WORKSHOP ON EARLY WARNING
OF COMMUNAL CONFLICTS AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

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Center for International Development and Conflict Management
University of Maryland

by

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Introduction

The workshop was the latest in a series on Early Warning (EW) which have been held around the world. Three have been hosted by the Centre for Refugee Studies (CRS) in Toronto. Others have been held in London, Berlin, New York, Kyoto, Vienna, Atlanta, Acapulco (the ISA meeting). Other related meetings on conflict or on ethnic conflicts (such as the one in Colleraine, Northern Ireland at the end of October, 1993) or on mediation and conflict resolution have also been held.

The last meeting at CRS focused on developing a technological prototype and a reference list of data banks on conflicts and early warning. CRS has almost completed the process of networking all its offices so that CRS scholars have access to data banks. A manual for other centres will soon be available for developing a technological node, acquiring the software and accessing the various databases critical to developing a network of institutions involved in Early Warning. CRS has also begun a pilot project on Early Warning focused on Eastern Europe.

The U. of Maryland meeting brought together an international group of experts concerned with Early Warning in order to go beyond the issues of the acquisition and sharing of information to discuss developing a model for EW which could be tested and used related to communal conflicts likely to lead to gross violations of human rights. Thus, data bases were viewed not so much as sources of information for developing an EW system but for testing any models developed. The workshop also dealt with the relationship of an EW system to the policy needs of international organizations.

The first day of the workshop was spent on a discussion of various models of communal conflict, genocide, politicide, and humanitarian crises, on the sources of data, and on using cases and comparative data for evaluating an EW model. Rather than reporting on those presentations in the order given, I will present a systematic roadmap and framework of the various theoretical approaches for utilizing the data bases to develop an EW model.

The framework is divided into two columns. The lefthand column includes those theories which reject the possibility of developing a single, universal model applicable to all situations and circumstances which can be used for developing an EW system. The righthand column envisions precisely such a possibility. Each column has four levels indicating different (and higher) levels of complexity in approaching the issue of EW, quite aside from whether the approach is committed to the possibility of developing such a model or not. The list of theoretical approaches is but a more systematic, and perhaps slightly more comprehensive analysis of the variety of approaches presented at the workshop by Rodolfo Stavenhagen of El Colegio de México.
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I

Non-universalist

II

Universalist

D

Structuralist

Stages

C

Phenomenologist

Deconstructionist

B

Deductive Theories

Normative Decision Theory

A

Correlation Studies

Narrative Approaches

The narrative approach (IA) takes each conflict situation as *sui generis*. Milton Leitenberg, a Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International Security Studies, who was trained in the hard sciences and worked on arms control problems for over twenty-five years, many of those years spent at SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, was the commentator on the third panel of papers focused on using cases and comparative data. He cast a sceptical overview on the attempts to develop a correlation statistical anticipatory or predictive model of conflicts and argued, in a quick survey of a number of conflicts, that a) the crises were not predictable and b) only one key factor needed to be attended to - the shift to instrumentalities of repression of the regime. For example, Milton argued that the current repression of ethnic minorities by the Moi regime in Kenya could not have been predicted until the events were actually underway. The point was asserted rather than being derived as a result of a survey of the scholarly literature on Kenya which might have indicated that, indeed, a number of scholars have been anticipating precisely this type of increased repression given Moi’s consolidation of power, the concentration of the key levers of power among individuals from his own tribe, and the sources of protest concentrated in regions and from leaders of other tribes.

A more positive view of the narrative approach is exemplified by the CRS early warning work on Eastern Europe in which, without a model, but by merely following the story, the group were able to anticipate in June of 1993 a crisis in Russia coming to a head in the third week of September, although they seemed to have no idea of the outcome of the crisis. They were merely pessimistic about the costs to democracy whoever emerged victorious, although they seemed more concerned about the degree and type of repression, and the flow of refugees, that would ensue if Yeltsin’s opponents won. Further, virtually at the same time as Yeltsin was crushing parliament, and the Western press and political leadership were celebrating Yeltsin as the saviour of Russian democracy, the CRS
unit issued warnings that Yeltsin was setting up a new dictatorship, fears that the West began to mutter about a month after Yeltsin began to consolidate his victory. Only then did stories begin to emerge about the method by which Yeltsin had manipulated the conflict and rejected a compromise solution.

