Global Demography and Foreign Policy: A Literature Brief and Call for Research

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**Introduction**

Demographic and migratory dynamics as interrelated social phenomena have historically had a profound influence on the shape of global politics. Patterns of immigration established in the past three decades in countries like Canada, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia are initiating changes to domestic ethnic compositions and numbers of foreign born citizens within these states. With the increasing intensification of global processes of social, economic, and political integration experienced to varying degrees depending on local contexts, both traditional and nascent diaspora communities around the world are positioned to potentially have an enormous impact on the foreign policies of their host and place of origin governments. Thus, according to the Central Intelligence Agency “demographic change will create incentives for a new network of alliances and foreign policy priorities for many of the world’s most influential governments” (CIA 2001: 5).

Reflecting on these transformations in global political dynamics, Khachig Tololyan has argued that, “just as the nation-state has begun to encounter limits to its supremacy and perhaps to even lose some of its sovereignty, diasporas have emerged in scholarly and intellectual discourse as the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” (Tololyan 1996: 4). However the impact of “diaspora” is not confined to the academic community. Events of the past five years including the rapid mobilization of the Kurdish diaspora and the events of Gulf War II have illustrated the changing nature of international politics and the increasing role played by diasporas in international affairs. If diasporas continue to play an important (and growing) role in international politics, what will this mean for states like Canada, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and Australia, who have become the favoured destination points for many of the world’s new migrants?

In attempting to negotiate a response to this overarching question, there is substantial recent literature on diasporas and foreign policy, though almost none on Canada. Much of the literature, as one would expect, focuses on the United States.\(^1\) As a major immigrant receiving country, as a — indeed the — dominant international actor, and as a country which has a political structure which rewards special interest groups and works under a system of competitive pluralism, the United States has a rich history of identity group politics, of home-host relations, and of using diaspora communities to further — and at times, inadvertently interfere with — US foreign policy interests. It also has experience with being used by such domestic identity groups to further their own ends and the goals of their former homelands. While there is rich, American-concentrated research on this large theme, there is relatively little within that literature on the process of moving from new immigrant to foreign policy advocate. And while much is known about how the US political system responds to the actions of domestic interest groups, there is

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\(^1\)For example see Citrin et al (1994); Clarke (2003); Cohen (1995); DeConde (1992); Glastris (1997); Huntington (1997); Karpathakis (1999); Mazrui (1996); Olive (1996); Shain (1989); Shain (1994); Shain (1995); Shain (1998a); and Shain (1998b).
less work covering how the bureaucracy handles these pressures which seem, more often than not, to be mediated by constituency politics of Congress and the President.

There is almost nothing comparable in the study of identity groups and foreign policy in parliamentary democracies. What there is does not address the issue of new citizens, which in terms of the dynamics of the immigrant countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is a continuous issue. Further, we must now recognize that efforts to the contrary, much of Europe will soon be facing similar challenges as they face pressures linking economic growth, labour demands and falling indigenous population increases to the pressures of becoming migrant-absorbing countries at a rate much higher than previously assumed, and from a mix of countries of origin previously not fully contemplated. In Asia, Japan faces somewhat similar pressures.

This paper then is inherently exploratory rather than explanatory. We have consciously sought not to provide definitive answers to the issues raised by migration, changing demography, New Canadians, and Canadian foreign policy but rather to assess how these issues are being theorized in other contexts, what information is currently available in terms of Canada-specific and comparative data, and where important gaps in knowledge are located in terms of New Canadians and foreign policy. As such, while literatures on social integration and immigration are referenced, this paper should not be thought of as an attempt to provide a comprehensive review of this wide body of research but rather as a preliminary attempt to probe areas where research is this area may intersect with our primary issues of concern. Most importantly, this paper aims to goes beyond the typical literature brief by making a clear call for a systematic research program centred on the study of New Canadians and Canadian foreign policy including the provision of a comprehensive list of potential areas for further research.

**Global Demographic Trends From Migration**

Migrant stock (persons who have immigrated and resettled in a country that they were not born in) numbered approximately 174,781,000 people in the year 2000 or 2.9 percent of the total global population. Of this total, 15,868,000 (9 percent) were refugees (UN Populations Division 2002). For a reflection of the number of people who are often hidden by more formal migration measures, the total population of concern for the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees was estimated at 19,783,000 in 2000.²

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³Persons of concern include refugees, asylum seekers, returned refugees, internally displaced persons, and stateless/war-affected populations.
From 1995-2000, Africa (-447,000 per annum), Asia (-1,311,000) and Latin America/Caribbean (-494,000) averaged annual negative net migration flows while Europe (769,000), North America (1,394,000), and Oceania (90,000) experienced annual positive net migration (UN Populations Division 2002). This data on migrant flows at a regional level provides a snapshot of the larger trends in global migration over the past five years. In a general sense, the movement of people has been away from the global south towards the global north. Technological advancements of the past few decades including improvements in transportation and communication as well as transnational networks created by diaspora communities have made it somewhat easier for individuals to be able to travel to distant places away from their country of birth to pursue new opportunities. As a result, states in Western Europe and North America are rapidly becoming the destinations of choice for people trying to escape the trappings of destitution and conflict that plague many parts of the South.

While analysts generally tend to focus on the rise in South to North migration patterns, there are also inter-regional, inter-state, and intra-state dynamics that need to be taken into account. For example, while the developed world was home to almost 60 percent of the world’s migrant stock in 2000, less developed regions absorbed 81 percent of the world’s refugees (UN Populations Division 2002). In 2000, Pakistan was host to 2,001,000 refugees and Iran 1,868,000. Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia have over 1,172,000 refugees combined (UN Populations Division 2002). Rwanda has had the second largest average annual influx of migrants (395,000) in the world over the past five years (UN Populations Division 2002). Countries like Saudi Arabia (25.8 percent); Bahrain (39.8 percent); Qatar (72.4 percent); Kuwait (57.9 percent); and the United Arab Emirates (73.8 percent) have large migrant stocks due to labour needs which are filled by foreign guest workers from countries like India, Pakistan, and the Philippines (UN Populations Division 2002).

Furthermore, the Central Intelligence Agency (2001) has reported that for the first time in history, a majority of the globe’s population will be living in urban regions. By 2005, there may be as many as 33 mega-cities with populations of more than 8 million people if current trends continue. 27 of these will be located in the developing world where urban centres lure rural dwellers with the prospect of higher wages, social services, and an improved quality of life (CIA 2001: 55). How to effectively govern these “states within states” and other smaller (but rapidly growing) urban centres in which 1.1 billion people live in areas where pollution exceeds healthy levels, 220 million lack access to clean drinking water, and 420 million lack access to latrines are among the many problems to which few effective solutions have been offered (CIA 2002: 57). Thus, while the flows of migrants around the globe are reflective of social, economic, and political “push-pull” factors that contribute to them, assessment of their impacts and how to most effectively and justly respond to them is still lacking in numerous contexts.
In terms of South to North migration flows, new social and economic developments will provide a further impetus to continue current patterns of immigration to Western states in which migrants are increasingly from non-traditional (i.e., non-European) source countries. These “push factors” include youth bulges in countries of the South (instances where a disproportionate concentration of a population is in the 15-29 age range) that increase the pool of persons likely to emigrate, the magnification of existing economic disparities between North and South, and the growing problem of environmental degradation. Traditional “push factors” that encourage people to migrate including the desire to be able to pursue better economic opportunities and escape from violent conflict can be expected to continue to play an important role in migration trends.

