Patriotic War Protesters and Hawkish Humanitarians: An Examination of the Identities and Fantasies (Re)Kindled in the Battle for Iraq

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Introduction

The decision of the President Bush administration to attack Iraq exposed deep fissures in the American populace. In the months prior to the so-called “Attack on Iraq” the American homefront had been conceptualized as the site of two counter-poised political discourses – with the political right invoking terrorist discourses to justify the attack on Iraq and the political left invoking humanitarian discourses to protest the nation’s mobilization for war. Although it is fair to say that the two discourses emerged from two distinct sets of concerns, what tends to be overlooked is their points of intersection and the unique historical vision – what might be called the new American dream – that is emerging at this crossroads.

This particular crossroads is occurring at a particularly sensitive time. It is occurring in the aftermath of 9/11 – an event which evoked the question “why us?” and, as a result, raised deeper questions pertaining to the American identity and way of life. It is also occurring at a time when the inter-national order itself is coming under intense questioning and strain – i.e., when the language of an inter-national realm, which presupposes that autonomous sovereign states are the major actors on the world stage, no longer fits. In these ways, the domestic dispute over the situation in Iraq is eerily reminiscent of a crossroads produced hundreds of years ago in Spain as a result of the encounter between the Spaniards and the Amerindians after the discovery of America. According to Beate Jahn, the Amerindians posed a threat to the “culturally specific world view of the Spaniards” which was resolved by two disparate responses, one based on assimilation and the other on conquest. While seemingly incommensurable, Jahn argues that the two disparate discourses actually worked together to create a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between the Amerindians who embodied a state of nature or pre-civil form of society and the Europeans who embodied civilization’s most advanced cultural form. It was this understanding of ‘the difference’ that solidified the view of states as ‘hard shells’ demarcating firm and inalienable boundaries between Us and Them; Inside and Outside; and Order and Anarchy. It also served as a foundation for European political thought which deemed the pursuit of notions of the good life based on a legitimate political community as possible within states, but not without – where a state of nature or the laws of the jungle reigned supreme. Hence, at a time in which the old form of world order was being dismantled (but the new had not yet taken its place), a settled understanding of difference began to crystallize as the by-product and enabling condition of two very distinct sets of concerns, that of the state-maker (seeking to subjugate the new lands and its people to his will) and that of the Jesuit (seeking to convert the barbarians to Christianity). This uneasy coming together ultimately enabled the birth of a new inter-national state system – one created according to culturally-specific European understandings of themselves and world order.

My research question concerns the following: If the competing European discourses which underpinned the emergence of the Westphalian state system reveal something about the ideas of Europeans who produced them, what might current fissures in the American populace tell us about the desires, hopes, and ambitions coming to play in the present interregnum? What interests me is not so much the outcome of the dispute between these competing ‘social forces,’ but rather the field of vision that is being produced in the spaces between. Unlike the previous resolution which contained the problem of difference within states, current discourses seem to suggest that the global spaces housing an absolute Other are shrinking and that
the boundaries between Us and Them are increasingly transcending state forms. How are these current images and visions being played out with regards to the American domestic debate over the war in Iraq? What understandings of difference or geopolitical space are being crystallized at the points of intersection and what understandings are being eclipsed or left behind? More generally, I wonder what precursors for the future world order may be found at the current historical crossroads that is, in part, signified by the Battle for Iraq.

To be clear, none of this has much to do with the actual events occurring on the ground in Iraq – which may or may not unsettle these discursive frameworks. Rather, I want to know what American dream(s) does the Battle for Iraq enable? And what implications does this have for those of us who, in various ways, may be left to live the American dream?

The bulk of my analysis in this paper is based on the news coverage of the liberal mainstream press – specifically the coverage of the antiwar protests and debates in the New York Times in the months leading up to and including the early days of the Attack on Iraq. It was during this time that questions about how best to secure the post-9/11 world and questions about America’s ‘rightful’ role in this world were the subject of many debates. But, arguably, by the time that the Iraq debate was making media headlines, important questions about the referent object of security – whether it be the American homeland, Western civilization or, as I will suggest, borrowing from Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen and Richard Johnson, a way of life that encompasses and exceeds both of these – were already settled. The only issue remaining was how best to secure it. However, this issue is not the primary concern of this paper; its main concern, in fact, is how the debate became constructed in this particular way. Thus, rather than starting with the lead-up to the Gulf War, when certain foundations had already been established that would shape the parameters of the debate, my paper will begin in the period prior. It will begin in immediate post-9/11 period when meanings were still being assigned – meanings which would give coherence to all that had happened previous to 9/11 and that which would follow (specifically the Attack on Iraq).

What I call the Battle for Iraq was not a singular debate, but, in fact, encompassed a number of issue areas: It was a battle about how best to extend the liberal democratic peace to a ‘rogue’ state or, to use the missionary language of our times, it was about extending the light of civilization to the dark corners of the globe. It was about securing market access, resources, global commerce, and economic growth. It was about making the world safe for democracy and the American way of life. It was about bringing freedom to the Iraqi people. And it was also about re-asserting American primacy across the globe. As this list demonstrates, spaces were created for the often conflicting interests of both state-makers and humanitarians – i.e., our modern-day Jesuits. Indeed, both came to the forefront of this debate.

Yet, what strikes me more than the ways that their concerns clashed are the ways in which they merged. Even the massive and vociferous antiwar demonstrations did little to upset this nexus. Within the peace movement, the very object of the Bush Administration’s security discourse was cast outside the legitimate realm of debate; only the means used to secure it was up for discussion. As a result, the defence of the peace actually re-affirmed the evolving status quo by downplaying civic tensions threatening the American identity pre-9/11 and by refusing to acknowledge the violent, ambitious terrorist Other that exists
within the American identity and way of life. This paper will focus on these omissions and the violences and ambitions that the American dream of a transcendent liberal democratic peace betrays. This paper seeks to interrogate the peace.

The argument will proceed as follows: First, it will interrogate the meanings assigned to the ‘event’ of 9/11 in the days and weeks following the terrorist attacks on American soil. Then it will investigate the arguments and concerns deployed by the anti-war and pro-war camps in the months leading up to the Attack on Iraq. Lastly, it will argue that at the intersection of these disparate concerns a cohesive vision emerged, even if just momentarily, of a new world order. Part fantasy, part reality, and held together as much by intersubjective imaginings as by any concrete forces in the world, this vision is what I call the American dream. It is a culturally-specific worldview put into practice by those with the power and the self-designated authority (i.e., ‘responsibility’) to do so.

The Event of 9/11

As stated, I will begin by querying the event of 9/11 itself – as it is this modern day encounter between ‘civilization’ and ‘the barbarians’ that has, for better or worse, become a defining event of present times. I myself have likened the event, in this paper, to the encounter between the Spaniards and Amerindians. This is because both instances or encounters have been interpreted as a rupture – “represented as an irruption on the surface of history, announcing a break with a taken-for-granted world” – and thus serve as signifying benchmarks in the periodization of history. While the death of the old Westphalian system has been alternatively lamented or celebrated for quite some time, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall (yet another momentous event), the content of the new world order to take its place has failed to acquire a fixed shape and, indeed, the post-Cold War (dis)order can be characterized as one of flux. This, of course, is not to say that the events of 9/11 occurred at a time when the world itself was a blank slate. To the contrary, it would be more apt to describe 9/11 as the empty vessel that was quickly filled with the already existing ambitions, dreams, and desires of what the new will or must be.

As Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen points out, the “brute facts” of 9/11 did not speak for themselves: “[T]here was little hard evidence as to why al-Qaida chose the World Trade Center as its target for the 11 September attacks.” Certainly, the question repeatedly raised in the American media, “Why would anyone do this to us?” points to the ontological challenges that 9/11 posed to the present world (dis)order and to the ‘us’ that was under attack. Pondering such questions, Couze Venn says, “Events, retroactively, are made to play the part of a new beginning and origin, which means that they oblige us to think anew the present and who ‘we’ are.” Even prior to the contentious “Attack on Iraq,” which in my opinion became the focal point of debates considering the question of what exactly was at stake in the constructions of the new, certain narratives explaining the events of 9/11 were discarded and others began to crystallize – giving meaning and coherence to the ‘brute facts.’

Quickly discarded, for example, was the idea that the attack on the World Trade Center was the mere work of Islamic fundamentalists and could be explained by Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”
thesis. This controversial argument, first published in 1993, asserts that the defining conflict of the Cold War period was being replaced by civilizational conflicts in which the West— the “highest cultural grouping” held in common by peoples primarily of North American and Western European descent— was at odds with “The Rest.” According to this view, the Muslim population, religion, and culture is, by definition, a threat to the liberal, secular, cosmopolitan values of the West and vice versa. But, despite the initial appeal that this argument held for some in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center’s collapse, it was soon employed by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair as an example of a position to reject.

Indeed, according to Rasmussen, the preferred view of world leaders which ultimately gained widespread acceptance, was that the processes of (Western) globalization had transcended particular regional, national, cultural, religious, and civilizational differences— incorporating the whole of humanity within its realm:

Globalization showed the transcendence of the Cold War world in favour of a ‘new world order’ governed by the values of democracy, market economy and civil society by which the West defined itself and human progress. Hence, globalization became a late-modern, sociological name for the ‘civilizing process’, which according to the Western mind gradually improves the human condition, civilization, by transcending its own achievements in favour of something increasingly better. In other words, Western victory in the Cold War had allowed it to define the world on its own terms and given it reason to believe that the world in due course would become more like the West.

The World Trade Center then was a prime target because it symbolized no less than globalization and the promise of human progress contained within. The consequences of this view for the conceptualization of world order were significant. It irrevocably challenged any remaining notions of a world characterized by hard and inalienable borders between states where politics characterized the relations within states and a state of nature/anarchy/chaos was the defining feature of relations without. The state of nature was both transcended and still firmly at the heart of this new narrative of International Relations.

Indeed, the threats of barbarism and chaos were larger than ever. They were precisely what globalization needed to defend itself against! But, now these threats lie within. The (spatial and temporal) distances between the wild and safe zones had collapsed:

The flows from the wild zones of people, risks, substances, images, Kalashnikovs and so on, increasingly slip under, over and through the safe gates, suddenly and chaotically eliminating the invisibilities that had kept the zones apart. Through money laundering, the drug trade, urban crime, asylum-seeking, arms trading, people smuggling, slave trading and urban terrorism, the spaces of the wild and the safe are chaotically juxtaposed.

Tellingly, the plans to attack the World Trade Center and the attacks themselves did not originate from the third world in a conventional sense of the term, but from what Rasmussen describes as “third world space[s]” in the first world. Zygmunt Bauman describes the lessons learned from 9-11 as follows: “We are all ‘inside’, with nothing left outside. Or, rather, what used to be ‘outside’ has entered the ‘inside’— without knocking and settled there— without asking permission. Rather un-ironically, the very processes, networks,
communication systems, and global civilian infrastructure that made globalization possible are the same processes, networks, communications, and infrastructure that make it possible for the “barbarians” to penetrate the safe zones, to project power globally, and to inflict harm on the powerful. The choice of al-Qaeda to seize on the new strategic possibilities posed by globalization only confirmed and hastened newly emerging understandings of global space that both conflicted with the clash of civilizations explanation of terrorism and, as Rasmussen convincingly argues, fostered the conclusion that the threats of disorder and terrorism are an inherent part of globalization itself. In contrast to the civilizing processes of globalization, the events of 9/11 can then be described as signifying, in the words of George W. Bush, a “parallel globalization of terror,” or, in the words of Colin Powell, the “dark side of globalization.” Terrorism, in this narrative, is globalization’s alter ego.

To the extent that terrorism was constructed within the frame of globalization itself, terrorist acts (other than those of homegrown white boys like Timothy McVeigh) could not simply be dismissed as tragic, albeit isolated, events – the work of lunatics or fringe fanatics. Rather, the terrorists were defined as an existential threat – engaged in a struggle for the future of humanity itself. Says British Prime Minister Tony Blair, “There is no compromise with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must.” According to a Washington Post editorial written by Retired Air Force General Charles G. Boyd, what was at stake was no less than “freedom, strength, tolerance and democratic principles dedicated to liberty and peace” – in short, a way of life that while quintessentially American was in the process of transforming/civilizing the globe. In the words of R.C. Longworth, a columnist with the Chicago Tribune, “Most Americans see their nation and its ideals as benign and positive, and they assume that these ideals...democracy, a free economy, consumerism, untrammeled communications, tolerance, equality between the sexes...can only benefit the rest of the world. It’s a shock to learn that not everyone wants to become like us.” And yet, as his article and countless other reports in the American media go on to conclude, this is the “harsh reality” forced on Americans in an age of terrorism.

In a similar vein, for example, Sean Hannity of Fox News Channel asked, “Are Americans afraid to face the reality that there is a significant portion of the world’s population that hates America, hates what freedom represents, hates the fact that we fight for our freedom world wide, hates our prosperity, hates our way of life?” More interesting than the answer to the question is that which gets expelled from consideration in this dichotomized world view of freedom-lovers – which, according to Prime Minister Blair, encompasses “states from all continents, people of all faiths, and parties of all democratic political persuasions” – and freedom-haters. On the one hand, as Richard Johnson points out, all of the violence and blood shedding of the American past are forgotten:

As we would expect in discourses of fundamentalist moral certainty, the enemy, the terrorist, is absolutely external and other. It can have no past, have no connection with a longer history of relationships in which Britain or the U.S. could be complicit. As Blair puts it, “this mass terrorism is the new evil in the world.” (Blair, 2 Oct.) Bush says that America is “learning about terror and evil” (Bush, 24 Oct.) as though in U.S. history nothing like this
has ever happened before – no gun crime, no electric chair, no Oklahoma City, no Kent State University, no WACO, no lynching, no extermination of First Nations, no Vietnam…

On the other hand, what is much less commented on and yet of more significance for the purposes of this paper, is that it is not only the negative aspects of American culture that are forgotten - as they are simultaneously projected onto the terrorist “evildoer.” Also forgotten are the Battle of Seattle, Fortress Quebec, and the massive ‘anti-globalization’ protests in Genoa – instances in which the so-called ideals of freedom-lovers, even Western capitalism and ‘American-style’ democracy themselves, came under scrutiny. The critiques offered by the protesters – which seemed to be gaining currency in the period before September 11th (even with the mainstream media) – came not just from the ‘outside,’ in any sense of the word, but from ‘within’ the heart of civilization.

