Voice, Tone and Ethos: A Portrait of the Translator as a Spokesperson

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Partant du roman The Voice de Gabriel Okara et de ses versions française (Jean Sévry) et allemande (Olga et Erich Fetter), cet article redéfinit la traduction comme une opération de ré-énonciation par laquelle un énonciateur se substitue à une instance d’énonciation antérieure pour parler en son nom dans une langue différente. Loin de toute nostalgie d’une voix originaire, l’instance traduisante règle son rapport à l’énonciation antérieure, construisant un ethos discursif.

Mots clefs : ethos, postcolonial, rhétorique, porte-parole, phonocentrisme

Working from Gabriel Okara’s novel The Voice and its French (Jean Sévry) and German (Olga and Erich Fetter) translations, this article redefines translation as an act of re-enunciation by which an enunciator substitutes him/herself to a previous enunciator to speak in her/his name, in another tongue. Far from longing for an original voice, the translating enunciator tunes the distance between the two enunciations, constructing a discursive ethos.

Key words: Ethos, postcolonial, Rhetoric, spokesperson, phonocentrism

Introduction, Hypothesis, Field for Investigation

Hearing voices in translated texts is an experience shared by many critics. Most of them theoretically agree to grant the translator a voice of his or her own, one that did not exist in the source text. However, it seems almost impossible to locate its source, as if the translator’s voice was everywhere to be heard while the translator is nowhere to be seen. In Eberhard Pause’s terms: “This is the paradox of translation: In uttering his translation, the translator is a speaker, but in this very same situation he is not the speaker. His utterance is not really his utterance. It will be understood as the utterance of someone else, it has no original status.”

How can one utter anything without being a person within the speech situation? This paradox may be illustrated with an analogy: the translator is similar to the assistant (kurogo) dressed in black on the stage of the classical Japanese dance-drama Kabuki. As Kumiko Torikai puts it in the opening of her book Voices of the invisible presence:

The tacit agreement is that kurogo is an invisible presence on stage, not meant to be seen by the audience. Interpreters are expected to play more or less the same role as kurogo. They are with principal players on stage, doing significant work. Nevertheless, they are not supposed to be seen and are expected to be transparent.
One major difference remains, however: the kurogo has no voice at all, whereas the translator, and even more literally the interpreter, is to be heard.

Our attempt to solve the translator’s paradox relies on a novel by the Nigerian author Gabriel Okara, *The Voice*, and on two of its translations: the French version *La Voix* by Jean Sévry and the German version *Die Stimme* by Olga and Erich Fetter. The novel tells the story of a desperate quest for an unnamed “it” by a young villager, Okolo, presumably shortly after the Independence of Nigeria – that is, around 1960. The fictive village of Amatu, terrified by Okolo’s quest, condemns him to exile and later, to death. A so-called witch, Tuere, shares the hero’s fatal fate while the crippled Ukule remains with a promise to “tend [their] spoken words.” The very title of the book makes it a perfect field for our investigation. Written in English, the novel is presented by the author as some sort of calque or literal translation from his mother tongue, Ijaw. Although we will contest such an assertion, we do not intend to deny the text’s linguistic uncanniness. Okara’s heterolingual poetics makes the text’s polyphony easier to grasp. Moreover, the linguistic stratification of the source text brings out voices within the translations.

Our aim is to ground an analysis of translation’s enunciative arrangement on *The Voice*’s heterolingual poetics. This means that we shall proceed from the text’s letter to look at translation instead of considering that “interlingual literary translation provides an analogue for post-colonial writing.” We shall start by reviewing a few attempts to localize the source of translational enunciation by adding a speaker. The [+ x] model, however, remains unsatisfactory because it lacks a proper theory of voice. Okara’s novel helps understand that voice is not a source but rather an effect of the written text. Such a conception of voice enables us to formulate an alternative model [x/…] where the translator does not report the speech of the initial speaker but speaks on his behalf. Such a proposition requires that we contest “the well-established idea of the uniqueness of the speaking subject,” and leads us to
use the Antique notion of *ethos* to account for the qualitative aspects of the voice and open up an ethical perspective without relying on the supposition of an “authentic” subject. The *ethos* hypothesis will be proofed, in the last part of this study, with an attempt to characterize respectively the French and the German versions of *The Voice* according to the tone of the voice that we may hear reading them.

**A Few Existing Attempts to Locate the Translator’s Voice: An Equation by Addition [*+x*]**

Without any claim to exhaustiveness, let us summarize a few models that have addressed the issue of locating the translator’s voice by using an equation involving one unknown under the form [*+x*].