Notwithstanding the current reticence of the United States in light of heightened security concerns post-9/11, there are additional “pull factors” from within potential host countries that will likely contribute to migration dynamics. Primarily, these include trying to offset the economic and social implications of aging populations with low birth rates, finding workers with special skills that may be in short supply (e.g., science and technology experts), and increasing available labour power. As such, immigration in the twenty-first century will be a means that some states will utilize in order to retain population and labour pools at levels which will generate sufficient economic revenues in order to maintain existing social infrastructure such as pensions and health care. Furthermore, the existence of already established diaspora communities both traditional (e.g., Jewish communities) or nascent (e.g., Afghani communities) within these receiving states like Canada will make them far more attractive destinations for resettlement.

**Diasporas, Transnational Networks, and International Migration**

Diasporas can be defined as “social and political identities that arise from migration (voluntary or imposed) to one or more host countries” (Sheffer 1994: 1). They can either be state-based like the Italian diaspora community or stateless like the Kurdish diaspora. Five major criteria have been proposed for utilizing the category of diaspora. First, a diaspora is made up of members who permanently reside in host countries. Second, diasporas maintain their ethno-national identities. Third, diasporas have established formal organizations or hope to do so in the near future. Fourth, communal solidarity and social cohesion are usually displayed by diaspora groups. Fifth, diasporas create transnational networks to the homeland and other parts of the diaspora (Sheffer 1994: 61).

In contrast to Gabriel Sheffer (1994), Daphne Winland (1998), has emphasized the differences that exist within diaspora communities. In her examination of the Croatian diaspora in Toronto, she has been able to illustrate that latent differences that exist within diasporas take on new significance as social and political changes occur within the country of origin (Winland 1998: 560). Diasporas tend to construct
homelands that are very different from people in the homeland, which Winland argues can lead to
tensions and disagreements between homeland and diaspora peoples (Winland 1998: 561; Winland 1995:
3-29). In addition, Yossi Shain has made the argument that as a diaspora grows and its demographic
becomes more complex, the less likely that it will consist of a homogenous population holding similar
political opinions (Shain 1989: 55).

Milton Esman (1986) has presented an understanding of diaspora that focuses more on practical political
consequences. He states “that with their variable capacities, opportunities, and propensities to exert
influence on behalf of their domestic or external interests, diaspora communities can be regarded as
interest groups and political actors” (Esman 1986: 335). Therefore, like any other interest group, Esman
believes that diaspora activities (in terms of scope and intensity) will be influenced by three major
factors including the resources (material, cultural, and organizational) available to them, the opportunity
structures in host countries, and the inclination or motivation to maintain solidarity and exert group
influence (Esman 1986: 336). Esman (1986) also outlines the numerous activities that diasporas may be
engaged in. These include activities such as trying to directly influence events within a homeland, acting
on behalf of a home government with a host government, seeking protection from a home government
when threatened by a host government, trying to influence international organizations on behalf of their
home government, and attempting to influence host government policy towards a home government
(Esman 1986: 340-343). By undertaking these and other kinds of activities such inter-governmental
mediation, diasporas occupy a unique position between homeland governments and host governments
forming what has been called a “triadic relationship” (Sheffer 1986: 1). Shain identifies African-
Americans, Cubans, Haitians, Koreans, Filipinos, Chinese, Asian Indians, Vietnamese, Dominicans, and
Mexicans as the newly empowered diaspora/interest groups in the United States (Shain 1994: 93).

It is important to maintain a distinction between diaspora and the more familiar term “ethnic group”. An
ethnic group differs from a diaspora by the extent to which a diaspora maintains its connections with its
homeland and kin communities in other states; an ethnic group’s ties to the homeland are often absent,
weak, or at best intermittent, and manifested by individuals rather than the community as a whole
(Toloyan 1996: 16). As such, the emphasis for research should be on the trans-state networks,
established by diasporas as a major source of their identity rather than their ethnicity (Sheffer 1986: 1).

For example, early in 1999, the Kurdish diaspora propelled itself into the international spotlight almost
overnight with a series of mass protests organized in several cities including Berlin, Washington,
London, Ottawa, Ankara, Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Demanding the release of the leader of the
Kurdish resistance movement in Turkey, Kurdish activists were able to target specific actors in the
“Ocalan Affair” including the Turkish and Greek governments. Demands were also made on host
governments to pressure for a sovereign Kurdistan. While attempts by diaspora groups to influence foreign policy are not new, the transnational coordination capacity demonstrated by the Kurds illustrated that previously unnoticed diaspora groups have the organization, multidimensional ties and communication networks in place to make their presence felt in the realm of international politics.

As the category of diaspora has entered mainstream political discourse, it has raised important questions concerning issues of citizenship and identity. Some wonder what the effects of transnational categories such as diaspora will be on traditional notions of citizenship? Diaspora also challenges the assumption that immigrants over time will increasingly identify themselves in terms of their new country of residence. Within this framework, diaspora appears as a new form of identification with powerful implications for Western states like Canada, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Should diaspora be viewed, as some analysts suggest, as a possible means of escaping communal alienation brought upon by the privileging of individuality in Western states or is it in fact a disintegrative phenomenon with negative consequences (Akenson 1995: 386)? While comprehensive answers to these questions cannot be provided here, these questions themselves demonstrate the importance of situating diasporas within any discussion of the impacts of migration.

For example, diaspora may potentially change immigrants’ senses of identity because it is one of the factors today that offers the possibility of multiple allegiances, aspirations, and pressures (Hassner 1993: 55). Winland suggests that transnational ties have been an integral part of identity construction for diaspora groups (Winland 1998: 567). Shain argues that diaspora identity is influenced by factors such as race relations in the host country, host government relations with the home government, as well as the home country’s policies towards its overseas constituents (Shain 1994: 86). Because diasporas maintain such strong ties to their homeland, they raise the question of whether their members within host countries see themselves as immigrants or as merely sojourners waiting for the opportunity to return to the homeland (Stevens 1995: 60)? Have diasporas contributed to a rift between political and cultural identity or have they served to keep them consistent? What will be the effects if diaspora becomes a primary form of identification for significant segments of host populations, rather than national citizenship?

Although historically, official citizenship status and its benefits have been the driving forces of the process to integrate immigrants, the appearance of communal forms of identity like diaspora raises doubts for some about whether this is still possible or even advisable (Janoski & Glennie 1995)? Have diasporas made the traditional notion of citizenship with rights and responsibilities granted to those born or residing within a particular geographical region antiquated? It would seem that at least theoretically, identification with a diaspora group challenges the basic primary liberal assumption of citizens as individuals. Does this then mean that the traditional Western view of nation building is dead? Or are
current trends and events indicative of new methods of nation building and political participation in liberal democratic societies? Do diaspora members just want the rights of citizens in their host countries or do they want to be fully integrated citizens in their host countries? Are diaspora group members willing to undertake the responsibilities of citizenship in their host countries? What kinds of political, social, and economic activities have established and nascent diasporas been engaged in around the world?

