OF OUTCASTS AND AMBASSADORS:
THE MAKING OF PORTUGUESE DIASPORA IN POSTWAR NORTH AMERICA

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ABSTRACT

How can a small peripheral government with few material resources assert itself as a geopolitical player in an era of rising global governance and dwindling nation-state sovereignty? This was the question in the minds of Portuguese officials when developing their foreign policies in the aftermath of the Second World War and again after the Revolution of the Carnations of April 25, 1974. In their case, examined in this study, the answer was similar in both contexts: tie Portuguese nationhood with imperial and diasporic imaginings, and develop a national diaspora with close ties with the homeland and its government. This study examines the social, cultural, religious, economic, and political processes by which Portugal's Estado Novo dictatorship laid the foundations for the diasporic discourse and institutions that followed the end of the colonial empire and the introduction of a new democratic political order after 1974. I will focus on the role played by homeland diplomats, ethnic entrepreneurs, Catholic missionaries, political activists and other transnational intermediaries in shaping a diasporic consciousness among the Portuguese communities of eastern Canada - Toronto and Montreal - and northeastern United States - New Bedford, Fall River, Boston, Providence, Newark, and other cities in New England and the Greater New York City area. This dissertation also engages with current discussions in the field of migration studies, especially those related with the concepts of diaspora, transnationalism, and nation-state, as well as ethnicity, class, and race, and introduces an imperial and homeland dimension to our frame of analysis. The period of history examined (1950s-70s) covers the inauguration of Portuguese mass migration to Canada and its resurgence to the United States; the rise of large international governing bodies, rival Cold War superpowers and their spheres of influence; the Portuguese Colonial Wars in Africa and the downfall of settler colonialism; the emergence of cultural pluralism and identity politics in Canada and parts of the United States; the radicalization of the Portuguese "anti-fascist" opposition; and the revolutionary transition to democracy in Portugal. These larger processes framed the local, national, and transnational histories of Portuguese immigrants in North America and had significant impact in the development of their diasporic communities, consciousness, and identities.
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INTRODUCTION

A temporary "crisis of national identity" is what Portuguese intelligentsia found itself in after the Revolution of the Carnations of April 25, 1974, which toppled Portugal's Estado Novo (New State) dictatorship (1926-74) and ended its centuries-old colonial empire. The new democratic state that replaced it clung to the old pluri-continental idea of Portuguese nationhood, reaching for its former geopolitical relevance beyond the small corner on Europe's periphery that Portugal was now restricted to.\(^1\) At this point, state officials redefined their national discourse, replacing imperial with diasporic mythologies. As part of this process, the emigrant, once an object of mockery by Portuguese elites, was elevated to heroic status, as the flag-bearer of the nation's borderless, entrepreneurial, and cosmopolitan spirit, often compared to the explorer of the "golden age" of maritime history. Largely ignored by national residents, this spirited celebration of emigration is regularly repeated during Portugal's national holiday commemorations, at home and abroad. After the revolution, emigrants were encouraged to think of themselves as transnational citizens of a national diaspora with strong ties to the homeland, which the state vowed to nourish and facilitate. Most emigrants welcomed this outreach by the Portuguese government and saw it as a positive step towards redressing the negligence they had been subjected to during the dictatorship, finally being recognized for their continuous financial contributions to Portugal. However, this project was built on a foundation laid out by the dictatorship, with a recycled imperial discourse, old methods, and the same inability to produce lasting results. Noticing the resemblances between pre- and post-revolutionary discourses, the emigrants grew weary of the Portuguese government's constant appeals to their patriotism and developed a somewhat distinct diasporic consciousness that sometimes bypassed the homeland.

This dissertation explores the social, cultural, religious, economic, and political processes involved in the making of Portuguese diaspora among various communities in northeastern cities in the United States (in New England and the New York Metropolitan area) and Canada (Toronto, Ontario, and Montreal, Quebec), and the role played by the Estado Novo and its

\(^1\) The public philosopher Eduardo Lourenço best articulated Portugal's post-imperial "crisis of national identity" and its solutions: "Our problem has never been one of identity, but the excessive way in which we live, in short, our hyper-identity, which has been historically derived not only from our intense [territorial, linguistic and political] singularity, but also from the supplement we aggregated when we took ourselves to be 'lords of conquest in Guinea, Ethiopia, etc.' ...After a brief hesitation, we changed from colonizer people par excellence, multispacial and racial, to a nation that creates nations. Thus, the Salazarist mythology of ourselves, refuted in practice, triumphed in the symbolic plane. We can continue to be the same while being something else. Once more, the simple manipulation of discourse spared us from an examination of our conscience that could be devastating. As identity crises often are" ("Crisis de Identidade ou Ressaca Imperial?" Prelo, n. 1, October-December 1983, 17 & 20 [my translation - henceforth "m.t."]).
diplomats in shaping the emigrants' transnational relations and collective consciousness in the postwar period (1950s-70s).

**Conceptual definitions, methodology, and archival sources**

The word "making" in the title of this study is a reference to E. P. Thompson's classic work *The Making of the English Working Class*, since this too is "a study in an active process which owes as much to agency as to conditioning;" and because a Portuguese diaspora also "did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making."² I do not mean by this to say that "diaspora" is a social category like "class", although there are some benefits in using this comparison, given the familiarity of most scholars with the latter. For instance, Eric Morier-Genoud and Michel Cahen used Karl Marx's distinction of "class in itself" (defined by the socioeconomic characteristics of a group of individuals) and "class for itself" (asserted through group consciousness) to argue: "there cannot be a diaspora in itself: there might be a diaspora only if it is for itself. And from there, we can engage in a study of how a diaspora comes into being or is formed historically, rather than presume that a diaspora exists and impose a hypothesis onto reality and deduce facts and theory."³

Like class, gender, ethnicity, race, and other social categories, diaspora refers to a group of people that either asserts or is ascribed a socially constructed identity based on a set of shared characteristics. But unlike social categories, diaspora relies on geographic factors, a sense of in-group fraternity, and shared collective memory, bringing it closer to the concept of nation, which some diasporas aspire to become. This analogy is all the more clear when we consider Benedict Anderson's famous description of nations as "imagined communities": "imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion;" "community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, nation is always considered as a deep, horizontal comradeship."

The same way that diasporas encompass more than one nation - the one longed for (the homeland) and those where its members reside (the host nations) - nations can host multiple

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diasporas within their borders, as is the case with Canada and the United States. But despite juxtaposing each other, diaspora and nation differ in a fundamental respect: unlike diasporas, nations are "limited because even the largest of them... has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind." Diyanbak, on the other hand, are clusters of transnational communities, whose members maintain relationships that span national borders and link distant sites. As Peggy Levitt argued, for these communities to develop, casual transnational relationships must become institutionalized and extensive enough for migrants to consider themselves members of "a collectivity constituted across space and express some level of self-consciousness about this membership by forming groups like hometown organizations that manifest their transnational character." In Levitt's assessment, it is only when "a fiction of congregation takes hold" of these interconnected communities that diaspora emerges.

Martin Sökefeld, who also argued for an interpretation of diasporas as "imagined transnational communities" resulting from mobilization processes, proposed studying discourse instead of group consciousness, since "consciousness needs to be expressed in discourse in order to produce social and political effects." In his assessment, "mobilization for diaspora need not be a straightforward process but can be intersected by other social and political processes that may be related to competing identifications." Sökefeld suggested that diaspora scholars take into account three core dimensions when studying these processes: 1) opportunities in both home and host countries, including means of communication and transportation, legal and institutional frameworks (i.e. multiculturalism), political conditions (i.e. censorship versus freedom of speech), among others; 2) mobilizing structures and practices, like social networks and civic associations; 3) and frames, which "include all the ideas from which imagination of community is composed," such as the idea of home, national identity, or the shared memory of triggering events. This study tries to answer for the Portuguese case some of the research questions proposed by Sökefeld, namely: who were the agents producing and disseminating transnational community discourses? What were the "events, strategies and practices" used in this mobilization

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and their social and political dynamics? And, was there resistance to these processes or competing community imaginations proposed?\(^6\)

The notion of *diaspora* as a "transnational imagined community" of willing expatriates differs from its classic understanding, which refers to the forced and often traumatic displacement and dispersal of a large group of people bound by ties of nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion, such as Jewish exiles, African slaves, Irish famine or Armenian genocide refugees. For these "refugee" diasporas, the ancient homeland became a largely mythical place yet a pivotal source of "authentic" group identity, to which its members held the vague hope of "returning" one day - even if they never set foot on their ancestors native land - motivated by a cultivated sense of victimhood and historical quest for justice. But in the late 20th century, expatriate intellectuals, artists, and politicians began using the term *diaspora* to describe large migrant groups that had not been victims of violent dispersal yet still were marginalized, and craft compelling deterritorialized, flexible, creative identities that could empower them in an increasingly globalized world. Postcolonial thinkers like Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy, and Stuart Hall led this redefinition of *diaspora* as a catalyst for new "third spaces" of "hybrid culture" and "double consciousness", away from "the old, the imperialising, the hegemonising, form of 'ethnicity'."\(^7\)

In the 1990s, when *diaspora*, *transnationalism*, and *globalization* became buzzwords in academia and popular parlance, used to describe a wide range of human phenomena and states of mind, various scholars set out to pin concrete definitions on these concepts that could capture their many variations while limiting their usage, in order to salvage their analytical value. One of the most referenced works to come out of this review was Robin Cohen's *Global Diasporas: an Introduction*, from which many migrant scholars have since departed from or built on. Cohen offered a typology for the different kinds of diaspora - victim/ refugee; labour/ service; imperial/ colonial; trade/ business/ professional; cultural/ hybrid/ postmodern - which according to him

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\(^6\) On the idea of community, Sökefeld argued: "There can be actors who powerfully express [it] and who take part in its discursive and social construction. Others remain more passive or even completely aloof, giving the imagination of community little or no significance for their own lives. Again others subscribe to the imagination of a particular community but they imagine it in quite different or even contradictory terms. Imaginations of community are never true representations of social reality but instead cover up complexity and difference within the imagined community. Instead of mapping social life, such imaginations project a community (in "Mobilizing in Transnational Space: a Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora," *Global Networks*, 6, 3 [2006], 267-268, 271-272, 279).

could be identified by different combinations of ideal characteristics: a dispersal or colonial expansion from the homeland; a shared collective memory; an idealized ancestral homeland; a return movement; a sustained ethnic group consciousness; transnational bonds of solidarity; a troubled relation with their host societies; and the possibility for engaging in creative forms of expression.  

Like Cohen, Rogers Brubaker argued that diasporas are not "ethnodemographic or ethnocultural facts", and that once we accept that we can then "study empirically the degree and form of support for a diasporic project among members of its putative constituency, just as we can do when studying a nationalist project." Brubaker noted that by overusing the term *diaspora*, its advocates ran the risk of turning it into a "non-territorial form of essentialized belonging," much too similar to that of *nation-state*, which the concepts *diaspora*, *transnationalism*, and *globalization* all promised to challenge and decentralize from our framework of analysis. He suggested that before we deploy *diaspora* as a "category of analysis", we should consider it a "category of practice... used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties... It does not so much describe the world as seek to remake it."  

While forming the crux of this study, the term *diaspora* is seldom used, especially when describing the actions and thoughts of its subjects. Portuguese government officials only began using the word "diaspora" in the late 1970s, after which it took some time to percolate down into popular parlance. But even then, as today, the term most often used was simply "Portuguese communities". Until the mid-60s, Portuguese officials and emigrants referred to these communities as "colonies", reflecting their imperialist mindset. Even the term *emigrant* has been the subject of contentious debate among Portuguese expatriates and politicians, as we will discuss in chapter one. Of course, just because *diaspora* was not used in the period of my research does not mean there was no diasporic consciousness as we understand it today. But to avoid crowding this study with casual uses of the very term I am trying to historicize, I have decided to reserve "diaspora" for my own conclusions about the intentions and outcomes of the

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11 The term "emigrant colonies" was also used by Italian officials from the 19th century until the end of the Fascist regime, during which time, Mark I. Choate argued, Italy tried to "make itself abroad" (in *Emigrant Nation. The Making of Italy Abroad*, 2008).
historical practices and processes discussed in each chapter, or when the actions of its historical actors are consciously "diasporic", even if they call it something else.

It is now a generally accepted fact that globalization has not brought about the end of nation-states; that territoriality is still a fundamental determinant of human consciousness; and that diasporas can be normative, oppressive, and calculated.\textsuperscript{12} In other words, the "buzz" is gone. Now that nation-states have proven to be more resilient than previously thought, we can focus on how these large modern political constructs managed to withstand the disintegrating pressures of "postcolonial globalization", with its "supraterritorial organization and new forms of regional integration."\textsuperscript{13} The larger answer is, because some nation-states reasserted their sovereignty and resisted global or regional integration, becoming more exclusive as a result, while others embraced postmodern notions of nationality and became more flexible and inclusive.\textsuperscript{14} Of course, reality is messier when we look at specific cases. For instance, in the Portuguese case, both strategies were used simultaneously, sometimes proposed by the same person. Although, as I will discuss, the flexible, deterritorialized notion of nationhood tied to the diaspora ultimately prevailed once the imperialist sovereignty-by-force strategy collapsed. Thus, my arguments on Portugal's nation- and diaspora-building projects confirm Brubaker's point about the "conceptual antithesis between nation-state and diaspora," which he argued "obscures more than it reveals, occluding the persistent significance (and great empirical variety) of nation-states."\textsuperscript{15}

One of the risks of reconciling nation-state and diaspora is letting our analysis fall back into the pitfalls of the once dominant national paradigm, and produce what Kevin Kenny called "national history writ large." To avoid this "tendency to homogenize and flatten out diversity," I will follow Kenny's suggestion and combine transnational and comparative perspectives in my


\textsuperscript{14} Laurie A. Brand discussed the examples of Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan, whose nation-states have implemented outreach policies with their expatriate communities in Europe and North America similar to the ones discussed in this study, as a way of reasserting sovereignty over their growing diasporas (in Citizens Abroad. Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa, 2006).

\textsuperscript{15} Brubaker, 2005, 10.
research. Thus, the multilateral relations discussed in this study are both vertical (between nation-state and emigrant communities) and horizontal (between emigrant communities), covering "transnational social fields" that span the Atlantic regions. While I will occasionally mention Portuguese communities in other parts of the North American continent, my research focuses on the northeastern region. My reasons for this are twofold. First, this is where the largest and most concentrated Portuguese communities on this continent. The Western regions of Canada and the United States (especially California) also have sizable Portuguese populations; however, their settlement histories, social and economic characteristics, and "transnational social fields" are considerably different from their Eastern counterparts, and deserve their own separate study. The second reason is more mundane, namely the fact that I was based in Toronto during my research, and this is where I was able to locate a large amount of community records in the hands of private collectors. I will also combine macro (or "top-down") and micro (or "bottom-up") perspectives, attempting to meet Levitt's and Nadya Jaworsky's proposed goal of "a thick and empirically rich mapping of how global, macro-level processes interact with local lived experiences." In other words, this study accounts for the actions and ideas of specific individuals who either contributed to bring forth or experienced the effects of large-scale processes. Whenever possible, I will provide brief biographies in the hope of shedding light on the personal background informing these individuals' personal views.

Donna Gabaccia has called on her fellow migration historians to change the scope of their research from a domestic to a global perspective, and to explore the "transnational linkages created 'from below' by immigrants - [or] 'immigrant foreign relations' - and American international or foreign policies, created 'from above' by the federal government." My research

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18 In 2008 I co-founded the Portuguese Canadian History Project (PCHP) with my colleague Susana Miranda, and later joined by Raphael Costa and Emanuel da Silva. Since 2009, the PCHP has worked in close partnership with the Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections, York University Libraries. Together we have been able to preserve an important part of the collective memory of Portuguese immigrants and their descendants in Canada, and democratize access to historical knowledge, both in its consumption and production. For more on the PCHP's principles, methods, and challenges, see R. Costa, da E. Silva, G. Fernandes, S. Miranda and Anna St. Onge, "Archiving from Below: Preserving, Problematizing and Democratizing the Collective Memory of Portuguese Canadians - the Portuguese Canadian History Project," in Amalia Levi and Dominique Daniel (eds.), _Identity Palimpsests: Ethnic Archiving in the United States and Canada_, 2014. For more information on the PCHP's collections and public history activities visit the blog - http://archives.library.yorku.ca/pchp/ - and online exhibits website - http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp
adopted a similar approach, although it focused primarily on the emigrants' linkages with their homeland government instead of with their hosts. As such, Portuguese ambassadors and consuls in North America are as much at the centre of this study as those emigrants who associated with or opposed them. The few works by Canadian migration historians that look at the efforts made by homeland diplomats to shape the institutions and the minds of their co-nationals in their host country were useful when drawing comparisons with my own case study, particularly those immigrants coming from authoritarian regimes, such as Adolf Hitler's Germany, Benito Mussolini's Italy, or Nicholas Horthy's Hungary. But researching the records amassed by the Portuguese embassies and consulates made it clear that these collections are crucial for piecing together a more complete history of immigration in North America, since they contain a great deal of information about migrant communities on matters that were invisible to host government institutions and their record keepers. This dissertation hopes to encourage other historians to consult similar records in the immigrants' countries of origin.

Most of the processes and interactions discussed in this study are essentially political, involving government officials, religious authorities, ethnic leaders, political exiles, and immigrant activists, all vying for power over their communities. To help us identify the different political contexts in which they operate, I will use E.K. Østergaard-Nielsen's typology, which defines three domains of political action: homeland politics, which refers to activism in the host nation that deals with homeland political matters; immigrant politics, meaning those actions taken by community activists to improve the socioeconomic circumstances of their peers in their host countries, even when using resources provided by the homeland; and translocal politics, or those interactions that focus on specific localities or regions in the homeland, and occur outside the purview of national governments. Like any typology, these are simplifications of complex contexts and motivations, which often intersect. Still, one important field missing from it is that of host nation politics, or those political actions taken by immigrants, as citizens or residents of their adopted nations, dealing with host society issues not directly related to their immigrant realities. I also refer to ethnic or racial politics, not as a fifth domain, since it traverses all, but to

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refer to those forms of activism that promote or invoke ethnicity or race above other forms of political solidarity.

While I will discuss migration movements and their socioeconomic characteristics, the focus of my study is the public, institutional or political processes of community formation in these immigrant communities, and not what John Bodnar called the immigrants' private "culture of everyday life." As such, I will explore "the rhetoric and ambitions of competing leaders" - often middle- and upper-class ethnic elites - more than the experiences of working-class immigrants, whom Bodnar argued, "could not realistically indulge in [political] pursuits for too long a period of time," and whose "power to influence public affairs and their supporters in public institutions were minimal."\(^{23}\) The range of terms used by migration scholars to describe ethnic elites as "brokers", "entrepreneurs", "intermediaries", or "prominenti", reflects the level of attention this group has garnered in the field. Those writing from a "bottom up" perspective, inspired by such social historians as Bodnar in the United States and Robert Harney in Canada, tend to focus more on the limited yet explicit agency of immigrant workers. Still, Bodnar offered valuable insight into the emergence of the immigrant middle class, "which in many ways owed its status to premigration experiences and which was frequently ambivalent about its relationship to the mass of immigrant workers, alternating between separateness and involvement."\(^{24}\) Harney, in turn, described these ethnic intermediaries as "men between cultures", whose role as community builders derived "as much from their assimilation to [the host society's] life as from their higher levels of literacy and sophistication."\(^{25}\) This generation of historians made great contributions to our understanding of immigrant communities, especially when contrasted with the reductive, fatalistic, and patronizing views of their predecessors (with various exceptions).

However, as Carmela Patrias argued, their "bottom up" paradigm tended to overemphasize the agency of common working-class immigrants at the expense of middle-class elites when explaining the formation of ethnic communities. As Patrias noted, ethnic fraternities "were not built by grass roots, set up spontaneously by former agriculturalists... the initiative came from artisans, skilled urban workers, and middle-class immigrants." Rural immigrants responded to the elite's initiatives "because mutual aid societies and social and cultural clubs fulfilled

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 142.
economic, social, and cultural needs. Voluntary associations thus became important arenas for regular interaction among different social strata among the immigrants.26

More recently, this debate over the class dynamics of ethnic community formation has been updated to reflect the transnational and globalization turn in the field of migration studies. As Ulf Hanerz and others have pointed out, class matters when it comes to mediating exchanges between homeland (or "metropolis") and expatriate communities (or "periphery"). In his words: "To have wealth and power is to have easier access to the metropolis; and it is through one's relationship to the metropolis that one often gains power in the periphery."27 Some scholars have accused the proponents of the transnational paradigm of homogenizing the diversity of migrant experiences and suggesting that nearly all immigrants engage in transnational relations on a regular basis, when in fact these linkages are channeled by a few.28 Still, others have challenged this criticism by arguing that, even though "the numbers who engage in regular transnational practices may be fairly small, those who engage in occasional, informal transnational activities, including social, cultural, and religious practices, in response to elections, economic downturns, life-cycle events, and climactic disasters are much greater. Taken together and over time, their combined efforts add up and can alter economies, values, and practices of entire regions."29

As feminist scholars have pointed out, migration histories have often placed men at the centre of their studies, leaving women on the periphery. Migrant women have traditionally been referred to as "dependents" or studied solely in the context of the family, with much attention dedicated to their experiences as victims of patriarchal oppression. Feminist migration historians, like Jean Burnet, Christiane Harzig, Donna Gabaccia, and Franca Iacovetta, or Wenona Giles and Susana Miranda for the Portuguese case, have shed new light on the experiences of migrant women as active participants in their own history, with enough agency either to improve their own lives or resist different forms of patriarchy.30 Their arguments instructed my research from the outset. However, in the period discussed here, Portuguese immigrant or ethnic women,
especially those in postwar newcomer settlements, were for the most part removed from the public institutional life of their communities, or were relegated to "auxiliary" committees for which I found few archival records. As a result of studying the public sphere, community elites, and homeland diplomats, this dissertation became largely about patriarchal men. That said, whenever possible, I will refer to individual women who directly participated in the processes discussed here, and account for the gender dynamics at play in their exclusion from these diaspora-building projects. I have also kept in mind the simple truth that: "As long as they could return freely to their hometown, migrant 'men without women' had few reasons to create a national diasporic identity."

**Portuguese diaspora studies: literature review**

In her contribution to the collection of articles that first introduced *transnationalism* to migration studies, Bela Feldman-Bianco noted: “In the current conjuncture of capitalism, the Portuguese state has come to redefine itself as a global nation some of whose people live beyond the confines of the state. Central to this redefinition has been the legitimization of the transnational networks of its migrants… at the very same time that U.S. efforts at immigrant incorporation have now given public acceptance to the celebration of ethnic communities as building blocks of the American social fabric.”

Despite having completed my undergraduate history degree in Portugal, I did not encounter any reference to this global nation- or diaspora-building project until I began my graduate studies in Canada. Feldman-Bianco's article not only got me interested in this topic, it also made me question why so little has been written about it in Portuguese scholarship, and particularly in historiography.

My first realization was that, until recently, scholarly literature on Portuguese migration has been fairly limited and largely dominated by the social sciences. Before 1974, few studies on emigration were published in Portugal, even though the topic was debated by some of the country's leading political thinkers, including two of the founders of Portuguese historiography, Alexandre Herculano and Oliveira Martins, whom I will discuss in chapter one. After the revolution, a new group of historians and social scientists greatly expanded the literature on this

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subject. Greatly inspired by the French *Annales* school (suppressed in Portugal during the *Estado Novo*) their works tended to have a heavy social scientific focus on quantitative data, and sought to explain the macro causes and consequences of emigration from a classic national perspective. Some, like Joel Serrão, were also influenced by the active history views of Herculano and Martins, and infused their historical analysis with political commentary. Serrão's *A Emigração Portuguesa* largely inaugurated the field of migration history in Portugal, to which Maria I. Baganha, Miriam H. Pereira, Maria B. Rocha-Trindade, and Jorge Arroteia made some of the most significant contributions. Despite the important works produced by this cohort, emigration remained largely ignored as a topic of study in Portuguese high school and university curricula.

On the immigration side, the scholarly output has been more extensive. Starting in the mid-1970s, a new group of scholars, such as Grace Anderson, David Higgs, Victor M. P. Rosa and João Apalhão in Canada, and Francis M. Rogers, Leo Pap and Jerry Williams in the United States, began studying Portuguese immigrants in greater depth. 33 Those in Canada benefitted from government funding for ethnic studies under federal and provincial multiculturalism policies, particularly those researchers associated with the Multicultural History Society of Ontario - like Higgs, Domingos Marques and Manuela Marujo 34 - directed by Robert Harney. 35 In the United States, where funding for ethnic studies was less available, the handful of scholars who wrote about the Portuguese produced some of the first extensive works on their immigration history, departing from the earlier pseudo-scientific analysis of racial characteristics or the filiopietism of amateur ethnic historians. Still, their works relied a great deal on anecdotal evidence and did not connect with the revisionist literature emerging in the 1960s-70s, following Rudolph Vecoli’s reaction to Oscar Handlin's *The Uprooted*, 36 or the "new immigration history" of Bodnar and others in the '80s. While in many respects outdated, their works remain a solid base of information for the growing number of scholars appearing since the ‘90s, and especially


the '00s, who have pushed Portuguese migration studies in North America in interesting new directions, using diverse methodologies and paradigms. Here I highlight the edited volumes by Kimberly DaCosta Holton and Andrea Klimt, and by Carlos Teixeira and V. P. Rosa, which compiled some of the research done by this new generation of scholars, which were of great help in the course of my research. Recent dissertations by emerging Portuguese-Canadian researchers, like S. Miranda and Emanuel da Silva, have also informed some of the arguments made in this study.

In Canada and the United States, a number of social scientists, such as Caroline Brettell, Edite Noivo, Stephen Lubkemann, Luis Aguiar, K. Holton, A. Klimt and others, have made significant contributions to our understanding of Portuguese transnationalism and diaspora in the post-imperial period. Their findings have informed many of my research questions, especially Noivo's arguments on the relationship between homeland and its emigrant communities. During her fieldwork in Toronto in the late 1990s, Noivo discovered that:

In their efforts to interweave emotions, memories, and images of their homeland with the experiences in and attachments to their new geographical and cultural contexts, [Portuguese emigrants] articulate conceptualizations of diasporicity that increasingly challenge monolithic versions of “Portugueseness”, which until now have been produced exclusively in Portugal… Despite their efforts to maintain “homeland attachments”, they increasingly seem to inhabit a reconstructed location – both social and psychological – that is punctuated by scripts of cultural dislocation from the Portugueseness defined by those who remain in Portugal itself.

Noivo disputed the notion that all diasporic connections are negotiated through the homeland, and argued that even when the latter tries to impose a metanarrative on the emigrants, they are able to push back or sidestep it. Moreover, in her assessment of what informs diasporic solidarities, the emigrants' shared sense of exclusion from the national society is as prominent as their sense of inclusion in the "global nation". In her words:

Diasporic consciousness may emerge out of and be constituted not only by positive attachments to homeland and hostland, but also by feelings of exclusion in both contexts…
consciousness of diasporicity as a network that connects them not only or maybe not even primarily to Portugal, so much as to others who have been similarly forced to leave it.\textsuperscript{41}

These competing notions of estrangement (as \textit{outcasts}) and belonging (as \textit{ambassadors}) will figure prominently in this study.

Another important contribution to Portuguese diaspora studies in recent years is Morier-Genoud's and Cahen's edited volume dedicated to the experiences, networks, identities, and representations of colonial migrants and settlers in Portugal's imperial space, before and after decolonization. While none of the articles in this volume deal with European labour migrants in North America, its authors offer important insights on the overall geography of Portuguese diaspora. Drawing on Cohen's typology, Morier-Genoud and Cahen tried to identify which type of diaspora the various Portuguese migrant communities fit into.\textsuperscript{42} Most importantly, they argued there were multiple semi-autonomous diasporas within the same Portuguese context, and that not all expatriate communities qualified as such. In their estimation, "diasporas need historicity to exist... diasporas form only with time: after the first migrants pass away, their children and grandchildren need to maintain the community to be able to talk of a diaspora." Following this logic, Morier-Genoud and Cahen suggested that Portuguese immigrants in the United States have formed a diaspora, since they have "a sense of community [that] has remained after several generations, a community with its own organisation, specific cultural and religious events, and so on." Indeed, there is a Portuguese diaspora in the United States, but depending on the period of history, we may have to look hard to find it. Missing from Morier-Genau’s and Cahen's generalization are the ebbs and flows of diasporic consciousness over time, whose periods of dormancy and revival depend largely on local, national, and international circumstances. The same authors offer a more apt description of the diaspora-building processes examined in this dissertation when referring to the different "social and ideological trajectories" of the Portuguese in South Africa: "one of dilution and the other of genesis, both splitting apart at an unknown moment in history, the point being that the process is not only long-term, fractured, and internally diverse but also has multiple trajectories."\textsuperscript{43}

Much work is still to be done on Portuguese migration and/or diaspora studies, although the number of publications, dissertations, conferences, and research centres dedicated to these

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 258.
\item \textsuperscript{42} In their estimate, the types that most aptly describe the different Portuguese diasporas, as proposed by Cohen, are the imperial (or quasi-imperial), trade diaspora, and labour diasporas.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Morier-Genoud & Cahen, 2012, 10-12.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
topics emerging in the past decade are an encouraging sign that they are finally getting the attention they deserve.\textsuperscript{44} While there has been an explosion in the number of studies dealing with specific issues related to the Portuguese in North America, no recent work has brought together their findings in a comprehensive manner, or compared and intersected the histories of the Portuguese in the United States and Canada. This dissertation seeks to make that contribution and provide a historical perspective to a body of scholarship that is still largely dominated by the social sciences and which too often draws essentialist arguments from synchronic data about processes that are deeply contextual and time-sensitive.

**Historical context and periodization**

Every historical periodization is to a certain degree arbitrary. Still, the historical time discussed in this dissertation, traditionally known as the "postwar period", contains various moments that can easily be identified as transition points in the histories of Portugal, Canada, and the United States. For the *Estado Novo*, the end of the Second World War opened a new chapter in its history, marked by the introduction of various internal reforms, though most of them were purely cosmetic. The 1950s also ushered in transformations in the social, cultural and economic character of North American societies, some of them beginning during the war, which had a tremendous impact in the racial, gender, labour and other dominant social structures. Recent world historians, like A. G. Hopkins, have also called this the period of "postcolonial globalization", when “the nation state had ceased to be the unquestioned vehicle of progress and in some cases had begun to unravel.” This period saw the rise of a new economy marked by transnational corporations and globally oriented financial, commercial, and information services industries, as well as large-scale international governance bodies.\textsuperscript{45}

By the time the war ended in 1945, the *Estado Novo* was entering its third decade in power. Its origins dated back to May 28, 1926, when a right-wing military coup ousted the democratic republican government, in power since the Republican Revolution of October 5, 1910. The new authoritarian regime emerged from among various sectors of the right-wing opposition to the First Republic’s liberalism, anticlericalism, positivism, and highly partisan


\textsuperscript{45} Hopkins, 2002, 9-10.
parliamentary system. In 1928, President Óscar Carmona appointed the young University of
Coimbra professor António Salazar as the new Minister of Finance. The latter would eliminate
the nation's large deficit through a combination of austerity measures, new taxes, policy tricks,
and a tight control of every ministry’s budget. Salazar's performance earned him the respect of
his peers and raised his public profile as a competent and honest statesman, who "saved"
Portugal from bankruptcy; an image carefully crafted by the now censored press. Salazar's
relatively moderate position within the dictatorship, which included republican conservatives,
monarchists, fascists, and other right-wing groups, also raised his influence with Carmona, who
entrusted him with the task of leading the National Revolution. In 1932, Salazar was appointed
President of the Ministerial Council (or Prime Minister), becoming dictator-in-chief of the
Estado Novo, formally inaugurated by the 1933 constitution.46

As we will discuss in greater detail throughout this dissertation, the Estado Novo was a
conservative authoritarian regime headed by a dictator who was supported by a largely symbolic
president and an unelected consultative National Assembly that was entirely controlled by the
União Nacional (National Union) party. Inspired by a blend of right-wing ideologies, such as
integralism, fascism, and Catholic social doctrine, the Estado Novo embraced corporatism as its
model for social and economic relations, with its vision of harmony between capital and labour,
and a paternalist ethos marked by traditionalist notions of rural, religious, and patriarchal family
life. This corporatist structure was regulated by the Statute of National Labour, which abolished
free trade unions, strikes and lock-outs, and organized labour-capital relations under state-
controlled national syndicates, professional guilds, and local community centres called Casas do
Povo (The People's House) or Casas dos Pescadores (The Fisherman's House), present in nearly
all mainland rural villages. Under this anti-capitalist, anti-liberal, anti-socialist ideal, workers and
employers were supposed to resolve their issues without resorting to conflict, within the official
structures. In reality, the regime's corporatist ideology had little in common with its institutions,
dominated as they were by large landowners, industrialists, and port authorities, who used them
to control labour and wages with the government's consent. As Fernando Rosas argued: "Created
from 'top to bottom' and rigidly overseen by the state, the Portuguese corporative organization...

would become a deformed body of bureaucracy and corruption and, frequently, one of the chief political-institutional factors of resistance to the countries' economic modernization."\textsuperscript{47}

Under the 1933 constitution, all parties except the \textit{União Nacional} were banned. Youth associations outside the \textit{Moçidade Portuguesa} (Portuguese Youth)\textsuperscript{48} a paramilitary scout organization inspired by the Fascist \textit{Opera Nazionale Balilla} and the Nazi \textit{Hitler Youth}, were also prohibited, except for those connected with the Catholic Church. Overall, the right of association for political, social, cultural, recreational, sports or any other collective activity was subject to state approval, which could dismiss any civil organization's by-laws and executives and replace them with government-appointed committees. Public gatherings considered to be of a "political or social" nature also had to be sanctioned and monitored by government authorities.\textsuperscript{49} Some civic organizations were tolerated by the regime, especially those of a seemingly local communitarian character. According to Daniel Melo, these folk associations were important spaces of passive civic resistance, where common people engaged in democratic practices like debating or voting.\textsuperscript{50} In rural settings, the \textit{Casas do Povo} also became important public spaces outside the church, where people could participate in collective activities, like sports competitions, film screenings, and other recreational programs. These community houses also offered limited social assistance and job training; however, most working families could not access these services since they could not afford the membership fees.\textsuperscript{51}

Social welfare was largely nonexistent under the \textit{Estado Novo} until the late 1960s. The responsibility to assist the aged, the ill, the unemployed, and the poor lay primarily with the extended family, and on the charity of Catholic Church organizations, like Caritas or the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. In the regime's view, state welfare discouraged individuals from being self-reliant, threatened family bonds, and "put in practice socialist principles repelled by the Christian concept of life."\textsuperscript{52} The rural background of Portugal's industrial workforce also functioned as a social insurance policy in the eyes of Salazar, since the unemployed could always return to the fields and live off the land.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 279-281 (m.t).
\textsuperscript{48} Founded in 1936, the \textit{Moçidade Portuguesa} was initially overseen by the fascist wing of the regime. In 1940, when Marcello Caetano became its director, the \textit{Moçidade} lost its paramilitary and germanophile characteristics and became a Catholic scout movement.
\textsuperscript{49} Rosas, 1993, 235, 273-274.
\textsuperscript{51} Miranda, 2010, 50.
The social pacification provided by Portugal's rural economy and Catholic Church was most pronounced in the northern mainland and in the Azores, where small-scale subsistence farming predominated and the church regulated much of the public and private life. In the Azores, for instance, individual families owned the vast majority of the land (nearly 80% in 1965), though very few of these holdings were capable of providing a living income (only 7% that same year). The situation was even worse in São Miguel, the largest and most populated island, where most of the land was owned by a few landowners who rented small plots to farming families or hired farmhands to work their fields. The high rents made it difficult for tenant farmers to subsist, let alone accumulate capital, while the high population density produced chronic unemployment and kept wages low. The concentration of land, wealth, and industry in the hands of a few Micaelense (of São Miguel) families made up a powerful conservative force opposing economic reform or meaningful social mobility. In the southern mainland region of Alentejo, farmland was concentrated in large estates owned by a few landholders who relied on a large mass of rural proletarians. Many of these farmhands sojourned or settled in the greater Lisbon area, where they became urban proletarians and developed a working-class consciousness; many of these workers joined the clandestine labour movement and the underground Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). Conversely, the minifundia in the north was a divisive force among rural workers who were protective of their small properties. As Brettell noted, this system created "minute scales of difference among rural peoples, enhancing competition at the expense of intraclass cooperation and interclass conflict." Nonetheless, independent family farming often required extra help to perform time sensitive tasks, like harvesting or stripping crops, or to deal with unforeseen natural calamities. The best way to undertake these seasonal tasks and ensure some security in times of crisis was for neighbouring farmers to help each other through collective reciprocity. As we will discuss, mass emigration was another important factor in fragmenting workers and in diffusing social tensions caused by

53 The Azorean archipelago is made up of nine volcanic islands in the North Atlantic Ocean, located about 1,300 km west of the Portuguese mainland coast and about 1,900 km southeast of Newfoundland. The largest island is São Miguel, followed by Pico, Terceira, São Jorge, Faial, Flores, Santa Maria, Graciosa, and Corvo.
56 Like the "work bees" of early North American farmers, this were "not only an economic and social exchange but also a process through which shared values and a collective identity were created and communicated" (in Catharine Anne Wilson, "Reciprocal Work Bees and the Meaning of Neighbourhood", Canadian Historical Review, 82, 3, 2001).
overpopulation, unemployment, and other social problems in the northern mainland and Atlantic islands; unlike the south, where emigration was less common.

Before the war, public education was valued for its proselytizing and indoctrinating role and little more. Its emphasis on Catholic morals and corporatist doctrine taught individuals to accept their place in society and renounce aspirations of social mobility. This was a clear departure from the positivist program of the First Republic, which sought to eliminate Portugal's soaring illiteracy rate and secularize society. Instead, the dictatorship reduced mandatory schooling; increased the grip of the Catholic Church over the public school curriculum; and reduced the professional credentials of educators, the vast majority of whom were women. Salazar feared the disruptive effects that intellectual culture and higher education could produce if made available to the general population. The National Foundation for Happiness at Work, a government corporation inspired by Mussolini's *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*, whose role was to organize leisure activities for urban workers, considered "[t]he altering of one's capacity for knowledge, the perfecting of intellectual faculties, the developing of a critical spirit, the sharpening of aesthetic taste, etc.," to be undesirable and actively avoided. In the eyes of this agency: "[t]rue popular culture does not consist in divulging the results of high culture, judging, on the contrary, that such propaganda may diffuse a falsely cultivated mentality, which in turn elicits social problems of difficult solution."\(^{57}\)

Two of the most central features of the *Estado Novo* were its widespread propaganda and violent methods of political repression, which together ensured that its views were widely disseminated and unchallenged. As we will discuss in chapter five, the Secretariat of National Propaganda (SPN) was in charge of crafting the regime's messages, developing its popular cultural policies, and regenerating the “national spirit” of Portuguese people. This agency was most active in the 1930s, when the regime spent a great deal of resources in large self-legitimizing spectacles of power and indoctrination, inspired by Fascist and Nazi propaganda and iconography. Another method of shaping mentalities and curbing freedom of thought and expression was state censorship. But the *Estado Novo*’s most infamous and violent tool of repression was the political police, originally called State Vigilance and Defense Police (PVDE), placed under the Ministry of the Interior, though ultimately supervised by Salazar himself.\(^{58}\)

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special police was dedicated to eliminating political threats in Portugal and its colonies (especially PCP militants and sympathizers). Its eyes and ears reached out to all sectors of Portuguese society through a vast network of paid informants, which produced a panopticon of fear and suspicion, where it was common for neighbours, co-workers, and acquaintances to denounce those whose loyalty to Salazar was deemed questionable.\(^59\)

The Estado Novo reasserted the colonial empire\(^60\) as an "indivisible and inalienable" part of Portugal, both territorially and spiritually, which the regime vowed to protect.\(^61\) Reacting to the League of Nations' criticism of its treatment of African labour, and the international community’s demands for its colonial territories to be placed under international administration, the military dictatorship reaffirmed the relationship between the metropolis and its colonies with the 1930 Colonial Act, reducing the latters' autonomy. In it, the regime clearly stated its imperialist self-understanding: "It is part of the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation that its historic function is to possess and colonize its overseas domains and to civilize the native populations contained therein."\(^62\) As Valentim Alexandre noted, this Act "marked the beginning of a period in which the state actively pursued the creation of an imperial mentality among the Portuguese."\(^63\)

At the end of the war, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's new superpowers, each with its own all-encompassing ideology and geopolitical sphere of influence. Both sides indirectly battled each other in a protracted Cold War that engaged much of the world's nations over four decades. As tensions escalated between the communist East and the liberal-democratic West, underlined by the threat of nuclear Armageddon, a group of non-aligned countries, composed initially of recently emancipated colonies in Africa and Asia, formed a third bloc that demanded an end to all forms of colonialism. The main stage for their diplomatic battles was the United Nations (UN), founded in 1945 to prevent competing national interests from escalating into military conflicts, and to promote international legal standards on a number of issues, such as universal human rights and the right of peoples to national self-

\(^{59}\) For a detailed history of this police agency see Irene Flunser Pimentel, *A História da PIDE*, 2007.
\(^{60}\) At this point, the Portuguese empire included Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Principe in Africa; Dadra, Nagar Haveli, Goa, Daman and Diu in India; Macau and East Timor in East Asia.
\(^{63}\) Alexandre, 1998, 49.
determination. Also with the purpose of creating political conditions for a lasting peace in Europe, in 1948, the United States began distributing massive financial stimulus and other forms of aid to those countries affected by the war so they could rebuild their economies. This European Recovery Program (also known as Marshall Plan) was supervised by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was the first of ensuing endeavours to boost European cooperation through large international trade organizations, such as the European Economic Community (EEC) - launched by the continent's strongest national economies in 1957 - and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) - founded in 1960 as an alternative to the EEC by some of its outlying countries. In the meantime, the Cold War’s rival factions congealed into two large international military alliances: the Washington-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded in 1949, and the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact, created in 1955.

In a world dominated by the vanquishers of far-right dictatorships and by opponents of settler colonialism, the Estado Novo found itself in an awkward position, as an authoritarian colonial empire torn between its ideological affinities with the former Axis nations and its historical alliance with Great Britain. But Salazar's "collaborative neutrality" with the Allied forces during the war, together with his staunch anti-communism, earned him an invitation to become a founding member of the OEEC and NATO. At the same time, Salazar despised American capitalism and its liberal worldview, and was averse to the United States' rise as the West's champion, preferring to deal with the American government through his British allies. However, by the 1950s, American supremacy in the Atlantic was an unavoidable fact that the dictator was forced to engage with in order to ensure the survival of his regime and empire. The key to this unfolding alliance was the Lajes Air Base on the Azorean island of Terceira. The Americans, who were first granted access to the base in 1944, considered Lajes' location in the mid-Atlantic to be of high strategic value and an absolute necessity for their Cold War military plans. So in 1948, Salazar agreed to a renewable long-term lease, turning Lajes into the most important bargaining chip in Portugal's diplomatic relations with the United States.65

Portugal's diplomacy thrived in the 1950s, when its foreign missions intensified their activities in NATO countries. The number of diplomatic offices increased in the ‘60s, as the

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64 Portugal was first invited to receive funds from the Marshall Plan in July 1947, but Salazar declined. However, this did not stop him from joining the OEEC. In the end of 1948, Portugal finally made a request for $625 million in U.S. aid.
number of expatriate citizens living in North America and Europe grew. In addition to its embassy in Washington, Portugal now had a diplomatic delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York City; and in the northeastern American states it operated consulates in Boston, Fall River, New Bedford, Providence, New York City, Waterbury (after 1964), and Newark (after 1968). Though not a diplomatic mission, the regime's tourism information bureau (or Casa de Portugal) in Manhattan was another important agency promoting the Estado Novo's foreign agenda in North America, with links to the emigrant communities. Portugal also increased its diplomatic presence in Canada after the war, when emigrants began settling in that country, at a time when the former British colony was trying to fashion a role for itself as an international player; though heavily influenced by the United States. In 1955, Portugal elevated its legation in Ottawa to full embassy status and replaced its previous honorary consuls in Montreal and Toronto (in 1956) with career diplomats; in 1959, it also opened a consulate in Vancouver.

Despite Portugal's good relations with its NATO allies, pressures on Salazar to democratize and forego his colonial empire mounted at the UN. Faced with this reality, the dictator recognized the need to improve the Estado Novo's external image and update core pieces of legislation and government agencies. One of the most significant democratic overtures made after the war was allowing the opposition to run their own candidates against the regime's nominee in the presidential elections, although with severe restrictions on the ability to campaign. This gave the opposition a platform to openly criticize the regime and mobilize people in the cause of democracy, as was the case with the campaigns of General Norton de Matos in 1948-49, and especially General Humberto Delgado in 1958; the latter inaugurating one of the most intense periods of political opposition and subsequent repression, as we will discuss in chapter seven.

Most of the internal reforms of this period were superficial, as was the case with PVDE, which changed its name to International and State Defense Police (PIDE) in 1945, at the same time it extended its violent methods. The political police was given legal powers to arrest anyone deemed "subversive" for purposes of "interrogation" without the need of a warrant, pressing

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66 Its first "extraordinary and plenipotentiary" ambassador was Luis Fernandes, who accumulated that role with that of Portuguese Ambassador in Washington, where he resided. In the ambassador's absence, the Chargé d'Affaires, Gonçalo Caldeira Coelho, was in charge of the embassy's business.

67 These were usually Canadians with some professional or business relationship with Portugal, who accepted the largely nominal yet prestigious role of honorary consul in order to elevate their social status and improve their relations with the Portuguese government. When their consular duties became too onerous with the arrival of Portuguese emigrants, these representatives were quick to abandon their diplomatic posts.
charges, or providing access to a lawyer, for periods that could go up to six months. The regime also had the power to purge "subversive" civil servants, deport opponents, or send them to the brutal Tarrafal prison camp in Cape Verde. In 1954, the year the Tarrafal camp closed, PIDE saw its powers increased once again, as it was now able to invoke preventive "security measures" to suspend an individual's right to habeas corpus for up to a year, which effectively allowed it to detain "suspects" perpetually without a trial; they could simply re-arrest them the moment they stepped out of prison.

Another important transformation of the 1950s was the modernization and industrialization of Portugal's economy, a long-term plan that became part of the Estado Novo's basis of legitimacy in the postwar period. With the regime's new economic objectives also came a growing concern for the population's educational levels, as the rising industrial sector demanded more qualified labour. During this time, the regime introduced measures to reduce the very high rate of illiteracy in the country - in the range of 50% for the total population in the '50s (though significantly higher among women).

Tied to this industrial transition was a new commitment to assert and expand Portugal's presence in Africa, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, in an attempt to enlarge its colonial markets. The imperial regime framed its "Portuguese economic space" with various protectionist policies that privileged the metropolis, built large public infrastructures, and actively encouraged Portuguese emigrants to settle in Africa. These and other investments did not stop with the outbreak of the Colonial Wars in Angola in 1961, and later in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

As we will discuss in chapters six and seven, the relations between Portugal and the United States became nearly untenable after this, especially during John F. Kennedy's presidency.

Starting in the late 1950s, and reaching record levels in the '60s-'70s, Portuguese mass emigration resumed to various parts of the world, especially in Europe. This phenomenon had vast implications for Portuguese society and economy, as we will discuss in detail in chapter one. Before these movements, the United States and Canada were "marginal references" in the minds

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68 From its opening in 1936 until 1954, the Tarrafal camp, or "Camp Slow Death" as its residents called it, incarcerated 357 opponents of the regime (most of them socialist workers), all of them men, of whom 32 died on site. The camp was reopened in 1961, this time incarcerating African nationalist rebels. Until 1974, 227 African anti-colonialists were sent to the camp, 4 of whom died (Fundação Mário Soares, Museu do Neo-Realismo, and Câmara Municipal Vila Franca de Xira, Memória do Campo de Concentração: Tarrafal, exhibition catalogue, 2010).


70 Rosas, 1993, 487-495.
of Portuguese mainlanders. As José F. Antunes noted: "the spectacular facets of American life diffused abroad - from the materialism of Wall Street to the 'immorality' of Hollywood - stirred repulse rather than fascination in Portugal." This was not the case with Azoreans, who had more intensive relations with their emigrant kin in North America than they did with other Portuguese in the mainland.

The North American societies encountered by Portuguese emigrants in this period also underwent deep transformations. Mainstream public opinion and policy makers in Canada and the United States converged in a growing liberal consensus that gradually accommodated cultural diversity, as long as it fit within the dominant principles of free enterprise, individualism, national loyalty, and middle-class gender norms, as prescribed by the ruling Cold War mentality. At the same time, various social movements pushed for radical transformations in these societies, and achieved important reforms in the legal and political structures that perpetuated their discrimination. Following the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, black, feminist, and some ethnic minority activists were able to challenge the *laissez-faire* dogmas of American free market capitalism with "affirmative action" legislation, which brought employment, educational, housing and other social and economic benefits to these historically marginalized groups. These affirmative action programs met with much opposition from American conservatives, who considered them "reverse discrimination" and a corruption of capitalist principles. Less anticipated was the resentment of white ethnic minorities, particularly those less privileged, who faced similar social and economic problems as their inner-city black neighbours. Older immigrants complained that "they had worked their way out of poverty when government aid was nonexistent, mass public education was severely limited, and manpower development programs did not exist." Those European immigrants who had been told since the 19th century that economic success and full citizenship was only available to those who shed their ethnic heritage and draped themselves in American ("white") skin, were not amused by the fact that race and ethnicity were now key for accessing government aid.

By the end of the 1960s, the legislative gains made by the civil rights movement had clearly failed to improve the socioeconomic conditions of most African-Americans, the majority of whom belonged to the lower classes. Urban centers in the northern American states had

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71 Antunes, 1991, 22.
received a steady flow of black migrants from the segregated South since the '40s, who settled in low-income neighbourhoods, often alongside European immigrants. These inner-city black communities grew at the same time as middle-class whites began moving to the suburbs, leaving behind those working-class European ethnics. By the mid-'60s, African-Americans had become the demographic majority in various cities in the North, although municipal governments failed to represent this change. The discrimination they were subjected to was evident in their disproportionately high rates of unemployment, crumbling and insufficient housing, poor schools, and other products of prolonged government neglect. Adding to these social problems was a sense of disillusionment with the civil rights' legal achievements. The sense of desperation among urban blacks, and especially youth, climaxed in the late '60s, when various radical black liberation movements were formed, many of them involved in the over 300 racial riots erupting in various American cities after 1964.\footnote{Ibid. 128-130.}

Canadian and American public officials, civil society, and ethnic communities also started advocating greater recognition of the cultural diversity introduced by European immigrants. In the United States, this impetus for European ethnic revival coincided with the 1965 Immigration Act, which reopened that country to mass migration, allowing newcomers to revitalize the old ethnic communities of their predecessors. Ethnic clubs, schools, businesses and other community institutions, dedicated to serving their members' social and cultural needs, flourished at this point. But this civic energy did not always carry into mainstream politics, and the little that did was usually channeled by the ethnic elites. That changed when a new generation of immigrant activists emerged in the 1970s, with new political views, methods, and goals. In Canada, this growing cultural pluralism would lead to the 1971 Multiculturalism policy statement, along with a number of similar policies in various Canadian provinces, as we will discuss in chapter eight.\footnote{Colburn & Pozzetta, 1994; John D. Skrentny, \textit{Minority Rights Revolution}, 2002; Franca Iacovetta, \textit{Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada}, 2006.} While becoming increasingly celebratory of cultural diversity, the United States had no comprehensive multiculturalism policy structuring access to government resources or streamlining the relation between ethnic representatives and public officials regardless of race. New England states launched multiculturalist programs addressing specific needs of ethnic communities but they were limited in scope. As Irene Bloemraad argued, the existence of consistent funding for multiculturalist civic activities in Canada had a significant
impact in the formation of that country's ethnic communities and their members' political integration in their host country, especially when compared to the United States.\textsuperscript{75}

In Portugal, the \textit{Estado Novo} launched a new series of reforms after Marcello Caetano replaced the aging Salazar on September 23, 1968; the latter stepped aside after injuring himself in a fall that resulted in a brain hemorrhage, which eventually ended his life two years later. Initially acclaimed as a moderate reformist, Caetano was expected to usher in the gradual liberalization, modernization, and Europeanization of the regime. For this he counted on the reserved support of a new generation of civil servants and politicians emerging from within the regime's ranks, along with a public opinion that was tired of the colonial wars and the regime's old-fashioned conservatism and repressive methods. However, their hopes were short-lived, since the new dictator submitted to pressures from the regime's far-right wing and compromised on the extent of his liberal reforms in order to continue the wars in Africa.\textsuperscript{76}

The 1970s saw a resurgence and radicalization of the opposition, with various Maoist and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary parties and armed groups appearing on the scene, some of them pulling militants away from the Soviet-friendly PCP. The labour movement too gained new life with the inauguration of the clandestine Intersindical in 1970, which organized various illegal strikes. Some sectors that had previously served as a bulwark of the regime, like the Catholic Church, also saw a rise in opposition voices. Threats to Caetano's rule also emerged from the far-right, where there were talks of a military coup. In 1974, the conservative Vice-Chief of the Armed Forces, General António de Spínola, publicly stated that the colonial wars were lost and that the only solution to end that conflict was for Portugal to grant independence to its African colonies; he also incited Army members to take over power.\textsuperscript{77}

Caetano's commitment to continuing the colonial wars ultimately prompted the fall of the \textit{Estado Novo}. The final blow was dealt by a group of military officers organized as the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), who originally came together to advocate for their professional interests and eventually became politicized, with many of its leaders embracing radical forms of socialism. On April 25, 1974, the MFA's forces advanced into Lisbon and arrested Caetano, putting an end to the dictatorship that had ruled Portugal for 48 years. The revolutionaries were cheered effusively by thousands of Lisboners, who mingled with the MFA's soldiers as they

\textsuperscript{75} Irene Bloemraad, \textit{Becoming a Citizen. Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada}, 2006.

\textsuperscript{76} Rosas, 1993, 547-548.

carried on their largely peaceful Revolution of the Carnations - named after the flowers distributed by the crowd that day and decorating the soldiers' rifles.\textsuperscript{78}

Support for the MFA remained strong in the urban centres and in the southern regions of Portugal, as they supervised what became known as the Ongoing Revolutionary Process (PREC), which lasted until the first constitutional election of April 25, 1976. This transition process was marked by intense political turmoil taking the country to the brink of civil war, as various factions fought for control over the revolutionary institutions with support from large sectors of the now heavily politicized population, which participated in many rallies, occupations, and other forms of direct political action.

In the days following the revolution, the military conflicts in Africa came to a halt; political prisoners were freed; leading members of the opposition arrived from exile; and new political parties emerged. The MFA's political program was first introduced by the National Salvation Junta, which governed until the first provisional government was installed shortly after. The revolutionaries invited Spinola to preside the interim Junta, but soon, ideological differences and disagreements over which path of decolonization to follow caused a rift.\textsuperscript{79} Spinola then appealed to the conservative "silent majority" to show their support for him in a rally in Lisbon. Suspecting that a "reactionary" coup was looming, communist and socialist militants barricaded the entrances to the city with help from the MFA, preventing the rally from taking place. Following this episode, Spinola resigned as interim president and his associates were removed from the Junta, thus opening the way for the PCP to take hold of important positions in the revolutionary government. In March 11, 1975, after rumours spread that the PCP and the radical wing of the MFA had compiled a list of right-wing leaders to assassinate, Spinola attempted a military coup, which was foiled. After this, Spinola and his group fled the country.\textsuperscript{80}

With the removal of Spinola and his conservative allies, the MFA veered farther to the left and began implementing its socialist vision in collaboration with the PCP and other radical Marxists. The first provisional government was succeeded in July 1974 by four short-lived PCP-dominated provisional governments, all led by General Vasco Gonçalves, until September 25, 1975. During this period, the revolutionary government nationalized various industries central to

\textsuperscript{79} Pinto, 2001, 65-67.
\textsuperscript{80} Ferreira, 1993, 35-51; Maxwell, 1995, 60-64, 79-81, 89.
the Portuguese economy (including the banks), and supervised the occupation of vacant houses and farmland across the country. Gonçalves also initiated the decolonization process leading to the formal independence of Portugal's African territories and the massive "return" movement of former colonial settlers. The first democratic elections in almost fifty years were also held during this period, on April 25, 1975, when voters were asked to select their representatives in the constitutive assembly responsible for drafting the new democratic constitution.81

A large portion of the Portuguese population was vehemently opposed to Gonçalves' policies and the communist parties that supported him. Tensions between far-left and centre-right supporters escalated in the "hot summer" of 1975, when the offices of communist parties were ransacked or burnt in the northern and central regions of the mainland, and in the Atlantic islands. New radical armed groups emerged on both sides of the political spectrum and a large number of rallies, strikes, occupations, and other civil unrest unfolded at this point. Meanwhile, communists, moderate socialists, and liberals continued to battle for control over the revolution. By September 1975, a group of democratic socialists denounced the MFA's soviet tendencies, raising fears of a violent clash between the two military factions. After this episode, a moderate provisional government (the sixth) was formed, with support from the centre-left Socialist Party (PS), and the centre-right Popular Democratic Party (PPD) - renamed Social Democratic Party (PSD) in November 1976. The moderates' victory was cemented on November 25, 1975, after General Ramalho Eanes - who became the first President of the Third Republic in July 1976 - foiled an attempted coup by a military unit affiliated with the PCP.82

On April 25, 1976, Portuguese citizens at home and abroad elected their first government of the new democratic era and inaugurated a new constitution. Marked by the socialist ideals of its architects, the new constitution enshrined a long list of individual and collective rights and founded a social-democratic system that assigned welfare responsibilities to the government. At this point, the new democratic government began pursuing a new foreign policy, increasingly oriented towards Europe and away from the Atlantic.83

Chapter structure

In order to gauge the Estado Novo's contribution to developing Portuguese diapora in North America, we must situate its policies and emigrant communities within Portugal's larger migration history. Chapter one will provide an overview of the cycles, policies, mentalities, and impact of Portuguese emigration from the first half of the 19th century to the present-day, supported by quantitative data on its demographic, geographic, and economic features, along with cultural references to the changing representations of emigration in Portuguese arts and literature. Chapter two will deal specifically with Portuguese migration to North America, offering a brief overview of the different movements and settlement patterns since the early 19th century, focusing especially on the 1950s-70s. Here I will examine the role played by homeland government and informal grassroots facilitators in shaping the movements and settlement patterns of Portuguese immigrants and their interactions with the host societies' gatekeepers.

In chapter three I will start examining the goals, methods, and overall power of homeland officials to influence the making of Portuguese communities and their leaders, looking at the close relationship between Portuguese Catholic clergymen in North America and the Estado Novo. I will discuss their combined efforts in preventing the cultural and religious assimilation of Portuguese emigrants into Canadian and American mainstream societies; the intersection of nationalist, imperialist, and Christian discourses in promoting ethnic, regional, and diasporic identities; and the contributions of lay parishioners in resisting or facilitating these processes. Chapter four shifts to secular community institutions, looking at the role played by homeland diplomats and their patronage in the making of these ethnic civil societies - by which I mean mutual aid societies, hometown fraternities, sports clubs, social agencies, trade unions, newspapers, radio stations, and the like. Here I will pay particular attention to the actions of ethnic entrepreneurs, or those middle-class businessmen and professionals who improved their social status, wealth, and political influence by acting as both patrons and brokers of less privileged immigrants seeking to access homeland and host nation institutions. Our discussion then proceeds to the realm of culture and language in chapter five, where I will reveal the intersections between Salazar's traditionalist propaganda and the proto-multiculturalist embrace of folk ethnicity in North America. Here I will highlight the ambiguous coexistence of tradition and modernity in the regime's popular cultural policies; in the tourist marketing of peasant life by upper-class urban diplomats; and in the embrace of an idealized rurality by ethnics who traded.
the Portuguese countryside for North American industrial cities. This chapter will also reflect on
the efforts made by Portuguese emigrants to build native language schools and libraries, and the
homeland's response to their constant requests for aid. While studying the cultural and linguistic
make-up of Portuguese ethnicity in proto-multicultural North America, I will discuss the process
of ethnic homogenization by which mainland emigrants came to dominate other regional forms
of Portuguese language and culture, particularly that of Azoreans.

Chapter six will reveal how the Estado Novo's diplomats used the ethnic institutions they
helped create to shape the views of Portuguese expatriates about their homeland government and
empire, and rally support for Salazar's foreign agenda from within Canada and the United States.
I will shed light on the diplomats' control over the editorial policies of Portuguese ethnic media,
and their use of Portuguese-American lobbyists to sway the views of high-ranking American
politicians. This chapter will also examine the regime's adoption of a multiracial discourse to
articulate Portuguese nationhood and imperial legitimacy, and its ambiguous embrace by
Portuguese-American ethnic leaders long stigmatized for their racial "inbetweeness." Framing
this complex discussion is the relation between European and Cape Verdean "Portuguese" in the
United States, especially their racial status within the evolving American identity politics. This
chapter will also reveal the Estado Novo's deliberate efforts to develop a diasporic consciousness
among Portuguese expatriates under an imperialist version of nationality.

Chapter seven will shift our attention to the Estado Novo's opponents, namely those
political exiles and other democratic expatriates who fought the regime from within the United
States and Canada. I will focus on three groups of self-proclaimed "anti-fascists" operating in
Toronto, Montreal, and the greater New York City area, and analyze their local and transnational
political activities. I will argue that the transnational networks developed by these "anti-fascists"
offered an alternative to the regime's imperial diasporic consciousness by underlining the
emigrants' shared memories of poverty, persecution, and exile from the beloved homeland, to
which they remained intensely committed. This chapter will also uncover the methods of
surveillance used by American, Canadian, and Portuguese secret services to gather and exchange
intelligence on these pro-democratic "radicals" and to undermine their political activities.

The final chapter in this dissertation will focus on the various transition processes taking
place in Portugal, Canada and the United States in the 1970s, including the emergence of a new
generation of young immigrant and ethnic activists; the introduction of multiculturalist policies
in Canada and parts of the United States; the deep political, social, and cultural transformations introduced by the April 25th revolution; among others. I will examine the effects that these changes had in shaping the self-understanding of Portuguese immigrants and their descendants; how they fragmented their individual and collective identities; and increased their communities' capacity to articulate diverse political solidarities. Finally, I will discuss the reactions of Portuguese expatriates to the narratives, reforms, and promises of Portugal's revolutionary and constitutional government, and the enfranchising of diasporic citizens in the homeland's national affairs.
1. PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION SINCE THE 19th CENTURY: MOVEMENTS, POLICIES, AND PERCEPTIONS

“Look, look, they go in herds
The emigrants...
Howls of sorrow on the roads.
Near the piers, on the bulwarks
Of distant ships...”
Guerra Junqueiro, Finis Patriae (1890).

When studying the early history of Portuguese migration we are confronted with a challenge from the outset: when does it begin? In a country with a long history of population movement, going back to its maritime expansion beginning in the 15th century, romanticized notions of traveling, exploring new lands, and seeking fortune abroad have made up an integral part of the Portuguese national psyche. Such history has provided the ideological means to interpret modern migrations, which in turn have replenished popular and national mythologies with new references and meanings. But are the differences between colonial settler and emigrant significant enough for us to consider them separate phenomena? Joel Serrão acknowledged there were plenty similarities between the two, although he still treated them as distinct categories. In his assessment, the two could be distinguished according to their ties with the state: the settlers moving through official channels organized by the colonizing state, and the emigrants moving on their own volition, independent of official sanctions, and sometimes even opposed to them.

Subsequent historians have rightly challenged this distinction on the grounds that it deflates the role played by the state in governing voluntary emigration. Nonetheless, until recently, most migration historians have not engaged with imperial history in earnest and vice versa (with notable exceptions). Their periodization usually begins with Brazil’s independence in 1822 and is divided into three large migration cycles: 1) the long classic cycle, beginning with the loss of Brazil as a Portuguese colony and going all the way to the 1930s, characterized initially by a predominantly transatlantic sojourner movement, and later by emigrant families; 2) the postwar cycle, spanning the mid-'40s until the mid-'70s, when emigration shifted primarily towards Western Europe, along with a significant increase in the flow to North America; and 3) the postimperial cycle, beginning with the global economic crisis and the coinciding political transformations in Portugal and the fall of its colonial empire in the '70s, characterized at first by

84 Quoted in Serrão, 1982, 27 (m.t.).
85 Ibid., 87-88.
86 Brettell, 1993, 52.
a dramatic decrease in overall emigration, followed by a gradual increase within European Union (EU) countries, and the rise of immigration to Portugal.87 Portuguese emigration has risen since the 2000s, reaching soaring heights in recent years. Its distinct characteristics make this a new cycle, however, it is still too recent to comprehend its full historical significance.

This chapter will discuss the distinct demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic characteristics of each of these cycles, the policies regulating them, and the evolving intellectual and popular perceptions of Portuguese emigration framing its motivations and meanings.

**The classic cycle: 1820s-1930s**

Throughout the 19th and well into the 20th centuries, the overwhelming majority of Portuguese emigrants went to Brazil. After declaring independence, the former colony developed a population policy that privileged European immigration over the traditional importing of African slave labour, which was finally abolished in 1888. Immigrants were recruited en masse from Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal to work in the traditionally slave-owning coffee plantations. A distant second to Brazil was the United States, which also attracted a great number of Portuguese emigrants, as we will discuss at length in the next chapter. Argentina, Guyana, and Hawaii were other less popular yet still significant overseas destinations. Seasonal migration within the Iberian Peninsula was also an old phenomenon along the borderland regions of Beira Baixa, Alentejo and Algarve, in central and southern Portugal. These were mostly sojourners working in rural, mining and fishing occupations in Spain, whose numbers are hard to quantify.88 Other European destinations also saw the arrival of a significant number of Portuguese labourers in the 19th century.

After the end of the Paraguayan War of 1864-70, in which Brazil was involved, Portuguese migration to the latter started growing at a faster rate, peaking just before the First World War. Emigration dropped drastically during that military conflict, but it would recover much of its previous momentum after 1918, oscillating in the tens of thousands of annual departures. Much of that flow was now directed to Europe, where postwar reconstruction efforts increased the demand for labour, while some of the traditional transatlantic destinations began introducing restrictive immigration legislation. In France, for instance, there were about 10,800

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88 There were also seasonal migration flows in the northern regions of Portugal and Spain, as was the case with Portuguese miners in the Asturias (Adrian Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860-1934, 1987, 40-41).
Portuguese living in the country in 1921; many of them were demobilized soldiers who stayed (or were left) behind after the war. Five years later, that number more than doubled to 28,900, growing to 49,000 by 1931.\(^{89}\) After this, Portuguese emigration dropped to its lowest levels since the mid-19th century, as a result of the Great Depression and the Second World War.

Most emigrants were from the rural regions of the northern mainland, except for those going to the United States, the overwhelming majority of whom came from the Azorean islands. The economic reasons driving emigration from these regions were largely the same as those in other southern European countries, namely: the predominance of small plot subsistence farming with little marketable surplus; population growth resulting from lowering death rates and increasing birth rates; little arable land available to be divided between descendants; no significant industrialization capable of absorbing excess rural populations; a long tradition of intra-European and transatlantic labour migration; and the introduction of new methods of transportation, including railways connecting the rural interior to the coastal sea ports, and steamships shortening travel times across the ocean.\(^{90}\) Initially, rural paupers did not migrate, since they did not possess the means to pay for their transatlantic journeys. But by the mid-19th century, when Brazilian agents began recruiting labourers in Europe, poorer cohorts joined this movement. The majority of them were peasants, mostly waged farm workers but also a few small landowners and tenant farmers. A significant minority were artisans, primarily from the construction trades. Most migrants at this time were illiterate.

For most of the 19th century, Portuguese migration was almost exclusively a temporary enterprise done by single males. But around the turn of the century, as more women began to leave, often joining their husbands or relatives across the Atlantic, these movements became increasingly permanent. Between the 1890s and 1920s, women represented an average of 26% of all emigrants, reaching a high of 32% between 1910 and 1919. At the same time, the proportion of married men migrating alone also increased significantly during this period.\(^ {91}\)

The average age of Portuguese emigrants in the 19th century is unknown, but we know there were a great number of unaccompanied minors working in Brazilian plantations.\(^ {92}\) Many of them were in situations of effective slavery, held under exploitative contracts by the *engajadores*.

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89 Serrão, 1982, 55-56.
92 Statistics on the age, sex, and marital status of emigrants started to be compiled by the Portuguese state only in 1885.
(recruiters) and plantation owners. As payment for their transportation (usually in the ship's hold), these young emigrants were sometimes sold by the ship captains to the plantation owners, much like slaves, although cheaper. According to reports from Portuguese diplomats at the time, many of these young emigrants were "minors of fourteen who are sent by their families to Brazil without recommendation of any sort in the place of destination, to free themselves from military recruitment. The number of children who wander in [Rio de Janeiro] without work is incalculable." 94

By the mid-19th century, a significant number of these early migrants turned to commercial activities in the urban areas of Brazil. A large minority of these brasileiros (Brazilians), as they became known, was able to achieve considerable economic success and return to Portugal, where they invested their newly acquired wealth. According to Miriam Halpern Pereira, the "myth of fortune" embodied by these prosperous returnees "performed in Portuguese society a role equivalent to that of the myth of the self-made man in industrial societies." The popular belief that one could become rich abroad almost instantly placed tremendous social and psychological pressures on the emigrants, who in turn exaggerated their success in their letters home, further inflating the myth. This "desire for social mobility", Pereira added, upset the ruling classes, who criticized the emigrants' "unbridled ambition for riches" as being immoral, and instead proposed that poverty was "a laudable condition akin to moral purity." 96 The overrepresentation of urban success stories obscured the fact that many more emigrants returned to Portugal in conditions of dire poverty and illness, or perished anonymously in the unforgiving Brazilian hinterland. 97

As in many European countries in the 19th century, emigration was a regular topic of discussion in Portugal's public sphere, engaged by some of the country's most influential thinkers, who debated its benefits and disadvantages relative to national interests. 98 While sympathetic to the "plight" of those forced to leave their homes in search of a better life

93 While an African slave cost around $1,500 to $2,000 réis in 1859, a Portuguese emigrant could be "bought" by a mere $120, the price of his sea passage (M. H. Pereira, 1999, 194).
94 Letter from the Consul of Portugal in Rio de Janeiro to the Portuguese Foreign Minister in 1864, cit. in Brettell, 1993, 54.
95 The Portuguese brasileiro resembles the Italian Americani. Both became popular myths in the regions of high return migration, affecting societal values to the point that it became a matter of shame and dishonour if a man did not attempt to improve his socioeconomic status through emigration. For more on the mentalidad of Italian migrants, see Franc Sturino, Forging the Chain. Italian Immigration to North America, 1880-1930, 1990.
96 M. H. Pereira, 1999, 184 (m.t.).
97 Between 1919 and 1930, 10,496 emigrants were repatriated to Portugal as indigents in their host countries; 9,596 of them came from Brazil (Serrão, 1982, 38).
98 For an examination of similar public debates in Italy, see Choate, 2008.
elsewhere, political commentators saw emigration as a structural problem with profound detrimental effects for national morale, economic development, and military manpower. The celebrated novelist-essayist-politician-historian Alexandre Herculano pointed to the exodus of his countrymen as a sign of Portugal's "collective misery", and as justification for the economic reforms proposed by his liberal caucus.99 "Out goes the energy, in stay the inert and mendicant arms," lamented Oliveira Martins, one of Portugal's pioneer socialist theoreticians and historians of the latter part of the 19th century. Martins praised emigrants for their "gifted" initiative and "money-making aptitudes", yet urged them to stay for the sake of developing their own country.100 Other important figures of Portugal's liberal, socialist, and republican intelligentsia studied this phenomenon and invariably concluded that it was a national problem that ought to be fixed through deep reforms. Their perception of emigrants was generally ambivalent, seen as both culprits and victims of the country's stagnation.

The "emigrant" was also a recurrent character in Portuguese literature, explored by some of the country's most celebrated authors, some of whom with personal histories of displacement themselves. The brasileiro figured in various 19th century novels, where he was commonly portrayed in an unflattering light, mocked as a moneyed, uneducated rustic, obsessed with social climbing. Camilo Castelo Branco, the most prominent and prolific author of Portuguese Romanticism, was particularly vicious in his description of this character, who often played the role of the immoral villain in his books (Figure 1). The Neorealist generation of the 20th century would redeem the brasileiro by describing the hardships that emigrants went through as labourers abroad, paying tribute to their courage and survival spirit. Some of these authors drew from personal experiences, as was the case with José Ferreira de Castro and Miguel Torga, both of whom spent part of their lives working in Brazil (Figure 2). Representations of emigration in the visual arts were scarce during this period (Figure 3-5). However, one piece captured the imagination of Portuguese intellectuals in 1872: Soares dos Reis' sculpture O Desterrado (The Outcast), considered by experts as one of Portugal's masterpieces in that medium. The "outcast" was inspired by Herculano's poem "Sorrows of Exile", about the poet's political exile and bitter longing for his homeland. Other artists drew inspiration from this piece, including the poet-philosopher Teixeira de Pascoaes, founder of the nostalgic saudosismo doctrine, who considered

99 Serrão, 1982, 117.
100 Oliveira Martins, "A Emigração Portuguesa", 1891, cit. in Joel Serrão, "Notas sobre a emigração e mudança social no Portugal Contemporâneo", Análise Social, vol. XXI (87-88-89), 1985, 996 (m.t.).
the "outcast" to be the ultimate plastic representation of the Portuguese national soul. A century after it was unveiled, Serrão associated "the outcast" with the 20th century emigrant and proposed a more woeful reading of this sculpture, as representing an "innocent victim of an unfair society that boycotts his joy of being, [who] searches for... reasons that can confirm his resolve to return to his lost paradise."101

Freedom of mobility became a principle protected by Portuguese authorities after the 1820 Liberal Revolution, and later enshrined in the 1826 Constitutional Charter. However, this respect for the individual's right to migrate without having the state dictate his or her destination and occupation made it difficult for government officials to implement their population and economic plans. By the mid-19th century, the state began assuming a more interventionist role in emigration matters, as governing authorities became increasingly concerned with reports arriving from Brazil about the widespread mistreatment of Portuguese minors at the hands of recruiters and employers. Portugal introduced legislation regulating the transportation of emigrants to Brazil, and stipulated that labour contracts offered to its citizens guaranteed three daily meals, a two-hour lunch break, laundry services, and a maximum of nine- to ten-hour work days. Additional legislation in 1863 required prospective emigrants to present proof of employment and prepaid transportation before they could be issued a passport. At the same time, the state upheld one of the chief incentives prompting youth emigration by keeping military duty mandatory; although it now required proof of military service (or a monetary deposit in lieu of) as a condition for obtaining a passport. These measures substantially reduced the abuse that Portuguese formal migrants were subjected to in Brazilian plantations, but also lead to a dramatic rise in illegal emigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; a conundrum that governing officials had to contend with throughout most of Portugal's history. Nonetheless, despite introducing severe penalties for illegal emigration, the government did not seem too concerned with its growing trend when in 1907 it increased the cost of obtaining a passport.102

The concerns of government officials and landowning elites regarding the impact of emigration on the country's economy were aggravated at the turn of the century when more families began to leave, leading to serious depopulation in some regions, and demographic stagnation at the national level. But while the large agriculturalists condemned emigration for

102 Brettell, 1993, 53-54.
reducing the nation's labour pool and consequently increasing wages, they were happy to see the economic status quo maintained with the exodus of a potentially disruptive impoverished population. The large landowners of Alentejo had traditionally benefited from the seasonal migration of sojourners from the more populated north and were opposed to the idea of colonizing the south since it raised the spectre of agrarian reform. The dwindling of this internal migration at the end of the 19th century reinforced talk of such reforms, at which point the southern rural elites moderated their criticism of emigration.

Another factor placating its public condemnation was the growing size of remittances.103 On this topic, Fernando Emídio da Silva, an early emigration scholar, commented in 1917: "It is from misery that comes our best riches: it is from the nostalgic pariah, the atavistic adventurer who leaves the inhospitable beaches of a land that failed to give him bread, in a tormented demand for better yet unsure destinations, that the gold comes."104 Curiously, Silva became administrator of the Bank of Portugal two years later. This ambivalent attitude prevailed throughout most of Portugal's emigration history.105

In the 1930s-40s, Portuguese emigration dropped to its lowest level, resulting from the restrictive immigration legislation introduced by the traditional countries of destination in reaction to the economic and political effects of the Great Depression and the Second World War. In the United States, legal barriers to immigration started even earlier, in 1917, and were later reinforced by the highly restrictive Immigration Act of 1924. The Brazilian government also tightened its borders in 1931, curbing the inward flow of European migrants and the outward flow of capital, thus bringing that large stream of remittances to a sudden halt.

Another catalyst for this drop in emigration was the rise of the Estado Novo. Even during the regime's most ideological years, Salazar never envisioned a Portuguese diaspora, or saw the symbolic value of emigration in the same way that Benito Mussolini or Adolf Hitler did. Italian

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103 Commentators at the time estimated $3 million escudos in remittances in 1873; $8 to $13.5 million between 1881 and 1890; and $20 to $24 million in 1917 (Serrão, 1985, 1001; M. H. Pereira, 1999, 200).
104 Fernando Emídio Silva, Emigração Portuguesa, 1917, XI, cit. in Serrão, 1982, 175 (m. t.).
105 This was also the case with other European governments in the 19th century. On this, Bodnar wrote: "Emigration itself was frequently viewed as a serious loss of productive citizens which would seriously harm economic growth... But homeland governments did not persist in attempting to prohibit something as uncontrollable as massive population movements. They often saw the benefits to be derived from the emigration of their citizens and sometimes moved to encourage it. As the nineteenth century progressed... mercantilists gradually dropped their earlier opposition and began to see emigration as an outlet for overpopulation, a means of reducing the burden of caring for the poor (even though the poor seldom emigrated), and a safety valve for popular discontent... Despite opposition from the landed gentry and even the military establishment who feared a loss of manpower, commercial transportation interests often stood to profit from migration streams... Understandably, when government realized they could not totally control the exodus and that they were often caught between opposite political factions, they moved to regulate the process in order to avoid a loss of influence altogether" (1987, 49-50).
and German immigrants in the '30s were subjected to systematic propaganda from their homeland governments, coordinated by its diplomats on a mission to make good patriotic Italians and Germans out of their expatriate citizens. As we will discuss throughout this study, Salazar's diplomats did exercise considerable influence within emigrant communities and nurtured their patriotism, but the Lisbon government sometimes undermined their organizational efforts. Salazar saw emigration primarily as an economic, financial, and policing matter. In his eyes, emigration was ultimately a good thing since it generated much needed remittances, which the regime used to balance the country's finances. However, the uncoordinated and in great part unlawful population exodus was something the authoritarian government could not tolerate, especially since its African colonies continued to lack a large settler population that could exploit its economic potential. The regime's interest in redirecting emigrants towards the colonies was amplified when the flow of remittances from Brazil was interrupted, prompting authorities to consider its African territories as replacements for that essential source of external payments.

The *Estado Novo* first tried to control emigration in 1929, when it decreed that citizens between the ages of 14 and 45 were not allowed to emigrate unless they had completed primary school. Given Portugal's very high rate of illiteracy, especially in the countryside, this effectively banned labour migration. The 1933 Constitution then proclaimed the government's "right and the obligation of coordinating and regulating the economic and social life of the Nation with the aim of populating the national territories, protecting emigrants, and disciplining emigration." The responsibility for repressing illegal migration and overseeing the issuance of passports was placed in the hands of PVDE, which in 1944 started enforcing a ban on passports for industrial and rural workers. Finally, in March 1947, it suspended emigration altogether, except for those candidates with a "letter of call" or work contract from abroad. It is difficult to say the extent to which these restrictions were responsible for curbing Portuguese emigration in the 1930s and '40s. Judging from the decades that followed, had the political and economic conditions in the receiving countries not been so unfavorable, they probably would have fallen short of containing emigration and likely would have furthered illegal departures. As for the

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108 Decree 16782 of April 27, 1929, *Diário da República Eletrónico* (henceforth DRE), url: [www.dre.pt/sug/1s/diplomas.asp](http://www.dre.pt/sug/1s/diplomas.asp)
110 Decree 33918 of September 5, 1944, DRE.
colonies, they were unable to attract a significant number of emigrants before the '60s, since they lacked the economic incentives or the capacity to integrate a large European settler population.

**The postwar cycle: 1950s-1970s**

The postwar cycle begins with the peacetime reconstruction efforts of those northern and western European countries most affected by the war. This rebuilding demanded a great deal of unskilled labour, which was provided by the countries of the south, leading to a large inter-European migratory flow. With little capacity to retain its excess population, spared from the war’s tragic death toll, Portugal became one of the largest providers of migrant labour for this reconstruction. Still, in the 1950s, the transatlantic movement continued to be dominant, representing 93% of all emigration (68% of which went to Brazil). The colonial wars in Africa starting in 1961 introduced another incentive for young men to leave Portugal clandestinely, so to avoid conscription. A great many families who were officially counted as economic emigrants also left the country to save their sons from fighting in the bloody conflict.

From 1962 to 1963, the European flow jumped from 18,626 to 32,798 legal departures, surpassing for the first time the transatlantic movement, with 22,420 in the latter year. In the '60s, the European movement represented 68% of all Portuguese emigration, a large portion of which was clandestine. Baganha estimated that, in the period of 1950-88, about 36% of all emigration from Portugal was illegal. Many of them crossed the ocean to Brazil, USA, Canada, and Germany.

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112 Maria I. Baganha, "Portuguese Emigration After World War II", in Pinto (ed.), 1998, 8.

113 Ibid., 5.
Spanish border covertly through the mountainous regions in the north, often with the help of hired smugglers and bribed border guards,\footnote{Pimentel, 2007, 67-68.} making the long journey on foot or hidden in cargo vehicles, in what was known as o salto (the jump) (Figure 6). The bulk of the European movement went to France (59% of all emigrants in the 1960s), particularly to the Paris metropolitan area, where the migrants built large shantytowns (or bidonvilles). The largest of these suburban slums was in Champigny-sur-Marne, where there were over 12,000 Portuguese living in dismal conditions in the mid-'60s (Figure 7-8).\footnote{The Institute of International Social Cooperation, "Report on Portuguese Community in France," 2011, 11.} Other important European destinations were Germany, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. New transatlantic destinations also emerged in this period, such as South Africa, Venezuela, Canada and Australia; old streams, like the United States, were also reactivated. Although decreasing in relative importance, the overseas migrant movement still represented a significant steady flow in this period, with a yearly average of over 36,100 legal departures in 1950-54, and over 25,600 in 1955-74. At this point, the United States and Canada replaced Brazil as the preferred countries of transatlantic destination.

Compared with transatlantic emigrants, who came primarily from rural areas in the Atlantic islands and the northern mainland, the European movement had a larger portion of urban and industrial workers.\footnote{Baganha, 1998, 11.} In most emigrant settlements on either side of the ocean the pattern was the same: women were primarily employed in service jobs, like cleaning, and the men in construction work. As in the past, the majority of emigrants from the mainland planned to return and invest their earnings in their hometowns after a period of intense work abroad, while those from the Azores were keener on settling permanently in North America, where continuous migration had transplanted many of their family members.

During their first years in the new country, emigrants focused almost exclusively on accumulating savings quickly by working long hours at multiple jobs and reducing living costs to a minimum, often at the expense of their personal rights, comfort and dignity. In Europe, the geographic proximity with Portugal allowed these migrants and their families to regularly visit one another, which helped them endure long stretches of intensive labour and mitigate some of the emotional toll and personal sacrifices (Figure 9). Over time, the tendency was for sojourners to take up residency in their host countries and begin calling for their family and friends to join
them on a permanent basis.\textsuperscript{117} Even after they settled in their adopted countries, emigrant families kept their intensive work ethic, usually mobilizing every able-bodied member of the household, including children, in the hope of buying a house in the new country.

Only ten months after implementing its emigration ban, the \textit{Estado Novo} acknowledged it was unable to uphold it. In October 1947, the regime opted instead to introduce a system of annual emigration quotas, determined according to the labour needs of the applicant's region of origin.\textsuperscript{118} As Baganha argued, this ambiguous yet overzealous policy - given that it was introduced in a decade when emigration averaged only 9,000 departures per year - was driven by the "corporatist regime's rationale of submitting individual rights to the collective interest," and its "need for a safety valve mechanism used for reducing the existing demographic surplus."\textsuperscript{119}

To centralize and better control its emigration services, the government also created the Emigration Junta (JDE). The new agency was responsible for coordinating the recruiting, transporting, and settling of emigrants in their new country, and "protecting" them from "\textit{engajadores} and self-interested intermediaries."\textsuperscript{120} PIDE was still responsible for policing illegal emigration, sanctioning the issuance of passports, and securing the borders. From that point on, prospective emigrants no longer had to go to municipal offices and declare their intention to leave the country. Instead, according to the JDE's inaugural decree: "the emigrant will see his case resolved without stress, or having to waste his meager resources; and, with all his documentation in order and his travel ticket in hand, he will embark for his destination as soon as his rightful turn arrives, with the least possible expense or strain, guided and looked after from the beginning, at no costs, by the services of the Junta." The JDE was also responsible for studying and advising the government on matters related to emigration; overseeing the negotiation and the enacting of international emigration agreements; ensuring the emigrants' best interests were met in their host countries by defining the basis of their labour contracts, their duration, the terms of their repatriation, their access to welfare benefits and subsidies for sickness and work accidents, and guaranteeing the transferring of their remittances or the payment of part of their wages in Portugal; recommend emigration quotas for each country; and propose the

\textsuperscript{117} Serrão, 1982, 40.
\textsuperscript{118} Decree 36558 of October 28, 1947, DRE.
\textsuperscript{119} Baganha, 2003, 4.
\textsuperscript{120} Harney (1977) noted that the blaming of informal emigration agents (or \textit{agenti}) by the Italian government for "artificially" increasing the exodus of its population was a "conservative device" promoted by the landowners of the South to obscure the structural problems compelling its rural inhabitants to leave the country and to justify their policing. A similar rationale may have been at play in the \textit{Estado Novo}'s condemnation and repression of \textit{engajadores}. 

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number of workers of a given occupation and region allowed to emigrate in a given period. The same decree also stipulated that shipping companies had to meet minimum comfort standards when transporting emigrants.\textsuperscript{121}

Another important piece of legislation introduced by the \textit{Estado Novo} in 1958 was its Nationality Law, which outlined the boundaries within which emigrants could claim or renounce their citizenship. The new law followed the principle of \textit{jus solis}, meaning that the place of birth (Portuguese territory) was the determining factor in assigning citizenship. There were exceptions to this rule. Emigrant descendants born abroad to a Portuguese father could be granted citizenship if they, or their father, declared an interest in obtaining it, and provided that their birth was registered in their local consulate. Portuguese mothers could also pass on their citizenship to their children as long as the father's nationality was unknown. Foreign women automatically obtained Portuguese citizenship when they married a Portuguese man, unless they requested otherwise prior to marrying. As for Portuguese women who married a foreigner and expressed a desire to maintain Portuguese citizenship, they were allowed to hold dual-nationality. Arguably the most significant aspect of the new law was the fact that, from then on, anyone who voluntarily took up citizenship in a foreign country would automatically lose their Portuguese nationality.\textsuperscript{122}

Portugal's economic landscape started changing in the 1950s, when the regime began shifting its focus away from agriculture and the northern mainland's labour-intensive industries towards the modern industrial sector emerging in the Lisbon metropolitan area. The government believed the growing industrial activity in the country's capital, together with emigration, would alleviate the population surplus in the northern countryside. In 1962, the state reinforced its role in managing emigration and oriented it towards national economic aims by introducing an emigration ban on skilled workers employed in strategic occupations, and enforcing a maximum emigration quota of 30,000 departures per year.\textsuperscript{123} That same year, another decree stated that Portuguese citizens could only emigrate upon obtaining a special "emigration passport". The \textit{Estado Novo} restated its paternalist commitment to expatriated citizens by promising to look after them from the moment they began planning their departure and throughout their entire stay abroad. It also reserved the prerogative to ban emigration to specific regions or countries,

\textsuperscript{121} Decree 36558 of October 28, 1947, DRE (m.t).
\textsuperscript{122} Law 2098 of July 29, 1959, DRE.
\textsuperscript{123} Decree 44422 of June 27, 1962, DRE.
"whenever special circumstances impose it." But in typical fashion, the government dropped its emigration quota the following year once it realized that its citizens continued to leave in very high numbers, inflating the ranks of illegal emigrants.

Unable to direct the country's migration flows through its own legal means, the regime sought the cooperation of host governments in order to achieve its goals. At the same time, the ample attention given by the international press to the poor living conditions of Portuguese emigrants in Europe (particularly in France) was cause for national embarrassment, which pressured the Estado Novo to introduce social security measures for its emigrants. In the 1960s, the Portuguese government signed a number of agreements with various European countries, regulating the movement of its emigrants and their access to social welfare programs. According to Vanda Santos, the real objectives of these bilateral agreements were to prevent the departure of skilled workers in certain trades and control the movements of political migrants, especially those trying to escape military duty. Nevertheless, in 1968, as a result of these accords, around 69,000 Portuguese families with at least one of its members working in France, West Germany, Luxembourg or the Netherlands, received free medical assistance and drugs from foreign health organizations; that year, another 181,303 families of Portuguese descendants living in France and Luxembourg received a family allowance from Portugal. While many families benefitted from these international arrangements, many more failed to take advantage of them, either because they ignored their existence, were illiterate, had little experience dealing with bureaucracy, or were undocumented and therefore avoided interacting with state officials.

In the 1960s, PIDE began a new chapter in its mission to repress clandestine emigration by putting its vast informant network to work on it. However, as was characteristic of the dictatorship, its strong policy statements on emigration did not always match their enforcement, which was sometimes lackadaisical. Many factors informed Salazar's deliberately ambivalent attitude towards emigration. As in the past, it was a convenient "safety valve" for releasing social and political pressures in a large unemployed and impoverished population. For dissatisfied workers living under a violent repressive state, emigration certainly seemed a more immediate and safer alternative to labour organization and political upheaval. Still, as Brettell noted, even if

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124 Decree 44427 of June 29, 1962, DRE (m. t.).
125 Vanda Santos, Discurso Oficial do Estado Sobre a Emigração dos Anos 60 a 80 e Imigração dos Anos 90 à Actualidade, 2004, 72.
effectively tolerated by the regime, clandestine emigration "was a rare form of collective [peasant] defiance of state law."\textsuperscript{128} Victor Pereira went farther and argued that "emigration was the main form of resistance used by the Portuguese popular classes." Portuguese labour organizers and the PCP did not share this view. For them, emigration and its remittances availed the regime, since the emigrants’ individual strategies to evade Portugal's structural problems undermined the communist organizers' efforts at collective mobilization.\textsuperscript{129}

Ironically, the regime's softness on illegal emigration also upset northern industrialists and large landowners, who repeatedly expressed concern over the serious labour shortages and rising wages precipitated by mass emigration.\textsuperscript{130} Salazar's general indifference to their pleas reflected his belief that the country's labour structure would be reshaped by the modern industry emerging in the south, with its high demand for skilled workers and professionals, who traditionally did not emigrate in large numbers. Another fundamental consideration behind the regime's ambivalence was its dependence on the emigrants' remittances. Long an important source of foreign revenue, remittances became indispensable for Portugal's balance of payments in this period. Their volume more than doubled in the 1950s, growing at an even faster rate in the mid-60s, even when compared to the volume of exports. As Baganha argued, the state's informal tolerance of illegal emigration contributed to this growth, since it deliberately separated families by allowing men to leave the country while making it hard for women to follow them, thus guaranteeing a flow of

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Graph3.png}
\caption{Graph 3. Sources: Baganha, 1994, 978. Values converted from Portuguese escudos through fxtop.com historical currency converter.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{128} Brettel, 1993, 54.
\textsuperscript{129} V. Pereira, 2009, 478.
\textsuperscript{130} For more on this see Elizabeth Leeds, "Industrialização e Emigração em Portugal: sintomas inevitáveis de uma doença estrutural", \textit{Análise Social}, XIX (77-79), 1983: 1045-1081.
remittances between them.\textsuperscript{131} In addition, the growing emigrant communities generated demand for Portuguese products in their host countries, which increased the country's exports. In short, emigration, legal or illegal, was seen as a positive contribution to the nation's finances. By 1969, with Caetano already at the helm, the regime stopped prosecuting clandestine economic emigration as a crime and began treating it as a lesser violation, penalized by heavy fines. At the same time, the penalty for recruiting or smuggling undocumented emigrants increased.\textsuperscript{132}

The impact of emigration on Portugal's economic development in this period has been the subject of debate among historians, who have contrasted the known benefits and drawbacks of mass emigration against the contributions that this surplus population might have made should they have stayed.\textsuperscript{133} But while scholars disagree on the ultimate benefits of emigration, the general consensus is that remittances had a detrimental effect on the country's economy, since they led to a rise in inflation and allowed the government to ignore its structural trade deficit. The cash inflow to the northern and central rural regions of Portugal also subsidized their traditional agriculture, perpetuating an otherwise unviable agrarian system.\textsuperscript{134} At the micro level, however, remittances were a lifeline for many Portuguese families, who used that money to pay for their increasing costs of living, and in some cases allowed them to expand their consumer habits. Some of these new consumer tastes were introduced by the emigrants themselves, who sent news of the latest fashions and the occasional luxury products with their letters home. This was particularly true in the Azores, where the majority of the population had little money other than what their migrant family members in North America sent them.

In 1970, the Portuguese Ministerial Council debated the "emigration problem" at length from which resulted a comprehensive plan that called for more information for prospective emigrants; a renewed commitment to curbing clandestine migration; the extension of social welfare to emigrants and their immediate families in Portugal; an increased collaboration with emigrant community institutions, especially when delivering welfare services; additional international agreements with countries of destination; and adherence to the UN's International Labor Organization's Migration for Employment Convention (Co97). The latter obligated

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\textsuperscript{132} Decree 49400 of November 19, 1969, DRE.
\textsuperscript{133} For more on this discussion, see Maria Baganha, "As Correntes Emigratórias Portuguesas no Século XX e o seu Impacto na Economia Nacional," Análise Social, Vol. XXIX (128), 1994 (4).
\textsuperscript{134} Rosas, 1993, 497.
\end{flushleft}
member nations to maintain "an adequate and free service to assist migrants for employment," and to "take all appropriate steps against misleading propaganda relating to emigration and immigration."\(^{135}\) Co97 also outlined a number of obligations concerning the equal treatment of immigrants in relation to the citizens of their host countries in matters of remuneration, union membership, housing, social security, employment taxes, and legal rights. According to the Minister of Corporations and Social Welfare, his government also decided to strengthen cultural ties between Portuguese descendants and their homeland by investing in community schools and opening summer camps for the emigrants' children.\(^{136}\)

To coordinate this new emigration policy, Caetano's government launched the National Secretariat of Emigration. The new agency, which replaced the JDE, responded to the regime's "urgent need to... convince those who want to leave the Country - often on their way to bitter disappointment - to stay, and to regulate and channel migratory flows, particularly those directed to [Portugal's] overseas provinces, as well as establish a support network for emigrants, wherever they are."\(^{137}\) The secretariat's first foreign delegations opened in 1972, in France, Luxemburg and West Germany, and later Venezuela and Canada.\(^{138}\) With the transferring of the emigration file away from the Ministry of Interior, PIDE lost its responsibility for monitoring the departure of Portuguese citizens, leaving that task to other police agencies.

While Caetano stated his resolve to prevent the "emigrants' denationalization", he continued to characterize mass emigration as a "cancer", one that he promised to stop by generating more employment.\(^{139}\) In its final years, the *Estado Novo* was beginning to change the way it engaged with expatriated communities. On the eve of the 1974 revolution, Portuguese officials were preparing to launch what Baganha called "the most liberal [emigration] law of this period". The proposed bill praised emigration as "a positive factor for the modernization and rationalization of labour, [one that] has made a powerful contribution to the progress and development of the country."\(^{140}\) Ironically, the emigration "cancer" began to dwindle as the regime was preparing to embrace it.

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135 Articles 2 and 3 of the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949, No. 97, url: www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100 ILO_CODE:C097
136 Interview with Minister Baltasar Rebelo de Sousa (April 9, 1975), cit. in Comunidades Portuguesas, União das Comunidades de Cultura Portuguesa, October 1971, Year 6 (24), 75-76.
137 Decree 40270 of August 22, 1970, DRE. The same document also created the Interministerial Committee for Emigration Affairs.
139 Speech delivered by Marcello Caetano at an Accião Nacional Popular meeting, September 27, 1972, cit in. Santos, 2004, 40.
140 Emigration policy bill, Actas da Câmara Corporativa 142 (February 23, 1973), cit. in Baganha, 2003, 4.
The post-imperial cycle: 1970s-1980s

Two events inaugurated this migratory cycle: the global "oil crisis" of 1973-74, and the Revolution of the Carnations of 1974. The first generated a worldwide economic recession that severely shrunk job markets everywhere and led to widespread anti-immigration policies in Europe. Some European countries also introduced programs encouraging the immigrants' voluntary repatriation, of which many Portuguese took advantage. France, who had already introduced tough immigration restrictions in the early 1970s, decided in 1974 to put a halt to the incoming flow of foreign workers. As a result, Portuguese emigration fell sharply by the end of that decade. This drop was particularly noticeable in the European movement, which dropped from 83% of total emigration in 1973 to 63% in 1975, and then to 39% in 1979. The overseas movement became dominant once again after 1978 (except for 1982-84), accounting for 51% of total emigration in 1980-88.\textsuperscript{141}

The number of returned migrants increased significantly during this period, from close to 7,000 in the 1960s to 13,000 in the ‘70s, and 52,000 in the ‘80s;\textsuperscript{142} about 71% of these were male, more than half over the age of 45, and a third over the age of 56. A significant portion (25% in 1970; 32% in 1980-81) were children and youth under the age of 19, many of whom were moving to Portugal for the first time. About 90% of former emigrants settled in the same rural communities they had left. The majority of them still lacked formal qualifications: 12% were illiterate; 24% had no formal schooling; and 56% had attended only primary school. They often found it difficult to transfer the skills learned abroad, or were simply not interested in resuming the same occupations they had as emigrants. In fact, 41% of

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Portuguese_emigration_by_destination_1974-1988.png}
\caption{Portuguese emigration by destination, 1974-1988}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{141}Baganha, 1998, 8
\textsuperscript{142}These numbers do not include former Portuguese colonials in Africa who returned to Portugal in mass in 1975.
returned migrants removed themselves from the workforce altogether. Those who remained active tended to start their own small businesses or turned to agriculture. As Baganha noted, their stories of emigration were generally triumphant: "A house, major appliances, a car, a small trade or restaurant, the opportunity for wives to stop working, the return to the region of departure, and a varying, but frequently reasonable, level of savings all guaranteed upward mobility." Their savings, which were largely used for consumption purposes, also contributed to develop local economies.

Most of the former political and intellectual exiles returned to Portugal in the aftermath of the April 25th revolution, wanting to join in the celebrations and contribute towards building a new future for their country. In the larger return movement their numbers were fairly small, but their impact in different areas of Portuguese society was immense. Some of the politicians that determined the fate of the Third Republic, including Álvaro Cunhal and Mário Soares, leaders of the PCP and PS respectively, returned to Portugal at this point (Figure 10). This cohort also included a great number of intellectuals, artists, and professionals who were now celebrated as heroes for their contributions in the fight against "fascism", from which resulted their exile. Upon their return, they often assumed leadership positions in their respective fields and political organizations, and contributed to modernize Portugal's outdated thinking.

The hasty decolonization of Portugal's former territories in Africa in 1975-76 led to another return movement of massive proportions, which placed severe strain on the country's fragile state. Over half a million Portuguese "refugees", or retornados (returnees) as they became known, hurried out of Angola and Mozambique when civil wars broke out between opposing nationalist forces immediately after their independence. The situation became desperate so quickly that an international airlift was put in place to fly these "refugees" back to Portugal, many of them leaving with nothing more than the clothes on their bodies and the few belongings they could carry (Figure 11). These former settlers faced much hostility from Portuguese civil society, now dominated by the left, which saw the retornados as reactionary colonialists, who had lived luxuriously in Africa thanks to the racist exploitation of its black populations. While in many cases this perception corresponded to the truth at some level, in many others it did not. In any case, Portuguese nationals were reluctant to aid these "refugees" and resented the support programs introduced by the government to assist in their reintegration, often accusing retornados

of "stealing their housing and jobs". About 60% of the returnees were born in Portugal. The vast majority were white, although a significant minority were black or mixed race (mostly Cape Verdeans). Along with their skin colour, the latter also stood out for their deepening poverty and harsh living conditions in shantytowns around Portugal's largest cities. Unlike white retornados, this group had no kinship networks in Portugal who could offer them temporary aid. According to Stephen Lubkemann, this racialized minority contributed to further stigmatize retornados in the eyes of native white Portuguese. Contrary to the expectations of the day, a spike in remigration did not follow from this mass repatriation. Still, a significant number did remigrate to countries with large Portuguese expatriate populations and became active members in these communities.

At this point, national media reported the difficult realities of Portuguese emigrants in Europe, where they were exploited as cheap labour and suffered severe material privations, thus challenging the traditional triumph through hard work narrative, and calling into question the emigrants' decision to leave their country in the first place. An article titled "Emigrant. The Revolution needs you", published by the popular leftist magazine O Século Ilustrado, wondered whether "leaving is a more courageous act than staying." The various short-lived PREC governments approached the emigration file from a Marxist perspective and treated it primarily as an economic and labour issue. In the eyes of the new political order, emigration was a "maximum humiliation" suffered by workers "forced to leave the land where they were born in order to guarantee minimum living conditions for their families," and with whose unrelenting patriotism the revolutionary government identified itself. At the same time, policy-makers, who first consulted with emigrant representatives on August 21-23, 1974, studied ways to improve the social, cultural, and economic situation of expatriates in their host countries; dismantle patronage and influence-peddling systems set up in their communities by the dictatorship; and channel the emigrants' savings towards the deep reforms planned for their homeland.

147 Speech by Prime Minister José Pinheiro de Azevedo, 6th provisional government (September 1975 - July 1976), cit in Santos, 2004, 44 (m.t.).
The first provisional government (May to July of 1974) pledged to protect Portuguese emigrant workers and introduce social and economic incentives encouraging their return. To carry out this program it created the Secretary of State of Emigration, operating under the Ministry of Labour, and equipped it with two subsidiary agencies: the General-Directory of Emigration and the Institute of Emigration. The first was responsible for informing the government on all matters concerning emigration and overseeing its international agreements. The second was in charge of supporting expatriate communities on labour rights issues; offering social assistance to emigrants on a day-to-day basis; supporting the development of organizations dedicated to advancing their social and cultural conditions; and connecting emigrants to Portugal's "national reality" by providing information on how to best invest their savings in their homeland.\(^{149}\) Except for minor adjustments,\(^ {150}\) this policy remained largely unchanged throughout the next five provisional governments.

The 1976 constitution reintroduced the right of individuals to freely emigrate and return to their country. That year also saw the first legislative elections of the new democratic era. Portuguese citizens and "plurinational" descendants over the age of 18 who were registered as "Portuguese" in their local consulates, were allowed to vote for their own political representatives at the National Assembly in the newly created emigration districts of "Europe" and "Outside of Europe" - each electing two members of parliament.\(^ {151}\) However, those whose citizenship had been stripped by the Estado Novo for having taken the nationality of

\[\text{Graph 5. Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições website.}\]
their host countries, did not have their Portuguese citizenship restored and were excluded from this election.\textsuperscript{152}

The first two constitutional governments (1976-78), led by the centre-left,\textsuperscript{153} set forth a list of initiatives aimed at improving the living and working conditions of emigrants. During this period, Portugal (re)negotiated social security accords with the EEC, various European nations, Venezuela, and Canada, ensuring that Portuguese emigrants be granted the same labour rights as the citizens' of these countries. In 1977, the government committed to defending the emigrants' right to education by equipping and subsidizing their community schools, and by training Portuguese educators to teach abroad. Its declared aim was to boost the national consciousness of emigrant children by teaching them the language, history, and geography of their ancestral homeland; but "without chauvinism."\textsuperscript{154} The government also pledged to advance emigrant interests in Portugal, such as boosting their investments in the home country,\textsuperscript{155} facilitating their return, and protecting their private property.

Despite their greater awareness of the emigrants' wants and needs, successive left-wing governments still perceived emigration as a national "problem" resulting from decades of poor economic management and deep-seated social inequality. But while economic development was the obvious solution in the minds of governing officials, the high unemployment rate in post-revolutionary Portugal forced them once again to open the emigration "valve" as a short-term solution to address the labour surplus. Interviewed by a Portuguese-Canadian newspaper during a visit to Toronto in 1977, the State Secretary of Emigration, João Lima, expressed his own ambivalence towards his role: "When systematic, the policy of emigration is extremely reproachable; it blocks the country from performing its most precious function, which is that of apportioning work. However, the present realities impose that some emigration be encouraged... I've been battling with myself, but I must develop that policy, hoping and trusting that in the medium-term the country's overall development will impact its underdeveloped regions."\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{152} Decree 93-C/76 of January 29, 1976.
\textsuperscript{153} The short-lived second constitutional government (January to August 1978) was formed by a coalition between PS and the right-wing Democratic Social Centre (CDS) parties, where the first had ascendency.
\textsuperscript{154} Law 74/77, September 28, 1977, DRE. Santos, 2004, 75-76.
\textsuperscript{155} The 6th provisional government (September 1975 to June 1976) had already addressed one of the emigrants' major financial concerns. Previously, those wishing to deposit their savings in their homeland were obligated by the Bank of Portugal to do so in escudos (Portuguese currency). Emigrants feared the ongoing political instability in Portugal would eventually devalue the escudo, along with their savings. To avoid this, the government allowed emigrants to deposit their savings in a foreign currency. "Depósitos em Portugal em Moeda Estrangeira", Comunidade, April 15, 1976, 6, York Space Institutional Repository, CTASC (henceforth YS-CTASC).
\textsuperscript{156} Interview with the State Sec. of Emigration João Lima, Comunidade, March 31, 1977, 13 (m.t.), YS-CTASC.
In the late 1970s, the Portuguese government shifted its focus from an emphasis on the social and economic concerns affecting emigrants into one that dealt primarily with their cultural and political representation; a turn that was furthered by the right-wing governments of the '80s. At this point, the expatriate communities' cultural identity and their place in the post-imperial nation was amplified in the state's official discourse. Emigrants were now represented as national ambassadors, valued for their cultural, political and economic integration in their host societies; no longer the social and economic outcasts in need of rescuing by their homeland state. As mentioned in the introduction, in the process of coming to terms with the loss of its colonial empire, Portuguese officials proposed a new collective imagination that could reassert the nation's greatness, reinvigorate a sense of patriotism among its people, and cling to some of its former geopolitical relevance. But the discourse and tropes used to elaborate this new national identity were largely the same as those of the old imperialist regime. The romantic notion of the explorer as the "adventurous", "entrepreneurial", "cultural broker" was recycled and redeployed, no longer identifying the civilized colonizer but the industrious emigrant. As Brettell argued: "it is in this desire for unboundedness, this desire to escape the ever prevalent thought that Portugal is ‘um país pequeno’ [a small country] that one can find an explanation for the symbolic transformation from navegador, to colono, to emigrante.”

As with most nationalist projects, this was a highly gendered process, where the nation's flag-bearer was always a man. No clearer evidence is there than President Ramalho Eanes' address on Portugal's national day celebrations of 1977, which marks the beginning of this official diasporic discourse:

> What distinguishes the Portuguese from other men is his exceptional capacity for making the whole world his land and every human being his brother, without ever losing the traces of his Lusiad roots.  
> Today, as yesterday, greatness lies in the universal dimension of our people... They have a right to the title of “strong” men, which Camões reserved for the great performers of Lusitanian diaspora. And decolonization, far from meaning that Portugal has lost its ecumenical perspective, has, on the contrary, reclaimed its historical vocation in a purer state. The country that we are today does not look at men as instruments of territorial exploration, but instead considers them links of an indestructible community of sentiment and culture...  
> Thus, a new concept of Fatherland emerges from our authentic national tradition: it matters more the man than the ground where he lives on."

At this point, the term "Portuguese communities" entered official parlance, while the word "emigrant" was avoided due to the unflattering images it invoked in Portuguese psyche, connoted as it was with poverty, illiteracy, and other ignoble stereotypes. This semantic

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157 Brettell, 1993, 60.  
158 President of the Republic, António R. Eanes, cit. in Comunidade, June, 1977, 5, YS-CTASC (m.t.) - my emphasis.
sensibility was reflected in the renaming of the national holiday, known since 1977 as the "Day of Portugal, Camões and the Portuguese Communities"; and in the replacing of the State Secretary of Emigration with the State Secretary for Emigration and Portuguese Communities in 1980.

The 1980s and early '90s were dominated by the PSD, which formed government as the leading partner of a centre-right coalition in 1980-83, and alone in 1987-95 (PS governed in 1983-87). During this period, the Portuguese state increased its commitment to the expatriate communities, in part driven by the rise in remittances, which grew a massive 2106% between 1974 ($173,600 USD) and 1989 ($3,656,025 USD). Their relative value to the Gross Domestic Product also increased, from 8.22% in 1973-79 to 10% in 1980-89.

Another important factor driving the government's increased activity was the dynamic personality of Maria Manuela Aguiar, the secretary of state in charge of emigration in 1980-81 and 1983-87; member of parliament for "outside of Europe" in 1980-85 and 1995-2005; and for "Europe" in 1985-87. A pioneer feminist politician - one of the first to occupy a decision-making role in the Portuguese

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159 Portugal's national holiday is celebrated every year on June 10 since 1911. The secular holiday was introduced by the First Republic as part of its project to reduce the Catholic Church's influence in Portuguese society. The date was chosen to coincide with the death of 16th century poet Luis Vaz de Camões, who wrote the national epic The Lusiads. Previously called the Day of Portugal (1910-43), the holiday was rebranded by the Estado Novo as the Day of Portugal, Camões and the Portuguese Race (1943-77). It was not until the regime appropriated the holiday and turned it into a propaganda feast, charged with militarist references (especially since 1963), that it became a prominent national and diasporic celebration.

160 Values not adjusted to inflation. Between 1974 and 1989, the median inflation rate was close to 20%, with a tendency to drop over time, which increased the relative value of these remittances even further (historic inflation rates from Trading Economics, url: www.tradingeconomics.com)


162 In 1985, the socialist Prime Minister Mário Soares invited Manuela Aguiar to remain as secretary of state for emigration despite her own party's electoral defeat.
government - Aguiar was an energetic champion of emigrant causes in parliament and within her own government. Her ideas and dedication not only shaped Portugal's emigration policies but also the expectations placed on homeland politicians by the expatriate communities. One of Aguiar's most important contributions was advocating for women's issues in the diaspora, which she realized early on in her tenure was a male-dominated domain. In her own words: "I could rarely speak to the women, 'locked' in the associations' restaurant kitchens or seated in the second and third rows of the audience, attentive and discreetly silent." The First World Meeting of Women in Associations and Journalism, held in June 1985, was the first government-backed initiative dedicated to Portuguese emigrant women. Of this event, Aguiar later recalled: "Finally, I heard the voice of women! More than their personal history, they made the history of the last half-century of Portuguese emigration, of the cultural associations, which, when we think about it, started with their participation, with the youth, with entire families revolutionizing the clubs' everyday life..."163

Various government programs and agencies dedicated to serving emigrants were introduced in the 1980s, the most significant being the Institute of Aid for Emigration and Portuguese Communities. Launched in 1980, the Institute set out to "guarantee efficient aid and protection to citizens who emigrate, during their preparations for departure, their adjustment and integration in the countries and communities of destination, their maintenance and promotion of relations with the country and communities of origin, and finally their temporary or definitive return."164

This decade also saw the entrenching of diasporic consciousness in the political minds of Portuguese officials and in the state's self-understanding of sovereignty, which now acknowledged that expatriate citizens had been historically marginalized from their nation's decision-making centres, despite having played an important role in its development. The vision of a borderless citizenship led the centre-right coalition government to create the Council of Portuguese Communities (CPC) in 1980. Inspired by the Conséil Supérieur des Français de l'Étranger, founded by the French government in 1948, the CPC (the second oldest council of its kind in Europe) was designed to advise the government on expatriate community matters and work towards "safeguarding the cultural values alive in the Lusiad communities across the World.

