WHAT WORDS CAN DO
ANALYZING ADULT/CHILD RELATIONS IN NARRATIVES OF LITERATURE AND PSYCHOSOCIAL THEORY

LUCILLE K. ANGUS

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Abstract

This thesis enters into an analysis of adult/child relations by looking closely at affective social and historical representations of childhood. It asks, how to characterize the self-other relation when the subject is a child. This work is composed of thematic close readings of three primary texts: Piera Aulagnier (2001) introduces the child as being, Jacqueline Rose (1992) presents the enigmatic child, and Carolyn Steedman (1994) traces the spectacle of the child. This thesis grapples with the being of the child, beginning by exploring infancy as a state of dependency that marks growth. I examine the child’s vulnerability that precedes speech and discuss how imperceptible traces of that state intersect with the child’s introduction to symbolization and the words adults use to represent childhood. I turn to examine forms of childhood shaped through fantastical, cultural and historical narratives, questioning the place of the child and adult within those representations.
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1. Introduction

This thesis examines specific historical, literary and social examples of what has been said about the child. The works that are used to investigate these examples trace their textual as well as social histories questioning the ways ideas about children and childhood came to be known beyond the source materials they can be traced back to, and even by illiterate people (Steedman 1994). Looking at the problem of the child coming into language through relations with those who are fully grown and the social and historical construction of childhood through adult texts, this thesis also comes to explore what cannot be said or what is repressed in the language that is spoken and written.

The thesis investigates the idea that children present adults with an enigma. They are both sites of ambiguity whose bodily gestures can be unclear and misunderstood and the personification of invested meanings that exceed the interpretation of any particular child’s communicative movements. The infant’s cries are often met with the anxious response of new parents and caregivers. And the meaning being communicated through this tearful expression is not always easily determined. Even as the caregiver begins to become familiar with the particularities of conveyance of the infant in their arms, it can remain difficult to distinguish between the cries of hunger and those relating to exhaustion. Beyond these and other basic needs the child’s cry opens an emotional body of expression that might impart some deeper desire. Described in this way the mysteries of the child seem to lie hidden within the infant’s body waiting for the deciphering gaze of the adult or the key of speech.

And this is where we bump up against so many confusions in the history of trying to understand the child. In the search for the key of speech there is also a search for the subject of the child. And yet, there is a slippage between the subjective observations of the parent or adult and the words children acquire later in life that try to express what came before. In the gap between child and adult and the elapsed distortions of memory we find difficulty in describing the subject. This is not to say researchers haven’t tried. The child is an over-studied subject in research, literature, popular culture and everyday
conversations. In recent years critical theorists and scholars in early childhood education have discussed the vast body of knowledge generated by developmental theorists (Penn 2005; Cannella and Diaz Soto 2010; MacNaughton 2005; Dahlberg and Moss 2005; Hultqvist and Dahlberg 2001; Burman 2008, 2013). These scholars note the ways developmental theory has shaped assumptions about children in global representations of childhood, pedagogical relationships, and politically determined discourse and institutions. Making sense of the child or knowing the child have become projects that cling to the professional role of the teacher and the hope for freedom that education is said to offer and these are sites of critique and potential renewal for many scholars (see for example, Hultqvist and Dahlberg 2001; Dahlberg and Moss 2005; Pacini-Ketchabaw, Kummen, and Thompson 2010). Developmental theory is one lens staking ‘truth’ claims about the child (MacNaughton 2005) and language development is entangled within this theory, and yet, it also presents something different: the pull of the inevitable and the promise of an explanation or story that might eventually emerge.

In a philosophical and linguistic inquiry into the forgetting and loss of language in the book, *Echolalias*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (2005) suggests:

> It is as if the acquisition of language were possible only through an act of oblivion, a kind of linguistic infantile amnesia (or phonic amnesia, since what the infant seems to forget is not language but an apparently infinite capacity for undifferentiated articulation). Could it be that the child is so captivated by the reality of one language that he abandons the boundless but ultimately sterile realm that contains the possibility of all others? Or should one instead look to the newly acquired language for explanations: is it the mother tongue that, taking hold of its new speaker, refuses to tolerate in him even the shadow of another?

(11)

Heller-Roazen goes on to ask if “the languages of the adult retain anything of the infinitely varied babble from which they emerge” (11-12). While this research will not seek out the specific remainders of the sounds of infancy, it contemplates the relationship
between the adult and child through this question of remnants. It asks: How to characterize the self-other relation when the subject is a child?

**Nature of the problem:**

In turning to consider the social and emotional elements of the process of moving into speech described by Adam Phillips (1998) we can begin to recognize the demands that accompany the child’s introduction to language. The ongoing difficulty of what is often seen to be an inevitable element of early childhood development begins to come into question as, “at this point of her life the child leaves more than one home, something she will do every time she speaks, which is always out of her own previous silence. That noisy silence, before language joined in, is a lengthy part of her own history” (42-43). In Phillips’ description the introduction of words no longer resembles a key. In an early childhood classroom when a child says goodbye to her parents; when she is frustrated in her play with other children; when she falls in the early steps of learning to walk; or when she is simply tired after a busy morning—she might cry. The response of parents, caregivers and educators to this tearful expression is crucial. Throughout the early months of the child’s life the caregiver can offer comfort, rest and food to try to appease the child’s distress. And then, as the child grows out of infancy, she is soon expected to express her needs in other ways. When the child cries the response may become a demand: ‘use your words.’ The demand to use words is repeated within the home and then at school. As the child is summoned to put into words something deeper than language, the adult’s speech might not admit a vocabulary to convey the possibilities of meaning previously opened by the child’s cry.

This thesis begins by examining what the child’s symbolization holds in store. It looks closely at the child’s communication as a repository of untold meaning that finds intersecting form in adult words and the adult demand for reciprocal communication. The thesis also examines the words that have shaped adult understandings of childhood through a study of a number of texts described below. In the specific cases within the family and in the historic and literary cases, the child enters into an adult world and is
located in relation to a dependency on a mother figure, a political positioning within society, and a fantasy. While any given singular child might have had some element of agency, Ludmilla Jordanova (1989) points to the difficulties of researching the voice of the child in history:

It may be that women and workers have simply spoken with the voices of the dominant discourse, although many historians would deny this. Children, however, have inevitably done so, since there can be no alternative for them. Their passage into being is inexorably a coming into language, a language which is, for the child, a given. There are no special sources available to historians or to others which avoid this trap. (6)

To write about or represent the child then requires an acknowledgement of the difficulty involved in this process: children are not given a voice; their speech, however, is subject to affect—their own and the one who listens.

New methods in the field of early childhood education draw on the pedagogical approaches emerging from the Italian municipal schools of Reggio Emilia (Rinaldi 2006; see also, Gothson 20101) to create ‘documentation’ and the New Zealand primary school curriculum to create ‘learning stories’ (Carr 2001) in order to think about new ways of assessment and “making [children’s] learning visible” (Project Zero and Reggio Children 2001, 18). And yet, it is the insistence of this thesis that such pedagogical tools can appear to side-step the intersubjective difficulties that will be addressed here. In some examples educators have chosen to use only visual mediums to avoid imposing the interpretation of an educator or adult on the child’s image. Cameras are given to children to picture their own experiences. The turn to the child to invite her to create her own image, to share her own words, or to perform her own embodied experience, in effect does not escape the question of how adult observation and conclusion impact the representations children produce and the representations of childhood adults produce.

1 Gothson (2010) examines questions of what it might mean to work with methods inspired by the Reggio Emilia approach in a different cultural context.
And this is not a critique, because this turn, to reframe the image of the child that is assembled through various pedagogical forms of documentation implicitly grapples with the very question of the representation of the child that is produced between adults and children in pedagogical settings. What may not be made explicit here, on the other hand, is the history of these relations that have impacted the images of childhood and that seem to continue to reverberate in the myths of childhood abound today.

When this mythic history is taken into account, not only does the idealized image of the child enter into the picture, but so do the little bodies that we have shied away from recede, leaving adults with their anxiety, fantasy, and ambivalence. This becomes apparent in a recent article written by Rachel Holmes and Liz Jones (2013). These scholars subvert the concept of protection that is prevalent in literature about young children and early childhood education as they grapple with the ideas of safe images that reinforce preconceived ideas about childhood innocence and the unsafe images that unsettle and provoke. Holmes and Jones reflect on the responses to a film they created, “where still and moving images of the young child are elicited to challenge what is often not allowed to be said within the textual sedation of early childhood mandates” (75).

Turning to the image and art these scholars find ways to elicit new meaning and expose existing contradictions. In my study I turn to the diverse, intertwining, and sometimes contradictory ideas that surround the context of the historic and personal construction of the child. I embark on a serious study of three major texts that take on the cultural study of childhood.

**Approach to the problem:**

My study asks: Is there a language between adults and children that might communicate the affective impact that symbolic language places on the child’s psychosocial development? I draw upon three primary texts selected for their discussion on the historical, the social, and the psychological work of the relational space of childhood and early symbolization. Together these texts offer a means of looking closely at the larger problem of trying to contain the child’s distress using language that is
already constructed from the adult’s investment in childhood. The close reading method helps me to ask why educators might talk about the language of young children through enigma. Close reading (Lentricchia and DuBois 2003; Gallop 2007) offers a method that can be used to study the historical and social conditions in which influential texts of childhood have been constructed. I apply the close reading method by analyzing each text through a thematic relationship. Each thematic reading addresses the relationship between adults, children and language by bearing respectively on the concepts of being, bodies and objects.

Piera Aulagnier’s (2001) theoretical work is analyzed from the vantage of understanding the relationship between words and being. This entry point questions what is at stake in the demand to speak and write that stems from the language of the other (13). It contemplates the residues of the vulnerable and dependent relationship that precedes speech.

The second text offers an opening into the theme of words and objects. Drawing from Jacqueline Rose’s (1992) work on Peter Pan and children’s fiction, this aspect of the thesis addresses the ways in which literary objects shape the language of childhood while being affected by the concept of childhood at stake in the cultural and historical period during which the objects were created.

The third text returns to the other side of language through Carolyn Steedman’s (1994) discussion of the child’s hidden interior symbolic acts and provides entry into the relational motif of words and bodies. This silent communication has been interpreted by the adult’s gaze, contributing to an understanding of the early language that emerged between adults and children. Analysis of these texts focuses on the ways representations of the child have developed historically and questions this history’s relationship to how language is understood.

**Defining language in this study:**

The problem of language—and our initial encounters with words—is a theme that runs throughout this thesis. It is a problem I grapple with in different contexts, difficult to
define. Defining language is complicated by the various uses of these terms in my engagement with other scholars and citations of their work. Generally, language, words, speech and verbalization are used interchangeably to indicate the time when the child begins to encounter—and then use—spoken words in her mother tongue(s). I conceive language across a pre-verbal to post-verbal frontier which demarcates the particular event of symbolization. In traversing this divide I grapple with the movement of language from the personal embodied expressions of the child, made intelligible by the family and familiars, to the public symbolization of words. This movement appears to enact the simple necessity of communication. However, when considered in connection with some of Adam Phillips’ (1998) questions it takes into consideration the infantile history that precedes this initiation. Phillips contemplates how learning to speak might provoke the child to wonder: “‘Why are words the thing?’;” “‘what is learning to speak learning to do, or like learning to do?;’” or, “what exactly must be given up in order to speak?” (43). In order to also consider how the history of the adult impacts this exchange, I would add, what words are already there? Or, what happens when we pass words on? While the focus of this thesis engages with the question of what words can do and will wonder what exceeds the boundaries of speech, at times in reference to the embodied languages of the child, I will not be undertaking a thorough reflection on the multiplicity of languages of the child here (see for example, Edwards, Gandini, and Forman 1998).

Description of thesis chapters:

This thesis consists of five chapters, including the introduction. Each of the main chapters considers the relations between the child and adult through one of the three major texts that structure this thesis and through a thematic that is used to examine each text’s representation of the child: Piera Aulagnier (2001) introduces the child as being, Jacqueline Rose (1992) presents the enigmatic child, and Carolyn Steedman (1994) traces the spectacle of the child. The concluding chapter gives thought to the implications of these representations for pedagogy. Chapter two begins with a discussion of the initial dependency of the child and the distinct position this places the child in. This chapter is
shaped by Piera Aulagnier’s (2001) psychoanalytic work, *The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement*. Taking up Aulagnier’s concepts of the “the primal process and the pictogram” I look at the intimate relational beginnings that precede the coming into being of a subject, or an ‘I,’ and what is already repressed through this intergenerational introduction to the world and to words (16). Aulagnier speaks to the shock of parenting with the question of how to listen and respond to the child through her complex theoretical work. Here I grapple with representations of the child as a being and consider the demands that fantasy and language place upon the child. Aulagnier’s work presents the relational dynamics that bind the child’s learning with words and ways with words and this second chapter presents the very difficulty of negotiating the self /other relation when the subject is a child. To further pursue the challenges of representing this asymmetrical relationship, chapters three and four engage in close readings of works that examine defenses against being.

