

Making the '*New Lourinhã, a European Lourinhã*': Democracy, Civic
Engagement, and the Urban Development of Lourinhã, Portugal,
since 1966

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY
YORK UNIVERSITY
TORONTO, ONTARIO

September 2014

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Abstract

Since 1966, Lourinhã's urban landscape has transformed as Portugal democratized. From a rural town with little infrastructure and few institutions in 1966, Lourinhã emerged by 2001 as an ostensibly modern European town. This work highlights key areas of economic and urban development and argues that Lourinhã's political culture became more institutionalized leaving less room for, and withering expectation of, citizen participation in local development as Portugal transitioned from dictatorship to democracy.

This dissertation examines Portugal's transition from the *Estado Novo* dictatorship (1933-1974) to European social democracy by focusing on Lourinhã's – a town of 22,000 people, north of Lisbon – urbanization since 1966. Lourinhã's urbanization involved, and indeed required, a shift in its institutional and political culture. In the 1960s and 1970s people were expected to participate in development at a cultural, political and financial level, acting as substitutes for non-existent state mechanisms of development. However, by the late 1980s, the momentum had shifted as regional, national, and European institutions participated in developmental programs, marking a dramatic change in how citizens engaged with the state and the Portuguese nation.

From this shift has emerged a debate about the nature of Portugal's transition to democracy. With the Carnation Revolution of 1974 – the military coup that toppled the *Estado Novo* – at the center of analysis, academics and pundits ask whether that event represented “evolution or revolution” for Portugal. Was Portugal on the path towards democracy before 1974? And, given contemporary problems, was the rapid shift to European social democracy the blessing it appeared to be by the 1990s? Did democratization disenfranchise the Portuguese in important ways? Are commentators like Jorge Silva Melo, a Lisbon playwright who began his career in the *Estado Novo* years, correct in asserting that, “under the dictatorship there was hope ... that was in '72/'73. Nowadays [2011], its exactly the opposite: there is no hope”? This dissertation uses Lourinhã's development as an example of a Portuguese experience to argue that the Carnation Revolution, although a watershed in Portugal's politico-cultural evolution, should not be understood as *the* moment when democracy came to Portugal.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to António Augusto da Costa, Maria de S. José Mendes da Costa, and João Luis Mendes da Costa. The degree that this work has helped me earn is dedicated to John Richard William Whitehouse, Brenda Irene Whitehouse, and Valeria Elizabeth Costa.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Adrian Shubert for his constant support in researching and completing this dissertation. Professors Suzanne Langlois and António Costa Pinto have helped me in countless ways as members of my dissertation committee. Without the encouragement and support of these three, this work would have been impossible to complete. I cannot express how thankful I am to my committee.

The Ontario Graduate Scholarship, the Faculty of Graduate Studies at York University, and the Department of History's generous research funds allowed me to conduct my archival research. In addition, the faculty and staff with whom I have worked for the past six years stimulated and motivated me to always enquire further. In particular, the friendships formed with Katharine Bausch, Gilberto Fernandes and Dagomar Degroot, amongst others, influenced me, and will continue to influence me for years to come.

I would also like to thank my family for their unwavering encouragement and support over the past six years. Multiple generations of Costas and Whitehouses have inspired me. The Whitehouses motivated me to pursue a doctorate. It is for the Costas that I studied Lourinhã's experience.

Finally, none of this would have been possible without my wife's patience and love. No contribution could have matched the one she has made to this dissertation.

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1. Introduction

On April 24, 1974 readers of *República*, one of Portugal's national newspapers, read a seemingly innocuous note in the paper's review section. The anonymous letter explained that *Radio Renascença's* program *Limite*, a late-night show on the popular Catholic radio station, "had been improving for some weeks. The quality of its news items and its choice of music make *Limite* obligatory listening."¹ The program's host, José Vasconcelos, had been waiting to read this particular review of his show. It was a signal that told him to recite the lyrics of José (Zeca) Afonso's popular, and censored, protest song, *Grândola, Vila Morena*, on *Limite* shortly after midnight on April 25. Junior officers in the clandestine Armed Forces Movement (MFA) heard the song's lyrics at 00:25, which spoke of a town where fraternity, equality and the people ruled, on Vasconcelo's show. They had agreed to mobilize and occupy government offices upon hearing this song, in a coup to overthrow Portugal's dictatorship and democratize, develop and decolonize Portugal.² By late morning the MFA had

¹ Quoted from: Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 58.

² Democratization, Development, and Decolonization were the guiding principles behind the founding of the MFA in September 1973. As the events that followed in Portugal between 1974 and 1976 demonstrate, the "3 D's" program was only an ideological link between many of the officers in the MFA. As Diego Palacios Cerezales and others have established, the MFA fractured in the aftermath of April 1974 and its members engaged in a battle to define the specifics of the three D's. Diego Palacios Cerezales, *Portugal à Coronhada: Protesto Popular e Ordem Pública nos Séculos XIX e XX*, Ricardo Noronha, trans. (Lisboa, PT: Tinta-da-China, 2011), 333-335. For a sample of work that discusses the MFA and its "3 D's" program, see: António Reis, "A Revolução de 25 de Abril de 1974, o MFA e o Processo de Democratização," in António Reis, ed, *Portugal Contemporâneo*, vol. 6 (Lisboa, PT: Publicações Alfa, 1993); Maria Inácia Rezola, *Os Militares no Revolução de Abril: O Conselho da Revolução e a Transição Para a Democracia em*

occupied important sites in Lisbon and ended Marcelo Caetano's dictatorship (1968-1974).³ In what must have seemed like an instant, forty-eight years of military dictatorship (1926-74), forty-one of which under António Oliveira Salazar's *Estado Novo* (1933-1974), had passed. Portugal became a democracy and the country was ostensibly set on a path that, many hoped, would see Portugal emerge as a modern Western European country.

25 de Abril, or the Carnation Revolution, that toppled the *Estado Novo* has been celebrated as a rupture in both Portuguese and world history. In some interpretations of the spread of democracy throughout the world, the Carnation Revolution began a wave of democratization that would see dictatorship end in other Southern and Eastern European, Asian, African and South American countries.⁴ Similarly, *25 de Abril* has been celebrated in Portugal, both academically³ and popularly, as *the* break with dictatorship and a triumph of social democracy over neo-dictatorial and communist forces that tried to establish their

Portugal (1974-76). (Lisboa, PT: Campo da Comunicação, 2006); Paul Christopher Manuel. *Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy*. (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1995), xi; Tom Gallagher. *Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation*. (Manchester, Great Britain: Manchester University Press, 1983), 186-88; Patrick Chabal, "Review: Portuguese Decolonization," *The Journal of African History*, 39:1 (1998), 161-162; Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution*. (London, Great Britain: Croom Helm, 1977); and, Maxwell, 96-103.

³ For further descriptions of that morning, see: Maxwell, 57-59; Gil Green, *Portugal's Revolution* (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1975), 7-12; Walter C. Opello, Jr., *Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 84-87; and, Gallagher, *Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation*, 188.

⁴ For discussions of Portugal's *25 de Abril* as the start of a wave of democratizations see: Samuel P. Huntington, "The Third Wave", *Journal of Democracy*, 2:2 (Spring 1991), 12-34; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. (Oklahoma City, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and, Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason M. Lakin. *The Democratic Century*. (Oklahoma City, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).

own regimes in the aftermath of *25 de Abril*.⁵

However, such interpretations overlook Portugal's political, economic, social and cultural development in the years prior to 1974.⁶ Portugal's modernization – this term refers to an economic and political process in the discussion that follows, which both motivated and was influenced by social and cultural changes – saw the small Iberian country on Europe's extreme western fringe change fundamentally in countless ways. In order to explore the myriad of changes in Portugal, the discussion that follows will focus on two larger processes and their interrelation in order to flesh out an understanding of how Portuguese society has changed from a country whose dictatorial government and economic backwardness were tolerated in the Cold War, to a Western social democracy with a respectable standard of living.

⁵ For examples of works that celebrate 1974 as a rupture in Portuguese history see: Josep Sánchez Cervelló, *A Revolução Portuguesa e a sua Influência na Transição Espanhola*. (Lisbon, PT: Assírio & Alvim, 1993); and, Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*; Reis, "A Revolução de 25 de Abril"; António José Telo, *História Contemporânea de Portugal*, vol. 1 (Lisboa, PT: Editorial Presença, 2007); Rezola, *Os Militares*; and, Maria Inácia Rezola, *Mitos de uma Revolução*. (Lisboa, PT: A Esfera dos Livros, 2007).

⁶ My argument vis-à-vis the contextualization of *25 de Abril* lands this dissertation in a Portuguese history war. Beyond debates between those from the left and right rehabilitating and giving credit to those in their political parties for key developments during the Revolution, a debate has emerged between those who contextualize *25 de Abril* and those who call it the key event in Portugal's democratization. More will be said later in this chapter. However, it is important to say, at this point, how toxic some arguments in this debate can be. In some ways, contemporary polemics originated with the celebrations for the thirtieth anniversary of *25 de Abril*, which saw the Portuguese government celebrate the revolution under the theme, "*Abril é evolução*". Those who do not see the revolution as evolution, but instead, a definitive break, lashed out, placing these celebrations somewhere between amnesia and lies. Such a celebration forgot, so the argument went, that Portuguese democracy was born in 1974 and was not the continuation of certain liberalizing reforms in the last years of the dictatorship. It was a lie because the "promises and hopes" of the revolution were appropriated by a process of "evolution" or "progress" that claimed the successes of the revolution as their own. See, Maria Manuela Cruzeiro, "'Revolução' e Revisionismo Historiográfico: O 25 de Abril Visto da História", in Martins, Rui Cunha, ed. *Portugal, 1974: Transição Política em Perspectiva Histórica*. (Coimbra, PT: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2011), note 184. The contribution this work makes is to refocus the debate by providing evidence and discussion not based in Lisbon's halls of power.

First, Portugal became a European social democracy in 1974, cementing the democratization of Portuguese government and its institutions. Before 1974, Portugal was governed by a conservative, Catholic, and repressive dictatorship known as the *Estado Novo* under Salazar until 1968 and Caetano in its final years. The regime fell overnight on April 25, 1974. However, as this dissertation argues, when certain practices and norms in Portugal's modernization are considered, this seemingly sudden democratization was not actually so sudden. In important ways, the *Estado Novo* had already introduced its subjects to democratic practices as it mobilized support for various developmental projects in the 1960s, thereby continuing a modest democratization before 1974.

The second area upon which my argument focuses considers the changes in Portugal's physical and economic infrastructure that occurred concurrently with its democratization in the last half of the twentieth century. At the macro level, Portugal's economy shifted since the late 1950s, causing a revolution in the country's infrastructure. Indeed, Portugal's economy has turned from reliance upon its empire to European markets and investment in economic policy. In addition Portugal's economy has come to rely upon the tertiary sector as the largest contributor to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁷ Welcoming new investment and relying upon the service sector has meant that Portugal's infrastructure (roads, electricity, running water and service points) has had to

⁷ In 2012, for example, Portugal's service sector contributed seventy-five percent of GDP. See: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/po.html> (accessed December 19, 2013).

improve exponentially since the 1960s. It has also meant that government support for traditional economic activities, like agriculture, needed to be supplemented by new methods and techniques in the private sector. Indeed, infrastructure and struggling farmers occasionally required developmental support in ways that the *Eatado Novo's* bureaucracy could not provide. This left a vacuum in civic responsibility which Portugal's population filled with the support of various levels of government encouragement until administrative services were advanced enough to tackle development without citizen involvement.

In investigating the relationship between changes in Portugal's politics and urban landscape there are, necessarily, certain debates with which any discussion must engage. The three most pertinent will be presented to introduce the dissertation that follows. First, urban, economic, and political changes over the last half-century in Portugal, have been part-in-parcel of a process of modernization. Modernization and modernization theory, along with its meanings and consequences, have been maddeningly difficult for scholars to pin down. This work will contribute to our understanding of this process by reinforcing some interpretations and offering a list of societal elements that must be renovated in order for modernization to occur. Specifically, the two elements of modernization that this dissertation considers are the renovation of urban and economic infrastructure, and a society's politics. The second debate, therefore, concerns the relative influence of changes in Portugal and Lourinhã's landscapes on the power dynamics in the civic sphere. Indeed, as Lourinhã's landscape necessarily

developed as Portugal modernized, the relationship between public and private actors fundamentally shifted. Finally, important shifts in civic relations underlay Portugal's democratization, calling into question some interpretations of democratization and the role of 'ordinary citizens' along with the importance of Portugal's 1974 revolution in the fall of the *Estado Novo*.

In order to engage in these debates, the following discussion explores how Portugal's development in infrastructure and key economic sectors contributed to the democratization of society by focusing on the fundamental transformation of a single Portuguese town since 1966. On the Atlantic Coast, roughly seventy kilometers north of Lisbon, we find Lourinhã. The town provides us with an example in which to consider the relative effects of Portugal's modernization and democratization on local political culture and development. Indeed, Lourinhã is a municipality that has experienced no major political upheaval either in support of, or against, any particular government in the twentieth century. In fact, since citizens have been given the chance to vote in open elections, they have consistently swept the Socialist Party (PS) to power at all levels. Further, Lourinhã has not faced demographic pressure to change, nor has it experienced unusual economic crises. Yet Lourinhã's physical landscape has undergone a dramatic renovation since 1966. Not only has Lourinhã's municipal government completely remade the landscape of the town's center, but also basic infrastructure like roads, water and electricity have been introduced and expanded in a relatively short period. This development has occupied the

center of politico-cultural debate in Lourinhã since 1966, mobilizing private participation in civic affairs under both the dictatorship and the democratic regime. Lourinhã becomes a site for enquiry into how processes like modernization can influence and change local political culture at an incremental pace. Historical change, for the most part, does not occur in extraordinary circumstances. Lourinhã's experience demonstrates how governments and private actors can work together to drive meaningful change without major rupture or disruption in peoples' lives.



Figure 1: Map of Portugal's Concelhos. The Concelho da Lourinhã is highlighted. Lisbon lies roughly seventy kilometers to the south. <http://tinyurl.com/lrzpcn> (accessed June 15, 2014)

Relative stability in Lourinhã's demographic, administrative and economic profile further highlights the influence of continuity as Lourinhã changed. The

town's transformation coincided with a varied and inconsistent demographic evolution: although the population of Lourinhã has not grown in gross numbers between 1966 and today, it has undergone a significant replacement. Lourinhã is a town of a little over 22,000 residents in 2014. In 1981, the municipality's population was 21,245 people, while in 1994 the population was listed as marginally higher at 21,680 people.⁸ Lourinhã's population grew steadily between 1869 and 1960 from 7,500 to 22,500. However, after 1960 the population dipped dramatically, falling to around 17,500 by the late 1960s. It then climbed to 21,000 by the late 1970s, leveling out from there.⁹ The decline in the 1960s totaled around 12,000 inhabitants who were largely replaced by internal migration and white, European returnees from the empire. In addition, the mortality rate outstripped the birthrate in this period further proving the importance of migration in Lourinhã's population profile.¹⁰ The immigrants were primarily Portuguese from other parts of the country, meaning that the town remains largely racially homogenous. Indeed, there are no significant groups of visible minorities in Lourinhã.

⁸ Mário Bairrada et al, *Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã*. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional, Ministério para a Qualificação e o Emprego, 1997). 21.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid, 21-22.




Table 1: Lourinhã's gross population between 1860 and today. The dip in the 1960s and 1970s coincides with periods of mass migration due to both economic hardship in Portugal and the colonial wars in Africa: military conscription encouraged many Portuguese to send their sons out of Portugal before reaching military service age. See: Mário Bairrada et al, *Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã*. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional, Ministério para a Qualificação e o Emprego, 1997). 21.

By the late 1990s, residents of the *Concelho* (municipality) of Lourinhã lived in eleven *freguesias* (parishes):¹¹ Reguengo Grande, Vimeiro, Moita dos Ferreiros, Moledo, Ribamar, Marteleira, São Bartolomeu dos Galegos, Santa Bárbara, Miragaia, Atalaia, and Lourinhã. The work of the Lourinhanense has consistently been in, or related to, agriculture. Indeed, Lourinhã's economy was shaped by its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean: the agricultural sector benefitted

¹¹ A *Concelho* refers both to a municipal area and a municipal government. This level of government is below a *Distrito*. Just as several *Concelhos* make up a *Distrito*, several *Freguesias*, local parishes or villages, make up a *Concelho*. Just as *Concelhos* have a council with an executive and councilors, *Freguesias* also have a local administration: a *Junta da Freguesia*. For the most part, each level of government relies on the level above it for the majority of its funding.

from the effects of the coast, while the local economy was supplemented by tourism revenue as visitors were attracted to Lourinhã's beaches.¹² In 1993, sixty-five percent of the 147km² in the Concelho was used for agriculture while twenty-eight percent was forested. Only four percent was used for residential buildings and an even more telling one percent was industrial land.¹³ As Portugal's economy continued to transition to the service sector in the 1980s, Lourinhã's agricultural industry remained obstinately large, even in the face of the town's robust tourism sector. In 1991, almost forty-four percent of the population found themselves in agriculture or the processing of agricultural products, nineteen percent were in the secondary and manufacturing sector, while thirty-seven percent were service based workers.¹⁴

¹² Bairrada et al, *Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã*, 17.

¹³ *Ibid*, 18-19.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 36.



Figure 2: Freguesias (parishes) of Lourinhã, c. 2014. <http://tinyurl.com/l5rynm> (accessed June 15, 2014)

Within the farming sector itself, Lourinhã's agricultural production has become increasingly specialized since the 1960s and, by the late 1980s, was focused upon just a few products. Over one quarter of the sector was devoted to growing potatoes, twenty percent of the resources were for grape production devoted to the wine industry, seventeen percent of products were fresh fruit, fifteen percent were cereals, thirteen were flowers and horticultural products, with forestry seedlings, animal feed, and various products making up the rest of the

agricultural catalogue.¹⁵ Even today, agriculture remains important. As late as 1997, the ministry of labour insisted that in order to improve the standard of living and further develop Lourinhã, local industry had to specialize even more and focus on agriculture, the food industry and tourism. By coordinating its activities with various existing organizations and through the formation of a local development corporation, so the argument went, Lourinhã's farmers could secure their future.¹⁶

Little incentive for development is found in the demographic and industrial history of Lourinhã. Population growth was not pressuring infrastructure, nor were new economic projects demanding an upgraded workforce, land or facilities. Nonetheless, Lourinhã today, like the rest of Portugal, would in many ways be unrecognizable to the resident of the 1960s. Thanks to the four-lane A8 toll highway installed in the late 1990s, along with the rest of Portugal's national inventory of A-series highways, for example, Lourinhã's residents are less than an hour's car ride to the country's capital. Before this, residents of Lourinhã could expect a car ride of over two hours to travel from the center of their town to Lisbon.¹⁷ Upgrading Portugal's national roadways has shrunk the already small country's space, allowing a new freedom of mobility that had not been enjoyed before the 1990s. Indeed, as recently as the 1960s it was not uncommon for Lourinhanense never to have seen Lisbon. Not only was the trip inconvenient

¹⁵ Ibid, 53.

¹⁶ Ibid, 8-10.

¹⁷ "Governo Anuncia mais Quilómetros de Estradas para o Oeste", *Alvorada* (May 25, 1997), 20.

and uncomfortable – taken on what we today would consider back or rural roads – but many had not the means (access to a car) nor any particular reason to leave Lourinhã, where most lived as near subsistence farmers who could either grow or find most everything they needed within the municipality's bounds.

**

The changes that came with national highways were nothing short of revolutionary, altering Portugal's landscape and space. Yet highway infrastructure is just one of the most recent in a series of developments that should be linked with Portugal's modernization. Taken together, the development of Portugal's infrastructure has changed places like Lourinhã in the last half century. The obvious question is what, then, was involved in Lourinhã's and Portugal's modernization, and how does that square with what scholars have deemed as necessary components of modernization?

In many ways, the seeds of modern Lourinhã, as read through its landscape, should be traced to the 1870s. Local historian Rui Marques Cipriano points to the nineteenth century, and specifically the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as the starting point in Lourinhã's modernization. This is the period when Lourinhã's modern administrative structure came into being to administer institutions and implement infrastructure programs. In the wake of the *Janeirinha* uprising of 1868 – led by merchants protesting new sales taxes – Lourinhã was

granted its own court to deal with their local rebels (the court would be taken away by the military dictatorship in 1927).¹⁸ Additionally, the town's modern market system with its monthly fair and weekly (later daily) market came into being to offer local farmers and merchants a venue to sell their goods.¹⁹ Cipriano argues that until this period, when economics and Lourinhã's culture began to change, the town was a small, isolated and closed village that relied upon subsistence farming.²⁰ The fathers of modern Lourinhã, for Cipriano, were the members of the municipal administration appointed in 1875: the Viscount Palma de Almeida, Dr. José Henrique Palma de Almeida; municipal medical doctor, Joaquim de Jesus Lopes; and the administrative secretary of the Câmara, José de Rosário e Silva. Led by this group, Lourinhã began to build roads to connect its parishes and install the first sewers.²¹ Under their watch the N-8 roadway, connecting Torres Vedras and Peniche would be built through Lourinhã near the *Quinta Santa Catarina*, making the town more accessible to regional economies and networks and offering a starting point in connecting the various parishes of the Concelho.²² In 1877, a post and telegraph office was placed in Lourinhã, and a municipal slaughterhouse was opened in 1883.²³ Furthermore, 1879 saw the first public lamps lit in Lourinhã. They were simple gas lamps until 1928 when a

¹⁸ Rui Marques Cipriano, *Vamos Falar da Lourinhã*. (Torres Vedras, PT: Sogratol/Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, 2001), 114.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 89-107.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 109.

²¹ *Ibid*, 109.

²² *Ibid*, 109-112.

²³ *Ibid*, 111.

“*petromaxe*” advanced gas lamp system was installed on iron lampstands.²⁴ It was not until 1932 that the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and the District of Lisbon installed an electrical substation and power lines. At this time they also installed a limited domestic water distribution network.²⁵

Together, the modest gains made by 1875’s municipal administration, taken with the installations that followed, were a loose series of projects whose connections to Lourinhã’s contemporary landscape are distant, yet very real. Unquestionably, they are the forbearers of today’s infrastructure: the N-8 is still in use, although in a different configuration; although *petromaxe* lamps have long since been replaced, a public lighting system grew from them; and while Lourinhã’s water works would be unrecognizable to even the members of 1875’s administration, they represent the modest beginnings of today’s infrastructure.

A more recognizable starting point in tracing the development of Lourinhã’s contemporary infrastructure, and the one used in this dissertation is 1966. In that year Portugal’s dictatorship celebrated the fortieth anniversary of its founding moment, in May 1926, with the opening of the famed and recognizable *Ponte Salazar* across the Tagus River in Lisbon. This project was the headliner for a series of infrastructure investments across the country. In Lourinhã, 1966 saw the inauguration of the town’s post office – then on the periphery of downtown Lourinhã and today an anchor on Lourinhã’s central square – and a campground at the beach to supplement the town’s budding tourism industry.

²⁴ Ibid, 111.

²⁵ Ibid, 115.

The anniversary was an opportunity for the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (CML)²⁶ to solicit the national government for support in a long-term improvement plan. The CML argued that the anniversary of the dictatorship's founding moment was an opportunity to invest in "fundamental" upgrades to Lourinhã's institutions and facilities: the water and electricity networks were to be improved and expanded; the sewer network and treatment facilities needed to be upgraded; a new hotel was to be built at Praia da Areia Branca (PAB) with a *Pousada*²⁷ at the fort at Paimogo; a new courthouse would lure a tribunal administration and, along with a new city hall, sit on a new central square; a cinema and regional bus station would open a new commercial district along the N-8 towards the *Quinta Santa Catarina* district; and new primary, secondary and agricultural schools would educate the population and help it to advance.²⁸

²⁶ The Câmara Municipal was, and remains, the municipal government in Portugal's governmental hierarchy.

²⁷ These were a chain of government owned and operated, high-end hotels in historic and cultural sites. Opened in the 1950s, *Pousadas* include a facility at the national palace at Queluz, the castle's keep in Óbidos, and a number of other locations around Portugal. Although in operation today, they were privatized shortly after the turn of the twenty-first century. This phenomenon was not unique to Portugal. Primo de Rivera's Spanish dictatorship of the 1920s, for example established the *paradores y albergues nacionales*. Like the *Pousadas*, they offer an interesting example of how government propaganda bled into tourism development and married political priorities with socio-economic realities. See: M.T. Newton, "Tourism and Public Administration in Spain", in M. Barke, J. Towner, and M.T. Newton eds., *Tourism in Spain: Critical Issues* (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996), 138-140.

²⁸ "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional", Governo Civil do Distrito de Lisboa: Comemorações do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional de 28 de Maio: Proc. D-13/3 (1966), Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).



Figure 3: Celebrating the *Ponte Salazar*. Ponte Salazar, "Comemoração de Duas Datas", *Boletim de Informações* (August 7, 1966), Plano Comemorativo para 1966, Proc. O-12/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

Many of the institutions and infrastructure highlighted in 1966 were completed over the following forty years. The cumulative affect of these projects was to reorient and remake Lourinhã. Beyond the proliferation of roads, electrical and water services since 1966, Lourinhã's landscape was transformed as the new central town square called for in 1966 was developed in the 1980s and 1990s. The *Praça da República* became the *Praça José Máximo da Costa* – named for the town's first elected post-revolution mayor – in 2001 when the new town hall was opened. This shifted the administrative and cultural center of the town from the *Praça Marques Pombal*. However, Lourinhanense had already been accessing services on the *Praça José Máximo da Costa* for over twenty years: the post office on the *Praça José Máximo da Costa* had begun operation

in 1966, the courthouse had opened alongside the post office in 1982, the market hall opened in 1989, and a music school opened with the town hall. Joining these institutions on the town's square, were the seventeenth century convent and church and the fire hall dating to the 1920s. In other words, Lourinhã's reorientation was a gradual process.



Figure 4: Map of Lourinhã in 1979 with the proposed area for development outlined. The contrast in the two landscapes is clear in terms of topographical layout, size, and space. CML, Plano de Pormenor da Zona Central: Extracto do Plano Aprovado, 1979', Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã', 1984. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

A number of non-governmental associations also emerged in Lourinhã around the turn of the twentieth-century: a recreation and cultural association; a musical band; and an historical association (GEAL).²⁹ After 1910, the associational landscape in Lourinhã expanded further with the founding of a civic

²⁹ Cipriano, *Vamos Falar da Lourinhã*, 111-112.

association named the *Centro Democrático*, which was replaced by the *Associação de Instrução Militar* in 1912, and a agricultural credit union, the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo da Lourinhã* in the same year.³⁰ 1923 saw the founding of the *Sporting Clube da Lourinhã*, dedicated to soccer. Then in 1928, a commercial and industrial association was founded. Local notables António Gentil Horta, Carlos de Almeida Oliveira and António de Conceição Bento founded Lourinhã's association of volunteer firefighters in that same year.³¹ An agricultural guild (*Grémio da Lavoura*) replaced the agricultural syndicate as part of the *Estado Novo's* corporative structure in 1939. The guild became *Louricoop* after 1974.³² The wine cooperative, *Adega Cooperativa*, was created in 1957, again with national direction.³³ In 1954 the *Alvorada*, Lourinhã's local newspaper, was established under its original title, *Redes e Moinhos*, taking its contemporary name only in November 1960.³⁴

This discussion makes sense of these advancements in Lourinhã's landscape, institutional and political structures, by considering them as part of the town's modernization. Certainly, despite some difficulty in agreement over precise definition, Lourinhã's experience would fall into many understandings of development labeled as modernization. Modernization, with its affiliates, modernity and modern, is a politically, socially and culturally loaded and contestable concept. As Susan Friedman points out, various scholars have

³⁰ Ibid, 113.

³¹ Ibid, 113-114.

³² Ibid, 115.

³³ Ibid, 115.

³⁴ Ibid, 115-116.

attributed a variety of processes and characteristics as elements of modernity and modernization depending on the context in which they are used. For example, between the 1960s and 1990s, modernity moved from having revolutionary connotations to being affiliated with establishment thinking. Further, cultural critics would look at modernity as a break with the past, tradition, and order, whereas a social scientist would suggest that it was a centralized system that adhered to the Enlightenment's ethos: "Progress – Science – Reason – Truth."³⁵ Others, like Robert Wohl, have complained that the definition of modernity "remains maddeningly elusive and unstable."³⁶

Nevertheless, some agreement exists amongst scholars over the requisite components of a modern society and the process by which it emerges. Most agree that intellectually, modernity and modernization's heritage includes Modernism; the turn of the twentieth century artistic movement of the early 1900s that was part of a radical transformation in Europe's "traditional institutions, social structures, and belief systems."³⁷ Indeed, transformation and change was at the heart of the modernist mentality. In the European context, Adolf Hitler's Germany and Benito Mussolini's Italy stand, for some prominent historians, as examples of those whose desire to reshape society and create a "new man", made them

³⁵ Susan Friedman. "Definitional Excursions: the Meanings of Modern/Modernity/Modernism", *Modernism/Modernity*, 8:3 (2001) 493-494.

³⁶ Robert Wohl. "Heart of Darkness: Modernism and Its Historians", *The Journal of Modern History* 74:3 (September, 2002) 574.

³⁷ Roger Griffin. *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*. (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 54. See also: Lawrence Rainey and Robert von Hallberg. "Editorial/Introduction", *Modernism/Modernity*, 1:1 (1994), 1.

modernists.³⁸ As scholars like Roger Griffin explain, modernization is a process that establishes a new social base for society and introduces an entirely new socio-political order.³⁹

In terms of modernity's features, a much more conservative view emerges. From this perspective, the process is not celebrated. Instead definitions rely upon a seemingly narrow set of results. Social Science theory in the early 1980s designated modernization as a process of social and economic change that led to, and maintained, secularization, rationalization in political and economic life, industrialization, accelerated urbanization and increased levels of popular participation in public affairs.⁴⁰ Modernity encompassed the economic, political, social and cultural in society and once it was achieved, the revolutionary aspects of the process were discarded. For example, historians have come to look for high levels of literacy, low levels of substance or alcohol consumption, low mortality and disease rates, a developed and active civil society, equal rights for women and minorities and the use of advanced technology in industry and

³⁸ Roger Griffin argues that Fascism was a variant of modernism: with its revolutionary and total projects to remake society, it could have only emerged "in the first decades of the twentieth century in a society permeated with modernist metanarratives of cultural renewal." Similarly, Eksteins asserts that despite many interpretations of Nazism, "which tend to view it as a reactionary movement ... intent on turning Germany into a pastoral folk community ... the general thrust of the movement, despite archaisms, was futuristic." As evidence, Eksteins invokes Hitler himself, who saw Nazism as more than a political movement. To him, "it was more than a faith; it was a desire to create mankind anew." In many ways, these historians build on the work of others like George Mosse, who pointed out that Fascism and Nazism were also revolutionary because they sought to create a "new man". See: Roger Griffin. *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*. (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 6; Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*. (Toronto, Canada: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 303; and, George Mosse, *The Image of Man: the Creation of Modern Masculinity*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 8.

³⁹ Griffin, 54-55.

⁴⁰ Harry Ritter. *Dictionary of Concepts in History*. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1986), 273.

other economic activities to identify a modern society.⁴¹ Politically speaking, dissent and protest, when highlighted, occur on the periphery of modern societies, as challenges to core values and achievements are rarely evident.

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As this discussion unfolds, it will be Lourinhã's experience with modernization through increased urbanization and popular participation in public affairs that will be explored. The development of Lourinhã's infrastructure coincided with the development of Portugal's infrastructure, changing public space in the country as the dictatorship sought to improve Portugal's economy. In the 1940s and 1950s, Portugal's dictatorship went to work on a number of infrastructure projects across the country aimed in part at improving Portugal's international image and preparing Lisbon for growth.⁴² The opening of Lisbon's international airport and the establishment of new neighborhoods like *Cidade Universitaria* and *Alvalade* were key accomplishments of the dictatorship's programme.⁴³ Improvements continued into the 1960s and were supplemented

⁴¹ See: Yanni Kotsonis. *Making Peasants Backward: Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861-1914*. (London, Great Britain: Palgrave MacMillan, 1999), 4-5.

⁴² For a discussion of the *Estado Novo's* concern for its international image see: Raphael Costa, "The "Great Façade of Nationality": Some Considerations on the Multiple Meanings of Estado Novo Portugal in Travel Literature", *The Journal of Tourism History*, 5:1 (Spring 2013), 50-72.

⁴³ See: A Urbanização e o Problema Habitacional da Região de Lisboa, #39 - "Plano de Expansão de Lisboa", 1959. Arquivo Salazar AOS/CO/CR-4 pt.4. (Arquivos Nacional do Torre do Tombo, PT). For a discussion of the importance of urban environments for 'national education' in Salazar's thinking see: Daniel Melo, *Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-58)*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2001), 44-46. Others, like Carlos Nunes Silva and Stephen Syrett have highlighted the importance of control of urban space in the Estado Novo when they argue that the state had

with investments commemorating the aforementioned fortieth anniversary of the founding of the military dictatorship in 1926 that would evolve into the *Estado Novo*. The opening of the *Ponte Salazar* (today the *Ponte 25 de Abril*) across the Tagus River in Lisbon was, as mentioned, the marquee infrastructure project in a series of improvements that put a punctuation mark on the 1966 celebrations.⁴⁴ Less spectacular investments made that year would help to bring electricity, running water and improved roads to various parts of Portugal by the 1970s. In the late 1970s, Portugal's infrastructure enjoyed another wave of investment as the newly founded democratic government reaffirmed the Portuguese government's goal of tying their polity to Western Europe by entering into agreements to join the European Economic Community (EEC). When Portugal became a full EEC member in 1986, the country's infrastructure was developing with the first waves in a flood of foreign investment that would help to build the country's contemporary landscape.

The transformation of Portugal's infrastructure had a profound effect on

shifted from manager of urban space under the dictatorship to a "regulator, coordinator and enabler" as a democratic government. See: Carlos Nunes Silva and Stephen Syrett. "Governing Lisbon: Evolving Forms of City Governance", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30:1 (March 2006), 99.

⁴⁴ For discussions of the various projects related to the 1966 commemorations see: "Comemoração de Duas Datas", *Boletim de Informações* (August 7, 1966), Plano Comemorativo para 1966, Proc. O-12/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966; "Efectivamente Inaugurada a Ponte Salazar Sobre o Tejo ao Serviço da Nação", *Alvorada* (August 28, 1966), 1; "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional", Governo Civil do Distrito de Lisboa: Comemorações do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional de 28 de Maio: Proc. D-13/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966; "Inauguração do Novo Edifício dos C.T.T na Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (November 13, 1966) 1, 6; "Reunião 11/10/61: Anteprojecto do edificio dos correios, telégrafos e telefones da Lourinhã", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 23. (1961-1963), 41.

the lives of the country's population. António Barreto has noted that the late 1970s and 1980s in Portugal was a period of infrastructure development that provided running water, electricity, sewers and sanitation facilities in much of the country. This led, Barreto continued, to an invasion of modern household appliances into the Portuguese home. The years between 1987 and 1994, for example, saw the number of household telephones rise from 33% to 74%; electric washing machines from 44% to 74%; and, the number of households with video viewers rose from 15% to 40%.⁴⁵ Indeed, Portugal's institutions pointed to infrastructure advancement as important evidence of their country's progress. The spread and growth of electrical consumption, Portugal's National Statistics Institute (INE) argued in 1985, was evidence of positive evolution: the use of electricity, it boasted, was forty-three times higher in 1982 than it had been in 1935. Electrical production grew exponentially along with consumption between 1960 and 1980. In millions of kWh, Portugal produced 3.263 units in 1960, 7.379 in 1970, and 15.264 in 1980, practically doubling every ten years.⁴⁶ Not surprisingly, domestic electricity, running water, and washrooms and kitchens came to be considered staples of basic comfort in the late 1980s. By 1987, ninety-six percent of Portugal's homes had a kitchen, ninety-seven percent had electricity, eighty-six percent had running water and almost seventy percent of homes had a fixed bath or shower. In towns or cities of more than 10,000

⁴⁵ António Barreto, *Tempo de Mudança*. (Lisbon, PT: Antropos, 1996), 76-77.

⁴⁶ Instituto Nacional da Estatística, "Portugal 1935-1985: 50 Anos" (<http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/viewImage.do?me=view&key=supcod%3D1%26sercodg%3D1%26iddoc%3D5396%26pagini%3D1%26pags%3D82%26pos%3D1>, accessed October 22, 2013), 54-55.

residents, these numbers were all “very close” to one hundred percent. Conversely, in towns and villages with populations of less than 10,000, the numbers were worse: four percent of houses lacked electricity, almost nineteen percent did not have running water, and only sixty-two percent of homes had a bathtub or shower.⁴⁷

Lourinhã’s infrastructure statistics matched the national numbers. Being a town of over 10,000, by the early 1990s the entire population of Lourinhã was served by domestic water while ninety-five-percent of the population had direct access to sewage draining infrastructure (as opposed to septic tank waste storage) and domestic electricity.⁴⁸ Such high levels are a testament to how far Lourinhã’s infrastructure had come in the preceding century. Truly, roads, electricity and running water have become, and were always considered, important elements of Lourinhã’s modern landscape.

The changes that occurred in Portugal’s infrastructure in the last fifty years did not occur in a linear or uncontested fashion. Certainly, subjects of the dictatorship and democratic citizens alike reacted to various projects with resistance and support, and, at times, even mobilized to initiate such projects. In many ways then, Portugal’s modernization through infrastructure was a political process in which various agents organized in support of their interests. Historians have long recognized the role that the built environment and its contestability

⁴⁷ Instituto Nacional das Estatísticas, “Indicadores de Confronto das Famílias”, *População e Condições Sociais: Condições de Vida das Famílias*, 1987.

(<http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/search.do>, accessed October 22, 2013), 5-6.

⁴⁸ Mário Bairrada et al, *Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã*, 28.

have played in various aspects of our past, including the promotion of political activity.⁴⁹ As theorized by Jurgen Habermas, the public sphere emerged in eighteenth century Europe as an intermediate space between absolute rulers and private individuals.⁵⁰ In this sense, the public sphere's emergence should be understood as the opening of a space for people to access resources and political influence beyond their station.⁵¹ However, the emergence of public space and the public sphere was not an uncontested democratization of access

⁴⁹ For examples of work dealing with space and gender, space and consumption, and space and race relations, see: Brian Cowan, "What was Masculine about the Public Sphere? Gender and the Coffeehouse milieu in Post-Restoration England," *History Workshop Journal*, 51 (Spring 2001), 127-157; Karen Harvey, "Gender, Space and Modernity in Eighteenth-Century England: A Place Called Sex," *History Workshop Journal*, 51 (Spring 2001), 158-179; David Nasaw, *Going Out: the Rise and Fall of Public Amusements*. (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993); Scott Nelson, "Livestock, Boundaries, and Public Space in Spartanburg: African American Men, Elite White Women and the Spectacle of Conjugal Relations," in M. Hodes, ed. *Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History*. (New York: NYU Press, 1999); Kathy Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York*. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986); Erika Diane Rappaport, *Shopping For Pleasure: Women in the Making of London's West End*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Judith R. Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and, Rosalind Williams, *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France*. (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1982). For discussions of space and its relationship to political participation, see: Susan G Davis, *Parades and Power: Street Theater in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia*. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986); James Epstein, "Spatial Practices/Democratic Vistas," *Social History*, 24:3 (October, 1999), 294-310; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, A. Sheridan trans. (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977); Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between Classes in Victorian Society*. (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1971); and, Jonathon Schneer, *London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis*. (Ann Arbor, MI: Yale University Press, 1999).

⁵⁰ Quoted in: Brian Cowan, "What was Masculine about the Public Sphere? Gender and the Coffeehouse milieu in Post-Restoration England," *History Workshop Journal*, 51 (Spring 2001), 129. See also: Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society*, T. Burger and F. Lawrence eds (Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press, 1989), 181-235 in which the author discusses changes in the public sphere's political functions through the emergence of mass media in eighteenth century Europe as the press shifted from conveying the news to including editorial content. For broader explanations of Habermas' bosu of work on the public sphere, see: Pauline Johnson, *Habermas: Rescuing the Public Sphere* (London, UK: Routledge, 2006); and Luke Goode, *Jurgen Habermas: Democracy and the Pubic Sphere* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005).

⁵¹ Karen Harvey, "Gender, Space and Modernity in Eighteenth-Century England: A Place Called Sex," *History Workshop Journal*, 51 (Spring 2001), 159.

to various facets of power for private individuals. In one of his many seminal works, *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault was among the first to draw scholarly attention to the role space could play in power relations and to the connection between space and politics. Foucault described the Western World's shift from public punishment to private discipline between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries and its implications for the way space was organized.⁵² In Foucault's estimation, space, or organized space, became an instrument of power, with prisons, army camps, and schools in the modern world being constructed so as to maintain discipline through constant supervision and routine.⁵³ As such, governments developed "political technologies" devised to create "a governable space of calculability."⁵⁴

Assessing the influence that built space had on political culture involves both looking at the negotiations among the various actors responsible for building and navigating that setting, and reading that setting itself as a document: space becomes a place to be read. Michel de Certeau was the first to develop such a methodology and consider its implications.⁵⁵ To distinguish between

⁵² Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 7-8.

⁵³ See: Ibid, 170-172.

⁵⁴ See: Reuben Rose-Redwood and Anton Tanter, 'Introduction: Governmentality, House Numbering and the Spatial History of the Modern-City,' *Urban History*, 39:4 (2012), 607-608. Rose-Redwood and Tanter build from the ideas presented in Michel Foucault's lectures on Governmentality, which suggest that the modern state survived through "governmentalisation," or the ever-increasing development of techniques and processes of governance. See: Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78* (New York, NY: Picador/Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 1-6.

⁵⁵ For examples of scholars ceding credit to Certeau, see: James Epstein, "Spatial Practices/Democratic Vistas," *Social History*, 24:3 (October, 1999), 297; and, Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, "Modernity, Melancholy, Memory and Filth: New Perspectives on Russian and Soviet Cities", *Journal of Urban History*, 39:5 (2013), 997-1002.

understanding space and place, de Certeau likens the act of reading place to watching the streets from a skyscraper above, seeing the layout and overall plan of the setting below. Meanwhile, that place turns into a fluid space when the same onlooker descends to the streets, navigating them as their nature changes with the time of day, weather, who travels them, etc.⁵⁶ Space and place are necessarily torn apart. As Anthony Giddens argues, “the advent of modernity tears space away from place by fostering relations between absent ‘others’ ... In the nineteenth century, the rapid expansion of print culture, the telegraph, railway, steamship, systems of exchange and trust all worked to ‘lift out’ social relations from local contexts.”⁵⁷ Indeed, a place’s purpose and its relationship to the people that occupy it go much further in defining space than do the particulars about a site’s physical make up.

The chapters that follow reflect upon Lourinhã as a place whose spaces shifted as residents and governments negotiated various developments: under consideration is its physical composition, how its space was developed and how Lourinhanense interacted with each other and their institutions in that space. As I argue, the relationship that developed between citizens and state in order to cultivate Lourinhã’s urban environment helped make Portugal’s transition to democracy all the easier. Indeed, some of the political practices that Lourinhanense were called upon to undertake after 1974, although newly

⁵⁶ See: Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, S. Rendall trans (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 92-97.

⁵⁷ Quoted in: Epstein, 309.

formalized, must have seemed unremarkable given their use as locals participated in civic affairs before 1974.

Historians of Portugal have undertaken some serious enquiries into the relationship between space and politics. The dictatorship and its manipulation of certain landscapes has offered scholars, like David Corkill and José Carlos Pina Almeida, a fruitful if under-appreciated avenue for exploration in the *Estado Novo*'s arsenal of coercive techniques. Corkill and Almeida expose the ways in which the dictatorship deployed spatial organization in the *Mundo Português* Expo of 1940 in support of its ideological goals.⁵⁸ Salazar's government emphasized the rural milieu as the space in which Portuguese identity was fostered. Beyond Corkill and Almeida's description of the 1940 expo and the recreation of rural space in Lisbon,⁵⁹ historians like Daniel Melo have explored the link between the rural setting and the dictatorship's brand of Portuguese identity.⁶⁰ The connection between rural space and political culture opened a venue for Portuguese dictatorship subjects to engage in politics and historians have followed this line of investigation. Led today by Pedro Ramos Pinto and Diego Palacios Cerezales, who build on Charles Downs' groundbreaking work on the neighbourhood commissions that emerged during the Carnation Revolution to organize residents in defense of urban rights, academics have explored the consequences of linking identity to space. Given the importance of the home and

⁵⁸ See: David Corkill and José Carlos Pina Almeida, "Commemorations and Propaganda in Salazar's Portugal: The *Mundo Português* Exposition of 1940", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44:3 (2009), 381-399.

⁵⁹ See: Ibid, 381-399.

⁶⁰ Daniel Melo, *Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-58)*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2001), 44.

neighborhood in *Estado Novo* propaganda, for example, it is not surprising that investigators have found that the defense of community and housing rights became sites of political organization and action before, during and the after the 1974 revolution.⁶¹

Despite the inherent importance of space in enquiries into Portuguese political culture and community organization, space as an agent is not the focus of such studies. In the investigation that follows, space as an agent is also not *the* focus. Like other studies on community and political culture in Portugal, the development of place and the manipulation of space emerge as processes where there existed negotiation, organization and political engagement, both under Portugal's repressive dictatorship and its democratic government after 1974-76. Put more specifically, the change in the relationship between individual, community and polity, as both a consequence of, and motivating factor in Portugal's modernization, is analyzed by exploring how subjects and citizens interacted with their community's development and, in Portugal's case, its modernization.

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⁶¹ See: Charles Downs, *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organization in the Portuguese Revolution*. (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 1989); Pedro Ramos Pinto, "Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth Century Portugal", *Contemporary European History*, 18:2 (May 2009), 199-215; Diego Palacios Cerezales, *O Poder Caiu na Rua: Crise de Estado e Acções Colectivas na Revolução Portuguesa, 1974-1975*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003); Diego Palacios Cerezales, *Portugal à Coronhada: Protesto Popular e Ordem Pública nos Séculos XIX e XX*, Ricardo Noronha, trans. (Lisbon, PT: Tinta da China, 2011), 261-369.

As Portugal and Lourinhã's landscape modernized, so to did their politics and political institutions. A key consequence, most agree, of modernization is increased public participation and advanced institutions to both facilitate and monitor new participation. Unquestionably, a relationship emerged between democratization and urban development, calling into question how each process affected the other. The reorientation of Lourinhã's landscape and the proliferation of services contributed to, and were shaped by, two processes that this dissertation considers. First, projects required the CML, other governmental institutions, and local private organizations to mature both to develop projects and then to control the services that were the projects' outcomes. Second, and as this dissertation argues, the proliferation of urban infrastructure and the institutional development that resulted altered the relationship among the individual residents of Lourinhã, the community, with their governmental and private representatives, and with their political institutions. Perhaps counter-intuitively, residents were more active, if limited in fields of action, in civic society and developmental processes as subjects of the dictatorship than they were as democratic citizens. In other words, the development of governmental organizations and institutions after 1974 coincided with a popular withdrawal from civic society. After the revolution, government and other organizations increasingly became able to take on the responsibilities that residents had been asked to fulfill, especially under the *Estado Novo*, whose own policies discouraged the development of government institutions like municipal

governments, which could become independent from Lisbon. As democratic government emerged and strengthened regional and local governments, citizens found less space to operate in a crowded civic sphere.

The coincidence of the maturation of civic and governmental organizations and mechanisms, and the proliferation of urban infrastructure is evidence of the political nature of urban development in Portugal in general, and Lourinhã in particular. These processes were, in fact, part of a major and profound shift in Portuguese politics between the 1960s and today as the country democratized. Although Portugal had some experience with democratic practices and institutions in the nineteenth century and under the short-lived Republic of 1910-1926, the origins of Portugal's contemporary democracy are to be found in the 1960s and two major initiatives undertaken by the *Estado Novo*. First, in an effort to diversify its trade portfolio, the regime opened its economy to foreign investment, shifting emphasis from its colonies to Western Europe and North America. The Western ideas that inevitably followed undermined the dictatorship's cultural and political legitimacy.⁶² New investment fuelled the 'economic miracle' in Portugal in the 1960s, providing investment for, among

⁶² For general discussions of this process see: David Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); José M. Magone, "Breaking with the Authoritarian Past in Portugal: Continuities and Discontinuities of International Linkages and their Impact on the Political System", *Portuguese Journal of Social Science*, 3:3 (2004), 157-174; J.M.B de Brito, "The Portuguese Economy: From Salazarism to the European Community", in A. Costa Pinto ed., *Modern Portugal* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 88-101; and Laurence Whitehead, "Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: a Comparative Policies Perspective", in G. Pridham ed., *Encouraging Democracy: the International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe* (London, UK: Leicester University Press, 1991), 45-61.

other things, improvements in Portugal's infrastructure and the standard of living for the Portuguese.

Second, and more directly linked to the fall of the dictatorship and democratization, the *Estado Novo* engaged in a thirteen-year counter-insurgency (1961-1974) in its African colonies: Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. When the conflict broke out in Angola in the winter of 1961, Salazar's government responded in kind, dug in, and sowed the seeds of its own demise. As costs and casualty rates rose, junior officers in the Portuguese Armed Forces organized and created the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), a clandestine group advocating Portugal's development, democratization and decolonization that would carry out the coup that ended the *Estado Novo* on April 25, 1974.⁶³

25 de Abril has become the marquee event, both popularly and academically, in narratives of Portugal's democratization and modernization. The revolution toppled the dictatorship's governmental institutions and the revolutionary period, 1974-76, proved to be traumatic for Portugal. By way of example, Portuguese identity under the dictatorship was linked to its role as the center of an empire that was lost in an instant. As commentators point out, to lose it all, essentially overnight, was jarring to say the least. Indeed, the vacuum left by the empire was quickly filled by a psychological shift to Europe that

⁶³ For discussions of the MFA, its actions, make up, and planning of April 25, 1974 see: Gallagher, *Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation*, 175-180; Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution*; Norrie MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire* (New York, NY: Longman, 1997); and, Valentim Alexandre, "The Colonial Empire," in António Costa Pinto, ed., *Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003).

matched the ongoing economic policy shift from the end of WWII.⁶⁴ Domestically, 1974-76 proved to be an unstable time in Lisbon as unrest threatened civil war, which demonstrated that successive revolutionary governments, some of which flirted with the extreme Left, could not provide steady administration.⁶⁵ However, the end result was a stable social democratic system that emerged with the election of Mário Soares' and the PS in April 1976.

Undeniably, however, and as this dissertation argues, *25 de Abril* must be contextualized and understood as a part of a longer process. In many ways, the democratic gains of *25 de Abril* were secured with Portugal's accession to the EEC in the late 1970s and 1980s, a process that irrevocably tied Portugal to a democratic future anchored to the future European Union (EU).⁶⁶ Similarly, democratic Portugal's origins are in the years and decades before 1974.

Nonetheless, the Carnation Revolution's place in Portugal's democratization is at the center of discussions about the country's development. The dominant trend in the historiography is to celebrate 1974 as a break from dictatorship and a victory for Mário Soares, democratic socialism and parliamentary democracy over Alvaro Cunhal, radical elements of the MFA and

⁶⁴ António Barreto, *Tempo de Mudança*, 10-11.

⁶⁵ For a good description of the machinations between the various revolutionary governments between the revolution and the first national elections in 1976 that saw Mário Soares' Social Democrats form the first stable democratic government in Portugal, see: Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*.

⁶⁶ Stephen Syrett, *Local Development: Restructuring, Locality and Economic Initiative in Portugal*. (Great Britain: Avebury Ashgate, 1995), 86; for further reading on Portugal and its accession to the EEEU/EU, see: Nicolau Andresen-Leitão, 'The Reluctant European: A Survey of the Literature on Portugal and European Integration 1947-1974', *e-JPH*, 3:1 (Summer 2005); Leitão, *Estado Novo, Democracia e Europa 1947-1974* (Lisboa: ICS, 2007), 21-22; Leitão, 'A Flight of Fantasy? Portugal and the First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community, 1961-63', *Contemporary European History*, 16:1 (2007), 71-87.

communist representative democracy.⁶⁷ However, historians have begun to challenge the understanding of *25 de Abril* as a complete break from the past by considering it in the *longue durée*.⁶⁸ Thinking of 1974 as evolution, as opposed to revolution, has inspired the reassessment of *25 de Abril*'s accomplishments as many argue that democratization and modernization in Portugal were well underway before 1974.⁶⁹ In this outline, after the Second World War, economic development emerges as a key contributor to the democratization process. Economic development necessarily required Portugal to embrace Western Europe and its investment dollars, and eventually, democracy, as association with the continent and its values became synonymous with future prosperity. By considering *25 de Abril* in this context, the revolution becomes just one part – an important one, to be sure – of a process leading to democracy that spans the supposed revolutionary rupture of 1974. Indeed, the discussion that follows respects and recognizes 1974 as a watershed moment in Portugal's history when fundamental changes crystalized. However, to suggest that *25 de Abril* was a moment when these changes began or were founded betrays the accomplishments of the Portuguese before and after 1974.

⁶⁷ See, for example: Josep Sánchez Cervelló, *A Revolução Portuguesa e a sua Influência na Transição Espanhola*. (Lisbon, PT: Assírio & Alvim, 1993); and, Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*. For an introductory summary of the various examples of this historiographic school see: Maria Manuela Cruzeiro, 'Revolução' e Revisionismo Historiográfico: O 25 de Abril Visto da História', in Martins, Rui Cunha, ed. *Portugal, 1974: Transição Política em Perspectiva Histórica*. (Coimbra, PT: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2011).

⁶⁸ See: Cruzeiro, 'Revolução' e Revisionismo Historiográfica', 134.

⁶⁹ See: Ibid, 130-132; and, for a representative example of Costa Pinto's views on this topic see, António Costa Pinto, 'Twentieth Century Portugal: An Introduction,' in A. Costa Pinto ed., *Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture*, 1st ed. (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2004).

Contextualizing *25 de Abril* as an event in the course of Portugal's democratization, limited here to the years after WWII, reveals an ongoing shift in a variety of institutional relationships between the 1960s and the 1980s. Under the dictatorship, Portugal was governed by coercion and, at best, tacit support. Coercion was achieved both through intimidation via the secret police, the *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE) between 1945 and 1969, its forbearer, the *Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado* (PVDE) between 1933 and 1945, and via constitutional centralization after 1933.⁷⁰ Salazar's 1933 constitution, which founded the *Estado Novo* and replaced the seven-year-old military dictatorship, which he himself had led since 1928, centralized power in the military president. Articles 81 and 82 of the constitution clearly placed all civilian bureaucrats, including Salazar, under the military head of state. In practice, this meant that the president's prime minister, Salazar, was at the center of daily state business.⁷¹ In addition to legal and police mechanisms, the *Estado Novo* also employed ideological and social instruments of control like its bureaucracy, its corporative structure, its schools, its propaganda, and the

⁷⁰ For the definitive history of Portugal's secret police see: Irene Flunser Pimental, *A História de PIDE*. (Lisbon, PT: Círculo de Leitores, 2011). For further discussions of coercion in Estado Novo Portugal see: Vanda Gorjão, *Mulheres em Tempos Sombrios: Oposição Feminina ao Estado Novo*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2002); and, D.L. Raby, *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal: Communists, Liberals and Military Dissidents in the Opposition to Salazar, 1941-1974*. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1988).

⁷¹ See: Diamantino P. Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: The Failure of Fascism*. (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991), 77-78. For one source that discuss consent and support amongst Portuguese citizens for Salazar's Estado Novo, see: Ellen W. Sapega, *Consensus and Debate in Salazar's Portugal: Visual and Literary Negotiations of the National Text, 1933-48* (State College, PA: Penn State University Press, 2008);

Church to intervene in everything from culture to the economy.⁷² The goal was to control the “desynchronizing developmental variables” of economic and social development in order to maintain the status quo. Between the 1930s and 1950s as part of “a model of programmed stagnation” Portugal had the lowest rates of urbanization, literacy, industrialization and economic development of any European country.⁷³ Such policies and structures meant that institutional development had to come from the central state. Indeed, the antecedents of many of the social security advances of the late 1970s – healthcare, education and social security – can be found in “Marcelismo”, an attempted liberalization of politics by Caetano. The health care of the late 1970s, for example, benefitted from the vaccination programs implemented by Salazar's successor.⁷⁵ However, it was not until the late 1970s, when state administration in terms of economic coordination, municipal governments and a central bureaucracy had developed enough to coordinate programs in all corners of Portugal, were the advancements of Marcelismo fully realized.⁷⁶

In this discussion, the most important change between dictatorship and democracy in terms of governmental institutions was in the increasing ability of

⁷² António Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 205.

⁷³ Ibid, 52. See also: Philippe Schmitter, “Liberation by *Golpe*: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal”, *Armed Forces and Society*, 2:1 (November 1975), 5-33. Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism*, 68. See also: Manuel Villaverde Cabral, “Sobre o Fascismo e o Seu Advento em Portugal: Ensaio de Interpretação a Pretexto de Alguns Livres Recentes”, *Análise Social*, XII:48 (1976), 895; and, Alfredo Marques, *Política, Económica e Desenvolvimento Económica em Portugal (1926-1959)*. (Lisboa, PT: ICS, 1988), 24.

⁷⁵ António Barreto, *Tempo de Mudança*, 25.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 26.

municipal governments to independently meet citizen demands. The *Estado Novo* had eliminated local autonomy by making local government, and its agents, appointees of the central government. Mayors were directly appointed by the national government and tended to be non-university educated, wealthy land or factory owners whose interests aligned with the *Estado Novo*'s. The only locally elected bodies, the *Juntas do Freguesias* (parish councils), were, in the end, reliant on the *Câmaras Municipais* for funding, and therefore subject to their whims. It is important to note that under the *Estado Novo*, no local or regional political structure or institution had any leverage over institutions above theirs, especially those at the national level. This began to change after 1974 as municipal officials became elected – the first elections were held in 1977 – and municipalities were given some financial autonomy in 1979.⁷⁷ Yet, scholars like Walter Opello concluded that, since into the early 1980s municipalities were dependent on the national and regional governments for upwards of sixty-five percent of their funding, local officials remained representatives of Lisbon in practice.⁷⁸

However, when we consider specific examples, the supposedly powerless municipal political sphere can emerge as lively and a site for meaningful participation. This is indeed the case when we consider changes in Lourinhã's

⁷⁷ Syrett, *Local Development: Restructuring, Locality and Economic Initiative in Portugal*, 150-151.

⁷⁸ See: Walter C. Opello Jr., "The Continuing Impact of the Old Regime on Portuguese Political Culture", in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 199; and, Joyce Firstenberg Riegelhaupt, "Introduction", in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 9-10.

politics and political culture between 1960 and the 1990s. Lourinhã was not the site of any major political actions like strikes, protests, or violent purges, nor was it the center of any oppositional, or supportive for that matter, forces for either the dictatorship or the democracy: politics evolved at times with, and at times seemingly in spite, of national machinations and intrigues.

By considering Portugal's democratization in the *longue durée*, we can also consider the relationship between economic modernization and political development. In many ways, modern society has, since the Second World War, come to be equated with Western European and North American *Democratic* society. In fact the most prominent marker of a modern society has come to be the existence of a democratic system of governance. Modernization theory, which gained prominence in the 1950s and 1960s, contended that political and economic development were intimately linked: economic development would, inevitably, lead to democracy.⁷⁹ More precisely, the effects of economic development – urbanization, increased education, and the diffusion of wealth and skills amongst the population – would lead to democratization as actors with new-found power would demand a greater say in political decision-making. By the 1970s, however, modernization theory's homogenized view of development's end point left it open to criticism. Still for some, developments in the 1980s, with the emergence of democratic capitalist regimes in new places and the fall of the

⁷⁹ See, for an early example of modernization theory and Democracy's role in that process: C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History*. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966).

Berlin Wall reaffirmed modernization theory and its link with a democratic outcome.⁸⁰ Democracy is the system that the international order in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has striven to implement across the globe as the best way to safeguard those high levels of literacy and education, low mortality rates, advanced capitalist economies, etc. that make a modern society. Democracy and its spread, moreover, has been identified as the defining feature of the twentieth century by some, including 1998's Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences, Amartya Sen.⁸¹ Based on numbers alone, many would agree with Sen. By the end of the twentieth century, 120 countries – sixty three percent of states with almost forty percent of the world's population – were democratic. This, Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin note, is the highest level of “experimentation” with democracy in the world's history.⁸²

Thinking about Portugal's democratization over a longer period also calls into question one classic account of the western world's march towards democratic government that breaks the history of democratic emergence into three waves. The first wave was limited to the nineteenth century, spilling into the early twentieth, and largely occurred in the United States and Western Europe. The second wave came after 1945, lasting into the early 1960s in much of Southern and Eastern Europe as well as Latin America and Asia. However, many of the gains made in this wave were lost in resurgent dictatorships in the 1960s.

⁸⁰ Lipset and Lakin. *The Democratic Century*, 140-142.

⁸¹ Amartya Sen, quoted in: Lipset and Lakin. *The Democratic Century*, 3.

⁸² *Ibid*, 3.

Finally, the third wave began with Portugal's revolution in 1974 and spread to other parts of Southern Europe, Asia, Africa and to Eastern Europe in 1989: Portuguese democratization was a leader and prime example of the third wave.⁸³ Still underway in the decade after the turn of the millennium according to scholars like Lipset and Lakin, this was the most dramatic and successful wave of the three, encompassing the most intense proliferation of democracy in world history and occurring in a fraction of the time of the first wave of democratization.⁸⁴

Homogenizing various transitions to democracy is problematic, to say the least. Cataloguing the emergence of democracies and lumping various national experiences into 'waves', papers over significant and evident differences in specific contexts separated by time and space. Indeed, third wave democracies have been labeled as domestic systems that emerged in spite of low economic indicators and political and cultural backwardness. They lacked, so the argument goes, industry, infrastructure, high levels of education and other variables that allowed civil society to develop to the point where democracy emerged out of popular movements. Instead democracy emerged because of elite leaders who would drag their backwards societies into the modern democratic world.⁸⁵

⁸³ See: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. (Oklahoma City, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3.

⁸⁴ Lipset and Lakin. *The Democratic Century*, 4-5.

⁸⁵ The aforementioned Samuel Huntington is the prime proponent of this argument. However, by the late 1990s, Huntington himself, and others, began to revise the theory suggesting that so-called third-wave democracies were, in fact, failed democracies, particularly in the former Soviet European bloc. Since they had skipped the developmental stages that first and second wave democracies had enjoyed, third wave democracies lacked the civil society and economic

This model has since been challenged as scholars have begun to dissect third wave democratizations, pointing out that civil society did in fact exist and contribute to democratization in several contexts where Huntington et al had insisted that elites drove political change. Especially in Southern and Eastern Europe cases, the existence and contributions of a nascent civil society and civic participation to democratization has begun to come to light.⁸⁶ Even under repressive regimes like Salazar's *Estado Novo* and Franco's Nationalist dictatorship, so-called ordinary people found room to contribute to "broader processes of political change" in the "contested terrain between the state and the private realm." Here, individuals were able to organize and pursue collective goals in the public sphere.⁸⁷ Such relationships would spawn social and

underpinnings to attain *modern democratic* status. This led Huntington to publish his *Clash of Civilizations* in 1996, arguing that democracy was incompatible with various world cultures. See: Richard Rose and Don Chull Sin, "Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies", *British Journal of Political Science*, 31:2 (April 2001), 331-354; and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

⁸⁶ For examples, see: Pamela Beth Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960-78*. (London, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Ramos Pinto, "Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth Century Portugal", 199-215; Dylan Riley, "Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: Italy and Spain in Comparative Perspective", *American Sociological Review*, 70:2 (Apr., 2005) 288-310; Paul Ginsborg, "Civil Society in Contemporary Italy: Theory, History and Practice", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 18:3 (2013), 283-195; Marco Lisi, "Rediscovering Civil Society? Renewal and Continuity in the Portuguese Radical Left", *South European Society and Politics*, 18:1 (2013), 21-39; Myrto Tsakatika and Costas Eleftheriou, "The Radical Left's Turn Towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths", *South European Society and Politics*, 18:1 (2013), 81-99; Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua Tucker, "Associated With the Past? Communist Legacies and Civic Participation in Post-Communist Countries", *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 27:1 (Feb., 2013), 45-68; and Constantin Iordachi, "The Collapse of Communist Regimes: Civil vs. Uncivil Societies", *East Central Europe*, 40 (2013), 141-149.

⁸⁷ See: Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain*, 2; Charles Downs, *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organisations in the Portuguese Revolution*. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989); Ramos Pinto, 'Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth Century Portugal,' 199-215; Pedro Ramos Pinto, 'Urban Social Movements

economic organizations in areas considered politically non-threatening to dictatorial governments like libraries, economic cooperatives, and volunteer fire departments that made later political organization much easier via participation and citizen training in democratic practices.⁸⁸ Those who suggest that civil society is the cradle of democratic transitions (as opposed to elite leadership or international intervention, for example) argue that that the moment when elites begin to make decisions about a transition to democracy should be viewed not as the beginning of the transition, but as the beginning of the end of that process.⁸⁹

That some look to elite involvement while others look to civil society as the drivers of democratization demonstrates, in part, the range of understandings of democracy. If we consider the democratic system – Democracy – then it makes sense to look to elite action and the implementation of that system when seeking to assess democratization. If, on the other hand, we accept that the success of Democracy rests upon popular acceptance of that system, then a number of social, economic and cultural considerations outside of the corridors of power should be considered when assessing democratization. Civil society and its

and the Transition to Democracy in Portugal, 1974-76,' *The Historical Journal*, 51:4 (Dec., 2008), 1025-1046; João Arriscado Nunes and Nuno Serra, "'Decent Housing for the People': Urban Movements and Emancipation in Portugal,' *South European Society and Politics*, 9:2 (2004), 46-76; Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, 'Did You Hear the Sermon? Progressive Priests, Conservative Catholics, and the Return of Political and Cultural Diversity in Late Francoist Spain,' *The Journal of Modern History*, 85:3 (September 2013), 528-557; and, Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, 'Dictatorship from Below: Local Politics in the Making of the Francoist State, 1937-48,' *The Journal of Modern History*, 71:4 (December, 1999), 882-901.

⁸⁸ See: Lipset and Lakin. *The Democratic Century*, 92-93; and, Riley, "Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: Italy and Spain in Comparative Perspective", 288-310.

⁸⁹ See: Radcliffe, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain*, 2.

context should be studied in a broader discussion about democratic culture.⁹⁰

The debate surrounding the role of elites and civil society in democratization, and the definition of democracy itself, hinges upon the chronological scope one applies. If an investigator is narrowly focused upon the events immediately adjacent to the formalization of democracy, elite contributions are likely to stand out as the significant factor. If, on the other hand, we consider a democratic transition in its historical context, the slow emergence of a democratic culture that contributes, but does not necessarily predetermine a democratic transition, is bound to draw attention.

