Andrews, Kristin A.Waldberg, Elizabeth2023-12-082023-12-082023-12-08https://hdl.handle.net/10315/41741One central commitment of comparative psychology is the prohibition against using folk-psychological concepts to explain nonhuman animal behavior, which requires us to disavow “the attribution of human qualities to other animals, usually with the implication it is done without sound justification” (Shettleworth 2010). Many scientists and philosophers believe attributing human folk-psychological concepts to nonhuman minds constitutes an egregious violation of the anti-anthropomorphism principle. Penn and Povinelli (2007) describe the practice as “insidious” and stemming from our “folk-psychological imagination.” Alternatively, others believe the prohibition against folk psychology is misguided and unnecessary. Andrews (2020) suggests “folk psychology plays an essential role in comparative psychology as the starting point, but not the end point, of our research.” I adjudicate this debate by examining our use of folk psychological concepts in comparative psychological research.Author owns copyright, except where explicitly noted. Please contact the author directly with licensing requests.PhilosophyPhilosophy of scienceElectronic Thesis or Dissertation2023-12-08Animal cognitionFolk psychologyComparative psychology