September 11th as it came to be understood, defused the radical potential of these critiques. In fact, the problems of poverty, inequality, exploitation, and environmental degradation were no longer the problems of globalization, Western capitalism, or American-style democracy per se. Instead the problem became the question of how to harness the “bright” side of globalization – i.e., how to help the poor seize the opportunities that globalization presented. These were seen as policy problems and ones that many in the West felt particularly well poised to address. Tony Blair, for his part, was more than willing to take up the cause of the poor and dispossessed:

The starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor, from the deserts of northern Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan: they too are our cause…This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder the world around us. Today, mankind has the science and technology to destroy itself or to provide prosperity to all. Yet science can’t make that choice for us. Only the moral power of a world, acting as a community, can.

Similarly, President Bush referred to the challenges posed by 9/11 as “the calling of the 21st Century” and Americans, he promised, would rise to the occasion. According to Johnson, who analyzes the anti-terrorist rhetorics of Bush and Blair in the post 9/11 period, Americans were encouraged to do this not by retreating from their way of life, but by seizing it as a source of strength and inspiration…as an exemplary to show the world. In part this involved continuing to work, travel, and shop – i.e., to be confident in who we are and “to make sure that our economy continues to grow” and in part this involved showing the world that Americans are a compassionate people “through…a million acts of responsibility and decency and service.” In Bush’s speeches, the American way of life is not only beyond contestation; it is precisely that which must be redeemed:

This country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world.
As these clips demonstrate, while President Bush often redrew the lines between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in very traditional ways – in ways that enabled him to interpellate ordinary Americans into a heroic narrative of the ‘American nation’ – the cause Americans were being asked to rally behind was larger than themselves and, in fact, larger than the Western world.

Indeed, the American way of life that was being re-produced in these instances was consonant with globalization and perhaps inextricable from it. In other words, the promise of human progress contained within globalization could not be without the American way of life and the American way of life could not be without globalization. Johnson argues that the speeches of Tony Blair and George Bush invite us to view ways of life as a “complex [global] unity” and he comments on the significance of this shift:

This ‘unity’ is not ‘society’ or the ‘social formation’ any more – the nation, that is, in disguise. Ways of living cannot be sustained as ‘national’ only. The whole world is now the unity; the setting is global: there is one ‘world’ in the phenomenological or experiential sense, one world in the geopolitical reach of power and communication, one earth as a bio-social environment. But this unity is both complexly divided and interrelated in its differences, in many different ways.29

What is important to note is that despite these differences, the 21st Century calling heeded by George Bush, was truly global.

For a short time, the tensions resident within this new narrative (which my own paper struggles to contain) were held at bay. The War on Afghanistan was a perfect example of this – i.e., a display of global cooperation/transcendence seemingly under the banner “Freedom-Loving Peoples of the World Unite” and sponsored, if you will, by the USA. But unanswered questions remained that had the potential to shake this narrative to its core. In particular, there was the nagging aforementioned issue of how to harness the bright side of globalization or how to extend globalization’s light into the pockets of darkness that threatened to proliferate across the globe. The relatively unproblematic ‘defensive’ act of bombing Afghanistan was really just the tip of the iceberg in this world where the spaces between the wild and safe zones had all but collapsed. Although the question of how to make the world safe for globalization and safe for America was seemingly little more than a strategic debate, in that the issue of what to securitize was already settled, deep divisions could arguably re-expose fissures in the referent objects themselves. *Globalization for whom? Whose way of life? Who or what is worth sacrificing in the name of security? Security for what?* These are questions that, if raised, threatened to tear apart the problematic ‘we’ at the heart of the American way of life – either within the territorial borders of the American state or writ large to encompass the ‘freedom-loving peoples’ of the world. My interest is primarily in the former. More specifically, I am interested in questions of how Americans came to understand themselves and their role in the world post-9/11 and post-encounter with the new ‘Other.’
The Lead-up to War: Narrating Protest

In order to explore these questions, I have chosen to investigate the stories that the Americans told – about themselves and about each other – in the period leading up to the Attack on Iraq. How do these stories reinforce particular understandings of the American identity and the larger world and how do they exclude others? Much of my analysis here is based on the news coverage of the liberal mainstream press – specifically the coverage of the antiwar protests and debates in the New York Times from November of 2002 to April 2003. A media analysis was chosen because more than the actuality of the ‘events’ themselves, I am interested in the narration of these events – i.e., how they came to be understood, interpreted, and reproduced or challenged on the ground. Says Ronald Crelinsten: “The role of the media is crucial in that it serves as the crucible within which public images and discourse are forged, shaped, and channeled into particular themes and agendas.”

I would add that it is also a site in which various subjectivities are forged, a medium through which we come to recognize ourselves as actors (the antiwar protester, the radical, the patriot, the humanitarian) and come to attach certain meanings to the identities we perform.

The identities of interest to me here are that of the antiwar protester and that of the patriot – identities which, in spite of important differences, in many ways merged in the lead-up to the Attack on Iraq. These identities played a crucial role in the stories that emerged because it is in relation to them that the American public was able to interpret and scrutinize their own responses to the debate. The debate itself centred specifically on the relative merits of launching a pre-emptive attack against Iraq as a means of securitizing the post-9/11 world. On the one side of this debate were antiwar protesters, who, while alternately demonized or belittled by the right-wing media as enemies of the state or “leftist stooges,” were by and large depicted as legitimate political actors with legitimate concerns by the mainstream liberal press. The New York Times and even the Washington Post emphasized the diversity of the protesters whose ranks included some unlikely allies such as “mothers, grandmothers, black and Latino organizations, unions…average ordinary people…the National Council of Churches…[and] Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities.”

Much attention was placed on the breadth and depth of antipathy to a pre-emptive strike:

City and county councils in 20 states have passed [resolutions imploring President Bush to slow down his confrontation with Iraq] from small towns like Woodstock, New York to cities as large as Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit. Many have liberal leanings…But others…have large numbers of Republican voters.

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1 Although the Internet increasingly functions both as a source of media and as a site for identity construction, I chose to focus on the liberal mainstream press primarily because I wanted to limit my focus to one specific type of media and because unlike various Internet sites, I think that the New York Times is uniquely placed as a seemingly ‘detached,’ ‘uninterested,’ ‘objective,’ or ‘credible’ (even if ever-so-slightly ‘liberal’) national newspaper. All of these descriptors are, of course, highly problematic, but it is nevertheless this perception of the New York Times and, likely, its self-designation as such, that made it a particularly interesting area of focus for me.
In the narration of the burgeoning antiwar movement that emerged from news stories like these, the fact that the protesters’ ranks extended beyond the usual suspects – i.e., “fringe groups or leftovers from Vietnam” – was often cited as evidence of the war protester’s credibility.

Indeed, comments such as those cited above tended to be followed by remarks that, while not necessarily supportive, seemed to legitimate the antiwar protester’s concerns. Evelyn Nieves, columnist with the Washington Post, participated in this process of legitimation: “Union members have the same concerns as others opposed to the proposed war, including a belief that the Bush administration has not weighed the economic consequences or made the case for unprecedented attack.”

Others similarly tended to credit the antiwar protesters with raising critical questions pertaining to “not just the use of force, but the cost of war.” The costs of war included, of course, the lives of American soldiers as well as the suffering of Iraqis – particularly women and children. But, in the face of George Bush’s massive tax cuts, it also included economic consequences, defined broadly, and specific concerns about the war’s impact on social spending and domestic welfare. In the words of Chicago councilman Joe Moore: “This war will be financed by deficit spending and drastic cuts in domestic spending. In either case, my neighborhood and neighborhoods throughout the nation will suffer the consequences of a sagging economy and even more cuts in federally funded projects and programs.”