164 Decree 316/80 of August 20, 1980 (m.t.), DRE.
and reinforcing the ties that bind them to Portugal." This council was also expected to consolidate these communities into a recognizable diaspora by providing "a platform for dialogue and better mutual understanding that reflects the union of Portuguese organizations and of their descendants living abroad." Its membership included the State Secretary for Emigration; the members of parliament for the emigrant districts; representatives from expatriate organizations; delegates from Portugal's labour unions and employers' associations; and a group of experts on emigration affairs. Countries with a "justifiable" number of emigrants were invited to form their own local committees responsible for representing their communities at the CPC and vice versa. While the homeland government proposed to consolidate the diaspora through the CPC, they alerted the council's members that its success ultimately depended on the autonomous contributions of its local committees.

The CPC's inaugural meeting was held in Lisbon on April 6-10, 1981, and attended by 300 delegates from various Portuguese communities around the world (Figure 12). The topics for discussion ranged from cultural and language education; social security; return and reintegration; community media; EEC integration; transportation; housing; professional development; citizenship; social and legal aid; to the Secretariat's organizational structure. Contrary to the organizers' unifying expectations, the meeting uncovered the heterogeneity of viewpoints and political disharmony within emigrant communities, with their personal rivalries and factions spilling into the working committees. Some delegates (presumably those on the left) accused the organizers of turning the meeting into a partisan platform for the ruling PSD, and complained about the undemocratic ways in which other delegates were selected. They also criticized the homeland government for its political instability and lack of continuity in its emigration

165 Decree 373/80 of September 12, 1980 (m.t.), DRE.
166 Canada and the United States were each given 4 seats at the CPC for "community associations" representatives, and 1 each for media representatives. Brazil sent the most delegates with 14, followed by France with 11, and South Africa with 8; West Germany and Venezuela both sent 2; Spain, England, Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the Nordic countries, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Argentina all sent 1.
167 According to Aguiar, the reason her government placed such emphasis on the "association movement" was because they recognized "its central role in organizing and developing the Communities, its capacity for preserving language, culture, customs and national traditions, without preventing... integration in the host society. All of that is done and maintained without the continuous aid of Portugal's governments: 100% civil society!" ("O Conselho das Comunidades Portuguesas e a Representação dos Emigrates", in Beatriz Padilla and Maria Xavier (eds.), Revista Migrações - Número Temático Migrações entre Portugal e Américas Latina, Fall 2009, n. 5: 257-262).
policies.\textsuperscript{169} This precarious start would set the tone for much of the CPC's existence, which has been marked by various controversies between its delegates and the succeeding governments trying to improve its functioning. In any case, the CPC has informed policy-makers on matters of concern for emigrants and their communities.

The Azorean and Madeiran regional governments also began making efforts to connect and consolidate their expatriated communities since they secured their political autonomy from Lisbon in 1976. In June and July 1977, the first Congress of Madeiran Communities brought together representatives from various emigrant organizations to discuss their expectations regarding their relationship with the regional government.\textsuperscript{170} Their advisory capacity was institutionalized in 1984 with the creation of the Permanent Council of Madeiran Communities; Madeira's equivalent to the CPC.\textsuperscript{171} The Azorean government organized a similar congress in August 1978, where its delegates discussed how best to serve its emigrant communities and develop "schemes of intercommunity connection."\textsuperscript{172} Azorean officials did not create their own diasporic council but held annual meetings with emigrant representatives, launched an agency dedicated to fostering ties with the emigrant communities, and sponsored numerous cultural initiatives promoting ethnic and diasporic consciousness based on the notion of Açorianidade\textsuperscript{173} (Azoreaness).\textsuperscript{174}

Another important step taken by the Portuguese state towards asserting its global scope was introducing a new Nationality Law in 1981 that replaced the previous ruling principle of \textit{jus soli} (which emphasized place of birth as the basis for citizenship) with that of \textit{jus sanguinis}, (which stressed lineage instead). Since then, both father and mother can pass on their Portuguese nationality to their children born outside of the country. The new law also recognized the dual-nationality of emigrant descendants, along with those former citizens whose nationalities had been stripped by the \textit{Estado Novo} for taking up the nationality of their host countries.

\textsuperscript{169} The most outspoken critics were the delegates from Europe and Canada - particularly those from Montreal and Winnipeg. ( briefing notes for the Minister James Fleming, Ethnic Groups - Portuguese, NAC).
\textsuperscript{170} "Madeirem' 77", Comunidade, March 31, 1977, 17, YS-CTASC.
\textsuperscript{171} Regional Legislative Decree 6/84/M of June 14, 1984.
\textsuperscript{172} "Congresso das Comunidades Açorianas," Correio Português, March 30, 1970, N473, reel 1, Archives of Ontario (henceforth AO).
\textsuperscript{173} Açorianidade was a term coined by the Azorean writer Vitorino Nemésio in 1932, referring to what he believed was the Azoreans' ethnic consciousness as islanders with a deep spiritual connection to the soil, the sea, and the shifting volcanic bedrock of their homeland.
With Portugal's entry in the EEC, migrant workers were able to travel within that European labour market with greater ease and pursue higher wages in the same northern and western European countries as their predecessors; though this time, the number of sojourners was much higher. By joining the EEC, the Portuguese government was finally able to secure those comprehensive legal protections it had previously tried to implement through bilateral agreements with individual countries. Portuguese citizens living in EEC countries saw their rights increase to match those of the citizens of their host societies, including full access to their welfare programs. At this point, Portuguese expatriates began refusing the term *emigrants* to identify themselves, not only because they now saw themselves as European citizens, but also because they rejected the stigmas of poverty, illiteracy, and foreignness associated with that label. Recognizing the need for a more inclusive language of nationality, the government adopted the term *non-resident* Portuguese in 1987.

Perceptions about emigrants or non-residents improved in Portugal as more of them returned to their hometowns; especially in the countryside, where their presence was most noticeable. Generally, Portuguese residents held sympathetic views about emigrants, especially when referring to the sacrifices the latter had to make during the dictatorship in order to secure a better life for themselves and their families. It also became common for non-emigrants to praise their counterparts' relentless work ethic, particularly when criticizing their own. Also, a great number of Portuguese families had at least one of its members live abroad at some point in their lives, which made individuals personally aware of that shared experience. Nonetheless, some disparaging notions about emigrants persisted, echoing those of 19th century commentators. Although the returned *francês* (Frenchman) never amassed the kind of legendary fortune that their *brasileiro* predecessors were known for, relative economic success was common. For the

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175 It was not until the Schengen Area was officially inaugurated in 1995 that EU citizens were able to circulate freely across the national borders of member states.
most part, these returnees had been able to improve their socioeconomic status, invest in their children's education, refurbish old houses or build new ones, or open small businesses. Their newer and often luxurious houses, their imported cars, their large tips at the local café, or their foreign accents and mixed vernacular, stood out in the otherwise dull countryside. This did not go unnoticed by urban visitors, who tended to see emigrants as both "nouveau riche yokels" and cultural products of a ruralist and traditionalist past that they wished never to return to. At the same time, some emigrants found it difficult to conciliate their (sometimes hyper) Portuguese identity with the self-perceptions of post-revolutionary Portuguese nationals. As we will discuss in chapter eight, it was common for emigrants visiting or returning to Portugal to remark on how they no longer recognize their "home", leading to what Noivo noted was the "stark irony that it may be easier for [diasporic Portuguese] to express their Portugueseness outside than inside Portugal."177

A "country of immigrants": 1990s-2000s

As a member of the community of modern European nations, Portugal began shedding its reputation as a have-not nation of emigrants and re-imagining itself as a desirable country of immigrants. Government officials changed their national discourse from its previous emphasis on diaspora to one that presented Portugal as a modern European country at the centre of an international linguistic commonwealth. Once again, emigration became primarily a labour issue, removed from the government's foreign affairs' agenda. Still, the structures previously put in place to support emigrants and their communities remained intact, new services continued to be created, and emigration officials persisted in their dedication to the diaspora. However, their work was no longer a government priority and fewer resources were allocated for it.

This reinvention was consolidated when a larger number of immigrants began arriving in Portugal in the 1980s-90s, initially from its former African colonies, then later from Brazil, Eastern Europe, and Asia. The growing presence of "other" racial and linguistic communities

177 Noivo, 2002, 270.
in Portuguese society stirred dormant nativist prejudices, although many embraced the cultural diversity introduced by these immigrants. The rise of new hybrid cultural habits and forms of expression resulting from the fusion of different cultures, especially those sharing the same linguistic background, was most apparent in urban contexts, where the immigrants settled in greater numbers. Gradually, this hybridism percolated into the mainstream without significant resistance from traditionalist cultural forces.\footnote{Writing about Portugal's music scene in 1998, the year that Lisbon hosted the World's Fair (Expo 98), anthropologist Timothy R. Sieber (“Composing Lusophonia: Multiculturalism and National Identity in Lisbon’s 1998 Music Scene”, Diaspora 11.2. Fall 2002) argued that, behind this cultural hybridity was an imbalance of power favouring the old imperial metropolis' version of Portuguese culture, to which "other" Portuguese cultural and linguistic traditions were supposed to descend or take inspiration from; never the other way around. Today, Sieber would find a more egalitarian music scene, where a new generation of eclectic artists of various cultural and racial backgrounds has emerged. Besides being interested in rediscovering traditional Portuguese sounds, themes and compositions - rejecting direct imitation of American and British influences as was prevalent in the 1990s - many of these new artists incorporate the cultural diversity of urban Portuguese society in their music in a somewhat effortless way, reflecting their own experiences growing up in multiracial and multicultural environments.} These cultural developments were supported by the national government, which introduced programs promoting cultural pluralism and highlighting the multiracial makeup of Portuguese society. However, the immigrants' cultural integration was not followed by a corresponding social, political and economic one, areas where they continued to fall behind white nationals.

Behind this domestic emphasis on pluralism was the government's attempt to legitimize its claim to being an broker nation occupying a "privileged" intermediary position between developed Europe and developing Africa. Despite having shifted its foreign policy focus from the Atlantic to Europe after 1974, Portugal kept close ties with its former colonies, with which it cooperated on a range of issues. In 1987, José Manuel Barroso, then State Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation,\footnote{Interview with José Manuel Barroso, Prelo 17 (October-December 1987): 39 (m.t.).} believed that:

> Portugal finds itself in a special situation, given that it is one of the least developed countries in the European community and at the same time a former colonial power... We are, therefore, in a rather original position. On one hand, Portugal still receives some international aid, while on the other, it is itself a provider of international aid. I believe that there is no other country in the world in this situation, at least not in an obvious way. For that reason, along with our participation in the EEC and NATO, one of our priorities is to maintain a special relation with those Portuguese-speaking African countries._\footnote{Durão Barroso, as he is known in Portugal, became Prime Minister with PSD in 2002-04. In 2004 he resigned to become the President of the European Union's Commission.}

Central to this political program was _Lusofonia_ (Lusophony), a broad concept adopted by the governments of Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) countries to amalgamate a diverse group of people from different nations, regions, and diasporic communities who shared that linguistic
background and its associated cultural traits. The term is used interchangeably to refer to the common international interests of Lusophone countries, or to the body of literary and artistic work drawn from Portuguese linguistic traditions and the intersection of its various cultures. Since 1996, this international postcolonial fellowship has had a home in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, a commonwealth of Lusophone countries, whose mission it is to disseminate Portuguese language, coordinate diplomatic efforts, and improve social, economic and cultural cooperation between its members.  

*Lusofonia* also many supporters - including Manuela Aguiar\(^\text{184}\) - but also detractors, including among supporters of cultural pluralism. Their criticism focused on what they believed was the Lisbon government's hegemonic construction of national identity that they claimed underlied its Portugal-centric version of Lusophone multiculturalism. Postcolonial critics have accused *Lusofonia* of whitewashing intrinsic power relations and cultural inequalities within the Portuguese-speaking world. In Lubkemann's words:

> As Portugal has attempted to re-imagine a postcolonial and national identity, it has engaged in a process of reinventing its past through a carefully crafted process of selective remembering and forgetting… This multilayered discourse represents an effort to claim a geostrategic social and political place for Portugal in the present, based on a sanitized and selective representation of the past. \(^\text{185}\)

Timothy Siber furthered this criticism:

> [T]oday’s common expressions of Lusophonia, especially those promoted by the state, represent at best a very superficial postcolonial reconstruction of older imperialist ideologies… The casting of the Portuguese elements as universal and neutral - exactly as in classical lusotropicalism\(^\text{186}\) - disconnects historic cultural exchanges entirely from underlying asymmetries in economic and political power, serving to conceal or to declare them irrelevant. \(^\text{187}\)

Whatever the case may be, *Lusofonia*’s language of cultural pluralism has seeped into the collective imagination of Portuguese nationals through multiple public and private channels, leading its civil society in turn to measure the government against its own pluralist standards. In fact, before the 2008 financial crisis, various signs indicated that the Portuguese government was

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\(^{183}\) The CPLP's founding members were Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe. East Timor joined in 2002 after gaining independence from Indonesia.

\(^{184}\) Aguiar described this commonwealth as "an adventure among equals, without any primacy attributed to territorial or demographic disparities among partners, and even less to any positions within former relationships" (cit. in Sieber, 165).

\(^{185}\) Lubkemann, 2002, 208.

\(^{186}\) *Lusotropicalismo* was a thesis proposed by Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre in the 1930s describing the Portuguese empire as an experiment in multiracial equality and miscegenation, and its colonial rule as being more benign than other industrial empires. Freyre explained this by referring to the supposed mixed racial background and humble character of the Portuguese. Salazar adopted this thesis after the Second World War to justify its colonial possessions in the eyes of its Western allies. We will discuss *lusotropicalismo* at greater length in chapter six.

taking significant steps towards fulfilling its own vision of an inclusive citizenship, recognized by the international community as a leader on that front.  

As Santos pointed out, the Lisbon government's efforts in the 1990s to "paint a positive image of immigrants" was comparable to "its promotion of a positive and non-stigmatized image of emigrants in the 1980s, which reinforced a view of Portugal as a humanist country." Though superseded, the emigrants were not forgotten with this shift towards Lusofonia. Candidates running in emigration ridings; hometown politicians fundraising for their public projects; or homeland dignitaries visiting on ceremonial occasions, all continued to praise the diaspora. As in the past, these visitors extolled the many virtues of their "hard-working" brethren and commended their continued patriotism.

Since 1992, emigrants have had the opportunity to follow daily occurrences in Portugal more intensely than ever before with the launch of the Portuguese international public television broadcaster RTPi. Originally intended as a tool for reinforcing and disseminating Portuguese culture across the Lusophone commonwealth, RTPi has became the diaspora's television channel. Its programming includes news-, talk-, variety- and game-shows; sports broadcasts; soap operas and other fictional series; and various informational and educational content. Most of its programs are produced by or purchased for RTP's national channels, but some are authored in the emigrant communities. Its most popular daily talk-shows (on both national and international channels) are those that cater to both resident and non-resident audiences, and weave local, national, and transnational themes. It is common in these live broadcasts for the guests, members of the audience, or viewers calling-in to send messages to loved ones in the diaspora and vice-versa. In the summer time, these shows travel across the country, broadcasting live from town squares, where they are surrounded by crowds of cheerful local residents; they showcase the people, the natural beauties, the food, the crafts and other folk traditions of the region, along with its recent infrastructural developments and other modernizing initiatives, often introduced by local politicians and businessmen. Largely absent from RTPi's programmig are the

188 The Migration Integration Policy Index is a triennial study launched in 2004 by a range of international institutions, including the European Union, which evaluates national policies promoting immigrant integration - i.e. labour market mobility, family reunion, long-term residence, anti-discrimination, political participation, access to citizenship, education. In 2007, the study included all EU countries, plus Norway, Switzerland and Canada; in 2010, it also included Bulgaria, Romania, and the United States. Portugal ranked 2nd in both years, trailing behind Sweden. For more, see www.mipex.eu/

189 Santos, 2004, 148 (m.t.).

190 In 1998, the Portuguese government launched RTP África in partnership with the TV networks of Lusophone African countries.
more modern expressions of Portuguese culture favoured by the urban and younger populations, including those multicultural expressions lauded in the government's Lusophone discourse.

Besides folk music and dance, the form of cultural expression that receives most airtime on RTPi is what is popularly called *pimba*, a style of music that has become associated with Portuguese emigrants. Characterized by its catchy and simple repetitive melodies borrowed from a variety of musical genres (i.e. Iberian folk traditions; European polka; American country; Brazilian forró; and electronic dance music), its gaudy performances, and its combination of lewd, ultra-romantic, patriotic and religiously devout lyrics, *pimba* has been a favourite among Portugal's rural populations and its emigrants. Emigration is a common theme in *pimba* songs, many of them expressing the sorrows of leaving one's home and the longing to return. Despite being a modern type of music, as evidenced by its extensive use of electronic keyboards and rhythm boxes, and its common adaptations of mainstream pop songs, *pimba* performers are typically associated with rural culture. Some of its most famous performers have been active since the 1970s (Figure 13), yet *pimba* only became a mass phenomenon in the '90s, when a large number of performers emerged in Portugal and the diaspora. Supported by only a few record labels, these musicians have had extraordinary success in both sales and live bookings, benefitting from a vast touring circuit that includes the Portuguese countryside and the emigrant communities. The summer (especially August) is their busiest season, which is when emigrants tend to spend their holidays in Portugal and almost every town in the country holds its annual *festa* (feast). These inevitably include plenty of food, alcohol and games, but it is the dancing that attracts most patrons; hence, the music band usually determines their success. The *festas'* organizers in Portugal and in the emigrant communities often encounter resistance from the older patrons whenever they try to improve the musical quality of their events by inviting other kinds of musicians and attract younger audiences.

While popular among Portugal's white lower classes, *pimba* is derided by the highly educated and urban-minded, who despise it for its mass-production, its amateurish compositions, and the crude and sexist content of its lyrics and performances. Nevertheless, on select festive occasions, such as weddings and street revelries, *pimba*'s detractors often allow themselves to be entertained by this music, even if in a sarcastic, tongue-in-cheek kind of way. The attention that

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*Pimba* is a Portuguese onomatopoeic colloquialism suggesting impact or a thud. Its closest English equivalent is "smack". The term was adopted by the general public to describe this genre of music after the release of the single "Pimba Pimba" by singer Emanuel, in 1994. In this song, *pimba* refers to the sexual act between a man and a woman.
RTPi dedicates to *pimba* to the detriment of other more sophisticated music genres has been a point of contention for its critics in both Portugal and the diaspora, who have argued that emigrants "deserve better”, and that *pimba*’s overrepresentation turns away younger generations from becoming interested in Portuguese culture.

Despite these fears, many Portuguese descendants have produced artistic works in their countries of residence reflecting on their social and cultural background. A considerable number of novels have been published in recent years recounting the experiences of Portuguese migrant families in their host countries and the authors' own identity struggles, some of them garnering critical acclaim. Curiously, these works are largely ignored in Portugal. However, Portuguese nationals have been quick to point out the ancestry of musicians, actors, and athletes of Portuguese descent who achieve international notoriety, eagerly claiming them as one of their own. This national appropriation is complete when these celebrities publically embrace their Portuguese roots. The most notable example of such recognition is that of Portuguese-Canadian singer Nelly Furtado. Born in Victoria, British Columbia, to a family of Azorean emigrants from São Miguel, Furtado became an international pop star in 2000 with the release of her critically acclaimed album *Whoa Nelly!* which sold millions of copies worldwide. In her songs, videos and live performances, she often includes references to her Portuguese (and Azorean) heritage. Following her international success, the Portuguese government invited her to record the official song of the UEFA Euro Cup soccer tournament, one of the largest sport competitions in the world, which Portugal hosted in 2004. Furtado was also invited to sing at the closing ceremony at the Luz Stadium in Lisbon, where she performed on a stage made to look like a futuristic caravel (representing Portugal's past and future), surrounded by a group of folk dancers from the northern mainland.

The 2008 global financial crisis caused emigration rates to rise once again, placing the old phenomenon back at the centre of Portugal's public debate. Contrary to previous migratory cycles, a large number of new emigrants are highly qualified workers and recent graduates with little hope of finding decent employment in the country that invested greatly in their education. At the same time, many immigrants have also begun to return to their home countries or move on to other destinations. The economic factors motivating people to migrate were exacerbated by

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192 For instance, Anthony de Sa's *Barnacle Love*, published in 2008, was a finalist in two prestigious Canadian literary awards. The book tells the story of a Portuguese cod fisherman who tries to start a new life in Canada after washing up in Newfoundland, of his disappointments and family struggles, and of his son's experiences growing up in Toronto's Little Portugal.
the austerity measures dictated by the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Committee (or troika) in the terms outlined for their financial bailout to Portugal in 2011, and implemented and extended by the PSD government of Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho. The prime minister and his cabinet members have even suggested to the country's unemployed that they should "abandon their comfort zone" and consider emigration as a viable economic strategy;\(^{193}\) a proposition that has led to a great deal of public outcry (Figure 14). The return of emigration has also been reflected in the growing body of scholarship, fictional and documentary filmmaking, and other artistic expressions dedicated to that topic. In these recent works, emigrants have been portrayed in a positive light and treated with the respect and admiration often reserved to one's ancestors; in this case, forebears of a reality that many young Portuguese have recently begun to experience.

**Conclusion**

Few phenomena have been as persistent in Portugal's history as the exodus of its people. Whether for economic or political reasons, with or without the assistance of the state, emigration has been a normal and sometimes expected part of life in Portuguese society, particularly among the rural and fishing populations of the northern mainland and Atlantic islands. Political, economic, and intellectual elites have considered emigration to be a reflection of the nation's past mistakes and a threat to its future ever since Portuguese workers began leaving the country's shores in large numbers to look for a better life elsewhere. Influential thinkers in the 19th century and their intellectual descendants saw this as the result of deep structural problems, of which the emigrant was an ambivalent victim of both want and greed. On the other hand, the desire to maintain the status quo moderated the protests of political and economic elites about the detrimental effects of mass emigration. While the exodus of cheap labour forced wages to rise and profits to drop, the removal of a potentially disruptive surplus population yielded social peace and guaranteed a steady flow of money into those regions where the ruling economic system fell short of providing for the welfare of its population.

Ambivalence has also characterized Portuguese emigration policy ever since 19th century liberal legislators tried to conciliate their commitment to individual freedoms with their moral

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responsibility to protect national citizens from foreign exploiters. Another dominant feature of the governments' handling of emigration since the 1860s was its inability to control or prevent its flow in any predictable way. Every restriction it put in place to curb the exodus seemed to result in a surge of clandestine movements. These emigrants' undocumented status consequently increased their vulnerability at the hands of unscrupulous employers in the receiving societies, which was the exact opposite of what Portuguese legislators intended with their restrictions. This was particularly true with the postwar migratory movement to Europe, where several thousands of Portuguese crossed the borders on foot, away from the state's gaze. Emigrants crossing the Atlantic had fewer opportunities to avoid the authorities, since they landed in highly supervised border-crossing ports. For that reason, those restrictions introduced by New World countries were more effective in reducing migrant flows from Portugal than European ones. Still, the extent to which host governments helped shape the volume of Portuguese emigration is difficult to estimate since most of their restrictions were introduced during periods of economic downturn or war, which were arguably more important factors in determining migratory movements.

While not entirely powerless, the Portuguese state had to factor in the porosity of its borders and the deficiencies of its enforcement apparatus when designing its emigration laws. Salazar was skilful at exploiting the gap between a statement of policy and its enforcement. The dictator managed to appear stern on the formal disapproval of emigration while reaping the benefits of a growing exodus of surplus labour with ongoing ties to Portugal. But besides the flow of remittances, emigration did not occupy much space in the dictator's mind. As reflected in the 1958 Nationality Law, Portuguese nationality under the Estado Novo was essentially territorial and did not envision a diasporic citizenship beyond its imperial borders. Moreover, emigrants who took up the nationality of their host countries were seen as defectors, not the dual-national international brokers celebrated by post-74 governments.

Nonetheless, the high rates of emigration in the postwar period demanded the regime's attention beyond mere financial and economic considerations. The Estado Novo's authoritarianism, with its repressive police apparatus and paternalist ideology, was undermined by its inability to contain the movements of its population. Its first comprehensive attempt at overseeing emigration and providing for the legal and economic protection of its citizens abroad was launched in the late 1940s, with the creation of the JDE. But it was only in the '60s that the regime intervened more intensely in what was now a phenomenon of massive proportions.
Driving this increased activity were the military's growing demand for soldiers to fight in the colonial wars; the renewed commitment to enlarging the colonial markets with white settlers; and the embarrassing media coverage of the miserable living conditions of Portuguese emigrants in Europe. Under Caetano, the regime assumed an even greater role in providing emigrants and their communities with greater social and cultural assistance.

A number of policies were introduced in the aftermath of the 1974 revolution to address a range of longstanding concerns held by the emigrants. The first left-wing governments saw emigration as a labour issue resulting from social and economic inequalities in Portuguese society, which they hoped to correct. Their policies were mostly concerned with ensuring that emigrants had equal access to social security, their labour rights were respected abroad, and their return to and/or investment in Portugal was facilitated. Eventually, even the socialists assumed an ambivalent position on emigration. While they wished not to emulate the past, they recognized the usefulness of emigration as a "valve" for relieving the country of its large unemployed population, and the value of remittances, which continued to grow at a fast pace.

The shift in emigration policy from a social and economic emphasis to a cultural and political one started in the late 1970s. However, it was the right-wing governments of the '80s that translated the discourse of global national citizenship and diaspora into actual institutions with real political meaning. Diasporic citizens could elect their own members of parliament and influence policy-makers through the CPC and its regional versions. Though sometimes dysfunctional, emigrant communities took advantage of these diasporic councils to push their agendas and demand a more inclusive national membership. Emigrant women were also finally heard by homeland government officials and encouraged to mobilize across the diaspora. Despite the overall shift in policy, this period also saw the introduction of numerous programs offering social and economic aid to the emigrants abroad and to those who returned home. Emigrants, for the most part, did not see these as generous gifts from the homeland but the recognition of what was theirs by right, legitimized not by some kind of symbolic entitlement, but by the very real financial contribution they made to Portugal's coffers.

In order to separate themselves from the Estado Novo's paternalistic policies, democratic officials changed their lexicon to avoid sounding like the old regime. They introduced new designations like "Portuguese communities" and "non-residents," and added "5 million
people”\textsuperscript{194} to Portugal's global population, now accounting for those living outside of its national territory. Emigrants had come a long way in their homeland's public imagination, from the miserable rustic obsessed with social climbing, or the outcast who perpetually longed for the country that rejected him, to the global ambassadors of Portuguese patriotism, cosmopolitanism, and industriousness. This discourse, however, was largely reserved for the diaspora and had limited circulation among Portugal's domestic audiences. Furthermore, Portuguese nationals had their own perceptions about emigrants, less informed by the government's official narrative than by their interactions with returnees, often echoing old unflattering stereotypes. Even the term \textit{emigrant} was but one of various designations used to identify a range of expatriate experiences, from the esteemed revolutionary exiles to the unwelcomed reactionary \textit{returnados}. Perceptions also changed between regions; generally, those on the countryside, who had benefitted most from the emigrants’ remittances, tended to have more positive views than their urban counterparts.

After joining the EEC, Portuguese officials shed much of their celebratory tone when referring to this historical phenomenon, along with its negative stereotypes, preferring instead to embrace a future where Portugal was to become a desirable, multicultural nation of immigrants. The "5 million" diaspora was also assimilated into the much larger Lusophone commonwealth. In the same way that the \textit{emigrant} had previously replaced the \textit{colonizer}, language now replaced territory as the crux of a national identity that continued to aspire to global greatness.

In recent decades, as emigration rises at a fast pace, the old "cancer" has returned to the forefront of Portugal's public debate. This time, however, the story has different characters, involving a large exodus of Portugal's most highly qualified generation in its history, many of them coming from urban backgrounds. Some of them have been able to gain notoriety as popular artists and athletes fairly quickly, joining the growing number of Portuguese descendants who have also risen to international fame in recent years. These developments will likely continue to improve the image that Portuguese nationals have of their emigrants.

\textsuperscript{194} This is the unofficial number used by the Portuguese government when referring to the estimated amount of emigrants and descendants living outside of Portugal. The actual estimate advanced in 1999 was 4.806.353.
Fig. 1 - (Top left) Cover of the first edition of Camilo Castelo Branco's *A Corja* (The Scoundrels), published in 1880. Here, as in many of Camilo's other works, the brasileiro is a villain, a valueless social charlatan who marries his daughter to a Baron for the sake of his own social status. Camilo's fixation on this character derived from his personal romantic tribulations with the wife of a wealthy brasileiro who made life difficult for him. This clandestine romance eventually landed Camilo in jail for the crime of adultery (image available in Almanach Silva, url: http://almanaquesilva.wordpress.com/2011/04/20/portugal-real/).

Fig. 2 - (Top right) Cover of the first edition of José Ferreira de Castro's novel *Os Emigrantes* (The Emigrants), published in 1928. The book tells the story of Manuel Bouça's journey from the Portuguese countryside to the Brazilian hinterland, and ‘back’ to urban Portugal. Besides describing the aspirations, challenges, and transformations experienced by the emigrants, Castro documented the world of rubber-workers and the exploitation they were subjected to in the Brazilian jungle. *Os Emigrantes* is considered one of the foundational works of Portuguese Neorealism and is translated into various languages (image available in url: www.ceferreiradecastro.org/silas/Emigrantes.htm).

Fig. 3 - *O Desterrado* (The Outcast), of Soares dos Reis, 1872-74 (image in Do Sublime, blog, url: www.dosublime.blogspot.ca/2011/01/o-desterrado.html).
**Fig. 4** – *Os Emigrantes* (1926) is Domingos Rebelo's most famous work. The scene portrays a group of emigrants saying goodbye to their loved ones while waiting for their ship on the port of Ponta Delgada, in the island of São Miguel. This painting is often associated with the concept of Açorianidade (or the Azoreans' cultural specificity) for its many references to local traditions and symbols, including its music, religious ceremonies, and the very phenomenon of emigration (image available in Museu Carlos Machado's website, url: http://museucarlosmachado.azores.gov.pt/osemigrantes).

**Fig. 5** – *A Partida dos Emigrantes* (The Emigrants' Departure) by Almada Negreiros, one of Portugal's most important artists of the 20th century and leading modernist painter. Painted in 1946-48, this triptych is part of a group of six large panels mounted on the internal walls of the Maritime Station of Rocha do Conde de Óbidos in Lisbon. The combination of vanguardist and conventional styles reinforces the coexistence between modernity and tradition in Negreiro's blending of cranes, pipes, and other objects of modern landscapes with the folk outfits worn by the emigrants (image available in the Manufactura de Tapeçarias de Portalegre's website, url: www.mtportalegre.pt/pt/artists/view/60/1).
**Fig. 6** - Screen caption from the movie *O Salto (Le Saut)*, by French director Christian de Chalonge. Released in 1968, the movie follows the journey of António, a poor Portuguese cabinetmaker who decides to join a friend in Paris and escape military duty in the colonial wars. The film highlights the struggles and mistreatment of undocumented immigrants in France and their journey from optimist to disillusion. Chalonge’s film reflected the political spirit of its time and was highly critical of French society. *O Salto* was well-received by film critics and won the Jean Vigo Award (footage available in YouTube, url: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9XVDWILLck).

**Fig. 7** - Photo by Gérald Bloncourt taken in 1966 on St. Denis’, in the northern suburbs of Paris. In this image, a cheerful Portuguese child eats a traditional Christmas treat (*bola de azeite*) on the muddy streets of her *bidonville*. Bloncourt’s photos of the Portuguese in France circulated in both countries and contributed to raise awareness of the difficult living and working conditions faced by Portuguese emigrants in Paris (image available in Torre.moncorvo, url: http://torre-moncorvo.blogspot.ca/2011/01/quadro-da-emigracao-reencontros.html).

**Fig. 8** - *Venho de Ti/ Je Viens de Toi* (I Come From You), by Rui Chafes. Unveiled in June 2008, at the Parque du Plateau in Champigny-sur-Marne, the sculpture is a monument to Portuguese immigrants in France, particularly those who lived in the slum that once stood on that ground and was demolished in the early 1970s. The monument was funded by various Portuguese banks and private companies (image available in the blog of the Portuguese embassy in France, url: www.embaixada-portugal-fr.org/blog/2008/06/memorial-de-homenagem-comunidade.html).
Portuguese emigrants from across Europe switch trains at a railway station in Irún, Basque Country, Spain, on their way home to spend the Christmas holidays. Photo taken in December 1969 (folder 06916.004.009, Mário Soares Archive - Permanent Exhibition Photographs, FMS).

Álvaro Cunhal and Mário Soares (top) celebrate with a crowd outside the Lisbon airport where the first had just arrived from his political exile on April 30, 1974. Soares had returned from France two days prior, the same day that the popular singer-songwriter José Mário Branco (bottom) returned from his exile. In this photo, Branco (in the middle) is joined at the Lisbon airport by his family and friends, among them fellow political songwriters such as José Afonso (the second on the left), whose song *Grândola Vila Morena* became the unofficial anthem of the April 25th Revolution (images available on: http://aspalavrassaoarmas.blogspot.ca/2011/12/o-trapaceiro-mor.html and: http://fitamoebius.blogspot.ca/).

Portuguese retornados from Angola and Mozambique waiting with their luggage at the Lisbon airport. Photo taken in October of 1975. Folder 06278.00607, Mário Soares Archives, FMS.)
Fig. 12 - The Mayor of Lisbon, Nuno de Abecasis, welcomes the Portuguese Communities Congress delegates at City Hall, 1981 (PT/AMLSB/PEL/005/S04144, AFimg165\A2043, Lisbon Municipal Archivals).

Fig. 13 - Cover for Jorge Ferreira's LP record "Viva, Viva New Bedford", released in 1983 by Henda Records. Born in São Miguel, Ferreira immigrated to Fall River with his family as a child. There he recorded his first album in 1979, beginning a long and prolific music career leading to over 40 recorded albums; large record of sales; countless tours across the Portuguese diaspora, where he has performed for sold out crowds in some of the world's largest venues. His repertoire includes a long list of songs dedicated to the emigrants.

Fig. 14 - Anti-government protesters chanting Grândola Vila Morena at a public event where the Minister of the Economy, Álvaro dos Santos Pereira, was speaking. The crowd holds signs showing the minister's face with the slogans "You emigrate!" and "Resign!". Minister Pereira was himself an emigrant in Canada for part of his life, first as a student, and later as an Economics professor in British Columbia (in Público online newspaper on February 23, 2013, url: http://m.publico.pt/Detal/1585498).
2. GATEKEEPERS AND FACILITATORS: PORTUGUESE MIGRATION TO NORTH AMERICA, 1820s-1970s

In order to understand how Portuguese communities developed in North America in the postwar period we need to be aware of their long history in that continent, which dates back to the first half of the 19th century. This chapter will provide a brief overview of Portuguese migration to the United States and Canada before the Second World War, focusing on its demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic characteristics, and the policies that regulated it. My analyses will become more detailed once we reach the postwar period, where I will discuss the emigrants' motivations to travel across the Atlantic, their initial working and living experiences in the new countries, and their gradual transition from sojourners to immigrants. I will also examine the role of kinship ties and other informal networks in creating migration chains between specific locations in the home and host countries, and how they were affected by or circumvented legislation in Canada and the United States.

Migration historians have often used the terms gatekeepers and facilitators to identify those individuals who stood between migrants and their destinations, holding keys that could either block or grant access to visas, jobs and citizenship. Gerald Dirks' used these terms to identify two camps within Canada's immigration officials: the gatekeepers being those regulators and bureaucrats who considered immigration to be at best a necessary evil, and either sought to curb their arrival or restrict their settlement; and the facilitators being those rare public officials who saw the benefits of immigration and sought to increase its volume, moved not only by economic and demographic considerations but also humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

Iacovetta wrote extensively about Canadian gatekeepers during the Cold War, particularly those state and civil authorities who determined "admission requirements and regulations" for entering Canada and accessing the benefits of citizenship along Anglo-Celtic, capitalist, liberal-democratic, middle-class, patriarchal, and heteronormative lines. This included a gamut of professionals with whom immigrants had direct or indirect contact, including government

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195 Here I use John S. and Leatrice D. MacDonald's definition of chain migration, as "that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants" (John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation, and Social Networks, The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 42, (1) January 1964: 82-97, cit. in Sturino, 1990, 3).

officials, social workers, doctors, journalists, and other experts.\textsuperscript{197} Other migration historians have built on Harney's discussion on the role of middle-class middlemen in facilitating the emigration of their "humbler countrymen". These were "all those who stood between the parochial, rural lower classes and the large society, those who mediated between feudalism and modernity," like notaries, loan sharks, steamship agents, and everyone who profited from the "commerce of migration". These \textit{facilitators} could also be found marketing their "literacy and assimilation" in the immigrant communities, promising access to the host country's resources.\textsuperscript{198}

Often left out of this discussion are the homeland state officials, particularly the diplomats and emigration inspectors posted in the countries of destination, who brokered and supervised these transatlantic movements. These men conciliated the roles of \textit{gatekeepers} and \textit{facilitators}, in the sense they narrowed the pool of potential emigrants by pre-selecting those who met the host countries' expectations, while working to expand the volume of emigration among select groups and regions in Portugal. Still, despite their best efforts, state officials on both sides of the Atlantic were not always able to control these movements, as obstinate migrants found ways to circumvent or overcome regulations with the help of grassroots informal \textit{facilitators} and their unlawful "commerce" of clandestine migration.

This chapter will examine the role of top-down arrangements between Canadian and American governments and the \textit{Estado Novo}, and the bottom-up migration schemes developed by travel agents, immigration consultants, family members, and other informal \textit{facilitators} in launching and sustaining Portuguese mass migration to North America in the postwar period.

**Portuguese fishermen and their early migration to North America, 1820s-1940s**

Since the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, the Portuguese have fished for cod on the Grand Banks, off the coast of Newfoundland. After declining in the 17th century, Portuguese cod fishing in the northeastern coast of North America revived in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, at which point St. John’s was large enough to attract and retain those fishermen who jumped ship. According to Anderson and Higgs, there may have been as many as 6,000 Portuguese in Newfoundland in 1935, most of whom had little connection with their homeland. Cod fishing continued uninterrupted during both world wars, though with several restrictions. It was during the Second World War that the


\textsuperscript{198} Harney, 1977.
Portuguese convoy was nicknamed the "White Fleet", in reference to the colour of its ships' hulls, painted white so that German submarines could easily identify the neutral Portuguese out at sea.\textsuperscript{199} By 1941, close to 3,000 Portuguese fishermen, most of them from the fishing villages of Aveiro, Figueira da Foz, and Viana do Castelo in the northern mainland, made the annual trip to Canada's Atlantic shores.\textsuperscript{200} But despite the ancient link to Newfoundland and the gradual piling of runaway fishermen in the region, no identifiable Portuguese community emerged as a result. These scattered individuals also did not produce any notable migration chain or play a significant role in the mass movement starting in 1953.

Things were different in New England. With the expansion of the Massachusetts' whaling industry in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, demand for labour increased. At the same time, crewmen became harder to find as Americans were now more interested in the expanding western frontier. It became common practice at this point for the whaling fleet to hire its officers in the United States and then fill its crew at the various ports where they stopped to restock. Located 2,000 miles off the coast of Massachusetts, the Azores were inside the area covered by New England whalers, who scoured its waters looking for sperm whales. As the only island system in the middle of the Atlantic, the harbours of Horta in the island of Faial and Ponta Delgada in São Miguel, also served as ports of call for the whaling fleet to replenish its supplies. Over the years, many young Azorean men joined these whaling crews hoping to make their journey to the United States without paying for passage while earning wages during the voyage, which could take up to three years and a great deal of hard work.

Another important source of labour for the Massachusetts' whaling fleet was the Cape Verde archipelago, especially the island of Brava. Discovered by Portuguese explorers in the 16th century, these ten islands off the coast of Senegal were colonized by white Europeans and

\textsuperscript{200} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 13.
black African slaves, who produced a large creole population. While lacking fertile land or significant natural resources, Cape Verde profited from its strategic Atlantic location, thriving as a centre for the transatlantic slave trade. After slavery declined in the 19th century, the islands' geographic location and good harbouring conditions continued to offer economic returns to the colonial empire, which invested almost exclusively in Cape Verde's maritime and commercial infrastructures, to the detriment of social, cultural, and other economic areas. With limited opportunities to earn a living, Cape Verdeans began emigrating in large numbers in the late 19th century, the vast majority of them going to the United States.  

Once in the United States, these immigrants settled in New Bedford - the heart of the American whaling industry - and other whaling centres in New England. The large whaling fleet departing from its ports employed over 10,000 crewmen, while the hundreds of subsidiary industries, businesses, and trades employed many more. Besides whaling and its derivatives, Massachusetts' commercial fisheries also employed a large number of Portuguese immigrants, especially once whaling waned in the 1860s. Other harbour cities like Boston and New York also attracted a significant number of migrant seamen who found waged work in the merchant ships that came through its ports. Many fishermen in Portugal were experienced farm workers, some of them owning small plots of land from which they supplemented their meagre income. The same was true for some Portuguese fishermen in New England, who worked as farmhands in the outskirts of New Bedford and Providence; Cape Verdeans, for instance, were the dominant workforce in Cape Cod's cranberry bogs. 

California and Hawaii also had large Portuguese populations. New England whalers had begun fishing the Pacific Ocean around the same time the "gold rush" started attracting fortune seekers to California. Many eastern fishermen jumped ship upon arriving on the West coast and joined the ranks of hopeful prospectors. The number of migrants moving West would grow at a fast rate, with California becoming the main destination for Portuguese newcomers in the 1850s-60s, and one of the states with the largest Portuguese population in the country since. The Portuguese in California would become associated with dairy farming and tuna fishing, where many immigrant families made great fortunes. Those who set up family farms in the countryside,

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202 Williams, 2007, 45-47.
in relative isolation from the rest of American society, were able to meet their labour needs by bringing their kin from Portugal (particularly the Azores), which allowed them to preserve their native language and culture better than their urban counterparts.\textsuperscript{204}

After 1849, whaling officers began avoiding the port of San Francisco in order to prevent the exodus of their crews and started restocking in the Hawaiian Islands. But here too they had to deal with large desertion rates, as many Portuguese fishermen abandoned their fleets to pursue other employment inland. The growing need for cheap farm labour and the interaction with Portuguese fishermen convinced cane planters to hire workers from the Azores and Madeira, who arrived in Hawaii with their families under an arrangement negotiated with the Portuguese government. These indentured labourers experienced many difficulties in the new country, where they were the target of pervasive racism, which led many to reemigrate to California.\textsuperscript{205}

Massachusetts became the centre of American industrialization in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, where places like Fall River and New Bedford evolved into factory towns, attracting many thousands of native and migrant workers into its cotton mills. By the 1870s, whaling, which had created the conditions for this industrialization, had been replaced by the textile industry as New England’s main economic driver. The mills, which had a very high demand for low skilled labourers willing to work for long tedious hours with low pay, actively recruited workers in Europe and eastern Canada. Entire families migrated to these factory towns, attracted by the fact that textile mills employed every able-bodied family member, including women and children (Figure 15).\textsuperscript{206} The early fishermen who had settled in these coastal cities were instrumental in determining the settlement and occupational patterns of the larger cohort that followed, most of them linked by kinship ties or other hometown connections.

With 2,555 Portuguese-born residents in 1870, Massachusetts was the most popular destination on the East coast when the second wave of migration began to arrive. By 1900, it surpassed California to become the state with the largest Portuguese population. Bristol County, which included New Bedford and Fall River, had the largest concentration, with 63.5\% of all Portuguese living in Massachusetts. In New Bedford, two separate settlements were formed: an older one, populated primarily by immigrants from Faial, was located on the waterfront in the

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 78-90.
\textsuperscript{205} For more on the racism experienced by Portuguese migrants in Hawaii see Robert Harney, "Portygees and Other Caucasians: Portuguese migrants and the racialism of the English-speaking world", in Higgs (ed.), 1990.
south end of the city, and a newer one composed largely of immigrants from São Miguel, located on the north end near the textile mills, where most of its residents worked.\textsuperscript{207} Smaller industrial cities, like Taunton and Lowell, also attracted a significant number of Portuguese. The many fishing towns along the coast also hosted sizable communities, particularly Provincetown in Cape Cod - the centre of Massachusetts' Grand Banks fishing - and Gloucester, in the northeastern part of the state (Figure 16).\textsuperscript{208}

Rhode Island had similar attractive factors as Massachusetts, except for the lack of a significant Portuguese presence prior to the 1870s. Still, the number of Portuguese-born in the state grew quickly after that. Providence, Rhode Island's capital and industrial heart, received the bulk of this movement, resulting from its proximity to New Bedford and Fall River. Between these urban centres was Newport County, a rural area with plenty of abandoned farmland where Portuguese immigrants were able to purchase land and form small communities.\textsuperscript{209}

Two factors led to the dramatic drop of Portuguese migration to the United States in the late 1910s. The first was the slew of restrictions put in place since 1917, when a new Immigration Act introduced a literacy requirement for every immigrant candidate over the age of

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\textsuperscript{208} Williams, 2007, 48-51.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 52-54.
sixteen. With one of the lowest literacy rates in Europe, Portuguese migration was greatly impacted by this rule and fell sharply as a result. Further restrictions were imposed by the 1921 Emergency Immigration Restriction Act, which introduced an annual quota system that limited the number of migrants allowed from a given nationality to 3% of its population living in the United States in 1910; a calculation that favoured northern European and British immigration (Portugal was assigned a quota of 2,520 per year). This system was made permanent by the 1924 Immigration Act, which reduced the cap to 2% of the national group's resident population in 1890. Despite the tiny quota assigned to Portugal (initially 503 arrivals per year; then 440 after 1929), special provisions, including the right of American citizens to sponsor their wives and children under non-quota visas, allowed for thousands of Portuguese immigrants to enter the country before the national quota system was abolished in 1965. Nonetheless, between 1922 and 1932, more Portuguese returned home (25,466) than entered the United States (11,589).

The second factor causing the decline of Portuguese migration to the United States were the changing economic conditions leading to the closure of New England's textile mills. Subjected to growing competition from modern factories in the south, mill owners in the north began replacing old manual looms with automated ones and downsized their labour force in the 1910s. The outcome of this, as Aviva Chomsky argued, was "a race to the bottom" that led to "the recurrent problem of overproduction, low wages, and underemployment." As New England's textile industry staggered, New York City's garment industry tried to contain rising production costs brought about by immigration restrictions, which disrupted the steady flow of cheap unskilled labour. Garment factories relocated to New Jersey and Connecticut where production costs remained low, and began attracting labour from the pool of unemployed in southern New England. A substantial number of these internal migrants were

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211 Carlo Cipolla estimated that the Portuguese had the highest illiteracy rate (65%) of all European immigrants arriving in the United States between 1900 and 1914, followed by the Turks (60%), Lithuanians (54%) and Italians (52%). Cape Verdians were less affected by this requirement since their illiteracy rate between 1911-17 was only 48%. As Halter explained: "The dependence on emigration to the United States both as a source of income through remittances to the islands and as an outlet for victims of famine caused the officials in Cape Verde to step up their literacy campaign" (Carlo Cipolla, *Literacy and Development in the West*, 1969, cit. in Serrão, 1982, 132-133; Halter, 1993, 48-49).


Portuguese families whose members had been laid off from the Massachusetts' textile mills. The majority moved to Newark, New Jersey's largest city, where they found work in unskilled, low-paying, factory jobs. In the state of New York, the Long Island counties of Nassau and Queens (a borough of New York City), and the city of Yonkers in Westchester County, were the most common destinations for Portuguese migrants. As for Connecticut, its fast growing Portuguese population settled primarily in the cities of New Haven and Hartford.

The Great Depression exacerbated New England's economic woes and brought the ultimate collapse of its textile industry. Once bustling factory towns, Fall River and New Bedford became economically depressed cities. Those in low- and unskilled occupations, like the overwhelming majority of Portuguese migrant workers, were most affected by the massive layoffs; in New Bedford, nearly half of the Portuguese working population was unemployed in the 1930s. Even before the textile industry collapsed, the economic situation of Portuguese mill workers was bleak, marked by "low wages, poor working conditions, overcrowded housing and inadequate health and social services." Portuguese families in Fall River and New Bedford also had one of the highest infant mortality rates in the country, with a striking 200 deaths per 1,000 births; more than double the national average. The economic collapse of these cities was also detrimental to the group's collective identity, since "being Portuguese" became associated with chronic unemployment and other social malaises. As a result of this prejudice, many Portuguese immigrants and their descendants in New England disassociated themselves from their national background and became more reluctant to manifest their cultural heritage or speak their native language in public. The lack of significant immigration in the '30s that could sustain a cultural connection to the old country also contributed to this cultural breakdown.

As we will discuss further in chapter six, Portuguese immigrants and their descendants had long tried to avoid racial discrimination by becoming "white" American. Many concealed their "Portagee" background by steering away from ethnic identifiers, like Anglicizing their surnames - "Perry" replaced "Pereira"; "Silver", "Sylvia" or "Wood" replaced "Silva", and so forth. In the 1920s, Americanization programs in public schools taught immigrant children to deplore their ancestors' nation, language, and customs, and love their new country instead. This relentless assimilationist pressure and the absence of cultural replenishment convinced many

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217 Williams, 2007, 58, 110-111.
immigrants and descendants to either forfeit or hide their Portuguese identities, together with its language and public symbols.\textsuperscript{218} Still, as James Barrett and David Roediger pointed out, by easing the racial panic of American nativists, the 1924 Act allowed Southern and Eastern European immigrants to "haltingly find a place in the ethnic wing of the white race."\textsuperscript{219}

During the Second World War, much of the United States' economic woes were temporary resolved by wartime industrial demands, which introduced an abundance of new jobs in the northeastern factory cities. The "total war" mentality, pervasive in all areas of American life, also heightened patriotism, which censored the "dual-loyalties" that ethnic minorities were believed to espouse. A whole new generation of Portuguese descendants were raised amidst this patriotic fervour, many of them fighting with the U.S. Army in European and Pacific battlefields, or joining in the war effort on the "home front" (Figure 17). Their sense of ethnic identity, when not entirely consumed by cultural and socioeconomic pressures to American conformity, was dormant or diluted. At the same time, the high residential concentration of Portuguese immigrant families in New England mitigated some of these assimilationist pressures and maintained spaces where these ethnics could use their native tongue, observe endogamous marriages, and partake in cultural and religious traditions away from mainstream scrutiny.\textsuperscript{220} As we will discuss in chapter three, Portuguese immigrants in the United States also kept in contact with their families in their hometowns and sent money and other gifts regularly. These introverted links with the homeland were reactivated in the postwar period and served as footing for Portuguese-Americans to eventually reassert their ethnicity.

**The Azorean refugee movement and the resurgence of Portuguese chain migration to the United States, 1958-1965**

The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act further reduced the already small annual immigration quota allotted to Portugal. While this act eliminated some of the discriminatory regulations that had outright excluded some racial and ethnic groups in the past, its progressive critics argued it did not go far enough in removing other effective and systematic forms of discrimination, like the national origins quota. The new legislation simplified the formula used to

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 111.  
\textsuperscript{220} Williams, 2007, 157.
determine these quotas by reducing it to one sixth of 1% of a national group's population living in the country in 1920. In the case of Portugal, this amounted to a mere 438 immigrants per year.\textsuperscript{221} In a message to Congress, President Harry S. Truman, who vetoed a first draft of the bill, proposed raising the total annual immigration quota to 300,000; congressman Emanuel Celler of New York then tabled this as a bill. While it was being discussed in committee, the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington, Luis Esteves Fernandes (1950-61),\textsuperscript{222} lobbied American legislators to have Portugal included in the list of countries benefiting from this plan. Following the advice of the Republican Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, who represented Bristol County, the ambassador asked the American-Portuguese Loyalty Association of New Bedford to present Portugal's position at the Senate's Judicial Committee. However, their efforts would be in vain, since the bill did not pass.\textsuperscript{223}

The following year, newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower added his voice to the chorus of discontent regarding the 1952 Act. Eisenhower urged Congress to pass emergency legislation admitting into the country a greater number of southern European immigrants, who had been effectively excluded by the national quota system. The expiration of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 provided the opportunity to craft new legislation addressing Eisenhower's call for reform. The result was the introduction of the Refugee Relief Act in 1953, which authorized the admission of over 214,000 non-quota "refugees", defined under this law as: "any person in a country or area which is either Communist or Communist-dominated who because of persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity or military operations is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto... and who is in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life or for transportation."\textsuperscript{224} During the House of Representatives' debate over this bill, Ambassador Fernandes again appealed to Minority Leader Martin to include 2,000 Portuguese immigrants in the proposed non-quota visas. Despite expressing interest, Martin confirmed that the Portuguese could not be included in this resolution since they did not qualify as "refugees".\textsuperscript{225}

It would take a "natural calamity" to finally reopen America's doors to Portuguese immigration.

\textsuperscript{221} Letter, Portuguese Embassy Counselor, João Affra, Washington, to Bertha Johnson, Corresponding Secretary of the Portuguese-American Civic League of Massachusetts, Somerville-Cambridge Councils, April 22, 1955, PEA M181, Colónia Portuguesa nos E.U. Portuguese American Civic League of Massachusetts, AHD.

\textsuperscript{222} In 1953-56, Ambassador Fernandes combined his mission in Washington with that of Portuguese ambassador to Canada.

\textsuperscript{223} Luis de Oliveira Nunes, Service Information, PMFA, January 02, 1957, 2P M446 A6, E.U.A. Diversos, AHD.

\textsuperscript{224} Sec. 2 (a) Refugee Relief Act of 1953.

\textsuperscript{225} Luis de Oliveira Nunes, Service Information, January 02, 1957.
On the morning of September 27, 1957, the Capelinhos underwater volcano located on the island of Faial's shore, erupted for the first time in nearly four centuries. Over the next seven months, lava, toxic gas, and giant clouds of ash were expelled from it. The fallout of rain and ash covered around 3,000 acres of pasture and crops, destroying 1,200 acres of arable land. In May, a spate of seismic activity destroyed over 600 buildings and other structures in the island, leaving several thousand people homeless. The first organized reaction from the Portuguese government came in June 1958, when it introduced an emergency plan for recovering the island's economy, rebuilding its infrastructure, and providing food, clothing and medical aid to the victims. Efforts were also made to move displaced families to the African colonies, though with poor results. No calls for international aid were made by the regime.

The large Azorean communities on both American coasts organized relief committees to send aid to Faial and demand that Congress introduce emergency legislation allowing the admission of the volcano's victims. Joseph Perry, a State Representative from Rhode Island, whose parents had emigrated from Faial, brought the matter to the attention of Rhode Island's and Massachusetts' congressional delegation. Senator John Pastore then introduced Bill S. 3942, calling for non-quota visas to be granted to "heads of families" affected by Capelinhos' eruption. John F. Kennedy, then in his second mandate as a senator rising to political fame, endorsed the bill, granting it greater political weight. The bill passed in Congress and was signed into law by President Eisenhower on September 2, 1958, opening the doors to 1,500 Azorean "heads of families" and their "dependents" until December 1, 1959.

While based on humanitarian concerns, prospective refugees were required to offer proof that they would be able to find employment and housing in the United States, for which they required assistance from their Portuguese-American relatives. Under this bill, only those who had been forced "out of their usual place of abode... and unable to return thereto, and who are in

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227 Decree 41 679 of June 16, 1958, DRE.
230 As per Public-Law 85-892, September 2, 1958, "dependents" included the immigrant's wife and "his unmarried sons or daughters under twenty-one years of age, including stepsons or stepdaughters, and sons or daughters adopted prior to July 1, 1958, if accompanying them," U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code, available at url: http://uscodebeta.house.gov/.
urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life" were eligible to apply for a refugee visa. American officials interpreted this to mean only residents of Faial who were directly impacted by the volcano. Many Portuguese-Americans were disappointed by this circumscribed take on the extent of the Azoreans' misery and lost their initial enthusiasm for the refugee program. In fact, the Catholic Welfare Conference, acting under instructions from the State Department to canvass New England's Portuguese-American communities, had trouble finding offers of employment and housing for these Faial refugees. Still, there were those who were ready to sponsor them in larger numbers, as was the case with the Azorean priest Augusto Leal Furtado, who processed and sheltered many of the displaced islanders at his St. John of God Church in Somerset.

To facilitate this movement, the U.S. State Department suggested to the Portuguese government that it collaborate with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Portuguese officials, who had refused to join the ICEM when it was created in 1952, were reluctant to accept its assistance, even when it offered to cover the transportation costs and settle these refugees with the help of its vast institutional network. Responding to an ICEM representative, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer Caldeira Coelho argued that his government respected the voluntary and individual nature of emigration and abstained from directing it - a curious statement by the same official who a few years earlier brokered a labour migration agreement with the Canadian government, as we will discuss further ahead. According to Coelho, joining the ICEM, with its multinational recruitment plans and placement targets, amounted to surrendering Portugal's sovereignty over its emigration policy. He also expressed reservations as to the suitability of the term "refugees" to address those displaced by the volcano; the Estado Novo likely wanted to avoid the term given its connotation with forsakenness, and the suggestion the regime was incapable of rescuing its own people.

Another organization offering to facilitate this movement was the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). The JDE was willing to consider this offer since the ICMC's charitable motivations and interest in family reunification supposedly matched the regime's own

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231 Public-Law 85-892.
234 The ICEM was created in 1952 by twenty western nations to facilitate the movement of refugees and surplus population from Western Europe to other western countries in need of migrant labour. Canada and other member states often criticized the ICEM's efforts to process refugees, which these governments saw as an infringement of their national sovereignty (Dirks, 1977).
235 Memorandum, Caldeira Coelho, October 16, 1958, 2P M558, E.U.A. Diversos, AHD.
236 The ICMC was founded in 1951 by American, Italian and German Catholic laymen and clergymen (including future Pope Paul IV) to organize the Catholic Church's assistance to the displaced peoples of postwar Europe and facilitate their migration.
emigration policy, which, according to the JDE's President, António M. Baptista, prioritized the "moral interest of preventing family disaggregation" over "material interests stemming from the entrance of remittances." The president of Caritas Portugal called a meeting with Baptista; the civil governor of Faial; the Portuguese Catholic Commission on Emigration's director; and the ICMC's director to discuss the latter's participation in the Azorean "refugee" movement. The ICMC offered to pay the costs of transportation and help the refugees find jobs and housing near their families in the United States, with funding from the American government; however, this money had to be channeled through the ICEM. Another of the ICMC's conditions was that it be allowed to send a delegation to the Azores to screen each individual applicant and check if they were suitable to "being received by their Catholic family". Both conditions were rejected by Baptista, who was happy to accept American funding as long as it was independent from the ICEM. The governor of Faial also refused the "alarmist" tone used in reports about the displaced Azoreans, claiming that no one in the island had suffered damages justifying a mass exodus. According to him, the support received from the Lisbon government and Caritas was enough to address any outstanding issues.

The Estado Novo's reaction to the United States' humanitarian gesture was lukewarm at best. Besides his aversion to foreigners meddling in Portugal's internal affairs, Salazar also worried about the Americans' influence over the Azores, given their military presence in Terceira and the vast emigrant communities in the United States. But as the extent of the damage caused by the volcano became clearer and the plight of those affected by it lingered, Lisbon came to agree to a temporary U.S. Vice-Consulate opening in Faial that could process visa applications and expedite this non-quota movement. The governor also changed his position on the dimension of the crisis and tried to convince American officials to broaden their criteria for issuing refugee visas. Eventually, the Americans yielded to calls for a more liberal assessment and accepted applications from Azoreans who lived away from the most damaged areas.

Over a period of nine months in 1959, 1,500 non-quota Azorean refugees and their "dependents" arrived in the United States. Building on this imperfect yet largely successful

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237 Memorandum, Caldeira Coelho, October 16, 1958.
238 Caritas Internationalis was created by the Holy See in 1951 as a confederation of Roman Catholic humanitarian relief and social service organizations of the same name, operating in various Western countries, including Portugal, the United States and Canada. The Portuguese Caritas was founded in 1945; its president in 1958 was Fernanda Jardim.
239 Memo from JDE's President Baptista on meeting at Caritas, October 21, 1958. 2P M558, E.U.A. Diversos, AHD.
240 The first American consulate in the Azores opened in the 1890s in São Miguel (Feldman-Bianco & MacDonald, 1997).
experience, Congress approved another 2,000 non-quota visas for Azorean "heads of families" the following year, coinciding with the UN World Refugee Year. Overall, 4,811 people were admitted into the United States through what became known as the Azorean Refugee Acts.²⁴¹

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act finally eliminated the national origins formula and assigned a 20,000 annual quota to every nation; it also placed greater emphasis on family reunification and prioritized skilled immigrants. Advocates of the new act sought to correct the disparity in European migration, where southern countries were previously discriminated against. However, contrary to the expert's predictions, most newcomers to the United States now arrived from Asia, South America and other non-European regions; the two exceptions to the decline of European migration after 1965 were the Greeks and the Portuguese. The new act opened a new chapter in the history of Portuguese-American communities by revitalizing old migration chains and re-establishing links with the homeland. The number of Portuguese newcomers jumped from 19,588 in the 1950s to 76,065 in the '60s, peaking at 94,246 in the '70s; 57% of those arrived in 1955-74 came from the Azores, especially São Miguel.²⁴² The majority of these newcomers were admitted under the family reunification class, although a significant minority also arrived as workers destined for sectors with labour shortages.²⁴³

These newcomers settled with or near their relatives, which furthered the residential concentration of Portuguese immigrants in the old northeastern settlements, as was the case with New Bedford, Fall River and various other cities and towns in the Bristol and Plymouth counties in the southeastern part of Massachusetts - popularly known as "The Portuguese

Graph 10. Source: Arroteia, 1983, 34

²⁴¹ Williams, 2007, 112.
²⁴³ Gilbert, 1989, 64-65.
This time, however, Portuguese immigrants settled almost exclusively in the larger cities. While Massachusetts, Rhode Island and California continued to host the largest communities, cities like Newark, New Jersey and Bridgeport, Connecticut (both in New York City's metropolitan area) now saw a large increase in Portuguese population. Besides their rapid growth, the settlements of New Jersey also had a higher number of newcomers, the majority of whom came from the mainland's northern regions. Also of significance is the fact that the return movement of Azorean migrants to their hometowns practically ended after 1965, reflecting the fact that most of their relatives were now in United States.

Portugal-Canada labour migration agreement, 1953-1961

On May 13, 1953, the cruise ship *Saturnia* landed in Halifax, Nova Scotia, carrying the first group of Portuguese migrant workers arriving in Canada under the labour migration agreement negotiated between the governments of both countries. These were the "pioneers", as future generations of Portuguese-Canadians would affectionately call them. By the end of the decade, over 6,000 Portuguese workers landed as a direct result of this official movement, which subsequently gave rise to larger migration chains.

Prior to 1953, Portuguese government officials and private individuals in Europe and North America had inquired of Canadian immigration authorities about their interest in starting a migration movement from Portugal. Immigration officials rejected these proposals, citing the "undesirability" of Portuguese workers on account of Canada being "chiefly an agricultural country", and the fact that "Portuguese in general are not particularly adaptable to [its] farming conditions." Overall, immigration from southern European countries was highly restricted between the 1920s and most of the '40s; the preference being for British, Americans, and northern Europeans. Only after the war did Canada shift to a more open immigration policy.

Moved by the tragic circumstances of millions of refugees in Europe, Canadians became more favourable to welcoming those displaced by the war, many of them their distant relatives.


245 Gilbert, 1989, 66-68.

246 Letter, Deputy Minister of Immigration to the Portuguese Consul J. B. Maclean, Toronto, May 17, 1925, file 85380, Vol. 201, Pt. 1, RG 76, Department of Immigration, NAC, cit. in Marques & Marujo, 1993, 2.
Another incentive for loosening restrictions was Canada's rapid economic expansion in the postwar period. Canadian farmers and industrialists pressured the federal government to expand the country's labour pool by opening the doors to low-skilled migrant workers from countries it previously snubbed. In 1947, Liberal Prime Minister William L. Mackenzie King's statement on immigration policy committed to fostering "the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration", while ensuring "the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can be advantageously absorbed in our national economy." Pressed by capitalist interests, the Ottawa government introduced a "sponsored labour scheme", which repealed an earlier order-in-council preventing contract labour from being recruited abroad, and authorized Canadian immigration officials to travel to Europe's refugee camps and recruit qualified workers. This program lost much of its momentum once the United States introduced its own Displaced Person Act in 1948 and began competing with Canada for these highly skilled refugees. Still, between 1947 and 1953, over 100,000 displaced persons were admitted into Canada under this scheme. Many of them would later sponsor their relatives left behind, leading to large chain migrations from across Europe.249

In Portugal, prospective emigrants welcomed the encouraging news from Canada. The Acting Canadian Consul in Lisbon, Lester S. Glass, reported to Ottawa in February 1947 that "the relaxation in Immigration regulations... news of which was published in many Portuguese daily newspapers has resulted in a flow of inquiries from various parts of continental Portugal and the Azores. These inquiries, on average of 20 a day, vary from local and long distance telephone calls."250 A month later, Glass reported having received 800 letters in a period of four weeks and a vast number of phone calls. Meanwhile, the consul of Portugal in Montreal, Canadian businessmen, and Catholic priests in both countries all offered to organize the movement of Portuguese labourers into Canada, but the answer from immigration officials remained negative. The Lisbon consulate received instructions from Ottawa to discourage further applications on the ground that Portugal's emigration policies prevented most of its population from leaving the country to seek employment. Indeed, the same year that King introduced a more liberal immigration policy, Salazar temporarily banned labour emigration, except when "carried

249 Gerald Dirks, Canada's Refugee Policy. Indifference or Opportunism?, 1977.
under accord or by conventions that regulate the conditions of its admission and settling in the countries or regions of destination.\textsuperscript{251}

Employers in the farming, railway, logging and mining industries continued to place "bulk orders" for manual workers with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI). After the European refugee camps were emptied, Canadian officials were pressed to look elsewhere to meet the growing economy's incessant labour demands. Motivated by the flood of applications received in Lisbon, Consul Glass surveyed officials in both governments about their willingness to start a migration movement between the two countries. Officials in Canada were discouraged by Portugal's complicated bureaucracy, which according to the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Laval Fortier: "was certainly not geared for the handling of bulk movements." As he explained in a letter to the Department of Labour: "every immigrant must obtain an exit permit before he can leave Portugal and unless he is destined to a relative in Canada, a labour contract is required. These contracts must be signed by employers in Canada and then forwarded to Portugal for signature by the immigrants. The contract is returned to Canada for certification by a Portuguese Consul in Canada (of whom there are only two who do not hold honorary appointments). It would then be returned to Portugal for consideration by the Portuguese authorities."\textsuperscript{252}

In 1951, after a conversation with Consul Glass, the JDE's President Baptista, initially agreed to waive the labour contract requirement for a small group of emigrants, but then retracted upon receiving contrary instructions from his superiors. Despite the failed attempt, this ambivalence encouraged Glass to increase pressure on Portuguese authorities to loosen their emigration restrictions. The following year, Glass secured the movement of 35 skilled workers.\textsuperscript{253} One of them was António Viola, a native of the mainland's fishing town of Peniche, who heard of Canada for the first time in 1951 when he learned it was looking for migrant workers. After coping with the cumbersome Portuguese bureaucracy, Viola managed to obtain sponsorship from a Brazilian friend living in Montreal, secure a Canadian work visa as a cabinet-maker, then finally get a passport. He later recalled having a message from Baptista waiting for him at the JDE's office, saying: "Portugal is interested in opening up emigration to Canada but

\textsuperscript{251} Art. 1, Decree 36199 of March 29, 1947, DRE.
\textsuperscript{252} Letter, Deputy Minister Laval Fortier to Department of Labour, July 18, 1951, file 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Department Citizenship and Immigration, NAC.
\textsuperscript{253} Marques & Marujo, 1993, 8-10.
we don't know anything about the country. Send us a letter once or twice a year when you get there. Viola and the small group of skilled workers who arrived in 1952 were successfully employed and adapted well to Canada. Their positive experiences gave government officials enough reasons to be optimistic about expanding this movement in the future.

With unemployment soaring in Portugal and nearing crisis proportions in the Azores, the Estado Novo turned to emigration as a temporary solution. Caldeira Coelho, then the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Ottawa, approached Deputy Minister Fortier in July 1952 to inquire about the possibility of starting a migration movement from northern Portugal. Coelho assured Fortier that the Portuguese government would select qualified farm workers, tradesmen and skilled workers, and pay for their transportation to Canada. A few months later, Coelho convinced Ottawa to include a small pilot group in their 1953 immigration program, consisting of 100 farmhands, 75 vineyard workers, and 100 female domestics. These were to be screened by a team of Canadian inspectors from Paris who would visit three of Portugal's mainland cities. Coelho reported the positive news to Lisbon and recommended the JDE put together a candidate slate that could "shatter the lack of confidence currently held about the quality of Latin immigrants." The Foreign Affairs Minister Paulo Cunha (1950-56, 57-58) stressed the importance of this inaugural movement to Baptista: "This year, Portuguese immigration to Canada must be considered a difficult experiment, since it has to fight against the absolute discredit of Latin workers in that country, reason why Canadian authorities want a comprehensive sample of different categories of mainland workers." Baptista in turn recommended the rural workers be recruited in the Atlantic islands, especially in São Miguel, where people were "eager" to move to North America and were likely to produce migration chains.

But before Baptista could approve this movement, he requested more information from Canadian officials on: the working and living conditions expected for these emigrants; the conditions of their repatriation on account of inadaptability or illness; the kind of assistance

255 In São Miguel, population density in relation to farmland exceeded 1,300 people per sq. mile in 1950 (Williams, 2005, 139).
256 Coelho also mentioned his government's interest in arranging for the movement of Portuguese-Americans to Canada, though there is no indication in the record as to the rationale behind this (letter, Deputy Minister Laval Fortier to unknown recipient, July 24, 1952, file 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Citizenship and Immigration, NAC).
257 Letter, President António M. Baptista, JDE, to the Minister of the Interior, Trigo Negreiros, Lisbon, January 07, 1953, 2P A5 M67, Canadá Diversos. Emigração Portuguesa, AHD.
258 Letter, Chargé d’Affaires Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa Legation, to PMFA, Lisbon, December 30, 1952, ibid. (m.t.).
259 Letter, Foreign Affairs Minister Paulo Cunha to A. M. Baptista, JDE, February 25, 1953 (m.t.), ibid.
available to them in case of accident; the possibility of placing them near each other and avoiding "emigrant camps"; the likelihood of transporting them to their designated workplaces upon arrival in the country; the chance for married emigrants to call for their families; and other issues of concern to the JDE. As for the female domestics, Baptista objected to sending single women, given that they would be "isolated in an unknown environment." Instead, he proposed recruiting men in Madeira, where there was an unemployment crisis in the hotel industry. The Minister of the Interior endorsed Baptista's recommendation that Ponta Delgada in the Azores and Funchal in Madeira be added to the cities to be visited by the Canadian inspectors. In his estimation, the number of applicants in Lisbon should be small, "since the professions where there is most interest and convenience in favouring emigration - agronomy engineers and auxiliary technicians... - are excluded, as well as... commercial and secretary workers. Qualified workers would certainly be authorized [in Canada], but it does not seem convenient for us to facilitate their departure, given that there is no unemployment, that they are being well paid, and that their prospects are promising." 

Canadian officials refused to go to the Azores and restated they would only accept female domestics. They then proposed replacing the domestics with skilled tradesmen and engineers from Lisbon, where they would also recruit half of the farm workers, while the other half was to be recruited in Funchal. The next day, Minister Cunha sent a telegram to the Portuguese Legation in Ottawa urging Coelho to convince the Canadians of the "absolute necessity" of including Azoreans in this inaugural movement, since the islands authorities had already begun the recruitment process, which involved significant costs for the applicants. Still, Canadian immigration officials maintained their refusal to include the Azores in their visit, citing the following reasons: "1. Precaution regarding public opinion, which opposes Latin and Catholic immigration, demands special care in order to ensure this experiment is well received; 2. Farmers do not easily accept Azoreans, who they consider hardly adaptable to the climate here; 3. Public opinion considers the Azores too far from Europe and the Government is afraid of being attacked by Parliament on the pretext of incurring extravagant travel costs to send Paris' team to Ponta Delgada for such small numbers." They were, however, willing to accept 20 Azoreans, as long

260 Letter, President A. M. Baptista, JDE, to unknown recipient, January 07, 1953, ibid.
261 Letter, Minister of the Interior Trigo Negreros to unknown recipient, January 21, 1953 (m.t.), ibid.
262 Telegram, Foreign Affairs Minister Paulo Cunha to Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa Legation, February 26, 1953, ibid.
263 Telegram, Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa Legation, to PMFA, February 28, 1953, ibid. (m.t.).
as they were sent to Lisbon for screening - 4,000 Azorean candidates had already applied at this point. Canadian officials also expressed their preference for single farm workers. If married, their "dependents" had to be screened at the same time as the "head of family", whether they were accompanying the migrant or joining him at a later date.\textsuperscript{264}

Finally both parties agreed to 100 farm workers (20 Azoreans, 30 mainlanders,\textsuperscript{265} and 50 Madeirans); 75 vineyard workers from Madeira; 50 tradesmen from Oporto; and 50 professionals and technicians from Lisbon.\textsuperscript{266} But before they could celebrate, complications in the recruitment process emerged; arguably the most significant was the fact that the "great majority of engineers cancelled their application when they learned about the conditions offered by Canadian authorities. They had been under the erroneous impression that the equivalence of their academic standing would be recognized anywhere in Canada and that they would be offered highly paid positions with specific contracts arranged prior to departure."\textsuperscript{n267} The JDE also failed to attract enough candidates in Oporto.

Before the applicants could be seen by Canadian inspectors they had to overcome various hurdles, each involving significant financial costs and little guarantee of success. Prospective migrants had to bribe corrupt officials, appease temperamental mayors, and negotiate with unscrupulous landowners, doctors, moneylenders and other intermediaries. José Cabral of Ponta Delgada remembered upsetting his Portuguese medical examiner when he told him he had already picked up the $100 USD that he was supposedly required to bring to Canada at a foreign currency exchange: "He lost his temper completely and was so furious that I shall never forget it. I found out later on that that [sic] same doctor was the 'big boss' of the district and worked on a commission from the Espírito Santo bank which was charging thirty one escudos for a dollar. I had bought mine for twenty nine."\textsuperscript{n268}

Another important hurdle that migrant applicants had to overcome was a security screening. The Canadian government solicited PIDE's cooperation to "avoid the entry in the

\textsuperscript{264} Memorandum, Deputy Minister Laval Fortier to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Hector Allard, March 26, 1953, file 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Citizenship and Immigration, NAC.

\textsuperscript{265} The JDE chose to recruit these farm workers in the northern districts of Bragança, given its "climactic conditions and rusticity of life", and Oporto, given its people's "greater resourcefulness and possible easiness of adaptation to more advanced cultural processes, stemming from their contact with the nearby city" [letter, President A. M. Baptista, JDE, to Director-General of Foreign and Consular Affairs, PMFA, March 21, 1953, 2P A52 M67, Canadá Diversos. Emigração Portuguesa, AHD (m.t.)].

\textsuperscript{266} Letter, PMFA to Canadian Consul in Lisbon, March 11, 1953, ibid.; memorandum, Deputy Minister Laval Fortier, March 26, 1953, Citizenship and Immigration, NAC.

\textsuperscript{267} Marques & Marujo, 1993, 11-12.

\textsuperscript{268} José Cabral added: "When we arrived at Quebec City on April the 7th, 1956, the dollars were changed into Canadian Money. Then and there I smelt a rat, for sure", cit. in Marques & Medeiros, 1980, 46.
country of individuals with communist or other political ideas contrary to the established Order." To monitor the selection process and review the lists provided by PIDE, the Canadian inspection team included a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officer. Still, despite this oversight, it was possible for political dissidents to slip through this security screening, or perhaps allowed to leave with PIDE's tacit consent. For António Sousa, of the mainland fishing town of Nazaré, his motivation to emigrate came after the 1948 presidential campaign of opposition candidate General Norton de Matos. As he later recalled:

I got involved in the elections and participated in meetings that were called at the time clandestine. I received an order of imprisonment, then was called communist because I was an anti-Salazarist... [T]he mayor of Nazaré then was a friend of mine, who had carried me on his arms, defended me and asked me to give up politics... [A]fter freeing myself from that situation I went to Lisbon right away to begin the process of leaving [the country] in whatever way possible... So I arranged a clandestine passage to North America. [T]he [travel agent] that arranged things... kept my 18 contos but fortunately didn't put me on the boat; lucky me. Because all those who went aboard died asphyxiated in the deck.

Recently married and with a newborn child, Sousa continued to look for ways to escape PIDE. When he heard of Canada's immigration recruitment, he applied as a bogus carpenter and was able to board the Saturnia in 1953.

After securing the means to pay for their passage and initial expenses in Canada, often through loans; spending considerable amounts of money to obtain their paperwork; and bowing their heads to their local masters, migrant candidates still had to meet the approval of Canadian immigration inspectors. The "essential basic requirements" that these gatekeepers looked for in farm workers were: "good general physique, previous farm experience in their own country and the ability and desire, as best it can be assessed, to adapt themselves to the requirements of farm employment in Canada." One specific detail that the inspectors looked for was whether the applicants' hands were "roughened and hardened", since that "should indicate at least whether or not he has been accustomed to heavy outdoor work." They were particularly interested in

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271 Gen. Norton de Matos, who had been the Governor-General of Angola and Minister of Colonies in the First Republic, ran in the 1948 presidential elections as the opposition's candidate, and garnered considerable popular support. When Salazar refused him the freedom to campaign and the assurance that the elections would not be rigged, Matos withdrew his candidacy in protest.
272 Portuguese colloquial term for $10,000 escudos.
273 Transcript of interview by Domingos Marques, c. 1978 (m.t.), 2010-019/001 (10), Domingos Marques fonds, CTASC.
274 50th Anniversary of Official Portuguese Immigration to Canada booklet, 2003, 60.
275 Portuguese officials estimated that $10,000 escudos ($350 CAD) was enough for emigrants to cover their passage and initial living expenses (letter, PMFA to A. M. Baptista, JDE, April 18, 1953, 2P A52 M67, Canadá Diversos. Emigr. Portuguesa, AHD).
workers with general experience and practical knowledge of the various phases of mixed and dairy farming practiced in Canada, instead of specialized European agricultural practices.  

Most upsetting to the candidates was the second round of medical exams conducted by Canadian doctors, who rejected applicants over "miniscule things". Indeed, an unexpectedly high number of prospective migrants and their "dependents", who had been previously vetted by Portuguese doctors, were denied passage by Canadian inspectors. This was especially taxing for those who had already taken up loans or sold their properties to get to this point in the screening process. In one case, two candidates from São Miguel, who had already said farewell to their families and made the trek to Lisbon, were considered unfit. A sympathetic Portuguese official arranged their free passage to Brazil to save them "the embarrassment of returning home."  

In the end, only 180 Portuguese workers arrived in Canada in 1953 as a result of this labour migration agreement. They made the week-long journey aboard Italian and Greek steam liners, and were escorted by a JDE inspector who provided them with contact information for Portugal's diplomatic missions in Ottawa and Montreal, a few basic English lessons, and notions about Canadian currency and the ways of its people. One inspector in particular, Ruy San-Romão, received much praise from the chargé d'affaires in Ottawa for his work in "caring for [the group's] appearance and helping maintain a good impression [with Canada's] authorities, which will constitute an excellent argument in favour of obtaining the admission of emigrants on a larger scale next year." Indeed, as Coelho reported to Lisbon, the first group of migrants "elicited many compliments from Canadian immigration authorities on their presentation, physical appearance and financial means."  

Upon arriving in Halifax, the migrants were put on trains heading to different parts of the country without being given much information and lacking the language skills to ask. Once at their destinations, they were picked up by Canadian immigration officials and escorted to the local government office. At times these agents failed to appear as scheduled and the migrants were left waiting, sometimes for days. In one case, a group of men waiting to be picked up in Montreal were thought to be a band of criminal fugitives and pointed out to the police. The

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276 Memorandum, DCI - Immigration Branch, November 02, 1953, 2P A55 M66, Emigração A a C. Canadá. Diversos, AHD.
277 Letter, PIDE Station Chief António Rosa Casaco, Ponta Delgada, to Director António Neves Graça, PIDE, June 17, 1957, PIDE/DGS, SC, SR Pr. 1056/48, ut. 2628, Serviços Canadianos - José Luis da Ponte Rebelo, National Archives of Torre do Tombo (henceforth ANTT).
280 Telegrams, Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa Legation, to PMFA, Lisbon, May 19 and June 01, 1953, ibid. (m.t.).
police asked over the radio for Portuguese interpreters in the area, to which a Canadian priest who had lived in Brazil for many years responded.\textsuperscript{281} In 1954, a similar incident happened in Peterborough, Ontario, where a group of migrants arrived earlier than expected and were offered overnight shelter at the city's jail; in this case, the mayor found an interpreter the next day.\textsuperscript{282}

Workers waiting at the immigration offices were usually handpicked by the farmers themselves, who inspected their bodies in detail. For some migrants, especially those who had never worked for someone else before, this was an affront to their personal dignity.\textsuperscript{283} Sometimes they had to wait days before being offered a job, which meant their hostel bills kept accruing. Others were assigned jobs in distant provinces. In one case, immigration officers instructed a group of workers in Montreal to go to London, Ontario, then southeast towards Windsor, where another officer drove them around the farm fields in nearby Harrow, looking for someone to hire them. At one of these farms they were told: "I don't like Portuguese people".\textsuperscript{284}

Once at the farms, the migrants' difficulties communicating and unfamiliarity with Canadian ways became problematic. Even those who had worked in agriculture in Portugal were ignorant of Canadian farming techniques, machinery and climate. For instance, Carlos Pereira, who had been a farmer and a miller in mainland Portugal, was tasked with milking cows in a farm near Ottawa, even though he had never laid hands on an udder. He recalled how his boss once handed him a spray and gave him instructions in English that he did not understand. Not realizing it contained toxic chemicals, Pereira assumed the farmer meant for him to spray the flowers: "When he saw me doing this he put his hands to his head and with even my poor English I understood that he was saying 'My wife will kill us, both you and me'."\textsuperscript{285} Others lied on their immigration applications about their supposed farming experience. This was especially the case with the "vineyard workers" from Madeira, among whom were police officers, drivers, hotel workers, shopkeepers, civil servants, and privileged "sons of family". Caldeira Coelho interviewed some of these men and asked them why so few actual farmers had been selected in Madeira, to which they replied that farm workers did not have the funds to pay for the passage or to contract loans - some at a 16\% interest rate.\textsuperscript{286}

\textsuperscript{281} Marques & Medeiros, 1980, 56.
\textsuperscript{282} Letter, Pinto de Lemos, PMFA, to A. M. Baptista, JDE, June 22, 1954, 2P A55 M66, Emigr. A a C. Canadá. Diversos, AHD.
\textsuperscript{283} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 37-38.
\textsuperscript{284} José da Nobrega, cit. in Marques & Medeiros, 1980, 57.
\textsuperscript{285} Carlos Pereira, cit. ibid., 67-68.
\textsuperscript{286} Letter, Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa, to PMFA, June 01, 1953, 2P A52 M67, Canadá Diversos. Emigração Portuguesa, AHD.
Canadian officials were not pleased when Portuguese migrants started breaking their contracts and returning to Montreal after only a few days on their farm jobs. These runaways complained they were isolated, overworked, underfed, and underpaid, or that their work was just "too hard".\textsuperscript{287} The very long hours and intense seasonal work of Canadian farms was something that these migrant workers were not accustomed to. In most cases their pay was below the $60-$80 a month they had been promised; others were not given contracts at all.\textsuperscript{288} As Anderson and Higgs noted: "many of the immigrants who arrived in the 1950s lost thirty pounds weight in their first few months in Canada."\textsuperscript{289} Manuel Arruda later recalled how he nearly "starved to death" on a dairy farm in Sherbrooke, Quebec. A week into his contract, he received a visit from the Vice-Consul of Portugal in Montreal, Fr. Manuel Pereira de Almeida, and the JDE inspector San-Romão. Arruda begged them to find him another job and threatened to escape. That evening he received a phone call from José Martins, a fellow Portuguese working on a nearby farm, who told Arruda he was in a worse situation than him; the man explained he had been put to work building the farmer's new house and that his hands were bleeding from spending the whole day working with a shovel "on an empty stomach." Arruda's employers invited Martins to come for a visit that night and the two men plotted their escape. The following Sunday they left for Montreal, where they contacted Fr. Almeida and asked him to find them a decent farmer who would feed them well and give them "time off to go to Mass on Sundays". According to Arruda, Almeida replied: "You guys came here to work, you came to get money, not religion." Eventually, the two runaways met a friendly Canadian woman in Montreal who was able to find them a farm job with good meals, good work hours, and a $55 monthly wage.\textsuperscript{290}

In another case, Francisco da Silveira recalled being fed one egg and two pieces of toast in the morning and at night while working at a dairy farm in Saint-Timothée, Quebec. When he complained to Vice-Consul Almeida, the latter allegedly said: "he was there to take care of the affairs of the Portuguese government, not the emigrants" - in Almeida's reports to Lisbon we find a different characterization of his work, with multiple mentions to trips taken to meet Portuguese migrants at distant locations, often to deal with their injuries and complaints, other

\textsuperscript{287} For more on the hardships faced by these early Portuguese migrants in Canada, see Marques & Medeiros, 1980.
\textsuperscript{288} According to Caldeira Coelho, those farm workers who went to southern Ontario were better off than those who went to Quebec, where wages were lower and work was more demanding (letters, Caldeira Coelho, June 01 & 06, 1953, ibid).
\textsuperscript{289} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 39.
\textsuperscript{290} In their original farms, Arruda was paid $2 per hour and Martins only $1. In Montreal, an immigration officer sent them to a hotel where the cost per night was $3; or as Arruda noted: "three days' work" for Martin (Marques & Medeiros, 1980, 63).
times as courtesy calls to animate these isolated men.\footnote{Letter, Vice-Consul M. P. Almeida, Montreal, to PMFA, June 30, 1954, 2P A55 M66, Reembolso despesas viagens do Consul Portugal em Montreal em defesa interesses emigrantes, AHD.} After Silveira's contract ended and a new group of Portuguese migrants arrived in 1955, he returned to Saint-Timothée to look for his replacement. Finding the farmer and his new Portuguese farmhand at church, he approached his countrymen. Silveira explained he was aware of the man's predicament since he had previously been in his shoes, and told the newcomer to pack his bags when he got back to the farm. Later that day Silveira arrived with a taxi and "rescued" his countrymen.\footnote{Trans. of interview by D. Marques and M. Marujo, Feb.13, 1993 (m.t.), 2010-019/001 (9), Domingos Marques fonds, CTASC.}

Canadian farmers interpreted the hardships encountered by these Portuguese workers differently. Anderson and Higgs asked the daughter of one of the farmers about her impressions of the Portuguese: "They were insolent and looked down on the farmer and his way of life. They put in time on the farm merely to fulfill their contract, which was their ticket over here. Often they considered farm work beneath their dignity, and worked accordingly."\footnote{Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 38. Unfortunately, the authors did not cite their sources, so it is impossible to know or verify them.} Portuguese authorities were also inclined towards this interpretation, since they found that, "in the vast majority of cases, the complaints [from the farm workers] were totally unfounded." Coelho considered the high number of grievances to be "based on such futile reasons that it is impossible to present them to Canadian authorities without a total loss of prestige for our workers." Perhaps because of this, Portuguese officials tried to appease the migrants by addressing their complaints individually and shifting the men around. They were also aware that many of these supposed farm workers had no previous agricultural experience, and believed this was the main reason why so many failed to adapt to its hard toil. However, Portuguese officials also recognized that, in some instances, farmers failed to fulfill their part of the contract. Coelho was aware of various cases where farmers laid off workers or halved wages during the winter season. Afraid of not being able to find another job, many migrant workers were forced to accept these cuts. In other cases, wages were paid irregularly or only after the workers threatened to leave.\footnote{Letter, C. Coelho to PMFA, June 01, 1953, and December 10, 1954 (m.t.), 2P A55 M66, Emi. A a C. Canadá. Diversos, AHD.}

Less than a month after the 1953 cohort arrived, Coelho reported to Lisbon that, judging from the number of complaints registered in the Montreal consulate, about 40% of all farm workers, especially those from the mainland, were ready to abandon their contracts and move to the cities where they could work for higher wages. This was a serious issue, since it raised cautionary flags for Canadian immigration officials as to the unreliability of Portuguese workers.
Inspector San-Romão, who was responsible for addressing each complaint, recommended that his government impose a penalty on every migrant who breached his contract, including not allowing them to leave Portugal when they returned to visit their families. Coelho eased anxieties by noting that, though troubling, breaches of contract by Portuguese migrants were not as serious as in the case of German and Dutch migrants. He also estimated that only 8% of the absconders had remained unemployed over the winter. Still Coelho proposed that the Portuguese government set up unemployment insurance for emigrant farm workers, even if they had to pay into it themselves. Baptista endorsed this suggestion and also asked Minister Cunha about the possibility of offering insurance for work accidents. However, these recommendations failed to gain traction with decision-makers in Lisbon.

Despite these concerns, the Canadian government, now dealing with a decline in its traditional sources of migrant labour, expressed interest in increasing the volume of Portuguese migration. In 1954, the railway building company R. F. Welch, which had traditionally hired Italian immigrants, was looking to employ up to 1,000 unskilled workers to do maintenance on Canadian National Railway tracks across the country. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Walter Harris, reserved 200 spots in this "bulk order" for the Portuguese, even after he failed to get a clear response from Lisbon regarding their interest in this offer. Harris also expressed his intention to replace Italian with Portuguese railway workers going forward, reflecting his government's growing anxiety about the relative increase of Italian immigration to Canada. For Portuguese officials, the most attractive aspect about this offer was the fact that the railway company was willing to hire Azorean workers.

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295 Letter, Caldeira Coelho to PMFA, June 03, 1953, 2P A52 M67, Canadá Diversos. Emigração Portuguesa, AHD.
296 Canadian immigration experts meeting in 1953 determined that the country needed another 16,000 farm workers, the majority of whom should be recruited in Germany. However, they worried about the recent decline in the quality of German migrants, since a growing number of them arrived with no farming experience and abandoned their farms before their one-year contracts were over. The experts concluded this resulted from the rapid increase in admissions from that country. Learning this, Minister Cunha cautioned the JDE not to compromise the quality of its emigration recruitment for the sake of expediting its increase (letters, Minister Paulo Cunha to A. M. Baptista, JDE, December 31, 1953; and Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa, to Minister P. Cunha, 30 April, 1954, 2P A 55 M66, Emigração A a C. Canadá. Diversos, AHD).
298 Formerly known as Veltri, R. F. Welch was founded by two Italian immigrants in the 1890s who were responsible for bringing a great many Italians to the U.S. and Canada. For more see John Potestio, The R. F. Welch (Veltri) Company, 2012.
299 British immigration dropped from 44% in 1946-50 to 27% in 1956-61, while Italian immigration increased from 4.5% to 18% in the same period (Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: a History of Canadian Immigration Policy, 1998, 314). According to Freda Hawkins, in the mid-1950s, it was estimated that every Italian immigrant was responsible for bringing an average of 49 relatives (Canada and Immigration. Public Policy and Public Concern, 1972).
That year, both governments agreed to a total of 950 migrants, including railway workers, farmhands, and tradesmen, all from the Azores. According to Coelho, this cohort "produced better results than those coming from the Mainland and Madeira," as most of them fulfilled their one-year contracts on the farms. When Coelho wrote his report, only 5% of these Azorean workers were unemployed, despite being winter. Their "physical characteristics" and quality of work also impressed Canadian farmers and immigration officials.301

Although living in far-off inhospitable places, railway workers did not experience the same level of isolation as their peers on the farms; plus, the wages, benefits and food offered by the railway company were significantly better.302 Whenever possible, R. F. Welch formed work gangs of the same nationality, which could include anywhere from 20 to 120 men; some of the Italian overseers also spoke some Portuguese (Figure 18).303 The fact they lived and worked in the wilderness, sleeping in tents and train wagons and travelling from site to site, was welcomed by the migrants, who had nowhere to spend their money. Still, work was heavy and intensive, and often done under the northern Canadian hinterland's unforgiving climate. Carlos Pereira, who worked in railway building in Sept-Îles, Quebec, remembered working outdoors in -58 degrees (F) and seeing the skin on a friend's face fall off from the cold, and another having to return to Portugal after losing a leg to frostbite.304

Other jobs commonly taken by these "pioneer" migrants were in mining and logging in the northern hinterland, harvesting fruit and tobacco in southern Ontario, or in the construction and service industries in major cities; only in the late 1950s did they start working in factories in larger numbers. As transient labourers, these sojourners worked at a number of different occupations before they decided to settle in one place. Again Carlos Pereira is a good example of this progression from sojourner to immigrant. After abandoning the farm where he worked for three months, then being laid off after five months of laying railway tracks in Sept-Îles, Pereira returned to Montreal and met a fellow Portuguese in a boarding house, who told him about a job

301 Letters from G. R. Benoit, Chief Operations Division, DCI, to Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa Legation, December 29, 1953; and from Caldeira Coelho to PMFA, December 10, 1954, 2P A55 M66, Emigração A a C. Canadá. Diversos, AHD.
302 R. F. Welch informed the JDE that they offered $0.90 per hour, subject to discounts ($1.92 per month for Employment Insurance; $65 per year for health and accident insurance). The regular work schedule was 10 hours a day or 54 hours a week, with voluntary overtime available at no extra pay. No minimum guaranteed period of work was required, which went on for the entire year. Workers had to purchase their own bedding for $15, reimbursed at the end of the year; or they could bring their own. The food was "of first rate", at a $2.40 a day. The cost of passage was $210-$240 by sea, and $25 by land (Halifax to Montreal); the company paid for the trip from Montreal to wherever the work camp was located (letter, PMFA to JDE, October 19, 1953).
304 Transcript of interview by Domingos Marques, c. 1978, 2010-019/001 (10), Domingos Marques fonds, CTASC.
painting airplane hangars in Goose Bay, Labrador. Pereira worked there for seven months, painting during the day and selling soda pop and decks of playing cards at night. After a year and a half in Canada, Pereira decided to go back to Portugal for a short period of time. In 1955, he returned to Canada and found work in a bedframe factory in Toronto, which he supplemented by working part-time in construction. After nine months of this, he bought a house in the city and called for his wife and daughters to join him.305

Experiences varied for the smaller group of tradesmen. Every year officials on both sides negotiated the type of skilled workers to include in this movement according to each country's labour needs. By 1955, the new Consul in Montreal, Henrique Vital Gomes, discouraged sending more tradesmen, noting it was "nearly impossible to place them" due to their language difficulties, the employers' reluctance to hire them, and the Canadian labour unions' resistance to accepting foreign contract workers. Indeed, mounting pressure from organized labour forced Canadian officials to temporarily cancel the recruitment of workers for railway building. Consul Gomes then proposed to Minister Cunha that only those from "the lowest rungs" be allowed to migrate to Canada, for whom the impact of low wages, no legal protection, and difficult working conditions would be smaller. He also urged emigration officials to decline applications from small rural landowners and only accept "the most backward" peasants, "like the Azoreans". In response, the JDE's president Baptista reassured the Minister that the absconding rate among Portuguese farmhands was not alarming in the Canadian context. Coelho in turn considered the consul's recommendations to be incomprehensible, since "every country seeks to be represented abroad by prosperous communities of the highest level, instead of a low level backward bunch." In his view, the opposite was the problem, since many of those migrants who abandoned their farm contracts were in fact skilled workers who were able to find work in their trades.306

The annual volume of Portuguese migrant workers remained largely the same until 1956, with some adjustments in terms of regional origin, desired skill set, and province of destination. Despite their positive reaction to Azorean workers, the Canadian government again limited recruitment to Lisbon in 1955. Portuguese authorities were not overly concerned with this development since they were confident that the Azoreans already in Canada would eventually sponsor their relatives and develop a larger migration chain. Immigration officials were later

305 Ibid.
306 Letters, Consul Henrique V. Gomes, Montreal, to Minister P. Cunha, Nov. 07, 1955; Caldeira Coelho to Minister P. Cunha, Nov. 10, 1955 (m.t.), 2P M190, Emigração - Canadá Política Emigratória e Resultados Movimento Emigratório em 1955, AHD.
disappointed with the quality of farm workers arriving from the mainland that year, citing their "poor adaptability", "constant complaints", and high absconding rates. After a year in the country, Canadian authorities estimated that 446 of the 923 Portuguese who arrived in 1955 had left their original place of work before their contract was over, and 9 never reported to their designated immigration office. For the 1956 cohort, immigration officials returned to the Azores, where they had previously made a "satisfactory selection". However, the high absconding rate of farm workers continued in this cohort. By May of that year, 152 of the 678 Azorean migrants had left their original jobs, 34 failed to report to an immigration office, and 25 reported yet disappeared before they could be placed.

The support networks available to Portuguese migrants in Canada grew as their numbers increased. Information about jobs in different parts of the country now circulated with greater ease and newcomers wasted less time before going after higher wages and better working conditions. Canadian officials recognized this and by the end of 1956 were starting to question the value of the Portuguese movement.

Table 1. Sources: Various correspondence, 2P A55 M66; 2P M190; 2P M446 A6; 2P M720 A8; EEA M140, AHD; and File 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Citizenship and Immigration NAC.

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308 Letters, DCI's Director, Ottawa, to Deputy Minister Laval Fortier, November 08, 1955, and May 15, 1956, file 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, NAC.
Still, demand for farm workers remained high, forcing Canadian officials to expand this movement in 1957. This time they were willing to recruit up to 2,000 farmhands, 50 tradesmen, and as many engineers as possible, along with their "dependents". Once again the DCI instructed its inspectors to carry a "meticulous careful selection" and urged them to find well-trained workers who could speak either English or French. Despite resistance from Canadian labour unions, immigration authorities yielded to the demands of railway companies and requested another 1,000 railway workers from the Azores. Altogether, 3,050 migrants were to be selected; the largest cohort to arrive in Canada under this migration agreement. That year, Portuguese migrants were also authorized to access the Canadian government's Assisted Passage Loan Scheme, which allowed them to borrow money interest-free to pay for their passage and repay over a two-year period. Selected in the mainland and the Azores, this was the first cohort to make the journey by air, which was now cheaper than travelling by sea. It took 38 flights at a rate of three per week until the last of this group arrived in Montreal, in May 1957 (Figure 19).

Unlike previous years, Canadian immigration services had a difficult time finding jobs for the newcomers. Portuguese officials attributed this to the arrival of close to 38,000 Hungarian refugees (following that country's revolution in 1956), and over 100,000 British refugees from the Middle East (following the Suez crisis of 1957), which expanded Canada's labour pool. The 1957-58 economic recession further reduced job markets in North America, leading to a spike in unemployment rates. Those construction, factory, and service jobs that Portuguese workers once found in abundance in the cities were now scarce. Because of this, a larger number of them started spending the winters in Portugal, when the Canadian unemployment rate was at its highest. Widespread unemployment was the reason provided by Deputy Minister Fortier when explaining his government's decision to limit the 1958 Portuguese migration movement to 500 workers, including tradesmen, service workers, and engineers, all of whom were to be recruited in the mainland. Canadian officials also decided to expand family sponsorship, hoping to raise its volume to about 2,000-3,000 Portuguese immigrants per year.

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309 The DCI introduced the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme in 1951 following the British pound's devaluing in 1949, which effectively increased transportation costs for British immigrants. In 1956, Canada expanded this scheme to include those immigrants "likely to become successfully established" (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998, 323).

310 Memorandum, DCI - Immigration Branch to Visa Officer A. J. Desjardins, Canadian Embassy, Lisbon, December 19, 1956, file 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, NAC.

311 Various correspondence, 1957, 2P M446 A6, Can. Operações de Seleção de Emigrantes, AHD.


This period of high unemployment coincided with the rise of Progressive Conservative John Diefenbaker as the new Prime Minister of Canada, and the appointment of Ellen Fairclough as the new Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Unlike the previous Liberal administration, which had been characterized by a flexible and relatively open approach to immigration, Fairclough promised to tighten Canada's admission policy, restrict the entry of unskilled workers, and extend family sponsorship. Immigrant officials now had to find ways to justify the importing of manual labourers to a Canadian public that was increasingly hostile to southern European immigration. In 1959, the humanitarian crisis unleashed by the Capelinhos volcano's eruption in Faial provided Ottawa with the opportunity to welcome 150 Azorean refugee families under special provisions. The next year, Canadian officials informed their Portuguese counterparts that the migration movement for 1960 was to be restricted to Faial, which the latter understood as a tactic to deflect public criticism, since that stream could be justified under humanitarian grounds. That year, 200 families from Faial and Terceira were sent to Ontario, Quebec and the western provinces. However, in 1961, another unemployment crisis led the Canadian government to discontinue the movement of Azorean families and limit the number of migrant workers to 200. The labour migration scheme negotiated between Portugal and Canada effectively ended that year. But as the Portuguese regime had hoped, this movement generated enough momentum to produce its own kin migration chains separate from official negotiations, capable of maintaining themselves even when Canadian authorities tried to curb southern European immigration.

Women's migration and family reunification in Canada, 1950s-70s

Portuguese migrant women, who started joining their husbands and fathers in Canada in larger numbers in the late 1950s, were instrumental in transforming what was largely a sojourner movement into a permanent or long-term immigration. Along with their many homemaking responsibilities, women played crucial roles in prompting and directing the movement of migrant men, who, as fathers, fiancés, and husbands, worked abroad in order to improve their daughters' dowries, meet their wives-to-be's stipulations, or improve their household's financial situation. Women were also important nodes in a transnational information network connecting these highly mobile men, who exchanged news about jobs, whereabouts, and other matters through their wives, mothers, and brides at home. Marriage-seekers in the hometowns also kept abreast of potential spouses working abroad and exchanged information about their employment situation among various families. Some of these men married by proxy while

316 Letter, Consul Artur Nogueira, Montreal, to PMFA, July 24, 1959, 2P M720 A8, Canadá Emigração Diversos, AHD.
318 Even before they left for Canada, women played crucial roles in prompting and directing the movement of migrant men, who, as fathers, fiancés, and husbands, worked abroad in order to improve their daughters' dowries, meet their wives-to-be's stipulations, or improve their household's financial situation. Women were also important nodes in a transnational information network connecting these highly mobile men, who exchanged news about jobs, whereabouts, and other matters through their wives, mothers, and brides at home. Marriage-seekers in the hometowns also kept abreast of potential spouses working abroad and exchanged information about their employment situation among various families. Some of these men married by proxy while...
contributions towards improving the household economy, the income earned by these women as waged workers (and sometimes breadwinners) outside the home made it possible for migrant families to save enough money to buy a house, a car, and other Canadian amenities. As homeowners, women sometimes capitalized on their homemaking skills by running boarding houses for other Portuguese migrants, offering them beds, clean laundry, and home-style meals; in some cases they ran informal daycare centres for other women working outside the house. By clustering people from different parts of Portugal in one neighbourhood, and generating demand for homeland foods and other products, boarding houses and the women who ran them were at the genesis of what Harney called the "emerging fabric of North American ethnicity."  

For example, Odilia Pereira and her four daughters joined her husband Carlos in 1956 at the family's new house in Kensington Market, a traditional newcomer neighbourhood in Toronto. Carlos remembered his friends' excitement when they arrived: "There were no girls here when my family arrived. So when there were parties, their success depended on whether or not we came... It would be me, my four daughters, and sometimes I brought one or two girls from my neighbourhood. I must be one of the most popular guys in the community" (Figure 20). Odilia found a job in a garment factory close to home, where she worked for four and a half years, while their older daughters worked in a bank. Their house became a point of reference for Portuguese newcomers, who were given the Pereiras' address by an unknown person in Lisbon and told they would find help there. Initially perplexed, the Pereiras did help their countrymen find jobs and hosted them in what became one of the first Portuguese boarding houses in Toronto. Later the Pereira's bought a farm outside the city (in Orangeville), where Odilia and the two youngest daughters worked all week, and Carlos and the oldest daughters visited from Toronto on the weekends. Here, the Pereiras grew beans imported from Portugal and made traditional sausages and bread, which Carlos sold to his Portuguese customers from the back of his station wagon on the streets of Toronto. In 1963, the Pereiras sold the farm and opened a grocery store in Kensington Market, by then a predominantly Portuguese neighbourhood.  

Ottawa's original position on the recruitment of Portuguese male workers was to "select as many single persons as possible." But after the first cohort arrived in 1953, sexual fears
about the presence of lonesome "Latin men" amidst Canadian women prompted immigration officials to submit a request for single female domestics, waitresses, and nurses from Portugal; the goal being to provide these men with "women of their own race". Canadian officials assured Portuguese authorities that local Catholic clergymen were prepared to supervise these women and ensure they observed the same moral conduct as was expected of them in Portugal.\textsuperscript{322} Portuguese officials were reluctant to meet this request, citing the increasing scarcity of domestics and nurses in Portugal, and the potential isolation that these women would face in a foreign environment, "where even men have a hard time adapting".\textsuperscript{323}

By 1956, the number of Portuguese migrants abandoning the farms had become alarming, prompting Deputy Minister Fortier to propose that they be allowed to bring their families into the country, as that would give them an incentive to settle and damper their willingness to pursue higher wages elsewhere.\textsuperscript{324} That year, Canada broadened its family migration provisions by allowing landed immigrants to sponsor their spouses, children, and siblings, along with the sponsored individual's spouse and children under the age of 21; it also removed restrictions on the number of non-working "dependents" accompanying or following the "head of the family."\textsuperscript{325}

Around the same time, the \textit{Estado Novo} clarified its position on female emigration. The JDE authorized single women to emigrate only if they had a labour-contract in the country of destination and their employer was either Portuguese or a married foreigner who had hired that woman in the past. Portuguese officials dropped the "letter of call" requirement for emigrants going to Canada, except for married women and children, who were not allowed to leave the country without their husbands' or fathers' consent.\textsuperscript{326} Later in 1956, Canadian officials pushed their Portuguese counterparts to simplify the sponsoring process for women and children by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{322} Letter, Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa Legation, to PMFA, August 19, 1954, ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{323} Telegram, Pinto de Lemos, PMFA, to Ottawa Legation, Sept. 24, 1954, ibid.; letter, Consul Vital Gomes, Montreal, to PMFA, Nov. 07, 1955, 2P M190, Emigração - Canadá Política Emigratória e Resultados Movimento Emigratório em 1955, AHD.
\item \textsuperscript{324} Letter, Deputy Minister Laval Fortier to DCI’s Director, October 25, 1956, file 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, NAC.
\item \textsuperscript{325} The 1956-785 order-in-council ranked four "preferred classes" of admissible immigrants: 1) British subjects from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, plus Irish, American and French citizens; 2) citizens of various European countries (including Portugal) who could guarantee Canadian employment in particular occupations; 3) relatives of legal Canadian residents born or naturalized in various countries; 4) and the relatives of Canadian citizens residing in Canada. This order maintained previous restrictions on non-European countries and placed quota limitations on non-white nations in the British Commonwealth (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998, 328-329).
\item \textsuperscript{326} Dispatch, JDE, March 20, 1956, cit. in letter, A. M. Baptista, JDE, to Minister T. Negreiros, March 12, 1958, 2P M557 A7 Assoc. Port. Canadá, AHD (in 1958, Minister Negreiros approved an amendment to this dispatch, stating that it did not apply to hired women with immediate relatives living near her place of employment, who could send a "letter of call" for her, and agreed to provide her food and moral protection, as well as assist in her repatriation whenever that responsibility fell on the employers).
\end{itemize}
allowing emigrant husbands or fathers to grant their consent when they were screened.\(^{327}\) These changes had a significant impact, as reflected in the growth of Portuguese emigration to Canada, which jumped from 941 departures in 1955 to 1,612 in 1956 - over 600 more than the number of migrant workers recruited that year - and to 4,158 in 1957 - over 1,100 more than those recruited.

In its typical ambiguous style, the regime expressed interest in increasing emigration through family reunification at the same time it delayed the departure of wives and children waiting to join their husbands and fathers abroad.\(^{328}\) As historians have argued, one of the reasons informing the JDE's approval of Canada as an emigration destination was the fact it was at the time "one of the few countries that allowed currency transfers."\(^{329}\) The view held by Canadian officials was that Lisbon objected to family migration, which the JDE argued was a misrepresentation of its policies. According to this agency, the Portuguese government simply wished "to guarantee that families do not find themselves in difficult situations abroad... Therefore, when the [male] emigrant's situation is unstable, it is preferable that the family remains in [Portugal]. Afterwards, once their situation improves and there is a possibility for habitation, all facilities are granted."\(^{330}\)

In March 1959, immigration sponsorship rights in Canada were again limited to nuclear family members, except for permanent residents with British, Australian, South African, New Zealand, Irish, French or American nationalities, who could still sponsor siblings and married children. Critics denounced the discriminatory basis of this legislation and accused Minister Fairclough of yielding to nativist fears, resulting from the increase in Italian immigration, which surpassed the British in volume for the first time in 1958. The Conservative government denied these accusations and replied that these measures were simply meant to address the growing backlog in immigrant applications and prioritize skilled candidates with decent chances of finding employment upon arrival. In a letter to the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister Marcello Mathias (1958-61), Consul Artur Nogueira in Montreal noted: "Those who live in Canada, however, whose job it is to deal with immigrants on a daily basis, know that this is not true, as it is exactly the skilled workers, the artisans, who have most difficulties in finding employment and are faced with every obstacle one can imagine." Nogueira mentioned the examples of two

\(^{327}\) Letter, Deputy Minister Laval Fortier to Director DCI, October 25, 1956.
\(^{328}\) Santos, 2004, 82.
\(^{329}\) Memorandum, JDE Secretary Vírgina Lobo, July 14, 1954, 2P A55 M66, Emigração A a C. Canadá. Diversos, AHD.
\(^{330}\) Memorandum, Caldeira Coelho, October 16, 1958.
Portuguese skilled workers, one a former radio operator in the merchant navy who now picked gravel on a golf course, and another, a former loom technician who returned to Portugal after washing dishes in a restaurant. The consul added: "In truth, what Canada wishes are unskilled workers to be exploited at will - until they open their eyes - in jobs that Canadians don't want."

This change in policy damaged Portuguese interests, which hoped to maintain a steady emigration stream to Canada and clear the surplus population in the Azores, among whom extended family sponsorship was a common practice. Salvador Garrido, the new Chargé d'Affaires in Ottawa, was tasked with convincing Canadian authorities of the "fundamental difference" between Portuguese and Italian immigrants, and emphasize that the former were "more susceptible to being integrated" in the new country. Eventually, the backlash from ethnic communities across Canada forced Minister Fairclough to reverse her restrictions on family sponsorship only a month after introducing them.

By May 1959, the Canadian government preferred that Portuguese families migrate together instead of reuniting at a later date. As a foreign affairs officer noted to Ambassador Emílio Patrício (1959-62) in Ottawa: "In some instances the head of family has been found to be quite content with his situation in Canada, preferring to send money to his family in Portugal rather than apply for their admission. In other cases, we have discovered that after the head of family has acquired considerable assets he will invariably return to his native land." On the other hand, Portuguese officials complained about the length of time (approximately two years in 1961) it took Canadian services to process an immigrant's application to bring his wife into the country and noted the negative consequences that such a wait could have on the couple's life.

