Inter-Disciplined? Disciplinary IPE and its ‘Others’

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Academic disciplines discipline the production of discourses. They force the creation and exchange of knowledge into preconceived spaces, called debates. Even if one is to engage the orthodox position in a critical manner, the outcome of the discussion is already circumscribed by the parameters that had been established through the initial framing of debates. Thus, as soon as one addresses academic disciplines on their own terms, one has to play according to rules of a discursive police that are reactivated each time one speaks.

When finishing the final year of my undergraduate studies, I encountered one of my former teaching assistants; a critical theorist in the neo-Gramscian school of IR who had taught my introductory International Relations (IR) course no less. Upon informing him of my acceptance into a graduate program and of my intention to study poststructural international relations theory, he provided a telling comment, saying, “So you’ve decided to give up on the political economy stuff and go all po-mo.” In my mind, the relative absence of so-called po-mo approaches to Global Political Economy (GPE) studies exposed not its irrelevance, but rather a lack of engagement by critical scholars whose IR inquiries tended to remain focused around questions of security. I have since come to observe both disciplinary exclusions that minimize such interventions – which must be destabilized lest they continue to discipline knowledge – alongside an all too minimal engagement with notions of material human security within the delineated discursive sphere that is commonly referred to as International Political Economy (IPE), despite an over-concern with material accumulation. It is with these disciplinary structures and the limitations they impose on knowledge accumulation (and according practice) with which I am concerned here.

The tradition of International Political Economy claims an origin in critical interdisciplinarity through the rejection of the separation of the political from the economic yet, despite this transdisciplinary foundation, IPE has seemingly created new boundaries rather than toppling them and subjecting them to sustained critical reflection. Indeed, as Marshall Beier and Samantha Arnold point out with respect to IR generally: [The] apparent disjuncture between the disciplinary disposition of international relations and its [interdisciplinary] origins underscores that there is no necessary connection between cross-disciplinary borrowing and the destabilization of disciplines themselves. Much to the contrary, there is apparently nothing to prevent the latter being born of the former. Akin to most disciplinary practices and despite its transdisciplinary premises, IPE is heavily characterized by incestuous research, by gatekeeping tendencies, by disciplined exclusions and by accordingly shaped norms (especially concerning the prioritization of a simplistic and unproblematicized conception of the material) that hinder the potential for critical research questions. In this sense, even though neither IPE nor its supposed parent-field of IR are actually considered disciplines, disciplinary tendencies permit the treatment of IPE as a de facto discipline for the present analysis.

In light of this understanding, this paper will explore the practices and consequences of disciplinary IPE before turning to considerations of how to move beyond hegemonic disciplinary practices through incorporation of various critical approaches that remain too undisciplined for the field’s core. The approach taken here follows in the tone set by Roland Bleiker which:

Being aware of the problematic dimensions of representation… view[s] academic disciplines as powerful mechanisms that direct and control the production and diffusion of knowledge. Disciplines establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. While providing meaning, coherence and stability, these rules also delineate the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal way. Innovative solutions to existing problems cannot be found if our efforts at understanding the international remain confined to a set of rigid and well-entrenched disciplinary rules.

It is accordingly maintained here that disciplinary practices in IPE mandate violent erasures and exclusions that deny the very sorts of critical thinking that could reformulate both theoretical and practical/material
inadequacies. Moreover, while it is the so-called mainstream that delineates the disciplined discursive sphere of IPE, even (some) critical scholars tend to reinscribe certain understandings of the materially-focused, predominantly positivist ‘state of the field.’ Thus, a dual purpose undergirds this paper: to speak to the disciplinary mainstream of IPE for the broadening of enclosed thinking spaces, and to challenge critical scholars to both engage GPE more actively and, in so doing, to reject the grounds that define legitimate knowledges. Indeed, in the words of Bleiker, my approach ponders the impossibility of “decenter[ing] the center through the language of the center.” Accordingly, it is argued that escape from the confines of this artificial ‘space’ is impossible in the absence of a critical framework that treats discipline as a verb rather than a noun and that denounces the binary oppositions that enable reified and spatial disciplinary ‘sites’ (and intermediating boundaries).

Disciplinary Practices
Before exposing the disciplinary practices of IPE specifically, disciplinary practices themselves must be explored. John Harriss provides a succinct definition of academic disciplines with his claim that they “imply not just particular subject-matter but also the existence of “a system of rules” – reproduced through training – for defining the subject-matter and the ways in which it is to be studied.” While there is nothing inherently wrong with this definition, Harriss does not attempt to go beyond disciplinarity and states that some form of discipline is necessary; yet such an approach shows the limitations of his account by neglecting to problematize the power that undergirds such rule-systems and the relations accordingly constructed. Some form of discipline is indeed inevitable, but in the absence of an enunciated problematization of power the term ‘necessary’ seems, to me, to prescribe a new disciplinary rigidity that would likely reinscribe unquestionable bounds. Bleiker’s explanation similarly identifies a system of rules, but notes the power relations inherent within, through his more elaborate description:

Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it established to assess them.

Thus, the delineations of legitimate knowledge reflect the rules and interpretations of the delineators to their benefit. It is in this sense that Ashley and Walker are able to speak of “the sovereignty of a “discipline”” emanating from its centre. Through the application of such sovereign authority over the discursive space, “The doorkeepers of IR remind those who pray for admittance to the temple of IR that only those who abide by the established rules will gain access.” In this sense, despite a perhaps benign or even positive original purpose for the framing of knowledge accumulation through common referents, one can perceive disciplinary structures to have simultaneously resulted in the rather disruptive effect of limiting capacities for legitimate grounds, research, and knowledge.

