

“GENERATION 9/11”: CANADIAN MUSLIM YOUTH NEGOTIATING
NATIONALIST AND SEXUAL SUBJECTIVITIES

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Abstract

While much attention has been given to the impact on adult Muslims' religious identities in the post-9/11 era, little research has been conducted on young Muslims who have grown up in this period. Moreover, the limited research on Muslim youths' identity tends to focus almost exclusively on male aggression and female piety. In this dissertation, I argue that the repetition of these themes in both scholarly research and mainstream media serves to narrow an understanding of young Muslims' identities, and functions to perpetuate stereotyped notions of young Muslims. I also argue that sexuality is hegemonically employed in North American national ideologies to construct Muslim sexuality as "inferior" to non-Muslim sexuality; however, until now, researchers have yet to examine its impact on young Muslims' sexual subjectivities. I situate my study in the context of national ideology and particularly the shifts taking place in the post-9/11 context that underpin notions of belonging and citizenship. The idea of the nation includes regulations and restrictions for "sexual crossings"—that is, "good citizens" should not have sex with "the enemy" Other (Nagel, 2003: 141-42). National belonging thus entails controlling the sexual practices of national members and defining "acceptable" sexual coupling. Accordingly, because "terrorist-enemy" constructions are frequently linked to Muslim identity, my study examines how this sexually racialized structuring affects young Canadian Muslims' perceptions of national belonging and citizenship. I argue that these interrelated constructions of Muslim identity and national belonging have an impact on young Canadian Muslims' sexual subjectivities and their perceptions of "appropriate" sexual coupling within a national context. Hence, this study simultaneously illuminates the links between Muslim sexual identity and perspectives of national belonging as well as stresses young Muslim identities as an under-researched area of Canadian identity politics.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my husband, Ron.

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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

A significant factor bearing on the formation of young Muslims' religious and sexual identities is the backlash Muslims in the United States—and Canada—have experienced following the terrorists' attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 ("9/11"). Individuals whose names, dress, or other markers signified an Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim identity were subject to violence and intimidation in the United States and Canada following the attacks (see Hollander, 2014: 14; Jamil, 2014; Jamil and Rousseau, 2012; Karim, 2006; Naber, 2006; Pintak, 2006). Long after 9/11, fear of and violence towards Muslims continues and, according to the 2013 Angus Reid Poll, was on the rise. The Poll notes a "growing level of mistrust" of Muslims across Canada but no increased concerns about the other major religions—Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism, Hinduism and Buddhism (Geddes par. 3). Although Angus Reid's 2017 Poll indicates residents of Québec have a more favourable view of Islam than in 2013,¹ across the rest of Canada, the study also found that 46 per cent of Canadians continue to view Islam and clothing associated with the religion unfavourably compared to how they view the other religions mentioned above.² Undoubtedly, such growing adversity is fueled by the post-9/11 "war on terror" rhetoric, the ensuing "culture of fear" generated by increased state surveillance and security measures, and subsequent Muslim-related terrorist attacks globally. While the adverse shift in attitudes towards Muslims post-9/11 poses some difficulties for young Canadian Muslims in forming their religious identities, recent work by Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai in the U.S. causes me to think about how the post-9/11 environment (including Islamophobia and racialized representations of Muslim identities) might bear on young Muslims' sexual identities. Specifically, Puar and Rai argue, "[S]exuality is central to the creation of a certain knowledge of terrorism," and, moreover, that homophobia and racism intersect to construct the "terrorist-monster" as a "fag" (2002: 117, 126). That is, as terrorism has become synonymous with Muslim identity in the post-9/11 context (Naber, 2006) and as the "terrorist" is assumed to be male, the queering of Muslim males simultaneously constructs Muslim males as both sexually deviant (Puar and Rai, 2002: 126) and inferior to heterosexual non-Muslim males (Naber, 2006: 250). Referring to this symbolic construction as "hegemonic sexual positioning," I argue that the post-9/11 "war on terror"

¹ Up from 16 percent in 2013 to 32 percent in 2017.

² See Kurl (2017).

rhetoric and the ensuing culture of fear function in ways that position Muslim sexuality as “inferior” to non-Muslim sexuality.³ I describe this phenomenon as a “de-sexualizing” process. Further, as constructions of masculinity produce reciprocal constructions of femininity (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848), the hegemonic sexual positioning of Muslim masculinity, in turn, affects correlating definitions of Muslim femininity. As sexuality is central to these constructions, I seek to understand how hegemonic sexual positioning resulting from the progressing “war on terror” and resulting culture of fear influences young Canadian Muslims’ sexual subjectivities.

I situate my study in the context of national ideology and particularly the shifts taking place in the post-9/11 context⁴ that underpin notions of belonging and citizenship.⁵ Nira Yuval-Davis argues that the question of belonging and citizenship is central to national ideology in terms of identifying “who is ‘a stranger’ and who ‘does not belong’” (2011: 2), and Joane Nagel argues that the idea of the nation includes regulations and restrictions for “sexual crossings”—that is, “good citizens” should not have sex with “the enemy” Other (2003: 141-42). National belonging thus entails controlling the sexual practices of national members and defining “acceptable” sexual coupling. Accordingly, because terrorist-enemy constructions are linked to Muslim identity, I further seek to understand how this sexually racialized structuring affects young Canadian Muslims’ perceptions of national belonging and citizenship, and specifically, the ways in which young Canadian Muslims regulate their sexual subjectivities within the framework of restricted sexual liaisons. In other words, at this moment, who do young Canadian Muslims perceive as “appropriate” sexual partners? Moreover, how do they perceive their sexual subjectivities?

U.S. cultural anthropologist Nadine Naber argues that the 9/11 backlash against Muslims has yet to be fully understood and that it has crossed U.S. national borders (2006: 258). The 2013 and 2017 Angus Reid Reports (above) demonstrate that this backlash has penetrated and

³ Sexual hierarchies are not new to contemporary societies. Ann Stoler (2010) argues that sexual relations were racialized and strategically managed in imperial politics (9), and that sexuality “[served] as a loaded metaphor for domination” not between men and women but rather as an image of masculinized political power (44). In examining the politics of sexuality in the post-9/11 era, I draw from Stoler’s work to shed light on the contemporary apparatuses of power that serve to racialize “Muslim” sexuality.

⁴ See Chapter 3, “National Trauma and the Post-9/11 Context,” for a discussion on the post-9/11 context.

⁵ See Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2011) for a detailed discussion on contemporary global challenges regarding securitization, and various citizenship strategies engaged in by young Muslims in the West in relation to exclusionary discourse.

continues to percolate within the Canadian national consciousness. My research thus seeks to flesh out the sexual facets of the 9/11 backlash on the lives of young Canadian Muslims who have grown up in the post 9/11 environment. The following section will discuss supporting research conducted with Muslim adults and youths in Canada and the U.S., as well as scholarship about nationalism, belonging, and citizenship on which I draw to contextualize my study. While much attention is given to young Muslims' religious identities in current research conducted in the West, this introduction will also identify critical gaps in studying the sexual subjectivities of young Muslims.

Research with Muslim Adults and Youth in Canada and the U.S.

Speaking about South Asian Muslim communities in Montreal, Uzma Jamil and Cecile Rousseau declare that the social impact of the “war on terror” on Muslim minority groups in Canada “has been severe” (2012: 371). In fact, they argue, “The climate of fear and anxiety engendered by the WOT [war on terror] calls into question their sense of belonging and status as citizens” (371). Jamil and Rousseau’s research confirms that fear of backlash from the majority group as a result of terrorism transforms minority Muslim groups in Canadian society in that some of the Muslims in their study sought to control and present behaviours favourable to the broader non-Muslim population. A similar study by Nadine Naber focuses on Muslim communities in San Francisco post-9/11. Naber argues that the culture of fear created by anti-terrorism policing and acts of violence by non-Muslims against Muslims create an “internment of the psyche” within targeted communities (2006: 252). Drawing from Foucault’s discussion on panopticism, her term refers to an intense, internalized sense of being watched by others and fear that one could at any time be attacked, deported, or disappear (2006: 255). Internment of the psyche can be experienced both individually and as a community. Jamil and Rousseau found this same internalized fear amongst individuals and communities in Montreal. Many respondents in both studies expressed self-consciousness about their behaviours and actions in front of non-Muslims and a desire to present a positive impression to defuse any negative perceptions.

Similarly, Selcuk Sirin and Michelle Fine’s study of young American Muslims indicates that the participants felt subject to social scrutiny, and surveillance—a “hegemonic gaze”—since 9/11 (2007: 160). Some youths in this study had also developed self-surveillance techniques in which they policed not only their conduct but judged other Muslims as “good,” or “not good,” as

well (Sirin and Fine, 2007: 159-60). Here, the emphasis is placed on visibly demonstrating pious behaviours (for example, wearing a hijab for women and controlling aggression for males). Sirin and Fine's assessment of a "hegemonic gaze" indicates a critical moment in the lives of young American Muslims in which they demonstrate discernment of their "placement" in contemporary American society.

An individual's view of his or her "placement" in each society forms his or her sense of identity. Although there are various theories about what identity is and how it is formed, all social identity theories describe a person's identity in relational terms (Buckingham, 2008: 1). Identity thus signifies both "sameness" and "difference" and perceptions vary depending on how individuals see themselves in relation to others. Nevertheless, while individuals determine their identity according to who they are with, the social situation they are in, and particular motivations held at that time, individuals do not control how they are defined by others (Buckingham, 2008: 1). Consequently, while individuals have the agency to determine their identities, these "negotiations" are always embedded in the very social structure that is created by themselves and other persons (Burke and Stets, 2009: 6). Individuals form expectations of and know how to interact with others when their identities are known. Identities convey meaning and thus determine social roles and behaviours (Burke and Stets, 2009: 13).

The fact that the young Muslims in Sirin and Fine's (2007) study felt subject to a "hegemonic gaze" and that some adjusted their perceptions of themselves accordingly (that is, in policing their behaviours and in judging the appropriateness of other young Muslims' behaviour) demonstrates their internalization of a shared symbolic meaning. Also, that their perceptions were in relation to a hegemonic form of sociocultural interaction is indicative of the hegemonic "placement" of Muslims in America at present. These young Muslims' perceptions and those of the Muslim participants in Jamil and Rousseau's (2012) and Naber's (2006) studies indicate the contextualization of ideas and representations of Muslims disseminated throughout Canada and the U.S. through various cultural forms.

This "placement," then, also speaks of the relational aspects of identity formation on the national level. The self-surveillance activities adopted, and judgements made about the conduct of other Muslims that the individuals in these three studies resorted to reveal their sense of "us" and "them"—that is, their religious group identity ("us") in relation to non-Muslim others ("them"). The fact that some of the Muslims in these studies sought to control and present

behaviours favourable to the broader non-Muslim population signifies not only their perception of their marginalized location within their respective nations but also the impact that the post-9/11 cultural and sociopolitical environment has had on their lives. Moreover, this perceived location speaks of their sense of belonging and status as citizens, as Jamil and Rousseau (2012) astutely argue (see above). Jamil and Rousseau's concept of citizenship here is not about legal rights, but rather refers to "symbolic citizenship," which Homi Bhabha claims pertains to issues connected to cultural differences and social discrimination and of matters related to collective inclusion and exclusion (1994: xvii). Moreover, Bhabha argues in *The Location of Culture* that "symbolic citizenship is now principally defined by a surveillant culture of 'security'" (xvii).

With this same understanding, Yuval-Davis argues that the question of belonging and citizenship is central to national ideology in terms of identifying "insiders" and "outsiders," which has tended to dominate "the politics of belonging" throughout the twentieth century (2011: 2). She defines "belonging" as expressing one's sense of "fitting in" and feeling "safe" within one's environment, and the "politics of belonging" as referring to collective identity, which is brought into relief when it is threatened in some way (2011: 10). Hence, political projects are constructed in specific ways to define the dominant "us" in relation to Others who threaten common boundaries.⁶ Consequently, the politics of belonging has intensified in the post-9/11 global context as the events of that day have resulted in increased vigilance for the "terrorist-stranger" who may be living amongst "us," and who, Yuval-Davis notes, is assumed to be young and male (2). Indeed, the "2014 Public Safety Canada Report" underscores young men as most at risk of radicalization. And in the wake of two murders of Canadian security personnel in October 2014 by young Muslim men who may have been radicalized, and the arrests of three young Muslim men in Ottawa in January 2015 for attempting to travel to Syria to join the terrorist organisation known as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), various media have persistently placed emphasis on young Muslim males in particular as at risk of radicalization and hence as posing a potential threat to the nation.

Although Yuval-Davis does not equate the terrorist-stranger with Muslim males specifically, she introduces her chapter on the politics of belonging by discussing the "7/7" subway bombings in London during the summer of 2005 and includes particular comments made

⁶Some examples Yuval-Davis gives on the politics of belonging are debates on whether Jews can be German, or abortion advocates can be considered Catholic (2011: 10).

by one of the bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, which indicate his identification (that is, belonging) with Muslims across the globe rather than as a British citizen. We may consider Yuval-Davis's discursive alignment as implying that it is young Muslim males, for the most part, who are frequently perceived to be potential "terrorists-strangers," and thus, may suffer the "hegemonic gaze" more intensely than other male "strangers" within nation-state borders. Although Sirin and Fine state that both the young Muslim men and women in their study were regularly questioned by non-Muslims about their being potential terrorists, it was only the young men who displayed deep angst on this matter (2007: 157). The young women in their study, on the other hand, derived a sense of empowerment from wearing a hijab (because the headscarf visually identified them as Muslims) as this afforded them many opportunities to explain to enquiring non-Muslims that Islam is a non-threatening religion (2007: 156). Regarding the "micro"-politics of belonging, the young women were thus knowingly using their bodies as "billboard space" (Genz and Brabon, 2009: 175) to communicate their "difference" from non-Muslims as non-threatening and thereby establishing their acceptability as citizens of the nation. Veiling thus affords young Muslim females some leverage in negotiating a sense of national belonging—as a symbol of *non-threatening* citizenship—that young male Muslims cannot access. This leveraging, however, is not always the case. A 2014 report of a Muslim teen being attacked and beaten in London, Ontario because she wore a hijab (Geddes, 2014) clearly illustrates the continuing contestation surrounding Muslim identity, the symbolic meanings attached to veiling, and the politics of belonging.

These gendered divisions in which young Muslims perceive their place of belonging—or the conditions of belonging—in the nation and their attempts to negotiate acceptance are critical to the development of their identities. For as Yuval-Davis argues, "Politics of belonging have come to occupy the heart of the political agenda almost everywhere in the world [. . . Indeed,] there is a growing obsession with belonging [in terms of] nationality and citizenship" (2011: 2). This claim resonates with that of former Canadian Liberal Party leader, Michael Ignatieff, who sees national identity on the cultural level as providing individuals "with their primary form of belonging" (1995: 5). Most revealing in these accounts of young Muslims' sense of belonging to the national body and the avenues open to them in "negotiating" symbolic citizenship (in the sense of collective belonging) is that they clearly illustrate the gendered aspects of national projects and processes.

Tamar Mayer (1999) argues that the gendered aspects of nationalism go hand in hand with national identity. Historically, she says, national projects have been the institution of men who have defined themselves as protectors of the nation in relation to the reproductive role traditionally assigned to females. This binary structure underscores heterosexuality as a hegemonic feature of nationalism owing to its procreative emphasis. Internal challenges to dominant heteronormative national constructions, such as, for example, same-sex marriages, figure strongly in national debates about national identity, specifically regarding the moral character of the nation. Gender, sexuality, and nationalism are all constructed but interrelated categories in that they serve to define the collective identity of a nation (Mayer, 1999; Nagel, 2003; Stoler, 2010). Nagel argues that, in times of war, the associations between these categories, as well as related concepts of symbolic citizenship, are intensified. Nagel asserts, for example, that the idea of the nation includes regulations and restrictions for “sexual crossings—what good citizens should and should not do sexually, and whom they should and should not have sex with. In this case, ‘our’ women should not be having sex with ‘their’ (particularly ‘enemy’) men” (2003: 141-42).⁷ Nationalism thus entails controlling the sexual practices of national members and defining symbolic citizenship. Since a sense of belonging or “good citizenship” is bound to the ideology of nationalism, and since sexual boundaries are based on exclusion, observing symbolic sexual boundaries exhibits fidelity to the nation (Nagel, 2003: 147) and thus confirms belonging. Contravening national sexual boundaries during the Second World War led to severe punishment for offenders (Nagel, 2003: 142); however, in the present, sexual boundaries are conveyed in subtler ways. For example, in a 2011 episode of the popular American television series *The Good Wife*, a respected individual running for a government office had to resign her bid when it was discovered that many years earlier she had had sexual relations with a relative of Osama bin Laden (“Affairs”). While it may have been acceptable in the past, it is an *unacceptable* sexual relationship now. The “enemy of the nation,” then, through association with Osama bin Laden, as this example shows, is unmistakably Arab-Muslim.

⁷ Ann Stoler demonstrates that constructions of gender, sexuality, and race categories were integral to the technologies of colonization, and that they have proven resilient in the modern era. However, following Nagel, I argue that in the historical present within the framework of the war on terror, Muslims collectively are increasingly constructed as an “enemy” of the nation-state. This identification conceptualizes life-threatening features associated with Muslim identities regardless of class, gender (although males bear a heavier weighting), sectarian affiliations, or ethnic heritage. Under these politicized conditions, sexual-crossings take on more saliency in the processes of classifying “subjects, nationals, citizens, and different kinds of citizens in the nation-state” (Stoler, 2010: 100).

Naber argues that the post-9/11 backlash “solidified the racial category ‘Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim’ enemy and rendered persons associated with this category as embodying a ‘culture’ and/or ‘religion’ that is inherently different and inferior to ‘American’ ‘culture’ and/or ‘religion’” (2006: 236). In the post-9/11 context, the “war on terror” rhetoric and the narrow construction of terrorist-strangers have significantly affected the lives of young Muslims, and in gendered ways, as discussed above. Some young Muslim women use their veiling as a point of departure to communicate that they are not a threat to non-Muslims, and thus establish themselves as “good citizens.” Naber’s (2006), Jamil and Rousseau’s (2012), and Sirin and Fine’s (2007) studies all show that their Muslim respondents expressed self-consciousness about their behaviours and actions, as well as a desire to present a positive image to non-Muslims in an effort to defuse negative perceptions. Also, Khaled Beydoun theorizes that Muslims in the U.S. have, since the time of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” initiatives purposefully adjusted their public performance of their religious identities in four specific ways: confirming Islam, conforming Islam, covering Islam, and concealing Islam, which (the latter) has become more prevalent under the current Trump administration (2018: 39).⁸ In Canada, Jennifer Selby’s 2012 study (see Selby, 2016) with young Muslims in St. John’s, Newfoundland, finds that one young man consciously conceals his religious identity in public (80), which may be indicative of Beydoun’s “concealing Islam” category.⁹ I argue that these various consciously guarded behaviours, however, also reveal some Muslims’ perceived relationship to the “enemy of the nation.” This surveillant conduct raises some important questions. If good citizenship means not having sexual relations with “the enemy Other,” and “the enemy” is by association to Osama bin Laden, Muslim, then how do young Muslims internalize these dominant tropes in the sense of forming their sexual subjectivities, and how do young Muslims define “sexual crossings”? In other words, how do young Muslims perceive their “sexual placement” within the nation and determine who qualifies as an “appropriate” sexual partner? My research, thus, seeks to flesh out

⁸ See Chapter 3, “Muslim Masculinity, Self-Surveillance and Canadian Citizenship,” for details about Beydoun’s four categorizations.

⁹ I emphasize here that the young man *may* fall into the “concealing Islam” categorization. Selby’s study examined trends in academic sources and public policy on Islam that focus on devout Muslim identifications that, consequently, manufacture piety as a mainstay of Muslim identity. This limiting focus on piety as undergirding *sincere* Muslim identities creates a notably restricted model of ‘Muslimness’ (2016: 72). It is this narrow definition that this young Muslim man was responding to, as he encounters it daily (2016: 81). See Chapter 3, “Muslim” Masculinity, Self-Surveillance, and Canadian Citizenship” for my discussion of how this limiting model of “Muslimness” translates into performing “Muslim” masculinity publicly.

the relationship between the post-9/11 “hegemonic gaze” and young Muslims’ self-surveillance practices, between a sociopolitical discourse that characterizes Muslims in a sexually “inferior” way, and young Canadian Muslims’ formation of their religious and sexual identities.

While post-9/11 hegemonic sexual positioning and its impact on young Canadian Muslims form the core of this dissertation, I also consider the current culture of sexuality in which young North American Muslims are growing up¹⁰ and the varying levels of religiosity that shape young Muslim individuals’ understandings of their sexuality.¹¹ The meanings that the young Muslims in my study make in light of contemporary sexual culture and their religious convictions related to sexuality inform my analysis of some of the ways young Muslims process hegemonic sexual positioning and negotiations of belonging. My study thus explores the relationship between sexuality, nationalism, and belonging—informed by the perspectives of a few Canadian Muslim youth themselves. While each of these themes is usually given individual attention, following Mayer (1999), Nagel (2003), and Yuval-Davis (2011), I consider them as interrelated categories within a hegemonic assembly that construct notions of belonging, which have taken on greater urgency in the post-9/11 context. I assert that a critical examination of hegemonic sexual positioning is absent in studying young Muslims’ identity, and thus I seek to explore the intersecting processes by which it informs the lives of young Canadian Muslims.

Statement of the Problem

Contemporary North American scholarly research and analysis of young Muslims’ identity often take gendered positions. Consequently, North American studies with young Muslim women tend to emphasize religious piety as a marker of identity (see, for example, Hoodfar, 2006; and Zine, 2008), while male-centred studies tend to accentuate the growing religio-political solidarity (coded as potentially threatening) of young Muslim males. These strategies reinforce current stereotyped perceptions of Muslim identity—that is, of oppressed Muslim women and violent Muslim men. Research with young Muslims tends to ignore sexual subjectivities as a

¹⁰ Andrew Yip and Sarah Page state that young people today “are constructed as imbued with sexual possibility” and as “a generation who are supposed to be having good sex—and lots of it” (2013:1).

¹¹ Sociologist Mark Regnerus (2007) found in his study with Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish youths that their sexual activities ranged from abstinence to negotiating sex by stressing particular boundaries, such as maintaining virginity by having oral sex, or consenting to sexual intercourse with someone to whom they are committed to marry. Regnerus’s study complicates assumptions that religious youths’ sexual convictions are inherently conservative.

manifestation of identity. For Muslim women especially, sexual subjectivities are automatically subsumed within religious subjectivities. Also, these patterns of conducting research with young Muslims indicate the invisibility of hegemony in discourses of North American Muslim identity. Accordingly, in the light of post-9/11 national ideologies and related hegemonic sexual positioning of Muslims, I assert that there is a critical gap in studying the sexual subjectivities of young North American Muslims. The following examples illustrate just how young Muslim women's identity is limited in two Canadian studies, and, in the broader North American context, the manner in which the potential violence of young Muslim men is presumed and communicated through both academic and media sources.

Young Muslim Female Identity

Western perceptions of Muslims as backward and uncivilized are rooted in the colonial period. European colonizers defined the differences in dress and customs of colonized "others" as inferior to the civilized superiority of Europeans. In Islamic countries, veiling and gender segregation along with permitting polygamy were seen as reflecting Islam's demeaning treatment of women. Later, especially after the 1973 Arab-Israel War and the oil boycott of 1973-1974, as Edward Said argues in *Orientalism*, Western media have routinely represented Arab-Muslim men as violent and deceitful (1979: 285-87), and other scholars claim that Muslim females are consistently characterized as passive, submissive creatures with little or no agency (Khan, 1995, 2006).

Scholarly research attempts to refute these racially biased and politically motivated characterizations of Muslims through an examination of the lived experience of Muslims. While methodologies and analysis vary, most North American studies are grounded in the participants' religious foundations and the immediate context in which the participants negotiate their identities (see, for example, Hoodfar, 2006; and Zine, 2008). Contemporary studies also tend to take a gendered approach. Hence, feminist scholars are sensitive to the racially discriminating depictions of Muslim women as passive and oppressed and thus explore Muslim women's agency in contradiction to these common stereotypes and Orientalist rhetoric. Accordingly, many take up the issue of veiling—a highly contested subject in the post-9/11 context because of "its emergence as an indisputable symbol of Muslimness" (Hoodfar, 2006: 204). Although the

reasons young North American Muslim women give for veiling are varied, the basic religious impetus rests in notions of piety.

The “pious Muslim girl” archetype is a dominant model endorsed for Muslim girls, states Jasmin Zine (2008: 40). This character “script” is rooted in conservative and patriarchal views of Muslim women’s identity and includes both inward spiritual sincerity and outward representation of devotion expressed through conservative clothing (Zine, 2008: 40-41). Sexuality is intrinsic to this script because sex in Islam is a moral issue. In Islam, *zina* (pre-marital or extramarital sex between men and women) is *haram*, a prohibited act for both genders. Also, the issue of *izzat*, or honour, is central to the discourse of piety in that it “effectively regulates the behaviour and actions of young Muslim women so as not to compromise family honour” (Zine, 2008: 41). *Izzat* underscores sexual purity and piety but is impressed more on females to guard their social conduct and their sexual desires (Chakraborty, 2010: 3; Dogan, 2011: 425; see also Nagel, 2003: 162-63).

Contemporary North American studies with young Muslim women conducted within a feminist framework demonstrate piety as exemplifying the young woman’s moral and social posture and verify the young woman’s agency regarding veiling choices. Hoodfar, for example, argues that most of the young women in her Canadian study consider veiling as symbolizing “good Muslim women” (the same archetype as the “pious Muslim girl” but articulated in concert with age increments), but that contrary to stereotypes of Muslim women being oppressed and forced to veil, her participants describe multiple ways that they utilize veiling as a strategy to negotiate their particular gendered positions within their families and Muslim communities, and within the broader public.

Some women, for example, maintained that they wear a veil to convey their “right” to dress as they choose while others indicate that they felt familial and religious community pressure to wear a veil. For these young women, their decision to comply with familial pressures resulted in more freedom for them regarding social movement. Indeed, Hoodfar states that familial and religious community pressure was a “common factor” precipitating the young women’s decisions to veil (2006: 212). One seventeen-year-old woman states,

After I turned twelve, my parents did not want me to visit my Canadian friends and more and more I had to stay home. [...] [O]ther Pakistani families did not

want to visit us, or if they did, they left their daughters at home for fear of being influenced by me. So, my life became lonelier.” (Hoodfar, 2006: 213)

Once she decided to veil, however, the young woman describes a peaceful home setting, friendships with Muslim and non-Muslim females, and opportunities to drive the family car (Hoodfar, 2006: 213-14).

Hoodfar’s analysis of this narrative, and others like it, points to the young woman’s agency in her decision to veil and downplays the power of parental and religious communities’ ostracizing strategies. She states, “By taking up the veil, they [the young women] symbolically but clearly announced to their parents and their community that despite their unconventional activities and involvement with non-Muslims, they retain their Islamic mores and values. They are modern Muslim women who want to be educated and publicly active, but not at the cost of their moral principles” (2006: 215). In the context of her study, Hoodfar’s accenting the young women’s agency as a measure of modernity (“modern Muslim women”) indicates Western feminist perspectives applied to her analysis, which foregrounds contemporary Western women’s democratic “right” to “choose” her attire—at the expense of examining the restrictions on the young woman’s social life and the wretchedness of being ostracized by her family and her religious community. To be sure, the accounts given in their interviews by the young women and from which Hoodfar draws her conclusions are after the fact and thus indicate the young women’s coming to terms with their situations and with what they perceive as favourable consequences. As a result, by implication, the restrictions and ostracizing measures that the young women relate are seemingly “downgraded” to teenage emotional “growing pains.”

However, what is missing in Hoodfar’s analysis is the young women’s perspectives on their sexuality in relation to veiling. Hoodfar comments, for example, that veiling is connected to “[p]arental fears concerning drinking, sexual activity and possible pregnancy” (2006: 213); however, the young women’s views on sexual activity are absent. Rather, what is stressed in these young women’s “decisions” to veil is their strong moral character. Also, Hoodfar notes that for some young women, veiling allows them the opportunity to interact with both Muslim and non-Muslim men without “the community” thinking of the exchange in sexual terms (2006: 214-15). One young woman states, for example,

Previously, it was always the worry that maybe there would be a misunderstanding, that someone might think I was propositioning them [(men)],

or that if someone sees me talking or walking with a man, they might think he is my boyfriend, and that of course is not good for one's reputation in the community. Since taking the veil these worries about talking with classmates or colleagues have disappeared. (Hoodfar, 2006: 215)

Indeed, the young woman's comments imply that she has no sexual interest in her male counterparts. While Hoodfar declares that veiling draws a symbolic *no dating*—which implies *no sex*—line, and also that “[t]he veil is a powerful means of communicating all these images without uttering a word,” she also stresses the absence of sexual desire in the young women: “and with this understanding [that veiling symbolizes no dating, no sex], it is not surprising that women have discovered and adopted it [(that is, veiling)]” (2006: 215). From this analysis, then, we may conclude that young Muslim women who “choose” to veil do so for moral reasons, and it is not that difficult a decision for them in terms of sexuality because they essentially have no sexual desires.

The problem with this assumption, of course, is that it is unlikely that all the young women in Hoodfar's study are asexual (in terms of lacking interest in or desire for sex). It is more likely that their sexuality was never discussed. Thus, sexual desire is assumed to be virtually non-existent in unmarried, pious “good Muslim women.” Indeed, the young women's sexuality was not discussed because the feminist lens employed by the researcher was effective in demonstrating that piety regulates the behaviour and actions of young Muslim women so as not to compromise family honour and that this gendered paradigm does not impinge on the agency of young Muslim women in the Canadian context in terms of exercising their “choice”¹²

¹² It is important to note that veiling has a long history and that it is relatively recently that it has become politicized. For many Muslim women, veiling symbolizes religious belonging and commitment, as well as an individual conviction (Almila and Inglis, 2018: 10). These sincere motives are disassociated from the “Western” agentic feminist framework. That is, Western notions of feminist agency are often forced into the analyses of Muslim women's reasons for veiling. Moreover, scholars have shown that notions of “Islamic” gender oppression work in ways that ignore Muslim women's agency. Al-Saji's argues that rather than being liberating, “unveiling” may be “experienced as bodily disintegration or immobilization” (2010: 809). Although veiling cannot be wholly separated from political and social elements and agency comes into play in these contexts, we must recognize that these factors change over place and time. In exploring Canadian Muslim women's veiling practices, especially for women who have grown up in Canada, it is likely that Muslim women have developed an “awareness” (Almila and Inglis, 2018: 10) of – and a narrative about – their veiling practices in relation/response to Western feminist values and recurrent inquiries (by non-Muslims) about their personal religious subjectivities. What I have described here is that Muslim women have multiple veiling subjectivities but are often positioned as either “outside” or “inside” a western feminist framework. This placement is problematic in that Canadian Muslim women are sometimes constituted as having an awareness of western feminist values that does not necessarily translate into *exercising* those values. I flesh out these discursive elements of veiling agency in the Canadian context in Chapter 5, “Defensive Discourses.”

to veil. Moreover, because the subjects' assertions are embedded in a discourse of piety the young women's sexual subjectivities are neatly and imperceptibly subsumed within their religious subjectivities. This discourse of piety as normalizing Muslim subjectivities is pervasive in Canadian socio-political commentaries on and in studies about "Muslim" identities (Selby, 2016: 76-78). I will address this theme below when I compare the gendered approaches taken in studying, analyzing, and "authenticating" young Muslim's religio-socio-political subjectivities. For now, in this section, I want to focus on the use of a feminist lens in Canadian explorations of young Muslim women's agency and, specifically, its overprivileging of religious subjectivities and omission of sexual subjectivities.

Another study employing a feminist lens and foregrounding religiously scripted subjectivities in its examination of young Muslim women's agency was conducted by Jasmin Zine in Toronto. Zine examines notions of honour and piety as constructed within Canadian Islamic school settings, and specifically, how teenage Muslim girls "construct notions of gender and religious identity [both] within and against the dominant patriarchal discourses promoted in these schools" (2008: 36). The "pious Muslim girl" archetype constitutes the dominant discourse shaping extrinsic behaviour expectations at the schools, including maintaining a modest dress code, which includes wearing a hijab and *jilbab* (long overcoat) (Zine, 2008: 40-41). Gendered boundaries are strictly enforced, but the physical movements of the female students are more rigidly controlled than they are for male students. At one school, the girls are not allowed outside during school hours, not allowed to walk down the street to the Mosque, and "the windows of the girls' classrooms are covered with green paint to conceal them from public view" (Zine, 2008: 52).

Zine states that while the young women in her study view Islamic schools as sites where they are "protected," and some affirm the imposition of gendered boundaries "as a form of appropriate Islamically gendered differentiation" (2008: 54), many others "recognize a certain level of physical and social disempowerment and speak with varying degrees of discontent about the surveillance placed on their movement and activities inside and outside of school" (2008: 50).¹³ Concerning Muslim female agency and strictly gendered boundaries, Zine notes that the

¹³ Regarding surveillance, Zine refers to a similar study of Muslim girls and Islamic schooling conducted by Kaye Haw in the U.K., who also witnessed the double standard in the community and vastly differing gendered surveillance practices. Haw refers to a more intense but "invisible scrutiny" of young females as the "*bradari* gaze," which she likens to Michel Foucault's notion of the panopticon in the sense of being watched and thus resulting in

transgression of these imposed restrictions is effected within an Islamic framework. For example, she relates the story of one young woman who disobeyed these limitations when she approached a young male student to offer her condolences on the sudden death of his brother. Although the principal chastised her for defying gender divisions, she interpreted her actions as “Islamically appropriate” because she understood that she would receive blessings for her act of kindness (Zine, 2008: 56). Zine claims that the young woman’s “defiance of the school’s rules means that she asserts her own Islamic imperative and rejects the standards imposed by the school [... and] begins to exercise agency based on Islamic ethics and values that are not constrained by gender” (2008: 56). Although the participants in her study made no explicit claims to feminism, the fact that they were cognizant of the double standard and resisted it in subtle and obvious ways, within an Islamic framework, demonstrates what Zine refers to as an “Islamically centred feminism” (2008: 57).

Islamically centred feminism, as Zine describes it in the Canadian context, sees young Muslim women acting outside of strictly enforced gendered boundaries, but only when those actions are in concert with Islamic moral protocols. As the definition of feminism in Canada means the advocacy of women's rights on the basis of the equality of the sexes, Zine’s religiously defined descriptor seems erroneous. More accurately, what Zine defines here is a legitimate reason for a young Muslim woman to *briefly* defy strict limitations placed on her because of her gender. My point is that examining young Muslim women’s lives utilizing a feminist lens generates a sense of feminist agency that may not be “valued” or is “disavowed” (by Western feminist standards) because, instead, what is commonly reinforced is the notion that young Muslim women are subjectively pious and act only out of that essential characteristic.¹⁴

Along with a feminist lens, Zine also includes a critical faith-centred perspective to contextualize the young women’s gendered and morally structured environment. This approach holds that religiously scripted subjectivities are embedded within the socio-cultural language of

the girls’ self-disciplining behaviour accordingly (see Zine, 2008: 46). The difference between this panopticon-like surveillance and the scrutiny discussed in Naber’s (2006), Jamil and Rousseau’s (2012), and Sirin and Fine’s (2007) studies, above, is that here only the females are under community surveillance. In the studies above, both female and male participants felt they were under surveillance—a “hegemonic gaze”—and thus modified their behaviours accordingly. An important distinction here, then, is that the *bradari* gaze is only, or mostly, directed at females within Muslim communities while the *hegemonic gaze* encompasses all young Muslims within their communities and public spheres.

¹⁴ This is not to say that “Muslim” feminist agency does not exist, but rather that the discourse of piety is restrictive. I draw on postfeminist theories about individualized forms of feminist agency in discussing young Canadian Muslim women’s agency in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.

one's experiences in faith-based settings (Zine, 2008: 38). However, Zine gives as an example the lives of women living in Cairo, Egypt, where Islamic religious elements are culturally entrenched, rather than exploring the religious (and feminist) subjectivities of the young women in the/their Canadian context. Paying attention to the particular influence of the socio-cultural context of young Muslims' experience is indeed essential in regard to contextualizing Muslim youths' religious subjectivities—and their sexual subjectivities. However, rather than consider the prevailing sexual norms of Canadian culture, which Zine refers to as “promot[ing] an MTV subculture of sexuality” (2008: 56, nt. 8), as having an impact on her participants' subjectivities, Zine dismisses these cultural signs because they conflict with familial and religious expectations of modesty regarding dress and behaviour. Yet this dominant sexual culture Zine describes is indeed a reality in the lives of young Canadian Muslims and should, therefore, also be drawn on as an essential context when examining young Canadian Muslims' identity.

To isolate sexual subjectivities as residing outside of young Muslims' experiences and selfhood or exclusively somewhere inside their religious subjectivities is to assume an order to young Muslims' subjectivities on their behalf. This rather honourable presumption, then, leads to overemphasizing piety, especially in relation to young women, which as Zine paradoxically argues, is a dominant preoccupation amongst Muslim communities (2008: 40). Research that foregrounds female piety while assuming dormant/suppressed/undeveloped sexual subjectivities demonstrates this same fixation. Repeating this pattern of preoccupation forces a “one-size-fits-all” sexual subjectivity onto young Muslim females, which in turn reinforces the perception of young Muslim female sexuality as dormant/suppressed/undeveloped in the dominant culture. When researchers focus only on the agency of young Muslim women in response to stereotyped notions of Muslim female oppression, they fail to respond to another common oppressed-related accusation—that of oppressed sexuality,¹⁵ and inadvertently reinforce this prevailing perspective.

Canadian studies utilizing a feminist lens effectively articulate young Muslim women's agency, but they simultaneously reinforce assumptions that young Muslim women are non-sexual beings. That is, by framing piety as the locus of agency they appear to privilege an

¹⁵ See Herrera and Bayat for a discussion on veiling in Germany (2010: 191-92). They refer to a journalist specializing on Algeria, gender, and Islam who claims that experiencing and experimenting with sexuality during adolescence is a necessary step in becoming a psychologically healthy adult, and that young Muslim women who assert modesty and reluctance in their interactions with young men will not develop essential social and relational skills.

asexual existence normatively. In so doing, these studies typically and consistently describe inequality between young Muslim women and young non-Muslim women, who are always already agential and sexual members of the nation. Indeed, invocations of piety in the context of these studies tend to negate “Muslim” sexuality while non-Muslim sexuality retains an intrinsically normative rhetorical space. In this sense, and in light of post-9/11 nationalist logic, I posit that such scholarly studies thus unwittingly collude with the hegemonic sexual positioning of Muslim sexuality as “lacking” in relation to sexually “normalized” non-Muslims.

Young Muslim Male Identity

In contrast to studies with young Muslim women, discourses of piety and oppression are absent in studies about young Canadian and young American Muslim men. Indeed, in Canada and the U.S., young Muslim men are shown as having greater latitude in expressing their identities well beyond their local communities, as well as having much more “relevance” in the public sphere than their female counterparts. That is to say that young Muslim men are commonly portrayed in political and scholarly studies, as well as in mass media reports as “at risk” to radical Islamism and hence a threat to national security. These recurrent discourses about young Muslim men as being potential threats to the nation convey the sense that violence is inherent in their characters. This naturalized Islamophobic characterization is steeped in the politics of inclusion and exclusion and buoyed by Orientalist, imperialist, and racialized discourses. As Khaled Beydoun argues, Islamophobia is greater than “fear” of Muslims by non-Muslims. “[T]he most potent form of Islamophobia are counterterror policies enforced by the state, which ‘legitimize prevailing misconceptions, misrepresentations, and tropes widely held by private citizens’ (2018, 17). I will come back to these themes throughout this dissertation. Here, however, I want to convey the widespread notion of young Muslim men as inherently violent as disseminated in mainstream media and at the level of government, because these are the most accessible and effective modes of communicating the theme of inherent violence.

A 2013 article in Canada’s *National Post* collectively claimed, “Ever since the 9/11 attacks Canadians have been puzzling over the motives of the extremists amongst them” (Bell). The extremists here are defined as young Muslim men, who were either born in Canada or immigrated to Canada at an early age. We may take this as a typical media narrative regarding “Muslim” extremism. More precisely, the article refers to Canadian Security Intelligence Service

(CSIS) statistics claiming that up to sixty young Muslim men, many in their early twenties, have travelled, or attempted to travel, overseas to al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations to engage in terrorism-related activities. Official reports in 2016 indicate that that number had increased to 180 individuals and that the government was aware of 60 “extremist travelers” who had returned to Canada (Canada. Public Safety. “2016 Public Report”). Although Canada has experiences of homegrown terrorism (for example, the “Toronto 18”), of significant note here is the relatively new term “extremist travellers” being used by the Canadian government that accentuates a travel-related connection to (young Muslim men’s) radicalization.

Narratives concerning “extremist travellers” emerged in 2014 after a spokesman for ISIS, an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq, urged its supporters to kill Canadians arbitrarily on domestic soil by whatever means.¹⁶ A short time later, two young Muslim men in separate incidents attacked and killed two Canadian military personnel, one in Québec and the other near the Parliament buildings in Ottawa.¹⁷ Heightened awareness of “extremist travellers” arose again in 2015 when three Muslim men in their twenties were arrested in Ottawa for conspiring to commit terrorism.¹⁸ In each case, media reports stipulate that the RCMP thwarted all attempts to leave Canada to participate in terrorist activity abroad (and to return to Canada as trained terrorists). Although none of these young Muslim men mentioned here had travelled overseas to join ISIS, intensified media attention over these attacks and arrests and the “extremist traveller” classification convey to the broader (non-Muslim) public that young Muslim men are potentially susceptible to Islamist radicalization, even though having grown up in Canada.

In the U.S., similar concerns about what Lorenzo Vidino, the Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland refers to as “homegrown jihadists” were expressed in American media sources in the aftermath of the

¹⁶ See Canada. Public Safety. “Government of Canada Updates”; and Bell, 2014.

¹⁷ Martin Couture-Rouleau, a twenty-five-year-old who had converted to Islam in 2013, deliberately ran over with his car and killed a Canadian soldier in Saint Jean sur Richelieu, Québec. Several months earlier, the RCMP, suspecting him of being an *extremist traveller*, had seized his passport and placed him under surveillance. In Ottawa, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who was also a convert to Islam, shot and killed a sentry on guard at the War Memorial in Ottawa and then proceeded to storm the nearby Parliament building where he was subsequently shot and killed by government security forces. A few weeks before this event, Zehaf-Bibeau had applied for a Libyan passport (his father is Libyan) so he could travel to Libya. The passport was turned down for a number of reasons (see “Ottawa Shooting”), including suspicion of being an *extremist traveller*.

¹⁸ The three young men arrested in Ottawa in January 2015 are twenty-one-year-old Suliman Mohamad, and twenty-four-year-old twin brothers Carlos and Ashton Larmond, who are reported to have converted to Islam in 2012 (see Helmer, 2016). The three pled guilty and were variously sentenced in August 2016.

Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013 (2013, “Understanding” par. 5). Although not negating the violence of terrorism, Vidino suggests that American “homegrown jihadists” are more troubled by personal conflicts than with seeking political justice. Vidino further notes that the Boston terrorists, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, had settled in the Boston area more than ten years before the attacks (2013, “Understanding” par. 5). Their embrace of jihadist ideology, he says, indicates a repeated pattern of radicalization promoted through the Internet and some “small radical clusters that exist throughout the country” (2013, “Understanding” par. 6). The main difference between Canadian and U.S. perspectives, however, is that Canadian officials emphasize the foreign elements of young Canadians’ “Islamic-related” radicalization in that many have travelled overseas (or attempted to) to join Islamic terrorist organizations, while U.S. experts point to domestic radicalization.¹⁹ The fact that both Canadian and American experts’ and media coverage of the above terrorist-related activities stress the *length of time* young North American jihadists had lived in their respective countries before engaging in terrorist activities, clearly implies that *any* young Muslim man who grew up in Canada and the U.S. could potentially turn to terrorism, and, therefore, may be considered a national threat.

Both Canadian (Jamil and Rousseau, 2012) and U.S. (Naber, 2006; Sirin and Fine, 2007) studies show that over the past decade, Muslim youths have experienced increased scrutiny and discrimination because of public perceptions of Muslims as associated with violence and terrorism. For many young Canadian and American Muslim men, this new “public stage” is both dismaying and defining. At present, as Moustafa Bayoumi puts it, “[young Muslim men] are in the eye of today’s security storm” (2010: 165). Bayoumi refers, for example, to a 2007 New York City Police Report that casts suspicion on the “mundane” activities of Muslim men under 35 years of age, such as gathering informally at “mosques, cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, non-governmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and bookstores”—what the Report calls “terrorism incubators” (2010: 165). Bayoumi observes that rather than identify the actual criminal activity, the Report focuses on the “ordinary and unremarkable behavior” of young Muslim men and thus “essentially criminalizes any and all young Muslim males who congregate together” (2010: 165).

¹⁹ Beydoun’s work demonstrates some slight differences in focus between the Bush (overseas) and Obama (home-grown) administrations (2018, 31).

Indeed, multiple narratives circulate throughout Canada and the U.S. expressing concern about the “threat” that young Muslim men pose to their respective nations. The “length of time” narrative underscores (unfairly) the potentiality for violence latently lurking in *all* young Muslim men living in Canada and the U.S., and there is evidence that law enforcers are now suspicious of young Muslim men’s mundane informal gatherings. The trouble is, terrorism does exist, and some young men under police scrutiny may indeed be involved in extremist activities. Michael Kimmel, the editor of the journal *Men and Masculinities*, strives to understand the connections between radicalized young Muslim men and masculinity. In his analysis, Kimmel links terrorist aggression to globalization and its distressing of traditional patterns of masculinity, which he claims are tied to employment (2003: 604). Kimmel asserts that in some Muslim cultures, regional job instability “often manifest[s] as gender revolts and include[s] a virulent resurgence of domestic patriarchy” (2003: 604). For Kimmel, then, the “recovery of manhood” is central to terrorist political ideology (2003: 615). He gives a psychoanalytical assessment of Mohammed Atta, the mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and pilot of the first plane crash into the World Trade Center, deducing that Atta was under familial pressure to live up to his father’s standards and achieve the same success as his sisters had (one a professor; the other a doctor). “Defeated, humiliated, emasculated, a disappointment to his father and a failed rival to his sisters,” Kimmel claims, “Atta retreated into increasingly militant Islamic theology” (2003: 617). While Kimmel’s assertion does not directly address “homegrown” radicalism (and taken at face value) it does suggest that young Muslim men’s “manhood” should be considered as an important issue in studies about young Muslim men’s socio-religio-political and masculine subjectivities.

Though perhaps not fully cognizant of the significance of “manhood” to a terrorist’s psyche, it is, nevertheless, common for Western scholars to pathologize extremists’ virility. For example, Mia Bloom explains ISIS’s online-recruitment tactics aimed at Muslim women: “Like the sexual pedophile, they are creating rapport, building trust, creating an environment of secrecy” (see Hembrey, 2015). Pedophiles are exclusively attracted to prepubescent children. Hence, not only does this aberrant characterization serve to construct Muslim men’s sexuality as “deviant,” but it also functions to infantilize the Muslim women who marry these “radicals.” In other research, scholars claim that post-9/11 terrorist-related rhetoric portrays Muslim men’s sexuality as “inferior” to non-Muslim men’s sexuality (Naber, 2006: 250). These scholarly

explorations exemplify existing multiple narratives that detrimentally define Muslim masculinity and sexuality.

