[These lecture notes were prepared by H.S. Harris for his 1995/1996 Hegel course presented at Glendon College, York University. This was the last Hegel course taught by him before his retirement in the spring of 1996. The last meeting of the course fell on his 70th birthday, 13 April 1996, the Feast of St. Martin. The lecture notes are enriched with references to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and contemporary issues. These lecture notes were not written for publication and their user must recognize that they are at most a first draft. The numerical references in the left margin of the text of these notes provide the page number of the English translation used. The *course description* from the college philosophy department calendar (also in the graduate calendars for both York University and the University of Toronto) follows:

**History of Philosophy – Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion** Tuesdays 19:00 - 21:30. The seminar will be devoted to the study of all surviving texts concerned with Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of religion. Particular attention will be given to the Lectures of 1827, but the evolution of Hegel’s thought from 1821 to 1831 will be studied (especially in the sphere of ‘Determinate Religion’). All members will present a discussion paper on some aspect of Hegel’s theory in its full evolution; and every registered student will write a final essay on an appropriate topic chosen in consultation with the course director. The place of religious experience in Hegel’s system, and the transition from religion to philosophy will be the focus of special concern. Required Text: G. W. F. Hegel: *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* : One Volume Edition: The Lectures of 1827, edited by P. C. Hodgson (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1988).]
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Hegel lectured four times on the topic at Berlin in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. His manuscript for 1821 survives. For 1824 and 1827 several sets of student transcripts exist. For 1831 we have only a summary made from someone else's notes by D.F. Strauss. Thus 1827 is the most developed version (and probably the most accurately preserved).

**Introduction of 1827**

**Topic I: Relation of Philosophy of Religion to philosophy as a whole**

*Philosophy as a whole* has three great divisions:

– Logic;
– Philosophy of Nature; [briefly discuss in class]
– Philosophy of Spirit.

Philosophy of Religion is the material climax of Philosophy of Spirit, which again has three divisions:

– Subjective Spirit (Anthropology, Phenomenology, Psychology);
– Objective Spirit (Theory of Society);
– Absolute Spirit.

Objective Spirit runs out into the "World-History" of finite communities.
Absolute Spirit has three great ranges of cognitive activity – which should ideally be "transhistorical" and "transcultural" in some sense:
- Art;
- Religion;
- Philosophy.

But "Philosophy" as a cognitive activity of finite spirit in relation with the Absolute Spirit is identical with the History of Philosophy. Pure Philosophy as the actual knowledge of Spirit is identical with Logic. "Logic" is the identical thought of finite and absolute Spirit. As thinking it belongs to finite spirit (and what makes the finite spirit "infinite" or "absolute" is quite simply what makes the thought logical, i.e., the fact that we all recognize it as "true," "objective" or "necessary."

So it is in Religion that the Absolute is known as an object of experience. Religion has the same content as "Philosophy" (i.e. as the conceptual theory of Logic, Nature and Spirit), but a non-conceptual form (or at least an inadequate conceptual form). We can recognize the most primitive difference of form at once by considering that religious experience involves a conscious encounter with Being(s) or Object(s) other than the conscious subject. But since the objective content is finally the same, the religious experience must finally become identical with philosophical thinking. Then the difference will only be that religious experience comes to the beginning of philosophy, the simple undeveloped shape of the real Concept. The self-development of this Concept is Philosophy; and Religion must reach the consciousness of the conceptual identity of the thinking community with its "God" before Hegelian philosophy can come to birth at all.

What is "religion"?

Can we accept this systematic doctrine as a proper definition of what religion is? Since Hegel (at least) must arrive at this interpretation of what his religion is, before he can do philosophy his way, the answer would be a vicious circle. He would have to assume that his" religion was "true religion." In his "Preface" he appears to do this (75). But that is only a prudential concession. If you want to talk about "Religion" to an educated audience of the religious, you must treat their religion with respect (i.e. you must admit that it is "true," or somewhere well on the road to truth).
Talking to an audience which includes adherents of different religions, and some who have no religion at all, he might have begun quite differently (as I am doing). We can't avoid circularity altogether, because how we identify "religion" in our own society must have an important influence on what we recognize as "religion" in other societies. But we must be as commonsensically neutral as we can, and use a minimal criterion of what qualifies as "religious."

That is what Hegel actually does. Even Hume (generally regarded as a model agnostic) uses the standard of "true religion" to dismiss some heathen practices as irreligious (Natural History of Religion); but Hegel begins "Determinate Religion" with "Magic" (223-35). He apologizes twice for treating fetish-worship, rain-dances, weather-control rites etc. as "religion," but he does it. His information is sketchy, and he has to lump different cultures together. The Eskimo, tribal Africa, and Shamanism in Central Asia are all dealt with in a few pages. Chinese religion and the Tao appear as the most developed form of magical religion.

Can we distinguish between "magic" and "religion"? Perhaps (if we use the systematic definition) we can. One does not try to control "the Absolute." The consciousness of finitude (and especially of mortality) is fundamental in religious experience. Thus Hegel underlines the importance of fear (225, 6 up) – while carefully insisting that it is not the proper "fear of God." Also, like the travellers he depends on, he is interested in beliefs about the dead. This is the first step of development in magical cult (231 at 441).

But we ought not to distinguish fear, awe and reverence, from the gaining of personal power as the distinction of proper religion from "black magic" (228, 9 up). This might be what the standard of "true religion" suggests. But we should notice rather that all of the characteristics of magic that Hegel picks out are prominent features of ordinary cult in the religion of his society. Magicians claim "direct power over nature" (227 at 437); and (as Kant – safely dead – argued) "prayer is a kind of magic" (228m). (The origin of reverence for relics is here: 231b-232.)

Magic is the work of specially trained experts. Thus the magicians become a privileged (and authoritative) social class – like the Catholic priesthood, but not like Luther's image of the
Christian "minister"). The authority that comes from direct power over nature is a denial and violation of proper human freedom (228, 1) – even though it also asserts the freedom of the spirit. Nature must be confronted as a free world – otherwise we cannot respect one another as free (227, 6 up). So we must not look for direct (magical) power; and we must not think of ourselves as in the power of higher "spirits."

The magical point of view is at the level of Sense-Certainty (229 at 439); and from the side of Self-Consciousness "desire is the governing factor"; i.e. Religion begins with wish-fulfilment.

Notice that Hegel does not think of magicians as a "caste," but as agents and companions of the chief (who is a monarch). The Chinese Empire is the ultimate development of this view.

Religion is originally the fear of that which has power over us; and the wish to have and exercise power ourselves.

What is our (fully developed) Religion?

The question with which Hegel's own Introduction starts is "What is the elementary concept of our religion?" The philosophy of religion deals with our cognitive experience of "God." Religion is "the relation of human consciousness to God" (76, 8) – and "God" is "the absolutely final end ... the absolutely free being." Notice how positive the definition is. Religious experience is bliss; and this is said to be universally true ("for all peoples and persons"). (We know that this means "all civilized people," and we can already guess that it means "civilized Europeans and North American colonists.") Religious bliss is radiant in life now" even if it is officially postponed (77, 1). Religion is properly a state of reconciliation with life.

The linking of philosophy with religion is appropriate again now (in spite of their earlier antipathy). Philosophy is an ally against the secularist Enlightenment (implicit in 81, note 13). But the theologians of immediate feeling do not think so, because the Enlightened philosophy knew
only a "natural religion of Reason" (82, 4). Yet the theology of immediate feeling is just as empty of content. The name of Christ is appealed to, but he is just like Socrates. The Trinity dogma was not in primitive Christianity, but it is the key content of our Christianity. To the piety of feeling, the dogmas of the Creed are just part of the history of our religion.

Hegel himself believes very strongly in "the witness of the Spirit" as the foundation of religious experience. But the true witness comes not just in reading a life-story but in meditating on what the community has believed in its historical development. So he can say that "present witnessing" is the foundation of his philosophy.

Philosophy only declares what everyone believes and acts on.

The theologians of feeling say God is unknowable. We only know that he is.

Philosophy agrees that it is our relation with God that is the object of religious cognition. But that means that God is known in his community – which is where he is "Spirit." [Df. from Phen.]. The comprehensive unity of the community is "God." "God" cannot be considered or treated as a singular determinate Being because then (as separate like us from the world he "knows") he would be "finite." Since our consciousness is a "relationship", "God" is necessarily a relationship. When we understand this we see why we don't need to be polemical, or even to make a response to those who mount polemics against us as "philosophers."

The appeal to feeling and immediate knowledge began in the Reformation. But then, what was necessary was to dismantle the hierarchy of social authority that had grown up round religion. The appeal to "immediate knowledge" was an assertion of the rational democracy (and equality) of the Spirit. What has happened now – through the critical attack of the Enlightenment – is that "immediate knowledge" has lost contact with the substance of religious tradition. Rational spiritual democracy has become subjective anarchy. But the social substance (our way of life) fordes its way to our attention. So "immediate knowledge" produces an ethical religion (93 at 77). But then the arguments start; and there are more and more plausibly defensible positions. But "theology" ought to be concerned with the framework of conceptual unity that unites us. (In the immediate awareness of religion this consciousness shows up as anti-intellectualism: "the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life."
The Spirit must interpret the biblical record for our time, and our post-1789 society. We must reinterpret the great central dogmas of our Christian faith; we are not scientific observers of "religious phenomena" but students of how our own religion informs our life (that is why it is important that when we observe "magic" which we regard as "primitive" and long-gone for us, we focus on phenomena that are analogously present in our religion.)

We don't need to distrust our "immediate knowledge," and to begin with a critique of our cognitive faculties. That only empties our religious consciousness, and makes us "dog-Christians." "God" is "absolute Reason" (df).

So we move towards him as we achieve rational comprehension of our world; and that is itself the required "critique of Reason."

Kant was right that we cannot use the categories of finite experience in the way that we use them to organize our finite world. "God" is not a "fact" in a world of "supersensible facts." In philosophical logic, oppositions like finite/infinite, subject/object, are like N and S in the magnet. They form a system like Sun and Planets.

Our only enemy is the view that God is the object of feeling that cannot become discursive cognition. Once it is admitted that immediate knowledge can be mediated we can go to work confidently.

Survey of Topic

We must operate methodically; and philosophical method is the developmental method of Logic. We begin therefore with:

1. The Concept (which moves through the series of its)
2. Determinate Forms (to reach finally its)
3. Absolute Form (109).

Since all the material for the movement from the determinate forms to the Absolute form comes from experience; and it is only in the Absolute form that the Concept can be clearly recognized, we have to be living in the absolute form before we can do philosophy of religion this way (or any
systematic philosophy at all – Hegel's method rests on the intuitive experience that Reason now knows itself perfectly; the only evidence for this is the experiential proof that it can explicate itself as a self-completing "logical" system. Hegel is in his own way a child of the Enlightenment.*

I. The Concept

This is the logical structure of the relation of the human community to God, that is instantiated in all forms of religious community. (1) Religion is "spirit realizing itself in consciousness" (this means "absolute spirit." Finite spirit "realizes itself" in all social institutions, e.g. in marriage, the courts, etc.). God comes into consciousness. Religious consciousness is (2) the awareness of the difference between the finite self and God. I can and should rise to him. But the thinking in which I do that is different from our reflective thinking as we formulate the Concept. Religious thinking is for everyone; ours is not. (Now that "religion" is a partisan factor in our politics it is doubtful that this is true. We must all so dome basic "philosophy of religion" all the time! Even in Hegel's educated world this was true. But in his world there were the non-political peasants.)

(3) The achievement of union with God. This is the cultus. All religious practice expresses and maintains devotion; and the height of devotion is mystical union (fn 77 – 1831 – is very good on the expressive range of the cultus).

* We almost all are, and we fall into 3 classes:
a) The Hegelian children, who think that we do know finally ("absolutely") what Reason and Truth are in theory.
b) The Fichtean-Marxist children, who know finally ("absolutely") what practical Reason requires: (what kind of human community ought to exist)
c) The Kantian-Sceptical children who think that Reason can never formulate itself finally (and hence that it is really a transcendental illusion).
There are "refugees" from the Enlightenment who want to go back to Plato (w. L. Strauss) or back beyond Plato (w. Heidegger). But the genuine cases are few, because the fashion sweeps them along unless they take a firm hold on their way of salvation; and category (c) is the present fashion.
II. Determinate Religions

The logical development of the Concept is all spread out in human space; and the evolution of the "absolute" religion is in time. There is the bud, the fruit, the seed, the growing plant, and maturity. The logic of development provides the structural plan of "history of religion."

III. Absolute Religion

The first thing to note is that this religion is universal. It is "Christianity" – but it is the Christianity of the "Church Universal." What its relation with the determinate religious communities logically is (i.e. ideally should be) is not clear. As a determinate community it is not "absolute." It is only "absolute" as the conceptual knowledge of the "religious relation"; and that it can only be when it has made the whole journey of development consciously. But to make the whole journey consciously is to remember it all.

The Concept of Religion

A. The Concept of God

After 12 pages on how to begin, Hegel begins as he must, with the Concept of God. Beginning is a problem, because in "Science" everything must be proved. But the beginning is necessarily an assumption. We don't have to worry much about this (though what Hegelian "proof" means in general is a problem) because we are not at the absolute beginning. Our concept of Religion is the result of the "System so far."

(And even what "proof" means becomes evident "in the progression itself."

The beginning concept is a definition of what "God" means to the (truly) religious mind. "God" is the truth of all that is, and "Religion" is the knowledge of that truth. But this Concept is a project, rather than a result. The philosophy of religion fills in the blank form; and the filling in will
begin with travellers' reports of what the Eskimo, the African tribesmen and the Central Asian shamals believe about God, etc.

Absolute knowledge is a circle in which the final result shows itself to be identical with the original project.

Religious devotion is a real (existential) experience. But a "feeling" is "scientifically abstract." But we have to work out the Concept of God as fully as we can. The beginning – the formal definition we have already given – is a subjective thought. As a logical entity that would have to be realized as an individual thing of a particular sort. But the Concept of God is different; it always remains universal" and does not go out of itself into this otherness. We shall begin with what is properly called "natural religion." But God in Nature is not like the logical Idea going out of itself into a world of "things in space and time. God in Nature is the universal life of Nature; and it is our comprehension of that life that grows and gets richer, and never loses anything.

God is never "subjective." Even when we do not comprehend him, he is the "self-enclosed" (perfectly complete and self-sufficient) object that we are trying to comprehend. When God becomes something other than the life of Nature (e.g. in Judaism) it is because Nature ceases to count as real being altogether.

God is the unity of all that is: the one Substance of Being and Thinking that Spinoza took him for.

This is "pantheism" according to its Christian critics. But to understand Spinoza is the first step towards the philosophical concept of God.

[All of this is out of place here:

God as Spirit is the "Substance that is not Substance, just as much Subject." "Spirit" is "the I that is We, and the We that is I." The "We" is fairly simple to unpack. It is the community of all who can say "I" from the first rational god-recognizing language-users to the last human atheists (whether they be the "last men" of Nietzsche, of Kojève, or of H.G. Wells' *Time Machine* world). But what is this "I"? The Athenians thought they were "Athena's" people, and the Hellenes were the people of Zeus. But Athena and Zeus were not proper subjects who could say "I." The people could say "Yes" and "No." The Athenians said No to Socrates who was one of them, and the Hellenes said No (most of them) to Xerxes, the Great King. But they only imagined Athena saying I; they heard
Socrates say it, and the jury-members each thought it for themselves as they voted Yes or No. Only *once* (in our record) did *God* say I (out loud). He said it (no doubt) silently in the mental hearing of Moses "I am." But he said it out loud once (and for always) when an eccentric Rabbi (trained outside the ordinary schools certainly) faced a crowd and almost got himself stoned for saying "Behold I say unto you, before Abraham was, I am." Perhaps that strange man never actually said that strange thing (or, more intimately, "He who hath seen me, has seen the Father"). It does not matter in the least. Everyone who can read or hear the story, can grasp that what is claimed is the identity of God with the mortal finite self that can say "I"; and it is not hard to realize that a mortal self who does say that is identifyin herself with *all I-sayers*; for it is not the self enclosed in a mortal envelope of flesh, who is "the Father." So if the story is just another of the "visions" of the poetic genius who *saw* the Heavenly Jerusalem etc., that makes no difference to its "truth." The identity of "I" and "We" is this identity of all "I-sayers" who can understand one another. They are also all different, and their mutual understanding is only partial; but it is "the Father" who makes the living process of their understanding (and the identification of this misunderstanding) possible.

So even when we arrive at the developed *concept* of One Divine Substance we have a long way to go; and the mere *language* God" and "Spirit" does not change the simple *thought*: The All is One. *Separation* of Infinite and Finite through doctrine of "Creation" does not change the fact that "what is" must be "in God."

But the experience of "the All" is "in me." So we say that "God" is "in us" as "finite spirits"; and it is only in *thought* that "the All" can be comprehended (not "feeling"). We are "religious" because unlike other living things, we can *think*. Just by *thinking* of the total unity of all things, we are not yet "religious" because religion is the *relating* of ourselves to this unity – and we *cannot* relate ourselves to the One (say of Parmenides).

This divine unity is active and alive. It is not a mere "soil" for growth; but it is a "womb" (for organic formation). Does this metaphor-change help? It emphasizes that the Concept does not change (as from soil to vegetation) but *unfolds*; and the "womb" metaphor must be taken as Christ used it; for what "emerges" from the womb of Substance must *return* to it.

Hegel is preparing to claim that his philosophy is *not* "pantheism"; but all this about "God as Substance" illuminates the sense in which "comprehension" of God *must* be pantheistic" in his view.
His own thought began from the "Identity-Philosophy" of Schelling (which is romantic Spinozism); and although he transformed the identity of Mind and Nature into a trinity of Logic, Nature and Spirit, the doctrine of the circular return means that "The Absolute is the All." The Infinite logically needs its finite self-alienation, "God without the world is not God." To the question "Is the Hegelian System pantheism?" we ought to say "Yes it is, but not any previously familiar kind of pantheism." Trading on C.F. Krause's coinage "Panentheism" is just cheating, because what God is over and above "the All" that is "in him" is simply "his" freedom (identical with our thoughtful freedom). But the right answer is that the whole question is misguided, because it only arises in the conceptual context of "God as Substance." (That is what Hegel is saying here – 122 at 273).

Of course, the Identity Philosophy is not "pantheism" in the sense of Thales' "all things are full of Gods." It is conceptually "Spinzism" or imaginatively the Hindu romanticism of the Bhagavad Gita. God is not "the World" but "the life of the World" (as in – say – Herakleitos). If we turn this into a philosophical concept we have an Eleatic One, and everything plural simply disappears. This (says Hegel) is the mess Spinoza is in. (But that's another story, and a long one! Hegel agrees with Novalis that Spinoza is not atheist, but "God-intoxicated"; and in this drunkenness, he loses the world. But Spinoza wrote an Ethics to show us how to live in the world wisely; so although there may be something logically odd about the implicit acceptance of finite bounds by the thinker, there is certainly something inadequate about this evaluation of his position.)

It is precisely the ethical consequences of Spinoza's theology that upset his critics. For (they say) to his God, the difference between good and evil is no difference. But, regardless of how things are for God, it is obvious that this is the crucially important difference for Spinoza. So they can't say this about his position, but only that this is what he ought to admit. Notice the conclusion Hegel wants to draw. "The distinction only exists if God is also evil. But at the level of Eleatic Substance – the affirmative "What is" – we can't say this. Evil is "what is not."

The ethical principle of Stoicism is "Love God." That is "good." So in the relation of humanity with God there is good and evil. (Hegel seems to waver about what he wants to say, because Spinoza is a side issue. He wants to defend him; but it is much more important to
distinguish *substantial* unity (Parmenides, Spinoza) from *spiritual* unity (Hegel). Note that "the whole of philosophy is nothing but a study [or system] of unity." Philosophy of religion is "a succession of unities." [The water example – 128 – doesn't help much unless we see that there are different *kinds* – i.e. levels – of "mixture"; and many types of divine – i.e. substantial – unity?]

**B. The Knowledge of God**

With the *conscious* distinction between finite spirit and absolute Spirit, "religion" begins. From God's side this distinction is "the Creation." God manifests himself by creating us, for whom he *is* manifest. But we shall see later that this is how God *is* for himself. God the Father *is* the Son (or human being *generally*). God *must* manifest himself because (as Plato said) he is not *jealous* (notice the deliberate siding with Athens against Jerusalem).

The interpolation from 1831 is polemical. On the one hand, the Protestant subjectivity of "feeling shows up badly against Medieval Catholic theology. On the other hand the claim that there is a rational *feeling* of the true God, faces the existence of very debased cults on one side and scientific atheism (that calls Christianity a reactionary political conspiracy) on the other.

Starting from the human side we find that as thinking beings we *must* think the unity of the whole, i.e. God. We are *conscious* of this unity in a succession of ways as follows.

1. **Immediate Knowledge**

   This is *logically* the most primitive. (Historically *representation* is *earlier*.) (The whole series is a set of psychological experiences of finite spirit.)

   Immediate knowledge of God is the *certainty that he is* (not just in my mind, but independent of it – cf. Anselm). (Obviously this certainty is implicitly presupposed in any *naïve* representation.)

   The standard of "certainty" is that "I am"; and by that standard "this other is likewise."
But is what I am certain of "true"? What is "certain" is "not yet true." The "certainty" must be mediated. Certainly that God is, must become the true cognition of what he is. We leave this aside for the moment.

The form of religious certainty is faith. (The implicit contrast is that the form of "truth" is "knowledge." But "faith" is already a way of knowing, so the contrast is partly misleading.) Even faith is not immediate certainty; I have to know what it is that I believe in; faith is more than a "sensible certainty"; but it is not yet knowledge of truth because one cannot show the necessity of what one "knows." "Sense-certainty" is like this.

On the other hand, I know Pythagoras' theorem. Jacobi saw this point. "My body," he said, is an object of faith (or the paper I am writing on). But the object of "faith" is usually God. We experience his presence, but we do not know why he is there (just as we do not know why we are embodied. Our Cartesian certainty is supposedly independent of that). In the ordinary view, God is the object of faith, precisely because he is not the object of any sensory intuition. [But in "natural religion" this is not true.]

We produce "grounds" for our faith, "reasons" for believing. But the paradigm of "grounds" here is inadequate. I believe in God, because my mother told me; and then I read the Bible etc. This sort of testimony only becomes absolute certainty as "the witness of the Spirit." So our problem is "What can the spirit bear witness to?"

My spirit can testify that "this content conforms to my nature, and satisfies my needs." But this is only the discovery of "what I truly desire." By this standard, religious faith is "wish-fulfilment"; and the "true religion" will depend on the education of my wishes into the desire for what I truly need. The scientist who holds that truth must be independent of anyones wishes will say that therefore we ought to be "agnostics" (and do without "God" – or for that matter without the denial of him). But we can turn this around, and say "Truth is what every rational person desires; to know objectively is what we need. So we need to educate our desires and wishes, just in order to "know objectively." It is a mistake to think that the "objective knowledge" that is independent of any and every desire (and therefore indifferently available to any and every desire) is enough. The
"truth" is properly the knowledge that we know how to use – the knowledge that "knows itself" adequately, our own adequate self-knowledge. That is why we have to be concerned with "Religion" as our final philosophical concern. The history of religion is the story of what humanity has objectively (i.e. communally) desired; in its logical order it shows us what we can (at our best, or "at the best") desire.

There is an antithesis of "faith" with "thought" (or of "certainty" with "truth") that this involvement of "self" enables us to understand. But we must deal with that later. For the moment we must consider "feeling" and "representation."

2. Feeling

"I feel this" indicates that this is "my own," it is me (privately or personally). But what is felt is objectively describable (in the case of a cognitive feeling). We may be committed to some "object" (purpose) but have no "feeling" about it; or we may be passionately committed (our feelings may be consciously engaged).

We are supposed to be passionate about God, or the "good cause" etc. But this is only a "just" requirement in the sense that we must act upon these principles (or beliefs). Passionate feelings, like sense-awareness, simply are what they are.

It is active dispositions that count.

God (the right, etc.) is like "hardness" – felt as objective. I am in it, as much as it is in me. "Consciousness" objectifies "feelings" (or "ejects the content out of feeling"). But the theory of immediate knowledge takes the subjective feeling as the source of the content.

Is this reliable (for "God," for "right" etc.)? Note 66 gives an argument against this [but perhaps not used in the lecture hall – Misc. P.] Here Hegel simply concedes that this view might be right – and argues that it does not get us anywhere. Some have these feelings, some don't. If it is there it is no more than a seed.

What matters is what it grows into; and that has to be something objective which can be evaluated as a public object and general possession. If have the freedom to do as I choose; but rational
freedom is doing what we recognize that we ought to do (cf. the problem of Luther at Worms). The immediate feeling must interpret itself as a thought; and the thought belongs to us all to evaluate.

Nothing is true or right, just because I feel it. There would be no good/evil or right/wrong if that were the end of the matter. (Hegel goes on and on, citing the self-justified criminal, and the Bible, etc., because Schleiermacher is preaching this gospel of feeling.)

For true religion, the feelings must be "purified." How do we know what that is? We must have a "representation" of it.

3. Representation

[Read the editor's note 75 – but something clearer is needed.]

How can we represent "God"? Michelangelo represents him as an old man with a longish white beard. He is here in his created world; his finger touches Adam's. But he is "the Creator" – and that puts him beyond this created world. So the "representation" itself stimulates the thought that goes beyond it, and inverts it. He can't be like that, and he can't be "here" in that way. Philosophy has "the same content" because it thinks out what the representation means.

It turns the sensible representation into a "concept" (an interpretation that is all thought and has no sensible element).

Notice that Hegel identifies "the true" as "the World-Spirit"; and adds at once that "the true" is what is for the World-Spirit (cf. note 78). It is philosophical knowledge that is the World-Spirit. In paring away Vorstellung philosophy seems to be "removing the content" – and is accused of destroying it. For the World-Spirit they are identical.

Vorstellung involves images; and we know that the image-content is symbolic.

Thus "only begotten Son" is an image indicating something analogous with the socio-biological relation. Prometheus and Pandora, the Tree of Knowledge are not literal persons and things.

Even true histories are religious symbols. Nativity, Passion, Crucifixion of Jesus are taken to be historic; but it signifies a divine ===. Personal histories reveal the singular spirit, and the history of a state reveals that of "the people."
The truth of history is what can be represented; but the universal powers revealed thus, cannot be represented in it. *That* needs free images. Thus Athena is not represented in the history of Athens; but the Athenians have her image in her house (the Parthenon).

"God" as a being on one side, who "creates the world" on the other, is a *Vorstellung*. This is a "nonsensible configuration." (We call it a *thought*, but it is not a proper one. We cannot *image* either the "world" or "creation" – so we can't image the God who does it. (Notice the difference from the creation of Adam – and Blake's divine geometer is not "creating" properly, but doing something analogous.)

God's "wisdom," "goodness," etc. are representations, because only the human world gives them a context for meaning by analogy. When they are taken properly as concepts, they flow into one another.

(n. 87 uses the example of *Providence*. But start from "Creation" [*precedes* in W₂] which is not a contingent *choice* of God, but a moment of his concept. Similarly his "Providence" is the "concept of history." Far from being "inscrutable" it is precisely what we can understand if we "draw the movements of history together" and look for the logic in it.)

Which should we start with – feeling of representation? The right answer is that we can't and don't start with *either*, because both are too loose.

But empirically (as students) we must start with representation because it is *objective*; and our *feelings* are a critical control upon our judgment of the representations. The feeling of the sacred is no guide by itself. Egyptians venerated the bull, Hindus the cow, etc. (But we have to *respect* these feelings; and in experience our own religious feelings are formed [*gebildet*] through representations.)

4. **Thought**

What is properly *objective* – above (or behind) the level of historic events – is *thought*. This turns "faith" into "conviction" by supplying "reasons" or "grounds."
(a) **Relationship of Thought and Representation**: Representation takes over all types of natural and human spiritual contents, and applies them to God. Thinking unites different "determinations" (each of which is represented separately) into one concept. E.g. "blue" – we have a model which shows the 'blue' range; but we take it up into a theory of color (specifically Goethe's which is suitably dialectical). (Notice that "the sky" is the paradigm again.) "Blue" is a certain kind of unity of light and darkness.

A large number of *shades* of blue" can be discriminated and represented. They are different; and in that sense each "contradicts" the others – its real presence is inconsistent with theirs. But they can be arrayed as a continuum – and we can think of the shades as *places* on that continuum. The trouble with "God" is that we never run out of "determinations" that must be added. God has a bad infinity of names. God's *mercy* and his *justice* are mutually "contradictory," but we must think them together as different aspects of him. His infinite *power* can only be thought as negating all finite forms; but his "wisdom" has to be conceived as the affirming of an infinite array of finite forms.

But the aim of thinking is to know why something is *necessary*. The answer has the form: "*because of x and y.*" (So *why* must this contradictory concept be posited as *real*? We can see why this section ends with the "proofs."

(b) **Relation of Immediate and Mediated Knowledge**: Everything in (a) is on the side of representation (and thought is *mediation*). But "God is." So we must reconsider the immediate certainty of faith.

We shall see in the end that speculative comprehension runs in a circle from immediate awareness through mediation, and back to mediated immediacy (or known certainty). "As certainly as I am, so certainly God is too" (at fn 96 which adds an important clarification).

Here we must consider the matter empirically. It is a *fact* that I have a representation of God in which I have *faith*. I know that I do not comprehend him (and that it would be wrong to try!). Is this *immediate* knowledge? No! There is no "immediate" knowledge. What we take to be "immediate" we *make* to be so by wiping out of consideration the mediating factors.
Thus, in Logic (Pure Being turns into Nothing; and the truth of them both is Becoming). My knowledge of God is in and through his relation to me – however I represent it. (Typically I have "come to be" through him.)

Knowing is mediation. If I know then I know something; my subjective awareness is related to an object (at 306). Immediate knowledge is a concept that abolishes itself. Moreover, we know that we have been taught our religion (whatever it is). Jacobi didn't suddenly wake up with the sense of being in God's presence. He believes God has revealed himself. But this is an event that he has learned about.

But all this mediation is external, says the believer. It merely made it possible for me to have the experience. Religion can't be put into me. This is the element of truth in the immediacy doctrine. Hegel too is a Platonist. My speculative knowledge is my own thought and conviction. We "recollect" it.

(But not from another life – that is a myth. The "witness of the Spirit" is within us. It is an immediate experience that contains much mediation. Incidentally, this is how experience works. What we learn with much mediating effort becomes "immediate knowledge."

(c) Religious knowledge as elevation to God: Religious knowledge as "immediate" is a motion towards God. This is a mediation in which the finite consciousness passes over to the "true Infinite." The motion is possible, because in making it, the finite consciousness discovers its own "true Infinity." It only is validly possible to "pass over" to the Infinite because we discover logically that the true Infinite is the self-comprehension of the finite. Until we reach that point, the "arguments" for the "existence of God" – the logical descriptions of the "passing over" – remain visibly and demonstrably invalid.

The mediating passage can be described two ways: the religious community – an actual finite "we" or each "I" – passes over to "God" (the Infinite, He who is). Or in more abstract terms, the thought of the Absolute (in the mind of me, the philosopher) passes over to actuality. (The first passage is "described" in cosmological and teleological proofs; the second in the Ontological Proof).
The first passage is from "finite" being to "infinite being." The finitude of the "line" simply disappears; the second is from subjective "infinity" to objective. (On the Dasein of God see P.H.'s note, which I cannot improve on.)

The proofs are mediations because they set up the relation of me as finite with the "object" (God). I am essentially related to this "other"; my "being" is mediated by it. The relation is the third term of a "syllogism"; and since the knowledge of God is a "syllogism," it is natural for there to be "proofs of God's existence." There is me; and there is "God"; and God is the ground of my being (and of my world's being). This is "religion," and it changes the simple concept of God as the "absolute other."

But since it is religious experience itself that is this syllogism, it is no wonder that those for whom religion has become immediate experience object to the proofs (or those who are beyond religious experience). The "proofs" distort the experience. But we shall put them together into a logical sequence in order to remove the distortion, and restore the proofs to their proper place of honour. (This does not mean that we can make them "valid" for those who are "beyond Religion"; but we can show the religious how they articulate religious experience. This represents the difference between Hegel's "immediate knowledge" of the testimony of the Spirit, and the "immediate knowledge" (of the Franciscan tradition and Jacobi). It does not affect the paradox that the "proofs" are valid only for those who do not need them – because they are "religious" already. The "proofs" are ways of meditating upon one's "faith."

Both Dasein and Existenz are expressions for finite being; and therefore they do not properly apply to "God." It is the "being" (Sein) of God that can be shown; and the Zusammenthang is not an external one, like that between "roof" and "walls" of a house.

It is logical like the internal relation of "triangle" and "two right angles." We "prove" the latter by "construction."

The "proofs" are like "constructions" in relation to the experience of God. So they are felt to be peculiarly inappropriate. The existence of God is not a "consequence" of the existence of the finite world. But simply to say this is to give too much importance to our own formal reasoning. The "cosmological" (and teleological) proof expresses the experience of humanity generally. It
describes the *self-evaluation* of finite spirit. We come to understand our finite world as an endless chain of finite necessity (infinite chain of "causes"). The finite links are all *contingent*.

But there must be a *reason* behind these contingencies.

The "argument" is a "rational wish" – and it takes off from the existence of "finite teleology" – there are organisms that need an organized environment – a *cosmos*. (Kant can complain all he likes, says Hegel. This is a necessity of Reason. But note how far Kant is justified in our world vie The "organisms" have evolved, say we, out of a pre-organic state of the world. "Purpose" itself has grown up. It all began with a "Big Bang" billions of years ago. Why? the orthodox answer is that we have no means of saying. But speculative theorizing about "before the Bang" continues. Would an answer be of any *religious* value? I cannot see that it would, but who am I to decide that?!

The "proofs" will not produce religious conviction. We have to produce our own elevation. We have to bring the religious spirit to them. *Logically*, it is not surprising that no conviction is produced. For the "pure Being" that is demonstrated for God is identical with "Nothing" – but Hegel does not get to this yet. In "devotion" it is the bad infinite of finitude (Becoming) that becomes "Nothing."