For all the worthwhile insights Bleiker, Ashley, and Walker provide into disciplinary practices, they tend to forget that they are based on practice and instead frequently ontologize disciplines as virtually real, stagnant and spatial entities. Yet, if in the vein of Steve Smith we believe that “all self-images [including those of disciplines] reflect normative concerns,” and that normative concerns are socially constructed and mutable, the ontologization of disciplines seems quite problematic indeed. In this sense, disciplines are performative; that is they have “no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute [their] reality.” This is what Beier and Arnold are getting at with their claim “that boundaries call into existence or create the “things” that they bound.” Insofar as these ‘things’ do not exist, but are rather manifestations of a currently dominating discourse, it seems more reasonable to speak of discipline as a practice rather than as a (spatial and ontologized) noun. In this sense, before even considering the simplified materialism of IPE, a semblance of materialism underpins disciplinarity itself.
A further problem of spatial metaphors concerns the delineation of an inside and an outside, which permits an Othering process and disciplines both the false interior and exterior. Consequently, an extrapolation from William Connolly’s exploration into Self/Other constructions can help expose disciplinariness as an identity practice and can illuminate the bi-directional disciplining aspects of such disciplinary identity. According to Connolly:

[T]o deny the stigma of external otherness – to treat it simply as the innocent, primitive, terrorist, oriental, evil-empire, savage, communist, underdeveloped, or pagan whose intrinsic defects demand that it be conquered or converted – is also to treat radical difference within one’s own church or academy as otherness (as amoralism, confusion, evil, or irrationalism) to be neutralized, converted, or defeated.

The discursive delineation of disciplined spheres of knowledge, then, serves to ‘other’ both ‘external’ sites of knowledge and ‘internal’ dissidence, and to demand conformity – often to the detriment of knowledge accumulation. Accordingly, the production of the spatialized inside and outside (or Self and Other) are simultaneous aspects of the same process of disciplining identity. Mattei Dogan has spoken of the creation of new disciplines through changing bounds and interdisciplinary practices, yet Connolly’s insights here illuminate the problematic and violent antagonism towards difference that remains even through interdisciplinary origins. International Political Economy provides a telling example of a newly disciplined identity-space, resulting from cross-disciplinary borrowings, through which academic Self-Other divisions are perpetuated to the detriment of knowledge production capacities.

Disciplinarity, then, can be seen as a discursive identity practice, such that the identity of the disciplined Self remains subject to regulation, as does the outside Other, in order to perpetuate relations of domination. Marshall Beier somewhat mimics this point, albeit with a postcolonial twist, when he writes: “Disciplinarity itself is inseparable from constitutive accounts of Selves and Others that inextricably bind the disciplines to the enduring legacies of colonialism.” Relations of domination can now be seen to exist not only within and across disciplinary ‘bounds,’ but also to exist practically and materially in a manner seemingly justified by the application of this Self/Other logic to the legitimizing practices of the academy. By mining what Michel Foucault has termed “subjugated knowledges” one can expose the arbitrariness and unnaturalness of such relations in order to challenge the relations of power that are at play in disciplinary practices. This in turn leads to the methodological approach called genealogy which, according to Foucault, is:

[C]oncerned… with the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organised scientific discourse within a society such as ours… it is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that the genealogy must wage its struggle.

While the approach taken here is not strictly genealogical in the sense of rewriting the (anti-)history of the discipline, it is genealogically-inspired insofar as I seek to expose some of the subjugated knowledges that run counter to the disciplined narrative of IPE.

One further brief consideration must directly precede my inquiry into disciplinary IPE specifically. As already hinted at, this concerns the social construction of disciplined thought and the role of ‘mainstream’ versus ‘marginal’ research programs. Mutability and the evolution of new disciplinary practices through hybridity and interdisciplinarity collectively emphasise what Beier has called “the temporal contingency of disciplining practices.” Indeed, as Smith points out:

Rather than being a ‘natural’ and ‘autonomous’ discipline with a series of unfolding debates which get ever closer to explaining reality, from a genealogical perspective international theory appears as a historical manifestation of a series of conflicting interpretations, whose unity and identity are the product of a victory in this conflict.
Such ‘victories’ are always temporary and the disciplining ‘mainstream’ is accordingly comprised of simply the current leaders in a perpetual conflict of (re)interpretation and (re)articulation. Critical theorists, then, must ensure that their approaches to knowledge do not result in the strict disciplinary ends that result from interdisciplinary methods. Ashley and Walker seem to find such an outcome to be impossible and speak of the impact of a crisis in the dominating discourse, noting that:

The boundaries that would separate one domain from another and one dissident struggle from another are put, as it were, under erasure. The attempt to impose boundaries – to exclude the concerns of cultural and ecological movements from the political programs of worker movements, say, or to exclude feminist scholarship from international studies – becomes distinctly visible.23

Yet, even as these erasures are enacted, any lack of critical self-reflection can potentially serve as an enabler for the (re)construction of new disciplinary bounds. The disciplining mainstream is perpetually in flux, but the concept of a site with a central focal point from which purest knowledge pervades need not be a standard component of scholarship. Delineated sites of legitimate knowledge need not be enunciated for an understanding of the GPE.

Disciplinary IPE

While the lengthy dominance of various realisms within approaches to security has seemed to epitomize the disciplinary extreme within International Relations, a ‘powerful orthodoxy’ remains pervasive within the supposedly more open IPE.24 Typical characterizations of the theoretical approaches to the subject matter demonstrate its limits. That is, IPE is usually deemed to have three major approaches – Liberal, Realist, and Radical – which are all typically held to share basic (and narrow) methodological and epistemological characteristics.25 For an example of the delimited grounds of ‘legitimate’ IPE theory in pedagogical practice, see Theodore Cohn’s textbook, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, in which (despite its subtitle) the only post mentioned is ‘postwar’ and feminism receives merely a passing sentence.26 Even to have held these three mainstream approaches as the orthodoxy is problematic since, as Jill Steans points out, to do so “is to identify a dominance within the field to the degree that a particular perspective or paradigm has been treated as though it was a “common-sense” view of the world against which all other perspectives should be judged.”27 While I am identifying this stream as the orthodoxy, I consciously do so with the understanding that I am (re)presenting the official disciplinary narrative with the intention of undermining its rigid dominance. Moreover, of the theoretical variations from this apparently definitive list of the disciplinary mainstream, the only postpositivist approach – the Gramscian inspired theory first articulated by Robert Cox28 – remains wedded to both delimiting materialism and economism that further inscribe disciplinary bounds, even while escaping the transhistorical universalizing of positivist social science. However, as critical approaches that destabilize the ‘hegemonologue’ (re)articulate visions of the subject matter and undermine the processes of knowledge bounding, disciplinary practices become more visible.29 It is my contention that, while there is much more work to be done to engage IPE critically, the interventions that have been made have evoked the teeth-baring responses of gatekeepers in ways that expose the rigid discipline underlying IPE.

