Biopolitical Strategies of Security: Considerations on Canada’s New National Security Policy

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The YCISS Working Paper Series is designed to stimulate feedback from other experts in the field. The series explores topical themes that reflect work being undertaken at the Centre.
Notions of national security, most notoriously, have invoked realities and necessities that everyone is supposed to acknowledge, but also vague generalities about everything and nothing. Much of the rhetorical force and political legitimation expressed through modern discourses of security rests ultimately on this simultaneous appeal to the hard and the vacuous, the precise and the imprecise, the exaction of blood and sacrifice in the name of the grand generalization…This time, vague generalities are increasingly articulated under the sign of the global rather than of the reason of state. 1

April of this year saw the introduction of Canada’s first national security policy in a document titled Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. The policy document outlines a broad and integrated approach to national security to respond to what Prime Minister Paul Martin describes as an “increasingly complex and dangerous threat environment.” 2 The policy is intended to work as a strategic framework for action to address “three core national security interests” – “protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;” “Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to Canada’s allies;” and “Contributing to international security.” 3 The integrated approach to national security is framed around the creation of new agencies devoted to securing the Canadian population and territorial state through development in six strategic areas of national security: ‘Intelligence,’ ‘Emergency Planning and Management,’ ‘Public Health,’ ‘Transport Security,’ ‘Border Security,’ and ‘International Security.’ New agencies include an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre for the purpose of centralizing “threat-related material,” a National Security Advisory Council composed of ‘security experts,’ a new public health agency along with new regional public health centres, an RCMP review mechanism and a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to act as an ethno-cultural and religious advisory body. 4 Much of the responsibility for the integration and proper functioning of security activities among federal departments and security agencies falls to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness created in December of 2003, just prior to the release of the national security policy. The document explains security measures already in place and outlines future plans to address remaining “security gaps.” 5 In both budgetary and political terms however, the new policy is not solely shaped by the planned implementation of new security mechanisms, but includes a series of measures brought into force since the events of September 11th 2001. More recent events, such as the Ontario blackout and the SARS outbreak in the summer of 2003, also led to immediate security initiatives and serve as additional factors that directly shape the policy. The structure of the document reflects this, wherein each chapter notes ‘what has been done’ and ‘what is planned’ in the formation of a national security policy for Canada. Thus, the $690 million 6 committed for the implementation of this new national security agenda is

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1 Walker, “The Subject of Security.” 63-64.
2 Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. opening remarks.
3 Ibid. vii.
4 Ibid. vii-viii.
5 Ibid. viii.
6 Ibid. viii.
There are two notable characteristics of the Policy that illuminate important aspects of modern power relations. The first is the articulation of the freedom, health, and safety of the Canadian population as a primary security objective. While continuing to share an understanding of the state (and therefore also political authority) as the solution to the problem of (in)security, the treatment of the population as a core national security concern represents a departure from traditional interpretations of security, which have tended to posit states as the primary, and often only, objects. No doubt this fits squarely with Canada’s ‘human security’ agenda, which has sought to broaden security to more intimately address the multitude of issues that affect people’s well being. The second characteristic concerns the emphasis on surveillance. While the policy explicitly devotes only one strategic area to intelligence, further investigation shows that securing each strategic area relies in large part on the development of routine surveillance practices and infrastructure. Enhancing surveillance, as a national security strategy, is a salient response to the criticisms of prominent figures of intelligence studies such as Wesley Wark, who argues that the remedy for Canada’s “immature security system” is to posit “intelligence as the first line of defense.” Indeed, this is precisely what the policy sets out to do. The culmination of these characteristics informs a new national security approach that rationalizes Canada as both a sovereign state oriented to ends-means strategies and as a collective population that requires subjection to regulatory mechanisms to secure it from a range of broadly conceived ‘risks’ that fit under the equally ambiguous rubric of liberty, health, and safety.

This paper examines Canada’s first national security policy in relation to Foucault’s postulation that modern society is marked by the emergence of biopower, a new mechanism of power that is principally concerned with the management of biological life. Alongside disciplinary power, which focuses on individual members of a society, arose ‘biopolitics,’ which conceives of and focuses on the life of populations. This power focused on life has meant that the problem of how best to govern has not only been posed as effecting ultimate dominion over a sovereign territory, but increasingly as one of yielding productive services from the citizenry. According to Foucault, ‘reason of state’ is no longer confined to the will of the prince, but is “government in accordance with the state’s strength,” that includes the ‘ends-means’ instrumental rationality associated with state survival in a competitive international system conjoined with the observance of what is governed, and how government might improve or enhance the qualities of a population. This study is invested in examining how state-building projects of national security, such as Canada’s national security policy, are mobilized through discourses and administrative practices that take elusive risks to the freedom, health, and safety of the population as an opportunity for action, and are made possible through a generalized

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7 For example S. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies.”
8 Wesley Wark, “Terrorism: It’s time to grow up.” A17.
expansion of surveillance. This reading of the new security policy suggests that the biopolitical character of security has greatly reduced the traditionally accepted distinctions between the state as a military and legitimated actor and the state as a service providing, regulatory agency for the management of the citizenry. In the context of national security, biopolitics, I suggest, has left unscathed a rationalization of the state as a direct authority, while also fostering decentralized mechanisms of rule that govern ‘at a distance.’

The relationship between biopolitics and security is key to apprehending this development. The management of life through surveillance mechanisms situates biological life, largely to the exclusion of political life, as the foundational object of security. The policy’s continual references to the importance of securing the freedom, health, and safety of the national population illustrate a clear objective to secure the ‘life’ of the Canadian population. Yet, on the same note, the erosion of civil liberties and the heightened policing of people in order to detect ‘risk’ areas and groups, that have accompanied recent and proposed security mechanisms, are paradoxically presented as the most tangible prospect for ensuring safety and guarding this same freedom. As a biopolitical force that takes the life of the population as its object, in an important sense the spreading of security has come to represent not only a distinctive, but also exclusionary rendering of freedom and safety. To address these securitizing practices, the paper addresses the policy as a security strategy that is reliant on surveillance mechanisms for the detection of unsecured, and therefore ‘dangerous,’ lives.