As the distinction between foreign and domestic policies increasingly becomes blurred in Western states, Buteux et al. have argued that domestic politics has become a crucial dimension of foreign policy-making (Buteux et al 1996: 156). As a result, diaspora groups with a vested interest in a particular foreign policy orientation may have leverage to exert pressure on policy-makers by being able to offer votes. This is nicely illustrated by the case of the Greek diaspora in Australia. By being able to provide votes, Michael has argued that the Greek community has played a major role in the determination of foreign policy as it pertains to the Cyprus issue (Michael 1991: 98). He contends that under normal circumstances, Cyprus would not have been a foreign policy issue in Australia; however, the Greek community was able to push it to the top of the agenda (Michael 1991: 98). The general unity of the Greek community catalysed the Australian government’s commitment to a “just solution” to the Cyprus problem (Michael 1991: 98). Diaspora participation was so significant that a former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs remarked that the role of diaspora communities was the “third axiom in foreign policy formulation” (Michael 1991: 107). The other important conclusion of Michael’s study (reflecting earlier observations) is that size, ability to mobilize, and ability to control the ethnic vote increases diaspora group lobbying effectiveness.

While there has been some work done on immigration, diasporas, and foreign policy in other contexts, very little systematic research has been undertaken in Canada. Particularly, there is a lack of analysis that reflects on the changing nature of immigration, that systematically (rather than anecdotally) examines how diaspora communities are acting politically, that uncovers how these groups may be trying to influence foreign policy formulation (particularly nascent diasporas), and determines what levels of success have been reached. These areas of interest are of course located within a broader field of inquiry. Issues of migration, integration, multiculturalism, citizenship, and identity are inextricably tied to diaspora politics and therefore need to be addressed in the Canadian context as related areas of research. Moreover, there are important economic consequences of new patterns of migration both for home and host countries. External sources of labour are increasingly needed by industrially developed countries in order to respond to the competitive pressures of globalization and to maintain existing levels of social programmes. Conversely, in many developing countries families receive income and governments earn large portions of their foreign currency through remittances sent back by relatives who live abroad. Thus,
the interplay of relations under the rubric of international migration is multi-faceted and multi-directional.

**Demographic Trends of Close Partners**

Growth in levels of migration combined with the fact that a rising proportion of migrants who have arrived in developed countries are from non-traditional source countries with different cultural traditions has increased threat perceptions in places like Canada, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Within these countries media pundits, politicians, and even some policy-makers argue that migrants who are from different religious, linguistic, and ethnic backgrounds than the majority in their newly adopted homelands are a danger to societal security. Popular discourses which draw upon traditional nationalist (if not racist) sentiments and xenophobic assertions like Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” or Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” claim that recent waves of immigrants and refugees are reducing national living standards by siphoning away social resources from “real” citizens, taking employment away from more qualified applicants, bringing tensions from their home state with them, and committing a disproportionate amount of crime. Moreover, it is often argued that these new community members engage in destructive social practices such as criminal activity at disproportionate rates and are unwilling (or unable) to integrate into their host societies. It is then claimed that this will inevitably cause social upheaval and disintegration. To this end, Loring Danforth has argued that the transnational networks developed by migrants are problematic for host states in that “the primordial sentiments of region, ethnicity, language, and religion have become globalized spreading throughout the world to unite vast networks of people who remain loyal to their national homeland even though they no longer inhabit it” (Danforth 1994: 332). Some are even more extreme and claim that in respecting the civil, social, and economic rights of newcomers, the rights of “true” citizens are being disregarded.
### Top 10 Negative Net Migrant Annual Flow (Annual Average 1995-2000)

- (-381,000) China
- (-340,000) Democratic Republic of the Congo
- (-310,000) Mexico
- (-280,000) India
- (-200,000) Kazakhstan
- (-190,000) Philippines
- (-180,000) Indonesia
- (-100,000) Ukraine
- (-91,000) Iran
- (-80,000) Egypt and Burundi


- (1,250,000) United States
- (395,000) Rwanda
- (287,000) Russia
- (185,000) Germany
- (144,000) Canada
- (118,000) Italy
- (103,000) Australia
- (100,000) Bosnia and Herzegovina
- (99,000) SAR Hong Kong
- (95,000) United Kingdom

Compelling and irrefutable evidence of any of these threat claims are totally untenable; however, this does not mean that some newcomers are not involved in criminal activity, that some newcomers do not have links to unsavoury political organizations in their homelands (or in other host societies), nor that some migrants may not want to integrate beyond basic levels needed to function in their host society. What it does mean is that the demonization of recent migrants by invoking security discourses that transform vulnerabilities into threats for questionable political ends is not a legitimate nor particularly productive position to hold or to research. Thus, as debates centre on these provocative and visceral topics in the post-9/11 context, far more fundamental kinds of questions about integration, the meanings of citizenship in liberal democratic societies, political participation, and the future demographic impacts of migration are not being addressed in meaningful ways. It is extremely important to avoid contributing (even implicitly) to the securitized discourse on migration. Therefore, one potentially useful set of
questions to ask in order to begin to address issues of integration and citizenship from a more progressive perspective is the following:

1. Who is the host society and what is its claimed governing ideology?
2. Who is already integrated into the host society? Why?
3. Who is not integrated into the host society and still considered to belong to a “them”? Why?
4. What are the contradictions of citizenship in the host society and are these being addressed to a significant extent in public policy?

It is inevitable that current migration movements will have an impact on their host societies. While some countries like Germany and the United Kingdom have expressed a desire to reduce yearly levels of immigration others such as Canada, Australia, and the United States have expressed a desire to maintain current levels (UN Populations Division 2002). Moreover, governments of major source countries like China and India are satisfied with levels of emigration and their maintenance; some like Pakistan and Turkey would like to raise levels of emigration (UN Populations Division 2002). Therefore, it would seem that current trends are likely to continue. Yet, even with an awareness of the empirical record and the likely probability that migrant flows are going to persist, what has not yet been determined is the scope and depth of the effects on the politics of host societies in relation to recent international migration dynamics.

In terms of close Canadian partners, only Australia has a higher proportion of foreign born population than Canada. The 2001 Australian Census reported that 22 percent of the population was born outside of the country (compared to 18 percent in Canada). This differential between Australia and Canada has been evident since 1971, as the proportion of foreign born in Australia has ranged between 20 percent and 22 percent. In sharp contrast to dominant perceptions and discourses of the United States as an immigrant society, only 11 percent of the population was foreign born. Still, this was the highest proportion in 70 years (Statistics Canada 2003: 5).