Jakobson’s communication model has been used as a basis for various attempts to locate the translator within the translated text. As early as 1975, Eugene Nida sketched the following schema: ⁷

![Figure 2](image)

On the first line, the source message (M₁) is addressed by Sender 1 (S₁) to Receiver 1 (R₁). On the second line, R₁ becomes the new sender for a new message addressed to another audience, and so on.

More recently, Cees Koster has revised such a model. In the following table, “STA” stands for “Source Text Addressee” and “TTS” for “Target Text Sender.” The interpreter’s point of view is taken into account and is named “describer”: s/he stands as an addressee of both the
target and the source text. A footnote specifies: “Whether one sees the describer as a subject or as an institutionalized extension of a specific theoretical framework is presently not relevant.”

Such representations do not account for the specificity of enunciation in translation: they merely duplicate the initial speech situation. Koster explicitly asserts: “It is interesting to see how every “slot” but one in Jakobson’s scheme of “constitutive factors in […] any act of verbal communication becomes doubly occupied, once applied to translation.”

More specific models have been developed within the framework of the theory of narrative structures. Giuliana Schiavi, for instance, combines the authority in charge of a translated text with the notion of “implied reader” developed by Wayne Booth and Seymour Chatman. The result is stunning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R.A</th>
<th>IA</th>
<th>Nr-Ne-IR/real translator</th>
<th>Implied translator-Nr-Ne-IR of translation</th>
<th>RR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

R.A = real author  
IA = implied author  
Nr = narrator  
Ne = narratee  
IR = implied reader  
RR = real reader  
The box indicates that the implied reader is intercepted and isolated.

We totally agree with Schiavi’s assertion that there must be, within the translated text, a “translator’s narrator” distinct from the author’s. But if this narrator specific to the translation is to be given a voice, s/he cannot be qualified as “implied,” for implied instances are voiceless by definition according to Chatman: “Unlike the narrator, the implied author can
tell us nothing. He, or better, it has no voice, no direct means of communicating. It instructs us silently, through the design of the whole.”12 We do not find it convincing either to derive the “translator’s narrator” from a voiceless “implied translator,” for we do not believe any text to be voiceless. The notion of “implied author” was invented to account for “unspeakable” texts where, supposedly, no narrator is to be heard. We share Genette’s criticism:

For me […] the widespread affirmations (new avatar of the old “showing” and therefore of the very old mimesis) according to which no one in the narrative is speaking arise not only from the force of convention but also from an astonishing deafness to texts. In the most unobtrusive narrative, someone is speaking to me, is telling me a story, is inviting me to listen to it as he tells it, and his invitation – confiding or urging – constitutes an undeniable stance of narrating, and therefore of a narrator.13

A different approach can be found in the works of Brian Mossop. His initial question stems from a pedagogical concern: “What am I doing when I translate?”14 According to his answer, translating is a kind of reported speech. In the following picture, X (the rapporteur) reports in writing to C what A had previously written to B: 15

![Diagram](image)

The main interest of the reported speech hypothesis (T ⊂ DR), as Kristiina Taivalkoski-Shilov has noticed, is that it explains a large range of translating solutions that would otherwise remain marginal or even scandalous. Instead of confining the translator to binary choices (foreignizing/domesticating, etc.) such an explanation widens considerably the scope of possible translations.16

Barbara Folkart has sought to specify what kind of reported speech, exactly – direct, indirect or else –, could correspond to a translated text. Her conclusion is that translation is a specific act of re-enunciation, a mode of reporting sui generis that obeys the following arrangement:

X → C: « A a énoncé à l’intention de B en LD : “[proposition° + syntagme°]” où le deux points double (::) symbolise la totalité des éléments (indices de ré-énonciation et autres) constitutives de la marge de ré-
According to Folkart, the translator (“X”), as well as the whole re-enunciating process, are concealed in a hidden pragmatic margin. There is no denying that translation readily covers up its own process, be it for ideological or structural reasons. It makes it particularly difficult to describe what kind of process, exactly, is taking place in the pragmatic margin of enunciation. Our guess, however, is that the operation that is taking place in the margin is not one of adding a new speaker but of substituting one speaker to another. The difference between quoting and translating can be illustrated as follows:

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reporting    | margin       | text
[ A + X ]    | « La Voix »  |
translating | [ X / A ]    | La Voix
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While the rapporteur is an additional instance in the speech situation, as perfectly illustrated by the title of Kristiina Taivalskki-Shilov’s book, *La Tierce main (The Third Hand)*, the translator takes the initial speaker’s place. In the case of translating a reported speech, his/her speech act is not a *mise en abyme* but a representation *standing for* the previous text. In other words, the translator does not as much report than speaks on behalf of. As Theo Herman explains:

Translators do not speak in their own name, they speak someone else’s words. The consonance of voices, but also the hierarchal relationship between them, is expressed in the ethical, and often also the legal imperative of the translator’s discretion and non-interference. Brian Harris once formulated it as the “honest spokesperson” or the “true interpreter” norm (Harris 1990: 118). It calls on the translator simply and accurately to re-state the original, without addition, omission or distortion. The translator’s words appear as it were between inverted commas. Although the translator speaks the words, it is not the translator who speaks.¹⁹

The translator is not another speaker whose presence would double the original speaker. S/he is not a person in Benveniste’s sense, as explained by Naoki Sakai:

The translator cannot be designated either as “I” or “you” straightforwardly: she disrupts the attempt to appropriate the relation of the addresser and the addressee into the *personal* relation of first person vis-à-vis second person. To follow the determination of a “person” as espoused by Emile Benveniste – that is, that only those directly addressing and addressed in what he calls “discourse” as distinct from “story” or “history” can be called persons, and that those who are referred or talked about in the capacity of “he,” “she,” or “they” in “story”
or “history” cannot be persons – the addresser, the translator, and the addressee cannot be persons simultaneously; the translator cannot be the first or second person, or even the third ‘person’ undisruptively.\textsuperscript{20}

The spokesperson or substitute differs from the rapporteur who is the author of the reported speech, even though s/he was not the author of the quote. Evidence of the rapporteur’s auctorial status is the fact that s/he might express her or his views and feelings about the reported speech: “I quote by memory/roughly”, etc. Further evidence is juridical: one can be condemned for reporting a speech in one’s own name, not for translating it.\textsuperscript{21} To put it differently, author and rapporteur both remain themselves when they speak whereas the translator, on the other hand, becomes as another:

In a way, the translator is similar to an actor playing a role with more or less \textit{Verfremdungseffekt}, but never completely identifying with the character – if not pathologically. The negotiation of this distance is another way to explain the vast range of translational possibilities that Taivalkoski-Shilov has analysed. But how can one have a voice without being a speaker? We seemed close to solving the translator’s paradox but now a new mystery has appeared…
An alternative proposition: an equation by substitution or representation [x]

Before we turn to an alternative equation to the rapporteur hypothesis, we need to understand what makes it so difficult to step out of the additional model [x]. We are victims of what Derrida names the “phonocentric illusion:” we believe each voice we hear leads to an authentic presence and one only. The whole problem can be seen from a completely different perspective if we assume that a voice is an effect produced by the written text, rather than a surviving trace of an oral source, an original anima.

A reading of Okara’s The Voice makes such a change of perspective possible. Gabriel Okara, whose mother tongue is Ijaw, asserts that:

As a writer who believes in the utilisation of African ideas, African philosophy and African folklore and imagery to the fullest extent possible, I am of the opinion that the only way to use them effectively is to translate them almost literally from the African language native to the writer into whatever European language he is using as his medium of expression. I have endeavoured in my works to keep as close as possible to the vernacular expressions.

Besides the political and ideological implications of such a statement, we notice that the novel is presented as a transcription of a previous, probably oral narrative. Chantal Zabus, with the help of the author himself and a linguist, Kay Williamson, has attempted to trace back a large number of occurrences. The following excerpt of her book, The African Palimpsest, is a succession of 6 groups of 3 lines. The first line is a quote from Okara’s novel, followed by the page number. The second line marked by the italics and followed by the diacritic sign “*” proposes an Ijaw equivalent, and the third line translates the Ijaw expression (back) into English.
“To every person’s said thing listen not” (Voice, p. 7)
Kèmè gbà yèmò sè pòù kùmò*
Man said things all listen not

“He always of change speaks” (Voice, p. 66); Yèmò dèjìminì bàrà sèrimọ̀ṣẹ̀ èrì ẹ̀tèminì*
things changing how always he (is) speaking

“Shuffling feet turned Okolo’s head to the door” (Voice, p. 26)
Sìsìrì sìsìrì wènibùààmì Òkòlà tèbè wùìmò wàdìbùù diàminì*
Shuffling moving-feet Okolo’s head turned door faced