To pursue this inquiry, the paper first discusses the emergence of biopolitics and its connection to mechanisms of security. The paper is subsequently divided into three sections. The first examines how the policy deploys truth claims over ‘threat’ as an immanent characteristic of modern life, and how the content of Canadian values that are said to both subscribe to a belief in the immanence of threats and rationally accept the national security policy as a response, work to produce an internal ‘Other’ that represents the proliferation of threats. The discussion then focuses on two techniques through which national security is deployed: first, the liberty, health, and safety of the population, which is analyzed predominately with reference to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and second, surveillance, by considering the expansion and development of intelligence practices that gives national security a totalizing reach. The paper concludes by returning to Foucault’s theorization of biopolitics and its relationship to war and racism to suggest some possible implications of the new policy in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’ and for societies that are increasingly organized around ‘risk.’

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10 My reference to securitizing practices draws on the Copenhagen School’s constructivist work which argues that security is most usefully understood as a speech act. See Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. The notion of security as a speech act is useful here only insofar as the object of this analysis is a government policy document that sets out to define the meaning and purview of security for Canada. In general, however, the approach adopted in this paper is more cogent with a post-structuralist, biopolitical, and discourse analysis that is less concerned with the constructivist process through which security becomes a speech act by the utterances of state officials or security actors, and more with the effects of security strategies themselves and the ways in which security is focused at the level of a population.
Biopolitics

According to Foucault since the seventeenth century western societies have been marked by biopower. In contrast to the classical theory of sovereignty which saw the state’s involvement in human affairs limited to non-intervention in life or putting to death, biopower saw the “acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a living being,” signifying the emergence of state control over biological life.\(^1\) Death or the allowance of life are essentially inconsequential to the relationship between sovereign and subject because, beyond the initial duality of life and death that underscores the Hobbesian ‘contract,’ nothing is guaranteed or owed. However, insofar as it is through killing that sovereign power is actively exercised over life, death is favoured.\(^2\) Hence, the power to kill or let live has commonly been referred to as the classical right of the sword. The emergence of biopower, alongside the theory of right represented the beginning of modern challenges to sovereign power by centering not on the ability to invoke death, but on life. The emergence of biopower involved the problematization of life in relation to political obligation, representing a reversal of the sovereign maxim, “the power to “make” live and “let” die.”\(^3\) According to Foucault, this moment of reversal signals the threshold of the modern era, when a society’s political strategies are wagered on the bodies and the life of a species. Says Foucault, “For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question.”\(^4\) Natural life, as distinguished from political life, has become the focus for the mechanisms and calculations of state power, signalling a passage from the “territorial State” to the “State of population” whereby the bare life of the nation became a problem of sovereign power, eventually transforming into a “government of men.”\(^5\)

While not replacing, but rather penetrating and operating alongside sovereign power, biopower characterizes liberal practices of government. According to Foucault, the era of biopower gave rise to the practice of government in which “the disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed.”\(^6\) Indeed, notes Colin Gordon, “Foucault saw it as a characteristic (and troubling) property of the development of the practice of government in Western societies to tend towards a form of political sovereignty which would be a government of all and each, and whose concerns would be at once to ‘totalize’ and to ‘individualize’.”\(^7\) The individualizing aspect of biopower, signifies disciplinary techniques of power first developed and institutionalized in the

\(^{12}\) Ibid. 240.
\(^{13}\) Ibid. 241. The sovereign maxim is to ‘let’ live or ‘make’ die.
\(^{15}\) Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. 3.
\(^{16}\) Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*. 139.
\(^{17}\) Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction.” 3.
Disciplinary techniques focus at the level of individual bodies and often involve panoptic forms of institutional surveillance. The totalizing character of biopolitics, on the other hand, involves calculations from which the ‘wealth,’ ‘health,’ or ‘illness’ of the population (of a state) can be measured by addressing human beings as “a global mass.”


Biopolitics is the endeavor “to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race…” Thus, Foucault linked the deployment of biopolitical techniques – which work to invest, enhance and modify life – with the emergence of governmentality which sought to govern citizens in new ways that are distinct from authoritarian rule and “most especially through acquired habits of self-control, reinforced by the normative gaze of others and the work of a variety of state and non-state agencies.”

Governmentality is aimed at forms of knowledge that have traditionally separated the domain of the state from other spaces by operating through the self-governing capabilities of individuals, spaces, and categories. Biopolitics is thus a specifically liberal method of governance that is informed by the limited role of the state as a coherent apparatus, in favour of governance ‘at a distance.’ With a focus on ‘life’ the subjects of liberal governance are capacitated to formulate their own imperatives and (counter) demands around that same ‘life.’ Members of a population are encouraged to exercise forms of self-regulation in ways that are beneficial to the population as a whole. The optimization of life through management of a population does not discipline individuals coercively, but attempts to conduct conduct, by disposing, rather than commanding, people to comport themselves in a manner that is contributes to the overall health of the state in biological and (liberal) political terms.

