Pandora's Sons:
The Nominal Paradox of Patriarchy and War

Thom Workman
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of New Brunswick
Fredericton, New Brunswick
E3B 5A3
wworkman@unb.ca

YCISS Occasional Paper Number 31
January 1996

This paper was initially prepared for the 36th Annual Convention of the
This paper draws upon a manuscript in preparation entitled
The Hidden Agenda of Mars: Race, Class, and Gender in Contemporary War.
A few remarks about the subject matter of this paper are appropriate. If you were to ask someone to describe a war zone, particularly in human terms, you likely would receive a fairly standard response: There are immediate threats faced by people caught in a war zone, threats that could involve physical and psychological injury, and the very real possibility of death. Persons caught within a war zone are preoccupied with the basic task of survival. The opportunity for development and growth, especially for children, is subordinated necessarily to the demands of staying alive. Children in a war zone, for example, typically forgo life-development opportunities, especially in education and play. Routine practices, including travel and work, are interrupted. Staying inside typically is deemed the best way to stay alive. Victims will forge special reliances and bonds in order to cope with daily life, usually with respect to acquiring basic amenities and fulfilling basic needs. Anxiety and stress rises in direct proportion to the perception of threat, and frustration at the heightened sense of vulnerability grows as the distance between "normal" life and "war-zone" life widens. The threat of injury and death, the preoccupation with survival, generalized privation, the suffocation of human development, the forging of special reliances, rising anxiety, stress, and frustration are typical features of any war zone.

What is the difference, one might ask, between a war zone and the situation faced by a female student walking across campus to reach her university library after dark? Typically, this situation would not be described as a war zone. The similarities between the two, however, are striking. A woman walking across her university campus after dark undeniably faces the prospect of immediate injury or death, as the proliferation of university escort services clearly demonstrates. Faced with the need to reach the library, a situation easily able to produce anxiety and augment the stress of university life, female students often go to elaborate lengths to re-arrange their schedules in order to reach the library during daylight. If unable to rearrange their day, women will create special reliances by booking appointments with escort services, seeking out males that they trust, or making arrangements to travel in groups. Not immediately evident is the frustration experienced in simply completing a paper or studying for an examination, or the disappointment with the prevailing view that her university success is limited only by her wishes and desires. Of course, many women simply forgo such trips to the library in the interest of preserving their safety, thereby sacrificing much along the way.

Why is only one of these scenarios normally described as a war zone? How could situations with such obvious similarities (and many more could be conjured up) escape the attention of most observers and commentators? Why has their been a hesitation to locate all forms of threat and violence, especially those pertaining directly to women, within a broader explanatory matrix? Why are some types of threat and violence, especially the practice of war, privileged or valorized over others, particularly in the manner in which they exact disproportionate amounts of scholarly
attention? What kind of tendentiousness is coming into play when war (as normally understood) is exalted as a scholarly subject. There is a curious celebration that frequently surfaces among intellectuals who turn their attention to war. One could hear Kal Holsti reverently expressing relief throughout the pages of The Dividing Discipline that Realists in international relations understood the importance of studying war.1 Peace researchers are smitten no less by similar notions of intellectual grandeur: "Others would place the quest for human dignity and equality above that for peace. But the danger of war is so great, and so immediate, that without reliable peace it hardly seems possible to pursue other goals effectively."2

Of course, the fact that two logically distinct lines of query—the failure to recognize similarities and the exaltation of a subject matter—are bound together anticipates one compelling response. The discipline that claimed the study of war as its own in the aftermath of World War I, that is, international relations, eclipsed critiques that were inclined to locate war within a broader explanatory matrix. Specifically, the feminist and Marxist critiques of war were excluded in the initial flurry of intellectual "homesteading" that quickly came to define the incipient field.3 Feminist critiques that addressed World War I in terms of patriarchal culture and society were circulated throughout the war.4 Similarly, arguments about the origins of World War I that focussed upon the nature and dynamics of globalizing capitalism were present from the beginning.5 It is curious that a field with the raison d’etre of explaining war would cast two sobering lines of inquiry aside at its point of inception. When viewed in this manner, the inaugural phase of intellectual activity in international relations, a phase that has been described recently as neo-Kantian in view of its penchant for democratic republicanism and its focus upon the cooperative prospects of sovereign states, appears as a discursive practice aimed at foreclosing radical critiques of war.6 From the outset, in other words, the theoretical understanding of international relations was profoundly political in terms of its consonance with the reproduction of patri-capitalism. The theory-that-became-praxis crystallized within an early 20th century discursive matrix that marginalized feminist and Marxist critique, and with it any possibility of addressing war as a historically embedded social practice.

3. The language of homesteading and settling intellectual frontiers is developed in Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
4. For example see the collection of writings in Margaret Kamester and Jo Vellacott, eds., Militarism versus Feminism: Writings on Women and War (London: Virago Press, 1987).
5. An excellent overview of these writings may be found in Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).
The tendency to reify war, that is, to fail to examine it as part of a broader set of cultural understandings and practices, was intensified during the positivist pall of international relations. The immediate task at hand became the application of a \textit{naturalist} model of science in the quest for nomological theories of war. Scholars could apply this theoretical knowledge to the world "out there" in order to promote and foster a more peaceful world. "The cause of the disease once known," presciently mused Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the \textit{Abstract of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace} in a manner that anticipated the spirit of researchers throughout much of the 20th century, "suffices to indicate the remedy, if indeed there is one to be found." The view that war might be related to patriarchy, indeed, that it might be rooted in patriarchal culture, or the possibility that war might be understood better as one manifestation of violence characteristic of a gendered society, was absent from almost all research. Nor was the developing feminist critique deemed to be all that relevant or helpful in understanding war.\footnote{Often the formal discourse of academia was silent on the relevance of feminist critique in the field, or about the relationship between the oppression of women in questions of war and peace, although it was guided clearly by the masculinist view of science. However, Betty Reardon's remarks about the informal responses among peace researchers are useful to bear in mind: "What is said around coffee tables in research institutes often is more truly revealing than what is said around seminar tables. Informal professional conversations can expose the sexist bias usually denounced in formal discourse." \textit{Sexism and the War System}, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985), p. 5.} War was treated as a \textit{thing} in need of an \textit{account} rather than a practice fundamentally linked to other sociocultural practices.