Portuguese immigration to Canada continued to grow exponentially until the mid-1970s, mostly through family sponsorship. 62% of those who arrived in Canada in 1955-74 came from the Azores, of which 78% were from São Miguel. Azoreans, in particular, made a concerted effort to transplant their extended families to North America. While close relatives often settled near each other, some extended family members lived in other parts of the continent. It was

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331 Letter, Consul A. Nogueira to Minister M. Mathias, April 17, 1959 (m.t.), 2P M720 A8, Canadá Emigração Diversos, AHD.
332 Salvador Sampaio Garrido later became the Portuguese ambassador in Canada in 1970-74.
334 The 1962 Immigration Act reintroduced limitations on family sponsorship on the basis of nationality. Only Canadians from "preferred" nations (now including Portugal) were allowed to sponsor children and unmarried orphaned nieces and nephews over the age of 21, married children, siblings and their immediate families.
335 Letter, author unknown, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, to Ambassador Emílio Patricio, May 28, 1959, 2P M720 A8, Canadá Emigração Diversos, AHD.
normal for Azoreans in Canada to visit their relatives in the United States and vice-versa. There is little data on the volume of this cross-border traffic. However, qualitative evidence suggests that immigrants in Central and Eastern Canada were likely to have relatives in New England, while those in Western Canada extended their families to California.³³⁷

Unauthorised movements: clandestine migration and its facilitators in Canada, 1950s-70s

Parallel to the official labour migration and family sponsorship movements, other informal streams were important in forming Canada's Portuguese communities. One commonly acknowledged movement, on which there is little data, was the clandestine migration of White Fleet fishermen, who jumped ship in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia and made their way West. After the war, demand for cod once again increased in Portugal and Brazil, leading to an increase in Portuguese fishermen on Canada's Atlantic coast; a period often referred to as the "Golden Age of the White Fleet."³³⁸ Unlike other modernized European fleets fishing in the Grand Banks, the Portuguese White Fleet mixed modern trawlers with traditional single-manned dories, where lonely fishermen caught fish by the strength of their arms. This was a very labour-intensive occupation with a high rate of injuries and deaths, due not only to the many dangers of the sea but the propensity for the larger ships to catch fire.³³⁹ It is no surprise then that so many of these men abandoned this hard life once their ships came ashore to restock.

In July 1961, Captain Toscano of the hospital ship Gil Eannes, the White Fleet's largest and most iconic vessel, informed the Portuguese embassy in Ottawa that a growing number of

³³⁹ Andrieux, 2009, 62-64.
fishermen deserted every year (29 that year so far), only a few of whom were captured and returned to their ships. Toscano explained that he lost money every time a fisherman escaped, since the latter were paid an advance of $4,500-$6,000 escudos. That year, for the first time, four runaways captured in North Sydney, Nova Scotia, appealed their deportation with Canadian authorities on the grounds they would be drafted to fight in Angola. The Portuguese government feared the media might take an interest in the men's story, or that Canadian politicians would take advantage of their situation to further condemn the *Estado Novo*'s colonial wars. Canadian officials too were afraid this case could lead to a dangerous precedent, considering the thousands of fishermen arriving on the country's shores every year. According to the Portuguese embassy, the Director of Immigration W. R. Baskerville tasked one of his officers with convincing these runaways to withdraw their appeal, which they did when told they had no chance of being granted refugee status in Canada. In the late 1960s, with the introduction of larger and better equipped British and Soviet fleets, cod fishing in the Grand Banks became less profitable for Portuguese ship owners, who began depleting their fleet, often by faking accidental fires in order to collect insurance.

Before the first Portuguese workers landed in Halifax in 1953, a small but pivotal migrant stream had been developing since the early 1950s, made up of reemigrant men from countries like Venezuela, Brazil, the United States, Argentina and France. Some of them had spent years outside of Portugal before hearing news of Canada's interest in migrant labourers. The discrepancy between recorded departures from Portugal

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340 Possibly helping their decision to drop the appeal was the fact that these men were "starved" in their prison cells, where they were given only "a drop of coffee and bread with raw tomato inside" (various correspondence between Captain Toscano in North Sydney, Luis Soares Oliveira at the Portuguese embassy in Ottawa, and the PMFA in Lisbon, July 18-21, 1961, PEA M3, Política Interna e Externa de Portugal. Deserção de 4 Marítimos Portugueses no Canadá, AHD).


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**Graph 12.** Source: Marques & Medeiros, 1980; Baganha, 1998
and Portuguese arrivals in Canada indicates the existence of a parallel movement of a few hundred migrants every year. However, the total arrivals from Portugal and other countries was likely higher, considering that official statistics did not capture the volume of illegal migration.

Many of these reemigrants had been part of the large postwar migration to Venezuela, where great economic development ensued after large oil deposits were discovered in the first half of the 20th century. Years of political instability in that country led many of these Portuguese migrants to look for other destinations. Álvaro Marques, who moved to Canada as a "tourist" in January 1952, left Lisbon for Caracas with his father at age 13. Eight years later, a sequence of political coups convinced him to leave for Montreal, where he worked clandestinely until 1955, when he finally obtained landed status. Marques recalled that there were "lots" of Portuguese "tourists" from Venezuela working in Montreal in the early 1950s; some stayed in Canada, others went to the United States, and others yet were deported.\footnote{Transcript of interview by D. Marques and M. Marujo, Feb. 15, 1993, 2010-019/001 (9), Domingos Marques fonds, CTASC.}

While there were no Italian-style padroni\footnote{For more on this historical character, see Robert Harney, "Montreal's King of Italian Labour: A case study of Padronism", \textit{Labour/Le Travailleur}, (4), 1979: 57-84.} among these Portuguese migrants, there were a few informal facilitators that found them jobs for a fee, and who sometimes took advantage of their countrymen. Usually Portuguese-Americans, these men spoke English fluently and knew how to navigate Canadian society. Carlos Pereira remembered one such individual in Montreal who "extorted" money from Portuguese migrants with the promise of finding them jobs, which he did not always deliver. According to Pereira, the man had fled from the United States where he was being chased by the Mafia: "Once they found out he was in Canada, he could never stop [running]... After a short while, he was found dead inside a car crashed against a pole."\footnote{Transcript of interview by Domingos Marques, c. 1978.} Not all migrants had a bad experience with these illicit facilitators. António Sousa recalled: "My first job cost me $50.00. There was a young man in Montreal who had come from the United States to rip off immigrants. But I didn't feel ripped off because I secured an interview with that money that got me my first job in Canada: a nine month contract as an assistant cook in Labrador."\footnote{António Sousa cit. in Marques & Medeiros, 1980, p. 64.}

Far greater was the number of migrants who helped their fellow countrymen at no cost other than the promise to reciprocate whenever called upon. In fact, many of those Portuguese migrants who arrived in Canada prior to 1953 provided meaningful orientation to those who followed, helping them find jobs, housing, and other important resources. Of all the informal
facilitators, Manuel Cabral was perhaps the one who impacted the largest number of newcomers. Born to Azorean immigrants in Somerset, Massachusetts, Cabral was an experienced tack-maker who travelled regularly across North America on business. After an earlier experience working in Ontario, Cabral decided to move to that Canadian province in 1928. Years later, he opened his own manufacturing company in Galt (present-day Cambridge), then later a business selling frozen fish as feed for mink farms, which forced him to travel between Ontario and New England. After 1953, Cabral started running into other Portuguese during his travels and was asked by his Portuguese-American friends to give rides to their relatives arriving in Canada. Cabral agreed to help these men by sheltering them in his properties, teaching them English, hiring or finding them jobs through his personal connections and through the DCI. Once word spread that Cabral was helping Portuguese settle in Galt, more newcomers poured into that southern Ontario city, where they were able to find jobs in factories and workshops, construction, tobacco farms and other occupations.\textsuperscript{346}

Some of Galt's residents were upset about the influx of Portuguese migrants in the region. Local newspapers reported the resentment of organized labour leaders who called this movement "unfortunate" given the high unemployment rates among Canadians.\textsuperscript{347} For immigration officials, the situation created by Cabral was "getting out of hand" and the group that gathered around him had to be "dispersed." The authorities were primarily concerned with the relative comfort and bargaining power that Cabral offered these workers. Despite the DCI's attempts to stop it, the flow of Portuguese migrants into Galt grew rapidly after these sojourners started settling in the region and calling for their kin in Portugal to join them.

Portuguese and Canadian authorities monitored the clandestine flow of migrant workers passing as "tourists", which continued to grow even after the two countries inaugurated their labour migration agreement. The JDE investigated various travel agencies in Montreal suspected of running illegal migration rings. In 1957, the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Ministry sent an inspector to investigate the involvement of Montreal's consular staff in two illicit schemes. The first had resulted in a public scandal, involving a major scam orchestrated by Simeon Golovin, a Paraguayan immigrant linked to Montreal's Holiday Travel Agency. According to the testimonies of community members, Golovin promised his clients safe passage to Canada and subsequent

\textsuperscript{346} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 79-80.

\textsuperscript{347} "Calls Influx of Portuguese 'Unfortunate',' Kitchener Waterloo Record, February 19, 1954. 2P A55 M66, Emigração A a C. Canadá. Diversos, AHD.
landed status at a cost of $300 per person. The scheme was reported to Canadian police by two of Golovin's collaborators after he ran away with $3,355 collected from prospective emigrants in the Azores. The other case dealt with an illegal migration ring operated by the Portugal-Canada, Tourist & Trade Bureau, co-managed by José Maria Gomes in association with a travel agency in Caracas. According to the ministry's inspector, the agency charged $700 to people in Venezuela seeking to move to Canada clandestinely. After obtaining their Portuguese passports in Caracas, clients were instructed to go to Brazil, or another South American country, where it was easier to get a Canadian tourist visa from a British consulate. Once in Montreal, these "tourists" contacted José Gomes and handed him a cheque from the Caracas agency for $200. He then sent them to a lawyer who regularized their status, for $500. In 1957, the consulate in Montreal was not aware of anyone being granted landed status in Canada through this scheme.

After his investigation, the inspector discovered that some consular staff kept personal relationships with Golovin, protected him on consular inquiries, and dismissed information about his dubious intentions, thus easing his illegal activities. The consulate's chancellor - brother-in-law to the consul and a friend of José Gomes - was admonished for having accompanied Golovin on a trip to Kitimat, in northern British Columbia, where the latter defrauded various Portuguese migrants. Moreover, one consulate staff member was a former Portugal-Canada general manager.

The number of travel agencies multiplied as Portuguese communities grew in the 1950s-60s. Newcomers, the vast majority of whom could not speak English or French or were illiterate, sought travel agents for their bilingualism and higher education, which the latter marketed through various services, such as interpreting, translating, accounting, legal counseling, and others. Brettell also attributed this reliance on travel agents to the fact that migrants' found it "hard to adjust to the specialization and division of services in the city." In rural Portugal, they had been used to dealing with one person, usually the priest or the local cacique (boss), who performed "a variety of roles and offer[ed] a multitude of services... The travel agent thus fits a

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348 It is unclear if this amount was included in the $700 that prospective migrants had to pay the travel agency.
349 In Consul Vital Gomes' and José Gomes' version of the events, these were unfounded accusations made by the directors of Montreal's Portuguese Association of Canada (APC), who long opposed the consul's ideas and wanted to divide the community. Interviewed by the inspector, the APC's president Agathão Lança took credit for the removal of Consul Gomes and pressed charges against Chancelor Assis, whom they sought to oust, along with Assis' aunt and fiancé who also worked at the consulate. Report, Consul José dos Santos S. Taveira, October 22, 1957, 2P M446 A6, Canadá Diversos, AHD.
350 Inspector Taveira also reported that the consulate's staff charged "exaggerated" sums of money for interpretation services provided at Montreal's airport (various correspondence, October-November 1957, 2P M446 A6, Canadá Diversos, AHD).
preconceived image of a man of many parts. While these middlemen helped the immigrants at a time when there were few Portuguese-speaking services available, their motivations were hardly altruistic. In fact, immigrants came to resent these travel agents once they learned that many of the services they had paid for were available for free at Canadian government agencies and social service centers.

In the eyes of the new Consul Nogueira, emigrants were easy prey for unscrupulous fraudsters and were "always ready to run towards the first charlatan that promises them the solution for all their difficulties and the cure for all their wrongs." He specifically censured the travel agencies' common practice of charging immigrants for services they did not need, like escorting them to the consulate to get a passport, or were available at a lower cost at the consulate, such as notarial services. Under Consul Nogueira's direction, the old way of doing consular business in Montreal stopped, as travel agents were no longer allowed as proxies when dealing with emigration matters. The consul also denounced Portugal-Canada's illicit practices in La Presse and the Montreal Star, the city's largest French and English newspapers. Still, the problems continued. Following the negative publicity, the owners of Portugal-Canada sold the agency to the Portuguese-American Filipe Contreiras, who pursued the illegal migration business in Montreal, now catering to those wanting to move to the United States. For some time, Contreiras chased potential customers in the consulate's waiting room after the consul refused to refer people to his travel agency; eventually he had to be ejected from the consulate by force. By late 1957, Portuguese diplomats in the United States asked the Montreal consulate for information on Portugal-Canada, as an alarming number of illegal migrants were coming to them with tourist visas obtained through that agency, and sometimes escorted by its staff.

Clandestine migration to Canada from various parts of the world continued to grow, reaching crisis proportions in the late 1960s. One of the main issues faced by Minister Fairclough was the large-scale illegal migration of the so-called Chinese "paper families." In 1959, in collaboration with the Hong Kong police, the RCMP took decisive action to dismantle an illegal migration ring, raiding more than thirty Chinese homes and businesses in cities across Canada.

352 Anderson & Higgs, 1978, 47.
353 Report (confidential), Consul Artur S. Nogueira to PMFA, September 30, 1957 (m.t.), 2P M446 A6, Canadá Diversos, AHD.
354 Letter, Consul A. S. Nogueira to PMFA, December 06, 1957, ibid.
355 Thousands of Chinese immigrants took advantage of family sponsorship rules to enter the country under false names and phony relationships with Canadian residents; they became known as the "paper families" (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998, 331).
As the RCMP increased efforts to curtail illegal migration, officials in Portugal worried about the growing number of Portuguese undocumented workers in Canada and the likelihood of a police crackdown in their emigrant communities. In October 1958, the JDE instructed civil governors in Portugal not to issue any more ordinary passports to workers wishing to visit Canada, since they were, "by norm, in no condition to do tourism." Then in January 1959, the regime introduced legislation granting amnesty to illegal emigrants who returned to Portugal to regularize their status.

At the same time the labour migration agreement between the two countries ended in 1961, a large number of families started leaving Portugal to spare their male children from being drafted into the bloody colonial wars. Officially, these were regular immigrants and not refugees, yet there was an important degree of political dissidence in their exodus. Some of these families left first to European countries, particularly France, and later moved to North America. Coincidently, the discrepancy between registered departures in Portugal and registered arrivals in Canada increase around this time, suggesting a growing number of remigration or clandestine movements. A considerable number of Portuguese war resisters fled to Canada between 1961 and 1974, some of them helped by political exile groups operating in Toronto and Montreal, as we will discuss in chapter seven.

Canadian immigration officials, now under Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, scrambled to conciliate the government's liberal views with the need to curb the rapidly expanding flow of illegal migrants. The false "visitors" problem was heightened by the creation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), of which Canada and Portugal were founding members. Beginning in 1963, Portuguese citizens visiting Canada for a period of up to three months were no longer required to obtain tourist visas, as one of the OECD's ruling principles was freedom of movement within member countries. This increased access resulted in a surge of applications for landed status from within Canada. That year, Consul Jorge Ritto reported that his Toronto office had received a high number of inquiries from prospective Azorean emigrants about the possibility of working in Canada without a visa; he

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356 Letter, A. M. Baptista, JDE, to various Civil Governors, October 21, 1958 (m.t.), 2P M557 A7, Canadá Diversos, AHD.
357 Article 1, no. 6, Decree 42089, January 6, 1959, DRE.
358 Miranda, 2010, p. 73.
359 As Arroteia (1983, 41) pointed out, this discrepancy was common in the Portuguese migration movement to Europe, as many of the emigrants who left for France later reemigrated to other countries, including Canada.
suspected they had been encouraged by a travel agency in São Miguel that sought to organize their clandestine movement.\textsuperscript{361}

In late 1964, Canadian authorities asked the Portuguese government to put a stop to these illegal departures and threatened to reinstate visa requirements for its citizens. In turn, the Portuguese Ambassador Eduardo Brazão (1962-67) blamed Canadian immigration officials for indirectly encouraging clandestine migration, considering the excessive length of time it took them to process applications, and the fact they did not have an office in the Azores.\textsuperscript{362} Another complaint voiced by Portuguese diplomats was Canada's misleading immigration propaganda, particularly its call for qualified workers. Consul Fernando Marques in Montreal expressed this view in an emphatic letter to the Portuguese embassy in Ottawa:

That pink propaganda that paints Canada without problems, with a lack of qualified workers, high wages, health and social benefits and trade unionism... only induces the emigrant candidate into error. They often trade stable and reasonably remunerated employment in Portugal for a reality where they are burdened by debts and a family under their care, in a country where the climate is harsh, where there is unemployment, where they are forced to live in the cities' worst slums.\textsuperscript{363}

In 1966, the Canadian government officially allowed visitors to apply for landed status from within Canada. Previously, attempts to legalize undocumented migrants were discretionary and usually depended on the state of the labour market. With this new rule, the government hoped to "clear away the existing backlog without serious hardship, and discourage the future flow of unskilled, undereducated workers."\textsuperscript{364} The next year, it created an independent Immigration Appeal Board to hear appeals from individuals facing deportation, who could base their arguments on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.\textsuperscript{365} These two pieces of legislation were greatly misused by prospective migrants and their informal \textit{facilitators}. The right to apply for landed status from within Canada encouraged more "visitors" to try their luck, while the lengthy appeal process allowed them to stall a deportation order if their applications were unsuccessful, during which time they continued to work for wages. Counselled by cunning immigrant consultants and lawyers, these "visitors" appealed their deportation orders even when

\textsuperscript{361} A similar situation occurred in the late 1970s and early '80s, when a large number of Portuguese "visitors" overstayed their permits. The Canadian government then decided not to place visa restrictions on the citizens of a fellow NATO country (letter, Consul Jorge Letiá Rito, Toronto, to PMFA, December 06, 1963, ibid.; Dirks, 1995).

\textsuperscript{362} Azorean applicants were also subjected to a medical exam that was only valid for six months, which in most cases was less than the time it took Canadian officials to approve their applications. As a result, candidates were forced to do another medical examination upon arriving at Montreal's airport (letter, Ambassador Eduardo Brazão, December 28, 1964).

\textsuperscript{363} Letter, Consul Fernando Marques, Montreal, to Chargé d'Affaires Fernando Magalhães Cruz, Ottawa, August 18, 1964, ibid.


\textsuperscript{365} Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998, 368-369.
they had no legal merit, hoping to receive amnesty on compassionate grounds, based on the fact they had since established roots in Canada (Figure 21). This led to an enormous backlog at the Appeal Board, where cases could take up to seven years to be resolved, further aggravating the problem.

With Robert Andras as the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, appointed by the new Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, the government finally took decisive actions to fix this problem. An order-in-council in November 1972 revoked the right of visitors to apply for landed status from within Canada. Then in August 1973, the government reformed the Appeal Board by removing the right of illegal residents and those visiting from countries without visa requirements to appeal a deportation order. To clear the backlog, Minister Andras introduced the Adjustment of Status Program, which gave undocumented migrants a period of 60 days to regularize their status, where each case was to be judged on compassionate grounds. About 39,000 people were amnestied as a result of this program.366

The family reunification and clandestine movements of the 1960s-80s367 helped delay the impact on Portuguese communities of the Canadian government's new "point system". Launched in 1967, this new immigration selection process privileged skilled and well-educated candidates, moving away from those unskilled labour sectors that had traditionally hired Portuguese migrants.368 Despite this policy change, more Portuguese landed in Canada in the first half of the '70s than in previous decades. While there was a slight increase in the late '80s, the total number of arrivals that decade (38,187) was still less than half of the total arrivals in the '70s (79,891).369

By 1981, 68% of all ethnic "Portuguese" in Canada (188,100) lived in Ontario (129,000), and 14% in Quebec (27,370), followed by smaller settlements in British Columbia, Manitoba and Alberta. Toronto's metropolitan area had the largest Portuguese population in the country (88,885); in its suburbs, the city of Mississauga had at this point the third largest Portuguese population (8,875) in the country. Other cities in southern Ontario, like Cambridge (Galt),

366 Ibid. 370-371.
367 Following the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision on the Singh v. Canada case, which allowed oral hearings at IAB appeals, thousands of Portuguese tried to take advantage of the ensuing backlog and applied for refugee status in Canada under false pretenses, waiting for a general amnesty from the government. Many of these bogus refugees claimed to be Jehovah’s witnesses escaping persecution in Portugal (ibid. 414).
368 The regulations introduced in 1967 created three categories of immigration candidates: "sponsored", "independent", and "nominated". Those applying under the last two were subjected to a selection process based on five factors - education, personal assessment, occupational demand, occupational skill, and age - each contributing points to the applicant's final score, which determined the success of his/her application (ibid., 359).
Brampton, Hamilton, Ottawa, London and Kitchener also counted several thousand Portuguese among its residents. The second largest Portuguese concentration in Canada (23,250) was in Montreal's metropolitan area. In British Columbia, Portuguese-Canadian communities could be found in Vancouver, Kitimat, and in the Okanagan Valley; while in the Prairie provinces, the cities of Winnipeg in Manitoba and Edmonton in Alberta both had a few thousand Portuguese. 370

**Conclusion**

Since the first Portuguese fishermen jumped ship on North American shores in the 19th century that this transatlantic movement has had a strong furtive and autonomous dynamic. Obstinate workers with national, family, and labour traditions of long-distance mobility were often ready to break the law or dupe bureaucrats in order to find better wages elsewhere; they did it to leave authoritarian Portugal, and they did it again to enter liberal North America. Elsewhere, however, was not anywhere. It was only when the will to migrate met the means and the opportunity to do so that mass migration took off, often from specific regions (or towns) to particular locations and labour markets. 371 It is no surprise that Portuguese immigrants in North America came predominantly from coastal regions with fishing economies. Their early migration resulted from the inclusion of these regions and its labour pools in the Atlantic routes of American whaling and Portuguese cod fishing fleets. But while New England's economy thrived, generating a very high demand for unskilled labour, Newfoundland's did not. Hence why the few Portuguese fishermen who settled in Newfoundland never triggered a migration chain like their counterparts to the south, who were able to guarantee jobs to their prospective migrant kin.

While economic considerations mattered more than state policies in the workers' decision to migrate, it would be wrong to say that legislation and its enforcers were never able to limit the movement of people determined to cross national borders. A clear example that they did were the restrictions introduced by American lawmakers beginning in the late 1910s, which nearly ended Portuguese immigration to that country. Still, legal barriers were most effective when additional

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371 On this matter, Bruno Ramirez (1991) wrote: "[M]igrants did not simply move from areas of economic marginality and underemployment to areas of industrial growth and labour scarcity. Rather, they entered specific labour markets at precise times of their cycles of development; and equally important, they entered labour markets characterized by particular types of labour processes and whose functioning entailed specific types of work. (...) Even when direct recruiting was gradually replaced by migration chains, the labour news that was transmitted most likely dealt with concrete labour markets and job conditions that could be met by aspiring migrants" (144, 149).
factors like economic downturns and war removed incentives or opportunities to migrate. Indeed, the four decades in which legal restrictions prevented Portuguese-American settlements from maintaining migration chains with their homeland coincided with the decline of New England's economic pull, a Great Depression, and the Second World War.

The war mentality, with its relentless patriotic propaganda and distrust for dual-loyalties, convinced many Portuguese-Americans (those who could) to assimilate into the dominant white majority. Nonetheless, transnational families managed to stay in contact with relatives across the ocean during this period. When the Capelinhos volcano displaced thousands of Azoreans, the old bonds between Portuguese-Americans and their ancestral homeland were rekindled. While not fully shared, their transnational solidarity was strong enough to push American legislators to open the doors to these disputed "refugees", at a time when southern European migration was still severely restricted. Curiously, this movement took place just as the world was recovering from an economic recession. By the time the 1965 Immigration Act reopened the doors to Portuguese immigration, the links between Portugal and its expatriate communities in the United States were once again prepared to generate large migration chains.

Every door into North America had its own gatekeepers and facilitators, which migration historians have studied at length. However, their focus has been mainly on the host nations. Even when they acknowledge the importance of the sending nations' policies and legal apparatus in determining migration flows, they often ignore the influence of homeland state officials on the ground. For instance, the labour migration scheme between Portugal and Canada may not have happened if not for the brokerage of the Portuguese chargé d'affaires in Ottawa. Of course, other factors contributed to convincing Canadian gatekeepers of the desirability of Portuguese workers. Still, those Portuguese officials who negotiated with their Canadian counterparts or worked with the migrants on the ground were crucial in determining the characteristics, the size, the provenance and destination of this movement. These formal facilitators, however, did not always have the emigrants' own interests in mind. Portuguese authorities often sympathized with the many problems facing their expatriate countrymen, but their primary concern was ensuring they met the approval of Canadian immigration officials and delivered a positive image of Portuguese workers, so that their mass migration could continue, with all the benefits it entailed for the regime. JDE officials cared that the emigrants be treated fairly and raised a number of stipulations before they could approve their departure, or made suggestions on how to protect
migrant workers against adverse situations. But their approach was consistent with the *Estado Novo*’s paternalist and patriarchal ideology, as evidenced in its stance on female and family migration. In other words, Portuguese workers migrating under the bilateral agreement with Canada were subordinate to the interests of Canadian *gatekeepers* and Portuguese *facilitators*, leaving them little room to formally dispute their mistreatment at the hands of employers.

That said, Portuguese migrants in Canadian farms and other isolated work sites, who had little knowledge of Canada’s languages and laws, did complain a great deal to their homeland representatives, who they regularly turned to for help. To avoid upsetting Canadian authorities, and the wider public, Portuguese officials tried to appease their countrymen by addressing individual complaints, thus containing their collective protest. But like other "subaltern" groups, Portuguese migrants were accustomed to using the informal method of resistance - or "weapons of the weak" as James C. Scott called them\(^{372}\) - of protesting with their feet. In other words, many workers simply left the farms where they were originally placed when they objected to their working and living conditions. In fact, the planned nature of this migrant movement, designed to meet the labour and demographic targets of its overseeing governments, was what caused it to break down. In the end, the furtive and autonomous drive of migrants seeking better wages prevailed over the structured job placements of immigration officials. Moreover, there was little that authorities could do to prevent the itinerancy of individual migrants within Canada, since freedom of movement and the right to seek better employment were respected under its laws. These noncompliant migrant workers grew more defiant once their numbers grew and the older cohorts began helping newcomers bypass state officials and their arrangements.

When the rate of runaway Portuguese farmhands reached troubling proportions, coinciding with a period of high unemployment in Canada, the *gatekeepers* terminated the agreement with Portugal and restricted the entry of unskilled migrants. Yet, Portuguese labourers continued to arrive in large numbers, only this time through unlawful schemes, often organized by informal *facilitators* who took advantage of the liminal spaces left open by Canada’s conflicting legal principles, international responsibilities, and short-term economic concerns. For its part, the *Estado Novo* maintained its ambiguous attitude towards illegal emigration by publically chastising it on one hand and tacitly allowing it on the other.

These "pioneer" sojourners eventually became permanent immigrants and soon generated exponentially larger chain migrations, connecting their hometowns with those where they settled. Their networks, mobilized by transnational families and organized migration rings, did not only extend across the Atlantic but also the North American border. By the mid-60s, their numbers reached a critical mass capable of sustaining mass migration from Portugal, even when governments on both sides sought to curtail it. Franc Sturino noted about the Italians: "the latent functions of informal networks, by and large triumphed over the manifest functions of State bureaucracies." He also argued that, once transnational kinship networks were established, lower-class migrants no longer had to pay for the services of middle-class intermediaries at home, since they could now rely on their kin's assistance and their flexible reciprocation systems. While this also applies to Portuguese migrants, Harney's argument that, "the process of migration was not as familial and paesano as 'chain migration' theory implies," and that "money and socio-economic structure were at the heart of emigration," also rings true. This was particularly the case with those who did not qualify under the im/emigration authorities' criteria and hoped to bypass their bureaucracy or escape the colonial wars. These prospective migrants resorted to travel agents and other informal facilitators, who charged considerable sums of money to assist in their clandestine movement and regularize their status in the new country. Landed immigrants too sought the services of these middle-class intermediaries, even when they were available for free at consular and host government offices. While some attributed this to the credulity or social deference of the lower classes towards local bosses, their preference for informal relationships was consistent with their methods of networking and mutual aid, which had worked relatively well during the sojourning phase. Furthermore, their distrust of state officials is unsurprising, given that they were used to living under an authoritarian police state.

In times of economic prosperity, Portuguese workers jumped ship, abandoned contracts, overstayed their visas, and did whatever they had to do to leave their chronically impoverished and repressive country, and pursue a better future for themselves and their families. Under these circumstances, raising legal obstacles to their movement only resulted in increasing clandestine movements, which further overwhelmed gatekeepers and enriched unscrupulous facilitators.

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373 Sturino, 1990, 141.
374 Harney, 1977, 22.
Fig. 15 - Portuguese spinner working in textile mill in Fall River. Photo by Lewis Wickes Hine, June 1916 (digital ID: nclc 03040 http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/nclc.03040, U.S. Library of Congress).

Fig. 16 - The "Andrews", a Portuguese-American family, poses in their house in Falmouth, on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The tag reads: "They run a 7 acre vegetable farm. They have just bought the first cow they ever had, of which they are very proud." Photo by Jack Delano, December 1940 (digital ID: ppmsca 12876 http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ppmsca.12876, U.S. Library of Congress).

Fig. 17 - Portuguese-American women manufacturing gas masks in a New Bedford factory. Photo by John Collier, Spring 1942 (digital ID: fsa 8d03652 http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/fsa.8d03652 U.S. Library of Congress).

Fig. 18 - Portuguese railway builders in Edmonton, Alberta, June 1957 (CTASC, David Higgs fonds, 2010-018/002 [09], ASC17694).
Fig. 19 - Portuguese migrants arriving in Canada aboard a Slick Airways plane in 1957, (F1405-36, Acc. 21210, file 36-16 MSR 2328, AO).

Fig. 20 - Sisters Maria Teresa and Maria Leonor Pereira outside their family's new house in Toronto's Kensington Market. Photo by Carlos Pereira, 1957 (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, ASC29606).

Fig. 21 - José Rafael, a former travel agent turned immigration consultant, sits at his desk in his Toronto office. Besides him, two undocumented Portuguese migrants seek to obtain landed status. In 1971, Rafael would be convicted of immigration racketeering and defrauding, although he was cleared of wrongdoing after appealing to the Ontario Supreme Court the following year. Photo by Judges, July 24, 1967 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC08252).
Despite the ambition, daring, and other personality traits that voluntary immigrants often identified with, leaving home and loved ones to start a new life in a different land was a daunting prospect. Once in the new country, the challenges they faced were often worse than what they anticipated. Building a better life in an unfamiliar land, where they were expected to sacrifice their bodies for meager wages, had problems communicating, and were ostracized simply by looking, sounding, or acting the way they always had, was by any account a taxing experience. These challenges were greater for those pioneering cohorts that could not rely on the support of long-settled relatives or well-established ethnic communities. Coming from deeply Catholic societies, where the Church interpreted and regulated much of their lives, it is not surprising that the majority of Portuguese immigrants sought solace in their spiritual beliefs. Many sojourners in Canada made long treks from their isolated farms to attend Sunday mass in the nearest towns, sought counsel and consolation from travelling priests visiting their work camps, and later settled with their families near Catholic churches.

Despite the resemblances, unfamiliar rites and languages in the new country made immigrants feel like strangers in their own Catholic faith. Their religious ways, supreme and undisputed in their homeland, became a matter of national tradition and a marker of ethnic identity in North America. Moreover, the difficult socioeconomic situation of immigrant families created the opportunity for Protestant social workers to proselytize those newcomers who sought their services. Fearing their emigrant flock would assimilate into the dominant Protestant or Irish/French Catholic denominations, Portuguese ecclesiastical authorities quickly realized the need to assign national priests to these communities. At the same time, the Estado Novo, founded on a Christian interpretation of national identity and imperial mission, recognized the Church’s importance to maintaining the spiritual, social, cultural, and linguistic ties of Portuguese expatriates with their homeland. As a result, immigrant laity, prelates, and government officials

375 Cit. in Maria Beatriz Rocha-Trindade and Eugénia T. J. Costa Quaresma, A Igreja Face ao Fenómeno Migratório, 2012, 49.
worked together with the Vatican's backing to create their own national missions and parishes\textsuperscript{377} in North America; this collaboration, however, was not exempt from the at times conflicting priorities of the Church and the Portuguese state.

Just as Italian priests were advocates of fascism in the 1930s,\textsuperscript{378} Portuguese priests, who were supported by the homeland government, championed the *Estado Novo*’s political agenda. Still, many Portuguese clergymen in North America became nuisances for the regime, as their personal ambitions often interfered with the diplomats' own plans for controlling the expatriate communities. As John Zucchi and Roberto Perin noted, rogue foreign priests were common in immigrant communities, especially during the years of settlement, when North American prelates scrambled to find willing missionaries to care for their ethno-linguistic congregations.\textsuperscript{379} These priests sometimes clashed with each other as they competed to expand their "clientele" in a context where larger flocks meant "more money, more power, more prestige."\textsuperscript{380}

But parishioners were not always keen on following the clergy's instructions. Tensions sometimes broke out between priests and laity on the financing of parish activities and the organizing of religious celebrations. Eventually, immigrant priests realized that their success in carrying their pastoral duties and increasing their profile in the community depended largely on the laity's support. Some priests were quick to win their parishioners' favour by catering to their regional traditions, even when these were distinct from their own. While devoted to spiritual worship, ethnic missions, parishes, processions, feasts, and other religious pursuits belied the worldly politics of their priests, laity, and homeland Church and state.

This chapter will discuss the relation between Catholic devotion, Portuguese national and regional identities, and diasporic consciousness, focusing on the relation between the various agents of Portuguese religiosity in North America. I will pay close attention to the relationship between the *Estado Novo* and the Catholic Church in Portugal in their mutual efforts to provide spiritual and social assistance to emigrants, ward off their cultural and religious assimilation, and

\textsuperscript{377} As John Zucchi explained: "A national parish differs from the more common territorial parish in that membership is based on ethnicity rather than place of residence. National parishes were introduced in North America to meet the needs of immigrants who spoke a language foreign to the host diocese. Under normal circumstances a Roman Catholic is obliged to belong to the parish in which he resides. However, if he belongs to a particular ethnic group which has a national parish in the diocese, then he can belong to the national parish... If there is more than one national parish for a particular ethnic group in the diocese, then each is given a geographic territory, and the Catholic must belong to the appropriate parish." John Zucchi, *Italians in Toronto: Development of a National Identity 1875-1935*, 1988, 120.

\textsuperscript{378} Pennacchio, 2000.

\textsuperscript{379} Zucchi, 1988, 118-140; Perin, 1998.

\textsuperscript{380} Brettell, 1977, 177.
advance Portuguese interests in the United States and Canada. I will also examine some of the largest religious festivals organized by Portuguese immigrants and their descendants, and discuss them in the context of transnational charity and diasporic networks.

The Estado Novo, the Vatican, and the Portuguese Catholic Organization for Migrations

One of Salazar's hallmarks was his piety. His corporatist ideology was heavily predicated on the ideas of Popes Leo XIII, Pius XI, and other Catholic ideologues, who critiqued both capitalism and its radical alternatives. The dictator also understood Catholicism to be a unifying thread throughout Portugal's history and took measures to ensure it remained an omnipresent force in Portuguese society. For most of the Estado Novo's life, and especially in moments of crisis, the Catholic Church had an important "legitimating function", coming to its aid on matters of moral ambiguity. Another of Salazar's legacies to Portuguese Catholicism was his copious use of the Fátima apparitions in state propaganda and of the Marian cult as a national treasure.

After studying in a Catholic seminary for eight years, Salazar enrolled in the University of Coimbra where he became a distinguished student and later a faculty member. During this period he also became one of the chief opponents of the anticlerical Republican regime, alongside his personal friend Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira, the future Cardinal of Lisbon and head of the Catholic Church in Portugal (1929-72). In the 1933 constitution, Salazar officially recognized Roman Catholicism as Portugal's national religion. That same year, Cardinal Cerejeira founded the Portuguese Catholic Action, which aimed to rekindle religious devotion in post-Republican Portugal, increase laity's participation in Church affairs, and be the Church's wing in civil society. In 1940, the Estado Novo signed a Concordat with the Vatican granting the Catholic Church administrative powers over Portugal's public education system and marital laws (it banned divorce in religious marriages) along with fiscal benefits. At this point, Salazar

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381 António Costa Pinto, O Salazarismo e o Fascismo Europeu, 1992, 60.
382 In May 13, 1917, three young shepherds (Lúcia, Francisco, and Jacinta) claimed to have been visited by the Virgin Mary at Cova da Iria, in Portugal's mainland town of Fátima. After regular monthly apparitions, a large crowd claimed to have witnessed the sun move in strange motions. This event was officially recognized as a miracle by the Catholic Church in 1930. Along with a message of daily penitence and prayer centered on the rosary, the shepherds said to have been given three prophetic visions, kept secret for decades. According to the Vatican's official interpretation, the first and second secrets, made public in 1941, predicted the end of the First World War and the start of the Second; it also asked for the apostate Soviet Russia to consecrate itself to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. The third secret, made public in 2000, predicted the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981. Since 1917, Cova da Iria became a pilgrimage site attracting large crowds of believers and tourists. Construction of the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Fátima on the site of the apparitions started in 1928, with support from the Estado Novo.
383 The Concordat did not repeal the constitutional separation between the church and state, even though the regime effectively had control over some of the Church's institutional life. As A. H. Oliveira Marques observed: "The Catholic feature of the New State must be emphasized but not exaggerated, for Salazar's regime (unlike Franco's) never posed as an 'apostolic' system.
renewed Portugal's Missionary Accords with Rome, guaranteeing state funding and logistic support for missionary work. Under the aegis of the imperial regime, missionaries were charged with fulfilling Portugal's "civilizing mission" in the world and turn native Africans into good "Catholic-Portuguese."  

National missionaries were also assigned to the emigrant "colonies", including in the United States, where Portuguese priests had been sent to since the mid-19th century. The Vatican began addressing the specific needs of migrant flocks in 1887, when it created the Scalabrinian missionaries.  

But it was only in 1952 that the Catholic Church articulated its doctrine on migrant flocks through Pope Pius XII's apostolic constitution Exsul Familia, which outlined procedures for the provision of spiritual care and social welfare to migrants and refugees. The Vatican urged national governments to open their doors to the millions of people displaced by the war, equating their forced exile with that of the Holy Family fleeing Egypt, and instructed the host countries' dioceses to provide appropriate pastoral care to these foreign nationals. With this document, migrant missionaries were placed under the jurisdiction of the dioceses they were sent to, and immigrant "national" parishes, where congregations could be served in their native languages, were reliant on the Holy See's formal approbation.  

Pius XII also created the Higher Council for Emigration, integrated in the Sacred Consistorial Congregation - a dicastery (department) of the Roman Curia that oversees the selection of new bishops. Meeting for the first time in 1957, this council assigned national bishops the task of founding and directing Catholic organizations to deal with emigration in their countries. In Portugal, that responsibility fell on the Bishop of Thiava, José Pedro da Silva, who became the Catholic Organization of Portuguese Emigration's first director (1957-62). That year, the Portuguese episcopacy launched the Day of the Emigrant, celebrated annually in every

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engaged in some kind of crusade against anti-Catholic elements. The Premier's few public remarks on Catholicism and religion in general were always strikingly moderate and tolerant, in contrast to his strong beliefs and extremist attitudes on other subjects. His speech of 1940... showed a remarkably middle-of-the-way position, uncommitted to any all-pervasive Church influence and definitely opposed to Church meddling in politics." A. H. Oliveira Marques, 1976, cit. in Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many, 2002, 82.

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The Missionaries of St. Charles Borromeo (Missionários de S. Carlos) were founded in Italy in 1887 by the Bishop of Piacenza, Giovanni Battista Scalabrini. Reporting to the Cardinals in Rome on the difficult material and spiritual conditions that Italian immigrants faced in the U.S., Scalabrini argued that most of their problems stemmed from their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness, which were linked to their religiosity. He then recommended the creation of "national parishes", equipped with schools and social agencies dedicated to assisting immigrants in their native language and directed by trained missionaries (Roberto Perin, Rome in Canada: the Vatican and Canadian Affairs in Late Victorian Age, 1990).

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Exsul Familia Nazarethana, August 1, 1952, Papal Encyclicals Online: http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius12/p12exsul.htm
diocese of the country, with the purpose of "awakening and forming the conscience of Catholics in regards to the problems of emigration," and "uniting the great Catholic family through prayer for its emigrant brothers."387

At this point, an increasing number of critical voices emerged within the Catholic Church in Portugal, censoring the Estado Novo's neglect of the poor, its brutal methods of political repression, and its violent colonialism. Many clerics were punished for voicing their negative opinions. The most high profile case was that of Bishop António Ferreira Gomes of Oporto, who was forced into exile in 1958 after writing Salazar a letter urging him to introduce social policies and democratic reforms in line with Catholic doctrine. These Catholic dissenters were invigorated by the progressive changes taking place in their Church after 1962, when Pope John XXIII convened the Second Vatican Council (or Vatican II), which lasted until 1965. Vatican II called for the modernization of the Catholic Church's internal structures - such as allowing mass to be said in vernacular languages instead of Latin - for the laity's increased involvement in Church life, and for greater interdenominational dialogue. Proponents of Liberation Theology, who believed the Catholic Church should be more assertive in advancing the rights of workers and other marginalized peoples, and demand the end of capitalist and colonialist exploitation, also began using the Vatican II to press their political views, despite Pope Paul VI's opposition. On the issue of migration, Vatican II recognized the Church's limited knowledge of this human phenomenon and called for more studies on its effects on individuals and their families. It also ascribed responsibility to national governments to protect foreign residents and ensure their equal treatment under its laws.

In Portugal, the new directives on the migrants' pastoral care were carried out by the Portuguese Catholic Organization for Migrations (OCPM), founded in 1962. Its chief goals were to increase and disseminate knowledge on Portuguese emigrants and their communities; connect and cooperate with Church officials in the host countries; send priests to serve emigrant congregations; and promote cooperation between clergy and laity. Despite the increasing anti-colonialist opposition within the Catholic Church, the OCPM assisted the regime in sending colonial settlers to Africa. Families waiting to embark in Lisbon were given tutorials by JDE agents about life in the colonies, and lessons from OCPM clergymen on religion and morality. Before embarking, priests heard confessions and gave clothing, shoes, crucifixes, images of Our

387 Ibid, 39, 106 (m.t.).
Lady of Fátima, rosaries, prayer books, and Catholic identity cards to those about to depart. This generous sending off was available only to state-coordinated colonial movements; the OCPM was unable to offer the same treatment to other emigrants because the JDE did not provide them information on their departures. The OCPM's imperial duties were in accordance with its ecumenical view of the missionaries' role, expressed by its first director, Bishop José Maria das Neves (1962-66), in 1962:

> It was the will of God and of our Betters not to limit our Motherland to a territory in one continent or one island. She covers lands and peoples from all the World and all the races. The ideal that guided us then and guides us still today is that of the Christian apostolate - "Go and teacheth all peoples" "Go and maketh Christendom"... Thus we became a people of essentially emigrants and missionaries. We formed a Motherland different from the other Motherlands because we brought all peoples in brotherhood under the principles of the Christian doctrine we profess.

Ensuring that Portuguese emigrants were provided spiritual care by their own national priests was a serious challenge, as the OCPM was never able to recruit enough clergymen to meet the demands of all expatriate communities. According to Bishop Pedro Silva, who inaugurated 14 foreign missions (6 of them in Canada) during his time heading the OCPM's predecessor, there were only 90 Portuguese priests for over 350,000 emigrants (outside of Brazil and the American East coast) in 1961. Under Bishop António R. Rodrigues (1966-69), the OCPM launched training programs for prospective missionaries, which were partially run by the Portuguese government. In 1971, still struggling with a shortage of missionary candidates, the Portuguese episcopate decided to invite the Scalabrinians to set up a permanent mission in Portugal, hoping they could expand the emigrant missionary pool.

The OCPM's main focus during this period was the massive exodus to Europe. Only under Fr. Aurélio G. Escudeiro (1970-74) did the organization begin focusing more seriously on North America. This, however, does not mean Portuguese emigrants in North America had been forgotten. Portuguese communities in California, for instance, "jubilantly received" the Azorean Bishop António de Castro Meireles in the early 1920s, and Cardinal Cerejeira in 1936.

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390 The other ones were in South Africa (1), Argentina (1), Bermuda (1), Venezuela (1) and France (4). The Canadian missions were located in Nelson and Vancouver in British Columbia; Kingston, Hamilton, and Toronto in Ontario; and Montreal in Quebec. Rocha-Trindade & Quaresma, 2012, 60.
391 D. Pedro da Silva, 1961, cit. ibid.
393 Letter, Vice-Consul Fausto Esteves, New York, to Chargé d'Affaires António C. Matias, PMFA, October 21, 1971, PEA M696, Comunidades Portuguesas no Estrangeiro. EUA, AHD; Rocha-Trindade & Quaresma, 2012, 63.
who visited various Portuguese national parishes. In turn, the Portuguese government and Catholic Church received various American prelates in their pilgrimage to Fátima with great honours, such as Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, Archbishop Richard Cushing of Boston, and others.\(^{394}\) Still, it was Escudeiro who increased efforts to establish more consistent relations between the OCPM and the Portuguese clergy on that continent. But shortly after this, the OCPM's paradigm on migration began to shift inward, reflecting the dominant views emerging in revolutionary Portugal, as expressed in Escudeiro's resolve to "fix the causes of emigration."\(^{395}\) In the aftermath of the revolution, the OCPM began focusing on returned emigrants, first with the white colonial retornados, and later with voluntary returnees from Europe and other parts of the world. As the number of black Africans and other immigrants arriving in Portugal grew in the following decades, the OCPM became increasingly concerned with facilitating their integration into Portuguese society and combating racial discrimination. Still, it continued to coordinate the work of missionaries abroad and advocate for the rights and advancement of Portuguese emigrant communities.

**National parishes, the cult of Fátima, and the Portuguese clergy in the United States**

One of the first things that immigrants did when they settled in the United States in the 19th century was to found their own churches.\(^{396}\) By 1941, Portuguese had inaugurated 30 parishes in New England alone. However, the shortage of Portuguese priests prevented the creation of more national parishes, and sometimes led to the denationalization of existing ones.\(^{397}\) In 1961, there were 75 Portuguese clerics for 29 national parishes, at a time when the estimated Portuguese "foreign stock" population in the United States neared 280,000.\(^{398}\) Those in California were especially underserved, which alarmed homeland Church and government officials, who worried these emigrants would fall prey to religious and cultural assimilation.

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\(^{394}\) Letter, Minister of Overseas M. Sarmento Rodrigues to PMFA, January 4, 1955, PEA M307, Projecto visita do Senhor Patriarca D. José da Costa Nunes aos núcleos portugueses da América do Norte, AHD.


\(^{396}\) According to the Dillingham Commission, the largest contingent within the 212 Portuguese professionals who arrived in the U.S. between 1899 and 1910 were clergymen (Harney, 1990, 126).

\(^{397}\) Pap, 1981, 179.

\(^{398}\) Rocha-Trindade & Quaresma, 2012, 147.
After mass migration restarted in the 1960s, similar concerns grew on the East Coast, especially among the newer communities in the New York metropolitan area.\footnote{Letter, Consul José M. Fragoso, New York City, to Ambassador L. Fernandes, M20, St. Anthony's Welfare Centre, AHD.} Portuguese immigrants also had to contend with their new minority status in the Irish dominated Catholic Church in North America (or French-Canadian in Quebec). Much has been written about the ways in which these dominant Catholic groups acted as gatekeepers of their Church and host nations.\footnote{See for instance Timothy Meagher, Inventing Irish America: Generation, Class, and Ethnic Identity in a New England City, 1880-1928, 2000; and James R. Barrett and David R. Roediger, "The Irish and the 'Americanization' of the 'New Immigrants' in the Streets and in the Churches of the Urban United States, 1900-1930", Journal of American Ethnic History, Vol. 24, n. 4, Summer, 2005: 3-33.} As with other groups, the relation between Portuguese congregations and their Irish-American bishops was characterized by the latter's resistance to recognize their distinct devotional practices or approve their own national parishes and related infrastructures, often in contravention to the Holy See's instructions.\footnote{Pap, 1981, 178; Perin, 1990.} Portuguese diplomats saw this as a serious obstacle to preserving the emigrants' national identity. One of the strategies they used to assert the cultural specificity of Portuguese emigrant flocks and lobby the Irish-American episcopate was for Portuguese bishops to make occasional visits to these communities. Another tactic was to endear Irish-American prelates with honorific titles awarded by the Portuguese state for supposed contributions made to Portugal and its citizens in North America. For instance, in 1955, Minister Paulo Cunha asked Ambassador Luis Fernandes to assess if Bishop James L. Connolly of Fall River merited a distinction from the Portuguese government. After making inquiries in the community, the ambassador found that Connolly had done positive things for the Portuguese in his diocese and had publicly expressed admiration for the Estado Novo. Still, his primary solidarity was with his fellow Irish-Americans and their well-known unease with "foreign" congregations. Fernandes concluded: "I don't believe... [Connolly's] actions in the future will always prove favourable to Portuguese Catholic interests. However, I believe it useful to ingratiate him, even if just to neutralize him." The minister took Fernandes' advice and bestowed Connolly the Portuguese Order of Christ in 1957.\footnote{Letter, PMFA to Amb. L. Fernandes, Feb. 18, 1955; reply, March 28, 1955; clipping, Novidades, April 30, 1957, PEA M307, Clero Português nos Estados Unidos, AHD.}

In order to convince Irish-American bishops to meet their requests, Portuguese-American priests and laity recruited the help of homeland officials. That was the case in 1951, when a group of immigrants in Newark asked Ambassador Fernandes to write Archbishop Thomas J.
Walsh endorsing their efforts to build a national parish in that city, which he did, to no effect. Two years later, the new Archbishop Thomas A. Boland continued to ignore the requests from the Portuguese. Frustrated with the archbishop's unresponsiveness, Fernandes requested Minister Cunha to take matters directly to the Holy See. In January 1954, after meeting with a committee of Newark's Portuguese, among whom was the Consul Manuel N. da Silva, Boland finally allowed the building of a Portuguese church and that a priest from Portugal be brought to lead this initiative; his only stipulation was that the latter speak English. Ambassador Fernandes attributed the archbishop's sudden change of heart to Minister Cunha's direct appeal to Rome.\textsuperscript{403} Contrary to the wishes of Newark's congregation, their new priest was not sent from Portugal but from another Portuguese parish in Cambridge, Massachusetts.\textsuperscript{404} Still, parishioners were likely pleased with the choice of Fr. José Lebre Capote, a native of Aveiro, where most of Newark's Portuguese were from. After an eight-year-long campaign, Capote and his congregation finally unveiled the Our Lady of Fatima chapel in 1956.

Learning from Newark's example, Portuguese in Connecticut bypassed the American bishops by making their pleas directly to the Holy See with the help of Portugal's diplomats. The cities of Hartford, Bridgeport, and Waterbury all inaugurated their own Our Lady of Fatima parishes, in 1958, 1962, and 1971 respectively.\textsuperscript{405} Following the successes of their Connecticut counterparts, the Portuguese of Peabody, Massachusetts, sent their local consul a petition asking Lisbon to forward their request for a national parish to Rome. This resulted in the creation of Peabody's Portuguese Catholic mission in 1965, which inaugurated their own Our Lady of Fatima church ten years later.\textsuperscript{406} Another national parish dedicated to Fátima was created in Cumberland, Rhode Island, in 1967; this one decorated with various nationalist motifs, such as the Portuguese Order of Christ Cross, and details inspired by the Padrão dos Descobrimentos monument in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{407} In 1973, Archbishop Boland approved the creation of yet another Our Lady of Fatima church, in Elizabeth, New Jersey, where a Portuguese Catholic mission had existed since 1923. Altogether, seven out of the eight Portuguese parishes founded in the United States were created between 1954 and 1973.

\textsuperscript{403} According to Minister Cunha, the success of their diligence with the Holy See was due to the intervention of Bishop José da Costa Nunes, Patriarch of the East Indies (correspondence, Amb. L. Fernandes, Archbishop Thomas Walsh, Fr. M. Rocha, Consul M. N. da Silva, and PMFA, Jul. 9, 1951 to Febr. 4, 1954 (m.t.), M182, Col. Port. Igr. N. Se. de Fátima Newark, AHD).
\textsuperscript{404} Letter, Committee Pro-Eregrida Parochia Lusitana of Newark to Archbishop Thomas Boland, June 20, 1955, ibid.
\textsuperscript{405} Letter, Fr. M. Rocha, Ludlow, to Amb. L. Fernandes, Jan. 12, 1958 (m.t.), PEA 251-A, Col. Port. nos EE.UU. Ensino, AHD.
\textsuperscript{406} Letter, Ambassador Pedro T. Pereira to PMFA, October 4, 1962, PEA M307, Colónia Portuguesa nos EUA, AHD; Our Lady of Fatima Church of Peabody website, url: www.rc.net/boston/fatima/History.htm
\textsuperscript{407} Letter, Ambassador Vasco V. Garin to PMFA, January 20, 1967, PEA M424, Colónia Portuguesa nos EUA Geral PEA, AHD.
States between 1948 and 1973 were named Our Lady of Fatima, with more following in subsequent years.  

One of the *Exsul Familia*’s chief advocates and dedicated champions of the cult of Fátima in the United States was Fr. Manuel Rocha. A native of Graciosa, Rocha was a well-educated and respected cleric with connections to the upper echelons of the Catholic Church in Portugal and the Vatican. Before moving to the United States he had founded the Portuguese wing of the international Jocist movement (Young Christian Workers), which he led for 17 years; served as the first religious director of the *Moçidade Portuguesa*; and was an aide to Portuguese Catholic Action's secretary-general. In the 1930s, Rocha travelled to the United States to convince a Hollywood film studio to produce a movie on the Fátima apparitions (Figure 22). Later he became an assistant to Fr. Augusto Furtado in Somerset (Figure 23), until Bishop Thomas M. O'Leary of Springfield asked Cardinal Cerejeira and the bishop of the Azores to assign Rocha to Ludlow's Portuguese congregation.

A small suburb of Springfield, in the southwestern end of Massachusetts, Ludlow's population rose quickly in the 1950s after the inauguration of the Interstate Highway 90. The once small Portuguese community became a sizable portion of Ludlow's total population, the majority of them coming from the northern mainland. Since the 1910s, Portuguese Catholics in Ludlow had celebrated mass at various temporary sites, such as their ethnic club hall. Over the years they raised money to build their own church, which they hoped to name "St. Anthony's". In 1948, Bishop O'Leary finally granted them permission to build a national parish. Under Rocha's direction, the congregation bought a large plot of land and erected the new church, which he convinced parishioners to name Our Lady of Fatima, the first of its kind in the United States. In the ample church grounds, Rocha planted an arboretum, built a replica of the Cova da Iria chapel, and a shrine to the Fátima apparitions. Over the years, the site became a pilgrimage destination for several thousands of Portuguese from across North America. Rocha's rectory

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409 There were no-Portuguese Catholic organizations in the U.S. dedicated to spreading the cult of Fátima, the largest being the Blue Army of Our Lady of Fatima, founded in New Jersey by the Irish-American priest Harold V. Colgan in 1947. Despite its rapid international growth, this anti-communist organization had little interaction with Portuguese-American parishes.
410 It is not clear if the 1952 Warner Bros. Pictures film *The Miracle of Our Lady of Fatima* follows from Rocha's proposition. Still, the movie's anti-communist overtones matched the *Estado Novo*’s own Cold War propaganda and its reviling of the previous anti-clerical Republican regime, portrayed in this Hollywood movie as socialist heathens.
411 The Fatima Review, 1973; Our Lady of Fatima parish of Ludlow website, url: http://ourladyoffatimaparish.org/history/
also hosted many Church dignitaries from Portugal and Rome during their visits to the American East coast. Rocha also maintained friendships with Ambassadors Luis Fernandes and Pedro Teotónio Pereira (1947-49, 1961-63), with whom he corresponded regularly. Rocha's dedication to the cult of Fátima was matched by his patriotism and unconditional support for the *Estado Novo* and the empire. His political outlook, which conflated religion, nationalism, and imperialism, corresponded with the regime's own message on Fátima, as articulated by the Consul in Boston, Jorge Borja de Freitas, during a speech delivered at the 21st anniversary of Rocha's Our Lady of Fatima parish, in 1970:

> Perhaps no other nation on earth has... demonstrated such an inseparable relationship between its history and the strength of its religious ideals, as manifested by its missionary spirit and what might be called a national raison d'être, which embraced the dissemination of Christianity... By consecrating the name of Fátima in this manner, one might say that [Mary] was paying tribute to the faith of the Portuguese people and was thus contributing towards the glory of Portugal... In building this parish of Our Lady of Fatima... [Fr. Rocha] contributed decisively toward fanning the flames of love for the mother country that burns in every Portuguese heart.

Fr. Rocha used Ambassador Fernandes' diplomatic influence on a number of occasions to push for the creation of new national parishes, expedite visa applications for Portuguese clergymen, host visiting Church dignitaries, among other deeds. One of the projects they collaborated on was the creation of a Portuguese-American apostolic vicariate, separate from Irish-American purview. Fr. Henrique Rocha (Manuel Rocha's cousin) of St. Elizabeth's church in Bristol, Rhode Island, originally proposed this idea, which was endorsed by Adeodato G. Cardinal Piazza of the Roman Curia in 1955. The Portuguese Catholic Action's Secretary-General coordinated this project in collaboration with Manuel Rocha and the Portuguese

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413 Letter, Fr. Rocha to Ambassador Fernandes, May 7, 1956, PEA M182, Our Lady of Fatima Rectory, Ludlow, AHD.
414 In 1960, Rocha wrote John F. Kennedy when the young senator was beginning his presidential bid, stating his happiness with the fact that a Catholic was running for the White House. Rocha addressed Kennedy's anti-colonialist views, explaining that, "the Portuguese case, is a case apart. Portugal was the only country that created, in various parts of the World, centers of population, structurally Portuguese, starting with the Catholic Faith." He then invited Kennedy to "make a statement expressing [his] recognition of Portugal's case Overseas, as being a special case" (letter, Fr. M. Rocha to Senator J. F. Kennedy, October ?, 1960, PEA M251, Igreja Nossa Senhora de Fátima - Ludlow, AHD).
416 Correspondence, Fr. Manuel Rocha and Ambassador Luis Fernandes, Washington, August 24, 1953 to June 23, 1959, PEA M182, Our Lady of Fatima Rectory, Ludlow, AHD.
417 An apostolic vicariate is a provisional Catholic jurisdiction, commonly established in missionary regions where there are no dioceses. The vicariate is directly administered by the Holy See through a titular bishop (vicar) or a priest (administrator). Some non-Roman Catholic immigrant communities, like Ukrainian Orthodox, were able to set up their own apostolic vicariates in North America.
embassy in Washington. Five new national parishes resulted from this partnership. However, for reasons unknown, the vicariate itself never came to fruition.

Another outcome of this initiative was the creation of the Lusitania Institute, a non-sectarian Portuguese language institute in Ludlow, open to students of all nationalities. This was Rocha's pet project, whose underlying goal, suggested to him by the Holy See, was to identify those students with a pastoral vocation and convince them to study for priesthood in Portugal or in Rome, in order to increase the pool of Portuguese priests in the Americas. With support from the National Education Minister, a team of architects made plans to build a Portuguese-American university college for 800 students. To carry out this plan, Rocha recruited various distinguished supporters, including Cardinal Cerejeira, the União Nacional and its National Assembly deputies, and some of the Estado Novo's most prominent ministers (including then Minister of the Presidency Marcello Caetano). He was also able to secure a total of $28,500 USD in subsidies from the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs according to Rocha, Foreign Affairs Minister Franco Nogueira (1961-69) later promised him additional funds if he managed to obtain Francis Cardinal Spellman's endorsement of Portugal's right to defend its African territories on public record. Rocha also invited a group of high-profile Portuguese-Americans to become founding donors and solicited contributions from the general community. In 1955, he convinced the Education Minister to offer his assistant Fr. Joaquim E. Lourenço a scholarship to write the history of the Portuguese in North America, which would allow the latter to tour the expatriate communities of the United States and Canada, and raise interest for the new college.

With the money he raised, Rocha bought the land for the future college and began construction in sections. The first building opened in 1962 with a classroom for ten students, where Rocha and other priests taught high school classes. The institute also hosted distinguished visiting lecturers from Portugal, including the anthropologist António Almeida and the former Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira. Two years later, the Lusitania received a $25,500 USD

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418 Letter, Fr. Manuel Rocha, Ludlow, to Consul J. Borja de Freitas, Boston, November 1, 1972, PEA M405, Festivais, Congressos e Comemorações Promovidos pela Colónia, AHD.
419 At an international congress organized by the OCPM in the Azores in 1972, Manuel Rocha once again proposed the creation of an apostolic vicariate for Portuguese emigrants, this time covering not just the U.S. but also Canada and Bermuda. The Portuguese Catholic Church's reaction to this proposal is unknown, but we know that some of diplomats in the U.S. approved of it (letters, Fr. M. Rocha to Consul Borja de Freitas, Boston, November 1, 1972; Consul Freitas to Amb. João Themido, November 3, 1972, PEA M405, Festivais, Congressos e Comemorações Promovidos pela Colónia, AHD).
420 Letter, Fr. Manuel Rocha to Ambassador Vasco V. Garin, December 9, 1967, PEA M334, Lusitania Institute Inc, AHD.
422 Letter, M. Rocha to Joseph Cardinal Ritter, August 10, 1964, PEA 251-A, Colônia Portuguesa nos EE.UU. Ensino, AHD.
grant from the Gulbenkian Foundation's American branch, which paid for a language laboratory offering a speedy, intensive Portuguese language course. Among its students were clergymen, businessmen, and professionals looking to work in Brazil rather than the Portuguese communities of North or South America. Facing this reality, Rocha began searching for bulk clients interested in working with the world's largest Lusophone country. Among his prospective clients were the Port of New York, where much of the American trade with Brazil came through, and the U. S. Peace Corps, the international development volunteer organization founded by President Kennedy in 1961. With Gulbenkian's additional funding the institute also opened English language classes for newly arrived Portuguese children.

Rocha's new strategy displeased Ambassador Vasco Vieira Garin (1963-71), particularly his lobbying of the Peace Corps. For Garin, those initiatives fell outside the Lusitania's mission, whose ability to spread Portuguese language and culture in the United States he began to question. We can only speculate why the Portuguese government urged Rocha not to become involved with the Peace Corps, although it is clear from the records that both parties made sure to keep it confidential. Whatever the reasons, Rocha obliged the ambassador's wishes and stopped pursuing that American organization. However, this curbed the institute's options to boost its stagnant enrollment numbers. With an average of only ten students per year, Gulbenkian finally suspended its funding in 1969. Consul Freitas proposed selling a second plot of land that Rocha had bought for a future expansion and use the money from the sale to reimburse the Portuguese government and the Gulbenkian Foundation, arguing the Lusitania Institute was unable to deliver on its goals and that its assets were underutilized. Rocha somehow managed to convince Garin not to sell the unused property and continue subsidizing its mortgage payments. After this, the Lusitania Institute continued to function as a private non-profit language school with largely symbolic ties to the Portuguese government.

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423 This Lisbon-based charitable foundation was created in 1956 with the Armenian oil magnate Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian's massive wealth and art collection. The Foundation was dedicated to promoting the arts, education, and science in Portugal, arguably becoming the de facto Ministry of Culture in the latter stage of the regime. The future (and former) ambassador in Washington Pedro T. Pereira played an important role in convincing the Armenian exile to set up his foundation in Portugal, later becoming one of its administrators.


426 Letter, Amb. V. Garin, Washington, to PMFA, March 9, 1964 (m.t.), PEA M609, Relações culturais com os E.U.A. Instituto Luso-Americano em Ludlow, Estado de Massachusetts, Fundado pelo Padre Manuel Rocha, AHD.

Around the same time that Portuguese officials began losing interest in Rocha's projects, another Portuguese priest began climbing the ranks of the American Catholic Church, eventually becoming one of the most prominent and influential Portuguese immigrants in the United States. Born in São Miguel in 1915, Humberto Sousa Medeiros moved to Fall River at age 15 with his working-class parents. There he continued his studies until his father took him out of school to work as a sweeper in the Sagamore Mills, earning $0.62 per hour. Medeiros eventually returned to school once his two younger brothers were old enough to replace him at the mill. A talented student, Medeiros recorded the best academic score in his high school's history, contradicting the low expectations that prejudiced educators often had for "Portagee" students. Thanks to the financial support from various benefactors, Medeiros was able to continue his studies, eventually completing four degrees at the Catholic University of America and the Pontifical North American College in Rome. In 1946, he was ordained into priesthood. In the next two decades, Medeiros worked at various Portuguese parishes in Massachusetts, eventually directing Fall River's St. Michael's church. After moving up the ranks in the Fall River diocese, Pope Paul VI named him Bishop of Brownsville, Texas, in 1966; then Archbishop of Boston in 1970; and finally Cardinal in 1973.\footnote{J. Anthony Lukas, \textit{Common Ground: a Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three American Families}, 1985, 391-393.}

In Brownsville, Medeiros earned the epithet "the poor man's Bishop", because of his affinity with Mexican-American migrant labourers, whom he followed throughout the Midwest during harvest season; as one of his aides described: "He eats with them; he lives with them; he shares everything with them." Soon after arriving in Texas, Medeiros became an ally of César Chavez's United Farm Workers during the fruit pickers' struggle for a minimum wage. Medeiros was one of the five members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Farm Labor Dispute, established by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, which was instrumental in securing Chavez' victory.\footnote{For more on this topic, see Marco G. Prouty, \textit{César Chávez, the Catholic Bishops, and the Farmworkers' Struggle for Social Justice}, 2006.} Medeiros criticized capitalism for being a system that "considers profit the key motive for economic progress, competition as the maximum law of economics, and private ownership as the means of production with an absolute right that has no limits and carries no corresponding social obligations." He was also known for fraternizing with controversial militant organizations,
like the Mexican American Youth Organization and the Black Panthers. In 1970, Medeiros left the country's smallest and poorest diocese to run its second largest, replacing the popular Richard Cardinal Cushing, a close associate of the Kennedy family and an influential local political figure. The elevation of a Portuguese-American to archbishop of an historically Irish-American archdiocese - the first non-Irishman to occupy that position in 124 years - shocked and infuriated many Bostonians. After the Pope's announcement, protesters expressed their discontentment by destroying Church property, including lighting a cross on fire on the Chancery's lawn, planting an unexploded pipe bomb at its front door, along with burning and raiding other sites. Defiant priests hurled bigoted remarks at their "Portagee" superior. Medeiros' anti-capitalist views and "radical tendencies" were also disconcerting for right-wing commentators, whom he occasionally upset by making critical remarks on controversial topics such as the Vietnam War. More palatable to his conservative critics was Medeiros' support of Pope Paul VI's opposition to abortion and other forms of birth control.

The day after Medeiros' consecration as Archbishop of Boston, Consul Freitas sent a telegram to Lisbon describing the prelate as someone "with liberal ideas, possible theoretical relations [with] American black movements, [and] maybe radical opinions." Despite his controversial political views, Medeiros' new powerful role in the American Catholic Church was too alluring for Portuguese diplomats not to harness. So they looked for ways to lay claim to his Portuguese identity while deflecting his impoverished emigrant background and American political education. Referring to the media's coverage of Medeiros' story, Freitas argued: "Allusions to his arrival [as a] poor immigrant and [to his] intellectual formation deriving entirely from this country seem to make celebration of his pertinent Portuguese ethnicity somewhat delicate (but no less convenient), so to avoid greater insistence on those facts and valorizing American contribution [to the] Archbishop's formation." As usual, the ambassador awarded Medeiros an honorific title in 1972, this time the Great Cross of the Portuguese Order of Christ, the highest distinction bestowed by the Portuguese government (Figure 24).


432 Telegram, Consul Freitas to PMFA, Sept. 15, 1970 (m.t.), PEA M656, Comun. Port. no Estrangeiro. Processo Geral, AHD.
After meeting with Medeiros at the embassy, Ambassador João Hall Themido (1971-81) reported to Lisbon that the prelate would be accepting their award. Themido communicated his positive impression of Medeiros, particularly the fact that he was fluent in Portuguese and maintained personal attachments to his homeland. Indeed, Medeiros took a very public trip to São Miguel in 1973, bringing with him an entourage of American clergymen, Portuguese-American businessmen and other notables; he also took $40,000 USD in community donations to various charity organizations on the island. Micaelenses cheered the island's returned son as he toured the sites of his childhood and addressed the crowds of onlookers. Those who could not see the Cardinal in person were able to follow his tour in the Azorean and Boston media, which dedicated many pages and much footage to his visit. Some of the American coverage placed the Estado Novo as the backdrop of Medeiros' rags to riches story, painting the regime in a negative light. The reporter's narration for Boston's WBZ-TV referred to the "backward nature" of the Azores and the "oppressive, indifferent" government under which they lived, leading many islanders to emigrate. In contrast, the readers of the local Diário dos Açores were offered a romantic narrative of emigration, as expressed by a government official at the Cardinal's welcoming party: "Here with you returns, entering the people's city grounds and our hearts' silent emotion, the great and sometimes tragic figure, though always beautiful in his tenacious and redemptive hope for the future, the Portuguese Emigrant." Medeiros reciprocated by confirming the patriotism of Portuguese emigrants and reciting the regime's imperialist mantra:

Being a small country, we don't rely on armed forces to conquer the world, but instead, we rely on spiritual forces to install in all the world the Truth that sets us free, the Truth that our missionaries spread yesterday and today, making Portugal known and loved, esteemed by foreigners. Every Portuguese, be it priest or not... be it religious or not... has and continues to be a missionary of Portuguese culture, which... integrates in itself a Catholic faith.

Medeiros' nostalgia for his humble origins was arguably nurtured by his problems dealing with the archdiocese's high debt crisis, his entanglement in Boston's tense racial politics, and his failure to live up to the expectations of civil rights activists who criticized his general inaction on their struggle to end racial segregation in the city's schools. Lacking the charisma, fundraising
skills, and political acumen of his predecessor, the Portuguese-American Cardinal avoided being in the public eye for much of his tenure, until he died in 1983.438

Manuel Rocha and Humberto Medeiros were only two of many Portuguese clergymen in the United States who had significant influence over their ethnic communities. Their personal stories do not fit in this study, though some will be mentioned throughout it. What remains constant for most of them was their dedication to preserving the cultural identity of their fellow Portuguese.

**Working immigrant families, social services, and covetous priests in Canada**

Most immigrant families in Canada were able to improve their financial situation after some time in Canada, where they were able to adapt tested economic strategies to their new context, including their aptitude for stretching household budgets and minimizing expenses, their willingness to trade personal short-term comfort for long-term economic gains, and the waged contributions of every able-bodied household member towards building the family's savings. Still, their relative economic success often came at heavy costs to the workers' mental and physical health, and led to severe strains on many immigrant families. Seasonal unemployment, work related injuries and fatalities, domestic abuse following threats to patriarchal norms, high rates of school dropout, and youth criminality, were some of the most common social problems encountered in Portuguese immigrant households and communities.439

Eager to address these issues were an army of mainstream social workers and their settlement agencies, most of them informed by Protestant social reform values or directly associated with Protestant churches. As Miranda explained, despite the immigrants' inexperience with welfare programs outside of religious charities in their country, one of the new economic strategies they adopted in Canada was to take advantage of the material aid offered by social service agencies.440 Those sojourners who arrived in Toronto in the 1950s accessed the social, educational, and informational programs of mainstream agencies like the secular International

438 For more on Medeiros tenure as Archbishop of Boston, see Lukas, 1985, 372-404.
Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, or the Protestant (United Church) St. Christopher House. When their wives and children joined them in the new country, they too became clients of these agencies' nursery schools, youth programs, and other services. The smaller Catholic Pro Aliis Club also had an aid committee dedicated to the Portuguese called Our Lady of Fatima. The club members, most of them Anglo-Canadian businesswomen and housewives, encouraged newcomers to learn English in order to "become good citizens of their adopted country."441

Much has been written about the role played by mainstream settlement agencies in assisting newcomers during their first years in Canada, and their attempts to assimilate immigrants into a Cold War, middle-class, proto-multicultural version of Canadian citizenship. As Iacovetta, Miranda, and others have argued, postwar immigrants were generally able to use the resources offered by these agencies without relinquishing their autonomy and cultural practices, thus thwarting the disciplining efforts of ethnocentric social workers.442 Less known is the aid provided by homeland diplomats and their consulates to newcomers during their settlement years. Before joining the programs of urban social service agencies, the sojourners' first experience with material aid in Canada was with the Portuguese consulates. In 1955, Consul Vital Gomes in Montreal alerted Lisbon to the overwhelming number of aid requests he received from emigrants across Quebec: "This Consulate has diligently found them new employment through the Department of Citizenship and Immigration; hospitalized and obtained medical assistance... to those in need, for free; it has not, however, been able to satisfy requests for money... to avail them of the most basic food, clothing and housing needs, given that Consular Regulations only allows it in cases of repatriation."443 Consul Gomes sometimes gave money out of his own pocket; as had his predecessor, Fr. Almeida, who gave close to $3,000 CAD of his own earnings, $700 of which had not been reimbursed months after he left Montreal.444 The consulate's limited staff also assisted newcomers at the city airport on a regular basis, sometimes during "the late hours of the night," without additional pay.

442 Iacovetta, 2006; Miranda, 2010.
443 Letter, Consul Vital Gomes to PMFA, May 7, 1955 (m.t.), 2P M190, Canadá Plano de Assistência aos Emigrantes, AHD; letter, Consul. V. Gomes to PMFA, May 28, 1957, 2P M446 A6, Canadá. Operações de Seleção de Emigrantes, AHD.
444 Fr. Manuel Pereira de Almeida combined his job as Vice-Consul in Montreal with that of priest in the Diocese of São Paulo, Brazil. In 1953, the Bishop of S. Paulo ordered Almeida to return to his pastoral duties, but the latter refused. In response, the Archbishop of Montreal stripped Almeida of his right to say mass and warned that more severe penalties would follow if he did not comply. The Portuguese government was not aware of Almeida's problematic situation until they were pressured by the Papal Nuncio in Ottawa to exonerate Almeida, which they did in 1954 (memo, Amândio Pinto, PMFA, July 7, 1953; telegram, Caldeira Coelho, Ottawa, to PMFA, November 17, 1954, PEA 194, Colônia Portuguesa no Canadá, AHD).
In 1955, officials in the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Ministry expressed concern over the well-being of sojourners in Canada, in light of the fact that the latter sent most of their earnings to Portugal, thus placing themselves in difficult financial situations. The Portuguese Legation in Ottawa proposed that consulates be equipped with an emergency budget for aiding emigrants in distress, and that the Canadian Catholic clergy be asked for help. The ministry forwarded the proposal to the JDE, noting the isolation that migrant farmhands were subjected to and their desperate need for "moral assistance". In the officials' understanding, the best people to provide this assistance and broker relations between farmers and migrant workers were the local Catholic priests, since they were familiar with the region and its habitants. Furthermore, nearly every Canadian diocese had its own immigrant services with priests prepared to assist fellow Catholic newcomers. However, the quality of these services varied between regions and depended largely on the local bishops' interest in the matter; according to Portuguese diplomats, the dioceses of Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston and London were good at this, unlike Toronto and Hamilton. In reply, the JDE assured Minister Cunha that they had already established contacts with various aid organizations and Catholic bishops in Quebec, Ontario, and the Azores. The JDE's president had personally requested help from the Vicar-General of Montreal, who in turn connected with the Immigrant Aid Society and the Rural Settlement Society of Canada. These two organizations took an interest in the Portuguese and provided them with various kinds of aid, like transit fares, clothing, job information, and loans to pay for their families' trip to Canada. The JDE also approved the creation of a consulate fund of $100 CAD per month to be disbursed to emigrants in need but had no money in its budget for it; Minister Cunha eventually covered that amount.

In the 1960s, Canadian settlement agencies began hiring Lusophone workers to better serve the growing Portuguese communities in their cities. Some were former United Church missionaries in Africa, as was the case of Edith Clarke, the first Portuguese-speaking staff at St. Christopher House, who had worked in Angola for 35 years. As the decade progressed, these mainstream agencies had to deal with increased competition from the growing number of social service providers emerging within the Portuguese community. Besides travel agencies and other informal language brokers, Portuguese Catholic priests, who started arriving in Canada during

445 Correspondence, PMFA officials and A. M. Baptista, JDE, April-May 1955, 2P M190, Canadá Plano de Assist. Emig., AHD.
447 For a comprehensive history of St. Christopher House and its relation with the Portuguese community in Toronto, see the PCHP online exhibit St. Christopher House, 1912-2012: a century of social services in Toronto, url: http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp/st-christopher-house
this period, also provided aid to the emigrants as part of their pastoral duties and inaugurated social service centres in their own parishes.

The first priest to lead a Portuguese congregation in Toronto was the Brazilian Odorico Schmidt, a former missionary in the Amazon region, who served the city's Lusophone community at St. Michael's cathedral. Before returning to Brazil in 1958, he convinced James Cardinal C. McGuigan Archbishop of Toronto, to assign a Portuguese priest to a parish closer to Kensington Market.\textsuperscript{448} A few months later, Fr. Alfredo G. Camacho of Funchal arrived in the city. One of his first acts was to launch a Portuguese chapter of the St. Vincent de Paul Society, whose charity work in Portugal was well known to his parishioners.\textsuperscript{449} By the end of that year, Camacho was celebrating mass in Portuguese at St. Mary's church, which would later become one of the most important social and political hubs in the Portuguese community.\textsuperscript{450} For the next two years, Camacho earned the appreciation of his fellow immigrants by helping a number of them settle, finding them jobs, enrolling their children in Catholic schools, counseling estranged couples, visiting those in the hospital, along with other deeds. However, as Consul Armando N. de Freitas in Toronto informed his superiors, the community was not yet large enough to support the priest financially, who found himself in a precarious situation. Camacho then requested a subsidy from the Portuguese government in order to continue his pastoral work, which the consul endorsed.\textsuperscript{451} In 1960, Camacho was suddenly reassigned to Argentina, where he became the director of the Portuguese Catholic Mission in Buenos Aires. To replace him, Archbishop McGuigan called Fr. Lourenço from Ludlow.

Other Portuguese priests were sent to Toronto in the 1960s. The mainland Fr. Frederico Fatela, the Micaelense Fr. Antero de Melo, and Fr. Manuel de Freitas Leite all joined Lourenço at St. Mary's in 1965. Before the year was over, this group of priests started clashing over their pastoral roles, community plans, and parish finances, until they finally parted ways: Melo went back to Portugal in 1966.

\textsuperscript{448}In his final report, Schmidt described Portuguese immigrants in Toronto as mostly unemployed, with poor diet, and prone to illness. He added: “The ladies are the most depressed, living inside the poorest housing conditions, hardly deserving to be called homes... birth control is practiced because of the housing conditions.” He also found that “the moral standard” of single and married men was “as a rule very high” (report, Fr. Odorico Schmidt, March 1, 1958, general correspondence and parish organizations 1957-67, Portuguese Congregation 1958-1972, Parish collection, ARCAT).

\textsuperscript{449}The Society of St. Vincent de Paul is an international lay Catholic charity dedicated to providing alms for the poor. Founded in 1833 in Paris, the Society quickly expanded to other parts of the world, including the U.S. in 1845, Canada in 1846, and Portugal in 1859 - the Funchal branch was the second to be founded in the country, in 1875 (letter, Fr. Alfredo Camacho to J. B. Conacher, Society of St. Vincent de Paul, Particular Council, Toronto, September 27, 1958, ibid).

\textsuperscript{450}St. Mary's became a "Portuguese" parish in the 1960s by virtue of its chief clerics' ethnicity and the majority of its parishioners. Technically, it remained a territorial parish until 1973, when it officially became a Portuguese national parish.

\textsuperscript{451}Letter, Consul Armando Freitas, Toronto, to PMFA, September 20, 1958, 2P M58, Canadá Diversos, AHD.
to London, Ontario, and Fatela to Montreal.\textsuperscript{452} Their conflict also divided the congregation, of which over 500 members sent a petition to Archbishop McGuigan requesting a new Portuguese parish, preferably under Melo's direction. As a result, the Italian parish of Our Lady of Mount Carmel began offering services in Portuguese, but instead of Melo, McGuigan entrusted the new Portuguese services to a former missionary in Brazil.\textsuperscript{453}

After this split, Fr. Leite, who had previously been assigned by the Papal Nuncio in Lisbon to tour the Portuguese diaspora and spent the last two years travelling in New England and Canada, sent his assessment of Toronto's Portuguese community to Minister Nogueira in Lisbon. He described the prototypical emigrant as being illiterate; obsessed with money; prone to slander and intrigue; and having no schools, daycare centres, or entertainment venues like other communities in the diaspora. He also warned of the pernicious presence of anti-Salazar exiles and "communist Protestants" who took advantage of the community's disarray to recruit followers.\textsuperscript{454} Indeed, the United Church was a vocal critic of Portugal's violent colonial rule, which many of its missionaries had experienced or seen firsthand.\textsuperscript{455} For instance, George Vernon Kimball, the Baptist minister of Toronto's United Church Portuguese congregation since 1964, had spent a year in Lisbon learning the language and another three years in Angola, from which he was banned in 1961. His outspoken criticism of Portugal's colonialism earned him the respect of anti-Salazarists in Toronto, with whom Kimball regularly collaborated.\textsuperscript{456} But despite the concerns of Catholic officials, the few Portuguese Protestant congregations in Canada and the United States never managed to convert a significant number of souls.\textsuperscript{457}

To improve the community's grim circumstances, Leite urged Lisbon to send "moral and material" support and deploy "means of propaganda and penetration", like launching a local newspaper, providing broadcast content to Lusophone radio stations, or creating a tourism centre.

\textsuperscript{452} Letter, Ambassador Alexandre L. da Veiga, Ottawa, to PMFA, March 28, 1968, PEA M401, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Exposição em que a "Portuguese Canadian Association... para a assistência religiosa à nossa colónia, AHD.


\textsuperscript{454} As Luigi Pennachio (2000, 59-60) noted, pro-fascist Italian priests in Toronto also conflated Communism and Protestantism to ostracize anti-fascist Italian immigrants as "evil Protestants", "weaklings who... could adapt to Canada only by abandoning their Italian and Catholic identity." By tarnishing the national integrity of their political adversaries and placing them outside of the ethnic group, these priests asserted themselves as the community's genuine representatives.


\textsuperscript{456} PIDE report, Luanda, October 5, 1966; and letter, Amb. E. Brazão to PMFA, November 17, 1966, PEA M533, Política Interna e Externa de Portugal. Conferência Amnistia aos Presos Políticos Portugueses em Toronto de 28 a 30 de Outubro, AHD.

\textsuperscript{457} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 149; Pap, 1980, 181-182.
that could organize festivals with Portuguese artists. The priest then informed Minister Nogueira of his plans to build a Portuguese pastoral centre independent from Toronto's diocese, for which he had mobilized a group of community members and requested the embassy's support. Together with Lourenço, Leite set up a cooperative to raise funds in the community in order to buy a building that could host a chapel, travel agency, health clinic, library, credit union, along with educational, recreational, legal aid, and sports programs.

To the priests' surprise, Ambassador Eduardo Brazão decided not to endorse their initiative. Brazão had doubts, particularly about the appropriateness of a pastoral centre offering credit services, which according to its proposed by-laws would "always be run by a Portuguese priest," and whose membership was conditional to the acquisition of "nominal stocks" (each worth $100) or a capital deposit at a generous 6% annual interest rate. In Brazão's view, the average emigrant was "suspicious by nature" and hardly understood the concept of credit. Another reason behind his reluctance was Leite's criticism of the Toronto newspaper Correio Português, and its co-founders Maria Alice Ribeiro and her husband António Ribeiro. Following a suggestion from the DCI, Mr. Ribeiro had approached Lourenço in the early 1960s with the idea of creating a Portuguese newspaper in Toronto. A year and a half later, Lourenço had purchased the necessary equipment and invited Mr. Ribeiro to be his newspaper's editor. While putting together the first issue, the two had a disagreement and the project was aborted. In 1963, the Ribeiros decided to publish their own newspaper. According to Leite, the couple had stolen Lourenço's idea and had placed it at the service of "communist Protestants." Leite was unaware that Ambassador Brazão and Mrs. Ribeiro were personal friends, and that the diplomat had encouraged her to launch the Correio, which was funded by the regime.

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458 Letter, Fr. Manuel F. Leite to PMFA, November 23, 1965 (m.t.), PEA 400, Colônia Portuguesa no Canadá. Recomendação do Padre Freitas Leite à Embaixada de Portugal em Ottawa, AHD.
460 Growing up in Lisbon, Maria Alice Ribeiro (1930-2000) had a privileged upbringing. She studied at the National School of Fine Arts; graduated as a nurse from a missionary college where she founded the Association of Catholic Nurses; and attended a journalism school in Rio de Janeiro. Ribeiro began her radio career as a producer in the Portuguese public broadcaster Emissora Nacional. She also collaborated with various newspapers and co-founded a cultural news magazine. In 1958, Ribeiro moved to the U.S. as a student, where she decided to stay after her scholarship expired, first in Washington, working as an aide to the Brazilian Navy Attaché, and later in New York, as an aide to the UN's Brazilian delegation. While in the U.S., she developed good relations with Portuguese diplomats, including the future ambassador to Canada E. Brazão. In 1962, she married António Ribeiro and moved to Toronto. Before founding the Correio Português, the couple worked for sometime in the Luso-Canadiano of Montreal. Throughout her life, Mrs. Ribeiro was very involved in Portuguese community affairs, volunteering at St. Christopher House, co-founding the Rancho da Nazaré, and other initiatives. After 1974 she maintained good relations with the Portuguese government, particularly with the Secretary of State Manuela Aguiar, who credited her with helping devise the CPC.
In his report to Lisbon, Ambassador Brazão argued that secular civic initiatives should be launched by the emigrants themselves, and only then should they be tactfully steered by the diplomats and the clergy, without "subjecting them directly or indirectly to a tutelage they would necessarily react to." In this careful manipulation he saw the clergy's role as "an indispensable complement to consulate action, which can only go so far." For Brazão, Leite was "desirous of destroying what has already been accomplished with much effort and sacrifice, so that all power and authority over the Toronto community remains in his hands." Still, despite the embassy's distancing, the two priests managed to raise enough money to secure a mortgage on a building in the Portuguese neighbourhood. But soon after the property was leased, a displeased Archbishop McGuigan decided to remove Leite and Lourenço from St. Mary's and replaced them with Fr. Alberto Cunha, who took over in 1966.

Before moving to Canada, Cunha had served in the diocese of Braga, in the northern mainland, in a parish with a long tradition of migration to South America. When the Canadian movement started in 1953, he became one of the Portuguese agents in charge of screening migrant candidates according to Canada's immigration criteria. It was then that the bishops of Kingston and Hamilton invited him and his brother, Fr. António Cunha, to move to Canada and tend to the Portuguese in their cities. For this, the Canadian episcopate bypassed their Portuguese counterparts and went directly to the Vatican for permission. Ambassador Brazão was upset with this circumvention since it furthered these priests' independence from Portuguese authorities. Still, Brazão praised the pastoral services provided by the brothers Cunha to those immigrants outside of Toronto, and their "national fervour". Considering them valuable assets, "with whom [Portuguese diplomats] have always been able to count on", the JDE approved the ambassador's suggestion to grant the two priests a monthly subsidy of $200 CAD each.

Over time, Portuguese diplomats became aware of Alberto Cunha's controversial personality, questionable ethics, and hunger for power. Like his St. Mary's predecessors, Cunha

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463 Telegrams, PMFA to Amb. Brazão, and reply, January 13, 1966; letter, Amb. Brazão to PMFA, January 19, 1966 (m.t.), PEA 400, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Recomendação do Padre Freitas Leite à Embaixada de Portugal em Ottawa, AHD.
464 Fr. Leite returned to Portugal, while Fr. Lourenço went back to Ludlow to teach at the Lusitania Institute shortly after being made a chaplain at a Toronto hospital (letter, Ambassador Veiga to PMFA, March 28, 1968, PEA M401, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Exposição em que a "Portuguese... AHD).
466 Telegram, Amb. E. Brazão to PMFA, March 11, 1963; letter, A. M. Baptista, JDE, to PMFA, May 20, 1963 (m.t.), PEA M400, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Visita do Embaixador Dr. Eduardo Brazão às Comunidades Portuguesas do Canadá, AHD.
had launched a fundraising cooperative in Ottawa-Hull to build a Portuguese Center, which was expected to have a canteen, conference rooms, offer English and French classes, and technical courses. The building was bought and renovated by community volunteers, who finally unveiled it 1964. However, for some reason, their plans for a community centre fell through shortly after that. According to the ambassador, Cunha retained ownership of the property and leased it to a new tenant, while refusing to return the money donated by the community. Years later, the embassy became aware of another incident where Cunha was brought to trial for allegedly assaulting a fellow immigrant in Toronto. Throughout his life, Cunha aroused suspicion for various alleged criminal activities, including extortion, embezzlement, and tax evasion, among others, which lead to a high-profile exposé by the Toronto Star in the 1990s.

Despite his polemical behaviour, Cunha was very popular with St. Mary's large Portuguese congregation, particularly those who benefited from the social services provided at his parish community centre and felt indebted to him. Azoreans also thanked Cunha for organizing the first Senhor Santo Cristo procession in the city, as we will discuss later in this chapter. Still, his relentless ambition fuelled the ongoing rivalry between Toronto's two Portuguese parishes, with St. Mary's being slightly more prominent than Our Lady of Mount Carmel, given the latter's geographic distance from the heart of the Portuguese community.

In 1966, Brazão urged Minister Nogueira to reach out to the Portuguese episcopacy and ask them to submit Cunha to the diplomats' will. Two years later, Consul Luis A. Martins suggested that the OCPM send a dynamic assistant to help Cunha tend to St. Mary's large congregation and eventually challenge his dominance. But to the diplomats' exasperation, there was little the OCPM could do to control Cunha, since he was under Toronto's Archdiocese jurisdiction and was now a Canadian citizen.

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467 Correspondence, Amb. E. Brazão, PMFA, and Ramiro Valadão, SNI, December 2, 1963 to April 13, 1964, PEA M400, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Associação dos Amigos de Portugal-Centro Português de Ottawa, AHD.

468 Letter, Amb. Veiga to PMFA, March 28, 1968, PEA M4001, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Exposição em que a "Portuguese... AHD. The archivist concealed Alberto Cunha's name in this letter, however, other biographical references made it obvious that it referred to the said priest. Other documents in this folder remained classified despite requests for release.

469 In his memoir, Um Passado Recentemente (2007, 39-41), Jaime Monteiro, a self-exiled communist, claimed that Cunha sent "goons" to his furniture store in Toronto and assaulted him, along with a Rádio Clube Português representative; the latter had to be taken to the hospital. According to Monteiro, one of the assailants was caught by the police and later tried. Monteiro laid charges against Cunha but the priest was acquitted. It is not clear if the assault mentioned in Ambassador Veiga's letter of 1968 is the same as in Monteiro's account.


471 Telegram, Amb. E. Brazão to PMFA, Mar. 16, 1966 (m.t.), PEA M400 Col. Port. no Can. Rec. do P. Freitas Leite... AHD.

472 Cunha's "subaltern" then was a young priest from Braga, who was also his cousin (memo [confidential], Consul Luis Martins, Toronto, October 31, 1968, PEA M401, Col. Port. Can. Exposição em que... AHD).

473 Letter, Director-General Nunes Freitas, PMFA, to António Salazar, September 10, 1968, ibid.
Besides using the pulpit to sway his flock and intimidate his detractors, Cunha also published his own newspaper, *O Jornal Português*, where he disseminated his political views and personal diatribes since 1968. Among his targets were the publishers of the rival *Correio*. In 1970, António Ribeiro furiously wrote to Ambassador Alfredo Lencastre da Veiga (1967-70) informing him of a threatening letter that Cunha had sent him and his wife, and called for someone in Lisbon to take "decisive action" and rid them of the odious priest. 474 Ambassador Veiga forwarded the matter to Foreign Affairs Minister Rui Patrício (1970-74), calling his attention to Cunha's "venomous" exploitation of Toronto's Portuguese. Veiga explained that he kept Cunha at arm's length and always declined his invitations to participate in St. Mary's widely popular *Senhor Santo Cristo* procession. Portuguese consuls in Toronto, however, did not have the luxury of ignoring Cunha, given his popularity and influence in the community. Instead, they maintained good relations with the controversial priest and kept him as an ally. Besides, Cunha was a staunch defender of the regime and its colonial empire, and a fierce enemy of its opponents in exile, whom he indiscriminately vilified as "communists".

Other priests competed with Cunha for the hearts of the expanding Portuguese congregation. In 1967, the new pastor of Our Lady of Mount Carmel, Roberto Marino, founded the Portuguese Social Service Centre, which offered Portuguese and English classes, trade skills training programs, job placements, immigration consulting, a rehabilitation centre, a music school, youth programs, interpreting, referrals, and other services dealing with housing, health care, and insurance; all free of charge. Such was its success that Ambassador Veiga endorsed Marino's request for funding from the Portuguese government. 475 The next year, Marino retired and was replaced by Fr. Melo, who continued the work of his predecessor. In 1969, he hired a young social worker from Lisbon. Interviewed by the *Star*, the social worker argued that the reason why Portuguese immigrants preferred the parish centre over similar government agencies was because "they are inclined to be suspicious of bureaucratic Anglo-Saxon departments," and "find it easier to confide in a parish-oriented community worker." 476 Despite widespread praise

474 According to António Ribeiro, upon reading Cunha's letter, his wife Maria Alice "fell off her bed and hasn't slept in two days" (letters, António Ribeiro to Ambassador Alfredo L. Veiga, February 25, 1970; and Amb. Veiga to Minister Rui Patrício, May 5, 1970 [m.t.], PEA M656, Canadá. Comunidades Portuguesas no Estrangeiro. Processo Gera, AHD.

475 I was unable to find confirmation whether or not the Portuguese government approved this request. Letters, Fr. Roberto Marino to unknown recipient, September 19, 1967; and Amb. Veiga to PMFA, March 19, 1968, PEA M400, Col. Port. Can. Rec., AHD.

for her work, which was partially funded by the Canadian federal government, the social worker was released in 1970 due to lack of funds.\footnote{Notes for the Minister, box 128, Ban 2003-01367-9, File 3260-P2-190/P15, Multiculturalism Directorate, NAC.} That year, Melo was transferred to a third Lusophone parish, St. Agnes Church, replacing the Brazilian Fr. Alexandre Neves. There he launched another social service centre in the parish's basement. Neves in turn moved to St. Helen's church and opened yet another Lusophone social service centre in 1973, this one financed by the Canadian Catholic episcopate, Toronto's City Hall, and the Canadian federal government. By 1975, there were 13 Portuguese priests serving in Toronto.\footnote{Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 145; Marques & Medeiros, 1980.}

In Montreal, Portuguese religious services were first offered in 1959, thanks largely to the efforts of Manuel Teixeira\footnote{Manuel Teixeira (1927-?) was born in Celorico de Basto, Minho. After quitting his seminary studies at age 18, he attended a agronomy college in Santarém. In Canada, he worked for the Montreal Botanical Garden and the tobacco company Rothmans, Benson & Hedges. Teixeira completed his bachelor's degree in agronomic studies in Montreal, and taught English and French in the Montreal Catholic School Board. Besides the \textit{Union Catholique Portugaise}, Teixeira spearheaded the short-lived Quebec Association of Portuguese Professional and Business Men (1967), and the Federation of Portuguese Organizations of Quebec. (1974). He also produced and hosted the TV show \textit{Reflexos de Portugal} (1971), and founded the newspaper \textit{Tribuna Portuguesa} (1972-74). Teixeira received the Order of Canada in 1983.\textsuperscript{479} He also produced and hosted the TV show \textit{Reflexos de Portugal} (1971), and founded the newspaper \textit{Tribuna Portuguesa} (1972-74). Teixeira received the Order of Canada in 1983.\textsuperscript{479}} and his Portuguese Catholic Union (PCU). Before migrating to Canada in 1955, Teixeira, who spoke English and French, worked as an interpreter in the Our Lady of Fátima Sanctuary. There he met the French-Canadian priest Raoul Gagnon who encouraged him to move to Montreal. Gagnon, who tended to the Portuguese congregation at the Notre-Dame Basilica, found Teixeira a job in the city's botanical garden. In 1958, Teixeira offered a statuette of Mary to the Basilica. \textit{Rádio-Canadá} covered the humble unveiling ceremony where Paul-Émile Cardinal Léger Archbishop of Montreal blessed the statuette (Figure 25). For Consul Nogueira, this ceremony was significant from a religious and political standpoint, since it presented an image of the Portuguese as being well connected with Quebec's Catholic authorities. Still, he argued, such an event would have made a greater impact if it had been hosted by a Portuguese priest, who could have warded off "the political intonation that 'French-Canadian' priests sometimes grant [these functions], that is, their desire to integrate foreign colonies into 'French-Canada'."\footnote{Letter, Consul Artur da Silva Nogueira to PMFA, October 21, 1958 (m.t.), 2P M558, Canadá Diversos, AHD.}

The Portuguese in Montreal were aware of Camacho's pastoral services in Toronto and began requesting a Portuguese priest of their own; they had the chance to transmit this directly to Bishop Pedro da Silva in September 1960 when he visited Montreal.\footnote{Report, Consul A. S. Nogueira, "Panorama da Colónia Portuguesa de Montreal, February 18, 1961, to PMFA, PEA M400 Colónia Portuguesa. Visita do Embaixador Dr. Eduardo Brazão às Comunidades Portuguesas do Canadá, AHD.} To organize their efforts,
the mainlander Teixeira and a group of Azoreans founded the PCU. The lay organizers arranged
for monthly Portuguese language masses to be held at Notre-Dame Basilica, said by Gagnon and
a Brazilian priest. Consul Nogueira, who attended these masses alongside his counterparts from
Brazil and Cuba, was pleased with Teixeira's initiative. However, he found the "well-meaning
dynamic man" to be irksome, and described him as "insincere", "pretentious", and "boldly
impertinent" - Teixeira wrote Salazar asking for a reimbursement for the $100 statuette he had
offered the Notre-Dame Basilica, which the dictator obliged. The consul added that Teixeira was
interested in using the PCU to access the French-Canadian clergy's patronage. Nogueira was also
vexed by what he saw was Teixeira's vanity, which contrasted with the fact he was "hardly
literate" and only said "nonsense when he speaks." The man's potential for embarrassing the
consul was such that the latter once dissuaded Teixeira from accepting an invitation to be
interviewed by the CBC. Nogueira appealed for the Portuguese episcopate to send a priest to
Montreal in part to silence Teixeira.482

In December 1960, Fr. António Gonçalves Janeiro of the Lisbon Franciscan order arrived
in Montreal. At that point, the PCU was under new administration and had become a respected
largely Azorean lay organization, offering a variety of activities, including Sunday masses,
Portuguese liturgical feasts, and other religious services in the community. To the exasperation
of those who hoped for great deeds from the new priest, Janeiro proved to be a tremendous
nuisance. The new PCU director, Domingos R. Vieira, pleaded with Consul Fernando S.
Marques to intervene in what he described was Janeiro's "insane and insensate" campaign of
destruction and subjugation. Vieira accused the priest of being "fiercely committed to destroying
the PCU, publicly vilifying its directors, ridiculing the organization, taking over its only sources
of income, and trying to transform it into a submissive instrument of his hate and avarice." Most
egregious to Janeiro's flock was his rapaciousness, to the point of "transforming the pulpit... into
a scandalous flea market tribune, where... he makes commercial announcements paid by top
dollars." Vieira described various examples of Janeiro's cupidity, such as refusing in-kind gifts
from the PCU and scolding its members for not giving him cash instead. In another incident, the
priest tried to "violently" take possession of the proceeds from a PCU feast, which Gagnon
eventually managed to prevent. Vieira was convinced that Janeiro's behavior stemmed from the

482 Correspondence, Consul Nogueira, Manuel Teixeira, and PMFA, December 09, 1958 to April 11, 1959 (m.t.), PEA M194,
Colônia Portuguesa no Canadá, AHD.
fact that the PCU had introduced him to the community as a humble Franciscan, to whom the "vile obstacle of money would not come between his spiritual action and the Colony." Janeiro also tried to take over the local newspaper *Voz de Portugal*. After failing to do so, he began publishing a parish bulletin attacking the Portuguese ethnic press and drawing their sources of advertising revenue. He was also accused of being arrogant to his parishioners, and of constantly invoking his supposed friendship with Salazar and Cardinal Léger to legitimize his acts and threaten those who crossed him. Finally, Janeiro made a habit of commenting publically about his enemies' private lives; he was brazen enough to visit the Foreign Affairs Minister in Lisbon to denounce the supposed licentious conduct of the Vice-Consul in Montreal.

Portuguese diplomats feared the Canadian media might get word of the scandalous priest and hurt the community's reputation. Cardinal Léger too was concerned with the allegations against Janeiro and ordered an inquest into his activities. According to the Vice-Consul José M. C. de Melo, Léger decided to retain Janeiro for another month "in order to avoid the impression that he had ceded to pressure from the colony". During this period, Janeiro ramped up his attacks and nearly got into a physical confrontation with the PCU's executives. Following this incident, Léger decided to immediately oust the belligerent priest, who left for Portugal in July 1961. The following month Janeiro was back in Montreal threatening to resume his duties with the Portuguese congregation, in clear defiance of the archbishop's orders. At this point, the PCU warned Janeiro they would resort to violence if he showed up to say mass. This seemed to have scared the priest, since in September he moved to New Bedford, where he continued to write to Portuguese officials (including Salazar) complaining about the conduct of the Vice-Consul.

To replace the erratic priest, Cardinal Léger chose the French-Canadian Dominican Thomas Leblanc, who had lived for many years in a convent in Fátima and spoke Portuguese fluently. Unlike his predecessor, Leblanc was well liked in the community and made efforts to have Montreal's Archdiocese officially recognize the Portuguese congregation. Following Leblanc's requests, Léger inaugurated the Santa Cruz Mission in December 1963, as the canonical home of the Portuguese in Montreal's diocese; the mission would be housed in a former Jewish community centre in the increasingly Portuguese quarters of Le Plateau-Mont-

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483 Letter, D. R. Vieira, PCU, to Consul F. Maques, June 04, 1961 (m.t.), PEA 400, Acusação contra o Pe. A. G. Janeiro, AHD.
484 Ibid.
485 Letter, Vice-Consul Camilo de Melo, Montreal, to Chargé d'Affaires Luis Soares de Oliveira, Ottawa, August 20, 1961; letter, Fr. Janeiro, New Bedford, to PMFA, October 3, 1961, PEA 400, Acusação contra o Padre António Gonçalves Janeiro, AHD.
Royal.\textsuperscript{486} Under Leblanc, the Sta. Cruz Mission opened a St. Vincent de Paul Society branch, a Sunday school, and various youth programs; its lay board of directors was also given a $15,000 CDN loan to operate a parish centre.\textsuperscript{487} The French-Canadian priest also led the creation of a Portuguese Community Coordinating Committee in 1963, bringing together members of the two largest Portuguese organizations and newspapers in the city, along with a DCI representative and the \textit{Centre Social d'Aide aux Immigrants}. The committee proposed to offer social, moral, material and other services promoting the integration of Portuguese immigrants into Canadian society. Consul Marques attributed this civic triumph to the peaceful climate now prevailing in the community, after its warring leaders finally decided to work together for the benefit of Portuguese immigrants.\textsuperscript{488}

Ambassador Brazão communicated the positive developments to Minister Nogueira, commending the work of Cardinal Léger and Leblanc. However, he noted that the latter had not once sought the support of the Portuguese consulate in that city, "certainly following instructions from his superiors."\textsuperscript{489} Brazão believed that only a Portuguese priest could truly provide for the emigrants' needs, as he argued after visiting Montreal in 1963:

\begin{quote}
It is the priest who counsels, protects, and motivates them for the enormous difficulties they encounter, who ties them to the traditions of their distant country, who seeks to unite them for their mutual support. This is the job of the missionary more than it is of the consulate... It is also the only comfort that we can give those who come illuded by a goal that is far from their possibilities.\textsuperscript{490}
\end{quote}

In 1965, Brazão continued to make the case for his government to become involved with the Sta. Cruz Mission, given its growing importance in the community. In order to gain control of the parish centre, he suggested that Lisbon arrange for the sending of an assistant priest from Portugal.\textsuperscript{491} Minister Nogueira followed up on Brazão's request and contacted Cardinal Cerejeira's office, alerting Portugal's episcopacy to the fact that a large congregation in Quebec was at risk of losing its national characteristics. With the arrival of Fr. Fatela from Toronto that

\textsuperscript{486} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 145; Marques & Medeiros, 1980, 128.
\textsuperscript{487} Letter, Consul F. Marques to Ambassador E. Brazão, December 31, 1964, PEA 400, Inauguração pelo Cardeal Léger... AHD.
\textsuperscript{488} In his memoirs, the communist Jaime Monteiro described Consul Silva Marques as an honest man who occasionally met with the group of Montreal "anti-fascists" and congratulated them for their enriching community work. According to Monteiro, the consul "paid dearly" for his diplomacy by being transferred to Malawi (letter, Consul Marques to Amb. Brazão, March 4, 1963, PEA M400, Colônia Portuguesa Canadá - União Católica, AHD; Jaime Monteiro, Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association. 18 Anos de Luta Contra o Fascismo, 1977, in Monteiro, 2007, 82-85).
\textsuperscript{489} A communiqué circulated in Montreal in 1964 by a Portuguese Liberation Committee claimed that Leblanc had rejected a $1.255 CAD cheque from the Portuguese consul for his parish centre because he did not want to collaborate with PIDE (PEA M13b, Política Interna e Externa de Portugal. "Comunicado" do Chamado Comité de Libertação Portuguesa... Montreal, AHD).
\textsuperscript{490} Letter, Ambassador Brazão to PMFA, April 1, 1963 (m.t.), EEA M140, Canadá Emigração - Expediente Geral, AHD
\textsuperscript{491} Telegram, Ambassador Eduardo Brazão, Ottawa, to PMFA, January 21, 1965, ibid.
year, the conversation between Portugal's and Quebec's Catholic authorities regarding the sending of a missionary stopped. Fatela would soon become Sta. Cruz Mission's director, taking over for Leblanc. Under the new priest, the parish centre launched two Portuguese schools, a boy scouts troop, and Montreal's own Senhor Santo Cristo procession.

Regional festas, gendered laity, and transnational charity

The lively liturgical calendars of Portuguese communities in North America have been filled with annual religious events of various shapes and sizes, of different cultural meanings and organizational structures, and distinct regional attachments. Within this devotional diversity, there were some shared elements, such as the popular festas (fêtes), lay governance, and charity goals. While significant to understanding the ideological content of Portuguese ethnic identity, I will not focus on the symbolic aspects or formal details of these traditional celebrations and how they adapted to North American contexts, given the extensive scholarship available on that subject. Instead, I will examine their gendered community-building function and their role in shaping transnational charity and diasporic networks.

While eager to declare and perform their distinct Catholic identity in public, many participants looked forward to the festas not so much for devotional reasons but for their worldly entertainment, which often included picnics, banquets, dances, brass bands and sports competitions, along with profane recreations, like drinking, kissing, and the occasional brawl. They were also opportunities to bring family members together, renew friendship bonds, and make new acquaintances. This blend of devotional and social functions was common in the way people in Portugal engaged with their church. The same juxtaposition existed in parish community centres, which often attracted more people than most ethnic clubs, especially among Azoreans. However, this marriage between spiritual and worldly pursuits was not without tensions between the clergy and the laity. Furthermore, given the somewhat mystical and profane characteristics of lay religious festas, Portuguese priests were generally uneasy about their doctrinal propriety. As Stephen Cabral noted after studying Portuguese feasting in New Bedford:

492 Letter, Director-General of Political and Internal Affairs, PMFA, to the Cardinal-Patriarch of Lisbon's Secretary, January 27, 1965 (m.t.); and reply, March 8, 1965, PEA 400, Inauguração pelo Cardeal Léger da primeira igreja Portuguesa... AHID.
494 Miranda, 2010, 84.
"These rituals of status reversal enabled villagers to affirm their popular religious sentiment against the formalism of the Catholic Church. For one weekend, the festeiros publicly challenge the priest's authority and control over church activities." 495

The idiosyncratic rituals introduced by Portuguese and other Catholic groups complicated the relatively monolithic versions of Catholicism in North America. Irish Catholics in particular saw this as an injury to their hard-earned respectability in their Protestant dominated countries, and a challenge to their monopoly over the articulation of Catholic identity. Still, Portuguese clerics in the emigrant communities knew better than to upset their parishioners by standing in the way of their traditional rites, and quickly recognized the financial and political benefits that such large gatherings could bring them. Reluctantly or not, Portuguese priests facilitated these "unsavoury" manifestations of Catholic faith even if they did not share their parishioners' traditions. That was the case with the mainlander Alberto Cunha, who inaugurated the Azorean Senhor Santo Cristo dos Milagres (Holy Christ of Miracles) procession in Toronto the year he took over St. Mary's parish.

Specific to the island of São Miguel, the Senhor Santo Cristo procession is centered on the devotion to a wooden statue of Ecce Homo, whose legend claims is evidence of divine intervention during an earthquake that hit the island in the 18th century. The procession was introduced in North America by Micaelense immigrants who offered replicas of the statue to their local parishes. Since it was first celebrated in Toronto, in 1966, the Senhor Santo Cristo grew into a weekend-long program of street festivities involving outdoor dances, carnival rides, and food vendors, consistently drawing several thousand participants and onlookers from various parts of Canada, the United States, and Bermuda. In 1973, the Star reported the arrival of 25 buses with visitors from Fall River, who joined the 55,000 participants in that year's festa; the attendance record sits at about 90,000 people, in May 1974. 496 According to Ambassador Veiga, the event brought Fr. Cunha close to $20,000 every year (Figure 26). 497 Like other "respectable" Catholics, the Lisboner Ambassador Veiga, who avoided Cunha and his schemes, was uncomfortable with the "painful spectacle" offered by the Azorean faithful, with their passionate

495 Cabral, 1989, 35.
496 "Big Day for Portuguese 55,000 Attend Festival", Toronto Star, PP-TPL; Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 144.
and sometimes gory displays of devotion during the procession.\textsuperscript{498} Canadian politicians and bureaucrats cared less about ritual peculiarities and regional specificities. The former recognized their electoral potential and made sure to be seen marching alongside Cunha and other ethnic notables, while government immigration officials saw these large gatherings as "prime opportunities" to advertise their services and set up information booths.\textsuperscript{499}

While the \textit{Senhor Santo Cristo} festival attracted the largest crowds in the Portuguese communities of Toronto and Fall River, the most widespread Azorean religious festival was the \textit{Festa do Divino Espírito Santo} (Feast of the Holy Ghost). A highlight in the liturgical calendar of every Azorean island and emigrant community, the Holy Ghost is one of the oldest Portuguese celebrations in the United States, most common in New England and California, and less so in the newer settlements of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{500} Devoted to the cult of the 13th-century Queen of Portugal Elizabeth of Aragon, who was canonized in 1625 for her dedication to feeding the poor, the Holy Ghost was premised on the celebration of Christian charity. Part of its annual celebrations, which included various elaborate rituals throughout the year, was the gift of a free meal to the poor and the infirm. Formally independent from the Church, the Holy Ghost was organized by local lay fraternities known as Brotherhoods (\textit{Irmandades}), traditionally composed of men of different social classes, which performed the feast's rituals at a site called the Empire (\textit{Império}), typically a small ornate structure built for that purpose, or an adapted community hall.