In addition to biopolitics as a technology that conceives of a population and addresses it as a political problem, Foucault was insistent on two additional characteristics. The phenomena that are considered are collective to the extent that only the mass level is taken into account. Biopolitics addresses “serial phenomena” that are “essentially aleatory events that occur within a population that exists over a period of time.” Finally, in contrast to disciplinary mechanisms, that respond to events or behaviours, biopolitics intervenes “at the level in which these phenomena are determined” and introduces regulatory mechanisms that “must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a homeostasis, and

19 Foucault, “The Birth of Biopolitics.” 73.
20 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. 142-4.
23 Ibid. 48.
compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field,” thereby serving as an effective strategy of normalization.26

_Biopolitics and Security_

As a distinctively liberal form of governance, biopolitics is also entangled with modern security practices. Gordon notes that according to Foucault, modern liberalism departed from prior conceptions of order through police and instead framed order in “mechanisms of security.”27 Security is increasingly the principle component of governmental rationality, he argued, that is both formulated through liberal governance and is intimately biopolitical in its focus at the level of population.28 Distinct from sovereignty, discipline, and law, security operates as “a specific principle of political method and practice…capable of various modes of combination with these other principles and practices within diverse governmental configurations.”29 The regulatory mechanisms of biopolitics that intervene at the level in which phenomena are determined are simultaneously security mechanisms that are directed to optimize and regulate life by addressing random elements or problems found in a population, in contrast to achieving desired outcomes by training individual bodies.30 The consistency between the operations of biopolitics and mechanisms of security are expounded by Foucault’s identification of three traits of security. As Gordon explains,

> It deals in series of possible and probable events; it evaluates through calculations of comparative cost; it prescribes not by absolute binary demarcation between the permitted and the forbidden, but by the specification of an optimal mean within a tolerable bandwidth of variation. Whereas sovereignty has as its object the extended space of a territory, and discipline focuses on the body of the individual (albeit treated as a member of a determinate collectivity), security addresses itself distinctively to ‘the ensemble of a population.’31

To optimize and regulate the life of a population is therefore to secure it from threats. As Foucault writes, “this is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal threats.”32

The mobilization of security to address elusive ‘threats,’ is principally expressed through discourses of ‘risk.’ Nikolas Rose argues that as the exercise of political authority is increasingly and primarily guided

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25 Ibid., 246-7.
26 Foucault, _The History of Sexuality: An Introduction_. 144.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
by the biological, vital reality of a people, requiring a “nationally organized and politically directed programme to improve the quality of the national stock and eliminate taints or weaknesses that might threaten it,” the proper care and protection of life becomes tied to the purging of those seen to constitute a threat to the whole. Rose ties the neo-hygienist and eugenic form of biopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century, which posited the health of individuals in terms of the fitness of national populations, to competitive inter-state projects. As he notes, “Population fitness was liable to threats from within and without, and national governments had the obligation to guard against these threats and to take measures to enhance fitness through policies that were formulated by, and enacted through, the apparatus of the state.” The prevalence of ‘risks’ became a motivating factor for the deployment of national programs to guard and improve the life of a population through security techniques.

This coincides with both Giorgio Agamben’s and Zygmunt Bauman’s argument that the project of biopolitics contains a form of thanatopolitics of population purification because “to manage the health of the ‘body politic’ inescapably requires the control and elimination of ‘foreign bodies’.” The biopolitical strategies intended to manage the political problem of the population, to protect the inside from internal discord or disunity, intersect with various forms of national policy/power that present the collusion of modern power with sovereign and juridical power, and population with territory. Indeed, the problem of the population was first signified by a shift in focus from epidemics characterized by fleeting disasters causing mass death, to endemics involving difficult to eradicate and often permanent illnesses rife in a population that led to the introduction of national standards and centralized institutions for the management of the health of the population. Canada’s national security policy is designed to respond to ‘fleeting’ natural or technological disasters, as well as long-term pandemic disease outbreaks and ‘terrorism’ as objects of security. As a thanopolitical governmental tactic, however, the policy does not merely encapsulate issues from disease to ‘terrorism,’ but functions as a cleansing strategy that constitutes these issues as indeterminate security risks that require continual monitoring and intervention. As Foucault contended that since the eighteenth century rationalities of government have been filtered through security, modern society, he concluded, is a society of security.

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34 Ibid., 5.
National Security and Canadian Values

The opening of Canada’s national security policy points to a history of wide-ranging threats while also positioning the document as a response to an “increasingly complex and dangerous threat environment.”

The framing of this ‘threat’ environment signifies two things. First, it holds that the prevalence of threats has become an immanent characteristic of contemporary society and second that, like never before, there are multiple sources of threat. Chapter one lays out a series of “current threats.” This includes terrorism, which can take the form of religious extremism, violent secessionist movements, state-sponsored terrorism and domestic extremism. Other sources of threat include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed and failing states that may ‘spread instability’ or become a haven for corruption and crime, and foreign espionage that threatens the prosperity and competitiveness of Canadian business through stealing of “industrial and economic secrets.” Natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as the blackout in Ontario and eight US states in August 2003, the growth of ‘cyber attacks,’ and organized crime involving narcotics and weapons trade, smuggling of migrant workers and the trafficking in persons, serve as additional sources of threat. Last, pandemics such as SARS are noted as representing the spread of disease as a result of increased travel in a globalizing world. The policy is intended to account for the security challenge of each of these threats, as well as the ways in which they are interconnected. The document declares the government’s commitment to “meet the new risk environment” because as “security is also about managing and reducing risks,” the national security system “must be capable of responding proportionately to existing threats while adapting quickly to meet new threats that may emerge.”

A second truth expounded by the document concerns claims about Canadian values. At the outset a desire for security is located at the intersection of colonialism and state formation. The very creation of ‘Canada’ it notes, was a security initiative “in order to provide peace, order and good government for Canadians.” Such ‘good’ governance of the Canadian population suggests that biopolitical techniques of liberal governance extend as deep as modernity’s reason of state. This sentiment underpins the design of the comprehensive policy that “proposes a framework for addressing threats to Canadians…in a way that fully reflects and supports key Canadian values of democracy, human rights, respect for the rule of law, and pluralism,” reflecting “core national security interests.”

