

Marketization of Planning : The Cases of Quayside-Toronto and Fikirtepe-Istanbul

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List of Acronyms

- CPPS Community Planning Permit System
- DPS Development Permit System
- FAR Floor Area Ratio
- MIDP Master Innovation and Development Plan
- MMI Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul
- PDA Plan Development Agreement
- RFP Request for Proposal
- SL Sidewalk Labs
- UDPs Urban development projects
- WT Waterfront Toronto

Abstract

Neoliberalism is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental concepts when explaining urban development and spatial processes. Urban politics is one of the most fundamental fields in which neoliberal restructuring is effective. Neoliberal urbanization aims to make urban areas attractive for capital and increase the role of market forces in urban development. One of the most practical ways to achieve this is to integrate neoliberal market-oriented approaches into urban planning and transform existing planning systems into marketized planning systems. To realize this integration, formulating large-scale urban development projects with market logic in partnerships between the public and private sectors is beneficial. This research paper examines two cases from Toronto and Istanbul to see how neoliberal market-oriented approaches are adapted into urban planning and what are the implications of this adaptation. In doing so, this paper investigates how actors, especially from the private sector, contributed to the marketization process of planning. Furthermore, this paper looks into how market-thinking and market-oriented methods were blended with regulatory planning frameworks.

Foreword

Marketization of Planning: The Cases of Quayside-Toronto and Fikirtepe-Istanbul is the final product of my academic journey in the MES Program, completed to meet the requirements for the degree of Master in Environmental Studies and obtain the skills necessary to meet the program requirements for membership of the Canadian Institute of Planners and Ontario Professional Planners Institute. Based on my plan of study, my major research consists of three components: urban development policy, neoliberalism, and large-scale urban development projects. This major paper fulfills specific learning objectives outlined in my plan of study: gaining knowledge about urban development policy in current cities, acquiring a strong working knowledge of objective of urban development policy considering the problems and the potential of cities, developing a fundamental understanding about how neoliberal ideology forms urban policy, and developing a basic understanding about how governance and politics are affective in shaping urban development projects. Focusing on two case studies from Toronto and Istanbul, this major paper concentrates on the marketization of planning through neoliberal urban policies. Investigating two large-scale projects from Istanbul and Toronto provides an insightful understanding of neoliberal marketized approaches in urban planning.

Introduction

When cities are subject to change, urban planning also change. When city authorities' focus on the cities as growth machines increase, it affects the function and content of planning. In this setting, the focus of plan-making changes, and planning becomes more a development, growth, and profit-making tool under the name of urban entrepreneurship than being conventionally a regulatory tool. In other words, when planning adapts market rules and prioritizes the goals of growth and profit-making, it turns into a market-oriented system and becomes a part of the marketization process.

The influence of Neoliberalism in this transformation of planning is enormous (Baeten, 2017). Planning exposed to the neoliberalisation process focuses on solutions based on the market-oriented philosophy that it promotes. Neoliberal practices and concepts promote market-oriented ideas and principles. In this context, planning adapts these practices and concepts internalizes the market principles (Theodore, Peck & Brenner, 2011). The neoliberal transformation of planning has been going on since the 1980s. Planning adapted "a more proactive and entrepreneurial" approach in the first phase of its neoliberalisation process between the 1980s and 2000s, and in the second phase after the 2000s, it has internalized "normalizing neoliberalism and practices concepts" (Olesen, 2014). Today planning plays a role in shaping cities with a more entrepreneurial approach, on the basis of neoliberal market philosophy. From the first phase of the neoliberalisation of planning, it is expected that planning achieves the goals of economic growth and competitiveness. In order to achieve the goals of economic growth and competitiveness, which are the reflections of a market-oriented philosophy, planners invent new ways (Peck, 2010). At this stage, we can say that market-oriented thinking through Neoliberalism penetrates planning systems to

operate according to the market rules. This leads to a step-by-step marketization process of planning.

The marketization of planning by integrating market-oriented thinking into planning and increasing the private sector's role in urban development involves administrative and contextual restructuring. In the case of administrative restructuring, the concept of the marketization of planning in the planning literature is usually associated with the entrepreneurial spirit that public administrations adapt, increasing the role of the private sector in urban development and providing public services, public-private partnerships for funding, transferring part of the authority of local administrations to the private sector, and the transformation of planners into a market actor (Birch & Siemiatycki, 2016; Brindley, Rydin & Stoker, 2005). In terms of the contextual restructuring, the concept of the marketization of planning is associated with adapting the marketing principles by planning, a shift of the focus of planning from answering the public needs to promoting economic growth and competition in the international arena, the introduction of new planning tools to meet the demands and needs of the private sector, integrating flexibility and discretion into planning to accelerate urban development and facilitate the private sector's participation in urban development (Ozkan & Türk 2016; Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010).

Planning tools that add flexibility and discretion to planning and lead to its marketization are becoming popular in different countries. These tools, which are also called planning policy innovations and are primarily discussed with policy transfer and policy mobility concepts in the literature, are used to overcome the limits set by regulatory planning and get fast results in urban development processes (Biggar & Siemiatycki, 2020). Regulatory planning, also known as conventional or conforming

planning, has a hierarchic, regulatory, and rigid structure (Steele, & Ruming, 2012). With a planning system having this structure, it is difficult to respond adequately and quickly to the urban development demands increasing recently around cities. Therefore, the regulatory planning system should be made more flexible (Tarakçı & Türk, 2017). Urban actors who are focused on economic growth and competition and want to realize this through urbanization intervene this rigid structure of planning with various planning policies and make it more flexible in favor of the private sector and urban development.

One of the urban development policies that add flexibility and discretion to planning is large-scale urban development projects (UDPs). These projects, which are defined as neoliberal urban development policy, increase the private sector's effectiveness in the public sphere and bring flexibility and discretion to planning. In this way, UDPs that play an active role in the competition of cities in the global arena and affect cities' structures also play an essential role in the marketization process of planning. UDPs are widely discussed in the planning literature with different perspectives, primarily how they affect cities' physical and social structures and management systems (Siemiatycki, 2013; Weinberg and Rotem-Mindali, 2019; (Kennedy et al., 2014); Sotomayor, 2015 . However, the effects of these projects on the structure of planning systems and their role in the marketization process of planning are not sufficiently included in the literature.

In this research, I argue that, as a neoliberal urban policy, UDPs give rise to the marketization of planning systems by increasing the private sector's role in urban development and integrating discretion and flexibility into planning systems. However, the marketization process creates implications for regulatory planning systems that

have certainty and rigidity features. Furthermore, the private sector's values such as profitability weaken the public values such as accountability. In this study, the effects of UDPs on the marketization of planning and implications will be examined through two large-scale projects selected from Istanbul and Toronto. I selected the Toronto and Istanbul examples as they are both global cities where neoliberal market-oriented approaches are experienced and integrated into the existing planning system. Both cities shape market-oriented urban policies that center economic growth with the aim to be positioned among world cities on a global scale. And Toronto and Istanbul they turn part of their urban territory into experimental areas to test planning innovations that accelerate and facilitate economic growth. In this respect, the Fikirtepe project in Istanbul and Quayside project in Toronto provide insights on how neoliberal market-oriented thinking penetrates planning systems to operate according to the market rules. In addition, they also indicate how marketization of planning leads to implications as they both failed projects. Both projects represent that if the integration of marketization approaches into planning is not done correctly, it causes severe complications for existing planning systems. The questions guiding my research are:

1. why and how does market-oriented thinking through Neoliberalism penetrate planning systems to operate according to the market rules?
2. Which features of marketization are integrated into planning, and how they change the nature of planning?
3. how do UDPs give rise to the marketization of planning systems by integrating discretion and flexibility into them?
4. what are the implications of marketized planning?
5. What role, if any, did the marketization of planning play in the failure of both projects.

Chapter Overview

The first chapter of this study is a literature review on the marketization process of planning. First of all, this chapter focuses on Neoliberalism, which is one of the powerful ideologies affecting urban planning, and then explains the relationship between Neoliberalism and marketization. Marketization, as one of the mechanisms promoted by Neoliberalism, plays an important role in planning when shaping cities and directing urban growth. In this context, the chapter investigates which characteristics of marketization become effective on the conventional planning system and transform it. Neoliberal transformations in Toronto and Istanbul planning processes are explained through case studies.

The second chapter explains the research design and various methodologies that were used in gathering data and analysis for this research. Then, the third chapter provides the first case study analysis of marketized planning, Google Sidewalk Lab's Quayside project in Toronto. The chapter investigates the marketization process of urban planning in Toronto based on two components: the actors and the plan structure.

First, the chapter presents the structural forces in Quayside's development process by examining and evaluating the roles of actors, the institutional relations, and surrounding events in the development process of the Quayside project. Initially, the main actors involved in the project's development are named, and the roles they played in the marketization of the planning process is explained. This analysis helps to reveal a connection between the roles of actors and the process of marketization of planning at Quayside. Secondly, the chapter analyses the structure of the Quayside plan and examines its traditional and marketized planning features.

The fourth chapter provides the second case study analysis of marketized planning, the Fikirtepe project in Istanbul. As with the Quayside project, this chapter examines the marketization process of planning in Istanbul through two components: the actors and the plan structure. First, the roles of actors, the institutional relations, and surrounding events in the development process of the Fikirtepe project are studied to understand the structural forces in the process. Then, conventional and marketized planning characteristics of the Fikirtepe plan are evaluated through the critical events, influential institutions, and principal actors involved in the process.