As briefly aforementioned, one important way in which IPE has been disciplined concerns the manner in which certain economic and political laws are framed as scientific and timeless – such as the Mundell-Fleming model, for instance.30 This has resulted from “an IPE that is primarily empiricist in epistemological terms and which relies on a very specific notion of power in order to construct a practice that is extraordinarily narrow in what it recognizes as legitimate knowledge.”31 Epistemology is vital to the task of disciplining IPE insofar as it determines capacities for knowledge by defining its legitimate grounds. This is remarkably similar to the field of traditional IR, where, according to Smith, positivism (as a methodology linked to an empiricist epistemology) “result[s] in a very restricted range of permissible ontological claims.”32
Within any framework that is able to transhistoricize, generalize and universalize its findings based on its epistemological and methodological assumptions, other knowledges are necessarily marginalized and disciplined insofar as they neglect to conform to the totality of science. The narrowed opportunities then open for contrasting approaches necessitate a turn to undisciplined research. According to J. Ann Tickner:

While IR feminists are seeking genuine knowledge that can help them to better understand the issues with which they are concerned, the IR training they receive rarely includes such knowledge. Hence, they, like scholars in other critical approaches, have gone outside the discipline to seek what they believe are more appropriate methodologies for understanding the social construction and maintenance of gender hierarchies. This deepens the level of misunderstanding and miscommunication and, unfortunately, often leads to negative stereotyping on all sides of these epistemological divides.³³

However, this undisciplined knowledge remains confined to the margins not only because it neglects to conform to positivist standards, but also because positivism and its empiricist epistemology are held to be settled and withheld from political discussion.

Epistemology and methodology, then, (no less than ontology) are profoundly political in their ramifications, yet remain beyond the disciplined realm of legitimate debate. For the quintessential example, in each of Robert Keohane’s attempted engagements with critical scholarship he attempts to discipline ‘reflectivists’ and feminists by denying any epistemological or methodological challenge.³⁴ Keohane’s 1988 Presidential address to the International Studies Association included a denial of ground to alternative perspectives, insofar as he denounces engagements with the epistemological and ontological commitments of positivism as ‘not fruitful.’ Thus, on the very ground where positivism claims supremacy, debate is stifled, such that Keohane can demand the production of “facts” rather than “dogmatic assertions of epistemological or ontological superiority.”³⁵ However, such a demand not only misses the point of postpositivist refutations of any possibility for factual, value-free knowledge, but further assumes its own epistemological superiority. It is such assertions and their underlying positivist practices that deny engagement with the ideational and the cultural in IPE by setting the terms of what constitutes the relevant subject matter of the field.³⁶ Surely, there is no neat line of division between the material and the ideational, but to uphold the division and discipline its subject matter towards one side of this false dichotomy (the material) is to deny recognition of the discursive constitution of materiality and the means for its comprehension, and is to discipline critical thought.

As Keohane’s 1988 address drew a sharp distinction between constructivists who embrace a scientific approach to IPE and poststructuralists who wholeheartedly reject it, he similarly distinguishes between ‘good girls, little girls, and bad girls’ in his insufficient engagement with feminism.³⁷ In “Beyond Dichotomy,” for example, Keohane perpetuates disciplined dichotomies by once again praising constructivists whose engagement with the ideational treats it as a variable for positivist analysis, as Keohane does with gender, while simultaneously discrediting any feminism that rejects “a commitment to a relatively conventional epistemology.”³⁸ His linguistic choice of the word “conventional” demonstrates his commitment not to true engagement or intellectual debate, but rather to relatively unquestionable norms of shared behaviour and suspect methodological grounds that are held beyond reproach. Thus, Keohane believes that any relevant feminism requires “systematically gathered evidence to test [their] propositions,” and a commitment to the “scientific method in the broadest sense [as] the best path toward convincing current nonbelievers of the validity of the message that feminists are seeking to deliver.”³⁹ In response, Tickner points out that Keohane’s challenge seeks to incorporate only feminism that broadens possible research questions within a positivist framework while disregarding that starting from different epistemological premises.⁴⁰ In other words, Keohane is disciplining all feminism, as he does poststructuralism, that neglects to conform to the disciplinary standards of ‘conventional’ IPE and simultaneously disciplines the conformists by demonstrating
the danger of ever questioning supposedly settled epistemological assumptions that are unproven even within the standards of a positivist framework.

While the role of disciplinary gatekeeping may not be self-consciously performed or instrumentally enacted and the gatekeepers may simply be following their beliefs in the pursuit of knowledge, various mechanisms are still collectively performed that marginalise alternative accounts in IPE. Thus, while Keohane certainly seems to believe his disclaimers that he wishes neither to force a choice between critical and problem-solving theories and that he is not gatekeeping, his own research plays into the disciplinary practices of IPE. For example, by delineating the ground for valid approaches – as positivist and scientific – Keohane is forcing a choice towards problem-solving theory and, furthermore, by so doing he is unconsciously acting as a gatekeeper for a diffuse and intersubjective disciplinary model. In such a manner, disciplinary discourse forces scholars to resign themselves to problematic material accounts that have no space for understanding interpretation. According to Marieke de Goede, for instance, according considerations of finance treat ‘it’ as “a coherent, powerful and clearly bounded system (or agent) – on which questions of discourse and representation have little bearing.” Such reification disregards the social and cultural components that underlay financial markets in a way that depoliticises the often drastic, human material effects of global finance. In this sense, an anti-disciplinary approach to GPE may not reject the material emphasis of disciplinary IPE but, rather, might challenge the separation of this material element from its discursive constitution and frame of intelligibility.