The third chapter introduces the problem of the words that are written for or about children through the enigmatic fictional child of Peter Pan and Jacqueline Rose’s (1992) study, *The Case of Peter Pan: Or, the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*. Here the question of the child as fantasy comes into discussion, not only through the fantastic escape that appears in the form of Neverland and the fairytale, but also in the leaps and bounds that Rose describes in the many readings of the text. Rose’s opening onto the object and words of children’s fiction exposes and protects a fantasy of origins that has bled into the author. And she opens the vulnerability of the social, veiled in retellings of Peter Pan, through the exploration of relations among author, story and performance. The complicated history of Peter Pan that Rose describes negotiates the affective cultural relations that surround this mysterious and well-loved character. This third chapter then pulls the zoom lens back to explore the psychical and social bonds that fill the texts written for and about children.

The fourth chapter analyzes Carolyn Steedman’s (1994) historical study of the construction of childhood through the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and
her finding of this child figure in the fictional character of Goethe’s Mignon. Goethe’s Mignon is an androgynous child acrobat forced to dance for an audience and seen to be physically manipulated by adults. Looking at shifts in diverse bodies of thought, literature, and politics, and the lives of the children on display in the streets or on the stage, Steedman traces the developing idea of childhood and brings a new understanding of history interested in memories of personal childhood. In these ways Steedman renews another image of the child that paradoxically renders the adult helpless. Steedman explains the importance of her work as something that emerges primarily from a particular historical period in England, although she also traces the personified idea of the child in the figure of Mignon through Europe:

The interest of the topic is, of course, that it is not transhistorical, that children have not always and everywhere been used as emblems of the adult human condition, though that is indeed the imaginative and cognitive legacy with which we operate in regard to children in the late twentieth century. (x)

And, despite these roots, Mignon seems to appear as a photographic negative of the child: She is the figure who makes us reflect on the history of adult’s watching children; she is the child whose character was reproduced on many stages in a variety of forms and whose image was projected onto children in the street in Victorian times. More recently as Erica Burman (2008) has argued, Mignon has resonated in the title character in the French film, Amelie (Jeunet 2001), played by Audrey Tautou. The child acrobat who is manipulated for spectacle leads this chapter to a discussion of the relations between bodies and words as Mignon’s timeless figure continues to resonate in current ideas about childhood.

In the thesis conclusion I return to the orienting themes and make connections between the child’s being, or, put another way, the child with a presence. This view is brought to Peter Pan, that child who is outside time and will never grow up, and the child acrobat Mignon, whose timelessness marks her repeated performance in history and the present. Aulagnier’s didactic text explores a history that the child cannot remember, Peter
Pan’s audience remembers the stories of his adventures that he is likely to forget and repeat, and in death, Mignon personifies the past of her adult guardian, leaving no fixed truth about the forgotten times of childhood. Faced with the child as a subject, as enigma, as spectacle, and a grappling of being, the conclusion discusses what it might mean to represent the child through a relational matrix that includes adult constructions of the child’s history with fantastical narratives written about childhood. The relational beginnings formed as the child enters the world through the family are carried into language as a dialectic, which I propose adult words attempt to resolve through representations of children and childhood.
2. Piera Aulagnier’s Difficulties of Reception: Investigating Developing Relations with Words Between the Mother and Infant

When it comes to the language acquisition of young children—parents, educators, and even researchers, seem to be anxiously awaiting the arrival of words. Research and pedagogical approaches strive between reassuring the concerned adults that the child will speak when he or she is ready, pressing the importance of sign language and other gestural forms of symbolism that the child might use before words, and looking at ways that language is already a part of the child’s world as it is spoken by the adults around the child, inferred in emblems and gestures and communicated through other symbolic forms such as image. Words take time and children often understand a good deal before they speak. The anxieties that precede the child’s introduction to speech anticipate the difficulties where words come apart. And then in cases where speech arrives later, words get picked apart, separated into sounds and phonemes, represented in songs and examined through the responses given by the adults in the child’s life. As words are broken down into their sound parts, there is an attempt to break down the steps of learning to speak, to find the simpler stages before words and the complex meanings they might invoke. There, some believe, lips and tongue can first figure how to articulate recognizable and reproducible sounds and connect those early utterances to the demands of communication.

Sounds make up words and it is easy to see how learning these rhythmic parts of speech might help lead to later vocalization. However, the relation between sound and word is not the only—or even the first—relation the child experiences with sound. In the early days and months of life the words that the mother speaks to the infant, before they become recognizable as distinct symbols, are greeted as the sound of the mother’s presence and the silence of her absence. And by the time the infant utters her first words, those words—compositions of sounds—carry the weight of the experiences of the first year or more of life and the desire made in first relations. This chapter argues that in
order to make sense of our early experiences with words and the affects within relations to language we must return to examine the experiences of the infant before speech, the beginning; or, our introduction to a world of others that communicate with words.

Piera Aulagnier’s (2001) psychoanalytic study, *The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement*, discusses the period before language and through Aulagnier’s analysis of these early beginnings provocations emerge that question the child’s introduction to words which unfolds as a contribution to understandings of the relations that come later. Returning to the time of early infancy involves first addressing the use of thinking about beginnings and particularly the problem of beginnings that are first expressed in a language without words and seemingly forgotten by the time that speech becomes available. Beginnings start from a place where words are not taken for granted, where words are not already the thing, and so we might imagine the child that Adam Phillips (1998) depicts when he asks, “why are words the thing?” (43). To begin here, and not from a position where speech has already been put to use by the adult, permits consideration of the development of language as neither linear nor progressive but rather something constituting loss and repression that must contend with the radical state of dependency that accompanies the time following birth. At this earlier beginning what is taken for granted are the relations and means of expression that exist prior to language. This focus lends its attention to the relation between the adult and child, as the child’s way of being without words is held in tension with the emerging familial relationships. And the child’s curious question when considered with Aulagnier’s theories inspires another: when words can be spoken, what happens when they are not the thing? Feelings are first named by the other who interprets them and the words that are said bring those feelings into being. And yet, there is a space between what is said and what is felt; the word that describes—even when it is the right word—and the sentiment experienced.

In this sense interpretation always misses the mark. And psychoanalysis does not shy away from this: It is through words and free associations that the analyst and
analysand work through past experiences, ‘feeling’ out the gaps that separate speech from affect. And here, I draw on Aulagnier’s description of this gap between interpretation and experience to explain how and why the concept of language in this thesis is used in ways that are not so easily defined. To talk about the time before language gives the feeling of forcing narrative when there is none to be had on a being or a personal history that relates and communicates in ways outside language. Aulagnier writes:

Feeling, far from being reduced to the naming of an affect, is an interpretation of it, in the strongest sense of the term, that links an experience in itself unknowable to a cause that is supposed to conform to what one experiences. As we have seen, what one experiences is also what has first been interpreted by the discourse of the Other and of others, by recourse to what might appear as a series of false syllogisms that refer everything that is manifested under similar appearances to one and the same thing. The statement: ‘all people dressed in black are in mourning’ would make one smile; but in what way is it different from the following: every satisfied need is a source of pleasure, every cry is an appeal to her who is absent, every movement is a sign of intelligence addressed to the mother? In a sense they are equally abusive and forced, but in another sense far from being reducible to a false syllogism, they represent the price that has to be paid for the gift and creation of meaning proper to language. The desire for conformity between affect and feeling entails the illusory belief that it would be possible to know something that is doubly outside language.

(94)

Following Aulagnier, this chapter will explore the meaning that can be made in language and from examining the infant’s early relations with others and things while keeping in mind the timing of those words, and the perspective granted by time. The descriptions may seem anticipatory, like the words that are given to the infant before she has entered the world of speech. And yet, this acts as a reminder of the tension between language and our origins, where expressions were once without words, and where linguistic metaphors now fit uneasily onto the ‘languages’ of the infant.
Why, then, begin at the beginning? With Aulagnier, the beginning is where early relations are formed and felt; where we first invest in parts of ourselves and others; where sounds and objects are cathected. Taking into consideration these first investments we can probe the relation between the psyche and object and the words in-between. In this relational space between self and other we find the very relation between experiences, or affects, and the meaning we make from them.

But we cannot begin with this simple triangulation of mine between affect, objects and words because the timing is off. Words come later and it is this little reminder of how easily we slip into linguistic metaphors that is key to Aulagnier’s arguments. It provokes many of the questions that emerge from her text and the belated work of words can be mobilized as a means to return to the text to probe further the depths of these early relations. So, to recall the curious child that Adam Phillips has imagined and the relations and experiences he might have had before speech, we can now add; in what way are words not the thing itself? What might we learn by exploring the gap between speech and experience? What does speech do to the experience of affect? And, how does time and the relation between adult and child complicate that question or render it forgotten?

To delve into these questions this chapter takes us through a number of theoretical terms introduced or elucidated in Aulagnier’s (2001) only text to be translated into English, *The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement*. Aulagnier posits a process that exists before the primary and secondary processes that we are familiar with in Freud’s work. She calls this earliest experience the primal, characterized through the form of representation it produces—the pictogram. By looking at how the first representations come to be produced in order to understand how the pictographic representation comes about I focus on the role of the senses, the work of cathexis, the event of the first encounter, and the concept of metabolisation. I then address the implications of those representations for the psyche through the analysis of the roles of repression, desire and the word-bearer that play into the infant’s initial dependency and relationship with the mother. The work of desire is a recurring concept of interest for
Aulagnier as she explores each of the three processes—the primal, the primary, and the secondary—and I touch on this theme in each of the following sections as it relates to the infant’s shifting perspective and the function of representation. The ways the primal process influences the primary and the secondary processes will then be elaborated through discussions of “the space where the I might come about” (71). The introduction of the I, and words, comes with the arrival of secret thoughts that do not threaten the child’s survival; the chance to lie or to choose not to speak and the opportunity to develop relations with others outside the family unit. Here words become a means to relate to others outside the family and question the intimate relations and the love that was characteristic of a childhood marked by dependency. Words then work to negotiate new relations to the history of growing within a family that include the difficulties of coming to terms with a new position as an autonomous individual within a larger culture.

Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these intimate infantile familial relations for the dilemmas of education. Aulagnier introduces the I in relation to others. Others serve as the comparison for the child to find an image of the I reflected back from the world and to reconcile this reflection with the one the child has constructed and imagined through familial reflections up to that point. The school—or the preschool—is often the first site where the child meets others, and other children. Where the school has a goal, and is therefore always anxious about the failure of its goal, there is a much more intimate dilemma for the little subject as relations with the mother come to be held in tension with the first introductions to the group and others. As Britzman (2011) writes in her book, *Freud and Education*, “educators inherit the added burden of understanding something that is not education, yet nonetheless leaves in its wake the objections, objects, and obstacles of having to grow up” (23-24). Or, as Freud (1920) wrote with regard to the child’s struggles with his or her first encounters with reality; “the lessening amount of affection [the child] receives, the increasing demands of education, hard words and an occasional punishment—these show [the child] at last the full extent to which he [or she] has been scorned. These are a few typical and constantly
recurring instances of the ways in which the love characteristic of the age of childhood is
brought to a conclusion” (603-604). Aulagnier will teach us something about learning to
speak, but she will also remind us how learning stretches back to the intimate moments of
our first relations and so the growing subject might struggle with the demands of speech
and the discourse of education, and yet also be renewed and a find a future through that
differentiation.

**The primal and what comes before words:**

Before becoming the child who gains knowledge of the world from the words
spoken by others or found in books, the infant takes in experiences of his or her
surroundings using the senses. The sights, sounds and tastes of the early moments of life
are experienced subjectively and some bodily experiences are then represented within the
psychical structure while others are not. It is likely the sounds of the spoken language that
the infant first hears will eventually be repeated and reproduced, but first they must be
interpreted and find a way into the psyche.

Aulagnier gives a detailed and systematic defense for a hypothesis of psychical
activity which is made up of “three modes of mental functioning,” or “three processes of
metabolisation” (4). She introduces the processes by describing the fundamental
similarities whereby each mode produces a representation and lists key laws and agencies
that distinguish each of the resulting representations and represented. The primal process
is introduced by Aulagnier prior to the primary and secondary processes. The processes
are successively triggered by relations and objects and as each new process is introduced,
the preceding processes continue to exist in distinct psychical spaces and in encounters
particular to the laws of the psyche’s functioning.