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Without doubt, into the 1960s, Lourinhã's political landscape was changing at the same time as its physical, manmade landscape. It is the relationship between these two spheres that I am interested in. As has been outlined, the four decades between the 1960s and today saw fundamental changes to Lourinhã's and Portugal's politics and infrastructure. The democratization of Portugal's politics followed a democratization of access to infrastructure and the ability to shape the landscape. Focusing on a specific locale, Lourinhã in this case, allows us to flesh out the relationship between changing space and political culture and assess the relative influence of

⁹⁰ For a discussion of the variants in defining democracy see: Lipset and Lakin. *The Democratic Century*, 10-11, 19-20.

international and national processes like modernization and its components, like democratization, on a local micro scale.⁹¹

A focus on the conjuncture between politics, infrastructure and development in Lourinhã reflects the local nature of the discussion that follows. Infrastructure and economic development were two of the areas that most concerned the municipal government in Lourinhã in the period discussed. The state of Lourinhã's municipal archives reflect the importance of the town's built

⁹¹ In the strictest sense, what follows is not a microhistorical discussion. A microhistory looks at a specific event that should be considered out of the ordinary, dissects that event, contextualizes it, and in so doing, argues as to how that event could have taken place in its specific historical setting. Instead, the dissertation is a local study that uses a specific place over a period of time to assess the relative influence of big trends on a micro scale. For examples and discussions of microhistorical work see: Judith C. Brown. *Immodest Acts: The Life of a Lesbian Nun in Renaissance Italy*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986); Richard D. Brown, "Microhistory and the Post-Modern Challenge," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 23:1 (Spring 2003) 1-20; Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History*. (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1984); Robert Finlay, "The Refashioning of Martin Guerre," *The American Historical Review*, 93:3 (June, 1988) 553-571; Carlo Ginzburg. *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos if a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, J. and A. Tedeschi, trans. (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1992); Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni. "The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange and the Historiographic Marketplace," in E. Muir and G. Ruggiero eds., *Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe*. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1991); Jill Lepore, "Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography," *The Journal of American History*, 88:1 (June 2001) 129-144; Giovanni Levi, "On Microhistory", in Peter Burke, ed., *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, 2nd ed. (Great Britain: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Keith Luria and Romulo Gandolfo. "Carlo Ginzburg: an Interview," *Radical History Review*, 35 (1986), 89-111; Laura Putnam, "To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic World," *Journal of Social History*, 39:3 (Spring 2006) 615-630; Helmut Walser Smith, *The Butcher's Tale: Murder and Anti-Semitism in a German Town*. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002); Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Return of Martin Guerre*. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983); and, Natalie Zemon Davis, "AHR Forum: *The Return of Martin Guerre* 'On the Lame'," *American Historical Review*, 93:3 (June, 1988) 572-603. For examples of works that use a micro scale in the sense that this work does, see: William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: the Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945*, revised ed. (Danbury, CT: Franklin Watts, 1984); Brian Juan O'Neill, *Social Inequality in a Portuguese Hamlet: Land, Late Marriage, and Bastardy, 1870-1978*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984); José Cutileiro, *A Portuguese Rural Society*. (Gloucestershire, UK: Clarendon, 1971); Mercedes Garcia-Arenal and Gerard Weigers, *A Man of Three Worlds: Samuel Pallache, a Moroccan Jew in Catholic and Protestant Europe*, M. Beagles trans. (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003); Steven Ozment, *Three Behaim Boys: Growing up in Early Modern Germany*. (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1990); and David Warren Sabean, *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

environment. Today in capable hands, the archives fell into disrepair in the early 1980s when files suddenly became disorganized and incomplete. The majority of the documents consulted here, although preserved, are not catalogued and are stored as they were created. Although this provides a challenge to the investigator, it also offers a rare look into what the CML prioritized and how they tackled issues. Under the dictatorship, and in the early democratic years, the CML's organs preserved each case file with all supporting documentation in thematic folders by subject. What clearly emerges, in part due to the sheer volume of material, is the importance and contestability of issues of infrastructure and economic development.

Most works on pre and post 1974 Portugal deal with: the national government and its agencies; organizations that were at an arms length from the *Estado Novo*; opposition movements like political parties; and certain nascent civil society groups.⁹² In addition, these studies often focus on Lisbon or other larger population centers in Portugal. Small and middling municipalities and their institutions deserve greater attention. To that end, the following chapters continue to focus on Lourinhã and its municipal government's relations with its public and their institutions in building the contemporary infrastructure, landscape and socio-economic profile we find today. Thus, this dissertation makes two broad, but related arguments about democratization and its relationship to

⁹² See, for examples: Gorjão, *Mulheres em Tempos Sombrios: Oposição Feminina ao Estado Novo*; Ricardo Marchi, *Império, Nação, Revolução: As Direitas Radicais Portuguesas no Fim do Estado Novo (1959-1974)*. (Alfragide, PT: Texto, 2009); and, Raquel Varela, *A História do PCP na Revolução dos Cravos*. (Lisbon, PT: Bertrand, 2011).

infrastructure development and the politics of space in late twentieth-century Europe. Indeed, these arguments reveal the nature of how Portugal's space changed.

First, municipal governments and institutions played an important role in supporting democratization in Portugal. After 1966, the Portuguese government and its municipal agents refocused investment and development in infrastructure for a variety of reasons. In order to accomplish their goals, they invited and encouraged local residents to contribute to development in a range of roles. The relationship between municipal government and local resident did not change significantly despite the democratic mechanisms introduced between 1974 and 1976. Indeed, in Lourinhã, an unintended consequence of the dictatorship CML's encouragement of public participation in infrastructure expansion was the practice of democratic activities by residents, which eased and promoted a later transition to democracy. The fact that the relationship remained paternal after 1974 made it all the easier for institutions like the CML to reduce its reliance on public participation in development into the 1980s as its institutions developed to complete the work that individuals often performed in the 1960s. In other words, a discourse emerged that valued private participation in development when governmental institutions alone could not achieve urban and infrastructure goals. This discourse shifted over time, increasingly discouraging private participation and celebrating the contributions of the CML.

Second, the availability of basic infrastructure like electricity, running water

and roads, along with other socio-economic services like municipal markets, agricultural cooperatives, and tourist infrastructure and services became vessels of modernity – the requisite markers of a *European* country. The context in which such services became important was set with the rapid proliferation of western, modern ideas that flooded into Portugal between the 1960s and 1980s via migration, tourism and the introduction of the EEC and its investment money. With these tools in hand, built partly with tacit and explicit support from private actors, governmental institutions in Portugal and Lourinhã increasingly organized space in the country, limiting both the freedom of use and manipulation of the landscape by private actors. Thus, as Portugal democratized, citizens found an increasingly narrow field of action in terms of their contributions and influence on their landscape.

One will note two things about the chapters that follow. First, they are centered upon the CML and even when discussions arise about private action, it is often recorded via contact with the CML or the local newspaper (and government collaborator), the Church run *Alvorada*, which remains a holdover from the *Estado Novo* years. This reflects both the sources available and my desire to showcase the role of local government and its institutions in Portugal's modernization and democratization. Second, although the dissertation is thematically, and loosely chronologically, organized, the chosen topics of discussion are the economy and infrastructure. Again, this reflects the priorities of the CML between 1966 and today.

The discussion will start, in a historical materialist vein, with a conversation of the agricultural sector as the base of Lourinhanense society, how it can be used to glean a general understanding of what it meant to be modern, and what means were employed in order to modernize. Agriculture remains the primary economic sector in Lourinhã and initiatives were undertaken to defend that sector's prominence in the town. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Lourinhanense farmers were encouraged to modernize through education, the application of new techniques and technologies to their work, and through seeking help from other individuals and organizations. These methods remained constant priorities throughout the period in spite of economic and political changes in Portugal. Modernization and modernity in Lourinhã were deployed as conservative forces in an attempt to preserve the local economy and the individual farmer. Also to be observed is the fact that the CML and other government institutions, although driving the discourse, required local farmers to act as partners in modernization. Modernity could be encouraged, but Lourinhanense needed to engage with their peers and institutions to achieve their goals, introducing them, in earnest, to the civic sphere.

The second chapter turns to the CML's efforts before 1974 to develop the town's tourism industry in order to take advantage of the tourist dollars that were flooding Portugal in the 1960s. Buoyed by new national investments in infrastructure in the mid 1960s, the CML turned to its tourism infrastructure by opening a campground at its beach, PAB, in 1966 and reorganizing its *Junta do*

Turismo in 1970. These major initiatives were supplemented by an ever-increasing effort to lay new infrastructure like water and electricity networks, especially in PAB, which would be needed to offer tourists a comfortable stay. Here again, modernization in an economic activity (tourism) helped to drive modernization in politics. Indeed, the CML encouraged public participation in welcoming tourists and developing the necessary infrastructure like the previously mentioned water and electricity networks, and also hotels and restaurants. As was the case with development in agriculture, the delegation of responsibility to locals in tourism did help to advance the industry. However, a secondary consequence was the invitation of dictatorship subjects into the civic sphere.

The following chapter deviates slightly from the previous two in that it deals specifically with how groups of farmers organized cooperatives between the 1960s and 1980s. Although cooperativism enjoyed the support of both the dictatorship and the democratic government, co-operatives acted under both regimes as largely independent organizations. The three Lourinhã cooperatives highlighted, the *Adega Cooperativa*, *Lourifruta*, and *Louricoop*, all had varying degrees of government support in their founding and their operations. It is no surprise then that despite their arm's length status from the CML, they operated within the dominant discourse that sought to defend individual farmers and their private property by modernizing. Nonetheless, co-operatives represent the most important and successful attempts at civic organization and the practice of

association amongst Lourinhanense between the 1960s and 1980s. Coop members engaged in voting, debates and development allowing citizens from various levels of socio-economic standards to engage directly with their local politics, economy and landscape.

The fourth chapter highlights the height of issue-based organization and participation in the civic sphere by Lourinhanense who banded together in groups of varying size and complexity to lobby the CML for basic infrastructure throughout the 1970s. Focusing on the CML's initiatives in the 1970s that were aimed at spreading the town's electricity and water works reveals that locals were not passive agents in the modernization of the landscape. Instead, their interests aligned with the goals of the CML: they too wanted electricity and water infrastructure. Indeed, the CML and local individuals and groups worked as financial and political partners to install this infrastructure as both provided political *and* financial capital to various projects. In fact, the development of the landscape in the 1970s demonstrates that both the CML and locals proved savvy manipulators of the changing political landscape in Portugal. The course taken in the development of Lourinhã's basic infrastructure illustrates the power of the ongoing processes of modernization in Portugal between the 1960s and 1980s along with the citizenry's prowess in engaging with their local government in an ever shifting political culture.

Finally, the development of Lourinhã's contemporary landscape exposes just how tenuous the strength of citizen participation in development was. By the

1980s, the CML and other government organizations had grown to the point where they could drive their agenda in ways their dictatorial predecessors could not. Thus, public participation took a back seat to government-driven development as the CML reoriented and renovated Lourinhã's town center with the opening of a new market hall as a key step in this process in 1989. This development was strengthened by the fact that development priorities shifted away from projects (water and electricity) that would directly improve private property. Labeled the *European Lourinhã* in 1989, the town as seen today has taken advantage of the various developments in infrastructure and the economy that will be explored in this dissertation. In many ways, however, the development, which required public participation that introduced locals to the civic sphere in the 1960s and 1970s, resulted in an enhanced supervisory regime in the 1980s that could not only control the discourse in Lourinhã, but also the landscape. In this sense, the 1980s were marked by an ostensible pull back from public participation. Yet, as will be discussed, locals found new and innovative ways to manipulate their landscape despite the growing control imposed by the CML.

2. Lourinhã's Agricultural Sector in Changing Times

In 1986, Portugal became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC). This was the culmination of a series of agreements, beginning with Portugal's signing on to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1959, which reoriented Portugal's economic policy in order to develop and strengthen ties with Europe. At the same time, Lourinhã's mayor awarded the town's *Diploma da Medalha de Ouro da Vila da Lourinhã* to individuals and institutions who, not surprisingly, conducted business in the town's dominant economic sector: agriculture. The award winners were recognized for their work in the development of the local economy and its integration into national and international markets. Amongst those recognized were: the local volunteer firefighters and their musical band; the locally developed fruit and vegetable farmers' cooperative, *Lourifruta*; Lourinhã's agricultural buying cooperative, *Louricoop*, which had emerged from the remnants of the *Estado Novo's Grémio da Lavoura* [farmers' guild]; and the wine producing cooperative, the *Adega Cooperativa*. Leading the group of the individuals acknowledged in 1986 were António José dos Santos and José António dos Santos who were awarded the gold medal for their work in the cattle and poultry industries in Lourinhã. They were recognized for "motivating and dynamizing the local poultry sector and

Lourinhã's poultry raising infrastructure.”¹ Lourinhanense, as mayor José Manuel dias Custódio explained to the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (CML), knew the dos Santos for their work in developing new commercial networks while industrializing both milk production and the packaging of meat. Indeed, the dos Santos were heralded as part of the “bed-rock” of the local, regional, and national economy. They were men with a “modern economic vision” who were “at the forefront of the Europe of the EEC.”² They had not waited for Portugal to enter the EEC but had foreseen what local farmers needed in order to take advantage of the European market and had sold in the EEC before Portugal's entrance into the community. Not to be forgotten, but discussed almost as an afterthought, the dos Santos were good humanitarians who had donated to the building of Lourinhã's old age homes.³

By rewarding the century-old volunteer firefighter's band and those who organized and modernized agriculture while respecting traditional humanitarian acts like donations to the elderly, local elites established politico-cultural priorities in the age of European integration. As it turns out, citizens who were recognized in late 1960s Lourinhã engaged in similar activities: they donated their time to activities and organizations rooted in Lourinhã's tradition and humanitarianism while working to modernize the town and its economy. By way of example, a tribute to Lourinhã's António Gentil Horta was printed in the local newspaper, the

¹ "*motivação e dinamização do sector agro-pecuário ... [and] nos campos avícola*". See: "Reunião 18/Jun//86: Propostas E Intervenções Dos Membros da Câmara Municipal - Do Senhor Presidente", *Livro da Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, no. 41, pp. 68-69.

² "*mais adiantados da Europa das Comunidades*". See: *ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

Alvorada, upon his death at the age of seventy-four in January 1968. Sr. Horta had earned recognition, the *Alvorada* argued, for the projects and improvements that he directed in service of Lourinhã. He had revived and reorganized the *Associação Comercial* [Commercial Association], which was a nineteenth century business development association that had become defunct because of a lack of local interest. He also helped to run the *Associação dos Bombeiros Voluntários* [Volunteer Firefighters' Association], having been its first leader, conductor and an instructor for new recruits. Later in life, Sr. Horta managed a high school in Lourinhã in partnership with Sr. Dr. Pisana. Together, they used the school as a platform to advocate for the construction of a permanent high school. Further, Sr. Horta was an advocate for the rural *freguesias*, authoring a petition delivered to the *Administração Geral dos CTT* [the General Administration of the Mail, Telephone and Telegraph office – Portugal's national post] calling for the distribution of mail in rural neighborhoods.⁴

Both Horta and the dos Santos were motivated by a desire to modernize Lourinhã. However, their contexts made their respective goals markedly different in scale. The dos Santos' scope, due entirely to context, was much broader than Horta's: access to European markets would not have been as easily available to Lourinhanense in the 1940s and 50s, primarily due to factors like technology and government policy. Such disparity serves as a primary illustration of the difference thirty years of development in the economy can have on local industry

⁴ "António Gentil Horta", *Alvorada* (January 14, 1968) pp. 1, 6.

and culture.

In Lourinhã, Portugal's economic development between the 1960s and 1980s served to fundamentally alter the methods and organization of local farmers and their networks without radically altering their basic desire to operate within a free-market system and defend their private property. In the late 1960s, Lourinhã's agricultural sector, dominated by farmers who operated as small-landholders, was fractured. Farmers operated individually and were isolated. Although they were being encouraged to organize and act collectively, there were few avenues for collective action. Indeed, organizations that practiced collective production and commerce were limited to the farmers' guild and the *Adega Cooeprativa*, the wine-producing cooperative founded in December 1957 that, although it survived, struggled in the 1960s. In addition, cooperation amongst farmers was impeded by the small land-holding system, poor infrastructure and limited access to both modern equipment and foreign markets.

Supplementing impediments to cooperation was the fact that farmers, although being encouraged by elites and the *Estado Novo* to cooperate and organize, were, paradoxically, being told to do so in order to preserve the individual farmer and his way of life. A major reorganization of rural society along socialist lines was not remotely what was being suggested – not even during the Revolution did Lourinhanense farmers experiment with collectivization or land

occupations like their colleagues in the Alentejo did.⁵ Farmers in the 1980s continued to be encouraged to preserve individual landholdings; however, in contrast to the 1960s, collective action had opened access to resources, equipment, and markets beyond the reach of small landholding farmers that had become available thanks to Portugal's economic agreements with Europe.

The scale and areas of development also differed between the 1960s and 1980s. In the 1960s, Sr. Horta and his contemporaries were working on education and basic infrastructure and communications. In the 1980s, as Portugal tied itself to European markets, the goal became to adapt to international commerce. In both cases, farmers were encouraged to work to preserve small-landholding agriculture as the center of their lives. Collectivized farms were never suggested, common ownership of land and resources was not a viable option in Lourinhã, and modernization meant adapting to an ever-globalizing horizon by taking advantage of new technology and methods without compromising local structures and practices.

Between the 1960s and the 1980s, Sr. Horta's and the dos Santos' accomplishments that were celebrated remained remarkably similar in spirit. This continuity suggests that in fundamental ways both development, as an important goal in Lourinhanense discourse, and its meaning were unchanged in this period.

⁵ See: Nancy Bermeo, *The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers' Control in Rural Portugal* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). One major contributing factor here is Lourinhã's small land holding pattern, which stands in contrast to the Alentejo's large *quinta* land-owning pattern. With most farmers being landowners to varying degrees in Lourinhã, there was not the motivation to collectivize or occupy as there was in the Alentejo where workers were employed by large farmers who monopolized production.

In other words, developmental activities that were valued as ways to modernize Lourinhã remained consistent. This chapter argues that modernization in Lourinhã between the 1960s and 1980s was to be achieved through education, the use of technology and science, mechanization, and civic engagement that was meant to create an increased awareness of new methods and how those methods could be employed in one's own interests. In addition, the continuing emphasis on the agricultural sector reflected the ongoing concern in Lourinhã with the defense of traditional rural values. This continuity stands as evidence of the power in the belief amongst Lourinhanense that as Portugal transitioned from dictatorship to democracy, "if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change."⁶ Certainly, development in agriculture through education, technology, mechanization, and civic engagement was called for time and again to help the local economy meet new political and economic challenges posed by Portugal's transition from an insular dictatorship to a European social democracy. In turn, meeting such challenges motivated agricultural modernization in Lourinhã.

After first outlining some of the major political, economic and cultural considerations that stimulated modernization and development in Portugal, this chapter moves chronologically through the *Estado Novo*, the revolutionary years, and, finally, the democratic government of the 1980s. It pays particular attention to the efforts and ideologies of important contributors to Lourinhã's discourse surrounding agricultural development, including the CML, the national

⁶ Taken from Giuseppe di Lampedusa's novel *The Leopard*. Quoted from: Robert O. Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism", *The Journal of Modern History*, 70:1 (March 1998), 7-8.

government, local pundits and politicians, and, later in the period, regional organizations that emerged to help local farming.

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This chapter sets for itself the ambitious task of discussing the meanings of agricultural modernization in Lourinhã between the mid 1960s and the mid 1980s. The context under which this modernization took place was marked by both Europeanization and democratization. In the second half of the twentieth century, Portugal's politics and economy were undergoing renovation. After the Second World War, the foreign policies of the *Estado Novo* made Portugal what Nicolau Andresen-Leitão has called a "Reluctant European" in need of Western money and markets, but suspicious of political and cultural intervention.⁷ As a founding member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1947-48, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1959 and as a signatory of various agreements with the European Economic Community (EEC) throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Salazar's *Estado Novo* continued a pragmatic approach towards its Western allies that aimed to guarantee economic development while safeguarding social stability and the

⁷ See: Nicolau Andresen-Leitão, "The Reluctant European: A Survey of the Literature on Portugal and European Integration 1947-1974", *e-JPH*, 3:1 (Summer 2005).

dictatorship.⁸ Europeanization continued with the fall of the *Estado Novo* in 1974 and the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. As António Gouchão Soares notes, African colonial independence allowed Portugal to focus its foreign policy efforts on Europe. The seven-year negotiation and preparation period (1978-1985) for Portugal's entry into the EEC ended with Mário Soares' government signing the Treaty of Portuguese Integration into the European Community that saw Portugal take on full membership on January 1, 1986.⁹

Portugal's Europeanization went hand-in-hand with its democratization. As the economy opened to Europe in the 1960s, Western European ideas made their way to Portugal along with investment and products.¹⁰ As historians like David Birmingham have noted, not only was foreign investment and tourism a way to raise capital for Portugal, but it also brought "material aspirations to the 'docile' workers who had formerly been so 'easy to govern'."¹¹ Similarly, António Barreto has argued that although formal democratization did not come to Portugal until after the *Estado Novo* fell on *25 de Abril* in 1974, European input in Portugal had been changing Portuguese economic and social customs beginning in the post-WWII period, encouraged by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty

⁸ Nicolau Andresen-Leitão, *Estado Novo, Democracia e Europa 1947-1974* (Lisboa, PT: ICS, 2007), 21-22. See also: Leitão, "A Flight of Fantasy? Portugal and the First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community, 1961-63", *Contemporary European History*, 16:1 (2007), 71-87.

⁹ See: António Gouchão Soares, "The Place of Portugal in the European Union" in R. Herr, ed. *The New Portugal: Democracy and Europe*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1992), 49-50.

¹⁰ Sasha Pack has discussed this phenomenon in Spain where Western European tourists undertook a "peaceful invasion of Spain" in the 1950s and 1960s armed with "money, time and ideas" that challenged Francisco Franco's Catholic Authoritarian dictatorship. See Sasha Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain*. (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 1-15.

¹¹ David Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 180.

Organization (NATO) in 1949.¹² Barreto, for his part, cites the opening of Europe for Portuguese trade and commerce as the catalyst for economic and technological innovations as well as the emergence of the "European option" in the early 1960s. Political opponents of the regime – Humberto Delgado, Mário Soares, Arlindo Vicente, and others – looked increasingly, after 1960, to European democracy as a model for Portugal. Indeed, political oppositionists and intellectuals alike rallied to European inspired initiatives like the *Programa para a Democratização da República* in the early 1960s. Barreto correctly associates the "European option" in the 1960s with political "moderns and liberals", whereas regime supporters were "Africanists and, eventually Atlanticists."¹³ Portuguese emigrants to France, Germany and other European countries, who planned, unlike their fellow emigrants who went to South or North America, to make their stays abroad temporary, also played a role in Portugal's Europeanization. Along with tourists, returning emigrants brought European ideas through music, literature, fashion, etc. into Portugal.¹⁴

¹² Barreto has made this argument in several papers and articles. For one example see: António Barreto, "Portugal, a Europa e a Democracia", *Análise Social*, XXIX (129): 5 (1994), 1051-1069. See also his anthology of publications: António Barreto, *Tempo de Mudança*, 3rd ed. (Lisbon, PT: Relógio D'Água, 1999).

¹³ Barreto, "Portugal, a Europa e a Democracia", 1053.

¹⁴ See: *Ibid*, 1052. In some ways, however, scholars like Barreto are careful to note that emigrants also helped to impede Portuguese modernization. Emigrant remittances, for example, supplemented the income of farmers, helping them to finance their livelihoods and remain on the farm. Or, as Maria Baganha points out, emigration, since it largely consisted of redundant workers, served to relieve domestic pressure on the regime. See: Maria Baganha, "From Closed to Open Doors: Portuguese Emigration under the Corporatist Regime", *Electronic Journal of Portuguese History*, 1:1 (Summer 2003), 1-16. For further reading on how Portuguese emigration and the networks developed between emigrants and Portugal affected the homeland in the 1960s and early 1970s, see: Maria Baganha, "As Correntes Emigratórias Portuguesas no Século XX e o seu Impacto na Economia Nacional," *Análise Social*, vol. XXIX: 128, (1994), 959-980; Maria Baganha, "Portuguese Emigration After World War II", in António Costa Pinto, ed., *Modern*

The more distinguishable and oft used marker for those looking to bookend the democratic era in Portugal, in comparison to economic and migratory contributors in the 1960s, is the revolution that overthrew Portugal's longstanding dictatorship on April 25, 1974. *25 de Abril* is often cited as the moment when democratization came to Portugal. Although this is an assertion that, as discussed, this dissertation seeks to qualify, the Revolution stands as an important political watershed and thus deserves note as an event that helped shape the backdrop against which Lourinhã's farmers modernized.

Accompanying these political changes, Portugal's economic policy, investments and success also shifted and altered the context in which Lourinhã's agriculture would progress.¹⁵ Between 1935 and 1999, Portuguese governments engaged in guided economic investment plans. Five have been chosen as

Portugal, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Victor Pereira, "Emigração e Desenvolvimento da Previdência Social em Portugal", in *Análise Social*, vol. XLIV:192, (2009), 471-510; Helen Graham, "Money and Migration in Modern Portugal: An Economist's View", in David Higgs, ed., *Portuguese Migration in Global Perspective* (Toronto, ON: MHSO, 1990); Caroline B. Brettel, *We Have Already Cried Many Tears: Portuguese Women and Migration* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1982); Jim Lewis and Alan Williams, "Portugal: the Decade of Return", *Geography*, 70:2 (April 1985), 178-182; Eugene L. Mendonsa, "Benefits of Migration as a Personal Strategy in Nazaré, Portugal", *International Migration Review*, 16:3 (Autumn, 1982), 635-645; and, Joel Serrão, "Notas Sobre Emigração e Mudança Social no Portugal Contemporâneo", *Análise Social*, XXI: 87-89 (1985), 995-1004).

¹⁵ One early, and prominent, thesis in Portuguese economic history postulated that the economy under the later *Estado Novo* was stagnant. The so-called Stagnation Thesis has long since been disproven with authors from a variety of disciplines demonstrating the overwhelming growth that Portugal's economy experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. For the bases of the Stagnation thesis see: Mark Hudson, *Portugal to 1993: Investing in a European Future*. (London, UK: the Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report no. 1157, 1989); and, *Employment and Basic Needs in Portugal* (Geneva, CH: International Labour Organization, 1979), http://www.ilo.org/public/portugue/region/eurpro/lisbon/pdf/79b09_903_en.pdf (accessed April 22, 2014). Eric N. Baklanoff has been a prime example of an academic who has shown the dynamic growth that the Portuguese economy experienced between 1959 and 1974. For Baklanoff's discussions of the thesis' faults see: Eric N. Baklanoff, *The Economic Transformation of Spain and Portugal* (London, UK: Praeger Publishers, 1978); Eric N. Baklanoff, "The Political Economy of Portugal's Later 'Estado Novo': A Critique of the Stagnation Thesis", *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 29:1 (Summer, 1992), 1-17.

examples here: four under the *Estado Novo* and one under the social democratic government. In each, foreign and private investment increased while government investment in agriculture fell as money was funneled to infrastructure projects that would provide education, roads and electricity. The first plan, the *Lei de Reconstituição* (1935-1950), saw the Portuguese government provide one hundred percent of the money invested in production and infrastructure. Between 1935 and 1950, of the thirty-two percent devoted to the “productive sector”, thirty percent went to agriculture, while the remaining two percent was devoted to industry. Most of the remaining sixty-eight percent for infrastructure went to transport, communications, and housing, with only one and a half percent going towards energy production, reflecting the minimal state of electrical service in Portugal. The total invested equaled approximately 4,4 million contos.¹⁶

¹⁶ See table 6.1 in: Pedro Lains. *Os Progressos do Atraso: Uma Nova História Económica de Portugal*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003), 175. One conto was one thousand escudos. Thus, 4,4 million contos is 4,400,000,000\$00 escudos.




Table 2: Contributions by the Government, Foreign and Private sectors in Government development plans in the twentieth century. See: Pedro Lains. *Os Progressos do Atraso: Uma Nova História Económica de Portugal*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003), 175.




Table 3: Investment in various sectors and services in the Portuguese Government's development plans of the twentieth-century. Of note is the sharp initial decline in investment in agriculture and increase in industrial investment. In addition, investment in electrical energy saw a rapid influx of resources in the 1950s and 1960s as Portugal electrified its landscape. See: Pedro Lains. *Os Progressos do Atraso: Uma Nova História Económica de Portugal*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003), 175.

The *I Plano de Fomento* (1953-1959) saw government investment fall to fifty-one percent with the private sector contributing thirty-nine percent of investment and foreign capital making up the remaining ten percent. Investment in agriculture fell to seventeen percent while industrial development received almost twelve percent of expenditures. Infrastructure investment remained around seventy percent, with the energy sector receiving the lion's share of money at thirty-five percent. In these five years, a total of eight million contos was invested, almost double the amount spent in the fifteen years between 1935 and 1950, not accounting for inflation. In contrast to the LRE, education and health received funding although it was a meager two percent.¹⁷

The *II Plano de Fomento* (1959-1964), which coincided with Portugal's entry into the EFTA and the opening of the economy to Europe, saw government investment fall again in favour of foreign investment. Foreign investment matched government investment at twenty-three percent with the private sector providing fifty-four percent of the twenty-one million contos invested over the length of the plan. In this plan, investment in the "production sectors" increased from thirty to forty-five percent, with investment in agriculture remaining unchanged at about seventeen percent. This meant that industry received the lion's share, up from

¹⁷ Ibid.

twelve to twenty-eight percent. Infrastructure fell to fifty-five percent, with roads and communications investment remaining at about thirty-percent and energy investment falling to twenty-one percent. Education was given about three and a half percent.¹⁸

The *III Plano de Fomento* (1968-1973) saw the private sector contribute the lion's share of investment at fifty-seven percent while the percentage of foreign investment fell to thirteen percent.¹⁹ The government contributed thirty percent of total investment. Agricultural investment fell again to thirteen percent while industry received twenty-five percent of spending. Tourism received, for the first time, funding of nine percent while energy investment remained around fifteen percent and transport and communications fell to twenty-four percent. Education received about six percent. In this period, investment ballooned to one hundred and twenty-two million contos.²⁰ The fact that tourism and service development received public funds for the first time is significant. Indeed, by the late 1960s, the Portuguese tourist industry had been booming for almost a

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ The drop in the percentage contributed to the development plan by foreign investment, is not, as some might assume, related to the protracted colonial war in which the Estado Novo was stubbornly engaged in its colonies, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, Western powers like the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies were tolerant of the *Estado Novo's* colonial adventure in the Cold War context, which pitted Portugal against Soviet and Chinese backed African nationals. In fact, Salazar utilized NATO aid as France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) provided war material and the United States granted a significant loan in 1972. Further, the drop in foreign investment will seem even more surprising given the shift discussed in this dissertation, and elsewhere, towards European investment to develop Portugal's economy in the 1960s in order to weather the problems faced because of the colonial wars. See: Thomas C. Bruneau, "Out of Africa and Into Europe: Towards and Analysis of Portuguese Foreign Policy", *International Journal*, 32:2, European Foreign Policies (Spring 1977), 292; and, Walter C. Opello, *Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 128.

²⁰ See table 6.1 in: Lains. *Os Progressos do Atraso*, 175.

decade, contributing large sums of money to Portugal's balance sheet.²¹

Finally, the democratic government engaged in 'Regional Development Plans', like the *Plano de Desenvolvimento Regional* (1994-1999), which, for example, was mainly funded (fifty-three percent) by foreign investment.²² The remaining forty seven percent of the 6,560 million contos spent, was provided by the government and domestic private sector: twelve and a half and thirty-five percent respectively. Agricultural spending remained at about sixteen percent with industry receiving twenty-four percent. Energy development was down to less than one percent, reflecting the advanced state of Portugal's electrical network, while roads and communications still received about twenty-five percent of funding with education and health receiving twenty-five percent, up from six percent in 1968-1973.²³

After the Second World War, these initiatives, coupled with Portugal's membership in the European Free trade Area (EFTA) in 1959, the nationalization of certain sectors and services in 1975 and Portugal's entry to the EEC in 1986, reflect the fact that the state has played an important role in Portugal's economic development in the twentieth century.²⁴ Generally speaking, historians have given most of their attention to the role of "economic politics" in promoting

²¹ See chapter 2 of this work, which focuses on Lourinhã's tourism industry in the 1960s and 1970s for a fuller explanation of the growing importance of tourism in Portugal.

²² Beginning in 1986, with Portugal's entrance into the EEC, the government engaged in regional development plans (1986-89, 1989-93, etc) aimed, in part, at decentralizing economic decision-making. For a brief description of these plans, see: *Programas de Desenvolvimento Regional* (Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional do Centro, February 26, 2010). http://www.ccdrc.pt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=331&Itemid=229&lang=pt (accessed April 22, 2014).

²³ See: Lains. *Os Progressos do Atraso*, 175.

²⁴ See: *Ibid*, 169-170.

economic development in Portugal.²⁵ They have focused on two state priorities: first, “agrarian reform” which changed the parameters of agricultural development in Portugal; and second, “industrial conditioning”, to promote the industrialization of Portugal.²⁶

The dual thrust in Portuguese economic development since the 1930s reflects the concern of critics who warned that industrial development could not be done at the expense of the development of agriculture. In other words, agricultural growth had to be considered while pushing for industrialization to achieve the government’s goals of reducing dependence on manufactured imports and investing in chemical manufacturing, iron production, cement and industrial equipment production, and the production of energy.²⁷

However important the economic motivations for investing in agriculture along with industrialization, these priorities seem secondary to the *Estado Novo*’s politico-cultural goals for the rural world, which continued to form the bases of much of Portugal’s culture even after the fall of the dictatorship. Salazar’s political discourse, aimed at “recreating rural nostalgia”, focused on promoting development in a number of areas that would reaffirm the viability and advantages of rural life in Portugal. The rural landscape was to be enhanced through public works like schools, bridges, roads, fountains and electrical

²⁵ See: *Ibid*, 28-29, 160-170 and Ch. 6. Lains himself notes this is a shortcoming in the literature and devotes his book to applying quantitative evidence in support of general politico-economic beliefs in the economic history of the dictatorship. Economic historians of Portugal have tended to judge the success of economic policy on the achievement of political goals, as opposed to quantitatively testable economic indicators.

²⁶ “*reforma agrária*” and “*condicionamento industrial*”. See: *Ibid*, 28-29 and Ch. 6.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 174.

infrastructure. Cultural and social life in the rural setting was to be preserved in sanctioned neighborhood social organizations and official institutions like the *Casas do Povo*. These would help to reinforce the formation of identity based on family, tradition, nation [*a pátria*] and Catholicism, all elements to be preserved and fortified by the state.²⁸

Lending his cultural power as dictator to the nostalgia for ‘Portuguese origins’, Salazar personally identified with the rural world. In his *Discursos e Notas* published in 1951, the dictator identified himself with “the rural spirit of which I am – in roots, in blood, in temperament – attached to the land, source of contentment and the improvement of men.”²⁹ Not coincidentally, Salazar degraded life in the urban setting: the city was a sad alternative to the countryside. Salazar lamented, for example, being away from the “murmur of water and the sound of the trees” whilst amongst the people of Lisbon who passed their days “sadly on the streets [without] a large park, without the luxury of the fresh grass and the cover of trees, where one could play ... run, take the pure air and intimately commune with nature.”³⁰ The city robbed the individual of their “destiny”. The cure was to conserve or restore the “ancient order, and historical mentality” that had been uprooted by the politics of the Portuguese state in the period before the *Estado Novo*, especially, the First Republic (1910-1926). Such attacks on the Republic included a devaluation of liberalism as

²⁸ Daniel Melo. *Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-1958)*. (Lisboa, PT: ICS, 2001), 44.

²⁹ “*No espírito do rural que eu sou – de raiz, de sangue, de temperamento –, apegado à terra, fonte de alegria, e do alimento ods homens*”. Quoted from: Ibid, 44-45.

³⁰ Quoted from: Ibid, 45.

well.³¹

For Salazar, Portuguese culture was based in history, tradition and the collective psychology of the people. Thus, the people had to be taught what Daniel Melo calls a “peculiar form of popular history”. Salazar’s popular history would work to legitimize “action” while also justifying the limited political options available to the Portuguese. Tradition became historicized, a tool for ideology that both legitimized and transformed reality.³² These cultural politics thus became the base of economic policy as well. Action, limited political choice, and tradition shaped how the *Estado Novo*, and indeed the post-1974 democratic regime, would have Lourinhanense respond to agricultural crises and modernize.

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The social, cultural and economic importance of agriculture in Lourinhã during the final decade and a half of the *Estado Novo* cannot be overstated. Locals, like those who led a workshop on agricultural development in Lourinhã in 1966, argued that the town was naturally advantaged in terms of agriculture and economic promise. From the sea, Lourinhã fished and its beaches provided the town with tourism dollars. Lourinhã’s wine was of excellent quality. The rich soil yielded fruit, vegetables, flowers, and other products. Not to be overlooked, Lourinhã’s proximity to Lisbon allowed the sale of these products in the

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid, 46-47.

metropolis with little logistical effort.³³ As for agriculture's cultural importance, the *Alvorada* also argued that farming was a primary concern of local citizens. Given that the *Alvorada's* self-stated reason for existence was to reflect the common mood in order to assist in the "renovation of the habits and ideas of the population, aiming to create greater hope for the future," it could not ignore the agricultural problems of the Concelho. In the *Alvorada's* view, agriculture preoccupied the minds of most of its readers, and farming's future was the source of many of the citizen's doubts and worries.³⁴

Many of these doubts and worries stemmed from the perception that agriculture was a sector undergoing profound change in the decades leading up to 1960. This change, along with adjustments in other sectors, was altering habits in agricultural society in Portugal. The *Alvorada* warned that whether this change was wanted or not, "like revolution it is without doubt a certainty in the agrarian life of Portugal and its effects, simultaneously devastating and rejuvenating, had already been felt." Lourinhanense were further warned that ignoring the "tremendous" transformation in agriculture caused by "progress in science, technology, economics, and society" would be a shame as new ideas and methods would pass one by.³⁵

Local elites expressed their concerns over the future of farming in Lourinhã at an early 1966 roundtable held at a local school, the *Externato D.*

³³ "Sessão Sobre Cooperativismo Agrícola na Moita dos Ferreiros", *Alvorada* (October 8, 1966) pp. 1, 4.

³⁴ "Agricultura Nova", *Alvorada*, ano 1 (November 5, 1960) p. 1-2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

Lourenço.³⁶ Those present at the meetings included such important local figures as the Mayor and the Secretary of the town hall, officers of the civil registry, delegates from the municipal health offices, the President and Office Manager of the *Adega Cooperativa*, officials from the Concelho's Treasury, Lourinhã's Secretary of Finance, representatives from the *Grémio do Comércio*, directors from the Hospital, the *Clube Recreativo*, the *Liga Agrária Católica*, and the *Lavradores* [farmers] *de Moita de Ferreiros* (João José da Silva, José do Nascimento and José Maria Pedro). Also in attendance were the primary school teacher and representatives from social institutions like day cares.³⁷ In the 1960s, roundtables like these were primarily concerned with a perceived and ongoing crisis in Lourinhã – a hallmark of the period is that there was always public discussion of crises in agriculture, the family, culture, etc., and the challenges associated with them. In part, this reflected the fact that between 1960 and 1986, the agricultural sector was contributing an ever-decreasing percentage of Portugal's national production. In 1960, agriculture contributed twenty-four percent of Portugal's production, yet by 1986, that percentage had fallen to just above ten.³⁸ As early as 1962, local pundits were writing about their fears in the *Alvorada*. Contributors explained that Lourinhã, an essentially agriculture town, was confronted, along with other agricultural towns in Portugal, with a "great crisis of poverty" due in part to a lack of rain, but also to the "culture of the

³⁶ Dom Lourenço was a founder of Lourinhã in the middle ages. Many of the town's facilities, clubs, etc bear his name.

³⁷ "A Lourinhã Quer: a Sua Promoção; o Seu Desenvolvimento", *Alvorada* (March 13, 1966), pp. 1, 5.

³⁸ See: Lains. *Os Progressos do Atraso*, appendix 6, chart A.2, p. 261.

countryside, which had caused a fall in productivity and a drop in the quantity and quality of the product produced.” This only made the imbalance between cost and the value of agricultural product worse. Further, the wages of farm labourers were “increasing alarmingly” due in large part to a shortage of labour caused by the “exodus to the developing industrial zones of Portugal.”³⁹

Lourinhã’s wine industry offers an example of the problems farmers were facing in the 1960s. The Portuguese wine industry was facing a crisis in these years. As the *Conselho Geral da Junta Nacional do Vinho* warned in 1965, “the country faced the most extreme crisis of ‘super-production’ of all times: 28,000,000 ‘hectalitros’ of wine produced in 1962 and 1963.” This output marked the best two years in Portuguese history; however, this “crisis of super-production” caused storage and price problems for both local producers and the *Junta Nacional*.⁴⁰ In response to the crisis, the *Junta Nacional* subsidized local *Adega Cooperativas*. Lourinhã’s *Adega* called a meeting in response in which local producers agreed to measures that reduced the price of wine on the consumer market, reorganized its transportation and delivery system, and committed to selling the *Adega*’s remaining inventory as quickly as possible.⁴¹ Such measures were meant to address needs of farmers who lacked the support and facilities to take advantage of the kind of increased production they achieved

³⁹ "Algumas Apreciações de um Lourinhanense", *Alvorada*, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) p. 1, 4.

⁴⁰ "O País enfrenta a maior crise de superprodução de todos os tempos: 28,000,000 de hectolitros de vinho produzidos em 1962 e 1963". "Comunicado do Conselho Geral da Junta Nacional do Vinho", *Alvorada* (February 14, 1965) p. 3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

in 1962 and 1963.

One editorial on 'New Agriculture' in 1960, argued that the modernizing measures and collective action that would later be taken in response to the crisis of 'super-production' were examples of a larger shift needed to improve the farmer's lot in Lourinhã. As the editorial explained, people suffered with "hard and unappreciated work ... with the hostile elements of nature ... an uncomfortable life ... [and were left with] economic difficulties and the uncertainties of the future." A "new life in agriculture" would mean an easing of the work of farmers through mechanization that would provide bread for their home and leave them time for recreation. These advantages were the byproducts "offered" by a "modern" civilization.⁴²

The questions for Lourinhanense were how to modernize farming without upsetting the structure of their society. Or, more broadly, those concerned were faced with considering what the meaning of modernization was in the 1960s. Here, the term *Desenvolvimento* (loosely translated as development but referring to a process of improvement) became the vessel for the meaning of modernization in Lourinhã. It also had varied meanings across different contexts. At the abstract level, in the early 1960s, Portuguese academics – excerpts of whose works were often reprinted in the local newspaper – provided a starting point for understanding the concept. One leading economist, Dr. Manuela Maria Da Silva, contributed to the *Associação Industrial Portuguesa's* series entitled,

⁴² "Agricultura Nova", *Alvorada*, (November 5, 1960) p. 2.

Estudos de Economia Aplicada, and highlighted the difficulty in defining *Desenvolvimento Comunitário*. Indeed, she suggested that it covered “a wide range of experiences.”⁴³ That said, it was her attempt to define it that the *Alvorada* printed in 1966.⁴⁴

For Da Silva, *Desenvolvimento Comunitário* needed to be a process that was driven at the local level by community actors supported by national bureaucracies and governments. Locals were to recognize the importance of the collective and its needs in order to come to “global solutions”, thereby ending “society’s traditional lethargy.”⁴⁵ As such, the participation of the population in *Desenvolvimento Comunitário* was essential and their sacrifice could be justified by the achievement, after time, of improved health and material benefits in the community.⁴⁶ Such accomplishments would be guaranteed by national governments, whose services and bureaucracies would support local initiative. Any widespread action, Da Silva explained, required the technical know-how and personnel that the government could provide. Their expertise would be needed to help lift underdeveloped areas to the level of those areas in the country that were more developed. National bureaucracies could serve to provide standardized dialogues and cooperation across community lines.⁴⁷ The collaboration of

⁴³ See: Manuela Maria Da Silva, “Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Uma Técnica de Progresso Social”, *Estudos de Economia Aplicada*, 16 (Lisboa: PT: Associação Industrial Portuguesa, 1962).

⁴⁴ See: “Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Uma Técnica de Progresso Social”, *Alvorada* (February 1, 1966) pp. 1, 3, 8.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

government and locals in development initiatives, for Da Silva, should be used to introduce gradual change to society so that the population could adjust to, and create an, “equalized and harmonized society” allowing all to access educational, social and economic services.⁴⁸ As such, a “new mentality” would be introduced to society, meaning, for Da Silva, that *Desenvolvimento Comunitário* would serve a certain political ideology: democracy. In short, *Desenvolvimento Comunitário* was to promote human liberty and value of the community through local and national cooperation in development.⁴⁹

Da Silva’s then, was a call for the abandonment of traditional methods, for cooperation between the state and various organizations and citizens for social progress through education, and for the promotion of the community as a defender of human liberty. Such a discourse was adopted in Lourinhanense discussions about development in the 1960s. Although this discourse was pervasive in many discussions, Lourinhã’s elites generally agreed that improving society started with modernizing Lourinhã’s agriculture. Certainly, science and technology, improved production methods and the reorganization of production, a better understanding of market forces and how to exploit them, and education were key instruments in how to develop Lourinhã’s agriculture. At the center of this discussion was the insistence of those in control of the discourse that modernization in agriculture was a moral virtue and, indeed, an obligation.

By way of example, the *Alvorada* described the modernization of

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

agriculture in 1960 as a “crusade” for the good of “the nation and the people”, which would be won by “sacrifice.”⁵⁰ Similarly, readers were warned in 1961 that, “without a strong, prosperous, and modern industry, you could not have economic progress nor could you elevate the standard of living for people.” If agriculture did not modernize through “mechanization and motorization, improved land use, the selection of seeds, careful and thorough fertilization, etc.”, farmers would not progress nor produce the maximum possible, and thus raise their standard of living.⁵¹

The use of scientific methods and technology was key to *Desenvolvimento* in the final years of the *Estado Novo*. Leaders of the local wine cooperative lamented that a “working hand” would falter if it did not wield chemical products, which would improve farmers’ lives by reducing the cost of production.⁵² Supporting this assertion, advertisers for agricultural equipment appealed to local interests in promoting advanced technology. By way of example, a September 1966 half-page advertisement in the *Alvorada* announced that a tractor dealer from Lisbon would be in Lourinhã on the tenth of October. The ad called on farmers to “consult their interests, which was also the interest of the national economy, at the retailer's information session” about the equipment available for

⁵⁰ “Agricultura Nova”, *Alvorada*, (November 5, 1960) p. 2.

⁵¹ “Agricultura e Indústria”, *Alvorada*, ano 1, no. 13 (May 30, 1961) pp. 1, 8.

⁵² Luis Graça, “O Presidente da Adega Cooperative Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)”, *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28, 1965) pp. 1, 4.

purchase by local farmers.⁵³

Farmers were also encouraged to work scientific techniques into their daily routines. Throughout the 1960s the *Alvorada*'s section on agriculture featured articles on, for example, the importance of treating seeds before planting, on potassium's virtues in growing tomatoes, on the price of producing salt, and on the defense of regional wines.⁵⁴ Another example featured articles on new methods of choosing plants and seeds available to farmers, on storing seed and bulbs and on fertilizing and experimenting with new fertilizer blends.⁵⁵ Farmers were also reminded about the importance of consistent reevaluation of their land and its potential. This meant that individuals were encouraged to frequently test the fertility of their land and the composition of the soil. Farmers were reminded that knowing the potential in one's property involved sending properly collected soil samples (a process that articles explained) to a laboratory.⁵⁶

Likewise, mechanization was an important tool in the modernization of agriculture as well. However, there were acknowledged drawbacks to the use of machines in farming. One *Alvorada* article on development, for example, walked a fine-line between levying an attack on non-mechanized farming and praising mechanized farming, being careful to suggest that both had their merits. A farmer with a tractor could do the work of "six or seven" labourers. That said, the farmer

⁵³ "Advertisement: Automóveis e Máquinas Agrícolas," *Alvorada* (September 11, 1966), p. 6.

⁵⁴ *Alvorada* (June 28, 1968), Secção Agrícola.

⁵⁵ *Alvorada* (March 24, 1968) Secção Agrícola.

⁵⁶ "Da Análise de Terras" *Alvorada* (March 24, 1968) Secção Agrícola.

with the tractor faced a problem: according to the article, he had a harder time adjusting his methods to conditions while working since a tractor moved so quickly. Farmers without a tractor could not move as quickly, but could evaluate their work at every step and were able to grow better quality produce in the short term. A farmer with a tractor certainly was capable of growing equal quality product. However, the mechanized farmer would have to wait, so the argument went, and evaluate and alter his methods at the end of each growing season. Thus, the farmer without the tractor could not produce as much, whereas the farmer with the tractor could, in the short term at least, produce more, but of lesser quality.⁵⁷ Mechanization was clearly the way forward. However, there remained value, at least in the short-term, in smaller scale production.⁵⁸

When technology and mechanization were not the most accessible avenues for modernization in agriculture, a greater understanding of market forces and their manipulation could contribute. Indeed, when technology alone could not improve the lot of those who used it, individual, regional and national actors were to turn to understanding and manipulating – but not challenging – the free market system in which Portuguese farmers operated. One article in the *Alvorada's* section called *Desenvolvimento* was a self-described "reflection and rationalization of tariffs as an indispensable element in the development of

⁵⁷ "Untitled", *Alvorada*, (June 11, 1965) p. *Desenvolvimento*.

⁵⁸ More research is needed, but I suspect that this ambiguity is related to the fact that most Lourinhanense farmers in the 1960s had neither the means to purchase mechanized farm equipment, nor, more importantly, the opportunity to use tractors and the like. Indeed, the smallholding land tenure that dominated the area meant that farmers' fields were too small to accommodate tractors, making their use inconvenient.

agriculture." Tariffs, if used properly, had value in a modern agricultural economy in order to subsidize farmers' shortfalls by protecting their markets.⁵⁹

From the highest levels of government, farmers were also encouraged to find new products in order to exploit a larger customer base. In one example of national government interest in agricultural modernization, the minister of the economy, Correia de Oliveira, before heading to London for EFTA meetings in 1967, met with the executive of the national agricultural fair. To be held in Santarém, the fair was to host Portugal's first national cattle competition in June 1967. The competition would judge eighteen varieties of cattle that provided a variety of foodstuffs including milk and beef. The criteria were wide enough to include foreign and domestic breeds: anything that was in Portugal's "economic interest." This was done to promote cattle farming – a potential area for small farmers and a "precious source of human nourishment" – as a rival or supplement to the nation's horse breeding industry. The fair "guaranteed an organization and atmosphere of interest [that was] certainly nothing inferior to the National Equine Competition, this year accented with brilliance."⁶⁰ In order to supplement the cattle competition a colloquium on national cattle breeding was to be held under the patronage of the Secretary of State for Agriculture. This meeting would be most valuable if it allowed workers in the industry to "debate the complex problems in cattle breeding."⁶¹ To be held in conjunction with the

⁵⁹ "Untitled", *Alvorada*, (June 11, 1965), *Desenvolvimento* section.

⁶⁰ "Feira do Ribatejo: Concurso Nacional de Bovinos na Feira de Santarém," *Alvorada* (December 23, 1966).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

competition at the national fair, the events were to feature and promote new directions in farming. The National Fair had, "for all its years ... enriched and renovated," and the 1967 fair would follow suit and motivate Portuguese farmers to explore the cattle industry, an endeavor described as a "major national interest."⁶²

The activities surrounding the cattle competition also highlight the final aspect of *Desenvolvimento* in Lourinhanense discourse during the *Estado Novo*: the need to be educated in new methods and techniques through public forums and organized events. In its first issue in fact, the *Alvorada* declared that a new mentality in farming was to be fostered by professional education that would teach farmers "new concepts in the agricultural market" along with techniques that would help farmers "specialize in acting harmoniously with the needs of the market." This would be achieved by the use of technology, scientific methods and the application of "rational management to labour." With these methods and the mechanization of agriculture, work would improve and production would become cheaper. Farmers were also encouraged to cooperate, abandoning individual action against the "devastating erosion" of their industry.⁶³ Other organizations, like the *Juventude de Agrária Católica* [Catholic Agrarian Youth], a wing of *Acção Católica* [Catholic Action] founded in the 1930s, echoed these sentiments. As early as 1961, the organization was working towards creating an open mind amongst youth in agriculture about technical and developmental problems in their

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ "Agricultura Nova", *Alvorada*, ano 1 (November 5, 1960) p. 2.

work. Their first *Curso Nacional de Extensão Agrícola Juvenil* [National Meeting for the Extension of Young Farmers] held in Coimbra in April, 1961, for example, included visits to the cinema and agro-economical study centers while covering topics like the organization and mechanization of agriculture, agricultural engineering, and discussions from national bodies like the *Direcção Geral dos Serviços Agrícolas* [General Directorship of Agricultural Services].⁶⁴

Despite a number of varied forums by a number of local and national organizations held throughout the 1960s, pundits of the early 1970s continued to insist that more was needed. As late as 1971, the *Alvorada* was complaining that the need for *tecnicização* [professionalization] in agriculture remained "notable and evident." As such, they called for a program that would "influence people." The paper argued that the "characteristics of modern man" would improve agricultural professionalization. Modern man was defined by: rapid technical progress; adherence to the concept of liberty; the psychological necessity of man to participate in the development of the whole; the need to specialize; the elevation of the cultural level of people; and, the "opening of the universal dimensions of man."⁶⁵

Advocates of development expressed frustration over the slow and uneven progress made in the 1960s with *Desenvolvimento*. Those with larger farms had been able to buy machinery by the mid 1960s and use it to grow more produce at a cheaper price. This opened a gap between farmers with, and

⁶⁴ "Movimento de Extensão Agrícola Juvenil", *Alvorada*, ano 1, no. 13 (May 30, 1961), pp. 1, 8.

⁶⁵ "Tecnificação na Pasoral," *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971), pp. 1, 6.

farmers without, the means necessary to meet pundit demands for modernization. As some complained, those farmers that started with more money were able to invest in land and machinery. Thus, they were then able to make more money. They had the advantage of producing with less cost by buying supplies in bulk. In contrast, the small farmer found it hard to buy a tractor or supplies at reduced prices.⁶⁶ In addition, such small farmers found little support from the *Estado Novo*. In the 1960s, Portuguese industry and resources remained in the hands of a plutocratic group of some forty families. In agriculture, as in most industries, this meant a significant concentration of the means of production. Farmers with less than two and a half acres owned nearly forty percent of the farmland in Portugal. In contrast, one percent of agricultural producers held fifty-one percent of Portugal's cropland. This juxtaposition corresponded with a geographic divide, as small-land holding systems existed north of Lisbon while large *quintas* dominated the southern regions of Portugal. The *Estado Novo* thus proved unwilling in practical, monetary terms, to help small-farmers who faced the dual problem of small, scattered landholdings and government food subsidies, which kept prices low.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ "Emparcelamento e Modernização da Agricultura: Palavras de Encerramento do reunião de Lavoura Proferidas pelo Nosso Colega de Equipa Eng. Manuel Belchoir," *Alvorada* (June 11, 1965), pp. 9-10 *Desenvolvimento*.

⁶⁷ See: Opello, *Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy*, 129-131. For further discussions of the inability of the dictatorship to assist small-landholding farmers, or the Portuguese government's, more generally, various initiatives, see: David Corkill, "Aspects of Portugal's Economic Development During the Late Estado Novo", *Portuguese Journal of Social Sciences*, 2:1 (2003), 70; Pedro Lains, "New Wine in Old Bottles: Output and Productivity Trends in Portuguese Agriculture, 1850-1950", *European Review of Economic History*, 7:1 (April, 2003), 43-72; Pedro Lains, "O Estado e a Industrialização em Portugal, 1945-1990", *Análise Social*, xxix:128 (1994), 923-958; Fernando Rosas, "Rafael Duque e a Política Agrária do Estado Novo,

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By 1974, with, or without the coming political revolution, Lourinhanense farmers faced a shifting economic landscape. Meanwhile, the politico-cultural importance of the small farmer remained central in motivating modernization. Farmers were being encouraged by various governmental bodies and media outlets to modernize the way they did business and grow their products. The need to educate themselves, reorganize how they worked, incorporate technology and new methods in their work and confront challenges was central to modernization. Certainly, the revolution did little to change the means and meaning of *desenvolvimento*. With *25 de Abril*, however, Lourinhanense farmers also, at least ostensibly, faced a shifting politico-institutional landscape as well as a shifting economic landscape. Indeed, the revolution saw the replacement of local government officials. Still, the revolution changed little in terms of both the local politico-cultural message, which remained Catholic and anti-communist, and the continued importance of government involvement in the organization of agriculture. An *Alvorada* article one month after *25 de Abril* explained that, despite the jubilation and their newfound political freedom, the Portuguese would still have to look to "Christ's message of equality" as the "best response" to ongoing challenges.⁶⁸

1934-44", *Análise Social*, xxvi:112-113 (1991), 771-790; and, Fernando Oliveira Baptista, "A Agricultura e a Questão da Terra – o Estado Novo à Comunidade Europeia", *Análise Social*, xxix:128 (1994), 907-921.

⁶⁸ Silva Moura, "O Povo Unido ... mas Consciente e Crítico," *Alvorada* (May 26, 1974), p. 5.

With the consolidation of social democracy and the election of Mario Soares' Socialist Party in March 1976, new challenges to the agricultural order in Lourinhã would continue to emerge and demand ongoing modernization. In the post 1974-76 period, with Portugal's impending entrance into the EEC, agriculture continued to receive politico-cultural encouragement to develop. Hanging over these discussions was the feeling, as the *Alvorada* complained in 1982, that agriculture was marked by the "sadness of our times."⁶⁹ Modernization continued to be driven by government and was focused upon the development and use of government services to intervene in farmers' troubles, their education, and in their production. Government also contributed to the creation of local and regional industry bodies to coordinate the efforts of farmers who, for their part, had to familiarize themselves with the challenges facing their community. Percolating below this discourse was the fact that agriculture continued to be fundamental to Lourinhã and its future.

Furthermore, the challenges facing the agricultural sector remained a key concern for governments and government policy after the revolution. One such challenge in the farming sector that saw the government take an active role in national farming, lay in the tensions between landowning farmers and their workers; which emerged as a concern in the democratic discourse after 1974. 1977 saw the *Ministério dos Assuntos Sociais* [Ministry of Social Services] reassess the economic and "social situation of the rural worker." The minister

⁶⁹ "Agricultura: Onde te Encontras?", *Alvorada* (October 1982), pp. 1, 5.

planned new legislation that would see the *Secretaria de Estado da Segurança Social* [Secretary of State for Social Security] become responsible for all workers, regardless of the sector in which they worked. This would put rural workers on equal footing with their counterparts in other industries and assess workers based on their socio-economic situation. The minister argued that land-owning farmers too often considered rural workers liabilities and drains on their business. The argument then followed that the relationship between landowners and their employees was permeated with mistrust and corrupted by suspicion. Such feelings could only be resolved, the Socialist government argued, if rural workers had the same protections as other workers, such as limits on their working hours, for example. Government protection would help to diffuse mistrust and give rural workers some freedom and "justice", which they deserved. Such an improvement in the relationship between farmer and employee would improve the agricultural industry: economic advantage would be gained by social progress in agriculture.⁷⁰

This initiative betrayed the ongoing change in social relations in Portugal: whose origins are the unintended consequence of *Estado Novo* policies to improve health and education, for example, and open the economy to foreign influence in its final decade. Despite the revolution, the processes changing social relations remained the same: education and social development continued to carry cultural weight. In a front-page editorial printed in October of 1982, the

⁷⁰ "Protecção Social aos Trabalhadores Rurais", *Alvorada* (June/July 1977), p. 10.

Alvorada asked in what state the agricultural industry found itself in the early 1980s. Reflecting on its self-professed role as aid to Lourinhã's farmers since the 1960s, the *Alvorada* explained that it had been working towards creating "a vigorous economy", matched by "*desenvolvimento social*." Hence, discussion since the 1960s focused on four areas: agriculture, schooling ("escola", or school, was the word used, not "educação", or education), family, and health. Along with the Church, the *Alvorada* prioritized these areas and featured its successes in them. These included its participation in various social services and the fact that it brought to light the problems of conflict between the generations over education, and the strides made in agricultural education.⁷¹

Schooling in agriculture was employed in formal ways for development after 1974 and was supported by local organizations, individuals and government. In 1985, the *Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento Rural* [Portuguese Association for Rural Development] planned to open its first school for farmers in the Concelho da Lourinhã. Linking education to rural *desenvolvimento*, the explicit goal of the school was to give the farmer "professional training and human dignity" by giving value to the social and intellectual life of the rural world. The school's founding would involve the local *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo da Lourinhã* [Savings Bank of Mutual Agricultural Credit of Lourinhã] and representatives from the CML, the *Associação de Agricultores da Lourinhã* [Farmers' Association of Lourinhã], and

⁷¹ "Agricultura: Onde te Encontras?", *Alvorada* (October 1982), pp. 1, 5.

other farmers' organizations like the cooperatives: *Lourifruta*, *Louricoop*, and the *Adega Cooperativa*.⁷² Classes would be conducted in the *Casa do Oeste* in Ribamar and would be available to thirty students at a time. The parents of potential students contributed by participating in the founding meeting of the school, which was to start classes in September of 1985. The school was to be supported by the Labour Ministry who provided 150,000\$00 escudos per year, leaving any remainder to be paid by the local associations and student tuition, which was set at 3,000\$00 escudos (roughly the equivalent of what in 2014 would be 15 Euros) monthly.⁷³

The emergence of formal schooling gave agricultural youth, who were presented more and more as active agents in the sector, a more prominent position in the discourse as instruments of modernization in the years following the revolution. The *Alvorada* highlighted young farmers' thoughts in a September 1985 article. The story led with a complaint that older farmers, "the parents", had worked for too long without defining "agricultural politics". Quoting José Gutierrez, a national journalist who first reported on this worry amongst young farmers, the *Alvorada* noted that the agricultural politics of elders failed to win legislative support for youth and for farmers writ large. In the 1980s, so the argument went, legislation was the key to supporting the agricultural "class" and the industry. Costa Oliveira's situation was highlighted as an example of the plight of Portugal's young farmers. From the Lisbon district, Oliveira had, "without

⁷² These three cooperatives are the subject of chapter three.

⁷³ "Escolas Familiares Rurais", *Alvorada* (May 1985) p. 3.

credit or aid from government”, built a juice producing business. Instead of government subsidies, he had to rely on help from local associations and family for labour and support. Making matters worse was the fact that over half of the work force available to him was over fifty years of age. Young farmers did not want to "enter the game of politics." They simply wanted access to land.⁷⁴ In this way, young farmers became examples of the plight of Portuguese farming in general. Indeed, the farming sector had become bogged down by older generations. In contrast, youth represented a modernizing and forward-looking agenda that would escape the problems created in, and by, the past.

This politicization of agriculture – which had been evident under the dictatorship, as discussed earlier – continued as Lourinhanense were reminded that moving past problems, such as the generational divide between farmers, via *desenvolvimento* was important for the nation. Sr. João Correia – described as a local pundit and farmer in Lourinhã – claimed that Portugal, an agricultural country, "sadly" needed to import food. He argued in the *Alvorada* that the mechanization of agriculture, "to its highest extent in each case," was needed for Portugal to realize its production potential. With this in mind, Correia applauded the international tractor fair to be held between March 26 and April 3, 1977 in the *Palácio das Feiras de Saragoça*. As he suggested, "all workers of the land who wanted to evolve and meet the demands of their country and humanity, who felt responsible for the development of agriculture" should attend the fair and take in

⁷⁴ "Jovens Agricultores Querem Estatutos: A Agricultura Está Envelhecida", *Alvorada* (September 1985), pp. 1, 3.

its technological expositions.⁷⁵

This discourse around improvement and development suggests a political awareness amongst farmers and their leaders as to their responsibility to the nation, as well as their sector. In one of many events in Lourinhã throughout the 1980s, a conference about the "*Mercado de Frutos e Hortícolas Frescos* [the fresh fruit and horticultural market] and the ascension of Portugal to the EEC" was held on March 7, 1986 in the *Casa-Escola Agrícola da Areia Branca*. Over two hundred farmers attended and discussed "four fundamental pillars of the political community for fresh fruit and horticulture." First, the participants were taught about the "rigorous norms of quality" that should be observed if producers wanted to sell in the EEC. They were reminded that sale of sub-par produce would not be allowed in EEC countries. Second, farmers were told that "fundamental activity" was carried out by farmers' organizations. In fact, farmers' aid and subsidies would be administered through such organizations. Third, the EEC guaranteed prices on certain products to ensure "a reasonable return" to farmers. Price guarantees would be anywhere from forty to sixty percent of market average, depending on the product. Finally, attendees learned about available funds and services designed to protect EEC farmers who sold products outside of the common European market.⁷⁶

The sector's self-awareness was not only motivated by internal desires

⁷⁵ João Correia, "Temas Económicos: Feira Internacional de Maquinaria Agrícola", *Alvorada* (February 1977), p. 11.

⁷⁶ "Frutas e Hortícolas na Europa em Debate na Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (March 1986), pp. 1, 2.

and encouragement for development, but was also spurred on by perceived external threats to agriculture. Even in the late 1970s, with citizens still learning to navigate Portugal's new political mechanisms, locals were not shy about encouraging their leaders to defend the local industry from external competitors. The *Alvorada* reported in 1978 that one of the local town councilors, José Bento Gonçalves of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), had lobbied the *II Governo Constitucional* on behalf of the fishers of Ribamar. In his correspondence with the *Presidente da Assembleia de República*, [President of the Assembly of the Republic] Gonçalves described Ribamar as a port that Peniche's – a fishing and fish processing city just to the north of Lourinhã – fishing industry relied upon. Thirty fishing boats and five hundred fishers used it as their homeport to catch lobsters, fish, and produce artisanal products. It was an excellent natural port that needed help to transform it into an industrial fishing port. Gonçalves explained that Spanish competition along Portugal's coast had cut into local revenues. As such, he asked three questions. First, why had money not been allocated to improving facilities along Portugal's coast? Second, what was the government's plan to defend Portugal and Ribamar's fishers in the face of such losses? Finally, Gonçalves asked if projects existed, or had been considered, that would allow fishers in Ribamar to develop and use Porto Dinheiro to supplement their facilities?⁷⁷

Of course, however, the external threat to local farmers that loomed

⁷⁷ "Em Defesa dos Pescadores de Ribamar", *Alvorada* (October 1978), p. 8.

largest in the popular imagination was Portugal's impending entrance into the European Common Market (later EEC) after Portugal signed its accession treaty in the late 1970s. As early as 1980, for example, locals were turning their attention to what the EEC would mean to Lourinhã. The theme for the local events marking the *Dia do Agricultor Cristão* [Day of the Christian Farmer], for example, celebrated on April 13, 1980 in Ribamar, Lourinhã, was the "entrance of Portugal into the common market." Attended by the regional director for agriculture in the Ribatejo and West, Manuel Figueiredo, along with two officials from the *Gabinete para a Integração Europeia* [Office for European Integration], the session offered an introduction to the history, principles and objectives and functioning of the EEC. This included discussions on the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), with specific attention to the mechanisms for prices and markets. Questions asked by attendees, the *Alvorada* reported, focused on how the EEC and its mechanisms could help farmers and the types of problems EEC membership had caused member states. Specific areas of interest included aid for retirement, access to the agricultural industry for young workers, and price guarantees for applicable products. Officials acknowledged that entrance in the EEC would lead to "profound transformations and great sacrifices", but that such changes would be good for the development of the farming industry in Portugal.⁷⁸

Local farmers also shared with their colleagues what challenges the EEC presented and the changes that needed to be made in order to prepare

⁷⁸ "*profundas transformações [and] grandes sacrifícios*". "O Dia do Agricultor Cristão", *Alvorada* (April 1980) p. 1, 4.

