of the events of 1492 in which the world became global in scope. The modern world is the product of a global economy in which ideas, peoples and materials circulate. Modern circulations are new not simply because of their scope but also because it was within these circulations that new types of peoples (“Amerindians,” slaves and “free” labourers), ideas (natural law, freedom and unfreedoms) and materials (commodities and “New World” resources) emerged and changed.

Forged through colonial experiments, the modern world is run through with what Quijano (2000) calls a coloniality of power that organized capitalist relations along ethno-racial lines while, at the same time, obfuscating those lines. On the one hand, then, because of the coloniality of power, the modern-colonial world has at its base what Partha Chatterjee (1993) and Mignolo (2000; 2001; 2002a, 2002b) call “colonial difference” that racializes of difference between colonizer and colonized. Underwriting colonial law, legislation, and discourses, colonial difference secured the colonizer’s superiority and legitimated the physical and epistemic violence of colonialism bent on transforming the colonies into productive and ordered spaces. On the other hand, coloniality of power deploys Eurocentric narratives that figure modernity as the product of a discrete Europe and European culture so as to deny or obfuscate colonial difference and the global circulations in which the modern world was created. In other words,
Eurocentric narratives represent Europe as the sole author of modernity and, thus, imagines Europe developed the modern ways of knowing the world all by itself. By denying the global scope of modernity, Eurocentric knowledge production denies that colonial violence is the product of modern, liberal political economies but, instead, lays such violence at the feet of deviant persons or theories. As such, Eurocentrism continues to hide the colonial difference that informs economic, political and social relations while making Europe and European culture the standard against which modern societies and institutions can be evaluated.

Against these Eurocentric narratives, Mignolo (2001, p. 28) argues that the “imaginary of the modern/colonial world arose from the complex articulation of forces, of voices heard or silenced, of memories compact or fractured.” In other words, Eurocentric narratives “suppress other memories” of modernity (Ibid). However, as opposed to imagining that these other memories arose from and continue to exist within spaces outside the coloniality of power, Mignolo (2000; 2001) argues that these other memories represent subaltern rationalities that arise out of a double consciousness that apprehends the colonial difference of the modern world that gave rise to it. As such, what Mignolo calls subaltern rationalities are neither essential ways of being that preceded colonialism, nor ways of knowing that existed outside the Eurocentric frameworks of modern reason. As Ranjit Guha (1982. p. vi) writes, because “subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of the ruling groups,” subaltern groups come to inhabit the world in tension with a modern world produced by elite discourses. While colonial subaltern groups may draw on pre-colonial or Indigenous knowledge to organize themselves, colonial subaltern reason is always caught up in the Eurocentric discourses and projects of modernity. As such, subaltern reason exists in a position of exteriority to Eurocentric, modern reason in which “exteriority doesn’t mean the ‘outside’ or to function free of the Eurocentric “set of terms that function as a reference point” for understanding modernity (Mignolo, 2002b, p. 947). If Eurocentrism provides the “interior” of modern world imaginary, this exterior, subaltern position is not free of colonial discourses or the coloniality of power but, instead, constituted through them even as they also exceed Eurocentric discourses (Mignolo, 2001).
By being in a position of exteriority to—but not outside—the colonial-imperial system and its self-justifying Eurocentric logic, subaltern rationalities are “the location of the emergence of epistemologies...that do not overthrow existing ones but that build on the ground of the silence of history” (Mignolo, 2002a, p. 67). Subaltern rationalities are not, then, the recovery of a preexisting consciousness, but the negotiation of subaltern subject-effects (Spivak 1998). In other words, there is no concrete subaltern archive to mine for the truth of what happened. As opposed to being in a position occupied by a particular subject who then speaks the truth about colonial violence, these positions of exteriority are loci of enunciation where the imaginary and physical violence of colonial-imperialism—or what Mignolo (2002a, p. 67) calls the “densities of the colonial experience”—become the starting point for thinking the colonial/modern world.¹¹

There are, then, different spaces of enunciation within the modern/colonial world to critique modernity: inside positions and also positions of exteriority that negotiate the modern world through subaltern rationalities. For Mignolo, postcolonial theorizing¹² emerges at the exteriority of the modern/colonial world while postmodern theory speaks from the inside and, thus, at “the limits of the hegemonic narratives of Western history” (2000, p. 89). By theorizing from the inside edge of Eurocentric modern theory—a position that critically self-reflects on the modern world without breaking its Eurocentric borders—postmodern theorists are not necessarily silent on the colonial history of modernity. However, postmodern engagements with colonialism continue to separate modernity from colonialism such that colonialism is something that can be dealt with without interrogating the colonial difference that continues to underwrite social, economic and political relations. In contrast, postcolonial “theorizing as a particular enactment of the subaltern reason coexists with colonialism itself as a constant move and force towards autonomy and liberation in every order of life, from economy to religion, from language to education, from memories to spatial order, and it is not limited to the academy” (Ibid, p. 93). Postcolonial theorizing does not simply try to recognize subaltern groups but, instead, challenges and dismantles the coloniality of power that subalternizes them so as to work towards building better futures.

By starting with the modern/colonial world as the basis for figuring colonial relations, my dissertation marks the Eurocentric frameworks that organize archival theory.
so as to displace such frameworks in order to create spaces of exteriority within archival theory. Given the breadth and scope of archival studies, looking at all the various strains of archival theory is beyond the scope of any one project. To focus my analysis, but also work to build transgressive archival performances that challenge Eurocentric archival frameworks, my dissertation is primarily interested in opening up spaces of exteriority through postmodern archival theories.

Orienting my work through postmodern archival theories may seem contradictory given what Mignolo argues about postmodern thinking in general. By no means an exception to Mignolo’s general critique, postmodern archivists’ transgressive archival performances largely continue to repeat Eurocentric geographical and historical biases. However, as opposed to writing postmodern archival theories off in the hopes of finding a more radical theory within archival studies, in this dissertation I will push postmodern archival theories towards the exteriority of Eurocentric theoretical frameworks. As part of the work of decolonizing archival discourses, my aim is to open up postmodern archival theories to radical and unruly notions of otherness that arise out of and contest the violence of the modern/colonial world so as to cultivate subaltern rationalities within archival theory. So as to create transgressive archival performances that function as instances of postcolonial archival theorizing, the following chapters tackle the Eurocentric imaginative geography of modern archives, the problems a “kidnapped” Greece poses to decolonizing oral and written modes of remembering as well as etymologies of the word “archive,” and the problems of liberal-settler politics for feeling good and bad in and through the settler nation’s archives.

The problem of settler colonialism and settler nationalism for decolonizing archival theory plays a big part in this dissertation. This is not because settler colonialism and settler nationalism are an effect of Eurocentrism per se, but are instead two of the many ideological frameworks through which Eurocentric knowledge production manifests. Instead, there are two reasons I turn to settler colonialism and nationalism throughout this dissertation to interrogate the Eurocentric archival knowledge production that informs the production of archival theory. First, doing so allows me to situate the postmodern archival theories coming out of settler nations—primarily Australia and Canada—so as to understand who and what benefits from reiterating Eurocentric archival
frameworks. While settler nations are by no means the point of origin for postmodern archiving, because archivists located in settler nations have been instrumental in fleshing out the parameters of postmodern archival theories through their publications, conference presentations and lectures, taking up the problematics of settler nationalism will allow me to map out the way postmodern archival theories reiterate and trouble Eurocentric and settler frameworks.\textsuperscript{13} Second, because it is within Canada’s continuing settler relations that the privileges I enjoy as a white, male academic are secured, interrogating Canadian settler nationalism is also a means of contextualizing my own approach to colonialism and colonial archives.

While a number of archivists have pointed to the political, economic and social inequalities that mark settler nations like Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the systemic nature of settler colonial violence in producing these inequalities have not been spelled out at length in the English-Language archival literature. So as to understand the way settler colonialism and settler nationalism encourage Eurocentric frameworks of knowledge production and otherwise re-colonize relations in and through archives, it is necessary here to outline the ways settler colonial violence organize and re-organize social relations.

Settler colonial and settler national relations are produced and organized through settler colonial violence. Like colonial violence, settler colonial violence is both psychic and physical and organized around shifting notions of racialized difference.\textsuperscript{14} However, whereas colonialism is a relationship between colonizer and colonized in which the colonizer suppresses and subordinates the colonized, settler colonialism is a triangular relationship between settlers, indigenous populations and the metropole. In this relationship, settlers both identify with and differentiate themselves from the imperial metropole while also desiring the erasure of the Indigenous subject so as to present themselves as heir to both European civilization and to Aboriginal land (Veracini, 2010a; Wolfe, 1999). In this triangular relationship, settlers ambivalently imagine themselves as having a doubled or split authenticity: both metropolitan and native while also being neither European nor Aboriginal (Johnston & Lawson, 2000).\textsuperscript{15} Settler colonial violence is particular, then, in that it works to secure settler title and entitlement to Aboriginal land by both denying the existence of any Indigenous sovereignty that would otherwise
compromise settler title, and also disavowing the acts of theft and violence by which settlers gain and secure title because acknowledging such acts would undermine the settler’s entitlement to the land that allows them to become native (Veracini, 2010a; Lawrence, 2002; Johnston and Lawson, 2000). As in other colonial contexts, settler social relations are historically contingent, and shaped by resistance to settler politics as much as organized through coordinated state and civil projects of dispossession (Dua, 1999; Burton, 1999; Perry, 2005b). The relationships between Aboriginal and settler communities constantly change, with the lines between these communities being both hard and fast and also flexible. The changing parameters of Aboriginal and settler, and the flexibility of the categories, do not necessarily displace settler colonial violence or the settler title and entitlement it works to secure. If, as Patrick Wolfe (1999) argues, that settler colonialism is a structure bent on the elimination of Indigenous populations by various means, this structure is run through with contradictions that do not negate the settler colonial order of things but, instead, make it tenuous and always in need of being re-secured. Settler colonial violence and its disavowal are, then, ongoing events that work to both restore settler colonial order and reorganize existing settler colonial relations to shore up what are perceived as cracks, inefficiencies or blind sides in the structure. Thus, while settler order is always under threat from a world that fails to conform to the desires of settler colonialists and nationalists, it is also being troubled by the very repetition—and the differences such repetition introduces—of restoring that order. That is, new acts of settler colonial violence often trouble existing settler relations even as this violence works to re-secure settler title and entitlement.

The dispossession and transformation of Indigenous lands into settler property occurs through legal, social and political processes must be maintained and defended over and over again through an aggregate of policies, laws and legislation that work together even as they fail to cohere into a totalizing system. As such, settler colonial violence in Canada involves the making and breaking of the treaties made between the Crown and Aboriginal nations as well as the unilateral interpretation of treaties by settler governments, government expropriation of land and reserve systems, legal and legislative structures such as the Indian Act that regulates Indigenous populations through forms of
“status,” the Indian Residential School system, and the everyday violence that denigrates and marginalizes Indigenous populations. While the contradictions and holes within this aggregate create possible avenues for change and resistance, this does not mitigate the effects of settler colonial violence on Indigenous peoples. Indeed, these avenues usually lead Aboriginal peoples and their allies to reinvest the very legal, legislative and civil frameworks that work to negate Indigenous title and authority (Smith, 2012). Thus, even though settler national frameworks are met with resistance, there is no one fatal flaw within settler nationalism that can be exploited that will decolonize the settler nation. Decolonizing settler society requires new frameworks that recognize and build on Indigenous title and entitlement.

Aligning itself with European metropoles and investing in Eurocentric narratives of modernity, the settler nation imagines itself as a modern nation through their European heritage. Allowing settler nations and nation-states to deny colonial violence or dismiss it as a minor thread in its history, Eurocentric attachments to modernity allow countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. to present themselves as fair and equitable societies based on liberal values of equality before the law and responsible governance. Thus, even when politicians and civic leaders acknowledge settler violence (often because it can no longer be ignored), liberal-settler politics positions liberal institutions and values as the proper means of addressing it. As opposed to decolonizing settler society, these liberal narratives cover over what Himani Bannerji (2001, p. 75) calls “colonial heart” of settler-liberal democracies like Canada in which the formal equality enjoyed by Canadian citizens is produced in tandem with continuing colonial projects of racist exclusion organized around the Indian Act and other laws and legislation governing Aboriginal people in Canada. While certain strands of conservatism within Canada continue to deny settler violence altogether, liberal-settler politics negates the possibility of decolonizing settler society even as it addresses the legacies of colonial violence.

Settler nations like Canada are, of course, not populated with only “white” European-born settlers and Indigenous populations. Drawing white and “non-white” immigrants from various colonies of Britain’s empire, colonialism’s economic and social imperatives produced differentiated British and Indigenous population through migration and inter-racial marriages. However, as Canada and other British colonies were
transformed from colonies organized around resource extraction to settler colonies, settler colonial policies and discourses sought to remove or negate any difference to produce the image of homogeneous settler and Indigenous populations (Mar & Edmonds, 2010; Perry, 2005b; Dua, 1999). With moral and cultural notions of Europeanness-as-whiteness underwriting liberalism and citizenship in settler countries like Canada and Australia, whiteness differentiates how settlers belong to the settler nation (Thobani, 2007; Bannerji, 2000; Veracini, 2010a).

Even though settler nations depended upon non-white immigrant labour to build and settle the country, the histories of settler nations like Canada and Australia are replete with instances of state sanctioned and unsanctioned acts of violence against racialized, non-Indigenous communities so as to secure white economic, political, and cultural supremacy. Since Confederation, the Canadian state has enforced a number of racist immigration policies towards non-European, Jewish and “non-white” European immigrants, and developed discriminatory work visa programs to manage and minimize a non-white presence. Denying the role of Indigenous and non-white settler populations in nation building, the whiteness of settler identity in Canada works to absent these communities from Canadian history and erase the violent acts carried out by the nation-state against these communities (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Bannerji, 2000).

As opposed to being undone multiculturalism, liberal multicultural discourses of tolerance and diversity, as well as policies encouraging the consumption of cultural difference, manage and preserve this whiteness in settler countries like Canada and Australia that have official multicultural policies and programs. While multiculturalism does challenge previous liberal programs of assimilation and creates space for “hyphenated,” ethnic communities, multiculturalism nonetheless re-creates a white, settler monoculture as the core values from which the difference of Indigenous and hyphenated communities are measured and judged (Bannerji, 2000; Mackey, 2002; Povinelli, 2002). As Sunera Thobani (2007, p. 29) puts it, “underneath the sanitized garb of a postmodern, multiracial, multiethnic ‘tolerant’ Canada, beats the heart of a stubbornly colonial national-formation, sharing a common imaginary with other white settler societies.”
Despite this ideology of whiteness, settler subjects are never exclusively the white, European subjects that racist nationalist projects in Canada and other settler nations invoke and desire. With the ongoing settlement of Indigenous lands in Canada done by both “white people or people of color” (Lawrence & Dua, 2005, p. 135-6), settler colonies were always hybrid spaces that confound “the most strident of settler rhetoric on racial purity” (Mar & Edmonds, 2010, p. 4). While the whiteness underwriting the national imaginary may cast non-white immigrants as “late arrivals” (Razack, 2002, p. 3) and actively curtail the possibility of many non-white immigrants and citizens attaining the level of material wealth and physical well-being enjoyed by white Canadians, the discrimination and racist violence experienced by non-white non-Aboriginal populations does not exclude them from being—or desiring to become—settlers. That is, although marginalized within racialized discourses of national belonging, non-white migrants and citizens become “settlers of colour” by identifying with the settler nation (Thobani, 2007). As settlers of colour, non-white subjects do not identify—or have trouble identifying—with the oppressive experience of Aboriginal populations even when these migrants themselves come from formerly colonized populations and face white settler racism (Ibid). As settler subjects, non-white migrants and citizens do not see their marginalization within the settler-national body and the violence of dispossession as two sides to the same coin of managing the settler nation. Indeed, settlers of colour imagine a better life for themselves—and attempt to build that life—at the expense of Indigenous sovereignty, equality, and the socially just distribution of resources.

It is within this ongoing economy of settler colonial violence and its disavowal that settler and Indigenous subjects are produced and, thus, it is through settler colonial violence that settler subjects come to feel different from Indigenous subjects. As such, it is through settler colonial violence that settlers come to feel close to and at a distance from Aboriginal people regardless of physical proximity. It is through settler colonial violence and its denial that people become friends, lovers and enemies. It is, then, within the imagined spaces of the nation produced by ongoing settler violence and its denial that settlers come to feel at home in Canada and feel in charge of the country as Canadians.
As a form of hospitality, settler colonial violence transforms settlers into hosts and Indigenous subjects into guests. Within this settler colonial hospitality, settlers-as-hosts not only set the rules of their house—the settler nation, state and the land—but also feel entitled doing so. And having disavowed the violence that might otherwise delegitimize their authority as host, settlers can come to feel entitled to speak for Indigenous peoples—often declaring Indigenous authorities unable or unfit to speak for themselves. At the same time, as the whiteness underwriting the settler nation differentiates settler subjects so as to normalize white settler subjects and values, non-white non-Indigenous subjects and communities remain as guests in the white settler nation. Thus, even as they are called to join the white settler as host of the settler society, ideologies of whiteness transform non-white settlers into “late arrivals” who, over and over again, must be managed by white hosts.

While framing settler nations like Canada and Australia as the ongoing development of unequal settler-Indigenous relations, examining settler relations does not reduce difference to an opposition between homogeneous settler and Aboriginal populations. Instead, taking up settler colonial violence requires paying attention to the way differential settler and Indigenous populations are produced. Further, examining settler nations like Canada and Australia as being underwritten by settler colonial violence emphasizes the systemic nature of such violence, the way it permeates government and civil institutions, and the way it informs interpersonal relations. Taking up the way settler colonial violence continues to permeate archives troubles liberal narratives that relegate colonial violence to the past or juxtapose the liberal values behind archiving to settler colonialism. Further, focusing on settler colonialism as a dominant mode of organizing relations in settler nations interrupts the move to separate, if not juxtapose, immigrant and Indigenous issues and demands on settler archives. Importantly, taking up settler colonial violence requires that archivists interrogate archival theory and practices by how they extend and frustrate settler title and entitlement.

By taking up settler colonial violence as a problem for thinking through Canadian archives and archiving, I am also trying to trouble the way “context” is reduced to fit into the nation-sized boxes that archives and archiving are usually examined through. That is,
by viewing Canadian archives and archiving through the lens of settler colonial violence, I work to critique the national imaginative geographies that often negate the colonial-imperial circulations in which knowledge is produced (Ballantyne, 2005) by directing archivists to look at how Canada’s archival theory and practice is produced in the circulation of peoples, ideas and objects between settler nation-states as opposed to on Canadian soil. By working to unsettle Canada’s archival community by moving archivists towards a critical examination of the transnational, neo-colonial economies of colonial difference through which settlers become doubled in Canada, this work of unsettling also has the potential to open up what Mignolo calls positions of exteriority to the dominant forms of Eurocentric knowledge production that organize modern and postmodern archival theories.

The aim of my dissertation is to propose modes of archival knowledge production that trouble, if not displace, the Eurocentric and settler frameworks that continue to inform the work of archiving and archival research so as to further decolonize archives and archival theory. To do this work, each chapter takes up a different archival object or concept to show how Eurocentric and settler frameworks permeate its construction by archivists and researchers so as to re-think archival theory through subaltern rationalities that situate these objects and concepts within modern/colonial geographies and histories. By thinking through these subaltern rationalities, my dissertation will open up spaces for doing what can be called, following Mignolo, postcolonial archival theorizing.

**How I got to where I began**

I entered my PhD program in Social and Political Thought at York University in 2006 with the intention of writing about Canada’s National Archives—which in 2004 had been rechristened Library and Archives Canada (LAC)—to map out the role of the archives in building the settler nation and nation-state. I was interested in how archival policies, modes of archiving and the work of archivists were shaped by racist, settler colonial frameworks that legitimated white, settler title and entitlement to Aboriginal land and authorized the differential treatment of settlers of colour, not to mention how these policies, modes of archiving and the work of archivists inform and shape these settler frameworks. Like many dissertation projects, it was ambitious and too broad in scope.
Nonetheless, with this project in mind, I made numerous trips to Ottawa, Ontario where LAC is situated to look over the “National Archives of Canada” fonds (RG37, reference number R1185-01-E), its numerous subseries (Dominion Archivist, Public Archivist, etc.) and the personal fonds of as many of the previous Dominion, Public and National Archivists that were open to the public. I went through copious boxes, wrote numerous notes and took hundreds of pictures of files with my digital camera. While some of this research was exploratory just to see what was there and familiarize myself with archival research, there were two things in particular I was wanting to do: first, track the way the National Archives managed records pertaining to and produced by Aboriginal peoples, and second, how the National Archives managed records pertaining to what were called Ethnic or Multicultural Archives. In addition to these trips to the archives, I filed Access To Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests for Record Disposition Authorities, Institution Disposition Authority or Multi-Institution Disposition Authority pertaining to the "National Archives of Canada" and "Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development" fonds, memos and other non-public documents pertaining to the creation and ongoing development of LAC’s “Multicultural Resources and Services” and “Aboriginal Resources and Services.”

Perhaps all this sounds manageable to those disciplinary thinkers reading this dissertation. However, to the ultimate downfall of my archival research, I went about my research from obtuse angles as I tried to incorporate the various critiques to archival research coming from the “archival turn” that I was only then being introduced to in a graduate seminar led by the late feminist scholar, Barbara Godard. Therefore, when I entered the archives to read what the National Archives had to say about itself, I was conscious—perhaps too conscious—of the problems associated with mining the archives for hidden truths. That is, I was aware of my own desires to uncover that yet unknown “thing” in the archives that would make me a legitimate academic and archival researcher, and hopefully discover those tasty details that would allow me to write a dissertation someone may actually want to read. I was conscious of the way this ambivalent archival economy of mining transformed records and the archives into objective, inert things while also investing them with longing and dreams of making them
I was aware how this approach to archival research supported an academic regime that was, in itself, a colonial inheritance.\textsuperscript{31}

I was also acutely aware of the limitations of the national framework I was reproducing to map out the National Archives role in Canadian settler nationalism by taking the records in the LAC as the story of what happened “here” instead of seeing the records being produced within shifting colonial-imperial circulations. To trouble this nationalist framework and to better map out the role the National Archives played in late nineteenth and early twentieth century British and French imperialism, not to mention Canada’s own imperial efforts,\textsuperscript{32} I specifically sought out the correspondences produced and received by archivists because these records seemed to me to represent records that were more clearly records produced or sent elsewhere and, thus, represented the international and transnational circles the National Archives and its employees circulated in. I paid attention to the trips archivists took abroad\textsuperscript{33} and when the Archives hosted and trained foreign archivists.\textsuperscript{34} I went through the records of the National Archive’s London and Paris offices because they documented Canada’s archivists overseas. In these letters outlining what was to be shipped to Ottawa from Europe and the business of running an overseas office through the High Commission, I became enthralled in the labour disputes between employees struggling to make ends meet in post-WWI London and Paris and the tight fisted Public Archivist of Canada Sir Arthur George Doughty.\textsuperscript{35}

Although I was by no means carrying out an institutional ethnography of LAC, it was important to situate my research within the space of the archives and how it was created and maintained. To do this, I realized I needed to look further a field than what archivists and researchers did and wrote. Looking around at all the researchers in the reading room, archivists with whom I turned to for assistance, but also other administrative staff, the cafeteria staff, security guards and the custodial staff I saw or talked with, my interest in the work of archiving led me to look more broadly at all the labour involved in archiving and to look up records that might speak to this broad definition of archival labour.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, this approach seemed increasingly poignant as the then current National Librarian and Archivist of Canada, Daniel J. Caron, worked to carry out the Conservative government’s austerity measures by realigning departments,
reducing the archives’ workforce and hiring contract workers, and “modernizing” archival access and collections by putting them online.³⁷

My archival labours produced a few interesting things. For instance, in searching out records on the National Archive’s security, I came across the reports and memos of W.O. Hough who, in his role as “Departmental Security and Emergency Measures Officer” in the late 1970s, not only tried to ensure patrons were not walking off with records but also drafted protocols that would prepare staff in case the National Archives came under attack from “insurgent groups,” labour demonstrators, Maoists and other dissident groups.³⁸ In addition to looking at the plans for the various archives buildings, I also requested photos depicting the construction of the present building at 395 Wellington St. that, to my pleasure, showed construction and maintenance crews. As a catalogue of the modernness of the new building, the pictures also showcased all the amenities of the building such as its state of the art boiler room, ventilation and climate control system. I was also pleased to find pictures of the building’s well-attended opening in 1967, what looks like the flooding of some storage facility, and of archivists’ trips abroad. However, I was also surprised when I came across pictures of beauty pageant contestants and winners from the “Public Archives and National Library Queen” competition in the early 1970s.³⁹ There was and continue to be a lot of different economies of labour going on within Canada’s National Archives.

As my own archival labours created a trail of notes, pictures and emails, I was also beginning to make a sizeable dent in to the archival literature that would help me understand how archives worked and all the archive related terminology I was coming across in the records. Starting with articles concerned with Aboriginal and “Multicultural” records and archiving, I moved in increasingly wider circles to understand the more technical aspects of the archiving world. As I pestered friends and friends of friends who had degrees in archival studies and information management, and attended conferences and talks at University of Toronto’s iSchool to gain some purchase on the work of archivists, I also began to work my way through Archivaria and other journals in which Canadian archivists published such as The American Archivist, Archives and Manuscripts, Archifacts, and the long defunct The Canadian Archivist.
From there, I moved to more regional publications like *Archival Issues*, as well as the international publication *Archival Science*.

I had already strayed upon some of these publications through Barbara’s course where we read archivists Verne Harris and Peter Horsman alongside Derrida, Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Stoler and others involved in the archival turn. The more I read, the more I became interested in the debates concerning the meaning and deployment of archival concepts such as *provenance* and original order. Even as I was disappointed to find that, until recently, there is comparatively little in these publications on issues concerning Aboriginal peoples, Indigenous archiving and Multiculturalism in archives, these debates and others showed the breadth of the field and the relative openness of the profession to take up the unequal power relations that have come to shape the National Archives and Canadian archiving. My view that archivists were a very professional—as opposed to academic or theoretical—discipline within academia was further dispelled as I read through Hugh Taylor’s essays and, from there, strayed onto “postmodernists” such as Joan Schwartz, Heather MacNeil, Sue McKemmish, Eric Ketelaar and, of course, the late Terry Cook. Indeed, it is out of appreciation for Terry’s work as a whole and the influence of his ideas on other archivists that he is a prominent touchstone—if not starting point for my examinations—in the following chapters. The analyses I make—especially in those sections that critically take up his and other postmodernist’s works—developed having benefited as much from Terry Cook’s spirit of critique as from his ideas. I join many in Canada’s archival community and abroad who are saddened by his death in May 2014, and can appreciate the void his death leaves in that community.

By the time I was shoulder deep into archival journals, monographs, collections, compendiums, and *festschriften* to map out how archivists—particularly English-Language archivists—were talking about themselves and colonialism, it became increasingly clear that I had two projects: one concerning archival theory and the other built on my archival research. For better or worse, I put aside the archival research with the expectation of returning to it once this dissertation was complete.
Where are we going from here and why

My dissertation has much to offer non-archivists and archivists. For starters, unlike other researchers caught up in the archival turn that have largely ignored archivists or relegated them to the footnotes, I take up archival studies and what archivists have to say about the archives as the basis for understanding archives as sites of knowledge production. As such, this dissertation is one of a few—if not the first—book-length examination of what archivists have written outside archival studies and, thus, will provide insight to those scholars who use archives for their research into how the work of archivists affects what those disciplines produce in and through the archives.

However, at best my dissertation remains on the edges of archival studies. For one thing, while my dissertation works through theories and theorists of modernity, Eurocentrism and settler colonialism that archivists have yet to take up, and offer new readings of theories and theorists more or less familiar to archivists, I do not attempt to translate these theories into archival practices. Instead, by reading archival theory as a series of overlapping concepts and assumptions that shape, and are shaped, by archivists’ various political orientations, I treat archival studies more or less as an object of study. Given the view among some North American archivists that archival theory is, as John W. Roberts (1987) quipped, “much ado about shelving,” I am sure my reading of archives and archiving will be welcome by some archivists but not all.

Nonetheless, my dissertation contributes to the field of archival studies by providing interpretations of a few concepts: memory, orality, literacy, oral, written, modern archives, and so on, that will reorient ongoing conversations between archivists. Also, I introduce critiques of liberal-settler colonialism and Eurocentrism that have, as of yet, had little play in archival discourses. While I do not much take up “non-Western” archival concepts and theories, I hope my interventions into the Eurocentric and settler frameworks that continue to inform archiving and archives will benefit archivists who are doing the work of translating and deploying non-Western—particularly Indigenous—concepts and frameworks by pushing these archivists to be critical of the Eurocentric and liberal-settler frameworks that continue to inform their work and goals. Because the point of my dissertation is to provide further direction for decolonizing archival theory, I make no apologies if this direction calls on archivists to risk a lot. Decolonization requires that
archivists give up a lot and, perhaps, risk doing damage to the theories and institutions they have inherited so as to open up these theories and institutions to different and more just futures.

To do this work of decolonizing archival theory, each chapter takes up a different object or concept that organizes the way archivists view the world within Eurocentric and/or settler frameworks. Concerned with how histories of archiving continue to negate or marginalize the non-European world as sites for producing modern archives and modern archival theory, Chapter One tackles the Eurocentric imaginative geographies underwriting what Samir Amin (1989, pp. 10-1) calls the mythic construct or image of Europe. These Eurocentric imaginative geographies remove nineteenth Europe and its archives from the colonial-imperial circulations in which “European” ideas, peoples and goods circulated so as to make Europe the lone author of the modern archival world. Focusing on France’s modern archival system, in this chapter I map out how this mythic Europe materializes in historicist narratives as well as critical histories and postmodern “radical historicizations” to negate the colonial difference that permeates French and European modern archiving. To displace this mythic image, the last section of Chapter One resituates modern archiving within the modern/colonial circulations within and between metropoles and colonies to push archivists to develop subaltern imaginative geographies that can account for the unfreedoms that that contemporary archiving have inherited from France’s modern archival system and nineteenth century liberal politics.

In Chapter Two, I turn my attention to the way archivists frame colonialism and tackle the violence of colonial archives, and also provide archivists with ways of overcoming such violence, by distinguishing between oral and literate ways of being, and also between oral and written modes of communicating the past. Taking up the task of decolonizing archival discourses and theories by challenging what archivists Sue McKemmish et al (2011, p. 226) call “the linked dichotomies of orality–literacy, myth–history, savagery–civilisation and tradition–modernity, and the consequent positioning of Indigenous voices and narratives as inferior,” this chapter tackles what I call the Eurocentric promise of postliterate archiving that allows archivists to imagine they have transcended colonial relations while allowing the neocolonial status quo to shape the post-colonial archival world. To do this, I first map out how this promise arises out of the
analytic distinctions between oral and literate ways of being that deny the colonial
difference of the modern world and reduces colonialism to an effect of a literate mindset
that ultimately began with the Greeks and “alphabetic” thinking. While hailed as both the
heir and radical transformer of the West’s and archivists literate thinking, I show that
postliterate archiving continues to imagine oral Indigenous communities as inferior and
ultimately outside the post-colonial future wrought by postliteracy. The second section of
this chapter maps out how a historical analysis of the rules that govern oral and written
modes of communication that begin the work of decolonizing archival discourses by
moving towards the power relations that underwrite the relationship between Indigenous
(oral) and settler (written) modes of transmitting the past. However, by showing how the
promise of postliteracy continues to circulate within Laura Millar’s (2006a) history of the
“blending” of oral Indigenous and written settler traditions in Canada—a history that
marginalizes settler colonial violence in Canada—I argue that archivists need to
challenge liberal-settler politics to continue the work of decolonizing archival discourses.

Continuing to tackle the problem of imagining archives through a Eurocentric
imaginative geography that Enrique Dussel (2000, p. 467) argues kidnapped Greece to
make it Western, Chapter Three maps out how etymologies of the word archive that trace
a route through the French archif and the Latin archivum back to the Greek word
arkheion (ἀρχεῖον) entangle archivists in a colonial-imperial linguistic archival order that
concretizes the division between the West and the Rest as scientific fact. In the first
section of Chapter Three I map out how modern linguistic science denies the colonial
difference underwriting that science’s division of the world’s languages into discrete
language families: Indo-European; Afro-Asiatic; and so on, by examining words and
creating etymologies through transcendental, objective and universal linguistic laws.
Exploring the Greek roots of the word archive through the etymological projects of
Jacques Derrida and Martin Bernal, in the second section of this chapter I argue that
troubling the Eurocentric limits of the Indo-European language family happens not by
pushing Greece and arkheion aside to create new origins for the word archive but,
instead, requires opening up this language family and, thus, Greece and Europe to non-
Indo-European languages and cultures by thinking language development through the
unruliness of loan words. By using etymology as a starting point to think through the way
postmodern archivists intervene in archival concepts and language, Chapter Two works to reorient postmodern archival theories within subaltern linguistic archival orders that open archivists up to unruly relations with unfamiliar others.

Chapters Four and Five both explore the way the emotions that arise through archival labours delimit how researchers and archivists are open to others and otherness. Drawing on Sara Ahmed’s (2004a, 2004b) framework of emotional economies in which feelings circulate between bodies and objects to produce differential types of subjects and communities, these chapters consider how archival research and archiving create and reorganize what Mark Rifkin (2011, p. 342) calls “settler structures of feeling.” Focusing on the ways the optimistic emotional economy of liberal multiculturalism in settler nations secures settler title and entitlement, these chapter question the way the bad feelings: feelings of guilt, shame, sadness and uneasiness, that circulate in the work of archival research (Chapter Four) and archiving (Chapter Five) become the basis for creating researchers and archivists as contrite hosts of settler nations and their archives.

Troubling the argument that unsettle settler relations requires that settler subjects feel shame, guilt and sadness when remembering colonial violence, in Chapter Four I look at how the bad feelings that arise through archival memory-work—bad feelings expressed in the apologies that this memory-work elicits from governments—play out in a form of “settler melancholia” in which settlers come to mourn the loss of the nation’s ideal goodness and not the violence done to Indigenous and other marginalized communities. Chapter Four goes on to examine how the assumption that multiculturalism provides a new, liberal politics based on a respect for difference allows settlers to once again feel good about the nation and also imagine themselves to be enlightened subjects entitled to retain their position of host. As a result, I argue that through multiculturalism, the healing processes apologies are meant to initiate re-settle as opposed to unsettle the nation and its archives.

Chapter Five continues to look at the emotional economies circulating in the archives by asking how what Terry Cook (1994, p. 318) calls the “uneasy” feelings generated by postmodern archival theories that “welcome and respect the ‘Other’” (Schwartz and Cook 2002, pp. 17-8) can unsettle the archival profession. By mapping out how postmodern welcoming and respecting moves between multiculturalist discourses
that reiterate settler colonial forms of hospitality by positioning postmodern archivists as enlightened hosts inviting in marginalized guests and also discourses of “re-spect” that push archivists to give up their authority over the archives, I conclude Chapter Five by arguing that to be unsettling, postmodern archivists in Canada need to take up and support Aboriginal cultural heritage as a means of developing and supporting Indigenous sovereignty. In other words, by re-specting others, archivists have the potential to open up spaces for postcolonial archival theorizing.

Even though each chapter can more or less stand alone, the chapters can be read together in different ways. While Chapters Two and Three both take up the problem of what Dussel calls a kidnapped Greece, Chapter Three’s interrogation of the Eurocentric imaginative geography of Western Civilization is more in line with the argument made in Chapter One. And while Chapters Two, Four and Five all take up the problems settler nationalism poses to efforts to move Canadian archivists and archiving towards what Mignolo calls positions of exteriority, all five chapters work to situate liberal politics within shifting colonial-imperial relations. By challenging liberal critiques that offer archivists the opportunity to build a better future by ameliorating existing liberal political, juridical, economic and social institutions, the aim of these chapter is to push archivists to imagine radically different futures. This approach does not mean that my analyses stray towards idealist solutions to concrete problems. Instead, each chapter begins with what is already available: what archivists are saying and doing, so as to use and redirect archival theory to create radically new and more just futures.

**Note on terminology**

Post-colonial is used throughout my dissertation to refer to the time period following official process of decolonization. In the case of settler nations like Canada, post-colonial refers to the transition from colony (or dominion) to independent country or territory. In this way, post-colonial differs from postcolonial (as in postcolonial theorizing) as far as the latter refers to a critique of colonialism and the continuing influence of colonial forces after decolonization. Neocolonial is used to refer to the economic and political restructuring of European empires following World War II, and refers to the transition from a model of empire in which metropoles enjoyed more or less direct political and
economic control over their colonies to a model in which metropolitan centres enforce indirect political influence over post-colonial countries through economic domination. While many Aboriginal communities living in settler nations like Canada may remain skeptical that there has been any meaningful change in their relationship with the Federal government since World War II, neocolonialism nonetheless speaks to the changing political, economic and social frameworks in which the Canadian government manages Aboriginal people.
Chapter One

The problems of a Eurocentric imaginative geography for writing archival histories

This chapter concerns itself with the historical narrative put forward by archivists that modern archival institutions, theories and practices germinated in nineteenth century Europe before being exported or otherwise dispersed around the globe at the turn of the last century. I am interested in this narrative because of the way it produces a figure of Europe ultimately removed from the nineteenth century colonial-imperial geography in which Europe and its archives and archivists were caught up. Concerned with the problems of writing histories of archival institutions, theories and practices in ways that attend to the colonial and imperial contexts in which archives and archiving developed, and also the Eurocentric frameworks that obfuscate these context, this chapter focuses on the Eurocentric “imaginative geography” behind this dispersal narrative of modern archiving. The imaginative geography both underwriting and produced by the dispersal narrative of archival institutions, theories and practices imagines nineteenth century Europe to be an internally dynamic geo-cultural entity that stands in opposition to and above other “cultures” because Europe was the birth-place of modernity. In other words, this chapter is concerned with a Eurocentric imaginative geography that produces what Samir Amin (1989, pp. 10-1) calls the mythic construct or image of Europe, and how this mythic Europe shapes the way archivists imagine the present day global archiving world as much as they figure it’s and their past.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines how archivists invest in France and the French Revolution as the starting points for the modern archives to argue that archivists’ France is caught up in a mythic Europe. Caught up in this Eurocentric imaginative geography, archivists fail to see France and its archives as part of a colonial/modern world organized around colonial difference. To understand how this mythic Europe has come to organize archival history, the next two sections look at three historiographical frameworks deployed by archivists: respectively historicist; critical; and postmodern frameworks, and how these frameworks deny the colonial difference of modern archiving. In the first of these two sections I argue that the historicism that underwrites both Ernst Posner’s 1940 essay “Some Aspects of Archival Development
since the French Revolution” and also post-World War II archival modernization
discourses negate colonial difference by reducing modern archival theory to a narrative of
inevitable sameness. In the second of these sections I argue that while critical and
postmodern frameworks challenge the historicist narrative by showing how the changing
power dynamics of Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary France created difference
within modern archival theory, critical and postmodern examinations of difference
remain invested in a mythic Europe.

The final and fourth section of this chapter takes the transnational geographies of
colonial-imperialism as the starting point for writing an archival history to trouble the
mythic image of Europe. Building on these transnational geographies of the colonial-
imperial circulations of peoples, goods, and ideas within and between colonies and
empires, I will outline what can be called subaltern imaginative geographies of nineteenth
century colonial-imperial archives and archiving that negotiate the colonial difference of
modernity so as to create what Mignolo (2002b; 2001) calls positions of exteriority to the
Eurocentric knowledge paradigms from which to write archival history.

**France’s modern archives**

Archivists generally figure the French Revolution as the beginning point for
modern, centralized, national and public archives that are organized around both juridical
and administrative, and also historical and cultural mandates (van Albada, 1991). Figured
as breaking with earlier archiving institutions, practices and theories, France and its
archives are integral to what Terry Cook (2013, p. 106) calls the “archival awakening” in
nineteenth century Europe. As such, France and its archives were integral to producing
what was new about the modern archival world – a newness that was then “exported
around the world” (Cook, 2007, p. 172). Thus, while looking at France allows me to
focus on the way one European country and its archival system participates in and shapes
archival theory’s imaginative geography, Revolutionary and nineteenth century France
are more than just one of a number of European traditions because without France there
would be no modern archival tradition. ³

While English-Language archivists usually refer to the French Revolution and its
archives in a general way, historians of French archives herald the National Assembly’s
edicts of 7 Messidor II (June 25, 1794) as well as legislations passed in 1796 as laying the ground work for an archival system that would become France’s *Archives nationales*. While legislation passed as early as 1789 or August 7 and September 4 1790 are significant, 1794 and 1796 are singled out because the legislation in these years not only established the archives but also laid out the foundations of an archival system. Of course, the Assembly did not create France’s first archives or archival system. But the archival system that arose out of the Revolution was something new even if its newness extended a number of archival functions that already defined archives in the *ancien régime*.

There are four general characteristics of France’s novel archival system. First, unlike the monarchical and ecclesiastical archives of France’s *ancien régime* – private institutions that secreted away the documents that underwrote the title and entitlement of these elites and, thus, secured the subordination of the peasants – the Revolution’s archives were to be open to the French public who had the right guaranteed by law to go into the archives and request to see any document housed therein (Moore, 2002). As opposed to simply being an idle gesture or administrative nicety, the legal right enjoyed by the public to see any state record was seen to ensure that the workings of government would be open to the public in whose name the government governed. By accessing these records, the public could ensure that the government was working in the public’s interests and not, like the deposed King, for their own benefit.

Public access to archives is still seen by many archivists and non-archivists alike as a cornerstone of democracy itself. By housing these records and providing access to them, archives are not just a storehouse but also an important mediator of the liberal social contract between the people and their government. As archivist Randall C. Jimerson (2009, p. 67) argues, when “the French Revolution ushered in the modern era of archival management…. archives became essential elements of a free, democratic society and its citizens.” According to archivist Luciana Duranti (2000, p.10), it was with the French Revolution that “the preservation of archives derived from a duty of the state towards its citizens,” and, importantly, that “this new figure of the *citoyen* determined the rise of new responsibilities for the archivist, who became also a guardian of the rights of the people as evidenced by the records.” American archivists James M. O’Toole and
Richard Cox (2006, pp. 50-1) argue that the French Revolution and the “rise of modern sensibilities” was a “watershed” event towards democratizing “all aspects of society” by establishing “the principle that records were critical because they helped protect the rights of people” by guaranteeing the public at large the right to “inspect and examine the records made and kept by its government.” Going further, O’Toole (2002, p. 108) argues that archives make real the “theoretical virtues of democracy” by allowing citizens to call governments to account. Limiting this right to access archival records was, and still is, seen to endanger the idea of democracy as well as the freedoms and liberties enjoyed by state citizens.  

Second, France’s post-revolutionary government not only archived records but also created a centralized, nation-wide archival system of “Archives Départementales” overseen by the national archivist (Posner, 1940). Because they can coordinate and standardize the archiving of records from disparate government departments, centralized archives continue to be seen as a primary means of making government bureaucracy more efficient as much as allow the archive to effectively fulfill its democratic function (Schellenberg, 1956). Even as the efforts of centralizing all of France’s records gave way under the weight of organizing such an operation, and the dream of centralizing records in various countries has given way in the face of forces for decentralization, the reorganization of these archival systems remains tied to ensuring if not improving government efficiency.  

In addition to being the key to efficiency, archivists also present the creation of national archival systems as having been a boon for archival theory and the professionalization of archivists. By creating national standards, but also training archivists to enforce these standards, the French archival system and other centralized, national archival systems have been “instrumental in developing and disseminating archival theory” (Brichford, 1982, p. 90). These national systems extended well beyond the walls of the institutions themselves to include legislation that gave archivists authority over the disposition of state records, institutions for training archivists, and professional associations. Integral to the development of a French and then European archival tradition is the founding of the state funded École Nationale des Chartes in the 1820s to train archivists for public service. Providing training for archivists from numerous
European countries in addition to French archivists, Chartes is credited with making the French archival system more efficient and developed, for being a breeding ground for new ideas like provenance, and ultimately a key part in the standardization of archival concepts and practices. By organizing archivists into a profession, the French national archival system provided much of the formalization to Cook’s “archival awakening.”

Third, the move to preserve records from the ancien régime as well as manage the records of the government is seen to represent an acknowledgement by the state of their role in protecting France’s documentary heritage and the beginnings of modern archives’ historical mandate. After peasants burnt many of the records of the ancien régime in the early years of the Revolution so as to expunge the nobility’s power and authority over the peasants attested to in those records—purges initially encouraged by the republican government most notably in 1793 and 1794,¹¹ in the latter half of the 1790s the assembly passed laws that recognized the state’s responsibility to secure and preserve records with historical, educational and legal value (Posner, 1940; Lokke, 1968). Even if, as Duranti (1993) and Heather MacNeil (2011) argue, that archives were used as sources to write history long before the Revolution, the modern archives’ historical mandate was new in that it was tied up in the emerging discipline of history. That is, the historical mandate developed as historians came to view archives as the preferred sources for fulfilling the demands of the new science of history. By preparing archives to meet the needs of a new breed of historian who imagined that it was through a scientific reading of archival records that they could understand the past—as nineteenth century positivist historian Leopold von Ranke put it—“as it really was” (Wie es eigntlich gewesen), the historical mandate changed the archiving profession especially as archivists were encouraged, if not required, to familiarize themselves with developments in historiography. Not surprisingly, the nineteenth century saw a growing number of archivists trained as historians who then used the archives for their own research purposes (Posner, 1940; Orr, 1981; Blouin and Rosenberg, 2011).

By taking on this role as guardian of historical records, France’s archives are seen as the origins of the modern archives’ research mandate that archivists continue to pursue and enrich (Orr, 1981). Caught up in the Revolution’s emphasis on nationalizing France, this research mandate was intimately tied to the task of preserving a French national
culture and writing national histories that transformed France’s archival collection into *patrimoine* (Moore, 2002; Ketelaar, 2007). While some archivists argue that the tie between national identity and archives is a result of the “forces of nationalism and cultural chauvinism” that began with Napoleon’s reign as opposed to with any act of the Republican government (Posner, 1940, p. 166; see also Brichford, 1982; Milligan, 2002; 2005), other archivists highlight that the French Revolution was the first time documentary records were used to create a new national identity (Jimerson, 2009; Cook 2013). For this latter group of archivists, it was not just that nineteenth century historians like Jules Michelet (1798-1874) used the archive to write histories of the French people, but that using archival documents was seen to give “legitimacy to historical depictions of national identity” (Jimerson, 2009, p. 70). As such, the role of archives in building national identity is the fourth—if contested—characteristic of the French Revolution.

Many archivists remain invested in the French Revolution as a means of speaking to the importance of the archives and defining its modern characteristics. This investment in the French Revolution stems from archivists and the archival profession’s attachment to an archives that is the mediator of the liberal, social contract; part of an archival system that is efficient and comprehensive in organizing and making available government records; and an institution that is both essential for historical scholarship and housing national patrimony.

Archivists are not alone in making the French Revolution the starting point for the making of modern institutions, theories and practices. Within French historiography, the French Revolution remains a “foundational event,” such that its “presence is felt up to the present day” (Farge, 2013, p. 99; see also Dubois, 2008; Nora, 1989). However, outside of France and the French Academy, the French Revolution and its aftermath also stand as the “foundational event” for political modernity: the development of democratic citizenship and rule of law within the confines of the nation-state. Historians figure eighteenth and nineteenth century France as the first modern political experiment: an experiment that spread across Europe either through governmental reform or in the face of Napoleon’s imperial army.

With the French Revolution figured as the foundational event, nineteenth century France and then Europe as a whole defines political modernity such that the problematics
of modern politics are understood as a continuation or fallout (depending on your political leanings) of events that took place in late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. With modern political history localized in Europe, political historians return to the French Revolution and nineteenth century Europe as a means of mapping out the tensions and differences that they argue continue to plague present-day liberal democracies. Indeed, by figuring the French Revolution as a foundational event, Europe and European history has become a means of understanding political modernity. And just as the French Revolution has become a means of figuring political modernity as both a period and way of thinking the world organized around the nation-state, citizenship, the rule of law, and capitalist relations, European political terminology and the historical, inter-European disputes over these terminology have come to provide the standard definition of citizenship, sovereignty, nation, and so on (Chakrabarty, 2007).

More often that not, figuring the French Revolution as the foundational event of the modern political world plays out within Eurocentric histories that assume that by the fifteenth century Europe had developed to a greater extent scientifically and technologically—or in such a way politically, economically, culturally and socially—to give Europe an advantage over other regions or civilizations (Blaut, 1993). Premised on what Samir Amin (1989, pp. 10-1) calls a mythic construct or image of Europe: a representation of Europe as a unique eternal essence that differentiates Europe and European things from the rest of the world, these Eurocentric histories represent Europe as both the author of modern world while also conflating Europe with modernity. Because Eurocentric histories and geographies assume that modernity is “fundamentally the result of Europe’s internal qualities, [and] not of interaction with the societies of Africa, Asia, and America after 1492” (Blaut, 1993, p. 2), modernity is imagined to be the product of European history, with being European interchangeable with the modern way of being. Reiterating these Eurocentric histories, Revolutionary France only extends to the inside edge of Europe’s mythic borders.