Another significant Portuguese-American religious festival, celebrated in various fishing towns on the East coast, was the Blessing of the Fleet; the largest being held in the town of Gloucester. At the beginning of each fishing season, the Archbishop of Boston visited this coastal town and blessed the fishermen's ships, around which other festivities were organized. One of the highlights of the ceremony was the fishermen's procession from the Azorean parish Our Lady of Good Voyage, where they carried a statuette of Virgin Mary that had been blessed by Cardinal Cerejeira and brought to the United States by the White Fleet.\textsuperscript{501} In the 1950s, a

\textsuperscript{498} The word Veiga used was \textit{penoso}, which can also mean "penitent" or "contrite". However, in this case, the ambassador seemed to refer to the fervent displays of piety that typically occurred at this procession as reasons for embarrassment.

\textsuperscript{499} Memorandum, W. R. Petryshyn, Community Development Officer, Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, May 20, 1970, B229102, RG 29-59, Citizenship-Portuguese Community Annual Bazaar, AO.

\textsuperscript{500} Pap, 1981, 189.

\textsuperscript{501} In 1955, close to 5,000 Portuguese cod fishermen carried a similar statuette to the St. John the Baptist's cathedral in St. John's, Newfoundland, as a thank you gift to the people of that city ("Será imponente a festa da benção da frota portuguesa em Gloucester", \textit{Diário de Notícias}, June 6, 1958, 1, DN-UMASS).
large number of Portuguese-Americans from across New England gathered in Gloucester every year, along with hundreds of clerics, including Irish-American bishops. Though celebrated mostly by ethnic groups, the fact that this was an American-born ritual may explain why so many Irish-American clerics were willing to endorse it.

Though a minority in North America's total Portuguese population, Madeirans were quite visible in the public life of their immigrant communities. In fact, they organized one of its largest gatherings in North America, the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament in New Bedford. Founded by four immigrants in 1915, the feast grew into one of the largest public events in that city, and one of its few tourist attractions; in the mid-1970s, it attracted an average of 150,000 people every year and generated around $100,000, about half of which was profit. The three-day festival celebrated in August was originally associated with the Our Lady of Immaculate Conception parish. But over the years it became an increasingly secular and Americanized commercial affair, centering more on its social and entertainment value than on its spiritual function. This was particularly the case in the postwar period, when more immigrant descendants took over its organizational duties and began catering to non-Portuguese patrons. The American-born generations introduced American staples such as carnival rides, parades with drum and bugle music, baton twirlers and "gaily-clad" majorettes, pizzas, hot dogs, and other mass produced foods competing with the traditional linguiça, lupine beans, and grilled codfish (Figure 27).

In the mid-1950s, the organizers used the feast's earnings to buy half a city block and build its permanent grounds: the Madeira Field. This investment marked a clear shift in the feast's orientation, which had previously donated all its earnings to the parish and to charitable institutions in Madeira. This strained relations between the lay organizers and the parish priests, the latter aggrieved by the lower percentage of the profits (though increasing total amounts) apportioned to the church, which depended on the feast's donations to remain solvent. Displeased by the clergy's attempts at interfering in the feast's business, the organizers distanced themselves from the Church even further, keeping to a merely formal association. As a result of this rift, Fr. Branco, a mainlander, threw his parish support behind another religious festival, the Senhor da Pedra (Lord of the Stone), revived in 1959 by Micaelense refugees recently arrived in New

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502 Festival program, May 15, 1950, PEA 2 M159, Col. Port. Luso-Americana... Festas Gloucester - Benção Frota Pesca, AHD.
504 Clippings, Standard Times, New Bedford, August 1 & 3, 1959, PEA M181, Feast of the Blessed Sacramento, AHD.
Bedford. According to some, the procession was originally motivated by a parochial rivalry between Vila Franca do Campo - São Miguel's previous capital before it was destroyed by an earthquake in the 16th century - and Ponta Delgada with its larger Senhor Santo Cristo procession.\footnote{Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 144; Pap, 1981, 197-198.} Branco eventually became one of Senhor da Pedra's chief organizers in New Bedford, preserving its devotional characteristics and pecuniary duties to the Church, while fanning its rivalry with the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament.\footnote{For more on the rivalry between New Bedford's Azorean Senhor da Pedra procession and the Madeiran Feast of the Blessed Sacrament see Cabral, 1989.}

The volunteer work that went into organizing these large events also made them important community building moments. As Cabral explained: "The collection of donations, the borrowing and lending of tools or cooking utensils, the purchasing of supplies, the decoration of the grounds, the solicitation of additional labor or financial backing" all contributed to the formation of ethno-regional bonds in the Portuguese communities.\footnote{Cabral, 1989, 36 & 133.} This process, however, was heavily gendered. For instance, membership in the Clube Madeirense S.S. Sacramento, which assumed the organization of the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament, the Madeiran Day, and the St. John's Night Feast in 1953, was exclusive to male heads of family (regardless of social class) as long as they were Madeiran-born or had a Madeiran father; the sons of Madeiran women and non-Madeiran men were excluded. This gender discrimination was reflected in the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament's annual parade, where until 1976 women marched behind the men.\footnote{Ibid., 47, 50, 117.}

Despite being premised on the benevolent deeds of a powerful woman, the Feast of the Holy Ghost's chief sponsors and organizers were also male heads of families. Assisted by a troop of aids, usually children, these men were responsible for covering about half of the expenses involved in running the festival - the rest being covered by the Brotherhoods - and were in turn given various accolades. Women played an essential part in the organization of these festivities, preparing food, crafting decorations and costumes, running bazaars and other fundraisers, to name just a few. However, their contributions were considered auxiliary to the more central ritualized role of the "virtuous" men. The only time women were individually honoured was in the crowning of the Holy Ghost's Queen and her maids of honour, which was usually reserved to young Azorean girls - one of the many innovations that immigrants made to the Holy Ghost
This Americanization of homeland traditions was another issue of contention for Portuguese priests, like Manuel Rocha, who complained to Ambassador Fernandes about the introduction of queens and majorettes to the Holy Ghost's cast, "with those dresses... far from 'liturgical' and the majorettes with their legs in the buff, bouncing, in front of the bands."

Still, Catholic parishes and charities were more accepting of women's leadership and community work than the male-dominated secular ethnic associations. This was consistent with women's gender-prescribed role as care providers and supposed innate nurturing skills. Still, women did contribute to the survival and development of secular clubs through their auxiliary committees, organizing fundraising events and other family-oriented activities that helped recruit new members and pay for the club's programs. This was not unique to the Portuguese, as most ethnic communities in North America maintained a parallel yet crucial female civic life, much of which was related to charity work.

While the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament became a largely commercial enterprise, the Madeiran Day maintained its traditional charitable duties. Launched in 1934, at the height of the Great Depression, by a number of New England Madeiran organizations answering a call for help from an orphanage in Funchal, the Madeiran Day set out to raise donations to support charitable institutions in the islands. Starting as a small community picnic in New Bedford, the event grew into a larger annual festival celebrated across New England and California. Curiously, donations rose quickly.

<table>
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<th>Madeiran Day total donations (USD) per year, 1934-1972</th>
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**Graph 13.** Source: Madeiran Day annual booklets, 1951, 1953, 1955-58, PEA M183, Col. Port. "Dia Madeirense", AHD. Values for 1959-66, 1969, are missing; though we know the total donations for 1959-66 was $41,500 (an average of $5187 per year).

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510 Some of the other innovations included the introduction of elaborate parades, with flashy banners and flags, marching bands, waving politicians and community notables, and other typical American features. According to João Leal (2009, 136): "Underlying this series of changes is the desire to add a more dramatic sense of spectacle to the Império processions."

511 Letter, Fr. Rocha to Amb. Fernandes, November 7, 1959, PEA M182, Our Lady of Fatima Rectory, Ludlow, AHD.

512 As we will discuss in the next chapter, Portuguese-American mutual aid societies were predominantly male. However, there were a few all-women organizations. The largest and most prestigious was the Portuguese Society of Queen Saint Elizabeth (Sociedade Portuguesa Rainha Santa Isabel), founded in 1901 in Oakland, California; in 1960, it had close to 14,000 members and 158 lodges. Like its male equivalents, this mutual aid society offered social insurance to its members and organized various charitable activities (Pap, 1981, 172).

513 For more on this, see Paula J. Draper and Janice B. Karlinsky, "Abraham's Daughters: Women, Charity and Power in the Canadian Jewish Community", in Burnet (ed.), 1986; and Harzig, 1997.

514 Not to be confused with the July 1st holiday celebrated by the Madeiran autonomous government since 1976.
after 1941 (the year the United States entered the Second World War) and remained high during the war, a time when Americans were being urged to invest their earnings in government bonds, and displays of "foreignness" and "dual-loyalty" were discouraged. At this point, public celebrations of ethnic identity were interrupted, or hidden, yet faith and devotion were private matters, pertaining to the realm of personal beliefs, which could be shared and celebrated away from the gaze of mainstream nativists. During the war, Portuguese priests continued to celebrate the traditional rites of their national and regional flocks inside their parishes and in other private settings. Ironically, patriotic propaganda promoting public-spiritedness among American citizens and urging them to support their country’s war effort may have also inspired Madeiran-Americans to be more altruistic towards their own nonaligned homeland.

By 1967, Madeiran Day organizers had sent donations worth over $230,000 USD (including in-kind gifts like clothing, an X-Ray machine, and a refrigerating unit) to hospitals, sanatoriums, orphanages, colleges and trade schools, seminaries, St. Vincent de Paul Society branches, and other institutions.515 While it subsidized religious organizations in Madeira, the festival was not associated with the Church and was arguably profane - the majority of donations were raised at the beer tent. Women raised another large portion of the donations through auctions, bazaars, picnics, banquets, dances, concerts, and other such paid activities.

Similar transnational charity "Days" existed for different Azorean islands, and specific towns in the northern mainland, which altogether sent "millions of dollars" in cash and in-kind donations to Portugal.516 This was disconcerting for some Portuguese officials. For instance, in 1950, Armando C. de Medeiros, an Azorean deputy at the National Assembly in Lisbon, called Salazar’s attention to the islands’ deep poverty and informed the dictator about the large donations of second-hand clothing arriving from the United States (37,000 bags that year), and how essential they were for most Azoreans. He added: "'Were it not for America, we would have nothing to wear': one hears this said frequently. What such a lament could produce in the political and social arenas, Your Excellency can guess better than anyone else."517

Portuguese immigrants were also quick to send humanitarian aid to their homeland in moments of crisis, such as the aftermath of natural disasters. The most generous donations

usually came from the wealthy communities of California, like the $43,000 USD sent to the Capelinhos volcano’s victims in 1958; or the $70,000 USD to the victims of the São Jorge earthquake in 1964. By contrast, a public petition by Rhode Island's Portuguese parishes was only able to raise $2,800 for the Capelinhos' victims (although there were other small petitions across New England). 518 Portuguese newcomer settlements also sent relief funds to the mainland. Lisboners affected by the massive floods of 1967 received three tons of clothing from their fellow Portuguese in New Jersey and New York, along with $18,000 CAD from those in Ontario. 519 Non-profit institutions in Portugal sometimes pleaded with the emigrant communities through their diplomatic representatives to help finance civic projects, as was the case with the National Secretariat for the Christ the King Monument. 520 However, these requests did not seem to muster the good will that immigrants reserved for their own community-run charitable initiatives. 521 To facilitate this transnational charity, Portuguese government officials waived taxes on humanitarian aid and encouraged emigrants to channel their donations through the regime's own relief agencies. 522 But some feared the government would misappropriate their contributions and preferred to channel them through international relief organizations, like Caritas and Oxfam, or have their own charity committees distribute their gifts directly to families in Portugal, which sometimes delayed the process. 523

Conclusion

Catholic devotion and religious identity were two of the main concerns of Portuguese immigrants from the moment they settled in North America. The Estado Novo and the Catholic

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519 The latter was raised by a committee chaired by Fr. Cunha, and sponsored by Toronto's Archbishop and various Canadian politicians (letter, Consul Alexandre Eduardo Lencastre da Veiga, New York, to Ambassador Garin, January 3, 1968, M51, Caso de transporte de roupas para victimas de inundações em Lisboa, AHD; letter, Alberto Cunha, Canadian Flood Relief for Portugal chairman, to Oxfam Canada, May ?, 1968, MG28-I270, Portugal flood relief, NAC).
520 The Cristo-Rei monument is a large-scale replica of Rio de Janeiro's colossal Christ the Redeemer statue, standing on the southern shore of the Tagus river overlooking the city of Lisbon. Construction began in 1959 and finished in 1969. The statue, which was built by the Portuguese Catholic Church with the Estado Novo's support, as a gift to God for having spared Portugal from the devastation of the Second World War.
523 Letter, Manuel Freitas, Director, "Cabrilho" Portuguese Radio Programs, San Jose, to António Salazar, April 2, 1964, AOS/CO/?PC-69, Pt. 3, 1964-6 Angariação de Fundos pelo Cabrilho Portuguese Radio Programs... ANTT; letter, Consul Ribeiro da Silva, San Francisco, to Ambassador Garin, January 13, 1965, PEA M251, Comunidade Portuguesa (Geral), AHD.
Church in Portugal understood the importance that religion had for preserving the emigrants' national identities in the face of assimilationist pressures from Protestant and Irish/French Catholic societies. Homeland diplomats and emigration officials also recognized the priests' work on the ground as essential for guaranteeing the social and spiritual welfare of emigrant families, many of whom dealt with dramatic living and working conditions. Despite their best efforts to organize an international system capable of addressing the diaspora's pastoral and social needs, the lack of Portuguese missionaries willing to preach in North America made this a difficult task. At the same time, it was this shortage of Portuguese clerics that empowered the existing migrant priests. Plus, the fact that the emigrant settlements were highly concentrated and fairly close to each other meant that these priests had the ear of large Portuguese congregations. Some priests were keen to sway their parishioners to their personal agendas and political views. In most cases, this meant fostering the immigrants' patriotism towards their homeland, their self-identification as subjects of the Portuguese empire, and mustering their Cold War support for the anti-communist dictatorship. Their hyper-nationalism further motivated the regime to subsidize and give logistical support to these clerics and their missions. However, this alliance could sometimes become burdensome and counter-productive, as many of these clergymen had their own ambitions and sometimes controversial personalities, which jeopardized the diplomats' plans and damaged the ethnic group's reputation.

The church remained the centre of community life for many Portuguese immigrants, especially Azoreans, who were more involved in religious associations than mainlanders. But the Catholic Church in North America lacked the overwhelming authority it had in Portugal. In the immigrant context, the laity's support was crucial for priests to carry on their missions and achieve their goals, which meant parishioners had a greater say in the running of their church activities and rites. This gave rise to influential lay organizations and community leaders, who mixed their religious activities with more secular social and cultural initiatives. Still, their bottom-up Catholic organization and advocacy counted with the top-down support of homeland government officials, who pulled many diplomatic strings to make their wishes come true; even when the devotional practices of peasants and fishermen seemed unsavory to urban diplomats and "respectable" Irish/French Catholics.

Judging from the sustained Catholic faith of Portuguese immigrants and their descendants in North America, who continue to frequent their national parishes, engage in its religious
celebrations, and enroll in Catholic schools in high numbers, efforts to prevent their spiritual and cultural assimilation into mainstream North American societies were largely successful. This had been the case even during the decades of intense "Americanization" following the United States' immigration shut down. As suggested by the Madeiran case, it is clear that ethnic communities did not forego all attachments to their homeland during this period, and maintained important transnational connections, as reflected in their large charitable remittances.

While Catholic priests bolstered loyalty for Portugal's nationalist and imperialist government among immigrants from all regions of the country, they did not necessarily consolidate regional solidarities or coalesce one shared national identity, as was the case with the Italians.524 Certainly, Portuguese of various backgrounds collaborated in their parishes and even in regionally based festas, processions, charity drives and humanitarian relief campaigns. Still, religion became a bastion of Azorean pride and identity in the mainlander dominated Portuguese ethnic communities and national diaspora, eventually becoming a base for the Azorean sovereignty movement after 1974, as we will discuss in chapter eight.

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524 Despite having strong regional identities, Portuguese immigrants, unlike the Italians, already had an historical and largely unquestioned sense of national identity before migrating to North America; that national solidarity, of course, waivered over time and across regional backgrounds. For more on the Italian case, see Zucchi, 1988.
Fig. 22 - Screen caption from the 1952 Warner Bros. film *The Miracle of Our Lady of Fatima,* directed by John Brahm, in which a Portuguese republican addresses the revolutionary crowd. Its trailer announced: "Yes, they called it a crime so they could conceal their own crimes. They called it a lie so they could sell their lies. But all the forces of darkness couldn't smother the flames of this enduring story" (trailer in, url: www.tcm.com/mediaroom/video/349847/Miracle-of-Our-Lady-of-Fatima-The-Original-Trailer-.html).

Fig. 23 - Ambassador Vasco V. Garin pins the Order of Prince Henry's medal on Monsignor Augusto L. Furtado's chest. Consul Francis Carreiro of Fall River (on the right), acted as master of ceremonies at the event held at Washington D.C.'s Lincoln Park. Over 800 people attended the ceremony in appreciation for the founder of Somerset's St. John of God parish (photo published in the cover of the *Diário de Notícias* of May 25, 1964, DN-UMASS.)

Fig. 24 - Archbishop Humberto Sousa Medeiros (right) receives the Great Cross of the Portuguese Order of Christ from Ambassador João Hall Themido (left) on April 1972, at Boston's Harvard Club (photo published in the cover of the *Diário de Notícias* of April 19, 1972, DN-UMASS).
Fig. 25 - Portuguese Catholic congregation at the Notre-Dame Basilica in Montreal, c. 1958. Manuel Teixeira stands with arms crossed, second from the right, bottom row (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/003 [03], ASC17696).

Fig. 26 - Toronto's St. Mary's Catholic Church's *Senhor Santo Cristo* procession, marching down Bathurst St., May, 1970. Photo by Dave Cooper for the *Toronto Telegram* (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC08248).

Fig. 27 - Feast of the Blessed Sacrament parade in New Bedford, 1965 (photo published in the *Diário de Notícias*, July 28, 1966, 6, DN-UMASS).
4. MAKING CIVIL SOCIETIES: SECULAR FRATERNITIES AND ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS, 1950s-60s

“[T]he Portuguese working class is not divided. Division never existed simply because they were never agents of the community identification as such.”
Rev. Eduardo San-Bento Couto, keynote address, Portuguese Interagency Network conference, May 8, 1982. 525

Portuguese immigrants have had a remarkable capacity for organization, voluntarism, and cooperation since the early decades of settlement in the United States, where they joined labour unions, created mutual aid fraternities, newspapers, and other secular institutions, around which their Portuguese-American identities were formed. Much of this civic momentum withered after the immigration restrictions of the 1920s and the ensuing emphasis on Americanization. Still, by the time mass migration from Portugal resumed in the 1960s, there were still enough institutions and agents of Portuguese-American public life available for these newcomers to access and revitalize. In Canada, however, such pre-existing structures and social capital were non-existent and postwar immigrants had to build their community from the ground. This chapter examines the formation of Portuguese civil societies in the United States and Canada in the postwar period, paying particular attention to the different social dynamics in each context.

In the 1960s and '70s, the Portuguese became the dominant group in many of the inner-city neighbourhoods where they settled. Portuguese immigrants were often credited with transforming their once "squalid ghettos" into thriving commercial districts, whose restaurants, bakeries, cafés and other ethnic businesses attracted people from across the city. These neighbourhoods became important markets for Portuguese products, and kept commercial ties with homeland companies and state officials. In clear contrast with Portugal's stifled civil society, these communities also hosted various associations and secular civic spaces, which increased their profile as ethnic constituencies in North America's increasingly multiculturalist polities. However, as is often emphasized in the literature, working-class immigrants prioritized economic concerns over civic and political ones. Organizational efforts were usually left to a minority of educated, bilingual, middle-class businessmen and professionals, who arrived with the mass of immigrant workers; or in the case of the United States, to the older influential immigrants and their descendants with longstanding commercial and political interests in

Portuguese-American communities. Still, after their initial settlement period, postwar immigrant men began joining existing community clubs in greater numbers and forming new ones, reinforcing the working-class masculinity of these ethnic spaces. By that point, their communities' civil societies were headed by self-appointed leaders, who cemented their positions by forging relationships with local politicians, host government officials, and Portuguese diplomats, who in turn exercised considerable influence over community affairs. However, not all of these men were cultural or economic "elites", as the common perception goes, especially in Canada where there were fewer upper-class immigrants.

Brettell used Robert Paine's terminology of *patrons* and *brokers* to describe how *ethnic entrepreneurs* distributed cultural, economic, and political resources among Portuguese immigrants in Toronto: the *patron* "recruit[ing] followers by his power to dispense favors", and the *broker* being "a middleman attracting followers who believe him able to influence the persons who control the favors."\(^{526}\) According to Brettell, what characterizes the *ethnic entrepreneur* is the combination of both roles in one individual: "patrons assume a broker role in order to buttress their positions as patrons." By employing "the idiom of ethnicity to maintain a degree of ethnic isolation and to enhance identification with the Portuguese nation", she adds, these middlemen were both "a communication line and a barrier to communication."\(^{527}\) In other words, *ethnic entrepreneurs* maintained the linguistic and cultural boundaries separating immigrants from the mainstream society in order to guarantee their positions of influence. For Brettell, one clear example of this duality was the travel agent, who was both "an entrepreneurial patron building up a clientele" and "a broker between the larger Canadian society and with the Portuguese world overseas."\(^{528}\) While she broached the subject of transnational entrepreneurship in this example, Brettell's analyses did not take into account the relationship between ethnic *brokers* and homeland diplomatic *patrons*, which we will discuss in this chapter.

The emigrants' civic energy in North America contrasted with Portugal's stifled civil society under the *Estado Novo*. In its typical ambivalent fashion, the regime empowered the civic and political engagement of its expatriates in their host countries, especially the upper-class ethnic leaders, in order to steer them along the dictatorship's interests. This chapter will examine the efforts of Portuguese diplomats to guide the development of these ethnic civil societies;

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527 Murphy, 1964, 849, cit. in Brettell, 1977, 172-173.
particularly their attempts to unite Portuguese communities and increase their political leverage in their host countries.

**Working-class organizations: labour unions, mutual aid societies, ethnic fraternities and sports clubs**

Unlike postwar newcomers in Canada, Portuguese-Americans had a history of labour organization and a living memory of large strike actions and their own union champions. Portuguese men and women, from both the mainland and the islands, had been involved in New England's labour movement as both rank-and-file and union leaders prior to the Second World War. But despite making up the majority of the workforce, Portuguese and other unskilled immigrant workers were neglected by mainstream textile unions. As a result, they tended to organize in smaller, more radical unions, which included a few anarcho-syndicalists and other experienced labour organizers exiled from mainland Portugal. In the 1930s, new labour laws introduced under President Frank D. Roosevelt's New Deal stimulated union membership. This period saw the emergence of a new generation of Portuguese-American labour leaders, like the Micaelense Mariano S. Bishop, who in 1934 led Fall River's textile workers into what is considered the largest labour strike in American history, involving close to 400,000 workers across many states. In the aftermath of the war, a long process of labour "deradicalization" ensued in the United States, first with the introduction of the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act, followed by Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-communist purges, and culminating in the merging of the leftist Congress of Industrial Organizations with the conservative American Federation of Labour in 1955. This was a triumph for the conservative faction within the American labour movement, which was traditionally anti-socialist and anti-immigration. Furthermore, the 1952 Immigration Act gave the American government legal means to deport whomever they considered to be a "subversive alien". Eula Mendes, a former member of the American Communist Party who had helped organize Portuguese workers in the large New Bedford strike of 1928, was deported to Portugal in 1953, where she had no family left. As she later recalled: "My arrest had an effect of creating a lot of fear amongst a lot of Portuguese

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people who were not citizens.\textsuperscript{530}

Another important postwar transformation in the United States was the economic shift away from manufacturing and towards service industries, which raised the demand for qualified workers. By the 1960s, the temporary boost provided by wartime industrial demand was over, and some New England cities returned to their previous depressed state. In New Bedford and Fall River, unemployment remained high, while per capita income was among the lowest in the country;\textsuperscript{531} an ignoble record matched by its very low schooling rates.\textsuperscript{532} However, these low educational levels, combined with the abundant supply of unskilled immigrant workers, kept labour costs down, thus delaying the shift away from manufacturing in these cities. Because of this, there were still enough unskilled jobs to attract newcomers to the "Portuguese Archipelago". Other pockets of manufacturing also existed in the Boston suburbs of Somerville and Cambridge, where a reasonable number of jobs in electronic equipment factories were available for cheap Portuguese immigrant labour.\textsuperscript{533}

While work was seasonal and wages low (average $2.71 per hour in Fall River in 1971), most rural immigrants considered this an improvement from their situation in Portugal. Unsurprisingly, women made up the majority of the garment industry's labour force (69\% in Fall River in 1971), since needlework was considered female work and therefore assigned a lower wage. Portuguese men had more employment opportunities but they were largely concentrated in construction and factory work. Jobs in construction became more widely available at the end of the 1950s, when large road building projects started in southern New England. Despite being a seasonal occupation highly sensitive to economic fluctuations, construction offered good wages for manual workers and many opportunities for advancement through its skilled trades, or by starting subcontracting businesses.\textsuperscript{534} Even those workers with no previous construction

\textsuperscript{530} One of the radical leaders of the 1928 New Bedford strike was deported to Portugal and later died en route to the Tarrafal prison camp. As for Mendes, she was eventually granted asylum in Poland (Eula Mendes, interviewed by Penn Reeve and Jack Stauder, July 2-3, 1986, cit. in Reeve, 2009, 353).

\textsuperscript{531} In 1969, Fall River had the second lowest median annual household income in Massachusetts, with $8,289 (compared to $10,835 in the rest of the state). In 1971, 10.8\% of all Fall River families earned an income below the poverty line (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973, Vol. 23, 227, and 1972, 4, cit. in Gilbert, 1989, 93).

\textsuperscript{532} In 1958, New Bedford's and Fall River's population had the lowest median number of school years of any American city with 10,000 people or more (Gilbert, 1989, 95). In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, 60\% of Portuguese-born residents over the age of 25 who landed in the U.S. between 1970-80 had 5 years of schooling or less (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1984: Table 196-A, cit. in Maria Sá Pereira, A Posição Socioeconómica dos Imigrantes Portugueses e seus Descendentes nos Estados de Massachusetts e Rhode Island (U.S.A.), 1985, 34).


\textsuperscript{534} Gilbert, 1989, 114.
experience were familiar with seasonal, outdoor, physically strenuous work, and saw a good fit in this industry. In Newark, where earlier industries disappeared over time, the southern area of the Ironbound district, where most Portuguese immigrants settled, continued to host a significant industrial complex capable of attracting new factories after the war. In the 1960s, the adjacent Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine Terminal, one of the busiest cargo ports in the United States, became another large employer. The Portuguese, who became the dominant ethnic group in the Ironbound during this period, were able to find employment close to their homes and soon became one of the most affluent ethnic groups in Newark.

The same shift towards a service-based economy also occurred in Canada, although its rapid economic development generated a large demand for unskilled labour in the construction industry. In Toronto, a great number of unskilled workers were needed to build the necessary infrastructures for the city's new role as Canada's chief financial centre, including the suburban residences where its expanding population would live. Montreal too launched its own large construction projects driven by the 1960s Quiet Revolution in Quebec that modernized various aspects of the province. As one of the last groups of unskilled workers to settle in Canada, the Portuguese were ready to grab hold of these construction jobs, particularly in the immigrant dominated and poorly unionized residential construction, where they competed with other immigrant groups, especially the Italians, who were the dominant workforce in this sector. Portuguese immigrant women were largely restricted to working in factories, janitorial work, and other low paid manual labour. In a growing service economy, where more office buildings were built, and more middle-class women worked outside their homes, cleaning offices and private residences became one of the few expanding unskilled occupations available to these immigrants. Cleaning jobs were also compatible with their homemaking responsibilities; because office cleaning was done at night, mothers could leave their children at home with their fathers who returned from work in the evening. Because of its flexible and cash-based nature, women could make decent incomes cleaning private residences and still maintain some independence.

537 There were important regional qualifications within the construction and janitorial occupational niches. Grace Anderson (1974), who studied the role of kinship ties in developing such employment niches among the Portuguese in Toronto, noted that construction jobs were primarily held by mainlanders, while Azoreans prevailed in janitorial work. This resulted from the immigrants' aggregate use of informal "networks of contact" when looking for jobs, which, she argued, narrowed their employment opportunities to those labour sectors already occupied by friends and relatives. In some cases, this specialization led to what she called mobility "traps", or jobs that offered no opportunities for advancing into higher skilled positions, as was the case with janitorial work. As a consequence of this occupational narrowing, mainlanders in Toronto availed themselves of a
Portuguese workers in Canada were largely absent from labour unions until the late 1970s. Scholars have traditionally attributed this disconnect to their rural and political background, and sojourning mentality. While these factors certainly contributed to their low unionization rates, another important reason was the nature of the construction and cleaning industries themselves. As Iacovetta explained, residential construction workers were difficult to organize due to the industry's "profusion of scattered sites and tiny subcontracting firms, highly seasonal and irregular employment patterns, and the ever-shifting work force dominated by low-skilled newcomers." In fact, the absence of union dues and closed shops was a factor attracting immigrants to that sector. Organizing the janitorial workforce was equally difficult. Domestic cleaning was nearly impossible to unionize because of its isolated and informal nature, while building cleaners had to contend with the common practice of contracting out jobs to private companies without observing successor rights, allowing contractors to free themselves from concessions previously made through collective bargaining.

A popular alternative to labour unions among Portuguese workers in North America was the ethnic fraternities. As with other immigrant groups, mutual aid societies were one of the earliest forms of Portuguese collective organization in the United States. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, when state welfare programs were unavailable, immigrants had to rely on traditional mutual aid strategies in order to guarantee some financial protection in the event of unemployment, sickness, or death. Their multiple lodges also became important social spaces for fellow nationals seeking companionship and emotional support, and those looking to exchange news and information in their native language. At their annual conventions, lodge representatives from around the United States shared their local experiences and expectations with their distant peers. With time, these meetings took on more pomp and pageantry, instilling a sense of ethnic pride in their members; they also began offering recreational activities and festivities based on homeland cultural practices in order to attract new members and raise funds.

wider diversity of trades within construction, accessed the benefits of joining trade unions, and were ultimately able to accumulate greater wealth than their Azorean counterparts. In terms of janitorial work, the general rule was for Azorean women to work in lower-paid yet more steady building cleaning, while mainlanders were concentrated in higher-paid yet more irregular domestic cleaning.

538 Franca Iacovetta, Such Hardworking People: Italian Immigrants in Postwar Toronto, 1992, 158.
540 Bodnar, 1985, 121. While present in the Azores and Madeira, mutual aid societies were most popular in the mainland, where they could span various towns and comprise thousands of members. When the dictatorship effectively banned the freedom of association in 1933, close to 570,000 Portuguese were members of a mutual aid society (Pap, 1981, 166-167).
for their endowments. For all these reasons, these working-class fraternities helped develop and disseminate Portuguese-American identity across the United States.

The first Portuguese mutual aid society in the United States, founded in New Orleans, dates back to 1847. This was followed by Boston's Portuguese Benefit Society in 1866, and the Portuguese Benefit Association of California in 1868. In a pattern that would be repeated throughout the history of Portuguese-American fraternities, rival societies were formed shortly after these two were created. Since then, a long list of mutual aid societies appeared throughout the country, some of them with lodges in various states. This movement was particularly strong in California, where the largest Portuguese fraternities were based. For instance, the Portuguese Union of the State of California, founded in San Leandro in 1880, had 150 lodges in 1918. The number of mutual aid societies on the East coast was not as high but still significant. In New England alone, there were 35 such fraternities (including lodges) in 1912. Many of them, however, did not survive the Depression or wartime Americanization.

The only multistate mutual aid society to remain open on the East coast after the war was the Portuguese Continental Union (UPC), founded in 1925 by a group of continentais (mainlanders) in Plymouth and Cambridge as an offshoot of the San Leandro fraternity. Originally accepting only mainlanders, the UPC opened its membership to Azoreans and Madeirans in 1931, and to Cape Verdeans in 1959. By 1970, the UPC was headquartered in a large building in downtown Boston and connected 68 lodges across Massachusetts (23), New York (9), Connecticut (7), Pennsylvania (7), New Jersey (6), Rhode Island (5), New Hampshire (1) and Ontario (1); altogether, it had 7,540 members and over $1.5 million in assets. For some time, the UPC even tried to open a lodge in Lisbon to serve those members who had returned to Portugal.

With extensive membership and capital, the UPC was one of the most influential Portuguese-American organizations in the postwar period, commanding considerable attention from American and Portuguese government officials. However, the outwardly cordial relations between Portuguese diplomats and the UPC's executives hid underlining political tensions.

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541 Williams, 2007, 165.
Aníbal Silva Branco, the UPC's secretary-general (1934-68) and former chancellor in the Portuguese consulate in Boston, endorsed Gen. Norton de Matos' presidential campaign in 1949, during which he voiced his pro-democratic criticism of Salazar's dictatorship. Still, Branco's prominent position in the community guaranteed him an invitation to any event organized by the *Estado Novo*'s diplomats. The Portuguese ambassador was also a regular guest at UPC functions, despite reservations from some of his staff. For example, in 1950, the Consul in Boston counseled newly arrived Ambassador Luis Fernandes ahead of the UPC's 25th anniversary celebrations to "keep a certain distance" from its founders, since they were "known for being frankly hostile to the current situation in Portugal, and even considered to be communists." This ideological dissonance, however, was not reason enough for the ambassador to forsake the UPC. Not only did Fernandes attend the event, he praised the organization and its founders' for their benevolent services to Portuguese immigrants.

Ethnically based mutual aid societies started losing relevance in the postwar period as the American state welfare system expanded, gradually removing incentives for workers to join private social insurance fraternities. Since the 1950s, the UPC's leaders had a difficult time recruiting new members; in fact, after 1963, its total membership started decreasing. To strengthen its position in this new context, the UPC merged with California's Portuguese Benefit Association in 1957, creating the Luso-American Fraternal Federation/ United National Life Insurance Society, which became the largest Portuguese-American organization; in 1968, it counted close to 14,000 members and over $5 million in assets. Despite the merger, the UPC, which continued operating on the East coast, continued to lose members (though its capital holdings kept growing) reflecting its failure to connect with postwar newcomers.

Most Portuguese fraternities were created to serve particular regional groups and were animated by parochial rivalries. Even within the larger regional camps, divided among mainlanders, Azoreans, Madeirans, and Cape Verdeans, there were rifts based on island and

545 Gen. Norton de Matos and his Movement of Democratic Unity (*Movimento de União Democrática*) withdrew their bid after the *Estado Novo* refused them the freedom to issue political propaganda along with their ability to scrutinize the ballot count, after which the regime's candidate Marshal Óscar Carmona was acclaimed President for his fourth consecutive mandate.

546 Various correspondence and news clippings, 1950 (m.t.). AHD 1950 Visita de Luiz Fernandes á União Portuguesa Continental Boston PEA 159.

547 UPC's Executive & Annual reports, 1955, 1965-72, PEA M181, Colónia Português... Portuguese Continental Union; M20 União Portuguesa Continental - Relatórios Anuais; PEA M333, Port. Cont. Union; M45, União Portuguesa Continental, AHD.

548 The LAFF was structured as an ethnic fraternity, while the UNLIS was a modern-styled life insurance company. Both organizations shared a main office in Dublin, California.

hometown origins.\textsuperscript{550} These rivalries dominated the civic life of pre- and postwar Portuguese communities, especially during their formative years. For example, in Toronto, most of the early secular organizations were founded by mainlanders and Madeirans; Azoreans were actively involved in parishes and other religious organizations but did not create their own secular clubs until the 1970s. But even at that point, co-islanders saw the need to create separate clubs, like the Fatherland Love (Amor da Pátria) and the Atlantic Wings (Asas do Atlântico), both founded by Azoreans from Pico and Faial in 1971 and 1973; or the Sport Club Angrense and the Sport Club Lusitania, founded in 1974 and 1976 by Terceira island immigrants.\textsuperscript{551} Postwar immigrants in the United States rekindled these parochial divisions; although, as other scholars have noted, newcomers tended to have a more developed sense of shared nationality than their predecessors. The intensity of these regional rivalries waned in succeeding generations of white Portuguese descendants, who either entirely renounced their ancestors' national or ethnic identity, or associated with a more comprehensive (though not completely inclusive) Portuguese-American or -Canadian identity.\textsuperscript{552}

As Pap noted, "[w]hat new Portuguese immigrants gradually adapt to is not really American culture, but Portuguese-American culture;"\textsuperscript{553} or as Conzen would say, newcomers to the United States reproduced the "localized" Portuguese-American "way of doing things". However, this welcoming process was riddled with tensions between pre- and postwar generations, which competed for the same scarce jobs. Tensions in Fall River and New Bedford had traditionally been strongest between Portuguese and French-Canadians, but after the first became the dominant ethnic group, their hostility turned towards those recently arrived from their ancestral homeland. Older immigrants and their descendants begrudged what they perceived were the excessive facilities offered to newcomers, who were provided with housing and jobs by their sponsoring relatives, along with government benefits. The older generations contrasted this with their individual and family experiences in a more austere and inhospitable American society. Portuguese-Americans also resented the fact that newcomers did not face the same assimilationist pressures as they had, as workplaces, businesses, social agencies and even mainstream newspapers began catering to Portuguese speakers.\textsuperscript{554}

\textsuperscript{550} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 160-161; Pap, 1981, 156-162.
\textsuperscript{552} Rogers, 1974; Williams, 2007, 114.
\textsuperscript{553} Pap, 1981, 164.
\textsuperscript{554} Ibid., 104-146, 117.
While causing real psychological and sometimes bodily harm, the discrimination that Portuguese newcomers suffered in the hands of their Americanized predecessors did not have serious consequences for their material pursuits or civic participation. Postwar immigrants were able to join the few surviving ethnic social clubs, often sponsored by their relatives or friends who were members. They did so in such large numbers that, by the late 1960s, newcomers had revitalized these organizations and dominated their memberships. In turn, this expedited the withdrawal of older Portuguese-Americans from social clubs. As one of them told Stephen Cabral during his fieldwork in New Bedford: "clubs are for 'greenhorns' who don't know any better."555

One of the largest and most active ethnic clubs to survive the war was Newark's Sport Club Portuguese (SCP), founded in 1921, at a time when there were only a few hundred Portuguese men living in the area. The club grew as more Portuguese relocated to Newark from other parts of the United States, joining its Portuguese-language school, drama troupe, boy scouts groups, marching band, football (or soccer) and basketball teams. By 1941, the SCP was able to open a new hall paid for with the members' contributions.556 Its membership continued to expand with the arrival of newcomers in the 1960s, the majority of them from the Aveiro region, particularly the fishing town of Murtaosa.

Among Azorean-American fraternities there was no clear distinction between secular and religious organizations, since even those dedicated to observing spiritual traditions served as venues for mutual aid, recreation, and political networking. Various Portuguese-American politicians in East Providence and Pawtucket attribute their electoral success to their membership in the Holy Ghost Beneficial Brotherhood (HGBB) and its associated St. Francis Xavier Catholic parish.557 Created in 1925 with the merger of two Azorean organizations - the Brotherhood of the Divine Holy Ghost and the Voz do Operário (Voice of the Worker) - the HGBB inherited the goals of its predecessors, namely to organize the annual Holy Ghost procession and feast, carry out charity work, and operate a mutual aid society. In 1915, its Philip Street Hall also hosted the St. Francis Xavier parish, where Lusophone Catholics congregated before they inaugurated their own church building in 1931. After one of its presidents was elected Rhode Island state

556 Sport Club Português website, url: http://scpnewark.com/main/
557 For more on these politicians see the Luso-American Elected Officials History Project at the Institute for Portuguese Lusophone World Studies, Rhode Island College: http://vimeo.com/18097330
representative in 1945, the HGBB became an incubator for political careers at the municipal and state levels. In the 1950s, the HGBB increased its profile in the small state of Rhode Island by organizing a series of sports events that attracted large crowds. As its public profile grew, so did its membership and political influence. Political aspirants joined the HGBB and St. Francis Xavier parish in order to network and elevate their profiles in the community. Most of these candidates were businessmen and professionals, but there were also a significant number of skilled workers and some union leaders. These politicians praised the education they received in public speaking, decision-making, raising votes, and other democratic duties by participating in the running of the HGBB. While their civic engagement prepared them for a career in politics, the fact that the HGBB became a Democratic stronghold in the 1960s (many of its members won political seats for that party) was what turned this Azorean fraternity into a Democrat nomination pool.558

Other important ethnic organizations promoting greater political engagement in New England were the Portuguese American Civic Leagues of Massachusetts, founded in 1913 (relaunched in 1928), and Rhode Island, founded in the 1930s. The main purpose of these "non-partisan" organizations was to raise interest in American politics, organize citizenship drives, and encourage Portuguese-Americans to run for public office. Over time, these civic leagues became political organizations in their own right, advocating on policy matters affecting their ethnic community, campaigning on behalf of Portuguese-American candidates, and raising support for public heritage projects memorializing Portuguese-American war veterans and other notables. Arguably, their most active sections were the women's auxiliaries, which organized dances, pageant shows, street parades, and other recreational activities, attracting large crowds and potential new members. The leagues' annual conventions also brought together hundreds of delegates from its multiple branches, along with a roll of American dignitaries.559 According to Consul Fernando Figueirinhas in Boston, its organizers were mostly "humble folk", with considerable political influence over a large section of the community. Figueirinhas reported in 1964 that the Massachusetts' Civic League had close connections with the Kennedy family, which saw this organization as "the most effective vehicle of penetration in the Portuguese colony." In hindsight, the consul lamented: "it was unfortunate that Portugal's official line did not

558 Scott, 2012.
follow in the footsteps... of these crafty politicians, and has wasted its time on elements of little or no prestige in the colony." Figueirinhas believed that, with time, the Civic League could be swayed into doing the Portuguese government's bidding.\(^{560}\)

Portuguese immigrants in Canada had to build their social clubs from the ground, which they did in considerable number and speed. The Portuguese Association of Canada (APC) in Montreal and the First Portuguese Canadian Club (FPCC) in Toronto deserve special attention for their longevity and popularity. Founded in January 1956, the APC was the first large Portuguese organization in Canada. Its founders thought of creating it after a group of 200 immigrant families met for a Christmas movie-screening organized by the Portuguese consulate. Like other ethnic associations, the APC hoped to become a place for social gathering, information exchange, cultural enrichment, and recreation. Over the years it ran a variety of cultural, social and sports programs, including English and French languages classes, a library, drama group, marching band, folk dance troupe, football team, and others. In 1959, the APC closed its doors following a series of conflicts involving its relationship with the Portuguese government. From the beginning, the APC had clashed with Consul Vital Gomes who wanted the club to endorse the views of the Lisbon government. The consul insisted that the APC's executive keep him informed of their business, presumably in an attempt to control them. When they declined, Gomes tried to discredit the association by accusing it of being a communist haven. The APC's executive retaliated by denouncing the consul's and his staff's participation in two illegal migration schemes (mentioned in chapter two), which led to Gomes' removal. The new Consul Artur Nogueira tried to appease his consulate's relation with the APC and offered them a small subsidy. This, however, led to internal conflicts between those who favoured this funding and those who rejected an endorsement from the Portuguese government, leading some of its most influential members to resign.\(^{561}\)

At this point, the APC's president was Henrique Tavares Bello Jr., a former consulate staff member who arrived in Canada with his wife, Maria Celeste T. Bello, in 1955. During his time at the consulate, Bello had been a vocal critic of the way Portuguese farmhands were treated by their Canadian employers, which provoked Gomes to reprimand him. In the APC, Bello continued to fight against the exploitation of immigrants by denouncing the illicit activities of

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\(^{560}\) Letter, Consul F. Figueirinhas to Amb. V. V. Garin, June 5, 1964, PEA M424, Colônia Portuguesa nos E.U.A. Geral, AHD.

\(^{561}\) Those who spoke against the subsidy and eventually resigned were Guilherme Tavares Manaças and Armando Agatão Lança (letter, Consul Nogueira to PMFA, April 7, 1958, 2P M557 A7, Associação Portuguesa Canadá, AHD).
Montreal's travel agents and other migration racketeers, some of whom were members of the association. Bello was also critical of Salazar's policies, which upset some of the APC's members; still, he approved of Consul Nogueira's subsidy. These internal conflicts eventually led to yet another a split, this time resulting in Bello's resignation and legal appropriation of the APC's official organ, the Luso-Canadiano. Months later, the APC closed its doors. At the time, Consul Nogueira lamented Bello's resignation and commended him for having elevated the APC to "a cultural level that it had previously lacked." For the consul, the underlying reasons why the organization struggled to remain open were "the lack of associational spirit among the immigrant masses, who prefer to live isolated - sometimes miserably - in order to better amass a few dollars", and the "small immigrant 'elite' that doesn't allow for leadership renewal."563

Bello would found the "anti-fascist" Portuguese Democratic Movement of Montreal (MDP) in 1961, with which the Luso-Canadiano became associated. After his resignation from the APC, another consulate staff worker was nominated interim president. Consul Nogueira initially opposed this but reconsidered, fearing the association would fall into the "wrong hands". However, the interim administration failed to prevent the APC’s closure. The same year the MDP was founded, some of the APC's former members re-opened it, this time introducing a by-law prohibiting members from using it for political purposes. Still, both the APC and its new organ, A Voz de Portugal, turned to the Estado Novo for funding and became political rivals of the Luso-Canadiano and the MDP. The splintering continued in 1964, when a third newspaper (O Lusitano) was founded in Montreal by A Voz de Portugal dissenters.564

In 1956, a group of mainlanders in Toronto's Kensington Market founded the FPCC, the longest running Portuguese association in that city. Throughout its history, this club offered a wide range of sports, recreational, cultural, financial, social, and educational programs for members of all ages (Figure 28). The FPCC was singular in its ability to bring together individuals from opposing political factions without falling victim to the schisms and personal rivalries that usually splintered the other clubs. The reason was likely the fact that its main activity was sports, whose teams met considerable competitive success and a significant following. Its chief program was the men's football team, which absorbed much of its resources,

562 Letter, Director-General of Internal and Political Affairs, PMFA, to Internal Economy, PMFA, February 25, 1958, ibid.
563 Letter, Consul Nogueira to PMFA, March 28, 1959 (m.t.), PEA M194, Colônia Portuguesa no Canadá, AHD; letter, Vice-Consul in Montreal to PMFA, June 25, 1960, PIDE/DGS SC CI (2) pr. 5552, u.i. 7397, Jornal "O Luso Canadiano", AHD.
564 Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 156, 163, 165-166.
but also secured much of its income. In 1969, with the Mozambican-Portuguese international football star Matateu in its squad, the FPCC won the Canadian National Soccer League to the delight of its loyal supporters (Figure 29).

Football was the raison d'être of most Portuguese working-class clubs in the postwar period, which underlined their masculine character. Since the 1920s, when football experienced a "golden era" in the United States, there were a number of successful Portuguese-American teams and players competing in nation- and state-wide leagues. In fact, one of the all-time best American footballers, considered by some as that country's "Pelé", was the Madeiran descendant Adelino "Billy" Gonçalves, who played for various New England clubs. One of the effects of the Americanization of the 1920s-40s was the decreasing popularity of football over "Yankee" sports like baseball and boxing. Still, regardless of their cultural specificity, sports remained an important venue for community gathering and civic engagement among Portuguese-Americans. For instance, in 1953, the UPC invited the Italian-American boxing champion Rocky Marciano to attend its annual convention in Fall River, as a publicity stunt aimed at attracting younger Portuguese-Americans to its membership. With the return of Portuguese mass immigration in the 1960s, enthusiasm for football was renewed. Old sports rivalries, like that opposing the HGBB and the Portuguese-American Athletic Club of East Providence, replaced the baseball diamond and boxing rink for the football pitch. In New Bedford alone, there were ten Portuguese-American football clubs competing in 1965.

The popular game sometimes served as an excuse for immigrant families in North America to visit relatives in other cities. Portuguese-Canadian teams sometimes crossed the border to play against their American counterparts and vice versa. For instance, in 1964, the Madeira Club of Toronto played in New Bedford against the local Portuguese United Soccer Club as part of that years' Feast of the Blessed Sacrament. An ad in the Correio invited its

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565 This was consistent with workers' priorities in Portugal, as evinced by a survey conducted by the National Foundation for Happiness at Work in 1951-60, which found that the most requested activity in its Centres of Popular Recreation was football, followed by movie-screenings, dances and theatre (Melo, 2001, 129).

566 Billy Gonçalves was born in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, on August 10, 1908 to a family of Madeiran immigrants who arrived in the U.S. two years earlier. His family moved to Fall River soon after he was born. Gonçalves started his football career at age 14, playing for various clubs in New England, including the Portuguese-American Lusitânia Recreation Club of East Cambridge. He would be most successful with the Boston Wonder Workers, the largest football club in Massachusetts, which competed in the first American Soccer League. He also played for the American national team in the 1930 and 1934 World Cup tournaments, attracting the interest of various international clubs. Gonçalves died in Newark on July 17, 1977 (Paulo Curado, "Billy Gonçalves: o 'Pelé' do Soccer Americano é Luso-Americano," Público online, June 4, 2014, url: www.publico.pt/desporto/noticia/billy-goncalves-o-pele-do-soccer-americano-e-lusoamericano-1638543?page=-1).

567 "Rocky Marciano na Sessão da Continental", Diário de Notícias, June 22, 1953, 1, DN-UMASS.

readers to support their club by registering for a group trip to Massachusetts, calling it an opportunity to visit loved ones south of the border.\textsuperscript{569}

Football was also one of the most cherished and sustained links between the emigrants and their homeland. On weekends, men gathered in their community clubs and cafés to listen to the broadcast of Portuguese matches, as was common practice in their hometown villages.\textsuperscript{570} Torontonians recall the crowds of football fans outside the Portuguese Bookstore on Kensington Market every Sunday afternoon, where the men listened to broadcasts blasted from the store's speakers.\textsuperscript{571} The same bookstore was also the principal vendor of Portuguese newspapers - the most popular being the sports titles - and the main ticket office for FPCC's games.\textsuperscript{572}

Occasionally, Portuguese football teams played exhibition matches for their loyal fans in North America. While sanctioned by Portuguese officials, the initiative and organizational efforts behind these visits fell largely on the ethnic clubs. In 1957, Sport Lisbon Benfica, the most popular and international Portuguese football club at the time, was the first team to play a series of exhibition matches in Newark, Fall River, and New York, thanks to the SCP's efforts. In 1966, with Eusébio da Silva Ferreira on its roster - one of the sport's all-time greatest and among its first international superstars - Benfica played for its Toronto fans; then in 1972, it treated football fans in Massachusetts to Portugal's most popular derby, with two exhibition matches against its Lisbon rivals, Sporting Club Portugal.

During the Estado Novo, football became a mass cultural phenomenon in Portugal. The opposition would later accuse the regime of promoting “the three Fs” – fado, football and Fátima – as alienating cultural forces or escapist pastimes meant to distract people from their countries' poverty and political repression. That perception, however, has recently been challenged when it comes to football.\textsuperscript{573} Many of Salazar's opponents were fans of the game, and even Benfica had avowed communists in their administration. Jaime Monteiro, a member of the PCP who fled to Montreal with his family in 1963, was a case in point. Along with being actively involved in the

\textsuperscript{569} \textit{Correio Português}, July 2, 1964 (m.t.). AO, N473 Reel 3 July 6, 1963 - July 2, 1964.

\textsuperscript{570} Miranda, 2010, 19-50.


\textsuperscript{572} When the FPCC opened its Portuguese language school in 1964, this bookstore also became its main supplier of textbooks. This commercial relation was facilitated by the fact that Mário Tomás, one of the bookstore owners, was an active member of the FPCC, whose headquarters were located beside his store (in Brettell, 1977, 175).

\textsuperscript{573} Ricardo Serrado's study on this topic revealed that the Estado Novo in fact delayed the professionalization of the popular sport until the 1940s and actively tried to prevent it from becoming a mass spectacle - unlike Mussolini's and Hitler's brands of fascism - largely because it believed sports should remain amateur and oriented towards good health, discipline, and education (\textit{O Estado Novo e o Futebol}, Lisbon: Prime Books, 2012).
"anti-fascist" movement in Montreal and Toronto, he wrote for Lisbon's sports weekly *A Bola*, the most circulated Lusophone newspaper in Canada (and likely the United States).574

The same way it tried to control football's mass appeal at home, the *Estado Novo* also intervened in the visits of Portuguese teams to the emigrant communities. In 1955, a group of Portuguese-Americans in Ludlow asked the ambassador about the possibility of bringing the Lisbon club *Os Belenenses* to play an exhibition match in New England. The embassy responded that the government only allowed Portuguese teams to play abroad "in circumstances where they are assured a positive result or that they will not embarrass Portuguese sports. Since North American football is not the strongest, His Excellence the Ambassador presumes that our authorities will not oppose a visit from Belenenses."575 The Lisbon team eventually played in New York City in 1962, under an International Soccer League tournament. Ambassador Pereira saw this as a good photo opportunity and accepted the invitation to perform the ceremonial kick-off (Figure 30). Unforsen by the ambassador was the fact that this was also a good opportunity for anti-Salazar exiles to organize a protest. During the Portuguese national anthem and kick-off, the members of Newark's pro-democratic opposition booed Pereira from the stands, holding a large placard with the words: "Godspeed *Os Belenenses*. Portugal yes, Salazar no."576

**The ethnic "elites": businessmen, professionals, politicians, and media moguls**

Hoping to escape the drudgery of waged labour, become their own bosses, or continue their previous trades, many immigrants opened businesses catering to their co-ethnics in the highly concentrated Portuguese settlements. In many cases, these entrepreneurs landed as labourers and spent their first years working for wages in the new country before they were able to amass enough capital to start their businesses. Rural immigrants, some of whom had never worked for another person before, opened food markets and sold groceries. Others ran boarding houses, cafés, restaurants, and other commercial establishments. The most business savvy recognized the growing demand for homeland products and saw the potential for generating profits, so they started importing goods from Portugal and distributing them in the ethnic markets. Artisans like tailors, bakers, butchers, barbers, mechanics, and typographers, set up

their own shops. Those with more education and some fluency in English or French opened travel agencies, driving schools, notarial services, and other service-oriented businesses. A few cultured immigrants with a penchant for writing and an interest in journalism founded newspapers. In close proximity to each other, these ethnic businesses imparted a "Portuguese" character to their densely populated immigrant neighbourhoods.

The prevailing exaggerated notion about Portuguese settlements among outsiders was that these were places where it was "entirely possible to work, shop, eat, worship, bank, marry, live, and die without ever speaking English or leaving the neighborhood except to travel [to] Portugal." Mainstream commentators, and some within the community, criticized the insularity provided by the so-called "institutional completeness" of these neighbourhoods, and blamed it for reinforcing the immigrants' marginality, barring their integration into the host nation's middle-class society. These critics underestimated the social and economic necessity of such ethnolinguistic spaces, which provided services otherwise unavailable or inaccessible to working-class immigrants. Besides allowing immigrants to purchase their favourite homeland products and access services in their native language, ethnic markets also welcomed consumer practices common in Portugal, such as bartering and keeping store credits, thus increasing their buying power.

Most of these ethnic stores were also family-owned, which made for a more personable market economy, where commercial relationships accounted for personal reputation and mutual trust, unlike the anonymous interactions of mainstream shopping. The same was true for ethnic credit unions. These were membership-run financial cooperatives, traditionally affiliated with ethnic clubs or parishes, dedicated to providing affordable credit to members; encouraging the accumulation of savings; investing in community development projects; and facilitating the sending of remittances. Besides their willingness to lend money to newcomers with little financial credit, these institutions attracted a significant ethnic client-base due to their location in Portuguese neighbourhoods and their Lusophone staff, where customers could rely "on [their] good character and reputation as much as on [their] credit rating." Dorothy Gilbert

578 Raymond Breton defined "institutional completeness" as the degree to which an "ethnic community could perform all the services required by its members." At its highest, "members would never have to make use of native institutions for the satisfaction of any of their needs, such as education, work, food and clothing, medical care, or social assistance" (in "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 2 [Se, 1964], 194).
579 Iacovetta, 1992, 64; Bodnar, 1987, 81-82
found in 1971 that much of the savings of Portuguese immigrants in Fall River were deposited in the 28 credit unions operating in that city.\textsuperscript{580}

In Canada, Portuguese businesses started opening shortly after the first sojourners settled in the cities.\textsuperscript{581} António Sousa opened the first Portuguese business in Toronto in 1956, three years after he arrived in Halifax aboard the Saturnia. Sousa first learned about business at his parents’ general store and livery in his hometown of Nazaré. He later built on that experience by obtaining a business certificate from a commercial school. After securing legal consent from his father and a family loan, Sousa opened his first store, selling fishing and nautical supplies. As we saw in chapter two, his first job in Canada was in Goose Bay, where he worked as a kitchen helper. There he learned English from a Russian cook and started selling goods to fellow workers in the evening, like soda pop and chocolate bars at first, and later clothing, jewelry and other products ordered from the Eaton's catalogue and retailers in Montreal. In 1954, Sousa moved to Toronto and called for his wife and their son to join him. The Sousas then bought a property in Kensington Market where they opened a restaurant and boarding house. Mrs. Sousa, who had left a relatively comfortable middle-class life in Portugal, ran the business during the day while Mr. Sousa worked double shifts at a local bakery and then at the restaurant in the evening.\textsuperscript{582}

As the only Portuguese landmark in Toronto, the Sousas' restaurant became a hub for newcomers looking to settle in the city; even the post office dropped bags of mail from Portugal there. As the community grew around it, other Portuguese businesses and clubs appeared. The FPCC, of which Sousa was co-founder and administrator, opened across the street from his restaurant. Three years after landing in Canada, he and a partner opened a Portuguese food importing company, distributing products to grocery stores in Ontario and Quebec. Over the years Sousa started other businesses and was involved in various community initiatives, including a fundraising campaign to build a sheltering harbour in his hometown, which was finally unveiled in 1983 by his brother Abílio dos Santos Sousa, then Mayor of Nazaré.\textsuperscript{583} Later in life, the Sousas moved to the Toronto suburb of Mississauga and began spending their

\textsuperscript{580} Gilbert, 1989, 93, 119.
\textsuperscript{581} For a sense of the speed in which ethnic markets developed, here is a chronological list of first businesses opened by Portuguese immigrants in Toronto: 1956, first restaurant, boarding house, barber shop, and grocery store; 1958, first travel agency, driving school, bakery, and goods importing firm; 1959, first auto shop and gas station; 1960, first photo studio; 1961, first fish store, and butcher shop; 1963, first newspaper, and clothing store; 1965, first bookstore, and typography; 1966, first children store, movie theatre, radio and TV equipment store; 1969, first music record store (Ribeiro, 1990).
\textsuperscript{582} "50th Anniversary of Official Portuguese Immigration to Canada, 2003, 60.
\textsuperscript{583} "Nazaré e o seu porto de abrigo", Correio Português, April 15, 1978, N473 reel 1, AO.
summers in Palm Beach, Florida, where Sousa became a founding member of the Portuguese American Cultural Society. More recently, in 2007, his youngest son, Charles Sousa, became a MPP for Mississauga; and in 2013, after having held the Ontario Ministries of Labour, and of Citizenship and Immigration, Charles became the highest-ranking Portuguese-Canadian politician yet, assuming the Ministry of Finance under Kathleen Wynne's Liberal government.

Like Sousa, most businessmen catering to a Portuguese clientele were actively involved in their communities' civic life. During her field research, Brettell found that, on numerous occasions, Portuguese business owners in Toronto joined ethnic associations in order to secure clients and contracts; as a bakery owner explained to her, this was simply "good business", "especially when they put on fêtes for which they require Portuguese delicacies." However, material rewards were not the only, or even the most important motivation for these ethnic entrepreneurs. Some simply craved personal recognition and a respectable social status for their organizing efforts, while others were genuinely interested in developing their communities for its own sake. Either way, most ethnic leaders dedicated a great deal of their voluntary or professional time to their communities.

As Bodnar would have predicted, those few businessmen and professionals whose economic success did not rely on the ethnic market, normally detached themselves from the civic initiatives of their less privileged co-nationals, or engaged only from a distance. Not only were their upper-class ways at odds with the experiences and interests of the working-class majority, but they avoided being associated with an ethnic group to which their host society assigned various unflattering stereotypes. There were, of course, exceptions, like the millionaire supermarket chain operator Joseph E. Fernandes in the United States, or the electronic

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584 50th Anniversary of Official Portuguese Immigration to Canada, 2003, 60.
585 Brettell, 1977, 176.
587 Born in Madeira, Joseph E. Fernandes (1923-2007) moved to the U.S. with his parents when he was 18 months old. His father, Joseph Bento Fernandes, was a successful Portuguese-Trinidadian businessmen, son of Madeiran immigrants, who is credited with revamping the rum industry in that Caribbean country, and known for his philanthropy with the Rockefeller foundation. J. E. Fernandes followed in his father's footsteps and became a millionaire businessman in his own right. In 1947, he opened the Fernandes Supermarket chain, with multiple stores in Massachusetts and Rhode Island; he also operated other businesses in Trinidad and Tobago and Puerto Rico. Fernandes was involved with a large number of American and international business and civic organizations, and was an active member of the Republican Party. In the Portuguese-American community, Fernandes served as chairman of various organizations, including the PAF, UPC and the Portuguese Cultural Foundation. In 1973, he branched out into ethnic media, becoming a co-owner of New Bedford's Portuguese Times and the Portuguese Channel 20.
telecommunications manufacturer Manuel Mira in Canada, who were both actively involved in their Portuguese communities.

The same intersection of ethnic entrepreneurship, civic engagement, and political ambition existed in Portuguese-American settlements, although with important differences. Portuguese-American civic society was dominated by the older immigrant generation and their descendants. Only in the 1970s did newcomers begin to reach positions of influence in these communities. Postwar immigrants hoping to establish themselves in the ethnic marketplace had to compete with their experienced and well-connected predecessors; although, some of the older settlements lacked well-defined commercial ethnic districts, like those in Newark, Toronto or Montreal. While the Portuguese presence in New Bedford, Fall River, and other parts of New England was widely noticeable, they were spread out or diluted into their "localized" contexts. Furthermore, the local economy in these depressed cities was incapable of sustaining thriving commercial districts. In some cities, other ethnic or racial groups claimed those commercial spaces as their own, as was the case in the suburbs of Boston and New York City.

Portuguese-Americans made up a larger and more established political constituency than their fellow ethnics in Canada. Since the early 20th century, Democrats and Republicans had consistently included Portuguese-American candidates in their party lists in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, although only a few were elected. After the Second World War, the number of Portuguese-American elected officials increased, with success rates varying from state to state. Due to a combination of demographic and legislative factors, Rhode Island, and particularly the city of East Providence, were especially favourable political arenas for Portuguese-Americans; between 1945 and 1979, that state elected 9 Portuguese-American State Senators, 20 House

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588 Manuel Mira was born in Leiria in 1933, where he trained as a radio and electronics technician before migrating to Brazil. After five years in South America, he moved to Toronto, in 1957. Two years later, he founded Mirtone Communications Systems, which in the 1970s grew into a multinational business, with sites in Florida, North Carolina, and Ontario. Mira volunteered much of his time to running various Portuguese ethnic organizations in Toronto, including the PCABIP, PCC, FPCC, and the Pro-Culture Society. He also served as Vice-President of the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto. In 1973, Mira moved to Florida and co-founded the PACS with fellow Portuguese-Canadian "snowbird" António Sousa. Later in life, Mira became an amateur historian writing on pre-Mayflower Portuguese settlers in the Appalachian Mountains (see chapter 6).

589 Kathleen N. Conzen described "localization" as the process by which immigrant groups embed their specific cultural practices in their surrounding non-ethnic public infrastructures, such as educational institutions, political organizations, businesses, and media. The local "rules of the game" laid out by these rooted immigrants influenced all residents of these neighbourhoods regardless of their ethnic identity; in other words, immigrant communities were "decentralized sovereignties" that created "their own public culture." Conzen urged scholars to estimate the "pluralisms of space" and "place-to-place variation" in their analysis of ethnic identity formation in "Mainstream and Side Channels: The Localization of Immigrant Cultures", *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 11 [Fall 1991].

590 Only in 1986 did Fall River city officials launch an urban requalification project promoting Columbia Street as a multicultural destination, with a number of Portuguese restaurants, cafés, bakeries and other such ethnic businesses (Gail Ciampa, "Fall River's Taste of Portugal", *The Providence Journal*, February 7, 2008, url: http://froed.org/?p=510).
Representatives, and many more city councilors. In Canada, Portuguese immigrants only started running for political office in the late 1970s, and elected their first co-ethnic candidates in the mid-'80s - the first Portuguese city councilor was elected in Toronto in 1988, followed by the first MPP in Ontario in 1995, and the first federal Member of Parliament (MP) in 2004.

After compiling a list of some of the most prominent Portuguese civic leaders in the United States and Canada (Appendix A), I was able to trace patterns in this group. The most obvious finding was the almost absolute absence of women in leadership positions. Club halls, with their game rooms, bars, and other traditional homosocial spaces, were considered disreputable places for women, who were only welcomed on special occasions, like dances and other events geared for families. However, as previously discussed, women made essential contributions to the survival and development of ethnic organizations through their auxiliary committees. This involvement in secular public life was deemed more acceptable given that it was done in a way that was consistent with their Catholic charity work. In terms of class characteristics, there were also substantial differences between the two countries. In both cases, ethnic leaders tended to emerge from among skilled workers, business owners, company managers, and professionals, but the Americans had a larger pool of individuals in prestigious occupations and public offices. This reflects the length of time that Portuguese had been in the United States, where they had been able to move up the social ladder and generate a larger intelligentsia. Another significant finding relates to the leaders' regional origins. In the American case, mainlanders and Azoreans were nearly evenly split in leadership positions, followed by Madeirans and Cape Verdeans; though Azoreans predominated slightly, their representation was still disproportional to their overwhelming majority of the Portuguese-American population. Still, mainland overrepresentation in leadership roles was most dramatic in Canada, where very few Azoreans occupied positions of power in secular organizations. Moreover, a significant number of community leaders were from Lisbon and surrounding area, who were a minority in the overall migration movement. The membership of the largest Portuguese associations in Toronto and Montreal was predominantly from the mainland, and a few from Madeira. Except


for Montreal's *Voz de Portugal*, founded by a *Micaelense* in 1961, all Portuguese media in Canada was operated by mainlanders until the 1970s. This had important consequences in the distribution of resources by *ethnic entrepreneurs* and in the articulation of Portuguese identity in Canada, as we will discuss in the next chapter.

Particularly striking was the number of civic and religious leaders involved in Lusophone media. The largest Portuguese newspapers published in North America in this period were the *Diário de Notícias*¹⁵³ (1919-73) and the *Portuguese Times* (1971-) in New Bedford; *A Luta* (1926-?) in New York; the *Luso-Americano* (1928-) and *Novos Rumos* (1961-?) in Newark; the *Luso-Canadiano* (1958-71) and *A Voz de Portugal* (1961-) in Montreal; and the *Correio Português* (1963-90s) and *O Jornal Português* (1968-75) in Toronto.¹⁵⁴ There were other smaller titles associated with ethnic organizations and parishes, along with many newsletters and bulletins published by various Portuguese organizations. Considering the high rates of illiteracy among this immigrant group, the large number of Lusophone titles available in North America since the 19th century, including those published in other parts of the world, was remarkable, regardless of their generally poor journalistic quality. However, only a few prewar Portuguese-American newspapers survived until the 1960s.

Those with little access to print media could enjoy Portuguese radio and television programming in various regions of North America. One of the pioneers in Portuguese-American broadcasting was Ferreira Mendes, who launched the first Lusophone radio show "*A Voz de Portugal*", in New England, in 1933.¹⁵⁵ Funded by ad revenue from local businesses, Mendes introduced listeners to Portuguese artists, announced local community events, delivered the news, and launched charitable campaigns to help fellow Portuguese immigrants and national residents in financial distress; he is credited for having raised over $500,000 USD in donations for various humanitarian causes. In 1952, Mendes founded WRIB, the first Portuguese radio station on the East coast of the United States, based out of East Providence, which closed in 1967. Since he began announcing on New Bedford's WNBH, until he retired with Taunton's WPEP in 1990, Mendes only interrupted his regular broadcast once, in 1943, due to the wartime

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¹⁵³ Not to be mistaken with the daily newspaper of the same name published in Lisbon since 1864.
¹⁵⁴ *Voz de Portugal* and *O Jornal Português* were also the titles of two different newspapers published in California at this time.
¹⁵⁵ Affonso Gil Mendes Ferreira (1899-1992), or "Ferreira Mendes" as his listeners knew him, emigrated from Portugal to Taunton in 1920. Besides WNBH, WRIB, and WPEP, he also worked in Providence's WPRO, Cape Cod's WOCB, and Fall River's WSR. Between 1925 and 1976, Mendes ran the biannual advertisement catalog *O Heraldo Portuguez*. In 1983 the Portuguese government recognized his civic contributions by awarding him the Order of Prince Henry the Navigator.
Though not as extensive as in California, where in 1954 there were 30 Portuguese radio shows, the few stations serving Lusophone audiences in New England, like WLYN and WUNR in Boston, or BWSM/WGCGY (broadcasting exclusively in Portuguese since 1969) in New Bedford-Fall River, were enough to cover its concentrated population. New Jersey's WHBI began emitting its first Portuguese show in 1964. In Canada, the first Portuguese radio transmissions began in 1958 with the show "Voices of Portugal", on Toronto's CKFH, followed by A Hora Portuguesa, on Montreal's CFMB in 1962, and many others after that. In 1968, a group of immigrants in Kensington Market launched the Rádio Club Português, the first Portuguese-owned radio station in Canada, broadcasting 15 hours of daily programming. In most cases, their inaugural broadcasts featured an address by the local Portuguese consul.

In order to be commercially viable, most Portuguese ethnic media outlets required government aid, both in terms of advertising revenue and print- or broadcast-ready content. As we will discuss in chapter six, the Estado Novo exploited this dependency to control the editorial boards of ethnic media and sway the views of Portuguese emigrants towards supporting their homeland government. Some of the individuals who ran these media outlets were also involved in other ethnic organizations and owned other businesses, which figured prominently in their publications and broadcasts. That was the case with José Rafael, a former travel and real estate agent turned immigrant consultant who hosted regular shows on Toronto's Radio Club Português and CHIN Radio. Besides promoting his business, Rafael also used his broadcast to rally the city's Portuguese in the aftermath of two high-profile murders, that of the young Madeiran immigrant Ângelo Nóbrega, in 1969 (discussed later in this chapter) and the famed

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597 Letter, Consul, Fernando M. Gonçalves, San Francisco, to PMFA, August 10, 1954, PEA M181, Colônia Portuguesa nos E.U. Organizações Portuguesas (Geral), AHD.
599 Transcript, July 18, 1964, M20, Assuntos diversos, AHD.
600 Brettell, 1977, 174
601 Before moving to Canada in 1957, José Rafael worked at the U.S. Air Force base in Terceira, where he learned some English. In Toronto, Rafael first worked as an office cleaner, later becoming a travel and real estate agent (Avis Travel Agency), radio announcer, and immigration consultant (Portuguese Immigration Aid Society). His activities as a travel agent and immigration consultant were investigated by the RCMP, which suspected illegal practices. In 1971 Rafael was convicted for immigration racketeering and defrauding, but successfully appealed the following year through the Supreme Court of Ontario.
Azorean "shoeshine boy" Emanuel Jaques in 1977 - this one gathering 15,000 protesters outside Toronto's City Hall demanding the city clean its "devious" and "dangerous" sex district.602

Besides accumulating administrative positions in working-class ethnic clubs, community elites also formed their own separate professional and business associations. In Canada, for instance, the Quebec Association of Portuguese Professional and Business Men, founded in Montreal in 1967, and the Portuguese Canadian Association of Businessmen, Industrialists and Professionals, founded in Toronto in 1969, aimed at becoming an organized voice for their class. However, neither of these associations lasted long or had any major impact in Portuguese-Canadian civil society. Nonetheless, they were instructive precedents for future attempts at coalescing the ethnic elite, such as the influential Federation of Portuguese Canadian Business and Professionals, founded in Toronto in 1981.603

**Diplomatic patronage and the quest for unity: ethnic confederations and Portugal Day celebrations**

Along with representing the Portuguese government on matters of foreign policy, diplomats were expected to maintain positive relations with the emigrant communities and foster their loyalty to Portugal. The Portuguese ambassador in Washington was regularly, and sometimes persistently, invited to attend community events. Most of the time he "regrettably" declined, sending instead an embassy officer on his behalf, to the organizers' disappointment. The ambassador's constant declining led to mounting grumblings from these communities. In one case, the Diário saw the need to come to Ambassador Fernandes' defense, arguing that he ought to maintain the solemnity of his office and could not attend every "card game and family feast." Reacting to this editorial, Fernandes explained to Minister Paulo Cunha that, in order to avoid being perceived as favouring one organization over another, he rejected all invitations that seemed to be concerned only with boosting the organizers' profile versus their local rivals.604

Despite this selective approach, a considerable portion of the diplomat's time was spent visiting local community organizations and participating in their events.


603 Besides its mission to coalesce Portuguese-Canadian businessmen and professionals in Ontario; raise the Portuguese community's profile; and award scholarships; the FPCBP has also been an incubator for Liberal political candidates at the national, provincial and municipal levels, including its former president Charles Sousa.

604 Clipping, editorial, Diário de Notícias, November 11, 1953; letter, Ambassador L. Fernandes to PMFA, November 14, 1953, PEA M182, Colónia Portuguesa. Jornais, AHD.
Ambassador Fernandes' first community visit was the previously mentioned 25th anniversary celebration of the UPC, in 1950. In his report to Lisbon, Fernandes mentioned his very favourable impression of the event, which "far exceeded his expectations", especially the extent to which the emigrants and their descendants were enthusiastic about Portugal. Inspired by their warm welcome, he recommended that more efforts be made to maintain regular contacts with the Portuguese "colonies" in the United States, and called for greater dedication from his consuls towards coordinating the communities' organizational efforts.605 His suggestion, however, was ignored by a number of consuls, who boycotted some community initiatives and treated emigrants with derision. In March 1955, the ambassador attended the 5th anniversary of the American Portuguese Loyalty Association of Fall River, alongside such prominent guests as the governors of Rhode Island and Massachusetts, the Congress minority leader Joseph Martin, two Portuguese-American state senators, the mayor of Fall River, and a crowd of 900 people. The event centered on a fundraising dinner for the association's scholarships, which sent young students to the University of Coimbra over the summer. Invited to address the crowd, Fernandes urged all Portuguese-Americans in New England to unite so they become a respected "moral force" in the region.606 Conspicuously absent were all but one of the New England consuls; according to Fernandes, they refused to pay for their own dinner. The ambassador was again embarrassed later that year when he attended the Blessing of the Fleet in Gloucester and none of the consuls came to receive him. This caused consternation among organizers and the ethnic media. In Fernandes' opinion, the reason why some consuls did not attend events where he was a guest was because they only cared for community gatherings where they were guaranteed to be the highest-ranking dignitary in attendance.607

At the same time, Ambassador Fernandes found the incessant invitations from small community clubs irritating. In his view, the only organizations of interest to the Portuguese government were the UPC and the American Portuguese Loyalty Association. He sometimes also chided Portuguese-American elites for their pretentiousness and questionable loyalty to Portugal. In 1953, he wrote Minister Cunha about the occasional testimonies of Portuguese-American travelers in the American press, in which they expressed condescending views about

605 Letter, Ambassador L. Fernandes to PMFA, September 30, 1950 (m.t.), PEA 159, Visita de Luiz Esteves Fernandes à União Portuguesa Continental, Boston, AHD.
607 Clipping, "Comentário do Dia", Diário de Notícias, May 26, 1955; letters, Ambassador Fernandes to PMFA, May 24 & August 1, 1955, PEA M307, Clero Português nos Estados Unidos, AHD.
Portugal. The ambassador noted their "airs of importance as cultivated and well-traveled people", and their "constant preoccupation in showing that they are true 'Yankees', with such attenuated bonds to Portuguese stock that they allow themselves to think as if they were worthy descendants of the first Nordic settlers, from a race 'above' the Latin." These paternalistic views were sometimes repeated by Portuguese-Americans, as was the case with the UPC's secretary-general, who wrote to the embassy after the ambassador's visit, thanking Fernandes and apologizing for the humble manners of the fraternities' working-class members. In his words: "The [UPC] is constituted almost exclusively of simple workers, and if the impression that His Excellency has of us is so flattering, certainly we have the right to feel proud for having once more demonstrated that, while being intellectually modest in their majority, the Portuguese do not surrender their place alongside the most civilized peoples of the world." In another instance, after learning of Fernandes' visit to Gloucester's Blessing of the Fleet, the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament's organizers tried to convince the ambassador to attend their celebrations, which he had repeatedly declined in the past. To improve their pitch, one of the organizers assured the ambassador he could expect an exquisite reception, since, unlike their Gloucester countrymen, they were not humble "fishermen".

The general perception among Portuguese-Americans was that their homeland government and diplomatic representatives despised and dismissed average working emigrants. Manuel Almada, a patriotic Portuguese from New Bedford, alerted Ambassador Fernandes to this widespread negative opinion, which he claimed was informed by the enemies of the regime, "who are busy night and day sowing suspicion of its acts and aims." This view, he added, was supported by the fact that "no 'average' citizen, no 'poor' man has ever been publicly honored by the Portuguese Government." Almada was referring to the diplomats' habit of reserving honorific titles for politicians, clergymen, media personalities, civic leaders, and other notables. As a way of refuting this upper-classist image, Almada suggested the ambassador publically award an honorable poor man; like Johnny Furtado, a physically disabled "ardent Catholic", son of Portuguese parents, who worked as a newspaper vendor for 30 years "on a street corner in freezing, as well as hot, weather", thanks to the "love for the people he meets." Many people in

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608 Letter, Amb. L. Fernandes to PMFA, September 22, 1953 (m.t.), PEA M182, Colônia Portuguesa Artigos s/ a Colônia, AHD.
609 Letter, Aníbal S. Branco, UPC's Secretary General, Boston, to Manuel Rocheta, Embassy's Councilor, Washington, October 17, 1950 (m.t.), PEA 159, Visita de Luiz Esteves Fernandes à União Portuguesa Continental, Boston, AHD.
New Bedford shared this admiration for Furtado, including some of its most eminent citizens, who were among the 375 guests at a banquet held in the poor man's honour, in 1950. The distinguished guests toasted Furtado's "virtuous" working ethic, which they considered especially commendable given "his humble profession", and reminded the audience that, "in this world of cynics", Furtado was a clear example of how there was "more to life than earning money". Fernandes applauded Almada's generosity and dedication, and sent Furtado a private letter praising his perseverance, social contributions, and "Catholic virtue", adding: "we feel proud that the blood running in your veins is of the same nationality as ours." However, no official accolade was bestowed on the "humble" man.

By the time the postwar immigrant wave arrived, the degree of disharmony within Portuguese-American communities had become unbearable to Portuguese officials. As the director of the Casa de Portugal told Ambassador Garin in 1966, there were rivalries between the poorer East and the richer West coasts settlements; between nearby settlements, like Providence and Bristol, in Rhode Island; between "communist" rebels in Newark and the regime's loyalists; between Cape Verdean organizations in New York; along with other rifts.

To put an end to this chaos, Portuguese diplomats increased their efforts to unite and eventually control these communities. In 1965, Pedro Corte-Real Pinto, the new Consul in New York, sent Minister Franco Nogueira his assessment on the status of diplomatic relations with Portuguese-Americans, and made suggestions on how to improve them. Pinto argued that, in the absence of a prominent and well-established institution backed by Lisbon, the job of "diffusing our viewpoints in this country" fell principally on the expatriate communities. According to Pinto, in the past, the consuls' outreach methods had consisted of delivering speeches at community events and providing aid to clergymen and the UPC; support for the latter came at the exclusion of other mutual aid societies, "for fear of the [UPC's] reactions, which is said to be very powerful". This strategy, he believed, prevented the creation of "solid institutions similar to what Spain was able to create in this country," which could inform and mobilize the emigrants on matters of importance to Portugal. In Pinto's words:

The situation I encountered in this country... does not call for a passive attitude from Portuguese representatives... as advocated by the [UPC] for their own self-interest, but instead

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611 “Foi carinhosamente homenageado... o 'ardina' Johnny Furtado," Diário de Notícias, January 9, 1950, 1. DN-UMASS.
612 Various correspondence between Manuel Almada, New Bedford; Ambassador Luis Fernandes, Washington; and John Furtado, New Bedford, November 18, 1952, PEA 181, Colónia Portuguesa. Processo Geral, AHD.
613 Letter, Ramiro Valadão, Casa de Portugal's director, to Ambassador Garin, April 6, 1966, PEA M424, Colónia Portuguesa nos EUA. Homenagem a Monsenhor José Cacella... AHD.
demands for almost daily intensive action... particularly in the selection of solid and truly pro-
Portuguese entities in each [community] that can serve as a base for these actions. I don't believe it
to be difficult to achieve good results, since solid institutions, namely those with an economic
focus, will gradually upstage certain dangerous groups that have for a long time frightened the
hierarchy and managed to publish the most unfair words in the Luso-American press during some
of the most difficult moments in Portuguese history.  

Pinto saw urgency in creating institutional hubs that could unite various community factions. To
achieve this he proposed that committees be formed in every Portuguese-American settlement,
with its members drawn from among the local elites and given instructions from Lisbon, and
with the ultimate goal of integrating them in a larger federation. In Pinto's words: "We are
convinced that by proceeding this way we could easily influence the American administration to
ease some of its anti-Portuguese positions."  

This, he added, was something that consuls had to
do in secret, since their diplomatic status prevented them from becoming directly involved in the
domestic affairs of American citizens.

The large mutual aid societies, civic leagues, and some veterans' associations continued
to open new lodges in the 1960s and claim the title of spokespeople for Portuguese-Americans.
But during that decade, new institutional coalitions emerged in the United States and Canada,
bringing together various Portuguese clubs and associations under large ethnic confederations.  

In July 1965, 150 delegates from various parts of the northeastern United States met in Bristol
for the Congress of the Communities, answering the call from The Knights of Corte-Reais' 
president Manuel Luciano da Silva, following the example of the Lisbon Geographic Society's
Congress of the Portuguese Communities, held the year before. According to Pinto, who
attended this meeting, he was able to indirectly sway the discussion in various committees
through a loyal and influential community member who did the consul's bidding. He was able
to persuade delegates to refuse a proposal calling for the integration of various mutual aid
societies into one large Portuguese-American Bank in New York; dissuade the Portuguese-
American press from "attacking" the Congress; and most importantly, convince the participants
of the need to create a Portuguese-American confederation. To chair the steering committee

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614 Letter, Consul Pedro Pinto, New York City, to PMFA, July 30, 1965 (m.t.), M45, Assuntos ref. às comunidades Port., AHD.
615 Ibid.
616 The League of Portuguese Fraternal Societies, founded in California in 1937, was the first Portuguese-American
confederation. This organization was responsible for financing the Portuguese representation at the 1939 Golden Gate
Exposition, which included a monument to Portuguese navigator João Rodrigues Cabrillo (Pap, 1981, 176).
617 The first international Congress of the Portuguese Communities, held in Lisbon in 1964, was organized by Adriano Moreira
and the Lisbon Geographic Society, and sponsored by the Estado Novo. The nine-day long meeting brought together a large
number of representatives from various Portuguese communities around the world, who discussed ways to improve the
relationship between the Portuguese diaspora and the homeland. More on this in chapter six.
618 The consul's recruit was Adriano Seabra Veiga, who later that year became the Vice-Consul of Portugal in Connecticut.
charged with creating the ensuing Portuguese American Federation (PAF), the delegates nominated the millionaire businessmen Joseph E. Fernandes. In Pinto's opinion, this was a welcome departure from the "political type of men on which our diplomatic actions in America have been based," towards recruiting "those individuals with real significance in the American world."619

The PAF was formalized in September 1966 at its first annual congress in North Easton, Massachusetts, which according to the organizers' was attended by "a broad cross-section of Portuguese-Americans representing practically every major profession and interest." A variety of topics were discussed, including the need to define "what being Portuguese means - traditionally and politically;" the need to assist the "social advancement" of newcomers; education; ethnic media; electoral participation; citizenship; youth, and other community matters. Delegates also considered creating a PAF radio station and a Portuguese museum in New England.620 In the early 1970s, the PAF eventually launched its own television show on WTEV, directed by António A. Costa.

As the PAF grew in the 1960s and '70s, the traditional power holders in the Portuguese-American communities, like the mutual aid societies and the clergy, saw their dominance dissipate. In 1972, the UPC's secretary lamented:

We must tell all Luso-Americans and Luso-Canadians that they don't have to "try" to organize new associations or federations to unite the Portuguese Communities of the Eastern United States and Canada since such desired organization exists already, was found 45 years ago and is called the [UPC]... We must announce to all that our Society places the interest of our Portuguese people, and their descendants... above any regionalism and that we are ready at any time to study a merger of all Fraternal Portuguese Societies in the United States, and to form one sole and gigantic Portuguese Fraternity... I think [these] arguments and facts will help us to persuade those we so badly need.621

Canadian state officials also welcomed the creation of ethnic confederations, since, as Iacovetta noted, the government's "mainly top-down approach usually meant dealing with ethnic elites, such as press editors and society presidents who were expected to influence the rest of their lot."622 The first major attempt at creating such a confederation was the Portuguese Canadian Congress (PCC), founded in September 1969 by a group of prominent individuals, clubs and associations from Toronto and Hamilton. Its aim was to act as "the spokesman for the

619 Letter, Consul Pedro Pinto to PMFA, July 30, 1965 (m.t.).
620 Report, 1st Annual Congress of the PAF, September 18, 1966, PEA M332, Federação Luso-Americana, AHD.
621 Supreme Secretary Francisco J. Mendonça' report, Annual Report UPC, 1972, M45, União Portuguesa Continental, AHD.
622 Iacovetta, 2006, 62.
Portuguese in their official contacts with the local authorities, the provincial and federal governments, the representatives of other ethnic groups, and/or representatives of the Portuguese government. The need for an umbrella organization that could speak on behalf of all Portuguese in Canada emerged after the death of Ângelo Nóbrega at the hands of a Toronto police detective. The suspicious nature of Nóbrega's death and the controversial inquiry that resulted in the detective's acquittal, accentuated the feeling of powerlessness shared by immigrants in a city dominated by Anglo-Celtic conservative forces. This outraged the Portuguese community, which organized a demonstration at City Hall that would later give rise to the PCC (Figure 32).

The initiative came originally from the community's left-wing, who later extended the call for unity to their counterparts on the right, including St. Mary's priest Alberto Cunha and his allies. Its founding president was Domingos da Costa Gomes, an exiled lawyer who represented political prisoners in Portugal. Besides being a PCP organizer, he was also an active member of the MDP and PCDA in Montreal and Toronto. Despite the anti-Salazar credentials of some of its members, the PCC's inaugural meeting was held at the Portuguese consulate in Toronto, with the participation of Consul Luis Martins; according to some, "a great force behind the formation of the Congress." But peace between the opposing political factions was short-lived, as those organizations close to the consulate split from the PCC only three months after its founding and created their own umbrella organization: the Federation of Portuguese Canadian Organizations of Ontario. This rival organization, which planned to "stay out of Portuguese domestic politics", wrote Premier John P. Robarts claiming that the PCC made fictitious claims as to the

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623 PCC by-laws, Chapter 1, Art. 1, September 26, 1969, RG 8-5 Box 233, B229091, Portuguese Canadian Congress, AO.

624 For a detailed account of the events surrounding the death of Ângelo Nóbrega and the organized response from the Portuguese of Toronto, see the PCHP online exhibit: "Taking it to the streets: Portuguese protests and parades in Toronto", url: http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp/protests_and_parades/angelo_nobrega

625 Domingos da Costa Gomes (1921-2003) was born in the northern mainland city of Chaves. In 1943, he joined the PCP's youth wing and later the MUD's youth. In November 1955, already a lawyer, Gomes was arrested for "subversive activities", but was released the next year. In 1958, he helped set up a system for smuggling PCP leaders, like Álvaro Cunhal, to cross the Spanish border. Gomes was again charged in 1964 but managed to escape to France. After a period of time in Switzerland and Belgium, Gomes finally moved to Montreal with his wife and daughter in 1966, and then Toronto in 1969. Later that year he returned to Portugal where he continued to practice law. After 1974, Gomes became a regular candidate for the PCP in his home city of Chaves (Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, url: http://estudossobrecomunismo2.wordpress.com/2003/10/02/notas-biograficas-domingos-da-costa-gomes/; PIDE/ E/010 SC, Registo geral de presos, liv. 111, registo 22121 & PIDE/DG5, SC pr. 2274/64, u.i. 6757, Domingos Jorge da Costa Domes, ANTT).

626 "Importante Reunião de Todas as Organizações Portuguesas de Toronto", Luso-Canadiano, July 25, 1969; "Ministros num Jantar do Congresso", Correio Português, April 15, 1970 (m.t.), F0571, 2010-018/004 & /005, David Higgs fonds, CTASC.

627 The organizations composing the FPCOO were: the FPCC; St. Mary's Portuguese Parish Centre; the Canadian Madeira Club; the Portuguese Canadian Credit Union; the UPC's Lodge 66; the Portuguese Cultural Centre; and the St. Christ Band (clipping, RG 8-5 Box 233, B229091, Portuguese Canadian Congress, AO).
size of its membership and lacked legitimacy to represent Ontario's Portuguese. As a result of this split, a new PCC executive was elected, this time led by the businessmen Manuel Mira. Costa Gomes, who accused the right-wing faction of conducting a smear campaign against him and his associates, and of running "divide and rule" tactics in the community, returned to Portugal in November 1969. After this, the dissident federation virtually disappeared.

Under Mira, the PCC made efforts to increase its community profile by providing social services to immigrants. Yet, by late 1970, another executive took over, led by Fernando Costa, a chemical engineer of Goan descent, and a riding organizer for the governing Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario. One of Costa's first actions as PCC president was to write to various Ontario Ministers requesting their assistance, warning them that "the existence of closed communities, excluded of the political life, are a potential danger for peaceful and democratic life of the country, as we have seen in many cities of U.S.A. [sic] and in Montreal." Of the Ontario Education Minister, Costa requested more ethnic and racial minority appointees to the governing bodies of community colleges. From the Minister of Citizenship, John Yaremko (a MPP for the increasingly Portuguese riding of Bellwoods in Toronto), Costa requested a $1,000 monthly grant. Federal and provincial officials welcomed the PCC and agreed to support the Portuguese community, which according to them needed "all the help it can get". However, upon further investigation, they became concerned about the divisive and "competitive nature" of Toronto's Portuguese. As one bureaucrat later put it, "we probably could not work with or help any group without getting some flak from the others."

In March 1971, Minister Yaremko announced he would provide the PCC with a non-recurring grant. But before the month was over, Costa would resign following an internal dispute with those executive members affiliated with the "anti-fascist" PCDA, known in the community as a "communist" organization. The dispute focused on Costa's covert attempt to include Consul

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628 Letter, Candido Guerreiro, FPCC, to Ontario Premier John P. Robarts, January 5, 1970, RG 8-5 Box 233, B229091, Portuguese Canadian Congress, AO.
630 Letter, Fernando Costa to Minister of Education Robert Welch, December 15, 1970, AO, RG 8-5 Box 233, B229091, Portuguese Canadian Congress.
631 In his letter to Minister Welch, Costa referred specifically to George Brown College in Toronto. Internal government correspondence revealed that officials were aware of Costa's "very threatening approach to several departments... as a result of some job that he held at George Brown Community College", and saw him as a "controversial and aggressive (overbearing?) personality in the Portuguese community... viewed with some suspicion and no little dislike by the members of the community" (correspondence between D. Russ Colombo and Deputy Minister R. M. Warren, Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, February 25 & March 8, 1971, ibid).
632 Various memorandums, D. Russ Colombo, February to March, 1971, ibid.; notes for the Minister, Ban 2003-01367-9, box 128, File 3260-P2-190/P15, Multiculturalism Directorate, NAC.
Martins and Fr. Cunha in the Portugal Day celebrations, which Toronto's Mayor William Dennison invited the PCC to organize. The leftist wing within the PCC was outraged by the consul's inclusion, as they refused to recognize Salazar's diplomats as Portugal's rightful representatives, and contended the inclusion of religious ceremonies contravened the PCC's secular by-laws. After Costa's resignation, another administration was elected, the fourth in less than two years.

Considering the announcement had already been made, the Ontario government decided to proceed with its grant despite the PCC's internal turmoil and Cunha's constant attacks through his newspaper. Ontario officials were aware of Cunha's "rather negative attitudes towards any new agencies or development which might detract from his own position in the Portuguese community." Still, they became less reluctant to fund the PCC after learning that its purportedly communist members were no longer part of its administration, thus removing "the final obstacle [for] proceeding with the grant". The cheque was presented to the new executive after the Portuguese Week celebrations.

As previously mentioned, the Estado Novo turned Portugal Day into a large propaganda event. One of its first official celebrations in North America took place in New York City, in 1957. The Casa de Portugal organized the festivities with the assistance from the Portuguese consuls in California and the East coast. Luis Gomes, who combined the roles of UPC's president and Casa de Portugal staff member, travelled to California to raise funds for this event among the local Portuguese mutual aid societies. The high point of the festivities was a parade of Portuguese-American organizations from New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and California on Fifth Avenue.

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633 Fernandes, 2010, 63-64.
634 José Henriques, "Ainda a Semana Portuguesa", _O Boletim_, June-July, 1971, Year 1, n. 9-10, F0579 2009-022/001 (13) PCDA fonds, CTASC.
635 Memo, John Gallucci & D. R. Colombo to Executive Director Community Services Division, Donald R. Martyn, April 27, 1971, Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, RG 8-5 Box 233, B229091, Portuguese Canadian Congress, AO; John Slinger, "Portuguese Unity Hard to Achieve", _Globe & Mail_, August 27, 1971, GM-TPL.
636 A question mark is handwritten beside this sentence, presumably by D. R. Martyn, the letter's recipient. In his report, Colombo also noted: "We are a little puzzled as to how the [PCDA] could be considered to have left-wing or communist leanings... I assume there could be a tendency for the Portuguese Government to consider them subversive and to attach a left-wing or communist label to the group. However, there is nothing that we could discover in the program of the Association, or the attitudes of its members, that would support such a statement" (letter, D. R. Colombo to D. R. Martyn, May 5, 1971, RG 8-5 Box 233, B229091, Portuguese Canadian Congress, AO).
637 Ambassador Fernandes was upset about Luis Gomes' trip to California, which he considered "an inexplicably overzealous action by an unqualified entity". In the ambassador's opinion, the Casa de Portugal representative had overstepped the rules of diplomatic representation, which reserved community outreach initiatives to the consulates (letter, Amb. L. Fernandes to PMFA, Oct. 10, 1956 (m.t.), PEA M307, Colônias Portuguesas nos E. U. A. Inst. Port. e Sociedades Portuguesas nos E. U., AHD).
638 Letter, J. Freire d'Andrade, Director of Casa de Portugal, New York City, to SNI, December 10, 1956, ibid.
the United States since then, it was not until the late 1960s that the Portuguese government began celebrating its national holiday in North America in a consistent and coordinated manner.

The (trans)national holiday provided diplomats with an opportunity to unite emigrants and their descendants, and rally their diverse civic leaders around their common heritage. Consuls in the United States started sponsoring the formation of Portugal Day organizing committees involving the largest possible number of Portuguese-American clubs and associations. Their coordinated efforts resulted in richer programs that sometimes expanded to week-long festivities, attracting large crowds; in 1969, close to 30,000 people participated in Providence's Portugal Day celebrations, believed by the organizers to be the largest Portuguese concentration in the United States up to that point.639

A few years prior, in 1967, the June celebrations coincided with the visit of the Portuguese Navy school ship Sagres to Virginia. After various community requests, Navy officers decided to include stops at various northeastern port cities with large Portuguese settlements. However, deciding which cities to include was a delicate matter, as they had to account for any potential rivalries and jealousies between them. Community leaders solicited the endorsement of American dignitaries in order to convince homeland officials of the worthiness and prestige of their receptions. At the same time, it was the promise of diplomatic and military pageantry that lured governors, senators, state representatives, admirals, and other powerful Americans to the events of an otherwise humble immigrant community. Preparing Sagres' visit to Newark, the new consul in New York City, Alexandre L. Veiga, called a meeting with prominent Portuguese-Americans where he stressed the need to project the image of a united community. In order for this reception to have a collective character, they agreed with the consul's suggestion that it should be organized by a committee of representatives from every Portuguese-American organization in New Jersey. In Veiga's own words, his intention was to "show state and local authorities that New Jersey's Portuguese community was already capable of unity [and represented] a potential force not to be neglected, especially considering that those authorities are elected by direct suffrage, and the higher or lower respect they have towards foreign communities is directly related to the unity these are capable of showing."640

639 Letter, Consul Manuel Alves de Carvalho, Providence, to PMFA, June 10, 1969, PEA M607, Comunidades Portuguesas no Estrangeiro. Celebração Dia de Portugal, AHD.

Once again, these propagandistic events were also convenient for the anti-Salazarists to carry their own political actions. For example, in 1964, a group of Portuguese "anti-fascists" distributed political literature to Sagres' young cadets visiting Providence that year.\(^{641}\) Similarly, in 1967, members of the MDP attended a reception at a Portuguese Navy frigate docked in Montreal and handed out political pamphlets to the sailors, informing them of the existence of a group of political exiles in Canada who opposed the regime and its colonial wars, and who were prepared to assist them should they choose to desert.\(^{642}\) Nonetheless, while being aware of the propagandistic nature of the June 10 celebrations, as dedicated patriots, political exiles were also drawn to the civic spirit of the national holiday and appreciated the opportunity to celebrate their homeland with their fellow expatriates. Sometimes this led to unlikely collaborations, as was the case with Newark's Portugal Day organizing committee of 1970, sponsored by the Portuguese consul and Casa de Portugal, and chaired by the Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal's (CPDP) secretary Eduardo Covas.\(^{643}\) That year, Montreal's MDP decided to organize their own June 10 event - a conference and poetry session. Such was their uneasiness with this perceived hypocrisy that they released a communiqué justifying their decision: "[By] participat[ing] in this commemoration... we want to affirm our people's unity beyond the political manoeuvres with which they want to divide us, and pay testimony to the fact that it is possible to bring peace to the Portuguese family even if the people do not have the material means to defeat the anti-democratic forces."\(^{644}\)

In Canada, Portugal Day was first celebrated as a large community affair in 1966. That year, the recently arrived Fr. Cunha organized the festivities, which attracted several thousand people to Toronto's Exhibition Coliseum.\(^{645}\) In 1967, coinciding with the Canadian Centennial commemorations and the 50th anniversary of the Fátima apparitions, Cunha arranged another momentous Portugal Day celebration, which included a parade with 11 floats representing different Portuguese cities, and a small army of children dressed in white outfits bearing the Portuguese Military Order of Christ cross, marching through some of Toronto's major downtown streets (Figure 33). The event ended with a large open-air mass celebrated by the Bishop of Vila

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641 Letters, A. O. Águas to E. Covas, June 09 and July 26, 1964, CD25A-CPDP.
642 Letter, F. Santos, FPLN, to PCDA, June 21, 1967; "Manifesto de Antifascistas Portugueses Emigrados e Exilados no Canadá à Tripulação da Fragata Almirante Pereira da Silva," 1967, F0579 2009-022/002 (10), ...004 (14) PCDA fonds, CTASC.
643 Clipping, Luso-Americano, June 04, 1970, PEA M656, II Celebração do Dia da Festa Nacional, AHD.
644 Communiqué, MDP, June 1970 (m.t.), F0579 2009-022/005 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
Real at Toronto's Maple Leaf Stadium, where 10,000 people were said to be in attendance. The following year, the Ontario government recognized Cunha's organizational efforts by officially proclaiming the week of June 10 as Portuguese Week.646

Initially, the Portugal Day festivities in Canada were organized by a small group of community elites coming together with the consul and deciding how Portuguese immigrants should celebrate themselves and their homeland. Their programs usually included an official proclamation by the local mayor; a ceremonial raising of the Portuguese flag at city hall, with speeches by political dignitaries; a commemorative mass at a Portuguese parish; a street parade, often with nationalistic and religious overtones; folk dance performances (ranchos); and a football match. As the event grew in popularity, those community associations that had been previously left out of the restricted organizing committees began demanding a seat at the table, or tried to exclude the consul and his traditional clients, as was the case with Toronto's Portuguese Week celebrations of 1971.

After the PCC's membership rejected Costa's proposal to invite the consul and the Portuguese priests, the organization fell into disarray and failed to deliver on the mayor's request. Instead, Cunha and his committee moved ahead with their Portuguese Week program, as they had done in previous years. This time, however, the PCDA decided to disrupt the celebrations by staging a rally during the consul's flag raising ceremony at City Hall, and distributing political flyers at various consulate receptions, where they were met with violence by a few Estado Novo supporters in the crowd.647

With the PCC's prolonged collapse, which dragged on until 1974, another organization tried to unite Toronto's Portuguese. The Pro-Culture Society, founded by Humberto Carvalho648 in April 1972, had the distinct goals of introducing Canadians to more sophisticated aspects of Portuguese culture and consolidating the community's political power. Speaking to a Star reporter, Carvalho bemoaned the divisive and belligerent attitudes of “so-called leaders”, which prevented the "few Portuguese who are qualified to ‘direct’ the community [from] offer[ing]

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647 Manuel Sanches, "Carta Aberta ao 'Novo Mundo'," O Boletim, June-July, 1971, Year 1, n. 9-10, F0579 2009-022/001 (13) PCDA fonds, CTASC.

648 Humberto Carvalho was born in Ponta Delgada, where he worked as a school teacher and a bank staff worker. He moved to Toronto in 1965 where he became a branch manager for a Canadian bank, and later started a company that imported construction materials from Portugal. Carvalho was also a grassroots organizer for the Progressive Conservative Party's Bellwoods riding association, and an amateur stage director with his own theatre company.
their services to their people.” Some time after this interview was published, a disgruntled reader wrote a letter to the editor berating Carvalho and his society:

[T]oo often in the last couple of years your newspaper has discovered too many people who are going to unify the Portuguese community once and for all. I am disappointed at this waste of time and talent. The issues that are really important, essential and useful to the community are: How to get work; how to get higher education; how to learn a skill; how not to be exploited by travel agents; how to be informed correctly about immigration laws; and how to survive in a different and many times hostile society. The Portuguese community is poor, uneducated, and young. It has no time to worry about phony culture defenders. After all, what culture can they get from businessmen who are only interested in promoting themselves? Culture happens naturally, it doesn't come out of board rooms, wrapped in plastic, as some kind of detergent.

This reader's criticism reflected the general feeling among the community's working-class majority, who in the 1970s began articulating a grassroots response to the social problems affecting them, as we will discuss in chapter eight. As for the Pro-Culture Society, despite its initial success (about 200 persons attended its first few monthly meetings) it eventually became a hub for the community's upper class and failed to make any significant civic, cultural, or political impact in Toronto.

Conclusion

Like any ethnic group in North America, the Portuguese were not a homogeneous bunch. Their civil society was riddled with conflicts between different factions and failed to represent the full extent of their communities' diversity. Generational, regional, political, class, gender, and racial solidarities all complicated the meaning of "Portuguese" ethnic identity, although some groups had more power to influence mainstream perceptions than others. White middle-class men from the mainland of Portugal were able to secure most ethnic leadership positions in the increasingly multicultural nations of Canada and the United States, where identity politics moved government resources with real socioeconomic implications.

Ethnic markets formed in highly concentrated Portuguese neighbourhoods allowed for the small group of immigrant tradesmen, businessmen, and professionals to sell their skills shortly after arriving in the new country, and for average workers to aspire to middle-class status by opening their own businesses. In Canada, it was these community "elites" who became ethnic entrepreneurs, as Brettell called them, and profited from their intermediary role between

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649 Joe Serge, “The Seven who are Trying to Unite Metro’s 50,000 Portuguese Immigrants”, *Toronto Star*, Jul. 15, 1972, PP-TPL.
immigrant and host societies, by linking economic interests to their civic volunteerism. Their
grip on Portuguese civic institutions was compounded by their group's recent migration and their
relative educational advantage over their rural peers. In the United States, the combination of
ethnic broker and patron was played at a much higher level, since a considerable number of
Portuguese-Americans already occupied positions of power in mainstream institutions when their
coethic newcomers began arriving in the mid-1960s. The term elites is also more appropriate
to describe Portuguese leaders in the United States than in Canada, since the former amassed a
larger body of upper-class, highly educated, distinguished professionals and public officials,
while the latter included many lower middle class, moderately educated, small businessmen, who
were only relatively better off economically than their working-class peers.

Portuguese diplomats recognized this important difference when dealing with each
community. Ethnic leaders sought the material and symbolic patronage of diplomats in order to
strengthen their status as transnational brokers and improve the collective profile of their
immigrant group, highlighting its cultural and political affiliation with such an old European
imperial nation and Western ally. At the same time, diplomats deliberately empowered these
community elites in order to best make use of their positions of influence and increase their
leverage with host country officials. In this sense, diplomats also played the dual role of brokers
and patrons, not only between emigrants and their homeland government, but also between
ethnic leaders and their host nation's officials.651

In Canada, the communities' nascent character and limited elite pool increased the
relative value of the "favours" dispensed by the diplomats to aspiring community leaders.
Diplomats were, therefore, better suited to manipulate the organizational efforts and public
opinion of Portuguese communities in Canada. In the United States, they had a fair amount of
influence over community affairs and were regularly asked for their patronage, especially after
Portuguese mass immigration restarted in the mid-1960s. However, they were also clients of
powerful Portuguese-American ethnic entrepreneurs, such as the heads of the large mutual aid
fraternities, who could sway their ethnic communities' public opinion, which often oscillated in
their support for the dictatorship, as we will see in chapter six. Moreover, the expatriate
"colonies" in Canada were not as strategic to the Estado Novo as those in the United States,

651 The same was true for Mussolini's consulates in Montreal and Toronto, who "intervened in the affairs of 'Little Italy' by
bestowing legitimacy on certain community leaders and by providing assistance to immigrants" (in Perin, 1984, 136).
which were more numerous, more powerful, thus better positioned to influence American politics and ultimately more useful for the regime.

In the United States, internal divisions were reanimated with the mass arrival of Portuguese immigrants in the 1960s. While "greenhorns" revived the civic life of old Portuguese settlements, becoming the dominant group in their communities, the traditionally powerful Portuguese-American fraternities saw their influence drop quickly as they failed to attract newcomers. At this point, Portuguese diplomats recognized the need to change their outreach strategies and focus on setting up ethnic confederations and empowering new leaders. Still, they had to rely on whatever community elites were available to carry on their consolidation projects, even when these leaders had been problematic in the past. However, old personal and political rivalries continued within these ethnic confederations and were sometimes too strong to be overcome by common civic and patriotic goals.

Regardless of the motivations behind the community leaders', homeland diplomats', and host government officials' uses for ethnicity, its political currency relied on the cultural distinction of the immigrant group; especially as multiculturalism emerged as the new framework for civic and political interactions between immigrant and host nation officials. Hence, the promotion of Portuguese cultural values and traditions in Canadian and American public life carried with it underlying political agendas, one of which was the Estado Novo's national and foreign interests, as we will see in the next chapter.
Fig. 28 - First Portuguese Canadian Club children Christmas party, 1966 (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/003, ASC17697).

Fig. 29 - First Portuguese Canadian Club player celebrates a goal against Toronto rivals Serbian White Eagles, 1970 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC12877).

Fig. 30 - Ontario Minister John Yaremko performs the ceremonial kick-off during football match between the Greek club Olympiakos and a Portuguese club in Toronto. Photo by Bill Russel for the Toronto Telegram, 1967 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC12881).
Fig. 31 - Band set to perform for the 'Portuguese Hour' radio show hosted by Francisco Oliveira (on the left), on New Bedford's WNBH station (photo published in Diário de Notícias, July 26, 1955, 4, in ad celebrating the show's 18th anniversary).

Fig. 32 - Portuguese protesting police violence against immigrants on Nathan Phillips Square, Toronto. Photo by Jim Kennedy for Toronto Telegram, May 17, 1969 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC08235).

Fig. 33 - Children carrying the Portuguese, Vatican, Canadian, and Canada's Centennial flags during Portugal Day parade, while marching down Bathurst St., Toronto. Photo by Leo Harrison for the Toronto Telegram June 19, 1967 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC08319).
5. MAKING ETHNIC CULTURE: NATIONAL PROPAGANDA, POPULAR ARTS, AND LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION, 1950s-60s

"It matters little, if from the Azores, Madeira, or the Mainland. What matters is that we be good folk."
Song performed by the Rancho Folclórico das Provincias e Ilhas de Portugal.\(^{652}\)

The extent of what has been written on ethnicity and its role in shaping migrant experiences is overwhelming. Views on the authenticity of ethnic cultures, their survival over multiple generations, their role in distributing material resources and political capital, along with other social and cultural significances, have evolved since historians began studying this topic.\(^{653}\) Scholars have moved away from the early conclusions of social scientists who considered ethnic cultures to be crystalized versions of "old world" traditions transplanted to the "new world", and evidence of the immigrant's refusal to assimilate into the dominant host culture. The consensus today is to see ethnic cultures as situational formations that change according to the challenges and opportunities confronted by immigrant groups, in a process that involves constant negotiation between ethnic spokespeople, like politicians, journalists, artists, activists, or community workers, and their host societies' dominant structures. Though often deemed "folk" or "traditional" in multiculturalist celebrations, historians have found these ethnic cultures to be the product of the adaptation of pre-migration customs (often rural) to receiving contexts (often urban). In other words, the ethnic cultures of North American immigrant groups are fluid hybrid constructs that originate and develop in migrant contexts that are in a constant state of flux.

While not entirely new to migration historiography, the conceptual frameworks of transnationalism and diaspora further complicated notions about ethnic culture. It has become clear that, despite responding to realities encountered in the migrant contexts, and therefore differing from the original practices that informed them, these cultural constructs were in various cases the result of bilateral exchanges between the ethnic leaders and homeland officials, each pursuing their own agendas, as was the case with the Portuguese in North America. Although "-American" or "-Canadian", their ethnicities were constructed and maintained through a process

\(^{652}\) "Pouco importa, se dos Açores, da Madeira, ou continente. O que interessa é que sejamos boa gente". The rancho Of The Provinces And Islands Of Portugal is a folk dance troupe based in Hamilton, Ontario, founded in the early 1980s.

\(^{653}\) Sökefeld (2006, 266), who considered diasporas to be "a special case of ethnicity", summarized the literature on ethnicity as a debate between primordialists/essentialists and situationalists/constructionists, the first arguing that "ethnic identity derives almost naturally from experiences of belonging in primordial communities like the family or other congregations, that identity is largely stable and continuous and that it depends on given cultural traditions," while the latter, "the theoretically dominant perspective today, argues... that ethnic identity is the result of processes of attribution. Yet, the theoretical perspective of constructionism does not rid us of primordialism because primordialism is a very powerful political device."
that was both local and transnational. Hence, the survival of ethnic identity over various
generations is not only determined by the temporal distance to the pre-migration experience, or
by the shifting structures of host societies, but also by the extent to which the homeland has the
will and the resources to nurture it.