With the loosening of the positivist/Realist hold on international relations and the simultaneous rise of feminist analysis, intellectual space has been created to address war in terms of the social relations of power between men and women. This development places war within a broader patriarchal matrix, and has helped to develop an understanding of war as one (obviously important) manifestation of patriarchal violence. This development also has promoted a more unassuming character with respect to the subject matter itself. The concerns lies less with warfare or its destructive potential (although this concern remains) than it does with the relationship between warfare and the oppression of women. Primary concern, that is, rests less with war than with the reproduction of patriarchy.

This paper addresses the gender critique of war directly. It argues that the gender critique of war has racked enough to be able to identify a preliminary thesis regarding war and the reproduction of patriarchy. The altered experiences and practices of war, combined with the sometimes dramatic modifications in gender representations (through propaganda, literature etcetera), are considerable. War can produce cultural crises of gender, especially as it throws the historical contingency and cultural arbitrariness of gendered constructs into relief. There is the suggestion that through war traditional gendered constructs can modulate and unwind. An emerging sense of cultural crisis revolving around gender shifts typically accompanies both war and post-war periods. Indeed, much
of the initial research on gender and war, in view of the extensive shifts in representations and practices during war, directly or indirectly explores the emancipatory effect of war upon women.

To the extent that war is contingent upon such gendered constructs, constructs that the practice itself appears to threaten and endanger, the relationship between war and gender might be said to be paradoxical. The paradoxical dynamic between gender and war, however, is softened by the profundity of the links between war and patriarchy. The gendering of experiences during war, along with the restoration of traditional gendered constructs after war, more than compensate for any war-induced sundering of the patriarchal tapestry. While the practice of war suggests that it might encourage a rupture in the gendered fabric of society, it overwhelmingly contributes to patriarchal reproduction. Questions oriented around the emancipatory potential of war where women are concerned, therefore, run the risk of losing a perspective on the overall role of modern warfare in the reproduction of women's oppression.

II

The gender critique of war provides a generalized account of wars and the way they are fought. The gender critique tells us why we have wars at all. While it is suggestive with respect to the frequency, character, and scope of war, it does not try to account for the timing and location of specific wars. It tells us why war is viewed widely as an acceptable practice or way to resolve human differences (although this acceptance invariably is accompanied with obligatory protestations of reluctance). The gender critique of war, for example, cannot account for the timing and location of the 1991 Gulf War, although it can provide an explanation of the warring proclivities of modern Western states, especially the inconsistency between the peaceful rhetoric of the US and its incessant warring practices. It can account for the spectre of war in the aftermath of Vietnam, with the end of the Cold War, and with the election of George Bush. It is less able to account for the appearance of war in the Middle East in January of 1991.

The opening intellectual orientation of the gender critique of war rests upon a constructivist view of human understanding and practice, that is, a view that anchors practices, including war, within humankind's self-made historico-cultural matrix. This view is contrasted starkly with those that ground human practices psychologically or biologically or genetically. War is not viewed as a natural practice as if delivered by the Gods; it arises out of human-created understandings and ways-of-living that have evolved over the millennia. More specifically, the assumption that men (the nearly exclusive makers and doers of war) are biologically hard-wired for aggression and violence is resisted, as is the related notion that women are naturally passive and non-violent. The explanation for war will not be found in testosterone levels. It is not the essential or bio-social male that makes war. War is the product of the gendered understandings of life—understandings of the celebrated masculine and the subordinated feminine—that have been fashioned over vast tracts of cultural
time. And since war arises from human-created understandings and practices it can be removed when these understandings change. War is not insuperable. Indeed, the rooting of war in human created phenomena is recognized as a response to the political incapacitation associated with biologically determinist arguments: "Attempts of genetic determinists to show a biological basis for individual aggression and to link this to social aggression, are not only unscientific, but they support the idea that wars of conquest between nations are inevitable."\(^8\)

The rooting of war within patriarchal culture can be examined by focussing upon the relationship between the masculine and feminine ethos.\(^9\) The ways of thinking about and practicing war arise within a highly disciplining gendered discourse, a discourse marked with well elucidated boundaries of the masculine and the feminine. The sphere of appropriate concerns and alternatives is established by these boundaries. The thinking and practice of war is limited by the consonance with the masculine ethos and corresponding dissonance with the feminine ethos. The boundaries of gender must be respected, and transgressions will necessitate immediate correction and expiation, especially if a subject is to avoid ideational ostracization or to be taken seriously. Carol Cohn's recounting of the musings of a white male physicist is telling:

> Several colleagues and I were working on modelling counterforce attack, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments. At one point, we remodelled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being thirty-six million immediate fatalities, there would only be thirty million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying, "Oh yes, that's great, only thirty million," when all of a sudden, I heard what we were saying. And I blurted out, "Wait, I've just heard how we're talking—Only thirty million! Only thirty million human beings being killed instantly?" Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn't even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.\(^10\)

Cohn adds that the physicist was careful not to transgress the pale of the masculine in his subsequent work. This self-discipline on the part of the physicist is revealing in that it underscores


the respect afforded gender boundaries. Appearing womanly invited an immediate loss of stature and a delegitimation of one’s contribution to the discussion. Expressing concern about the pain and suffering associated with the death counts, or subordinating icy abstractions to particular, concrete considerations was recognized as an abandonment of the appropriate policy-making framework.