Of the limited capacities permitted by such a deep commitment to positivism, the ontological understandings that frame the discipline of IPE exemplify them. The state-centrism of IR is certainly (re)inscribed in the international emphasis of IPE – even while differently framed as relations between state and market. Within this framework, approaches that problematize the state as referent object reflect undisciplined tendencies insofar as the disciplinary approach of state-centrism undergirds the discipline’s very performance. David Campbell has convincingly argued that a cessation of the performative practices that underpin state action would facilitate its diminution to the point of its complete disappearance. Similarly, within the limited confines of IPE, “stasis would be death.” That is, the disciplinary structure of IPE could not continue in the absence of perpetual reconstructions of the discursive and identity-based premises that shape its very foundations. However, as important as ontology is to the disciplining practices of IPE and as similarly closed to discussion as the dominating ontology is, its rigid construction remains dependent upon the inflexibility permitted and justified by the epistemological and methodological commitments of positivism that remain the focal point of this critique. Indeed, without challenging the fundamental universality of positivism, new ontological universals would appear to be the inevitably (re)constructed resolutions (akin to cross-disciplined disciplinarity) in the absence of a reformulated epistemological basis for knowledge. That is to say that, while I hold ontological criticism in high regard, the bases for post-disciplinary GPE are doomed to failure if such ontological reformulations are made in the absence of epistemological and methodological critiques.

The disciplinary practices of IPE, however, go beyond its commitment to positivism. Tooze and Murphy, for instance, observe a base materialism in conjunction with an economistic conception of power leading to a focus on resources to the theoretical and practical detriment of those lacking resources. Sandra Whitworth has made a similar observation, noting IPE’s “almost exclusive emphasis on questions of production, work, exchange and distribution.” Even the dominant critical strand of neo-Gramscianism maintains this economism and materialism, and perpetuates the disciplinary marginalization of theoretical approaches that prioritize the ideational. Indeed, IPE – as a whole and not simply its problem-solving constituency – is so heavily focused on material analyses and quantification that those who seek to understand the conceptual underpinnings of these material forces are no longer considered to be working within the same disciplinary confines. For example, post-disciplinary approaches to global finance that neglect to prioritize economics
have, *within an interdisciplinary journal no less*, evoked fears of “rather flat culturalist stuff that sometimes comes out of English Departments,” thereby demonstrating the power of the materially-focused disciplinary definition of IPE.47 The emphasis on materiality is certainly paved with good intentions, but it seems that, insofar as ‘there is nothing outside of discourse,’ interpretation must be theorized lest the material be granted a life of its own and that the general trend in material emphasis prioritises those with resources to the (ironically material) detriment of the (predominantly female) poor.48

Moreover, as pointed out by Tooze and Murphy and related to the material focus of IPE, a commitment to theoretical parsimony has had two further disastrous effects on IPE. First, as noted concerning economism, power has come to be treated as an instrumental material resource, rather than as a diffuse form of social power, such that a Foucaultian understanding is unattainable within the constructed confines of “the discipline.”49 The second deleterious effect concerns the prioritization of crude notions of actor rationality (whether that actor is a person, firm, state, or organization) over “a more complex psychology.”50 This relates back to the pervasive positivism insofar as the assumption of (Western and masculine) rationality is universalized and transhistoricized to the detriment of more thorough and focused analyses.

Within such disciplined bounds, critical voices not only tend to be scarce but, whenever present, tend to be ignored rather than engaged. Steve Smith has convincingly argued that, “a discipline’s silences are often its most significant feature. Silences are the loudest voices.”51 In such a case, the silences of feminism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism in IPE must be almost deafening. V. Spike Peterson seems to blame such marginalization on the Enlightenment legacy, since its emphasis on rationality assured that “‘rational’ ways of knowing dignified ‘rational’ ways of being such that alternatives were increasingly marginalized, at best, and often ‘erased’.”52 Thus, the belief in rationality constructed a world in which rationality was the only permissible course of action and those who defined ‘rationality’ accordingly disciplined the rest. It is within this tradition that, “most of the IPE literature continues to make invisible questions of gender.”53 Keohane defends the trend of ignoring feminism by claiming fear of attack for engagement.54 I would venture, however, to suggest that responsive attack only comes out of non-engagement, when (like Keohane has done by quasi-engaging feminism not on *its* own terms, but on *his* own) feminism is treated as an alien Other in contradistinction to the rational, masculine Self. In a sense, then, one could easily argue that Keohane’s non-engagement with feminism served simply to prove the effect of gendered binaries, rather than to prove responsive feminist attacks. Similarly, Tooze and Murphy acknowledge the invisibility of women’s issues to IPE, but instead blame the marginalization of issues of human security, since “They are questions about the least powerful; questions about people whose actions – individual and collective – are assumed to place little constraint on the rational pursuit of self-interest by the powerful.”55 In this understanding, critical voices are ignored not simply because they are Othered, but because IPE has been constructed as a discipline emphasizing (instrumental, material) power and the (instrumentally and materially) powerful. Regardless of the specific reason for the marginalization of feminism and other critical approaches, the silences are pervasive – both in relative absence and in non-engagement – and, therefore, indicate telling theoretical gaps in disciplined IPE.
Critical Exclusions
The exclusions of disciplinary IPE are debilitating both to theoretical advancement and material well-being. Tooze and Murphy, for instance, conclude by noting the importance of epistemology insofar as the dominating positivist epistemology in IPE denies the relevance of studying poverty. In contrast to discipline that denies engagement with supposedly settled questions, Tooze and Murphy argue that “If… power is about the contestation of knowledge, ideas, and claims to truth, then questions of epistemology, ontology, and methodology are fundamental to all matters of international political economy, however immediate and policy-directed they might seem to be.” Against a sovereign core disciplining those who would threaten these unquestionable and assumed grounds, then, is a necessarily marginal – at least to any disciplined site – zone of contestation in need of discipline according to mainstream directives. Ashley and Walker argue that, “it follows that these marginal times and places are sites of struggle, where power is consciously at work.” (Note also, as aforementioned, that the diffused Foucaultian conception of power that underpins this analysis would be thoroughly imperceptible within an economistic framework that individuates power.) In a time of increasing resistance to the edicts of disciplinary IPE, this accordingly leads to the claim that, “deterritorialized zones are multiplying so that it can be said that “our present age is one of exile,” it makes sense to listen to the exiles who live and move in these contested marginal zones, respecting the dissident practices they undertake.” Yet, it is critical to make a distinction here: the disciplined nature of IPE means that the exiles who engage subject matter of relevance to GPE must move not in marginal ‘sites’ which would reify ‘the discipline,’ but in post- or supra-disciplinary circles that engage not only the subject matter but the disciplinary bounds defining it.

Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum argue that a post-disciplinary perspective in GPE would invite a “cultural turn.” By escaping the confines of disciplined IPE, such an approach would add “discourse, ideology, identity, narrativity, argumentation, rhetoric, historicity, reflexivity, hermeneutics, interpretation, semiotics, and deconstruction” to the toolboxes of critical theorists. In so doing, they add, “the cultural turn” would repair the artificial separation of the political from the economic that can be seen in the depoliticization of, for example, the “structured finance” de Goede so visibly deplores. Yet for all their post-disciplinary rhetoric and their insights into the necessity of cultural interventions in GPE, Jessop and Sum conclude their article by redefining new disciplinary bounds through the delineation of Marxism as the only productive path to such an end. Here too they feign inclusiveness insofar as they claim that 

this tradition [Marxism] can be made even more fruitful through its creative synthesis with other pre- or post-disciplinary traditions such as political ecology and feminism (or “queer theory”) provided that its primary concern with the materiality of capitalism, its structural contradictions and its associated strategic dilemmas is maintained.

Such an argument unfortunately seems rather representative of the ‘critical’ approaches to IPE with which I seek to engage. The reinscribed materiality, newly delineated grounds for legitimate research and the demarcated theoretical frameworks that are deemed proper for the pursuit of such disciplined knowledge are clearly not ‘post-disciplinary,’ or arguably even ‘critical’ then. However, despite these shortcomings, Jessop and Sum’s insights into the need for a “cultural turn” do seem to reflect somewhat “more fruitful” pathways towards less rigidly bounded knowledge.

A less disciplined and dogmatic cultural approach to GPE, offered by de Goede, holds markets to be cultural insofar as they reflect their social and discursive construction. To actually consider the social construction of markets, however, de Goede argues, an interdisciplinary approach is vital, since insights from geography, politics, cultural studies, anthropology, sociology, economics, and even aesthetics are deemed relevant. However, de Goede’s intervention is not post-disciplinary in general; that is, she argues for post-disciplinary approaches to global finance, but reifies the disciplines from which she wishes to draw by even seeking to define them in terms of delineated spheres of specific knowledges. Regardless, her poststructural engagement
with GPE is one of few explicitly so, and simply its existence may portend a disciplinary crisis or perhaps the beginnings of one. Indeed, even without fully going beyond disciplinary bounding itself – simply challenging the bounds she disapproves of – de Goede’s work perhaps indicates a crisis of IPE in the understandings of Ashley and Walker:

[D]issident works of thought elicit attention and prompt critical readings because these works accentuate and make more evident a sense of crisis, what one might call a crisis of the discipline of international studies [or in this case IPE]. They put the discipline’s institutional boundaries in question and put its familiar modes of subjectivity, objectivity, and conduct in doubt; they render its once seemingly self-evident notions of space, time, and progress uncertain; and they thereby make it possible to traverse institutional limitations, expose questions and difficulties, and explore political and theoretical possibilities hitherto forgotten or deferred. In short, dissident works of thought help to accentuate a disciplinary crisis whose single most pronounced symptom is that they very idea of ‘the discipline’ enters thought as a question, a problem, a matter of uncertainty.

In the potentially looming crisis of disciplinary IPE, opportunities are opening for both material and ideational transformation and, indeed, insofar as the material and the ideational are co-constitutive, both would transform in tandem. According to Whitworth, “during periods of debate or crisis those [hegemonic] understandings are open to question and far more likely to be challenged. Debates or crises are material or institutional opportunities in which the shared consensus around gender [for example] begins to unravel.”

None of this is intended to imply that a definitive ‘crisis’ is upon us, but simply that an existing space for such a crisis can be perceived by the overt disciplining of critical approaches and their disciplinary grounds of contention. Furthermore, meaning is continually in flux and new constructions through the intertext are perpetually being enacted and performed, such that any intervention may have (some of) the effects described by Ashley, Walker, and Whitworth.