By decontextualizing modern institutions and ideas from the violent and exploitative processes of colonial-imperialism that form them, Enrique Dussel argues (1998: 3) that Eurocentric frameworks offer something of a utopian promise that Europe can both realize the Truth of the world “through itself without owing anything to anyone”
and that this way of coming to know the world is benign. As such, the modern subject knows the true workings of the world (even if the models for understanding how the world works change over time), and also assumes that this way of knowing the world is neither the result nor cause of violence. Indeed, by truly knowing how the world works, the modern way of knowing holds out the promise of producing both a productive and peaceful future. It is for this reason that Eurocentrism is not a European form of ethnocentrism—or Europe’s unique way of doing things and view of the world—comparable to other ethnocentrisms because Eurocentric thinking presents Europe as a universal that is “the only solution to the challenges of our time” (Amin, 1989, p. vii).

This construct of Europe is mythic, then, because it hides the global geography that characterizes the post-1492 modern world and, thus, hides both the coloniality of power and colonial difference that permeates the modern world while minimizing the importance of colonialism in the formation of Europe and modernity (Amin, 1989; Coronil, 2007). As such, this mythic Europe hides the physical and psychic violence of colonization and empire building that secured a changing array of European countries as the centre and organizers of modern political and economic relations. At the same time, because the modern way of knowing the world is imagined to be benign, violence and exploitation are only imagined to arise when some outside influence is introduced. Detached from its own colonial history, the problem is never liberal democracy itself but some outside variable. As a result of this Eurocentric imaginative geography, then, the republicanism and modern, liberal democracy that developed within the mythic border of nineteenth century France are seen to stand in opposition to the horrors of colonial-imperialism (Wilder, 2005).

Even though the geographical limits of this mythic Europe are more or less delimited by the national borders of twentieth century European countries, what constitutes Europe nonetheless changes. As opposed to troubling the Eurocentric narrative, Europe’s shifting geography has created a flexible attachment to modernity. For instance, as the North Atlantic world came to constitute Europe’s centre in the eighteenth century, European countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece were displaced to the peripheries of modernity where they joined “non-European” countries—settler-nations like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Apartheid South Africa—who
were modern through their Northern European heritage. In this way, rearranging Europe’s mythic borders allows scholars to recuperate and reinvent Europe and modernity.

Through its shifting borders, then, this mythic Europe remains in a superior position to other cultures by standing in for a modernity it alone authored. Even as modern institutions and values are taken up by non-European peoples, the mythic Europe is reiterated by what J.M. Blaut (1993) calls a Eurocentric “diffusionist” historical framework that represents modernity spreading from Europe to pre- or non-modern outlying areas and peoples. As this diffusionist framework casts the non-European world as a derivative of Europe, it also hides the Eurocentrism underlying modernity by representing modernity as being available to everyone, for everyone’s benefit, and to do with it what they will, regardless of its European origins. Indeed, because modern ideas, institutions and values are benign, the diffusion of these modern goods promises to create a less violent and more progressive world.

Walter Mignolo argues that there is no way to return to the colonial difference of modernity through a mythic Europe that does not further subordinate non-European peoples and cultures. Troubling and displacing this mythic Europe requires seeing how modernity is part and parcel of a colonial world that was global in scope, and also seeing it from what Mignolo (2002b; 2001) calls a position of exteriority that works according to subaltern rationalities. This position of exteriority is not free of colonial discourses or the coloniality of power but, instead, is constituted through them even as they exceed those discourses. By being in a position of exteriority to—but not outside of—colonial-imperial systems and their self-justifying Eurocentric logic, subaltern rationalities are “the location of the emergence of epistemologies…that do not overthrow existing ones but that build on the ground of the silence of history” (Mignolo, 2002a, p. 67).

As opposed to being in a position outside colonial violence related to some traditional and essential “non-European” way of being, these positions of exteriority are loci of enunciation that arise out of the double consciousness colonial difference produces within colonial populations. As opposed to being a position occupied by a particular subject who then speaks the truth about colonial violence, these positions of exteriority speak to the imaginary and physical violence of colonial-imperialism—or what Mignolo
(2002a, p. 67) calls the “densities of the colonial experience”—that then become the starting point for thinking modernity. Unlike Eurocentric frameworks that negate the coloniality of the modern world, positions of exteriority begin with the troubling logic of subaltern rationalities to re-interpret the modern/colonial world.

For Mignolo, the difference between modern reason and subaltern rationalities illuminates the different spaces of enunciation within the modern/colonial world from which to critique modernity: spaces of postmodern and postcolonial theorizing. For Mignolo, (2000, p. 93), postcolonial theorizing “coexists with colonialism itself as a constant move and force towards autonomy and liberation in every order of life, from economy to religion, from language to education, from memories to spatial order.” In contrast to postcolonial theorizing’s move towards a position of exteriority, postmodern theorizings speak from the inside and, thus, at “the limits of the hegemonic narratives of Western history” (Ibid, p. 89). Even as postmodern theorists negotiate colonialism, their critique redraws the mythic Europe and reiterates what Mignolo (2002a) calls imperial difference: a difference that hides or does not engage with colonial difference while representing modernity as a colonial-imperial world. For this reason, postmodern critiques of colonialism continue to negate the coloniality of modern social, economic and political relations.

It is not simply that archivists think through Europe’s mythic borders because they return to France and Europe to write their histories of modern archives or that they necessarily take up the French Revolution as a foundational event. That is, archivists’ return to France and the French Revolution to situate the modern archive does not have to repeat the mythic Europe. However, because of the historical frameworks they think through archivists repeat this Eurocentric imaginative geography by obfuscating the imperial geography of the French state. As a result, the seemingly inherent position of the citizen at the base of the rights and freedoms that archivists and archives uphold, the efficiency of a centralized, nationalized system, the apparentness of the nation-state underwriting both the field of history and patrimoine, end up reiterating the mythic image of Europe and Eurocentric biases. The next two sections will look at the three historiographical frameworks: historicist, critical and postmodern, through which archivists write their history, and how these frameworks lead archivists to deny the
colonial difference of the modern archival world. With an understanding of different ways histories of modern archiving remains invested in the mythic Europe, the last section of this chapter will propose a transnational framework of modern archiving that pushes towards the exteriority of the mythic image of Europe and, thus, towards subaltern imaginative geographies of France.

**Historicist modernity and modernization**

Historicism is the first and most influential historical framework to organize archivists’ investments in the French Revolution and its archives. There are many different currents of historicism and much debate over both its definition and its validity as an analytic framework. As such, there is no one agreed upon definition. However, in general historicism assumes that the “nature of a thing lies in its history; if we wish to grasp the nature of a nation, a people, an institution, or an idea, the historicist will require us to consider its historical development” (Ankersmit, 1995, p. 144). Subaltern Studies historian Dipesh Chakrabarty (2007, pp. 22-3) argues that historicism is a mode of thinking that tells us that in order to understand the nature of anything in the this world we must see it as an historically developing entity, that is, first as an individual and unique whole—as some kind of unity at least in potentia—and, second, as something that develops over time.

In this way, historicism transforms assemblages of actors, discourses and materials that are always in tension with each other into inherently consistent cultural entities that develop over time. According to historicist thinking, Europe, Asia, and other cultural entities are distinct according to some primordial cultural identity or characteristic, and are becoming more or less mature over time.

Having transformed the world into discrete, cultural packages, Chakrabarty (2007) argues that historicism temporalizes what are imaged to be inherent cultural differences existing in the world by arranging these different cultural entities along a timeline that holds modern Europe as the ultimate end point. Denying what anthropologist Johannes Fabian (1988) calls the coevalness of different, but contemporary, worldings, historicism figures non-Euro-American countries as less mature versions of Europe. In other words, through historicism non-European peoples and societies become anachronistic: their
beliefs, political structures and so on, are seen as reminiscent of something out of Europe’s past. By temporalizing difference against the standard of modern Europe, historicism focuses on the particulars of different cultural entities while at the same time homogenizing all non-Euro-American differences as non- or pre-modern. It is as a result of this historicist framework that many non-Euro-American countries or communities are continuously denied full participation in the international political sphere because they are deemed not yet modern or modern enough (Chakrabarty, 2007).

While certainly not the first archivist to frame modern archiving within a historicist framework, Ernst Posner’s historicist narrative of modern archival development outlined in his 1940 essay “Some Aspects of Archival Development Since The French Revolution” has become canonical among English-Language archivists. In his article, Posner (1940, p. 162) argues that the “ideas that originated during the French Revolution constitute the main currents underlying the archival development of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” For Posner (Ibid), the French Revolution is the origin of a “specialized public archives service” or an archival administrative model that centralized the archiving of government records, archived historical records, was open to the public and, in the early nineteenth century, took up its role as the guardian of national patrimony. This specialized public archives service model then spread across Europe before being taken up in the United States. Separated for the most part from the social, political and economic relations in which it emerged and changed, the specialized public archives service appears to be a thing unto itself that is self-evidently efficient and otherwise conducive to good governance. Indeed, in Posner’s telling the French model remains relatively unchanged despite being adopted by countries like England and Sweden where authorities actively worked to suppress any and all revolutionary fervour throughout the nineteenth century.

It is fair to say that this historicist narrative is alluring for archivists because it figures present day archival institutions, theories and practices not only as continuations of those born in and around the French Revolution but also figures institutions, theories and practices as becoming more complex and increasingly comprehensive over time. By creating an almost unbroken connection between present day archives and revolutionary legislation, Posner’s history allows archivists to imagine that the archival profession is an
extension of a French foundation with a commitment to the rudiments of democracy, efficient and good governance, robust scholarship, and the development of national community and identity. Imagining themselves to be the heirs of an institution committed to freedom, truth, efficiency, and so on, Posner’s historicist narrative positions archivists as the guarantors of liberal democratic principles. In this way, the past that Posner conjures up through his historicist narrative is not foreign or strange, but the prologue to the present: re-authorizing the present system and reaffirming archivists’ commitment to it in the process as the best of all possible options out there.

In providing purpose and direction to archivists, Posner’s history also attaches archivists to a mythic Europe that hides the international circulation of ideas, peoples and goods in which European countries were caught up in and, since the sixteenth century, has more or less controlled. To “trace an outline of the archival developments of modern times,” Posner (1940, p. 159) goes back to France’s Revolutionary archives to situate it as heir to a European archival tradition that goes from Roman record keepers through the archives of Medieval Greece, Italy, France and England, and then on to early modern German, Austrian, Scottish and, finally, French archives. Through his history, Posner naturalizes nineteenth and twentieth century European borders by writing them into the past such that Europe appears to be a natural, more-or-less self-contained cultural entity that produced a European archival tradition in conversation with itself. By harkening back to Rome, Posner invests archivists in modern archival institutions, theories and practices dissociated from the imperial and colonial violence that secured Europe’s post-1492 influence over the world’s economy.21

Posner’s historicist framework also attaches archivists to a narrative of Euro-American superiority and, ultimately increasing homogenization of the profession. Even though Posner neither characterizes the European archival tradition as the only archival tradition nor the best of all archival traditions, he is clear that the promise of a more robust archival theory and profession nevertheless rests on further developing the Euro-American “records management” tradition (1940, p. 172).22 In other words, Posner’s history works to confirm his belief that the records management tract is really the only viable way forward. This way forward is, also, a push towards producing an increasingly homogeneous set of archival standards and professions.
While Posner may only have been speaking to Euro-American archivists in his essay, by the 1950s, the promise that records management could build a more robust, modern archiving became increasingly global in scope through discourses of modernization that dominated archival development projects until at least the 1970s. It is in these discourses of modernization that the anachronizing and homogenizing logic of historicism is most clear. Interestingly, as Posner’s essay circulated and gained currency among archivists, Posner and many other influential Euro-American archivists were actively involved in shaping these discourses and projects.23 Organized through such agencies as the International Council of Archives (ICA)—a UNESCO umbrella organization of archivists and archival associations founded in 1948—archival development shifted from being primarily focused on rebuilding war-damaged European archives in the 1940s and early 1950s to being framed as the task of supporting archives in the “developing world” in the late-1950s and 1960s.24 Because modernization discourse at this time focused on duplicating the economic and political successes of “developed,” liberal, capitalist countries—particularly the United States—by providing “less developed” or “underdeveloped” countries around the world with technologies to increase production and efficiencies so as to raise all countries to the level of “development” enjoyed by the U.S. (Willis, 2011), the differences of archival systems in developing countries were evaluated through ICA projects according to how closely that system resembled the records management framework. Just as modernization theory naturalized the development of capitalist relations and positioned Euro-American capitalism as the modern—or most advanced—stage of this development, discourses of modernizing archives represented records management as the apotheosis of archival history such that the work of making archives in South America, the Caribbean, Asia, the Pacific Rim and Africa efficient and productive required creating national archival system—or strengthening what were seen as weak archival systems—in less developed countries. These newly developed archives were imagined as integral to the needs of the liberal government and citizens that other modernization projects were attempting to foster or impose.25

As critics of post-World War II development theories were pointing out as early as the 1970s, by removing the global power relations that created the poverty and strife in
“underdeveloped” countries, modernization projects often produced situations of economic dependency and underdevelopment through unequal exchanges between the political and economic dominant “centres and less affluent peripheries of the global economy” (Young, 2001, pp. 50-4; see also Petras, 1981; Willis, 2011). As opposed to leading to greater economic and administrative efficiency or cultural robustness in the third world and other newly independent nation-states that came into being with post-World War II decolonization, modernization and subsequent neoliberal development theories secured the economic, political and cultural hegemony of “developed” countries in this post-colonial world (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Willis, 2011; Petras, 1981; Young, 2001).

As opposed to seeing the implementation of modern records management standards and principles as forms of cultural imperialism through neo-colonial economic channels, archivists of the day saw the expansion into the developing world as a matter of realizing the inherent potential of the European tradition to make the larger archival world more stable, efficient, and productive. Contributing to development discourses, archivists argued that archives were a key part of modernization itself. For archivists, then, belonging to “modern times”—as Posner put it—becomes predicated on having a national archival system that was open to the public, that facilitated historical research and that preserved and made available the documentary patrimony of the nation. As being truly modern required adopting a records management approach.

Even though development theories attached “less developed” and “underdeveloped” to measurable indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP), with the modern “developed” Euro-American world standing in as the norm and desired end of modernization, “less developed” and “underdeveloped” countries became figured as less mature versions of Europe. Archivists involved in developing the world’s archives often attributed Third World poverty and supposed inefficiencies to the fact that these less-developed people resided outside or before the twentieth century. While climactic, geographical and socio-cultural factors are recognized as creating particular problems for archives in developing nations, throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, the shortfalls in third world archiving ultimately rested with the developing countries themselves and the third world governments that refused or
were unable to see the benefits of developing a comprehensive archival system.\textsuperscript{28} Even as they invested in modernizing projects and spoke to their value for bringing about a better future for less-developed peoples, the anachronizing logic of modernization theory left Euro-American archivists doubtful that developing countries could meaningfully contribute and further archiving theory and practice because such countries were always trying to catch up.\textsuperscript{29}

The harms that modernization discourses produced cannot and should not be laid solely at Posner’s feet. Nonetheless, the historicism that underwrote Posner’s essay as well as the modernization discourses and development project he was involved in normalized the mythic Europe and the racializing logic of inherent cultural difference it maps onto the world. Through historicist narratives of modern archival development, democracy became reduced to the liberal social contract, nation-sized archival systems become the route to efficiency, and the focus on collecting the national patrimony creates the potential for robust historical scholarship and meaningful heritage. By hiding the complex and extensive geography of modern Europe and modernity, historicist narratives of modern archival development denied—and continue to deny—the colonial difference that shapes the modern/colonial world as it transforms difference into sameness and admits only one viable option in the modern archival world: everyone should be heir of France. Thus, when the psychic and physical violence of colonial-imperialism is brought to light, historicist narratives take them up as unfortunate but minor detours on the road towards a homogeneous and well-developed archival world. With such historicist narratives, there are no positions of exteriority.

**Eurocentric critiques of the historicist narrative**

A critical approach to the past frames the more recent historical frameworks: critical and postmodern histories, for organizing the archivist’s relationship to France’s revolutionary archives and nineteenth century archiving. Both critical and postmodern histories challenge the historicist narrative to argue that France’s archives are not inherent entities built around specific tenets that have matured over time. Instead, both historical frameworks argue that archival tenets have changed over time as they are shaped and reshaped by the social and political forces of the day.
In the last twenty to thirty years, critical historians of France’s archives have challenged historicist conceptions that modern archives are an inherent entity, maturing since the French Revolution. While certainly rebuffing Posner, these critical historians target the historicist narratives that have dominated the study of France’s archives since the mid-nineteenth century (Moore, 2002). Structured according to what Lara Jennifer Moore calls internalist approaches that view practical needs or the idiosyncratic interpretations of archival practice and theory as the catalysts of changes in nineteenth century archival policies and practices, internalist approaches detach archival institutions, theories and practices from the political context of the day (Ibid). By ignoring the shifting political contexts in which changes to archiving took place, internalist approaches more often than not repeat the narrative of archival development in which nineteenth century archivists continued and concretized Revolution’s archives by replacing the chaos of the revolutionary archival practice and theory with a more unified and consistent archival order (Ibid). In opposition to this narrative of growing systematization and increasing archival order, Moore (2002, p.17) argues that decisions “about preservation, classification, inventory, and access were…the result not just of practical considerations or the opinions of individual archivists and librarians but also key shifts in national politics.” As opposed to characterizing the years following the French Revolution as the slow but purposeful work of refining archival theory and practice to create an increasingly coherent archival order, Moore argues that the meaning of archival order changed throughout the nineteenth century with the shifts in power that accompanied each new regime.30

Critical historians such as Moore and Jennifer S. Milligan show that the narrative of a maturing archival order and the value of that order are the construct of latter archivists and historians. While the Revolution may have inspired laws that made the archives open to the public, Milligan (2007a) argues that it was during the Second Empire of Louis-Napoléon (1848-1871) that archivists consciously represented the archives as an integral component to maintaining a just balance between state and society and, thus, as the guarantor of the liberal democratic social contract. According to Milligan (2005, p 171), archivists of the Second Empire worked to figure the archives as the “necessary buffer zone between state and citizen, between public and private, that the social contract
required,” through the development of regulations that decided what was public or open for consultation and what was private within those “public” records and, thus, not for everyone to consult.

Milligan shows that the work of protecting the private information of individuals stored in the archives that archivists working today in liberal democracies perform by ensuring that the restrictions of privacy laws are enforced is indebted to the work of these mid-nineteenth century archivists. And as opposed to viewing the work of protecting privacy as the creation of an order that extends Revolution’s democratic principle behind a public archives, Milligan shows that nineteenth century archival order is constantly being reorganized. Dividing the archives according to categories of public and private records required archivists to create administrative procedures for how the public could access these private records and, thus, informed how democracy was understood. Further, in determining what could be seen, by whom and how it could be seen, archivists of the Second Empire established themselves as the rightful arbiters of civic rights but also authorities on what was and was not proper for the public to see. That is, while building the integrity of the archives as the mediator of the social contract, archivists also presented themselves as moral authorities. Archivists represented their profession as being able to fulfill the archives democratic function but in a way that assured families whose public position caused their “private” papers to land in the archives that their privacy would be respected (Milligan, 2007b; 2002).

Contrary to the historicist narrative in which archives and archivists seemingly naturally reside between state and society as guarantor of civic rights, then, the archives became interpreter of those rights and, thus, set the “outlying limits of democracy” by determining what kind of “transparency the state could accept and society demand” (Milligan, 2005, p. 177). As opposed to France’s archives being an inherent check on the abuse of government power, setting the “boundaries of the modern Archives was part and parcel of marking the limits of state power in the post-revolutionary nation” (Ibid). And because nineteenth century French republican and monarchical states influenced archival policy, the archive was never outside of the state in setting these limits. Instead, it was through its public archives that the state set the boundaries to which it was subject.31
Milligan (2005; 2002) similarly troubles narratives of an increasingly liberal archival order by showing that the archives research mandate and the vaunted place of the archives within historical scholarship was tied to Emperor’s efforts to legitimate his regime and organize the French nation-state in the image of his empire. Milligan (2007a) argues that stuck in a bind between needing to censor historians using the archives to write critically about the First Empire—and, thus, muddying the legacy of Napoleon Bonaparte upon which Louis-Napoléon staked his claim to rule France—and the problem that introducing censorship laws would compromise his image as the supporter and nurturer of liberalism, Louis-Napoléon empowered archivists appointed by him to create and use archival regulations to limit what a historian could see. By regulating historical scholarship through changes to archival procedures, the Emperor’s move to limit access was done without changing or creating laws and, thus, kept the restrictions out of public view (Milligan, 2007a).

Milligan’s historical analyses of France’s nineteenth century archives show that the principles of publicness that underwrote the modern archives democratic function and historical mandate changed according to political factors. As opposed to furthering the archive’s revolutionary tenets and giving them order, nineteenth century French archival regulations delimited democracy and history by opening particular modes of access to citizens and researchers. It was through these delimited modes of access that citizens held the government accountable and historians pieced together the past.

By troubling the progressive narrative of a maturing archival world, critical histories have also troubled the distinction between Revolutionary chaos and nineteenth century order by appreciating the archival destruction that took place during the Revolution as something other than chaos. For instance, Judith M. Panitch (1996, p. 32) argues that the historicist depiction of the Revolution as “a short-lived period of destructive furor [that] rapidly gave way to more enlightened concepts consolidated in a few key laws” tells us nothing about why certain records were saved or destroyed in the formative years of the modern archives. By focusing on individual instances of destruction and conservation to understand the development of the archive’s modern mandate, Panitch maps out the diverse economy governing modern acquisition and conservation. As opposed to being chaotic, Panitch argues that French archival legislation
between 1789 and the early 1800s purposefully saved records documenting land and titles appropriated from the aristocracy and the Church so as to legitimate the new state’s claims to them and, thus, the right to sell lands and titles to generate revenue. In turn, the Assembly allowed other records of the ancien régime to be destroyed because the record’s symbolic connection to the aristocracy’s repressive relationship to French peasants was so strong that destroying such records aligned the assembly with the peasants who were holding the torches. And still in other cases, records of the ancien régime were recycled, so-to-speak, because the paper was more valuable in the making and firing of munitions than for the words printed on it.

Milligan, Moore and Panitch challenge archivists investment in the historicist narrative that their profession arose out of a consistent and robust archival mandate by showing how eighteenth and nineteenth century French archives, archivists and archiving were intimately tied up in the changing social, economic and political relations of power. By upsetting the historicist narrative of archival development, Milligan, Moore and Panitch trouble archivists’ identification with the French archival tradition organized around democracy, efficiency, rigorous historical scholarship and documenting the development of the nation. Unsettling present day archivists’ belief that they are heirs to the noble ideas at the base of the modern archive, critical histories of France’s archives call on archivists to evaluate the principles upon which they base their practices and hang their profession.

However, even though these critical histories overturn the historicist narratives of development, they nonetheless largely reproduce as opposed to displace the mythic Europe underlying these narratives. On the one hand, Panitch and Moore concern themselves with events that appear localized in continental France. The political situation influencing revolutionary archival legislation traced out by Panitch is mostly focused on events occurring in the provinces and Paris. Whereas she mentions that the Minister of the Navy was appointed to sort archival documents in 1793 so as to secure the much coveted cloth paper for artillery use, Panitch does not consider the role of the navy and these recycled records in securing overseas possessions and the influence of these acts on France’s archival legislation. Similarly Moore’s examination of École Nationale des Chartes—the school that trained many nineteenth century archivists and was the breeding
ground of archival theory and practices—only seems to be affected by the needs and
demands of Paris and the provinces for archivists while the need to organize the France’s
global empire goes unmentioned.

Milligan, on the other hand, acknowledges but then displaces the influence of
France’s imperial geography on France’s archives and the role of archives in building
France’s nineteenth century empires. In arguing that the *Archives nationales* was a key
technology of France’s imperial rule, Milligan (2002) makes reference to France’s North
African campaigns and the effects of French Imperialism in the formation of the French
nation. Indeed, Milligan (2005, p. 163) notes that in 1804 Napoleon not only captured the
archives of other lands but also declared that as the repository of his imperial exploits, the
*Archives nationales*—renamed the Imperial Archives by Napoleon—would become
Empire’s memory. However, empire’s memory remains located on the European
continent and, overall, Milligan does little to explore this link between French Imperial
projects overseas, the production of a French national identity and the *Archives
nationales*. Thus, despite her turn to the French Empire and, thus, a turn to events that
take place as much outside of its and Europe’s borders as within it, Milligan like Panitch
and Moore nonetheless reifies France’s continental borders to build her historical
analyses of France’s archives.

“Postmodern” archivists are some of the most vocal promoters of this critical turn
in archival history. Contrasting themselves from nineteenth and twentieth century
custodial or modern archivists who obfuscated and denied that archives and archiving are
political in nature, postmodern archivists assume that power relations mediate all stages
in the transmission and reception of archives (Ridener, 2009). Postmodern archivists
work to interrogate what Eric Ketelaar (2001, p. 132) calls “the tacit narratives of power
knowledge” that both permeate the archive and are covered over with custodialism’s
depoliticizing metanarratives. In this way, postmodern archivists work to bring to fore the
“social, cultural, political, economic and religious contexts” that “determine the tacit
narratives of an archive” (Ibid, pp. 136-7). In contrast to the custodial figure of the
archivist as the passive record keeper and filer of records, postmodern archivists assume
that archivists produce the archive and, thus, are responsible for fostering particular types
of social relations through the archives.
Unlike modern archivists who have, since the French Revolution, tried to organize the work of archiving according to universal principles that desire and impose sameness, postmodern archivists build archival theories and practices that recognize and promote differences. Postmodern archiving calls on archivists to recognize the multiple and different record creators and users of archives when appraising and describing records, and to deploy different epistemologies to pursue different modes of archiving (Ketelaar, 1997a; Cook & Schwartz, 2002; Horsman, 2002). Unlike modern archival theory that consciously or not supported the status quo, postmodern archivists work to build “transgressive” archival performances upon the multiple narratives—as opposed to a singular narrative—that underwrite archives so as to create a more self-conscious, critical and social justice-oriented profession that archives “otherwise” (Cook & Schwartz, 2002; Jimerson, 2009; Harris, 2004; 2007; Cook, 2001b).

As part of the work of creating transgressive performances, postmodern archivists work to develop theories and practices that respect “diversity, ambiguity, and multiple identities” and are aware of the “Other” (Cook & Schwartz, 2002, p. 183) if not theories and practices that “welcome and respect the ‘Other’ and their otherness (Schwartz & Cook, 2002, pp. 17-8). While the Other is figured by Cook (2001b, p. 23) as those peoples “beyond” Western society whose racial, class, gender and sexual difference are too different from Western norms to be included, postmodern archivists generally recognize that the otherness that marks those peoples as outside are attributed to those persons or communities by others. As such, postmodern archivists understand that otherness is the product of modes of representing what Western subjects see as different about other persons or communities according to racialized, classed, gendered, sexed, and/or ableist categories because it is by representing these others as inferior that Western subjects conjure up their own superiority. While by no means positioning themselves outside this othering process, as part of creating more self-conscious, critical and social justice-oriented theories and practices, postmodern archivists work to figure out ways of representing and including marginalized groups in the archive without further marginalizing them (Schwartz & Cook, 2002; Carter, 2006).

To flesh out the multiple and marginal narratives within modern archiving performances, postmodern archival theories encourage archivists to re-interrogate the
history of archiving (Cook, 1997a; Nesmith, 2005; Heald, 1996). Attentive to the way historical frameworks like historicism shape the way one views the past, postmodern archivists call for a “radical historicization of archives” (Heald, 1996, p. 100). Like critical histories, this radical historicization troubles the historicist’s linear, progressive narratives of archival development by attending to the social relations of power that authorize particular iterations of archival concepts, institutions and projects.  

Cook and Eric Ketelaar are the most notable postmodern archivists to critically take up the history of modern archiving. Questioning the linear narrative of writing histories of the archives, Cook’s (1997a; 2013) histories of archiving break up the progressive narrative of linear archival development by drawing out the various discursive shifts that took place throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Following Cook, terms such as archives, archivist, evidence, history, memory, and so on, that historicist frameworks represent as progressive maturing are presented by Cook as always in flux. As a result, the work of archiving, like the meaning of archives, is not what it once was. To go back to the French Revolution and its archives is to enter into a discursive field markedly different from the present. Thus, while Cook seems to be invoking a historicist, Posnerian-like narrative by referring to a nineteenth century “archival awakening” in Europe as leading to a more formal “archival theory and professional practice” (2013, p. 106) after “centuries of informal development” (2007, p. 172), Cook’s archival awakening does not solidify into a singular institution or archival order. Instead, the changing social and political contexts in which the dispersion of theory and practice throughout Europe before being “exported around the world” to Europe’s dependencies and colonies—especially the United States, Canada, Australia and South Africa (Ibid)—has meant that this archival awakening has been reordered multiple times over since the French Revolution.

Similarly, in opposition to something like Posner’s grand narrative of a singular European tradition, Ketelaar (1997a, p. 146) argues that even while “Roman law, the Church, Napoleonic occupation, the Habsburg Empire” have had “great impact on national norms and systems” and provided “European nations and states with a supranational framework,” these factors do not flatten out the differences between various European national, regional and local archives. According to Ketelaar (Ibid),
present day Europe as much as nineteenth century Europe “is united by its differences” such that it is “difficult and dangerous to refer to the European concept or theory.”

While these postmodern projects are like other critical histories, it should also be expected that postmodern historical projects would work to include the “Other” beyond Western society into archival history without further marginalizing them. If the racial difference of colonized subjects and the colonial difference of the modern world were to be incorporated within histories of archiving, one could expect that postmodern archival theories would provide a generous theoretical framework for tracing out what Mignolo would call the subaltern rationalities of modern archiving. However, colonial others and otherness seems to be missing in both Cook’s and Ketelaar’s historical analyses. That is, even as these postmodern histories work to open archivists up to the difference at play within the archiving world since the French Revolution, these radical historicizations—like Panitch, Moore and Milligan’s critical histories—nonetheless reproduce a mythic Europe that represents nineteenth century Europe as an autonomous cultural entity that alone authored the modern archives.

Even though Ketelaar is right to argue that differences between the national archival systems of the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy, and so on, cannot be reduced to single European way of archiving, his national-focused analytic framework hides the fact that many nineteenth century European countries carried out projects of colonization inside and outside Europe’s borders and exploited both European and non-European peoples as they pursued imperial aspirations. Reconstituting Europe’s borders to emphasize national, region and local archival differences that existed and continue to exist in Europe ends up covering over the way these countries extended—and continue to extend—beyond their European borders. Ketelaar’s national differences do not trouble the place of Europe as the stand in for, and author of, a modern archiving but, locates the difference of modernity within a mythic Europe. 38

While Cook’s history goes beyond Europe to include its colonies, his narrative remains diffusionist. By entering the archival scene at the end of the nineteenth century or beginning of the early twentieth century, the colonies in Cook’s diffusionist narrative are the recipients of what Europe alone created. In this way, Cook figures colonialism as the avenue for transmitting Europe’s modern archival theory as opposed to being the
context in which modern theory was created. The colonial other and colonial otherness remain outside of Europe and outside of archival history until some time after Europe is already wide awake. In this way, Cook’s diffusionist narrative attaches the psychic and physical violence of colonial-imperialism—or what Mignolo (2002a, p. 67) calls the “densities of the colonial experience”—to the introduction of archival theory outside of Europe as opposed to a formative aspect of modern archival theory and practice. As such, Cook’s history maintains the mythic limits of nineteenth century Europe.\(^{39}\)

With their critique of the historicist narratives of archival development, and their interrogations of the power relations that shaped France’s and Europe’s modern archives, postmodern radical historicizations and critical histories have much to contribute to Mignolo’s project of seeing modernity from positions of exteriority. However, as with Panitch, Moore and Milligan’s critical histories, Ketelaar and Cook’s historical projects work from inside the Eurocentric logic of colonial-imperialism. Even though critical histories and postmodern radical historicizations build on and draw out the differences within modern archival theory and practice, those differences remain Eurocentric.

**Thinking France’s archives from the exteriority of a mythic Europe**

Historicist, critical and postmodern histories of modern archiving continue to resituate archivists within a Eurocentric imaginative geography. Having detached Europe and the specialized public archival system from its colonial-imperial geographies and the exploitative economies that produced vast amounts of private and state wealth, Posner and other historicist narratives anachronize non-European archival traditions by presenting archivists with an archival world that is naturally moving towards ever growing sameness. While critical and postmodern histories resituate archival history within the changing power relations of nineteenth century Europe to show the differences within archival theory and practices, these differences are circumscribed by the mythic image of Europe. If histories of modern archiving are to trouble this Eurocentric imaginative geography, the return to France’s archives should look for the difference of France and Europe that disturb the very borders of Europe as well as the limits of modernity by taking up the colonial difference of modernity. In other words, archivists
need different, subaltern imaginative geographies that bring to light the “densities of the colonial experience.”

By imagining France’s archives and archival system within a more complex and expansive geography of colonial-imperialism, archivists can begin to rub against the mythic image of Europe so as to frame archival history within subaltern imaginative geographies. This expansive geography recognizes that the political, social and economic spheres in which France’s revolutionary and nineteenth century archives and archival system arose and changed were global in scope and organized through empire. This expansive history accounts, for instance, that not long after French peasants were storming the Bastille, French soldiers were sent by the republican legislature to quash a slave uprising in San Domingo—an uprising that would become the revolution that created an independent Haiti—so as to secure French colonial rule and protect France’s lucrative sugar trade. As such, this expansive geography troubles the juxtaposition of republicanism and liberal values with colonial-imperial violence to see the unfreedoms generated by colonial difference.

While being the most profitable of France’s possessions if not the most profitable European colony at the end of the eighteenth century (Phillips, 2009), San Domingo was, however, only part of France’s eighteenth and nineteenth centuries empire. Even though France lost some of its overseas territories in North American to the British during the Seven Years War (1756-64), France’s colonies and overseas holdings as of 1789 included the Caribbean islands of San Domingo, Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as French Guiana, the Indian enclaves of Pondicherry and Chandernagor, islands such as Mauritius and Réunion in the Indian Ocean, in addition to European colonies like Corsica. Napoleon’s relatively short-lived empire was built by invading Egypt and other parts of North Africa and the Middle East, and by re-establishing the Emperor’s reach over its overseas colonies and territories like Louisiana through treaties and military campaigns, as it was built by invading other European countries. And while much of Napoleon’s empire was lost before or because of Waterloo, by the Third Republic parts of Africa (Tunis, Madagascar, the Congo, Niger) and Asia (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) were, like many Caribbean and Indian territories, under French rule.40
To combat the mythic Europe in the history of modern archives, archivists interested in subaltern histories of France must, interestingly enough, first transform the France’s current archival system because that system is a primary cause by which historians of the archives come to forget the Imperial circulations in which France’s modern archiving developed. For even though “revolutionary France left a trail of records” that attests to the important place of colonialism in the last four hundred years of French history (Trouillot 1995: 101), France’s Archives nationales in no small way occludes France’s imperial geography by how those records are acquired, preserved and made available.

Historian Tony Ballantyne (2005; 2004; 2003) argues that even though national archives are repositories of documents that attest to the transnational character of empire, because they are housed in a national archives, researchers often conceptualize archival records as a window on the development of a particular nation. By transforming archives “into repositories where ‘our’ national story might be found” (Ballantyne, 2005, p. 104), the imperial circulations in which the nation was established and continues to function are lost or obfuscated. While empire “was porous, fluid and energized by the circulation of people, ideas, and ideologies through an almost bewildering array of imperial institutions, networks, and forms of cultural production,” national archives circumscribe historians’ understanding of this circulation (Ibid, p. 105, see also Burton 2003b). And just as Ballantyne (2005, p. 106) argues that it is important for historians of former colonies and decolonized countries to write histories that assume that these “colonies developed within a larger imperial system” that does not simply end with the formation of the independent nation-state, historian Antoinette Burton (2003a; 2003b) and Frederick Cooper (2007b) argue that historians should also trouble the national geographies that delimit histories of Europe’s nations by examining these nations within imperial circulations.

In other words, as Susan Buck-Morss (2009: 39) argues, if we have become accustomed to narratives “that place colonial events on the margins of European history, we have been seriously misled,” France’s Archives nationales are key site for misleading France’s historians. At present, the Archives nationales separates France’s documentary heritage such that records of the ancien régime and the Revolution, records of the central
state, and documents pertaining to France’s overseas departments (*Archives nationales d’outre-mer*) are housed in different buildings in different cities. By conducting their research in the *Archives Nationales*, the scope of historians such as Milligan, Moore and, to a lesser extent, Panitch, would have been circumscribed by the separation of the *Archives Nationales fonds* (Series AB) from other *fonds* identified by archivists as being associated with empire and housed in another series, if not another building, altogether. By dividing France’s documentary heritage in this way, France’s imperial geography and the role of the archives within it becomes obscured by a circumscribed image of the French nation that extends only as far as its mapped borders.

When studying the history of archiving, the nationalization of history through archives is compounded by the tendency to structure historical analyses around national archival systems. By creating national standards and practices that divide the world’s archival community into more or less neat, national packages, national archival systems provide archivists with what appear to be concrete nation-sized structures upon which archivists can frame their histories. However, just as historical narratives of “our” national story imagine cultural patrimony on a national scale, the focus on national archival systems in no small way nationalizes a history of archival institutions, theories and practices and the archival profession that is global in scope because they circulated within colonial-imperial economies.

There are, of course, exceptions to this nationalized framework. Archivists working in former colonial archives have begun to outline how their archival holdings were built within imperial geographies and, more importantly, how archival theories and practices continue to secure imperial-colonial relations in many former colonies. While I will turn to this scholarship in the following chapters, it is enough here to point out that even though archivists take up colonial-imperial geographies and the violent legacies that underwrite archival theory and practices in former colonies, nineteenth century French and European archives remain for the most part outside the scope of these critiques.

So as to understand how colonial difference shaped and was shaped by Europe’s archival awakening, archivists should examine metropoles and colonies in a “single analytic field” because, as Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper (1997, pp. 3-4) argue, “Europe was made by its imperial projects.” Taking up nineteenth century France
within a “single analytic field” troubles the national boundaries of France’s archival world by showing that the French territory has never been “coterminous with the boundaries of who was considered French” (Ibid, p. 22). More importantly, however, this single analytic field also undermines the archivist’s belief in the benign and ameliorative value of French republicanism—and liberalism more generally—that invest archivists in the liberal social contract as much as nation-sized archival systems. That is, looking at metropoles and colonies within a single analytic field shows that colonies were the “imaginary and physical space in which the inclusions and exclusions built into the notions of citizenship, sovereignty, and participation were worked out” (Ibid, p. 3). Within this single analytic field, the liberalization or “embourgeoisement” of nineteenth century French politics cannot be reduced to projects solely aimed at creating a citizen subject with rights and freedoms protected by law, efficient and stable governments elected by the people, and an orderly commercial sphere based on “free” wage labour because such projects were always tied up in producing non-citizen subjects, dependent economies and differential unfree labourers throughout the empire (Ibid, pp. 30-1). In short, examining metropoles and colonies within a single analytic field prevents historians from opposing liberalism to colonialism and, by taking up colonial difference at the heart of these unfreedoms, opens up nineteenth century Europe and its archives to subaltern readings of liberal colonialism.

As opposed to being a homogenizing project that produced abstract equality among citizens, nineteenth and twentieth century liberalism produced differential populations throughout France’s empire. Whether recognized under colonial law or produced through extra-legal but sanctioned means, France’s political and economic stability after the revolution required that the government and non-state organizations manage these differential populations. Produced through the racialized language of empire that equated true Frenchness with whiteness, France’s striated population—like its geography—was anything by straightforward even if it was systematized under the law or through written and unwritten rules and regulations. It was against these other types of subjects and through their subordination that the meaning of citizenship and the rights of citizens were produced.
Even if France’s differentiated population preceded the Revolution, the nineteenth century liberalization of empire created new types of subjects and transformed existing racial inequalities. Nineteenth century imperial projects that extended French citizenship to those living abroad did so by distinguishing between full citizens with rights and other subjects without such rights yet living under the authority of French rule. Just as many French subjects in the “outré-mer” were never granted full citizenship, citizenship was denied to non-settler subjects in Algeria even though Algeria was legally an extension of France after 1848 (Derderian, 2002; Ho Tai, 2001). It was within this position of differential citizenship and what historian Hue-Tam Ho Tai (2001, p. 911) calls the “Janus-faced” nature of liberal imperialism “in whose name French-men were enfranchised while other people were subjugated,” that Algerian subjects were vulnerable by law to torture and other abuses.48

Thus, even as the liberalization of empire saw many European countries including France outlaw the slave trade and slavery in their colonies over the nineteenth century as they moved away from colonial projects of domination that physically coerced, enslaved and, in many cases, exterminated indigenous population in favour of liberal civilizing missions, liberal colonial-imperialism was neither less violent nor potentially less violent than former colonial-imperial regimes. Instead, the liberalization of empire was the reorganization violence and colonial difference. Liberal empires authorized and even championed the subordination and elimination of colonial subjects through the market economy and in the name of progressive, civilizing politics.49

To assume that liberal citizenship is the solution to colonial forces and ideas is a critique of modernity from positions inside a Eurocentric logic. By producing a more expansive geography that challenges archivists’ investment in the national limits that circumscribe archival efficiency, the archive’s research mandate and patrimonie, while also pushing archivists to consider the darker side of the liberal social contract, evaluating metropoles and colonies within a single analytic field pushes histories of modern archiving to include more people and places and also trouble the Eurocentric frameworks that order these people and places. Beginning to think liberal colonial-imperial as a system that produces liberal freedoms and unfreedoms allows archivists to begin to create subaltern interpretations of modernity and modern archives.
There are at least three general ways archivists can position France and its modern archives within colonial-imperial circulations of peoples, ideas and materials that make up this more expansive and troubling geography of Europe. The first of these approaches is to focus on the funding of France’s modern archival system: *Archives nationales, Chartes*; the drafting and passing of archival legislation; and so on. Even though the French East India Company was basically insolvent by the time the revolutionary assembly dissolved its monopoly in 1790, and the French crown was almost bankrupted by its support of the American colonists against the British in the 1770s (Gottman, 2013; Phillips, 2009), France’s colonies—particularly those colonies and holdings in the Atlantic between the sixteenth and early nineteenth century—remained an important source of revenue for the modern French state. As the source of raw materials and agricultural goods, as well as being consumers of European goods and slave labour, colonies like San Dominique in the eighteenth century were a significant source of wealth for private and public companies, while taxation of imports and exports and the sale of charters filled state purses. Just as the “slave-trade and slavery were the economic basis of the French Revolution” (James, 1963, p. 47), revenues from colonial trade provided the capital for the industrialization of production within European and the expansion of European empires (Dubois, 2009; Phillips, 2009).

France’s modern archives are intimately tied up in this colonial trade. Holding on to this lucrative colonial economy was a priority of the *ancien régime*, the Revolution’s leaders, and the First Republic, even as the moral and political problem of slavery divided the Assembly in the early 1790s (Trouillot, 1995; Blackburn, 1991; James, 1963). Along with the sale of property confiscated from the aristocracy, then, it is safe to say that the revenue generated by colonial trade paid for the new archives and France’s first archivist. Just as Napoleon’s seizure of foreign property paid for as much as filled the shelves of his Imperial Archives, France’s modern archival system was financed through a colonial-imperial economy built largely on slavery until the slave trade was outlawed 1848, and then on the “free” labour of differentially “unfree” colonial subjects after that (Dubois, 2009).

Second, France’s imaginary spaces, as Stoler and Cooper (1997) call them, were shaped through colonial-imperial exchanges. Much like the import of foreign goods and
ideas from Asia shaped France’s pre-Revolutionary fashions and artisanal production (Gottman, 2013), France’s imperial economy and colonial experiences shaped France’s modern political ideas and sense of self (Phillips, 2009). Historian Laurent Dubois (2009, p. 142) notes that “Jesuit Relations:” the published accounts of Jesuit experiences in seventeenth and eighteenth century North American colonies, influenced how French people imagined Indigenous people as potential converts and France’s role in the New World as the harbinger of civilization. Modern political philosophers also used these texts to frame their theories of human nature and political relations. As Edward W. Said (1979) argues, Egypt’s position as a place and people waiting to be colonized informed and spurred on Napoleon’s ill-fated invasion of Egypt (1798-1801). Napoleon’s efforts to know Egypt through scientific study and make Egypt “modern” through colonization was, in turn, a means by which France came to realize itself as an empire.

Thus, alongside the slaves and freed gens de couleur who inhabited eighteenth and nineteenth century France, the imagination of the French nation after the Revolution were also populated with representations of colonized subjects that informed their sense of self, the limits of liberté, égalité and fraternité, as well as who could be modern and how. Tackling this imaginative economy of Frenchness means countering what Gayatri C. Spivak (1988: 280-1) calls the “epistemic violence” of imperial subject formation in which the imperial subject’s Self is predicated on producing the colonized subject as a para-subject or shadow-self of that imperial subject by sublating—erasing or subordinate difference through processes of inclusion or translation—the colonized subject’s alterity. Not only are the records of empire and imperial memory replete with this epistemic violence, but the modern archives, its mandate and the archivist’s sense of purpose were also shaped within this imaginary economy. Just as differential subjects populate colonial-imperial France well into the twentieth century, this epistemic violence did not end with liberalization but was reinvented through civilizing projects and wage labour, and then the reinvention of France’s Empire into a community of independent states after World War II.50

Third, the work of modern archiving is colonial-imperial in scope because nineteenth-century European governments organized and were organized through colonial-imperial circulations. Despite the deceivingly neat divisions between
government departments, there were no hard and fast distinctions between those officials and departments governing the colonies and those concerned with continental France. As French archivists worked to archive the records of France’s government and, indeed, divide it up, the day to day functioning of France’s eighteenth and nineteenth century governments and discourses of governance were colonial-imperial in scope. For just as the First Republic (1892-1804) was no less imperial in scope than the ancien régime that preceded it or Napoleon’s empire that followed it, the French state’s imperial scope neither disappears with the end of each “Empire”-named regime nor is it typified by anyone regime. Indeed, the governments of the Second Republic (1848-1852), Second Empire (1852-1870) and Third Republic (1870-1940) are no less imperial even if their projects and rhetoric were national in scope (Cooper 2007b).

Archivists working in the Archives nationales have always worked with records that were produced within or between colonies, records that traveled back and forth between the metropole and colonies, between colonies, and between metropoles along overlapping official, entrepreneurial and familial lines of communication. Indeed, as a state agency, France’s archival system became part of this imperial machine that both extended existing economic, political and social circulations and also created new archival colonial-imperial circulations. That is, while the construction of colonial archives before and after the French Revolution were founded and changed to suit the demands of colonial governance, throughout the nineteenth century France’s archival system came to inform colonial policy and what constituted good colonial governance.

For instance, as when Cochinchina’s colonial governor Admiral de la Grandière mandated the creation of that colony’s archives in 1868, by the second half of the nineteenth century colonial administrators were setting up archives in France’s colonies to ensure good and efficient colonial governance. Regardless of whether or not Cochinchina’s archives fulfilled de la Grandière’s desires, the promise reiterated by Chartes graduates that an archives was at the base of efficient governance shaped France’s imperial imagination just as Chartes trained archivists would begin to circulate between colonies and metropole to impose archival order in colonies like Cochinchina. In other words, French archivists never simply imposed some pre-established imperial archival order when they worked abroad. As opposed to making Cochinchina’s archives a
mere copy of France’s *Archives nationales*, the way archival theories, practices and employees traveled to and from colonies, and were changed in these colonial-imperial circulations, created and reorganized the ideals of France’s liberal empire.

Thinking the colonial-imperial modern archives from a position between the liberal freedoms and unfreedoms of modernity is not a negative or nihilistic pursuit that gives up an investment in some noble modern archival project. Instead, pushing towards this exteriority and thinking from a space of liberal freedoms and unfreedoms opens archivists up to new understandings of colonial-imperial relations, the French Revolution and the events of the nineteenth century. As archivists displace the mythic image of Europe from the history of modern archiving in favour of geographies of circulating ideas, peoples and materials, other places and events within this geography challenge the privileged place enjoyed by both the metropole and the French Revolution in archival histories.

Subaltern imaginative geographies of modern archiving emerge in these colonial-imperial circulations to produce new readings of old maps while also searching out new maps based on unfamiliar cartographic principles. Even though colonial-imperialism is the context for modern social, political and economic change, it does not mean that European’s were the only agents of change (Ballantyne, 2010). France “was forged in multiple sites, with complicated repercussions and reactions that brought together actors as varied as *philosophes* and enslaved insurgents, in a web of influence and counter-influence that was always multidirectional” (Dubois, 2009, pp. 152-3). As such, it is not enough, as Amy Turner Bushnell (2009, p. 212) argues, for European settlers to “occupy the stage” while “natives stand in the wings” of any colonial-imperial map. Indeed, many of the spaces on nineteenth century maps of imperial France were often controlled by Indigenous populations, with the empire itself shaped by events like the Haitian Revolution.