The practices of war emerge within gendered understandings that inflect all spheres of social life. As we created "man" and "woman" we simultaneously created war. Contemporary warfare, in complementary terms, emerges within the inner-most sanctums of gendered life. Gender constructs are constitutive of war; they drive it and imbue it with meaning and sense. War should not be understood as simply derivative of the masculine ethos, although it numerous facets accord with the narratives and lore of masculinity. The faculty of war is our understanding of man and women, of manliness and womanliness, and particularly of the subordination of the feminine to the masculine. It is the twinning of the masculine and the feminine that nourishes the war ethic. This can be illustrated by examining the infusion of the language of war with heterosexual imagery typically of patriarchy, that is, with ideas of the prowess-laden male sexual subject conquering the servile female sexual object. Both sex and war are constituted through understandings of male domination and female subordination. The language is bound to be mutually reinforcing and easily interchangeable. War is a metaphor for sex and sex is a metaphor for war. A recent study of nicknames for the penis revealed that men were much more inclined to metaphorize the penis with reference to mythic or legendary characters (such as the Hulk, Cyclops, Genghis Khan, The Lone Ranger, and Mac the Knife), to authority figures and symbols (such as Carnal King, hammer of the gods, your Majesty, Rod of Lordship, and the persuader), to aggressive tools (such as screwdriver, drill, jackhammer, chisel, hedgetrimmer, and fuzzbuster), to ravening beasts (such as beast of burden, King Kong, The Dragon, python, cobra, and anaconda), and to weaponry (such as love pistol, passion rifle, meat spear, stealth bomber, destroyer, and purple helmeted love warrior). The intuitive collocation of sexuality with domination, conquering, destruction, and especially instruments of war is confirmed by this study. Both sex and war, however, are manifestations of the gendered notions of power-over, submission, inequality, injury, contamination, and destruction. Both practices are integral expressions of patriarchal culture and proximate to its reproduction. It is hardly surprising that the language of sexuality and war is seamless.

War is masculinist in the sense that it is bound up with the flight from woman to man; it is a repudiation of feminine characteristics and traits in favour of those understood as masculine. War is inscribed with the celebration of manliness and the concomitant loathing of womanliness. We can speak of war in terms of its migration "to the masculine" and its flight "from the feminine". With respect to the former, war is associated explicitly with the achievement and recovery of masculinity. Embedded

---

within the fabric of masculinity are the rituals of violence and destruction. Violence and aggression are not incidental to masculinity; they are integral to its meaning. War arises as the quintessential practice of masculine confirmation; in and through war manliness is achieved. The tapestry of virility embodies the war ethic. The masculinity of the war-maker is not doubted. War becomes the exclusive sanctuary of masculinized males (and occasionally of masculinized females). The extensive role of "women" in the functioning of the militaries is understood logistically but does not resonate within patriarchal consciousness. Lyndon Johnson's concern about the measure of a man are telling:

President Lyndon B. Johnson had always been haunted by the idea the he would be judged as being insufficiently manly for the job.... He had unconsciously divided people around him between men and boys. Men were the activists, doers, who conquered business empires, who acted instead of talked, who made it in the world and had the respect of other men. Boys were the talkers and the writers and the intellectuals who sat around thinking and criticizing and doubting instead of doing.... As Johnson weighed the advice he was getting on Vietnam, it was the boys who were most sceptical, and the men who were most hawkish who had Johnson's respect. Hearing that someone in the administration was becoming a dove on Vietnam, Johnson said "Hell, he has to squat to piss." The distancing of oneself from the war-option invites a series of disciplining cultural epithets (such as George Bush's "wimp" image) that signal the fall from the masculine. The debate around the entry of women (and gay men) into the military is driven largely by the fear that the military will be emasculated, this is, that it will lose its integrity as a masculine preserve. Joining the military is understood typically as a part of proving your manliness. Actually fighting in war is a more meaningful confirmation of one's manliness. Males that participate in war in a supportive manner are deemed to be less "manly" that the veteran soldier. Support for peace or peaceful initiatives is viewed easily as a sign of masculine deprivation. Peace is intuited as arousal disfunction.

Another dimension of the migration to the masculine is the necessary presence of untainted rational calisthenics. The language of war must appear reasonable (uncontaminated by emotion), serious, respectful of abstractness, mindful, cultured, thoughtful, logical, and objective. The language and understanding that shapes war thinking cannot be personalized, subjective, or emotional. The cold, hard, dispassionate, distant, abstract, disembodied, rational, logical thought characteristic of war planners, the strategic community, and policymakers is the arena of masculinity. The manner in

---


which war-thought and philosophy share the goals of transcending the particular, concrete, bodily world in favour of the abstract and the universal has invited comparisons between the two. Sara Ruddick writes: "... philosophers often honour, even as they construct, conceptual connections between reason, war, and masculinity. As Plato warned, the struggle to become reasonable 'mustn't be useless to warlike men'; on the contrary, philosophers see to it that those men and (sometimes) women who are called 'reasonable' have 'proved best [both] in philosophy and with respect to war.'"  