These concerns, while recognized as legitimate, tended to be attributed to the ‘nervous mood’ of the American populace. Mr. Baldassare, a pollster with the (American) Public Policy Institute, explains the link between economic anxieties and views on war as follows: “People are in a kind of nervous mood I haven’t seen since the early 1990s. They are very wary of the state’s vulnerable position economically right now. That has made people cautious about things they might view as extraneous events, including going to war with Iraq.”

And yet, as David Halbfinger and Jacques Steinberg of the New York Times point out, this time the American mood is “mixed with little of the national cockiness that many recall accompanied the prelude to Desert Storm.” This time American vulnerability became the overriding theme of the day and the lens through which the antiwar protesters’ concerns and perhaps the movement itself came to be interpreted.

Indeed, much was made of the fact that the American homefront could no longer be presumed as external to the conflict. Some soldiers expressed concerns about leaving their families to fight a war across the ocean when the American homeland was under attack: “We used to fight wars only in foreign lands, but it is not so anymore. I worry more about my family right here than about me over there. I know I am going to protect myself. But my kid is 10 years old…And my wife, too.”

The nation was jittery — under a code orange terror alert with heightened levels of security at public gathering places and even places of work. People were afraid to open their mail because of the anthrax scare and were buying duct tape in the event of a chemical or biological weapon’s attack. Civilians were, quite literally, on their guard, having been asked to actively participate in the nation’s security efforts – to watch for strange and suspicious behaviour and to call police if they noticed an unattended briefcase or lunch bag. Says Ulrich Beck: “the terrorist has made everyone into a disaster movie scriptwriter, now condemned to
imagine the effects of a home-made bomb assembled with the help of gene or nanotechnology; or the collapse of global computer networks by the introduction of squads of viruses and so on.”

In this climate, a number of Americans, concerned with how they would be perceived at home and abroad, by potential terrorists within and by the international community at large, claimed to be motivated by fear. The risk of provoking more terrorist attacks was, in the words of one father and protester, “one of the most convincing arguments of the antiwar movements.” Others expressed a strong desire not to go it alone. In fact, the backing of the United Nations was a significant determinant in many Americans’ willingness to support the war. Clearly, the national mood was in many ways unlike that of Desert Storm:

There [was] little excitement at the chance to put newfangled American weapons to the test, few illusions about how costly a war could be in human life or material or money…[and] concern that the government’s willingness to go it nearly alone, at a dear price in international support, could prove fatal at a later date.

In short, this was a time of doubt...a time of ontological insecurity. Rasmussen points out that as opposed to the Mutually Assured Destruction of the Cold War period when “people in the East and West had ontological security...albeit in a somewhat ironic form,” in the post-9/11 world the “enemy” was a vague amorphous character who could not simply be deterred or contained: “The events of 11 September 2001 seemed to confirm the growing fears of the late 1990s that the strategic game had changed and that Western governments did not quite know what the new rules were.”

Hence, for some Americans, the lingering question ‘Why do they hate us?’ was a pertinent security matter that could not be answered merely by redrawing the lines between us and them. Interestingly, some of those who claimed to be protesting out of fear attempted to bridge this gap by granting communicable status to the terrorist, a potentially subversive act. Michael N. Nagler, the founder and former chairman of the Peace and Conflict Studies Department at the University of California argued that the protest’s significance may not lie in its ability to persuade President Bush or fellow Americans against going to war, but in sending a message to potential terrorists: “This is going to penetrate the consciousness of some of the people who hate us and make it harder to stereotype us. A key element in nonviolent struggle is risk. When you are willing to take a risk it has a strong emotional impact on the other party.”

Protesters, like Professor Nagler, were conducting theater which is not unusual for protest movements in and of itself. But, it is noteworthy that this performance was not aimed primarily at national audiences, but at the world stage. It is also noteworthy that some protesters were trying to communicate with those deemed by President Bush to be incommunicable. These are people who, in Bush’s words, “have no country, no ideology,” “can only survive in darkness,” and whose “only motivation is evil.” By granting communicative status to the terrorist ‘Other,’ these protesters, like the group Families for Peaceful Tomorrows (which highlights the linkages between victims of 9/11 and the victims of civil war and US bombing in Afghanistan), adopted a potentially subversive, self-conscious and reflexive posture. It demands an awareness of how the American people and actions of the American government are perceived by others and one which has the potential at least to re-cast the American identity as a question. But, the seemingly
more radical challenge that these protesters posed went largely unnoticed in the New York Times. Comments like Nagler’s did not disturb the overriding narrative of a peace movement largely driven by fear. The opinion peace written by Bill Keller for the New York Times sums this narrative up best:

With our troops amassed against Iraq, Americans are apprehensive and divided. The polls show us still torn between containment and war, between the instinct to give it time and the yearning to get it done. We worry about civilian carnage, American casualties and terrorist reprisals, about further shocks to a shaken economy, about being a nation alone. The Pentagon is ordering body bags by the thousand…What most of all animates our national anxiety, I think, is the fear that war will backfire. Most people did not imagine themselves anywhere near the front line in 1991. Now the front line is where we live and we are afraid.  

In this narrative, the concern for peace in and of itself may seem little more than a mere backdrop for the more pragmatic national, economic, and social security issues that come to the fore, but it would not be fair to dismiss the pacifist impulse all together. For one, even by the media accounts, this was hardly a movement of all pragmatists. Describing what unites the various array of individuals who joined the antiwar group by the name of Bronx Action – aside from the shared observation that they are not full-time protesters (i.e., “they are mainly white, middle-class, middle-age and have full time jobs”) – Leslie Eaton says the following: “Some describe themselves as pacifists. Others are more pragmatic…Many say they are both pacifists and pragmatists.”  

What made the movement noteworthy (and from certain perspectives what made it legitimate) was just the extent to which pragmatic and pacifist concerns came together. For another, an interest in peace, or at least a desire not to participate in this particular war, was the common thread uniting all the various Americans against war – hence, the names of the two largest umbrella groups co-ordinating and organizing the protest effort were United for Peace and Justice and Win Without War. The fact that the American mood can be characterized as one of vulnerability or apprehension does not discount the concerns that many Americans raised. Perhaps for many it just highlighted the stakes involved in this particular war which, in many ways, was laying a claim to the construction of the new – that which was being born out of the World Trade Center’s ashes. In the words of one hand-made protest sign “Peace = Life. War = Death. Let Us Choose Life.”  

Strange Bedfellows - The Bush Administration and Liberal Humanitarians Gear up for War
But, this is not to say that the pro-war camp did not. And it is here that things get interesting. To understand this it is necessary to understand the formally stated reasons for war and its ideological underpinnings. The formally stated reason for launching a pre-emptive attack against Iraq (which was more exclusively focused on in the early days of the pro-war campaign) was to forcefully disarm Iraq of its alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction – weapons that Iraq was believed to be storing and producing in violation of United Nations’ resolutions. According to one Bush administration official, if anything was learned from 9/11 it was the need to “be proactive to prevent threats from emerging” and WMD in the hands of Saddam Hussein fit the definition of an emergent threat.  