The approach dominating the workshop was the variety of papers on correlation statistical models and projections which were used as a basis for building an EW system. These include the following papers:

J. David Singer and Michael D. Wallace’s introduction to their 1979 edited volume, To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics. Singer has since edited (with Richard Stoll) Quantitative Indicators in World Politics: Timely Assurance and Early Warning (1984), (with Paul Diehl) Measuring the Correlates of War (1991) and (with Brian Gibbs) Empirical Knowledge on World Politics: Summaries of Data-Based Research, 1970-1991 (1993). Singer is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and did not arrive until the second day.

Jonathan Wilkenfeld (U. of Maryland) and Michael Breecher (McGill) "The Ethnopolitical Dimension of International Crises: A Preliminary Mapping." Michael (who was not present) and Jonathan have codirected CRISBANK, the data collection on International Crisis Behaviour and coauthored a number of books on using correlated data to understand inter-state conflict. The article was a departure from their past work, for in it Jonathan and Michael took their past data on inter-state conflict and extracted the ethnopolitical dimensions of those conflicts.


Peter Wallensteen (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala U) "Requirements for Early Warning: Some Early Thoughts". Unfortunately, due to the death of his father-in-law, Peter had to return to Sweden before the workshop even started.

John Davies (the research coordinator for the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the U. of Maryland and director of the GEDS (Global Event-Data System) and of COPDAB (the Conflict and Peace Data Bank) projects at CIDCM) on "Event Data for Conflict and Crisis Early Warning."
Helen Fein (Executive Director of the Study of Genocide in New York and author of eight books, including *Accounting for Genocide* (1979) and *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (1991)), had two papers, "Accounting for genocide after 1945: Theories and some Findings" which had already been published in the *International Journal on Group Rights* (1993), and "Tools and Alarms: Uses of Models for Explanation and Anticipation".


and, last but certainly not least,


Singer’s book and introduction was a pioneer in the application of social science research to developing early warning indicators for forecasting conflicts. He had dismissed sceptics who argued that the number of factors were too complex (IA above) or others who, in the Hegelian tradition, argued that we can only look backward, not forward, for the Owl of Minerva flaps its wings only at dusk (IC above). Singer took more pains to take on the deductive theorists (IIB above) who required, as a precondition for forecasting, a fully developed and verified general theory of international politics. Singer argued that inductive correlational studies, relying on a few indicators, provided the foundation for theory building and, in any case, no permanent grand theory which was definitive was possible. Correlational models also had a heuristic value in forecasting, whereas models based on abstract theory may be very difficult if not impossible. In any case, correlation studies and probability estimates would be more useful than 'seat-of-the-pants' judgements, provided that the data on which they were based was reliable and properly coded. Singer also...
expressed scepticism of two other correlational statistical systems in use, the Delphi system of surveys of opinions of experts and man-machine mathematical simulation models, although he was open to the use of formal models, such as those used in game theory, which were useful for clarifying hypotheses and concepts, critical for correlational studies, but otherwise of little predictive value.

The result was a series of papers, including Wallace's results of the Correlates of War project, outlining the slowly changing properties of a system as a whole over a long period of time - that is, the broad gauge changes in the international environment which could be correlated with increased tension and violence among states. Related to this was an early warning indicator on the whole system level developed by Siverson and King. Four other papers offered correlations based on attributes of the states themselves using analytic and regression analyses that have become standard for such correlation studies. One index of indicators used a combination of geographical, social and economic factors. Another developed a composite index for predicting whether states would become nuclear powers. A third, developed by Ted Gurr, developed an index of internal conflict based on economic and political variables. Dewitt developed a set of indicators for 'breakpoints' at which conflicts shift strength and direction. Finally, in addition to the papers on the system as a whole and on the attributes of a single state, a third set of papers focused on the behaviour of those states, such as in the foreign policy statements of senior policy makers, or on the perceptions of external threats and actions.