Before 9/11, young Canadian and young American Muslim men were not perceived in the public sphere as the harbingers of radicalism and a threat to national security, nor was Muslim manliness portrayed in research and mass media as pathologized, deviant, or “inferior.” However, at present, a review of both media and scholarly constructions of young Muslim men’s character and psyche reveals the tendency to typify young Muslim men as inherently violent with a pathologized sexuality. Crucially missing in studies of young Canadian and young American Muslim men’s identities is how these sexually symbolic constructions of Muslim male sexuality as “deviant,” “inferior,” or “pathologized” in relation to non-Muslim males may affect young Muslims’ sense of masculinity as well as their sexual subjectivities. Indeed, one young man in Sirin and Fine’s study stated that the “hegemonic gaze” left him feeling “violated” (2007:160), a word commonly associated with sexual assault victims. Since there is agreement among some terrorist specialists and scholarly researchers that Canadian and American homegrown “jihadists” are more troubled by personal conflicts than with seeking political justice (Vidino, 2010; Skillicorn et al., 2012), and that a sense of “manhood” may also play a role in terrorist-related constructions of masculine identities, I assert that a critical examination of the interplay between sexuality and young Muslim masculine subjectivities is needed. The omission of this investigative perspective reveals a crucial gap in research with young Canadian and young American Muslim men.

Comparing Gender-Based Studies

These gendered patterns of studying young Canadian and young American Muslims’ identities reinforce stereotyped perceptions of young Muslim women as oppressed and young Muslim men as potentially violent and prone to radicalization. Studies concerning young Muslim women are organized around their home-based communities and school settings and thus expound identity at the local level. In studies of veiling, difference is conveyed in the vocabulary of piety, which consists of notions of a blended “western” and “Islamic” feminist agency and the observing of “proper” gender and sexual protocols. As noted above, especially in my examination of Hoodfar’s (2006) study, sexuality is acknowledged as an aspect of veiling practices but is elided as a reality in the young women’s lives. Based on 2009/2010 Canadian statistics, 66% of 15- to

24-year-olds reported having had sexual intercourse. The likelihood of being sexually active rose with age. In the 15- to 17-year-old, 18- to 19-year-old, and 20- to 24-year-old categories, 30%, 68%, and 86%, respectively reported being sexually active (Canada. Statistics. *Sexual Behaviour*, 2017). Although Hoodfar (2006) and Zine's (2008) studies were not directly focusing on sexuality, my argument is that invocations of piety in the context of these studies tend to negate young Muslim sexuality while young non-Muslim sexuality retains an intrinsically normative rhetorical space.

Jennifer Selby identifies the discourse of piety as an aspect of “culture talk,”²⁰ described as the over-privileging of piousness in binary representations of “Muslimness” and a trend that has gained currency in the post-9/11 era (2016: 76). Culture talk is a by-product of cultural racism—an Orientalist, imperialist, racialized logic that reduces Islam and Muslims to a narrow cultural definition that overlooks its historical, political, and broad geographical heritage. Its contemporary configuration stems from the polarized dichotomies of good Muslim (non-terrorist)/bad Muslim (terrorist) ideologies. “Piety” thus has come to signify a “good Muslim.” In order to distance themselves from “bad Muslim” characterizations, Muslims in western societies are often pressed to demonstrate piety or devoutness in their daily lives. Social pressure to conform to this ideological construct translates to academic sources and public policies that focus on devout Muslim identifications, which, in turn, reproduce this limiting profile of “Muslimness” (Selby, 2016: 76). In academia, Selby points to the researcher's perspectives and formation of questions in shaping the respondent's answers. That is, if the researcher assumes piety is present in the interlocutors' daily negotiations and forms questions based on that assumption, Muslim responses may reflect these assumptions (Selby, 2016: 77). Although, as examples, I take issue with the feminist lens used by Hoodfar and by Zine as limiting young Muslim identities—specifically, in eliminating their sexual subjectivities—I also want to suggest that the frameworks by which these scholars approach their studies may, in fact, be underpinned by “culture talk.”

Narratives about young Muslim men, on the other hand, are articulated at national and international levels. In the range of discourses centering on young Muslim men's identities, notions of inherent violence and sexual deviancy or pathology are common and serve in

²⁰ “Culture talk” is a concept Selby borrowed from Mahmood Mamdani, author of *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror*. 2004. See Selby, 2016: 73.

nationalist ideologies to vilify Islam and “Islamic” identities. In colonial and imperial enterprises, vilifying the sexuality of the ‘other’ served to regulate sexuality and demarcate personal and public racial boundaries and positions of power (Stoler, 2010: 42). In her examination of colonial racial tensions, Stoler argues that “sexuality [was] the most salient marker of Otherness and therefore figures in any racist ideology” (2010: 46). Likewise, in commenting on the racialized and sexualized components of contemporary nationalist politics, Islamic studies scholar Scott Kugle argues, “Sexuality is connected not just to spirituality, but to politics as well. [...] We need to think more clearly about ‘intimate citizenship,’ how the personal, emotional, and sexual dimensions of our lives (which are often locked away as ‘private’) actually have very public and often political consequences” (2010: 191).

The differences in both geography and methodology associated with young Muslim-related discourses and studies reveal the essentialist cultural assumptions made about young Muslims’ gendered subjectivities, as well as their ideological positioning and relevance in nationalist discourses. Moreover, the juxtaposition of studies and discourses such as these of young Canadian and young American Muslims demonstrates that young Muslims are persistently defined regarding their “difference” from other “Canadians” or “Americans.” Identifying difference from a cultural perspective, Stuart Hall claims, is about establishing symbolic boundaries and creating a classification process in that the marking of difference dictates the need to “close ranks” against those who upset the symbolic order (1997: 236-37). Regarding nationalist ideology, symbolic boundaries underscore a sense of national belonging and citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 2). With this logic, then, the varying discourses that contribute to constructions of difference between young Muslims and young non-Muslims in Canada and in the U.S. are critical to studying and understanding young Muslims’ identities at this time.

As I have argued above, national projects include defining “insiders” and “outsiders” (Nagel, 2003: 147; Stoler, 2010). By constantly reproducing conservative constructions these “typical” research approaches and racialized discourses delimit the “outsider” subject position of young Muslims. They further provide a cultural framework whereby “sexual crossings” are symbolically conveyed—that is, by symbolically supporting regional “insider-outsider” positioning, sexual boundaries based on exclusion are thus demarcated. The fact that national ideologies and Muslim stereotypes are supported rather than challenged in these analytical

frameworks indicates the invisibility—what Louis Althusser calls “obviousnesses” (Fairclough, 2001: 84)—of hegemony in discourses about young Muslims’ identities. Given that sexual identity and conduct are prominent in nationalist ideologies, and that some young Muslims perceive themselves as under a “hegemonic gaze,” I contend that research with young Canadian Muslims would benefit from a turn toward an inclusion of an examination of sexual subjectivities rather than continue a strict and exclusive emphasis on the contemporary socio-political constructions of “piety” and “Muslim” masculine subjectivities.

Chapter 2: DISCOURSES OF SEXUALITY

The intent of this chapter is threefold: (1) to provide a brief summary of contemporary theories related to sexuality; (2) to discuss sexuality in relation to Canadian and American youths in order to illustrate a broad range of sites where young peoples' sexuality is represented and debated; and (3) to give a brief historical overview of normative and non-normative perspectives of and practices relating to sexuality in the Islamic world, as well as discuss some contemporary issues involving young Muslims in regard to these themes in both Muslim-majority societies and in the Canadian context. This discussion will also reveal critical gaps in research with young Canadian Muslims on matters related to sexuality.

Sexuality Theory

Sex researchers today are divided between theories of essentialism and theories of social constructionism; however, in the past three decades, there has been a substantial increase in research on the social and cultural dimensions of sexuality and gender that have challenged essentialist positions.

Essentialism holds "that certain phenomena are natural, inevitable, universal, and biologically determined" (DeLamater and Hyde, 1998: 10). Evolutionary theorists thus maintain that universally men pursue fertile women to maximize their gene reproduction, and women do this as well but also desire a sexual mate who will provide essential resources (money, food, and so on) towards the rearing of offspring. Sexual orientation poses a challenge for evolutionary theorists because homosexuality has no reproductive value and homosexuality and bisexuality essentially decrease heterosexual mating and reproduction (DeLamater and Hyde, 1998: 12). Sociobiologists, who apply evolutionary biology to social behaviour, have explored genetic influences on human sexuality, neuroanatomical factors (that is, female-male brain differences in the size of the hypothalamus), and hormonal imbalances. However, DeLamater and Hyde state that research conducted within these fields is inconclusive in explaining heterosexual and homosexual behaviours because not only is such research limited to these two categories of sexuality, but they fail to include the possibility that the nature of homosexuality has changed over time or has been influenced by environmental conditions (1998: 12-13). Moreover, cultural essentialists argue that the close bond between mother and infant shape feminine and masculine identity and sexual behaviour in later life; the mother provides a female identity for her daughter,

but the male child must break this bond to establish a separate, independent identity. This theory is criticized for cultural determinism of essential qualities in females and males that are not universally applicable (DeLamater and Hyde, 1998). While biological determinism and cultural essentialism explore different fields of study, their commonality is that individuals have an underlying and unchangeable nature.

Conversely, social constructionism holds that environment predominantly shapes human experiences. These experiences are external to individuals and are understood as shared by others within the same sphere of influence, including those of family, groups, communities, and country. Social practices are undergirded by shared language and common expectations of social and gendered behaviour. While social constructionists agree that sexual desire is biologically driven, DeLamater and Hyde contend that “biology does not dictate where, when, and with what object a person engages in sexual behaviour” (1998: 14). In this respect, sexuality, they say, is guided by social cues rather than biologically, and that these social signals place limitations on sexually related activities (1998: 14). Social constructionists further argue that the discourse of sexuality changes over time and place, and that terms used to describe and discuss sexuality (for example, sexual anatomy, sexual initiation, impotence, and frigidity) are communicated and given meaning by one’s social milieu and through a shared language.

Moreover, sociologist Anthony Giddens (1992) argues that the spread of modern contraception and new reproductive technologies have served to separate sexuality from reproduction and thus intimacy has undergone a significant transformation in the late modern period. Plummer adds that sexual relationships are now much more open to negotiations of intimacy and that new patterns of intimacy have emerged in the twentieth century, including “hooking up,” cybersex, sadomasochism, bisexuality, polyamory, and surgery to enhance sexual attraction or sexual functioning (2003: 4-6). Weeks (2009) also asserts that these contemporary shifts in sexuality have affected transformations in religious organizations. For instance, Episcopal/Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, he says, are currently debating the role of women and the recognition of gays and lesbians in the congregation as well as the legitimacy of same-sex unions and the ordination of gay priests. Muslims, too, at least in western countries, are debating the role of women in leading mixed-gender prayer and the recognition of gay imams.²¹

²¹ In February 2015, a group of Muslim women in Los Angeles opened an all-female mosque to get around the debate (see Street, 2015).

Moreover, Weeks adds that although the papacy forbids abortion and birth control, millions of Catholics use contraceptives to control fertility, and insists that even in countries dominated by religious dogma, “[m]orality is being privatized” (2009: 28). Indeed, contemporary shifts in notions of sexuality and intimacy wrought by biotechnological advancements in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and the accepting of sexual desire for its pleasurable appeal more than for its reproductive value have led social constructionists to define sexual identity at present, as decidedly negotiable.

Sexuality and North American Youth

The contemporary shifts in sexuality and intimacy described above are represented in various media. Communications scholar Paul Wright claims that young people in Canada and the U.S. are exposed to a plethora of sexually suggestive and explicit media on a regular basis. Wright claims that teens watch several hours of music videos a week, are regular soap opera and talk show viewers, spend a significant amount of time per week engaged in prime-time viewing, as well as devote close to two hours a day watching movies and reading magazines (2009: 182). Wright states that not only do films target adolescent audiences, but they also consistently portray sex as an activity primarily engaged in by unmarried people, and between the young and newly acquainted (2009: 189-90). Moreover, the portrayal of adolescent sexuality differs across media genres, thus offering a variety of sexualized imagery and scripts. Wright explains, for instance, that

. . . female adolescents who primarily consume television dramas and comedies may learn that sex is a risk[-free] and responsibility-free activity. On the contrary, female adolescents who primarily read teen and women’s magazines are exposed to a great deal of information about STIs, contraception, and unplanned pregnancy. Similarly, teenage males who find lad magazines insipid but enjoy daytime talk shows will be exposed to more risk and responsibility messages than their counterparts who have the opposite media preferences. Or consider sexual motives. Female adolescents who prefer prime-time programs may learn that sex is a recreational activity, female adolescents who prefer women’s magazines may be confused as to whether sex is about lust or love, while teen magazine readers may adopt a relational orientation towards sex. Perceptions of homosexuality may

also differ depending on which media genres adolescents most frequently attend to. Sitcom viewers may learn that homosexuals are eccentric, although harmless, while heavy consumers of feature length films may learn that homosexuality and deviance go hand in hand. As a final illustration, heavy soap opera viewers may develop positive attitudes towards marital sex while heavy film viewers may come to believe that marital sex is monotonous and unexciting. (2009: 196)

Plummer makes a similar assessment, claiming that much of our “daily conversation is both about and informed by these media” (2003: 20). In particular, Plummer cites the sex lives of stars and political figures such as former President Bill Clinton as driving contemporary discussions about sexuality. Regarding the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal (1998), for example, he notes, “[P]eople began to ask exactly what constitutes sex—and indeed whether oral sex is really ‘sex’” (20).

The variety of media depictions has heightened an awareness of adolescent sexuality. Accordingly, young people often find themselves faced with a confusing array of contradictory messages and sources of sexual and contraceptive information. Their information comes from parents, peers, teachers, doctors, actors, political figures, film, television, magazines, advertisements, and the Internet, including online pornography. In putting these messages, images, and sexualized narratives into perspective, Yip and Page (2013) state that youth and sexuality are primarily divided into two main discourses. On the one hand, “[y]outhful bodies are held up as perfect emblems of sexuality” and young people are viewed, as noted earlier, as “a generation who are supposed to be having good sex—and lots of it”; on the other hand, youth are considered at risk of teenage pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases (STD) (2013: 1).

The subject of youth-at-risk is central to North American educational curriculums. Researchers in this field point out that these programs are designed to encourage abstinence in order to reduce teenage pregnancy and STDs, but they do not actually address the reality of teenagers’ sexual lives, such as, for example, “hook-ups,” oral sex, masturbation, homosexuality, bisexuality, sexual desire, and easily available online pornography (see E. Connell, 2005; Irvine, 1994; Moore and Rosenthal, 2007; Owens et al., 2012; Raymond, 1994; and Tolman, 1994). Although educational programs do help reduce STDs (Barrett et al., 2004: 136), other research indicates shifts regarding young peoples’ sexual activity and attitudes about sexuality in the last decade. For example, young people are engaging in sexual activity (vaginal intercourse) at

younger ages than previous generations (Barrett et al., 2004: 141; Maticka-Tyndale, 2001: 9), and young people are now more supportive of same-sex relationships and rights than past generations (Barrett et al. 141). Moreover, while religious affiliation does play a role in religious youths' views on sexuality and decisions as to when to become sexually active (Mcnamara Barry et al., 2010), Regnerus found in a U.S. study of religious youth thirteen to seventeen years old that there is currently a shift towards oral and anal sex to avoid pregnancy (2007: 41). This change may also be related to conversations about just what constitutes sex, as noted above regarding the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal and public conversations after that about whether oral sex denotes sex. And ever since the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation CBC radio star, Jian Ghomeshi, was fired in October, 2014, over alleged sexual abuse claims for what Ghomeshi calls "rough sex," and also American entertainer, Bill Cosby, who has had numerous allegations brought against him for sexual assault and misconduct, the legal boundaries around practices involving consent, bondage, dominance, sadism, and masochism have also become part of the public discussion on just what constitutes sex.

In addition to the precedence given sexuality in advertising, television, film, education programs, music lyrics, and videos, print media, and on the Internet, youth sexuality is also prominent in legal matters. One example that gained international attention was a Florida teen named Kaitlyn Hunt, who was charged in 2013 with "lewd and lascivious battery on a child 12 to 16" ("Kaitlyn"). Hunt's sexual relationship with a younger female student (fourteen years old) at her high school was brought to the attention of the authorities only after Hunt turned eighteen. Although sexual activity, in this case, is illegal in terms of age of consent, there was a public outcry over the charges against Hunt. Within a few days of the arrest, most North American news sources and Internet groups reporting on this story were stressing opinions that this was a "consensual, same-sex relationship."²² This public outcry indicates that a consensual sexual *relationship* between a fourteen-year-old and an eighteen-year-old—regardless of gender—has become relatively normalized behaviour.

The emphasis on Hunt's "consensual relationship" is in line with Giddens' (1992) claims about late modern sentiments regarding sexuality. However, as Wright asserts above, media

²² For examples of the public outcry, see the online petition on ForceChange.com entitled "Don't Prosecute High School Girl for Being in a Same-Sex Relationship" (2013); and the *Huffington Post* article, "Kaitlyn Hunt" (2013).

genre is important in depictions of and discussions about youth and sexuality. For instance, television talk shows often portray youth sexuality as problematic. To illustrate, a May 2013 episode of a popular American television program, *Dr. Phil*, was about a fifteen-year-old female who had been “hooking up” for sex with unknown men whom she had met online (the ages of these men were not stated). The host of the show, psychologist Dr. Phil McGraw, did not discuss trends in young people’s hooking up strictly for sex or using the Internet to negotiate “opportunities.” Neither did he discuss young females’ sexual desire and agency, but rather he saw the young woman exclusively as a victim of male predators and as someone lacking self-worth (“Young,” 2013). In this therapeutic talk-show setting, youth female sexuality is not taken for granted; it is disavowed. Although the young woman was actively seeking males for sex, the labelling of her as a victim codes her as a passive female and the males she approached as stereotypically sexually aggressive. Themes of young female victimization and individual morality in this talk show context, along with the absence of a discourse of desire, are in concert with sex education curricula in North America (see, for example, E. Connell, 2005; Fine and McClelland, 2006; and Tolman, 1994).

Indeed, adolescent sexuality is a popular topic in a variety of media formats; however, the format dictates how sexuality and youth are represented. The Hunt and *Dr. Phil* examples of youth sexuality are typical discourses on this subject and ones in which youth female sexuality, in particular, is both portrayed, denied, and judged. While the Hunt and *Dr. Phil* accounts clearly illustrate adults’ moral panic about youth and sexuality, they also emphasize the fact that young people are indeed negotiating their sexual relationships—on their individual terms. On this negotiation process, McNair adds that while some adolescents self-identify as homosexual, others engage in same-sex exploration as “part of their initiation and progress to adulthood,” but do not consider themselves as homosexual (2002: 27). McNair argues that for young people today, sexuality foregrounds sexual exploration, as well as “sanctions” females who attend to their sexual desire (2002: 24). Portraying youth engaging in sexual exploration and activities is not only overt in multiple media formats, but it is also a reality in the lives of many North American youths today. Although a reality, this does not mean that all youth explore sexuality in the same way. The wide range of youths’ sexual experiences includes various and interrelated factors such as age, gender, ethnic and racial identities, personality type, and degrees of religiosity.

Sexuality in Islam – Normative Perspectives

Regulations for sexual conduct are a primary concern in Islam.²³ As Islam spread across vast geographical regions in the Middle East, North Africa, and Western Asia, different schools of jurisprudence arose to address an array of sexually related behaviours and social expectations. While the premodern jurists drew primarily on the Qur'an and hadith (sayings and routines of the Prophet) in establishing licit and illicit sexual rules, varying interpretations of these texts led to considerable diversity and complexity in legal rulings (Tucker, 2008). These rules included the criminalization of illicit behaviours and served to regulate men's and women's clothing and conduct in the public sphere. Throughout Islamic history, the regulation of these ordinances has varied depending on place and time and in light of Western influences and the demands of modernity. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the process of regulating licit (hetero) sexually related conduct throughout Islamic history. I also look at Muslim marriage trends in the contemporary context as well as some marriage situations unique to young Canadian and American Muslims.

Marriage occupies a central and pivotal place in Islamic law. In Islam, marriage regulates “natural” sexual desires as an extension and value of social harmony and thus legitimates sexual relations. Being sexually available and providing sexual satisfaction to one's spouse is obligatory in marriage unions; however, while Muslim scholars acknowledge the historical importance given to female satisfaction in the sexual act within a married union, emphasis is placed on “women's obligations to make themselves sexually available to their husbands, rather than the reverse” (Ali, 2006: 9). This gendered sexual inequality stems from the contractual elements of marriage (*nikah*) in which men are obligated to pay a dower (*mahr*) to the bride (as opposed to a dowry that the bride brings to the marriage).²⁴ Traditionally, emotional issues were not factored

²³ This focus in no way suggests that the policing of gender and sexuality is unique to Muslim societies. Rather, sexual conduct and gender roles are regulated in all societies through religious, familial, governmental, and educational systems.

²⁴ In pre-modern jurisprudence, the amount of *mahr* varied between schools and according to the wealth of the parties. Depending on the school of thought, the Muslim dower could be in cash or immovable property, or a combination; a portion of it could be paid up front with the balance deferred to a later date, such as in the case of divorce or the husband's death (Tucker, 2008: 47). In part, the *mahr* was meant to compensate women for the risk involved in marriage where men have or have had unrestricted rights to divorce (Ali, 2006: 4), but the amount was also dependent on the social status of the woman, so it played a decisive role in (re)confirming a bride's (and her family's) social status. If a husband did not pay a due portion of the dower, his wife could force payment through litigation. In this case, the *mahr* also serves to establish the gendered rights and obligations of the couple.

into the laws governing marriage and sexual relations; rather, jurists concerned themselves with defining marriage based on sexual rights and financial obligations. Men's financial obligations were thus accentuated at the onset of the marriage union as well as throughout the marriage term, and women's sexual obligations therein constituted an equitable exchange (Ali, 2006: 13).

Once the marriage contract was signed and the marriage consummated, the rights and duties of wives and husbands were stipulated in the rules of *nafaqa* (maintenance) and *nushuz* (disobedience). *Nafaqa* is the maintenance that a Muslim husband must provide for his spouse and is his principal legal obligation.²⁵ While most classical jurists "viewed maintenance as compensation for the enjoyment of a wife's body," Tucker asserts that maintenance was a woman's right, and the Islamic judge was expected to act on behalf of the wife to help her collect it from her husband (2008: 52). While the doctrine of *nafaqa* during the pre-modern period details the wife's material claims on her husband, rules outlining *nushuz* (disobedience) outlined the woman's marital responsibilities. Besides making herself sexually available to her husband, a wife could be expected to obey her husband's demands to make herself attractive and not to leave the marital domicile without her husband's consent because this would make her inaccessible to her husband (Tucker, 2008: 53). As Tucker observes, *nushuz* was a "defining concept for marital relations, inscribing dominance and submission in the marital relationship" (56).

In the mid-nineteenth century, Islamic thinkers sought to reform regulations concerning marriage in keeping with the demands of the modern world. By the late 1800s, as European colonists criticized Islamic culture on laws that discriminated against women as evidence of inferiority, Muslim women too were beginning to criticize the Islamic rules for marriage and divorce as unfavourable to the development of healthy families (Tucker, 2008: 66). Faced with the challenge of maintaining the integrity of the sharia (canonical law of Islam), reformers examined the key sources, especially on such matters as "companionate marriage," that is, whether a woman is an equal companion to her husband or a minor under his control; a woman's right to participate in the arrangement of her marriage; stipulations regarding *nushuz*; the practice of polygyny; and the age of the female upon marriage (Tucker, 2008: 66-69). Although legal reforms during this period sought to amend what seemed to be inequality in marriage,

²⁵ Provisions include food, shelter, and clothing, and depending on the wealth of the man, other necessities may have been elaborated, such as servants or jewelry (Tucker, 2008: 50).

disparity continued in the amended codes with husbands defined as authority figures and wives as dependent (Tucker, 2008: 77).

Moreover, while Islamic discourse sanctioned legal involvement in domestic and familial spheres, we may also trace its genderization and sexualization of space in the public domain. Gender segregation was essential to controlling human sexuality, especially “the power of sexual attraction to disrupt society and threaten the unity and stability of Muslim communities” (Tucker, 2008: 177). In matters related to religious obligations, such as prayer, jurists sought to control sexual desire through regulating women’s and men’s interactions in space and establishing protocols for clothing. Jurists also addressed whether a woman should pray in the mosque at all,²⁶ and the issue of ‘*awra*, the lust-inducing parts of human bodies, but they disagreed on what, precisely, constituted the ‘*awra*.²⁷ The jurists’ discussions of such boundaries in the context of prayer inevitably expanded into deliberations of how women and men should dress and behave in each other’s presence in business dealings and in general (Tucker, 2008: 181). In all cases, sexual desire is a commanding problem, and although it was male desire that tended to occupy the jurists’ deliberations, Tucker notes that the “necessary restrictions fell most heavily on women” (184).

Should the safeguards against illicit sexual acts fail, the jurists detailed the rules for punishing the offences, including the crime of *zina* (unlawful sexual intercourse). The jurists accepted two kinds of verification for *zina*: confession and witness. Four male witnesses were required, and they must be witnesses to the act of sexual intercourse itself. This witness stipulation makes conviction of the crime less likely, for the penalty for *zina* is stoning for married individuals and one hundred lashes for unmarried individuals (El-Feki, 2013: 32; Tucker, 2008: 187).²⁸

Juridical attention to *zina* and its associated punishments has undergone significant changes since the early premodern period. Under Ottoman rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while *zina* continued to maintain an active presence in the law, the criminal

²⁶ Prayer in the mosques is obligatory for men but not for women. Some jurists thought it was acceptable for old women to attend but not young women. Some recommended certain prayer times to attend, such as dawn or evening, or when it was less likely for men to attend (Tucker, 2008: 179).

²⁷ Most classified a woman’s entire body except her hands and face, but some thought a face veil was required as well. For men, most jurists held that a man’s ‘*awra* was the part of his body between his navel and his knees.

²⁸ Men and women received the same punishment at an emotion-filled public event. Making the penalty a public spectacle underscored the community’s role in policing and punishing this crime, and also served as a strong warning to community members as a caution against erroneous accusations (see Tucker, 2008: 188).

codes effectively eliminated execution as a penalty and replaced it with fines (Tucker, 2008: 197). Flogging remained, however, but for habitual offenders, such as a prostitute, although even then it was rare (see Semerdjian, 2008: 33). Other types of sexual crimes were merged with the crime of *zina* along with similar punishments, such as same-sex intercourse between males, prostitution, and pimping (Tucker, 2008: 197). While matters related to *zina* more or less disappeared from Islamic discourse by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because the *hadd* or fixed Islamic penalties for sexual crimes had fallen into abeyance by this time, this situation was “dramatically reversed” beginning in the 1970s (Tucker, 2008: 204-5). In their political efforts to regenerate conservative Islamic ideologies (Islamization), several countries reinstated *zina* penalties, including Libya (1973), Pakistan (1979), Sudan (1983), and Nigeria (2002) (Tucker, 2008: 205), and reinstatement of these punishments is currently under debate in the Malaysian state of Kelantan (Neo and Shah, 2015).

In Pakistan, for example, the Zina Ordinance came into effect in 1979 under the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88). Previous to this, adultery crimes fell under the jurisdiction of the Pakistan Penal Code, and very few cases of adultery were reported before 1979 (Khan, 2006: xviii). However, according to Khan, between 1979 and 1995 one million zina cases were filed and 300,000 were heard by Pakistani courts (2006: xvi). Khan adds that while females charged with these crimes range in age from twelve to elderly women, ninety-five percent of the cases are acquitted (2006: xvi). She also claims that laws governing rape were subsumed under *zina* laws during this period, meaning that if a woman cannot prove coercion, then she is charged with engaging in an illicit sexual activity. Khan affirms regarding the resurrection of zina in Pakistan that while no stonings occurred during her research period, public whippings were not uncommon (2006: xix).

The resurrection of zina laws—or the “‘Islamization’ of law”—as Tucker terms it, has come to represent a form of Islamic identity (Tucker, 2008: 205-6; see also Rahman, 2014). Furthermore, the gendered intensities of blame and conviction as illustrated in the Pakistani charges brought against women reveal that the constraints of sexual morality tend to be placed more forcefully on Muslim women at this juncture than on Muslim men in the project of manifesting that identity. Consequently, the revivification of *zina* in the current era has sparked a re-examination of the classical *fiqh* rulings by both historians and feminist scholars. A feminist re-reading of the textual sources has revealed how gender was constructed in the Islamic legal

tradition in light of the social mechanisms related to patriarchy and bondage. Ziba Mir Hosseini, for example, points out that in the classical era, patriarchy and slavery were culturally ingrained and that these socio-sexual dynamics regulated social norms (2010: 22). Her point is that although the jurists' edicts were carefully made, their rulings, nevertheless, reflected the gender assumptions of their time. Moreover, contemporary examiners have demonstrated that the regulations regarding death by stoning derive from the Sunna (sayings of the Prophet) and not from the Qur'an and further argue that the authenticity of these hadith has been challenged (Hosseini, 2010: 24-25). In addition, feminist scholars draw attention to the fact that the Qur'an does not speak of punishments for consensual sexual relations in private or stoning for adultery but condemns extra-marital sex and authorizes the prosecution of "this crime only when the act is performed" in public; hence, the emphasis placed in the Qur'an on there being witnesses to the act (Hosseini, 2010: 25).²⁹ Thus, reiterating the primacy of the Qur'an over hadith is essential in contemporary understandings of regulations regarding sexuality, as is restating the fact that the authenticity of these hadith has been challenged (Hosseini, 2010: 24-25). In the current context, the Islamists' call to "return to Sharia" (Hosseini, 2010: 23) and implement *fiqh* rulings has undergone a careful investigation by Islamic studies and feminist scholars and is vigorously contested based on the historical and contextual analysis.

Besides *zina*, other matters related to sexual desire, gender, and social harmony acquired new prominence at the end of the nineteenth century. Veiling issues, as noted above, fell under the purview of awra, but by the early part of the twentieth century, debates over veiling and sequestering women were caught up in broader issues of women and modernity. Arguments against seclusion and veiling included complaints that they restrict women's social opportunities, thus placing the entire burden of work and public life upon the man; they encourage homosexuality and lesbianism; they prevent women from obtaining worldly knowledge needed to run her home and raise modern-thinking children, and they are not a Qur'anic mandate, but

²⁹ The Qur'an addresses *zina* in several places. Sura (Chapter) 17:32 commands believers not to commit *zina*: "Nor come nigh to adultery: for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road (to other evils)." The following two Suras provide direction for punishment of *zina*. Note that the penalties apply to both males and females. Sura 24:2: "The woman and the man guilty of fornication, -- flog each of them with a hundred stripes: Let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by God, if ye believe in God and the Last Day: and let a party of the Believers witness their punishment." Sura 24:4: "And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and produce not four witnesses (to support their allegations), --flog them with eighty stripes; and reject their evidence ever after: for such men are wicked transgressors;" (See, *Holy Qur'an*. Trans. Ali A. Yusuf).

rather a social practice (Tucker, 2008: 201). Arguments for seclusion and veiling focused on the issue of *fitna* or social discord, particularly as caused by illicit sexual desire (Tucker, 2008: 201). By the 1930s, however, most urban women in Muslim-dominated countries had repudiated face veils, and by mid-century most Islamic jurists had also abandoned isolating and veiling stipulations (Tucker, 2008: 202). This shift in attitudes and law indicates that notions of *fitna* were rejected or at least considerably relaxed in favour of cultural modernity. However, as an integral and distinct feature of the “‘Islamization’ of law,” strict codes of sexual propriety emerged in some Muslim-majority countries, as noted above, in the late twentieth century, and clothing options for Muslim women, especially veiling, have become integral to promoting a strict version of Islamic identity. Since this time, veiling has emerged as an essential marker of Islamic identity globally, and, consequently, has gained significant political and public attention in the twenty-first century.

Partly incited by the demands of French secularism (*laïcité*), the “headscarf debate,” as it came to be called, followed France’s 2004 legislation to ban the wearing of Islamic head coverings in public schools. In keeping with the tradition of diversity in interpretation of Islamic codes of propriety, responding Islamic jurists and Muslim spokespersons claimed differing points of views—that is, some argued that veiling is a divine obligation, while others argued that it is only recommended by Islamic law (Tucker, 2008: 207-08). Regardless of these nuances, fatwas (legal opinions) were pronounced claiming that veiling is a religious obligation for adult Muslim women.³⁰ While Islamic rules of propriety have always targeted women’s social conduct, including clothing, the turn towards establishing an “Islamic” identity in the late twentieth century along with the conflict stemming from French secularism have resulted in placing social exigency on Muslim women more than on Muslim men to uphold visually an Islamically defined sexual morality.

Polygyny and issues concerning marriage, as outlined in the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), are legal topics currently engaging the attention of jurists and lay people alike. Although Muslim reformers have questioned the legitimacy of polygyny since the nineteenth century (Tucker, 2008: 57), this

³⁰ Many mediators who oppose France’s legislation argue that it does not comply with United Nations conventions on human rights and personal religious freedoms, and, further, that it stigmatizes women wearing headscarves in public spaces (see Tucker, 2008: 210-11).

practice has undergone considerable debate in recent times. In 2003, for example, Sisters in Islam (SIS), a Muslim feminist group in Malaysia,³¹ organized a “Campaign for Monogamy” in which they argued that the Qur’an is restrictive on polygyny rather than permissive and that women opposed to co-wives have the right to divorce (“Campaign”). They also assert that fairness in polygamous marriages is judged from the husband’s point of view, which is contrary to the claims of women and children. According to their 2013 nationwide polygamy study, over ninety-one percent of children from these marriages said they would not recommend it (“Focus” n.pag.). The Campaign, however, garnered significant opposition from Muslim activists in Malaysia (Weiner, 2004). CEDAW, on the other hand, which entered into force in 1981 and focuses on the elimination of gender discrimination in public and private spheres, has been ratified by a number of predominantly Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen (Tucker, 2008: 80). All of these countries, however, have submitted reservations to certain articles of the Convention on the grounds of incongruity with religion, which deal with women’s full equality with men in civil matters, including freedom of movement and choice of residence, and equal rights and responsibilities within marriage, including divorce (Tucker, 2008: 80).³² As Tucker rightly observes, “these reservations weigh the provisions of CEDAW against an ‘Islamic’ legal standard that stresses complementarity in the marital relationship rather than the equality mandated by the convention” (2008: 80).

Another issue now animating licit Muslim sexual discourse concerns young Muslim sexuality and marriage. Indeed, for some young Muslims, marriage may not be a viable avenue to legitimate sexual expression because of the widening gap between sexual maturity and job stability—that is, when young people have reached sexual maturity but are unable to secure jobs that provide the financial means to support themselves apart from their parents, thus postponing marriage and raising a family (see Coté and Allahar, 2006: 6). This current global phenomenon, now dubbed “waithood,” notes Shereen El Feki, author of *Sex and the Citadel: Intimate Life in a Changing Arab World* (2013: 35; see also Singerman, 2011: 66), has led to the rise in “informal” or “unofficial” marriages in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab region (2011: 43-44). Unlike *mut’a*

³¹ As noted earlier, the Malaysian state of Kelantan is currently considering reinstating *zina* laws. Sisters in Islam remains firmly opposed to their implementation. See “Introduction of Hudud.”

³² For a comprehensive breakdown of reservations and objections to CEDAW by country, see United Nations. “Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to CEDAW” (2009).

or temporary marriages practiced by Shi'i Muslims mainly in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, and also on the rise in Britain according to a 2013 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) documentary,³³ informal (not registered) '*urfi* marriages are permitted for Sunni Muslims, albeit with varying levels of tolerance, in Sunni-majority states. In *mut'a* marriages, the bride and groom agree to marry for a specified period of time, ranging from hours to years, at the end of which they automatically divorce; a marriage contract and *mahr* are also required, but "temporary" wives are not allowed to inherit from their husband's estate, and children born of the union have the same rights as those from an official marriage "provided their fathers acknowledge paternity" (El Feki, 2013: 43; see also Tucker, 2008: 57-58). Hence, a *mut'a* marriage does not enjoy the same level of social prestige nor legal rights as an official marriage, declares El Feki because it "is not about settling down and starting a family; it makes no attempt to varnish its sexual purpose" (2013: 44). Informal '*urfi* unions also make no attempt to conceal their sexual purpose, but they do express both religious and legal concerns. As El Feki asserts, "Such is the desire to steer clear of *zina* that [...] couples will go to considerable lengths to bring their sexual relations into Islamic alignment" even if that entails "subvert[ing] social conventions and circumvent[ing] family control" (2013: 43, 47). In contrast to official and *mut'a* marriages, *urfi* unions are religiously acceptable but not legally registered, are often kept secret from the young couple's families (the couple continue to live apart), require a signed form or a verbal agreement between the couple, may or may not include witnesses, and do not involve financial responsibilities (the woman can waive her right to *mahr*) (El Feki, 2013: 45-46). Paradoxically, considering the marriage is not formal in the first place, divorce from an '*urfi* marriage can be granted through the courts providing a written contract or witnesses to the marriage is provided (El Feki, 2013: 46).

A rise in wealthy summer tourists from the Gulf regions has seen growth in another type of temporary marriage in Egypt called *zawaj misyaf* or "summer marriage" (El Feki, 2013: 182). This kind of union shares a similar framework as '*urfi* contracts except the woman's family is involved in the process (El Feki, 2013:184). Criticized as prostitution "with a religious twist" (El Feki, 2013: 184), these "marriages", are now common in Egypt and also among Muslims in some areas of India (see, for example, Wajihuddin, 2016). Although *misyar* marriages come with

³³ The BBC documentary is titled *Married for a Minute* (see Mahmood, 2013).

a large *mahr*,³⁴ the fact that *'urfi* unions do not involve financial commitments certainly takes the pressure off young males to provide materially for a wife. However, young women have no rights to financial support during or after the marriage, and this is especially troubling if a pregnancy occurs and the father denies that the marriage took place. In this case, the child has no paternity claim to financial upkeep or inheritance (Hasso, 2011: 1-2). By placing the burden of proof on the woman in these marriages, verbal agreements are thus to the man's benefit, which may also suggest that oral agreements are more popular in these unions than written contracts. This preferred choice is not to imply the general irresponsibility of young Muslim men, but rather this underscores the financial responsibilities placed on men in Muslim marriages in light of pervasive unemployment.³⁵ Whereas El Feki (2013) stresses the religious and legal aspects of avoiding *zina* as a primary factor underpinning *'urfi* marriages, Singerman (2011) points to the economic dimensions of marriage and the deep social cleft between adulthood and "waithood." She says, "Since marriage equals adulthood in the Middle East, exclusion from marriage or delayed marriage compromise full participation in society" (2011: 67). The apparent gap in research on this marriage trend is in exploring how young Muslims may be opting for *'urfi* unions as a form of resistance to the traditional mechanisms of sexual control.

Of course, not all Muslim men deny paternity in temporary marriages. For example, a *mut'a* marriage that took place in Canada in which the father acknowledged paternity also saw the parents battling for custody over their five-year-old daughter. In this case, a thirty-five-year-old already married Muslim man contracted a temporary marriage with an eighteen-year-old Muslim woman.³⁶ In fact, they contracted three *mut'a* marriages; during the second a child was born, and the parents had an oral agreement that the father would have custody of their daughter for three years and then she would be returned to her mother (Fournier, 2009: 73). The father did not return custody, the case went to trial in Ontario in 1994 (under civil law) at the mother's

³⁴ According to El Feki, a wealthy man paid EGP 20,000 to marry for one week a nineteen-year-old woman whose father makes EGP 700 a month (2013: 183).

³⁵ Recent studies of Egyptian youth indicate that twenty-seven percent are unemployed, mostly between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine (Singerman 2011: 67). For particulars pertaining to these studies, see Amer, 2006; Kabbani and Kothari, 2005; and Salehi-Isfahani, 2005.

³⁶ Both the man and the woman are immigrants to Canada. The man was born in Zaire; his immigration date is not disclosed. The woman was born in Uganda and immigrated to Canada at age five.

behest, and the court ruled in the father's favour because it was in the best interests of the child to do so, adding that these cases (that is, *mut'a*) were rare in Canada (Fournier, 2009: 75).³⁷

Details about why an eighteen-year-old Canadian Muslim woman would contract a *mut'a* marriage in Canada were not provided in this account. However, Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men is a problem currently facing young Muslims in Muslim-minority cultures. According to Islamic law, Muslim men may marry non-Muslim women (preferably Christians or Jews), but Muslim women may only marry Muslim men. Based on early tribal customs, the logic was that women came under the physical and economic protection of their husbands, and thus the children from marital unions would be raised in the faith of their fathers (Hogben, 1991: 155). These laws were meant to protect women and children economically, as well as safeguard the advancement of the Muslim *umma* (community). Early Muslim immigrants to Canada and the U.S., who were mainly men seeking employment, frequently married non-Muslims (McIrvin Abu-Laban, 1991: 15). As the Muslim populations in these two countries rose, so too did the numbers of same-faith marriages; however, Hogben claims that interfaith marriages have continued because of changing attitudes "under the influence of the North American society's liberalism and theoretical disdain for distinctions" (1991: 168). As well, according to Jane Smith, Co-Director of the Duncan Black Macdonald Center for Christian-Muslim Relations at Hartford Seminary, incidences of Muslim women in the U.S. marrying non-Muslim men is on the rise (2007: 56).³⁸ Moreover, the *Encyclopedia of Women and Religion in North America* confirms that Muslim interfaith marriages are on the rise in the U.S. and also in Canada (see Smith, 2006: 624), and the Canadian Council of Muslim Women reports that twenty-six percent of Canadian-born married Muslim women in Canada have non-Muslim spouses (see Hamdani, 2014: 14). Overall, most analysts claim that Muslims born in Canada and the U.S. are more open to interfaith marriages than foreign-born Muslims (see, for example, Smith, 2006: 624; and Hamdani, 2014: 14). Dane characterizes a young Canadian Muslim woman who marries outside her faith as having more latitude in the public sphere and higher levels of education than those who opt for traditionally arranged marriages (2006: 253). But unlike Hogben, who points to

³⁷ Ruling in the best interests of the child is an important distinction in the Canadian case. Where *mut'a* marriages are legalized, such as in Iran, custody is the father's right; however, provisions are made for initial nurturing. That is, the child remains in his or her mother's care for the first seven years. In case of disputes when the child reaches seven years of age, the court considers the best interest of the child in its ruling. See item 2.3, "Custody and Guardianship of Children," (2014) on the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (HRDC) website.

³⁸ Unfortunately, Smith does not provide statistics to support her claim.

liberal attitudes underpinning interfaith unions, Dane suggests that having greater social mobility disadvantages this group in regard to selecting a Muslim spouse within their Muslim communities because the woman may be perceived as non-traditional or more embracing of Canadian secular culture, thus narrowing the marriage pool and forcing her to wed outside her faith (2006: 253). As the consequences for young Muslim women marrying outside their faith may include stigma, shame, and rejection from their families or religious communities, studies of North American Muslim women who have married non-Muslims thus need to be conducted to get a clearer understanding of this phenomenon.

Other variables related to Muslim marriages in the Canadian context include marrying outside of one's sect, which Hogben says is not as important to Canadian-born Muslims as is marrying outside one's ethnic group (1991: 162-65). However, Hogben claims that some Canadian Muslim leaders support and encourage inter-ethnic marriages as a way to strengthen the Muslim *umma* (1991: 164). According to 2010 Statistics Canada reports, however, it is the Muslim population that could show the greatest proportional increase of all religious faiths, with its numbers tripling by 2031 (Canada. Statistics. "Projections" 2010)³⁹, and in the United States, statistical reports indicate that the Muslim population is expected to more than double by 2030 ("Future", 2016: 137). Given this substantial population growth, it is impossible to say whether Canadian Muslim leaders will continue to encourage inter-ethnic marriages or if the appeal of interfaith marriages will persist, especially given the existence of current national programs of Islamization and campaigns to reaffirm an "Islamic" identity (Tucker, 2008; Khan, 1995). That said, however, according to one of the participants in my study, Muslim religious leaders in multiple local settings are vigorously promoting Muslim-only marriages (see Chapter 5, "National Belonging").

While the Sharia provides the framework for licit and illicit sexual conduct, its application varies based on such factors as sect, geographic location, cultural dynamics, political leadership, and the recognition of Islam as the state religion and law.⁴⁰ Moreover, any emphasis

³⁹ Canadian statistics indicate that by 2031 the proportion of the population having a Christian religious denomination could be approximately 65%, the Muslim population is expected to rise to approximately 7%, and the non-religious proportion of the population could rise to approximately 21%.

⁴⁰ Countries that recognize Islam as the state religion and where sharia is incorporated into its laws include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (Rafiq, 2014: 267). Muslim-dominated countries that do not formally recognize Islam or the sharia in its legal systems include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Albania and Azerbaijan (Rafiq, 2014: 268).

placed on heterosexual same-faith marriages by Muslim religious leaders both locally and internationally will serve to inform young Canadian Muslims of “proper” sexual protocols. However, though legal reports indicate that at least one Canadian Muslim youth contracted a *mut’a* marriage, a lack of research on Canadian Muslim youth sexuality makes it difficult to say whether other young Canadian Muslims are entertaining “temporary” marriage scenarios, either as a way of adhering to Islamically mandated gender and sexual protocols, or as a possible way to challenge traditional conventions. My current study attempts to fill some of the gaps in the research and offers some insights into the “placement” of Muslims in the Canadian socio-political landscape and the ways young Muslims are currently negotiating both gender and sexuality within this context.

Sexuality in Islam – Non-Normative Perspectives

In Islam, as noted above, the heterosexual marriage bond sets the standard by which all other sexual relationships are measured—and sometimes punished. Yet, considerable evidence exists in historical and contemporary studies of same-sex sexual engagement in Muslim-majority (El-Rouayheb, 2005; Murray and Roscoe, 1997; Nigst and García, 2010; Ze’evi, 2006) and -minority cultures (Rahman, 2014; Puar, 2007), as well as a historical range of socio-cultural attitudes ranging from severe condemnation to passive tolerance. This section provides a historical overview of attitudes towards and practices involving “non-normative” sexual relations throughout Islamic history, and I also discuss some contemporary issues involving young Muslims in both the Gulf region and Canada.

The Shari’a (the traditional law of Islam), the Qur’an, and Hadith (the sayings attributed to Mohammed) are generally interpreted as condemning same-sex sexual relations. Related verses in the Qur’an refer to the story of Lot of Sodom—the destruction of the Sodomites is thought to be explicitly associated with their sexual practices (that is, anal intercourse). According to Wafer (1997), the hadith provide more detail about Mohammed’s supposed views on the matter, but the exegeses are inconsistent, ranging from the Prophet’s awareness of the practice of some of the men in his tribe to condemnation. Hence, while all the legal schools regard sex between males as unlawful, they differ over the penalties imposed (Wafer, 1997: 89). Aside from addressing sodomy, the hadith does more clearly indicate, Wafer notes, that attraction between males was common, and thus Prophet Mohammed cautioned against gazing at

beardless youths lest men be tempted into unlawful conduct (1997: 90). The point Wafer and others (El-Rouayheb, 2005; Kugle, 2010; Murry and Roscoe, 1997; Ze'evi, 2006) make is that sexual attraction between males was clearly recognized in these texts and, though to be resisted, was not necessarily considered perverted.