Shaped by the colonial-imperial circulations of peoples, ideas and materials, the modern notions of citizenship, efficiency, history and *patrimonie* in which archivists invest were never totally “European” in origin. This is, in itself, nothing to bemoan or celebrate but, instead, something that should require historians of the modern archives to start from other points on the imperial map and trouble the diffusionist directions of the flows that imagine everything moving from metropole to the colonies. In this expansive
and troubling geography, subaltern interpretations and ideas arise that call archivists to account for the colonial difference underwriting modern archives and, also point them to other interpretations of familiar concepts. For instance, leading up to and during the Haitian Revolution, revolutionaries in San Domingo deployed European and African political theories to both understand and combat the oppressive and racialized system of slavery, and also form notions of citizenship and freedom that rubbed against liberté, égalité and fraternité. As opposed to being ideas and voices coming from outside of modern France, these other interpretations offer archivists starting points that both speak to what Mignolo calls the “densities of the colonial experience” and expressions of the double consciousness wrought by colonial difference that opens up positions of exteriority to understand modern archiving. In other words, these subaltern imaginative geographies resituate the historian of the archives, estranging them and modern archives from the familiar lines of mythic Europe.

If France persists as a problem for writing histories of modern archiving, it is not the only country haunting archivists. In the next chapter I turn to Ancient Greece and move from the problem of writing history to the problem of decolonizing archival discourses by challenging what McKemmish et al (2011, p. 226) calls “the linked dichotomies of orality–literacy, myth–history, savagery–civilisation and tradition–modernity, and the consequent positioning of Indigenous voices and narratives as inferior.” Therefore, while the next chapter is, in a way, also concerned with Eurocentric imaginative geographies, I shift my focus from the problems of a mythic Europe to the troubling critiques of modern archivings’ literate and written biases so as to challenge the Eurocentrism behind the “myth of the alphabet” and the liberal-settler narratives that attempt to re-secure settler title and entitlement at the base of post-colonial archives and archiving.
Chapter Two

Eurocentrism and the promise of postliterate archiving

Archivists and historians increasingly distinguish between oral modes of remembering and written record keeping practices to frame colonial relations: particularly the relations between colonized, Indigenous populations and Euro-American settlers. This distinction allows archivists to point to the cultural differences that distinguish Indigenous and settler modes of communication, and also speak to the power relations behind dominant archiving theories and practices that not only favour written record keeping practices but also marginalize—if not outright denigrate and dismiss—Indigenous modes of remembering. The imposition of written record keeping practices and “written” archives on Indigenous populations are part of the colonizing process that works, in settler-national contexts, to secure settler title and entitlement to stolen land by privileging settler legal structures, modes of governance, and private property rights, over and against traditional Indigenous authorities and relationships to the land.\(^1\)

Decolonizing mainstream archival discourses requires that archivists challenge the written bias in archival theories and practices that buttresses settler colonial relations of power. However, because the distinctions between oral and written remain caught up in essentialist, Eurocentric frameworks of oral and literate ways of being or mentalities, decolonizing mainstream archival discourses and theories cannot simply be reduced to arguing for oral modes of remembering that remain opposed to a literate mentality. Instead, decolonizing archival discourses is about challenging, as Sue McKemmish et al. (2011, p. 226) argue, “the linked dichotomies of orality–literacy, myth–history, savagery–civilisation and tradition–modernity, and the consequent positioning of Indigenous voices and narratives as inferior.” To critically engage the power relations between Indigenous remembering and settler written record keeping, decolonizing archival discourses requires that archivists take up the difficult work of critically interpreting the written bias that underwrites colonial archiving so as to trouble the influence of Eurocentric mentalities frameworks.

To carry out this work of decolonizing archival literature, I do two things in this chapter. First, I map out the two registers: mentality and historical frameworks, that
archivists use to organize the differences between oral and written modes of communication. To this end, the first section of this chapter outlines the mentality framework developed by Hugh Taylor based on Marshall McLuhan’s communication theory to argue that orality and literacy are Eurocentric in denying the colonial difference of the modern world by reducing colonialism to an effect of literacy that ultimately began with the Greeks and “alphabetic” thinking. The second section examines how archivists use a historical approach to situate oral and written modes of communication within the colonial context of Indigenous-settler relations to argue that the historical frameworks begin the work of decolonizing archival discourses by showing that colonial difference underwrites oral and written modes of communication. As it works to account for the complex colonial relations that inform oral remembering as much as written communication, these historicizations function as subaltern rationalities that open up spaces for postcolonial archival theorizing.

The second thing this chapter is interested in is how what I call the Eurocentric promise of postliterate archives figures electronic archiving in both of these registers as the transcendence of colonial relations. In the first section I show how this promise extends the Eurocentric framework of the mentalities framework and, by obfuscating the continuing colonial relations within electronic archiving, encourages archivists to reinvest in narratives of Western Civilization. In the second section, I show how this promise buttresses Laura Millar’s (2006a) liberal-settler historical narrative of an increasingly “blended” oral-written archival world that re-secures settler title and entitlement by obfuscating the ways colonial difference continues to shape the present. That is, through a reading of Millar’s essay, I will show how the postliterate promise works to assure archivists that there are no more meaningful differences between oral and written modes of remembering and, thus, closes down the decolonizing potential of the historical framework.

**Greek literacy and the promise of the postliterate archives**

According to archivist Terry Cook (1992, p. 39), fellow Canadian archivist Hugh Taylor was significant for developing archival theories and practices by encouraging archivists to “return to a conceptual orality” behind the written record. That is, as
opposed to seeing and treating records with a literate bias that views records as coherent wholes—records that can be known in and of themselves and, thus, archived according to their intrinsic qualities.\(^2\) Taylor’s conceptual orality pushes archivist to see records as the product of a social context: the words and deeds that produce and give the record its meaning.\(^3\) Taylor’s notion of conceptual orality and call for archivists to examine the context in which records were produced has been fruitful for archival theorists and, in particular, those advocating for postmodern archival frameworks. Rather than archivists organizing their work around the supposedly inherent characteristics of the records, many postmodern-inspired archivists argue for modes of archiving that begin with what archivist Tom Nesmith (2006) has come to call a notion of societal provenance that assumes that records are the product of ongoing processes involving multiple records creators working within unequal relations of power.\(^4\) As Nesmith (2006) argues, a notion of societal provenance is necessary to understand inter-cultural relations between Aboriginal and settler populations in which records were produced, but also open up colonial records to new and dissenting readings.\(^5\)

As archivists—particularly postmodern archivists—push the archival community to pay greater attention to the words and deeds behind record, the concepts of literacy, orality and postliteracy that Taylor deployed to make his argument have largely disappeared from the discussion even as a “return to conceptual orality” and societal provenance continue to orient archival theorists. For Taylor (1988), the return to conceptual orality is tied to the effects of electronic media on twentieth century literate societies: effects that require archivists to rethink the work of archiving through postliterate\(^6\) archival theories and practices that both trouble and extend literate archiving. It is also because of this postliterate context that Taylor directs archivists to engage with preliterate, Indigenous communities. To consider the significance of conceptual orality and postliterate archiving for decolonizing archival discourses, and account for why Taylor’s notions of literacy, orality and postliteracy have largely disappeared, it is necessary to map out Taylor’s theoretical approach to, and critique of, literate archiving.

Taylor’s theory of conceptual orality emerges out of his interest in the work of Canadian communication theorists Harold Innis, Walter Ong and, in particular, Marshall McLuhan. Following these theorists, Taylor distinguishes between literate and oral
approaches to records by identifying the Greeks’ reinvention of the phonetic alphabet between the fifth and eighth centuries B.C (when the Greeks began representing vowel sounds) as the starting point of a literate mentality. This return to the Greek alphabet entangles these communication theorists and the archivists that follow them in what Harvey J. Graff and John Duffy (2008, p. 46) call the “myth of the alphabet” that assumes the use of this reinvented phonetic alphabet restructured Greek thought. The “myth of the alphabet” assumes that by “representing sound graphically,” literate Greeks no longer needed “extra-textual information in order for the reader to decode the signs” that was characteristic of oral modes of reading and writing (Street, 1995, p. 154). In other words, with the representation of vowels, the Greeks no longer needed performers to interpret a text to make it understood because, with everything written on the page, the text could now simply be read. Believing that the representation of vowels abstracted sound into “purely spatial components” (Ibid), the myth of the alphabet assumes that literate language “could be objectified, manipulated, preserved, and transmitted across time and distances, leading to the development of abstract thought” (Graff & Duffy, 2008, p. 46).

Richard Cavell (1999) argues that McLuhan’s take on the importance of the invention of the phonetic alphabet differs from others. For McLuhan, it is not that the phonetic alphabet spatialized reality but, instead, changed the way oral cultures experienced space. For McLuhan (1964), the move from orality to literacy was a move from an acoustic to a visual, Euclidean model of space that exchanged an ear for an eye when negotiating the world. In McLuhan’s take on the importance of the Greek’s reinvention of the alphabet, then, the transition from orality to literacy was a move from unbounded sensory perception of space to a demarcation of the senses and, thus, a move from an experience of the world as presence to sequential repetition.

Despite McLuhan’s distinct spatial interpretation, McLuhan still adheres to the myth of the alphabet. As a form of media determinism—the idea that differences and historical change are caused by the adoption and use of particular media such as the phonetic alphabet—the myth of the alphabet is productive because it transforms literacy into a mentality by removing literacy from the contexts in which particular reading and writing practices took place. With literacy seen as a “fundamental agent of change—change either in the works of society or to the mentality of individuals” (Thomas, 1992,
p. 15), literacy marks a historical—as much as psychic—break from the past that leads historians to divide “literate” from “preliterate” Greece, and also separate literate Greeks from their preliterate neighbours that remained dominated by a oral mentality. As such, through the myth of the alphabet there are “rational, historical, individualistic literate peoples on one side, and ‘nonlogical,’ mythical, communal oral peoples on the other” (Graff & Duffy, 2008, p. 46). In other words, the myth produces a world divided between an oral experience of the world as presence and a literate way of being that abstracts the observable world into discrete spatial-temporal co-ordinates and phenomena seen from an abstract, Archimedean perspective (McLuhan, 1962; 1964; Grosswiler, 2004). Important for those who think about how literacy changed the way the past is imagined, the myth of the alphabet divides the world into oral cultures that recall the past to make it live again in the present, and literate peoples who externalize memory such that the past—which is now understood through written records—is seen as different from the present because it is placed at a temporal distance from the present.  

The myth of the alphabet is also productive as it creates historical discontinuities and geographical divisions within the ancient world as it ties Ancient Greece to modern Europe by removing Greece from the ancient Eastern Mediterranean world in which it traded and situated itself. According to this myth, Literate Greece was fundamentally different from its neighbours because Greece both invented the phonetic alphabet and remained the sole beneficiary of this technology within an overwhelmingly oral Eastern Mediterranean world. Through the myth of the alphabet, European scholars “kidnapped” Ancient and Classical Greece—as Enrique Dussel (2000, p. 467) puts it—from the Eastern Mediterranean world in which it was a part to make it essentially Western. By kidnapping Ancient Greece, the myth of the alphabet separates a literate West from the rest of the world.  

By going back to a Greece that is distinct from the rest of the Mediterranean world, the myth of the alphabet buttresses the Eurocentric interpretation of modernity as the product of Europe in conversation with itself by arguing that Europe, as part of a literate, Western Civilization, was always already distinct from the Oriental, oral world. Kidnapping Greece both obfuscates the influence of long-standing oral modes of communication on Ancient Greek reading and writing techniques and also purifies the
Western tradition by pushing the Phoenicians—from whom the Greeks inherited their alphabet—to a time and place both outside and before literacy proper and, thus, outside and before the Western world. In this way, the myth negates any Near Eastern origins and characteristics of abstract, rational thought as it also negates the historical and international relations in which the phonetic alphabet, along with Greek language and culture, took shape (Grosswiler, 2004; Bernal, 1987; 2001). Although oral and literate societies and peoples interacted, in a world divided by the myth of the alphabet the development of the literate world is imagined to happen according to an inherent literate mentality. In other words, having kidnapped Greece, “literate” Western culture is the result of a literate West in conversation with itself.\textsuperscript{11}

Dividing the world between oral and literate mentalities creates a rather strange world geography. Defined by lack of phonetic-based technologies and standing in as the antithesis or negative space of literacy, the parameters of orality become increasingly elastic over time, capturing within it different and often unrelated cultural practices. At the same time, literacy becomes geographically discrete and primarily localized in Europe. As the moniker “oral culture” homogenizes the differences between African, Chinese (and Asians of all kinds), and Aboriginal cultures, literacy gathers together Europe into a cultural entity that exists despite the differences between Europe’s national and sub-national constituents. By conflating abstract thought with a Western intellectual tradition, the myth of the alphabet groups the different and often antagonistic schools of European philosophy and science together, while non-European “philosophies” are made out to be more or less the same in their oral nature. The perceived orality of certain European communities is explained away as oral hangovers and the failure of literacy to fully penetrate this or that sub-national group or ethnic community.

Even as contemporary oral communities continue to exist alongside literate ones, the myth of the alphabet presumes a linear, historicist narrative in which orality not only precedes literacy but also that the only future of oral societies is to become literate. In this way, Greece’s transformation from oral to literate becomes paradigmatic for theories of social, anthropological and cognitive development just as the history of Western Civilization from Ancient Greece to modern Europe becomes the model for understanding historical development. That is, the history of the literate West becomes a
means for mapping out the different stages that mark the development of different
civilizations and, ultimately, the development of the world. Understanding the
development of the world through the history of the Greco-Roman world and its
European heirs creates both a world in Europe’s image and also makes modern, literate
Europe the most advanced stage in world history (Dussel, 2000). In other words, the
myth of the alphabet imagines the “ascendancy of the White, Christian West as the
meaning of history” (Sterne, 2011, p. 222).

By making democracy, rational, scientific and abstract thought, as well as
historiography, monotheism, capitalism, and codified law the products of literate
thinking, literacy is figured as the cause of those values and institutions deemed modern
(Sterne, 2011; Havelock, 1976; Thomas, 1992; Grosswiler, 2004). In this way, the myth
of the alphabet both negates the role of oral, non-European peoples in the production of
modernity, and also anachronizes contemporary oral cultures such that they are seen to be
out of sync with the modern world (Sterne, 2011). Denying what anthropologist Johannes
Fabian (1988) calls the coevalness of different—but contemporary—worldings, the myth
makes non-Western subjects and practices understandable only as something left over
from the past. Within this Eurocentric framework, modernity can be understood without
studying non-Europe and the colonies, while Europe is what makes non-Europe and the
colonies historically understandable.

Further, with literacy posited as the only real future for oral cultures, “non-literate”
technological transformations within oral cultures are seen as incomplete or lacking. For
instance, while oral cultures may use writing, pictographs, “hieroglyphs, and other forms
of representing speech were seen as prior and inferior to alphabetic literacy” because they
do not abstract vowel sounds into “purely spatial components” (Graff & Duffy, 2008, p.
46). Without producing abstract thought, contemporary oral societies are figured as static
or unchanging, and remain more or less commensurable with the ancient Orient. Unable
to significantly change themselves, oral communities are marked by their conservatism
and adherence to tradition in comparison to the dynamism of the West’s literate
technologies. With few exceptions, those who ascribe to the myth of the alphabet assume
that literacy not only supplants orality but also is superior to it (Thomas, 1992).
Invoking the myth of the alphabet, Taylor (1988, p. 458) argues that the invention of the “phonetic alphabet…separated those who used it from the concrete immediacy of the natural environment from which pictograms had been drawn.”\textsuperscript{14} With the advent of this abstract mode of thinking “thoughts became interiorized, detached, analytical, having a life of their own and yielding to reason and logic, expressed, exchanged, and preserved through text” (Ibid). Literacy in Greece ultimately led Greeks to think “in a linear manner” such that the subject of thought came to see himself at a distance from the world (Ibid; McLuhan, 1964; Thomas, 1992; Ong, 2002).

With this myth underwriting archivists’ views of Greek record keeping practices, archivists attribute the emergence and rise to prominence of archivists (archons) in Athens and the important place of the Metroon or records office in Athenian society to the externalization of memory that is part and parcel of literate thinking. As the argument goes, reading and interpreting written records as opposed to relying on authorized remembrancers or mnemons required the develop of record keeping practices to protect records from being manipulated so that they could be trusted as sources of the past.\textsuperscript{15} As a profession dedicated to ensuring that records can be trusted, modern archivists are often figured as the heirs of the Athenian archons and thus a profession caught up in a literate way of thinking that goes back to the Greeks (Taylor, 1988; 1992; Cook, 2000).

As opposed to seeing the literate bias of modern archiving as a boon, Taylor follows Ong and McLuhan who are concerned with the limitations and problems of literacy.\textsuperscript{16} For McLuhan and Taylor, the dynamism of the phonetic alphabet is not a benefit but an individuating process that creates a distance between the subject and the world. For McLuhan (1964), only literate subjects capable of imagining themselves as being outside and not of the world could create world-destroying weapons and exploit the earth’s resources to the detriment of all living creatures. Echoing the Judeo-Christian narrative of humanity’s expulsion from Eden, McLuhan portrays oral societies as retaining a pre-lapsarian experience of being in and of the world.\textsuperscript{17} Compared to the fallen state of literacy, McLuhan’s orality appears to be “innocent, pure, and natural, uncorrupted by the written word” (Thomas, 1992, p. 7).

Despite his critique of literacy, McLuhan continues to abide by the myth of the alphabet’s Eurocentric historical narrative in which the Western, literate subject is the
only true subject of history because, unlike the “magically discontinuous and traditional world” conserved by non-alphabetic writing systems, the phonetic alphabet releases “the individual…from the tribal web” (1964, p. 86) to allow the literate individual to transform the world. In McLuhan’s writing, orality remains on the edges of history and oral communities remain absent presences in making the modern world. By conflating literacy with modernity, orality becomes tied to the term “traditional” or “tribal” such that oral communities are more or less static entities unable to fully disabuse themselves of their oral mentality. Despite his critique of literacy, until phonetic writing arrives on the scene, according to McLuhan non-Western cultures remain relatively unchanged.

Even though McLuhan does not valorize the phonetic alphabet as a more true and productive way of knowing the world, in his writing the phonetic alphabet retains a universalizing capacity that non-alphabetic writing does not have. For instance, in contemporary encounters between oral societies and the literate West, the Western subject is not in danger of becoming tribal by learning non-alphabetic script. For McLuhan (1964, p. 58), “Westernization,” or the transformation of tribal societies by detaching traditional subjects from their “tribal web,” is the only outcome of encounters between oral and literate cultures. Mired in the Eurocentric progressive narrative that literacy follows orality, and convinced of orality’s ineffectualness, McLuhan remains convinced that non-Western writing is incapable of retribalizing Western subjects.

Because McLuhan’s media determinism subsumes colonialism and imperialism within the long duree of Western literacy, the colonial project and imperial ventures do not seem to significantly alter literacy or the literate subject. However, Westernization remains significant for McLuhan who is very concerned with the hybrid “tribal” subjects Westernization produces. Even though the destructive power of the literate West staggers McLuhan, he warns that the hybridization of the Chinese, Indian and African oral cultures with the introduction of the phonetic alphabet will produce an “aggressive violence” that will make “the previous history of phonetic alphabet technology seem quite tame” (1964, p. 58). In McLuhan’s critique of literacy, oral communities remain caught in a double bind: left to themselves they remain inferior, if Westernized they become threatening, if not monstrous.
Informed by McLuhan’s framework, it is perhaps no surprise that Taylor’s call for a “return to a conceptual orality” is not a call to return to preliterate orality. Instead, conceptual orality builds on McLuhan’s analysis of the conceptual changes wrought by electronic media in modern literate societies. According to McLuhan, the linear and centralized world of literacy is imploding with the fragmentation and decentralization wrought by automation and new media. The postliterate subject McLuhan imagines is no longer distanced from the world but connected to it because new media devices extend “our central nervous system itself in a global embrace” so that the subject has an immediate and multi-sensorial experience of their environment (1964, pp. 19-21). Through the development and use of new electronic media in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the West is being “retribalized.”

In comparison to the threatening hybridizations of oral communities that result from Westernization, the retribalization of literate society is, in McLuhan’s (1964) opinion, less violent and less dangerous. Indeed, in comparison to the destructive power of literacy, retribalization appears to be a wholly positive event. As Taylor (1992, p. 21) puts it, postliteracy offers a return to the relationship between “movement and speech” at the base of orality that will allow the postliterate subject to interpret the world with terms that “do not modify, analyze, or describe independent clauses but speak concretely about a world of the past in the present, a mythic presentation” (Taylor, 1988, p. 458). While literate-minded archiving treats records as inert materials to be organized according to objective criteria and mined for facts by researchers, postliterate archiving opens up the potential of creating spaces for experiencing and interacting with records that are animated by the words and deeds that created them. In other words, the postliterate archivist will allow researchers to engage with a living past. As opposed to creating hard and fast categories, the postliterate archivist creates theories and practices that pay “far more attention to the nature of these media, the way they work us over, and the way they affect our culture” (Taylor, 1993a, p. 234). By creating an experience of the world that “is more holistic and planetary” through which we become more “conscious of ourselves as part of a natural environment,” postliterate orality is a means of transcending the biases of literate archiving (Taylor, 1988, p. 457). This holistic view of the world wrought by electronic media underwrites what can be called the promise of postliterate archiving.
As opposed to facilitating a return to orality or even a valorization of oral communities, the promise of postliteracy maintains the distinction between postliterate orality and preliterate orality. Indeed, oral cultures’ lack of capacity to change the world contrasts not only to the transformative power of the alphabet, but also the potential of electronic media. As the outcome of the West’s development of electronic telephonic media such as the radio and the telephone, postliterate orality can break literacy’s hold on the Western imagination and way of being in the world. Postliteracy is, then, not an effect of any encounter between oral and literate cultures but the end result of a dialectical process taking place solely within the literate West. As a result of Western electronic technologies, postliterate orality troubles but ultimately expands a literate mentality. By inheriting from literacy the capacity to change the world, postliteracy extends the Eurocentric assumption that modernity and whatever follows modernity will continue to be the product of the West in conversation with itself. If literacy troubled McLuhan’s belief in the superiority of the West, the Eurocentric retribalized, postliterate subject allows McLuhan to reinvest in Western Civilization.

Taylor, and later Cook, were interested in the effects of a postliterate world on archives and, in particular, were concerned that by continuing to approach the archives with literate, “paper minds,” archivists risk becoming obsolete because they will be unable to adapt to this new reality (Cook, 1994, p. 302-3). Unlike the hierarchically ordered literate world, the postliterate archivist must contend with “a world full of uncertainties, fluidity, and abandonment to fixed positions” (Taylor 1993a: 227-8). This risk is most present in challenges posed by electronic records: records produced by multiple users over an indefinite period of time, in various locations and for numerous purposes. Unlike the seemingly tangible and stable provenance of written records, electronic records remain relatively intangible in the ongoing processes that create them (Cook, 1992). In this way, conceptual orality is not only more holistic but necessary to deal with a world of electronic records. However, for a profession that has for so long focused on creating or imposing a fixed order on the multitudes of records put in their care, adapting archivists to an electronic world of fluid categories is more than difficult.

Thankfully for Canadian archivists concerned with their literate bias, even though the ephemeral nature of postliterate “electronic records threaten paper-minded people as
nothing before ever has” (Cook, 1994, p. 303), all is not lost because, according to Taylor, the literate archive was never totalizing. Even though Taylor (1992: 19) argues that the “whole richness of the oral discourse and exchange…is lost” to the literate West, the literate archives in Canada have always strayed towards what remains of an oral heritage in at least two ways. First, by figuring Canada’s archiving tradition as part of a bureaucratic system inherited from England, Taylor (1988, p. 459) argues that despite the codification of English law, “English common law has kept alive the spirit of ancient oral custom over against written codes.” Second, because archives have been responsible for the records of parliaments, courts and other “institutions where oral discourse plays a large part” (Taylor, 1992, p. 19), archivists have always been pushed to the margins of literacy by working with records that are the remnants of words and actions of public officials. By attending to the records of acts and deeds and being part of a bureaucracy that is as much the offspring of common law as written law, archivists have always attended to the excess of written records even if their paper minds have not realized it.

Unlike librarians who deal only with content, then, Taylor (1992) argues that because archivists deal with texts as texture and are attuned to the media of the record, archivists can handle new media records because they can see them as actions. While Taylor (1992, p. 20) notes that archivists “cannot and should not deny or reject our textual literacy” he argues archivists must nonetheless “resist reading the ‘new’ media in a literal, textual manner and begin to learn unfamiliar grammar, syntax and semiotics.” Archivists need to “bring all our senses to bear—not just intellectual rationality and the old linear approaches” to all types of records; including textual documents (Taylor, 1993a, p. 229). It is by bringing all their senses to bear on the record to compliment and transform their textual literacy, that archivists will be able to meet the demands of postliterate subjects and deal with the new challenges posed by electronic records.¹⁹

The Canadian archivists capacity to cope with electronic media is, then, according to Taylor, the result of a tension within production of the literate West’s documentary heritage. And while this capacity is in no way linked to an interaction with colonized, Indigenous subjects, for Taylor postliterate archiving also promises to overcome colonial record keeping practices as far as colonialism and colonial archives as an effect of literate thinking.²⁰ According to Taylor (1988, p. 463), colonial record keeping—as represented
in the files of Canada’s Department of Indian Affairs (DIA)—is the “perfect expression of a value system based on the phonetic alphabet, literacy, and print” that abstractly approaches the world.\textsuperscript{21} As a result, Taylor’s framework suggests that postliteracy—as the troubling, if not undoing, of literacy—takes care of the problem of colonial relations in a place like Canada. The danger of such a promise is that, by reducing the problems of colonialism to the problems of literate thinking, Taylor’s mentalities framework risks making the electronic media appear antagonistic to the colonial projects they were a part of. By obfuscating the power relations that inform electronic media, the promise of the postliterate archives prevents archivists from contending with what might be called a postliterate neocolonialism and the marginalization of Indigenous communities that manifests in the work of postliterate archiving and bringing “all our senses to bear” on records.

Despite the opposition of postliteracy to orality, the potential of postliterate archiving to end colonial record keeping practices does not mean that Indigenous people cease to exist in the postliterate archival world. Indeed, so that paper minded archivists can begin to grasp what the postliterate environment demands of them, Taylor (1988, pp. 457-8) argues that archivists should look to contemporary-yet-traditional Indigenous communities because these “preliterate” communities “depended, and still depend, on memory and the spoken word accompanied by gesture and action to communicate with each other.” While seemingly troubling McLuhan’s dismissive and then fearful view of preliterate oral communities, Taylor’s approach to Indigenous communities, no matter how positive, remains Eurocentric. By describing Indigenous communities as “preliterate,” postliterate archiving approaches particular Indigenous communities as members of a homogenized and timeless group outside of modernity.\textsuperscript{22} And even though these so-called preliterate communities such as the Indigenous communities in Canada become sources for the future of archiving, nowhere does Taylor propose sharing authority over the archives with these communities. While Indigenous peoples may persist in Canada, they nonetheless remain outside or on the edge of Canada’s postliterate archival system.

Indeed, as a problem of a literate way of thinking that goes back to the Greeks, the promise of the postliterate archive is premised on the denial of colonial difference. In
Taylor’s framework, literacy, rather than the colonially of power, shapes the modern world. Premised on the Eurocentric assumption that the literate West created the modern archival world in conversation with itself, the promise of the postliterate archive forecloses any possibility of creating what Mignolo (2001, 2002b) calls an enunciative space at the exteriority of the Eurocentric, hegemonic knowledge system because the colonized, non-literate other remains outside modernity. Remaining at the internal limit of a Eurocentric notion of modernity, “conceptual orality” returns the archivist to a modern world produced by Europeans in conversation with themselves.

The disappearance of Taylor’s oral-literate-postliterate distinctions from archival discourses—particularly postmodern archival discourses—concerning “conceptual orality” and getting at the context behind the record to think through provenance is, in part, due to the totalizing and depoliticizing nature of such a framework. Even though Cook argues in favour of Taylor’s significance for contemporary archivists and, indeed, builds on Taylor’s work, Cook nonetheless tackles and works to displace the depoliticizing effects of the promise of the postliterate archive. Indeed, Cook (1992) argues that by focusing on the acts and deeds behind the record—and, thus, understanding the record as part of the larger social context in which it was produced—archivists are required to deal with the power relations governing the archive’s production. Whereas paper-minded archivists reduced provenance to a single author or location, focusing on social context pushes archivists to see provenance as a relationship between the author and other social actors. In the case of the DIA archives, then, by focusing on the acts and deeds behind the record, the archivist should see the archives as the relationship between DIA agents and Indigenous populations and the power relations that govern that relationship. While colonialism remains largely literate in scope for Cook, Cook’s rethinking of Taylor’s conceptual orality nonetheless permits the colonial archives contain far more than the literate subject or a literate bias.

In Cook’s reformulation of Taylor’s conceptual orality, archivists are called on to take up the task of documenting both society’s marginalized members whose role in creating the records has been heretofore obfuscated, and also the modes—social, economic and political—by which groups were and continue to be marginalized. In the case of DIA records, archivists are pushed to see colonial record keeping as a process that
continues to marginalize the presence of Indigenous populations in those records and their role in creating them, as opposed representations of literate thinking. With an eye to the unequal power relations in which records were produced, archived and accessed, within postmodern archiving conceptual orality opens up avenues for Aboriginal communities to be seen as substantive participants in making archives where once they were the invisible objects of archival records.

In Cook’s interpretation of conceptual orality, turning to the preliterate societies for guidance, as Taylor advises, would be accompanied by an interrogation of the way Indigenous communities have been marginalized through colonialism and colonial record keeping. One would hope this would include critiquing the Eurocentric framework that conjures up contemporary Indigenous communities as “preliterate” and residing at the edges of modernity. If the work of decolonizing archival discourses and theories requires challenging, as McKemmish et al (2011, p. 226) state, “the linked dichotomies of orality–literacy, myth–history, savagery–civilisation and tradition–modernity” that position “Indigenous voices and narratives as inferior,” archivists must not only critique their own paper minds but situate those paper minds as part and parcel of a modern world shaped by the coloniality of power. If returning to the words and deeds behind the record is to have the potential of opening up a space of enunciation built on another, subaltern “grammar, syntax and semiotics,” archivists need to interrogate and challenge the myth of the alphabet. In other words, decolonizing archival discourses and theories requires that archivists approach oral modes of remembering and written documentary traditions as a relationship mediated by colonial difference.

**Decolonizing oral and written traditions and the neocolonial promises of post-documentary Canada**

To challenge the myth of the alphabet that frames the study of Ancient Greece, historian Rosalind Thomas (1992) argues that Greek literacy needs to be historicized. That is, the way Greeks read and wrote, and the values they gave written records, needs to be determined according to the extant anthropological and textual evidence and not according to some simplified relationship between inherently different oral and literate mentalities. Following from her own historical examination, Thomas argues that Greece’s
oral traditions were not replaced by literate approaches but, instead, that these traditions continued to inform the use of written records. As such, Athenians did not imagine written records as modern record keepers do. Instead, written records were seen to have a variety of symbolic values in Athens that had as much to do with displaying wealth and power, and of seeing records as being imbued with religious or magical properties, as it did with maintaining the authenticity of the record.²⁴

In critiquing modern archiving, many archivists have moved from discussing literacy and orality to looking at the relationship between oral modes of remembering and written documentary traditions. As opposed to being mentalities, this shift to oral and written situates the making and use of written archival records and oral modes of transmission within the social and political relations in which they developed. Taken up by archivists and researchers working in and through settler nations’ archives, oral and written communication are situated within settler colonial relations that marginalized Aboriginal peoples and denigrated if not outright negated Indigenous modes of remembering and the work of installing a colonial archives in these settler colonies-turned-nation-states.²⁵

As opposed to being an inherently different way of being and thinking, archivists increasingly frame oral Indigenous modes of remembering according to the rules or laws that determine the conditions by which authorized persons can transmit knowledge through particular modes of communication: oral histories, artifacts, and so on.²⁶ Tied to political, economic and social relations of power, these rules govern who is authorized to transmit knowledge, to whom it can be transmitted, and how it is to be transmitted. As opposed to being static or homogenous, oral modes of remembering are multiple, flexible and changing, with the rules governing transmission being neither uniform across different Indigenous communities nor static.²⁷ Similarly, written record keeping is seen as the sets of rules that determine, among other things, how to ensure the authenticity of records through processes of acquiring, describing, preserving and making these records available within continuing settler societies.

The difference between oral and written is not the result of inherent ways of knowing and being but is, instead, the difference between the rules that govern oral modes of remembering and written documentary traditions. Seen as the relationship
between different sets of rules, archivists both acknowledge that Indigenous and settler modes of communication are distinct ways of remembering, and also allow them to draw comparisons between Indigenous and European-settler communication systems. Thus, archivists recognize that Indigenous and non-Indigenous modes of communication remain incommensurable because the rules of transmission are founded in, and support, different legal, political and moral systems of property and propriety. That is, oral and written presume different understandings of authority and ownership, as well as religious or spiritual worldviews, even if these worldviews remain fluid. This incommensurability does not, however, prevent archivists from translating and deploying Indigenous rules to create more “mixed” archival praxis. As such, the work of decolonizing archival discourses does not come from either dividing the world absolutely as a mentalities framework does or by creating a sameness through translation that negates the difference of one or the other system. Instead, decolonizing archival discourses requires that archivists interpret and translate differences in ways that promote and maintain vibrant and equitable social, political and economic relations within and between these Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. To carry out such decolonizing modes of interpretation and translation archivists must critically interrogate the ways oral and written modes of communication reproduce colonial and settler colonial social relations.

Much critical work has already been done to map out the relationship between written archives and colonization. David Hanlon (1999, p. 15) argues that in the Pacific Islands it is difficult to disentangle libraries and research collections from the imperial and colonial pasts that have made them possible, whose records they preserve, and whose written histories they advance (often to the exclusion or repression of other histories). The existence of libraries and collections in the Pacific has been made possible by the intrusion, contact, displacement and colonisation of then extant local epistemologies. Knowledge written down needed a place to be kept, while other modes of knowledge were left to be forgotten.

While historical scholarship continues to exclude and repress other non-textual modes of remembering when writing of post-colonial histories, the authority of written archives within settler colonial legal and political processes in particular also continue to marginalize Aboriginal communities and Indigenous modes of transmitting the past. Looking at land claims proceedings and other legal matters where Aboriginal title is at
stake in Canada, Adele Perry (2005) points out how written archival records are privileged as evidence over and above oral histories and other non-textual evidence. Perry argues that this privileging of written records and the underlying assumptions that such records are more reliable are premised on the delegitimization of non-archival sources—often feminized, private sites of remembering and oral modes of transmission —by figuring myth, songs, stories, and oral histories as being too ephemeral and subjective. With Indigenous communities’ non-archival sources of evidence routinely made inadmissible or denigrated in legal proceedings, Perry (2005, p. 334) argues that the authority of written, archival records remains intimately tied to their role as the “adjudicator of empire” in settler Canada.

So as to challenge and displace the privileged place of written archives in settler nations and other post-colonial sites, scholars are encouraged to turn to and authorize Indigenous oral sources to decolonize research practices. However, by pointing the role of non-textual and embodied practices underwriting colonization, Diana Taylor (2003) troubles the easy distinction between written archives and oral modes of remembering that continue to frame many critiques of the colonial archives: critiques that often reduce colonization to textualization. Looking at the repertoires or embodied practices of European colonizers in South America that accompanied the importation of the written archives, Taylor argues that such repertoires cannot simply be figured as embodied, colonial “texts.” While writing and written documents shape the colonizer’s “embodied practice in innumerable ways,” the written archives “never fully dictate embodiment” (Taylor, 2003, pp. 20-1). As when priests converted Indigenous subjects and, then, continued to observe the way these newly minted Christians comported themselves for signs of dissemblance, Taylor argues that colonization was carried out, and colonial order policed through colonial repertoires. Situated on the edges of a written archival authority that worked to destroy the embodied and material modes of remembering and communicating used by Amerindian communities, colonial repertoires worked to supplant Indigenous repertoires (even if this often led to the transformation as opposed to the erasure of these Indigenous repertoires).

While unpacking the authority of the written archives, critiques of the written archives must, then, also consider how unequal, colonial relations of power develop in
and through colonial and settler colonial repertoires.\textsuperscript{30} Importantly, taking up colonial repertoires also pushes scholars to consider how particular interpretations of Indigenous, oral repertoires participate in the reproduction of colonial and settler colonial relations. Acknowledging that colonialism has transformed the legal, political and moral systems that govern Indigenous peoples as well as the rules that organize and legitimate Indigenous ways of doing things, in the context of settler nations critical examinations of Indigenous repertoires are interested in mapping out how the rules governing Indigenous oral modes of transmitting the past support settler title and entitlement.

Indigenous scholar Martin Nakata (2012) argues that Indigenous and allied scholars must be critical of the way Indigenous communities and authorities—especially those authorized by the state to manage Indigenous affairs—police Indigenous identity and membership and create fault lines within and between officially recognized, “status” Aboriginals and non-status Indigenous communities. Unwilling to reduce all native identities to colonial inventions but acknowledging, as African historian Fredrick Cooper (2007a, p. 258) puts it, that the “colonial archives are no more independent of ‘the colonized’ than oral traditions are independent of ‘the colonizer,’” Nakata is critical of the reductive definitions of being “Indigenous” deployed by Aboriginal and settler authorities to manage the post-colonial order of things.\textsuperscript{31} While the Indigenous policing of Aboriginal identity is no doubt employed to create and protect communities from further settler encroachment, Nakata (2012, p. 105) remains wary of how the “policing of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion” to feel secure “has become more important to some, than opening” the category of Indigenous up to “to include those with ambiguous histories.”\textsuperscript{32}

In many cases building on the above literature, archivists also approach the rules that govern written record keeping practices as being informed by a legal, political and economic system that secures settler title and entitlement to stolen land and the right of the settler nation-state to govern sovereign Indigenous peoples. Shauna McRanor (1997) states that while western culture has always been both oral and written, archivists and western society in general have developed a bias for the truth of written records. Similarly, Anne Gilliland \textit{et al.} (2008, pp. 89-90) argues that because much of what archivists “believe about the nature of archives…about the kinds of objects that a record
can comprise, and the characteristics and circumstances that make that record either reliable or authentic” is based “upon Western ideas” and imbricated in European political and social structures, little “or no space exists within [archival theory] for cultures with non-textual mechanisms for recording decisions, actions, relationships, or memory, such as those embodied in oral, aural, or kinetic traditions.”

Even as the distinction between orality and literacy, or the anachronization of Indigenous communities through terms such as “pre-literate” creep back into efforts to decolonize archival discourse, archivists decolonizing archival discourses insist that there is no “singular, simple, or direct transition from orality to literacy,” and that this assumption about the inevitable transition from oral to literate obfuscates how oral modes of remembering and written documentary traditions co-exist in post-colonial contexts (Wareham, 2002, p. 197). To give expression to this oral and written reality, archivists propose what can be called postcolonial archiving practices and theories that arise out of archivists and Indigenous groups working together so as to negotiate the demands of both oral and written traditions. According to archivist Jeanette Alias Bastian (2013, p. 124), the postcolonial approach to archives “offers an alternate view of the archives, one that privileges a myriad of voices and expressions, both textual and non-textual.” As opposed to pushing archiving towards a homogenizing cultural relativism, a postcolonial approach begins decolonizing archival discourses when the privileging of multiple voices is accompanied by the work of acknowledging Indigenous ownership of archives produced by and about Indigenous people. Negotiating Indigenous ownership opens up colonial records to Indigenous rules of transmission and also requires archivists challenge the very institutional structures and discourses that underwrite their authority over the archives as they build new structures and discourses that authorize Indigenous and settler authorities.

By challenging the orality-literate dyad to understand non-literate technologies and practices, archivists are creating what Jonathan Sterne (2011, p. 209) calls “a richer, more varied, and more robust deep history and global anthropology of communication.” This more robust deep history works to open up what Mignolo calls positions of exteriority by showing that both the relationship between oral and written modes of communication and also our understanding of what constitutes oral and written are founded in colonial
difference. Thus, while archivists work with Aboriginal communities to develop “mixed” archival techniques built on Indigenous and settler traditions, they are also pushed to consider how both oral and written traditions exist within colonized forms of knowledge production. Even those Indigenous rules for remembering that predate colonial contact and settlement do not persist outside colonial relations as interpretations of those rules take place within the changing demands placed on Indigenous people within colonial and neo-colonial legal, political and economic frameworks.

As opposed to homogenizing the difference between Indigenous and settler modes of transmitting the past by labeling both colonial, critically evaluating how oral modes of remembering participate in the colonial order of things instead frustrates the search for authentic modes of being Indigenous that, as Nakata argues, work to limit and police who and what counts as Aboriginal. As opposed to further decolonizing modes of archiving oral and written records, the search for authentic Indigenous rules for transmitting the past puts the onus on Aboriginal peoples to prove themselves to archivists who are then transformed into judges as opposed to colleagues. As such, postcolonial approaches to archiving, negotiating Indigenous ownership of records, and challenging notions of authenticity offer starting points for developing subaltern forms of thinking the authority of written archives and the colonial relations that organize archives and archivists. In this way, critically translating and deploying oral modes of remembering open up potential spaces for postcolonial archival theorizing.

Because decolonizing archival discourses calls on archivists to translate non-textual modes of transmitting the past to produce a “mixed” praxis that works to create vibrant and equitable social relations within and between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities, not all “mixings” do the work of decolonization. And because settler colonies and nations brought Indigenous and settler communities together as much as kept them apart to secure settler title and entitlement, many of the “mixed” archival practices that have materialized over time are less the result of decolonizing processes than one would hope. Indeed, even when historical exchange between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities begin to trouble settler relations, this potential for decolonizing archival discourses can be closed down by settler interpretations of the past, present and future. Guided by a liberal-settler politics that obfuscates and negates the
colonial violence underlying settler relations so as to move on with the status quo, archivist Laura Millar’s (2006a) analysis of the historical relationship between what she calls oral and written documentary traditions in British Colombia (B.C.), largely closes down the decolonizing potential of the historical framework. As well, because her analysis invokes the promise of postliteracy, Millar’s article is worth taking up as it will allow me to map out her liberal-settler historical analysis and how the promise of postliteracy continues to circulate in Canadian archival circles in ways that re-secure settler title and entitlement in the face of contestation from Indigenous groups and their allies.

In her article “Subject of object? Shaping and reshaping the intersections between aboriginal and non-aboriginal records,” Millar appears to take up the work of decolonizing archival discourses by framing the difference between oral and written modes of communication in B.C. as the difference between Indigenous and settler rules governing transmission. Whereas she does not go into much detail concerning the rules that govern the settler’s written documentary tradition, Millar (2006a, p.334) does trace out the structures of authority in “traditional” Aboriginal communication and two different types of oral testimony: adaawk, which Millar characterizes as “public record of ownership and rights” and kungax, “the special authority and responsibilities of a chief and links the tribe, clan, or house with its ancestors and its territory.” And, like other decolonizing histories, Millar argues that despite having distinct cultural origins, there is no longer any easy distinction between oral and written documentary traditions because over time settler and Aboriginal peoples have influenced each other’s documentary practices. Indeed, according to Millar (p. 347), any meaningful distinction between oral and written traditions in B.C. is a moot point because today “written documents have incorporated oral evidence, and oral testimony includes evidence found in written sources.” Even though Millar (p. 333) notes that “oral, native oriented methods of information sharing” are “a world apart from paper-based finding aids and computerized subject indexes,” she nonetheless declares that “oral and written have blended together” in B.C. (p. 348).

According to Millar (p. 345), proof of a blended reality in B.C. is evidenced by the greater inclusion of native oriented methods by B.C. archivists and the adoption of
written recordkeeping standards by Aboriginal communities in setting up their own archives. In other words, the present archival world is blended because Aboriginal and settler authorities have altered their own documentary traditions in the process of adopting each other’s rules of transmission. More importantly, Millar assumes that the bias towards oral testimonies and, thus, the authority of written, archival records, are a thing of the past because of events like Judge Allan McEachern’s 1987 decision to allow oral histories and “traditional knowledge” as evidence in the Delgamuukw v. British Colombia land claims case (pp. 332-3). With written and oral documentary traditions given equal consideration, according to Millar the written archive no longer dominates legal and archival frameworks in B.C.

Even as Millar echoes other decolonizing projects by arguing for a “mixed” archival tradition, Millar’s history and argument are troubling. Although Millar acknowledges the failures of courts to resolve long-standing land claim cases, Millar’s historical analysis bypasses the unequal political, economic and social relations that mediate settler-Aboriginal relations and the violence of settler colonialism. In a footnote (p. 332 n.5), Millar explains her turn away from the political, economic and social aspects of colonialism by arguing that while “many believe” the effects of settler colonialism have been detrimental to Aboriginal populations and “reach far beyond issues of communications and information management,” such beliefs are, for her, mired in “personal inclinations or political preferences” and caught up in reductive framework focused on “winners and losers, of oppressors and oppressed.” Stating that she is looking beyond such biases “to the historical realities in place,” Millar (Ibid) situates herself within what she calls the “complex subtlety” that marks “the evolution of intercultural communications and relationships.”

Having separated the historical relationships between written and oral traditions from the political, economic, social policies and projects of Canadian settler colonialism that organize settler-Aboriginal relations so as to secure settler title and entitlement to the land, Millar’s historical narrative of blending dances around power relations. As opposed to understanding how “the evolution of intercultural communications and relationships” played out within, and contributed to, the ongoing negation of the Aboriginal sovereignty otherwise recognized and guaranteed through treaties and Canada’s Constitution, the
dispossession of Aboriginal land, the creation of the Indian Act that transformed sovereign peoples into wards of the state, the assimilation of Aboriginal people, the destruction of intergenerational relations within Aboriginal communities, the erasure of Indigenous culture through the prohibition of Aboriginal ceremonies and the removal of Aboriginal cultural objects, the restructuring of Aboriginal governing systems through the creation of band councils and the imposition of government appointed spokespersons, as well as the gendered violence of marriage laws and other measures under the Indian Act, Millar largely personalizes such violence as acts of disreputable Indian Agents and other settler authorities (pp. 337-40). In this way, Millar obfuscates any attempt to understand how a settler ideology to secure settler title and entitlement has both divided settler and Aboriginal populations and also brought them together to the detriment of Aboriginal people. Thus, Millar is unable or unwilling to consider how settler title and entitlement mediates her “blended” present.

Obfuscating the political, economic, and social policies of Canadian settler colonialism does not necessarily mean that Millar is insensitive to the demands of Aboriginal people. However, her view of such demands and, thus, what justice for Aboriginal peoples would look like, is caught up in the ambivalence of a liberal-settler position that both recognizes the struggles of Indigenous peoples—and may want to accommodate their political goals—and also “tends to assume…that the liberal social order, one exemplified by the settler state, its sovereignty, and its constitutional regime of rights, is an unproblematic or legitimate limit to these struggles” (McRanor, 2006, p. 54). While accommodating the demands of Aboriginal people will change and, perhaps, strike down some laws or policies if not identify some laws and policies as unjust, a liberal-settler politics is unable to countenance that justice for Aboriginal people undermines the authority and jurisdiction of Canada’s justice and parliamentary systems.

By pointing to unresolved land claims issues before the court but not going further to question what type of justice such processes will create, Millar echoes liberal-settler assumptions that the problems facing Aboriginal peoples can be “overcome not by resisting the modern liberal-democratic state but, instead, by enlisting it and its system of law to secure certain rights” (Ibid). Millar fails to consider what feminist political theorist Himani Bannerji (2001, p. 75) calls the double nature of Canadian liberalism in which the
liberal democratic project of ensuring formal equality amongst its citizens works in tandem with the colonial project of racist exclusion. That is, Millar fails or chooses not to see that Canada is a “liberal democracy with a colonial heart” (Ibid) in which the formal equality of all Canadian citizens is enforced through legal and political systems that govern the economic, political and social lives of Aboriginal people with a different set of laws and legislation such that they remain colonized subjects and dependent nations.

Despite the failure of the land claims process, Millar (p. 348) is consoled that Aboriginal and settler communities are at least “coming closer together in their acceptance of the need to integrate their cultures, customs, and communications technologies, to seek some common ground.” As opposed to being a starting point by which to re-interrogate the land claims process and its failures, Millar moves away from such an analysis to state that the search for common ground is “perhaps…all one can ask [for] right now” (p. 348). Indeed, any suggestion that the search for common ground will include demands for justice for Aboriginal claimants unlawfully dispossessed of their land seems less likely as Millar closes her article by opining that “perhaps it is only through understanding and encouraging the commonalities, not the differences, in communication systems and information technologies that we can turn away from factionalism and move closer to a time of peaceful consensus” (348). While this “time of peaceful consensus” sounds desirable in and of itself, by making factionalism as opposed to colonial violence the problem confronting archivists and Aboriginal authorities seeking common ground, the demands made by Aboriginal communities that settler authorities acknowledge the historical injustices they committed against Aboriginal peoples, the discriminatory violence of the Indian Act, and the right of Indigenous self-government risk being labeled as problems because they stir up factions within and between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. Indeed, by making overcoming factionalism as opposed to fighting continuing colonial violence the goal, “common ground” forecloses various political projects that call Canada’s settler society to account.