To understand how the psyche comes to represent to itself the objects and parts of
the world it encounters, we must also ask how it represents itself to itself. And, in turn;
what motivates this relation between the self, or parts of the body and psyche and the
external objects and world? Aulagnier’s reading of these early motivating forces, the
drives, emphasizes the frictions found in Freud (1940): “forces we suppose lie behind the
tensions caused by the needs of the [id], [that] represent the physical demands on the psyche” (4), and that shape the affective relations, the love and hate that mediate the infant’s pursuit of pleasure and unpleasure and unity and destruction. The affective connections that are made with part objects and body parts are the means by which those connections are extended to the psyche and Aulagnier pursues this through the explanation of acts of cathexis:

I understand that every act of representation is coextensive with an act of cathexis, and every act of cathexis is motivated by the psyche’s tendency to preserve or rediscover an experience of pleasure. As soon as one introduces this term, more perhaps than any other, one is confronted by what is irreducible in Freud’s warning ‘it is evident that everything new that we have inferred must nevertheless be translated back into the language of our perceptions, from which it is simply impossible to free ourselves.’ (7)

The perceptions of sight, hearing and touch all impact the connections developing among the body, the psyche and the first object. And yet, we are also reminded by Aulagnier that while the infant might close his or her eyes, squirm and refuse to touch something, or vomit the milk that is offered, there is no way to shut out the sounds that greet our ears. And this fact plays into Aulagnier’s analysis as she begins to draw out some insights from the question of what might motivate those initial affective relations and initial acts of cathexis; the question of why invest in that object or that sound or that mode of expression and not another.

To heed Freud’s warning and return to the language of the perceptions points to the infant’s relation to his or her body as the mode of her first interpretations. The first object is not encountered as a breast, or as the mother, but through the taste of milk, the sensation of suckling and the feeling of swallowing and then the satisfaction of hunger. The need for food and the process by which that hunger is satisfied are not the only senses awakened and imparted to the psyche in that first encounter, as the infant’s hunger is soon replaced by the feelings of pleasure. As Aulagnier noted earlier, this first
encounter awakens a desire to rediscover the pleasure offered by the breast, but the desires awakened in this moment are also pulled in other directions as the tensions that are aroused with the recognition of a need represent the lack that leaves the infant radically dependent on another if he or she is to repeat that experience of pleasure. The awakening of the infant’s desire for pleasure is accompanied by an opposing tension: the desire to return to that brief silent state before any desire. And, it is in this wish that we can first find the experience of unpleasure. Beginning with these opposing tensions, Aulagnier goes on to explain the broader implications of this first encounter as;

From the first encounter, the primal process will have the function of representing: at the moment when the mouth meets the breast it meets and swallows a first mouthful of the world. Affect, meaning, culture, are co-present and responsible for the taste of those first molecules of milk that the infant takes into himself: the food element is always duplicated by the swallowing of a psychical food, which the mother will interpret as the swallowing of an offer of meaning. (15)

The investment of energy in objects begins with the stimulation of a sensing part of the body and it is through this stimulation that the external object that triggers the sense or senses comes to be recognized and then represented. So, as the body first experiences the milk move pass the lips into the throat and belly, in the warmth of the mother’s caress, and in the presence of her voice—perhaps there is also a smell—the sensory organs become the site through which the object is represented to the body. These are means by which the pictographic representation is reflected and produced. The investments and the representations that follow, then, are first experienced as a stimulation and the pictographic representation is “given to the psyche as a presentation of itself” (Aulagnier, 18). To begin with the infant’s bodily perspective experienced through the primal process and interpreted through the pictogram, involves beginning with the problematic where the encounter with the first object is not yet recognized as an object outside the self.

The primal process is characterized by these tensions that are felt, interpreted and attributed to the body parts, or zones, and while the tensions seemingly pull in opposing
directions and are clearly shaped by different affects, they share the perspective of the primal body, “whose property is to preserve its state of energetic equilibrium by self-regulation” (16). This energetic equilibrium shapes the desire to preserve the feeling of pleasure or to return to the state of quietude before desire. Only the actions of the body and the corresponding external objects that stimulate those actions will come to be represented or known in the psyche. As the experiences of the body come to be known in the psyche through the work of representation, these representations are entangled with affect; “representation of an affect and affect of representation being undistinguishable for and in the register of the primal” (17). Love and hate are experienced through the unity and destruction of the pictographic representation. This is explained through the mechanism Aulagnier calls metabolisation. Through the description of this process we can see not only the close relation between affect and the form of representation that precedes words—namely the pictograph, but how this relation between affect and representation can be interpreted as the relationship between the body/psyche that characterizes the primal period rather than the internal world/external world that comes to be represented later.

The breast is first taken into the self through cathexis. Through the psyche’s presentation to itself of the encounter with the outside world of suckling from an object, an experience of pleasure is produced by the self. This process of “taking-into-self” (22), or cathexis, is one part of the process of metabolisation that Aulagnier uses to describe the mechanisms by which the parts of the body come to be aligned through encounters with the outside world and outside objects, establishing the “complementary object-zone” (19), before coming to be represented by the pictogram. “Rejecting-outside-self,” or decathexis, is the other mechanism of metabolisation that works as a response to the experience of unpleasure whereby the psyche experiences a tearing apart (22). The quality of the pictogram can be understood through this process of metabolisation by which it comes about:
The pictogram is simply the first representation that psychical activity gives itself of itself by its shaping of the complementary object-zone and by the relational schema that it imposes on these two entities. Pleasure and unpleasure will depend on the relations respectively set up between object and zone. The state of mutual attraction, of magnetisation of one by the other, will be the coextensive representation of any experience of pleasure: the state of rejection, of aggression of one by the other, coextensive with any experience of unpleasure. (Aulagnier, 30)

The pictographic representation comes about through the work of metabolisation that encompasses the processes of cathexis and decathexis and the affective experiences of pleasure and unpleasure. Metabolisation is the concept Aulagnier uses to understand the process by which some objects, relations, and ideas come to be represented and not others and how that relationship is shaped through affect. The term can be likened to other bodily functions like breathing or eating, the taking in or rejecting of objects, the work of determining if something is a good or bad object, or loved or hated. Similarly to those bodily functions, while the food or oxygen may act as a stimulating object, the psyche looks to its own body in order to sustain and repeat the action or reject and tear away from it.

So, to return to the questions and model raised earlier and extrapolate some of the implications of this early development for understanding the relation between affects, objects and words, we can first note how the infant develops relations between the self and the object and how each of those relations is determined by the experience of pleasure or unpleasure, or affects. Aulagnier’s pictographic representation comes to serve as a pre-cursor to words and statements and it is through this earlier form of representation that we can find a direct link between affect and representation. At this point affect and representation are nearly inseparable and words remain elusive; not yet the thing. To recall the question, in what way are words not the thing itself, draws attention to the lack of distance between affect and representation which in the primal process, where the object and bodily zones share a similar immediacy, points to how the
infant’s early relations in the world might initially be experienced as the things themselves where there is not yet space for the intervention of words.

**Early encounters with the word-bearer and the in-between of the primary process:**

Initially, the relation between the infant and the first object is not represented for the infant as an awareness of his or her autonomous body and her dependency on the other. And yet, to speak of the distinct perspectives, desires, and relations of the mother and infant sets up a division that does not effectively address their embedded relations. For the infant, the breast—the earliest relationship with the mother—is the first experience of pleasure, and the mother’s absence, among other things, leads to the experience of pain, or unpleasure. When the mother is absent the child remains capable of hallucinating the breast through the pictographic representation which, for the time-being, offers all the same satisfactions of the real breast. In Freud, and Aulagnier follows Freud’s work closely in this case as we enter the primary process, it is this tension between reality and hallucination, the hunger that is inevitably left unsatisfied, that triggers the beginning of the primary process and begins to awaken the infant’s awareness of his or her autonomous yet dependent position in the world. And yet, for Aulagnier the primal period also foreshadows these later processes. She posits that between the organ stimulation experienced by the infant and the hallucination that follows as a psychical response, there is an excess that eventually exposes some difference between the real and the hallucination (10). In the primal, these raw excess materials have not been metabolized and therefore have not yet been represented for the psyche. Without representation, these objects and relations do not yet exist for the infant. To follow this literary metaphor, which seems far more suitable in the case of the mother who has already engaged the secondary process and has language at her disposal, the mother’s presence could be said to contribute to a climactic order where the relation with the mother is one of excess, offering experiences, language, and meaning beyond what is represented for the infant in the pictograph. Like in a novel where the metaphors and literary devices can exceed the particular moment being described and yet contribute and
build towards a climax, these excesses of the primal contribute to the encounter that triggers the beginning of the primary process and remain supportive, albeit forgotten, elements of the infants developing psyche.

The primary process marks the period when the child can no longer ignore that the mother is a distinct subject and not an object under his or her control. As the mother takes on a role of her own in the child’s eyes, Aulagnier gives the mother another title: The mother is the word-bearer, the one who has already encountered all three processes. And so, even before the infant can speak or understand the words that are uttered around him or her, the representations introduced through the primary and secondary processes that have already undergone repression are a part of the daily encounters and relations the infant has with the mother. The primal period, the introduction to words, and the eventual encounter with the larger culture outside the family are all marked by the relationship with the mother and for Aulagnier this means that each phase anticipates the next, and particularly the work of the secondary process. The mother speaks from the position of someone who not only anticipates her child’s development but also as someone who has already developed. To get at the implications of the mother’s position as a developed adult relating to her newborn child involves also carefully considering the differences of experience for the mother and child when words are first shared between them:

To remember that language is first of all received as a sound sequence must not make us forget that, for the voice that speaks, this succession is at once a message, expression, imputation of a feeling and a desire, and that the possessor of that voice forgets that for the infant the effects that will result from it are of quite a different order. The representative of the Other acts in a way that conforms to what he says, the work of the secondary, thus effecting the anticipation that projects onto the child a before-the-event hearing of which it is the indispensable condition. (Aulagnier, 57)
By looking at this move from the stimulating experiences of sound to the act of listening and the search for meaning that comes later we can trace out a gap that seems to be bridged by the social.

In Aulagnier’s description of the child’s movement towards the statement we can find what might be considered a precursor to Adam Phillip’s question, why words: What is it about hearing and the voice that leads discursive representation to become the thing used once the child enters society—why is the voice-object the thing? There is the infant’s hearing that cannot be closed off from the outside world except in sleep. And Aulagnier begins here and then as she takes seriously the infant’s grappling with the recognition of his or her autonomous position in the world, takes into consideration how the infant listens for the presence of the mother and others. The voice appears to have additional qualities, specifically tone, that set it apart from the other senses. Voice announces its presence and unlike the visualization of the breast can erupt abruptly and speak in different tenors that contribute to the experience of pleasure and unpleasure. This distinction gives the voice-object its power as the persecutory object (61). In order to make sense of how the voice-object comes to take on this powerful role and the implications of this I think it is helpful to first examine two overall shifts that Aulagnier emphasizes within the primary process.

Aulagnier describes the primary process through the description of two key transitions. The first is the shift from the psyche/body relation through which the pictograph was formulated to a psyche/world relation that is represented by the fantasy. The infant’s recognition of his or her autonomous position is difficult. The awareness of another body invokes the awareness of another psyche. And so for the infant there are now two spaces and yet the desire for a single space remains and this is the omnipotence of desire that governs the fantasy representation of the primary process. Faced with reality, the infant clings to the omnipotence of desire as this fantasy can bear the weight of any unpleasure that the infant inevitably experiences through his or her relations with the world. Now, the affects of pleasure and unpleasure can be attributed to the Other’s
desire, transforming them into a source of pleasure (43). The infant’s fantasies cling to the mother as each of his or her bodily experiences and affects are represented as a response to the mother’s desire. She desires to pleasure the infant by offering the breast and her desires also deny the breast, which for the infant is the equivalent of the other denying his or her existence (56).

Located in the shift that leads the voice-object to take on the power of the persecutory object is a transition for the infant from one who sees, and resorts to the scenic representation of the pictograph, to one who hears and begins to enter the realm of discursive representation. In the in-between space of the primary, fantasy representation transitions between two forms that Aulagnier refers to as thing-presentation, which is reminiscent of the pictograph and relates to the sensory experiences of the body, and word-presentation, which foreshadows the secondary process and relates to the outside world through hearing. Aulagnier argues that this transition, and the transition it facilitates from the pictographic representation of the primal to the discursive representation of the secondary, is made possible through the connection made by the pictograph to the sense of hearing. The mother’s voice initially contributed to a visualization of the presence of the breast represented by the pictograph. And yet, we are also reminded that:

It would be illusory to wish to set up a hierarchy of value or temporal precedence between seeing and hearing. Although it is true that the primary has thing-presentation as its first raw material, it should be added that the fantasy representation that results from it is a representation of a state of the psyche that accompanies any erogenous sensory excitation. It is because the ear begins by ‘seeing’ the heard that thing-presentation and word-presentation will be able to be welded together, with the result that the subject will be able to see only as long as he can ‘think’ of himself as a seer. (56)
Can this be read as an example of one of the gaps between speech and experience? To see or to hear—to see and hear: What is the significance of how the I comes about and how the bodily senses come to represent those experiences to the psyche?