But the "affirmative non-finite which thus arises is the Infinite" – i.e. God. (This way of getting to God cannot result in the Creator who is completely independent of the world. It is a logical "negation of the negation" – cf. the variant reading in n. 126.)

The "negation" of the finite is internal to it. Everything that comes to be must perish. (But "coming-to-be and perishing" do not perish. So that experience is of ambiguous import.) This self-negation of the finite is "affirmative." The endless repetition is a "bad infinity."

Everything flows, as Herakleitos said; but as a result, nothing changes and everything remains the same. This is the "eternal return" that Nietzsche wanted us to contemplate. He saw only meaninglessness in it, and so do I. Hegel thinks that it drives us forward to the "true Infinite" – and it is the meaning of *this* transition (or the sense in which it is logically legitimate) that is crucially important. As far as I can see, it is transition away from the meaninglessness of the physical world, and back into our own thinking (where *meaning is*). So the only God who matters to us is the "infinity" that arises from *that* transition. This is *not* the transition made by faith – which *leaps* out
of the "bad Infinite" and postulates a real "good Infinite." That leap is "unconscious." Interpreting it legitimately (as my transition) is "philosophy."

The proofs are bad (invalid) because they purport to validate the transition of faith. But Hegel thinks that his syllogism is valid. We begin with the finite, which contradicts (and so sublates) itself; and so we arrive at the Infinite as the truth of the self-sublating finite. For this transition to happen, the self-sublation has to be an act of thought. The things that sublate themselves by simply dying (or perishing) are merely replaced by other things just like themselves. The invalidity of a simple relinquishing of "the world" in thought in favor of "God," reveals itself gradually as it sublates itself. We work out the fact that God needs the world, and that he is necessarily incarnate in us.

At the beginning of the faith-transition there is simply the uneasy awareness that the supposed logical transition is invalid. We can't get from the finite (even when its bad infinity is grasped – or rather just because its bad infinity is grasped) to the Infinite. It is our Reason (which grasps the "bad Infinite") that is "truly Infinite." (Compare P. Hodgson's note 132 which sums up the transition.)

[The discussion of the "proofs" is passed over for the present. It would have to be treated if this is written up; and it may be treated at the end of the course.]

C. The Cultus

Religion as cognitive elevation to God is theoretical. The practical side – divine service – is the Cultus.

Whereas the devoted knowledge of God is self-forgetfulness, the service of God is self-expression. I have to bring about my own union with God. In cognition I can become (and can recognize that I am) infinite. In action, I must limit and define myself.

I accept the condition of finitude; and in religious action it is the Infinite that is over against me. My project is to know God in myself, and myself in God (not just "to know God" – see the addition in n. 173). I am to "enjoy God" (332) – join "myself in God" with "myself."
The presupposition in the cultus is that the reconciliation of humanity with God is consummated an und für sich. The activity of cultus is to bring me, the single worshipper, into the whole. [The universal community] for which it is already accomplished is the foundation of religious consciousness.

This is the "substance" of religion [cf. 195, n. 180]. God is alpha and omega. In him I have my actual being. The purpose is not to elicit faith – because to be in the community is to have faith already.** The cultus is the mystic union.

The "mystical" is just what transcends the understanding.

Devotion is the first form of cultus: immersion in God (in prayer).

Representation is removed, because the worshipper symbolically negates finitude. Second comes external ceremonies: the sacraments. This is where sacrifice fits in (and even human life may be sacrificed). Greek participatory sacrifice makes a holy act of our negating what we consume. [The reference of human sacrifice is made because it is the human "body and blood" of God that is enjoyed in the Christian sacrifice rite.]

Third is the giving of oneself to God: the sacrament of penance. One can make this self-sacrifice ceremonially (on Sunday). Or one can devote one's whole life to God ("thorough elaboration"). Properly ethical life is the real fulfilment of this complete gift of self to God. (In this aspect, philosophy is a form of cultus, since it aims to know God, and to do so "in his works."

Giving one's private ideas up for the truth is a form of divine service. [n. 180. There is no religious education in the sense that we describe this experience to children in terms they can understand, so that they can have the experience. We are born into the communal faith – and the poets bring it to consciousness for us first. This note should be returned to at the end since we are not in this situation now – and the breakdown of it is described here.]

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* 192 n. 175. This presupposition applies to Greek religion too Ä at least Ä cf. W² (1831).
** 192 n. 175. W² explains dramatically that trying to induce religiosity is "outside religion."
Determinate Religion (1827)

Introduction

The "Determinate" religions are those in which the "concept" of Religion (as the cognitive "elevation" of the finite self to the Absolute – or "Divine" – point of view) is not fully developed, but has reached some earlier stage at which it has stopped (and stabilized). The assumption involved here, is that human social consciousness develops through a series of logically necessary stages. The primitive "state of Nature" is stage A – where all human culture starts. From there Stage B is the only advance possible; there is no compulsive necessity to advance at all; but Stage B when it is spontaneously discovered is attractive; it has advantages, it solves problems or opens up possibilities and opportunities that were not perceivable in the earlier stage. Then when Stage B is reached, the further Stage C gradually becomes consciously available. Stage C has apparent attractions or advantages over Stage B. The real social existence of the community is evolving all the time. That is where the new problems come from, for which the older religious thought system had no answer; and some new vistas of opportunity are opened up by new forms of social interaction and communication.

The practical assumption of Hegel's approach is that no community can go straight from Stage A to Stage C spontaneously. This is directly implied by the hypothesis that the motion of development is a logical one. But in its practical application it is only a working hypothesis which we use to discover (and test) what is "logical" (or "necessary") in cultural development. It is obviously subject to variation under historical pressures of different kinds. Thus a culture in Stage A (being immediately at home in the natural environment) may come into direct contact with one that is at Stage C. What will happen then must depend on what their real relations are. The Stage C culture may absorb the Stage A one in an imperial fashion; and Stage A may continue for its members in an appropriately modified form; but also the Stage A culture might move directly to Stage C (if the opportunity was there, because the socio-political relation was not one of subjection). This would not invalidate the methodical assumption of a "logic" of development.
The discovery of a general logic of development, has to depend on the intuitively intelligent observation of cultures that have evolved autonomously (in relative isolation from one another). We can be confident about an A-B-C sequence if we find it verified in cultures that have evolved over a long period independently. But the project of "intuitively intelligent observation" presupposes the achievement of an absolute (no longer "determinate") point of view on the part of the observer. To be "intuitively intelligent" means to be "neutrally sympathetic." The observer must want to identify with the "determinate" point of view that (s)he is observing, to understand it sympathetically from inside. It must not be (practically) "judged" from another point of view but only theoretically characterized (as fairly as possible) from its own. This means that a logic of cultural development can only be discovered from the standpoint of a community that has reached the level of cognitive "elevation to the Absolute." There has to be the readiness to "forgive" all cultural differences, the will to simply understand them, and to identify the reasons and causes for their existence. That is why we have to begin with the "Concept of Religion" as it can be observed in our own community (after we have shown that our own community has indeed reached the "absolute standpoint").

But if we are at that standpoint ourselves, then we can discover the "logic" of development most easily in the evolution of our own "particular" culture (to the point where it becomes "absolute"). This is – in the main – what Hegel does. It is what he did first (in the Phenomenology); and it is evident that the history of philosophy in the culture that has reached the point of religious "absolution" is enormously influential – at least – in his formulation of philosophical logic as such. It does not matter (at least it is not crucial) if the identical pattern of development is not discoverable in the history of other living cultures. [Note that Hegel treats all "determinate" religions as essentially past phenomena – 205, 3-6.] If they have not formulated the social ideal of maximal self-realization (or self-expression) on the part of all individuals equally in a universal brother-sisterhood, then perhaps we can discover why that is; and if we discover that we shall have the end of the "clue" that leads to an explanation of why their logical development is aberrant. That (and that alone) is what gives a measure of validity to Hegel's placement of living religions, that do not come into the sequence of the historical development of Christianity. (We shall see later why – in our post-Hegelian perspective – these religious traditions need to be reexamined (and who must do the relevant reexamination). We shall find that the "logical" structure always remains (and must remain) a hypothetical construct; and that is a good thing. For logic is
(quite generally) a most excellent servant, and a quite intolerable master. (This is a "religious" judgment; and the crucial point about religious knowledge is that it is all "immediate"; "logic" has not yet got a grip on it. If the religion is not yet "absolute" it is a worse tyrant than philosophical "logic" – e.g. for Salman Rushdie. But the "absolute religion" gives exactly the right standpoint for logical inquiry.)

With this said as a preamble we can approach Hegel's text. It is comforting to know that Hegel used Griesheim's transcript of 1824 in writing up his 1827 lectures (201, n. 2). (He used his own ms. of 1821 in preparing for 1824). It is also good from our point of view that no full transcript of 1831 has survived. Hence the retrievable fragments of 1831 are printed in our footnotes; and the first of them is a fuller version of Hegel's opening (201, n. 3): The determinate religions are "species" of the "genus" religion. The genus itself is perfectly realized or expressed in one of its species. This is a necessary truth in the philosophy of spirit, because we cannot know the genus at all unless it has developed to maturity in history. There is no evolution in our knowledge of nature. So in nature we have to discover the order of species empirically by external reflection and comparison. (There might not be a perfect species in this case; what is more interesting is that even in the evolutionary perspective, the latest species is not necessarily the best developed. There are degenerative forms – blind "cave" adaptations for example. It is the relation of the particular species to the total ecological balance that we would have to use to decide what the high point of development is – and even that is subject to criticism.)

Spiritual classification must begin from the experience of the absolute realized. From this point of view we can see that (for the sake of self-recognition, which is the condition of self-consciousness, the Concept of Spirit must divide. (There must be two religions at least, if there is ever to be an "absolute" religion – and when there is an "absolute" religion, it won't be a religion anymore because it is not an opposite. The initial condition is bound to be a great plurality of religious communities – and the struggle for mastery has to be a defining aspect of them all.)

In the "true" religion the division (and struggle for mastery) is overcome. The "otherness" ceases to be "absolute," and the Self-Concept knows itself. When God ceases to be an "absolute other," there are no "absolute others"; so logically the climax is determined: "God" must become
simply the *absolute* (or self-knowing) aspect of the human philosophical community. *All* religions "qualify" as "religions" because this climax is *implicit* in them. (Was the Nazi gospel a religion? Yes, for in the particular case of the self-conscious Nazi leaders this climax was fully *explicit*. But it was shockingly degenerate – like blind cave-species in Nature – because it returned to the primitive *tribal* view that the tribe just over the hill was a *different kind of living animal* ("Plant and Animal" in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Since this is a visible *falling away* from what German culture had achieved before 1933 (or better "before 1914") the sense in which this "religion" "does not correspond to the Concept" needs no underlining. Hegel can say with cheerful confidence that "Africans and Asiatics are not free"; the Nazi Party was "not free" in the same moral sense (or perhaps even a stronger one). The important thing is that the "freedom" referred to is *absolute* respect for conscience." It has taken "thousands of years" to get to that (but it took fewer than twenty to fall away).

In Hegel's world the "determinate" religions are the "gentile religions" (the religions of the non-Christian "heathens"). Thanks to the Christian take-over of the Bible, the Jews themselves have become one of the "Gentile" nations. The translators neutralize this as well as they can by rendering "heathen" as "ethnic." There *must* logically be at least two important stages of "determinate" religious consciousness – a "natural" stage of *implicit* identity with God, and a "conscious" stage of division between the "finite" and the "Infinite." But in Hegel's presentation – even at its most mature – the important division is between "us" – the self-conscious Christians – and "them" – the unselfconscious "heathen." There are those who have heard the Gospel, and those who have not – and the former are clearly destined to *take charge* of those who have not. (The "Crusades" failed; but that was historically necessary and valuable. *Now* – in Hegel's 1827 – the Crusading movement is implicitly justified once more – and Hitler was the new Napoleon who has made a cultural "Restoration" at the level of *World* Culture evidently necessary in the world since 1945.)

What is crucial in studying "determinate" religion is to understand that the Concept of "God" and that of "ourselves" (the human community) define themselves together. Thus I know that if I study *Buddhism* I shall find in Prince Siddharta, who became Gautama, a human concept as well developed as any that I can find in the Gospels. But I cannot accept Hermann Hesse (or Mr.
Christmas Humphries) as my authority in Buddhism. My Buddhism must be the "Infinite Consciousness" of the community that sees its God in it; and what it finds in its God must match what it finds in itself. Thus the "Religion" that I take as "absolute" is not that of the Crusades (for instance), but that of the Prussian Restoration (in which the "constitution" of Napoleon's France and the watchwords of 1789 are just below the surface).

In the communities that have a "natural" religion, there is no consciousness of individual freedom. This is necessary because they know themselves as part of the Nature whose living "Spirit" is their God. (This is the proper sense of "natural religion." The religion of the "natural light of Reason" – if it is truly a religious experience at all) is an aspect of the coming to birth of the absolute religion. Hegel does not say that – and the demonstration of it must wait until we get to the absolute religion. For the moment we must follow the explanation given in 1831 (203, n. 5). The "natural" consciousness is sensually desirous. The "breach with nature" comes when the spiritual desires are clearly distinguished from the sensible ones. (Hegel speaks according to the "learned prejudice" of his time – à la Hume – when he says that "religion first originates" here. To us "enlightened" souls it is the elevation out of natural religion that is interesting – and at least conditionally "respectable." When "God" is sundered from Nature we become "certain" of our definition for the first time. So "Religion" becomes a distinctly identifiable Concept then. But the logical division of the stages of religious consciousness teaches us to recognize

A) Natural Religion (Unity of Spirit and Nature) as the first. This is Magic.

B) The cleavage of Consciousness. Here Nature loses all value and significance: Humanity itself is "null," says Hegel. But that is a partisan verdict in which logic is given too much weight. What is true is that in the "cloven" situation there is necessarily a practical inconsistency. Three Oriental Religions give the "stages" here: Chinese Religion, Hinduism, Buddhism/Lamaism.

(3) The Transition out of this Substantial conception of God involves three Religions likewise: The Religion of the Good (Zoroaster and Judaism); The Religion of Anguish (Phoenicia) and The Religion of Ferment (Egypt). (This is an attempt to get back as near as possible to 1807; and it is, alas, largely a pipe-dream.)
1827 is more consistently empirical – the brief critique of the "religion of Reason" enforces this, because the mistake of that view is that "nature" properly means immediacy, and hence (in spiritual contexts) experience. "Reason" is primitively negative (cf. "Insight" in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*). Thus it comes to consciousness in the "cloven" stage. Fully developed Reason is the double negative that reinstates positive Content – in plain language (as Hegel says) is "Spirit according to its Concept." This is fairly plain (and positive) for us because we know what the "Concept" is that is to be the standard. Here Reason and Experience agree – so the "true" religion is one that has been revealed historically; but the rational interpretation of it has evolved to the stage of "self-recognition" ("Revelation" is "the witness of the Spirit" – so one must have what "the religion of Reason" is in one's consciousness before one has the witnessing experience properly, e.g. Pascal. But "the Religion of Reason" is on the verge of atheism – as Pascal saw.)

A) 1827 already has *Nature-Religion* clearly defined (for 1831).

B) But the elevation of Spirit above Nature is differently analysed. First there is elevation to the Infinite in negative thought (Insight). This gives us the Judaic experience. On the other side spiritual individuality can be idealized. Thus we get the Greek Gods (as ideal selves). These two movements are opposites – and both are logically necessary. So they must be brought together and reconciled.

The immediate reconciliation (implicit in both Judaic and Greek experience) is the identification of a human community's purpose with the absolute purpose of God. This happens in Roman Religion; and Rome brings both the Jews and the Greeks into Imperial Subjection. We have a living human God in the Emperor – and Hegel comments that any finite human (spiritual) purpose could be just as rational as "God's." But this experience of the arbitrariness of fate" is what was needed to prepare for the gospel of a non-arbitrary union of human individuality with God.

All of the great Eastern religions are analysed only as "natural religion." This is because the societies of which they are ideal reflections are substantial – i.e., stable, not developing through the movement of the principle of individual freedom. The movement of "elevation" has the two
opposite sides represented by the Jews and the Greeks (regarded as simply coordinates, not in
development sequence). Hegel admits that even in the "natural" religions, there is an important
movement of "spiritual elevation," but he insists that it is radically inconsistent (like Spinoza's
Ethics). [Of course, from the point of view of those who want to realize the universal community of
the Absolute Religion, the resolution of the "contradiction" in the different Oriental traditions is
vitally important. But it is not a question simply of "logic" but of the reformation of society.] The
"second stage" is "consistent" only in the sense that the evolution of Christianity has resolved the
logical conflict – otherwise, each side is consistent with itself, but they are radically opposed
(inconsistent) yet each needs the other.

Roman religion is not the proper resolution of this conflict, but only the necessary transition
to "absolute religion" in which it is resolved.

A: Immediate Religion (Natural Religion)

Introduction:

a) The Original Condition

In 1824 Hegel began with his discussion of the "cosmological proof." This provides the
concept of Natural Religion. So it is like the concept of Religion generally, prefixed to the
discussion of the "determinate Religions." That general concept is just what the determinate
religions do not have. (Their consciousness of religion is essentially practical [self-guiding; whereas according to its concept Religion is theoretical [cognitive].) Similarly, a logical proof that
God is implied by Nature is what no "naturally religious" worshipper can even imagine. The
"proof" is the result of natural religion as it survives in the Absolute Religion (and we are probably
putting it in the best place by leaving it till the end).

Instead of the "proof," therefore, Hegel begins with a philosophical interpretation of the
Garden of Eden story. This is the "result" of Natural Religion, present in religious form (i.e., as a
Vorstellung) in the consciousness of the Absolute Religion. (Hegel is concerned only with the right interpretation of it for Lutheran Christians who are on the verge of the transition to philosophy. What a Rabbi – e.g. Fackenheim – might say about it is of no concern to us, and nothing Hegel says is meant to differ from or contradict any such Judaic interpretation. He is not arguing even against Augustine, say – whose view has an important place in the evolution of the interpretation he gives.)

According to our tradition, then, the original condition of humanity was ideal. God created us in his image, and we lived in direct communion with him. We had not asserted any independence. Hegel takes this as signifying "harmony with Nature." Natural man intuits "the inner being of Nature" (210 last). They had "absolute knowledge and true religion." Nature was not a complex of useful tools; it was simply continuous with their own nature. "Most religions," says Hegel (skipping over his own account of magic), "begin with a sojourn in Paradise."

This "intuition" is not yet divided in sense and intellect. It is intuition of the universal form of the sensible – not, we may infer, in the abstract shape of "pure space" and "pure time," but an aesthetic awareness of the concrete living whole. There is an effort of thought in this (and Hegel calls it "negative" of singularity but it is consciously positive, producing "the universal"). [For the paradigm case in his experience see Hölderlin's Hyperion – avoid Christian examples like those in n. 23.] It is certainly a mediated form of consciousness – but not consciously so. There is, however, a conscious effort of purification that is necessary.

Was there (could there possibly have been) an original state of innocence – a Golden Age? (There were always the pressures and emotions that obscure this consciousness.) The Vorstellung is logically foundational; i.e., it marks the beginning point to which we must return. What it indicates is that humanity is not a natural essence (like stone or plant – 213, 9) but the "instinct of Reason" – the faith that Nature is rational. In our tradition this is expressed as "God created the World," and the "instinct" says we must know God as other.

But was this ever a "state of being"? The fact that "Paradise" is now lost, shows that it is not "essential," because we can't lose our essence. The communion with God in Paradise is not therefore the truly human condition. But what is pictured is remembered, not lost; and this means that it is essential to us (as our destiny in the ideal future). Being "spirit" (not nature) we are an sich what is true (not für sich). The Concept is a self-realizing process. So the Vorstellung is essential
but not historically "true." We need it because we must make ourselves (213, n. 28 - 1831). "Spirit" is "to be for oneself, to be free."

"Innocence" is the absence of the good/evil division. "Paradise" is a zoo, with humans as the prize animal exhibit. There is no responsibility – so "innocence" = "savagery" or the dominance of natural desire.

For humans this is evil (as soon as they recognize it). This realization has given birth to the Vorstellung of "original sin"; but we are not evil by natural inheritance.

The story of the Fall contains profound truth. We must leave nature behind because we are spiritual freedom; this is how we come to know God.

Evil is just evil; but the knowledge of evil is the beginning of good. The story speaks as if we ought not to have acquired the "knowledge of good and evil." But we couldn't avoid it because freedom is our essence. We are "lords over the choice" but as rational we must learn not to so regard ourselves – we must give the "lordship" back to God.

We are not to be "Lords" like God (as the Serpent promised); but we are to share the knowledge with God (as God himself said). Paradisal innocence is the ignorance of childhood. But we must "grow up."

That we primitively had knowledge is an absurd supposition. It takes Nachdenken to acquire knowledge of Nature. No actual scientific knowledge has been found in the "natural" cultures [wrong about China].

b) The Forms of Nature-Religion

Natural religion cognizes God directly in Nature. So it is aware of Nature and Spirit as an undivided unity. (But because Spirit is self-making this distorts the pure theoretical character of cognition.) It is not simply the worship of natural objects (for it projects our own spiritual freedom upon nature); and it is not Gnosticism (with its image of Adam Kadmon) which is much more developed. It takes humanity simply as found (or given); and "God" is a mysterious power (who could not have "Sons").
1. Magic: The natural man (or woman) can gain control of this power. (That is the "first hypothesis" of those who have listened to the Serpent, after expulsion from Eden.)

2. Self-Contained Being: The stance of Magic is defeated; and the human response is to retire into self, and concentrate on self-mastery.

3. Free Imagination: Complementing Self-Containment in this alienated phase is the imaginative enjoyment of Nature as free expression. Buddhism and Hinduism go together because of what Hegel calls "the identity of inner and outer."

3. Transition. Thus logically the third moment is the "transition into cleavage" – and again there are two complementary shapes: the Zoroastrian religion of Light as Manifest; and the Egyptian religion of subjectivity as hidden in the darkness.

In 1831 only "Magic" is viewed as immediate (or simply natural) religion. Everything beyond it becomes part of the movement of Spirit into separation from Nature. This is an improvement in philosophical justice because at least it leads to the analysis of the great Oriental Cultures as having "essence" and not just "states of Being." But the logical movement is unchanged. The immediate will accepts its powerlessness. But God is recognized only as power.

He is Substance, and Nature and Humanity are accidents. The initial position is properly called pantheism.

God is the "first Substantiality." We do not "posit" him; we only recognize him as an inscrutable power. "Elevation" towards God is self-annihilation.

First, in China, we have the recognition of a substantial objective foundation for our social life. The foundation is implicitly spiritual." God and Humanity are united in the single person of the Emperor.

In Hinduism, the Substance withdraws into an abstract intellectual realm. The intellect is ours (though, of course, we are not conscious of this – we do not recognize the "universal Ego"). But it is simply our perceptual consciousness of nature that is here intellectualized. We have images of the Trinity (and of the Incarnation). But all is seen at the same level of natural existence.
Buddhism/Lamaism pushes the Incarnation to the point of explicit consciousness. Thus the breach with Nature becomes conscious. God and Man becomes one through conscious effort. [This moment was actually considered as part of "Magic" in 1824.]

1. **The Religion of Magic**

   a) **The Concept**

   We should begin with the introductory paragraph of 1831. "Magic" is the immediate control of Nature (matter) by Spirit. This is not a matter of the Understanding with its universal categories. It is the most naïve shape of Self-Consciousness (in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* logically coeval with Sense-Certainty). Distinction of objective universal and subjective *Dasein* has not been made. Humanity knows no higher power than itself. [This is erroneous. Hegel is impressed by the general fear of the witch-doctor's power. But tribes set up their witch-doctor because they are afraid of the "spirits"; and there are kinds of control over the environment that they need – e.g. weather-control. How the dance is related to this, is ambiguous. But the tribe knows that it doesn't always work.]

   It is very difficult to enter into the mind of primitive culture. We cannot even be Greek pagans properly – and "savagery" is much further away. But we must assume that it is a severely practical frame of mind, practical-economic without consciousness of *morality*. Desire dominates and the will is "wild." There is "fear" but it is not "the fear of the Lord"; it is the fear of "chance." *Anything* can happen (or at least I don't know what can). "The Lord" is different because he has a definite will, and I know what it is (or at least, when I am violating it).

   I must be aware of my own "falsity" for that.

   In Magic I am "Spirit" (and Spirit has control over Nature) (n. 63). (That there is a *fear of Nature* was apparently granted in 1827).
As magician I go through special discipline, and I am doing something privileged. We all learn to use bits of nature as tools. Here we must respect Nature in order to achieve our ends. We develop skills by practice; and our respect is for Nature's freedom, like that which we know that we have ourselves.

Magic is direct power over Nature; and for the magician no one is free. [The magician herself is the highest power – but not free.] Even in the higher religions magic survives – e.g., as witchcraft. Prayer is (as Kant thought) a kind of magic in its ordinary use. But always we are asking God (as recognized supreme Lord) so the standpoint has been double-inverted.

Magic (like prayer) accepts the permanent order of nature, but manipulates (or asks for manipulation of) the contingent event-content: drought, rain, beasts, enemies.

b) The experience of Magic

Magic belongs to small (tribal) communities. We find it for example in the Eskimo, who control the weather, and attract the whales. (Capt. Ross reports no concept of afterlife). Reports of Mongol tribes are similar. Herodotos already knew of African tribal witch-doctors. They are not a distinct caste; but Hegel thinks that the tribal king is one of them. Magicians may be ill-treated if they cannot help.

Veneration of the dead is the first step in development. (The afterlife is especially the realm of Spirit in Hegel.) Sickness is caused by a dead spirit.

Bones of the dead are preserved and reverenced (as in Catholic cult). Skulls of dead enemies give power.

The sky is asked (and threatened) for rain. There are special rites for turning away the hostility of the dead (human sacrifice, Hegel and his sources assimilate cannibalism under religious rites).

The "natural" means of "elevation" are, humanly speaking, terrible.

Hegel cites the magic employed upon the dead (and the belief in ghosts) as evidence of the rational weakness and immaturity of the Negroes generally.
Humans do not die of natural causes, but by the magic of other humans (hence Hegel interprets magic as human omnipotence). The sick – or the king – are sometimes killed by their community for this reason. Everything human is (or should be) the work of human will. (But "the Devil" is generated by this psychological theory [in Egypt – so this bit is out of place here].)

The Negroes worship the divine power in fetish-form – as household god (Lares) – and change their God if their luck is bad. This is the beginning of the consciousness of a divine power "beyond" experience.

c) **Chinese Religion**

The Imperial Religion of China, as Hegel understands it, is the full political development of "Magic" as a religion. He depends on the great series of *Memoires* written by the Jesuit missionaries. in 1827 he incorporates references to the Dao (a very old Vorstellung adapted later in quite different ways by Confucius and Lao-Zi. Lao-Zi was slightly older than Confucius, but the classic Dao De Jing was probably not written down till later (Confucius and Lao-Zi 6th cent. B.C.; Dao De Jing, 3rd cent. – see 244, n. 115).

He recognizes the importance of Buddhism in China; but he *subsumes* it under the older Dao (and the Imperial Cult) rather than recognizing it as a "world-religion" (like Christianity or Islam). He puts the impersonal concept of "Heaven" at the centre of the picture; and "Heaven" is not just the power of nature, but a moral Providenced that dispenses justice. This is a "double inversion" of the primitive concept of "magic," in which the wish of the magician is the decisive or directing force. As Hegel says, "we seem to have entered a different and higher sphere" (above natural religion altogether). What shows us that this is not so is the divine significance of the Emperor.

Hegel misunderstands (or misrepresents) the controversy between the Jesuits and the other Catholic missionaries.
The Jesuits were willing to let their converts incorporate their traditional observances into the Christian frame; the other missions were more puritanical. Hegel follows a source that simplifies this into the question of whether "Heaven" was a proper name for "God the Father"; and the Franciscans are credited with the view that the Chinese "Heaven" is just "Nature" and not "Providence." Hegel has himself adopted the "Providence" view (for systematic reasons). But I think we should assume that he is a neutral observer as between Jesuits and Franciscans ["Capuchins" got into an by mistake – not necessarily Hegel's.]

In 1831 Chinese Religion becomes the "Religion of Measure." It is placed at the climax of the Logic of Being. In spiritual consciousness it marks the transition into the "Breach with Nature" (so both Jesuits and Franciscans are entitled to their opinion, but Franciscan opinion is safer – because the spiritual breach is made only by the Emperor (and his authorized agents). "What is" is known as the order of things ("Heaven"). The universal authority of the Emperor is still that of a "magician."

"Heaven is the physical-moral Zusammenhang as a whole" (indeterminate). The Emperor is "sovereign on earth." Religious and ethical law emanate from him. He even "rules Nature" (hence this is a religion of magic) because Nature is not yet clearly distinguished conceptually.

He is our only mediator with Heaven. We should not distinguish him from God (as even the believers in the "Divine Right of Kings" do in Hegel's world). We think of "Heaven" as "the Beyond" – but the Chinese "Beyond" is empty (just as ours will be when the Enlightenment has done its work). The souls of the dead belong to this world here and now (just as they ought to in our world). The Emperor rules them (as Dante knew the Pope does not). [n. 105. Misc. P.: The Emperor's authority over the dead shows that they are regarded as part of Nature, for which he is Magician. For us they belong to the realm of Spirit.]

The Dao is Measure or Reason: The Emperor's authority is an essential power beyond this level of simple Being. The laws of Dao can be thought of abstractly as a natural and a human order.

All the philosophy and science of the Chinese can be expounded under this category [without distinction between the natural and the human?]. The "measures" are simple categories: Being/Not
Being, One/Two, Yang/Yin.* There is a mystic numerology of fives – 4 corners and centre, five elements, colours, key notes, human relations (up to the Emperor at 3 and then down again).

One can retire from practical life for contemplation – but the "measures" must be observed in practice. If natural disaster strikes, the origin of it is ethical failure [this seems like superstition to us, but look how it now applies to us!].

The Emperor is Son of Heaven. "Heaven" is the Sky [hence the Franciscan complaint as Hegel understands them].

The Emperor ploughs a ceremonial field, of which the produce is for offerings to Heaven. He is ethically responsible for misfortune. Thus the whole of divine service becomes identical with ethics (as it does once more in Unitarianism and George Eliot).

The dead are ethical powers – but so are those who retire from the world (they become "self-contained"). But all are subject to the Emperor.

A change of dynasty is described in our records (1122 B.C. in a record that goes back to 2300 B.C.).

The old Emperor and Court were burned up in a fire. The new one promulgated two books – one containing laws hardly changed; and the other the new administrators by name – including the authorities of the dead (who were summoned to an assembly for the purpose).

The earlier nobility were included at both levels (n. 111). Political authority was cemented by this recognition and organization of the ancestors.

Defiance by the dead is not tolerated. The Emperor's word is law even over these venerated spirits; and the spirits govern the forces and divisions of Nature. The Emperor's deceased family becomes Imperial.

Only the followers of the Dao were excluded from this hierarchy. They were special because even as embodied here, they were Spirits. (It seems that they are their ancestors, so they don't have them. This is Hegel's recognition of Buddhism in China. The Buddhist is a self-contained "immortal.")

*See the I Ching but Hegel was probably not acquainted with it.
This "class devoted to the inner life" is an anticipation of a higher stage of development of the religious life. They are outside the State-religion. The next stage in the spiritual evolution of natural religion is this "self-knowing of self-consciousness as the highest." These Daoists are little Emperors on their own account. They aim at immortality, at being "pure sages."

They live for "pure thinking"; the full development of their religion comes later, in the work of Lao-Zi (who is a contemporary of Confucius and Pythagoras).

Confucius developed the ethical character of Chinese religion (not speculative like Lao-Zi). Dao is the Universal. Triad comes into play. 1 6 2 6 3; and 3 produces the Universe (as in Pythagoras). 1 is the "dark principle"; 2 is light; 3 is the "Spirit" (breath) that unites and establishes harmony.

n. 124 ["Dark and Light" are Hegelian improvements à la Zoroaster and Boehme, for "matter" and "aether" in his source.]

n. 125 One source was looking for the name of Jahweh in the Chinese record. J. Chi; Wei he found anyway – and Hegel adds the Hebrew and Gnostic equivalents.

247 He ignores the fact that his direct source is a sceptic about the Hebrew JHWH === was expressed in three Chinese characters – I suspect that he doesn't care, because it is "providentially appropriate" – cf. (H and S), LHP I, 124-35 (Werke 1832, 13, 444). Anyway it is not now accepted.

n. 127 This note gives a clearer account of how we must go from 1 to 3, but that is all short-form Hegelian logic, not religious symbolism, so I shan't waste time on it. ("God" is an empty word without 3 stages of logical evolution.)

At the level of religious symbolism we do find the triangle and three lines (Hegel's error! n. 128).

248 But the determinations remain abstract. Conscious spirit remains immediately singular. Lao-Zi is an incarnation of Buddha. The Dao is present (indifferently?) in dead spirits (such as Lao-Zi) and living priests. The Emperor is "the actuality of this [abstract] foundation." He does the actual ruling on behalf of "Heaven." (This "abstract foundation" is Reason – and to say that it is "abstract" means that there is no consciousness of self-realization in the human agent. With the development of concrete rationality there is the awareness of freedom (and choice?). At the stage of full development we have "Conscience." Conscience is the awareness that Reason is founded in
oneself. This is what is typical of the religious standpoint in its full development. There are "ethical principles and duties" in the Chinese religion (or in the Greek "Ethical Substance" – so it is right and proper that China should be moved up to the "rupture with Nature" level like the Greeks in 1831) but they are not the principles and duties recognized by this unique individual.

Hegel's information on Confucian morality was certainly deficient. But the judgment that there is "no inherent morality" in it is largely an *a priori* prejudice. No doubt the normal attitude to the environment was much infected by the fear of "spirits." Things in the world did have "power" (and this sort of thing would impress Western reporters). It is *this* that removes the natural world from the sphere of "Reason" and makes the Universe "abstract" (cf. n. 135, 1831). The magical power of the Shen *intervenes* between ordinary life and the laws and decrees of the Emperor. The whole system of social relations is thus rendered "irrational." (This is an "Enlightened" prejudice. Compare Voltaire's description of the Ancien Régime in which laws and customs varied in every region. Hegel wouldn't call that "irrational." Also, of course, there were diviners, and methods of divination, in all European peasant communities. Notice that the *magical* control of life generally continues to be emphasized in 1831.