Indeed, consistent patterns of “Islamic” homosexualities were apparent throughout the Muslim world from pre-Islamic times to the present. As the religion and military forces of Islam spread outward from Arabia, they encountered societies with diverse cultural and religious practices. The capacity to adapt to and sometimes adopt local customs extended to sexuality as well. Thus, Islam inherited “both *status-differentiated* patterns of male homosexuality and *gender-defined* alternative roles” (Roscoe, 1997: 55). Gender-defined patterns of homosexuality include men who functioned as prostitutes (for male customers), as cross-dressing entertainers, and eunuchs (Roscoe, 1997: 64).⁴¹ The category of status-differentiated homosexuality includes pederasty (sexual activity involving a man and a boy), such as flourished in pre-modern Athens, as well as all relations between men in which one is of higher social status than the other. This ranked model of sexuality clearly differentiated the inserting (high status) active role and the penetrated (low status) passive role in sexual intercourse (Roscoe, 1997: 56). From the medieval period to the nineteenth century, neither “high” nor “low status” sexual participants were considered abnormal or homosexual. Boys and youths were not stigmatized because they were expected to outgrow this role, and a passive adult recipient was thought of as obsessive (Peirce, 2009: 1331). Although sexual relations between males may not have been viewed favourably throughout Islamic history, it was of far less consequence than adultery and the “defilement” of virginal women. Indeed, sex with boys and effeminate men was viewed during this period both as a way to satisfy men’s sexual needs and protect women’s virtue (Murray and Roscoe, 1997: 310).

Peirce (2009) notes that there have been comparatively few sources on the control of male sexuality, except in the context of homoerotic sex. She adds that this is in part the result of

⁴¹ Will Roscoe, a co-editor of *Islamic Homosexualities*, claims that if a eunuch’s seminal ducts were severed after the age of puberty, eunuchs were still able to derive pleasure from sex, achieving erection and orgasm. There was also an assumption, Roscoe says, that eunuchs were “passive homosexuals,” if sexual at all, and many did have sex with men (1997: 64). It was common, too, for eunuchs to achieve high social status mainly because they lacked competing familial loyalties. That is, eunuchs could not marry and have children and committed homosexuals did not desire heterosexual marriages, so a eunuch’s allegiance and placement in high ranking offices provided rulers with a means of controlling the power of hereditary nobility (Roscoe, 1997: 64-65).

an assumed binary in which males are sexually autonomous and dominant, while females are controlled and subordinated (2009: 1331). Peirce thus points to the practice of gender segregation as playing a critical role in constructions of “normative” and “non-normative” sexuality (2009: 1330). On this same theme, Roscoe (1997), underscores patriarchal values as playing a critical role in these constructions. He argues that by inciting male desire while restricting females’ (and male youths’) sexual availability, prostitution is inevitable. “This, in turn,” he states, “requires social controls and a discourse that asserts the difference between sex for love and sex for sale” (1997: 57), in place of a discourse of sexual abnormality or deviance.

Still, attitudes and discourses about same-sex desire shifted considerably from the premodern to the modern period. Ze’evi (2006) describes the growing popularity of Sufism, which had by the seventeenth century come to value certain homosexual experiences as expressions of divine unity, as in conflict with orthodox doctrine. The Sufi idealization of homoerotic attraction was rooted in the spiritual and somewhat pantheistic-based teachings of Islamic Scholar Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240), which held human beauty to be a manifestation of divine beauty. “In an effort to relate profane to heavenly love,” Ze’evi says, “the Sufis developed the idea of gazing at beauty as a path to true love of God” (2006: 82). Although women were indeed considered beautiful, their presence was unacceptable in a Sufi lodge and, therefore, Sufis chose beardless⁴² adolescents as their “objects of contemplation” (Ze’evi, 2006: 83). The experience of gazing at beardless youths along with traditional spiritual enhancers, such as music, song, and dance, manifested in homoerotic expressions of unity. By the seventeenth century, these music-gazing rituals (*samà*) were condemned by conservative religious leaders, and heated disputes produced copious amounts of literature about the dangers of the *samà* and “warnings against the corrupting power of the gaze” (Ze’evi, 2006: 87).

Ze’evi’s analysis of the language used at this time about heterosexual and homosexual desire illustrates “that [male] attraction to both men and women is not only normal [throughout Muslim history] but the norm” (2006: 91). However, while intercourse between same-sex adults occurred and was denounced throughout Islamic history, it did not threaten the fundamental

⁴² The terms for beardless boy could be used to refer to prepubescent, smooth-cheeked boys, as opposed to adolescent, downy-cheeked youths, but it could also refer to all youths who did not yet have a fully developed beard, and thus as old as twenty or twenty-one. The low age limit was at puberty, seven or eight. See El-Rouayheb, 2005: 30-31.

tenets of religion as did the Sufis' love of and intercourse with beardless youths because the latter was not understood to be a deviation from "normal" sexuality, but rather it "was rapidly becoming an article of faith for many Sufis and their retinues, challenging orthodox ethical norms" (Ze'evi, 2006: 93). Consequently, unwavering pressures against heterodox Sufi teachings on this matter, along with the coexisting adoption of European Victorian attitudes about sexuality, resulted in diminished Sufi popularity, and by the nineteenth century, Ze'evi says that Sufi ideas about same-sex relations were considered "shameful for their homoerotic, not their politically radical content" (2006: 93-96; see also El-Rouayheb, 2005: 156).⁴³

In contrast to the rich archive of male same-sex desire throughout Islamic history, homoerotic relations among women are less well documented and thus less understood. One recent study, however, by Nigst and García (2010) examines transvestite and, in some cases, homosexual adolescent females living in the Arabian Gulf region. Referred to as *boyāt* (plural for female adolescents who dress and behave like boys),⁴⁴ these young women are challenging local social structures that define female gender and sexual roles.

Dominant discourses tend to group all *boyāt* as lesbians, say Nigst and García, but they argue that this is problematic given the fact that the *boyāt* live in societies characterized by strict gender segregation. It is a well-attested fact, they state, that separation of this sort provides an ideal environment for intrasexual relations and that adolescent boys in these regions do indeed "seek their objects of cathexis" (2010: 30). However, intrasexual activity in this setting is facilitated by the framework of segregation and thus does not necessarily indicate homosexuality as a sexual preference or identity (Nigst and García, 2010: 30). Those *boyāt* who do self-identify as lesbians are socially significant in that they "make public" their sexual orientation, claiming they were born that way, whereas most Arab lesbians "would not dare to" make their situations

⁴³ Khaled El-Rouayheb (2005) adds that changes at this time reflected the delicate balance of ideals in popular culture and notes the significant shift in attitudes toward pederasty and same-sex sexuality by the early twentieth century. For example, in a new publication of *The Arabian Nights* in Cairo in 1930, he says the few stories that related to pederastic love affairs were expunged, and by the late 1940s, terms common to European dialogue, such as "sexual perversion," began to appear with regularity (2005:158-59). The emerging view at this time, El-Rouayheb adds, was that all forms of passionate attraction to boys were equally signs of "sickness" and "depravity," and by the late twentieth century, notions of sexual perversity included sodomy, effeminate passivity, the love of boys, and lesbianism (2005: 159-160).

⁴⁴ In some cases, the young women adopt male physical characteristics, such as the *muruwwa* (a code of masculine virtue in pre-Islamic Arabia indicating bravery and manliness), "the most important symbol of which is the mustache," by shaving their faces to promote hair growth (Nigst and García, 2010: 28).

known (Nigst and García, 2010: 32). In this sense, the authors argue that the *boyāt*’ transgression is “on a political level by affirming individual rights” not recognized in their society (32).

Nigst and García claim that in Arabic societies both female and male homosexuality are tolerated anomalies (31). However, in such Arab paternalistic cultures that “[enshrine] male dominated heterosexuality as a largely unquestioned norm,” (Jackson, 1999: 161), it may be that male youths’ homosexual relations carry more social legitimacy than does “traditional” lesbianism. Indeed, as Nigst and García argue, it is “against the invisibility of ‘traditional’ lesbianism, the *boyāt* propose to make visible their sexual orientation” (2010: 32). The *boyāt*’ transgressive performances may, therefore, be seen as resistance both to hegemonic forms of gender *and* (tolerated) homosexual “norms.” In other words, by asserting their sexual orientation, some lesbian *boyāt* may be attempting to put female homoeroticism “on par” with the local young male homosexual subculture.⁴⁵ Also, though largely scorned by their communities, the *boyāt* nevertheless carve for themselves a visible social space in which they can be non-normative (in both a gender and sexual sense) and visible at the same time. Clearly, more research on this phenomenon is required not only to enhance our understanding of the “non-normative” gender and sexual subjectivities of young Muslim women in this region in relation to overarching patriarchal sexual “norms,” but also to explore how both the social and familial expectations for these young women to marry and bear children—to secure their future—shapes their sexual subjectivities over time.

Even though the literature on Muslim homosexual subjectivity is scarce and what is available focuses mainly on men’s sexual relations, some scholars, such as Joseph Massad in *Desiring Arabs* (2007), argue that homosexuality in the Arab (Muslim) world is not understood in the same way as it is in Western societies. Massad criticizes LGBT and human rights activists who attempt to enforce Western constructions of homosexuality upon the Arab world, referring to activist groups as “Gay Internationals” (2007: 160). Instead, Massad advocates for the right *not* to “come out,” seeing sexual categories of heterosexual and homosexual as not applicable in Arab culture. As the above discussion shows, throughout Islamic history, Muslims have not only engaged in homosexual activities, but have also exemplified tolerant attitudes towards these practices, so some may agree with Massad. However, a few contemporary documentaries depict

⁴⁵ In adopting this approach, I have been influenced especially by Stevi Jackson’s examination of feminist thinking about heterosexuality and male dominance, in *Heterosexuality in Question* (1999).

the experiences of lesbian and gay Muslims dealing with the biases of heterosexuality within their communities, and the participants' desires to reconcile their faith with their homosexual identities.⁴⁶ Contrary to Massad's argument, the Muslim interviewees in these films explicitly claim queer identities in line with Western notions of homosexuality—that is, as having same-sex sexual orientations. At this moment, the debate continues about whether homosexuality exists in the Muslim world or instead a kind of (male) bisexuality operates that is not commensurate with Western notions of identity politics. At present, what is clear is that attitudes towards and notions about “Muslim” homosexuality vary. Murray and Roscoe note, however, that should modern Islamic fundamentalist movements seize control of Muslim-dominated states, more rigorous interpretations of religious law will see the eradication of all forms of same-sex relations “such as have not been seen before in Islamic history” (1997: 313).

I now turn to Canada where where I am conducting my research. Although there is a lack of research on Muslim sexual subjectivities and attitudes about homosexuality in Canada, a few gay Muslim support groups exist.⁴⁷ Indeed, a deficiency of existing literature makes it difficult to gauge Canadian Muslims' perspectives about “non-normative” sexual practices; however, the recent debate over the newly introduced sex-education curriculum in Ontario (2015) provides a glimpse into the ways at least some Canadian Muslims view “normative” and “non-normative” sexuality. Throughout this debate, as reported in various news sources, Islamic school principals, Muslim religious leaders, scholars, parents, and others have demonstrated concerns over the appropriateness of teaching young Muslims about heterosexual and homosexual desire. While no challenges are made to heteronormative sexuality, this debate does show Muslims divided over teaching Muslim youths about the realities of LGBT lives. Those who oppose any form of discussion on this theme, in an educational setting, include Farrah Marfatia, the Principal of Maingate Islamic Academy in Mississauga, who has written a Guide: “How to Talk to Your Muslim Child About Topics in the Ontario Ministry of Education's Health Education Curriculum, 2015.” Excerpts from her Guide identify three primary concerns: masturbation, gender identity, and homosexuality.⁴⁸ On the latter theme, she encourages parents to advise their

⁴⁶ See, for example, *A Jihad for Love* (2007), directed by Parvez Sharma. Also, *Gay Muslims* (2006) directed by Cara Lavan depicts Muslims living in British communities.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Salaam Canada. Url: < <http://www.salaamcanada.info/>>. Also, in Toronto, the Unity Mosque (also known as the El-Tawhid Juma Circle) offers a LGBT-friendly and gender-equal space for committed Muslims.

⁴⁸ Along with giving parents advice on their rights and procedures to formally opt-out of sex-education classes, Marfatia advises Muslim parents to encourage their young to fast as a way to avoid masturbating (2015: 21); to

children “not to engage in discussions with others regarding families with same-sex parents” (2015: 31). In advocating refusal to participate in such conversations, the tone of her excerpt suggests the promotion of moral superiority as a non-aggressive protest against legalized recognition of same-sex relationships, rather than her favouring “a common Islamic ethos of avoidance in acknowledging sex and [‘non-normative’] sexualities” (Murray 1997: 14).⁴⁹ Principal Marfatia claims that her Guide has received abundant praise from imams, Muslim teachers, and parents (see Javed, “Sex-Ed,” 2015). Indeed, media reports indicate significant spikes in enrollment in Islamic private schools since launching the new curriculum (see “National Post View”), and when the program originally launched in September 2015, over 20,000 students were reportedly absent from schools in the Thorncliffe Park region, a predominantly Muslim area of Toronto (Brown, 2015).

Conversely, there has also been an overwhelming outpouring of support from Muslim teachers, imams, scholars, and parents for the new curriculum. Not only do these supporters strongly encourage teaching youth about their bodies, sexual desires, and safe-sex practices (see Salter), but they also champion human rights as the primary motive for teaching Muslim youth about and encouraging acceptance of same-sex unions (see Chanicka, 2015; and Fiorito, 2015).⁵⁰

The pointed censoring of (Western notions of) homosexuality on the one side and the avid promotion of tolerance on the other demonstrates that sexuality, especially homosexuality,

reinforce the fact that Allah does not make mistakes, and, therefore, gender identities are fixed at birth; to remind youth that anal sex is “displeasing to Allah” and that the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah happened because the Sodomites engaged in homosexual anal sex (31).

⁴⁹ See Stephen O. Murray on “the will not to know” in Islamic cultures. Murray argues that because the penalties for non-marital sex are severe, the trustworthy confessions of four male eyewitnesses of the act are required for conviction, thus making punishment unlikely. Hence, societal norms tend towards concealment or non-disclosure of another Muslim’s “sin” (1997: 14). Murray also contends that non-disclosure serves to protect both the local and the overarching social system regarding sexuality from direct challenge (1997: 16).

⁵⁰ For example, Samira Kanji, the President of the Noor Cultural Centre in Toronto, underscores Canadian multicultural values as fostering a sense of tolerance, which is also valued by immigrant Muslims (see Fiorito, 2015) and Jeewan Chanicka, a Muslim public-school Principal in Toronto, maintains that the LGBT community is a group amongst many in Canada and that the school system is responsible for stressing acceptance of all groups (see Chanicka, 2015). For a sampling of media illustrating Muslim involvement in this debate, see Brown, *Toronto Star*, 2015, and Fiorito. *Toronto Star*, 2015; Chamicka, and Daigle, *Muslim Link*, 2015; Jeffords, *Toronto Sun*, 2015; Salter, *Huffington Post*, 2015; and “National Post View,” *National Post*, 2015. Although there are media reports of opposition from Catholics to the new curriculum for the same reasons that Muslims are opposed, little is reported on Catholic supporters. Most non-Muslim related reports refer to supporters as “parents” with no mention of their religious affiliations. For a report on Catholic opposition, see Fatima, 2015, and for “parental” support, see Urback, 2015, and “Ontario’s Sex Ed Debate,” 2015. Jewish faith opinions on this debate are virtually non-existent in the media; however, one Jewish-related report indicates that Jewish educators and parents support the new curriculum or, at least, are nonplussed about modifying it for their private school curriculums (see Cslag, 2015).

is a contentious issue amongst Canadian Muslims (at least in Ontario). It is important to note, however, that advocates who support teaching about homosexuality in an educational environment do not condone or strive to legitimize Muslim same-sex relationships; rather, they demonstrate an Islamic identity that is consistent with Canadian democratic values. Although each side has its complexities, an examination of the social structure of these opposing positionalities must be considered in light of Canada's multicultural organization (Bannerji, 2000). It is also worthwhile to consider these differing positions in light of rising Islamophobia, and Muslim sexuality scholar Momin Rahman's argument that LGBT rights are currently being deployed within an Islamophobic civilizational discourse which reiterates the perceived incompatibility of LGBT and Islam (2014: 132-33; see also Puar, 2007; and Puar and Rai, 2002). Rahman's theory is relevant because it places the debate within a global context where Islamic identity is being actively scrutinized at present. This thesis would suggest that those opposed to the new sex-education curriculum are striving to present a unified, moral "Islamic" identity that is, in fact, *incompatible* with LGBT identities, in the strictest sense. Those who espouse tolerant attitudes about homosexuality, however, are endeavouring to combat Islamophobia by advocating Islamic *compatibility* with Canadian multicultural values. Although contrary, these two positions signify the formation of two distinct but intricately related Canadian Muslim discourses on matters related to youth sexuality and homosexuality both within Canada's multicultural context and in light of wide-ranging Islamophobia (see page 106, footnotes 97 and 98 regarding Islamophobia in Canada and in the U.S.).

Moreover, these interrelated positions denote the religious, ethnic, cultural, and global themes currently informing young Canadian Muslims about issues related to sexuality. As well, in the post-9/11 world, when Muslim identity is precariously "othered" in Canada, and the U.S., research shows that many young Muslims are engaged in self-surveillance strategies—that is, conducting themselves "appropriately" so non-Muslims do not perceive them in a threatening or adverse way (see Jamil and Rousseau, 2012; Sirin and Fine, 2007; and Naber, 2006). It seems apparent, then, that Muslim youths in Canada are caught between these opposing ideologies. To conduct themselves "appropriately"—as Muslims *and* as Canadians—young Muslims must elaborate a narrative that holds together multiple discrepancies both about "Islamic" identity and views about "non-normative" sexuality in order to present a "proper" Canadian and Muslim identity in line with Canadian secular and multicultural values. The fact that other religious

youths in Canada are not commonly obliged to “broadcast” their religious identities and sexual views in this same way not only makes the study of Muslim youth sexual subjectivities singularly important at present but also identifies a critical gap in academic research.

In this section, I have endeavoured to show that attitudes towards “non-normative” sexuality have changed throughout Islamic history and are certainly not monolithic today. Although widely considered unlawful across all Muslim-majority societies, abundant evidence throughout Islam’s historic past as well as in the present demonstrates same-sex relations as both common and tolerated. While there is some evidence of Muslims adopting the secularized Western view of homosexuality as a sexual identity, scholars are more likely to agree that a bisexual subculture operates, at least in some Muslim-dominated countries. Attitudes about homosexuality or a bisexual subculture are not well researched at this time in North America or in other Muslim-minority countries, so Muslims’ perspectives of and practices involving same-sex relations in these contexts are not well understood. Lacking, too, in contemporary research, are studies centering on Muslim females’ homosexual relations and practices.⁵¹ Indeed, while much of the available research on Muslim “non-normative” practices is conducted outside Canada, this section reflects the constraints and opportunities of a broader variety of socio-political contexts.

⁵¹ For some female-authored accounts of female homoeroticism, see Malti-Douglas, 2001; Habib, 2007; and Amer, 2008.

Chapter 3: NATIONALISM, SEXUALITY, AND CITIZENSHIP

This chapter explores linkages between nationalism, sexuality, and citizenship in Canada and the U.S. in the post-9/11 context. I employ a social constructionist and postmodernist approach and use discourse analysis to show the characterization of the emergence of Muslim sexual identities as (sometimes) deviant and unequal to the dominant majority through the targeting of Muslims in numerous and varied discourses underpinning national ideologies and citizenship agendas. These examinations of the various narratives about “Muslims” and “Muslim” sexuality since 9/11 are vital to understanding young Canadian Muslims’ identity because they illustrate that concepts of “Muslim” sexual identities are differentiated in the U.S. and Canada and that these constructions ultimately bear on notions of citizenship and national belonging. Before I begin, however, I need to address my categorization of “Muslim.”

Muslim identity is by no means a monolithic category. Muslims in Canada are ethnically, individually, and religiously diverse (McDonough and Hoodfar, 2005). Indeed, there is no universal description of a “Muslim” identity. However, as Rahman and Hussein (2011) argue, Muslim identities have been narrowly defined in religious terms because of heightened public attention and state and media scrutiny, especially post-9/11.⁵² They add that this narrow definition is shaped by forces both outside and inside Muslim communities. That is, groups representing Muslim populations in Canada and the U.S. also support and contribute to a conservative Muslim specific identity (Rahman and Hussein, 2011: 255-259). Paralleling Rahman and Hussein, Selby argues that Canadian governmental and academic reports “over-privilege” a conservative Muslim identity (2016: 73). Moreover, Stuart Hall claims that identity is a “‘production,’ which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (1990: 222). Like Hall, social constructionist and postmodernist perspectives understand collective identity as moulded by dominant cultural scripts and mechanisms of power and recognize that variations within and between identity categories are often reified through public discourses (Cerulo, 1997: 387, 391). Accordingly, I problematize many of the sources and discourses discussed in this chapter that concretize certain representations of “Muslim” identity, both outside and within Muslim circles.

⁵² See also Naber who argues that in the U.S. the post-9/11 backlash “solidified the racial category ‘Arab-Middle Eastern-Muslim’ enemy and rendered persons associated with this category as embodying a ‘culture’ and/or ‘religion’ that is inherently different and inferior to ‘American’ ‘culture’ and/or ‘religion’” (2006: 236).

I begin this section discussing cultural trauma as a shared national experience in the U.S. in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, placing emphasis on the defensive function of cultural trauma. This protective function is essential to establishing both the historical context of this study and the origins of which Muslims' social "placement" begins to be conceptualized as outside the perceived U.S. national body. My research explores similar perceptions and national ideologies in Canada in light of growing insecurities over Muslim-related terrorism since 9/11 and identifies some of the ways young Muslims, in particular, understand their identities or "placement" within the Canadian context. Next, to show the sexualized construction of this "placement," I outline how castration symbolism is employed in both scholarly and non-scholarly narratives about the attacks. Phallic symbolism has a long historical appeal; however, in the post/9/11 period, it is associated with violent masculinity, including rape, and thus operates as a sexualized discourse of domination and defeat of the terrorist (Muslim) enemy/Other in response to the metaphorical "penetration" and "rape" of American power by the terrorists on September 11. Extending this sexualized account, I then discuss the construction of the "terrorist-monster" in psychoanalysis and academia as outlined by Puar and Rai (2002), while stressing that "knowledge" produced about the terrorist mindset overlaps with "knowledge" generated about the "Muslim" psyche. I draw from the work of Puar and Rai, who elaborate the construction of the terrorist as a sexualized monster, and Puar's (2007) concept of *homonationalism* to explain the complex relationship in the U.S. between the terrorist-monster, citizenship, and national ideologies. Again, the purpose of this discussion in the U.S. context is to identify these conceptualizations in relation to Muslim (terrorist) identities and national belonging and explore through my study with young Canadian Muslims similar factors or experiences in the formations of their perceptions of Canadian national identity. Next, building on Edward Said's (1979) concept of Orientalism in the service of colonialism, I discuss theories on its current use in the post-9/11 context, specifically in feminist discourse as an instrument of imperial feminism, that is, showing "Western" women as more liberal and intellectually advanced than Muslim women who wear religious clothing. Here, I argue that feminist Orientalism at this time may function as a response to the general "remasculinizing" of the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Canada in the wake of 9/11 and that the critiquing of Muslim women's religious attire also works as a means to reassert the merits of liberal feminism. I also argue that Orientalist speech targeting young Muslims demonstrate new strands in Orientalist themes and indicates that young Muslim males,

especially, are politically differentiated within a national framework. Following this, I address changes in Canadian citizenship laws in 2009 that distinguish between “authentic” and “other” citizenship, again demonstrating how Muslims since 9/11 have been differentiated and conceptualized as outside the perceived Canadian national body. I further argue that these changes have an impact on young Muslim self-surveillance strategies, veiling practices, and performances of “Muslim” masculinity. In the last section of this Chapter, I explore how the secular regulation of religious life in Canada is entwined with the enterprise of “sexual normalization” in its integration of Canadian Muslims. Drawing on the work of Canadian religious, secularism, and nationalism scholars, I discuss how the problematic framing of Muslims’ religious and sexual subjectivities not only serves as a mechanism of differentiation between “Canadian citizens” and “Muslim citizens” within Canada but also frames Muslims as sexually deviant/oppressive.

National Trauma and the Post-9/11 Context

The 9/11 attacks qualify as having generated a U.S. national cultural trauma. Cultural trauma, as defined by American sociologist Jeffrey Alexander in *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, is “[w]hen members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to an awful event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever, and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (2004: 1). Alexander explains that it is not the event itself that causes trauma, but the meanings associated with and disseminated about the event. Cultural trauma is thus the effect of a sociocultural process resulting in “a new system of cultural classification” (Alexander, 2004: 10). Smelser adds that the characteristic feature of the 9/11 cultural trauma experienced by American citizens include a perception of the attacks as “an incredible violation of the nation” (2004: 266). This foregrounding of a collective sense of “nation” and differentiating who belongs to the national body is important to understanding the formations of national ideologies that developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in both the U.S. and Canada. Although it was the U.S. that suffered the collective “violation,” I argue that since 9/11, especially, because it highlighted vulnerabilities to terrorism, but also in light of additional “Muslim-related” terrorist activities locally (for example, the “Toronto 18”) and globally, Muslims in both countries have been differentiated in varying ways. My discussion here is meant to identify the roots of differentiating Muslims in the U.S. and Canada as well as underscore its

significance for Muslims in both Canada and the U.S. In the U.S. context, Smelser further declares that the attack generated a sense of indelibility amongst Americans, that is, “that the events would not only never be forgotten but also that we would never be *able* to forget them” (2004: 266). Other characteristic features include widespread collective mourning for the innocent people killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and a collective endowment of the events with a sacred character. Smelser explains this sacralization not in a religious sense of the term, but in the sense that the tragedies “stand as a monumental instant in the history of the nation” (2004: 267). Also, there are not only deliberate efforts to remember the events collectively, through the erection of monuments and commemorative ceremonies, but there is also sustained public interest in the remembering process, especially, Smelser states, “among politically interested groups over *how* the remembering should take place” (2004: 267).

Collective mourning in the U.S. following the 9/11 attacks focused mainly on the innocent people killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, especially the police officers and firefighters who died while carrying out rescue activities (Smelser, 2004: 266). The profound “idolization” of the public workers quickly morphed into a heroization of these individuals in much the same way as military heroes are memorialized in the nation’s history (Smelser, 2004: 266). This “idolization,” Smelser adds, demonstrates that this cultural trauma was “not exclusively [...] negative in its impact” in that it led to a sense of national solidarity (2004: 266). In his words,

It included a sense that every citizen was affected and thus equal to all other citizens under adversity and threat. It included feelings of well-being toward other fellow citizens [...], a temporary upward blip in people’s trust in other groups (Muslim Americans excepted), and their trust in political authorities and community leaders. (2004: 268)

The assertion that Muslim Americans are excluded solely from this delineation of “every citizen” indicates as this dissertation argues, that since 9/11 Muslims in the U.S. (and Canadian Muslims as argued above) have been differentiated within the nation-state. This exclusive “placement” of Muslims as outside the national body at a time of collective national crisis, at least initially, can be read hegemonically as evidence of the emergence of the conceptualization of a culturally elevated location for non-Muslims—in direct relation to Muslims—within the nation. I thus argue in this dissertation—and my study of young Canadian Muslims bears this

out—that Muslims in the U.S. and Canada feel that they must strive purposefully to demonstrate a commitment to and solidarity with the national body more than any other national group.

As a defensive strategy against an overwhelming sense of violation, the identification of the enemy of the nation was critical in the weeks immediately following the 9/11 attacks. As “is typical of traumatized states,” says Nancy Caro Hollander, the U.S. “mobilized [. . .] omnipotent defenses” in its attempt to reverse or nullify its sense of vulnerability (2014:15). Moreover, Hollander adds, the “unprecedented vulnerability” of the U.S. at this time reflected the need for the U.S. to reaffirm its hegemonic position in the world (2014: 15). The hegemonic status of the United States in the world is assumed to imply military and economic power; however, a socio-psychoanalytic reading of America’s defensive expression also elaborates, in part, the sexualized dimensions inherent in this “reaffirmation.” These sexualized aspects are especially evident in classifying both the enemy of the nation (internal and external), as well as characterizing its “ideal” citizens. Identifying and examining socio-psychoanalytical frameworks is essential because this is when expressions related to sexuality emerge in post-9/11 discourse (for example, “rape” and “emasculatation”). It is also the point when Muslims begin to be differentiated within the national imaginary in sexually related terms. The following section thus details various identity frameworks in which these sexualized elements and essential characterizations play out in the politics of national belonging in both the U.S. and Canada.

These sexualized elements are critical to understanding young Canadian Muslims’ identity at this time because, as my study with young Canadian Muslims demonstrates, a strong sense of national belonging is important to each of the interviewees. However, while some felt fully accepted as Canadians and as Muslims within Canada, others felt that they were not accepted completely as Canadian citizens because they are Muslim. Also, my study reveals that some of the interviewees have internalized an “enemy” Other national/political subject positioning and that some frame their sexual subjectivities within this discriminatory framework (see Chapter 5).

Post-9/11 Context: Perpetuating (De)Sexualized Muslim Otherness

Castration Symbolism

Howard Stein (2004) employs a psycho-cultural anthropological approach in his exploration of the “cultural unconscious” of America following the 9/11 attacks. His examination maps the

relationship between the “official” picture of culture and the “underlying unconscious dynamics that link surface and interior” (2004: xii). While the “official” or surface account of the 9/11 attacks delineates two camps—the evil terrorists (and those who support them) who are opposed to American democracy, freedom, and modernity in general, and the innocent, victimized, freedom-loving Americans, who were unsuspecting of such violent hatred against them—Stein’s psychological exploration of the symbolism of the attacks and the places chosen for the attacks reveals an unconscious attempt of the attackers to *emasculate* the U.S. by destroying specific buildings that symbolize powerful America. For Stein, both the Twin Tower *and* the two jets hijacked by the terrorists to destroy the Towers, are regarded as phallic symbols. Hence, he describes the attack as “an immense rape scene”:

As I watched the countless replays of the second jet approaching and penetrating, then exploding, the South Tower, the attacks upon the Twin Towers felt to me like an immense rape scene: the two jets as vicious phallic thrusts piercing vulnerable tissue. Yet, the Twin Towers were themselves proud, audacious, American phallic thrusts into the technological New York City and American skyline. Symbolically, it felt as if the attacks (instruments of projective identifications) were intended to turn symbolic American ‘maleness’ into ‘femaleness,’ and in turn to transform the feminized adversaries of America into potent, triumphant males. The collapse of both towers into a mass grave show how far the symbolism of (national) castration or emasculation can go. (2004: 11)

Stein’s double phallic symbolism used to describe the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers is fascinating and persuasive. But narratives of castration and emasculation have a long history of patriarchal discourse, including, for example, God’s covenant with Abraham in the Old Testament, which requires all males in the tribe to be circumcised (Genesis 17:10-11),⁵³ and Sigmund Freud’s Oedipus complex theory.⁵⁴ A major distinction between the castration symbolisms in these two examples are the sexualized features posed in Freud’s theories.

⁵³ A circumcised penis is distinguished at this time as important to God and a critical appendage in terms of garnering God’s unmitigated protective power, the powerlessness of “man” and the absolute power of God, and both male superiority over women (because of God’s intense focus on the male sex appendage) and tribal superiority (in the sense of it being a signifier of God’s “chosen” people).

⁵⁴ Based on the classical Greek tragedy *Oedipus Rex*, Freud articulates boys as in competition with their fathers for sexual possession of their mothers. Castration anxiety is an extension of his theory in which the boy fears being castrated by his father as punishment for his incestuous desires.

Contemporary phallic symbolism is associated with “violent masculinity,” assert the editors of *The Cultural Encyclopedia of the Penis* (Kimmel et al., 2014: 187). Like Stein, they also draw on a castration narrative to explain phallic or masculine violence in the 9/11 attacks: “When Islamic terrorists on September 11, 2001, attacked the World Trade Towers, they effected a symbolic castration, to which the United States responded with more phallic violence in the war to ‘topple’ Saddam Hussein” (2014: 187). These scholars further demonstrate current phallic symbolism employed in religious discourse directed at Muslim terrorists. They refer to fundamentalist Christian U.S. Lt. General William G. “Jerry” Boykin’s rebuke to an “Islamist enemy:” “My God is bigger than his god” (187). A popular feminist theologian, in turn, scorned “this type of phallic divinity as a ‘god/rod’” (Kimmel et al., 2014: 187).

Phallic symbolism has a long and variant history; however, it has gained currency in the post-9/11 context in narratives related to power, masculinity, and terrorism, as demonstrated above in psycho-cultural analysis, in scholarly texts, and in religious—and military (Boykin is a former Lt. General in the U.S. Army)—discourses. Moreover, as Stein’s narrative above makes clear, a sexualized component underpins this narrative. In Stein’s account, the privileged position of the phallus as the signifier of absolute power (both of the terrorists and of the U.S. nation), and of rape as *the* means by which that power is at once “substantiated” and “controlled,” infuses the attacks with a highly-sexualized element. In this respect, rape is joined to contemporary castration/phallic symbolism as an expression of defeating the “terrorist” (Muslim) “enemy/Other.”

Nadine Naber (2006) gives an account of how this violent symbolism in the service of defeating the Muslim enemy/Other is articulated “on the ground.” Her research demonstrates that raping, or alluding to the raping of, Muslim women accomplishes the emasculation of Muslim men. In her study with Arab-Muslim Americans in San Francisco post-9/11, she recounts a story of a young hijab-wearing Muslim woman who had been sitting outside a restaurant with a group of friends. The young woman states that a man who was sitting nearby and playing the guitar and singing began

. . . singing about Muslim women and how they are so oppressed over there and how they get sexually abused by their men and how they get raped all the time and that they loved to be raped by their husbands and the reason that they don’t say anything is because Muslim women are weak. He said, “if they like it over

there, we can give it to them over here,” and he went on and on about how they should come to this country to see what real men are like. (Naber, 2006: 252)

Naber analyzes this incident as evidence of what Shohat and Stam refer to as the “colonialist rape and rescue fantasy” (2014: 252). However, the “rescue” in Shohat and Stam’s description relates to a White colonizer mentality that involves liberating non-white (Black and/or Arab, in this case) women. “Rape,” however, in their account, is forced *only* on White women by Black/Arab men— “since White women cannot possibly desire Black/Arab men,” while the sexual relations between White men and Black/Arab women “*cannot* involve rape” since Black/Arab women (evidently) sexually desire the “White master” (Shohat and Stam, 2014: 157). Given Shohat and Stam’s clear racist structure, I argue, then, that the rape narrative in Naber’s account, and especially the comment about “real men” specifically directed at Muslim women, is less about a “colonialist rape and rescue fantasy” than it demonstrates how rape is joined to contemporary phallic symbolism as an expression of non-Muslim male “phallic superiority” over the Muslim male terrorist enemy/Other. In other words, being “raped” by a Muslim man (“their husbands”) is *nothing* compared to being raped by “real [non-Muslim American] men.” Indeed, in this example, although the man in this scenario was in proximity to American Muslim women he (dis)regarded them and the Muslim men they had sex with as not of “this country.” This dominant “phallic posture” dovetails with current American national ideology in that it ties non-Muslim men’s sexuality to the nation and locates Muslim men’s sexuality—and Muslim women—as residing somewhere outside the (true) nation-state, or, in other words, not belonging to or characteristic of “true” citizens of the nation-state.

Stein’s reference to the terrorists as “feminized adversaries” also demonstrates that the 9/11 terrorists were, from the time of the attacks, conceptualized as emasculated—that is, not “real men.” This discourse of “feminizing” and “emasculating” Muslim men demonstrates that while the “war on terror” calls for strategic military engagement internationally and intensified national border patrolling, the “war on (Muslim male) *terrorists*” calls for the devaluing of their sexuality. In this case, while American soldiers battle Muslim terrorists internationally, ordinary citizens can participate in the battle in understated but distinctively harmful ways—on the home front—like the man in Naber’s example. Thus, phallic symbolism in the post-9/11 context incorporates rape discourse to support violent masculinity as a non-Muslim male *attribute* as a counteroffensive to a violent “Muslim” terrorist. In other words, this subject positioning in

relation to national belonging in the post-9/11 context, or perhaps more accurately, an imagined “national manhood,” as philosopher Bonnie Mann refers to it in her examination of the relationship between gender and nationalism in the U.S. in light of the “war on terror” (2014: 4), serves to relocate the injury of 9/11 on the Muslim Other⁵⁵ in explicitly gendered and sexual ways. Furthermore, not only does violent phallic symbolism operate here as a sexualized discourse of domination and defeat of the “Muslim” “enemy/Other,” it demonstrates the conceptualization of Muslims as *outside* the perceived national body.

The above evidences phallic symbolism and emasculation as constituting and contextualizing emotional violence done to the American psyche (Muslims excluded) in the aftermath of 9/11 and ostensibly validates violent masculinity, including rape discourse, as an appropriate response. The lopsided morality sustaining these violent masculine schemas may be supported, to some extent, by the differing conceptualizations of “war” and “terrorism.” Talal Asad (2007) unpacks and contrasts these concepts, attributing essential differences to Orientalist and racialized logics. Specifically, Asad argues that “war” is held as a difficult but moralistic endeavor to save people belonging to or in support of liberal democracies, while “terrorism” is constructed as barbaric, senseless, indiscriminate, pathological, and destructive. Progressively modern technology contributes to the sense of war as a civilized machine because it is thought to reduce collateral damage and reduce the number of soldier deaths (35); war is considered morally defensible because modern liberal governments and its soldiers experience remorse and guilt over deaths incurred in war (17); and in war, the military of a liberal state only targets civilians when “*it is compelled to do so*” (emphasis in original, 36). Contrastingly, Asad says morality is considered absent in terrorism because terrorists do not suffer guilt when killing innocent people (36); terrorists are viewed as “engaged in conspiracies” and because their motives are undefined, they needlessly breed uncertainty and fear in liberal democracies (29-30); and because terrorists are constructed as barbaric there is the notion that he (or she) does “not value human life as” *civilized* peoples do and thus will take greater risks with theirs and others lives (such as, for example, a suicide bomber) (35). Asad makes compelling arguments both against the moralities of war and the immoralities associated with terrorism. Along with the

⁵⁵ My analysis here is influenced by Judith Butler’s concept of the sovereign subject as one who believes in his or her own inviolability: “Such a sovereign position not only denies its own constitutive injurability but tries to relocate injurability on the other” (qtd. in Mann, 2014: 3-4).

logics of emasculation and phallic “superiority,” Asad’s work shows that the ethical binaries of war/terrorism contribute to organizing, legitimizing, and sustaining the binaries associated with masculine violence in the post-9/11 era. The logics of morality and immorality, and of emasculation and phallic “ranking,” reveal that the interrelated conceptual frameworks of “war” and “terrorism” that vilify Arab/Muslim identities and exonerate “patriotic” masculinity thrive in the imaginations and practices of “manhood” in America in the post-9/11 era. Research conducted with young Muslim males (Sirin and Fine, 2007) and with older Muslim men (Naber, 2006) in the U.S. reveal that these essentialized frameworks may affect how (young) Muslim men perceive and conduct their masculinity in the public sphere. In my study, I have reworked these American sexualized, moralized, and exclusionary agendas into Canadian conceptualizations of “Muslim” masculinities and identities to examine their relationship to young Canadian Muslims’ sense of citizenship and national belonging. In Chapter 3, “Muslim Masculinity, Self-Surveillance, and Canadian Citizenship,” I flesh out the ideologies of violence that undermine “Muslim” masculinity and its appearance in the public domain. However, the un/ethical, sexualized, inclusionary/exclusionary frameworks can be traced throughout this dissertation.

Terrorist-Monster: Queering the (Muslim) Terrorist Enemy

“The forms of power now being deployed in the war on terrorism,” argue Puar and Rai, “in fact draw on processes of quarantining a racialized and sexualized other” (2002: 117). Moreover, “[s]exuality,” they assert, “is central to the creation of a certain knowledge of terrorism” (2002: 117). U.S. terrorism studies programs, they claim, are at the forefront of this production of knowledge as terrorism studies draw on psychoanalytic frameworks of the psyche to understand the terrorist mindset. In *Mental Health in the War on Terror: Culture, Science, and Statecraft* (2015) Neil Aggarwal also makes a connection to the psychodynamic scholarship disseminated by “experts” and the “knowledge” produced about the terrorist’s mind, and further argues that “knowledge” about Muslims is manufactured in this process. His study of U.S. government documents, professional bioethical debates, legal motions and opinions, psychiatric and psychological scholarship, media publications, and policy briefs finds that mental health professionals construct cultural meanings on how Muslim upbringings relate to political violence

(2015: 85). In fact, Aggarwal says, “understand[ing] the ‘Muslim mind’ [is] a hot topic of academic conferences and proceedings” (2015: 83).

In this section, I focus on the construction of the Muslim terrorist Other as a sexualized “monster” as outlined by Puar and Rai (2002) while stressing that “knowledge” produced about the terrorist mindset overlaps with “knowledge” generated about the “Muslim” psyche. I also draw from Puar’s (2007) concept of “homonationalism” to illustrate the overlapping relationships between concepts of the terrorist-monster, sexuality, citizenship, and national ideologies, which not only generate and define cultural definitions for normal and abnormal sexuality but also contribute to a concept of hegemonic sexuality. The overlapping of Muslim terrorist characterizations and “knowledge” about Muslim citizens in general, variously expressed through media sources, proves to be a significant point of conflict amongst all of the young Muslims in my case study. Not only do these widely articulated racialized characteristics shape my interviewees’ sense of their identities, but my research shows that these depictions also inform their daily behaviours and fears (see Chapter 4).

Puar and Rai draw on Michel Foucault’s figure of monstrosity and explore its employment in terrorism studies towards understanding the terrorist psyche, as well as the dissemination of such “knowledge” in various media. They argue, for example, that discourses about Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and terrorists use the language of the monster to express the concept of pure evil— “the opposite of all that is just, human, and good” (2002: 118). Foucault traced the historical etymology of “monster discourse” and its application in social institutions, linking the conceptualization of the monster to the formation of “abnormals” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 118). His work shows that “monsters” came to be understood as part animal, mixed gender, or individuals whose public or private behaviour deviates significantly from or violates social norms. Foucault further tied monstrosity to sexuality through the regulating of sexual desires and sexual acts such as sodomy (Puar and Rai, 2002: 119). Puar and Rai argue that Foucault’s concept of these figures of the monster and the person to be corrected frequently converge in contemporary psychoanalytical-based discourses of the terrorist-monster. Dominant frameworks include theories about “Muslim” personality disorders that stem from “negative childhood experiences” related to family dysfunction, which in time give “the individual a poor sense of self and a resentment of authority” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 123; see also Aggarwal, 2015: 94-95), which manifests later in life in various forms of violent activity (Aggarwal, 2015: 102-

04). Collectively, these theories support an understanding of “how an otherwise normal individual becomes a murderous terrorist, and that process time and again is tied to the failure of the normal(ized) psyche” (Puar and Rai, 2002: 123).

This “normalized” psyche, Puar and Rai point out, was constructed in the West and relies on a heterosexual family dynamic as a model of normalcy (2002: 123-24; see also, Aggarwal, 2015: 92). Consequently, another psychoanalytical theory based on family dynamics and common to terrorist discourse, they claim, is that of failed heterosexuality. This specific discourse promotes the idea that Muslim men are “sexually frustrated” (Puar and Rai, 2015: 124). Some explanations about Muslim men’s sexual frustration thus point to the men’s desire to martyr themselves for the heavenly promise of seventy virgins. Research psychiatrist Norman Doidge, for example, says that the “cults” these martyrs belong to “frustrate everyday erotic longing for other people so that the devotees will turn that longing toward the cult leader and the cause. [. . .] People who deny themselves erotic outlets soon see any normal expression of eros as the devil incarnate” (n.pag.) (see also Francoeur et al., 2004: 1138).

In both these frames of analysis (troubled childhood and failed heterosexuality within a heterosexual family dynamic), the terrorist psyche is pathologized. Consequently, as Puar and Rai argue, the “knowledge” produced about the terrorist’s psyche is connected to the West’s construction of abnormal humans who “have always been racialized, classed, and sexualized” (2002: 124). The main difference, though, is that while similar explanations have been extended to individuals, such as, for example, Hitler, the pathologized terrorist psyche is here generalized to a racialized religious group.

Visual evidence of this sexualized racializing practice was seen in the early days following the 9/11 attacks when a proliferation of caricatures circulated of Osama bin Laden portraying him in a burka or depicting him being sodomized (Puar and Rai, 2002: 126). Using sodomy to dehumanize bin Laden appeared in another image widely circulated on the Internet after the U.S. invasion of Iraq of Osama bin Laden sodomizing a donkey. In *The Homoerotics of Orientalism* Joseph Boone states that “[r]ather than a symbol of foreign power overwhelming an emasculated United States, this depiction of sodomy denotes dehumanizing bestiality and, by association, the uncivilized, animalistic nature of America’s once ‘number one’ terrorist” (2014:

3-4).⁵⁶ Although not entirely consistent, the relationship between the images of bin Laden being sodomized and those of sodomizing demonstrate the uniformity in sexually demonizing the (Muslim/terrorist) “Other.”

Clearly, these images of sodomy denote feminization, homosexuality, and bestiality, and are meant to humiliate; however, Puar and Rai argue that these types of images also show that not only is “queerness as sexual deviancy [...] tied to the monstrous figure of the terrorist as a way to otherize and quarantine subjects classified as ‘terrorists,’ [but, this also serves] to normalize and discipline a population through these very monstrous figures” (2002: 126). In other words, through localising queerness and deviance on the bodies and subjectivities of pathologized—monstrous—terrorist Others, “normative” heterosexuality is reinforced as both representative of the “character” of the nation and of the good— “normal”—citizen subject.

Unique in the post-9/11 context, however, is the rise of the “good” homosexual as a citizen of the nation in contrast to the terrorist-monster queer. Puar (2007) expands on this concept of the “good” queer subject in contrast to the pathologized terrorist-monster. Here, Puar traces how queer subjects and the rhetoric of sexual exceptionalism within queer discourses and practices both reinforce the heteronormative foundations of the nation and make acceptable a “good” queer subject (2007: 44). For Puar, the good queer subject is a necessary foil to the construction of the terrorist as the epitome of the deviant queer subject. Her term “homonationalism” defines the fusing of homonormativity and nationalism:

National recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. At work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what I term ‘homonationalism’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of American empire. (2007: 2)

Puar argues that the racialized body and the sexualized body are manipulated to justify American military offensives under the banner of the “war on terror.” Specifically, the fact that the “good” queer citizen has rights becomes a signifier of modern “civility” and “superiority” in comparison to some Muslim majority countries where homosexuality is illegal. With its support of women’s

⁵⁶ This image is too small to replicate successfully here. However, it can be accessed by googling “Osama bin donkey.”

rights, the U.S. is held up as a symbol of modern progress in contrast to Afghanistan and Iraq and other Muslim-dominated countries that persecute, torture, or kill their gay and lesbian citizens and deny equality to women. The “adding on” of a nationalized homosexual identity to the dominant heteronormative national identity illuminates the relationships between sexuality and power in the interaction between the “West” and the “Islamic East.” Emerging from this discourse is a concept of hegemonic sexuality, which supplants narratives centred on the binary opposition of hetero- versus homo-sexualities.

Further, the racialized aspect of homonationalism alters queer rhetoric in terms of shifting the stigma of queerness⁵⁷ onto Muslim/Arab Others. For example, Puar points to the objections of one queer anti-war group to homophobic graffiti written on a U.S. missile: “High Jack This Fags” (2007: 43). Puar notes that the epithet “fags” is disconnected from any racial connotations and comprehended here only as a homophobic slur (2007: 43). However, the fact that the word “fag” referred to the “targeted terrorists,” the Afghanis, was not questioned by the group suggests that the use of “fag” in this case is less about homophobia and more indicative of the shift of Arabs into the space of inferiority formerly occupied by gay identities (Puar, 2007: 44). According to Puar, queer shifts at this point from being an expression of identity against the hetero/homo axis, to connote the racialized and sexualized (perverse) Muslim/terrorist/Arab Other.