Containment and deterrence were deemed to be out-dated and insufficient
responses to the new threats. The change was that rogue states no longer had to launch an attack from their
soil. Despite little compelling evidence, the fear was that Saddam Hussein could aid and abet a terrorist
attack either by directly sponsoring a terrorist organization and supplying them with weapons or by merely
selling weapons on the black market. Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, articulates this concern
as follows:

Containment and deterrence goes back to an era when the only use of force we were worried
about was one in which the use of force could be directly associated with a country, and that
country had an address. The whole thing that terrorists introduce is that you not only do not see the threat coming but you do not know where it came from.  

What Mr. Wolfowitz does not say here is that the ambitions underpinning a pre-emptive attack against Iraq
pre-dated 9/11 by at least ten years.

Under the former Bush administration, Mr. Wolfowitz, acting in the capacity of an aide to then
Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, drafted a document known as the Defense Planning Guidance that made
the case that the administration should adopt a new foreign policy based on the doctrine of pre-emption. It
argued that this would allow the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to maintain its
military superiority and “enlightened domination” throughout the globe. A broad directive would
furthermore enable the United States to be “postured to act independently [or with ad-hoc assemblies of
nations] when collective action [with traditional allies] can not be orchestrated.” Hypothetical wars,
including a second war against Iraq, were also discussed in this proposed foreign policy framework – a
framework which was judged at the time to be “too bellicose” – but which seems to have gained favour with
the current administration.

The significance of this is that it reveals that the current seeds for the post-9/11 world were planted
long before the event itself. The event may have provided the occasion to bring this framework to fruition,
but it is important to note that the old framework could not simply be inserted into the present
administration’s foreign policy agenda untouched. Other ideas were coming to fruition in the 9/11 period as
well and their influence shaped the overall foreign policy framework. Specifically, there was the matter of
the liberal democratic peace which had become transcendent as a result of the processes of globalization.
What sense did ambitions of military superiority make in this world? In part, this question has already been
answered: “Terrorism was seen as a challenge to the international order and the civilizing process of
globalization generated by that order.” In other words, military might was needed to make the world safe
for democracy. But this age-old refrain fails to illuminate the novel features that were occurring at this time.

The United States had declared a state of exception – a suspension of the old (rule of law) and the
implementation of the new. As the saying goes, exceptional measures are needed for exceptional times.
Arguably, there is little exceptional about this. It is and always has been a means by which states re-inscribe
their sovereignty and redraw the lines between inside and outside in a way that determines who is politically
subject. And yet, what made this event rather unique, if not exceptional, is that this time the state of
emergency that President Bush declared was global. Venn explains as follows:
In the USA since September 11th, the suspension of law – inside the US applying to anyone suspected of terrorism or of supporting it, and internationally – in phrases of the kind: “We want Osama bin Laden dead or alive, preferably dead” instantiates the state of exception and of the sovereignty of the USA with respect to all other states.\(^6\)

In so doing, the United States re-cast itself as the exception.\(^6\) Its exceptional status derived from two factors. The first was its unrivaled ability to project military power. The second, and no less important, was its status as the bastion of freedom and democracy. Says Rasmussen, “Taken together the focus of decisive action and Liberalism put the United States apart from the world as the strongest and freest society in the world.”\(^6\)

Hence, the United States suspended international law – asserting its right to decide who the global terrorists are and what measures are necessary to mitigate the terrorist threat – in order to save it.\(^6\) In the words of George Bush, “The course we follow is a matter of profound consequence to many nations. If America wavers the world will lose heart. If America leads, the world will show its courage. America will never waver. America will lead the world to peace.”\(^6\) In this narrative, the United States is, in fact, the guardian of world peace and order. As America leads the world through these exceptional times, the dichotomy between its particular interests and those of the globe is perceived as false. This is the age of transcendence when the United States morphs from a great power within an international order to the constituent force of world order itself.\(^6\) Some would call this the age of Empire, but unlike the Roman or British Empire, this modern day variant is much more concerned with the production of liberal subjectivities than with the physical conquest of new lands.

A defining characteristic of the age is that war is conducted in the name of humanity. Humanitarian concerns and war aims necessarily overlap and sometimes merge. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri explain that “Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself, but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace.”\(^6\) Certainly, as the Bush administration’s campaign for war against Iraq proceeded, even in the face of large-scale protest, the humanitarian basis for war came to the fore in Bush’s speeches:

> I’ve listened carefully as people and leaders around the world have made known the desire for peace. All of us want peace. The threat to peace does not come from those who seek to enforce the just demands of the civilized world. The threat to peace comes from those who flout those demands. If we have to act, we will act to restrain the violent and defend the cause of peace. And by acting we will signal to outlaw regimes that in this century the boundaries of civilized behavior will have to be respected. Protecting these boundaries carries a cost. If war is forced upon us by Iraq’s refusal to disarm, we will meet an enemy who hides his military forces behind civilians, who has terrible weapons, who is capable of any crime. These dangers are real…Members of our armed forces also understand why they may be called to fight…They know that America’s cause is right and just: the liberty of an oppressed people and security for the American people.\(^6\)

In this speech, President Bush does not deny or minimize the security interests of the United States. He simply highlights that America’s cause is the cause of the civilized world. The liberal news media picked up this theme as well, emphasizing the virtue of regime change in Iraq as a means of extending globalization’s
civilizing forces to a pocket of the world still seeped in darkness. The links between global security and regime change in Iraq was perhaps made most forcefully and repeatedly by the New York Times’ columnist Thomas Friedman:

The war has two purposes – one stated, one unstated – but both require the same means. The stated purpose is to disarm Iraq. The unstated purpose is to transform it from a totalitarian system that has threatened its neighbors and its own people into something better...And it can serve as a progressive model to spur reform – educational, religious, economic, and political – around the Arab world…The unstated logic is that the real threat to open societies today comes from all the angry young men and women being produced by the misgovernance, backwardness, and extremism emanating from that part of the world. And if that anger results in another 9/11 it will mean the end of open society as we know it, and globalization as we know it...That is why helping the Arab-Muslim world get onto a different course is the only meaningful response to 9/11.69

Friedman argues that transforming Iraqi society is a cause that “liberals should care about.”70 In part because “liberating the captive people’s of the Mideast is a virtue in itself” and in part because what was being defended was no less than the Western liberal ontology of today’s globalized world.71

Contrary to what some of the war’s critics may claim, this war was not only or even primarily about territory or access to resources. (Although this is not to say that traditional geo-strategic factors did not play an important role.) In an age of transcendence, such wars no longer made sense. This, according to analysis and editorial commentary in the New York Times, is what the “cynical Europeans” just did not get.72 An opinion poll by Pew Research Center found that solid majorities in key European constituencies (75 percent in France, 54 percent in Germany and 76 percent in Russia) believed the American desire to invade Iraq was motivated by oil-lust.73 And yet, despite the deep divisions in the American populace only 22 percent subscribed to this view.74 How does one account for this? According to the commentary by Max Boot, the difference reflects the European’s more jaded view of the world which stems from their own imperialist past: “In the case of Iraq, they just can’t seem to accept that we might be acting for, say, the general safety and security of the world.”75 Time and again American idealism emerged in various accounts defending American intransigence in the face of massive domestic and global opposition to war. William Saffire, for example, who seemed to be speaking to the war’s opponents directly, argued that citizens’ “reasonable fear should be accompanied with a strong dash of hope”:

Wilsonian idealists have found a soulmate in President Bush, who surprised all of us with his challenging vision...making the world a safer place...But safety is not all...If Bush’s vision of a transformed region fails, it will fail while daring greatly – a nobler course than that weakly advocated, in Teddy Roosevelt’s words, by “those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.”76

The message here was clear: despite any and all objections, the United States had a sacred duty to forcefully, if necessary, transform the Iraq’s “pre-political” society into a modern democracy – i.e., to remake the globe in its image.77 This was the 21st Century calling heeded by George Bush. Like earlier crusades, this liberal
variant was based on the firmly held belief that the Western world had attained a higher level of cultural advancement than the rest of the world – one that all rational peoples aspired to.