Portuguese farmers. In the minds of farmers like João Perreira da Costa, Portugal was an essentially agricultural country. Further, Costa explained that the agricultural sector was, "as we all know ... for the most part, antiquated." Most farmers were older and thus not concerned with new methods of production, the analysis of the land, or in manipulating the land. For example, "ninety percent of Portugal's farmers did not know how to correctly apply insecticides." The lack of professional agricultural schools, in some pundits' views according to Costa, exacerbated the situation. The state was called upon to create these schools: as Costa complained, "we have to think quickly on this, [we only have] three years before we enter the EEC."⁷⁹ Portugal's accession into the EEC presented these farmers and their industry with a new problem. Costa worried that Portugal's relatively small and unorganized agricultural sector would not be able to compete with their neighbors in a free market environment. Furthermore, the different nature of land ownership in the north, where small landholding farmers were the norm, and south, where large quintas were owned by few and worked by many, exacerbated the situation and made a Portugal-wide policy solution difficult.⁸⁰ Others pointed out that Portuguese farmers faced two "big problems." The first was the division of property and the second was how commercial networks were organized leaving farmers with no guarantee of work or production. The resolution to these problems required official intervention to be sure. However,

⁷⁹ João Perreira da Costa, "A Agricultura que Não Temos e a Entrada na CEE", *Alvorada* (February 1980), pp. 1, 8.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

the *Alvorada* argued that those directly interested in the outcome of these solutions should also be involved. Lourinhã, it was reemphasized, had the ability to compete in the agricultural market. In order to compete though, evolution was needed. So, what was missing? The *Alvorada* suggested it was just "one simple thing:" everybody focusing their efforts to solve these problems together. This did not mean fighting against the EEC, but working to integrate Lourinhã into the common market. The EEC should be used, the paper argued, as a "motor to kick-start Portugal's transformation."⁸¹

Thus, Lourinhã's farmers were told that although EEC membership would be a great challenge, it would also be a great opportunity. As the *Alvorada* explained, with full membership in the EEC in 1986, Lourinhanense entered a "new era" for Portugal.⁸² The EEC was a European conglomeration of countries with economic, social, and political objectives. The EEC was not a finished project, but one that was ever changing and which required active participation from member states and their citizens. The *Alvorada* argued that, "the defense of a reality based upon the community would also be the defense of the legitimate interests of the Portuguese."⁸³ All understood the "reality of Portugal's agriculture – a backwards sector, in need of modernization."⁸⁴

The question was how best to prepare to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the EEC. The overwhelming answer in the 1980s was to

⁸¹ "A Lourinhã e a Adesão à CEE", *Alvorada* (March 1986) p. 5.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ "a defesa da realidade comunitária passa também pela defesa dos legítimos interesses Portugueses." Ibid.

⁸⁴ "realidade da nossa agricultura - um sector atrasado, a precisar de uma modernização." Ibid.

further organize in a variety of local and regional organizations. Local colloquia, for example, told farmers that organization in professional associations and the modernization of methods in agriculture, facilitated by organization, was the best way to prepare for common market membership.⁸⁵ This led to events like 1983's December 14-16, *Associação Dinamizadora da Regionalização da Agricultura's* [Dynamizing Association of the Regionalization of Agriculture] (ADIRA) second national meeting about the regionalization of agriculture. At this meeting ADIRA was scheduled to release a report prepared over five years by a government office in charge of regional agriculture, which was meant to relay the "positive experiences, the practical examples and the motivating realizations" of the regionalization of agriculture by coordinating crop growth, having certain municipalities specialize in certain products, and allowing regional bodies to guide investment. The report would offer lessons for the specific conditions of each region. This fell in line with the meeting's goal: to reflect on the work of the regional agricultural offices while promoting the augmentation of farmers' profits through the "best use of the factors of production (fertilizers, seeds, water, pesticides, agricultural machinery, manual labour, etc.)."⁸⁶

The agricultural regions under ADIRA were: Beira Litoral, Beira Interior, Ribatejo e Oeste, Alentejo e Algarve, Trás-os-Montes and the Entre-Douro e Minho. Lourinhã was in the Ribatejo e Oeste, represented in 1983's national

⁸⁵ "O Dia do Agricultor Cristão", *Alvorada* (April 1980) p. 1, 4.

⁸⁶ "II Encontro Nacional Sobre Regionalização da Agricultura - Decorrem da Melhor Forma os Trabalhos Preparatórios", *Alvorada* (November 1983) p. 1.

meeting for the regionalization of agriculture by Eng. David Geraides. Each region was asked to present three specific areas on which it could focus that would help regionalization, and what areas they would need help in. For the Ribatejo e Oeste the wine industry, livestock, and grains were targeted as areas worthy of development. In the wine industry, it was argued that farmers were not paid well enough for quality grapes. In livestock, milk and meat production were missing the infrastructure needed to produce cheese, process milk. In addition, grazing land in the area was hard to find and maintain. The regional grain farmers faced problems with water supply for their fields and drainage. The regional emphasis on flower production and the continued division of the land through small-land holdings exacerbated these problems.⁸⁷

Highlighting the importance of modernization through regional organization in order to defend traditional mores was the Catholic Church's parallel and supportive involvement with developmental initiatives in the 1980s. Indeed, the Catholic approach to modernization, in terms of techniques, followed very closely the methods outlined above. However, the Catholic approach to modernization was done, not in the name of defending economies and economic activity, but in defending traditional rural family structures and providing charitable services: in maintaining the economic viability of rural life, the traditional rural world would be preserved. For example, the annual *Assembleia Diocesana* [Diocesan Assembly] in October 1980 was concerned with organizing

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Portugal's farmers, both in preparation for entrance into the EEC, and for the protection of certain traditional values. Organized by the *Acção Católica Rural (ACR) dos Adultos do Patriarcado do Lisboa, na Região do Oeste* [Catholic Rural Action of the Adults in the Patriarchy of Lisbon, in the West Region], the meeting included representatives from the *Movimentos do Juventude Agrária e Rural Católica (JARC)* [Agrarian and Rural Catholic Youth Movement], from the *Acção Católica dos mais Novos (ACN)* [Catholic Action of the Younger], from the *Liga Operária Católica (LOC)* [Catholic Working League], and the President of the ACR. Sessions ranged in topic from the promotion of women in the agricultural sector, to professional training sessions for farmers, information sessions on EEC entrance, contemporary problems for families, relations between parents, children, and the school, on teaching faith ["*educação da fé*"], along with discussions on things like interfamily relations, aid for the poor, daycares, and aid for the elderly. Interestingly, the ACR also discussed voting and its role in "building society."⁸⁸

The ACR in 1980 identified three "fundamental problems" affecting rural people. First, the economic system and its "mechanisms and competition" challenged the Portuguese farmer. This led to an individualism that prevented the industry from specializing in certain products, something that would help maximize the sector's production. Second, the family faced generational conflicts as domestic patterns changed and children spent more time in school than they

⁸⁸ "Cristãos no Mundo Rural", *Alvorada* (December 1980).

had in earlier periods. Finally, the ACR suggested that farmers' deep belief in Christ led them to act without appropriate care. The ACR suggested, for example, that many Christian farmers applied pesticides and herbicides without proper protection for themselves or their consumers, endangering their mortal lives and thereby inadvertently ignoring the welfare of others.⁸⁹ This led the ACR to develop specific programs. 1981's plan of action for the ACR in the *Região Oeste* focused upon: the promotion and creation of a mentality that followed the message of Jesus Christ; helping the family with its inter-generational problems by defending marriage, the value of schooling for children, and the importance of men and women living together with the elderly members of their families and youth; helping farmer's organizations to resolve their "many problems"; promoting an *Escola Rural*; encouraging farmers to think of their place in the world; educating farmers about the consequences of entering the EEC; and, repetitively, continuing to promote faith in Christ.⁹⁰

1984 would see the ACR host a meeting of five hundred delegates to discuss "*jornadas sociais*" [social working days]. In addition to the delegates, the ACR also welcomed "other individuals" including the Programming Director of RTP (the Portuguese public broadcaster) and representatives from Catholic rural organizations in France and Spain. The meeting's goal was to reaffirm the importance of the evangelical role in the agricultural sector and of faith in rural culture. This meant that one was "to reveal and communicate to the rural people

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ "*revelar a comunicar aos rurais Jesus Cristo e o seu Evangelho*". Ibid.

Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit."⁹¹ A series of conclusions about social work came from this meeting, highlighting the organization's realization that the reorientation of the rural world after 1974 was threatening the 'traditional' way of life in Portugal. First, it acknowledged the "large transformations in the rural world in the past ten years (1974-1984)" and reaffirmed its belief that the protagonists of the struggles caused by this change were those that contributed to the "total *desenvolvimento* of each rural environment [and] solidarity with all rural people." The ACR also noted the transformation that was underway offered certain risks to the culture and identity of rural people. This meant that those engaged in social work in the rural world needed to "defend the identity of the rural man and preserve and promote his cultural value in the rural medium."⁹² Thus, the ACR rejected "urban activities." Complaining of the "invasion of urban types of diversions", the ACR suggested that participants in the brand of social work that they advocated needed to teach rural people the activities of their "heritage: folklore, traditional games, pilgrimages, and other popular festivals."⁹³

The ACR also recognized economic problems. Unemployment, underemployment, and low salaries were a key issue in 1984. It was a question of "dignity". The right to work was important for more than "winning bread", it also helped people "realize" themselves. The ACR's social workers were to combat poor employment by acting in "solidarity" with their fellow people by promoting

⁹¹ "'Jornadas Sociais' da Acção Católica Rural - 'Mundo Rural, anos 80: uma Situação, um Desafio, uma resposta', *Alvorada* (August 1984), p. 1.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ "*património: folclore, jogos tradicionais, romarias e outras festas populares.*" See: "*Ibid.*"

initiatives that would create work and helping with employment search services. The rural world had to operate with a "communal feeling." Part of the solution was to be found in reclaiming unused and abandoned farm land, upon which the "country depended to eat."⁹⁴ The ACR also advocated for social security measures in light of what it saw as the exploitation of farmers by economic sectors that benefitted from cheap agricultural produce and labour. It was the State's responsibility to step in, especially before Portugal entered the EEC. This could also be solved with state education about EEC mechanisms.⁹⁵ Finally, the ACR called for the proliferation of various rural associations. Association life was crucial in order to promote and achieve public participation in civic life and, in turn, the preservation of Christian values.⁹⁶

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The agricultural industry and the rural world remained threatened throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In each decade, those in charge of the discourse dominating Lourinhanense politics, culture and economy called for development and modernization. Similarly, in each decade, development was based upon increased organization, mechanization, science, education, and increased civic engagement amongst farmers. Despite the economic and

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

political upheavals that Portugal experienced between 1960 and 1990, the goals and means of development promoted by the dictatorial *Estado Novo* and the Social Democratic regime that emerged after 1974 were remarkably similar. In fact, the modernization undertaken by the leftist democracy that won out in 1976 should be seen as a continuation and deepening of the *Estado Novo's* program of the 1960s. As new challenges and larger threats to Lourinhã's agricultural industry emerged, modernization deepened.

Some historians, like Edgar Rocha, Alfredo Marques, Halpern Pereira and Fernando Rosas, have argued that it is, in fact, increased government investment as crises emerged that should be understood as what protected agriculture and rural Portugal in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.⁹⁷ Arguments like this ignore the role of local organizations and individuals in preserving agricultural ways of life and contributing to their town's development. Certainly, this chapter has outlined a number of ways in which local organizations, starting with the CML and the *Alvorada*, including various local and regional associations, promoted and participated in agriculture's modernization to meet the challenges presented to local development by national and international changes.

In the chapters that follow, the continued emphasis on the elements of modernization discussed above will reappear in a variety of other contexts in Lourinhã's development. The leading role of the CML and other governmental

⁹⁷ See: Edgar Rocha, "Evolução do Défice Externo Agrícola, Particularmente no Domínio Alimentar, e Suas Causas", *Análise Social*, 15 (1979), 853-54; and, Lains. *Os Progressos do Atraso*, 179.

institutions will also continue to be featured. However, what becomes evident is that development and *desenvolvimento* in the various areas was a conversation, not a lecture: local citizens worked within the discourse set by government officials and town elites to manipulate modernization and affect their landscape.

3. Making Lourinhã a Tourist Destination in the 1960s and 70s

On May 28 1966, Portugal celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the '*Revolução Nacional*'.¹ The so-called National Revolution of 1926 ended the ill-fated Portuguese First Republic (1910-1926) with a military coup. In 1928, just two years later, the military administration would bring António Oliveira Salazar to government as its technocratic saviour from financial mismanagement.² The celebrations were marked by the inauguration of the *Ponte Salazar* on August 6, when the bridge was described as the "greatest work of engineering executed in Portugal."³ Spanning the *Rio Tejo*, the *Ponte Salazar* (today the *Ponte 25 de Abril* in honour of the revolution that toppled Salazar's *Estado Novo* in 1974) was heralded as a triumph of the Portuguese nation and a symbol of the capabilities and patriotism of the *Estado Novo* and its functionaries.⁴ Its proximity to Belem, with the Monument to the Discoveries, the Monastery of St. Jerome (where Vasco da Gama and the national poet, Luis Vaz de Camões, are interred), and

¹ These celebrations existed despite the relative instability that plagued the military dictatorship in the years immediately following 1926. The instability stemmed partly from the nature of the coup – Marcelo Caetano later said that, "everyone knew what they did not want" – the various factions that emerged as power brokers after 1926, and from the tenuous relationship between Salazar, the military, and the radical right, particularly before World War Two, but after as well. For overview's of the regime's and Salazar's difficult relationship with the army and radical right after 1926 see: António Costa-Pinto, "The Radical Right and the Military Dictatorship in Portugal: the National May 28 League (1926-1933)", *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 23:1 (Summer 1986), 1-15; and, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, "Salazar, the Portuguese Army, and Great War Commemoration, 1936-45", *Contemporary European History*, 20:4 (2011), 405-418.

² As I write this in late 2011, democratic governments in Italy and Greece have appointed financial technocrats as Prime Ministers to reign in contemporary financial crises.

³ "*maior obra de engenharia executada em Portugal*". See: "Comemoração de Duas Datas", *Boletim de Informações* (August 7, 1966), Plano Comemorativo para 1966, Proc. O-12/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

⁴ "Efectivamente Inaugurada a Ponte Salazar Sobre o Tejo ao Serviço da Nação", *Alvorada* (August 28, 1966) p. 1.

the medieval defensive Tower of Belem, further cemented the Ponte Salazar's importance as a national symbol.⁵

Infrastructure projects like the *Ponte Salazar* would become the lasting legacy of the commemorations of the fortieth anniversary of the National Revolution of May 28, 1926. Lourinhã would use the occasion to embark on its own program of urbanization that would, as discussed in the introduction, define the next four decades of the town's development.⁶ In the short term, Lourinhã's program in honour of the fortieth anniversary of May 1926 saw "various improvements [that were] of public interest."⁷ The inauguration of the new postal building and the opening of the *Parque de Campismo* in PAB were the highlights of the town's many projects and represented the initial steps in building its

⁵ Ellen Sapega describes the Lisbon neighborhood as "a prime example of a site of national memory (*a lieu de mémoire*) in which, or onto which, successive generations have sought to inscribe symbolic reminders of collective experience, Belém presently constitutes an urban area where successive versions of official, state-sanctioned memories of Portugal's imperial project have been conflated with material remains." See: Ellen W. Sapega, "Remembering Empire/Forgetting the Colonies: Accretions of Memory and the Limits of Commemoration in a Lisbon Neighborhood," *History & Memory*, 20:2 (Fall/Winter 2008), 19.

⁶ "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional", Governo Civil do Distrito de Lisboa: Comemorações do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional de 28 de Maio: Proc. D-13/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966. The Pousadas were established in the 1950s by the Portuguese dictatorship in order to promote Portuguese tourism to foreigners while promoting the richness of Portuguese history and its rural culture. In this sense, they resembled the *paradores y albergues nacionales* established in the 1920s by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in Spain. See: "Instalação de uma Rede de Pousadas", 1953, *Arquivo Salazar*, PC-8E1 cx. 562, pt. 107 (Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisboa, PT); "Plano das Pousadas", 1954, *Arquivo Salazar*, PC-8E1 cx. 562, pt. 112 and PC-8E1 cx. 562, pt. 115 (Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisboa, PT); Daniel Melo, *Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-58)*. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2001), 250-258; Raphael Costa, "The "Great Façade of Nationality": Some Considerations on the Multiple Meanings of *Estado Novo* Portugal in Travel Literature", *The Journal of Tourism History*, 5:1 (Spring 2013), 58-60; and, M.T. Newton, "Tourism and Public Administration in Spain", in M. Barke, J. Towner, and M.T. Newton eds., *Tourism in Spain: Critical Issues* (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996), 138-140.

⁷ "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional".

contemporary landscape. As such, the post office and *Parque de Campismo* can be understood as parts of a project of national and state renovation underway in a 1960s Portugal whose government's legitimacy was questioned by the colonial wars in Africa and whose role was being reassessed as part of a general renegotiation of the social contract in post-war Western Europe. The commemorations linked advances not only to the regime's founding moment, but also served as a reminder of revolution and a new start. The post office and the *Parque de Campismo* were the local manifestations of an attempt to rebuild and reshape the Portuguese state and nation in a time of crisis.



Figure 5: Lourinhã's post office, which opened in 1966, continues to serve Lourinhanense today. "Novo CTT", *Alvorada* (November 13, 1966) p. 1.

The post office should be understood as a tool for both communication and the proliferation of bureaucracy.⁸ Lourinhã's post office would house two

⁸ Benedict Anderson, in his seminal *Imagined Communities*, identifies communication via print-capitalism and the development of a unilingual bureaucracy, which spoke languages closer to

supervisors and ten postmen to improve distribution to the rural *freguesias* [parishes] of Lourinhã while overseeing mail, telephone, and telegraph services, thirty-seven local in-house mailboxes, and three service kiosks to sell stamps and serve the public.⁹ The new facility would expand the phone network past the existing two hundred and seventeen subscribers and nine phone booths, making it possible to service six hundred new subscribers.¹⁰ These improvements, according to the head of the Portuguese postal service, Sr. Eng. Duarte Calheiros, were made possible by the civil administration: Lourinhã's government, police, military, and church officials. The press, radio, and television services – the "organs of public information" – were also acknowledged. Mainly, though, the new post office was meant to be understood as part of the development of the Portugal's *Serviços dos CTT*, particularly with respect to their telephone service network.¹¹

However, given that Lourinhã's new post office was a national government initiative,¹² it was the *Parque de Campismo* and the tourist industry that served as a key motivator for the local administration in the modernization of Lourinhã's landscape, institutions, and political culture in the 1960s and early 1970s. Not

local dialects than was Latin, as related and foundational aspects in the creation of "imagined communities" like the nation. See: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (New York, NY: Verso, 1992), ch. 2-3.

⁹ "Inauguração do Novo Edifício dos C.T.T na Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (November 13, 1966) pp. 1, 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² The new post office had been proposed by the *Engenheiro-Director* for the *Serviços dos Correios, Telégrafos e Telefones* in 1961. Under the terms of article 10.4 of the *Regulamento Geral das Edifícios Urbanos*, national offices had the right to ask *concelhos* like Lourinhã to consider the installation of facilities in their towns. See: "Reunião 11/10/61: Anteprojecto do edifício dos correios, telégrafos e telefones da Lourinhã", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 23. (1961-1963), p. 41.

only was tourism important in building the Portuguese state in economic terms – it is no surprise that a country whose service sector grew from contributing 45.6% of its GDP in 1966 to contributing 74.7% of its GDP in 2010¹³ would have started building with a tourism related facility—but the *Parque de Campismo* and tourism also became sites of cultural and political development in the decade following the *Parque*'s opening.



Figure 6: The Entrance to Praia da Areia Branca's campground upon opening in 1966. A Voz (July 11, 1966). Clipping in: Parque de Campismo - Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. A-12/19 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

¹³ See: Instituto Nacional Estatísticas, *Estatísticas Para o Planeamento: Continente e Ilhas Adjacentes: 1960-1970* (Lisboa, PT: Instituto Nacional Estatísticas, 1972), p. 15, <http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/search.do> (accessed April 20, 2012); and, *CIA Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/po.html> (accessed January 20, 2012).

When the campground was opened in 1966, Lourinhã's mayor, João Ferreira da Costa, described his town as a rural *concelho* of the "2a. ordem" with a monthly market held on the first Monday of every month and annual fairs held in the various *freguesias* [parishes] over the summer. Lourinhã's economic activity was, he said, primarily agricultural. Ferreira da Costa noted that Lourinhã had no large industry, only two small ceramic makers and two small mechanic shops.¹⁴ By 1970, the town had added to its economic portfolio by reorganizing its *Junta de Turismo*: becoming one of thirty-seven *Juntas* in Portugal in 1970. Following some administrative turmoil surrounding the leadership of the *Junta* between 1968 and 1970, the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (CML) appointed a permanent president, Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. The appointment and reorganization included the increased formalization of the *Junta's* structure and procedures. Along with the opening of the *Parque de Campismo*, this restructuring represents the single most obvious effort made by the CML in the late 1960s and early 1970s at formalizing its structures and organizing the landscape.

The formalization of governmental structures and the organization of space—in the name of tourism in this case—are widely accepted parts of the

¹⁴ João Ferreira da Costa, Presidente da C.M. da Lourinhã to Chefe dos Serviços Culturais dos Correios, Telégrafos e Telefones (May 9, 1966), Administração-Geral dos C.T.T: Edifício dos C.T.T da Lourinhã - Inauguração, Proc. R-12/1 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

modernization of any society.¹⁵ The questions in this case become: why was tourism the chosen vehicle of modernization and what forms did modernization and development take? Tourism was one area that the *Estado Novo* recognized as not only a source of economic benefit, but of cultural benefit as well. The development of tourism in 1960s Lourinhã created an institutional culture that valued the development, protection and commercialization of an idyllic destination, characterized by a natural and rural setting that was serviced and made accessible by modern infrastructure amenities that the town lacked before the development of the region's tourism.

This chapter will first discuss the expansion of Lourinhã's tourist industry: the reorganization of its *Junta do Turismo* in 1970 and its being put under direct control of the CML in 1973, as well as the development of local tourist sites and infrastructure. These efforts reveal both the infrastructure and ideological priorities of the local governing institutions in the modernization of Lourinhã.

Second, it will explore the ways in which locals were invited to participate in

¹⁵ For how increased government systems reflect modernization, see: C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History*. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966), 13-16; Michael David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History", *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas*, 54 (2006) pp. 536; Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe", *World Politics*, 18:3 (April, 1966), 378-414; Bernard E. Brown, "The French Experience of Modernization", *World Politics*, 21:3 (April, 1969), 366-391; and, James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), particularly section one entitled "State Projects of Legibility and Simplification", 11-83. For discussions of modernity and space, see: R.O. Whyte, *The Spatial Geography of Rural Economies*. (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1982), 12; Paola Lanaro, "Economic Space and Urban Policies: Fairs and Markets in the Italy of the Early Modern Age", *Journal of Urban History* 30:1 (November 2003), 37-49; Brian, Owensby, "Domesticating Modernity: Markets, Home, and Morality in the Middle Class in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 1930s and 1940s", *Journal of Urban History* 24:3 (March 1998) pp. 337-363; and, Eric Swyngedouw, "'Not a Drop of Water': State, Modernity, and the Production of Nature in Spain, 1898-2010", *Environment & History*, 20:1 (Feb., 2014), 67-92.

advancing tourism and the ways in which government officials promoted, controlled and conditioned this participation. Although this involved local authorities accepting some public criticism as Portugal's dictatorship transitioned from Salazar's *Estado Novo* to Marcelo Caetano's *Estado Social* in its final years,¹⁶ the only acceptable relationship between state and citizen remained paternal in nature. In the end, what can be said is that although the relationship between state and subject proved to leave some room for popular expression, it was the institutions of the local government that ultimately mattered in how Lourinhã developed.

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Given the importance of institutions in building Lourinhã, it is crucial to understand some of the priorities and guiding principles of the actions that contributed to the town's modern landscape. By the time Lourinhã turned to tourism in a significant way in the 1960s, Portugal's national government had

¹⁶ Pedro Ramos Pinto reminds us that Caetano attempted a "wider policy shift ... to rebrand the regime as an '*Estado Social*' (social state), giving public welfare provision a central role in the legitimating discourse of the dictatorship." Ramos Pinto argues that these policies must be understood as part of the attempt to find new sources of legitimacy as social expectations changed after WWII and as the colonial question threatened the government after 1961. For Caetano, calls for democracy were misguided. What was needed instead was a measure of social security. Only with "prices that match salaries, decent houses, accessible education, efficient social insurance, good medical assistance and guaranteed pensions in old age and incapacity" would the people be satisfied. What actually occurred, however, was a renegotiation of the social contract in which the state took on new social responsibilities. Ramos Pinto argues suggests that the regime fell in 1974 because it over promised, and under delivered on its social promises – a fact that became obvious through open discontent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See Pedro Ramos Pinto, "Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth Century Portugal", *Contemporary European History*, 18:2 (2009), 204-207.

been shaping the industry for decades.¹⁷ Lourinhã drew ideological inspiration, supplemented by financial and technical support for projects, from national institutions. After outlining the national government's tourism policies, the discussion will turn to Lourinhã's administration and its efforts, including the reorganization of its *Junta do Turismo* in 1970.

In the 1930s, tourism in Portugal depended on the *Ministério do Interior*. In 1940, the *Secretario Nacional de Informação* (SNI) took responsibility for tourism and Portugal began to organize and develop tourism to compete with the rest of Europe.¹⁸ By the 1960s, the SNI had made tourism an increasingly important and transformative sector of the Portuguese economy. As the Portuguese government sought to find substitutes for its stagnant agricultural sector—from 23.2% of Portugal's GDP in 1961, agriculture, forestry, and fishing had fallen to only 12.2% in 1973—¹⁹ tourism emerged as an important source of income.²⁰ As Diamantino Machado has demonstrated, tourism became a key contributor of foreign currency and was second only to emigrant remittances as a

¹⁷ See: Jim Lewis and Allan M. Williams, "Portugal: Market Segmentation and Regional Specialization", in A.M. Williams and G. Shaw eds., *Tourism and Economic Development: Western European Experiences*. (London, UK: Belhaven, 1988); *Turismo: Separata do Anuário Comercial de Portugal, 1932*, 1st ed. (Lisbon, Portugal: Conselho Nacional de Turismo, 1932); and, H. de Carvalho Curado, "Cultural Tourism in Portugal", in Greg Richards ed., *Cultural Tourism in Europe*. (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996), 250.

¹⁸ O Presidente de Junta de Turismo Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: XII Serviço de Imprensa", *Alvorada* (December 27, 1970) p. 8. The State did not create a body responsible for tourism until 1911 when it opened the *Repartição de Turismo* [Department of Tourism] under the *Ministério do Fomento* [Ministry of Development]. H. de Carvalho Curado, "Cultural Tourism in Portugal", in Greg Richards ed., *Cultural Tourism in Europe*. (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996), 250.

¹⁹ See: Diamantino P Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society: the Failure of Fascism*. (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991), 21.

²⁰ By the mid 1930s, in fact, the Portuguese Central Bank was describing tourism as "the great new source of income to our economy." See: Carvalho Curado, "Cultural Tourism in Portugal", 250.

source of “invisible income” in Portugal’s balance of payments in the late 1960s. In 1967, for example, Portugal carried a trade surplus of 9,564,000\$00 escudos, yet by 1970 the country was carrying a trade deficit of 10,743,000\$00 escudos. Throughout those years, tourism contributed a surplus of between 5,376,000\$00 escudos and 2,659,000\$00 escudos.²¹ The increase in tourism’s relative performance reflected a shift that scholars Jim Lewis and Allan Williams have identified in Portugal’s tourism industry as it moved from relying upon domestic clientele and spa based travel before 1950 to one focused on taking advantage of increasing foreign tourist dollars and beach visits in an increasingly commercial 1960s Western Europe.²²

Beyond tourism’s importance economically, the *Estado Novo* recognized the sector’s propagandistic potential as well. Tourism became a privileged site for António Ferro (the head of the SPN and Salazar’s propaganda chief), who argued in the 1930s that the sector would become the “great façade of nationality.” Tourism was not only considered “indispensable to our renovation,” but it would also “lose its character as a small and frivolous industry in order to play an important role in directing and decorating our nation.”²³ This meant, as historians like Daniel Melo have noted, that tourism was part of an “omnipresent campaign for the *reaportuguesamento de Portugal*’, inspired by the integral

²¹ Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society*, 30-31.

²² Lewis and Williams, “Portugal: Market Segmentation and Regional Specialization”, 121.

²³ “*grande fachada da nacionalidade*”; “*perde assim o seu carácter de pequena e frívola indústria para desempenhar o altíssimo papel de encenador e decorador da própria Nação.*” António Ferro, quoted from Daniel Melo, *Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-1958)*, (Lisboa, Portugal: ICS, 2001), 250-251. For a representative example of Ferro's work, see: António Ferro, *Salazar: Portugal and Her Leader*. (London, Great Britain: Faber & Faber, 1939).

ideas of a mythical ruralism ... and a longing for Portugal's peasant origins." This led to the establishment of national standards in hotels—opening a number of the aforementioned state-owned Pousadas—manipulating folk culture and art, and holding and participating in both national and international fairs.²⁴

Reflecting the dominant propagandistic motifs in *Estado Novo* literature, the establishment of standards and practices vis-à-vis tourism focused on the promotion of Portugal as a rural, sun-soaked and unspoiled destination whose beaches rivaled the best on the world.²⁵ However, this focus should not be thought of as merely a cultural or political choice. Portugal's government had institutionalized its tourist industry later than most of its wealthier European neighbors.²⁶ Accordingly, given its increasing poverty relative to the rest of Europe, Portugal could not offer the same sorts of attractions that its European competitors could. As H. de Carvalho Curado explains, the Portuguese state knew that the rural nature of the country and its relative lack of "high culture resources" would mean a different approach to marketing tourism than Paris, London, etc. used. By the 1930s, Portugal's propaganda office was developing "a touristic promotion of Portugal based on popular features, instead of traditional cosmopolitan, learned activities with which the country was not at ease."²⁷

²⁴ Melo, 250-258.

²⁵ See: Raphael Costa, "The "Great Façade of Nationality": Some Considerations on the Multiple Meanings of *Estado Novo* Portugal in Travel Literature", *The Journal of Tourism History*, 5:1 (Spring 2013), 50-72.

²⁶ The State did not create a body responsible for tourism until 1911 when it opened the *Repartição de Turismo* [Department of Tourism] under the *Ministério do Fomento* [Ministry of Development]. Carvalho Curado, "Cultural Tourism in Portugal", 250.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Subsequently, propaganda officials developed a strategy that helped to emphasize Portugal's rural nature, highlighting:

the typical characteristics of our [Portugal's] villages as an alternative to the international magnificence of great artistic centers; the gaudy colours of our craftsmanship were emphasized, instead of the excellent foreign museums; the colour of our folklore, instead of great cosmopolitan amusement; the generous simplicity of our hospitality, as alternative to the worldly mannerism of great social life; the simple, savory regional cooking, instead of the cuisine of famous centers.²⁸

The regime developed a number of initiatives in order to exploit Portugal's tourism resources. The tourism secretariat's 1970 plan of action, for example, established so-called "*brigadas itinerantes*" that were meant to visit local authorities and agencies involved in tourism and help them to improve services. Tourist officials would learn that to receive tourists, they "should possess, along with the delicacy and kindness of a civilized person," a basic knowledge of languages, complete knowledge of the region they work in, and the capacity to put tourists in contact with people in all the related industries in their area. As had been done in Porto, where the *brigadas* began their work, local authorities were to establish programs for the art and history of the region: art and religion; an inventory of monuments and artistic structures; and the information needed to complete the professionalization of the officials in the region.²⁹ Second, the industry was to be professionalized and taught at tourism schools in Lisbon, Faro, Funchal and Porto. These schools would prepare tour-guides to present

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ "*deve possuir, além da delicadeza e da amabilidade próprias duma pessoa civilizada*". "Turismo", *Alvorada* (March 8, 1970) pp. 1, 5.

artistic and historic sites and help the visitor see the land as connected to its people, its monuments, and "the glories of the People [o Povo]." Through such initiatives, the visitor would see and learn about Portugal's greatness.³⁰

The involvement of the national government in tourism deepened in the latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s with new development plans that earmarked funds for the industry and continued to value certain types of touristic activities. The *III Plano de Fomento* (1968-1973) earmarked funds for the conservation of tourist-related sites, both natural and manmade: 42,000 contos to conserve and make beaches and rock cliffs on the coast more accessible; 42,000 contos to stabilize rivers in tourist zones; 30,000 contos for the conservation and restoration of national buildings and monuments; 9,000 contos to pave roads that cut through forests; and 3,000 contos to develop and protect hunting species. These "enormous expenses" were needed for "national tourism ... a strategic sector in our [Portugal's] economic growth."³¹

Certain national priorities were evident in the promotion of tourism across the various programs designed to shape the industry. These priorities were clear in a 1966 survey sent from the national tourist office to municipalities. As part of the "restructuring of Tourism" undertaken by the *Comissariado do Turismo*, Praia da Areia Branca's (PAB) *Junta de Turismo* [Tourism Office] was forwarded a questionnaire as part of a national study on how to improve tourism in the region

³⁰ "Turismo e Equipamento Turístico", *Alvorada* (March 22, 1970) pp. 1, 5.

³¹ "*turismo nacional ... um sector estratégico do nosso crescimento económico.*" See: O Presidente de Junta de Turismo Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: XII Serviço de Imprensa", *Alvorada* (December 27, 1970) p. 8.

north of Lisbon. The cover letter explained that the *Comissariado* wanted information on historic and natural sites, as well as any folklore or artisanal information about the area.³² Earlier that year, the CML had received a separate questionnaire from the *Comissariado do Turismo*. The document was broken into sections asking Lourinhã to describe: its markets and festivals; its monuments (which included “churches, chapels, monasteries, castles, medieval fortifications, Roman bridges, etc.”); its museums; any artisanal producers that might exist; regional pastries and dishes; local folklore; local sports that might have interest for tourists; any local theater, cinema, or casinos; the state of the local *Parque de Campismo* (if it existed— Lourinhã’s opened a few months after receiving the questionnaire); any picturesque sites or vistas; any thermal baths that might be available to visitors; if the Concelho had an airfield or landing strip; and any lakes, swimming pools, oceanic or river beaches.³³ These foci fit into Portugal’s concern for the protection, promotion and organization of traditional images and its recognition that it had to sell its less developed assets.

³² Presidente da C.M. da Lourinhã to Presidente da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca (May 7, 1966), *Comissariado do Turismo: Valorização Regional e Retenção do Turismo no Nosso País*, Proc. X-4/4 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

³³ *Comissariado do Turismo: Repartição de Fomento* to Presidente da C.M. da Lourinhã (January 18, 1966), *Comissariado do Turismo: Organização de um Ficheiro Turístico - Valorização do Património Regional*, Proc. X-4/1 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.



Figure 7: Newspaper Clipping. Praia da Areia Branca, Lourinhã looking to the north in 1966. In view is the youth hostel that continues in operation today. The caption reads, "Praia da Areia Branca gives optimal conditions to attract national and foreign tourists." "Iniciada a Concertização de um Grande Plano Turístico na Praia da Areia Branca," *Diário da Manhã* (July 11, 1966). Clipping in: Parque de Campismo - Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. A-12/19 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.




Figure 8: Praia da Areia Branca, c. 2014. The hamlet is at the north edge of the Concelho of Lourinhã and is in the Freguesia of Lourinhã.

Although the *Estado Novo* contributed to creating a local environment that reflected its propagandistic motifs, it was largely up to local governments to drive the modernization of the landscape. Nevertheless, this development was inspired by the same cultural priorities that lay behind the national government's efforts. Indeed, both the local and national governments recognized the politico-cultural importance of urban development.

In terms of local development, the CML was the main actor, touristic or otherwise, and following the opening of the *Parque de Campismo*, development reflected an increasing concern for building an urban environment to complement

the rural cultural priorities that dominated the discourse. Indeed, the CML's formal activity plans reflected a deep concern for urban improvement. At the beginning of the period, beyond noting schools, Lourinhã's activity plan for 1966 also listed such priorities as a new town hall, the completion of the *Parque de Campismo* in PAB, the widening of the access road to PAB, an increase in the town's treasury, the improvement of the town's electrical net, the maintenance of heritage buildings, and the acquisition of land for a new monthly outdoor market ground and Civic and Commercial Center.³⁴ Such projects had political value, and local opinions reflected it. A 1969 project to build a road from the town center to Abelheira was, according to the local newspaper, "well deserved", especially given that fact that, "we [Lourinhanense] deserve the advantageous opportunity of a political union between us [those around the Concelho]. Roads would lead to this union."³⁵ In another example, between 1970 and 1973, the CML approved the building of three "urban complexes" with residential and commercial units. The first was a complex in the north end of PAB and the second was planned for the Quinta de Santa Catarina. The third was a study in the possible urban development of the Quinta da Maria Gil in Lourinhã. Together they would help to "bear fruit for a better future for Lourinhã."³⁶

Precisely because of the political and social ramifications of development,

³⁴ "Plano de Actividade da Câmara Municipal para o Ano de 1966", *Alvorada* (November 7, 1965) pp. 1, 3.

³⁵ "*parece-nos oportuna como vantajosa uma política de união entre nós. As estradas estão no limiar dessa união.*" See: "A Abelheira, Zona de Turismo [II]", *Alvorada* (May 11, 1969), pp. 1, 3.

³⁶ "*produzir frutos para um melhor futuro da Lourinhã.*" See: "XXVII Serviço de Imprensa da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca - Concelho da Lourinhã: Informação Sobre o Turismo Local (II): Movimento da Construção no Concelho da Lourinhã," *Alvorada* (March 26, 1973) pp. 8, 4.

the CML was motivated to undertake certain types of projects and to control the foci of those projects. In the early 1960s, tourism and the tourist season were proving to be a massive motivation for development. As the 1963 tourist season approached, when swimming at the beach was possible, the CML scrambled to install fifty meters to read domestic water consumption.³⁷ Similarly, the sewage system at PAB proved to be a worry near the end of the 1966 season. An August 1966 letter sent to Lourinhã's mayor by the *Subdelegação de Saúde do Concelho da Lourinhã* warned that a "dangerous situation" existed for the public health of residents in PAB. The letter, which was sent in duplicate to all affected residents at the beach, explained that polluted water was seeping into the ground and contaminating the area between the campground and the *Pensão Santo António* – the small hostel at the center of tourist infrastructure at PAB. The "inadequate capacity" of the ditches along the walls on the main road running parallel to the coast, given the influx of tourists in the summer months, exposed the system's faults. The *Subdelegação* explained that the existing ditches had been built before there was running water when there were many fewer residents. Residents had been warned of this danger and asked to clean the ditches along their property. Still, the only permanent solution to the problem was to expand the sewage system.³⁸

³⁷ "Reunião 22/Maio/63: Fornecimento de cinquenta contadores volumétricos de água para redes domiciliárias", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 24. (1963-1964), p. 14

³⁸ Subdelegação de Saúde do Concelho da Lourinhã to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (August 2, 1966), Direcção dos Serviços de Melhoramentos Urbanos: Obras no Edifício a VIGIA na Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. O-12/28 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

The concern with the tourist season, and how the landscape should be shaped for it, continued into the 1970s. In 1970, the CML discussed the expense of the excess use of electrical energy for public lighting in PAB and decided that, outside of the tourist season, the expense was not justified. As a result, the number of public lights was reduced between the fifteenth of October and the thirtieth of May every year.³⁹ This is not to say, however, that the 1970s were a time of infrastructure subtraction. For example, in 1971 the CML demonstrated its proclaimed "great interest" in the "*desenvolvimento*" of PAB, by approving the development of a project to spread the public bus lines to PAB.⁴⁰ In search of allies in its efforts to improve the landscape, the CML proved interested in public feedback concerning how the environment could be changed. So, when the director of the *Parque de Campismo* was asked to summarize the complaints about the *Parque* in 1973, he reported that: visitors asked for more parking space; that the entrance to the *Parque* needed to be painted or white-washed along with the bathrooms and other facilities; sand needed to be placed in the parking spots and replaced after each rainfall; the pungent water from the nearby river needed to be cleaned or the *Parque* needed to be shielded from the smell; signs needed to be placed on main roads pointing to the campground; sewers needed maintenance; more public lights and electrical outlets needed to be added; and a receptionist and guards needed to be hired so that the *Parque* was

³⁹ "Reunião 26/Out./70: Iluminação Pública na Praia da Areia Branca," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 29 (1969-1971), p. 115.

⁴⁰ "Reunião 8/Out./ 71: Acesso a Zona Rodoviária da Praia da Areia Branca," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 30 (1971-1973), p. 31.

staffed twenty-four hours a day.⁴¹

Before public complaints and suggestions could be addressed by the CML, it was important to open access routes and infrastructure for development. Generally speaking, when it came to infrastructure and tourism, Lourinhã's situation was seen to mirror the national situation. As the anonymous Pascoais explained in 1961, "by the grace of God" Portugal had been blessed by its "geography, its natural beauty, its history, its climate, and its hospitable and happy people [so that], in tourism, it would find a great source of income."⁴² Before Portugal and Lourinhã could take advantage of the "great source of income", however, two "troubling problems" had to be solved. First, there was a shortage of accommodations and second roads were in poor repair and far too scarce. As Pascoais explained, "we need roads that are not discouraging," wide roads, "happy, flowered, and fresh." The roadways needed to cover the country allowing the tourist to visit many places, where they could meet "simpler people." As for accommodations, more hotels and hostels needed to be built while ensuring that the ones that endured met minimum standards like well-functioning bathrooms and tinted windows in rooms to reduce the heat in guest rooms.⁴³

When considering what to develop for its tourist industry in the 1960s, the CML decided that urbanization and infrastructure development were important if

⁴¹ O Director do Parque de campismo to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, (April 14, 1973), Parque de Campismo - Funcionamento de Parque - Sugestões e Reclamações, Proc 21-B/2 (1973), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1973.

⁴² Pascoais, "Turismo", *Alvorada*, ano 1, no. 12 May 5, 1961) pp. 5-6.

⁴³ "alegres, floridas, cobertas de perfume e de frescura"; "povos mais simples". See: Pascoais, "Turismo", *Alvorada*, ano 1, no. 12 May 5, 1961) pp. 5-6.

it were to take advantage of tourism income. This meant that electrical infrastructure, roads, waterworks, hotels, and other urbanization projects had to be started. In 1966, the *Alvorada* published an editorial defining Lourinhã's touristic environment. In describing PAB as an ideal tourist destination, the paper argued that the beach had a "splendid" camping site and baths with "all the commodities", developed under the mayoralty of Sr. João Ferreira da Costa and the Câmara Municipal. PAB also had "beautiful dwellings" in the "modern style, [it had] running water, good wine stored at the Adega Cooperativa, cafés, restaurants, fluorescent lighting, a playground, and various daily bus routes between the center of Lourinhã and the beaches."⁴⁴

Despite such triumphant declarations, local commentators continued to call for basic improvements. In a 1968 article, the aforementioned Luis Fragata argued that "Lourinhã needed much more." Some places had a great present, while others, with just a short paved road, could have a great future. As Fragata pontificated:

it would be an agreeable weekend, when one could visit Lourinhã and [all] its rich ocean coast ... not counting Ariea Branca which is already a princess, nor the already famous Porto-das-Barcas and its lobster and *caldeiradas* [fish stews], but counting, still, the future that Paimogo and Porto Dinheiro in Ribamar, could have with an easily created and short road to Maceira—and the springs in Vimeiro—already internationally known and frequented by nationals and foreigners.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ "estilo moderno, boa água canalizada, belo vinho puro da região fornecido em garrações pela Adega Cooperativa, cafés, restaurante, luz florescente, parque de jogos, a varias carreiras diárias de autocarros, entre Lourinhã e as praias." See: "As Praias da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (June 26, 1966) p. 1.

⁴⁵ *será um fim de semana agradável, ai poderá encontrar a Lourinhã e toda a sua costa de mar riquíssima, se a soubermos aproveitar, não contando com a Areia Branca que já está sendo princesa, nem o já famoso Porto-das-Barcas das lagostas e caldeiradas, mas contando sim,*

More accommodation and sites also needed to be operational. In the spring before the *Parque de Campismo* was opened in 1966 Lourinhã reported to the *Instituto Nacional Estatística* (INE) that, including the *Parque*, twelve tourist establishments would operate in the Concelho that year. Of these twelve, seven were restaurants (one in Lourinhã proper, one in Vimeiro and the rest in PAB), one was the *Parque de Campismo*, three were *pensões* (two in Lourinhã, one in PAB), and one was a *restaurante/pensão* in PAB.⁴⁶ However, in the eyes of local critics, these facilities were not enough. In the *Alvorada*'s 1965 Christmas issue, always published with an eye to reviewing the year that was about to end, local pundit Moura Guedes wondered about how to develop Lourinhã's tourism. Central to his argument were what he called urban improvements. He argued for developing Lourinhã's central square, for example, by adding a restaurant and a snack bar near the bandstand. He also called for a road connecting the beach at Paimogo to Ribamar. Yet PAB was Moura Guedes' focus. He suggested an Esplanade with tables, a hotel and restaurants, and a swimming pool, which would not be far from a nautical sports and recreation center near Paimogo. The installation of baths would, along with the hotels mentioned, help to bring tourists

ainda, com o futuro que poderá ter Paimogo e Porto-Pinheiro, este em Ribamar, o que facilmente poderia ser ligado por uma curta estrada à Maceira - termas do Vimeiro - já internacionalmente conhecida e largamente frequentada por nacionais e estrangeiros. See: Luis M. Fragata, "Para Rever: Mas a Lourinhã Necessita Muito Mais", *Alvorada* (November 24, 1968) pp. 1, 5.

⁴⁶ "March 31, 1966 – Turismo: Estabelecimentos Hoteleiros e Similares", Instituto Nacional de Estatística: Turismo. Estabelecimentos Hoteleiros e Similares: Proc. U-4/1 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

in the winter as well as the swimming season.⁴⁷ Five years later, similar discussions continued. The *Junta de Turismo* claimed that Lourinhã had welcomed something like "three million visitors in the decade before November, 1970." This success had been achieved, the *Junta* further boasted, without hotels and other facilities. It was only then, in 1970, that Lourinhã had a private hotel at PAB ("*o Luanda*") and was beginning to improve its bathing facilities—the *Junta* noted that as many as three swimming pools could be completed by 1971-72 (something that has not happened, even to this day).⁴⁸

However, success, or lack thereof, was not only attributable to local officials. An article in 1970 describing the *Serviços Centrais de Turismo*'s plan for that year grumbled that slow development in tourism was a result of a lack of infrastructure beyond the CML's control. As the author explained, despite "certain success" in the "many initiatives to organize the bases of tourism", the plan did not address basic infrastructure needs.⁴⁹ In the Algarve, for example, where the "sea, weather, hotels, and people" were "so splendid", sanitation issues remained too prevalent. Although the Ministry of Public Works had taken steps to remedy these issues, it remained for the national government to solve similar problems across the country. The discussion concluded by saying that although local and national tourist officials had to do their part in terms of "touristic equipment and professional training", it was ultimately up to the national public works officials to

⁴⁷ Dr. Afonso de Moura Guedes, "Enquanto Vemos Passar os Turistas", *Alvorada* (December 25, 1965) pp. 9, 12.

⁴⁸ O Presidente de Junta de Turismo Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: XII Serviço de Imprensa", *Alvorada* (December 27, 1970) p. 8.

⁴⁹ "Turismo e Equipamento Turístico", *Alvorada* (March 22, 1970) pp. 1, 5.

lay basic infrastructure.⁵⁰

Lourinhã's undeveloped public beach at Paimogo provides an interesting example of a blank slate upon which officials envisioned an ideal tourism development—one, I should note, that has still not come to fruition. In contrast to PAB, which by the 1960s had an established base for the development of tourism, the beach at Paimogo was yet to be exploited. The site of a small wharf where fishermen launched their boats, Paimogo had a naturally sheltered harbor—one of the many sites at which the Duke of Wellington landed his army in the Peninsular War in 1808—and the ruins of an old fort. Some, like the future president of the *Junta de Turismo*, Silva, saw Paimogo as an ideal site for future nautical sports, such as the ones practiced in tourist hotspots like Cascais near Lisbon and Praia da Rocha in the Algarve.⁵¹ For Silva, development had to occur at Paimogo to further capitalize on the tourist dollar. As he explained in 1966, “we all regret” the exposed ruins of the fort at Paimogo, while admiring the beach's “magnificent bay” that should have inspired the national government and the CML to open a Pousada in the old fort. Silva also mused about the possibility that the bay could be developed without upsetting the natural setting surrounding of the beach. His motivation? To earn a share of the “*dólares, libras ou francos*” spent on the Algarve coast.⁵²

Three years after publishing Silva's opinions, the *Alvorada* continued to

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Pedro Luís, “Praia da Areia Branca/1966:8 Apelos a Junta de Turismo - O Aproveitamento de Paimogo”, *Alvorada*(February 1, 1966) pp. 10, 9.

⁵² Pedro Luís, “Praia da Areia Branca/1966:8 Apelos a Junta de Turismo - O Aproveitamento de Paimogo”, *Alvorada* (February 1, 1966) pp. 10, 9.

complain about the lack of development at Paimogo. As one article explained, beyond the excellent natural conditions, its geographic connection to PAB, and its historic fort, Paimogo was a natural shelter and, as a place to launch fishing boats, was "superior to many ports in the country." They argued that building a quay for the lobster fishery, for example, would have great economic benefits. Such a facility would also help promote sport fishing. However, the *Alvorada* suggested that, "perhaps, the development of tourism at Paimogo had been ignored by the "Excelentissimo Secretariado Geral do Informação e Turismo." It insisted that Paimogo had beautiful land that could be developed for buildings and "a beautiful swimming pool."⁵³

This discussion about Paimogo also betrays the tendency amongst pundits in Lourinhã—following the lead of the national government—to romanticize and protect the natural environment and the rural Portuguese way of life. Indeed, Lourinhanense individuals and institutions used lyrics to describe their landscape as unspoiled, picturesque, and unpretentious.⁵⁴ One local columnist wrote that Lourinhã was a "Garden of Europe, planted on the ocean's coast" and a "Paradise" where "serpentine rivers with gentle waters flow, singing laments of love, kissing the rock bed and trees it meets on its way."⁵⁵

⁵³ "superior a muitos portos do país". See: "O Forte e Praia do Paimogo", *Alvorada* (March 9, 1969) p. 1.

⁵⁴ The town was often described as being in an ideal geographic setting for tourism. See: Luis M. Fragata, "Para Rever: Mas a Lourinhã Necessita Muito Mais", *Alvorada* (November 24, 1968) pp. 1, 5.

⁵⁵ "Jardim da Europa à beira-mar plantado"; "serpenteiam rios, sempre com águas mansinhas e suaves ao seu deslizar, cantando endeixas de amor, ao beijar as pedras do leito e as árvores que encontram no seu caminhar." See: José Manuel Landeiro, "da Lourinhã: Turismo", *Alvorada*

The most important element of Lourinhã's landscape, and the element that was cultivated and defended, rightly so according to commentators, was its distance from urban life. This is not to say that Lourinhã rejected urbanization, quite the opposite. It merely attempted to limit it to infrastructure improvements. Tourism in and around Lourinhã, and in Portugal in general, was defined in opposition to the type of tourism in cities like Paris, Madrid, Rome, and Lisbon. As the *Alvorada* explained in 1964, when Lourinhã's modern touristic agenda began to come into focus, there were two types of tourism. The first was the type found in great cities where one sought historic sites and "marvels of civilization and progress". The other was defined by the search for, and discovery of, places that had not been "invaded by progress with all its vices and inconveniences." The good news for travelers was that "many of [Portugal's] cities and towns were perfect for [the second] kind of tourism." They were places where foreigners and Portuguese could find "traditional hospitality." Industry and commerce had not interfered with the tourist's ability to see old monuments and the traditions of the "ancestors of the Portuguese."⁵⁶ In fact, Lourinhã's commitment to the image of an idyllic escape from urban space was a cornerstone of its tourism. Local commentators like José Manuel Landeiro explained that Lourinhã was on the road to, but not in, the "great urban centers".⁵⁷

(July 14, 1968) pp. 1, 4.

⁵⁶ "A Problemática do Turismo", *Alvorada*, (March 8, 1964) pp. 1, 8.

⁵⁷ José Manuel Landeiro, "Da Lourinhã: Turismo", *Alvorada* (July 14, 1968) pp. 1, 4. For a further discussion of the Portuguese program that sought to align present the country as a rural or natural destination, see: Costa, "The 'Great Façade of Nationality'". Indeed, foreign guidebooks reflected Portugal's touristic motifs, presenting the country as a destination in which to enjoy

Indeed, PAB, as was explained, was an ideal escape from the city without having to give up modern conveniences. There, one found new homes with modern architecture and modern restaurants “where one could rest their body and spirit from the noise of the city and take the pure air and sea breeze”.⁵⁸ Where urban development was needed, local commentators called for the establishment of “norms of construction” that would create and preserve garden areas and highlight the natural features of the land: “architecture without muscles or makeup”. Specifically, certain pines and other decorative trees were seen as ideal for improving the beach at Areia Branca.⁵⁹

In Lourinhã, domestic visitors from urban centers were often highlighted in order to emphasize the town as an escape from the city. The *Junta de Turismo* reported that on June 6, 1971, “dozens” of cars came from Lisbon to Lourinhã. Along with six buses, the cars brought “more than 2000 people” to visit the gothic arcades of Lourinhã’s *Igreja do Castelo*.⁶⁰ Such visits were not only an opportunity to highlight local sites, but to also emphasize the value of Lourinhã’s

historic and natural sites. See, for example: Peter Fryer and Patricia McGowan Pinheiro. *Oldest Ally: A Portrait of Salazar’s Portugal*. (London, UK: Dobson, 1961); Georges Pillement, *Unknown Portugal*, A. Rosin trans. (London, England: Johnson, 1967); Eugene Fodor, ed., *Fodor’s Modern Guides: Spain and Portugal, 1959*. (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1959); David Wright and Patrick Swift, *Minho and North Portugal: a Portrait and a Guide*. (Bristol, Great Britain: Barrie & Rockcliff, 1968); and, George Jacobs, *How to Get Along in Portugal and Spain*. (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1966). For archival records that confirm the dictatorship’s concern with presenting this image, see, in the Arquivos dos Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, (Lisboa, PT): Propaganda de Portugal no Canadá: 1954 a 1960. P.E.A 297. Proc. 362,41 (1954); and, Propaganda de Portugal nos Est. Unidos da América, 1954 a 1961, proc. 362,42, P.E.A. M.304.

⁵⁸ “O Turismo e a Época Balnear a Nossa Região Agrícola”, *Alvorada* (June 23, 1968) pp. 1, 6.

⁵⁹ “Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos à Junta de Turismo - 3. Arquitectura sem Músculos nem ‘Maquiage’”, *Alvorada* (December 25, 1965), pp. 12, 10.

⁶⁰ “Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã - XVIII Serviço de Imprensa: Turismo e Anti-Turismo no Verão”, *Alvorada* (June 27, 1971) p. 6.

atmosphere, and the difference between it and an urban setting. Certain pundits, like Luis Fragata, contrasted Lourinhã to the city by suggesting that people were drawn to Lourinhã's "pure air of the countryside".⁶¹ In fact, for Fragata, touristic success stemmed from the fact that people came with their families to Lourinhã in the summer to recuperate from the stress of their lives in the city.⁶² Beyond the economic benefits visitors brought, Lourinhanense would also benefit from the new roads and infrastructure that the local government needed in order to welcome these visitors.⁶³ What was not often discussed as a consequence of domestic visitors was the potential corruption of the rural world that the *Estado Novo's* propaganda so highly valued.

This dressed down anti-urban image of Lourinhã—a landscape 'without makeup or muscles'—was then packaged by the CML and sold to tourists as goods and experiences. The three fishing ports in the *Concelho da Lourinhã* (Porto das Barcas da Atalaia, Porto Dinheiro, and Paimogo) provided fresh seafood and shellfish to tourists in two "beautiful restaurants" that served "delicious *caldeiradas* ... which were unrivalled." These restaurants offered lobster, octopus, crab, and regional wine in comfortable dining rooms above the rocks and over-looking the ocean.⁶⁴ Similarly, Lourinhã's agricultural setting provided visitors with a variety of fresh fruits and vegetables grown in Lourinhã's "fertile soil". Again, recognizing the importance of some modern infrastructure, it

⁶¹ *ar puro do campo*". See: Luis M. Fragata, "Para Rever: Mas a Lourinhã Necessita Muito Mais", *Alvorada* (November 24, 1968) pp. 1, 5.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ "O Turismo e a Época Balnear a Nossa Região Agrícola", *Alvorada* (June 23, 1968) pp. 1, 6.

was noted that goods were stored in "an important fridge by our friend, sr. *Fernando Franco Bebiano Correia*."⁶⁵ Local businesses, like *Foz Bar* in PAB, practiced mixing modern infrastructure and an idyllic natural setting. In one of its advertisements in 1967, it explained that, built on the rocks separating the north beach from the south beach at PAB, *Foz Bar* was an ideal spot for lunch or dinner, baptisms, marriages, etc. The restaurant had "rare and agreeable architectural lines" and that, with all the "panoramic wealth of the sea that surrounded [the restaurant]", offered great opportunities for photographs that were "indispensible in great occasions."⁶⁶




Figure 9. Foz Bar, Praia da Areia Branca, 1967. As alluded to, Foz Bar sits on PAB and is surrounded by the ocean. It remains a popular and thriving business today. *Alvorada* (November 12, 1967) p. 6.

Behind these priorities was an attempt by the CML to promote local

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ *Alvorada* (November 12, 1967) p. 6.

commerce. In the 1960s, both the CML and local individuals made an effort to develop a commercialized tourist industry—the landscape was for sale and the local government would support those who were working to sell aspects of it. Opinion pieces in the *Alvorada* often discussed the need to improve touristic infrastructure in such a way to make it financially profitable. Beyond additional roads to open access to lesser-used beaches like Paimogo, as Luis Fragata argued, the area also needed a stand to sell ice cream and refreshments in a garden with tables and awnings. More lodging was also called for. Accommodation could come either from new development or by converting historical buildings like the fort at Paimogo into Pousadas. In addition, Lourinhã needed a tourism information office that could sell local souvenirs.⁶⁷ This was to serve as a base from which Lourinhã could expand to include a golf club, swimming pool, skating rink, and an *aeroclube*: all described as equipment that would offer income to Lourinhã.⁶⁸ In fact, the Câmara Municipal supported a variety of initiatives. In 1968 when Sra. Laura de Almeida Godinho, the owner of *Foz Bar* at PAB, needed help with permission to do business on public land, Lourinhã's administration had no problem supporting her. Proclaiming the importance of *Foz Bar* to Lourinhã's tourism, the CML requested that the national government allow *Foz Bar* to use the public street for the sale of goods. The Bar, in the CML's eyes, contributed to the "prestige of Lourinhã and the region's

⁶⁷ Luis M. Fragata, "Para Rever: Mas a Lourinhã Necessita Muito Mais", *Alvorada* (November 24, 1968) pp. 1, 5.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

tourism."⁶⁹ Godinho had written Lourinhã's mayor just a few days before he drafted his letter to the appropriate national office. In the letter to the mayor, Godinho explained that the area around her bar should be classified as an SNI approved tourist establishment and that it would help PAB and Lourinhã to have such an approved establishment at the beach. She also complained that she had been given a bill for the occupation of public land after she had already arranged and paid her rent to the authorities.⁷⁰

The CML also directly engaged in offering, or attempting to offer, commercial opportunities to visitors. In May 1970, the Mayor informed the Câmara that the *Adega Cooperativa* intended to open a wine store at PAB. The CML granted permission after receiving a notarized petition and the payment of the appropriate tax for occupying a public site.⁷¹ A more interesting foray into capitalist development for the CML involved its attempts to open a Cantina/Bar at the *Parque de Campismo* in the late 1960s. In the winter after the *Parque* opened, the Câmara discussed making a public call for bids to open a Cantina/Bar at the campground. The competition would be run with the following conditions: the Câmara would sign a three year operating agreement with the successful bidder, at a cost of ten thousand escudos per year for the owners of

⁶⁹ "Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã to Director-Geral dos Serviços Hidráulicos (May 15, 1968)", *Bar Balneário na Praia da Areia Branca, Laura de Almeida Godinho*, Proc. 38-C/18 (1970), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1970.

⁷⁰ "Laura de Almeida Godinho to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã" (May 11, 1968), *Bar Balneário na Praia da Areia Branca, Laura de Almeida Godinho*, Proc. 38-C/18 (1970), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1970.

⁷¹ "Reunião 11/Mai./70: Posto de Venda na Praia da Areia Branca," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 29 (1969-1971), p. 61.

the bar; the cantina had to be open, at minimum, between the first of May and the fifteenth of October every year; and payment to the CML could be made in three installments throughout the year.⁷² By April, the CML had adjusted its requirements for the contract to run the Cantina in the *Parque*. Originally set at ten thousand escudos per year, the Câmara reduced the rent to eight thousand escudos per year to try to stimulate applications.⁷³ From this process, the CML received just one proposal from Tomás da Silva Araujo Morais, of Lisbon. Morais accepted all the conditions, save one, offering only six thousand escudos per year. The CML deliberated and authorized the mayor to negotiate and sign a contract on their behalf.⁷⁴ However, as of October 1967, nothing had happened. Morais, in fact, reminded the CML in the fall that he was still interested in running the Cantina/Bar at the six thousand escudo per year offer made in the spring.⁷⁵ In 1969, the CML ran another competition with no results.⁷⁶

The fact that the CML's touristic approach mirrored the national government's approach stems from the nature of the *Estado Novo's* governmental structure. As Stephen Syrett reminds us, under the *Estado Novo* local officials were agents of the central government. Presidents of the *Câmaras Municipais* were directly appointed by the national government. The only locally

⁷² "Reunião 9/Jan./67: Exploração da Cantina e Bar-Restaurante do Parque de Campismo," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 27 (1967-1968), p. 5.

⁷³ "Reunião 10/Abr./67: Parque de Campismo - Exploração da Cantina e Bar," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 27 (1967-1968), p. 34.

⁷⁴ "Reunião 29/Mai/67: Cantina e Bar do Parque de Campismo," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 27 (1967-1968), p. 51.

⁷⁵ "Reunião 23/Out./67: Cantina e Bar do Parque de Campismo," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 27 (1967-1968), p. 91.

⁷⁶ See: "Reunião 14/Abr./69: Parque de Campismo - Exploração da Cantina e Bar," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 28 (1968-1969), p. 96.

elected bodies, the *juntas do freguesias* (parish councils), were reliant on the *Câmaras Municipais* for funding. The *Estado Novo's* political system ensured that no political system level had any leverage over a higher level: municipal officials could not overtake regional officials, etc.⁷⁷ In fact, it was not until 1979 that local governments were given the power to raise funds from their population and then it was only in user fees such as land transfer taxes.⁷⁸

In order to highlight the dependence of local governments upon national departments, the national government reminded Lourinhã in 1966 of its requirements for funding local projects. In order to provide help developing the necessary tourism infrastructure, the national *Comissariado do Turismo* (under the *Presidência do Conselho*), for reasons of "functional order and administration", informed local mayors of new guidelines for funding applications and selection criteria. Under the guidelines, the government set a deadline of November 15 of the year in which the event was to happen. The *Comissariado* insisted that requests for funding for festivals within the applying *Concelho* include full financial studies that demonstrated the value of the event to the town or region. All other projects needed financial reports as well, in addition to

⁷⁷ Stephen Syrett, *Local Development: Restructuring, Locality and Economic Initiative in Portugal*. (Great Britain: Avebury Ashgate Publishing, 1995), 150.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 151. See also Joyce: F. Riegelhaupt, "Introduction", in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences*. (USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 9-10; and Walter C. Opello Jr., "The Continuing Impact of the Old Regime on Portuguese Political Culture", in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences*. (USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). Interestingly, Walter Opello has discussed patterns in local governance in the decade or so after *25 de Abril* and concluded that despite open and competitive elections, local officials remained beholden to national institutions as the 1980s continued to see local governments depend upon national departments of sixty-five percent of their income.

architectural and administrative proposals and plans. According to the guidelines, the strategy for publication and advertising should also be included. However, the Comissariado warned that "only in very special cases would subsidies be granted for [the publication of] brochures, posters, vignettes, etc."⁷⁹ Generally speaking, subsidies for advertising purposes should have been sought from the *Repartição de Propaganda*, which controlled tourist related publications under the *Decreto no. 34134* of 1944 that required tourist publications to be submitted for approval to the *Comissariado do Turismo*. In order to "honour our general propaganda abroad", templates for publication were provided by the *Gabinete de Publicações*.⁸⁰ Applications would only be accepted from local tourist offices or *Câmaras Municipais*, which must in turn connect the work directly with the improvement of the tourist industry in the area.⁸¹

In the 1960s, then, the people of Lourinhã were being told about the importance of the local government's involvement in the development of Portugal's tourism. The question was, how would the CML engage in tourism and achieve its goals? An *Alvorada* op-ed piece from 1964 entitled "Lourinhã and Tourism" opened by explaining that the advertising campaign undertaken by the

⁷⁹ "só em casos muito especiais poderão ser concedidos subsídios destinados à execução de folhetos, cartazes, vinhetas, etc." See: "Ruy Pereira e Alvim, O Chefe da Repartição de Fomento, Comissariado do Turismo: Repartição de Fomento to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã" (August 19, 1966), *Comissariado do Turismo: Subsídios a Conceder através do Fundo do Turismo*, Proc. Z-3/2 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

⁸⁰ "honrar a nossa propaganda geral no estrangeiro". See: "Esclarecimentos Sobre Edição de Publicações Turísticas" (undated), *Comissariado do Turismo: Subsídios a Conceder através do Fundo do Turismo*, Proc. Z-3/2 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

⁸¹ "Ruy Pereira e Alvim, O Chefe da Repartição de Fomento, Comissariado do Turismo: Repartição de Fomento to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã" (August 19, 1966).

government to attract visitors would have no “practical value” if regional authorities did not participate in developing their touristic infrastructure.⁸² The national government had put in great effort to attract tourists to Portugal, ostensibly for the financial benefit of its citizens, and if Portugal were to take advantage of its “great natural beauty” through tourism, municipalities would have to follow Lisbon’s lead and prepare for tourists. In the forward-thinking Concelhos, the article explained, one found a *Junta do Turismo* charged with opening the region and its attractions to tourists. Not surprisingly, promoting Lourinhã’s beaches was what the author argued that the *Junta*’s top priority should be. As was written, although the large beaches like PAB were well promoted, Lourinhã’s coastline was generally unknown to visitors. The *Castelo da Igreja* with its medieval architecture and art was also a concern. Indeed, it was incumbent upon readers to recognize the site’s importance.⁸³

Although Lourinhã had a *Junta do Turismo* in the 1960s, it seems to have played a minor role in touristic development and was subject to criticism. It was not unusual for the *Alvorada*’s pundits to criticize the *Junta*, criticism that eventually led to its reorganization. One such pundit was Silva, the man who would become president of the *Junta* in 1970. Under his penname Pedro Luis, he frequently criticized the *Junta*’s actions and inactions throughout the 1960s. In a series of articles in 1965 and 1966 entitled “*Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos à Junta de Turismo*” [Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Eight Appeals to the

⁸² Alvaro Carvalho, “A Lourinhã e o Turismo” *Alvorada*, ano III, no. 71 (August 9, 1964) p. 1.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

Tourism Office] he outlined eight things that the *Junta* could do in 1966 to improve tourism in Lourinhã.⁸⁵ These ranged from infrastructure improvements, to opening a tourist office at PAB, to organizing events for groups like youth. The articles led to the *Alvorada* accusing the *Junta de Turismo* of being in a “prolonged hibernation”, complaining that no official response had yet been given, either in writing or in deed—the language used in the article referred to the *Junta de Turismo* not responding to “us”, suggesting that “we all know” that no response had been offered.⁸⁶

Further, the *Junta* as it existed in the 1960s, by and large, continued to act only through Lourinhã’s mayor. For example, in order to propose the establishment of an esplanade with a bar and children’s playground at PAB in 1961, the *Junta* had to rely upon the mayor to present their case to the Câmara Municipal.⁸⁷ The *Junta* had little public presence with no major annual events and little to no direct engagement with Lourinhanense, either through the *Alvorada* or public consultations. In contrast, after 1970, the *Junta* would have an office, print weekly updates in the newspaper, start a complaints and suggestions book in its office,⁸⁸ and attempt to offer visitor services.