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40 Ibid., 6.
41 Ibid. 7.
42 Ibid., 8.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., opening remarks.
articulating the relationship between security and values, it is insisted that Canadian values are enabled and assured through the security approach advanced.\textsuperscript{46}

There is a notable discursive othering of those who are seen as not sharing these Canadian values. For instance, the statement that “No one better appreciates the need to protect our society than those who chose this country as a place to build a better life or who fled the consequences of instability and intolerance in other parts of the world” is prefaced with the assertion that “Canadians stand together in reaffirming that the use of violence to pursue political, religious or ideological goals is an affront to our values and must be met with a determined response by Canadians and their governments.”\textsuperscript{47} Somewhere between the people who ‘chose’ Canada and the homogenous ‘Canadians’ opposed to violence, is the insertion of some non-Canadian ‘other’ (in a legal or national sense). This coded non-Canadian ‘other’ leaves suspect the special mention of immigrants and refugees as appreciative subjects of ‘Canadian values.’

Practices of othering can also be identified through the manner in which Canadian values are mobilized as a strategy for managing difference as a site of risk.\textsuperscript{48} A concern for maintaining an ‘open society,’ while first articulated through the treatment of Canadian values as a definable and homogenous set of objects, then picks up the issue of differences among members of the population identified as ‘ethno-cultural’ and religious.\textsuperscript{49} To be sure, such references to ‘ethno-cultural’ differences are typically discursive racializations or identifiers of ‘othered’ categories of non-white people of non-European descent.\textsuperscript{50} While the language chosen avoids casting such ‘othered’ groups as threats explicitly, the policy employs ‘ethnic’ and religious categories to articulate how components of the population require special management techniques for the security of the population as a whole. Thus, in the context of addressing the problem of terrorism the policy notes the presence of “communities in Canada that may feel caught in the “front lines,”” which necessitates the creation of a “Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security.”\textsuperscript{51} The Roundtable is intended to “engage in long-term dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage security interests in a diverse society and will provide advice to promote the protection of civil order, mutual respect and common understanding.”\textsuperscript{52} While it is noted that partnerships will be formed with all communities to “ensure that

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 1. Other places in the document, however, suggest a tension between security measures and liberties by calling for a ‘balance’ to be struck between them.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{48} For a broader and more developed and discussion of this issue see Razack, Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society.

\textsuperscript{49} Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. 2.

\textsuperscript{50} This point is developed well in Stuart Hall, “The spectacle of the “Other”,” Representation: cultural representations and signifying practices, ed. Stuart Hall (London: Sage/The Open University, 1992).

\textsuperscript{51} Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. 2.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
there is zero tolerance for terrorism or crimes of hate in Canada,“ the initiative is deployed against a backdrop of historically racialized communities who signify the ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds from which ‘diversity’ is constituted. The need to address the ‘problem’ of ethno-cultural and religious difference is thus marked on the bodies of ‘othered’ groups and locates them as security risks that require management. This only becomes more apparent where the document urges Canadians to “deal frankly” with the new complex security environment because “the seeds of conflict and extremism can take root even in the most tolerant of settings.” The national security policy is proposed on the grounds that risks to the Canadian population are posed from within and without, lending currency to desires to establish protocols to detect such threats.

Significantly, the policy’s discourse on Canadian values is not simply limited to constituting an ‘other,’ but also to the invention of ‘self.’ The use of Canadian values to rationalize the need for a national security policy serves as a performative act that (re)inscribes an identity for the Canadian state. Acts of othering are always simultaneously claims to identity. The identity of Canada, like all other forms of identity, is constituted in relation to difference that, as David Campbell’s work has shown, inscribe “boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an “other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign.””

Thus, the constitution of an ‘other’ is a performative constitution that has no origin outside of a continual state of relationality. This performative character of Canadian identity is deeply implicated in, and indeed thrives on, the construction of its own alterity. Consequently, the idea that Canadian values have been presented with unique challenges, or are faced with encroaching dangers in the post 9/11 period, “objectifies events, disciplines relations and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk” and consequently legitimates the need to take defensive action in the name of security.

Population Security

A central concern in Securing an Open Society is how best to protect the health and safety of the Canadian population, in contrast to the association of security only with the life of the State independent of its inhabitants. This care the population is not confined to the chapter devoted explicitly to ‘Public Health Emergencies,’ but is a concern that shapes the policy as a whole. This is first evident by how occurrences that are unlikely to directly compromise the sovereign, territorial, or legal presence of a state are positioned as explicit threats to national security, such as pandemics, unexpected natural disasters and critical infrastructure breakdowns. Second, other identified threats such as ‘terrorism’ and foreign espionage that resemble more traditional, direct threats to the sovereign power of the state, are largely treated as threats to

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Campbell Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 9.
56 Ibid., 3.
the well-being and prosperity of the population. The conflation of the behaviour of states and the structure of the state system with Hobbes’s state of nature thesis have meant that national security policies have tended to be interpreted as having an overriding concern with the survival of the state from threats posed by other states in an anarchical international realm in which states are claimed to be the only, or primary, actors.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, despite the potency of the traditional reason of state logic that has carried interpretive force in shaping the meaning of national security, the policy in question articulates a biopolitical orientation to threats in an arena in which the operation of sovereign power and ‘reason of state’ logic are most potent. In an important sense, this signals a shift in the problem of sovereign power from a sole concern with territory to conceive of and include a population. National security as a mechanism of state power can thus be seen to draw in biological life aside from a predominant association of the state with legal rights and a social contract.