2. *Sein in sich (Buddhism, Lamaism)*

Chinese Religion, Buddhism, and Hinduism are all dealt with for the first time in 1824. In 1824 both Chinese Religion and Buddhism are treated as "religions of magic"; in our series (1827) Buddhism has been promoted out of this category into the second level of "Natural Religion." In 1831 *both* of them are moved up out of the Natural Religion category altogether; and at that stage Hinduism is inserted *between* Chinese Religion and Buddhism. Chinese Religion is finally designated as "The Religion of Measure," Hinduism as "The Religion of Abstract Unity," and Buddhism as "The Religion of Annihilation" (*self*-annihilation, that is). The 1827 arrangement has the advantage that the treatment of Buddhism is *continuous* from China to Tibet. But this is a false appearance because Hegel evaluates religions as the common modes of life and consciousness of
communities; and Tibet is a very different (more religiously unified) community than China. The final arrangement is better because Buddhism emerged historically in the context of Hinduism. (The treatment of China is historically anomalous in any case. But there is no avoiding this, because Buddhism was an invading force that came into an existing background of politically organized "magic.")

The Chinese Dao is here regarded as the primitive form of "Sein in sich." Since it was indeed much older than Lao-Zi (who took it over and reinterpreted it) this may well be historically valid. But the 1831 arrangement has better historical warrant.

The initial comment of 1831 shows Hegel's "idealism," however. The social condition of the Hindus was much less "contingent and confused" than their religious imagination. It is true, however, that once the caste-system is socially established (as God-given) "the condition of the people as a whole could never become one that is founded in right and inwardly justified." Because the caste-system organizes humanity into a kind of "animal kingdom of the Spirit" it appears to me that Hinduism is the only "world religion" that can be fairly categorized as "category A - natural." It is not "immediate" – the "Laws of Manu" are a human social achievement, and an enormously impressive one. But it is a stabilization of human spiritual freedom as an imitation of the "balance of Nature." So a good case could be made for taking it first (or as the perfectly developed "religion of magic").

The Concept of Buddhism is the "bringing together" of the "abstract unity" of Life (which flows freely into any mill-stream in Hinduism) into a conscious concept of the unity of the absolute Self. In Hinduism, we humans are just part of nature; and Nature is just the free "revel" of the Life-Force. Now the Life-Force is aware of itself as one universal force. There is nothing outside it. What emerges from it as "differentiated" life flows back into its indifference in death; and as "natural death" it is "the reflection of negativity into itself." When this becomes spiritual consciousness it will be thought (and in Hindu or Buddhist philosophy, that is just what it is).

In the Chinese context of 1827, the continuity of Tibetan Buddhism with the Dao is a matter of simple unbroken coherence. But now "immediate personality" (the Shen) is identified with God grasped as the Universal Substance. God is immediately present in certain individuals.
Hegel knows that the Indian Buddha was a historical person. But now he is present in his images, and in his Priests. In the Tibetan religion God is present in a definite living Lama. According to the figures Hegel has – which he does not give – there are more Buddhists in the world, than Muslims, and more Muslims than Christians.

It is the existence of God in singular humans that distinguishes this religion from Spinoza's theory of the divine Substance that thinks itself. But this identity is not a magical one, because the individual who becomes a Buddha must be elevated above desire and singular will. The characteristic posture of the Buddha image shows absorption in thought. [Hegel has misidentified a Hindu posture and statue, but his point is nonetheless correct about the Buddha.] This is a religion of peace and gentleness, and there are great religious orders.

One seeks to be elevated into absolute stillness. The highest (thing or state) is Nothingness (or Non-Being). All particular being is to be negated; it is accidental. One must become absolutely empty and tranquil; all movement ceases by self-cancellation.

We will nothing, want nothing, do nothing. So far as we can achieve this state, we become united with God. The cycling of life in the transmigration of souls is over. the individual is just an accidental form of this universal Substance. (Our view, added Hegel in 1831 (n. 151) is just the opposite. We are supposed to assert ourselves positively on this universal ground.

Buddhism regards self-affirmation as mere vanity. We experience that moment of stillness in our devotional cultus, but we don't strive after it all the time. This is, however, a possible option.

This is the state of Nirvana, the state where all suffering and stress has ceased. We should remember that Schopenhauer took up this ideal, and made it intellectually fashionable. Hegel (and his audience) are good industrious Lutherans, to whom the idea of deliberately aiming to become "nothing" is quite astonishing. But as a definition of God, Hegel is quite prepared to defend "Nothingness."

God is not anything finitely determinate. God exists, but he is "the Empty"; and those who say we cannot know God are taking the side of the Buddhists. This is a necessary moment of religious experience, but only one moment of a full life.
What is cancelled and superseded (aufgehoben) in this cultus of nothingness is the wheel of birth. In the Chinese Dao we have the wish for personal immortality, since every ancestor becomes one of the Shen.

The doctrine of transmigration is higher, because the individual soul continues to exist. The Shen, being in another world, do not exist according to Hegel's criteria (and we should note how primitive the ordinary Vorstellung of "immortality" is in his view). The Buddhist concept of God is the first true concept of the self that is properly immortal [at 466] – it is "subject to no alteration," "eternal tranquility." God's "presence to self" involves the devoted worshipper; but the "immortality" of the worshipper, is her immortal existence as a sensible accident (and when (s)he becomes one with God, all "presence to self" is superseded.

What is represented in "transmigration" is the necessary unity of essence and existence; and the absolute indifference of God is revealed by the complete indifference of the soul to the form that it assumes.

Both God and the worshipper are Sein in sich; they are not for one another. Spirit is not known as concrete, it is known only as an abstract essence. Nirvana is escape from this separate sensible existence; but it shows how abstract the immortal essence is.

In Tibetan Buddhism, God is recognized as incarnate in a specific living human. This is repugnant and shocking to us, says Hegel, carefully refraining in 1827 from any mention of Jesus; and then in 1831 insisting that it is only the Risen Lord who is God for us Christians. When a living human is identified as God, we lose sight of the necessity for self-transcendence. (Even the otherness of an animal form – say the bull – is apt to bring this need to mind better.) But every (spontaneously formed) religion brings to light something that is essential to Reason. This is what we have to grasp. [In the case of special sects forming within a larger community, we must always try to understand from inside, what human need they express. But they will be pointers to our failure to realize some ideal that we are quite conscious of, rather than revelations of a hitherto unrecognized moment of rational development (probably). (Compare I.C. Jarvie on Cargo Cults.) The recurrence of "actual physical presence" in such cults is quite frequent. Usually the
understanding of the natural order enforces identification of the empirical individual as a "messenger."

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*Sein in sich* is the essential transitional stage from the categories of Being to those of Essence; and for God the crucial category of Essence is *Substance*. Substance is (properly speaking) unconscious; it is the *order of Nature*; and as the rational life of Nature it is the *Nous* of Anaxagoras.

But this is not a conscious form of intelligence; it is revived in Schelling's Philosophy of Nature as the "World Soul." Nature as *alive* is "self-intuiting," and this self-intuition is what is meant by the theological *Vorstellung* of "creation" ("creation" and "preservation" being the same thing).

This brief recourse to the history of philosophy is the prelude for a discussion of "pantheism." The standpoint of the "Oriental" religions generally – the religions of God as the Absolute Substance – is "pantheism" in the proper sense. In the East (where the Sun *rises*) the Universal is the "chief determination; in the West (where it sets) the Singular becomes focal. But in the proper sense the divine Substance is the *unity* of the whole; but because of the expression God is One and All, this becomes degraded into "God is everything" (distributively). The "oriental" view (like that of Spinoza) is that the *unity* of Nature is God.

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It was Lessing who first injected the Greek phrase *Hen kai Pan* into the Spinoza controversy of the 1780's. He declared himself to be a "Spinozist" and said that the "One and All" was his God. Speculative idealism – and especially Schelling's philosophy of Nature – sprang from this root. There is ambiguity in the written record here (see n. 167) but it is quite clear that Hodgson is right. *Philosophical* pantheism is the doctrine that all finite things are swallowed up in God. "Pantheism" in this sense "swallows up" "panentheism" (which is simply one way of spelling it out); so the introduction of *that* category does not alter the unmistakeable fact that speculative idealism is a *form* of "pantheism."

What Hegel finds wrong with oriental "pantheism" is precisely that the All as One is absolute *negative*. So it swallows up the *kosmos* and we can never recover it. This may not be *just* in Spinoza's intellectual pantheism; but it is surely a fair comment on Buddhism.
For speculative idealism it is the "basic determination" that "God is the All" or "the unity of the All is God." We need to develop this, to have a "concept" of what holds everything together and of how everything fits in. But this "concept," including the "reality" to which it corresponds, is "God." So proving the "existence" of God is identical with "developing the Concept"; and a "materialist" (who says that "matter" is the ultimate ground of everything) is just characterizing the "basic determination" in a certain way. (S)he must develop her Concept of how everything is grounded on "matter." (Speculative idealists think (s)he will end up characterizing it as the sort of "life" that is logically destined to "know itself.") [This is implicit, but the point is not made.]

Forgetting about such intellectual infidels as that, and reasoning only to convince our rational believers regarding how they must conceive their God, we start from the position of "Faith" that "in Him we live and move and have our being." We hold that we are actual – that our actions are free, and they make a difference.

But it is through God that this is so. We agree with the Buddhists that we are "in his presence"; and this "presence" is his presence as the "Substance" of all accidental manifestation. Spinoza took his stand on this; and he was therefore accused of "pantheism." But if we (and our activities) are really independent of God – if we are "substances" on our own account – then God is not "omnipresent." Like the God(s) of Epicurus he is banished to the spaces between the "worlds" – the "worlds" being the spheres of the independent actual substances. A way between Gods "swallowing" presence – so that nothing else is actual – and his absence, because all of us are actual, must be found.

This is the "spiritual" concept. God is the "truth" for finite "spirits." [Particular attention should be paid to Hodgson's note 172 on F.A.G. Tholuck: Hegel, Spinoza, Fichte and Parmenides are "pantheists of the Concept." Hegel does not try to deny this. His quarrels with the other three are family-disputes about how "the Concept" – i.e. the divine thinking – is to be articulated.]

The religious contradiction can be seen in Jacobi, who calls Spinoza an "atheist," but also says God is the ground of all finite beings. [This is unfair to Jacobi who takes Spinoza for a mechanical materialist.]
In the Christian religion God is Substance, but also Subject (and this is possible, as Hegel will eventually explain, because he is a Trinity of Persons, so he can be Spirit, or two subjects in communication). But as a unity he is the One Substance – and Spinoza is right that the Divine Substance is a thinking Substance. But this thinking Substance is not "Spirit," so it cannot be the God of an actual community. Actual communities don't begin by "thinking" their God; they communicate with him as an object of imagination. So the Buddhism with which we are concerned (being a Natural Religion) needs a natural human being to represent its God.

The inwardness of this represented substance is simply negative – like pure thought as "Insight"; and for the ordinary consciousness of the community there is just this visible human being who is God. They know that his identity with God is in his profound thought – and that as a natural living organism he will die (just like them). But the thinking of the lonely individual is just the annihilating of all determinate being. As pure Nous this thinking cannot be self-conscious, because the thinker must cease to be conscious of himself; and he does not lose himself in an organized world – as the king forgets himself in the business of the kingdom. The whole world is "created and preserved" by this activity; but it is not yet known.

Each community needs its own "God-bearer." So how many divine "Lamas" there are depends on how big the communities are that can think of themselves organized and united round one centre. God can be present to us in several lamas at once. (Hegel's data are poor, and his presentation of them still poorer, but the logical principle is clear.) This is a logical advance over China (with one divine Son of Heaven); but it means that political organization is fragmented.

Chinese Buddhism ("Fo") recognizes eight thousand incarnations of Buddha (n. 185; some of these were – as Hegel probably knew – animal manifestations. But from the way he goes on in 1831 [n. 186] – when he transposes Hinduism and Buddhism – it looks as if he regarded that as a "survival" of the more primitive "fantasy-consciousness" of God. The impossibility of fitting animal-divinity into his concept of Buddhism together with the recognition that it was actually there was probably one factor that led to the reordering of Hinduism and Buddhism.
When the divine Lama dies, his reincarnation has to be discovered. He must be instantly reborn somewhere else. Hegel is clearly impressed by the fact that the new two-year old God in his report is recognized by his "mature" behavior. This fits with his own way of putting theology and cult together as a religion of "pure thinking" (see especially n. 191). His reports praise the "Regency" for the excellent education of the child. But he does not comment on that. Obviously we are meant to take a "Platonic" view of the whole business. The child is helped to "remember" that he is God.

"The Substance has concentrated itself in him, in order to show itself outwardly." (If the "Substance" is pure thinking then it cannot do that in a non-human animal.)

The Substance concentrated in him is the Nous of Anaxagoras. Hegel's claim that it is "not very different" to suppose it has its existence in a particular human being is very puzzling. One can only say that it is "very different" – more different than Anaxagoras was from Pythagoras – who did (probably) think he was divinely inspired, while Anaxagoras thought that Nous was in all of us (in slightly different ways and degrees). We cannot even say that Anaxagoras was like the thoughtful Buddhist, since the latter wants to achieve forgetfulness, while Anaxagoras said he would rather "discover one true cause" than be the King of Persia. (All that interests Hegel is that Nous cannot "know itself." It does not know "true causes"; it is the "true cause." There is a parallel here between the history of religious representation, and the history of the philosophical Concept as such; this deserves to be underlined, because the "Substance" that the Buddhist aims to be united with is the same "essence" that pours itself out as the "revel" of sensible Nature in Hinduism.)

[Note 192.] In 1831 when Hegel decided to treat Buddhism as a cultural development out of Hinduism, he was obliged to look at Hinduism from its philosophical side. So he called it "The Religion of Abstract Unity" – The Religion of "Identity" so to speak. At that stage only "Magic" is treated as Natural Religion. In 1824 he treated all religions that were not part of the "phenomenology" of Christianity as "natural"; and in that perspective Hinduism becomes the religion of the "productive imagination." But he still regards it there as logically more developed than Buddhism. In 1827 the relation to Buddhism leads him to see two sides as essential to Hinduism. (It is probably reflection on the historical relation that leads him to change the order, and
emphasize the *conceptual* aspect of Hinduism. A return to 1824, with Hinduism as "natural," and China as the *climax* of the "Buddhist" development, might be the best arrangement.

3. **The Hindu Religion**

We should begin with the approach of 1831. The basic logical situation is what Hegel calls the "identity of inner and outer." Whatever is *only* an "inner" experience must have an analogue that is *only* "outer." The two sides are strictly complementary, and so logically necessary to each other. In 1831 Chinese, Hindu, and Buddhist Religion are all forms of "Pantheism." But in the Chinese "religion of Measure" there is no conscious self-assertion at all. God is the order of objective *measures*. Then Hinduism is the "Pantheism" in which God is recognized as the divine *Life* of all living manifestations in the outer sensible world. The Religion of Measure is the divinity of the Understanding; and Hinduism is the first stage in the evolution of the Religion of Reason. Looking at this from the side of thought leads Hegel to speak very frankly about the transition from Logic to Nature. It is *our* logically perfected consciousness that "lets itself go" as Nature. "It is in our thinking alone that nature ... exists as the universal." The ordinary Hindu worshipper has no "Idea" of that sort; but (s)he knows that the Divine Life is pouring itself forth in all these sensible (i.e. imaginative) forms. This *externality* of God is phenomenologically prior to the discovery of God within pure thought. But the unity of it all is a pure thought; and it must be conceptualized as a *thinking* activity (Kant's "intuitive Intellect" which *creates* its objects).

It is natural for this intuitive thinking to be focussed on, and for Hinduism to develop into, Buddhism. But then, at first, God is recognized as quite self-sufficient and self-contained. Nature is just a free overflow which he does not *need*. If we try to *comprehend* this freedom, by taking the flow back into the thinking unity, it gets away from us. We can only *imagine* the three aspects of God: Creator, Destroyer, Preserver.

Thus Hinduism becomes an imaginative *forecast* of the Absolute Religion. Everything is there, but the aspects are all separate. We cannot put it together, because we do not recognize that the freedom of our own thoughtful contemplation is what is essential. Every different way we look at it, we find only the bad infinite that transcends our conceptual grasp; and for the ordinary
worshipper it is the external riot of sensible life that is the main "presence" of God, so the title of 1824 and the order of 1831 are correct together. "Substance" (returning to 1827) is "the totality of its externality."

The thinking subject is accidental (mortal). But God is spiritual power as well as natural. God has appointed a way of life for us (a differentiated organism of ways of life) as well as establishing an order in the riot of natural life. The totality is (imaginatively) grasped. It is all a Unity. God is really One. But he lets Nature go as an enormous community of divine powers; and he takes them back into himself finally.

269 a) The One Substance

The first attribute of God in all religion (from the most primitive onwards) is his power. (Still true even of the post-religious Big Bang.) Even as finite, and as caught up in a flow of power that is "Fate" for us, we "posit ourselves" as finite powers. But all our power comes from the natural flow in which we are caught up. So the concept of Substance is the unified power that reveals itself in the totality. (God is what he does. The God of Descartes and Leibniz who can do anything imaginable – or unimaginable – is a fiction. Spinoza is right.)

This totality of power is Brahman. He is self-contained; but he goes out of himself "as breath" (implicitly spirit), and is "for himself" in the world that he creates. He is a Cartesian God (not Leibnizian perhaps) because his identity with his creation is not posited. I must say I am Brahman" but I cannot say "I think Brahman." The determination is not "reciprocal" (cf. Anselm on "that than which nothing greater can be thought"). In my identity with Brahman I am drowned, I disappear. Of course, while I am here, I exist for myself, but there is no proportion between these two aspects of my being.

Brahman in his self-sufficiency is not like the Christian Father who "exists" in his Son (which Hegel identifies as the finite human world). Brahman remains the "Lord" with power over all.
b) The Multiplicity of Powers

But Brahman does "let himself go" into a great community of natural powers. These, in turn, are not yet the beautiful ideals of human life that we shall meet in the Greek Gods. The whole of Nature itself is thought of poetically – not yet prosaically – so they are more like the Greek Titans: Sun, Moon, Mountains, Rivers, etc. In our conception these natural powers are posited as outside of Spirit. Nature is external; it belongs to the sphere of Understanding. This alienation happens in Greek philosophy.

But ever the Olympian Gods are human ideals rather than natural powers [memo: watch out for what Hegel says about Poseidon!].

There is no order or logic in the Hindu Pantheon. Thought has not yet reached its own proper beginning level (the prosaic universal concepts of the Understanding). Sun and Moon are not yet "physical things" (n. 197).

[Notice the editorial improvement made by Marheineke in 1832.]

When it comes to aesthetic judgments, we have to recognize that Hegel is a Kantian who has identified the standard of taste as Greek.

The imaginative freedom of Hindu art can only be regarded, therefore, as a distortion of "nature." We might reasonably retort that the Hindu artist "knows" his (her?) own "freedom" just as well as the Greek – the absence of a "natural standard does not prevent the achievement of beauty. The Greek "standard" does give the human form a focal place that it does not have in Hindu art; but even the interpretation of what that means is ambiguous. (Certainly for the future, the Greek ideal cannot hold a privileged position, even if we agree that "the beautiful is the spiritual that expresses itself sensibly." Even the point about "particularization" needs qualification. The Hindu community is particularized into sub-communities; and the Hindu pantheon of Gods makes more systematic rational sense than Hegel is able to see (partly because his information is poor). But the community is "particularized" naturally – rather than into "free" political independence. If the principles of individual self-realization (and respect for conscience) can be assimilated into the Hindu world, the organic system of their religion will be affected in various ways; but it will be more rational perhaps than the classical Greek tradition was at its best.
The Hindu religion – even in Hegel's picture – is more *philosophical* than Greek religion (except as rationalized by Xenophanes and Plato). For the *particular* deities emerge from the *unity* of Brahman, and return to it. Hegel calls this a "shocking inconsistency," but that is a judgment made from the standpoint of *Enlightened* rationalism. He can only maintain it from his own standpoint, because he does not take the Hindu tradition seriously as *philosophy*. In reality, he is just trading on the cultural prejudice of his audience.

274 The Substance is Brahman (Parmenides' "It is") or Brahm (speculative "I am"). But the personification as subject is only superficial, Hegel thinks. He is naturally glad to take this view over from William van Humboldt (n. 204 Ed.) because Brahma cannot in his loneliness be a proper "Subject" in the philosophical sense. He has no "other" in whom to recognize himself. He is the God of Spinoza, but at an aesthetically intuitive, subphilosophical level of consciousness. In spite of the "shocking contradiction," Hegel admits that the distinction of Brahman into a trinity of deities is "the instinct of the Concept" (i.e., the "instinct of Reason"). It is this *anticipation* of the Christian dogma of the Trinity that causes him to rate Hinduism so highly among the determinate religions. (For Tholuck it was an argument *against* the properly *Christian* status of the dogma; but for Hegel it was this dogma that gave Christianity its "absolute" status).

275 "Distinction has no right as against the absolute unity." What particular gods do (or wish) must fall within the will of Brahman. So their activity is the expression of his "goodness" (or his justice). "Justice" (as we can see from n. 207) is what sets the *limit of subsistence* for every finite mode of being. In the Hindu triad this is the *third* moment. These three moments (as Hegel said in 1831 – n. 208) are not "persons" because they do not have the proper relation of subjectivity to one another. They are three "shapes" of the one Absolute (1831 gets this right). We should notice that "mercy" – which typifies the Holy Spirit as "the Comforter" – is missing.

The first moment is Brahman-Brahma – "the simple Substance."

276 There are a mass of myths about Brahma (and even about Parabrahm, what is above him). (Parabrahma is philosophically necessary when Brahma is one of the *three.*) Everything proceeds from Brahma (as creator). He is both the agent and the passive material. In the passive aspect he
becomes the "uterus" for Vishnu as creator [cf. the Christian Logos as Creator – but he does not create from God, but from "Nothing" – and the Father generates the Logos]. Hegel is insistent that logic is lacking in the account of Brahma – see n. 212 (1827).

Creation is poetically described in many versions. In the Vedas he is the formless One that is summoned by a higher power to create.

In 1831 Hegel recognizes that the Hindu Creation is the work of thought. Creation is "a relating of thought to itself." Thinking that is "bei sich generates or "begets" itself.

This is an "infinitely profound and true feature." Hegel cites the beginning of the Code of Manu – which is especially important in his perspective because it sets up the social organization of the human community. "The Eternal, with a single thought, created the Waters" [cf. Thales, and ANET]. The "single thought" is also called "the Word" [this may be an "assimilation" by A. Dow on whom Hegel depends] – In the waters, an Egg was developed from divine Seed, and so Brahm himself was born. But the Egg divided into Male and Female [cf. Chinese Yin/Yang]. There is a circle because the Male force of thought is begotten, but becomes a new begetter through the practice of meditation. (Speculative philosophy makes the same circle in Hegel's own theory.) The thought that is "brought forth" is just the thought that brings forth. H.T. Colebrooke translates a passage from one of the Vedas that sounds like the beginning of Hegel's Logic: "There was neither Being nor Nothing, but the One."

It is in the human discipline of meditation that this thinking actually exists; and there is a specific caste – the Brahmins – whose vocation it is to do this meditative thinking. They must read the Vedas and pray. This is "God's very self." One can, of course, read the Vedas without understanding; this non-comprehension that is trying to comprehend is the "Nothing" of pure thinking, from which everything comes. (The I of "pure intuition" is empty – that is where the Phänomenologie des Geistes arrives!)

The second moment is Vishnu or Krishna. He is the embodiment of Brahma, and the preservation of the finite world. Especially he is human incarnation. This is represented in great epic tales, in conquest stories, and in love affairs [contrast the Temptation and the puritanical life of Jesus].
The third moment is Shiva (Mahadeva, the "great god") – the Destroyer who consumes all finitude.

He ought properly to be the Destroyer who preserves by taking back into self. But he is simply the category of Becoming as Coming to Be and Passing Away.

His symbol is the Lingam, the power that generates what is mortal. This is an image of natural life and death, not of spiritual reconciliation.

It is the Trimurti, the Three-Shape, not Brahm himself, that is grasped as the Highest. But each moment of the Triad is also the whole Triad. In the older portions of the Vedas there is only Brahma, the One, without Vishnu and Shiva. The Trimurti is a later development [cf. O.T., N.T., and Early Fathers – religious truth has to develop historically; it is not "revealed" all at once]. There are castes that are devoted to one moment of the triad; and social conflict sometimes arises from this.

Each of the triad can regard himself (or be regarded) as the whole. But also every part of the natural world is personified as a divine unity: Sun, Moon, the Ganges, etc. Human passions are divinely personified – sometimes as animals [and why not? but it is scandalous to Hegel's audience].

There are no hospitals for the sick poor, but there are for sick cattle [cf. n. 232].

(Actually an older polytheism was absorbed by the Brahmanic revolution. Hegel is vaguely aware of this).

(Repeats and elaborates 1827(281). Emphasizes caprice of the imagination.)

c) The Cultus

The highest act of worship is the emptying out of everything personal or specific in the union with Brahman in Nirvana. This is the cult of Yoga. But ordinary devotion is a passing state like our Sunday service. The goal of a dedicated Yogi is complete indifference (and austerity). For this a temple is not needed. There are temples only for the lesser manifestations of God (up to, and including, Vishnu and Krishna).
True devotional concentration is complete forgetfulness of self in Brahman. This begins as a momentary experience, but it can become a habitual state (n. 239). Some achieve it by remarkable physical disciplines (sleeping standing up, etc.). It is of the essence of this discipline that all human ethical ties are abandoned. (Notice Hegel's assertion of the true ideal of human freedom (n. 239 - W2).

Physical endurance is the mark of perfection. One can become a magician with power over nature – as is shown by the story of Vishvamitra in the Ramayana. Hegel told this story at length in 1831 (n. 244). It reminds one of Macaulay's comment (Oxford Book of Quotations).

The Brahmins are the highest caste. Even when involved in worldly affairs their lives are supposedly devoted to Brahman. They are the existence of Brahman. They issued from its mouth [cf. the Christian Logos again]. Others can rise to the status they have naturally, but only by years of ascetic devotion. (This devotion is not penitence for sin.)

The Brahmins are "twice-born" – once in the flesh and again in the spirit (in "1 n. 241 this is identified with magical power – so that is probably what "the abstraction of spirit" means – cf. the miracles of Jesus). The kings cannot call them to account – but the English governors take no notice of that, but shoot them as rebels like others.

When the ideal of the empty mind is cultivated, the imagination can run riot. Nature ought to be attended to, and its positive unity (its lawful necessity) ought to be discovered. The solitary unity of Brahman is completely careless of what happens in the world. "Reason" is the recognition of right and duty. Like natural necessity, these are absent in Hinduism (Prob. ?) (The fact that Brahman has no temple is symbolically significant – 1827? n. 246).

Hinduism does not yet have logical categories. It is fanciful. Everything in the world enjoys the freedom of caprice. We can observe the same sort of thing at the basis of Greek religion (dryads and nymphs) – but the Hindu imagination does not beautify – the humanity that they share with Nature is impoverished. They are not conscious of proper freedom.

Humanity is thought of simply as part of nature, and on the same level as all the other forms of life. Thus the project of elevation to God involves despising it just as much as all the other forms. (Hegel uses the "sip of water" comparison first in Phänomenologie des Geistes in connection with the guillotine.) (Sti fits in here too, says Hegel, but that is a gross oversimplification since it is the
husband-wife "identity" that is at issue there – implicitly, however, Hegel's implication is that the wife is just as much a free self-realizing individual as the husband.)

Bound up with the gospel of self-sacrifice there is much superstition. (Anything that "fetters" us to Nature is to be regarded as "superstition." European "enlightenment" and alienated indifference to the natural environment is taken for granted here as "rational." Implicitly this applies to the social environment also. We ought to be able to go anywhere and do anything – "the career open to the talents." (For Hegel, however, this is an intermediate stage that is the prelude to a "rationally returned" identity with Family, Work, and organized political society.) One cannot achieve this if life starts with a prescribed way to stand up, etc. It is illuminating to reflect that "toilet-training" is a mass of "prescriptions" – but they are such that one comes to understand the rationale of them, and take over responsibility for them. They are not like the commandment of Pythagoras! To study n. 253 is a way of understanding how unjust it is to call the Hindu sense of pollution "unethical; and the sense of "pollution" shows that the body is not an "external determinacy" for most Hindus. (It is true enough that the devout in solitude give up on personal cleanliness, but that is a dialectical extreme.)

The particular aspect of Nature itself is merely accidental. There have been many Indras (Sky God, Zeus) and there will be many more. As we can see from the transition made in 1831 (n. 256: the whole text probably, though the first part may have been written by Hegel for 1827), Hegel sees Hinduism as a Negative Monism imposed upon an imaginative polytheism of natural powers. In Buddhism the Negative Monism becomes independent, and the concept of individual human responsibility becomes central (although it is self-negation that we are responsible for). What happens now is that the Negative One in which all determinacy is swallowed begins to become a proper "self-positing" Subject. That this is what is supposed to happen is clear, but it is not clear how it happens, because Hegel concentrates attention so much on Brahman in his account of the "Cultus." Brahma-Vishnu-Shiva (the forgotten triad) are the first representation of Divine Personality.

d) Transition
When God begins to become a subject we are moving out of Natural Religion. But it is a long slow process for religion to become "spiritual" properly. God, as the totality of what is, does not need to be worshipped. It (rather than He or She) has no need of subjectivity at all. Finite subjects are accidental to it. This will continue to be the case for a long time.

The worshippers are essential, because God must know himself – and he does so only through their knowledge of him. His knowledge is always the knowledge that his community has of him. But it will be a long time before it is identical with the knowledge that they have of one another.

Brahman, and all the gods below it, are not external to each other. They must be brought together. The Many must not simply pass away and be reborn, they must "return into" the One. Thie "return" is the proper topic of the Logic, and cannot be dealt with "logically" here.

But also the finite self now begins to assert itself, so that God becomes for the first time a proper "Other," an object.

In Hinduism the concentrated self is Brahman. God and the worshipper become simply identical. I do not "think of" God; I am God. This is the "Nothing" out of which everything comes, and into which it passes away. When I separate myself from this absolute Nothing, and begin to think of it as an object, then implicitly the total reality is "Spirit," because although I have distinguished myself from it, I know that my thinking capacity is "it"; and that, as a finite consciousness, I am comprehended in it. This is the implicit "Concept of Spirit" [philosophical example: the two ways of Parmenides].

It is an "instinct of Reason" that the absolute otherness of God relative to my finitude is not satisfactory. God is "spirit" in all religions, because the concept is "bound" to develop in that direction. Why? Just because it is a concept, something to be shared by finite knowers who respect one another. We represent God (even Brahma) as a human being like ourselves. This is superficial (as Xenophanes pointed out – and the Hindus did justice to the horses, cows and trees by acknowledging the divine spirit in everything).

But now "the rupture of consciousness" takes place. Hegel puts all of the Eastern religions after this "rupture" in 1831 – and as "philosophical" they deserve it. But if the philosophical piety
of the Vedas were treated as the "transition" then Hindu polytheism could be regarded as the fullest development of "natural religion" – with the caste system as a social imitation of the "animal kingdom."

4.a) The Religion of Light (Ancient Persia)

In the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* Hegel began the conceptual evolution of religion with this; and these "religions of the transition" were "Natural Religion" simply. At that stage he only wanted to do the cultural evolution of his own interpretation of Lutheran Christianity. In lecturing on religion he must deal with the great living religions of Asia (and even with Africa as well as he can). But the important "transition" here is to history. The Parsees survive as a small community in India [cf. n. 284 (1831) on p. 304]; and the Jews as still smaller, scattered communities all over Europe. But it is not with them that Hegel is concerned. He is interested in the Old Testament as the holy book of a national community that was first subjugated, and then destroyed by the Romans. "The religion of the Jews" goes from Moses to Jesus, we might say – or perhaps better from Moses to the Maccabees.

In 1831 Hegel found a proper triad for the transition: Persia - Syria - Egypt. But like "Plant and Animal" in 1807, "Syrian Religion" was mainly a "speculative" construction (in the bad sense). The best we can say is that Hegel was trying to follow his empirical-historical method.

At the moment of the rupture, the Absolute is simply independent and self-sufficient. There is nothing to be done except contemplate the divine light in its creative activity.

In the seething stage the worshipper is more involved. We can see why Hegel looked for a religion of physical suffering, because it is the opposite extreme from simple contemplation. Egyptian religion is the cult of death and the Beyond.

In Persian religion, the Divine Unity is present externally. The creative power is there objectively as a phenomenon. The light that creates and maintains everything, comes and goes like
a human subject. And everything is in the Light. It does not come tumbling out of an invisible source from which it is then quite distinct. The finite world is given to us by the Good.

Hegel emphasizes the anticipation of Plato's philosophy in the religion of Zoroaster. The Light is "the good as absolute power." Quite a lot of what Hegel says seems to be justified by this anticipation. In the Phänomenologie des Geistes we hear only about the transcendence of the "Light-Essence," its sublimity. (Certainly not about "the unity that defines itself as subject" – 298 at 270). There was no "goodness" in the world before – it was only to be left behind – and even the God who must be sought was not "good" (as opposed to evil).

Power simply expresses itself without purpose or direction (n. 273). God as good is a being in which we recognize ourselves (Hatho, 1824 – see II, 352) and the goodness of our gift of life.

In the identity with Brahman all difference is homogenized away, so that the positive affirmation is minimal and there can be no pretending that ascetic discipline is "good." Now everything (stones, etc.) is "good" as a positive affirmation of being – one does not have to be "twice-born."

That life is "good" is a subjective judgment. But the "goodness" of things is still "abstract." We can see what this means by reflecting on the fact that what we do with the gift of life – and everything that it puts into our power – is a matter of choice. We can do evil with it, be bad. The goodness of things is not yet a concrete experience.