A change in the *Junta*’s leadership in 1968 afforded the CML the

⁸⁵ See for examples: “Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos a Junta de Turismo; 1966 Implica”, *Alvorada* (November 28, 1965), pp. 1, 4, 6; “Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos à Junta de Turismo - 4. Força da Juventude, Clãs Sociais e Ferias/1966”, *Alvorada* (December 25, 1965) pp. 12, 10.

⁸⁶ “Junta de Turismo: Hibernação Prolongada”, *Alvorada* (May 8, 1966) p. 1.

⁸⁷ “Reunião 9/8/61: Esplanade, Bar, e Parque Infantil de Praia da Areia Branca”, *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 23. (1961-1963)*, p. 21.

⁸⁸ See: Junta do Turismo da Areia Branca, Concelho da Lourinhã, *Livro de Sugestões/Reclamações, 1974-83. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT)*.

opportunity to create a more active tourist office. In December 1968, the President of the *Junta de Turismo*, Sr. Doutor Marques Real, submitted his resignation. The Câmara accepted the recommendation that Sr. Doutor Rafael Adolfo Coelho take over and they informed the *Secretariado Nacional da Informação Cultura Popular e Turismo*.⁸⁹ At this time, Silva was contacted to be the President of the *Junta de Turismo* by then Mayor Ferreira da Costa. The position had been technically vacant while Silva's nomination went through the Câmara Municipal and the *Secretaria do Estado de Informação e Turismo*.⁹⁰ Why Silva did not become *Presidente* in 1968 is unclear from the documents.

The confusion ended on July 5, 1970, when Lourinhã's new mayor, Sr. Lucinio Cruz, created a new *Junta de Turismo* in the Concelho under the office of the Mayor of the CML in accordance with the *Código de Organização Administrativa*. This represented a formalization of the *Junta* and its structure. Under the new administration members of the *Junta de Turismo* were to complete various exams. Silva was named the President of the new *Junta de Turismo*. He was forty years old, had been a member of the *Mocidade Portuguesa* [Portuguese Youth], had been a diocesan leader of *Acção Católica*, and had experience with administration in associations. He was also involved in publishing and community commentary writing in the *Alvorada* under the pseudonym, Pedro Luís. To help the new *Junta*, Sr. Flávio Alves, a sixty-year old

⁸⁹ "Reunião 28/Dez./68: Junta de Turismo," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 28 (1968-1969), p. 57.

⁹⁰ "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.

resident of Porto das Barcas, was named an advisor. His experience in the oil companies and his travels to Europe and Brazil were seen as important assets.⁹¹ The *Junta* was to be made up of: a president designated by tourism's central service on the approval of the town mayor; at least one municipal doctor named by Lourinhã's mayor; a hotel official elected by the hotel owners of the region; an established business-owner chosen by the town's mayor; and the captain of the port or another maritime official to sit on the *Junta's* board.⁹²

Along with the new structure of the *Junta* came an increased formalization of its responsibilities. Under Article 127 of the Código Administrativo, the new *Junta* was obligated to: keep an inventory of the region's "natural, archeological and historic assets"; hold exhibitions, preserve and publicize regional dress; advertise the region's art and natural attractions; create and conserve public libraries; advertise notable aspects of the region's past and present life; explore local theaters and cinemas; build and administer gymnasiums and sports fields; hold public festivals; erect and preserve monuments; create and conserve parks, gardens, vistas and other sites for public enjoyment; work towards the proliferation of public lighting within the *Junta's* jurisdiction; and contribute, "as much as possible", to the improvement of the touristic area for which the CML was responsible.⁹³ In carrying out these responsibilities, the *Junta* was to have relative autonomy from the Câmara in decision-making. However, the *Junta*

⁹¹ "Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca do Concelho da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (July 26, 1970) pp. 1, 4.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

relied upon the Câmara for funding and technical expertise.⁹⁴

The institutionalization of Lourinhã's tourism at a local level was completed in 1973 when the Câmara transformed the *Junta de Turismo* into a *Comissão Municipal de Turismo* [Municipal Commission of Tourism]. The *Comissão* was meant to express the CML's commitment to tourism. It would be more "efficient" than the *Junta* had been and would be integrated into the municipal governmental structure. This meant that it would be staffed directly by municipal employees.⁹⁵

After 1970, the reorganized *Junta* followed the precedent offered by the CML to develop commercial and tourist sites. However, the realities concerning funding limited the *Junta's* ability. When, for example, the *Alvorada* asked Silva upon his appointment if money had been secured to complete projects like the mini-golf and tennis court, he responded by saying no and noting that all the *Junta's* effort had been focused on securing a subsidy for the *Edifício de Turismo*. The next subsidy had already been requested for the *Palácio Foz*—an area to be developed with a walkway and pedestrian bridge at PAB. The *Alvorada* pushed the funding question further and asked, since the *Junta* had no money, how did it pay for cleaning equipment, the *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (GNR) in the summer, advertising, etc.? Silva explained that he had promised to make the budget public at the end of every activity. Beyond that, the *Junta*

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ "Reunião 20/Jul./73: Comissão Municipal de Turismo em Substituição da Junta de Turismo," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 31 (1973-1974), p. 57.

received a subsidy from the Câmara that came from a small tax on restaurants.⁹⁶

Whereas the new *Junta* was limited in direct infrastructure development by funding, it proved to be much freer to act in communicating with visitors and organizing their time in Lourinhã. As the *Junta*'s weekly contribution to the *Alvorada* suggested, its bulletin had improved the town's tourism in a number of ways. The *Junta* noted the schedule it put up in its office that outlined water temperatures in the ocean, various other schedules, and accommodations. This information included airplane schedules, bank schedules, hotel prices and home rental information. They also administered the sand sculpture competition, always welcoming the maximum 120 children. The *Junta* took care of the gardens in PAB in a way that "made them more welcoming to those who visited." It also helped to organize the *Dia do Turismo* while keeping people involved with regular public meetings and with the meetings with the Câmara Municipal. The *Junta* also noted its creation of incentives for programs to improve tourism like expositions, fliers, colloquiums, and social economic development. A book of fifty sites was published in spring 1973.⁹⁷

The *Junta*'s plan for 1973 reinforces the evidence of the office's inability to act independently on infrastructure improvement, while remaining freer in terms of traveller services. The first priority for 1973 was the construction of a mini-golf course in PAB, something that had been mentioned as a priority upon Silva's

⁹⁶ "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.

⁹⁷ "*modo a dar um efeito mais receptivo a quem nos visita.*" See: "Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca - Concelho da Lourinhã: XXX Serviço de Imprensa: Informando Sobre Turismo Local (V)," *Alvorada* (June 8, 1973) pp. 8, 5.

appointment to the *Junta* in 1970. The activity plan explained that the project had already been studied.⁹⁸ The second project was to make tourists, both national and international, more welcome in Lourinhã. This meant that a panel inside the *Junta* had been working on compiling information on prices of accommodation and restaurants, transportation schedules, event schedules, and water temperature (of the ocean) throughout the year. The group aimed to report on their findings and compare Lourinhã to other areas in Portugal.⁹⁹ Third, the *Junta* vaguely aimed to develop their economic and touristic potential in 1973. Although this was a general category in the *Junta's* activity plan, it did call for the advertising of the Concelho on the radio, in print and on television to "demonstrate the best of our Concelho of Lourinhã."¹⁰⁰

The *Junta's* advertising took a number of forms. Silva engaged the public and visitors in a limited dialogue. Immediately upon being appointed, he started the complaints and suggestions book in the *Junta's* office.¹⁰¹ He also believed in cooperating with the press, something his *Serviço da Imprensa*, published in every issue of the *Alvorada*, is evidence of.¹⁰² At times, the two activities were combined to further Lourinhã's image. Commonly, the *Alvorada* would print letters from visitors or excerpts from the *Junta's* complaints and suggestions

⁹⁸ "XXIV Serviço de Imprensa da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca - Concelho da Lourinhã: Plano de Actividade Turística para 1973," *Alvorada* (February 11, 1973) p. 8.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: II Parte", *Alvorada* (March 14, 1971) pp. 1, 7.

¹⁰² "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.

book. A thank you letter to the *Junta de Turismo* dated May 21, 1971 from Carlos Manuel Renderio from Lisbon was printed in the *Alvorada*. In it, he explained that he remained “enchanted” with the “extremely kind manner with which he was attended to” in the *Junta de Turismo* at PAB. In particular, Ana Maria Vicente, the employee that dealt with the letter’s author deserved “the congratulations of all of us” for graciously dealing with old and young visitors. Sr. Rendeiro then apologized to Ana Maria for publicly mentioning her—he was sure she would be embarrassed—but he wanted “all to know that there were kind and attractive youth in Lourinhã.”¹⁰³ Similarly, when poor reviews of Lourinhã’s sites appeared, Silva was not shy to release details about visitors’ positive impressions. For example, reviews of the *Parque de Campismo* that rated the facility in the second category were dismissed. Silva pointed to the opinions of those who visited as a better indication of the *Parque’s* performance and he quoted an interview of a visitor who explained that he was looking forward to returning.¹⁰⁴

The press was also used by the reorganized *Junta* to pressure the CML. In a 1972 *Alvorada* story covered by reporter Eduardo Filipe, the *Junta* was given credit for forcing the Câmara to debate concerns over the town’s postcards. The *Junta* had run an article earlier that year, bringing the issue to the public’s attention. The issue concerned displeasure at the fact that the town’s postcards featured only PAB. Subsequent newspaper articles claimed that because of the

¹⁰³ “*maneira tão gentil como fui atendido*”; “*todos sabem que há jovens bonitas e simpáticas na Lourinhã*.” See: Letter from Carlos Manuel Rendeiro to Junta de Turismo (Lisboa, 21.5.71), “Agradecimento à Junta de Turismo”, *Alvorada* (June 13, 1971) p. 10.

¹⁰⁴ “Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte,” *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.

Junta's pressure, a new run of colour postcards featuring other sites in Lourinhã would be printed.¹⁰⁵




Figure 10: Lourinhã's new postcards (1972) highlighted attractions other than the beach. Here, the Norman era *Igreja do Castelo* and other sites in the town are featured. " Postais Ilustrados da Praia da Areia Branca e Concelho da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (February 13, 1972) p. 1.

The communication undertaken by the *Junta* under Silva is perhaps the most interesting aspect of its activities. The reorganized *Junta's* priorities, the things that were supposed to be achieved by institutionalizing local tourism, went beyond opening tourist attractions and commercial sites. Silva wanted to "*dinamizar*" [dynamize] tourism at all the levels, in each freguesia, in each restaurant manager, etc. Although Silva wanted to implement touristic upgrades that would maximize output with little investment (the mini-golf course and tennis

¹⁰⁵ Eduardo Filipe, "Postais Ilustrados da Praia da Areia Branca e Concelho da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (February 13, 1972) p. 1, 8.

court were examples of such projects), and to improve infrastructure like sanitation facilities, he also knew the importance of not focusing solely upon PAB and its facilities. He wanted to continue to help people by responding to their letters, to finance touristic endeavors, and to protect investments and facilities.¹⁰⁶ This reflected, according to the *Alvorada*, Silva's "democratic spirit, which he had instituted in his 'Press Services.'" Silva explained that he undertook this, and other initiatives in his life (including membership in various committees), because he believed that they were the best way to serve his community and its citizens.¹⁰⁷

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The idea that people could be conditioned to help improve tourism, and the recognition that the financial and bureaucratic resources available at the municipal level were insufficient to achieve developmental goals, lay at the base of Silva's plan to *dinamizar* the local industry. If Lourinhã, and indeed Portugal, were to harness its touristic potential, the local people and local organizations would have to contribute. The important question is how the dictatorship would rally local participation while ensuring that individuals and groups acted within acceptable parameters. The answer was for both the government and local elites

¹⁰⁶ "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: II Parte", *Alvorada* (March 14, 1971) pp. 1, 7.

¹⁰⁷ "*espírito democrático que instituiu estes <<Serviços de Imprensa>>*". See: "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.

to deploy paternalistic language and messaging to encourage certain forms of participation while limiting others with legislation and other administrative deterrents.

Before the *Junta* was reorganized, Silva's colleagues at the *Alvorada* were telling Lourinhanense about the importance of being conscientious about tourism. As an article that called for "a Progressive and Efficient Tourism" argued, hospitality was key for the efficiency of tourism. When a worker in a hotel or restaurant attended a guest as if they were "granting a favour" by taking too long to serve customers, and by not having the things that tourist guides noted as regional items, the tourism industry in the region suffered. The article did not intend to present an excessively negative picture of service in Lourinhã. Instead, it argued that any problems stemmed from a lack of preparation. This could be solved by the creation of tourism schools in regions that welcomed large numbers of visitors.¹⁰⁸ For the reorganized *Junta*, according to Silva, the greatest obstacle was the "medieval mentality in our homeland" and he equated this 'mentality' with inefficiency. In response, the *Alvorada's* interviewer asked Silva how the Presidente of the *Junta de Turismo* could help Portugal move from the "tail of Europe" ["*cauda da Europa*"]. Silva said, without explaining how exactly tourism would help Portugal, that Portugal's "sin" was inefficiency. Silva believed, "sincerely, in the economic, social and human power of tourism."¹⁰⁹ For the new

¹⁰⁸ "Por Um Turismo Progressivo e Eficiente", *Alvorada* (December 18, 1969) p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ "*sinceramente no poder económico, social, e humano do Turismo*." See: "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.

Junta, the success of tourism was not measured only in its economic benefits. As the Junta argued in 1971, tourism for restaurant and hotel owners meant hosting. For the *banheiros* at the beaches, tourism was conserving and keeping a clean beach.¹¹⁰

Such opinions demonstrate the fact that it was important for officials to control, as much as possible, private initiative and to channel efforts to sanctioned ends. Thus, it seemed obvious to elites that the relationship between space and tourism was reciprocal. Space needed to be controlled as traditional Portuguese societal structures were challenged in the 1960s; tourism was not only a way to control the interaction between visitors and locals, but also a justification for the increased control of space and action.

Approved sources told Lourinhanense what types of initiatives were worthy of support. According to one commentator, for example, since the main road in PAB had been opened with its first houses in the 1920s, no major updates had been done leaving the street with the appearance of an "old shoe." A model for improvement could be found in the "ancient Vila de Óbidos." There, the "lovingly maintained houses" at the beach in Baleal enchanted travellers. At São Pedro de Muel, families could rent apartments and houses together, but, the author asks, how many were saddened by not being able to do this at PAB? The author then asks, "what do we have?" The answer: disjointed architecture. Some houses had verandas. Meanwhile, other dwellings were not set back from the

¹¹⁰ "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã - XVIII Serviço de Imprensa: Turismo e Anti-Turismo no Verão," *Alvorada* (June 27, 1971) p. 6.

road at all. Further, houses sat on narrow, impassable roads. In ninety percent of the cases of new construction, neighboring houses were not copied, nor designed with their neighbor's broad lines considered. The exceptions, where the author found "expressions of beauty", were in houses that were cared for by a "woman full of wrinkles." For this author, the answer lay in imposing some standards of construction and adding trees and gardens to the existing buildings.¹¹¹ The evident privileging of family-cared accommodations along with outward appearance reflected the author's belief that although architecture was an artistic language, it was also functional. As such, it had to be subordinate to the sanctioned conditions of urbanization and the physical, regional, cultural, human, and social environments.¹¹²

The idea put forward in the *Alvorada* that space had to be subordinated to social and cultural concerns mobilized by officials was not lost on Lourinhã's municipal administration when it opened the *Parque de Campismo*. The *Parque's* regulations, covering a variety of areas from hygiene to conduct, were printed in the issue immediately following the site's opening. Campers had to adhere to hygienic standards that called on them to dispose of dirty water properly. They were also restricted to wearing clothes that did not "exceed the norms of camping ethics and that never offended public morality and good manners." Further, control of action followed in campers' restriction from "acts of propaganda

¹¹¹ "Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos à Junta de Turismo - 3. Arquitectura sem Músculos nem 'Maquiage'", *Alvorada* (December 25, 1965), pp. 12, 10.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

[espousing] whichever attitude or argument that could bother campers." In addition, radios and musical instruments were banned between 23h and 7h as part of a general restriction on noise during sleeping hours. Games could be played, so long as this did not interfere with other campers. Game players had to vacate open campsites, if a new camper arrived to occupy the site they were playing on, and all equipment had to be removed at the end of the game. Finally, commercial activity within the campgrounds was prohibited without the special permission of Lourinhã's mayor.¹¹³ Personal property, and its use, was also regulated in the *Parque*. Vehicle use within the *Parque* was limited to "strictly necessary" activity. It was to be done at an absolute minimum speed while always yielding to bicycles, "with or without a motor", and children. Animals were allowed on the grounds, so long as they did not interfere with, or disturb, other campers.¹¹⁴

By 1973, Lourinhã's *Junta* made their expectations clear vis-à-vis private participation in civic life. One of the *Junta's Serviços de Imprensa* explained that the Junta felt that it, along with the people of Lourinhã, "fought" against "*anti-colectivismo*" and for the development of local tourism. All their struggles were made, they explained, without sufficient knowledge about the amount of touristic construction, camping in Portugal, and the commercial and industrial sectors.

The *Junta* cited *Deputado Oliveira Ramos* of the *Assembleia Nacional*, who

¹¹³ "exceda as normas da ética campista e nunca de modo a ofender a moral pública ou os bons costumes"; "actos de propaganda e de quaisquer atitudes ou procedimentos que possam incomodar os demais campistas." See: "O Progresso na Praia da Areia Branca", *Alvorada* (July 24, 1966) p. 7.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

defined ideal citizenship on January 31, 1973, while discussing "means of social communication," as someone educated and informed; and who would see the importance of taking part in civic life at the local and national level. Ramos complained that there was not enough participation from the masses in elections, nor was there enough discussion about civic issues. The central problem, the *Junta* complained via Ramos, was having citizens realize their importance in public affairs. The *Junta* argued that one important and, at the time, ever growing way to spread information and promote involvement was through economic and social groups like cooperatives and associations.¹¹⁵

In conjunction with the reorganization of the *Junta de Turismo*, the *Alvorada*, as the local administration's informal agent, offered Lourinhanense the history of their town's tourism, one that legitimized certain forms of participation by private individuals. Law no. 18.314 of March 25, 1930 named the Concelho da Lourinhã a "jurisdiction of tourism." In the same year, the CML approved the project to connect PAB to the road between Peniche and Lourinhã. The roadway was to be well marked with signs leading to the beach. In 1936, a new administration under José Pinheiro de Andrade laid piping to bring drinking water to PAB along the new road. Further, a wooden bridge was to be built over the Rio

¹¹⁵ Ramos discussed "*meios de comunicação social*". Ramos' extended quote is as follows: "*quanto mais o cidadão é pessoa bem formada e bem informada mais se acentua a tendência para ele tomar parte na orientação da Cidade, já cooperando no ordenamento da vida local, já na consecução de política nacional. Para isso, não basta uma presença generalidade das massas nos actos eleitorais, nem tão pouco, uma propaganda maior dos chamados temas civícos. O problema central é um problema de educação: urge tornar o povo ciente de que é indispensável a sua participação nos negócios públicos e que ele também é responsável pela marcha boa ou má que eles tomam.* See: "XXVI Serviço de Imprensa da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca - Concelho da Lourinhã: Informação Sobre Turismo Local (I)," *Alvorada* (March 12, 1973), pp. 8, 5.

Grande from Foz. But others, the Alvorada noted, also contributed to PAB's "urban progress". José Luís dos Santos and Francisco Pereira built the first multi-dwelling building along with their *Pavilhão Verde*. The mayor of the 1960s, Ferreira da Costa, following in this tradition of development, initiated "uncountable improvements" to the beach. His administration built the "headquarters of the *Junta de Turismo*" with the help of the SNI, where they placed a post station. He also contributed to the "beautification of the beach" and planned new projects that would improve the flow of clean water to the residences at PAB.¹¹⁶

Development, according to the narrative, was supported by projects initiated and championed by individual residents. The first was José Nunes da Costa Pinto. Heralded as a "tireless visionary",¹¹⁷ Costa Pinto was the man largely responsible for the development of PAB. He had championed the name change from Praia do João Soldado in 1923, after an old banheiro who owned an historic boathouse that was beside the *Pavilhão Verde*, to PAB. The 1923 law no. 8.714, which he was said to have advocated for, classified the beach as a touristic destination, which granted support for the creation of a body to "manage" the beach's future.¹¹⁸ Before leading this cause Costa Pinto had been involved in developing the housing around PAB. The first initiative taken by Sr. Costa Pinto, and a society that he formed, was the building of "affordable

¹¹⁶ "Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca e do Concelho do Lourinhã," *Alvorada* (April 19, 1970) p. 6.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ "*praia de turismo com a nome a <<Praia da Areia Branca>>, sendo então criada uma Comissão de Iniciativa para gerir os seus destinos.*" See: Ibid.

housing" in the early part of the 1910s. Landowners who had property near the beach opposed these new dwellings. However, as the *Alvorada* explained, these people lacked the "vision" that Costa Pinto and his group had.¹¹⁹ By 1918, Sr. Costa Pinto's group, described as an ad hoc commission, had been augmented by new touristic initiatives. Land had been acquired for new lodging. The first place to be built was the home of Sr. José de Almeida on the cliffs above the coast at PAB. However, the costs of building limited the development to Sr. Almeida's house and that of his brother, Joaquim. According to the *Alvorada*, the Almeida homes were the only ones at PAB until 1928 when Sr. Costa Pinto organized another "*sociedade*" to build a block of economic houses. Four houses were built this time.¹²⁰

Building on this narrative, it is no surprise that when Lourinhã turned to Silva to run the *Junta*, he was presented as a capable, responsive, and devoted citizen of Lourinhã. The *Alvorada* described him as someone who had always been interested in the town's problems. He never entered a café to "kill time". Silva went instead to talk to people about the issues facing Lourinhã, "our home." Silva was further described as a man who had spent many years on his grandparents' farm, his spare time helping people load their tractors in town, and being a "prolific" writer. Not only had he written for the *Alvorada* as Pedro Luís, but also in the first six months of 1969 alone, he had written ten letters to the *Junta de Turismo*. Despite the fact that he read "one book a month", Silva still

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

had the time to participate in local roundtables, various meetings, and the social life of Lourinhã, all in addition to his job in the Planning and Studies Office [*Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento*] in the CML. Silva's reputation as a devout Catholic who preferred to spend time with his family at home helping his children with their education made him all the more notable.¹²¹

For their part, local citizens, who acted as individuals or in small informal groups, were not only the heroes of official narrative, but they were also called upon to donate resources, both financial and in kind, to development projects. This gave them the opportunity to ask for infrastructure and, frequently receive positive responses, provided they wanted the improvements in key areas like the beach, electrical infrastructure, etc., where government interests aligned. For example, in November 1963, the CML received a letter from a citizen requesting the installation of a public street lamp in his neighborhood in PAB. In response to his request, municipal officials referred the matter to the *Sociedade Electrica do Oeste Limitada* in Caldas da Rainha asking for a cost estimate for the project.¹²² By December 21, the Concelho had received a reply back from the *Sociedade* about this project. The *Sociedade* had quoted a cost of 251\$40 escudos for this citizen's project allowing the CML to move ahead with the installation of the street

¹²¹ "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," *Alvorada* (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.

¹²² "Reunião 13/Nov./63: Instalação de uma Lámpada de Iluminação Pública na Praia da Areia Branca", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 24. (1963-1964), p.88.

lamp.¹²³

Residents occasionally organized and actively campaigned for infrastructure for their neighborhoods. First, in the fall of 1960, for example, Reverend Padre Marcelino, parish priest of *Santa Barbara*, asked Lourinhã's town council if electrical service could be expanded to Santa Barbara for 1962. He argued that existing power lines already passed one kilometer from the parish and that the population would take responsibility for the work needed to connect the freguesia to them.¹²⁴ Second, 1961 saw Lourinhã's Mayor present a proposal on behalf of Sr. José Máximo da Costa, himself a future mayor of Lourinhã and deputy governor of the District of Lisbon (the regional governmental body responsible for Lourinhã). Sr. Máximo called for electrical infrastructure for one classroom in a Ribeira dos Palheiros school.¹²⁵ Third, Lourinhã's Mayor was given a donation of 40.600\$00 escudos by the residents of São Bartolomeu to pay for the electrification of their neighborhood. The residents were commended by the town council for trying to improve the "the level of life and progress that this improvement represented."¹²⁶

Although the results of these three requests varied—money was set aside for Sr. Máximo's project, Reverend Marcelino was informed that Lourinhã's

¹²³ "Reunião 21/Dez./63: Colocação de postes de iluminação publica em Abelheira e Toxofal de Baixo e de uma lâmpada na Praia da Areia Banca", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 24. (1963-1964), p. 106.

¹²⁴ "Reunião 26/10/60: Electrificação de Ribamar", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 22. (1959-1961), p. 135.

¹²⁵ "Reunião 22/2/61: Instalação eléctrica da escola de Ribeira dos Palheiros", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 22. (1959-1961), p. 167.

¹²⁶ "nível de vida e progresso que este melhoramento representa." "Reunião 24/Abr./63: Donativo da população de S. Bartolomeu para electrificação", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 24. (1963-1964), p. 7

electrical allotment had already been spent but that a study would be commissioned to look into preparing infrastructure, and the residents of São Bartolomeu were successful as electrical capacity had already been allotted for their area¹²⁷—there are some interesting similarities in terms of private goals and participation in public decision-making. Beyond showing a clear willingness to take independent action to achieve goals, there was also an acceptance of private participation on the part of local administration. In Sr. Máximo's and Reverend Marcelino's cases, educated local elites took charge to solicit the Concelho on behalf of residents. In the case of São Bartolomeu, the residents organized themselves to raise the huge sum of 40.600\$00 escudos.¹²⁸ To put that effort into perspective, the average monthly for agricultural workers in the District of Lisbon, including Lourinhã, in 1970 ranged from forty-three to one hundred and fifteen escudos, depending upon the industry and skill level.¹²⁹

Those locals who did not volunteer their participation found themselves under pressure to contribute to development. In May 1967, the cornerstone was laid for a new church to service the freguesias of PAB and Seixal. The church was meant to center what would be a new Freguesia in the north end of the

¹²⁷ See respectively: "Reunião 8/3/61; Instalação eléctrica da escola de Ribeira dos Palheiros", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 22.* (1959-1961), p. 171; "Reunião 26/10/60: Electrificação de Ribamar", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 22.* (1959-1961), p. 135; and, "Reunião 24/Abr./63: Donativo da população de S. Bartolomeu para electrificação", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 24.* (1963-1964), p. 7.

¹²⁸ "Reunião 24/Abr./63: Donativo da população de S. Bartolomeu para electrificação", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 24.* (1963-1964), p. 7.

¹²⁹ See: "Anuário Estatístico de Portugal", 1970. Instituto Nacional de Estatística. p. 257. <http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/search.do> (accessed May 5, 2014).

Concelho that could manage the urban and tourist development around PAB.¹³⁰ However, to complete the project, the Concelho required the financial support of the residents of Seixal and PAB. Described as a reflection of the population's "cultural level and way of life",¹³¹ residents were meant to take ownership of the project. To remind residents of their role, the local newspaper printed updates on the state of the project and its finances. Reports printed in May and July 1967 reported that material and labour at the cost of 377.111\$00 escudos had been ordered for the building. It itemized the material and labour, listed donors and the amounts donated to the project, ranging from 10\$00 escudos to 3.000\$00 escudos, and solicited further donations to make up for the project's 26.000\$00 escudo deficit.¹³²

Thus, state officials expected Lourinhanense to participate in civic life in a number of ways. Due to the financial limitations of Portuguese municipalities—beyond lacking the power of taxation and having no consistent stipend from the national government they also had to apply to the national government for funding on a project-by-project basis—citizens were expected to contribute monetarily to local development. One example in which the citizenry was required to step in for both the local and regional governments concerned the installation of sewers and water treatment facilities in PAB and Seixal. A project for the sanitization of Praia da Areia Branca and Seixal at a cost of 4,97 contos

¹³⁰ "Igreja de Nossa Senhora de Fátima de Seixal e Praia da Areia Branca", *Alvorada* (May 28, 1967) pp. 1, 13.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² See: *Ibid.*; and, "Igreja de N. S. de Fátima de Seixal e Praia da Areia Branca", *Alvorada* (July 23, 1967) p. 8.

was developed by the Serviços de Fomento da *Junta* Distrital de Lisboa and presented to the CML in the summer of 1968. The mayor informed the Câmara that this project would only be possible with the financial participation of the property owners and landlords in PAB and that that participation had to be solicited with the help of the local neighborhood organization, the *Grupo dos Amigos da Praia da Areia Branca* (GAPAB).¹³³

Beyond financial contributions, citizens were also expected to control their behavior as a way to participate in tourism. The disposal of trash at the beach is perhaps the most interesting example of this type of contribution. Even before the *Junta* was reorganized and Silva was put in charge, he argued that there was a relationship between Lourinhã's development and the behavior of locals. Writing as Pedro Luís, he argued that the "poor education", of people contributing to the amount of litter and dirt at the beach, was like a "social blemish [in the eyes of] visitors."¹³⁴ The litter found at PAB was "sad" and showed a lack of civility.¹³⁵ He also complained about the disruption caused by portable radios, which were officially prohibited.¹³⁶ However, Silva did recognize that part of the problem with behavior at the beach was lack of enforcement and he complained. The solution, then, was to lobby the tourism commission for an attendant for the summer

¹³³ "Reunião 8/Jul./68: Saneamento da Praia da Areia Branca, Seixal e Estação de Tratamento", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 27 (1967-1968), p. 196.

¹³⁴ "*urticária social para o estrangeiro*." See: Pedro Luís, "Praia da Areia Branca/1966:8 Apelos a Junta de Turismo - Areia Branca Igual a Areia Suja, Não e Não!!!", *Alvorada* (February 1, 1966) pp. 10, 9.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ "*o uso de rádios-portáteis em intensidade de som que perturbe o sossego dos outros banhistas*". See: Ibid.

months to police the rules. The attendant could also police "all the soccer games and the like, which could disturb other beach visitors." By both regulating the behavior of visitors to the beach, and by taking personal responsibility for one's own behavior, the "*barbárie*" at the beach could be eliminated.¹³⁷

When Silva became president of the *Junta* in 1970, it is no surprise that he worked to highlight the importance of public cooperation in touristic initiatives. Under Silva's supervision, the *Junta* explained to people through its bulletins that "everyone could help" in developing tourism.¹³⁸ At Christmas in 1971, the *Junta* explained that Christmas time was the time to "give your hands for a better Lourinhã." The *Junta* called on readers to undertake civic engagement to improve their home ("*a minha terra*"). All needed to ask themselves, "what can I do in 1972 ... to touristically improve my Concelho?"¹³⁹ Youth could organize clubs in their schools to plant and maintain public gardens or clean public areas.¹⁴⁰ Silva and the *Junta* went even further than suggesting that participation was important. Readers were told that to be selfish was a social crime, a "spiritual cancer." Not cooperating and participating in local development reflected poorly on individuals.¹⁴¹

As Silva had called for in the 1960s, this heightened expectation of civic

¹³⁷ "*todos os jogos de bola ou outros que de alguma forma, possam perturbar a comodidade dos banhistas*". See: *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ O Presidente de Junta de Turismo Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: XII Serviço de Imprensa", *Alvorada* (December 27, 1970) p. 8.

¹³⁹ "*que poderei fazer em 1972 ... para melhorar, turisticamente o meu Concelho?*" See: Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva, "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã - Tempo de Natal, Tempo de Colaboração", *Alvorada* (December 19, 1971) pp. 12, 5.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

engagement went along with increased attempts at control. The *Junta* called on Lourinhanense to try "new habits, new actions, and, in the end, a new mentality to guide the people of Lourinhã." Part of this new approach was greater care with trash in tourist areas, greater collaboration between the public and their institutions, and, equally as important, the establishment of public washrooms in shared tourism space.¹⁴² One of the largest problems faced by Câmaras Municipais in 1972 around Portugal, according to the *Junta*, was the collection of trash. In Lisbon, for example, councilors had invested "thousands of contos" and begun a campaign for a "cleaner Lisbon." Much of this campaign was focused upon public education through advertising. However, it included placing new trash receptacles around Lisbon with ashtrays and cigarette disposal bins.¹⁴³

The *Junta* was also happy to note that the trash problem had been solved in places like Evora or Vila Viçosa as well as many of the neighborhoods in the Alentejo. Meanwhile, the North had also taken a big step towards dealing with the problem by introducing a public garden program. Lourinhã's Câmara had also recognized the importance of not only keeping the Concelho clean, but also the importance of the "presentation of our land."¹⁴⁴ However, the *Junta de Turismo* argued that people who did not help to keep the Concelho clean did not deserve to reap the rewards of a clean environment. The biggest problem was the

¹⁴² "novos costumes, nova actuação, enfim, uma nova mentalização que conduza, afinal, a uma vida nova para as gentes da Lourinhã." See: "Lixos/Colaboração do Público/W.C. Públicos - Precisa-se duma nova mentalidade colaboradora da Parte de Todos Nós", *Alvorada* (August 13, 1972), pp. 8, 3.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

“people of tomorrow.” The children who spent their time at the beach in the summer were targeted as the worst litter culprits. Despite this, the *Junta* suggested that their teachers were at least partly to blame for not instilling in them the importance of putting trash in receptacles. The *Junta* called the pollution sad.¹⁴⁵

In order to motivate locals to take responsibility for the tourist environment, Lourinhã's tourist officials did not mind using embarrassing reviews of the town and its facilities. PAB's *Junta de Turismo*, for example printed some excerpts from its complaints and suggestions book in its bulletin printed in the *Alvorada*. None of the excerpts printed celebrate PAB or its facilities. One complained that, in the thirty-two years the author had been visiting, PAB had never been in such a neglected state. The garbage in the streets—picked up by the garbage truck only every two days—was overwhelming and the mosquitoes were equally as abundant. This author, evidently Portuguese, hoped that these problems would be resolved, "for the good name of Portugal" not to be tarnished in foreigners' eyes. Unfortunately for the author of this complaint, his excerpt was printed alongside that of a Marian Thomas from England. Thomas complained that she was "disgusted at our first experience camping in Portugal at Praia da Areia Branca ... there have been many dogs around the site making the site very soiled including the floors of the washrooms (which didn't seem to have been cleaned for weeks)." The *Parque de Campismo* was sorely lacking in hot water supply

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

and a place to keep food cold, amenities that were "important ... having young children." Yet despite these complaints, the excerpt concluded by thanking the "charming lady at the Turismo office who was most helpful."¹⁴⁶

Organized activities and events were also seen as important tools in achieving influence over citizen behavior and protecting citizens of the town from unwanted influences. The clean up of the beach at PAB was, as the Alvorada insisted, everybody's responsibility. Locals who enjoyed the beach had to be more mindful about where they put their trash when at the beach. The Alvorada proclaimed, "*areia suja, não e não!*" ["dirty sand, no and no!"].¹⁴⁷

More important at that time, however, was the development of summer programs for youth. Such programs could present local children with an alternative to the undisciplined and morally questionable activities of foreign teenagers. Instead, activities centered upon religious values were commended. Social pundits (in this case, the man who would later become a president of the *Junta de Turismo*) in Lourinhã called upon the *Junta de Turismo* to organize a holiday program for youth as their primary activity for the coming summer.¹⁴⁸ Pedro Luís argued in 1965 that youth tourism had to be managed for the sake of the children of PAB. The people of Portugal lived in a "meteoric age" in which youth maintained their distance from society. Luís complained that

¹⁴⁶ "Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca - XLV Serviço de Imprensa: O Nosso Livro de Sugestões/Reclamações," *Alvorada* (July 14, 1974) p. 2.

¹⁴⁷ "Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos a Junta de Turismo; 1966 Implica", *Alvorada* (November 28, 1965) pp. 1, 4, 6.

¹⁴⁸ Pedro Luis, "Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos à Junta de Turismo - 4. Força da Juventude, Clãs Sociais e Ferias/1966", *Alvorada* (December 25, 1965) pp. 12, 10.

Lourinhanense had seen “good sized groups of French youth” at the beach between PAB and Paimogo. This was called a "plague" that had garnered too much attention from newspapers.¹⁴⁹ Instead, praise should have been given to the youth who formed the seminary group, who on their own initiative in 1965, created a provisional campground and a center from which holiday activities were planned for Christian and non-Christian boys and girls. They organized events like picnics, improvised a chapel in a nearby garage, had a lunch table open daily, improvised an altar that used a guitar instead of an organ during service, and used bricks for seats and pews. They also played modern music and placed posters in Lourinhã announcing that all were welcome. Luís suggested that the tourism office should collaborate with groups like this to organize their own events.¹⁵⁰ Within such a controlled framework, foreigners would be welcomed without worry, and indeed, would have something to learn from locals.

The socio-cultural effects of foreign visitors on locals were a priority in discussions of interaction between the two. Historians like David Birmingham have cited the transformative effects of new music, culture, and ideas that were brought by the tourist boom of the 1960s into a Portuguese society that had been closed from the world since the Second World War.¹⁵¹ This became increasingly important as the number of visitors increased in the second half of the 1960s.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ See: David Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 179-183.

One article from the *Alvorada* at the end of 1964 cited the *Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento Turístico do SNI* which reported that between January and August of 1964, Portugal welcomed 681,279 foreign vacationers and projected that 800,000 foreigners would visit Portugal in 1964 with 1,000,000 foreigners expected to visit in 1965.¹⁵² For a country of only 8,000,000 or so people, this kind of influx led some to refer to tourists as the "new invading hordes."¹⁵³

Despite such language, the *Estado Novo* sought foreign visitors. For government officials, tourism was an important way for Portugal to be known by the rest of the world.¹⁵⁴ Its value lay not only in reinforcing the values espoused by the regime to both domestic and foreign travelers, but also in reinforcing the regime's legitimacy as the successor to the Catholic monarchies that had presided over the reconquest of Portugal from the Moors and its Golden Age of discovery.¹⁵⁵

The use and promotion of mass media for tourism was also important in the relationship between Lourinhanense and visitors, both foreign and domestic. Commentators like Landeiro recognized the relationship between tourism and an exchange with visitors. As he explained, there was no doubt that Lourinhã was "a zone of incalculable value for tourism ... with natural beauty that did not find an

¹⁵² "Um Milhão de Turistas em 1965?", *Alvorada*, (October 25, 1964) p. 5. In truth, these numbers turned out to be conservative. Portugal would hit the one million foreign visitor mark in 1964 and that number would double by 1968. Interestingly, Portugal would welcome almost nine million foreign travelers in 1992. Carvalho Curado, "Cultural Tourism in Portugal", 251.

¹⁵³ "*novas hordas invasoras*". See: Dr. Afonso de Moura Guedes, "Enquanto Vemos Passar os Turistas", *Alvorada* (December 25, 1965) pp. 9, 12.

¹⁵⁴ See: Melo, *Salazarismo e Cultura Popular*, 250.

¹⁵⁵ For a discussion of propagandistic aims of the *Estado Novo* and their cultural manifestations see: António Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation* (New York, NY: 1995), 193-194.

equal in Portugal." Additionally, the case for tourism's importance to Lourinhã was made all the stronger by the fact that both domestics and foreigners visited.¹⁵⁶ In her study of Nazi Germany, Shelley Baranowski has highlighted the value of contact through tourism in building national community, arguing that tourism was a way to not only bring the working class into the socio-cultural fabric of Nazi Germany, but also to challenge local and religious "particularisms" that undermined the German nation.¹⁵⁷

Beyond moral controls on behaviour, some minor concrete measures were also taken to remind people of their responsibilities. Seeing as clean public washrooms were an important aspect of the *Junta's* call for a new mentality in Lourinhã, the *Junta* placed signs in public washrooms. Washrooms were cleaned daily and users were reminded to leave the washrooms in a condition they wished to find them. Generally, the *Junta* explained, the public washrooms in Lourinhã were "clean". This was in response to complaints received by the *Junta* on the cleanliness in the *Parque de Campismo's* washrooms. The same went for semi-public washrooms in restaurants and cafés.¹⁵⁸ The *Junta* also highlighted legal means of behavioural control. People were mandated to act more "civilized" and use the trash receptacles at the beach. The *Junta* reminded people not to

¹⁵⁶ "uma zona de valor incalculável para o Turismo pois possui bastantes recursos naturais, alguns de beleza sem igual em qualquer parte do nosso País". See: José Manuel Landeiro, "Da Lourinhã: Turismo", *Alvorada* (July 14, 1968) pp. 1, 4.

¹⁵⁷ See: Shelley Baranowski, *Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 119-120; and, Shelley Baranowski, "Strength Through Joy: Tourism and National Integration in the Third Reich", in S. Baranowski and E. Furlough eds., *Being Elsewhere: Tourism, Consumer Culture, and Identity in Modern Europe and North America*. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 213-214.

¹⁵⁸ "Lixos/Colaboração do Público/W.C. Públicos - Precisa-se duma nova mentalidade colaboradora da Parte de Todos Nós", *Alvorada* (August 13, 1972), pp. 8, 3.

leave their cigarette butts, food leftovers like bones and fruit peels, and plastic bottles at the beach. Leaving trash was punishable by a law enacted in 1965 (*Lei 46619*) and reinforced in 1971 (*Lei 90-71*). If a person was caught littering fines could reach up to 1,000 contos.¹⁵⁹

Although there were suggested ways in which Lourinhanense could, and indeed should, participate in development, this was not an open invitation to civic life. Beyond the obvious means of control employed by the *Estado Novo*—repression through PIDE being the best example—civic participation was still limited to certain forms and venues. Entrepreneurial engagement in tourism, for example, was encouraged. A series of postcards published in 1972 featuring Lourinhã offers a number of clues to illustrate the public appreciation of entrepreneurship. Lourinhã's Papelaria Santos published a series of postcards highlighting the Igreja do Castelo and the Largo Principal, which were sold in his store and at other establishments around the town. Although it congratulated him for this, the *Alvorada* suggested, that he might work with the Câmara to produce a larger series of cards that could be sold with the help of the *Junta*.¹⁶⁰ Beyond being a clear case of public encouragement for entrepreneurism, it should also be understood, in part, as an attempt to limit action. The arrangement being suggested to Sr. Santos would see him selling his cards in more places while handing some control over what sites were featured in his cards to the *Junta* and

¹⁵⁹ "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã - XIX Serviço de Imprensa: Tempo de Verão, Tempo de Férias", *Alvorada* (July 11, 1971) pp. 8, 5.

¹⁶⁰ Eduardo Filipe, "Postais Ilustrados da Praia da Areia Branca e Concelho da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (February 13, 1972) p. 1, 8.

Câmara.¹⁶¹ In other words, his facility was needed to print the cards, the fact that he had independently started such a venture was rewarded, however, creative control over the product was to be limited.

In addition to individual participation, the legitimizing history discussed earlier also highlighted organized groups of locals. Thus, certain local, semi-official, interest groups emerged to supplement individual engagement. Perhaps the best example in the 1960s is the *Grupo dos Amigos da Praia da Areia Branca* (GAPAB). Founded in the 1950s by wealthy residents of PAB, the GAPAB had, and still has today, a headquarters in PAB built partly with government money. Its role was to consult with the *Junta*. It took part in local tourist events, contributing judges, for example, to the annual sand sculpture competitions or to writing competitions. More generally, it promoted the area and its history. In the introduction to its 1971 activity plan, published by the *Junta de Turismo* in the Alvorada, the GAPAB noted that the beach had been a tourist spot for forty years and that the press and first construction undertaken in the early years of the beach were the "seed, which gave the fruits which we see today."¹⁶²

Again, however, the GAPAB did not engage in non-sanctioned discussions. Their general assemblies, although critical of government inaction, were never directly critical of Portugal's system of government. Discussion

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: Serviço de Imprensa no. 13" *Alvorada* (January 24, 1971) pp. 8, 5.

stayed focused on matters of urban development. Those attending the August 1967 general assembly, for example, discussed whether or not to approve of or alter the budget for the year just finished. Then the floor was opened to discuss whatever the members of the GAPAB wanted to discuss and a large number of complaints were brought to the floor. These centered on the "constant lack of water and the lack of pavement that created continuous clouds of dust." The president of the GAPAB promised to discuss the issue with the President da Câmara da Lourinhã about improving water capacity for the next year.¹⁶³ Members of the GAPAB also discussed installing better ventilation for the dining hall in the Vigia (the headquarters of the GAPAB).¹⁶⁴

The *Junta*, of course, was also an agent in development. Although the *Junta's* profile picked up considerably after 1970, when it came to construction and urban development, its role was distinctly a secondary one. As late as 1973, the *Junta* recognized that urban development and construction was not its primary function. However, it still insisted that informing the population about development remained its central mission.¹⁶⁵

The CML, however, was in direct control of project development. Generally speaking, the Câmara had the power to initiate projects and to set the parameters for them. Yet because it lacked the power to raise money on its own,

¹⁶³ "*factos das constantes faltas de água e também pela falta de alcatroamento de ruas o que motivam sucessivas nuvens de poeira.*" See: "Notícias da Praia: Assembleia Geral Ordinária do Grupo dos Amigos da Praia da Areia Branca", *Alvorada* (September 10, 1967) p. 5.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ "XXVII Serviço de Imprensa da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca - Concelho da Lourinhã: Informação Sobre o Turismo Local (II): Movimento da Construção no Concelho da Lourinhã," *Alvorada* (March 26, 1973) pp. 8, 4.

the Câmara found itself having to piece together funding from both the national government and locals on a case-by-case basis. Funding for upgrades to the sewage and water treatment systems in Seixal and PAB in the late 1960s serves as an example. The Governo Civil de Lisboa and the Direcção de Urbanização de Lisboa asked the Câmara in September 1969 if it could take financial responsibility for installation of the sewers in PAB and Seixal, as well as the water treatment center. The CML responded by saying that it could take responsibility for the portion of the investment (two thousand four hundred contos) because of the collaboration of the home and landowners in PAB who contributed one thousand two hundred and fifty contos. At this time, the Mayor also informed the Câmara of a telephone conversation that he had with the Governador Civil de Distrito de Lisboa in which the Governor reaffirmed that despite this one lapse in funding, Lourinhã could count "*incondicionalmente*" on the long-term support of the Governo Civil in this work. This left the Câmara grateful and reaffirming that it would need support to finish the work in the future.¹⁶⁶

Perhaps the avenue used most often to manipulate the participation of Lourinhanense and local groups was mass media. The deployment of the press had been something that had been called for earlier in the 1960s by Silva's colleagues at the *Alvorada*. In 1965, Dr. Afonso de Moura Guedes, a local columnist, complained that over one and a half million foreigners had visited

¹⁶⁶ "Reunião 13/Out./69: Saneamento da Praia da Areia Branca," *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 28 (1968-1969), p. 179.

Portugal that year, attracted, no doubt, by Portugal's climate and its low cost of goods and accommodation, both reflections of Portugal's low standard of living.¹⁶⁷ On their journeys, Moura Guedes explained, tourists often visited two or three cities in the interior and then spent time on the Algarve's beaches or occasionally the beaches of the Atlantic coast. Yet, he grumbled, few stopped in Lourinhã. Why had Lourinhã not entered Portugal's "flourishing tourism market" even though it had four beaches of "indescribable interest", the nearby restaurants of Peniche, and historic attractions dating from as early as the Iron Age?¹⁶⁸ Moura Guedes insisted that the solution to Lourinhã's poor touristic performance was to be found in a "younger and more suggestive" approach through improved advertising and road signage.¹⁶⁹

The necessity of advertising and mass media for tourism was clear to other pundits like José Manuel Landeiro and the anonymous Pascoais. In 1961, Pascoais explained that Portugal's natural advantages in tourism needed to be promoted "through modern means like publication science [*ciência publicitária*] that could reach a range of men."¹⁷⁰ A near identical opinion was expressed seven years later by Landeiro who argued that tourism had been well developed in the intervening years, becoming a large source of income. For Landeiro,

¹⁶⁷ A number of scholars have subsequently pointed to Portugal's low standard of living, and the resulting low prices, as a prime attraction for tourists. See, for examples: Machado, *The Structure of Portuguese Society*, 22-32; and, Lewis and Williams, "Portugal: Market Segmentation and Regional Specialization", 102-103.

¹⁶⁸ Dr. Afonso de Moura Guedes, "Enquanto Vemos Passar os Turistas", *Alvorada* (December 25, 1965) pp. 9, 12.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Pascoais, "Turismo", *Alvorada*, ano 1, no. 12 May 5, 1961) pp. 5-6.

"developed marketing" was required for the industry to expand further. He even went so far as to say that doing without marketing and publication was not an option.¹⁷¹

Local officials also recognized the importance of mass media in attracting tourists in the 1960s. When, for example, Lourinhã opened its *Parque de Campismo* in 1966, the local government not only monitored the national coverage the *Parque's* opening garnered, but was also sure to invite reporters from national newspapers.¹⁷² However, a new facility could not be opened regularly. So, by the early 1970s Lourinhã's *Junta de Turismo* and its Câmara Municipal were sponsoring regular events and competitions that drew attention to the town in the national press. In 1971, GAPAB along with the *Junta* started an annual competition for the best article or news report featuring PAB appearing in any Portuguese newspaper. A jury made up of "suitable" locals chosen by the Câmara Municipal, the *Junta de Turismo* and the GAPAB would judge the competition. The prize would be 5.000\$00 escudos. Articles had to be submitted (they could not be ones that the judges came across) and no publicity pieces would be accepted.¹⁷³ Local organs also offered continued support to an annual *Concurso de Construções na Areia* [sand sculpture competition] that had attracted the sponsorship of, and coverage by, the national daily newspaper, the

¹⁷¹ José Manuel Landeiro, "Da Lourinhã: Turismo", *Alvorada* (July 14, 1968) pp. 1, 4.

¹⁷² See: Parque de Campismo - Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. A-12/19 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

¹⁷³ "Grupo dos Amigos da Praia da Areia Branca: Prêmio Imprensa/71, Regulamento", *Alvorada* (February 14, 1971) p. 3.

*Diário de Notícias.*¹⁷⁴



Figure 11: Praia da Areia Branca sand sculpture competition, 1972. "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: XXVIII Serviço de Imprensa - Praia da Areia Branca", *Alvorada* (October 22, 1972) pp. 10, 9.



Figure 12: Praia da Areia Branca sand sculpture competition, 1972. "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã - Ainda o XX Concurso das Construções na Areia Realizado em 6/9/71 na Praia da Areia Branca", *Alvorada* (January 9, 1972) pp. 10, 9.

¹⁷⁴ "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: XIX Concurso de Construções na Areia", *Alvorada* (October 25, 1970) p. 5.

Through the 1960s and into the 1970s, the local individuals and groups that were told to participate in development also saw agents like the *Alvorada* try to hold the CML to certain standards and achieve certain goals. When these were perceived as not being met, the CML became subject to public criticism. Arms-length groups like the GAPAB and the *Junta* had the ability to organize criticism of the CML in key areas related to public health like sewers. They also called on officials to improve roads and, interestingly, tourism related sites in Lourinhã. As one article in 1971 complained, under the watch of the CML, PAB with its “natural beauty” and proximity to Lisbon had come to be considered “like a bastard daughter.”¹⁷⁵ PAB should have been “treated like a cherished daughter.”¹⁷⁶ PAB’s condition further caused outrage. One opinion piece published on the front page of the *Alvorada* in the fall of 1972 complained that the “sad reality” of PAB was that the Câmara Municipal, or elements within it, were not interested in maintaining the beach. This meant that necessary work was still not being done to minimum standards. The roads and boardwalk needed cleaning, for example fruit peels still littered the area, and asphalt was still needed. Also, the boardwalk should have been illuminated.¹⁷⁷

It is not terribly surprising that the Câmara was consistently held accountable for infrastructure, or lack thereof, relating to areas like public health. In a letter in August 1966, the head of PAB's *Junta de Turismo* explained that the

¹⁷⁵ “*como sua filha bastarda.*” See: Carlos Ribeiro, “Considerações Acerca da Praia da Areia Branca”, *Alvorada* (July 11, 1971) p. 5.

¹⁷⁶ “*tratada como filha querida desta Vila.*” See: Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ João Viegas Faísca, “Tristes Realidades da Praia da Areia Branca,” *Alvorada* (October 8, 1972) pp. 1, 5.

sewer system in the beach town had become worse every year. This was an even greater problem in 1966 than it had been in the past, as was explained, because of the municipal campaign to improve hygiene starting on April 18, 1965 and the inspectors that came with it. This meant that, for example, the *Bar Santo Antonio* needed to have emergency work done on the sewer pipe that ran alongside its property and that an open ditch (an unfinished sewer) was shared by many and represented a "danger to public health". Such occurrences, the *Junta* insisted, needed to be resolved. Residents "deserved" the basic necessities. The message was clear: the town was not upholding its end by offering the minimum infrastructure.¹⁷⁸ Lourinhã's mayor responded sympathetically to the *Junta's* call for improvement in the sewer system in PAB. He thanked the *Junta* for the help that it had already given and offered in the process and explained that the GAPAB had already committed 3.000\$00 escudos for each water storage tank needed. He also explained that Lourinhã had undertaken studies on the full sewer system asked for by the *Junta* with the Distrito de Lisboa.¹⁷⁹ The availability of clean water and related infrastructure was a related and ongoing concern for local organizations.

In 1966, PAB's *Junta de Turismo* continued to question the mayor about

¹⁷⁸ "Presidente da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã", (August 16, 1966), *Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca: Irregularidade do Abastecimento de Água e Deficiências do Sistema de Esgotos da Praia da Areia Branca*, Proc. X-4/5 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

¹⁷⁹ "Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã to Presidente da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca," *Saneamento da Praia da Areia Branca*, (August 20, 1966), *Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca: Irregularidade do Abastecimento de Água e Deficiências do Sistema de Esgotos da Praia da Areia Branca*, Proc. X-4/5 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

the limited water supply and poor pressure at peak tourist times at the beach. For the *Junta*, the water related issues represented "a problem added to the deficient hygienic conditions in which we live during the summer." As such, the *Junta* made a number of observations for Public Works. First, they wanted temporary water storage tanks put in place that would supplement the supply until PAB could have access to the Concelho's main water supply. Second, the *Junta* pointed out that the low water pressure had become a major problem only after the opening of residences and places to stay in the lower plateau's of PAB's landscape, especially after the *Parque de Campismo* was opened. Finally, the *Junta* noted that if a temporary solution was to be implemented, the worst hours of the day for water pressure was between 9am and 1pm and 5pm and 9pm.¹⁸⁰ In response to PAB's *Junta de Turismo*, Lourinhã's mayor suggested that the lack of pressure had been due to a ruptured pipe that had been dislocated the previous winter, which had been "exceptionally intense". In fact, the mayor explained, the Câmara had already opened bidding for repair work that would include new water storage tanks.¹⁸¹

Although concerns related to health and hygiene affected tourism, they did

¹⁸⁰ "um problema mais e juntar às já deficientes condições higiénicas em que vivem durante o verão" See: "Presidente da Junta da Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã", (August 16, 1966), Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca: Irregularidade do Abastecimento de Água e Deficiências do Sistema de Esgotos da Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. X-4/5 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

¹⁸¹ Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã to Presidente da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca, "Irregularidades no Abastecimento de Água", (August 20, 1966), Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca: Irregularidade do Abastecimento de Água e Deficiências do Sistema de Esgotos da Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. X-4/5 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.

so as a secondary concern. Tourism itself motivated various public agents to call upon the Câmara to uphold certain standards and develop new areas. Beyond being on the ocean, with a beach and panoramic views, Abelheira, for example, was on the national road with easy access to Lourinhã and PAB, and it had electricity. However, the *Alvorada* noted, there were no signs on the national road directing tourists to the site. The article then asks: Was this due to a lack of money? Less populous centers had road signs, and in fact better roads that were found in Abelheira. Abelheira could not, it was argued, become a destination unless the roads were improved. In the end, the article argued that Abelheira paid its taxes. It should, thus, be entitled to improvements.¹⁸²

Another 1972 opinion piece complained that Lourinhã had built a successful *Parque de Campismo* that hosted foreign and national tourists. It also had a *Junta de Turismo* with an office at the Beach. The article asked, "*para que?*" [for what?] The main road leading to the beach was impassible, "like all of the roads." People could not enter their houses without knee-high rain boots. Readers were also reminded of the fact that electricity and running water had only recently come to the beach and much of the work that had been done should have been credited to the GAPAB, not the *Junta* or the Câmara. It was this group that pushed for the urbanization of the beach and had the boardwalk, wall, and bathrooms installed.¹⁸³ This was only partly true. This group had been

¹⁸² "A Abelheira: Zona de Turismo", *Alvorada* April 27, 1969) pp. 1, 4.

¹⁸³ Carlos Ribeiro, "Considerações Acerca da Praia da Areia Branca", *Alvorada* (July 11, 1971) p. 5.

involved in lobbying and consultations, but the construction had required the Câmara to go ahead.

Most homeowners were, the reader was reminded, those who had bought their property as a tourist home. Further, PAB was a weekend destination for buses and organized tours. Did Lourinhã want to show these national and foreign tourists "the misery of the roads of this beach?" The article also asked what foreign visitors would think about these conditions given PAB's proximity to Lisbon.¹⁸⁴

Others protested because of the financial burden the CML had placed on locals. For years, the Alvorada argued, tourism and touristic infrastructure had relied too heavily on private investment. This had left PAB with just one restaurant [Foz Bar] and one pensão with a dozen rooms or so. A few other café-bars had emerged along the muralha. The government had talked about building a Pousada and a Hotel, but no one had risked investing in their construction. The *Mociedade Portuguesa* had finished its reconstruction of a *Pavilhão de Férias* beside the beach. Surely, the Alvorada suggested, the tens and hundreds of children that would visit the beach because of this facility offered reason enough to complete the lacking infrastructure.¹⁸⁵ In the end, the article complained that the Concelho received tax and other revenue from tourism. Local businesses also earned much of their living from it. "And what do they do for the good of their

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

users? Absolutely nothing!"¹⁸⁶

By the summer of 1974, just months after the fall of the *Estado Novo*, the *Junta de Turismo* was printing apologies for its failure to deliver on promises like a mini-golf course, something that had been on the *Junta's* agenda since the late 1960s. After "putting up with" the studies for a mini-golf course in PAB, the *Junta* submitted a proposal for funding to the national body (SECET) and its *Fundo de Turismo*. Initially, the *Junta* explained, the cost of the course was to be around sixty contos. However, the cost had elevated by twenty contos, needed for the surrounding flowers and gardens, and to have the outdoor electric lighting. This plan was to also lay the groundwork for a future tennis court, and other facilities of "collective interest." So, the *Junta* appealed to the reader's "courage ... [and] spirit of sacrifice" in asking for forgiveness for how long the course took to build.¹⁸⁷

That the government controlled many of the venues for public participation does not change the fact that the citizens maintained some power in their relationship with the state. Collectively, citizens were considered an important part of the success of tourism. Throughout the 1960s, the Portuguese people themselves were a reason to visit. As the *Alvorada* explained at the end of the decade, Portugal's tourism relied on the "special fashion" of the land and people.¹⁸⁸ It was well known that "Experts and observers ... are unanimous in

¹⁸⁶ "E o que se faz para o bem-estar dos seus utentes? Absolutamente nada!" See: Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ "Informação Sobre Mini-Golfe," *Alvorada* (July 14, 1974) p. 2.

¹⁸⁸ "Por Um Turismo Progressivo e Eficiente", *Alvorada* (December 18, 1969) p. 1.

their praise of the hospitality of the Portuguese.”¹⁸⁹ Such statements granted the citizenry some power. Along with their financial contributions that were outlined earlier, feelings like this allowed the citizenry to expect the state to respond to certain of their concerns.

However, the power that people had under the *Estado Novo* should not be overstated. Beyond the cultural and legal means of control discussed earlier, we must not forget the political and often violent means of control that historians like D.L. Raby and Irene Pimentel have highlighted.¹⁹⁰ What should be understood is that the politico-cultural relationship between the government and its subjects under the *Estado Novo* was fluid. Although the state maintained a monopoly on power, even when Caetano attempted a modest liberalization after Salazar’s death, the fact that the state required public participation to achieve its goals granted individuals and groups a small degree of influence.

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Tourism was a key area for development in Portugal and Lourinhã in the 1960s and 1970s. Its relative lack of development at the start of the 1960s in comparison to its European neighbors offered the *Estado Novo* and local

¹⁸⁹ "Conhecedores e observadores ... são unânimes em louvar a hospitalidade dos Portugueses". See: "Por Um Turismo Progressivo e Eficiente", *Alvorada* (December 18, 1969) p. 1.

¹⁹⁰ See: D.L. Raby, *Fascism and Resistance in Portugal: Communists, Liberals and Military Dissidents in the Opposition to Salazar, 1941-1974*. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1988); and, Irene Flunser Pimentel, *A História de PIDE*. (Lisbon, PT: Círculo de Leitores, 2011).

governments the opportunity to promote its ideological and economic priorities. Rural life and artisanal activity, along with Portugal's natural setting, became what the government promoted and protected through tourism. However, the *Estado Novo* quickly learned that modern infrastructure like roads, running water, and advertising were needed if the landscape were to be sold via tourism. So, tourism became a key motivator for modernization in the waning years of the *Estado Novo*.

Underdeveloped bureaucratic structures prevented the *Estado Novo* from developing its resources without help from the population. Thus, the *Estado Novo* and local governments, like the CML, worked to control local participation. Although the government more or less successfully manipulated participation, it did allow people to organize in sanctioned forms, one of which, cooperativism, is explored in the next chapter.

4. Lourinhanense and Their Agricultural Cooperatives

In 1966, Portugal had three hundred and sixty three agricultural cooperatives, fifty-two *Adega Cooperativas* (cooperative wine cellars) and one hundred twenty-two consumer product coops. These produced 250,000 *contos* of economic activity annually in everything from bread, olives and olive oil, milk products like butter, in poultry, and in other service sectors.¹ The popular discourse told citizens that such institutions helped to secure a fair return for farmers and lower prices for the consumers. They also gave farmers easier access to technology and production resources like insecticides, fungicides, fertilizers, and machinery.² However, much like agriculture more generally in Portugal, coops served a political function as well. Indeed, coops were both: a site of coordination for farmers in which new techniques and expertise were shared amongst members; and advocacy centers as coop boards liaised with local and national government offices on behalf of their members.³

Their responsibilities made coops sites of sanctioned political participation under both the dictatorship and the post-1974 democratic government. Cooperative activities were necessarily charged with political meaning as the modernizing aspects in their activities helped farmers, their communities, and Portugal as a whole defend their agricultural roots. As a 1971 open letter calling

¹ "Sessão Sobre Cooperativismo Agrícola na Moita dos Ferreiros", *Alvorada* (October 8, 1966) pp. 1, 4.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

on farmers to join a fruit coop in Lourinhã suggested, if farmers wanted to continue to live an agricultural life, they needed to "accompany the evolution" that the cooperative movement embodied. Cooperativism, and the various advantages it offered small farmers (like the ability to stockpile produce) was the only way to continue to compete.⁴ Indeed, coops remained important sites of modernization and political participation in the defense of the rural world between the 1960s and 1980s. As Portugal's Prime Minister, the Social Democrat Francisco José Pereira Pinto Balsemão lamented in 1981, farming had been the most unprotected sector in Portuguese society for too long. This was a "great truth that had to be said."⁵ The Prime Minister argued that, as a long-term goal, "we want a modern and competitive agriculture."⁶ However, this was not possible without help and expertise. Farmers needed to study their soil, how to effectively divide their land and to manage their equipment. They also had to help to build infrastructure like roads, and water facilities that would channel water to their fields. Agricultural coops needed to be – and in fact, as this chapter argues, became – important institutions in this work.⁷

Three coops in particular contributed in significant ways in Lourinhã in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The first, the *Adega Cooperativa*, played a leading role in Lourinhã's agricultural industry in the 1960s. As part of a national network of *Adega Cooperativas*, Lourinhã's *Adega* organized the sale and production of

⁴ "Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (October 1971) p. 7.

⁵ "grande verdade que tem de ser dita." See: "Primeiro-Ministro na Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (October 1981), p. 1.

⁶ "queremos uma agricultura moderna e competitiva." See: *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

wine for local grape farmers. By the late 1960s, the *Adega*'s leaders joined other local farmers and turned their attention to organizing a fruit coop, *Lourifruta*, which opened in 1967 and would have a production and storage facility running by the early 1970s. Before *Lourifruta* closed in the late 1990s, it would become a successful producer and exporter of fruit, vegetables and processed food across Portugal and to other European countries. *Lourifruta* would become an example of economic success and of how local farmers could contribute and gain access to civic society in meaningful ways. By the late 1970s, locals moved from these production coops to supplement them with *Louricoop*, a supply and equipment-purchasing coop that emerged out of the remnants of the town's *Estado Novo* Farmers' Guild [*Grémio da Lavoura*]. *Louricoop* was started in order to help farmers gain easier and cost effective access to their supplies.