In the Whitworth article cited here, she argues for a “natural affinity” between feminism and IPE, but one that has never fully “materialized” within IPE’s disciplinary structure. This affinity revolves around IPE’s (and feminisms’) broadened problematic from the rigid questions of “war, peace, and security” that have tended to define more traditional IR. Indeed, as Whitworth points out, “quite traditional IPE issues, such as debt management, export processing zones, and international organizations, affect and are affected by gender relations.” Yet, she notes that despite this affinity, “IPE offers important intellectual and political spaces within which feminist analyses might be developed but does not itself offer a sustained analysis of these relations.” Whitworth concludes by recognizing and criticising the disciplinary materiality of IPE that prevents any systematic engagement with feminisms that operate predominantly at the ideological level. Despite differences in their approaches, Peterson agrees with the interconnection between theory and the material lives of women, and accordingly makes a solid case for reformulations of theoretical IR. Yet, such an interconnection is denied by disciplinary IPE through its (positivist) focus on material objects that are apparently detached from subjectivity.

Peterson further denounces the state-centrism of IR generally for its disregard of “women’s systemic insecurity.” Her telling critique is as relevant in IPE as in traditional IR since, not only is there no compelling separation of the two interconnected ‘subjects’ other than disciplined parameters, but also since the focus on state-based flows of material define these parameters in IPE. As aforementioned, even the term International Political Economy illuminates the state-centrism of its focus. The beginning, yet incomplete, (crisis-esque) transformation towards Global Political Economy is not only semantics, but further opens the disciplined field to the very sorts of critiques of, for example, ‘women’s systemic insecurity’ that Peterson and others make central to their analyses – and which are denied by state-referent notions of political
economy. In the absence of such varied referents, insights such as de Goede’s on the gendered genealogy of finance or Peterson’s on both “triad analytics” (which looks at the integration of identities, meanings, and social practices/institutions) and related diffuse complicity would be incomprehensible. It is such insights – with immense theoretical and material ramifications – that are denied by the disciplined exclusions of feminism in IPE.

While there are admittedly a variety of feminisms and feminist epistemologies, between which I do not stake value judgements here, I believe that any post-disciplinary interventions feminists are able to make would owe a significant debt to poststructuralism which seeks to expose and destabilize the boundedness of the very disciplinary structures that otherwise ensure their relative silence. According to James Der Derian, poststructuralists seek “to interrogate present knowledge of international relations through past practices, to search out the margins of political theory, to listen for the critical voices drowned out by official discourses, and to conduct an inquiry into the encounter of the given text.” It is this approach that has drawn the most ire from the gatekeepers of IR and IPE, since it most thoroughly destabilises the foundational grounds of their (de)limited and (de)limiting research programs. As Bleiker has noted, poststructuralism has shown that “the difference between represented and representation is the very location of politics.” Accordingly, it is the representations that depoliticize which appear to be most highly disciplined. Yet as the insights of postcolonialism demonstrate, domination is never total and always engenders a resistance such that, within critical scholarship, discipline invokes disciplinary crises. IPE, however, finds itself threatened insofar as the understanding of performativity negates the entire premise of the prioritized material, such that the matter threatens the disciplinary sovereignty of the gatekeepers. In the absence of such insights, IPE could not acknowledge the discursive constitution and interpretation of ‘the real,’ nor could the relations of power that underlay interpretive, textual practices of markets be exposed. In this sense, it is more than the ‘sovereignty of a discipline’ that is under threat, it is the sovereignty of both disciplinary and ‘real world’ power relations that are constructed and supported by depoliticizing disciplinary structures of domination.

Post-Disciplinary Options: New Beginnings as Anti-Conclusions
The interdisciplinary status of disciplinary IPE is not definitively ossified. Its construction is social, rather than material, and the material emphasis of IPE has been enshrined merely through a narrative that has delineated (unproblematised) materiality as the site of proper (positivist) knowledge. In this sense, it is mutable. Marieke de Goede draws on the work of Ernesto Laclau to argue that the relative ossification of ideational structures cannot be turned backwards, but its future remains open to our interventions. Der Derian offers an important disclaimer, however, for our (re)constructions of the future of GPE: “The issue is not how we, as theorists, think about the world, or even how others have thought about it in the past, but how we think others ought to think about it.” IR (like IPE) is changing from its historical origins as an American, policy-oriented social science and we, as theorists, have a role in collectively shaping its evolution. In this sense, my research here comes from and remains part of the intertext; that is, I do not wish to define a new field of GPE, but rather to contribute to discussions of where and how this field might evolve (and of where and how it is limited) – my critique coming out of the intertext and returning back into it. In this sense, I am arguing not for the eradication of disciplinary discourses since they are necessary precursors to intelligible discussion, but I am arguing for a drastically weakened rigidity and acceptance of the self-reflection and acknowledgement of mutability necessary to embrace disciplinary verb-dom and to expand the (de)limited discourse of the present ‘state of the field.’

With this as a backdrop, one virtually necessary option is to facilitate the crisis that numerous scholars have emphasised as a site for change; in the words of William Connolly to “disrupt the closures” that have delineated disciplinary IPE. How can one do this? The simple answer is by doing it – by performing, practicing, and enacting post-disciplinary practices that go beyond (de)limited proper pursuits of knowledge.
Indeed, by transgressing boundaries, one exposes and delegitimizes the bounds themselves and, by so doing, one is able to demonstrate the historically contingent, socially constructed, and absolutely arbitrary nature of disciplined bounds. De Goede contends that “It is precisely in these spaces of (re)articulation that financial practices are vulnerable to criticism and change,” but these spaces do not exist independently of our own practices that construct them – much like the disciplined spaces we seek to dismantle. By transgressing and unmasking the depoliticization ensured by disciplinarity, we can ensure the (re)socialization and (re)politicization of that which is both social and political – such as those most materially and adversely impacted by global financial (de)regulation. While drawing on wider sources we should also ensure a wider reach that speaks to those beyond the disciplinary bounds of traditional IPE or American IR, and would assure the wider engagement which feminists call for – and which the security of those marginalized by race, class, and gender require.