Within Western Europe in 2000, migrant stocks as a percentage of the total population of key countries were the following: the United Kingdom (6.8 percent); France (10.6 percent); Germany (9 percent); Denmark (5.7 percent), Iceland (5.6 percent); Sweden (11.2 percent); Norway (6.7 percent); Italy (2.2 percent); Netherlands (9.6 percent); Ireland (8.1 percent); Spain (3.2 percent); Portugal (2.3 percent); Austria (9.4 percent); Belgium (8.6 percent); and Switzerland (25.1 percent) (United Nations Population Division 2002). Although for most of countries listed here (save for Sweden and Switzerland), the percentage of migrants are not as high major migrant destinations like Australia, the United States, or Canada, these migrant stock levels are at (or approaching) historical peaks.
More importantly, migrants are now an important source of population growth. As social mores have changed, birth rates in much of the developed world are no longer high enough to sustain population levels. As a reflection of this phenomena, immigration is contributing more and more to any population growth that is occurring in Western Europe and North America. From 1986-1990, immigration accounted for 27 percent of the annual population growth in these developed countries. From 1991-1995 it had risen to 50 percent and the latest figures from 1996 to 2000 place population growth attributed to immigration at 70 percent (CIA 2001: 42).

As the total migrant stock experiences growth in absolute as well as proportional terms in Canada’s key partners, migrant sources are increasingly from countries where there is not a long-standing historical migration pattern in place. For example, from 1995-1999, Germany admitted over 340,000 migrants from the former Yugoslavia and over 300,000 persons from Turkey (Migration Source 2003). Given the relatively closed nature of German society and who can properly be considered German according to citizenship law, many difficult political and social issues are arising in the German context. In the Netherlands, significant numbers of new migrants are arriving from Turkey, Iraq, Morocco, and Afghanistan as well as the continuation of movements from former Dutch colonies like the Antilles/Aruba and Suriname. In the United Kingdom during the 1990s, top sources of migrants included Pakistan, India, Somalia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. While there are colonial and Commonwealth ties in every case here (save for Somalia), it is still important to consider what kind of impact migration might have in a society like the United Kingdom that has not experienced a significant amount of cultural or ethnic heterogeneity during its history (Migration Source 2003).

While the reasons may sometimes be more out of self-interest than humanitarian concern, thankfully the majority of people in Western states have recognized that at the very least there must be acceptance of the cultural diversity brought about by the new flows of immigration into their countries. Whether cultural diversity should be encouraged has proven to be a highly explosive issue. Depending on the country, multiculturalism has been a policy located somewhere between toleration and promotion in an effort to deal with the changing nature of Western societies. For many people, multiculturalism is the formal recognition that homogeneity is not a prerequisite to enjoy the benefits of a strong and vibrant national community; it is indicative of a changing notion of citizenship that seeks to embrace diversity rather than eliminating it. As such, multiculturalism is perceived as a positive development.

Conversely, some cynics have argued that multiculturalism is a concession offered by liberal states who have realized that assimilating their members beyond basic procedural commitments is not possible; from a different perspective some analysts have remarked, full assimilation into host societies has become unfashionable for diaspora groups (Joppke 1996: 486; Sheffer 1986: 65). Others contend that in
sharp contrast to liberal doctrine, multiculturalism has legitimized racial identity as the preferred choice of self-definition rather than the individual (Citrin et al 1994: 9). It is in the midst of these debates around multiculturalism and identity in Western states that diasporas become key social units that must be analysed in the study of integration issues and their effects.

**Recent Trends in Migration Flows to Canada: General Impacts**

Unlike countries such as Germany, Japan, and Great Britain that are experiencing unprecedented changes in immigration dynamics within their own contexts, immigration has been a key component to the development of Canada which has a long and varied history. Since 1901, Canada has received 13.4 million immigrants, 2.2 million of which were admitted between 1991 and 2000 (Statistics Canada 2003: 6). This is the largest number for any decade in the past century. In comparison, 1.3 million immigrants were admitted in the 1980s and 1.4 million in both the 1970s and 1960s (Statistics Canada 2003: 6). Historically speaking, European immigrants accounted for the vast majority of immigrants who arrived in Canada previous to 1961, representing 90 percent of the total (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). Since this time, the overall proportion of European immigrants has declined with each decade. Recent immigrants are most likely to have arrived from Asian countries. Of the 1.8 million immigrants who arrived between 1991 and 2001, 1,066,230 (58 percent) came from Asia (including the Middle East); 357,845 (20 percent) from Europe; 200,010 (11 percent) from the Caribbean and Central/South America; 139,770 (8 percent) from Africa; 51,440 (3 percent) from the United States; and 15,385 (0.8 percent) from Oceania (Statistics Canada 2003: 6). In contrast, Asian immigrants who arrived during the 1980s numbered at 491,720 or 47 percent of the total; during the 1970s the number was 311,960 representing 33 percent of the total; and previous to 1961, 28,850 Asian immigrants arrived which comprised less than 3 percent of the total (Statistics Canada 2003: 6).

Reflecting the recent surge in New Canadians, data from the 2001 Canadian Census reveal that the proportion of Canada’s population that was born outside of the country has reached the highest level since 1931. 5.4 million people, or 18.4 percent of Canada’s population was born in another country, up from 17.4 percent in 1996 (the previous Census year), but lower than the historical high of 22.2 percent in 1931 (Statistics Canada 2003: 5). Perhaps more importantly, this increase is a result of recent immigration flows from non-traditional sources. According to the 2001 Census, approximately 1.8 million people who lived in Canada were immigrants who had arrived during the previous decade, accounting for 6.2 percent of the total population (Statistics Canada 2003: 6). This represented a sizeable increase from 1991, when 1.2 million immigrants arrived during the previous 10 years and represented 4.3 percent of the total population (Statistics Canada 2003: 6). Still, while quite large in real number terms, the annual intake of immigrants during the 1990s has actually comprised less than 1 percent of the total population in any given year with a range between 0.6 percent and 0.9 percent (Statistics Canada
This though is a proportionately higher intake than either Australia or the United States over the same time period.

Regional and Local Trends
In 2001, the two provinces with the highest proportion of people born outside of Canada were Ontario with 3 million individuals who accounted for 27 percent of the total population and British Columbia where 1 million people represented 26 percent of the total (Statistics Canada 2003: 17). 15 percent of Alberta’s population was foreign born, followed by Manitoba (12 percent), the Yukon (11 percent), and Quebec (10 percent) (Statistics Canada 2003: 17). The number of foreign born for Quebec was the highest in 100 years (Statistics Canada 2003: 17). Almost 90 percent of immigrants who have arrived in the past decade have settled in either Ontario, British Columbia, or Quebec (Statistics Canada 2003: 17). 56 percent (over 1,000,000) of immigrants who arrived in the 1990s live in Ontario (Statistics Canada 2003: 17). Another 20 percent (370, 600) live in BC and 13 percent (244, 900) in Quebec (Statistics Canada 2003: 17).