The *Adega*, *Lourifruta*, and *Louricoop* are just three examples of a plethora of coops that were created in Lourinhã, both before and after 1974. Along with the *Adega* and *Lourifruta*, another industry specific coop that emerged in Lourinhã was a bakery, the *Padaria Modelo*, which opened in 1965. The *Alvorada* described the *Padaria* as a "dream" that could only have been created by "association" and cooperation. The *Padaria* was opened by the *Panificadora União Central da Lourinhã*, an association started by twenty-two of the town's bakers in 1960. Its facilities were meant to provide a central location to make bread for the entire Concelho.⁸ First and foremost, the *Padaria* and

⁸ "sonho que só a associação pôde concretizar". Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da

Panificadora's goal was to modernize the bakeries of the Concelho by "remodeling" bakers' shops. This was not restricted to the commercial aspect of bakeries but also included a social aspect, as the *Alvorada's* reporter, Alvaro Carvalho, noted. His first impressions of the *Padaria Modelo*, was that it was an institution of "health, dynamism, light, in contrast to night and the silence of after hours or the nocturnal sickness of the cafés." Contrasting the work the bakers did to the nightlife of the cafés, Carvalho lionized and sanctified the bakers in their white jackets who worked at night so that there would be bread for the morning. There were seventeen bakers, three deliverymen and three administrators. Work began at eight pm on weekdays and Saturdays as bakers plied their trade until 6 am each day.⁹



Figure 13: Bakers at work in the *Padaria Modelo*, a bakery run on cooperative principles. Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) p. 1. These photos in the *Alvorada* highlight the importance of mechanization in production. They also tie cooperative organization to mechanization.

Lourinhã", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) pp. 1, 5.

⁹ "o ritmo, o dinamismo, a luz, contrastando com o mudo da noite e do silêncio das horas paradas ou do bulício nocturno dos cafés." Ibid.



Figure 14: Bakers at work in the *Padaria Modelo*, a bakery run on cooperative principles, 1965. Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) p. 1. Not surprisingly, the bakery environment also featured women as important parts of the workforce.

The relevance of coops' contributions to the politico-cultural landscape continued to be important to Portugal throughout the 1970s. After 1974, when community organization and farmers' collective action – which Nancy Bermeo and Charles Downs have chronicled in their seminal contributions to our understanding of Revolutionary Portugal¹⁰ – became a widespread phenomenon, Lourinhanense also engaged in community organization to address issues that residents felt would improve their lives. Thus, for example, motorists of Lourinhã and Peniche came together in 1976 to open a transportation and automotive coop based in Ribamar: the *Cooperativa Rodoviária dos Trabalhadores de Peniche e Lourinhã* [the Worker's Transportation Coop of Peniche and Lourinhã].

¹⁰ See: Nancy Bermeo, *The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers' Control in Rural Portugal*. (New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1986); and, Charles Downs, *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution*. (New York, USA: SUNY Press, 1989).

Upon opening, the coop had thirty-three members. Together they purchased five Opel vehicles to share and to rent. These motorists cooperated because they lacked both the need and the ability to buy a car for full time use. When part time use of a vehicle was needed, cooperation would help members to avoid the car rental companies' expensive rates. The announcement trumpeted the fact that "the creation of new work posts and the attempt to put car rentals at the public's service, is also [a reflection] of the spirit of the Cooperative."¹¹




Figure 15 : The first five Opels bought by *Cooperativa Rodoviária dos Trabalhadores de Peniche e Lourinhã* in 1976. "Advertisement: Nova Cooperativa Automóvel de Peniche e Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (March, 1976) p. 7.

Despite examples like the *Padaria* and the *Cooperativa Rodoviária*, agricultural cooperativism remained the most common and accessible means for local individuals to engage in civic affairs throughout the period. On March 24,

¹¹ "a criação do novos postos de trabalho e a tentativa de pôr o aluguer verdadeiramente ao serviço do público, está também presente no espírito da nova Cooperativa." See: "Advertisement: Nova Cooperativa Automóvel de Peniche e Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (March, 1976) p. 7.

1977, for example, an agricultural cooperative was founded in Vimeiro.¹² VIMACOOPE's constitution set the minimum number of members to ten. Members could be individual farmers of either sex engaged in any agricultural activity, including forestry (a reflection of the forested landscape around Vimeiro). Membership, however, also came with restrictions. Members, for instance, were limited in terms of where they were able to farm. If a member acquired land outside of VIMACOOPE's jurisdiction, the farmer had to notify the coop.¹³ Members were also organized into three categories. The first, "*honorários*", were individuals who performed services for the coop and were recognized by the general assembly. "*Fundadores*" were those first members to draft and sign the statutes. Finally, "*associados*", were members who signed on to the coop and accepted its statutes.¹⁴ Thus, membership was egalitarian, to a point. Applicants had to be recommended by two members and would be considered on their "quality" and what they could contribute to the group.¹⁵ However, the only firm barrier to membership was that prospective members had to contribute a minimum of 120.000\$00 escudos of economic activity to the coop per year. In years when members fell short, exceptions could be made with the approval of the coop's board.¹⁶

With the help of these coops, agriculture's importance in Lourinhã remained a constant in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Agriculture was a key part

¹² "VIMACOOPE - Cooperativa Agrícola do Vimeiro, SCRL", *Alvorada* (May 1977), p. 7.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

of not only how citizens made their living, but also how their political lives were shaped. Further, agriculture influenced Lourinhã's social and physical landscape as institutions emerged to support farmers. In many ways then, the key mode of agricultural development in Lourinhã – outlined in a previous chapter as being based upon education, technology and mechanization, public participation, education, and science – was the cooperative. This chapter argues that between the 1960s and 1980s, under both the dictatorship and the democratic government, cooperatives in Lourinhã were sites of modernization in defense of agriculturally based life. As such they became important and sanctioned sites of political participation and development, making them agents of both democratization, as citizens were welcomed into the public sphere, and of modernization by helping to shape the town that exists today. That said, the period between the 1960s and 1980s is not monolithic. The opening of the political sphere by the revolution in 1974 did lead to spontaneous cooperative organization in a number of sectors. This proliferation, however, abated in the 1980s as regional and European organization increased.

What follows is a chronological examination starting in the 1960s and moving into the 1980s that highlights the emergence and contributions of some of the major cooperatives that acted in Lourinhã and contributed to the its socio-political culture and landscape. Although largely defunct and ineffective by the 1990s, the *Adega Cooperativa*, *Lourifruta*, and *Louricoop*, along with a smattering of cooperative associations that emerged in the late 1970s,

contributed to Lourinhã's democratization and modernization in a key period in Portugal's development. Most importantly, the emergence of 'modern' techniques based on education, mechanization and science in the coop movement demonstrates a shift in the coop's role from organizer to modernizer. In the early years, improvement in agriculture was to be won through cooperative organization of labour, sales and production. However, how development was encouraged shifted in the 1980s as coops, having already jumped the organizational hurdle, became educators and disseminators of modernity and the previously discussed *desenvolvimento*.

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The 1960s marked a fundamental shift in Portugal's political economy. As such, Lourinhã's farmers faced new opportunities and challenges. Portugal's "opening to Europe", with the European Free trade Area (EFTA) in 1959, signaled the end of policies inspired by economic nationalism and autarky that resulted in protectionism and limited access for foreign investment. This shift enabled a period of economic growth and modernization that saw the country's GDP grow at a rate of eight percent per year, causing the GDP per capita to jump from US\$275 in 1960 to US\$1,271 in 1973.¹⁷ This, as David Corkill has argued, represented the culmination of a broader shift starting with the end of

¹⁷ David Corkill, "Aspects of Portugal's Economic Development During the Late Estado Novo", *Portuguese Journal of Social Sciences*, 2:1 (2003), 61.

WWII that dismantled barriers to industrialization and modernization in Portugal's economy as the regime experimented with economic planning.¹⁸ That said, the agricultural sector did not enjoy the kind of growth in the 1960s that Portugal's overall economy did. In fact, the sector remained largely stagnant in that decade. Although some years, 1965 for example, saw growth of ten percent in the farming sector, other years – 1966 stands out – saw a contraction of over twelve percent. In contrast, industrial growth over the 1960s was constant with industrial GDP growing anywhere from six to fifteen percent per year.²⁰

Cooperativism, sanctioned in the name of agricultural development, became an important tool for Lourinhã's farmers in meeting these new challenges. However, as I argue below, elite promotion of cooperativism also allowed farmers to participate in civic affairs and to practice activities that gave them input in Lourinhã's political, cultural, and urban development.

In the 1960s, the outstanding institution that developed to help farmers with new challenges was the winemaking *Adega Cooperativa*, today a mere shadow of its former self, but still renowned for the *aguardente* it produces. Unlike later cooperatives in Lourinhã, which would be organized locally, the *Adega* was part of a national network of *Adega Cooperativas* that were linked to the *Junta Nacional do Vinho*. The *Junta Nacional* was founded in 1937 and was part of the *Estado Novo's* efforts to control production, distribution and prices of agricultural products. The national body became instrumental in the founding of

¹⁸ See: Ibid, 61-73.

²⁰ See Table 1 in: Ibid, 62.

Adega Cooperativas across Portugal in the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequently guaranteeing prices for local farmers associated with the *Adegas*.²¹ The *Adegas* in turn, featured the “best hygienic and technical conditions” farmers could expect. Farmers learned that “modern *Adegas*” were equipped to, and responsible for, creating the best wine possible in order to maximize the value of Portuguese wine by providing consumers with an improved and consistent product in both quality and price. The *Adega* movement, which began in the 1950s, spread rapidly. As the directors of Lourinhã’s *Adega Cooperativa* reported, “in just a few years, Portugal had covered the country with a progressive network of *Adegas*, which fulfilled a development plan that, as was clear to all, benefitted the agricultural sector.”²²

The *Adega*’s main activities centered around making, conserving and selling wine and wine-based products while reducing the cost of production and improving the quality of the product via mechanization.²³ The *Adega* was no small concern or niche producer in Lourinhã. In 1964, for example, it produced 20,120 liters of wine and 4000 kilos of crushed grapes left after the juice had been removed.²⁴ In addition, the 1965 capacity of the *Adega*’s warehouses was

²¹ See: Margarida Fernandes, "State Cooperatives and Farm Policies in Portugal After the Carnations' Revolution", Session 72 – Cooperative Enterprises and Cooperative Networks: Successes and Failures, *XIV International Economic History Congress: IEHA 2006* (Helsinki, Finland: August 21-25, 2006), 3-4.

²² "Adega Cooperativa: Falam os Directores", *Alvorada*, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) pp. 8, 3.

²³ Luis Graça, "O President da Adega Cooperativa Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28, 1965) pp. 1, 4.

²⁴ "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercício de

2,900 barrels of wine while its production capacity was 4,000 barrels. This meant that they could process three million kilos of grapes. However, this capacity could still not meet local demand for production as the farmers associated with the *Adega* could produce enough grapes for around 6,600 barrels of wine. In order to solve the *Adega's* storage problem, the *Junta Nacional* was asked in 1965 to approve the expansion of Lourinhã's facility to accommodate 10,000 barrels.²⁵

Need for a larger facility demonstrates just one way in which the *Adega* was limited in the early 1960s. Until 1965, by way of example, the *Adega* had only sold its products to commercial wholesalers and the *Junta Nacional do Vinho*.²⁶ Limited buyers proved problematic. As 1964's *Relatório e Contas da Gerência do Ano Transacto* [budget] showed, the *Junta Nacional* was over a year behind in its payments to the *Adega*, not having paid for product shipped to it in 1962 and 1963.²⁷ Despite receiving payment in 1964 for past years, the *Adega* proved unsatisfied with relying solely upon selling primarily to the *Junta*. Thus, the *Adega* diversified and began to sell its products directly to the consumer in order to have both increased control over prices, and to better serve the consumer and farmer.²⁸

1964", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 3, 5.

²⁵ Luis Graça, "O President da Adega Cooperative Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28, 1965) pp. 1, 4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercício de 1964", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 3, 5.

²⁸ Luis Graça, "O President da Adega Cooperative Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28,

In spite of certain retail limits, the *Adega* boasted a healthy membership base. In a town of roughly 20,000 people in the 1960s, 712 farmers and their families were associated with Lourinhã's *Adega* in 1965. The *Adega*'s President admitted, at the time, that this level of association created a demand from membership to process grapes that the *Adega* could not meet.²⁹ Such intense demand from membership fueled efforts by *Adega* directors to seek further expansion. José Bento Gonçalves, member of the managerial board, "great worker of the Cooperative Movement in Portugal," and President of the *Cooperativa dos Empregados da Companhia dos Telefones* [Cooperative for Telephone Company Workers], argued at the *Adega*'s 1965 general meeting that the expansion of the coop in Lourinhã was essential in allowing farmers to sell directly to the consumer market.³⁰

The democratization of access to markets and resources that was a consequence of membership expansion also demonstrates that the *Adega* offered Lourinhanense farmers an opportunity to engage in civic life based on economic activity. In other words, individual access to the public arena was achieved through economic means, suggesting that citizenship valued by the government in the 1960s was based on financial contributions to society. The *Adega* offered a number of economic advantages, but only to those who could contribute to the whole that the coop represented. According to the official

1965) pp. 1, 4.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ "grande obreiro do Movimento Cooperativa em Portugal". "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercício de 1964", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 3, 5.

discourse, being a member of an *Adega Cooperativa* offered grape producers a number of competitive advantages. As a member of an *Adega*, farmers would deliver a load of grapes to the *Adega's* processing facility on a fixed day. From there, the *Adega's* technicians weighed your grapes and within a few days contributors would receive an allowance totaling roughly half of the value of their grapes. In addition to receiving a portion of the value of their grapes almost immediately, contributors to the *Adega* did not need to worry about the storage or sale of their wine, which was often a problem as farmers lost inventory due to small or dirty private facilities. As dirt entered the aging wine, it ruined it. Further, the pooling of financial resources and inventory allowed farmers to sell their wine at the optimum market price without having to worry about local competitors. The *Adegas* would help then, to standardize wine production and sales in the region.³¹

An unintended consequence of *Adega* members using their economic resources to engage with the civic sphere was that it allowed them to engage in democratic political practices. For example, members were given the opportunity to take part, and vote, in general assemblies. Of the roughly 700 members, approximately 200 associates of the *Adega* attended the General Assembly on the 4th of April, 1964 to discuss and vote on the *Relatório e Contas do Exercício de 1964* [1964's budget], and elect a new managing body on a three year mandate. The *Relatório e Contas do Exercício* was unanimously accepted and a

³¹ "Adega Cooperativa: Falam os Directores", *Alvorada*, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) pp. 8, 3.

motion praising the past board's work passed. The meeting ended with a wine tasting session featuring the *Adega's* products.³² Several positions were voted upon with the election of three members to the managerial board with an additional three substitutes. Three members were elected to the fiscal council. Those elected to the *Assembleia Geral* – an advisory body in the *Adega* – included Lourinhã's mayor, João Ferreira da Costa.³³ Although unanimous support and electing people like Ferreira da Costa to a leadership role are unremarkable voting results, the process – the voting itself – is an interesting example of democratic activity in dictatorship Portugal.

In contrast to these political contributions, the *Adega* had little impact on Lourinhã's long-term economic development and landscape beyond its own facility, which stands to this day on the outskirts of the town's core. The *Adega's* headquarters enjoyed a concentrated burst of investment in the early 1960s. Outside of the town center,³⁴ the *Adega's* processing facility and central offices opened in 1962. As a notice in the *Alvorada* explained to associates on July 29, 1962, the *Adega's* new offices had been open since July 12, 1962 at the warehouses of the *Junta Nacional do Vinho*, next to the future site of the *Adega*

³² "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercício de 1964", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 3, 5.

³³ The following individuals were elected: Dario Pedro de Matos, José Bento Gonçalves, and António Guilherme Gomes to the managerial board. Their substitutes were Dr. José de Carvalho, Horácio da Silva Alves, and Jorge Pedro Simões Silva. The fiscal council consisted of Joaquim Pedro de Carvalho, Lino Cordeiro Reis, and José Diogo Leitão. Horácio Duarte Caxaria L. Henriques and Luis Rei Venâncio were elected along with Ferreira da Costa to the *Assembleia Geral*. See: *Ibid*.

³⁴ As has been discussed, Lourinhã underwent a geographic shift between 1960 and 2000. As new institutions emerged the town developed, building a new town center around new institutions like the courthouse, market and a new town hall. However, the *Adega's* facilities are still well outside Lourinhã's geographic center of power.

Cooperativa.³⁵ The facility's first phase, when completed, housed 3,600 barrels of wine. Although these barrels were to service the farmers affiliated with the *Adega*, not all contributed consistently. In the year of the move, the *Adega* expected, for reasons that were not known, only forty-two of the two hundred producers to deliver their grapes for processing.³⁶ Despite the underwhelming participation by members, the next phase of development in the *Adega* went ahead the following year. At a general meeting of the *Adega Cooperativa* in Lourinhã in March 1963, attended by representatives from the *Junta Nacional do Vinho*, it was announced that the national office would fund the second phase of construction on Lourinhã's *Adega*. This would bring the total storage and production capacity to around 6,000 barrels.³⁷

Unlike its later counterparts in other industries, however, the *Adega* did not – or perhaps was not permitted to – conduct educational sessions for its farmers nor did it contribute to the proliferation of technology amongst its members. Although offering farmers access to its equipment, the *Adega* maintained a monopoly on the production of wine in its facilities. Farmers, via the *Adega*, enjoyed access to larger markets and the consolidation of commercial activity well beyond what individuals could have hoped to achieve on their own. The *Adega*, then, represented a first step towards agricultural *desenvolvimento* in Lourinhã. In contrast, *Lourifruta*, which emerged in the late 1960s, in many ways

³⁵ "Notícia: Adega Cooperative da Lourinhã", *Alvorada*, ano II, no. 30 (July 29, 1962) p. 8.

³⁶ "Adega Cooperative: Falam os Directores", *Alvorada*, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) pp. 8, 3.

³⁷ "Informação Vinícola", *Alvorada*, ano II, no. 41 (April 14, 1963), p. 7.

out of the *Adega*, represented a much more robust contribution to Lourinhã's modernization and democratization.

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Founded in 1967 by twenty-four local farmers,³⁸ at its height in the 1980s, *Lourifruta* would export fruit and vegetables across Europe before closing its doors in the late 1990s. For thirty years, *Lourifruta* was, in many ways, the crown jewel of Lourinhã's agricultural sector, attracting national attention and actively participating in Lourinhã's civic life and development. Like the *Adega Cooperativa*, *Lourifruta* made contributions to the economic and political life of Lourinhã, as well as the geographic landscape. However, *Lourifruta* was much more active in the civic life of Lourinhã than was the *Adega*.

As the *Adega Cooperativa* was consolidating the wine market in Lourinhã in the early 1960s, discussions turned to what could be done to improve conditions for fruit producers who, according to many locals, made up the backbone of one of Portugal's most important fruit growing regions.³⁹ The sites of organization for a fruit coop early on were the *Adega Cooperativa* and the local church. In April 1965, in a meeting of the General Assembly of the *Adega Cooperativa*, a call was made to all those interested in the creation of a fruit coop

³⁸ "A Lourifruta e o seu Historial", *Alvorada* (February 1978) pp. 1, 3.

³⁹ "A Associação o Cooperativismo: Esta na Orem do Dia, e ai de Nós de não Evoluirmos nesse Sentido!...", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) pp. 1, 3.

to meet on Sunday, May 2, "directly after Mass". That scheduling would allow as many local farmers to participate as possible. The *Alvorada* explained that, "we did not have doubt" that Lourinhã's farmers would support the initiative demonstrating that a coop was a "part of their desire and would help achieve [members'] interests and aspirations."⁴⁰ In attendance at the inaugural meeting were a number of individuals involved with the *Adega Cooperativa*, Mayor Ferreira da Costa, agricultural engineer Pimenta de Castro, and Horácio Caixaria, who was an official from the local farmers' guild and the *Adega*. At the time, the mayor remarked that the farmers and notables had come together with two goals. First, they sought to produce top quality fruit in excellent conditions. Second, interested parties aimed to commercialize the fruit industry in Lourinhã.⁴¹ After the mayor, Pimenta de Castro spoke about some of the problems with developing the fruit sector while not upsetting the industrialization of agriculture and the development of the tourist industry in Lourinhã.⁴² From this meeting, a commission made up of many of the same people involved in the *Adega* was established to organize a fruit coop. Other notables like the mayor and João Marques (himself the future head of the administrative commission established in 1974 to manage the CML during the revolution), were also part of the commission.

⁴⁰ Luis Graça, "A Caminho da Organização Cooperativa da Nossa Lavoura: Vai Propor-se a Criação de uma Cooperativa Frutícola no Concelho, em Reunião de Lavradores a Realizar no Próximo Domingo", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 1, 5. "*parte do seu desejo e vem ao encontro dos seus interesses e aspirações.*"

⁴¹ "Com a Criação da Cooperativa de Frutas: Novas Perspectivas se Desenham para o Futuro da Nossa Lavoura", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) p. 1, 5, 6.

⁴² *Ibid.*

After being founded in 1967, *Lourifruta*'s operations expanded rapidly in the 1970s. In 1971, it began storing fruit in a refrigerated facility and selling farmers' products. When business operations began, *Lourifruta* had the ability to store up to 1,600 tons of produce.⁴³ In 1974, *Lourifruta* expanded operations beyond fruit production and sales to include activity in the horticultural sector.⁴⁴ A year later in 1975, the fledgling coop expanded its refrigeration facility to facilitate the storage of up to 2400 tons of produce.⁴⁵ By 1976 *Lourifruta* had begun to process fruit and place products into frozen packages for commercial sale.⁴⁶

Lourifruta's rapid development helped the cooperative organization to grow. By winter 1978 *Lourifruta* had 390 members, 35 full time employees and the ability to store up to 2,400 tons of fresh produce and 1,000 tons of frozen produce. They could package up to 2.4 tons of frozen produce per hour. The organization sold 25.000\$00 contos of fruit and 20.000\$00 contos of horticultural produce. *Lourifruta*'s notoriety and success was evident in that they held spots in two prominent Lisbon markets, the *Mercado de Frutas do Cais Sodré* and the *Mercado Abastecedor do Rego* in Lisbon. They also sold directly to Lourinhanense in the villages of Laranjeiro and Areia Branca. In addition, *Lourifruta* exported their product to England and Belgium.⁴⁷

Economic success gave *Lourifruta* the reach and cultural cachet to contribute to Lourinhã's development both economically and politically. The

⁴³ "A Lourifruta e o seu Historial", *Alvorada* (February 1978) pp. 1, 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

public image put forward by *Lourifruta* demonstrates that the coop's management was aware of their political and social influence. A *Lourifruta* director's meeting in 1971 reveals that the coop considered it self an "industrial project for the benefit of the Concelho's agriculture."⁴⁸ Ten years later a *Lourifruta* advertisement explained that the coop's eight hundred farmers worked in "defense of farmers and the consumer."⁴⁹



Figure 16: A *Lourifruta* advertisement from 1981 explains that the 800 farmers associated with the coop worked in “defense of farmers and consumers.” “Advertisement: Lourifruta”, Alvorada, (April 1981) p. 14.

With *Lourifruta*'s elite and establishment origins in the *Adega Cooperativa*, and with the mayor's involvement, the coop embarked on an economic program

⁴⁸ "emprego industrial para beneficio da agricultura do concelho." In: "Certidão da Cópia da Acta da Reunião da Direcção Realizada em 5 de Abril de 1971", Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), (Arquivo Municipal da CML, Lourinhã, PT).

⁴⁹ "Advertisement: Lourifruta", Alvorada, (April 1981) p. 14.

aimed at helping local farmers compete in existing national and international frameworks. Thus, remaking economic relationships, as opposed to economic systems in a revolutionary sense, was at the center of *Lourifruta's* efforts between the 1960s and 1980s. At a meeting of fruit producers in 1965, in *Lourifruta's* pre-history, Pimenta de Castro argued that because farmers were absorbed in tending their fields, they had little time to think about the problems of commerce and sale of their product.⁵⁰ Sr. Pimenta further argued that the commercialization of fruit in Portugal had been "fundamentally missed." He concluded that only strong groups or business blocs could overcome the problems of under-commercialization and catch up to more advanced producers.⁵¹ A coop was an available and important tool to build a strong bloc. Working in a cooperative would help small farmers to gain access to industrial techniques that would grant them the ability to deliver new products to the market. Such techniques would see farmers earn income from "sub-products" (fruit juice for example), which would be an important source of future income.⁵² More generally, local news outlets described a fruit coop as beneficial, both economically and socially. Readers were told that the coop would allow Lourinhã's farmers to alleviate social problems by tapping into markets and profits that would end "economic mediocrity, misery and frustration."⁵³

⁵⁰ "A Associação o Cooperativismo: Esta na Orem do Dia, e ai de Nós de não Evoluirmos nesse Sentido!...", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 89 (may 9, 1965) pp. 1, 3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Luis Graça, "A Caminho da Organização Cooperativa da Nossa Lavoura: Vai Propor-se a Criação de uma Cooperativa Frutícola no Concelho, em Reunião de Lavradores a Realizar no

A more coherent argument linking a fruit coop to giving farmers an advantage in the capitalist system was published in the year of *Lourifruta's* founding. An open letter in the *Alvorada*, addressed to "dear men of the countryside," discussed the need for a fruit cooperative in Lourinhã. The author complained that farmers were forced to take prices for their fruit below cost just "so they would not lose everything." Consumers, "with well paying jobs" often took advantage of low prices, leaving the farmer with little. In Lourinhã, for example, the author pointed out that a kilo of pears could cost less than 3\$00 escudos. The author went a step further and wondered, "who knows, maybe some would have to take less than 2\$00 [per kilo for their pears]?" The argument was that fruit farmers had been taken advantage of because there had been no collective resistance to such exploitation. Some, the letter insisted, did not resist because they felt that they lacked the economic resources. However, he continued, many "had more than enough wealth to not worry about immediate bills." Put more simply, the letter insisted that greater coordination between farmers would help the situation without needing an out and out revolution in commercial relations. Simple resources, like access to refrigerated storage, would alleviate some pressure. Such equipment would allow farmers to prolong the life of their product and sell directly to the consumer, skipping the middleman. A cooperative would help farmers procure such equipment and gain a competitive advantage. The letter lyrically concluded by saying that it had been

Próximo Domingo", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 1, 5.

three years since the idea for a fruit cooperative had emerged, three years of discussion, and three years “in which others earned what we deserved to be earning!”⁵⁴

Once *Lourifruta* began operations, it moved quickly to position itself as a strong competitor in national and international markets. With facilities opening in 1972, *Lourifruta* would store fruit for local farmers. The fruit would be kept in refrigerators and sold when the market yielded the best price. *Lourifruta's* farmers became both producers and retailers, eliminating the middleman, and helping locals compete with foreign producers, “especially the French”, whose agricultural sector was a strong European challenger. Such facilities would also allow farmers to extend their selling season well past what the climate would allow.⁵⁵

Lourifruta's business success garnered national attention within a decade of the opening of its facilities. In the fall of 1981, members from the national government including the Prime Minister, Pinto Balsemão, and the Minister of Agriculture, Commerce, and Fisheries, Bento Gonçalves, came to Lourinhã to tour the coop's facility. Along with these elected officials, representatives from other coops from across Portugal also toured *Lourifruta* to examine the "quality" of the export and sales operation. *Lourifruta* was considered a prime example of

⁵⁴ "quem sabes, talvez alguns a tenham entregado por menos de 2\$00?"; "são mais que suficientemente ricos para não se preocuparem com receitas imediatas." In: "Argumento que Poderá Ser um Certo Estimulante Aos Fruticultores/A Constituição da Cooperativa dos Proprietários Fruticultores do Concelho da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (October 22, 1967), pp. 1, 4. "que outros ganham o que devia ser ganho por nós!"

⁵⁵ "Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (October 1971) p. 7.

Pinto Balsemão's government's emphasis on "work and export" as its economic priorities. The news report reasoned that, "when Portugal imitated Lourinhã, the Portuguese economy would be saved." Because *Lourifruta* "exported much more than it imported," it was considered to be an exemplar of "progress."⁵⁶ The Prime Minister explained that he had chosen *Lourifruta* as the site of his meeting with the country's fruit industry representatives because of its "dynamism that placed [the coop] at the highest level in the country."⁵⁷

Lourifruta continued to lead the local economy through the economic challenges of the 1980s. Of particular concern to Lourinhã's farmers in that decade was Portugal's entrance into the European community. A 1987 colloquium for example, encouraged farmers to continue to change how they conducted business. Ostensibly, the colloquium was called to teach farmers about the various sectors that would be affected by Portuguese entry into the EEC. The colloquium was sponsored by: *Lourifruta*; the Civil Governor Dr. Afonso Moura Guedes (a long time pundit in local outlets like the *Alvorada*); deputy Eng. Vasco Miguel of the national assembly; Lourinhã's mayor, José Manuel Custódio; and the *Caixas de Crédito Agrícolas*.⁵⁸ The head of *Lourifruta*, Luis Damião,⁵⁹ opened the colloquium by welcoming the various participants.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ "quando o País [Portugal] imitar a Lourinhã a economia Portuguesa estará salva." "Primeiro-Ministro na Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (October 1981) pp. 1, 5.

⁵⁷ "dynamismo que a coloca no nível das melhores do país." Ibid.

⁵⁸ "Lourifruta no Contexto de Adesão de Portugal à CEE," *Alvorada* (January 1987) p. 4.

⁵⁹ Damião is my Godfather. A cousin of my father's, Damião is a farmer with minimal education. Having lived in Canada in the early 1980s, Damião and his family returned to Portugal to take up positions in *Lourifruta* and the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícolas* while starting and maintaining a national horticultural production and sales operation – *Soflor*.

He explained that *Lourifruta's* twenty years of existence were evidence of the ability of local farmers to adapt to new challenges and situations. Accession to the EEC was just the latest of these changes. Damião also repeatedly returned to the need to sell to regional, national and international markets and to identify emerging opportunities.⁶¹ According to the *Alvorada*, many of the speakers emphasized the need to produce uniform goods and to attractively package it: products were "bought with the eyes. The better [a product] was presented, the more it sold." This, the article suggested, indicated a "change in mentality" and advances towards "new goals [and] to be culturally developed."⁶² Given *Lourifruta's* success, it was argued that the coop should lead the local fruit and horticultural industries in promoting local products on the international stage.⁶³

By 1991, *Lourifruta* was considering using greenhouses to grow tomatoes, peppers, potatoes, eggplants, and "other plants in that family." *Lourifruta's* facilities were used to hold a regional colloquium on raising these crops, which were grown on "more than seventy percent" of the local Torres Vedras region's agricultural land. Over one hundred and fifty farmers, scientists, and industry representatives met to attend the sessions. These included: a session on fertilization of tomatoes and peppers, led by Eng. Ana Maria Simões from the *Rebello da Silva laboratories*; a talk on new methods and technologies used in growing tomatoes, peppers, and eggplants by Eng. Miguel Rato from *Hortícola*

⁶⁰ "Lourifruta no Contexto de Adesão de Portugal à CEE," *Alvorada* (January 1987) p. 4.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² "é compra com os olhos. Melhor apresentação mais venda."; "novos quereres ou seja um desenvolvimento cultural." *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

Oeste; a session on soil and its proper uses by Eng. Coimbra Dias from *Neoquímica*; a seminar on preventing diseases and plagues that typically struck tomatoes, potatoes and eggplants by Eng. Gralheiro from *Rhone-Poulenc* in order to "maximize" the commercial value and quality of the product. The meeting ended with a session by a Dutchman on how potatoes were grown in Holland. Paulus Squerk from *Wolf & Wolf* brought two representatives from his Dutch seed company with him to present the Dutch experience in potato growing and suggest some potato varieties that might work well in Portugal. These sessions all emphasized lessons from abroad, the use of scientific techniques and the professionalization of farming techniques.⁶⁴

Lourifruta's opening of access to economic markets through organization and modernization went hand-in-hand with the internal political democratization of decision-making. However, whereas *Lourifruta* was consistent in its mission to equalize farmer access to economic benefits, political benefits for *Lourifruta's* farmers did increase after the *Estado Novo* fell. Damião for one is an example of these new opportunities. Emerging as a strong figure in *Lourifruta* and the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola* in the 1980s, the minimally educated farmer who returned to Lourinhã after an attempt to emigrate to Canada in the early 1980s, did not have the socio-economic background or education to rise under the *Estado Novo*. This shift characterized how *Lourifruta's* leadership evolved from elite and managing members of the *Adega Cooperativa* and the CML in the 1960s, to local farmers in

⁶⁴ Eng. Ana Tabarra Santos, "Jornada-Debate as 'Solanáceas' na Lourifruta", *Alvorada* (Oct., 27, 1991).

the 1980s.

Lourifruta and other cooperatives represented what many considered an advanced way to organize the polity and funnel civic participation in the 1960s. According to Pimenta de Castro in 1965, association was “natural and spontaneous.” Association was the means by which more advanced fruit industries in France, Switzerland, Holland, and Italy had developed. The individual way of life had to be left behind. As Sr. Pimenta argued, “today [1965], the isolated farmer had no value.” He implored farmers to, “with their colleagues, fight for their interests.”⁶⁵ Even the public general meeting was celebrated as a forum for participation, so long, of course, as it was productive and respectful. Indeed, after the first meeting of farmers interested in creating a fruit cooperative in Lourinhã, the *Alvorada* gave a glowing review of the proceedings stating that, “contrary to the pessimistic predictions of some doubters of the gentleness of others, the meeting of fruit farmers was a success.”⁶⁶

However optimistic and inclusive the organization was about grassroots contributions to in the 1960s, the leadership in creating *Lourifruta* remained in the hands of local elites. The commission assembled – made up of men from the *Adega Cooperativa’s* management board and people from the CML – had felt it necessary in 1965 to proceed only with the blessing of government offices like

⁶⁵ “hoje [1965], o lavrador sózinho nada vale”; “com os seus companheiros, lutar com eles pelos seus interesses.” In: “A Associação o Cooperativismo: Esta na Orem do Dia, e ai de Nós de não Evoluirmos nesse Sentido!...”, *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) pp. 1, 3.

⁶⁶ *contrariando as previsões pessimistas de uns e contrapondo-se ao quietismo de outros, a reunião dos fruticultores redundou em pleno êxito.* “Com a Criação da Cooperativa de Frutas: Novas Perspectivas se Desenham para o Futuro da Nossa Lavoura”, *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) p. 1, 5, 6. ”

the *Direcção-Geral dos Serviços Agrícolas* and organizations like the *Grémio da Lavoura* before heavily recruiting local farmers. The *Direcção-Geral dos Serviços Agrícolas* pledged their support for a fruit coop and the commission moved forward with recruiting fruit farmers to join the initiative.⁶⁷ The participation of the guilds also remained an important consideration.⁶⁸ In fact, *Lourifruta's* origins, along with the Church and *Adega Cooperativa*, can be found in the local *grémio*. At the conclusion of the first public meeting for what would become *Lourifruta*, the *Grémio's* head, Horácio Caixaria, remarked that a fruit coop had already been discussed and approved by other bodies, yet the blame for it not being created sooner was not only the state's, but "ours" as well. Caixaria was reminding readers that they had to take responsibility for failures in the civic sphere. As president of Lourinhã's *Grémio*, Sr. Caixaria had invested over 350 contos over the five years of his administration in order to create a fruit coop. In the end, the project died because it lacked a building and the interest to purchase the necessary land.⁶⁹

After the dictatorship fell, *Lourifruta's* leadership and priorities became more inclusive of those who would not have had the opportunity to take a formal leadership role under the *Estado Novo*. One of *Lourifruta's* prominent leaders in

⁶⁷ "Desenvolvimento: A Cooperativa de Frutas em Plena Organização", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 91 (June 13, 1965).

⁶⁸ In contrast, some, like José Bento Gonçalves, a noted expert in Cooperativismo, expressed the importance of autonomy from the *grêmios* of any future fruit coop. Still others, like José Marques, disagreed suggesting that dialogue between the *grêmios* and any future coop was not only essential but in the spirit of cooperativism. "Com a Criação da Cooperativa de Frutas: Novas Perspectivas se Desenham para o Futuro da Nossa Lavoura", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) p. 1, 5, 6.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

the early 1980s, António Augusto da Costa, who was elected Secretary of *Lourifruta* in 1984,⁷⁰ for example, was an uneducated local farmer who worked his modest landholdings on his own.⁷¹ Such men, like Damião, could not have hoped to gain this level of stature under the *Estado Novo*.

Lourifruta's economic and political contributions to liberalization also guided how it contributed to the development of Lourinhã's social, cultural, and urban landscape. *Lourifruta's* most visible impact on Lourinhã is the large warehouse and office complex that sits, even today, at the south end of Praia da Areia Branca. Dominating the landscape overlooking the beach, the facility that once donned the *Lourifruta* moniker, represented, at the time of its construction in the late 1960s and early 1970s, an ambitious commercial venture for Lourinhã, Lourinhanense farmers, and the CML. The nascent *Lourifruta* bought land from the CML in 1968 to build refrigerators, a reception and office area along with storage and production facilities to process fruit into other products. The land had been sold by the CML to *Lourifruta* as an investment in "municipal heritage."⁷² From this, a supportive relationship between *Lourifruta* and the CML emerged, meaning that each institution, at times, pushed the other to develop new methods and infrastructure. Both institutions became officially invested in the facility's

⁷⁰ "Lourifruta-Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã, Cooperativa de Responsabilidade Lda", *Alvorada* (February 1984) p. 13.

⁷¹ António Augusto was my paternal grandfather. He was illiterate and never had the opportunity to retire, still working his land when he passed away at the age of 62. Although he contributed well above his station to *Lourifruta*, holding a leadership role his entire life – this included being the coop's negotiator when the original land was purchased from the CML for *Lourifruta's* facility, for example – he was not the prototypical dictatorial elite.

⁷² "Reunião 28/Out./1968: Cedência do Terreno à Cooperativa de Fruticultores de Lourinhã", *Livro da Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, no. 28, pp. 34-35.

success when the CML received a letter from the *Direcção-Geral da Administração Política e Civil* in October 1968 concerning the transfer of land from the municipality to *Lourifruta*. The *Administração Política e Civil* wanted an extra clause added to the sale's contract that gave *Lourifruta* a maximum of two years to build its facility under threat of fines.⁷³ From plans for *Lourifruta's* building at the south end of Praia da Areia Branca we can see not only political and economic liberalization as priorities, but we can also see how the building pushed development of the area and institutions around the building.



Figure 17: *Lourifruta's* mammoth facility stands today. It had a short life as the headquarters for *Frutas, AB* but was sold to an international hotel and resort developer who has not, despite plans, done anything with the land. *Lourifruta's* Headquarters c. 2013. Collection of the Author, (August 2013).

⁷³ Ibid.



Figure 18: *Lourifruta's* facility. In this picture, the developer's billboard from the early 2000s is as dilapidated as *Lourifruta's* former office, storage and manufacturing facility. *Lourifruta's* Headquarters c. 2013. Collection of the Author, (August 2013).

The building's layout and amenities demonstrate *Lourifruta's* dual economic and social purpose, as well as the importance of indoor and monitored space. Upon opening, *Lourifruta's* building consisted of an industrial refrigeration facility with three chambers that totaled 1,600 tons of storage capacity, a reception area, and a "social zone" with an office, washrooms and a 3,021 square meter dining and cooking facility. The second level had two balconies totaling 480 square meters, and a public area of 26,331 square meters.⁷⁴ The

⁷⁴ "Lourifruta to Exm. Snr. Presidente da Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã", March 9,

building would have an entrance big enough for bicycles, along with an area to park them as well. This would include a ramp leading up to the general platform upon which, facilities would be built for: a fruit processing station; social services for individual workers; administrative services; offices and garages to repair and maintain equipment; and “other buildings that could be considered necessary.” However, the fruit processing and storage station, an *Estação Fruteira*, would be the principal facility and would have its own designated entrances and transit way.⁷⁵

The *Estação Fruteira* was the facility's focal point. Thus, it was meant to occupy the majority of the indoor space. The *Estação's* lobby would include two levels and house the social and administrative services. A potential workforce of fifty women and twenty-five men would use this space.⁷⁶ *Lourifruta's* social services area would comprise: a foyer; changing rooms for men and women; washrooms, including showers, for men and women; an atrium; a kitchen with dish washing facilities; a dining area; and a meeting room.⁷⁷ The building proposal explained that the changing rooms, washrooms and shower rooms for men and women would be separate. Eating and cooking areas, on the other hand, would be a mixed space.⁷⁸ The administrative facilities, comprising the

1973. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.

⁷⁵ "Mémoria Descritiva e Justificativa: Cooperativa dos Fruticultores da Lourinhã - Lourifruta", (c. 1970). Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

second of the three areas of the *Estação*, would include: a vestibule; a reception area; an archive; an executive office; a manager's office; offices for workers in various fields; and meeting rooms. The executive office would be on the second level and, importantly, have windows overlooking the facility's *Estação Fruteira*.⁷⁹ The refrigerators (the final area of the *Estação*) would be on the north side of the building in the back. This would initially have three rooms with the possibility of future expansion.⁸⁰

Planning the exterior and orientation of the facility was heavily dictated by the building's surroundings. Beyond a planned parking lot lined with trees next to the administrative offices,⁸¹ *Lourifruta's* planners built around the existing environment. Given that no access roads existed, the building's orientation would be dictated by the property's terrain.⁸² The facility was oriented on the property so as to take advantage of the "natural protection against the ocean winds" offered by the sand dunes to the east.⁸³ It was also important that the pavement used at the facility "did not transmit vibrations." In addition, the proximity of the sea called for the use of materials that were resistant to salt.⁸⁴

Underlying plans to work around the environment was the glaring problem of road access. In their evaluation of the construction of *Lourifruta's* facility, the *Junta Distrital de Lisboa* did not oppose the building or its location. However, it

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ "protecção natural contra os ventos do mar." Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

did express concern over access to the facility. In February 1971, the Junta Distrital warned that such a facility would see “intense vehicle movement” that would require “adequate access.” In fact, the District explained that in its study it found that the area lacked the necessary roads. Thus, it insisted that a road be added to the project between Lourinhã and PAB to specifically service the facility. The District judged, in the end, that the CML should resolve the situation. Further, any future application was to take such considerations into account.⁸⁵

By March 1971, as predicted by the *Junta Distrital*, *Lourifruta* was admitting "difficulty" in building its facility. Following up on a conversation that took place with town officials, Lourinhã's mayor received a letter from the struggling coop. In the letter, dated March 5, 1971, *Lourifruta* explained that they would face a problem with funding the construction of their new facility *and* the necessary roadway infrastructure. The added expense was too much for *Lourifruta* to bear without help. Thus, the coop was writing to formally ask the CML to collaborate in expanding the road that went through Areia Branca to the facility. Specifically, the coop asked for “help aligning the road, and other technical considerations.”⁸⁶ In response to the problem with the construction of the access points for the facility (as identified by the *Distrital de Lisboa*) in 1971,

⁸⁵ Mário Mota de Magalhães/Junta Distrital de Lisboa, "Construções Particulares - Concelho de Lourinhã, Cooperativa dos Fruticultores da Lourinhã - Lourifruta: Construção de uma Estação Fruteira, Parecer dos Serviços," Lisboa, February 4, 1971. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.

⁸⁶ "*colaboração em alinhamentos [of the road] e outros assunte técnicos.*" In: "Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã, Lourifruta to Senhor Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Concelho da Louinhã", March 5, 1971. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.

Lucínio Guia da Cruz, Lourinhã's mayor, invited *Lourifruta's* directors to meet with him to discuss a possible delay in the construction schedule and a bank loan for 140.000\$00 to fund the delay.⁸⁷ This episode would be resolved, in part, by the CML helping *Lourifruta's* application for credit with the *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* for 140.000\$00 escudos in 1971.⁸⁸ This was not the first time, nor would it be the last time, that *Lourifruta* and the CML collaborated. Both parties built their relationship upon the recognition that *Lourifruta* was an important institution whose "social and economic interest" contributed to Lourinhã.⁸⁹ In fact, building *Lourifruta* and its facility would prove to be an ongoing concern throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the facility continued to expand.

The most successful and prominent production coop in Lourinhã's history, *Lourifruta's* contributions to the economic, political and modern landscape of the town between 1967 and the 1990s are clear. Further, the turn to more educational activities in the 1980s, mentioned above, also demonstrates how *Lourifruta* shifted along with the agricultural sector as a whole from development through cooperative organization towards development through technology and science. Lourinhã's most prominent post 1974 cooperative organization,

⁸⁷ "adiçional de prorrogação do prazo da execução da obra" and receive a "garantia bancária, do valor daqueles trabalhos, no total de 140.000\$00." In: "O Presidente da Câmara, Lucínio da Cruz to Presidente da Direcção da Cooperativa de Fruticultores de Lourinhã", July 5, 1971. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.

⁸⁸ "O Presidente da Câmara, José Maximo da Costa to Exm. Snr. Gerente da Agência do Banco Nacional Ultramarino", April 5, 1978. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.

⁸⁹ "O Presidente de Direcção de Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã to O presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã", June 26, 1971. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.

Louricoop, would stand as a prime example of the renewed emphasis on modernization through science and technology in 1980s Lourinhã.

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Buoyed by *Lourifruta*'s success, local agricultural elites sought to supplement production coops with cooperative purchasing power through what would become *Louricoop*. In the open political environment that emerged after 1974, local farmers made a presentation to the CML in June 1976 arguing that a certain piece of municipal land, the former site of the *Grémio da Lavoura* where, appropriately, the monthly *feira* was held, would be ideal for the headquarters of their new agricultural purchasing coop. Although this required alteration of the town's urbanization plan, the CML decided to develop plans to have equipment moved to the proposed site.⁹⁰ Just three months later, in September 1976, the CML approved the establishment of the facility for the *Cooperativa Agrícola da Lourinhã (Louricoop)*.⁹¹ This physically and symbolically represented the end of support for the former guilds as the method of organization preferred by authorities in Lourinhã. Further, by placing it at the site where *feiras* had been held, the CML also gave *Louricoop* a fitting historical heritage as a commercial

⁹⁰ "Reunião 9/Jun./76: Instalações para a Cooperativa Agrícola", *Livro da Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, no. 33 p. 28.

⁹¹ "Reunião 28/Set./76: Implantação das Instalações da Cooperativa Agrícola", *Livro da Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, no. 33, p. 73.

entity that would go some way in neutering *cooperativismo* as a potential challenge to capitalist relations by the 1990s. That said, like its predecessors, *Lourifruta* and the *Adega Cooperativa, Louricoop* contributed to Lourinhã's development as it modernized and moved closer to Europe. For example, it, like its forerunners, ran courses for local farmers, such as 1986's courses on treating apple and pear trees, on fertilizing the land and potato growing, which included lessons on new varieties of potatoes and the opportunities that existed to sell them. Courses would focus on experimenting with new crop varieties and cultivating techniques.⁹²

Louricoop was not a retail operation, but instead distributed supplies directly to farmers as a purchasing cooperative. Thus, *Louricoop* argued, it had a simple objective, to "serve the farmers" by helping them operate with lower expenses through collective and bulk buying.⁹³ This also meant, of course, that *Louricoop* was interested in its own sales and profits. On May 11, 1980, 364 members of the general assembly of *Louricoop* elected their board of governors for 1980/81. In 1979, *Louricoop* had welcomed 443 new members, and increased sales by thirty percent. The board was mandated with the continuation of the building of *Louricoop's* headquarters and engaging in various activities that would promote the coop, increase their membership and thus, their sales base.⁹⁴

The commercialism and social concerns evident in other coops were

⁹² "Noticias da Louricoop", *Alvorada* (March 1986) p. 5.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ "LOURICOOP: Cooperativa de Apoio e Serviços de Concelho de Lourinhã, SCRL", *Alvorada* (June 1980) p. 2.

evident in how *Louricoop* planned its central facility. *Louricoop's* building was to be located about five hundred meters from the northern exit of Lourinhã proper. This site was chosen, in part, because of its proximity to the site of the CML's projected storage facilities. The facility would be divided into three parts. One was reserved for the distribution of the products they would carry like pesticides and other equipment. Another section would store grain, rations and seeds.⁹⁵ The office, to be equipped with electric lighting, air conditioning, heating and telephones, would be in a two-story annex attached to the warehouse. The first story would include a waiting room, a store and a showroom for agricultural equipment, a reception area with a wicket to serve the public, and a community information board.⁹⁶ The second floor would house a multi-purpose room with a library where one could view movies. The multi-purpose room was next to a meeting room, and a room for general cultural activities. The second floor would also include an office for the coop's bookkeepers, two archives and offices for an agricultural consultant, one for an inspector, and one for a sales manager.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Memória Descritiva, August 24, 1978. Proc. no 937/78: Louricoop - Construção de Armazém e Escritório, Lourinhã. "Obras Particulares: Sem Alvarás de 935 a 946, Caixa no. 4 (1978).

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid. See also: "Louricoop to Senhor Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã", September 4, 1978. Proc no. 932/78: Louricoop, Construção de um Stand para Exposição do Máquinas Agrícolas." Obras Particulares: Sem Alvarás de 697 a 934, Caixa no. 3 (1978). Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.



Figure 19: A farmer rides his tractor to *Louricoop's* annual festival in 1984. "Lourinhã em Festa – Louricoop em Exposição", *Alvorada* (May 1984) pp. 1, 2.

However, *Louricoop's* most celebrated contribution to Lourinhã in the 1980s was the annual expositions it held throughout the decade. *Louricoop's* expos were elevated to nothing less than a Lourinhã-wide event: when *Louricoop* held an expo, Lourinhã was "*em festa*".⁹⁸ A poem published by the *Alvorada*, described 1984's expo as a chance for "Government officials, ministers, doctors, presidents, priests, and *senhores*" to mingle together, celebrate, and fraternize. The expo, which had been "pretty" and had been a place where "animals were shown, ... should remain in the memory and be inscribed in the history of the *Concelho da Lourinhã*."⁹⁹

As an important part of Lourinhã's social and commercial calendar, *Louricoop's* expos became an event that highlighted the aspects of *modern*

⁹⁸ "Lourinhã em Festa – Louricoop em Exposição", *Alvorada* (May 1984) pp. 1, 2.

⁹⁹ See: Figure **Error! Main Document Only**. A pome published about Louricoop's 1984 Expo. Ibid.

1980s Lourinhã. In the spring of 1983 (April 30, May 1 and 2), *Louricoop* held its first exposition. Its purpose was to “show modern agricultural machines and equipment and the varied products for farming.” The expo would also include cultural events like “children’s design competitions [with] the theme, ‘Cooperation’.” Visitors would also be able to attend exhibits by the local firefighters, the local *grupo folclórico*, and seminars on Lourinhã in “the context of national agricultural.”¹⁰⁰

1984’s expo followed suit with 1983’s expo and demonstrated how to organize and run events that blended cultural and commercial priorities. *Louricoop’s* 1984 exposition was heralded as an event that improved the social environment of Lourinhã for its people and the 4,100 members of *Louricoop*. Despite the fact that it was reported not to have made any money, exhibitors were “happy” with how the organizers improved the festival year after year, explaining that, “this was how to run a festival.”¹⁰¹ The animal pavilion was “without doubt” the most visited at the 1984 exposition. The children especially liked it. These same children, it was explained, had their best moment, however, competing in athletic competitions on the expo’s first day. The children’s athletic exploits revealed “some great physical prowess.”¹⁰² The public test for expertise in tractors was also reported as being a highlight. However, many were

¹⁰⁰ “mostragem das modernas máquinas e alfaias agrícolas e dos mais variados produtos para a agricultura”; “desenhos infantis subordinado ao tema <<Cooperação>>”; “a Lourinhã no contexto de agricultura nacional.” In: “Louricoop - Exposição 83: Presidente da Republica na Inauguração”, *Alvorada* (April 1983) pp. 1, 19.

¹⁰¹ “Lourinhã em Festa - Louricoop em Exposição”, *Alvorada* (May 1984) pp. 1, 2.

¹⁰² Ibid.

disappointed that it was not run as a competition. Such a competition would have cultivated the “cooperation necessary” to be successful in operating such machinery.¹⁰³ The expo also featured demonstrations in sheep shearing with electronic sheers. This allowed visitors to see the service and facilities that *Louricoop* could offer.¹⁰⁴ Finally, there was also a soccer match between the *Seleção das Cooperativas* and the *Velha Guarda*. The match was a friendly affair that ended in a sardine BBQ.¹⁰⁵

1984 best demonstrated modern Lourinhã by privileging indoor – and thus, monitored – space. In 1984 *Louricoop* cooperated with the *Casa Misericórdia da Lourinhã*. This allowed *Louricoop* to expand the expo's size and to offer visitors over one hectare of indoor exposition space. The indoor space was considered optimal. Not only was it “well illuminated”, but it also allowed organizers to house all the local organizations that contributed to the “culture, closeness, and cheerfulness” in Lourinhã in one, easily accessible place for visitors. Under one *Louricoop* sponsored roof, visitors found a one stop shop for the institutions that were important in Lourinhã: the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo de Lourinhã*, the *Adega Cooperativa, Lourifruta*, the *MAFA da Lourinhã*, the *Instituto António Sérgio*, the *pavilhão da Holanda*, the local firefighters, the *Banda da Lourinhã*, the *Escola Preparatória, Adapecil*, the Museum, the *Rancho de Ribamar a Acção Católica Rural*, and the *Alvorada* with spaces in the expo's

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

privileged and indoor facility.¹⁰⁶

The following year, in 1985, *Louricoop's* expo would continue with the usual themes. The Minister of Agriculture, two secretaries of state and the Civil Governor of the region would open the expo, which would include performances by the local *rancho foclórico*, a soccer match, tractor and equipment demonstrations, and a car show.¹⁰⁷ However, as Portugal prepared to enter the EEC, Europe and education became important additions to the expo, which would continue to be a theme in 1986. *Louricoop's* 1985 expo included a number of events meant to educate local farmers. These included visits to an "experimental field", a colloquium about admission to the EEC, and an "information session about association and rural development."¹⁰⁸ In March 1986, *Louricoop* took Europe a step further, insisting that their upcoming expo would have a different aspect from those in the past. It would engage more directly with the "new reality: our accession to the EEC is a fact!" Quoting "*O poeta*", *Louricoop* explained that "the whole world is composed of change" and that they too wanted to "evolve". This meant applying a "new dynamic to our organization." Therefore the expo had to have an "international element". *Louricoop* felt it had a responsibility to present new ways of producing and selling in the new environment. So, pavilions in 1986 would focus on means of "development [towards] more interesting and productive work."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ "O Ministro da Agricultura e a Banda da Armada na Louricoop", *Alvorada* (April 1985) pp. 1, 2.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ "*nova realidade: a nossa adesão à CEE é um facto!*"; "*todo o mundo é composto de*

Louricoop, to its credit, also insisted upon applying new techniques in agriculture throughout the year. For example, 1983/84 was considered a banner year for Lourinhã's agriculture. Potato sales and production fuelled this surge. In potatoes for seed alone, Lourinhã sent out more than thirty thousand sacs that production year. This success was a result of *Louricoop's* experimentation with, and dissemination of, new potato varieties. *Louricoop's* success was attributed to having developed and executed an effective plan of action. *Louricoop* had also undertaken a program of experimentation with soil enrichment and land organization under the supervision of Dr. Catanho Meneses. Meneses and his team had experimented with twenty varieties of potato in various conditions in order to learn which varieties yielded the best quality product in Lourinhã's soil. They observed the resistance of various varieties to diseases and fungus, and the growth period of each variety. From the success of the past year and the experiments of Dr. Meneses, *Louricoop* recommended a certain variety to its farmers. After consulting the membership and the consultative council of *Louricoop*, the coop purchased its potato seed for 1984/85.¹¹⁰

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Although the *Adega Cooperativa*, *Lourifruta* and *Louricoop* were either

mudança"; "desenvolver um trabalho mais interessante e mais produtivo." See: "Louricoop Comunicado", *Alvorada* (March 1986) p. 5.

¹¹⁰ "A Agricultura no Concelho - Louricoop: Importadora e Distribuidora de Batata de Semente", *Alvorada* (October 1984) p. 3.

closed or relegated to minor roles in Lourinhã's economic and social landscape by the 1990s, there is no doubt that they were important agents of modernization between the 1960s and 1980s. Each made economic, political and urban contributions to Lourinhã, acting in response to difficulties faced by local farmers. The rupture in the Portuguese political landscape in 1974 did indeed make room for more direct involvement in civic associations like coops, however, to say that the fall of the *Estado Novo* was a significant moment in the cooperative movement in Lourinhã would be difficult. Although coop leadership did open after 1974, membership and participation was already open and based on economic criteria from the beginning. The significant change in the coop movement instead can be found in a changing emphasis on how to best help farmers, which came in the 1960s. In the early years, cooperative organization and the mutual sales and production themselves were the highlights of cooperative hope. By the end of the period, the emphasis shifted towards education and improved techniques used by individual farmers.

Another way to look at the change in the cooperative movement is to note that it changed from focusing on the group and collective economic and social action, to focusing on the individual and liberal capitalist business. Given how Lourinhã's agricultural industry developed, it is hard to argue that liberal capitalism was ever threatened, despite what some leftist actions in other parts of Portugal during the Revolution might suggest. Portugal's modernization and development, as undertaken originally by the *Estado Novo*, continued to shape

the country well after European social democracy came to Portugal. What can be said is that this process accelerated after 1974 as Portugal embraced Europe.

In the next section of my dissertation, I turn to the 1980s in Portugal, culminating in the opening of Lourinhã's new municipal market. Acclaimed as a 'modern' institution in Lourinhã, it was said to introduce a "new Lourinhã, a Lourinhã of European Integration."¹¹¹ What made it modern above all, was the indoor and electrified environment it offered. Like the agricultural cooperatives, this institution was granted cultural importance. First, however, I will turn to discussing the political and cultural importance of both electricity and water, and the civic engagement those services inspired, before examining the market and central square in the final chapter.

¹¹¹ 'Novo Mercado Municipal Inauguração está Próxima: Com Custos Globais de Cerca de 3,500 Contos', *Suplemento Alvorada: Informação Municipal*, (February, 1989), iv.

5. Water, Electricity and Community Organization

In 1959 when electricity – at the time considered a daily tool for some and a "dream for others" – came to the *freguesia* of Toxofal in the Concelho of Lourinhã, a local poet, Mariano Vicente, published the following verse in the *Alvorada*:

It was one time, one place;
Which [one] would be embarrassed to ask [for];
The right to look;

At the people who would want;
They asked and cried so much;
Toxofal, in truth;
Which, finally came; to have electricity!";

Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!;
We are in a day of celebration;
That a more modest land;
Does not like to be darkened;

Eh! Eh! Eh! Eh!;
Boys they sing;
Who until they feel the beat;
Here inside the heart!¹

Seven years later on July 4, 1966, Toxofal celebrated its anniversary with electric lighting. Manuel Rodrigues, writing in the local newspaper – by then the *Alvorada* that had been founded in 1960 – explained that he would never forget the support from the 1950s and 1960s mayors of Lourinhã, Srs. Capitão Simões

¹ *Era uma vez um lugar; Que envergonhado pedia; A justiça dum olhar; Ao povo que pretendia; Tanto pediu e chorou; O Toxofal, na verdade; Que, afinal acabou; Por ter electricidade!; Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!; Estamos em dia de festa; Que a terra por mais modesta; Não gosta de escuridão; Eh! Eh! Eh! Eh!; Rapaziada é cantar; Que até se sente pulsar; Cá dentro o coração!* See: Dr. Mário Batista Pereira, "A Inauguração da Electricidade no Toxofal", *Alvorada* (June 11, 1995), p. 7.

Belo and João Ferreira da Costa respectively, who helped bring electrical lighting to Toxofal. The congratulations then finished with a reprinting of Sr. Vicente's poem, this time dropping the final two verses.² The *Alvorada* returned to the topic of Toxofal's electrification in 1995, producing a retrospective of the completion of electrical infrastructure for the parish thirty-six years earlier. Dr. Mario Batista Pereira recalled the "popular contentment" from all at the "marvelous source of energy." Electricity, so Pereira asserted, was "so important and so used daily by all Portuguese to ... turn night into day."³

Similar sentiment about "such magic"⁴ was also an important way for Lourinhanense in the 1960s to come to understand electricity. The *Alvorada's* Reporter X wrote in 1964 that, "fluorescent lamps ... made night into day", a feat that was clearly important for the center of Lourinhã. As Reporter X continued, it had been three or four years since Lourinhã had seen, "with delight", fluorescent lamps installed on the main road. Those were meant to have been the first set of lamps in a series of new installations that were to replace the gas streetlights. However, "unhappily", the new lamps had yet to appear. The author conceded that for those who had lived with gas illumination in the streets and who had only enjoyed electricity in their homes for a short while, the need for new fluorescent lamps on the streets would seem to be an "exaggeration or a luxury." But those who said this, Reporter X complained, were the people who did not live in central

² Manuel Rodrigues. "Salve a Electricidade!", *Alvorada* (July 26, 1966), p. 6.

³ Dr. Mário Batista Pereira, "A Inauguração da Electricidade no Toxofal", *Alvorada* (June 11, 1995), p. 7.

⁴ Ibid.

Lourinhã, only coming into the center during the day to visit or conduct business.⁵

In deploying Sr. Vicente's poem on a number of occasions, linking electric lighting to happiness, safety and, to be sure, a *right* in both the authoritarian and democratic years, Lourinhanense discourse over the last fifty years shows that seemingly mundane infrastructure remained socially and politically charged. Indeed, academics agree that electricity had a profound effect on the home and social processes in the Western world. With the United States leading the way in the 1920s, power tools, heating and cooling appliances, and full electrical lighting – which had begun to emerge in earnest in the 1880s when gas lighting was first challenged as the primary utility in American cities – changed domestic work and improved the home environment. However, as Historians like Ronald Tobey lament, a scholarly consensus emerged in the 1980s that treated residential electrical modernization as a phenomenon of consumerism linked to mass production economies.⁶ In other words, Tobey correctly, in my estimation, complains that these scholars denied the public and collective aspects of electrification – and by extension, infrastructure – reducing the process to

⁵ Repórter X, "A Iluminação da Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (October 25, 1964), p. 8. "*lâmpadas fluorescentes, que quase faziam da noite o dia.*"

⁶ See: Ronald C. Tobey, *Technology as Freedom: the New Deal and the Electrical Modernization of the American Home*. (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1996) 2-3. For examples of work that Tobey considers part of the consumerist thesis of electrical modernization see: Ruth Schwartz Cowan, *More Work for Mother: the Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983); Harold L. Platt, *The Electric City: Energy and the Growth of the Chicago Area, 1880-1930* (Chicago, IL; University of Chicago Press, 1991); David Nye, *Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940* (Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press, 1991); Thomas P. Hughes, *Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); and, Mark H. Rose, *Cities of Light and Heat: Domesticating Gas and Electricity in Urban America* (University Park, PENN: Pennsylvania State University, 1995).

rationality and individuality.⁷ In fact, as Tobey argued, there is nothing rational about consumerism as people purchase well beyond utility. Tobey wanted to move the debate to politics and, in his case, the political struggle over the American home in the 1920s and 1930s, suggesting that Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and its household revolution – raising American residences to minimal standards of shelter, electrical access (80% of homes in the USA were not serviced by electricity in the mid 1930s), and, as such, improve the “qualities of the families in those homes” – was the base of a national revolution of social modernization that mobilized popular and political groups and discourses in support of various positions.⁸

Similarly, historians like Jonathon Coopersmith have looked to government policy as a driver for electrification. In his work, Coopersmith argues that Russia's revolutionary Bolshevik government made electricity its top infrastructure priority in order to differentiate itself from the Tsarist regime that preceded it.⁹ He also agreed that electricity had a cultural and social role: “As well as changing night into day, electrification transformed capital markets, the military, manufacturing, the spatial geography of cities, and many other facets of ... life.”¹⁰ Likewise, both the domestic and the public context in *Estado Novo* Portugal, and particularly in settings like Lourinhã, became important sites of social and cultural negotiation through infrastructure. As Irene Vaquinhas and

⁷ See: Tobey, *Technology as Freedom*, 3-4.

⁸ See: *Ibid*, 2-6.

⁹ See: Jonathon Coopersmith, *The Electrification of Russia, 1880-1926*. (USA: Cornell University Press, 1992). 1-3.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 1.

Maria Alice Pinto Guimarães tell us, order was at the base of governance in both the public and the private spheres. This meant organizing time, activities, and social and moral attitudes in clearly demarcated spaces: a popular Portuguese maxim reminded all that, “a proper place for each thing and each thing in its place.” In order to put each thing in its place, homes needed to be clean and accessible.¹¹ By the late 1960s, this was to be done in Lourinhã with electronic appliances, lighting, and running water.

This chapter examines the political and cultural meanings of water and electrical infrastructure in Lourinhã from the late 1960s into the 1980s and how the development of that infrastructure intersected with the town’s political culture against the backdrop of Portugal’s shift from dictatorship to democracy.

Generally speaking, we think of dictatorial subjects as benign and passive.

Particularly in the Portuguese case, where the *Estado Novo*’s subjects were under-educated and widely distracted with maintaining their subsistence way of life, our understanding of citizen engagement with development and politics is that civic engagement was a low priority for people. However, this chapter, and indeed this entire dissertation, reveals a strong private commitment to participating in public development of infrastructure and services. At the heart of this chapter is a sample of private letters received by Lourinhã’s mayor – as we will see, he was the point of contact with the municipal government for many –

¹¹ “*Um lugar certo para cada coisa e cada coisa em seu lugar.*” See: Irene Vaquinhas and Maria Alice Pinto Guimarães, “Economia Doméstica e Governo do Lar: os Saberes Domésticos e as Funções da Dona da Casa” in José Mattoso and Irene Vaquinhas, eds. *História da Vida Privada em Portugal: A Época Contemporânea* (Lisbon, PT: Circulo de Leitores, 2011), 211-213.

requesting electrical and water infrastructure. These letters were most common as a form of citizen/subject-government communication in the 1970s and range from demands for service to polite requests with offers of financial and labour contributions to the development of infrastructure.

From the context and negotiations framing these letters we can draw conclusions about the meaning of development and about political culture as Lourinhã and Portugal modernized and democratized. Electricity and water were sites of rapid development in Lourinhã, where improvements carried cultural as well as practical meaning. In addition, they were part of the larger series of events and developments forcing local governments like the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (CML) to further coordinate and modernize their processes: we see the role of private individuals, for example, decrease as other institutions developed to deliver service in the 1980s. As this chapter demonstrates, locals were actively engaged in the public realm under Portugal's dictatorship. Even more striking, despite proclamations of a new participative political culture emerging after 1974, evidence shows that citizens took it upon themselves to engage in civic and infrastructure affairs more frequently and in more direct ways before 1974 than they did after.