As noted in Puar (2007), the legal theorist Muneer Ahmed argues that this transference of stigma from queers to Muslim/Arabs after 9/11⁵⁸ is legitimized through moral and emotional channels. Ahmed asserts that prior to 9/11, hate crimes against gays in the U.S. were viewed as crimes of moral depravity, while hate crimes against Muslim/Arab-Americans (and other individuals mistaken as Muslim/Arabs, such as Sikhs and Hindus)⁵⁹ after 9/11 are more generally “understood as crimes of passion” (qtd. in Puar, 2007: 45). Although deemed legally and morally unacceptable, the anger underpinning these crimes is comprehended by the broader public in a

⁵⁷ In the early part of the twentieth century, queer referred to homosexual in a disparaging way. More recently, the term has come to include any persons whose sexuality or gender identity does not correspond to heterosexual norms.

⁵⁸ Also, see Aggarwal regarding the representations of “Arabs” and “Muslim identities” as not “being Western” (2015: 100).

⁵⁹ Crimes against individuals misidentified as Muslim have continued in the U.S. and in Canada since the 9/11 attacks. The *Huffington Post* reports that the FBI began tracking hate crimes against Arabs, Sikhs, and Hindus after several accounts of reported violence in California, Florida, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin (see Kaleem, 2013). *Global News* reports of vandalism at a Sikh temple in Canada, January 2015 (see Mertz, 2015). And in September 2014, *The Guardian* identified a new racial category: “the apparent Muslim,” to explain the rise in violence against individuals who are or are mistaken for Muslims (see Singh, 2014).

much more sympathetic light. Particularly revealing in this transference of stigma—this “mechanism of scapegoating” as Puar puts it—is that it underscores the gendered, sexualized, and racial coding of these bodies:

Indeed, exemplary of this transference of stigma, positive attributes were attached to Mark Bingham’s⁶⁰ homosexuality: butch, masculine, rugby player, white, American, hero, gay patriot, called his mom (i.e. homonational), while negative connotations of homosexuality were used to racialize and sexualize Osama bin Laden: feminized, stateless, dark, perverse, pedophilic, disowned by his family (i.e. fag). What is at stake here is that not only is one good and the other evil; the homosexuality of Bingham is converted into acceptable patriot values while the evilness of bin Laden is more fully and efficaciously rendered through associations with sexual excess, failed masculinity (i.e. femininity), and faggotry. (2007: 46).

While hate crimes against Muslims—and other individuals misidentified as Muslim—in Canada and the U.S. have continued since 9/11 (see footnote 59), it is impossible to generalize whether these crimes are underpinned by a sexualized stigma as Puar describes. Certainly, however, slurs of “terrorist” or “Osama” or “fag” or other derogatory sexualized insults in relation to bin Laden, directed against Muslims/Arabs/misidentified Muslim Others, typify this gendered, sexualized, and racialized coding.⁶¹

Discursively, psychoanalytic metanarratives accounting for the failure of the “normalized psyche” of the terrorist slide into the rhetoric of the sexual depravity of terrorists, which are transferred to the bodies of individuals who are Muslim or who are perceived to be Muslim. This transmutation is reflected in post-9/11 interpretations of hate crimes against people who are (mis)identified as Muslim, as well as in the division of “acceptable” queers and queered “others.” These transmutations further affect a sense of patriotic citizenship within the U.S. nation because ethnic and immigrant communities perceived as tied to these perverse terrorists abroad are ideologically segregated within the nation-state, since having a “good psyche” is equivalent to

⁶⁰ Bingham was an athletic homosexual who was aboard one of the hijacked planes during the 9/11 attacks. He is believed to have assisted in the plan to overtake the plane from the hijackers.

⁶¹ An example of two thirteen-year-old Muslim youths who were called “terrorists” and told that one of their fathers was Osama bin Laden, surfaced at a Toronto school in November 2014 (see “Toronto French School Ignored Racial Slurs Against Muslim Students, Court Hears”).

being a “good citizen” (see Nagel, 2003: 141-42; also Bhabha, 1994: xvii; and Aggarwal, 2015: 94). In many ways, “Muslim” sexuality is thus “understood” as a type of failed sexuality through the fusing of it with an abnormal psyche and the transference of homosexual stigma. In this sense, “Muslim” sexuality is demeaned in contradistinction to a “normalized” heterosexuality, and contrary to a “normalized,” non-Muslim, and “patriotic” queer sexuality. As here argued, the post-9/11 war-on-terror-us-versus-them rhetoric is biopolitical. The ideological manufacturing of a perverse “Muslim” psyche/citizen acts as a foil to the “good citizen” who, in comparison to and because of his or her “normalized” psyche and sexuality, not only enjoys an unchallenged belonging to the nation but also occupies hegemonic sexual positionality therein.

Orientalist Rhetoric: Post-9/11

Orientalist rhetoric, as defined by Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1979), is a discourse that accompanied the actual domination of the Orient by western European countries. Said argues that the Orient is not so much a fact of geography as “a European invention” and “one of [Europe’s] deepest and most recurring images of the Other” (1979: 1). Orientalist statements are constructed in ways that extract and define *opposites* in light of the morals and ethics of the West’s self-definition. In this way, the essence of the *superior* Occident is defined in contrast to the *inferior* Orient. Hierarchical binary oppositions such as civilized/uncivilized, developed/undeveloped, masculine/feminine, and modern/archaic were relied on both to define each geographical “character” and to rationalize colonial incursion in the Orient as a civilizing mission. This cultural dynamic serves to dictate the significance of *what*, *who*, and *how* the Orient is “known” by the West. “[I]n short,” as Said claims, “Orientalism [is] a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (1979: 3). Orientalist rhetoric has increased in the post-9/11 era in Canada and the U.S. (Jiwani, 2005; Nayak, 2006; Prasad, 2003). This section explores its expression in the “typical” themes of unstoppable U.S. military strength in the service of “oppressed” Muslim women in the “Islamic East,” the employment of imperial feminism to bolster White Western women’s civilizational superiority, and the demonizing of young Muslim males.

Some scholars in the U.S. argue that the U.S. political base uses Orientalist rhetoric to fashion itself as a strong, powerful, “hypermasculine” state while depicting Arab/Muslim countries and individuals as weaker but posing a threat. Meghana Nayak, for one, also contends

that the current Orientalist project relies on the infantilization of Arab/Muslims in its discourses regarding Arab/Muslim-dominated cultures (2006: 43). Infantilization is a well-worked Orientalist motif. Discursively situating the Occident/Orient as an adult/child, developed/undeveloped, civilized/uncivilized dichotomy ensures a sense of Occidental superiority, and has provided the primary rationale for colonialism. However, as Nayak claims, after 9/11, U.S. infantilization discourses, gender violence, and oppression were made aspects of Arab/Muslim majority cultures “to underscore that patriarchal violence does not exist in the West and that the *only* reason a woman may die in a non-western country is because of a monolithically oppressive, static Culture” (2006: 48). Hence, the promotion of a militaristic solution to end gender violence under the guise of helping Other women obtain or exercise their rights serves to justify U.S. military actions (Nayak, 2006: 48). Nayak further contends that after 9/11, various U.S. government sources, media, and “‘experts’ collaborated to signify the oppression of Arab/Muslim women as the definitive proof of Islamic terror, and Muslim women accordingly became a central point of the war on terror” (2006: 49). Nayak critically argues, however, that military engagements lauded as necessary to save “oppressed” Muslim women overseas are conditional, only mattering if these Othered women express U.S. patriotism. Otherwise, some deaths resulting from combat are simply considered collateral damage (2006: 50).

The popular 2014 film *American Sniper* (2014) gives evidence of this patriotic condition. The American sniper’s task in this movie is to kill terrorists while simultaneously saving Muslim women and children from these extremists. However, in one scene, the American sniper, although deeply conflicted, must shoot and kill both an Afghani child and his mother because they are carrying a bomb designated for a U.S. military tank (*American*). It is “[t]hese contradictions,” Nayak says, “of saving yet hating the Other, sympathizing with yet neglecting the realities of the Other [that] are indicative of Orientalist logic” (2006: 51).

Yasmin Jiwani (2005) argues similar points on the current use of Orientalist rhetoric in the Canadian context. Her examination of Canadian media’s representation of Muslim women after 9/11 reveals Orientalist discourses that serve to advance the interests of White feminists at the expense of Muslim women, under the guise of benevolence (2005: 19). The term “imperial feminism” describes European women’s contribution to the colonizing project under the pretext of goodwill. Female Christian missionaries to the Orient were “helpful” in “civilizing” Oriental

women, while at the same time advancing the notion that Western women are superior in all ways. Jiwani takes up the issue of imperial feminism in her examination of female reporters who purposefully position themselves in contrast to Muslim women. In two separate *Globe and Mail* articles female reporters donned burkas and walked around the city of Toronto to gauge others' reactions towards them. One journalist reports, "The burka tells the world, 'Do not acknowledge that I am here'"; and the other states, "It persuades me to walk quickly with my arms at my side, staring down at the sidewalk" (Jiwani, 2005: 19). The reports, claims Jiwani, "reinforced the perceived contrast between oppressed Muslim women who wear either the hijab or burka and their representation as Western, progressive, liberated and egalitarian journalists" (19). Nayak and Jiwani's critical assessments of government, "expert," and media sources demonstrate that Muslim women are frequently placed at the centre of Orientalist discourses, but their voices are silenced. Through an Orientalist feminist lens, Muslim women are made "mute witnesses to their oppression" while White, non-Muslim women represent the liberated, democratic and altruistic nature of the nation (Jiwani, 2005: 19; see also, Nayak, 2006: 48).

Media representations of Muslim women was a concern discussed in my interviews with young Canadian Muslims. All interviewees stated that Canadian and American mainstream media represent Muslim women as "oppressed" and expressed offence over these discriminatory depictions. Some of the female respondents and friends or family members of others began wearing a hijab or burka in an attempt to refute such repeated representations of oppression, they said. The interviewees endorsed veiling as a Muslim woman's "choice" and rejected it as a symbol of oppression. As well, the respondents said that they frequently address this "oppressed Muslim women discourse" in their conversations with non-Muslims in an effort to present an alternate view – that is, the image of Muslim women as agents of their own lives (see Chapter 4, "Religious Discrimination" and Chapter 5, "Defensive Discourses").

Along with the special attention given Muslim women's bodies after 9/11, *fear* of Islamism has intensified. The official rhetoric that "Islam is peaceful" but "Islamists are evil" ensures that Muslims are both demonized and made suspicious (Nayak, 2006: 52). Electronic media have hastened the reinforcement of politicized stereotypes by which the Oriental "Other" is viewed in the West (Said, 1979: 26). Perhaps nowhere else is the politics of fear of Muslims more prevalent than in media reports on terrorists. The well-published 2006 arrest of 17 Muslim Canadian youths and one older man labelled the "Toronto 18," exemplifies the media's reliance

on Orientalist themes to demonize Arabs/Muslims and Islam. Miller and Sack examined media reporting of the Toronto 18's coverage in four major Canadian newspapers from June 3 to August 5, 2006, described as the "arrest period" (Amin-Khan, 2012: 1603). Miller and Sack examined 225 columns, editorials and letters to the editor, concluding that

. . . a significant portion of the published commentary raised unreasonable public alarm, cast suspicion on the followers of a major religion and impugned Islam itself, failed to subject the allegations of the Canadian government and security officials to rigorous scrutiny, and predicted guilt before the suspects were able to exercise their democratic rights to a fair trial. (qtd. in Amin-Khan, 2012: 1604)

Some of the most demonizing articles included references to Muslim women, like this one from a *Globe and Mail* columnist:

The accused men are mostly young and mostly bearded in the Taliban fashion. They have first names like Mohamed, middle names like Mohamed and last names like Mohamed. Some of their female relatives at the Brampton courthouse who were there in their support wore black head-to-toe burkas (now there's a sight to gladden the Canadian female heart: homegrown burka-wearers darting about just as they do in Afghanistan), which is not a getup I have ever seen on anyone but Muslim women. (qtd. in Amin-Khan, 2012: 1604)

In truth, because of their young ages, five of the Toronto 18's names were legally protected under Canada's Youth Criminal Justice Act, and only one of the other thirteen whose names were publicized had "Mohamed" in his name. The journalist's linking of the name of Islam's Prophet in such a deliberate manner to these few radicals serves to demean Islam and Muslims monolithically. Given the young ages of seventeen of the Toronto 18, this patronizing "naming" strategy suggests the inability of Muslims to progress from the time of their Prophet, hence Islam's "failure" to modernize. The reference to burka-clad female relatives typifying Afghani women implies the same regressive theme and further binds Muslim women to terrorism in a way that suggests that they do not know any better (by "darting about" and wearing a "getup"), thus infantilizing them. These discursive trajectories further function to demonize Muslims as incapable of accepting of Canadian democratic values and dismissing of the rule of law. Violence here is the product of backward cultures (and religious beliefs), rather than issues related to social, political, economic concerns, or any other possible factors.

Another reporter, from the *Toronto Star*, targeted Muslim youth, in particular:

Here is your war: Be sickened. Be frightened. Be angry. But don't you dare be shocked [...] These accused wanted, if intelligence experts are correct (and they've been wrong before), to kill you. Your children, your parents, your lovers, your neighbours [...] The Jihad Generation—nothing alleged about it—makes no distinctions. Come such a day, Toronto will look like London . . . Madrid . . . Bali . . . New York City. Blood streaming, mangled metal, severed limbs, inchoate rage and immeasurable grief. (qtd. in Amin-Khan, 2012: 1604-05)

In its entirety, this piece is pure racist hyperbole; however, the reference to the “Jihad Generation” merits unpacking. This term indicates neo-Orientalism in the formation of a global “tag” pinned on youth, and young Muslim males, in particular. This type of media representation of youth creates a moral panic within society. Often the focus of moral panic, “youth personify a given society’s deepest anxieties and hopes about its own transformation” (Maira and Soep, 2005: 1). Based on the notion of young people as “at-risk,” moral panics carry a “warning” in which predictions are made about what might happen unless this situation is addressed, thus sensitizing us to the possible danger of youth who are not better supervised (Barron and Lacombe, 2005). Historically, the bad, out-of-control behaviour of “Othered/Oriental” men is not new to Orientalist rhetoric, after all, they *were* according to imperial colonizers, “uncivilized”;⁶² however, this demarcating label indicates a shift to identifying Muslim male youth specifically. While Muslim women’s bodies bear the justification for feminist and international military agendas, *fear* of Islamism is thus located on the young male body. To be sure, the “Jihad Generation” tag reflects insecurity about youth while at the same time expressing fear of the racialized Other becoming an actor rather than an object in domestic and international hierarchies (see Nayak, 2006: 45). Incendiary Orientalist stereotyping, here supported by some Canadian mainstream media, serves to differentiate young Muslim men politically and threateningly within a national framework. Moreover, media-supported Orientalist rhetoric also indicates social angst about the place of Muslim male youths within contemporary Canadian society. It is not surprising, then, that the young men in my study reported feeling that they were

⁶² Stoler notes that in the early twentieth-century, abandoned métis (“mixed blood”) youths in the Indies and Indochina colonies came to be viewed disdainfully as vagrants, delinquents, and “free-roaming European bastards” (2010: 109). These discourses continue, she adds, in contemporary France (radical Right) with similar concerns expressed about immigrant foreigners, specifically about “contamination, infiltration, and national decay” (109).

adversely differentiated from their non-Muslim peers and described their diligence to be polite and friendly to all non-Muslims at every opportunity lest they be accused of harbouring violent tendencies.⁶³

Orientalist rhetoric in the post-9/11 context underscores the traditional appeal of Orientalism as an Occidental mode of perception, appropriation, and control. Discursive tactics employed to infantilize, demonize, and dehumanize Muslim men, women, and youths have gained currency in the post-9/11 period. Moreover, this racialized rhetoric authorizes a “Western cultural consensus about the *essence* of being” Muslim (Prasad, 2003: 11).

“Muslim Citizenship” and Self-Surveillance Strategies

Differentiations between “citizen” and “Muslim citizen” have emerged both in Canada and in the U.S. (Ghaffar-Kucher, 2009; Zine, 2012). In Canada, the recent amendments to Canada’s Citizenship Act (2008/2009) and the political and public debates about “authentic” and “non-authentic” citizens that animated the debates may have informed these notions of differentiated citizenship. Specifically, while new restrictions apply in extending citizenship to individuals born abroad to Canadian parents, the impetus for the debate arose out of concern in extending citizenship to people living in countries with large Muslim populations, where the “authenticity” of these particular citizens was questioned. Conceptualized as the “Muslim Question,” the debates reflect the cultural and political tensions concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants (Kazemipur, 2014; Selby and Beaman, 2016). The “Muslim Question” parallels the “Jewish Question” circulating in late-nineteenth-century Europe about the integration of Jewish migrants. Like Muslims today, the religious customs and traditional clothing worn by Jewish people was problematic to integration. Perceived as inherent cultural differences, associations were made regarding the threats (culturally, criminally, and of political radicalization) Jewish immigrants posed to European civilizations (Kazemipur, 2014: 8; Selby and Beaman, 2016: 10). Selby and Beaman (2016) interrogate the use and value of the MQ in current Canadian contexts and Kazemipur (2014) explores the MQ within the framework of the post-9/11 era and global and national debates on multiculturalism. I do not expand on the “Muslim Question” in this section, but rather I focus on explaining the critical amendments to the new Citizenship Act and

⁶³ For further discussion on the theme of the perceived violence of Muslim males see Chapter 4, “Media Gendered Representations”; Chapter 5, “Media Gendered Representations”; and, Chapter 3, “Muslim Masculinity”).

critique how these differentiations on citizenship have filtered into public and also Muslim community discourses. However, the reader should keep in mind the historical footings on which this current network of racialized constructs rests.

In 2008/2009, Canada amended its Canadian Citizenship Act to bring it in line with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Bill C-37 contains two specific clauses which address citizenship extended to second generationers. On the one hand, this Bill retroactively restores or gives Canadian citizenship to individuals who had lost or never acquired it because of stipulations in the 1947 Citizenship Act.⁶⁴ This group is referred to as “Lost Canadians.” At the time this repatriation clause was amended, another citizenship category was included for all other second-generation Canadians born abroad. The second clause is known as the “first-generation limitation,” which restricts the inheritance of Canadian citizenship to the first generation of children born abroad to Canadian citizens (Winter, 2012: 47). So, whereas the “Lost Canadians” amendment grants Canadian citizenship to particular second-generationers born abroad, the “first-generation limitation” prohibits the extension of citizenship to certain second-generationers.⁶⁵ Together, these citizenship clauses ignited a politicized debate about “authentic” and “non-authentic” citizenship.

Several Candian scholars argue that these two amendments are influenced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent “war on terror,” and the political and public deliberations about heightened security concerns (Winter, 2012: 49; Harder, 2010: 204). One significant post-9/11 change, for example, resulted in the 2007 Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). This program requires Canadians and Americans to have passports when crossing their shared border rather than previously accepted drivers’ licenses or birth certificates (Winter, 2012: 49). It became apparent after this program began that thousands of individuals living in Canada or the U.S. did not qualify to hold Canadian citizenship. That is, even though these individuals may have been born in Canada or to a Canadian parent (before 1947), they lack or lost citizenship because of particular provisions of the 1947 Citizenship Act (see note 64).

⁶⁴ Examples of not granting citizenship in 1947: To an individual whose parents were unmarried at the time of her or his birth; a person born abroad to a Canadian mother but a non-Canadian or non-British father; or distinctions between foreign born and native born in cases of citizenship revocation (Winter, 2012: 46).

⁶⁵ Prior to 2009, it was possible for Canadians to pass on their citizenship to endless generations born abroad provided these relatives prove residency in Canada or demonstrate “substantial connection” with Canada before their 28th birthday (Winter, 2012: 55).

Elke Winter says that the Lost Canadians' matter was "hotly debated in both parliament and the courts, which before 2008 had variously granted and refused Lost Canadians' claims to citizenship" (2012: 51-52). However, in the post-9/11 era, Winter says there was great sympathy for the Lost Canadians mainly because their case spoke of "a 'more authentic' form of Canadianness and belonging to the 'Canadian national family' than citizenship that is granted through the regular naturalization processes" (2012: 52-53). Scholars also contend that in the wake of 9/11 a growing concern about the perceived potential threat of Muslims within the nation, homegrown terrorism, and minority religions undermining egalitarian gender relations have become key issues and these concerns have led to public discussions about immigrant rights and Western civilizational superiority, which is thought "to be in need of protection" (Winter, 2012: 50). Although questions of race, culture and religion were avoided in government and public discourses regarding the citizenship amendments, these themes taint the discussions (Winter, 2012: 56). Namely, the Lost Canadians amendment embraces individuals who are White, English-speaking, mostly Protestant, of British/European heritage and often hail from the U.S.,⁶⁶ while the first-generation limitation amendment restricts individuals hailing from Arab, Muslim majority, and non-Western immigrant-sending countries (Winter, 2012: 57).

The introduction of the first-generation limitation is widely believed to be in response to the 2006 Lebanon crisis (Winter, 2012: 55). When the Israeli-Lebanon war began in 2006, Israeli military blockaded the country and made escape by land, sea, or air almost impossible. To protect its trapped citizens, Canada spent between 75 and 76 million dollars to evacuate approximately 15,000 Canadians through Canadian Forces airlifts and other means (Winter, 2012: 55). Concerns arose in Parliament and public discourse at this time about the costs involved to evacuate Canadians with dual citizenship who may never have lived in or visited Canada, and the obligation the Canadian government has to its dual nationals living abroad. Winter says, "In stark contrast to the debate surrounding the Lost Canadians – most of whom were living abroad and were to become dual citizens – there was a widespread assumption that" *these* dual citizens had no allegiance to Canada and were indeed "citizens of convenience" who

⁶⁶ Emigration records show that the repatriation clause applied to 240,000 individuals who had "lost" Canadian citizenship at the time of the 1947 Citizenship Act. The Canadian population in 1947 consisted of predominantly White Protestants of European, mainly British, descent. Therefore, these potential applicants' ethno-national, socio-demographic, linguistic, and possible religious characteristics were known beforehand (Winter, 2012: 54).

only appealed to their Canadian citizenship when opportunity suited them (2012: 55-56). Thus, their allegiance to Canada is not adequately established or proven.

This allegiance issue was not raised in deliberations about the Lost Canadians, who were often born in the U.S. along with their children and, therefore, would both merit dual citizenship under the repatriation clause. In contrast, while the Lebanese-Canadians were suspected of “importing ‘old world’ conflicts into Canada” from their “motherland,” the case of the Lost Canadians was underpinned by a discourse of patriotism⁶⁷ (Winter, 2012: 56). Moreover, Winter states that public discourse depicted the Lost Canadians whose lives were not under threat as “authentic” Canadians, while Lebanese-Canadians “evacuated from a warzone were not considered Canadian enough” (2012: 56).⁶⁸ In the one case, individuals are White, English-speaking, of British/European heritage and hail mainly from the U.S., while on the other, individuals come “from Lebanon and, by extension, from other Arab/Muslim/non-Western immigrant-sending countries” (Winter, 2012: 57). Suitably, Winter argues,

[I]t is predominantly non-White Canadians and those of Arab descent and/or Muslim faith who were – and still are – at the centre of the second debate. It is precisely these Canadians’ authenticity that is cast in doubt – so much in doubt that the Canadian government feels compelled to legislate “a real connection to the country” which, in the case of the Lost Canadians and their children, is taken for granted. (2012: 57)

These political debates and related public discourses have critical implications for Canadian Muslim citizens. Indeed, public dialogues illuminate how citizenship is constructed from social and political practices aside from formal rights. For example, mainstream media reporting of Muslims detained at the Canada-U.S. border reveals three particular ways that the discursive framework of “authentic” and “non-authentic” is deployed: (1) by articulating Muslims as “non-authentic” citizens; (2) by articulating Muslims as individuals who *choose* to be Canadian (rather than being “authentic”); and (3) by articulating Muslims, women and youths included, as possible threats to Canada. The Canada-U.S. border is a prominent site where

⁶⁷ Some of the Lost Canadian’s parents had fought in World War II.

⁶⁸ Winter examines public discourse about the “authenticity” of the Lebanese-Canadian’s who were evacuated in 2006. For a discussion of the economic bases underpinning the claim that the individuals evacuated are “citizens of convenience,” see “I’m a Lumberjack and You’re Not” (2006).

Muslims come face-to-face with the spirit of the first-generation clause as they are often required to *re-prove* their allegiance to Canada, even when they have resided in Canada for many years and hold a Canadian passport. Take for example the detainment of a 22-year-old Muslim “native-born Canadian” woman from Kitchener and her mother who “is a Canadian citizen who has lived in Canada for 25 years” at the Canada-U.S. border for over six hours in May 2014, as reported in the *Record* (Thompson, 2014). Both women wear hijabs, which makes their religious affiliation apparent. The father’s immigrant status and his *choice* to be a Canadian are also illustrated in this news story. In exasperation, the young woman declares about her ordeal, “It’s not justified. It was like we had no rights, being on that line between the U.S. and Canada” (Thompson, 2014). When contacted by the *Record* reporter, a U.S. Customs’ spokesperson stated that anyone hoping to enter the United States bears “the burden of proof to establish that they are clearly eligible to enter the United States” (Thompson, 2014).

We may take this example as typical both of Muslims being detained at the border⁶⁹ and of the emphasis placed on citizenship in a mainstream media report. In this case, the reporter accentuated the fact that the young woman was a “native-born Canadian” and her mother “was born in Kenya but is a Canadian citizen who has lived in Canada for 25 years” and her father is a permanent resident. Although the young woman’s native-born status is noted, her immigrant “ranking” is stressed in relation to her parents’ immigration status. These *lengths-of-time* details are critical in validating this family’s commitment to Canada precisely because “these (Muslim) Canadians” authenticity is cast in doubt. I stress here the prominence given citizenship that underpins these types of media narrations. Citizenship discourse here works in concert with *the burden of proof* that is repeatedly required of Muslims in the post-9/11 era to establish legitimate citizenship.⁷⁰

Rather than being treated as “authentic” Canadian subjects, Muslims are often dealt with as duplicitous citizens much the same way that the Lebanese-Canadians in 2006 were suspected of being unfaithful in their allegiance to Canada. In fact, Muslims’ “Other” citizenship status often comes into relief when attempting to cross the border. Specifically, because Muslim

⁶⁹ It is important to note that several participants in my study expressed trepidation in crossing the Canada-U.S. border. These interviewees talked about their personal experiences and those of friends and family members. Some were detained for extended periods of time, and some said detainment is now a consequence of being Muslim.

⁷⁰ See Keung (2015), and “Winnipeg Family” (2015) for additional examples of Canadian Muslims detained at the Canada/U.S. border and similar stress placed on length-of-time citizenship.

Canadians' "authenticity" is questionable, they are often forced to "re-consent" to being members of Canada. This practice also reinforces the language of authenticity. As Harder asserts, "[T]he 'other' to the 'authentic' does play a crucial role in national identity construction and, [...] immigrants are especially important since they are the only citizens within contemporary nation-states who do consciously affirm the authority of the sovereign" (2010: 207). In this sense, as long as the "other" citizen is placed in the position to verbally "re-consent" or re-prove her or his loyalty, "authentic" citizenship is implicitly reinforced, as is the worthiness of the Canadian nation-state. Indeed, ideologically aided by the WHTI initiative, Canada's "other" citizens (especially those who are Muslim) repeatedly and nationally "testify [(via mainstream media)] to the fundamental consentworthiness of the regime by symbolically representing the consent that is effectively unattainable for native-born citizens" (Honig qtd. in Harder, 2010: 207). These public routines illuminate how citizenship is constructed from social and political practices aside from formal rights (see also Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011: 277), and, more strikingly, how Muslims are commonly placed at the centre of these socio-political discourses.

Moreover, the burden of proof stipulations outlined in recurring mainstream media accounts leave the reader of these news reports wondering why the Muslims named in them were unable to prove their worthiness to cross the border. Hours-long investigations may suggest to the broader public that *these* Muslim citizens are indeed a security threat. Consequently, by repeatedly raising these questions and uncertainties about Muslims' intentions in crossing the border, "Muslim citizenship" is located at the level of national security. The repetition in the deployment of uncertainty in mainstream media contributes to manifesting a distinction between "authentic" Canadian citizens, whose citizenship is not publicly scrutinized, and "non-authentic" "Muslim citizens," whose citizenship is legal but dubious.

The differentiations between "Canadian citizen" and "Muslim citizen," however, are not only disseminated through mainstream sources but they are also articulated within Muslim communities and Muslim-based discourses. For example, Jasmin Zine, editor of *Islam in the Hinterlands: Exploring Muslim Cultural Politics in Canada* (2012), illustrates how these discursive frameworks become integral to Muslim-centred dialogues. She refers to a Canadian forum where Tariq Ramadan, a Muslim and scholar of Contemporary Islamic Studies at Oxford University and a popular international speaker on integrating Islam in the West, spoke about the

situation of Muslims in the West and instructed Muslims to claim and assert their rights as citizens, not just as Muslims. Zine reflects,

I understood his point to be that in positioning ourselves in this way, we claim legitimacy under the auspices of citizenship and a shared stake in the country. By locating ourselves as *Canadians*, not simply as Muslims, we can assert our citizenship rights and status and can then stake our claims as *insiders* of the nation. Although I agree with the political spirit Ramadan calls us to adopt, I have two points of contention to raise here. First, such claims rely on the consent of others in recognizing us as “real citizens” and members of the imagined community of the nation (Anderson 1983). Second, the logic of this position dictates that when we speak only as *Muslims*, we are locating ourselves *outside* of the narrative of citizenship and national community. Rather than solidifying our status and rights as citizens, this move seems to further shore up the perceived irreconcilability of “Canadianness” and “Muslimness.” (2012: 17)

Zine thus elucidates here the dichotomous ways that “Canadian citizenship” and “Muslim citizenship” are articulated and reinforced at the level of national belonging, but she also troubles the technologies of inclusion and exclusion that manufacture these classifications.

Researchers of Muslim youth identities in the U.S. have also identified this religio-citizenship differentiation between “citizens” and “Muslim citizens.” Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher (2009), for example, argues that because of the perception of Muslims as a security threat in the U.S. post-9/11, nation and religion have come to outweigh other identity markers, such as race and ethnicity.⁷¹ Ghaffar-Kucher refers to this reduction process as the “religification” of Muslim identity (2009: 7). Her research with Pakistani Muslim youth in New York City between 2004 and 2008 reveals that these youths increasingly identified themselves as Muslims in the post-9/11 era because this alignment enabled them to transform their experiences of exclusion into experiences of solidarity with other Muslims both locally and globally (2009: 8). This identification, Ghaffar-Kucher observes, “softens their ‘outsider’ identity by giving them a place where they feel they ‘belong,’ even within an inhospitable environment” (2009: 18). Moreover,

⁷¹ Certainly, U.S. President Donald Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric, including a plan to ban Muslim immigrants and generate a Muslim registry or database, clearly illustrates that Muslim religion is a problematic identity marker in America. For an overview of Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric, see Jenna Johnson, *Washington Post*, 2016.

Ghaffar-Kucher contends that the religification of identity has critical consequences both academically and socially for young Muslim Americans, specifically regarding the ways in which these youths are increasingly constructed as “non-citizens” (2009: 18). She recounts a focus group discussion with Muslim teens that illustrates their distinguishing between being “American citizens” and “Muslim citizens” in America (note: AGK are Ghaffar-Kucher’s initials):

Soroiya: Everything has a stereotype, and there’s a stereotype for Americans.

AGK: What is that stereotype?

Soroiya: Like being White.

Iffat: Italian.

Soroiya: Christian.

Marina: Definitely not Muslim. Ever since September 11th, definitely not Muslim.
(2009: 10)

Like its operation in Canada, Ghaffar-Kucher observes that religion is increasingly being used as a formal marker of difference by the mainstream media in the U.S. and also by ethnic-religious groups themselves (2009: 18). As a result, she concludes that some young Muslims perceive themselves as outsiders in the U.S. and thus “imagine themselves to be part of a ‘Muslim community’ that provides an alternative identity as an ‘insider’ even though this feeling of belonging is in a community that is increasingly being ostracized by the mainstream” (2009: 18).

Political and public discourses cannot be undervalued in their contribution to the formation of individual, group, and national identities. Indeed, perspectives of national belonging, both within and outside Muslim communities, have implications for how young Muslims socialize, forge networks, make educational and employment choices, and assert themselves locally and nationally⁷²—and for Canadian society more broadly. While the emergence of the Lost Canadians on the Canadian political agenda provided an opportunity to amend some long outstanding citizenship discrepancies, the advent of the notion of some Canadians as “citizens of convenience” in relation to the 2006 Lebanese-Canadians’ rescue from a war-torn country and subsequent amendments to the 2009 Canadian Citizenship Act have spawned discourses at the government, public, and community group levels about the meanings

⁷² For more on this topic, see Herrera and Bayat, 2010; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011; and Thomas and Sanderson, 2011.

of “authentic” and “non-authentic” citizenships in which Muslim citizenship is being differentiated within the national body. Although the voices of young Muslims are rarely expressed at these sites of deliberation, the one example above of the twenty-two-year-old Muslim woman detained at the Canada-U.S. border illustrates her exasperation at being identified as a Canadian “Muslim citizen” rather than a “Canadian citizen.” As Stuart Hall reminds us, “Subjects [. . .] only exist meaningfully *within* the discourses about them” (1997: 45). Indeed, we need to think about the politics underpinning these discourses and the implications they have for young Canadian Muslims in shaping their sense of national belonging. Certainly, the citizenship issue relating to the Toronto-born Omar Khadr⁷³ comes to mind. Captured at 15 years old in a battle in Afghanistan, his “Muslimness” was more often foregrounded in political-legal arguments than was his “Canadian” citizenship. (In Chapter 3, “Muslim Masculinity, Self-Surveillance, and Canadian Citizenship,” I expand on the impact of the treatment of Khadr and this politicized differentiation on young Canadian Muslims’ sense of Canadian citizenship).

Veiling and Citizenship Strategies

Muslim women’s veiling practices and the meanings attributed to these practices vary across time and place (Naghibi, 1999). Nima Naghibi (1999) argues that the veil does not signify only one state of being, but that veiling practices are shaped by the historical and political contexts in which Muslim women live their lives. However, veiling practices are most often explored from traditional feminist perspectives where female oppression or emancipation are studied and debated alongside notions of religious piety (see, for example, Hoodfar, 2006; and Zine, 2008). Absent from these studies is an examination of the relationship between veiling and citizenship, and specifically the contestations around citizenship and Muslims in the context of global insecurity and concerns about citizenship rights and national belonging, as well as how these issues may relate to matters of sexuality. Accordingly, drawing from citizenship, post-feminism, and nationalism theories, I explore these themes in this section.

Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2011) establish empirical links between their studies of securitization and analysis of citizenship in light of globalization, multiculturalism, and

⁷³ See Note 64 for details about Khadr’s capture, imprisonment, and release.

discourses on terror. Their studies were comprised of young Muslims living in the Netherlands, France, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, and Canada. Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking argue that macro events play out at the collective and individual level in terms of socio-psychological (in)securities that condition different citizenship strategies. Three major citizenship strategies they map are retreatism, essentialism, and engagement. Retreatism as a citizenship strategy emerged in the post-WWII immigration era. Retreatism is most apparent with first-generation immigrants who often suppress their needs, such as religious needs, to accommodate rather than challenge dominant cultural values (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011: 278). Essentialist citizenship strategies, on the other hand, developed in response to everyday exclusionary practices. This method involves reasserting boundaries, which in turn provide individuals psychological comfort through (re)establishing a firm sense of belonging to a specified group. As hostility toward Muslims in Western countries has intensified in the post-9/11 period (Herrera and Bayat, 2010), young Muslims who turn to radical Islam are, according to Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, contemporary examples of essentialist citizenship strategies (2011: 282).

Although retreatist and essentialist citizenship strategies are evident amongst Muslim youth in Canada, they are much more apparent amongst Muslim youth in Britain, France and the Netherlands (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011: 281-82). Because multiculturalism is institutionally entrenched in Canada, new Canadians, at least theoretically, have a strong sense of citizenship rights that are on par with the Canadian-born population. Accordingly, young Canadian Muslims, Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking state, more often embrace engagement as a citizenship strategy (2011: 282). Engagement involves “a willingness and determination to open self to Other, both psychologically and sociologically,” thus making it a “dialogical citizenship strategy” (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011: 282). The capacity to express oneself “and to construct one’s own free agency,” as Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking assert, “is the basis of an immersion into an effective political existence” (2011: 284). These socio-political activities are what Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking refer to as “desecuritizing moves,” essential to establish the politics of engagement (2011: 284).

Although Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking interviewed hundreds of young Muslims across Europe and Canada, they do not explore the gendered aspects of these three primary citizenship strategies. However, veiling is very much a gendered practice. Symbolically and from the point of citizenship engagement, veiling is a useful tool to convey a young Muslim woman's sense of

self in society, to open dialogue on the topic of Islam and Islamic traditions with non-Muslims, and also to express and situate herself as an engaged political citizen.

There is some overlap between this engaged citizenship model – as much as it underpins young Muslim females’ participation – and postfeminism theory. According to Genz and Brabon, postfeminism, arising in the late twentieth century, is characterized by “more individualistic assertions of [...] choice and self-rule” than of collective and activist politics in pursuit of gender equality, as seen in previous generations (2009: 8). One U.S. immigration and nationality lawyer calls these individualistic assertions “engaged individualism” or “micro-political agents” (qtd. in Genz and Brabon, 2009: 169). According to Budgeon, “young women nowadays use ‘an interpretative framework that owes much of its potency to feminism’ while also being derived from a brand of postfeminism that appropriates feminist ideals and grafts them onto consumable products” (qtd. in Genz and Brabon, 2009: 173). Thus, as Genz and Brabon argue, postfeminist agency also involves a contemporary shift from sexualized portrayals of women as victimized objects to knowing sexual subjects through understanding the use of their bodies as marketable “billboard space” (2009: 175). Purposefully choosing politicized clothing that advance their personal causes, such as breast cancer awareness with the caption “What Would You Give For A Great Pair of Tits?” young women today, Genz and Brabon say, are “seek[ing] to rework the systems of sexual and economic signification” (2009: 175). Young Canadian Muslim women, then, who choose to wear a veil (hijab), are likely sensitive to the use of their bodies as “billboard space” and thus see themselves as “self-conscious social actors” (Genz and Brabon, 2009: 176). To illustrate, a 2011 *Toronto Star* article about why young Muslim women choose to wear a hijab states in regard to an eighteen-year-old Ryerson University student: “When she later read about families returning to the U.S. from the convention being interrogated and fingerprinted and having their cellphones confiscated, she found deeper layers of conviction. *Hijab* now spoke to her sense of social justice” (Walton, 2011). The student comments, “I felt it was a form of racism. It was only Muslims they were checking. I decided *hijab* would be my form of resistance and freedom of expression. I wanted to be identified as a Muslim” (Walton, 2011). This statement reveals that the young woman employs engaged citizenship strategies and that she knowingly makes use of her body to support her “cause.” Her conscious decision to wear a veil both resonates with a common citizenship

strategy amongst minorities in Canada and provides her occasion to flex her micro-political muscle.

While engagement has proven to be a popular citizenship strategy for young Muslim women in Canada, and sensitivity to the use of their bodies as billboard space is affirmed, studies conducted in the U.S. by Sirin and Fine (2007) and Naber (2006) and in Canada by Jamil and Rousseau (2012) demonstrate that young Muslims in Canada and the U.S. also engage in self-surveillance techniques in order to present a more favorable perception of their Muslim identity to non-Muslims. Indeed, Jamil and Rousseau's research in Montreal confirms that fear of backlash from the dominant non-Muslim culture as a result of global terrorism affects and transforms Canadian Muslims' sense of belonging and citizenship (2012: 371). Moreover, the young Muslims in Sirin and Fine's American study indicate that they felt subject to a "hegemonic gaze" and thus began practising self-surveillance of their behaviours to ensure that they were favourable to the broader non-Muslim population (2007: 159-60). In the post-9/11 context, then, engaged citizenship strategies, contemporary feminist practices, and self-surveillance techniques intersect in the daily lives of some young Muslim women in Canada.

Moreover, citizenship practices are not separate from national identity. Indeed, these varied yet connected citizenship responses in the lives of young Muslim women are reflected in nationalist ideology. As discussed above, in Canada the "other" citizen confirms the "authentic" citizen, both of which are constructed categories serving to define Canada's collective identity. Nationalist projects also include identifying "insiders" and "outsiders" (Nagel, 2003: 147) and further provide a cultural framework whereby "sexual crossings" are symbolically conveyed—that is, by symbolically supporting regional "insider-outsider" positioning, sexual boundaries based on exclusion are thus delimited. Regulating sexual liaisons in times of war (and it could be argued that global terrorism and public and political terror discourses invoke an overarching sense of war), Nagel (2003) argues that the associations between gender, sexuality, and nationalism, as well as related concepts of symbolic citizenship, are intensified. Nagel asserts, for example, that the idea of the nation includes regulations and restrictions for "sexual crossings—what good citizens should and should not do sexually, and with whom they should and should not have sex. In this case, 'our' women should not be having sex with 'their' (particularly 'enemy') men" (2003: 141-42). Nationalist projects thus entail controlling the sexual practices of national members and defining symbolic citizenship. Since "good

citizenship” is bound to the ideology of nationalism, and since sexual boundaries are based on exclusion, observing symbolic sexual boundaries exhibits fidelity to the nation (Nagel, 2003: 147) and thus confirms national belonging.

Historically, nationalizing projects were underwritten with sexual regulations. During the colonizing period, for example, Ann Stoler argues that regulating sexual relations was not only strategically managed in imperial politics and served as a mechanism in defining national identity, but it also clarified “the personal and public boundaries of race” (2010: 9, 42). Moreover, Sherene Razack claims that from the view of the colonizer, the veil became the lens through which Muslim men, familial structures, and “Islamic” culture were seen and constituted (2010: 887). I have noted elsewhere that the essentializing of “Islamic” identities to fixed cultural attributes rather than to adaptable religious, political, historical, and geographical lineages is a facet of cultural racism (See page 22). The concept of “cultural talk” (Mamdani, 2004) is an outcrop of cultural racism in that it delineates “good” and “bad” Muslim identities based on politically constructed assumptions about “Muslim” character. These assumptions, as Selby (2016) notes, have formed a static lens by which expectations about “Muslim” behaviour are gauged and which Muslims are pressed to respond in like manner. Theoretically, then, contemporary Canadian nationalist ideology, marked by imperialist sexual and racist logic, forms the framework by which young Canadian Muslim women now negotiate their agency in veiling “choices.”

In terms of sexuality, citizenship, and nationalism, the “choice” to wear a hijab or veil at a time when hostilities towards Muslims have increased globally and Muslims have come under scrutiny as being possible terrorist enemies may relate to what Kinnvall and Nisbett-Larking refer to as a “desecuritizing move” (2011: 284) because it symbolically conveys citizenship engagement (as opposed to segregated essentialist hostilities), and, possibly, signifies “compliance” with the unspoken yet discernable “sexual crossings” imperative. For example, going back to the *Toronto Star* story about veiling, the reporter adds,

But many who choose (*hijab*) as teens or adults say it’s a decision that comes from self-confidence and empowerment, not coercion. These hijab-wearers, it seems, are moved by faith or motivated by political ideals. And some are grateful for the desexualizing effect of a scarf and loose clothing. It makes them less approachable, more “respected,” they say. (Walton, 2011)

This comment about the “desexualizing effect” of veiling indicates that the reporter and the young Muslim women she interviewed are cognizant of the fact that veiling here signifies sexually and that it is a marker of sexual boundaries. Of course, on a personal level, sexual boundaries have to do with such things as morality and marriageability. But on a national level, when we consider current hostilities towards Muslims globally, fears of backlash from the dominant non-Muslim culture as a result of global terrorism, young Muslims’ citizenship engagement as a “desecuritizing move,” “culture talk,” and observing symbolic sexual boundaries in times of war as exhibiting fidelity to the nation and thus confirming belonging, the “desexualizing effect” of donning a veil may denote unconscious corroboration in demarcating sexual boundaries *within* the nation. As argued throughout this dissertation, “Muslim” identity is now (unfairly) linked to global terrorism and is often portrayed in mainstream media in terms of a national threat. As such, young Canadian Muslims may perceive themselves as holding “enemy or outsider” positionality within the nation. In fact, as outlined in the above section, there is evidence that “Muslim citizenship” is differentiated from “Canadian citizenship” both on the national level and within Muslim communities. In this sense, then, “desecuritizing moves” that involve observing sexual boundaries (meaning Muslim-Muslim sex only) within the nation may indicate discernment of “restricted” sexual crossings. As Nagel argues, observing symbolic sexual boundaries exhibits fidelity to the nation and thus confirms belonging (2003: 147). Certainly, these “compliances” are much simpler when the “enemy” is another nation; however, when “enemy otherness” is formed inside the nation, observing symbolic sexual boundaries within the nation becomes much more nuanced. In this scenario, visually identifying as a conservative female “Muslim” becomes a national membership strategy.

This logic has caused me to rethink the efforts of Zunera Ishaq, a Muslim woman who insisted on wearing her niqab while taking the oath of Canadian citizenship in 2015. While I had initially viewed and applauded her agency from a feminist perspective, and still do, I now find myself reflecting on how this phenomenon may be interpreted as a national membership strategy. My thinking here is influenced by Alia Al-Saji (2010) who gives examples of how French Muslim women subvert and attempt to “resignify” the invisibility of racist attacks on their veiling subjectivities. She argues that the “insistence of veiled Muslim schoolgirls” to wear veils at public schools demonstrates not only an “attempt to resignify veiling but also French identity – to destabilize the borders of what is meant by ‘French’ and its exclusion of what is ‘Islamic’”

(2010: 892). Comparatively, in Canada, this attempt to “resignify” veiling can be translated in Ishaq’s insistence on wearing a niqab in the citizenship ceremony – undoubtedly, the most “Canadian” of Canadian experiences. Taken up in the Supreme Court, her endeavours catapulted her case into the centre of the 2015 federal election, which also saw the former Conservative government proposing a “barbaric cultural practices” hotline and the tabling of anti-terrorism legislation (Bill C-51), which passed through the Senate in June 2015. Not only did Ishaq win her right to veil during her ceremony – and “resignify” her veiling subjectivities – she was, ironically, able to vote in the 2015 election. Moreover, she was also recognized in 2017 as one of Toronto’s outstanding citizens. Her exceptional efforts may, therefore, be seen as “destabilizing” what is meant by “Canadian” “and its exclusion of what is ‘Islamic’” (Al-Saji, 2010: 892). But could this phenomenon also denote her unconscious corroboration in demarcating sexual boundaries *within* Canada? If “Muslim citizenship” is symbolically differentiated from “Canadian citizenship” both on the national level and within Muslim communities, as I argue above, does she “destabilize” these politicized structures or reify them? If observing symbolic sexual boundaries exhibits fidelity to the nation and confirms belonging, and visually identifying as a conservative female “Muslim” denotes a national membership strategy, how are we to interpret Ishaq’s “crusade”? That is, does she challenge these exclusionary practices, or comply with them? I am inclined to say that she does both. I see her efforts as representing the conflicting polarities of contemporary Canadian culture, its modern footprint and its colonial residue. They also illuminate the possibilities open to young Muslim women to exercise their individuality, as well as the muddy terrain in which they must negotiate those possibilities.