The paper concludes with reviewing the analyses of the two case studies conducted through the 3rd and 4th chapters in line with the literature study. The chapter presents the similarities and differences in the planning processes of the Quayside and Fikirtepe projects and discusses what led to their failures. In this context, the chapter compares how two cities have formulated their urban development projects and integrated flexibility and discretion as market-oriented principles into their existing planning systems. Despite the differences in contexts, planning systems, and legal frameworks, there is a correlation in the marketization processes of their plans.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Neoliberalism and Marketization

The ongoing changes in the social and economic structure also change our perception of cities. Changing urban paradigms are also reflected in urban planning and transform it. As being one of the influential ideologies discussed extensively in urban planning literature, Neoliberalism affects planning profoundly. The transformative dynamics of Neoliberalism show its effects from society and individuals to cities, countries, and global scales. The effects of neoliberal understanding on cities and, therefore, on urban planning are included in the concept of neoliberalization of planning. The planning approach defined as neoliberal planning is shaped in line with the views and systems that neoliberal ideology nurtures or supports. "Market mentality" is one of the philosophies of Neoliberalism that is imposed in planning (Holman, Mossa & Pani, 2018). Market-oriented thinking permeates planning and neoliberal policies lead to its marketization. To analyze the marketization of planning within the framework of neoliberalization, two lenses will be applied: the changing role of actors in the planning process and the changing structure of planning.

Neoliberalism is "a political ideology that focuses on creating and releasing value by freeing markets from unnecessary regulation and state intervention while concomitantly creating the conditions for stimulating economic growth through competitive, capitalist markets" (Holman, Mossa & Pani, 2018, p.610). According to Birch and Siemiatycki (2016, p.179), "Neoliberalism is conceived as the insertion or installation of markets as the underlying institution or mechanism for organizing

society". There is a tight relationship between Neoliberalism and the market mechanism. Peck (2010, p.1-2) explains this relation as "neoliberalism is practically synonymous with the market-oriented philosophy of the "Washington consensus" agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a usually pejorative signifier for a distinctly American form of "free-market" capitalism, (p.2) propagating globally". Also, Carlquist and Phelps (2014, p.1233) explain this relation as: "All versions of Neoliberalism entail that market principles and values are no longer restricted to exchanges of physical commodities, but extend to governmental policy as well as to subjectivity and everyday life".

The history of planning's neoliberalisation goes back to the 1980s when articulation with the global economy and competitiveness were the prevailing paradigms. This period marks the increased effect of market mechanisms and minimized interference to market conditions. Olesen (2014) mentions about two phases of Neoliberalisation of planning: "developing a more proactive and entrepreneurial planning approach" in the first phase, between the 1980s and 2000s; and "normalising neoliberal practices and concepts in strategic spatial planning", in the second phase, after the 2000s. Swyngedouw et al. (2002, p. 547-548) explain that what Neoliberalism has led to in planning is "a gradual shift away from distributive policies, welfare considerations, and direct service provision towards more market-oriented and market-dependent approaches aimed at pursuing economic promotion and competitive restructuring".

When we take the notion that "neoliberalism is practically synonymous with the market-oriented philosophy" (Peck, 2010, p.1-2) as a reference, then we can say that through the Neoliberalisation process of planning, market-oriented thinking is introduced into planning. It changes the role, aim, and structure of planning practice. The extension of

market-oriented approaches and the use of market-type-mechanisms is associated with the concept of marketization (Hansen & Lindholst, 2016). Within the economic geography discourse, marketization is described as “the process of designing, implementing, maintaining, and reproducing specific socio-technical agencements that embrace a calculated and monetarized exchange of goods and services”(Barnes, Peck & Sheppard, 2012,p.205). The process of marketization involves “conversion of goods into commodities”; “marketizing agencies”; “identification of the formative settings through which encounters between goods and agencies are organized”; “price-setting” and “market design and maintenance” (Barnes, Peck & Sheppard, 2012; Çalışkan & Callon, 2010).

Marketization of Planning

When it comes to the planning sector, marketization refers to adapting market mentality and mechanisms into planning, strengthening the position of the private sector in planning processes, and reforming the structure of planning. This kind of marketized planning is described as market-oriented planning in the planning literature (Hanssen & Saglie,2010; Lind, 2002). Mäntysalo (1999, p.179) states that “market-oriented planning ...is primarily motivated by creating favorable conditions for economic growth and private investment”. The characteristics of market-oriented planning involve an entrepreneurial spirit that public administrations adapt, the increasing role of the private sector in urban development and planning, forming public-private partnerships for funding, transferring part of the planning authority of local administrations to the private sector, the transformation of planners into a market actor, adapting the marketing principles by planning, a shift in the focus of planning from answering the public needs to promoting economic growth and competition in the international arena, the introduction of new planning tools to meet the demands

and needs of the private sector, integrating flexibility and discretion into planning to accelerate urban development and facilitate the private sector's participation in urban development (Birch & Siemiatycki, 2016; Brindley, Rydin & Stoker, 2005; Ozkan & Türk, 2016, Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010).

The realignment of relationships and roles between stakeholders is part of the marketization process in planning. The role of actors in the market-oriented planning process differs from those in the conventional planning process. In a neoliberal marketized planning, the public sector acts with an entrepreneurial spirit and “gains a more proactive role in introducing market principles in planning through local, national and international regulatory reforms” (Baeten, 2017, p.105). It organizes more collaborations with the private sector. The underlying logic of this collaboration is to work with “a more dynamic, efficient, entrepreneurial private sector that provides better services for less money” (Bevir, M. 2009). Thus, the role of the private sector is strengthened in market-oriented planning through public-private partnerships (PPP) while the role of public authorities is reduced. This is the outcome of strengthening the relationship between state and market actors and leads to the marketization of public services and planning (Birch & Siemiatycki, 2016).

Market-led approaches in the delivery of public services are expressed in the ‘New Public Management’ discourses. The concept of marketization is seen as one of the most crucial global reform trends of the New Public Management approach (Hansen & Lindholst, 2016). New Public Management, described as “an ‘internal’ discourse centered on denigrating government delivery of services in comparison with visions of efficient private sector delivery” (Birch & Siemiatycki, 2016), has been influential on planning practice. Witzell (2019) states that “neo-liberalism and New Public

Management have affected perceptions of the role of planning, the material objectives of planning, as well as the organization and governance of planning practices” (p.1413).

In urban governance, marketization refers to increasing participation of the private sector in the delivery of public services and “the integration of competition and price mechanisms into public services” (Bevir, 2009, Hansen & Lindholst, 2016). Furthermore, as Birch and Siemiatycki (2016, p.183) emphasize, “marketization processes ... entail the insertion of market principles in non market areas of life, especially the public realm”. The use of market principles and values in public sector management and governmental policy is linked to the formation of entrepreneurial forms of governance that “emphasizes the spatial manifestations of market forces in the deregulated global economy” (Eraydin, 2012). The ‘market values’ that the public sector wants to benefit most from its partnerships with the private sector are efficiency, effectiveness, and innovation (Witzell, 2019). For the private sector, ‘profitability’ is the prevailing market value when partnering with other parties (Van der Wal, De Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008).

In an entrepreneurial environment, we witness increasing participation of the private sector in urban planning processes. The public sector creates partnerships with the private sector through contracts and development agreements and transfers its planning authority to the private sector (Birch & Siemiatycki,2016; Brindley, Rydin & Stoker,2005; Hanssen, 2010). As a result, the private sector starts to produce plans on behalf of the public and becomes more effective in decision-making processes. In order to encourage the private sector's participation in urban development, bureaucratic processes are deregulated by urban governments, and new policy

instruments and legal frameworks are introduced. Moreover, planning undertakes a function that facilitates the work of the private sector, and in this setting, planners turn into market actors in favor of the private sector (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010).

However, giving the private sector a prominent role in urban development through marketized planning processes causes implications for urban governance and planning and stirs essential criticisms. It is the responsibility of central administrations to optimize the conditions for capital accumulation in neoliberal marketized planning and overcome any legal problems that may arise in the realization of urban interventions in favor of developers. In this context, it is vital to meet the needs of the private sector. However, at this point, the interests of individuals or companies may override the public interest in marketized planning as opposed to traditional planning that puts the public interest in the center. Another implication is related to participation in the planning process. Considered a 'must-have' in traditional planning, public participation is less important to developers (Hanssen & Falleth, 2014). Ferreira et al. (2020, p.5) explain that Big Tech firms tend to “act against the public interest while depoliticizing institutions and downgrading democracy”.

In addition, it is a ritual of marketized planning to keep negotiations and shape development contracts behind closed doors in the process after the public sector transfers its planning authority to the private sector. According to Hanssen and Falleth (2014), “market-oriented practices have made urban planning more opaque and closed to the public”. Planning does not act in accordance with the preferences of citizens, and “decisions are taken in several more or less open, non-hierarchical fora, and the distinction between private and public responsibility becomes blurred (Falleth,

Hanssen,& Saglie, 2010). As a result, deterioration of public values such as legitimacy and accountability, which are essential values of public planning, emerges.