The problems of disciplinary practice, however, go beyond those of its mainstream gatekeepers. Critical theorists are often implicated in the disciplinarity of interdisciplinary practices, in the closure of thinking spaces to viewpoints that question the intersubjective origins of understanding and interpreting the material, and in the denial of ground to the very problem-solving theorists whose denial of ground they abhor. De Goede has denounced, for instance, the apparently critical call to (re)regulate financial trading; thereby showing both the integration of these supposedly critical theories within unquestioned epistemological bounds and her own delimiting of valid GPE. This criticism is not meant to detract from the immensely important, well-researched, thorough, and critical interventions de Goede’s genealogy offers, but simply to reiterate the need to avoid reconstructing new disciplinary bounds from the ashes of those we seek to burn down. Der Derian has offered a similar disclaimer on:

[W]hat the collective purpose of this enterprise is not: namely, to affirm a new identity, authenticity, or disciplinary purity through opposition to another, ‘older’ school of thought. On the contrary, we aim at a dialogue, with neglected thinkers and forgotten footnotes, but also with the ‘great’ texts and traditional scholars, that is meticulously attentive to the constraints imposed by the past, critically interpretive of the dominant voices of the present, and openly speculative about what can – while soberly reflective about what cannot – be said and done in the world politics of the future.

In this sense, I seek a more inclusive approach to GPE – one not delimited or disciplined by the materialist, positivist grounds of the mainstream, but rather one as inclusive of those who reject its materialism and positivism as of those who accept them. Indeed, such an approach is also necessarily disciplinary, but its advancements lie in the perpetual problematization of its inevitable disciplining alongside a commitment to permitting reflective criticism rather than enshrining ossified disciplinary structures beyond the realm of political debate.

Following such claims, the disciplinary conventions that undergird this paper seem somewhat ironic, but unfortunately the discursive sphere of IPE studies with which I seek engagement and dialogue would be much less likely to hear a call grounded in, say, the politicized feminist ‘everyday.’ Indeed, the inability of the orthodoxy to hear such critiques has been a component of the argument made within the disciplinary conventions of this writing. In other words, I have attempted to refer, wherever possible, to sources within the field and, due to the topic’s relative lack of engagement within ‘IPE proper,’ to draw on IR theorists (whose voices are near enough to be perceptible within IPE’s disciplined confines) in order to extrapolate their findings to a subfield in desperate need of such intervention. With this paper then, I seek not to ‘disrupt the closures’ so much as to soften the ground to the need for the epistemological, methodological, ontological, and post-disciplinary reflexivity that could force such disruptions.
In short, I seek a disrupture of disciplinary and gatekeeping practices, and not the construction of a newly gatekept and ossified discipline in its stead. Similarly, Jill Steans argues that “the legitimacy of feminist work will only be recognised as part of “the discipline” if “the discipline” is rethought in ways that disturb the “existing boundaries of both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world”.” Yet, Steans has not problematized disciplinary constructions; rather she has merely problematized those disciplinary constructions that deny feminism. If feminism were permitted to construct its own bounds, one must ask what ‘it’ would deny. Instead, the approaches of feminism, poststructuralism and postcolonialism must learn from their experiences on the margins and develop, in the stead of disciplinary IPE, inclusive approaches to knowledge (re)production that recognize, problematize and seek to avoid disciplinary practices insofar as that is possible. In brief, ‘we must strive to become undisciplined,’ while remembering that this is an attempt doomed to never succeed, but that must never be given up, since to do so would be to (re)settle disciplined, ossified, and colonized practices as nouns and to forget their mutable social construction. While this may be easier said than done, since discipline is an identity practice and identity seems always to be constructed in relation to difference, postcolonialism offers insight to the concerned GPE scholar with the advice that difference can be celebrated and not denigrated based on (gendered) binary contradistinctions. The words of Beier and Arnold are most telling of how to go about this within IR:

A supradisciplinary approach thus enjoins us to find and foreground ourselves in our work. We must identify and account for the choices we make about what we think is and is not worth including in our work and, equally, our choices about how best to approach that which we include. This process, too, is something that must be practiced in a sustained way, such that the supradisciplinary study of security [or, in this case, IPE] is less an end than a means – it is something we can only aim to move toward.

In other words, the process is never complete. Discipline, as a discursive practice, is as ultimately inescapable as identity practices (to which it also conforms), but these practices can be observed, held to be practices grounded in convention, and repoliticized through struggles for a thankfully and necessarily permanent and incomplete problematization of its strictures. To ever conclude this effort would be to reinscribe the mainstream as the new discipline, it would be to inscribe disciplined bounds on the exiled margins of that day and age. In this sense, it is a process that will never succeed, but neither will it leave utterly silenced and disciplined those voices with much to offer for the theoretical and material benefit of those with the greatest need for human security.

This paper has benefited from the critical comments, suggestions and insights offered by an anonymous reviewer, David Mutimer, Samantha Arnold, Simone Arsenault-May, Arthur Imperial, Heather Johnson, Colin Lennard-White, and Scott O’Connor. I owe all of them an immense debt of thanks and the acknowledgement of the utility of their insights.
Throughout this paper I draw a distinction between International Political Economy (IPE) as a disciplined approach to the subject matter and Global Political Economy (GPE) as the evolving disruption of these enclosed thinking spaces.

On IPE’s transdisciplinary distinction between the political and the economic, see: Bob Jessop & Ngai-Ling Sum, “Pre-Disciplinary and Post-Disciplinary Perspectives,” New Political Economy Vol. 6, No. 1 (2001), p. 96. For more on its disciplinary origins, see: Marieke de Goede, “Resocialising and Repoliticising Financial Markets: Contours of Social Studies of Finance,” Economic Sociology: European Electronic Newsletter Vol. 6, No. 3 (2005); & Roger Tooze & Craig Murphy, “The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE: Mystery, Blindness and Invisibility,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 25, No. 3 (1996). On interdisciplinary disciplinarity see: J. Marshall Beier & Samantha L. Arnold, “Becoming Undisciplined: Toward the Supradisciplinary Study of Security,” International Studies Review Vol. 7, No. 1 (2005), p. 56. While Beier and Arnold are speaking of the supposedly de facto discipline of security studies, their telling observations are quite relevant here: Interdisciplinarity means “between disciplines.” Taking them as ontologically given, it necessarily – indeed, by definition – reifies the disciplines. But even more problematic than this, it becomes a reified thing itself: the idea of interdisciplinarity carries in tow the project of constructing a new interdiscipline… Just as the “inter” ontologizes the disciplines, so too the arity confers thingness upon that which would displace them – and it remains a matter of displacement inasmuch as the discourse of interdisciplinarity calls forth the same sorts of spatial metaphors suggested by disciplinarity. The project is thus logically more an objection to existing disciplinary structures than to disciplinarity itself; or, at least, it is not well-tooled to transcend these limits.