Drawing on the ideas of Carl Schmitt, Italian critic and theorist Giorgio Agamben provides a useful way to understand this relationship between sovereignty and biopolitical concerns with biological or bare life. Agamben borrows Schmitt’s idea that the structure of sovereignty is based on the notion of the exception.\textsuperscript{58} This perspective holds that sovereign power derives its force from the capacity to create a state of exception by suspending normal rules and laws; meaning that what is outside of the sphere of sovereignty is not its ‘outside.’ Instead, the sovereign’s authority to decide upon the exception means that the outside is always already included within the sphere of sovereignty. The relation of exception signals that sovereignty and human life are not related by a social contract, but that it is the bare life of human beings that function as the foundation for the state’s legitimacy and sovereign power. According to Agamben, “from the point of view of sovereignty, only bare life is authentically political;” it is “the always present and always operative presupposition of sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{59} Consequently, biopolitics as a power that is focussed on species life is intimately connected to sovereign authority, as well as state formation. Not only is it modernity’s less obvious ‘reason of state,’ its concurrent association with the creation of state policies and programs for the administration of the population of a state, blurs the borders between ‘state’ and ‘society.’

A significant effect of the linkage between national security and population health and safety that characterizes biopolitical practices can be seen by the creation of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. As Paul Martin remarked, the new department exercises jurisdiction over “core functions of security and intelligence, policing and enforcement, corrections and crime prevention, border services, immigration enforcement, and emergency management.”\textsuperscript{60} This overarching public security ministry swallowed the agencies of the Solicitor General’s portfolio, which includes the RCMP, CSIS, Correctional Services of Canada, and the National Parole Board, while additionally encompassing public health, border

\textsuperscript{57} Krause and Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods.” 230-3; Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 53-60.

\textsuperscript{58} Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 11.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 106.

\textsuperscript{60} Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. 9.
security, and disaster response. The policy notes that the new minister, along with the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies and the recently appointed National Security Advisor, “will ensure the development and implementation of the security system.” The new department is the designated body through which most of the policy will be implemented and coordinated, signaling how the security system, while including sovereign territoriality, is situated at the level of public health and safety to address regulative and disciplinary problems within the Canadian population itself.

The treatment of the population as the primary object of national security by the national security policy and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, suggests a transformation in the meaning of security adopted by Canada’s security strategy. The policy recognizes no higher obligation than to ensure the well-being of its citizens and that the criteria for what constitutes a national security concern encompasses “events and circumstances that generally require a national response.” In addition, Wark notes that despite the identification of the new department by some as ‘Homeland Security lite’ a unique feature is its definition of security. In tandem with the national security policy, the new department defines security, in addition to ‘terrorist’ threats, as embracing health pandemics, and natural and human created disasters. The broader security threats addressed are largely mobilized around the linkage of national security to public emergencies, enabled by the inclusion of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness into the new department, notes Wark. The maximizing of emergency preparedness as seen in both the policy and the department broadens what counts as a security threat because with “the overriding objective,” remarks Paul Martin, “to make a positive difference in the lives of Canadians” very little is left unaccounted for.

Another distinguishing feature of the new department is the announcement that it is to have no authority over immigration functions, which is intended to avoid the identification of immigrants and refugees as threats to national security. Some commentators have noted that the broadening of the security agenda to include pandemics and natural disasters on the one hand, and the omission of immigration functions on the other, make for both a more and less sweeping department than the Department of Homeland Security in the US. However, the addition of the newly created Canada Border Services Agency in December 2003 to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, which is reported to include “7,000 federal employees responsible for customs duties; the inspection of passengers, animals,

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61 Jim Bronskill, “New Public Safety ministry to handle security, threats and disasters.”


63 Ibid., vii.

64 Wark, “Martin’s new security agenda: Feeling safe yet?” A25.

65 Ibid.


plants, and food; and immigration services such as investigations, intelligence and deportations,” suggests that it may simply be more sweeping.\textsuperscript{68} It would seem inaccurate to suggest, for instance, that the elaborate border functions of the new department do not play at least an indirect role in determining the fate of many refugees and immigrants. The thirty percent reduction in the number of refugee claimants from January to June of this year suggests that this may be a fair assessment.\textsuperscript{69}

Illustrating the manner in which sovereign power works in conjunction with biopolitics, the security strategy used by the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness’ has unique characteristics that merit discussion. As R. B. J. Walker notes, the fundamental purpose of concepts of security in relation to the sovereign state “is that they must expand to encompass everything within the state, at least in its ever-potential state of emergency.”\textsuperscript{70} Through this care of the population, security mechanisms take on a totalizing function, whereby the Department’s national security objectives involve defining ‘states of exception,’ through its administrative power to declare emergencies within the broadest possible definitions, the most wide-ranging objects of security, and under virtually any circumstance concerning ‘life.’ The mandate and administrative capacity of the Department signifies how the exercise of political authority through national security practices can be principally guided by the vital reality of the Canadian population.

**Surveillance and Security**

Critical theorists have tended to draw on Foucault’s conceptualization of disciplinary power to explain the explosion and technological innovations of surveillance and intelligence in the modern era.\textsuperscript{71} Beginning in the seventeenth century Foucault saw a “movement of exceptional discipline to one of generalized surveillance…the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline…their spread throughout the whole social body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society.”\textsuperscript{72} The normalizing character of a society invested in a power focussed on life is the result of discipline’s operation as “a discourse about a natural rule, or in other words a norm,” as distinct from law.\textsuperscript{73} The expansion of surveillance linked to the formation of a disciplinary society invested in the instantiation of “natural rules,” has witnessed the development of liberalism that has involved governance through mechanisms that enable greater freedom. Thus, the modern nation state’s connection to the development of surveillance as a principle method of administrative control has involved power that can be experienced as an empowering aspect of liberal subjectivity. To borrow from James Der Derian, surveillance is thus increasingly less reliant on

\textsuperscript{68} Bronskill para. 9.

\textsuperscript{69} Jiménez, “Tighter security cited in refugee-claims decline.” A8.