In addition to the changing role of the actors in the marketization process of planning, the second component is the changing nature of planning. As Allmendinger and Haughton (2012, p.94) point out, "Planning tends to adapt very quickly to reflect the dominant ideology and priorities of the age." One of the prominent examples of this is the adaption of market-oriented approaches by planning with the influence of neoliberal ideology. The aims, role, and structure of planning change through a neoliberal transformation process.

Market-Oriented Planning Versus Conventional Planning

The primary role of conventional planning, which is also called regulative planning, land use planning, traditional planning, statutory planning, prescriptive planning, conforming planning, is to direct the physical development of cities by considering the public interest and in accordance with the laws. In the conventional system, planning has primarily a regulatory role and controls the development and use of land even it promotes economic growth and development. Brindley, Rydin, and Stoker (2005) explain the function of regulative planning as "providing restricted development opportunities in certain locations and exercising a veto of development in other areas". Sager (2001) lists essential components of regulative planning as zoning, building codes, subdivision regulation, compensation, and other means of development control. Contrary to regulative planning, market-oriented planning promotes economic growth and competition in cities and is used to stimulate development. It turns into a facilitator of growth. According to Brindley, Rydin, and Stoker (2005), market-led planning has financial and property interests and wants to reshape

communities based on these interests. In such an environment, planning has a discretionary characteristic and gains a strategic role rather than a regulatory role. The strategic role of planning is related to flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness to rapid change, involving public-private partnerships, and integration of innovations into the management approach.

The process of neoliberal marketization pushes changes in the structure of planning, its goals, and role. Traditional planning has a hierarchical, rigid, and regulative structure. Accordingly, the regulatory plan provides 'certainty' by designating land uses and defining landforms through a planning scheme and zoning. All of the planning decisions in a regulatory plan have to be consistent and confirm higher-level plans. Modification after its approval is not anticipated in the regulatory plan, the content of which is created in line with the predetermined higher policies and strategies in the planning hierarchy. The objective of land use planning is development control. This process operates automatically according to predetermined rules and laws, and in this respect, it is rigid. Another feature of this type of planning comes from its legal dimension, strict control. In contrast to the 'certainty' feature of regulative planning, the critical feature of market-oriented planning is flexibility (Brindley, Rydin, & Stoker, 2005). Tendencies of deregulation, privatization, flexibilization are the crucial characteristics of marketized planning. This type of planning provides room for discretion. As opposed to certainty and rigidity in regulative planning, flexibility and discretion in market-oriented planning are essential to facilitate urban development.

When the features such as flexibility and discretion are integrated into conventional planning under the name of innovation, its structure turns into a hybrid system. Baeten (2017, p.105) defines neoliberal planning as "a hybrid between existing planning

regimes and subsequent gradual neoliberal transformations". The tools that hybridize it by adding flexibility and discretion to planning are defined as "innovative market-oriented planning instruments" (Ferreira, 2020) and are used in many countries today. The interventions of innovative market-oriented planning instruments contribute to fostering flexibility and discretion in planning practice to meet the needs of diverse stakeholders in complex settings. These policy innovation tools are widely discussed through the literature on policy transfer, fast policy, and policy mobility (Peck, 2010). Countries transfer and use these mobile policies after they are experimented with and implemented successfully in other countries. They are used to loosen regulatory planning rigidity and get fast results in urban development processes (Biggar & Siemiatycki, 2020).

Large-scale UDPs have complex configurations through which different innovative market-oriented planning instruments are created and used. Siemiatycki (2013) mentions the "mobility of innovative mega-projects" and how they become "mechanisms of policy transfer". They are channels for the diffusion of ideas and innovation. They set frameworks "through which innovative ideas are created, diffused and implemented, cycles or waves of innovation emerge in the types of public policies and urban development initiatives being undertaken" (Siemiatycki, 2013, p. 160). As Weinberg and Rotem-Mindali (2019) state, different governance structures, financing techniques, and land uses are required when achieving large-scale projects. These projects usually involve "exceptional" forms of governance, and do not go through the usual channels (Kennedy et al., 2014). Sotomayor (2015) refers to UDPs as "quick-fix urbanism" and stresses their fast implementation process by granting "exceptionality measures from statutory norms and procedures"(p.376). Some features associated with UDPs are flexibility, exceptionality measures, cutting social and environmental

regulatory standards, speed, freezing of conventional planning tools, bypassing statutory regulations and institutional bodies, and changes in national or regional regulations.

Neoliberal Transformation of Toronto

Toronto is a metropolitan region with the fastest growth rate of any city in North America (Vaz & Arsanjani, 2015). As Canada's major urban center, Toronto is "a gateway of international economic, cultural and migration flows" (Rosen and Walks, 2015). The city has experienced a gradual process of neoliberal economic and political restructuring. The process of neoliberalizing Toronto can be traced to the immediate post-World War II years. However, it is the more recent municipal amalgamation in 1998 that accelerated the city's neoliberal transformation. This new political regime was one of the province of Ontario's measures of deliberate neoliberal restructuring under the Tory Mike Harris government (Keil, 2002).

The amalgamation of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and its six local municipalities into a single 'City of Toronto' is a milestone marking a significant neoliberal turn in the city's history. It was about making Toronto 'bigger'. Boudreau et al. (2009) explain the formation as "the project of ensuring Toronto's central role in Canada and the world." Further, Kipfer and Keil (2002) refer to this change as "from the 'city that works' to Neoliberalism," and Lehrer and Laidley (2008) refer to the same process as "from the 'city that works' to the 'city that astonishes.'" This shift shows a big ambition to place Toronto as a competitive city on the global stage. Newly amalgamated city integrated this ambition into its policy and planning documents such as Toronto Competes: An Assessment of Toronto's Global Competitiveness, 2000;

Toronto Economic Development Strategy, 2000; Toronto Official Plan, 2002; Culture Plan for the Creative City, 2003; The Strategies for a Creative City, 2006.

Urban planning had a vital role in enabling Toronto's physical transformation to realize the goals of the competitive city. However, it needed to shift its focus from comprehensive-rational planning to an entrepreneurial and project-oriented planning model. The new Official Plan in 2002 paved the way for the transformation of planning. This radically new kind of plan included powerful strategies favoring development and developers by loosening the existing zoning regime (Cowen, 2004; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008). The new planning regime established a ground for "facilitating reinvestment" by "reducing regulatory weight" (Kipfer and Keil, 2002). Intensive regeneration and open zones for large-scale redevelopment are two of the central components of the plan. According to Kipfer and Keil (2002), the new official plan process, Olympic bid, and waterfront revitalization are three initiatives that helped the planning system change its focus and turn into a new regime. These initiatives were part of Toronto's new vision focused on large-scale development projects (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008).

Neoliberal Transformation of Istanbul

As the largest metropolitan area in Turkey, Istanbul has always been at the top of the national development agenda and promoted as a global city. Central and local governments in Turkey have embraced neoliberal urban policies from the 1980s with an entrepreneurial spirit to trigger urban development and provide economic growth. A turning point in Istanbul's transformation history is the so-called 'Menderes Construction Period' between 1950 and 1960. In this period, some of the historic urban texture of Istanbul has been demolished and replaced apartments. Also, as a result of

this process, large corridors have been opened for vehicle traffic (Ataöv and Osmay, 2007; Dogan and Stupar, 2017). Implementations in this period can be accepted as the first 'urban renewal' experience in Istanbul (Ataöv and Osmay, 2007). The period between 1950 and 1980 is marked by rapid population growth and rapid urbanization in Istanbul. Economic growth and industrialization policies led to rural-urban migration (Ataöv and Osmay, 2007). As a result, urban sprawl raised and informal housing became a reality for Istanbul (Enlil, 2011).

When it comes to the 1980s, neo-liberal policies involving market-based approaches have been influential on the urban regime in Istanbul. The desire for making Istanbul a 'world city' became dominant through national and local strategies more than ever. In this context, Istanbul's new mayor Bedrettin Dalan declared many urban projects marketing the city. These projects included 'the high-rise office buildings, mass housing projects, malls, gated communities, luxury hotels, and new transport networks' (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010). In this period, the legalization of squatter settlements was accelerated, and many single houses were transformed into apartments. Again in this period, Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ) started to construct housing projects to provide new houses in mass housing areas and transform and redevelop squatter areas (Karaman, 2013).

From the 2000s, ambitious visions and programs for Istanbul were declared by city actors to strengthen its position in the competitive global arena. The 'Istanbul International Financial Center Program' was just one of these programs. The Program was initiated in 2009 and defined within "Priority Transformation Programs" of the Tenth National Development Plan of Turkey, approved in 2013. With this program, alongside the formation of a financial sector integrated into global markets, "the aim is

to establish an effectively-audited and transparent market, which can correspond to the needs of the real economy, has a strong physical, technological, and human infrastructure, and in which all kinds of financial instruments can be issued" (10th Development Plan, p.78). The Program's target was that Istanbul would rank among the first 25 in the Global Financial Centers Index.

Over the past twenty years or so, large-scale urban development projects have been accelerated in Istanbul. Most notable among many mega projects in Istanbul is the so-called 'Kanal Istanbul' project announced as a part of the 2011 election campaign. Known as the Second Bosphorus of Istanbul, the project includes a new water canal connecting the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea and residential and office areas. Also, a third airport promoted as the biggest airport in the world was built next to the 'Kanal Istanbul' project area. Looking at the scale of these mega-projects, "it could be seen as an important feature of a new city with growing global aspirations" (Dogan & Stupar, 2017, p. 284).

Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology

In order to analyze the process of integrating neoliberal market-oriented approaches to planning and the resulting complications, the Fikirtepe project from Istanbul and Quayside project from Toronto were selected. These projects, located in two global cities, Toronto and Istanbul, which are the application areas of neoliberal urban policies, were large-scale urban transformation projects. Both projects were planned to transform one of the most valuable areas in Toronto and Istanbul. On the grounds that each project's plans included market-oriented approaches and both projects were canceled, comparative research provides an opportunity to analyze the marketization process of planning and implications of market-based planning methods.

The research was conducted in two stages with a diverse set of methods. The first stage included a literature review of scholarly articles to explore how market-oriented thinking through Neoliberalism penetrates planning systems to operate according to the market rules and which features of marketization are integrated into planning and how they change the content of planning. The review highlights the transformation process of planning through neoliberal market thinking and determines the characteristics of marketized planning.

The second stage involves the documentary analysis and media analysis investigating the marketization process of planning through Fikirtepe and Quayside projects. At this stage, actors' roles and planning frameworks explored market logic and market-

oriented methods integrated into planning. Firstly, I mapped the primary events and players in the process, described their roles and power relationships, defined their interests and strategies, and established a connection between actors' roles and the marketization of planning. While focusing on actors' roles, I also examined the implications of market-oriented approaches for planning. The data I used came from publicly available government documents, academic articles, and media outlets. I reviewed news and articles on the Fikirtepe and Quayside projects through online mass media tools for media analysis. I conducted a content analysis of these documents and media texts.

Secondly, I made a content analysis to explore the marketized planning characteristics of Fikirtepe and Quayside projects and the implication of these characteristics within regulatory planning systems. The analysis included the analysis of plan reports and related planning and policy documents from the City of Toronto, Sidewalk Labs, Waterfront Toronto, Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul, Kadikoy District Municipality, and Ministry of Environment and Urbanization Turkey concerning the formation of the two projects.

As a limitation to my research, the Covid-19 pandemic affected the way I worked. The restrictions and uncertainty caused by the pandemic caused to reduce my expectations for qualitative analysis through interviews and site visits and essentially limited my research to textual analysis and examination of plans.

Chapter 3: The Quayside Project

The Quayside project also referred to as the Sidewalk Toronto project, was the latest mega-project prepared for Toronto, spearheaded by Sidewalk Labs, an urban planning and innovation company owned by Alphabet Inc. that is Google's parent company. Sidewalk Labs put forward a proposal to develop a new 'smart city' on a 77-hectare brownfield plot adjacent to the city's port area, along Toronto's waterfront. The project was launched in 2017 under a partnership between Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto, a local public agency established by the Government of Canada, the Province of Ontario, and the City of Toronto in 2001 to redevelop the city's waterfront.

The process started after Waterfront Toronto issued a Request for Proposal (RFP), "seeking an innovation and funding partner" for the development of the Quayside area on March 17, 2017 (Waterfront Toronto, 2017). Sidewalk Labs responded to the RFP and was selected by Waterfront Toronto after an evaluation process involving several local and international firms. They then signed the initial "Framework Agreement" to develop a more detailed Plan Development Agreement that would define each party's roles and responsibilities. After Waterfront Toronto's board approved a Plan Development Agreement (PDA) with Sidewalk Labs on July 31, 2018, Sidewalk Labs started preparing a plan for the Quayside area. Then, the 1,500-page, 4-volume Master Innovation and Development Plan (MIDP) for Quayside was submitted to Waterfront Toronto by Sidewalk Labs in June 2019.



Figure 1 Quayside Project Location. Source: Sidewalk Labs

However, Sidewalk Labs announced that it was withdrawing from the project in May of 2020, citing “as unprecedented economic uncertainty has set in around the world, and in the Toronto real estate market, it has become too difficult to make the 5-hectare project financially viable without sacrificing core parts of the plan we had developed” (Doctoroff, 2020).

Principal Actors and Their Roles in Quayside

This section aims to understand the structural forces in Quayside’s development process by examining and evaluating the roles of actors, the institutional relations, and surrounding events in the development process of the Quayside project. The objective is to understand how conventional and market-oriented Quayside planning was through the critical events, influential institutions, and principal actors involved in the process. This analysis establishes a connection between the roles of actors and the

process of marketization of planning. In this context, the nature of institutions, their activities, and the effects of their decision-making methods on the planning process, the framework for institutional collaborations and joint decision-making, are examined. The first stage includes the mapping of the events and actors involved in the process, and the second stage includes the identification of roles and power relations, the strategies they followed, and the identification of their interests.

The critical events and actors involved in the Quayside planning process are listed in the table below. The events in the development period and the actors related to all these events are listed in Table 1.

Table 1 - Actors and Events in the Quayside project

Date	Events	Actors
March 2017	Request for Proposals for the Quayside released	Waterfront Toronto (WT)
October 2017	Framework Agreement signed	WT-SL
July 2018	Plan Development Agreement signed	WT-SL
2018	Public Open Houses 1,2,3,4 held	SL
May 2018	Responsible Data Use Policy Framework released	SL
2018	Ontario Auditor General's critical statement in Annual Report released	Auditor General of Ontario
June 2019	Draft Master Innovation and Development Plan (MDIP) published	SL

April 2019	Block Sidewalk, a local coalition, formed to block the project	#BlockSidewalk citizens group
April 2019	A lawsuit against all three levels of government, seeking to cancel the partnership agreement between SL and WT launched	the Canadian Civil Liberties Association
May 2020	Sidewalk Labs' withdrawal from Quayside Project announced	SL

Waterfront Toronto

The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, also known as Waterfront Toronto, is one of the leading actors who played an essential role in the Quayside project. As the initiator of the Quayside project and representative of the public side in the project, Waterfront Toronto (WT) is a quasi-public agency established on behalf of the Government of Canada, the Province of Ontario, and the City of Toronto, to realize urban renewal in the Toronto waterfront area. The agency aims to contribute to economic development and ensure the participation of the private sector in the waterfront development as defined through the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002. Similar to WT, urban development corporations are established in many countries around the world today to unlock the development potential of cities and realize urban regeneration in partnership with the private sector (Raco, 2005). They are defined as “the most brutal instrumental innovations for enforcing neoliberal

agendas” and seen “as a way to privatize urban policy, make the free enterprise spirit the core dynamic of inner cities regeneration, and reduce the role of the public sector and an interfering local state” (Pinson & Morel Journal, 2016). In the case of the Quayside project, WT was an example of this and played an essential role in the marketization process of planning.

The primary role of the WT in the process was to impose market-based thinking and an entrepreneurial spirit on urban development. Considering the objectives defined in the RFP issued by WT in 2017 and the document's language, it is seen that the institution acts as a market actor with an entrepreneurial spirit. The RFP explains the details of the urban regeneration to be achieved in the waterfront area and announces a partner search to perform it. It also lists the objectives of the project as follows: creating a new global market model for urban developments; establishing a complete community that provides diverse living and working spaces; providing a testbed for a smart city project to support Canada's techno-innovation sector's growth and competitiveness in global markets’ and developing a new partnership model ensuring financial feasibility (Waterfront Toronto, 2017). The use of the phrases 'a global market model', 'a testbed for a smart city project', 'growth and competitiveness in global markets', and 'a new partnership model' represent market-based thinking. Other objectives in the RFP, other than ‘establishing a complete community that provides diverse living and working spaces’, reveal the fact that the project is not a ‘plan’ that prioritizes public needs, but rather a real estate development ‘project’. Accordingly, the waterfront area would be used as a testbed for a new smart city model, and if successful, the model would be marketed to other world cities. At this point, while the emphasis was placed on the development of the tech and other relevant sectors in the RFP, it was not clear enough how the project would meet the needs of the city of

Toronto and its residents, other than generating economic gain for some. Another statement that draws attention in the RFP is the expression of 'innovation partner'. Here the use of 'innovation' for a partner who would work for WT was a sign of the new approach to planning in the process to come.

The other role of WT in the process was to strengthen the private sector's hand in urban development while weakening the public sector's hand. Increasing the influence of the private sector in urban development and planning is part of the marketization process of planning, as explained in the literature section. WT did this by partnering with the private firm Sidewalk Labs (SL) and giving it the responsibility to prepare a plan for Quayside through a Plan Development Agreement. However, it should be noted that WT does not have the authority to plan in Quayside. According to the Planning Act, the City of Toronto has the authority to conduct the planning and zoning of lands. At this point, although WT is an urban development corporation, it differs from its counterparts elsewhere in the world in terms of its power and authority. Unlike other urban development corporations, which are equipped with superior power and authority to ensure urban development, WT's power and authority are very limited (Flynn & Valverde, 2019). So, in the Quayside project, the criticism has been made that WT has signed an agreement with SL to plan Quayside even though it has not had authority to make a plan itself. It has even been stated that SL's plan did not have the status of an official plan (Goodman & Powles, 2019; Flynn & Valverde, 2019).