The letter samples I highlight establish the cultural investment in infrastructure that underpins this chapter. As they represent an important aspect in the culturally charged development process in Lourinhã, the letters reveal some of the dynamics surrounding the relationship between subjects/citizens and

the Portuguese government as it transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s. As I argue below, the coincidence of governmental and private priorities in infrastructure development between the 1960s and 1970s, opened space in the civic sphere for subject-citizens to participate in governmental affairs under Portugal's dictatorship. After explaining the state of Portugal's water and electrical infrastructure between the 1960s and 1980s and establishing the consistent importance of change and development in that period, this chapter will turn to a conversation about the political capital of Lourinhanense and how they engaged in development. What will follow is an outline of the cultural aspects of private engagement with infrastructure development: the ways in which people organized to engage; what arguments they made in their requests for service; and the source of their political currency in societal priorities in the landscape and the home. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the practical and institutional considerations of infrastructure development and civic participation: put plainly, private and governmental priorities ran up against an underdeveloped bureaucratic and governmental service delivery system that, as it advanced, came to supplant the role that private citizens enjoyed in the 1960s and 1970s in their landscape's development.

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The 1980s, especially following Portugal's entrance into the European

Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, were the beginning of a renewed and overwhelming makeover of Portugal's infrastructure and economy. Like in the 1960s, the economy grew in leaps and bounds in the 1980s and was buoyed by a new wave of foreign investment and aid from Portugal's EEC partners that saw the country's roads and infrastructure emerge and resemble what we see today. This included the building of Portugal's first one thousand miles of highways to replace aging rail and local road networks. As David Birmingham so charmingly put it, with new roads Portugal's "cities skipped with alacrity from the age of the electrical tram to that of the motor car without adopting either Dutch-style bicycles or Italian-style motor scooters."¹² Such tremendous change was evident at the private level as well. António Barreto has noted that the late 1970s and 1980s in Portugal was a period of development in infrastructure providing running water, electricity, sewers and sanitation facilities. This led, Barreto continued, to an invasion in the latter part of the 1980s of modern household equipment in the Portuguese home. The years between 1987 and 1994, for example, saw the number of household telephones rise from 33% to 74%; electric washing machines from 44% to 74%; and, the number of households with video viewers rose from 15% to 40%.¹³

Coastal and rural towns like Lourinhã were the chief beneficiaries of new national transport routes, local water networks and completed electrical lines. As

¹² David Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 200-201.

¹³ António Barreto, *Tempo de Mudança*. (Lisbon, PT: Antropos, 1996), 76-77.

the *Alvorada*'s municipal supplement was riddled with photos of roads dug up for water pipes and sewers in the mid-1980s, Lourinhã's mayor, Manuel Custódio announced in 1987 that the CML had completed the electrification of the Concelho.¹⁴ This was a large step in Lourinhã's modernization. As local economists, Mário Bairrada et al., have explained, the availability and consumption of electricity have long been considered markers of infrastructural modernity.¹⁵ In fact, by 1991, 96% of Lourinhã's homes had electricity, 93% were attached to sewers, 90% had running water and 84% had a shower or bathtub.¹⁶



Figure 20: Lourinhã road construction, 1987. This image comes from the Municipal bulletin printed with every issue of the *Alvorada* in the late 1980s. A prominent feature of these bulletins was the front-page images of infrastructure improvements from across the Concelho. See: "Informação Municipal", no. 2. *Alvorada* (January, 1987).

¹⁴ "A Lourinha, na Senda do Progresso: Entrevista ao Presidente da Camara Municipal Conduzida pelo Director do Alvorada", *Alvorada*, 593 (November 1987) 6.

¹⁵ Mário Bairrada, et al., *Perspectivas Para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinha*. (Lisbon, PT: Instituto do Emprego e Formacao Profissional, 1997) 28. Bairrada and his colleagues actually do use the term "*modernidade*" (modernity), and although they never explicitly define their rhetoric, their definition of modernity and modern in Lourinha indicates that they see modernity as being in a 'modern' environment: see Bairrada et al, 88-90.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 26-27.



Figure 21: Digging a trench for water infrastructure, 1987. In this photo, a mechanical digger digs a trench for piping. One will note the proximity of the equipment to existing houses, highlighting the advanced residential network around which basic infrastructure needed to be installed. See: "Informação Municipal", no. 2. *Alvorada* (January 1987).

The proliferation of infrastructure and household goods in the 1980s was matched in magnitude by the advancements of the 1960s. According to the national statistics institute (INE), per capita consumption of electricity in Portugal increased from 260.2 kWh in 1960 to 705.4 kWh in 1970 with steady year over year increases. Further, measuring in units of 1000kWh, INE reported that domestic consumption of electricity increased from 630,877 units in 1964 to 1,062,639 units in 1970. In the same period, electrical use in the kitchen

effectively tripled from 44,575 units to 153,801 units. In addition to domestic consumption, INE reported, using 1000kWh units again, that electricity consumption for public lighting almost tripled from 67,319 units in 1960 to 155,343 units in 1970. Although increase in water consumption did not match the rate of increase in electrical consumption, it nonetheless almost doubled in the 1960s. INE reported that, this time using units of 1000 cubic meters of water, total consumption in Portugal increased from 96,935 units in 1960 to 177,984 units in 1970.¹⁷ This increase in water and electrical consumption occurred at a time when Portugal's population was stagnant. According to INE, between 1960 and 1970 Portugal's population declined marginally from 8,851,289 in 1960 to 8,668,267 in 1970.¹⁸

However, a 1969 survey of Lourinhã's infrastructure conducted by the CML with its eight *freguesias* reveals that these impressive figures concerning the spread of infrastructure in Portugal in the 1960s mask the reality that most people, certainly in Lourinhã, did not benefit from these services. *Freguesias* were asked to report, by neighborhood, on road access, electricity, water treatment facilities, garbage collection and cleaning services, and if they had a cemetery. Doing a tally of the survey's results shows that of seventy-eight neighborhoods in the Concelho of Lourinhã, sixty had road access, forty had

¹⁷ Instituto Nacional de Estatística, *Estatísticas para o Planeamento: Continente e Ilhas Adjacente: 1960-1970* (Lisbon, PT: May, 1972). 113-114.
<http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/viewImage.do?me=view&key=supcod%3D1%26sercodg%3D1%26iddoc%3D5343%26pagini%3D1%26pags%3D166%26pos%3D1> (accessed May 14, 2013).

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 29.

some form of electrical service, twenty-five had water treatment infrastructure, seven enjoyed garbage collection or cleaning services, and sixteen had a cemetery. As responses were hand written, *freguesia* officials were able to add addendums in the margins that show that respondents felt that an additional five neighborhoods needed road access, three areas needed electricity, thirteen needed water treatment, thirteen needed cleaning services, and two needed a cemetery.¹⁹

In addition, the survey reveals varied understandings of the meaning of the categories of infrastructure and no apparent patterns in the coincidence of certain types of infrastructure. For example, access to roads did not always mean that electrical infrastructure existed and vice versa: Vale da Viga reported road access but no electricity while Seixal reported electricity but no major road access.²⁰ It is also interesting to note that in some cases under the category “*energia electrica*”, the ambiguous response “*tem luz*” [has light] (not necessarily indicating electricity at all) is used instead of the oft-used “*tem*” [has].²¹ As for water service, in Santa Barbara public fountains and washbasins were

¹⁹ See: "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁰ "Relação dos Melhoramentos Necessarios na Freguesia da Lourinhã no Concelho da Lourinhã", 1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²¹ "Relação dos Melhoramentos Necessarios na Freguesia da Miragaia no Concelho da Lourinhã", 1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

recognized as water treatment infrastructure.²² In Vimeiro, water treatment was needed because all “tourist centers had running water” and if Vimeiro was to take advantage of its assets as the site of the battle of Torres Vedras in which Wellington confronted Napoleon’s forces, such infrastructure was a must.²³ On the whole, these responses reveal that water infrastructure, sewage and cleaning facilities were generally considered more desirable in 1969 than was electricity.²⁴

The 1969 survey came at a time when infrastructure was a popular topic for the local paper, letters to the municipal government, and within the CML’s chambers. In the 1960s, roads and particularly the water supply were common topics while electricity became the dominant issue in the 1970s. As mentioned, the above-discussed 1969 survey was part of a larger evaluation of infrastructure conducted by the CML. In fact, roads and road repairs were the second area discussed in the CML's evaluation of its infrastructure in 1969. However, particular attention was paid to a road destined to link Ribamar to the fishing port in Porto Dinheiro. What made this a "necessary work" was the advantage it would bring to the fishermen in the area. This was considered a region where fishermen and workers lacked "decent working conditions" in comparison to other

²² “Relação dos Melhoramentos Necessarios na Freguesia da Santa Barbara no Concelho da Lourinhã”, 1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pede pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²³ “Relação dos Melhoramentos Necessarios na Freguesia da Vimeiro no Concelho da Lourinhã”, 1969. See: "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pede pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁴ See: "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pede pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

ports. Porto Dinheiro needed the road so that Lourinhã could fully exploit the resource. Exposing an awkward list of priorities in the construction process, the road had already been landscaped, had the decorative aspects installed, and had seen berms built to protect neighboring residential areas. The road's budget, however, ran out before it had been paved.²⁵

By the 1970s, when attention turned more towards electrical infrastructure, similar issues emerged. Despite not gaining significant steam until the 1970s, Lourinhã's administration was aware of their infrastructural needs and appeared proactive about dealing with deficiencies. For example, as early as 1960, they had deemed the public lighting in *Regueugo Grande* deficient, and so launched a study on how to improve the situation.²⁶ Deficiencies continued well into the 1970s, as was the case with water infrastructure. A month after the Revolution in 1974, the CML decided to launch an investigation into the parishes, which "still did not benefit from the electrical network." The goal was to assess what was needed for those places to have electricity.²⁷ Further, electrical conservation and energy consumption was on an ongoing concern in 1976. Monitored by the Ministry of Industry and Technology, Lourinhã's administration was reminded that electrical usage would be limited during Christmas and the New Year. This would be part of the energy savings initiative announced in 1975's *Diário do Governo*,

²⁵ CML, "Relatório das Obras Necessárias no Concelho", July 22, 1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁶ "Reunião 23/11/60: Iluminação de Regueugo Grande", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 22. (1959-1961), p. 143.

²⁷ "Reunião 24/Maio/74: Electrificação total do Concelho", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 31 (1973-1974), p. 177.

series 1, no. 17 of the January 21, and which was confirmed by a resolution from the Council of Ministers published in the *Diário da República* on July 6 1976.²⁸

All this reveals the piece-meal and, at times, varied approach taken by the CML towards infrastructure development. A 1965 project for water infrastructure had first been proposed and developed in February 1951. A water treatment network, it was argued, would "lift the deficient conditions presented" in the parish of Lourinhã. However, as the Ministry of Public Works explained in 1965 the project did not, as originally conceived, resolve issues caused by Lourinhã's landscape, namely the inconsistent flow of the river leading from the south of the Concelho through Lourinhã parish and out to PAB, not to mention the need to elevate the water storage and filtration facilities in relation to the water outlets in homes and businesses. Installing a fully elaborated water system – as opposed to piece-meal improvements – was needed from the start, ministry officials argued, as their population and water consumption projections assumed that between 1965 and 2005, consumption would nearly double with the population. They assumed that Lourinhã parish's population of 1,350 in 1965 would balloon to 2,450 by 2005 while each inhabitant's water consumption would rise from sixty liters per day to one hundred liters per day.²⁹ The CML moved quickly to address the Ministry's concerns. Halting work until the problems related to construction,

²⁸ "Secretaria de Estado da Industria e Energia: Direcção Geral dos Serviços Eléctricos to Pres. da Comissão Administrativa da CML", November 26, 1976. "Electricidade: Diversos; Poupança de Energia", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-B/3 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁹ Ministerio das Obras Públicas, Direcção Geral dos Serviços de Urbanização, "Informação ao Exmo. Engenheiro Director Geral", November 2, 1965. "Revisão da Rede de esgotos de Lourinhã", Arquivo Corresspondencia 1965, proc. A-12/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

including what the ministry noted, repaving of certain areas, lack of water supply and “protests and complaints” from the population, the CML explained that they would move forward with work as part of the projects related the 40th anniversary of the May 28, 1926 celebrations. That way, the CML could “honour” the Concelho and the national government, augmenting the “brilliant period” as much as possible.³⁰

The apparent lack of overall planning, coupled with the rapid proliferation of infrastructure, caused service problems for the CML and national government. An August 1973 note from the Secretary of State for Industry explained that the budget for the proliferation of electrical infrastructure was stretched as the number of projects underway (185 as of August) already matched the total number of projects for all of 1972. As such, the Secretary was informing municipalities that the application process for projects would be altered slightly. “Normally”, obtaining the license for work would be the final phase in the process, however, applicants would be required to obtain work permits “in advance.” In addition, the ministry would not accept applications during the remainder of August and September, unless it was for work that “absolutely” needed to be done, in order to clear the backlog.³¹ In a continuing effort in late 1973, the national body responsible for coordinating the development of electrical

³⁰ “Pres da. CML to Sr. Ministro das Obras Públicas: Revisão da Rede de Esgotos de Lourinhã”, December 2, 1965. “Revisão da Rede de esgotos de Lourinhã”, Arquivo Correspondencia 1965, proc. A-12/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³¹ Ministério da Economia, Secretaria de Estado da Indústria, “Nota”, August 9, 1973. “Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Projectos de Electrificação”, Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 37-D/18 (Arquivo Muniipal da Lourinhã, PT).

infrastructure (the Secção-Geral dos Serviços Eléctricos) established their priorities in terms of which projects were to be favoured in 1974. First, "new works" were preferred over expansions or renovations of existing infrastructure. Second, all applications were required to list all participating parties up front. Next, all things being equal (including cost), applications would be prioritized in the order which they were received.³² Especially after the revolution, as Portugal's government changed, the quick rate of electrification and the creation of the necessary infrastructure could cause problems for the CML/Commission.³³ In October 1975, for example, the CML/Commission had to delay construction on the electrical infrastructure for the Quinta da Santa Catarina until an undefined problem with "various complaints" that concerned "the entire Concelho's network", could be resolved. However, the CML/Commission decided to grant final authorization for the Qta. Sta. Catarina project.³⁴ The electrical company would also provide the CML with obstacles to service. Citing difficulties in supplying needed electricity in 1976, SEOL informed the CML that their supply of electricity would be cut at the source – as opposed to relying upon locals and their institutions to limit their usage. Cuts were made on a weekly basis, with the

³² "Secção-Geral dos Serviços Eléctricos to Pres da CML", October 8, 1973. "Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Projectos de Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 37-D/18 (Arquivo Muniipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³³ The CML was shaken up in July 1974 with the President being replaced by an administrative commission. Sr. Joaquim Pedro de Carvalho became the Secretary of the Treasury and Police. Sr. José António Simões took responsibility for hygiene, cleaning and the cemeteries of Lourinhã. Public Works and road maintenance became Sr. M. Vicente's office. Finally, Sr. Luciano de Jesus Ferreira took over as secretary for Markets, Sport and Tourism. See: "Reunião 27/Jul./74: Distribuição de Pelouros", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 31 (1973-74), p. 196.

³⁴ "Reunião 8/Out./75: Electrificação da Urbanização da Quinta da Santa Catarina", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 32 (1974-76), p. 16.

week of July 9, 1976 seeing electricity to Lourinhã cut for 1.3 hours a day in certain areas. The letter suggested that, "for reasons of security", the CML should consider using backup generators and electrical storage units in affected areas. Failing that, SEOL would be able to reestablish the energy supply at a moment's notice if an emergency arose. Such institutions and situations would involve hospitals, the firefighters, police, or "other justified cases."³⁵

Problems in service development and delivery, as this chapter argues, left space in the civic sphere for private participation under Portugal's dictatorship. As we will see, when the context is considered it is not surprising that the *Estado Novo* would open space for the public to practice civic engagement. This should be understood as part of a growing trend in the West after 1970. Urban planners and governments have increasingly accepted the importance of social support for projects to develop 'sustainable cities', for example. Luis Loures and Pat Crawford, although acknowledging that the role of the public has been considered in projects for the better part of the twentieth century, point to the 1970s as a turning point in the West. They suggest that the increasing need for public consultation evident since the 1970s is likely due to the "growing dissatisfaction with the results of the technocratic administrative process" that has increased exponentially since 1945.³⁶ Perhaps more importantly for governments like the *Estado Novo*, concerned with Portuguese identity and

³⁵ "SEOL to Pres. da CML", July 2, 1976. "Electricidade: Diversos; Poupança de Energia", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-B/3 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³⁶ Luis Loures and Pat Crawford, "Democracy in Progress: Using Public Participation in Post-Industrial Landscape (re)-Development", *WSEA Transactions on Environment and Development*, 9:4 (Sept., 2008), 794-795.

nation building, Loures and Crawford have argued that public participation in the development of the landscape encourages a sense of belonging to, and responsibility for, the larger social and cultural community along with the development of a common identity.³⁷

The period that this chapter and dissertation deals with cannot be described as monolithic, and the local contemporary discourse recognized that it was a time of change. However, the importance of development and improvement remained constant. In the decade leading to the Carnation Revolution, progress and technology, for example, were considered important elements of a society that many were told needed improvement. The 1960s, as described by the *Alvorada*, were an age in which "our technical progress had made manual labour more profitable, cheaper, and produced better quality goods, easing human tasks." Sources continued to say that in Portugal, however, the proliferation of small industry, many times rudimentary, did not have the ability to switch from hand to machine production. They lacked the necessary capital to invest in machinery, and the Portuguese lacked the knowledge to apply technical know-how to production with new machinery.³⁸ This was a "situation without exit" in which the baking industry found itself in the 1960s. The difficulty in mechanization and development constituted a crisis that needed urgent action to replace the old ways of producing bread with newer and more hygienic methods.

³⁷ Ibid, 794.

³⁸ "nos progressos da técnica que tornam a mão de obra mais rentável, mais barata, e a produção de melhor qualidade, facilitando por isso a tarefa humana." See: Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) pp. 1, 5.

The scant profits made by the industry made this kind of investment impossible, so, bakers of each region created societies with quotas on production, ensuring that enough bread was produced while still maintaining prices. These actions were in response to a state initiative to industrialize the sector in which the government called upon each bakery to remodel its facility. In Lourinhã, this led to the founding of the *Panificadora União Central da Lourinhã*, in 1960.³⁹

By the time the dictatorship was toppled in 1974 discourse surrounding development, looking to the future, and inclusion was being applied to political culture as well – even if, as this chapter will demonstrate, people had been participating in the civic realm before the revolution. Just three weeks after *25 de Abril*, the *Alvorada* led with an article about the “Portuguese Family” (in this case the Portuguese polity) in the context of the revolution: other front page stories from that day included the next article in an ongoing series on Russia and a note from Portugal's Bishops about the revolution.⁴⁰ The article led by saying how pleased it was at the “liberation of the Portuguese Family.” Liberation did not only refer to political liberation. Instead, it referred to the fact that each individual had gained the power to “speak and feel” how they wanted, “without fear and interference in their problems” from what the article called, “the community in which they were integrated.” Further, although one always had to be wary of interference from the “political chiefs”, that fear was mitigated by certain political

³⁹ See: Alvaro Carvalho, “A Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã”, *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) pp. 1, 5. For more discussion on the cooperative bakery, see Chapter 3.

⁴⁰ See: “A Família Portuguesa em Reconciliação”, *Alvorada* (May 12, 1974), pp. 1, 4; and, *Alvorada* (May 12, 1974), p. 1.

arrangements. The *Alvorada* was happy to be a "constant" in the revolution and in the program of "non violence" of the *Junta de Salvação Nacional*. Perhaps reflecting the fact that the *Alvorada* was an approved organ of the dictatorship, it argued that the new regime had to reject "vengeance" and extend clemency to those associated with the *Estado Novo*. In this way, the "Portuguese family [would be in] reconciliation."⁴¹ A year later, in the spring of 1975, when the first elections for Portugal's Constituent Assembly were held, the *Alvorada* proclaimed that the results demonstrated a "desire of the Portuguese people to participate ... in the construction of the new society." What they voted for, the paper explained, was "progress", "liberty", and the rejection of extremes like "totalitarianism". The election results, which rejected dictatorship – a new communist one as well as the Corporatist one of the past⁴² – and embraced liberty, could not have come from, so the argument continued, an "uncultured or illiterate" people. The results showed a solidarity and willingness to help one another in progress and development.⁴³

At the end of my period, elements of Lourinhã's society were looking back in reverence on the years since the 1960s and the transformation that their environment had undergone. An editorial in 1995 explained that in the past century much had changed: electricity; transport; telecommunications;

⁴¹ "A Família Portuguesa em Reconciliação", *Alvorada* (May 12, 1974), pp. 1, 4

⁴² At the time the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) under Alvaro Cunhal, which had ties with the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), played a key role in governing Portugal in the months following *25 de Abril* and represented one potential dictatorship and a combatant in what was a near Portuguese civil war in 1975.

⁴³ "A Cultura do Nosso Povo", *Alvorada* (May 25, 1975), pp. 1, 3.

information technology; medical advances; industrial and agricultural advancements; and changes in commerce and tourism. These developments, the editorial continued, were coupled with revolutions in governmental and political practices, tension between the Church and State, revolutions, wars and colonial independence, emigration, an “explosion” in schooling, and Portuguese integration with Europe. The consequences of all these shifts were nothing short of the alteration of modes of thought, of the lives and feelings of people, families and communities. Agriculture, for example, did not need the human labour it once did. Instead, the agricultural world needed people who could understand the language and formulas of the new commercial challenges facing the sector. Farmers needed to understand chemical uses (for fertilizers, insecticides, etc.) and how to organize and work efficiently. In the end, farmers, and Lourinhanense, needed to keep two things in mind when navigating the modern world. First, they had to remember and be proud of their heritage, recognizing that they played an essential role in society. Second, they had to integrate new technology, had to continue to organize in defense of their culture, work with a critical eye always looking to improve, and to be attentive to the “signs of the times with creativity” in creating new habits and ways of life and new ways of doing business. Citizens should “be more democratic and better prepared” to contribute to “our land ... our life and our collective and institutions ... in the interests of the community and the common good.” Parents had to work for better schools. People needed “less television and more meetings.” Finally, the editorial

concluded by reminding people to do more for "*nossa terra*", for "human relations", each day doing more for "people and for the community."⁴⁴

However, what editorials like the one from 1995 fail to do is historicize its comments. Again, the fact that progress remained valuable in discourse and culture is important. Yet, many of the things that it asked readers to do (engage in community and contribute to its development) were things that Lourinhanense had been doing for decades.

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Subject-citizens and government worked within a complex and shifting political culture to resolve infrastructure deficiencies. These actors' struggles reveal important aspects of Portuguese politics as it transitioned from dictatorship to democracy. First, the letters that citizens submitted to the CML's mayor reveal that under the dictatorship people both had political currency with officials and acted as bargaining chips between government agents. Whether letters were always successful in shaping action is not as important as the fact that they constitute a clear example of people engaging in civic affairs.

As mentioned, Lourinhanense engaged their local administration in the late 1960s and 1970s by writing letters about infrastructure, asking for assistance in unresolved repair issues or for new service. Sometimes they offered resources

⁴⁴ J.B. "Editorial", *Alvorada*, (February 26, 1995) p. 1.

to help resolve requests, sometimes they simply invoked 'need' or 'lack of service' to justify their demands. Neither argument seems to have affected the result of the request. I shall return to the arguments used by letter writers later. For now, what is important is that people asked, revealing that they felt they had power with officials. What follows will consider from where they derived this power, how they chose to spend it, and a discussion of some of the institutional effects the exchange between officials and citizen-subjects had on political mechanisms and culture.

Although the sea change in Portuguese politics around the Revolution of 1974 eventually secured political freedoms and responsibilities for Portuguese citizens, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the Portuguese did not possess a level of political responsibility, and thus power, before 1974. This is particularly true when it came to individual health and the individual's environment. As early as 1964 the message was clear: it was up to the people themselves to create a healthy environment. Locals were not to wait for authorities to provide clean water. They were to be sure to live near a fountain if they did not have running water in their homes. Further, they were to have their water chemically tested, again, not waiting for the government to test it for them.⁴⁵

That said people were not left without direction in how to monitor resources. The *Alvorada's* pedagogical function was evident in all sorts of areas, including in instruction of how to protect water supplies. In 1966, for example, it

⁴⁵ Lima Bastos, "Educação Sanitária A Casa", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no, 76 (October 25, 1964) p. 8.

printed an article written by a nurse entitled "Water" which reminded people to have their well water analyzed, to keep their well covered to prevent bugs and other debris falling into it, to build their wells away from animal barns where manure was collected, and finally to boil drinking water (or treat it with chlorine) if they were not sure about its cleanliness.⁴⁶

As the dictatorship entered its final years and Marcelo Caetano's modest liberal reforms were beginning to change the country's political culture, messages encouraging citizen-subject involvement were reinforced. At the end of the tourist season in 1972, for example, the *Alvorada* wrote about how the public needed to become involved in public sanitation. Taking inspiration from "one of the more illustrious (and newer) deputies in the National Assembly, Dr. Magalhães Mota" who had spoken about people's responsibility for self-learning and acquiring information, the *Alvorada* talked about the need for Lourinhanense to take responsibility for the care of the town, especially in the tourist season. Information was to be made available by the CML and the Junta de Turismo, but citizens were responsible for consuming it. This meant that Lourinhanense had to attempt to develop "new habits, new actions leading to a new way of thinking and, finally, a new life for the people of Lourinhã." Lourinhanense were to look to Lisbon for an example, where local officials had invested "thousands of contos" in infrastructure and citizens were using that infrastructure to its fullest potential: in

⁴⁶ Enfermeira Lima Basto, "A Água", *Alvorada* (April 24, 1966), p. 3.

this case, the writer was discussing Lisbon's new public trash receptacles.⁴⁷ Such discourse continued after the Revolution and into the 1980s. As late as 1981, Lourinhanense were reading that two important aspects of public hygiene – sewers and clean roads – were still lacking in many places across the Concelho. Without such "important improvements", the population's wellbeing deteriorated. In addition to improvements in infrastructure, citizens needed to learn about the advantages of sewers and running water, lighting, and what equipment was still needed in their areas. Above all, citizens needed to be "implicated" in the "responsibilities and worries of their governments." Citizens needed to encourage and mobilize support for improvement: the best asset they had was the "public manifestation ... of alarm" around problem areas. The *Alvorada's* writer, Francisco Curto, concluded by saying that he had "confidence" that he would not "be frustrated by [the] indifference [of the people]."⁴⁸

Such discourse, however, was not rooted solely in a belief in the importance of public participation in civic affairs. Although we should not discount that such a sentiment existed, even under the dictatorship, we must also recognize that municipalities needed private resources in order to complete projects.⁴⁹ For example, a project with a total cost of 4,797 contos developed by

⁴⁷ "Lixos / Colaboração do Público / W.C. Públicos: Precisa-se duma Nova Mentalidade Colaboradora da Parte de todos Nós", *Alvorada* (August 13, 1972), p. 8.

⁴⁸ Francisco Curto, "Moledo: Não Tem Esgostos Nem Ruas Asfaltadas; Apenas a Principal e Muito Deteriorada", *Alvorada* (October 1981), p. 13.

⁴⁹ Indeed, many have discussed local administrations' reliance upon both administrative resources from regional and national governments, as well as private cooperation in lieu of the ability to apply direct taxes on local constituents. See: Rui Afonso Lucas and João Francisco de Magalhaes Ilharco, "The Role of Public Administration in the Consolidation of Democracy in

the *Serviços de Fomento da Junta Distrital de Lisboa* for the sanitization of Praia da Areia Branca and Seixal was presented to the CML in the summer of 1968. The mayor informed the CML that this project would be possible only with the financial participation of the property owners and landlords in Praia da Areia Branca and that participation had to be solicited with the help of the "*grupo de Amigos da referida Praia*."⁵⁰ Moving quickly, by 1969, the Civil Governor of Lisbon and the *Direcção de Urbanização de Lisboa* had completed its sewers and water treatment station in PAB and Seixal and were asking the CML to pay the share of the work they had approved in the project's development plans. The CML responded to the Civil Governor's letter and explained that it would indeed forward the necessary funds (2,400 contos), in part because of the contributions of homeowners in PAB – Seixal, however, was not mentioned, perhaps reflecting the very different socio-economic makeup of each village.⁵¹

In fact, in the 1960s and early 1970s, some institutions and offices in Lourinhã reflected a growing concern for public opinion that went beyond financial contributions to projects.⁵² One such institution was established in 1968

Portugal", in R. Baker ed., *Transitions from Authoritarianism: the Role of the Bureaucracy*. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Martin Kayman, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal*. (Newport, Wales: Merlin Press, 1987), ix-x; Stephen Syrett, *Local Development: Restructuring, Locality and Economic Initiative in Portugal*. (Great Britain: Avebury Ashgate, 1995), 93-97; and, Giulio Sapelli, *Southern Europe Since 1945: Tradition and Modernity in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey*, A. Fuller, trans. (USA: Longman, 1995), 94-96.

⁵⁰ "Reunião 8/Jul./68: Saneamento da Praia da Areia Branca, Seixal e Estação de Tratamento", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 27 (1967-1968), p. 196.

⁵¹ "Reunião 13/Out/69: Saneamento da Praia da Areia Branca", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 28 (1968-70), p. 179.

⁵² This must also be considered in light of the modest liberalizations undertaken by Caetano after his ascension to power in 1968. For discussions of how Caetano eased censorship and tried to implement a "Social State" to replace the "new State", see: Martin Kayman, *Revolution and*

when the CML created a commission to investigate what areas needed electricity and lighting – "our dream". A targeted area for infrastructure was the neighborhoods of Pregança in Santa Bárbara. Despite the commission setting aside 21.000\$00 escudos, since the residents of that area were "too poor" to contribute to the work, the job remained too expensive to complete: early estimates came in just short of 500.000\$00 escudos.⁵³ However, by 1973, the CML was making progress towards funding the project with national and regional bodies like the Distrito de Lisboa. Explaining that the area was densely populated and underdeveloped, the CML pleaded with the District's Governor for aid. The CML explained that the local population was "active and [would have] influence in the next elections."⁵⁴ Similarly, Lourinhã's mayor solicited the Secretary of State for Industry for support in electrifying Pregança. As with the Distrito, Sr. Lucinio Guia da Cruz (Lourinhã's last pre-Revolution mayor) appealed to the secretary on political grounds explaining that electricity was a very important issue for the local residents and that bringing electricity to the area would have "good political repercussions". Further, the fact that the residents of Pregança were the only ones in the area lacking electricity provided more tension in what da Cruz called

Counter-Revolution in Portugal, 49-50; Manuel Baioa, Paulo Jorge Fernandes, and Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, "The Political History of Twentieth-Century Portugal", *Electronic Journal of Portuguese History*, 1:2 (Winter 2003), 7; and, Pedro Ramos Pinto, "Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth Century Portugal", *Contemporary European History*, 18:2 (2009), 206-207.

⁵³ See: "A Comissão to Pres. da CML", April 29, 1968; "Pres da CML to Ministro da Economia", September 10, 1970; and, "SEOL to Pres. da CML", July 14, 1970. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregança", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁴ "Pres. da CML to Governador Civil do Distrito de Lisboa", May 9, 1973. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregança", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

the “actual political moment.” The situation had been further exacerbated since 1970 when the industry ministry had built facilities without extending the electrical infrastructure to nearby Pregança.⁵⁵ Da Cruz then pressured the Distrito for support with the news that the Secretary of State for Industry was “very interested in the problem” of electricity in Pregança.⁵⁶ In the end, 1973 was not to be Pregança’s year for electricity. The Lisbon District governor sent a copy of a letter he received from the Direcção dos Serviços Eléctricos to the CML which explained that no help could be expected from the state for that year as 1973’s budget had already been allocated. Instead, the Direcção explained that the room existed in the first months of 1974 for help and that the CML should prioritize this work.⁵⁷ Ultimately, 1974 would see the necessary work begin.⁵⁸

A more cynical reader of the attempts to secure Pregança’s electrical infrastructure might suggest that utilization of ‘public opinion’ as a reason to engage in public policy was simply another tool in the inevitable negotiations between officials as they worked to secure certain projects or advantages in Portuguese politics. However, such discourse should be seen as related to

⁵⁵ “Pres. da CML to Secretário do Estado da Indústria”, undated. “Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregança”, Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). See also, “Pres. da CML to Secretário do Estado da Indústria”, July 23, 1973. “Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregança”, Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁶ “Pres. da CML to Governador Civil do Distrito de Lisboa”, July 6, 1973. “Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregança”, Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁷ “Copy: Dir. dos Serviços Eléctricos to Distrito de Lisboa”, May 22, 1973. “Pres. da CML to Secretário do Estado da Indústria”, undated. “Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregança”, Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁸ “Pres. da CML to Pres. da Junta da Freguesia da Santa Barbara”, January 30, 1974. “Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregança”, Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

similar sentiment, especially after 1974, when citizens moved from those who requested and offered to help to those who complained about lack of services. In other words, the type of political capital held and the way that residents of Lourinhã spent that capital changed in the 1970s as they moved from being seen as subjects to becoming sanctioned and active citizens. In the post-Revolutionary period, newly-elected officials like Lourinhanense Vereador senhor Manuel Gentil da Silva Horta, were quick to take up the torch for electrical infrastructure. In February 1977, for example, Horta presented the "case for electrical storage" that would benefit "consumers". As he explained, the electrical energy supply was "much less than normal, a fact which contributed to public complaints." After hearing Horta, the CML committed to improving electrical service and resolving the "deficiencies" in the electrical infrastructure.⁵⁹ Similarly, into the 1980s, public complaints, as opposed to requests, to the CML became more common. Sr. João Henriques of Atalaia, for example, approached the CML in November 1980 about two different problems. First, he complained that recent roadwork had caused rain water to pool on his property and flood his storage space. Second, he complained that his neighbor had built a structure onto the public road, thereby blocking access to his property. In response the Mayor commented that he had noted the two complaints and would look into possible solutions.⁶⁰

Regardless of the use of the peoples' opinion in government discourse,

⁵⁹ "Reunião 14/Fev./77: Rede Eléctrica de Vila da Lourinhã", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 33 (1976-77), p. 137.

⁶⁰ "Reunião 6/Nov./80: Queixa do Senhor João Henriques", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 36 (1980-81), p. 91.

what is important to note here is that public opinion carried weight in discussions about development. Now I turn to discussing the cultural and social uses and sources of this political power. Between the late 1960s and late 1970s, Lourinhanense did, indeed, use political capital and engaged in the civic sphere, mobilizing around the issues pertaining to water and, more so, electrical infrastructure. A sample of the letters found in Lourinhã's municipal archives sent from citizens to the CML's mayor reveals a high degree of engagement with civic affairs and a willingness, both under the dictatorship and the post-1974 democratic regime, to be proactive about issues concerning their daily lives. The letters in question consist of correspondence from Lourinhanense between 1969 and 1977 (after which the letters are either no longer archived or simply stop coming), always addressed to the mayor personally, requesting the installation of new electrical or water service or the repair of existing service. They reveal that locals acted as individuals and in groups, that people from various educational backgrounds from the illiterate to the middle class engaged with the CML, and that these actors not only wanted resolution of their requests, but were willing to contribute resources, both financial and in kind, in order to see that requests were answered.

In all, I randomly sampled sixty-three letters from annual folders with dozens of letters each. The twenty-five letters from 1969 are requests pertaining to water. Thirteen of the letters asking for water service or water service repair offered to contribute to the needed work with financial resource or labour.

However, letters about water abruptly ended after 1969, when peoples' attention turned to electricity. Between 1970 and 1977, thirty-eight letters involving electricity requests (primarily seeking new or repaired public lighting) were sampled: sixteen of these letters offered some financial help or to provide some of the labour; seventeen were from groups of community residents; fifteen of the letters were hand-written; eight included hand-drawn diagrams of the neighborhood and requested placement of new infrastructure; and only three were signed by women. The majority of letters asked for public lighting and did not provide rationale beyond a simple lack thereof for their request. In contrast, seventeen letters expanded on the lack of public lighting and offered a myriad of affects that the lack of lighting had, thereby providing further rationale for their request.⁶¹

First and foremost, the letters sent to the Mayor of the CML were a tool used in the place of other freedoms like association and demonstration, which the regime did not allow, for *Estado Novo* subjects to draw attention to issues.

⁶¹ See: "Água e Saneamento: Fornecimento de Água; A Particulares. Ligações e Desligações. Reclamações", Arquivo Correspondencia 1969, proc. 10-B/a (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregarça", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Projectos de Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 37-D/18 (Arquivo Muniipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Assuntos Gerais sobre Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 37-D/7 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Electricidade de Portugal: Relações cm a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliações das redes Electricas, Orcamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

Some residents, for example, took it upon themselves from time to time to inform the mayor when public lamps were out of service. This practice saw Sr. Américo da Silva ask in 1970 that the CML remove a lamppost outside his home, next to the cemetery in Porto Dinheiro because it was not working. In response, the CML's Secretariat informed the residents that the post would be repaired so that the area would "remain lit."⁶² In fact, off-hand and suggestive remarks like Silva's (and many of the letters sampled), should be considered a volley in a negotiation. Seemingly, if residents could draw attention to issues in an amiable way, they could then get authorities to take control of the issue. In the fall of 1973, the residents of Casal Serrano in Reguengo Grande wrote the mayor complaining that on a street with six houses, there existed only one lamp at the extreme end of the street. Beyond "great benefit" to the residents of the street, the letter's authors offered no special circumstances justifying the need for more lamps, nor did they offer to help with the costs.⁶³ However, the residents' request caused the CML to investigate. What the CML's Secretariat found was that indeed, a single lamp serviced the street at the road's entrance. In addition, two other posts already were in place that could house a light (a fact omitted in the residents' letter), leading the investigator to recommend installing a lamp on the second

⁶² "Américo da Silva to Pres. da CML", July 1, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).: and, Secretaria da CML, "Informação: Iluminação Casais de Porto Dinheiro", July 21, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶³ "Casimiro Bernardino et al to Pres. da CML", November 11, 1973. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

post – about eighty six meters from the first post. Winter especially caused poor conditions along the road, further stressing the point that a light was required. In addition, the investigator secured financial help for the work from affected residents, in spite of the absence of such an offer in their original letter.⁶⁴ The negotiation then, was successful for the residents of Casal Serrano as the Mayor began the process in January 1974 to install a lamp.⁶⁵

As tallied above, financial participation was a common tool used by residents in securing projects for their areas and no individual donation was too small as letter writers frequently pooled resources. This sometimes led residents to be vague about their contributions. In April 1970, the residents of Matas argued that despite two electrical posts, the town lacked public lamps. Thus, they asked the CML's mayor to communicate with SEOL. For the necessary work, each signatory could contribute, "more or less", 235\$00 escudos.⁶⁶ Other groups were more specific. As of November 1969, the residents of Casais de Porto Dinheiro requesting "lighting" had collected almost 25.000\$00 escudos from nineteen residents. Individual donations ranged from 100\$00 to 3.500\$00 escudos as the letter writers provided a break down of their pool of money.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Secretaria da CML, "Informação", December 20, 1973. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁵ "Pres. da CML to SEOL", January 9, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁶ "António Mocencio to Pres. da CML", April 11, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁷ "Peditorio da Luz", Novemebr 16, 1969. "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). See figure 1, as well.

Peditório da Luz	
Americo da Silva	600\$00
Manuel José Afonso Júnior	100\$00
Manuel José Trindade	500\$00
Manuel Antunes	1000\$00
Manuel Trindade	1000\$00
José Afonso	500\$00
José Miguel	3500\$00
José Miguel	3500\$00
Edmundo Miguel dos Santos	3500\$00
António Carlos Martins	600\$00
peleito Martins Subinho	500\$00
António Anacleto	1000\$00
Manuel Anacleto	1000\$00
Artur Anacleto Caisaria da Luz	600\$00
Alfonso Domingos Anacleto	500\$00
José Anjos	1000\$00
José Anjos da Luz	1000\$00
Francisco Anacleto	1000\$00
Manuel Joaquim dos Santos	3500\$00
16/11/1969 24950,00	

Figure 22: Community donations in Casais de Porto Dinheiro for street electrification, 1969. "Peditório da Luz", November 16, 1969. "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

Another approach taken by letter writers was less conciliatory. Showing frustration and a sense that they were entitled to some service, local people also complained. In 1969, residents of Reguengo Grande, like Francisco Mário Rodrigues protested that he was, "for many days", without water. On days when water returned, it was only for certain hours in the day. The worst part for Rodrigues was that, in July of 1969, he "paid more than 161\$00 escudos" for service that he did not receive and in August he paid "more than 190\$00 escudos having missed so much water!" Riddled with exclamation marks, Rodrigues' letter reminded the mayor that the writer had visited the city hall many times to complain of the "injustice." Rodrigues, however, clearly had no real recourse

besides complaint, asking only that he be reimbursed: his frustration seemed palpable.⁶⁸ Other construction issues led Lourinhanense to grumble. Américo Mendes, for example, wrote Lourinhã's mayor from his home in Lisbon complaining about an abandoned home construction site next to his second home in Porto da Barcas. The abandoned site was not only ugly, but it had also disintegrated at points due to rain leaving water pooled on the site and on Sr. Mendes' property causing "increased humidity" in the Mendes house. For the beauty of the neighborhood and the potential for future development in Porto das Barcas, Mendes asked the mayor to act.⁶⁹

It is also of note that letters were addressed to the Mayor and not the municipal government – no doubt a reflection of the paternalism and personalism of Portuguese politics under both the *Estado Novo* and the Social Democracy.⁷⁰ As early as 1966, identifying herself as a "consumer of water", Elvira Cardoso of Nadrupe complained in a letter to Lourinhã's mayor that faults in the piping in her neighborhood had meant that, for "twenty-one days", she had been with reduced water service. As such, she asked the mayor to look into the problem and see to

⁶⁸ "Francisco Mário Rodrigues to Pres. da CML", September 19, 1969. "Água e Saneamento: Fornecimento de Água; A Particulares. Ligações e Desligações. Reclamações", Arquivo Correspondência 1969, proc. 10-B/a (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁹ "Américo Mendes to Pres. da CML", December 30, 1971. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregaça", Arquivo Correspondência 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷⁰ For discussions of the importance of personalism and paternalism in Portuguese political culture, see: Douglas Wheeler, "The Revolution in Perspective: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Modern Portuguese History," in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler eds., *In Search of Modern Portugal*. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 342; Phillipe C Schmitter, "The 'Régime d'Exception' That Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal," in L.S. Graham and H.M. Makler eds., *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and its Antecedents*. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979); and, Kayman, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, x.

it that she was not charged for water that she did not consume.⁷¹ Notably, the majority of the time, the mayor was the one to begin the process of resolving issues in letters as many were riddled with the handwriting of Ferreira da Costa before 1970 and Cruz after. A typed letter of August 1970 to the mayor of Lourinhã from Sr. Luis Augusto Valviga asked that the CML install a public lamp outside his building in Sobral and offered to take responsibility for the costs of the project. As was often the case, the mayor wrote a short instruction for CML officials on the letter on September 2, saying that Sr. Valviga would have to wait for an opportunity for the CML to proceed with the work.⁷²

All that said there was no discernable pattern or formula for success for requests with each being assessed by the CML on its own merits. Informal approaches, for example, could be successful. An undated letter from 1970 consisted of one sentence – "the residents of the road that needed light in Atalaia de Cima" – and was signed by a list of seven names (three of the surnames were Morgado) which included a hand-drawn diagram showing a curved road with seven houses on it with suggested locations of public lamps.⁷³ In July 1970, the CML announced that two streetlamps would be provided.⁷⁴

⁷¹ "Elvira Cardoso to Pres. da CML", October 30, 1966. "Reclamações Contra o Consumo de Água", Arquivo Correspondencia 1966, proc. A-5/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷² "Luis Augusto Valviga to Pres. da CML", August 28, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷³ "Residents of Atalaia de Cima to Pres. da CML", undated. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷⁴ "Informação: Iluminação - Atalaia de Cima Casal do Bargassalinho", July 21, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

The written format as well, although some might think it limiting given the degree of illiteracy in 1970s Portugal, was surprisingly inclusive. Beyond requests being sent by groups of people (so long as one in the group was literate, the illiterate could participate in this form of participation), those who were illiterate could nonetheless participate as individuals. Many letters were signed in the name of the "signatories who did not know how to write". Lourinhã's mayor received a request, for instance, for electricity from Joaquim de Sousa, Augusto Rosa da Costa and Manuel Batista de Sousa. Sousa et al, from Sobral shared a building where they found "darkness" and thus asked for the installation of a lamp on an existing post while offering to pay for the costs of the project: it is unclear which signatories were the ones who "did not know how to write."⁷⁵ In addition Lourinhã's mayor received a sort of form letter, which appeared several times with minor variations that could offer the illiterate access to the civic sphere on an individual basis."⁷⁶ These letters were always typed and occasionally, but not always, signed on behalf of someone who cannot read or write. The form letter cited "total darkness" around the house or area in question, which "occasionally turns everything to disorder". Importantly, the letter also offered to

⁷⁵ "Joaquim de Sousa, Augusto Rosa da Costa and Manuel Batista de Sousa to Pres. da CML" April 23, 1971. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷⁶ See, for examples: "José dos Santos to Pres. da CML", June 21, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Sr. José Branco Vilela to Pres. da CML", May 10, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Sr. José António Comes to Pres. da CML", January 12, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

cover some of the costs of the work.⁷⁷ The letter often, but not always, worked, as, in the case of one such letter sent in October 1976 from Sr. Joaquim Luis, the CML forwarded the matter to SEOL for a quote.⁷⁸ An additional tool employed by writers was to draw a diagram of the area and the lamps they wanted. As mentioned, eight of the thirty-eight letters sampled included hand-drawn diagrams illustrating requests. This was often done "for better explanation"⁷⁹, although it additionally offered the illiterate a chance to engage.



Figure 23: Residents often drew diagrams describing where they wanted streetlamps. "Silvério Santos to Pres. Da CML", October 3, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷⁷ "*ocasionando transtornos da todo a desordem*". See, for example: "Joaquim Luis to Pres. da Comissão Administrativa da CML", October 6, 1976. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷⁸ "Pres. da Comissão Administrative to SEOL", October 19, 1976. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷⁹ "Silvério Santos to Pres. Da CML", October 3, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

Typically, letters were sent by groups which organized around neighborhood and family – two categories that were far from mutually exclusive as settlement patterns frequently progressed along family lines with multiple generations often living in the same household or on family land. In the early 1960s, this organization often involved ‘elite’ leadership. In the fall of 1960, Reverend Padre Marcelino, parish priest of *Santa Barbara*, asked Lourinhã’s council if the electricity service could be expanded to Santa Barbara in 1962. Before the council, he argued on behalf of residents that existing power lines already passed a little more than one kilometer from the town and that the population would take responsibility for the work needed for the connection to the existing infrastructure. The deputy mayor informed the priest that Lourinhã had already spoken to SEOL the previous August about the overall availability of electricity in 1962. Given the limited supply of electricity, Lourinhã had decided to focus on São Bartolomeu, Cabeça Gorda and Moledo and that the possibility of expanding the electrical net beyond these pre-allotted projects was limited: Lourinhã could likely electrify two areas or towns per year given future electrical restraints. The deputy mayor proposed that Lourinhã launch a study on the possibility of preparing the infrastructure for electrification in 1962 of Santa Barbara.⁸⁰

However, as the decade progressed, more impromptu organizations emerged without elite representation from priests or notables. This took two

⁸⁰ “Reunião 26/10/60: Electrificação de Ribamar”, *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 22. (1959-1961), p. 135.

forms. First, residents would take it upon themselves to write on behalf of their neighbors, drawing legitimacy from a call for the common good. Nadrupe resident José Barbosa, for example, took it upon himself in November 1969 to ask Lourinhã's mayor for a lamp on his street. In the name of the farmers of Nadrupe, he explained that his road had no lighting and that two more people lived along the street. Even without offer of assistance, the mayor forwarded the request to SEOL asking for the work to be done as soon as possible.⁸¹ Similarly, writing on behalf of the eight families who lived in the Casal de Porto de Chão neighborhood in Moita dos Ferreiros, Sr. José Isidoro wrote the mayor of Lourinhã to request that his neighborhood be electrified and for which the families would take responsibility for the expenses of the work.⁸² Second, formal and inclusive organization emerged to resolve specific issues. This meant that people like Francisco Antunes and his neighbors, João da Conceição, Manuel Francisco Rato, Faustino Francisco Rato, and Bernardino Francisco, explained in a letter to Lourinhã's mayor dated April 14, 1970, that the residents of Ribamar near Poco da Quinta "needed" public lighting outside their houses. Antunes et al. concluded by thanking the mayor and asking him to take the necessary steps to have the lighting installed. The letter then had a hand written note from the mayor dated April 17, 1970, asking the Secretariat to take the necessary steps to begin

⁸¹ "José Barbosa to Pres. da CML", November 28, 1969. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸² "José Isidoro to Pres. da CML", July 3, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

work.⁸³ Such organization also opened space for women like Sra. Maria Antónia Pinto of Porto Dinheiro, to write. Along with Srs José Alfaiate da Fonseca and José da Fonseca, she pleaded for herself and the two other residents for lighting infrastructure for their houses, which, of course, first required electricity. Sra. Pinto explained that she was asking again for electrical infrastructure. The Mayor did not acknowledge the repetition but did send a letter to SEOL to begin the needed work.⁸⁴

Formal groups and institutions also got involved in lobbying for electrical infrastructure. One letter, the first found in my research from an association, was from the "youth of the Secção Cultural de Clube de Santa Barbara" in July 1974. In it, the youth asked for four lamps to be installed on existing posts, explaining that "at night, especially in winter," youth and the elderly had difficulty travelling between Marquiteira (where the club met) and Casal Miso.⁸⁵ However, arms length governmental organizations also lobbied. In 1966, Lourinhã's sub-delegation for health, made up of local engineers, doctors, and other notables, reported to the CML about the ongoing danger to public health due to the flow of waste into the ocean at PAB. Caused mainly by the "insufficient construction" around sewers and retaining walls, run-off from farmers' fields and sewers found

⁸³ "Francisco Antunes (Neto) to Pres. Da CML", April 14, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸⁴ "Maria Antónia Pinto to Pres. sa CML", June 8, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸⁵ "Secção Cultural do Clube de Santa Bárbara, Lourinhã to Pres. da CML", July 28, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

its way to the beach, soaking the sand and polluting the water. The group called on the CML to advise locals about the dangers associated with this problem and, "with the utmost urgency" to clean the area and proceed to upgrade the sewage and retaining systems.⁸⁶ In addition, the Juntas da Freguesias would occasionally send letters to the CML requesting lamps on behalf of residents. In 1975, for example, the Junta da Freguesia de Moita dos Ferreiros sent a letter on behalf of Srs. Francisco Julio Rodrigues and Horácio Rodrigues asking for lamps on their street. Srs. Rodrigues offered to cover the costs of the work which was needed because the nearest lamp was "about one hundred meters" away.⁸⁷

Direct government organizations like the Junta do Turismo also engaged the CML about things like water shortages, complaining that they were leading to problems in hygiene and sanitation. By the end of the 1966 tourist season, the CML and the Junta do Turismo were discussing water shortages and sewage leaks at PAB: both organizations recognized these as leading problems.⁸⁸ For the Junta do Turismo, these two problems contributed to PAB's "deficient hygiene" during the summer when visitors inundated the area and water pressure was nearly non-existent between the hours of 9am and 1pm, and 5pm and 10pm. The lack of water and sewage links was, according to the Junta, a result of the

⁸⁶ "A Subdelegado de Saude to Pres. da CML", August 2, 1966. "Saneamento da Praia da Areia Branca", Arquivo Correspondencia 1966, proc. A-4/2. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸⁷ "José Pedro Rosário to Pres. da Comissão Administrativa da CML", February 24, 1975. "Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Projectos de Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 37-D/18 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸⁸ "Junta do Turismo to Pres. da CML", August 16, 1966. "Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca: Irregularidade do Abastecimento de Água e Deficiências do Sistema de Esgotos da Praia da Areia Branca", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1966, proc. X-4/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

conjunction of a number of factors. First, blocked drainage routes limited water pressure to homes. Second, the distribution network had been expanded too quickly without augmenting the water storage and treatment facilities. Finally, and directly related to the second point, the inconsistent demand – very high in the summer and low the rest of the year – meant that developing the source infrastructure was difficult.⁸⁹ The CML agreed with the Junta's assessment of the problems with PAB's water infrastructure, however, it also explained that sewage leaks had been caused by the unusual winter of 1965-66 which had dislocated many underground pipes as the temperature rose and fell. This also helped to explain the reduction in water pressure and supply as underground pipes leaked. The CML also explained that they planned to open a bidding process on the 24th of August for the contract to repair the pipes between the end of the tourist season and the winter.⁹⁰

Often individuals who acted on behalf of the groups they represented led these organizations, particularly in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1961, Lourinhã's mayor presented a proposal to council on behalf of Sr. José Máximo da Costa – himself a future mayor and deputy head of the District of Lisbon. Recognizing the limited availability of electrical power, Sr. Máximo called for electrical infrastructure, including interior equipment, to be provided to one classroom in Ribeira dos Palheiros' school. The proposal was well researched

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ "Pres. da CML to Junta do Turismo da PAB", August 20, 1966. "Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca: Irregularidade do Abastecimento de Água e Deficiências do Sistema de Esgotos da Praia da Areia Branca", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1966, proc. X-4/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

and required that any work would conform to the conditions of the '*Caderno de encargos e desenhos (fornecidos?)*' of the *Direcção-Geral de edifícios e monumentos Nacionais* and that a budget of no more than 1,350\$00 be allocated. The CML decided to ask the finance department to allot the funds to execute this project with the addition of exterior installations as well as the interior ones asked for.⁹¹ Sr. Máximo submitted a budget of 1,020\$00 two weeks later, which the town council approved.⁹² Also causing individual action by notables, some infrastructure represented an ongoing cost for wealthier residents of Lourinhã. Sr. António Vieira, a first Sergeant working in the military schools, for example, wrote the mayor of Lourinhã in 1970 in order to end his ongoing cost for public lighting outside his building, "*Vivenda Eulália*", on the road to Atalaia. Sr. Vieira complained that since lamps had been installed in 1967, their upkeep had cost him "more than 5.000\$00 escudos" and that with recent problems due to "the uncertain and doubtful days in which they lived", he could no longer maintain the infrastructure. The CML responded by passing a note to SEOL asking for an estimate on the ongoing costs for the lights. The CML later sent a letter in which, since the two lamps lit the whole street, they took on the responsibility.⁹³

⁹¹ "Reunião 22/2/61: Instalação eléctrica da escola de Ribeira dos Palheiros", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 22. (1959-1961)*, p. 167.

⁹² "Reunião 8/3/61; Instalação eléctrica da escola de Ribeira dos Palheiros", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 22. (1959-1961)*, p. 171.

⁹³ See: "António Vieira to Pres. da CML", February 7, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT): and, "Pres. da CML to SEOL", February 24, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para

Underlying these letters, whether they were from individuals, groups, or associations, is a sense that writers believed that the government carried a responsibility for service delivery and development. Issues straddling the 1974 Revolution highlight this best. First, requests continued throughout the revolutionary years (1974-76) – it was business as usual – except that letters were directed at the Administrative Commission, as opposed to the Mayor. In one such 1974 letter from residents in Casal Mulato of Moita dos Ferreiros, five signatories (all surnamed Rego) explained that an extension of electrical infrastructure thirty meters into the neighborhood would allow the signatories to add another three streetlamps to their area. The improvement would "benefit the users of the neighborhood and benefit the Câmara Municipal in an electrified future for Casal Mulato."⁹⁴ Second, and more importantly, residents did not excuse the revolutionary and democratic governments of pre-revolutionary promises. Lisbon residents who owned homes in PAB often requested lighting on more sophisticated grounds than a simple "lack of infrastructure." Sr. Neves of Lisbon, for example, finished work on a home in PAB in September of 1974 and reminded the CML that his building license, dated June 8, 1972, granted by the CML, acknowledged that there was a lack of public lighting and that this would be remedied. Thus, Sr. Neves asked that the CML proceed with the installation of a

Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁹⁴ "António Joaquim da Silva Rego et al to Pres. da Comissão Administrativa da CML", August 23, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

lamppost in front of his house.⁹⁵

In fact, letters from both before and after 1974 leave the impression that some subject-citizens viewed electrical lighting as a right, not a privilege. One letter, from August 1971, from five residents of an apartment building at 12 rua Miguel Bombarda in Lourinhã complained that as the area around the building gained electrical lighting, their building had been left in the dark. They explained that at the turn of the century, the building had installed a gas-lamp, which remained in operation until 1932, when another building in the area got an electrical lamp. Much remained unchanged until "1968 or 1969" when the "old [were] substituted for new" lamps in the area. However, "inexplicably", their building was left without public lighting, an asset deemed "indispensable." The writer concluded by suggesting that a "simple trip at night" to the area would say more than could be written. The letter concluded not by asking for a lamp directly, but instead by asking if their building had been inadvertently looked over.⁹⁶ Through the revolution, the idea that lighting was indispensable can be gleaned from other requests. Silvério Santos' October 1974 request for a street-lamp in Casal do Seixo was unsuccessful as the road in question was under the Câmara Municipal de Torres Vedras' jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Sr. Santos' letter shows, once again, the impression that residents increasingly saw lighting as a

⁹⁵ "L. Miranda Neves to Pres. da CML", September 4, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁹⁶ "António Mateus, Luis Ferreira Cordeiro, João Correia, Hercúlio Guilherme Andrade, et al to Pres. da CML", August 11, 1971. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

basic right – especially when one considered that some had it and others did not. Santos explained that close to three hundred meters of road remained unlit outside his home and that people had to "pass that distance at night without a single light". Santos called the situation "inhuman" and complained that raising the necessary money could only be done "with difficulty!" by local residents. Santos continued by insisting that his request was "so simple" and "just."⁹⁷ Some residents thought so highly of lights and electricity that they questioned post-Revolutionary Portugal's priorities when it could not deliver such infrastructure. Sr. António Ilídio Martins João of Casais Novos in Moita dos Ferrieiros asked why Portugal was "on the road to socialism if there could not be a society where he could ask for a lamp or lantern" for his neighborhood. Sr. João was expressing his frustration over two months of waiting for a follow up letter that was promised to him by the mayor in a face-to-face conversation in which he had asked for lighting and offered to help with the costs.⁹⁸

Residents insisting that electrical lighting was a right reflected a common impression that emerged, especially after 1974, when letters more and more demanded infrastructure because others had it. In October of 1976, Sra. Gabriela dos Santos complained to Lourinhã's mayor. She had lived next to the slaughterhouse in Casais Araujo since 1963. The area enjoyed public lighting,

⁹⁷ "Silvério Santos to Pres. Da CML", October 3, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁹⁸ "António Ilídio Martins João to Pres. da CML", March 5, 1977. "Electricidade de Portugal: Relações cm a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliações das redes Electricas, Orçamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

which as a resident she had contributed to – presumably financially. However, she evidently felt that she was not getting her money's worth. Complaining about the darkness around the public stairs near her house, she explained that when she visited Lisbon, and "other places", such areas were much better lit than the one outside her home. Insisting that the mayor would agree that the stairs near her home were under-lit, she asked him to investigate and install additional lighting.⁹⁹ Similarly, a group of twenty-five residents in Reguengo Grande wrote to the mayor of Lourinhã in 1976 arguing that some neighbourhoods of the freguesia "already benefitted from electricity and lights," while others did not. In the minds of those who signed the letter this was not "just." The letter went on to describe by neighborhood (outlining five locales and suggesting exactly how many lamps were needed in each case) where lights existed and where they did not (a passage which someone at the CML has highlighted). The letter outlined sections of up to five hundred meters of roadway that were without public lighting, going so far as to name the residents of houses where electricity stopped along the line. The letter also explained how many lamps were needed in certain sections of Reguengo Grande in order to provide sufficient lighting. In one neighborhood, the letter explained, six public lamps were needed to satisfy the fifteen residences whose occupants were interested in electricity and public lighting. In other neighbourhoods, some residents enjoyed electricity in their

⁹⁹ "Gabriela Lopes Filipe dos Santos to Pres. da CML", October 21, 1976. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

homes but had no public lighting on the street while their neighbours would be happy with getting either. The letter included notifications to the CML about residents who had already, individually, requested lighting: Sr. José João Agostinho of Vale de Fora, for example. In addition, the Junta da Freguesia da Reguengo Grande signed the letter with a note suggesting that they felt that the described projects would provide maximum “justice”, clearing all inequities in electrical infrastructure.¹⁰⁰

However, residents made other arguments in support of their requests for light, underscoring what they valued – beyond the sense of equality outlined above – about infrastructure. At the basest of levels, some asked for infrastructure because it would improve how people moved in and accessed the landscape. Some, like Srs Henrique dos Santos and Heitor dos Reis, not only asked for street lighting but also took the time to provide a reason beyond the normal "lack of lighting" for a lamp. They explained that the poor condition of the road, coupled with the lack of lighting at the entrance to their neighborhood in Atalaia de Baixo beside the football field, made it difficult to enter their street, "especially during the winter." Although Srs. Dos Santos and dos Reis could not offer financial assistance for such a project, they did insist that they would "help in the ways they could." The mayor instructed that the matter be referred to SEOL for a quote on the cost of the work.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ "Moradores de Reguengo Grande to Pres. da CML", undated. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰¹ "Henriques dos Santos e Heitor dos Reis to Pres. da CML", June 4, 1970. "Electricidade:

Such arguments also spoke to the fact that subject-citizens saw improved infrastructure as a means to improve Lourinhã's safety. Seniors, like Pedro José Noivo and Artur Gregório of "a dark alley" in Abelheira, who wrote Lourinhã's mayor in October 1971, asked for a lamp to be installed on an existing neighborhood post where one had been placed in the past so as to make the road easier to navigate. They asked for forgiveness. Being seniors, they lacked the ability to contribute to the project. This was passed onto the CML as opposed to SEOL directly.¹⁰² Other writers saw infrastructure as a means to improve safety for neighborhood children. Sr. António Rodrigues Antunes da Silva, a corner-store owner in Ventosa, had his request for lighting met in 1969. His corner store, the CML's Secretariat explained, served many farmers who "did not return from work until night time" to buy their bread and other goods. Since the street outside Sr. da Silva's store lacked public lighting within one hundred meters, the CML decided that a lamp should be installed. The lamp would be placed within nine meters of the store and "serve all the people who need the store." Further, since it was often children who were sent to buy bread from the store, "it was absolutely necessary" to have the street outside lit.¹⁰³

Infrastructure was also needed, so arguments went, to secure the safety

Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰² "Pedro José Noivo and Artur Gregório to Pres. da CML", October 10, 1971. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰³ Secretaria da CML, "Informação", October 21, 1969. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

of those other than seniors and children. Sr. José Ferreira of Marteleira wrote a letter on August 8, 1970 to Lourinhã's mayor explaining that the square in town, where he lived and operated a store, lacked light despite the fact that an electrical post that could power a lamp existed. The problem, Sr. Ferreira continued, was that many people lived on the square and had trouble travelling through at night due to the "broken visibility" in the neighborhood. He asked the CML to install and maintain the "much needed" lamp on the square. The mayor read the letter on August 12 and explained that he would visit the square and investigate the situation.¹⁰⁴ Some requests for public lamps, like Sr. Fernando da Silva's, explicitly invoked the good of the community as reason for new infrastructure. With his house at the fork in the road between Casal Novo and Ribamar, Sr. da Silva complained that public lighting ended before the fork in the road, leaving the area "isolated". In addition, lighting the fork would help traffic flow and benefit a "large part of the population" by improving that traffic artery. Although Sr. da Silva did not offer assistance, financial or in-kind, he did ask the Mayor to advise him on the potential costs of the work. For his part, the mayor sent the matter to SEOL to obtain a quote.¹⁰⁵

Indeed, when residents wrote and argued that infrastructure could provide a safe environment, they were also suggesting that infrastructure would bring

¹⁰⁴ "José Ferreira to Pres. da CML", August 4, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰⁵ "Fernando da Silva to Pres. da CML", ebruary 20, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

order to that environment. The aforementioned form letters directly suggested that darkness meant disorder, suggesting that the cover of night led to all sorts of ill behavior.¹⁰⁶ Although at times this argument worked, we should not think of the CML and the Portuguese government as passive suppliers of infrastructure by request. I have already made reference to some limitations placed on development by circumstances that the CML had to navigate: limitations in electrical supply, for example. In fact, the CML had to vet requests, regardless of unsubstantiated claims of darkness causing disorder. A January 1972 letter from Joaquim da Silva Prazeres of Moita dos Ferreiros asked Lourinhã's mayor to have "one or more" public lamps installed. At night, the neighborhood "was in total darkness, occasionally [causing] upheavals in all order." If the mayor would have lamps installed, the residents promised to take responsibility for "all of the costs", likely not knowing what all of the costs were.¹⁰⁷ However, Sr. Prazeres' request was denied in the end. The mayor had sent a town official to investigate, who found that the road in question was "peculiar" in that it was an old service road for local cattle farmers. Since the street was not a "public roadway" and was

¹⁰⁶ See, for example: "Joaquim Luis to Pres. da Comissão Administrativa da CML", October 6, 1976. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "José dos Santos to Pres. da CML", June 21, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Sr. José Branco Vilela to Pres. da CML", May 10, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Sr. José António Comes to Pres. da CML", January 12, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰⁷ "Joaquim da Silva Prazeres to Pres. da CML", January 13, 1972. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregarça", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

outside the communal domain, the mayor informed Sr. Prazeres that nothing could be done by the CML. This decision came despite the fact that the Secretariat's investigator agreed that a light was needed on the road at night.¹⁰⁸

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Rejections like that of Sr. Prazeres' request reveal of course that the CML and the Portuguese government had their own concerns in infrastructure and that some of the political power that residents displayed when pushing for projects derived from the coincidence of resident and governmental priorities. Further, there is no doubt that the CML and the national government placed great value in infrastructure and in local participation in its development. In 1963, the Mayor presented a donation to the Concelho by the population of São Bartolomeu, in the value of 40,600 escudos for the electrification of their neighborhood. In the eyes of the council, this showed the effort that this population made in trying to lift the "level of life and progress that this improvement would represent."¹⁰⁹

Town planning in Lourinhã backed pronouncements of infrastructure's significance. Beyond being a key focus in the CML's activity plans, various

¹⁰⁸ See: "Pres. da CML to Sr. Joaquim da Silva Prazeres", February 18, 1972. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregaça", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); and, CML Secretaria, "Informação", January 25, 1972. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Electrificações; de Pregaça", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰⁹ "nível de vida e progresso que este melhoramento representa." See: "Reunião 24/Abr./63: Donativo da população de S. Bartolomeu para electrificação", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 24. (1963-1964), p. 7

infrastructure improvements were to serve as the basis to secure a healthy and hygienic environment, a secure transit system, an improved education system and to allow the region to grow its demographic and economic profile.