By donning a veil, young Muslim women in Canada exemplify their state-sanctioned engaged citizenship status, which, as Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking argue, is a particular citizenship practice that favourably distinguishes Canada from other Western countries at this time (2011: 286). As regards knowingly using their bodies as billboard space, veiling can be for some young Muslim women an emancipatory practice that foregrounds contemporary Western micro-political feminist ideals. Indeed, for young Canadian Muslim women, “choosing” to wear a veil is neither the brazen challenge to secular values that many claim it to be nor does it necessarily compromise Western feminist values. On the contrary, in the Canadian context, it can merge and uphold both standards. Notwithstanding this blending of engaged citizenship and active feminism, underpinning this endeavour may also include an unconscious discernment of

sexual “restrictions,” which are ideologically disseminated through public, political, and nationalist discourses. This “good” citizenship “observance” facilitates and ensures a sense of national belonging. That is, rather than “rework the systems of sexual and economic signification” that Genz and Bradon say is an aspect of utilizing their bodies as billboard space (2009: 175), veiling for some young Muslim women may well indicate “compliance” with the establishment of internalized sexual borders in light of current nationalist ideologies. Thus, veiling for some young Canadian Muslim women in the contemporary Canadian context not only clearly demonstrates engaged citizenship and feminist agency but it may also indicate citizenship and agency operating explicitly within the contours of contemporary Canadian national order.

“Muslim” Masculinity, Self-Surveillance, and Canadian Citizenship

There is neither a uniform “Canadian” masculinity nor a uniform “Muslim” masculinity. However, R. W. Connell (2005) argues that multiple and competing versions of masculinity exist at any given time within a gendered hierarchy.⁷⁴ In Canada, the many versions of Canadian masculinity are shaped by the social positions of other men, social class, race, ethnicity, and social, cultural, and political forces (Greig and Holloway, 2012: 122). Some scholars describe a contemporary crisis in masculinity brought about by the feminist movement (Faludi, 1992), and some relate this crisis to job insecurity, higher divorce rates and absentee fathers (Kahn, 2009: 197-98), which results in sons becoming “too feminine” (Kahn, 2009: 200). Amanullah De Sony (2013) argues that there is a crisis in masculinity in the Muslim world. He claims that because of instabilities in the political landscape a theocratically idealized masculinity is emerging, “defined through familial dominance and shows of power, sometimes expressed as militarism” (2013: 1). Muslim men who do not readily conform to this manly script, says De Sony, may “feel forced to consider themselves secular and therefore outside the religious community” (2013: 1).

To be sure, socially, culturally, and politically shaped expectations⁷⁵ of how masculinity *should* be performed publicly are always in circulation and prone to change over place and time. In 1959, Erving Goffman argued that all individuals perform or act out their identities publicly as

⁷⁴ See also, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005).

⁷⁵ Burke and Stets note that individuals perform their identities according to the expectations associated with their social roles (2009: 161).

a form of impression management (17). This enactment includes “sincere” expressions of identity and “cynical” performances, wherein the individual has no ultimate concern for how others perceive them (Goffman, 1959: 8). Because Muslim masculinities have been vilified in various terrorist-related constructions in the post-9/11 environment, young Muslim men’s performance of their masculinity in public spaces has come under intense scrutiny. Canadian and U.S. studies reveal that young Muslim men may be more surveillant of their own performances (Jamil and Rousseau, 2012; Selby 2016; Sirin and Fine, 2007). This section looks at how the “expectations” for Muslim masculinity in public spaces have taken shape in the post-9/11 period and how some young Muslim Canadian men have responded. My framework includes the U.S. instigated “war on terror” rhetoric and subsequent U.S. and Canadian state security initiatives that treat Islam as a radicalizing religion.

In his 2018 work, Khaled Beydoun theorizes that Muslims in the U.S. have, since the implementation of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” initiatives, purposefully adjusted their public performances of their religious identities in four specific ways: confirming Islam, conforming Islam, covering Islam, and concealing Islam. Confirming Islam includes praying in public and wearing Islamic religious signifiers, such as the headscarf for women and beards for men.⁷⁶ Conforming Islam is illustrated in amalgamating American symbols with Islamic ones, such as a star-spangled headscarf, and being a “good Muslim” before the eyes of the state (Beydoun, 2018: 47). A “good Muslim” includes disavowing acts of terrorism and terrorist groups and expressing religious and political conformity by way of endorsing and reiterating the secular principles and “values” of the U.S. This posture supports secular ideologies and reconfirms counterterror initiatives (Beydoun, 2018: 48-49). Covering Islam includes changing one’s obviously Islamic-related name (for example, “Muhammad”) to one that suggests an “ethnic” or “Black” heritage⁷⁷ and refraining from speaking Arabic especially in airports and on

⁷⁶ For Muslim men, wearing a beard signifies piety similar to a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf. The beard expresses a conservative religious identity. In the post-9/11 period, mainstream media showcases bearded Muslim terrorists. Consequently, a beard worn by a Muslim man has become synonymous of a ‘terrorist’ identity (Beydoun, 2018: 44-45).

⁷⁷ In Beydoun’s example, a young Muslim woman first changed her name on her resumes from “Shahida Muhammad” to “Shahida Sade” and then to “Stacy Jackson.” She did not get any “bites” when using “Muhammad;” however, she did get responses to “Sade” and even more when she switched to “Stacy Jackson.” Had she continued to hide her religious identity in her interviews, she would have graduated to “concealing Islam” (Beydoun, 2018: 50-51).

airplanes.⁷⁸ Concealing Islam includes concealing one's Muslim identity when in public spaces "as a means to avert suspicion, isolation, and gain acceptance" (Beydoun, 2018: 53). Not wearing religious signifiers (for example, a headscarf for women or beards for men), not attending mosque or religious gatherings or publicly associating with other Muslim who do and attempting to pass as "ethnic" or Black with no accompanying religious residue are some accessible ways to conceal an "Islamic" identity. Beydoun claims that specific performances of Muslim identities in the U.S., what he refers to as "acting Muslim" (5), can be traced to the three administrations that have "dealt" with the war on terror and so-called homegrown radicalism.

The Bush administration focused on overseas counterterrorism initiatives, created the Department of Homeland Security, and ushered in the Patriot Act, which permitted the electronic surveillance of citizens (mainly Muslim Americans) without a court order (Beydoun, 2018: 27-28). The Obama era instituted community policing and proliferated binary distinctions between moderate and radical Islam. This period saw the implementation of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program, which fixated on policing and prosecuting homegrown Muslim "radicalization" (Beydoun, 2018: 31). According to Beydoun, the Obama era thus reified "radicalization as a distinctly Muslim American phenomenon" (2018: 31). Counter-radicalization theory and the CVE policing initiatives served to establish the binary of moderate Islam versus radical Islam. Moreover, the government's endorsement of moderate Islam placed "pressure on Muslim communities to perform their Americanness" under the watchful eyes of government officials and Americans at large (Beydoun, 2018: 33). According to Beydoun, the government's attempt to thwart radicalization by imprinting *American* values onto *Muslim* identities culminated in nurturing the "moderate Muslim archetype" (2018: 33).

This racialized archetype can also be found in Canadian discourses. Specifically, Selby (2016) examines trends in academic sources and public policy on Islam that focus on conservative Muslim identifications and, consequently, manufacture piety as a mainstay of Muslim identity. This limiting focus on piety as undergirding *sincere* Muslim identities creates a notably restricted model of 'Muslimness' (Selby 2016: 72). Selby notes that this condensing practice signals an ascending trend in Canada in the post-9/11 era that serves to reify pious expectations of Muslimness (2016: 73). Epistemologically, characterizations of piety provide a

⁷⁸ Beyoun refers to the ejection of a University of California-Berkeley student from a flight for saying the word "Insha'Allah" while onboard (52).

cue to how we can “know” Muslims. Conversely, this construction minimizes and devalues notions of multiplicity in Muslim identities (Selby 2016: 82). In an example of one young Muslim man’s negotiations of his religious identity in public spaces, Selby demonstrates how his dialogues are frequently caught up in public assumptions about Muslim piety but are not necessarily reflective of his personal devotion. The young man was reluctant to participate in Selby’s study because he was doubtful that his experiences and his religiosity would be accurately represented in the analysis. He indicated that “hypervisibility” of Muslims in Canada affects both Muslim women and men and as such, that the public perception of Muslim piety overshadows his daily life (Selby 2016: 80). Although he identifies as Muslim, Selby notes that he is “[c]onscious of his outsider foreigner status” and thus “takes care to avoid being identified as a practicing Muslim” (2016: 81, 80). It is crucial to note that his religious identity avoidance here parallels Beydoun’s “concealing Islam” model of public performance and thus could be interpreted “as a means to avert suspicion, isolation, and gain acceptance” (2018: 53). Even so, to this young Muslim man, he is publicly performing his/an identity in relation to the broader public’s expectations of “Muslim” identity.

While the notion of piety or devoutness has become an essential marker of Muslim identity—pressed upon Canadian Muslims, as evidenced above—concern over the radicalization of young Muslim men continues to drive public, scholarly, and political discourses concerning the threat of young Muslim men. In academia, for example, Peter Beyer’s (2014) study (conducted between 2004 and 2006) of 35 young Muslim men who grew up in Canada was undertaken to explore explicitly the public fear that Islam facilitates radical behaviours. Beyer based his framework and analysis on five factors believed to influence the likelihood of young Muslim men’s radicalization⁷⁹: socio-economic deprivation, the search for identity,⁸⁰ social affiliations, political marginalization and grievances, and radical rhetoric (2014: 122). While radicalization was not demonstrated amongst this study group, Beyer notes that research is inconclusive as to whether all five factors need to be present in the process of radicalization or only some and whether other factors may be overlooked. Unfortunately, with no conclusions as

⁷⁹ Beyer based his study on Mina al-Lami’s five factors of radicalization provided for the New Security Challenges program (funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council (2014: 122).

⁸⁰ The definition given for the “search for identity” explanation is that young Muslim men are caught between identifying with their parents’ Muslim world, which they reject, and the Western world “which rejects them” (Beyer 2014: 122).

to the possible *future* radicalization of the 35 young men, Beyer leaves open the suspicion of terrorism linked to young Muslim men.

Discourses about the radicalization of Canadian Muslim men at the level of government are represented in the Anti-Terrorism Act. In 2015, the Canadian government framed radicalization as a fabric of Islam and linked young Muslim men to “jihadi” terrorism.⁸¹ The discourse of “jihadi” terrorism increased in the fall of 2014 in the wake of the killings of two Canadian soldiers by Muslim men, one in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec and the other in Ottawa. Still, these events only exacerbated a nascent fear of Muslim men already percolating in Canada as evidenced by Omer Aziz (2014), a Muslim reporter for the *Globe and Mail*:

Among moderate and educated Muslims—that is, the tens of thousands of Muslims who populate Canadian businesses and universities—there is a quiet insecurity many of us share. After 9/11, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Iraq War, and so on, this is the dragging fear that “we” may be labeled and libeled as one of “them,” where “them” can refer to an endless catalogue of reprehensible groups.

This “fear” that this young Muslim man speaks of must not be overlooked in public performances of “Muslim” masculinity. Driving the fear of being profiled as a terrorist “other” are the related discourses about the fear of young Muslim males as being “at risk” of radicalization. This fear is not only expressed through public, academic, and political discourses but also is reiterated within Muslim circles. The Islamic Social Services Association in concert with the National Council of Canadian Muslims and the RCMP produced an anti-terrorism handbook in the fall of 2014 titled *United Against Terrorism: A Collaborative Effort Towards A Secure, Inclusive and Just Canada* (UAT). The handbook opens with a quote from former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson that is superimposed on an image of the Canadian flag: “Under this flag, may our youth find new inspiration of loyalty to Canada; for a patriotism based not on any mean or narrow nationalism, but on the deep and equal pride that all Canadians will feel for every part of this good land” (“United” 1). While the handbook itself problematizes Muslim youth as a whole through what Thomas and Sanderson refer to as “an anti-terrorism prism” (2011: 1035), its invocation of loyalty as a necessary expression of nationalism suggests how young Muslim males *should* perform their masculinity in public. Indeed, Jamil and Rousseau found in their research with Canadian Muslims that many had internalized a sense of

⁸¹ See Lum (2015) for some examples of public statements by then Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

being watched by others and thus expressed self-consciousness about their behaviours and actions and a desire to present a positive impression to others in an effort to defuse negative perceptions (2012: 371) (for similar findings in the U.S., see Naber, 2006; and Sirin and Fine, 2007). For young Muslim men, this self-surveillance is expressed as non-aggressive masculinity and strict obedience to Canadian laws. Also, as a point of departure, the UAT handbook holds that Muslim identity trumps all other identities that young Muslims may embrace. Although the guide seems to take this faith-centred identity for granted, it is of vital importance in how young Muslim men *express* their masculinity. Specifically, the primary significance of faith identity for young Muslim men is critical to and underpins discourses on radicalization and anti-terrorism. While Canadian secularism establishes faith as primarily a private matter (Seljak, 2012; Ontario, “Systemic,” 2012: section 4.1), for young Muslim males, their religious identity is problematized and has become a public issue. For young Muslim men, an “overly” religious identity suggests a weak national identity and thus a threat to social cohesion and safety—in other words, an “Islamist” terror threat (see Thomas and Sanderson , 2011: 1036-37).

As a citizenship model, non-aggressive and obedient characteristics are communicated in the UAT handbook as representative of an active or engaged style of citizenship (6-17). And typical of an immigrant citizenship style in the Canadian context, according to Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, as noted above, is that of engagement. Engaged citizenship, they say, involves “a willingness and determination to open self to Other, both psychologically and sociologically,” thus making it a “dialogical citizenship strategy” (2011: 282). The capacity to express oneself in tandem with the political climate is the basis of social and political existence and thus involves what Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking refer to as “desecuritizing moves,” in that engagement forces a discussion on, and hopefully a resolution of, pertinent socio-political matters (2011: 284). A recent study conducted by Bullock and Nesbitt-Larking (2011) with young Muslims (15- to 24-years-old) in the Greater Toronto Area and London, Ontario, reveals that overall “the interviewees exhibited a willingness to engage in the broader political society and political processes” (2011: 1). However, their research also shows that these young Muslims’ sense of Canadian citizenship is precarious. Almost all mentioned the treatment of Omar Khadr⁸² by the

⁸² A controversial Canadian convict captured by American soldiers in a skirmish in Afghanistan in 2002 in which he was accused of killing a U.S. soldier. Khadr, aged fifteen when captured, was held by the U.S. at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba for eight years before he pleaded guilty to war crimes. He spent ten years at Guantanamo Bay before being transferred to Millhaven Institution in Ontario, then to the Bowden Institute in

federal government and worries over being targeted as “terrorists.” One male youth in their study, who was born in Canada, indicated that because of the fear of terrorism, he was concerned that the government might introduce laws that adversely target Muslims (2011: 27-28).

Such laws, in fact, have been established in Canada post-9/11. On this, Sherene Razack (2007) points to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada (passed November 1, 2001) that authorizes security certificates. A security certificate⁸³ permits the detention and expulsion of non-citizens⁸⁴ who are believed to be a threat to national security. An individual can be indefinitely detained when there is concern that he (and it is typically male) is a threat to national security or to another person or may not show up for court proceedings. Most importantly, there is no avenue for detainees to argue their case. A judge of the Federal court reviews the findings against the detainee “in a secret hearing” in which neither the detainee nor his lawyer is present; the detainee receives only a judicial summary of the evidence against him (Razack: 2007: 3). Razack refers to this legal structure as a “state of exception” in which non-citizens (usually Arab/Muslim) have fewer rights than do citizens (2007: 3). She examines the case of Hassan Almrei, who was refused admission to Canada because authorities concluded that he had “a profile” suggesting he was a strong *candidate* for recruitment to a terrorist organization, such as Al Qaeda (2007: 4). According to Razack, it is this “profile” that drew the attention of law enforcement authorities (the issuance of a security certificate) *and* indicted him *and* placed him into a state of exception (2007: 25). Razack argues that although the issuance of security certificates in Canada pre-dates 9/11 and the “war on terror,” in the post 9/11 context “their usage is now primarily directed at [male] Arabs and Muslims” (2007: 5).⁸⁵ The

Alberta. He was released on bail in May 2015. Although the Canadian government immediately communicated their disapproval of Khadr’s release (see “Omar”), in July 2017, the Trudeau government officially apologized to Mr. Khadr for the role Canadian security officials played in the abuses he suffered as a teenage prisoner at Guantanamo Bay and paid \$10.5-million to Mr. Khadr to settle a \$20-million lawsuit he filed over violations to his rights as a Canadian citizen.

⁸³ The certificate originates from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and is confirmed by the Solicitor General of Canada.

⁸⁴ For example, a permanent resident, refugee or foreign national.

⁸⁵ At the time of her writing, Razack identified five men detained under this legal structure as Muslims of Arab origins (2007: 6).

exclusionary practice of racial thinking⁸⁶ achieves clarity here in the elimination of due process for perceived (Muslim) “undesirables.”⁸⁷

Along with expectations of piety, loyalty, non-aggressiveness, obedience, and minimal displays of religiosity in the public sphere, this uncertain sense of Canadian citizenship also affects the public performance of young Muslim masculinities. A 2015 video experiment conducted by a young Muslim man, Mustafa Mawla, in downtown Toronto illustrates this uncertainty and its impact on his sense of masculinity. Through this experiment, Mawla demonstrated engaged citizenship but also masculinity that is at once faith-based, self-surveillant, and non-aggressive. He brought these “expectations” of “Muslim” masculinity together in the public sphere—the place where young Muslim masculinity is fervently scrutinized. For the experiment, called the “Blind Trust Project,” the bearded young man, dressed in jeans, a hooded jacket, and a blue toque blindfolded himself and stood at Dundas Square in downtown Toronto with signs that read “I am a Muslim. I am labelled as a terrorist” and “I trust you. Do you trust me? Give me a hug” (Mawla, 2015). The video, which was posted on YouTube, shows him standing with his arms outstretched waiting to be hugged. Several strangers, both female and male, stopped to hug him. One man stopped his car on the street, jumped out and ran over to give Mawla a hug and then quickly returned to his vehicle. The masculinity performed in this experiment is utterly non-aggressive. This experiment indicates a “Muslim” masculinity that wants to be accepted and understands what is required for that to happen. Moreover, Mawla not only (cautiously) participates in the public sphere as an (a tentatively) engaged citizen, but he also generates physical contact with other (non-Muslim) citizens. His religion is made apparent in the signage, but it is not overt. By blindfolding himself and opening his arms, he creates both a sense of vulnerability and non-aggression towards all other individuals. He certainly cannot hurt what he cannot see. Blindness here also suggests a two-sided purpose. In Greek tragedies, for example, blind characters (soothsayers) had greater insight into situations than did the main characters. Blindness thus problematized humans’ access to knowledge. In the “Blind Trust Project,” the young *blind* Muslim man thus has much more

⁸⁶ In colonial studies, Stoler argues that racism or “race thinking” marked the colonizer’s stance that differentiated between indigenous, European and “poor whites” in its class stratifications (2010: 13, 34-48).

⁸⁷ Systems of inclusion and exclusion are an aspect of colonial heritage. In examining colonial nationalisms and citizenship categorizations, Stoler demonstrates the convergence of racial thinking and national logic in systems of inclusion and exclusion (2010: 84).

insight into the *real* threat of Muslim masculinity than what is increasingly disseminated through mainstream media and political discourses.

Mawla's performance of "Muslim" masculinity in one of the busiest public spaces in Canada illuminates the fact that we live in a time of terrorism. Although terrorism was present in the world before 9/11, this historical moment set the contextual framework for the current era of terrorism. *Time* itself is present in discourses of radicalized identities. The time continuum is a fundamental feature of radicalization theory that establishes slippery binary distinctions between moderate and radical Islam. Namely, a "Jihadi" is *already* understood as a radicalized Muslim, and the radicalization gaze cast upon all other young Muslim men conceptualizes possible *future* extremists. The technologies of gazing are bounded by assumptions about the "Muslim other," which are formed and strengthened through repeated representational discourses in multiple formats, often unwittingly. Specifically, the UAT handbook and Beyer's (2014) study, which measured the possibilities of young Muslim men's radicalization against a diagnostic list of likely factors, both constitute radicalization as a young Muslim male phenomenon. But how does a young Muslim man respond to the radicalization gaze and the "technologies of exclusion" (Stoler, 2010: xvii) that place him (as a threat to national security) outside the national body? How do young Muslim men demonstrate non-threatening masculinity, and how many times do they need to do so? How does the radicalization gaze ultimately shape "Canadian Muslim" masculinity?

One response to the radicalization gaze is to withdraw from the public eye a religious (Islam) identity; another is to insert oneself into the public sphere to purposefully engage and unsettle the public assumptions about piety and of a radicalized Muslim masculinity (while retaining a personal religious identity). The "Blind Trust Project" is an example of the latter pushing back against the radicalization gaze. Through a cautiously engaged citizenship style, Mawla "tells" non-Muslims what he "sees" *and* performs an "acceptable" "Muslim" masculinity that is both non-aggressive and not too religious (appropriate for the Canadian "secular" setting; see Seljak, 2012). It is a sincere performance and the people who stop and hug him recognize its sincerity. Regarding Beydoun's (2018) models, his performance may be considered "conforming Islam" by purposefully demonstrating that he is a "good Muslim" who, by his unprotected actions, indicates his disavowal of terrorism and, contrastingly, his acceptance of the "values" of Canadian society. Most notably, this blind experiment shows that the radicalization gaze

problematizes young Muslim men's masculinities and creates vulnerabilities regarding performing their/a masculinity publicly. It also demonstrates that not only do public affirmation and self-surveillance strategies intersect in the lives of some young Canadian Muslim men, but also that some young Muslim men negotiate public "expectations" about their masculinities within the assumptive contexts in which they live their daily lives. Less clear, is which assumptive structures are most constraining on young Canadian Muslim men's lives at this time.

Muslims and Canada's "Sexual Nationalism"

Throughout this chapter, I have stressed the overlapping structure of nationalism, sexuality, and citizenship in Canadian and American identity politics. I began with the notion of collective trauma in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the mobilization of a defensive strategy in the U.S. that included identifying the enemy of the nation and constructing its adversary's sexuality as "abnormal." I described the promotion of these "irregular" classifications as operating through castration symbolism, terrorist-monster queering racializations, and orientalist rhetoric. I then looked at current definitions of "Canadian citizen" and "Muslim citizen" and the strategies utilized by Canadian Muslims to "prove" their allegiance and thus belonging to Canada. I showed that it is common for young Canadian Muslims to practise an "engaged citizenship" strategy; for young women, this may include purposefully wearing religious clothing such as a hijab (which also comprises a sexualized element); and for males, this includes deliberately demonstrating non-violence in the public sphere. I round out this section discussing nationalism, sexuality, and citizenship in Canada focusing on the period between 2007-2015, a time when "Muslim" practices figure prominently in political and public debates.

Even though several years have passed since 9/11, a sense of national vulnerability continues in Canada, sustained by increased "Islamist-related" terrorist activities perpetrated both locally⁸⁸ and globally. Since 9/11, Canada has legislated the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Public Safety Act, the Combating Terrorism Act, the Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, and, while not directly addressing terrorism, the 2009 Citizenship Act was created to limit extending citizenship to second-generationers born abroad, especially those raised in Muslim-dominated countries, as discussed above. In the last decade, religious diversity has also taken centre stage in a variety of

⁸⁸ For example, the "Toronto 18", and the 2014 shootings at Parliament Hill, Ottawa and the running over with a car of two Canadian military personnel in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec.

public policy debates in areas as varied as citizenship, security, employment, education, and human rights (Seljak 2012). While some see these debates as Canada's continued working out of distinctions between its historical religious (Christian) past and its current policy of secularism (Seljak, 2012; Klassen, 2015)⁸⁹ others claim that the debates centre on Muslim-related practices more so than those of other religious groups (Bilge, 2012; Selby, 2014).

Canadian secularism emerged in the 1960s from a national desire to address growing religious diversity by advancing a more secular model of public life and state organization. "For Canadians," as religion scholar David Seljak (2012) asserts,

[T]he formula 'to be a good Canadian one must be Christian' has been replaced with a new one: to be a good Canadian (egalitarian, democratic, rational and multicultural) one must be secular – or at least the right kind of religious person, that is, one who confines religion to private life. (n.p.)

Although Canada has become more religiously diverse in the last five decades, Canadian secularism is more accommodating of religious communities who have adapted themselves to Canada's liberal norms (see footnote 90). Owing in large part to the feminist movement, and now socially entrenched, these norms advocate gender equality and sexual freedoms. The secularization of religion and the rise in gender and sexual equalities has prompted analysts to use terms such as "sexual nationalism" to describe Canada's current national impetus (Bilge, 2012), and "sexularism" (Scott, 2009), the narrative that secularization ensures gender equality

⁸⁹ Pamela Klassen (2015) offers the term "civic secularism" (the combining of Canada's religio-political past with modern political theories) for thinking through the postcolonial imprints of religion and sovereignty on Canadian notions of secular identity. She argues that civic secularism supports multicultural ideals but is "born of selective forgetting of the intertwining of Christianity and violence in the nation's origins" (5). She offers, for example, the political "secular" manoeuvres of the Quebec's governments in 2008 and in 2013. In 2008, the Québec government produced the Bouchard-Taylor Report, which recommended developing "open secularism" (*laïcité ouverte*) to accommodate the religious diversity of (non-Christian) immigrants (7). The Report also recommended the National Assembly should remove the crucifix hanging above the speaker's chair, but the government legislated against this move, claiming the crucifix was a symbol of heritage and not religion (7). In 2013, the Québec government proposed the "Charter of Québec Values" which meant to regulate how religion could/could not be performed publicly by civil servants. Visual symbols of religious identity formed the core of the Charter and its ensuing public debate (of which Muslim women's veiling was the dominant topic). The Charter set out to limit and control certain symbols (such as the niqab) in the public domain while the crucifix maintained its dominant historical presence in the National Assembly. Moreover, Klassen notes that above the crucifix is the coat of arms of the British monarch. She argues, "Together, these represent the material, historical symbols of the complicated interweaving of state sovereignty, Christian power, and layers of colonialism in Québec" and thus "the impossibility of the neutral state." (8). The Charter foregrounded secular values, but as Klassen argues, it was unable to dislocate itself from its Christian and colonial past in its current nation-building endeavours.

and sexual emancipation. Further, the “sexularist” view deems religion to be oppressive to women and non-heteronormative sexualities (Bilge, 2012: 307).

While Canadian secularism is more accommodating of religious individuals and organizations who have adapted to Canadian liberal secular norms, it is, paradoxically, also increasingly intolerant of religious communities and members who transgress established norms (Seljak, 2012).⁹⁰ Selby and Fernando (2014), argue that in Québec a primary strategy to ensure the normalization of “proper” religious and “proper” sexual subjectivities, and to confirm, or not, the “proper” integration of its Muslim population is to demand Canadian Muslim women to make public their reasons for wearing a face veil or hijab. This line of questioning is meant to ascertain Muslim women’s stance on religiously endorsed patriarchy (oppressive) and the level of and commitment to gender equality and sexual emancipation.⁹¹ Although secular ideology defines religious and sexual lives as private matters, making these views public, as Fernando insists, is both a contradictory aspect of secular ideology and a subtle process of the sexual regulation and normalization of Muslim populations in Canada (2014: 691).

Consequently, the language of gender equality and sexual emancipation has become increasingly pivotal to Western immigration and integration governing strategies. This egalitarian emphasis has “giv[en] rise to a new brand of nationalism” in which women’s rights and gay and lesbian rights are considered primary civilizational values and markers of difference against migrant communities, particularly Muslims, who are, since 9/11, cast as posing a threat to these values (Bilge, 2012: 303).⁹² Thus, “sexual nationalism” as described by Bilge, is understood as the incorporation of gender and sexual normativities into the “governmentality”

⁹⁰ Since 1960s, Canada has advanced a more secular “open” model of public life and state organization and affirms religious diversity in the public realm but does not legally separate church and state (Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC), section 4.2.3). Canadian laws and culture preserve “residual Christianity,” which directly or indirectly shapes societal norms, systems, institutions, and “secular” Canadian values (OHRC, section 4.1). Opinion polls indicate that Canadians prefer confining religious practices to the private sphere and are more tolerant of religious diversity the less it deviates from “Canada’s mainline Christian past” (OHRC, section 4.1). As a predominantly Christian public, negotiations over establishing public and legal structures are thus processed through the apparatus of open (liberal) secularity.

⁹¹ As I argue in Chapter 3, veiling is also a marker of sexual boundaries within the nation. That is, there is evidence that “Muslim citizenship” is differentiated from “Canadian citizenship” both on the national level and within Muslim communities. In this sense, then, by observing sexual boundaries (meaning Muslim-Muslim sex only) within the nation, young Muslims may indicate discernment of restricted sexual crossings, and observing symbolic sexual boundaries exhibits fidelity to the nation and thus confirms belonging (Nagel, 2003: 147). Questioning veiling practices from this perspective, then, seeks to reaffirm sexual boundaries as well as ascertain levels of fundamentalism/extremism. Note, this argument is unique to this dissertation. See page 13, footnote 12 for additional comments on veiling.

⁹² See also Dupré, 2010: 238, and Puar, 2007.

(referring to Foucault) of migrant/Muslim integration and the politics of the nation (304).

According to Bilge, the Othering of Muslims in Canada in this context entails the racialization of Muslims' gender and family relations, their conceptions of femininity, masculinity, and marriage and sexuality, as pathologically deviant (submissive, violent, promiscuous) (2012: 315, nt 4).⁹³

Racialization of these “objectionable” characteristics is linked to notions of patriarchal oppression and is perpetuated through various discourses about Daesh (ISIS) and Taliban raping and oppressing women, and polygamous Muslim unions (Bilge, 2012: 310). From a sexularist perspective, secularisation has ensured gender equality—and “hard-won gains,” explains Bilge, “must be protected against religious others who coerce their women into submissive practices such as hijab” (2012: 311). Indeed, to ensure these gains in Québec, the 2011 government-funded *Conseil du Statut de la Femme* (Council of Women's Status; CSF) Report was initiated to address explicitly women's rights in the province. Selby asserts that this Report “emphasizes women's rights as the reason to bar all conspicuous religious signs in Québec, including the niqab” (2014: 449). Through its promotion of an “inclusive feminism,” the Report criticizes English-Canada's multicultural policies, which accommodate the wearing of full-face veils and hijabs. Although the Report does not detail “the visual parameters around acceptable normative female sexuality,” it does suggest, claims Selby, “that women's faces must be bare and their bodies a-religious in order to be ‘neutral’” (or exemplify “proper” female sexual protocols) (2014: 450).

Moreover, Selby (2014) adds that the examples provided in the CSF Report are almost exclusively confined to Muslims. The distinguishing point made here is that whereas English-Canada's multiculturalism strives to remove inequalities “and confer the status of normative citizen or member on everyone” (Taylor, 2013), Québec's feminist-informed “sexular” cultural strategy confers the status of normative citizen on those who demonstrate allegiance to a sexually appropriate feminism, symbolically constructed as an a-religious female body in the public sphere. It is important to identify this distinction regarding addressing immigrant/Muslim integration in English-Canada and Québec because young Muslims living in Québec may perceive more social pressure to conform to (and may more strongly resist) a sexually

⁹³ The racialization of minority's familial, gendered, and sexual subjectivities has a colonial heritage. See Stoler (2010) regarding how colonizers established and controlled gender and family relations, and sexual hierarchies in the colonies.

appropriate feminist nationalism than do young Muslims living in English-Canada where the promotion of multicultural diversity and inclusivity may be more influential as markers of national belonging. For example, the participants in my study hail from English-Canada (Ontario) and my findings indicate that multiculturalism, especially the notion of inclusivity, is fundamental to all the participants' sense of national belonging (see Chapter 4, "National Belonging"). While strongly endorsing multicultural diversity, they also viewed veiling through a feminist lens (amongst other views) and, therefore, claimed veiling as a Canadian woman's "right" to express her individuality (see Chapter 5, "Defensive Discourses"). Thus, feminist secularism across Canada cannot be understated as a framework by which young Muslims (and all religious groups) must navigate their identities.

Along with the 2011 *Conseil du Statut de la Femme* Report, analysts of Québec's feminist nationalism further argue that the part played by the paradigm of gender equality and sexual emancipation is supported through Québec's 2007-2008 "reasonable accommodation debate"⁹⁴ (Bilge, 2012: 315; Dupré, 2012). Specifically, disputants argued that Muslim women's face veils represent the submission of women to patriarchy and hence the contravention of Muslim women's freedom in a secular state. Additionally, in 2015, the Québec Liberal government introduced Bill 62,⁹⁵ which banned face-covering for all public servants in Québec. This injunction initiative garnered tremendous media attention across Canada and became a hot topic of debate during the 2015 federal election. Indeed, the government leaders at that time ensured that the ban on the niqab *across Canada* would be part of the state's broader effort to continue the fight on terrorism. Not surprisingly, the niqab ban created an unprecedented level of awareness of and involvement in the debate and its process by Muslims across Canada. In fact, a poll conducted by Mainstreet Research shows that seventy-four percent of Canadian Muslims aged between 18 and 34 had been "actively involved in the election process" compared to the forty-two percent national average for the same age group (Javed, "Unprecedented," 2015).

As a key political tool in the 2015 federal elections, the niqab took centre stage in political and public deliberations underpinning Canadian citizenship rights and national

⁹⁴ Reasonable accommodation refers to the legal obligation of a governing body to adjust for individuals or groups depending on special needs. Ensured under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, accommodation includes religious, education, or employment-related matters. In Québec, the debate focused intensely on religious accommodation.

⁹⁵ Bill 62 still must undergo a clause-by-clause study before it can pass in to law.

belonging. During this time, Muslim women across Canada were questioned publicly through media and through various studies about their stances on veiling—in other words, to make public their private thoughts on their religious and sexual views. A 2016 Environics Survey⁹⁶ illustrates that this line of questioning continues. Voicing opposition to this survey and similar polls, one Muslim Toronto lawyer argues that they are useful only to differentiate Muslims nationwide and disturb notions about Muslims' adherence to Canadian secular values. She contends that the survey only makes formal the questions that Canadian Muslims are asked daily (Kanji, 2016).

For Mayanthi Fernando (2014), Muslim women's answers that describe wearing a head covering either as a religious obligation or a personal choice fail to convince a secular public of its individual value. Although she is writing here about veiling controversies in France, her analysis can be applied to the Canadian context:

Yet the formulation of the headscarf as both a choice and an obligation remains unintelligible to a secular public [. . .] On the one hand, justifying the headscarf by emphasizing its status as an obligation makes one a fundamentalist, since secular republicans take that obligation to be incumbent upon all women; on the other hand, by declaring the headscarf a choice, Muslim French women lose the capacity to express the ethical stakes of what it means to veil as a religious duty and as integral to one's subjectivity. Yet framing the headscarf as both a religious duty and a personal decision constitutes a kind of doublespeak for secular republicans, an insidious attempt to mask a fundamentalist agenda with liberal terms. Incited by secular power to speak of religion, to reveal their inner religious selves, Muslim French women can only reinforce the suspicions that generate this incitement, only confirm their status as anti-secular, fundamentalist subjects. (2014: 693).

⁹⁶ The Environics Institute for Survey Research conducts social research related to issues of Canadian public policy and social change. In this 2016 Survey, the focus is placed on how perceptions and experiences of Muslims have changed since 9/11, how they vary across key segments of the population (for example, age group and country of birth), and how perceptions of Muslims and non-Muslims compare regarding national belonging. Although the study found that "Muslims are more likely than other Canadians to value patriarchy," it also revealed that second generation Muslims are less accepting of patriarchy than their parents (See Environics, 2016).

For Fernando, this line of questioning is entwined with the enterprise of sexual normalization, and for Bilge (2012), it establishes the symbolic boundaries of national belonging both by regulating “proper” religious practices and by gauging (possible) Islamic extremism.

The outcome of this conflation of Canadian secularism and sexual nationalism in the process of religious and sexual normalization is the propagation of Muslims’ religious and sexual “otherness” in contrast to “normalized” Canadians. Not only does the problematic framing of Muslims’ religious and sexual subjectivities serve as a mechanism of differentiation between “Canadian citizens” and “Muslim citizens” within Canada, but it also constructs Muslims as sexually deviant/oppressive. That is, secularly defined sexual protocols regarding what constitute the “proper” female subject and “proper” femininity also stipulates protocols of maleness and masculinity and thus clearly establishes specific sex and gender norms (see Selby and Fernando, 2014). Undesirable or improper sexuality includes violence against women, forced marriages, and polygamy, which are, according to Selby, implicitly framed in the CSF Report as (Muslim) immigrant sexual deviancy (2014: 452). Muslim men who support veiling are often accused of sexism. As Selby states, “[T]heir wives and sisters are the victims of this form of sexism, and niqab-wearers reflect the most ostentatious expression of this domination” (2014: 454). Also, it is important to note that while “Muslim sexuality” is constructed as “unnatural and oppressive” through government-sanctioned secular discourses, non-Muslim sexuality enjoys unquestioned sanction and is thus normalized through public and political narratives (Selby, 2014: 454).

The ideology of sexuality in Québec’s secular nationalism includes a progressive feminism in which the free expression of sexuality is linked to an a-religious and mainly visible female body. Québec’s sexularism ideologically frames niqab-wearers as performing “improper” femininity and female sexuality in the public sphere. Indeed, niqab-wearers and those who support them are constructed as incompatible with Québec nationalism. However, as the prominence given the “niqab debate” in the recent federal election makes clear and as the 2016 Environics Survey establishes, the notion of “proper” Muslim religious and sexual views are also an aspect of broader Canadian sexularist nationalism. The “niqab debate” also garnered significant political attention and action amongst young Canadian Muslims compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. If being politically engaged in one’s country is a marker of national belonging, then young Canadian Muslims clearly demonstrated in the last federal election not only their belonging to the nation but also expressed their concern for where Muslims “fit” into

the imagined national space. What the Environics Survey and the Mainstreet Research (mentioned above) fail to illuminate, however, is how “Muslim” sexuality, which is constructed as “unnatural and oppressive” in multiple public and political discourses about Muslims’ religious and intimate relationship customs, informs young Muslims’ sexual subjectivities in contrast to the rest of Canada’s sexually “normalized” citizens. Essentially, this is what my present study strives to understand.

Chapter 4: METHODODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

Methodology

Need for the Study

This qualitative case study of young Muslim Canadians' national and sexual subjectivities is required for several reasons. First, Muslim youths' sexual subjectivities is an under-researched area in academic studies. The available literature on Muslim youth identity overlooks young Muslims' sexuality while overemphasizing religious identity, and in the case of young Muslim males, places stress on the potentiality of radicalism and violence. These observations are drawn from scholarly research with young Muslims and from various media discourses about Muslims in Canada and the U.S. Although numerous scholarly studies have been initiated in response to popular stereotypes, many reproduce these same stereotyped constructions. Exceptions to these patterns are the studies conducted by Jamil and Rousseau (2012; Canada), Naber (2006; U.S.), and Sirin and Fine (2007; U.S.), who explore the impact of the post-9/11 backlash on Muslims in their respective countries. Sirin and Fine's study is one of the few that has focused on Muslim youth specifically.

Second, contemporary youth research in Canada and the U.S. stress sexuality as an important factor in a young person's transition to adulthood (Arnett and Jensen, 2002; Irvine, 1994), and other studies demonstrate that sexuality is a prime issue in stereotypical constructions of Muslims in the post-9/11 context (Naber, 2006; Puar and Rai, 2002). In this respect, these various tensions and their implications for young Canadian Muslims, who are forming their religious and sexual identities in their transition to adulthood, demand critical attention.

Third, the globalization of economics and politics has made individuals and groups more insecure about their identities and their expectations for the future. One response to an individual's sense of insecurity is to draw closer to any collective that is perceived to confirm identity and reduce anxieties. Catarina Kinnvall (2004), who explores the political psychology of globalization and Muslims in the West, asserts that in times of rapid change, nationalism and religion are particularly powerful markers of identity and are "therefore more likely than other identity constructions to arise during crises of ontological insecurity" (2004: 741). Moreover, sexuality is linked to national ideologies (Nagel, 2003) and religious identity, and discourses on Muslim sexuality have been drawn into contemporary constructions of national identity (Puar, 2007; Puar and Rai, 2002). Studying young Muslims' sexual subjectivities, therefore, exposes

the ways that Muslim sexuality is constructed in Canadian national ideologies in the light of growing global insecurities, and reveals how young Canadian Muslims, in particular, understand their religious and sexual identities within this national context.

Fourth, national ideologies also include regulations for and restrictions on “sexual crossings” (Nagel, 2003). In the post-9/11 context when the Muslim enemy Other identification is propagated within the “war on terror” narratives, and sex with “the enemy” is demarcated, studying young Muslims’ sexual subjectivities reveals how young Muslims understand symbolic sexual restrictions and thus determine who are and are not “appropriate” sexual partners.

Fifth, Canadian Muslim youths are continuously forming a sense of themselves as Canadians. From a national perspective, it is essential that young Muslims have a strong sense of themselves as Canadians. It is equally important, then, to understand what factors may adversely shape this perception, as well as what factors positively contribute to this perception. Studying the sexual subjectivities of young Canadian Muslims will reveal how post-9/11 constructions of Muslim sexuality and religiously based teachings about sexuality intersect to shape young Canadian Muslims’ sense of themselves as Canadians.

Purpose of Study

I argue that sexuality is hegemonically employed in Canadian and American nationalist rhetoric to position “Muslim” sexuality as “inferior” to, or not on par with, non-Muslim sexuality. Sexuality theories link sexuality to citizenship (Nagel, 2003; Puar and Rai, 2002) and national belonging (Nagel, 2003; Yuval-Davis, 2011). Using these theories as a point of departure, my study seeks to broaden an understanding of how this “hegemonic sexual positioning” may affect young Canadian Muslims’ perception of national belonging and citizenship in relation to sexuality and how Muslim youth regulate their sexuality accordingly. Absent in current literature is a description of the interrelationship and interactivity between these related entities in the context of national belonging. Previous studies conducted by Jamil and Rousseau (2012) in Canada and by Naber (2006), and Sirin and Fine (2007) in the U.S. demonstrate that adult and adolescent Muslims engage in self-surveillance techniques to present a more favourable, or less threatening, perception of their religious (Islamic) identities to non-Muslims in these national settings. According to these studies, these constructed postures have risen in relation to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and globally since then. With this understanding, I situate this *non-threatening* posture in the post-9/11 context where “Muslim” identity is now inevitably linked to

terrorism. On this basis, I approached my study with the assumption that young Canadian Muslims perceive and construct “appropriate” sexual identities in line with hegemonic “placement” to assure themselves and non-Muslims not only of their belonging to the nation but their unique position within the nation—that is, hierarchically less powerful and thus *less threatening* to the social order. The purpose of this study, then, is to understand some of the ways that young Canadian Muslims engage with, disregard, internalize, or resist hegemonic sexual placement.

Orienting Framework

I situate my research project within a social constructivist/interpretivist paradigm, and I strive to be reflexive of my presence in this project, from formulating the central questions of the research to determining the methodological strategies to analyzing and interpreting the research findings. Social constructivism, or interpretivism, holds that knowledge is a product of one’s social context where subjective meaning evolves from experience and interactions with others and through the historical and cultural norms operating in people’s lives (Creswell, 2007). A constructivist viewpoint holds that identity formation is a relational “process” between individuals and their specific environments (Creswell, 2007: 21) and that “reality” and thus meaning, is individually constructed (Smith et al., 2009: 3). As James Scotland puts it, “[T]here are as many realities as individuals. The interpretive epistemology recognizes subjectivity is formed through interaction with ‘real world phenomena’” (2012: 11). A constructivist stance thus holds that meaning is not created, but rather constructed (Crotty, 2015: 42). Using an example of a tree, Crotty exemplifies how knowledge or meaning is constructed: “We need to remind ourselves here that it is human beings who have constructed it as a tree, given it the name, and attributed to it the associations we make with trees” (qtd. in Scotland, 2012:11)

Similarly, my study constructs “knowledge” about a “Muslim.” I assume that there is a general agreement about a “Muslim”; that is, that a “Muslim” is associated with a set of beliefs known as “Islam.” With this understanding, I categorize and construct identities as “Muslim” and “non-Muslim.” Knowledge is constructed through the interactions of individuals and their world and expressed within a social context (Scotland 2012: 12). The social world, therefore, is comprehended and constructed by individuals who participate in it (Scotland, 2012: 12). Individuals construct different meanings of the same phenomenon (Scotland, 2012: 12). For example, the meaning of “tree” takes on different connotations depending on individual

perspectives (for example, from the perspective of an environmentalist or that of a lumberjack) (Scotland, 2012: 12). Thus “tree,” “Muslim,” “non-Muslim,” and “Islam” are subjectively understood.

People’s various understandings or meanings of the same phenomena are fluid and thus may change over time (for example, a lumberjack may become an environmentalist and thus perceive the value of a tree in a new way). Because knowledge is socially and culturally shaped and historically rooted, formed in part by “techniques of domination” (Foucault, 1999, 2009: 162), the interpretive paradigm accepts the existence of ideologies rather than questions them (Scotland, 2012: 12). Accordingly, in my study, I accept the ideologies related to nationalism, including notions of sexuality, without questioning them. The goal of my study, however, is to identify, label, and give definition to the ideology that I refer to and understand as *hegemonic sexual positioning*.

Along with an overarching constructivist paradigm, I employ a postmodernist interpretive framework. Some of the major theorists of postmodern concepts are Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Giroux, and Freire (as noted in Creswell 2007: 25). Postmodernism holds that knowledge claims are rooted in historical contexts and conditions that are shaped by the multiple perspectives of race, class, gender, sexuality, religion, and other group affiliations (Creswell 2007: 25). As noted by Creswell, the tension between these conditions “show themselves in the presence of hierarchies, power and control by individuals in these hierarchies” (2007: 25). These power dynamics rely on a discourse of difference and in the marginalization or “othering” of people and groups (Creswell 2007: 25; Hall, 1997: 239). A postmodernist lens thus serves to identify and critique obscured hierarchal social ordering rather than call for radical change (Creswell 2007: 25). Hence, Thomas (1993) calls postmodernists “armchair radicals” because they are more concerned with changing ways of thinking than of calling for decisive action (qtd in Creswell 2007: 25). I align the approach to my study with this “passive” metaphor in that I am seeking a deeper understanding of the issues I raise and hope to offer another way of thinking about the identity formations of young Canadian Muslims, as well as bring to light some of the subtle workings of power and oppression within the Canadian cultural context. One of my goals in this research project is to establish a new way of looking at the lived lives of young Canadian Muslims and to challenge what I regard as limiting characterizations.