If the search for common ground is, as Millar states, “perhaps…all one can ask [for] right now,” the “one” who desires “peaceful consensus” and accepts common ground before—or without—demanding accountability forecloses justice and perpetuates the status quo while presenting its perpetuation as the way forward. Indeed, the “one”
who is willing to accept such a common ground is less the impersonal, imagined anyone than someone who is unwilling to give up the status quo that benefits them. While “peaceful consensus” achieved through “understanding and encouraging the commonalities” would suggest equal footing between Aboriginal and settler authorities and, thus, would require admissions of wrong doing by settler society, by putting off any analysis of the coercive and violent elements of B.C.’s colonial history, Millar’s common ground cannot offer the equality or the justice many Aboriginal people are calling for. Instead, common ground offers Aboriginal peoples little other than the continuation of long standing grievances and inequalities. While Aboriginal peoples are asked to give up their calls for justice for the sake of peaceful consensus, having already taken up oral modes of archiving it does not appear that settlers will have to give up anything to create common ground. In this way, the consolation Millar expresses in reaching “common ground” forecloses the hope of others for a more just future.

Perhaps in an effort to preempt the critiques of those who might argue that her history of blending may be little more than the erasure or subordination of difference through processes that include Indigenous documentary traditions into settler archival frameworks, Millar ends her article by speculating that the whole distinction between oral and written records is becoming moot. According to Millar (p. 348), “[w]e are moving into a world that is neither oral nor written: a post-documentary society, a cyberspace society.” Interestingly, in contrast to her stated effort to look “to the historical realities in place,” Millar’s post-documentary society strays far from the historical use and development of information and communication technologies in Canada (ICTs) and more towards the media determinism of the mentalities framework.41 Echoing the promise of the postliterate archives that electronic media will create a new, transcendent way of being in the world, Millar argues that the post-documentary society will remove “the perceived gulf between written and oral” (p. 348). To this point, Millar (p. 348) opines that by posting their business records online, Aboriginal organizations in B.C. are not only transforming but also moving beyond Indigenous oral transmission and the rules of adaawk and kungax. Indeed, in the context of reaching “common ground” this post-documentary near-future is promising because, as the two traditions continue to evolve “together in a new part- and post-oral, part- and post-written form of communications
technology,” it might bring about a “resolution to the contentious issue of land claims” (p. 348).

The cyberspace to which Millar pins her hopes does not resemble Canada’s digital environment. As opposed to being an undifferentiated media space, cyberspace in Canada is riven by a “digital divide” in which “differential levels of Internet access and use generally mirror, and so presumably reproduce, existing indexes of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage in Canada” (Barney, 2005, p. 154-5). The “digital divide” in Canada cannot be reduced to simply having or not having access to the internet but, instead, concerns what type of access one has to the internet as well as how individuals and groups use and influence the development of ICTs (Ibid). Analyses of Canada’s digital environment place Aboriginal people on the wrong side of the “digital divide” because many Aboriginal people do not have access to broadband internet, and because Aboriginal communities have little to no influence over the development of ICT technology or the regulation of Canada’s digital economy. As with other forms of mass communication in Canada that have little Aboriginal content, ICTs also often exact “an assimilationist price upon Aboriginal languages and cultural autonomy” (Ibid, p. 159).

Aboriginal communities have begun the work of decolonizing their media environment by working to create the infrastructure necessary to have meaningful access to cyberspace by developing content, modes of access, and governance structures that reflect and strengthen Aboriginal social, economic and political relations. Even if the work of posting Aboriginal records online are part of this effort to decolonize cyberspace, Millar’s post-documentary framework clouds this work by suggesting that decolonization is an effect of electronic media themselves as opposed to the work Aboriginal communities within cyberspace.42

Digital and internet-capable ICTs change the way Canadians interact with the world. The use of such ICTs to document the past will also change the documentary process; whether that process aligns itself with a written, record keeping tradition, oral modes of remembering, or a “mixed” tradition. As opposed to disappearing within this electronic, postliterate world, ICTs reorganize oral and written modes of communication and remembering and the relationship between them.43 If cyberspace is to be a platform
through which the “contentious issue of land claims” is going to be resolved, more work must be done to address the neo-colonial inequalities in Canada’s digital environment.

If the historicization of oral and written modes of communication is opening up an understanding of oral and written as founded in colonial difference, Millar’s history of blending is intended to convince archivists that colonial difference no longer matters. According to Millar (p.333), “oral and written forms of communication have converged at so many points that to see a purity in either one is to look in vain.” At the end of her essay, Millar returns to the futility of invoking a “pure” tradition by stating: “one must acknowledge that trying to revert to pure oral tradition is just as illusory as trying to return to quill pens and rag paper” (348).

Of course, it is not those taking up quill pens and rag paper that are the object of Millar’s critique but, instead, the unnamed and un-cited Aboriginal spokespeople whom Millar (p. 330) claims argue for the “idea of the purity of Aboriginal oral communications, [and] about the power of native ‘traditional knowledge’” that is itself the product of Aboriginal cultures “untainted by Western modes of communication.” Instead of coming to understand how conjuring up “untainted” traditional knowledge and, thus, a dichotomy between oral and written traditions “shore up neocolonial investments in maintaining the split as a hierarchy of cultural and social values” (Grossman, 2013, p. 11), or how the invocation of “traditional knowledge” might speak to the vitality of Aboriginal communities and Indigenous practices despite Canada’s colonial history, Millar’s history of blending dismisses such claims as more or less melancholic.44 Figured as being unable to let go of the past and live in the blended present Millar describes, these Aboriginal people are only creating problems for themselves and settlers who wish to move on.45

In contrast to the post-colonial future imagined and desired by Millar in which the colonial past of Canada can be ignored, archivists decolonizing archival discourses are pushing for this colonial past to come into view. In contrast to Millar who wants Aboriginal people to move towards a common ground that remains dominated by the Indian Act and settler sovereignty, Nakata (2012) wants more narratives of being Indigenous that include the differential, lived experiences of status and non-status Aboriginal peoples so as to challenge the limited “authentic” notions of Aboriginal
identity that polices who and what is and can be Indigenous. As opposed to getting over the past and moving on for the sake of Millar’s liberal-settler common ground, decolonizing archival discourses call on archivists to imagine a future that looks radically different than the current status quo. To strive for such a future, archivists need to develop archival theories and practices that tackle the coloniality of power that permeates the liberal-settler archival world.

While this chapter has argued that the return to an ancient “literate” Greece negates the colonial difference of written archiving and forecloses any possibility of decolonizing the oral-written dyad, the next chapter also returns to ancient Greece but finds that it is not so easily dismissed. By taking up etymologies of the word archive in the next chapter, I will show that through the word “archives” archivists are confronted by the Eurocentrism of a modern linguistic science that denies the colonial difference underwriting the classification of Indo-European languages that as much links modern Europe to ancient Greece as it traces the word “archive” back to the Greek word *arkheion*. Instead of dismissing ancient Greece or breaking its link with Europe, the next chapter turns to the work of returning a kidnapped Greece to the Eastern Mediterranean world in which the Greek language and culture developed by thinking through subaltern linguistic rationalities that attend to the colonial difference that permeates the modern, scientific study of languages and builds on the silences of that haunt that science.
Chapter Three
Eurocentrism and the word “archive”

This chapter is interested in the way etymologies of the word “archive” that trace a route through the French archif and the Latin archivum to the Greek word arkheion (ἀρχεῖον) commit archivists to Eurocentric frameworks of knowledge production. This turn to etymology is, on the one hand, meant to compliment the work of postmodern archivists who have attempted to get at the difference within archival theory by opening up the different meanings of words and concepts that archivists use. However, on the other hand, this turn to the Eurocentrism underwriting etymologies also seeks to trouble the mythic image of Europe that continues to haunt even postmodern archivists’ critiques of modern archiving.

Interestingly, even though interrogating etymologies of the word archive move archivists outside archival science, etymology nonetheless confronts them with another archive: a linguistic archive. As the product of a modern linguistic science that imagines language to be a repository of concrete, discrete traces of linguistic origins, etymology is governed by what can be called the modern linguistic archival order. Etymologies of the word archive and the meanings such etymologies create are, then, the products of a linguistic archival order that negotiates modern social relations of power and the Eurocentrism that negates the colonial difference of the modern/colonial world.

To displace the Eurocentrism underwriting etymologies, I will trouble the modern linguistic archival order by intervening at two points—one point in each of the following sections—in the archivalization of the word archive.¹ In the first section, I turn to the “founding” of modern linguistic science by taking up the work of late eighteenth century linguistic and legal scholar William Jones to both map out how the modern linguistic archival order came to deny the coloniality of power that underwrites it by conjuring up transcendental, objective and universal linguistic laws to divide the world’s languages into discrete language families, and also resituate the modern linguistic archival order within the colonial difference that underwrote Jones’ and later nineteenth century linguists’ work. I conclude this section by outlining how subaltern linguistic archival rationalities are not the expression of any particular group but, instead, arise from reading
across the modern and other “subaltern” linguistic archival orders as much the living archives of words for the silences that permeate these archives.

In the second section, I focus on the construction of the link between archives and *arkheion* through the familial logic of the modern linguistic archival order that figures Greek culture and language in ways that negate the colonial difference underwriting modern Europe and Western Civilization. By then exploring the Greek roots of the word archive through the etymological frameworks of Jacques Derrida and Martin Bernal, in this section I argue that subaltern linguistic archival orders do not emerge by pushing Greece and *arkheion* aside to create new origins for the word archive but, instead, requires opening up the Indo-European language family, Greece and Europe to non-Indo-European languages and cultures by thinking language development through the unruliness of loan words. At the end of this section, I will briefly return to the linguistic work of postmodern archivists to suggest how the trouble with etymology might help postmodern archivists appreciate the colonial difference underwriting modern archiving and also the colonial difference underwriting their own linguistic endeavours.

**A troubling etymology**

In an attempt to open up archivists and archiving to the differences within the archival tradition, postmodern archivists have focused on the multiple meanings that persist in the word archives and within archival concepts. Critically rereading the efforts of late nineteenth and early twentieth century modern archivists who worked to standardize archival terminology and systematize archival practices in the hopes of creating a more unified community of professional archivists, contemporary archivists have found that the standardization of language did little to create a uniform understanding of archival terms. As Peter Horsman (2002) notes, even as archivists took up the *Manual for the Arrangement and Description of Archives* (1898) by Dutch archivists S. Muller, J.A. Freith and R. Fruin as the text around which they would organize themselves, translating the Dutch manual’s word *archief* (archive and archival *fonds*) has troubled archivists since at least the first international congress in 1908 when archivists from various countries went away having agreed to principles that they all interpreted differently.2
Indeed, even the work of archivists in the past forty years to reorganize the profession around the principle of *respect des fonds* that demands archivists maintain or re-create the *fonds* internal (original order) and external (*provenance*) order, *fonds* reveals itself over and over again to be neither a historically nor a theoretically stable given. Instead, the term *fonds* is “a Babel of archival principles, and a jumble of definitions and interpretations and methodologies” (Ibid, p. 5). As opposed to negating the difference within *fonds*, postmodern archivists have negotiated this linguistic difference to develop archival theories and practice that keep archivists open to the difference within the archival community, within archival institutions, and within physical and virtual *fonds*.³

In many ways, the opening up of differences within archival concepts can be juxtaposed to the efforts of modern archivists who wished to reach a single meaning upon which a scientific practice could be built. Further, the opening up of differences within archival concepts can also be juxtaposed to the use of etymology to return archivists to earlier and original meanings of the word archive. This is not to say that postmodern archivists do not deploy etymologies, but that the emphasis on different meanings and different archival traditions is a different project than finding a word’s original meaning through its etymology. In this way, postmodern archival linguistic endeavours can be juxtaposed to modern archivists like T.R. Schellenberg (1956) and Ernst Posner (1972a) who both used etymology of the word archive to make their claims about what modern archives are and do.⁴

The differences between the postmodern and modern archivists, however, begin to fall away as one notices that both linguistic projects continue to imagine the modern archives through a mythic image of Europe. That is, both modern and postmodern archivists deny the global scope of a modern/colonial world and obfuscate the colonial difference that permeates the modern archival world by remaining within the Euro-American world to trace out the circulation of archival concepts and words. While the persistence of this mythic Europe is certainly the result of the Eurocentric geographical imagination that still haunts archivists’ histories of the modern archives that I traced out in Chapter One, the Eurocentric limits of the word archive are also the result of the rules that twentieth century linguists—as much as their nineteenth century forebears—continue to follow to study languages and create etymologies. To gain some purchase on how
engagements with the word archive and archival concepts can trouble the Eurocentric limits of knowledge production and open on to positions of exteriority, it is necessary to map out the colonial difference at the heart of modern linguistic science so as to build linguistic archival orders according to subaltern rationalities.

Schellenberg (1956, p. 11) and Posner (1972a, pp. 91-2) both make a point of pointing to the Greek origins of the word “archive” to make their claims about the importance of Greece and its archives for modern archivists. Schellenberg’s turn to the Greek origins of the word archive follows on the heels of his historical argument that the first public archival institution was the Athenian Metroon (400-300 B.C.E) and, thus, provides proof of Greece’s influence on modern archiving. Interestingly, even though Posner places the origins of the institution in administrative apparatuses of more ancient, Near Eastern civilizations, according to Posner the Greek origins of the word archive, archivist and other archival terminology speaks to the historical significance of Greece in the long history of archival development. In both Schellenberg’s and Posner’s work, then, etymology functions as something like evidence of a scientifically proven relationship between archive and arkheion and, thus, between Greek and English and also the Metroon and modern archives. Of course, this use of etymology is not unique to Schellenberg and Posner. Indeed, while both archivists have had immeasurable influence on twentieth and twenty-first century archival frameworks, it is really the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) that is responsible for archivists’ continued use of etymology to speak to the indisputable evidence of Greece’s influence on archives and the archival profession.

The OED (1989, p. 614) notes that while the English language first borrowed the word archive from the French archif “in the early seventeenth century, the French word is derived from the Latin and Greek.” While the OED’s primary focus is on the various meanings of English words from when they enter the English language, the editors of the OED include a word’s etymological origins and, if possible, its trek from its earliest form until it was adopted into English. As the OED’s first editor James Murray (1837-1915) argued, the OED provides etymologies to give “a clearer comprehension of the history and use of the word in English” (Kastovsky, 2000, p. 122).
Derived from the Greek words *etymos* (truth) and *logos* (word), etymology has traditionally been the practice of determining the truth within the word by returning to its original lexical source and, then, tracing out its changing definitions up until the present (Blank, 2011). Tracing words like archive back to the Greek, like giving its earliest use in English, expressed the belief of nineteenth century lexicographers and philologists like Murray that a word could only properly be known if its earlier forms were known because a word’s earliest form contained its truest meaning (Silva, 2000). And while the conviction that earlier definitions of the word—and indeed, the original meaning of a word—retain the true meaning of the word can be traced back to Plato’s *Cratylus*, Murray and the OED’s belief in the truth residing in origins and their efforts to identify these origins were indebted to the work of eighteenth and nineteenth century comparative philologists—in particular, the Neogrammarian school of linguistics—who fashioned linguistics as a scientific pursuit that studied languages according to objective laws (Kastovsky, 2000).

While the OED editors may have merely shared the conviction of other lexicographers and philologists, it was on this notion of language as a scientific pursuit that the OED distinguished itself in the increasingly crowded nineteenth century dictionary and encyclopedia market. Challenging earlier dictionaries that traced the development of a word that relied, as Murray argued, more on imaginative connections than on rigorous study, the early OED editors married their belief in the importance of the history of words to a scientific approach to lexicology (Silva, 2000). Just as the OED became the authoritative source for the history of English words based on its scientific approach to language, it was under the rubric of linguistics as a modern, scientific discipline that the Greek origins of words like “archive” were concretized.

The scientific study of languages begins with comparative philology which can be traced back to the work of orientalist scholar Sir William Jones’ 1786 “demonstration of structural commonalities between Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit” that led him to assert that all these languages belonged to the same Indo-European language group (Errington, 2001 p. 31). Jones’ work, of course, does not mark the beginning of the study of non-European languages by Europeans. While the modern science of linguistics can be traced to Jones, the project of studying language was part of a tradition that starts in the sixteenth century.
and the work of missionaries amongst “savage” populations (Errington, 2001). While missionaries were often trained in Europe, Europe’s colonies became keys sites for developing linguistic theories and also for applying European assumptions about languages (Ibid).

Colonial linguistics was intimately tied to missionaries’ work and, as a result, the early study of non-European languages was tied to the work of explaining Christian doctrine and gaining converts. The work of converting savages led missionaries to represent Indigenous peoples’ spoken languages into European script. While this transcription allowed missionaries to translate scripture into natives’ languages, having their language written down made these Indigenous peoples and their cultures understandable to European audiences and made them into something that could be studied and ruled from the metropole (Ibid). Far from being a benign process of merely putting spoken languages down on the page, missionaries transformed Indigenous social, political and economic relations through the transcription of languages. As Joseph Errington (2001) argues, this transformation of spoken languages into written ones saw missionaries construct linguistic structures for languages and create a single language out of what were really polyglot environments. Through colonial linguistic practices, missionaries created languages and, in doing so, created populations: ethnolinguistic groups. Language was the means of dividing what were often the fluid social relations that structured Indigenous populations along hard lines to make these groups understandable and governable to colonial regimes.

While Jones’ work certainly did not displace the role of missionaries as the primary source of information about foreign, “savage” languages, Jones’ work and comparative philology changed the parameters of colonial linguistics in two profound ways. First, it was not simply that Jones and other comparative philologists argued that laws governed language, but that these laws could be empirically known because they were mundane. Thus, unlike sixteenth and seventeenth century missionaries who believed in the divine origins of languages: all languages are derived from an original and primary, Edenic language given to man by God, Jones and later philologists asserted that language was a human construct (Said, 1979). Whereas earlier missionaries believed that language was a window on to spiritual realm, for comparative philologists, language underwrote
human consciousness. Within the burgeoning field of linguistic studies, the work of studying languages was done to better know the human mind and human civilization (Mitchell, 1991).

Second, comparative philology believed that languages were organized according to its own internal logic that was universal in scope (Foucault, 2002; Said, 1979). That is, Jones and others reduced language to linguistic laws that existed independently of the way that language was spoken and its speakers (Errington, 2001). This conviction that linguistic development and the relationship between languages had its own internal logic meant that language had a history separate from a history of the material world (Foucault, 2002). By detaching languages from the world around it, like comparative philologists, many contemporary linguists continue to study languages that are imagined to work according to transhistorical and universal laws. Characterized by its secular, empirical and law-focused approach to languages, comparative philology is characterized as the beginnings of the truly modern study of languages: linguistic science.

Because it was believed that the modern study of languages could provide a history of human consciousness, nineteenth century comparative philologists saw language as an archive of human history that was, unlike other archival repositories, uncorrupted by human meddling because it was governed by its own intrinsic laws (Krishnaswamy, 2004). Given the prevalence of the positivist ideas among nineteenth century historians, it is perhaps no surprise that nineteenth and early twentieth century philologists’ conjured up a linguistic archival order that organized languages according to inherent qualities within words. Through this modern linguistic archival logic, linguists imagined themselves as the discoverers of latent linguistic truths revealed through their scientific approach. As such, modern linguists believed that they had discovered the keys to a linguistic archive objectively organized according to a natural linguistic archival order.

Just as postmodern archivists have argued that the custodial mentality underwriting modern archival theories and practice hid the politics of archives and the creative aspect of archiving from archivists, this deference to a transcendent and universal linguistic archival order obfuscates the context in which comparative philology and linguistic science developed and, thus, de-contextualizes and depoliticizes
comparative philology and etymology. Like the linguistic work of earlier missionaries, comparative philology developed in the colonial periphery. When Jones made his “discovery,” he was working as judge and legal scholar in India at the time when English authorities had decided that India should be governed according to laws founded in traditional Indian values. Jones’ study of Sanskrit that lead him to “discover” the commonalities between Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit was work initially undertaken to interpret Indian laws that required they be translated from Sanskrit to English (Cannon, 2006). As such, Jones’ linguistic and legal scholarship arose out of an attempt by British authorities to systematically know what constituted India’s Indianness and, thus, know their colonial subjects according to what was argued to be these subject’s inherent nature.

While Jones was interested in learning what Britain’s Indian subjects knew (Ibid), Jones, along with others administrators and Orientalist scholars, saw ancient texts—particularly Sanskrit texts—as the truest source for knowledge about what constituted Indian culture. By reducing true Indian culture to what was written in ancient texts, Jones’ linguistic and legal scholarship was dependent on Indian scholarship and developed in conversation with Indian scholars and interpreters (particular Brahmans who were the authorized interpreters of the religious texts). However, as opposed to being a project to know how Indian scholars defined tradition, Jones’ scholarship was ultimately bent on knowing Indians better than they knew themselves (Said, 1979; Mani, 1987; Dodson, 2007). Knowing Indians better than they knew themselves spoke both to the racist bias held by British administrators that Indians were dissembling and habitual liars (Dirks, 1993), and also the imperial assumption that true knowledge could only arise out of empirical scholarship governed by science. Because scientific knowledge was the purview of Europeans, to know Indians as Indians knew themselves would not produce true knowledge about India. Within these colonial-imperial frameworks of knowledge production, only scholars like Jones who could approach the world and ancient Sanskrit texts scientifically could truly understand Indian laws and Indianness (Krishnaswamy, 2004).

Caught up in Eurocentric narratives in which Europe realizes the truth of the world through scientific study all by itself, histories of comparative philology and
linguistic science fails to attend to these colonial-imperial frameworks and often glosses over the Indian context as they map out the European predecessors and heirs of Jones’ work (Ibid). Indeed, making science a European feat is not incidental to understanding the colonial-imperial limits of comparative philology and etymology. As Revathi Krishnaswamy (2004, p. 7) argues, as “Europe emerged as the privileged location of ‘science,’” science became “a category strategically deployed by the philological project to mediate Europe's relations with its colonized Others.” That is, as comparative philology transformed decontextualized languages and transhistorical linguistic laws into the hard facts of the linguistic archive, these scholars’ archival logic became increasingly entangled in eighteenth and nineteenth century imperial-colonial projects of classifying the world’s populations and cultures. The difference of language, as determined by European, colonial linguists became one of the primary means “for figuring and naturalizing inequality in the colonial milieux” (Errington, 2001, p. 20). That is, through the study of language linguists constructed and naturalized the colonial difference of non-Europeans and the colonial theatres in which they lived. Believing that they were revealing the true order of human civilizations, linguistic scientists were unable to see how their science created the colonial milieux they studied.

The Eurocentric assumption that science was European also marginalized the role of Indians and Indian scholarship in the development of linguistic science. Even though Jones’ central premise that universal and inherent laws govern all languages was an imperial conceit, this premise was based on Indian linguistic scholarship that had long studied Sanskrit according to linguistic laws. Dismissing the Indian scholars and scholarship they relied upon by arguing that they and it were too disorganized, pre- or unscientific to be accurate, European—and particularly English—scholars like Jones and later philologists made themselves out to be true heirs of ancient India’s superior linguistic tradition (Dodson, 2007; Krishnaswamy, 2004; Errington, 2001).

With independent linguistic laws providing European linguists with what appeared to be an objective means of knowing the historical development of past and present civilizations, language also became the “privileged site of history” and a means of colonizing the past (Krishnaswamy, 2004, p. 1). If colonialism, as Franz Fanon (1968: 210) noted, is not satisfied with destroying the lived present of the colonized but, by “a
kind of perverted logic…turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it,” modern linguistics became a means of putting that distorted past into the service of colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{13} By characterizing language as producing an archives—hard materials determined by objective laws—that were both separate from those who spoke that language and also only an archive European linguistic scientists could properly understand, European linguists became the inheritors of ancient wisdom and also the authorized writers of ancient history.

With their linguistic archives in hand, imperial historians colonized the colonized’s history by dismissing the written and oral histories produced by colonized subjects on the grounds that it was not scientific enough. The modern linguistic archive exiled the colonized from their own past in a colonial-imperial project to create histories for the colonized (Ibid; Norton, 1993). In this way, linguistic science allowed European scholars to colonize the peoples and cultures of both the ancient and modern worlds. However, as opposed to being seen as a means of securing European rule and superiority, modern linguistics and Jones’ efforts to truly understood India’s culture and past were seen and continue to be seen, as the benevolent acts of an imperial master restoring India and Indians to the greatness of their own unique civilization.

New nineteenth century linguistic interpretative frameworks reorganized the ways colonial linguists understood the world’s languages as it also changed the way they naturalized the inequality within colonial milieux. After the publication of Charles Darwin’s \textit{On the Origins of Species} (1859), the linguistic archival order adopted a Darwinian-like model that organized the world’s languages into discrete, language “families” (Krishnaswamy, 2004). Figured as descendants from the same archaic language, languages belonging to the same language family were understood as having genetic or genealogical relationships with each other. Working within this familial logic, linguists “tended to stress continuity and similarity within the family,” while stressing the difference between linguistic families (Ibid, p. 9). European linguists saw the speakers of the Indo-European languages—often separated by great distances—as having more in common than they had with any neighbouring ethnolinguistic group that belonged to different linguistic families. Colonial contact may have brought different peoples together, but it did not bring them linguistically closer to each other. In most colonial
theatres, linguistic science provided the hard evidence that colonized and colonizer were entirely unrelated. And even when linguistics brought Europeans and non-European languages—such as Hindi, Urdu and Punjabi for instance—closer together as members of the Indo-European family, colonial difference was maintained by viewing these languages as derivatives of Sanskrit. That is, comparative philologists saw a similarity between European languages and “Indo”-languages but only so far as the latter were abstracted from the decline that marked their present day ethnolinguistic communities.  

As theories of social evolution began to inform various scientific fields in the second half of the nineteenth century, racial hierarchies came to explicitly underwrite how linguists understood the evolution of, and differences between, language families. With this social evolutionary model as their guide, philologists argued that “the Indo-European family of languages to which Sanskrit belonged represented the highest form of linguistic expression” (Ibid, p. 8). As the analogy to biological evolution endowed “linguistic change with directionality” such that “the Indo-European ‘family’ came to signify the apex of linguistic, cultural and racial perfection” (Ibid), analyses of non-Indo-European languages became a means of ascertaining the level of those cultures’ development against a European norm. That is, if comparative philology imagined itself as the study of the history of human consciousness, nineteenth century linguists deployed historicist schemas that transformed cultural difference into temporal distance from a Eurocentric present so as to break that history down into stages of development with Indo-European family of languages, cultures and races as the desired and ultimate end point. The archival logic of colonial-imperial linguistics anachronized other linguistic families and presented their linguistic development as proof of their racial and cultural inferiority.  

Thus, the hard facts of the modern linguistic archive were used as proof that the members of non-Indo-European families were unable to properly know the world and, thus, unable to properly organize social, economic and political relations. The linguistic archive was proof of the need for colonial intervention and underwrote the white man’s burden.

In the late nineteenth century, the influential Neogrammarian school intensified the colonial parameters of linguistic science. While many nineteenth century linguists had already transfigured the “similarities and differences among and between language
families…into "evidence" of national, cultural, and racial identity” with Indo-European language and European civilization at the top of the pyramid, Neogrammarians dismissed the influence of non-Indo-European language speakers and cultures on the development of Indo-European languages altogether (Krishnaswamy, 2004, p. 9). That is, even if Indo-European languages did come in contact with other language families, Neogrammarians believed that it was unlikely that languages belonging to lesser language families could influence the development of the more sophisticated Indo-European languages (Bernal, 2001). Even as the study of linguistic exchange between languages belonging to different language families gained ground, Neogrammrian-influenced linguists continued to assume that the Indo-European language family was protected against any degradation caused by exchanging words with less developed language families. With language families—particularly the Indo-European language family—more or less hermetically sealed from their inception, nineteenth and early twentieth century comparative linguists continued to develop their science with what Martin Bernal (1987; 2001) calls a belief in the double purity of language families and the European family of nations.

Judith Butler (1993) argues that words have a history and, while speakers can use and abuse words in new ways to create new social relations, the history of a word and how that history is written means one cannot do whatever one wants with that word. As such, no one stands outside politics because using words interpolates the speaker as much as their audience in the politics that mark that history. To deploy etymologies of the word archive is to entangle anyone’s project in the Eurocentrism of modern linguistics. Through their etymologies of the word archive, Schellenberg, Posner, and the OED consciously or not take up this linguistic archive caught up in colonial-imperial circulations of ideas, peoples and objects that worked to secure Europe’s superior position in relation to its colonial subjects and the Eurocentric denial of these circulations. Through etymology, the word archive and the institutional archive are caught up in a Eurocentric archival order that hides the colonial difference of the modern-colonial world behind seemingly objective genetic relations and hierarchically organized linguistic families. These authors also produce an understanding of the word archive built on analytic frameworks that reduce polyglot contexts to discrete ethnolinguistic groups in an effort to know and exert authority over people and places.
Troubling the Eurocentrism of etymology requires addressing what Walter Mignolo calls the colonial difference of the modern/colonial world from positions of exteriority. Such positions account for what Mignolo (2002a, p.67) calls the “densities of the colonial experience” at the base of the colonial-imperial linguistics archival order: the obfuscation and denigration of non-European knowledge systems; the colonization of history; and the reification of fluid relations into more static ethnolinguistic groupings and hermetically sealed language families, and also open up the word archive to other words and languages through subaltern linguistic archival rationalities. These subaltern rationalities are not the properties of any one ethnolinguistic group but, instead, “build on the ground of the silence of history” (Ibid).

As with any archive, the modern linguistic archive underwriting etymologies of the word archive are replete of silences.16 Produced by the colonial violence of transforming “savage” speech into text, imperial interpretations of Indian linguistic traditions, and Eurocentric interpretations of modern linguistic science, Jones discovery is itself a bundle of silences. To trouble Jones’ discovery and the Eurocentrism of modern linguistic science, it is perhaps tempting to argue that the Indian scholars—mostly male Brahmans—upon whom Jones and later European scholars depended on to both learn Sanskrit and provide a traditional interpretation of Indian law are the “ground of silence” and a subaltern starting point for reorganizing the modern linguistic archive. Along these lines, Michael S. Dodson (2007, p. 44) argues that these Brahmanic scholars provide “competing visions of Indian society and history within the emerging public sphere, thereby making important contributions to early formulations of anti-colonial modernity and Hindu national identity.” Produced within what Dodson calls the double set of Orientalist practices that called on and displaced Brahmanic authority, what these Indian scholars said in response to Jones’ and other philological scholars are worth exploring as they provide a “historical polyvocality” in contrast to colonial history’s focus on the colonizer’s discourse (Ibid, p. 59). In Dodson’s analysis, studying the work of Indian Sanskrit scholars will provide the subaltern content and mode of analysis for creating an anti-colonial modern linguistic science. Indeed, by drawing on the exchanges between colonizing and colonized linguists, Dodson’s “historical polyvocality” rubs against the
Eurocentric denial of the modern/colonial world and pushes linguists and others to take up the colonial difference that shapes modern/colonial linguistic archival orders.

However, representing Brahmanic authorities as the ground of silence of linguistic history risks ignoring how the position of these Indian scholars as authorities on Indian culture and traditions was recognized and exploited in colonial discourses that assumed there was, first, a definitive Indianness and, second, that this Indianness is discernable through textual interpretations of ancient Sanskrit texts. Instead of turning from Jones to elite Sanskrit scholars, subaltern linguistic rationalities critically take up the limits of this “historical polyvocality.” That is, subaltern linguistic rationalities interrogate the silences that haunt these many, historical voices.

In her analysis of British officials like Jones’ efforts to create a truly Indian cultural and legal framework to govern India, Lata Mani (1987) shows that Indian women constitute the limits of both Brahman and English interpretation of Indianness. Focusing on the nineteenth century debate around the practice of Sati, Mani argues that the British legal framework allowed Brahmans to promote and institutionalize themselves as authorities of Hindu scripture and a Hindu tradition that was textual in nature, and, thus, position themselves as the legitimate representatives of a definitively traditional Indian people and culture. In Brahman and British textual interpretations of Sati as either an Indian tradition (Brahman) or crime (British), Mani argues that there was no subject position available to women. Instead, women became the ground upon which scripture and textual interpretation took place. Women who fell within the purview of Sati were produced as effects of either modernization or religious custom; two processes in which either English jurists or Brahman textual scholars were the true subjects.

Building on the work of Mani, Gayatri C. Spivak (1988) argues that without attending to the silence of the debate over Sati—what cannot be said and by whom about Sati—one is left choosing between Brahman or English legal authorities as Mani argues, but also risks representing colonial law as the sole cause of the subalternization of Indian women. That is, Spivak argues that without attending to both the absent-present subject position created for women and also the displacement of the non-textual or “said memory” (smriti) by Brahman-led interpretative tradition of Sanskrit texts, the authority of Brahmanic interpretations risks being reduced to an effect of colonial discourses and,
thus, a result of the arrival of British lawmakers like Jones (Shetty & Bellamy, 2000). In other words, with colonization figured as the orginary cause of subalternization, India’s “pre-colonial” past remains largely untroubled by critics of colonialism.

In Mani’s interpretation of the discourse around Sati, the Brahmanic notion of Sati as Indian ritual is the other side of the colonial discourse about what constitutes Indian tradition. In Mani’s interpretation, the Brahmanic-lad turn to tradition is an effect of the psychic economy of colonialism that, as Fanon (1968) argues, orients the colonized towards the past and gives them the task of unearthing authentic tribal identities as the means building post-colonial futures. Spivak’s argument is, however, slightly different. While not denying that Brahmanic interpretations of “tradition” contributed to colonial discourse, Spivak argues that the subalternization of both women and said memory were underway long before Jones arrived. According to Spivak, what is potentially lost in focusing on the violence of colonial discourses is that Jones’ legal and linguistic interpretations were misreadings of the Brahmanic construct of Indian tradition; misreadings that add another layer of text over the subalternized woman and said memory.

What Spivak is highlighting in her reading of Sati is the double violence of India’s colonial legal traditions: the textual violence of both “pre-colonial” and “colonial” authorities. Following from Spivak’s account, building “on the ground of the silence of history” requires that critics negotiate the palimpsestic nature of colonial legal order. Building on the silences of history requires that scholars attend to the pre-colonial violence that persists—and yet always remains illegible—in the colonial order of things. As part of the colonial order of things yet effaced before that order began to gather together traces for their legal archives, the authority of “said memory’s” (smriti) interpretation of Sanskrit texts cannot be recovered through the colonial legal interpretations because it is that which was silenced by interpretations Jones in turn covered over with his own interpretation. What one returns to through the colonial archives is the representation of this order that is also its effacement by Indian elites.20

As the work of building on the ground of the silence of history, subaltern linguistic rationalities trouble the linear nature and temporal demarcations of colonial history: the distinction between pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial, to mark out the
silences of the modern linguistic archive. As opposed to simply being silences produced by colonial linguists like Jones, subaltern rationalities read the modern linguistic archive with an understanding that while colonial modes of archiving always silence others when transforming traces into archives, these silences are themselves marked by silences. Even as subaltern rationalities read across the “polyvocality” of Indian linguistic scholarship to build on the concrete linguistic facts organized by modern/colonial linguistic archival orders, these rationalities do so in ways that negotiate the economy of silences that haunt these orders to trouble the concreteness of languages and social relations these orders conjure up.

Even as the textualization of languages by colonial, modern/colonial and Indigenous elite linguists remain a primary point of interrogation, just as decolonizing archival discourses in the previous chapter requires that archivists consider the ways oral and written modes of transmitting the past are caught up in reproducing colonial relations, subaltern linguistic rationalities must also interrogate the way what linguists call “living”—as opposed to textual—interpretations of words participate in neo-colonial linguistic orders. In other words, just as subaltern linguistic rationalities remain suspicious of the anti-colonial nationalism of elite Indian scholars, these subaltern rationalities must also remain suspicious of the “living” interpretations of words that produce “un-scientific” and fluid archives of words through the organic mingling of languages within polyglot environments as a way outside the colonial linguistic archival order.21 Because these living interpretations are always caught up in the continuing colonial order of things, subaltern linguistic archival rationalities remain suspicious of them even as they use these relationships to trouble the modern linguistic archival order and the familial logics that bind words like archive and arkheion together to the exclusion of other words and linguistic relations.

_Arkheion is nothing but trouble for the modern archival order_

By using etymology to show the concrete relationships between both archive and arkheion and also Athens’ Metroon and modern archives, Posner (1972a) and Schellenberg (1956) also use etymology to return archivists to what Enrique Dussel (2000, p. 467) calls a kidnapped Greece. According to Dussel, Eurocentric scholarship
kidnapped Greece by removing it from the Eastern Mediterranean world of which it was a part in order to make it part of a narrow European heritage. Whereas Schellenberg’s historical analysis is quite clearly Eurocentric by representing Greece as European-like, Posner’s historical analysis is interesting in that it both displaces Greece as the origin of the archives while at the same time representing Classical Greece as the beginning of a Western archival tradition that stands in opposition to an Oriental tradition. Through both Schellenberg’s and Posner’s work, the word *arkheion* and the Greeks who spoke it remain familiar because it and they are part of a Western tradition.

Schellenberg and Posner’s use of etymology to scientifically tighten the bonds that bind their kidnapped Greece and their modern archives are hardly coincidence. As imperial linguistic scholars continued to colonize non-European histories and create a place for themselves as the heirs of the world’s different civilizations, they also carved off the Greco-Roman world to make it part of their own distinctively Western and European heritage. Indeed, while European scholars were kidnapping Greece before Jones, Bernal (1987, 2001) argues that the new field of modern linguistic science changed the way the classical world and, in particular, Greece was studied in the nineteenth century by allowing scholars to use the linguistic archive to make their claims about a Europeanized Greece. The fact of Greek’s Indo-European familial status cut the Greek language, culture and people off from the Egyptian and Semitic languages and peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean, and provided the necessary evidence to back up the Eurocentric claim that Greece, and thus the origins of Western Civilization, was linguistically, culturally and racially European.

Having kidnapped Greece through its language, nineteenth century linguists’ learned assumptions about the racial and cultural superiority of the Greek language distanced the Greeks from the Eastern Mediterranean world of which they were apart and protected Greece from being contaminated by these Oriental languages and cultures. That is, even if there was contact, the assumed less dynamic nature of Semitic and African ethnolinguistic groups allowed linguistic scholars to downplay if not outright dismiss the influence of Eastern Mediterranean languages and cultures on Greece. Built on this Eurocentric modern linguistic archival order, modern linguistic science imagined that
Greek language and culture were more or less autogenetic for having been the product of an isolated [proto] Greek people.

Given the Eurocentrism surrounding Greece, it may seem counterintuitive to return to Greece and *arkheion* to push the word archive towards non-familial relations with other words. Nonetheless, to dismiss *arkheion* altogether because it is caught up in the modern linguistic archival order is to miss an opportunity to challenge the pervasive Eurocentrism in Euro-American knowledge production that desires to find an origin and image of itself in a linguistically, culturally and racially pure past. The turn to *arkheion* and Greece here is, then, an attempt to trouble the exclusive boundaries of the Indo-European language that ties English to Greek to the exclusion of other relations with other linguistic families. To trouble etymology in this way is to trouble the stability of words and the modern linguistic archival order that arranges them. As with a number of troubling things in archival scholarship recently, this return to Greece begins with Jacques Derrida’s (1995) *Archive Fever*.

Like Schellenberg and Posner, Jacques Derrida is also interested in the etymology of the word archive that goes back to the Greek. However, as opposed to taking the reader back to Athens’ *Metroon*, Derrida (1995, p. 1) begins *Archive Fever* by taking the reader back through *arkheion* (home of the archon or magistrate) to its root word *arkhē* (origins, to rule). At first glance, this etymological move seems to echo Schellenberg and Posner’s Eurocentric histories of the archive especially as Derrida (p. 2) traces out a genealogy from the English to the Greek (*arkhē* and *arkheion*) through the Latin (*archivum* or *archium*). That is, it appears that Derrida finds the archive’s Greek etymological roots through Roman variations to reconstruct a nice, neat, European-bound history of the word. However, there is a difference between Derrida’s etymological labours and Schellenberg’s and Posner’s. Whereas the linguistic archive Schellenberg and Posner draw on figures *arkheion* as a familial relative of the word archive, and the Greece to which they return through etymology looks familiar and Western with its *Metroon* and democratic *polis*, Derrida’s etymology returns his reader to a Greek word and culture that fails to become familiar because it is divided within itself. In other words, whereas Schellenberg and Posner’s etymology returns us to Greece, Derrida’s etymology returns us to the problem of Greece and the difference haunting etymology.
Although *Archive Fever* is silent on the particular Eurocentric investments of the archive or etymology in the double purity of languages and Europe, Derrida makes a point of returning to ancient and classical Greece to trouble the Eurocentric analogies that link Greece and Europe without breaking that link. While not denying the Eurocentrism of this link, according to Derrida (2010), breaking this link would obfuscate the political and philosophical vocabulary Europe has inherited from the Greeks and, thus, would not allow scholars to excavate the otherness of Greek thought that continues to haunt Europe as Greece’s heirs. While this link allows intellectuals to see a resemblance between themselves and the Greeks and, through Greece, construct a “we” of Europe, for Derrida the limits of this link should not be surpassed in the hopes of transcending Greece. Instead, the link between Greece and Europe should be turned against Eurocentric scholarship (Ibid; Derrida & Birnbaum, 2007; Leonard, 2010; Gasché, 2007).

Derrida’s constant return to Greece and the Greek language follows from his argument that since Plato, Western philosophy (metaphysics) has been based on the construction of binaries that privilege presence over absence, speech over writing (logocentrism), and the masculine over feminine (phallocentrism) in the making of meaning. According to Derrida, because a notion of European spirit is located in a metaphysical tradition that excludes what cannot be known, Europe can only be thought of as a self-identical concept. Derrida’s return to Greece, then, is his attempt to create a new “philosophy grounded in a radical rereading of the foundational texts” of metaphysics so as to rethink and transform the present (Leonard, 2010, p. 2). Because of the link between Greece and Europe, Derrida’s attempt to estrange Greek thought from the metaphysical tradition creates a “fissure in the fabric of modernity” and, thus, creates the possibility for Europe to critique itself from the very limits of what it is to be European (Ibid, p. 4).

Instead of finding new origins for philosophy, Derrida estranges contemporary philosophy from metaphysics by reading Greek texts from the margins. That is, Derrida reads Greek texts from the perspective of others that classical texts have tried to exclude (Egyptians, barbarians, etc), but also to read for the radical alterity within Greek thought itself (Leonard, 2010; Derrida, 2010; Gasché, 2007). Derrida hopes not simply to break down the distinction between Greeks and their others, but to show that because of this
radical otherness circulating within metaphysics– the absent-presence of what has been left out or silenced but nonetheless is there in some fashion because it defines what Greekness is– the Greeks “were always already other to themselves” (Leonard, 2010, p. 8). To get at the alienness of Greek thought exploits the link that makes Greece the origins of Europe to show that “from the start Europe has been dislocated from itself to such a degree that it is open and hospitable to what it does not, and cannot, determine” (Gasché, 2007, p. 16).

Derrida’s etymology of “archive” should be read within the context of his larger engagement with Greece and, thus, as working to show the radical alterity within Greece and Greek thought. While this makes sense, Krishnaswamy (2004) warns that linguists critical of the coloniality of linguistic science should be wary of “antihumanist” philosophers like Michel Foucault and Derrida who follow linguistic scholar Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) to extend the nineteenth century’s treatment of language as the operation of transcendental laws. That is, while Derrida may be critical of Greece, he follows the modern linguistic archive to do so. Contradicting Krishnaswamy, Derek Attridge (2004) argues that Derrida and other poststructuralists break from any pretention towards an objective science of linguistics and modern appeals to laws that could produce the true meaning of any word. Indeed, whereas Saussure dismissed etymology outright, according to Attridge (2004, p. 123), Derrida and other poststructuralists take up etymology to turn “the etymological dictionary against itself, using the power of etymology to undermine the easy mastery of language implied in much of our literary and philosophical tradition and to shake our assurance in fixed and immediately knowable meanings.”

Even though Attridge distinguishes de Saussure from the poststructuralist approach to language, it is fair to say that Derrida would not concede that this separation leaves poststructuralist linguistics untouched or uninformed by a Eurocentric modern linguistic science. Derrida’s approach is neither anti-Europe nor does he propose anti-Eurocentric positions because such positions assume that one can absolutely oppose the past they inherit. As Derrida states (Derrida & Birnbaum, 2007, pp. 44-5): “What I call ‘deconstruction,’ even when it is directed toward something from Europe, is European.”
On this insistence of deconstruction’s European origins, Mark Redfield (2007, pp. 386-7) argues that

Derrida’s proposals unquestionably maintain or suffer a certain proximity to or contamination by Eurocentrism. Contamination gives deconstruction its chance. One starts within the historical and metaphysical text within which one finds oneself and exploits its fissures and catexes.27

Because Derrida assumes that “we are radically historical beings, unable to extricate ourselves from the processes that have made us” (Ibid), poststructuralist linguists should assume that their return to Greece, no matter how critical, is always indebted to Jones and other colonial linguists.

Even though poststructuralist linguistics is not a de facto anti-Eurocentric space of creation, poststructuralist linguistics is nonetheless a productive place to begin to trouble the Eurocentric linguistic archival order and open it on to other words and etymological relations. Poststructuralist linguistics’ productivity arises not because it is completely divorced from comparative philology but because it willingly and self-critically moves within the tension between sameness and difference that modern linguistic science denies. That is, by troubling the familial boundaries that delimit etymologies and underwrite the double purity of languages and Europe, poststructural etymologies push towards the limits of the modern linguistic archival order.

As part of what Attridge (2004) considers a more general, poststructuralist approach to etymology, the relationship Derrida creates between “archives” and arkheion is something like a play-on-words. While using the linguistic archive constructed according to the laws of genetic relations, etymology as play-on-words creates relationships between words according to various strategies in an effort to make the contemporary word strange. Making the word strange troubles any assumption of a straightforward relationship between the signifier and signified such that the speaker is confronted with various potential relationships and relations with other signs, as well as the power relations that mediate signification. As such, by making the word strange through a play-on-words, Derrida’s etymology works to trouble the speaker’s knowledge of the world and their place in it by showing that all meaning is relational and, thus, contingent on other factors present and seemingly absent. As opposed to ensuring the correct etymological genealogy or generating a true—or truer—meaning of that word, the
task of etymological play is to try to transform the world by transforming what the word means.

In *Archive Fever*, Derrida estranges archivists from the contemporary and familiar meaning of “archive” by returning to the Greek and showing that there is a fissure within the very root of the Greek word *arkheion: arkhē*. Always trying to point out the instability of meaning by troubling the meaning of words, Derrida’s etymologies do not reject etymology but work against what Derrida calls “etymologism:” the use of etymology to get at the true origins of the word, so as to dislocate the presence the single, truer meaning would create (Derrida, 1974, p. 8, as quoted in Attridge, 2004, p. 125). Working against the logic of truer origins, Derrida uses the etymology of archive to return to the archive’s origin in both senses: to the Greek *arkhē* and to the idea of origins. Derrida shows that what should be the archive’s stable origins: both Greece and *arkhē*, are really unstable. Derrida shows that etymology drew the reader towards this instability by providing two definitions of *arkhē*: both “origins,” and “to rule.” In meaning both “origins” (commencement) and “to rule” (commandment), *arkhē* is divided within itself and, thus, draws the etymologists in two directions at once. Indeed, instead of resolving this tension between commencement and commandment by supposing that any act of founding or creating order precedes the act of ruling it, Derrida argues *arkhē* does not permit such a sequential ordering of events. In *arkhē* any founding is inseparable from the act of maintaining or enforcing what is founded.

There are as many orders of commandment as their commencements. In *Archive Fever*, Derrida’s primary object of study is the archival logic of psychoanalysis that finds its origins in Freud. Going back to Freud’s writing on the unconsciousness-as-archive in which Freud argues that it is both possible to retrieve the original, traumatic event through analysis and, also, disavowing that any such retrieval is possible, Derrida shows that the return to Freud’s writing troubles psychoanalysis’ desire to found their profession as a science in Freud. By following linguistics own archival logic back to the instability of the root word *arkhē*, Derrida also troubles the modern linguistic archival order that uses root words to discern the genetic relations that hold language families together of the archive. There can be no single and definitive concept of archiving because the root or origin (*arkhē*) of the archive and archival order fails to be an origin but, instead, leads
elsewhere. Using etymology Derrida shows that the modern linguistic archival order cannot produce a single or definitive etymology because words divide within themselves and lead elsewhere.

As Verne Harris (2007, pp. 39-40) points out, in *Archive Fever* Derrida shows that it is “from within the word [archive] itself—coming from behind linguistics or semantics or etymology, coming from the very process of archiving—there is a troubling meaning.” That is, Derrida does not so much trouble the word “archive” so much as to show that the trouble is there in the word and that this trouble is being hidden by what Derrida calls the archontic principle or function. Derrida’s archontic function (1995, pp. 2-3) gathers together texts to create a “single corpus” in which “all the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration” to hide the division within *arkhē* that threatens to partition all archives. Sheltered from the authority that gathers together texts to make it into a single corpus, Derrida (p. 2) argues that the archive is under “house arrest.” Linguists have put the word archive and etymology under house arrest through recourse to language families built on the laws of genetic relations that concretize and close off words to un-familial relations.