Since Singer and Wallace published their pioneer study, there have been a proliferation of data bases and correlation analyses (the latter exemplified best by the Breecher/Wildenfeld works) in the attempt to replace opinion and argument with calculation, but it is unclear whether any significant work has been done on falsification of the generalizations based on past correlation studies.

Singer's paper (as distinct from the introduction to his 1979 book) zeroed in on the operational indicators required in a data collection, monitoring and an EW system, rather than the conceptual clarity of the model itself and the implementation strategies. Singer felt that modern technology available in the field and communications provided the foundations for the collection of much greater and much higher quality data as well as better analytic tools to digest the data. Singer provides a meta-level set of guidelines for ascertaining these indicators and differentiating between ordinary and special variables or causes, either temporary, occasional, or episodic, and either local or general, while focusing on statistical data on disappearances to indicate the use of such variables. One of the items characteristic of this area of research and Early Warning is a much higher tolerance for false alarms given the high cost of the violations.
Singer points out the issues in data collection that have been the conclusions of other EW workshops, the need for a thesaurus of terms (such as the one HURIDOCS or the Refugee Thesaurus provides) though he speaks about definitions suggesting he may have a univocal discourse in mind. The necessity of assessing the degree of reliability of the data, methods of resolving conflicting data and for offsetting biases are critical.

Wilkenfeld used his data base to analyze the ethnopolitical dimensions of such conflicts and concluded that 42% of all international crises (defined in their previous work as an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions between adversaries introducing a high probability of military conflict) in the 1918-88 period had an ethnopolitical dimension with two different dimensions - secessionist (Sri Lanka) and irredentist crises, the attempt to regain territory regarded as part of its homeland. On this basis, presumably the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be regarded as a crisis with an ethnopolitical dimension. They also concluded that ethnopolitical crises had become predominant (56% of crises) in the multipolar world that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. Further, ethnopolitical crises were dominant in Africa (63% of such crises), were average in Europe (44%), below average in Asia (36%) and only 14% in the Americas. With respect to the threat dimension, the authors found that 61% of international crises with a territorial threat had an ethno-political dimension and 59% with a threat to existence had an ethno-political dimension and together accounted for 52% of all ethnopolitical crises. Ethnopolitical crises were more likely than their counterparts to exhibit high levels of violence - 53% of all crises involving serious violence and 57% of all crises involving full scale war. Further, 55% of all ethnopolitical crises ended with formal agreements compared to 35% for non-ethnic crises, but there was less satisfaction with the outcome (83% of the crises in which all parties were dissatisfied were ethnic in origin.)

As interesting as the extrapolations were, there were a number of problems with the results. First, they were based on a definition of ethnic conflict which was highly restrictive. For example, conflicts in Guatemala have a very important ethnic dimension in relation to the indigenous people of the area, but this would not emerge because a) ethnic conflicts are defined as those with secessionist or territorial acquisitive dimensions, and, related to a, b) the data base is a collection of inter-state conflicts, which avoids most conflicts which are intra-state. These two factors alone would suggest that the vast majority of the conflicts are ethnopolitical in any expanded sense of the term since the author's own data already indicate that the incidents of ethnopolitical crises increase in a multipolar world.

Further, it is difficult to tell what can be extrapolated from the data with respect to anticipating conflicts rather than whether violence and war will be more likely with ethnopolitical crises or
formal agreements will be more likely a requirement to end such conflicts. Similarly, the statistical correlations seem irrelevant to determining the types and timing of appropriate intervention strategies. Nevertheless, with all these caveats, the statistical correlations seemed to verify many of our general apprehensions, and this study was only the first beginning in using their large data base for such purposes.