Postmodernism distinguishes the historical, cultural, and social conditions that inform and shape the lives and identities of individuals and groups and recognizes the formation of fluid or multiple identities. As an interpretive lens, my constructivist/interpretivist and postmodernist framework guided my research design in that I assumed that my participants had multiple identities—religious, youthful, and sexual, for example—and that their identities would be multiple and fluid across these entities, as well as underpinned by their subjectivities related to gender, familial relations, ethnicity/race, age, class, health, education, and other social factors. Because my study focused on the formation of Canadian identity, it was essential for me to be aware of Canadian multicultural ideologies in doing research with a minority group in Canada. This includes being aware of ethnic/racial, religious, and cultural diversities in light of the privileges of a mostly Eurocentric and Christian majority population. In doing research with “Muslims,” in particular, it was also essential to be aware of the current climate of Islamophobia⁹⁷ in Canada and elsewhere.⁹⁸ Islamophobia is prejudice towards or discrimination against Muslims based on their religion or perceived religious identity associated with Islam. Islamophobia is a useful concept to critique both the anxiety of non-Muslims and levels of angst Muslims may express in response to such bias. Reflecting on these social tensions was essential to understanding my own assumptions about religious identities and Canadian culture. It was also important for me to realize that they may shape my participants’ views of our shared culture

⁹⁷ (1) In 2015, Statistics Canada reported 159 hate crimes targeted at Muslims, up from 45 in 2012, representing an increase of 253 percent (See Canada. “Police-reported hate crimes, by detailed motivation, Canada, 2011 and 2012” and “Police-reported hate crimes, 2015”). (2) Structural Islamophobia has been embedded in Canadian national security laws and policies since 9/11 by way of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Public Safety Act, the Combating Terrorism Act, the Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, and, while not directly addressing terrorism, the 2009 Citizenship Act was created to limit extending citizenship to second-generationers born abroad, especially those raised in Muslim-dominated countries. (3) Canadian Muslim organizations have put in place strategies to deal with Islamophobia. For example, the National Council of Canadian Muslims has published a booklet about helping Muslim youths deal with their traumatic experiences related to Islamophobia (See “Helping Students Deal,” 2016). (4) Islamophobia may also be read into Muslim employment statistics. Statistics Canada 2006 report shows that Muslims almost double the national average in postsecondary education yet the Muslim unemployment level (14.3 percent) was higher than the unemployment percentages of all other major religions (Roman Catholics, 7.4 percent; Baptists, 7.1 percent; Buddhists, 8.9 percent; Jews, 5.3 percent; Hindus and Sikhs approximately 9.5 each) (as reported by Moghissi, 2016: 95).

⁹⁸ In the U.S., Pew Research reports 307 incidents of anti-Muslim hate crimes in 2016, up 19 percent from 2015. Between 2014 and 2015, hate crimes against Muslims rose 67 percent (see Kishi, 2017). President Trump’s call (2017) for a travel ban on Muslims from several majority-Muslim countries is an example of structural Islamophobia. More recently, an anti-sharia movement has taken place in the U.S. In 2017, twenty-three bills were introduced in eighteen states to ban the practice of Islamic law (see Pilkington, 2017).

and thus to be sensitive to how my participants made sense of these ideological conceptions in accordance with their individual experiences.

Researcher Positionality

As a non-Muslim, white, middle-aged woman, I recognize that I do not share many of the same experiences of my participants and that this is a significant factor bearing on both the research design and the interpretation of the data. However, Merriam et al. argue that “[w]hat an insider ‘sees’ and ‘understands’ will be different from, but as valid as, what an outsider understands” (2001: 417). That is, both perspectives contribute to furthering an understanding of the data. Other scholars argue that while it is important to acknowledge the ethical dilemmas confronting researchers, it is equally important not to shelve valuable research because the researcher lacks essential experiences of the study group (Anteliz et al., 2001). To do so may “replicate the stereotypes that contribute to some groups being marginalized from ‘mainstream’ society” (Anteliz et al., 2001). Indeed, as I argue in my introduction, the persistent current research focusing on Muslim women’s agency and Muslim men’s violence contributes to perpetuating popular gendered stereotypes of Muslims. The goal of my research, in part, is to draw attention to these “standard” themes as well as to normalize sexuality as an integral part of Muslim youths’ transition to adulthood. Moreover, although I do not share the essential experiences of the study group, I situate myself within this framework in that we do share the same socio-political context.

In reflecting on and studying Canadian national identity and nationalisms globally and historically, I began to understand how gender and sexuality complicated racial, ethnic, and national identities, boundaries, and conflicts. It was a short step from thinking about youth and sexuality to considering the ways that sexualities constituted race, ethnicity, and the nation, to recognize the socially constructed sexual aspects of *Muslimness* operating in Canada in the post-9/11 period. My background in postmodernist, post-colonial, cultural, and feminist studies helped me to see, in variously related public discourses and academic studies, that Muslim sexuality was being differentiated and racialized while non-Muslim sexuality appeared to be enjoying a “normalized” location within both Canadian and U.S. national contexts. I understood this contrast as a “hegemonic placement” of Muslim sexuality in that it was being ideologically constructed as “inferior” to, or not on par with, non-Muslim sexuality. Related scholarly work sharpened my understanding of this racialized and sexualized hegemony. I discuss a number of

these contributions in my overview. As a constructivist-postmodernist researcher, I seek to increase my understanding of the phenomenon of hegemonic sexual placement by interviewing young Canadian Muslims who, I believe, have experiences with this phenomenon unique to their cohort. My primary research questions centre on national belonging, which, following Nagel (2003), I believe is underpinned by social constructions of sexuality. In employing a postmodernist interpretive lens, my objective in this study is to flesh out the nuances of the power of the cultural phenomenon in which “Muslim” sexuality is elemental.

Research Approach

I argue that sexuality is hegemonically employed in North American national ideology to construct Muslim sexuality as “inferior” to non-Muslim sexuality. Since I was interested in understanding the hegemonic sexual positioning (HSP) of Canadian Muslims, its “impact” forms part of this understanding. This logically foregrounded the issue of sexual positioning and facilitated my identification of it as the phenomenon of study.⁹⁹ The identification of this concept as the phenomenon of the study had fundamental implications for the research questions, as well as data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The purpose of this study is to understand the phenomenon of HSP and gain insight into its impact on the religious and sexual subjectivities of young Canadian Muslims through an exploration of their lived experiences in the post-9/11 environment—the environment in which they transitioned from childhood to adulthood. This study also explores the ways that HSP may shape young Canadian Muslims’ perceptions of national belonging in terms of sexuality.

My constructivist/interpretivist worldview was instrumental in the design of my research project. The constructivist worldview is closely aligned with phenomenology in its recognition of an individual’s subjective meaning-making (Creswell 2007: 21). Accordingly, my methodology included an interpretive phenomenological approach. In its narrowest understanding, phenomenology is the study of an individual’s experience with a phenomenon or a series of related phenomena and becoming more consciously aware of the experience. Hence, phenomenology seeks to understand “what a concept or phenomena *mean*” to an individual who

⁹⁹ My reflection on the phenomenon of study and on its relationship to the research question was greatly influenced by the deliberations undertaken by Dr. Colleen Fisher at the University of Western Australia, in her phenomenological study about domestic violence. A brief explanation of her reflections is highlighted in Savin-Baden and Major 2013: 91.

has experiences of them (Hopkins et al., 2017: 21), and/or “uncover [both] what several people who experience a phenomenon have in common” and “how they experience” the phenomenon (Savin-Badin, 2013: 214, 215).

The philosophical roots of phenomenology are traced to its founder, Edmund Husserl (1885-1938). A German philosopher, Husserl believed that people only understood objects in the external world as they appeared through one’s consciousness. He thus argued that what seemed to be real or true to individuals is rooted in one’s experiences in the world (Groenewald, 2004: 43). For Husserl, phenomenology involved a conscious reflection on human experience. He thought that with a purposeful examination of one’s experience, a person would identify the “essential features” of that experience (Smith et al., 2009: 12). For Husserl, phenomenology aims to help us to understand another’s experience, and in so doing, we expand our understandings of phenomena (Hopkins et al., 2017: 21).

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), a student of Husserl, challenged some of Husserl’s assumptions. While Husserl argued for a *transcendental* understanding of phenomenology, Heidegger concerned himself with a *hermeneutical* and *existential* understanding of phenomenological inquiry (Smith et al., 2009: 16). Heidegger thought Husserl’s phenomenology too theoretical. Smith et al. state, “he questioned the possibility of any knowledge outside of an interpretive stance, whilst grounding this stance in the lived world” (for example, people, relationships, and languages) (2009: 16). Meaning thus has fundamental importance because consciousness “makes possible the world, but in the sense that it makes possible a *significant* world” (Drummond qtd. in Smith et al., 2009: 16; their emphasis). Heidegger understood “Being” as always already inheriting a pre-existing world consisting of other people, objects, language, and culture in which individuals functionally and meaningfully relate to (Smith et al., 2009: 17-18). Thus, for Heidegger, an individual is always “a worldly ‘person-in-context,’” whose meaning-making is rooted in an intersubjective relationship with his or her immediate environment (Smith et al., 2009: 17).

Fittingly, as Smith et al. observe, “the interpretation of people’s meaning-making activities is central to phenomenological inquiry” (2009: 17). With a constructivist/interpretivist worldview, I align my research project and goals with the Heideggerian interpretive approach.

Research Design

An interpretive phenomenological approach attempts to uncover what individuals experience in relation to a phenomenon, and how they experience it, including its inward (feelings) and outward (actions) manifestations (Savin-Baden and Major, 2013: 215). The primary concern in a phenomenological approach, whether descriptive or interpretive, is to give full attention to each participant's account. Because of the depth of analysis, sample sizes are usually small (Hopkins et al., 2017: 22). For example, Creswell advises researchers to interview from five to twenty-five individuals (2007: 61), and Smith et al. endorse interpretive phenomenological studies with one individual, arguing that the study is "intended to demonstrate existence, not incidence" (2009: 30).¹⁰⁰

In-depth interviews are the primary form of data collection in an interpretive phenomenological approach. Additional forms of collection that may be used include focus groups, open-ended questionnaires, observations, and role-playing (Scotland, 2012: 12). Although it is suitable for interpretive approaches to incorporate multiple forms of data collection, there are many perspectives regarding the process of validation. Postmodernists, who tend to take an interpretive approach to their research designs, for example, have begun to reconceptualize validation in qualitative studies (Creswell 2007: 204).

Validation in interpretive approaches, which emphasize the importance of the researcher in the various data stages and processes and acknowledges that the researcher's analysis is always open for reinterpretation, is considered inscribed holistically on the research project (Creswell, 2007: 205). It includes recognition of the researcher "as a sociohistorical interpreter" whose pre-knowledge "give[s] substance to the inquiry" (Creswell, 2007: 206). Validation, from this perspective, then, is woven into the "chain of interpretations" that both inform the study and produce its findings (Creswell, 2007: 206).

In following the tenets and strategies of an interpretive phenomenological approach, along with reliable methods of data collection and analysis, and with these understandings of validation in a postmodernist-interpretive approach, my interpretations of the findings add to an

¹⁰⁰ Other examples include Lopez and Willis, who illustrate three phenomenological studies where seven women, ten women, and fifteen individuals (gender was not mentioned), respectively, participated (2004: 731-33); Savin-Badin and Major illustrate one descriptive phenomenological study that recruited six high school students (gender was not mentioned) (2013: 223) and another study that recruited twenty-four interviewees (2013: 219); and Groenewald recruited ten individuals for his descriptive phenomenological study (2004: 46).

established pattern of interpretations. I assume that readers of a postmodernist-interpretive study will expect to broaden their understanding of the research subject rather than demand multiple forms of validation. I thus chose not to include additional forms of data collection and concentrate my study solely on the data collected in the in-depth interviews. My method for data collection followed the strategies of an interpretive phenomenological approach. I recruited a small sample size for in-depth interviews and supplemented the interviews with memoing (explained below). I transcribed the interviews and then analysed them using thematic analysis. My interpretations reflect my constructivist-postmodernist framework.

As stated above, phenomenological sample sizes are typically low (Creswell, 2007; Smith et al., 2009). I initially set out to recruit up to 20 participants for my study. I had hoped to recruit equal numbers of females and males. However, unfortunately but tellingly, I encountered difficulty recruiting participants. Specifically, it appeared that the topic of sexuality was problematic.¹⁰¹ That is, some of my participants told me in their interviews that attracting young Muslims for my study would prove difficult because openly discussing sexuality would likely make the parents of these youths uncomfortable. Also, two females who signed up for my study and had confirmed interview times later withdrew, both stating that their parents did not want them to participate in research about sexuality. My recruitment efforts included promoting my study to Muslim students in Islamic-based courses, handing out approximately 100 flyers, and putting up posters in various locations at York University. I also spoke with a representative of Salaam Canada, a queer Muslim organization in Toronto, who connected me to a member who indicated their interest in being a participant in my study. Unfortunately, the individual was outside the age delimitations of the study. In the end, I recruited eight participants. This small number of participants meets the parameters for a phenomenology study; however, a limitation of my study was that I was unable to recruit equal numbers of males and females (See “Participants” for more details, below).

¹⁰¹ Uzma Jamil (2014) reports that she had trouble recruiting participants for her multiple studies with Muslims living in Montreal, which she attributes to the post-9/11 “war on terror” context. Specifically, some potential recruits expressed fear of social or political repercussions if their identities were somehow revealed; some spoke of being labelled as “disloyal citizens” or as “the enemy within” (156). The participants came from immigrant families hailing from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Jamil notes that individuals from working-class background were more cautious about their participation than those from the middle-class grouping (157). Also, in addressing public assumptions about “Muslim” piety, one young man was reluctant to participate in Selby’s (2016) study because he was doubtful that his experiences and his religiosity would be accurately represented in the analysis. Although different in their research focus, along with mine, these two studies suggest a pattern of reluctance amongst young Muslims to participate in research about “Muslim” identity.

It was apparent that my study topic, sexuality, was problematic. However, I was uncertain as to how my being a non-Muslim or the combination of the topic and my non-Muslim status affected my recruitment efforts. In the interviews, some of my participants stated that they found it “easier” for them to talk to an “outsider” on matters related to sexuality than they imagined it would be to talk to a Muslim “insider.” These comments were made when we were well into the interviews when a high level of comfort had been reached. It is possible, then, that at a similar stage in similar interviews, these participants may have felt the same level of comfort talking to a Muslim (“insider”) interviewer.¹⁰² Nevertheless, when conducting research with young Muslims on the topic of sexuality, future researchers should take into consideration the relationship between “insider”/“outsider” researcher positionalities and parental support. Two other studies that explored the intersections of religion and sexuality (and gender) are those conducted in the U.K.¹⁰³ by Yip and Page (2013) and in Canada by Dickey Young et al. (2016). Neither of these studies indicated any tensions between “insider”/“outsider” positionalities either in their recruitment processes or interviews. However, the approaches taken in these studies were different from mine in that these were multiple-year studies¹⁰⁴ incorporating mixed qualitative and quantitative approaches and included several hundred participants from 18 to 25 years old from diverse sexual orientations and religious backgrounds, and both studies were well funded.¹⁰⁵

These mixed-faith studies offer some compelling insight into how British and Canadian youths negotiate the intersections of religion, sexuality, and gender. These two groups of researchers are now working together on a comparative international analysis of their respective

¹⁰² While I have attempted to problematize representations of “Muslim” sexuality operating in Canadian culture and have striven to “normalize” young Canadian Muslims’ sexuality, I have also inadvertently, through this study, drawn attention to and thus problematized the mechanisms of young Muslims’ sexual subjectivities. However, I maintain that the value of my study in drawing attention to the sexualization of power within discourses of national identity and the limiting effect of dominant perceptions of “Muslim” sexuality is important to a more holistic understanding of young Canadian Muslims’ identities.

¹⁰³ 83.8 percent were from England (2013: 15).

¹⁰⁴ Yip and Page 2009-2011; Dickey Young et al. 2013-2014.

¹⁰⁵ Following Yip and Page’s study, the Canadian study included an online survey supplemented with face-to-face interviews and video diaries, and used the same survey questions, mostly quantitative but with some modifications, designed by Yip and Page (Dickey Young et al., 2016: 17). One main difference between these two studies was that Yip and Page drew their participants from six specific religious groups (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism) representing the six major religions in the U.K., while Dickey Young et al. expanded their Canadian study to include “nonreligion” and “spirituality” as possible categories of identification (see Dickey Young and Shipley, 2016: 9-10).

findings, which will shed light on these important issues and extend our understandings of the relationships between religious and sexual identities of Canadian and of British youths. One drawback, though, is that no specific conclusions about a distinct religious group or a comparison of two or more religious groups could be drawn from either of these studies. Moreover, neither of these studies indicate any changes in levels of religiosity over the course of the participants' transitions to adulthood. As I argue in this dissertation, because of the heightened scrutiny of "Muslim" identities in the last several years as a result of increased "Islamic-related" terrorism globally, Muslim youth are a generation set apart from their non-Muslim peers. Like other Canadian youths, as Dickey Young et al.'s (2016) study implies, Muslim youths must also negotiate their religious, sexual, and gendered identities between popular hypersexualized notions of youthfulness on the one hand, and restrictive or limiting religious views on sexuality on the other. But I argue that young Canadian Muslims must also deal with their experiences of being "othered" as possible "enemies" of the state and, so, must filter multiple, and often denigrating, mainstream representations about "Muslim" identities and "Muslim" sexuality. Consequently, I maintain that these uniquely Muslim-related experiences cannot be overlooked in understanding the formation of young Canadian Muslims' identities.

Research Questions

The experiences of the participants growing up in the post-9/11 context, their religious beliefs and convictions, and their sexual subjectivities form the basis of my study. The interview questions correspond to these three overarching themes. Questions in the "Religious Identity" section were designed to explore each participant's level of religiosity and identify the most meaningful aspects of their religious identities. In the "Growing Up in the Post-9/11 Environment" section, questions focused on the everyday experiences of and reflections on being a Muslim in Canada during this time. The questions in the "Experiences and Views on Sexuality" section were designed to explore the participants' views of sexuality in Canadian culture, sexuality and gender, and personal sexual boundaries. The interview questions were mainly open-ended and structured to gain a broad spectrum of opinions and experiences on a range of topics. Some questions were devised specifically to ascertain the participants' perspectives on relationships with non-Muslims and whether there had been any apparent changes in their views and experiences as they have grown older.

The primary research questions of this study are: how is “hegemonic sexual positioning” perceived by my research participants (young Canadian Muslims in the post-9/11 environment), what drives these perceptions, and what impact do these perceptions have on the participants’ religious, national, and sexual subjectivities? In exploring the main research questions, the following sub-questions were explored: how do the participants experience hegemonic sexual positioning—that is, what meanings do they form from these experiences; how does gender shape these experiences; what are the salient themes, patterns, or categories of meaning for participants, and how are these patterns linked with one another; how do the participants contextualize their perceptions of national belonging; how do young Muslims regulate their sexuality in light of these perceptions; and how do young Muslims define appropriate sexual partners and relationships?

Aside from drawing attention to young Muslims’ sexuality as an overlooked subject of research, as well as interrogate some common assumptions currently circulating about young “Muslims’” sexuality, the research questions were designed to examine: the perceptions the participants have about being Muslim in the context of their lived experiences and the factors that drive these perceptions; how young Muslim respondents feel about discriminatory experiences and their response to these experiences, especially those experiences related to sexuality and gender; the participants’ perceptions, judgements and assumptions of permissive sexuality and youth in contemporary Canadian culture and their beliefs about young people and sexuality; the respondents’ perceptions of who constitutes an appropriate sexual partner (for example, female only, male only, female and male, Muslim only, or non-Muslim) and what constitutes an appropriate sexual relationship (that is, between casual to committed, and monogamous or polyamorous), and within what contexts (for example, marriage only, pre-marriage, non-marriage).

Scope and Delimitation of the Study

This dissertation seeks to explore the sexual facets of the post-9/11 backlash on the lives of young Canadian Muslims who have grown up in the post-9/11 environment. Accordingly, my study was delimited to young Canadian Muslims who are between seventeen to twenty-four years old at the time of the study and who were born in Canada or immigrated to Canada at under ten years of age. These age specifics represent the cohort who have grown up in the post-9/11 context and are also individuals who have reached an age when they are more experienced

and knowledgeable about issues related to sexuality. This study drew self-identified Muslim students attending York University in Toronto, Ontario, during the 2014-2015 terms when I was completing my Ph.D. requirements and thus had ample access to qualified participants. This study, therefore, provides a snapshot of young Canadians' identity from a particular location in Canada rather than a full national survey which would entail a more extended period of investigation and some level of funding. However, rather than seek generalizations, the goal in an interpretive phenomenological approach is to uncover what individuals experience in relation to a phenomenon, and how they experience it, including its inward (feelings) and outward (actions) manifestations (Savin-Baden and Major, 2013: 215). Also, one of my goals in this research project was to establish a new way of looking at the lived lives of young Canadian Muslims and to challenge limiting characterizations.

Participants

The participants in this study consisted of eight self-identified Canadian Muslims, six females and two males, aged between eighteen and twenty-three years old, who were born in Canada or immigrated to Canada at under ten years old. As stated above, these age specifics represent the cohort who grew up in the post-9/11 environment as well as having been raised in North American culture and are also individuals who have reached an age when they are more experienced and knowledgeable about issues related to religion and sexuality. The participants were from the same socio-economic middle-class, non-married, and self-identified as heterosexual, but diverse regarding ethnicity/race, gender, age, national origin, and religiosity.

Procedures

Data collection consisted of in-depth interviews lasting up to two hours and held in a private room at York University. I paid utmost attention to the ethical aspects of the research, namely the issues of privacy and consent. Participants were reminded of my research framework, aims, and intentions. Specifically, that studies conducted with Muslim groups in Canada and the U.S. indicated that some Muslims purposely strive to present a positive image to non-Muslims in an effort to defuse dominant negative perceptions and that U.S. scholars claimed that young Muslims felt subject to a "hegemonic gaze" since 9/11, and had developed self-surveillance techniques, including monitoring sexual conduct. The participants were further informed that my research sought to explore the relationship, if any, between the post-9/11 "hegemonic gaze" and

young Canadian Muslims' self-surveillance practices of their sexual conduct. Regarding my personal interest in this study, I explained that I was initially interested in exploring Canadian youths' religious identities and had found an abundant supply of research on many different religions, but little data on Canadian Muslim youths. This gap in research material caused me to reflect critically on its absence as well as the need to develop a study. After explaining the research goals and having the participants sign the Letter of Consent forms (see Appendix A), I informed the participants of the interview structure as outlined above.

The interviews were digitally recorded with the permission of the interviewees. Field notes were taken during the interviews, and immediately afterward I compiled a synopsis of the interview noting salient points as adopted from a model designed by Miles et al. (2014: 125). These field notes consisted of three questions and a detailed summation of the interview: (1) What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this contact? (2) What struck you as salient, interesting, illuminating or important in this contact? (3) What new (or remaining) questions do you have in considering the next contact? And, (4) Summarize the information you acquired (or failed to acquire) on each of the target questions you had for this contact (see Appendix F). I also recorded body language (sub-text) in relation to a particular experience the participant was describing at the time.

Each interview was transcribed as soon as possible after the meeting. I also compiled detailed memos to record new ideas, to condense each section of the interview, and to detail new themes or expand on identified themes. Memos serve to tie together different pieces of data into a discernible whole (Miles et al., 2014: 96). Miles et al. describe memoing as "first-draft self-reports, of sorts, about the study's phenomena and serve as the basis for more expanded and final reports" (2014: 96). As an analytical tool, these memos enabled me to capture, compare, and contrast themes, as well as examine differences and similarities across the data sets.

First-stage coding of the data consisted of generating a list of three types of codes: (1) a priori or deductive codes drawn from the literature review (for example, "self-surveillance"); (2) inductive codes generated directly from the interview data (for example, "invisible"); and (3) in vivo codes, which are a word or phrase spoken by the interviewee (for example, "teacher") (Miles et al., 2014: 81). I then developed a meta-matrix to list all the codes and the participants' "use" of these codes, thus providing a visual diagram of the frequency and context of codes, the similarities, and differences across data sets, and areas of high concentration (Miles et al., 2014:

136). I modified codes along the way as necessary. Thematic matrices were then created to include the participants' responses along with the main themes. This was necessary to identify variances in the ways the respondents talked about and valued each topic and was an essential step in the analytical process towards understanding the participants' "interpretive perceptions" of any given topic (Miles et al., 2014: 75). The constant comparison of themes within and across the data sets in this manner along with critically examining emergent themes formed the basis of my interpretation. For two data sets, "National Belonging Comparison" and "Maturation Deviations," I also created graphs to illustrate the data. Questions for the "National Belonging Comparison" were meant to probe how the participants view themselves overall as Muslims and as Canadians, as well as how this translates "on the ground" as they go about their daily lives being both Canadian and Muslim. Each code cluster was weighted on a scale of one to three. This graph provided me with a snapshot of how the interviewees experience their religious and Canadian identities, and thus added another layer of interpretive data (see Figure 4: National Belonging Comparison, page 144). External characteristics, such as age and gender of the participants, were not coded; however, in comparing differences across the data, when there was an occurrence, gender was taken into consideration as a possible factor.

Findings

This section presents the key findings obtained from eight in-depth interviews beginning with a brief description of the interviewees. Four main themes and several subthemes emerged that inform understandings of how young Canadian Muslims experience and understand their identities. The four main themes are (1) "Religious Discrimination"; (2) "Media Gendered Representations of Muslims"; (3) "Sexual Subjectivities"; and (4) "National Belonging." The significant findings will be discussed in this Chapter and analyzed in Chapter Five.

Summary of Participants

The study included eight self-identified Canadian Muslims, six females and two males, aged between eighteen and twenty-three, who were born in Canada or immigrated to Canada when they were less than ten years old. These age specifics represent the cohort who grew up in Canada in the post-9/11 environment and have reached an age when they are more experienced and knowledgeable about religious and sexual issues. The participants came from the same socio-economic class, but there was diversity regarding ethnicity/race, gender, age, national

origin, and religiosity. To preserve the participants' anonymity and confidentiality, pseudonyms were chosen for all the participants.

Raniyah is an 18-year old self-identified heterosexual Muslim woman who was born in Canada. Her parents immigrated to Canada from India. She wears a hijab, and her mother and older sisters wear niqabs. Raniyah has conservative religious views. Along with her family, she practices “all that is obligatory,” such as wearing a veil (hijab), praying five times a day, halal foods, observing Ramadan, and being charitable. Because obligatory observances are reinforced within her family, she has not yet developed objectivity about her religious practices; however, Raniyah believes that she practices a “truer” Islam than her parents, whose beliefs, she says, are culturally shaped. Such as, for example, her mother wearing a headscarf while eating “because the angels won’t come” otherwise, she says with a shrug. Raniyah observes, “Like where they came from, it’s a lot about culture, and then I grew up here, and it’s more about religion.” She perceives equality between Muslim women and Muslim men and understands differences in gendered roles as necessary to familial and social balance. Raniyah described many experiences of being called a “terrorist” since beginning to wear a hijab. Once, for instance, while waiting at the bus stop with her older sister, who wears a niqab, some young men yelled from a passing car, “Halloween’s over.” However, she does not equate this and other insults with discrimination. In her mind, she is Canadian, and this identification helps her filter any experiences of discrimination.

Nour is a 21-year old Canadian-born Muslim woman whose parents emigrated from Syria. She self-identifies as heterosexual, wears a hijab and holds progressive religious views. She is bothered about the ways Muslims are represented in mainstream media, especially about “extremist” associations, and feels that she must educate non-Muslims about the realities—the good realities—of Muslim life. Hence, Nour actively participates in volunteering and community events at every opportunity, “mainly to show the world that not all of us are bad apples,” she says. An articulate and intelligent young woman, Nour has researched and contemplated the Islamic traditions that tend to draw the most queries from non-Muslims, such as veiling, arranged marriages, gendered social roles, halal diet, fasting during Ramadan, and daily prayer, so that she has ready answers for non-Muslims who show interest in these matters. Rather than practise religion “by the book,” she says that she and her family “live it by our lifestyle.” Hence, she talks more about her spirituality and the peace she derives from her faith than of Islamic “rules.” She

feels that she and her family separate culture from religion and that her “secular” and “multicultural” Canadian upbringing has taught her that religion is a private matter: “religion is separate and [...] we shouldn’t try to mix between the two.” Although her sense of being an “ordinary” Canadian was shaken after 9/11, and she has suffered religious discrimination, she refuses to see herself as a victim. Rather, at every opportunity, she responds to discrimination with overt politeness. Nour has taken to wearing coloured hijabs, noting that there are now ‘hijabi bloggers and different fashion industries in the hijab’ and “Muslim women would say, we’re more coinciding with Western culture. The hijab isn’t just a religious symbol anymore—it’s mainly a fashion statement.” Her desire to be a hijabi fashionista in no way lessens her sense of spirituality or religious obligation; however, it is evident that the first impression she makes on non-Muslims is important to Nour.

Marya is a 21-year-old Muslim woman who was born in Iraq and immigrated to Canada with her parents when she was four years old. She self-identifies as heterosexual. Marya prays daily but does not wear a hijab or participate in Muslim community events. After 9/11, she received a lot of attention at her public school from her non-Muslim classmates; comments were frequently made about her being a “terrorist.” However, in her grade twelve World Religions class, the other students turned to her for answers on Islam. She didn’t know the answers but felt that she needed to answer their questions and that she should also know about her religion. From that time, she has immersed herself in Islamic studies, and consequently, feels that education is the only way to change the general public’s wrong interpretations of Islam and Muslims. Marya perceives a level of “Muslimness” that is acceptable in Canadian culture and thus imposes restrictions on her life in concert with her perceptions. She enrolled in some Women’s Studies courses to demonstrate that she is not “too Muslim,” which she understands as showing concern for women’s rights and issues. Marya imagines that in keeping a low religious profile, there will be no chance of any “incriminating evidence” cropping up in her future that might thwart her goal of becoming a lawyer. She states, “I feel like I need to, as a Muslim, represent more of a neutral, diplomatic, you know, pro-democracy [...] even my aspirations, my career aspirations, I feel that I need to represent that diplomatic Muslim because I feel like that’s kind of been lost since 9/11.” Thus, Marya describes the conscious stifling of her “Muslim” voice as a “safer” route to take and that it is something that young Muslims “just do” without expressly talking about it.

Nadia is a 21-year-old, Canadian-born Muslim woman whose mother and father emigrated from Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively. She self-identifies as heterosexual. She does not wear a hijab. Nadia follows the “basic rules” of Islam: prays five times daily, reads the Qur’an every Friday, observes halal traditions, and does not consume alcohol. She sees herself as keeping an open-mind about Islamic traditions and practices rather than taking her parents’ or anyone else’s beliefs as “truth.” She, therefore, does her own research on every subject and makes up her own mind accordingly. She sees this strategy as deviating from conservative religious thinking and attributes it to her Canadian upbringing: “I tend to like come in between. Like okay, this is what Islam is saying, okay, but I’m Canadian at the same time. So, I try to blend them together.” Currently, perceiving prejudice of her religious identity and fearing physical consequences, Nadia has developed strategies to conceal her Muslim identity publicly. She said she used to joke along with her high-school classmates about having “Osama bin Laden hiding in (her) closet” at home, but in time she quit doing that. In contrast to concealing her religious identity, Nadia readily discloses her liberal feminist and individualist ideals. She takes issues with the feminist logic that categorizes women’s rights to be scantily clad as a matter of personal choice, while at the same time claiming that the hijab signifies oppression. Nadia’s feminist perspective sees women’s clothing choices as stemming from their individual social locations.

Kalila is a 19-year-old self-identified heterosexual Muslim woman who was born in Pakistan and immigrated with her parents to Canada when she was five. She does not wear a hijab because she feels that it is unnecessary. She says that it symbolizes many different things to people, but that spirituality comes from within and should steer a believer’s lifestyle, not be held up for public consumption. Her perspectives on religion and on sexuality are strongly shaped by her concept of individualism. That is, *everything* a person does or believes is a matter of choice. She subscribes to an Islamic framework but states that many subject positions in Islam are open to interpretation. Consequently, Kalila spends a considerable amount of time reading books and searching the Internet on Islam-related topics, such as marriage, arranged marriage, sexuality, veiling traditions, and fasting, and has made some conclusions that differ from her parents and from other Muslims she knows. On the topic of gender equality in Islam, Kalila is undecided if it exists in theory and in practice. She is currently examining the arguments for and against equality but admits that various interpretations come from “a patriarchal society and that is a

little bit hard for me” to understand. Growing up in the post-9/11 environment has made Kalila fearful of being identified as a Muslim, and her fear unsettles her sense of being accepted as a Canadian. Although Kalila claims that she has not experienced any direct religious discrimination, she worries that she may one day be “found out”:

I feel that it’s just normal that I’ve always grown up with this like fear, that people might judge me because of my name or judge me because of where I come from, like, you know [...] It’s kinda like you’re in between because you are a Canadian, but your fear is that people will reject you as a Canadian because of what like somebody else did and how people perceive another group.

Saida is a 19-year-old, self-identified heterosexual Muslim woman who immigrated to Canada from Kuwait with her parents when she was nine. She is chatty, friendly, and complex. She has many experiences with ethnic (Arab) and religious discrimination growing up in Canada. In primary school, discriminatory remarks were associated with her dark skin colour, and in high school, they related to her being a Muslim. In high school, Saida dealt with constant taunting from schoolmates, Muslim and non-Muslim, about her being a “terrorist.” She describes her high-school years as the most trying regarding sometimes hiding her religious identity and at other times asserting it. She says that she does not wear a hijab because her mother does not want her to—that wearing it might increase the chance of Saida being physically assaulted. Under the conditions of real and perceived discrimination, then, she attempts to conceal her Muslim-Arab identity. Saida has conditioned herself to monitor her conversations, emotions, and actions lest she becomes angry and says or does something she will regret. Saida has a supportive family and Muslim community where she lives. Dating is not allowed, but she expects to have a marriage arranged for her by her family members sometime in the future and feels confident that it will be a good match.

Kaseem is a 19-year-old, self-identified heterosexual Muslim man who immigrated to Canada from Pakistan with his parents and siblings when he was four. Although raised as a Muslim from birth, he and his parents and siblings started practising Islam diligently around 2007. He is devoted to practicing Islam daily and committed to ongoing studies on Islamic traditions. His busy schedule includes attending mosque one to five times daily, providing leadership to a Muslim youth group, full-time university studies, and a part-time job. He believes in the purity of Islamic doctrine; any discrepancies in practices globally are ascribed to cultural

differences, for the most part. Within this framework, it is essential for him to separate or distance his family's current practice of Islam from his parents' Pakistani cultural upbringing. That is, he does not believe that his parents' Pakistani background has had any influence on his religious identity. Instead, he refers to his family as "Islamist Canadians" because they have become committed practitioners of Islam while living in Canada. Because he sees Canadian culture—and his mosque—as ethnically diversified, with "people of all different faiths and ethnicities," their Islam is a *Canadian* Islam because he cannot point to one dominant ethnic influence. Since no one ethnic culture dominates the mosque he attends, he has a sense that his beliefs are free of "foreign" cultural customs and as such, he is performing a "proper" Islamic identity. Kaseem gets involved with public events that communicate constructive Islamic teachings, such as the annual Reviving the Islamic Spirit in Toronto, which draws over 20,000 attendees. Kaseem gains a great deal of satisfaction from the positive, goal-oriented strategies of which he can actively engage, and from identifying with thousands of like-minded Muslims in one location.

Sadiq is a 23-year-old Muslim man who immigrated to Canada with his family from Kenya when he was six. He self-identifies as heterosexual and describes himself as a secular Muslim. He does not pray regularly nor attend mosque and Muslim community events. Sadiq participates in Ramadan and believes in the "good" teachings of Islam, but religion does not shape his worldview. He feels that his worldview is shaped by Canadian culture in the sense that he separates his religious identity from the public sphere. One's religion, Sadiq says, is a private matter, and as long as it does not infringe on others, individuals should be free to practise it without discrimination in whatever way they choose. Sadiq's family are practising Muslims, and he speaks in particular of his mother who worries about his spiritual state. However, he feels that his spiritual state is fine and that his mother is looking for outward signs of his faith. Looking for outward signs of faith, Sadiq says, is common amongst Muslims, and this constant scrutiny troubles him. He has no desire to prove his faith, yet he feels that other Muslims require proof. The inward/outward professing of "Muslimness" is an ongoing tension in Sadiq's life.

Religious Discrimination

The interview questions for this section were modeled on studies conducted by Jamil and Rousseau (2012), Naber (2006), and Sirin and Fine (2007), who examine the ways Muslims of

various ages living in Canada and the U.S. have experienced and responded to religious discrimination and stereotypes post-9/11.¹⁰⁶ In my first questions about growing up in the post-9/11 era, I wanted the participants to comment on how the events of 9/11 affected their lives, not their memory of the event when it happened, as they were all young children at that time. The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of the post-9/11 environment on the participants' religious, national, and sexual subjectivities, so the question was worded to set the stage for thinking about their social environments *after* 9/11, that is, their formative years. Other questions in pertaining to this section dealt with the participants' experiences of fear or anxiety and safety in relation to their religious identities. The questions also probed the participants' behaviours when in the company of non-Muslims to explore the participants' sense of being under any surveillance (the "hegemonic gaze"). While the "hegemonic gaze" refers to a sense of being watched by the broader public, practising self-surveillance indicates a response to perceived scrutiny. The theme of religious discrimination encompasses the participants' negative experiences of being Muslim in the post-9/11 era and the correlating effects, including the development of various fears, self-surveillance practices, and engaged citizenship strategies. The following table provides a snapshot of each participant's perspective in these groupings and offers a comparison across the set.

Figure 1: Impact of Post-9/11 Environment on Religious Identity

	Post-9/11 Environment			Fears					Can Gov	Safety					Self-Surveillance	
	None	Oth ered	Norm alized	Border/ Airport	Teac hers	None	Non-Mus	Mus/ Extre mists		Family Friends	Know- ledge	Distan ce	Withdraw	Comm Engage	Social Engage	Yes
Raniyah	*			*	*					*						*
Nour		*				*				*					*	
Marya			*				*		*		*				*	
Nadia		*		*			*		*						*	
Kallia			*				*				*					*
Saida		*			*		*					*			*	
Kaseem	*			*									*		*	
Sadiq	*							*			*			*	*	

Note: Under Post-9/11 Environment, "Normalized" denotes the linking of Muslim identity with the events of 9/11 as now commonplace.

My findings indicate that the participants have had numerous direct and indirect, but not universal experiences, of religious discrimination over the course of their lives post-9/11. The participants describe real and perceived discrimination in relation to strangers, peers, employers,

¹⁰⁶ See Appendix B for a complete list of interview questions.

teachers, and border officials. Most of the participants describe experiences of “terrorist-” related insults and harassment. This theme can be traced to the events of 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” initiatives and resultant culture of fear. This “terrorist” connection demonstrates the negative impact that the post-9/11 environment has had on the participants’ lives. Raniyah described two painful experiences but has curiously rejected them as evidence of discrimination:

I remember this guy; he called me a terrorist, and that was the first time—I’ve *never* had that before. I felt so . . . It kind of just hit me. I wondered what just happened! And once with my sister, she was wearing the niqab, and then some guy screamed out from his car: ‘Halloween’s over!’ I guess [discrimination] exists, but I haven’t really experienced it.”

My analysis of Raniyah’s transcript connects this theme of experiencing religious discrimination but not registering it as such to her perspectives of multicultural inclusivity, which I take up in the fourth theme in this section, “National Belonging,” below. Here, I will continue to focus on the participants’ experiences of religious discrimination growing up in Canada.

Continuing with the theme of “terrorist”-related discrimination, Nour describes an incident at her workplace when a male co-worker asked her, “Is that a bomb in your hijab?” These and similar comments pain Nour but she prefers to smile and kindly engage her co-workers rather than verbally challenge their biases. Nadia said that she had never been called a “terrorist” but that her brothers had been called this many times. She says, however, that she has been called a “sand-whore.” She states, “I’ve been called it once, and it stumped me. What’s a sand-whore? What’s a sand-whore? I’m like, okay, that’s what Muslim women are, like sand-whores . . .” Nadia deduced that the slur might be associated with Arab Muslims and the Arabian Desert. The “sand-whore” insult is particularly violent in its efficient compaction of racial/ethnic, religious, gendered, and sexist bigotry. Saida says that she “[doesn’t] know a Muslim who hasn’t been” called a terrorist or another term implying having terrorist ties. She says that students in high school would sometimes say to her in light of the 9/11 attacks: “Oh, so it was your *kind*. It was *your* people who did that.” Saida describes being both dumbfounded and angered by these kinds of comments. Sometimes she has expressed her anger at being associated with “terrorist” identifications; but as she has aged, Saida says she has come to realize that some people try to goad her into an argument and she is, therefore, more careful in her responses. The fact that she and most of the other participants have experienced this scenario multiple times while growing

up is telling of the ubiquity of “terrorist” discriminatory discourses and the distressing impact they have on their lived lives.

This distress continues in other forms of religious discrimination. For example, two participants described their experiences of being “Othered” as Muslims and their sense of social segregation. Nour described a personal encounter:

The looks were different; the treatment was different. I remember, and I’ll never forget, I was walking downtown, and there was a man who looked at me, and he was so afraid, he crossed the road on the other side. This was after 9/11, and at that moment, I thought, “Wow, we are *really* not liked.” At that moment, it affected me because I actually felt that I was alienated . . . It definitely hit home, and it hit hard. In the beginning, I felt a definite sense of separation because I was “the Muslim.” People could identify me as Muslim.

Nadia described experiencing exclusion at a national level:

I think nationality-wise, there was a huge segregation . . . It’s like, at one time I could relate to people who were of colour, like you know, we’re all marginalized, we’re buddies you know, we can fight like social segregation and establish barriers together. But it’s like, okay now we can Other the Muslims, we can isolate them, we can alienate them. So, it’s like, these people who, yes, were non-Muslims, but they were of colour and now all of a sudden they are ganging, they were like siding with a bunch of other people saying, “this is Canadian; you are a terrorist because you are a Muslim.” So, I experienced that *a lot*. It’s like I felt really Othered.

Most of the participants expressed various forms and levels of fear about their religious identities. Some indicated fear of non-Muslims. For example, Marya states, “[W]hen someone has a strong opinion on Muslims being really bad, it really makes me nervous.” Nadia says, “[Y]ou don’t know all the people out there, what they’re like.” Some participants described the fear of being discriminated against because they are Muslim. Kalila says that she fears traveling abroad: “...in those kinds of places where they will discriminate, I feel like . . . I do fear that they will somehow find out that I am Muslim, and they will like judge me for it.” But she is also concerned about experiencing discrimination traveling within Canada: “I definitely want to go to like Newfoundland and stuff, but I feel like there are some provinces definitely in which you

might not be accepted.” Raniyah states that she has a fear of being discriminated against in the job market because of her religious clothing: “[E]very time I go for a job interview, I think that they won’t hire me because I wear a hijab; I won’t represent their store. This is a fear that I have.

Although none of these participants explicitly state that they are fearful of teaching staff, they all indicate that some of their present anxieties relating to their religious identities derive from their experiences with teachers. Raniyah and Saida expressed anxiety with teachers who teach Religious Studies classes, specifically when Islam is the topic of study. Raniyah claims that her teacher “had Islamophobia” and as such, “He wasn’t just teaching religion; he was expressing his opinion on Muslims.” In recalling this story, she began to show visible signs of anxiety. Her leg started shaking; she was gripping her hands and rolling the ring on her finger. It has been a couple of years since she was in that class but the memory of it continues to upset her. Saida did not show any signs of anxiety when she talks about her says her religious studies’ teacher. Rather, she is matter of fact as if she has repeated this story before: [He] “just didn’t like Muslims. He knew I was Muslim, and he slanged us in class.” She adds that the events of 9/11 have entered the school curriculum and have thus become a common academic discourse from which she cannot escape. True to Saida’s tendency to categorize herself as a Muslim “us” in opposition to non-Muslim “them,” she states, “9/11 is talked about. I think that since the whole thing happened, it’s just part of the curriculum now, and it makes us look so bad.”

Marya relates a heart-breaking story of when she was in third grade, and her teacher humiliated her for wearing a hijab. Marya says she flipped the end of her headscarf across her shoulder, and it hit a girl standing next to her. The teacher, she says, “slammed her books on the table and she was like, ‘If you’re going to wear that thing in my class, then wear that thing properly or don’t wear that thing at all!’” Marya adds, “And like, ‘that thing’ phrase stuck with me; it’s stuck with me now.” Indeed, the incident had such an adverse impact on her that she never wore the hijab again in public.

Fear of airports/border crossings also emerged under the theme of religious discrimination. Kaseem, for example, anticipates experiencing religious discrimination when crossing the Canada-U.S. border: “When I’m crossing the border I’m always fearful of getting checked for security. That just fears me. So, I always know, just because I’m Muslim.” Nadia is succinct in her fear of airports: “Airports give me major anxiety.” They give Sadiq anxiety too, so much so that he purposefully manages his religious identity by being especially vigilant in

supervising his demeanour at airports. For example, he is exceptionally friendly to airport officials so that he is not “mistaken” for a “Muslim” extremist: “I don’t want to act a certain way. I mean, I don’t want someone to think that I’m, you know, a little bit too passionate or that I might *do* something.”

One participant expressed fear of the Canadian government, the Conservative Party, in particular. Marya, who closely follows Canadian politics, describes the Conservatives as actively constructing notions of Muslims as extremists, which, she believes, serves to increase Islamophobia in Canada. Marya imagines herself involved in politics in the future, but she is concerned that increases in Islamophobia will hinder her career course. Moreover, Marya also described her fear of being perceived as an Islamic extremist if she were to participate in political demonstrations. Accordingly, she says that she avoids all rallies: “I choose not to be active on campus and be affiliated with any groups whether they are pro-Palestinian or pro this or pro that because I just feel like professors and the academic community might view me as ‘them’—just extreme.” Sadiq also expressed the theme of extremism as a fear; however, his anxiety is not being perceived *as* an extremist, but rather he is fearful *of* “Muslim” extremists living in Canada. In his words, “[T]here’s a lot of extremists that have sort of popped up after 9/11. You know, that kind of affects me too. I don’t know who I’m talking to. So, I kind of stay away from others I don’t know in my own religion.” Sadiq has thus increased vigilance for what Yuval-Davis calls the “terrorist-stranger” who may be living amongst us (2011: 2).

The various themes of fears described by the participants correlate with the participants’ hyper-vigilance of their religious identities while in public. The findings reveal that the participants commonly practice six techniques of self-surveillance associated with their religious identities. These include being purposefully approachable, judging other Muslims, hiding religious identity, controlling anger, guarding conversations and managing impressions.

Some of the participants describe a sense of being “watched” by non-Muslims (the “hegemonic gaze”). For these participants, consciously adjusting their public demeanour to seem friendly and approachable has become a habit. As Nour says,

After these images came out after 9/11, then I knew that all eyes were on Muslims—eyes of fear or curiosity. They were curious to know who we are, or fearful. Both ways deserved a reaction from the Muslims that was welcoming or

was supposed to be welcoming and positive . . . I have to do my best to portray an image of what Islam is supposed to be or how it actually is.

Nour feels that it is necessary to explain Islam to non-Muslims “because,” she says, “we feel that they look to us as the enemy. So, we try to avoid that—we go in a whole different direction. I don’t feel that way. I feel that if we want to show them something, then we need to be a part of them.” Because she strongly feels that Muslims should adjust their demeanour so that they are perceived as approachable, Nour also indicates that she judges other Muslims who do not respond to non-Muslim provocations in a controlled manner. Accordingly, she holds Muslims responsible for perpetuating stereotypes of Muslims as “barbaric” and “angry.” She exclaims,

I feel as a Muslim we haven’t done a good job in representing ourselves . . . because sometimes I’ll see the one commentary by the Muslim, and he or she is just swearing off. Like how is that comment going to explain? Like you’re just showing them that “Yes, you guys are barbaric, and you guys are angry always.” So, there I feel it is not their [non-Muslims’] fault; it’s our fault.

Nour’s comments on consciously adjusting her mannerisms in the presence of non-Muslims disclose her sense of Muslim Otherness and the strategies she has developed to straddle symbolic inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries. That she blames other Muslims for not following suit—for not enacting a “good” Muslim performance—shows that she holds Muslims responsible for her/their persecution. Nour’s assumptive reflections reveal the invisible forces of hegemonic social systems and the degree to which they have shaped her young life.

Another technique of self-surveillance associated with the participants’ experiences of religious discrimination is to hide their religious identities. Marya, for example, expressed exasperation over being “watched” at her workplace: “[A]ll these non-Muslims, like constantly telling me you can’t do something: you can’t do this, you can’t do that. It’s like, leave me alone!” The numerous experiences Marya has had with non-Muslims’ expectations about her religious identity based on the (assumed) “rules” by which she must (obviously) live, compel her to conceal her religious identity: “[I]t’s like I have to show that I’m not religious, that I’m not spiritual. I always have to be completely indifferent toward my religion, but it’s really difficult.” In this example, concealing her religious identity reinforces Marya’s sense of control over her religious subjectivities in light of ideological constructions of “Muslim” identities.