However, despite being under house arrest, *arkhē* continues to refute the very promise of origins because the desire for origins leads linguists to an unstable word that opens on to more than one order. By returning archivists to the power of commanding, Derrida leads them not just to the *archon* who commands but to the power relations of the place of the archive (*arkheion*) and the archival order that gathers together people as much as texts. Based in the laws of the archive— the record keeping order but also the Athenian laws of ownership and hospitality— the power to command is not indivisible in the figure of the *archon* but depends on living in the space with others: present and absent, human and nonhuman. Through Derrida’s move from the word archive to *arkheion*, archivists are led to the others and “other others” within the archives. These others, the slaves who worked in the *Metroon* perhaps, do not exist outside the power of the archon or Athenian property (and, thus, slave) laws, but they nonetheless divide the archive and speak of other origins of Athens’ archival order and, thus, the messy space in which Greek culture developed. Athens’ archive and archival order—like Greek language
and culture more generally—did not arise from something proto-Greek, but arose within the circulation of goods, peoples and ideas within the Eastern Mediterranean world.

Derrida’s move back through the Indo-European language family from archive to *arkheion* arguably troubles the familial grouping of languages because the trouble of *arkhē* threatens to open up the Indo-European language family to the otherness the modern linguistic archival order denies. And just as *Archive Fever* works to open up archiving to an Other and otherness yet to be determined—and others and otherness that are perhaps indeterminable (Harris, 2007), Derrida’s turn to *arkhē* challenges archivists to work within the difference of the linguistic archival order when taking up the word archive. Even though the modern linguistic archival order cannot be reduced to what Derrida calls etymologism, by pushing against the familial limits of the modern linguistic archive, Derrida tries to open up another archival order—another way of archiving and thinking origins—with a different relationship to its others. In this way, changing the word changes the world because, as Derrida (1995, p. 18) puts it, “what is no longer archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same way.”

With the Greek language and the modern linguistic archive troubled and opened up to other, foreign relations, subaltern linguistic rationalities can begin to explore the lived relationship between Greek and other Eastern Mediterranean languages that formed through the circulation of goods, people and ideas. As opposed to turning to an entirely other linguistic order that wishes to fix relations, subaltern linguistic rationalities can begin to create new subaltern orders that trouble the familial logic that kidnaps Greece through the marginalized logic of loan words: words that are adopted with little or no alteration from a foreign language. Because Derrida says little on Greek loan words, mapping out this subaltern linguistic archival order then, requires a move from Derrida’s *Archive Fever* to Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena*.

This move from Derrida to Bernal is, perhaps, surprising given that Bernal’s etymologies are not playful and certainly not Derridean or otherwise poststructuralist. Bernal’s etymologies neither show the inherent contradictions within the meaning of Greek words, nor attempts to trouble the present meaning of a word by making its Greek origins strange as Derrida does. Instead, Bernal’s (2001) etymological project situates the development of the Greek language within the Afro-asiatic linguistic environment of the
Ancient and Classical Eastern Mediterranean world by proposing Afro-asiatic—in particular Egyptian and Phoenician—origins to Greek culture and words. With the stated intention to “lessen European cultural arrogance” (1987, p. 73) that underwrites a commitment to an autogenetic Greek culture, Bernal works to re-situate Greece and the Greek language within the Eastern Mediterranean world.

Contrary to what many critics of Bernal claim, Bernal’s etymological project does not make Egypt and the Levantine the truer origins of Greek culture and language even as his etymologies create new African and Semitic origins for Greek words. Instead of proposing new linguistic origins based on objective connections between Greek and these Afro-asiatic languages determined through the scientific study of phonological change, Bernal’s (2001) argument rests on his own linguistic scholarship that constructs etymologies on the semantic relations between words. Bernal argues that the turn to semantics and creating etymological relations based on the similar meaning of words is warranted in the case of Greece because, unlike other Indo-European languages that have their own unique phonology and a large Indo-European vocabulary, Greek has an Indo-European phonology but a large percentage of its vocabulary—some 60 percent—is non-Indo-European. Thus, while Bernal’s accepts that Greek is, phonologically speaking, an Indo-European language, many Greek words comes from elsewhere.

By building etymologies based on the similar meanings between various Greek and non-Indo-European words, Bernal moves away from the philological and, in particular, the Neogrammarian emphasis on phonetics to understand linguistic formation and change to take up a sociolinguistic approach to language that assumes languages are lived and, thus, change according to how they are used and abused. As opposed to developing according to transcendental laws, Bernal’s sociolinguistic approach looks at how Greek words emerged in and through exchanges: trade; war; spread of religious practice; and so on, with their neighbours. As opposed to emerging with a relatively isolated Indo-European, proto-Greek peoples, Bernal (2001, p. 11) argues that the Greek language grew up “at the intersection of Europe and the Middle East as a thoroughly mixed and eclectic culture” made up of African, West Asian and Indigenous Greek languages. Arguing that Greece was significantly impacted by such exchanges with other Mediterranean peoples during the second millennium B.C.E, Bernal proposes that a
significant portion of a Greek vocabulary was built on loan words taken from other Eastern Mediterranean languages; words that were then adopted and used by the Greeks. Because Egyptian and Phoenician civilizations at this time dominated the Mediterranean world, Bernal deduces that Egyptian and Semitic languages will be likely sources for many loan words.

Although Bernal notes that linguists have identified approximately 70-80 percent of Greek words by deferring to sound laws and linguistic families, he argues that all etymologies cannot be built in according to these laws because such laws misrepresent the remaining 20-30 percent of words. Treating these 70-80 percent of words as “regular” Greek words that fit—or appear to fit—within the linguistic archival order, the other 20-30 percent of words are considered misfit words. As opposed to seeing these misfit words as the residue of intercultural exchange, linguists ignore and dismiss these words and, in doing so, dismiss the trouble loan words cause the linguistic archival order. Contrary to traditional linguistic scholars Jay H. Jasanoff and Alan Nussbaum (1996, p. 189) who argue that loans words in Greek are “obvious exotica” and isolatable misfits, Bernal (2001, p. 119) quotes Walter Burkert who argues that foreign loan words were “thoroughly absorbed into the structures of Greek phonetics and morphology” such that they could hide in plain sight, dissembling through their phonetic adoption into the Greek language. By defying the hard laws that constitute language families and allowing foreign words to dissemble as Greek words, the unruly nature of loan words pushes linguists to consider that even seemingly self-evident Indo-European words may be foreign in origin. Thinking through loan words, then, brings to the fore the strangeness of Greek words and culture. Thinking through loan words, linguists have to consider that even etymologies of familiar Greek words have the potential of leading speakers outside the Indo-European language family.

Contrary to laws of phonetic change, then, the linguistic borrowings that interest Bernal are not limited by familial groupings but occur through the interaction and exchange between different cultural groups. Thinking through loan words to build his etymologies, Bernal moves outside the Indo-European linguistic family to find the Afro-asiatic roots of the Greek language. However, even though loan words trouble the science behind hermetically sealed and seemingly homogeneous linguistic families, thinking
through loan words does not necessarily dismiss the familial framework entirely. Instead, thinking through loan words troubles linguistic exchange between family members because, while Bernal (2001, p. 113) agrees with linguists that “there are regularities of phonetic change within language families,” he goes on to argue that “semantics follow no such clear-cut guidelines and often show considerable and largely unpredictable shifts in meaning” that fail to be captured under phonetic laws or adhere to familial relations. In other words, if there are many ways Greek words are open to non-Indo-European influences that cannot be ascertained by the laws of phonetic change, linguists cannot assume that exchanges between family members are made apparent by these laws.

Contrary to accusations that Bernal’s etymologies “rely on superficially suggestive but demonstrably secondary phonetic resemblances between Greek and Egyptian or Semitic words,” and that these etymologies lack an order altogether such that they offer no way of verifying their correctness (Jasanoff & Nussbaum, 1996, pp. 182-3), Bernal (2001, p. 125) organizes his linguistic archive according to a theory of “competitive plausibility.” That is, Bernal creates etymologies based on what was probable given the anthropological, archaeological and historical scholarship concerning the period in which linguistic exchange occurred. As opposed to negating the scientific archival order, competitive plausibility complicates matters by proposing a secondary archival order for the residue of misfit words created by traditional linguistics. With the Greek language split between two linguistic archival orders: phonetic change and sociolinguistic borrowing, that remain incommensurable even as they work side-by-side, the Greek language remains open to two ways of determining linguistic parentage and, thus, no determinate way to trace out a definitive family tree. As opposed to creating new African and Semitic origins, with competitive plausibility the distinction between African, Semitic and Greek recede as Bernal shows that the Greek vocabulary arises within a circulation of words that cannot easily be said to belong to just one language or another. After Bernal, Greek is an Indo-European language and also the gathering and transformation of words that can no longer easily be divided into foreign and familial categories.

While Bernal is neither playful in his approach to words nor does he open up the Greek to the radical alterity of logos as Derrida does, he does open up the Greek language
to Greece’s others—Egyptians and barbarians—that the Greeks themselves attempted to exclude while he also troubling the difference between Greek, Egyptian and Phoenician that Eurocentric scholars wish to uphold. According to Bernal, there is no pure Phoenician, Egyptian or Greek culture or language as all are always already mixed when they came in contact. Greek’s greatness and its influence on Europe “was not the result of isolation and cultural purity but of frequent contact and stimulus from the many surrounding peoples with the already heterogeneous natives of the Aegean” (Ibid, p. 11).

As part of his project to “lessen European cultural arrogance,” Bernal’s etymologies contravene the limits of the modern linguistic archive by breaking down the barriers that otherwise parse Greece off from the Mediterranean world.

Derrida and Bernal both open up the word archive and the linguistic archive to unruly difference by pushing at the linguistic archival order, stretching language families until they are strange, and creating ties across familial lines that estrange the familial logic of the modern linguistic archival order. Of course, as troubled and troubling as “arkhē/ion” is according to Derrida, arkheion is not one of the Greek words that Bernal traces back to an Afro-asiatic language. Indeed, there seems to be little doubt of the archive’s linguistic roots in the archaic Indo-European form arkh- (Watkins, 2000). However, the Indo-European heritage of arkheion neither makes arkheion immune to the difference within the Greek language nor allows it to reside outside the circulation of words and ideas by which the Greeks built their vocabulary to inhabit the world.

Just as returning to arkhē leads to the otherness of archival commandment by tracing out the roll of slave labour in the Metroon, subaltern rationalities trace out the otherness of the Greek language through the word archive. However, even as subaltern linguistic rationalities trouble the familial order of languages, it does not outright deny the familial link between archive and arkheion by creating new linguistic origins. Instead, subaltern linguistic archival orders open up etymology to other languages and other types of relation with those languages so that the word archive can move archivists to the exteriority of the modern linguistic archive. Even though these subaltern relations remain speculative, they nonetheless haunt arkheion and its connection to the word archive.

The word archive is, then, troubling to the modern linguistic archival order that denies the colonial difference of linguistic science. Despite the number of archival
theorists—archivist and non-archivist—who have taken up Derrida to critique the authenticity of records and consider the political nature of creating origins, none to my knowledge have taken up the trouble of the Greek origins of the word “archive” and the linguistic archival order that gathers together the Greek, Latin, French and English as members of the Indo-European family. Indeed, by seeing the Greek roots of the archive as a rather straightforward matter, archivists have not troubled the modern archival linguistic order that underwrites etymology.

By focusing on archivists’ inattention to the politics of etymology and how the Greek origin of the word archive is premised on what are taken to be the objective relations between English and Greek to the exclusion of non-Indo-European languages, I do not want to minimize the work done by postmodern archivists to politicize translation and archival terminology. However, archivists interested in the trouble of language need to consider not only the difference between European words but how to open up these words and concepts to non-Indo-European languages and peoples. By considering the problems of the modern linguistic archival order that underwrites the etymology of the word archive, postmodern archivists can begin to appreciate the colonial difference that informs modern archiving and also their turn to the problems of archival concepts. To displace the mythic image of Europe, archivists can begin to look to the global circulations of “European” archival concepts and the non-European difference of archival concepts. A subaltern linguistic rationality can push archivists towards the limits of their own linguistic examinations.

By making Greek and Greece strange, subaltern linguistic rationalities have the potential of opening archivists up to uncomfortable relations and unfamiliar—and unfamiliar—feelings towards others. In the next chapter, I will take up the emotional economies that permeate settler national archives to further archivists’ exploration of the emotions circulating in the archives. In particular, the next chapter will consider the potential of uncomfortable feelings as a means of unsettling archival researchers.
Chapter Four

Unsettling archival memory-work

This chapter concerns itself with the emotional acts of remembering political violence through archives. In particular, I look at the bad feelings that circulate around official apologies and processes of reconciling with victims of settler colonial violence in settler nations such as Canada and Australia. While there is a strong emphasis placed on settlers to feel guilt, contrition, shame and other bad feelings about colonial violence as a necessary first step to start the reconciliation and healing process, this chapter critically takes up the potential of pain and negative affects as anti-colonial feelings upon which post-settler politics can be formed. I argue that the unsettling aspects of bad feelings can be negated or deferred by liberal multiculturalism that allow the settler to once again feel good by consuming cultural difference and the pain of colonial others. In short, I argue that liberal multiculturalism organizes what Mark Rifkin (2011, p. 342) calls “settler structures of feeling” that give rise to “certain modes of feeling, and, reciprocally, particular affective formations among non-Natives [to] normalize settler presence, privilege, and power.”

Taking up Walter Mignolo’s (2000, p. 107) argument that there are differences between postmodern and postcolonial modes of remembering violence in which the latter theorizes “the past in terms of coloniality” because it arises when subjects feel the hurt of colonialism, this chapter deploys Sara Ahmed’s (2004a) framework of affective economies to examine the way subjects in settler nations come to feel the hurt of colonialism through archival memory-work so as to mark out postcolonial modes of remembering through archives. In particular, building on anti-racist and anti-colonial critiques of liberal multiculturalism, I look at the way in which multiculturalism’s optimistic emotional economy reinvests contrite settlers in continuing settler-colonial relations as enlightened hosts that have transcended—or have the potential to transcend—their colonial past by consuming their own and others’ pain. As a result, multicultural emotional economies detach reconciliation from social justice in attempts to heal the settler nation. At the end of this chapter I consider what an unsettling emotional archival economy might look like.
Archival memory-work

The legacies of slavery, empires, and mobility are frequently painful, but they are inescapable: in many ways, these legacies are at the heart of what it is to be modern, what it is to be human, at the start of the twenty-first century (Ballantyne & Burton, 2005, p. 1).

Archives are emotional spaces. Historian Arlette Farge (2013, p. 5) argues that as opposed to archival research being a relatively benign endeavour, “the archive grabs hold of the reader,” overwhelming the researcher with all the details of lives lived that fail to cohere to any one narrative or theory. To deal with the way archives grab hold of the reader emotionally as much as intellectually, archival researchers have taken up memory as a framework to address the affective experiences of remembering the past because, memory— unlike history— takes into consideration the emotions that arise in the process of remembering as well as the politics of those emotions. Archives, as a place of doing memory-work, “can elicit a host of emotions and memories, many of which are disconcerting, painful and enraging” (Hanlon, 1999, p. 15). It is not just that disturbing and pleasurable emotions accompany the work of remembering, but that memory is unpredictable and always threatens to overwhelm the rememberer (Craig, 2002; Chakrabarty, 2002). It is because of this troubling emotive relationship, between feeling overwhelmed and being incapacitated by the remembered event, that Dipesh Chakrabarty (2002, p. 115) argues that memory “is far more complicated than what historians can recover, and it poses ethical challenges” to the one who remembers.

Even though memory-work is not done exclusively in archives, archives remain important sites for memory-work because they are repositories “for the material of memory haunted by the myths of places and people who have long since disappeared” (McAllister, 2010b, p. 215). Indeed, because they contain the physical remnants of past actions, archives— particularly national archives and public records offices— have become contested spaces of remembering in which researchers use the state’s own records of their actions against the state. This contestation is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the study of colonial and settler colonial regimes because how such regimes are remembered lays out a particular picture of present-day, post-colonial relations. That is, how colonialism is remembered sets the terms for how one can point to or deny the colonial legacies within and between post-colonial nation-states. Despite
critiques that argue that drawing up past grievances against the state and its national subjects in democracies like Canada is melancholic in nature or antithetical to future oriented projects, such memory-work is the work of justice. That is, the duty to remember the violence of the past and, thus, what is owed and to whom, is a prerequisite for building a better future (Booth, 2001; Mbembe, 2002).

The emotions arising through memory-work done in the archives of settler nation-states are complex. When mining the official documentary heritage of past colonial regimes and the nation-state heirs of these regimes, researchers find themselves getting angry, sad, confused, inspired, overjoyed, frustrated and a variety of other mixed emotions. That is, as researchers touch the past through archival records, the records they are reading also touch them. Researchers may feel a sense of accomplishment or relief in finding names and events otherwise lost to history. They may also find themselves incited to act or, conversely, become overwhelmed and unable to act when reading accounts of past injustices and acts of political violence carried out by colonial authorities. Researchers may also similarly feel incited or overwhelmed when confronted with the gaping holes in the official records into which the events that have shaped a community’s collective sense of the past have disappeared.

While the events of the past touch the researcher, the feelings that arise from being touched by the past in the archives arise within the complex social relations that shape the present. That is, archival memory-work is run through with the relations of power that permeate and organize archives. These relations of power will allow some researchers to feel at home in the archives as they build a past for themselves through archival records, while for other researchers just entering the official or public archives can be off putting if not traumatic. For instance, researchers examining historical injustices may be discomforted and torn by having to rely on official records to support their claims of state sponsored discrimination, exclusion or genocide. And for researchers who belong to communities that were and continue to be the object of racist policies and discrimination, delving into the history of their communities in the archives exposes them to the objectifying language of state rule that represents these communities—and, thus, the researchers—as problems to be solved.
The emotional archival memory-work done to address the wrongs of Canada’s government and civil society has led to a number of government apologies and processes of compensation. After using archived government records and other sources to show that the forced removal and detention of Japanese-Canadians living on Canada’s West Coast during World War II, and then forced dispersal and settlement of these “internal threats” across Canada after the war was unjust and racially motivated, the Japanese Canadian Redress movement elicited official acknowledgement of the government’s wrongful actions and compensation in 1988. Accompanying public consultations and hearing of testimonies conducted as part of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), protracted archival research showed that Indian Residential Schools (IRS) were based on a policy of assimilation and civilizing the savage, and that government and Church officials knew of the abuses taking place in these schools. This research underwrote the Commission’s recommendations for further public inquiry, apologies, compensation and other funding (RCAP). RCAP’s reports and recommendations along with continued political pressure led to two apologies to IRS survivors: a Statement of Reconciliation offered by Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government in 1998 and an apology and the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Prime Minister Steven Harper’s Conservatives in 2008.

Apologies⁸ are events that give expression to the complex emotions that arise through archival and other memory-work, while also giving rise to new and different emotions for those persons hailed by them. That is, apologies bring up the bad and good feelings among those who identify as victims and survivors as well as perpetrators. As events that give voice to past violence in the present, apologies often cause victims to relive traumatic events, as well as feel sad and angry for all their friends and family members who have died or been hurt as a result of settler colonial violence. As Robert Joseph, an IRS survivor, said on the day Harper apologized: "There will be many, many emotions, and some of them will be painful. There will be a lot of tears."⁹ At the same time, many victims and survivors felt the stirrings of accomplishment, relief and even joy at finally hearing the government apologize and admit their guilt.¹⁰ For those who identify as perpetrators—and, of course, not all settlers do—apologies bring up feelings
of shame and guilt but also the good feeling of finally taking responsibility for what they have done.¹¹

Eliciting more than individual emotional responses, apologies mark and invoke what Lauren Berlant (2000, p. 34) calls instances of nationalized sentimentality that tries to rebuild the nation across “fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy.” Through nationalized sentimentality “relatively privileged citizens are exposed to the suffering of their intimate Others, so that to be virtuous requires feeling the pain of flawed and denied citizenship as their own pain” (Ibid, p. 35).

As Mitch Miyagawa (2011, p. 354) notes, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s acknowledgement of wrongs committed against Japanese Canadians in 1988 “was the beginning of our national experiment with institutional remorse—an experiment that has grown greatly over the past twenty years” to include official and other types of apologies for the internment and harassment of Italian Canadians (1990), the Chinese head tax (2006), the “Komagata Maru incident” (2008) and the two IRS apologies.¹² Since 1988, Canada’s government and civil society have again and again expressed how sorry they are and how bad they feel for what was done in their name.

As opposed to being a particularly “Canadian” response, apologies, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) and national sentiments of bad feelings are part of what Elazar Barkan (2000, p. xxviii) argues is a new, post-Cold War “public morality” in the West that has seen a “growing political willingness, and at times eagerness [among Western nations], to admit one’s historical guilt.” Canada joins other settler nations like Australia, as well as former imperial powers, to apologize to specific Indigenous peoples and marginalized citizens.¹³ As a way to take responsibility for what was done, apologies also serve more practical, realpolitik ends. As in instances when European governments apologize to the governments of former colonies, the aim is to put both colonialism and any bad feelings still circulating within these former colonies and elsewhere towards Europe behind these two states and nations so as to strengthen diplomatic and trade relations and get on with business-as-usual (Howard-Hassman & Gibney, 2008; Freeman, 2008). Along similar lines, apologies to Indigenous and other marginalized peoples can enhance a settler state like Canada’s “international human rights reputation with regard to oppressed minorities” when that reputation appears tarnished by a history of settler
violence and on going discrimination (Regan, 2010, p. 57). In this practical analysis of the apology, it is perhaps of little surprise that the eagerness of nation-states to address historical injustices that can be relegated to the past is not matched with action to address contemporary injustices (Barkan, 2000).

Indeed, even though apologies and admitting guilt can be risky for governments as it opens up potentially expensive processes of redress and legal actions by victims, apologies, compensation and TRCs are also means of closing down legal actions already under way (Corntassel & Holder, 2008). And while apologies and reconciliation are means of mending relations between settlers and Indigenous populations, in the face of a violent past that undermines the state’s moral legitimacy, official apologies function as “political and legal strategies to resolve the troublesome question of [the state’s] moral legitimacy” (Regan, 2010, p. 57). That is, because liberal settlers have set the terms that define political and legal processes and objectives, apologies are strategies that strive for a notion of justice that does not undermine the authority of settler institutions.

However, apologies can give voice to new national discourses. For instance, if, as Sunera Thobani (2007) argues, Canada’s civil society and government usually blame the violence of settler colonialism on a few “bad apple” settlers when it acknowledges such violence at all, Harper’s IRS apology—along with this apology for the Chinese head tax—mark a change in settler discourses as far as Canada’s government recognized and apologized for Canada’s racist and assimilationist policies.14 It is for this reason that Paulette Regan (2010, p. 56) argues Harper’s IRS apology represents Canada’s efforts as a “guilty” settler nation to “grapple with the unresolved moral and ethical legacies of colonialism” even though the apology only addresses IRS survivors.

Indeed, even though apologies are ways to make offending nation-states look better in the eyes of the world and manage dissenting minorities, Janna Thompson (2008, p. 34) argues that apologies are nonetheless an important part of reparative justice as far as the apology “answers the harm that injustice causes to the dignity of the victims.” According to Thompson, apologies convey to the victims that perpetrators take responsibility for the injustices committed and, as an act of contrition, demonstrates the respect the perpetrator has for the victim. In this way, recognizing guilt is meant as a first step in a process of reconciliation with marginalized populations because it means
recognizing oneself as the cause of harm or as benefiting from violence.\textsuperscript{15} As opposed to closing the door on the past by denying or forgetting historical injustices to get on with business-as-usual, apologies can be part of processes of remembering political violence and recognizing its damaging effects.\textsuperscript{16} As Kirsten Emiko McAllister (2010a, p. 13) argues, it is only through remembering political violence that communities affected by such violence can heal because with remembering there is “the possibility of identifying ways to transform debilitating intergenerational effects [of political violence] and thus assert (a new form of) continuity over time.”

However, if healing is to be more than a process that has marginalized groups reconcile with the settler polity, then apologies and TRCs must unsettle settler relations such that settlers loosen their hold on the land so that Indigenous title and entitlement can have sway. As opposed to just appearing to take responsibility, many critics argue that settlers must actually feel bad if they are to become unsettled and open themselves up to the pain they have caused marginalized and Indigenous communities (Regan, 2010; Veracini, 2010; Chambers, 2009). Feeling bad about the pain they have caused others is seen as a necessary, unsettling starting point from which settlers can come to feel differently \textit{with} as much as \textit{about} marginalized and Indigenous people.\textsuperscript{17}

Without negating the potentially unsettling capacity of bad feelings, there is the danger of assuming that feeling bad hardens settler subjects against the appeals of settler politics. Indeed, assuming that guilt and contrition mark the end of settler society can obfuscate the way in which feelings of guilt, contrition and shame can be mobilized by settler politics. As such, unsettling settler society is not just a project of creating bad feelings but is, instead, a question of how those bad feelings are organized. Therefore, it is necessary to interrogate emotional economies of contemporary settler societies and the way bad and good feelings circulate.

\textbf{Emotional economies}

To talk about emotional economies and the circulations of feelings rub against the subject-centred framework for understanding emotions in which emotions arise within and emanate from a person. Nonetheless, to talk about how feelings circulate between subjects, bodies and things is particularly appropriate given the nature of archival
memory-work. In archival memory-work, emotions are neither simply there in the records to be discovered nor entirely baggage brought in by the researcher. Instead, emotions arise in the work of archival research and, thus, in the relationships between researchers, records, archives, and archivists that play out within economic, political and social relations of power. In this way, emotions and feelings arise and circulate through archival labours that are always already caught up in unequal power relations that extend, if not complicate, long standing inequitable, exclusionary and oppressive practices sanctioned or otherwise permitted by the state.

If feelings, emotions and desires are produced through archival memory-work then affects do not originate from within a subject and move outwards towards objects and other individuals. Feelings, emotions and desires are economic: they circulate between figures, objects and signs to produce the boundaries of subjects, objects and also those people and things that fail to become full subjects and concrete objects of study. Emotions “circulate and are distributed across a social as well as psychic field” such that affective economies “involve subjects and objects, but without residing positively within them” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 119). As such, emotions and desires “are not simply ‘within’ or ‘without’ certain subjects (Ibid, p. 117). Instead, the “subject is only one nodal point in the economy, rather than its origin and destination” (Ibid, p. 121).

Sara Ahmed’s work emphasizes how affects get stuck and accumulate on objects, bodies and subjects through discourses even as these felt objects, bodies and subjects organize these discourses. By getting stuck and accumulating as they circulate, Ahmed argues that feelings “create the very effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds” (Ibid, p. 117). That is, emotions produce and reshape the individual’s skin, community boundaries, and the tactility of objects. How we feel about something, how emotions intensify or dissipate, and how the object of our desires and revulsion change or get stuck, constitute differences within the archives.

In creating bodies, communities and objects, Ahmed avoids juxtaposing emotions: love vs. hate; joy vs. fear; happiness vs. sadness; and so on, but, instead, explores how feelings such as love can be caught up in economies of hate and fear. As such, subjects, communities and objects are not the result of one feeling or another, but of a complex economy that arranges feelings and emotions in particular ways. Because of
their complex circulation, the relationship between bad and good feelings and also between these feelings and matters of justice and injustice are complicated. While injustice and pain are inseparable because suffering has “something to do” with what is wrong, injustice cannot be reduced to having bad feelings or simply feeling bad (Ahmed 2004a, p.193; Berlant 2000). As such, “the relationship between injustice and feeling bad is complicated” (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 193). At the same time, Ahmed argues (Ibid, p. 196), “justice is not simply a matter of feeling good: it is not about the overcoming of pain, or even about the achievement of happiness. That is, being happy is not itself a sign of justice.” While “justice has to leave room for feeling better” because for “those whose lives have been torn apart by violence, or those for whom tiredness of repetition in everyday life becomes too much to bear, feeling better does and should matter,” this does not mean justice can be reduced to just making people feel better (Ibid, p. 201). Indeed, if justice is about becoming happy without changing dominant norms and structures than justice would be reduced to reconciling with and reinvesting in problematic dominant norms: capitalist relations, settler notions of justice, etc. In this way, “the desire to feel good or better can involve the erasure of relations of violence” (Ibid, p. 197).

Similarly, the process of healing cannot be conflated with the overcoming of bad feelings because if bad feelings are an “effect of injustice, then to overcome bad feeling can also be to erase the signs of injustice” (Ibid, p. 197). Instead, just feelings as Ahmed (2004a, p. 201) argues, involve being “moved by feelings into a different relation to the norms that we wish to contest, or the wounds we wish to heal.” Healing as a form of justice is, then, about opening “different kinds of attachments to others” (Ibid).

Ahmed’s economic model of emotions allows us to understand how feelings are not simply the effects of settler relations but, instead, create differential settler and aboriginal subjects and secure settler title and entitlement. Importantly, seeing the way emotions and feelings circulate allows us to appreciate settlers and aboriginal peoples as feeling subjects who are shaped and undone by emotive interactions they have with others and the world. It is not that settlers or aboriginal subjects have their own unique feelings about colonialism, but that their feelings—feelings that get stuck to and slide off historical injustices and ongoing neocolonial violence, or feelings that get stuck to and slide off of settlers and Aboriginals—circulate together.
As a matter of tackling the emotional economies that form and deform bodies into settler and Aboriginal subjects, Ahmed’s economic model argues that decolonization is a matter of changing how people feel. Decolonization cannot be about making people feel good without also changing the material and discursive structures of settler nationalism through which emotions circulate. As such, decolonizing emotions is about producing unsettling emotional economies: economies in which settlers and Indigenous people feel differently with each other as much as feel differently about each other, so as to unsettle settler title and entitlement. In other words, decolonizing archival memory-work requires unsettling what Mark Rifkin (2011, p. 342) calls “settler structures of feeling,” or the processes “and institutionalized frameworks of settlement – the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands – [that] give rise to certain modes of feeling, and, reciprocally, particular affective formations among non-Natives [to] normalize settler presence, privilege, and power.”

Ahmed’s economic model for understanding emotions also helps us flesh out the distinctions Mignolo makes between postmodern and postcolonial theorizings of modernity. If challenging the mythic image of modernity begins with the act of remembering the imaginary and physical violence of colonial-imperialism—or what Mignolo (2002a, p. 67) calls the “densities of the colonial experience”—that underwrite modernity, postcolonial theorizing begins with an experience and memory of colonial violence so as to move “towards autonomy and liberation in every order of life” (Mignolo, 2000, p. 93). Conversely, theorizing from “the limits of the hegemonic narratives of Western history” (Ibid, p. 89), postmodern theorists remain unable to displace Eurocentric narratives of modernity.

In making this distinction between postcolonial and postmodern, Mignolo is clear that postcolonial theorizing and remembering is not the property of a particular ethnic group. Postcolonial theorizing is an enunciative space open to all who move from an experience of the densities of colonial experience towards the decolonization and liberation in every order of life. In a similar manner, when Mignolo (2000, p. 107) argues that “those for whom colonial legacies are real (i.e., those whom they hurt) are more (logically, historically, and emotionally) inclined to theorize the past in terms of coloniality,” those whom are hurt do not signify a pre-constituted group. Instead, coming
to feel hurt in a particular way is a means of constituting spaces of enunciation from which postcolonial theorizing can take place. While open to all feeling subjects, not all ways of feeling hurt—all hurtful emotional economies—are the same. It is not that postmodern theorizing does not feel the pain of colonialism, but that postmodern theorizing reinvests feeling subjects in the Eurocentric order of things.

Thinking through the problem of postcolonial and postmodern emotional economies clarifies, then, the distinction Mignolo (2000, p. 92) makes between settler colonies in which “postmodernity is the discourse of countermodernity” and “deep-settler colonies” in places like South America “where colonial power endured with particular brutality” and in which “postcoloniality is the discourse of countermodernity.”21 As opposed to arguing that settler colonies like Canada, the United States, Australia and so on, were not brutal enough to hurt colonized peoples in the right way, Mignolo is arguing that settlers’ discursive and affective economies of shame, guilt, forgiveness and so on, get organized to reconstitute settler title and entitlement to Indigenous land. Conversely, postcolonial theorizing and remembering organize hurt feelings towards the decolonization of the modern/colonial world’s discursive and affective economies.

In emphasizing the importance of feeling hurt in postcolonial theorizing, Mignolo is not arguing that theorizing the past in terms of coloniality denies feeling good or repairing colonial wounds, but that liberation requires mobilizing feelings of hurt so that they circulate with other emotions in unsettling ways. As such, approaching the bad feelings that accompany apologies within an economic model of emotions pushes us to critically take up the way such bad feelings circulate: the way they create new skins, boundaries and surfaces for bodies, communities and objects. Unsettling settler colonial emotional economies requires interrogating the dominant political-affective economy of liberal multiculturalism in which these apologies are offered to see if it creates a postcolonial position of enunciation.

**Apologies and the shamed subject of liberal multiculturalism**

Leaders of settler nations are making official apologies as twenty-first century settler states reorganize themselves around the multiculturalist logic of recognizing difference (Barkan, 2000; Taylor, 1994; Seth, 2001). Liberal multicultural theories
challenge the homogenizing logic of earlier forms of liberalism in which differences in the form of different beliefs, customs, and so on, were erased in the name of organizing political life around singular and universal ways of being. Building on a notion of mutual respect for particular cultural differences, multicultural theories are meant to create a space in which people holding “different moral and religious views can nonetheless live together in circumstances where conflict is minimized,” and also create “commonly agreed principles of justice” so as to be able to adjudicate conflict where and when it arises (Seth, 2001, p. 69). By allowing settler subjects to live with and be open to others that are different from themselves, multicultural theory is different from the assimilative logic of yesteryear.

Even though multiculturalism is a critical interrogation of liberalism, multiculturalism remains invested in what can be called the double fantasy of liberalism: both the “self-correcting nature of rational argument” and also that the “convulsive competition” of capitalism does not engender any real social conflict (Povinelli, 2002, p. 32). That is, liberals believe that the self-reflexivity of public reason leads over time toward a shared and better sense of public opinion because it is supposedly (ideally) oriented only to the best argument, and, as more persuasive arguments arise, they continually renew, emend, revise, and rectify past accounts, and also that relations based on private property and profit are harmless if not beneficial to organizing social and political life. If and when conflict does arise, it is believed self-reflexive, reasoned debate will resolve the matter and put the otherwise benign capitalist social, economic and political relations back on the right path to greater freedom.

Furthering this liberal fantasy while also distinguishing itself from an earlier assimilative liberal ethos, multicultural theory assumes that difference can be recognized without engendering any conflict that cannot be resolved with public reason (Ibid, p. 16).

As Sanjay Seth (2001) argues, multicultural theory keeps up this fantasy by assuming that while there are particular differences in the world, all differences are commensurable at the abstract level. As such, multicultural theory transforms difference “which supposes at least the possibility that things are incommensurable” into plurality “where things are so many variations on a theme” and, thus, “can be ordered and compared” (Ibid, p. 74). Because liberal multiculturalism assumes that everyone is using
the same or similar categories when they express their difference, any and all conflict can be worked out by sitting down and rationally talking it out. Even though there are different cultures, nothing is radically different such that all cultures are exchangeable with each other. As such, those who are too different to be made commensurable, or who argue for the incommensurability of life worlds, are regarded as the problem for introducing strife where none is imagined to exist. Those who cause problems are more than likely branded by liberal states as some sort of extremist or ideologue for not recognizing or tolerating “difference.”

Imagining that it has transcended the assimilative logic of liberal theory that was the cause of settler violence while also furthering the progressive politics the liberal fantasy underwrites, a commitment to multicultural plurality allows settlers and the settler state to imagine themselves as more enlightened liberals (Bannerji, 2000; Mackey, 2002). As such, present-day multicultural states and societies are imagined to no longer be the violent, assimilative state they once were and thus, are states and societies able to truly recognize their own wrongdoings well also respecting the difference of those they once repressed. As an expression of liberal multiculturalism, apologies acknowledge past wrongs while the transcendent and enlightened position that multiculturalism conjures up for settlers and settler states guarantees the pledge that this will never happen again because it assures everyone that they are already a different people and state.

Of course, the liberal multicultural fantasy only hides the inequalities and violence of twenty-first century neocolonial social, political and economic relations, while severely delimiting how this violence is interpreted and, thus, what actions will be taken to tackle these inequalities (Thobani, 2007). Settler nation-states such as Canada and Australia with official multicultural policies continue longstanding settler colonial relations by managing Aboriginal populations with reserve systems complete with their own laws and requirements of status. As feminist political theorist Himani Bannerji (2000) argues, for this reason Canada and Australia remain liberal democracies with colonial hearts. At the same time, multicultural respect for plurality also produces new means of securing inequalities as it reorganizes settler colonial violence to meet the demands of Canada’s increasingly neoliberal political economy. In these settler nation-states, multiculturalism transforms difference into plurality so as to manage different
communities in a way that distinguishes a white, settler monoculture from Indigenous and “hyphenated” subjects while also securing white settlers as hosts and white, settler monoculture as the core values from which the difference of Indigenous and hyphenated guests are measured and judged (Bannerji, 2000; Mackey, 2002; Povinelli, 2002). Multicultural social relations in Canada are, then, organized by overlapping colonial and neocolonial lines of force.

Discourses of cultural difference are one of the primary ways multicultural policies, programs and discourses re-authorize colonial forms of hospitality that re-secure the moral authority of white settler subjects and states as host capable of managing Indigenous and hyphenated-settler communities as guests. With culture already imagined as an abstract category and exchangeable good that everyone possesses, multicultural policies further commodify specific practices and materials of Indigenous and hyphenated communities by reducing them to “cultural symbols” or culturally-specific commodities: food; clothes; festivals; and so on, that can be consumed by everyone (Bannerji, 2000; Mackey, 2002; Ahmed, 2000). Indeed, the logic of cultural consumption is at the heart of multicultural difference and enlightened politics because it is through the consumption of these cultural symbols that one is with other people and, more importantly, can change in relation to the difference of these other people (Ahmed, 2000). In the case of multicultural Canada, Canadians will become a better people through the consumption of the cultural difference of others.

Given the continued liberal investment of multiculturalism in the benign goodness of capitalist relations, it is perhaps of little surprise that cultural difference is caught up in the commodifying logic of capital. And given its transformation of difference into plurality, it is also not surprising that this commodification depoliticizes the category of culture such that the political demands and expressions of Indigenous and hyphenated communities appear to be separable from their “culture,” transforming these political demands and expressions into unwanted excesses. As a result, those people that continue the political struggles that define their community are often characterized as radicals unwilling—or traditionalists unable—to let go of the past and thus unwilling or unable to get along with everyone else in Canada. With culture depoliticized, the avenues made available to marginalized groups by multiculturalism also remain largely outside the
political sphere of rights and legal demands. And with the structural racism, sexism and misogyny and so no, of Canadian multicultural society hidden by the belief that multicultural unity is “natural, commonsensical, and non-political,” marginalized groups who disturb this seemingly benign space with complaints or demands are themselves characterized as the source of disruption (Mackey, 2002, p. 133).

As depoliticization transforms difference into plurality and, thus, sameness, within multiculturalism’s racializing logic, subjects imagine that the culture being consumed is both chosen and authentic. Thus, even as the commodification of culture transforms culture into sets of beliefs someone can choose to consume, the racialization of non-white ethnicity also conjures up Indigenous and hyphenated cultures as inherent ways of being. While multiculturalism allows white settlers to be with these different others—and, imagine that they are being transformed by being with them—by consuming the inherent difference of non-white subjects through their cultural symbols, multiculturalism also calls on members of hyphenated communities to “identify with the impossible object of an authentic self-identity” that is imagined to arise out of their inherently unique cultural traditions so they can participate in multiculturalism as an object of difference to be recognized by themselves and others (Povinelli, 2002, p. 6). In this way, multiculturalism encourages hyphenated communities to consume themselves as these inherent and unique cultural traditions with the promise that if they do this they too can becomes good, multicultural subjects.

With liberalism in both its assimilative and multicultural forms equated with a modern, political way of being, the inherent difference of hyphenated and Indigenous subjects becomes aligned with the “traditional” that place these communities and its members outside—or on the edge of—the modern world. With Indigenous and hyphenated communities’ haunted by unenlightened practices and beliefs, and illiberal approaches to the world, their cultural difference remains threatening to liberal multicultural values and, thus, a problem to be solved by multicultural policies. In other words, what are portrayed as the inherent illiberal differences of Indigenous and hyphenated cultures require management if they are to be recognized within liberal multiculturalism.
Even as their participation and investment in Canadian multiculturalism promises to make Indigenous and hyphenated communities good modern liberal subjects within the racialized logic of Canadian multiculturalism, this promise is always seen to be compromised by the very traditional beliefs that underwrite their cultural difference. As always being not quite modern, Indigenous and hyphenated communities cannot be completely transformed by being with others (Ahmed, 2000; Povinelli, 2002). White settlers are the only truly multicultural subjects because their liberal heritage and inherent modernness allows them to be transformed with different others (Ahmed, 2000). Thus, despite their violent past, within the logic of liberal multiculturalism white settler society and the settler state are the best candidates to manage the polity because their liberal nature makes them the most tolerant of differences. Against this ever-present threat of traditional, illiberal values, multiculturalism comes to re-secure the moral authority of white settlers and the liberal state (Mackey, 2002; Bannerji, 2000). In other words, because hyphenated settler and Aboriginal subjects and communities may become too traditional in and through the consumption of their own cultures, white settlers must become hosts so as to ensure the liberal multicultural state stays liberal.

Despite its deferral to reasoned argument as the means of resolving conflict and organizing political culture, sentiment is neither absent from liberalism nor an anathema to it because moral sensibility—or how you feel about someone or something—has always accompanied and limited reasoned debate (Povinelli, 2002). Indeed, emotions play an important part in settling and re-settling the liberal democracies like Canada. Liberal nationalism is replete with emotions: such as love for the nation; feelings of community by coming to hate perceived enemies; and so on, informing the application of the law, legislation and other political decision making processes even if liberal thinkers have tried to down play or minimize the influence of these emotions and feelings. Indeed, as opposed to being superfluous, liberal emotions circulate in ways that have allowed liberalism and whiteness to become intertwined in Canada.

On the one hand, then, the emotional registers in which the apologetic state expresses itself is not new. However, on the other hand, the emotions circulating through apologies are novel because they are organized by what Elizabeth Povinelli (2002) notes is the optimism that pervades multiculturalism. Multicultural optimism holds out the
promise that despite their mistakes in the past, settlers now have the right political framework to allow them to see the truth of the settler nation’s violent past, that Indigenous and hyphenated others can truly be recognized, and that a better future is again possible through continued investment in multicultural nationalism. It is through this optimistic organization of feelings that multiculturalism works to reconstitute colonial hospitality in settler nation-states so that the settler nation can feel good about getting on with its business.

Within multicultural settler nation-states, then, the legitimacy of settler institutions and authority are re-secured by organizing the bad feelings generated by confronting the nation’s violent past within this optimistic emotional economy. That is, as opposed to outright compromising multiculturalism’s optimism, these bad feelings are seen to underwrite the promise that liberal multiculturalism can deliver on its promise. Examining Australia’s apologies to Aboriginal communities, critics of Australia’s multicultural politics point out that because the shame settler Australians feel stems as much from having failed to live up to a multicultural ideal as for the violent actions that were committed in their name, feelings of shame slide from what was done to Aboriginal communities to become a failure to meet a national ideal (Povinelli, 2002; Ahmed, 2004a). As the bad feelings become what Haydie Gooder and Jane M. Jacobs (2000, p. 232) describe as “settler melancholia” in which settlers cannot let go of their sense of loss for the national ideal, the transcendence promised by multiculturalism transforms settler shame into national pride. While feeling proud in having taken responsibility for a historical wrong can be, as Aboriginal Australian legal scholar Mick Dodson (2009, p. 112) argues, a “foundation to help our nation attempt to repair the past,” the pride felt at having re-oriented and recommitted the Australian polity towards the multicultural ideal allows settlers to overcome their melancholia by reinvesting in the nation but without first addressing the historical wrongs committed against Aboriginal peoples (Ahmed, 2004a). Importantly, because melancholic settlers assume that it was the national ideal that was harmed along with Indigenous peoples, settlers join Aboriginal peoples as yet another wounded group in need of healing. The job of multiculturalism is, then, to heal the national psyche as much as heal the relationship between settler and Indigenous communities.
It is also through feeling shame about what was done that settler-national subjects can again believe in their own good intentions. If the good intentions of colonial officials were corrupted by assimilationist policies, Povinelli (2002) argues that shame has become a means of recuperating faith in good intentions because the contrite settler subject: the subject who is sorry for what they did, is imagined as being able to distinguish more clearly between what is good or bad. As Povinelli (Ibid, p. 160) argues, it is as though “national passions and affects organized around the imaginary of a shamed and redeemed nation” will be enough to direct good judgments. It is through feeling shame, then, that the settler nation and state legitimate their role as host to manage all these contentious guests. It is, thus, through feeling shame that the nation can move on.

Matt James (2008) notes that in the statement he made concerning the Japanese-Canadian Redress Agreement in 1988, Prime Minister Mulroney said more about Canada’s tolerant people and commitment to multicultural diversity: a diversity that was always the intention of “our forebears,” than he did about the violence done Japanese Canadians or spoke to the criteria for the redress settlement. James (Ibid, p. 148) argues that the present day reader of Mulroney’s statement may read it less as an “attempt to atone for racist injustice” than “as a hymn to national virtue.” Along similar lines, while Harper expressed “sorrow over the racist actions of our past” when apologizing for the head tax in 2006, he was nonetheless eager to “turn the page” on this past as opposed to evaluating it (Ibid, p. 150). While there was no talk of turning the page in his 2008 apology to IRS survivors and their families, Harper’s statement in 2009 that Canada has “no history of colonialism” and his governments unwillingness to release thousands of archival documents pertaining to IRS to TRC researchers suggests that even his apologetic government is unwilling—or unable—to dwell on the past. While addressing the problem of assimilationist policies that could have led settler society to, as Regan (2010, p. 56) hoped, “grapple with the unresolved moral and ethical legacies of colonialism,” the apology and TRC has narrowed the scope of what parts of that legacy the government wishes to grapple with. It is for this reason that Miyagawa (2011, p. 362) argues that Harper’s apology to IRS survivors was a “forgetful apology at its best” because apologizing for the schools allows Canadians to “forget about all the other ways
the system had deprived—and continued to deprive—aboriginal people of their lives and land.” In other words, while feeling sorry and shame, those bad feelings only go so far. In such forgetful apologies, Regan (2010, p. 109) argues that it is through expressions of contrition that Canadian settler society shows that they “are filled with good intentions, which is, after all, what really matters.” Through this renewed faith in good intentions, Canada can once again be seen as a “constant good work in progress, its missionary roots still intact” (Ibid). Through multiculturalism’s emotional economy, the “recognition of a brutal history is implicitly constructed as the condition for national pride” in which “shame is posited as an overcoming of the brutal history, a moving beyond that history through showing that one is ‘moved by it’ or even ‘hurt by it’” (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 111). Indeed, by being moved, feeling settlers can distinguish themselves from other settlers who will not apologize or do not appear sincere when they do. In doing so, hurting settlers resituate themselves within Mulroney’s “hymn of national virtue” in which they are true, feeling Canadians and accuse unrepentant others of not only being unfeeling but also unCanadian. Being moved by colonial violence allows feeling settlers to again feel good: to have rehabilitated the national ideal and their place within it. As such, in being moved by colonial violence, feeling bad so as to again feel good is a way of moving through the violence of the past to resettle the post-colonial nation.

With assimilationist liberalism imagined to be the negation of meaningful relations between white settlers and settlers of colour, and between settler and Indigenous communities, the closeness forged within multicultural societies between these disparate communities are touted as a step towards new, post-colonial emotional economies. In particular, Barkan (2000), Rhoda E. Howard-Hassman and Mark Gibney (2008), as well as Natalie A. Chambers (2009) all point to the empathetic relationships apologies and bad feelings can open up between perpetrators and victims. While empathy or identifying the pain of others through one’s experience does indeed bring both perpetrators and victims closer together, empathizing with aggrieved marginalized and Indigenous communities does not, however, necessarily compel settlers “to identify [his or] her complicity in structures of power relations” that secure their title and entitlement by marginalizing and oppressing others (Boler, 1999, p. 159).
Indeed, identifying and feeling closer to victims of political violence through their pain can often obfuscate the differences of race, class, gender, and so on, between different settler groups and between settlers and Indigenous subjects that were—and continue to be—mobilized to organize settler society. Unlike other forms of closeness that negotiates such differences, empathy can be a means of what Sherene Razack (2007, pp. 375-6) calls “stealing the pain of others” by which settler subjects consume “an other to cannibalistically incorporate them into [them] self” (McAllister, 2011, p. 441). As with other forms of cultural difference within multicultural settler nations, by stealing the pain of others, the suffering that defines other communities becomes a way for settlers to consume the other and become like them yet remain superior to them. As such, by feeling bad and consuming the pain of the others, settlers again become doubled: both victim and vanquisher.

By generating bad feelings, archival memory-work can be an ideal means for white settlers to become doubled. Indeed, stealing the pain of others is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in work of white settler genealogical researchers who discover their multicultural and Indigenous roots through archival records. In this doubled position, the empathizing white settler subject begins to release themselves from being responsible for the past and on-going settler-national violence because they are also heirs of these marginalized communities (Lawrence, 2004; Ahmed, 2000; Mackey, 2002; Povinelli, 2002). However, unlike marginalized communities who might wish to take all the necessary time needed to heal their community, the transcendent-and-doubled settler subject feels the pain of the past so as to move on. It is in this doubled position that feeling settlers can justify asking Indigenous people and pained settlers of colour to let go of the past and move on with the liberal project (Regan, 2010; Povinelli, 2002).