Many self-professed ‘doves’ or ‘liberals,’ both of whom are typically affiliated with the politics of the Left, also heeded the call and joined the pro-war camp. Some criticized the antiwar protesters for not being humanitarian enough. One of these was New York writer and cultural critic Paul Berman who derided the antiwar protesters for “not marching in support of the oppressed Iraqis.” He and others argued that there was nothing contradictory about opposing the war in Vietnam and supporting war in Iraq because in both cases the impulse was humanitarian. Well-known human rights scholar and activist, Michael Ignatieff made a similar argument when explaining his support for war: “Being antiwar and antiuse of force was a kind of defining signature of being a liberal, but that was 30 years ago. In the 90s, being a liberal meant being in favour of military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. Human rights has come into this and complicated the picture considerably.” But, Ignatieff acknowledged that many of his friends were adamantly opposed to the war. The conciliatory view, which came to predominate in the New York Times, was that both sides were “genuinely high-minded” – even if the subtext suggested that the antiwar protesters were slightly misguided. As stated in an OP-ED by Nicholas Kristoff, “one [side] is driven by horror of war and the other by horror of Saddam.” What both share, however, is a “dream of Iraq that is democratic and an America that is admired around the world.”

**The New American Dream**

This is what I call the new American dream, a sort-of refurbished “Manifest Destiny,” forged at the crossroads of competing and conflicting humanitarian and security concerns. It was a dream (whether broadly ascribed to or not) that brought together rights discourses, development discourses, and even the conduct of war. In this dream all sides (not only, and sometimes not even primarily, that of the antiwar protester) embraced the promise of life. Indeed, the war on Iraq was what might be referred to as a “biopolitical war” – a war fought over the terrain of life or, perhaps equally paradoxically, the martial face of the liberal democratic peace.

Says Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, “While the advent of global liberal governance is...associated with claims concerning the establishment and extension of liberal peace, it is frequently overlooked that the biopolitics of global liberal governance has a martial face.” War typically tends to be understood as the ‘other’ to peace, but, as Dillon and Reid describe and as this paper highlights, the two are, in fact, now intimately connected: “Liberal humanitarians have, for example, become politicized, geopolitically ambitious, and sometimes warlike in pursuit of liberal peace. They also have found themselves in alliance with the institutions of international political and economic governance as well as branches of the military.” War is a constituent element of the liberal democratic peace – involved in the production of new and increasingly complex spatial configurations delineating the spaces between inside and out or where politics gives way to the exception. Towards this end, the sovereign state remains a pivotal player in the “organization and operation of international power, including that of contemporary liberal peace.” True, the days of states as actors with the exclusive ability to project power globally, as per traditional realist
accounts, have passed. Today (Western) states operate through the complex networks of global liberal governance where they vie for power and collaborate with aid agencies, humanitarian organizations, the United Nations, multinational corporations, the media, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations to project power across the globe. And yet, what has become particularly evident since 9/11, is the extent to which such states continue to have an instrumental role both in “developing the productive powers of territory” and in the broader processes of constituting subjects who are amenable to the technologies of governance or the “diverse ensemble of power” which I refer to above.

The War on Iraq illustrates this point well. This war was engaged in a complex process of re-mapping that sought to extend the realm of global liberal governance by bringing new territory and people within its sway. Venn argues that towards this end, “[t]he terrorist as a figure is the perfect enemy for the global corporate order: deterritorialized, mobile, polysemic, universal, subsuming previous enemies.” Such a figure not only enables the tentacles of power to have a new and extended reach in the name of security, but it also makes an “enemy of anyone who opposes a particular world as understood by the USA.” The new and shifting contours of the map were re-imagined in just this way. Because the Attack on Iraq was a war of liberation, the martial face of liberal peace was ever present (and has now been documented in a series of leaked photographs from Abu Ghraib prison), but in “principle” at least the US army needed to show restraint. The contradictions abound, but the case I am trying to make is that these contradictions were totally foreseeable and not inconsistent with the worldview that was coming to fruition in the Battle for Iraq.

In principle, rule by the threat of death, the type of rule embodied by Saddam Hussein, runs contrary to principles and techniques of global liberal governance. Hence, Iraqi life, in all of its plurality and difference, was prized by the US administration – sometimes in explicit contrast to the administration of Saddam Hussein: “Coalition forces take great care to avoid civilian casualties. The Iraqi regime has done the opposite. It has deliberately put civilians in harm’s way, and used women and children as human shields. It has sent execution squads to kill Iraqis who choose freedom over fighting for a brutal regime….” President Bush pledged to “safeguard Muslim holy sites and other protected places in Iraq that are important to the religious and cultural heritage of Islam and of Iraq.” Moreover, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the fact that the Americans did not constitute an occupying force:

The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people…Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own. We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments…In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.

The important point to note here is that the Iraqi ‘choice’ was subsumed within the framework of the civilizing processes of globalization – which, of course, was characterized by liberal economic markets, Western-style institutions, and an approximately secular rule of law. Liberty, in other words, had already
been defined and, as the quote above makes clear, it was up to Americans to judge when the Iraqis had attained it.

But make no mistake: the over-riding message of the day was that American might was justified by right (not the other way around). Any doubt should have been removed the day that the American marines took control of Baghdad and in a symbolic gesture pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein. In a moment of exuberance, prior to the statue’s demise, a US marine draped the American flag over Saddam Hussein’s head. But, with video cameras rolling and a couple hundred Iraqis assembled to witness the event, this impulse of bravado was quickly checked. As the New York Times explains, “[h]oping not to send a politically clumsy signal, the marines quickly stowed the American flag they unfurled at first and replaced it with an old Iraqi flag.”

Apparently they did this at the behest of military command. What is significant about this message, more than its content, is who it was directed at. Iraqi subjectivity wasn’t the only target of this performance. Interestingly, this moment was repeatedly highlighted by the American media suggesting that the message was directed at (skeptical) American audiences as well.

Despite all claims to the contrary, difference and dissent were perhaps the real targets of this war. In the words of Antonio Negri, “the other that they are trying to crush…is not bin Laden and terrorism [or, I might add, Saddam Hussein], but rather it is the multitude.”

Oddly (or not), while Americans were waging war in the name of liberty across the globe, Venn notes that political repression was returning to the centre. This is evident both in terms of the criminalization of dissent and perhaps, more significantly, in the seemingly innocuous day-to-day practices of surveillance ranging from the monitoring of credit card transactions and random security checks of vehicles at federal buildings to electronically filing the fingerprints of anyone who comes to the United States with a visa. On the one hand, this is quite commensurate with the new spatial configurations of the globe – the collapsing of boundaries between the wild and safe zones. In a world that George Bush characterizes as inhabiting “thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder…[and] spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs” security measures that target individuals and groups may be deemed necessary. On the other hand, the merging and broadening of criminal and enemy discourses that these new “security” measures entail may also be considered a threat – depending on the form of life deemed worth protecting. What happens as these two discourses merge is that individuals are increasingly measured not only by their actions, but also by their dispositions and intents such that one’s level of patriotism may, in itself, constitute a security concern. Dillon and Reid comment on this shift as follows:

What Foucault had already noted in respect of the advent of disciplinary power/knowledge, [t]he idea of dangerousness mean[s] that the individual must be considered by society at the level of his potentialities and not at the level of his actions; not at the level of actual violations of an actual law, but at the level of the behavioural potentialities they represented.