Controlling their anger in public spaces emerged as a significant theme across most of the interviews as a technique of self-surveillance. Nadia, for example, is especially diligent in making sure non-Muslims do not detect her underlying anger. She feels that it is better to control her anger and let non-Muslims believe that she is passive than to get into a heated debate. She says, “I’m not going to fight fire with fire, you know. I’m just going to let them be with the impression that I’m a pushover.” In another example, Saida has learned to walk away from “terrorist”-related “jabs” as a way to demonstrate an opposite disposition to that of the “aggressive terrorist” stereotype. She declares, “I have to stay calm because if the person comes to me and accuses me of being a terrorist and I retaliate by being aggressive, that’s not going to help the situation You either just take it or walk away from the situation.” Likewise, Sadiq’s controlling of his anger in the public domain signals the same desire to demonstrate a Muslim identity in opposition to “violent terrorist” typecasts. He states, “I kind of have to sit there and reel myself back. I don’t want to look a certain way. I don’t want to act a certain way. I mean, I don’t want someone to think that I’m, you know, a little bit too passionate or that I might *do* something.” Asked why he felt he had to do that, Sadiq responds, “I don’t want to look like somebody Because even what I think of an extremist is someone who is literally screaming.”

Guarding conversations is another theme that emerged in my study as a method of self-surveillance in relation to the participants’ religious identities. Saida, for instance, reveals that she is hyper-vigilant of her comments when conversing with non-Muslims lest any of her remarks be misconstrued. She says, “[W]hen you are trying to actually live your life in Canada you have to watch every word you say. Because even if you have a best friend who’s non-Muslim, and you say one word that affirms everything they’ve heard about your race, your religion—you just made an enemy.”

The sixth theme to emerge from this study related to self-surveillance is managing the impressions of security officials at airports and border crossings. Several of the participants, as noted above, fear the systems of (Muslim) surveillance when travelling across international borders. In purposefully displaying what the participants’ perceive as “friendly” personas, the participants attempt to signal to border officials that they are not national security threats, and, therefore, will avoid being detained because they are Muslims. The participants in this study expressed many fears related to religious discrimination, but border crossings seem to elicit the most anxiety. It is in this environment that they feel the most vulnerable about their religious

identities; that being detained could, in fact, have life-altering consequences. Accordingly, some of the participants describe their strategies as controlling “vibes.” For example, Nour says that she feels it is important to give off a “friendly vibe,” while Sadiq similarly states that a “positive vibe” must override a “negative vibe.” Also, Sadiq states, “If I’m flying, I make every effort to not look suspicious.” Sadiq also says his efforts help him look “like a normal person.” Most of the participants talked about trying not to look “suspicious” at airports/border crossings. The participants’ discourse of impression management in this context speaks of their sense of being constantly “watched” and its constraining effects on their religious identities.

Besides the patterns of self-surveillance that emerged in this study and discussed above, the findings show that some of the participants purposefully engage in promoting Muslims as non-threatening and Islam as a non-violent religion. For some, engagement operates through organized group events. Kaseem, for example, participates in the annual Reviving the Islamic Spirit (Toronto) and MuslimFest¹⁰⁷ (Mississauga) events. He loved to talk about these events in the interview, the organizing process, the goals of presenting Islam and Muslims favourably, his conversations with non-Muslims who attended, and the personal rewards he gained from his contributions. Kaseem says, “I value what it means to be Canadian. I’m an active member of society; take part in all community events; take part in school events.” Engaging thus allows Kaseem to “feel more Canadian—just like anyone else.” The linking of his Canadian identity to the promotion of his religious identity may be understood as an “engaged citizenship” strategy, which is, according to Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, a popular citizenship approach taken by young Muslims in Canada (2011: 282).

In another example of engaged citizenship strategies, Nour employs an individual, as opposed to organized efforts, to foster favourable perspectives of Islamic traditions. Nour mainly focuses on educating non-Muslims about the gendered nuances of Islam while also stressing equality between the sexes. She says, “Always those questions come out: ‘Were you forced to wear the hijab?’ Do you have arranged marriages?’ And, ‘Why are women stoned?’ Those are the main questions asked and the ones that I feel I cannot brush off.” Wearing a hijab is, therefore, essential to Nour’s engagement because it attracts the attention of non-Muslims and subsequently opens a dialogue on Islam. Perceiving her hijab as a key conversational device,

¹⁰⁷ According to the MuslimFest official website, MuslimFest “celebrates the best in Muslim arts and entertainment.” Located in Mississauga, Ontario, MuslimFest features both local and international artists.

Nour relates a typical experience she has with co-workers: “[She] would always look at my head. I could tell that she wanted to ask... she asked me how I put it on, and from then on she felt comfortable asking me a lot of questions.” Her engaged citizenship activities are purposefully orchestrated. As Nour puts it, “It is about making a difference. It’s being able to say at the end of the day, ‘I’m just like you, but I’m a Muslim. So, they [(non-Muslims)] see that we aren’t barbaric.”

As these examples show, some of the participants purposefully engage in promoting Muslims as non-threatening and Islam as a non-violent religion. This engaged citizenship strategy has the objective of improving non-Muslims’ perspectives of both Muslims and Islam, as well as improving social dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. Its primary function is to present Islam in a positive light by distancing Canadian Muslim identity from stereotypes of “violent extremists.” While Kaseem’s engagement involves organized group activities, Nour’s engagement with the non-Muslim community is primarily an individual effort. Moreover, Nour’s statements, “there’s no difference” and “I’m just like you,” and Kaseem’s statement, “just like everyone else” are discursive claims to normalcy that underscore, for them, their sense of belonging to the national collective both as religious individuals and as engaged Canadian citizens.

Another important theme to emerge from this study is that of a “defensive” discourse that also articulates feminist ideals. I categorize it under the theme of Religious Discrimination because it operates as a response to stereotyped accusations of oppressive patriarchy supposedly in operation in “Muslim” familial structures. This “defensive” discourse derives from stereotypical media depictions of Muslim men as aggressive and oppressive patriarchs and Muslim women as oppressed. It includes Muslims consciously stressing that Muslim women exercise agency *and* that their male relatives in no way interfere with their decisions. According to one of the participants, it is now essential for Muslims to articulate that Muslim women are not oppressed and that Muslim men are not oppressors. In the interviews, each participant voiced this “female agency/no male interference” condition in their conversations when talking about their (that is, the female participants’) or their female relatives’ reasons for wearing a hijab or niqab. For example, the following statements are typical of comments made about wearing a hijab: (Kaseem is talking about his sister’s decision)

Kaseem: “I feel that it is a personal choice . . . Like my parents never forced any of us to do anything.”

Nour: “I wore it when I hit puberty . . . I remember my dad saying, Are you sure? No one has forced you into this? No one has convinced you?”

This double-sided “defensive” response signals the participants’ alertness to feminist discourse in framing Muslim women’s agency.

Media Gendered Representations of Muslims

The findings in this section detail the participants’ perceptions of gendered representations of Muslims in various media, including print media, televised, radio and online news broadcasts, film, and social media. The findings of this study reveal that media representations of Muslims play a substantial role in shaping the participants’ perceived prejudice. Media representations inform the interviewees of both local and global discourses related to Muslims and Islam.

Muslim men, the participants said, are primarily depicted as angry, political, and as terrorists or in relation to terrorism. Three of the participants also attached an Arab ethnicity to the terrorist/terrorism depiction. For example, Nour states, “Like for men, they all are jihadists who have bombs strapped to them wherever they go, and they are angry always. We are represented as barbaric, as camel riders, although there are so many people in the States especially who say ‘Arabs’—like all Muslims are Arabs!” Sadiq gave a succinct account of how Muslim men are represented in mainstream media: “Terrorists, terrorism, extremists, radicals.”

Portrayals of Muslim women were grouped as invisible, without agency, and oppressed. Marya captures all three categories in her statement: “Muslim females are submissive, they’re like passive, they’re in the background, they’re not active, they’re you know, oppressed.” Saida made an interesting observation. She agrees with these categories of representation but also adds that these depictions are in direct relation to Muslim men: “From what I’ve seen, I don’t really see Muslim women being portrayed in the media unless a Muslim man is involved. So, if you got rid of all the Muslim men in the world, Muslim women would just be under the radar.”

One participant describes a sexualized portrayal of Muslim women which challenges these fixed stereotypes. Nadia stated that Muslim women are represented as “passive” for the most part; however, she added that she had recently seen sexualized depictions on Tumblr of naked (supposedly) Muslim women wearing hijabs or niqabs only. She says, “I’ve actually seen

them being very sexualized . . . It's like photos strictly [. . .] Like you'll have the niqab, and you'll have a nude woman; like Middle-Eastern Muslim women. So, I think it's kind of being sexualized." Diverging from her statement that Muslim women are mainly represented as passive, and in contrast to Raniyah, Marya, Kalila, and Saida, who describe media representations of Muslim females as "invisible" and/or without agency, Nadia details a unique version of women's representation in media that she perceives as both highly visible and suggestive of having agency.

All the participants say that media representations of Muslims negatively affect them to varying degrees, some deeply. The participants' responses range from purposefully engaging in conversations with non-Muslims to "correct" these stereotypes to avoiding going out in public when stories of Islam-related extremism are reported. Media gendered representations of Muslims are actively associated with the participants' perceptions of prejudice. Marya describes representations of Muslim males as "active," "angry," and "political," and Muslim females as invisible, without agency, and oppressed. While these portrayals have become a routine part of her life, they nonetheless affect her deeply, especially media representations of Muslim women. When asked how she feels about certain representations, she states, "Oh, horribly. Like, so bad. Like, I could cry sometimes." Saida describes media representations of Muslims as a normalized part of her daily life, but its impact on her is significant. She describes an overwhelmingly negative media portrayal of Muslims that has compounded her experiences of direct, indirect, and perceived prejudice. She internalizes these representations stating that they have become "a part of me," and dreads going into public spaces after she sees "Muslim"-related stories on the news, preferring to self-segregate herself for fear of backlash. She feels the *hegemonic gaze* intensely: "People are going to look at me, and people are going to ask questions." Sadiq, on the other hand, states that negative media portrayals of Muslims are *not* "part of me." He thinks that the "deliberate negative image" of Muslims "is made to get more ratings." Nevertheless, they stir his anger and a desire to "defend Islam." He says, "Oh, I get angry, of course . . . I still feel the need to defend Islam."

Sexual Subjectivities – Section "A"

The findings related to the participants' sexual subjectivities were divided into two sections. Section "A" examines the participants' views on the culture of sexuality in Canada, young

peoples’ sexuality in general, young Muslims’ sexuality, and the participants’ views on similarities or differences between young Muslims’ and young non-Muslims’ sexuality. The following table displays each participant’s answers to the interview questions pertaining to section “A” and offers a comparison across the set. Details for Section “B” are listed under that heading below.

Figure 2: Sexual Subjectivities -Section A

	How would you describe the culture of sexuality for young Canadian people today?		Do you think more young people are having pre-marital or non-marital sex than in previous generations?			Are Muslim youth having non-marital sex? Explain how you know this.				Is Muslim sexuality the same as or different from non-Muslim sexuality?		Does being a Muslim restrict your sexuality in any way? Explain			Are the young Muslims you know as sexually active as the non-Muslims you know?		
	Open	Diff Types	Yes	No	Not Sure	Yes	No	Don't Know	Know?	Same	Diff	Yes	No	Not Sure	Yes	No	Don't Know
Raniyah	*H		*			*			Friends		*		*w/m		*sh		
Nour	*		*			*			Friends	*/d		*				*	
Marya	*		*			*			Friends	*/d		*				*	
Nadia	*				*	*/sh			Friends	*				*		*	
Kalila	*HHBA		*			*			Friends	*		*				*	
Saida	*		*			*			Friends	*	*	*				*	
Kaseem	*		*			*			Friends	*	*	*				*	
Sadiq	*		*					*		*	*	*					*

Legend

- H – Homosexual
- HH- Heterosexual, Homosexual
- B – Bisexual
- A – Asexual
- */d – Same with some difference
- *w/m – within marriage
- */sh – yes but shifting

The participants in this study view the culture of sexuality for Canadian youth today as “open” or hypersexualized, and most think that more young people, including young Muslims, are engaging in sexual activities than in previous generations. Two participants also articulated an openness to what Kalila refers to as “different types of sexuality,” including homosexuality, heterosexuality, bisexuality, and asexuality. Sadiq neatly sums up the overall perspective of the participants’ thoughts on the current culture of sexuality: “There’s no question about it—yeah, they’re doing it. It’s not, *maybe* they are. Young Canadians, I feel, they all have sex. The stigmatization of sex is gone.”

Regarding young peoples’ sexuality, all participants except Nadia, who stated that she did not know, said they thought more young people today are having pre-marital or non-marital sex than in previous generations. Kalila explains this perceived increase in sexual activity amongst youth as both breaking with traditions and exercising independence. She says, “When you are this age, you just want to do whatever you want to do, and you do whatever you can to justify it.”

Kaseem takes a sociological view, pointing to the prevalence of the film and music industries as currently influencing young peoples' sexual agency: "You see your friends doing it; you see your music, your movies; it becomes the norm."

Judging from their many Muslim friends and relatives who are sexually active, most of the participants describe young Muslims as sexually active outside of marriage, although the participants claim they themselves are not sexually active. Kalila and Kaseem emphasize a "relationship" element that justifies non-marital sexual activity amongst young Muslims. Additionally, some of the participants are observing a shift in young Muslims' sexual activity from being active during their high school years to abstinence once in university. When asked to expand their thinking on this phenomenon of abstinence, the participants contextualized it in the discourse of marriage. Nadia says, "I think people in high school that are Muslim were more into having sex, and like growing up, now they're like, 'no, we're going to wait till marriage.' And that's happened with a *huge* amount." Raniyah adds, "they feel bad about it, and now they're going to wait until marriage."

Although all the participants perceive the culture of sexuality for young Canadians today as "open" and claim that young Muslims, including many of their close friends and relatives, are markedly sexually active, several participants said that young Muslims are *less* sexually active than non-Muslim young people. Nour, Marya, Kalila, and Kaseem cite religious upbringing as an explanation for their perceived variances. For example, Kalila says, "I think Muslims are less, a lot less sexually active. Just the whole religious aspect of it. I think that they probably, they think a lot more before they do it." Kaseem states, "[young Muslims] are less [active]. They're brought up with that Islamic upbringing." Although some pointed to a religious upbringing as a possible reason for being *less* active, the participants had previously described young Muslims as sexually active regardless of religious convictions. Raniyah is the only participant who perceives the sexual activities of young Muslims and non-Muslims as equivalent, although, as noted above, she observes a shift currently taking place in which previously active young Muslims are now (in university) deciding to suspend sexual activity until they are married.

Overall, it was evident from the responses that the participants were perplexed about this substantial contradiction and their inability to account for it. This paradox of perceiving young Muslims both *as* sexually active and also *less* sexually active than young non-Muslims emerged as a significant finding under the category of sexual subjectivities. That several participants have

observed a shift from being active to abstinence in young Muslims' sexual activities is another significant finding. Contextualizing and moralizing abstinence in terms of marriage provides a crucial foundation on which to examine these perceived shifts taking place in young Muslims' sexual behaviours in the transition from adolescence to adulthood. Also, throughout the interviews, it was apparent that the participants were well acquainted with the sexual lives of young people both inside and outside of their friendship circles. Their comfort with the discourse of young peoples' sexuality was telling of the prevalence of the phenomenon.

Sexual Subjectivities - Section "B"

The findings in this section articulate the relationship between the participants' religious views on sexuality and their sexual subjectivities. The interview questions for this section were intended to examine the participants' beliefs and perceptions on interfaith marrying, dating non-Muslims, sexual intimacy with non-Muslims, and in what areas, if any, the participants' perspectives deviate from those of their parents. The questions were designed to allow the participants to interpret sexual relations either within or outside of marriage. Various themes emerged from the discourse of interfaith sexual relationships and are separated into categories pertaining to each research question. The following table displays each participant's answers to the questions in this category and offers a comparison across the set.

Figure 3: Sexual Subjectivities- Section B

	What are your thoughts on intermarrying, that is, Muslims marrying non-Muslims?		Are there any restrictions set by you, your family, or your religious community regarding dating non-Muslims?		Is it acceptable for Muslims to have sexual relations with non-Muslims?		Is it OK for young Muslims to explore their sexuality with non-Muslims, or is it best to explore it with other Muslims?		Are your views on sexuality the same as or different from your parents' views?	
	Accept	Unaccept	Yes	No	Accept	Unaccept	Accept	Unaccept	Same	Diff
Raniyah	*p/bk		*i/f			*		*		*
Nour		*	*i/f		*w/m			*o/m		*s/s
Marya	*		*i/f		*m	*f		*o/m		*s/s
Nadia		*	*i/f		*		*			*o/m
Kalila	*		*i/f/sh		*w/m		*			*s/s/ts/tg
Saida	*m	*f	*i/f		*w/m			*o/m	*	
Kaseem		*	*i/f		*w/m			*o/m	*	*?
Sadiq	*			*i/f	*		*			*s/s

Legend

- *p/bk – Muslim men only can marry Jewish or Christian women
- *i/f – individual and family
- *i/f/sh – individual/family/shift
- *w/m – within marriage
- *o/m – outside of marriage
- *m - males
- *f - females
- *s/s – same-sex
- *s/s/ts/tg – same-sex, transsexual, transgender
- *? – does not know parents' views on non-heterosexual sexual orientations

On the theme of interfaith dating, all but one participant said that there were restrictions set by themselves and their parents regarding dating. All the participants' parents expect them to marry at some point in the future and to marry another Muslim. The participants' religious and sexual subjectivities regarding interfaith sexual unions are, therefore, greatly influenced by their parents' perspectives on this theme. Nevertheless, the participants were divided in their views of interfaith marrying and interfaith non-marital sexual unions, and one of the participant's remarks illustrate her contemplation of a broader social context for thinking through these themes.

On the theme of interfaith marriage, the participants were divided in their convictions. Four participants view interfaith marriage as unacceptable for various reasons. Some mentioned the risk of the Muslim spouse converting to his or her partner's religion, while others thought it would be difficult for their offspring to formulate their religious identities, and one thought that a Muslim woman's religious rights within marriage may be placed at risk. Of those in favour, some articulated restrictions for intermarrying, such as it is being acceptable for Muslim men only, or suitable providing the Muslim woman maintains her Islamic beliefs and practices, or acceptable providing any offspring be raised to follow Islam. Kalila was unique in her contemplation about Muslims marrying non-Muslims. She spoke from the perspective of its cultural relevance rather than from her religious convictions, although her religious subjectivities

are affirmed in her deliberation. Kalila feels that intermarrying offers a “solution” to Muslim Otherness—that is, it is an exceptional way to alter or dismantle some of the currently constructed stereotypes of “Muslim” identities. One way to realize first-hand the moral integrity of Muslims, Kalila surmises, is through interfaith marriage. She states,

I think that it’s very acceptable because how are you supposed, how are you supposed to change people’s minds? So, you know, seeing somebody that you love practise something, you know that it’s for a good reason. And especially with religion, like if you live with a person, and you realize that, or even though you don’t want to convert, but at the same time, you form this idea in your head that Muslims are not bad, like they’re not that, they’re not outside. They’re like human beings, and they have their own struggles, and they have their own questions and everything.

Kalila thus sees intermarrying as beyond religion. In her mind, it is an exclusive way to “normalize” Muslims within Canada.

Kalila’s contemplation of interfaith sexual relations (Muslim/non-Muslim) bears similar reflections and is also unique across the interviews. Kalila reasons that to segregate sexual intimacy between Muslims and non-Muslims systematically serves to categorize Otherness:

I don’t think that it’s wrong to explore your sexuality with somebody who’s not a Muslim. I don’t think it’s wrong because they’re human beings . . . If you like refrain from doing things that human beings do with non-Muslims, you kind of put them in the category of like not really the same category as you.

Moreover, Kalila sees sexual intimacy between Muslims and non-Muslims as progressing the social status of Muslims:

Like I think it’s, it’s doing something—like it’s *progressing something*. It’s saying that, to other people, that Muslims are not the Other. It’s like somebody you can be sexually active with. Somebody who’s free to make, you know, their own choices and they’re not stuck in the bonds of their religion.

Kalila’s perspective includes contemplation of a broader social context in which her sexual subjectivities intersect with prevailing discourses of Muslim Otherness. The merging of Kalila’s religious and sexual subjectivities on the theme of intermarrying in this respect gives testimony to her subject positioning as a Muslim in Canada. The assimilation of religious and sexual

subjectivities at the level of national identity is a unique but significant theme emerging in the context of this study. Moreover, this finding is critical to this study as it demonstrates that some young Muslims may regulate their sexual subjectivities within the symbolic framework of nationally restricted sexual liaisons.

Aside from Kalila's exceptional interpretation, most of the other participants view interfaith sexual unions as unacceptable outside of marriage. Marya stated that as a matter of honour, non-marital interfaith sexual relations are acceptable for Muslim males but not Muslim females: "I think it's okay for a guy to, you know, date a non-Muslim girl and stuff but for a girl it's like, no, she has to be protected, and she has to, she can't date non-Muslims. It's like a shame to the honour of her family." Besides Kalila, Nadia and Sadiq hold opposite views of interfaith sexual relations than those of the other participants. Nadia's opinion is that if a young Muslim is going to sin by having sex out of wedlock, then the religious beliefs of the partner are irrelevant. Sadiq states that it is acceptable for Muslims to explore their sexuality with non-Muslims and implies that it is best to do so for religious reasons. That is, unlike Nadia, who thinks that religious beliefs are irrelevant, Sadiq thinks that religious subjectivities are essential to determining a sexual partner outside of marriage. He reasons that if a Muslim is going to sin by engaging in pre-marital sex, then it is best to avoid involving another Muslim. He says, "pre-marital sex is not good, it's not a good thing, so why drag another Muslim [into an act of sin]." In other words, for Sadiq non-marital sex with a non-Muslim female is not less morally wrong, but "it's easier" in terms of being judged by other Muslims. He is, therefore, willing to accept condemnation for his conduct but not willing to be implicated in the transgression of another Muslim, or at least of a Muslim woman. He implies here that a non-Muslim sexual partner does not signify the same level of violation and thus garner the same degree of associated guilt as a Muslim sexual partner would. Thus, he demonstrates an openness to pre-marital sexual exploration, as well as a preference for non-Muslim female sexual partners for religiously based reasons. While Sadiq's opinion is contrary to that of most of the female participants in this study, in particular, Raniyah, Nour, Marya, and Saida, who indicate that sex with non-Muslims is unacceptable outside of marriage, his opinion is similar to Marya's as she also agrees that nonmarital interfaith sexual activities are permissible for Muslim men but not for Muslim women. Overall, the views of the participants regarding interfaith sexual relations reveal the

intersection of religious discourses of sexuality and marriage, and notions of youthful sexuality in producing gendered and nationalist (inclusionary/exclusionary) forms of sexual subjectivity.


On the theme of parental views, most of the participants indicated that their opinions on same-sex sexual orientation differ from their parents. That is, these participants are accepting of same-sex relationships while their parents are not. Kalila added that her views also differed from her parents regarding acceptance of transsexual and transgender individuals. Nadia, who, with a feminist-informed tenacity, tirelessly researches and compares legal rulings and cultural discourses on Islamic traditions relating to gender and sexuality, differed from her parents in thinking that sex was for marriage/reproduction only. She reasons that because Islam favourably recognizes sexual desire, then the rules legitimizing its expression should be somewhat flexible. She states, “Like penetration isn’t only used to like reproduce type of thing. It opened my eyes. But to my parents, it’s more like, ‘no it’s something you can do after you are married,’ type of thing.”

The findings related to sexual subjectivities in section “B” reveals the relationship between the participants’ religious views on sexuality and their sexual subjectivities. While all the participants demonstrate conservative views on marriage as legitimizing sexual intimacy, most of the participants indicate that they differ from their parents on the issues of same-sex orientation. Another notable finding is that one participant sees sexual intimacy between Muslims and non-Muslims as potentially advancing the social status of Muslims. Because her view incorporates a broad social perspective, this may also indicate that her religious and sexual subjectivities are influenced by her perception of national subject positionality. She states that not only is she accepting of interfaith marrying and non-marital sexual intimacy with non-Muslims, but she encourages these as ways to erase the Otherness of Muslims within the nation. This finding is critical to this study as it demonstrates that some young Muslims regulate their sexual subjectivities within the framework of nationally restricted sexual liaisons. In sum, the participants were divided over their views of interfaith marrying and sexual relations, mainly in agreement regarding dating non-Muslims, mainly because of parental influences, and most differed from their parents in their (the participants’) support of homosexuality.

National Belonging

The participants described varying levels of the impact their religious identities had on their sense of national belonging. The findings in this section detail the participants' views on being accepted in Canada as Muslims, their reflections on being Canadian Muslims, and their perceptions of what an "insider" and an "outsider" means to them regarding national belonging and how they situate themselves accordingly. From this data, three major themes emerged: as a Muslim, as a Canadian Muslim, and as a Canadian. Eight subthemes were also identified. The interview questions in this set probe the participants' perceptions of what an "insider" and an "outsider" means to them, how they situate themselves, how they view themselves overall as Muslims and as Canadians, as well as how this translates "on the ground" as the participants go about their daily lives being both Canadian and Muslim. The following graph shows the perceptions of each participant in these groupings and offers a comparison across the set.

Figure 4: National Belonging Comparison



Scale

As a Muslim

- Accepted – 3
- Ambiguous – 2
- Unaccepted - 1

As a Canadian Muslim

- Belong – 3
- Difficult – 2
- Unaccepted – 1

As a Canadian

- Insider – 3

On the theme of belonging as a Muslim, most of the participants indicated that they feel accepted in Canada as Muslims. Some of the participants express an *absence* of religious discrimination as supporting their sense of acceptance. Nour reasons that she has been treated kindly by strangers and holds a job. Kalila points to a diverse and accepting ethnic and religious community in stating, “These people are familiar with Muslims.” Moreover, Kaseem stressed that he has never experienced religious discrimination. The absence of prejudice, he says, provides “proof that people are accepting of” him as a Muslim.

Some of the participants expressed an ambiguous sense of acceptance as Muslims. These participants point to representations of Muslims in media that, consequently, instill fear in them and unsettle their perceptions of acceptance. Nadia, for example, states that her sense of acceptance increased after the 2014 killings on Parliament Hill in Ottawa because of non-Muslims who showed their support of her Muslim identity:

If you asked me that five years ago I would say no, but I feel like *now* I am. Because after, like after what happened a few weeks ago in Ottawa, you know, I was expecting *severe* backlash, like you don’t understand. But like people were just saying, “Why are you guys justifying yourselves? You guys shouldn’t have to stand up and say, ‘Oh, he doesn’t represent us.’ We should already know.”

The ambiguous sense of being accepted as Muslims in Canada stems from the participants’ concerns for how non-Muslims will react to news reports of “Muslim”-related violence. They fear social backlash, which unsettles their sense of acceptance as Muslims. One participant describes perceived prejudice and an incidence of discrimination that confirm for her non-acceptance as a Muslim.

The above demonstrates that perceptions and experiences of religious discrimination underpin all the participants’ sense of national belonging as Muslims. Those who express a lack of religious discrimination have a stronger sense of national belonging as Muslims than those who expressed the expectation of religious discrimination or perceived prejudice.

On the theme of belonging as Canadian Muslims, most of the participants expressed a sense of a blended Canadian Muslim identity and thus a strong sense of national belonging. Noteworthy is that the participants’ discourse of belonging was contextualized in relation to

being accepted by non-Muslims. Several participants articulated actively participating in communities or activities with non-Muslims. Kalila describes a comfort level in talking to non-Muslims who ask her about her faith. Raniyah states that absence of Islamophobia in Canada allows her to “act on her religious beliefs” and “speak freely.” Sadiq consciously separates his religious identity from the public sphere, stating, “There’s no real ‘being a Muslim.’ You’re just part of a huge crowd.” This separating of his religious identity from public consumption corresponds with contemporary “secular” Canadian culture and may give him a sense of possessing a “Canadian-style” religious identity.¹⁰⁸ In this sense, he engages with other (non-Muslim) Canadians on a regular basis but does not foreground his religious identity.

Some of the participants expressed difficulty in being Muslims in Canada. These participants describe actively controlling their Muslim identities, including distancing themselves from non-Muslims. Nadia expresses her troubled sense of national belonging in light of “Muslim extremist” typecasting: “The very small number who have come out and, like, lived up to the stereotype, it’s a pattern of extremism, and it’s like one percent, under one percent of them! So, it’s like, why do the rest of us have to, like, go through it, you know?”

The main difference between those participants who indicate a strong Canadian Muslim identity and those who describe a more fragile sense of their Canadian Muslim identity is in how they engage with non-Muslims in the broader Canadian culture. Those who actively engage with non-Muslims have a stronger sense of being Canadian Muslims than those who actively control their Muslim identities, except for Sadiq, who involves himself with other Canadians but does not allow his religious identity to emerge in most of his social interactions.

The third theme of national belonging is “as a Canadian.” This theme has three subthemes: insider, in-between, and outsider. Regarding being an “insider,” most of the participants indicate a strong sense of being a Canadian “insider.” Some of the participants mentioned that Canadians tend to think inclusively, which underscores for them a strong sense of being an “insider.” Kaseem emphasizes multicultural ideology as an inclusive way of thinking: “I think it’s more ideology or that way of thinking that you have where you are accepting of other people.” Sadiq describes his sense of being an “insider” derives from the fact that he has

¹⁰⁸ As noted above, opinion polls indicate that Canadians prefer confining religious practices to the private sphere and are more tolerant of religious diversity the less it deviates from “Canada’s mainline Christian past” (Ontario, “Systemic Faithism,” 2012: section 4.1; see also Seljak, 2012).

not experienced severe forms of discrimination, such as a physical assault. He also refers to a recent YouTube video of a Canadian social experiment on racism and prejudice in which several non-Muslim Canadians rallied behind a young Muslim man who was being intimidated by a non-Muslim man. The protective reaction from non-Muslim Canadians in this experiment demonstrated Canadian inclusivity and confirmed for him that Muslims *are* Canadians: “And the reaction from everybody, it made me feel that although I will never meet these people in my life, I felt really proud to be a Canadian. So, I mean, that’s awesome to see that! When I see that, I wouldn’t feel that I would be targeted in any way.” Although Sadiq feels a strong sense of national inclusivity, his comments and reflections belie the fact that his sense of belonging is contingent on how he perceives the broader Canadian public’s acceptance of him as a Muslim man. Including this social experiment in his conversation about national belonging indicates his concern about being accepted as a young Muslim man in Canadian society. Because none of the female participants in this study voiced concern about their sense of national belonging in relation to their gender, the inclusion of this topic reveals a gendered difference in the ways that the participants perceive national belonging, as well as performing their religious identities in public.

Some of the participants indicate an “in-between” sense of national belonging. For some, this sense of not fully belonging derives from Canadian multicultural ideologies. For example, Nadia states that there is no “one definition of being Canadian because it’s all multicultural.” Although she grew up in Canada, Nadia feels that her ethnic and religious identities set her apart from “the mainstream population”: “I’m an ‘outsider’ only because I don’t fall under the mainstream population only because of the colour of my skin and my religion.” Although Nadia states that there is no “one definition of being Canadian,” she expresses her awareness of a dominant culture that does not share her particular ethnic or religious identities. Thus, “on paper,” Canada is multicultural, which means it is accepting of diverse ethnicities and religions, but this definition conflicts with her lived experiences.

Saida stands alone in her sense of being an “outsider.” She mentions multiculturalism as being accepting of her ethnic and religious identities but also describes a youth culture embedded within Canadian culture, which she feels she cannot access. For her, then, there is a conflict between a diverse, multicultural society accepting of her ethnic and religious identities, and a

unified youth culture from which her religious identity both isolates and excludes her. In her words,

Even though Canada is multicultural, there's a culture embedded within this culture, and I can't take part in it. I can't understand what my white friends say about going to a club, or drinking, or hooking up, or having boyfriends at thirteen. So, I can't contribute to most conversations. So, I exclude myself, and they exclude me. So, I can't say that Canada excludes Muslims; no, Muslims often exclude themselves because of different rules and values.

The theme of national belonging reveals that perceived prejudices and experiences of religious discrimination underpin all of the participants' views of national belonging. The findings further show that the main difference between those participants who indicate a strong Canadian Muslim identity and those who describe a more fragile sense of their Canadian Muslim identity is in how they engage with non-Muslims in the broader Canadian culture. Those who actively engage with non-Muslims have a stronger sense of national belonging than those who actively control their Muslim identities or perceive religious prejudice pervasively.

Summary

The four abovementioned themes and sub-themes relating to in-depth interviews inform understandings of how eight young Canadian Muslims experience and understand their religious, sexual, and national subjectivities. The theme of religious discrimination encompasses the participants' negative experiences of being Muslim in the post-9/11 era and the correlating effects, including the development of various fears, self-surveillance practices, engaged citizenship strategies, and a prevalent "defensive" discourse. The theme of media gendered representations of Muslims encompasses the participants' perceptions of gendered representations of Muslims in various media formats. The findings of this study reveal that media representations of Muslims play a substantial role in shaping the participants' perceived prejudice.

The theme of sexual subjectivities was divided into two sections. Section "A" reflected the participants' views on the culture of sexuality in Canada, young peoples' sexuality in general, young Muslims' sexuality, and the participants' views on similarities or differences between young Muslims' and young non-Muslims' sexuality. The main finding here was a substantial

contradiction in the participants' perspectives on the sexual activity levels of young Muslims and young non-Muslims. Other significant findings include the observance of a shift towards abstinence in young Muslims' sexual activities as they enter university and the prominence given to notions of marriage in shaping the participants' sexual-related perceptions. Section "B" reflected the relationship between the participants' religious views on sexuality and their sexual subjectivities. A notable finding was that one participant sees sexual intimacy between Muslims and non-Muslims as potentially advancing the social status of Muslims. This finding is significant to this study as it demonstrates the participant's regulation of her sexual subjectivities within the framework of nationally restricted sexual liaisons.

The theme of national belonging encompasses three main subthemes relating to the participants' perceptions of being accepted in Canada: as Muslims, as Canadian Muslims, and as Canadians. The theme of national belonging reveals that perceived prejudices and experiences of religious discrimination underpin all the participants' views of national belonging. In the next Chapter, I analyze these findings in light of my research questions.

Chapter 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of my study was to broaden an understanding of how “hegemonic sexual positioning” may affect young Canadian Muslims’ perception of national belonging and citizenship in relation to sexuality and how young Muslims regulate their sexuality accordingly. The intention was to understand some of the ways that young Canadian Muslims engage with, disregard, internalize, or resist hegemonic sexual placement. For this study, the lived experiences of eight young Muslims, six females and two males, living in Toronto and surrounding area were gathered through in-depth interviews, examined using thematic coding methods and clustered to identify emerging themes, as outlined by Miles et al. (2014) and presented in Chapter 4. This Chapter expands on the main themes presented in Chapter 4 and discusses the findings in light of the literature and research questions. Following this, the study’s limitations are addressed, and I add some final thoughts.

Religious Discrimination

My study of young Canadian Muslims’ identities formed in the post-9/11 era reveals that discrimination, emotional stress, coping, religious and national identities, and sexuality are meaningful themes in their lives. The participants articulated experiences of direct discrimination perpetrated by strangers, peers, employers, teachers, and border officials. They have also experienced religious discrimination indirectly through an overwhelmingly negative, gender-stereotyped mainstream media portrayal of Muslims and via discrimination faced by their family members and Muslim friends. For them, the psychological effects of recurrent prejudice and discrimination include sadness, fear, anxiety, vulnerability, powerlessness, anger, and frustration. These findings are similar in scope to the conclusions of a Canadian study of Muslim identity by Jamil and Rousseau (2012), as well as studies conducted in the U.S. by Sirin and Fine (2007) and Naber (2006). The coping strategies for these experiences include hypervigilance of conversations, demeanours, and religious identities. Moreover, these discriminatory experiences were shown to affect the participants’ perceptions of belonging to the Canadian national collectivity. Consequently, I found that the participants negotiate their religious identities in two particular ways. Some proactively hide or restrain their religious identities. This method is also in line with the findings of Jamil and Rousseau (2012); Naber (2006); and Sirin and Fine (2007). The second method employs an engaged, proactive undertaking in which the foregrounding of

their religious identities is mainly strategic. Some aspects of engagement confirm Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking's (2011) claim that as members of a minority group in Canada, young Muslims feel empowered both by Canadian laws that guarantee their citizenship rights and by the multicultural discourse of inclusivity. However, my findings indicate that for those participants who practice engagement, they do so strategically to promote Islam and Muslims as "good." In this sense, these participants are responding to a discourse of Islam and Muslims as problematic or unacceptable.

Gender plays a role in how the participants practice engagement. While both genders described engagement in organized group activities, only the female participants described efforts to engage individually with non-Muslims. For these young women, wearing a hijab was essential to their individual efforts to enter conversations because it attracts the attention of non-Muslims and thus provides an opportunity to launch an equitable dialogue. This is not to favour engagement among other reasons for veiling, but rather that for the participants, the hijab is understood as a tool for engaging dialogue with non-Muslims. Although the participants have also experienced negative comments for wearing a hijab, engagement to promote Islam, which includes "correcting" stereotypes of oppression and gender inequality disseminated through mainstream media, was revealed to be a major commitment in the lives of these participants. Consequently, these participants have learned to balance their active and rewarding engagement while coping with criticism about Islam and their religious beliefs.

Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking claim that some young Muslims' social engagement is a citizenship tactic consisting of "desecuritizing moves" (2011: 284). "Desecuritizing moves" were essential to the participants applying this strategy as it underpinned their efforts to convince non-Muslims of theirs and Muslims' presence in general as "non-threatening" and Islam as a long-standing and peaceful religion. Moreover, the participants, who foreground religious signifiers and strategically practice engagement, attempt to demonstrate a "good Muslim" characterization. This depiction is in line with Beydoun's (U.S.) description in disavowing acts of terrorism and terrorist organizations and expressing religious and political conformity by way of endorsing and reiterating Canada's secular and feminist ideologies and multicultural principles. The "good Muslim" posture also reconfirms state counterterror initiatives (Beydoun, 2018: 48-49). The "good Muslim" performance is related to the discourse of piety, which frames the concept of "culture talk" (see Selby "Muslimness," 2016). Within this framework, "piety" has come to

signify a “good Muslim” in contrast to a “bad Muslim” (terrorist). This structure comprises Muslims in western societies demonstrating piety in their daily lives and the public’s expectation for demonstrations of piety as characteristic of a “good Muslim.”

In contrast to the participants who foreground their religious identities as a means to engage with the non-Muslim public, several participants indicated that they hide or restrain their religious identities as a strategy to avoid accusations of extremism. Indeed, most have experienced “terrorist”-related name-calling and are vigilant in controlling their anger. Also, most have internalized a strong sense of “enemy” Othering. The psychological effects of this perceived prejudice result in these participants purposefully hiding their religious identities by not wearing religious signifiers, guarding their conversations, and avoiding political groups affiliated with Islam. I found no distinction between genders in this regard. The findings of my study thus confirm the research of Jamil and Rousseau (2012) who argue that the fear of backlash from the majority group as a result of terrorism affects minority Muslim groups in Canadian society. My findings, however, do not support Sirin and Fine’s U.S. research in that the young males in their study felt the need to suppress their anger and frustration more so than the young females under study (2007: 159).

Because the participants attempt to distance themselves from vilified characterizations of Muslim identity and espouse mainstream socio-political “norms,” they too are performing “good Muslim” identities. Another category Beydoun puts forward as characteristic of some Muslims in the U.S. is “concealing Islam.” Concealing Islam includes concealing one’s Muslim identity when in public spaces “as a means to avert suspicion, isolation, and gain acceptance” (Beydoun. 2018: 53). Not wearing religious signifiers (for example, a headscarf for women or beards for men), not attending mosque or religious gatherings or publicly associating with other Muslim who do and attempting to pass as “ethnic” or Black with no accompanying religious residue are some accessible ways to conceal an “Islamic” identity. Most of the participants who conceal their religious identities described efforts to signal a “good Muslim” profile and to purposefully “conceal Islam” as a means to sometimes avert suspicion and sometimes to gain acceptance from the non-Muslim populace.

Moreover, the participants, who conceal their religious identities, also indicated uncertainty as to what to expect from the majority population each day. Consequently, they not only anticipate discrimination but sometimes also fear a collective backlash against Muslims. For

the most part, this fear is fuelled by mainstream media reports of “Islamic” extremism in Canada and globally. Accordingly, for some, their fear rises after certain incidents are publicized (for example, the 2014 Ottawa killings on Parliament Hill), and then they revert to a “holding” position in anticipation of the next report. My findings indicate that this psychological fear is most often relieved or reconciled by verbal confirmations of acceptance through non-Muslim friends, who assure them that they (the friends) do not associate them (the participants) with “Islamic” extremist or “enemy” Muslims. For the participants, who internalize a strong sense of “enemy” Othering, these non-Muslim friendships provide a crucial cocoon of acceptance because for them they not only reflect national attitudes about inclusivity, but they also confirm personal acceptance and national belonging.

The various themes of fears described by the participants (outlined in Chapter Four) correlate with the participants’ hyper-vigilance of their religious identities while in public in two specific ways. Some of the participants foreground their religious identities and strategically engage in dialogue with the non-Muslim population, and the other participants conceal their religious identities, in comparable ways, to distance themselves from religious discrimination and sometimes to demonstrate a “good” Muslim identity. The most significant finding of these two approaches is that regardless of which subject position the participants’ favoured, all the participants practised self-surveillance of their religious identities. Those who actively concealed their religious identities perceived higher levels of prejudice and correspondingly seemed to suffer greater levels of anxiety. For some of the participants, having supportive non-Muslim friendships proved helpful in alleviating anxieties.

Media Gendered Representations of Muslims

Although I found no distinctions between genders in monitoring their anger, I did find a difference in how the participants perceive their gendered performances in the public sphere. Many of the participants have experiences of “enemy Othering,” which one interviewee described as an “Othered Othering”—a category of discrimination reserved for Muslims only. The participants’ public perspectives about “Muslim” identity were influenced mainly by gendered stereotyped portrayals of “Muslim” identities circulated via mainstream media. All the participants described public perceptions of Muslim women as being passive, oppressed, and without agency and Muslim men as aggressive, angry, and violent. Moreover, these depictions

inform the participants of the level of “threat” that Muslim actors hold in the public domain. I found that the female participants, who wear a hijab and thus foreground their religious identities, have a sense of being perceived as “non-threatening.” This perception affords them some latitude in performing their Muslim female identities publicly. As stated above, these participants have many experiences of being approached by non-Muslims, often strangers, to ask about their veiling practices and faith. For these participants wearing a hijab is a visual marker of a passive or non-threatening (female) Muslim actor. For one of the hijab-wearing participants, this gendered aspect of “Muslim” identity gives her a sense of “safety” and national belonging. For example, Raniyah describes her fear of Canada/U.S. border crossings in direct relation to the males in her family. She explains that it is only the men in her family (who wear religious signifiers) who have been detained by border officials while the females, who all wear niqabs or hijabs, are less scrutinized. She described experiencing intense fear at the possibility that the men in her family would be detained. She also became visibly upset when talking about her high-school teacher, specifically, that she perceived his having the power to draw attention to Muslim women’s clothing in an adverse way. Raniyah also believes that there exists in Canada “that fear of Muslims over terrorist acts,” but adds that this fear does not affect her personally. Like Raniyah, all of the other participants understand the public perception of veiling as not only a visual marker of Muslim women’s religious identity but also as symbolizing a non-threatening (female) Muslim actor. For the female participants who wear a hijab, their perception of this gendered “Muslim” distinction aids in authorizing their gendered faith performances in public.

For the two males in this study, the main distinction between them regarding public performances of their religious identities is that one foregrounds his faith and the other “conceals” his. Another main distinction is that Kaseem, who foregrounds his religious identity, described all of his public experiences in association with other Muslims (such as in community groups, a youth group, in his work setting, familial setting, in socializing, and in travelling) while Sadiq, who conceals his religious identity, spoke mainly of singular or individual experiences. (Kaseem’s shared public appearances are also distinct from the female participants who largely described individual experiences of “being Muslim” in public spaces). Consequently, Sadiq articulated concerns about performing his gender/masculinity in the public sphere. It is possible that Kaseem has concerns about publicly performing his “Muslim” masculinity and thus may

feel more comfortable in public in the company of other Muslims, but he did not convey anxiety over his masculine identity as Sadiq did.

Sadiq talked mainly of his religious identity in a public context. He described deliberately separating his religious identity from public scrutiny, stressing that his religious identity plays no role in his Canadian identity. For him, this separation parallels contemporary secular Canadian ideologies that conceptualize religion as a private affair (Seljak, 2012: Ontario, “Systemic,” 2012: section 4.1). On one level, this belief affords him a sense of performing a “proper,” “Canadian-style” religious identity. On another level, however, my analysis of his comments on belonging to the Canadian national body reveals his personal concern about performing “Muslim” masculinity in the public domain. For example, he criticized young Muslim men for wearing religious clothing, emphasizing that if these young men encountered discrimination, it was, consequently, their fault. He also referred to a recent YouTube video of a Canadian social experiment about racism in which several non-Muslim Canadians rallied behind a “passive” young Muslim man who was being bullied by a non-Muslim man. Comparing this online video, titled “Canadians React to Ottawa Shooting Racism” (2015) to the “Blind Trust Project” (Mawla, 2015) online video discussed in Chapter 3 (“Muslim Masculinity, Self-Surveillance, and Canadian Citizenship”) provides insight into the “acceptable” performance of “Muslim” masculinity in the public sphere at this time in light of trepidation about the “terrorist-stranger” who may be living amongst us, and who is assumed to be young and male (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 2). The identity “scripts” put forward in these videos are essential to Sadiq because they exemplify publicly performing “Muslim” masculinity. These videos assured him that young Muslim men are indeed accepted in Canadian society, providing they demonstrate “non-aggressive” masculinity. Accordingly, he identifies with the non-aggressive, non-threatening posture of the young men in the videos. The positive verbal and physical reactions the videotaped men received from non-Muslims, confirm for him his public performance of “Muslim” masculinity.

Moreover, both video experiments were designed to “test” the Canadian (non-Muslim) population’s response to young, defenceless Muslim men and both showed non-Muslims responding favourably. These experiments, available on YouTube, are important sources of affirmation for Sadiq, and possibly for other young Muslim Canadian men because they demonstrate the best of Canadian multicultural “inclusivity.” However, these experiments also

depict Muslim masculinity as necessarily different from non-Muslim masculinity. They also illustrate young Muslims as different from other “Canadian” young people. Finally, these particular “experiments” show that inclusivity has an exclusionary component in that they differentiate young Muslim men from other religious and non-religious men within the Canadian national body. These experiments thus constitute the politics of national belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011) and show distinct ways that young Muslims are factored into contemporary notions of acceptance.

Defensive Discourses

All the participants in my study describe typical media representations of Muslim females as “oppressed” and Muslim males as “oppressive” of females. These findings indicate that these gender-stereotyped media portrayals contribute to a defensive discourse that was articulated by every participant. These fixed depictions are represented and refuted in what one interviewee describes, and I refer to as Muslim Women’s Oppressed Discourse (MWOD). This discursive frame consists of the participants stressing that the wearing of the hijab (or niqab) is a woman’s “choice” and immediately following up that declaration with a statement about a male relative’s (father or husband) non-involvement in this decision. Since two of the participants in this study wear hijabs and all but one of the participants’ mothers and some of their sisters wear hijabs or niqabs, this bilateral gendered avowal occurred across all the interviews. These findings hence demonstrate that not only it is critical for the participants to stress that Muslim women exercise their agency and that male-controlling figures do not force their wills upon them, but also that the participants intuitively grasp these essential components of MWOD.