So there has to be an equally abstract power of Evil in the world, if God is simply and immediately the Good. The world is really a battle between the two powers.

Good ought to be triumphant; but this is only an ought-to-be. It is a destiny that is never achieved (1824).

The dualism of Is and Ought is what religion and philosophy turn upon. We must get beyond it, for if we do not we are not Christians but Manichees. God is a unity. Evil and the finite must not have completely independent being.

We can see how "abstraction" works by considering the phenomenal world. The Good is Light (which "creates" the world at least for our vision). But light can be absent, and then there is darkness which removes all the good things. What is abstractly there all the time is just space (and
time in which Light and Night alternate). So (n. 280) Brahman is analogous with Space and Brahman with time – but Brahman needs us to see theirs and the dawn.

(see also n279) We ought not to reject the view that Light is Good as a mere metaphor. *

303 For Nature is the necessary first moment of Spirit; and thought does not take place in an intellectual vacuum. Sense-awareness is the necessary first moment of it; and "before" there is sense-awareness, there is only unconsciousness – i.e., complete indeterminacy.

n281(1831) Persian religion presents us with "the self-determining One" – i.e. with the Good. "True" and "Good" are synonyms for theory and practice. Power is indeterminate: realization of Good is its determination. This logical progression must be grasped first imaginatively. Brahman is implicitly (or inwardly) good. The Light is the natural outward expression of this. But Light must reveal something dark; and Good logically requires the contrast with evil.

From our fully developed spiritual standpoint we say "God creates the World out of nothing." This puts the Hindu and Persian progression together. "Light" begins to spell out what "creation" means; the development of Cognition from Understanding to Speculative Comprehension will complete the process of spelling it out. [The Light-Religion is the religion of the Big Bang so to speak; and this is the real self-release of the Idea as Nature.]

304 The Lord of Light is helpless without the antitheses that he does not comprehend within himself. The Light must shine in the Darkness; the Good must have Evil to triumph over. The personification as two divinities is superficial, because there is no comprehensive unity. (This is a philosophical judgment that is willing to let the world settle its own problems – when we think how easily and frequently life becomes – or threatens to become – a life-and-death struggle for recognition because of the simple "Good/Evil" interpretation we can see that the personification ought to be "superficial," but often is not. But the point is that if we are to be philosophical about a conflict we must assume that the good/evil antithesis is only a superficial analysis of it.)

* cf. 1831 in n. 284: "We might as well say that the Good is the Symbol of Light."
n284(1831) In this religion humanity as a particular good confronts the universal good (this is a formulation that implicitly refers to the inner light). The Parsees are not fire-worshippers – for fire consumes, but light reveals and lets be.

306 Everything belongs to Ormazd as the Light. But his world is full of particular, mutually external "goods": sun, stars, planets. The Sun is naturally the most important. Ormazd is the source of life – and all life is holy.

307 Ormazd has a divine council of heavenly lights (1831 – see n. 284 on p. 305); and the kingdom of Persia is organized in the same way. The Prince is the representative of Ormazd and his councillors of the stars, etc.

308 [Hegel gets into a muddle about Mithra – see n. 287 – but his mistake does not affect anything important – several scholars were muddled obviously.]

Hegel notices that the Tree of Life in Genesis – he says Tree of Knowledge – has a Persian analogue. He cuts the Fravashis – who get fuller notice in 1824 – to a passing mention. (Human spirits, living and dead, Zoroaster especially – II, 356-7).

309 The Cultus is an ethical way of life – doing good works, especially to make the land fruitful. (In 1831 Hegel commented on the simplicity of the prayers.) Cultus and life are not divided.

(n290) Transition to next stage (Egypt)

(n295) The editor comments that we can see the intermediate phase of Syrian religion emerging here (which will be recognized in 1831). What is happening is that Hegel is looking for an imaginative anticipation of the Incarnation Story. We have the Trinity anticipated in Hinduism. Then Persian religion brings "the Father" into relation with his "prophet" Zoroaster; Egypt (after representing the Understanding in 1807, being ignored in 1821, regarded as the cosmic enigma of the Spirit in Nature in 1824) is now seen as anticipation of God's Death and Resurrection. What is needed to fill the blank space is a religion that anticipates the Crucifixion, by viewing human life as suffering for the sake of God. This has to be found in the cultural world from which the Christian Gospel comes; and when Hegel goes looking for it, he believes that he has found it in "Phoenicia."
For the moment, however, he can only point out those elements in the Hindu record that fit the pattern.

Persian religion offers us, in the sphere of external "intuition," what Judaism will transpose into the inner element of thought. God is the One Almighty Light that creates the world. The second form (Egypt) will show us the dark inward self "abandoned to externality."

From the side of the Infinite we shall move over to that of the finite; and this is no longer the unconscious finitude of natural becoming that we can see in the Hindu religion. There it is just the One that pours itself out; now it is really "the subject" that lets itself go out into natural expression. "God" is incarnated, and the natural story of human life is his story.

This story is not united with that of the Divine Goodness. We have the story of an individual life that does not know itself as the Creator, but only as we know ourselves in Nature. Freedom "seethes in and out" of this reality – the God lives and dies. In this way the dualism of light and darkness begins to be overcome. Darkness and death (human mortality) begins to be accepted as a moment of God's life. The idea of a final victory of the Light, which is not now and never actually will be, is given up. God must be reconciled with death; he must go through it, and be resurrected from it. But this will happen only at the level of natural "ferment," not at the level of conscious self-comprehension.

"A subject is this distinction" [of intellectual light and natural life that must die – i.e., of "soul and body"]'). The "light" does not perish in death; but "I" die, in order to "be restored." This "represents free spirit" – but as yet only as a "drive." In "Resurrection" the God comes back to life in the body. That is not "Spirit."

Reconciliation with the negative, is the death of God. (The negative in general is simply transition and change. Spiritual negation is willing the denial (or transformation) of one's "natural" desires. One thus becomes "free" (and rational). Thus, to be reconciled to one's own death is "freedom." The natural will is now (by definition) evil. But to die is part of the natural will.
In a higher, philosophical, perspective, "negation" if finitude generally. Thus "God" is reconciled with finitude when he "begets his Son." For a "Son" is another self – and the most obvious natural form of "resurrection." Thus God is "present to himself" in his Son.

In the religious myth it is one and the same subject that goes through the experience of death and resurrection. So natural Good and Evil are reconciled. In Hindu mythology God (especially Vishnu) has many incarnations. The Buddha was the *ninth* (although the best transcript – now lost – seems to have got this wrong, so Hegel's memory may have let him down). In Tibet there is always a *living* Lama. This shows us that death is not important in these representations (in the way that it has become important for us now).

The point is that every human life is lived towards the one death that is its own; and God now has just the one death that is *his* own. God has become the sort of subject that we are. But the *reconciliation* with death is in his *resurrection*.

**b) Egyptian Religion**

This recognition of death and resurrection is what we see in the religion of *Ancient Egypt*. This is its "soul" (i.e. life-principle).

Egypt is selected for this reason from others like it (n. 317. Hegel probably has data on "Phoenician" or "Syrian" religion already).

The image is *Osiris* – opposed by Typhon [n. 319. Hegel's source is Plutarch, *On Isis and Osiris*]. But now Osiris dies. So he is "twice-born"; and as such he is *spiritual* not natural. His resurrection from death expresses explicitly the fact that he belongs *not* to Nature, but to *representation*. He is known to be a representation.

In this role, he is Ruler of the Dead; but as here with us he is also Ruler of the Living (who are going to die). "What does not have natural existence is preserved" (n. 321 – 1931?). Typhon, and all the suffering of this world, is overcome. Osiris is the Judge of Right and Justice.
The dead are gone from the sensible world; but they *endure* in the intelligible world. Hegel trusts Hdt who says the Egyptians were first to say "human soul is immortal" (very dubious proposition). In China and India we find the doctrine (head ===) but it is not an *ultimate* truth. (This is what "subordinate and inessential" means.) The ultimate truth is that we ought to get off of the "wheel of birth." We ought to forget ourselves in God (and be forgotten).

In Egypt personal immortality becomes *essential*. "Subjectivity" is "totality" – and as such it is the *representation* of true independence." [n. 326 is probably an editorial addition; but it brings out why "immortality" is so significant. The problem is: "What does it mean? It doesn't mean what is directly "represented."] Osiris is a late arrival among the Egyptian Gods. But this is because he is the final development (or completion) of Egyptian religious consciousness. [Hegel spelled this out very clearly in 1831 (see n. 329).]

He also recognized quite explicitly that Osiris represents the seasonal life of *nature* (n. 329, p. 317). But he emphasized the human institutions (and benefactions) credited to Osiris.

Osiris is not an actual historical man (though some historical events are referred to in his myth – n. 329, 1831). It is the Idea that is posited "on the soil of representation." [Historical individuality is a necessary moment that Christianity must insert before the transition from "representation" to "thought" can take place properly.]

All we have at the moment is the "abstract foundation of subjectivity." What will it mean for that foundation to become "concrete"? All we can see here is that the universality of the antithesis" has to be much deeper; and it looks as if the "antithesis" referred to is that between "Spirit" and "Nature."

The truth represented is "not bound to time." The *representation* refers to "the time after death." But the "universality" of the meaning is *eternal* (by implication). *That* means (say I) that it is as much *now* as "ever." The "universality" is not the external universality that is "common to many instances." Surely *this* means that "my soul," "your soul," "her soul" will not "be together somewhere else." The "will be" has already been outlawed; now the "together as many instances" is

outlawed. We have to understand how subjectivity "goes down absolutely" and becomes "internally fulfilled" (cf. Spinoza's *Scientia intuitiva*).

The life-story of "subjectivity" carries with it the "movement, life and history" of everything in the "immediate" world [i.e. the world of sense and historically directed "representation"]). So the story of Osiris is "the inner, essential story ... of nature."

In particular it is a "calendar-myth." (Hegel is agreeing with and relying on Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie* here – but the Easter-timing of the festival is really more important to us. What is still more important is that the *symbolic* relation is "reciprocal." Osiris can *symbolize* the Sun (waxing and waning) or the Nile (flooding for the fertility of the harvest); but equally Nile and Sun can symbolize Osiris (Lord of living and dead).

The symbol itself is "the ruling element." "The inner is the *Bedeutung* of the outer"; and "representation" has an *independent* status. In the "significance" thjere is the *Trieb* to bring the representation to intuition. The significance is not immediately there; it is a programme to be carried out. Brahman is the immediate descent into inwardness; Zoraster's Light is the immediate presentation outwardly. Osiris must be *interpreted*; we must give his meaning. Thus, minimally, the cycle of the seasons must be comprehended as one whole; and this whole must be recognized as the divine "Subject."

Hence the whole cultus of Egypt is to "labor for God." The inward significance must be given its outward expression.

The Egyptians built the most amazing religious monuments ever. Ruins now, but astounding for their beauty and the energy expended. The spirit of toil never rested in making itself visible to itself. What their God was they showed [and they could not show what he was "Beyond"; they could only show what he is – now and here].

The life structure of the community is expressed: Right, morality, marriage, art. But especially God's judgment, and the record of what we do. The realm of the Dead is just the record of living transience, *fixed* by the Understanding. The great monuments are tombs for the dead. Why should their bodies matter so much if their souls were immortal?
Because this preservation reflects the importance of the immortal soul. Burial (in some universally approved way) is an essential human social rite (laying the body in the earth or burning it). But to preserve it as the Egyptians did, shows that humanity is above the natural level. (There is the same reciprocal relation of soul and body here.) But humanity is still conceived as a "substance." In fact living nature is a system of substances, so animal-human Gods are needed; and the Pharaohs are living-human Gods. The God "consecrates" his "Son." Alexander has the Oracle proclaim him as "Son of Amnon." [Theme of Roman Religion – climax – brought in too early here?]

The different districts worshipped particular animals; and the bull (Apis) was Osiris himself. All the forms of Nature-Religion are united in Egypt. We saw in Hinduism already how God, as infinite Power, is an unconscious but universal life. So when this inner is outwardly expressed it is as animals. The use of animal masks shows that consciousness knows itself to be more than "dull" animal vitality [but continuous with it, we may add]. ["Dull" means having no memory (?).]

The religious state is reflected in politics. The Pharaohs had to struggle with the priests (as modern monarchs have had to).

Everything in Egyptian art is symbolic. The central symbol is the Sphinx, but there is mathematical symbolism in the temples and Pyramids. The Egyptian people is an enigma to itself – unlike the Greeks for whom everything is clear. But what is emerging in their culture is free subjectivity.

This diligent labor did not yet produce fine art – though the Trieb was there.

Fine art is beyond desire and natural life. It knows itself as free, and its object is to be free. [In Greek culture] it does not think itself as free, but it expresses itself as free for aesthetic contemplation.

Its Dasein is wholly determined by spirit. It dwells in Nature as a free spirit. This is what we mean by "beauty" – true freedom of expression.

The Egyptian culture is striving for this [and Hegel did say (p. 321) that the monuments were "beautiful" – that is a slip probably – see 1831 which returns to the standpoint of 1807 – Understanding.]
There is a struggle of meaning with material – an attempt to stamp "Spirit" on the outer body. In 340, the Pyramid is a crystal that preserves a dead body. The outer shape is not imbed with the inner beauty. Meaning and picture, Vorstellung and Dasein are still separate – in principle, mutually opposed. In Greece (so Hegel seems to say here) the subjectivity will be "fulfilled and concrete." But this is only a half-truth. The Greeks will achieve aesthetic "concreteness" (beauty). But the "subject" will be only the Fate looming over the Ethical Substance (and Greek philosophy will be the philosophy of "Substance."

The Greeks do transfigure Nature into Spirit; and that is what the Egyptians can't quite do.

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Egyptian religion exists for us in their art – when it is interpreted in the light of the historical record. The Greek record is superior because it is not mute works of art, but works of literature. Unjust judgment, because the hieroglyphics could already be read. But Hegel says that "the hieroglyphs will always be hieroglyphs." This indicates his belief that Egyptian culture will always be alien and "enigmatic." We cannot enter into it with the security that we enter the Greek world – but is that a dialectical illusion? Not entirely. Homer and Co. do make the difference. The Egyptian papyri, says Hegel sadly, are all about land-transfers. The works of art are works of free fancy; but they do have definite meanings (so does Indian art, but Hegel didn't have the Greeks to help him there).

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Egyptian culture still has to become clear to itself; life is a riddle for it.

1831n343 It is still fermenting. It is a culture of strife (like the Persian war of Ormazd and Ahriman. The inscription of the Goddess Neith in Sais sums it up:

"No mortal has lifted my veil." Hegel interprets what is behind the veil (n. 344) as the inward differentiation of Nature – "something other than the appearance that presents itself immediately" (n. 345). He follows Schiller in regarding the veil as a shroud. The Goddess is no virgin for (text) "Helios – i.e. Ra, the Light Essence – is "the fruit of my body," she says. When the veil is lifted the Light will be born.

The still shrouded Light becomes evident in the Greek religion of beauty, and the Jewish religion of God as the Sublime. In Greek religion the riddle is solved. Oedipus answered the
Sphinx before he slew her. Humanity itself is the answer to the riddle (as free self-knowledge). We have had to spend all this time* on the Nature Religions, because (a) they are so alien to us; and (b) the moments are all fragmented into independence.

B. The Elevation of the Spiritual Above the Natural

Religion of the Greeks and the Jews

In 1807, the Jewish religion does not "appear" – for the obvious reason that Yahweh is not an "appearing shape" of God. But the reference to it is found in connection with Greek Religion (Miller, "Living Work of Art"). In 1821, 1824 and 1827 Judaism and Hellenic Religion are treated together, but in 1827 the Hellenes come first; then in 1831, the Persians and the Jews come together (as the transitional forms from "rupture" to "freedom." Otherwise, the order is that of 1807. So W. Jaeschke's view of the Phenomenology is finally half-justified for 1831. Judaism was regarded as the "Oriental Principle" in 1797. So Hegel finally comes back to his earliest position ("Fragments of Historical Studies").

In the cultures of this second stage humanity is consciously master of Nature. We know that we are making our own environment, and that "nature" is only a repertory of utilities (positive and negative). We are still within Nature, but our destiny is to use made Nature" to form our own human nature. What is strictly "natural" is unconscious; distinction and development can only reveal themselves as differentiated separateness. In the new phase, the differentiation is conscious; it is held together as the awareness of a process. We have entered the sphere of Desire – and of the desire that successfully realizes itself. Thus "the Heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork" (just as our human life in the City shows ours, and is a human "glory." God himself (and the true freedom of human existence) is beyond and above all natural finitude (and the experience of everyday life); but this beyondness is not a negation of nature, or of

* All this time was literally from 18 June till 10 July 1827 (Hegel lectured 5 days a week – cf. pp. 209 and 320 for the relevant termini.)
ordinary existence. God (or the human spirit) is the concrete self-expression of freedom (see Charles Taylor). Nature and finite life are the sign through which the expression is made (n. 349). "Witness" is certainly an editorial "improvement" that ought not to have been made – the "Word" of God is here thought of in its external aspect, not as itself "creative").

God expresses himself in the world (as the Greek ideal of beauty; or he shows how he is absolutely (sublimely) above and beyond the world (in Judaism). The Christian synthesis needs both moments. In 1827 Hegel regards Jewish sublimity as a decisive conceptual advance over Greek imaginative Vorstellung; in 1831 he went back to the view of 1821 and 1824 (that Yahweh is the bare Concept of God in thought, and that Greek polytheism was an advance towards concreteness. So here he says that in the religion of sublimity "the form is more in keeping with the content." (The problem is precisely "how much content is there?" – and should the philosophical religion of Plato be counted as part of Greek religion? The reader of Sophocles will very likely say "Yes.") In 1827 Judaism is regarded as more advanced because the ruling relative of Spirit over Nature is made explicit. (But this is a dangerous emphasis – for the future application of Hegel's theory, the standpoint of 1821, 1824, 1831 is safer ans saner. Then again, pragmatic relativism may be best; for the integration of Islam into the universal philosophical culture the Judaic insight is probably best; for the integration of the Hindu world the Greek emphasis may be more important, etc.)

1. **The Religion of Beauty (Greek Religion)**

   a) **The Content**

   What Hegel emphasizes first is the humanity of Greek religion. Yet actually, in his analysis of the conceptual content, it is impersonal Necessity (or Fate) that is one main focus of attention. This is the moment of otherness, but it is what stands highest in the ontological order; and the reconciled third moment (the particular community of Gods) is in the subordinate position.

   The first moment is the Concept of Rational Freedom. This is the freedom not of caprice – doing what one likes – but of rational self-determination, the freedom to plan life as a whole, and to follow the plan, learning and modifying one's policy, as one goes along. Thus on its finite spiritual side this freedom is Sittlichkeit, a way of life that is communally established and agreed upon.
"Freedom is formal" in the sense that it is its own end; it wills itself, and nothing else than itself. Ethical life will die to maintain itself. Hegel has to take for granted that his audience knows what Greek ethical life was like (Leonidas 300 example).

Greek ethical life is immediate in the sense that all individuals identify with the communal way. They do so in a particular mode (as male or female); but the individuals do not define themselves; they are defined by the communal way. (The situating of modern freedom is different.) What is rational is what God (or the lawgiver inspired by God) has laid down. It does not "subsist as a subject." The "spiritual and essential ethical characteristics" appear as "mutually external." This is probably the mutual externality of "divine and human law," or of the ethical duties of the two sexes, the externality of City and Family.

Ethical life is opposed to Morality; but in modern freedom we have a situated morality, which has returned into its "ethical substance." In the modern situation ethical life has ceased to be "immediate." But here it is immediate (or substantial). It is this "situated or returned" morality that is spoken of here. Immediate ethical life does not "know itself" – so it fragments; the ethical requirements of City and Family come into conflict – and so do the Cities with one another. Greek Tragedy presents many cases of how agents identify with some ethical value as a pathos (n. 354. It is unsound to appeal to a Patristic Christian use here. Hippolytos is a safer example). There are many ethical powers; and they conflict. But also natural powers come into conflict with them.

The "glory" of Greece, however, is the perfect harmony of nature and immediate ethics (second nature). Spirit rules and determines nature. The Titans are the divine forces of nature. The Sun is a God (Helios), and the Ocean. But the Olympians have conquered the Titans. Spirit rules over Nature. There is this deep meaning in what looks like a fairytale. The Titans have been banished to the edge of existence. Nature is the surrounding context of our life. But it is our self-expression that matters.

(We can see here that it is the mutual externality of Nature and Spirit that is crucial at this stage; is this not more extreme in Judaism? Reconciliation begins with the Greeks – see esp. n. 361, the rewrite of 1831.)
Many ethical powers are numbered among the Titans too. But these are inward powers (like the ethical divinities of the Eastern religions). They have not achieved outward expression and recognized status. They are objects of fear and awe. This seems to be what Hegel means by calling them "abstractly crude spirituality." When he compares "the Oath" with "Conscience" he means that it is subjective. There is no publicly decreed penalty for a false oath, as there is for a breach of Zeus's law.

Situated Conscience exists in a world of objective institutions (see esp. n. 362). What is right is enforced. Also the working of the natural ethical powers is not mechanical rather than rational. Nemesis falls on anyone who is "out of line" – not on those who deserve it for misdeeds. The Eumenides pursue Orestes, but Athena acquits him.

The Olympian Gods are natural powers too. Zeus is the Sky, the Weather God; but also he is the God of political justice (and at his highest reach, of universal human fellowship – God of Strangers and Guests.

Phoebos-Apollo is God of natural light, but also of all knowledge. There is an explicit outer/inner identity here. Hegel does not allude clearly to the fact that the Shrine at Delphi originally belonged to the Earth-Mother until 1881 (n. 371), but he does draw attention to the priority of Gaia and Themis at the beginning of the Eumenides (see n. 371 on p. 337 for the final formation of 1831).

(see n. 371 on p. 337 for the final formation of 1831). The succession is not to be taken historically [though it is historical?] but spiritually (cf. n. 371, ambiguous = what this means).

Oracles begin with interpretation of natural sounds (rustling of leaves at Dodona). In the next phase we have a human mouthpiece, but she does not speak a human language. The Muses begin as brook-nymphs (1831 – there is a similar progression in the concept of Diana-Artemis).

The Prometheus Myth tells of the beginning of meat-eating (Hegel explains the Greek concept of sacrifice but not the deception theme). But although Prometheus taught other skills too, he was a Titan. The Titans represent natural needs. Prometheus is tortured forever because these needs are never satisfied.

Prometheus could bring us fire (says Protagoras in Plato), but not political wisdom. Aeschylus makes him prophesy that a son of Zeus will overthrow him. This reference to Herakles has been fulfilled.
The fragmentation of the Ethical Substance is represented by the many Gods. Zeus is father of the family. The absolute unity of the Divine is empty Necessity or Fate (empty because it has no meaning or providential purpose – it is unintelligible, it has no "content" to be understood, it is a simple brute fact. All wisdom, even divine wisdom, must simply accept it.

This character of Schicksal, inherited from Greek experience, is vitally important. Greek culture is the life of Reason, at the intuitive level of immediate awareness, finite in ethical life, infinite in religion. But in this immediate awareness, the ultimate power is blind and dark, it is just what absolutely is so. The absolute religion develops from this root. What is unintelligible gradually acquires meaning; it becomes intelligible. But the ultimate reality simply is there. We are certain simply that it is so, and that it must be accepted as the necessary condition of all progress towards beauty, truth and goodness. Schelling made a great fuss in the last fifty years of his long life about the transcendent, unintelligible aspect of absolute Being. Hegel simply accepts the "thrownness" of consciousness. We are in the world; and this is an inescapably necessary fact. The Greek imagination says that this must hold even for the Gods if they are selves. We must not ask "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Our business, the business of Reason, is to discover "Why is this so?" We must give meaning to a factual necessity that we recognize as "brute fact." There is a reason why this is so"; and if we pursue it with enough determination we can eventually discover why we have to begin with "this is so."

But if we persist in asking "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (instead of "Why is there this?) then we must leave the Greek context of thought altogether – since we refuse to accept the answer "For no reason. It is just so." And if we do that – if we go back beyond Greek experience to the Oriental traditions – then we realize that the mistake is in the question. There is not "something rather than nothing" – and the Greek axiom that "out of nothing, nothing comes" is a mistake. What there is, is a Nothing that generates something, and takes it back again indifferently. When Job asks his God "Why is there this?" his God says "Where were you when I created the world?" But it is only his assumption that the Nothing has a voice to answer him with. We have to discover the right interpretation of that assumption. Still, the concept of a speaking relation with the Nothing out of which came created being is an advance over the Hindu-Buddhist
tradition. If we think of Job's God as Greek Fate endowed with personality, we can justify the ordering Hegel makes in 1827. Judaism comes out of the Oriental background – that justifies the order of 1821, 1824, 1831; but the two traditions finally met in Alexandria – Philo the Jew and Clement justify the order of 1827; and Philo did not need Plato. What the Greek tradition contributed was the concept of God as a process of community (and of finite life as a process of free ethical self-expression). The modern result is the concept of the Whole as the free self-determination – or "definition" of individuality within the community.

This unintelligible Necessity underlies everything (if we accept the Greek "standpoint of consciousness"). The Absolute is unknown and unknowable, because there is nothing to be known about it.; it is a necessity that is empty of all rational content. Looking at it in our present scientific perspective – and with full consciousness that that is subject to change and development – we say "We believe that there was a Big Bang"; and like Tertullian we believe that "because it is absurd." It is exactly as absurd as the voice in Job's great thunderstorm, though not quite as explicitly absurd as the impregnation of a Virgin by the Spirit of God (which actually happens more than once in Greek myths). The rational acceptance of this empty Necessity reveals our freedom. We can go on from this. It is the condition of free self-determination. To suppose that Job's God is "free" with respect to this "necessity for us" is to use "freedom" in a different, more radical sense. We do not understand this divine "freedom," we cannot comprehend it as rational; we are only admitting (logically) that this "Necessity" is identical with "absolute contingency." To think of God as having a "choice" among contingent possibilities, and as choosing "for a reason," does not bring us any closer to understanding "what is." But it is implied by the concept of "Creation," and it does take us one step towards the logical comprehension of the concept of "creation." We need that concept, and we know by intuitive experience that it is comprehensible, because we are obliged to recognize and declare that we create ourselves on the foundation of the many-sided contingent-necessity (or necessary-contingency) that we are rationally compelled to presuppose.

This "necessity" is not something we can "see" from an armchair. We come up against it when we are trying to do something that shows itself to be impossible for us. We may die trying to defy it, or come to a halt, but be quite unreconciled. (Job is a paradigm except that he expects
Necessity to explain itself.) "Freedom" shows itself as voluntary recognition, and stoical surrender to what "has to be."

This freedom belongs to "pure thinking"; it recognizes the universal validity against which it has been directed. (In the absolute religion – n. 388, 1831? – there is the consolation of faith: What ought to be, will be – cf. "We shall overcome" – but we must wait for the explanation of that.)

Only the middle term (Particularity) is fully realized in Greek religion. The Universal (Fate) is uncomprehended; and so is the Singular (n. 389 shows that B. Bauer – editor of W2 – thought this meant the individual Gods; and that is confirmed by Hegel's layout of the discussion at 331(3)). Universal and Singular will come together as comprehended in Yahweh. Fate becomes a person from whom Job can demand an answer. But the Phänomenologie des Geistes points to the human singular will as comprehended only in death; and the whole world of Ethical Life does bring itself to death. Judaism realizes the Universal; but it is Rome that realizes the Singular. n. 391 shows how because Judaism comprehended only the Universal term, the external appearance of Rome was necessary. But Bauer put it in because in the Greek religion Zeus is flanked by impersonal universal necessity on one side, and the contingent disorder of his Singular Olympian family on the other. The 12 Singular Gods are not a logical order like Kant's Categories. The Olympians are concrete "Spirits" though they are not – either singly or together – "infinite Spirit"

(n. 394, W1 half revises this passage. But W2 gives us the text of 1831: The Olympians are "free individuals" like us. Hegel takes back the 1827 claim that the inward essence of each is "one property." That appearance – e.g. that Poseidon is "the Sea" – is only an inheritance from their origin in natural religion. They can have likes and dislikes and can go in any direction as we do.)

Hegel here adopts the reasonable view that the Mysteries are part of the oldest stratum of Greek religion. The foundation in natural religion is visible here. Nothing of higher speculative importance will be found in them (as Schelling thought about the "mysteries of Samothrace"). This mistake is like that made by F. Schlegel about Hinduism [and by Novalis about Egypt].

(About the Bhagavad Gita, in particular, we may think that Hegel was mistaken; but the general principle that what is universally manifest is more important than what is secret and esoteric we can agree with Hegel.) The stories of Zeus' many love affairs belong to his natural background too; and
the recognition of particular Gods began in particular places (with delightful stories that are of interest to scholars, but not to us).

What is noteworthy on the side of appearance is that the Gods are *beautiful*. The way they exist for their worshippers is as human shapes that are ideal or perfect.

In their ethical aspect they come into view as a system of divine *law*, which simply and unassailably *is*, just like Fate. Thus Antigone knows that whatever the political authorities say, she *must* bury her brother. This is an *inward* oracle for her, like the rustling of Zeus' oak at Dodona (this is a good example of the *immediate* identity of inner and outer). The silence of the deep woods makes us aware of the god Pan; and the lightning of Zeus. The law-consciousness, like the panic, or the awe created by lightning, are just the beginning-points of conscious development.

What is *free*, in contrast to these experiences of *what is*, is self-consciousness as *imaginative*. The artists *produce* the Gods as images for us. (n. 404, 1831? shows that the supplement at 7 from ought to be [being] not [freedom].) [n.404 W2 (1831) explains the identity of inner and outer. Hegel appears to be a rigorous phenomenalist about inorganic nature. Natural objects exist "only for our perception." The inwardness of them is "thought." The *necessity* of natural law is what *appears* objectively "in a godlike way." I cannot produce an interpretation of this passage that squares with the concrete "freedom" of the Gods except by emphasizing that this is "necessity in immediate unity with finitude."

For pure thought to appear *intuitively* is a contradiction. The Gods appear as *free*, and as such they seem to be subject to Fate. But as "pure thought" they are "posited necessity." They are moments in the "order of Nature" imagined as existing "for themselves." It is *Fate* that becomes "the inwardness of things" when we "break through the outer shell" properly.] But for the moment (1827 at 345 top) the "explanation" of necessity is the representation of it "in a godlike way" (n. 404). The Greek God is a contradiction between finite apparent form and universal thought content. We start from an inner abstract thought (say *justice*) or from an immediate outer perception (say *thunder*) and we shape the necessary source of it as an imaginary agent. Thunder becomes the voice of justice (compare n. 410 - 1827? and 411).
We begin imaginatively and piecemeal in this way, because our thinking begins in this way. If we could begin with "pure thinking" we would be monotheists [but Abraham did not begin like that; it is a long way from him to Moses, as it is from Homer to Xenophanes and Plato].

The Greek Gods are parts of one natural and spiritual whole, imagined by plastic artists and poets. The artists know that they have made the Gods; and Herodotos (or Pausanias) can record this consciousness historically. God is not yet grasped "in spirit and in truth." Even the abstract thought of the Understanding has still to go to work (in Xenophanes, Plato and again in Medieval Philosophy) [for Herodotos see n. 408. Pausanias still to find].

As yet rational interpretation is done by plastic shaping done by the imagination for the imagination.

Athena controls the rage of Achilles; and many other myths are imaginative poetic explanations of psychological phenomena. The Gods issue from natural necessity as intuitions of freedom. Their freedom is what is expressed in the imagining of them as beautiful shapes. Spirit is fragmented [because freedom must be finite]. So we have polytheism (different from Hindu polytheism because fo the ethical freedom represented). But the essential moments of human life are represented. Everything is here represented. Only in the "absolute" religion does pure thought become the foundation. Here beauty creates a "conformity" of spirit and sense. Phidias made it possible for his fellows to see Zeus (1827 text). The human shape is the representative shape of Reason – which is the harmony of nature and spirit. This is the existence of spirit.

Only in Greek culture could the ideal of beauty (as free harmony of nature and spirit) be achieved perfectly. It did not happen before; and it cannot happen now. (hegel would have to say that Hindu sculptors symbolized the negative freedom of thought found in their thinkers; and in his perspective it is not at all surprising that modern philosophical European culture can now appreciate the very different ideal that that produced. We are post-Romantics – since in his view Romantic art died in the thoughtful recognition of its inevitable failure to express modern spiritual freedom.
sensibly. That failure made a new ideal of beauty necessary; and so we could see the beauty of what he and his contemporaries found repellent (because distorted).

Of course, the Gods do not really have human shape; but the proper criticism of this aspect, is not that the Greeks make them too human, but that the Greek concept of divinity, falls far short of true humanity. Humanity (in the concrete sense of human individuality) must be comprehended as one of the logical moments (or "persons") in God, so the Greeks are moving in the right direction. The Mosaic prohibition of graven images should be understood as referring to God's existence being essentially in thought and for thought, but the Greeks are on the track of the necessary moment of right manifestation (which must then be taken back, or return to thought in the Spirit as third moment. [Marheineke W1 looks more like what Hegel probably said in 1831; Bauer wrote it up more elegantly.]

The use of human shape is not misguided self-worship. The human shape is the shape of Spirit because we think. Xenophanes himself was worried about the actual shape of the world-whole [his name supplied probably by Lasson – not given by Hegel? cf. n. 413]. He thought that God, as thinker, had a body and a shape. Hegel clearly believes that there is a rational foundation for the thinking-soul link with the human body; but he half-admits that he doesn't know how to show this. [He agrees with Aristotle, De Anima 407 b13.]

b) The Cultus

In "divine service" the empirical consciousness elevates itself to the feeling awareness of God within it. It achieves "union with God." Greek cultus (unlike the Oriental religions) is an affirmative relation of the finite subject with God. The Greek Gods are the substantial powers (n. 419, Marheineke) of the natural and the ethical world – and especially of the ethical world, within which Nature has been comprehended. These ethical powers are the rational content and substance of human freedom. They define the rights and vocations of men and women; and they are realized and expressed in those rights and vocations. The Athenians say that they "belong" to Athena; but really she is their actual spirit as a community [but isn't she the same Goddess in the temples of other Cities?]. The Furies are the wrongdoer's own deed risen against him. The name Eumenides is
not a euphemism, but their proper name when one is in the right relation with them. Eros is one's own impulse of desire. Thus the relation with God in cultus is a relation with self. Self-sacrifice is a boundary-relation here – and is to be conceived positively (cf. Leonidas and 300) because self-affirmation is the normal relation.