While settlers of colour can also discover and consume their Indigenous roots through genealogical archival research, more often that not multiculturalism divides hurt marginalized groups from each other even as the pain these communities feel is generalized as a form of non-white difference. Indeed, even as multiculturalism’s optimism pushes pained marginalized groups to let go of their pain and move on from the past, within the racialized logic of multiculturalism the identities of these communities are also fixed by that suffering. That is, as their history of suffering becomes part of the
“impossible object” of their authentic self-identity, multiculturalism asks Indigenous and hyphenated communities to identify through their particular suffering within white, settler society.

Seeing themselves through their own history of suffering, settlers of colour identities can materialize through what McAllister (2010a, p. 14) calls the reactionary politics of victimhood that prevent those marginalized groups who were wronged from seeing their own roll in settler colonial violence. In being victims, hyphenated communities can distance themselves from the settler state and the violent projects of settling stolen land and begin processes of redress that will allow them to feel comfortable within Canada without necessarily changing the colonial relations underwriting the Canadian nation-state. That is, the wound or suffering that defines a victimized hyphenated community works to detach their suffering—and, thus, their communal identity—from historical relations of settler violence. As victims, marginalized communities continue to be haunted by colonial violence but without a meaningful way of confronting or disentangling themselves from it (Ahmed, 2004a).

If, as Barkan argues, apologies mark a new “public morality” in the West, multiculturalism mitigates or negates unsettling aspects of this morality. Indeed, by transforming settlers’ bad feelings into national pride and reconstituting white settlers as contrite hosts, multiculturalism’s optimistic emotional economy works to re-settle the fraught nation-state and transform the political demands of hyphenated and Indigenous communities into the requests of hurt guests. Just as empathetic relationships encourage white settlers to consume the pain of aggrieved others, the reactionary politics of victimhood does not allow settlers of colour and Indigenous communities to cultivate relationships that would allow them to understand their marginalization as two sides of the same settler colonial violence. Instead, forgetful apologies mark different marginalized groups off by their pain and begins processes of healing and reconciliation that continue to organize these groups in relation to white, liberal-settler norms.

**Unsettling troubled feelings in the archives**

The bad feelings that arise through archival memory-work should not be written off. These bad feelings speak to the settler colonial violence, historical injustices, and
what Povinelli (2002, p. 109) calls proof of liberal intolerance “that makes a mockery of liberal claims about the progress of tolerance.” Because such bad feelings can circulate in unpredictable ways that always threaten to overwhelm the rememberer, these bad feelings can be a discomforting—if not unsettling—experience for settler subjects.

However, because such memory-work is being done within multiculturalism’s optimistic emotional economy in settler nations like Canada and Australia, these bad feelings can get caught up in what Achille Mbembe (2002, pp. 24-5) calls acts of commemoration that soften “the anger, shame, guilt, or resentment which the archive tends, if not to incite, then at least to maintain, because of its functions of recall” so as to mitigate what one owes victims and survivors of colonial violence. That is, commemorative acts mitigate the overwhelming bad feelings memory-work elicits to re-settle the sensibilities of troubled settler subjects. As commemorative acts, apologies and reconciliation transform bad feelings into renewed national pride and conjure up notions of justice that reinvigorate liberal-settler legal and political institutions and processes so that healing becomes about feeling good again within liberal-settler order of things.34

Unsettling memory-work must take the risk that justice will trouble the normal state of things and multiculturalism’s optimistic emotional economy that re-secures white settlers as contrite hosts over pained Indigenous and hyphenated guests. As such, remembering settler colonial violence means living with the violence of the past and the feelings circulating through the memory-work in unsettling ways. In her work on queer memory—both queering memory-work and remembering queer communities—Heather Love (2007) argues that contrary to the liberal progressive narrative of inclusion in which queer communities move from feeling shame to feeling pride, a queer experience of the past is a matter of “feeling backwards.” That is, as opposed to narrating a history of queer communities as the move from being ashamed to identify as queer to feeling and expressing pride in being queer, “feeling backward” troubles this progressive narrative by calling up the feelings of shame, despair, escapism, self-hatred, bitterness, and loneliness that were tied to being queer in a world that denied—and continues to deny—the possibility of same-sex desire (Ibid, p. 4). As opposed to being the result of melancholia, these lingering bad feelings are spaces of enunciation from which to speak to the ruined state of the present-day social world that remains marked by homophobic violence. The
politics of queer futures—futures for queers outside the heteronormative binary of homosexual and heterosexual desires and the violence of homophobia—depends on developing a relationship to the past that can negotiate the negative affects and loss that make up that past without moving beyond them.

Using Love’s work as a starting point for negotiating the negative affects of remembering settler colonial violence through the archives, the historical injustices of settler colonialism should emerge in ways that allows the negative affects of shame and suffering to be lived and experienced in the present without transforming them immediately into better feeling futures or retreating into them as victims. Before Mulroney’s statement captured the pain of Japanese-Canadians within his “hymn to national virtue,” the archival memory-work behind the Redress movement was working to expose the racist violence underwriting citizenship and belonging. Roy Miki, a key player in the Japanese-Canadian Redress movement, states that in the beginning the movement was not really interested in an apology but, instead, in a justice-oriented project requiring that the government acknowledge that “democracy had broken down” (Miyagawa, 2011, p. 360). As opposed to rehabilitating Canadian virtue in the hopes of coming to inhabit the clean, white space of the nation, working within this broken down space promised to interrupt the narrative of progress behind reconciliation in which hyphenated Canadians could become full participants in the liberal-settler nation-state at the expense of Indigenous sovereignty. Working within this broken down space allows hyphenated communities to recognize their implication in colonial processes even as these processes deeply and detrimentally affect them. Circulating in such a broken down space, bad feelings that arise in remembering Japanese-Canadian internment has the potential to create unsettling relationships between settlers of colour and Indigenous subjects.  

If, as Ahmed (2004a, p. 201) argues, “emotional struggles against injustice” involve being “moved by feelings into a different relation to the norms that we wish to contest, or the wounds we wish to heal” in the hopes of opening “different kinds of attachments to others,” unsettling feelings will open up different kinds of attachments to Indigenous others that will admit robust notions of Indigenous title and entitlement. As Chambers (2009, pp. 286-7) argues, healing in the wake of the IRS apology means
settlers must risk “feelings of discomfort and unease by participating in Indigenous peoples lives and communities” in ways that recognize both Aboriginal subjects as human beings and Indigenous authority. As opposed to empathetically consuming the difference of the aggrieved other, unsettling feelings mark the settler colonial power relations that underwrite the difference between hurt hosts and pained Aboriginal subjects even as these feelings trouble those distinctions and work to create new forms of hosting as much as opening up a space for new hosts.

Coming to form different kinds of attachments through bad feelings does not mean that such relationships are about only feeling bad together. Unsettling modes of justice and healing must create good feelings that open on to meaningful notions of Indigenous sovereignty and related notions of Indigenous title and entitlement to change the settler nation’s legal, political, economic and social order of things.\textsuperscript{36} Gerald Taiaiake Alfred (2009, p. 184) argues that for “justice to be achieved out of a colonial situation, a radical rehabilitation of the state is required. Without radical changes to the state itself, all proposed changes are ultimately assimilative.”\textsuperscript{37} To radically rehabilitate the settler state so as to make it a place where Indigenous communities can live and thrive and, thus, challenge what Bannerji calls the “colonial heart” of Canadian liberalism, Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder (2008, p. 467) argue that any process of reconciliation must “begin by acknowledging Indigenous peoples’ inherent powers of self-determination.” Unsettling feelings and feeling unsettled are organized through emotional economies that decolonize the title and entitlement that underwrites “settler structures of feeling.”

The next chapter continues to examine the archives as a feeling space of memory-work within continuing settler colonial relations but shifts the perspective from researchers to archivists. While outlining how archivists-as-memory workers have come to acknowledge the importance of recognizing the emotive aspect of archival research, the next chapter is interested in the emotive economies archivists—particularly postmodern archivists—create. Specifically, the next chapter is interested in what Terry Cook (1994, p. 318) calls the “unease” postmodern archival theories cause archivists by welcoming and respecting the Other (Schwartz & Cook, 2002, p. 17-8), and if such unease has the potential to unsettle Canada’s archival community.
Chapter Five

The “uneasy” space of postmodern archiving

Continuing the work done in the last chapter of interrogating the emotional economies of archives, this chapter is interested in the affects—particularly bad feelings—circulating around the work of archiving. In particular, this chapter asks whether what Terry Cook (1994, p. 318) calls the “unease” generated within archival communities by a postmodern archival theories that “welcome and respect the ‘Other’” (Schwartz and Cook, 2002, pp. 17-8) has the potential to create what Mignolo calls positions of exteriority in relation to Eurocentric modes of knowledge production that would unsettle archivists attached to settler nationalism in Canada. In this chapter, I take up the postmodern archivist’s uneasy acts of welcoming and respecting the Other as a mode of hospitality to argue that such hospitality can be unsettling when archivists risk giving over the archives to others and encourage unfamiliar—and potentially threatening—otherness. Building on Sara Ahmed’s framework of emotional economies and critiques of multiculturalism laid out in the previous chapter, in this chapter I show that by aligning “postmodernism” with Canadian multiculturalism, archivists negate the potential of transforming the “unease” feelings generated by postmodern archival theories into unsettling feelings and, thus, fail to create feeling positions of exteriority from which to decolonize archival emotional economies.

As with the last chapter, this chapter continues to interrogate archives as spaces of emotional memory-work by, first, mapping out how memory’s archivists have taken up the emotional aspects of archives and archiving. Then, building on Cook’s claims that postmodern archival theories create “uneasy” emotional economies that open memory’s archivists up to marginalized groups and notions of otherness, I evaluate this “unease” as a response to both the demand from Indigenous groups and their allies that official archives and archivists attend both to the coloniality of archives and the archival profession and also claims made by these groups on the archives themselves. Finally, by mapping out how postmodern welcoming and respecting moves between multiculturalist discourses that reiterate settler colonial forms of hospitality by positioning postmodern archivists as enlightened hosts inviting in marginalized guests and also discourses of “re-
spect” that push archivists to give up their authority over the archives, I conclude this chapter by arguing that to be unsettling, postmodern archivists in Canada need to take up and support Aboriginal cultural heritage as a means of developing and supporting Indigenous sovereignty.

**The emotional space of memory’s archive and documentary heritage**

In the past twenty years, archivists, like researchers, have increasingly turned to frameworks of memory to organize the work of archiving. Archivist Barbara Craig (2002) notes that memory has become a useful metaphor for archivists to explain what they do as archivists even if the details of what memory’s archivist does—or does differently from earlier figurations of their profession—remains unclear. To clarify what is new about memory’s archive and archivists, archivists primarily compare and contrast memory with history and, thus, differentiate memory’s archivist and archive from history’s archivist and archive. With history’s archive characterized as a repository of remnants of the past, history’s archivist is the custodian or modern record keeper that provides the researcher with evidence of past events by ensuring the authenticity of archival records. Deploying a custodial paradigm of record keeping, history’s archivists assume that archives are an “impartial, innocent by-product of action” and they themselves are neutral and passive filers of records (Cook, 2001a, p. 10; Schwartz, 1995). Framing their work in the positivist language of both a scientific and bureaucratic rationalism, custodial record keepers imagine that they allow records to persist as unchanged as possible so that patrons can come to know the past as it really was.

Contrasted to the custodial paradigm, memory’s archive is not the benign repository of facts but an institution involved in creating what is remembered. Memory’s archivist recognizes that they are an active agent in the construction of memory by determining what is archivable and what is not, as well as how that archive is described, conserved and made available. In these “houses of memory,” as former National Archivist of Canada Jean-Pierre Wallot (1991, p. 282) put it, archivists “hold the keys to collective memory” by choosing what to save and what to destroy. As such, memory’s archivist recognizes that they have “enormous power and discretion over societal memory” (Nesmith, 2002, p. 32). Approaching archives as “value-laden instruments of
power,” memory’s archivist starts with the assumption that the work of archiving and, thus, what is remembered is shaped by the power relations that permeate society (Schwartz & Cook, 2002, p. 178).

While memory’s archives continue to be important sites where researchers put together claims about the past, memory’s archives are also figured as important sites where archival users can construct a sense of collective and individual identity. That is, by turning to archives and using the remnants of the past to build a sense of themselves and community identities, researchers entangle memory’s archive in the production of “social identity, and the formation of group consciousness” (Brothman, 2001, p. 62).

Whereas history’s archive in places like Canada has always been tied to nationalizing projects and efforts to give expression to a unique Canadian history—if not historiography, the collective and individual identities being produced in memory’s archives are understood as acts of creation. In other words, as opposed to assuming that records contain information about an already existing collective “us,” memory’s archivist acknowledges that any “us” is produced in the archives by a researcher who chooses what to remember within the demands of the present (Ketelaar, 2005). As such, memory’s archivist increasingly accepts the political nature of identity formation.

By distancing themselves from the work of historians, the framework of memory has become one means by which archivists have redefined their profession over the past fifty years as something other than the handmaiden of history. At the same time archivists were figuring archives as information and transforming their profession into information specialists, by seeing themselves as memory workers archivists were also figuring archives as heritage and themselves as purveyors of documentary heritage. In these archival heritage sites, archivists worked to meet the needs of researchers who created identities by identifying through and with archival records. It is through this heritage framework that archivists increasingly understood and interrogated memory’s archives as emotional spaces in which researchers were touched by the past and, in being touched, constructed individual and communal identities for themselves.

Writing in the early 1980s, Canadian archivist Hugh Taylor (1982-3) argued that seeing archives as “heritage” required archivists of his day to change how they thought about the ways users and archivists experience archives. As opposed to simply being
sources that remained “remote from the people” because they were impersonal remnants from another time, archival users must be allowed to have a more immediate and affective experience of records if archives are truly to become thought of as heritage (Ibid, pp. 119-20). According to Taylor, (Ibid, pp. 122-3) for archivists to create such an experience they must view records as “possessing their own aesthetic and emotive qualities.” If people are to identify with the past—to make it theirs by making it part of their sense of self—archivists need to cultivate a space that is “equally ‘hospitable’ to the emotions and feelings that arise in the act of reading records as it is a space conducive to piecing together evidence of the past (Ketelaar, 2013, pp. 24-5). That is, archivists must cultivate spaces in which archival users can identify with the past and even get caught up in it by forming emotional attachments to the records (Millar 2006b).8

In contrast to the disinterestedness of custodial record keepers and the objectifying frameworks of modern archiving that distanced researchers from the record, archivists-as-memory workers have re-imagined themselves as the creators of feeling spaces where researchers can be touched by the past to see it as their heritage. This is no easy job because it is not as if records contain or elicit pre-determined emotive responses. Instead, different readings of the same record can give “rise of different emotional responses” (Ibid, p. 116). Indeed, while using documentary heritage to construct identities is often framed as a positive experience, not all emotional responses make the researcher feel good (Endelman, 2007). Because, as Taylor (1995: 9) put it, “heritage in a profound sense, is all that has gone before and still survives to inspire or haunt us,” archivists recognize that memory-work gives rise to disturbing and pleasurable emotions (Craig, 2002).

As opposed to simply providing a sense of comfort and inspiration, recognizing the haunting aspect of heritage has led archivists to consider the acts of political violence that underwrite identities and communities: acts that make imagined communities culpable for historical injustices. Memory’s archivists have come to consider the fact that “our” past is not simply something with which we will come to feel comfortable with but, indeed, may be something that disturbs us and leaves us discomforted. As such, memory’s archivists must negotiate potentially unruly spaces in which documentary heritage can undo researchers sense of identity and feeling of belonging in a community.9
By taking up the fact that archives can undo, as much as constitute, identities and a sense of what is ours, memory’s archivists are taking up the politics of archival emotions. In Sara Ahmed’s terms of emotional economies, memory’s archivists are, in other words, beginning to consider the way emotions arise through memory-work and, thus, how feelings and affects circulate in archives to create particular bodies and communities.\(^{10}\)

Even though archivists are increasingly aware of the emotional economies within memory’s archives, there remain ambivalences within the archival literature concerning the emotional economies of history’s archives. On the one hand, as Mark Greene (2003-2004, p. 100) argues, archivists see history as being no more or less emotional or rational than memory. That is, while different from the emotional economies of memory’s archives, history’s archives were nonetheless run through with feelings.\(^{11}\) On the other hand, archivists continue to view history’s archives as sites in which positivist historians and custodial archivists worked disinterestedly.\(^{12}\) In such readings, the disinterestedness of history’s archives is contrasted to the emotionality of memory’s archives.

Ann Laura Stoler (2009, p. 73) argues that it “is not official archives that bracketed sentiment and their cultures of evidence and documentation, but our pre-emptive readings of them.” Largely based on representing modern archives and record keeping as technologies epitomizing modern Enlightenment frameworks bent on organizing political, social and economic life according to abstract categories produced through reasoned judgment, Stoler (2004; 2009) argues that these pre-emptive readings miss that Enlightenment thinkers did not negate affective relations outright but, instead, were interested in how to create and maintain proper modes of feeling to support enlightenment reason. In Enlightenment thought, Stoler (2009, p. 97) states, to “be reasonable was to master one’s passions, command one’s sensibilities, and abide by proper invocation and dispersal of them.” While mastery led political theorists to distinguish between public and private spheres of life, and designate private realms as sites of intimate and emotional relationships and the public sphere of life as sites of reasoned debate, the public realm were nonetheless replete with affective relations.\(^{13}\) Modern governments and their archives were, then, never emotionless spaces. Indeed, according to Stoler, modern states attempted to manage the affective states of populations
by developing both methods to assess appropriate sentiments and techniques to cultivate proper sensibilities across both public and private spheres.

Stoler (2009, p. 57) intervenes in these pre-emptive readings of archives to redirect colonial scholars away from treating colonialism as just the “weaponed force” of Enlightenment reason. As modern modes of governance, Stoler (2004, p. 5) argues colonial and imperial rule were just as concerned with the “distribution of sentiment, by both its excessive expression and the absence of it” in both public and private spheres as they were with developing abstract categories to organize social relations. Thus, while modern, political theory continued to espouse the importance of maintaining the division between dispassionate (public) and emotional (private) spheres of life, colonial “modernity hinged on a disciplining of one’s agents, on policing the family…[and] the cultivation of compassion, contempt, and disdain” across both spheres (Stoler, 2009, p. 98). Colonial archives were part of this attempt to shape the emotional lives of colonial subjects while also creating affective archival orders of their own.

While her own work approaches colonial archives as “condensed sites of epistemological and political anxiety” to map out the emotional aspects of “colonial commonsense” that underwrites colonial documentation, Stoler (2009) maps out the contemporary frameworks and habituations in archival scholarship that reproduce “colonial commonsense” among archival researchers. For this reason, Danilyn Rutherford (2009) argues that Stoler pushes colonial scholars “to think very carefully about their own epistemic anxieties, their own ‘awful reactions’ to those [colonial subjects] they seek to understand” because the “passions that haunt are of more than passing interest: they have done much to shape our contemporary world.” Just as critiques of colonialism must trouble pre-emptive readings, colonial scholars must also interrogate the neocolonial emotional economies in which they make their critiques.

By troubling the archival communities own pre-emptive readings of modern record keeping to interrogate the emotional aspects of history’s archives, memory’s archivists can position themselves to understand how the “disinterested” emotional economies behind positivist research and custodial archiving worked to enforce dominant raced, classed, gendered, and sexed relations. Even if archivists have not much followed Stoler to interrogate the emotional aspects of colonial archives, by critically taking up the
way emotions circulated in history’s disinterested archive, memory’s archivists are well positioned to understand how custodial disinterestedness made colonial archives key technologies and techniques for creating and enforcing affective modes of colonial governance. However, because archivists have primarily focused on the emotions produced by archival memory-work as opposed to the emotions that emerge and gather around the work of archiving documentary heritage to map out the affective spaces of memory’s archives, to interrogate the emotional economies of memory’s archives archivists need to critically think about how memory’s archivists’ passions and displeasures extend and trouble the emotional economies of custodial disinterestedness. More importantly, memory’s archivist needs to critically consider how their passions and displeasures play out within a neocolonial order of things.16

Critically taking up the emotional work of archiving is particularly important in settler nations as indigenous and racially marginalized communities and allies call on public archives and archivists to account for the colonial violence of the past and way the archives and the work of archiving continues this violence. That is, in the name of social justice and decolonization, activist and scholars are calling on archivists to attend to how the work of acquiring, describing, conserving and making records available reflects and reinforces the epistemic and physical violence of settler society’s racist past and present day policies. Indeed, even while archivists work to make archives meet the needs of researchers who are working to expose the settler-colonial and settler-national violence documented in the archives,17 archivists are also being called on to both address the way archives delimit the way Aboriginal peoples access records and also challenged to work with Aboriginal communities to develop new modes of archiving that attend to the living nature of Indigenous cultural heritage. In other words, as memory’s archivists turn their attention to the emotional aspects of archives and archiving, archivists working in settler nations are being challenged to recognize the Indigenous affective economies that allow living records to live.18

A key point underlying Indigenous claims to archives and the records therein is that Aboriginal authorities can better care for the living aspects of Indigenous cultural heritage because they best understand the affective economy required to allow these documents to live. In many cases, calls to recognize Aboriginal authorities tied to the
demands of Aboriginal communities for self-determination and Indigenous sovereignty in settler nation-states like Canada where such demands continue to be negated by the Indian Act and liberal-settler legal and political frameworks that give precedence to the crown’s exclusive jurisdiction in almost all matters.\textsuperscript{19} While often framed by archivists as partnerships between archives and Aboriginal communities, working with sovereign Indigenous communities is more troubling for Canadian archivists because it positions archives and archivists in the tense space between international treaties and United Nations’ declarations that recognize Indigenous rights, settler political and legal frameworks that outline and enforce Aboriginal rights, and also Indigenous laws and sovereignty that were not extinguished with settlement.\textsuperscript{20} While having to address records according to Indigenous standards can be challenging for archivists, negotiating Indigenous rights and sovereignty begins to trouble the settler and settler state’s title and entitlement over the archives. As such, negotiating Indigenous rights and sovereignty troubles the legal and moral authority that underwrites public archivists’ title and entitlement to the archives.\textsuperscript{21}

As it leads to privileging Indigenous sovereignty and legal frameworks to organize the emotional work of archiving living records, opening up archives as feeling spaces is risky work for public archivists in settler nations. However, it is through this risky work and critically interrogating the neocolonial, settler emotional economies underwriting memory’s archives and archiving that all archivists in Canada and other settler nations also have the potential to unsettle their work and profession.

**The postmodern “unease” of welcoming and respecting the “Other”**

As opposed to reasserting an impersonal custodialism against Indigenous claims, archivists in Canada’s public institutions have more or less worked to open themselves up to the demands of activists and scholars to decolonize the archives and archiving, and the claims Aboriginal and other marginalized communities make on Canada’s archives. Indeed, as opposed to dismissing such claims and demands, postmodern archivists have been particularly eager to address the claims of marginalized groups and take up emotions that arise in and through the archives in their efforts to better understand archiving as political work so as to develop more socially just and democratic way of
archiving. Assuming that particular archival theories and modes of reading archives come to the fore not because they are more “true” but because social, political and economic powers privilege certain archival labours over others, postmodern archivists question the tacit narratives their profession deploys while working to create transgressive archival performances with marginalized others to open archives and archiving to these others and otherness. Privileging postmodern archiving as being more open to difference than modern archival theories and practices, postmodern archivists recognize that archives are spaces of contestation: both spaces where archivists challenge old theories and practices and propose new ones, and also spaces where researchers deploy competing interpretations of records (Harris, 2007), and develop theories and practices that will the archives open to further contestation. By pushing archivists to evaluate themselves and work with others who remain distrustful of—if not hostile towards—archives and archivists to produce new and transgressive modes of archiving, Terry Cook (1994, p. 318) states that postmodern archiving makes archivists “uneasy.”

However, as critical as postmodern archivists are, because they—like other heritage workers—have only gestured towards the affective economies that arise through and organize the work of archiving, and have also said little on how the emotions that arise through archival memory-work plays out in the neocolonial order of things, postmodern archiving remains a questionable starting point to begin the risky work and critically interrogating the neocolonial emotional economies underwriting the settler nations’ archives and archiving so as unsettle settler archives and archivists. And yet, by pushing archivists to be open to others and other forms of authority as much as question their own principles, the unease that postmodern archival theories generate among archivists has the potential to create unsettling modes of archival hospitality. Indeed, as this unease manifests through the postmodern archivists work with Aboriginal and other marginalized communities to negotiate their demands to decolonize the archives and archival profession, this unease has the potential to open what Schwartz and Cook (2002, pp. 17-8) call the “sensitive” postmodern archivist up to the affective economies in which feeling the hurt of colonialism circulates and is mobilized to create what, following Mignolo, can be called spaces for postcolonial archival theorizing.
However, as unsettling as this unease might become, there are limits to how far the “sensitive” postmodern archivist is expected to go in making themselves uneasy. Even while postmodern archivists work with others—and work to include others and otherness in the archives without further marginalizing the marginalized—Schwartz and Cook argue even this sensitive archivist knows they will not be able to take everything and everyone into consideration in their work. Indeed, in the face of the moral dilemmas that arise from self-critique and working with others, according to Schwartz and Cook, the demands of postmodern archiving should trouble but not immobilize the archivist. In the end, the authors (Ibid) argue that the sensitive archivist “can only welcome and respect the ‘Other,’ and try to tell through appraisal and description and outreach as full a story as possible.” By limiting how they feel towards others, sensitive archivists will open up or close down the archives to others in particular ways that will determine how the archives is open to contestation. In other words, even as postmodern archiving opens up archives and archivists to others, postmodern hospitality in the archives will be delimited depending on how the work of welcoming and respecting is interpreted by archivists.

**The differing emotional economies of re-spect and respect**

What is to be made of postmodern welcoming and respecting and how can welcoming and respecting be pushed towards an unsettling emotional economy of unease? While it may be tempting to place the work of interpretation at the feet of individual, sensitive archivists, to do so is to ignore the discursive frameworks in which welcoming and respecting—particularly respect—are already caught up. Two discursive frameworks in particular stand out: re-spect and multicultural respect. To gain some purchase on postmodern respect and the potential of opening it on to unsettling emotional economies of unease, it is necessary to trace out these discursive frameworks.

In outlining their politics of welcoming and respecting the “Other,” Schwartz and Cook (2002, pp. 17-8) acknowledge the insights of archivist Verne Harris on the violence of giving voice, translating and representing marginalized communities. In this reference to Harris, respect is pulled towards what Harris, gesturing to Jacques Derrida, calls “re-spect [as in seeing again, seeing anew]” that troubles the reduction otherness to
recognizable forms of difference (quoted in Cook 2007b, p. xxvii). Opening up other ways of feeling for and through others, re-spect orients Harris’ (2007) attempts to embrace otherness that do not eliminate the unknowability of the “Other” as happens when identifying others with preconceived categories.25

The aim of Harris’s work in general is to frame a notion of archival justice: of what is owed to whom and how such debts are to be repaid through the archives, based on a politics of hospitality towards the “Other” that reaches “out for what is not known (for what is, possibly, unknowable)” about the “Other” while reaching “out to those excluded or marginalized by prevailing relations of power” (2007, pp. 4-5). Because what is unknowable is both the other and the otherness of the self, Harris’ notion of justice calls on creating relations with others without repositioning the subject as knower and “Other” as object to be studied, or, in other words, without separating Self and Other.26 For Harris, archivists are with and for others in unruly ways such that archivists are neither ever alone in the archives nor able to completely limit how others touch them or are touched by them. By welcoming and re-specting the “Other,” postmodern archivists open up these unruly relations with others that are there—in some way or other—with archivists in the archives.

In Harris’ (2007, p. 291) hospitality of re-spect, archivists are challenged to be welcoming to others and also “hospitable to contestation” by creating a space in which the contestations that mark the archives are kept open as opposed to closing it down with new theories, interpretations or rules. In this hospitality of re-spect, then, archivists risk everything in the act of welcoming and re-specting because it requires turning the archives—including authority over the archives and, thus, the archiving profession—over to others who they do not know or know fully. Caught up in uneasy relationships with others, archivists cannot become hosts able to distance themselves from guests so as to adjudicate on their worthiness as guests.27 A hospitality of re-spect is dangerous for archivists because re-spectful archives could become unfamiliar, if not hostile, to them.

At the same time, in other essays Schwartz and Cook both associate postmodernism with multiculturalism and, in particular, Canadian multiculturalism. For Schwartz (2002), multiculturalism is an analogous postmodern epistemic space of plurality in which binary thinking is challenged. In his work, Cook (2002b, p.24) sees
Canada’s multicultural present and Canadian archivists’ “Total Archives”\(^{28}\) approach as expressions of Canada’s longstanding “postmodern” sentiments invested in “ambiguity, tolerance, diversity, and multiple identities.” Due to this longstanding multicultural perspective, Canadian archival theory is “filled with diversity and ambiguity” because Canadian archivists have for a long time been aware of the “existence of different stories, mixed narratives about multiple interpretations of similar past events and even the same past texts, that generated doubts about ‘Truth’ and objectivity in recorded memory” (Cook, 2007, p. 174).

It is possible to see this alignment of postmodernism with multiculturalism as a means of translating postmodernism’s “breadth of vision” into “the (often prosaic) minutiae of archivy” and, thus, as a means of transforming theory into practice (Cook 2007b, p. xxiv-xxv). However, such an analysis would miss how this alignment translates postmodernism into the abstract register of multiculturalism and puts postmodern archival theories in the service of furthering multicultural—particularly Canadian multicultural—policies. By aligning postmodernism with multiculturalism, both Schwartz and Cook repeat official claims that multiculturalism transcends the inequities of binary thinking. Cook even appears to echo both official and elite discourses that Richard Day (2000) argues figure Canadian multiculturalism as something akin to realizing a latent ideal of Canadian diversity as opposed to a discourse that constructs diversity in a particular way. Aligned with multiculturalism, postmodern archival theories and the work of welcoming and respecting are ways of realizing this latent ideal for Canadian archivists.

Aligned with multiculturalism, postmodern archival theories become entangled in multiculturalism’s optimistic economy. In this entanglement, welcoming and respecting conjures up postmodern archiving as a way for Canadian archivists to realize a Canadian archival tradition that is imagined to have been obscured by both custodialism and assimilationist forms of liberalism. That is, in its alignment with multiculturalism, the novelty and challenges posed by postmodern archival theories and the unease produced when working with unfamiliar others gets organized within the good feelings of transcending what are perceived to be the limits of custodialism and colonialism. Thus, while postmodern archivists are supposed to remain critical of the politics of archiving—
both modern and postmodern, when attached to multiculturalism, postmodern archiving appears to hold out the promise of transcending past injustices perpetuated by modern archivists and colonial societies.

Caught up in the work of making the archives sites for producing identities, postmodern archiving is also mixed up in the good feelings of providing users with what these users supposedly want and need: collective identities. Even as Schwartz and Cook (2002, p. 16) argue that postmodern archivists need to critically evaluate their role in the “business of identity politics,” archivists have been relatively silent on the commodification of identity under liberal multiculturalism or more generally within neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, like memory’s archivists in general, postmodern archivists go back and forth between talking about community identities as identities that already exist in the world and just need being filled-in so-to-speak with archival records, and also identities constructed through the archives. Thus, while they attempt to untangle the politics of archival identities from the essentialized identities of modern archives, postmodern archivists often echo multiculturalism’s language of authentic identities that can be consumed through the archives.

Therefore, even as they critically take up the problems of providing access to records, archival silences, and misrecognition in the production of identity, many postmodern archivists remain invested in building what Wallot (1991, p. 266) calls robust “houses of memory” by amassing “a documentary base sufficiently luxurious and wide” from which archival users can build dynamic collective identities because these identities will provide communities with stable and rich senses of themselves. Even though archivists argue for the emotional and physical value of these “houses of memory” because the identities produced there allow users to combat the increasing feelings of rootlessness created in an age of transnational flows and a world of “superficiality and ‘instant’ everything,” archivists have said little about how figuring their profession as part of the solution to rootlessness allows archivists to feel good and comfortable in their work. And yet, it is through these houses of memory that the unease archivists produce by questioning tacit narratives, and the unease archivists feel in their confrontation with marginalized communities, slides towards the good feelings of helping to make a better and more rooted world through identity.
While the work of welcoming and respecting brings communities into the archives to work with archivists, and fills the archives with what archivist Rodney Carter (2006, p. 233) calls a “polyphony of voices,” under the sign of multiculturalism this plurality of other voices does not necessarily challenge the authority of the archivist. Indeed, by arguing that archivists should avoid trying to include too much contestation or unruly forms of difference so as not to immobilize themselves, Schwartz and Cook’s “sensitive” archivist retains the authority to include others and also to exclude those whose claims archivists deem unreasonable or whom they find too unsettling in their difference in the name of ensuring the work of archiving continues. In this way, welcoming and respecting allows archivists to reassert their position as host with the authority grant or bar access, and greet those who appear at the archives’ doors as guests.

The unease experienced by sensitive, self-critical postmodern archivists can mix with the other bad feelings of coming to realize how Canadian archivists and archives have perpetuated—and perpetuate—settler colonial violence. However, as these bad feelings get caught up in multiculturalism’s promise of transcending the past, postmodern archiving risks encouraging archivists to feel like enlightened hosts. That is, in the face of this troubling past and equally troubling claims from others, this postmodern promise of transcendence, as much as their professional training or the authority bestowed on them by the state, re-secures the archivists moral authority over the contested archives. While Indigenous and hyphenated-Canadians are encouraged to enter the archives and make it theirs, as enlightened hosts, archivists only have to offer their guests their willingness to work with them and respect their difference. In other words, as working with others and their otherness allows the postmodern archivist to transform the archives and their profession so as to transcend the past and once again feel good, to their guests the archivist only has to offer their own ability and willingness to be transformed with these others. The sensitive archivist is not expected to give over the archives to these others.

Even though postmodern questioning and self-critique opens archivists up to others who contest and make claims on the archives in the name of justice, in its alignment with multiculturalism, postmodern archiving becomes a way of managing these contestations as opposed to allowing them to continue to play out. Under the rubrics of multiculturalist identity politics there is the potential that postmodern archivists will
hear the demands for justice and claims to the archives made by marginalized communities as requests for inclusion and for the space to build their own particular community identities in their own corner of the archives. While postmodern archivists such as Carter (2006) argue that respect requires archivists to abide the wishes of those groups who, out of protest, do not wish to be included in the archives, respect does not demand that archivists turn these “houses of memory” over to other persons and communities who continue to protest the archives.

If postmodern archivists come to inhabit the position of enlightened host through multiculturalism, postmodern emotional economies of “uneasiness” also risk becoming separated from the other emotional economies circulating within memory’s archives. That is, with the archivist’s unease figured as playing out in a time and place imagined to come after the violence of modern, colonial archiving, the sensitive archivist’s openness to colonized others is imagined to arise and play out outside of continuing settler colonial and neocolonial relations. In such cases, the postmodern archivists’ “sensitive” nature becomes proof of their enlightened position and risks foreclosing any further interrogations of how postmodern unease creates or intensifies other uneasy emotional economies that organize the work of remembering settler colonial violence through settler archives.

As opposed to seeing how “unease” circulates with the bad feelings that arise through archival memory-work, the relationship between enlightened archival host and pained guests risks becoming one of compassion where the postmodern archive in which guests can build robust community identities becomes the archivist’s gift to these others. Framed as a compassionate gift, opening up archives to Aboriginal and hyphenated communities as sites where they can build collective identities by again breathing life into ancestors killed by colonial violence is imagined to pay down—if not pay off—what these marginalized others are owed by the settler nation-state (Arondekar, 2005). As repayment of this debt, the archivist’s compassionate relations with Aboriginal and hyphenated communities transforms the archivist’s unease into good feelings. In other words, as opposed to being seen as a mode of archiving caught up in continuing colonial and settler-colonial relations, under the sign of multiculturalism postmodern archiving
and the sensitive archivist risk being seen as a gift offered to marginalized communities as compensation for the violence of the past.

In contrast to the hospitality of re-spect in which the archives becomes “hospitable to contestation” in ways that challenge the archivist’s right to become host, aligned with multiculturalism the archivist-as-host welcomes and respects the “Other” to manage contestation. Unlike the work of re-specting that leaves the archivist unsettled in the archives by troubling their claims to, and authority over, the archives, the archivist-as-host again settles into the archives by turning claimants into guests to be adjudicated. Whereas the enlightened archivist positions themselves at a distance from their unsettling past, the re-spectful archivist remains entangled in the calls from researchers for justice in the face of historical injustices. And whereas multiculturalist interpretations transform the postmodern archivist’s unease into good feelings, the re-spectful archivist’s unease remains caught up in the problematic feelings that arise and circulate in work of remembering settler colonialism in and through the archives. Where as respect risks nothing and remains at “the limits of the hegemonic narratives of Western history,” (Mignolo, 2000, p. 89) re-spect has the potential to open up spaces for postcolonial archival theorizing.

**An unsettling archival hospitality**

Respect is neither an empty word nor a word with a pre-determined meaning. As Allison Boucher Krebs (2012, p. 189) notes, “it will take time, respect, and patience” as well as “open hearts and minds ready to search for win/win solutions located potentially outside the comfort zones of existing practice” from both settlers and Aboriginal communities “to transform the information practices, policies, and procedures around Indigenous information and knowledge held outside Indigenous communities.” Because respect can create certain emotional economies that will “open hearts and minds” in particular ways, how postmodern archivists welcome and respect the Other will create particular forms of hospitality.

To get a handle on respect and the politics of sensitive archivists, memory’s archivists need to better interrogate the emotional economies that they cultivate and deploy. In this way, archivists would do well to follow non-archivists such as Ann
Cvetkovich (2002, pp. 110, 116) who examines what she terms the “archivists of emotion” in LGBTQ archives: archivists who form “often fetishistic, idiosyncratic, or obsessional” attachments to records. On the one hand, following Cvetkovich would turn archivists attention to how they are caught up in what Richard Cox (2008) calls the “romance of the document.” On the other hand, because Cvetkovich is interested in how these affective modes of archiving reflect and shape the politics of LGBTQ communities, following Cvetkovich would push archivists to resist celebrating their emotional attachments as proof of having overcome the disinterestedness of official archives and, instead, to consider the politics of this romance by interrogating how their attachments as much reinvest the archival profession in settler title and entitlement as challenge the status quo.35 To take up an unsettling hospitality of re-spect, postmodern archivists need to challenge the multiculturalist notion of respect that conjures up an enlightened position that separates the sensitive archivist from the settler violence that shapes the archives and the archivists’ profession. To do this, archivists need to re-historicize affective economies of archiving that challenges any easy distinctions between modern and postmodern, history and memory, and objective and emotional archiving.

So as to ensure that postmodern unease does not circulate around this enlightened position, archivists need to see the emotional work of archiving as being tied up with the fraught archival memory-work of Indigenous and marginalized groups. Entangling the feelings that archivists and researchers produce and work in does not mean, however, that the goal of entanglement is either to align these emotional economies or to orient both towards making everyone feel better about each other. Indeed, because it is not possible to “know in advance what makes others (or even ourselves) feel better about the injustice that have shaped lives and worlds” (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 201), archivists cannot offer researchers certain feelings as compensation for historical injustices or as a means of bringing about more just relations in the archives. Unsettling the archives means archivists and researchers coming to feel differently together and in ways that trouble multicultural hospitality in which archivists become sensitive hosts and Indigenous and hyphenated Canadians become pained guests.

Unsettling multicultural hospitality requires that archivists create new modes of hosting that as much create new ways of feeling between hosts and guests as create new
hosts. So as to arrest the settler colonial hospitality that multiculturalism tries to re-secure in Canada, uneasy postmodern archivists need to open settler archives and archiving up to Indigenous cultural rights that open on to robust notions of Indigenous sovereignty. This opening up is not the gift of a compassionate archivist. Instead, in Canada, Indigenous title and entitlement over records extends from radical interpretations of the rights of independent—if not sovereign—Indigenous peoples recognized and guaranteed through international treaties and declarations that challenge the Canadian governments framework of Aboriginal rights. These radical interpretations also open on to extant Indigenous legal and political frameworks that were not extinguished with settlement. Archivists Raymond Frogner (2010) and Shauna McRanor (1997) both argue for the need to archive Indigenous cultural heritage in Canada according to Indigenous rules of transmissions. However, as it opens on to a robust notion of Indigenous sovereignty in Canada, the deployment of Indigenous modes of archiving and information management cannot be restricted to records pertaining to Indian, First Nations or Aboriginal affairs and communities but, instead, demands that archivists re-imagine (imagining again, imagining anew) where the line around “aboriginal affairs” is drawn.

Even as uneasy modes of postmodern archival hospitality draw on existing Indigenous political and legal traditions, unsettling modes of hospitality are not something already existing within Aboriginal communities like inherent identities. Instead, unsettling hospitalities arise out of what might be called “illiberal” interpretations of these traditions negotiated between archivists and Aboriginal communities. As new hosts and notions of hosting arise, new affective economies also develop in which emotions slide and stick in and through the archives in unfamiliar ways. In these unsettling emotional economies of archiving, archivists and Indigenous communities come to feel differently together as they also come to feel differently about each other.
Conclusion

By mapping out the way Eurocentric frameworks manifest through histories of modern archives, critiques of literacy, the etymologies of words, and archival emotional economies, I have pointed to the ways colonial difference continues to haunt the modern archival world and how imaginary geographies of Europe, distinctions between oral and literate ways of being, modern linguistic science, and multicultural optimism cover up that colonial difference. I have argued that working to create what Walter Mignolo calls positions of exteriority to hegemonic Eurocentric knowledge production can build on the work of postmodern archivists but also demands that these archivists confront and displace the Eurocentrism that informs histories of modern archiving, the promise of moving into a postliterate future through electronic media, the various ways these archivists return to a kidnapped Greece, and the way archivists feel with and about others through archives and archiving. Displacing these Eurocentric investments demand that archivists—postmodern and other—begin to work along subaltern theoretical trajectories that negotiates the colonial violence haunting modern archives and archiving.

Outlining the ways a mythic image of Europe delimit the ways archivists imagine a modern archiving tradition that began with the French Revolution, in Chapter One I propose a subaltern historiography of modern archiving that is both transnational in scope and also accounts for the colonial difference underwriting nineteenth century liberalism. This subaltern historiography takes up modern European archiving as institutions, ideas and practices produced in circulations that extend well beyond Europe’s continental borders, while interrogating the ways these institutions are caught up in economies that produce differential subjects and para-subjects. By imagining their social role as the keeper of archives that provide a bulwark against secretive and authoritarian states by making these states transparent through its records to its citizens, making states efficient by effectively managing their records, and creating robust sources for historical scholarship and national identity, archivists continue to largely obfuscate the way such investments developed and changed within shifting colonial-imperial power relations. By being unable to account for the colonial difference underwriting nineteenth century liberalism, histories of modern archives fail to provide a context for understanding the
way citizen-based political models continue to marginalize migrants and refugees and make stateless persons vulnerable to further violence.\(^1\)

At the end of Chapter One, I gesture towards the Haitian Revolution as a complicated and agonistic starting point from which to begin to think modern archival history as it not only troubles the geography of “Europe” but also makes the unfreedoms and para-subject produced alongside French liberal citizenship and through the liberalization of nineteenth-century empires evident. Beginning with the Haitian Revolution should frustrate liberal narratives of progress that privilege the development of capitalist political, economic and social relations as markers of modern success. Beginning modern archival history with the troubling space of the Haitian Revolution should, then, trouble archival projects that work to build a better future for archives, archivists and the societies they serve by strengthening these relations.

Taking up the work of decolonizing archival discourses by challenging “the linked dichotomies of orality–literacy, myth–history, savagery–civilisation and tradition–modernity, and the consequent positioning of Indigenous voices and narratives as inferior” (McKemmish et al, 2011, p. 226), in Chapter Two I point to how the historicization of oral Indigenous and written Western or settler modes of communication displaces the Eurocentric myth of the alphabet underwriting Hugh Taylor’s distinction between orality, literate archives and postliterate archiving. As opposed to imagining a world divided between oral and literate ways of being, decolonizing archival discourses comes about by interrogating the changing laws of transmission that organize oral and written modes of communication. Historicizing Indigenous and settler modes of communication allows archivists to mark the physical and psychic violence that underwrite the authority of written archives while also troubling the hard and fast distinctions between oral and written to see how colonial relations are maintained through particular modes of including and valorizing oral modes of remembering. And, as opposed to figuring colonialism as an effect of literacy and, thus, something overcome with postliterate modes of thinking, decolonizing archival discourses—as a mode of subaltern theorizing—requires interrogating the ways digital record production and archiving play out within neocolonial relations.
Even though archivists—particularly postmodern archivists—are taking up this historical approach, in Chapter Two I show how liberal-settler interpretations of Indigenous-settler exchanges stymie the work of decolonizing archival discourses. When such liberal-settler interpretations rehabilitate the Eurocentric promise of postliterate archiving, the work of building new, unsettling social relations is negated in favour of efforts that both declare colonial violence a thing of the past and also extend the settler status quo. Subaltern theorizations of oral and written modes of communication refuse the allures of liberal-settler interpretations and the promise that archivists can move on without having to give up their authority over archives and archiving.

By taking up the Eurocentrism of a modern linguistic science that underwrites etymologies of the word archive that trace the word back to its Greek origins (*arkheion*), in Chapter Three I work to open up the word archive and archival discourses to the colonial difference that marks the modern linguistic archival order and resituate etymology within subaltern linguistic rationalities. By showing how modern linguistic science developed within colonial-imperial circulations, and how Eurocentric linguistic frameworks deployed transcendental linguistic laws to deny the colonial difference underwriting the formation of language families, I argue that etymology should work according to subaltern linguistic rationalities that trouble the familial logic of the modern linguistic archive by opening up unruly relations with foreign and unfamiliar languages. If etymology takes archivists back to *arkheion*, decolonizing the linguistic archival order does not require that archivists find some non-Greek origin for the word archive but, instead, calls on them to trouble English and Greek’s familial relationship so as to rethink Europe through the difference of Greece. By returning to *arkheion* through Jacques Derrida’s *Archive Fever* and Martin Bernal’s etymologies that exploit the trouble of loan words, I show that Greek is always opening on to non-Indo-European languages and cultures.

While subaltern linguistic rationalities open up Europe to others and otherness through the difference of Greece, such rationalities also understand that colonial violence is not something that simply begins with the colonial encounter. Organizing my examination of etymology around the legal and linguistic work of comparative philologist William Jones in India, I argue that the colonial violence of the modern
linguistic archives is the misreading of a pre-colonial textual violence. By working with the silences of linguistic history, subaltern linguistic rationalities do not return linguists to an original, pre-colonial Indian linguistic tradition but requires that linguists continue to negotiate the violence of Indigenous elite interpretations of language in addition to displacing the Eurocentrism of modern linguistic scientists.

Tracing out the way multicultural optimism transforms the negative emotions circulating through both the memory-work of researchers working in the records of settler violence and also the work of archiving memory in the face of contestations from Indigenous groups and allies in settler nations like Canada into good feelings, Chapters Four and Five trace out how multiculturalism’s emotional economies allow liberal-settler society to recuperate the settler nation by imagining that it and they have transcended their colonial past. Both chapters work to unsettle the emotional economies within settler national archives by moving the hurt felt in remembering settler violence to create new modes of feeling with others and feeling about others that trouble settler title and entitlement. In Chapter Four, I argue that to unsettle feelings of shame, guilt, sadness, anger, relief, joy and so on, arising out of remembering colonial violence means organizing their circulation around the broken down space of citizenship while opening them on to robust notions of Indigenous sovereignty. In Chapter Five, I argue that unsettling the “uneasy” feelings generated by postmodern archiving and circulating within archival communities requires developing modes of welcoming and respecting the Other that do not reconstitute archivists as hosts of Indigenous and other marginalized guests. An unsettling archival hospitality built on re-spect works to give over the archives to other and otherness so that Indigenous modes of hosting can develop.

At the time of writing, Library and Archive Canada (LAC) is being transformed by the federal government’s neoliberal-oriented agenda. This restructuring includes reducing the full-time work force and then contracting out the work of archiving through private agencies, reducing hours of operation, reducing what the archives acquires, and setting-up Private-Public-Partnerships (3Ps) to digitize those parts of the collection that are deemed profitable. As a result, archiving has become an increasingly precarious form of employment, researchers face greater wait times to access records, public access to parts of Canada’s documentary heritage are mediated through private companies, and
LAC faces the threat of becoming increasingly invisible to Canadians as funding for outreach and promotional services gets cut.\textsuperscript{2}

In the face of this economic shake-up to Canada’s archival community, the critiques I make in my dissertation concerning the Eurocentrism that continues to inform Canadian archiving may seem out of place, perhaps even irrelevant, to many Canadian archivists. That is, my dissertation may seem rather moot to archivists if the archives where they work are killed by a thousand budget cuts. Indeed, arguing that archivists need to give up their authority over the archives may be seen as hindering, if not hurting, archivists efforts to ensure that LAC retains a robust mandate and employs full-time archivists to carry it out. In the face of such threats, it seems more strategic for Canada’s archivists and their allies to rally around Canada’s archival traditions, and to cry foul that cuts will only harm the archivists’ important and longstanding role in archiving Canada’s documentary heritage and ensuring researchers have access to such records. While conserving and reinvigorating what LAC already does is important, demanding a return to the modes of archival labour that existed before the cuts risks making earlier colonial-capitalist relations the rallying cry in the face of new neoliberal and neocolonial directions in government.