\textsuperscript{70} Walker, “The Subject of Security.” 76.

\textsuperscript{71} For example, Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy*; Lyon, *The Electronic Eye*; Whitaker, *The End of Privacy*.

\textsuperscript{72} Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. 209.

\textsuperscript{73} Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976*. 38.
centralized authoritarian power and instead operates as “the new technostrategic force of normalization in world politics.”

In line with the normalizing function of surveillance, David Lyon offers a fittingly expanded conception of surveillance that includes the “mundane, ordinary, taken-for-granted world of getting money from a bank machine, making a phone call, applying for sickness benefits, driving a car…” He suggests that interactions in modern liberal societies almost always entail a trace of our doings, making surveillance both a conduit of the capitalist marketplace, as well as a product of bureaucratization and the governmental administration. Techniques of surveillance, he notes, have set in motion expanding citizenship rights to social services such as healthcare and welfare, indicating the extent to which surveillance has become entwined with modern practices of liberal government. Lyon suggests that this ‘rise of surveillance society’ has witnessed the mobilization of a panoptic gaze over many aspects of people’s lives. While the panopticon has generally been used only with reference to disciplinary forms of surveillance, in recent work Lyon has suggested that for Foucault, there is not merely one aspect of panoptic surveillance, but two: the panopticon as the unseen observer and the panopticon as a classificatory power. In the latter instance, surveillance identifies and seeks to regulate the objects (health, sanitation, birthrates, race, crime, etc.) that biopolitics endeavours to rationalize. Such classificatory techniques of surveillance are mobilized not in the interests of disciplining bodies to achieve a particular conduct, but to do away with corrupting factors that threaten the security of the population as a whole. As discussed below, the surveillance strategies proposed in the national security policy serve as an example of how the panoptic character of surveillance has been articulated through a variety of regulatory mechanisms. It is after all through the application of surveillance mechanisms that the problems of a population are revealed, assessed and categorized according to the ‘risk’ they may hold.

A recent media headline that reads “McLellen says Canada’s No. 1 security objective is to shore up intelligence gathering” is squarely reflected in the national security policy and highlights an increasing reliance on surveillance. Intelligence is the first key area identified in the policy and is declared to be the foundation for national security. The expansion of intelligence mechanisms is, in part, justified on the grounds that “intelligence reporting and assessments are based on fragmented and sometimes contradictory information,” making it “essential to bring together information on threats to Canada from all available

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76 Ibid.


78 Gordon, “McLellen says Canada’s No.1 Security Objective is to Shore up Intelligence Gathering,” 1.

sources and properly assess it in order to provide as accurate and complete a picture as possible.”

Intelligence is also advanced as a necessary approach to the transboundary nature of current threats, including ‘terrorist’ threats, pandemics, weapons proliferation, failed and failing states, and organized crime.

Yet, while the national security policy is shaped by the expansion of intelligence activities, the commitment to bolstering intelligence, like the formation of the national security policy generally, did not begin with the release of the policy document, but has been part of a lengthier process of surveillance enhancement in the wake of September 11th 2001. This has involved additional funding to enhance capacities in various departments and agencies, such as the Canadian Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, and the doubling of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of the Privy Council Office. Intensified surveillance was also made possible by bringing together the Canada Border Services Agency, CSIS, the RCMP, and Emergency Management under the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Department, and was further complemented by the National Security Advisor of the PCO who “briefs the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister on national security from an integrated government-wide perspective.” Budgetary increases of 30 percent and 25 percent were made for CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment respectively, and the mandate of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada was expanded to “to identify, assess and track suspicious transfers of money that could indicate support for terrorist activity.”

The policy shows that these increased intelligence capacities were just the beginning of an unprecedented expansion of surveillance practices. The policy pledges to “devote a greater proportion of our efforts to security intelligence” to address “the security threats facing Canada and our allies” with an additional $167 million for distribution in a number of areas. Taking cues from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, a noted feature is the creation of a new integrated ‘Threat Assessment Centre,’ described as “a community-wide resource” that will conduct a “comprehensive analysis of all available information on potential threats to Canada and make the results of that analysis available to all who require them.” A range of bodies including Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, CSIS, the RCMP, the Communications Security Establishment, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Privy Council Office, Transport Canada, and the Canada Border Services Agency will support and staff the new Centre. As required, the Centre will draw on expertise from other departments and

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80 Ibid., 16.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 17.
83 Ibid., 16.
84 Ibid., 17.
85 Ibid., 18.
agencies, including Health Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and Environment Canada. There is also a special section titled ‘Working with Our Allies’ which notes the international character of the “evolving security environment” and signals, but does not specify, the development of “important new relationships” to focus on “anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, new and emerging health concerns and the protection of our armed forces personnel deployed abroad.” These activities outlined in the ‘Intelligence’ chapter, while not encompassing the full scope of plans for surveillance enhancement, testify to the coupling of issues that have traditionally been taken up only under the logic of sovereignty, with matters concerned with administering of the health and safety of the citizenry. This enhancement of surveillance as a principal security mechanism enables concern for the health and safety of the population to be conjoined with the maintenance state. Indeed, the enhancement of surveillance is dispersed far beyond military and diplomatic functions, and is taken up primarily as an administrative task.

In addition to the chapter titled ‘Intelligence,’ the national security policy’s new commitment to intelligence is reflected in the all the other ‘key measures,’ including ‘Emergency Planning and Management,’ ‘Public Health Emergencies,’ ‘Transport Security,’ ‘Border Security’ and ‘International Security,’ set out in the policy. This is the effect of the policy’s “integration” strategy, which works to enhance the reach of intelligence activities to benefit the goals of all six key areas. In an important way, intelligence plays the critical link between national security activities by working to close “security gaps” with the overall trajectory of totalizing the capacity of the national security system.