Of the total population of immigrants that arrived in Canada during the past decade, 43 percent call Toronto home while Vancouver (18 percent) and Montreal (12 percent) were the next two most popular permanent destinations (Statistics Canada 2003: 7-8). Toronto has one of the highest foreign born populations in the world (44 percent of the total population), higher than Miami (40 percent), Sydney (31 percent), Los Angeles (31 percent), and New York (24 percent) (Statistics Canada 2003: 28). The Canadian national average for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) is 18 percent (Statistics Canada 2003: 28).

Sources of Immigration
Among individuals who immigrated to Canada during the 1990s, the leading country of birth was the People’s Republic of China (197,355). It was followed by India (156,120), the Phillippines (122,015), the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong (118,385), Sri Lanka (62,590), Pakistan (57,990), and Taiwan (53,750) (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). Over 768,000 immigrants or 40 percent of all immigrants who came to Canada in the past decade were from one of these seven countries (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). For immigrants that arrived from Europe, the most frequent countries of origin were Poland (43,370), the United Kingdom, and Romania (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). Immigration from the Caribbean and Central/South America has dropped by 5.5 percent from 16.5 percent of the total during the 1970s and 1980s to 11 percent in the 1990s (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). The leading source countries are Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). Immigration from African sources increased slightly during the 1990s, representing 8 percent of the total, up from 6 percent of the total during the 1980s. The most popular countries were Somalia, Algeria, and the Republic of South
Africa (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). The United States remains a steady source of immigrants to Canada, being the source country for 3 percent of the total number of immigrants into Canada during the 1990s (Statistics Canada 2003: 7). For the 1990s, the United States placed as the eighth most frequent country of birth for immigrants to Canada.

Sources of Refugees
According to the UNHCR, in 2001, Canada was the country of permanent resettlement for 12,200 refugees, placing it second in the world behind the United States (68,400). From 1996-2001, close to 157,000 people applied for refugee status in Canada. Top source countries for people seeking refugee status in Canada have included Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Iran, Colombia, India, Iraq, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Algeria, Zaire, and Bangladesh. Refugee applicants (and dependents) from these countries have comprised approximately 60 percent of the total number of applicants for refugee status over this time period. Still, in comparison to other industrialized countries, the number of refugee applicants in Canada compared to the overall population is low. From 1992-2001, Canada ranked twelfth amongst 30 industrialized countries in terms of the annual average of refugees per 1000 inhabitants (0.94) (UN Populations Division 2002).

Sources of Foreign Workers
Foreign workers are those who are admitted entry into Canada in order to staff temporary employment positions which are not being filled by Canadians. This may occur because there is a lack of domestic workers able to fill the position (e.g., high tech skill workers) or a lack of domestic workers willing to fill the position (e.g., farm labour during harvesting season). From 1978 to 2001, the total number of foreign workers who entered Canada totalled 2,149,701 individuals (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2002: 8). Total annual inflows of foreign workers (including reentries) during the same period have almost doubled from 58,841 to 118,957 workers (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2002: 8). From 1997-2001, nearly 30 percent of the foreign workers who entered Canada were born in the United States, which is not very surprising given the longstanding ties between our two countries and the cultural similarities (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 9; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2002: 9). The second largest source country during the same time period was Mexico at approximately 10 percent of the total. The top ten source countries were rounded out by the United Kingdom, Jamaica, France, Australia, Japan, Philippines, Germany, India, and Trinidad/Tobago (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 9; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2002: 9).

While foreign workers as a category of migrant are often rendered somewhat invisible by the kinds of employment niches that they fill and the locations where these are performed, they are indicative of the social changes that result from transformations occurring in the global economy. It is important to have
information and analysis on how these people are recruited; the industries that rely on foreign workers; the kinds of links that exist between foreign workers and their home countries during their stays in Canada; the links that exist between foreign workers and Canada when they return home; how foreign workers are integrated (or not integrated) into Canadian society during their stays; how many foreign workers try to emigrate to Canada after returning home; and the relationship between immigration and foreign worker perceptions of integration efforts during their initial stays.

### Cumulative Total Annual Flow of Foreign Workers 1997-2001

424,442

### Yearly Annual Flow 1997-2001

- 2001: 93,083
- 2000: 93,663
- 1999: 85,405
- 1998: 77,981
- 1997: 74,310

### Sources of Foreign Students

Until recent events that saw a number of Pakistani students falsely accused of being terrorists, another often overlooked category of migrants were foreign students. In 1978, the stock of foreign students in Canada numbered around 6,124 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 5). By 1980 the number had reached 33,260 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 5). By 1999, the foreign student stock was close to 87,000 persons (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 5). In terms of annual flows, between 1997-2001, 275,284 foreign students entered Canada for the first time (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 17; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2002: 17). Top source countries were the Republic of Korea at 43,239 students (or 15.7 percent of the total); Japan with 29,202 students (10.6 percent); China which sent 24,587 students (8.9 percent); the United States at 22,483 students (8.2 percent); and France with 18,326 students (6.7 percent) (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 17; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2002: 17). Other major source countries were Mexico, Taiwan, Germany, Brazil, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and Colombia (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000: 17; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2002: 17).
To our knowledge very little work (and none of it recent) has systematically examined the role of foreign students in the design and implementation of Canadian foreign policy. We can hypothesize that foreign students are an excellent resource for Canada that deserves further study for the following reasons. First, foreign students are among the brightest individuals in the world and therefore should be a resource that is harnessed by both Canadian employers and the Canadian government in order to maintain Canada’s comparative advantages that derive from its highly educated workforce. Second, foreign students contribute to informal “track two” types of diplomacy as strong contingents of foreign students offer Canadian students exposure to perspectives gained in contexts that they might not otherwise be witness to as well as providing Canadian “leaders of tomorrow” the opportunity to interact with their international peers. Third, in cases where they do not decide to stay in Canada upon the completion of their studies, foreign students are in a unique position in terms of their connections and networks between their home and former host country (or countries) to act as liaisons and facilitate increased political, social, and economic interactions. In particular, they will potentially have key knowledge of how to negotiate the cultural differences which sometimes can impede these types of endeavours.

In the United States, foreign students have unfortunately been targeted as a potential security threat. It is thought that since students tend to be younger, they are more sympathetic to politically radical views than older migrants or their peers who are not pursuing studies. This has caused foreign students to be constructed by US officials as a potential pool for operatives to manipulate and/or recruit from for the purposes of committing or aiding in acts of terrorism. As a result, all foreign students in the United States are required to report and register with key government agencies involved in Homeland Defence and the “War on Terrorism”. Therefore, it is important for the Canadian government to examine how to best manage our increasing numbers of foreign students to the advantage of all parties involved so that we are not co-opted into adopting extreme policies by an increasingly fearful and distrustful American administration.

**Implications Regarding the Source Countries of Migrants**

In light of the trends outlined above, it is important to remember that most of the countries listed as major sources of New Canadians have sizeable diaspora communities not just in Canada but in other states around the world. This is also true of small diaspora populations in Canada that may have larger populations in other host countries. Therefore, research needs to be undertaken to determine the extent of trans-state networks among diaspora populations (particularly nascent diasporas) and how these have

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4 Back in 1975, Donald Barry briefly looked at the role played by Biafran students in Canada. The article was entitled “Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of Biafra” and appeared in *Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics*, edited by A. Paul Pross.
been used (or could be used) for political mobilization to influence relations between home and host state(s) or between host states.