This connection between scenic and auditory functions plays into the development of the persecutory object. The infant listens for the presence of the voice and that presence, with its potential to erupt at any moment, can be a source of unpleasure for any zone of the body, beyond just the auditory zone. This means that there is always a fear that the voice will erupt, paradoxically rendering the presence of the voice necessary to soothe this fear (61). Through this more complex role the infant begins to find significance in the voice beyond the binary expressions that had been interpreted in the primal through its presence and absence (64). These expanding expressions are the next steps towards the symbolic representation of the secondary process.

**The I and beginning to bear the representations of others:**

Starting with the infant who cannot speak, Aulagnier focusses her analysis on the relationship between the mother and the child. Fantasies, desires, and repression mark their initial interactions. The mother’s wish may extend beyond the child’s gestures and expressions and the child’s thoughts remain hidden. As the child begins to learn to speak Aulagnier describes how she or he will enter a world for the first time where she might have secret thoughts that do not threaten her survival:

One cannot hide the fact that one is refusing to eat or sleep; one cannot hide the fact that one has defecated; but one might be able to hide that one is pretending to love, to hear or, on the other hand, not to hear or not to desire the forbidden. Unlike the activities of the body, the activity of thinking is not only the latest function, whose value will take precedence over all its predecessors, but it is the first whose productions may remain unknown to the mother and also the activity by which the child may find out that she has lied to him, understand what she would not like him to know. So what we see being set up here is a strange struggle in which the mother will try to find out what the child is thinking, to
teach him to think ‘properly’, as defined by her, whereas the child discovers the first tool of an autonomy or a refusal that does not directly put his survival at risk. (87)

In the wake of the infant who has encountered the world through the words and psyche of another, arrive the child’s emerging thoughts. The mother’s words are already bound by repression, are filled with her wishes, and contain the socio-cultural laws of the family’s context. This most intimate relation and the image of the child imagined and put into words by the mother remain unconfirmed or yet to be questioned by the infant upon entering the secondary process. Fantasies and misunderstandings have blurred the lines of communication from the perspective of both the mother and the infant. These difficulties of reception unfold as a tension that creates the importance of secret thoughts. The child’s thoughts may bump up against the image represented by the mother and may leave the child unable to identify with the figure depicted by the mother’s wishes.

The mother’s wish recalls earlier wishes—her first wish to have a child, made when she was a child herself—and admits the necessary work of repression. Her refusal to let the newborn child satisfy this earlier desire opens a future for the infant’s desire. The mother’s denial of the Oedipal myth in the immediacy of her real relationship with her child foreshadows the infant’s forthcoming Oedipal struggles and preserves the work of repression. Through this denial the mother and infant become complicit in one another’s repression. Aulangnier argues that the mother’s refusal to let this child satisfy her desire leaves the child to desire to have another child of his or her own and continue to desire to be the child the mother wants. Both love and conflict emerge for the child as the mother perpetuates desire through the recognition of the real child and the preservation of the mythical state of the wish.

The child’s newfound autonomous position begins as, and perhaps always remains, a work of renegotiating the infant’s understanding of himself or herself and the world that was first known through a position of dependency within a system of kinship. In psychoanalysis, beginning with Freud, there are key images that depict this sense of
moving from within the family to find a position within the wider culture and society. Castration is marked by scenes of body parts disappearing into the other and Aulagnier speaks to this while also acknowledging the significance for the subject of a new position in the world whereby the child might find out that the intimacy shared with the mother is not what the child had imagined. Along with Lacan, Aulagnier finds the possibilities of a future in speech. This future introduces us to the opportunities for questions and curiosities to be explored with others in a community and yet also shows us that we are one among many and so leaves us longing for the first object, and the bond felt with the mother. Madeleine Grumet (2006) explains:

Lacan argues that language is a bridge we construct to connect us once again to that part of ourselves we surrendered when we separated from her. Language is something that we throw ahead of us to gather up what we have let behind. As we throw it beyond us to bridge the gap, we recuperate our losses through communication, through texts. Lacan suggests that we cannot ever really pull ourselves together with language, because this wordy material of history and culture is inadequate to symbolize and express that original sense of connection.

(213)

Speech comes about throughout a negotiation with the child’s autonomous position and the mother’s words offer the child a means to question the mother and to learn about the family through the words of others and the laws of the community. And yet, in learning to be someone there is always a sense of something that is lost.

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2 Aulagnier chose Lacan as her first analyst. McDougall and Zaltzman’s explain in the preface (2001) to the English edition of Aulagnier’s text how this lead Aulganier to join Lacan’s Ecole Freudienne. Aulagnier’s work demonstrates this influence and is also marked by specific theoretical divisions. McDougall and Zaltzman explain that Aulagnier collaborated with two other dissidents to begin a new school named Le Quatrième Groupe after a disagreement over the rigors of preparation and testing offered to analysts by the Lacanian school. This split seems to have also lead to an emphasis on certain key theoretical distinctions between the two schools. The concepts of interpretation and the timing of linguistic metaphor discussed earlier in this chapter appear to have been emphasized in Aulagnier’s collaborative works and in the book of Cornelius Castoriadis (1998) who joined Le Quatrième group some years after it was founded. Aulagnier refers readers to Castoriadis’ work and there the distinctions being drawn between the two schools through the concept of interpretation can be more clearly seen.
Conclusion:

If we look at what psychoanalysis might have to offer to the mother’s agony or to the space of education built on the relations between adults and children, or teachers and students, we can draw on the relational process of interpretation. For the clinician interpretation takes place between the analyst and the analysand. This is not a suggestion to take up the studied clinical method of analysis in the broader spaces of education, but to draw on the belated and thoughtful possibilities of interpretation understood as an exchange between I and Other grappling to put into words something that has not yet been made fully conscious. This chapter has also made an effort to look at how this gradual introduction to symbolization is accompanied by other forms of representation that are distinct from discursive interpretations.

After following Aulagnier through an analysis and inquiry into the three processes of the child’s psychical development I find the questions probing the gap between speech and experience or affect seem to parallel the distances explored in the time between childhood and adulthood or the words that mark the relationship between the adult and child. Many of the concepts explored in this chapter take shape in this gap. In this sense, this space in-between child and adult and experience and symbolization is filled with processes, loss, desire, thoughts, relations and even words and so it is perhaps not a gap at all but rather a time that precedes language and must await the after-the-fact of interpretation. Words do not arrive as a key that can bridge this gap or as a simple tool to making sense of the abundance of affective experiences that have filled this space. Words are the form of representation particular to the secondary process that are necessary to the existence of an experience within the psyche. Experiences encountered in primal and primary processes that have come to be represented in the psyche, then, are considered pre-conscious in Aulagnier’s approach and they have the potential to be made fully conscious. These parallel spaces that set apart the adult and the child and affect and speech are then brought into relation with the work of interpretation. Counterintuitively, there is violence to interpretation that is necessary and can be limiting. Aulagnier opens
up a discussion of the relations between child and mother through the words introduced between them so that we might explore the implications of this violence that leads to a grappling of being when faced with the subject of the child. Words are neither the first nor the only form of representation available to the child and when analyzed alongside fantasy and pictogram the role of speech comes into question and the beyond of words becomes essential to the broader work of interpretation.
3. Unfulfilled Promises: Jacqueline Rose’s Cultural Study of the Enigmatic Peter Pan

Peter Pan is the exceptional child. Parentless, refusing to grow up leaves him bound to repeat, always return to Neverland and to forget. Something of this enigmatic character has been tied up in the reception of his story over the years. Sticky questions about what it means to be a child—or the adult nostalgically searching for the escape and the freedom of childhood fictions—draws the audience reluctantly to the questions of the difficulties of growth, the problem of what is being resisted and the darker sides of J.M. Barrie’s (1928) fairytale. Many scholars have offered analysis of this classic text and others continue to do so. This chapter returns to Neverland through Jacqueline Rose’s (1992) seminal text, *The Case of Peter Pan: Or, the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*. Rather than offering another interpretation of Barrie’s text or as many have done before, a biographical study of Barrie’s life, Rose offers a reading of what came after.

Peter Pan first appeared as a character in a story written for adults called *The Little White Bird* (Barrie 1902; Rose 1992), but he was first introduced as the classic tale for children that we have all come to know on the stage in 1904. The tale is embodied in this performance and soon after materials were produced that attempted to capture this figure on the page. But Barrie himself didn’t publish the children’s story, *Peter & Wendy*, until years later in 1911. Language has at once eluded and overdetermined the flighty fantasy of Peter Pan. Jefferson’s (1985) review of Rose’s book comments on the “realist mode where characters and events speak for themselves and language appears to vanish,” which she argues is “[...] sanctioned in children’s literature [and] is not, like Peter Pan, a style that does not want to grow up; its arrested development is in fact a repression that uses a Peter Pan image to hide what it is up to” (795). The dynamic is reminiscent of Felman’s (2003) theoretical turn to psychoanalysis at the intersection of philosophy and literature, “showing how speech always brings the body—the unconscious—into play” (ix). Rose’s analysis teases out the fantasies of adults and children that have
unfolded through the reception of Peter Pan. And here I raise further questions for what it means to write for children or to address the child.

In the theatre of Peter Pan, the Darling family takes the stage at the beginning and end of the play, but the bulk of the performance—and the adventure—is left to the children. Mr. and Mrs. Darling are left behind in the nursery but the words that enact those parental roles follow the children to Neverland. The repetition, the logic of exchange, the elision between life and death and the bonds of imagination between adults and children float across the border between home and the fairyland and these theatrics of reciprocity drew my attention to the question of belief that is tied up in the language of Peter Pan and childhood. This belief is linked to the hope of a promise that seems to be connected to each seduction in the tale and begins with Peter’s promise of fairies that lures Wendy and the boys out of the nursery. Peter Pan is full of promises despite the fact that this exceptional boy is always working against the intrinsic promise of childhood—growth, and against the fears of author J.M. Barrie’s time, a time of high infant mortality rates (and so not all children grew up). To see in new light how the adult’s fears play out in the characterization of the child I will turn briefly to look at Felman’s (2002) discussion of the scandal of the speech act in Molière’s (1682) Don Juan as it is examined through the promise. This discussion deals with a character who does not appear to be innocent or share many childlike qualities. I think using this discussion helps further elaborate the role of language in Peter Pan and the investments that can be read through the words addressed to children that Rose draws to our attention. As we will see, Peter Pan and Don Juan share the compulsion to repeat and a strange mathematical logic that leads Don Juan to place his belief in arithmetic and Peter Pan’s audience to voice their beliefs in equations that exchange the child’s creativity and curiosity for the certainties of the adult.

To explore the type of relationality that exists between adults and children through the text of Peter Pan is to investigate further what I referred to as a defense against being in the introduction, and which in Rose’s work appears as more than a simple barrier as it
questions how language can take the form of “mastery” or control over the child (Rose, 10). To return to Rose’s work is to remember that relationships between adults and children are not always easy, innocent or filled with the delights of fairy dust. It is easy enough to find scholars and pedagogues in the field of education or early childhood studies who speak to child-centered practices or who now work to remind us of the asymmetrical relationships in the classroom between the teacher and the student and the co-constructions that might take place between adults and children (see for example, Dahlberg and Moss 2005; Burman 2008; Lenz Taguchi 2007). With Rose, this reminder is accompanied by a discussion of the desires and beliefs that might make these relations adverse or “impossible.” Impossible, not in the sense that adults and children do not exist together in families, in classrooms and in the world; but rather in the sense that the fantasies and promises that already occupy those spaces in the form of cultural narratives, memories, personal stories, or wishes, can bar the entry of the particular adult or child, interrupting the exchanges where those people might meet.

Hannah Arendt’s (1961) chapter on “the crisis in education” (173) reminds us of “the real and normal relations between children and adults, arising from the fact that people of all ages are always simultaneously together in the world” (181). For Arendt, this crisis can be found in the problem of the new confronting the old and the lack of protections afforded to both the child’s newness and the established old world. In a fiction where the child is set apart in another world and does not threaten to grow up and destroy the old world he is born into, fantasy is the only place for the young and the old to turn. Peter Pan has captured imaginations through this turn to the haven of childhood. And so too has the language used to narrate his adventures. Rose, for her part, argues that it is the very quality of growth that renders the destructive elements of childhood benign in children’s fiction and in memory as children are already “so to speak, ‘on their way’” (13).