Still another facet of the sojourn to the masculine may be found in the remembrance of killing and the comparable silence on birthing. Remembering war and commemorating soldiers confirms the past achievement of manhood. On the numerous armistice or army days worldwide societies collectively confirm the past attainment of manliness. Remembrance confirms that manhood was achieved in the past and reminds present generations of their (ultimate) task. Memory is disciplining.

On the other side of the war ledger is the flight from the feminine. War is premised upon the understanding that the feminine is the enemy of the warring essence. It is imperative to emphasize that war is not neglectful with respect to woman, or that it is merely non-inclusive, hesitant, or reluctant. Rather, war is axiomatically bound up with the fear of the feminine. The ideology of war involves the presupposition that womanliness is antithetical to war, that it will undermine the warring ethic. Warfare presupposes that woman is the enemy of man's crowning practice. It identifies the feminine as the castrating enemy of the manly/war scheme. Any suggestion of gravitation towards the feminine is equated with the decay of masculine resolve.

The flight from the feminine entails the simultaneous denial and appropriation of the things women do. Labels such as heroism, bravery, and sacrifice, for example, are reserved for war; the attendant pain and loss of life in childbirth is socially repressed. There is no equivalent effort to commemorate or celebrate the bringing forth of life. In fact, childbirth has been epidemiologized over the last century, while gestation and birth imagery has been appropriated by weapons designers. Birthing does not have the recollective equivalent of war. At best, the womb is enlisted to further the war project, that is, to insure future soldiering generations. Womanliness is domesticated, in a sense, to

---

14. Ruddick's Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990) opens with the explicit equation between masculinity and reason: "My life has been shaped by a love affair with Reason... In college I realized that not only did Reason protect me from social and emotional imbroglios, He—or it, as I was learning to say—offered me worldly possibilities... Reason, at least as Western philosophers had imagined Him, was infested by—and contributed to—the pervasive disrespect for women's minds and lives from which I suffered. For a woman to love Reason was to risk both self-contempt and a self-alienating misogyny. pp. 3-5. Quote in text from p. 145.

ensure that it does not undermine war. Men's killing is acclaimed typically in terms of its "protective" function, that is, as protectors of the home and the hearth. Men are cast, in the end, as the most important caretakers.

These motifs shade into outright loathing. War may be hell indeed; but it is driven by an ideology of hatred. Misogyny is the theory; war is the practice. Myths surrounding woman as the enemy of man (and the things men do) lay at the heart of war-thought. Modern war is connotatively inseparable from the dehumanizing representations of woman. The drive "to war" is recessed within the myth of woman as man's worst enemy. Modern warfare is a relentlessly Pandoran affair. Its abundant coital imagery is organically inspired by its misogynistic cradle. Common parlance routinely asserts that an enemy that has been consigned to ignominious defeat is an enemy that has been "thoroughly f**ked" (which resonates culturally as being reduced to a woman). It has been observed that the construction of a soldier requires the killing of the woman within. The training of the soldier is replete with a litany of disciplining epithets regarding the feminine. The transformation from boy-recruit into man-soldier requires the extirpation of any feminine traits and identities; it demands the vanquishing of any lurking womanliness. War is femicidal. This foreshadows, moreover, the vigilance with respect to the subversive feminine being looming within the warring fabric. Soldier and policymakers guard against the association of their actions or ideas with feminine traits. Regardless of its particular manifestation or definition of a practice, ritual, or goal linked to militaries and to battle, the ideology of war requires a strict, unrelenting overcoming of anything understood as womanly. Its discourse of identity and achievement, in other words, repudiates and disavows the feminine as much as it is embraces the masculine.

This misogynistic reflex undergirds the representation of opponents (on the war front and the "home" front) as women. Those opposing war routinely are dismissed in feminine terms, as being too emotional, too sentimental, as lacking in firmness and determination, as naïve, unthoughtful, weak, confused, and, in the branding coup de grâce, as unmanly (it is commonly suspected that peaceful people or doves, after all, don't "have balls"). There is a common and essential association between women and peace, an association that has permeated a share of social activism and

16. One of the most thorough empirical analyses of the understanding of the "protector" and the "protected" may be found in Jacklyn Cock, Colonels & Cadres: War and Gender in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991). A similar idea of protecting "white women" in the context of Western colonial experiences emerges as a principal theme in Abouali Farmanfarmaian's "Did you Measure up? The Role of Race and Sexuality in the Gulf War," Collateral Damage: The New World Order at Home and Abroad (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992): "A Black man in LA and an Arab ruler several thousand miles away differ only in terms of the weapons they use and the weapons used against them; the threat they represent is similar." p. 125.

scholarly research. Military enemies, moreover, typically are represented as woman. Military targets, especially the ground or earth itself, also are connotatively feminized in war-think.

The practice of war surfaces within gendered understandings and identities. War embodies the rehearsal of patriarchal consciousness. Numerous leaders (mainly male but occasionally female) overtly draw upon gendered understandings for policy guidance. It is this sense of war being constituted and inflected through gender that informs the claim that patriarchy lies at the root of war. Without gender it is unlikely that war would arise as such a frequent alternative in human life, and that entire societies could be so extensively militarized regardless of the costs and trade-offs involved.