This chapter focuses on the role played by the Estado Novo's policies and state officials
in shaping the ethnic identities of Portuguese immigrants and descendants in the increasingly
pluralist postwar North American society. While I pay special attention to transnational relations
and public performances of ethnic culture, I do not intend to minimize the significance of place
in understanding the formation of ethnic identities, nor the importance of studying the
immigrant's daily lives for understanding their cultures as "socially produced structures of
meaning". Here I heed Perin's caution against the tendency among social scientists to
essentializing the cultural behaviours of immigrants as simply "ethnic", without taking into
account their improvisation, creativity and ability to adapt to new contexts. In his words, "the
concept of culture must be broadened to encompass aspects of everyday life which, after all, are
its very basis. Immigrant history, it must be stressed, is not about ‘national’ culture, but about
popular culture." However, I argue that the "popular" Portuguese culture promoted in the
expatriate communities and performed for North American audiences was deeply connected to
the "national" culture imagined and propagated by the Portuguese government. As Kathleen
Conzen and co-authors argued: "It is a truism of immigration historiography that the masses of
immigrants brought no sense of nationality to America with them, only local identities and
allegiances. This may indeed have been true in a day-to-day sense. But it was not only the
leaders who had memories of nationalist calls upon their loyalties." Drawing on Eric
Hobsbawm's concept of "invented traditions," this group of prominent American migration
historians argued:

...ethnicity is not a "collective fiction," but rather a process of construction or invention which
incorporates, adapts, and amplifies preexisting communal solidarities, cultural attributes, and

657 Hobsbawm defined "invented traditions" as "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a
ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically
implies continuity with the past... However, insofar as there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of 'invented'
traditions is that the continuity with it is largely fictitious. In short, they are responses to novel situations which take the form of
reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition" (in "Introduction: Inventing
historical memories... Ethnic groups in modern settings are constantly recreating themselves, and
ethnicity is continuously being reinvented in response to changing realities both within the group
and the host society.\textsuperscript{658}

This was the case with North America's Portuguese communities, whose "changing realities"
included the national "traditions" advanced by the \textit{Estado Novo}'s cultural propaganda and
tourism marketing, and the proto-multiculturalist ideologies and public policies developing in
Canada and the United States. This chapter discusses how the Portuguese regime's self-conscious
project of (re)inventing national identity was an important transnational factor in the making of
Portuguese ethnic culture in North America's increasingly multiculturalist societies. Here I will
also problematize the traditional/modern dichotomy that sometimes underpins characterizations
of ethnic cultures and demonstrate how the two often coexisted in the immigrant's worldview.

Language was another crucial factor in the formation of ethnic identities and intra-ethnic
community relations. More than a sense of shared national identity, it was linguistic kinship that
led sojourners in an unfamiliar and often inhospitable land to seek the company of their
countrymen when travelling, working, and boarding. The linguistic interdependency of the
immigrant generation, who for the most part could not speak the dominant language(s) of their
host societies, was also at the core of their residential concentration, which itself was at the
genesis of ethnic neighbourhoods. Much has been written on heritage language retention and its
significance in articulating and preserving ethnic cultures, leading to the ambiguous consensus
that different communities ascribe it different value.\textsuperscript{659} As for the Portuguese, scholars agree that
this group "consider[s] language a powerful contributor to the community's sense of
cohesiveness"; a view that is supported by its high levels of residential concentration, and by
statistical data from the 1970s onward, which ranks Portuguese among the top ethnic
communities in terms of heritage language retention.\textsuperscript{660} The high value placed on native
language among the Portuguese in North America is reflected in their organized attempts to
introduce language classes in private community and mainstream public schools.

\textsuperscript{658} Conzen et al., 1992, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{659} Contributing to this view was Jeffrey Reitz's and Raymond Breton's research, who after studying Canadian and American
realities concluded that: "Language is a vital component of culture, although it is not equally so for all groups. For some, its loss
seems to be close to complete acculturation; others can abandon it and yet retain other cultural elements" (in \textit{The Illusion of
Difference: Realities and Ethnicity in Canada and the United States}, 1994, cit. in Rena Helms-Park, "Two Decades of Heritage
\textsuperscript{660} For a summary of the literature and statistical data produced on heritage language retention among the Portuguese in Canada,
see Helms-Park, 2000.
Portuguese language, however, was not the anodyne common denominator of national and ethnic culture that one might expect from a nation that prides itself on being linguistically homogenous since the 13th century. The linguistic construction of Portuguese ethnicity in North America was, to varied degrees, a process of domination by one regional variation over the rest. As the sociolinguist Emanuel da Silva noted: "the dominant discourse recognizes that 'standard' Portuguese is spoken in the regions of Lisbon and Coimbra in Mainland Portugal. All the other regional and international varieties of Portuguese are made to fall in the line behind it, starting with other varieties spoken in Mainland Portugal, Madeira, the Azores, Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, East Timor, and in the Portuguese diaspora or elsewhere." Particularly significant to the North American context was the relation between the minority of "standard" Portuguese speakers from the mainland and the Azorean majority who spoke the Micaelense variety, whose accent is sometimes considered impenetrable by other Portuguese speakers. This linguistic distinction heightened larger social, economic, religious and cultural tensions between Azoreans and mainlanders. In communities where Micaelenses were the majority, the predominance of "standard" Portuguese in ethnic cultural expressions suggests a process of linguistic domination. As da Silva argued, the homeland and host states "legitimized" the dominant group's "cultural and linguistic capital" by promoting a homogenous ethnicity that corresponded with their respective imperialist and multicultural national visions. In this sense, he adds: "the discursive practice of associating Azorean Portuguese with Micaelense, the most marginalized variety of European Portuguese, became a strategy of marginalization and advantage." This chapter analyzes the process and the spaces of regional and linguistic domination/marginalization in the construction and recognition of "Portuguese-" ethnic identity in North America.

Traditional versus modern: the cultural and educational policies of the Estado Novo

In a country where political engagement was forcefully discouraged and civil society highly restricted, national culture was the only area available for the Estado Novo to mobilize its

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661 Da Silva, 2011, 105.
662 While popularly understood in the Lusophone world to be common across the archipelago, the Micaelense accent is specific to the island of São Miguel. Other Azorean islands have their own accents, though none as distant from the "standard" Portuguese as Micaelense. Even within São Miguel there are local varieties of Micaelense, the most impenetrable being the one spoken in the fishing town of Rabo de Peixe. This accent is said to result from the island's mixed colonization in the 15th century by Portuguese settlers from the southern regions of Alentejo and Algarve (these too having their own distinct accents) and France.
663 Da Silva, 2011, 106.
citizens. Portuguese people everywhere were invited to participate in the affairs of the nation by assuming their role as agents of its "spiritual mission" in the world. Salazar's doctrine was simple: "We need to convince the people that happiness is not achievable by modern life and its artifices, but by each one seeking to adapt to the characteristics of his external environment."664 The dictator was persistent in his rejection of modernity and its ill effects on Western societies, particularly those that related to the progressive secularization of life, the proletarianization and politicization of labour, the competitiveness and individualism of liberalism, and the relentless material accumulation of capitalism. As David Corkill and José Almeida pointed out, Salazar "re-imagined Portugal as an oasis of peace and internal order, a problem-free country that served as an example to other nations at a time of international upheaval and war... [T]he regime had developed a distinctively Portuguese solution to the crisis that fell outside the dominant contemporary political ideologies... In essence, the message was that simple peasant living was superior to modern, materialist dominated culture."665 This was the paradigm that Portuguese ethnic leaders had to work with in their dealings with the homeland government.

The corporatist, nationalist and imperialist ideology supporting the Estado Novo was disseminated via an extensive propaganda apparatus and cultural policy based on a "nationalist-ruralist-traditionalist model of popular culture."666 Originally coordinated by the SPN, the política do espírito (politics of the spirit), as formulated by its inspired director António Ferro (1933-49), was supposed to lead to the moral regeneration of Portuguese people by inculcating in them a sense of national identity based on Christianity, family, historical consciousness, rurality and its popular traditions. The dictatorship's conservative ethos was aestheticized by Ferro, who skillfully recovered and reinvented traditional forms of popular culture (e.g. folk dances), and combined them with erudite conventions (e.g. ethnographic museums) and modern mass media (e.g. cinema). Despite the regime's early ideological rejection of modernity, Ferro used cinema, radio and the stage arts to engage a population that was largely illiterate.

In 1944, the SPN changed its name to Secretariat of National Information (SNI), then to Secretariat of State of Information and Tourism (SEIT) in 1968. Ferro remained at the helm of the Secretariat until 1949, at which point he resigned, disappointed with its rigid bureaucratic

666 Melo, 2001, 375 (m.t.).
structure and lack of funding. Without Ferro, the SNI lost much of its cohesive vision. Its initiatives became more pragmatic, responsive, and concerned primarily with monitoring the cultural activities of private organizations. Nevertheless, the SNI/SEIT continued to incorporate popular culture in a vast range of programs that penetrated the everyday lives of Portuguese people.

After the war, as Portugal's industrial infrastructure developed, a new collective imagination emerged in some sectors of society, one that privileged material progress and modernity over economic conservatism and spiritual values. But at the same time the country modernized, the regime renewed its commitment to promoting ethnographic manifestations of popular culture, such as folk dance performances (*ranchos*), which flourished in the 1950s. Various authors have explained the dictatorship’s traditionalist and historicist rhetoric during this period as a way of countering the unwanted changes introduced by industrialization. By linking the state with the nation's past, this traditionalist rhetoric preserved "an element of continuity where Portuguese people could recognize themselves historically in a nation with a living heritage that was still present." In other words, the state and the collective memory of Portuguese people were represented as one and the same.

In order to meet the growing demands for qualified industrial labour, the government introduced measures to abate Portugal's high illiteracy rates. These included an Adult Education National Campaign in 1952, which involved the mass circulation of educational films. In 1956, it introduced mandatory schooling to 4th grade for boys and 3rd grade for girls; in 1964, mandatory schooling was raised to 6th grade for both sexes. The positive results of this investment in public education became apparent by the 1960s, when illiteracy rates dropped below 30% of the population (still one of the highest rates in Europe). Lower-class families, however, still could not afford university education for their children. The only viable alternative for lower-class boys to pursue advanced studies was to enroll in a seminary, which still involved considerable personal and financial costs.

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667 As Daniel Melo (2011, 211) noted in his study of the *Estado Novo*'s popular cultural policies, after Ferro left, "the [SNI's] projects became less flamboyant and ambitious, its cover strategy less globalizing or systematic, its actions more concrete, and its publics more limited and compartmentalized. In sum, its priorities were different: information control, a more elitist cultural propaganda and tourist advertisement."

668 Melo, 2001, 103 (m.t.).

669 Domingos Marques, a Portuguese immigrant from the Aveiro region who settled in Canada in 1968, spoke of his family's decision to enroll him in the seminary as a child and of his later experience as an educated young man in Toronto's Portuguese community, in a filmed interview for the PCHP online exhibit *Comunidade newspaper, 1975-1979. Part 2: Video interviews*, url: http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp/Comunidade_video
Despite his suspicion of public education, as a former professor, Salazar valued intellectual pursuits and scholarship but reserved those to the elites. The dictator considered the formation of professional elites to be of greater importance to the welfare of the nation than improving its population's literacy, as he explained in an interview with Ferro in 1938:

> Our great problem [...] is that of training elites that can educate and direct the Nation. Their weakness or deficiency is the gravest national crisis... I do think there is greater urgency in constituting vast elites than to teach everyone how to read. This is because the great national problems must be resolved not by the people but by the elites framing the masses.\(^{670}\)

Under this paternalistic ideology, and in the absence of a dynamic civil society, universities played an essential role as talent pools for the Estado Novo's cadres. Compared to other sectors of Portuguese society, universities enjoyed a greater (though limited) degree of intellectual freedom and were important windows to the world, where information circulated with greater ease. An unintended result of this relative freedom within universities was the emergence of militant groups of student activists who organized a number of high profile protests in the 1960s. The number of postsecondary students increased steadily during the life of the regime, growing rapidly in the 1970s, as Caetano (a former dean of the University of Lisbon) opened a number of new universities and renovated old ones in some of Portugal's largest mainland cities.

The Estado Novo rejected the anti-spiritalist secularizing ideas behind the First Republic's positivist program for advancing scientific research and scholarship in Portugal.\(^{671}\) But despite the censorship, university faculty purges, and other measures inhibiting critical thinking and scientific production, the regime assimilated some republican initiatives and supporters. In 1929, it created the National Education Junta, which set out to create and subsidize research centres, scholarships, international scholar exchanges, and divulge Portuguese literate culture abroad. The promotion of Portuguese language and literature abroad was another important task assigned to this government agency. As noted in one of its first reports, this was partially motivated by international political concerns: "Our door for entering foreign Universities is the teaching of Portuguese language and literature. Even if it was not done already, this should be one of the main preoccupations of the National Education Junta, since knowledge of a country's language is the most powerful enabler for its propaganda and cultural

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\(^{670}\) António Salazar interviewed for Diário de Notícias (Lisbon), October 16, 1938, cit. in Melo, ibid., 53 (m.t.).

In 1936, the Junta was placed under the newly created Ministry of National Education and renamed Institute for High Culture, which led to a significant loss in its administrative autonomy. The agency recovered some of its independence in 1952, but not its previously ample financial capacity. That year it was again renamed, becoming the Institute of High Culture (IAC), a designation it maintained until 1976. As Fernanda Rollo and co-authors argued, the 1950s and '60s (especially since the start of the colonial wars) was a period when the regime boosted its promotion of Portuguese "high culture" and language abroad, and when the IAC increased efforts to connect with Western European universities. In 1967, the IAC lost its responsibility over scientific and technological research to another government agency, allowing it to concentrate solely on disseminating Portuguese language and literate culture.

**Popular culture and rurality: the ranchos folclóricos**

One of the most popular representations of rurality and peasant traditions in Portugal were the ranchos folclóricos (folk dance troupes). Originating in the northern mainland region of Minho during the early decades of the 20th century, ranchos were disseminated across the country by the dictatorship as an expression of national culture. This propagation transformed the original local characteristics of its songs, choreographies, and outfits, and introduced new universal references to an idealized Portuguese rurality. To a considerable degree, state bureaucrats invented ranchos folclóricos as we know them today. Despite being part of the Estado Novo's cultural repertoire from its early days, it was only in the 1950s that ranchos proliferated in Portugal and became regular features at state ceremonies. The growing investment in tourism in this period, with its marketing events in Portugal and abroad, also regularly included rancho performances, thus playing an important role in popularizing them.

Ranchos became one of the most popular public manifestations of Portuguese culture among immigrants, and today continue to be one of the default expressions of ethnic identity at multicultural venues across North America. For those immigrant parents seeking to ward off the host society's assimilationist pressures, ranchos were also seen as a good way of instilling a sense of ethnic identity in their children. Those who wished to impose ethnic endogamy on their

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descendants also saw ranchos as appropriate venues for social interaction and seeking marriage partners. These descendants, who generally ignored the ethnography or political history of these practices, in turn became agents in the formation and dissemination of Portuguese identity in their communities through their performance of ethnicity.

By assuming social and cultural purposes specific to their North American context, and by rearranging their original (yet also reinvented) characteristics, ranchos in the immigrant communities departed from their counterparts in Portugal. Holton noted that, unlike post-1974 Portugal, which "overhauled costumes, musical repertoire and choreography to rid folklore of its ties to fascist cultural policy... [which] had turned folklore dancers into whirling national flags", ranchos in the emigrant communities "have not, for the most part, experienced fascist stigma nor undergone post-revolutionary cultural reform. Ranchos in the diaspora generally do not conduct ethnographic research; rather they recreate dances from books, videos, television programs or in consultation with other folklore groups in Portugal. Some perform the nation not the locality, using amalgamated costumes and repertoire sampled from all of Portugal's twelve regions." This improvised amalgamation did not result from a deliberate break with traditional ways or a lack of concern for authenticity, but rather from the lack of available resources and expertise.

The growing ethnic pluralism in postwar North America was a fertile ground for these ethnographic expressions of national culture to thrive. Even old settlement agencies like the International Institute hosted regular "Ethnic Weeks" showcasing the popular and most colourful traditions of the various ethnic groups in its catchment areas. Still, this liberal cosmopolitanism was not egalitarian. As Iacovetta argued for the Toronto case, the success of the Institute's ethnic programming "depended on the established Canadians' enjoyment and approval. For their part, the newcomers were expected to perform their role as pleasing, decorative symbols of Canadian tolerance and pluralism, and to perform an ethnicity that was a carefully contained presentation of music, costumes, dances, handicrafts, and food." City officials also began recognizing the potential benefits of this kind of "domestic tourism" and came to endorse

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674 Holton, 2009, 157-158.
675 Founded in New York City in 1910, the International Institute would open over 60 branches across the U.S., plus one in Toronto (since 1956). After the war it adopted the liberal cosmopolitan ideals and internationalism epitomized by the UN. Unlike other settlement agencies at that time, which were dedicated to assimilating newcomers, the International Institute encouraged immigrant groups to preserve their distinct cultural characteristics and build their ethnic communities while learning how to be loyal participating citizens of their adopted nations. The Toronto branch would become one of the largest settlement agencies in the city, where the Portuguese made up a sizable portion of their client base (Iacovetta, 2006, 83-84; Miranda, 2010, 85).
676 Iacovetta, 2006, 96.
multicultural events in the 1960s. Toronto Mayor Donald Summerville, for instance, was a self-avowed folklorist who championed the making of folk communities in his city.677 But as Iacovetta argued, while reflecting a growing appetite for cultural diversity among Canadians, this "folklorization of immigrants" was never meant to threaten the privileges of the dominant Anglo-Celtic group, or decentralize it from Canada's postwar nation-building project. On the contrary, this was about "turning immigrants into folk who carry with them quaint traditions that can be put on display for Canadian consumption." This process of "eating the other", as coined by bell hooks, allowed the dominant group to "co-opt the cultures of racial minorities as a way of strengthening their power and privilege."678

Portuguese diplomats followed these cultural debates with great interest, carefully considering how this growing pluralism could benefit their efforts to nurture the emigrants' ties to their homeland. Portuguese officials particularly appreciated the “folklorist” type of multiculturalism developing in Canada, since it fit the Estado Novo's propagandistic uses of popular culture. In 1962, a Portuguese rancho of Montreal performed at a folklore festival organized by the city's Catholic School Commission (Figure 34). Consul Fernando Marques reported to Lisbon that the troupe made a positive impression despite the fact it had not been able to secure authentic rancho costumes or a knowledgeable choreographer.679 Marques noted the great enthusiasm among the Quebecois for folkloric activities, pointing out that local authorities did not pursue a "melting pot" policy, but sought instead to maintain "the sociological individuality of the various ethnic groups." This, he added, "led me to think of the urgent necessity to give these initiatives the attention they are due, and to seek the necessary contributions from official or private Portuguese entities... so that Portugal is represented in this Country by folkloric troupes that can dignify the traditions and the art of our people."680

In 1964, Toronto's Rancho da Nazaré, the first of its kind in Canada, founded in 1958, won first prize in a local festival showcasing folk dances from different ethnic communities in the city. In attendance was Prime Minister Pearson who presented them with the award. Consul

678 Iacovetta, 2006, 60.
679 A common request made to the SNI's director during his visit to the Portuguese-American communities in 1960, was for Portugal to send experts who could mentor their ranchos on how to the best perform folkloric culture. “O Dr. Moreira Baptista Fala da Sua Visita aos E. Unidos”, Diário de Notícias, November 23, 1960, 6, DN-UMASS.
680 Letter, Consul Fernando Marques, Montreal, to PMFA, May 12, 1962 (m.t.). HDA 1962 Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá – Geral – União Católica PEA M400
Jorge Ritto reported to the ambassador in Ottawa that "the repercussion of this [award] in the colony was very large, given that it is the first time that a local Portuguese community organization achieves such notoriety and appreciation in the social life of this city.” Ritto was impressed by the size of the event, which involved forty competitors, including representations from Toronto's largest ethnic communities. He also noted that the Lisbon government had not subsidized the rancho, unlike the homeland governments of many of other national troupes. Other ranchos appeared in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia in the 1960s. Many of them travelled across North America, invited by other Portuguese communities to participate in local events, like the First Festival of Portuguese Folklore, held in Montreal in 1966; some were also invited to perform for larger mainstream audiences on Canadian and American television shows.

Despite repeated appeals from the consuls, none of the Estado Novo's agencies developed consistent plans to assist the cultural activities of Portuguese emigrants, other than simply react to the occasional requests for traditional costumes, music records, and decorative materials. For instance, upon soliciting the SNI for help in this matter, Consul Marques in Montreal received a collection of music records and a single traditional lavadeira (laundry woman) costume, which were to be kept at the consulate and lent to community associations. State officials who received these requests asked the diplomats to comment on the merits of the organizations' initiative, its benefits to Portugal's interests, and the “political suitability” of those involved. Even when requests were approved, it could take months before the government came through with its support; that is, when it did not fail to deliver altogether, which sometimes happened.

Although prepared to advocate for their local ranchos, most diplomats harboured a deep-seated disdain for the emigrants' unsophisticated forms of cultural expression, stemming from their uncomfortable relation as members of the educated upper classes with the peasant traditions of those they were supposed to represent. Part of the diplomats' duties was to monitor public opinion in their host countries and the ways in which Portugal and its government were portrayed in the international media. They were upset to find that Portugal was commonly

681 Letter, Consul J. L. Ritto to Amb. E. Brazão, May 13, 1964 (m.t.), PEA M400, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Actividades Associativas da Colónia Portuguesa em Toronto PEA, AHD.
682 Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 182.
perceived as a backward country stuck in antiquated traditions. Moreover, diplomats moved in elite social circles of the cities where they were posted. Surrounded by sophisticated high society individuals, they resented being associated with such "unflattering" rural imagery coming from their home country.

Upper-class immigrants and descendants also shared a similar unease about the prevailing representation of their ancestral home as a land of peasants, pervasive in both North American media and Portuguese propaganda. Consul Nogueira in Montreal complained to Lisbon about a Disney documentary screening in the city. According to the consul, the film, which focused exclusively on Portugal’s rural life, was “leaving a bad impression” in the community. The scene that most irritated him showed the grape harvest in the Douro region, where Port wine is produced, which culminated in the traditional pressing of the grapes by a dozen of barefoot men, with their pants rolled up to their knees, stomping the fruit to the sound of an accordion. Consul Nogueira was not aware if this was still a common practice, but knew that “such spectacle" was "unpleasant". He added: "I personally heard complaints from the audience – and I have been informed that this happens in every session – that translated into true repugnance for that scene… People will think twice before they drink another cup [of Port wine].”

Another diplomat who expressed his dislike of the regime's traditionalist imagery was Consul José M. Fragoso in New York. During preparations for the fifth centenary of Prince Henry the Navigator's death, in 1960, the consul communicated to Lisbon that there was a general desire in the community for images of modern Portugal. In forwarding a request from the organizers asking for photos of Portugal and Cape Verde, the consul asked that these show the various public works in progress in the mainland and colonies, instead of the "same old" images of natural landscapes and traditional customs. According to Fragoso, Portuguese-Americans were anxious to see the modern developments in their homeland, "instead of folkloric Portugal, which regardless of its human flavour and traditionalist charm, not only do not impress but also frustrate those - and there are many! - who, for better or for worse, have allowed themselves to be conquered by the surrounding obsession for material progress.”

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685 Letter, Consul A. S. Nogueira to PMFA, March 26, 1958 (m.t.), PEA M297, Propaganda Portugal Canadá – Diversos, AHD.
686 Letter, Consul J. M. Fragoso to PMFA, July 21, 1960 (m.t.), ibid.
wished for more images of industrial Portugal, he censured Portuguese emigrants for letting themselves become assimilated into North American capitalist culture and having a very modern desire for material accumulation.

**Selling Portugal: tourism, trade, and the popular arts**

António Ferro, the *Estado Novo*’s original propagandist, recognized Portugal's potential as a tourist destination for Western travellers wishing to escape their stressful industrial societies and enjoy the simple bucolic pleasures of its beautiful natural landscapes, Mediterranean climate, long coastline, and romantic historic sites. Ferro also understood the importance of tourism in delivering Salazar's national regeneration project and improving the dictatorship's image abroad. In 1949, he wrote: "If tourism is a serious issue, it is because it is linked, directly or indirectly, to almost every national issue, as an indispensable outline of our renovation [...] As such, tourism must lose its character as a small and frivolous industry in order to perform the lofty role of stage director and decorator of the Nation itself.”

Aware that Portugal could not compete with Europe's cosmopolitan capitals and their sophisticated cultural attractions, the regime marketed Portuguese tourism by highlighting its popular, traditional, and rural features, focusing on “the typical characteristics of our villages”, the “gaudy colours of our craftsmanship”, “the colour of our folklore”, “the generous simplicity of our hospitality,” and “the simple, savory regional cooking.” Portuguese people were asked to play their part in selling tourism by performing their "Portugueseness" to visiting travellers.

In the 1950s, Americans surpassed the British to become the second largest source of visitors to Portugal (Spaniards being the first). Canadians also began spending their holidays in Portugal in greater numbers after the Canadian Pacific airline (CP Air after 1968) inaugurated its flight connecting Toronto, Montreal, Santa Maria and Lisbon in 1958. One of the driving forces behind this increase in interest was the *Casa de Portugal*, located in the Rockefeller Centre in New York City (Figure 35). Inaugurated in January 1941, this tourism and trade information bureau (with replicas in Paris and London) was tasked with disseminating information in the United States concerning "the progress attained by Portugal in its commerce, industry, agriculture and tourism'; to furnish information to the Portuguese government concerning

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687 António Ferro, *Turismo, Fonte de Riqueza e de Poesia*, Lisboa, SNI, 1949, 34, cit. in Melo, 2001, 250-251 (m.t.).
business conditions in the [United States], and to 'advise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of references made in the [American] Press about Portugal'.”689 One of its many activities was to lend photographs and films to community clubs and mainstream American institutions, like public libraries and universities. For a sense of the volume, in 1964, the Casa lent 578 slides, 1236 regular photos, and 363 films. Also very solicited by the Portuguese ethnic media were its subsidies in the form of advertisement contracts, which were about selling Portugal as much as they were about controlling editorial boards, as we will discuss in the next chapter. The Casa also sponsored visits from newspaper owners, journalists, and travel agents to Portugal, where they were offered a view of the country that the regime intended them to publicize. In 1964, a year that saw the volume of American tourists to Portugal grow quicker than the European average, the Casa sponsored visits from 34 journalists, 11 travel agents, and 23 airline staff.690

The Portuguese government also hired American public relations firms, which published newsletters, articles, and other forms of tourism marketing in popular newspapers and magazines.691 This marketing strategy was aimed at the mainstream American public and made no special efforts to target Portuguese-Americans, much to the despair of ethnic media owners like João Rocha of the Diário de Notícias. In 1954, the latter asked Ambassador Fernandes why the Portuguese government did not invest more in advertising to Portuguese-Americans, to which the diplomat replied: "Personally I doubt that any palpable results could come from such a program... In my opinion, to which I don't want to impress any official character... the spiritual link that attracts Luso-Americans to their original pátria... is so sincere that it should not be adulterated by 'propaganda'."692 In the 1960s, however, the Casa would regularly buy advertisement space in the Portuguese-language press. Whether moved by a sense of patriotism or by the ad revenue it entailed, many in the Portuguese ethnic media embraced the regime's propagandistic mission. That was the case with Maria A. Ribeiro, the editor of Toronto's Correio Português, who opined: "Besides the dollars that he leaves in the Country, the tourist contributes

689 “Report[s] of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,” 1942-78, U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act website: www.fara.gov/ (henceforth FARA.GOV); "De Relance... Os Factos do Dia", Diário de Noticias, January 31, 1941, DN-UMASS.
690 Casa de Portugal annual report 1964, AOS/CO/PC-91B Pt. 10, Actividade da Casa de Portugal em N.I., 1964 [1965], ANTT.
691 “Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended”, October 1963, FARA.GOV
692 “Fala a este jornal o Sr. Embaixador de Portugal nos E.U., Dr. Esteves Fernandes," interview with Luis Fernandes, by João Rocha, Diário de Notícias, April 02, 1954. DN-UMASS (m.t.).
to refuting the often unpleasant and unfair commentaries about Portugal that are published in the American press" (Figure 36).^{693}

Beginning in the 1960s, a significant number of visitors to Portugal from North America were emigrants visiting their hometowns for the holidays, who now had access to cheaper and more available flights. This was the beginning of what is today called *turismo de saudade* (tourism of nostalgia), a concept introduced by the Portuguese tourist industry in recent years to refer to the annual vacation trips that emigrants take to Portugal and the marketing strategies employed to target them.^{694} While the expression is recent, the practice certainly is not, as evidenced by a 1961 newspaper ad from the *Casa*:

- Remember the old olive tree at your parents’ home...
- the old trunk where you played...
- where you searched for the sparrows’ nests?
- So go, remembering, evoking the time that passed
- and will never come back...
- The old olive tree, in its pain,
- calls for you, dreaming, every night
- in that little corner of OUR PORTUGAL!^{695}

As Katherine Brucher pointed out, missing from this idyllic picture were the “unpleasant aspects” that led emigrants to leave the country.^{696} Pilgrimages to Fátima also became more common in the ’60s, often organized by Portuguese clergymen with the collaboration of travel agencies and airline companies. The state-run Portuguese Air Transports (TAP) and *Casa de Portugal* advertised directly to pilgrims in religious bulletins, such as the *Fatima Review* published by Manuel Rocha’s Lusitania Institute.^{697}

Portuguese immigrants were often reminded of their patriotic obligation to consume and promote homeland products. In his interview with Ambassador Fernandes, João Rocha argued that a "patriotic campaign" calling on emigrants to consume products from Portugal would nurture their spiritual and material connection to their ancestral homeland, and help prevent their traditions from dissolving in the American "melting pot". The ambassador replied that such a campaign would likely fail to produce the desired effects, and instead placed that responsibility on Portuguese-Americans themselves, who should "spontaneously take interest in importing

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^{693} “Casa de Portugal em New York”, by M. A. Ribeiro, *Correio Português*, December 5, 1963, 3 (m.t.), N473, reel 3, AO.
^{695} *Casa de Portugal* ad, *Diário de Notícias*, August 4, 1961, 6 (m.t.), DN-UMASS.
^{696} Brucher, 2009, 222.
certain national products so much to their liking;" much like, according to him, the Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks did. But even if the Lisbon government initially lacked a comprehensive plan to promote Portuguese exports in the emigrant communities, private companies with business relations in Portugal tried to instill a patriotic imperative in its Portuguese-American customers. For instance, in 1954, an American freight company that specialized in transporting goods between Portugal and its colonies published the following ad in a Portuguese-American publication: "It is the duty of every Portuguese resident in the United States of America to contribute by any means at his disposal to divulge and increase the consumption of products coming from Portugal." Ethnic associations like the APC in Montreal also urged Portuguese in Canada to consume and divulge homeland products as a way of "improving the living conditions of those who toil and suffer in our Country." The regime's lackadaisical attitude towards the expatriate market began to change in the 1960s. Proof of this was the SNI's director César M. Baptista's visit to New England and California in 1960, where Portuguese-American representatives received him with great honours. The purpose of this visit was to monitor the Casa's work, meet with travel agencies, transportation companies, specialty press, and learn about what Portuguese-Americans needed in order to better sell Portugal's brand in the United States. At the same time, Baptista confirmed that his government had to be strategic about how it spent its meager resources. Interviewed by a reporter upon returning to Portugal, Baptista acknowledged his government's financial handicap in the face of the enormous North American market. He added that the most common remark he heard from Portuguese-Americans was the necessity to “make Portugal’s presence in the United States more frequent and more visible [sic], by sending individual or groups of lecturers, ranchos folclóricos, music bands, theatre or ballet companies: cultural embassies, and so on.” Baptista admitted this fell under the purview of his agency, but his limited budget prevented its execution, “especially when compared with a country so rich, so vast and so demanding as the United States, which attracts the very best there is in the world in the areas of culture and art.”

698 Interview with Ambassador Fernandes, April 02, 1954, and "Os Portugueses dos Estados Unidos e a Mãe Pátria", Diário de Notícias, January 11, 1955, DN-UMASS.
700 APC news bulletin, Year 1, no. 5, M557 A7, Associação Portuguesa Canadá, AHD.
701 "O Dr. Moreira Baptista Fala da Sua Visita aos E. Unidos", November 23, 1960 (m.t.).
At this point, the Casa's ads in the Portuguese ethnic press reminded readers they should buy homeland food products in their local markets. This was especially the case during festive seasons, when families were keen to prepare traditional Christmas and Easter meals (Figure 37). Portuguese-Americans seemed to have responded to the call, since exports to the United States saw a 10% average annual increase in 1954-64. A great many of these exports were household consumer products, such as tapestries, copperware, glassware, embroideries, china, clothing, along with food products like wines, tea, coffee, canned food, chestnuts, and olive oil. A significant increase in exports also followed the arrival of Portuguese immigrants in Canada, eventually tipping the balance of trade in Portugal's favour in the early 1970s. For example, in Toronto, there were three Portuguese businesses in 1958 importing fresh and frozen fish, canned goods, olive oil and other foods; subsequent companies began importing wines and marble in 1963, cigarettes in 1965, and chocolate products in 1967.

While the Casa de Portugal's scope of action extended to Canada, its activity there was limited to subsidizing the Portuguese-language press and occasionally providing the consulates with marketing materials. Much of the initial promotional work in Canada was done by the consuls themselves, who recognized that country's potential as a profitable market for Portuguese tourism. In their view, the affluent lifestyle enjoyed by middle-class Canadians, combined with their country's terrible climate, was favourable for selling sunny Portugal. In 1960, Consul Nogueira in Montreal urged Lisbon to develop an intense tourism campaign in Canada, to which he received a lukewarm response. Determined to carry on with his plan, Nogueira asked the SNI to send him marketing materials and traditional Portuguese products, with which he put together a mobile showcase and circulated it through Montreal's travel agencies.

Community businesses and associations in Canada also approached the consulates for materials to dress up their stores and halls. Government agencies wishing to carry their own marketing initiatives also recruited consular staff and community representatives. For example,
in 1955, the Portuguese Wine Junta began hosting annual wine tasting events in various Canadian cities. These were usually held at glamorous venues and meant to impress a sense of prestige and sophistication on its guests. This was the case in 1964, when they held a wine tasting at Toronto's prestigious Royal York Hotel. As reported by the Correio, this was an event of "unusual glitter and elegance" that included a group of Portuguese youth dressed in traditional garments waitressing a crowd of close to 400 people "from the best Toronto society". Consul Ritto introduced the many distinguished guests to the Junta's representative, among whom were the usual Portuguese-Canadian dignitaries, whose smiling faces, well-groomed suits and evening gowns plastered the pages of that community newspaper.

Of all the cultural products exported by Portugal, music, and fado in particular, was arguably the one that made the greatest impression on North Americans. The origins of fado have been an issue of debate for Portuguese musicologists for a long time, who can trace them with certainty only as far back as the early 19th century. Its style and lyrics are characterized by a brooding melancholia, tales of sorrow, loss and longing, and other themes connected with the Portuguese concept of saudade. Some forms of fado, however, are festive and humorous, particularly those that sing about the lives of working people. Originally performed in bohemian taverns and brothels in the lower-class boroughs of Lisbon, fado was initially chastised by the Catholic Church for its immorality. But like other forms of popular culture, the status of fado was elevated during the Estado Novo and turned into Portugal's official "national song". Starting in the 1930s, state propaganda took fado from its seedy working-class venues and moved it onto radio, cinema and theatre stages, making it accessible to the masses. Casas de Fado (Fado Houses) emerged during this period as the formally designated spaces for performing this type of music, replacing the previous disreputable venues, yet maintaining some of their bohemian charm. As fado singers became professional artists, the state also began policing their lyrics and licensing their careers.

One of the reasons explaining the rise in interest in Portugal among North American travelers was the international success of fado singer Amália Rodrigues, and the popularity of the song "April in Portugal," adapted from Amália's "Coimbra". Amália’s rise to stardom started early in her career, in the mid-1940s, when she performed at some of the most distinguished

707 “A Prova dos Vinhos Portugueses”, by António Ribeiro, Correio Português, February 27, 1964, 1 (m.t.), N473, reel 3, AO.
708 Of the $345,000 PTE in music records exported from Portugal in 1963, 73% came from sales to the U.S. (J. S. Mendes, 1964).
music halls in Rio de Janeiro, London and Paris, and made her movie debut in *Capas Negras* (1947) - at the time the most watched film in the short history of Portuguese cinema. Her international career received a significant boost in 1950 when she was invited to tour Europe with other artists as part of a series of benefit shows sponsored by the Marshall Plan.\(^{710}\) In one of these concerts, the French singer Yvette Giraud heard Amália perform “Coimbra”. Giraud later recorded a version of the song under the title “Avril au Portugal”, and it was this version that was later picked up by a number of American musicians, including Les Baxter, Vic Damone, Tony Martin, Louis Armstrong, Bing Crosby and others. In 1953, there were nine different recorded versions in the United States, five of which made it to the Billboard magazine chart that year.

The original Portuguese version of the song praised the northern city of Coimbra and its long academic traditions. “April in Portugal”, whose lyrics were written by the Irish songwriter Jimmy Kennedy, spoke of finding love in Portugal, where Spring, music and wine inspired a fleeting romance between two lovers that ended on a rainy morning. Following the song's success, Amália performed a Portuguese and English medley on NBC's Eddie Fisher show, while promenading on a set simulating an idyllic European town.

Around the same time, Frederico Valério, a Lisbon composer who wrote many songs for Amália, was also having considerable success in the United States, eventually finding his way to Broadway, where he wrote two musicals in 1954 (*On With the Show* and *Hit the Trail*). His fados “Partir, Partir” and “Ai Mouraria” were adapted to American audiences by Damone and Fisher under the titles “Don’t Say Goodbye” and “Star of the Night”. This approval of Portugal's artists and traditional music by the American public and mainstream performers bolstered the ethnic pride of Portuguese immigrants and descendants in North America, who saw it as validation for their cultural distinctiveness.\(^{711}\)

Building on Amália's success, the *Casa de Portugal* sponsored visits from Portuguese singers to perform in American and Canadian cities. Canadian Pacific Airlines also intensified its marketing campaign in the 1960s by bringing artists and celebrities from Portugal to perform in Canada. On one such occasion, the Portuguese radio and television hostess Maria Leonor expressed her frustration with her government for not assisting in her mission to promote Portugal. She shared with the *Correio*: "I asked the SNI for some tourism propaganda material to

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\(^{711}\) António Alberto Costa, “A Música Portuguesa nos Estados Unidos”, *Diário de Notícias*, April 18, 1953, 4, DN-UMASS.
give people... I had to buy it myself.”\footnote{“D. Maria Leonor. Locutora da Emissora Nacional e da Televisão Portuguesa esteve no Canadá a convite da Canadian Pacific,” \textit{Correio Português}, October 24, 1963 (m.t.), N473 reel 3, AO.} Such visits became a regular affair in the late '60s, largely due to TAP's entry in the North American market, which inaugurated flights connecting New York (in 1968), Boston (in 1970), and Montreal (in 1971) to Lisbon and Santa Maria (Azores). As part of its marketing strategy, TAP sponsored visits from popular musicians, actors, radio and television personalities to the United States and Canada, targeting both Portuguese immigrant communities and the mainstream public.

The immigrant communities also generated their own impresarios. One of the most successful Portuguese music promoters in Canada was Amadeu Vaz, a native of Nazaré, who immigrated in 1955. Vaz had a typical "pioneer" experience during his first years in Canada; he travelled the country with fellow countrymen looking for better wages, offering his labour to farmers, railway builders, hotel managers, and construction bosses. In 1968, after working in construction for ten years, Vaz and his brother founded the Rádio Club Português and opened a record store in Toronto, dedicated to disseminating Portuguese music. At the same time, Vaz became an impresario; one who would bring an impressive number of performers to tour North America in the 1970s. Some of Portugal's most popular artists of the day performed in Toronto under his sponsorship. His shows catered to other ethnic communities in the city as well. In 1970, Portuguese speakers in Toronto were thrilled to see Roberto Carlos (one of Brazil's most popular singers) perform at the Varsity Arena for a crowd of 3,800 people. Another common cultural import from Portugal were the revistas (revues), a form of theatrical entertainment popular among the lower classes, characterized by a mix of comedy sketches, musical acts, folk dances, and some female nudity. Some of these touring ensembles travelled long distances, like the Vedetas Show, which in 1969 visited Montreal, Oakville, Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver.\footnote{\textit{Correio Português}, August 30, 1969, F0571, 2020-018/05 (01), David Higgs fonds, CTASC.}

While appreciative of the wide array of performers offered by promoters like Vaz, who kept the expatriate communities abreast of the latest fads and popular acts in Portugal's show business, emigrant audiences were not shy to criticize artistic choices and demand better value for their money. For instance, a \textit{Correio} editorial echoed what it claimed was the widespread criticism in the audience at the Vedetas Show, who complained about its "Brazilian" finale:
The show, which started with the artists entering the stage wearing outfits from the Portuguese provinces, ended with Brazil's colourful and attractive folklore and the song "Cidade Maravilhosa"... [W]e must not lose sight of the fact that the artists who visit us from Portugal are like ambassadors... [F]or the final apotheosis of a show for Portuguese living outside the Pátria, it pains us to say that there should have been room only for Portuguese performances, with or without folklore, where the public could partake.714

Portuguese language instruction and community schools

Portuguese language instruction, deemed critical for strengthening the affective bonds between generations and ensuring the survival of the ethnic community, was arguably the cultural pursuit that most appealed to common immigrants, ethnic leaders and entrepreneurs alike. The linguistic disconnect between the immigrant generation and their descendants was felt most dramatically within family relations. The majority of immigrants encountered English or French for the first time in North America (Figure 38). In some cases, the first language they learned in the new country was that of other immigrant groups they interacted with in their workplaces.715 English as Second Language (ESL) classes were usually available in the urban centres, but working immigrants did not always find time to attend them or were discouraged by the idea of going back to school. In Canada, government-sponsored ESL classes were only available to "breadwinners" and not "dependents", the latter comprising the majority of immigrant women. Furthermore, the illiterate could not enroll in these classes since they required basic reading and writing skills.716 For those who did attend them, ESL classes were useful for improving their employability and empowering them in various ways. They were not, however, designed for providing a level of linguistic proficiency that allowed them to express complex thoughts and emotions. Their children, on the other hand, raised and schooled in the new country, could speak the dominant language(s) fluently but often had difficulty conversing in their parents' tongue. It was also common for children to translate and interpret for their immigrant parents, helping them in their trips to the doctor, dealing with financial matters, filling government forms, and taking on other adult responsibilities. In their recollections, Portuguese descendants often lament having been forced to become adults sooner than other kids because of their linguistic responsibilities.717

Different families had different views and strategies on language retention and

714 António Ribeiro, editorial, Correio Português, April 15, 1969 (m.t.), ibid.
715 Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 41, 68.
717 This "lost youth" sentiment is usually coupled with the memory of having to contribute to the household's financial welfare by working for wages from an early age. For more on this topic see Noivo, 1997; and Miranda, 2010.
acquisition. Some strove to pass on their native language to their children by speaking it at home, usually motivated by a desire to return to Portugal at some point in the future (this was particularly the case with mainlanders). Others chose to repress it, seeking instead to assimilate voluntarily, convinced that this would improve their children's chances of success in the new society. However, available census data suggests the latter was not the norm. In 1971, 87% of the 85,845 people who answered "Portuguese" as their "mother tongue" in the Canadian census also said that was the "language most often spoken at home"; in 1981, the number of native Portuguese-speakers nearly doubled to 164,615 (139,765 of them born in Portugal), though the ratio of home use dropped to 74%. The U.S. census data does not allow us to calculate this ratio, but judging from the growing number of people who answered "Portuguese" as their mother tongue in 1960 (91,592) and 1970 (140,299), and from those "foreign-born" who answered "Portuguese" as the "language spoken at home" in 1980 (232,794), that ratio was likely high among newcomers.

One important difference between the two countries was the fact that the majority of Portuguese civic leaders in Canada were mainlanders, while in the United States their overrepresentation vis-à-vis Azoreans was less pronounced (as seen in the last chapter). This had consequences for the formation of Portuguese identity in the former, where multiculturalism, with its propensity for homogenizing internal diversity within ethnic groups, would become national policy. In this scenario, the Estado Novo's cultural propaganda and tourism marketing, centered on mainland references and traditions, further shunned the Azorean majority from the dominant discourse of "Portugueseness" articulated in ethnic organizations. Another significant difference was the fact that postwar newcomers in the United States settled in multigenerational ethnic communities where Portuguese-Americans had gradually lost contact with native speakers, and those who remained involved in their ethnic community increasingly conducted their business in English. That is not to say that Portuguese-American associations had stopped using their heritage language altogether, or that the old guard had no interest in promoting its instruction. For instance, in 1950, the UPC's president expressed the following

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concern: "In the various visits I have had the pleasure to make to many of our Branches, I verified the youth's indifference during our sessions, an indifference that derived from their lack of knowledge of Portuguese language." The mutual aid society's concern for linguistic preservation may have been more material than affective, since ethnic fraternities depended on the contributions of young working members in order to guarantee their survival. In this scenario, regional linguistic distinctions likely lost much of their social significance, especially among descendants.

Language was also of critical importance when it came to religious services. Having Lusophone priests available to say mass and provide spiritual and social services was one of the first needs identified by Portuguese immigrants, government and church authorities in Portugal. Not surprisingly, these clergymen set up the first community schools in their parishes. The earliest was found at the Holy Ghost parish in Fall River, in 1912. As we saw in chapter three, parishes were the social spaces where Azoreans were most prominent and where Portuguese linguistic diversity was best represented, given the fact that churchgoers and their priests came from various Lusophone backgrounds (appendix A). This sociolinguistic heterogeneity provided a refuge for Azoreans to articulate their distinct cultural identity, especially in those Portuguese communities where mainlanders dominated secular organizations.

Differences in regional representation in Canada and the United States were also reflected in the fact there were more Portuguese language instructors from the islands in the latter. In the early 1940s, there were over a dozen Portuguese language schools in New England, New York and New Jersey. These ranged from a single teacher dedicating a couple of hours per week at the local club, to larger parish schools with buildings and resources fully dedicated to that purpose. One of the largest was run by Our Lady of Mount Carmel parish in New Bedford, with twelve classrooms, a hall for 700 people, and a gym (Figure 39). Inaugurated in 1941, this parish school was the brainchild of priest António Pacheco Vieira, a Micaelense who dedicated much of his time and energy to convincing local church authorities to allow its construction. Bishop James E. Cassidy of Fall River finally consented to Vieira's school in December 1939, after receiving an honorific title from the government of Portugal, in a ceremony prepared by the Portuguese priests of his diocese. The costs involved in building the school were in large part paid by

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721 UPC Annual Report 1950, 3 (m.t.), PEA M159, Colônia Portuguesa e Luso-Americana nos E.U., AHD.
722 According to Pap (1981, 181), no Portuguese parish schools were ever created in California or Hawaii.
Despite the fact they depended on volunteers and donations, some schools were able to offer free classes, removing what could otherwise be a prohibitive expense for working-class immigrant families. That was the case with the Luís de Camões School of Newark, founded by the SCP in 1939, which was fully financed by the contributions of its club members and community donations. Students were able to enroll for free in one of four classes offered three nights a week.\footnote{\textit{Escola Luiz de Camões do Sport Club Português"}, by Domingos José Rodrigues, Director of the Instruction and Recreation Section of the S.C., \textit{Diário de Notícias}, December 22, 1941, 13, DN-UMASS.} The school directors complained about the lack of interest shown by the Portuguese government, which constantly faltered on its promises to send them textbooks and provide legal accreditation. In spite of this, the school was able to maintain an average of 40 to 50 students during its first four years in operation.

Notwithstanding the paucity of support from the \textit{Estado Novo} at this time, some of the diplomats took personal interest in the teaching of Portuguese language to younger generations and appealed to their superiors to dedicate more resources to this cause. They were aware that the number of immigrant families with school-aged children actually returning to Portugal was very small. They also knew that the trend was for more descendants to stay in North America as the economic level of their communities improved. Nonetheless, Portuguese diplomats were largely supportive of language education as a way of guaranteeing the emigrants' \textit{portuguesismo}. For instance, in 1940, Ambassador João Bianchi\footnote{His actual title in Washington was Plenipotentiary Minister of Portugal.} convinced the IAC to pay for the teacher's salary ($40 USD a month) at the Portuguese Official School of New Bedford. He also led a group of "gentlemen" into donating 75 desks and chairs to this school.\footnote{"Escola Oficial Portuguesa de New Bedford", \textit{Diário de Notícias}, February 3 & 27, 1940, 2, DN-UMASS.} That same year, Consul António Alves in New York called a meeting with the directors of various community associations in his jurisdiction and asked them to sign a petition requesting Lisbon to grant official status to the Portuguese language schools in the area.

The official accreditation of community schools by the homeland government was a major aspiration for immigrant parents, who wanted to ensure that their children's degrees were recognized in Portugal, should they return one day. School administrators considered accreditation to be paramount to their survival since it granted them access to funds from Lisbon, and gave them a competitive advantage over non-official schools. In order for private schools to
be granted official status by the Ministry of Instruction, they had to be in operation for at least three years prior to the request, have a minimum of 40 students in each of those years, and employ educators with teaching certificates from Portugal. This excluded the majority of community schools in North America, since their inconsistent enrollment numbers did not meet the minimums, and because certified Portuguese teachers were hard to find.\footnote{726} Because of this, Consul Alves' initiative in 1940 failed to produce results. Two decades later, Consul Fragoso recalled that only two of the “seven or eight” Portuguese schools in New York and New Jersey remained open following the government's inaction.\footnote{727}

The lack of interest from Portuguese and American officials on matters of heritage language education was the source of ongoing disappointment for the immigrants. Portuguese-American commentators often lamented the absence of Portuguese studies in American colleges and universities and wondered about the reason for such flagrant oversight, especially in light of Portugal's historical contributions to Western civilization. One Joaquim Oliveira of Danbury, Connecticut, wrote a lengthy essay on the "Crisis of Portuguese Language in the United States", published on the front page of the Diário on October 24, 1950. He related a conversation he had with an American professor, who explained to him that this gap in the curricula was not motivated by a "disdain for [Portugal's] magnificent language or its heroic and most noble people," but an "invincible, instinctive repugnance" for its dictatorial government, which "mutilates Art and destroys the sacred freedom of thought." Oliveira then followed this damning statement by equating the Estado Novo to a new Portuguese Inquisition.\footnote{728} These words convinced authorities to ban this issue of the Diário in Portugal.\footnote{729}

This unfavourable situation began to change in the 1950s, and more quickly in the '60s, when the dictatorship increased its commitment to promoting Portuguese language abroad, by offering subsidies, book donations, and official assent to a larger number of community schools. The immigrants also helped bring about important policy changes in their host countries. In New England they pressed political representatives to change the federal government’s policy regarding the immigration of foreign language teachers, who until 1951 were subjected to the

\footnotesize\begin{align*}
\footnote{726}{"O Problema das Nossas Escolas", by Gil Stone, Diário de Notícias, February 17, 1940, 1, DN-UMASS.}
\footnote{727}{Letter, Consul Fragoso to Amb. Fernandes, May 16, 1960, PEA M251, Esc. Luís de Camões S. C. P., Newark, AHD.}
\footnote{728}{"A Crise da Língua Portuguesa nos Estados Unidos," Diário de Notícias, October 24, 1950, 1-4 (m.t.), DN-UMASS.}
\footnote{729}{The memorandum from PIDE's director Agostinho Lourenço, dated of October 19, 1950, mentions the article by its title, which it claims was published in the Diário on October 18. The article I read on DN-UMASS was clearly published in October 24. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear (SNI Censura cx. 733, Jornal "Diário de Noticias" em New Bedford (1948-54), ANTT).}
\end{align*}
same immigration quotas as everyone else. That year, the U.S. Congress added teachers to the
list of skilled immigrants allowed to enter the country outside the national quota system.\textsuperscript{730}

One of the pioneers of Portuguese language instruction in the United States was Laurinda
C. Andrade.\textsuperscript{731} Born in Terceira, Andrade moved to New Bedford in 1917, at age 17, where she
began working in the cotton mills. Despite her poor financial means, Andrade pursued higher
education and obtained a college diploma. Later she became an "Americanization" teacher, then
editor and director of the Portuguese-American weekly \textit{Tribuna} in Newark, and eventually
secretary to Ambassador Bianchi in Washington. Determined to introduce Portuguese language
to the public school curriculum, Andrade returned to New Bedford in 1942, where she began
teaching English and French in high school. Two years later, with the help of João Rocha, she
found the Portuguese Educational Society of New Bedford, whose goal was to stimulate cultural
exchange between the United States, Portugal and Brazil. After many years of pushing for
Portuguese language instruction in the public school system, Andrade was finally allowed to
open the Portuguese Department at New Bedford High School in 1955 (the first in the United
States), which she directed until her retirement in 1966.\textsuperscript{732}

Interest in Portuguese as a language of business also increased among American officials
at this time, driven by Brazil's growing political and economic significance.\textsuperscript{733} In 1950, the
Library of Congress hosted close to 260 delegates from various parts of the world (the majority
from Portugal and Brazil), who came together for five days in October for the International
Colloquium of Luso-Brazilian Studies. The main recommendation coming out from this meeting
was that Portuguese language and Lusophone literature should be taught in American secondary
and post-secondary schools. They also agreed that Portuguese and Brazilian cultural institutions
should join efforts in increasing Lusophone collections in American libraries; exchanging faculty
and students; promoting seminaries and intellectual missions. Curiously, the Library of
Congress, which agreed to collect and disseminate data on Lusophone studies in the United

\textsuperscript{730} Letter, Amb. Fernandes to PMFA, May 01, 1951, PEA M171, Colônia Port. e Luso-Americana nos E.U. Esc. Port., AHD.
\textsuperscript{731} Laurinda C. Andrade (1899-1980) graduated from Brown University's Pembroke College in Providence in 1931. She
continued her education at New York's Columbia University, where she obtained a Masters degree in the Spanish Department. In
1968, Andrade released her autobiography, titled \textit{The Open Door}.
\textsuperscript{732} \textit{Portuguese Immigrants in the United States: Laurinda C. Andrade"}, Library of Congress, Hispanic Reading Room, url:
www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/portam/landrade.html
\textsuperscript{733} In October 13, 1950, the governments of the U.S. and Brazil signed an agreement allowing for their national cultural agencies
to operate in each others' countries in order to promote the exchange of professors, students, artists, and other cultural agents
(“Foi Assinado um Pacto Cultural Entre os E.U. e o Brasil”, \textit{Diário de Noticias}, October 18, 1950, DN-UMASS).
States, delegated this task to its Hispanic Foundation.\textsuperscript{734}

In 1958, the National Defense Education Act\textsuperscript{735} identified Portugal as one of the countries whose study had been most neglected in the United States and encouraged scholars to advance the government's knowledge of that country. In 1960, after returning from a trip to South America, which included a stop in Brazil, President Eisenhower declared that relations between the United States and its southern neighbours were at an "all time high", urging "millions of Americans" to learn Spanish and Portuguese. Around the same time, the State Department declared Portuguese a "critical language".\textsuperscript{736} These political incentives led to the inclusion of Portuguese language in the curricula of some American schools and universities, which the Portuguese government saw as an opportunity to improve its influence in the United States. However, as Consul Fragoso alerted in 1960, the continuation of Portuguese studies in American universities would depend on their course enrollment, hence it was essential that Portuguese-Americans be "oriented" towards learning their heritage language.\textsuperscript{737}

Portuguese-American associations did not require the homeland's orientation to launch their own linguistic programs. Various community organizations offered scholarships and ran exchange programs for youth wanting to study in Portuguese universities in the summer. At the founding meeting of the Luso-American Fraternal Federation in Long Beach, in 1957, the UPC and the Portuguese Benefit Association of California created an Education Committee dedicated to those exact goals. This committee had a very positive response from Portuguese-American students, convincing the organizers to launch a more comprehensive Portuguese language education program with the University of Coimbra, coordinated by the Luso-American Education Foundation. Though proposed in 1959, this foundation was only officially inaugurated in 1963, in San Francisco, with a starting $12,000 USD endowment from the United National Life Insurance Society. Besides awarding scholarships, coordinating student exchanges, and promoting Portuguese language instruction in California, the foundation also assumed the responsibility of organizing San Francisco's Portugal Day celebrations, beginning in 1966.\textsuperscript{738}

In Newark, the Luis de Camões School continued to plead with the Portuguese

\textsuperscript{734} Pedro Teotónio Pereira chaired the Portuguese delegation ("É Recomendado o Ensino da Língua Portuguesa nas Escolas dos E.U.", \textit{Diário de Notícias}, October 23, 1950, DN-UMASS).

\textsuperscript{735} For the rationale behind this act see Skrentny, 2002, 182-186.

\textsuperscript{736} "Eisenhower Recomenda o Estudo de Português," \textit{Diário de Notícias}, March 9, 1960, DN-UMASS.

\textsuperscript{737} Letter, Consul Fragoso to Ambassador Fernandes, May 16, 1960.

\textsuperscript{738} Luso-American Life Insurance Society: Luso-American Education Foundation: history, url: www.luso-american.org/laef/
government for accreditation. In 1958, Maria Pia Figueiredo de Sousa (a former principal in Funchal), the school’s only teacher, told Ambassador Fernandes she would gladly obtain the required teaching certificate but her current situation did not allow her to travel to Lisbon, where the exams were held. Portuguese officials simply restated that proper certification remained an essential condition for the school to be granted official status. Despite this, the IAC granted the school a $519 USD annual subsidy to help with maintenance costs. About a year later, Consul Fragoso reported that the school had enrolled 70 students in two classes (Portuguese language and History) that year. According to him, this was a remarkable number, considering that students frequented these classes in addition to their American schooling, without any extra credits to their diplomas. The consul also noted that people in the community were grateful for the subsidy and were enthusiastic about their school, as reflected by the renovations that the SCP had begun making to its building. The SNI's director visited this school during his tour of the Portuguese-American communities in 1960 and praised the community's efforts to preserve their heritage language. He also acknowledged that his government should study the best ways to support these schools in a “realistic” manner. Following the SNI's advice, the school directors hired a certified teacher from Portugal. However, it still took the government another eight months before they granted the school official status, in July 1961. After this, enrollment grew to over 100 students per year, nearly doubling in the late 1960s. In 1970, the SCP received $7,000 USD from Lisbon to cover part of the expenses of expanding the school (its total estimated cost was $50,000 USD).

Other community schools also benefitted from the homeland government's newfound commitment to its emigrants in North America, even if its aid remained inadequate. For instance, the Official School of New Bedford received hundreds of textbooks in 1960 and 1962; however, by 1966, it reported that some of the children were forced to drop out because they lacked textbooks. In 1962, the same school began receiving a $519 USD annual subsidy from the IAC, but by 1963, its building was in such disrepair that it faced the prospect of closing.

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740 Letter, Consul Fragoso, New York, to the IAC’s Secretary, January 21, 1960, M20, Escola Portuguesa Luis de Camões, AHD.
743 Letter, Consul N. de M. Cordeiro, Newark, to Amb. V. Garin, June 13, 1970, PEA M334, Organismos de Ensino, Geral, AHD.
maintenance costs of its second site, located in a different part of the city, had to be partly covered by the teacher’s meager wage. Ambassador Pereira worried that the school's closure would hurt Portugal’s “prestige” in the eyes of the expatriate communities and the larger American society. Pereira reminded Lisbon that in New Bedford, the so-called "Portuguese capital of America”, smaller ethnic groups were able to maintain their own schools, and so it would be an embarrassment if the official Portuguese school (one of the first to be accredited) closed its doors. Following this dire assessment, the IAC increased its annual subsidy to $1,730 USD in 1964.744

In Canada, Portuguese classes were first offered in 1958 by Montreal's APC, which started with close to 50 students.745 Concerned about the separation of families, given that some immigrant parents were sending their children to Portugal to study the language, the "anti-fascist" Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association (PCDA) also began offering Portuguese language classes in Toronto, in 1960.746 But the largest and most successful Portuguese school in Canada was that of Toronto's FPCC, which opened in 1964. The idea for the school came to Lourenço Gonçalves, the club’s president in 1963-64, while serving as president of the St. Vincent de Paul Society section at St. Mary’s Catholic parish. There, Gonçalves learned about the social ills affecting the Portuguese in the city and was particularly impressed by the lack of communication between parents and their children. He then recruited the support of Consul Ritto and Lisbon's Gulbenkian Foundation, which sent him the first textbooks. The school opened shortly after that with 18 students and one teacher - Branca Amélia Proença, a native of Guarda, in the central mainland, and a certified teacher in Portugal, where she had taught for 26 years before moving to Canada.747 The following year, student enrollment jumped to 94, a second teacher was hired, and classes were extended to from one to three days a week, held after regular school hours.748 In 1968, it was officially recognized by the Portuguese government and began receiving a $1,882 CAD annual subsidy.749

With or without funding, the lifeline of these community schools were the teachers who

744 Letter, Ambassador Pedro T. Pereira to PMFA, March 27, 1963, PEA M251, Escola Oficial Portuguesa – New Bedford, AHD.
746 Letter, F. Ciriaco da Cunha to J. DeMonfort, IIMT, March 12, 1960, F0579, 2009-022/003 (17), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
747 Gonçalves eventually stepped down from the FPCC’s presidency a few months after taking office and was replaced by Firmino Oliveira, the PCDA’s former president (more on him in chapter 7), who inaugurated the school (Humberto de Brum Ferreira, Escola do “First Portuguese”: 25 Anos de Historia, 1989, F0571, 2020-018/001, David Higgs fonds, CTASC).
748 Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 138-139.
749 Converted from $50,000 escudos through fxtoom historical currency converter.
ran them, often with great personal sacrifice. These were usually working-class immigrants, the majority of them women, who had been educators in Portugal and took on teaching in North America as a second job. The additional income, however, does not fully account for their dedication to these schools, since their pay was meager and often inconsistent. These teachers showed a great deal of volunteerism in their work. Maria Vieira da Luz, who taught at New Bedford's official school since 1950, saw her IAC subsidy for 1962 delayed for over a year, to the point that the embassy had to advance her money while she waited. The next year she was entitled to an $87 USD monthly subsidy, which was considerably less than what American primary school teachers received in a week; furthermore, part of her wages were used to pay for school expenses. With her husband sick at home, da Luz decided to quit that year and move to California, where she was offered a better job. Consul Vasco Villela alerted Lisbon that no one in New Bedford wanted to take her job because of the low pay. Still, he was able to recruit a teacher from Madeira to be the next school principal.

The new teacher was Carolina Celeste Moniz of Funchal, where she had been a school principal for over three decades. Shortly after she was hired, Moniz realized that the amount of work she was asked to do was disproportional to her financial compensation and threatened to quit. Eventually, she decided to continue despite the low pay. But as the consul later reported, the teacher, who was known for her “impulsive spirit”, was having a hard time dealing with the students and their parents, leading to conflicts where he occasionally had to intervene. The main reason behind this disagreement was the fact that Moniz often arrived late to class and showed no interest in teaching at both school sites, as stipulated in her contract. According to the consul, this resulted from the fact that she was “not young and finds herself tired at the end of the day, given that she has to work in a factory.” He added that the situation was getting worse with the arrival of new immigrants and their increasing demand for Portuguese classes. In 1965, Moniz wrote to the ambassador informing him that she had not received her subsidy for seven months and asking him to intercede with Lisbon officials, given that her situation was getting desperate. She added that her pay at the factory was so little that she was forced to ask for financial assistance from people in the community. Following this report, the IAC sent Moniz a cheque for $893 USD to cover the first semester of that year. Unfortunately for her, the inconsistency of payments coming from Portugal was not resolved; by October 1968, she was owed her $144 USD monthly subsidy for 14 months straight. Ambassador Garin expressed displeasure with the
IAC’s continuous failure to honour its commitment and placing the teacher in such a predicament that she repeatedly had to ask the local consul for cash advances, which he lent from his own pocket. The ambassador also scolded the IAC for the “unpleasant and disreputable effect that [this situation] provokes in the Portuguese-American community.”

Other Portuguese diplomats were also vocal in their criticism of the IAC's delays in scheduled funding, its irregular delivery of textbooks, and overall limited aid for these community schools. Responding to one such criticism, the IAC's director emphasized his agency's commitment to assisting Portuguese schools in the United States, which he considered of “primordial importance,” yet reminded the ambassador that they had limited funding and could not do more than what they had done so far. Nonetheless, in 1967, the IAC assumed a more dynamic approach and started gathering information on various Portuguese communities around the world, in order to draw a comprehensive and coordinated plan to aid these schools.

For this, the IAC asked for the diplomats' cooperation, who were in a privileged position to inform them about local emigrant communities and make suggestions as to the best ways to engage them. Consuls were asked to fill out a survey asking about the different kinds of Lusophone groups in their jurisdiction; their estimated population; how strong their connection with Portuguese traditions were; what institutions they had in place to promote “Portuguese influence”; and what kind of assistance their consulates had provided them in the past.

Responses varied regarding the cultural and linguistic practices of each community. For instance, the consuls in New Bedford and New York noted that the immigrants, regardless of what part of the empire they were from, largely retained their native language and traditions, and had a strong sense of homeland patriotism. The consul in Boston, on the other hand, noted that Portuguese-Americans in his area spoke very limited Portuguese and the traditions they adhered to were largely those tied to the church. He also noted that newcomers from the Azores had very limited “cultural education” and their language was riddled with regional mannerisms. When it came to assessing community needs, the consuls' largely shared the same views, mentioning their efforts to prevent the immigrant's assimilation into American culture, which usually amounted to


attending social functions and celebrations, assisting in the creation of new associations, and consolidating existing ones. Every consul noted the lack of infrastructures catering to the high demand for Portuguese language classes and other cultural goods, and how the growing number of newcomer families exacerbated this problem. Finally, they all urged the government and Portugal's philanthropic organizations to invest in these communities, provide them with more cultural resources, and sponsor the creation and maintenance of their schools, libraries and cultural centres.

The international Lusophone scholar community also began pressuring Lisbon to recognize its national language as a valuable resource deserving of greater investment. The "first" Luso-Brazilian Symposium on Contemporary Portuguese Language, organized by the IAC in Coimbra, in 1968, was a sign that the regime was open to do more on this matter. One of the participants, Fernando Matos, presented a paper on Portuguese language instruction in the United States, England, and Canada. In his view: “It matters little whether Portuguese is being taught with an Azorean accent (as in the secondary schools of New Bedford, Fall River, Providence) or Brazilian; what is summarily important is that we raise greater enthusiasm for the Portuguese language.” He argued there were more reasons to be optimistic about the future of Portuguese language instruction in North American universities than in secondary schools.

Matos reported there were “only eight official schools” offering Portuguese classes in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and another 2,802 students enrolled in schools run by Catholic parishes. Throughout the United States, 117 universities accepted Portuguese as a prerequisite for admission; 100 offered Portuguese courses at the elementary level, and 84 at the intermediate level; and 11 of them had doctoral programs in Portuguese. In Canada, Portuguese language courses were offered in 4 universities. Despite the encouraging numbers, Matos warned that enrollment was low (only 2,478 students in the United States in 1963). Nonetheless, he was confident that Portuguese instruction in North America had a promising future since the international profile of Brazil continued to grow.

When Caetano pronounced the regime's new mission to "valorize men through education,

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752 It is not clear if by “official schools” Matos meant only schools run by the Portuguese community and sponsored by the IAC, or if he was including schools in the American public school system.
753 According to the Annual Congress of Modern Languages held in Chicago that same year, there were 9,000 students enrolled in Portuguese language classes at the primary, secondary, and university levels across North America (“Nove mil jovens americanos aprendem, presentemente, a língua portuguesa”, Diário de Notícias, January 17, 1968, 1 & 6, DN-UMASS).
making them more valuable and productive, he was simply ratifying the changes already taking place in his government's approach to education in the emigrant communities. In March of 1969, the regime reaffirmed its commitment to teaching Portuguese language, history, and geography in the emigrant communities. A new bill placed responsibility for creating primary schools in foreign territory with the Ministries of National Education and of Foreign Affairs, which would act upon recommendations from the IAC and the Directory-General of Primary Schooling. The government's focus was primarily on the emigrants in Europe; particularly France, which saw the creation of 200 Portuguese classes during Caetano's administration.

This increased care for Portuguese language instruction by homeland officials paralleled the growing momentum in the United States towards accommodating linguistic minorities (especially Latinos) in the public school system and enshrining their rights to "bilingual education" in the students' native languages. In 1968, the U.S. Congress passed its first bilingual education law, included in President Lyndon B. Johnson's Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which recognized the need for special programs aimed at immigrant children with limited English skills, and provided funding for school districts to run them. Additional legislation promoting the immigrants' native language instruction would be introduced in other American states and Canadian provinces in the 1970s, as we will discuss in chapter eight. Because of the organizational efforts of community educators and the meager yet essential funding of homeland officials, Portuguese immigrants were well placed to benefit from the multiculturalist policies of North American legislators as they began meeting the cultural and linguistic demands of ethnic minorities.

**Literate culture: ethnic press, authors and libraries**

Ironically, efforts to promote Portuguese language and literate culture in North America received more direct aid from the *Estado Novo* than did performances of popular culture. In the 1960s, the IAC and other government agencies increased their support for "high culture" initiatives by sponsoring visits from Portuguese lecturers to North American universities, and

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757 Santos, 2004, 75.
758 As Skrentny (2002, 179) described, bilingual education in the U.S. has been grounded "on that idea that primary and secondary school students who do not speak English well or at all should be taught in some or all subjects in their native language while they learn English".
offering scholarships to emigrants and their descendants. The Gulbenkian Foundation was another important funder of the Portuguese arts and literate culture in North America, whose support was often a prerequisite for the Lisbon government to deliver its own aid.

A small number of elite societies contributed to disseminating Portuguese "high culture" in North America, the most powerful being the American Portuguese Cultural Society. Founded in 1962 (though most active after 1966), this society was made up of powerful American and Portuguese individuals with political and commercial ties to Portugal and its colonies, including heads of banks and major corporations, performing arts promoters, lawyers, university professors, and a few Portuguese-American leaders. Among its funders were banks, oil companies, business associations, and multinational corporations, as well as the Gulbenkian Foundation and TAP. They sponsored art exhibits, concerts, lecture tours, and luncheons with illustrious personalities at distinguished American venues - including a concert by Amália Rodrigues at New York's Lincoln Centre Philharmonic Hall in 1966 - with the goal of promoting greater understanding of Portuguese education, science, literature, fine arts, and commerce. Although open to the general public, their events made no effort to connect with the working-class ethnic community. The cultural society was particularly keen on educating American investors about industrial and financial developments in Portugal, highlighting the country's recent modernization. This pleased Foreign Affairs Minister Rui Patrício, who met with its members in 1971, conveying to them “the need for reshaping the image of Portugal in university circles where so often that image comes from the coarsest defamatory pamphlets,” as well as “the necessity of emphasizing modern Portugal, since there was a tendency to neglect it and concentrate on her past.” Minister Patrício confirmed his commitment to the organization by granting it a $3,647 USD subsidy, and appointing a liaison officer in the Washington embassy to deal directly with its requests.

A more important venue for articulating Portuguese national, linguistic, and ethnic cultures was the community media. The various Lusophone newspapers, radio shows, and television programs were essential in preserving the immigrants' native language. They met the

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760 In the 1970s, Admiral George W. Anderson Jr., the Chief of Naval Operations in the American blockade during the Cuban missile crisis, and ambassador to Portugal in 1963-66, accumulated the position of APCS president with that of chairman of President Richard Nixon's foreign intelligence advisory board.

761 Converted from $100,000 escudos through fxto.com historical currency converter.

linguistic needs of its immigrant audiences, many of whom had difficulty understanding English or French. They also gave native Portuguese speakers a sense of comfort by allowing them to engage with and make sense of the topics of the day by use of common expressions, stylistic characteristics, literary and popular references particular to the Portuguese language. The use of native language in the ethnic media also accentuated the group's separate identity, while simultaneously underscoring their citizenship by connecting it to the affairs of the host nation. However, this linguistic bulwark excluded those descendants who did not speak Portuguese, further alienating them from the communities that these ethnic gatekeepers hoped to keep alive. This linguistic barrier was aggravated by the complicated style adopted by some newspapers, who often published pedantic editorials on erudite and abstract topics, using pompous and sometimes cryptic vocabulary incomprehensible to the common Portuguese reader.

Besides international, national and local news from Portugal, Canada and the United States, ethnic newspapers also published articles on arts and literature, including poems and short stories from some of Portugal's greatest authors, along with the works of local community writers (especially poetry). There was no shortage of immigrant authors willing to pour their thoughts and emotions in rhyme and prose about the country they left behind, and the anxieties and desires about the one they adopted. The Novo Mundo newspaper of Toronto, for example, published an original novel by a local writer in multiple parts; in 1972, the same newspaper organized a tour of the Portuguese communities of eastern Canada by the distinguished neorrealist author Fernando Namora.\textsuperscript{763}

In the United States there were already a few works by Portuguese-American authors published before the 1950s.\textsuperscript{764} Since then, various Portuguese migrants and descendants have produced works with considerable critical acclaim and commercial success.\textsuperscript{765} Considered one of the most prolific and influential Portuguese authors in the United States, José Rodrigues Miguéis left Portugal in 1935, after Salazar's rise to power. Miguéis contributed to the intellectual journal Seara Nova, the most influential dissident publication in Portugal, which counted among its ranks some of the most prominent republican and left-wing thinkers. Away from the constraints

\textsuperscript{763} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 183.
\textsuperscript{765} Including John dos Passos (Madeiran-descent), Alfred Lewis (Azorean-born, based in California), Olga Cabral (West Indian-born, based in New York), José Rodrigues Miguéis (Lisbon-born, based in New York), and Jorge de Sena (Lisbon-born, based in California).
of the Estado Novo's censorship, Miguéis published a large body of work in the '50s-'80s, some of which has been translated into various languages. He was also an editor for the Portuguese edition of Reader's Digest, responsible for introducing various American authors to the Lusophone world with his translations. Miguéis was also involved in the civic and political life of its expatriate community as a member of the republican opposition in exile and as a community organizer in New York. Another acclaimed Portuguese-American author was Alfred Lewis. The son of an Azorean whaler who became a gold prospector in California, Lewis followed his father to that part of the country in 1922. Arriving without any knowledge of English, he eventually became an accomplished author in that language and a municipal judge in the San Joaquin Valley. His 1951 novel Home is an Island, about his childhood memories of Flores, the island where he grew up, became a bestseller and is considered one of the founding works of Portuguese-American fiction. In Canada, the first books by Lusophone authors only appeared in the late '70s. Only in the '90s did a larger output of Portuguese-Canadian literature begin to emerge.

The IAC, the Ministry of Overseas, the Gulbenkian Foundation and other public and private institutions in Portugal helped build community libraries in the halls of ethnic clubs, and stocked their shelves with books. Aside from school textbooks, book donations from Portugal ranged from national and imperial histories and geographies sanctioned by the regime, along with foundational works of Portuguese literature. Curiously, among the books donated by the IAC were sometimes titles by authors who openly opposed the regime and whose works had been censored in Portugal, like Miguel Torga (arrested by PIDE in 1939), José Régio (Humberto Delgado's supporter), and Manuel da Fonseca (PCP militant).

Politically subversive literature was also circulated in Toronto, Montreal, and Newark by local "anti-fascist" exiles. These activists distributed books, newspapers, communiqués and other political literature received from fellow exiles around the world, especially from the publishers

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767 L. Rodrigues, Os Bastardos das Pátrias, Toronto, 1976; Domingos Marques & John Medeiros, Imigrantes Portugueses: 25 Anos no Canadá, Toronto, 1978; Francisco J. Cardadeiro, Retalhos de Prosa, Toronto, 1978; Rui Cunha Viana, Os Sonhos do Tio Girassol, Montreal, 1979. Except for John Medeiros, who was born in São Miguel, all authors were mainlanders.
768 For a list of published Portuguese-Canadian authors see the website Satúrnia: Letras e Estudos Luso-Canadianos, url: http://manuelcarvalho.8m.com/autores.html.
769 Letter, author unknown, IAC to PMFA, August 12, 1964, M20, Assuntos Diversos, AHD.
of the *Portugal Democrático* newspaper in São Paulo, Brazil.\textsuperscript{770} The chief organ of the leftist opposition in exile, the *Democrático* had a sizable circulation in North America, thanks largely to the efforts of its agents in Canada, who sold subscriptions to readers across the continent (including non-Portuguese), and even in Africa.\textsuperscript{771} In 1960, less than a year after its founding, the PCDA informed its contacts in São Paulo that the demand for newspapers and books extended throughout Canada, where "many hundreds of books" had been distributed, both in Portuguese and English.\textsuperscript{772} The PCDA's correspondence confirms that the demand for such literature in Toronto and Montreal remained high throughout the 1960s and '70s; most of the money from their book sales went to support the costs of publishing the *Democrático*. Newark's CPDP was less successful in selling subversive books and distributing political literature to Portuguese-Americans in the greater New York City area.\textsuperscript{773}

Besides availing themselves of the resources provided by the homeland, Portuguese immigrants also pressed local politicians to commit more resources towards the building and stocking of their community libraries. That was the case in 1971, when the radio host António A. Costa\textsuperscript{774} rallied hundreds of his Portuguese listeners to crowd New Bedford's Municipal Council and demand that city councillors reverse an earlier decision not to cover the $6,000 monthly salary required to hire a new librarian; its approval by the city being conditional for securing a $56,000 grant from Washington, earmarked for purchasing books and equipment to build a Portuguese library. As a result of the community's demands, the council reversed its decision and apologized for having made it in the first place.\textsuperscript{775}


\textsuperscript{771} Letter, Mary Clark, Democratic Republic of the Congo, to Américo Baptista, PCDA, November 6, 1971, F0579, 2009-022/005 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

\textsuperscript{772} Letter, Fernando C. da Cunha, PCDA, Toronto, to José Alves das Neves, São Paulo, May 08, 1960, 2009-022/003 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

\textsuperscript{773} Letter, Eduardo Covas, CPDP, Newark, to João Sarmento Pimentel, São Paulo, June 04, 1961, CD25A-CPDP.

\textsuperscript{774} António Alberto Costa (1928-2005) was born and educated in Lisbon. In 1948 he moved to New Bedford where he first worked as a Lusophone radio host with WBSM/WGCY, and later as a TV host and producer with WTEV. In 1972 Costa bought the weekly newspaper *Portuguese Times* of Newark and moved it to New Bedford. He also launched the TV show "*Panorama de Portugal*", which led to the creation of Portuguese Channel 20. In 1978, Costa left the *Times* and became the director of the Portuguese section of Washington's public broadcaster *Voice of America*. Costa continued working on Lusophone radio in Rhode Island and Florida until late in his life.

\textsuperscript{775} Letter, António A. Costa, WGCY Radio, to Consul Jorge B. Freitas, January 30, 1971, PEA M969, Comunidades Portuguesas no Estrangeiro. Pedido de noticiário para esyação de rádio de New Bedford, AHD.
Conclusion

As various migration scholars have argued, forming and performing cultural identities were not priorities for most working-class immigrants, who cared first and foremost about improving their economic situation. But as their children grew up surrounded by a different culture and language; as their economic situation improved and realized their lives were permanently bound to the new country; as they joined with fellow immigrants in making community social spaces; as their cultural "otherness" was rewarded by host government officials; and as their homeland officials encouraged them to preserve their cultural identities and avoid assimilating into a foreign land, these working-class immigrants began to acknowledge the need and the opportunities to assert their cultural heritage and pass it on to their children.

Language instruction was the most pressing cultural need facing immigrant families and ethnic organizers, as reflected by the rapid increase in Portuguese language schools in the 1960s. However, linguistic standards in those civic communities dominated by mainlanders excluded regional variations and consolidated the social and cultural exclusion of certain groups of Portuguese, particularly the Micaelense majority. In the United States, while mainlanders were also overrepresented, their dominance was less apparent. Here, regional variations in Portuguese language were better represented in secular and parish community schools, as many of its teachers and directors were from the islands. Still, the linguistic, popular, and erudite culture promoted by the Lisbon government in the expatriate communities was essentially mainland.

The type of ethnic pluralism celebrated in North America in the 1960s, which focused on the performative, consumable, and iconic aspects of the immigrant's national cultures - or what critics of multiculturalism have called "the three D's approach" (dress, diet and dance) was receptive to the Estado Novo's popular cultural engineering and nationalist propaganda. As Conzen and co-authors noted: "Folk festivals became the favored vehicles for these celebrations of a choreographed and sanitized cultural pluralism. The cultural contents of such folk festivals often owed more to the inspiration of romantic nationalism than to the actual traditions of peasant immigrants."

Indeed, performances of Portuguese ethnicity, while adapted to their migrant context, were presented as genuine expressions of folk heritage to North American

778 Conzen et al., 1992, 13.
audiences, which largely ignored the fact they were sanctioned and aided by the dictatorship. This budding multiculturalism was convenient for the diplomats as they made efforts to unite the emigrant communities, nurture their diasporic identity, and increase Portuguese exports.

Motivations to preserve and divulge Portuguese culture and language outside the homeland were not only psycho-affective but also utilitarian and material. As Mark I. Choate argued for Italian-Americans: “The emigrants had come to America to earn money. Cultural groups in Italy therefore promoted commerce as a cultural tool: strong relations between Italy and the Americas might persuade emigrants that speaking good, standard Italian served a utilitarian purpose.”

The same can be said of the commercial relations between Portugal and the expatriate communities, mediated by homeland state officials, international businesses, and ethnic entrepreneurs, who sought to consolidate and expand ethnic markets by nurturing the expatriates' cultural connections with Portugal. Hence, the celebration of a quaint and pleasant ethnicity brought these agents economic benefits, since it promoted a vision of Portugal that corresponded with its tourism marketing and cultural products.

Portuguese state officials recognized their "moral responsibility" to nurture the emigrants' cultural connection with their homeland, and the importance of these ethnic communities in promoting Portuguese products and increasing the country's exports. They were also convinced that emigrants could play a major role in spreading Portugal's linguistic influence in the world. Still, the Estado Novo failed to make a sustained and comprehensive commitment to supporting the cultural infrastructures of Portuguese ethnic communities in North America. The limited budget assigned to its cultural agencies fell considerably short of their directors' vision, even when the emigrants' requests met the government's populist criteria. Moreover, the regime's stark distinction between "low" and "high" culture was apparent in its cultural investments in North America, where the erudite activities it sponsored were disconnected from the ethnic activities of the lower-class emigrant majority. Still, in some cases, the socio-cultural distinction between popular and literate culture was muddled in the expatriate communities, since the IAC's mandate to disseminate Portuguese language sometimes led it to partner with working-class organizations.

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780 Zucchi (1988, 115) described a similar process in the development of a shared national/ethnic consciousness among Toronto's Italian immigrants at the turn of the century: “Developing an Italian ethnic consciousness was inherent in the very nature of the ethnic brokers' work, in the contracting that went on between wholesalers and retailers, in the networks they established... In a subtle way, those who entered the network were, through their commerce, moulded into 'Italian' ethnics and they, in turn, perpetuated their new identity and tried to pass it on to other immigrants from Italy. Consumers also became aware of this identity as they read the labels on Italian products or simply heeded the advertisements of their brokers.”
in their efforts to build community schools and libraries.

As homeland representatives, diplomats were both the lightning rods of criticism from the emigrants and their most adept advocates in Lisbon. Some foreign officials were genuinely dedicated to their expatriate communities and undertook tasks that went beyond their expected duties. Most diplomats admired the efforts of Portuguese emigrants to preserve their cultural and linguistic heritage and occasionally rebuked their own government for not reciprocating. Still, despite delivering the regime's traditionalist propaganda, diplomats found the peasant character of the emigrants' ethnic performances to be embarrassing and sometimes inappropriate for modern North American audiences.

The Portuguese case confirms that ethnicity is situational and constructed, and that primordialism is a "very powerful political device."781 In the Estado Novo, that primordialism took the form of "invented traditions", such as ranchos. But even ranchos were supported by modern infrastructures like mass media. This ambivalent relation between traditional and modern was not new to Portuguese emigrants, who had been trading Portugal's rural countryside for North America’s industrial cities since the late 19th century. The tension between modern and traditional customs, between material progress and spiritual nurturing, or between urban and rural lifestyles, was intrinsic to the Janus-like character of most immigrants. On one hand, the vast majority of them shared a rural background that greatly shaped their worldviews and whose symbols they cherished, particularly when it came to articulating their ethnicity. The rural world, associated with notions of collectivism and spirituality, offered a sharp contrast with the individualism and materialism of North American capitalist culture and accentuated the ethnic group's social and cultural distinctiveness. The difficult living and working conditions that most immigrants faced in the new society, paired with the nostalgia for the land they grew up in, often gave rise to romanticized memories of a simpler and more meaningful rural life, to which many hoped to return to one day. Their descendants, raised in some of the most modern and urbanized societies in the planet, may not have had the same desire to "return" to the land but they too were prone to mythologize their rural heritage, which most knew only indirectly through their ancestors. This nostalgia, coupled with the emerging cultural pluralism of their host societies, made Portuguese ethnic communities potentially fertile soil in which to cultivate the Estado Novo's "politics of the spirit". On the other hand, immigrants were the antithesis of the homeland

781 Sökefeld, 2006, 266.
government's traditionalist and ruralist ethos. They chose to abandon their peasant lives, even if temporarily, and pursue their material advancement in foreign modern industrial societies. Those who were less romantic about the past could still remember the difficult living conditions and asphyxiating political culture they had left in Portugal. At the same time, those who were born and raised in the United States but whose identity remained associated with Portugal, a poor, "backward", undemocratic country in the eyes of the world, welcomed the representation of their "homeland" as a modern and industrializing nation, since that improved their own status as hyphenated Americans.

Assisted by the regime's propaganda, ethnic media, private impresarios and community artists, immigrants were able to follow cultural trends in their homeland's popular culture. However, they were not vessels waiting to be filled with cultural symbols by transnational intermediaries. Indeed, their ethnic culture often imitated popular practices in Portugal. Still, their ability to improvise with the few available resources provided by the homeland government, and their willingness to borrow practices from and meet the expectations of host societies, gave their cultural expressions a distinctly hybrid quality. They also managed to draw a significant number of modern popular artists to their community stages with little help from the regime, where they performed for savvy emigrant crowds; and build their own community libraries and circulate a diverse sample of Portuguese literature, including works forbidden in Portugal. Finally, immigrants could also access the massively attractive cultural offerings of North American mainstream society, and ignore, or relinquish, their ethnic group and its derivative cultural expressions. Nonetheless, there were plenty of Portuguese ethnic leaders in North America willing to drape themselves in the cultural discourses conveyed by the Estado Novo's propaganda, which infiltrated their host nation's mainstream public opinion. Far from being innocuous, these cultural references were filled with political messages supporting the dictatorship’s national, foreign, and colonialist agendas, and promoting an imperial-diasporic vision, as we will discuss in the next chapter.
Fig. 34 - Portuguese Rancho of Montreal posing outside a church, 1960s (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/003 [03], ASC27314).

Fig. 35 - Casa de Portugal staff, the consul and the chancelor of the consulate in Providence, and the show's hostess pose for the WJAR cameras with two young Portuguese women dressed as tradional "Minhota" and "Minho bride", showcasing "the economic and political progress made in Portugal, its history, industry, folklore and culture as well as its main exports" (photo published in the front cover of the Diário de Notícias, October 10, 1957, DN-UMASS [m.t.]).

Fig. 36 - Front cover of the Correio Português' second issue, of July 19, 1963, fully dedicated to the beauties of Sintra. The text by João Afonso and the images were likely provided by the SNI (N473, reel 3, AO).
Fig. 37 – “Always Have In Your Home To Toast Your Family And Friends, in 1970, Brandies of Portugal. Table, Port and Madeira Wines and other Portuguese Products. Available in every fine establishment” (advertisement published in the Diário de Noticias, April 8, 1970, 4, DN-UMASS).

Fig. 38 - Portuguese men learning English at worksite in Manitoba, 1950s (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/003 [04], ASC29575).

Fig. 39 - Portuguese children and nun during class at the Portuguese school of Our Lady of Mount Carmel parish, New Bedford. Photo by John Collier, April 1942 (Prints and Photographs Division, U.S. Office of War Information, Library of Congress, LC-USW-3-2021-C [11]).
6. MAKING IMPERIAL CITIZENS: LUSOTROPICALISM AND THE MULTIRACIAL DIASPORA, 1950s-60s

“This pilgrim Nation on foreign land that are our emigrants.”
Adriano Moreira, President of the Lisbon Geographic Society, May 9, 1964.782

When the Portuguese migrated to North America they not only left their hometowns, islands and country, but also their imperial space. Even those who migrated in the 19th century were well aware of their nation's global geography. Their schools, their churches, their press, their very settlements in the middle of the Atlantic, all reminded them of Portugal's maritime history. And if that was not enough, since the 1930s, emigrants were urged by government authorities to choose Portugal's colonies in Africa as their destination. As citizens of a European colonial empire with territories in Africa, Asia, and previously South America, these emigrants were conscious of their "whiteness". But because their racial identity was unchallenged, it was not important to their daily lives in Portugal, and therefore never fully articulated. That changed when they arrived in North America and were confronted with an extremely racialized society, where Anglo-Saxons were at the top of a ranking that privileged northern Europe.

As Marilyn Halter argued in her study of Cape Verdean migration to the United States, historians "need to collapse the traditional and arbitrary division between black history and immigration studies" and stop thinking "of race relations primarily in terms of the African American experience alone."783 Like Cape Verdeans, whose case we will discuss in this chapter, European Portuguese in the United States had a complex racial identity. Given their physical characteristics, geographic origins, low entry status in the labour market, legal status, national history, and a number of other factors, Portuguese immigrants did not fit in the neat hegemonic "white"/"black" framework of American society. As James Barrett and David Roediger argued, they were one of the "inbetween" races, along with other Southern and Eastern European immigrants.784 Like Halter, these historians collapsed the fields of immigration and racial studies, and in doing so have greatly contributed to our understanding of how "whiteness" in the United States was constructed and reinforced by various immigrant groups. Roediger and Noel Ignatiev have shown how early Irish immigrants in the 19th century improved their status in the labour market, political structures, and overall American society at the expense of blacks, with

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782 Adriano Moreira's speech during the Overseas Week in Aveiro, May 9, 1964 (m.t), in Sociedade de Geografia, 1964, 20.
783 Halter, 1993, 15.
784 Barrett and Roediger, 1997.
whom they had initially identified as fellow peasants. Irish-Americans "became white" by violently removing blacks from their workplaces and neighbourhoods, discarding and mocking their shared peasant culture; in short, they embraced the role of white enforcers of racial oppression.\(^{785}\)

Though less violently, European Portuguese immigrants engaged in a similar "process of adaptation and legitimization" in the United States, where, as Halter argued, they became "'whiter' than ever... by purposefully defining themselves in sharp contrast to the 'black' or Cape Verdean Portuguese."\(^{786}\) Their historical identity as white European colonizers complicated their racial identity in a way that is perhaps unique among "inbetween" immigrants in the United States.\(^{787}\) This was manifested in the Portuguese-Americans' embrace of imperial myths and tropes, in their relationship with local colonial "Portuguese" (i.e. Cape Verdeans), and their open support for Salazar's foreign policies whenever they asserted their identity as European, Western, and "white" ethnic Americans.

In the postwar period, this imperial strand in Portuguese-American identity was roused by a growing anti-colonialist consensus in American public opinion and the international siege on the \textit{Estado Novo}. In some cases, the political reverberations of Salazar's anti-American stance unraveled the hyphenated identity of Portuguese-Americans, pulling them farther from their heritage. In other cases, the regime's propaganda and diplomatic influence heightened the immigrant's pride in their imperial heritage and generated a Portuguese hyper nationalism not seen before in the United States. The regime was able to shape the political views of a large swath of Portuguese civic leaders in North America and win their hearts and minds by elevating them to the status of cultural and political "ambassadors" of their homeland's global imagination.

At the same time, the \textit{Estado Novo}'s propaganda asserted its supposed pro-miscegenation brand of colonialism and the mixed racial origins of Portuguese people. Gaining momentum at the same time as the civil rights movement, this new multiracial discourse cancelled the earlier attempts of Portuguese-Americans to "become white" and prompted them to (re)connect with their "fellow" Cape Verdean-Americans. It also urged Portuguese-Americans to somehow conciliate their colonialist heritage with an endorsement of African-Americans' struggle for

\(^{786}\) Halter, 1993, 16.
\(^{787}\) Similar diasporic experiences can be found in the Japanese, Lebanese and Syrian communities of Brazil, as discussed by Jeffrey Lesser, \textit{Negotiating Identity: National Identity, Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil}, 1999.
racial equality; at least until African-American activists turned their attention to Portugal's violent colonialism.

This chapter will discuss the complex intersections of ethnicity, race, and empire in the making of Portuguese identity in the United States, where racial politics were of great consequence to immigrants. In doing so, I will build on Halter's collapsing of black history and immigration studies by adding imperial history to the mix. This will help us understand how Portuguese-Americans evolved in the United States' racial scheme, and how the Estado Novo began providing them with the cultural and political means to articulate a Portuguese diasporic identity.

Protecting the empire: lusotropicalismo, Portugal's foreign relations, and the colonial wars

The pressure on Portugal to surrender its colonies became more vigorous after the ratification of the UN Charter in 1945. Confronted with an increasingly hostile international community, Salazar made changes to the empire's institutional and juridical structures, and adopted a new nationalist discourse that eschewed the colonialist terminology of his detractors. The new vision was implemented in 1951 through a constitutional reform that replaced the term "colonies" with "overseas provinces", now considered parts of a single pluricontinental and multiracial nation.788 Central to this legal revision was the lusotropicalismo thesis proposed by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, in his book The Masters and Slaves (1933). Freyre argued that, due to the historical and geographical characteristics of Portuguese culture and society, its brand of imperialism was more humane and adaptable to tropical cultures than its European counterparts. Gerald J. Bender synthesized the major themes of lusotropicalism as follows:

Given the unique cultural and racial background of metropolitan Portugal, Portuguese explorers and colonizers demonstrated a special ability - found among no other people in the world - to adapt to tropical lands and peoples. The Portuguese colonizer, basically poor and humble, did not have the exploitative motivations of his counterpart from the more industrialized countries in Europe. Consequently, he immediately entered into cordial relations with the non-European populations he met in the tropics... The ultimate proof of the absence of racism among the Portuguese, however, is found in Brazil, whose large and socially prominent mestiço population is living testimony to the freedom of social and sexual intercourse between Portuguese and non-Europeans. Portuguese non-racism is also evidenced by the absence in Portuguese law of the racist legislation in South Africa and until recently in the United States barring non-whites from specific occupations, facilities, etc. Finally, any prejudice or discrimination in territories formerly or presently governed by Portugal can be traced to class, but never colour, prejudice.789

788 Pinto, 2001, 22.
After having initially rejected its pro-miscegenation arguments, Salazar recognized the usefulness of Freyre's thesis in affirming Portuguese exceptionalism and making its brand of imperialism more palatable to the international community. Lusotropicalism became the official doctrine after 1951, constantly alluded to in the regime's propaganda and diplomatic relations. More than ever before, Portuguese learned their nation stretched from "Minho to East Timor", and their national soul was boundless. "Being Portuguese" was said to be a universalist vocation that included a natural aptitude for cultural brokerage and a historical imperative to spread its spiritual and civilizing message across the world.\(^{790}\)

The first signs of crumbling within the empire appeared in the 1950s, when nationalist liberation movements, some of them linked with the Soviet Union, emerged in the Portuguese territories in Africa and India. At this point, Salazar began characterizing Portugal's presence in Africa as "Europe's rear" in the battle against communism. Meanwhile, calls for decolonization increased at the UN; the loudest coming from the African-Asian bloc, which in 1960 became the voting majority in the General Assembly, the same year it passed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Despite the increasing international siege on Portugal, Salazar could still count on the "collaborative neutrality" of important Western allies, like France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Spain, Brazil, and the United States. In fact, one of Salazar's most productive friendships was with President Dwight Eisenhower, during whose administration the dictator enjoyed his most amicable diplomatic relations.

In 1961, Portugal's Western entente began to disintegrate. The election of liberal John F. Kennedy in the United States and socialist Jânio Quadros in Brazil, both anti-colonialists, removed important support for Salazar. The British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan also changed his country's position on European colonialism in Africa, now believing "the winds of change" would inevitably bring the independence of its colonized peoples. Canada and the Scandinavian countries also escalated their criticism of Salazar's dictatorship and colonial policies, introducing moratoria on arms sales to Portugal, and calling for its removal from NATO. In the meantime, the UN continued to demand that Portugal surrender its African territories.\(^{791}\)

Salazar's intransigent position on Portugal's feeble empire became even less tenable with

\(^{790}\) Melo, 2001, 47.
\(^{791}\) Rosas, 1993, 517-518.
the outbreak of the colonial wars in Africa, on March 15, 1961. That day, the Union of Peoples of Angola, led by Holden Roberto, unleashed a series of attacks in the north of Angola, resulting in the massacre of about 1,000 white Portuguese settlers (including children) and 6,000 black servants. The counter-offensive began soon afterwards with equally senseless violence in the jungles and cities, many of them carried out by Portuguese civilians, who engaged in horrible atrocities, including the arguably genocidal massacre of non-combatant African natives. By mid-1963, the Portuguese army had managed to contain the rebels in Angola, although the war escalated on two new fronts in Portuguese Guinea, on January 1963, and in Mozambique, on September 1964. Until the 1974 cease-fire, many tens of thousands of Portuguese men (about 1% of the country's population) were drafted, initially for a period of two years, then four after 1967.\footnote{Pinto, 2001, 48.} As previously mentioned, military conscription generated an unquantifiable but by all accounts large exodus of war resisters and families with near military-age sons.\footnote{For a detailed account of the colonial wars in Africa see José Freire Antunes, \textit{A Guerra de África, 1961-1974}, Vols. 1-4, 1996; and \textit{A Guerra Colonial 1961-1974}, documentary film, directed by Joaquim Furtado, Series 1-4, RTP, 2007.}

With the start of the colonial wars, protecting the empire became the chief mission of Portuguese diplomacy. That task became harder once President Kennedy took office on January 1961 with the promise of ushering in a new liberal era in American foreign policy that was less tolerant of authoritarian regimes and settler colonialism. The American ambassador at the UN was instructed to vote in favour of any Security Council resolution advocating the self-determination of African nations. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also began secretly funding Holden Roberto's pro-Western party after the African leader met with Kennedy in Washington.\footnote{The U.S. also began secretly funding Eduardo Mondlane, the leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), in 1963 (Antunes, 1991, 171, 237-239; Maxwell, 1995, 50-51; Pinto, 2001, 17, 20-21, 25).}

In March 1961, after the United States approved a UN resolution calling on Portugal to move towards the self-determination of Angola, a wave of anti-American rallies took place throughout Portugal and some of its colonies, with the regime's tacit support; the largest brought anywhere between 15,000 to 20,000 people together outside the American embassy in Lisbon.\footnote{Following these protests, the \textit{Diário de Notícias} reported that many Portuguese-Americans, especially those travelling to Portugal, were afraid of being ostracized by Portuguese custom officers due to their American citizenship ("Repercussões da Tensão Entre os E.U. e Portugal", \textit{Diário de Notícias}, March 28, 1961, 1, DN-UMASS).} The protesters accused the Americans of treachery, demanded they be evicted from Lajes, and called for the emancipation of African-Americans. Public anger was amplified by the disturbing news and images of massacres arriving from the north of Angola.
Also fuelling this anti-American sentiment was the U.S. government's collaboration with known opponents of the regime, starting with Captain Henrique Galvão and his Iberian "pirates". In January 1961, a squad of Portuguese and Spanish armed rebels led by Galvão, seized the Portuguese cruise liner Santa Maria off the coast of Curacao, along with its 600 passengers and crew. Their plan was to sail to Angola and join a group of anti-Salazar settlers and African nationalists and launch an uprising that they hoped would trigger a revolution.\footnote{David L. Raby, "Portuguese Exile Politics: The 'Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional', 1962-1973", Luso-Brazilian Review, 31 (1) (Summer 1994), 80.} For 12 days, Galvão and his men avoided capture by Portuguese, British, and American navy vessels. Three days into the pursuit, the world learned of their freedom fighting goals and their association with then leader of the opposition Humberto Delgado. To the Portuguese government's despair the British Navy withdrew after this, while the Americans treated Galvão as a legitimate political representative, as opposed to an "international criminal." The United States helped negotiate Galvão's asylum in Brazil, where the Americans safely escorted the ship.

Kennedy also exploited the fissures within the Portuguese military since the start of the colonial wars. Many high-ranking officers had grown fond of the liberal democracies of their NATO allies. In April 1961, the U.S. government enticed the Portuguese Minister of National Defense and former Military Attaché in Washington, General Júlio Botelho Moniz - an apologist of decolonization and democratic reform - to lead a putsch from inside the regime; their plan, however, failed.\footnote{Rodrigues, 2002, 82-88, 275; Pinto, 2001, 17.} In the cabinet reshuffle that followed Moniz' attempted coup, Salazar appointed the 38-year-old Adriano Moreira as the new Overseas Minister. Moreira's political trajectory had been the reverse of many democratic dissidents, since he started as an opponent of the regime and later became one of its rising stars. Despite being a champion of lusotropicalism and other imperialist myths, Moreira was a conservative reformist who believed the colonies should gradually become autonomous from Lisbon. He removed legal barriers preventing indigenous Africans from becoming citizens; abolished rules allowing the forced labour of black rural workers; promoted public education; among other changes.\footnote{One of the main pieces of legislation that Moreira eliminated was the Statute of Indigenism, which divided colonial populations into three categories: white settlers, assimilated indigenous (assimilados), and indigenous. The few Africans that obtained assimilado status through education were still subjected to various forms of institutional discrimination.} Still, these social reforms were secondary to the military defense of Angola, where the efforts to crush African nationalist rebels intensified.\footnote{Antunes, 1991, 94-95, 235-236.} Moreira also re-opened the Tarrafal Prison Camp where many of the Estado...
Novo's political enemies had been sent to die, now dedicated to incarcerating African liberation leaders. Salazar originally endorsed Moreira's policies, since they improved the empire's international image and somewhat normalized the political situation in the colonies. The young minister had raised his profile in the regime and was seen as a legitimate contender to succeed the aging Salazar - the other candidates being Pedro Teotónio Pereira and Marcello Caetano. However, by the end of 1962, the old dictator ordered Moreira to reverse his policies. The minister refused to do so and resigned. Moreira then dedicated himself to academia, promoting the inclusion of social sciences in the curriculum of Portuguese universities, and became the president of the Lisbon Geographic Society.

In December 1961, after a ten-year-long diplomatic battle with an unyielding Salazar, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru abandoned Gandhi's non-violent methods and finally ordered his army to occupy the poorly defended Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman and Diu. Despite the Estado Novo's repeated appeals to the UN and the United States, there was no resolute international condemnation of India's attack. In fact, Kennedy banned the sale of arms to Portugal and ensured that military equipment sent through NATO was not deployed in Africa. In January 1962, Salazar expressed his frustration with the United States and threatened to leave the UN. Again, the regime's followers in Lisbon reacted to these developments with another wave of anti-American protests.

The deterioration of Portugal-U.S. relations jeopardized the Americans' hold on the Lajes Air Base, whose leasing agreement was up for renewal in 1962. However, after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, during which Portugal remained steadfastly on the side of its NATO ally, Kennedy's anti-colonialist agenda was superseded by national defense concerns. The conservative dominated Congress, particularly those congressmen from heavily Portuguese-American districts in Massachusetts, like Republicans Joseph Martin and Hastings Keith, and Democrats John W. McCormack and Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, also pressured Kennedy to reassess his policy towards Angola and improve relations with Portugal. The rapprochement began in

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801 Adriano Moreira also became the director of the Technical University of Lisbon's Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina (founded by the Lisbon Geographic Society in 1906 as the Colonial School) until Caetano removed him from office in 1969. After the 1974 revolution, Moreira moved to Brazil. In 1977 he returned to Portugal and to political life, becoming a Member of Parliament with the Democratic and Social Centre - People's Party (CDS-PP) during the centre-right government of 1979-83; he became the CDS-PP's leader in 1986-88.
late 1962, with the two countries inaugurating a new period of "collaborative neutrality". After this, Kennedy's administration offered Portugal substantial military aid, reduced its conspicuous contacts with African nationalist rebels, and became silent on matters related to Portuguese colonialism on the international stage. In exchange, Salazar granted provisional access to the Lajes Air Base, until a new lease was finally signed in 1971.804

The U.S. government's tolerance of the Atlantic ally increased as the military presence in Vietnam grew in 1961-62, further reducing the already limited media coverage of Portugal's wars in Africa. Relations with the Estado Novo continued to improve during the administrations of Lyndon Johnson and, especially, Richard M. Nixon. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's powerful National Security Advisor, stopped supporting African nationalists, partially lifted the arms embargo on Portugal, and embraced the NATO ally as a stalwart defender of the West engaged in a fight against communism on "the African flank".805

As for Canada, Portuguese diplomats realized that its foreign policy was now determined more in Washington than in London. In Ambassador Eduardo Brazão's assessment, while he would strive to "enlighten" Canadians about Portugal's colonial policies, their "definitive mot d'ordre... will always come from the U.S."806 Still, despite the Americans change of heart, Canada continued to publicly oppose Portugal's wars in Africa and refused to sell arms to the colonial regime. Nonetheless, according to Stephen Lewis, the leader of the left-wing New Democratic Party (NDP) of Ontario, over a third of Canadian exports to Portugal in the late 1960s were industrial supplies that could be used in war production, along with firearms, ammunitions, and explosives. Furthermore, the jet fighters used by the Portuguese Air Force to drop napalm bombs in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea were made in Canada.807

The short-lived "liberal spring" that followed Marcello Caetano's ascension to power in 1968 failed to democratize the regime at the same time it carried on the colonial wars. When Caetano backtracked from his reformist project in 1970, the many malcontents inside and outside the regime recognized they had lost their last chance for a peaceful political resolution to the

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804 Maxwell, 1995, 52.
806 Telegram, Amb. Eduardo Brazão to PMFA, January 5, 1963 (m.t.), PEA M296, Relações Políticas com o Canadá, AHD.
807 Canada had sold these jet fighters to Germany, who later resold them to Portugal. As Lewis revealed, after having publicly forbid the resale to Portugal in 1965, the Canadian federal government later allowed that deal to go ahead through backroom negotiations (Stephen Lewis' speech to the United Church of Canada's Board of World Mission, March ? 1971, F0579, 2009-022/005 (8), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
Estado Novo's antiquated authoritarian and colonialist rule. The wars in Africa would last until 1974. In the end, it was the dictatorship's resolute defense of the empire that precipitated its fall, though not without first claiming the lives, limbs, and sanity of tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict (to which we can add the many landmine victims in its aftermath), and leaving a lengthy legacy of political turmoil in its former African colonies.

"Black Europeans" or "white Africans": the racial complexities of Portuguese- and Cape Verdeans in the United States

In the United States, where race touched every aspect of society and only "whiteness" granted full access to the so-called merit-based economy, the notion that Portuguese people favoured miscegenation and were historically of mixed race was not advantageous. Since they began arriving in the United States, Hawaii, and Bermuda in the 19th century, Portuguese migrants had to contend with racial stigmas from Anglo-Saxon whites. Like other Southern and Eastern European immigrants, they became quickly aware of their hosts' deep racist beliefs and learned to assert their "whiteness" as a form of self-preservation and self-promotion. As Barrett and Roediger argued, these European "new immigrants" occupied an ambivalent "inbetween" position in America's racial hierarchy, as defined by policy makers, the courts, employers, labour unions, and overall popular opinion. Pseudo-scientific studies validated these popular prejudices. For example, Donald Taft's 1923 doctoral thesis at Columbia University attributed a number of social ills afflicting Portuguese families in New England to their "Negroid blood", concluding they were hardly apt for North American urban industrial society, though they were still better equipped than the more "negroid" proletarians. This "inbetweeness" is also reflected in the recurrent stereotypes ascribed to Portuguese immigrants (and other Southern Europeans), ranging from the well-meaning honest, hard working, law abiding, and family oriented to the demeaning dull, docile, temperamental, and reluctant to change.

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808 Rosas, 1993, 545-558.
812 For a list of common adjectives attributed to Portuguese-Americans see Pap, 1981, 118-120.
The racial identity of Portuguese-Americans was complicated further by the presence of Cape Verdeans in New England (Figure 40). A people of mixed racial descent, Cape Verdeans were the Portuguese empire's own "inbetween" people: not fully African nor European. Educated in Catholic seminaries and Protestant missions, many Cape Verdeans occupied middleman roles in the Portuguese colonial administration, which further distinguished them from continental Africans. As Halter argued, this racial and ethnic "inbetweenness" continued in the United States, where Cape Verdeans migrated not as "black Portuguese," or even necessarily as "Cape Verdean", but as Catholic, Lusophone, Portuguese nationals. Regardless of racial perceptions, Cape Verdeans landed in the United States holding Portuguese passports, under that country's migration quota, and were therefore legally "Portuguese", hence "European", hence "white." However, their movement became a small stream after the restrictive immigration policies of the 1920s, and would not see a great increase after the 1965 Act, since Portuguese colonial bureaucracy made it nearly impossible for average Cape Verdeans to obtain emigration visas. Still, the legal status of those who made it across the Atlantic not only confounded American authorities but also thwarted some of their racist policies, like the ban on African immigrants from becoming United States citizens (lifted in 1952). As Miguel Moniz pointed out, this legal advantage was a compelling enough reason for Cape Verdeans to assert their Portuguese roots.

Whether moved by a cultural affinity for their European colonizers or by a strategic interest in joining a "racially fluid" group that allowed for "the greatest malleability in their racial classification", Cape Verdean immigrants initially presented themselves as Portuguese-Americans. At the same time, like other European immigrants, Cape Verdeans distanced themselves from black Americans, realizing their easy association with "blackness" was detrimental to their well-being. Following the same logic, European Portuguese in turn excluded Cape Verdeans from their neighbourhoods, churches, clubs, and workplaces in order to protect

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813 Divisions based on skin colour also existed among Cape Verdeans, each category attached to social and cultural understandings, some informed by inter-island enmities.
814 Non-white colonial "Portuguese" had no such luck in Canada. In 1955, Minister Cunha inquired with Canadian immigration officials if they were willing to include Goans in their labour migration agreement, to which Prime Minister Pearson replied that, despite being Portuguese citizens, Goans were still Asian, and were therefore excluded by Canada's immigration laws (letter, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister Laval Fortier, Ottawa, December 16, 1955, file 3-33-27, Vol. 130, RG 26, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, NAC).
815 Moniz, 2009, 418.
816 Ibid.
their own "whiteness". Over time, Cape Verdeans formed their own associations and parishes where they preserved some aspects of their Kriolu (creole) language and culture, and maintained transnational ties with their homeland. Still, their organizations' chief concern was asserting Portugueseess. For instance, Brooklyn's Society for the Perpetuation of Portuguese Heritage (SPPH), a Cape Verdean association restricted to "individuals of Portuguese descent" with no less than high school education, strove to "cement closer relationships, preserve customs, culture and traditions, promote activities and cultural development of people of Portuguese heritage... and to acquaint ourselves with the achievements of the people of Cape Verdean descent, both here and abroad."

The "inbetweenness" of Portuguese-Americans continued to puzzle state bureaucrats in the 1950s, the latter remaining unsure how to categorize this group in their rigid racial matrix. In the American south, where segregation was most virulent, this confusion resulted in curious legal compromises. In January 1958, *The Virginian-Pilot* published a story on the segregation of "Portuguese" children in the small township of Gaston, in Northampton County, North Carolina, based on a "century-old stigma". As the press described it, there were 16 destitute rural families in Gaston who were thought to be descendants of white migrants from the north, Native Americans, and free blacks, who had mingled some time in the Antebellum period. Their relation with Portugal, however, remained a mystery, as their ancestors left no written records. Despite being visibly white, Methodist, and having Anglo surnames, these "Portuguese" had long been ostracized by the county's "pure whites", who in 1923 passed legislation banning "Portuguese" children from attending white-only schools. Because "Portuguese" parents refused to send their children to black-only schools, the state allowed them to build a "Portuguese"-only primary school in Gaston, which only taught up to eighth grade. The *Pilot*'s reporter interviewed the school's only teacher, Osceloa T. Crew, a "pure white" Northampton resident, who tried to instill in her students a sense of pride for their supposed heritage by teaching them about Vasco da Gama, Ferdinand Magellan and other heroes of Portugal's "golden age".