For example, in 2001, significant concentrations (over 5,000) of Iraqi refugees were seeking asylum in Australia (10,000); Canada (6,000); Denmark (12,600); Iran (386,000); the Netherlands (26,100); Norway (8,200); Saudi Arabia (5,100); Sweden (25,900); United Kingdom (12,000); and the United States (19,100) (UN Populations Division 2002). Given the recent focus on Iraq in global affairs, it would only seem prudent to be able discern the views of Iraq’s diaspora population on military action, if they have tried to inform host governments of their views, what actions they have taken during and after the invasion (e.g., information campaigns, organization of humanitarian aid), and the communication networks in place or in the process of being established.

**Immigrants and Economic Conditions**

The majority of immigrants who arrived in Canada during the 1990s (regardless of their source country) were within the 25-64 working age demographic (Statistics Canada 2003: 8). Immigrant arrivals between 1991 and 2001 contributed over 1.1 million persons to Canada’s working age population, accounting for 66 percent of its growth (Statistics Canada 2003: 8). These new arrivals accounted for 7 percent of the total working age population. Of these a disproportionate number relative to the Canadian born population, fell into the younger part of the working age bracket. For example, in 2001, 46 percent of the immigrants who arrived during the 1990s were aged 25 to 44 as compared to 31 percent of the total population (Statistics Canada 2003: 8). Older working age immigrants between the ages of 45-64 made up 17 percent of the immigrants that came to Canada during the 1990s, compared with 24 percent within the total population (Statistics Canada 2003: 8). Although finding that most recent immigrants are generally of working age is not a new development, preliminary research has indicated that they may not be integrated economically, socially, or politically as rapidly (or even to the same extent) as previous waves of immigrants, though there is much contention on these issues.

The most recent publicly available data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada reveals some interesting trends in terms of levels of income earned by the various categories of immigrant defined by the Canadian Immigration Act in relation to years since admission.¹ In 1995, economic principal applicants reported high employment earnings ($14,500-$43,000), low rates of unemployment benefit

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¹This study looked at individuals born in Canada over 18 years of age in 1995 as well as immigrants over 18 years of age who had arrived between 1970-1995. Thus, the years since admission ranged from 0 to 15 years.

²All of these numbers for each category approximate the range reported by immigrant cohorts by years since admission. These numbers do not necessarily represent those who just arrived in comparison to those who had been in the country for 15 years.
For tax-filers who were born in Canada, the average income was approximately $28,000, 14 percent reported unemployment insurance benefits, 10 percent reported receiving social assistance, and 63 percent reported employment earnings. (2-16 percent) and social assistance usage (9-11 percent), and high percentages of tax-filers reporting employment earnings (53-75 percent) compared to other immigrant categories and those born in Canada (CIC 1998: 16-19). Economic spouses and dependants reported lower employment earnings ($10,000-$26,000), lower rates of unemployment benefit (4-11 percent) and social assistance usage (4-12 percent), and about average percentages of tax-filers reporting employment earnings (47-65 percent) relative to other immigrant categories and persons born in Canada (CIC 1998: 16-19). Immigrants in the family reunification category did not do as well as other immigrant categories or Canadian born persons of working age. On average, family reunification immigrants reported lower employment earnings ($8,000-$28,000), high rates of unemployment benefit (5-23 percent) and social assistance usage (4-19 percent), and lower percentages of tax-filers reporting employment earnings (51-64 percent) (CIC 1998: 16-19). While immigrants in the refugee and refugee-like category reported lower employment earnings ($10,000-$31,000), high rates of unemployment benefit (6-20 percent) and social assistance usage (18-52 percent), a high percentage of tax-filers from this immigration category reported employment earnings (37-68 percent) (CIC 1998: 16-19).

All of these numbers were greatly influenced by the amount of time an immigrant had been in Canada. In most cases the relationship was intuitive. For example, average employment earnings increased for all immigrant categories the longer people were in Canada. However, some of the trends were counter-intuitive. First, unemployment insurance benefit use was far lower than the Canadian average for most immigrant categories during the first 2-4 years in Canada at which point rates surpassed the Canadian average and then fell below again for most categories somewhere at the 6-15 years since admission (CIC 1998: 17). Second, immigrants in the family reunification category surpassed the Canadian average in terms of tax-filers reporting employment earnings by one year since admission, only to fall below and stay below the average at 7-15 years since admission to Canada (CIC 1998: 19).

After examining this same data from the 1970-1995 cohort of immigrants, Jeffrey Reitz (2000) argues that transformations in the structure of the Canadian economy and changes to the distribution of earnings across occupations are contributing to a downward trend in immigrant earnings. Reitz asserts that the Canadian economy is now a knowledge economy defined by the expansion of education and the increased importance of education in labour markets (1-2). As a result:

The employment and earnings success of newly-arriving immigrant men and women in Canada over the period 1971 - 1996 has been very significantly eroded by rising levels of native-born education, the increased significance of education in Canadian labour markets, and the increased
difficulty that immigrants have had in gaining market recognition for their qualifications. A parallel investigation for specific urban areas shows that these trends are actually pronounced in the major urban centres such as Toronto...Initially, the introduction of skill-based selection in the 1960s created an immigrant advantage in educational attainment, which helped immigrant integration in the labour force despite its devaluation by employers. But over the period 1971 - 1991, native-born educational levels actually rose more rapidly than did those of immigrants. This trend, when coupled with the lower evaluation of immigrant skills, easily enabled the native-born workers to widen their lead over immigrants.(18).

According to Reitz, what makes this so difficult to understand is that during the same time period, the educational qualifications needed to be accepted into Canada became more rigorous. Yet, because of a discounting of immigrant skill levels by potential employers:

Only in the 1990s has immigrant selectivity increased to the point that immigrant education levels actually have begun to rise more rapidly than those of the native-born workforce. This happened despite an increase in the family-class component of the immigrant admissions. However, because of the discounting of immigrant skills, the effect of this recent surge was insufficient to slow the accelerating native-born lead. Not only are immigrant skills discounted, but the extent of this discounting has increased. As the mainstream workforce participated in the move toward post-industrialism and the knowledge economy, and the value of its educational skills has increased, but the relative value of immigrant skills actually has declined (Reitz 2000: 19).

The conclusion of this report was that further analysis needed to be undertaken to determine the reason(s) for the increased discounting of immigrant skills by Canadian employers. Reitz states that although “increased racial discrimination is one possibility”, the fact that white immigrants are also affected, seems to render a racial explanation somewhat inadequate.