The fight for a more secure employment for archivists and a robust budget for LAC and the fight for more unsettling futures are, however, not so opposed. Indeed, efforts to open up the potential for unsettling new relations with others that undermine the authority of neoliberal and neocolonial political-economies is to fight for a more resilient and just LAC. Remaining critical of the goals and desires of archivists and their allies as well as the government will be important to win the fight for a more radical LAC.
Notes

Introduction

1 On the importance of conducting an ethnographies of colonial archives when using them, see Nicholas B. Dirks (1999, 2002). Stoler provides a (2002) genealogy of the “archival turn” through the work of anthropologists and historian that, among other things, works to displace Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever (1995) from its privilege place. Coming in the midst of the archival turn, Stoler concedes that Derrida’s work nonetheless gave the archive a “theoretical stature” (2009, p. 44). Stoler (2009, p. 45) also usefully distinguishes between research done primarily by historians and archivists concerned with institutional archives, and the archive of cultural theory (usually with a capital “A”) that refers more to “a metaphoric invocation for any corpus of selective collections and the longings that the acquisitive quests for the primary, originary, and untouched entail” than the institution, even if she admits that the distinction between archives and Archives is often blurry.

2 Nicholas B. Dirks (2002) states that it is through the archives that one can track the way the colonial state produces itself discursively not only in what it says but in how it organizes its records. Dirk’s point is that through its archives, the state produces the primary texts upon which its history is written. It is for this reason, Dirk (2002, p. 60) writes that while “all archives reflect their particular origins as state records, colonial archives betray the additional contradictions of colonial governmentality.”

3 Michel Rolph Trouillot (1995) uses the term “archival power” to describe the role of archives in shaping authority. Archival power determines “the difference between a historian, amateur or professional, and a charlatan:” archives “convey authority and set the rules of credibility and interdependence; they help select the stories that matter” (Ibid, p. 52). Trivialization of certain events is a form of archival power.

4 This critique is made by Schwartz (2006, pp. 1-7). Stoler is perhaps the most attentive to what archivists are writing. However, in Along the Archival Grain (2009), most archivists appear in the footnotes (cf. especially pp. 44-6).

5 It would be misleading to argue that there are absolutely distinct camps: postmodern; postcustodial; and diplomatics, within English-Language archival communities although much mud has been slung across these lines. Nonetheless, quick and dirty differences can be drawn. Diplomatics (record keeping) takes a document-up approach to archiving and is concerned with developing archiving processes that ensure the reliability and authenticity of records. Postcustodialists (records managers) approach archives en mass to develop methods to manage the processes of archiving. Postmodern archival theories build on “postmodern” theorists that contest metanarratives to critically evaluate and intervene in the work of archiving and in archives more generally. While the postmodern approaches have been aligned mostly with a postcustodial approach, in large part due to the influence of Terry Cook in shaping a postmodern project for archivists, postmodern archival theories have also been aligned with diplomatics (Heald 1996).


7 Similarly, Heather MacNeil (2001, pp. 44-5) writes: “Against modern theory’s advocacy of universality, certainty, necessity, singularity, and likeness, postmodern theory posits the virtues of locality, ambivalence, contingency, multiplicity, and difference.”


9 Similarly, Sue McKemmish et al (2011, p. 212) argue that decolonization requires that archivists embrace “multiple ways of knowing and archiving, and multiple forms of archival records, including the oral and the written.”

10 As historian Fredrick Cooper argues in the case of African history, the problem is that the colonial archives have shaped Indigenous “forms of historical preservation and memory” (2007, p. 257). While historians of Africa have turned to oral histories to counter the “Eurocentrism of the written record” and set “popular memory against elite documents,” many miss the fact that the categories of ethnicity that define historian’s subjects were the product of territorial administrations (Ibid, p. 257).

11 Mignolo (1993, p. 127) argues: “When I say that colonial difference is best understood by someone who experienced colonialism, I am accused of giving priority to the ethnic and cultural situation of the understanding subject. According to this argument, a woman or a Mexican is in a better position to
understand women's issues or colonial situations respectively. Yet this is not the point I am trying to make. Rather, I am concerned with the tension between the insertion of the epistemological subject within a disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) context governed by norms and conventions as well as with its being placed in a hermeneutic context in which race, gender, and class compete with and shape the goals, norms, and rules of a given disciplinary game...Thus the locus of enunciation is as much a part of knowing and understanding as it is of the construction of the image of the "real" resulting from a disciplinary discourse. Postcolonial theorizing is different from postcolonial theories as far as the latter have been commodified by first-world academia (Mignolo, 2000, p. 93).

17 Of the most prolific "postmodern" archivists, Eric Ketelaar is one of the few residing outside a former settler colony. That said, the Netherlands where Ketelaar works as an archivist and academic, is certainly not outside of colonial-imperial circulations.

18 Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s comments in September 2009 that Canadians “have no history of colonialism. So we have all of the things that many people admire about the great powers but none of the things that threaten or bother them” works to cover over the long history of refusing to deal with first nations as an independent nations with which the Federal government has treaty obligations. Such denials only lead to further violence by transforming aboriginal poverty into an "Indian Problem:" the problem of Indians being Indians that require further intervention by settler, as opposed to the result of continuing settler relations (Regan, 2010).


20 While certainly in use before then, Shaista Patel (2010) seems to be the first to put the term “settler of colour” in print (See Phung, 2011). Patel’s term speaks to arguments made by at least Lawrence & Dua (2005), and Thobani (2007). Thobani (2007, pp. 16-7) argues: “Keeping their sights fixed firmly on gaining equality with nationals, immigrants have thus far, with few exceptions, ignored the interrogation of their own positionality with regard to Aboriginal peoples. Most have largely forsaken the possibilities for building alliances with Aboriginal peoples, failing to imagine a future of sovereignty for them and what their own location within such a future might be...Relating to Aboriginal peoples largely through the national symbolic, upholding its imagining of the self-determination of Aboriginal peoples to be an impossible political objective, most immigrants continue to articulate their own interests with regard to the state and interests of nationals.” Thobani (2007, p. 18) adds: “In the absence of a politics that envisions the transcendence of this foundational relation, the anti-racist aspirations of immigrants remain limited at best, and complicitous at worst.” To unsettle settlers of colour, Robinder Kaur Sehdev (2011, p. 265) argues: “We [people of colour]
must also recognize our implication in colonial processes even while they deeply (and detrimentally) affect us.”

While it is important to map out the exploitative and oppressive effects of violence, the presence of psychic and physical violence does not in and of itself pervert social relations. Violence, and not its absence, structures social relations to constitute bodies as subjects: bodies that are always already caught up in relations with others to form a community. As Judith Butler (2004, p. 27) argues, “violence is, always, an exploitation of that primary tie, that primary way in which we are, as bodies, outside ourselves and for one another.” How we are “for one another” and, thus, how we delimit our responsibility for others will depend on how “interdependencies between subjects is avowed or disavowed, instituted or not” (Butler 2009, p. 43). While seeing all relationships as premised on some form of violence may risk relativizing critiques of violence, to imagine that desirable social relations occur—or can occur—outside of exploitative structures remains an idealist conceit.

Thobani (2007) argues that Canadian citizenship transformed immigrant settlers into exalted insiders while transforming Aboriginal peoples into aliens on their own territories. As Sara Ahmed (2000, p. 190n.3) argues: “We need to consider colonialism in terms of the historical injustice of the transformation of guests into hosts before we can ask the question of what would be a better form of hospitality.” Following Ahmed, a more radical notion of hospitality always requires not simply arguing that we’re all “guests,” but which “guests” have the authority to become a “host” and which ones do not.

In a framework that separates immigrants of colour from settler colonialism, “Aboriginal peoples are caught between a rock and a hard place” when it comes to immigration. “Either they are implicated in the anti-immigrant racism of white Canadians, or they support struggles of people of color that fail to take seriously the reality of ongoing colonization” (Lawrence & Dua 2005, p. 136).

Comparing Canadian and Australian archives, for instance, is a mainstay of English-Language archival literature, however rarely does the connection address both as settler nations. Notably, Hugh Taylor (1993, p. 227) wrote that Australian and Canadian archives “run parallel...whereby Europeans settled in an ancient land people by its aboriginals.” English-language Canadian archivists often publish in archival journals supported by national archivist associations in Australia (Archives and Manuscripts) New Zealand (Archivaria), and United States (The American Archivist) while archivists from these settler nations often publish in Archivaria. Canadian archivists collaborate with archivists in these settler nations, attend conferences and give guest lectures there. While certainly the circulation of Canadian archivy is not limited to settler nations, these settler nations are important ports in that circulation. On the circulation of traveling theory, see Edward W. Said (1982) and Nick Perry (1995) on traveling theorists.


I use the title “National Archives” as a short hand for the institution known as Canada’s Dominion Archives (1872-1912), the Public Archives of Canada (PAC) (1912-1987) and then the National Archives of Canada (NAC) (1987-2004) before it amalgamated with the National Library in 2004 to become Library and Archives Canada (LAC). The name National Archives should not be read as a sign that I prefer or privilege the pre-amalgamated institution. Instead, I chose the name National Archives because that is the name of the funds in the LAC collection.

RG37 vol.458.

These requests and others returned thousands of documents.

Barbara was my doctoral co-supervisor before her death in 2010.

On the colonial inheritance of archival researching see Burton (2003a) and Arondekar (2005).


Smith lectured in the Caribbean (MG31 E96 vol. 3. file 22 “Caribbean Archives Conference”), Lamb’s trip to Nigeria and Guinea in 1961 on behalf of the Ford Foundation to assess the possibility of a Research Institute there (MG31 D8 Vol.38 file 10 “Africa – Archives (Ford Foundation)”

34MG 31 E96 Vol.3 file 1 “The Canadian Archivist”

35RG37: vol.504 “London Office: PAC Correspondence.” The records suggest that Doughty was very adapt at securing additional income for himself even as other archivists suffered (RG37: vol.303. “PAC History pt. 2”)
This more expansive notion of archival labour arose out of a need to challenge the description of archives as elite spaces by thinking through the labour that saw these spaces as things to be cleaned, repaired, and secured. However, the interest in the labour of archives developed while I was on strike at York University from November 2008 until February 2009. While I walked the picket line with other members of CUPE 3903—the union representing teaching assistants, research assistants, and contract faculty—in the bitter cold, I watched as the new Ontario Archives was built on campus not 200 metres away. As the building went up, work crews went to and from the site while other crews worked on new “Bus Way” being built to campus so as to ensure that Ontarians could access their archives in this northern, car-centric part of Toronto. Work crews used this new bus way to get to and from their construction sites so as not to “cross” our picket lines.

Caron was responsible for cutting about 20% of LAC staff to meet the Conservative Governments “austerity” measures, while transforming many of these jobs into temporary and precarious contract work. He also introduced a “code of conduct” that severely limited the ability of archivists to publicly speak about the archives; a code of conduct that echoed similar policies censoring other public servants who might criticize the Conservative government’s heavy investment in the Alberta Oil Sands and greater resource extraction despite the threat such investments pose to the environment. Further, it was under Caron’s watch that the LAC greatly reduced what it collects and the services it provides. Caron eventually resigned in May 2013 after it was discovered that he had inappropriately claimed personal expenses for reimbursement.

The photos no longer existed but I was able to access the catalogue cards (R1185-31-1-E “Public Archives Publicity and Programming Photographs”).

Gilliland et al (2008) talk about Eurocentric archival curriculums and tie it to European norms and whiteness. However, they leave the term itself largely undefined. Archivist Joan Schwartz argues that diplomats “can reveal a great deal about documents…by clarifying the archival nature” of these documents if adapted to “modern Canadian archives” and not “used as a tool of Eurocentric archival imperialism” (1995, p. 64). It is unclear what Schwartz means by “Eurocentric archival imperialism” because neither imperialism nor Eurocentrism are topics of her article or later work. However, because “modern Canadian archives” is her hope for a new understanding and deployment of diplomatics, European archival imperialism would seem to be attached to those who wish to make diplomatics the study of documents and not the study of the social relations of power the produce documents. What is worrying about such a distinction is that it places modern Canadian archives outside and against “Eurocentric archival imperialism” even though Canada’s modern archives and modern archival thinking are the products of Settler colonial projects that draw on Eurocentric frameworks of knowledge production.

Chapter One

Modern, here, is somewhat confusing given that “modern archives” “modern archiving” and so on, denote different things in archival discourses. For instance, American archivists call post-World War II institutions organized around ideas of modern records management “modern archives” (Schellenberg, 1956; Cook, 2013). The publication of the Dutch Manual in 1898 is considered the birth of modern archival principles (Cook, 1997a). Juxtaposed to archives in the ancient world, Ernst Posner (1972a) attaches the modern archives to modern administrative practices that first appear in the 12th century in Europe. In this chapter modern archives denotes archiving within the modern period more or less defined by historians: between 1800 and the 20th century, or between “early” modernity (1500-1800) and “late” (20th century) modernity. Thus, modern archiving is archiving that takes place in what is referred to as the “modern world” that came to fruition not only at the time of the French Revolution but because of it. While the term “modern” is used by archivists to refer to the archival institutions, theories and practices that came out of French Revolution (Ribeiro, 2001; Heald, 1996), other archivists refer to these archives, theories and practices as traditional (Cook, 1997a), pre-modern (Cook 2001a), and “paradigmatic” (Gilliland et al, 2008). As they are used in this chapter, the terms “modern archives” and “modern archival system” do not really contradict any other figuration of modern archives because most archivists conjure up the “modern world” either explicitly or implicitly even when they call this period by another name.

Edward W. Said (1979) argues that an imaginative geography denotes both the geographical distinctions produced by particular discourses and those geographical distinctions that underwrite these discourses. As an imaginative geography, Said (1979, p.54) writes that Orientalism assigns “one space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’ is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be
entirely arbitrary.” These distinctions are arbitrary because it “is enough for ‘us’ to set up these boundaries in our minds; “they” become designated as different from ‘ours” (Ibid). In this imaginative geography their space “out there” and outside ‘ours’ is crowded with ‘suppositions, associations, and fictions” (Ibid). This division is “something more than what appears to be merely positive knowledge” (Ibid, p. 55). In this way, Orientalism is a “distribution of geographical awareness”—a world split into two halves: the Orient and Occident—that manifests itself across numerous fields that elaborate this division (Ibid, p. 12). In this way, the Orient is an “other” imaginary space and culture against which Europe can define itself. Created by Europe for this purpose, the colonization and civilizing of the Orient becomes a way of producing this identity and reinforcing Orientalist discourse. In this way, the “Orient at large, therefore, vacillates between the West’s contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in – or fear of – novelty” (Ibid, p. 59).

3 See Moore (2002). As Olga P. Palmer exclaimed in her 1939 history (p. 70): “Then came the French Revolution!”

4 For an examination of the laws passed by the National Assembly, later republican governments and, then, under the Bonaparte dynasties concerning archives see: Posner (1940); Lokke (1968); Duchein (1980/1; 1992); Panitch (1996), and Milligan (2002). Concerning the Archives nationales, archivist Carl Lokke (1968, p. 29) argues that the “act of 7 Messidor an II, drafted while the blade of the guillotine rose and fell ever more frequently, became and is today the charter of the Archives Nationales.”

5 This is not to say that this new system was unprecedented. As Ian E. Wilson (2000) notes, long before the French Revolution archives were used to write histories while other European governments had something resembling record dispossession programs. Judith Panitch (1996) also questions whether or not France’s Revolutionary archives were all that new given that they continued to serve a legal function and as cultural institutions; roles archives of the ancien régime fulfilled.

6 Expressing the same emphasis as Posner on the role of the archives in democracy, archivists Angelika Menne-Haritz (1994) argues that the archives democratic role born with the French Revolution was really a rebirth of Athens’ democratic archives-as-public institutions. The publicness of archives shows “the potential that archival work…has for making policy and administration public and for guaranteeing the citizen’s right to control elected representatives” (Ibid, p. 531). Given the European scholars tendency to Europeanize Greece to use it as the foundation of Western, European civilization, the place of Athens’ here hardly upsets my argument about the mythic construct of Europe but is merely another variation. See Chapters Two and Three for critiques of a Europeanized Greece.

7 Harris & Merrett (1994); Eric Ketelaar (1997b); and Heather MacNeil (1991) all argue that freedom to information and access to archival records are a foundation of any democracy. However, unlike the authors above, they do not link this freedom to the French Revolution. This is not to say that such generally held views about freedom to information do not conjure up a mythic Europe. Indeed, all of these articles, the spectre of Euro-America haunts the notion of democracy.

8 Duchein (1980/81) points out that despite the laws centralizing the archives in 1796, by 1799 the Archives départementales (provincial archives) and Archives communal (municipal archives) were governed under separate legislation, and would not be part of the national system again until 1897. Duchein also points out that the imagined efficiency of a centralized government was undermined in France by the ambiguity of the word “archives” such that many archives were destroyed, misplaced or never transferred because they were not identified as archives.

9 According to Blouin & Rosenberg (2011, pp. 22-3) Chartes was also responsible for extending the Revolutionary spirit by teaching republican concepts of archival value

10 Moore (2002) argues that Chartes charter dates to 1814 even though most other archivists date the school from when it was reorganized in the 1920s

11 For a more detailed discussion of the Republican governments edicts to destroy records, see Lokke (1968). For a critical discussion of the relationship between the destruction and archiving of records, see Panitch (1996).

12 On the process of nationalization that accompanied the French Revolution, see: Wallerstein (1990), Frenc (1990); Skocpol & Kestnbaum (1990).

13 Part of the Revolution’s foundational status stems from Hegel’s reading of the French Revolution as the result of Enlightenment philosophy and, thus, is emblematic of, but also catalyst for, the “modern” stage of World history in which “thought ought to govern reality” (Arthur, 1989, p. 18). Political modernity is, thus, the study of the post-Revolutionary world in governing the world by reason.

14 See also Ferenc (1990); Skocpol & Kestnbaum (1990).
1961, in which participants on the influence of Posner on the development of records management in the United States. American law even if, as Duranti argues, America is one of those “us” who perpetuate Roman law. Only seems to give credence to Europe as a more or less singular “legal” entity. Boles & Greene (1996) argument suggests a static and timeless nature to Roman law. As opposed to being a study of law, it really however, as opposed to showing how Roman law has changed through its various inheritors, this legal argument suggests a static and timeless nature to Roman law. As opposed to being a study of law, it really only seems to give credence to Europe as a more or less singular “legal” entity. Boles & Greene (1996) argue that Duranti’s mythic construction of Roman law obfuscates the differences between Roman and American law even if, as Duranti argues, America is one of those “us” who perpetuate Roman law. Posner was a proponent of records management in the United States where he worked. See Ross (1981) on the influence of Posner on the development of records management in the U.S. Posner himself participated in, and contributed to, modernization discourses as is evidence from his report on the sixth international conference of the Round Table on Archives held in Warsaw Poland in 1961, in which participants—including himself—agreed that it was a “duty of the countries most advanced
in the scientific and economic domain to assist, to the greatest possible extent, the state recently admitted to
independence and those not yet possessed of the experience necessary for the administration of their
archives” (1962, p. 18). To do this, the conference attendees advised the ICA to set up a secretariat that
would copy and translate already existing documents, articles and manuals available in the Euro-American
archival world to these other countries (Ibid).

25 Throughout the 1960s, the ICA organized funding and other support, and carried out pilot projects that
would provide technical assistance to “developing” or “underdeveloped” countries and create
organizational structures within the ICA to facilitate such development. (Rieger, 1976; 1967; 1965;
Keeskeméti & Rieger, 1969; Plavchan, 1977). The goal of such projects were to create more efficient and
“healthy administration, socio-economic, and intellectual development of the nations involved” (Rieger,
26 For examples of this argument, see Smith (1972).
27 For examples of this position, see Mayer (1972)
29 Summarizing the presentations at the 1972 conference in Moscow, American archivist Morris Rieger
(1973, p. 501) states that if “the third world is to make further substantial progress in archival development,
the initiative must be taken by the emergent countries themselves, and this in turn depends on the success
of the international agencies in the field and mainly of the archival authorities of these countries in
educating their political and administrative masters to the national value of archival services.”
28 Even as more non-European countries joined the ICA in the late 1960s, Euro-American archivists were
told by non-Western archivists—or, at least what they heard them say—was that “with a few exceptions,
archival underdevelopment is the rule in the third world” (Rieger, 1973, p. 500). Rieger (1972, p. 163)
argues that the “capacity of national archival establishments in the developing world to make substantial
contributions to nation-building will remain unrealized until they themselves achieve minimal functional
effectiveness; until, that is, they develop competence to discharge the basic responsibilities of modern,
public archival institutions with respect to records management and archives administration.” To be able to
meaningfully contribute to archival discourses, Rieger joined a chorus of others arguing that archivists from
developing countries must first be trained as archivists in regional archival training centres founded by the
ICA and its partners in the developing world (Ibid). However, the perceived parochial nature of these
regional centres and the continued difference of non-Euro-American archival systems lead Euro-American
archivist to characterize African and Asian archivists and archival systems according to their supposed lack
or deviance (see van Albada, 2007).
30 Moore (2002) looks at the transformations of the École Nationale des Chartes from the Bourbon
Restoration to the end of Second Empire (roughly 1820-1871) to map out the way archives, archival
practice and theory and the archival profession were shaped by the changing politics of each regime and
also how each regime used the archives and archival order to legitimate itself.
31 Moore (2002) challenges the very attachment of archives to France’s revolutionary principles by
juxtaposing the work done to create archival systems that will make government transparent through its
records to the founding of public libraries by various nineteenth century French governments as so to create
a literate population that could more effectively participate in public life. Throughout the 1800s, Moore
argues, there seems to be a pattern of moving from libraries to archives that mirrors the move from liberal-
left to conservative-imperial politics. While the revolutionary government certainly did pioneer archival
reform, “under later regimes archives seemed to become linked with opposition to the revolution, libraries
with support for it” (Moore, 2002, p. 195). Because libraries were attached to public education and literacy,
libraries and not archives allowed the populace to more skillfully negotiate public life and, perhaps, read
and write critiques of the government. Associated with controlled production of national histories that
could be made to celebrate the current regime, archives were a better bet for maintaining social order.
32 According to Milligan (2002, p. 9): “Historical knowledge was a category carved out of the larger body
of information contained in the Archives, its limits marked off by the perceived needs of the state and
perceived wishes of the public.” And as historians’ archival labours resulted in conflating the history of the
French nation with the history of the state by writing the former with the records of the latter, Bonapartist
archivists laboured to organize the study of history to be in line with the interests of the imperial state
(Milligan, 2005).
33 According to Panitch, Posner’s argument continues the debate set out by nineteenth century French
archivists as to whether revolutionary archivists really worked to conserve records or allowed much
France’s archival heritage to go to the peasants’ bonfires. The stakes of such an argument is whether or not the government really recognized their role as guardians or not.

In French archival literature, Michel Duchein (1979) argues that the right of access was instituted to allow prospective property owners wanting to buy nationalized land to see original titles held in the archives (Cf. Ketelaar 2007: 352).


On imperial subject formation, see Spivak (1985), on Orientalist othering, see Said (1979).

On the importance of seeing relations of power within historical projects, see: Heald (1996); Brothman (1993; 1991); Cook (1997a; 2001a; 2001b; 2002).

See also Ketelaar (1992) on the difference of Europe. This mythic image of Europe is shared by Horsman, Ketelaar and Thommasen (2003) in their study of the Dutch Manual. In this study, parochial Europe becomes universal as it moves abroad because, the authors (2003, p. 269) state: “No foreign author could participate in the discussion about principle and methods without involving the crux of the Manual. In that context, those curious Dutch examples and that incomprehensible and untranslatable jargon could be ignored.”

Reading Cook’s history as a diffusionist narrative gives new meaning to the colonies Cook (2007) gives particular mention to: United States, Canada, Australia and South Africa because these settler nations most readily identify as heirs of Europe. Even if they bristle against the limitations of Europe’s nineteenth century archival theory and practice, archival communities in these settler nations nonetheless saw their modern archival institutions, theories and practices as continuations of what began in Europe. Despite its many revisions, Cook’s historical narrative of archival development travels within a Eurocentric imaginative geography as it goes from France (1840s) through the Dutch Trio (1900), on to Sir Hilary Jenkinson (1920-30s) and then jumping the pond to T.R. Schellenberg (United States 1930-50) and, from Schellenberg to Lamb (Canada 1950-70s).

On France’s changing colonial-imperial empire, see especially Ho Tai (2001), Dubois (2009), Stoler & Cooper (1997), and Cooper (2007b).

Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995, p. 101) writes: “Colonial management and both private and public communication between France and the Americas also left their paper trail. In short, the inaccessibility of sources is only relative. It cannot explain the massive disregard that French historiography shows for the colonial question and, by extension, for the Haitian Revolution. In fact, French historians continue to neglect the colonial question, slavery, resistance, and racism more than the revolutionary assemblies ever did. Most historians ignored or simply skipped whatever record there was.”

This applies more to Milligan and Moore who draw heavily on France’s archives than to Panitch who builds her argument by reading across published histories.

Archives Nationales website: http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr (May 2014). The Archives Outre-mer were officially created on January 3, 1979 under the new archives legislation (Law no. 79-18). At that time, the archives outre-mer housed records from now independent colonies and Ministère de Colonies. These records were distinguished from the Archives départementales that included the three overseas départements of Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion (Duchein 1980/81).

Felicia Gottman (2013, p. 538) speculates that one of the reasons the French East India Company is so little studied is that its archives are spread between the “Company Archives in Lorient, Brittany, and the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence, with only comparatively few relevant documents being held in the National Archives in Paris.”

In particular, see Jeanette Allis Bastian’s (2003; 2013) work on the way standard notions of provenance continue to impede descendants of slaves and other colonial populations in U.S. Virgin Islands from accessing the colonial records of the islands held in European archives, and her argument that archivists should adopt an expansive notion of provenance that views the whole colonial community and not just colonial administrators as record creators to combat this imbalance. Also, the work of Evelyn Wareham (2001), Shauna McRanor (1997), Sue McKemmish et al (2011), David Hanlon (1999), Adele Perry (2005), Ricardo L. Punzalan (2006) and other archivists and historians in settler nations like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand map out the way colonial archives suppressed Aboriginal populations and Indigenous knowledge production in settler nations, and how recognizing the claims of Indigenous communities to the
records housed in the archives of settler nation-states opens up these archives to new modes of archiving that speak to the needs of these communities.

Bernard S. Cohn (1996, p. 4) similarly argues that in the case of the British conquest of India, “metropole and colony have to be seen in a unitary field of analysis.” On the making of Europe, Frantz Fanon (1968, p. 100) argues, “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.” According to Fanon, not only was it through the othering violence of the colonized that Europe came to be, but the wealth of Europe was done through at the expense of the colonies. As such, the colonized people are owed their due and the capitalist powers must pay.


See Lazreg (2011) and Fanon (1968) on the use of torture and other means to produce of subordinated Algerian subjects.


See Cooper (2007b) on the way in which the post-World War II French Nation was formed through the work of transforming France’s Empire into a French Community of “independent” nation-states as opposed to the proposed Union that would have saw French citizenship extended to everyone in the metropole and colonies. The threat of this Union model for metropolitan politicians was that it would have more or less equalized relations between white and non-white French subjects and circumscribed the authority of the metropole over the former colonies.

For instance, Bastian (2003) traces out how the archives of the U.S. Virgin Islands traveled through Haiti and other foreign ports before ending up in Europe’s capitals. Colonial archives were constantly traveling to and from the metropole and other colonies as government records creators were promoted, demoted and moved to other posts or retired home to Europe, or when the threat to French rule in a colony and, thus, the records of that rule, required the removal of colonial records to the metropole. For the familial enterprises and the bonds between colonies, see Dubois (2009).

Eldon Scott Cohen (1954) traces archives in Cochinchina—part of France’s Indochina and the southern part of present day Vietnam—back to the edicts of the colonial governor to keep and classify government records. The story Cohen tells of archives in Indochina from then until 1954 is one of increasing disorganization until the archives came under the supervision of Chartes graduate Paul Boudet in 1917. Indochinese archivists were not trained until 1930, some of whom Cohen notes went on to work in France’s archival system.

On rethinking the intellectual pedigree of the Haitian revolution see Dubois (2006), Blackburn (2006) and Trouillot (1995). According to Dubois (2006, p. 12): “Insurgents in the Caribbean…generated new strands of discourse that were, like all discourse, both embedded and in tension with the web from which they emerged.”

Chapter Two


2 Ensuring the evidentiary nature of records requires verifying the provenance of the record—that the record is what it is believed to be—and that its contents remain unchanged after it enters the archive so it remains a reliable record of the event.

3 See Taylor (1988) on the idea of “conceptual orality.”

4 On societal provenance, see Nesmith (2006) and Piggott (2012). In general, societal provenance is an expanded view of provenance that shifts the focus from organizing archives according to record creators (“traditional” provenance) to the processes of producing records. As such, societal provenance considers all the social actors involved in the processes of creation and archivalization, as well as the inequalities that marked the relationships between social actors and, thus, the production of silences in the archives: what was not said or kept, and the other modes of archivalization erased and other authorities displaced in the production of the archives. On the turn from record creators to the process of creation to frame provenance, see Cook (1997a; 2001b).
5 According to Nesmith (2006, p. 358), because societal provenance recognizes Aboriginal peoples as co-creators of records that document Indigenous life, societal provenance opens up the possibility of allowing archivists to draw on Indigenous modes of archiving and information management to archive these records.

6 The spelling of “postliterate” varies, with Taylor sometimes referring to it as postliterate or post-literate. I have chosen to go with postliterate.

7 Paul Grosswiler (2004, p. 146) calls this approach “alphabetic literacy theory.” Social anthropologists Jack Goody and Ian Watt (1963) and classical scholar Eric Havelock (1963, 1976) along with McLuhan and Ong build the work of Albert Lord and Milman Perry to advance the myth of the alphabet (Grosswiler, 2004; Sterne, 2011).

8 The externalization of memory that supposedly accompanies moving from orality to literacy is reiterated in the distinction between memory (oral) and history (writing) by Pierre Nora (1989), Jacques le Goff (1992), and Clanchy (1980-1; 2013). These authors have had a significant influence on archivists and their take up of memory, and in the distinction between modern archival memory and the dying world of traditional memory (see Schwartz & Cook, 2002; Carter, 2006).

9 Historians of the classical world only got in the business of kidnapping Greece in the eighteenth century. While Greece was generally seen to be part of the Eastern Mediterranean world up until the eighteenth century, Greece’s Europeanization began in the eighteenth and nineteenth century with European scholarship invested in the history of a European civilization distinct and superior to other civilizations (Bernal, 1987; 2000; Vlassopoulos, 2007).

10 According to Dussel (2000), this also obfuscates all the “non-Western” Arab philosophers that allowed Europe to “rediscover” Greece during the Renaissance and make Greece Western, as much as the colonial context (Spanish and Portuguese colonial projects) in which this rediscover happened.

11 Archivists might, here, argue that they already have a solution to the kidnapping of Greece: turn to Ernst Posner’s Archives of the Ancient World (1972a) because Posner attaches the records consciousness and written records to a history of writing that challenges the conflation of the “literate” archives with Greek literacy. Arguing that there is a “rational administration” and attendant record consciousness underwriting the development of archives that make archives “bureaucracy’s favorite child,” this record consciousness goes as far back as the invention of writing for administrative purposes in ancient Mesopotamia (1972a; 1957). Indeed, Posner’s argument that the modern archival world is the result of what he calls a “two-fold” inheritance of Oriental and Western traditions also seems to challenge Eurocentric imaginative geographies. However, a Eurocentric image of Greece emerges in Posner’s writing, and this Eurocentrism informs his history of the “modern” archival world.

Despite Posner’s (1972b, p. 315) conviction that the historian of the archives must not “put asunder” the connections between the East and West the comprise history, Posner maintains a Eurocentric distinction between Orient and West in which the former remains relatively unchanged from about 350 B.C. to the end of Fatimid caliphate in 1171 A.D. Not only are all the disparate cultures in varied locals, across 1500 hundred of history subsumed under the “Oriental” category, but also despite the intervention of the “Parthians, the Arabs, the Mongols, and the Turks” to transform this Oriental tradition, according to Posner (1972a, p. 11) the Orient and its archives remain static such that the Normans in the 13th century adopted an oriental bureaucracy relatively unchanged since the Persian Empire. While Posner (1972a) argues that Imperial Rome contributed little to archival science in comparison to Oriental tradition, the Roman Western world is nonetheless very different because it’s potential to change contrasts with the Oriental traditions’ static nature.

Therefore, even though the modern archives are the result of a “twofold inheritance,” in Posner’s historical framework the Oriental tradition itself never becomes modern until the West modernizes them through colonial expansion (1972b, p. 308). Non-European societies remain on the edge of the modern world until the West makes them modern. As such, contemporary Oriental traditions are not needed to understand the development of a modern records consciousness because they remain pre-modern. Despite its “twofold inheritance,” in Posner’s history there are no non-European agents even though his history includes non-European peoples and places. By continuing to draw on Posner to make the argument of the archives ancient and diverse origins without attending to the problems of his “two-fold inheritance,” present-day archivists reiterate—or risk reiterating—Posner’s division between an agental West and a passive, traditional Orient.

12 Dussel (1995) and Guha (2002) argue that W.F. Hegel’s (1777-1831) philosophy of history is responsible for the reduction of World-History to a history of Europe.
This is Posner’s analysis as well (1972b). See note 10.

Following on the work of Thomas (1992) and Clanchy (2013), archivists such as O’Toole (1993) and Cook (2000) have taken up the symbolic significances of archives that persist despite the externalization of memory. Nonetheless, the externalization of memory framework still seems to hold sway: see Schwartz & Cook (2002) on the archival nature of modern memory.

Unlike Ong who takes up the capacity of orality to bring Christians closer to God (Sterne, 2011), McLuhan does not valorize orality even if literacy troubles him.

This Judeo-Christian analogy is fitting given McLuhan and Ong’s involvement in the theological debates amongst Catholic scholars in the 1960s concerning the potential of Christianity’s literate tradition to bring people closer to God (see Sterne, 2011). According to Ong, the new orality that results from electronic media created the potential for a new and better experience of God (Ibid).

For Taylor, there are, however, some similarities between conceptual orality and pre-literacy because it is with postliteracy that our “perceptions are no longer so linear and logical and we are recovering a sense of the acoustic space of preliterate societies which may be our salvation” (1992, p. 21). Nonetheless, by coming after literacy, postliteracy remains separate from preliteracy.

Archivist Joan Schwartz (1995; 2002) and Lorraine O’Donnell (1994) have taken up this point of the archivists attunement to the record’s media to argue that despite archivist’s paper minds the tension within the literate archives opens up spaces within archiving to approach non-textual archival documents such as photographs according to a visual grammar, syntax and semiotics that will allow archival users to see such records as more than just texts with pictures.

Taylor (1988, p. 462) defines colonialism as “the transnational form of bureaucratic development that often attempts to achieve the effects of private enterprise through purely bureaucratic arrangement and fiat.”

See also Russell (1984-5) on the coloniality of DIA records. Taylor and other archivists who have strayed towards reducing colonialism to literacy are not the only ones to lay out a totalizing and reductive theory of colonialism as rationalization. Ann Laura Stoler (2002, pp. 4-6) argues that throughout the 1980s and 90s colonial studies generally assumed that “the mastery of reason, rationality, and the exaggerated claims made for Enlightenment principles have been at the political foundation of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century colonial regimes and should be at the center of critical histories of them.” Scholars of colonialism figured the colonial state as a state focused on rationalizing rule such that the affective economies circulating within colonial rule were treated as surface matter and a smoke screen for what was really going on. Like the role of oral modes of transmission in colonial governance, the affective economies of colonialism were overlooked or dismissed. I turn to the emotional economies in the colonial archives in chapter four and five.

In a self-reflective article, Taylor (1993b) maintains the distinction between European and Indigenous peoples traditions as the difference of oral and literate traditions even as he talks about the increasing influenced of native peoples and their views on Environmentalism after his retirement in 1982.

Interestingly, even as archivists drew out the symbolic values of records within the literate archive, a kidnapped Greece nonetheless continued to function as the starting point of archival history. See O’Toole (1993), Schwartz & Cook (2002).


On the rules of transmission for oral modes of remembering, see Gray (1998), McRanor (1997), Pylypchuk (1991), Wareham (2001), Frogner (2010), and Berzins (1991). Frogner (2010, p. 53) writes: “Aboriginal oral testimonies are offered in a communal performance in which an audience receives and, in an archival sense, gives authenticity to the evidence; the historical sources often have a detached (i.e., non-textual), changing form; and they have a non-linear, heterogeneous provenance.” See also, McRanor (1997); Pylypchuk (1991). Aboriginal criteria are complex because they are not “necessarily fixed and immutable or uniform across all Aboriginal groups: definitions of sacred/secret vary and can change over time, there are great cultural variations in who can know, see or hear what, when and in what circumstances and Aborigines like non-Aborigines differ on what they individually consider private, offensive or demeaning” (Berzins, 1991, p. 201).

According to Walter Mignolo (1995), the privileging of written history by humanists in the early modern period occurred within colonial-imperial contexts and, as such, written history is tied to processes of carrying out and legitimating the conquest of the Americas and enslavement of Amerindian populations. As a means of authorizing their claim to America and their authority over Amerindian peoples, humanist discourses tied history to written history and, specifically, to phonetic script that was figured as being the proper way to know the world. To be able to write history and not just recall the past, one had to have a proper alphabet. Amerindians could not write history because they lacked an alphabet and, thus, the capacity to know the world and the past in its true form. Even though Amerindian informants and scribes made a history of the New World possible, writing history and ordering the past was the purview of the European missionaries.

In this way, what Hugh Taylor called the “acts and deeds” of a European oral tradition and legal system were never outside the logic of colonialism even if they were not textual.

While critical of white, settler subjects “discovering” their aboriginal heritage—what aboriginal communities often call “wannabees,” Indigenous scholar Bonita Lawrence (Mi’kmaw) (2004: 13-4; 85) argues that the term “wannabee” is often deployed by status Indians against non-status, Métis peoples and mixed-blood Indians to differentiate these latter peoples from those who are entitled to enjoy everything from full membership in particular bands to speaking for and as aboriginal people. In this way, notions of authenticity come to authorize as opposed to oppose or even frustrate settler colonial categories.

As Lawrence (2004, p. 1) argues, for “Native people individual identity is always being negotiated in relation to collective identity, and in the face of an external, colonizing society. In both Canada and the United States, bodies of law defining and controlling Indianness have for years distorted and disrupted older Indigenous ways of identifying the self in relation not only to collective identity, but to the land.” See also Barker (2006) and Simpson (2007) on the exclusionary politics of Indian status in Canada. Lawrence (2004) argues for the inclusion of “mixed-blood,” non-status aboriginal people within Native communities as a means of challenging the Indian Act and government regulation of status but also of troubling the colonial mentality that continues to inform many Native bands’ own thinking on membership.


Similarly, McKemmish et al (2011, p. 212) argues that archivists must embrace “multiple ways of knowing and archiving, and multiple forms of archival records, including the oral and the written.”

On the importance of Indigenous authority to decolonizing archiving, see Wareham (2002; 2001), McRanor (1997), and McKemmish et al (2011).

Millar may not have provided a description of the rules governing a written documentary tradition because she assumed that the readers of *Archival Science* would be familiar with Canada and B.C.’s European archival tradition.

According to Millar (2006a, p. 333): “McEachern’s decision contradicted the longstanding assumption by Canadian courts that hearsay evidence was untrustworthy since it was third party information that could not be verified. Instead, McEachern permitted the admission of the unwritten oral traditions of First Nations bands or “houses” because, he argued, that information “cannot be proven in any other way.”

Millar (2006a, p. 331) describes British Columbia’s colonial history in this way: “In British Columbia, the relationship between aboriginal and non-aboriginal people has largely been one of wary respect, mutual frustration, and, on both sides, perhaps more tolerance than acceptance. There has never been all-out war, there was no Custer’s last stand, but that doesn’t mean that all has been peace, harmony, and light in aboriginal–non-aboriginal relations”. Millar (2006a, p. 332) goes on to say while “stories of contact and conflict, colonization and imperialism abound,” she is more interested in B.C. as a case study that allows her to explore the “concept of evidence, the nature of archives, and the place of traditional knowledge in the arsenal of a society’s memory” that somehow, for her anyways, stand outside the “stories” of colonial violence and inequality.

For an analysis of the violence of settler colonialism in Canada and how they were carried out those policies, legislation, law and so on, see also Mar & Edmonds (2010), Alfred (2009), Lawrence & Dua
Chapter Three

1 According to Ketelaar (2001, p. 133), archivalization describes “the conscious or unconscious choice (determined by social and cultural factors) to consider something worthy of archiving.” Along similar lines, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995, p. 53) argues that the making of archives involves “a number of selective operations: selection of producers, selection of evidence, selection of themes, selection of procedures – which means, at best the differential ranking and, at worst, the exclusion of some producers, some evidence, some themes, some procedures. Power enters here both obviously and surreptitiously.” Following Ketelaar (2001, p. 132) a little further, it is fitting to say that in this chapter I am after the Eurocentric “tacit narratives” that underwrite etymologies of the word archive.


3 For archivists interested in the difference within archival theory, see Cook (2013), Cook and Schwartz (2002), and Harris (2007).

40 On the illegitimacy of Canadian law and legislation in the face of Aboriginal sovereignty, see Pastnerak (2014).

41 Millar restates Italian archivist Donato Tamble’s (1994, p. 410) question: “Which archives then will there be after writing?” to preface her move to a transcendent postdocumentary society. While Tamble (Ibid, pp.409-411) extends the “archival ‘game’ back before writing and written documents—all the way back to paleolithic period, his notion of writing reiterates the mentality framework by juxtaposing writing to pre-writing “verbal culture, typical of the tribal organization” and also post-writing “machine-yielded and machine readable” records that Tamble posits may resemble pre-writing archival labours more than written archives.

42 While new technologies create challenges and problems for Indigenous groups, Indigenous peoples are adapting digital and online technologies to their uses (Ormond-Parker & Sloggett, 2012). For instance, in developing a digital community archive, the Koorie people faced many challenges in “terms of technology, and defining the socio-technical requirements needed to respectfully represent the cultural protocols of Koorie individuals and communities” (Huebner & Cooper, 2007, p. 21).

43 Phaswane Mpe (2002) notes the overlap between oral modes of transmission and written archives in radio performances in South Africa in which oral poets use and revise scripts and, indeed, prefer to perform for radio as opposed to in public because it allows them to have a script (and not be accused of reading because no one can see them). By placing these new relationships in the fraught political context of post-Apartheid South Africa, the reader must attend to the social relations that underwrite these postliterate uses of records.

44 Looking at the film Bend It Like Beckham (2002), Sara Ahmed (2010) argues that racialized immigrants who complain about the prejudices, exclusions, and racism when they came to England are being characterized as melancholic: that is, the immigrants are unable to let go of past grievances and, thus, unable to accept multicultural Britain. In this way, the racialized immigrant and not Britain’s racism are the problem facing multicultural Britain.

45 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Millar not only calls on Judge McEachern to make her point, but also echoes the judge’s own reasoning for reneging his ruling to include oral histories. For McEachern, the primary problem of including oral histories lies with aboriginal peoples themselves. As opposed to it being the settler’s legal system’s inability to accommodate and negotiate oral histories, McEachern overturns his decision to admit oral histories by arguing there is not only too much of it but that they are too much: aboriginal people are too unruly, their presentations lack the proper decorum, and that its overtly emotional and political nature caused it to lack objectivity (see Perry, 2005). That is, Aboriginal people become the problem when the legitimacy of settler title and entitlement to the land is challenged. Indeed, in Millar’s telling, the reference to Judge McEachern omits that the admission of oral histories was the result of Gitksan and Wet-suwt-en communities’ demand for more than recognition of their culture and, thus, a challenge to the “Court to overcome notions of the superiority of Western culture and its methods of communication, preservation, and legitimation of knowledge” (Ibid, p. 331). McEachern, it would seem, was unwilling to do this.
producing silences. The modern linguistic archival order is no exception to this process of retrieval (the making of archives). The historical dating of words—as with the establishment of ancient origins—is based on the word’s paper trail: dictionaries search texts to trace out the history of a word’s use. Words are undoubtedly spoken long before they appear in print.

Echoing Fanon’s critique of a return to tribal ethnicity, Fredrick Cooper (2007a, p. 257) notes that while African historians have turned to oral histories to counter the “Eurocentrism of the written record” to set “popular memory against elite documents,” the categories of ethnicity that define these historian’s subjects were the product of territorial administration.

French philologist Ernest Renan (1823-1892) claimed that Semitic languages were in a state of “arrested development” (Said, 1979, p. 145).

Trouillot (1995, p. 29) argues that the “production of traces is always also the creation of silences.” "Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance)” (Ibid, p. 26). The modern linguistic archival order is no exception to this process of producing silences.

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4 Schellenberg and Posner are not the only archivists who make this etymological link back to Greece. See Blouin & Rosenberg (2011), Jimerson (2009), and Duranti (1993).
5 Posner (1972a, pp. 92-1) writes: “The historical significance of Greece’s archival developments found its most obvious expression in the fact that it was the Greek language that gave to the Western world the internationally accepted terms for the designation of official documents, for the depositories in which they are kept, and indirectly for the persons who administer them. Moreover, the effectiveness of Greek archival institutions was later recognized outside the country itself.”
6 The historical dating of words—as with the establishment of ancient origins—is based on the word’s paper trail: dictionaries search texts to trace out the history of a word’s use. Words are undoubtedly spoken long before they appear in print.
7 For an examination of Cratylus, see Blank (2011) and Johannes Bronkhorst (2001).
8 Comparative philology became the academic rubric under which the missionaries’ studies of foreign languages were gathered together in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Errington, 2001).
9 See Harris (2007) on the obfuscations of custodial archiving.
10 Like other colonial administrators, Jones took his job in India under the employment of the East India Company so as to secure his fortune so he could return to England and live an independent retirement (Cannon, 2006). Jones died and was buried in Calcutta in 1794.
11 For instance, after spending dozens of pages outlining how Jones employed Indian tutors to learn Sanskrit: the language and its rules, Cannon (2006, p. 244) state when it comes to Jones “discovery,” “[a]pparently no one helped Jones construct his hypothesis.” While “no one” here means without the help of other European scholars, Cannon never considers the various Indian tutors and advisors that pepper Jones’ life and work as meaningful contributors to comparative philology.
12 Jones’ and other orientalists’ dismissal of Indian scholars can be juxtaposed to the amateur historical work of early nineteenth century Major Colin MacKenzie in India who relied heavily on native informants and, according to Nicholas B. Dirks (1993), recognized the importance of Indians in telling their own history when he amassed a staggering collections of historical artifacts: the MacKenzie archive. It is for this reason that Dirks (Ibid, p. 308) argues that “MacKenzie’s historiographical concerns and modes of collecting opened up his archive to voices that were rarely heard.” However, this does not negate the fact that MacKenzie’s archive was collected to save Indian history from the neglect it suffered at the hands of the Indians themselves.
13 Echoing Fanon’s critique of a return to tribal ethnicity, Fredrick Cooper (2007a, p. 257) notes that while African historians have turned to oral histories to counter the “Eurocentrism of the written record” to set “popular memory against elite documents,” the categories of ethnicity that define these historian’s subjects were the product of territorial administration.
14 Cannon (2006, p. 241) defends Jones’ interest in Sanskrit over “Hindustani” and excuses his lack of investment in a Hindi-English dictionary being compiled by surgeon John Gilchrist in 1780s by stating that while Jones loved languages, he preferred “the classical to the vernacular. Sanskrit so fascinated him that there was little time for Hindi.” Cannon also tries to excuse Jones’ own views that colonial Indian subjects were inferior to Europeans by saying such views were an effect of the company he kept. Cannon (2006, p. 260) argues that Jones “still wished for universal liberty for all peoples, of which the Indians were currently incapable” because, quoting Jones: “[f]ew of them have an idea of [liberty]; and those, who have, do not wish it. They must (I deplore the evil, but know the necessity of it) they must be ruled by an absolute power.” Distinguishing Jones opinion from “lingering Western bias,” Cannon (2006, p. 246) argues that Jones opinion was “simply a practical realization of the state of contemporary Indian political capacities.” It is safe to say that Jones’ attachment to Sanskrit expresses the Eurocentric belief that Indians were less developed than Europeans.
17 Sati is the act of a widow burning herself alive on the funeral pyre of her husband. Argued by Brahmans to be an Indian ritual prescribed by Hindu religious texts, the legal dispute between English jurists and Brahman interpreters was whether or not this aspect of Indian tradition had a place in modern India. As such, the legal argument revolved around a distinction between traditional and modern, and between Indian and European values and, thus, whether or not India could be modern.