As the discourse of danger expands in this way, the “domain of strategy expands and changes accordingly” with the result that antiwar protesters increasingly fall under the magnifying scope of the societal gaze.
Hence, the antiwar protesters’ intentions and the successful communication of these were key to the very viability of their campaign. Large public relations firms were hired to assist the mainstream antiwar groups (who were by and far the majority) get their message across.\textsuperscript{102} The main message, apart from the fact that they opposed the war, seemed to be that the antiwar protesters did not pose a threat to the American identity or way of life. In fact, the leaders of the mainstream organizations capitalized on their patriotic stance. The carefully worded mission statement of the largest of the antiwar coalitions, Win Without War, read as follows: “We are patriotic Americans who share the belief that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to possess Weapons of Mass Destruction. But we believe that a pre-emptive military invasion of Iraq will harm national interests.”\textsuperscript{103} Critique was purposively limited to the wisdom of this particular war. It did not extend to the goal of disarming Saddam Hussein, intervention in Afghanistan or American participation in other wars. One of its founding members explained that “[r]ight from the beginning we tried to frame it as a message that would go down well in broader communities than just the [typical] antiwar crowd.”\textsuperscript{104} Organizations such as the Sierra Club, the National Organization for Women, or the National Council of Churches that wanted to join this coalition had to explicitly adopt a “patriotic” and “reasonable” stance.\textsuperscript{105} According to New York Times columnists Dean Murphy and Kate Zernike, mainstream antiwar groups, including Win Without War and United for Peace and Justice, “sought to cast their movement as the loyal opposition.”\textsuperscript{106} Win Without War encouraged the two million subscribers to its email list to send letters of support to American troops. Both coalitions tried to distance themselves from “the stereotypical images of angry flag burners or scruffy anarchists”\textsuperscript{107} – going so far as excluding certain speakers from their rallies, marginalizing groups deemed too “left wing and alienating,” and dismissing certain protest tactics.\textsuperscript{108} Although there was some disagreement in the initial week of war over the merits of a large-scale civil disobedience campaign (aimed at the disruption of everyday life) to garner national and international media attention, by the war’s second week both coalitions thought it best to abandon such tactics in order to accommodate the mood of a country at war. A New York Times article commented, “even the umbrella organization [United for Peace and Justice] that helped shut down San Francisco last week began its more mundane protests this week with an announcement that demonstrators interested in thuggery should keep their distance.”\textsuperscript{109} Instead its website encouraged its members to light candles or hang yellow ribbons in the name of peace. All of this in addition to the slogan “Peace is Patriotic” which was written on billboards, newspaper ads, and protest signs – often against the backdrop of an unfurling American flag – made one point overwhelmingly clear: The American identity and way of life were quite simply not at stake or even up for discussion in this particular national debate. The sanctity of the American dream was re-affirmed; the only remaining question concerned how best to achieve it.

So successful were the antiwar protesters in communicating this message or in internalizing the societal gaze – depending on how one chooses to look at it – that rather than being cast out of the a heroic narrative of a nation pulling together at a time of war, they became central to it. Unlike past instances in which protesters have been discredited with tearing families, communities, and even the nation apart, this time they became wrapped up in a narrative celebrating American tolerance, community and freedom of
expression. The civic anxiety produced by the question, ‘Why would anyone do this to us?’ was all but denied in the stories that emerged in the liberal mainstream press. Stories printed in the New York Times repeatedly cast civic solidarity as over-shadowing the pro-war/anti-war divide. One story, for example, commented that unlike the anger and rigidity that characterized the Vietnam War debate, this time both sides ‘remain on speaking terms’ despite their disagreements: “Thirty years ago, after a decade of escalating war in Vietnam, slogans like “America, Love It or Leave It” carried an angry punch. This time the mantra of many New Yorkers seems to be, “Everyone is entitled to their opinion.””10 Another story, written shortly after the war commenced, noted that with American troops in danger “standing firm has become harder” and “small doubts have begun to crack the surface of resolve on both sides of the war debate.”11 My favourite article, which examined the difficulty of protesting in a rural community where everyone knows your name and where staking your ground may be taken as a personal affront by your neighbour, tells the story of how one community overcame the tensions within. This story ends with one man who organized an antiwar demonstration and another who planned a counter-demonstration joining together and leading the community in the spirit of neighbourliness and conciliation: “Mr. Redalen, carrying his flag, and Mr. Wright, with a “Wage Peace” sign, walked arm in arm at the head of the line, down Parkway Avenue and to the Lutheran church, where Mr. Redalen led those gathered for the potluck in a prayer.”12 The message in these stories and others like them was that the spirit of national solidarity or community was prevailing over more particular views.

This message also appears to have gained popular expression as evinced in the comments coming from the pro-war camp. The New York Times reported, for example, that when asked if antiwar demonstrations should be permitted, one gentleman, who just finished arguing that the antiwar protests were counter-productive, responded incredulously, “Oh, of course they should be able to protest, without a doubt. That’s what we’re fighting for.”13 Similarly, when asked about the war’s supporters, an antiwar organizer made the comment that “there are a lot of people with very good intentions on both sides.”14 Opinion polls also reflected the mood of tolerance with 61 percent of Americans saying that antiwar protesters should have the right to hold protest marches and rallies, a number considerably higher than during the Vietnam War debate.15 This tentative acceptance of anti-war protesters by the mainstream liberal press and by the general public, in some ways provided the antiwar movement tremendous success in terms of sheer numbers involved, with demonstrations bringing together tens of thousands of people from all over the political spectrum. But, the point remains that by most indications this acceptance was, indeed, conditional. It came at the cost of more critical questions about the referent object that was being secured – the American identity and/or way of life – and at the cost of a more radical interrogation of the global ambitions that the Battle for Iraq betrayed. This is not to say that there were no Americans asking these types of questions, but that the movement’s very approval and widespread appeal seemed to depend on the sidelining of these issues from the mainstream debate. Indeed, if the war on Iraq can be viewed as a biopolitical war, one waged over the terrain of life, then I think that the following quote from William Connolly is particularly apt: “In a highly structured state, an episodic, juridical politics of dissent against extreme atrocities lapses into a nonpolitics
of nihilistic consent to the everyday extension of discipline and normalization – the most ominous form nihilism assumes today.” Applied to my essay, I take these words to support my contention that the mainstream antiwar protests were disturbingly apolitical. Far from disturbing the peace, these protesters left it – replete with its myriad of violences – intact.