So, to depart from Arendt, we can turn to Peter Pan and ask what kinds of fantasies have followed and entangled themselves in the story of a boy who might not
threaten destruction. What is bound up in a childhood that is destined to repeat? What is said about the language between the adult and the child in the words that repeat Pan’s story? And as we follow Rose we can look at the various narrations of Peter Pan’s stories and read into the words of Barrie’s (1928) *Peter and Wendy* to find out what sets apart this version of the adventures of Neverland that was the only version that Barrie committed to text. The variations of the text then lead us to ask, whose words and fantasies are being censored? What becomes of the child’s aggression, sexuality and difference when childhood is rendered into a fairytale or a children’s classic? This was not the final text produced about the boy who could fly and its slippery authority brings into question the relations between adults and children invoked in the words written for children. For while Peter Pan never grows up, the other characters, the readers, the author, and—most pointedly for Rose—the narrator do; and in some cases already have. What interests Rose most is not simply the inevitability of and resistances to growth and the questions and difficulties that Peter Pan poses to this, or even the relations between adults and children that have been called into question in the history of the book and it’s author. Rose stays with the question of how the history of Peter Pan’s reception has invoked a fantasy of the child that relies on an unarticulated mythology of the adult.

**The field of children’s literature:**

It seems that Jacqueline Rose has fueled the fire as scholars of children’s literature have turned from asking, “why do we get ‘hooked’” (Tatar 2011, xxxv) by Peter Pan and his Neverland of fairies and pirates, to include the question of why “The Case of Peter Pan has maintained its influence in the field of children’s literature in

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3 This book marks Jacqueline Rose’s only venture into the field of children’s literature scholarship (Rudd and Pavlik 2010). The book was widely recognized when it was first published in 1984 and it continues to resonate today. In 2010 the journal of Children’s Association Literature Quarterly marked the 25th anniversary of the book with a special edition including articles discussing “Rose 25 years on” (Nodelman 2010, 237). Debate about Rose’s text is ongoing, particularly surrounding the provocative claim found in the title and throughout Rose’s argument: “the impossibility of children’s fiction.” This claim has provoked fantasies and defenses of the child, new and old. While Rose’s texts and the ongoing debates clearly demonstrate the relationships between cultural ideas about children and the texts written for children, in order to avoid getting caught up in simply recounting this debate, testifying to what distinguishes children’s literature in
Britain and the United States” (Bradford 2011, 272). Or, more bluntly, “when may [we] consider [it] irrelevant and stop giving precious space to discussing [it]” (Tarr 2013, 112). For some critics (Tatar 2011) it is the idea of a division in the audience between adult and child, the provocative suggestion that Rose invokes indicating that the adult reader or viewer might see Peter Pan’s childhood innocence differently that draws disparagement. Others, (Rudd and Pavlik 2010; Rudd 2010; Bradford 2011) who might admit the slippery relations between adults and children and the fantasies of innocence that preoccupy them have pointed to Rose’s work as a necessary intervention for the field of children’s literature in the 1980s when it was published before going on to take issue with the generalizations made by the text: Rose’s apparent leaps from questions addressed to the specific figure of Peter Pan, or a few other eighteenth to twentieth century British texts, to addressing the question of the child, speaking for children—or to cite her title—the very “impossibility of children’s fiction.”

Critics who focus on defending the problem of who is addressed by Barrie’s work, the child or the adult—or who was the intended audience—seem to have neglected to pay attention to which Peter Pan Rose was reading⁴. In the process these critics risk missing the point Rose is making about reading and the relationships between adults, children and culture. To simply return to a reading of Peter Pan, Barrie’s biography and the various versions of the story of that exceptional character that have emerged since the play was first produced has lead Stirling (2012) among others (see for example, Tatar 2011) to argue that the question of who the narrator addresses, adult or child, and the confusion of his position at times was deliberate and is the very thing that makes this text a classic.

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⁴ Allusion to Rose’s comment that “we have been reading the wrong Freud to children” (12).
While undoubtedly true, their reading risks excluding the lingering discussion that explores what it means to be addressed by such an ambiguous narrator or to write for an audience that is imagined as the child. It is in large part this very ambiguity that has incited the varied and enthusiastic responses to Peter Pan over the years and it is with reference to these “thousands who have continued to purchase for children version after version of the story and who have faithfully attended the productions of the play” that Rose has asked; “what is the meaning of Peter Pan?” (Rose 1992, back cover). There are those who have responded negatively to Rose’s work, who have offered their own readings of Peter Pan or who have perpetuated the very fantasy that Rose is trying to open to discussion; exemplifying how “Rose’s work seems to operate remarkably like a Freudian symptom, continuing to worry and trouble the discipline, although it is hardly ever confronted directly” (Rudd and Pavlik 2010, 225). And yet there have also been many scholars and theorists who question the role of the literary critic (Krips 2000, xi), the adult who addresses other adults, and who works to remind readers that literature is not purely an escape. For each adult’s nostalgic reading or for the one who looks to

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5 Examples of the generative discussions that manage to avoid the pitfalls of defending the very fantasy of childhood that Rose is trying to bring into question include Valerie Krips (2000) book on heritage and childhood, that takes up Rose’s provocation to investigate the role or purpose of the literary critic; and Gabrielle Owen’s (2010) article on queer theory and the child. Ann Jefferson (1985) offers a review of Rose’s book that looks past the fantasies of the child to the problems of language more generally. She notes that Rose’s text offers the concept of repression for delving deeper into the questions of sexuality, death and history that are often missing from discussions of texts representative of children and popular culture more broadly—not because they are not there—but because they are repressed under the illusion of simplicity and innocence. For broader discussions on the field of children’s literature and how Rose’s arguments fit into the ongoing debates there, Nodelman’s (2008) book explores the debates that have gripped the field of children’s literature over the years including Rose and her major opponents. However, his book also includes an analysis of 6 books that might fall into the category of children’s literature and produces a list of 45 similarities in order to support the argument that children’s literature is not just grouped together according to its audience and it exists as a distinct genre (Hunt 2008). Jack Zipes has written numerous books on fairytales and in his book *When Dreams Come True* (2007), there is a chapter (219-238) that explores the life of J.M. Barrie and the relevant biographical events that contributed ideas and stories to the making of Peter Pan. Zipes appreciates Rose’s contribution and only amends Rose’s argument by suggesting that her reading of the narrator’s voice in *Peter and Wendy* demonstrates more clearly that the book was intended to speak to adults, and so the slippage that Rose speaks of remains between the adult and his or her memories rather than the adult and the child. Turner (2010) writes about Alice and Wonderland, taking up Rose’s arguments to examine how difficult it has been for western culture to give up on the fantasies of innocence for the ‘real’ child, and distinguish that from the ideas about children storied in fairytales.
rediscover that child through story there are always messy questions that are evoked when we remember the lively children and adults who are reading these tales.

**Acting out the promise: The value of words in Peter Pan and Don Juan:**

Rose (1992) tells us that, “as a play, Peter Pan is above all famous for the moment when Peter Pan turns to the audience and asks it if it believes in fairies” (29). Rose remarks that this is an extreme example of the suspension of belief that is requested of any theatre audience, who “at least for the duration of [the] performance, [...] should believe that it is true” (29). This suspension of belief that is tied to the theatre tells us something about the performance of the speech act and with Rose we can see how this staged act brings to life the object of childhood through the figure of Peter Pan.

In *The Scandal of the Speaking Body*, Felman’s (2002) analysis demonstrates how Molière’s Don Juan has robbed words of their truth, reflecting them back onto the object of his desire. Don Juan believes in nothing—not God, not honour, and not the promise of words—and so, language, people and experiences become interchangeable as he promises marriage to one woman after the next only to run off in pursuit of a new love shortly after the honeymoon:

He knows perfectly well that belief is only the effect of reflection, the reflexivity that he exploits: even though he refers his interlocutors back to themselves, even though he profits from the self-referentiality of the explicit performance, he still succeeds in creating belief in his ontological commitment and in the objective reality of the specular illusions that he produces. The act of seduction is above all an inducer of belief. [...] Thus, for Don Juan, belief, which he manipulates in others is always a performance of language, an illusory meaning-effect produced by a reflexive and self-referential signifier. (Felman 2002, 19)

The theatrics of Don Juan are exposed for all but the other characters to see (and even they have their doubts). As readers of this play we believe no more in the promises and commitments he makes than he does himself. Peter Pan is not a grand seducer like Don
Juan, and yet for his audience it is far easier to suspend belief, fall in love, and escape with him to the world of fairies.

Peter Pan, unlike Don Juan, who becomes the “promise not kept” (Felman, 24), is the living promise, one that might always remain a site of hope; never reaching a time when that promise might go unmet. So why compare the two? Don Juan clearly has little to teach us about children. He shows no desire to change his ways even when his father states that “birth is nothing where virtue is not” (Molière, act IV scene vi), declaring that Don Juan is a failure of the parental wish for a child. What Don Juan puts on display is the unspoken “breach which is inherent in the promise but which it represses and conceals” (Felman, 34). I think it is the promises of childhood captured, or perhaps unraveling in Peter Pan, that invite our belief and that conceal the fantasies that Rose works so hard to uncover. While real children grow up, Rose writes that “Peter Pan has always been assigned the status of truth (lost childhood, nostalgia or innocence)” (137) and so Pan’s promises are neither consummated nor allowed to fail.

Don Juan and Peter Pan also share the compulsion to repeat: Don Juan repeatedly chases after women because he does not believe in any kind of truth—or at least any kind of truth that is not exchangeable. Felman writes that “Donjuanian unbelief is above all disbelief in the capacity of language to name a transitive truth” (19). Others in this story use constative language and knowledge, assuming that language might convey information and therefore believe it could convey a truth, whereas Don Juan’s atheism is reflective of his disbelief in the capacity of language to go beyond something self-referential: The seduction that ends when there is “no more to say” (Felman, 15; Molière, act II scene ii). As Don Juan flaunts his commitments and mocks heaven, he rubs up against the beliefs of the other characters:

SGANARELLE: Now that is more than I can stand! For there is nothing truer than the Bogey, I’d be hung for it. But at least a man must believe in something here below. Now what do you believe in?

DON JUAN: What I believe in?
GANARELLE: Yes.

DON JUAN: I believe that two and two make four, Sganaralle, and that twice four is eight. (act III scene i)

Felman (2002) notes that this statement implies that Don Juan believes in “quantity as opposed to quality;” in “the arithmetic system insofar as it is has [...] no meaning, insofar as it is an entirely self-referential system;” in “the plus sign” as accumulation; in “the principle of equivalence” and “infinite substitutability” which leads to a belief in cardinal numbers, where there is no first (22). I would also add that the equation in which Don Juan rests his belief deals with couplings and pairs—even numbers. Don Juan is willing to seduce women with a promise and to even follow through with that promise, but he does not go beyond that. There is no room for a third in his equation. The logic of reproduction, $1+1=3$, does not appear to sit well with his system of belief. As Felman explains, “it is Don Juan himself who does not believe in his own promises. Unbelieving, the mythical seducer refuses to be seduced by his own myth, refuses for his part to be seduced by language, to believe in the promise of meaning” (21). And so to look to my equation, and to return to Rose where children are overdetermined by meaning we can also ask how Peter Pan escapes that equation, $1+1=3$; an equation which only in jest could be said to symbolize the complicated biological, social, cultural, and psychical experiences of reproduction.

We can see that arithmetic cannot handle birth or death in Don Juan. The repetition that speaks to Don Juan’s philosophy is one of proposals and wedding vows—vows that are not seen through to conception, that cannot allow for reproduction, and that when broken, cannot fully be atoned for in death. And here is where Peter Pan intervenes, where Don Juan’s logic of arithmetic seems to intersect with the theatrics of Neverland. It is these equations that seem to be carried through across the barriers between children and adults, Neverland and the nursery, the stage and the audience: We see that one fairy is born for the laughter of each child; one dies each time someone declares that they do not believe in fairies; and, “there is a saying in Neverland that, every time you breathe, a
grown-up dies” (Barrie 1928, 102). Each equation seems to be linked to the freedom of the child’s imagination and it is this imagination that the play famously invokes in its audience. And Rose (1992) suggests another equation: “If children’s fiction builds an image of the child inside the book, it does so in order to secure the child who is outside the book, the one who does not come so easily within its grasp” (2). So, to follow Felman (2002), “what does this belief in numbers, in arithmetic, signify” (21), for Peter Pan and for the child?