Throughout the 1960s, the CML listed water and electrical works in its *Planos das Actividades*. Divided into “rural” and “urban” improvements, these documents differentiated between the two by suggesting rural improvements would open access to areas with roads and new basic services like water while urban improvements meant expanding services and creating new buildings (service points) in densely populated areas like the center of the *freguesia* of Lourinhã.¹¹⁰

Water infrastructure, particularly in the 1960s, was a major component of the CML’s plans. For instance, Lourinhã considered the development and expansion of its waterworks and sewage network to be top priorities in its activity plan for 1961. Two of the four sections of the plan focused on the treatment of water and the development of the town’s sewers. They prioritized the continued construction of the treatment station in Reguengo Grande as a key facility in providing residential areas with water. Beyond this facility, two areas were targeted for the expansion of the Concelho’s water infrastructure: PAB and

¹¹⁰ See, for example: “Reunião 14/9/60: Plano de Actividade Para o Ano de Mil Novcentos e Sessenta e Um”, *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 22*. (1959-1961), p. 119-120. Rural improvements focused exclusively on the expansion and improvement of transportation networks into and amongst the *freguesias*. A number of municipal road projects were named as priorities for 1961. Roads would be built, expanded, and linked to existing municipal and national roads while the local public transportation network – serviced by buses – would continue to be ‘studied’ and ‘elaborated’. Urban improvements, in comparison, focused upon the construction of service buildings. Here priority went to schools in the Concelho of Lourinhã, with special attention paid to the construction of one in the *freguesia* of São Bartolomeu, a new slaughterhouse in Lourinhã proper, and the consideration of developing plans for a new town hall.

Lourinhã proper.¹¹¹ In addition to making these two centers the CML's priority, councilors successfully insisted that Lourinhã also prioritize the expansion of the waterworks to residential areas in the *freguesias* that were in need of public fountains and washrooms.¹¹² In 1963, the municipal government continued to be concerned with maintaining and expanding their water sanitation and distribution network. Generally speaking, Lourinhã targeted the installation of public fountains and washrooms in order to have some service provided to "as many citizens as possible." More specifically, residential areas in Reguengo Grande were targeted to receive domestic infrastructure while it was hoped that villages like Seixal, São Bartolomeu, Reguengo Pequeno and Feteira would receive public fountains.¹¹³ Additionally, the fact that clean water was not provided to the southern part of the Concelho was a concern. Here a study was commissioned by the Concelho's Health Services, which explored the potential use of a large well in the southern part of the municipality that could, by the town's estimate, provide up to one million liters of water per day.¹¹⁴ Although these works continued, they came to be identified as '*obras de abastecimento*' by 1965 when five projects were prioritized. The first was the second phase of the Concelho's water treatment plan to provide service to Moita das Ferreiros, Cesaredeas, and Zambujeira do Mar. Next, Lourinhã aimed to replace the old network servicing residential properties in the center of Lourinhã. Third, Lourinhã was to engage in

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ "Reunião 12/Ago./62: Plano de Actividades Para o Ano de Mil Novecentos Sessenta e Três", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 23 (1961-1963) p. 140.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

exploratory work in the Vale do Roto to see about expanding water service to the southern part of the Concelho. Fourth, the installation of new well-based fountains was to be considered along with the continuation of ongoing maintenance of the existing infrastructure. Finally, Lourinhã hoped to install new bathrooms in Casal da Galharda, Pinhoa, Féteira, and Toledo, which had been projects for the previous year but which had not been completed.¹¹⁵

By the mid 1960s, electrical works were beginning to take a more prominent position in the CML's plans. Included as rural improvements in 1966, electrical infrastructure along with roads, including the public bus network, were listed as priorities in Lourinhã's activity plan. Electricity was to be provided to Paço, Pena Seca and Cabeça Gorda as per the CML's plan to provide the Concelho with electricity.¹¹⁶ The improvement of existing electricity networks was also made a priority. Beyond noting schools, Lourinhã's activity plan for 1966 listed priorities like a new town hall, the completion of the Parque de Campismo in PAB, the widening of the access road to PAB, an increase in the town's treasury, the improvement of the town's electrical net, the maintenance of Lourinhã's heritage buildings, and the acquisition of land for a new Campo da Feira and a Centro Civico e Comercial da Lourinhã.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ "Plano de Actividade da Câmara Municipal para 1965", *Alvorada* (February 14, 1965), pp. 3, 5.

¹¹⁶ "Plano de Actividades da Câmara Municipal par o Ano de 1966", *Alvorada* (October 10, 1965) pp. 1, 4.

¹¹⁷ "Plano de Actividade da Câmara Municipal para o Ano de 1966", *Alvorada* (November 7, 1965) pp. 1, 3.

Infrastructure would serve to help with the improvement of public health. It was, in fact, at the center of governmental health initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1968 the national government launched a national hygiene campaign under the auspices of the *Comissão Permanente de Educação Sanitária*.¹¹⁸ Readers of the hygiene pamphlet released as part of the campaign were warned to combat flies by properly storing food such as meat, fish, cheese, fruit, preferably in refrigerators, powered of course by electricity. This was no substitute though for vaccinations against disease that flies and mosquitoes carried.¹¹⁹ Typhoid was another major concern in the campaign. Readers were reminded that it could be transmitted through urine and feces. Direct contact with those infected could cause transmission. Indirect contact through shared clothing, contaminated water, unwashed food, etc., could also lead to illness.¹²⁰ Instructive images accompanied written lessons. They featured children drinking potentially contaminated water and playing in uncontained runoff from public washrooms and outhouses.¹²¹ All these concerns fed the need to promote infrastructure development. Local officials were on the same page as their national counterparts while concerns about hygiene continued to mobilize officials into 1973. When, for example, the sub-delegation for health in Lourinhã found that Luis Moreira's patio had been flooded by sewage, the CML ordered

¹¹⁸ "Pres. da CML to Pres. da Comissão Permanente de Educação Sanitária, Lisboa", August 12, 1968. "Higiene e Limpeza: Diversos; Higiene Geral - Programa Nacional de Educação Sanitária", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 9-B/2 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹¹⁹ "Higiene e Limpeza: Diversos; Higiene Geral - Programa Nacional de Educação Sanitária", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 9-B/2 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

the corresponding *freguesia* of Miragaia to clean the area and investigate the blockage.¹²²

Health and infrastructure continued to fuel local and national politics throughout the revolution. In the fall of 1974, the revolutionary government's commission for local administration, along with health services and public works, took to organizing the sanitary conditions across Portugal. Citing the need to establish basic health conditions and a "healthy environment" to end epidemics of diseases like cholera, which, so the argument went, the *Estado Novo* had not controlled, the revolutionary government's health office set short, medium, and long term goals.¹²³ The short term was limited to the period until March of 1975, the medium until December 1979 and the long ended in 1985.¹²⁴ In order to fix what it saw as a broken hygiene system, the revolutionary government set short-term goals that would standardize and rationalize how the water supply across the country would be treated. It argued that existing water infrastructure (to homes and public fountains) should be the subject of special legislation aimed at disinfecting water by controlling bacteria in the supply. This would go hand-in-hand with a "special regime of transition" that would take total control of ensuring

¹²² "Subdelegação de Saúde do Concelho da Lourinhã to Pres. da CML", August 20, 1973; and, "Pres. da CML to Freg. Da Miragaia", September 22, 1973. "Higiene e Limpeza: Diversos; Queixas Sobre Limpeza das Povações," Arquivo Correspondencia 1973, proc 9-C/3 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹²³ See: "Dir. de Serviços de Administração Local to Governadores Civil do Distritos", October 19, 1974; "Gov. Civil de Distrito de Lisboa to Pres. da Com Administrativa", November 23, 1974. "Serviços de Saúde: diversos; Casos de Higiene e Saúde", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 6-D/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹²⁴ Direcção-Geral de Saúde, "Plano de Saúde e Ecologia Ambientais Objectivos a Curto Prazo Acções Imediatas", July 8, 1974. "Serviços de Saúde: diversos; Casos de Higiene e Saúde", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 6-D/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

the safety of the water supply. This meant the monitoring of sewage where both human and animal waste was diverted, regular tests of city and town water systems, new financing for infrastructure, and various education programs for both infrastructure workers and locals, among other provisions.¹²⁵

Infrastructure development was also to contribute at a more abstract level than outlined above. Infrastructure was to serve as the basis of a modern landscape that could accommodate and promote economic growth. The Quinta de Santa Catarina in Lourinhã emerged in the late 1960s as the area upon which the town could grow onto a blank slate. Thus, the environment, infrastructure and all, could be built to create an ideal setting. A long running advertisement in the *Alvorada* for the development of the area explained that the Quinta would have residential units, both to rent and to buy, shops in a commercial center, as well as gardens and schools, all serviced by water and electrical lines. The accompanying aerial view of the proposed development showed a rational and contained compound composed of straight lines and clear pathways and roads: a far cry from the muddled center of old Lourinhã, which had grown organically over centuries.¹²⁶ Future development was a further consideration when installing new facilities. When the CML built electrical infrastructure for the Zona da Palmeira, the construction plan focused on the structure that would house the electrical transformation and storage cells, with an eye to the uses of the electricity produced by those transformers. The transformers would serve as the

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ See: "Urbanização da Quinta de Santa Catarina: Lourinhã", *Alvorada* (October 22, 1972), p. 2.

center of a network to provide public illumination for the area's road entrances and its residential streets. The construction of the infrastructure would affect, it was noted, "underused" public bus routes, a parking lot, and the existing public illumination in green spaces in the area.¹²⁷ The project represented an effort to bring the lighting in this neighborhood to the "recommended ... minimum value" so as to provide uniform infrastructure to an area which did not have what was called "reasonable" lighting for an expanding urban area.¹²⁸

Throughout the period, economic development was linked time and time again to tourism by municipalities across the region. In the spring of 1966, the CML was advised that the Concelho of Torres Vedras was moving to install hydraulic equipment in service of its water infrastructure in the areas of Vimeiro and Maceira (villages where the CML also had some purview) that it governed. Torres Vedras cited two prime concerns: touristic development and the region's "limits [on growth], which were greatly prejudiced by the lack of drinking water." Until 1966, Torres Vedras had been able to get by with the natural mineral water springs and wells in the area. However, with all the "touristic industry and the regional hotel" built at the beach, the Concelho had to "insist" that the district of Lisbon resolve the problem. The CML was advised because Torres Vedras requested that, as part of the solution, their infrastructure be integrated with that of the southern zone in Lourinhã in the *freguesias* of Vimeiro and Maceira. The

¹²⁷ "Memória Descritiva e Justificativa do Projecto de Electrificação da Urbanização Parcelar da "Zona da Palmeira" na Lourinhã" (undated). Caixa: Electrificação: Quinta de S. Catarina; Bairro da Palmeira; Praia da Areia Branca. Arquivo das Obras Municipal. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹²⁸ Ibid.

rationale, for Torres Vedras, was that the source of much of the natural spring and well water used in the area was found in the CML's jurisdiction. Such a project, it was explained, could be the first step in creating a larger "Western Zone of Torres Vedras."¹²⁹

Although the CML was in step with Portugal's developing tourism in the 1960s¹³⁰, the late 1970s continued to see infrastructure as a basis for development in that sector. In 1978, PAB continued to be called a touristic center of unequaled beauty by the CML where hundreds of people relaxed on weekends and in the summer. It was, "without doubt", valuable to the CML. The area serviced between 4000 and 6000 residents, a campground, three restaurants, a small hotel, a motel, a casino, two markets and a cinema. These privileges were warranted given the fact that national and international visitors frequented the beach.¹³¹ Despite PAB's importance, the public lighting was considered "simple, rural and antiquated" with its incandescent bulbs hanging unprotected without reflectors from tubes. In addition, the existing infrastructure was in poor repair having been "attacked" by the "*clima salino*" which had rusted iron components. This was inefficient given that these components needed frequent replacement. The state of repair, coupled with recent road and

¹²⁹ Informação ao Exmo. Eng. Chefe do Serviço de Hidrologia Sobre o Abastecimento de Água do Vimeiro e Maceira", Spring 1966. "Abastecimento de Água à Zona Sul do Concelho de Lourinhã", Arquivo Correspondencia 1970, proc. 37-B/8 1966 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹³⁰ See the chapter in this dissertation on tourism in Lourinhã.

¹³¹ "Praia Da Areia Branca: Remodelação e Ampliação da Rede Eléctrica de Baixa Tensão - Memória Descritiva e Justificativa" (29/11/78). Caixa: Electrificação: Quinta de S. Catarina; Bairro da Palmeira; Praia da Areia Branca. Arquivo das Obras Municipal. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

waterworks repair and expansion in PAB meant that electrical infrastructure needed to be expanded and updated.¹³² The construction was to be completed in four phases prioritized by locality as follows: the area around the pensão S. João; the area around the "motel"; the area around the cinema; and the 2nd phase. The first phase would allow expansion towards the fort (built in 1674) near Paimogo; the motel phase was needed to allow expansion near the major road between Lourinhã and Peniche; the cinema phase was to be done in conjunction with water and sewage facilities that were "evidently needed." The 2nd phase was an open-ended phase that would be worked out in the future. The first three phases were to be worked on simultaneously. The S. João phase covered the Pensão S. João, the Parque Campismo, the boardwalk, the casino, the future swimming pool and the play park. The "Motel" phase would cover the restaurant and a future market while the "cinema" phase was to cover the water pumping station. Finally, the "2nd Phase" would cover a future market, cinema, stores and a second water station.¹³³

These public priorities were matched by governmental priorities for the private sphere as well: infrastructure was not only an important part of health, development, and tourism, but it was also vital for the completion of what officials in the 1960s and 1970s felt was the ideal Portuguese home. The fact that the government would highlight the importance of development in the home is unsurprising given the importance the family held in official discourse throughout

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

the period. On the cover of its first edition, the *Alvorada* argued that a group of families coming together created a neighborhood, a group of neighborhoods coming together created a Concelho, a group of concelhos created a Distrito, and finally a group of Distritos formed a nation. Thus, the family was the base of the nation and the family's health was of key importance for the future. A family was defined as a man and woman "united by love" to confront life, to share joy, hope, work and sadness. Also, the local paper warned that because youth is filled with dreams and kindness, one only thinks about the hopes and happiness of life, not the sadness and labour that must be shared by a husband and wife.¹³⁴

Sobering discussion about the family was not uncommon. In the early 1960s, a feeling of crisis existed in Portugal. For some, this crisis manifested itself in the deterioration of the family. Lourinhã's local paper commented in 1962 that, "the world was on a short path to ruin" because the "proper family, the fundamental rock of society, was in great danger of destruction." Threatening the world and the family was the pursuit of material wealth, motivated by a "demonic hate of God." This hate had led, in the eyes of the Church-run *Alvorada*, to men attacking one another out of a hate that "had never been seen." It was a time of "massacre and abortion." The way out of ruin was to rebuild the fundamentals of society. The family had to be defended so that "*salvaremos o mundo todo*" [we will save the world].¹³⁵ Such alarms sounded into the 1980s. The *Alvorada's* Christmas issue in 1980 began by reminding readers that the "family is the

¹³⁴ "Família", *Alvorada*, ano 1 (November 5, 1960), p. 1, 3.

¹³⁵ "Defender a Família", *Alvorada*, ano II, no. 29. (July 8, 1962) p. 1.

foundation of human life and of all societies." Sadly, it continued, the family was being "gradually destroyed" as some of the "more important family values" were in decline. Under attack were spousal fidelity and the "sacred character" of matrimony with its "ordained objective" (children) along with the "greatness of paternity and maternity", and finally, the "inabdicatable" parental responsibility for moral education. Along with organizations like the Confederação Nacional das Associações de Família (CNAF), the *Alvorada* urged the "fortification" of the family in order to protect Portugal's future. Amongst other vague suggestions, the CNAF called for the defense of the "familial building".¹³⁶

Defining, defending and building up the home was one point where government and official discourse could help the family, and, of course, providing infrastructure was important to this objective. A 1964 article by Lima Bastos described the ideal Portuguese home and its advantages. The goal of the home was to build public health and, "without health, it is difficult to live happily." But what was health? As Bastos explained, "it goes beyond the absence of illness (which is how the World Health Organization defines health), it is physical, mental and social well-being."¹³⁷

In order to achieve a healthy home certain amenities had to service the residence. First, Lourinhanense were told that water had to be accessible. Improvements in sanitation, and by extension, life, depended upon access to clean water via direct plumbing, or nearby fountains. Sending it for chemical

¹³⁶ "Fortalecer a Família para Mudar Portugal", *Alvorada* (December 1980).

¹³⁷ Lima Bastos, "Educação Sanitária A Casa", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no, 76 (October 25, 1964) p. 8.

analysis was the best way to ensure that it was safe to drink and cook with.¹³⁸

Closely linked to water as a major contributor to sanitation was the sewer system. Sewers would help keep at bay the flies and rats that were the source of many illnesses.¹³⁹ Second, Lima Bastos identified central heating as an important part of creating a healthy home. It avoided the need to use a fire, which not only endangered the house, but also poured toxic gases into the home.¹⁴⁰ Third, having a finished floor that covered exposed soil was also an important necessity. Cement flooring, rock, tile or wood were preferred methods to finish a home. These floors could be covered with a carpet to be more comfortable to walk on. These types of finished floors would also reduce danger to children, as they would help to avoid contamination by vermin, like cockroaches, as well as keeping dangerous things like excrement, if the home did not have a bathroom, from soaking into the ground.¹⁴¹

A home also had to be compartmentalized and space was to be defined by the activity carried out in that room. A family had to have a designated sleeping area and arrange the beds in order to reduce the transmission of diseases. This was to be done by limiting the number of people sleeping in the same room and having rooms well ventilated. It was also essential to separate adolescent boys and girls. If your dwelling did not have enough rooms to

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Lima Bastos, "Educação Sanitária A Casa", *Alvorada*, ano IV, no. 78 (November 22, 1964) p.

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¹⁴¹ Ibid.

separate people, then a curtain or *tabique*, could be used..¹⁴² Further, sleeping in the same bed carried the risk of spreading disease, “not to mention the discomfort involved.”¹⁴³ Some solutions were available for those who had neither the rooms, nor the beds to separate people. Children who were young enough for a cradle could sleep in a box or a drawer placed on the floor. Arranging two chairs together could also help to solve space issues. For older people, mattresses could be placed on the ground at night and stored in the kitchen, the home's entrance, or in the sitting room during the day. As Bastos pointed out, many houses had a dining or sitting room that was often closed and rarely used. Judgment was then passed as it was explained: “it is a shame if [the room] was not used to sleep when they lacked [sufficient beds] in the bedroom.”¹⁴⁴ The message was clear: staying healthy meant sleeping apart.

Homes also needed designated cooking and washing areas. The room in which one cooked and ate was very important. It had to be positioned such that the smoke created from cooking could easily exit the home, be airy and have both a window and a door with nets to keep flies out. Dangerous liquids like gases or poisons for rats that children could drink needed to be locked away with a key. That said, if children were going to be in the kitchen, it would be best to keep hazardous liquids out of that room altogether.¹⁴⁵ If your home did not have a bathroom, then an arrangement should be made with a neighbor who did, so

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ “É pena não se aproveitar para lá dormir aqueles que não têm cama no quarto.” See: Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

that one could wash. That said, Bastos was clear that it would be easy enough to build a place beside the home where people could wash. A shower, for example, could be built with "with little work and little money."¹⁴⁶

Five years later, in 1969, local editorials continued to call for a reworking of the home along similar lines. One article explained that a comfortable house would include a washroom, a clean kitchen, running water, bedrooms with a "minimum degree of comfort", rooms "where a family could read", heating systems, furniture, and comfortable beds. The editorial reminded readers that "everyone knows that the environment of the home influences our development and our future lives." For this reason it was important to take "special care" in creating the home.¹⁴⁷ Unfortunately though, as the paper lamented, rural Portugal did not have the ability to build such houses. This is why, as the author argued, there was a "great exodus from the rural areas of Portugal to Lisbon, France, Germany, and Canada." Portugal needed to urbanize by installing sewers, electrical infrastructure, and running water. The article called on Portugal to study the problem, create a program and a policy to "build a future for the Portuguese."¹⁴⁸

Lourinhanense felt pressure from those like the CML and commercial companies, who controlled discourse, to develop such homes. Pressure came only from articles like the two described previously, but also from advertisements

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ "A Habitação nos Meios Rurais", *Alvorada* (January 11, 1969) p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

that reminded Lourinhanense of the need to run a clean and serviced home. Ads similar to one for *Sulfazul*, a chemical mold remedy for the home, emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, insisting that commercial products would help make management of the home easier. *Sulfazul*, for example, would help “against mildew the way you want”.¹⁴⁹ Another advertisement in the *Alvorada* in 1968 explained to shoppers that “a great part of happy homes” was the availability of a refrigerator¹⁵⁰, which, of course, required electrical service to the home.

Beneath all of these discussions about the importance of electricity and water infrastructure lay the fact that the desires of both local governments and local subject-citizens were undercut in the 1960s and 1970s by an underdeveloped government and bureaucracy that was incapable of delivering a modern landscape and services without public participation. Put plainly, the coincidence of government and local interests went some way in opening the civic sphere to subject-citizens in exchange for their help in developing Lourinhã. However, as democratic government took control and standardized service delivery, the state began to monopolize development, which had the peculiar effect of reducing the kind of civic participation described earlier. We must remember that in any analysis of political culture, priorities and goals were bound to reach well past logistical capabilities in Portugal, looking to what ideally would be created, not what was actually capable. This was true under both the dictatorship and the democracy.

¹⁴⁹ See: “Sulfazul”, *Alvorada* (March 14, 1971), p. 4.

¹⁵⁰ “Ad: AEG Santo”, *Alvorada* (July 28, 1968), p. 3.

The complex and tangled negotiation between locals and government over infrastructure, especially in the years of the dictatorship and the early years of democracy, reflects the basic reality that the CML lacked the resources necessary to carry out its own program. In fact, funding issues dogged the CML, which often relied upon bank loans and private contributions to complete projects. In November of 1963, for example, the Câmara received notice from the *Direcção-Geral dos Serviços Electricos* requiring the CML to explain their plans for electrification through 1967. Prompted by this letter, Lourinhã named four areas of priority. First, the Câmara wanted to see, in 1963, the completion of the projects that had entered the Director-General's office before Aug 31. Second, the Câmara wanted the projects submitted since August 31 to the Director-General's office to be completed in 1964. Third, in the three years following 1963, the Concelho wanted to electrify the following neighborhoods: in 1965 they aimed to electrify Casal Novo, Mereudeiro, Ventosa, e Pregarça; in 1966 the Câmara wanted electricity for Reguengo Pequeno, Fontelas, Casais da Galharda, Pinhoa and Casal do Simplício; in 1967, the hope was to electrify Casais Serranos, Vaizea, Casias do Moinho, Casal Tormeiro, Casal de Feitosa and Casal de Leafa. Finally, the Câmara wanted to avoid accessing credit at the Caixa-Geral do Depositos, Credito e Providência, despite making it clear that it would borrow money if that was "in the people's interests."¹⁵¹ In another example of limited resources the CML discussed the electrification of Pinhera e Casais da Galbarda

¹⁵¹ "Reunião 13/Nov./63: Plano de obras de electrificação", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 24. (1963-1964), p. 84.

in July of 1974. The CML discussed the fact that they did not have the necessary money to complete the infrastructure needed. They would need to set aside money in the next annual budget for this project. The project had been initiated when local commissions in the neighborhoods asked the CML to supplement their investment.¹⁵²

Covering expenses often involved several contributors including various levels of governments, organizations and individuals. The electrification of Casais de Porto Dinheiro, a representative case, was undertaken in the summer of 1970. Of the total cost of 98.000\$00 escudos, the national and district governments gave forty-five percent (44.100\$00 escudos) with the remaining fifty-five percent to be raised by the CML.¹⁵³ Interestingly, nowhere does the correspondence between the CML and SEOL mention that any of this money came from local residents. However, given that we know that residents promised close to 25.000\$00 escudos for this project, we have to assume that their money would be included in the CML's portion, leaving the local administration to contribute around 30.000\$00 escudos.¹⁵⁴ In other cases, the CML was not even a financial player. In one such project, plans for a sewer system in PAB had been sent to the Direcção de Urbanização in March 1969 and approved. Considered an "urgent work", the state promised half of the money with the landowners

¹⁵² "Reunião 27/Jul./1974: Participação do Município em Electrificações", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 31 (1973-74), p. 199.

¹⁵³ "SEOL to Pres. da CML", May 27, 1970. "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁵⁴ See: "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

providing the other half: "over three hundred and fifty contos."¹⁵⁵

By the early 1980s, such projects were more commonly funded, at least in part, by bank loans. Indeed, despite municipalities gaining financial autonomy in 1979, they nonetheless lacked the ability to raise money through direct taxation and so remained dependent for upwards of sixty-five percent of their funding on the national government. In addition, local contributions tapered off, leaving institutions like the CML scrambling for alternate sources of revenue.¹⁵⁶ Thus, funding for the major water and sewage infrastructure upgrades and installations in the south of the Concelho (a scheduled fifteen year project) that would dominate much of the agenda in the mid and late 1980s was secured in 1981 with a thirty million escudo (or thirty thousand conto) loan from the Caixa Geral de Depositos. The loan would cover roughly fifty-eight percent of the cost of the work. The rest would come from public funds at various government levels – there was, by this point (1981) no mention of direct private donation.¹⁵⁷

In fact, projects in the 1960s and early 1970s were often contingent on private financial participation. In an example from 1965 of local participation in the maintenance of water infrastructure, Dr. José Machado of Ribeira de

¹⁵⁵ CML, "Relatório das Obras Necessárias no Concelho", July 22, 1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁵⁶ See: Stephen Syrett, *Local Development*, 150-151; Joyce Firstenberg Riegelhaupt, "Introduction", in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 9-10; and, Walter C. Opello Jr., "The Continuing Impact of the Old Regime on Portuguese Political Culture", in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983).

¹⁵⁷ "Reunião 23/Abr/81: Empréstimo para Abastecimento de Água ao Concelho", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 36 (1980-81), pp. 151-154.

Palheiros wrote the CML about a decaying, thirty year old pipe that supplied clean water to public fountains and cleaning stations.¹⁵⁸ A little over a month later, Dr. Machado forwarded, through his lawyer, a 25.000\$00 escudo donation to the CML to help pay for the repair of the decrepit pipe.¹⁵⁹ At times, money could be such an important factor in the CML's assessment of which projects to undertake that when Sr. José António Gomes asked for lighting on his street in January 1974, necessary because darkness could lead to disorder at times, the CML responded by asking him if he could contribute to the expenses for the requested work.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, in the summer of 1970, the CML was moving on requests from Sr. Herminio Antunes Henriques, of Casal Vale da Cruz, and Sr. Américo da Silva of Casais de Porto Dinheilro, about the installation of public lamps in their neighborhoods. In a councilors' meeting, the CML agreed that lamps were needed in these neighborhoods and agreed to work on their installation, provided that those residents interested in the success of the project paid for the cost of the installation of lamps.¹⁶¹

In developing infrastructure, a few institutions and officials emerged as key actors and mediators between the various levels of government and local

¹⁵⁸ "Dr. Francisco José Vieira Machado to Pres. da CML", December 14, 1965. "Solicita Reparções de Caminhos em Ribamar de Palheiros e Conduto de Abastecimento de Água", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1966, proc. Z-13/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁵⁹ "Duarte Ferreira Pires to Pres. da CML", February 10, 1966. "Solicita Reparções de Caminhos em Ribamar de Palheiros e Conduto de Abastecimento de Água", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1966, proc. Z-13/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁶⁰ "Pres. da CML to José António Gomes", January 21, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliação das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁶¹ "Reunião 27/Jul/70: Instalação de Lampadas para Iluminação Pública", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 29 (1969-71), p. 87.

subject-citizens. These included governmental bodies like the Juntas de Freguesias (parish councils), the CML, the Distrito de Lisboa, SEOL and later *Energias de Portugal* (EDP is the national energy company in Portugal) along with various national ministries. They also included loose and unofficial groups organized around specific issues, locality, and family; neighborhood commissions, which emerged around the revolution; and individuals. However, Lourinhã's mayor was first and foremost amongst these.

As the main recipient of letters to the CML, Lourinhã's mayor was not only able to guide responses and results, but also to receive a high degree of exposure to his constituents and other institutions. So, the Mayor's responsibilities in the 1960s consisted of relaying information and requests from citizens, institutions and businesses to the CML. By way of example, in late November 1967 the Mayor of Lourinhã brought João Henriques' letter of October 17 to the CML's attention. Sr. Henriques had written regarding the electrification of certain neighborhoods in the south end of the Concelho bordering Torres Vedras. Sr. Henriques need the CML's help in dealing with the municipal government in Torres Vedras since the neighborhoods in question straddled both the municipalities of Lourinhã and Torres Vedras. Sr. Henriques was seeking the installation of some street lamps in Lourinhã's area, which would need to be serviced by Torres Vedras' power lines. From this exchange, the CML noted that instead of using Torres Vedras' infrastructure, they needed to electrify their parts

of the neighborhoods in question.¹⁶² The Mayor was also responsible for recommending his own projects and setting general policy direction to the CML. In 1965, Councilors considered a proposal from the Mayor calling for the “elimination of deficiencies” in infrastructural aspects in Lourinhã. These improvements concerned street lamps in various locales, including the main streets in Lourinhã proper (from rua Visconde ... de Almeida, and Avenida José de Almeida) and the street running parallel to the ocean in Praia da Areia Branca, along with the walkway on the beach.¹⁶³

The mayor’s power and role has changed little as the position remains central in the town. José Manuel Dias Custódio, who first took up the position as Lourinhã's Mayor in 1983 and only retired in the fall of 2013, exhibited signs in the early 1980s that he would continue the legacy of his predecessors in promoting infrastructure. As a councilor, Custódio took the lead on several issues including the supply of electrical equipment. In September 1981, he presented a plan to the CML in order to "rectify the illumination of Lourinhã" in which Phillips had proposed to supply the needed material at the "price [the CML] had hoped." The CML approved of the plan; however, the Chefe de Secretaria of the CML noted that the existence of the project had not been through the necessary consultation process or a public competition. In addition, the materials, their

¹⁶² 27/Nov.67: "Electrificação da Casais do Ripo", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 27 (1967-68), p. 121.

¹⁶³ "Reunião 27/Jan./65: Melhorias na iluminação pública de Lourinhã/Melhoramentos na Praia da Areia Branca", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 25 (1964-1965), p. 90.

costs, the budget and plan of activities were also unknown.¹⁶⁴

Such warnings from the Secretariat of the CML reveal that by the 1980s an important level of bureaucratic oversight had assumed new importance in how local business was done. We should remember that the Secretariat existed in the 1960s and 70s and investigated many complaints and requests but that they held no real power over the CML and thus were not able to act as a level of oversight in municipal government. Time and time again in the 1980s, however, the Secretariat emerged in the documents playing a role they had not in the 1960s. By September 1981, the CML was going ahead with the installation of public lamps in the Quinta de Santa Catarina. The CML approved the work and since the contract was won in an "open competition" and there had been no "duplication of payments", the Chefe de Secretaria did not "have any objections" about how the work was contracted.¹⁶⁵ Similarly, the CML, in October 1982, decided to replace the public lighting around the courthouse to match the work Philips had done in other areas of the Concelho. They set a budget of 500.000\$00 escudos, while the Chefe de Secretaria reminded councilors that they needed to hold a public competition for the contract.¹⁶⁶

That said, the emergence of the Secretariat as a level of oversight in the 1980s should be seen as step in the ongoing standardization of services in

¹⁶⁴ "Reunião 24/Set./81: Mudança de Iluminação na Lourinhã", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 37 (1981-82), p. 23.

¹⁶⁵ "Reunião 24/Set./81: Iluminação Pública da Quinta de Santa Catarina", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 37 (1981-82), p. 23.

¹⁶⁶ "Reunião 7/Out./82: Iluminação Pública na Lourinhã", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 37 (1981-82), p. 176.

Lourinhã that was well underway in the 1960s as infrastructure development pushed the CML, and indeed Portugal, to develop its regulations and institutions. As early as 1962, as more and more “industrial” consumers of water emerged, the CML was pressed by institutions like the Adegas Cooperativas to set a fixed price for water consumption for commercial use. The Council unanimously decided that they would establish a price of two escudos per cubic meter of water used.¹⁶⁷ By 1966, the CML was turning its attention toward regulating and overseeing residential hygiene. In approving orders from national bodies like the Direcção Civil e Política, the CML set into its bylaws a requirement that no residence could be newly occupied without having been inspected and found to have the “indispensable conditions of hygiene.” These conditions included access to washrooms (not necessarily in the home or with running water); and, access to wells (no more than 100 meters from the home), if running water did not exist in the home. If drinking water was not readily available to the home, then it would not be possible to have the inspectors visit. In addition, inspections could not be done for people in arrears on tax payments and fees for the inspection: financially, the resident must have been in good standing with the CML.¹⁶⁸ In 1971, with the completion of the water infrastructure in PAB and Seixal, the CML felt the need to write “proper regulations” for the municipality’s sanitation services. This meant that walls on or bordering public thoroughways could not

¹⁶⁷ “Reunião 12/Set/62: Preço da água para consumidores industriais”, *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, No. 23 (1961-1963) p. 144.

¹⁶⁸ “Reunião 26/Out/66: Postura Sobre Vistorias a Habitações Para Efeitos de Beneficiações Higiénicas”, *Livro de Actas da Câmara municipal da Lourinhã*, no. 26 (1965-67), p. 169-173.

cause rain water to pool or sewers to back up. Domestic water systems – those within houses – must have been kept separate from systems that collected and channeled rainwater. The regulations covered everything from payment for services to basic information about infrastructure in both private and public buildings such as schools. New construction would have to comply with the regulations and existing structures would have to be brought up to code. The regulations also standardized the minimum requirements for project applications. After listing the various fixtures one might find in a bathroom, the regulations noted that the minimum that a bathroom must have was: a toilet, a bidet, a bathtub (with or without a shower fixture), and a sink.¹⁶⁹

Inevitably, institutions also emerged and developed along with regulation in response to growing demand for service. In 1969, the Civil Governor of Lisbon and the Direcção de Urbanização de Lisboa had completed its sewers and water treatment station in PAB and Seixal and were asking the CML to pay the share of the work they had approved in the project's development plans. The CML was able to raise the funds because of local donations and the recently organized survey office responsible for mapping "rustic property". Opened by Lourinhã's mayor with the participation of the civil governor of Lisbon, the office gave the CML a better understanding of the Concelho and how improvements would affect specific properties (making taxation for services easier).¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ "Reunião 8/Fev/71: Regulamento do Serviços de Saneamento", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, no. 29 (1969-71), pp. 140-167.

¹⁷⁰ "Reunião 13/Out/69: Saneamento da Praia da Areia Branca", *Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã*, n. 28 (1968-69), p. 179.

However, the greatest push for standardization came with the founding of the EDP after the revolution. After the regional electrical services like SEOL were nationalized and placed under EDP, problems related to the interference of high-tension power lines came to the fore. As the EDP explained to the CML in a letter from September 1977, "frequent and dangerous situations of incompatibility" between high-tension lines and local infrastructure had been discovered in Lourinhã. The interests of property owners and "promoters of urbanization and the obligation of the public distribution of electricity" wanted to establish new electrical lines by altering existing infrastructure. Similarly, the letter continued, the construction of isolated houses frequently conflicted with technical recommendations, creating "irregularities in energy supply for large urban zones." Thus, greater coordination between the various actors was needed, especially in order to ensure that those areas that were "most important" and "deserving, [like] urban and industrial zones," had sufficient access to electricity. This was done in the name of the national economy.¹⁷¹

The urbanization, and requisite electrification, of the Quinta da Santa Catarina in Lourinhã offers one example of the EDP having to reconcile past projects with national infrastructure requirements. A letter in July 1977 from the EDP to the CML explained that there were problems with the ongoing urbanization of the Qta. Sta. Catarina. Acknowledging that electrical

¹⁷¹ "EDP to Pres. da CML", September 18, 1977. "Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Assuntos Gerais sobre Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 37-D/7 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

infrastructure was "indispensable" to the urbanization of the area, EDP explained that a number of buildings had gone up without the addition of any new electrical lines thus taxing a system that "could not support other loads." Exacerbating the situation were construction projects close to the high tension lines, forcing EDP to undertake "onerous modifications ... and expenses" in order to complete the electrical projects already underway in the area. In short, EDP was taking this opportunity to present the CML with a bill for 41.339\$00 escudos, leaving open the possibility for further "questions" between EDP and the CML about the urbanization of the Quinta da Santa Catarina.¹⁷²

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As highlighted above, Lourinhanense enthusiastically engaged in the improvement of their landscape and the creation of a modern Lourinhã. However, we should not think of the *Estado Novo* as a misunderstood government that welcomed private action in all areas of civic affairs. Indeed, locals continued to be barred from direct and meaningful political organization. Only certain sectors, such as infrastructure, were important and sanctioned sites for Portuguese to engage in civic affairs.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, basic infrastructure was central to

¹⁷² "EDP to Pres. da CML", July 11, 1977. "Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Assuntos Gerais sobre Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 37-D/7 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

Lourinhã's development. As we have seen throughout the rest of the dissertation, these services emerge time and time again as central to the way Lourinhanense understood a modern, and what came to be 'European', Lourinhã. With both the government and subject-citizens interested in these services, a sort of perfect storm emerged under the dictatorship in which those who the *Estado Novo* consciously tried to keep disinterested and unengaged were allowed and sometimes called upon to act in civic affairs. With the Portuguese government and the CML unable to fund and complete all projects on their own, civic engagement in infrastructure development was welcomed and, indeed, encouraged. Having considered the state of infrastructure in Lourinhã between the 1960s and 1980s, the priorities of both locals and the government, as well as the ways in which both of these sectors acted in order to achieve their goals, the discussion will turn in the dissertation's final chapter to Lourinhã's contemporary urban landscape. By the 1980s, the CML had turned its attention to building the modern center it boasts today. By looking at the development of the town's market hall and central-square, the dissertation will continue to discuss Portugal's urban priorities and political culture by highlighting the elements that the CML ultimately valued as representative of a modern Lourinhã.

6. Towards the "New" Lourinhã's Contemporary Center

In July 1989, eleven years after the first architectural proposals were tabled, Lourinhã opened a new market hall.¹ Considering the facility a center of both social and economic activity, the municipal government boasted that the new market hall was in a “privileged location” on the ring road connecting Lourinhã to larger centers like Lisbon, and Peniche: that it was an integral part of the development of a new municipal center that would include a new bus-station, new municipal offices, and a soccer field; and that visitors would find the cleanest environment possible.² Lourinhã’s mayor, José Manuel Custódio Dias, heralded the market as an important step towards building “a different Lourinhã ... a European Lourinhã.”³ More than anything, however, the market hall ought to be understood as emblematic of the development of Lourinhã’s organized, spacious, and modern landscape in the 1980s, which had developed in parallel to Portugal's political culture and its political institutions.

Nevertheless, a single market hall would never make a "European" urban landscape by it self. In fact, the term “European” is riddled with ambiguity and complexity meaning different things in different contexts. In late 1980s Lourinhã,

¹ The first plan for a new market appeared in 1978 after first being mentioned in a 1966 statement of intention for Lourinhã’s urban landscape. See boxes 55 and 56, *Novo Mercado Municipal* (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, Lourinhã, Portugal) for architectural plans and letters regarding the development of the market between 1976 and 1989.

² "Abriu ao Público O Novo Mercado Municipal", *Suplemento Alvorada: Informação Municipal*, (August 1989), iv.

³ "Novo Mercado Municipal Inauguração está Próxima: Com Custos Globais de Cerca de 3,500 Contos", *Suplemento Alvorada: Informação Municipal*, (February 1989), iv.

building a European environment became merely the latest label attached to a project that began in the 1960s to modernize the town, while rationalizing and realigning the urban built environment, beginning with tourism facilities, agriculture, and then basic infrastructure. Throughout this time, the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (CML) had discussed the prospect of moving the town's center from the *Praça Marquês de Pombal*, in Lourinhã's medieval center, out to the periphery of the medieval core at the *Praça da República* (later renamed the *Praça José Máximo da Costa* for the town's first democratically elected Mayor and former deputy governor of the District of Lisbon). Little was done to achieve this realignment in the 1960s and 1970s as the CML struggled to set up such basic infrastructure as water, electricity and roads. However, as the 1980s progressed the CML found itself with a *Praça da República* that was developing with the opening of a long-promised municipal courthouse in 1982, and a new main road (N247) connecting Lourinhã to Torres Vedras and Peniche that circumvented the old town and passed alongside the *Praça da República*, its new market hall and the existing post-office, fire hall, and principal church. The opportunity to abandon the town's old centre and build a new square to represent the modern Lourinhã was presenting itself.




Figure 24: Central Lourinhã's landmarks. The *Praça Marquês de Pombal* is marked in orange. In contrast, the new administrative center, the *Praça José Máximo da Costa*, with its more organized topography, is marked in yellow.

The drive to rationalize the built environment was made all the more appealing since, after the 1960s, Portuguese citizens became increasingly active in civic affairs in a number of arenas, including urbanization. At the macro level, as has been discussed in previous chapters, Portugal was undergoing a dramatic political, social, and economic transformation. In the 1950s, Portugal was primarily a rural society, under an inward looking and conservative authoritarian dictatorship that, despite its economic frailty, maintained an overseas empire. By the early 1990s, however, Portugal had developed a semi-industrialized economy with a democratically elected government whose future was bound to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Union (EU).⁴

⁴ Stephen Syrett, *Local Development: Restructuring, Locality and Economic Initiative in Portugal*. (Great Britain: Avebury Ashgate, 1995), 86. This evolution included a bloodless political revolution, the Carnation Revolution, which ended the *Estado Novo* (1932-1974) on 25 April 1974; a series of bloody, drawn out, and costly colonial wars in the 1960s and 1970s which in large part triggered the 1974 revolution; and Portugal's entrance into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. As to the cost of the colonial wars, the Portuguese regime was spending nearly fifty per cent of its revenue on its efforts to suppress the revolutions in its African colonies in the 1960s. See, Maria Baganha, "From Closed to Open Doors: Portuguese Emigration under the Corporatist Regime", *Electronic Journal of Portuguese History*, 1:1

Accession to the EEC was the culmination of a process to move the country economically closer to mainstream Europe, starting with Portugal's admission to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1960. Macro changes of this magnitude challenged Lourinhanense citizens at the micro level to adapt. As local agents like the *Alvorada* newspaper celebrated Portugal's modest industrialization and the economic resurgence of the 1960s that propelled this change, it also reminded its readers that the Portuguese could not forget that industrial developments were supported by long-term improvements to the country's scientific infrastructure, technical base, and "sociological character." Through education, "modern generations" had to be "adapted" to meet the challenges of the future.⁵

Waves of economic modernization altered many of Portugal's public spaces through the development and reordering of its infrastructure. As previous chapters have shown, dictatorship subjects and democratic citizens were given, and spent, political capital as active participants in this reordering. This chapter uses the development of Lourinhã's market hall – a major step in the creation of the new town center – to consider the ways in which public space was reorganized as Portugal democratized and modernized, and as towns like Lourinhã sought to regulate an increasingly politicized urban setting.⁶ In part, this

(Summer 2003), 5.

⁵ "Adaptar-se às Exigências do Mundo Moderno", *Alvorada* (June 28, 1970), p. 1.

⁶ For other examples of historical work using markets as a site of enquiry, see Herbert Eder, "Markets as Mirrors: Reflectors of the Economic Activity and the Regional Culture of Coastal

chapter focuses on the development of Lourinhã's contemporary built environment and argues that this urban landscape, its new town center, and the new market hall, became important sites for the expression of what Portuguese political culture came to value as representations of modern and democratic Portugal in the late 1980s: modern Lourinhã was to coordinate and rationalize its landscape designating space for various specific purposes. This was a long-term project that had begun under the dictatorship. Yet, despite the severe ruptures in Portuguese political structures and mechanisms, the country's political culture and modernization was marked by continuity as Portugal transitioned to European social democracy in the 1980s. Additionally, this chapter considers this process in the context of the Lourinhanenses' understanding of their rights vis-à-vis their built landscape, which were, in many ways a legacy of *Estado Novo* policies.⁷

With the consolidation of democracy in Portugal in the 1980s, citizen involvement in urban development waned as the CML completed its modern urban center.⁸ Indeed, as previous chapters have demonstrated, citizen

Oaxaca", in *Markets in Oaxaca*, ed S. Cook and M. Diskin. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1976) 67. He reminds us that, "Markets can be viewed as microcosms containing a representative array of the elements comprising a regional environment. Markets provide a compressed display of an area's economy, technology, and society – in brief, of the local way of life." For similar uses of markets as analytical tools see: Anand Yang, *Bazaar India: Markets, Society, and the Colonial State in Gangetic Bihar*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), ch. 1; B.L. Anderson and A.J.H Latham eds., *The Market in History*, (Great Britain: University of Texas Press, 1986); and R.O. Whyte, *The Spatial Geography of Rural Economies*. (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1982).

⁷ See: Pedro Ramos Pinto, "Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth Century Portugal", *Contemporary European History*, 18:2 (May 2009), 199-215.

⁸ This dissertation suggests that civic engagement in Lourinhã waned in that citizens did not directly organize and lobby local government in the 1980s to the same degree that they had in the

engagement in urban development during the 1970s was high, often being required to supplement insufficient government action. In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, such citizen engagement decreased as service-based infrastructure projects, which local residents saw as benefitting them directly, were completed and then replaced by less immediately relevant institutional infrastructure embodied by the re-alignment of the town center. This chapter contrasts the burst of 1970s' political activity, largely around urban issues, with the relative quiet of the 1980s as the CML built its new center, including its market hall. I explore this contrast in the context offered by the various issues that emerged in the 1970s around the landscape by first considering both private and governmental activity that demonstrates an increasing sophistication in both spheres in terms of their understanding of the issues and of organization.

1970s and 1960s. Ultimately, Lourinhã's experience suggests that engagement faded, not because of the souring of a relationship between the government and locals, but because the issues that mobilized citizens (electricity and water infrastructure for example, as demonstrated in the previous chapter of this dissertation) were by and large resolved. This chapter will provide further evidence that engagement was issue-based in its section on clandestine builds in Lourinhã.

Such an argument stands in contrast to some models of post-dictatorship government/citizen engagement that have emerged when discussing the Spanish experience of Francisco Franco's dictatorship after 1975. For example, Pamela Radcliffe suggests that there was a breakdown of trust between government and citizens. Indeed, she argues that family associations, for instance, developed new and more radical ways of engaging with the government after 1975, which suggest a "breakdown of the collaborative model of relations with the state." See: Pamela Radcliffe, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960-78*. (London, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 306-316. Two other important and useful works on the Spanish experience are: Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: a Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 213-288, in particular; and, Peter Donaghy and Michael Newton, *Spain: a Guide to Political and Economic Institutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For further reading on models of citizen engagement see: Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", *Sociology*, 24 (1990), 189-217; Martin Parker, "Organizations and Citizenship", *Organization*, 4 (Feb, 1997), 75-92; Fiona M. Smith, "Discourses of Citizenship in Transition: Scale, Politics, and Urban Renewal", *Urban Studies*, 36 (January, 1999), 167-187; Michael Marinetto, "Who Wants to be an Active Citizen? The Politics and Practice of Community Involvement", *Sociology*, 37 (February 2003), 103-120.

Second, I turn to the 1980s, when governmental institutions continued to improve and the CML took a stronger control over the landscape and its development with tools like legislation, mapping, and electricity.

Although it is clear that supervision of growing private action and political activity was a priority for the CML in the 1980s, the potential explanations for the contrasting drop off of private action are numerous and fluid. One factor motivating the decline in citizen participation presents itself with the CML completing improvements near and dear to the hearts of locals, including electrical and water works, and, not coincidentally, economic issues like housing and farming. Similarly, the emergence of higher-level outlets for political expression after 1974, like legal political parties and civil society organizations, served to funnel direct action away from more personal methods of civic engagement used before 1974, like, for example, letter-writing and private discussions. Also to be considered is the possibility that governmental institutions successfully developed their own mechanisms of control and coercion that adequately discouraged, or at least channeled, complaints through approved outlets and bureaucracy. As this chapter points out, all of these activities were in play as citizens and governmental institutions negotiated their places in the changing post-1974 political environment that attempted to deal with both dictatorial legacies and a democratic future.



Figure 25: Map of central Lourinhã with the area that would become the new town center in the 1970s, highlighted. Dominated by the old soccer field, the area also included the old market. Today, the new square, the *Praça José Máximo da Costa*, is an open area bounded by the medieval convent, a courthouse, a fire hall, a post office, a music academy and the new town hall. The renovation of this space was total. CML, Plano de Pormenor da Zona Central: Extracto do Plano Aprovado, 1979', Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã', 1984. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

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The 1970s were, in many ways, a fluid decade for Portugal's politics. At the national level, the colonial wars were inciting renewed and virulent dissent within the army – junior officers formed the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) which was responsible for the coup on April 25, 1974 – while Marcelo Caetano, Salazar's successor, wrestled with former Salazar loyalists to implement a series of liberalizing reforms. During the Revolution, of course, Portugal went through a two-year period of extreme political instability that, at times, nominally threatened to turn into civil war. National politics calmed down after 1976, when Mário

Soares' Socialist Party (PS) won the first democratic election of the post-dictatorship period and consolidated democracy. By the late 1970s Portugal found itself in peculiar circumstances: people were endowed with new freedoms, but political institutions had not developed to the point where they could channel the new freedom to political participation. In places like Lourinhã, this meant that citizens engaged their local administration demanding action in their urban landscape – an area which the dictatorship had allowed and encouraged people to understand as inherently open to them – from an institution (the CML) that could not effectively respond to their concerns. The lesson, it seems, for the CML was that in the democratic world more management was needed over both political participation and the landscape, particularly where these two matters coincided.

The need to monitor private political action in the late 1970s was particularly acute, especially given the legacies of political action and culture from the revolution. The various ways in which Lourinhã's political culture changed and became more organized must be understood in the context of *25 de Abril*. The revolution's legacy in Lourinhã was not to provide a moment of rupture but was more subtle and felt only in the years following 1974-76.

The revolution's immediate effects in Lourinhã were limited to changes to the CML's leadership. In the weeks, and indeed days, before *25 de Abril*, Lucinio Cruz, Lourinhã's mayor since 1970, was being applauded for his election to another four year mandate. *Acção Nacional Popular's* Lourinhã office, for

example, congratulated him and was arranging a meeting with the Governor of the District of Lisbon, Sr. Dr. Afonso Marchueta. In the meantime, Cruz was to know that the Governor had "great respect" for the mayor and confidence in him.⁹ However, Cruz's tenure as mayor ended by July 1974,¹⁰ as an administrative commission was appointed to head the CML. Under the leadership of João Marques, the CML's administrative commission - made up of certain notables who were engaged in politics before 1974 and trusted by the new revolutionary administration, but who did not belong to any political party - would last until the election of José Máximo da Costa as Mayor in 1976. Further highlighting the continuity of political leadership in Lourinhã, Costa was himself a member and deputy mayor in the administrative commission and had been involved in various political actions throughout the 1960s and 1970s, advocating particularly for education and electrical infrastructure.

The transition in leadership was without incident. Upon taking power, the administrative commission asked for, and was granted, support from various governmental institutions like the District of Lisbon, which, itself a part of a larger series of bureaucratic upheavals in the wake of 1974, had experienced changes

⁹ "Acção Nacional Popular to Pres. da CML", April 22, 1974. "Presidência: Inaugurações; Homenagens; visitas; Cumprimentos," *Arquivo Correspondência*, 1974 proc. 3-B (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). For another congratulatory note see: "secção Cultural do Clube de Santa Bárbara to Pres. da CML", March 26, 1974. "Presidência: Inaugurações; Homenagens; visitas; Cumprimentos," *Arquivo Correspondência*, 1974. proc. 3-B (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰ It is important to note that continuity in politics was much more prevalent than discontinuity and Cruz stands as a shining example of this. Indeed, Cruz returned to the CML as a town councilor in the first municipal elections in 1976.

in its leadership.¹¹ Local organizations, which, by and large, did not experience bureaucratic upheaval *en masse* in 1974, also accepted Lourinhã's new leadership without protest. The *Junta do Turismo* quickly lined up behind the administrative commission. The *Junta's* head, Carlos Ferreira da Silva, appointed by the dictatorship's CML, recognized the commission's nomination and supported them in their work "contributing to the real *dinamização* [dynamization] of the various problems in Lourinhã."¹² In fact, the administrative commission did not need help in relations with their Lourinhanense citizens. Requesting some technical support from the District of Lisbon (an accountant and an engineer to assist the new administration), the administrative commission reported that they enjoyed good relations with the population with whom they had a "frank dialogue."¹³

However the longer-term effects of the Revolution were more significant. In terms of day-to-day operations, it was business as usual in the CML although there had been a substantial shift in the town's political culture: organized action through formalized groups became a prominent form of political expression. The

¹¹ "Pres da Com. Admin da CML to Director dos Serviços Fomento da Junta Distrital de Lisboa", July 19, 1974. "Presidência: Inaugurações; Homanagens; visitas; Cumpriméntos", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1974 proc. 3-B (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). Although no exhaustive study has been done to date on personnel change in the Portuguese democracy in 1974, some general discussions exist. See, for example: Dimitri A. Sotiropolous, "Southern European Public Democracies in Comparative Perspective", *West European Politics*, 27:3 (2004), 409, 412; Nancy Bermeo, "What's Working in Southern Europe?", *South European Society and Politics*, 4:3, (1999), 263–87.

¹² "Pres. da Junta do Turismo da CML, C.L.F da Silva to Pres. da Com. Admin da CML", July 24, 1974. "Presidência: Inaugurações; Homanagens; visitas; Cumpriméntos", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1974 proc. 3-B (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹³ "VP da Com. Admin. da CML to Gov. Civil e Gabinete Técnico de Lisboa", September 28, 1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

most obvious effect of the Revolution, of course, was the emergence of political parties. The long illegal and beleaguered Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) emerged from the shadows. It was joined by dozens of other parties in the immediate run up to, or aftermath of, *25 de Abril* led by what have become mainstays like the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Christian Democrats (CDS) and the Popular Party (PP).¹⁴ Joining political parties as agents on the local level were the various national professional organizations, some of which had existed before 1974, while others emerged afterwards. The former *Grémio Nacional das Farmácias*, by way of example, became the *Associação Nacional das Farmácias* after the revolution and lobbied local governments about developing new retail space for pharmaceutical services.¹⁵

The most novel newcomers to the political arena after 1974 were the *Comissões Moradores* (resident or neighborhood commissions). Organized around locality as opposed to profession or political belief, the neighborhood commissions emerged in the wake of the revolution to lobby governments about housing and municipal infrastructure.¹⁶ By early 1975, four neighborhood commissions emerged in Lourinhã: in Vimeiro, Sobral, Nadrupe e Casalinho das

¹⁴ For various correspondence between local political party offices and the CML see: "Diversos: Reuniões ... Políticos", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1974, proc. 28-A/67 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁵ "Associação Nacional das Farmácias to CML", October 30, 1975. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): Plano de Urbanização: Lourinhã", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 37-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁶ For an introduction to these organizations see: Charles Downs *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organization in the Portuguese Revolution*. (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 1989).

Oliveiras and Pinhal da Cruz, with more to follow later that same year.¹⁷ Gauging the commissions' success in terms of strength and effectiveness is difficult as the organizations fizzled by the late 1970s. However, the commissions' existence is a testament to an opening and democratizing political culture after 1974 and they are excellent examples of sites of practice in activities like association, debate, lobbying and election. Nadrupe's *Comissão de Moradores*, for example, elected its board on June 15, 1975 and, as required, informed the CML. Eleven men sat on the board: two business owners; six farmers; one store clerk; one electrician; and the final member was an unspecified "public functionary."¹⁸ This board then lobbied the CML on behalf of its constituents. Toledo's *Comissão*, for instance, was mobilized in 1975 to advocate for the installation of public lights. Calling the infrastructure an "urgent necessity", the commission asked that new lights be installed as new homes were built.¹⁹ Likewise, Atalaia-Montoito's neighborhood commission made six requests of the CML in November 1975, which ranged from road repair to garbage collection and street cleaning, to mapping the sewage system.²⁰ Indeed, in short order the neighborhood commissions became a recognized vehicle for public consultation and participation. Also in 1975, as

¹⁷ "VP da Com. Admin. da CML to Gov. Civil e Gabinete Técnico de Lisboa", September 28, 1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁸ "Com. da Moradores da Nadrupe to Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML", June, 1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁹ "António Paulo to Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML", November, 1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁰ "Comissão Moradores de Atalaia-Montoito to Pres. da Com. Admin da CML", November 12, 1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

the district of Lisbon's Governor tried to organize its future priorities for urban landscape development, it asked its various municipal governments to contribute. Concelho level governments were to consult with their *Juntas de Freguesias* (the traditional representatives of parish residents) along with the newly minted neighborhood commissions as to what the population needed.²¹

When considering the revolution in context, the emergence of the various neighborhood commissions was not surprising. Preceding the revolution, Lourinhanense had proved eager to organize and practice democracy through authorized associations and lobbying. Reguengo Grande's 'Improvement Commission' went straight to the District of Lisbon in January of 1974 to request water infrastructure for their town. Reminding the District Governor of their meeting upon his last visit to Lourinhã, the commission reasserted its desire to have running water brought to the town. As it insisted, "everyone wants to help, everyone wants progress."²² Other pre-existing and dictatorship-sanctioned groups like the volunteer firefighters' band also continued as agents in urban development after the revolution. As one of the oldest and most active organizations in Lourinhã, the band was an effective agent in the project to change the town into the 1980s and beyond. As part of the band's undertakings, it ran a small music school for the local youth. In 1983, the school had forty

²¹ "Gov. Civ. do Distrito de Lisboa to Com. Admin. da CML", August 22, 1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²² "A Comissão de Melhoramento, Reguengo Grande to Governador Civil de Distrito de Lisboa", January 30, 1974. "Cultura e Desporto: Grupo Desportivo de Reguengo Grande", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 27-A/11 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

students who, according to the band, "deserved much attention." As such, the band appealed to the CML for a permanent facility designated for use only as a music school in order to improve the town's "musical culture." In 1983, however, the band did not envision having its current facility – an impressive and large building opened shortly after the turn of the millennium, adjacent to the new town hall – on the central square (indeed, today's central square was not the town's center in 1983); instead they appealed for space in the town hall.²³

By the 1980s, neighborhood commissions had taken their place as permanent, if minor players that did not fulfill the promise of their early activities, in the culture of organizational and individual involvement in urban development. Neighborhood commissions worked in many of the same ways that Lourinhanense had in years previous. However, what their diminished role in the 1980s reveals is that in the 1970s institutions like the CML lacked the resources to meet local expectations for housing and infrastructure. Pedro Ramos Pinto has explained that *Estado Novo* policies that privileged the family and private property, when coupled with dictatorial willingness to manipulate the landscape, meant that citizens developed expectations of their government to provide housing and urban services that were sometimes met, but which, in this discussion, demonstrate a degree of political literacy in Portugal before 1974.²⁴

Expectations by residents in Lourinhã were also expressed independently

²³ "Banda dos Bombeiros Volunt. da Lourinhã to Pres. da CML", May 26, 1983. "Orgãos da Autarquia: Câmara Municipal; Relações com a Administração em Geral; Sindicatos e Associações Semelhantes", Arquivo Correspondencia 1983, proc. 01.02.05.15 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁴ See Ramos Pinto, "Housing and Citizenship", 199-215.

of groups like the *Comissões de Moradores*, both before and after 1974 as the urban landscape was an ever shifting, organic, and contestable aspect of day-to-day life for individual residents who experimented with lobbying the government over specific cases. By 1975, for example, young Lourinhanense were asking the CML to help them secure rental housing. Complaining of a lack of suitable housing for him and his future wife, Alvaro José Pereira Ferreira wrote the CML describing an apartment, including its owner, which would be available once renovations were completed. Ferreira asked that the CML support his application for tenancy. Similarly, Orlando Ribeiro wrote the mayor informing him that he would need a home once he was married. In this case, he noted that a house in Nadrupe was being built for the primary teachers who had been housed elsewhere since 1969. He asked if he could rent the home, if there were no teachers interested in it, suggesting that the teacher's current residence had sufficed and could continue to be sufficient for them.²⁵

Renters' issues emerged as an important entry point for Lourinhanense to access the civic sphere as both property owners and would-be renters accessed their political representatives to express opinions over, and to affect the town's physical environment while respecting housing rights. Property owners like João André Júnior solicited the CML about renters' issues. Júnior owned a property in Vimeiro but lived in the neighboring Concelho of Torres Vedras immediately to

²⁵ "Alvaro José Pereira Ferreira to CML", October 21, 1975; "Orlando Fernandes de Fonseca Ribeiro to Pres. da CML", February 28, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

the south of Lourinhã. He had a tenant there whom he wanted evicted. The tenant owned another house, so would not be homeless, Júnior explained. For his part, Júnior had to sell his building, which was proving too costly to maintain. The CML's administrative commission responded by telling Júnior that they did not have the power to evict his tenant, suggesting that he should seek help from the courts.²⁶ In similar cases an individual's need, in comparison to others, was legitimate grounds for request for CML intervention. For example, in December 1974, Rui Pereira had targeted a unit for himself and his family to live in. However, it was already rented. Yet, as he explained, the renter lived elsewhere and did not need the home in question. The unit would provide "favourable conditions in which to live" for he and his family and the current tenant gave no justifiable reason to remain as leaseholder.²⁷

Although the CML could not help in cases like Júnior or Pereira's, it could step in if a rental building or unit were in disrepair; and residents did, at times, take advantage of this. When António Rodrigo of Ribeira dos Palheiros complained to the CML about the state of the building in which he rented a unit, the administrative commission had the office of the Mayor's Chief of Staff investigate and ensure that there were "minimum conditions of livability." The complaint centered upon the lack of an on-site washroom, so the CML ordered

²⁶ "João André Júnior to Pres. Com. Admin. da CML", June 23, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁷ "Rui Pereira to Pres. da Com. Admin da CML", December 16, 1974. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal da Lourinhã, PT).

that the Chief of Staff's office ensure, together with the building's manager, that one be installed.²⁸ Cases where the CML stepped in over the state of a building not only displayed its willingness to respond to residential concerns, but its concern for the urban environment's appearance, as well as a general agreement between citizens and government over urban conditions. It is no surprise then that the municipal authority would be proactive about urban maintenance. Targeting "ruined homes" and other buildings in disrepair, the administrative commission sent letters to land owners like Dr. Fernando Quintas do Nascimento whose properties had ruined buildings, ordering the demolition of such structures.²⁹ In fact, the CML's Administrative Commission developed a standardized letter by 1975 that ordered the destruction of "ruins of various buildings". Landowners were given sixty days to comply by either repairing or destroying the offending building before the government expropriated the land upon which it sat.³⁰

Consensus also emerged around how the urban environment affected health, and individuals complained to the CML about how the landscape smelled, for example. In particular, animals, barns and chicken coops became a potentially offensive urban issue by the late 1970s. Property owners, like

²⁸ "Pres. da Com. Admin da CML to Chefe do Gabinete do Pres. da CML", July 21, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

²⁹ "Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML to Dr. Fernando Quintas do Nascimento", June 5, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³⁰ "Pres. Com. Admin. da CML", June 5, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

Laurentina Pereira of Praia da Areia Branca (PAB) lobbied the CML and had to apologize in her letter of August 1977 for complaining about the same issue she had raised the previous summer. Nevertheless, she explained that the smell coming from her rented basement was unbearable because of the animals kept there. After she had written and warned the tenant herself, a CML official had ordered her tenant to remove the animals, but they remained.³¹ In response, the CML asked the health office for advice. After having investigated, health officials told the CML that the basement housed two dogs and a rabbit, and that the smell must have been coming from nearby sewage lines.³² Likewise, António Moço complained in 1977 about the bad smells coming from his neighbor's property where a chicken coop had been built and rabbits were raised. Moço insisted that it was a "true offence" to him and asked the CML to take action.³³

Indeed, chicken coops inspired higher-level political activity both in terms of collective action and in terms of governmental action beyond the CML, pushing local urban issues beyond Lourinhã's political sphere. By way of example, the Junta de Freguesia de Miragaia forwarded a 1977 complaint to the CML, "signed by various residents," about chicken coops owned by Rui Antunes da Silva and Mário Antunes which "contaminated the water of a public

³¹ "Laurentina Adão Pereira to Pres. da CML", August 22, 1977. 'serviços Policiais: diversos; Queixas; Existência de uma Instalação ...' Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³² See: 'serviços Policiais: diversos; Queixas; Existência de uma Instalação ...' Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³³ "António Silvério Moço to Pres. da CML", September 10, 1977. 'serviços Policiais: Diversos; Queixas', Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

fountain."³⁴ The CML had health officials investigate. They found a poultry coop that they “should have been informed about”, which was attached to a building that was more than fifty years old. The building lacked running water and was the source of foul odors, leading health officials to advise the CML that the building should be taken down.³⁵ This case even garnered national action as one of the organizing residents, António Rodrigo Canoa, wrote then Prime Minister Mário Soares about the offending coop, complaining that the owners of the coop, who were wealthy and had running water, and thus were not in need of the public fountain, continued to raise chickens “forty-nine meters” from his neighbors' source of water. Despite various complaints to the CML, nothing had been done. Silva's and Antunes' chicken coop had become an issue of social justice that was playing out over the urban landscape.³⁶ So, when residents like Sr. José Rêgo complained against his neighbor, João Antunes, asking the CML to have Sr. Antunes' pig barn taken down, it was presented as an issue of basic fairness. The barn bordered Sr. Rêgo's "rustic" property and runoff from the barn was polluting his vegetable patch, encroaching on his ability to make a living.³⁷

Although the CML often sympathized with offended residents, local officials could not always resolve issues. In one instance, a letter was received

³⁴ "Pres. da Junta da Freg. da Miragaia to Pres. da CML", February 2, 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³⁵ "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³⁶ "António Rodrigo Canoa to P.M. Mário Soares", January 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³⁷ "José Joaquim da Silva Rêgo to Pres. da CML", March 30, 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

regarding Ramiro da Silva Carruço's "offensive pit" where water collected and where he dumped his compost. Worried neighbors protested that the pit was affecting the water in the area and asked the CML to study the issue.³⁸ The complaints led to an investigation in which the CML found that the pit in question was not leaking pollution into the neighboring properties, but was, nonetheless, a potential danger. If the complainants wished to proceed further, they would have to seek action through the courts.³⁹ In fact, governmental offices higher than the CML were often involved in managing issues of landscape and animals. The agricultural ministry, for example, worked in 1980 to protect Portugal's natural growth forest around Mafra, not far from Lourinhã, from possums. The forest's density had "always been rigorously controlled." Given the potential problems that the animals could cause for the forest, the ministry was suggesting relocating some to Lourinhã where they could be used for educational programs about Portugal's nature. The ministry could have created the program if the CML provided the facility to house the animals.⁴⁰

The proliferation of private organizations, especially neighborhood commissions, along with increased individual engagement around the landscape, was matched and overtaken by a redoubling of efforts from officials to maintain an understanding, if not control, of the shifting political environment. As early as

³⁸ "Unknown to Pres. da CML", March 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

³⁹ "Informação", April 26, 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁴⁰ "Ministério da Agricultura e Pescas: Direcção-Geral de Ordenamento e Gestão Florestal to Pres. da CML", December 26, 1979. 'secretario: Serviços Gerais; Dir. Geral do Ord. e Gestão Florestal" Arquivo Correspondencia 1980, proc.04.05 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

the fall of 1975, bodies like the District of Lisbon were trying comprehend the outlets of "local popular power" and asked each Concelho to complete a survey on neighborhood commissions. Lourinhã's administrative commission reported that the Concelho had four neighborhood commissions in Vimeiro, Sobral, Nadrupe e Casalinho das Oliveiras and Pinhal da Cruz. These supplemented the *Comissões de Melhoramento* [improvement commissions] from the freguesias but, according to the CML, lacked any sort of advanced organization or cooperation between the varied neighborhood and improvement commissions, or for that matter, with the local government. In addition, there were no workers' commissions or unions to support these organizations either. Beyond these, no other "popular assemblies" emerged during the revolution. Indeed, in terms of real effect and success in lobbying, the neighborhood commissions did not achieve anymore in terms of results than had their ad hoc and individual predecessors.⁴¹ It should be noted, however, that this does not diminish the significance of the commissions as novel and effective sites of political organization and practice.