“... when everybody surface-water-things tell” (Voice, p. 34)
ògònrí bènì yèámò ki kòmèmoṣè mú gbàminì*
up water things that everybody is telling

“The engine-man Okolo’s said-things heard” (Voice, p. 70)
ìnṣìnà-owéè bè Òkòlà gbàyèmò nàmè*
Engineer the Okolo said-things heard

“How can you a spoiled girl marry at this your young age?” (Voice, p. 103)
Tèbàrákọ̀ ọ̀rì bèi kàlàttàbọù mú sèi-fáà u èràbòù kù nànà ngà ò*
Why you this small-boy go spoiled-lost girl marry

According to Zabus, the second line is the “source” for the English text. Her archaeology pretends to exhume an “origin” but the very superposition of the three different lines shows that translating from Ijaw is not sufficient to account for the text’s awkward English. Not only the text does not derive mechanically from a source, but such a source does not exist since Okara never wrote any Ijaw version prior to the English text! A brief genetic detour provides the necessary proof: the “Opening chapter of an unpublished novel” released in Black Orpheus 10 (1962) gives access to a previous layer of the text, showing no trace of Ijaw.26
As suggested by the “*” sign, the Ijaw line only exists within the theorist’s reconstruction: it is not a source but an effect of the written text. The effect is produced because when confronted with a non-standard expression – what Riffaterre calls an “agrammaticality” – the Anglophone reader assumes the underlying presence of another tongue that s/he has never mastered. In the same way Ijaw proves to be an effect of the English text – and not a source or hypotext, the voice might just be an effect of the text. Such a hypothesis corresponds to what the text itself asserts about voices.

The name of the main protagonist, Okolo, means “the voice” in Ijaw and he himself explains in direct speech: “I am the voice from the locked up insides.” This “inside” implies a polyphonic place within the self, just like a sound box. Not only is Okolo a voice, he is also inhabited and surrounded by many voices: “Okolo stood, hearing all the spoken words outside and speaking with his inside” and further: “As Okolo stood thus speaking with his inside, a voice entered his inside asking him to bring some firewood from the corner of the hut.” According to The Voice, voice is not the source of individual authenticity but rather an effect. The novel suggests even further: listening to its voices suggests that speaking subjects are not unified entities. During a trial, a protagonist called “the questioning one” tells Okolo that no-
one can access his “inside” (“Your inside is your box. We cannot open it and see what is inside.”) How are we to realize this suggestion and open up the black box of the enunciator?

**Ethos: A Brief Archaeology**

In an article dedicated to voices in literary written texts, Richard Aczel “argues for a qualitative, as opposed to merely functional, concept of voice.” He considers that such a concept enables to counter the “overestimation of the first-person pronoun” to “signify a far more distinctive corpus of subjectivity effects.” Having portrayed the translator as a spokesperson or a substitute, we believe it necessary to go beyond Brian Harris’ deontology of the “honest spokesperson” to sketch a proper ethics for translation. Proving the constitutive polyphony of any speaking subject is the only way to regulate the risk of usurpation undergone by translation understood as a substitution. The proximity of the two words *ethics* and *ethos* are not the only reason we have to link them. First, we notice with James S. Baumlins that “voice is often used interchangeably with *ethos*.” Secondarily, *ethos* may be specified as purely internal to the enunciative stage, where notions as “subject” or “speaker” always refer to extra-discursive instances. We will not use *ethos* as a synonym for voice but as a tool to characterize voices without tracing them back to subjects existing prior to the enunciation.

In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, *ethos* designates the image of oneself built by the orator in his speech in order to exert an influence on his audience. This image is produced by a manner of speech rather than by its message: the orator does not claim his sincerity but speaks in such a way that his sincerity appears to the audience. According to Aristotle, *ethos* is a discursive as opposed to referential construction: it should not be confused with the social status of the empirical subject. Oswald Ducrot, who explicitly refuses the “postulated unity of the speaking subject,” keeps the empirical speaking subject outside of the scope of his study. The speaker, called “locuteur,” combines two different characters: the “locuteur” “as such” (L)
and the “locuteur” as “being in the world” (λ). He explains: “In my terminology, I shall say that ethos is attached to L, the speaker [locuteur] as such: it is insofar as he is the source of the utterance that he sees himself as decked out with certain qualities which consequently render this utterance acceptable or repellent.” 36

In the case of translated texts, ethos is not attached to one speaker but to the relationship between two speakers. As a result, ethos does not designate a personal figure but the negotiation of the distance between two figures. In other terms, ethos in translation is differential. It characterizes an attitude of a spokesperson towards the speaker s/he is representing and the represented speech. A decisive contribution has been made from interactional pragmatics that considers ethos as a negotiation between sender and receiver 37. This means that ethos is not solely produced by the author or the translator in the case of a translated text: the reader contributes to staging this discursive figure that only exists within the text, imagining the tone of a voice that is nowhere else to be heard.