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817 This was especially the case at the turn of the century, when more Cape Verdeans from the islands of Fogo and São Tiago (of darker complexion) began settling alongside their Brava (of lighter complexion) countrymen (Halter, 1993, 120).
819 Letter, Consul J. M. Fragoso, New York, to PMFA, July 21, 1960 (m.t.), M20 Assuntos Diversos, AHD.
The Diário of New Bedford ran this story for months and expressed its outrage over the ignorance of North Carolina's legislators. Its director, João Rocha, wrote extensively about the "misuse" of the label "Portuguese". He suspected these families had no real connection with his own ethnic and religious ancestry and were "simply an unfortunate group of people, without roots nor history, living adrift in a hostile world...". In February, Rocha, published a letter he had sent the editor of the Virginian Pilot, in which he asked:

Are they really Portuguese? And, if they are, they certainly belong to some racial segment. If they came from continental Portugal, the Azores or Madeira and their fathers were Portuguese, they are Caucasians - WHITE. (...) However, there are Portuguese CITIZENS who might well be negroes. They came from Portugal's African territories... There are, too, Portuguese CITIZENS who [are] Mongolians (the "yellow" race). They obviously must come from Portugal's Asiatic colonies... What may be difficult for [North Carolina's legislators] to comprehend is that Portugal and the Portuguese are proud of them all. They believe living people - regardless of creed or color - are human beings and MUST be treated as such. Rocha went on to say that all that Miss Crew had to do to boost her students' pride in their heritage, "if they are really Portuguese", was tell them "the truth"; that is that "Caucasian Portuguese mariners" charted trade routes to other continents that were later explored by other European nations, and that Portuguese-Americans, like the writer John dos Passos, the composer John Philip Sousa, the American revolutionary hero Peter Francisco and others had made great contributions to their country.

Ambassador Luis Fernandes informed Lisbon that the Portuguese-Americans in the north were enraged and sent letters to their political representatives complaining about the abusive and demeaning use of their ancestry for segregationist purposes in the south. In Fernandes' opinion, the Portuguese government should not falter in the face of this "insult". He proposed referring the case to the State Department and lobbying congressmen from North Carolina and Northampton County to fix this problem. To learn more about these "Portuguese" families, Fernandes assigned the embassy's press officer, Bernardo Teixeira, to investigate the situation. After spending a week in Gaston with two Pilot reporters and a photographer, Teixeira submitted his 12-page report. In it he described his interaction with the children as an "unforgettable experience", noting with irony that some had light blond hair and blue eyes, and looked "whiter" than their "pure white" teacher, Miss Crew, who had brown eyes and darker skin

821 João Rocha, "Comentário do Dia", Diário de Notícias, February 14, 1958, 1, DN-UMASS.  
822 "Ainda o caso das familias 'Portuguesas' segregadas... Carolina do Norte", Diário de Notícias, February 24, 1958, ibid.  
823 Ibid.  
824 Letter, Amb. L. Fernandes to PMFA, Mar. 4, 1958, PEA 71, Segregação racial... "Portugueses" na Carolina do Norte, AHD.
The teacher told Teixeira the children had suffered from the *Pilot*'s story, as with anything that drew attention to their "Portuguese" label, which condemned them to "inferiority and isolation". In Miss Crew's experience, the children recoiled in their seats every time she tried to teach them about Portuguese history, since it reminded them of their own segregation. Crew mentioned she had once invited a former missionary in Brazil to give a presentation on Portuguese architecture in that country, to which many of the children cried in shame, some skipping class the next day. The parents too were "horrified" by the press' coverage, and worried it could expose those relatives who managed to escape the "Northampton siege" and were now living as "normal whites" in other states.

According to the "semi-legendary" memories of local elders, these families descended from crewmembers of a Portuguese merchant ship wrecked on North Carolina's shores sometime before the Civil War, who later settled in that county and had sexual relations with the creole daughters of white plantation owners and black slave women. Whatever the case, they no longer had a connection to Portugal, which they knew little about. In his conclusion, Teixeira was very critical of the "stupidity" of American southerners, who forced the "Portuguese" of Northampton to live in a state of constant fear and suspicion, and to abhor that national label that "isolates them from the world like lepers in the Middle Ages".

Meanwhile, the press in Portugal insisted: "The Sixteen Families Living in Segregation in the United States Are Not Portuguese." The following month, the *Diário* reported that scholars gathered at the Lisbon Geographic Society arrived at the plain conclusion that these segregated families in Gaston were not "Portuguese" since "they were born in North Carolina, and were therefore American."

825 The county school's superintendent forbid Miss Crew from speaking to the press or that photos be taken of her students. Still, she agreed to speak with Teixeira and consented that the children be photographed for the embassy's records, as long as they were not published in the press. Crew also warned Teixeira not to mention he was from the Portuguese embassy and suggested instead he introduce himself as someone from Washington studying the school's conditions. According to Teixeira, some of the children refused to have their photos taken, while others, timidly, accepted on the tacit understanding that somehow this could help them improve their situation.

826 Teixeira proposed a different theory for their origin. In his estimation, these were offspring of Portuguese labourers who migrated from Pennsylvania to work on the building of the nearby Roanoke canal in the early 20th century. In 2001, the Portuguese-Canadian businessmen Manuel Mira published *The Portuguese Making of America: Melungeons and Early Settlers of America*, where he argued the Melungeons, a group of mixed race people who settled in the Appalachian Mountains in the 16th century, were descendants of "proud Portuguese" shipwrecks, who arrived in North America before the Spanish and the British. According to Mira, the "Portuguese" of Gaston were descendants of this group, as was Abraham Lincoln, which explained his "Portuguese features".

827 Bernardo Teixeira, report to Portuguese embassy, Washington, March 1958 (m.t.), PEA 71, Segregação racial... "Portugueses" na Carolina do Norte, AHD.

Following Ambassador Fernandes' appeals, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Charles B. Elbrick (who became the American Ambassador in Lisbon soon after this) pressured Northampton's state representatives to remove the term "Portuguese" from their segregationist legislation and use some other designation to discriminate against those Gaston families. The State Department alerted the Governor of North Carolina to the international implications of legally discriminating against a group of people on the grounds of their national heritage. The governor replied that the old legislation barring "Portuguese" from white-only schools had been revoked, and that efforts were under way to include them in the same electoral lists as "whites", which was accomplished in June 19, 1959, through a bill passed at North Carolina's legislature. 829

While more Portuguese-American leaders began asserting their ethnicity in the 1950s, their communities were still fairly reluctant about celebrating their ancestry. This changed after the Capelinhos volcano crisis and the revival of Portuguese mass migration. According to Francis Rogers, the arrival of these newcomers created two camps in the Portuguese-American communities: the orgulhosos (proud), those newcomers who held a positive view of their national heritage and racial identity; and the envergonhados (ashamed), the older generations who learned to hide their ancestry given its questionable "whiteness". Rogers argued that newcomers also differed from their predecessors in having more formal education (though still below the American average) and coming from a modern Portugal where racial diversity was part of the official discourse. He claimed these orgulhosos were appalled by the racial segregation in the United States and offended by the assimilationist proclivity of their predecessors. 830 As one newcomer told a reporter from Cambridge's The Harvard Crimson in 1974: "I have learned [since coming] here that sometimes people have been ashamed that they are not from the United States... The 'mixing pot' ideal is not good. We can gain from living in the United States, but we have something to offer too;" another immigrant who had lived in the United States since the age of nine, said: "If I'm going to be called anything, I'd like to be called

829 Telegrams, Amb. L. Fernandes to PMFA, April 3 & March 11, 1958; letter, Luis Norton the Mattos to Amb. Fernandes, April 11, 1959, PEA 71, Segregação racial relativamente a "Portugueses" na Carolina do Norte, AHD.
830 Rogers, 1974.
Portuguese, because I don't believe in giving up a nationality and taking on another one. There is no American heritage. I felt that I would be giving up something by becoming American.\footnote{831}

The resurgence of Portuguese mass migration coincided with the rise of African-American cultural nationalism and white "ethnic revivalism"\footnote{832} in the late 1960s. Black activists like Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X, and others urged their brethren to look to their African roots as a source of cultural pride, identity, and political strength that would help them overcome their historical anonymity and sense of inferiority, and redefine their place in American society. Their calls for an African-American ethnicity were embraced primarily by black youth, who strove for more than just integration into the inherently racist liberal capitalist society, and wished instead to change its political and economic structures. Since the 19th century, European immigrant leaders had made similar attempts to promote a sense of pride in their group's historical roots and articulate an ethnic identity that was distinct yet integrated in the American nation. The most notable filiopietistic efforts were arguably those of Italian-Americans, who managed to elevate the Genoese navigator Christopher Columbus to hero status in American national consciousness, as recognized by the Columbus Day federal holiday.\footnote{833}

Portuguese ethnic leaders were engaged in various filiopietistic campaigns since the 1940s, seeking official heritage status for those Portuguese navigators who explored the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of North America prior to the founding of the United States and Canada, along with other "pioneers" of Portuguese immigration.\footnote{834} By weaving their national narratives into North American foundational myths, ethnic leaders sought to free themselves from the stigmas of "foreignness" and "dual-loyalty", and secure their group's full membership in the American polity. For this, they were able to use cultural resources provided by their homeland government's propaganda and its diplomats' political capital. For instance, in 1963, Ambassador


\footnote{832} For more on this topic see Colburn & Pozzetta, 1994, 130-138; Skrentny, 2002, 277-281.


\footnote{834} Due to the space constraints of this dissertation, I had to remove a chapter on public memory, historical consciousness, and diasporic narratives among Portuguese communities in North America, where I discussed these topics at length. I intend to turn that chapter into two journal articles some time in the future.
Brazão, a prolific historian of Portuguese diplomacy and maritime explorations, including the explorations of navigator Gaspar Corte-Real, said to have reached the coast of Labrador in 1501 - was received with exceptional honours by Newfoundland's Premier Joseph Smallwood and his recently confederated provincial government. Speaking at St. John's Rotary Club, Brazão educated his audience about the "true" history of Canada's "discovery" and Portugal's role in it, adding:

"[The Portuguese empire is] the crowning of our sociological ideal... a multi-racial formation of homogenous groups of different colours but interrelated in a way analogous to the colours of the rainbow. This approach did not imply... compulsion, nor imposition under duress or otherwise, of the will of one power or nation over other ethnical [sic] groups, but was done with open arms, it was the moral and physical elevation of the aborigines whom we found... in the primitive state. This is the WORK of Portugal, a great enterprise of social equality in the approximation of races."

He then asked Canadians to endorse Portugal's historical mission, which depended on:

"...the comprehension and understanding of the Western world, which must realize that the... labels - colony, colonization, anti-colonization - do not rightly apply to us... We are preparing a new chapter in the History of the World... Everything depends on us. The winds of history must not make us drift off the true course."

In Brazão's view, to be ignorant of Portuguese history was not only to be ignorant of Canadian history but also to jeopardize Western civilization, of which both countries were stakeholders. Two years later, in 1965, Brazão unveiled a statue of Corte-Real in front of Newfoundland's new legislative assembly as a gift from his government to the people of St. John's, in the presence of Portuguese ethnic leaders from Canada and the United States, a group of White Fleet fishermen, and various Canadian dignitaries. Smallwood, who Brazão commended for having the courage to publicly declare his admiration for Salazar in such unsympathetic North American context, accepted the gift from Britain's "famous old ally", asserting Newfoundland's ancient link with continental Europe.

In another example, Ambassador Garin delivered a speech in Sacramento for the 1964 Cabrillo Day festivities, celebrating the "discovery" of California by the Portuguese navigator João Rodrigues Cabrilho in 1542. Garin offered a warped Cold War interpretation of Cabrilho's discovery, arguing that, since "Russia's sinister expansionist designs were later witnessed in the

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835 Among Brazão's works were The Corte-Real Family and the New World (1965), and The Portuguese Discoveries in the Histories of Canada (1969), written during his mission in Canada.
836 Speech by Ambassador Eduardo Brazão at the St. John's Rotary Club, Newfoundland, May 30, 1963, PEA M400, Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá. Visitado do Embaixador Dr. Eduardo Brazão às Comunidades Portuguesas do Canadá. AHD.
838 The Cabrillo Day was instituted in California in 1935, in large part due to the efforts of the Cabrilho Civic Clubs, a nexus of Portuguese-American organizations in that state, the first of which was founded in San Francisco in 1934. They also convinced the Portuguese government to donate the Cabrillo National Monument in Point Loma, San Diego, unveiled in 1942.
north, in Alaska, rather than on California's shores, one can say that we owe to Cabrillo the securing of California for the Western World... and that he came to serve well the future cause of free men with his superhuman exploit." According to Garin, the Portuguese empire was defined by a deep respect for "human dignity and social justice and for equal rights for all, regardless of race, creed or colour," and was "a fountain of inspiration to those countries who criticize us and are looking for solutions for some of the problems besetting them." This indirect reference to America's racial conflicts certainly caught the crowd's attention, which had seen the Civil Rights Act introduced only a few months before.\textsuperscript{839}

High-ranking Canadian and American political officials delivered similar praise for Portugal’s glorious maritime history at various heritage celebrations organized by Portuguese civic leaders, repeating the \textit{Estado Novo}'s imperial mantra. Moreover, they reproduced the colonialist, Eurocentric narratives of Canadian and American "founding nations" that subjugated North America's indigenous peoples. These ethnic heritage campaigns sometimes led to contradictory statements of admiration and loyalty for the opposing colonial and racial views of Portuguese and American governments. One of the most interesting cases was that of Manuel Luciano da Silva,\textsuperscript{840} the most spirited and polemical champion of the Portuguese pre-Mayflower settlement thesis. Da Silva dedicated his life to obtaining official recognition from American and Portuguese political and scientific authorities of the supposed discovery of North America by the Portuguese, and the preservation and celebration of Dighton Rock's inscriptions (Figure 45).\textsuperscript{841} This included challenging the memorialization of Christopher Columbus as the official

\textsuperscript{839} Letter, Amb. Vasco V. Garin to Minister Franco Nogueira, September 18, 1964, PEA M609-A, Relações Culturais com os E.U.A. Convite Governo Americano ao Sr. Dr. Adriano Moreira... AHD.

\textsuperscript{840} Manuel L. da Silva was born to a family of humble means in the small town of Vale de Cambra, near Aveiro. In 1946, at age 19, Da Silva joined his immigrant father in Brooklyn and became a secretary in the Portuguese consulate, studying English at night. Later he enrolled at New York University, where he met José Dâmaso Fragoso. Sharing a fascination for the voyages of the Corte-Real brothers, they founded the Miguel Corte-Real Memorial Society in 1951. After that he went to Portugal to study medicine and returned to the U.S. in 1958, settling with his family in Bristol. After Fragoso resigned from their Society, Da Silva took on the mission of claiming the discovery of North America for the Portuguese. Da Silva's aggressive style earned them many enemies, who in turn dismissed him as a charlatan and his arguments as fabrications of a creative hyper patriotic mind.

\textsuperscript{841} For centuries, the Dighton Rock has been the subject of speculation by many history aficionados, who have submitted it as flagrant archaeological evidence to a range of historical theories regarding the arrival of the first Europeans to North America. The boulder, originally located in the riverbank of the Tauton River in Berkley, is remarkable for the carved inscriptions that cover its surface. In 1912, Dr. Edmund Delabarre, a professor of psychology at Brown University and an expert in the field of shape perception, claimed to have discovered the Portuguese coat of arms on the surface of the Rock, along with a Latin inscription that translates to: "Miguel Corte Real, by the will of God, here chief of the indians, 1511." Delabarre spent a great deal of time studying its carvings and became an expert on the subject. He published his findings in 1919 and captured the attention of Portuguese officials, who in 1933 awarded him with an honorific title for outstanding services to the nation in the realm of sciences and culture. Until 1963, when Da Silva convinced Massachusetts' state officials to remove the Rock from the water and build a state park and museum dedicated to the history of Portuguese maritime explorations, the Dighton Rock was submerged 20 hours a day and entirely ignored by the American public.
"discoverer" of America, based on the fact the "Italian" had never set foot on what was present day United States; Da Silva argued the only reason why Columbus was celebrated in the United States was because Italian-Americans had a sizable political constituency. Da Silva was a divisive figure in the Portuguese-American community, not only because of his flamboyant and outspoken personality, or his conceit and affected erudition, but also because of his regular public tirades against the Estado Novo and its diplomats, whom he accused of incompetence, discrimination, and lack of concern for emigrants - even though he regularly requested and received support from Portuguese officials. Besides being fervently Portuguese, Da Silva was also a proud American, who strongly believed in its foundational values of liberty and democracy. Throughout his life, Da Silva was involved in Portuguese-American community affairs and became one of its most well known civic leaders. As founder and president of various associations, he spearheaded a number of social causes, including the elimination of Cape Verdean discrimination by Portuguese-American organizations. In 1970, as the PAF's president, Da Silva launched a campaign in the Portuguese-American media demanding the regime abolish the costly visa requirement for Americans travelling to the Cape Verdean islands. According to him, this unfairly targeted Cape Verdean immigrants who were "as much if not more Portuguese than those immigrants from the Mainland, Madeira or the Azores." While the majority of Portuguese immigrants and descendants deliberately joined "white America" during the Second World War, Cape Verdians were subsumed into "black America". Cape Verdians fighting in the U.S. armed forces were often placed in segregated regiments where they interacted with black Americans from across the country, and experienced racism from "a wider society that did not know or care about their ethnic identity." In the 1960s, their racial consciousness was further complicated by the emergence of African-American cultural pride and the struggles for independence in Portuguese Africa. Despite having little contact with their homeland, the anti-colonial Africanist message was particularly powerful for Cape Verdean

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842 In 2008, Da Silva once again upset Italian-Americans by publishing the book *Christopher Columbus was Portuguese*! with his wife Silvia Jorge da Silva. The couple’s journey to prove Columbus was Portuguese was fictionalized in 2007 by Portugal's most acclaimed filmmaker, Manoel de Oliveira, in his film *Christopher Columbus, The Enigma.*

843 In 1966, while president of Rhode Island's Portuguese American Civic League, Da Silva opened its membership to "non-white" individuals (*Diário de Notícias*, October 17, 1966, 1, DN-UMASS).

844 At this point, visa requirements had been abolished for Americans travelling to the mainland, Madeira, and the Azores.

845 Transcript of speech by Manuel L. da Silva in *A Voz dos Açores* radio show, Middletown, Rhode Island, April 5, 1970, PEA M333, Portuguese-American Federation, AHD.
descendants, who had little affinity with their former Portuguese colonizers and current local labour market rivals. According to Halter, this led to "intergenerational rifts between the parents and grandparents who were staunchly Portuguese and their children who were beginning to ally themselves with the African American struggle not only in political thought but also in cultural expression."846

The ambiguous relation between Cape Verdean immigrants and their Portuguese heritage was also reflected in their qualified support for the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). The Cape Verdean-American Roy F. Teixeira, then Massachusetts' Assistant Attorney General, tried to mobilize support for the PAIGC's fight against colonialism among his countrymen in New England. However, he believed Cape Verde should remain within Portugal's political sphere through a kind of postcolonial commonwealth, where each member nation would have "the same citizenship, interdependence, common commerce and defense, so we can maintain our culture in a free regime."847 Teixeira was also associated with Newark's anti-Salazarist CPDP and was a personal friend of its chairman Abilio Águas, who believed, like Henrique Galvão, that the "tribal peoples" of Portuguese Africa would not be prepared for democratic self-rule until democracy was reinstated in Lisbon. Teixeira discussed his views on Cape Verde's independence with the PAIGC's prominent leader and socialist thinker Amílcar Cabral during the latter's visit to the UN in December 1962. He tried to convince Cabral to lend his support to the Portuguese liberal opposition and meet with Galvão. Teixeira was disappointed when he learned of Cabral's re-Africanization program and the PAIGC's intention to cut ties with Portugal altogether.848 Despite his collaboration with African nationalists and the Portuguese opposition, Teixeira, who had business interests in Portugal,849 made sure to keep good relations with EstadoNovo officials, who in turn sought his favour as a prominent Massachusetts civil

846 Halter's (1993, 9 & 164) criticism of the "ethnicity paradigm" echoes the protests of Cape Verdan immigrants towards black cultural nationalists, namely the fact that an emphasis on a homogenous African American identity fails to recognize "the diversity of cultures among racial minorities in the [U.S.]. African Americans are seen within this construct as simply another ethnic group, and undifferentiated population. Like the larger society itself, the discourse of ethnicity theory reveals a biracial rather than multicultural mode of analysis."

847 Letter, Roy Teixeira to José Mendes, Jersey City, February 1, 1963, folder 04614.070.080, Amílcar Cabral Archive, Fundação Mário Soares (henceforth FMS).


849 Roy Teixeira was co-owner of the Boston-based Algarve Investments and Development Associates, which in 1970 sought to obtain exclusive rights to build and operate two casinos and other tourist facilities in the Algarve (letter, Pres. A. J. Pereira and Sec.-Gen. F. J. Mendonça, UPC, to Amb. V. V. Garin, November 12, 1970, AHD Portuguese Continental Union PEA M333).
servant.⁸⁵⁰

Portuguese diplomats had to tread carefully in this racial minefield when dealing with the two "Portuguese" communities in New England. Still, the racial sensitivities of European Portuguese did not stop the diplomats from harnessing the assertive "Portugueseness" of Cape Verdeans, and obtaining their support for the imperial regime. For instance, in 1960-61, Cape Verdeans in Bridgeport and Brooklyn joined in the _Estado Novo'_s official commemorations of the fifth centennial of the death of Henry the Navigator and the discovery of the Cape Verdean islands. According to Consul José M. Fragoso in New York, who chaired the organizing committee, the event gave his consulate the opportunity to reconnect with that community, after they had grown apart over the years.⁸⁵¹ One of Fragoso's contacts in this process was the SPPH's President José Monte,⁸⁵² who had been instrumental in negotiating this rapprochement. Monte in turn recruited the consul's assistance to convince the Gulbenkian Foundation to help them build Portuguese libraries in Cape Verdean community halls. Fragoso forwarded this request to Lisbon and suggested the SNI, the Lisbon Geographic Society, and other centres of imperial studies send regular publications. Along with sponsoring these small libraries, the Portuguese government agreed to curating a mobile photographic exhibit and showcasing documentary films about Portugal's colonial territories, producing bilingual booklets about Cape Verde, and promoting tourism to the islands among its emigrants. The SPPH also mobilized government resources to celebrate Kriolu culture, as was the case in 1967, when the SNI covered the costs of shipping a monument to the poet and composer Francisco Xavier da Cruz (or B. Leza), paid for by the contributions of Cape Verdeans in the United States, and placed on his gravesite in the island of São Vicente.⁸⁵³

Another example of good relations between Cape Verdan organizations and Portuguese officials was the Cape Verdan Beneficient Association's annual debutant ball in New Bedford - one of the few events organized by that community that was regularly covered by the _Diário_.

Among the usual guests were the Portuguese consul and other dignitaries, like the ambassador or the director of Casa de Portugal, who often noted the "Portugueseness" of the Cape Verdeans and their islands' natural beauties. As was common with other community pageants, the "Queen of the Ball" and her mother were awarded flight tickets for mainland Portugal, sponsored by the airliners, which they received from the diplomats' hands (Figures 46-47). 854

Whether moved by the civil rights movement or the Estado Novo's lusotropicalist propaganda, European Portuguese in the United States began changing their racial attitudes in the 1960s. During this decade, a number of ethnic organizations began dropping their previous exclusionary membership policies and allowed non-whites to join. 855 Still, the historical reluctance of "white" Portuguese to welcome Cape Verdeans in their midst was hard to conciliate with the regime's profession of racial equality. 856 American journalists commented on the "civil rights limbo" in which "mixed-blood" Cape Verdeans found themselves in. In 1968, the Washington Post quoted Manuel Costa, 857 a 50-year-old Cape Verdean descendant and civil rights advocate, who commented: "The Cape Verdan has a pathological fear of being associated with blacks... so that the bulk of his life, his energies and resources are spent defending his 'white' origins." However, for him there were no doubts: "I'm black and I know it." Costa recognized that Cape Verdan culture, with its Catholic faith, pidgin dialect, and island cuisine, distinguished them from other black minorities. Still, they all had one thing in common: "low incomes and a high number from each group on the city's welfare rolls." 858 Indeed, the terrible socioeconomic conditions that black residents were subjected to were the main catalyst for the wave of racial riots that assailed various American cities in this period, including Newark in July 1967, and New Bedford in July 1970.

854 "For Brilhante a Festa de Debutantes da Associação Beneficente Caboverdiana," Diário de Notícias, May 29, 1967, 1 & 6, DN-UMASS.
855 In 1955, Aníbal Branco complained about a bill tabled at the Massachusetts legislature forcing mutual aid societies to abolish membership restrictions based on race or religion. He argued: "If such law is approved... we will be forced to accept as members any individuals who want to be part of the [UPC], be they black or yellow, Greeks or Australian, Catholic or Muslim... And help us God, they could also force us to accept the blind and crippled!" The UPC finally allowed Cape Verdeans to join in 1959 (A. S. Branco, UPC Executive Report, 1955, M181, Colónia Portuguesa. Organizações. Portuguese Continental Union, AHD).
857 Manuel (Manny) Edward Costa Sr. (1918-92) was born in New Bedford to Cape Verdean parents from the island of Santo Antão. In his youth, Costa served as an officer in the U.S. Army and became an accomplished college athlete in various sports. Later Costa became a teacher, coach, writer, TV host, social worker, and civil rights activist, working with underprivileged youth, immigrants, and other low-income residents in New Bedford. On July 5, 1998 (Cape Verdean Recognition Day), the city of New Bedford renamed Cannon St. (near Monte Playground) after him.
Newark was the stage for one of the most intense race riots in the United States in the 1960s, resulting in 23 deaths (most of them killed by state police and the National Guard), over 700 injured, and close to 1,500 arrests, during a period of five days. The Portuguese and Italian neighbourhoods were the least affected by the massive street clashes between the city’s black population and the state police and military, protected as they were by armed citizen patrols and the National Guard. After the riots, the "white flight" to the suburbs accelerated, leaving Portuguese and Italians as the only two large European communities in inner Newark.\(^{859}\) Later, the city's Portuguese became the target of anti-colonial campaigns led by local black activists, like the poet Imamu Amear Baraka (formerly LeRoi Jones), founder of the Congress of African People. In 1970, Baraka called for a boycott of Portuguese products as a way of protesting that country's colonial wars in Africa. This campaign involved small protests outside the Portuguese consulates in Newark and Boston, and at the Casa de Portugal in New York.\(^{860}\) Responding to these "insults", Portuguese leaders in Newark called a meeting at Our Lady of Fatima's parish hall, attended by 800 to 1,000 community members. As reported by the Newark Evening News, the message that came out of that meeting was clear: "We are Americans and we want to be respected as Americans."\(^{861}\)

The 1970 riots in New Bedford were marked by various incidents of arson, looting, shootings, and street confrontations with police. Hundreds of people were arrested and one 17-year-old male, the Cape Verdean-American Lester Lima, was murdered by a group of three white civilians in a drive-by shooting. The riots involved a large number of Cape Verdean-Americans, including one of its leaders, the Vietnam War veteran and Black Panther Party activist Frank "Parky" Grace.\(^{862}\) Notably absent from the Diário's limited reporting of the city's riots was any mention to the Portuguese or Cape Verdean backgrounds of those involved; the protesters were simply referred to as "blacks" (pretos), even though most had Portuguese surnames. The paper also made no mention of Lima's background, despite the fact that a


\(^{860}\) The consulate in Newark received a bomb threat on the morning of November 24, 1970, the day Baraka called a news conference to lay out his actions against Portugal (telegrams, Consul Nuno M. Cordeiro to PMFA, Nov. 24, 1970; Amb. V. Garin to PMFA, Dec. 4, 1970, Relações Bilaterais de Portugal c/ os E.U. Atentado à Bomba contra a Embaixada de Portugal... AHD).

\(^{861}\) Clippings, "Os Portugueses Newark Insurgem-se Contra os Insultos de que Foram Alvo," Luso-Americano, December 3, 1970; Don Prial, Newark Evening News, ? December, 1970, PEA M334, Vida Religiosa Comunidade (Geral), AHD.

\(^{862}\) For more on the New Bedford riot of 1970 see Rucker & Upton, 2007; and Jama Lazerow, ""A Rebel All His Life": the Unexpected Story of Frank "Parky" Grace", in Lazerow & Yohuru Williams (ed.), In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement, 2006. The involvement of Portuguese whites and their reactions to these riots needs further research.
Portuguese priest celebrated his funeral in a Portuguese parish. The *Diário* also chose not to mention the Portuguese heritage of Mayor George Rogers - the first Portuguese-American to occupy that office - criticized by the Governor's office for his lack of leadership during the riots.\(^{863}\) This would not be a glaring omission if the *Diário* did not make a habit of highlighting the heritage of successful Portuguese-Americans recognized in mainstream society, as it had done when Mayor Rogers was elected in January 1970. Other American newspapers like *The Harvard Crimson* did allude to the Portuguese heritage of Cape Verdian-Americans and reported that Lima's killing had "contributed to a growing sense of solidarity" between the two groups;\(^{864}\) according to the *Crimson*, this unity was reinforced by their common demand for more jobs and low-income housing.\(^{865}\)

Smaller episodes of violence continued throughout the summer, affecting the Feast of the Blessed Sacrament, New Bedford's largest annual public gathering. On the night of July 29, two days before the kick-off of the Madeiran feast, a group of protesters set fire to vehicles and buildings and engaged in a gunfight with the police. To prevent further violence, Mayor Rogers declared an evening curfew over a period of a week and cancelled the feast. The organizers eventually convinced him to allow a smaller event for two days in August in order to recover some of the costs already incurred in its preparation. Following the mayor's request, and the example of local politicians, the local consul decided not to attend the shorter celebrations. This irritated Minister Patrício, who reminded his subordinate that his "obligations towards the Portuguese community must prevail over local circumstances."\(^{866}\)

**Rallying for empire: shaping the imperial consciousness of Portuguese immigrants**

Portuguese-Americans came out publicly in defense of their homeland and empire after the *Estado Novo* became the target of international pressures in the 1950s. Their readiness to do so proves once again that the assimilation of European immigrants in the United States was not a *fait accompli* by the end of the Second World War. For instance, in 1950, they held public rallies

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\(^{863}\) Another official criticized by the Massachusetts Governor's office was the Portuguese-American Attorney Edmundo Dinis, whose heritage was also omitted in the *Diário*’s story ("Os distúrbios de New Bedford atribuídos às [sic] autoridades municipais", *Diário de Notícias*, August 19, 1970, 1, DN-UMASS).


\(^{865}\) As Barrett and Roediger argued (1997, 28-33), this flexibility between seeking distance from non-whites and finding common ground in shared grievances was a common characteristic of "inbetween" immigrants.

\(^{866}\) "Repetiram-se em New Bedford os Tumultos e Incêndios", *Diário de Notícias*, July 30, 1, DN-UMAS; letters, Minister Rui Patrício, Lisbon, to Consul J. B. A. Freitas, New Bedford, Sept. 1970 (m.t.), PEA M656, Com. Port. nos Estr.. Pr. Geral, AHD.
in New Bedford, Fall River, and East Providence in solidarity with their fellow Portuguese in India, when Nehru first threatened to annex Portugal's territories. They sent telegrams to Salazar, the Governor General of Goa, the Indian ambassador in Washington, and the UN's Secretary-General expressing their repudiation of Nehru's hostile demands.867 Led by the president of the charity organization Madeiran Day, this movement was joined by various civic and religious leaders in those communities.868 The crowds attending a series of public meetings held in these three New England cities were large enough to draw the attention of Republican Minority Leader Joseph Martin, then Salazar's chief ally in the U.S. Congress (Figures 48-50). Writing on behalf of Portuguese-Americans in his Fall River district, Martin appealed to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson to take into account the historical presence of Portugal - a nation of "bold seaman who took... the light of civilization to all parts of the world" - in Goa, and persuade Nehru to desist from his territorial pretensions.869

Starting in the 1950s, the imperial regime tried to shape American public opinion in its favour by hiring American public relations firms to publish editorials, ads and other propaganda techniques in the mainstream press. In 1950, the Estado Novo hired the Manhattan-based George Peabody & Associates for a median annual payment of $48,300 USD. That contract lasted until 1963, when it hired another Manhattan company, Heyward Associates, which remained a client of the Portuguese government after 1974.870 Meanwhile, in 1955, the Casa de Portugal more than doubled its annual expenditures, which continued to grow over the next decade. The regime also made inroads in the editorial rooms of American

![Graph 14](image-url)

**Graph 14.** Sources: Casa de Portugal annual reports, 1964, AOS/CO/PC-81B Pt. 10, Actividade da Casa de Portugal em N.I., 1964 [1965], ANTT.

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867 *Diário de Notícias*: "Comício de Apoio aos Portuguese de Goa", April 24, 1950, 1 & 4; "O Case de Goa e os Portugueses de Rhode Island," May 13, 1950, 1 & 3, DN-UMASS.


869 “Deputado Martin secunda os protestos dos luso-americanos no caso de Goa,” *Diário de Notícias*, May 24, 1950, DN-UMASS.

870 Report[s] of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,” 1953-63. FARA.GOV.
newspapers, like New Bedford's *Standard-Times*, which consistently praised the Portuguese government. Basil Brewer, the president of E. Anthony & Sons, which owned the *Standard-Times*, local radio and television stations, and an airline, was given the Portuguese Order of Christ and the Brazilian Order of the Southern Cross for "his work in promoting better understanding between those countries and the U.S." According to the *Diário*, Brewer was responsible for raising the profile of Portuguese-Americans in New Bedford as well as their "pride in their Lusitanian ascendency." Also useful was Brewer's influence over congressman Hastings Keith, who often backed Salazar's interests in Washington.

These large propaganda investments did not include Portuguese ethnic media, much to the frustration of its directors. Still, although with significant exceptions, most media outlets either actively endorsed the regime and its empire or were largely uncritical towards them. The ethnic press also reflected their editors' frustration with North Americans' ignorance or disdain for Portugal and tried to improve that country's profile, and by extension that of their own national group. Their mixture of patriotism and self-interest often led ethnic editors to publish wholehearted defenses of their homeland's actions, even if that meant going against their host government's views. The ethnic press focused a great deal on homeland affairs, especially in Canada, where the communities were younger. Their coverage of community issues largely focused on the affairs of ethnic clubs and national parishes, the finances of mutual aid societies, social and religious events, the successes of co-ethnic entrepreneurs and politicians, and the elites' *fait divers*. Absent from their pages were the everyday realities of common immigrants or their many social and economic problems. However, editorials and letters to the editor sections sometimes delved into political commentary of some consequence to the civic life of their communities, though they regularly became venues for public spats and diatribes.

Much of the ethnic media's content pertaining to the homeland was cut and pasted from publications in Portugal, or received directly from the Portuguese semi-public News and Information Agency (ANI) and the SNI/SEIT, which sent content on Portuguese history, the

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873 Letter, A. O. Águas to George M. Houser, American Committee on Africa, April 19, 1962, CD25A-CPDP.
875 Founded in 1947, ANI was technically the first Portuguese international news agency. Tied to the Estado Novo, it was largely subservient to the regime and subject to systematic censorship. By the 1950s, ANI had correspondents across the Portuguese empire and in foreign countries, producing around 70,000 words per month; 1 million in the mid-'60s (Sónia M. P. da Silva,
arts, customs, and natural beauties. The latter also swayed Portuguese ethnic media by offering advertising contracts with the Casa de Portugal, which were often vital for the commercial viability of these businesses. Portuguese radio stations in North America also used content provided by the Emissora Nacional, the regime's official public broadcaster since 1935.

Launched in Fall River in 1919, the Diário de Notícias was the oldest and most circulated Lusophone newspaper in North America (10,000 copies per issue in 1966), and likely the only Portuguese daily published outside a Lusophone country. Initially critical of the Casa de Portugal's disappointing work, its director João Rocha tamed his commentary in the late 1950s, when his newspaper began consistently publishing tourism ads from that bureau (Figure 51). Another important sponsor was the powerful mutual aid society UPC, whose services, activities and financial reports were extensively advertised in the paper, along with its directors' occasional opinion pieces. Rui Correia, who studied the Diário's contents during the first half of the 20th century, noted how the paper reflected the diversity of political and cultural opinions in New Bedford's community, among which were monarchists, republicans, socialists, liberals, and fascists, all of whom "asserted a fiercely-articulated national dignity." But while it was initially "ideologically eclectic", the Diário gradually came under the Estado Novo's influence.

Although a regular nuisance, the various Portuguese ambassadors in Washington refused to see the Diário as a lost cause, believing it could become a major asset if only they managed to control its director. Despite Rocha's nagging criticism of the Lisbon government, the Diário's patriotism contributed to disseminating Portuguese language and culture in a way that served the regime's interests. Portuguese consuls, including those who were personally attacked by Rocha, were told to ingratiate themselves with him as much as possible and avoid engaging in open...
discussion, limiting their responses to "clarification" letters. Nonetheless, in November 1950 (and briefly in 1948), the Diário was banned in Portugal - before, only single issues were occasionally barred. Afraid this interdiction would aggravate Rocha's hostility and have negative repercussions in the Portuguese-American community, Ambassador Teotónio Pereira and Minister Paulo Cunha expressed their objections to this moratorium. The minister who oversaw the government's censorship services argued he had been "benevolent" with the Diário multiple times yet the paper insisted on challenging his authority; so the ban continued. In 1952, the SNI joined those calling for the ban to be lifted, but to no avail. At this point, the censorship services suggested the government create another newspaper in New Bedford staffed by allies of the regime. 882

As expected, Rocha increased his attacks following the ban. For example, in August 1951, the Diário warned readers of growing suspicions regarding government employees opening correspondence sent by emigrants to their families in Portugal, and sometimes stealing its contents. 883 The paper also republished dissenting statements by Portuguese public figures and damaging articles from the American press, like those from Protestant missionaries in Africa who denounced the racist oppression of African natives at the hands of the Portuguese. 884 Another of Rocha's favourite topics was the longstanding absence of a career consul in Boston, where Portuguese citizens were served by supposedly unqualified and disreputable honorary consuls; in his view, this was proof of the regime's indifference towards the emigrants. By the end of 1953, Rocha began accusing the Portuguese government of squandering money on George Peabody's firm, which he argued could be better invested in the Portuguese-American press. 885 Around this time, Ambassador Fernandes learned that the Diário was in dire financial straits and had asked the U.S. State Department for an annual subsidy. 886 Rocha's motivations were, according to the ambassador, more material than ideological, and he attributed the paper's

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882 Letter, Censorship Services Director to Ministry of the Presidency, March 08, 1952, SNI Censura cx. 733, Jornal "Diário de Noticias" em New Bedford (1948-1954), ANTT.
883 Various correspondence between various government officials, from May 31, 1948 to August 21, 1951; clipping, "É Violada a Mala do Correio em Portugal!", Diário de Noticias, August 9, 1951, ibid.
884 Some of the loudest critics of Portugal's colonial empire and its treatment of indigenous peoples in Africa were American and Canadian Protestant missionaries, particularly Methodists and Baptists, whose missions in Angola dated back to the 19th century (Antunes, 1991, 171-173, 265-268).
886 Years later, Rocha explained to the consul in Boston that the Diário's financial situation did not allow him to discard any potential readers and was therefore forced to publish content that appealed to both sides of the political spectrum (letter, Consul of Portugal, Boston, to Amb. P. T. Pereira, Sept. 20, 1961, PEA M251-A, Col. Port.... Diário de Noticias [N. Bedford], AHD).
attacks to the director's "desire to encourage this Embassy to... buy [his] silence." In 1954 the government finally decided to lift the ban on the Diário; however, this olive branch did not stop it from attacking the regime.  

In 1957, PIDE opened a file on Rocha's political activities and asked the local consul to relay information on him. The next year, during Rocha's first family trip to Portugal in 27 years, a PIDE agent received instructions to follow the director and record where he stayed and with whom he met. The agent probably felt awkward when Rocha met with Salazar at the dictator's official residence for a half-hour interview. As described in the Diário's ensuing article, Salazar praised Rocha's onerous efforts to run a Portuguese daily in the United States and thanked Portuguese-Americans for their patriotic reaction to the Goa crisis: "They were admirable," said the dictator. Rocha in turn described Salazar as a "great man [who], above all else, is a simple man, affable, a profoundly human creature." During his visit, Rocha also met with members of the Portuguese press, the SNI, and spoke at the Lisbon Geographic Society.

Meanwhile, in Canada, the Luso-Canadiano was the first Portuguese newspaper to be launched commercially, after it became independent from the APC in 1959 (Figure 52). Until October 1960, the paper was printed in Portugal (Montijo) and was subject to the regime's censorship, during which time it was largely apolitical. To escape the "blue pencil", Henrique T. Bello, its owner, called his typographer José das Neves Rodrigues from Portugal and began printing the now bi-weekly in Montreal. To the diplomats' dismay, the Luso-Canadiano (re)inaugural editorial introduced itself as an "anti-fascist", "anti-Bolshevik" and "independent" newspaper that strove for a return to democracy in Portugal "of the type which exists in Canada." Bello recruited his fellow anti-Salazarists in Toronto, who lent him money.

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887 Initially the ban was only lifted in the mainland, until the Governor of Ponta Delgada requested the Ministry of Interrior to extend his decision to the Azores, so not to upset its large emigrant community in New Bedford, which had made inquiries about the matter (letter, Governor Aniceto A. dos Santos to the Ministry of the Interior Chief of Staff, June 16, 1954, SNI Censura cx. 733, Jornal "Diário de Noticias" em New Bedford [1948-1954], ANTT).


889 Born in São Bartolomeu de Messines, Algarve, José Neves Rodrigues (1920-2012) was a typographer with the newspaper A Gazeta do Sul before moving to Montreal. Besides composing the Luso-Canadiano, Rodrigues also help found other Lusophone publications in that city, including La Tribune Portuens. He also co-founded the Casa dos Portugueses/MDP, the Caixa Económica dos Portugueses de Montreal - a Portuguese-Canadian housing cooperative - and was involved with the CPRPS.

890 Letter, H. T. Bello to Fernando Ciriaco da Cunha, October 1, 1961. F0579, 2009-022/003 (2), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

891 Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 164.
contributed content, distributed the newspaper, and connected it with the exile community around the world.  

In 1961, the regime changed its laissez-faire approach to Portuguese ethnic media and began making significant efforts to control it. That decision was prompted in part by the wide international coverage of the Santa Maria highjacking, which exposed Salazar's dictatorship to the world. Portuguese opponents in Toronto and Montreal (the latter led by Bello) took advantage of this opportunity to increase their profile in Canada and protest against the regime. Consul Artur Nogueira informed Lisbon about the unfavourable and in his view biased coverage of the Santa Maria episode in Montreal's mainstream media. He also expressed displeasure with the lack of organized response from his allies among the city's Portuguese, who were slow to come to the regime's aid, in part due to their own disappointment with that government's unreliability when it came to supporting their community projects. Nogueira warned about the impending danger of Montreal's community leaders breaking ranks with the Portuguese government and urged Lisbon to increase its aid to these "uneducated" yet keen emigrants.

In a letter to Montreal's La Presse, Artur G. Ribeiro, the director of the newly founded A Voz de Portugal - which replaced the Luso-Canadiano as the official organ of the APC - repudiated Bello's tirades against the regime and affirmed that the latter had only began opposing Salazar after Lisbon denied the Luso-Canadiano a subsidy; something, Ribeiro claimed, A Voz would never request. Bello in turn took legal action against Ribeiro and his newspaper for defamation. According to one of Bello's associates, he had rejected a subsidy offered by the Portuguese ambassador, but had asked for an advertising contract from the Casa de Portugal. However, Bello withdrew his request when he was asked to change his newspaper's political

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893 One of the community leaders to answer the consul's call for a public response to Bello's attacks was the former president of the Portuguese Catholic Union, Manuel Teixeira, who sent a letter to Montreal's La Presse (along with Artur Ribeiro) to that effect. In response to the consul's reproach over his delayed reaction, Teixeira reminded the diplomat of the general lack of support he had received from Lisbon during his time as the PCU's president (report, Consul A. Nogueira, "Panorama da Colónia Portuguesa de Montreal", February 18, 1961, to PMFA, PEA M400, Col. Port. Visita do Emb. Dr. E. Brazão às Comunidades Portuguesas do Canadá, AHD).
894 In his report to Lisbon, Consul Nogueira mentioned that "delays and difficulties from Portuguese authorities" had caused the launch of A Voz de Portugal (in 1961) to be held up for three months, during which time the Luso-Canadiano was able to publish its views unopposed (report, Consul A. Nogueira, February 18, 1961).
895 The Portugal Democrático of São Paulo had published an article in September 1959 accusing Bello of being an ally of the Estado Novo, following information received from Toronto's PCDA. They later retracted the accusation after the PCDA became better acquainted with Bello. Ribeiro's allegations again injured Bello's reputation in the exile community, as many rebel groups sought confirmation of his allegiance from their contacts in Montreal (letter, Silvério C. Letra, São Paulo, to F. C. da Cunha, November 29, 1960, F0579, 2009-022/003 (17), PCDA fonds, CTASC).

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orientation. Later in 1961, Bello's libel suit revealed that *A Voz* was in fact printed in Newark by the *Luso-Americano*'s publishers; in January 1962, the latter stopped printing the Montreal title after being served a notice to appear in court. However, the following month, *A Voz* was back in circulation, this time with content cut and pasted from the *Diário*.

The courts later ruled in Bello's favour and ordered Ribeiro to pay him $600 in damages plus legal costs.

Other newspapers were founded in 1961, like Newark's *Novos Rumos*, created by Fr. José Capote and endorsed by Consul Fragoso and the SNI. To the consul's disappointment, this title became an outlet for progressive Catholics and other moderate critics of the regime, leading the *Casa de Portugal* to cancel its ad contract. But like the *Diário*, the diplomats recognized the overall usefulness of Capote's paper and feared that cutting its subsidy would make him more hostile.

Other publications in New York were more active and unambiguous about touting the *Estado Novo*’s message, for which they were compensated, such as *A Luta* and *Our Lady of Fatima*, both published by Monsignor José Cacella, the founding director of St. Anthony's Mission in the Bronx. Another champion of Salazar was Gil da Câmara Stone, a former *Casa de Portugal* director and *Diário* reporter, who was dedicated to fighting the "red infiltration" (namely the CPDP) in the Portuguese community. With a meager $200 USD subsidy from the SNI (cancelled in late 1962), he launched *The New York Bulletin* in December 1961, circulated by mail to American journalists, congressmen, civil servants, UN delegates, and embassies from various nations; and the *Vidalusa*, mailed to about 1,000 Portuguese-American paid subscribers every month.

In May 1961, about a month after the first soldiers arrived in Angola, the Overseas Companies of Portugal - a consortium of corporations with large investments in that colony -
hired the New York public relations firm Selvage & Lee to advocate in favour of the colonial government. The contract, worth $760,000 USD over a period of three years, was among the largest of its kind in the United States at the time.\textsuperscript{904} This investment paid for an extensive propaganda campaign that targeted popular American media outlets; sponsored trips by prominent American officials and journalists, who were offered slanted tours of Angola and Mozambique; and lobbied business organizations, civil institutions, military officers, civil servants, and congressmen.\textsuperscript{905} To carry out its lobbying, Selvage & Lee created the Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs (PACFA), which mobilized 70 Portuguese-American individuals, led by the lawyer Martin Thomas Camacho of Boston.\textsuperscript{906} According to Camacho, the overall investment made in the PACFA in 1961-64 was close to $200,000 USD.\textsuperscript{907}

As an American organization, the PACFA was allowed to intervene in that country's domestic politics in a way that diplomats could not. One of its chief goals was portraying the Portuguese empire as a multiracial haven, where whites and blacks intermarried and were equal before the law. This fantastical description of Portuguese colonialism was usually contrasted with Jim Crow policies and the "plight of the American Negro". Camacho also condemned those "Negro leaders" who criticized Portugal's colonial policies and supported what he described were Soviet extremists in Africa, accusing the former of "practicing racism in reverse". In Camacho's view, their anti-Portuguese stance "[lent] credence to the arguments they are not, in fact, ready for equality."\textsuperscript{908} Such accusations of hypocrisy on the part of Americans regarding race and colonialism were regularly made by Portuguese officials, like Adriano Moreira, who liked to point out that the United States had once been a colony where aboriginal peoples were not given the chance to benefit from its founding principles of liberty and democracy.\textsuperscript{909}

\textsuperscript{904} In 1962, out of 241 American organizations registered under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (not including government-run agencies like the Casa de Portugal), Selvage & Lee was the 9th largest recipient of funds from a foreign agent ($320,500).
\textsuperscript{906} Martin (Tomás) Camacho (1913-73) was born in Madeira and moved to the U.S. with his parents as a child. Camacho graduated from Harvard and Suffolk universities; served in the U.S. Army in the Second World War; and later practiced law for over 30 years in Boston. He was hired by Selvage & Lee upon the recommendation of Portugal's UN delegate and former consul António Colaço. Camacho was an active member of various Portuguese-American organizations, including Massachusetts' PAACL, PAF, and the Madeira Club. In 1972 the Portuguese government awarded him the Order of Prince Henry the Navigator.
\textsuperscript{907} Letter, M. T. Camacho to Martins Cabral, Selvage & Lee, May 4, 1964, PEA M253, Penetração. Portuguese-American Committee for Foreign Affairs, AHD.
\textsuperscript{908} The PACFA's press release also stated: "There are only 240 million Negroes, but there are 930 million white people in the world; 930 million of the yellow race, and 930 million of the brown-red race. Before the American Negroes decide that they should align themselves with all other Negroes, regardless of geography, culture or other circumstances, they should ponder these figures" (PACFA/ Martin Camacho press release, December 10, 1962; and pamphlet, (?) 1962, ibid.).
\textsuperscript{909} Antunes, 1991, 192.
Other groups organized their own community initiatives in defense of their homeland government. In Ludlow, Fr. Manuel Rocha received direct instructions from Ambassador Fernandes in 1961 to "guide the Catholic population in this country into supporting the policies of the Portuguese Government" (Figure 53). Together with a group of representatives from Ludlow's Portuguese community, Rocha appealed to President Kennedy asking him to declare his "friendship for Portugal... a life-long friend and ally." That summer, another group of concerned patriots, with committees in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, and Ontario, launched the Portuguese-American Fund, which raised community funds to aid "victims of strife in Angola." By the end of this campaign, in January 1962, they had raised over $14,000 USD, later sent to the Red Cross in Angola.

While Camacho mobilized fellow Portuguese-Americans to join his cause, none of the Overseas Companies' investment went to the ethnic media. As expected, João Rocha criticized Selvage & Lee's campaign. Still, at this point, the Diário had reduced its attacks on the regime and much of its content now came from the ANI. By mid-1962, the efforts of Selvage & Lee/PACFA started bearing fruit. Even the Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented to Minister Nogueira that Portugal's propaganda was beginning to bring American public opinion closer to the Estado Novo's viewpoint. However, in 1963, the unlawful connections between the Portuguese government, the Overseas Companies, and Selvage & Lee were exposed by the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, which investigated the lobbying activities of non-diplomatic representatives in the United States. After interviewing Camacho and the managers of Selvage & Lee, the committee found that the Portuguese government, particularly its foreign offices in Washington, New York, and London, were involved in the Overseas Companies' scheme, and that the latter was linked to the Overseas Ministry in Lisbon. They also uncovered that Camacho received logistic support from the consulates along with regular

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911 The meeting where this appeal was approved was held in the same salon where Ludlow's Portuguese-American associations had previously (December 31, 1941) passed a resolution asking for the Estado Novo to support the allied forces during the Second World War (clipping, Manuel Rocha, "Cartas da América", Novidades, May 9, 1961 [m.t.], ibid.).
912 Some of the Fund's leaders were Diamantino Baltazar, Luiz A. Carvalho, Manuel Luciano da Silva, and Manuel S. M. Leal.
913 Portuguese-American Fund ads, Diário de Notícias, September 27, 1961, 4, and January 19, 1962, 5, DN-UMASS.
914 Letter, Consul C. B. da Carvalho, Boston, to Amb. P. T. Pereira, October, 27, 1961; and reply, November 6, 1961, PEA M251-A, Colónia Portuguesa nos EE. UU. Jornais Portugueses. Diário de Notícias (N. Bedford), AHD.
916 The OCP's liaison in Lisbon was the lawyer Alexandre Ribeiro da Cunha, a high-ranking officer in the Portuguese Overseas Ministry and Alexandre. P. Basto's nephew ("Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States", Committee on Foreign Relations - United States Senate, 1963, FARA.GOV.).
instructions from Ambassador Pereira (Figure 54); moreover, the embassy's press officer, Bernardo Teixeira, worked as an aide to Camacho under Selvage & Lee's payroll. Most troubling for this Senate committee were the unconfirmed suspicions that Portuguese officials had successfully lobbied 12 Democrat and Republican congressmen (most of them from Massachusetts) into endorsing Portugal's colonial administration at the Congress in October 1962. These congressmen quickly rejected the allegations and justified themselves with the argument they were simply representing the views of their large Portuguese-American constituencies. 917

In Canada, in May 1963, Ambassador Brazão communicated his astonishment to Lisbon about the fact he had been received by over 1,000 immigrants in Toronto and 3,000 in Galt, who waved small Portuguese flags outside their local church grounds. 918 A few months earlier, Brazão was also happy to report that Bello had written him a "lengthy and pleasant" reply to a letter he published in the Luso-Canadiano. The ambassador interpreted this as a gesture of reconciliation and an attempt by Bello to reconnect with the Portuguese government. Brazão instructed the consul in Montreal to approach Bello and carefully offer him a grant for his newspaper, which the latter declined, arguing it infringed on his journalistic principles. He was, however, willing to accept ads from the Casa de Portugal, the same way that the Canadian government published its public announcements in the ethnic press. 919 The consul concluded this was an opportunity to neutralize the "nefarious" newspaper, but that they had to proceed with caution, in order "not to give the impression we want to buy it." The ambassador then informed Lisbon about the arrangement and recommended the ad revenue offered to the Luso-Canadiano be the same as the direct subsidy to its rival A Voz. 920

Unfortunately for Brazão, his efforts to silence the Luso-Canadiano did not go as expected. Only three days after reporting his consul's deal with Bello, the ambassador sent another telegram to Lisbon to the effect that the Luso-Canadiano had published a rebuke of his

918 Telegram, Ambassador E. Brazão, Toronto, to PMFA, May 13, 1963, PEA 400 Colónia Portuguesa no Canadá, AHD.
919 Bello explained to Consul Fernando Marques that the Luso-Canadiano's leftist bent was the exclusive responsibility of its former editor Neves Rodrigues, whose "anarchist" tendencies had associated the newspaper with "extremist movements". Bello added that he did not belong to any particular ideological camp other than being a democrat, and had in fact refused various requests from opposition leaders to place the Luso-Canadiano at their disposal. Bello also said he wanted his paper to focus more on immigrant issues in Canada than on homeland affairs; however, as a democratic newspaper, it remained open to various political viewpoints.
letter in the newspaper, authored by the PCDA's anti-Salazar president. Furthermore, the
accusations exchanged between rival newspapers continued. Bello berated M. Alice Ribeiro of
Toronto's Correio Português for having accused him of accepting a subsidy from the Portuguese
government. The PCDA got involved in this public spat and returned the accusation, criticizing
the Correio for receiving funds from the dictatorial regime to spread lies "on the backs of
Portugal's famished." While the Luso-Canadiano continued to be an important platform for anti-
Salazar activists in Canada, in 1963 it did also carry ads from the Casa de Portugal.921

Despite the public controversy surrounding its illegal activities, the Overseas Companies
continued to push their colonialist agenda in the United States until 1975. However, in April
1964, they dropped Selvage & Lee, along with Camacho and the PACFA, and hired the
Washington-based Downs & Roosevelt - though its administrators were largely the same as the
New York firm. That year, the Casa de Portugal reported that Americans were becoming more
favourable to the regime's narrative, and that the ethnic media had been "extremely valuable" in
influencing the views of Portuguese emigrants and their descendants regarding their homeland.
As the Casa's director argued: "As long as [the emigrants] speak Portuguese at home and show
interest for news from their homeland, we can count on the colony in periods of emergency."
Still, the Casa's resources were insufficient to meet every request from the communities and was
often forced to turn away advertising opportunities not foreseen in its budget.922

Two years later, the Casa's new director, Ramiro Valadão, informed the embassy that the
relationship between the regime and the Portuguese-American media had never been better: the
Diário had largely stopped its attacks, thanks to Casa's advertising contract and successful
efforts to pacify João Rocha (he was awarded an honorific title from the Estado Novo in January
1966); the Luso-Americano continued to provide valuable services in Newark, which according
to Valadão was the most difficult community, given the presence of "communists"; the
Portuguese press in California was also falling in line with the regime's orientation; and 30 radio
shows had received content from the Casa. In addition, the American television stations ABC,
NBC, CBS and WBR, broadcasting in both the United States and Canada, had all shown films
provided by the Casa; over 1 million Americans had attended the 1,377 screenings of Portuguese

921 Telegram, Ambassador E. Brazão to PMFA, March 7, 1963, ibid.; M. A. Ribeiro, "Pórtico", Correio Português, January 30,
1964, N473 reel 3, AO; "À Custa da Fome em Portugal", A Verdade, April 1965, n. 7, 6. 2009-022/001 (9), PCDA fondo,
CTASC; clipping, Luso-Canadiano, April 30, 1965, SC SR. 551/45 np. 2465, Gil Stone, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
922 Casa de Portugal, annual report, 1964 (m.t.).
films in 1965; and the travel documentary *Bravo Portugal* had been seen by over 100,000 people in 65 of "the most important cultural centers in North America." The only newspaper title in the United States that continued to be a nuisance to Valadão was Newark's *Novos Rumos*, but even it had curbed its critical tone after Portuguese officials appealed to New Jersey's Catholic episcopacy to restrain Fr. Capote's political conduct.923

In 1968, a large cross-section of Portuguese-American civil society rallied once again behind their homeland government. Led by Fr. Mário B. Cordeiro of Santa Cruz, California, a coalition of Portuguese Catholic priests, ethnic associations, newspapers, and radio broadcasters in that state sent a group letter to the UN Security Council countering another letter sent to that international body by the communist Joaquim Barradas de Carvalho and his group of Portuguese political exiles in São Paulo. Five Portuguese-American clubs in New York and New Jersey subscribed to the letter written by their Californian peers, stating their allegiance to the Portuguese government.924

As we will discuss at greater length in the last chapter, the Portuguese ethnic media in the 1970s began publishing more local content and focusing on the social and economic realities of common immigrants. Nonetheless, they continued to report on national and local news from Portugal and obtain funding and content from the Portuguese government. For instance, António A. Costa, who hosted Lusophone radio (WBSM/WGCY) and television (WTEC) shows in New Bedford, and later became an advocate for various progressive causes in that linguistic community, travelled to Portugal in 1970 to record a message from Prime Minister Caetano, which he broadcast on his radio show. Consul Jorge Freitas of Boston, who occasionally visited WGCY's headquarters, urged his superiors several times to take advantage of Costa's programming and feed it news content as a way to counteract "the assimilationist intensity of American national propaganda."925

923 Letter, Ramiro Valadão, *Casa de Portugal*, to Ambassador Vasco V. Garin, April 6, 1966, ibid.
924 The same coalition invited Prime Minister Caetano to visit the Portuguese-American communities of California later that year; however, that visit never came to fruition (correspondence between Portuguese-American organizations and individuals from California, New York, and New Jersey; the UN Security Council; and Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, from March 11 to November 19, 1968, PEA M332, *Actividades Politicas das Colônias Portuguesas nos E.U.*, AHD).
The imperial diaspora: Adriano Moreira and the Union of Portuguese Cultural Communities

The first officials in the *Estado Novo* to call for the integration of the emigrant "colonies" into the homeland state's purview and imperial self-understanding did so in reference to the communities in North America. In 1944, Luis da Câmara Pina, then a major in the Portuguese army and a professor at the Institute of Higher Military Studies, delivered a paper at the second congress of the *União Nacional*, titled "The Duty of Portugal Towards the Lusiad Communities of North America" - published the next year with a preface by Manuel Cardinal Cerejeira. After praising the demographic, economic, and religious "value" of Portuguese emigrants in the United States, Pina urged his fellow party members to ensure the national "sentiment" and language of these expatriate communities not only be preserved but expanded. He added:

> It is not possible [or] admissible to cut spiritual ties with those Portuguese who one day left for America... It is not right, or fair, or rational to lose the moral interest [and] material advantage of possessing on the [Western] margin of the Atlantic... half a million ambassadors.\(^{927}\)

The professor highlighted three core measures the IAC, the SPN, and the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs could take in order to guarantee these communities remained part of the "Portuguese spiritual empire": remove barriers to emigration and convince the United States to raise Portugal's immigration quota; intensify cultural exchanges by sending news content, books, newspapers, and sponsoring student exchange programs; and send Portuguese instructors to teach in the emigrants' community schools. Pina also called for the creation of two Portuguese cultural and linguistic centres, one on each coast, with the help of local Portuguese priests; in his estimation, these clerics had "heroically" prevented the extinction of Portuguese language among the emigrants since they first landed in the United States.\(^{928}\)

It is not clear if Pina's vision inspired those Portuguese officials and ethnic leaders who decades later implemented some of its elements. Until the 1960s, the idea of using state resources to engineer a Portuguese diaspora had little traction within the *Estado Novo*. Still, some officials occasionally mused about the untapped potential of Portuguese emigrant communities and the responsibilities the government had towards them. For instance, in 1955,

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\(^{926}\) Some of Pina's enthusiastic findings included: the emigrants' ability to resist assimilation even after achieving some financial success; their commitment to religious traditions; their "rare" and impressive capacity for civic association, to the point of being overrepresented; the tremendous capital amassed and redistributed by its large mutual aid societies; the fortunes of dairy farmers in California; and the proliferation of schools, newspapers, and radio shows (Luis da Câmara Pina, *O Dever de Portugal para com as Comunidades Lusíadas da América do Norte*, 1945).

\(^{927}\) Ibid., 64 (m.t.).

\(^{928}\) Ibid., 65-73 (m.t.).
the Minister of Overseas wrote Minister Cunha endorsing a proposed trip to the Portuguese-American communities by the former Archbishop of Goa and Daman. In his letter, Rodrigues noted: "These days, when there is so much talk about Goa... where we still have half a million Portuguese, half of them Catholic... it is perhaps pertinent to remember that we have almost a million practicing Portuguese Catholics in North America." Portuguese authorities also saw General Franco develop his own Spanish diaspora with the Institute of Hispanic Culture, which cemented the cultural bonds between Spain and Latin America through their common *Hispanidad.*

The vision of an "ecumenical" Portugal, encompassing national, colonial, and emigrant communities, remerged in 1964, through the former Overseas Minister and then president of the Lisbon Geographic Society, Adriano Moreira. In his view, the dominant view in Portugal, which saw migration outside imperial territories as a loss, should recognize the potential benefits of these independent movements:

> The Portuguese presence in foreign territories can and must be utilized as an instrument for defending and strengthening our interests in this epoch of internationalization... [It] must be a buttress for defending the integrity of a cultural and political space that is entirely dependent on the Nation and on Portuguese sovereignty.  
> (...) This is not just a sentimental matter... but also a cold evaluation of our immediate interests. Whenever we feel the need to mobilize world opinion against an aggressor... more than public relations techniques, we can count on the Portuguese communities, descendants, and those aligned with Portugueseness, to stand up and fight... This institutionalization is within our immediate power more than the remedy for economic growth that will halt the increasing emigration rate.

To fulfill and sustain this triad of nation, empire, and diaspora, Moreira envisioned the creation of a representative government body where Portuguese expatriates were allowed to intervene in affairs of mutual interest. He warned against it becoming "a bureaucratic organism, with its authority coming simply from the top, determining and imposing," and wished it be "a corporation that lived from the contributions and interventions of Portuguese communities... ."

After this speech, Moreira spent months travelling and meeting with emigrant leaders around the world, generating momentum for the first Congress of Portuguese Communities, held in Lisbon, on December 8-16, 1964. Throughout August and September, Portuguese leaders in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, California, Hawaii, Ontario, and Quebec, welcomed

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929 Letter, Minister of Overseas M. Sarmento Rodrigues to PMFA, January 4, 1955 (m.t.), PEA M307, Projecto visita do Senhor Patriarca D. José da Costa Nunes aos núcleos portugueses da América do Norte, AHD.  
930 For more on this subject see Jean Grugel, "Spain and Latin America", in R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo, and J. Story (ed.), *Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World*, 2005, 137-159.  
931 Moreira, 1964, 13 & 21 (m.t.).  
932 Ibid. (m.t.), 22.
the former minister and heard his ideas on diaspora at various community receptions, attended by hundreds of illustrious guests, and covered by the local ethnic media. At every opportunity, Moreira reminded his audience that: "The Portuguese who are today engaged in armed conflict against terrorism in Angola and Guinea are exactly the same as those who... are integrated in the collective efforts of the American people, as exemplary citizens... [who] actually respect all their neighbours irrespective of color, race or creed."  

Though spearheaded by the Lisbon Geographic Society, the Congress counted on the Estado Novo's formal support. Some of the regime's prominent officials and supporters were part of its organizing committee, including the Head of State for the Army, General Luis C. Pina; the railway, oil, and financial capitalist Alexandre Basto, who chaired the Overseas Companies; the President of the Gulbenkian Foundation; along with former ministers, Navy officers, and other professionals of the state and "civic society". Altogether, there were 192 delegates - only 22 of them women - from Brazil (84), the United States (58), Spain (9), Canada, France (6 each), Argentina, Japan, Venezuela (4 each), Hong Kong, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Uruguay (2 each), Australia, Malawi, South Rhodesia, Singapore, Sweden, and Turkey (1 each). They were received with honours by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Overseas, the Mayor of Lisbon, and the State Secretary of Information and Tourism. The event opened with an afternoon mass at the grandiose Hieronymites Monastery, accompanied by the Choir of the Portuguese Community of China. Salazar himself chaired the Congress' inaugural session that evening (Figure 55). 

The Congress' proceedings took place in the Lisbon Geographic Society's hall and were divided into ten thematic sessions, dealing with social, religious, economic, cultural, and technological issues. The papers ranged from pseudo-scientific lectures on lusotropicalism and related topics, like "The Bio-Social Expansion of the Portuguese Man" or "Scientific and Historically Humanist Roots of the Spiritual Unity of the Portuguese World"; descriptions of the

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933 Various clippings from the Diário de Notícias, Luso-Americano, and Standard Times, August-September, 1964, PEA M609-A, Relações Culturais com os E.U.A. Convite Governo Americano ao Sr. Dr. Adriano Moreira... AHD.  
934 Adriano Moreira's speech at the Cabrillo Day celebrations in Sacramento, California, September 12, 1964, ibid.  
935 Among them were Anibal S. Branco (UPC), Ida F. Pimenta (PACFA), João Rocha (Diário de Notícias), Luis Gomes (UPC), Martin T. Camacho (PACFA), Manuel Luciano da Silva, Manuel S. M. Leal (Portuguese American Fund), and Roy Teixeira.  
936 They were: Alberto Cunha, Armando de Mello, Armando Romão, Eduardo F. Mattos, Frank Silva, and João de Gois Paulo. The Portuguese-Canadian organizations that adhered to the Congress were the newspaper Correio Português and Lusitano, the Radio Club Portuguese Voice in Canada (Toronto), and the clubs Amigos de Portugal (Kingston) and FPCC.  
938 Built in the 15th century on the southern shore of the Tagus river, the Hieronymites Monastery has since been a symbol of Portugal's maritime explorations and the nation's glorious past. It houses the tombs of Vasco da Gama and Luis Vaz de Camões.
emigrants' social, demographic, geographic, and religious characteristics; technical presentations on telecommunications and transportation; assessments on the communities financial, economic, and political potential; to unabashed professions of patriotism and eternal loyalty to Portugal. Almost every presentation made reference to Portugal's heroic maritime explorers of the past, usually followed by a comparison with the emigrant's own courageous journey, framed by lusotropicalist references. The missionaries' contributions to preserving the emigrant's cultural heritage and language were also extolled repeatedly. But sometimes, wrapped in these celebratory messages, were allusions to the structural problems causing emigration, its negative impact on rural towns and their local economies, or the difficult situation of many nationals living in foreign lands. Some of the speakers' recommendations were quite progressive, such as lessening restrictions forcing people to leave the country illegally; creating a repatriation fund for those who failed to adapt to their host countries; increasing social assistance in emigrant communities by appointing social attachés in diplomatic offices; offering representation to the largest emigrant communities at the National Assembly by appointing their own deputies, as was done for the "overseas provinces"; and others. Some suggestions, such as increasing the IAC's investment to community schools and libraries; increasing the visits of Portuguese scholars and artists; sending more books and films; or establishing more flight connections to emigrant communities, were later implemented with varied success, as seen in previous chapters. Delegates were also encouraged to create confederations uniting all cultural Portuguese in their adopted countries in order to better defend "their common values."939

One of the speakers, José de Magalhães, pointed to Spain's Institute of Hispanic Culture as an example of "spiritual integration" that Portugal should follow. He noted the cultural power of *Hispanidad* was such that even Portugal and Brazil had been swept under its umbrella in the eyes of the world; a perception that the concept *Lusitanidade* had not yet vanquished. Magalhães also counterposed the Congress' approving tone by highlighting the deep poverty that many emigrants were subject to. He warned delegates about the dangers of living "in the permanent contemplation of the past and turning [their] backs to the future," alerting them to the "great crisis" of Portuguese language and literary arts, suffocated as they were by censorship.940

939 Communications by the representatives of Oliveira de Azeméis and Arganil, by Dr. Lopo C. Cancellari de Abreu, and by Manuel Martins da Cruz (Casa das Beiras of Lisbon), *ibid*. Clipping, "Congresso das Comunidades", *Diário da Manhã*, December 25, 1964, 27, PC-69, Pt. 13, Correspondência sobre as seguintes questões: realização do Congresso das Comunidades Portuguesas, 1o, de Lisboa, AOS/ CO/, ANTT.
940 José Raposo de Magalhães' communication, Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1964.
The most caustic address was that of Aníbal S. Branco, the UPC's veteran secretary-general and former chancellor in the Boston consulate. After praising his fellow ethnics in the United States as being "honest" and "hard-working", Branco criticized the little interest shown by Portuguese authorities in building community libraries or filling their bookshelves - a common request made by various delegates. He was particularly incensed by the poor quality of some of the consuls and their staff, who at times hurled insults at emigrants who had sacrificed their Portuguese nationality to obtain American citizenship. Besides being rude and unfair, Branco argued this attitude was shortsighted, since these Portuguese-Americans could offer "better services to Portugal with the American authorities than those who never naturalized."941 Other participants contested traditional definitions of Portuguese nationality and citizenship, and proposed a broader more inclusive interpretation. In the absence of dual citizenship, they argued that foreign naturalization and subsequent loss of Portuguese citizenship should be seen as a purely legal process, one that gave emigrants access to all the rights available to them in their host countries, without necessarily having cultural connotations.942 According to Lisbon's Diário da Manhã, the delegates concluded that: "Being Portuguese has, therefore, a predominantly spiritual content that does not prevent the perfect exercise of citizenship in another country."943

The Congress gave birth to the Union of Portuguese Cultural Communities (UCCP), which was to be run by the Lisbon Geographic Society. According to its by-laws, the UCCP was "a private international apolitical institution, the purposes of which are to promote and assure the relations and cooperation among those associations, groups or individuals connected with, or interested in, the conservation and propagation of Portuguese traditions." Its membership was reserved to individuals living abroad who were Portuguese born, descendants, or "affiliated with Portuguese culture", along with their associations and cultural institutes. The title "cultural communities" resolved some of the ambiguities surrounding Portuguese nationality, since it included foreign citizens and those racialized groups like the Cape Verdeans.944

Overall, the delegates' reacted favourably to the Lisbon Congress and seemed convinced of their homeland's genuine interest in connecting with their expatriate communities, furthering their leaders' positive relationship with Portuguese authorities. For instance, the PAF's founders

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941 Aníbal da Silva Branco's communication (m.t.), ibid.
943 Diário da Manhã, December 25, 1964 (m.t.).
944 "Statutes of the Union of Portuguese Cultural Communities, December 17, 1964," ibid.
cited this meeting as their inspiration for the 1966 Congress of the Communities in Bristol and their resulting confederation. Even Branco noted in the UPC's annual report that, despite his initial reservations about what he expected would be a highly "political" event, the Congress had been a triumph of fraternity and good will, with few political discussions.⁹⁴⁵

Of course, Portuguese political exiles had a different view of this event, which they saw as a colossal propaganda affair, orchestrated by Moreira and his fellow colonialists to mobilize the emigrants' support for Salazar and his imperial policies.⁹⁴⁶ The U.S. government shared this view, which was communicated by the American cultural attaché at the Lisbon embassy to a group of Portuguese-Americans attending the Congress. The foreign officer reminded his guests that his government still defended the right of self-determination of all colonized peoples, and that relations with Portugal were not on the best of terms. He also argued the Congress' objectives were clearly political and warned the delegates about the organizers' intentions to pass a motion supporting Portugal's colonial policies.⁹⁴⁷ Finally, the attaché advised this group not to attend the next Congress meeting should it take place in Angola or Mozambique.⁹⁴⁸

As expected, the second Congress of Portuguese Cultural Communities was held in Mozambique, on July 13-23, 1967. This time there were 200 delegates (one of them Gilberto Freyre) but a smaller Portuguese-American representation.⁹⁴⁹ The 10-day meeting took place aboard the luxury liner SS Príncipe Perfeito, which cruised the Mozambican coast, stopping at various points, including the Fort of São Sebastião - as Vasco da Gama had done on his way to India in 1497. The themes of this meeting were similar to the first, though its imperialist overtones were even more pronounced and the links with Brazil highlighted. As reported by The New York Times: "a few delegates showed discomfort of [Minister] Nogueira's political tone. They felt they were being pressed to support Portuguese policy in Africa;" this was particularly the case with the large Brazilian delegation, "which included several deputies and influential

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⁹⁴⁶ A decade later, Jaime Monteiro recalled Moreira's diasporic project as: "an astute pretense to copy what Mao Tse-tung had done with the Chinese communities. ...[C]ontrary to the Japanese and their migration chains to Brazil, where they sent professors, technicians, doctors andagronomists, the Portuguese regime... sought to maintain [the emigrants] isolated, sending them clergymen, reactionary literature, cheap music and manipulative agents, which would keep the Portuguese within their orbit" (in "Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association. 18 Anos de Luta Contra o Fascismo," [1977] 2007 [m.t.], 78-79).
⁹⁴⁷ The Portuguese-American Manuel S. M. Leal, who was not at this reception at the American embassy, started his communication at the Congress by proposing the participants approve a resolution reaffirming their support for the Portuguese empire and those fighting for it in Africa (Manuel S. M. Leal, "Sobre a Comunidade Portuguesa da Nova Inglaterra. Identificação étnica, cultural e histórica expansão cultural e do Portuguesismo," Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1964).
⁹⁴⁸ Letter (confidential), Consul F. Figueirinhas to PMFA, January 12, 1965, PEA M251, Comunidade Portuguesa (Geral), AHD.
⁹⁴⁹ Among them were Francis M. Rogers, Ida F. Pimenta, Manuel Rocha, Manuel S. M. Leal, and Robert C. Arruda.

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Also on the agenda were the circulation of literary works in the vast Lusophone market in North and South America; and the preservation and standardization of Portuguese language across the diaspora, resulting in an agreement to develop teaching materials that bridged linguistic differences between Portugal and Brazil. The definition of *Lusiad* "community" and "nation" were also discussed at length, with arguments made for their separation from the political concepts of "state" or "territory".  

This was the last congress organized by the UCCP, which continued to offer lectures and publish a quarterly magazine until the early 1970s, when it began to fizzle out. It is not clear what role, if any, Moreira, the UCCP, and the two meetings played in the *Estado Novo*'s decision to create the National Secretariat of Emigration in 1970. Nonetheless, it is evident that their efforts contributed to improving the emigrants' profile in the eyes of Portuguese officials.

**Conclusion**

The history of race relations in the United States is full of complexities, each stemming from the particular characteristics of different ethnic or national groups; nuances that are too often lost in the popular discourse surrounding identity politics. Introducing an imperial perspective to this discussion admittedly complicates matters further. But it also reveals an important strand in this historical mesh that helps us understand the specific experiences of "inbetween" immigrant groups like the Portuguese and the Cape Verdeans, and uncover new transnational agents behind the historical (re)constructions of American racial identities. In this regard, homeland government officials and their foreign agenda helped shape the development of Portuguese communities in North America, particularly their racial identities, political views, and their consciousness as diasporic citizens of an increasingly cultural and linguistic empire.

The cognitive dissonance of some Portuguese ethnic leaders, who combined their support for their homeland's colonialist regime with an adherence to their adopted nations' liberal democratic values, was not unique. In many ways, their attitudes were similar to the Italian-Americans' endorsement of Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Like the *Estado Novo*, the Fascist's "carefully orchestrated pro-Mussolini propaganda campaign successfully played on

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Italian Americans' sense of pride in their home country." In both cases, the celebration of the homeland's empire "constituted a kind of ransom for their own lives, so full of sacrifice." Still, there were important differences between the two groups. In Canada, for instance, the Fascist consul's efforts to instill a timeless and deterritorialized sense of Italian identity (or *italianità*) in the emigrants' self-understanding resulted in a vague cultural campaign that "fell short of an articulate defense of fascist principles or of Italian foreign policy by a disciplined and strong pressure group." While there were many Portuguese-Americans who opposed Salazar and his colonial policies, the majority of civic and religious leaders did defend them despite their host societies' largely anti-authoritarian, anti-colonialist, but also (and above all) anti-communist worldview. Another important difference, which may explain the first, was the degree to which empire figured in each group's national imagination. Portugal's centuries-old empire was more ingrained in the symbolic articulation of Portuguese national identity than Mussolini's colonial aspirations were for Italians. Portugal's imperial history of itinerancy and adaptability provided expatriates with a stock of metaphors they used to claim their belonging in both the homeland's and host's national communities.

By adopting the narratorial subjugation of non-white colonial subjects and highlighting their homeland's contributions to Western ("white") civilization, Portuguese ethnic elites were involved in a less violent but still exclusionary project similar to that of Irish-Americans in the 19th century. The patriotic embrace of Portugal's glorious history by the ethnic elites in New England and California contrasted with Gaston's "Portuguese" abhorrence of such racial label and their supposedly shared heritage. The latter's visible "whiteness" was unquestioned outside of Northampton County, yet tainted by historical hearsay in their hometown: a clear example of how racial identities are historically constructed and deeply contextual. In reverse, the historical construction of a Portuguese-American founding narrative of North America worked in the community's favour in the context of New England's and California's emerging identity politics, since it elevated the status of that community and its civic leaders in the eyes of American officials. The segregation of "Portuguese" in the "backward" south further vindicated the heritage campaigns of Portuguese-Americans in the "progressive" north, since it allowed the latter to rise

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954 Perin, 1984, 139.
above America's racial divide and preach their lusotropicalist principles of racial pluralism. At the same time, Portuguese intellectuals were quick to dismiss the supposed ancestry of Gaston's "unfortunate people" and demanded American officials to stop "misusing" their national identity to describe these poor, illiterate, isolated, rural, mixed race, and somehow assimilated families, whose association with their much vaunted pro-miscegenation and versatile "Portugeseness" they found insulting.

For the reasons listed above, the ethnic revivalism of Portuguese-American middle-class leaders was largely conservative; especially when compared with the struggles of African-American nationalists, who sought to change the dominant political and economic structures oppressing blacks in the United States rather than improving their status within them. However, Portuguese immigrant workers in the 1960s, who shared some of the same socioeconomic problems as their black neighbours, seemed more willing to identify with the latter's demands for increasing government investment in social programs, public housing, employment, and other welfare measures. However, when African-American activists turned their attention to Portuguese colonialism and boycotted Portuguese-American businesses as a form of protest, the latter were quick to conceal their ancestry, which had once again become a liability, and declare themselves just "Americans."

Finally, the threats to Portugal's sacrosanct empire and the resources mobilized to protect it provided the impetus for reimagining the nation's geography and its people's itinerant qualities. A by-product of this discursive bulwark was the annexation of expatriate communities as outposts of the imperial nation in foreign hostile polities. By conflating colonial and emigrant settlements as equal parts in the imperial narrative, the Estado Novo laid the building blocks of the state-sponsored Portuguese diasporic discourse that would reemerge triumphantly after the fall of empire. In this sense, the colonial wars were what Sökefeld would call a "triggering event" for mobilizing the making of "imagined transnational community" discourses, not only for the imperial government but also for its political opponents. As we will discuss in the next chapter, the regime's imperial imagining was challenged by pro-democratic and anti-colonialist exiles in various expatriate settlements, who, through their own global networks, international meetings, and transnational collaborations, performed and articulated an alternative version of Portuguese diaspora.

955 Colburn & Pozzetta, 1994, 138-141.
Fig. 40 - Cape Verdean cranberry bog workers in Falmouth, Massachusetts, September 1911. The photographer, Lewis W. Hines, noted: "Shack near John D. Crocker's Bog. Housing 7 Portuguese in bunks. Dirty clothes and garbage on the floor. There were bunks for 12 persons. The shack was 10 x 12 feet and 8 or 9 feet high" (Library of Congress, digital ID: nclc 00154 http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/nclc.00154).

Fig. 41, 42, 43 - (Top left) Bernardo Teixeira with teacher Oceloa T. Crew and "Portuguese" student; (top right) young female student at Gaston's "Portuguese" school; (bottom) B. Teixeira, a Norfolk county official, and the "most prosperous of the 'Portuguese' farmers". Photos taken in March 1958 for the Portuguese embassy's files (PEA 71 "Portugueses" na Carolina do Norte, AHD).
Fig. 44 - Toronto's Rancho Folclórico da Nazaré and the Portugal's chief government officer for fisheries, Admiral Henrique Tenreiro, posing in front of Gaspar Corte-Real's statue during its unveiling ceremony in St. John's, Newfoundland, on September 8, 1965 (photo published in Diário de Notícias, September 13, 1965, 6).

Fig. 45 - Cover of Manuel Luciano da Silva's Portuguese Pilgrims and Dighton Rock: the First Chapter in American History (1971), with a photo of the author and an image of Prince Henry the Navigator behind him.

Fig. 46 - (Left) Cynthia Mae Dinis, the "Queen" of the Cape Verdean Beneficient Association's debutant ball, receives a flight ticket from the hands of Mário Félix, TAP's director in the U.S., on May 27, 1967 (photo published in the Diário de Notícias, May 29, 1967, 1, DN-UMASS).

Fig. 47 - (Right) The Portuguese consul of San Francisco, Joseph Sigal, awards "Miss Cabrilho Queen" 1966, Jeanette Nunes Correia, with a trip to Portugal (photo published in the San Diego Tribune, September 29, 1966, PEA M334, AHD).
Fig. 48, 49, 50 - Speakers on stage during public meetings at New Bedford's Carmo hall (top left), at Fall River's Azorean Club and Band hall (top right), and crowd gathered at East Providence's Phillips Hall (bottom left), all protesting Nehru's threats of annexating Goa and expressing their solidarity for fellow Portuguese in that territory (photos published in Diário de Notícias, April 24, May 13 & 23, 1950, DN-UMASS).

Fig. 52 - Luso-Canadiano issue of January 15, 1967, announcing the death of its owner Henrique Tavares Bello (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/004 [06]).
Fig. 53 - Retiring Ambassador Luis Esteves Fernandes meeting with President John F. Kennedy, July 05, 1961 (JKWHHP-1961-07-05-B, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

Fig. 54 - Ambassador Pedro Teotónio Pereira meeting with President Kennedy, September 15, 1961. Photo by Abbie Rowe (AR6785-A, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

Fig. 55 - Congress delegates dine at Feira das Industrias, Lisbon, December 10, 1964. Photo by Armando Serôdio. (PT/AMLSB/SER/S03182, AF\img96\A47887, Lisbon Municipal Archive)
7. THE RADICALS' DIASPORA: "ANTI-FASCISTS", WAR RESISTERS, AND OTHER POLITICAL EXILES, 1950s-60s

"Sons of the PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL, in this country there are hundreds of political exiles and young men who had the nobility of deserting the colonialist army. Join us..."
Movimento Democrático Português, Montreal, 1967.

Political persecution resulting in forced or voluntary exile is somewhat of a tradition in Portugal's history. After the Second World War a new wave of political exiles left Portugal to safeguard their personal and intellectual freedom. A significant number of them went to Montreal, Toronto, and the greater New York City area, where they organized pro-democratic committees. Many of them would spend a great part of their lives outside of their native country but remained intensively dedicated to it, fighting the dictatorship from abroad. Among these were leftist radicals who not only opposed the Estado Novo's conservative and colonialist dictatorship but also the capitalist system championed by their host governments. Other were more moderate and identified themselves with the liberal-democratic ideals that underpinned American and Canadian political systems. Still, they all believed the dictatorial regime could be defeated only by a coup or a revolution, especially after 1958. In light of this, American and Canadian authorities saw them as subversives who worked to overthrow the government of a Western allied nation, which happened to be undemocratic.

Social historians writing on North American migration have produced a vast literature on radical activists and their battles with conservative factions in their communities. In his seminal work The Transplanted, Bodnar highlighted the common experiences of radical militancy among immigrants in the United States, which had been largely neglected by previous historians. He also argued that immigrant workers and their families were prepared to "deal with capitalism, albeit on their own terms;" and were "neither locked to a present nor counting too heavily on vague promises of a better life in some distant future." In other words, most immigrants had little time for or paid little attention to the rallying cries of radical militants. This notion prompted Perin to ask: "is there not in the fascination with the radical immigrant more than an element of romanticism? These intellectuals were atypical immigrants, and they did not, as a whole, participate in the life of their local community. Most in fact regarded their fellow countrymen with condescension, if not contempt. Why then accord them such significance?

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956 Handout distributed by the members of the MDP to the crewmen of the Portuguese Navy frigate Almirante Pereira da Silva during its visit to Montreal in 1967, F0579, 2009-022/004 (17), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
...Immigrants were after all rooted in a Canadian reality.\textsuperscript{958} This cautious scepticism helps us recognize the resistance encountered by radical exiles in their efforts to politicize their fellow expatriates, and not assume their overrepresentation in the archival record is proportional to their impact in the general experience of Portuguese immigrants. However, as we will see in this chapter, while some of the leading radical immigrants were detached from their local communities, there were plenty of others who were poorly educated workers; at the same time, even the latter were often condescending to their illiterate countrymen. Non-political immigrants were also not entirely rooted in their local reality, since their fear of reprisal by Portuguese authorities was enough to discourage them from engaging in local politics.

Other historians have found a more engaged relation between so-called radical and common immigrants, as was the case with Hungarian nationalist and communist militants in Canada. As Patrias observed, their efforts to raise the political consciousness of fellow immigrants would not have been successful "had their ideologies, and the institutions that they created and supported, not responded to the needs of the immigrants." Even Hungarian communists, whose goals were internationalist, relied on "aspects of shared culture and fellow-feeling" and infused their radicalization programs with an "ethnic component."\textsuperscript{959} Drawing from this example, we will examine the extent to which Portuguese radicals' involvement with ethnic culture, or lack thereof, affected the outcome of their political actions.

Another useful concept for understanding the liminal role occupied by political exiles vis-à-vis their immigrant communities and host societies is Elisabetta Vezzosi's "radical ethnic brokers". As she put it: "In the lives of immigrant trade unionists, socialists, and anarchists, protest and accommodation were not counterposed but merged in the same figures, who thus became leaders of 'passage' or 'transition', or, better still, 'radical ethnic brokers' who mediated between immigrant communities and the larger society."\textsuperscript{960} In this chapter, we will discuss the activities of Portuguese radicals in North America and their political brokerage between immigrant communities, American and Canadian polities, and the distressed homeland. We will also examine how the exiles' transnational collaboration and global networks effectively created an alternative diasporic community that contrasted with the \textit{Estado Novo}'s imperialist version of

\textsuperscript{958} Perin, 1990, 220 & 221.
\textsuperscript{959} Patrias, 1994, 230.
diaspora and "Portugeseness". Finally, we will discuss how the secret services in the United States and Canada reacted to the "subversive" activities of these pro-democratic "radical ethnic brokers" and how they cooperated with PIDE in the context of the Cold War.

The "external front": Humberto Delgado, Henrique Galvão, and the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional

While the 1926 military coup forced many republicans and other opponents into exile, it was not until General Humberto Delgado's failed presidential bid that the opposition's "external front" began to take shape. As in the past, the dictator expected the 1958 presidential elections to be a formality; a way to assess the opposition and reinforce the regime's political legitimacy. However, Delgado's charismatic Eisenhower-styled campaign rallied an unprecedented and unexpected amount of popular support, as reflected in the large public gatherings at his open-air events, which caught the regime unprepared to deal with such mass defiance. Delgado's campaign came after a period of intense political repression known as the "led years" (anos de chumbo) (1949-58), when many left-wing leaders were sent to prison or into exile, which threw the rank and file into disarray. At this point the split in the opposition became more pronounced, with communists on one side and social democrats, liberals, and democratic conservatives on the other. In the first camp were primarily factory workers, tradesmen, and other urban labourers, along with farm workers from the south; they were organized by the PCP, a clandestine yet robust political party with ties to the Soviet Union. The second camp was more fluid; in 1958 it was represented by the somewhat amorphous Democrat-Social Directory (DDS), whose leaders, primarily intellectuals and middle-class professionals, were inspired by Western democracies. There were ideological cleavages within the DDS, but in the early 1950s its members agreed that "peaceful evolution" rather than revolution was the most feasible path for political change. After Josef Stalin's death in 1953, even the PCP recognized the benefits of coalescing the various anti-Salazar factions into a united "national reconciliation" front, and engaged in legal, electoral, reformist political actions. The 1958 presidential election was an opportunity to test this united front's strength.

Believing the best nominee to be someone from within the regime's own ranks, who could eventually lead an internal putsch, the centrist opposition camp selected Delgado as their "independent candidate". Initially excluded from this nomination process, the PCP eventually
withdrew their own candidate's bid and threw their support behind Delgado. Before becoming the opposition's candidate, Delgado had been an officer in the Portuguese Air Force and a supporter of the *Estado Novo*, which he represented in Montreal at the International Civil Aviation Organization (1947-50), and in Washington, first as the Portuguese military attaché and later as the Mission Chief with NATO (1952-57) (Figure 56). During his time in North America, Delgado developed a liberal consciousness and began repudiating Salazar and his dictatorial government. But more than his ideas, it was Delgado's novel brand of politics, characterized by his bravado and public theatrics, that rallied so many behind "the fearless General" (o *General sem medo*) - a nickname he earned after responding to a reporter that he would "obviously fire" Salazar once he became president. The charismatic general shunned the traditional methods of the republican opposition, with its "chronic legalism, its moderation, its attachment to republican shibboleths... [its] careful public statements, [its] agreements among small groups of intellectuals and professionals," replacing them with "mass politics and bold, direct action."962

Less than a week into the campaign, the regime reverted to its traditional methods of intimidation and invaded Delgado's campaign offices, beating and imprisoning his supporters at public rallies, and deploying other repressive tactics. In the end, the elections were rigged. However, this time, it was obvious to everyone the official ballot results did not reflect the popular mood. After the phony elections, PIDE clamped down on Delgado's supporters, forcing many to flee the country; the general himself was granted asylum in the Brazilian embassy, until he managed to leave for that country in April 1959.963

Delgado's campaign inaugurated a period of crisis for the *Estado Novo* that would include the beginning of the colonial wars and a series of high profile revolutionary actions that captured the attention of media around the world, opening the regime to an unprecedented level of international scrutiny. The most dramatic of these actions was the highjacking of the *Santa Maria* liner on January 1961, which Captain Henrique Galvão had planned in Venezuela with Delgado's assent. As discussed in the previous chapter, after a 12 day-long pursuit, the "freedom fighting pirates" docked safely in Recife on February 2, where the recently elected President Quadros granted them asylum. While Galvão's original plan failed, his action was seen as a

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961 Rosas, 1993, 503, 519, 522, 526.  
963 Rosas, 1993, 530.
massive success, since it tore down the decades-long "curtain of silence" that had kept Portugal hidden from the world's gaze. As Rosas argued, it also revealed the "existence of a vast movement of popular contestation to the old dictatorship, until then accepted by the West as a patriarchal entity, benevolent, and even adequate to the lowly politics of the Portuguese."\footnote{Rosas, 1993, 532 (m.t.)}

Once in Brazil, Galvão and his men joined the group of Portuguese exiles in São Paulo. In March 1961, about 100 political émigrés led by a small group of socialists gathered in that city to discuss ways of organizing the exiled diaspora (the "external front") and how best to support the opposition in Portugal (the "internal front"), led largely by the PCP; they also agreed the latter should remain the primary field of battle.\footnote{Raby, 1994, 81.} The participants concluded that the Portuguese opposition could benefit from the international attention garnered by the colonial wars, as long as they clearly stated their support for the African liberation movements and worked together despite ideological differences.\footnote{Letters, João Sarmento Pimentel and Manuel Sertório, Comissão Inter-Ligação, São Paulo, to PCDA, March 29, 1961; and Unidade Democrática Portuguesa, São Paulo, to the leaders of the Anti-Salazarist Internal Front, January 20, 1962, F0579, 2009-022/003 (1), PCDA fonds, CTASC.} But this was not Galvão’s view or style. Months after arriving in Brazil, the rogue captain became estranged from Delgado and his fellow anti-Salazar exiles. To his allies’ surprise, Galvão argued the Angolan "tribes" had no sense of nationhood and would not be ready for self-determination until a democratic regime in Portugal prepared them for it.\footnote{Galvão based his views on his experience as the Estado Novo's commissioner for the Oporto Colonial Exhibit; former District Governor in Angola; deputy for Angola at the National Assembly; and Inspector-General of the Portuguese Overseas Territories. Galvão's service with the regime also included directing the public broadcaster Emissora Nacional in the early 1940s (Antunes, 1991, 122; Rosas, 1993, 562).} Galvão's colonialist views were untenable for the left-wing opposition, especially after April 1961, when they agreed to share resources and coordinate actions with the national liberation parties fighting Portuguese soldiers in Africa. Galvão also had pretensions to become the leader of the democratic opposition in Brazil, thus placing him on a collision course with Delgado. In late 1961, the two found themselves in Morocco at the same time, each preparing their own revolutionary actions. Galvão helped Hermínio da Palma Inácio plan the first ever highjack of a passenger airplane, on November 10, 1961. Inácio seized the TAP aircraft mid-flight from Casablanca to Lisbon and dropped anti-Salazar (and anti-communist) pamphlets over the Portuguese capital, then returned safely to Morocco. Delgado in turn entered Portugal with fake papers in anticipation of a popular insurrection that he hoped to lead following the assault on the military barracks in Beja, on New Year's Eve 1961. The assault was foiled and the authorities
launched a widespread manhunt for the escaped assailants; Delgado managed to leave the country upon hearing of the mission's failure. In the general's eyes, it had been Galvão's earlier action and public boasting that alerted Portuguese authorities and ultimately compromised the Beja assault. The schism between the two liberal democratic leaders would grow in the years to come, fuelled by their spirited and tenacious personalities. But while Delgado remained a central figure in the leftist dominated opposition, Galvão became increasingly isolated.\(^{968}\)

After 1958, the opposition became more radicalized, as reflected in the various high profile political actions that followed, including Álvaro Cunhal's prison break in January 1960, and the PCP's return to its traditional revolutionary ethos; the American-backed attempted coup by General Botelho Moniz in April 1961; the student strikes in the universities of Coimbra and of Lisbon in 1962; along with various workers strikes throughout the country. The regime responded to this increasing defiance by beating and sometimes shooting at protesters; making sweeping political arrests (well over 3,000 in 1958-62); intensifying its use of torture; and reopening the Tarrafal prison camp. The escalation of political repression and military conscription generated one of the largest exodus of Portuguese political exiles and war resisters (including draft-dodgers and deserters), most of whom went to Western Europe, North Africa, or South America.\(^{969}\)

The call from São Paulo for a united "external front" became more pressing as the exiled diaspora grew. In December 1962, their efforts finally materialized with the founding of the National Liberation Patriotic Front (FPLN) in Rome. As David Raby argued, this was "the most serious attempt yet to organize an effective revolutionary blow against the regime from abroad." Still, its founders agreed the FPLN should always defer to the "internal front".\(^{970}\) The new transnational organization, which set up headquarters in Algiers in 1963, connected exiled groups in Algeria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, England, Morocco, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and kept ties with African nationalist movements. That year, Delgado met with Cunhal in Prague. The ideological adversaries agreed to work together and seek a common revolutionary solution to overthrow Salazar. After this, a new FPLN executive committee was formed, with Delgado as president, Cunhal as vice-president (though he often delegated that role

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\(^{969}\) Raby, 1994, 78; Rosas, 1993, 531-519.

\(^{970}\) Raby, 1994, 81, 83.
to another PCP representative), and Fernando Piteira Santos, Rui Cabeçadas and other socialists as supporting executive members.\textsuperscript{971}

By the fall of 1964, the ideological diversity and competing revolutionary strategies within the FPLN had resulted in intense factionalism, which culminated in Delgado's divorce from the organization and the creation of his short-lived National Liberation Portuguese Front, based in Rabat. True to his reputation, the "fearless General" continued to plot wild revolutionary plans, until February 13, 1965, when he was lured into an ambush on the Spanish-Portuguese border and was assassinated, along with his secretary Arajaryr M. de Campos. Because it happened soon after Delgado’s falling out with the FPLN, speculation about his death became rampant. One conspiracy theory, proposed by Delgado's aide in Rabat, Henrique Cerqueira, accused the FPLN and the PCP of betraying the general and enabling his assassination. Cerqueira’s controversial thesis captured the media's attention and was conveniently endorsed by the regime. This scandal damaged the international reputation of the Portuguese opposition and further deepened the many fissures breaking apart the once united anti-Salazar front. Years later it was confirmed that the murder had been perpetrated by PIDE.\textsuperscript{972}

The FPLN continued to operate despite the opposition's internal turmoil. However, it lost much of its early impetus and assumed a more coordinating and intermediary role in the exiled diaspora. Still, the FPLN continued to attract new socialist leaders, who came to dominate the organization under Piteira Santos' leadership. In 1970, yet another ideological split culminated in the PCP leaving the FPLN, after which the latter lost much of its influence in the opposition.\textsuperscript{973}

\textbf{Abilio Oliveira Águas and Newark's Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal}

The many republicans who moved to the United States after 1926 introduced a transnational dimension to the political life of Portuguese-American communities; particularly on the East coast, where João Camoesas,\textsuperscript{974} Joaquim A. Correia,\textsuperscript{975} José Miguéis, and Abilio

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\textsuperscript{971} Ibid., 81-84.
\textsuperscript{972} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{973} Ibid., 87.
\textsuperscript{974} João J. C. Camoesas served as the Minister of National Instruction in 1923-25. He introduced a bill that promised to reform Portugal's education system along Frederik Taylor's scientific organization ideas and the U.S. school system; however, the bill would never be discussed in parliament. In 1928 Camoesas was deported to Angola, from which he moved to the U.S. two years later, settling in Taunton, Massachusetts. Camoesas was involved in various Portuguese-American civic initiatives, and was a regular contributor with New Bedford’s \textit{Diário de Noticias}.
\textsuperscript{975} Joaquim Alves Correia (1886-1951), or Father Larguezas, was a Catholic priest born in the northern county of Paredes. He authored various works on Catholic social doctrine, including \textit{A Largueza do Reino de Deus} (1931), and wrote for influential
\end{footnotesize}
Oliveira Águas were outspoken and articulate critics of the *Estado Novo*. These republicans maintained ties with the leading members of the opposition and contributed regularly to their publications; they also shared their political views on the pages of the *Diário de Notícias*. As was often the case with Salazar's enemies, Portuguese diplomats and their community allies branded these figures as "communists", convincing American authorities to police their activities and limiting their freedom of speech, even though they were liberals or social-democrats. With the death of Camõesas and Correia in 1951, the republican opposition in the United States lost much of its vitality.

After the *Santa Maria* episode, some of the old republicans sprang back into action and joined the growing exiled community in the United States, as was the case with Águas. Born in the mainland city of Figueira da Foz, in 1890, Águas was educated in Lisbon and London where he met some of Portugal's most distinguished republican thinkers. After living in Mozambique, working as a colonial administrator in Zambezia, Águas was hired as manager of a British investment company in Brazil, which took him on business trips across Africa, South America, and Canada. In 1925, Águas was appointed vice-consul of Portugal in Providence, where he earned the reputation of being a friend of the downtrodden for his solicitude in helping newcomers dealing with American officials. Four years later, Águas was removed of his duties as a diplomat after having denounced the French shipping company Fabre Line, endorsed by Salazar, for transporting Cape Verdean immigrants in their ships' cargo holds. After this, Águas became an outspoken critic of the regime and its neglect of Portuguese emigrants, voicing his opinions in the pages of Providence's *News-Tribune*, and lecturing in various community halls. He also helped found Rhode Island's Portuguese American Civic League and was involved in a number of civic initiatives and heritage campaigns. Águas was also one of the most respected and better connected Portuguese immigrants in Washington's political circles, with such illustrious friends as President Harry Truman. After the war, Águas became involved with the Democratic Party, first as the president of the Portuguese section in the party's Nationalities

opposition publications, such as Seara Nova. In 1945, Correia joined Mário Soares and other prominent democrats as a member of the *Movimento de Unidade Democrática*. In 1946, he was sent to San Diego to serve that city's Portuguese congregation. Later he became a professor of sociology at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 1980, the Portuguese government awarded him (and Abílio Águas) an Order of Freedom title, created in 1976 to distinguish individuals for their services to democracy and freedom.

976 For more on this see Correia, 2009, 233-241.

977 In 1934, Águas married Maria Elizabeth Delabarre, the daughter of the Brown University Professor Edmund Delabarre, who first advanced the argument that Portuguese explorers had landed in New England in the 16th century. Throughout his life, Águas helped promote his father-in-law's thesis and the preservation of the Dighton Rock.
Directory, and later as municipal candidate in Berkley, Massachusetts, where he lived; he was also credited with securing the first Portuguese-American public appointees in the state of Rhode Island.

By 1960, a small group of exiles, predominantly from urban areas in mainland Portugal, had converged in the Greater New York City region where they created a political nucleus. One of its leaders was Eduardo da Cunha Covas, a former accountant from the suburbs of Lisbon (Moscavide), according to PIDE with connections to "well-known and active communists," who arrived clandestinely in New York aboard a merchant ship in 1950. Covas had various factory jobs in New Jersey before starting his own business making guitar strings. Another leading member was António Manuel Dias, a fishing trawler pilot from the outskirts of Oporto (Matosinhos), who had been deported from the United States six times before marrying an American citizen and becoming a permanent resident in 1954. Other members were sojourners turned immigrants in the 1950s; most of them labourers, though there were also a few white-collar workers and small business owners. Their early activities consisted primarily of distributing political literature, such as the *Portugal Democrático*. It was the editors of the São Paulo newspaper who connected them with Águas, with whom they created the Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal in April 1961. With Águas as chairman, Covas as secretary-general, and close to 60 members in New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, the Newark-based CPDP advocated the restoration of the republican regime under the principles of 1910.

The CPDP's members were largely working-class immigrants with few material resources and some Portuguese descendants with more financial means; though according to Águas, the latter were less committed to the democratic cause in Portugal. Águas had amassed a considerable fortune through his business ventures, though but much of it was locked in bad investments in Portugal, which he was unable to oversee in person for fear of being arrested. Nonetheless, Águas had ample political capital and was able to find help from many influential

978 Finding Aid, Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal, CD25A.
980 PIDE issued an arrest warrant for Covas after he jumped the *Pêro de Alenquer* cargo ship along with fourteen other crew members; the warrant prescribed on October 14, 1966 (SUF, 768/50, nt. 647, Eduardo da Cunha Covas, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).
981 Various correspondence between Norman W. Philcox, U.S. Embassy, Paris; Fernando da Silva Pais, PIDE; and an FBI agent, March 4 to April 30, 1964, SC, CI (2) 3972, nt. 7309, Eduardo da Cunha Covas PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
Americans. Throughout his longstanding participation in community affairs, the veteran republican witnessed the rise of the postwar generation of Portuguese-American civic leaders but chose to stay away from them and their ethnic activities, given their close relationship with the regime; he also instructed the CPDP's operatives to follow suit. However, this withdrawal enhanced the group's disconnect with the larger Portuguese community, which paid little attention to the CPDP's calls for mobilization. In fact, various Portuguese ethnic leaders, clergymen, journalists, and civic organizations countered Águas and the CPDP with political actions of their own. Still, there were enough influential and resourceful individuals in the Lusophone communities who were willing to aid Águas and his group on a regular basis.

Contrary to the dominant perception in the Portuguese community, Águas and his group were firmly opposed to communism and made sure to stay clear of any association with such movements. Of particular concern to Águas was the Americans' perception of the CPDP's activities, since he depended on their cooperation to carry on his mission. Águas had this in mind when he cut ties with the increasingly "philo-communist" Portugal Democrático in 1962, and withdrew his support for all initiatives from the "totalitarian" camp. True to his pre-Delgado political roots, he also advised his followers not to engage in public demonstrations (though they sometimes did) since he believed it eroded their organization's prestige. Furthermore, Águas shared Galvão's colonialist views. The CPDP's first communiqué, of June 1961, stated: "We do not collaborate with those who want independence for Angola, and we would place ourselves on the side of the government, even the Dictatorship, if a foreign power, whichever it may be, tried to take possession of any parcel of territory under Portugal's flag." With the help of the Cape Verdean-American leader Roy Teixeira, Águas tried to convince Cape Verdeans to join in the CPDP's struggle for democracy in Portugal and for self-rule (not independence) in their homeland. In Águas' assessment, only a democratic coup in Lisbon could prevent the

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984 Among these were M. T. Camacho, S. da Veiga, G. Stone, J. A. Rodrigues, L. Gomes, J. Capote, the Luso American Social Club (Brooklyn, NY), Portuguese Recreative Club (Jamaica, NY), Portuguese Instructive Social Club (Elizabeth), Sport Club Português (Waterbury), Club União Portuguesa (Naugatuck), among others (letter [confidential], Amb. P. T. Pereira to PMFA, September 18, 1963, PEA M552, Comité Pró-Democracia em Portugal, AHD).
985 In a letter to PIDE Director F. Silva Pais, the U.S. Embassy's Legal Attaché in Paris, Norman W. Philcox, informed that Covas' political activities had support from "very few, if any, of the Portuguese people residing in Newark, New Jersey. His activities do not appear to be serious or effective" (N. W. Philcox to F. S. Pais, March 4, 1964, SC, CI (2) 3972, nt. 7309, Eduardo da Cunha Covas PIDE/DGS, ANTT).
986 Letters, A. O. Águas to E. Covas, June 20 and August 6, 1961; February 7, 1962; and June 9, 1964, ibid.
987 Clipping, "Comunicado", Diário de Notícias, May 31, 1961, 2, sent by PMFA to PIDE Director Col. Homero de Matos, July 18, 1961, SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u.i. 7307, Comité Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDA/DGS, ANTT.
Africanization of Cape Verdeans and guarantee their ongoing identification with Portugal, "where, after all, they have always been considered our equals and, certainly, therefore, well above the savages of the African Continent."988

Soon after its founding, the CPDP connected with the FPLN and other leaders of the opposition, though their primary loyalty was towards Galvão, whose trust Águas' earned when he raised funds for the Santa Maria operation.989 By August 1961, Galvão was sending his mail to Portugal through his new friends in Newark.990 The rebel captain also accepted the CPDP's invitation to visit Newark and address Portuguese democrats in that city but was unable to secure a visa to enter the country.991 Finally, in December 1963, the CPDP managed to bring Galvão to New York to speak at the UN.

The UN's Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration first invited Galvão to make a deputation in March 1962.992 To secure the cooperation of American officials, Águas and Teixeira set up a delegation representing close to 40 organizations and went to Washington to speak to the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who declined to receive them. The politically astute Águas quickly recognized he would not be given access to the State Department, nor would Galvão be issued an entry visa, while negotiations over the Lajes Air Base lease extension were ongoing.993 What Águas did not predict was the extent to which American interests in the Azorean airstrip allowed Salazar to co-opt Kennedy's administration into accepting many of the dictator's terms. Once they learned of the UN's invitation to Galvão, Minister Franco Nogueira began pressuring American officials to deny entry to the Portuguese "terrorist", warning of "grave consequences" otherwise. The Americans recognized the diplomatic risks of allowing Galvão in the country and took discreet actions to prevent him from doing so. Facing a bureaucratic blockade from the United States' border services, Galvão's visa applications were repeatedly delayed until the UN's invitation finally expired in July 1962, with no extension being offered, after pressures from the American delegation to that effect.994

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988 Letter, A. O. Águas to E. Covas, July 19, 1961, CD25A-CPDP.
990 PIDE intercepted a letter of August 31, 1961, from H. Galvão in São Paulo to Cdr. José Moreira Campos in Lisbon. The sender on the envelope was the CPDP's António J. Almeida of Newark (SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u i. 7307, Comité Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).
991 FBI Report (unsigned), November 1, 1961, ibid.
992 Memorandum, UN General Assembly, Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, March 22, 1962, SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u i. 7307, Comité-Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
993 Letters from A. O. Águas to H. Galvão, April 30, 1962; and to E. Covas, June 20, 1962. CD25A-CPDP.
Resistance to Galvão's presence at the UN also came from some sectors of the Portuguese opposition, especially from Delgado, who issued two communiqués criticizing the CPDP for their allegiance to his revolutionary rival; for labeling anyone who disagreed with Galvão as "communists"; and for failing to communicate with fellow opposition members in Brazil. Delgado was especially concerned with Águas' important connections in Washington, where the CPDP's manoeuvres could potentially result in more harm than good. The CPDP maintained its resolve and continued to plead with the UN to renew its invitation to Galvão and secure his safe passage to New York. For this, Águas sought the favour of his powerful American friends, some of whom were already involved in the international fight against Salazar and his colonial empire.

Squeezed between the African-Asian bloc's demands for Galvão to be allowed in the United States on UN business, and Nogueira's assurance that Portugal would seek his extradition once he landed in that country, American officials decided to delay Galvão's arrest until after his address. After many months of negotiations, Galvão finally arrived in New York on December 9, 1963, and immediately delivered his speech at the UN's Trusteeship Council. For two and half hours, the former colonial officer expressed his controversial views on the Portuguese empire, arguing that African "tribal peoples" were not prepared for peaceful democratic self-rule, mostly because Salazar had corrupted Portugal's emancipatory humanist mission. He also argued that African nationalist rebels were harbingers of Soviet neo-colonialism, and that the only solution to end the colonial wars and bring forth the independence of Portugal's African colonies was for democracy to return to Lisbon. While consistent with his previous statements, well known to the Portuguese opposition, Galvão's testimony infuriated the African delegation, which voted to strike it from the record. An Algerian UN delegate speaking to the press afterwards described Galvão's appearance as "a mountain giving birth to a mouse;" a headline repeated in the pro-Salazar press. As American officials had hoped, Galvão returned to Brazil the next day, before the courts could process a warrant for his arrest.

996 Letter, Arajary Campos, Movimento Nacional Independente, to E. Covas, July 17, 1963 (m.t.), SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u.i. 7307, Comité Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTF.
997 Among these were Roger N. Baldwin, founder of the American Civil Liberties Union and the International League for the Rights of Man; George Houser of the American Committee on Africa; and U.S. congressmen (letter, E. Covas to Manuel Serqueira, Montreal, March 26, 1962; A. O. Águas to George M. Houser, ACA, April 19, 1962, CD25A-CPDP).
The CPDP continued to endorse Galvão after this and Águas continued to translate and forward the captain's political essays to American politicians and press, particularly the New York magazine *Ibérica*, published by the exiled Spanish socialist Victoria Kent. However, in the mid-1960s, the older liberal-republican opposition, now gathered around the Social-Democratic Action, was beginning to lose momentum as their former socialist allies achieved greater notoriety with their new Portuguese Socialist Action (which became the PS in 1973) led by former DDS and FPLN members, including future Prime Minister Mário Soares.