In a related study, using 1996 Census Data, Reitz (2001) examined Canada’s “brain waste”. This refers to the number of immigrants in Canada who were trained professionals in their home countries who have been unable to re-certify in Canada. Anecdotally, we have all heard of stories of doctors from African countries who are driving taxis or engineers from Eastern Europe working as short order cooks, yet very little government action has been undertaken to address this issue. Reitz has estimated that the Canadian economy is losing up to $2.4 billion annually because immigrant skills are under utilized and up to $12.6 billion because they are underpaid. While the problem is often presented by cynics as one that will necessitate the lowering of Canadian standards in order to harness the potential expertise of immigrants with professional designations from another country, the real issue, is a lack of opportunities for people to pursue re-certification in Canada. Given the shortages in many specialized professional fields, the
failure to implement accessible re-certification programmes would seem to be squandering countless opportunities to make the most of Canada’s human capital resources and foster deeper economic integration of New Canadians.

One recent trend that has also been identified as potentially indicative of deeper structural problems with immigrant economic integration is the rise of industries that essentially serve as immigrant worker ghettos. Eric Fong (2002) in a survey of Asian immigrants in Toronto found that 43 percent of persons of Chinese descent were employed in the Asian ethnic economy which was defined as businesses managed by people of Asian decent or those that employ a majority of Asian employees. Immigrants employed in the Asian ethnic economy tended to have lower education levels than those employed outside of this sector and less developed English language skills. It is hypothesized that because Asian immigrants employed in the Asian ethnic economy do not have the same skill levels as those employed outside of it, they will not fare as well in economic terms in the long-run as their counterparts.

In response to the perception that a disproportionate number of immigrants were self-employed relative to the general population which supposedly reflected an unwillingness (or inability) to effectively participate in the labour market, Citizenship and Immigration Canada commissioned a report to analyze the existing data. In examining immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1980 and 1994, findings suggested that in certain years, over 20 percent of specific arrival cohorts (i.e., immigrants who all arrived in one particular year), received some income from self-employment (Li 2001). However, self-employment in the immigrant population was shown to be more a matter of degree than a discrete mode of participation and was more likely to be utilized as an income strategy the longer an immigrant has been in Canada (Li 2001: 12). Furthermore, the study concluded that immigrants with more resources and qualifications are more inclined to engage in self-employment as a means of upwards mobility (Li 2001: 13). Thus, self-employment does not seem to necessarily indicate an inability or unwillingness to integrate into Canadian society.

We must remind the reader that much of the information presented in this section is dated and considered contentious. Unfortunately, in terms of more recent studies of immigrant economic experiences, key research on the education and income levels of the latest newcomers will not be released until January 2004 by Statistics Canada.

Social and Political Effects
As an increasing number of New Canadians arrive from countries where neither of Canada’s two official languages are widely spoken, 61 percent of those who came to Canada during the 1990s reported that they speak a language other than English or French most often at home in 2001 (Statistics Canada 2003:
In 1991, 56 percent of immigrants who had arrived during the 1980s reported using a non-official language most often at home (Statistics Canada 2003: 9). Of 1990s’ immigrants who reported speaking neither English nor French at home, Chinese was the language spoken at home by 33 percent of respondents (Statistics Canada 2003: 9). Punjabi at 7 percent was the second most popular and Arabic at 5 percent was the third most common (Statistics Canada 2003: 9). People who were born in the People’s Republic of China were the most likely immigrant group to be speaking a non-official language at home (88 percent) with 29 percent unable to carry on a conversation in either English or French (Statistics Canada 2003: 9). People who have immigrated from India (15 percent) and Taiwan (13 percent) had the next highest proportions of members who cannot speak either official language (Statistics Canada 2003: 9).

Almost 13.4 percent of the Canadian population has identified themselves as “visible minorities” (persons other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race, or non-white in colour), a total population of almost 4 million people (Statistics Canada 2003: 10). From 1996 to 2001, the number of Chinese increased in Canada by 20 percent and the number of South Asians by 37 percent (Statistics Canada 2003: 11). This is consistent with the finding that the proportion of visible minorities in the total Canadian population has been growing over the past two decades. In 1981, 1.1 million visible minorities accounted for 4.7 percent of the total population; however, by 1996 the total number was 3.2 million which represented 11.2 percent of the total population (Statistics Canada 2003: 10). To put this into perspective, while the total population of Canada increased by 4 percent between 1996 and 2001, the visible minority population grew by 25 percent (Statistics Canada 2003: 10). Between 1991 and 1996, the total population of Canada increased by 6 percent while the visible minority population rose by 27 percent (Statistics Canada 2003: 10).

In 2001, 73 percent of immigrants who came to Canada in the 1990s were members of visible minority groups (Statistics Canada 2003: 10). This represented a significant increase from 1991 when 68 percent of those who came during the 1980s were visible minorities and from 1981, when 52 percent of those arriving in the 1970s were members of visible minority groups (Statistics Canada 2003: 10). Only 30 percent of visible minority members in Canada were actually born in Canada (Statistics Canada 2003: 10).

While there have been dramatic increases in the number of New Canadians who are visible minorities and from countries that have not traditionally been significant sources of immigration to Canada, the impact in terms of the reported ethnic origins of the Canadian population is still relatively small. In 2001, after Canadian (11.7 million), English (6 million), and French (4.7 million), the most frequent reported ethnic origins were Scottish (4.2 million), Irish (3.8 million), German (2.7 million), Italian (1.3 million),
Chinese (1.1 million), Ukrainian (1.1 million), and North American Indian (1 million) (Statistics Canada 2003: 12). It is difficult to say what kind of changes we might see in the reporting of ethnic origins in the next two decades though what we do end up seeing will be quite reflective of self-perceptions of the degree to which people have been integrated into Canadian society. The census question on ethnic origins requests that people freely choose which category, or categories, best describes them. Therefore, depending on how integrated people feel within Canadian society, they may in fact chose Canadian as one (if not the only) category to describe themselves.

In terms of political participation, some work has been done on immigrants and traditional forms of political and community participation in Canada. In providing a brief synopsis of studies that are pertinent to issues at hand, a couple of methodological issues must be brought up. First, work on participation tends to treat immigrants and Canadian born persons as distinct and internally homogenous groups. This of course is a gross theoretical oversimplification with absolutely no empirical basis. Second, Canadian born participation rates are often (implicitly) presented as the standard that needs to be met by New Canadian groups. Many researchers in this area argue that it is actually not very helpful to use Canadian born participation rates as the baseline or standard to be achieved as they are in many instances not particularly impressive (Stasiulis 1997: 22).

According to a study done by Jeffrey Reitz (1980) based on data from 1973, political participation of immigrants in Canada was negatively associated with the intensity of ethnic identity. Daiva Stasiulis (1997) reports that two conclusions stemmed from this research. First, ethnic cohesion rather than immigrant status hindered political participation. If this is indeed the case in Canada, the impact of nascent diaspora populations may be not as consequential as anticipated. Second, people of higher status had both higher political participation rates and weaker ethnic identities (Stasiulis 1997:13). In contrast to these conclusions, studies by Jerome Black (1991; 1987) of data collected in 1983 showed that even when socio-economic background, partisanship, efficacy, and interest were controlled for, immigrant status affected levels of political activity (Stasiulis 1997: 14). However, disparities in political participation (voting, campaign activity, contacting politicians, and involvement in protest movements) between Canadian born and foreign born diminished as immigrants became more established. Another study has showed that there is not a linear progression of increased political participation by immigrants according to the number of generations a group has resided in Canada. Political involvement tended to peak in the second-generation and then for some forms of participation drop below average levels by the fourth and fifth generations (Chui, Curtis, and Lambert 1991 reported by Stasiulis 1997: 15). Most importantly though, Stasiulis (1997) has made the argument that even with the studies mentioned above, there is a dearth of research on immigrants and ethnocultural minorities in regards to electoral politics.
Within the Canadian context, ethnicity and electoral politics is generally framed around the French-English axis and rarely examines the activities of New Canadian groups.