Wallerstein’s paper focused on three traditional types of situations. The first was on shifts in the international system and the global rules of the game that impact on how conflicts are dealt with, such as a shift from real politics of self-interested state players to ones which incorporate the interests of a much larger group of players in the determination of state policy. If we are currently undergoing another major shift in those norms now, then it is difficult to ascertain this critical domain of both early warning and its use when we are undergoing the change. The second and third dealt with the Breecher/Wilkenfeld work on inter-state conflict and on the escalation of protracted armed conflicts. Ethnic conflicts fell within his fourth category of latent, dormant or new conflicts, using Ted Gurr’s work, though I found the description for this covering category misleading. (This might have been clarified had Wallerstein been able to stay.) Wallerstein also provides a list of the possible international actors (the UN, states, NGOs, academics) who might be involved in operationalizing a EW system.

PIOOM has, by contrast, a direct interest in ascertaining the root causes of human rights violations and discovering facilitating and inhibiting factors to effect the frequency and intensity of human rights abuses. The project is focused on the cultural, social, economic, and political conditions that can be correlated with human rights abuses with a view to detecting indicators which can signal impending violations of human rights. PIOOM is at the stage of writing research proposals to develop such a system, though they already have a number of data bases on human rights violations and political violence critical in developing such an early warning system. In the development of their model, they deemed that regression correlation models are useful for mean values, but would not be accurate enough for a single country, and, contrary to Singer and Wallace, they have a higher regard for inter-subjective models, such as the Delphi method, especially when supplemented by using long and short-term data collected by PIOOM.

In Helen Fein’s 1993 published paper, she concluded that the largest number of genocides since 1945 have been reactive or retributive rather than ideological. An excluded ethnoclass begins to regard the government of the dominant ethnoclass as illegitimate and rebels, which, in turn, provokes elites to use genocide and massacre. The success of such genocides is also dependent on the absence of internal social controls or external interventions, such as sanctions. Fein believes that rational choice theoretical models
are overstated, since many of these slaughters are not premeditated (though many rational choice models do not require premeditation or even conscious thought - see William Dray on Rational Explanation in History) but she wants to incorporate assumptions about the rationality of the actors in her models for mitigating such conflicts. The key factors seem to be ethnopolitical exclusion and the absence of internal and external controls to mitigate the (inevitable?) conflict that ensues from such exclusion. In her other paper, Fein outlined a GEM (good-enough model) for anticipating genocides in the contemporary world focusing on the breakdown of the state, the absence of democratic checks and/or adequate human rights protection mechanisms, the analysis of ethnic hierarchies and the current state of the political economy, the perceptions of the excluded minority, and the interventionist tools available.

The rest of the correlational studies and articles came from the plethora of work of the Maryland group (Davies, Harff and Gurr). Whereas Gurr and Harff have focused on publicly accessible historical data banks to ascertain minorities at risk in the past, and to develop a model to ascertain the most relevant variables, Davies focused on GEDS (the Global Event Data System, a near-real-time data on the stream of daily actions and reactions through which crises and conflicts might arise.) The Minorities project provided a number of contextual variables (political and economic inequalities, past and present discrimination and repression, grievances over lost autonomy, regime insecurity, group cohesion, international support, democratic norms and institutions while GEDS is focused on what Gurr and Harff call the accelerators, the events which precipitate conflicts or crises by aggravating (or moderating) the variables. It has been used also to update various other data banks - Azur's COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank) and WEIS, the World Event Interaction Survey, which is restricted largely to state actors, while providing a great expansion in the narrative detail and greater analytic capacity.

Harff's own work focused on humanitarian crises which she was at pains to see were not subsumed under communal, or regional or ideological conflicts for that matter. As Harff wrote in her paper, "not all massive human rights violations result from (or, I would add, in) open communal conflict. Harff distinguishes between genocide (where the victims are generally defined communally - note, genocide seems to be used when there is victimization based on a group's communal characteristics without respect to the character of that victimization, but I may have misunderstood Harff) and politicide (where the victims are political opponents). Her variables were divided into international background conditions, including political upheaval (such as changes in borders or the formation of new states), multipolarity correlated with increased instability and increasing ethnic and political fragmentation, and the absence of humanitarian interventions. The first two - political upheaval and increasing ethnic and political
fragmentation - seemed to be two sides to the same coin following the end of the Cold War and seem to hark back to the Wilkenfeld/Breecher study that ethnopolitical crises have increased in a multipolar world. [One question might be whether the variable of humanitarian international intervention of various kinds could be correlated with those situations where there is political and ethnic fragmentation but no extensive humanitarian crises, or whether some other variable, such as one or more of the background internal variables which follow, might be connected with the absence of such a crisis.]