SL stood out and was more influential and effective than other involved institutions, and WT played an essential role in this. In the process, WT's choices, such as giving SL the responsibility of preparing the plan; taking a passive role in the preparation of the plan; leaving to SL the organization of the town hall meetings and public round tables,

where the draft plan was presented to the public and their opinions were received; leaving the public-policy making on data governance to SL, are indicators of how WT contributed to increasing the influence of the private sector in urban development and to strengthening the market-oriented thinking. On the other hand, all these steps listed above initiated a civic discourse around the project from the very beginning, and WT received severe reactions from the public. Many Torontonians concerned about the leadership of the SL in the project and saw the process as the privatization of public services. There were over 200 critical articles on the Quayside project published between April 2019-May 2020 (Blocksidewalk, 2020). In one of these articles, Bianca Wylie (2020) stated that "Part of what made Sidewalk Toronto so problematic, from a governance perspective, was the power it threatened to hand over to Sidewalk Labs to lay out the infrastructure design of a large swathe of public and private space".

On the other hand, the Quayside process shows that WT was also effective in weakening the public sector and strengthening the private sector with its 'fast' and 'secret' business making style. Urban development corporations are known for their lack of public accountability and transparency, and they can do things without public scrutiny (Tondro, 2010). WT is an example of this. As Goodman and Powles (2019, p. 458) point out, "for the crucial first eighteen months of the venture, many of the most consequential features of the Sidewalk Toronto project were hidden from view and unavailable for serious scrutiny". The question marks in the project start from the beginning in the establishment of the relationship between WT and SL and the signing of agreements. The fact that the communication and data exchange between WT and SL started before the release of the RFP raised questions in public opinion (Morgan & Webb, 2020). According to Ontario's provincial auditor, WT did not receive consultation from other public institutions before the agreement and did not give

enough time to the Board of Waterfront Toronto to review the Framework Agreement (OAG, 2018). Another issue is that in 2017, WT published only a summary of the Framework Agreement and did not make the original document available to the public (Rider, 2018). In addition, expanding the project area to 77 hectares, which was declared as 4.9 hectares in the initial agreement, after 16 months increased doubts about what exactly WT was planning to do in the waterfront area.

Many other questions have been raised about the smart city concept, which became part of a comprehensive planning process for the first time in Toronto. As the details of the project emerged in the documents published by SL months later, question marks increased. The Quayside plan, called the Master Innovation & Development Plan, was published by SL in 2019, and it caused much more confusion than providing answers to the questions that had been raised. Spread over four volumes (The Overview, The Plans, The Urban Innovations, and The Partnership) and more than 1,500 pages, the plan was difficult to digest by the public. Upon this, WT published a document, 'Note to Reader', to help the public understand the contents of the plan report. Question topics included data collection, data control, privacy, competition, procurement, the use of public space, privatized services, land ownership, and infrastructure ownership (Goodman & Powles, 2019, p.458). Some of the questions included "should a private tech giant be designing cities?" (Buntin, 2019) , "What is Google's role in this project?" (Sidewalk Labs, 2019a), "Does this plan supersede the existing precinct plans or waterfront planning frameworks?" (Sidewalk Labs, 2019a), "How far will the Sidewalk stretch?" (Toronto Star, 2019).

From another point of view, WT strengthened the hand of SL by exceeding its powers and entering an area without previous experience. Prior to Quayside, WT proposed

comparatively small-scale projects, which were consistent with the Official Plan and secondary plans prepared by the City of Toronto. They were usually condo projects, park development, or facilities to improve the area. However, the Quayside project had the vision to be a world-class city-building model designed with complex technical components and cutting edge technology. A project of this scale requires comprehensive planning, and the City of Toronto has the authority to prepare this kind of plan. Another issue is that WT, which has no experience in issues such as "smart cities", data collection, sensors, and digital economy policies " (Flynn & Valverde, 2019) and which was technically overstepping its capability, set up a partnership with a world technology giant like Google and fell behind SL in terms of financial and technical capacity. As Flynn and Valverde (2019, p. 770) emphasize, "WT is not equipped to pursue entrepreneurial projects". Thus, WT's lack of capacity to develop a comprehensive plan integrated with high technology strengthened the SL's hand to take the control.

Sidewalk Labs

Sidewalk Labs, an urban planning and innovation company of Alphabet Inc. and sister to Google LLC, was the winning bidder to develop Quayside on the eastern Toronto waterfront in partnership with WT. SL's intended implementation of the Quayside project was a prime example of "the insertion or installation of markets as the underlying institution or mechanism for organizing society," which is conceived as Neoliberalism (Birch & Siemiatycki, 2016). As a Google affiliate company, SL's active involvement in the redevelopment process of Quayside highlights a dramatic increase in corporate power and participation of the private sector in the delivery of services, and especially in urban development and planning in Toronto. In the bigger picture, this involvement represents the desire for "a neoliberal, market-driven land use,

speculation, and investment” on the Toronto waterfront (Carr & Hesse, 2020). The company was given the unique role of developing a leading city-building model in one of the most crucial land pieces of Toronto with the goal of relocating Toronto within the hierarchy of global cities. SL’s role was unique because it was the first time a world leader company in digital infrastructure prepared a city plan in Toronto even though the company has never developed and drawn up a city plan before (Haggart & Tusikov, 2020).

How did SL contribute to the marketization of planning in Toronto through Quayside? SL played an essential role in the marketization process of the planning in Toronto by integrating market values and market logic into the existing planning system, weakening some of the public values, and attempting to make public policy. SL’s power for doing these things was coming from its strong position and roles in the project. Considering its multiple roles in the project, SL was more than a developer for Quayside. While WT defined its partner as an ‘innovation and funding partner’ in the RFP, the roles SL envisioned for itself were “planning partner; real estate research and development; real estate economic development catalyst; infrastructure financing; horizontal development partner; advanced infrastructure facilitator; technology deployment; investments in economic development, and value sharing” (Robinson & Coutts, 2019, p.339). Positioning itself as a key player with all of these roles, SL occupied a hegemonic position in design, and projected implementation, operations, and maintenance of the Quayside smart city.

First, SL integrated market logic into the planning through its business model. In the MIDP, SL planned a ‘digital layer’ in addition to the physical layer to collect data from neighborhoods via sensors, lights, and cameras. According to the Plan, the digital

system would monitor and measure every interaction in the project area and define what is needed most based on the use and preferences. Decision-making on the type of facilities, road network, and land uses in the project area would be based on the data collected from the area. Therefore, planning at Quayside would be a continuous and demand-based process. This demand-based method is widely used by market actors and called 'market orientation.' The concept is defined as "organization-wide information generation and dissemination and appropriate response related to current and future customer needs and preferences" (Walker et al., 2011, p.707). In contrast, a conventional plan designates land uses based on the legal standards defined in the relevant regulation.

Second, SL prioritized 'profitability' as a market value in its market model. 'Data', one of the most profitable commodities in today's world, was vital in SL's sophisticated technology-based and data-driven model at Quayside. SL had a dominant position in data collection and governance, and there was no limit on data collection and use. Given that SL is sister to Google, a world leader in technology innovation and data governance, what could be done with this 'data' was far beyond this project. De Carlo et al. (2020, p. 5) explain this as "everything and everyone in the zone was to become the 'subject' of a mega-data stream of behavioural, personal, technical and facility information, collected by thousands of cameras and sensors and managed by a new Urban Data Trust that would make the data available to Google and others to mine, manipulate and profit from."

Another point was that SL would have ownership of any 'intellectual property' generated through the project and gain revenues from Intellectual Property and Data Ownership (De Carlo et al, 2020). However, SL's data-based business model stirred a

civic discourse and caused criticism from the public regarding data collection, data control, privacy, and how it might be used. Questions such as “Is Sidewalk Labs, and this project, intended to be a data source for Google?” and concerns such as “data monetization is a key part of Sidewalk Labs’ business model” (Sidewalk Labs, 2018) forced SL to explain its model to the public. To address a range of concerns and questions, SL proposed a framework for digital governance in Quayside called ‘Civic Data Trust’. However, it did not help clarify things for the public but caused more confusion and brought more questions (Morgan & Webb, 2020).

SL’s ‘Civic Data Trust’, a proposal for digital governance was an example of the privatization of public policy. SL, a private company, made public policy and set digital infrastructure and smart city building standards. By defining new terms, SL created new regulations on data governance without having policymaking authority. For instance, in its proposal, SL defined a new term called ‘urban data’, “information gathered in the city’s physical environment, including the public realm, publicly accessible spaces, and even some private buildings” (Sidewalk Labs, 2019b, p. 94). However, “urban data is unrecognized in Canadian law” (Tusikov, 2019). Another thing about the proposal was that the project developer was defining how to manage the project for itself (Tusikov, 2019). There were already concerns about the project, and new policymaking provoked another discussion about the project, leading to the question: “why is a vendor making policy?” (Goodman and Powles, 2019).

The third point about the SL’s role in the marketization process of the planning in Toronto was the weakening of some of the public values through the Quayside process. SL’s participation in Quayside reveals “how marketisation has challenged the public content of policy, undermining the legitimacy of public values language

“(Warner & Clifton, 2014). First of all, SL prioritized profit-making strategies in its business model at the expense of the public interest (Carr & Hesse, 2020). Prioritization of profitability in public works is usually seen as unethical and not compatible with the public content of the urban policy as there is a notion that the public sector should prioritize public interest and need. #Blocksidewalk, a citizen group formed to block the Quayside project, explained their concern regarding the public interest as “Development should prioritize city needs first, not the needs and interests of a private corporation” (Blocksidewalk, 2019). Secondly, SL neglected ‘responsiveness’, ‘transparency’, and ‘accountability’, essential values for the public sector. ‘Accountability’ is the most important value for the public sector, while it is the less important for the private sector (Van der Wal, De Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008), which was the case in SL’s Quayside.