Around the same time, questions about the deteriorating health of the CPDP's 72-year-old leader began to emerge among his supporters. Poor returns from Águas' investments in Portugal also began to take a toll on his personal finances. At this point he asked Galvão to convince his associates in Lisbon to send funds for the CPDP, so they could continue their work in the important American context. The veteran politician also began resenting what he saw was the ingratitude of former business partners and fellow republican exiles in the United States, along with Portuguese-Americans at large, who according to him: "know and feel that Portugal is a pawn of the so-called Democratic powers and feel nothing but indifference or disdain for our People." Águas was equally disillusioned with Portuguese immigrants and their supposed unshakable apathy. This frustration informed his views on Adriano Moreira's "flirting" with the Portuguese-American communities, whose efforts Águas dismissed, believing they would yield little results, since, according to him, the immigrants were "entirely indifferent to the overseas question and even less to Portugal." Having predicted that no more than ten Portuguese-Americans would attend the Lisbon Geographic Society's Congress of 1964, Águas' sense of defeat was likely aggravated once he learned that over fifty of them had been present. Águas' personal and political fatigue became even greater after his long-time confidant and CPDP legal advisor, Aristides A. Andrade, an American-raised Portuguese lawyer in Taunton, passed away in June 1964.

Finally, in 1965, the U.S. Department of Justice forced the CPDP to close its doors following a long investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on their

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1000 Raby, 1988, 234; Rosas, 1993, 542.
1001 Questioned by a FBI agent in June 1964, João Rocha opined that Águas' financial ruin was the real reason why he opposed Salazar and fought to install a democratic regime in Portugal, where he could recover his former prestige and fortune (FBI report, June 19, 1964, SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u.i. 7307, Comité Pro-Democrata e Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).
1002 Letters, A. O. Águas to E. Covas, August 27 and October 21, 1964, CD25A-CPDP.
activities, discussed later in this chapter. The CPDP reopened some time after this and continued to lead the anti-Salazar opposition in the United States, but they would never again achieve the same notoriety as when they brought Galvão to New York.1004

**Portuguese "anti-fascists" in Canada: the Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association and the Movimento Democrático Português**

Founded on September 15, 1959, the Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association (Canadian Portuguese Democratic Committee until 1962) was the second Portuguese association to open in Toronto and one of its most enduring, lasting until 2007. For nearly fifty years, its various executives reshaped its political views and activities while remaining faithful to its "anti-fascist" roots. The majority of its members were migrant labourers from the mainland, almost all men,1005 some having gone into exile after Delgado's campaign. There were a few professionals among them, including the founding president Fernando Ciriaco da Cunha, an agricultural engineer and former bureaucrat who arrived in Canada with his wife and children in 1957. In an open letter to Salazar, where he criticized the dictator and announced his support for Delgado, Ciriaco described his life growing up under the Estado Novo. He recalled joining the Moçidade Portuguesa as a child in Lisbon, marching in parades and shouting at the top of his lungs, with his arm raised in fascist salute. He had praised Salazar for sparing Portugal the horrors of the Second World War and joined the União Nacional. But when the world began learning of the barbarities committed under Hitler's and Mussolini's rule, Ciriaco started noticing similarities with Salazar, recognizing the dictatorship as a "caricature" of the Nazi and Fascist regimes.1006

Ciriaco was a municipal worker before leaving Portugal. In 1943, at age 22, he became a technocrat in the Belgian Congo's colonial government, where he learned about the struggles of African peoples for self-determination.1007 Four year later, Ciriaco left for Colombia, where he worked for Rojas Pinillas's authoritarian government, becoming one of the dictator's "closest advisors" on matters of agriculture and colonization. Again he saw glimpses of Salazar's "rotten" government as he "learnt how dictatorships were installed and maintained." In 1957, Ciriaco

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1004 At the time of my research, the CPDP's records in the CD25A pertaining to 1966-84 were not yet available for consultation.
1005 The PCDA's original structure included a Feminine Relations sub-committee, apparently constituted by the members' wives; there is no mention of their activities in the record. Only after 1974 did women begin joining the PCDA in larger numbers and assuming a more prominent role in the organization.
1006 Open letter to Salazar, F. C. da Cunha, October 1959 (m.t.), F0579, 2009-022/003 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
moved to Brazil and worked for a short period as an economist in the oil sector, until he finally moved to Canada, where he was hired as an administrator of "one of Canada's largest firms." Once in Toronto, he organized the few political exiles in the city and began corresponding with Delgado, Galvão and other leaders of the opposition in exile on a regular basis.

Unlike its president, most of the PCDA's members were labourers without steady income. As Ciriaco explained to Galvão, justifying the modest donation made to the captain’s recently inaugurated radio broadcast in Caracas: “it’s on those [sojourners] that we count to raise funds for our activities, but only when they return at the end of summer. Here it's like the African hinterland, money is earned when isolation is greater and saved because there is nowhere to spend it.” Still, they were generous with their money more often than not, responding positively to funding requests from fellow exiles around the world. The majority of the PCDA's members lived in the working-class downtown neighbourhood of Kensington Market or the suburb of Scarborough. Ciriaco, on the other hand, kept a distance from the Portuguese community. In a letter to Galvão, he argued that Portuguese immigrants were “trained to follow others, not think for themselves,” and that they were led by incompetent leaders who spent their time and energy fighting each other. He concluded, the best way to consolidate his committee was to avoid appearing in public and live far from the "colony," with which he remained connected through his collaborators: "This way I maintain my personal prestige and prevent the possibility of them trying to involve me in hearsay and gossip.”

The PCDA sought to expand its membership beyond Toronto. In 1960, they ran a membership drive in Northern Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. That same year, Ciriaco encouraged Portuguese democrats in Montreal to create their own anti-Salazar committee and sought potential leaders. In his view, the Estado Novo's fall was imminent and there was urgent need to launch a "campaign of democratic instruction among Portuguese immigrants," in order to prepare them for the post-dictatorial future.

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1008 Letters, from F. C. da Cunha to João A. das Neves, Portugal Democrático, São Paulo, December 4, 1959; and to H. Galvão, March 05, 1960 (m.t.), F0579, 2009-022/003 (4) & .../002 (1), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
1009 List of names and addresses; letters, F. C. da Cunha to H. Galvão, Caracas, March 31 and June 21, 1960 (m.t.); Suzana Torres, Tangier, to F. C. da Cunha, April 7, 1960; F. C. da Cunha to Casa dos Portugueses, Montreal, January 23, 1962; F. A. Oliveira to José A. Reis, São Paulo, April 4, 1963 F0579 2009-022/002 (1) .../003 (1 & 5) PCDA fonds, CTASC.
1010 Letters from F. C. da Cunha to Américo Marques, February 2, 1960; João Alves das Neves, June 25, 1960; and Guilherme Manaças, Montreal, April 11, 1960 (m.t.), F0579 2009-022/003 (1 & 3), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
In 1961, Henrique Bello founded the MDP (Casa dos Portugueses until 1964), whose anti-Salazarist credentials Ciriaco later confirmed (Figure 57-58). According to the consul in Montreal, the MDP was initially composed primarily of former government workers; later they attracted political exiles and war resisters who began arriving in that city in larger numbers in the 1960s. Many of these newcomers brought considerable militant experience from Portugal, like Maximino Serra and Mavilio Mendes, who participated in the Beja assault and managed to escape to Morocco, where they departed for Montreal; or Eugénio Vargas, a former member of Delgado's renegade Front in Rabat, who arrived in Montreal in 1965. Others were PCP militants, like the previously mentioned Domingos Costa Gomes and Jaime Monteiro. Others still were liberal professionals, like Rui Cunha Viana, a journalist and former newspaper owner from Lisbon, who also immigrated in 1965.

Ciriaco started corresponding with Delgado and Galvão a few months before the *Santa Maria* highjack, which would put him and his fellow "anti-fascists" in Toronto and Montreal on the front pages of Canada's mainstream press (Figure 59). Canadians were delighted to read about "freedom fighting pirates" eluding American, British, and Portuguese warships, planes, and submarines; as a reporter called it: a "real-life Errol Flynn drama." The newspapers *Toronto Daily Star* and *Globe & Mail* ran the story for 16 days, dedicating many cover pages, editorials, and illustrations to it. At one point, the *Star* had seven reporters stationed in Portugal, Brazil, Angola, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Puerto Rico, covering what one of the journalists described was “one of the biggest [stories] of the decade.”

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1011 According to Firmino M. Rita, Bello had been a member of *Movimento Unidade Democrática*’s youth wing (letter, F. M. Rita, Montreal, to F. C. da Cunha, March 30, 1960, FO0579, 2009-022/003 (3), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
1012 Report, Consul Artur Nogueira, "Panorama da Colónia Portuguesa de Montreal, February 18, 1961, to PMFA, PEA M400, Colónia Portuguesa. Visita do Embaixador Dr. Eduardo Brazão às Comunidades Portuguesas do Canadá, AHD.
1013 After the failed takeover of the Beja military barracks, the Lisboner Maximino Rosa Serra - whose brother, Manuel Serra, was one of the leaders of the assault - and his Madeiran comrade Mavilio J. F. Mendes managed to flee to the coastal village of Santa Cruz, where they stole a light aircraft from the local flight club and flew to Albufera, in the Algarve. There they refueled the aircraft and continued on to Tanger, Morocco, where they were granted political asylum. From there the two escapees later moved to Montreal with UN passports (investigator notes, October 21, 1963, SC, E/GT 144, n.t. 1436, Maximino Rosa Serra, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).
1014 Letter, from "the Agent" (illegible signature), to PIDE, November 18, 1965, SC, CI (2), pr. 4779, u.i. 7370, Movimento Democrático Português, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
1015 Born in Setúbal to a syndicalist and pamphleteer father, Jaime Monteiro (1924-2012) developed his proletarian consciousness early in life. Feeling politically beset in Portugal, he left his comfortable job in a brewery after seeing an ad asking for tradesmen to go to Canada who could speak any of the official languages. Monteiro passed PIDE's screening with forged papers and landed in Montreal as a fake professional painter, along with his wife Elvira T. C. da Fonseca and two children, in May 1963. There he opened a furniture store and joined Bello's group, with whom he founded the *Club Portugal de Montréal*; he also became a regular contributor for the *Luso-Canadiano*. In the late 1960s Monteiro moved to Toronto and joined the PCDA.
conservative *Toronto Telegram*, who had been recently arrested in Lisbon for taking pictures of Portugal's crumbling Air Force equipment, wished "good luck to the pirates."\(^{1017}\) Audiences were drawn by such emphatic headlines as: “Pirates Capture Liner;” “Atom Sub in Chase. Still Won’t Surrender;” “The Pirate Captain Says: ‘Salazar’s a Portuguese Hitler’;” and oddities like “8-Year-Old Has Plan for Capture;” or “Newsmen ‘Chute to Ship, Land in Ocean.” Torontonians were reeled further into the drama when reading: “Toronto Man’s Brother in Crew of Santa Maria;” “Pirate Chief has Friends in Toronto;” or “Pirate War Reaches Our Bay St.”

Anti-Salazarists in Toronto and Montreal received major exposure, as they became the official spokespersons for Delgado and Galvão in Canada. In an interview to the *Star*, Delgado saluted his “loyal followers” in Montreal; a few days later, the same newspaper published an exclusive message from the general to all Canadians: “This is the first step for Liberation of the slavery which dominates our beloved Portugal.” The *Telegram* also mentioned the fact that Delgado had been a supporter of Salazar until he worked in Montreal and Washington, during which time he learnt what "true democracy" was. Another article reported that Delgado's message had been read to about a hundred Portuguese supporters gathered at a joint meeting of the PCDA and the FPCC. Reporters at this event interviewed Ciriaco, whom they introduced as "a long-time personal friend" of Delgado and Galvão, and the only man in Canada who knew the rebel's real objectives and destination; “but he’s not telling.” Ciriaco did tell the reporter he had been informed of Galvão’s plan in a telephone conversation with his brother in São Paulo. He also explained that the PCDA's mission was to prepare Portuguese immigrants in Canada for their transition to democracy.\(^{1018}\)

In Montreal, a small group of demonstrators, organized by Bello, picketed the American consulate on January 25, to protest the U.S. Navy's pursuit of the *Santa Maria*; they rallied again three days later outside the Portuguese consulate. Interviewed by Montreal's *The Gazette*, Consul Artur Nogueira dismissed the "negligible" number of protesters (15 in the first rally and 40 in the second), most of which, he claimed, were "intellectuals", none of them Azorean, and some Spanish exiles. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some of the consul's allies in the

\(^{1017}\) "Police-Victim Says: ‘Good Luck to Pirates’", *Toronto Telegram*, January 26, 1961, Scott Library, York University, microfilm.

Portuguese community publicly dismissed Bello's legitimacy, pointing out that the vast majority did not share his views; Artur Ribeiro of the *Voz de Portugal* even argued that Bello had lost the right to debate Portugal's domestic politics since he was now a Canadian citizen.1019

Similar yet larger rallies were also held in Toronto, organized by the PCDA, including a drive-by protest in front of Consul António Patrício's residence in the posh suburb of Forest Hill, and an evening one in front of the Portuguese consulate on Bay St., in the heart of Toronto's financial district. The latter was scheduled to coincide with the arrival of a pro-Salazar delegation delivering a petition to Consul Patrício, signed by 714 people pledging their support for regime. The petition was organized by the 30-year-old immigrant Renato Graça of Hamilton, with the aid of Portuguese priests. They mobilized people from Hamilton, Galt, Oshawa, and Toronto, who arrived carrying placards reading: “Delgado and Galvão are vampires” or “Send pirates to Russia where they belong.” Graça deplored the slanted media coverage of the *Santa Maria* crisis, which made it seem as if the majority of Portuguese opposed Salazar. He confessed being emotional when seeing so many of his fellow immigrants answer his call, adding: "This shows the Canadian press Portugal has freedom. It shows the government has support.” The number of Salazar's loyalists reported to be present varied drastically, from 1,000 according to *Daily Star*, 700 in the *Telegram*, to only 200 in the *Globe & Mail*. This display of loyalty climaxed when Consul Patrício descended to the lobby, stood up on a chair and waved to the crowd, which responded with loud cheers.1020 But contrary to Graça’s intentions, the main story in the papers the next day was not the strength of the pro-Salazar camp but its violent reaction to their pro-democrat co-nationals.

The PCDA’s motorcade counted 17 cars sporting signs and flags, which honked their horns as they drove past the consulate. When the motorcade came around a second time, a large number of pro-Salazar supporters, "many of them women carrying babies," blocked the cars' passage. Some of the Salazarists began kicking, rattling, and eventually flipping one of the vehicles (Figure 60-61). One of the democrats was punched through his car window, while other angry loyalists tried to poke their opponents with their own flagpoles. Some of the democrats


responded by jumping out of their cars and getting into fistfights. Leading the motorcade was Ciriaco's car, carrying his wife and children, who shouted "Polícia! Polícia!" as the PCDA's president drove away through a dodging crowd. Meanwhile, as a Star reporter noted: “100 feet away, in an elegant restaurant, diners quietly continued eating as the battle raged outside.” After ten minutes, the Toronto police arrived and dispersed the "mob", arresting two pro-Salazar supporters, released shortly after; the Portuguese government would later pay for these men's court expenses. According to Consul Patrício, the police failed to identify who had caused damage to the cars, "thanks to the spirit of national solidarity in the colony"; in his eyes, this was a tremendous defeat for the PCDA.

The Bay St. riot gave Canadians a clear example of how foreign politics of apparently no direct concern to them could have an impact on their cities through immigrant communities. But judging from the absence of letters to the editor and opinion columns following the incident, Torontonians, much like the undisturbed diners, did not seem greatly alarmed. The reason may be because they had a chance to learn about Portuguese politics and the rebels’ struggle for democracy through the Santa Maria coverage; they could identify the camps and comprehend the issues. For those enthralled by the modern buccaneer saga, the Bay St. riot may have simply spiced up a story that kept rewarding them.

The only critical reaction to this violent incident was a small piece in the Star called "The Newcomers". Its author asked: “Why a riot over Portuguese politics on lower Bay St.? ...Why don’t they get this excited over Diefenbaker versus Pearson?” The reporter quoted a Department of Citizenship and Immigration officer who remarked: “They chose this country. They came here, but they refuse to look upon it as a home. We try to stress Canada is their new home during occasional lectures at the International Institute.” The journalist then asked Ciriaco to explain what was the point of demonstrating over Portuguese politics on the streets of Toronto, and what the protesters had meant by "our country", to which he responded: “I gave moral support to [Galvão] as I would to any democratic movement in the world.” Also interviewed was António Vaz, one of the democrats assaulted during the protest, who explained he had decided to join

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1022 António Pereira Vaz was born in Idanha-a-Nova, on the central region bordering Spain. After living in Lisbon for a few years, he moved to Toronto in 1955, at age 26, where he worked as a tool and die maker. Vaz later became a community worker and civic leader, volunteering as an interpreter at St. Christopher House; advocating for urban preservation as the co-founder of
the motorcade because that would have been impossible in Salazar's Portugal: "Here I am free, and I want the Portuguese to be as free as we are in Canada." Both men said they were planning to obtain Canadian citizenship and rejected the implication that a concern for homeland politics precluded a sense of belonging to Canada. Instead, their struggle for democracy in Portugal was a tribute to Canada's fundamental values and active citizenship. Furthermore, the PCDA promoted naturalization among Portuguese immigrants in Toronto and Montreal, in collaboration with the DCI and the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto. Still, according to Consul Patricio, a DCI senior officer advised Ciriaco after the Santa Maria protests that it was "in his best interests" to abstain from getting involved in Portuguese politics in Canada.1023

The Santa Maria saga was the backdrop for the coalescing of Portuguese "anti-fascists" in Montreal, leading to the inauguration of the MDP (Figure 62). Around the same time, Bello also founded the Canada Movement for Freedom in Portugal and Colonies, gathering various influential Canadian individuals and organizations, including the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation national leader Hazen R. Argue, the president of the Canadian Labour Congress Claude Jodoin, as well as journalists, authors, student leaders and other left-wing activists. Its goal was to "muster interest for the Portuguese case among the greatest possible number of Canadian entities and organizations, and at the same time contradict... the SNI's notorious propaganda campaign." In August 1961, Bello attended the NDP's founding convention in Ottawa and secured their commitment (and that of the Canadian Labour Congress) to fight for the rights of the people of Portugal and its African colonies, particularly the right to free trade unions.1024

In 1963, Ciriaco moved to Ottawa after accepting a job in the federal government. Replacing him as president of the PCDA was its co-founder Firmino Alexandre de Oliveira. The new leader had escaped to Canada in 1959 after an acquaintance reported him to PIDE for supporting Delgado's presidential bid. Oliveira was committed to expanding the PCDA's social...
services in partnership with the International Institute and the DCI, and changed its by-laws to reflect a more social, educational, and cultural role, while keeping its "anti-fascist" spirit. Under him, the PCDA continued to picket the Portuguese consulate and attract the press' attention. However, Oliveira tried to improve relations with the young Consul Jorge Ritto, even warning him of upcoming PCDA demonstrations and asking the consul not to take them personally.1025

In 1964, Oliveira yielded his presidency to Guilherme Antunes dos Santos, a recent migrant who had impressed the PCDA's membership with his articulate left-wing critique of the Estado Novo during community events. That year, Oliveira co-organized with the consul a screening of a state-sponsored film about Angola. At the end of the show, Santos delivered a lengthy attack on the regime, during which Consul Ritto and Oliveira left the room. The latter's solidarity with the consul caused a rift between him and the other PCDA members, ultimately leading the former president to sever ties with the association.1026 Oliveira later became the president of the FPCC and opened his own travel agency, which had business dealings with the SNI/SEIT.

Under Santos, the PCDA shifted farther to left and became affiliated with the FPLN, although it continued to correspond with Delgado and Galvão. In November 1964, the PCDA launched its bulletin The Truth/ A Verdade, distributed across Canada, the United States (including California), and other Portuguese expatriate communities.1027 The small newsletter published communiqués from the FPLN, African liberation movements, and other anti-Salazar organizations around the world; news about the plight of political prisoners in Portugal; transcriptions of critical articles published in the mainstream press; and commentary from PCDA members, many of them with a clear Marxist bent.1028 From its pages we learn the PCDA considered its political struggle in the "unsuitable terrain" of immigration to be "an arduous one", and believed expatriates had forgotten about their social and political ills in Portugal after achieving some financial comfort in Canada; a complaint repeated often by other Portuguese

1027 Its December 1964 issue mentioned a circulation of "close to a thousand" copies per issue, anticipating an increase in the near future (A Verdade, n. 5, F0579, 2009-022/001 (9), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
1028 “Perspectiva Socialista Para o Portugal de Amanhã,” A Verdade, n. 11, October 1965, 3-5; and “A Canadian Socialist Viewpoint on Portugal,” The Truth, n. 4, May 1965, 7-8, F0579, 2009-022/001 (10), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
exiles in North America.1029 A Verdade's first editorial remarked: "Those living abroad, who enjoy a material situation they could never had in their homeland, must... open their brain to the truth and not be afraid to fight for her."1030

While the PCDA hoped to raise the immigrants' political consciousness, their tone was patronizing, judgmental, and ultimately alienating. This was especially the case when it came to the Azorean majority, seen by Portuguese exiles in North America as a major reactionary force; in a letter to Delgado, Oliveira blamed the Bay St. riot on the "ignorance of the Micaelense majority." When Portuguese "anti-fascists" in Canada invited Galvão to visit their communities in 1964, his associates in the United States convinced the captain to decline, given the organizers' socialist tendencies and the predominance of "hostile" Azoreans in their communities.1031 In an attempt to reach out to that section of the community, A Verdade published an "Open Letter to a Portuguese of the Azores". In it, the PCDA invited Azoreans to join in their fight for democracy and integrate into Canadian life, where men with "a solid Christian moral foundation" knew real freedom. To remove any misgivings, the authors added:

I know when I speak to you about “integrating into Canadian life” that you confuse it with Portuguese “denationalization,” and when you speak of “Salazar” you believe to be speaking of “Portugal.” (...). The bad formation of your mentality, in respect to the interpretation of these two words, is no fault of your own, but that of… the mainland fascists, who introduced in the humble milieu in which you lived... an absurd and false mystic that Portugal is Salazar.1032

On another occasion, A Verdade published a note from a disgruntled community member asking to have his name removed from the subscription list, who observed: "If you don’t have anything better to do then go work with a pike and shovel as I do. Please wipe your ? [sic] with the papers.” The editors took offence and criticized the man for his rudeness, and asserted their own intellectual superiority over Salazar’s "illiterate" supporters. Another person circulated an open letter in the community criticizing the PCDA for their harsh response to the "poor illiterate" immigrant. A Verdade then responded by warning about the "heavy costs" awaiting those who criticized the PCDA, and published a lengthy response to their "fascist" detractor, highlighting every grammatical and semantic imprecision in his letter. Despite their aggressive

1029 In a letter to António Abrantes, dated April 26, 1961, Eduardo Covas expressed the same frustration about the supposed self-centered political indifference of Portuguese immigrants in the U.S. (CD25A-CPDP).
1030 “Primeiro Passo,” A Verdade, n.1, Nov.1964, 2 (m.t.) & n. 10, July 1965, 4, F0579, 2009-022/001 (9 & 10), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
1032 The authors also stated that an Azorean was "as a good a Portuguese as those born in Mainland Portugal," and promised to "come out swinging, fighting the deprecators, seeking to elucidate them on anything that pertains to the Azores" ("Carta Aberta a Um Portugês dos Açores,” A Verdade, n. 4, December 1964, 11-12 (m.t.), F0579, 2009-022/001 (9), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
condescension, the editors pointed out to its readers that *A Verdade* was put together by miners, peasants, construction workers and other proletarians.  

As previously mentioned, the most popular anti-Salazar literature available to Portuguese readers in Toronto and Montreal was the *Portugal Democrático* and *Luso-Canadiano* newspapers. Portuguese in Canada could also tune into the FPLN's broadcast Radio Voice of Freedom, transmitted twice a week from Algiers.  All of these outlets published or broadcast messages from the PCDA and MDP. Until the 1960s, the distribution of censored press and works of literature from Portugal, mostly by leftist neorealist authors, were the only cultural activities carried by these "anti-fascists" in Canada, who loathed the SNI's propaganda and its folksy expressions of popular culture.

In 1965, the PCDA began making preparations to receive Delgado in May, after the general accepted their invitation. Following the news of his disappearance in Spain, where he was said to be incarcerated, the PCDA sent a member to Europe and North Africa to learn more about what had happened. In the meantime, the MDP and the PCDA picketed Portuguese and Spanish diplomatic offices in Montreal, Toronto, and Ottawa, demanding Delgado's release. The rallies, which gathered crowds in the hundreds, including Spanish exiles, Canadian university students, and other activists, again attracted the media's attention. By May, it was apparent that Delgado was in fact dead. The PCDA, which a few months earlier expected to cheer Delgado's arrival in Toronto, now demonstrated outside the Portuguese consulate on Bay St. to protest the assassination of "Portugal's legitimate president".  

The anti-Salazar movement in Toronto, which had expanded until this point, began splintering along ideological lines, as the PCDA's reputation in the local and larger exiled communities became associated with the far-left. The PCDA continued to advocate the unity of all "anti-fascists", though criticizing democratic actions of the "Platonic kind", in the belief that only an armed revolt could bring down the regime. In June 1965, Henrique Cerqueira,

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1034 "Radio Voz da Liberdade", *A Verdade*, October-November, 1966 (m.t.), F0579, 2009-022/001 (12), PCDA fonds, CTASC.


1036 A short time before Delgado was killed, the PCDA had committed its "absolute support" for the general's intended revolutionary coup, which he claimed to be planning (*A Verdade: Reafirmação*, n. 7, April 1965, 15 (m.t.); and n. 8, May 1965, 7-8, F0579, 2009-022/001 (9), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
Delgado's polemical aide, visited Toronto on a mission to reveal information on the general's murder and gather financial support to carry on his revolutionary plans. That summer, Cerqueira was able to convince a number of Portuguese in the city to donate close to $3,000 CAD for a supposed revolutionary action in the works. Seeing that the PCDA's leaders were unconvinced by his revolutionary promises and conspiracy allegations, Cerqueira and a group of dissident members he had met in Morocco began attacking the association's executives, accusing them of being communist and therefore having responsibilities in Delgado's death. In the eyes of president Guilherme Santos, who was also victim of personal attacks, Cerqueira had reaped the benefits of the PCDA's patient work in the community, where they had cultivated a revolutionary spirit among Portuguese expatriates that was now wrecked. After reporting these incidents to the FPLN and asking for their help in exposing Cerqueira as an "agent provocateur", Piteira Santos concluded the two organizations should tighten their relationship in order to ensure the PCDA did not to "fall in the hands of dubious elements."  

The MDP had its own problems with members arrived from Rabat, including president Eugénio Vargas, whose political objectives were obscure to the PCDA and FPLN, other than the fact that he had no interest in being "too active", fearing exposing its members' identities. In the summer of 1965, the Montreal group stopped communicating with their allies in Toronto and Algiers, until July 1966, at which point Neves Rodrigues, the Luso-Canadiano's former editor, took the helm of the MDP and reconnected with the PCDA and FPLN.

In January 1966, Júlio Ricardo Félix, a cabinetmaker and PCP militant from Caldas da Rainha, replaced Guilherme Santos as the PCDA's president, after the latter left the association following a disagreement over a seemingly minor issue related to its by-laws. It is not clear

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1037 For reasons apparently related to Cerqueira's conspiracy theories surrounding Delgado's death, four people were expelled from the PCDA after clashing with other members. Two of them, Mavílio Mendes and José D. do Vale, had come from Morocco where they met Cerqueira; another claimed to know of a PIDE infiltrator in the PCDA but failed to submit evidence; and another got into a minor scuffle with Guilherme Santos. The latter was also the target of open letters circulated in the community attacking his moral virtue and commenting on his private affairs (communiqué, PCDA, May 28, 1965; open letter, Luis Vasconcelos, Scarborough, 7 June 1965; F0579, 2009-022/003 (8 & 14), .../005 (7), PCDA fonds, CTASC).


1039 Letters, G. A. Santos to FPLN-JRN, July 31, August 31, and December 16, 1965; F. P. Santos to PCDA, March 11, and May 9 1966; and J. N. Rodrigues to PCDA, July 18, 1966, F0579, 2009-022/002 (10), .../003 (8), .../004 (17), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

1040 In an interview for a Portuguese-Canadian magazine two decades later, Joaquim Alves (G. A. Santos' vice-president) recalled that Santos was expelled after he was found to be a "PIDE agent". I found no evidence corroborating Alves' statement. However, it is clear there were other reasons for his "removal", which the new executive was careful not to mention in their correspondence, other than saying that further details were best discussed in person ("Origens da Portuguese Can. Democratic
what happened to Santos between then and July 28, 1968, when he was arrested at Lisbon's airport for "activities against the security of the State;" he was released eight days later. The new president reinforced the PCDA's ties with the FPLN, which expressed interest in intensifying its presence in Canada, one of the few NATO countries to assume "critical and reserved attitudes” towards Salazar. This partnership would produce the fourth international conference on Portuguese political prisoners, held in Toronto on October 28-30, 1966 - the first three being held in São Paulo (1960), Montevideo (1961), and Paris (1962).

After Portugal's colonialism, PIDE's powers to arbitrarily detain, torture, and trample on the human rights of political opponents was the aspect of the dictatorship that drew most international condemnation. After the 1962 university strikes, when a large number of students were arrested and sent to fight in Africa, fellow academics around the world held solidarity protests. The expulsion and occasional arrest of Canadian Protestant missionaries in Portugal and Angola, who criticized the colonial government or associated with anti-colonialist rebels, was another issue enraging Canadian public opinion. Furthermore, according to Ambassador Brazão, in October 1966, the embassy in Ottawa received an average of 20 letters per day from various parts of Canada protesting the arrest of Canadian Jehovah's Witnesses' in Portugal.

Since its creation, the PCDA had concerned itself with the plight of political detainees and raised funds for their families in Portugal. For example, their 1966 Christmas campaign raised $385 from 125 donors; donations grew to $611 in 1973. Some donations came from remote places like Kitimat and Louis Creek, in the interior of British Columbia. These were small but heartfelt contributions, as was the case with a Portuguese immigrant in Griffith, Ontario, who wrote: "Me and another friend send five das each with our best intentions. I...
apologise for it being so little. I ask that my name is not mentioned to avoid complications with my wife."

The three-day Canadian Conference for Amnesty in Portugal took many months to prepare. The MDP provided logistical support and sent a delegation, while the Luso-Canadiano acted as the conference's official organ. Funding, delegates, and propaganda material also came from exiled organizations in other countries, the most substantial coming from the FPLN. The latter's know-how was also indispensable to the organizers, who appealed to their allies in Algiers to send someone experienced, since they were all workers with admittedly little more than a primary instruction. From Paris, the FPLN sent Silas Cerqueira, a PCP militant exiled in France, and one of the organizers of the pro-amnesty conference in that city. He dedicated his month and a half vacation from his job as a research assistant at Sorbonne University to prepare the Toronto conference, coordinating its media outreach and connecting with Canadian politicians and activists. Silas Cerqueira was able to count on the prestige of the Paris conference, which had been attended by such distinguished personalities as Bertrand Russell and the former President of France Vincent Auriol.

The CPDP, which had eschewed the Paris conference due to its organizer's affiliation with the far left, initially abstained from supporting the PCDA's efforts. The Newark group had begun exchanging correspondence with fellow anti-Salazarists in Canada in July 1961. Some time after that, Águas concluded his fellow exiles to the north were poor allies since they sided with the "philo-communists" of São Paulo and had not lived in North America long enough to fully understand its politics. Still, after meeting with CPDP representatives in New York, Silas Cerqueira, who visited that city to study the possibility of sending a delegation to the UN, convinced Águas' group to send financial aid (a meager $45) to the Toronto organizers; he was, however, unable to dispel their misgivings about the FPLN and its associates in Canada.

While the PCDA and FPLN were the main organizers of this conference, they chose to work behind the scenes and leave the spotlight to a Canadian committee chaired by the United

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1046 I tried to replicate the grammar mistakes in the original Portuguese version (letter, Manuel B. Oliveira, Griffith, ON, to PCDA, October 13, 1966, F0579, 2009-022004 (04), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
1047 The PCDA tried to muster the support of like-minded Portuguese in Canada and launched a fundraiser, to which at least 142 people contributed a total of $720, many of them anonymously.
1048 Letters, G. V. Kimball's to prospective sponsors, May 5, 1966; PCDA to FPLN May 7, 1966; Silas Cerqueira to PCDA, August 25, 1966; F0579, 2009-022/002 (10), .../004 (19), .../005 (2), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
1050 Letters, J. R. Félix, PCDA, to Comissão de Apoio à FPLN c/o Port. Democrático, São Paulo, October 7, 1966; A. O. Águas to PCDA, October 17, 1966; and E. Covas to PCDA, November 14, 1966, F0579, 2009-022/004 (9 & 10) PCDA fonds, CTASC.
Church minister G. V. Kimball. By presenting it as a "Canadian" event, they hoped to avoid a purely "ethnic" connotation. They also tried to deflect the partisan and ideological labels ascribed by the Portuguese consul and his allies in the community by emphasizing the fact that PIDE imprisoned dissidents of all political stripes, including Catholic activists. The organizers stressed this was not a "political" conference but one that dealt with human rights' violations, which "interests all citizens of any country." As the organizers explained: “It’s precisely because it is a Canadian Conference, with important Canadian personalities, that it has more value and projection, and can compel authorities in Portugal to free political prisoners.”

Their strategy was successful, since a large number of Canadian dignitaries endorsed the conference, including federal and provincial party leaders and members of parliament, distinguished civil servants, union leaders, activists, journalists, authors, intellectuals, and artists.

The esteemed Canadian journalist and author Pierre Berton chaired the conference, which was officially inaugurated by Toronto's mayoral candidate William Dennison (Figures 63-64). Federal MPs Andrew Brewin and David MacDonald spoke of their recent visit to Portugal, where they had secretly met with various dissident lawyers, students, doctors, journalists, and the families of political prisoners. The FPLN delegation - composed of Rui Cabeçadas and Pedro Ramos de Almeida from Algiers, and Vítor Ramos and Assenção Neves from São Paulo - reminded Canadians that it was the tacit support of leading Western nations

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1051 Editorial, *A Verdade*, n. 15, August 8, 1966 (m.t.), F0579 2009-022/001 (12), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
1052 Among the conference sponsors were: NDP national leader Thomas C. Douglas; federal MPs Andrew Brewin (NDP), Barry Maher (NDP), and David MacDonald (Progressive Conservative); Ontario MPP James Renwick (NDP); Quebec Socialist Party president Jean-Marie Bedard; former diplomat and civil servant Hugh L. Keenleyside; United Auto Workers director George Burt; Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec vice-president Fernand Daoust; LIUNA-Local 183 founder Gerry Gallagher; feminist activist and Voice of Women president Thérèse Casgrain; Amnesty International representative Kathleen Savan; journalist and author Pierre Berton; author John R. Colombo; literary theorist Northrop Frye; historians William M. Kilbourn and Kenneth W. McNaught; political scientist Crawford B. Macpherson; mathematician Chandler Davis; comedian and television personality Dave Broadfoot, and many others. The majority of them did not attend the conference (*A Verdade*, n. 14 June-July 1966 & n. 16, October-November 1966, 6-8, F0579, 2009-022/001 (12), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
1053 In June 1971, when the PCDA protested the ceremonial raising of the Portuguese flag by Consul Martins at Toronto's City Hall, then Mayor Dennison asked the demonstrators to: "Leave your differences behind you... Start out afresh to do something for yourselves." Offended by the Mayor's remark, the PCDA released the statement: "Is it not sufficient proof [of] our participation in the life of this hospitable country that received us... the fact that we use the democratic laws we now enjoy to express our contempt for the Caetano Regime? A regime that has time and again been condemned by most United Nations members, Canada included, for not heeding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? ...Our Portuguese democratic members do not intend to be only recognized as hard working, honest and law-abiding people. We intend to participate in a world where all are able to live freely and democratically" (*O Boletim*, Year 1, ns. 9-10, June-July 1971, 11, F0579, 2009-022/001 (13), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
1054 Outside the House of Commons, Brewin was a lawyer with experience on deportation matters - in the 1940s he represented Japanese-Canadians contesting the federal government's deportation orders - and MacDonald was a United Church minister.
1055 The opposition's presidential candidate (1951) Prof. Ruy Luís Gomes and Cmdr. João Sarmento Pimentel, both exiled in Brazil, were supposed to attend the conference but they were denied travel documents by the Brazilian government (telegram, Ambassador E. Brazão to PMFA, October 31, 1966. PEA M533, Política Interna e Externa de Portugal. Conferência Amnistia aos Presos Políticos Portugueses....AHD).
that enabled Salazar’s "fascist" dictatorship to carry on with its human rights abuses in Portugal and Africa.\footnote{A Ve\textit{r}dade, n. 16, October-November, 1966, F0579, 2009-022/001 (12), PCDA fonds, CTASC.} One after the other, the speakers\footnote{Among the speakers were the FPLN's Vitor Ramos and Pedro R. de Almeida; the MDP's Domingos C. Gomes; University of Toronto professors Mark MacGuigan, Ronald de Sousa, and Margaret Sears (also the Voice of Women's vice-president); National Lawyers Guild of America representative Max Stein; and United Church missionary W. Sidney Gilchrist.} denounced the lack of civil liberties in Portugal; PIDE's repressive "security measures"; the brutality of the Tarrafa prison camp; Delgado's assassination; the colonial wars; and NATO's provision of weapons to Salazar, along with Canada's role as a Western ally. Various individuals and organizations in Canada and abroad sent messages of support that were read at the event, including Canada's former Prime-Minister John G. Diefenbaker, the philosopher Bertrand Russell, the anti-apartheid activist Bishop Trevor Huddleston of Masani (Tanzania), along with many other personalities, student organizations, labour unions, and exiled groups around the world.

Conference participants approved resolutions condemning the Estado Novo. They decided the organizing committee should remain active as the Canadian Committee for Amnesty in Portugal (CCAP).\footnote{The CCAP was responsible for coordinating material aid to the families of political prisoners in Portugal, informing the Canadian government about human rights abuses in Portugal, and collaborate with similar organizations around the world.} A letter-writing campaign was also launched at the conference, asking Canadians to write Ambassador Brazão and his superiors in Lisbon, demanding amnesty for political prisoners - a month after the conference, over 1,000 people had signed a petition demanding the release of four prisoners.\footnote{The organizers singled out four candidates for amnesty: the student José Bernardino; Sofia Ferreira; Capt. Varela Gomes; and Manuel Serra (the last two involved in the Beja assault). The labour leader José Vitoriano, incarcerated for 16 years with an expired sentence, was in the organizers' original list but was released prior to the conference, in August 1966.} Ten Liberal, NDP, and Progressive Conservative MPs met with Cabeçadas to discuss future collaboration with the FPLN. Brewin and MacDonald presented their findings to the Canadian Department of External Affairs after the conference.\footnote{The two federal MPs responded to Ambassador Brazão's circular accusing them of interfering in Portugal's domestic affairs, arguing they were concerned with "international standards of behavior clearly laid down by a number of international documents, the breach of which transcend matters of merely domestic concern and justify, and indeed demand, appropriate protest." Reporting to Lisbon, Brazão commented the tables could easily be turned "if members of our National Assembly contacted Indians [and] Eskimos in their 'reserves' under the guise of those same [international] principles" (letter, A. Brewin and D. MacDonald to Amb. E. Brazão, October 31, 1966; telegram Amb. E. Brazão to PMFA, November 2, 1966 (m.t.), PEA M533 1966 Política Interna e Externa de Portugal. Conferência Amnistia aos Presos Políticos... AHD).} Finally, a document edited by the law school professor Mark MacGuigan, outlining the different ways in which the regime had violated the UN charter, was submitted to that body's Human Rights Commission and to Prime Minister Pearson; this was followed by a visit from a CCAP delegation to the UN headquarters in New York City.\footnote{Conference proceedings, October 28-30, 1966; CCAP Newsletter, November 29, 1966, CTASC F0579 2009-022/004 (3 & 7), PCDA fonds; telegram, Consul Pedro M. M. C. R. Silva Pinto, Montreal, to PMFA, November 24, 1966, PEA M533, Política Interna e Externa de Portugal. Conferência Amnistia aos Presos Políticos... AHD.}
According to the PCDA, the conference was a "resounding success" and had generated great interest among Portuguese-Canadians, many of whom became involved with the association afterwards. But while the Luso-Canadiano and the Portuguese press in Brazil gave it extensive coverage, the mainstream Canadian media did not. Attendance over the three days of the conference was also lower than anticipated, with an average of 60 people per day. Portuguese diplomats, who expected to do much damage control after the event, were relatively satisfied. Even some Portuguese democrats in Toronto criticized the "extreme" views expressed at the FPLN-dominated conference. One of those was António Vaz, the same who had participated in the PCDA's motorcade in 1961, who wrote Prime Minister Pearson cautioning him against endorsing the conference's resolutions. Vaz introduced himself as "an average Canadian" of Portuguese descent - "but [with] full allegiance to Canada" - who opposed Salazar's assault on civil liberties yet was ambiguous when it came to the dictatorship's methods of fighting communism. He accused the communists of having taken over the conference's supposedly humanitarian agenda to push their ideological message and "bring discredit on the Portuguese government." Despite the diplomats' relatively favourable assessment, the conference clearly irritated Portuguese authorities, since in February 1967, all Canadian citizens who endorsed it were prohibited from entering Portugal; this interdiction would be lifted in January 1968, except for Brewin and MacDonald.

The pro-amnesty conference was the last high profile political action organized by Portuguese opponents in Canada until 1974. After this, the CCAP continued to run its "adopt a prisoner" campaign with relative success, raising funds for political prisoners and their families in Portugal. The PCDA and MDP changed executives in 1967 - the first led by Estevão Gago and the latter by D. Costa Gomes - and started dedicating greater attention to cultural initiatives and
local community affairs. The MDP in particular assumed a more comprehensive role, offering social and cultural programs, including a library; English, French and Portuguese language instruction; gym classes; music lessons; a choir; and a café bar. In December of that year, its founder Henrique Bello died of cancer. His wife, Maria C. T. Bello, continued publishing the Luso-Canadiano with help from the MDP, until it finally closed in May 1971.

First in September and then in November 1968, the "Portuguese Antifascists in Canada" assembled at two meetings held in Toronto and Montreal, and agreed to increase cooperation between the PCDA and MDP, and organizing more joint activities. They also encouraged Portuguese exiles around the world to follow their example and called for another international meeting to discuss the future of the "external front" in Caetano's era, as well as form a government in exile, for which they endorsed the PCP's former presidential candidate Ruy Luís Gomes as its head. At this point, however, the FPLN had lost much of its initial impetus and the "external front" was increasingly less united. Like their transnational ally, the PCDA and MDP now lacked the means, energy, and enthusiasm of its founders. Membership dwindled and halls became social spaces similar to those of other community clubs. In the 1970s, however, this tendency was reversed, as we will discuss in the next chapter.

Cold War surveillance and deportation: PIDE, the FBI, and the RCMP

Throughout the history of Portuguese postwar migration in North America, the fear of infiltration by PIDE, with its wide network of informants, was prevalent and played a critical part in ensuring that most Portuguese immigrants remained politically passive. As I have argued elsewhere, for those hoping to return to Portugal, it was wise not to participate in political activities. While their fears were mostly based on rumour, PIDE's surveillance was in fact more extensive than the emigrants probably realized. As Irene F. Pimentel revealed in her detailed history of the Estado Novo's political police, it was common for PIDE to receive

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1067 Clipping, "Uma Nova Fase na Vida do Movimento Democrático Português", Luso-Canadiano, September 15, 1967, n. 34. SC, CI (2), pr. 4779, u.i. 7370, Movimento Democrático Português, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
1068 Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 166.
1071 Still, harassment by PIDE's collaborators was never as extensive as that perpetrated by Mussolini's "blackshirts" in Canada in the 1920s-30s, who made threatening visits to the homes of anti-fascist immigrants in Toronto and their families in Italy, with the RCMP's tacit consent. For more see Pennacchio, 2000, 35-37, 59.
information on the activities of Portuguese subversives in various parts of the world, gathered by the diplomatic missions and channelled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They also exchanged intelligence with the secret services of allied nations hosting anti-Salazarist exiles. As a member of NATO, PIDE had privileged access to the West's intelligence network, and was able to develop partnerships with various national agencies under the guise of fighting "common criminality". The most productive of these collaborations was with the CIA, formalized in June 1956. The American agency helped modernize PIDE's database and taught various spying and counter-intelligence techniques to a group of agents tasked with infiltrating the PCP. This collaboration cooled down during President Kennedy's first years in office but was rekindled after 1962.

PIDE's interaction with the Canadian secret services was less intense. Nonetheless, as Reg Whitaker noted, "there was little reluctance [among Canadian officials] to engage some dubious elements in repressive dictatorships that happened to proclaim their strong anti-Communism. Spain, Portugal, and Turkey... were judged to have 'more or less efficient police services', liaison with whom was left to the RCMP's discretion." After all, some of the RCMP's most consistent activities throughout its history was to "identify, intrusively observe, and even actively counter 'subversive' organizations formed among minority communities." As discussed in chapter two, since the start of Portuguese mass migration to Canada, the RCMP sought PIDE's assistance in screening potential communists among applicants. The two governments had also agreed to share information on the cross-border "infiltration" of known communists in 1951, two years before the arrival of the Saturnia. Under this accord, each country's embassy alerted their hosts whenever a communist national attempted to travel to the other's territory, giving border officials the option to deny entry visas, while agreeing not to disclose the source of their information.

There is no proof that Canadian officials deported Portuguese immigrants on the grounds of their political affiliation as they did with other migrant groups, like the Italians. However,

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1073 In the 1950s, the CIA also installed antennas in Portugal to broadcast its Radio Free Europe (ibid., 108, 120-121, 125).
1076 Various correspondence (some confidential) between Minister Paulo Cunha, PIDE Director Capt. Agostinho Lourenço, and the Canadian consul in Lisbon, May 21 to August 8, 1951, PEA M314, Passaportes e Vistos. Viagens de Comunistas Canadianos a Portugal e de Comunistas Portugueses ao Canadá. Secreto, AHD.
this lack of evidence may stem from the fact that the 1952 Immigration Act granted immigration officials wide discretion to reject and deport immigrants without disclosing the reasons, nor the source of the information. Another possible explanation is the fact that, unlike other European groups, the bulk of Portuguese immigration began in the 1960s and '70s, a time when Canadian public opinion "weighed in the balance against the overriding authority of national security... and against the power and influence of the RCMP."\textsuperscript{1078}

Still, Canadian authorities did deport undocumented Portuguese migrants, some of them young men trying to escape military duty in Africa. The PCDA and MDP pleaded with immigration officials on behalf of war resisters and other illegal migrants seeking political asylum in Canada, arguing they would face violent reprisals and possibly death should they be repatriated. Both organizations received requests for assistance from Portuguese expatriates around the world, particularly North Africa, where many colonial soldiers fled to. For instance, in September 1962, Firmino Oliveira pleaded with Minister Richard Bell to prevent a Portuguese stowaway detained on arrival from falling into PIDE's grasp. The Minister decided not to overrule the Immigration Appeal Board's rejection of the deportee's appeal but allowed him to leave by his own means to a country of the stowaway's choosing. However, once the man was released, he evaded Canadian authorities and became a fugitive.\textsuperscript{1079}

Sometimes, undocumented migrants with questionable motivations exploited the exiles' political context to their advantage. In one case, Montreal's \textit{La Presse} published the story of Humberto B. Correia, who was arrested by the RCMP in October 1961 at the Gare Maritime Champlain in Quebec City, after using a fake passport to re-enter Canada. Correia's activities in Canada are not clear, but the RCMP was investigating him with the help of the Portuguese consulate in Montreal, in connection with an illegal migration ring. After the story was published, the \textit{Emissora Nacional} announced that Correia would be "stiffly punished on his return to Portugal". Following this broadcast, Correia applied for political asylum and sought help from the MDP and PCDA. Meanwhile, the Vice-Consul and Correia exchanged public rebukes in \textit{La Presse} and \textit{A Voz}, with the first denouncing what he described were community "agitators" and their bogus refugee claims. With information passed on by the consulate,

\textsuperscript{1078} Whitaker, 1987, 236.
Canadian immigration authorities raided Montreal's Portuguese community, including MDP meeting places, looking for illegal migrants. One of the detainees was a former student at the University of Lisbon and a member of the MDP, who had participated in Montreal's *Santa Maria* demonstrations. His associates complained to Minister Ellen Fairclough about the constant threats and insults hurled at them by *A Voz* and its "vice-editor" the Portuguese vice-consul, whom the MDP tried to have declared *persona non grata.* In his letter to the minister, Bello described the frightful state of Portuguese immigrants, who:

...feel that the Salazarist system [has] already penetrated in this democratic Canada of ours, to train and place, in every sector of Portuguese communities, spies and villains capable of making depositions and accusations that can menace our jobs. And to create the fear among us, they are labeling the Portuguese democrat immigrants as 'communists'. Fear is a general sickness of the Portuguese immigrants in Canada.

The drama of Portuguese undocumented war resisters took a tragic turn on December 7, 1967, when the 23-year-old Gomes Rosa jumped to his death from the eighth floor window of a federal government building in Montreal, after he was informed by Canadian immigration authorities that his refugee application had been refused and he had to return to Portugal.

After this incident, the MDP sent a letter signed by various Portuguese organizations in Montreal to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Jean Marchand, pleading for a more "humane attitude" from immigration officials whenever deciding the fate of illegal migrants fleeing the colonial wars; a message they underlined with a rally outside Montreal's immigration office.

According to Jaime Monteiro, the minister received a MDP delegation in Ottawa and assured them that no other Portuguese migrant would be deported without first seeking their counsel.

After this, the MDP and PCDA continued to encourage Portuguese soldiers to desert to Canada, including those sailors who occasionally docked in Montreal, who were told: "When you serve under a banner of crime and treason, desertion is honourable."


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1081 Letter, H. T. Bello to Minister E. L. Fairclough, November 1, 1961, F0579, 2009-022/003 (2), PCDA fonds, CTASC.


1083 Clipping, *Portugal Democrático*, February 1968, n. 126, SC, CI (2), pr. 4779, u.i. 7370, Movimento Democrático Português, PIDE/DGS, ANTT; letter from "the Portuguese organizations of Montreal" to Minister Jean Marchand, December 14, 1967, F0579, 2009-022/004 (17), PCDA fonds, CTASC.


Deportations of Portuguese clandestine migrants, some of whom were political exiles, were also common in the United States. The most prominent anti-Salazarist to be detained by American immigration officials was Palma Inácio. As an air force mechanic, Inácio sabotaged 20 aircrafts in a Portuguese air base during a failed republican coup in 1947, for which he was incarcerated. Two years later he escaped prison and absconded to Morocco. In 1951, he travelled from Casablanca to California, working as a table waiter on a cruise ship. Eventually Inácio made his way to Windsor Locks, Connecticut, where he lived, and found a job as a mechanic and flight instructor in Northampton, Massachusetts. In March 1954, American immigration authorities arrested Inácio and were preparing to repatriate him, following PIDE's request. Thanks to the intervention of Águas and the Portuguese-Brazilian industrialist Lúcio Tomé Feteira, Inácio was allowed to leave for Brazil instead. There he connected with Delgado and Galvão and planned other revolutionary stunts, including his infamous airplane highjack.  

PIDE learned of the CPDP's existence in June 1961, after the consul in New York alerted Lisbon to a communiqué they published in the *Diário*, where its founders revealed their identities; with this information PIDE opened files on the group's activities. With the help of Portuguese diplomats, community informants, and the FBI, PIDE began learning more about the lives of these individuals and their families in Portugal. In May 1964, they started a file on the PCDA after receiving one of its communiqués from a Toronto informant. In December of that year, the MDP also became a target of investigation, after its members revealed their identities by signing a FPLN protest letter to the UN.

In the aftermath of the Bay St. riot, Ciriacó told the *Star* he recognized three members of “the Portuguese Gestapo” whom he had met as a government worker in Portugal. According to him, these agents “immigrate to a country as anyone else would and get a job. Then they report...”

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1087 Besides Águas, Covas, Dias, and Andrade, the CPDP also included António José de Almeida, António Vargas Cavaco, Arnaldo Vinhas Santos, Fernando da Veiga, Francisco Aleixo, and Zeferino António Dias (letter, Consul H. Silva Martins to PMFA, June 19, 1961, PEA M549, ...Comunicado do Comité Pró-Democracia em Portugal, AHD).  

1088 Even the Portuguese consul in São Paulo relayed information about Águas, which he received from a Portuguese immigrant who had lived in Boston for a few years (correspondence, PIDE Director H. de Matos, Consul M. A. Carvalho in Providence, Consul C. B. Carvalho in Boston, the Consul in São Paulo, and the PMFA, Aug. 28, 1961 to Mar. 3, 1962, PEA M549, Elementos de Identificação de um Português de Origem, Naturalizado Americano, de Nome Abílio de Oliveira Águas, AHD).  

1089 SC, CI (2), pr. 1913, u.i. 7685, Associação Democrática Portuguesa - ADPC Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

1090 Of the 112 signatories, 39 were from Canada, 46 from Brazil, 18 from Uruguay, 4 from Venezuela, 3 from the U.S., and 2 from Argentina (SC, CI (2), pr. 4779, u.i. 7370, Movimento Democrático Português, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).
on the activities of anti-government Portuguese groups in foreign countries. Police in Portugal contact relatives and exert pressure on them to write to these people urging them to keep quiet… These men are real gangsters. They spend two years in a country then report back to Portugal.”

Ciriaco was aware of cases where Portuguese emigrants in other countries had been arrested upon arriving in Portugal for the holidays, based on information provided by infiltrated agents in their communities. On a CBC-TV show later that year, Oliveira reaffirmed that PIDE had infiltrated Toronto and Montreal and that Portuguese immigrants were "frightened to speak their mind." This time he spoke of a man who was arrested in Portugal due to his brother's anti-Salazar activities in Canada. In 1970, the PCDA's Eurico D. Nunes was arrested when visiting Portugal because of his political conduct and affiliations; thanks to his wife's "diligent" efforts, he was released a few days later. Back in Toronto, Nunes withdrew from the PCDA and the community altogether, fearing additional reprisals.1091

There is no direct evidence of PIDE agents actually being sent to Canada or the United States to spy on Portuguese exiles, but there is plenty on the existence of community informants. For the most part, their identities and personal motivations are unknown.1092 We know, however, that Gil Stone - the publisher of the pro-Salazar newsletters in New York - began relaying information to PIDE inspector Álvaro P. Carvalho in August 1963. As a reward for his services, PIDE's director Fernando da Silva Pais recommended that the Foreign Affairs Ministry subsidize Stone's publications.1093 Sometimes Portuguese authorities received information from unexpected sources, like the public relations manager George Peabody. According to him, American intelligence agencies approached him regularly for information on Portuguese subversives in the country. In 1963, he was asked about the CPDP's activities and its relations with Galvão and Delgado. Following this inquiry, Peabody reached his contacts in Brazil and obtained the names of the exiled revolutionaries' connections in Newark. He then relayed that


1092 In one case, the informant was related to a PIDE agent (memo, PIDE's inspector Orlando Guedes Pinto, January 18, 1967, SC, CL (2) 6747, nt. 7459, Andrew Brewin and David Macdonald, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).

information to the SNI's director and requested that his identity as the source not be revealed in Lisbon.  

Exiled organizations were cautious when accepting new members, since they feared infiltration by informants or agent provocateurs. They organized their own intelligence network through the FPLN, with whom they exchanged information about known Salazar supporters, PIDE collaborators, and other suspicious individuals in their expatriate communities. Despite the exiles' carefulness, Portuguese authorities were able to collect information from sources inside or very close to their organizations. In fact, one of the PCDA's founders, whom we will call Xavier, volunteered information on his former comrades to PIDE. In November 1967, Xavier was denied entry in Portugal after landing at Lisbon's airport and was ordered to return to Canada on the next available flight. Following this incident he contacted Portuguese authorities trying to ascertain the reasons behind his barring and offered to clear his name with PIDE by sharing information on "agitators" in Toronto. In his request for a travel visa, Xavier explained that, despite having become a Canadian national, he felt "as Portuguese as those who defend it in our Land with arms in hand," and that he refused to work with "leftist elements and others foreigners who sought to embarrass Portugal." Ambassador Brazão endorsed Xavier's visa application and confirmed he had relinquished his subversive activities, which PIDE had gathered information on since 1963; that year PIDE had issued him an arrest order, which was nullified in November 1967 and replaced by a prohibition to enter Portugal. In January 1968, with a visa in hand, Xavier was finally allowed into Portugal. Once there, he walked into PIDE's headquarters in Lisbon and offered his testimony about the past and current activities of his former PCDA comrades.

This was not the first time Xavier had shared information on the PCDA's activities. According to him, in the early 1960s, two RCMP undercover agents began frequenting the PCDA pretending to be NDP organizers. These agents then approached Xavier (a Canadian citizen since 1964) and asked that he provide information on two PCDA members affiliated with the Canadian "Communist Trotskyist Party" (likely the League for Socialist Action), who had recently applied for citizenship; according to Xavier, the RCMP consulted him every time a

1094 Clearly, Baptista did not meet Peabody's wishes, since his letter was filed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (letter, G. Peabody to C. Baptista, March 28, 1963, PEA M554, Carta Enviada Pela Firma "George Peabody and Associates", AHD).
1096 One of the agents who interviewed Xavier was Álvaro P. Carvalho.
"suspicious" Portuguese immigrant applied for citizenship.\textsuperscript{1097} He also mentioned the RCMP had made similar requests of Ciriaco after he accepted a job with the federal government; Xavier did not say whether or not the PCDA's former president obliged. With Xavier's insight, Canadian officials rejected the citizenship bids of the two Trotskyists. At this point, the PCDA's members began suspecting there was an informant in their midst. That suspicion fell primarily on Xavier after he opposed the sending of funds to African nationalist forces through Eleanor Roosevelt's American Committee on Africa. To erase doubts about his loyalty, Xavier became more active in the PCDA's rallies, communications, and administration. In 1964, the RCMP convinced Xavier not to abandon the association after Guilherme Santos' arrival and asked him to obtain information on the new president, which he was unable to. Xavier eventually left the PCDA against the RCMP's wishes, but kept abreast of its internal dynamics, which he revealed to PIDE.

While they suspected PIDE's presence, Portuguese exiles, many of whom had become Canadian or American citizens, hardly expected to be under surveillance by their democratic hosts, much less that the intelligence compiled by these agencies would be shared with Portuguese authorities. But that was what happened after June 1961, when Consul Henrique Martins asked the FBI in New York to gather information on the CPDP.\textsuperscript{1098} From the FBI's reports to PIDE we discover that they consulted with known registered informants; interviewed community members; and searched the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Services, Newark's public gas and electric power supplier, motor vehicle registration, and a local credit bureau. The FBI also kept notes on the individuals who picketed the Portuguese consulate, as it had been the case during the \textit{Santa Maria} saga.\textsuperscript{1099}

The RCMP also shared its information on the activities of Portuguese opponents in Canada with PIDE, as was the case in September 1967, when the Director of Security and Intelligence William L. Higgitt (RCMP Commissioner after 1969) relayed to inspector Agostinho Barbieri Cardoso - one of the PIDE agents involved in the planning and subsequent cover-up of Delgado's assassination\textsuperscript{1100} - information gathered on the PCDA, MDP, and CCAP.

\textsuperscript{1097} The use of ethnic informants to infiltrate communist organizations, and the use of citizenship security screenings as a tool for recruiting "human sources" was a common practice of the RCMP during the Cold War. For more on this see Whitaker, Kealey, and Parnaby, 2012.
\textsuperscript{1098} Letter, PMFA to PIDE Director Homero de Matos, November 8, 1961, SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u.i. 7307, Comitê Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
\textsuperscript{1099} FBI reports on the CPDP, November 1 & 27, 1961; and June 19, 1964, ibid.
In turn, Higgitt requested intelligence on the connections between these political exiles and known communists in Portugal.\textsuperscript{1101}

After learning the identities and addresses of these expatriate subversives, and of their families in Portugal, PIDE was able to intercept their correspondence, monitor their movements, and unravel their networks.\textsuperscript{1102} The exiles developed complex mailing systems to conceal their communications. Given the high profile of Galvão in Brazil and his contacts in Lisbon, the two sides exchanged correspondence indirectly through Newark to avoid detection. For large packages the CPDP relied on steamship crewmembers they could trust; according to Águas, these were "humble people, but like everyone who has to supplement their income with some portable contraband, they are experienced with handling customs officers."\textsuperscript{1103} Sometimes, CPDP operatives visiting Portugal personally handed mail to DDS leaders in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{1104} The CPDP also set up a system by which Galvão's letters were mailed under a fake identity to Covas' teenage son in Portugal.\textsuperscript{1105} However, in March 1964, after identifying Covas' family in Portugal with help from the FBI, PIDE installed a wiretap on their home phone and listened in on their conversations, until November 1965.\textsuperscript{1106} After that, PIDE was able to intercept most correspondence between Águas, Galvão, and the DDS.

PIDE also intercepted correspondence between exiles in Canada and their contacts in Portugal. For example, in February 1967, the MDP sent a cheque worth $538 to the publishers of Lisbon's \textit{República} newspaper, the product of a Christmas fundraiser for the families of political prisoners in Portugal. PIDE had intercepted the letters arranging this transaction and confiscated the cheque, for which they were publicly shamed in the opposition media.\textsuperscript{1107} Besides

\textsuperscript{1101} Letter (confidential), William L. Higgitt, RCMP, to Agostinho Barbieri Cardoso, PIDE, September 21, 1967, SC, CI (2), pr. 1913, u.i. 7685, Associação Democrática Portuguesa - Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
\textsuperscript{1102} The Portuguese postal services had a team of "hounds" and "pickers" who separated mail to and from individuals and addresses flagged by PIDE. Its agents opened the envelopes using techniques learned from the CIA. In some cases, the agents read, photocopied, and placed the letters back in the envelopes, then shipped them to their intent recipients. In other cases they kept the letters. Some of these "pickers" were found to steal money mailed by the emigrants (Pimentel, 2007, 339-340).
\textsuperscript{1103} António Dias was the liaison with these seamen, who received payment for their smuggling services (letter, A. O. Águas to H. Galvão, March 22, 1963 (m.t.), CD25A-CPDP).
\textsuperscript{1104} The CPDP's António Cavaco met with the DDS Moreira Campos and Sebastião Ribeiro in Lisbon on April 1963, carrying a message from Águas. Shortly after this meeting, Ribeiro was arrested by PIDE. I found no indication in the records suggesting the two events were related (letters, A. O. Águas to H. Galvão, May 1, 1963; and A. O. Águas to E. Covas, May 24, 1963, ibid).
\textsuperscript{1105} Galvão wrote initially as "Cynthia Frocks", under which Águas set up a post office box in Segregansett, Massachusetts; they changed it to "Kathleen Smith" after PIDE arrested Ribeiro and apprehended his address book (letters, A. O. Águas to H. Galvão, March 24, 1964; and A. O. Águas to E. Covas, March 28, 1964, ibid).
\textsuperscript{1106} Reports, FBI agent, March 30, 1964; and PIDE inspector António Silva Ribeiro, July 29, 1964 and November 24, 1965, SC CI (2) 3972, nt. 7309, Eduardo da Cunha Covas PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
\textsuperscript{1107} Letter, H. T. Bello to Carvalhão Duarte, \textit{República}, Lisbon, February 16, 1967; transcript of Rádio Voz de Portugal broadcast, July 16, 1967, SC, CI (2), pr. 4779, u.i. 7370, Movimento Democrático Português, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
intercepting mail, PIDE also sent letters to the exiled organizations passing as fellow anti-Salazarists and sharing damning rumours about individual members. In fact, according to Ciriaco, the majority of requests for information and money received in the PCDA's mail turned out to be "exploiters, swindlers, and even people tied to PIDE."\(^{1108}\)

Portuguese authorities also issued search and arrest warrants for when these exiles visited Portugal. For instance, in March 1963, PIDE intercepted a letter from Águas to the DDS' Moreira Campos, where the former raised concerns about António Dias' planned summer trip to Portugal with his family. PIDE learned that Dias had left for Portugal in July and obtained a warrant for his arrest, on the grounds of distributing anti-Salazar propaganda and escorting Galvão during his visit to New York - this information had been reported by the FBI, whose agents interviewed Dias in November 1962, when he was already an American citizen.\(^{1109}\) PIDE eventually decided to cancel the warrant and discreetly watch his movements instead; something they repeated when Dias returned to Portugal in 1965 and 1968.\(^{1110}\)

Though Águas was upset about the FBI's inquiries, he believed no harm could come from them, and that every opportunity the CPDP had to clarify its pro-democratic conduct was "healthy".\(^{1111}\) In his assessment, the orders for their surveillance had likely come from the State Department, as part of its ongoing efforts to appease the Portuguese government during the Lajes airbase negotiations. In fact, the CPDP's founders had preemptively informed the State Department in May 1960 about their committee and asked if their actions contravened any laws or conduct expected of American citizens.\(^{1112}\) Still, the FBI's investigation continued until 1964, at which point the U.S. Foreign Services had their own file on the CPDP that they too shared with PIDE.\(^{1113}\) In November, FBI agents questioned Covas about the CPDP's relations with Galvão and the Social-Democratic Action, and whether the Newark committee planned to

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\(^{1108}\) Letters, from F. C. da Cunha to João Alves das Neves, March 12, 1960; and to Casa dos Portugueses, Montreal, January 23, 1962, F0579, 2009-022/003 (1 & 5), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

\(^{1109}\) Letters, A. O. Águas to M. Campos, March 27, July 20, and October 14, 1965, SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u.i. 7307, Comité Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTT; letter, A. O. Águas to E. Covas, November 11, 1962, CD25A-CPDP.

\(^{1110}\) Various correspondence and notes to and from PIDE Director F. S. Pais and his agents, from June 1963 to July 1968, SC CI (2) 3972, nt. 7309, Eduardo da Cunha Covas PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

\(^{1111}\) Letter, A. O. Águas to E. Covas, November 11, 1962, CD25A-CPDP.

\(^{1112}\) There was no record of a response from the U.S. Department of State (letter, António Almeida to U.S. State Department, May 16, 1960, ibid).

\(^{1113}\) Letter, N. W. Philcox, U.S. Embassy in Paris, to PIDE Director F. S. Pais, March 4, 1964, SC, CI (2) 3972, nt. 7309, Eduardo da Cunha Covas PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
overthrow Salazar by force. Covas replied the CPDP was merely a point of contact between the Action and the American government.\footnote{1114}{The FBI was aware of Covas undocumented status in the country, though there is no mention of it surfacing during their conversation (letters, A. O. Águas to H. Galvão, November 26, 1964; and March 9, 1965, SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u.i. 7307, Comité Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).}

In March 1965, the Department of Justice instructed the CPDP and its individual members to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as official spokespersons of the Social-Democratic Action, which American officials understood was a political party. Águas rejected this interpretation and stressed the CPDP was composed of American citizens and longstanding residents who neither received nor solicited funding from foreign sources; to no avail. Refusing to accept that legal imposition, along with the increased surveillance such official status would force upon them, Águas and his companions decided to close the CPDP; though they vowed to continue its activities unofficially. However, a few months later, the CPDP was again in operation, after a former U.S. Attorney General and "old friend" of Águas convinced the Department of Justice to drop the case against them. Still, the government's harassment and effective rejection of their anti-Salazar message was a major blow for the morale of these pro-Western activists. As Covas remarked, his faith in the "so-called mentors of the Free World" had been broken, to the point he was "absolutely convinced that the communists are right... in that the much praised American democracy is nothing more than a farce."\footnote{1115}{Letter, E. Covas to A. O. Águas, January 7, 1965; Águas to U.S. Dept. of Justice, January 9, 1965; Covas to Águas, January 13, 1965; and Águas to M. Campos, March 22, 1965; A. O. Águas to M. Campos, June 16, 1965, SC, CI (2), 478 np. 7012, Abílio Oliveira Águas, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.}

Conclusion

Until recently, the dominant perception of Portuguese immigrants in North America was that they were politically apathetic. In the 1980s and '90s, sociological snapshots of ethnic communities dismissed the political experiences of Portuguese immigrants on account of their low "political participation", which they equated with "a certain political backwardness and even an aversion of things political."\footnote{1116}{Apalhão & Rosa, 1980, 218. For other examples of this perception see Jeffrey Reitz, The Survival of Ethnic Groups, 1980; and Carlos Teixeira, "Portuguese", in Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples, 1999, 1078-1079.} Despite their superficial analysis, these blanket statements contributed to legitimizing popular perceptions of Portuguese immigrants as docile and insular. As I have discussed elsewhere, there were many factors contributing to the lack of sustained

\footnote{1114}{The FBI was aware of Covas undocumented status in the country, though there is no mention of it surfacing during their conversation (letters, A. O. Águas to H. Galvão, November 26, 1964; and March 9, 1965, SC, CI (2), pr. 3926, u.i. 7307, Comité Pro-Democrata em Portugal, PIDE/DGS, ANTT).}


\footnote{1116}{Apalhão & Rosa, 1980, 218. For other examples of this perception see Jeffrey Reitz, The Survival of Ethnic Groups, 1980; and Carlos Teixeira, "Portuguese", in Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples, 1999, 1078-1079.}
electoral participation among Portuguese communities. However, the debate over the political life of marginalized minority communities, like the Portuguese in North America, is distorted by traditional perceptions of "political participation" as something that is exclusive to citizens at the ballot box or other formal democratic processes, measured by voting rates and number of candidates. As we have seen in this study, Portuguese immigrants organized humanitarian fundraising campaigns, gathered in street protests, and other informal political actions aimed at specific causes, seeking tangible and meaningful results, sometimes bypassing elected officials.

The immigrants' socioeconomic characteristics and financial priorities highlighted by these social scientists to explain the limited electoral turnout of Portuguese immigrants are consistent with the arguments made by Bodnar or Perin that common immigrant workers paid little attention to the abstract promises of radical activists. These historians, however, did not suggest that common immigrants were docile, or that politics played no role in the formation of their communities. As we know, the civic and religious life of Portuguese ethnic communities was infused with intense political battles that straddled both homeland and host nation politics. A focus on the "local realities" of immigrant communities that only concerns itself with their political engagement with or "integration" in the host society misses a fundamental part of their experience as transnational beings, in their beliefs, actions, and solidarities. As Patrias concluded, "even immigrant communities comprised largely of semi-literate peasants and rural labourers should not necessarily be seen as enclaves, cut off from outside influences... Even a handful of better-educated immigrants can exert a crucial influence on community development by infusing it with ideological content and by linking the group to political concerns in the homeland and in the receiving society."

The reluctance of some social scientists to accept homeland politics as a legitimate form of political engagement in the host country perpetuates the conservative bias of North American multiculturalist discourse. As we have seen before, American and Canadian officials regularly endorsed the proud testimonials of dual patriotism voiced by Portuguese ethnic elites and rarely coaxed them to forego their homeland affinities. This tolerance for homeland solidarities was not

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1117 Other reasons often cited to explain this supposed political apathy among Portuguese-Canadians were their initial sojourning mentality; their predominantly working-class profile and consequent lack of time and resources to invest in political pursuits; their low levels of schooling and poor language skills; their unfamiliarity with democratic procedures and poor sense of engaged citizenship, resulting from living for decades under a dictatorial regime; their lack of unity as an ethnic constituency; their fear of PIDE's infiltration in their communities; and their primary preoccupation with homeland politics (Fernandes, 2010). For a discussion on the electoral participation of Portuguese-Americans see Cornwell, Jr., 1980, and Bloemraad, 2006.

1118 Patrias, 1994, 232.
always extended to its leftist exiles, seen to be radical, subversive, hence dangerous. This happened even when their political ideals were informed by the dominant liberal-democratic ideologies of their host nations. It mattered little to North American secret services that these "radical ethnic brokers" sought not only to overthrow their homeland's dictatorial and colonialist government but also educate their fellow expatriates about the principles and processes of democracy in their adopted countries. These exiles' direct involvement with the host countries' political parties and other mainstream institutions also contradicted the dominant perception that an involvement in homeland politics prevented or slowed the immigrants' "integration" in their adopted societies. In fact, these exiles were the first to promote naturalization and participatory citizenship in their immigrant communities. Nonetheless, the "foreignness" of these citizens prevailed when it came to sharing damning information on their transnational political activities with their homeland's secret services.

As Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld noted, Prime Minister Trudeau, who introduced Canada's multiculturalism policy in 1971, "still believed Old World antipathies should be discarded when immigrants entered Canada... It was his view that recycling the past might serve the needs of ethnic communities but not the needs of Canada." This was a message that Portuguese exiles in Canada heard more frequently from their host politicians as the ethnic revivalism of the 1960s gave way to the multiculturalist discourse of the '70s, which privileged seemingly innocuous cultural expressions of ethnicity. Unlike Patrias' Hungarian "proletarians", Portuguese exiles refused to incorporate SNI/SEIT sponsored expressions of folksy ethnicity in their political messages, which placed them increasingly at a disadvantage in the increasingly multiculturalist North American polity.

Middle- and upper-class "radicals", like Ciriaco and Águas, also distanced themselves from their working-class countrymen and their ethnic affairs. This isolation was more pronounced in the case of the CPDP, whose members, spread around the greater New York City area, were instructed to follow Águas' example and stay away from the community's social activities. On the other hand, the members of the PCDA and MDP were also members of other community clubs and lived in or frequented their cities' Portuguese neighbourhoods. This helps explain why they had more success than their Newark peers at rallying their local countrymen

behind their revolutionary goals, despite the arguably greater resistance from reactionary forces in Toronto and Montreal. Another important difference explaining their relative success was the fact that the PCDA and MDP worked in newcomer settlements, where the memories of poverty and persecution in the homeland were sharper than among the multigenerational Portuguese-American communities.

Regardless of their relations with the immigrant communities, these political exiles were able to muster a great deal of support from progressive politicians, activists, and public figures in their host countries, along with the mainstream media's consistent attention (particularly in Canada), all of which increased their political leverage. In the case of the CPDP, such valuable endorsements from American dignitaries were possible due to Águas' political capital and wide personal network, which he amassed over many years through his involvement with the Democratic Party. As for the PCDA and MDP, whose members and some executives had little formal education or financial means, they were able to count on the FPLN and its transnational network of Portuguese exiles, with whom they shared resources, information, know-how, and political status. To some extent, their reliance on external allies to elevate their own profile in Canada and the United States was similar to that of conservative ethnic brokers and their relationships with Portuguese diplomats.

Despite lacking the Estado Novo's relatively ample resources, these political exiles were able to disrupt Salazar's foreign agenda and challenge the regime's colonialist propaganda in North America. With the help of their exiled networks, these radicals were able to circulate their literature, raise funds, and organize high profile political actions that tarnished the regime's carefully crafted image of political consensus. Although on a much smaller scale, the 1966 pro-amnesty conference in Toronto, with its emphasis on universal human rights, contrasted with the colonialist humanism preached at the Lisbon Geographic Society's congresses of 1964 and 1967. Though they never engaged in direct confrontation with Moreira's "pilgrim nation", the FPLN and the opposition's "external front", of which the PCDA and MDP were dedicated representatives, offered Portuguese expatriates an alternative version of diaspora. Contrary to the regime's celebratory imperialist vision of itinerant "Portugeseness", the radicals' diaspora promoted a sense of transnational solidarity based on expatriate memories of poverty, persecution, and exile from their beloved country, and the reimagining of Portugal as an anti-colonial, peaceful, and democratic nation. Although they had very different goals and ideals, the
two diasporic narratives shared discursive similarities. In both cases, Portuguese expatriates were urged never to forget their fellow countrymen back home and advance their well-being, and advocate on behalf of their co-nationals in their host societies. In addition, both the regime's emigrant "colonies" and the FPLN's "external front" were considered subsidiaries of the homeland, where the future of Portuguese nationhood was ultimately decided.
Fig. 56 - General Humberto Delgado crowns the "Portuguese Princess" Odete Neves during the First International Azalea Court in Norfolk, Virginia, 1954 (PEA M181, Colónia Portuguesa nos E.U. Portuguese American Progressive Association Club, AHD).

Fig. 57, 58 - (Top) Casa dos Portugueses/MDP headquarters on 3774 Rue St. Denis, Montreal; and (bottom) some of its members, c. 1961-64 (photos available in blog os50anos.com, url: www.festejamos50anos.com/associacao/portuguese-canadian-club-of-montreal/).

Fig. 59 - Toronto Daily Star's front cover announcing the capture of the cruise liner Santa Maria by "Portuguese pirates", January 24, 1961 (PP-TPL).
Fig. 60 - Pro-Salazar demonstrators rattle the car of an anti-Salazar protester on Bay St., Toronto. Photo by Ted Dinamore for the Toronto Daily Star, January 30, 1961 (PP-TPL).

Fig. 61 - Pro-Salazar demonstrator arrested by the Metropolitan Toronto Police. Photo by Proulx, published in the Toronto Telegram, January 30, 1961 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC27215).

Fig. 62 - MDP members, men and women, protest the dictatorship in Montreal's snow covered streets, c.1962 (photo available in blog os50anos.com).

Fig. 63 - Poster for the Canadian Conference for Amnesty in Portugal. The "hand in chains" drawing was the FPLN's logo (CTASC, PCDA fonds, 2009-022/006 [03]).

Fig. 64 - Protesters outside the consulate of Portugal on Bay St., Toronto, demanding the release of political prisoners. Photo by Reed for the Toronto Telegram, 1967 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC08256).
8. NEW BEGINNINGS, OLD JOURNEYS: MULTICULTURAL, GENERATIONAL, AND REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS, 1970s

"I came from afar, from very far. What I've trekked to get here! I will travel afar, so very far, where we will find ourselves, with what we have to give us." Chorus for the song Eu Vim de Longe, Pra Muito Longe (1982), by José Mário Branco.1120

News of the Estado Novo's collapse on April 25, 1974 was initially greeted with much hope and euphoria by most Portuguese expatriates, except those in the colonies. But in the turbulent revolutionary transition period (or PREC) that followed, Portuguese expatriates grew apprehensive about the future of their kin and property in the homeland, as they watched tensions between opposing political factions escalate into near civil war. This political transition happened alongside other changes taking place in the 1970s that were equally important in shaping the future of these communities, such as the "minority rights revolution" in the United States, the advent of multiculturalism in Canada, or the emergence of a new generation of young immigrant activists. This chapter will discuss how these transition processes unfolded and intersected, leading to the rise of a new political order in Portugal and its post-imperial diasporic project in the latter half of the decade. We will also revisit some of the topics discussed in the previous chapters and briefly evaluate their situation during this period, highlighting the changes and continuities in the interactions of Portuguese emigrants with their host and home nations.

I will also partake in the discussion of whether ethnic politics, framed by multiculturalist and civil rights policies, limited or stimulated overall political activism among immigrant communities, and bring a historical perspective to a debate that has largely taken place in the social sciences – especially when it comes to the Portuguese. Here I will engage primarily with Giles’ critique of Canadian official multiculturalism, which is representative of a larger leftist perspective on this national policy first introduced in 1971.1121 After studying the settlement and labour experiences of Portuguese immigrant women in Toronto, Giles concluded that official multiculturalism is a patriarchal consensus-building policy that rewarded ethnicity over other forms of identity and political solidarity, such as class or gender, and deliberately empowered self-appointed ethnic middle-class leaders whose personal agendas were out of touch with the needs of those immigrant workers they claimed to speak for. In this view, by limiting their

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1120 Eu Vim de Longe... (m.t.) is one of Branco's most popular songs, released in his 1982 album Ser Solidário (Being Solidary). Its lyrics express the initial jubilation, followed by disappointment and sense of betrayal felt by Branco and other radical socialists after the 1974 revolution and the ensuing transition to a social-democratic/liberal political order in Portugal.

funding criteria solely to "ethnic" activities, Canadian government officials effectively restricted the range of issues that immigrant activists could advocate, and therefore curbed their potential activism in other critical areas. Bloemraad, who compared the rates of citizenship acquisition of Portuguese immigrants in Toronto and Boston, had a more positive reading of the effects of multiculturalism in promoting civic engagement.\textsuperscript{1122} She found that naturalization rates in Canada increased rapidly after 1971, departing from its historical parity with the United States, despite greater rewards for citizenship in the latter.\textsuperscript{1123} Bloemraad attributed this to Canada's official multiculturalism, since it helped create ethnic institutions where immigrants could develop an interest in public life and learn about their host countries' decision-making processes.

In the United States, Colburn and Pozzetta also argued that European ethnics seeking group recognition in the 1960s could not go as far as challenge "the basic belief in the rationality of individuals and markets, which elites had long held to be the essence of the American capitalist system;" in other words, they stopped short of demanding access to affirmative action programs.\textsuperscript{1124} However, women of all backgrounds benefitted from such equity programs after the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1965; in Canada, they had to wait until the 1986 Employment Equity Act. Hence, only able-bodied white males - who comprised the majority of Euro-American ethnic leaders - were excluded from affirmative action programs. However, as John Skrentny argued, white ethnics, such as the Italians, Jews, Polish, and others, began to mobilize in larger numbers and muster their political strength in the late '60s and early '70s to demand inclusion in the "minority rights revolution" and benefit from its equity programs redressing their historical marginalization.\textsuperscript{1125}

This chapter will contend that immigrant activists did in fact use the language, opportunities, and resources provided by civil rights and multiculturalist policies in Canada and the United States to advance various progressive causes beyond that of cultural identity. Their growing civic and political engagement, however, was not the result of one "revolution" but a combination of various transition processes in their local, national, and transnational contexts, occurring simultaneously and intersecting in the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{1122} Bloemraad, 2006.
\textsuperscript{1123} While permanent residents in Canada could sponsor immigration applications, that privilege was reserved to citizens in the U.S.
\textsuperscript{1124} Colburn & Pozzetta, 1994, 140.
\textsuperscript{1125} Skrentny, 2002, 277.
Multicultural societies: Portuguese immigrant communities in the early 1970s

Once avoided by white middle-class city residents and neglected by municipal officials, some of the inner city immigrant "ghettos" of yesteryear became quaint multicultural destinations in the 1970s, as North American urbanites developed their pluralist worldviews. Cosmopolitan city-dwellers hoping to experience the sights, sounds, and flavours of different world cultures began seeking them in these neighbourhoods, where ethnic entrepreneurs were ready to cater to them (Figure 65). These commercial interactions were at the genesis of the multicultural tourism described by a New York Times reporter in 1982, when he wrote of his visit to Newark's Ironbound, where "April in Portugal" was "waiting just across the Hudson":

The Saturday stroller along almost a mile of Ferry Street... is plunged into a Lusitanian world, where signs and talk on the street are in Portuguese, where loudspeakers on stores or on automobiles blare soccer recaps and melodies from Portugal, where the stores are jammed with shoppers seeking Portuguese groceries, pastries, wine, clothing and household gift items. At night, the visitor can sit in restaurants and absorb the keening of the fado... or join in hearty simple-stepped but colorful dances that bring back memories of home, even if the dancers have never been to the old country.

Municipal officials also recognized the commercial and electoral value of these communities and began supporting the development of their cities' multicultural landscapes as profitable tourist venues, sometimes enhancing their recognizable stereotypical features. Streets and squares were renamed to reflect the foreign origin of its local residents, while city maps identified their ethnic neighbourhoods as miniature homelands, like "Little Portugal" or "Portugal Village". By the '80s, these ethnic spaces became the quintessential material and geographic expressions of multiculturalism, by then a well-established public ideology in Canada and in those northeastern American states where the Portuguese settled.

The fixity of these geographic markers contrasted with the immigrants’ continuous mobility and the fluidity of their transnational lives. These imagined boundaries did not prevent them from leaving their original working-class settlements in search of better housing, usually in areas of the city occupied by older ethnic groups, or to middle-class suburbs. For instance, in Toronto, the Portuguese were gradually "pushed out" of Kensington Market and Alexandra Park.

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1126 Jacovetta, 2006, 94-98.
1129 For more on this topic see Carlos Teixeira, "Residential Experiences and the Culture of Suburbanization - a Case Study of Portuguese Homebuyers in Mississauga," Housing Studies, 25: 4 (2007): 495-521.
by Caribbean and East Asian newcomers arriving in the '70s, and moved to neighbourhoods predominantly occupied by Italians. In Fall River, it was Portuguese newcomers who prompted the older Portuguese-Americans to leave their historical quarters. By 1972, Fall River's population was roughly evenly split between American- and foreign-born, the latter growing in number as more Americans left the city; by 1980, the vast majority of Portuguese in Massachusetts (74%) and Rhode Island (73%) had arrived in the country after 1965. As Gilbert noted during her fieldwork in Fall River in the early '70s: "there is the feeling on the part of some residents that the 'greenhorns' are 'taking over the city'."  

While many of the earlier immigrants had improved their living conditions and become homeowners  
1131 - an important symbol of status and rootedness in the new country  
1132 - thanks in large part to their families' intensive labour and meticulous saving strategies,  
1133 they still faced considerable social and economic challenges. Immigrant blue-collar workers were largely left to fend for themselves as the American and Canadian labour movements shifted their attention away from the declining manufacturing industries and onto white-collar workers. Portuguese women in clerical and other service work benefited from this, since they began organizing in higher numbers and made strides towards achieving greater pay equity.  
1134 Construction workers, on the other hand, had little union protection until the late 1970s, which left them vulnerable to exploitation by contractors, who subjected them to speed-ups and long workdays, unsafe working conditions, and sometimes wage theft.  
1135 Thus, an occupation that was already prone to injuries and long-term health problems became disabling or deadly for many workers.

Part of the relative economic success of Portuguese working-class families came from the economic contributions of their children, who often worked part-time after school or helped in family-owned businesses. Some parents, especially those with little schooling themselves, took

1130 Gilbert, 1989, 51 & 71; Sá Pereira, 1985, 34.
1131 An article in the *Toronto Star* of March 2, 1970, estimated that over half of all Portuguese in the city owned their homes (cit. in Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 44).
1132 As Sturino (1990, 179-183) argued, home ownership served as a kind of "surrogate peasant farm" since it delivered some of the benefits of owning land, such as social respectability, family cohesion, security against unemployment, and a property that could be passed on to the children. By hosting roomers or renting sections as separate dwellings, homeowners could also turn their properties into a source of income.
1134 In the 1970s, more Portuguese women in Canada and the U.S., especially in the second generation, exited the vanishing needle trades and other manufacturing jobs and moved into service occupations. Those with higher education joined traditionally female professions, like social workers, health care aides, and teachers. Men, on the other hand, tended to stay in the construction industry, where they were able to move into its many skilled trades and entrepreneurial opportunities.
1135 Iacovetta, 1992, 154-162.
their children out of school as soon as they were legally allowed to, or simply did not encourage them to pursue higher education. At the same time, Portuguese youth, and especially boys, were often eager to drop out of school and work for wages, following their parents' example of achieving relative material comfort with little formal education. By abandoning school, Portuguese youth also forsook the repeated assaults on their personal dignity and sense of self-worth that many suffered under bigoted teachers in Anglo-centric public school systems. Furthermore, in areas with few highly-skilled jobs, as was the case in Fall River and New Bedford, there were few economic incentives for educational advancement. As Gilbert pointed out: "Individuals who go to college run the risk of educating themselves out of the city's capacity to employ them; leaving Fall River means leaving family and friends." To this day, Portuguese youth in Canada and the northeastern United States continue to register high dropout rates and rank among the lowest in academic achievement. This phenomenon has attracted a great deal of attention from educators, activists, politicians, social workers, and researchers inside and outside Portuguese communities.

In Massachusetts, various ethnic groups facing high dropout rates in their communities (including the Portuguese) joined the movement led by Hispanic educators to pressure the state legislature into addressing the cultural and linguistic needs of their children in the public school system. After a two-year campaign, Massachusetts became the first state to pass its own bilingual education law, the 1971 Transitional Bilingual Education Act (Chapter 71A), which mandated bilingual education in any school district with twenty or more non-English speaking students, and earmarked funds for implementing these programs. Besides offering classes in the immigrants' native languages, the Act also called for classes on the history of their "home" countries. But as Skrentny pointed out, the fact that immigration from Europe began declining after 1965 (with the exception of the Portuguese and Greeks) meant there were fewer European immigrants in Canada. In 1964, Edith Ferguson found that: "among the immigrants that arrived in the United States after 1970, those who are most fluent in English are the ones who earn less income, despite having higher education rates." According to her, this reflected their reluctance to work in physically strenuous yet better remunerated jobs. Similar observations were made about Portuguese immigrants in Canada. In 1964, Edith Ferguson found that the average length of schooling among Portuguese immigrants in Toronto was 3.7 years for men and 2.8 for women. However, the proportion of Portuguese workers in Canada earning $10,000 or more (66.6%) was higher than other immigrant groups who arrived between 1967 and 1977 with similar or higher educational levels, such as the Italians (45.9%), East Indians (41.4%), Greeks (41.3%), and Chinese (34.7%). While Portuguese-Canadians in Toronto have greater opportunities for educational and occupational advancement than those in Fall River and New Bedford, the academic achievements of young Portuguese males remain one of the lowest in that Canadian city. The reason perhaps being the continued strength of the residential construction industry in Toronto's ever-expanding suburbs and downtown high-rise condominiums (Ferguson, 1964; Sá Pereira, 1985, 55, 59-61; Gilbert, 1989, 49, 120-121; Miranda, 2010, 96).

For an overview of this discussion see Nunes, 2003; Gilbert, 1989, 122-137; and Sá & Borges, 2009.
immigrant children using these bilingual language programs. As a result, most of the funding disbursed by federal and state governments was channeled to Spanish speakers, "the original intended beneficiaries"; for instance, in 1973, only four Portuguese bilingual programs received federal funding, compared to 165 Spanish equivalents. In 1972, the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program policy authorized the federal government to assist in "planning, developing, establishing, and operating" programs providing ethnic students with opportunities "to learn about the nature of their own cultural heritage, and to study the contributions of the cultural heritages of other ethnic groups of the Nation." But once again, this federal program "never received anything more than token funding." In the meantime, Portuguese consuls were overwhelmed by the growing number of immigrant families with school-aged children arriving in areas outside the larger Portuguese-American centres. Some diplomats sent urgent requests for help to Lisbon, while others took more direct approaches to resolving the problem, like Consul Adriano S. Veiga in Waterbury, who in 1971 brought together 50 teachers and club directors to create an organization dedicated to introducing Portuguese classes into Connecticut's public schools. Fortunately for community organizers, there were some certified teachers among the newcomers, who joined the staff of existing schools or founded new ones. The number and size of Portuguese community schools and teaching staff also increased in Canada. Montreal saw the inauguration of three new schools between 1971 and 1975, one of them (the Atlantic School) sponsored by the Portuguese bank Atlântico. Older community schools also grew. For instance, in 1971, the FPCC's primary school in Toronto began offering classes up to the sixth grade (partially subsidized by the Portuguese bank Fonsecas & Burnay), which was extended to a full preparatory curriculum the next year. In 1974, the school had 762 students at five different sites. After that, its enrollment began to drop (622 students in 1976) not only because of the declining migration flow from Portugal, but also due to growing competition from other schools emerging in the community, which were granted official status by the Portuguese government faster than

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1140 Comunidades Portuguesas, January 1971, Year 6, n. 21, 20; letter, Consul Jorge de B. A. Freitas, Boston, to Ambassador Vasco V. Garin, February 12, 1970, PEA M334, Escola Portuguesa "Clube Juventude Lusitana (Cumberland), AHD.
1141 The other two were the Santa Cruz mission's school, which started with 60 students in 1971, and grew to 350 students and 11 teachers in 1974; and the Lusitana High School, founded in 1975. Both schools were founded by Fr. Frederico Fatela.
The Portuguese in Canada also advocated for their native language to be included in the public school curriculum in areas with a large "Lusophone" population. Some of these demands were organized by the students themselves, as was the case in Toronto's Harbord Collegiate Institute, where in 1973 the student representative body, led by the young Portuguese-Canadian Manuel Azevedo, circulated a petition asking for the introduction of a Portuguese language class (Figure 66). Two years later, their wish came true and the class was inaugurated with 35 students. They were also responsible for instructing the Toronto Board of Education on what Portuguese publications to subscribe to, and what books and music records to buy for the school's library. According to one of the students involved in this initiative: "At Harbord there is Portuguese culture but one that is typically Torontonian. That culture results from the fusion of not just the North, South and Centre of Portugal, but also the Mainland and the Adjacent Islands. All sit in one room and discover by themselves that they are all equal, all Portuguese."¹¹⁴³

The Portuguese ethnic media also expanded in the 1970s, with television now offering immigrants more diverse and accessible Lusophone content. At least one Portuguese television station and seven programs on various channels were launched in New England, Ontario, and Quebec, in 1973-75. Through shows like Passport to Portugal - produced by New Bedford-Providence's WTEV (Channel 6) in 1970 and broadcast in California in 1971-73 - or Reflexos de Portugal - on Montreal's National Cablevision in 1971 - or the many others that followed, immigrants of variable literacy skills were able to see the images and hear the sounds of their home country and its peoples, and revisit the places and customs of their youth from their living rooms, in a way that no other media could provide. The number of Portuguese publications in North America also increased rapidly. In Toronto and Montreal alone there were 22 new periodicals launched in that decade.¹¹⁴⁴ New sources of advertising revenue became available for Portuguese ethnic media, as host governments started publishing more public announcements in the immigrants' native languages, and the growing number of community businesses sought to advertise their services to their co-ethnics. This reduced their dependency on the Estado Novo's subsidies, thus increasing their editorial freedom. While still publishing preapproved content

¹¹⁴³ Edmundo Duarte, "Português na Harbord", Comunidade, July 11, 1975 (m.t.), YS-CTASC.
from the SEIT and ANI, the Portuguese ethnic press began focusing more on host society issues, especially those affecting their local communities. These new sources of revenue, however, were not enough to sustain the *Diário de Noticias*, which published its last issue on October 19, 1973, marking the end of a 54-year-long era in the history of Portuguese-American press.  

Meanwhile, in Lisbon, the weekly *O Emigrante* (renamed *Mundo Português* after 1974) sought to connect with the Portuguese diaspora as a platform to "inform, discuss, denounce, and demand" on matters of importance to the emigrants. Founded by Valentim G. Morais and pastor Vitor J. Melicias in January 1970, at the outset of Caetano's "liberal spring", the newspaper was distributed in various parts of the world. Because it was published in Portugal, *O Emigrante* was subjected to the regime's censorship. Most of its content was discreet and reflected the views of liberal reformists, including Moreira and his diasporic vision of Portuguese nationhood. Still, the censors cut a number of articles deemed problematic that dealt with the emigrants' miserable living conditions, the horrors of the colonial war, or even Christian appeals for peace. Among these were opinion pieces by a Portuguese-American contributor, who argued in favour of American naturalization and encouraged emigrants to vote in their adopted countries. Criticizing the Portuguese government for only sponsoring the visits of business delegations and having only profits in mind when dealing with emigrants, he wondered: "Do they think we all have great fortunes in banks or hidden under our mattresses?" The author contrasted this with the fact that community organizations had to cover the costs of bringing artists, football teams, ranchos and other entertainers from Portugal out of their own pockets. He added:

> We have the right to benefit from Portugal's cultural evolution through aid, which ought to be sent [to us] by government agencies whose mission is to educate and transmit the richness of *lusophone* culture, of which every emigrant is proud of, even if they have little knowledge of it... We seriously need to face our rights and obligations with the Mother Country and create a distinct and indissoluble personality, capable of imposing and demanding from Portuguese society the place that is ours by justice...  

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1145 In his final editorial, João Rocha blamed an ongoing strike by pulp and paper factory workers in Canada (likely in Quebec), the inflating prices of postal fees and printing paper, and the growing labour costs for his decision to close the *Diário* ("O 'Diário' termina hoje a sua publicação," *Diário de Noticias*, October 19, 1975, 1, DN-UMASS).

1146 In December 1964, the Portuguese government approved funding for a similar newspaper called *Correio de Portugal*, with the subtitle "The Newspaper of the Portuguese Communities in the World." It is not clear if this newspaper was ever published (PC-57, Pt. 33, Correspondência... edição do semanário "Correio de Portugal" com o subtítulo "Jornal das Comunidades Portuguesas no Mundo," projecto dos Estatutos da Sociedade que o vai editar, AOS/ CO, ANTT).


1149 Medeiros, “Que Nos Deram Em Troca?” (m.t.), 1973.
Similar complaints were made to Portuguese diplomats by community organizers, like the president of New Bedford's Feast of the Blessed Sacrament, who in 1973 requested financial aid to pay for the trip of a rancho troupe from Madeira. After having his request denied by the Casa de Portugal and a few other government agencies, the organizer shared his frustration with Ambassador Themido:

Here we are trying to expose Portuguese Culture to thousands of people and no one cares to help. Please realize Mr. Ambassador that many in the [organizing] committee are American born and yet we have an inner warmth and pride of being of Portuguese descent, that we are sacrificing our time, money and hard work to be part of this great traditional Feast. Yet we are having difficulty in convenc [sic] the Portuguese themselves.\textsuperscript{1150}

The ambassador explained he had no funds in his budget for cultural expenses of "that kind", and suggested they seek out TAP's representative in the United States, for whom the prospects of future charter business might convince him to sponsor the feast.

Ranchos continued to grow in popularity in the Portuguese communities, now encouraged by their host societies' multiculturalist ideologies. Even longstanding Portuguese-American fraternities like the UPC, now struggling in the age of welfare state, tried to harness ranchos' popular appeal in order to attract new members. In 1971, the mutual aid society sponsored a tour by a rancho from Figueira da Foz, which performed at the UPC's lodges in New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. This initiative followed a resolution passed by its general membership calling on the UPC to become more involved in "Portuguese activities" as a way of promoting its financial services.\textsuperscript{1151} This was the first time the old fraternity organized a tour with so many performers (40 in total), which was a major undertaking. To cut costs, the UPC’s directors asked lodge members to house the performers in their homes and in their friends' and relatives'. In the end the tour was a success, with every performance attracting large crowds; in Newark, the interest was such that they had to schedule a second show, where the rancho performed for 1,500 people.\textsuperscript{1152} According to the UPC's Secretary-General: "hundreds of members and many other people not affiliated with us, were set into motion and put to work for the good of the Society... Besides this, thousands of people from the Portuguese Communities, now know that our Society is not just another insurance company,

\textsuperscript{1150} Letter, David Correia, President of the Committee Feast of the Blessed Sacrament, to Ambassador João Hall Themido, April 4, 1973, PEA M405, Festivais, Congressos e Comemorações Promovidos pela Colónia, AHD.
\textsuperscript{1151} UPC Annual Report 1971, M45, União Portuguesa Continental, AHD.
\textsuperscript{1152} “Êxito sem precedentes do Rancho da Casa do Povo de Maiorca nos E. Unidos”, Diário de Notícias, August 18, 1971, 1, DN-UMASS.
but a Fraternal Society also.\textsuperscript{1153}

Visits by Portuguese artists and celebrities increased in the 1970s. Sometimes these tours prompted them to return to North America as immigrants, as was the case of the young fado singer Natércia da Conceição.\textsuperscript{1154} After touring New England with the Vedetas ensemble, Conceição decided to abandon her promising career in Lisbon's fado scene and settle in Massachusetts. In 1970, together with Valentina Félix - another fado singer who settled in the United States after performing at the UPC's 1969 annual convention\textsuperscript{1155} - Conceição opened what was possibly the first fado house in North America, in Acushnet, Massachusetts (Figure 67).\textsuperscript{1156} Amateur fado singers started appearing in almost every Portuguese settlement at this point, attracting patrons from inside and outside the community to its ethnic club halls and restaurants.\textsuperscript{1157} Immigrant musicians also created their own travelling ensembles and toured North America. One such troupe was the Azorean Caravan (Caravana Açores), organized by António Câmara "Tabico", who migrated clandestinely to Canada from São Miguel in 1970. After working in a variety of menial jobs in Montreal and Toronto, Tabico decided to pursue his passion for singing desgarradas (a form of improvised and often humorous fado singing battles). Together with his wife Lurdes Faria, he gathered a number of Portuguese musicians in Toronto and began performing in the city. In 1971, his Caravan toured Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, and various New England locations. For some time, Tabico conciliated his job as a janitorial worker with his touring of North America.\textsuperscript{1158}

Portugal Day celebrations also grew in popularity during this decade, expanding to new locations and engaging a larger number of organizers than before. Montreal (and Vancouver) celebrated the national holiday for the first time in 1970, with the participation of Quebec's Premier Robert Bourassa, his Minister of Cultural Affairs and Immigration, various members of the federal and provincial parliaments, the Archbishop of Montreal, and other dignitaries.\textsuperscript{1159} During the preparations for these festivities, a group of community organizations offered the city

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\textsuperscript{1153} UPC Annual Report 1972, M45, União Portuguesa Continental AHD.
\textsuperscript{1154} Natércia da Conceição (1934-2009) was born in Vila Franca de Xira, north of Lisbon. She moved to the capital at the age of 12. Before migrating to the U.S., Conceição recorded various LPs and was praised as one of the potential successors of Amália Rodrigues. Besides continuing her singing career in Massachusetts, she was a radio hostess with Portuguese stations in New England. One of the highlights of her fado career was performing for President Bill Clinton at the White House.
\textsuperscript{1155} Flyer, 1969, PEA M333, Portuguese Continental Union, AHD.
\textsuperscript{1157} Anderson & Higgs, 1976, 182.
\textsuperscript{1158} Avelino Teixeira, "Faleceu o Mestre António Tabico", February 12, 2013, Venus Creations, url: www.venuscreations.ca/view.asp?id=5913
\textsuperscript{1159} Various flyers and news clippings, June to July 1970, PEA M656, IIa Celebração do Dia da Festa Nacional, AHD.
\end{flushleft}
a bust of Camões and asked Mayor Jean Drapeau to rename a street after the epic poet. Drapeau went further and promised to name a public square scheduled for construction the next year, in Le Plateau Mont-Royal, as Parc du Portugal - an area later known as "Little Portugal".1160

While Portuguese communities became more autonomous from the Estado Novo in the early 1970s, its diplomats still had significant pull over community affairs and commanded considerable deference from expatriates. For example, a crowd of over 600 bystanders greeted the Foreign Affairs Minister Rui Patrício as he walked the streets of the Ironbound in 1970 on an official visit.1161 Diplomats kept disbursing subsidies to cooperative community leaders and guiding them towards political cohesion, while ethnic organizations continued to invite these homeland officials to their functions and bestow on them honorary memberships.1162 Also invited to these receptions were local politicians who tried to ingratiate themselves with this ethnic constituency. Sometimes this led to the awkward (even if inadvertent) approval of "fascist" symbols, as was the case when the Ontario Minister of Trade and Development, Allan Grossman, attended a dinner offered by Toronto's FPCC for the departing Consul Luis Martins in 1971, and sat at the head table draped in a Moçidade Portuguesa flag.1163

Furthering trade became a higher priority in the agenda of Portuguese diplomats in Canada and the United States, as Portugal's trade surplus with those countries continued to grow in the early 1970s. Portuguese exporters recognized the capacity of emigrant markets for selling and promoting their products abroad and increased their presence in these communities. Canadian officials, like Minister Grossman, whose electoral riding included Kensington Market, were also interested in developing trade with the EFTA member. During his trade visit to Portugal in 1971, Grossman claimed the largely working-class Portuguese community in Ontario had become an "elite" for whom Canadians had "the most respect and consideration."1164 The minister's increased respect for the emigrants' transnational economic and financial capacity was

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1160 Darpeau's promise would only become reality in 1975, when the city finally unveiled the Parc du Portugal (letter, Consul Luis Gaspar da Silva, Montreal, to PMFA, Oct. 23, 1970, PEA M761, Relações Bilaterais de Portugal com o Canadá, AHD).
1162 Telegram, Amb. S. Garrido to PMFA, February 19, 1973, PEA M761, Relações Bilaterais de Portugal com o Canadá, AHD.
1163 In 1973, a delegation from the Moçidade's national committee opened a training centre in San Francisco (the first outside of Portugal) dedicated to instilling "Portugueseness" among Portuguese-American youth. This delegation also visited New York, Newark, New Bedford, and Ludlow to study the possibility of creating additional centres (Correio Português, April 30, 1971, F0571, 2010-018/005 David Higgs fonds, CTASC; and letter, Manual Lourenço Antunes, Moçidade Portuguesa National Commissioner, to PMFA, May 25, 1973, PEA M766, Deslocação a Cidades Americanas de Portugueses, AHD).
1164 "Mesa Redonda...", "O Ministro Allan Grossman... de visita a Lisboa," Correio Português, August 15, 1971, N473 reel 1, AO.
shared by Portuguese banks, like Atlântico, Fonsecas & Burnay, and Pinto & Sotto Mayor, which began opening offices in North America, offering to handle the emigrants' ever-growing remittances and facilitate their investments in the homeland. As previously mentioned, these banks sought to win the favour of their customers by funding their community institutions and events, and by advertising in the ethnic media.\footnote{Cartas ao Director, ibid.; letter, Mário M. Félix, TAP delegate, to Consul Mário J. M. Freitas, New York, December 5, 1971, M45, Convites das Agremiações Portuguesas AHD; David Higgs notes F0571 2010-018/002 David Higgs fonds, CTASC.}

Portuguese political exiles in Canada saw things differently. On October 5, 1971 (the 61st anniversary of Portugal's Republican Revolution) the MDP sent a communiqué to various Canadian politicians, media outlets and progressive organizations, calling for the government to prevent the proliferation of Portuguese banks in Canada and curb the growing outflow of remittances. In their eyes, these transactions were a "double treason", since they drained capital from Canada to finance Portugal's dictatorship and its wars - curiously, in 1970, a PCDA delegation accepted the Portuguese consul's invitation to attend the inauguration of the Fonsecas & Burnay's office in Toronto.\footnote{Communiqué, MDP, Oct. 5, 1971, SC, CI (2), pr. 1913, u.i. 7685, Associação Democrática Portuguesa, PIDE/DGS, ANTT; Júlio Rosado and Manuel Sanches, "Preamble", Annual report 1970, PCDA, F0579 2009-022/005 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.}

By the early 1970s, political factions in Canada's Portuguese communities were well defined and its representatives made in-roads with mainstream politicians and their parties. The PCDA and MDP continued their efforts to raise the immigrants' civic consciousness, and advocating on behalf of political prisoners in Portugal and war resisters in Canada.\footnote{In 1973, the PCDA received requests for information and assistance from deserters who had fled to Denmark, France, and Canada (various letters, January-May 1973, F0579, 2009-022/006 (1), PCDA fonds, CTASC).} They also restated their support for the now socialist dominated FPLN and their commitment to "an armed revolution seeking the radical destruction of Portugal's current socio-political structures and their restoration on the basis of socialism by the Portuguese people, for the Portuguese people."\footnote{Communiqué, MDP, December 20, 1970, F0579, 2009-022/005 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.}

However, their focus had started to shift towards local politics, as reflected by their intensifying relations with Canadian political parties, labour unions, ethnic federations, and other progressive organizations. Some PCDA members joined the ranks of the Communist Party of Canada,\footnote{Letter, Caldeira Coelho, PMFA, to PIDE Director F. S. Pais, November 15, 1972, SC, CI (2), pr. 1913, u.i. 7685, Associação Democrática Portuguesa, PIDE/DGS, ANTT.} while others helped Anglophone NDP candidates running for public office in Portuguese-heavy ridings.\footnote{Some PCDA members had been grassroots organizers for the NDP since the mid-1960s. One of these politicians was the Toronto city councilor and later MP Dan Heap, who developed close ties with the PCDA and other progressive and labour} These "anti-fascists" also began collaborating more closely with political exiles from
Countries like Brazil, Chile, or Spain, and were regularly asked for financial and logistic support by newer leftist Canadian organizations. In late 1969, the PCDA welcomed one of its most prestigious members, the Portuguese-Brazilian sociologist Florestan Fernandes, who taught at the University of Toronto until 1975. In 1970, the MDP co-founded the Anti-Torture International Front, together with the Committee Solidarity-Brazil and a group of Greek, Haitian, and Vietnamese activists.

Despite their best efforts, the PCDA's executives now had to deal with an aging, frustrated, and increasingly disengaged membership. Furthermore, as noted in its 1970 annual report, there was a growing lack of institutional memory among current members, who were not well informed about the association's history and founders. The new managers tried to dispel the "myths" that the PCDA was a communist organization, strictly interested in politics, and virtually dead. They organized picnics, children's parties, dances, created a library, hosted lectures, organized trips to the Azores with the help of "non-official" Portuguese travel agencies, and participated in various kinds of community events. However, the PCDA's financial woes became a significant problem, which limited the scope of its actions. In 1970, members Jaime Monteiro and Joaquim Alves, both small-business owners, launched the "non-profit commercial society" Portugal Investment Corporation, of which 90% of the shareholders were PCDA members. The following year, the two men were expelled from the PCDA because, according to Monteiro, their corporation refused to lend it money at no interest.

Activists in the Portuguese community ("Eleições Gerais no Canadá", A Verdade, n. 11, October 1965, 16; José Henriques, "Ainda a Semana Portuguesa", O Boletim, June-July, 1971, Year 1, n. 9-10; and "Ainda as Eleições", September 1971, Year 1, n. 12, 12 & 14, F0579, 2009-022/001 (10 & 13) PCDA fonds, CTASC). For more on Dan Heap and his relation with the Portuguese community, see Miranda, 2010.

In October 22-24, 1971, Spanish exiles in Toronto organized their own pro-amnesty conference, which had many of the same sponsors as the PCDA's 1966 conference, including Rev. Kimball, Andrew Brewin, David MacDonald, Pierre Berton, and others. Rui C. Viana attended as the representative of the "North American anti-fascist Portuguese organizations" at this conference. (letters, Tony Godinho, Secretary PCDA, to SCDA, February 5, 1970; flyer, Conference for Amnesty in Spain, F0579, 2009-022/005 (4 & 8), PCDA fonds, CTASC).

Florestan Fernandes was an influential Marxist thinker arrested many times by Brazil's dictatorial regime. He was also the main challenger of Freyre's lusotropicalist thesis. For more on the legacy of Fernandes' ideas in Brazil's racial, labour, and immigration policies, see George Reid Andrews, Blacks and Whites in Sao Paulo Brazil, 1888-1988, 1991 (letters, Portugal Democrático, São Paulo, to PCDA, September 22, 1969; and Tony Godinho, PCDA, to Florestan Fernandes, November 3, 1969, F0579, 2009-022/004 (14), PCDA fonds, CTASC).


In 1965, the PCDA had also considered launching a consumer cooperative that could "free its members of the speculative profiteering of some commercial organizations." It is not clear if this cooperative ever was created ("Uma Ideia em Marcha", A Verdade n. 5, January 1965, 11 (m.t.), F0579, 2009-022/001 (9), PCDA fonds, CTASC).

Jaime Monteiro, "A PCDA Afunda-se Por Culpa de Quem?" Luso-Canadiano, February 15, 1971, F0571, 2010-018/004 (5) David Higgs fonds, CTASC.
In Montreal, Rui Viana took the helm of the MDP, which also faced decreasing membership. He changed the organizations' activist methods and stopped calling rallies where only a handful of protesters showed up. Instead, he decided to invest in cultural programming. In Viana's view, "only culture or hunger can make revolutions, and with our fridge full and our books closed we are magnificent ground for all kinds of servitude." The cultural activities that he had in mind, however, were not the rural folk performances idealized by the Estado Novo, but more sophisticated Portuguese arts, literature, and scholarship.