However, I argue that this female-agency/male-indifference assertion inevitably supports the notion of patriarchal oppression because even though Muslim women are declared to have agency, there is always a male in the background who has the authority to force his will on familial women—but merely elects not to exercise it. What is implied by this construction, then, is the idea that while Muslim women make choices, (familial) Muslim men still have authority over these decisions. Indeed, the notion of Muslim women’s agency is produced here through its opposition to male-controlled power. Muslim women’s agency asserted within this framework is drawn in part through what Judith Butler describes as “in the very relations of power that it seeks to oppose” (1993: 82). Because MWOD is constructed in light of and in refutation to patriarchal

power, it cannot, therefore, extract itself from that bond (see Butler 1993: 82-83). Given that Muslim women's control over their bodies is thus "monitored" by patriarchal figures, I argue that MWOD symbolically reinforces rather than subverts the stereotype of Muslim women as essentially non-agentic and oppressed and Muslim males as always oppressive. The corresponding effect is that, since Muslim women's agency is thus subject to patriarchal power, Muslim women are not as free to apply it as are non-Muslim women whose agency is taken for granted as operating outside of male authority.

Contemporary scholars argue that Orientalist themes of the infantilization of Muslim women are evident in political (Nayak, 2006) and mainstream (Jiwani, 2005) propagandas to reinforce both the need for Western military intervention in Islamic countries and to reify the perceived contrast between oppressed Muslim women (that is, those who wear hijabs) and Western, progressive, liberated women. In the Canadian context, Jiwani describes some Canadian non-Muslim female journalists' Orientalist experiments in which their donning niqabs for a day produced discourses of Muslim women as stereotypically oppressed and voiceless. Thus, making Muslim women "mute witnesses to their oppression" while white, non-Muslim women represent the liberated, democratic and altruistic nature of the nation (Jiwani, 2005:19). With this perspective of infantilized Muslim women, I argue that, for the young Muslims in my study, MWOD offers an indispensable opportunity both to reject characterizations of Muslim women as silent bystanders as well as to refute allegations of oppression. In refuting Muslim familial stereotypes in this way, the participants simultaneously express familial conformity to Canadian gendered equality "values." Accordingly, the participants' sense of social acceptance amongst the dominant non-Muslim population is efficiently and essentially strengthened through this prevalent defensive discourse. However, because MWOD symbolically reinforces rather than negates the stereotype of Muslim women as non-agentic and oppressed, and Muslim males as oppressive, the participants also demonstrate complicity with contemporary Orientalist rhetoric that serves to infantilize Muslim women while simultaneously supporting the ideology of non-Muslim women's liberated and egalitarian superiority.

One female participant offered an original media representation of Muslim women that unsettles fixed stereotypes. This depiction includes highly sexualized images of Muslim women

wearing a hijab or niqab and nothing else.¹⁰⁹ Contrary to Muslim women being “oppressed,” “invisible” and “non-agentic” in stereotypical media representations, as the participants in this study describe, these images suggest the opposite. Indeed, for this participant, these images imply agency in the (assumed) Muslim women’s decisions to pose naked for photographs and agency that is (assumably) operating outside of any male-controlling relatives’ influence. Moreover, for this participant, the women in these images demonstrate control over their bodies; and having the ability to manage one’s body expressly is integral to Western feminist principles. Some scholars, such as Genz and Brabon, would argue that these images indicate “postfeminist” agency at play, which involves a contemporary shift from sexualized portrayals of women as victimized objects to knowing sexual subjects (2009: 175). Indeed, it was essential for this participant to stress that the young women portrayed in the images were not victimized. Moreover, this insertion of (supposedly) agentic Muslim women, who are in control of their bodies and their sexuality, into the public conversation about oppressed and oppressive Muslim identities serves both to disturb and challenge fixed representations. This is an exceptional conversation in that it offers an alternative public discourse on Muslim women’s—and by extension, men’s—identities by (seemingly) leveling gendered power dynamics.

Furthermore, it reveals in a symptomatic way, the contradictory character of the public discourse on veiling in Canada: that is, that being covered and thereby asserting modesty is incongruous with the feminist values held for young women, in particular, which normalize a visible assertion of young woman’s sexual availability (Selby and Fernando, 2014; Selby, 2014). Though this participant shows that she embraces veiling as an aspect of a Muslim woman’s identity, her excitement over this alternate—and sexualized—representation indicates both her conformity with this (permissive) socio-cultural feminist perception and her desire to denounce veiling as a form of social control of the body and, more generally, Muslim female sexuality.

What I find relevant here are the multiple rationalities behind the conceptions of youthfulness that underpin narratives of veiling in Canada. On the one hand, young Muslim women are expected to assert their sexual (in that veiling signifies sexual readiness) independence from a male-controlling figure, and to demonstrate their openness to experiment with sexuality visually—viewed as a necessary step in the process of becoming a

¹⁰⁹ These images exist on the participant’s Tumblr social networking website. They were not made available during the interview.

psychologically healthy young adult. Because MWOD symbolically reinforces rather than subverts the stereotype of Muslim women as essentially non-agentic, the highly sexualized narrative, which focuses on young Muslim women intently, effectively circumvents MWOD by inserting into the public conversation the notion of being sexually experienced *as representative* of young Muslim women's lives. Indeed, the excitement this young interviewee conveyed over these sexualized images demonstrates her discernment of and desire to straddle the line between mainstream perceptions of youthfulness and visual expressions of "Muslim" identity, as well as to refute victimizing stereotypes of Muslim women. Her conversation and enthusiasm also show, especially as her Tumblr description came on the heels of her MWOD defence, the way she is attempting to blur the lines between feminist agency, youthfulness, sexuality, gender, and Islam. For this participant, who has suffered discrimination for wearing a hijab, this image offers her a more comprehensive identity marker than do the other images she has seen that clearly objectify and victimize Muslim women. Her statements thus reveal the nature of the public discourse on veiling in Canada and the ways that she is attempting to realize her gendered, sexual, and religious identities.

Veiling discourses overlap prevailing discourses of feminism, youthfulness, and sexuality. The fact that all the participants in my study asserted MWOD as a defense of both Muslim women's agency and Muslim men as supporting that agency, suggests that not only are the participants preoccupied with these matters, but they are under significant social pressure to defend their families and their religious beliefs in light of these issues. The interviewees' informal articulation of norms entrenched in the Canadian culture—that is, in their awareness of secular feminist ideals and sexualized youthfulness—clearly demonstrates their membership in Canadian society, but their repeated "defensive" discourses also reveal the management of religious plurality and both the politics of integration and youthfulness in Canadian culture and the similar ways they navigate their daily lives.

Sexual Subjectivities

All the participants stated that they knew of some young Muslims engaged in non-marital sex, which establishes the fact that young Canadian Muslims are engaging in sexual activities outside of marriage. This confirms research about young Canadians in general (Côté and Allahar, 2006), and young Muslims elsewhere (Ali, 2006; El Feki, 2013) in that marriage is being postponed

while young people seek higher education and job stability. For some, young Muslims, this means negotiating temporary marriage contracts (*zawaj 'urfi*), which are religiously acceptable in some places, such as in Egypt, but not legally registered (Ali, 2006: 70). However, I found that the participants do not formalize non-marital sex in this same way. Instead, they contextualize “interim sexual outlets” in terms of a future marriage union. This rationale allows the participants to justify morally engaging in sexual intimacy outside of marriage. Moreover, the participants insist that it is their choice to have sex with whomever and whenever they choose, or not to have sex at all. This flexibility is consistent with Weeks’s argument that in the current period, people are increasingly willing to decide for themselves how they want to behave sexually, and that religious-based morality has become a private matter (2009: 28).¹¹⁰ For all the participants, non-marital sex is “acceptable” (but not necessarily appropriate) for young Muslims providing that it not be promiscuously engaged in with multiple partners and involves a committed and emotional relationship.

Even so, marriage was championed by the all the participants as the framework in which all sexual desires and unions should be contemplated. They thus described same-faith non-marital heterosexual “relationships” as impending marriages. Indeed, same-faith marriage was also a common theme. All stated that their parents expect them to marry another Muslim; likewise, they anticipate same-faith marriages for themselves in the future. Interfaith marriages were acceptable for some of the participants, but with restrictions. For some, only Muslim men are allowed interfaith marriages; for others, it was acceptable for varying reasons, including maintaining Muslim identity and practices and raising children in the Islamic faith.

Marriage, for all the participants, was perceived as relating solely to heterosexuals. All the participants indicated that their parents held strictly conservative views on homosexuality; however, most of the participants expressed opposite opinions. That is, although none espoused same-sex marriage, some of the participants indicated that they were open to this option, but more so if it involved non-Muslims. Those who were accepting of homosexuality said that they

¹¹⁰ While Canadian secular ideologies inform the participants about sexual options aside from marriage, Weeks’s (2009) sweeping assertion suggests that young peoples’ sexual subjectivities are also influenced by the global contemporary youth culture. It is impossible to ascertain which of these influences is more powerful in the lives of the participants; however, I stress the Canadian context in my analysis of the participants’ religious and sexual subjectivities rather than global influences because the participants’ lives are deeply grounded in the Canadian social environment (including, for example, laws, clothing, language, and education) and because a portion of the interview questions centred solely on the participants’ sense of their Canadian identities.

understood same-sex desire to be biologically instinctive, and for them, this detail legitimates its social acceptance, but they had not thought through whether it could or should be legalized within an Islamic framework. The participants' liberal-minded attitudes are more in line with Vidino's (U.S.) claim of newer generations of American Muslims being more flexible about sexual plurality (*New*, 2013: 197-98) than with Rahman and Hussain's Canadian study, which found that young Muslims held stricter views on homosexuality than their parents (2011: 264).

On the issue of dating, all but one of the participants indicated that dating is considered taboo by their parents. The participants spoke both of their fear of parental reprisal and respect for their parents' wishes as the reasons they obey their parents' restrictions on dating. The participants' sense of "choice" in this matter, then, correlates with their parents' levels of firmness or leniency. Nevertheless, some of the female participants balance their desires for boyfriends and parental restrictions by simply keeping their dating a secret. One participant, for example, stated that her Muslim boyfriend lives in a distant community and communication is mainly done through Internet sources. Their occasional meet-ups are planned in collusion with her friends who arrange to travel together to the boyfriend's neighbourhood. These rendezvous are hence discreet and supervised. While indeed pushing boundaries, this participant also observes, in part, the "pious Muslim girl" script that underpins non-marital sexual relationships (Zine, 2008). Izzat, or honour, is central to this script in that it effectively regulates young Muslim women's social behaviour and their sexual desires so as not to compromise family honour (Zine, 2008; Chakraborty, 2010). By "dating" a Muslim boyfriend and meeting under the watchful eyes of other young Muslims, the participant can exercise her agency in negotiating spaces for individuality in concert with parental (and moral) restrictions on non-marital sexual intimacy.

Muslim boyfriends evidently collude with this clandestine activity. However, my study found that the sexual double standard was apparent in negotiations of non-marital sexual intimacy. While one male participant values chastity as a moral obligation, the other feels free to explore his sexuality before marriage. As well, all the females in my study, especially those with brothers, indicated that male sexual exploration is less "managed" by parents/families/Muslim communities than it is for young females. Although heterosexual marriage was shown to be deeply valued across all my interviews, the sexual double standard and the familial control of female sexuality was shown to influence all the participants' notions about sex outside of

marriage and same-faith marriages. The following comment by Marya succinctly articulates the privileging of men's desire and sexual agency, the emphases placed on sex within marriage unions only, especially for females, and the notion of female/family honour:

“I think it's okay for a guy to, you know, date a non-Muslim girl and stuff, but for a girl it's like, no, she has to be protected, and she has to, she can't date non-Muslims. It's like a shame to the honour of her family.”

However, one of the male participants with a liberal view of non-marital sex indicated that he preferred non-Muslim women as sexual partners before marriage, even though he expects to marry a Muslim woman. His preference for non-Muslim sexual partners before marriage demonstrates that his sexual subjectivities are also shaped by the “pious Muslim girl” and *izzat* ideologies and defined within the context of marriage. That is, Muslim women are potential marriage partners, and non-marital sex with them is rationalized as committing to marriage at some point in the future. However, non-marital sex with non-Muslim women does not necessarily denote future marriage. I see this non-Muslim sexual partner preference outside of marriage as supporting this young man's religious subjectivities because it allows him to honour religious marriage regulations (because he will eventually marry a Muslim woman) while also respecting the religiously based restrictions placed on young Muslim women's sexuality. A study of American youths' religious and sexual subjectivities conducted by Regnerus (2007) indicates that it is common for non-married religious youths to negotiate their sexual desires within religious parameters. According to Regnerus, religious youths' sexual activity is not reduced to “right” or “wrong,” but rather, judgements made about whether to engage in sexual activities or not are complex and based on several factors, such as the age of the individuals, length of time in a “relationship,” and potential for marriage (2007: 83-118). As Regnerus shows, a young individual's religious convictions will have some degree of impact on her or his sexual subjectivities; however, the decisions she or he makes for engaging in, or abstaining from, sexual activity are not categorical or absolute. Indeed, my study also shows that for some of the participants, the negotiation of sexual intimacy is quite complex. Participants who hold more liberal views of sexuality struggle with how to negotiate their sexual desires outside of marriage, especially when marriage is not a viable option for them at this point in their lives. What Regnerus does not comment on but which I found in my study, however, is that these religious and sexual complexities are seemingly underpinned with ideals about gendered sexuality.

This finding is significant because it is within this sex-marriage framework that the participants perceive young Muslims to be less sexually active than their non-Muslim counterparts. I initially found this comparative revelation to be a conundrum because the participants gave ample evidence that their Muslim friends and relatives were having sex as often as their non-Muslim friends. However, in analyzing their comments across the data sets I found that the discourses of Muslim sexuality were deeply embedded in the doctrine of marriage, but when they spoke of non-Muslim sexuality, they made no connections to marriage. The participants thus perceive young non-Muslims' sexuality as more liberal and exploratory because it does not necessarily lead to a wedding. It is not seen as "managed" to the same extent by parents/families/communities and so it is perceived as less restricted—easier.

Female sexual desire is fundamental to this uneven perception. For my participants, young Muslim women's sexuality, primarily, is regulated within the framework of Islamic marriage, but young non-Muslim women's sexuality is observed as uncontrolled—period. The implication, then, is that young non-Muslim women are "available" for sex, and hence are thought to have the liberty to negotiate sexual intimacies without marriage commitments. In comparison, young Muslim women who elect to "go all the way" with their Muslim boyfriends, are believed to engage in pre-marital sex with their future husbands. So, on the one hand, while the participants observe young Muslims to be as sexually active as young non-Muslims, on the other, they are also thought to be less sexually active because Muslims' sexual activities are rooted in the framework of marriage. Viewing non-Muslim sexuality as free of these same restrictions, it appears literally and liberally unrestrained. This unequal and probably inaccurate perception primarily rests on the observed differences between the participants' experiences and their discernment of young Muslim and young non-Muslim women's sexual boundaries.

"Shift" Towards Abstinence

Two of the female participants observed a shift towards sexual abstinence amongst the young Muslims they know between high school and the second year of university. The two participants informed me of this theme apart from direct questioning on this subject during their interviews, and both seemed convinced of the reality of this sexual phenomenon, as well as perplexed as to its rate of frequency. Also, a third female participant, who had been sexually active with her

boyfriend in her last year of high school, articulated this same “trend” in her decision to now abstain from sex until legally married.

As young Muslims in Canada are under social and state scrutiny, and as Muslim organizations are increasingly advocating moral conservatism as distinctive of Muslim identity (Rahman and Hussain, 2011), this shift in sexual abstinence may not only reflect these surveillances and religious ideologies but may also indicate that some young Muslims find it necessary to withdraw what might be considered “less Islamic” behaviours from social scrutiny. For example, the two participants described their friends’ explanations for electing sexual abstinence as operating within an Islamic framework of marriage. That is, while their friends had believed that they would eventually marry their boyfriends, when their relationships failed they opted to wait until lawfully married to become sexual actors again. All the participants championed marriage as the normative structure in which all sexual desires and unions are contemplated, but they all had knowledge of the sexual affairs of numerous friends. This “knowledge” underscores the social aspect of these young peoples’ otherwise private lives. The social reality of young people’s lives today cannot be underestimated. Today, a young person is likely to have several social media platforms, such as, for example, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Foursquare, and Instagram. Although different from traditional surveillance (for example, policing), the effects and behaviour modifications are similar (Marwick, 2012). Studies show that individuals self-monitor social boundaries by strategically revealing, concealing, and broadcasting personal information to create connections with their so-called “friends” (Marwick, 2012: 384). Social media users also monitor others’ behaviours to reify what is perceived to be “appropriate” conduct between individuals (Marwick, 2012: 384), including the reinforcement of “proper” gender and sexual norms. Thus, through broadcasting one’s likes and dislikes, personal and professional associations, relationship statuses, and so on, social users communicate their adherence to, or deviation from, the status quo. Purposefully deleting data is indicative of self-surveillance. The fact that the two participants described the announcement of abstinence amongst their Muslim friends indicates that these sexually related details were somehow broadcasted. This public detail suggests social self-surveillance and the “deleting” of “knowledge” of sexual activity from ongoing social consumption.

In the act of “announcing” sexual abstinence, the participants’ friends communicate personal “choice” as their motivation while maintaining their “right” to be sexual actors. They

may also indicate their observation of Islamic sexual protocols by abstaining from sex until married. Indeed, as these young people enter an age range more associated with marriage, they may become more vigilant of their sexual identities to ensure their religious respectability and hence, marriageability. However, the similar “broadcasting” of a specific (non)sexual identity indicates a high level of self-surveillance of these young Muslims’ sexual identities. As I have shown above, some of the participants revealed that the increased state and public surveillance and heightened national security in the context of the “war on terror” have also affected their sense of national subject positioning and, consequently, their sexual subjectivities. In this sense, then, it is possible that the “shift” to abstinence and the “broadcasting” of sexual restrictions may also be related to this same discernment, and thus indicate the observance of symbolic national sexual boundaries.

The “announcement” of sexual abstinence may also be related to affecting a sense of control over the issue of marriage. For example, one participant, who had been sexually active with a former boyfriend (whom she kept secret from her family), stated that she has now decided to postpone marriage, and thus sexual intimacy, to pursue her career goals. While this young woman voiced her desires for love, a family, and sexual pleasure, she also said that she is “mildly” pressured by family members (mother and aunts) to finish her education and get married. “You’re not getting any younger,” said one aunt at a recent family gathering, and another advised, “Men don’t want educated girls.” Indeed, all the young Muslims in my study articulated the importance of marriage to their parents; all stated that their parents expected them to marry another Muslim and a couple indicated that they were likely candidates for arranged marriages after they graduated from university.

This participant’s either “sex-and-marriage,” or “career-and-no-sex” positionality demonstrates that she is compelled to choose one over the other, not to modify them. It is important to note that she is “choosing” this course both in light of and against familial pressures regarding marriage and Islamic gender ideals. In accentuating her desire to free herself from the normative demands of Islamic marriage, the participant expresses individual agency and the desire to forge her identity beyond/outside normative Islamic gender categories.

On one level, the participant’s election to pursue a career and postpone marriage and sex may be considered as operating within the normative Islamic parameters of piety. However, the discourse of piety was not articulated in her interview about her decision. Instead, she identified

her decision to abstain from sex and marriage for the next several years as underpinning her desire for a highly educated husband. Her decision is indicative of contemporary feminism in which agency is individualized, and the emphasis is placed on “choice” and “self-empowerment” (Genz and Brabon, 2009: 167). Thus, while she was at one time interested in pursuing marriage and engaged in (“pre-marital”) sexual intimacy, she has become much more mindful in her second year of university with positioning herself to obtain her interpersonal goals and negotiate marriage options according to her personal agenda and desires.

The phenomenon of abstinence, as indicated in three interviews, suggests a range of possible undercurrents. These include, but are not limited to, the ongoing tensions of embracing and upholding a pious “Islamic “identity (whether these young Muslims wish to or not),¹¹¹ adjusting to the increased public scrutiny of their sexual lives and exercising individual agency to obtain personal goals. Moreover, the fact that several young Muslim women are socially broadcasting the same sexual restrictions indicates the extent to which they discern the social scrutiny of their sexual lives. This understanding goes beyond a limited interpretation of young Muslims’ sexual subjectivities as restricted through the Islamic discourse of piety and encourages an active rethinking that captures the multiplicity and complexity of young Muslims lives at this time.

National Belonging

Both genders in this study demonstrate discernment of symbolic national sexual boundaries regarding interfaith sexual unions. For some participants, such as Kaseem, religious leaders, who are purported to guide young Muslims’ sexuality increasingly within a traditional Islamic framework, highlight these limitations. For others, such as Kalila and Sadiq, their understandings of sexual restrictions are informed by the internalization of an “enemy” Other national subject positioning. Regarding religious authorities, for example, Kaseem stated that spiritual leaders in multiple settings are vigorously advocating sexual abstinence until marriage and urging Muslim-only marriages. In his words,

In the past five, ten years, you’ve seen mosques talking about this issue [sexual abstinence]; you’ve seen Friday sermons discussing this issue. So, in Canadian

¹¹¹ Herrera and Bayat claim that the increased tensions in the post-9/11 era in which politics and discourse in the West are centred on Islam and Muslims, has rendered even “secular” Muslim youths to identify with Islam (2010: 21).

society especially, you've seen this issue starting to be discussed. You have religious leaders who are now first-generation Canadians, first-generation Muslims; they're graduated from the Canadian system; they've grown up in this area. So, we don't have the same leaders as fifty, sixty years ago. So, these are people who grew up in this time and age, and they know the issues that the Muslim youth face, and at every level, it's being discussed nowadays.

Notable in Kaseem's comment is his observation of a significant increase in the focus on this topic in the last five or so years. The 2006 Statistics Canada report on interreligious unions gives some evidence of this shift; however, the report also states that immigrant Muslims (along with Sikhs and Hindus) are least likely to be in interreligious unions than other immigrant populations, and that interfaith unions were lower for Muslims in 2001 than they were in 1981 because of the growth of the immigrant Muslim population over this period.¹¹² For other religious groups (other than Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu), however, because of increasing cultural diversity, the report indicates that interreligious conjugal unions are on the rise, reasoning that the decline in the importance of religion in social life and the fact that Canadians are becoming more tolerant of people outside their own religious group are factors underpinning this rise in interfaith marriages. The Statistics Canada report mainly focuses on immigrant Muslims, but Kaseem explicitly stresses the Canadian-born feature of this sex-based campaign in his comment—the “first generation of Muslims.” Here he conveys the age-defined youthfulness as well as the “Canadianness” of this “newer” population “who grew up in this time and age.”

Discursively, he is talking about the culture that he has grown up in—the post-9/11 environment. He sees young Muslims as a global collectivity, and he notes the intensity with which religious leaders are taking up the issue of same-faith marriages. This increased attention on sexual abstinence and same-faith delimitations seem to be in line with Rahman and Hussain's claim that because of heightened public awareness and state and media scrutiny post-9/11, Muslim organizations increasingly advocate moral conservatism and a distinct Muslim identity (2011: 262; 267). These sexually demarcating patterns influence “Muslim-only” sexual subjectivities and effectively delineate Muslim identity within the Canadian national context. They also set Muslim youths in some significant ways as generationally distinct, infusing them

¹¹² Data in this article are from the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Censuses of Population and from the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS). See Canada. Statistics. *Interreligious Unions in Canada*.

with a decisive obligation to cultivate strong Islamic identities. Delimiting Muslim-only sexual unions within a politicized context demarcates “appropriate” sexual partnering within the nation.

Two other participants also expressed the notion of “appropriate” sexual coupling. Kalila stated that she perceives intermarrying and non-marital interfaith sexual intimacy as offering a solution to negate her/Muslims’ sense of “enemy” Otherness. She believes that interfaith marrying would provide non-Muslims with first-hand experiences of Muslims’ religious fidelity and trustworthiness as Canadian citizens. Whereas “sexual crossings” with the “enemy” Other are considered by national members as ignoble, more than any other act of acceptance, sexual intimacy symbolically demonstrates belonging to the nation (Nagel, 2003). Kalila thus evokes “sexual crossings” as desirable to making Muslims equivalent to non-Muslims in Canada. She rationalizes that sexual intimacy between Muslims and non-Muslims, even outside of wedlock, would advance the public acceptance of Muslims. She states, “Like I think it’s, it’s doing something—like it’s *progressing something*. It’s saying that to other people that Muslims are not the Other.”

Sadiq also evinced consciousness of “appropriate” sexual coupling in light of “enemy” Other implications. As noted above regarding the sexual double standard, the participants view Muslim men as having more latitude regarding non-Muslim sexual and marriage relationships than do young Muslim women. Accordingly, Sadiq talked about exploring his sexuality with non-Muslim women outside of marriage.¹¹³ He also expressed fear of rejection from any young non-Muslim woman he might pursue because he is a Muslim. In contrast, he did not express fear of being rejected by a young Muslim woman. Consequently, his self-consciousness about being Muslim plays a more prominent role in avoiding sex with non-Muslim women than does his religious convictions about postponing sexual intimacy until marriage. Although not his first preference, he also indicated that if he were to pursue “interim sexual outlets” (Ali, 2006), then he would partner with a young Muslim woman who would also be a potential marriage partner. The linking of his self-imposed sexual boundaries to his perceptions of “enemy” Otherness demonstrates his discernment of symbolic sexual subject boundaries.

“Enemy” Other constructions and religiously influenced sexual demarcations operate in different ways, but they both have similar effects on the sexual subjectivities of these participants

¹¹³ I commented above that this participant’s religious subjectivities prevented him from “choosing” young Muslim women as possible sexual partners because he feels compelled to respect the “pious Muslim girl” imperative.

regarding restricting sexual liaisons in that they both work to demarcate Muslim sexuality within a national context. While national ideologies entail controlling the sexual practices of national members and defining “acceptable” sexual coupling (Nagel, 2003), these two equal forces exemplify the ways ideological sexual positioning operates in the current Canadian national ethos, as well as illustrate that the ways these participants experience being Muslim in the post-9/11 context occur within limitations placed on their sexual identities. The internal realities of these ideological boundaries have not yet been thoroughly explored.

Conclusions

The phenomenological research method employed in this study attempts to uncover what several participants who experience a phenomenon have in common. Critical in this strategy is identifying the phenomenon under study. This pinpointing and naming of the phenomenon—in this case, the concept of hegemonic sexual positioning—had theoretical implications for the research questions, as well as data collection, analysis, and interpretation. In uncovering what the participants in my study experience in relation to this phenomenon enabled the reduction of their individual experiences to a narrative of shared phenomena. Focusing on their shared experiences offered understandings about what most concerns the participants, the language that the participants’ employ in their constructions, and a sense of their “Muslimness” in the Canadian context.

Moreover, this study argues that the concept of hegemonic sexual positioning is missing in research concerning the formation of young Canadian Muslims’ identities. The overarching theme of “piety” in many contemporary studies about young Muslims’ identities obscures the realities of sexuality and national belonging in the formation of their subjectivities. This omission is significant since the findings in this study reveal young Muslims are under considerable social pressure to demonstrate national solidarity. Furthermore, many of the participants have internalized the “enemy” Other categorization, a category that sets them apart from all other national groups, and all are distressed over the negative portrayals of Muslims and Islam in mainstream media. Consequently, all the participants have developed strategies to show their commitment to Canadian “values,” to publicly perform *non-threatening* “Muslim” postures, and for some, to conceal their religious identities and emotions.

My study shows that all the participants participate in a defensive discourse, which I refer to as the Muslim Women's Oppressed Discourse (MWOD), in attempts to qualify Muslim female agency as separate from male authority. I argue, however, that because MWOD is constructed in light of and in refutation to patriarchal power, it cannot, therefore, extract itself from that bond. Thus, the participants, and presumably other young Muslims, are complicit in reproducing the stereotype of Muslim women as essentially non-agentic and oppressed and Muslim males as always oppressive. I also discussed one participant's offering of an alternative, sexualized discourse of Muslim women's agency that circumvents MWOD by inserting into the public conversation the notion of being sexually experienced *as representative* of young Muslim women's lives. This unique offering opens discourse about the perceived relationship between Muslim women's sexual and religious lives.

I noted that all the participants contemplate sexual desire within the framework of marriage and that this theme was absent in contemplations of young non-Muslims' sexuality. Indeed, it is within this sex-marriage framework that the participants perceive young Muslims to be less sexually active than their non-Muslim counterparts and that non-Muslim sexuality appears to be more liberal because it is supposedly free of marriage restrictions. The findings also show that the sexual double standard was apparent in the participants' negotiations of non-marital sexual intimacy and that the "pious Muslim girl" archetype came into play in these negotiations. Moreover, some of the participants discussed a current "shift" in young Muslims' sexual activities from being sexually active to abstinence. I discuss this phenomenon in light of social media and social surveillance of young Muslims lives, and also as an aspect of having control over the issue of marriage.

Finally, I discussed the findings relating to the discernment of symbolic national sexual boundaries regarding interfaith sexual unions. I analyzed three related findings: that religious leaders are said to be advocating sexual abstinence until marriage and urging Muslim-only marriages, that one participant perceives intermarrying and non-marital interfaith sexual intimacy as offering a solution to negate her/Muslims' sense of "enemy" Otherness, and that one male participant's self-consciousness about being Muslim played a more prominent role in avoiding sex with non-Muslim women than did his religious convictions about postponing sexual intimacy until marriage. I analyzed these findings in light of "enemy" Other constructions of "Muslim" identity.

The findings, although preliminary, bring to light significant patterns, themes, and challenges that the participants are persistently dealing with and have an immediate and long-term impact on the formation of their identities. Moreover, this study reveals the multiple discourses currently shaping young Canadian Muslim identities and highlights the relationship between sexuality and national ideologies.

Limitations of the Study

One limitation of the research design was that although I was interested in exploring the impact of hegemonic sexual positioning on young Canadian Muslims, this could only be accessed in a limited way. The data collected was from a small number of Canadian Muslims who live and for the most part grew up in the Toronto area. Although the individual interviews were able to draw out many similar experiences, additional, more diverse interviews could have produced other details, perspectives, and narratives. While the purpose of using phenomenological inquiry is to gather detailed descriptions from a small number of participants, a larger number would have been more representative of the population. This small size also limited heterogeneity. The fact that most of the participants were women may have influenced the current findings. Although the findings provided initial evidence for the critical role gender plays in the lives of young Muslims, future studies should include comparable numbers of females and males to flesh out incongruences amongst gender sets.

A second limitation of the study was that it was not able to apply ethnic, racial (skin colour)¹¹⁴ and class analysis to the findings. This, again, was influenced by the sample size. That the participants were all students of York University suggests middle-class backgrounds, as well as high levels of education. These higher levels of education may be reflected in the findings in the topics the participants paused to reflect on and in their articulations. There was some evidence that the participants' ethnic/racial backgrounds influence their religious and sexual subjectivities, but limited diversity prevented gathering comparative data. Consequently, I was not able to contribute to knowledge about how class and ethnic/racial identities intersect with the religious, sexual, and national subjectivities of young Canadian Muslims. However, regarding ethnic/racial identification, it is important to note Ghaffar-Kucher's (2009) argument that in the

¹¹⁴ Nagel (2003) notes that current notions of *race* centre exclusively on visible (skin colour) distinctions among populations (6).

U.S., nation and religion have come to outweigh other identity markers, such as race and ethnicity. Thus, she refers to the “religification” of Muslim identity in the U.S. (7). Also, Ghaffar-Kucher found in her U.S. study (2004-2008) with young Pakistani-Muslims that the youths increasingly identified themselves as Muslims in the post-9/11 era because this alignment enabled these youths to transform their experiences of ethnic/racial exclusion into experiences of solidarity with other Muslims both locally and globally (2009: 8; also, see above page 77). Future studies with young Canadian Muslims should consider these potential trends.

A third limitation of the research design was the composition of the sample. As all the subjects were recruited from York University, they did not broadly represent Canada’s young Muslim population. In fact, it could be argued that only particular types of young people are willing to participate in a study about sexuality. These individuals, for instance, might have more liberal attitudes about sexuality or be more mature than other 17- to 23-year-olds. Also, the recruitment poster/flyers (Appendix D) I used at York University explicitly stated that the study sought to understand how the events of “9/11” may have shaped young Muslims’ views on their religious and sexual subjectivities. Therefore, the research participants may have self-selected based on their previous experiences of discrimination and their perceived understanding of the purpose of the study. The findings regarding discrimination may, therefore, be unique to, or, at least, distinctive of, this sample of Canadian Muslims. Hence, future studies should include methods to address discriminatory experiences in a variety of contexts. This will allow researchers to improve understandings of significant shifts and transitions in how young Muslims negotiate their identities across a variety of settings.

Final Thoughts: “Generation 9/11”

The sense of national vulnerability in the wake of 9/11 has been sustained in Canada by “Islamic” terrorist activities perpetrated both locally and globally. Since 9/11, Canada has legislated the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Public Safety Act, the Combating Terrorism Act, the Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, and, while not directly addressing terrorism, the 2009 Citizenship Act, which was created to limit extending citizenship to second-generations born abroad, especially those raised in Muslim-dominated countries (Chapter 3, “Muslim Citizenship and Self-Surveillance Strategies”). Even as successive Canadian governments have attempted to react to both the threat and reality of terror-related hostilities with these measures aimed at

increasing national security, Canadian politicians recently passed a motion condemning Islamophobia. While the private member's motion, M-103, generated a lively debate, its passing in the House of Commons sends a strong message—that in a world where Muslims are facing heightened criticism and hostilities, the Government of Canada officially claims to support and value its Muslim citizens.

The many “terrorist”-related events since 9/11 and the uneven attempts by all Western democracies, including Canada, to find the right balance between domestic security and the desire to accommodate the rights and needs of their Muslim minorities highlight the fact that there is still no fixed solution. The fundamental question my study raises, then, is what does this sustained political turmoil and civilizational discourse mean for young Canadian Muslims in forming their religious and national identities? Scholars around the world are beginning to ask similar questions about the formation of young Muslims' identities. In examining Muslim youth cultures and subcultures worldwide, Herrera and Bayat contend that the current cohort of young Muslims have developed a “generational consciousness” that sets them apart from other youth cultures in general, referring to this group as “the globalized generation of the post-9/11 era” (2010: 11, 21). In Canada, the *Toronto Star's* commissioning of an exploration of this “Generation 9/11” (Shephard, 2016) highlights the general acceptance in Canadian society of distinguishing young Muslims from their non-Muslim peers. Indeed, my research demonstrates that the participants are highly conscious not only of their religious identities but their “difference” from other young Canadians, as well as cognizant of a sense of “Otherness” within the national body.

Understanding the identity processes of these young people requires innovative methodologies and comparative, interdisciplinary, and intergenerational collaborations. Qualitative research should examine everyday practices and negotiations while maintaining a sense of the political and global tensions currently animating “Muslim” identity. Moreover, further research should consider the cultural context in which young Muslims negotiate their identities. With the continued global turmoil around “Islamic” and national identities, the current state of affairs has not changed for young Muslims. Hence, what the findings of this study suggest is that the sexualization of power within discourses of national identity, and the limiting effect of dominant perceptions of “Muslim” sexuality, must be recognized in discourses of

Muslim identity, and in understanding the ways, young Canadian Muslims negotiate their identities.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A – Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

Study name

Young Canadian Muslims' Sexual Identity After 9/11

Researcher

Researcher's name: Catherine Legault

Doctoral Candidate, Graduate Program in Humanities

Email address:

Graduate Program in Humanities phone:

Purpose of the research

Canadian research indicates that since 9/11, some minority Muslim groups in Canada purposely strive to present a positive image to non-Muslims in an effort to defuse dominant negative perceptions. In like manner, studies with young Muslims in the U.S. demonstrates that the youth felt subject to a "hegemonic gaze" since 9/11, and had developed similar self-surveillance techniques, including monitoring sexual conduct. This research seeks to explore the relationship, if any, between the post-9/11 "hegemonic gaze" and young Canadian Muslims' self-surveillance practices of their sexual conduct.

In addition, since the 9/11 attacks in the U.S.A., Muslim religious identity has been overemphasized. Thus, this research seeks a more balanced view of young Muslim identity.

What you will be asked to do in the research

Participants will agree to in-depth interviews lasting between one to two hours. The interviews will be conducted at a private office at York University. Interviews will be tape recorded to ensure the accuracy of participants' comments. Ms. Legault will also take handwritten notes. If necessary for the sake of clarification, some interviews may be followed up with emails and/or telephone communication.

Risks and discomforts

There are no physical risks from your participation in the research. If you feel emotional when talking about your personal experiences, you may make use of York University's counselling

services. The York University Counselling Services telephone number is xxx. The Centre is located in xxx. Website URL: xxx

Benefits of the research and benefits to you

You may benefit from having the opportunity to share your stories with an interested individual. You may also benefit in terms of engaging in a more deliberate self-reflection of your Canadian Muslim identity. In broader terms, your input in this study may bring greater awareness and sensitivity to some of the social pressures some young Muslims currently struggle within the post-9/11 context.

Voluntary participation

Your participation in the study is completely voluntary, and you may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not influence the relationship you may have with the researcher or the nature of your relationship with York University either now, or in the future.

Withdrawal from the study

You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with the researcher, York University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible.

Confidentiality

All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence, and unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not appear in any report or publication of the research. All data will be kept for five years, after which it will be deleted from computer storage, and any hard copy material will be destroyed. Your data will be safely stored in a secure facility, and only the researcher will have access.

Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law.

Questions about the research?

If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact Catherine Legault directly.

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University's Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the

Canadian Tri-council Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a participant in the study, you may contact the Senior Manager and Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York University, telephone xxx or email xxx.

Legal rights and signatures

I, _____, consent to participate in “Young Canadian Muslims’ Sexual Identity after 9/11” conducted by Catherine Legault, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Humanities. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my consent.

Signature _____

Date _____

Participant

Signature _____

Date _____

Principal Investigator

Appendix B – Interview Questions

Name: _____ Gender: M or F Hijab Y or N Time in Cda: _____
Date of Interview: _____ Location: _____ Family from: _____
Age: _____ Self-Identify as Muslim: Yes___ Telephone No.: _____

Introduction to the study and interview: I am interested in the religious and sexual identities of young Canadian Muslims. I chose to explore these areas because they are often interrelated; because sexuality is an important part of a young person's transitioning to adulthood; and since the attacks in the U.S.A. on September 11, 2001, Muslim religious identity has been overemphasized. Thus, I seek a more balanced view of young Muslim identity, but also to understand how the events of 9/11 may have shaped your views on these matters. I have three main groups of questions regarding your religious identity, your experiences growing up in the post-9/11 environment, and your experiences and views on sexuality.

Religious Identity Questions

- a. Describe your religious affiliations and beliefs.
- b. How frequently do you attend mosque? And Muslim community events?
- c. Do you participate in Ramadan?
- d. Do you plan on making Hajj at some point in your life?
- e. How does your ethnic background or your parent's culture if they came to Canada from another country, influence your religious identity?
- f. One aspect of Muslim traditions that garners a great deal of attention is the wearing of the *hijab*. Explain what the *hijab* means to you/family/community. For male participants or women who do not wear a hijab: What do you think it means to the woman wearing it? What do you think it means to the young woman's family/community?
- g. What do you think a *hijab* expresses to non-Muslims?
- h. Same questions regarding women who wear a *niqab*, and *burka*.
- i. Do you take pride in being Muslim? //What are some of the things you value most in being a Muslim?

- j. Do you ever joke about being Muslim?// If so, what are the jokes about?
- k. How would you describe a “good” Muslim? How would you describe a “not good” Muslim?
- l. What is your understanding of the equality of women and men in Islam?
- m. Some Muslim families continue the tradition of arranged marriages. What are your thoughts on this?
- n. What are your thoughts on intermarrying, that is, Muslims marrying non-Muslims?
- o. Are there any restrictions set by you, your family, or your religious community regarding dating non-Muslims?
- p. Do you plan on marrying?// Describe your ideal marriage partner.
- q. Are your views on Islam the same as or different from your parent’s views? Explain.

II. Growing Up in Post-9/11 Environment

- a. After the terrorist attacks in the U.S.A. on September 11, 2001, there was a lot of rhetoric about “us” (Americans/Westerners) and “them” (terrorists/Middle East-Arabs) and this included a lot of negative representations of Muslims. As a young Muslim growing up in Canada, how has this affected you?
- b. How are Muslims represented in media?// In what ways are these representations different for Muslim males and Muslim females? //Describe how you feel when you see particular Muslim representations?
- c. Have you been called, or do you know another Muslim who has been called a terrorist or another term implying terrorist ties? //How did you/they respond?
- d. What is it like to be a Muslim in today’s culture? //What is difficult about being Muslim today?

- e. Have you experienced fear or anxiety in being Muslim?// If so, what do you do that makes you feel safe?
- f. Do you associate with non-Muslims?// If yes, explain. If no, why not?// Has this changed as you have grown older?
- g. How would you define a “good” Muslim citizen?
- h. If you had to describe yourself as an “insider” or an “outsider” in terms of national or Canadian identity, how would you respond? //Explain what makes you an “insider”/ “outsider.”
- i. Have you had to be careful about what you say or how you behave, or whom you associate with when in the company of non-Muslims?
- j. Have you ever been provoked to anger by non-Muslims?// How did you respond?
- k. Do non-Muslims try to provoke you in any way?// How do you respond? //Has this changed as you have aged?
- What is the best way for young Muslims to get along with non-Muslims?
- l. Have you ever explained Islam to non-Muslims? //If so, describe the situation(s), what you said and why.
- m. Is it important for you to explain your religious beliefs to non-Muslims?
- n. What are some of the more important facets of your religious beliefs and traditions that you feel the need to explain?
- o. Do you create situations in order to explain your beliefs, or do you wait and take advantage of situations as they arise?
- p. Have you experienced any discrimination because you are Muslim?
- q. Do you feel that you are accepted in Canadian culture as a Muslim?

III. Experiences and Views on Sexuality (Answer only as much as your comfort level allows)

- a. How would you describe the culture of sexuality for young Canadian people today?
- b. In your opinion, what constitutes “having sex?” (i.e. intercourse, oral or anal sex, kissing, intimate touching, etc.)
- c. It seems to be much more acceptable today that young people explore their sexuality outside of marriage. That is, to have multiple partners, and perhaps, same-sex experiences. What are your thoughts on this?
- d. Are your views different for young females and males?
- e. Do you think more young people are having pre-marital or non-marital sex than in previous generations? Explain.
- f. Are Muslim youth having non-marital sex? //Explain how you know this.
- g. Are you now or have you ever been sexually active? //If so, at what age did you become sexually active? //Describe your first encounter.
- h. If having had sexual experiences: who have you had sex with (i.e. men only, women only, both men and women)?
- i. Have you or Muslims you know ever explored same-sex unions?
- j. Is it acceptable for Muslims to have sexual relations with non-Muslims?
- k. If sexually active: During the past year, with how many different male partners have you had sex? Female partners?
- l. In terms of sexual orientation, do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or straight, gay/lesbian, or bisexual?
- m. Is Muslim sexuality the same as or different from non-Muslim sexuality?

- n. Does being a Muslim restrict your sexuality in any way? Explain.
- o. Are the young Muslims you know as sexually active as the non-Muslims you know?
- p. Is it “OK” for young Muslims to explore their sexuality with non-Muslims, or is it best to explore it with other Muslims?
- q. “Hooking up” for sex with a stranger or near-stranger has become more popular in the last decade. What are your thoughts on this?// Do you have personal experience of sex with a stranger?
- r. When you find yourself attracted to someone, what do you do?
- s. Have you ever watched pornography on the Internet?// If so, have you watched pornography in the past year?// If so, would you say you watch it occasionally or frequently?
- t. What type of pornography are you drawn to (male-female, same-sex, sadomasochism, interracial, etc.)
- u. If watching pornography frequently: how do you reconcile watching pornography with your religious beliefs?
- v. Are your views on sexuality the same as or different from your parent’s views? Explain.

Appendix C – Ethics Approval



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Certificate #:	STU 2014 - 094
Approval Period:	07/03/14-07/03/15

Memo

To: Catherine Legault, Humanities - Graduate Program

From: Alison M. Collins-Mrakas, Sr. Manager and Policy Advisor, Research Ethics
(on behalf of Duff Waring, Chair, Human Participants Review Committee)

Date: **Thursday, July 03, 2014**

Re: Ethics Approval

An Appropriate Sexual Citizenship? Young Canadian Muslims' Sexual
Identity After 9/11

I am writing to inform you that the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee has reviewed and approved the above project.


Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at: xxx or via email at: xxx

Yours sincerely,

Alison M. Collins-Mrakas M.Sc., LL.M.
Sr. Manager and Policy Advisor,
Office of Research Ethics


Participate in Research

Muslim Youth



Volunteers are needed to take part in a study of

Canadian Muslim youths' Religious and Sexual Identities



WHY do research on the religious and sexual Identities of young Canadian Muslims?

- ✓ BECAUSE these areas are interrelated.
- ✓ BECAUSE sexuality is an important part of a young person's transitioning to adulthood.
- ✓ BECAUSE, since 9/11, Muslim religious identity has been overemphasized. Thus, this study seeks both a more balanced view of young Muslim identity, and also to understand how the events of 9/11 may have shaped young Muslim's views on these matters.


To qualify as a participant, you:

- Self-identify as Muslim
- Are between 17 and 25 years old
- Were born in Canada or the U.S.A., or immigrated to one of these countries before you were ten years old

As a participant in this study, you will be asked to attend ONE in-depth interview lasting from one and a half to two hours.

For more information about this study, please contact:
Catherine Legault,
PhD Candidate,
Department of Humanities* Email:

This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a York University Research Ethics Committee.



Appendix E – Introduction Letter to Participants

Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. This sheet is to inform you of the goals and structure of my research.

I am interested in Canadian youth identity and how it is shaped by religious beliefs. Sexuality is also an important factor in a young person's transitioning to adulthood and thus should not be overlooked in examinations of identity. How young Canadians think about religion and about sexuality informs researchers about current trends in Canadian youth culture.

More specifically, there is a great deal of research focusing on youths' views of sexuality; however, research with young Muslims tends to centre only on their religious identities. Indeed, Muslim religious identity has been overemphasized since the events of 9/11. Thus, this study seeks both a more balanced view of young Muslim identity, and also to understand how the events of 9/11 may have shaped young Muslims' views on these matters, if at all. Thus, the interview is structured around three themes: religious identity; growing up in the post-9/11 environment; and experiences and views on sexuality.

To qualify as a participant, you: (1) self-identify as Muslim; (2) are between 17 and 25 years old; and (3) were born in Canada or the U.S.A. or immigrated to one of these countries at under ten years of age.

I am looking forward to meeting you. I think you will find this research interesting, and also a benefit to you in terms of engaging in a more deliberate self-reflection of your Canadian Muslim identity.

Best regards,

Catherine

Appendix F – Post-Interview Summary Sheet

Post-Interview Summary

Name: Age: Ethnicity: Hijab: Time in Canada:
Interview Date: Today's Date: Parents from:

1. What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this contact?
2. Summarize the information you got (or failed to get) on each of the target questions you had for this contact.

Questions Re:

Information

Wearing hijab

Intermarrying

Good Muslim Citizen

Sense of Canadianess

Behaviour around
non-Muslims

Sexuality

3. Anything else that struck you as salient, interesting, illuminating or important in this contact?
4. What new (or remaining) target questions do you have in considering the next contact?