SL was unwilling to justify and explain its actions to the public and even the other parties in the project. As Goodman and Powles (2019, p. 466) state, “at every stage, ambiguity, secrecy, and slipperiness have dogged the Sidewalk Toronto project”. SL’s actions that undermined the public sector values in the Quayside project can be listed as meeting with WT long before the agreement; ignoring councilors and city staff when organizing public meetings and preparing the MIDP; extending the project’s borders, and proposing new developments publicly unknown; not providing enough information on data collection and privacy; and publishing the 1500-page draft plan without an executive summary, which made the plan challenging to digest by the public. All these issues above led to severe criticism against SL and WT and questionings about democracy in the planning. Valverde (2018) sees SL’s plan as “a radical departure from the principles that have guided city planning in Canada since citizen participation and accountability came to the fore in the era of Jane Jacobs, a

renowned Canadian-American urban planner.” When these issues were happening, there were four resignations of high-profile advisors from Waterfront Toronto’s and Sidewalk Labs’ advisory board over data privacy and lack of public input concerns (Fussell, 2018).

The City of Toronto

The City of Toronto, which has the authority to make plans in Toronto by provincial mandate and under provincial supervision, did not actively participate in the plan preparation process in the Quayside project but instead played a role as a facilitator and supervisor. The passive role of the City in planning and policy-making processes, which are the Municipality's responsibility, contributed to the increase of the influence of the private sector in the planning.

In the Quayside project, things were complicated in terms of the City's involvement in the planning process. While SL was preparing the plan, how much and how the City provided input for the MIDP is not apparent. At the beginning of the project there was already uncertainty about the role of the City. This was visible through a city staff report on the Quayside project (The City of Toronto, 2017) stating that “the scope of City staff involvement in this project not yet known” and “the City will maintain influence of the project through plan making and planning approvals process.” Also, on the City’s official website, some of the statements regarding the City’s role in the Quayside were explaining as follows (The City of Toronto, 2021a):

- The City of Toronto is not a party to the Plan Development Agreement (PDA) between Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs.
- City staff provide preliminary comments on work in progress...

- The roles and responsibilities of the City, ... in revitalizing the East Bayfront and the Port Lands are defined in a Memorandum of Understanding approved by City Council in 2006.

However, there was no detail on the form, content, and size of the City's influence on the planning process in the formal documents published by relevant institutions and stakeholders.

The only noticeable thing about the City's role was that the City has the responsibility for the review and approval of the MDIP (The City of Toronto, 2017). The City staff, together with Provincial and Federal governments staff, attended the meetings with SL and provided feedback for SL's proposals, ensuring they have consistency with the applicable government legislation and regulation, existing planning framework, and City priorities (The City of Toronto, 2019). The meetings have been "high level discussions based only on limited information, for the purpose of understanding, without prejudice, the proposals relative to applicable government legislation and regulation, City plans, policies and by-laws" (The City of Toronto, 2019).

In addition to taking a passive role in the Quayside planning preparation process, the City also had a passive role in the policy-making process on data infrastructure and governance for a smart city at the beginning. After SL made the MIDP public, the concerns over data collection and privacy issues were raised, and the company faced considerable criticism (Tusikov, 2019). To address these concerns, SL released its proposal for digital governance called 'Civic Data Trust' in October 2018. However, it made the situation more complicated than before. In response to the controversy generated by Sidewalk Labs, the City started to develop a policy framework for digital

infrastructure called “Digital Infrastructure Plan” in February 2019 (The City of Toronto, 2021b).

#Blocksidewalk

One of the most important actors in the public debate about the Quayside project was #Blocksidewalk, a citizens group launched to fight the project. The group, the largest local movement opposing the project, started the campaign in 2019 with 30 Torontonians, and then over 1000 Torontonians joined the group (Blocksidewalk, 2019a). The process that led to the formation of the group goes back to the beginning of the project. As mentioned in the ‘Principal Actors and Their Roles in Quayside’ Section, several issues led to public reactions in the planning process of Quayside. Among them were “ambiguity, secrecy, and slipperiness” (Goodman and Powles, 2019); and “data privacy and use, intellectual property, and data ownership” (De Carlo et al, 2020). Robinson and Coutts (2019) explain some of the issues raised from public critics of the project as “how the year-long stakeholder consultation process has taken place, how and when key project details have been shared, the evolving and relationship between Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs, and data privacy and ownership.”

Thus, the public's resistance towards the project was a one-year wave of resistance before the #Blocksidewalk was launched. The turning point for the #Blocksidewalk founders was that the Toronto Star reported on leaked documents indicating the change in the scope and scale of SL’s plans (Coletta, 2019). According to the leaked documents, SL was considering the extension of the project borders to a larger portion of the waterfront, proposing a new rail infrastructure and a Google development on the Port Lands; and also, was “looking for a share of the property taxes, development

fees, and increased value of the land” (Kirkwood, 2019). After the leaked documents were made public, the #BlockSidewalk campaign was formed, citing “a misleading, undemocratic engagement process that harms the public interest” and “the overwhelming lack of transparency and accountability with the project” (Blocksidewalk, 2019b). The group called on Waterfront Toronto to cancel the project and turn down a business deal with SL.

The #Blocksidewalk group held press conferences at Toronto City Hall and published several media releases, including updates about the project and their actions. The primary concerns of the public from this period that #Blocksidewalk mentioned in their meetings and documents were “data governance, the problems of “rogue capitalism” as inspired by Zuboff (2019), lack of transparency, trust, scale, political economic disparity, tax avoidance, housing affordability, spatial planning, labour market, public services, and economic nationalism” (Carr & Hesse, 2020, p.76).

#Blocksidewalk acted as a vocal opponent of the Quayside project. It was formed as a result of the response of Toronto residents who thought that they were not included in the project enough, worried about the future of their city, and could not get adequate answers to their mounting questions. Concerned residents were looking at other options; as Bianca Wylie, a lead organizer of the #BlockSidewalk campaign, said, “There needs to be the option to say no” (Zarum, 2019). It is not wrong to say that all these reactions from the public were not only towards the Quayside project but also towards the marketization of existing planning in Toronto, which can be seen through the campaign values of the #Blocksidewalk as follows (Blocksidewalk, 2019a):

- Urban planning is something that happens between Torontonians and the City, focused on the public interest.

- Development should benefit the people of Toronto and should respond to the needs of Torontonians as expressed by Torontonians.
- Development should prioritize city needs first, not the needs and interests of a private corporation.

Changing Structure of Planning

The MIDP

The Master Innovation and Development Plan, the MIDP, was a development plan prepared by SL to revitalize Toronto's eastern waterfront, 77-hectare IDEA District (Figure 2). The IDEA District consisted of two phases: Quayside, a five-hectare neighborhood as the first phase, and the River District, a 62-hectare area made up of five neighborhoods as the second phase. The MIDP contained a development plan for the Quayside and a concept plan for the River District. The plan set up a vision for the Quayside as well as the neighboring River district based on the integration of physical, digital, and policy innovations to produce dramatic improvements in quality of life and generate significant economic opportunity. Blending work, home, and play, the project was intended to create mixed-use development consisting primarily of new residential units, as well as retail, office spaces, and a variety of amenities (Sidewalk Labs, 2019c).



Figure 2 - The IDEA District. Source: Sidewalk Labs

The plan embraced the smart city philosophy, which Mattern (2017) defines as “transforming the idealized topology of the open web and Internet of Things into urban form”. According to the plan vision, Quayside would be a new type of place, “the world’s first neighborhood built from the internet up,” and “Quayside will feel like no other neighborhood in Toronto – or, indeed, the world.” (Sidewalk Labs, 2017, p.15). The plan strengthened this vision with a new approach for Quayside that “sees cities as platforms for urban innovation that create the conditions for people to build, test, and refine new ideas” (Sidewalk Labs, 2017, p.12). Urban innovations were the essential parts of the Quayside project, and the plan envisioned the physical and digital layers to realize urban innovations. The digital layer was designed to collect the information (Figure 3). A network of sensors and other connected technology at the digital layer would collect real-time data about the infrastructure, buildings, and shared resources

in the public realm. After collection and analysis phases, fine-grained data would feed the digital model, a component of the project created to support city operations and inform long-term planning decisions (Sidewalk Labs, 2017). The model would also allow application developers to access location-based data sets to create new apps to improve public service efficiency.




Figure 3 - The City as Platform. Source: Sidewalk Labs

The PDA defines the MIDP as a ‘development plan,’ and development plans have no definition and legal status under the Planning Act. It was a project-specific development application. The first phase of the MIDP, the Quayside Development Plan, would be a ‘development proposal’ and be subject to the City’s development review process after the approval of the Board of Directors of both Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs. Development proposals are prepared when landowners want to use, alter or develop their property in a way that deviates from the Official Plan or the Zoning By-law (The City of Toronto, 2021c). Then they must apply for a site-specific Official Plan Amendment, Zoning By-law Amendment, or combined application.