Despite the equations of belief they share, I want to point out how Peter Pan’s relationship to language differs from Don Juan. While Don Juan is full of words, and yet their meaning is empty, Peter Pan searches after stories and readily, through Wendy, links mothering to narrating. And yet, words resist him both in the story as he seeks out another to tell tales and in the textual form of Peter Pan which has evolved through endless writings and rewritings. But beyond Peter’s troubles with words there are similarities as Peter Pan accumulates and then forgets; each adventure is infinitely substitutable. When Wendy returns to Neverland for spring cleaning Peter no longer remembers the pirate, Hook, as he has been replaced by new enemies and eventually, when Wendy becomes too old to fly off to Neverland, she is substituted by her child and then her grandchild. And so, perhaps Peter’s equation could be said to be a belief in 1=1 or 2=2; where each adventure replaces the last. While the lost boys appear to replace Peter’s family, their numbers are always changing and as new boys join their ranks, some die in battles with pirates and others succumb to the pull of adulthood (Barrie 1928). In this sense the logic of Neverland also seems incapable of reconciling the equation of reproduction: It forgets and replaces rather than reproducing. Even the stories, the words that capture events and people, must be told by an outsider. And yet this logic of exchange must also resist what one scholar has pointed to as a self-evident aspect of children, the cliché “that the children of today are the citizens of tomorrow” (Castaneda 2002, 1). Rose describes the resistance to words that Peter Pan encounters as a ‘war’ and her description of the
slippery qualities of the text offers insight into the relationship between Peter Pan and language:

Language operates according to [this] principle. The ‘I’ shifts from person to person, and is only ever momentarily arrested by the one who speaks. The ‘I’ has a meaning solely by belonging to a system which includes all the other terms (‘you’/‘he’/‘she’/‘it’) against which it is set. [...] Language works on the basis of an antagonism between terms. What Barrie’s Peter & Wendy demonstrates too clearly for comfort is that language is not innocence (word and thing), but rather a taking of sides (one word against the other). In Peter & Wendy, the line between the narrator and his characters is not neat and/or invisible; it is marked out as a division, not to say opposition, or even war. (Rose, 73)

This opposition is embodied in the promise. Peter Pan shows us the fantasy of the child who is full of promise and does not risk outgrowing the belief in that promise. And yet, in the details of his story as others grow up around him, including his audience, his resistances to growth and the difficulties of that change that exist within language become visible. This is much more immediate for Don Juan, who “[...] is not only a master but a professor of rupture. Even while making his own promises, he teaches the others, through the irony of their own behaviour and through the needs of their flesh, that promises as such are liable to be broken” (Felman, 27). And then Felman gets at the root of the problem, addressing what seems to be troubling Rose’s audiences: “Etymologically,” she explains, “‘to seduce’ signifies ‘to separate’; and Don Juan, true to that underlying meaning, seduces only by teaching that separation is an essential aspect of seduction” (27). If we can consider Peter Pan’s refusal to become a man as a promise of incompleteness not unlike Don Juan’s, then it is also possible to understand this division between the fantasies of the adult and the child that Rose exposes in Peter Pan as conducive to Felman’s rupture in consciousness:

[...] Every promise promises the completion of incompleteness; every promise is above all the promise of consciousness, insofar as it postulates the
noninterruption, continuity between intention and act. To the extent that Don Juan embodies the performance of promising as a performance of rupture, he becomes the symptom of the self-subverting power of the performative only in that performative. Indeed, the Don Juan myth is the myth of the performative only in that the performative, pushed to its extreme logical consequences, enacts its own subversion. What the myth of the speaking body, in other words, performs, is the very subversion of consciousness. (34)

And so Peter Pan does disturb and his destructive qualities emerge—not simply because he is the exception—but because of the tensions, desires and promises extracted from his story that render his adventures and his repeated actions incomplete. We know that Barrie was writing during Freud’s time and his description of the child’s dream mind, the shifting island that can be recognized as Neverland could easily be seen as the unconscious. We also know about Peter Pan’s lost origins and his search for a mother figure to tell him stories. What comes next was always the more persistent question: what happens to the promise when it simply repeats the promise without ever delivering its commitment?

**Conclusion:**

Education’s concern for the child, fantasy of the idealized child, or interest in creating a practice that might be ‘child-centered’ speaks to the promise of the young and the adult’s investment in them. And yet these more obvious sympathies also draw out the question of why it so difficult to notice the adult in the room. What is it about the child, or the fantasy of the child, that lets us forget ourselves and that seems to push the adult out of the equation, or out of the story? Rose returns us to this first question, a question that we cannot leap over if we are to address the subject of the child in the relations between self and other. The problem is that we cannot simply trace these questions or any kind of theory of the child back to its origins. And so Rose begins with the question of culture and the difficulty of the stories, images and words that precede and have already produced the figure of the child. She exposes the sticky issue of how reproduction might
not slip directly into the seductions of repetition as words and culture are produced between adults and children and not simply inherited.

Rose’s last chapter examines the changes and censorship of language that were required of Barrie’s text before it was permitted to become a ‘reader’ for children in schools in England. She points out that this erasure is not just an action that tries to simplify the text but something that also echoes ideas about children and language. The sequencing of events and the more rudimentary descriptions were seen as the child’s natural language. Through this analysis Rose differentiates between the literary language judged to be acceptable for older children and the sequential language that depicts the ordering of events and was assumed to be acceptable for younger children. In this particular rewriting of Barrie’s text the ambiguous narrator disappears, the one who comments on his own position and makes clear the use of language as it related to an adult educated in Latin. Its slide into the memories of childhood is removed. The very slippage that invites Rose to probe the question of who is speaking now—the adult narrator or the child—and to question what it suggests about the adult’s desire when the adult narrator confesses those memories and longings for childhood is removed from the pages in preparation for its use in school. Rose’s text brings these messy slips to the surface. In a sense Rose works against the very pull of the Neverland; the allure that has captured readers, teachers, theatre audiences, politicians and academics and the force of repression that works to maintain the disregard for the unconscious. She makes it possible to think of a child that is unknown and to continue from there, “for it is not only childhood, but adulthood itself, which can serve as the last of all myths” (xvii). And, remarkably, Rose stakes this claim within the broader frame of questioning what fantasies of the child are repeated and then left unexamined through the stories that circulate in our culture.
4. Carolyn Steedman’s Spectacle ‘As if’ Child: History’s Lingering Unconscious

Carolyn Steedman’s (1994) historical inquiry, *Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority, 1780-1930*, is described as a study with an elusive object. She investigates a particular historical period, ideas of subjectivity emerging and shifting during that time, the investments in the children of that period, the production of the idea of childhood through labour laws, school acts, and literature, and a shift in the perspective of historical exploration. And yet, Steedman notes that “sometimes, it seemed...that what [she] was really describing was littleness itself, and the complex register of affect that has been invested in the word ‘little’” (9). Littleness is just one of the words that comes to be used to describe the child and the distinction of childhood in relation to the adult. The idea of language is not as clearly traced in this text as in those of Aulagnier or Rose and the words refound in this investigation often emerge fully formed in the figure of the child, or already integrated within ideas of memory, history and interiority. Avoiding the pitfalls whereby “discourse (for example, narrative, representation, and symbolization) [is granted] a monopoly as the medium through which social life, and therefore childhood, is constructed” (Prout 2011, 7), Steedman presents relations between language, its objects and its time as important for making meaning from historical events and for recognizing the diverse perspectives that would have existed historically. In this way Steedman offers a historical analysis of the ways in which the category of childhood emerged in a particular period in England and Europe and the ideas about subjectivities of both adults and children that permeated that distinction. The
inquiry does not begin with a search for historical representations of childhood but rather a search for a particular child as represented in the literary figure of Goethe’s little acrobat, Mignon, and the many child figures that later emanated this character.

As Freud writes in his “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” “the finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it.” (1925, 288). Steedman comes to observe this dynamic at play as she recognizes that her writing repeats the continuation of Mignon’s history and the persistent desire to uncover the history of the child figure whose origins have been sought out by many others. When Steedman realizes that she is not alone her questions quickly shift from the historian’s task of seeking out the lost child to include queries that investigate what Mignon represented for the audiences of the circus, the theatre or the newspaper. Steedman seeks out the well-known examples of Mignon from the time but also looks to fragments and residues of texts and to the ideas about this embodiment of the child that were represented in other fields of thought. The intent is not to uncover some final truth about this androgynous figure or what she might represent for childhood. Rather, Steedman seeks to give voice—or text—to events, details and lives that speak to significant theories from that time period. Stated clearly in the introduction, Steedman explains that her book:

6 Other examples of books that set out with this aim, and which incorporate expansive historical examinations of the conditions or constructions of childhood include, Cunningham’s (2005) investigation of how children were seen in western society from 1500 to the present. Jenks (2005) compilation of texts on children and childhood is amassed under the description of the sociology of childhood. In this book we can find the re-printing of a chapter from Steedman, among other chapters and articles from other notable scholars published elsewhere. In the introduction to this book, Jenks also explains how the field has moved on since Aries’ seminal text.

Since the radical thesis put forward by Aries (1973) that children essentially came into being with the rise of bourgeois society there has been a milder view, more widely held, that children have not always been perceived and related to adults in the same way- the dimensions of space and time are critical in this understanding. So childhood becomes a particular phenomenon of modernity, with its ideal-typical place in western society being assured through its liberation from process and production. But however real children may have become structurally differentiated through modernity this does not fully account for the upsurge of intellectual attention directed towards them in late modernity. (Jenks 2005, 1)

In other recent scholarship, the reminder that childhood is socially and historically constructed has re-emerged in order to examine the new sociologies of childhood that have taken up this perspective, and yet are also situated within a particular time and place (Prout 2011).
...concerns the ideas, beliefs, and conceptualizations that were involved in remembering and reshaping a literary figure in the century and a half after it was first written in Wilhelm Meister. At the end of it all it should be clearer why the idea of childhood that Mignon embodied—it meant something—was an idea, an entity—to those who had not read Goethe, who had never purchased the sheet music for Schubert’s most famous of all the settings of her most famous song, who had never seen a shoddy sério-comique version of Ambroise Thomas’s opera Mignon (let alone a staging in its pristine form); meant something to those who did not know why child acrobats performing on the music-hall stage, and young women vaulting on horseback at the circus, were so frequently called Mignon.[...] The proposition is that the complex of beliefs, feelings and sentiments that ‘Mignon’ frequently articulated were to do with childhood, and to do with the self, and the relationship between the two, in the period between 1780-1930. (3)

Admittedly, Steedman becomes implicated in the historian’s desire to rescue something from the past and she acknowledges the “deep pleasures involved in pursuing a figure like this” (2). But she also grapples with the complicated and shifting notion of history that is tied to this ‘dislocation’ of childhood.

After a brief discussion of the science and thought that took shape during the period explored in Steedman’s study I move on to examine the spectacle of bodies and children presented in her work. The question of watching children was already explored with Rose (1992). In the historical framework of this chapter we are presented with a similar problematic that invokes new questions, as the bodies that were visible on the stage and the street helped to create the very image of what was known as childhood. Moreover, Steedman suggests that “child-figures, and more generally the idea of childhood, came to be commonly used to express the depths of historicity within individuals, the historicity that was ‘linked to them, essentially’” (12). And yet, there are contradictions and complexities that emerge from different readings during that time. The
child appears at once as representative of growth and death; as a sexual being and a figure who should be protected; as a being who is manipulated and has agency. And while it is clear to me as a reader that many of these ideas about childhood remain imbedded within our current perceptions of childhood, Steedman points out that the “interest in the topic is, of course, that it is not transhistorical, that children have not always and everywhere been used as emblems of the adult human condition” (x). And so an exploration of the image of the child observed and written about by mothers, clinicians, politicians, citizens in the streets, and audiences of the circus and theatre will lead into a discussion of a more recent view of the young characters in Kazuo Ishiguro’s (2005) novel, Never Let Me Go, and Britzman’s (2009, 45-59) chapter on reading that takes this novel as its object of inquiry.

Set in a dystopian society, the narrator, Kathy H, and her friends are clones whose insides present the cure to cancers and illnesses faced by the human population, or normals, as they are called. The characters and themes of this novel appear to be very different from Mignon, and so might not be described as one of Mignon’s sisters, as Steedman labels some of the iterations of Goethe’s acrobat. While they are raised at a distance from the normals, Kathy H and her friends are among the fortunate attending a school called Hailsham, reputed to be the best of the institutions for clones. And like the child acrobat, they are presented as manipulated by the adults around them, both in their education as they grasp for meaning in tasks which lead to nothing, and in life as around the age of thirty they begin to donate their organs leading to an early death, or to ‘complete’ as Ishiguro’s characters say. Britzman’s (2009) chapter draws on this novel for a discussion of the difficulties of reading, of what makes us slow readers, and this seems to be the concept resounding in the work of the historian depicted through Steedman’s search for the child. The concepts of childhood that were once so easily interiorized as personal histories are drawn out again to be read through the researcher’s transference. Britzman asks; “how can this novel be read? Shall we see the novel as an allegory for interiority? Or is it a parable for child rearing and so a comedy of error made from
forbidden parental Oedipal wishes? What if the novel is the educator’s phantasy: that teachers, in the ways in which they prepare students, do have a hand in murdering them?” (48). Ishiguro’s book does goad new perspectives on the problem of interiority, but along with Steedman’s work it also offers insight into the difficulties of reading the words and histories narrated about children.