We shall now test the ethos hypothesis by turning to the French and German translations of The Voice and see if it enables us to characterize the relationship between the translators’ voices and the narrator of the source text.

**Ethos in the German Translation: The Stance of a Moralist**

The German version Die Stimme is one of these cases where the translator’s voice “parachutes itself into the text, breaking the univocal frame.” 38 Five words, which were neither flagged nor cushioned 39 in the departure text, are followed by footnotes in the German version:

- (Die Stimme p.29) Ph. D.*
- (Die Stimme p.62) Compound*
- (Die Stimme p.69) Fufu*
- (Die Stimme p.74) Moimoi, Akara*
- (Die Stimme p.76) Garri*  

*Englische akademische Grade.  
*Umzäuntes Grundstück, Gehöft.  
*Gekochter und gestampfter Yam.  
*Beides sind in Öl gebackene Bohnenkuchen.  
*Hirsebrei.
The reader, obviously, is not meant to be familiar with the Nigerian context – nor the English one. But what kind of a sender does such a translation suggest? Footnotes give indications about the implied reader but they also tell about the enunciation of the text. This is probably one of the reasons why translators tend to avoid footnotes: they reveal where the translator stands. Footnotes stage a discrepancy or a will to meta-comment within the narrative voice. Various attitudes regarding the text are likely to be adopted in the footnotes. The text may be commented, explained, criticized, contextualized, etc. Various readers may have very different feelings about the kind of attitude adopted in the German footnotes. To our eyes, the meaning of these footnotes cannot be restricted to a merely informative purpose, for the translators could have opted for intra-sentential gloss, for instance: “*Garri, Hirsemehlbrei*”, or “*Hirsemehlbrei (Garri)*”. This option would have given the same amount of information minus one: the explicit proof of the translator's intervention. This is the reason why we interpret these footnotes as a sign of an authoritative attitude. The voice that we hear in Die Stimme tends to guide us towards the “true sense” of the text.

The quote from page 31 given above is a good example of such an authoritative ethos. Here is the German translation and our English back-translation:

In der Hüte stand Okolo, hörte jedes der draußen gesprochenen Worte und dachte tief nach. Er dachte tief nach, um dahinter zu kommen, warum diese Frau sich so verhielt.

*Okolo was standing in the hut, hearing all the spoken words outside and meditating. He was meditating to find out why this woman behaved in such a way.*

The awkward expression “speaking with his inside” has disappeared and so has the structural opposition between “inside” and “outside.” The initial polyphony gives way to a purely interior and silent meditation, since “nachdenken” does not imply any type of dialogue. One could diagnose here a tendency to reduce polyphony “out of fear of being lost among the various voices in the text,” but our purpose is to try and picture the figure produced by such
a text. The German version produces the effect of a narrator willing to control the decoding of
the text, just like in a “roman à cesse.” The translator’s voice is one of a moralist.

This interpretation relies entirely on the tone of the German version and we need not to have
any piece of information about the two translators, Olga and Erich Fetter. It is however
possible to support our interpretation by referring to the paratext. The German version was
released in 1975 in Eastern Germany. The publishing house and the name of the collection,
“Aufbau” (“construction”), clearly indicate a very specific context: post-World War II
communist Germany in the process of reconstruction. A summary of the novel intends to give
a final clue to the reader: the novel is to be read as a parabola, a symbolic tale about the
search for a new way (“nach dem neuen Weg”). A publication house named “Edition Neue
Texte” thus proposes “new texts” in order to find “new ways.”

To our eyes (or ears), the German version produces a figure that is very different from the
source text’s and comparatively very authoritative in its invitation to meditate. The source text
is handled as didactic material for the sake of a moral. Okolo’s quest was never named in The
Voice: “What is he himself trying to reach? For him it has no name. Names bring divisions
and divisions, strife. So let it be without a name; let it be nameless…” The voice we hear in
Die Stimme is much more steady and assertive: “Namen bringen Teilungen, und Teilungen
bringen Zwist, Hader. Also lass es ohne Namen sein, lass es namenlos sein…” Albeit intra-
discursive, the *ethos* echoes with the context and in this instance may resonate with the German division, “die Teilung Deutschlands,” here repeated twice.