In addition to international background conditions, Harff includes internal background conditions (the salience of group identities, the degree of group satisfaction, the history of the ruling elite’s reliance on coercive power, and the duration and length of democratic norms). In addition to the two types of background conditions, Harff adds intervening variables (an exclusionist ideology by the ruling elite, the fragmentation of that elite, the role of charismatic leadership, and the degree of economic hardship resulting from differential treatment) and three types of accelerators: accelerators applicable to both genocides and politicides (external interventions or supports for the elite or the dissidents, the number of clashes between the regime and targeted group, an increase in restrictive policies); and those specific to either politicide (the size and cohesion of the opposition, the occurrences of violent opposition by kindred groups in neighbouring states, and the degree of aggressive posturing) or genocide (the rate of increase in frequency and severity of life integrity violations).

I must say that I found Harff’s categories confusing. The short time available during the meeting to read, understand and query the papers meant that I was unable to obtain clarification during the workshop, but there seemed to be a compression between the variables themselves and the ways of measuring those variables (frequency, severity, size, cohesion). Further, a clash between a regime and a targeted group would be evidence of genocide rather than an accelerator of genocide, and an increased frequency of such clashes would enable one to measure whether the genocide was accelerating but is not itself an accelerator or a catalyst, but I might have not understood the categories, or they may have been too compressed in the format of brief presentations characteristic of the workshop. Harff’s research planned to focus on four comparative case studies - the treatment of the Kurds in Iraq versus those in Turkey, the treatment of the Palestinians in Lebanon versus those in Israel [in this case, Harff noted that both groups are Muslims, when only there is a significant percentage of Christians - larger in Israel - in both states, and that ratio might be a significant variable] and the treatment of Albanian and Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia/Serbia, and East Timorese in Indonesia and Moros in the Philippines. All of these cases appeared to be ones of potential genocide, that is, of repression of a communal group rather than a
political opposition, so it would appear to be a study of genocides, given the definition of genocide used. Secondly, the first two studies included the same group and the treatment of the same group by two different states, whereas the third study was the treatment of two different communities by the same state and the fourth study was a comparison of the treatment of two different minorities by two different but relatively proximate states. It was not clear whether this selection of case studies in this pattern was germane to the study.

Harff's historical study (with Ted Gurr) of 60 communal and political cases of victimization since 1945 (in comparison to the 90 cases Ted Gurr studied that were victims of systematic repression and discrimination in the late eighties) tried to explain why states victimize groups. [There was no attention paid to why a correlation study, however insightful, and even if predictive, was not regarded as properly an explanation by many philosophers of social science and science (cf. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation), but that is a side issue for the account, but not the status of the method.] The Harff/Gurr paper focused on deliberate state actions (rather than cases of group repression and victimization resulting from state permissiveness or the absence of adequate state protective mechanisms).

Ted Gurr provided four papers written on his own. One, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," had been previously published in International Political Science Review (1993). It analyzed the data on 227 communal groups to test a model explaining how and why those groups mobilize to promote and defend their collective interests when their cultural identity and historical autonomy as well as their interests were at risk. The strongest determinant of the magnitude of communal protest was the group's prior political mobilization, but this factor becomes less significant once the campaign is underway. Key factors also included the presence of legitimate grievances (economic, political and social) - the degree of mobilization directly correlating with the degree of disadvantage suffered - and the contagion factor from events in neighbouring countries and globally which help to explain why groups mobilize in the first place. The mobilization becomes one of protest and then rebellion depending on the use of state power and the built-in ability of any democratic institutions to respond to the grievances and permit institutional change to take place. Simply put, protests characterize democracy while rebellion characterize the path taken in nondemocratic states. Nondemocracies tend to respond to communal protests by increasing the degree of control.