III

The practice of war, however, appears to create some wobbling of gendered identities and constructs, that is, it hints at the relaxation of gendered understandings and the maceration of man/woman identities. Women in particular are granted greater latitude through war, an effect that appears to be contingent partially upon the length of any given war. These reconstituted understandings and identities can be extremely dissonant with respect to the prevailing pre-war culture. This loosening of gender hints at a paradox of war, a paradox in the sense that war originates within gendered understandings, understandings that then modulate and evince signs of significant change or evolution. The slackening of gender through war suggests that war might foster its own undoing through the possible reconstruction of a gendered life less conducive to aggression, violence, and ultimately war itself. Brief examinations of male and female wartime experiences will suffice to illustrate this effect.

The most widely documented effect of war upon gendered practices addresses the relationship between WWII and women, especially in the United States and Great Britain. The exigencies of the Second World War drew women into the labour force to a degree unmatched in previous periods. These changes have encouraged an exploration of the lingering effects of WWII upon women, especially with respect to expanded opportunities outside the home and amended experiential understandings. William Chafe, for example, contends that the altered practices for

---

18. This association, in fact, provides an important baseline for much of the research into gender and war, especially the frequent identification as non-essentialist.

19. Although most of this research has been centred around the experiences of World War II, there has been some research on World War I. See Gail Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War* (London: Croom Helm, 1981).
women that arose during WWII "did make a significant difference" for women after the war. First, the war gave social sanction to the participation of well-off, married middle-class women in the labour force, whose continuing participation after demobilization contributed to the dramatic growth of the female labour force in the post-war period. Chafe argues that the explosive growth of young mothers in recent times "had its starting point with the sanctioned participation of middle-aged, married women during the war..." Moreover, by radically altering gendered practices WWII fed new ideas about a women's place in society. As Chafe writes: "... by creating a basis in social reality for the idea that a woman's 'place' is not in the home, and by creating an audience of women who knew firsthand how unequal their treatment in the workforce was, these changes helped to provide a crucial precondition for the emergence of a coherent political movement that challenged traditional values regarding women's and men's proper roles."  

Sherna Berger Gluck, in her oral histories of female workers from WWII, also contends that the war helped to initiate a period of change in American society. She argues that the cultural image of women in the 1950s, an image broached in Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique*, was partly a reaction to the altered lives of women in the post-war period rather than a mere reflection of their lives. "If people were behaving according to the cultural ideals," Gluck asks, "why was it necessary to continue to promote them so stridently?" She suggests that the "postwar messages can better be understood as a measure of the amount of change that was occurring in the society—as an attempt to stem the tide of that change." Gluck contends that concepts such as the feminine mystique impair our ability to see the "slow incremental process of change" in women's life that is attributable in part to the wartime experience. Although the exigencies of war were responsible for drawing women into the workforce, it was the experience of war itself that subtly changed women's understandings:

The potential for social transformation was created by the wartime need for women workers. For a brief period, images of women were revised, employment opportunities were expanded, and public policy was enacted that created new services for women. These were necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Social values also had to

22. *Ibid.*, Other writers agree that World War II was important in the development of a second wave of feminist critique in American society. See Susan Hartmann, *The Home Front and Beyond: American women in the 1940s* (Boston: Twayne, 1982).
change, including women's definition of themselves. Women's wartime experience played a vital role in that process of redefinition—the reverberations of which are still being felt today.\textsuperscript{26}

In other words, women's experiences during WWII, and not the propaganda campaign that drew them into the workforce, were a watershed in the evolving position of women within American society. World War II, therefore, had more than an ephemeral impact upon the lives of women in the United States.

Other researchers agree that some change in the position of women was initiated by the war, but emphasize that such changes were modest in comparison to the continuing subordinate status of women within society. Karen Anderson's study of female labour in Seattle, Detroit, and Baltimore during World War II leads her to conclude that the war "marked an important turning point for women, involving as it did the implicit rejection of the idea that a woman's household responsibilities could not be reconciled with outside employment." She adds that "the wartime experience began the process of accommodation between family and work and pointed the way to a greater degree of choice for American women."\textsuperscript{27} She stresses, however, that the process of change initiated during WWII was reversed significantly in the post-war period, especially as a result of the aggressive campaign aimed at folding women back into the home:

\ldots it is important to note just how much the change begun in the war years was thwarted in the postwar period... Wives who had emerged from their wartime experiences with increased self-confidence and self-reliance were urged to deny those capacities if such duplicity and self-abnegation was necessary to restore diminished male egos. With their stress on manipulative femininity and the importance of purchasing marital harmony at the cost of a woman's individuality, the postwar themes resembled closely those of the nineteenth-century cult of domesticity.\textsuperscript{28}

This emphasis on traditional life tended to contradict the perceptions that emerged out of women's wartime experience. Anderson concludes that the war created no residual ideological legacy consistent with women's experientially-acquired sense of greater social latitude.

The experience of war also has shown signs of creating a disjunction between men's understanding of themselves and the broader ideology of masculinity.\textsuperscript{29} Elaine Showalter's discussion of shell-shock during World War I provides an excellent example of the emerging contradiction between suffused