The reverence of God is that proper to humanity itself. But there is also natural need to be acknowledged. But Bacchos and Demeter are the divine Mystery of human life, and not just Corn-Goddess and Wine-God.

In the festivals it is the aspects of human life that are manifested. The people go in procession for Athena.

In relation to Necessity one must be steadfast; towards contingency one has to be indifferent. The Gods themselves share the subjection to Necessity with humans. Death is the universal shape of Necessity for mortals; but we see the subordination of the ethical powers in the Gods as portrayed in Tragedy.

The Chorus expresses the Ethical Order; but the heroes act to change the order, and this causes a cleft in the order itself. The highest spiritual tragedy occurs when the ethical powers are cloven and collide. The collision is resolved by their surrender of one-sided independent validity [Eumenides*]. This may mean tragic destruction for the hero. This is the case in Antigone where there is collision of the Gods below with the political power. Creon is not in the wrong; he is maintaining a necessary right. The tragedy itself shows that both are guilty of one-sidedness (but both are right). The end is reconciliation (though Antigone and Haemon are dead by then).

(1831, n. 430). Oedipus is one-sided in his knowledge; he does not know it is his father he has killed. He is the knowing one who answered the Sphinx, but he falls as far below the ordinary consciousness as he was above it. The collision is between consciousness and unconsciousness.

(1831?) In 1831(?) Hegel spoke of the tragedies of Sophocles generally as ethical collisions in which Necessity is not blind. The agents do not comprehend it but the audience can recognize divine Justice. So there is an unhealed sorrow here because the individual consciousness is simply sacrificed. The heroic individual needs to recognize her own one-sided blindness, so that (s)he can return to membership in the ethical community.
This begins to happen in places. But the reconciliation is more by external purification, than by inward conversion.

Thus, in the *Eumenides*, Orestes is acquitted by the Areopagos. He has avenged his father's death by killing his mother. The acquittal unites recognition of the ethical outrage with recognition of ethical necessity [but the cleansing of guilt is external – except that the Furies are *his own* madness]. *Oedipus at Colonus* hints at a more Christian form of reconciliation; but there is not the typically Christian idea of being able to turn over a new leaf and make a new beginning.

On the other side, there is the free contingency of events and volitions. The personal responsibility for this aspect is not yet recognized and accepted. Humans are not yet the individual architects of their own lives; it is not themselves, but their own ethical Substance – what it means to be Athenian, Spartan, Hellene, not barbarian – that they express [cf. the comments on Jacobi's merely subjective idea of *Sittlichkeit* in *FK* 145-46]. In modern ethical life the ethical substance becomes (through the formation of the *situated* moral conscience) "the subjectivity that is inwardly universal." But at this stage the *contingent* is that which there is no custom for"; and in this sphere the believer does not "trust in God" but admits that the issue is at the mercy of "destiny" (cf. Euripides, *Hecuba*). They have recourse to *oracles*.

The Oracle has its origin in natural religion; and it depends on the interpretation of some natural phenomenon (or experience). Dependence on such things shows that the Greek consciousness lacked our awareness of personal responsibility (n. 437). We see this consciousness for the first time in Socrates. His inner *daimonion* is the voice of conscience.

Thus in the religion of beauty "spirit or reason is the content," but the content is still *substantial* not subjective. It falls asunder into its particular sides [male/female, but also the Cities, and free/slave for certain]. The Spirit has its *human* shape; and through the human body it "has the natural in it (but as ideal)." ("Ideal" has the two meanings of "the range of the possible" and "the beautiful" as the possibility that ought to be realized.) *Ideality* is what is common to Greek and Jewish religion; but in Judaism, "beauty" becomes "obedience to the Law." God's law is present in Greek ethics, but it is human imaginative freedom that shapes it. Elevation into Judaic sublimity is
necessary because the particular ethical powers have to be embraced within a unity. [This has the practical implication that Hellas ought to be a peaceful brotherhood not a set of warring communities.]

2. **The Religion of Sublimity (Judaism)**

1827 represents the high point of Judaism's fortunes in Hegel's thought. Its status in 1831 is below the religion of Egypt – and the armchair invention of a "Phoenicial religion" forms the transition to Egypt. This probably represents an attempt to place it in the historical phenomenology of the oriental religions. But that is a mistake, because it is only in the phenomenology of Christianity that it has a world-historical significance. This is what determines its placement in 1827. The Greek "religion of beauty" has to be elevated into the "religion of sublimity" before it can be absorbed properly into the Gospel of the Consummate Religion. This happens in Alexandria after the Roman death of the Jews as a nation. It is Jesus as its last prophet, not Moses as its first, who is decisive for its placement.

In general, Greek religion and the Old Testament hold hands throughout Hegel's life. The Jews hardly get into the *Phenomenology*; and they are banished to the Sunrise in 1831. But they come on the scene in 1794 as the willing "serfs" of God in a Lordship/Bondage relation. It is this relation that defines Egyptian religion in the *Phenomenology*. So in pushing them back to hold hands with Persia in 1831, Hegel is implicitly returning to his earliest position. But that earliest position was not historical yet. The Jews and the Greeks were the religion of servitude and the religion of freedom then. Even then, however, Hegel was interested in the "forms of Union [with God]" as a range of cultural forms that stretched between these opposite poles. 1831 shows the continuing influence of that concept. But the reason why the Greeks and the Jews held hands shows up in 1827: they are twinned as actual contributors to the Consummate Religion.

In both Nature becomes an "ideal" content – it is sublated, subordinated to Spirit. It is the rational and ethical remaking of it – the realization of an ideal form in it, or on the basis of it – that matters. The Greek ideal is that of outward sensible beauty. "The soil of that religion is not yet
pure thought" – this is not true of Plato, Aristotle, and the Post-Socratic schools generally, but they have gone beyond Greek Religion (as philosophy does). They have achieved monotheism, "the universal unity which is subjectivity and is inwardly concrete" [i.e. individuated]. The God of Plato and of the Stoics (like Aristotle's God according to Thomas) is the Substance that is just as much Subject. But what first merits the name of "God" in the "ethnic" religions as communities is the God of Moses.

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a) The Unity of God

The God of Moses is the absolute Subject that is not substance but absolute power. Nature is only "posited," it is a possibility that is allowed to be (cf. Plato's Timaeus, but not the Stoics or Spinoza). This absolute power we saw in Hinduism, Buddhism and Persia – and in Persia it was "absolute wisdom" (that which requires us to turn our backs on concrete existence is not "wise"). Rational freedom as the integrated unity of the ethical is holiness. This transcends what can be expressed in any beautiful form. The Olympian Gods are specialized like the animals. Greek ethics is a "spiritual animal kingdom" (not the view of Plato and Aristotle, but cf. Gorgias as reported by Meno).

The God of Moses is "the One" who says "I am, who Am." He is explicit. (We ought not to say "he" in reference to Hindu Brahma or Chinese "Heaven," since those Gods are not "infinite subjects."
(1831, n. 447. That oriental God is a neuter one "as in pantheism" – should we say this about Stoic God, or Spinoza's God? Even the Persian "Light-Essence" is impersonal. We have only now reached the right foundation of Absolute Spirit.)

Nature is sublated altogether. This One has no body, no shape. He is a thinking activity, and we can only think of him. But he is not just negative. He determines himself.

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b) Divine Self-Determination and Representation
God's *wisdom* involves self-determination. God judges – and he *creates* what he judges good – here is the difference from Persian religion, where God is good, and has to have evil outside him. Here the knowledge of evil (at least) is logically inside him. God is *purposive*-providential; but his providential decree posits an external realization. (n. 453, 1831. Creation ought to be conceived as *internal*. In the Consummulate Religion "We live and move and have our being in God." Hegel identifies "Creation of World" with "Begetting of Logos.") This is the "truly concrete" knowledge of God as Spirit [1827 is no less clear].

God is *Creator* (in the Judaic view). This is quite different from "emanation" or "procession" – which we find in Hinduism. (n. 457, 1831 explains "Creation from nothing." Aristotle's "prime matter" is "nothing" [passively]. Thinking is "nothing" actively – or "being" in the Cartesian sense: "identity with self.")

All cultures begin with the concept of "procession." We don't find a proper concept of "creation" until later. [This seems to be an assumption, not well supported by evidence. "Creation" stories are found in most cultures. Only in Greece is "Creation" a later *philosophical* development. In Hinduism "creation" is *popular* mythology, and procession is "philosophical"?]. But what has "gone forth" counts as independent. This ceases to be true in the *philosophical* assertion of "creation." God is what is first, what absolutely exists. The finite created world has only a conditional existence. [On this view, it seems to be "procession" that is misrepresented. What has "gone forth" is *not* independent (except in the case of the Olympian Gods). There is a difference in that Yahweh is an independently absolute self, and Brahma is not. (It seems to be Greece and Moses that are being compared.) The Greek Gods are *finite* selves, precisely because they have "gone forth" from the whole.

In the Judaic view God is the Infinite, and created Nature is the finite. What is logically necessary is that the beginning (God, the Subject) and result (Absolute Spirit) should coincide. God must evolve, and emerge at the end (as the Olympian Gods do). "Creation" itself is eternal, so beginning and end can coincide. The divine subjectivity must *create itself*. Then it will be concrete Spirit. This is why "creation" has to be *within* God – see n. 463 (1827?)
God as "spirit" is a distinction that sublates itself. Father and Son are united in the procession of the Spirit – three persons but one "substance" (cf. n. 465, 1827?). In Yahweh we have only the first person. But he is related to his world; and it is in and through his relations that we know about him. The story of God's relation with his world is his own story – just as our relations with one another are "human nature." (This identity starts at the level of sense-perception – n. 466-467, 1827? – the thing is the totality of its possible relations.)

The first relation (external and unmediated) is power. God brought the world out of nothing; he can send it back to nothing. But his power is wisdom (so that is not what ever could happen). The moments of wisdom are goodness and justice. That the finite world is, is the goodness of God. God lets the finite world go free (cf. end of Logic). This is his freedom [as against Spinoza's view+; and this "release of himself from himself" is the necessary condition of true self-creation as "infinite subjectivity." Theologically: the "begetting of the Logos" (the Son) is logically inseparable from the "creation of the finite world" (meaning the release of the finite into freedom). But God's justice limits this freedom; manifests the "nullity or ideality" of the finite (the finite is what perishes – it is not just as necessarily as it is. Transience – or "real possibility" – is the logical condition of freedom.

But simple becoming – as a cyclic process of substance – is not enough. Goodness and justice are the moments of the absolute Subject. The One subsists as Subject, because it is purposive. Purpose is the proper determinacy of the Concept. The world ought to be; and it ought to be transformed (and so to perish in its first form).

"Justice" as what ought to be, involves purpose, a goal.

This goal is not a finite goal. To be in perfect harmony with nature, is to be "cheerful" or "friendly." This is a way of relating to God that the Greeks pushed to full consciousness. But one can achieve it by relaxing, by doing nothing. Infinite subjectivity is strenuous – it means giving all you have got. So one must be alienated from nature, one must see it prosaically, as merely instrumental. The Greeks experienced it poetically (or as divine, cf. n. 469, 1827?). What Hegel means by "the particular ethical powers have independence only according to their form" is not clear. The Cities are "free" but not "absolutely independent." To live "for the City" is in the end to
be disappointed. That is not the adequate end of the "good life." Aristotle agreed that the City exists for the sake of philosophy, not vice-versa. The ideal values that the Gods personify must be reduced to prosaic categories of the Understanding. This is what the Jews achieve.

In the prosaic world, the appearance and activity of God becomes *miraculous*. In Hinduism *everything* is a marvel, and one cannot single out miracles. But when there is a natural order of Necessity, the manifestation of divine freedom is a miracle. The appearance of "Spirit," i.e. of human freedom, is the true miracle [471n. 1827. But this "miracle" is itself the presence of order – which must here mean purposive order or "Providence."]

The Judaic view then is that God created us in a world of "useful" things; but that he makes miraculous interventions in it. The created world itself, however, eternally manifests his power, goodness, and justice; and as the infinity that it points to, he is "sublime." But the absolute self-containment of his wisdom, goodness and justice is his "holiness." His *sublimity* if his *freedom from finitude*, his *beyondness*.

In Greek religion, the outward sensible shape reveals the inward spirit through its *beauty*. The awareness of sublimity is the *consciousness* that the outer expression is to be overlooked. The "sign" is only a sign negatively. God is *not* "this." But he is not a *wild* breaking of all bounds (as in Hinduism) either. God is the One who is *wisely* self-defined. We are aware of him in the order of things; but we are aware of him as *beyond* it.

(see 475n) The third attribute of God is his *purpose*. [First and second were God's independence, as Creator, and his relation with the created world. What Hegel calls "third" on 364 is not an aspect of God, but of the world – its loss of divinity. But "second" is "power," "goodness and justice," and third is "wisdom."]

Creation reveals God's "wisdom." This is evident in the creation of Nature; but there it is only superficial – the teleology is external. Everything is provided with what it needs. God's true purpose is revealed in human consciousness. Consciousness is the shining back of God to himself. He means to be known to consciousness, and to be acknowledged by it. The whole world (not just the Jews) should see his glory and praise him. But this is the theoretical purpose. He has a more
determinate practical purpose: righteousness. This sets the standard of Sittlichkeit for the Jewish nation specifically, but it is a universal canon of behavior. We are all "walking in the sight of the One God."

Human life is a broken condition; created nature as a whole subsists under God's dominion; and our natural impulses and needs are likewise an outer shell for an inner life. We deserve to prosper and be happy only if we follow the law of God; and if we follow the law, we have a right to prosper. God's answer to Job seems to deny this, and imply Greek resignation to fate; but Job's own indignant protest is taken by Hegel as what is essentially Jewish. Job does, however, accept his own insignificance in response to God's answer. We can see clearly here that almighty Fate has become a person; but Hegel's interpretation of Judaism is biassed toward the prophetic view that God will reward righteousness – and he does in the end reward Job! This is what matters to Hegel. The teaching is "Trust God to the end, and he will reward you." One displays one's trust by following God's law no matter what happens. One implication of the transformation of Fate into "God" is that God is just; he will in the end do what is right. Necessity is not "blind"; it is "the Concept."

(The Greek gods, we may notice, are not "just." They take sides, and have favorites. But Zeus is under the Law (as well as subject to Necessity). Yahweh is himself the source of Law, the Lawgiver. So he must be "just" no matter how indifferent he may appear.

The Book of Job testifies to the certainty of this logical link between righteousness and divine reward (though Hegel admits the possibility that Herder may be right – it may not be a Jewish book at all. Job has lived righteously; and he cannot accept the view that he is simply subject to a Fate that is indifferent to that. But he has to learn absolute submission. He must learn to say "Yea, though Thou slayest me, yet will I trust in thee" (and to stand by that). (If the justice of God is conceptual you don't wait and see whether it is "confirmed.")

Righteousness, then, is what matters. So one must be concerned with self-examination (with right intention) and with repentance and grief for any failing that one discovers.
But this purpose is a limited one, because the concept of God is still a limited determinate one. God is self-determination, rational freedom, wisdom.

But he simply is – he does not come to be, he does not develop. The Unity of God must not be a fixed unity of the Understanding. It must go out of itself, negate itself (invert itself) and return to itself with that negation. It must be "the negation of the negation of itself" or the comprehensive inversion of its own initial concept. This is what happens in the "Manifest Religion" (as Hegel calls it here and in the Phenomenology). The One will not be "determinate" but "self-determining" when it comprehends its "opposite" (here "the Other" rather than "the Many" I think). This comprehension must still be "eternal." Self-development must be contained within the One, and the process grasped as a whole.

Hegel developed the account of the "limitation" at greater length in 1831. But we will consider the text of 1827 first. The essential reason why Jewish monotheism is "limited" is that "God" does not comprehend his community. That is why "self-development" is logically necessary; and God cannot be the "absolute Concept" unless his community is the absolute community. But here his community is (outwardly) a finite determinate one. He is the God of the Jews (as distinct from the Gentile nations).

Even the Christian God is the God of the Christian family of nations.

But his Gospel is preached to all nations indiscriminately.

The Gospel is not just (or primarily) for us. The Jewish God (in contrast) has made a covenant with the Jews specifically.

There is another (inner) aspect to the limitation too. This is a revelation of the Understanding (the initial phase of Reason out of which the Concept proper develops). God's Law is given in so many words. It is a set of fixed prescriptions. But no actual law for humans can be like that.

In 1831 – given by the Werke – Hegel declared that specific national religions were typical of the Orient.

[This is not true of Buddhism – and this preconception has badly distorted his theory, which would be sounder if the universal (philosophical) aspect of Eastern religion were distinguished from the
popular, tribal, level.] The Greeks and Romans were the first universalists, he thinks. Doubtfully true of Hinduism, but certainly the Laws of Manu rest on the assumption that every tribe should stick to its own Gods; and when your relation to God is fixed by birth, you can't preach the word to others (as he says). For the Hindus we are all in our "castes." But the Jews have reached the universal thought (or Concept) of God, while still insisting on its absolute particularity. The Persians have reached "the Good"; but they identify it with external Light.

Yahweh is pure thought, yet exclusively Jewish. All peoples are to praise him; and Isaiah even prophesies the will be his priests (66:21). But that is a later development. At the moment of maturity the Jews are "the chosen people" [B. Bauer (W2) brings in "servile consciousness" to account for this – not certain this was actually in Hegel's text, but quite plausible]. Their God has done many things for them, and there is no consciousness that he has done things for other peoples. Sometimes it is implied that Yahweh is the Jewish God among the other Gods – and then he is (like Zeus) just the greatest among them. But the Jews consistenly regard "other Gods" as false. What is implied is that "God" exists for his worshippers, and theirs is the true worship.

God is creator of the Universe; and he has given universal laws (the Decalogue); but also he has given many particular laws for the ethical life of the Jewish people. The Jews take even the universal laws as positive commands, not principles of Reason. [This, too, is a return to the standpoint of 1797, so Bauer may be truth telling about "servile consciousness."] Moses simply delivers God's Word; so he is not like Solon and Lycurgos, who legislated as human thinkers.

God himself put the laws on the stone. The laws are valid because "Yahweh ways this"; and the validity is eternal even for the prohibition of pork (my example of "most trifling regulations"). The Greeks had some "Divine Laws"; the Jews, all.

Jewish steadfastness in obeying the Law is not "fanaticism of conversion" such as we find in Islam (they can't make "converts"); [but Bauer added that Islam is not nationally "particular"] but "fanaticism of stubbornness (which Hegel regards as admirable).

Because they were not "free" they did not believe in immortality. There is no higher human purpose than the service of Yahweh. One should preserve one's own life, and guarantee life's continuance in the family; the main [human] purpose of life was its preservation. [This has
interesting implications. First, there must be higher purposes than the simple preservation and
continuance of life; and to believe in immortality is to believe in higher human duties than the
"service" of the "true" God. The Concept of Absolute Spirit tells us what these are: Art, Religion,
Philosophy. These are the spheres in which the human soul becomes "immortal" – and only
philosophy is beyond "divine service."

c) The Cultus

Jewish cultus is ceremonial. The Law identifies the particular human activities that are
"legitimate." But the wisdom of the Law is not developed. It does not penetrate to the inner life of
feeling – and, of course, it is all fixed precepts for the Understanding.
The religious code for God's service is not really separate from the political and ethical code. The
life of this world, which is inherently changeable, is treated as immutable (like thought). Thus God
has given the Jews their land.

They are one great family (of twelve tribes). Every particular family has its appointed lot.
[Does this mean the tribes? No. See Leviticus 25.] There is as yet no legal concept of property.
This is another aspect of the "limitation."
c) The Religion of Expediency: Rome

Hegel's treatment of Roman Religion remains fairly constant. Only the transitions vary (at beginning and end – see Intro. 57). The fullest version is in the 1821 Ms. Rome unites Greece and Judaea, but on their bad side (or in an understanding way).

He begins here with a review. Natural religion was stage 1; and Beauty and Sublimity were stage 2; the totality of Determinate Religion is Rome. But the totality of Natural Religion and Determinate Religion (Being-in-self, and Being-for-self) will be "Consummate Religion" (in and for self). Rome is only the "relative totality" (of Determinate Religion) through unification of Greek Beauty and Judaic Sublimity.

1. The Concept of Purposiveness

This is purposiveness [n. 496 (1827?): In Greek Beauty, the Absolute is in-itself as Necessity; in Jewish sublimity it is for-itself as a subject. Greece has a divine community of ethical powers. That community must now be unified but preserved, not unified by negation (as in Judaea).] Abstract Necessity must become a particular inward purpose. [This is what does happen, but why must it? Could'n Islam happen now? Hegel's answer is clearly No! Rome is as Islamic as it can be. There has to be a Universal Gospel that absorbs Greece and Rome, before the universal side of Judaism can become an effective rational gospel. The particular side of Judaism – which can be a unifying power for Greek particularism, must be developed first.]

In the Judaic position there is a contradiction. God is absolute Wisdom, and as such he is to be praised by all; but in particular, he is the God of Israel, a relatively small part of the earth, and one people among the many. This contradiction is now to be resolved. One people is to become Lord of the world. The divine purpose is "to embrace particularity in general" – i.e. particularity as it is expressed in Greek Religion (as an unstable community of communities). But because it remains a particular unity (dominance of one of the particular communities) it is not a spiritual unity. The abstract thoughtful unity of Judaism – its sublimity – is lost; so is the free beauty of Greek Religion. This is a unification by negation.
The result is a "relative totality." The universal principles of beauty and sublimity are brought into relation, so that they negate one another, and cancel out. Only the particularity is left to appear in the union. The Greek Gods, whose beauty was an end for their communities (each of whom focussed on one of them), are now means (to the fulfilment of singular purposes, and the policy of the dominant community). While the God of Judaea loses his eternal sublimely transcendent aspect, and keeps only his particular covenant aspect. He becomes the Destiny of Rome (Fortuna). Roman religion is the fully developed (conceptual) religion of the Understanding [cf. n. 500 which may be editorial but is certainly right-minded – cf. the Ms. of 1821].

This supposedly divine purpose is an empirical goal of human beings, directed upon the external world. A truly divine purpose would have to be a logical development of the Concept; and the Roman Empire is that only in its historical context. This is a logically necessary moment – one that must be realized, but which comes to an end historically when it has been internalized. This will happen at the Reformation (for Hegel agrees with Hobbes about the Papacy – "the ghost of the Roman Empire"). It is the "temporal power" of the Popes that is inherited from Roman Religion.

God, as subject, does have to be substantially realized; a Christian community must have a Christian legal and constitutional system. But there is no doubt that that should involve Jewish emancipation (and even equal civil rights for atheists, though Hegel is hardly likely to say that).

The inner purpose of Judaism is the realization of the family. It is the perfect realization of Antigone's "Divine Law" – the exposition of "natural Sittlichkeit. But now it is humanized: there is to be a universal human law, a Universal City.

This purpose is ascribed to God but it is not proper to him. The State is an abstract principle here: i.e., not inwardly rational (like the polis) but legally positive; and that is because the will of God is conceived in that way. God is not rationally conceived yet. One thing that "concrete spirit" clearly means is that it has to seem natural and reasonable to identify our own will with God's. What we have here is enforced authority. The community here is not a proper constitutional state (the
"constitution" being what we *universally* agree should be maintained) but a legal dominion (see *Phenomenology* VI. "Condition of Right").

Athena is the living spirit of her City. She does not have a purpose to realize; she expresses the knowledge that it *is* realized. But now the projected realization of a civil purpose is the Will of the One God.

2. **The Configuration of the Gods**

The external shape of this religion in its place must be shown so that the accordance with the Concept is visible; the detailed development of the Concept can also be illustrated in this way. It is a mistake to lump Roman religion together with Greek. The Gods are outwardly the same, but have quite different standing. This is clear because the constitution and political history are so different; and (as everyone agrees) these depend on the religion.

The Romans are serious, the Greeks lighthearted and serene. The Romans aim at practical understanding for realization of purpose (the Greeks at philosophical understanding for its own sake, but not in their religion). There is purpose in Greek religion (unexplained) but in their recognized multiplicity they are free from [*finite*] purpose. Spirit stands *above* the multiplicity and views it ironically. (Finite life is a *comedy*; cf. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.)

The Greek Gods (like their Cities) are concrete individuals. They have adventures, and the poets can have fun with them. The serious Roman purpose of dominion, turns blind Necessity – the supreme power – into the Fortuna Publica of Rome itself. The victory of Rome over all is what is destined. Jupiter Capitolineus (the *Roman Zeus*) is the real king of the Gods. (n. 514) In 1831 (probably) Hegel explained the advance in terms of *Volk* as family. Greeks envisaged a world of many "families"; Jews saw one family as chosen; the Romans one family as *universal* – literally speaking this achievement belongs to Church not Empire. In 1827 he sticks to the *non*-spiritual unity that the Romans aimed at.

It would be spiritual if it were organic – i.e. if all the *communities* felt they were part of one living whole. But here the *particular*, the ruling power, is distinct.
The fact that the Romans identified their Gods with Greek prototypes is not important. The Greeks had already done this vis à vis Persia, Syria, Babylon (Hegel overlooks Egypt). But the identity is superficial. The Roman Gods are not free individuals, but old and gray – indeed moribund. Mechanical Gods of this kind have been introduced in France too – ref. to the Revolutionary "Goddess of Reason" rather than to esthetic imitations by Racine? (But see 1821 Ms. on that.)

The Romans do have many gods that are distinctively theirs. Dominion was the goal of the City, but the Romans had private lives; and they invented divine powers prosaically in order to have guardians for particular problems and needs. But these human purposes are the finite goals of the natural organism. The Lares and Penates are the household God of the family – which is only an "Underworld" in Greek religion.

But there are many simple allegories of finite needs and purposes. The Romans have an Age of Innocence (kingship of Saturn), and many agricultural festivals. The baking of bread has its Jupiter; and the Hearth Goddess moves from utilitarian to spiritual status (or is it only in Greece that she becomes spiritual? – cf. n. 524). But Peace is a goddess; and so are Fever, and Wheat Rust.

All those gods are collected into one system under the Roman Destiny. As the Romans conquered the world they brought all of the old free Gods into one Pantheon – and Rome itself became a confusion of cults.

3. The Cultus

God is served for a purpose that is really human. Cicero said the Romans were the most pious because they brought religion into everything (see De ND 2:8 for example [look for n. 532, 533 in Cicero!]). This piety is the self-suppression of individual self-expression in favor of the universal purpose of the State. n. 535. In 1831 Hegel added a proposed etymology of religio which he wrongly ascribed to Cicero. He wants to claim that Roman life was as prescription bound as that of the Jews. But the Jewish service of God is completely inverted, because in the Roman view, the Gods must serve and fulfill the destiny of Rome.
Hegel's prejudice about the Romans is very evident. It is impossible to avoid the subjectivity of selection in the account of a culture as a religious whole. But this is one place where Hegel had plenty of knowledge and evidence; and we can see that his preconceptions have governed his interpretation of it.

Religion is the tool of the government. This was true of the Delphic Oracle in Greece but there the political control passed from one power to another at different times. With Roman oracles, it was always the same government in charge. Roman furtus was no different from Spartan; but the Romans were conquerors obsessed by "manifest destiny," whereas the Spartans conquered enough, early on, to keep them preoccupied with fear of a "slave-revolt." The Romans did not enslave those they conquered. They assimilated them.

What Hegel says about Roman "patriotism" shows that he was not an advocate of totalitarian absorption of individuality into the State. The State should be an instrument of individual self-realization (even if its members should not think of it as an instrument, but recognize it as their own "divine" substance). He looks to Roman drama for his evidence; he is repelled by what he finds, and he is unjust to its ethical content. His reaction reflects agreement with Plato that society is organized for the sake of peace, not war. It is in war situations that the Ethical Substance becomes an "earthly God" demanding absolute subordination and self-sacrifice.

His view of the Empire is even more negative than his view of the Republic. He concentrates attention first on the tyrannical power of the Emperors who were unbalanced (not to say insane). It is natural for him to do this in the context of his philosophy of religion, because the deification of the Emperors is the clearest evidence of the inversion of the Judaic insight. The deification of the Emperor is different from the divinity of the Chinese Emperor or the Pharaoh, because it is the climax of a political process, whereas the Oriental emperors are at the focus point of a "substantial" customary way of life. [(n. 540, 1831?)]. In the Emperor, it is the aggressive natural individual that is deified; but in the Consummate Religion, every singular subject is recognized as having infinite value – only (s)he must remake her natural self by education.]
The unethical madness of the Emperor reveals the "blindness" of subjectivity when it breaks away from its substantial foundation. The Romans make the logical implications of Jewish separation and exclusiveness clear. Abraham and Moses separate their tribe and nation from the rest of the world in order to make them the servants of a Divine Purpose that is "sublime." It exists in pure thought, and it cannot be adequately expressed in sensible life. But the "instinct of Reason" demands a unification of Reason and the senses, a harmony of thought and imagination. So the Divine Purpose is humanized first as the project of world-conquest. We can see here why self-consciousness is conceived as primitively an aggressive urge to dominate in Hegel's Phenomenology. For that is what history has shown it to be – particularly in the history of the Christian society that produces Hegel's "Science."

The primitive position of self-consciousness has "indifference to concrete life" (the "freedom" that can only express itself as domination) on the side of the subject; and "the reserve or inwardness that is equally that of the divine and of the individual" on the side of the object. But the human individuality here is "abstract" – i.e. it is defined abstractly in thought as a legal personality. So the movement of consciousness is from the abstractly stoic individual to the domination of God. Roman "freedom" belongs to the legally recognized person.

Hegel comes round to the concept of legal personality last (reversing the order of the Phenomenology), because religious experience is concerned with concrete experience. Legal right is the most abstract (poorest) level of right. Conscience is a higher level of right (and as we can see from the Phenomenology, "natural right" comes in between). But the highest (truly concrete) level is the ethical right of "situated" conscience (or "moral right" in the proper sense). Legal right is the personal right to dispose of property. ("Personality" is the Concept that passes through all of these levels. God is "three persons in one substance"; and human "personality" is the middle term.) Roman religion is the sabsolute religion without its "spirit." The second (comprehensive) inversion is necessary.

(1831) sums up: The Roman State is the abstract (i.e. legal) power over all other nations. Recognized gods pass into the Roman pantheon. Thus they destroyed the "beautiful" freedom and independence of the Hellenic world. The power of Fate destroyed ethical freedom. They produced
"monstrous misery" and "universal sorrow" (contrast Gibbon's view of Augustus to the Antonines). This "unhappy consciousness" is the birth-pangs of the true religion. "God sent his Son" "when the time was fulfilled." But we should notice that Jesus was born at the beginning of the Imperial Peace; the "time was fulfilled" only when Constantine was converted – and that was at the end of more than a century of genuinely "unhappy consciousness." Hegel is not concerned with what happened to the Jews in Judaea (after Moses and the prophets – and Jesus is like a latter-day prophet in his world-historic picture). The destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in A.D. 70 is symbolic of the Unhappy Consciousness; but no one else is unhappy at that point. Rome has just got the Empire finally settled down.

III. The Manifest Religion

Introduction

1. Definition of this Religion

We began with the Universal concept of Religion. Then we dealt with the Particular determinate forms of religion. Now we shall deal with the perfect or complete religion, the one that corresponds properly with the Concept. Here the Concept is "for-itself" or objective to itself. The Concept is now conscious of itself as fully realized in the world. (The heading "Perfect" or "Consummate" religion is justified by this logical character; and Hegel seems to point at it in the 1831 lectures – n. 3 – cf. D.F. Strauss heading III, 359, n. 2.

The advance U-P-I is the right order for science (I being when the Concept is object for itself). Note that the Concept is our thinking concept; and at the end it is "Science" that grasps its Concept (in the object). In 1831 Hegel said "we have defined religion as the Self-Consciousness of God" (n. 3). We don't find this in 1827; but it is the position taken in 1807. We were told that "religion is the relation between the subjective consciousness and God"; and this "relationship" is one of elevation (104-5). But now that the elevating has come to its final moment, we have to reflect that what Hegel said originally was that only "the consciousness that is itself spiritual" that can know God. Spirit can only be for itself. So it is only in his worshippers that God can be "self-
conscious" at all. Their consciousness of him is his self-consciousness; and it is only when they fully realize the Concept that is both theirs and his, that he is fully self-conscious.

FINITE consciousness is the cognitive state that has an object other than itself. It knows itself in this object. God is consciousness; but not finite. He knows himself in the other consciousness that is implicitly the consciousness of God, but also explicitly because it knows that it lives and moves "in God." It mediates the otherness, by negating its own finitude. This "self-recognition in the absolute other" is Spirit. Hegel can say safely that "finite consciousness knows God only to the extent that God knows himself in it." He does not say that God only knows himself in consciousness. But he does say that "consciousness is itself a moment in the Concept that is the process of God"; and he leaves us to ask ourselves what "knowledge" could mean without that moment. We can admit readily that God has knowledge of himself that we do not have – for others know him in ways we do not; but if he has knowledge of himself that we cannot have, then we do not even know what that means. To speak that way is to violate our actual working concept of knowledge. It is the nature of concepts to allow that violation (because "bad infinity" is a necessary subordinate aspect of their "true infinity"). But the violation has no positive meaning in the theoretical sphere. It does not produce or signify any cognition. The absolute limit of knowledge, is that "God is the spirit of his community." Hegel does say "God is utterly offenbar." The transition from Roman religion was the Unhappy Consciousness. "Knowledge of God as free spirit" was "burdened with finitude" in the gospel of "Roman destiny" and with "immediacy" in the Jewish gospel of "sublimity." The Romans destroyed Jerusalem. That was the beginning of the Unhappy Consciousness.