Another paper described the Minorities at Risk project and the categories used - the background characteristics, the group category codes, the intergroup codes for differentials, the types of grievances and conflicts, and the regional listings. A third
depicted how the model might be used and tested as a basis for risk assessment of communal conflict. Harff, for example, uses the MAR database and format for her project with its background conditions, intervening conditions and accelerators. Presumably, by monitoring the accelerators the degree of risk of a protest being converted into a rebellion can be assessed. Finally, Gurr’s fourth paper provided a proposal for a coordinated approach to research which would be both interdisciplinary and globally-oriented to enable the research community to enhance the capacity of anticipating peace-threatening crises.

It is clear that the workshop was dominated by correlational theorists (IIA above). The deductive theorists referred to by Rodolfo Stavenhagen - biosociologists who connect conflict with genetic inheritances (Didier Bigo [below] provides the example of Konrad Lorenz’s work on instinctive aggression as an example), ecological theorists who connect conflict with a group’s need to find an ecological niche in a crowded world, social bonding theorists who explicate the mechanisms of cultural reproduction through the process of socialization, education and the internalization of values, and semiotic theorists who explain cultural reproduction through the use of language and signs and signals - all attempt to subsume the correlations that may be discovered within a higher theory which will explicate why such mechanisms are employed to preserve group identity. All of the above deductive theorists are collectivists in that the theory of explanation is to be found in the characteristics of the group. There are other deductivists who would reduce communal conflicts to matters of individual interests. Gurr’s correlations might be able to test such a reductionist model. On the other hand, the correlates used might beg the question and be precisely the ones that would reinforce a self-interest model to explicate communal conflict.

Other theoretical models are less positivist and derive from the tradition which traces back to Kant - rational choice theory as typed by Rodolfo Stavenhagen - and the presence of differential communal norms as Herder had once described as the core factor in communal differences and, hence, conflict. (IIA above) Rational choice theory looks at the ends, the norms or values of the individual, the perceptions of reality of the individual and his or her anticipations of the result of any action. Communal conflicts are, thus, the result of a significant number of members of a community calculating and transmitting information until the grounds for their grievances were removed. Collectivists invert the rational choice model and place the major emphasis on the collective shared values inculcated into a group.

In the workshop, there were no papers presented rooted in rational choice theory and only one paper which could be perceived as being rooted in communal choice theory (IIA above) in which the historical, social and institutional norms provide the theoretical
basis for explaining the correlations observed by Ted Gurr. However, Martin Heisler's paper on "Normative Caveats in the Pursuit of Secure Rights: the Context of History, Development and International Relations" argued that the location of a society, its culture, institutions and norms within an historical developing international context was the key critical factor and not simply the norms themselves. Thus, the theoretical explanatory model was a dynamic one entailing a basic trajectory of genetic development and change for any society (IVB above). Further, theorists assist in fostering such conflict when they fail to recognize the dynamics of change and, instead, reify the communal group in the very process of studying communal conflict through what Heisler calls ethnic nominalism. Thus, inequalities - social, political, economic - or the attempts to redress such inequalities, are not explanatory factors, but the concomitants of the attempt of individuals to delegitimize a group. Protest and rebellions are but the means of a political elite to legitimize that group, but, in the process, identities may be homogenized and frozen since militarization favours reification. Unfortunately, Heisler did not provide a genetic development model of society. In fact, at the end of the paper a prescriptive recommendation for basic human rights as universal norms suggested that societies who base their actions on a respect for human rights in fact occupied the highest niche on the social normative ladder, thereby deprecating other societies as occupying lower stages of development.

Much to my surprise, two of the papers presented at the symposium reflected phenomenological perspectives (IIIA above). Rodney Tomlinson, a Professor of International relations at the US Naval Academy, in his paper, "Early Warning of Communal Conflicts," cast his model within systems theory and designated the background variables (of Ted Gurr's model) as environmental factors and the accelerators as intervening variables, but expressed concern on the lack of a feedback element in all the correlation models. In his World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) survey monitoring international behaviour, the concern was not in differentiating protest and revolution reactions as two simplistic dichotomies, but in monitoring the signals which indicated the willingness of either party to cooperate or engage in conflict - evaluative signals (the example was given of the signals given off by China and the United States en route to the path leading up to the Nixon mission), the potency of any signal or the energy invested in the alteration, the style utilized by the respective parties and the complexity of the conflict. The interaction of these four factors provided useful clues of the behaviour alternatives likely to drive an interaction sequence so that this time-series device builds in a feedback loop that allows a learning curve to develop between events.