An examination of the key areas of the national security policy highlights important aspects of the meaning and focus of security that also deserve attention. While traditional issues, such as international, border and transportation security are covered, other areas address emergency planning and public safety, which are meant to encapsulate critical infrastructural malfunctions (in response to the Blackout in August 2003 that left most parts of Ontario and a number of states in the US without electricity for days) and public health emergencies (such SARS). The inclusion of these latter two issue areas suggests that the Canadian government’s security agenda has broadened beyond traditional military concerns, and adopted a security perspective that some may argue fits squarely with it’s purported commitment to adopt a human security agenda. But what is most interesting about this turn of events in the context of this discussion is the way in which the security rubric exposes an indistinction between these formerly disparate realms of concern. It is not simply that security has been refocused on non-traditional areas of state administration, but as the following discussion of the key measures shows, the biopolitical character of security has ceased to recognize a distinction.

The ‘Emergency Planning and Management’ and ‘Public Health Emergencies’ measures are provided with increased surveillance capacities for the detection of public health and infrastructure emergencies. In addition to the recent integration of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection into the Department of

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 17.
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the ‘Emergency Planning and Management’ measure involves the creation of a Government Operations Centre also to be housed in the new department. This is intended to “provide stable round-the-clock co-ordination and support across government and to key national players in the event of national emergencies.” Aside from the purchase of new equipment to track and detect ‘bioterrorism’ and the increased support for the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, which conducts surveillance with an ‘early warning’ internet system to detect health risks from disease outbreaks and contaminated foods to natural disasters and ‘bioterrorism,’ new measures in the key area of ‘Public Health Emergencies’ are proposed. It is noted, “Public health surveillance will be enhanced” with superior standards for data collection and collaboration with provinces and “stakeholders.” As well, the ‘Canada Health Infoway’ will support the implementation of a national public health surveillance system with an additional $100 million of funding from the 2004 budget. The identification of these areas as ‘key measures’ for national security, as well as the surveillance capacities that they entail, are directed towards the regulation of characteristics found within a population – from rates of illnesses related to food quality and disease outbreaks to criminal activity – insofar as they as seen to threaten the health and safety of the population generally.

A variety of new and expanded regulatory surveillance mechanisms have been expended on the more traditional “key” areas of transportation, borders, and international security. What is most interesting about these surveillance enhancements is not only an intensified focus on detecting threats through totalizing surveillance mechanisms, but the reliance on monitoring biological substances and biological characteristics of the population, as opposed to ‘political’ issues, to secure the state. For transportation security, airport screening of goods and people, undercover operations, inspections of transportation workers and enhanced detection technologies for land, air and sea are mandated. New investments in trace detection systems, gamma-ray systems, ion mobility spectrometers as well as “permit effective and unobtrusive screening of containers for explosive, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological devices.” are set out in the policy. Similarly, detection strategies are key to border security enhancement along with and new funds for “LiveScan” digital fingerprinting, an ‘RCMP Real Time Identification project’ that enables the electronic recording of fingerprints for instant verification, and biometrically enabled smart chips that use facial

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88 Ibid., 24.
89 Ibid.
90 Health Canada. The Global Public Health Intelligence Network. 30.
91 Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. 32.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 37.
94 Ibid., 41.
Biopolitical strategies of surveillance are not principally oriented to the past (to reform deviance), but to the future as a mechanism of control concerned with producing the conditions through which members of a population are subjected to continual and expansive risk profiling as a strategy to render the population, and consequently the state, safe and healthy. It is this link between biopolitics as a productive method of governing populations through security apparatuses that provides a
decisive turn for surveillance to be constituted as a ‘liberatory’ mechanism of societies characterized by the prevalence of ‘risk.’

Contemporary biopolitics, in contrast to biopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century, is also instructive in its sensitivity to liberalist conceptions of multiculturalism and notions of citizen responsibility. The notion of society as composed of a single national culture, with a specific national destiny tied to a national territory, argues Rose, has entered a crisis which has seen the pluralizing of ‘culture’ to ‘cultures,’ and ‘community’ to ‘communities.’ Not only is this crisis reflected in Canada’s multicultural policy generally, but it has informed the creation of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to supplement the development of the national security policy. Rose argues that, among other transformations, this crisis has led to a responsibilization of citizens. In the quest for health, citizens are encouraged to become active partners who are accountable “for securing their own well-being.” The enterprises involved in this “will to health” involve wide ranging aspirations for health in which the “conduct of individuals is governed ‘at a distance,’ by shaping the ways in which they understand and enact their own freedom.” The ‘invitation’ for ‘diverse communities’ to participate in Canada’s national security endeavours is such a case in point. Technological innovations in surveillance as seen in the new security policy enable security measures to be cast as a “will to health” as national security does not only involve prohibitive or coercive mechanisms imposed against the will of its targets. Rather, it may also operate as a productive power that produces the wills of individuals, particularly through discourses of rights and responsibilities in a political context that is increasingly characterized by a range of calculated risks. The normalization of elaborate security operations can be seen by how increasingly, notes Rose, “surveillance is ‘designed in’ to the flows of everyday existence.” As Lyon notes, the post September 11th ‘panic regime’ shows that “anxious publics are willing to put up with many more intrusions, interceptions, delays, and questions than was the case before September 11.” The deployment of mechanisms of state intervention to securitize biological, economic and social processes that concern a population, in conjunction with rationalities of responsibilization that treat constituents as facilitators of security, posits security as a condition of liberty. This is a process of subjectification, which Michael Dillon defines as,

\[\text{[A]n order of knowledgeable practices, norms of conduct, and elaborate protocols of behavior. Its object is to produce calculable subjects operating in calculable spaces, formidably empowered by their very subscription to, indeed inscription into force by,}\]

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103 Ibid., 6.
104 Ibid.,
105 Rose, Powers of Freedom. 234.
technologies of calculation. The defining and distinguishing paradox of power/knowledge is therefore that it is that very subjectification to power that is empowering. Consecutively, ‘risk’ as a category of existence rationalizes freedom not as constrained by mechanisms of security, but as protected by them. In a society of security, such forms of regularized freedom are normalized into the paradoxical and everyday conditions of freedom and subjection. In short, security tells people how to be good citizens.