18 In the case of Sati, Spivak (1988, pp. 296-7) argues that remaining within the framework of a textual-based Indian tradition offers colonial scholars two discursive positions: an Imperial, modernizing position that sees “White men saving brown women from brown men” so that women can become “modern” subjects under male, British rule; or the nativist position that argues “The women actually wanted to die” to fulfill their traditional role as widow. In the nativist position, the true Indian woman’s subjectivity is determined by Brahmanic interpretation of sacred Hindu texts. Similarly, without attending to the silences the critic of modern linguistic science becomes caught between Cannon’s (2006, pp. xvi-xvii, 222-40) defence of Jones that valorizes Britain’s juridical mission furthered through Jones’ linguistic studies, and the nativist perspective that Jones linguistic discovery is based on unsound interpretations of Sanskrit because a non-Indian can never truly understand Sanskrit or interpret India’s ancient texts properly and, thus, that philology cannot properly know India and its past (see Dodson, 2007).

19 Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s argument in Archive Fever (1995, p. 7) that “the violence of the archive itself” is that it “takes place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said memory” (Ibid, p. 11) to read Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Sandhya Shetty and Elizabeth Jane Bellamy (2000) argue that the textualization of Indian laws by Brahmans before and during the colonial regime represents the violence of the archive as it displaced and delegitimized other interpretations of Indian law.

20 Spivak (1985, p. 270) makes a similar point about the existence of the Rani of Simur in colonial archives: “The Rani emerges [in the archives] only when she is needed in the space of imperial production.” Spivak (Ibid, p. 271) goes on: “Caught in the cracks between the production of the archives and indigenous patriarchy, today distanced by the waves of hegemonic ‘feminism,’ there is no ‘real Rani’ to be found.”

21 “Hinglish”—a hybrid of English and South Asian languages—is the most recent example of new lived relationships being produced between languages. On Hinglish, see Sinha & Thakur (2005) and Kachru (2006).

22 Posner (1972a) claims that with the Greek polis, the world divided into Western and Oriental parts. Historian Kostas Vlassopoulos (2007) argues that nineteenth century historians of the Ancient world adopted the Greek polis or city-state to characterize Greek politics and also to distinguish Greece from the Oriental-like Eastern Mediterranean world in which Greece participated. While scholars had compared Greek city states to European ones since the early modern period, Vlassopoulos argues that that it was only with the increasing investment of nineteenth century European scholars in a distinct history of European civilization that studies of the polis came to underwrite claims of an ancient pan-Greek state and identity that distinguished classical Greece from its Oriental influences and Near Eastern neighbours (37). While European scholars disagreed as to whether Greece’s difference from its Eastern neighbours and heritage was due to an inherently Greek civilization expressed in the polis or that the polis gave rise to an un-Oriental Greek civilization inherited by Western Europe—or, indeed, oscillated between the two arguments—the polis, as a term of analysis, became a means of distinguishing the West from East in civilizational terms. As such, from the nineteenth century until the present, the polis became one of the primary means for making Greece the origins of a Western Civilization.

For Posner (1972a, p.91), the Greek polis is at the heart of Greece’s “magnificent civilization,” and something new that made Greece’s social and political structures distinct from the dynastic empires of its Near Eastern neighbours and also its Mesopotamian and Egyptian ancestors. While Posner otherwise marginalizes the influence of Greece on the modern archives, the democratic nature of the polis allows Posner to liken Athens to the United States because both share the democratic tendency to publish lots of documents so as to make the decisions of their governments accessible to their citizens. Interestingly, according to Posner, the central place of the Metroon in relation to other government buildings in the Greek agora is analogous to the place of NARA within Washington’s triangle of Federal buildings.


24 For Derrida, Greece is the beginning of metaphysics: “an ultimate system that can account for the reality of phenomena in the world” (Brothman, 1999, p. 73). According to Brien Brothman (1997, p. 189), in Archive Fever, Derrida interrogates the central predisposition of metaphysics and archives: “namely the
possibility of acts of writing, that is, faithful disposition of the mind’s content onto a durable material medium by a transcription of phoneticized symbols.” In this way, Archive Fever extends Derrida’s project of deconstructing Western metaphysics that privileges “thought, speech and voice,” by making them out to be “authentic, natural, and originary” while consigning “what is commonly called writing to the subordinate status of a servile contrivance, a ‘prosthetic’ device designed to simulate, repeat, and preserve the content of thought and to prolong the sound of speech — a forging, so to speak, of authentic identity, presence, and meaning” (Brothman, 1997, p. 190). Deconstruction works against/in tandem with metatheory by showing how meaning is only a trace leading elsewhere. For Derrida, “deconstruction takes on the never ending ethical responsibility of naming what inevitably remains unnamed in our writing, of eliciting the silenced voicings and concealed meanings that simultaneously dwell within the worlds writings, and yet beyond the limits of the ‘reality’ upon which sovereign, proprietal authors claim to bestow true names” (Brothman, 1999, p. 74).

25 There is not the space here to give a full account of the difference between Saussure’s semiotics and comparative philology. In brief, whereas comparative philology saw each word as containing clues to its development and the history of linguistic development more generally, with the work of Michel Bréal (1832-1915)—founder of modern semantic and teacher of Saussure—words became empty parts of a semantic relationship between signifier and signified (Mitchell, 1991). With semiotics, meaning arose not from the words or the linguistic laws they represented but from the semantic structure; the way signifier and signified were arranged by the author. As opposed to being governed by universal laws, the semantic arrangement transmitted the author’s meaning. Derrida argues that difference does not only arise in the relationship between signifier (words) and signified (objects) but also in the slippage between words. “A word and its meaning turn out to be not a unique, two-sided object, but the product of interwoven relations of differences, one ‘element’ of which exists only in terms of others, in a weave that has no edge or exterior” (Ibid, p. 145). The sameness of the word arises not out of its ability to represent the object but out of its repetition that is, according to Derrida, itself the repetition of differences. That is, while it is the “same” word repeated, every time a word is repeated, the context of the iteration changes.

Thus, for Derrida, meaning “is an effect of this paradoxical quality of sameness and difference, whereby a word always happens to be just the same only different” (Ibid, p. 145). Saussurean linguistics covers over this difference by supposing that there is separation between the material world and ideal or metaphysical realm of meaning (semantic order). Against Saussure, Derrida argues that the materiality of words (objects) is not entirely arbitrary (organized by the semantic structures) because words have materiality: all the “non-phonetic aspects of writing” such as punctuation, spacing, juxtaposing of different texts “which are ‘material’ and yet created effects of meaning” (Ibid, p. 146). For Derrida, Saussure’s mystical separation of material and ideal is a “theological” effect of his linguistic theory (Ibid). While Derrida argues that Western philosophy is built on the privileging of speaking over writing (presence over representation) and, indeed, sets up his grammatology in opposition to this metaphysical metanarrative, Derrida’s grammatology is not a new transcendental law of language but works to show the difference at the heart of what is taken for self-evident and, thus, the instability of what is taken for truth.

26 There is a third interpretation of poststructuralist etymology worth mentioning here even though there is not the space to follow it up. Nancy Struweer (1983, p. 124) argues that etymology was always ideological because they “deal in opportunity…[and] can be exploited as a means of aligning contemporary and past usages in a provocative mode; etymological engagement acts as a tying of social bonds, a tactic of social solidarity.” That is, etymology has always been about pushing one group’s representation of the world. Distinguishing between “classical” and “modernist” (poststructuralist) practices of etymologizing, Struweer argues that while the latter subverts the ideological drive of the former modernist etymologizing refuses to take up the political project of using etymology to advance a more radical position. Instead, Struweer argues, modernist etymologies are hung up on formalist disagreements as opposed to creating links between concrete experiences and social constructs (words). As such, modernist etymologies are unable to create new links between the past and the present and, thus, abdicate the responsibility of creating new social bonds. Attridge (2004) disagrees with Struweer and argues that Derrida’s approach to etymology is political while challenging the linguistic archive—the hard facts of language—upon which etymologies are constructed.

27 For Derrida, Europe is “paleonymic:” it is an old word Derrida is putting to a new purpose, but still a name for something that cannot be divorced from Europe/EU even if it cannot also be reducible to it.

28 Most present day uses of etymology are not playful. Most English-speaking theorists still turn to the OED to gather earlier if not original forms of the word that the scholar believes will give them some purchase on the true meaning of the word. The divided nature of *arkhē* returns us to Derrida’s more general formulation that origins are also always created after the fact (Richards, 2008). For Derrida, the authenticity of an original depends on the copy: on something to supplement and authenticate it. The signature is a key example in Derrida’s writing of what he means by supplemental logic. Just as the authority of the signature is dependent on the countersignature to authenticate it—either a record of your signature against which to check to subsequent signatures, or a witness to testify that you are the person behind your signature—establishing the authenticity of the original (your signature) always requires something outside to authorize it. As Orrells (2010, p. 182) summarizes: “The originary, the first time is always already ‘haunted from the origin’ by the second time, its reproduction, its repetition, which facilitates the very possibility of a memory of the first time, which nevertheless will itself remain merely a *ghostly* (not-present-to-itself) memory. There is quite simply no possibility of an event of a memory as event, without the trace of that event, without the prior possibility of its repetition.” For the relation between the archive of an event and the event, see Bell (2004). As such, a thing is not reducible to itself: to an origin or original, unique state from which its unity derives but is, instead, constituted by a speech act that calls it up at a later date (Richards, 2008). Similarly, while the authority of the ruler depends on their relationship to an origin or founding act—a constitution, revolution, and so on—the origin is also always constituted within the relations of power that govern the speech act that make it the founding act.

30 Even though Freud’s analysis sought out origins of neurosis in an original, traumatic event, Freud also posited that neuroses have retrospective causalities: that “subsequent events may be necessary even to establish the very identity of earlier ones, and the psychic work done by events defined in retrospect can often be understood only when we admit to the power of the complex operation” (Van Zyl, 2002, p. 53). Because neuroses develop in the relationship between first and secondary events and also in relation to the manifestation of symptoms in the present, a traumatic event cannot be reduced to an original moment but, instead, has multiple causes occurring at different times that confound any reduction of the trauma to a linear temporal cause-and-effect relationship. As opposed to clearly laying out a regiment of treatment, then, Freud’s writing and, thus, psychoanalysis’s archive is conflicted: at once desiring to have unmediated access to an original event imagined to be at the root of any neurosis while at the same time mapping out the strangeness of psychic processes that make any such access impossible. As opposed to being able to produce a single theory or concept out of Freud’s archives, psychoanalysis troubles itself and cannot but remain troubled by Freud’s conflicting principles. What appears to be Freud’s concept of the archive: a concept of origins; of the psyche; and of psychoanalysis as a science, fails to become a concept. In Freud “all we have is a notion, an impression, associated with the word” archive (Harris, 2007, p. 42).

31 In *Archive Fever*, as with his other work on hospitality, Derrida is interested in the economy of hosting and the power of guests to make demands on the host. On hospitality, see Derrida & Apel (1998).

32 Despite his focus on a democratic-minded Greece, Posner (1972a, p. 111) points to the slave labour that allowed the *Metroon*—like all of Athens’ other institutions—to work.

33 According to Jasanoff & Nussbaum (1996, pp. 193-4), Bernal’s etymology that traces the Greek word “Athena” back to the Egyptian goddess *Ht Nt*—the paradigmatic argument for the African roots of Greek culture—can no more be supported than to argue that “Athena” comes from any other number of similar meaning words in other languages that can be made to resemble Greek words. According to these authors, without a systematic linguistic archival order, the historical claims Bernal creates through his etymologies are, at best, circumstantial.

34 Even though *arkhē* does not appear to be a loan word, this is not to say that the archive is exclusively “Greek.” According to Calvert Watkins’ (2000, p. 5) *The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, archon* (Athenian magistrate, ruler) comes from the Greek verb *arkhein* that is, itself, “of unknown origin, but showing archaic Indo-European features like *arkh-*.” That is to say, while the root word *arkh-* resembles archaic Indo-European forms, the word *archon* brings with it unknown elements. While the word *archon* may be traced back to *arkh-* through *arkhein*, the genetic link between *arkh-* and *arkhein* can only be suggested. This is, of course, entirely speculation.
Chapter Four

1 Despite changes within the field of history, in this essay history is characterized by the positivist formulation of knowing the past as it really way. As historian David Hanlon (1999, pp. 11-3) argues, history distances the researcher from the past. He calls this the “chill of history.” According to Hanlon, archives are full of records that cannot be chilled, but instead touch the reader. “Such are the power of emotions that lie catalogued, indexed, bundled, and boxed among the chill and cold of the archives of this world” (Ibid, p. 11). In and through archival research libraries, “emotional responses and connections are formed to peoples different in many ways from us, distant in terms of time and place” (Ibid, p. 13). History cannot negate these emotions, only deaden their touch on the researcher.

2 At the risk of over-simplifying the differences between history and memory: history is the concern for how things were while memory forefronts putting past events in the service of the present for numerous reasons. Whereas history has always put the past in the service of the present, memory forefronts and engages this aspect that is otherwise disavowed or downplayed in the writing of history. As memory scholar Barry Schwartz puts it. “Recollection of the past is an active, constructive process, not a simple matter of retrieving information. To remember is to place a part of the past in the service of conceptions and needs of the present” (1982, p. 374, quoted in West, 2002, p. 214). As Kirsten Emiko McAllister (2010a: 7) argues, memory, “as well as the act of writing about memory, operates in a political field of power, desire, denial and struggle, something that not all historical scholars recognize as a valid area of inquiry.”

3 On being overwhelmed by the things that touch us, see Stallybrass (1993; 1998).

4 The choice of the term “memory-work” to describe what is going on in the archives is meant to highlight the labour of remembering with records: the work of reading, flipping through folders, and the emotions and muscles employed in being in the archives. As a process of remembering: of re-encountering what is past but lingers in our memories, memory-work is an encounter that is always the act of encountering again moments when we were with others—moments when we were being pulled outside ourselves—because these moments haunt us and, thus, demand that we return to them and encounter them again differently to make peace with them. Drawing on Erving Goffman, Sara Ahmed argues (2000, p. 189n.8) that memory-work “can be thought of in terms of returning to such ‘unsettling encounters’…when one is faced by others (especially others that have a relationship to the law such as parents, teachers or the police) in such a way that one is ‘moved from one’s place.’” It is this sociality of remembering—of being with others and things that haunt and unsettle—that encapsulates memory-work.

5 Memory-work is being carried out in alternative archives, community centres and other sites of memorialization. See McEwan (2003) and McAllister (2010a).

6 To read the official records pertaining to the internment and deportation of Japanese-Canadians by the federal government during World War II, Kirsten Emiko McAllister, says that visiting “the archives is a strange experience, somewhat like a pilgrimage into the catacombs of what was once terrifying power” (2010a: 59). Finding documents meant McAllister has to adopt the government’s language of “the Japanese problem” and the racial language of “Japanese dissent.” (Ibid). Concerning the use of archives by aboriginal people in Canada, archivists Mary Ann Pylypchuk (1991-2, p. 122) notes, that the “lives of Indians have been excessively regulated by the federal government. Placing their records in a government archives would make them dependent on yet another non-native institution.” This continued dependency can be discomforting. Malea Powell similarly talks of her experience of being an Indian in colonial archives: “As I sat there and thought about empire, I started to get very cold – felt myself grow puny and insignificant in the face of imperialism and shivered at the impossibility of it all – me, an Indian, a mixed-blood, here in this odd colonial space” (quoted in Rawson 2009, p. 128). In Australia, a number of reports point out the re-traumatization of Indigenous scholars who work in archives to build identities, seek justice and so on. For a list of these reports see McKemmish and Piggott (2013).

7 Janke and Iacovino (2012, p. 160) argue that these feelings of discomfort in the archives are heightened in cases where communities do not have control over their records. Another aspect is to consider the feelings of being overwhelmed when the researcher is confronted with what they perceive as being their own lack of skills and resources—money and emotional—needed to carry out their research. Indigenous scholar and activist Lynn Gehl (2000) outlines the skills she developed to assemble from different archives and sources the right documents to prove her Indian heritage, and the often exhausting emotional labour of this work that often left her discouraged. Gehl (Ibid, p. 68) writes: “It is an enormous task. Individuals require time,
money, stamina and great determination to fulfill the Registrar's requirements. Many of Canada’s Aboriginal people are poor, illiterate, or unemployed as a result of the forced assimilation process.”
8 “Apologies” here covers a variety of acknowledgements by the Canadian government and other organizations of wrongs committed even if the government does not in so many words apologize. While the Canadian government does not apologize in the Redress Agreement but, instead, at the behest of the Redress movement itself, acknowledges the wrongs they committed, I have included it under the category of apology primarily because it is characterized as an apology by many commentators (Miyagawa, 2011; James, 2008).
12 The distinction between official and other types of apologies is important as official apologies are more likely to be accompanied with compensation and other reconciliation processes. Harper’s 2008 apology to the Indian-Canadian community in Surrey British Columbia for the 1914 “Komagata Maru incident” was seen by many as of less value because it was not an official apology. [CBC August 3, 2008, “Harper apologizes in B.C. for 1914 Komagata Maru incident.” http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/harper-apologizes-in-b-c-for-1914-komagata-maru-incident-1.747120 (Accessed July 2014)]. See also Miyagawa (2011) and James (2008). And, in the case of the two IRS apologies, PM Steven Harper’s 2008 apology for the IRS was seen as more substantive than the previous Statement of Reconciliation made in 1998 by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government because Harper’s was made in parliament. As well, unlike the Liberals who limited their apology to those who suffered sexual and physical abuse as IRS students, Harper both apologized for all harm suffered by IRS students, their descendents and Aboriginal communities, and committed to a Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) process. See Matt James (2008, pp. 140-1) on the lack of moral authority of 1998 apology and its status as a “quasi-apology.” See Regan (2010) and Cornthassel & Holder (2008) comparisons of these IRS apologies.
13 There have been many apologies. A few of note: Two Australian Prime Ministers have apologized to Aboriginal populations. Prime Minister John Howard made a personal apology in 1998 and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd made an official apology in 2008 for the Australian government’s role throughout the twentieth century in removing aboriginal children from their families and communities. Queen Elizabeth II and New Zealand Prime Minister apologized to the Maori peoples in 1995. Germany apologized to Namibia for colonial rule in 2004. Belgium apologized to the people of the Congo for the 1961 assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 2002. U.S. President Bill Clinton apologized in 1993 to the peoples of Hawaii for violating their sovereignty.
14 Harper’s apology (2008) states: “Today, we recognize that this policy of assimilation was wrong, has caused great harm, and has no place in our country.”
15 Because settler colonial violence creates differential settler subjects: white “Canadian” subjects and hyphenated settlers of colours, the categories of victim and perpetrator are never as clear cut as they appear even as such violence divides the nation between Indigenous and settler communities.
16 In the statement of apology for IRS, Harper (2008) recognizes the importance of an apology for healing: “The government recognizes that the absence of an apology has been an impediment to healing and reconciliation.” Cheryl McEwan (2003, p. 740), states: “Individuals and nations are seeking to overcome their traumatic legacies through the establishment of historical truth and the creation of collective memory.”
17 As Natalie A. Chambers (2009, p. 287) states: “The process of unsettling ourselves in truth and reconciliation may stir up powerful negative emotions such as resistance, defensiveness, and denial and feelings of paralysis. However, by practicing self-acceptance and being patient with the process, these emotions may shift to feelings of anger, then grief and sadness, as we come to understand and see for ourselves how colonization is experienced as cultural genocide by Indigenous peoples. When we feel a
sense of profound loss, then, and only then, our hearts may be at a place where we can authentically participate in truth and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.”

18 Referring to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Deleuzian translator and scholar Brian Massumi, Eric Shouse (2005) argues that it is important not to confuse feelings, emotions and affects. According to Shouse, affect “is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act.” Unlike feelings, which are sensations that have “been checked against previous experiences and labeled” and, thus, are personal in that it has a biography or previous references upon which to interpret these sensations, “affect always precedes will and consciousness” and “is a non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and unstructured potential” (Shouse, 2005). Emotions are “the projection/display of a feeling” and, thus, social in that others are meant to understand and accept that you are feeling a particular way (Shouse, 2005).

By being interested in feelings and emotions and not specifically the intensities open up bodies, the affective economies I am interested in are those that are socially understood: those intensities that have been given shape and form through language. While I could easily have called what I was looking at emotive economies, economies of feelings, or as Stoler (2009) does, to talk of sentiments, I have chosen to talk about “affective economies” because of the indeterminate way feelings, emotions and desires manifest and change. That is, while focusing on how particular feeling, emotions and desires are produced and solidified, I am interested in how emotions, feelings and desires oscillate within registers (sad, love, happy, and so on) at different intensities (the move between indifference to being overwhelming). As such, I am interested in conditions of these circulations: particular how are they limited and extended by discourses.

19 As Ahmed (2004a, pp. 43-4) shows, love for the Aryan nation is caught up in hate for immigrants and fear of black bodies.

20 Berlant (2002, p. 75) calls this a “stupid form of optimism” in which people come to believe the promises made to them by society that sustains investments in the nation as the source of good feelings/resolution of violence (quoted Ahmed, 2004a, p. 196).

21 Mignolo borrows this distinction from Ann McClintock (1992, pp. 88-9).

22 There are, of course, important differences between Canada and Australia’s multicultural policies. In Australia, Aboriginal populations fall under the rubric of that country’s multicultural policy while in Canada they fall under the rubric of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs and, thus, sit outside official multicultural policy and funding. Despite these differences, and because multiculturalism is often used to refer to an openness to all differences, the line between being within and outside multiculturalism is blurry even if Aboriginal people are constantly reminded of their exclusion. While aboriginal people in Canada do not fall under multicultural policy, they are still asked to be “authentic.” Lawrence (2004) and Thobani (2007) argue that aboriginal people are asked to live in an imagined “precontact” state by the law to be seen to be legitimately (authentically) aboriginal. For differences between Aboriginal and Canadian legal frameworks for dealing with Aboriginal people, see Povinelli (2002) and Iacovino (2010).

23 Or, as Thobani (2007: 29) puts it, “underneath the sanitized garb of a postmodern, multiracial, multiethnic ‘tolerant’ Canada, beats the heart of a stubbornly colonial national-formation, sharing a common imaginary with other white settler societies.” Thobani adds that even “the idea of Aboriginal rights reconfirms the authority of a sovereign settler state with the power to determine the nature, the form, and, most importantly, the extent of the rights of Aboriginal peoples” (Ibid. p. 40).

24 Richard Day (2000) argues that within Canadian multicultural discourses diversity is figured as being introduced into Canada by non-British and Non-French (i.e.: non-white), hyphenated and Indigenous communities. As such, multiculturalism is necessary only because there are non-white “cultures” that must be accommodated in some way. See also Ahmed (2007) on the way in which affirmative action-style diversity policies creates diversity as the property of people of colour.

25 Official multiculturalism is also seen as an economic strategy to diversify and internationalize Canada’s economy by drawing on the transnational affiliation of multicultural Canadians (Mackey, 2002). In this way, Australians cannot afford to be intolerant of different cultures because it will both undo them as liberal subjects and threaten their livelihoods (Povinelli, 2002).

26 As Barkan (2000, p. xxxix) argues, the liberal West embraces “tradition but only its liberal guise, as long as it is inoffensive, is open-minded, and can accommodate pluralism.” Given the racial ambivalence of colonial multiculturalism, tradition will always be, as Homi Bhabha argued (1994, p. 115), “white but not quite,” and, thus, always fail to be liberal enough because being liberal enough would make the traditional
other white and destroy the colonial difference that governs the relationship between modern and traditional. As Thobani (2007, p. 4) state: “In the [Canadian] national imaginary, Indians are presented as making impossible and unending demands for special treatment in their claims to land and state funds and to hunting, fishing, and logging the nations fast-depleting resources. Immigrants are made responsible for importing ‘their’ backward cultural practices in the country…. along with their diseases…. their ancient murderous hatreds…. and their criminal gangs…. More general representations of the nations Others obviously also exist, but on the condition that their distinctive racialized experiences are denied and the political claims arising from such experiences are cheerfully relinquished in their bid to claim a new hyphenated Canadian identity as beneficiaries of the nation’s largesse.”

27 The PMO’s office explained that Harper’s 2009 comments were meant to distinguish Canada from other “great powers” that have colonized other countries and that “prime minister stands behind his apology that was made last year ‘to IRS survivors. See Aaron Wherry (Oct 1, 2009) MacLean’s. http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/what-he-was-talking-about-when-he-talked-about-colonialism/ (Accessed July 2014).

28 Comments in Canada’s Conservative national newspaper the National Post more often than not call on the country to let go of past and move on. Letters to the editors of this paper continue to defend the selfless acts of settlers who, as they argue, also built hospitals and the like, or work to contextualize the violence in IRS so as to make it appear less-exceptional of the times (Paul Russell: Could it be that residential schools weren’t so bad? (January 11, 2014) http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/01/11/paul-russell-could-it-be-that-residential-schools-werent-so-bad?_federated=1 (Accessed July 2014); “Sarah Daitch: Exposing the dark legacy of residential schools” (Jan 20, 2014). http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/01/20/sarah-daitch-exposing-the-dark-legacy-of-residential-schools/ (Accessed July 2014). These opinions and feelings pre-date the official apology.

29 Apologizers often feel hurt by others who do not think an apology was necessary or compensation useful. Members of the Liberal Members of Parliament expressed feeling hurt by Conservative Member of Parliament Pierre Poilievre’s comments about the lack of work ethic among Aboriginals and the corruption of Band Chiefs hours before the PM apologized. Poilievre then apologized for his insensitive comments. See CBC (June 12, 2008) “Conservative MP apologizes for ‘hurtful’ comments on aboriginal people.” http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/conservative-mp-apologizes-for-hurtful-comments-on-aboriginal-people-1.712106 (Accessed July 2014).

30 Paulette Regan (2010) maps out another empathetic relationship between TRC adjudicators and survivors that she calls colonial forms of empathy. Examining the way government adjudicators heard the testimonies of former students of Canada’s IRS as part of the TRC process, Regan argues that while government officials may have personally empathized with aboriginal claimants, in their roll as public officials they attempted to remain neutral. Organizing their sentiments according to a impersonal notion of empathy: an empathy belonging to no one, adjudicators dismissed or diminished Indigenous claims if they appeared too emotional. Hearing and also disregarding the emotional testimony of TRC claimants continues colonial violence by reiterating the Cartesian mind-body dualism and Enlightenment models of self-mastery as the subordination of the passions to reason in public life.

31 In the case of Australia, Gooder & Jacob (2000) map out how settler melancholia has led settlers to conjure up and identify with an imaginary original indigene that is lost to both them and contemporary Indigenous communities, and also more truly Indigenous than the Indigenous subjects to whom settlers apologized. Because Australian Aboriginal communities must show that they continue to practice pre-colonial “traditional” cultural customs unchanged by European culture, identifying with this imaginary indigene authorized settler judges of the contrites state to deny Aboriginal land claims processes because these judges felt claimants failed to meet the definition of “traditional” cultural customs.

32 In the archives, genealogical research has become a productive form of private memory-work in which white settlers become marginalized others by “discovering” their diverse backgrounds. As the result of their mixed genealogical heritage, white settlers come to identify with their true “doubled” self, and takes on the pain of the aggrieved other. In this doubled position, the settler can negate their role in settler colonial violence because they see themselves as the heirs of the victims even if they enjoy a social and economic affluence not available to indigenous and non-white hyphenated subjects. Eva MacKey (2002, pp. 97-8) documents settler subjects acting out their documented and imagined aboriginal heritage at multicultural festivals and ceremonies. In her work on co-habitations and other relationships between British men and Indian women in colonial India, historian Durba Ghosh (2005, pp. 30-1) recalls how she encountered white, metropolitan genealogical researchers in the archives who were excited to share with her their mixed-blood
(Indian and British) ancestry. This “cosmopolitan identity” as Ghosh called it gave these patrons a claim to a subject position that made them more than simply the heirs of British oppression because they were also heirs of the oppressed. In this doubled position, these subjects imagined themselves as inhabiting a place outside the racist politics of contemporary British immigration politics and foreign policies and, thus, not answerable to the demands from marginalized communities for justice because they are also one of them.

Zionists who deploy the Holocaust to authorize the genocidal military campaign by the state of Israel and Israeli settlers against Palestinians are represented as the paradigmatic example of the politics of victimhood. Victimhood can manifest in many other ways. Dionne Brand, in her book What We All Long For (2005: 4), writes about the immigrant, first and second generation Canadians living in ethnic neighbourhoods in Toronto who willfully disregard the contentious politics surrounding the Native (Ojibway) land they live on because “it could be that what they know hurts them already, and what if they found out something even more damaging? These are the people who are used to the earth beneath them shifting, and they all want it to stop—and if that means they must pretend to know nothing, well, that’s the sacrifice they make.”

As Rinaldo Walcott (2011, p. 346) argues: “Reconciliation does not ask us to rethink where we are; it asks us to accept the present as an accumulation of injuries for which apologies must suffice as the entry into the flawed ecocidal, genocidal, anti-human, late-modern world still premised on Europe’s partial conception of the human as the only option for being human in this world. Reconciliation might provide us a view towards new and, or more, hopeful human relations, but it does not allow us to seriously grapple with the brutalities that have brought us together in these new geo-political zones and their multiple disadvantaged relations of Europe’s invented Others.”

As George Elliott Clarke (2011, p. 404) argues, “no African-Canadian community may properly thrive until we have understood and embraced the Indigenous People and their campaigns for justice, and that we champion these struggles as our very own” To unsettle settlers of colour, Robinder Kaur Sehdev (2011, p. 265) argues: “We [people of colour] must also recognize our implication in colonial processes even while they deeply (and detrimentally) affect us.”

Concerning the decolonization of the Canadian justice system, Thobani (2007, pp. 63-4) argues that: “Transforming itself in accommodation to Aboriginal sovereignty remains the real task and test of Canadian justice.” If settler allies must “enter willingly into a more vulnerable, unsettling space of not knowing as we listen to Indigenous testimonies;” a space that “enables Indigenous people to draw upon their own history, law and peacemaking as they see fit.” to work with Indigenous communities, such spaces are not the product of individual chance but require “substantive changes to existing economic structures, political institutions and legal systems” (Regan, 2010, pp. 41, 175).

Alfred (2009, p. 183) wants restitution not reconciliation: “Restitution, as a broad goal, involves demanding the return of what was stolen, accepting reparations (either land, material, or monetary recompense) for what cannot be returned, and forging a new socio-political relationship based on Canadians’ admission of wrongdoing and acceptance of the responsibility and obligation to engage Indigenous peoples in a restitution-reconciliation peace-building process.”

Chapter Five

Figuring out what memory means, and how archives as memory institutions differ from earlier archival missions and practices, has become part of how archivists think about and frame what they do and what they should do (Craig, 2002). This figuring out has not made things more clear. Even as archivists juxtapose the work of memory to that of history, the division remains blurry at best with memory’s archivist’s using and recycling the terms used by history’s archivists.

Archivists both in favour of the turn to memory as a framework and also those critical of this turn to memory compare and it to history. For those in favour of this turn to memory, see Brothman (2001) and Greene (2003-2004). For those critical of the turn to memory, see Blouin & Rosenberg (2011) and Lowenthal (2007).

The custodial paradigm is tied up in positivist frameworks of knowledge production that goes back to nineteenth century sociological and historiographical theories of Auguste Comte and Leopold van Ranke. Positivism is a social science research methodology posits that through an objective relationship between a researcher and a discrete object of study the true nature of an object can be known. True nature, here, implies coming to know an object according to the natural laws that govern an object: laws knowable only through objective, scientific investigation. As the revealer of natural laws, the positivist scientist does not
impose an interpretation on the object but, instead, merely describes the causes that delimit what a thing is. Indeed, within a positivist framework the subject exists outside the world they want to know. Maintaining an objective distance from the world, then, means the researcher comes to know their object of study without changing it. Maintaining this objective distance is essential as the stakes for research is set as nothing less than the possibility of creating a better future (Harris, 2007). Caught up in investments in historical progress, positivism pins the act of creating a better future on the act of studying a world that is outside and separate from the subject.

4 As Nesmith (2005, p. 262) puts it: “Archiving, as the multifaceted process of making memories by performing remembered or otherwise recorded acts, transmitting such accounts over time and space, organizing, interpreting, forgetting, and even destroying them, produces constructions of some prior activity or condition.” See also: McIntosh (1998). Harris (2007), Cook (1997a), Nesmith (2002). Ketelaar (1999; 2001), and Brothman (1991).

5 On the production identities through archives, see Schwartz (1995), Brothman (2001), Cook (2013), and Nora (1989). International organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) International Council on Archives (ICA), the international governing body and funder of archives and archival initiatives amongst member nations, promotes both the evidentiary and memory mandates of archives although “memory” conditions what is understood as evidence. The ICA states: “Archives constitute the memory of nations and societies, shape their identity, and are a cornerstone of the information society. By providing evidence of human actions and transactions, archives support administration and underlie the rights of individuals, organisations and states. By guaranteeing citizens’ rights of access to official information and to knowledge of their history, archives are fundamental to identity, democracy, accountability and good governance” (“ICA Mission, Aim and Objectives” http://www.ica.org/124/our-aims/mission-aim-and-objectives.html, Accessed July 2014).

6 On the archival community’s move away from history and being handmaidens of history, see Millar (1999), Cook (1984-5; 2013), and Dodds (1983-4). If, as Hermann Rumschöttel (2001) argues, that the development of a unique archival profession is largely a post-World War II project, memory extends these efforts by distancing archivists from history. Indeed, the turn to the language of memory and the concern for identity continues the move away from history by Canadian archivists in the 1970s and 1980s who increasingly defined the work of archiving within “distinctive administrative, technical, legal, and often seemingly contemporary, rather than historical, concerns” (Nesmith, 2004, p. 9).

7 Taylor sits on the inside edge of the what Laurajane Smith (2006) calls “authorized heritage discourse” that has deep roots in nineteenth century European conservation movements and which gained ground starting in the 1970s; particularly after the UNESCO adopted the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage in 1972 that transformed heritage into the technical realm of management and conservation. Authorized heritage discourse focuses on “aesthetically pleasing material objects, sites, places and/or landscapes that current generations ‘must’ care for, protect and revere so that they may be passed to nebulous future generations for their ‘education’, and to forge a sense of common identity passed on the past” (Smith, 2006, p. 29). That is, the “heritage” object or place provides the viewer with the sense of belonging to a historically viable community. Because of the nationalist organization of world cultures, and because the nation-state has been a—if not the—primary force in attracting people to their past, the identity that most heritage discourses produce are national in scope. Because Taylor is concerned with archival records as heritage objects: objects that contain or convey some concrete sense of “our” past outside of interpretation, his essay moves archivists to become authorized and authoritative heritage works in the archival realm of heritage. However, by focusing on the processes by which heritage must be developed, there is a critical distance from the authorized heritage discourses that moves Taylor, as I said above, to what can be called these discourses inside edge.

8 People may become attached to the materiality of records: the records’ feel; smell; and tangibility, as much as the information they contain (O’Toole, 1993). Rekrut (2005) looks at the materiality of records: the paper and whatnot they are printed on, which may contribute to the record accruing spiritual and historical significance. As opposed to seeing how emotional attachments are being reformed in the digital age, many researchers and archivists mourn the loss of the record’s materiality as records become digitized or are “digital-born.”

9 Along these lines, archivist Doug Rimmer (2010) at Library and Archives Canada (LAC) states that: “Documenting the darkest or most complex pages from history, such as the experience of Japanese immigrants on Canadian soil during the Second World War, is the responsibility of memory institutions.”
On this point, particularly see Bastian (2003; 2013).

On the emotional economy of history’s archives, see Blouin & Rosenberg (2011, pp. 24-28). David Hanlon (1999) argues that even though history distances the researcher from the past: what he calls the “chill of history,” history’s archives are full of records that touch the reader. History cannot negate these emotions, only deaden their touch on the researcher.

The relative emotionlessness of history’s archive is often espoused by historians like Hugh Taylor who argues that the postliterate, synaesthetic electronic age is a break from the depersonalizing literate age, and postmodern archivists who assert that “postmodernity” is a mode of being coming after modernity (Heald, 1996; Cook, 2001b). As Cook (Cook 2001b, p. 24) writes: “Passion, imagination, sexuality, artistic perception, right-brain intuition – the irrational and the subjective – all these are integral to the human soul, and yet all were relatively absent from the left-brain scientific rationalism that animated the Enlightenment-based metanarratives” of modern thinking and archiving. In such readings, being more emotive or being attuned the emotions is seen as being outside of or in opposition to modern archiving.

Interestingly, the division between a rational public sphere and emotional private realms leads scholars to continue to assume that public records were the manifestation of reasoned discourse while private records were the home of intimate knowledge and relations. As such, reading someone’s private records continues to be imagined as gaining access to the “private” person: often seen as the authentic person because they were no longer performing their public role. As well, the distinction between reasoned argument and (overly) emotional responses still shapes archival discourses such that rational, analytic and intellectual interpretations are not only distinguished from emotional interpretations but also preferred. In particular, Dodds (1983-4, p. 29) disparagement of the arguments between archivist Edward Laine and historian Donald Avery as being too personal such that, it appeared to a “number of [Archivaria] readers, [that] judgement seemed to have been totally suspended.”

Stoler (2009, p. 278) is interested in the way the “politics of empire bleeds into the texture of the personal and then, as if too present, is carefully washed out.” Stoler tries to unpack the way the separation of public and private spheres underlying modern imperial politics has led to a “cultivated ignorance” that creates the conditions for disregarding the way colonialism informs intimate and personal relations.

See Helen Freshwater (2003) on how historians organized their passions while constructing archives as objects of desire as well as sites of fantasies. See Burton (2003a) concerning the relationship between the discipline of history and official archives within the modern, colonial world, and the diminishment and dismissal of feminized memory because of this relationship.

Richard J. Cox (2008) states that archivists and researchers are caught up in the “romance of the document,” there are few gestures towards tackling the affective work of archiving by archivists. James O’Toole (2002) signals to the emotional economies of record making and record keeping but does not take it up. Indeed, even though Cox (2008, p. 64) states that the emotional aspects of records are a “powerful means for understanding why our records are so important in society,” Cox is more concerned with how archivists are unable to have the time to deal with the emotional aspects of records because they are overwhelmed by the sheer volume of records that need processing than he is interested in consider what is at stake for archivists if they make the emotional elements of records a element of a appraisal. Perhaps the most substantive take up of the emotional aspects archiving was K.J. Rawson’s (2009) examination of the “archival logics” of access to archives created by archivists. Rawson (2009, p. 140) argues that what a “researcher experiences, be it satisfaction, shame, or any other emotion, is a product of both that researcher’s approach to the past and the archival logics that design the archival experience.”

In Canada, this work notably occurred in the National Archives with the creation of the land-claims process after 1969 when the Federal government allocated millions of dollars to facilitate research (Morrison 1979-80; LAC RG 37 vol. 489). See Lindsay (2011) on the role of British Colombia’s Provincial archivist Willard E. Ireland in advancing Aboriginal rights and titles in the Regina v. White and Bob (1965), and Calder v. The Attorney General of British Columbia (1973) and the appeal processes following these rulings. Archivists have also had to meet the needs of Aboriginal researchers looking for records of their ancestor’s band memberships after Bill C-31 (1985) amended the Indian Act to allow “children, including their descendants, born prior to 1985 to an Indian man or an Indian woman regardless of who they married” to claim status (Gehl, 2000, p. 68).

Commenting on the absence within archival literature on the spiritual and the emotive aspects of archives, archivist Anne Gilliland (2010, p. 340) notes that the “near-void in contemporary archival discourse would suggest that somewhere along the way, as archives became “modern,” they lost their
connection to the spiritual and that their focus on the bureaucratic record and on reasoning and evidence, together with the rationalization of archival practices, also downplayed the emotional.” However, Gilliland argues that “because of substantial evidence of trauma caused by archives and records that has emerged through events such as truth and reconciliation commissions, and in part because of increased awareness of alternate constructions of archives in indigenous and other non-Western settings,” archivists are beginning to take up these matters (Ibid).

19 As it concerns Aboriginal documentary heritage in Canada, Mary Ann Pylypchuk (1991-2, pp. 122-3) argues that archivists “must respect the organic nature of the aboriginal heritage and the traditional procedures of record creation and selection.” McRanor (1997) argues that to protect the integrity of the documents within Aboriginal notions of reliability entails understanding Aboriginal processes of ensuring reliability, recognizing obligations to Aboriginal people as owners of the intellectual and cultural property it contains, and including Aboriginal people in the preservation of materials. In Australia these claims are based on what Janke (1999, p. xvii) calls “Indigenous Heritage Rights.” Indigenous Heritage Rights include “participant rights” that extend to aboriginal subjects as subjects of the records and not just author of the records (Iacovino, 2010). As Janke (1999, p. 47) argues: “The right to ensure that any means of protecting Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property is premised on the principle of self-determination, which includes the right and duty of Indigenous peoples to maintain and develop their own cultures and knowledge systems and forms of social organization.” In the U.S., Allison Boucher Krebs (2012, p. 187) argues that “Indigenous peoples have both rights to as well as responsibilities for Indigenous knowledge in all its manifestations.” Mick Gooda (2012) argues that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008) creates a baseline of rights for Aboriginal people that nation-states signatories must meet: self-determination; participation in decision-making processes; free, prior and informed consent; re-setting relationships between indigenous and government; and Cultural rights.

20 In Canada, the sovereign rights of Aboriginal people are recognized in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and individual treaties. Aboriginal rights are enshrined in Canada’s Constitution (Section 35). On a critique of Aboriginal rights, see Thobani (2007).


23 While Tom Nesmith (2005) calls on archivists to examine the emotional dimensions archives inspire, and Cook & Schwartz (2002, p. 185) note that archivists need to consider how archival performances “involves the whole person, all the senses, all the emotions, memory, a sense of presence, co-ordination of the mind and body,” neither take up the affective relations of archiving generally or postmodern archiving in particular.

24 McKemmish et al (2011, p. 220) argue that what they call a reconciled methodology to critically evaluate archives requires archivists work with others. For these authors, “reconciliation involves a re-conceptualisation of the ‘archive’, amongst other things, a recognition and acknowledgement of mutual rights in records, the development of frameworks for the respectful coexistence of Indigenous and non-Indigenous records, and exploration of the concept of a community or individual as an archive.”

25 Harris (2007, pp. 46-51), after Derrida, calls this seeing anew: “seeing in blindness” and a mode of seeing that troubles the overlapping binaries that conflate knowing with sight (shedding light) and lack of knowledge with blindness (being in darkness). As abstract or even defeatist as “unknowable” sounds, Ahmed (2000, p. 73) notes that the “unknowable is a relation to what is already assumed to be known: it is hence not an absolute. The unknowable is a limit that pushes to the boundary of the historical and ontological: the ways of being in the world in which being-ness is constituted by the worldliness of the world” (Ibid). In other words, there is no unknowable being without “worldly beings who demand to know” (Ibid).

26 Despite the notion of the discrete self conjured by metaphysics, for Harris and Derrida, there is no hard and fast division between self and other. The Other is not outside the Self but, instead, “the Other is the condition of the One [Self]” (Derrida, 1995, p. 79).

27 On a radical, unlimited hospitality, see Derrida & Apel (1998).

28 Traced back to what archivist Douglas Brymner, in 1882, called, a “Noble Dream” that involved supplementing the lack of official records produced by Canadian statesmen by collecting a variety of sources: both official and unofficial, to fill Canada’s dominion archives and create a documentary base
from which historians could write a definitively Canadian history by (Wilson, 1983). While unofficial
guiding principle before the National Archives (1988-2004) made Total Archives a part of its mandate,
Canadian archivists—particularly those employed by the Public or National Archives, worked to acquire
government and private records in a variety of media so as to represent as diverse a picture of Canadian
society as possible. (Cook, 1979-80; 2001b; 2005; 2007; Millar, 1998; 1999). Total Archives has been
differently understood by archivists and used to legitimate varying and often conflicting archiving projects,
especially since its resurgence in the 1970s. With ambivalence towards earlier iterations of a monolithic
Canadian mandate, in its current manifestation Total Archives is equated with an obligation to collect a
diverse type of media from diverse communities so as to represent society as a whole (Millar, 1998). As an
expression of society, Total Archives is equated with the growing accountability of archives reflected in the
move to archiving governance. As such, for Cook anyways, welcoming and respecting the “Other” comes
as the outgrowth of the “total archives approach” that has always focused on more than just the “powerful
interest groups of either users or creators, or the state” (1997a, p. 34). In this way, Total Archive,
Multiculturalism and postmodern overlap until they are almost synonymous in Cook’s writings.

29 Canadian archivist Edward Laine (1980) is one of the few archivists to critically take up Canadian
multicultural policy. Laine’s complaint is that multiculturalism is “straight-jacketed” by bilingualism. Laine
(1980, p. 226) acknowledges that while it has failed to meet some of its objectives, “the concept of official
multiculturalism…has succeeded in profoundly altering the way Canadians now perceive themselves, their
society and historical past.” However, Laine’s critique is that such a straight-jacketed framework does not
encourage scholars of Canada’s multicultural—non-English and non-French—groups to study them using
argues that “Western society is increasingly organized around the consumption of signs, requiring the
commodification of both subjects and objects of culture. We are working now at a time of conjunction
between consumer, media, and information society.” The monetization of the value of the archive that must
increasingly justify its existence by showing it is well used, should push archivists to consider how the
work of the effects of representation of the past “in present-day commodified technoculture” (Ibid, p. 17).

30 For example, Ketelaar (2005, p. 54) argues that: “The common past, sustained through time into the
present, is what gives continuity, cohesion and coherence to a community.” A marginalized community’s
common past can only be there in the record, if the communities themselves are involved in the archiving
groups in the past and the present can make them more visible in different areas of society and can facilitate
their participation in discussions concerning themselves and their interests in a society which has
marginalized them for many hundreds of years. In modern society, the archive should be one of the basic
parts of a working democracy, and it should provide reliability also for minorities and marginalized
groups.”

31 Wallot (1991) argues that houses of memory are more important than ever because information and
communication technologies have not only uprooted people but also created a sense of rootlessness. In this
world of “superficiality and ‘instant’ everything” the “irretrievable loss of precious historical
documentation results in gaps in the collective memory of Canadians, thus in a sense of dislocation and
uncertainty” (Ibid, p. 282). In his role as Canada’s National Archivist, it is of little surprise that identity for
Wallot is national in scope. Indeed, one can read Wallot’s call to reinvest in Canada’s houses of memory as
driven by what Canada’s sense of self was being threatened by the transnationalization of Canadian businesses, the
Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, Quebec Separatism and re-writing Canada’s history to reflect its
multicultural image while maintaining Canada’s European roots. Wallot’s piece accompanies numerous
projects to re-instill in Canadians a sense of being Canadian at a time when pluralist, social and cultural
histories were fracturing the monolithic narrative of Canada to a Canada from a Quebec, First Nation and
“multicultural” perspective (West, 2002). Collective memory was seen by elite cultural produces like
Wallot as the glue needed to keep everything together. Postmodern archivists more or less extend Wallot’s
argument but also challenge its national limits. Echoing Wallot’s concern about the problems of an
“accelerating presenting,” Cook argues that houses of memory are institutions “citizens can use to open
doors to the personal and societal well-being that comes from experiencing continuity with the past, from a
sense of roots, of belonging, of forming various identities” (Cook, 1994, p. 181; 1997b; 2007) Carter
(2006) and Ketelaar (2005) also argue that collective identities produced through archives will provide
rootedness in an increasingly rootless world.
Also see Langton (2001) for the argument that British Sovereignty in Australia neither negated Aboriginal for a reading of Indigenous sovereignty as a limit on the authority of settler political and legal framework.

Indian Affairs before it. For an understanding of how Canada’s Constitution admits Indigenous legal heart.” While p

status Indians, it seems the name change has changed little about what Bannerji called Canada’s “colonial appeal of the superior court’s decision that Métis and non-

the way the Conservative government dismissed the “Idle No More” movement and the government’s

name was meant to better reflect the work of the department that also deals with Inuit and Métis—and, therefore, more than just “Indian”—affairs and use a less colonizing name, the relationship of the government to Band councils or aboriginal communities is no more respectful than before. Indeed, given the way the Conservative government dismissed the “Idle No More” movement and the government’s appeal of the superior court’s decision that Métis and non-status Indians qualify for all “benefits” owed full status Indians, it seems the name change has changed little about what Bannerji called Canada’s “colonial heart.” While providing the settler nation with good feelings, Aboriginal Affairs is no more robust than Indian Affairs before it. For an understanding of how Canada’s Constitution admits Indigenous legal authorities and concepts within a common law tradition, see Burrows (2002; 2010). See Pasternak (2014) for a reading of Indigenous sovereignty as a limit on the authority of settler political and legal framework. Also see Langton (2001) for the argument that British Sovereignty in Australia neither negated Aboriginal title nor jurisdiction.
Conclusion

1 See Thobani’s (2007) critique of liberal political theorist Seyla Benhabib who argues for a transnational, cosmopolitan world but is unwilling to consider the rights of migrants to enter countries or to have claims on a country where they are not citizens (but where they may work). “The desirability of implementing the principle of global economic justice is here trumped [in Benhabib’s work] by a defence of the principle of the sovereignty of enfranchised citizens” (Ibid, p. 70). “Ultimately, Benhabib’s vision is one which enhances the power of the powerful, albeit with a desire to have them use such power responsibly, in an enlightened manner, as it were” (Ibid, p. 73).

2 See Groover (2013; 2012) on the changes taking place at LAC.
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