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 270.
\item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 174-175.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Paul Fussell, for example, discusses the homoerotic experiences of men during war, experiences that are inconsistent with masculine norms and expectations. See \textit{Wartime: The Experience of War, 1939-1945} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
\end{itemize}
gendered constructs and the self-understandings emerging out of lived experiences. She begins by
drawing attention to the high incidence of shell-shock during the war. By 1918 there were more than
20 hospitals for shell-shock patients throughout the United Kingdom. Through her examination
of the relationship between a psychiatrist named William Rivers and one of the shell-shock victims
named Siegfried Sassoon, Showalter argues that shell-shock emerged as a response to the gap
between masculine expectations and the horrifying realities of the war front: "Placed in intolerable
and unprecedented circumstances of fear and stress, deprived of their sense of control, and expected
to react with outmoded and unnatural 'courage', thousands of men reacted instead with the
symptoms of hysteria; soldiers lost their voices and spoke through their bodies." The experiences
of war, especially combat and loss, sat awkwardly against the masculine ethos of the courageous
soldier. Shell-shock emerged as a common response to this contradiction between experience and
expectation. "For most," she writes, "... the anguish of shell shock included more general but intense
anxieties about masculinity, fears of acting effeminate, even a refusal to continue the bluff of male
behaviour. If it was the essence of manliness not to complain, then shell shock was the body
language of masculine complaint, a disguised male protest, not only against the war, but against the
concept of manliness itself." Showalter parallels the WWI soldier to the rejectionist posture of
females in the late 19th century: "[just as] epidemic female hysteria in Victorian England had been
a form of protest against a patriarchal society that enforced confinement to a narrowly defined
femininity; epidemic male hysteria in World War I was a protest against the politicians, generals, and
psychiatrists." Shell-shock was perceived as antithetical to the war effort. The treatment for shell-
shock surrounded the quarantining of the emerging feminine traits and the reinvigoration of
masculine identity: "Sassoon was diagnosed was having an anti-war complex, and his treatment
aimed at replacing his emotive (thus feminine) view of the war with appropriate masculine views.
Such diagnosis, moreover, allowed the army to contain Sassoon's pacifism from a potentially
receptive public." The research on the experiences of men and women in war suggest that the emerging gendered
understandings can exist in rather stark opposition to the prevailing representations of gender within
society. The propaganda campaign that drew women into the labour force during World War II,
moreover, publicly displays the malleability of gender constructs within society, especially when this
campaign was suspended abruptly at war's end. Both the understandings derived from war-time

30. Showalter, Elaine, "Rivers and Sassoon: The Inscription of Male Gender Anxieties," in _Behind the Lines:
Gender and the Two World Wars_ ed., Margaret Randolph Higonnet _et al_ (New Haven: Yale University Press,
31. _Ibid._, p. 64.
32. _Ibid._
33. _Ibid._
34. _Ibid._, p. 67.
experience and the modulation of official gender ideology expose the historical contingency and cultural arbitrariness of gender constructs within society. In a sense, war may perform a sort of denaturalization function with respect to gendered constructs. Wartime life, in other words, evinces some tendencies to be culturally traumatic, exposing as it can the ease with which gendered understandings can be renovated, and creating chasms between experiential understandings on the one hand and the masculine/feminine ethos on the other. It can puncture the widely-perceived fixed, unyielding, bio-social natures of "man" and "woman" that are so integral to war itself. The exigencies and horrors of war suggest that men and women can be something significantly different from images formalized in cultural codes. War can render gendered constructs less immuring. These tendencies hint at a paradoxical relationship between gender and war. That is, although gendered understandings are so integral to war, it would appear that war can simultaneously work to rewrite gendered constructs and reinscribe gendered identities. The practice of war seems capable of creating crises of masculinity and femininity. It dwells within gendered understandings, and yet ultimately risks destroying them.

IV

The paradox of gender and war, however, loses its fizzle. While there is the suggestion that widespread wartime experiences and changing public representations of "man" and "woman" can work to macerate the narratives of gender, a development that would undermine the basis of warfare significantly, there is considerable indication that patriarchal culture is gender resilient throughout war. Just as war produces experiences and altered representations of gender that point to a relaxation of gendering discourses, it also reinvigorates many elements of gendered life in every social sphere. This revitalization of gendered life can continue well into the post-war period. Gendered constructs appear to have a great capacity for retrenchment throughout war. The wobbling or slackening of gender is modest when measured against the overwhelming capacity to revivify gendered understandings and practices. War may induce an infirming of patriarchal culture although the capacity to recuperate, a capacity significantly charged by the dynamics and complexities of war itself, is considerable.

The potential for a lasting interruption in gendered understandings and practices are circumscribed during the prosecution of war and in the post-war era. Wartime life is more suggestive of a modification in the practices associated with gendered constructs rather than a fundamental shift in the constructs themselves. Altered practices are represented in a manner consistent with the relentless narratives of gender. Women continue to be depicted as nurturers, as mothers, in attentive and supportive roles, as sexual objects, as vulnerable, as emotional, and as man's enemy. The

---

35. For an excellent analysis of how many of these narratives were reproduced in British film and the cultural industry more generally during World War II see Antonia Lant, *Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema* (Princeton University Press, 1991), especially chapter 2.
growing involvement of women within the workforce during wartime also gets represented in terms of traditional gendered constructs. Women move from the home to the home front; the family broadens to include the entire nation. The involvement of women in the generalized war effort is animated with images of supporting the men at the front. During World War II women typically were perceived to be working "for the duration" of the war and no longer.