The newly emerging political parties also warranted attention and, for the most part, cooperated, with local authorities. Political parties that were active in Lourinhã in the wake of the revolution fell in line with recognized governmental institutions like the CML. The *Partido Popular Democrático*, for example,

⁴¹ "VP da Com. Admin. da CML to Gov. Civil e Gabinete Técnico de Lisboa", September 28, 1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondência 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

informed the CML when and where their meetings in the Concelho would take place.⁴² That said, and despite the seeming freedom of activity in the wake of the revolution, political action continued to be policed in the democratic period. The *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (GNR) reported to the administrative commission in November 1974, for example, that an unnamed political party had held an unsupervised and unapproved meeting that could have caused a public disturbance. In turn, the Interior Ministry reminded municipal authorities that all meetings had to be preapproved.⁴³

Indeed, controlling political activity through the urban landscape was not new to Portuguese governments in the 1980s. After 1974, the processes discussed in previous chapters by which the urban environment and public space became an arena for public engagement in the civic sphere accelerated as the expanded democratic political sphere in Portugal and Europe was embraced. This was, in many ways, an inherited legacy of the dictatorship as urban issues were considered political before 1974. António Oliveira Salazar, the dictator himself, dealt with individual housing and space issues throughout the 1950s.⁴⁴ More substantially, the dictatorship was engaged in large urbanization plans by

⁴² "Partido Popular Democrático to Pres. da CML", November 13, 1974. "Diversos: Reuniões ... Políticos", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1974, proc. 28-A/67 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁴³ "Ministerio do Interior a. Interna: Guarda Nacional Republicana to Pres. da CML", November 13, 1974. "Diversos: Reuniões ... Políticos", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1974, proc. 28-A/67 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁴⁴ See: A Urbanização e o Problema Habitacional da Região de Lisboa, #37 - "Ministério das Corporações e Previdência Social" January 24, 1959. Arquivo Salazar AOS/CO/CR-4 pt.4. (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, PT). In this example, Salazar received a letter from a Lisbon official about a resident's complaints over barn space in Portugal's capital. As a testament to both the importance of housing and space issues in *Estado Novo* Portugal, and to Salazar's work ethic and micro management, the dictator wrote instructions in the margins to have a reply written suggesting some solutions.

the late 1950s aimed at expanding Lisbon. The first major urbanization plans in Lisbon had been undertaken as part of the 1940's celebration of the 1640 restoration of the independence of the Portuguese Monarchy⁴⁵ and were concluded in 1946 with the development of the Lisbon districts, Alvalade and Areeiro. The 1950s had proceeded with the expansion of Lisbon's industrial zones, residential zones, and with the completion of Cidade Universitária at the north end of Lisbon's *Avenida da República*. 1959 saw the national government pass a law establishing the basis for the creation of a "*Plano Urbanístico da Região de Lisboa*." The plan would include the construction of "great arteries" – including the *Ponte Salazar* – to create means of communication and contact between centers. The plan also aimed at creating the conditions needed to facilitate the permanent migration of people from the countryside as Lisbon urbanized. Fifty thousand new residents were to be accommodated over the following twenty years. Politically speaking, Lisbon's expansion was to create unity and end "inconvenient social segregation [that was] not part of the culture of interaction between Lisbon's neighborhoods."⁴⁶

For immediate post-revolution governments, increasing control over

⁴⁵ In 1640, the Portuguese monarchy was restored after decades of Spanish rule. Indeed, so seminal is the moment that a historiographical debate has long been argued between those who suggest that 1640 was a Portuguese national revolution from Spanish rule against those who maintain that it was a mere dynastic restoration in Portugal. See: David L. Tengwall, *The Portuguese Revolution, 1640-1668: A European War of Freedom and Independence*. (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010); Francis Dutra, "The Spanish Monarchy and the Kingdom of Portugal, 1580-1640", in Mark Greenglass, ed., *Conquest and Coalescence: the Shaping up of the State in Early Modern Europe*. (London, UK: Edward Arnold, 1991); and, Francis Dutra, "Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy" in Robert Foster and Jack P. Greene, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution in Early modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1970).

⁴⁶ A Urbanização e o Problema Habitacional da Região de Lisboa, #39 - "Plano de Expansão de Lisboa", 1959. Arquivo Salazar AOS/CO/CR-4 pt.4. (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, PT).

political culture included the development of new levels of oversight in the 1980s, giving local and regional institutions more ability to develop on their own. In addition to new national laws granting greater power to municipalities, including some freedom to manage their own budgets, the government created new mechanisms of regional administration, such as the Interior Ministry's white paper in 1980 on regionalization in continental Portugal, which proposed decentralization and the dissemination of responsibility for service development.⁴⁷ Regionalization was defined as an institutional arrangement in which new organizations emerged to make independent decisions. It was a decentralized system in which the law transferred decision-making power that had belonged to the national government to its local dependents.⁴⁸ In practice, a balance needed to be found between the national, regional and municipal levels of government.⁴⁹

Several steps had already been taken since the 1960s towards regionalizing Portugal's administration. In 1969, the dictatorship divided the Portuguese mainland and islands into six planning regions and created the *Comissões Regionais de Planeamento*. In 1976, the *Gabinete de Apoio Técnico* (GAT) was created to help municipalities. The Constitution of 1976 established space for regional administrations corresponding with the dictatorship's six

⁴⁷ Ministério da Administração Interna, Secretaria de Estado da Administração Regional e Local, *Livro Branco Sobre Regionalização*. 1980. 'secretária: Serviços Gerais; Direcção-Geral de Administração Regional e Local', Arquivo Correspondencia 1980, proc. 09.01.04.01 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 7.

planning regions as well as autonomous regions, with legislatures, in the Azores and Madeira. In 1977, laws were passed defining the organizational structure of regional planning departments. In addition, the 1977 "*Lei das Autarquias*" [Law of Authorities] was passed defining local administrations' functions and organs with an eye to giving more responsibility to the municipalities. 1979 saw municipalities achieve some financial independence with the *Lei das Finanças Locais* [Local Finances Law], allowing them to take on some expenses without national government approval. Highlighted was 1977's creation of the *Comissões de Coordenação Regional* (Commissions of Regional Coordination – CCR) made up of municipal representatives and GAT officials to replace the regional planning commissions as bodies of communication with national ministries.⁵⁰

This apparent decentralization of power should be understood, however, as an attempt by the central government and its institutions to guide the discourse as Portugal democratized in the 1970s and 1980s. The biggest challenge to regionalization, in the interior ministry's estimation, was not institutions of public administration or other organizations, but the Portuguese population in general. Given new chances to participate in choices about their socio-economic reality, their culture and their politics, people would be required to learn about their choices and, determine if regionalization was something they wanted.⁵¹ In this way, the ministry linked regionalization to the development of Portuguese democracy. In part, regionalization would involve political lessons in

⁵⁰ Ibid, 3-4.

⁵¹ Ibid, 1-2.

that it required the "practice of equality in rights and opportunities between citizens" in organizing the state and wielding its power. In practice, in terms of commercial service delivery, industrial organization, agricultural services, professional organizations, etc., the white paper argued that regionalization was already well underway (and had been since the 1960s). However, the Interior Ministry argued that a lack of political oversight in past private discussions in the process had left an imbalance in rights and opportunities for people across Portugal: indicators like infant mortality, electrical energy consumption and literacy remained imbalanced across Portugal's regions. Indeed, the white paper itself was a testament to democratic practice as it had been developed in consultation with the public and representatives from various sectors of Portuguese society. It was the hope of the white paper's authors that its publication would open a "constructive dialogue" within Portuguese society about what "democratic Portugal" should be.⁵²

Discussions surrounding the white paper on regionalization clearly channeled public dialogue towards at least considering, and, at best, favouring both regionalization and democracy; asking citizens how they envisioned these structures. Meanwhile, local administrations like the CML did their best to channel development with the tools at hand. By way of example, the mapping of the roads in Lourinhã became an important activity for the CML as it moved towards greater control over the town's geography. As early as 1972, the CML

⁵² Ibid, 1-5.

recognized the need for new street names in PAB as the beach town expanded. Seeking the advice of the Junta do Turismo, it was suggested that street names continue to honour the pioneers of the beach village like Prof. Lima Bastos, actress Emília das Neves and painter Eduarda Lapa. In addition, names should be descriptive based on features of the roads surroundings, like the church or market, while new roads should be given names inspired by nature: of maritime flowers or trees, for example.⁵³ The group in charge of naming new streets consisted of the CML's deputy mayor Manuel Gentil Horta, the president of the GAPAB, Jorge Vences, town councilor António José dos Santos, and Carlos da Silva, the head of the Junta do Turismo. Following the suggestion to name things based on historical figures, geographic or institutional features, and flora and fauna, nine of thirty-five suggested names were descriptive, twenty-four were named after historical or popular figures, and the rest were inspired by nature.⁵⁴ Horta, who remained a town councilor, proposed these names again in 1977 since nothing had been done on the file since 1972.⁵⁵

This coincided with a growing desire in Portugal to understand the country's urban networks and roads after 1974. Typically, roads and lanes had emerged organically under the dictatorship as farmers and residents simply cut

⁵³ "C.L.F da Silva, Pres. da Junta do Turismo to Pres. da CML", March 7, 1972. "Assuntos Policiais: Diversos; Nomes de Ruas e Numeros de Polícia de Lourinhã e Praia", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/8 (Arquivo Municipapl da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁴ "Comissão para o Estudo Toponímico das Ruas da PAB to Pres da CML", November 1973. "Assuntos Policiais: Diversos; Nomes de Ruas e Numeros de Polícia de Lourinhã e Praia", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/8 (Arquivo Municipapl da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁵ "Copia da Deliberação da Câmara Municipal Tomada em Reunião Realizada em 25 de Outubro de 1977". "Assuntos Policiais: Diversos; Nomes de Ruas e Numeros de Polícia de Lourinhã e Praia", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/8 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

their own paths on the landscape to access fields and new homes. During the revolution, the new government made naming roads a priority. Acting on complaints from the post office, authorities in Lisbon asked district officials to fill the gaps in the road naming and building numbering across Portugal. The post office had experienced "many difficulties in mail distribution" due to errors in mapping and designating roads and properties in Portugal.⁵⁶

Beyond mapping and, thus, rationalizing the roadways, officials continued to police the streets, maintaining and developing laws and regulations. The CML's administrative commission was acutely aware of transit and its effects on urban movement. In the summer of 1976, for example, the GNR was reminded about parking regulations in Lourinhã that had not been properly enforced, especially in front of the Town Hall.⁵⁷ Likewise, the CML also worked to control the roadways around schools, reminding the secondary school's administration that scooters were not allowed on the sidewalk in front of the entrance and that measures would be taken to control traffic.⁵⁸ This had come as a result of a complaint by various school employees whose classes were disturbed every

⁵⁶ "Director-Geral Manuel Pereira to Gov. Civil dos Distritos", September 19, 1974. "Assuntos Policiais: Diversos; Nomes de Ruas e Números de Polícia de Lourinhã e Praia", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/8 (Arquivo Municipapl da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁷ "V.P. da Com. Admin. da CML, José Máximo da Costa to Comandante do Posto da GNR", July 30, 1976. "Regulamentos Posturas e Editais; Regulamentos; Regulamento Sobre Tránsito (Alterações à Postura)", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 43-A/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁵⁸ "Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML to Pres. do Conselho Directivo da Escola Secundário da Lourinhã", May 31, 1976. "Regulamentos Posturas e Editais; Regulamentos; Regulamento Sobre Tránsito (Alterações à Postura)", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 43-A/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

afternoon by vehicular noise.⁵⁹ The CML's administrative commission, in yet another example of its willingness to respond to public concerns, especially when their interests coincided, installed a crosswalk on the main road from Torres Vedras. The CML had previously received "various complaints" from pedestrians.⁶⁰

As the 1980s dawned, the CML faced a growing tide of popular participation ranging from private complaints to organized lobbying. For their part, post-revolutionary administrators worked to respond to citizens and their organizations while building new institutions to respond in areas where the dictatorship had relied on coercion and intimidation. Into the 1980s, however, this dynamic would shift. Private involvement would diminish since many of the issues they lobbied for would be resolved: Lourinhã would complete its electrical network and sewage system in the 1980s and farming would become more centralized with the cooperatives, discussed earlier in chapter four, and new companies limiting small farms. Although this points to the fact that it was economic issues that motivated private initiatives, and that, as Portugal's economy began to benefit from European markets and funds in the 1980s, it stands to reason that complaints would drop, we cannot overlook the fact that governmental institutions also developed further, becoming more adept at

⁵⁹ "Pres. do Cons. Directivo to Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML", May 17, 1976. "Regulamentos Posturas e Editais; Regulamentos; Regulamento Sobre Tránsito (Alterações à Postura)", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 43-A/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁰ "Pres. da Com. Admin da CML, João Marques to Dir. de Estradas do Distrito de Lisboa", November 16, 1976. "Regulamentos Posturas e Editais; Regulamentos; Regulamento Sobre Tránsito (Alterações à Postura)", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 43-A/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

controlling development, thereby limiting room for private input.

As the next section reveals, the 1980s were the decade when the CML could finally turn to building the infrastructure that would create its discernible environment. With basic work in electricity and sewers well underway, the CML put a face on its modern landscape, beginning work on what would become its new town square. This meant re-purposing roads through the old town center, beginning to develop its new central square, building a new municipal market in an indoor and controlled setting, and curbing private illegal builds called *obras clandestinas*. Using tools like the electrical infrastructure, largely installed in the previous decade, and legislation, the CML made a concerted effort to control the landscape and complete the town's project first introduced in 1966.

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If any doubt had existed as to the CML's intentions in the 1980s, the 1984 municipal urbanization plan made it clear that development would be funneled through the municipal administration. Furthermore, the plan would see the goals of 1966 largely achieved.

1984's urbanization plan detailed how Lourinhã had expanded since the early 1970s towards Torres Vedras, primarily in the *Zona Quinta Santa Catarina* where new facilities like the soccer stadium, a residential suburb of mixed use residential and commercial condominium buildings, and schools would continue

to “*dinamizar* [dynamize] the social and cultural life of the town and promote future urban growth.”⁶¹ A result of “clearly expressed necessities,” the plan had a number of overarching goals: to promote the ongoing study of the urban environment in order to identify and resolve issues before they affected Lourinhã; to bring together the smaller diverse plans developed over the preceding years into one general urbanization plan; to eliminate gaps in urban development at the municipal level; to mobilize all available mechanisms in support of Lourinhã's urbanization; to establish a schedule for periodic revisions and the maintenance of the plan; and to inform the public while promoting their participation and input in the town's urbanization objectives. These goals went hand-in-hand with the desire to increase Lourinhã's population by almost 1000 people by 2004; to create jobs across the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors; to improve the quality of the town's housing; to expand its industry without polluting the environment; and to improve town services like transportation via road improvement.⁶²

Road and transit management was an important aspect of the organization of space in the years following the 1984 plan. Certainly, easing the movement of people and goods was vital for Lourinhã's development. By way of example, the urbanization plan discussed the need to balance accessibility to the urban environment between pedestrians, cars, commercial vehicles, and

⁶¹ “*dinamizar a vida social e cultural da vila, o que incentivará ainda mais o futuro crescimento urbano.*” Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã”, 47.

⁶² Ibid. 3-5.

transport animals while maintaining trees and green infrastructure.⁶³ Already in 1980, Lourinhã's plans had to be revised to accommodate a new road that bypassed the center of the old town, linking Lisbon, Lourinhã, and Peniche. The new road would pass near the *Campo da Feira*, the soccer field, a school and day care, the "future Câmara Municipal," the bus station, the market, the health center, the old age home, and a town parking lot.⁶⁴ This was a convenient development for the CML, which recognized that traffic had to be diverted away from the old town center. The first proposal undertaken after the 1984 plan was a 1985 proposal to expand Lourinhã's bus terminal along the new road and on the outskirts of town, keeping heavy bus traffic outside of Lourinhã's cramped streets. In 1985, Lourinhã dealt with roughly 108 buses per day: 82 different, local, bus trips and 26 express, inter city routes. To service these, Lourinhã's terminal featured seven bus quays. The 1985 proposal called for ten loading quays and an additional ten parking spots for buses between routes. The new bus station would be serviced by a help center with a ticket office, a parking lot with thirty-four spaces, and "green space and trees."⁶⁵

Two zones in Lourinhã proper were foci of space management after having traffic pushed to the outskirts. First, the new town square was to be a mixed-use space with an open-air amphitheater that could sit 226 people.

⁶³ Ibid, 39.

⁶⁴ "Plano Parcelar da Zona Central da Vila da Lourinhã", 1980. 1. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁵ Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, "Plano de Pormenor da Zona do Centro de Tráfego na vila da Lourinhã: Estudo Prévio", 1985. 2-3. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

Surrounding the amphitheater would be a space with trees, as well as a bar with a patio and flowerbeds.⁶⁶ Along with the new town hall, the square included the 1982 courthouse, the 1966 post office, the fire hall, a music academy, and the seventeenth century convent that was converted to a multiuse facility housing a day care, the offices of *Alvorada*, a popular, if run-down café, and the town's main church. Secondly, at the same time that the CML was moving to complete its new square, it was also preparing to turn Rua João Luis de Moura, which runs through the center of the old town, into a pedestrian mall. This project was made possible by the Lisbon-Lourinhã-Peniche road around Lourinhã that opened in 1980.⁶⁷ Formerly the only road through Lourinhã between Lisbon or Torres Vedras and Peniche, the Rua J.L. de Moura has become a commercial zone limited to pedestrians with cafes and restaurants, stores, the town's museum, library and local art galleries.

⁶⁶ Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, "Arranjo Urbanístico em Frente ao Paços do Concelho: Plano de Execução", 1993-1994. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁷ Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, "Arranjo Urbanístico da Rua João Luis de Moura", October 15, 1997. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).



Figure 26: Map of Rua João Luis de Moura, which has become a pedestrian mall. However, it was the only thoroughway for traffic en route between the factories and fishing port of Peniche and urban centers to the south like Lisbon. Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, 'Appendix: Arranjo Urbanístico da Rua João Luis de Moura', October 15, 1997. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

Since the 1960s, a new town square had been a high priority of the CML, which recognized its economic, bureaucratic, and cultural significance: the CML also saw it as a space it could control. An early proposal for the center of Lourinhã was approved in 1966: it included a bus station, market, cinema,

schools, a post office, a courthouse, a new town hall, and an office building for the *Grémio da Lavoura* (farmer's guild), an *Estado Novo* institution.⁶⁸ With little movement in the intervening years, beyond the opening of a post-office in 1966 and a courthouse in 1982, Lourinhã's new town center remained a fluid project in the mid 1980s. In 1984, many of the CML's public services were still offered and administered from the town hall on the Praça Marquês de Pombal. However, even at this early stage (seventeen years before the new town hall would open and complete the new square) the CML was insisting that these services would need to move to a new town center on what was then called the Praça da República (to be renamed the Praça José Máximo da Costa for Lourinhã's first elected post-revolutionary mayor, in 2001).⁶⁹ This area was targeted as the site for a new civic center where the town hall would eventually be situated.⁷⁰ The old town, being "compact [and having] low buildings", was in "strong contrast" to the areas of recent urban expansion – in part, a model for future development – where apartment blocks towered over the old town.⁷¹

⁶⁸ JDL, Serviço de Fomento, "Lourinhã: Pl. Porm. da Zona Central", 2. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁶⁹ For the announcement of the renaming of the central Praça see: Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, *Boletim Municipal*, no 4. (2001). <http://www.cm-lourinha.pt/SEARCH/search.aspx?query=boletim%20municipal%202001> (Accessed December 11, 2013).

⁷⁰ Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã", (1984), 56. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 49.



Figure 27: The old town square, the Praça Marques Pombal in the early 1940s, and the new, Praça José Máximo da Costa in the late 2000s. The old square was a cramped parking lot by the time the new one opened in the 1990s. The new square is open and airy, while the old one has become a cramped parking lot in the center of the old town. ‘Praça Marquês de Pombal, c. 1940’ (Collection of Maria Isabel Mendes); and, ‘Praça José Máximo da Costa, c. 2008’ (Collection of the author).

By this time, the goal was to create a large, central space that could accommodate several buildings to house services and that could also become a meeting space for locals. Thus, it had to include leisure spots (today, the square includes a café and an amphitheater), be easily accessible, and include trees and other green infrastructure.⁷² Along with the District of Lisbon, the CML felt the need to establish an “instrument that would provide the best possible

⁷² JDL, Serviço de Fomento, "Lourinhã: Pl. Porm. da Zona Central", 13.

development of urban space in order to achieve equal development.”⁷³

Lourinhã’s new market was an integral part of this remodeling; it was meant to anchor the commercial infrastructure that would attract people and business to the Praça José Máximo da Costa. When planned in 1982, the market was to be situated alongside a new bus terminal, municipal offices that would eventually become the new town hall, a garden, and a music school.⁷⁴ The market’s site on the new *praça* would benefit from its proximity to the bus station and the *Campo da Feira* (site for a monthly flea market) and would be easily accessible to the exponentially growing number of cars in Portugal with a new traffic circle, and a parking area on the new town square.⁷⁵ In addition, the size of the new square, coupled with its proximity to the main road that passed by the market, made it more accessible to automotive and bus travelers than the old center. Further, it was assumed that the new square would attract business to Lourinhã. The market proposal from 1978, in fact, suggested ten self contained stores, separate from the market’s indoor stalls, instead of the twenty that Lourinhã’s representatives had originally requested: the planners’ assumption was that the market would entice entrepreneurs to establish stores in the area, and so reducing the number of stores in the market building would encourage

⁷³ Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã”, 1.

⁷⁴ "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", 1.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 1. Indeed, the number of cars in Portugal was to explode in the 1980s despite a relatively stable total population. In 1980, there were 94 cars per 1,000 Portuguese. However, by 1990, that number had almost doubled to 187. See: European Environment Agency, *Indicator: Vehicle Ownership*. (August 20, 2001). Table 1. <http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/access-to-transport-services/vehicle-ownership-term-2001>, (Accessed June 15, 2014).

development by would-be store owners in the surrounding area.⁷⁶

Like the new town square, a new market was a 1966 priority and, given the inadequacy of the older facility, the matter became urgent. By the 1970s, Lourinhã's daily market, founded in 1933, was tarnishing the town: indeed, in many ways, the institution's rejuvenation was emblematic of the town's change. In the 1970s, the CML considered the conditions of the market "deplorable".⁷⁷ Among other problems, the roof had fallen into disrepair and this sent the CML on a search for a replacement that could transmit light, which ignored the fact that the electrical infrastructure was insufficient to provide enough artificial lighting for the facility.⁷⁸ In fact, in many ways, electrical service was at the heart of the renovation of Lourinhã's market, the town's landscape, and how both were to become controlled spaces.

In 1987, Lourinhã's Mayor, José Manuel Dias Custódio, announced that all residential and commercial areas were finally on the electrical grid.⁷⁹ The completion of the electrification of Lourinhã was a large step in the town's modernization, and the transformative power of electricity was not lost on the planners of the new market. The 1982 architectural proposal, the one that was eventually accepted and built by the town, declared that electricity was a

⁷⁶ "Câmara da Lourinhã, Mercado: Ante-Projecto", June 13, 1978. Obras Municipais, Box 56, proc. P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁷⁷ "Junta Distrital de Lisboa from Presidente da Câmara da Comissão Administrativa, Lourinhã", September 17, 1976. Obras Municipais, box 56, P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); "Reunião de 24 de Abril de 1980", *Actas da Câmara*, Livro 36 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT) 5.

⁷⁸ "Acts de Reunião de 14 de Abril de 1973", *Actas da Câmara*, Livro 31, Caixa 15 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT) 23.

⁷⁹ "A Lourinhã, na Senda do Progresso: Entrevista ao Presidente da Câmara Municipal Conduzida pelo Director do Alvorada", *Alvorada*, (November 1987) 6.

necessary aspect of new markets as it would help shape the consumer's experience, putting it in line with other "modern markets that had been built" in Lisbon, Cascais, and Loures.⁸⁰ Architects argued that electricity would light the interior, including the shops and stall area, as well as the exterior of the building. Furthermore, for safety reasons the emergency exit signs required electricity, as did the insect repellent lights – needed for hygienic purposes. Finally, infrastructure including the clock, the sound system, and public telephones also needed electricity.⁸¹ Planners linked these services to modern markets that could be better monitored than older facilities, stating that these facilities needed "good illumination to make things look clean and attractive," as well as electric cash registers, and illuminated signs to exhibit the prices of products.⁸² Electricity would also facilitate proper exposition of everything from farmers' products to luxury items.⁸³ Moreover, certain areas, including municipal offices, the veterinarian, and the office of the market's administrator required electrical heating for their workplaces.⁸⁴

Electricity would also have a great impact on the area surrounding the market. As late as 1984, the project's planners sought to use Lourinhã's new market as a starting point to develop the town's east end. With a planned

⁸⁰ "*Moderno mercados construídos*". "Novo Mercado Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", (October 1982), 1. Obras Municipais, Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸¹ "Novo Mercado Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", (October 1982) 1. Obras Municipais, Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸² "Um moderno mercado exige uma boa iluminação não só para facilitar a leitura dos cartazes de localização e rotulos de preços dos produtos expostos como também para se apresentar ao público com aspecto alegre, limpo e atractivo." See: *Ibid*, 5-8.

⁸³ *Ibid*.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*.

electrical transformer station in the new market, Lourinhã would be able to spread its electrical net to new neighborhoods. This would allow future residents to bring lights, telephones and refrigerators to their homes.⁸⁵ Electricity from the market's transformer station would also power traffic lights and street lamps in the immediate neighborhood.⁸⁶ This initiative helped to ensure that by 1993, the growth in the number of domestic energy consumers in Lourinhã tripled the growth in the number of consumers in Lisbon and the Tagus Valley.⁸⁷

The public support for electrical infrastructure in Lourinhã, outlined in previous chapters, allowed the market's planners to develop an ever-more monitored space. However, the market's layout would also need to contribute to this goal. Planners called for a specific market layout that reflected a concern for formal control and standardization. The 1978 plan suggested that the common space in the market be reduced to allow for more permanent stores to be included on the building's periphery. This would create room for street vendors to move into the facility and operate under the watchful eye of the market's manager, whose office was to be placed in the most central position possible.⁸⁸ Not content to wait until the market's opening, the CML moved in 1983 to begin controlling the market's space more carefully with its first formal regulations for

⁸⁵ "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã, Projecto das Instalações Electricas", (August 1984) 1. Obras Municipais Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸⁶ "Novo Mercado Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", (October 1982) 5-8. Obras Municipais, Box 55. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁸⁷ Bairrada, et al., *Perspectivas Para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã*, (year?) 28.

⁸⁸ See: "Câmara da Lourinhã, Mercado: Ante-Projecto", (June 13, 1978). Obras Municipais, Box 56, proc. P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); and, "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", (October 1982), 7. Obras Municipais, Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

the space. These regulations were the first to establish a standard fee for the stalls in the market, rules for lease transfers, and a schedule of lease payments on the stalls. There was also a penalty system that disciplined those who violated the regulations with increasingly severe penalties, including fines and suspension leading to eventual expulsion.⁸⁹

Market planners and town officials also arranged the facility's interior in an ongoing attempt to manipulate how consumers experienced the market. By arranging the products for sale, planners emphasized certain products, aesthetics, hygiene, and customer comfort. In the proposals for the market tabled in 1978, it was suggested that Lourinhã reduce the total number of planned stalls from sixty-five, without reducing the number of stalls allocated for fish, eggs, turkey, and chicken.⁹⁰ By 1982, the product emphasis had slightly changed along with the local agricultural sector, but a concern for certain goods was still evident with twenty-five per cent of the stalls designated for fish, and thirty-four per cent for fresh fruit and vegetables.⁹¹ In order to make the market space more aesthetically appealing and more hygienic, the flower vendors were to be at the entrance, whereas fishmongers would occupy the stalls in the corner furthest from the main door.⁹² As first mandated in 1983, six years before the new facility was ready, the CML limited the sale of all salted and fresh fish to a specific zone

⁸⁹ *Regulamento Interno do Mercado Municipal*, December 1983. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁹⁰ "Câmara da Lourinhã, Mercado: Ante-Projecto", June 13, 1978. Obras Municipais, Box 56, proc. P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁹¹ "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", (October 1982) 1. Obras Municipais, Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁹² "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", 6.

in the market, and prohibited the preparation of the fish within the market grounds.⁹³ In addition, consumers would be spared the sight of animals that had been allowed to enter the market to deliver goods before 1983.⁹⁴ Finally, all surfaces were to be tile or stainless steel, and the market was to be equipped with bug-lamps on the periphery in order to maintain the highest hygienic standards possible.⁹⁵

For the most part, the CML was able to successfully apply such standards in order to manage Lourinhã's development and the municipal space that that development created. Indeed, the market hall, as first conceived by its planners, was an effective retail space into the late 1990s, when it began to face serious competition from international and national grocery store chains like *Lidl*, *Intermarché*, and *Pingo Doce*. Faced with this competition, the market hall's managers accepted product retailers into stalls that did not fit the original distribution of goods in their facility: clothing stalls have emerged to supplement the fruit, vegetable, flower, fish and meat retailers who sell in the market hall. For its part, the CML maintained the regulation of retail space in Lourinhã despite competition to its own facility. *Intermarché*, *Lidl*, and *Pingo Doce*, opened in the 1990s and early 2000s, are regulated by the same principles under which the

⁹³ *Regulamento Interno do Mercado Municipal*, 1983.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* Seeing as this document tells us that Lourinhã's government felt the need to ban large animals from the market, it is reasonable to assume that large animals were an unwanted fixture in the old market.

⁹⁵ See: "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", 8; and "Novo Mercado Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", 8.

market hall was opened in 1989.⁹⁶ This confirms the success and endurance of the principles that governed the market hall's space.

Certainly, commercial spaces where food or services were offered to the public were regulated and their development was effectively managed. However, while the CML was developing its market hall and central *praça*, Lourinhanense citizens undertook spontaneous and illegal private builds, as they had for decades before. These works were deemed *obras clandestinas* by the CML and they were seen to fly in the face of the CML's efforts to control its landscape. *Obras clandestinas*, ranging from additions to homes, wall augmentations, freestanding ocean-side getaways to shanty dwellings, became something that was not to be tolerated in the 1980s. Built largely by African immigrants from the former colonies, and demolished in the late 1980s, shanty dwellings are by far the least documented instance of the *obras clandestinas* as the local newspaper – very much an establishment voice – offered no coverage and municipal archives fell into mismanagement. In such cases, clandestine works and their owners were associated with poverty and those outside the mainstream. As early as 1970, the *Alvorada* reported on the campaign by the municipal government in Lisbon to eliminate the “[in]famous huts”. The problem with clandestine builds, the paper insisted, was that they were “huts and other installations that did not offer security, hygiene, a salubrious environment and were what the people called *'bairros de lata* [garbage can houses].” These places were the result of

⁹⁶ See: *Aviso # 6144/2000: Regulamento dos Mercados Municipais do Concelho da Lourinhã*, (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã) August 2000.

poverty and unemployment, the *Alvorada* explained, and were, sadly, a feature of many urban centers.⁹⁷

However, documented instances of crackdown on clandestine builds in Lourinhã were more commonly related to illegal builds undertaken outside the shantytown. Lourinhanense like Pedro Teodoro dos Anjos of Santa Barbara faced an increasingly coordinated administration that was intolerant of illegal construction. When in 1974, for example, he went ahead and built an addition to his house that exceeded his permit, the CML investigated and decided that the illegal portion of the new build would have to be demolished, as per various laws and regulations under the *Regulamento Geral das Edificações Urbanas*.⁹⁸ Others, like Joaquim da Costa of São Bartolomeu, faced fines if they did not demolish their clandestine works. Having built a wall around the first floor of his home without a permit from the CML, da Costa was warned in October 1974 that if the offending wall were not demolished within three months, he faced a fine of 10.000\$00 to 50.000\$00 escudos.⁹⁹

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the CML was using the *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (GNR) to help control clandestine works. In 1978, the GNR, via the Ministry of Internal Administration, informed the CML that it had

⁹⁷ "A Atração das Cidades e as "Habitações dos Pobres", *Alvorada* (February 22, 1970), 1, 5.

⁹⁸ "Pres. da Comissão Admin da CML to Delegado do Procurado da República na Comarca da Lourinhã", December 21, 1974. "Obras Particulares: Diversos; Construções Clandestina; Embargos," Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 38-C/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

⁹⁹ "Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML to Joaquim da Costa," October 30, 1974. "Obras Particulares: Diversos; Construções Clandestinas; Embargos," Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 38-C/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

warned several residents about their illegal builds.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the CML, in its efforts to clamp down on such projects, turned to other organizations for help. The mayor of Cascais, sent the CML a correspondence between Cascais and the Ministry of Urban Habitation and Construction about that municipality's own problems with illegal builds. As the mayor explained, he lacked the proper regulation and the national ministry was able to help. In their case, Cascais faced a number of problems including those clandestine works that, although illegal, were in fact beneficial to local residents. As the mayor explained, in Cascais, many illegal buildings existed that locals rented to tourists and residents, benefitting owners, but remaining beyond municipal control. In such cases, demolition was not ideal for either the Câmara or the owner. Put simply, the local Câmara was more interested in bringing offending builds under taxable control.¹⁰¹ When not controllable, clandestine works like José da Costa's were slated for demolition. Having built a "*barraca de madeira* [wooden tent]" at Paimogo, Sr. Costa, who owned a home in Seixal and used the hut to relax at the beach, was ordered on July 15, 1980 to demolish it within eight days. Referred to as the "*transgressor*" in the correspondence, Sr. Costa had failed to demolish his hut as late as August 6th. The port captain at Paimogo asked the

¹⁰⁰ "Pres. da CML to Comandante do Posto da GNR", June 28, 1978. "Obras Particulares: Diversos; Construções Clandestinas; Embargos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1978, proc. 38-C/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

¹⁰¹ "Pres da Câmara Municipal de Cascais to Pres da CML", March 2, 1978. "Obras Particulares: Diversos; Construções Clandestinos; Embargos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1978, proc. 38-C/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).

CML to demolish the hut and charge Sr. Costa for all the costs.¹⁰²

Although largely successful in curbing private and spontaneous contributions to the landscape through illegal builds and managing local interactions in public space, the CML has not been entirely successful in dominating the landscape. Indeed, today locals have found new unauthorized ways to use the landscape to express their opinions. In the following images taken from 2010, unhappy residents have used the walls adjacent to the municipal market to protest agricultural conditions complaining that, “supermarkets eat everything” and calling for “fair prices for farmers.” Adorned with the logo of the Left Bloc (a political party made up of disaffected socialists and communists that was founded in 1999), such graffiti illustrates the landscape’s ongoing importance for political expression today.

¹⁰² "Direcção-Geral de Portos to Capitão do Porto de Peniche", June 1980; "Capitão do Porto do Paimogo to Pres. da CML", August 6, 1980. "Obras Particulares: Demolições", Arquivo Correspondencia 1980, proc. 3/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). Sr. Costa's case is also interesting for the long-term outcome, which I suspect was common. My great uncle, José da Costa maintained a weekend hut at Paimogo until his death in the mid 2000s. The CML seemed to have won the fight over the wooden hut however, as the one I remember was a brick and mortar structure with a full kitchen and deck overlooking the ocean.



Figure 28: Graffiti outside the new market hall. Although little resistance to Lourinhã's renovation is evident (in fact, locals played an active role in building the town's modern landscape), public space remains a site for protest. The above graffiti, appearing outside Lourinhã's modern market hall in the wake of the financial crisis of the late 2000s, remains there today (into 2013) and complains that 'supermarkets eat everything' and calls for 'fair prices for farmers.' The new town hall is visible in the background of figure 27. 'Market Graffiti' (collection of the author, 2010).

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Custódio's European Lourinhã would not, it should be noted, come to fruition until 2002 when he opened the new town hall, completing the municipal administration's move to the Praça José Máximo da Costa. However, the stage

had been set in the 1980s. Faced with a vocal and increasingly organized citizenry in the late 1970s, the CML struggled to respond to complaints and requests. With the help of new institutions and mechanisms, the CML took steps to manage its political culture and landscape and, during the 1980s, it was able to both manipulate existing space and create new venues where public activity could be monitored. For their part, locals were left to respond to CML initiatives, going from proactive to passive agents. This exposes a shift in Lourinhã's political culture as Portugal democratized and modernized in the 1980s: in some ways, democracy in Portugal meant less direct access for citizens to affect the shape of their landscape. The CML's new-found power over the landscape in the 1980s, symbolized in the town's municipal market and the Praça José Máximo da Costa, pushed civic participation to the outskirts of the political realm as ordinary citizens were no longer invited to contribute to development.

7. Conclusion

The changes in both Portugal's urban and economic infrastructure, along with its political culture since the 1960s were drastic and occasionally coincidental. As has been argued, infrastructure and urban development had the power to inspire political action. In many cases it was the government itself that invited political involvement and helped to create the discourse surrounding the citizen's roles and responsibilities in Portuguese society and its future. Thus, when *25 de Abril* seemingly brought democracy to Portugal in mere hours, Portuguese citizens had already been practiced participants in the polity. Nor was the "development", that was part of the MFA's program along with "democracy" and "decolonization", novel to Portugal in 1974. Places like Lourinhã had, through government investment and guidance from many levels, a development plan that was already well underway.

It is not surprising that important areas of development for the CML in Lourinhã are also areas where we see movement in the relationship between citizens and their government. Certainly, agricultural modernization, tourism, the cooperative movement, electrical and water infrastructure installation, and the building of a new town center have all been CML priorities since the 1960s. In discussing how these areas have progressed in Lourinhã, I have largely focused upon government-initiated interventions into the debate around development: these interventions included encouraging citizens to act in support of CML

priorities. However, there are moments of seemingly spontaneous civic participation as well, even if that participation was very often guided or inspired by various discursive mechanisms from above.

This interpretation of Portugal's democratization and modernization, which robs *25 de Abril* of its place as the seminal event in that process, is part of a historiographical shift, as outlined in the introduction. However, it also represents a contribution to an even broader shift in how the history of Portugal is being examined. Indeed, historians of Portugal have been looking to new areas of inquiry to reassess key assumptions in Portugal's development. The body of historical work produced in the modern period on Portugal is primarily found in multi-volume histories that cover the scope of Portugal's past since the country's founding in the twelfth century. These works also privilege political and economic topics like dynastic intrigue or the Discoveries.¹ The basic focus on high politics and economy in Portuguese History was challenged, however, beginning in the 1960s. A.H de Oliveira Marques, an historian working in the United States, thus outside the direct influence of the dictatorship's historical program, led a general re-focus and reinterpretation of Portugal's past. In a Historical Materialist vein,

¹ For examples, see: Alexandre Herculano, *História de Portugal: Desde o Começo da Monarquia até o Fim do Reinado Do Afonso III*, vols. 1-4, José Matoso, ed. (Lisboa, PT: Bertrand, 1980-81); J.P. Oliveira Martins, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1-2. (Lisboa, PT: Parceria A.M Pereira, 1917); and, Baquero Moreno, Aurélio de Oliveira, and Fernando de Sousa, *História de Portugal*, vol. 1-2. (Porto, PT: Porto Editora, 1983). In this trend, the *Estado Novo* was an author, publisher, sponsor, and subject. See: Franco Nogueira, *História de Portugal, 1933-1974*. (Porto, PT: Civilização, 1981); Secção de Propaganda e Recepção da Comissão Executiva dos Centenários, *Portugal: Oitos Séculos da História*. (Lisboa, PT: Sociedade Industrial de Tipografia, 1940); Costa Brochado, *Historiôgrafos dos Descobrimentos*. (Lisboa, PT: Comissão Executiva das Comemorações do v. Centenário da Morte do Infante D. Henriques, 1960); and, João Martins da Silva Marques, *Descobrimentos Portugueses: Documentos para a sua História Publicados e Pefeaciados*, vol. 1-3. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto para a Alta Cultura, 1944-71).

Marques and a new cohort of historians looked to socio-economic topics to explain Portugal's development.² The longer term effect is that studies like this dissertation, which explore specific, social, cultural and political topics, are being used more and more to explore the specificities of the Portuguese experience. I was focused on urban development and municipal culture. Likewise, the history of other cultural activities and sectors are now being fleshed out as well.³

This historiographical reassessment has been recently matched by a popular reassessment of the development of Portugal, particularly in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008, as citizens questioned Portugal's transition from dictatorship to democracy. Indeed, Portuguese citizens, struggling in one of the most severe crises of the economic downturn of the first decade in the twenty-first century, have begun to question both the process and results of their country's development since the Second World War. In one particularly negative

² It is interesting that Marques used the same form, the multi-volume collection, as those against which he was arguing. See: A.H de Oliveira Marques, *História de Portugal: Desde os Tempos Mais Antigos até ao Governo do Sr. Marcelo Caetano*, vol. 1-3. (Lisboa, PT: Edições Agora, 1972-73); A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *História de Portugal*. (Lisboa, PT: Comisariado para a Europália – Portugal, 1991); A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *Daily Life in Portugal in the Middle Ages*, S.S. Wyatt, trans. (Madison, WS: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971); Joel Serrão and A.H. de Oliveira Marques, eds., *Nova História de Portugal*, vol. 1-13. (Lisboa, PT: Editorial Presença, 1990); José Narino Figueira de Campos, *Os Descobrimientos: Encontros de Povos, Culturas, e Religiões*. (Lisbon, PT: Paulus, 1998); and, José Eduardo Franco, *Mito de Portugal: a Primeira História de Portugal a a sua Função Política*. (Lisboa, PT: Fundação Maria Manuela e Vasco de Albuquerque d'Orey, 2000).

³ For examples ranging from film, literature, music, consumer culture, women's politics, youth culture, etc, see: Patricia Vieira, *Portuguese Film, 1930-60: the Staging of the New State Regime*. (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); Ellen W. Sapega, *Consensus and Debate in Salazar's Portugal: Visual and Literary Negotiations of the National Text, 1933-48* (State College, PA; Penn State University Press, 2008); Isabel Gumarães Sá, "The Uses of Luxury: Some Examples from the Portuguese Courts from 1480 to 1580", *Análise Social*, vol. XLIV: 192 (2009), 589-604; Rita Costa Gomes, *The Making of Court Society: Kings and Nobles in Late Medieval Portugal*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Antonia M. Ruiz Jiménez, "Women and Decision-Making Participation within Rightist Parties in Portugal and Spain", *Análise Social*, vol. XLIV:191 (2009), 235-263; and, Samuel Weeks, "Cultural Dimensions, Lusophone Spaces", *Análise Social*, vol. XLVII:1 (2012), 2182-2199.

2011 account of Portugal's transition into the European mainstream, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) discussed the "credit crunch" that Portugal faced after 2007. The BBC's reporter, representing the Euro-skepticism ever present in Britain, reinvigorated after 2007, highlighted problems in the Lisbon-Brussels relationship, and the disenchantment of some Portuguese with their government's chosen paths of development. Indeed, the report warned that in Portugal, the "age of free money, doled out by Brussels, is over." Such investment had been an integral part of Portugal's plans in the past, financing roads, infrastructure and a building boom that had left the country with countless housing and building developments left unfinished by the economic crash.⁴ To show the effect of such failures on Portugal's citizens, the reporter turned to Jorge Silva Melo, an actor and stage director described as a "veteran of Portugal's revolution in 1974." Melo yearned for his youth in the years before 1974 and explained that,

under the dictatorship, there was hope. We felt that things were changing and, for instance in the theater and in the film world, people were starting to do films without money. The actors from the main companies were leaving the main companies to build cooperatives or things that were without money – that was in '72/'73. Nowadays, its exactly the opposite: there is no hope.⁵

Of interest in Melo's account is his discussion of money. There was "hope" when he and his compatriots could engage and work in their field using cooperation as a substitute for the money they did not have. In a sense, what

⁴ Paul Mason. "BBC News - Mason's Europe: Portugal Faces Strain in Economic Revolution", <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12512815> (February 18, 2011: accessed 2011-02-24 08:19:58).

⁵ Ibid.

underlies Melo's and other assessments in Portugal of the roots of the crisis is the failure of the Left to counter-balance capitalism at various stages in Portugal's development.⁶ One of the more critical accounts of Portuguese development published in the wake of the economic crisis was *Portugal: Ensaio Contra a Autoflagelação*. In this essay, legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues that the ideological roots of the crisis were to be found in the unquestioning acceptance of the capitalist system. Santos suggests that the defining moments in this battle were the loss of communism and socialism as competitors to liberal capitalism with the fall of the USSR in 1990 and Tony Blair's election in 1997 in Great Britain. As global communism crumbled with the USSR, and Tony Blair tried to 'humanize' neoliberalism with his brand of social democracy, Santos infers that the irrational pursuit of profit that the capitalist neoliberal system is built upon was left unchecked.⁷ However, as this work suggests, the wholesale acceptance of capitalism in the West, and in Portugal more specifically, can be dated to well before the period suggested by Santos. Despite flirtation with the extreme Left during the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon and in the Alentejo, capitalism was never in question for any extended period as was seen in the discussion of Lourinhã's tourism and its development in the 1960s, and even in the development of cooperativism in the town's agriculture

⁶ For examples of popular essays written by former government officials and journalists reassessing Portugal's development leading to the crisis see: Medina Carreira, *O Fim da Ilusão*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon, PT: Objectiva, 2011); João César das Neves, *As 10 Questões da Crise*. (Lisbon, PT: D. Quixote, 2011); and, Mário Soares and Teresa de Sousa, *Portugal Tem Saida: Um Olhar Sobre a Crise*. (Lisbon, PT: Objectiva, 2011).

⁷ Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Portugal: Ensaio Contra a Autoflagelação* (Coimbra, PT: Almedina, 2011), 16-18.

industry. In fact, Lourinhanense were mobilized by the *Estado Novo* in order to cash-in on Western tourism dollars by making the landscape more accessible and sellable, while cooperatives emerged in order to defend the farmer's place in national and international markets. In the end, any flirtations with the extreme Left on the national stage between 1974 and 1976 were well and truly suppressed with Portugal's acceptance of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in the late 1970s.

This dissertation has contributed to this discussion with its assessment of Lourinhã's modernization. Because I was motivated, in part, by the recent reconsideration of Portugal's modernization and democratization spurred by the financial crisis, I presented an explanation of how Portugal came to find itself in the state it does today. Beginning in the 1960s with an economic turn towards Europe, Portugal's rapid modernization, brought basic industry and infrastructure to places like Lourinhã by the 1980s and 1990s. However, the rapidity of this process meant that key developmental steps, particularly in industrial and economic terms, were either missed or downplayed.⁸ By the 1980s and 1990s then, Portugal's modernization had led primarily to a concern with the aesthetics of modernity: making traditional sectors and landscapes look modern with infrastructure and other amenities, as opposed to consolidating modernization's gains through the slow development of the necessary industry and structures to

⁸ For one discussion of Portugal's missed developmental steps see: Stuart Holland, "Dependent Development: Portugal as Periphery", in Dudley Seers, Bernard Schaffer and Maria-Liisa Kiljunen eds., *Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations*. (New Jersey, USA: Humanities Press Inc., 1979), 140.

build a sustainably modern society. Indeed, investment in struggling, traditional sectors too often trumped investment in non-traditional economic sectors in local decision-making. This meant that modernization in Lourinhã was inherently conservative, an attempt to *modernize to stay the same*, improving output just enough to maintain traditional ways of life. Only in the past five to ten years, with Portugal's heavy investment in the development of nanotechnology and health sciences has the country begun to develop the industry and branding that can provide it with a sustainable economic base from which to maintain the amenities of a modern society.

Portugal and Lourinhã's modernization is an ongoing process. Thus, my study of the modernization of Lourinhã did not seek to catalogue, organize and recount a completed event or process. Instead, I discussed a process that continues to be an ongoing concern for the municipality. As C.E. Black noted in his seminal work, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, the recounting and organization of past events is often concerned primarily with societal institutions and forms while explanation is concerned with causality, or how society functions: explanation was my primary focus. That said, Black also warns that the desire to explain is too often motivated by a contemporary problem and can lead the researcher to hasty or superficial conclusions which, he complains, have too often become canons of historical and causal explanation by the followers of modest historians who are aware of the limited or superficial nature of their

conclusions.⁹ Consequently, the local nature of my study allowed me to avoid grand conclusions about human development and to go beyond homogenizing the experience of European and Portuguese modernization.

Certainly, when considering European History, the experience has been homogenized, which, at times has led to Portugal being excluded from consideration as a participant in the European past. Some arguments in particular, which emerged in the twentieth century, ended Europe at the Franco-Spanish border in the Pyrenees.¹⁰ Such assertions, by and large, suggest that Portugal's economic and political development were what left the Iberian country on the outside of Europe, looking in. Indeed, the general course of European History (as problematic as an assertion that such an homogenized path exists) teaches that European development required the emergence of a middle-class that would end absolutism and replace it with some form of liberal government – defined primarily by a governance agreement laid out in a constitution that replaced governance by divine right. Such a middle-class would, naturally,

⁹ C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History*. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966), 36-37.

¹⁰ For a good introduction to arguments that placed Portugal outside Europe and the European development path, thereby explaining its backwardness in the modern period, see: Francis M. Rogers, "Portugal: European, Hispanic, or Sui Generis?" in R. Herr and J.H.R. Polt, eds. *Iberian Identity: Essays on the Nature of Identity in Portugal and Spain*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Berkley, 1989); Douglas Wheeler, *Republican Portugal: A Political History, 1910-1926*. (Madison, WS: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 12-13. Spain is also often left on the outside of Europe in some considerations. For examples of those who challenge this assumption, see: Mary Vincent, *Spain: 1833-2002, People and State*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University press, 2007), 1; Jesus Cruz, *Gentlemen, Bourgeois, and Revolutionaries: Political Change and Cultural Persistence Among the Spanish Dominant Groups, 1750-1850*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 260-265; Adrian Shubert and José Alvarez Junco, eds, *Spanish History Since 1808*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10; Isabel Burdiel, "The Liberal Revolution, 1803-1843", in Adrian Shubert and José Alvarez Junco, eds, *Spanish History Since 1808*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 17.

emerge as a consequence of an industrial revolution.¹¹ In comparison to its European neighbours, the development of liberalism and industrial society in Portugal seems insignificant: France, Germany and England are frequently celebrated as the drivers of European industrial and liberal development. However, Portugal's liberal history is as long as that of any other European country.¹²

Europe's History and modernization, as defined by liberal development, was evident in Lourinhã's experience since 1960. Surely, the experience of Lourinhanense, as they consistently engaged with their local government regardless of national governmental structures, demonstrates that Portugal practiced a form or consequence of European liberalism along with its

¹¹ For examples of works that, taken together, discuss the emergence of liberal democracy and an industrial society in the modern period as pillars in determining the course of 'European History', see: R. D. Anderson, *France, 1870-1914: Politics and Society*. (Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 30-41; Philip Nord, *The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-13; Sanford Elwitt, *The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in France, 1868-84*. (Baton Rouge, LS: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), 1-14; Jonathon Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-51*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 241-255; P.H. Noyes, *Organization and Revolution: Working Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848-49*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 1-5; Clara M. Lovett, *The Democratic Movement in Italy, 1830-1876*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 1-3; Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967), 3; and, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 144-155.

¹² In fact, successive liberal monarchical governments, supported by the military, marked nineteenth-century Portuguese politics. After Napoleon's forces were expelled from Portugal and succession was decided in the civil war of 1828-34, some form of liberal government ruled until the twentieth century. See: David Birmingham, *A Concise History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 100-148; José Manuel Freire Nogueira, *As Guerras Liberais: Uma Reflexão Estratégica Sobre a História de Portugal*. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2004); Victor de Sa, *Liberais e Republicanos*. (Lisboa, PT: Horizontes, 1986); Pedro Tavares de Almeida, *Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista (1868-1890)*. (Lisboa, PT: DIFEL, 1991); Pedro Tavares de Almeida, ed., *Burocracia, Estado e Território: Portugal e Espanha, Séculos XIX-XX*. (Lisboa, PT: Horizontes, 2007); Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *União Sagrada e Sidonismo: Portugal em Guerra (1916-1918)*. (Lisboa, PT: Edições Cosmos, 2000).

neighbours.

Europe's modernization and liberalization, which had profound effects on people's understanding of citizenship and polity after the Second World War, is often labeled as a process of Europeanization.¹³ However, the results of Europeanization are ambiguous at best. It is not surprising then that the CML's mayor did not define what a European Lourinhã would be when he employed the term in describing what Lourinhã could be in the 1980s and 1990s after the opening of its market hall. European Integration and 'Europe', or, the idea of 'Europe', remain contested terms. Most can agree that European identity and heritage remain equated with Christian civilization, the ideals of the Enlightenment, including Progress and Reason, and a sense of liberal justice based upon humanism.¹⁴ The fathers of the European Project after the Second World War embraced this loose and potentially fluid definition. In fact, the ambiguity of 'Europe' became the term's strength after WWII. Tony Judt notes that, "like 'growth' or 'peace' – with both of which ['Europe'] was closely associated in the minds of its proponents – 'Europe' was too benign to attract

¹³ For a recent reassessment of the link between Europe's modernization and Europeanization see Kiran Klaus Patel's 2013 article which argues that the European Union is too often used as the lens through which to assess Europe's modernization and Europeanization. Nonetheless, the link between modernization in Europe and institutional Europeanization remains clear. See: Kiran Klaus Patel, "Provincializing European Union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective", *Contemporary European History*, 22:4 (2013), 649-673.

¹⁴ For some examples see: Gerald Delanty and Paul R. Jones, "European Identity and Architecture," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5:4 (November, 2002), 455; Ross Balzaretto, "The Creation of Europe," *History Workshop*, 33 (Spring, 1992), 181-196; Roberta Guerrina, *Europe: History, Ideas, Ideologies*. (London, England: Bloomsbury, 2002); H el ene Ahrweiler, "Roots and Trends in European Culture," in Soledad Garc ia ed. *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*. (London, UK: Pinter, 1993) 30-45; and Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe*, Norbert Guterman trans. (New York, NY: Meridian, 1966), 366-379.

effective opposition.” When Pompidou first spoke of a European Union in the 1970s, France’s Foreign Minister Michel Jobert asked Edouard Balladur what it meant exactly. Balladur replied, “Nothing ... but then that is the beauty of it.” Even Pompidou referred to Europe as a “vague formula ... [created] in order to avoid paralyzing doctrinal disputes.”¹⁵

The goals of European integration, culturally associated with the development of a common European heritage and a European polity, are equally undefined. The tensions between forces for state-to-state (confederal) relations and those for supranationalism (via the subjugation of national European governments to a European super state) have dominated the history of European integration. However, Desmond Dinan reminds us that these two concepts are not mutually exclusive and in fact remain present in the European Union’s (EU) institutions today.¹⁶ Nowhere is this more evident than in debates regarding the possibility of deepening European citizenship beyond a common passport and currency. Although most scholars seem to agree that a deepening of common cultural bonds between Europeans is ideal, there remains much debate on what the development of European citizenship means and how it may be achieved. Scholars like Derrida and Habermas argue that European identity must abandon cultural reference points because they will always prove divisive or may be inappropriate in the context of a multi or poly-national Europe. These authors

¹⁵ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. (New York, NY: Penguin, 2005), 733.

¹⁶ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 2.

want to maintain a “limited non-essentialist degree of European identity.”

Opposing scholars like Anthony Smith and John Pocock argue that European identity could never threaten national identity and thus, all attempts to codify European identity are doomed to failure. Smith et al point to the absence of a shared language, a functioning civic order and strong cultural ties evident in national contexts. As Gerald Delanty and Paul Jones suggest, the first option will likely result in little more than a European association with legal and economic structures, while the second option will offer a culturally deficient identity that will do little more than offer the EU an identity that legitimizes the projects of its political masters.¹⁷

Nonetheless, a process of Europeanization, in which both the citizens and states of Europe are becoming more closely associated with the EU and a common European identity is well underway. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli’s edited work, *The Politics of Europeanization*, notes the institutional spread of Europe, arguing that ‘Europeanization’ does not mean convergence “because convergence is a consequence of Europeanization and there must be a difference between a process and its consequence. Nor does it mean ‘harmonization’, because within the EU, not even agricultural policy is fully harmonized.” Instead, Europeanization has meant the spread of ‘institutional similarity’ across Europe.¹⁸ The political philosopher Étienne Balibar, on the other

¹⁷ Delanty and Jones, 455-466.

¹⁸ Alan S. Milward, “Review: The European Union as a Superstate,” *The International History Review*, 27:1 (Mar., 2005), 96.

hand, takes Europeanization further by looking at the development of 'transnational citizenship'. Balibar argues that, "what has emerged is neither a reproduction of the same 'constitution of citizenship' [Balibar's equivalent for the classical Greek term *politeia*] at a supranational level (not even in the form of a 'federal citizenship' in a 'federal state'), nor a dissolution of the notions of 'community' and 'people' in a post-national 'cosmopolitical society'."¹⁹ Instead, transnational European citizenship leaves the bases of citizenship – identity, sovereignty, and membership – in flux. For Balibar, therefore, the key to European citizenship is what he calls the 'borders', "where political and economic structures meet the collective imagination. In play is the definition of the means and modes of exclusion and inclusion. Here the symbolic forces of material and political reality and power meet representations of identity."²⁰ In the end, although Balibar sees the development of a European citizenship, he concludes that an active European citizenry has not emerged to push forward the European agenda.²¹

That said, in some ways, this dissertation has suggested a way forward in the development of citizenship, European or otherwise. Lourinhã's modernization, which locals at times labeled Europeanization, demonstrates how

¹⁹ Balibar argues that 'transnational citizenship' is different from supranational and postnational citizenship. Balibar sees the concept of transnational citizenship as a direct result of the way in which European unification "has progressively divorced the two concepts of *citizenship* and *nationhood* that the classical state practically identified." See: Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, James Swenson, trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), viii.

²⁰ Ibid, 3-4.

²¹ Ibid, 178-179.

infrastructure issues can mobilize would-be citizens and engage them in a nation-building project. Beyond the advantages of closer communications and shrunken distances, infrastructure development, in Lourinhã, brought groups of people together on a case-by-case basis and engaged them with their community. As scholars like Luis Loures and Pat Crawford have argued, public participation in the development of the landscape encourages a sense of belonging to, and responsibility for, the larger social and cultural community along with the development of a common identity.²² In fact, landscape architects and governments have increasingly accepted the importance of social support for projects to develop sustainable cities. Loures and Crawford, although acknowledging that the role of the public has been considered in projects for the better part of the twentieth century, point to the 1970s, not coincidentally within the period this dissertation deals with, as a turning point in the West. They suggest that the increasing need for public consultation evident since the 1970s is likely due to the "growing dissatisfaction with the results of the technocratic administrative process" that has grown exponentially since 1945.²³ Policy-makers have turned then to a variety of methods of consultation including public meetings, workshops, citizen juries, focus groups, interviews, etc. However, public workshops are often considered the most effective means as they can be

²² Luis Loures and Pat Crawford, "Democracy in Progress: Using Public Participation in Post-Industrial Landscape (re)-Development", *WSEA Transactions on Environment and Development*, 9:4 (Sept., 2008), 794.

²³ *Ibid*, 794-795.

a forum for direct discussion and negotiation between various parties.²⁴

Such a limited view of public participation fails to take into account the very important ways that locals and government interacted in modernization processes like the one in Lourinhã. Certainly, aided by various levels of government support, the CML managed to control the town's development agenda. It was them and their allies who promoted modernization in agriculture and the adoption of various techniques and technologies. Similarly, the CML and the national government identified tourism as an area of priority for economic growth. With the government's blessing, the influx of tourist dollars coincided with a reorganization of agricultural labour into cooperatives. Such tourism and agricultural development required advances in infrastructure, including the introduction of basic services like water and electricity. With the base that these four areas offered the CML, it finally turned in the 1980s to completing its built environment, in part closing old doors to citizen participation that Lourinhanense had enjoyed while aiding tourism, agriculture and infrastructure to grow in their town. The building of the 1980s saw some Lourinhanense turn to non-traditional forms of contributions to their landscape through things like the *obras clandestinas*. Unsurprisingly, once citizens had been invited to participate in civic affairs in the 1960s and 1970s, it proved hard to totally shut them out of development in the 1980s.

In the end, the modernization of Lourinhã reveals the collaborative nature

²⁴ Ibid, 796.

of Portugal's democratization. It is clear that at each stage locals were invited and encouraged to participate in development. It is also clear that individuals became active on a case-by-case basis around issues of immediate concern to them. However, what is also evident is the power that these individuals and groups attained. As they demonstrated their effectiveness in aiding development, the CML found itself increasingly reacting to civic participation, instead of encouraging it. By the 1980s, the CML got ahead of its residents and was able to drive the agenda as it had in the 1960s. In the final analysis, Lourinhã is today a modern town. Its residents enjoy all the trappings of a modern lifestyle while its administration has developed the means to service its constituents while driving its agenda forward.

What has been reviewed goes some way in explaining how Lourinhã got to where it is today. However, some important considerations have not been introduced in this dissertation, either because of the availability of sources or their direct relevance to the CML's agenda since the 1960s. Reflecting the local nature of this study, these topics are international in nature. Namely, exploring the international contributions to Lourinhã's landscape could attain a fuller understanding of Lourinhã's development: those contributions stemming from emigration, the Portuguese empire, and the institutions of a united Europe.

As mentioned, Lourinhã has a large emigrant community in North America and Europe. These people often maintain close ties with their hometown. Beyond maintaining personal ties, many are engaged in the economic life of Lourinhã.

Remittances were just one way in which they could contribute to Lourinhã's development. The *Alvorada* was an enthusiastic promoter of remittances from those Lourinhanense who emigrated. One 1979 article explained that between January and August of 1978, some 46.117.000\$00 contos had been sent in remittances to Portugal from its emigrants. This money would help unemployed and needy recipients.²⁵ On a local scale, such contributions helped local organizations with expenses. Emigrants in Toronto, Canada, for example, helped to buy Lourinhã's volunteer firefighters a new ambulance in 1980, raising 520\$00 Contos (approximately \$12,000CAD).²⁶ Indeed, the *Alvorada* thanked each donor by listing them and their donations over a half page of newsprint.²⁷ This is to say nothing of the contributions made to Lourinhã's landscape in the form of home purchases made by those emigrants who maintain summer homes in the town. The number of foreign flags found on Lourinhã's homes in the summer is testimony to how important emigrants continue to be in contributing to the shape of the town's landscape. On top of this, of course, is the exchange of cultural and political capital brought back by emigrants who, along with their children, bring their music, art, commercial preferences and ideas with them each time they visit. The story of Lourinhã's emigrants deserves future attention.

Likewise, the Portuguese empire and its fall played a role in Lourinhã's political development as well. Certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, local

²⁵ "Remessas de Emigrantes", *Alvorada* (January 1979), p. 8.

²⁶ "Viagem ao Canadá", *Alvorada* (December 1980).

²⁷ "Festas em Toronto" *Alvorada* (January 1981), p. 3.

discourse reminded residents that a colonial war was on and that all needed to do their part for those conscripts and countrymen in the colonies. Particularly in the immediate aftermath of the revolt in Angola, local institutions mobilized in relief of victims. Just one issue after making a call to citizens for support for the victims of the “terrorism in Angola”, the *Alvorada* published the total donations made by each of Lourinhã’s *freguesias*. From Reguengo Grande, 645\$00 escudos were collected; from Miragaia, 6,042\$50; from Moledo, 80\$20; from Vimeiro, 2,252\$50; from Moita, 7,300\$00; from Santa Barbara, 1,767\$50; from São Bartolomeu, 738\$30; and from the freguesia da Lourinhã, 9,000\$00. The ad concluded by reminding people that had not donated through their parish councils that they could still do so.²⁸ In the official discourse around the colonial war, the values of the *Estado Novo* were reinforced, contributing to the broader emphasis on traditional institutions and systems in the 1960s for which the CML mobilized support. Lourinhanense were reminded of what hung in the balance of their struggle in Africa in the *Alvorada* in January 1964. As the paper reported;

Yet again, the energy of the UN exploded against us [Portugal]. Yet again, our foreign minister gave understanding, with words that could not leave doubt, that we, the Portuguese, would not leave threats, that we were resolved to meet those who dared to steal our spirituality, morality and history ... no one had doubts about Portugal's responsibilities for the defense of Europe and the West ... If Europe had not abandoned Africa, if the principles of responsibility for defense and survival had not been dropped ... Europe would have been an invincible bloc that could have had great strength in civilization and Christian culture. But, Europe ignored Salazar's sensible and clear warnings, and today the situation was ... denigrated and ridiculous. Portugal would not contribute anything to this

²⁸ Illustration, *Alvorada*, ano 1, no. 13 (May 30, 1961), p. 1.

embarrassing position.²⁹

Unsurprisingly, the empire and the colonial war was an ever-present motivation for Lourinhanense and their government to remain conservative in the 1960s. Although it had no ostensible effects on Lourinhã's landscape, the empire's fall and its relationship to the democratization underway in the 1960s could be explored further.




Figure 29: Propaganda: '*Somos um todo - uma força que não quer amputações*', the Alvorada also proclaimed that "in Lourinhã, the aid movement for victims of terrorism in Angola was underway: *todos temos obrigação de dizer - Presente!*". Illustration, *Alvorada* (May 5, 1961), p. 1.

As Portugal abandoned its empire, Europe became even more important to its development. Like the empire, this is not obviously evident in Lourinhã's landscape. However, the importance of European investment for Portugal's infrastructure, particularly into the 1990s, should not be ignored. Indeed, the next logical step in exploring the relationship between infrastructure and political culture is to look at EU programs for infrastructure investment in Portugal in the

²⁹ "Na África Defendendo o que resta da Europa e o Ocidente", *Alvorada* (January 12, 1964) p. 1.

1990s and European culture, identifying common goals and coincidences.

For now, Lourinhã's development stands as an example of how economic and infrastructure development can contribute to political inclusion and democratization. The municipal governments and Lourinhanense, along with residents and local governments of countless municipalities in Portugal, who have struggled to be heard and contribute to the development of their township deserve a place in our understanding of how modern democratic societies were built in the last half of the twentieth century. Further, at the core of the argument of this work is a belief that policymakers and academics need to look harder at the local level for solutions to national and global problems. As issues of democratization and governance become more and more prevalent in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, and citizens struggle to earn equal footing in civic affairs, an appreciation of the experiences of those who have struggled in the past to engage in civic affairs will have benefits beyond improving specific localities.

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