In 1971, Viana invited the PCDA to join with the MDP in creating a North America-wide organization that could mobilize Portuguese "anti-fascists" across the continent, help them set-up local committees, and increase their collective leverage with Canadian and American officials and the media. Other goals included sending financial aid for the PCP's armed revolutionary wing, and sending clothing, medicine, and money to those colonial regions "freed" by African rebels. At this point, a group of young educated activists emerged in New England, most of them recently arrived from Portugal, like Onésimo T. Almeida and José R. Aica. In October 1973, Portuguese "anti-fascists" in Canada met for the first time with fellow activists from southern Massachusetts – organized under the Fall River Portuguese Committee for Democratic Action (or Fall River Democratic Movement) - for a meeting in Montreal that gathered close to 75 participants. All parties agreed to coordinate their political actions against the regime and form a united front. It is not clear if any of the CPDP's members were present at this meeting, or even if their organization was still active at this point. We know, however, that Abílio Águas continued to denounce the Estado Novo in the United States, since, in April

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1177 Born in Lisbon, Rui Alberto Castro da Cunha Viana (1927-2001) wrote for various publications, including Carreira Nova, which he owned. In 1965, he moved to Montreal with his family, where he worked as a librarian. Besides serving as the MDP's president in the early 1970s, Viana was also the vice-president of the Anti-Torture International Front and the Ligue pour la Liberation de l'Afrique Portugaise et Astral. He returned to Portugal in 1975, where he became the chief redactor of the socialist party MDP/CDE's organ Unidade, and the labour confederation CGTP's organ Alavanca.

1178 Letter, R. Viana and Amadeu Moura, MDP, to PCDA, July 21, 1969 (m.t.), F0579, 2009-022/004 (17), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

1179 Letter, R. C. Viana, MDP, to PCDA, September 14, 1971, F0579, 2009-022/005 (8), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

1180 Born in São Miguel in 1946, Onésimo Teotónio de Almeida moved to the U.S. in 1972 after completing an undergraduate degree at Lisbon's Catholic University. He continued his graduate education at Providence's Brown University, where he became professor of Portuguese cultural and intellectual history; chair of the Department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies; and editor of a Portuguese studies academic journal. Since 1979, Almeida has hosted talk shows on New Bedford's Portuguese Channel and Portugal's RTP-Açores/ RTP-International. Today, he remains a prolific scholar, poet, and essayist.

1181 José Alves da Rosa Aica obtained a law degree from the University of Lisbon before he moved to Toronto in 1971 to escape military duty. There he became the PCDA's executive secretary until he moved to East Providence the following year, where he settled with his parents. There he continued his studies at Brown University and later taught Portuguese in the Fall River/ New Bedford area (letter, José Aica, East Providence, to PCDA, February 14, 1972, F0579 2009-022/005 (13), PCDA fonds, CTASC).

1182 Clipping, Bill Burgess, "Portuguese Opposition Abroad", The Torch, October 19, 1973, Vol. VII, n. 6, Southern Massachusetts University, SC, CI (2), pr. 1913, u.i. 7685, Associação Democrática Portuguesa... PIDE/DGS, ANTT.
1970, together with the magazine *Ibérica* and the International League for the Rights of Man, he co-organized a press conference for Mário Soares in New York.\textsuperscript{1183}

Opposition to Portugal's colonialism from American and Canadian radical organizations, as well as Protestant and Catholic clergymen,\textsuperscript{1184} also intensified in this period. Portuguese diplomatic offices in North America became the target of various pickets and bomb threats. On June 9, 1970, an undetonated bomb was found outside the *Casa de Portugal* - as well as the South African, Brazilian and Haitian consulates in New York. On the night of August 29, a dynamite bomb exploded in front of the Portuguese embassy in Washington, causing significant property damage; two days later, another undetonated device was found in an annex of the embassy, this one capable of destroying the entire building. The Revolutionary Action Party assumed responsibility for these and other explosives placed in the embassies of countries that, according to them, engaged in or lent support to "the exploitation and oppression of African people around the world."\textsuperscript{1185} In 1973, the Toronto consulate also received a bomb threat and had its telephone lines severed, while the Boston consulate had its walls vandalized with graffiti like: "Defeat Portuguese colonialism;" "Viva FRELIMO;" or "Blood of Africans". By April 1974, anti-colonial protests outside Portuguese foreign offices had become a regular affair, generating a mixture of outrage and embarrassment among those immigrants and descendants who identified with their Portuguese imperial heritage (Figure 68).\textsuperscript{1186}

**Generational shifts: young Portuguese activists and their political uses of race and ethnicity**

A new generation of Portuguese male and female social workers, journalists, teachers, and other civic professionals, emerged in Canada and the United States in the 1970s and assumed leadership positions in their communities. Many of them had either arrived at a very young age or were born in the new country, while others had recently arrived from Portugal. They were usually young, bilingual, generally better educated than their peers, and moved comfortably in both mainstream and immigrant contexts. Growing up in Portuguese working-class

\textsuperscript{1186} Telegram, Consul Mello Gouveia, Toronto, to PMFA, April 9, 1973; telegrams, Amb. J. H. Themido, Washington, to PMFA, September 27 & November 2, 1973, PEA M761, Relações Bilaterais... com o Canadá. Processo Geral, AHD.
neighbourhoods during one of the most politically engaging periods in recent history, these young activists were well aware of the deep social inequalities in their host societies and the accomplishments of the large social justice and civil rights movements of the '60s-'70s. Like the older "anti-fascists", they too were "radical ethnic brokers" who mediated between the immigrant community and the larger society. Although, unlike the older generation, these young ethnics focused primarily on their North American reality and strove to improve the everyday lives of immigrant workers, as opposed to nourishing their ties to the homeland. Nonetheless, they maintained personal connections with Portugal and followed its political developments with much interest, especially after 1974. As most Portuguese democrats around the world, they would receive a jolt of national pride and an intense political education from their fellow countrymen in the homeland. Many of these emerging leaders were inspired by the revolutionary enthusiasm in Portugal and adopted its pervasive Marxist language and socialist goals.

Among these activists were social workers influenced by the "community development" methods in vogue in the United States since the 1960s, which focused on empowering marginalized individuals by including them in the planning and management of social programs targeting systemic problems, thus promoting their capacity for self-determination. These community workers created their own secular social agencies, even though Catholicism remained an important element in the political education and social consciousness of some of them. This was the case with João Medeiros and Domingos Marques, who ran the Portuguese Communitarian Movement (MCP) and its leftist organ Comunidade (1975-79) out of Toronto's West End Young Men's Christian Association (Figure 69). Both men had studied for the priesthood in Portugal before moving to Canada and were deeply influenced by the reforms of the Second Vatican Council and the social doctrine of Liberation Theology. The vital role that...

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1188 Born in São Miguel, João Medeiros hoped one day to become a missionary in Angola. He started his seminary studies in Terceira, then later moved to Sta. Iria da Azóia and Olivais (in the outskirts of Lisbon), where he became more critical of the Estado Novo. In 1971, at age 26, Medeiros joined his parents and siblings in Canada, in 1971. The YMCA hired him the following year as a Portuguese youth outreach worker. Medeiros recruited five other young volunteers, including Domingos Marques, and founded what would become the MCP and Comunidade. In the late 1970s, Medeiros ran as city alderman for the NDP and became a union manager at LIUNA's Local 185.
1189 After leaving the seminary to join his parents in Canada in 1968 (as discussed in chapter two), Marques continued his education, obtaining a bachelors degree in Sociology. In Toronto, Marques dedicated much of his life to the Portuguese community, as a youth organizer, reporter, social worker, language instructor, interpreter, newspaper owner, amateur historian, school board trustee, rehabilitation consultant, and president of the Alliance of Portuguese Clubs and Associations of Ontario. For a retrospective on his life, see the PCHP online exhibit Comunidade newspaper, 1975-1979, url: http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp/Comunidade_records
priests played in rural Portugal, as the closest thing to social workers, also made them role models for young idealists like Marques, who recalled:

For whatever reason, my mom said... I wanted to be a priest because I was by nature... of different temperament [than my siblings]; more docile, I'm sure... Somehow they convinced me I was going to be a priest, and change the world... What does a priest do, especially in the old days? ...They were counselors, they did rehabilitation, they did everything.1190

Once in Toronto, Marques started working as a youth organizer at St. Mary's church, under the supervision of Fr. Cunha's young aide, and as a reporter in *O Jornal Português* (Figure 70). He remembers developing his political awareness by watching Cunha's machinations and learning about the different factions in and outside the community:

Father Cunha had controlled everything about politics in Toronto... You would go to any religious procession or event, there was Minister [John] Yaremko, Minister this... [Y]ou had all these people going after the ethnic vote; even though we couldn't vote then, they were still after us. And so it's natural I started seeing those things... "Why are they here? What do they want from us?" So gradually you start to become politicized.1191

Marques cut ties with St. Mary's church in 1970 after Cunha took over the parish's youth group and imposed his overbearing ways. Before joining the MCP in 1972, Marques furthered his knowledge of social justice issues by volunteering as an interpreter, responsible for conveying to the courts and state bureaucrats the various problems faced by his fellow immigrants in Canada. Working alongside Medeiros and others, he continued to develop his progressive ideals, eventually becoming a trustee in Toronto's Catholic School Board for the NDP. Medeiros too would run for Toronto city council with the NDP in 1978, as well as other MCP/Comunidade collaborators.1192

Montreal also saw the emergence of a group of secular social workers who were critical of the communities' priests, even though they were helped by Catholic institutions. In 1972, at a meeting called by the St. Vincent de Paul Society, they founded the Portuguese Centre of Reference and Social Promotion (CPRPS), which offered social services to Portuguese immigrants with funding from the Sta. Cruz Mission and the federal government.1193

Nonetheless, in an interview given to Marques years after the April revolution, CPRPS workers...
contended that the Sta. Cruz Mission had delayed the social "evolution" of Portuguese immigrants; especially after Fatela took over from Leblanc as pastor.\footnote{Transcript of interview with CPRPS members, by Domingos Marques, c. 1978 (m.t.), 2010-019/001, Domingos Marques fonds, CTASC.} Also in 1972, a group of Canadian, American, and Portuguese youth launched *Radio Centre Ville*, a "pirate" broadcast in the city's Quartier Saint Louis. Their goal was to become an outlet for the residents of their working-class neighbourhood to discuss local issues and other meaningful topics neglected by the mainstream media. For its first broadcast, the Portuguese hosts interviewed the "anti-fascist" Rui Viana - a clear departure from the traditional inaugural address by the local consul.\footnote{Hispanic, Greek and Haitian programming was later added and *Centre Ville* became a licensed multicultural radio station (blog "os50anos.com", url: www.festejamos50anos.com/anos-70/1972/radio-centre-ville/)} The MDP also began collaborating with the CPRPS soon after its creation, prompting Ambassador Garrido to request that Lisbon elevate the Montreal consulate to a higher diplomatic class so it could hire more staff, in order to face the growing threat of a united opposition front.\footnote{Telegram, Amb. S. Garrido to PMFA, July 5, 1973, PEA M761, Relações Bilaterais de Portugal com o Canadá... AHD.} 

Progressive social advocacy organizations mushroomed in various Portuguese centres in North America at this time. The Cambridge Organization of Portuguese-Americans (COPA), the Portuguese Youth Cultural Organization of Fall River, the Somerville Portuguese-American League, the Portuguese Communities Activities Council of Gloucester, the *Caisse d'économie des Portugais* of Montreal, the Working Women Community Centre and the Portuguese Interagency Network of Toronto, to name a few, all offered important services and outreach programs, needs assessment studies, and advocated on behalf of immigrant workers and their families on a variety of issues.

Like their predecessors, this generation of civic leaders understood there was political strength to be gained if Portuguese immigrants presented a united front when dealing with host officials, and began making efforts in that direction. In June 1973, COPA organized the "Portuguese National Convention" at Harvard University, bringing together 200 delegates from New England, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and California for a three-day meeting. They proposed solutions for a range of socioeconomic problems affecting the Portuguese, and asserted their political power as an ethnic (and racial) constituency. The organizers had great ambitions for this gathering, which they were convinced would "mark a conscious and definite change in our way of acting and decision-making as a Community." They invited various American officials, including President Nixon, who declined. Notably missing from their guest
list were the Portuguese diplomats and most of the priests, doctors, lawyers, professors and other distinguished personalities of the older Portuguese-American establishment. As reported to the Portuguese ambassador by an infiltrated observer, those attending this meeting were mostly youth, some with political ambitions, others aiming to become community leaders, all of whom expressed a desire to move beyond the "saudade" (nostalgia) of previous generations, even though some had only recently arrived from Portugal.  

The convention's organizers were influenced by the civil rights movement; or in the words of COPA's director Aurélio Torres: "A lot was being said about black awareness at the time - we wanted to raise Portuguese awareness." They were also prompted into action by the former Mayor of Cambridge Alfred E. Vellucci's failed attempt at securing federal funds to develop a Portuguese cultural district in that suburb of Boston. Hence, the main topic of debate in their meeting's agenda was the racial matrix used by the American government when allocating funding for underprivileged racial and ethnic "minorities," and how they failed to recognize the Portuguese as a distinct "cultural entity". As the organizers saw it: "although the population index of the Portuguese Community [in Cambridge] may be twice the black population and four times the Spanish, in [the] federal budget... we were granted a modest and insufficient amount... only because we are included and considered as part of the Spanish Community." These community advocates tried to resolve the longstanding racial complexity surrounding Portuguese-Americans and take advantage of their racialized identity in order to benefit from affirmative action programs. The participants agreed that Portuguese-Americans should "preserve", "develop" and "exalt" their "ethnic values" in order to access government resources earmarked for racial minorities.

Ironically, the older ethnic leaders' success in asserting the "whiteness" of European Portuguese was now detrimental to the progressive goals of their successors, who saw other

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1199 In 1995, the Portuguese community unveiled a bust of their beloved former councilor and mayor in East Cambridge - Vellucci's electoral district - "in recognition and gratitude" for his solicitude.

1200 The Truman's President's Committee on Civil Rights defined "minority" as "a group which is treated or which regards itself as a people apart," based on physical or cultural characteristics (cit. in Skrentny, 2002, 91).

racial minorities obtain access to employment, housing and other affirmative action programs; among the beneficiaries were those Cape Verdeans who assumed an African-American identity. Other racial and linguistic groups aside African-Americans lobbied the United States government to recognize their status as marginalized minorities deserving of equity programs. But according to Skrentny, the addition of American Indians, Asian Americans, Latinos and women to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's scope of action was "not based on mass mobilization but more on a simple understanding of which groups were analogous to blacks." Other pieces of legislation introduced a range of equity programs covering racial, ethnic and linguistic minorities, but the Portuguese were always left out; the only exception being the 1972 Ethnic Heritage Studies Program.

The overwhelming majority of delegates at the Cambridge convention voted in favour of asking municipal, state, and federal officials to recognize the Portuguese as an official "ethnic minority", including all who identified with that heritage, regardless of "race, creed, or sex." This resolution also called for Portuguese communities to "promote education, self-consciousness and responsibility" and strived to bring about "that unity that will allow us to achieve all our objectives." As reported in The Cape Verdean, of Lynn, Massachusetts, the participants described this meeting as a pivotal moment in the communities' history that represented a shift from trying to "melt into a native-born American majority," which marginalized “non-white” Cape Verdeans, into asserting a distinct multiracial Portuguese-American identity. Onésimo Almeida, one of the organizers, told the Cape Verdean publication: "no matter how the government of Portugal considers them... the Portuguese here will be welcome - whether they're black or white - if they want to join us."

At this point, Cape Verdean-Americans had begun to organize themselves as an ethnic group separate from the Portuguese. In 1972, some of their community leaders decided to emulate the PAF and founded the Cape Verdean American Federation in Rhode Island, whose goals were to promote "nation-wide participation of people of Capeverdean [sic] birth or

1202 Skrentny, 2002, 90.
1203 "Portuguese Parley Asks Recognition as Unique Culture," Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 1973, PEA M253, "Congresso dos Portugueses na América" (Harvard University), AHD.
1205 Cape Verdean, June-July, 1973, PEA M253, Comunidade Cabo-Verdeana, AHD.
descent and friends in projects that will benefit them in this country and their kinfolks abroad." Its mission to increase awareness of their homeland, its culture, and the history of its people in the United States was endorsed by Rhode Island's Governor Joseph Garrahy, who in 1973 proclaimed June 24-30 as Cape Verdean heritage week. In February 1974, 800 Cape Verdeans from across the United States met in Providence for their federation's first national convention, where they discussed the islands' political future and their own cultural identity as hyphenated Americans. Support for the PAIGC had also grown considerably by the 1970s, in large part due to the efforts of Black Power activist Salahudin O. Matteos. This raising of national and ethnic self-awareness unfolded amidst much internal debate between those who asserted their Portuguese heritage, those who affirmed an "inbetween" Kriolu race, and those who saw themselves as African-Americans. Other differences related to whether Cape Verde should become an independent state or join Guinea-Bissau after the colonial wars. In other words, the majority of Cape Verdean immigrants and descendants at this point were no longer seeking to be recognized as "Portuguese".

Older Portuguese-Americans rejected the Cambridge reinterpretation of their group's racial identity. Having witnessed the subjugation of non-whites in America throughout their lives, they believed that to strive for anything but "whiteness" was counter-productive. Instead, as Moniz noted, these older ethnics sought to avoid discrimination by "asserting connections to other white ethnic groups such as the Italians or Greek." One of the most vocal critics of this minority status campaign was the distinguished Portuguese-Irish-American Harvard Professor Francis Millet Rogers. A third generation descendant of an Azorean whaling ship captain who arrived in New Bedford in 1837, Rogers had been raised to appreciate his linguistic and cultural

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1207 Clipping, "Acting Governor of Rhode Island Proclaims Cape Verdean Week Upon Inauguration of Headquarters for Cape Verdean-American Federation," Portuguese Times, July 19, 1973, PEA M253, Comunidade Cabo-Verdeana, AHD.

1208 Born Milton Matthews in 1933, this son of Cape Verdean immigrants first changed his name to Milton X, then Omowali, and eventually Salahudin as he proceeded in his journey as an African-American activist. Growing up in New Bedford and Boston, Matteos had a typical Cape Verdean "inbetween" experience, encountering blatant racism for the first time in the U.S. Army as a soldier in the Korean War. A spiritual man, Matteos had decided to become a Catholic priest until he was discouraged by a white priest on account of being "black". After this, Matteos became involved with the Nation of Islam and worked closely with Malcolm X in Philadelphia. In the mid-1960s he distanced himself from the Nation and began studying other religions, while continuing his activism with the All-African People's Revolutionary Party and the Black Economic Development Conference. Starting in 1969, Matteos went on a two-year journey through Africa looking for Amílcar Cabral, who eluded him. In Guinea-Bissau he fought alongside PAIGC militants. Matteos finally met Cabral after returning to the U.S., in 1972, and joined the Cape Verdean leader as he toured the country. This encounter inspired Matteos to return to Boston and preach Cabral's "universalist" anti-colonialist message. That year he found the PAIGC-USA Support Committee and began educating college and university students across the country about the anti-colonialist party and the Cape Verdean people's struggle ("A Spiritual Journey," South Coast Today, February 13, 2001; "The Cape Verdeans and the PAIGC Struggle for National Liberation. An Interview with Salahudin Omowale Matteos," Ufahamu, Vol. 3, n. 3, (Winter 1973), 43-48).
background, eventually making a career of it as the most prominent Portuguese studies scholar in the United States. Rogers was also a patriotic American and Second World War veteran, whose liberal-democratic values occasionally put him at loggerheads with Portugal’s pseudo-fascist regime.\footnote{Francis M. Rogers (1914-89) was born in New Bedford. His paternal grandfather emigrated from Faial and married an Irish woman. After completing his doctoral degree in French literature at Harvard University, Rogers enlisted in the U.S. Navy to fight in the Second World War, where he earned the rank of Colonel. After the war he returned to Harvard and became a faculty member in the department of romance languages and literature, and later Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. His scholarly work was largely dedicated to Portuguese language and history. For more on Rogers' biography see Sheila R. Ackerlind (ed.), *Internationalism and the Three Portugals: the Memoirs of Francis Millet Rogers*, 1992.} According to his daughter, Sheila Rogers, her father’s opposition to a "non-white" status was informed by their family's history, whose social ascension would likely not have been possible had her great-grandfather not Anglicized their surname from "da Rosa" and not embraced a "WASP" identity. Together with other influential Portuguese-Americans, Rogers reached out to his connections in the Massachusetts' congressional delegation and urged them to dismiss the Cambridge resolution, as the Portuguese were "white."\footnote{Moniz, 2009, 410, 422-423.}

Not all of the senior Portuguese-American leaders opposed COPA's ethnic activism. For instance, the media entrepreneur and PAF manager António Costa organized a similar gathering a few weeks after the Cambridge meeting, titled the "United Portuguese Community Convention", with the goal of consolidating New Jersey's Lusophone peoples under a single pan-ethnic linguistic group. As the owner, producer, and host of various Lusophone media shows and publications, Costa was able to disseminate his message of unity, while at the same time berating his "ill intentioned" critics, dubbed by him "losers" and "zeros" who saw their relevance in the community slip away. Writing in Costa's *Portuguese Times*, Onésimo Almeida, who had arrived in the United States only the year before, joined him in lambasting the old elites: "There [were] no medals. Nor decorations. Nor sashes for knights of the nameless Order. Nor crosses of merit Tower and Sword. Little claps for you, little claps for me... The Convention was work."\footnote{"A convenção", *Luso-Americano* & "Os que teiman na desunião", *Portuguese Times*, June 7, 1973; "Convenção da United Portuguese Community" & "Harvard - Congresso dos Portugueses na América", June 14, 1973, *Portuguese Times*, (m.t.), ibid.}

A similar rejection of the old guard was common among young community activists in Canada. For instance, in 1973, the CPRPS organized Montreal's Portugal Day celebrations, which they boasted in a communiqué had no "honorary tribunes," no "paternalism from the 'notables'," or "reserved seats"; instead, "the people reunited and made their own feast". They added: "Portuguese workers know how to walk on their own feet, they don't need crutches! Down with the 'notables!'" Like the ethnic entrepreneurs they criticized, the CPRPS was
committed to preserving Portuguese customs and traditions, but only "in the extent that they contribute to improving Canada's pluricultural (pluriethnic) society."\textsuperscript{1212}

The new generation of Portuguese ethnic leaders in the United States and Canada also made repeated calls for the greater participation of their fellow immigrant workers in the labour movement. One of COPA's priorities was to "arouse the consciousness" of Portuguese workers. However, its efforts to unionize workplaces and launch class action suits against exploitative employers in Cambridge were met with resistance by Portuguese workers who feared losing their jobs. Just a month before the revolution, COPA's directors and some political exiles were asked by \textit{The Harvard Crimson} to gauge the success of their outreach efforts in the city. Though still optimistic, they admitted their idealism had been shaken by their fellow immigrants’ general unresponsiveness to their calls for political mobilization and unity. According to these activists, one of the reasons for their community's reluctance was the decreasing yet still strong assimilationist pressures from American society, which made immigrants hesitant about engaging in cultural diversity politics. A greater obstacle, they claimed, was "the heritage of oppression and forced non-involvement that the Portuguese bring with them from Portugal." This political alienation translated into low naturalization rates, which prevented their community leaders from offering a cohesive voting bloc to politicians willing to take up their causes; hence the Portuguese were "ignored by the rest of the city."\textsuperscript{1213} However, that political disengagement would change after April 25, 1974.

\textbf{Hope and apprehension: the April 25th Revolution and its impact on the Portuguese communities during the PREC}

On June 9, 1974, 200 people gathered in Toronto’s Trinity-Bellwoods Park to celebrate the first Portugal Day since the fall of the \textit{Estado Novo} and to cheer the MFA. Organized by the PCDA's José Henrique, the event was attended by young and old Portuguese immigrants and their Canadian friends, who sang revolutionary songs and listened to various speakers talk about the future of their homeland and of their own community. Benjamim Cabral, a former chaplain in Angola, said: "We Portuguese, who did not desire to be simply seafarers and yearners of a past that is as epic as it is distant, are now starting to live the most essential of human rights -

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\textsuperscript{1212} Flyer (m.t.), CPRPS, 1974. F0571, 2010-018/002 David Higgs fonds; transcript of interview with members of the CPRPS, by Domingos Marques, c. 1978; CPRPS report 1975-76, CPRPS (m.t), 2010-019/001, Domingos Marques fonds, CTASC.
\end{flushright}
The young factory worker Rita Veiga and the older "cleaning lady" Idalina Azevedo spoke of their experiences trying to unionize their workplaces and urged Portuguese workers to follow the revolutionary example of their brothers and sisters in Portugal by joining a union. The Toronto School Board Trustee Dan Leckie talked about the discrimination that Portuguese children suffered in the Anglo-centric public school system. Other speakers, like the MCP's director João Medeiros and the NDP city councillor Dan Heap, celebrated the April revolution by drawing parallels with the immigrants' struggle in Canada.

Meanwhile, in New York, Consul Mário de Freitas organized a large reception at the International Institute of Education (across the street from the UN headquarters) to which he invited a large number of influential people, including presidents of large corporations, bank managers, UN delegates, members of the American and foreign press, and Portuguese-American civic and business leaders. As reported by the *New York Post*, "the place was filled with Portuguese-Americans, several hundred of the 25,000 New Yorkers of Portuguese origin, people who had never before been sought out by the Portuguese diplomats here, much less invited to a party... Portuguese diplomats around the world, said one official... had received instructions from Lisbon to celebrate by forging links with the working-class Portuguese expatriate communities around them." The *Post's* reporter interviewed a man whose daughter was attending a Portuguese language school in Manhattan, who said: "The new regime... has promised to help out the school - something the old one never did." He also interviewed the president of the American Portuguese Cultural Society, an American businessman with investments in Portugal, who was used to "enjoying Portuguese official hospitality in the old days;" the reporter noted the man's gold cigarette case as he commented on the odd mix of business people and "Portuguese of very simple origin." Among the guests were Jorge Sampaio (the President of Portugal in 1996-2006) then "a young socialist lawyer" representing the Portuguese provisional government at the UN, as well as the ambassadors for the Soviet Union, Tanzania, Algeria, and other African nations. Various American guests wrote Consul Freitas afterwards congratulating him for his country's liberation and for throwing such a good party. Among them was Evelyn J. Heyward, of Heyward Associates, who wrote: "I think if you had hired Madison Square Garden you would still have had an overflowing crowd."
In the lively crowd of well-dressed bourgeois and short-sleeved immigrant workers there were people playing accordions, fists raised in the air, some holding signs with messages in Portuguese like: "Hunt DGS ex-PIDE in the USA"; "Let there be conditions in Portugal for the emigrants to return;" or "We want voting rights for all emigrants." Similar demands could be heard in other North American cities. In Toronto, the PCDA held rallies outside O Jornal Português’ headquarters and the multicultural station CHIN Radio, demanding the cancellation of Fr. Cunha's show Echoes From Portugal (launched the previous year), and at Global TV’s building, where the show Festival Português was recorded since January 1974, and, according to the protesters, had spread false information about the situation unfolding in Portugal. In Swansea, Massachusetts, another group demonstrated outside the restaurant where then Foreign Affairs Minister Mário Soares dined with former CPDP members (in a tribute to the veteran republican Abílio Águas), demanding Ambassador Themido be removed from Washington, and that the names of PIDE’s agents and associates in the United States be made public.

This reception took place during Soares' visit to North America in September 1974, where he met with the U.S. State Department in Washington and other NATO allies in Ottawa. During this trip, Soares was the guest of honour at a dinner hosted by Portuguese democrats in Ottawa, attended by close to 500 people (40 of them PCDA members). Speaking to the Lisbon’s Diário de Noticias on his return, Soares described this event as one of the most instructive parts of his trip, since he was able to hear about the emigrants’ experiences, problems, and expectations directly from them. He was particularly touched by a teary-eyed emigrant father who told him that, because of the revolution, his 5-year-old Canadian son was no longer ashamed of calling himself Portuguese at school, and that he was proud to see Soares on Canadian television. “For the Portuguese, who are so used to being the subject of all kinds of international criticism and polemics,” said the former political exile turned minister, “this is extremely interesting.”

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1216 Photo contact sheet, ibid.
1217 In 1974, the PCDA, with help from city councillor Dan Heap, began investigating the source of Cunha's financial wealth and real estate, in search of unlawful activities. They planned to submit their findings to Catholic authorities and hopefully remove Cunha from St. Mary’s church (ledger 1974, minutes from July 1st and 17th meetings, F0579, 2009-022/006 (2), PCDA fonds, AHD).
1220 Soares prefaced his comments by alerting the reporter to the fact there was a large Portuguese community in Canada, something, the minister confessed, he was not aware of. Clipping, “Mário Soares – Regresso a Lisboa”, Diário de Noticias, Lisbon, (unknown day) September 1974, F0579, 2009-022/006 (4), PCDA fonds, AHD.
Like Soares, other provisional government representatives began visiting North America shortly after the revolution. In Canada, they were usually hosted by the PCDA or the MDP, which organized information sessions and other public events where these visitors explained their political program and asked for the emigrants' support in building a democratic and socialist Portugal. Also in September, Toronto and Montreal received an official delegation on a "goodwill tour of Portuguese communities," composed by the "April Captain" Salgueiro Maia - who led the MFA troops into Lisbon and forced Caetano to capitulate on April 25th - and other government officials, including the new Secretary of State for Emigration Pedro Coelho (Figures 71-72). They visited the community's clubs, schools, pool halls, and businesses, where they learned about the emigrants' views on the political shift in Portugal, and what they expected from the new government. As a Star reporter noted: "There was none of the pomp that usually accompanies such visits by foreign government representatives within [Toronto] communities. About 75 people followed them around. But there were no large throngs to welcome them. There were no cheers, no noisy greeting" - a different reaction from Minister Patrício’s visit to the Ironbound in 1970.1221

The following month, Toronto hosted another beloved “anti-fascist”, the communist songwriter José Afonso, whose song Grândola Vila Morena was broadcast on the morning of April 25th as a signal for the MFA's forces to advance into the capital and has since become the revolution’s anthem. Together with the musician Rui Pato and the writer Urbano Tavares Rodrigues (also a PCP militant), Afonso enlivened that year's Republican Revolution commemorations with two concerts that attracted over 1,700 people (Figure 73).1222 Curiously, two Portuguese banks in Toronto donated $100 each to help cover the costs of the event, which was co-organized by the PCDA, MDP and Fall River Democratic Movement. Over 50 new members signed up with the PCDA in the days following the concerts - 150 more had done so in the first six months of 1974. This success encouraged them to arrange more concerts and other events with leftist artists from Portugal for years to come. Portuguese revolutionaries were also invited by Canadian socialists to talk at their events. For example, António Silva, a member of the Portuguese Revolutionary Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors, and of the Proletariat

1221 One of the outcomes of this visit was an offer by Secretary Coelho to fill the PCDA's library shelves with books that they had planned to request from the Gulbenkian Foundation (Joe Serge, "Hero of Portuguese coup says democracy thriving at home," Toronto Star, September 24, 1974, PP-TPL; ledger 1974, minutes from October 16, F0579, 2009-022/006 (2), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
1222 Ibid.
Revolutionary Party/ Revolutionary Brigades, was invited by the Independent Socialists (the former radical wing of the NDP, known as "The Waffle") to speak in ten cities in North America in October 1975.\textsuperscript{1223}

Political figures on the right also visited North America during the PREC. One of the most high-profile visitors was General António de Spínola, the former president of the short-lived National Salvation Junta, who fled to Brazil after his failed right-wing coup in March 11, 1975. While in exile, Spínola became the leader of the far-right Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal (MDLP) and the Portuguese Liberation Army (ELP) - created by former PIDE director Barbieri Cardoso.\textsuperscript{1224} He held an information session in Toronto's St. Lawrence Centre for the Arts on November 23, two days before the far-left's own attempted coup in Portugal and the subsequent seizure of power by the centre-right (Figure 74). Spínola spoke for nearly three hours to a crowd of about 800 people, "amid repeated cheers and thunderous applause." As reported in the \textit{Globe & Mail}: "five medium-sized plastic garbage cans were passed around to the audience, and they quickly filled with $5 and $10 bills;" according to \textit{Comunidade}, the collection grossed a few thousand dollars. Outside the centre, an even larger crowd tried to get in. Among them were over 200 protesters from the PCDA, NDP, League for Socialist Action, and other left-wing organizations, which condemned Spinola's efforts to organize a "fascist" coup in Portugal.\textsuperscript{1225}

The emigrants' initial cheers for the revolution’s promise of democracy were gradually muted among the conservative majority as they saw the provisional governments veer farther to the left. The MFA's Revolution Council recognized how the emigrants' fear of losing their hard-earned savings and properties in Portugal could turn them into a strong reactionary force. On April 1975, to placate their growing anxieties, the Council prohibited the occupation of vacant houses without consent from the overseeing "Residents Committee", which based its decision on the circumstances behind these properties' vacancy. As a visiting member of the Popular Socialist Front explained during an information session at the PCDA's headquarters: "the emigrant's property is sacred". Nonetheless, the MFA's position was clear; their goal was to "end

\textsuperscript{1223} General Assembly report, PCDA, June 1974; letters to PCDA from Pinto & Sotto Mayer Bank and Fonsecas & Burnay Bank managers, Toronto, October 3 & 4, 1974, F0579, 2009-022/006 (3, 4 & 6), PCDA fonds, CTASC; "Revolucionário Português" \textit{Comunidade}, October, 1975, Year 1, n. 4, 6, YS-CTASC.


\textsuperscript{1225} "Exiled Former President Promises to Liberate Portugal," \textit{Globe & Mail}, November 24, 1975, GM-TPL; \textit{Comunidade}, December 1975, Year 1, n. 6, 8, YS-CTASC.
the exploitation of man by man, and whoever rejects this principle is being counter-revolutionary and will not be accepted in the country. If the [e]migrant doesn't like it... he can pack up his bags and turn back.”

Fear of communism and what it could mean for the emigrants’ relatives and investments back home was reinforced by North American mainstream media, which covered the political developments in Portugal through a Western Cold War prism. To challenge the media's "alarmist interpretations and lack of objectivity," the PCDA bought ad space (paid for by a community petition) in the Globe & Mail and published a statement of support for the MFA and its reforms, signed by a long list of Portuguese immigrants and Canadian allies, including Toronto city councillors, university professors, clergymen, and others. The newly appointed democratic consuls also urged emigrants to obtain information about the situation in Portugal from reliable sources, including the bulletin News and Facts, printed by the Casa de Portugal with contents from ANI, and circulated by the consulates.

The purging of the Estado Novo’s diplomats from Portuguese consulates and embassies in North America was one of the main priorities of former political exiles immediately following the revolution. The Portuguese Democratic Action Congress of North America, founded the year before in Montreal, sent a delegation to Portugal in May 1974 to meet with the revolutionary Junta and communicate their democratic expectations, which included "liberating" the emigrant communities from the "fascist" diplomats. Had they not replaced the consul in Toronto, the PCDA might have followed the suggestion of its director Manuel Sanches and occupied the consulate until the Junta appointed someone with democratic credentials. They also urged the new authorities in Portugal to stop subsidizing organizations and media outlets formerly funded by the regime, and to modernize community schools so to prevent "individuals with no cultural training and committed to fascism from continuing to assume positions of responsibility in these institutions." In August, the PCDA also had the opportunity to present its views on the

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1226 Domingos Marques, "Representantes da F.S. em Toronto," Comunidade, August 8, 1975, 5, YS-CTASC.
1228 News and Facts bulletin, F0579, 2009-022/006 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
1229 The delegates were Júlio R. Félix for the PCDA, and Rui C. Viana and Amadeu Moura for the MDP (letter, Manuel Sanches, Bachstrub, Germany, April 26, 1974; communiqué, Congresso Português de Acção Democrática da América do Norte, May 21, 1974, F0579 2009-022/006 (3 & 4), PCDA fonds, CTASC).
situation of Portuguese emigrants in Canada at the Secretary State of Emigration's first policy consultation meeting in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{1230}

As requested, the old diplomats were replaced with new ones, who vowed never to subject the emigrants' to the same neglect they had suffered under the previous regime. According to Consul Ernesto M. Feu in Toronto, the old regime had "simply regarded [the emigrants] as a source of remittance money." Feu then proposed to turn his consulate into a social service centre dedicated to assisting emigrants integrate into Canada, and to helping the community set up "an institute through which we could deal with legal, educational, health and work problems... under the patronage of the Consulate General." Like his predecessors, Feu urged Toronto's Portuguese to present a "united face" so they could "be recognized as an important sector in Canada's multicultural society, and transmit to this country those Portuguese cultural values that are among the oldest in History."\textsuperscript{1231}

The PCDA was keen to collaborate with the consul and advise him on community matters, namely which individuals and organizations he should stay away from and withhold his patronage. They warned him especially about Fr. Alberto Cunha, who according to them was the leader of the MDLP in Canada. They were also eager to develop joint initiatives aimed at educating emigrants about their citizenship rights and duties. However, at this point, the PCDA was opposed to granting emigrants the right to vote in Portuguese national elections. Its members shared Urbano Rodrigues's view on this issue, which he articulated in a Lisbon newspaper upon returning from Canada: "in countries... of a decidedly capitalist nature, like the United States and Canada, it would be practically impossible for left-wing parties to conduct an authentic electoral campaign in the emigration sectors." Or as Monteiro put it: "the majority of emigrants are far removed, not only from Portuguese reality, but also from the political, economic and social changes taking place all over the world... In addition, many Portuguese nationals live in countries... which do nothing to overcome the political retardation of their citizens, much less their immigrants." The ambivalence of their position as democratic activists opposed to extending voting rights to expatriate citizens is exemplified in Monteiro's own actions, who

\textsuperscript{1230} Handwritten report by Henrique Matos, August 21-23, 1974, F0579, 2009-022/006 (3), PCDA fonds, CTASC.
\textsuperscript{1231} "Immigrants Neglected, Need Help to Integrate, Portuguese Consul says," \textit{Globe \& Mail}, January 22, 1975, 5, GM-TPL; Ernesto Magalhães Feu, communiqué, \textit{Comunidade}, August 8, 1975, 5 (m.t.), YS-CTASC.

Portuguese postwar emigrants, the majority of whom had not yet become citizens of their host nations, were given the chance to vote for the first time in 1975. Overall, 21,934 emigrants in thirty countries registered to vote; the largest turnout being in Germany (6,025), followed by the United States (4,685), France (2,924), Canada (2,142), and the rest of the world. Newark registered the highest number of voters (2,565) in the United States, followed by New York (1,380), Boston (536), Washington (147), and San Francisco (57); while in Canada, Toronto had the highest turnout (1,720), followed by Montreal (212), Vancouver (125), and Ottawa (85). Considering the number of Portuguese citizens living in North America at this point, this turnout was extremely low. The numbers also point to a greater voter participation among newcomer settlements with a higher portion of mainlanders.\footnote{António R. Bandeira, "As Eleições em Portugal" cit. in Comunidade, August 8, 1975, Year 1, n. 2, 7, YS-CTASC.}

Two months after these elections, the Correio Português asked five emigrants in Toronto to offer their views on the topics of voting in homeland elections and on the revolution's impact in their community. One of them was Monteiro, who, as we have seen, argued that emigrants were not used to dealing with complicated political matters. Still, he was happy to see they were "making an effort to overcome this handicap," even claiming the Toronto community was among the "most conscious of the need to move the [PREC] towards a democracy of the masses, towards authentic socialism." Monteiro added it was unlikely that the emigrants' children would remain interested in "homeland" affairs since they led "Canadian lives." Yet, he believed it was possible for them to develop a Portuguese identity in Canada that was neither "exclusivist nor nationalistic, but co-operative and positive." One such descendant was the Goan-Portuguese-Canadian Fernando Costa, the son of the PCC's former conservative president. Interviewed for the Correio's reportage, Costa noted the community's "growing political awareness", which he hoped would translate into greater political engagement; ideally, he added, of a socialist kind. The young lawyer also praised the revolution for "tremendously" improving attitudes towards women, and was pleased to see several anti-racist campaigns. Another of the interviewees was the manager of Toronto's Fonsecas & Burnay bank, Manuel Pedroso, who was pleased to see his
fellow countrymen develop "a keen interest in day-to-day happenings in Portugal." In his opinion, the Portuguese government should enfranchise all emigrants: "[w]e live in a world where distances mean nothing and where we can follow what is happening in other countries day by day." The Progressive Conservative António Vaz had a different opinion. In his view, only those citizens living in the national territory should have a say in running their government, as was the case in Canada. Ironically, Vaz, who had rallied behind Galvão and Delgado alongside the PCDA back in 1961 (as he reminded the reporter), and later became an ally of Fr. Cunha and the Portuguese consul, now accused those pro-regime community "elites" who made an about-face on their political views after the revolution of being deceitful and self-interested. Firmino Oliveira, now a PS representative in Toronto, had come around to supporting emigrant voting rights, but with some hesitation. Like other leftists, he argued the emigrants' confusion about the political situation in Portugal resulted from their lack of political experience, their geographic distance, and the ubiquity of false information.1234

Canadian authorities monitored political debates in Portuguese immigrant communities and were alarmed by the increasing socialist tendencies of many of their civic leaders. The Ethnic Press Analysis Service of the Secretary of State Department carefully scrutinized the Portuguese-Canadian press. Of particular interest to them were the PCDA’s activities, especially their sponsorship of visits by Portuguese socialists. In one case, Joaquim Meirim, a popular football coach in Portugal known for being an outspoken communist, toured the emigrant communities of North America, stopping in Toronto in November 1977. Interviewed by Comunidade, which was regularly monitored due to its "Marxist character", Meirim explained his trip was motivated by his desire to see old friends and his curiosity in discovering how the emigrants lived and organized themselves. The government’s analyst/translator interpreted this visit as an attempt by the PCDA to organize local football clubs as centres for communist youth indoctrination. According to this civil servant, even the Correio had shifted to the left and now "wholeheartedly" supported philo-communist Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, since it published contents penned by his followers in Lisbon.1235

1234 Report: Portuguese Press, June 1975, Dept. of the Secretary of State.
1235 "Entrevista com Joaquim Meirim," Comunidade, November-December 1977, Year 3, n. 34, 15, YS-CTASC; report: Portuguese Press, Dept. of the Secretary of State. For more on the Comunidade's surveillance by the Ethnic Press Analysis Service, see the PCHP online exhibit dedicated to Comunidade, url: http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp/Comunidade_records/canadian_surveillance
Canadian officials were also alarmed by the growing animosity between opposing political factions. An article in the *Correio* alerted readers to a reactionary coup being prepared in the Portuguese expatriate communities. According to it, emigrants were "vulnerable to counter-revolutionary propaganda because of their 'archaic, medieval... ideologically bourgeois education'." This "political void" was being occupied by the MDLP's/ELP's transnational "fascist" network. The article also mentioned "a group of agitators" in Toronto who threatened to set fire to the PCDA's headquarters and attacked left-wing immigrants and their businesses, especially on the days when newspapers arrived from Lisbon. On August 23, 1975, about 200 right-wing demonstrators from cities across Ontario marched in Kensington Market to protest what they saw was a communist takeover in Portugal. The rally had been announced a few days earlier through an anonymous pamphlet circulated in the community that called for "death to communists", including those who had signed the PCDA’s statement of solidarity to the MFA published in the *Globe & Mail*.

Another right-wing movement to emerge in this period with considerable impact in North America's immigrant communities was the separatist Azorean Liberation Front (FLA). Founded in London, on April 8, 1975, the FLA was led by the *União Nacional* parliamentarian José de Almeida and backed by the large landowners and economic elites of São Miguel, who feared losing their wealth and property to the agrarian reform and nationalization program carried out by the socialist Lisbon government. This movement also counted on the covert support of centrist democrats in the mainland, who tried to undermine the far left. The FLA blended various political stripes, from the center-left to the far right, and framed its separatism as an anti-colonialist struggle against a metropolitan government that they accused of exploiting the islands for centuries. Its leaders appropriated the symbols of an earlier monarchist pro-autonomy movement, such as the blue and white flag, along with traditional Azorean cultural references, like the hymn of the Feast of the Holy Ghost. But more than a political program, which was never fully articulated, it was the rejection of communism and its anti-clericalism, and a rapidly growing sense of Azorean ethnicity that united FLA militants and its supporters in the

1236 Report: Portuguese Press, Dept. of the Secretary of State, January 1976; David Higgs' notes, F0571, 2010-018/002, David Higgs fonds, CTASC; "Estranha Manifestação", *Comunidade*, September 1975, 1 & 8, YS-CTASC.
1237 A similar separatist movement existed in Madeira, led by the *Frente de Libertação do Arquipélago da Madeira*, or FLAMA. This movement had little expression in North America given the small size of its emigrant population.
diaspora. In the summer of 1975, the FLA organized its first rally in Ponta Delgada, where its supporters stated their willingness to use violence to achieve their goals. They confirmed this by destroying the offices of the PCP and other socialist parties in São Miguel and Terceira later, socialists in Toronto organized a rally in solidarity with those "Azorean patriots who were expelled from their land by the fascist terror."  

One of the FLA's main sources of funding and political support were the Azorean immigrants in Canada and the United States. Many of them had embraced their host nations' capitalist ethos and Western Cold War mentality and urged their relatives back home to ward off communism, and if necessary separate from Portugal, assuring them the United States would come to their aid. Almeida tried repeatedly to obtain formal support from President Nixon and the UN, but with little success. Meanwhile, he met a generally positive response in the Azorean communities he toured, spreading his nationalist vision and raising funds for his movement. Separatist committees were formed in various North American cities, like the Frente de Apoio à Independência dos Açores in Toronto, or the Comité Açoreano 75, which had 15 chapters across New England and California. They held information sessions, distributed political propaganda, launched petitions, and organized rallies, including outside the UN headquarters and the White House - the latter drawing 17 buses from Fall River, New Bedford, and various localities in Rhode Island. Their views were also disseminated in the Portuguese ethnic media and in Azorean parishes.

The Portuguese far-left was convinced the Azorean nationalist movement was a project of the U.S. government, driven by their fear of losing access to the Lajes Air Base. The Americans had recently been reminded of the military importance of the Terceira base during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which the United States forces heavily relied on to provide support to the Israeli army. Suspicion of American involvement with the FLA was furthered by an article in the Boston Magazine of November 1978. According to this publication, the FLA had links with the far-right French armed group Organisation de L'Armée Secrète, whose operatives had been

1242 "Comício de Solidariedade", Comunidade, November 1975, Year 1, n. 5, 8, YS-CTASC.
1243 He was assisted by his brother-in-law, Carlos Matos, who quit his job as a pharmacist in Fall River to become the FLA's representative in the United States.
1245 Tony Amaral, "Revolucionário Português," Comunidade, October 1975, YS-CTASC.
granted asylum in Portugal after 1963 and since cooperated with PIDE through the covert anti-communist "mercenary" agency Aginter Press.\textsuperscript{1246} The magazine claimed the \textit{Secrète} operative Jean-Denis Raingeard travelled to the United States in April 1975 to obtain financial and military support for the FLA from Republican Senators Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms, and to meet with President Gerald Ford's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft. It also mentioned the \textit{Secrète} arranged for the FLA and General Spínola to buy weapons through its contacts in Nicaragua, in Miami's Cuban community, and in New York's crime syndicates, in a deal brokered by two Americans, including Victor Fediay, an aide to Senator Thurmond. Almeida eventually refused this deal, which required the Azores to become a tax and gambling haven after independence.\textsuperscript{1247}

Former political exiles also suspected there were escaped PIDE agents and other "fascists" among the imperial \textit{retornados} who started arriving in North America from Portugal's former African colonies after 1975.\textsuperscript{1248} The Portuguese government requested Canadian and American authorities to ease restrictions and expedite immigrant applications from its citizens escaping civil war in Angola, which started shortly after its independence in November 1975. However, immigration officials did not consider these former colonial settlers to be "refugees", since their Portuguese citizenship allowed them to return to Portugal unimpeded. This legal interpretation conflicted with the "refugees'' own views, many of whom felt betrayed or unwelcome in Portugal and saw themselves as people without a country. Regardless of their legal status, these \textit{retornados} began migrating to North America in significant numbers, either sponsored by relatives or arriving as "visitors" and later applying for landed status.\textsuperscript{1249}

Some communities organized support groups to help these expatriates settle in the new country and pressure their host governments either to recognize them as "refugees" or regularize the status of the undocumented. Despite underlying tensions between formal imperialists and anti-colonialists, these support groups brought together community members from across the political spectrum. The Portuguese Refugee Aid Committee in Toronto, for instance, mobilized secular and religious leaders in and outside the community, and pushed Canadian politicians to discuss the plight of undocumented newcomers from Angola and Mozambique. In June 1976,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1246} For more on Aginter Press and the ties between PIDE and \textit{L'Armée Secrète} see Pimentel, 2007, 128-129.
  \item \textsuperscript{1247} Fred Strasser and Brian McTigue, "The Fall River conspiracy. How an international plot to liberate the Azores was launched - almost - from Fall River, Massachusetts," \textit{Boston Magazine}, November 1978, cit. in Ferreira, 1993, 185-187.
  \item \textsuperscript{1248} Monteiro, 2007, 81.
  \item \textsuperscript{1249} Comunidade: "Pedido de Auxílio ao Canadá para Angolanos," January 8, 1976, 4 & March 3, 1976, 1 & 4, YS-CTASC.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
when the committee wrapped up its activities, it had raised over $13,000 (mainly through Catholic institutions), which St. Helen's parish distributed to imperial "refugees" in the city. Their lobbying efforts also helped Portuguese officials reach an agreement with the Canadian government on March 22, 1976, in which the latter agreed to prioritize and favour immigrant applications from these retornados, especially if sponsored by relatives living in Canada. By February 1978, approximately 3,000 Portuguese former colonial settlers were living in southern Ontario, the majority of them coming from Angola.\textsuperscript{1250}

The collapse of the Portuguese empire also had major repercussions for Cape Verdeans in the United States. Founded by the New Bedford-born Raymond A. Almeida in January 1975, the American Committee for Cape Verde (or Tchuba) advocated for Cape Verdan national interests in the United States and pushed American officials to aid the new African nation. On February 22-23, a group of expatriate nationalists opposed to the socialist PAIGC (among them Roy Teixeira) met at the Sheraton Hotel in Boston for the Juridical Congress of World Cape Verdan Communities, where they proclaimed Cape Verde's independence.\textsuperscript{1251} PAIGC supporters outside the hotel protested against the divisive manoeuvre of Teixeira's group - the latter would create the centre-right Democratic and Independent Cape Verdan Union party in 1977.\textsuperscript{1252} Eventually, Teixeira’s group failed to prevent the Portuguese government from transferring power to the PAIGC and its one-party system, since that is what happened on July 5, 1975, when Cape Verde’s national independence was officially recognized in the capital city of Praia.

Post-imperial epilogues: change and continuity under Portugal's new political order

The 1976 constitutional government elections marked the end of the PREC and the beginning of a new democratic era. After this, tensions deescalated as political debates became increasingly institutionalized. The number of emigrant voters increased significantly since the previous elections, with 51,693 votes cast in Europe and 40,047 in the rest of the world (Graph 5); the cities with the largest electoral turnout were Dusseldorf, Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro,


\textsuperscript{1251} Raymond A. Almeida, "Chronological references: Cabo Verde/Cape Verdan American", UMASS, url: www1.umassd.edu/SpecialPrograms/caboverde/cvchrono.html

and Toronto. Right-wing parties received most of the emigrant votes, with the PPD electing a member of parliament in each region, the CDS electing one "Outside of Europe", and the PS, which won the national elections, electing only one in "Europe"; curiously, the PCP received one hundred times more votes in Europe (5,082) than outside of it (508). The emigrant vote was now courted directly by those candidates running for these diaspora seats, who campaigned in foreign neighbourhoods with logistic support from local party representatives selected from among old and new community leaders (Figure 75). This introduced yet another transnational layer to an already intricate political constituency that juxtaposed homeland and host nation activists, politicians and their organizations.

In the eyes of Canadian officials, this "overt politicking among visiting politicians from Portugal... is found to be disruptive to the Canadian integration and citizenship processes." But as in the past, concerns for homeland politics did not preclude Portuguese immigrant activists from engaging with their host nation’s polity; quite the contrary. The political profile of Portuguese communities in Canada increased in the latter half of the decade, as evinced by the growing number of candidates running in municipal elections (Figure 76). The number of Portuguese workers involved in labour unions, including positions of leadership, also grew in this period. The wildcat strike of Portuguese "cleaning ladies" at the Toronto Dominion Centre and their unionization at the Ontario Legislature building in 1974-75 are still two of the most high profile cases of Portuguese labour activism in Canada (Figure 77). In 1979, the Labourers International Union of North America's Local 183, which represented workers in public, commercial and residential construction in the Greater Toronto Area - its membership at the time being 50% Italian and 35% Portuguese - hired a team of Portuguese stewards to inform their co-ethnic workers about their labour rights and convince them to become more actively engaged in union business. Today, Local 183 is one of the largest construction locals in North

1253 Electoral results in "Europe": PS 29,793; PPD 16,596; PCP 5,082; CDS 3,576. "Outside Europe": PPD 21,317; CDS 13,483; PS 2,517; Christian Democratic Party 1,277; PCP 508 ("Resultados eleitorais no estrangeiro," Comunidade, June 10, 1976, YS-CTASC).

1254 Briefing notes for Minister J. Fleming, file 3217-202-P2 pt. 1, box 20, Ban 2003-01367-9, Multiculturalism Directorate, NAC.


1256 For more on this issue see Miranda, 2010.

1257 The Portuguese representatives were Victor Barreiras (born in Bombarral, migrated at age 9), António Lucas (born in Guarda, migrated at age 15), and António Dionisio (born in Lourinhã, migrated at age 13) (Fernanda Gaspar, "Local 183 tenta interessar os sócios portugueses", Comunidade, January 31, 1979, Year 4, Vol. 2 (9), 1, 6-7, YS-CTASC).
America, with over 32,000 members, a large portion of them Portuguese-Canadians, many of whom occupy management positions.\textsuperscript{1258}

One of the factors driving this rise in labour activism was the consciousness-raising impact of the April 25\textsuperscript{th} revolution. Ann Bookman, who participated in a unionization drive in a Boston electronics factory, noted how "events in Portugal had an observable and positive effect in countering the fears of Portuguese workers who wanted to support the union. The number of workers who became union members increased dramatically during this period."\textsuperscript{1259} Another important reason was the existence of well-established community infrastructures, with resources, activists and politicians that these ethnic workers could mobilize. Portuguese factory workers in Boston, most of whom were women, were able to muster the support of civic leaders and hold union meetings in their ethnic club halls. In Toronto, Portuguese cleaners recruited progressive community agencies and newspapers, like St. Christopher House, the PCDA, the MCP and Comunidade, along with Canadian social workers and politicians. As various scholars have noted, ethnicity was an important factor in the organization of these immigrant workers, as "their common language, kin ties, neighborhoods, and other bonds gave them a cohesiveness as a group that most [mainstream] workers lacked;"\textsuperscript{1260} or as in the case of Toronto's cleaners, their specific "ethno-cultural expressions of militancy and solidarity" were reinforced by "the overlapping bonds of ethnic, class, and gender identity."\textsuperscript{1261}

Though temporarily reinvigorated by the revolution, the old "anti-fascist" organizations lost their original \textit{raison d'être} after 1976 and struggled to stay relevant as activist associations. They continued to engage in various progressive movements, promoting racial and gender equality, children's rights, pacifism and other causes, though never focusing on a specific platform. Local left-wing politicians still frequented their community halls and attended their functions, which were now primarily cultural or educational, like theatre troupes, music schools, poetry recitals and others. While these organizations assumed many of the same characteristics as other ethnic clubs, their members liked to stress that their cultural programs were more sophisticated and educational than those of traditional ethnic organizations. More women became involved with the PCDA and MDP in the late 1970s, injecting new life into their tired

\textsuperscript{1258} Liuna! Local 183 website, url: www.liunalocal183.ca/AboutUs/Local183.aspx
\textsuperscript{1260} Bookman, 2009, 402.
\textsuperscript{1261} Miranda, 2010, 324.
memberships, which helps explain how they managed to stay open for decades after the revolution. But it was not until the '80s that women started assuming positions of leadership in these and other community organizations.\textsuperscript{1262}

The Azorean and Madeira separatist movements also abated after 1976, when the new Portuguese Constitution enshrined the archipelagos' Autonomous Regional Governments. What little hope the FLA had in Washington supporting its cause disappeared after the Portuguese government took steps to consolidate democratic rule and confirm its Western alliance. Azorean nationalists continued to attract interest from private Americans, like the Las Vegas real estate millionaire and capitalist libertarian Michael Oliver, whose Phoenix Foundation was dedicated to creating tax havens in small independent nations.\textsuperscript{1263} Curiously, the only states to ever endorse the FLA were Soviet-backed Algeria and Libya, who sent representatives to the Azores and Madeira in 1978, where they highlighted the islands' "Africanness."\textsuperscript{1264}

While the political momentum of Azorean nationalism subsided, its symbolic expression continued to elevate the ethnic and civic pride of Azoreans at home and abroad, as reflected in the multiplication of blue and white flags with golden açores (Northern Goshawks) waving at community gatherings, stamped on t-shirts, on bumper stickers, and other adornments (Figure 78). The influence of Azorean public intellectuals also grew in the 1970s, with a new generation of scholars and writers following in the footsteps of Vitorino Nemésio, the founder of Açorianidade, who died in February 1978. Many of them were expatriates, like Onésimo Almeida, Eduardo Mayonne Dias, and Vamberto Freitas (the last two living in California since the '60s). The Azorean autonomous government would also help raise the diasporic consciousness of its emigrants by aiding their communities’ growing civic activity, where more secular organizations began to appear.

Heritage language instruction continued to be the main cultural pursuit of Portuguese immigrants in North America, who now had options when it came to enrolling their children in language classes. In 1977, the Canadian federal government followed the American example and implemented a Cultural Enrichment Program, which covered close to 10% of the operating costs of heritage language schools run by ethnic communities. That same year, the Ontario and Quebec

\textsuperscript{1262} Ledger 1978, F0579, 2009-022/001 (4), PCDA fonds, CTASC.

\textsuperscript{1263} Correio Português: "FLA quer transformar Açores num 'Paraíso Fiscal," January 30, 1978; "Organização Holandesa disposta a apoiar separatismo açoreano," April 15, 1978, N473 reel 1, AO.

\textsuperscript{1264} Ferreira, 1993, 188.
governments introduced their respective Heritage Language Program and *Programme d’Enseignement des Langues d’Origine*, which allocated funding to school boards that offered these language classes; in both cases, Portuguese became one of the most prominent languages.\textsuperscript{1265} Though generally accepted as positive steps towards eliminating cultural discrimination, these programs were sometimes criticized by ethnic activists for being poorly conceived, excessively bureaucratic, and neglecting to engage parents, consult or collaborate with community educators and their schools, or addressing the ongoing problem of school drop out.\textsuperscript{1266} Financial and logistic support for Portuguese language schools was still the most common request made to homeland officials visiting the diaspora. Under the new democratic regime, Portuguese expatriates had the chance to make demands directly to the State Secretaries of Emigration and their own members of parliament, who were more receptive to their requests and arguably understood their needs better than the previous regime. However, while these democratic officials committed to supporting the emigrants' educational initiatives in a consistent manner, constantly demarcating themselves from the unreliable policies of the dictatorship, they pointed out a familiar constraint: "There is little money.\textsuperscript{n1267}"

As discussed in chapter one, remittances grew to record heights after 1975 despite the sharp drop in emigration. Not only did this cement relations between homeland and diaspora but bolstered the emigrants' sense of entitlement and leverage when making demands of the Portuguese government. Helping expand this capital flow were various government policies that offered incentives to emigrants investing or depositing their savings in Portugal. In 1977, 24 representatives from the Bank of Portugal visited various Portuguese centres in North America to advertise and explain financial products and fiscal benefits available to emigrants. According to these envoys, these special programs were offered "not as a privilege, but as an act of justice." Asked by *Comunidade* earlier that year if his government was continuing a "Salazar-Caetano type of policy", where emigration was effectively stimulated for the sake of boosting remittances, the State Secretary of Emigration João Lima answered categorically that it was not, but acknowledged that "at first glance [both policies] might appear to be similar.\textsuperscript{n1268}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1265} Helms-Park, 2000, 131.
\textsuperscript{1266} For more on this debate see "Education, heritage language and multiculturalism" in PCHP online exhibit *Comunidade newspaper, 1975-1979*, url: http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp/Comunidade_records/education_multiculturalism
\textsuperscript{1267} "São as comunidades que devem tomar iniciativas e o Estado que deve apoiá-las," *Comunidade*, March 31, 1977, 13;
\textsuperscript{1268} Interview with the State Sec. of Emigration, João Lima, *Comunidade*, March 31, 1977, Y. 2, n. 26, 13 (m.t.), YS-CTASC.
\end{footnotesize}
The tourism industry kept pushing its *turismo de saudade* in the diaspora, assisted by the Portuguese government's National Tourism Offices in Manhattan, and in new locations, like Toronto's Bay St. and Montreal's Place Bonaventure. By 1976, TAP offered flights to Lisbon five times a week from cities in northeastern Canada and the United States via Santa Maria or Terceira. Like the *Casa* had done before, the air carrier now sponsored visits to Portugal by ethnic media directors and travel agents from North America. TAP's marketing in the Portuguese press also echoed the familiar messages of old, as in this 1977 ad published in the *Comunidade*:

...Father. Mother. Brothers and cousins, all will be delighted to be with you... You're going to claim those long awaited feasts [and] take copious naps in that field where the old pine tree waits for you... There will be sun... music ...joy. Come with us... Aboard our people. Aboard your language. Aboard our friendliness. Come along, as this is your home.\(^{1269}\)

In the first seven months of that year, Portugal saw a 38% increase in the number of tourists; 65% among Canadian visitors, and 76% among Americans.\(^{1270}\)

Emigrants returning to Portugal on vacation now encountered a different reality than the one they left, and in most cases were positively impressed by the social and economic progress of their hometowns, forcing some to question their decision to leave. In September 1977, *Comunidade* asked three immigrants recently returned from their holidays in mainland Portugal to share their impressions about its post-revolutionary society. The men mentioned the improvements in consumer power and quality of life, and drew examples from their family and friends. One man noted his old pals now volunteered to pay for drinks at the bar, as opposed to expecting him, the “emigrant”, to pick up the tab, as was customary in the past. Another man argued that the attitudes of those visiting Portugal had changed as well. In his words:

There was a time when relations between the locals and the emigrants were not very good. The emigrant wanted to show himself, he was pompous... Now the emigrant who goes [to Portugal] doesn't say that things [in Canada] are fantastic. Now he notices: "Ah, you have unemployment here? So do we"... They've reached the conclusion that things aren't so different after all.\(^{1271}\)

Another interviewee added:

While [people in Portugal] may not think, for instance, in buying a house, they can afford a car like I do, have their home as well equipped as mine, and go to restaurants, movies, the beach, or a night out. I don't do that here. Over there, socially, they are living better than me.\(^{1272}\)

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1269 TAP advertisement, *Comunidade*, March 31, 1977, 6 (m.t.), YS-CTASC.
1270 *Comunidade*: "Desenvolvimento turístico nos Açores," April 15, 1976; TAP ad, May 5, 1976, 5; "Centro de Turismo de Portugal no Canadá", September 1977, 12, YS-CTASC.
1271 “A situação em Portugal vista por alguns de nós," *Comunidade*, September 1977 (m.t.), YS-CTASC.
1272 Ibid.
The gulf in personal experiences and collective memories expanding between Portuguese emigrants and nationals became increasingly harder to straddle, notwithstanding the substantial improvements in transportation and telecommunications. The emigrants' roots in the adopted country deepened as their children grew up as hyphenated ethnics with little or no desire to "return" to Portugal. Their parents also began accepting the fact they could never "return home", since the places they experienced in their youth and romanticized in their senior years had changed considerably. For many postwar immigrants, the late 1970s was a time of retrospection, especially in Portuguese-Canadian communities settled in the late '50s and '60s. Older and newer generations began preoccupying themselves with recounting and honouring the memory of the migrant "pioneers", whose personal stories were first captured by Marques and Medeiros in their 1979 *Portuguese Immigrants. 25 Years in Canada.*

The 25th anniversary of Portuguese mass migration to Canada was commemorated with much fanfare in May 1978, and again during that year's Portugal Day festivities in June. In Toronto, the celebrations involved the traditional raising of the Portuguese flag at City Hall, and a parade of social clubs, marching bands, *ranchos*, and other community organizations from across Ontario. People dressed in traditional peasant and fishermen garments were followed by the usual entourage of politicians, ethnic leaders, diplomats and other dignitaries. In High Park, the city's largest public playground, the Portuguese community unveiled a monument to itself in the form of a *padrão*, alluding to their homeland's imperial history (Figure 79-80).

By focusing on the sojourners-turned-immigrants who first settled in Canada in the 1950s, this and future tributes to the “pioneers” centered on the virtues and successes of this largely male cohort. As Colburn and Pozzetta argued in reference to Italian-Americans, the "bootstraps" narrative celebrated in these memorialization efforts highlighted "the group's ability to succeed based on the immigrant work ethic, sacrifice, family, and loyalty;" cultural values cherished by the immigrants "that they believed were compatible with the mores of American society."

These celebrations focused more on (working) class than on ethnicity. But by embracing "triumph over adversity" tropes and the familiar Christian narrative of redemption, the injustices and indignities forced upon the immigrants by the capitalist and racist societies that

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1273 A tall stone post with the Portuguese coat of arms and a cross on top. Portuguese maritime explorers placed these markers in the lands they "discovered" as a way of symbolically claiming them for the Portuguese crown; much like the modern-day flag planting. Today the *padrão* is one of the most recognizable symbols of Portugal's explorations, a recurrent element in national monuments, and a common marker of Portuguese presence in the world.

1274 Colburn & Pozzetta, 1994, 135.
exploited them were somewhat exonerated, as their ongoing social, economic, educational, and health problems became metaphorical trials essential to their personal tales of overcoming and absolution. Moreover, by placing the male "pioneers" at the centre of the Portuguese-Canadian story, they framed that group's official public memory within a patriarchal and Portuguese-born interpretation of their past, where immigrant women and their Canadian-born children were either ancillary or incidental.

The Day of Portugal, Camões and the Portuguese Communities, as it became known in 1977, continued to braid the immigrants' "bootstraps" narrative with the national discourses of home and host nations, and reinforce transnational bonds of "Portugueseness" between near and far diasporic communities. Host government officials at these "multicultural" events continued to extol the imperial heritage of the Portuguese and trace direct links between the early modern maritime explorers and the "persistent, hard working, disciplined, friendly" immigrants, who made "good citizens anywhere they settle." Portugal Day parades and surrounding festivities also grew in size, showcasing the civic strength and cultural diversity of this ethnic constituency. An estimated 80,000 people attended the 1977 festivities at Toronto's Trinity-Bellwoods Park, where they enjoyed performances from homeland and local Portuguese artists, including amateur fado singers, like Consul Ernesto Feu. As in the past, Portuguese diplomats took advantage of these occasions to urge the emigrants to unite and flex their political muscle.\footnote{Briefing notes for Minister J. Fleming; \textit{Correio Português}; "O embaixador de Portugal em Toronto," April 15; "Crónica da quizena," June 15, 1978, N473 reel 1, AO.}

At the same time, Portuguese immigrants grew skeptical (or cynical) of their homeland's promised commitment to their communities. Commentators like Onésimo Almeida characterized the annual national-diasporic celebrations as nothing more than empty words:

June 10 will be back in a few months, [with m]ore emotional speeches sending saudades and kisses to the emigrants; official revelries here and there; embassies of fado and football across this world, dilating that nostalgic weeping and leftover-empire. Portuguese around the world will once again hear the same dose of sentimental verbosity as the year before... promises of fidelity, enduring and fecund love; care for their problems... and in return they will be asked to reciprocate that love... by sending those needed remittan$ses [sic] to help build the Pátria.\footnote{Onésimo T. Almeida, "É pouco o que chega às comunidades," \textit{Correio Português}, March 30, 1978 (m.t.), N473 reel 1, AO.}

Adriano Moreira noted the echoes of his own diasporic project in the new government’s post-imperial outreach to Portuguese expatriate communities and accused the new political order of "pretend[ing] that nothing existed before they appropriated [his] idea." Moreira saw no harm in this, as long as those implementing his vision were competent, which, in his opinion, was not
the case. According to him, the new government had not yet understood "the transcending national importance of [the emigrant] issue, which they envelope in an uninspired folklore that is useless to the people of these communities." The former colonial minister also lamented the redefinition of Portuguese nationality along blood (hence racial) lines, laid out in the Nationality Law of June 24, 1975. Under this legislation, only those former colonial citizens who could trace their Portuguese ancestry up to third generation were allowed to claim their Portuguese citizenship. This excluded the majority of black Africans, along with Cape Verdean immigrants and their American-born descendants, even if they self-identified as Portuguese.\(^\text{1277}\) In any case, the number of Cape Verdeans who saw themselves as "Portuguese" first and foremost had dwindled by this time.

Cape Verde’s independence inaugurated a new period of mass exodus to New England, as well as Portugal and the Netherlands. Cape Verdeans were now freed from colonial bureaucracy and could apply for immigration directly at the American embassy in their nation's capital. This new migrant cohort introduced a more articulate and assertive Kriolu culture in the United States, amplifying the ethnic distinctiveness of Cape Verlean-Americans at a time when multiculturalism rewarded such cultural diversity. In December 1975, after Cape Verdeans petitioned the Massachusetts state legislature, Kriolu was officially recognized as "a living foreign language" distinct from Portuguese, which meant its instructors could now receive funds earmarked by Chapter 71A.\(^\text{1278}\) As a result of these legal, political, and cultural changes, Cape Verlean-Americans became more aware of their national identity, now reinforced by their homeland government, which, like Portugal, also developed its own transnational citizenship and diasporic council.\(^\text{1279}\)

**Conclusion**

The 1970s was a decade when various transitional moments unfolded and intersected in the lives of Portuguese immigrants and their communities in North America, stretching their identities and solidarities in multiple new directions. In a decade filled with cultural, political, and economic transformations, three shifts were of particular importance in reshaping the way

\(^{1277}\) Interview with Adriano Moreira in *O Diabo*, republished by the *Correio Português*, January 30, 1978 (m.t.), N473 reel 1, AO.
\(^{1278}\) R. Almeida, "Chronological references: Cabo Verde/Cape Verlean American".
Portuguese expatriates and their descendants saw themselves in the world: the introduction of multiculturalist legislation; the rise of new progressive civic leaders in their communities; and the dramatic political changes in their homeland. When studying the period before and after the April revolution, it is impossible not to notice the ironic and at times hypocritical role reversals of community leaders, or how new political agents continued to employ the community-, nation-, and diaspora-building methods of old. Throughout this decade we saw young social activists criticize the old guard of ethnic brokers while championing ethnic minority rights; Portuguese-American leaders pleading with officials for being recognized as “non-white” while Cape Verdeans becoming comfortable in their own “inbetween” skin; “anti-fascist” activists complaining about the biased mainstream media coverage of homeland politics; right-wing political exiles planning coups with their transnational networks; pro-democratic advocates opposing the political enfranchising of fellow emigrants; and other such unexpected turns.

Another interesting irony was the fact that, in some ways, the fall of the regime that had largely been responsible for the mass exodus of Portuguese emigrants, contributed to further uprooting them from their homeland, even though the new democratic state invited expatriates to return, both symbolically and physically. The rapidly changing consciousness, identities, and lifestyles of Portuguese nationals; the growing separatist nationalism of regional sub-groups; and the displacement of former imperial settlers from their colonial homes, all prompted a significant number of “Portuguese” expatriates to distance themselves from their supposed “homeland”. The diasporic discourses assumed by national and regional governments, with their claims that Portuguese people were “at home” everywhere, would eventually repair these ties. But in the process, the homeland became a symbolic function of the diaspora, as much as the diaspora reaffirmed the homeland’s national ethos as a global political entity.

Public memory played an important role in justifying and making sense of these transitions. Postwar immigrants began framing their collective story of mobility and belonging as they became increasingly torn between the country they left and the one that their children called home. As Colburn and Pozzetta argued, their “bootsrap” narratives “sought national recognition of the group respectability that they believed they had earned through their social and economic achievements and through the strength of their family structures.” According to these authors, “white” European ethnics seeking group recognition did not go as far as African-

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1280 Colburn & Pozzetta, 1994, 140.
Americans and other racial minorities in challenging the capitalist ideologies of their host society and demand that governments redress the social and economic injustices done to their group in the past. Indeed, those immigrants with personal histories of upward mobility and other measures of economic success, which were usually the ones celebrating their life stories, tended to impress a conciliatory or integrationist tone to their memories of settling in their adopted country; the same was true of the 1960s ethnic revivalism of Portuguese-American middle-class leaders, discussed in chapter six. But as we have seen in this chapter, the new generation of social activists emerging in Canada and the United States in the ‘70s - some of whom helped memorialize the older generation’s personal stories – used their group’s race and ethnicity to challenge those dominant structures oppressing immigrant workers.

Portuguese social activists in the United States tried to access government funds and programs aimed at removing social and economic obstacles facing marginalized racial and linguistic groups, but failed to have their own ethnic group recognized as a deserving "minority". They were not alone in this defeat. As Skrentny described, "white" European ethnics were left out of the "minority rights revolution" for a number of reasons, but mainly because they were below the "threshold of perceived discrimination that legitimated claims of oppression or victimhood," and because their "multiplicity of identities further undermined the analogy with blacks, who were seen principally in terms of race."1281

As Bloemraad pointed out, the fact that Canadian official multiculturalism was more generalized in its support for ethnic communities helps explain why immigrant activists there were more successful in obtaining state funds for their progressive social programs and advocacy agendas. This contradicts some leftist perceptions about the supposed hegemonic power of Canadian official multiculturalism. According to Giles, immigrant activists working within this policy framework were "cornered into arguing on an ethnic (rather than a class, gender, and racialized) basis;"1282 in other words, they were expected to be ethnic brokers, like the old community leaders they hoped to replace. While Canadian policy-makers may have sought to homogenize the immigrants' "multiplicity of identities" and limit the range of issues they were able to advocate, the historical record reveals a more subversive use of government resources by those applying to them. For example, Comunidade was a self-avowed champion for the rights of

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immigrant workers and dedicated much of its content to promoting the labour movement, gender
equality, and criticizing Canadian capitalism with blatant Marxist language. While praising
ethnic diversity and promoting Portuguese language education, the newspaper was also critical
of some multicultural programs and denounced the electoral patronage that came with
government grants. 1283 Its support of Portugal’s socialist revolutionaries was also well known to
Canadian authorities, who placed the newspaper and its editors under surveillance. Nevertheless,
Comunidade stayed in circulation for four years, thanks in large part to the ad revenue it received
from the Ministry of State for Multiculturalism and other government agencies. 1284 Behind this
perception is an antiquated notion of hegemony as an overpowering, top-down, consensus-
building process that imparts a "false-consciousness" on subaltern classes. Gramscian scholars
have long rejected this simplistic understanding of hegemony and acknowledged the subtle forms
of resistance and creative subversion available to those being "dominated". 1285 This is a more
accurate representation of the uses of multiculturalism by these young "radical ethnic brokers."

After the revolution, the new democratic government’s views on the previous regime
began taking hold as the dominant narrative of the recent political past. In the institutional
memory of this new political order, the many negative aspects of the Estado Novo’s emigration
policies were highlighted, while the ones that laid the foundation for the post-imperial diasporic
project were forgotten. Furthermore, their criticism of the regime's neglect of Portuguese
communities was overly simplistic and sometimes simply false. Indeed, as we have seen
throughout this dissertation, Salazar paid little attention to emigrants beyond their remittances,
and his regime largely ignored the social and cultural requests of its expatriate citizens, or dealt
with them in an ad hoc manner. Nonetheless, many government officials took a genuine interest
in these communities’ affairs and took the emigrants’ concerns to Lisbon; for instance, it is not
true that the regime “never” helped community schools, or that it had no interest in the social
welfare of emigrants. The fact that its diplomats had ulterior motives should not take away from
the intrinsic value of some of their social and cultural community initiatives, even when
compared with those of democratic officials, since the latter had their own political agendas too

1283 See for instance, editorial, February 28, 1978, Year 3, n. 36: 11-12; and "Caça ao Voto Atinge o First Portuguese", May 4,
1979, Year 4, Vol. 2, n. 12: 1 & 3. YS-CTASC.
1284 For a comprehensive history of the Comunidade and the MCP, see PCHP's online exhibit: "Comunidade newspaper, 1975-
1979", url: http://archives.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/pchp
1285 See for instance James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, 1990; or William Roseberry,
"Hegemony Hegemony and the Language of Contention", Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (eds.), Everyday Forms of State
Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, 1994.
(including boosting trade and remittances). Moreover, while democratic diplomats paid greater attention to the social problems affecting their expatriate citizens and had a clearer vision of how to address them in an engaging manner, they soon were confronted with the same lack of funds that plagued their predecessors, and were forced to limit the scope of their actions. Such disappointing realization added to the emigrants’ frustration with the homeland, and their growing skepticism of its government promises.
Fig. 65 - Singer Mano Belmonte performing while diners eat at Irmãos Unidos restaurant on "Portugal Village" (736 Dundas St. W.) in Toronto. Photo by Gilberto Prioste, 1979 (Gilberto Prioste private collection).

Fig. 66 - Portuguese language class in session at the Harbord Collegiate Institute in Toronto, 1978 (photo published in Comunidade, October 12, 1978, CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/003 [02], ASC17700).

Fig. 67 - Valentina Félix sings for patrons at her Fado house in Acushnet (photo by O. Louis Mazzatenta, National Geographic Stock, unknown date).

Fig. 68 - (Bottom) Anti-colonial protestors in Toronto. Photo by McFadden for the Toronto Telegram, 1969 (CTASC, Toronto Telegram fonds, ASC27212).
Fig. 70 - (Top) Domingos Marques working at O Jornal Português office in 1969 (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/003 [03], ASC17701).

Fig. 69 - Clipping from Comunidade introducing the Portuguese community workers at the MCP-YMCA, among them João Medeiros (middle, top row) and Domingos Marques (third from the left, middle row). Published in Comunidade, February 1977 issue (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds).

Fig. 71, 72 - (Top) Salgueiro Maia listens to Portuguese fishmonger in Montreal; (bottom) crowd gathered at Montreal's Portuguese Workers' Club to welcome the official delegation from Portugal's revolutionary government, September 1974 (photo available in blog os50anos.com).
Fig. 73 - José (Zeca) Afonso performs in Montreal with the members of MDP singing behind him, October 1974 (photo available in blog os50anos.com).

Fig. 74 - Crowd gathers outside Toronto’s St. Lawrence Centre for the Arts as General António Spinola speaks inside, November 23, 1975. Photo published in Comunidade (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/003 [02], ASC17702).

Fig. 75 - (Left) Alberto João Jarim, the President of the Autonomous Regional Government of Madeira, addresses the crowd in Toronto’s Hilton Hotel. Fr. Alberto Cunha seats in the back. Photo taken for Comunidade, June 1978 (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, ASC06665-n9-9A).

Fig. 76 - (Right) City Alderman candidate Bill Moniz canvasses the streets of Toronto ahead of that city's 1978 municipal elections. Photo published in Comunidade, September 1978 (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, ASC06678).
Fig. 77 - (Left) Portuguese strikers organized by the Canadian Food & Allied Workers Local 530 in the picket line outside Lancia-Bravo factory in Toronto. Photo taken for Comunidade, February 1979 (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, ASC06662-n4A).

Fig. 78 - (Right) Members of the Sacred Heart of Jesus band hold Portuguese, Canadian, and Azorean - FLA design - flags during Portugal Day celebrations at Nathan Phillips Square, Toronto. Photo published in Comunidade, June 29, 1979 (CTASC, Domingos Marques fonds, 2010-019/001 [01], ASC06663-n38A).

Fig. 79 - (Left) Portugal Day parade in Toronto. Photo by Gilberto Prioste, June 1978 (Gilberto Prioste private collection).

Fig. 80 - (Right) Portuguese community leaders, local politicians, the Portuguese consul, and the "April Captain" Vitor Alves (sixth from the right) pose in front of the Padrão monument to the "pioneers" of Portuguese migration to Canada, unveiled in High Park in June 1978. Photo by Gilberto Prioste (Gilberto Prioste private collection).
CONCLUSION

How does a small peripheral government with few material resources assert itself as a geopolitical player in an era of rising global governance, when rival superpowers threatened the sovereignty of nation-states and colonial empires? This was the question in the minds of Estado Novo officials when they developed their foreign policies in the second half of the 20th century, and the one driving this study. For Salazar, the answer was to reinvent his imperial regime as a Western stronghold against international communism, and the Portuguese nation as a pluri-continental and multiracial haven, whose contributions to Christian civilization were at the genesis of the West's global dominance. When the regime's imperial fantasy began to crumble, its propaganda continued to push this lusotropicalist fiction at the same time as it drafted the nation's youth to kill and die in unfamiliar "overseas provinces", and protect the empire against the anti-colonialist "winds of history". Meanwhile, a parallel version of pluri-continental and multiracial nationhood gained traction in those government sectors that dealt with international and colonial politics. Inspired imperialists, like Adriano Moreira, envisioned the union of all Portuguese expatriates and descendants under one large diaspora loyal to the homeland.

Eventually, the Estado Novo's sovereignty-by-force strategy led to its demise, along with the centuries-old empire that legitimized Portugal's claim to being a large country. Hovering above its debris remained the deterritorialized version of nationhood, where "being Portuguese" meant sharing in a national heritage that celebrated itinerancy and hybridity. Before securing its EEC membership and re-imagining itself as a modern European nation (of immigrants), the post-revolutionary government adopted this lingering lusotropicalist discourse to overcome its "crisis of national identity" and reassert itself on the international stage as a postmodern global nation (of emigrants), no longer legitimized by overseas provinces but by its Portuguese communities.

These were the "top down" discourses. The "bottom up" response to these grand narratives, however, differed according to the audiences and the agents who promoted, interpreted, or rejected them. Lower-class workers, upper-class entrepreneurs, youth activists, political exiles, mainlanders, Azoreans, Cape Verdeans, men, women, all related to their "homeland" in different ways and pinpointed it in different places on the map. Few deliberately sought to create a diaspora; they were too busy organizing their own local ethnic communities,

1286 As William Roseberry argued about the hegemonic projects of state formation: "The state, which never stops talking... has a number of audiences who hear different things; and who, in repeating what the state says to still other audiences, change the words, tones, inflections, and meanings" (in Roseberry, 1994, p. 365).
worrying about their hometown kin, and/or managing their own individual and household issues. Still, their transnational charity and humanitarianism, their sports and religious exchanges, their political coalitions, and other engagements, linked their local community institutions to those of their hometowns and other Portuguese settlements in North America. These interactions reinforced regional and national bonds of solidarity that helped develop a sense of belonging to a larger diaspora. Over time, those agents tasked with advancing the Estado Novo's agenda in the emigrant communities, like the diplomats, priests, newspapers editors, and other influential individuals, who had the means and the will to articulate the larger picture, wove these loose transnational bonds into the regime's national-imperial imagining.

Diplomatic officials, the basic agents of international relations (between nations), often broke the rules and became agents of transnational relations (in spite of nations). Portuguese ambassadors and consuls recruited, coerced and manipulated emigrant leaders and their institutions to do the dictator's bidding, in direct contravention of non-interventionist diplomatic conventions. At the same time, these diplomats were not mere instruments of the Estado Novo's foreign policy. Indeed, much of their local organizational efforts had little resonance in Lisbon and were often frustrated by the lack of support and vision of their superiors. It was common for consuls and ambassadors to advocate on behalf of expatriate communities, and sometimes take matters into their own hands when they failed to obtain a timely or satisfactory response from Lisbon. Generally speaking, these diplomats abroad tended to have a more liberal worldview than their domestic counterparts, given their cosmopolitan education and, in some cases, their prolonged residence in democratic nations. Still, these state officials carried out their missions with a great deal of cognitive dissonance and relativism, since they stimulated in the emigrants the very same civic and political engagement the dictatorship curbed in the homeland. Moreover, despite objecting to their cultural "backwardness" and parochialism, the diplomats' admiration for the emigrants' continued dedication to their common heritage inspired them to take initiatives beyond their expected duties and nourish these communities' links with Portugal. The combined efforts of diplomats and their community allies, which mixed state-level and grassroots political agendas, produced the institutional basis for the creation of a homeland-sanctioned diaspora, with its unifying federations and national holiday celebrations.

As Patrias argued, the "bottom up" paradigm of earlier social historians tended to downplay the actions of immigrant elites in the formation of ethnic communities, since the latter
were seen to be out of touch with the everyday realities of common immigrants. This social disconnect did exist in many cases, but not all. Many middle-class ethnic entrepreneurs shared a similar social background and sojourning experience as the immigrant workers they served. This was especially the case in newcomer settlements, like those in Canada, where the term *elites* is a less apt description of these upwardly mobile immigrants than of the well-established Portuguese-American dignitaries to the south. To a large extent, the social ascension of these immigrant middlemen was tied to their transnational brokerage and the value of their patronage. Providing these ethnic entrepreneurs with resources, status, and influence (though not always wealth) were the diplomats; patrons themselves, though more highly placed in the "supply chain". These foreign officials deliberately empowered community leaders in order to better manipulate them and increase their leverage in their host societies. The diplomats' outreach efforts were more extensive in the United States, where Portuguese-American leaders were better organized, more numerous, and powerful. Because of this, their relationship was less unilateral than with Canadian emigrant leaders, since the Americans' status and power derived less from the *Estado Novo*'s patronage or from transnational relations with Portugal; hence, they were in a better position to resist or negotiate the diplomats' encroachment in their community affairs.

Patrias also revealed how ethnic identity is infused with political ideology, which is often the domain of the "elites". Indeed, middle and upper-class community leaders, the vast majority of them men, had the most to say about the collective identity of Portuguese ethnics. As businessmen, journalists, and other kinds of professionals who catered to the ethnic market, they also had the most to profit from reinforcing their shared cultural heritage. At the same time, by endorsing the *Estado Novo*'s historical narrative about Portugal's contributions to Western civilization, Portuguese-American elites tried to carve a space for themselves within the cultural borders of both home and host nations, making the case for full membership as bona fide American and Portuguese nationals. In their public heritage celebrations, the agendas of Portuguese diplomats, ethnic leaders, and host nation politicians intersected in a relationship of convenience moved by mutual self-interest, where ideological and political differences were momentarily set aside, for they all reaped benefits from participating in such events. For the ethnic leaders, to be seen mingling with host and homeland dignitaries elevated their elite status and brokerage reputation. For the illustrious American or Canadian guests, it was important to be seen supporting a potentially useful ethnic constituency in an increasingly multiculturalist polity.
And for Portuguese diplomats, these were excellent opportunities to meet with influential people in less formal and more candid settings, survey the mood in their government agencies and private sectors with respect to Portuguese interests, and hopefully win their favour.

It is important to acknowledge that not all promoters of Portugal's historical "greatness" and its cultural and linguistic heritage were upper-class males. At the grassroots of this patriotic education were the schoolteachers, many of them women with teaching experience in Portugal, who could barely conciliate their underpaid teaching jobs with their living experiences as immigrant labourers with an elevated cultural status. Their voluntaristic dedication to Portuguese language education was matched by the many donations of common immigrants towards building community schools and libraries in their club and parish halls.

But the most fervent champions of the *Estado Novo*'s nationalist and imperialist ("ecumenical") message in the emigrant communities were Catholic priests sent from Portugal to ward off North American assimilation. Many of these clerics kept close ties with Portuguese diplomats and other homeland officials, as well as with lay and secular ethnic leaders, with whom they built various community institutions. These were not *elites*, in the classic sense of the term, since their religious vocation and social work demanded they remain close to the lower-class emigrants they served. This, however, did not stop some of them from coveting wealth and power, to the point of becoming insubordinate and unpredictable. Though usually critical allies of the dictatorship, these migrant priests could become terrible inconveniences for its diplomats, especially when they were outside the Portuguese episcopalts' jurisdiction, which meant the regime had little control over their actions and personal agendas. While they were keen to promote loyalty to the homeland nation and its empire, these priests, including those from the mainland, were also keen to fulfill the wishes of their Azorean and Madeiran parishioners and observe their distinct devotions, rites, and symbols, which often conflicted with the "respectable" spirituality and demeanor of North American Catholic Church. Parish halls, lay associations, and religious festivities thus played a crucial role in consolidating and performing distinct regional identities, which fed into separatist national and diasporic consciousness. These clergymen's sensibility to distinct Catholic identities was in part what earned them their parishioners' loyalty, which also meant their power relied on their ability to make their flocks happy.

In North America, where the Catholic Church was less powerful and centralized than in Portugal, the laity had a more important role in raising funds and organizing parish activities,
meaning they had more leverage to influence their priests. This sometimes led to tensions between them and traditionalist authoritarian priests from Portugal. This was especially the case in the United States, where most of the laity were Americanized descendants of immigrants, who preserved homeland traditions selectively, and assigned different meanings and purposes to religious festivities imported by their ancestors. The Portuguese-American laity was able to negotiate the terms of engagement with their priests and shun those who remained uncooperative. Their organization was also large and efficient enough to coordinate translocal charity and disaster relief campaigns across North America to aid those in need in their hometowns. It was common for these expatriate benefactors to use church channels and avoid the Portuguese government's direct intervention. Together with their steady flow of remittances, the small charitable contributions made by individual emigrants had a tremendous impact on the lives of impoverished beneficiaries, as well as the macro economy of the regions and the nation; thus confirming Levitt’s and Jaworsky’s argument that even casual transnational activities can have a great impact when combined.¹²⁸⁷

Political exiles, who fought the dictatorship at the local, transnational, and international fronts, also relied on the combined transnational linkages of fellow "anti-fascists" in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, to denounce the crimes of Salazar/Caetano and expose the pseudo-fascist NATO member to largely uninformed North American audiences. While its leaders were usually businessmen, professionals, or skilled workers, many of these activists were unskilled labourers with humble social and educational backgrounds. Still, they were able to circulate a sizable amount of political literature, organize numerous public rallies, draw endorsements from influential Americans and Canadians, and capture the attention of mainstream media, thanks in large part to the logistic and financial support of its transnational "anti-fascist" network. As "radical ethnic brokers", their commitment to democracy in Portugal was matched by their active citizenship in Canada and the United States, and their efforts to increase the immigrants' political engagement with their host nations. The fact they were fighting for democracy in their homeland did not prevent American and Canadian secret services from spying on them and sharing damning information on their activities and affiliations to the unaccountable PIDE. The sense of persecution, betrayal, disappointment, and exclusion felt by these exiles was compounded by the widespread complacency or hostility of their fellow emigrants, accused by the émigrés of having

forgotten the hard times they and their families had lived in Portugal. In their correspondence, news bulletins, literature, music, information sessions, and other communications, these exiles articulated a distinct diasporic consciousness, based on their self-understanding as outcasts of a nation that had failed them but to which they remained committed to return.

Another alternative "Portuguese" diaspora developing in North America was the Cape Verdean. After a long history of exclusion from the European Portuguese's religious and secular community spaces, Cape Verdean immigrants decided to build their own institutions on the margins of New England's Portuguese-American centres. Though initially not trying to create a separate ethnicity, continued rejection by "white" Portuguese and Americans, along with their own distancing from "black" or African associations, prompted them to assert their hybrid Kriolu language and culture. Still, they continued to see themselves as citizens of a multiracial empire, as reflected in their requests for aid from the colonialist regime. But by the time Portuguese-Americans adopted the lusotropicalist version of nationhood and began opening their institutions to Cape Verdeans, the latter were no longer interested. At this point, Cape Verdeans had multiple choices regarding their ethnic and national identity, which were passionately debated between foreign- and American-born generations, and fuelled by the American "black power" movement and the PAIGC's war for independence. After their homeland's independence, their once shy Kriolu culture became the dominant identity in Cape Verdean-American communities, now animated by a new cohort of proud national immigrants from the homeland, and a Cape Verdean nation-state seeking to affirm its distinct national identity in collaboration with its diaspora.

Another factor encouraging the ethnicization and national affirmation of Cape Verdean-Americans was the fact that multiculturalism, both as ideology and a set of government policies, had taken root in New England. In Canada, multiculturalism contributed to subsume the regional (and national) character of Azoreans under a homogenous Portuguese-Canadian identity dominated by the mainland's cultural and linguistic standards. Though not without controversy, the introduction of heritage language and culture curricula in American and Canadian public schools in the 1970s was a momentous shift away from earlier emphasis on assimilation. Immigrant children were encouraged to learn about their homeland and showcase their ethnicities, thus reducing their shame about assuming their minority identities. As C. B. Paulston noted, besides recognizing "the legitimacy and value of the students' ethnic background in the eyes of the dominant majority," these language classes brought "all the children together" and
"contribute[d] to a sense of community cohesion." This cohesion, however, sacrificed the Lusophone world's regional and national diversity for the sake of ethnic homogeneity. As Da Silva noted regarding the current state of Portuguese language education in Toronto: "From the teachers, who are predominantly first-generation immigrants from Mainland Portugal, to the curriculum, which presents the standardized and Mainland-centric views of the Portuguese language, history and culture, these classrooms reinforce the traditionalist and homogenizing dominant discourse that legitimize portugueseness is Mainland portugueseness."

Curiously, both multiculturalism and the civil rights movement suited the Estado Novo's propaganda and foreign agenda. After embracing lusotropicalism, Salazar and his diplomats took pleasure in contrasting Portugal's supposed multiracial society with the United States' deep racial segregation, to the point of cynically endorsing the liberation struggle of African-Americans while crushing African nationalists in the colonies. At the same time, the type of multiculturalism developing in Canada and parts of the United States, which favoured the most picturesque and seemingly traditional elements of the immigrants’ cultural heritage, fit perfectly with the SPN's/ SNI's/ SEIT's engineering of Portuguese popular culture along the ruralist ethos of its dictator. Moreover, this folk culture's bucolic alternative to the modern city life was an excellent platform for marketing Portugal's growing tourism industry and exports.

The younger generation of Portuguese "radical ethnic brokers" emerging in the 1970s also adopted the discourses and resources of American and Canadian identity politics to reach their goals. While critical of the older ethnic entrepreneurs and their devotion to the authoritarian homeland, this new generation used the language of ethnicity to unite and mobilize their fellow immigrants, seeking to increase their political leverage with host nation officials. However, their self-understanding as Portuguese ethnics was more extensive than that of their predecessors, since they invited non-European Lusophone groups like the Cape Verdeans to join them in forming a multiracial pan-linguistic identity. Still based on Portugal's imperial geography, this discourse continued to shape the self-perception of Portuguese ethnics long after the fall of the empire. For instance, the 2001 Celebration of Portuguese Heritage Act, which recognized June as Portuguese Heritage Month in Ontario - and whose preamble once again extolled the Portuguese maritime "discoveries" - was introduced by Carl DeFaria, a Goan-Portuguese-Canadian MPP.

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1289 Da Silva (2011, 118) cited a study by Manuel Oliveira and Carlos Teixeira (2004), which found that "less than 5% of students in Portuguese-language classes were of Azorean descent."
The racial identity of Portuguese-Americans remains unresolved in the eyes of U.S. government officials, who continue to classify them under multiple categories, depending on policies and departments. In recent years, Americans have also increasingly mistaken the Portuguese for "Hispanics" or "Latinos", a misconception reinforced by the growing number of Brazilian immigrants (also mistaken for "Hispanics" or "Latinos") living side-by-side with Portuguese-Americans in New England, where both groups seem to be fostering a Lusophone community consciousness (though not without tensions). Even in Canada, the Portuguese have been conflated with "Latinos" in mainstream popular culture, in part due to the creative and commercial exploits of such high-profile Portuguese-Canadians like Nelly Furtado, who recently began singing in Spanish and marketing her music to that large linguistic market.

The Portuguese government now promotes Lusophone consciousness among the citizens of its linguistic commonwealth, after it made language the crux of its global identity and replaced emigration with immigration as the focus of its cultural hybridity. But before that, the Marxist revolutionary governments, which shared the views of most political exiles, saw the diaspora as a tragic consequence of "fascism" and "capitalism", whose structural inequalities and oppression had produced the massive exodus of the country's labour force. Communist and socialist politicians operated under the assumption that, given the proper conditions, most emigrants would want to return to Portugal and were ready to invest in their homeland. Indeed, after 1974, remittances increased rapidly and many emigrants did return. However, other "Portuguese" expatriates, like the Azorean separatists and the imperial retornados, decided to cut ties with the mainland at this point. Others still, arguably the majority, maintained a vague aspiration to return but knew the places of their youth had changed dramatically with Portugal's social, cultural, and infrastructural modernization unfolding since the 1950s, and more rapidly after the revolution.

Those centrist governments that followed the PREC gradually recoiled from the Marxist goals of the provisional governments and resumed the diaspora-building project started by the dictatorship, to which they made many progressive and democratic improvements. It was at this point that the emigrants were elevated to the status of national ambassadors, and references to Portugal's imperial past reappeared in the many addresses of homeland dignitaries to the now lukewarm emigrant audiences. At the same time, Portuguese communities welcomed the

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1291 Nelly Furtado's Spanish album Mi Plan was released in 2009.
resources, benefits, and institutions provided by the homeland government to fulfill its diasporic vision. The fact that emigrants could now visit their families in Portugal more frequently, use instant long-distance communication technologies to speak with their loved ones, and eventually follow the daily occurrences in Portugal and other expatriate communities by tuning in to RTP International, simultaneously reinforced their ties with the homeland and made their permanent return less necessary. Though still central to their national and ethnic identities, Portugal became not so much a home but a nexus of diasporic connections facilitated by the post-imperial state. As Noivo argued, Portuguese emigrants now inhabited "reconstructed locations", where their "diasporicity derives from stitching together experiences and contradictory emotional connections - including both a longing for home and a resentment of exclusion from it - grounding a complex collective imagination."\(^{1292}\)

In my introduction, I argued that diaspora and nation have in common the fact they are both "imagined communities," yet differ when it comes to geography, as nations, unlike diasporas, are limited by territory and political borders. However, as the Portuguese case illustrates, national and diasporic consciousness can become intertwined and difficult to differentiate, especially when reinforced by imperial imaginings. The Portuguese nation, before and after the fall of its empire, may not have imagined itself to be "coterminous with mankind," but it certainly claimed a large part of Christian civilization as of its own making. When Portugal's territorial borders shrank and it once again became a small peripheral country, the national imagination of its elites remained limitless, reaching every corner of the world where Portuguese emigrants had established communities, claiming them as outposts of the new diasporic nation. These national imaginings were not immaterial or inconsequential to the lives of Portuguese emigrants. Though dealing in symbols, cultural references, and historical narratives, these official discourses legitimized the homeland state's encroachment in the affairs of Portuguese emigrant communities, and vice versa. They justified the clandestine intervention of diplomatic officials; the emigrants' expectations that the homeland government provide for their well-being abroad and help them build their community institutions; PIDE's prerogative to request and receive intelligence on expatriate "subversives" from foreign governments; the extension of voting rights and parliamentary representation for expatriate citizens; or the creation of a diasporic council to advise the Portuguese government on policy matters. In sum, nations

\(^{1292}\) Noivo, 2002, 271.
and diasporas do not only juxtapose, they also occasionally meld. Migration and diaspora studies must take this into account when discussing the national paradigm if they are to understand the resilience of nation-states and the legacies of colonial empire in our globalized era of transnational belongings.
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ABBREVIATIONS

(m.t.) - my translation
ANI - Agência de Notícias e Informação (News and Information Agency)
APC - Associação Portuguesa do Canadá (Portuguese Association of Canada)
CCAP - Canadian Committee for Amnesty in Portugal
CDS - Centro Democrata Social (Democratic Social Party)
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
COPA - Cambridge Organization of Portuguese-Americans
CPC - Conselho das Comunidades Portuguesas (Council of Portuguese Communities)
CPDP - Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal
CPRPS - Centro Português de Referência e Promoção Social (Portuguese Centre of Reference and Social Promotion)
DCI - Department of Citizenship and Immigration
DDS - Directório Democrato-Social (Democrat-Social Directory)
EEC - European Economic Community
EFTA - European Free Trade Association
ELP - Exército de Libertação de Portugal (Portuguese Liberation Army)
ESL - English as Second Language
EU - European Union
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
FLA - Frente de Libertação dos Açores (Azorean Liberation Front)
FPCC - First Portuguese Canadian Club
FPLN - Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (National Liberation Patriotic Front)
HGBB - Holy Ghost Beneficial Brotherhood
IAC - Instituto de Alta Cultura (Institute of High Culture)
ICEM - Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
ICMC - International Catholic Migration Commission
JDE - Junta da Emigração (Emigration Junta)
MCP - Movimento Comunitário Português (Portuguese Communitarian Movement)
MDLP - Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal (Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal)
MDP - Movimento Democrático Português (Portuguese Democratic Movement)
MFA - Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement)
MP - Member of Parliament
MPP - Member of Provincial Parliament
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP - New Democratic Party
OECC - Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OCPM - Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações (Portuguese Catholic Organization for Migrations)
PAF - Portuguese American Federation
PAIGC - Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PCC - Portuguese Canadian Congress
PCDA - Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association
PCP - Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)
PCU - União Católica Portuguesa (Portuguese Catholic Union)
PIDE - Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defense Police)
PMFA - Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PPD - Partido Popular Democrata (Popular Democratic Party)
PREC - Processo Revolucionário em Curso (Ongoing Revolutionary Process)
PS - Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)
PSD - Partido Social Democrata (Social Democratic Party)
PVDE - Polícia de Vigilância e de Defesa do Estado (State Vigilance and Defense Police)
RCMP - Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCP - Sport Club Portuguese
SEIT - Secretariado de Estado de Informação e Turismo (Secretariat of State of Information and Tourism)
SNI - Secretariado Nacional de Informação (Secretariat of National Information)
SPN - Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional (Secretariat of National Propaganda)
SPPH - Society for the Perpetuation of Portuguese Heritage
TAP - Transportes Aéreos Portugueses (Portuguese Air Transports)
UN - United Nations
UCCP - União das Comunidades de Cultura Portuguesa (Union of Portuguese Cultural Communities)
UPC - União Portuguesa Continental (Portuguese Continental Union)
Appendix A. Civic, political, and religious leaders by city of residence, place of birth (or regional background), and occupation, 1950s-1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of birth/Background</th>
<th>Civics/Politics</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Other Business/Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boston, MA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aníbal Silva Branco</td>
<td>Mainland Portugal</td>
<td>Sec.-Gen., UPC; 1934-68; Chancellor and Sec. of the Portuguese consulate in Boston (?)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Editor/director, <em>O Independeante</em> (New Bedford); correspondent <em>Diário de Notícias</em> (New Bedford)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humberto Sousa Medeiros</td>
<td>São Miguel (Azores)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic priest in Fall River and New Bedford; Bishop of Brownsville, TX, 1966-70; Archbishop of Boston, 1970; Cardinal, 1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin T. Camacho</td>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>Dir., PACFA, 1961-64; Board Dir., PAF, 1970s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lawyer, lobbyist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fall River, MA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank B. Oliveira</td>
<td>Fall River (parents from São Miguel, Azores)</td>
<td>State Rep. 1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John M. Arruda</td>
<td>Fall River (parents from São Miguel, Azores)</td>
<td>City Coun. 1952-58; Exec. Dir. Fall River Housing Authority, 1950s; Mayor of Fall River, 1958-63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Leite Fonseca</td>
<td>Fall River</td>
<td>Member, School Committee of Fall River, 1945-7; State Sen. 1952-84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Bedford, MA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>António Pacheco Vieira</td>
<td>São Miguel (Azores)</td>
<td>Founder, Portuguese school of Our Lady of Mount Carmel, 1941</td>
<td>Catholic priest, Our Lady of Mount Carmel parish, 1907-7</td>
<td>Owner, WJFD radio station, 1975-2010</td>
<td>Lawyer. Insurance company, and restaurant owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmundo Dinis</td>
<td>New Bedford (parents from São Miguel, Azores)</td>
<td>City Coun., 1940s; State Rep. 1949-50; State Sen. 1953-56; District Attorney, 1959-70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Rogers</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Rep. 1949-50; Mayor of New Bedford 1970-71; City Coun., 1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other towns in MA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudolph H. DeSilva</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>(Taunton) Mayor of Taunton, 1972-74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Providence, RI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph I. Mello</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Rep. 1949-54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electrician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvester Perry</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>State Rep. 1955-60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner, liquor store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Providence and Pawtucket, RI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julio F. Rocha</td>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>Union leader; Pres. HGBB, 1941-43; State Rep. 1945-56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Supplyman”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

425
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Occupation/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John L. Lewis</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Financial Sec., Portuguese American Democratic Club; Pres. Brazilian-American Athletic Club; Member of various orgs., e.g. HGBB; Union leader; State Rep. 1949-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augusto W. Sá Bento</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Rep. 1957-66; Lawyer; Host, TV show Os Portugueses (channel 36), 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert T. Rocha</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Sen. 1959-66; Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William A. Castro</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>President, HGBB, 1960-62; State Sen. 1967-83; Bus terminal manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Travers, Jr.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Pres. Portuguese-American Democrats of RI, 1963-64; Chair, Port. Sport Club; President Fall River Soccer Association; State Rep. 1961-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol, RI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Alfred</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Rep. 1939-56; Wire worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>António Ponte</td>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>State Sen. 1955-56; Owner, furniture store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Lima</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Rep. 1957-60; State Sen. 1975-83; Funeral director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry W. Pacheco</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Rep. 1967-72; Asst. car sales manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas J. DiPonte</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>State Sen. 1973-74; Owner, furniture store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other towns in RI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Sylvia</td>
<td>U.S.A. (Azorean descent)</td>
<td>(Little Compton) State Rep. 1937-40; State Sen. 1941-58; Carpenter; Steam engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Almeida</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>(Portsmouth) State Rep. 1951-52; State Sen. 1953-60; Dairy farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Mendes</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>(Smithfield) State Rep. 1955-60; Overseer, textile factory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis R. Costa</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>(Jamestown) State Sen. 1963-66; Owner, golf course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank L. Nunes</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>(Middletown) State Rep. 1971-74; Public accountant; Real estate agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, NY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gil da Câmara</td>
<td>São Miguel (Azores)</td>
<td>Owner/editor, New York Bulletin, Vida Lusa, and The Daily; Interim agent, Casa de Portugal (1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Dímaso Fragozo</td>
<td>São Miguel (Azores)</td>
<td>Co-founder/Pres., Miguel Corte-Real Memorial Society, 1951-7; New York University lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Jacella</td>
<td>Algarcia (mainland)</td>
<td>Catholic priest. Founder/director, St. Anthony's Mission (1924); Owner/director, Portugal (1926-35); A Luta (1935-75); Nossa Senhora de Fátima; Music teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark, NJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abílio Oliveira Águas</td>
<td>Figueira da Foz (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-Founder Rhode Island PACL; Pres. Portuguese section, Democratic Party nationalities directory; Chair, CPDP, 1961-7; Contributor, News-Tribune (Providence); Businessmen; company manager; Vice-Consul of Portugal in Providence (1925-30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo da Cunha Covas</td>
<td>Moscavide (mainland)</td>
<td>Sec., CPDP, 1961-7; Distributor, Portugal Democrático; Accountant; factory worker; guitar-string maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Lebre Capote</td>
<td>Ilhavo (mainland)</td>
<td>Catholic priest, in Lowell (1949-50), Cambridge (1950-55), and Newark (Our Lady of Fátima) (1955-77); Owner/director, Novos Rumos (1961-7);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasco S. Jardim (Jr.)</td>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>Publisher, Luso Americano (1939-7); Typographer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Title/Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armando Barqueiro</td>
<td>Alcobaca (mainland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domingos da Costa Gomes</td>
<td>Chaves (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-founder/President, PCC; MDP; Mem. PCDA; Founder, President, PCDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domingos Reis</td>
<td>Sao Miguel (Azores)</td>
<td>Co-founder, <em>A Voz de Portugal</em>, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederico Fatela</td>
<td>Guarda (mainland)</td>
<td>Founder, Portuguese School of Santa Cruz (1971); President, Lisboa School (1966-1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrique Tavares Bello</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>President, APC; Founder/Pres., Casa dos Portugueses/MDP; Co-founder, Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Neves Rodrigues</td>
<td>Algarve (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-founder, MDP; Co-founder, Caixa Economica dos Portugueses de Montreal, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Teixeira</td>
<td>Celorico da Beira (mainland)</td>
<td>Founder, UCP; Co-Founder, Club Portugal, 1965; Co-Founder, Federation dos Organismos Portugueses de Quebec, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rui Cunha Viana</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Secretary-General, MDP; Vice-President, Front Internacional Anti-Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfredo Camacho</td>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>Catholic priest, St. Mary's parish (1957-1959); St. Elizabeth parish (1959-61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvaro Rosinha</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>President, FPCC; Co-founder, PCDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amadeu Vaz</td>
<td>Nazare (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-founder, FPCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Pereira Vaz</td>
<td>Idanha-a-Nova (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-founder/Sec., KARA, 1957; Founder and Sec., UPC Lodge 66, 1963-7; Board member PCCU, 1966-7; Toronto Metro Separate School Board trustee, 1972-7; various admin. roles in FPCC, Toronto's Doctor's Hospital, Metro Consumers Cooperative, Harbourfront Centre, Trinity Recreation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>António Sousa</td>
<td>Nazare (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-founder and Pres., FPCC, 1956, 1960, 1975; Dir. Rancho da Nazare, 1962; Co-founder, Pro-Culture Society, 1972; Founder, Nazare Recreative Club; Dir. FPCC Portuguese school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domingos Marques</td>
<td>Aveiro (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-director, MCP, 1972-7; Pres. ACAPO; TSSSB school board trustee (1991-94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Occupation/Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Ciriaco da Cunha</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Co-founder/Pres. PCDA, 1959-1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Pedroso</td>
<td>Setúbal (mainland)</td>
<td>President, Hamilton Portuguese Information Centre (Hamilton); Councilor, Council of Portuguese Communities (1981-?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilherme Antunes dos Santos</td>
<td>Leiria (mainland)</td>
<td>President, PCDA (1965-66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humberto Carvalho</td>
<td>São Miguel (Azores)</td>
<td>Founder/Pres., Pro-Culture Society, 1972-80h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Monteiro</td>
<td>Setúbal (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-founder, Club Portugal Montreal (1965); Exec. member, MDP &amp; PCDA; Co-Founder Portugal Investment Corporation (1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquim Esteves Lourenço</td>
<td>Terceira (Azores)</td>
<td>Catholic priest, Our Lady of Fatima (Ludlow); St. Mary's parish, 1961-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Medeiros</td>
<td>São Miguel (Azores)</td>
<td>Founder/co-director, MCP, 1972-?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Rafael</td>
<td>Terceira (Azores)</td>
<td>Pres., FPCC (c.1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Júlio Ricardo Félix</td>
<td>Caldas da Rainha (mainland)</td>
<td>Pres., PCDA, 1966-68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lourenço Gonçalves</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Pres., FPCC, 1963-64; Co-founder, FPCC school, 1964; Co-founder, PCCU, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Alice Ribeiro</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Co-founder, Rancho da Nazaré, 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Mira</td>
<td>Leiria (mainland)</td>
<td>Co-founder/pub. relations officer, PCABIP 1969; Pres., PCC, 1969-70; Sec. FPCC, 1971-73; Co-founder/Pres., Pro-Culture Society, 1972, 7; Vice-pres. IIMT (?); Co-founder/Pres., PACS (Florida) 1981-84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chemical engineer, college teacher**

**Agricultural engineer; civil servant**

**Editor, Jornal Português (1968-75)**

**Contributor, The Truth/A Verdade; Distributor, Luso-Canadiano**

**Owner, travel agency**

**Bank manager; owner, construction materials importing company**

**Correspondent, Luso-Canadiano (Montreal), and A Bola (Lisbon)**

**Cars salesman, owner, furniture store; co-founder, credit union**

**Radio announcer, Radio Clube Português and CHIN Radio**

**Office cleaner; travel agent; immigration consultant; real estate agent**

**Editor, Comunidade, 1975-79**

**Social worker**

**Correspondent, Novidades (Lisbon), 1958; and A Luta (New York); Co-founder/ed., Correio Português, 1963-7; Publisher, Seleções Português (7); Dir. and host, Radio Club Português, 1968-?**

**Publisher/owner, communication systems**

**Owner, bookstore, 1965-86**