The extensively altered practices do not undermine conventional gendered understandings. As Leila Rupp concludes in her examination of World War II German and American propaganda: "... the adaptation of public images to the demands of war allowed both the German and the American public to accept the employment of women in `unwomanly' occupations without challenging basic ideas about `woman's place'... The war was not a social revolution, for society generally or for women in particular. As long as women had a `place', in the home or in the war, little had changed".36 Maureen Honey's examination of the Rosie the Riveter phenomenon in the United States similarly concludes that women were represented with traditional gender markers—especially the role of nurturer and helper—that undermined any positive images that might have emerged through the war experience.37

The extensively altered roles of women that occur in wartime, in fact, create widely felt anxieties about the preservation of femininity, and invite overt efforts to preserve the feminine self. This anxiety is heightened as women become drawn into the military itself. An examination of the Canadian military during World War II reveals that the growing involvement of women created intense anxieties about the preservation of femininity.38 This anxiety was manifested in the debate upon the appropriate uniform for females. The long association of the man with the military uniform, and the identification of the uniform in terms of a series of masculine traits including forcefulness and toughness, created grave concern about the effects of the uniform upon women. Reassurance was needed that the uniform did not diminish a woman's femininity, and the military even resorted to polling Canadians about the attractiveness of women in uniform. Part of the solution to these concerns was addressed by allowing women to avoid standard issue underclothing,


37. Maureen Honey, *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984). She writes: "As defenders of liberty, women were cast into a selfless role that conflicted with the concept of female self-actualization through new work opportunities." p. 216.

an arrangement that was preserved throughout the war. "Its effect," Pierson writes, "was to leave open what was perceived as a sphere of feminine self-expression." 39

The capacity for patriarchal culture to recover in post-war periods appears considerable. The utter destruction of warfare, the growing sense of war fatigue or collective exhaustion that can accompany drawn out wars, the revoicing of ideas about the "way of life" that was supposedly defended or protected, the need to refine the purpose of the war in general, the difficulties of readjusting to civilian life, especially during periods of large-scale demobilization, the general social and economic dislocation that can accompany the disruptive effects of war, and political crises often attendant to war can contribute to a cultural environment prone to reenlivening reactionary gendered constructs. 40 In this atmosphere the relaxation, interruption, modification, or oft-purported rupture of traditional gendered constructs is confronted directly and aggressively, and would appear to conclude invariably with the rigidification and consolidation of traditional gendered understandings. In other words, any residual effects of gender-softening during the war are contained.

Studies from different twentieth century wars reveal the consolidating tendencies of traditional gendered constructs in post-war eras. 41 Susan Kent's examination of the reconstruction of gender in post-WWI Great Britain underscores this tendency. According to Kent, the post-WWI period in Great Britain can be characterized by a reactionary appeal to traditional notions of "men" and "women". These constructs resurrected and intensified the notion of "separate spheres" for males and females, a position that had been subjected to sustained opposition by feminist critics in the pre-war period. The immediate post-war period in Great Britain revealed a strong desire to return to normalcy and peacefulness, especially in view of the rapacity and horrors of the war. The massive demobilization and social dislocation of the war was permeated with a "backlash against women", most palpable in the area of women's employment, but extending into other spheres of life. 42 The

39. Ibid., p. 147. Discussion extracted from chapter 4. Pierson concludes that the post-war backlash against women in Canada (especially regarding employment) was linked to concerns regarding the preservation of the feminine woman.

40. For example see Mary Louise Roberts' discussion of gender as a post-WWI French site integral to dealing with the disruptive effects of the war in Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917-1927 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Roberts identifies (p. 216) some representations of women that were integral to the post-war debate on gender, a debate that certainly "sustained a system of domination" and that was "haunted by the figure of the childless, young woman, sexually promiscuous, loose in her morals, free in her clothes, who wanted to 'live her own life'".

41. These discussions are not limited to the twentieth century. For example see Catherine Clinton, "Reconstructing Freedwomen" and Victoria Bynum "Reshaping the Bonds of Womanhood: Divorce in Reconstruction North Carolina," in Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

collective aspiration for normalcy and stability was accomplished in part through the strict redefinition of gender: "The perceived blurring of gender lines occasioned by war's upheaval led many in British society to see in a reestablishment of sexual difference the means to re-create a semblance of order." The frequent collocation of sexuality with WWI itself partially undergirded the widespread belief that guarding against a gender war was necessary to ensure a post-war peace. Peace would have to include sexual peace: "The antidote to disorder following a war that had been represented in sexual imagery and sexual metaphor," Kent writes, "would itself be depicted in sexual terms." The search for a post-war calm would be achieved by insuring a calm between the sexes. Ultimately, the preservation of peace between nations and between men and women evolved to consider issues of sexuality directly. As Kent writes: "... sexuality and war were understood by the culture—consciously or unconsciously—to be inextricably intertwined. Thus, the resolution of conflict through mutual, pleasurable sexual experiences within marriage was regarded by many sexologists and sex reformers as a means of reducing the threat of war by removing the sexual repressions and tensions that, they sometimes implied, helped to bring it about."

The manufacturing of a gender peace drew upon the notion of natural, biological differences between men and women that underwrote their separate spheres of life. Women who failed or refused to accept these differences incurred generalized wrath and were pathologized by psychiatrists and sexologists. Feminists in particular were characterized as "abnormal, sexually maladjusted women who hated men." In the process, the pre-war feminist discourse was marginalized culturally. Feminist ideas of integration and equality were deemed to be inappropriate to the achievement of a genuine calm: "... after the horrific events of the Great War, the spectre of conflict between men and women could hardly be tolerated; postwar society sought above all to reestablish a sense of peace and security in an unfamiliar and insecure world. The most fundamental step in the direction appears to have been an insistence upon gender peace: a relationship of male-female complementarity in which women did not compete with men in the public sphere... Prewar egalitarian feminism, with its suggestion of sex war, seems to have become associated in the public mind with a renewal of the massive conflict so recently ended."