**The advents of literature and physiology between the unconscious and the child:**

The time period that Steedman (1994) marks out begins in 1780 shortly after the first version of Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister* was published in 1795-96. She examines Goethe’s life and speaks about his own interests in scientific research in the 1780s and 1790s (43). Steedman also discusses emerging scientific fields, particularly nineteenth century physiology. The gradual development of cell theory plays an important role, first manifesting in physiology and medicine, before it was founded between 1840 and 1870. We can see the questions and curiosities that were sparked by this new perspective echoed in the figure of Mignon. Steedman argues that “the historical discussion of scientific work always posses questions of imagery” as developing theories are first explained using “figurative representations” (44) before the technical terms and “scientific meaning” are adopted (Manier quoted in Steedman, 44). Goethe’s work on metamorphosis was praised for the way the writing seemed to mirror the phenomenon it was describing (Steedman, 50). And, Steedman describes George Henry Lewes 1858 work that endeavored to bring the concept of metamorphosis to British readers in a new light by, “making strange—by historicising—conventional 19th century physiological thinking” (48-49). Ideas from nature both morphed with and were divided from the general concept of growth as the field of physiology—focused on the “change and development within[...] an organism” (51)—resisted the adoption of the interests of the field of biology, which looked at the conditions for life itself found in organisms and bodies. The cell, first discovered in 1832, presented images of littleness, interiority, growth, and death. Cell theory matured in the last quarter of the century and, for the general audiences, it was presented as the simplification of existence: “the fundamental
unit of life” (59). Thus, life and death became closely related as the cell came to be thought of as the “final place, the thing that simply could not be dispersed” (60).

Investigations into evolutionary theory in both Darwinian and non-Darwinian form—of which the latter was more popular in the nineteenth century as it could still be interpreted through divine organization—offered ideas about the relationship between childhood and nature (51). Steedman discusses Hugh Cunningham’s work as it has “shown how, by use of a complex set of analogies, children of the urban poor in nineteenth-century Britain were connected with the ‘savages of the anthropological imagination’” (Steedman, 83). Growth and change, but also “death and extinction” (83) were implied in these theories and so children also became representatives of hope as they appeared to be an example of birth and development. A couple of Darwin’s key texts were published in the 1880s. And, around this time Freud was working on his early theories. Steedman notes that there are “long established associations between littleness and interiority and between history and childhood that were theorized in emergent psychoanalysis between about 1895 and 1920” (77).

The concept of time presented in Freud’s theory of the unconscious—something out of time entirely—brought new possibilities for the figure of the child. Jenks (2005), in the introduction to a series of edited volumes on childhood, recently wrote:

We look backwards to childhood as a source of causality for unruliness, psychopathology, asociality, antagonistic egoism, and all that might spoil the present. We look forward through childhood to plan futures, project utopian visions, to grasp at creativity and to sustain our need for the possibility of untainted love. (1)

And although the child’s drastic change in stature and relationality to the surrounding world in the first years of life have probably always signified some kind of metaphoric relation to time, Steedman points to Freud’s work on the unconscious—the thing that is outside time—and the gradual elision of childhood with the unconscious that took place
through psychoanalytic, literary and popular theories for the specific changes wrought—
both to the child and to the understanding of history:

At the end of the period under discussion, it has been suggested, Freud drew on
two orders of thought, the physiological and the evolutionary, in order to
establish childhood in its relationship to the unconscious, so that the unconscious
mind was conceptualized as the timeless repository for what was formerly the
matter of time and history, that is, an actual childhood, an actual period of
growth and its vicissitudes. In this way, through the images Freud used, and by
networks of understanding that he activated when he described these processes
in neuro-physiological terms, his account of the unconscious repeated the
imperative of nineteenth-century physiology, which was to confront death with
the idea of endlessness. (Steedman, 96)

In the tensions between timelessness, death and the child that are brought together
here we find one of our difficult readings. In the society of clones and normals (Ishiguro
2005), where the insides of Kathy H and her friends complete the insides of others, the
comparison seems at once too literal and too grotesque. Mignon, who personified the idea
of childhood during the late Victorian and war years in Britain and parts of Europe, has a
literary death, and yet death as is the case for the clones, is her fate all along. The timeless
figure of the child lives on in the adult's unconscious where she is not granted an
existence of her own. Despite the many versions that have attempted to rescue Mignon by
adding an ending where she grows up to marry Wilhelm, it was always known that death
was her fate. And so, while Mignon and Steedman teach us something about narratives,
how the stories of people and events come to be told and remembered through history
and memory, she will do this with reference to a figure who “has no true origin” and who
“certainly [...] has no end” and so “has to die”7 (42). Steedman explains that this

7 Having said this, Steedman also describes the earlier version of Goethe’s play, that was left unpublished
until 1910, and so “this particular point of Mignon’s origin was not known to the nineteenth century. [...] So
nineteenth-century readers did not know that in the earlier version Mignon did not die” (Steedman, 21).
“argument is essentially to do with her out-of-placeness in a form of writing” (42). Mignon’s out-of-placeness mirrors the position of the unconscious out of time.

As a historian captivated by the stories of the child, Steedman’s transference reminds us of the other forms of adult stories about childhood, namely our theories. The adult fantasies found in Rose’s (1992) work on the literary object reemerge to ask difficult questions of our theories of children and childhood. And Ishiguro’s (2005) unsettling fictional clones push through to ask, do we turn to children to fill out our insides? Thus, in Goethe’s rendition of the character’s death, as her heart breaks and her story is told, and it becomes clear that she represents Wilhelm’s past; the child figure now represented within him takes on the nostalgia for the elements of the creative, beautiful and androgynous littleness that he seems to have been searching for when he joined the traveling theatrical group and came across Mignon. Theories of childhood become repositories for the adult’s unconscious fears, anxieties and desires making representation of the child impossible. Instead the little acrobat comes to represent Wilhelm’s interiority as something both timeless and lost in the past.

The spectacle of the child:

Victorian audiences watching the circus, attending the theatre and passing matchbox girls or chimney sweeps in the street related the sympathies they felt for the tragic figure of Mignon to these visible children everywhere. When Wilhelm first saw Mignon she was being beaten for refusing to perform her egg dance. Wilhelm paid to take her under his care. The story that emerges before and after Mignon’s death tells of a beautiful but androgynous figure who leapt about with ease but whose body performed “strange dislocations” (Steedman, 23). She was at once alluring and had a “repellant strangeness” (23) and her gender was the subject of much debate as early on she claimed to be a boy and only later, when she was a little older, did she change her dress after she saw Wilhelm in the embrace of a woman. It was this sight, of her father figure with a woman that lead to her broken heart and death, but the story told afterwards exposed that “Mignon was the child of an insane brother-sister relationship” (Steedman, 26).
Concern and desire for Mignon spread beyond literary examples in the nineteenth century. In Hugh Cunningham’s book Steedman finds a history that leaves out much of the affective relations between adults and children, beginning “in the 1840s with the first effective factory legislation, or in 1918, when half-time labour is finally abolished, or in the 1940s, when educational legislation and the inauguration of the National Health service bestow childhood on every child” (6). But even those legislative acts were not immune to the vested interests of concerned or nostalgic adults. Campaigns against the use of child labour in factories were not immune to the overdetermined defense of childhood: “Irritated capitalists complained that ‘all the workers in mills are spoken of as children’....[...].‘Childhood’ was a category of dependence, [...before it became descriptive of chronological age” (Steedman, 7). Fears for the safety of the acrobats continued despite the bill introduced in 1872, and many adults were concerned that parents would continue to manipulate their children for the profit of performance (101). Elsewhere Steedman clarifies that despite the fact that there were never large numbers of child performers, these children continued to represent the figure of Mignon along with the street children selling everything from matchboxes to watercress.

Mayhew interviewed a street girl selling watercress somewhere between December of 1850 and January of 1851. This little girl captured adult imaginations and Steedman finds in her another representation of Mignon (117). It was argued that Mayhew dramatized the story, and Steedman notes that there was “quite a determined break from a source in Mayhew’s transcript” in Mary Sewell’s retelling of the story “which shows his child utterly clear that she is not an object of care or compassion—‘No people never pities me in the street.’” In the new version, however, “this fictional child becomes an object of pity and philanthropy” (125). In the tellings and retellings, then, there is a break where the wishes of the audience might enter. Britzman (2009) explains that:

One effect of melancholy is also a defense against it: we wish for a doppelgänger. Each night we may project our mistakes and wishes into the body
of someone just like us. [...] Anxiety’s delegates give reasons, intentions, wishes, and purposes to our bad objects. Ishiguro narrates the doppelgänger’s enigma: here is a society that engineers its own greedy immortality, a social state that cannot lose the object, cannot wear out and so will neither die nor recognize love. (52)

And so while we struggle to read all the versions of Mignon’s story and the history of childhood around her, something else is exposed in the work of history beyond the events and their documentation. The details of real children’s experiences brush up against the spaces where fantasies and wishes can exist and then interpretation becomes just as important as the ‘real.’ Britzman (2009) explains how a psychical or symbolic collapse confronts readers of Ishiguro’s novel when they are faced with the fact that the characters are not machines but rather these clone “students [...] are real and invoke horror because they can never be separated from their function and our cruelty” (46). Like the child acrobats, whose very growth and shape is manipulated for the purpose of performance, the engineered characters of Ishiguro’s novel grow up without origins. And Kathy H’s narrations are caught in the work of memory. She searches for meaning and recounts fantasies of lost objects—the belief that became a joke among her classmates tells of Norfolk as “something of a lost corner” of England, “where all the lost property found in the country ended up” (Ishiguro 2005, 60). Strangely, the students ended up in the lost corner in search of the narrator’s friend, Ruth’s, original—the name they had given to the person they imagined they were copied from. Kathy H and her friends are the doppelgängers returning to look for their origins. Similarly, Steedman’s account of a search for Mignon indicates a fantasy where the adult wish is to protect her ‘as if’ she were real—‘as if’ she were the child in the street or on the trapeze—or the child in us. Britzman describes how “Ishiguro takes away this ‘as if’ quality and readers [...] feel a symbolic collapse. Literal creepiness leaves readers to question both the content of their own insides and the design of the external world” (46). Mignon’s doppelgängers continue to appear and Freud’s belated childhood lives on in our memories. It would seem then,
that the nineteenth century child figure has lived on beyond the fantasies and desires of those who constructed it “as if” the child has gained a kind of immortality.

Conclusion:

We can experience difficulty in understanding our insides (and the fact that we emerged from inside someone else). The difficulty of words emerging from within us, out into the world, parallels this challenge to the apprehension of meaning and being. Both of these can be explored without reducing these relationships to simple binaries of inside and outside as the relational component enters in forms of sexuality and family, as words are first spoken to the infant by the adult caregiver. Steedman writes that “one of the arguments here is that the idea of the child did allow this transmutation of feelings into thoughts” (10). The transmutation of feeling into thought is a central concept and difficulty that emerges from Steedman’s text: It poses the problem of acknowledging that the lasting image of the child developed in English and Western society between 1780 and 1930 generated language that could address the affective, psychical, and social along with situations and problems of memory that were not always so easily accessible to thought or language. From contest of meanings grew new possibilities of thought and speech and a new interest in the child that resulted in a turn to observing, staging, manipulating and studying the child, and in a roundabout way, asking what the child had to say. The result seems to have been a conflation between representations of the adult’s inner-child—the idea or distant memory each person holds within them of a childhood lost in the past; the Mignon inside each of us—and the child figure in cinema, stories, or talked about in politics. And it was not long before the physical child, wandering in the streets, working in the factory, studying at school, or at home in the family was indistinguishable from this image of the child in representations of children in literature and discourse.
5. Conclusion:

In some sense this thesis seems to be saying, ‘just wait a second.’ My work initiates a pause—a request to return to three works on childhood that have been available in scholarly circles for some time. Two of these works have been read widely and cited by many scholars in the fields of education, cultural studies, child studies, history and children’s literature. The third, Piera Aulagnier’s Violence of Interpretation was made available to English-speaking audiences in 2001 and thereafter received attention from scholars with a particular interest in psychosis. Aulagnier’s other works have been popular among readers of psychoanalysis in France. In this final chapter I will take the time to return to these works and to bring them together through the distinct perspectives of children and language theorized in each text. My study urges a pause to consider seriously the significance of infancy, a time before speech and the relationships, affects and representations that fill the infant’s wordlessness; it is a pause that supports me to examine adult fantasies of childhood residing too comfortably in the adult’s words; and, it is a pause to revisit the contested origins of the construct of childhood and the historical figures and theories that helped shape it. This final caesura allows for an attention to the work of interpretation, as I venture back into the imaginative leaps between the themes and provocations presented in each of the chapters of this thesis. My purpose is to outline a relational matrix and its implications for thinking about the place of language in the education of young children.