Given the high concentration of new immigrants in Canada’s major metropolitan centres, work is beginning to be undertaken on how the gender and racial profile of these immigrants have been affecting (or will affect) their searches for affordable housing in highly competitive rental markets. Furthermore, this research is trying to understand what causes many immigrants to be segregated into neighbourhoods with high concentrations of members of their particular ethnic group (e.g., Toronto’s Chinatowns). Some argue that while segregation may provide a social distance that reinforces inequality, it may also allow for the creation of a comfort zone to mitigate against the trial and tribulations of integrating into a host society. On the immigrant experience in trying to secure affordable and adequate housing, Sylvia Novac (1996) has argued that ethnic disadvantage stems from a combination of cultural choices, economic differences, institutional policies and practices, and racial or cultural discrimination. The key is how do these interplay (Novac 1996)?

**Conclusions and a Call for Further Research**

There is ample evidence that migration patterns are changing the demography of Canada. The numbers (both absolute and proportionately) of foreign born Canadians from non-traditional source countries, visible minorities, and persons for whom English and French are not first languages, reflect a Canadian population base that is vastly different in composition than a generation ago. As current “push-pull” factors continue to influence global migration patterns in combination with the Canadian government’s ongoing interest in maintaining existing levels of immigration, demographic impacts will likely be even more pronounced a generation from now. In this growing diversity lies many potential opportunities for the Canadian government and the Canadian people. Not to acknowledge though that there may be potential security risks would be foolish. At the same time, to place undue focus on these risks, to severely impede (or even criminalize) the movement of people based on the attributes of a few individuals would be to undermine core Canadian values and potentially rob Canadian society of a plethora of benefits. Furthermore, to succumb to pressures exerted by key allies who are experts in overreaction and overzealous in their securitization of migration issues would be to reject Canada’s publicly stated commitment to the principles of human security.

We can hypothesize that New Canadians and nascent diasporas have and will be trying to influence Canadian foreign policy to better reflect their own interests on specific issues of concern. Unfortunately, there is almost a total absence of systematic research undertaken in the Canadian context on these important issues. We know very little concretely about what kinds of political actions diasporas have taken in Canada in regards to Canadian foreign policy, what kinds of political action diasporas groups
could potentially take, what kinds of networks diaspora groups in Canada have with their home country and other host countries, what the “hot-button” foreign policy issues are for specific diasporas groups in Canada, or what may be “hot-button” issues in the future. This research is desperately needed and would be of great utility to the policy-making community.

Specifically, there are fundamental questions that remain unexplored from the perspectives of political and sociological inquiry. What are the generational differences in immigrant communities and how are they reflected in their participation in the politics of foreign policy making? While we have some understanding about domestic political behaviour (e.g., when, why, and how new citizens become involved in local, provincial, and federal politics), there is no equivalent data or even articulated theory concerning the thresholds which must be reached before new citizens become engaged in issues of international affairs and foreign policy. How do new citizens and their community leaders perceive their rights and their interests concerning the foreign policies of their adopted home? Do such people focus on single-issue items directly linked to their identity politics (aid projects for Somalia, support for Tamil Tigers, a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, changes in immigration or refugee law, etc.)? If so, what impedes a broadening of their agendas and, if not, what explains the transition from single-issue activism to more general concerns of Canadian foreign policy? Is this behaviour any different to that undertaken by others who were immigrants of earlier generations and who, while Caucasian and Christian, were not from Western Europe? What can be learned from comparing these earlier but still identity-based communities (e.g., Ukrainians, Poles, Serbo-Croats, Hungarians, etc.) to the newer communities who come primarily from Asia and Africa, but also the Middle East and South America? To what extent are identity-group communities politically engaged? What is the significance of divisions within such communities when policy-relevant action is undertaken?

Within this general set of questions are many more specific issues of relevance for the policy community. For example, do the responsible government departments and agencies appropriately reflect the interests of New Canadians, especially those who have different backgrounds, interests, sensitivities and perhaps values than the historical Canadian mainstream, and if so in what ways and how is this accomplished? Do New Canadians express their interests and concerns about the policies and actions of their adopted government, and do they attempt to influence policy? Is there a difference between New Canadians who arrive as just another wave of those from the same origins, and therefore are more likely to receive community support in their initial years in Canada, as compared to those for whom such support structures are less accessible? Does, for instance, the Department of Foreign Affairs and

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8Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon (2003) has explored potential foreign policy issue areas in the coming years that might draw the attention of New Canadian groups. Primarily these include immigration policy and economic policies towards home countries.
International Trade take into account the divisions within identity communities when policies are formulated and actions undertaken? How do identity communities which often are not monolithic in composition or in preference structure manage their attempts to influence government? What is the relationship between federal politics (i.e., the parliamentary and constituency processes) and New Canadians, especially those from within “non-traditional, non-mainstream” communities? Do our new citizens perceive that their views and preferences are being seriously considered and responsibly addressed by their parliamentarians and officials? To what extent are New Canadians viewed as a resource of information, expertise, etc for policy development? What options are available or need to be created to facilitate the ability of the Canadian state to draw from the richness of the plurality of Canadian communities while, at the same time, being duly sensitive to the need to place such initiatives within the larger context of established Canadian values, interests, and policies.

Throughout the work done on diaspora politics in other contexts like the United States, there is a startling consensus within the appropriate academic fields that diasporas have been trying to influence foreign policy; the consensus breaks down when trying to determine the factors which enable this to occur, the impact of these attempts to influence policy-makers, and the impact on the state in general. While further research does not imply that a consensus will be reached (nor is consensus a measure of success), it is necessary that Canadian scholars begin to address these questions. Additionally, Winland (1998) has suggested several interesting and neglected areas that should be examined within this larger project. The first is to probe the powerful attachment of homeland ties for ethnic identities in Canada. The second is to look at diaspora activities at the trans-state level rather than only focussing on voting patterns, lobbying efforts, and attempts to influence foreign policy. The third recommendation is to explore the conditions of arrival (e.g., immigrant, refugee, exile), settlement (e.g., patterns of incorporation and exclusion), and departure (e.g., flight, expulsion, emigration) with a special emphasis on the places in-between (Winland 1998: 568). Winland argues that studying these areas “could reveal how multiple displacements (and diaspora histories) shape diaspora attitudes and experiences in Canada” (Winland 1998: 568).
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