In its general concept, "religion" is any consciousness of "absolute essence." The subject is here distinct as the act of consciousness from its object (the absolute essence). This is a "finite" relationship: being distinct and separable, the two terms "limit" one another in an external way. So if we start with the separateness of the finite subject, we cannot know anything "absolute" truly. The cognitive relation destroys the absoluteness. But if the essence is conscious, it can know itself "absolutely." This then is the logical foundation on which the absolute religion must be conceived. God knows himself in us, because we know ourselves in him. It is the relationship that is "absolute" [n. 5, 1831: Religion is both subject and object] – it comprehends itself. And because the absolute
object furnishes the subjective consciousness this religion fulfils itself. God is Spirit; and I can know him only "in spirit and in truth."

2. The Positivity and Spirituality of this Religion

This religion has a positive history. As "Idea" (the perfect correspondence of Concept and Object) it must transcend time. In that aspect it has eternal status.

We shall see that that means the experience of it is in the eternal present; but it can achieve this status only by a gradual realization, stage by stage, in the historical record. It is now manifest as the Idea must be) because it was revealed over time. For the religious consciousness God has given himself to us; and the knowledge of him came to us empirically.

We have here a graphic illustration of the sense in which Hegel is a Lockean empiricist. Everything must come to us from outside. Knowledge is given by the senses; this applies to "spiritual" as well as material knowledge. Kant is right about the "laws of freedom" being higher than "external spirituality." But even the knowledge of our freedom comes to us from outside. (We can take the laws of Moses as our paradigm of the "externally spiritual," I think. But in Moses Mendelssohn they become "the ethical by nature.") We only recognize our own "nature" because of our education. We learn our "principles" dogmatically. We only "see" their validity later.

Law and authority present themselves to us from without. We ought to understand why they are rationally necessary; and when we do it acquires its rational, essential, status. (Hegel does not see the Fugitive Slave Law coming; but he is on Luterh's side against the Diet of Worms.) Laws have to be "external" (backed by force). This does not prevent them from being internally rational – and so subjectively internalizable. Punishment is normally a positive (externally imposed) experience. In its positive aspect, nothing in experience is rational. It is "rational" to suffer what one did. But this is generally not practicable. So the law founds things out in a way that does not pretend to be rational. (This discussion is very important for Hegel's supposed "absolute rationalism," and for the "rationality of the actual." He recognizes the irrationality of "brute fact"; and he holds that in dealing with it, there can only be a conventionally imposed "reason." "Common sense" decides what is "reasonable," "fair" or "just"; and different communities will develop different conventions,
which must be maintained simply because they belong to "our way of life." Understanding may lead to modifications; but there is no such thing as "absolute understanding." The following discussion applies this to the making of a "conventional" interpretation of historical events.)

Thus, in the historical emergence of the manifest religion, there are things and events that could have been different (and different interpretations can be equally valid? Doctrinal differences are not always important?). But there is a rational core in it (specifically of moral law) which we can recognize and identify. We must draw this out of our historic religion. [M. Mendelssohn's Jerusalem did this for the Jewish Law – and so made the case that Judaism was more "rational" than Christianity. This is a challenge that Hegel set out to answer from 1794 onwards.]

The record of positive historical fact is essential to the verification of the religion. The verification can itself be "positive." Thus miracles are supposed to show that the agent comes from God; and historical testimony is supposed to show that he did the miracles. A miracle is a happening in the sense-world. [Hegel has not spoken of miracles before (159-161), but only of the historical record as the foundation of the "witness of the Spirit." By this time we can deal with "miracles" as the embroidery by which imagination registers its consciousness of the presence of the Spirit.] The factual record, he says again, cannot establish anything spiritual. The miracle stories, in particular, are put aside (as they must be). Some things that were taken as miracles, may now be understandable; or they may be rejected as contrary to our understanding of nature. The point is that (as Lessing argued) nothing that happened can prove the spiritual origin or truth of a "revelation." Only the "witness of the Spirit" can do that.

Thus, in the records, Moses does "miracles"; and the Egyptian magicians do likewise; and Jesus himself both denies the demand for "signs and wonders" and denounces, in anticipation, those who will do them in his name later. Miracles, says Hegel thankfully, can simply be left out. [It is obvious, I think, that he does not believe in them, but some believers do, and one ought not to attack "the witness of the Spirit" in anyone – unless it shows itself practically to be "the witness of an evil spirit of their own"? There is no hope of distinguishing between "S" and "s," as Hodgson (n. 16) wants to do.]
The "witness of the Spirit" can in general embrace the acceptance of miracles (our miracles, that is). But one who has it will respond to everything "noble" in the historical record. Like Dante, (s)he will see Saladin in Limbo; and believe (as Dante assuredly did) that the souls in Limbo are destined for Paradise at the Last Judgment. But like Anselm, (w)he will seek to understand what the witness leads her to believe – and after Kant (s)he will not accept as understanding what Anselm was prepared to settle for.

Reason has "matured"; and life is lived in accordance with rational principles – though they need not be formulated as Kantian "maxims." Ethically formed "character" is the basis of full-fledged "Reason" at the spiritual level. Both "needs" and levels of development vary a great deal. The highest level (the third that we have distinguished) of development is "philosophy." Philosophy is the circular formation of the witness of the Spirit, so that it needs no presuppositions. It arrives (on completion) at insight into the "necessity" of the truth revealed.

Faith (Belief) and thought have often been opposed in such a way that only thoughtful "proof" is regarded as satisfactory. But for most of us the witness of the spirit is present as our "belief" – and that is enough.

"Authority" is an adequate foundation – and "miracles" have their place in it – but pious Lutherans accept only those in the Bible nowadays! But there is a moral certainty which is as secure as "sense-certainty" (for truth of fact) or "thoughtful proof" (for "ideas"). This is typical of religious faith; but since religion is peculiar to humans we ought to think about our faith [obviously this duty is relative to our education – but those who reach University should become "philosophical" about it.] For this "faith" is not an immediate feeling; it is already a form of thought, mediated thoughtfully in the very way that it is first transmitted to us.

We read the truths of our faith in the Bible; and through the witness of our own spirit they become basic to our personal lives.

Then those who have cultivated the Bible record to the scientific level (as theology) begin to argue that only the Bible record has authority. For many, experience shows that this record is enough. But this exclusive attitude is a bad foundation for theology. (n. 21 Lessing is clearly to be preferred to the Bible-collector Pastor Goeze.) We must not only read the Bible, but interpret it; and then
what we say has logical implications, etc., which are subject to criticism; the presuppositions that provide the context of our interpretation can be criticized – and so on.

The interpretation of the Bible that is generally acceptable at a given time is peculiar to its own age. If we assume (with the Enlighteners) that humanity is naturally good, or (with Schleiermacher) that we cannot have discursive knowledge of God, this conditions our whole reading [though the Bible plainly contradicts Schleiermacher – n. 31, probably 1827].

This is another form of positiveness: that the record of revelation must be read in the context that one brings to it, the context that one accepts positively as true (and already given). One may take it (for example) that God's revelation is formally logical (or consistent). This is a ruinous assumption, since Spirit cannot express itself adequately within the trammels of formal logic. But whatever assumptions one makes must be subject to philosophical criticism. (Hegel's claim is that he interprets the record in the context of the only speculatively consistent logic.) The theologians carry on without recognizing the need for this philosophical criticism.

What are called dogmas have been formulated in this contingent and arbitrary way. But "the Creed" or "the Catechism" is a force to be reckoned with in social life; philosophy must show how it should be interpreted (not "how it is false"). Philosophy must transform it from "dead letter" to "living spirit" – according to what the Bible says itself. Here it is especially important that the "Spirit" should be that of universal Reason ("concrete spirit, thinking, reflecting, sensing"). The finite spirit, is to become the Holy Spirit. (Thus "the Spirit" is "God in his community" like "the King in Parliament.") Theologians don't know they are doing reflective philosophy, just as M. Jourdain did not know he was speaking prose. It is only the reflective philosophy of the Understanding that they do, so they cannot hope to comprehend the manifestation of God properly. It is because of their finite mode of thinking that the fundamental dogmas have disappeared from theology. Speculative philosophy is the only orthodox mode of interpretation now (cf. n. 40).

Here we shall proceed philosophically: that is, we shall expound the witness of the spirit in a speculatively logical order. We shall not begin from historical facts. We must put aside even the history of our own education in the faith. [This has the advantage, for non-believers, and those who
have not had the Christian education, that they can study the exposition as a logical construct. The proper preamble for it (logically) is the review of determinate religion that Hegel now gives.

3. **Survey of Previous Developments**

Religion is the conscious relation of finite spirit ("the spirit of distinction") is "spirit as essence" or "true, nonfinite Spirit." The "distinction" in the relation logically involves the elevation of spirit from finite to infinite. Hegel says that "the distinguishing is the elevation" which seems like a contradiction – at least until we are describing the final point of arrival. But in fact, what is meant is *first* that *unless* the finite consciousness is engaged in the elevation it is not "spirit" at all; and *secondly*, that at every *stage* of the elevation, the finite and infinite sides correspond perfectly. God is not elevated to "absolute Spirit" until we are elevated to fully self-conscious spirit. Every shape of the "distinguishing" is a necessary *stage* of the "elevation." The so-called "proofs" identify the most important logical *stages*. (Otherwise the contrast between "finite" and "infinite" becomes vague and indefinite on both sides.)

Finite" and "Infinite" can be conceived *finitely*; or *infinitely*. If they are rigorously opposed then both become "finite concepts." The *infinite* concept of them is that in which the "infinite spirit *encompasses* finite spirit as a necessary moment; and "finite spirit" is an active process of self-distinguishing within the infinite Spirit. We have to overcome "the standpoint of consciousness" which is just this process of self-distinguishing. God must encompass this standpoint as a whole if *he* is to be conscious.

Otherwise "God" becomes a *bad infinite* (as Hegel takes him to be in Buddhism). The finite is not to be taken as *contradictory* of God. It is a *transition to infinity*. The finite in itself is what is "not true"; and God as opposed to the finite becomes finite.

This argument is *not* helpful, and should probably be dismissed as sophistry. What God *as opposed to the finite* becomes is evident in Buddhism. He is not "finite"; he is infinite in a *bad* way that is abstractly understandable, but not comprehensible. Whereas it is the very fact that there is statable truth about the finite that gives it infinite potential significance. Plato lived from 428/7 to
We can exactly place his "transition to infinity"; and this (with the writings he left) establishes his "essential independence." We shall go on (as long as philosophizing goes on) arguing about how the writings should be interpreted. This is his "self-distinguishing in God." (There are deeper significances in the proposition "the finite is what is not true" when we begin to discuss "what actually happened in the past" or "what a natural event is"; but in the sphere of the Spirit we need "the finite as finite"; and we can be clear about it. This is what one would expect, since "Understanding" is the initial stage of the Concept.)

The finite is "eternally self-sublating" in the sense that the present continually becomes the past; and if I am to know what I think about Plato (or Hegel) I must read and think again (or at least read over what I have written). If we think of "elevation to the infinite" in its finite sense, it becomes what we have characterized as the "Buddhist" experience; as Hegel says, it is "the consideration of finitude" that gives us "development and progressive determinacy."

We began with the Concept. This concept is the self-experience of spirit. But as a mere concept (not an abstractly objective concept, but a subjective activity of thinking the Absolute) it is finite. As a concept it is not real. Any measure of realization sublates this one-sidedness; it also sublates the immediacy. (What Hegel means by the "onesidedness, deficiency, or mere abstraction" of the Concept – and even its "immediacy" – is not clear. He seems to want us to take it any and all ways – for the "Concept" can be grasped as our activity, or our concept of God ("finitude" and "abstract infinitude"). And the immediacy is illustrated by the human child, who does not yet think at all but will be able to.

Hegel just lays it down that the immediate being of the Concept is "the natural" (i.e. not "Nature" as a concept of the thinker, but "nature as it happens for consciousness"). "The natural" is whatever is "immediately" – i.e. the sense world, and the human desires (and the capacities directly involved in the interpretation of same). "Natural Spirit" is the same as "empirical consciousness with immediate self-consciousness" (see Phenomenology of Spirit IV and IV A). "Immediate Spirit" is all of the human "inclinations, desires, instincts and passions" (including the "instinct of Reason" and the passion that Plato calls "spirit," i.e., the urge of self-assertive agression.
If we use the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as our guide, the discourse can be easily interpreted. It is the characterization of the movement in logical terms that makes it difficult – because we do not start as conceptual thinkers" at all. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* shows us how the progression is logical. [Hegel is at the disadvantage of talking to an audience who mostly do not have the *Phenomenology of Spirit* – and can only get the *Encyclopedia*.]

In its reflection upon absolute Being, this primitive, undeveloped self does not divide what immediately is into "subjective and "objective" nature (as "natural self-consciousness" does in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*). It imagines God" as the All within which it is itself comprehended. To be free – which is its logical aim even in this *absolute* relation – it must withdraw itself from this condition of empirical consciousness. Hegel takes "Magic" as the first position of consciousness. But even in finite experience it doesn't work. His conceptual analysis of "magic" as a relation of simple mastery is faulty. It is precisely the sense of God (as the absolute Master) that he has left out.

So the next step is *absolute withdrawal*. One seeks to become one with the "free" source of Being that is absolutely withdrawn. The outstanding example is "identity with Brahman" in Hinduism. (n. 51 shows just why I want to invert the order of Hinduism and Buddhism.) But this is an abstract separation (simple *opposition* of God and finite world). The self-consciousness is empty – it seeks the "freedom" of being nothing. So the "religions of the transition" provide the first form of reconciliation between the empirical consciousness of magic and the free consciousness of withdrawal. (The religion of the transition thus belongs logically to "natural religion" in this perspective.) The Being that is absolutely free (and simply beyond all finitude) reveals itself (outwardly) as the Light (of both sense and intellect). It is the power that generates everything (but not yet a distinct "Creator" – one can see how this moment is improved if one links Judaism with Persian religion as Hegel did in 1831. For then one can distinguish "sensible" from "intellectual" Light and have a properly separated Creator.)

In the next great phase (elevation of Spirit above Nature) we have the beginning of *spiritual religion*. The clear distinction between nature generally and human nature has begun. Human
freedom (and divine freedom) is conceived as "being gone within oneself," i.e. being independently self-determining. (cf. Stoicism as corresponding physical consciousness). But free human being is the free community as far as the religion is concerned; the conscious individual is free as "Athenian," "Spartan.")

"The natural" is now the outward appearance of the ethical (nature reformed according to our inward thought-pattern). The "inwardness" is "concrete." It has a necessary outward expression in Art. Art provides us with the model of ethical life. But in this mode we need many distinct models. The divine becomes a community of particular ethical powers. The religion provides a total picture, but not a subjective identity.

The second mode of finite spiritual religion involves the separation of spirit as infinite from external nature as finite. The spirit is "sublime" infinitely above and beyond Nature; and it embraces all ethical freedom and power within itself, because the One God is absolute wisdom. Spirit has recognized its freedom; and for the first time it is properly "the Subject" – so it is now truly "God." Previously there was the absolute substance – 'It' rather than 'He' – until the community of Greek Gods came; and even they were still subject to "It" as the blind "necessity" of Fate. The Particular was subjectified, but the Universal was still "substantial" – now the Universal is a Subject, but his community is Singular rather than Particular. So its purpose (being necessarily Universal is "abstract" – to be "concrete" it must develop into a properly mediated U-P-I. [Hodgson's note 55 is mistaken. "God" is not "external."]

Thus the Roman stage is where the purposive aspect of God is first made concrete. But the teleology is external. God's people (the Romans) are to master all other nations. Here God himself does become "external." This is symbolically represented in the "externality" of the Emperor as "Lord of the World" – and of the Roman Law as positively imposed.

The dominion of Rome is a "worldly purpose." God's "wisdom" is external to our minds in a way in which it is not "external" even for Job. He must learn to admit that God is wiser than he, that he must submit trustingly. But the wisdom does demonstrate itself to him in the end.

The purpose is "abstract" and consequently it is "domination as such." This is the subjectified return of the absolute domination of Necessity or Fate. It is not "blind." It dominates
now as lordship over life. You must submit for a reason; and the reason is that if you resist you will die. The "comprehensive subject" – the Emperor (or Rome as the source of Law) comprehends only "what is finite" (i.e., empirical life generally). The Jews, with their sublimely infinite God, can choose death as a community; and they do so choose.

The transition from Roman to Manifest Religion is through the transformation of purpose. Rome ends up in tyranny and barbarian conquest. This experience enforces an inward turning of Spirit. We (our forefathers) have to ask "What is the human vocation?" The Concept (Divine/Human self-knowledge) now has only itself as its purpose. It becomes clear about what the purpose is. But this clarity comes only gradually; and it achieves itself just as fast (and as far) as it becomes clear. That is what "eternally" means. To know the purpose is at the same time to fulfil the purpose – and part of the knowing is the recognition that "eternity" is now (in the actual present comprehended as "eternal"). "Now" is, on one side, the limit of finitude, because it never is at all, it always was (and is no longer). But "now," as the moment of philosophical comprehension of all time and all existence, "is, was, and ever shall be." In this aspect it is the positive "sublation of finitude" – whereas as absolute transcience it is only the "negative sublation." Spirit now determines itself (not the world – at first it sees itself as determined in "the other – purely intellectual – world." It is "inwardly posited" (the outer world belongs to the Devil – but it is also God's).

Spirit "determines itself infinitely." It is not clear what this means here. What follows seems to suggest plausibly that the whole series of determinate stages is now gathered up and "encompassed" within the "infinite" subjectivity. So we ought to have a series of stages for the absolute Subject, parallel to that which we have seen in the "Substance." But since the "encompassing" has already happened (implicitly), perhaps it need not become explicit in any similar order: "infinitely" may just mean "forever" (the bad infinite of the future – or the good infinite of eternal now?).

What we have seen so far, however, is now described as the gradual "stripping away" of the modes of finitude. So it would seem that the Infinite Subject (clearly announced in Judaism) needs to reposses all these modes as "self-determinations." No! for Hegel is only claiming that the Spirit had to go through this process of self-determination "in order to be Spirit." But then again, Spirit
only is its own essential self by "being returned to itself from out of itself"; and in Roman religion it is as far "out of itself" as it can get. So we should certainly observe to see what relation there is between how it "posits itself from itself as at home with itself" and the stages by which it came to be "out of itself."

411 It is clear now (from here on at 411) that we are looking forward. There will be stages in what is to come. We begin again with the immediacy that is "finitude." But now it is our immediacy, our finitude – not the immediacy of hosts of aliens and dead peoples. Spirit is now to become "absolute and infinite subjectivity, whereas we now are only finite spirit, a finite community of subjects. We are "the subjectivity for which spirit is" – and the spirit that is for us is the one that has come to be in Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome. The last stage is that we ("this Concept") are to be "infinite form"; and "the infinite form" is a "circuit" that goes back at least as far as Classical Athens for its beginning point. (We will worry about the earlier stages later on.)

Stages to be expected then are: (1) "stripping away the mode of finitude from Classical, jewish, and Roman religion; (2) self-diremption; and (3) return to self from this diremption. This is the course that we have gone through, beginning with Spirit as a conceptual presupposition. But this process of becoming is not to be separated from our final arrival at Absolute Spirit. The "result" is the concept that "posits itself, and has itself as its content." This Concept which is both subjective and objective in perfect correspondence is the Idea. But it is still a process, because Spirit is that which produces itself. Previously it did so unconsciously. Now it does so consciously.

412 This process is "freedom" because the Concept is bei sich, chez soi, "at home with itself." It has posited its own finitude, and sublated it at the same time. We say in the Creed that God is the "Creator of all things, visible and invisible"; and in general, that He is just, all-knowing, wise. This we arrived at in Judaism. But it is not authentic knowledge – it is Understanding; and that is only the beginning, the first stage of speculative Reason (Enc. ’ 80). This stage passes over into Dialectic (Enc. ’ 81). Here contradictions arise, and in our reflective theology we compose the oppositions as well as we can (cf. note 61). But this God is not the "Living God." The life of God involves self-positing infinitude (i.e., the accepstance of death). The contradiction is set up, cancelled, and preserved all at once.
This is the absolute activity (Aktuosität) of God. God is not to be "defined" (by the listing and analysis of his "predicates"). We must live "in Him" with his life. Our human particularity is the necessary moment of the Particular in Him.

4. Division of the Subject

The same ambiguity about whether we are looking back or forward continues. The process of coming to be is not to be separated from the "result" that has come to be. The Idea (of God) has come to be by setting up the distinctions (of Nature and Spirit, and then of Natural Spirit, Sublime Spirit, and Conquering Spirit). But now the moments of development are philosophical-systematic:

1. First there is the pure logical aspect: God is the Absolute Idea in thought. This is where we arrive at the end of the Logic (Enc. ' ' 213-44, esp. 213-15). But now the fact that the "thinking" is universal, and so must embrace Vorstellung – instead of referring just to the pure thought of Logic – is vitally important. So this gives a second stage. The Idea as pure thought becomes "other" than itself in Representation.

2. God as Verstellung: God gives himself Dasein as Nature and as finite Spirit. The Creed says that God "created all things visible [i.e. Nature] and invisible [i.e. finite Spirit]" and that he "begat" the Logos, his Son – or in the actual words: "he came down from Heaven, and for us men and for our salvation, he was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man." But in the speculative interpretation, the "creation of the visible and invisible" is identical with the "begetting of the Logos." The "incarnation" is eternal. It could only be revealed "when the time was come" (and that was a matter of 320 years or so, not of a nine-month gestation), but it was logically identical with the setting up of the representational relation between the first thinking consciousness and its natural environment. The basis of God's being "Spirit" is that he must be for Spirit; and he can only be for a Spirit that is the motion of elevation from finite consciousness to infinite thinking. God can only be for the consciousness that is moving to reconciliation with him. The consciousness that defines itself as finite is a living contradiction which needs to be reconciled (to be "at home" with itself, to know itself in God).
3. **God as and for Spirit**: The experience of reconciliation is the *presence of God in his community*. The community is "liberated from the antithesis" (of finite/infinite) and is certain of its freedom in God (this is in *forgiveness*, rather than in *choice*, which involves determination and acceptance of limits).

Looking at these three stages *empirically*, we realize that as logical (or "pure") thinkers, we are *infinite spirit*. We can think "God's thoughts before the Creation"; but then as empirical awareness we are *finite spirit*, spirit cloven from "the rest of the world"; and finally we are finite spirit that "returns" – it comprehends its own state of being comprehended in the absolute Spirit. These moments are Universal, Particular and Singular. The Absolute Idea is:

a) God before the Creation;
b) God the Creator, the Idea freely letting itself go into Nature and finite Spirit;
c) the Holy Spirit, God reconciled with Creation, and knowing himself in his community.

These three moments are the living activity of absolute Spirit: Eternal Life.

Notice the expression "*self-revelation.*" *First*, God is for Spirit as *logical thinking*. He is "*present to himself*" through his differentiation. Even at *this* stage, God "begets" the Son, but they are identical. The "second stage" is *simply* his "expression as sensibility" (Spinoza's "God or Nature" is logically correct). *Secondly*, there is real otherness. God the Son created the world, and became incarnate in it. Pure thinking (the "scientifie" standpoint, whether Hegelian or Einsteinian) is not the only valid one; sense perception, and the "representation" that it makes possible, is valid and necessary. Hegel says "here he – God the begetter – brings forth Nature." But I have *read in here* the Son brings forth Nature," because if we finite natural spirits were not here with sense-consciousness there wouldn't be "Science."

Without "representation" there wouldn't be *thirdly*, the Concept as Subject-Object, the elevation of finite to absolute Spirit, the *sublation* of the standpoint of consciousness. Most of what Hegel says about the transition to "Kingdom of Spirit" is concerned with the move from historic to speculative "manifestation" (or from Religion to Philosophy). "We have the character of subjects only within the sphere of Religion" – (or, as philosophical thinkers we have to add) "The Son comes into the world, and this is the beginning of faith. But *thought* began *earlier*, and "the Son came" when
thought began. Only without the "beginning of faith" the Kingdom of the Spirit would not have dawned properly.
A. **The First Element: The Idea in and for Itself**

This is God in his *eternal* Idea "before" the Creation. [Remember that "eternity" is just the concrete comprehension of the present moment. It is *Now* (as in the Myth of Er) and "before" means "logically prior to empirical consciousness" – that is what "so to speak" means here.] *Creation* did not happen *once* (at the "beginning"); it, too, is "always"; it happens *now*. God in his abstract Idea is within the element of *thinking* (not of conceiving). This has to refer to the fact that there are two great *stages* of the Logic, before we get to the Concept. The logic of *Being* (or the thinking of God as *Nature*); and of Essence or the thinking of God as Intuition [Greece + and as Pure Insight [Judaism] – the two sides of the Real Concept (or Idea).

In our own religion, the abstract Idea is what is expressed in the dogma of the Trinity and its abstract being is as "the Father." God as Spirit is "the *living* God"; and that means that the Idea is a *process*; it *determines* itself logically, by differention; and the first differention is its *abstraction* from experience as pure thinking. This is all Universal. The *particular* (or the finite) is distinguished (and ignored). But the particular as totality *is* God, once more. The two sides are perfectly equal and identical. The two sides need one another and imply one another. This is the Holy Spirit, the spirit of love, "proceeding" between them.

"*Love*" is a spiritual relation, the relation of two who identify as one. Each is at peace with self in the other. This is the simple (eternal) Idea of God.

The ordinary theological discussions of God's "attributes" belongs to the more primitive level of *Vorstellung* and *Verstand*. The Orientals recognize the hopelessness of this approach, and say that God has many names. He is a bad infinite of predicates. ("Orientals" may be Philo the Jew – cf. n. 73). The predicates are "*particulars,*" which come into opposition and dialectical contradiction – and the contradictions cannot be resolved – e.g. " justice" and mercy". (Schleiermacher wants to take the predicates as "relations to the world." But that is just what makes the contradictions evident.)

The fact that the contradictions are not resolved makes us aware that we are not describing the "living" God in this way. (Actual life drowns or dissolves the contradictions. Hegel was
teaching the "drowning" interpretation in "The Spirit of Christianity" – 1797/8.) But the whole process of reflective theological discussion is "external," and for that reason the contradictions cannot be resolved. And from this point of view the claim that "the Idea is itself the resolution of the contradictions" makes no sense. We simply have to surrender the whole standpoint.

In the "kingdom of the Father" we are doing God's thinking. We have to pass on to "Creation." That is to say, we must move from Thought to Being. This is the transition made in the Ontological Argument, so we must discuss that briefly here.

The transition is made within the element of thought. God as Concept is God the real Creator. When God "creates the world," this is the positing of what is not God. "The world" is what is other than God, what is without God, Godless. That is not "within the Concept." But the existence of God himself is within the Concept. God is the Spirit, the positing of self as the other which is identical with self. The "self" and "other" that are identical are "thought" and "being" (Father and Son). The argument expresses the dialectical process. The Concept contradicts its simple self and posits its opposite as a necessary moment of its own being. "God the Father" is a finite (determinate) Concept because it is "abstract." It is the absolute Universal which abstracts from Particular and Singular.

To become "infinite" it must sublate this abstract universality and posit distinction in it; but as the true Universal it is the sublation of that distinguishing. (The argument is clearer perhaps, when we start from the Cartesian foundation: "I think, therefore thinking is; and "thinking" is the Universal concept of truth, positing me as finite – because I know myself as finite – but then sublating that opposition – because I can and do think what is true (and distinguish it from what is false).

This is "the speculative Idea." For non-speculative reflection, the finite and the infinite have to remain distinct and opposite. Each is absolute, but they are necessary correlates. This creates a contradiction. But for the understanding speculative Reason becomes a "mystery." But there is no "mystery" about God's self-revelation. It is only mysterious for all forms of external reflection.

Sense perception is essentially spatio-temporal "externality." Distinctions are stable and explicit: this here, that there; this now, that, then. But distinctions of Reason are not like that. So Reason is a "mystery."
"God intuits himself in what is distinguished." (Notice that God is the "subject" of pure thinking experience. Descartes would say "I intuit myself in God." But "I" am not a substance, so that is wrong – or, at least, the sense in which I am an eternal essence needs clarification.)

Hegel is quite explicit that God can only be present to himself "in his other" here. This is repugnant not only to "sense experience" but to orthodox doctrine (according to which God did not need the world or us). The orthodox theologians do not say that "everything is independent"; but they do say that it exists by grace. For God it is superfluous, de trop. In Hegel's view Reason as "mutual being in the other" is the true supersensible world. He goes on and on about the difference between Reason and Understanding. For Understanding, what is crucial is that its concepts can be mathematically schematized; for Reason the Concept is identically in two places at once.

n87(1827?) All life transcends the Understanding and its model; even an animal organism is a "unity of soul and body" which cannot be mathematically schematized.

Life itself, as a process of need and satisfaction, is a "contradiction" which the Understanding leaves unresolved. The state of need is felt as a contradiction; and "satisfaction" resolves this. (But how am I distinguished "for myself" from the self that is needy? As a free project for satisfaction? This fits in with the view that satisfaction resolves the contradiction.) The process is not mechanical (or blindly automatic). There is a "lack" and a self that reaches beyond it. Satisfaction is envisaged in thought. It is my purpose (for analysis see n. 91).

According to Hegel the Understanding finds this presence "inconceivable," but it is not clear to me how this is true. The practical Understanding finds the means to satisfy the need. That is its essential task.

But when this situation is absolutized – when we try to conceive of God as the "life" of the whole, this view that the Divine Life is a process of achieving satisfaction does not occur to us as equally necessary. It can't apply to God, because God can't be in need, can't lack anything. He is not a "concrete" identity like a living organism. That is what is "inconceivable" – and the finite case is never actually "conceived." The state of "need" is simply kept separate and distinguished from the state of "satisfaction." They are not brought together. Religious consciousness is like that. "Father" and "Son" are kept distinct in the way that they are distinct in ordinary experience. So the truth is
"revealed" to consciousness in its **content**. But the **form** is not conceptual; and when it *is* conceptualized, "contradictions" arise. (For instance, God *does and doesn't* need the World.)

In 1831 Hegel amplified his discussion thus: The *eternal Idea* is expressed in the dogma of the Trinity. God is Triune. This is a pure thought known in the state of God-possession ("enthusiasm" – the language is ascribed to Plato in LHP 2:30 - W14:199, but Plato doesn't use it), which is both the highest activity and the supreme *rest* of thought.

Ordinary people "know" this mystery by faith, and in the form of *Vorstellung*; but it is the conceptual *truth* regarding what Spirit is.

In the *Vorstellung* it is simply *given* as a fact; but the Concept is what Aristotle first formulated as the life of God: "pure act." The pure act of self-knowing involves an *other* which is known as *self*; that is expressed in the begetting of the Son. This self-distinction is the *Urteilung*; but the distinction takes place in an identical being. God is Spirit (without material "darkness" [but is that identity intelligible?]). "Father-Son" is a *Vorstellung* and does not represent the difference-in-identity perfectly. God *acts* to produce an other, and a relation; but he *is* also the whole process.

Judaism knows the Father alone, in abstraction. But God is the process in which God (as the beginning) constitutes himself as the beginning (the presupposition) *because he is the end*. This can be given as the true *fact*. But it is the task (and entire content) of philosophy to *know* it as the true Concept. All of Nature and spirit moves towards this knowledge.

The Understanding brings up the finite categories against this. But "3" is not a *number* here. That God is One Being is "untrue." He is the *process* of Absolute Knowing – self-objectification in Nature and Spirit in order to come to logical awareness of himself. The *Verstand* thinks it is all over with knowledge of God when it finds a contradiction.

But in the first element there is not even a *real* contradiction.

When we state the conceptual process, stage by stage, consistently without contradiction, the Understanding counts *three* stages.

But this is an elementary mistake (n. 94). The three moments are best comprehended as "Persons" because "personality" is founded on freedom. Legal personality is the fixed independence of
Understanding. This turns Christianity into tritheism. But *living* "personality" surrenders isolation and separateness.

In love and friendship the person gives herself to the other (and for the surrender of an abstraction (s)he gains concreteness.

Here the discussion of the Trinity as a Concept ends for the moment. Hegel now began a discussion of how the dogma had been anticipated in earlier religions (and in Greek philosophy). Summing up his theoretical discussion he comments that everything must be conceived in a Trinitarian context. Whatever God has "created" must have the divine truth in it. He writes like a medieval speculative theologian (or like Augustine). But there is no need to suppose that he thinks the appeal to orthodox faith has any probative force. (Or so far as it *does*, it is because interpretation must go in a circle; and the *proper* beginning is in the Logic. We are only allowed to speak as he does here, because we are talking to believers about their religion.)

Since the Trinity is evident in *all* finite experience, it is not surprising that it is anticipated in pre-Christian religions. It was evident, first, in the Trimurti, the Three Shape of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva.

But there the third moment is not reconciliation in the Spirit, but Passing Away and Change (a very inferior union of the distinctions). Even in Christianity, the dogma emerged only gradually – *after* the Resurrection and the Pentecost. It *requires* to be *thought*.

It was noteworthy also in the philosophy of the Pythagoreans [Proclus, *Platonic Theol*. 3.9-14] and in Plato [*Timaeos*, 35b-35c], but only as abstract categories of pure thought: the One, the Other, the Third as their unity. Most surprisingly the Triad is found in Philo (who studied the Pythagoreans and Plato; and finally it is taken up by the Gnostics, although expressed only in very fanciful ways.

We have to recognize the rational foundation of these fancies, but we need not follow them up in all of their historical forms (Christian and pre-Christian). The logical pattern is as follows:

a) The Father, the One, Being, is the abstract Abyss, the Depth, Emptiness, the Ineffable. This is the Negative Concept, the Inconceivable.
b) Otherness Self-Determining, the Logis, the Word – a distinction which vanishes. This appears also as *Sophia*, Wisdom – the wholly pure human being. Adam Kodmon.

[n112, 1831: It is the vision that God sees in the Creation]. Creation is not once but always; and God's *Sophia* remains always with him.

c) The shapes of the third moment are not specified here – except for last sentence (above).