The post-Vietnam era in the United States also evinces an emerging crisis of gender and efforts to redress the eroded boundaries of the masculine and feminine. In particular, the loss in Vietnam

43. Ibid., p. 99.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 107. Kent adds (p. 109): "Domestic harmony, and thus social peace, appeard to Britons to depend upon the establishment of a managed and controlled sexuality whereby warriors could be rendered peaceable and wherein women could find, acknowledge, and express their sexuality with a framwork of 'scientific' approbation."
46. Ibid., p. 112.
47. Ibid., p. 113.
increasingly came to be understood in terms of a severely bruised or irreparably injured masculinity. As Susan Jeffords argues, this crisis of American masculinity necessitated a prolonged period of cultural cleansing aimed at restoring its wounded masculinity. Vietnam veterans were disassociated from the American defeat in Vietnam. Responsibility for the American loss became associated with unpredictability, weakness, indeterminacy, and indecisiveness, that is, "characteristics traditionally perceived in American culture as feminine characteristics against which the masculine is defined." For Linda Boose, the post-Vietnam era could also be characterized in crisis terms, with a de facto repudiation of a conquest/dominance oriented masculinity expressed in the form of an intense repugnance towards the Vietnam war. The early post-Vietnam period, therefore, evinced an antimilitarist discourse and the "latent conditions for extending its impact" within the American cultural field. This crisis of masculinity encouraged a modulation of the American war-memory from one characterized by the immoderate use of military thinking (the recurrent theme of the anti-war discourse) to one where the underlying reason for the loss in Vietnam surrounded the militarily devastating restrictions associated with excessive tolerance, bureaucratic interference, political pandering, and generalized indecisiveness. The post-Vietnam cultural convalescence, in other words, reconfigured the memory of Vietnam in a manner that resurrected the ethos of conquest and domination. As Boose writes: "... the language of the 1980s became an echo-box for reconfirming the ethics of `getting tough', `playing hardball', `being a winner', and not `flinching' or `wimping out'."

The 1991 assault on Iraq, for Boose, allowed the anti-war discourse to be buried, and restored the chain of victories by America's sons that extended back to the Civil War, that is, it reestablished the "space in which sons confirm their authority with the fathers" (wounded by the Vietnam experience).

In each of the miniwars staged in the decade before the Persian Gulf crisis, America's primary goal was not, as had earlier been suspected, merely to undo defeat in Vietnam: It was to put to rest the legacy of resistant sons bequeathed by that conflict. January 1991 offered a unique opportunity. With Soviet power in collapse, a war in Iraq allowed America to demonstrate that it was the only big man around. There was now no one to impede American military muscle, block American control of the United Nations, or provide an alternative power base around which to rally any opposition. Simultaneously, through round-the-clock saturation bombing, subnuclear weaponry,


tactics that flouted the Geneva conventions, overt censorship of media information, intransigence in all negotiations, and the rejection of all third party ceasefire proposals—in short through the repeated choice of high violence options gratuitously disproportionate to the level of threat, an unfettered U.S. militarism was internally staging its own rebirth.51

The patriarchal resuscitation of the traditional masculine ethos in American culture received its most poignant confirmation in the 1991 Gulf War. Any space for the reconstitution of a masculine ethos less prone to war was foreclosed. While the residual culture of one war underwrote a crisis of gender, the recuperative capacity of patriarchal culture, a recuperation that involved a series of "corrective" mini-wars, appeared inexorable. War itself became the antidote to the crisis of masculinity.

V

When contemplated from the perspective of gender the practice of war appears somewhat paradoxical. It is bound up with notions of masculinity and femininity. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how war would be understood as anything other than hideous, destructive, and terribly harmful in the absence of gender discourse. When abstracted from the context of patriarchy war is drained of its meaning. War rests upon the unself-conscious appropriation of patriarchy as a sense-managing universe. Gendered constructs, in short, are constitutive of the intersocial practice that has received the appellation war.

And yet, this same practice appears to induce modifications and changes in gendered constructs, changes that could ultimately deprive war of its foundations. A recognition of these changes has inspired numerous studies to explore the emancipatory effect of war upon women, with the most frequently asked questions focussing on World War II. The nature of these questions, however, carry with them the curious intimation that the condition of women within society is incidental to the practice of war.

Unfortunately, they are integrally related to each other. The effects of war, moreover, have been contained historically by the same understandings that yield the practice in the first place. The recuperative capacity of patriarchal culture appears considerable. Exploring the emancipatory effects of war, therefore, runs the risk of losing sight of the fundamental nature of war within patriarchal society, namely, its role in the preservation and reproduction of patriarchal power. War is not about conquering nations or about policing actions or about warding off aggressors. It is about preserving

ways of life, about preserving prevailing relations of power. Obviously war can have an immediate goal, such as a piece of land or the defence of a border; its underlying preservative function barely will be intuited by those involved (although if one were pushed to detail the way of life at stake it would begin to be clear). War is about preserving patriarchal ways of life, and especially about preserving the subordination of women. Warfare is the technology of patriarchy—its most dramatic instrument of maintenance. It is very unlikely that war would create a meaningful emancipatory window for women when it is so fundamentally entwined with patriarchal culture. One must never lose sight of the fact that warfare is, as Thomas Paine observed more than two centuries ago, "the art of conquering at home." In a recent work Susan Gubar draws attention to the increasing sense of dread that many female intellectuals had during the Second World War, apprehensions impelled by the representation of woman as both booty and enemy. Such images and representations boded poorly for women in the post-war period, and Gubar contends that these intellectuals were intuiting that the war was, in effect, "a blitz on them."

52. Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man* (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1969), p. 99. Paine adds: "In reviewing the history of the English Government, its wars and its taxes, a bystander, not blinded by prejudice, not warped by interest, would declare, that taxes were not raised to carry on wars, but that wars were raised to carry on taxes."