According to the planning hierarchy in Ontario (Figure 4), a development plan, or 'the review of development applications,' is defined within the 'Project-Specific' category as "the final stage of the municipal planning process" (The Simcoe Muskoka, 2019). It must be consistent with planning documents that come before it, such as the Provincial Policy Statement and the Official Plan. Thus, a development plan is a low-level planning document in the Ontario planning structure. In a hierarchic planning system, plans are classified according to their scales, scopes, function, and authority. There is grading from general to specific in this classification, from top to bottom, from abstract to concrete, from comprehensive to detail. Moving down through the hierarchy, the geographic scope is narrowed to the particular parcel of land. Moreover, plan vision is developed based on the geographical scale of the planning area as planning decisions are expected to be effective mainly for the planning site.

As for the River District Concept Plan, the MIDP anticipated creating Community Planning Permit By-laws. The Central Waterfront Secondary Plan identifies the Central Waterfront as a 'Development Permit System Area,' now referred to as a Community Planning Permit System (CPPS). The CPPS is "a discretionary land use planning tool that combines zoning, site plan, and minor variance processes into one application and approval process" (The Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2018). The Official Plan explains the CPPS as a "proactive planning mechanism that could be applied in a wide variety of conditions around the City, to facilitate development and effectively achieve city-building objectives" (pg. 5-12).

The project site was subject to a multi-layered planning policy structure, including an official plan, secondary plans, planning frameworks, precinct plans, and zoning by-

laws. The MIDP was prepared consistent with these planning policy frameworks for the Central Waterfront (Sidewalk Labs, 2019d). The Official Plan for the City of Toronto designates Quayside and the River District with three land use designations: Natural Areas, Parks, and Regeneration Areas. According to the Official Plan, Regeneration Areas are “key to the Plan’s growth strategy, reintegrating areas of the City that are no longer in productive urban use due to shifts in the local or global economies” (pg. 4-18). Being consistent with the Official Plan, the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan also designates the project area as Regeneration Areas and Parks and Open Space Areas. In addition, the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan designates the Central Waterfront as a ‘Development Permit System Area,’ now known as CPPS as per the definition above.

Marketized Planning Characteristics of the MIDP

The Quayside planning process differs from traditional planning at some points and shows marketized planning features. First of all, although the plan is a development proposal that comes after the official plan and secondary plan in the Ontario provincial and municipal planning hierarchy and does not have a legal plan status, it has been developed with a high-level plan vision and a comprehensive planning approach. In this way, it eliminated the existing plan hierarchy by overriding it. Secondly, the MIDP was an example of the marketized plan that employed ‘innovative market-oriented planning instruments’ such as the ‘Development Permit System.’ Third, the plan adapted a flexible land-use approach and demand-based system called ‘outcome-based code’, shifting the certainty feature of traditional planning towards flexibility. In addition, with this flexible approach, the plan was no longer a finished product. Planning is designed as a flexible and continuous process. Also, the plan went beyond

the existing planning system by creating an autonomous region with separate planning rules with the new flexible zoning model.

Setting an internationally important vision for the Quayside area, the MIDP went beyond a development proposal. Strengthening Toronto's place among world cities and establishing 'a globally significant community' along the eastern waterfront (Sidewalk Labs, 2019c) were the goals of the MIDP. WT states that "a primary objective of waterfront revitalization is to deliver key economic and social benefits that enable Toronto to compete effectively with other top-tier global cities for investment, jobs, and talent" (2017, p.9). Also, one of the ambitious motivations for Quayside was to "create a globally significant demonstration project that advances a new market model for climate-positive urban developments" (Waterfront Toronto, 2017). WT predicted that the project would be a pilot project and be a model for global cities. The plan promoted the Quayside site as a new type of place saying that "Quayside will feel like no other neighborhood in Toronto – or, indeed, the world." (Sidewalk Labs, 2017). Toronto Mayor John Tory showed his enthusiasm for the project, saying, "By having Sidewalk interested in coming here, we're building up our credentials as the place to be in the world" (Bozikovic, 2017).

An essential step in the MIDP that could potentially contribute to the marketization of existing planning in Toronto was the creation of the 'Development Permit System (DPS).' The regulation for Development Permits (Ontario Regulation 608/06) came into effect in 2007 to provide greater flexibility in the development processes by municipalities. It is described as "a discretionary land use planning tool" and "an innovative planning tool" (The Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2018). Combining zoning, site plan, and minor variance processes into one application and approval process,

DPSs facilitate developments and accelerate the approval process. Using this system for the River District, the MIDP was helping to provide more room for flexibility and discretion in the existing planning and make it more marketized. As explained in the Literature Review, "innovative market-oriented planning instruments" such as DPS hybridize conventional planning systems by adding flexibility and discretion to planning.

As a development plan for the particular parcels in the eastern waterfront, the MIDP set up a vision that would be influential not only in the planning area but also in Toronto and even in the world cities. The plan envisioned Toronto as "a living laboratory of global significance," "a global example for climate-positive living," and "the global hub for urban innovation" (Sidewalk Labs, 2017). Furthermore, SL imagined that this revitalization project could help position "Toronto and Canada as a world leader in urban innovation, and delivering step-change improvements in quality of life" (Sidewalk Labs, 2017, pg.20). In this sense, SL was not proposing a development for Quayside but rather a comprehensive plan that would affect the whole city.




Figure 4 -The Planning Hierarchy in Ontario. Source: (The Simcoe Muskoka, 2019)

Contrary to the 'certainty' characteristic of conventional planning, the MIDP had 'flexibility' in its framework. Establishing a flexible land use and demand-based system, the Quayside adapted a more flexible planning approach. Defining Quayside as 'a living laboratory for urban innovation', the plan embraced a built-in flexibility approach for Quayside, which would use the physical layer as an open-to-change system. This adaptable system would enable "flexible buildings, people-first streets, a versatile public realm, and open utility infrastructure" (Sidewalk Labs, 2017) to create in the project area. SL's activity-based model would "inform and explore a wide range of policy options including in the areas of roadway pricing, ride sharing, zoning and land use, and incentives to conserve water and energy" (Sidewalk Labs, 2017, p. 74). Based on the data collected from the project site, an automated decision-making system, also referred to as an "outcome-based" system in the plan, would define which land uses, facilities, and road networks would be efficient at Quayside. Furthermore, land use

designations would be flexible and changed when the needs and demands of the residents change.

Buildings within the project site would be “highly flexible spaces that can quickly adapt to new uses, from residential to commercial to light manufacturing” (Sidewalk Labs, 2019e). This ‘mix of uses’ approach is called ‘outcome-based code’ defined in the MIDP, allowing a broader range of uses to coexist within built areas. SL identified a “use-neutral” code category combining nine code categories into a single category, such as restaurants, single dwelling units, mercantile/ retail uses, and low-hazard industrial uses (Sidewalk Labs, 2019f). Therefore, any built space with a “use-neutral” designation in the project site could have all of these nine uses simultaneously without getting permission or doing any Zoning amendment.

What are the implications of this new flexible zoning approach for the existing planning system? First, as opposed to the conventional plan-making way, the decision-making system in the MIDP was dynamic and demand-based, and planning was proposed to be a continuous process. A planning scheme is created in the conventional planning system to provide certainty and show the ultimate picture of urban development in a project site, even though the system allows plan amendments when required. However, it was completely different with Quayside. Land uses and zoning were subject to change when demands change. It was difficult to predict what Quayside would look like in the future, and what the physical characteristics of the neighborhoods in the eastern waterfront regarding land uses would be.

Second, the MIDP created a new zoning mechanism, ‘outcome-based code’ as mentioned above. It was a ‘multiple-use zoning’ system versus existing ‘single-use

zoning'. While the Official Plan of Toronto allows commercial, residential and institutional uses within the mixed-use areas, the MIDP would allow residential, commercial, and light industrial alike within the 'use-neutral' areas at the IDEA district. SL proposed this multiple-use building code "as an alternative to traditional regulation" with the belief that cities will use outcome-based code to govern the built environment in the future (Sidewalk Labs, 2017, p. 120). SL was criticizing the existing zoning and building ordinances that "static regulations often result in low-quality, single-use neighborhoods that reward obsolete approaches and penalize innovation" (Sidewalk Labs, 2017, p. 120). Also, SL stated that "This approach of "single-use zoning" made sense in a world without reliable tools to monitor the environmental nuisances of commerce and industry" (Sidewalk Labs, 2019 f, p.251).

Third, the MIDP proposed an autonomous urban area in Toronto with separate planning rules with this flexible and outcome-based system. Toronto's eastern waterfront would be directed by new planning rules, different from the rest of the city.

Chapter 4: The Fikirtepe Project

Fikirtepe was a large-scale urban regeneration project planned in Kadikoy, one of Istanbul's most important central business districts. The project site, known as Fikirtepe, was 131 hectares and the population was 47,655 before the plan approval (MMI, 2011). Populated by migrants since the 1950s, the neighborhood in the Kadikoy district became a squatter settlement over the years. Without any city plan, the area turned into a place where urban problems reached their peak by the 2000s. Although Fikirtepe has had urban problems, it was still attractive for some developers due to its central location in Istanbul and its proximity to the Istanbul Financial Center Project area. In 2005, the Fikirtepe neighborhood was declared as a “Special Project Area” by the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul (MMI) in the master development plan based on the urban problems such as existing building stock in the poor physical condition and the threat of earthquakes (MMI, 2011).