The phrase ‘state of the field’ is used here in accordance with Richard Ashley and Rob Walker’s observation that the limited epistemological and ontological capacities of the state (or status) of the field prescribe specific understandings of the state (as sovereign entity) that become ossified in the absence of varied interpretations. In this sense, the state of the field permits an understanding of the state that is very much of that field. Moreover, the according perception of the state relies heavily on a notion of sovereignty that seems to parallel a form of disciplinary sovereignty enacted by its gatekeepers. See: Richard K. Ashley & R. B. J. Walker, “Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 3 (1990).


Bleiker, “Forget IR Theory,” pp. 63-4. For more on the power relations Bleiker perceives underneath disciplinarity, see: Bleiker, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” p. 514: Representation is always an act of power. This power is at its peak if a form of representation is able to disguise its subjective origins and values. Realism has been unusually successful in this endeavour: it has turned one of the many credible interpretations into a form of representation that is not only widely accepted as “realistic,” but also appears and functions as essence.

Ashley & Walker, “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline,” p. 375.


While not speaking specifically of these authors, this all-too-frequent-habit is thoroughly challenged in: Beier & Arnold, “Becoming Undisciplined,” esp. pp. 53-7.


Beier & Arnold, “Becoming Undisciplined,” p. 46.

Ibid., p. 43: “Disciplinarity, however, is not a condition; disciplinarity is a practice.” This point is similarly made in: William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 46: “No identity [even of disciplines] reflects being as such; no identity is the true identity because every identity is particular, constructed, and relational.”

Dogan, “The New Social Sciences.”

Beier, International Relations in Uncommon Places, p. 54.


The initial division of three is criticised as definitively based on ‘positivist, empiricist standards’ in: Tooze & Murphy, “The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE,” p. 682.


The term, ‘hegemonologue,’ is drawn from Beier, *International Relations in Uncommon Places*, where he defines it as “a knowing hegemonic Western voice that, owing to its universalist pretensions, speaks its knowledges to the exclusion of all others” (p. 2).


For more on this, see: Tickner, “You Just Don’t Understand,” p. 613.


Keohane, “Beyond Dichotomy,” p. 197. Accordingly, this has led Jill Steans to note that only some standpoint feminisms seem to be legitimate according to the disciplinary standards of scientific IPE, while the insights of others are accordingly deemed illegitimate.


48 Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 4. On the oversight of those in poverty enabled by a focus on resources, see: Tooze & Murphy, “The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE.”


50 Tooze & Murphy, “The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE,” p. 703.


53 Whitworth, “Theory as Exclusion,” p. 117.


58 On this, see: Tooze & Murphy, “The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE,” p. 683.

59 Ashley & Walker, “Speaking the Language of Exile,” p. 262. It is vital to note, as an aside, that Ashley and Walker’s claim to exile is to exile within an incredibly privileged site – the Western academy.

60 On supradisciplinary approaches, see: Beier & Arnold, “Becoming Undisciplined;” and on post-disciplinary methods, see: Jessop & Sum, “Pre-Disciplinary and Post-Disciplinary Perspectives.”


62 de Goede, “Resocialising and Repoliticising Financial Markets.”
Indeed, few poststructuralist interventions have been made in GPE. While it is acknowledged that some scholars, such as Lily Ling, Anna Agathangelou, Randall Germain and Tony Porter present poststructural-inspired approaches to GPE from (some margin) ‘within’ the recognized discipline, de Goede, V. Spike Peterson and (arguably) Ronen Palan appear to be most thoroughly committed to enunciating poststructuralist approaches to GPE and creating a space for them. Palan calls his own work ‘radical constructivism’ which arguably breaks slightly with poststructuralism, but that break is not obvious and is, at best, debatable. Moreover, while it is acknowledged that various scholars outside of the field (for example, critical human geographers, political scientists, literary scholars, psychologists, philosophers, and accountants, such as Simon Dalby, Nigel Thrift, Andrew Leyshon, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Jane Baxter, Wai Fong Chua, and others) have contributed to discussions relevant to poststructural GPE, the performed disciplinary bounds have tended to keep their research from engagement. It is to the dismantling of such bounds that I aim here, but regardless, this does show the minimal amount of engagement from within and without the disciplined domain.


Ibid., p. 116-7, 119, 125.

Peterson, Gendered States, esp. p. 32.

Ibid., pp. 31-32.

On these points, see, especially: V. Spike Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies (Routledge, 2003), pp. 2, 4, 13, 40.


See: de Goede, “Resocialising and Repoliticising Financial Markets.”

de Goede, Virtue, Fortune and Faith, pp. 4-7, 179.

Ibid., p. 19.


Connolly, Identity/Difference, p. 50.

Ashley & Walker, “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline,” p. 396.

de Goede, Virtue, Fortune and Faith, p. 146.
For more on this, see de Goede, “Resocialising and Repoliticising Financial Markets.”

For more on these points, see: Anna M. Agathangelou, “‘Sexing’ Globalization in International Relations: Migrant Sex and Domestic Workers in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey,” in Geeta Chowdhry & Sheila Nair (eds), *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class*, (Routledge, 2002).


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