The mother and child’s anguish, the adult’s desires and fantasies masked by promises and the images and spectacles of the lost object of childhood make the project of renewing existing interpretations of childhood difficult. Grappling with the relational and competing worlds of the psychical, cultural and historical in some sense highlights the “violence of interpretation” of the child which Aulagnier works from (85). A relational matrix allows us insight into these perspectives, and can help us to conceive of the processes of representation that bring affective experiences within our grasp. It also
shows us why making sense of these things that are just words may make us uneasy and why so often words defy communication and its logic of exchange. In his lectures on child development between 1949-52, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the pause in the child’s speech acquisition that appears soon after he or she begins to speak the first words. We can see it partly indicated in sounds that the child once babbled with ease and now struggles to pronounce. Merleau-Ponty (2010) suggests, “everything happens as if the child were obliged to restrain himself, because now sounds have taken on a distinctive signification. From the moment when phonemes serve to differentiate words, the child shows a need to appropriate their new value, to gradually acquire their system of opposition and of original succession” (15). These words give us a clue to the implications for early childhood education and the opportunities for further research that stem from this thesis.

**Education and the unconscious in Aulagnier, Rose and Steedman:**

Each chapter in my thesis presents a perspective of children and language that takes seriously the advent of the unconscious. Repression, fantasy, contradiction, and timelessness are called up by the unconscious and at times surprise and upset our coherence and our plans. Even language, which can be seen as an essential medium for moving affects to the descriptive realm of experience and consciousness through the representation of feelings, can elude us, say more than we intend, or expose more than we know.

To begin to grasp how this might all measure up to the goals of education, Britzman (2011) gives us a clue in the form of psychoanalysis, where she finds “our impressive means for a critique of education’s blind spots made from its reliance on both consciousness and the insistence that we learn from direct experience” (30). Aulagnier (2001) takes us closer to what can be found in the unconscious qualities of language. She warns against the omnipotence of the mother’s discourse and the trap that can be set up between the mother’s speech and the infant’s response if the mother forces her hand. The more she forces her power over the other the more she must make “everything [...]

sayable” (94). Aulagnier describes how verbalization masks the workings of the unconscious in language:

> The more a discourse wishes to be faultless, unambiguous, unquestionable, and tries to present itself as a complete construction, the more there appears at work what I shall call the autonomy of logic proper to the linguistic system. In this case, meaning can no longer prevail over the wealth of metaphor, play on nonsense and humour—that is to say, that set of procedures that make communication the locus in which interpretation and questioning remain possible. (94-95)

The mothering of education sits in a precarious position between words and affect. At times she might be seen to have already pushed her hand too far, and her words. Other times the logic of the linguistic system with its demands for communication and consciousness becomes a shared burden for mother and child. Elsewhere, Britzman (2009) agrees with this, stating her belief that “to understand the depth and potent creativity of the emotional world requires a particular language dedicated to that world’s symbolization, a language that can contain ‘the violence of interpretation’” (84). Here, a chance to pause and step back can permit a leap into the pre-conscious where affective representations find their beginnings.

In the chapter 2, with Aulagnier’s theories, we are offered the chance to return to the beginning and ask, why words and not just things? The implications of this question are twofold; it both introduces an exploration into the other and earlier means of presentation found in Aulagnier’s theories of the primal period in the form of the pictogram and inquires into the myriad of symbolic initiations into a world of words the child affectively and relationally experiences with the mother and the family. Few of us remember much of those earlier experiences by the time we enter school. And yet the intimacies of infancy and early childhood leave us marked by the weight of our initial dependencies. The first words come with the first cultural relations outside the family, and so, while the introduction to words might be met with a sense of loss, there is also a
future sourced by belonging and a place for curiosity. Pointing to the potential of the unconscious in education, Britzman (2011) goes further, writing that “once unhinged from consciousness of it, understanding the indirections of experience, including such events as hatred, love, hostility, aggression, jealousy, and inexplicable thoughts and actions becomes the work of interpretation” (29). Aulganier’s belated arrival to these difficulties of speech also seems to say something about the retrospective work of interpretation, and particularly that which eludes words—that cannot make the leap from the affective realm to named feelings; or, from the pre-conscious pictogram to the conscious symbolic realm of difference and desire. To be sure, she emphasizes speech as an important step and key movement for the child’s future of desire and meaning-making. She also draws our attention to what the adult might make of the residues of the infant’s experiences before words; or, what can be considered a broader sense of interpretation that grapples with those repressed elements of the unconscious that elude us.

Leaping into the world of Neverland and its broadest sense, we can perhaps imagine Rose’s (1992) reading of Peter Pan and the fantastic stories that preceded and followed him as an example of interpretation as it is introduced by Aulagnier. In chapter 3, with Rose we find the return of the repressed of childhood as she pays particular attention to the role of the adult in the making of children’s literature. Rose draws out the desires, anxieties and fantasies of childhood that are left unexplored in the assumption that the subject of children’s literature is the child. Language, then, both hides the affect from which it is produced and exposes a fantasy of childhood. In this chapter, the equivocal relations between adults and children and the audience and the text are explored alongside the scandal of the promise that is described through the character of Don Juan in Felman’s (2002) work. In her writing on the other side of the promise, the side that demonstrates how the very act of the promise hinges on the possibility of its failure, Felman turns to the character who pledges that failure. Her theories of language and the speech act lead her to deduce that, “the Don Juan myth is in effect the myth of the promise of consciousness falling flat on its face” (34). What becomes the myth of Peter
Pan, is his status as the eternal promise, who never risks failure and therefore never arrives at a time when he is expected to deliver the goods. James Kincaid (2003) describes Peter Pan like so; “he flashes, teases, invites but does not deliver” (104). What is uncovered on the other side of this promise is not its failure but rather the desire that holds up the belief in the innocence, playfulness, and imagination that have been invested in the figure of the child.

The eternal commitment that Felman finds in the speech acts of matrimony or the finality of death is transformed into an eternal promise when transposed onto the figure of the child. Don Juan’s subversive play with the promise of words takes on infallible attributes in the theatrical display of Peter Pan. In the reception of J.M. Barrie’s work in schools and broader audiences Rose (1992) finds “a definition of education, literature and culture which carries with it, quite explicitly, a notion of origins[...], which is not[...] unrelated to the emphasis on the living speech of the child (oral culture as the primary truth and the written word as its contamination). The other true speech and the supreme embodiment of culture is the Bible: ‘in the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God’” (135). And this tells us something about the impossibility of the promises made by education which presents a child that could only be a fiction and yet invokes unfaltering belief. Education, then, promises linear progress and is confronted by the difficulties of uneven development; it promises knowledge and faces unexpected, even ‘secret thoughts.’ And education is not beyond the problems of time that defer learning or call upon the traumas of earlier experiences. If education could deliver on its promise the result that we could expect would be uniform production. Not even Ishiguro’s clone could accomplish such standardization. In this sense: We rely on its failures, resistances, conflicts and unaccountable dilemmas to allow for the possibilities of children who as speaking subjects, interpret.

These three perspectives support scholars highlight the implications of the unconscious in the work of education. They up the child’s worlds beyond the reach of words pointing to the generative possibilities of interpretation. And so to conclude we
will go back to school. To draw out implications my study has for education, I return to the introduction of the thesis and the choices that were made in the articulation of the methodology. My method hinges on conceptions of language that emerge throughout this work. I began by teasing out the socializing demands of speech and words in order to distance the difficulties of language from discussions about the power of words engaged through analysis of embedded discourses of education (MacNaughton 2005). This sense of disentangling permits for the space of interpretation and a reintegration—or transference. Returning to the child’s acquisition of language through psychosocial, cultural and finally historical relations before venturing into the narratives and discourses of education allowed me to enter the classroom from the perspective of the word-bearer’s relationship to education. From here we can grapple with adult fears of being misunderstood that lead to a search for the clarity of words and the “autonomy of logic proper to the linguistic system” that can impede the bearing of words to children (Aulganier, 95).

To return to the teacher’s demand, ‘use your words,’ it is as if words will stop something instead of carrying on being. The acquisition of language when exposed as a demand reveals another side. Abreast of the demand, ‘use your words’ seems to be the accompanying refusal, ‘you’re not allowed to cry.’ When read through remainders of babble examined in the form of onomatopoeia in Heller-Roazen’s (2005) linguistic study “the exclamations of the child, in any case, indicate that language evolves in a time that is neither unitary nor linear; they suggest however resolutely one speech may develop it continues to bear within it elements—traces of another”—sounds perhaps representative of affects—perhaps things (14). The teacher’s demand for words contains traces of the adult’s affective response to cries of earlier languages. The demand admits the vulnerability that is exposed when faced with reminders of the child’s dependency and lost past. In the request, ‘use your words,’ the teacher appears to be divulging; ‘your cries makes me helpless.’
The texts of Aulagnier, Rose, and Steedman all approach the subject of the child characterized through self-other relations by means of the question of vulnerability and fictions thereof. In the face of this helplessness my methodology has turned to look at literature. Given these conceptual frames of the difficulty of imagining the child and the catastrophic consequences of doing so in some cases, a return to literature has helped me to ask: is there something we should understand about language that can be taken back to education? Aulagnier starts us off with a reminder of the necessary work of repression that accompanies the child’s introduction to words before Peter Pan and Don Juan depict narratives of repetition and promise. These characters evoke fantasies and desires that run wildly astray of the work of memory and play with the repercussions of repression. Through Steedman’s historical investigation and Ishiguro’s novel we embark with the researcher and the narrator into the lost realm of the past where origins remain elusive and what is found confronts the reader with the trials and horrors of uncovering the repressed. Literature lets us play with unconscious materials by masking our desires in fantasy and projecting the difficulties of understanding familial relations and the expanses of lived time that set apart childhood and adult life into the words and figures of fiction. The adult’s demand for words is animated in children’s literature as a demand for the child. And yet even the fictional child resists apprehension. Words tell us something about our conceptions of interiority and the child (and childhood) we hold dear. Words also leave us tongue-tied and grasping for meaning seemingly beyond description. Aulagnier’s theories, Rose’s cultural study and Steedman’s historical analysis serve as reminders of the difficulties we confront in the search for origins in childhood and the problem of taking words with us into explorations of those earlier relations. For education this reminder extends to the gaps and pauses that might be filled with words or that might already have taken hold of the mask of consciousness leaving behind the representations, relations, figures and histories of childhood that precede words.
Questions and opportunities for further study:

Analysis of the progression from sounds to words can expose the silences and difficulties where we can imagine there is a grasping for meanings between self and other. This thesis has left me with questions of how we might respond to these words and silences in education. The child described by Adam Phillips (1998) who asked us, “why are words the thing?” in the introduction and the second chapter continues to resonate (43). And after examining the developing relation between representation and affect with Piera Aulagnier, the question of what demands are made on the psyche, the social and the symbolic by other forms of representation emerges for further consideration. How does the child’s history of experiencing the world through the bodily and visual representations of the pictogram continue to play out? And, what are the implications of an unacknowledged infantile history? Alongside Piera Aulagnier’s articulation of the child’s acquisition of language, I wonder how we can include the child’s loss within a concept of language acquisition, and how the unconscious or the time of infancy might be construed for policies and pedagogical approaches that address the languages and literacies of the young learner.

This pause in the child’s speech offers a way into the implications for further research in readings of child development and approaches that address children’s delays in development. The relational matrix put forward in this thesis offers questions that turn on the adult who identifies, diagnoses and shapes the concept of childhood and development. This thesis points to a tendency to fill the delay with words that attribute promises, fantasies, cures and even our own adult memories to the child. This is to suggest that there is room for a broader concept of interpretation in education that might be able to handle, or at least grapple with, the contradictions, leaps in time, projections and repressions that were introduced through Freud’s theory of the unconscious. Further research could explore how the teacher might think of his or her relationships in the classroom differently if they were approached through the role of interpretation. This research might look at what can emerge—the tensions of language, thought, time and
sexuality that could be explored through a concept of the symbolic open to the psychoanalytic idea of interpretation.