Security, Racism, and Terrorism

As an instrument of governance, security operates quite separately from discipline and law. As Agamben writes, “While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and to globalization…security intervenes in ongoing processes to direct them;” while it is the goal of discipline to bring about order, “security wants to regulate disorder.” These attempts to regulate disorder through mechanisms of security allow for security to become the sole criteria for the legitimation of state activity. This neutralization of politics to security, which very much coalesces around ‘risk,’ he notes, also contains its own essential risk. “A state which has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism,” he writes, “it can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic.” Baudrillard similarly contends that as terrorism and the repression of terrorism hold the same unpredictability, it is difficult to distinguish between them. The regulations enforced by security measures, he argues, are an internalization of defeat in a state of absolute disorder. With the culmination of war as an activity only among states or aspiring states, “it becomes clear that security finds its end in globalization, argues Agamben, because “it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is in truth the worst of all disorders.” This disorder is liberal globalization manifested in its opposite form, writes Baudrillard, “a police-state globalization, a total control, a terror based on ‘law and order’ measures.”

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108 Dillon, “Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the “New World Order” to the Ethical Problematic of World Order,” 324.

109 The connection between liberalism, freedom and governmental power is well developed by Burchell in “Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self.” 19-36.


111 Ibid., para 3.

112 Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism. 31.

113 Ibid., 32-3.


115 Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism. 32.
of security and terrorism ends in a legitimation of the actions of each other, forming “a single deadly system.”

This relationship between security and terror signifies deeper qualities about biopower and the connection it posits between life and death. According to Foucault, biopower is centered on life essentially to the exclusion of death such that death becomes taboo, privatized, and is pushed outside of the power relationship. The right to end life is diminished through biopower’s interventions that make live and improve life “by eliminating accidents, the random element, and the deficiencies” such that “death becomes, insofar as it is the end of life, the term, the limit, or the end of power too.” Yet, a certain formulation of the power to kill still remains operative within this technology. According to Foucault, biopolitics motivates racism to intervene as the precondition for the right to kill. Racism, he writes, is “the break between what must live and what must die” by “fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls…to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races.” It functions by establishing a biopolitical relation of war organized around the maxim that “In order to live, you must destroy your enemies.” With the aim of improving life, racism establishes a biological rather than a warlike relationship between one’s life and the death of another. Killing thus becomes acceptable in the biopower system, not for political victory, but only if it eliminates threats to the biological health of a race or species. Rather than political adversaries, the enemies that are to be done away with are posited in evolutionary terms as internal or external ‘threats’ to the population. “Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State,” says Foucault, because racism “is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.” Such a state of affairs is unlikely to come as much of a surprise to critical security and surveillance scholars who have long claimed that the issue of ethnicity has been pivotal to grasping the Canadian security regime since its inception.

The hinging of social and political rights on the biological existence of a population, in contrast to the association of rights with the capacities and obligations of individuals, raises yet more problems. As

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118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., 254-5.
120 Ibid., 255.
121 Ibid., 255-6. By “killing” Foucault is not only referring to murder, but also indirect and symbolic forms of murder, “exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on.” 256.
122 Ibid., 256, 258.
security derives power from constant reference to a state of exception, it also simultaneously depoliticizes society and ultimately, renders security mechanisms and democracy irreconcilable. This effect means that political negotiations are neutralized and sites for instigating challenges to existing political arrangements, such as the need for a ‘war against terrorism,’ or the need for risk factors to stand as the organizing principle of a society, become imperceptible. Because threats and risks are constituted in biological terms, the ultimate goal of a society as Baudrillard puts it, is “zero death,” unseating the role of politics, political life, and ethical interrogations as meaningful criteria for decision-making. As Walker has observed, the possibility of uttering security has become unresolvably linked to “our ability speak about and be many things other than secure, and not least of our ability to be citizens, democrats, or even humans.”

Conclusion

The usefulness of critical considerations on the proliferation of security mechanisms is to be found in how they seek to unseat the normalizing process entailed in security strategies themselves. For proponents of human security the broadening of national security to focus on the vital life of the Canadian population may, at first glance, appear to be a laudable endeavour. However, the alignment of security with the life of a population detonates an arsenal of surveillance strategies only witnessed historically in circumstances of totalitarianism. Lyon, for instance, notes how surveillance produces an inner compatibility between democracy and totalitarianism, which this essay suggests might be found in mechanisms of security that have been mobilized with particular force since September 11th, 2001, but also in response to the development of security as a strategy for freedom and well-being more generally. Thus, even while security has come to mean new things, one must always be reminded of whose security is always already secured in the conditions of sovereign statehood.

It is important to raise questions about developments in security, as I have done here through a consideration of Canada’s national security policy. This paper has proceeded by outlining Foucault’s ideas of biopolitics in relation to security as an organizing principle of modern politics. It then proposed an understanding of how ‘threat’ is linked to the production of Canadian values and Canada as a ‘risk society.’ It turned to consider how the biological existence of a population is conceived of as an object of security through new arrangements in Canadian policy and the manner in which such arrangements are made possible through the expansion and development of surveillance. Finally, the paper incorporated some considerations on the implications posed by the connection between biopolitics and security. Canada’s new policy serves


125 Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism. 16.


as only one example of how securitizing practices can present difficulties for attempts to confront state authority when wars are no longer waged on behalf of a sovereign, but rather, on behalf of a people.
Bibliography