While Tomlinson focused on feedback loops that allowed the different perceptions of various parties of one another to be monitored at the same time as their behaviour also altered in response to these different perceptions, Didier Bigo was more
concerned with a feedback loop into the observer’s consciousness rather than the consciousness of one of the actors. Didier Bigo edits the journal *Culture and Conflict* and directs the Polemos database at the Institut d’Études Politiques of the Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris which codes episodes of victimization on minority individuals and ethnic groups using global news sources. In his paper, "Is there a good use of data banks to think the relationship between conflict and human rights violation?" Didier commented on the antipathy of French social science to mathematical correlational models. On the other hand, Didier was very French in refusing to reify a group in the very process of undertaking the analysis, but considered that each group was a construct with its own genesis and historical trajectory, and is in fact most definitively constructed in a conflictual relationship. Further, Didier did not confine himself to behaviour analysis but also focused on symbols, including in that symbolic interaction the role academics play in fostering certain signals rather than others. Further, unlike the correlation models presented by Fein, Harff and Gurr, Didier proposed a third frame, that is, the introduction of a third party in whose eyes the conflicting parties are seeking legitimation. The third party may pose as a mediator or as indifferent, but in either case, the behaviour of the third party influences the trajectory of a conflict. Finally, Didier insisted on breaking down the radical dichotomy between the domestic and the international spheres arguing that there was an interaction between the process of socialization in both a diaspora and a homeland and the dynamics of mobilization and interaction. Basically, Didier introduced a cautionary note in linking human rights violations and conflict lest we ignore those breaches of human rights which do not appear because the rights violations are not or cannot be recorded and monitored and, in fact, are the most productive for the oppressor (the logic of silence and propaganda). He also cautioned against well intentioned acts which in fact exacerbate conflicts and the abuse of human rights. Essentially, Didier was concerned that a feedback loop be connected to the foundations of creating the constructs we purport to analyze and building them into any model, including not only the construction of the group, the data available for analysis, the role of the purported mediator and the definitions and constructs - such as of violence - used by the analyst.

Rodolfo’s survey of the variety of approaches to ethnic conflict also included the deconstructivists (IIIA). He omitted those who like Ian Jarvie belong to a Popperian school of analysis so that Jarvie’s study of the Cargo Cults explicated their conflict with the dominant culture in terms of their incorporation of events ‘created’ by the dominant culture within their historically constructed worldview.

Perhaps the most complex model offered to the symposium was proffered by William Zartman, Jacob Blaustein Professor of
International Organization and Conflict Resolution and Director of African Studies at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University who focused on the dynamics of an evolving conflict and its interaction with processes of mediation in intervention in order to assess the most appropriate points and methods of intervening given the stage at which the conflict had developed. Zartman offered what I would term an operational model of Didier's critical self-reflections, but I have not yet been able to ascertain how comprehensive and inclusive it was. Certainly it was a three party model which also seemed to be founded on a stability theory of a state attempting to establish equilibrium with the dynamic forces of a civil society and which, if I am correct in my interpretation, would slot this model into a IVB niche above as one version of a complex dialectical stage model of the dynamics of communal interaction and intervention in which the stages of the process are clearly designated as well as the effects on those stages of any interventions.

Another attempt, parallel to this report itself, to provide a self-reflective overview of approaches, but with a more positive outcome of providing guidelines to constructors of models was available in Hayward Alker's paper on "Emancipatory Empiricism: Toward the Renewal of Empirical Peace research," previously published in the book edited by Peter Wallensteen, Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges (1988).

Finally, there were a number of papers presented (including my own) on the difficulties and problems of the interaction of research in affecting policy. An overview of those papers must await a separate report as must a report on the proposals to increase cooperation in the efforts to develop an early warning model concerned with humanitarian crises.
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