**Ethos in the French Translation: Re-embodies as an Avatar**

The French translation produces a very different *ethos*. Text and paratext are once again complementary sites of production of the enunciative figure. An important “Avertissement,” signed by the translator “Jean Sévry. Université de Montpellier,” explains the will to avoid exotism. An anthropological reference is given to *Les Peuples du delta du Niger* by Amaury Talbot:


Ce que le romancier appelle « Inside » (le for intérieur) vient de l’Ijaw « Biri », qui est localisé dans l’abdomen et qui est le lieu des émotions. Celles-ci vont s’emparer de toute sa personne jusqu’à lui donner la parole, de sorte que le dialogue avec l’esprit, siège de la symbolisation indispensable, est permanent. Il faut nous garder, à cet égard, de tout exotisme facile. […] (Amaury Talbot, Les Peuples du delta du Niger, 1932, pp.154 et suivantes).

The reading of the text confirms the figure sketched within the paratext. Archaisms such as “for intérieur” compel the reader to recall that s/he is reading a translation, for one keeps asking oneself what exactly was written in the source text. The translator’s presence cannot be forgotten:

A l’intérieur de la case Okolo se tenait, écoutant toutes les paroles ainsi dites à l’extérieur et parlant avec son for intérieur. Il parlait avec son for intérieur pour découvrir pourquoi cette femme se comportait ainsi.

The *ethos* produced by this French version is thus one of a scholar. At the same time, the distance between the two enunciations is minimal and the absence of metadiscourse shows that the enunciative attitude is not one of a look from above. Far from commenting on the source text, the translator’s voice seems to pursue its enunciation in another language. Jean Sévry asserts that he is prolonging the author’s creative gesture, since the author has pictured himself as a kind of translator: “Traduire *La Voix* revient, en quelque sorte, à retrouver l’écriture d’Okara et à passer par les mêmes initiatives de recherches!”

The translator seems to be some kind of avatar that re-embodies the voice in another tongue.
Conclusion

The voice we hear in a translation did not exist in the departure text. Such a voice is an effect produced by the translated text rather than a trace of an original anima and it has no “authentic true self” as its source. The translator sounds like Okolo, who is both a voice and a receptacle for many other voices. Far from being a unified subject, the translator speaks with his or her own voice but for someone else and in someone else’s name. The translator is some kind of spokesperson who represents another person. Instead of assuming an additional enunciator, as suggested by the [+ x] model – that describes the act of translating rather than its products i.e. translations – we rely on a polyphonic model of the speaking subject that enables a substitutive relationship whereby one speaker stands for another: [x/…]. The ethos co-constructed by the reader and the translator gives a specific tone to the translation that does not correspond to any “real” voice beyond the text. Voices in translation picture the negotiation of a distance, ranging from total identification to radical detachment with an infinite number of intermediaries: reincarnation as in The Voice’s French translation or moral stand back as in the German one.

Bibliography


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4 The neologism is borrowed from Rainier Grutman, Des langues qui résonnent. L'hétérolinguisme au XIXe siècle québécois (Québec: Fides, 1997), p. 37. Our understanding of heterolinguism within a literary text is the construction of a difference among languages that is the staging of a tongue as foreign so as to denaturalize all kind of discourses about purity, sense of belonging, etc.
5 Maria Tymoczko, “Post-colonial writing and literary translation,” in Postcolonial Translation Theory and Practice, eds. Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.19-20. We are proceeding from literary translation, and not from
technical translation or simultaneous interpretation, and such a starting point is probably defining. We hope, however, to bring structural aspects to the fore.


18 The little hand or *colophon* is borrowed from François Récanati, *La transparence et l'énonciation : pour introduire à la pragmatic* (Paris: Seuil, 1979), p. 49.


Gabriel Okara, *The Voice*, p. 34.


The **ethos** we are interested in is a discursive and not a referential **ethos**. We did, however, do research on the translators and some biographical data about the Fetters can be found in Tania Peitzker, *Dymphna Cusack (1902-1981): a Feminist Analysis of Gender in her Romantic Realistic Texts*, 2000, <http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2004/10/>., p. 36. Website consulted on February 5, 2013.

Gabriel Okara, *Die Stimme*, p. 110.

Gabriel Okara, *The Voice*, p. 112.

Gabriel Okara, *Die Stimme*, p. 110.