We have to be able to say how these wild imaginative forms are immature; and basically this is a matter of the Idea being posited in the Beyond, outside this world, and our Reason. The Idea is conceived as belong to God alone, not as reflected here (in the world of the Other). Thus it is not the *Universal* Idea.

Boehme was the first to recognize the Trinity as Universal Idea. He is still wild and fanciful. But the Trinity was everywhere – and especially in our *hearts*. He brought it into the human realm of *Vorstellung*.

More recently, Kant has restored the Triadic form to philosophical prominence in his Table of Categories [cf. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Preface].

This is correct insight, because the triadic form is the true pattern of determinacy in thought.
B. The Second Element: Representation

It is important to realize that this is the sphere of Nature, and of ordinary physical reality. In Spinozist terms it is the sphere of "ex tension." But it includes whatever forms of knowledge are possible in a spatial mode, or through reference to the world of extension. This is the general realm of "Consciousness" (as involving some reference to sensible "reality") as opposed to "pure thought." "Pure thought" is the sphere of "concepts"; and we are supposed to operate with "concepts" without appeal to "experience." For myself, I find this difficult; and I never feel secure about arguments and inference unless I can illustrate them with "conscious" examples. Fortunately, in Religion at least this is justified, because now we are dealing not with the "Concept" but with the "Idea." In the Idea the two sides are known to be "identical." So the appeal to experience is necessary and proper. ("Representation" is a complex process. Miller's "picture-thinking" is only the most primitive or crudest form of it. But it will do for a guiding light or elementary model.)

1. Differentiation

a) In God and in the World

The Idea expresses itself determinately (or in a finite shape). It has been doing this ever since we began to look at "Magic." But when we reached "the Trinity" we were faced with explicit contradiction in the finite image. The finite reference is always legitimate because God is "the Idea"; but in the "Trinity" the Concept expresses clearly the way in which it is "beyond" Representation (that God is beyond representation always shows up somehow; but in the Trinity, the demonstration becomes "logical" (in the sense that there is now a rational way forward). The "Creation of Nature" is now seen to be the next step in the emergence of "the Idea" (i.e. in its self-definition.

This logical order is distinct from the order of experience in any case. Pure thinking, the transcending of the "standpoint of consciousness," is the climax of experience as a cognitive process. It is a "result" even though it is what is absolutely first. We needed to get to it
so that we could make it first. And now we must look at the realm of experience in the context that it provides. We have to think about religious experience, while clearly understanding what thinking is. The Idea is the absolute truth. That is God. So the Idea is not simply our subjective thinking. The object of thought is necessarily experienced as an object. We encounter it as the absolute thinking; and the absolute thinking is the absolute Being. We are "immediately aware" of God.

But just as our "immediate awareness" of the sensible environment has actually been mediated by a long process of "experience," so this "immediate awareness" of God is actually mediated by a long process of thought.

What truly is, is Spirit as a process of self-relating in identity. When we begin from the side of logical thought, the Father is the Son. They are together "in the Spirit"; and "the Son" is us, the community of all of God's children, together in the Spirit.

But for that identity to be accepted, otherness must first be taken seriously. The "Son" must really be other; he must suffer otherness, or alienation. The Idea must "let itself go." It is only for the free being that freedom is; and freedom involves letting go, letting the Other be free. [N.B. "We don't let God go free; He lets us go. That is how you can know you are free in a limiting situation.] It is the Idea that is absolutely free; and it is free, by letting the World go (as a contingent system of necessity).

The World is a system of possibilities. Its truth is its "ideality" – i.e. everything that it can be successfully thought of as (the criterion of "success" is its actuality. It is "created" or "posited" by thought. In other words, it is what it is successfully interpreted to be; it is not genuinely actual until it is truly interpreted. So far as it is truly interpreted it is a harmony of satisfied desire (or of "love," i.e. desire in the course of satisfaction). But the quest for "truth" starts with a fallen condition, or with frustrated desire, desire unsatisfied. The world of reconciliation is the one in which desire knows the way to satisfaction.

Boehme rightly saw that the beginning of finite consciousness is self-posting as rebellion. We have to run up against the limits of possibility, in order for the process of self-discovery, and self-knowledge, to begin. The logical form of the rebellion is that we try to be independent to be
self-sufficient. Our first discovery is our own finitude. We are only part of the world. Lucifer, the Light-bearer, fell for this reason. But his fall was the direct begetting of the Son who was not a rebel. The Son has Lucifer in his "consciousness" always as the limit that must not be transgressed (that is how it is in the "Kingdom of the Father"). But in the Kingdom of the Son, this becomes the "history of experience." The finite world must be there first, maintaining itself in its apparent independence; and the true Son is finite Spirit returning from alienation in Nature to union with God.

Nature is always unrelated with God. (Like Goethe, Hegel argues that Mephisto cannot be "saved.") We give Nature its cognitive status — and we had better learn how to "save" it, if we want to save ourselves. The attitude of Goethe and Hegel won't do for us. That is the metaphysical reason why the "Determinate Religions" need to be re-evaluated. We know how true it is that Nature is not stably "independent"; it can maintain itself only by wiping out finite Spirit.

Our relation with nature does not belong to the Philosophyy of Religion, but only to the "Phenomenology" and "Psychology" of Subjective Spirit. We have to consider Nature, only so far as God is recognized and experienced in it. For us (in the perfected religion) this aspect survives only in the cosmological and teleological "proofs" of God's existence. But Nature is now, for us, really an other. The "rationality" of any set of facts can lead us to God — so piety seizes on them as evidence for God's wisdom. But (a) the order of Nature is not higher than humanity as evidence; and (b) "God" is not an appropriate "cause" for anything "natural" (we need another finite natural phenomenon).

God's voice is not heard in the thunder.

The further addition in W² here is relevant to our situation. There is a higher view of nature even for us. As our own foundation, Nature is part of the great movement of "elevation" (or self-sublation) by which finite spirit recognizes its own "infinity" (or recognizes itself in the Infinite). This is important theoretically because the theory of evolution sublates the distinction between Nature and finite Spirit; and practically because there are so many "natural religionists" among our fellows.

b) Natural Humanity
Looking at the problem in its experiential context, there are two aspects to be considered: (i) The need for absolute truth; and (ii) how it appears.

i) It is presupposed that subjective spirit needs and demands the truth (theoretical). This implies that initially it exists in a state of untruth. We are not talking about practical needs like hunger; so the presupposition does not enforce itself. But Hegel assumes the need and gives the consequently necessary religious analysis of the human situation. We are "lost" souls, sinners.

Our primitive condition is that of the Unhappy Consciousness. We know that we are cut off from God, but that God is still really there.

Against this, the enlightened Reason maintains that we are naturally good. Both positions are maintained: We need God, and we do not need him. It is "natural goodness" that prevails in Hegel's own time (ever since the Kantian philosophy, he says (in 1824 "Concept" I, 288). If this view is right then our present enterprise is superfluous, he says. But it is true that humanity is "good" in Concept. The religious say we are "made in the image of God."

This is what the unhappiness of consciousness arises from. We are not "good" implicitly (or "by nature") as the Enlighteners assume; but that does not mean that we are "bad" by nature (as the Unhappy Consciousness assumes). Spirit steps out of Nature, and makes itself. It must express freely what is conceptually implicit. The Unhappy Consciousness is a state set up by consciousness because it must pass beyond the situation of natural (automatic, spontaneous) expression of the inward essence. The Unhappy Consciousness is the "stepping forth," the explicit opposition to Nature.

Notice that Hegel treats the knowing consciousness that steps forth as the "true self." The "nature" that is "fallen" is the "implicit" being – because Nature is always what is "implicit." But for the Unhappy Consciousness it is "God" who is "good"; the Changeable Consciousness is "evil." In the proper sense, humanity is the cleavage. There are two opposite senses of "by nature." It means "in Concept"; and "in experienced fact." This latter standpoint is more concrete, and hence "higher." So it is more true that we are "evil by nature" because to be "by nature" is evil.
In the religious view "natural goodness" is "natural innocence." But we ought not to be "innocent"; we ought to will, and be responsible for what we will. Wrongdoing is more developed than "innocence." But the natural will is self-centered; and in that sense it is "evil" (because like Lucifer it is self-assertive). Since the self is asserted in any action, the "natural evil" of human existence is always in evidence (and "forgiveness" is always in order). But the explicit evil of human action does not do away with its implicit goodness. To act, or even to think reflectively, is to distinguish oneself as actual, as this subject, from the Concept of humanity (the actual Concept). I must assert myself on some one side of an issue, so I am bound to be partisan.

It is superficial to say humanity is "naturally" both good and evil. Conceptually humanity is good; but a human agent expresses a "natural" (evil) will. It is the dialectic relation that matters.

c) The Story of the Fall

The religious Vorstellung of the absolute truth, the "way it appears" is in the story of the Fall. A conceptual (logical) necessity is here represented as what happened. God created Man and Woman in his own image. This is the human Concept: to be rational (i.e. "good"). Humanity lived innocently in the Garden of animal nature.

The Tree of Cognition was there in the middle of the Garden; and the man and woman disobeyed God's command. They ate the fruit. This was because the Serpent said they would be "like God" if they had the knowledge of Good and Evil.

This cognition, this elevation is evil itself, and the source of it. "Being evil" is located in cognition. Hence consciousness is Unhappy. What is distinctively human (as opposed to lower animals) is self-division and self-judgment. But this cleavage is what is evil.

The "first" humans means the Concept of human being (which is logically first). The order of logic is represented as the order of experience, because experience is what Vorstellung can represent; this has the unfortunate consequence that our involvement in Adam's sin appears to be irrational and unjust. Actually each of us is Adam (or Eve) and there is no problem here. "Inheritance" (like the "Son-relation") is only a metaphor.
The "cleavage" is equally the means of Good – the "middle" of the "conversion." The Serpent tempted Eve with the claim that those who had the knowledge would be "like God." This represents the origin of the act as evil. But God himself confirms that the Serpent was not lying. "Behold Adam has become like one of us" (Genesis 3:22).

Human labor (and the "labor" of childbirth) are now represented as a punishment for the disobedience. But human labor transforms the environment, and creates the human world (the labor of childbirth is common to the animals in some sense – the transformation of human experience is more subtle in this instance. Hegel passes over this.)

There is another Tree in the story: the Tree of Life. God drove Adam out of Paradise so that he might not become immortal. The implication is that humanity is not naturally immortal. Death belongs to life as finite. Humans must die; and they must not live in a natural harmony until they do. Hegel may have spoken about a contradiction involved in human death – n. 148 – but he did not explain it, except as follows:

"Humanity is immortal only through cognitive knowledge for only in thinking is its soul pure and free." [Michelet explained this by quoting from his own notes of 1824: "Eternity is not mere duration, as mountains endure. On the contrary it is knowing, and, thus understood, it is what Spirit is in itself" (compare III, 208-9).]

d) Knowledge, Estrangement and Evil

The historical experience of what this representation means takes a considerable time. The experience has to be actualized. Humans must become conscious of their "evil" state; but at the same time they must know that their Concept is rational (good). This condition occurs in all religions. But in the determinate religions the antithesis has some "subordinate" form. No one is radically evil (or "lost," "damned").

In the Persian Religion the antithesis of Good and Evil becomes absolute. But it is external to human experience. They observe it in the world. [What about Judaism? Hegel seems to concede, by implication, that what Adam and Eve did is what we can all do, but must not.] But here it is the knowledge that one is, purely and simply, evil.
There are two forms of the antithesis. On the one hand, we are cut off from God – evil; on the other hand we are cut off from natural harmony – we are unhappy. First, we need to be reconciled with God – and this is the limit situation where that need is felt most poignantly (as contradictory and hence impossible). Human being is itself a contradiction. This produces anguish (Schmerz) – the presence of a negative in an affirmation. Anguish is a moment of the reality of evil. Evil on its own account is an abstraction. It actually is only in antithesis to the good; and here the antithesis is within the conscious subject, so the cleavage is infinite anguish. If there is no consciousness of the Good, the evil is not felt. It is "an empty nothingness." [Just how should we take that?]

Evil and anguish can be infinite when God is known as the one Good. For then the negative is known as Evil (Universally). The elevation of finite humanity to its "infinite" consciousness teaches the meaning of this. For the infinite anguish is the condition of our plunging into our own depth (which is equally a plunging into evil – or more graphically, into darkness). If we are to have a real "affirmative experience of plunging into the pure unity of God, it must be matched by a plunging into the negative – for which the figurative expression is "God is dead" – and the symbol is the Crucifixion.

My primordial situation is the awareness of the great gulf between me and the state of blessedness.
I do what comes naturally, and I cannot plead the innocence of "knowing not better." I do know better, and I am in "sin." Not to know better, itself, appears to me to be sinful. So however I twist and turn in my mind, the fact of sin remains. This is the state analysed as Unhappy Consciousness in the Phenomenology; and the result is humiliation and remorse. I cannot be happy in the world. There are no higher human values (of ethical life) in it, because I am not free. The world ought to be rational, but it is not. So I am driven back into myself.

What God demands of me on one side, and what I demand of the world on the other, is unachievable; and the happiness that the foolish look for in the world must be renounced. In this way perhaps I may be able to come into harmony with God. I must give up on the natural relation...
altogether, and seek only inner happiness – the harmony of my affirmative side (the knowledge of God) with my *Dasein* as a finite spirit.

This element of anguish (*Schmerz*) comes to expression in Judaism. They seek to walk righteously in God's sight; and they have the consciousness of *sin* [but not yet *absolutely*?]. The surrender of the world, and the retreat into the inward self, comes in the Roman world (after the Jewish destruction) when the whole world is "unhappy." Each of these (Jewish righteousness, Roman patriotic destiny) is one-sided. The Jews emphasize the *humiliation* of human aspiration; the Romans elevate human personal will *abstractly*. This is what we see in Stoicism and Skepticism; their sages were supposed to be self-sufficient. Independence, by "abstraction" from the rat-race, and rigorous definition of "wisdom," results in "happiness" and harmony with God.

Judaism and Rome (or Stoicism and Skepticism?) bring the antithesis to its height? Probably the meaning is Judaism (in the Prophets) on one side (divine) and Stoics/Skeptics on the other (human) because "height" and "depth" are here used interchangeably – and it is hard to ascribe "depth" to the Roman "purpose."

The Jews recognize the God/mortal antithesis, the rupture between God and us. Infinite and finite are fixed opposites; and everything on my side is evil. The Stoics and Skeptics on the other side insist that if I give up all pretensions to controlling the world I can achieve happiness in my thoughtful self-sufficiency. But this view ignores the negative, just as the first one attends only to the negative. It requires a flight from actuality – including my own actuality, my own will in the world. I retain only my immediate self-consciousness as a thinker. This pure thinking is the ultimate depth. These two opposite moments logically contain the need for a transition.

The Concept of Judaism and Roman religion (indeed of *all* of the preceding religions?) has refined itself into theseantithesis – (surely the "refinement" occurs only in a Christian consciousness?); and the resulting need is expressed by St. Paul (not *originally* a Christian): "When the time had fully come, God sent his Son." (This was only intuitive certainty in *his* small community; but it showed itself to be rational, as it became actually universal.)
2. Reconciliation

a) The Idea of Reconciliation and its Appearance

The inward antithesis between finite and infinite Spirit must be intensified to its purest (universal) extreme. That this happens within the subject, demonstrates that the subject is the infinite power of unity. It can bear this contradiction, because it recognizes that the antithesis is sublated implicitly. (Hegel's view seems to be that the antithesis is only complete in consciousness when the gospel of reconciliation and atonement is preached).

The sublation has two sides: First, I may know that God and I are not "beings-in-ourselves." We are one being, so that the antithesis is logically sublated. (God has not abandoned me, etc.) Therefore, secondly, I can be reconciled with God (or "saved").

It is because it is implicitly (logically) sublated that it can be explicitly seen to be sublated. It is seen to be sublated only "by grace" – only through God. This is logically correct, because the reconciliation is an eternal truth. God is the Substance; but as living Spirit he sends his Son.

This substantial side is one side of what must come to consciousness. It is a contradiction that God should take flesh, and become a finite being with a natural will. But this is the starting point. It constitutes the need; and the contradiction is preserved: "it dwells in spirituality." This is possible because Spirit is the process of self-differentiating. It is the whole process that is abidingly real. That is the stable subsistence of a contradiction. But it is not viciously contradictory, because of the transfer of attention and reference to the process. The divine Idea is not violated; the otherness of the Son is realized.

But he is still God – and therefore it is Spirit that is most truly God.

This means that Evil can no longer be defined as simply the Other, the negative. God is not simply the positive, but the positive that comprehends the negative; he comprehends the Other. It is necessary for him to posit himself as finite; and for this to come to consciousness is infinite anguish.
(because God must die). In representational terms God appears as human, and a human appears to us as God.

Systematically, the logical necessity of the Concept is to come to conscious certainty as a fact. This experience of certainty actually precedes the logical discovery of the truth.

The religious consciousness is non-speculative. Knowledge begins for it as sense-intuition of external existence. "Seeing is believing." What is immediately intuited (inwardly or outwardly) is what is certain. So God had to appear "in the flesh"; and he had to appear in precisely one human shape, because this is the maximum limit of certainty. The thought that God is humanity in general is not enough; and the experience that God is human singularity in general cannot come first. "The substantial unity of God and humanity is what humanity implicitly is." But that is a thought beyond ordinary consciousness. It can only appear in that sphere as a singular being who is set apart. (Why shouldn't it appear as someone who tells us that we are all one with God? Ans. That is just how it did appear.)

So there is one human who is for us "as the soul of certainty" about our reconciliation. We must be ready and able to hear the message; and we must see and hear him as a singular human being.

In 1831 Hegel described the Incarnation thus: It is the revelation of God in finite Spirit that is higher than his revelation in Nature. God appears as a human being in the flesh. He can be a singular body for us others only when we have the proper concept of the unity of divine and human nature. God must not be alien, and we must not be "accidents" of his being. We must be taken up into God in accord with our "essence and freedom" (and "subjectivity") because this subjectivity is present in God himself. The incarnations of Hindu deities, or of the Buddha or Dalai Lama, are quite inferior logically.

Among the Greeks we hear of a human hero, Herakles, who becomes a God. This is quite different from what happens here (and only shows the impulse of Reason towards it). In Hinduism, substance only "dons the mask" of subjectivity – it does not attain to freedom.
There are common myths in which the body is regarded as the prison of the soul. The material side is "untrue"; it degrades the spirit. But on the other hand, individuation is essential. We have to be singular subjects. We do feel that matter gets in the way; it impedes our freedom of expression. Physical dependence degrades this and derails it, turning our minds to "lower" things. But this moment of immediate existence belongs to spirit. Natural life is not an external necessity. For this to be "revealed" God must become human and die. This reveals to humanity "what the nature of Spirit is." God must be revealed in the entire development of the Idea; but in particular he must be human, because that is the physical shape of spirit. The burning bush, for example, is not an authentic appearance of God. As a single person, with natural needs, he expresses a necessary moment. This is quite different from the accidental incarnations or masks that occur in Hinduism. God can only be truly incarnate once. [What does this indicate about the Second Coming? Nothing definite, yet, but it may get defined eventually.]

The Church calls Christ "the God-man" – a "monstrous combination" that contradicts both Vorstellung and Verstand (why Vorstellung? because it ought to be God who is represented by the human shape?). But the expression is right (Hegel thinks) because the identity of divine and human consciousness is thus brought to mind clearly. The finitude, weakness and frailty of human nature does not damage God; and the otherness of physical being does not impair the unity of the eternal Idea. In the physical order only the human is spiritual; so God must take human shape.

b) This Historical Presence of Christ

God's appearance has two aspects: first, he is an ordinary human being; but secondly, he is the divine spirit. [In 1831 (n. 175) Hegel added that through faith we know that the "beyondness" of God is thus superseded.]

Christ is not an ordinary man (like Socrates). He can be thought of this way – or as a "prophet" as he is thought of in Islam (cf. III, 244, n. 215 - 1824 on both Socrates and Islam). But this is not the religious standpoint. He is an ordinary man in every way too, however; except that he is not a sinner. Nor is he involved in "particular worldly interests." (It is not clear what this implies
about "integrity and teaching" which can be included. Perhaps we should say that Jesus did not live an Aristotelian "whole" life; and he did not "teach" but did something more.) Anyway, "he lives only for the truth, only for its proclamation." (Hegel seems to ignore the fact that his Gospel can't be the same as the one preached in his name after his death.) He wants to make us conscious of our relation with God. (1831 n. 174 seems to be a comment about the Gospel preached by Paul – v. confusing addition.)

The second moment, however, is his "teaching office" – so the comment about "integrity and teaching" is confused somehow. Hegel does now underline the fact that his teaching had to be different from the Church's teaching about him. Some of what he said was reinterpreted in new ways, and some fell by the wayside. He did not know he was founding a new religion at a moment when the world needed it because "outward Dasein, natural existence, now has religion as its substantiality." (That was some way off in the future – how can it be taken to refer to the world before Constantine?)

Jesus – and the primitive Church – preached polemically against "the subsistence of externality" in human consciousness; and positively they proclaimed "the Kingdom of God" – a condition of reconciliation in which God is king in our hearts.

Our lives can all be changed if we will turn away from the outer world as it is. There is no actual Christian community yet, living a distinctively Christian life. There is only Jesus and his disciples, spreading the Word. (They are forced together into a community, because the outer world is against them.)

The Call of Jesus is to identity with an infinite energy. All finite ties are to be surrendered. "Who is my mother, my brothers? Whoever does the will of God. Let the dead bury their dead. I came not to bring peace but a sword, etc."

Ordinary life is to be given up, and this new religious life is to take its place. (Religion has a different place and relation to ordinary life, when it is a constituted system, and one is born into it. One is no longer "in danger of losing it.")
What made it all worth it was the proclamation of the Kingdom. This is what is expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. The Beatitudes are among the greatest sayings ever uttered (1831, n. 191). They wipe out every superstition, every "bondage." Luther's Bible has put them in every home. This makes a crucial difference between Protestant and Catholic communities.

In the Gospel of Jesus there is no mediator [though the Book is needed when he is gone]. We can transpose our lives directly into the Kingdom if we will. Principles such as "Love your neighbor" are important but traditional, says Hegel. (This ignores the Parable of the Good Samaritan, which gives it a non-traditional interpretation.) We can admit, however, that it is "Seek ye first the Kingdom" that is the key to everything else. Here we see that Hegel does take Jesus as a prophet speaking for God, and not properly as a teacher. He makes an immediate demand, i.e. one that comes through his mouth directly from God. He is not conscious of himself as a mediator. He speaks as the "Son of Man" but he is in perfect harmony with God. (Given that the role of the prophet was traditional and was well understood, Hegel's comment about the identity of the divine presence with this human being can only apply to this human being. There is nothing new vis à vis Zarathustra, say.)

What made Jesus different from earlier prophets was his death. He became a martyr to the truth of his new Kingdom. This kingdom was in stark contradiction with the existing worldly authority.

His death made him more than a man.

[In 1831 Hegel said more: Jesus was put to death as a social revolutionary. Like Socrates he brought "inwardness" to consciousness. Socrates also taught that one must not stop short at civil obedience. So he died for a similar reason: "for the truth." The teaching of Jesus was culturally different; but the kingdom of Heaven is also much "deeper" than the inwardness of Socrates.

It is with the death of Christ, however, that the "reversal of consciousness" begins. The comprehension of it makes the difference between ordinary consciousness and faith. This comprehension takes place "in the Spirit" (the "Spirit of truth" or "Holy Spirit"). The divine nature is revealed in the Christ-record – especially in the passages of John's Gospel about the Son knowing the Father. Faith comprehends these "in their truth" through the interpretation of Crucifixion. This
is the "witness of the Spirit" which takes us beyond comparison of Jesus with Socrates. Truth is revealed in him for the first time (but "revealed in him to the eye of faith" – who can say what a faithful Buddhist sees in Siddharta-Gautama? except the Buddhist herself? Ans. (s)he won't see the death of God and man together.)

c) The Death of Christ and Transition to Presence

Before Jesus died there were around him believers in the Kingdom, people who lived in and for the Kingdom. But his death changed things. It was violent and unjust, caused by hatred. But the meaning of it was religious, not ethical or moral. The Verhältnis to God was involved, to something beyond, not present. The Kingdom, on the other hand, is present (and God in it; for its members love one another, and God is love. The Kingdom also involves the sense of God as needed. So there is a distinction between self and God. The presence of God is certain, but it is a certainty that comes from the physical presence of the one who knows his own unity with "the Father." The certainty has so far depended on his physical presence in the realm of sense-perception. But now comes "the descent of the Spirit" (because the living Jesus promised that).

We have seen God, thus far, as the imagined spirit of human freedom: as the Volksgeister ("subjective, limited forms" and "contingent shapes"). The primary reference here has to be to Greece. "Contingent" because pictured by specific artists, "limited" because indefinitely many; "subjective" why? Because they are the "subjects" of the Ethical Substance perhaps? On this side Yahweh comes in; he is not "contingent-shaped" or "limited," but he is the God of a single Volk-subject – and this Volk knows itself to be free. The Jews must be included here somehow, because what follows is the Roman "anguish of the World" – and they are the most visible expression of that. The anguish results in an impulse to know God as one infinite, universal Spirit. This "instinct" of Spirit "demands" the Incarnation of God as an actual human being. It takes hold of the life-record, with teaching and "miracles" of the man Jesus, and interprets them in the context of this "demand."
And after Pentecost, the record, and the interpretation, develops. The death of the Christ-figure is the touchstone. Jesus is the "God-Man." God took human shape and died in it. He died even the death of a condemned criminal.

This is a terrible thought: that God has died, he has accepted, become reconciled with natural negation. This is terrible anguish and loss for the religious spirit: everything high and holy is brought to nothing. But now the reversal begins. God maintains himself in death. His death turns over into the death of death (negation of the negation). God "rises from the dead" (without losing his humanity).

The human God appeared only to familiar friends. The Resurrection was a phenomenon of faith, not "an external history for unbelievers." (What does that mean? Minimally that no one is going to believe that it happened, unless they have "faith." But "faith" should mature into philosophical comprehension of the divine nature (i.e. of the Concept). Starting (in the second sphere) from sense-intuition, we have seen the immediate sensible Singular sublate itself. In the first sphere (Logic) it was the abstract Universality (the "seclusion") of God that was sublated – his immediate being as "essence of essences"; now it is "abstract humanity," the immediacy of singular subsistence, that is sublated (by natural death). But the death of the God-Man is the "death of death" – just as ending the "seclusion" of the Concept was the realization of the Idea, but now this "realization" occurs for Consciousness.

God has "put death to death" by rising from it. Finitude and humiliation are alien to Christ as God. He took this over from us; and he has put it to death by his death. Dying as a criminal, he displays the infinity of love. He accepts the extreme of evil (as suffering) into himself. This is quite opposed to the doctrine of rational imputation, according to which we are each responsible for our own doings. This doctrine applies only in the finite sphere, not in the sphere of free spirit. Already in the moral sphere (before we reach religion), spirit is known to be free (it is not bound down, defined, by its own past). Limitation (even when it reaches sin) is a nullity for infinite spirit.

What was done, can be undone. Finitude and evil are destroyed. The world is reconciled with God (implicitly). This is an existential experience, not a historical fact. The subject feels the anguish of sin, and knows (s)he is forgiven.
The relationship of the believers moves from the Man to the God at Pentecost; and the "descent of the Spirit" is a certainty of inner feeling. The martyred teacher and friend is transformed. Only after his death could the disciples know what the Spirit of God was, and it was the Spirit (not Jesus himself) who would "guide them into all truth." Jesus is glorified; but Christ only returns to his original "glory."

Death is the "middle term" for this syllogistic transition. Everything in the life-record is reinterpreted in the light of the "Ascension"; the Gospels themselves only get written after Pentecost (n. 204). [An's marginal note means "they are not history."]

_Gott selbst ist tot_, says the hymn. Death belongs to him. The worshippers of Osiris sang this. But _now_ he has been among us as a human. The meaning is _inwardized_ (this is not the seasonal death of Nature). And now it is precisely death that reveals the divine glory. The human, the finite as negative, is stripped away. But it is _God's_ death, He shares it.

Thus, the certainty that is achieved is: that the Idea of God involves _us_, that _we_ are certain of union with God, that the human is God present. What humanity, what spirit is: _an sich_, both God and dead.

This is "the stripping away of the human," and "coming to be of Spirit." The consciousness of the community makes this transition (from Jesus to Christ, the God-Man, the unity of God and humanity). This is its foundation, the truth from which it begins. God has shown himself to be reconciled with us. Our _otherness_, our self-distinguishing, is a moment of God himself – one that disappears and sublates itself – but one that is eternally necessary.

The history of Jesus became a divine history. God is _seen_ in him. The doctrine of the Trinity develops out of the logical absorption of this truth. We cannot be reconciled with God in Christ, unless Christ is God; and that means that the Spirit is God. God must be the self that distinguishes itself as other, and returns to itself as community (cf. §208). Other theological formulations of the Crucifixion (as "sacrifice," as universal Atonement) reduce automatically to this, because the "eternal divine history" is a universal history.
When God dies, we *all* die; and when he rises, we all rise – just as (n. 211) "the Apostle [John the Evangelist 3:14 recounting what Jesus said to Nicodemus] compares faith in Christ with looking upon the bronze serpent (Numbers 21:5-9).

The Idea had to be a sensible certainty (in its *manifest* phase) which both passes over into spiritual consciousness, *and* "is converted into the immediately sensible" (a *dead body*) so that God's life is seen in it.
C. The Third Element: Community, Spirit

Only about two and a half lecture hours remained when Hegel reached this point. He had to deal with the climax of "Absolute Religion" quite briefly.

When "Christ rises" it is in his community.

The "birth" of the spiritual community is in the "descent of the Spirit" at the Feast of Pentecost. This is the "comprehension" of what had happened in the life and death of Jesus. The "comprehending" is an act of Faith. About sixty years after Jesus was crucified, what had happened was recorded as "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory." The process of living, dying and being glorified, is one that every believer must now go through. Everyone must die and rise again with Christ. God has gone through the process as one of us. So we can all do it.

1. The Origin of the Community

Faith has two elements: an actual historical memory-experience or record; and the spiritual comprehension of what has happened. Verification (or confirmation of faith) is not, and cannot be, "sensory." There is a complete shift of perspective when an empirical record is given a spiritual interpretation. We have seen that the so-called "proofs for the existence of God" are concerned with this "shift."

Investigations about the Risen Christ are not empirical historical inquiries, sense-experiences. The "witness of the Spirit" is not a matter of being convinced by the historical evidence.

The Scriptures have two kinds of meaning. They are historical records; but also they are the basis of spiritual experiences. The community is the existing Spirit, or God existing as community. The first moment (Father) was a logical Idea, not yet at the stage of Judgment (or division between Concept and Reality). This is the Universal. The Second moment is the "Son," the Idea in sense-appearance. Opposition between the real living man (Jesus) and the pure Concept (Father). This is
the Particular. It moves back into union with the Concept (Universal). The Third moment (Singular) is the Community, the Spirit as a syllogistic motion back through the Particular to the Universal. It is in the Community that "I" exist as Singular; and through the mediating identity of the divine and the human, I return to God the Father just as Jesus did.

The community is initially the group that knows "the Kingdom is at hand. God is Father, Son and Spirit." God is "life eternal"; and as John said, "in the Logos was life, and the life was the light of men." The Logos has appeared – so we should all recognize ourselves as children of God, citizens in his Kingdom.

Through my faith, the historical record gets its spiritual meaning; and through my faith, therefore, I know that I am reconciled with God – i.e. "saved" (or "filled by the divine Spirit").

I am only a Singular subject. I am quite "different" from the Absolute Spirit. But God, the Absolute Spirit, knows what is in my "heart." He knows the substantial will in me – the will to belong to his community, and to be saved. I am, of course, a sinner. I fall short, I make errors. But I repent, and therefore this finitude is reduced to inessential status – it is the aspect of me that dies.

This is my concept of the community (the uniting of the first two moments, God and finite self.

The Spirit of God is my pure self-consciousness that knows and wills truth.

2. The Subsistence of the Community (Bestehen)

The community realizes itself as the Church. The Church is here; it maintains itself. It provides the means – and the guidance – by which singular subjects come to the truth. Through it, the Spirit becomes real. The truth is now known and presupposed. The Church is the universal community that guards it. The Church teaches this known truth as doctrine. The doctrine is essentially that inside the Church one is saved. This is quite different from the original "outpouring of the Spirit" with which the community began.
The "doctrine" is the spiritual meaning of the faith, formulated as a presupposition of membership in the community. It is the consciousness of the Spirit (as an objective reality). Initially the presence of the Spirit is subjective: intuition, faith, feeling – the witnessing of a flame of fire. The feeling of the Spirit as fire has to be developed into Vorstellung. At first everything is remembered as a story; and the meaning is elaborated and fixed by the authority of the Church. But later thinking gets to work on the remembered record. There begins to be a Christian "philosophy." This "philosophy" is a confused mixture of "fact" and theoretical interpretation, of "impure" empirical contents, and "pure" speculation. Since "spiritual" truth exists only as "known" (not as present facts), the Church is essentially a teaching institution.

We are born into the faith. It is the contextual frame of our interpretation of the world and of our life. We are baptized into the community before we are perceptually and thoughtfully conscious. We are saved from "the world" and "the Devil" as babies.

The doctrine is taught to children from outside. Only as (s)he learns to think and reflect does (s)he become conscious as Spirit. Her first relation to it is as a positive authority. All truth (even the sense-experience that ought not to count as truth) comes to us first "on authority." It is a present fact that enforces itself. The senses are authoritative. But Church doctrine is taught as true. Custom is an established conviction, that is taught as "what is right." Like Church doctrine it has authority.