Perhaps most disturbing is that the antiwar movement itself became caught up in the American dream – not a thorn in its side, but an integral part of its global quest for peace and justice. Dissent could be tolerated, even celebrated, so long as it did not challenge the politics of life itself. In the words of one Iraqi who ran to embrace American soldiers, “You are Americans. You are humanity.” And with these words all the pieces of the American dream came together. The images were captured in the words and pictures of the New York Times. The Iraqi reaction to the American capture of Baghdad was one of three. For those dancing in the streets, no interpretation was deemed necessary. For those protesting the American occupation, they were exercising “their new right to complain – something that often landed them in prison or worse during Saddam Hussein’s rule.” And for the rest – standing in the background, quiet, and watchful – their reaction was one of, and I kid you not, “muted…euphoria.” Even the antiwar protesters at home were voicing doubts about their own reservations. How could something so good possibly be bad? But, the very moment that the Battle for Iraq was won was also the moment it was lost. The snapshots of celebration and victory were just that and could not contain those chaotic (what some might call dangerous) surplus elements of reality and life that continuously defy capture – i.e., the random possibilities in all of us that cannot be calculated, targeted, or governed. The kaleidoscope was shaken again – but surely remnants of the American dream remain.

Conclusion
I have not clearly defined what this dream is or is not. I have only provided suggestions, hints, and perhaps a rough outline of what this dream may contain. In part, this is because by my understanding a dream is almost by definition intangible. Its importance lies in what it signifies and not in what it is. Nor have I provided a definitive statement about what the product of this dream, the shape of the emerging world order, is or might be. Again, I am not particularly concerned with engaging in a debate about what the world is or is not. And I will not claim to know. All I can do is try to illuminate aspects of this world that I believe deserve illuminating and highlight aspects of another truth – where light is seldom brought to bear. What I am trying to do is expand the scope of the political to the terrain of life and identity and to demonstrate power’s increasing investment in these biopolitical realms. The Battle for Iraq signifies to me the opposite: an attempt to cast critical questions about our way of life and the good of the liberal democratic peace outside the realm of political contestation. The oft-repeated warning of President George W. Bush, “You are either with us or against us,” captures this exceptionally well.

Hence, I try to illustrate that the promise of a liberal democratic peace that transcends the old polarities between East and West, North and South, or the West and ‘the Rest’ is not benevolent nor, in its current guise, is it a universal dream. Rather, I try to show that the choice being offered to us is the product
of a unique historical vision that I refer to as the American dream – one which is replete with its own violences and ambitions. I compare this vision with that produced in Spain hundreds of years ago, after the discovery of America, in order to suggest that the political terrain on which the Battle for Iraq took place is perhaps much more circumscribed than it appears to us at the present moment. Just as the competing responses of the Spanish towards the Amerindians, affirmed a singular understanding of the “difference” between Us and Them that served as the basis for the Westphalian state system, underlying that which differentiates the opposing sides of the current pro-war/anti-war debate is a very similar worldview. This particular view conflates American interests and values with human interests and values and allows the United States and the institutions of global governance to aid, discipline, monitor, and/or intervene in foreign populations on this basis. Although the new boundaries that are being drawn are much more fluid and porous (some would even say ‘open’) than those of the classic state system, I am stricken by the extent to which the separate concerns of state-makers and humanitarians have again conjoined to delimit the spaces of the political – albeit in profound new ways and with profoundly different effects.

For instance, it is no longer the case that the state-makers wage war and destruction and the humanitarians urge peace and life. These polarities no longer really exist as Michael Ignatieff points out that the new wars are done in the name of life, liberty, and peace. What Ignatieff does not mention is that this peace, if we can still call it that, is a highly militarized and securitized one. As the olive branch of the liberal democratic peace is extended to more and more peoples across the globe, the target of power (embedded in security and governance discourses) is increasingly directed within. Cultural differences are welcomed, even celebrated, under the umbrella of peace, but simultaneously many of the spaces of our innermost private identities are over-invested in ways that lead us to cast politics out of the equation of who we are and what we want. In the era of transcendence, it is through the administering of life – bodies, ambitions, and desires – that the American dream thrives domestically and gains new footholds across the globe. As Michel Foucault observed, wars are less frequently waged primarily as a means of ‘deduction’ – i.e., as a means to appropriate the land, resources, taxes, or labour of a subject population. It is more often the case that they are waged on behalf of a population, a people, or, to use the more encompassing category of the present, a ‘way of life.’ This shift is not simply vernacular as it highlights the productive aspects of modern war – war’s ability to produce that which it claims to be defending. The American dream cannot be born from a barrel of a gun; yet, domestically at least and for a specific period of time, this dream was re-imagined, re-produced, and re-invigorated in the Battle for Iraq.
ENDNOTES


4  Venn, note 2, p. 121.


7  See, for example: Rasmussen, note 3, pp. 335-337; and Johnson, note 5, p. 224.

8  Rasmussen, note 3, p. 342.

9  Ibid.


11  Rasmussen, note 3, p. 326.


14  Quoted in Rasmussen, note 3, p. 330.

15  Quoted in Urry, note 10, p. 57.

16  Quoted in Rasmussen, note 3, p. 337.


19  This statement was actually made prior to September 11th; it was made in reference to the Nairobi bombing.

20  Quoted in FAIR (10/01), note 17.
21 Quoted in Johnson, note 5, p. 217.
22 Johnson, note 5, p. 221.
23 President Bush quoted in Johnson, note 5, p. 221.
24 Rasmussen, note 3.
25 Quoted in Johnson, note 5, p. 220.
26 Quoted in Johnson, note 5, p. 216.
28 Quoted in Johnson, note 5, p. 216.
29 Quoted in Johnson, note 5, p. 212.
35 Nieves, note 32.
36 Janofsky, note 33.
38 Olson, note 34.


45 Halbfinger and Steinberg, note 40.

46 Rasmussen, note 3, 332.

47 Ibid.

48 Quoted in Murphy, note 43.

49 Johnson, note 5, p. 223.

50 President Bush quoted in Johnson, note 5, p. 221.


53 Ibid.


55 Quoted in Gordon, note 54.


57 This comes straight from the Defense Planning Guidance, quoted in Purdum, note 56.

58 Purdum, note 56.

59 Rasmussen, note 3, p. 337.


61 Venn, note 2, pp. 126-127.

62 Rasmussen, note 3, pp. 338-340; and Venn, note 2, pp. 126-127.

63 Rasmussen, note 3, p. 338.

64 See, for example: Venn, note 2, pp. 126-127; and Dillon, note 13, p. 77.

65 Quoted in Rasmussen, note 3, p. 338.

66 Rasmussen, note 3, p. 338.


70 Ibid.


73 Boot, note 72.

74 Ibid.


79 Ibid.

80 Quoted in Zernike, note 78.


82 Ibid.

83 See Dillon and Reid, note 13, pp. 41-46.

84 Dillon and Reid, note 13, p. 44.

85 Dillon and Reid, note 60, p. 120.

86 See, for example: Antonio Negri’s comments in Giuseppe Cocco and Maurizio Lazzarato, “Ruptures within Empire, the Power of Exodus: Interview with Toni Negri,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 19.4 (2002), p. 189; and Dillon and Reid, note 60.

87 Dillon and Reid, note 60, p. 127.

88 See, for example: Dillon and Reid, note 60; and Hardt and Negri, note 67.

89 Urry, note 10, p. 66.
90 Dillon and Reid, note 13, p. 41.

91 Venn, note 2, p. 128.

92 Ibid.


94 Ibid.

95 Speech by President Bush, note 68.


97 Quoted in Cocco and Lazzarato, note 86, p. 194.

98 Venn, note 2, p. 124.

99 Quoted in Rasmussen, note 3, p. 332.

100 Dillon and Reid, note 13, p. 57.

101 Ibid.


104 Murphy and Zernike, note 102.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Clementson, note 103.


109 Murphy and Zernike, note 102.


113 Quoted in Eaton, note 110.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.


119 Filkens, note 117.

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