We learn sensible facts "from authority." (Does Hegel mean that someone explains the Sun and Moon to us as children? That I must "put up with it" is certainly taught. In the natural cultures one is taught "Sun and Moon are Gods" – sense content and doctrine go together. Probably it is the accepted interpretation of sense-content that comes "from authority." ) Certainly our religious faith is imparted to us by authoritative teaching. Hegel cheerfully calls this "the truth." The object of "education, practice, cultivation" is to make acceptance of "truth," and the doing of what is good, habitual. Evil has been sublated "in and for itself." The baptized child is born into freedom. (Notice that Hegel simply assumes that this is "the freedom to do good" – contrast Augustine.) For the saved Christian there is no absolute otherness – otherness is posited as sublated. We do wrong and evil things, to be sure. But it is an sich nichtig. Spirit can undo it. (We have to concede to
Fackenheim that this Christian confidence is now *unconvincing*. We can't "undo" Hiroshima or the Holocaust; and we can't even be confident that it has been undone spiritually.

The "undoing" of which Hegel is thinking is *penitence*. The evil comes to naught because the truth is acknowledged and the good is willed. The past cannot be changed. But its significance can be cancelled. Clearly Hegel is thinking of the education and rehabilitation of individuals. But also he has in mind the *doctrine* that Satan has already lost the battle. There is no endless fight between good and evil (as in Persian religion). (That is one aspect of "infinity," however; and "evil" has to be recognized as a moment of the Divine Being. So we could argue that in our historical, *finite* perspective – as a number of different communities – there is a never-ending fight between good and evil. Hegel's critique of Kant is of doubtful validity. He *was* right about Freedom; but – just for that reason – how *can* he be right about "good and evil"? I am never finally damned (n. 235, 1831) because I can always lay hold of my implicit unity with God; but what does the certainty of "final salvation" really amount to? (n. 239, 1831) indicates that acting on this belief is logically or methodically rational. You must make *some* assumption, so you don't assume that striving for the good is pointless. What else does the assertion "it *is* the act of the divine Spirit" mean?)

That the community is securely established is what the celebration of Holy Communion shows forth. Here difference is sublated and a "mystical union" is experienced.

Why is this a "negative unity"? (We are *all* one?) This unity begins with the Host. There are three views of this: Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist. According to the Catholic view God is directly present as this external thing. —— According to the Lutheran view, there is a *movement* that begins from the physical piece of bread; but it is in the experience of consumption that God is present. It is a spiritual experience, and the "witness of the spirit" is necessary to it.

"Transubstantiation" means only this change of levels – the annulment of the level of external fact. According to the Calvinists the whole ceremony is a *Vorstellung* only. *We remember* the God-Man. (Hegel gives no verdict here; but it is obvious that the Lutheran view is right for him.) Thus the community is maintained by a triadic process: teaching, penitence, communion.

3. **The Realization of Spirituality**
Realization of spirituality "in universal actuality" involves transformation of the community. Religion reconciles the heart to God – the inner self. It is essentially spiritual. (There is no way that what has been done can be undone in the outer world – Religion is not concerned with that.) It is the "pure heart" that enjoys God's presence (note that the Lutheran view of the Mass is assumed). But "the heart" is "abstract" – we are in church, and the rat-race still goes on outside. As "pure hearts" we are all reconciled and united. But on the other side of this "universal spirituality" there is the personal individuality of each one of us, with all of our weekday worldly interests. We are not trying to forget that, or to turn away from it (as in the paradigm set by Siddharta/Gautama – and even, arguably, by Jesus himself.

The "kingdom of God" (which Jesus preached) must be shown forth in the world. It is to be known and experienced there. The spiritual community provides the principles of the worldly realm. When Hegel says that "Religion is the foundation of the State," he means that the political-legal constitution, and the social mores, should be informed everywhere by the spirit of the religion. So we have good grounds for reinterpreting his justification of the actual structure of his society in the direction indicated by the spirit of Christian charity. (To do this is the proper way to "follow Hegel." Of his arguments we must say "He was the child of his time.")

The spiritual truth that is to be realized in the world is precisely that we are all "children of God"; we are all recipients of his grace, and each of us has an infinite value, in virtue of her vocation. The universal (infinite) aspect of this vocation, is its direction by and towards freedom. This freedom is to be expressed and enjoyed in the world (and not just in church). We are to be "at home" in the world. We achieve the comprehension of our "freedom" (or of our rationality) through our religion; but it must transform our real world. Thus slavery, for example, ought not to exist in the Christian world. [What about wage-slavery then? or child-labor? or the more obvious economic forms of the subjection of women? When we come to the subjection of women in the family the application of the Christian principle becomes more complicated. But it is quite clear that the Christian mode of "being at home in the world" does not being resigned to it, still less being satisfied with it.]
The first moment of "reconciliation" is actually *separation*. The *immediate* relation of the Church with the world, is one of "otherness" (or *abstraction*). But the world is *my* world, my *substance*. So if I withdraw from it (like a monk or nun) I am negating *myself* as well. I have an *impulse* towards nature, social life, art, and science. (This is a prejudiced verdict: even in the cloister one can be a "scientist"; and – like Fra Angelico – an artist. Nor is a good Benedictine cut off from *nature*, because *laborare est orare*. Only "social life" is severely restricted. Of course, one need not remain "cloistered." But that moves us into the next moment.)

The logical development of spirit requires that this immediate otherness should develop into *involvement* with the world. But the involvement is a relation of *domination*. The Church (as the reconciled community) must rule over the unreconciled realm of worldly life. In so far as the worldly realm needs to be culturally formed and educated, this authoritative relation is justified. But one inevitable result is *assimilation*. The Church itself becomes a hierarchy of power, and is corrupted from purity of spirit into worldliness. For the ordinary Church member this is the experience of *unfreedom*. Every aspect of life is *cloven* between the aspect of salvation (holiness) and that of damnation (the unholy). This is the condition of the "Unhappy Consciousness," or of universal *servitude*.

The true reconciliation is through the resolution of the conflict in *Sittlichkeit*. Christian *Sittlichkeit* is the *penetration* of spiritual freedom into the worldly realm. In 1831 (n. 250), under the shadow of *another* revolution in France (1830), Hegel emphasizes that constitutional government is the principal form in which "the divine has broken through into the sphere of actuality." It is vitally important to his view that "the worldly realm has its foundation in the divine will; and his conclusion about the Revolution of 1830 was that the French could never get their political constitution right, because they never had a proper religious Reformation. (But this was just the judgment of a finite individual in a certain social position in a certain State; the climax of 1821 – that we must leave the world to solve its own problems in its own time – is arguably more "philosophical." It is the continuing *authority* of the Church in his own society that makes it difficult (inexpedient) to *say* this sort of thing in 1831. 1821 is therefore to be preferred to the later lectures.
The institutions of true *Sittlichkeit* are *divine*, though they are not *holy* (as opposed to *secular*). The idea of a special, higher than ordinary, holiness (e.g. celibacy, vow of poverty) is a mistake. In the "vow of obedience" the mistake becomes quite explicit, because *ethical* obedience is voluntary submission to the will of God, *as one understands it for oneself*.

After summing up the three stages of "reconciliation" (which can be recognized in the *Phenomenology*—the summary here enables us to put the Unhappy Consciousness, *Bildung*, and Faith and Insight together), Hegel sets out the stages by which religious reconciliation passes over into *philosophy*. So far we have only dealt with the first of these: the development of reconciliation into Protestant ethical consciousness.

The new development that begins with *that*, is the *thinking* consciousness of religion. *Thinking* is a way of "being at home with oneself" even when it is as abstract as the free thought of the Stoics. But Hegel has the thinking of Christian "Faith" and Enlightened "Insight" in mind. The "infinite demand" (n. 253, 1831) is that "the content of religion should be confirmed by thought."

What this means is a very contentious problem. By my reference to "Faith and Insight" I have already indicated my own interpretive position— which is at (or near) the "enlightened extreme."

Hegel himself sets up the contrast between "thinking" (i.e., Insight?) and "the concrete" (i.e. Faith?). He gives a very *positive* evaluation of the Enlightenment. It "defies and destroys externality in whatever form." No doubt he is thinking of the *German Aufklärung*, more than of its French predecessor. But he regards the "religion of Reason" as excessively *abstract*. The Enlighteners do not appreciate the *concrete* significance of the Trinitarian Concept of God.

Abstract thinking is directed against "externality in general"—so it is "opposed to distinction as such because in distinction a reciprocally opposed externality is indeed present." What does this mean? I take it that the "reciprocally opposed externality" is the Mosaic God as an independent and transcendent being. Hegel seems to agree with D'Holbach (or Helvétius) that *this* God must be rejected. But "in the Idea of God, in the concrete truth, this externality is likewise resolved." In the movement from God as Lawgiver, to God as Spirit—through the "middle" represented as the "Son"
– the *opposition* between the thinking worshipper and her "Creator" is *resolved*. We, the finite spirits, "live, move, and have our being in God."

n. 255 (1827) is to be regarded as the beginning of a new paragraph. Having indicated the right way out of the difficulty, Hegel turns to his own criticism of the "enlightened" standpoint. The enlightened view annuls everything that is concrete and determinate in God. It turns the Christian Trinity back into the God of Moses. It conceives of God in a *conscious understanding* way. God becomes completely *sublime*; and we cannot *know* him at all. [Re. n. 256: It is surely Schleiermacher, rather than Kant and Jacobi, that Hegel has his eye on in 1827!]

It was not the theologians, but the secular Enlighteners who first argued that our original human nature is *good*. But then "the good" comes to mean the abstract concept of "happiness"; and everyone gets to define it according to her own contingent circumstances and caprice. The uniting of this abstract ideal with religious faith can produce hypocrisy. The pious life of *feeling* is what is exalted in *Pietism*. This does not quite cease to be "Christian," because a very attenuated form of the "witness of the spirit" is maintained (n. 258, 1831). But it becomes a piety of the "Beautiful Soul," in which every worshipper has her own God, her own Christ, etc. That is the opposite of *true* religion which unites us with the community.

It seems clear that Hegel regards this Pietism as the dissolving of *Faith* into philosophical consciousness. On the other side, Rational Insight dissolves into "absolute culture" (see n. 259). He seems to forget about absolute culture, and to see the opposite poles, as external authoritarianism and the abstract subjectivity of the Beautiful Soul. [It is not "the religion of the Enlightenment" but "the religion attacked by the Enlightenment" that is the extreme of servitude – Hodgson's note 261 is mistaken.]

The third moment in this evolution of the religion of thought is the *speculative* interpretation of the Trinity. We now arrive at *Philosophy*. The "content," rejected by both Insight and Pietism, "takes flight into the Concept": Thought now *interprets* the dogma (as its own content). It *comprehends* it as concrete experience. On its two flanks secular Enlightened Reason and Pietism "volatilize all content." These are the two shapes of "the purely subjective standpoint."
What Hegel says about this mediated return to the possession of objective content is puzzling. "The Concept produces the truth ... but it recognizes this truth as at the same time not produced." It is easy to see that what is produced is the speculative interpretation; and that the recognition that it is not (really) "produced," is the recognition of its logical status. It is the eternal truth about human experience, and about "truth." In this perspective it is no more "produced" than is Pythagoras' theorem. But what does this eternal logical status entail? Surely not that the historical genesis is in any way privileged? In the "biography of God" Jesus is not more important than Prince Siddharta (or Zarathustra).

Speculative philosophy "expresses the witness of spirit in a developed, thoughtful fashion." Hegel says that it is "the justification of religion, especially of the Christian religion, the true religion." But surely this is a way of recommending his own philosophy to the religious majority of the learned. It is true that the Christian religion of his own Prussia is the fullest development of human rational freedom. But what is important in his comment is the "justification of religion" generally.

Form and content go together. But all of the "modes of the appearance of God" are forms of this same absolute content. Hegel's God does care for the Chinese (and the undiscovered tribe of Monomotapa); but their destiny is not to be converted to Christianity, but rather to be converted to philosophy (in their educated class, at least). The task is to find the same speculative truth in their own tradition; and a socio-political transformation of their societies is mandated by this task. Thus, if slavery is unChristian then the Indian caste-system is inhuman; but how it is to be given a more human ("rational") shape is for the Hindus themselves to work out.

Concrete thought is "the witness of the spirit." The "substance" that is to be spiritualized (or "subjectified") is the content of tradition (which already constitutes the ethical substance of the community from which the individual must emerge as "God's child." Hegel is not concerned about this, but only about turning back the attack of the Enlightenment. He repeats in outline his critical response in the Phenomenology. But now he insists that "determinacy is itself the Concept."
crucial truth of Christianity is the Incarnation of God in every one of his children. When we define our vocation, God is "determining himself" in us.

There is a simple faith that finds the witness of the Spirit in the book, and accepts the interpretation given by authority. (n. 265, 1831:) The experience of the Pietists is completely justified at this level. But it is thinking that is the criterion of what is true in feeling; and thinking is bound to start. Philosophy is the thoughtful interpretation of the content. It should not be thought of as "placing itself above religion." It places itself only "above the form of faith. The content is the same in both cases." [But what does this mean? In view of the identity of form and content, the content itself must be transformed by the (higher) philosophical form. Hegel continually fudges on this issue. At this point he merely insists that thinking out the meaning of one's religious feeling does not leave behind or lose the feeling. So, for instance, the philosopher thinking in Schleiermacher's mode remains deeply conscious of her absolute dependence on God – but she is not like a dog.]

Philosophy is the consummated reconciliation with God. Speculative philosophy is the true theology (as Aristotle thought). The theological programme of speculative philosophy is "to reconcile God with himself" (Logic); and with Nature. Here the object is to show that "otherness" is an sich divine. The Philosophy of Spirit is directly continuous with this, because finite Spirit has to elevate itself out of Nature, and up to the condition of reconciliation with God. This process of elevation is historical; and it does not "surpass all Reason" – though Hegel would agree with the Authorized Version that "the place of God passeth all understanding" (Phil. 4:7). On the contrary it may be experienced and felt without any developed "Reason"; but it is "first known, and thought, and recognized as what is true" through Reason.

The positions opposed to speculative philosophy are first the critically analytical philosophy of the Understanding – which wants to get rid of Religion as a mass of "superstition"; and secondly the ingenious piety of feeling. But speculative philosophy is properly the exposition of religion as rational cognition (n. 268, 1827). This exposition contributes to the advancement of religious piety [Religiosität].
[This analysis and discussion is based on the 1827 Lectures (PLH, 162-189) supplemented by the 1831 discussion of the Ontological Argument (PLH 3, 351-358) and the Teleological Argument (PLH 2, ) and the printed Lectures on the Proofs (Spiers and Sanderson translation III, 155-346).

Proofs for the Existence of God

The basic position that Hegel takes about the "proofs" is that the existence of God cannot be "proved" in any ordinary sense, because one cannot move from a "finite" premiss to an "infinite" conclusion, but that the "proofs" are advanced at different stages in the evolution of religious consciousness, because they logically express the important phases in the "elevation of the mind (the finite spirit) to God (the infinite spirit). If we study the "proofs" as dialectical motions, involving the actual negation of the supposed finite premiss, and then the negation of that total experience of assertion and negation, we can see how the proofs are dialectically valid; and we can thus discover what they mean (or what consciousness of God they express).

One might say that in traditional terms, Hegel begins from the Franciscan position that the existence of God cannot be proved (and does not need to be) because it is self-evident; and starting from there he shows how the supposed "proofs" can be mediated into expressions of that self-evidence. (But just what is "self-evident" remains a problem for interpretation; and if one presupposes a [dialectically indefensible] definition of God as a subjective Concept – say the Mosaic Concept of the Independent Creator – one can perfectly well be an "atheist" relative to that definition of "theism.")

Religion is a motion of the finite consciousness towards infinity. Thus we pass over from one "content" to another; and this "passing over" is an elevation of our own consciousness. It is the infinity of our own thinking activity, that we reach; but when we say that the elevation is "to God" we indicate that this "infinity" is not just the subjective experience of our consciousness. We think the thought of the objective infinity, within which our own thinking experience is comprehended.

We pass over from the finite consciousness of the "we" – as the community we actually belong to (or of the "I," when praying privately, but notice that Anselm says "We believe that thou
art *that* etc." in his prayer) – to the *infinite* being. Or we may consciously pass over from our subjective concept of the infinite being to its objectivity. These are the two main shapes of the "proofs" – passing over from "Nature and finite spirit" to "God" or from the "thought" of God to his "actuality."

In the "empirical" proofs the common element is "Being" – the transition is from *finite* to *infinite* Being. In the "ontological" proof the common element is "the Infinite" – and the transition is from infinity in thought to infinity in actuality. (Actually Hegel needs to distinguish the *cosmological* proof – which expresses the consciousness of Natural Religion; from the Teleological Proof which expresses that of Religious Freedom (1831) (i.e., Greeks, Jews, Romans). The Teleological Proof is at the level of *Essence* in the Logic; and it is no accident surely that the discussion of the "proofs" is brought together with the "Concept" stage of the 1827 Lectures. This is the year when Hegel produces his revised *Encyclopedia* (with its expanded *Logic*; and the project of a *course* on the Proofs (delivered in 1829 and prepared for publication in 1831) is very clearly conceived as a special application of the Logic (Sp and San, 3, 155).

Knowledge of God is mediation. So the very form of religious experience is a relative one (and the very concept of an *immediate* knowledge of God is a mistake. Hegel is not a "Franciscan" in that sense; but he is willing to start from an experience that "feels" immediate, and in that sense he is "Franciscan").

I am aware of God as an "other" to whom I am related. I may also be in immediate unity with God; I may be "identical" with him in some way. But that "unity" or "identity" is not without distinction. It is conceptually *distinct* from the distinct being that belongs to me and to God in my thought. The *mediation* is a relating of these two distinct beings. It produces a mediated identity, a *syllogistic* identity. Knowing God is a syllogistic relation. The "proofs" represent this; to explicate them is to explicate *religion* itself as such.

But the form of "proof" is a *distortion* of the religious relation. Hence the "proofs" have been criticized. But the criticism, so far as it is formally valid, is *one-sided*. We have to strip away the distortion, and see what positively remains, instead of simply reflecting the proofs as "invalid."
First of all, "existence of God" is an oxymoron. *Dasein* is "determinate finite being"; and *Existenz* is a determinate mode of Essence. These are quite the wrong expressions for God's *being*. We can properly speak of God's *Sein* (at the level of Being); his *actuality* (at the level of essence) or his "objectivity" (at the level of the Concept). These three sets of distinct logical concepts are to be shown to "hang together" – or "cohere."

This "coherence" must be *internal*. There is *external* coherence. Thus a house must have a roof if it is to be a proper house. But the house walls can perfectly well exist (for some considerable time) without a roof. The *being* of the roof is in no way involved in the being of the walls.

166 *Internal* coherence is illustrated by geometrical theorems. The angles of a triangle must add up to two right angles. But we may note that the three straight lines are just as separable as the beams, tiles and stones of the house; and the constructions which we use to "prove" theorems are quite separable from the figure whose internal coherence is demonstrated.

This type of demonstration by external additions is not applicable to God. We cannot start with definitions and assumptions. Mathematical demonstration is always *hypothetical*: "if these conditions exist, then this other one exists too." [n. 118, 1827. Geometric proof is the ideal paradigm of *Verstand.*]

But the syllogistic of Understanding does not work with God. The being of God cannot be a *consequence* of any finite facts or assumptions. But to stop at this negative assertion, is to ignore "the universal consciousness of mankind." Hegel does not accept the *consensus gentium* argument as establishing any definite conclusion. It only establishes that there is something *actual* here that has to be rationally comprehended.

The universal consensus indicates that the "proofs" have to be understood as God-experiences, formulations of the "elevation" of finite spirit to God. Dialectically, the minimal argument is that because *finite* experience is all contingent, there *must* be a necessary being that is the *ground* of the contingency.
It is the teleological proof which Hegel claims is inseparable from religious consciousness. Because there is finite, mortal life (living self-reproductive organisms) there must be a being that has produced the living order on purpose. [Our evolutionary theory volatilizes this necessity; all life has evolved gradually out of a condition of things in which no life is apparent. So the potential to produce living organization must have been present in that "pre-living" environment. Hegel says that the universal procedure of this argument is "not upset by criticism, for it is necessary." But it ought to have been upset already in his time by Hume's Dialogues (which volatilizes the "necessity" in a pre-evolutionary way; and it certainly has been upset now.

The protagonists of "immediate knowledge" say quite correctly that the arguments do not produce any real religious conviction. (On the contrary, as Hume shows, the teleological argument is precisely what raises the "problem of evil" to clear consciousness. If the First Cause argument is valid – if there must be some necessary ground for all contingency, what difference does that make to me? Hegel could quite legitimately respond that it might make an important difference to someone living in a community with a natural religion, even if it leaves a believer in Pascal's Savior cold. But he prefers to take it as the subjective side of the criticism of the "proof."

What it shows is that the "proof" must be expounded as an expression of our own elevation to God. (That is what it is, in fact, for the Stoic naturalist, for example. But it remains true for us that we cannot worship the Big Bang.)

The two modes of proof are the passage from Being to God (Cosmological and Teleological Proof) and the passage from God to Being (Ontological Proof); and the passage is to be conceived as an experience of personal elevation. The Cosmological Proof (as formulated by Kant) encapsulates the "First Cause" argument (as interpreted by Aquinas). But Hegel's formulation is designed for dialectical interpretation: "There are finite things, therefore there must be an infinite ground which is a necessary Wesen; for the finite is what is not its own ground. It is what is contingent."
The religious experience of the truth of this logical interpretation is that in our disposition of devotion, we are aware of all finite being as *transient*. It *is not* becomes the deep truth that engulfs everything that *is* in the finite mode. But this "non-being of the finite" is "inwardly affirmative."

The Infinite comes to consciousness as that which comprehends (and grounds) the *transitoriness* (the Being/Non-Being) of the finite. (See for example, the poem of A. von Haller quoted in *Encyclopedia Logic* §104).

But in this ("oceanic"?) experience, the finite does not subsist at all. Lasson (n. 126) amended this to fit Hegel's double-negation theory. But the next paragraph confirms this one – though Lasson supplements that one too. (Just how often are we to believe that *our* sources left out the crucial step which Lasson's better sources preserved?)

The finite does not subsist, because it is internally contradictory. Its non-being is as essential to it as its being. What emerges from this self-negation is that it has an affirmative aspect. Not its perpetual regeneration, for that is only a "*bad infinite.*" Herakleitos recognized this "bad infinity." [Actually this was the *Herakleitizing* of Cratylos.] The "bad infinite" has its place in logic; but not in the philosophy of Religion. But the circularity of bad infinite transformation gives birth to the "true infinite"; and the genuine other of finite self-sublation is the infinite stability of Being. When we elevate ourselves to God, we rise into a realm of absolute stillness.

The "proofs" are *distorted* because the finite starting-point is regarded as a subsisting term. In *elevation interpretation*, the finite beginning is recognized to be a self-sublating contradiction; and the resolution of that contradiction into its true interpretation is the True Infinite. There are not two separate terms in relation. The self-sublation of the first gives rise to the second as the truth of the first. The finite world is surrendered; we do not claim that it is at all. [Philosophically, this seems to be exactly the transition made by Parmenides, though he did not formulate it *dialectically.*]

The formal critique of this "proof" rests on the assumption that the finite starting-point *endures.*
But also the two terms can be taken as simple opposites, and any possibility of a transition can be denied. *This* critique rests on the assumed finitude of our Reason. But it is precisely our Reason that recognizes the finite as contradictory, self-sublating; and this means that speculative Reason is already above and beyond the dialectic. The Infinite as a pure thought is the abstraction of that which has no limit. When we sublate all limits, our own finitude of thought does not subsist. [n. 132 PCH explain the argument as clearly as it can be explained. But cf. Parmenides – where the problem is to interpret how "It Is" has Limit.]

Hegel now takes up the "proofs" in a historical order. The *cosmological* proof begins from the *contingency* of everything in the world, and posits God as the necessary Being (or, as subject, the necessary *Essence*). This "proof" can be found (he says) in many transitions of his *Logic* – specifically in the transition from Essence to Necessary Essence. [We should look for this in the 1827 *Encyclopedia* rather than in the *Science of Logic*. I think Hegel means the whole conceptual movement of *Actuality*.] Hegel now expounds one of the thorniest bits of his Logic: the movement of negation and double negation. (So he may have the transition from Identity through Contradiction to Ground in mind.) Nothing that he says is helpful to the understanding of religious experience. The argument is that God as "necessary essence" must *determine* himself. He determines himself as activity (of self-expression?) that takes itself back into itself. This return to identity is *necessary*. [n. 138 (1827?) explains the movement in terms of the "proof."]

The *teleological* proof has the same form as a logical transition, but includes more content. [It expresses the experience of the religions of "Freedom."] Here it is *finite spirit* (living consciousness) that is the starting point. But the concept of purpose involved is *external*. [On Kant's distinction between physicotheology and the "moral proof" see PCH in n. 140.] Hegel takes up this proof first in its most degenerate form (Goethe's satire on Wolff and the cork tree). (We can fairly call this the *Roman* religious experience!) But he recognizes that Kant has restored the Aristotelian concept of *inner* teleology; and it is this that is expressed in Greek Religion (with Judaic positivity as a transitional mode towards Rome).
This is non-finite purposiveness, because end and means are not external to one another — they produce one another in a circle. But how are we to make the progression from finite organic life to absolute organic life? The world is an organic cosmos in which everything has its place. Finite spirit must freely achieve a harmonious place in this cosmos. ("Elevation" here does not seem to involve self-sublation — or at least not in the same way.)

The argument is not that there are many organisms (and organic systems). Therefore, there must be a universal mind controlling it all with wisdom. On the contrary, the whole complex of finite life must be set aside, as "untrue." The Universal Noûs is what is thus uncovered. We recognize it as what truly is. Saying it is "the negation of the negation" seems to mean that it is the adequate hypothesis for the explanation of what cannot otherwise explain itself.

But, in fact, the postulated explanation is not adequate. The proposed Concept is "God is the divine Life of all things, the World-Soul that organizes the Cosmos."

This still falls short of the Concept of Spirit. We take one further step towards this when we say that God is a cause separate from the cosmos he creates and preserves. He is a wise Architect and Governor. But this step is not yet made (by Anaxagoras? by Plato?). [It is made by Moses.]

The third (absolute) shape of the transition is still to be considered. This has "Spirit" as its Grundlage. It is a mistake to say: "Because there are finite Spirits, there must be an absolute Spirit," since the finite spirits cannot be the Grundlage from which the consequence follows. The argument is rather: "the finitude of the finite Spirits has no truth. The truth and actuality of the finite spirits is the absolute Spirit. The finite life sublates itself in being, and the finite spirit sublates itself in knowing. It knows logically, and it knows in the eternal present. This self-negation is "affirmation of the infinite."

Hegel says "it is surprising that this transition was not specified in the proofs." But it seems to me that it is exactly what is specified in the so-called "Cartesian circle." Descartes argues that my existence as a thinking being necessarily presupposes the infinite thinker. Through him the Ontological Proof is reinstated — and this is made explicit in Leibniz. (The problem is to say what it means. The Hegelian view of "the eternal present" is what determines this correctly. The Cartesian
interpretation is invalidated by its intuitive dependence on the concept of "Substance." "Substance" is the being that is in simple independence of time.)

The Concept of Spirit invalidates "pantheism." Hegel has defined "pantheism" in such a way that no thinking consciousness could hold it. But that is absurd. It seems clear that the Presocratic thinkers were "pantheists" in an easily intelligible sense. The separateness of Noüs in Anaxagoras makes a distinction between "God" and "the world" possible; and the distinction between "finite" and "infinite" experience becomes necessary in Parmenides. But in Plato, what is "separate" and "objective" is not God, but the Ideas; all by itself, this shows the enormous drawing power of the "pantheist" hypothesis, that identifies God as "Soul of the World."

Hegel's more serious position is that Spinoza (and dare we say? Parmenides) is a pantheist, in a way which his own "absolute spiritualism" has left behind. To think of God as "substance" is to think of him as the life of the world (the Aristotelian soul of it). But Spinoza makes the transition from finite to Infinite properly (as a negation); the result is that the finite world is left behind altogether – and has no proper "being." Spinoza is made to agree with Parmenides. It is doubtful whether Parmenides wanted to accept this "acosmic" view of God; and certain that Spinoza (who spent years elaborating an Ethics for human life) did not. But perhaps neither of them had a logically consistent way out of it. (We should particularly notice, however, the fact that it is culturally convenient for Hegel to take this view. The philosophy that is to belong to the "people" must adjust itself to popular prejudice regarding the interpretation of history.)

Hegel's "spiritual" transition passes beyond the absolute negation to the "negation of the negation" – the return to and comprehending reconciliation with finitude. This is the transition from God as Substance, to God as Substantial-Subject. (The problem is: In what sense is the "spiritual" God substantial? Chapter VI C of the Phänomenologie des Geistes seems to me to settle this. But was that Hegel's final view – or even his complete view at the time?)

At this point Hegel can make the transition to the Ontological Argument. This does describe the transition from finite consciousness to God as Absolute Spirit. But instead of moving from Being to God, it moves from God to Being. We can only begin from our own subjective
Concept of God however; so again the beginning is from a finite term. (Hegel seems to imply that we cannot "begin from God" in the way that Spinoza thought possible. When we try to do that, we cannot get back to the finite world.) In our Subjective Concept, "God" has *Existenz* – but only as opposed to our finite life. We must not "represent" God. The definition must become simply that "God is."

This is what happens in the Ontological Proof. This proof belongs to Christian experience; the Greeks could never have formulated it. Anselm grasped it thus: "We have the representative concept of God; but according to the true Concept, God's existence is necessary.

Kant criticized this Ontological Argument (in the form given to it by Moses Mendelssohn); and it has generally been rejected. But it is another genuine case of *elevation* to God: Anselm argued that according to the representative concept God is *perfect*. (This version of Anselm has been strongly influenced by Leibniz. Anselm appeals not to "perfection" but to "greatness." It is Gaunilo (or Gaunilon) of Marmoutiers with his "perfect island" who starts the search for a definition of God's *perfection*.) What is "absolutely perfect" must actually exist.

But (as Kant complained) "reality" (the coincidence of being and thought) cannot be "plucked" from a presupposed Concept.

The tradition that developed from Anselm formulated the concept of the "most real essence" (as if "reality" were a matter of *degree*, which is exactly what the critics deny). Hegel gives this meaning by identifying Reality with "Determinacy" – which does admit of degrees. But this is a *petitio*, because the determinacy that can be increased or diminished is *conceptual*. It is only if one is a Hegelian idealist that the "proof" holds. (If one thinks that sensible being is as perfectly determinate as it can be, then "God" just refers to the "absolute Force" which must manifest itself – i.e. we are thrown back to the level of Natural Religion.)

I can have a representative concept of "100 dollars in silver" that is as *determinate* as you want to make it.

This was the objection that Gaunilo first made with his "perfect island." The perfect determinacy of the Concept has nothing at all to do with the real existence of the thing.
The right response is that a "representative concept" is not a proper Concept. In order to understand Anselm we must formulate "the Concept as such." The true Concept is alive; it mediates itself. Hence, of course, it is. As the absolute or "pure" Concept, it is a process of positing finitude in order to negate it, and be "identical with itself through this negation."

What does this mean? Where can this "self-particularising Concept" be found and recognized? Hegel gives a theological answer, based on the Christian definition that "God is Love." Divine love "creates the world," and begets itself as "the Son" in the world. The returned identity of the two is "the Spirit." But why should a non-Christian accept this (or even a non-Trinitarian Christian)?

The logical argument that "Being is not the concrete, but the absolute abstraction" does not get us over this problem. It only points up the fact that we have no idea of what we mean when we say that "God is." The absolute use of "is" has no meaning for us. As J.L. Austin said, Moses should have responded to God's declaration "I am, who am," with "You are what?" (Hegel's critique of "relation to self" seems to me to point in the same direction. Logic starts here, but this is only the beginning. Being is only the first determination of the Concept. Where then is logic? Ans. In the self-transcending thought that seeks to comprehend its world. It couldn't be in that subjective thinking, if it were not in the objective world that is to be known. (But isn't that an assumption? Yes, it is. What demonstrates its own "reality" is the scientific interpretation of the world. That is the "absolute Spirit" that we know).

God is not just "Being," because the Concept is the totality of determinations. (That is what I have translated as "the scientific interpretation of the world" – I ought to have said "the interpreting" because Hegel insists here that the task of logic is "to grasp the movement of the Concept as activity." He also insists that "the Concept" is the real Concept that expresses itself in the world. "The Concept is the purpose of an object, the soul [Aristotelian] of the living thing." The order of Nature is the Concept, but does not have it. The conscious self is the existing – but subjective – Concept. Note that it is the desiring, purposive activity that is thus characterized – not the Cartesian thinking Ego. The self is active, it objectifies itself, it is a Trieb [Schiller's Letters on Aesthetic Education]. Every satisfaction of drive is a sublation of subjectivity. The drive arises from a deficiency (a subjective lack or need.
the satisfaction procures the feeling of self-realization. When I am satisfied I exist actually. The Concept posits itself as both subjective and objective, but also as neither (to interpret that is the problem – but I think that the "neither" is the Logic of Being and Essence).

This is the proper critique of Anselm's argument. Anselm's thought is true. But it only presupposes the logical Concept. This simple presupposition must be allowed to demonstrate itself. Hegel thinks that the consciousness of God in the "immediate knowledge" theology is representative. But that is probably an unjust misinterpretation. But he does recognize that it is the same consciousness that Anselm was seeking to formulate. This historical identity is what is important (and not generally recognized). We need to be aware that Hegel agrees with the "immediate knowledge" theology. But he insists that it is only the beginning of the knowledge of God – and certainly not the recognition of our inescapable ignorance.

Even Spinoza employs the Ontological Argument. (The ambivalence of Hegel's own attitude is evident here; for if Spinoza is "acosmic," the value of his support is very dubious. But Hegel wants to underline the resemblance of Spinoza's position to his own. God's being is only the beginning of our knowledge.)

The finite is what does not correspond to its Concept. It is not just as truly as it is. We say "Man is mortal." But this "separation" of "soul" and "body" (concept and reality) is what is impossible for the true Concept.

The conclusion is an ambiguous reflection on "immortality." Every drive is an example of conceptual self-realization. But the drive of "Spirit" is towards infinity. (It seems clear to me at least, that the finite, limited, side of every drive – even our "spiritual" drive – means that only "objective immortality" can be achieved. As individuals finitude is our necessary destiny.)