Figure 5-The location of Fikirtepe Source: (MMI,2011)



Figure 6- Fikirtepe before and after the project started Source: (Akgungor,2017)

It is possible to divide the planning process of the Fikirtepe region into three parts. In 2011, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality prepared the implementation plan in the area and approved it. However, this plan was canceled with a court decision on the grounds that 'it was contrary to the principles of the Turkish regulatory planning system and Reconstruction Law No. 3194, and it was not consistent with the higher-level plans' (Türk et al., 2020). This time, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization prepared an implementation plan and approved it in 2013. The Ministry made plan amendments several times over the years. However, this plan was also canceled in 2019 with a court decision on the grounds that 'there was lack of facility areas in the plan, it was against the planning regulation and urban planning principles, the plan was not prepared in the way that balance conservation and development; and was not protecting the public interest' (Kulcanay, 2019). In this study, I analyzed the Fikirtepe plan (Figure prepared

by the IMM in 2011 for the first time, canceled in 2013 by a court decision, re-approved by the Ministry with minor changes in 2013 and cancelled again in 2019 by a court decision.

The Fikirtepe Plan approved in 2011 was prepared to develop the area economically and socially, to ensure its integration with the city, and define the transformation strategies specific to the region. It also aimed to increase the quality of urban life in the neighborhood by providing more facility areas and public spaces. In addition, it envisioned strengthening the building stock in the planning area against all disasters, especially earthquakes (MMI, 2011). In one of his public speeches, Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş promoted the Fikirtepe project as part of the development process of Istanbul as a world city. He said that "Istanbul is developing. Every part of Istanbul deserves this. Istanbul was ranked first among 150 cities in the world in terms of its developing economy and employment growth" (Tek Borsa, 2011).

Principal Actors and Their Roles in Fikirtepe

This section investigates the marketization process of the planning in Fikirtepe through the roles of actors, the institutional relations, and surrounding events in the development process of the project. The objective is to understand how conventional and market-oriented Fikirtepe planning was through the critical events, influential institutions, and principal actors involved in the process. This analysis establishes a connection between the roles of actors and the process of marketization of planning. In this context, the nature of institutions, their activities, and the effects of their decision-making methods on the planning process, the framework for institutional collaborations and joint decision-making, are examined. The first stage includes the mapping of the events and actors involved in the process, and the second stage

includes the identification of roles and power relations, the strategies they followed, and the identification of their interests.

The critical events and actors involved in the Fikirtepe planning process are listed in the table below. The events in the development period and the actors related to all these events are listed in Table 2.

Table 2 - Actors and Events in the Fikirtepe project

Date	Events	Actors
March 2005	Fikirtepe announced as 'a special project area'	Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul
February 2011	Fikirtepe Plan approved	Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul
2011	A lawsuit seeking to cancel the plan launched	The Chamber of City Planners, The Chamber of Civil Engineers , The Chamber of Architects
February 2013	Fikirtepe Plan cancelled with a court decision	The Chamber of City Planners, The Chamber of Civil Engineers , The Chamber of Architects
May 2013	Fikirtepe announced as 'a risky area'	Ministry of Environment and Urbanization
August 2013	New Fikirtepe Plan approved	Ministry of Environment and Urbanization
July 2019	New Fikirtepe Plan cancelled with a court decision	The Chamber of City Planners, The Chamber of Civil Engineers , The Chamber of Architects

The Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul

MMI is the most important actor from the public sector in the Fikirtepe project. Having the planning authority in Fikirtepe, MMI declared the region as 'a special project area' in 2005 and started planning studies in 2008. The complexity of the urban problems in

the field developed without a city plan over the years has made a planning study difficult. MMI has prepared the Fikirtepe plan and approved it in 2011 to solve the problems in the region, such as the poor quality building stock, bad environmental conditions resulted from unplanned development, lack of social and technical facilities, and ownership problems (MMI, 2011).

MMI was influential in the marketization the planning process in Fikirtepe integrating market-based thinking and an entrepreneurial spirit into urban development. Specifically, with the Fikirtepe plan, MMI strengthened the role of the private sector in urban development and planning in Istanbul and transformed the existing planning system by including marketized planning characteristics in the plan. MMI's three ways of empowering the private sector in urban development and integrating market logic into the plan were the new planning methods, special development rights, and flexible facilities.

MMI empowered the private sector in urban development through the new planning methods provided through the plan. In order to ensure rapid urban transformation and facilitate the operation, the plan provided several options to transform the parcels in the area. In the plan, MMI proposed a system that allowed the transformation of a single parcel in addition to the transformation of larger building plots defined through the plan. This was a new method in urban transformation, which was not defined through Turkish planning regulations (Gursoy, 2015). The landowners would benefit from the special development rights that would increase once they reached a consensus with their neighbors to merge their parcels. The maximum development right would be given to the big building plots defined in the plan consisting of hundreds of parcels. Besides, a single parcel owner could apply on his own. In this

case, however, the owner would have the lowest development right. In other words, landowners who could combine their plots with other plots would have the most advantage. In order to do this, organizers were needed to bring the landowners together. In the Fikirtepe transformation process, although the MMI prepared and approved the plan, it did not take an active role in the implementation phase and left the management and organization role to the private sector (Kuyucu, 2018). MMI has directed the landowners to take action and realize their projects in agreement with the private sector. This approach of the MMI to not take part in the implementation phase has led the private sector to step in and strengthen its hand.

The other way MMI empowered the private sector in urban development and integrated market logic into the existing planning system was the special development rights provided through the Fikirtepe plan. In the Kadikoy district where Fikirtepe is located, the maximum floor area ratio (FAR) was 2.07 to limit land-use intensity before the Fikirtepe plan. However, MMI proposed a maximum FAR of 4.14 for the Fikirtepe area in the new plan. This FAR of 4.14 was unexpectedly high in the Kadikoy district, where development rights had been kept steady at 2.07 since the first plans were created to control the amount of development. Furthermore, similar to the Quayside project, MMI created an autonomous region in the Fikirtepe with special development rights, which is two times higher than the maximum FAR allowed in the other parts of the Kadikoy district. The municipality's explanation for this very high FAR was that they were aiming to create an economic value to attract the developers and trigger the urban regeneration in the area where diverse urban problems were affecting the quality of urban life negatively in Fikirtepe.

It should be emphasized that the Fikirtepe plan encouraged landowners to act with a 'market logic'. In his speech on February 1, 2011, Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş said: "I believe that these development rights that we have provided here have doubled real estate values. But it will multiply by 4, 5 times" (Eyidogan, 2021). While such statements raised the income expectation of the people in the area, they also intensified the bargaining between developers and landowners. Fikirtepe residents, who previously approached the transformation process suspiciously and waited for a while, became seekers for 'the most profitable option' for their land's development as they learned about the offers of different companies. The residents of Fikirtepe, predominantly low-income families, started to be called 'millionaires' in the mass media (Uzunçarşılı, 2014).

The effect of special development rights was huge on the landowners in Fikirtepe. They forgot the emergency of the situation that their houses were in a poor physical condition and started to seek the most profitable proposal from developers. A Fikirtepe resident, who learned that one of his flats' value would be \$597,000 after the project would be completed, stated in the local press that he was not satisfied with the sale by commenting, "There are places with buyers up to \$1,791,000, ours was sold at this price, it was less" (Milliyet, 2014). Another example is that a parcel owner in the area has not agreed on combining his parcel with others even though all other parcel owners in the same building lot have agreed to combine their parcels. While all houses in this lot were demolished, the building of the landowner who did not make a deal, remained in the middle of the building lot alone for five years and referred to as 'symbol of the urban regeneration in Fikirtepe' (Figure 6). This landowner, who caused to stop the urban transformation process, was finally persuaded by a developer with a good deal (Alagöz, 2014).



Figure 7- Symbol of the urban regeneration in Fikirtepe Source : (Alagöz, 2014)

The third way MMI integrated market logic into the existing planning system was the flexible facilities in the planning area. The plan did not include new facility areas, which was against the Turkish planning regulation. According to the Turkish planning system, it is obligatory to show all social and technical equipment areas in an implementation plan. Instead, in the Fikirtepe, facility areas would be planned after the parcels were merged and urban design projects were approved by the Municipality (MMI, 2011). The facility areas' location, type, and size were flexible, and developers could propose any facility area with their urban design project. However, this situation created chaos as it was the first of its kind. After the approval of the Fikirtepe plan, MMI prepared a 'key map' showing the types and locations of the facility areas to eliminate confusion. However, there was no formal definition of the 'key map' in the planning regulation. All of these steps, creating flexible facilities and keymap, were done by the Municipality to facilitate the process, but, at the same time, they integrated flexibility into the existing planning system, which is one of the marketized planning features. In this way, the

principle of 'certainty' in the regulatory planning system has been shifted towards flexibility and discretion (Tarakçı & Türk, 2018). However, this flexibility for the facility areas led to a lawsuit and cancellation of the plan in the later period.

Developers

Turkey's largest real estate companies such as Teknik Yapi and Eksioglu took an active role in the implementation phase of the Fikirtepe plan. In the beginning, 20 companies started constructions in the area, but this number has changed over time. Although MMI took an active role in the planning process, it has left the management and organization to the private sector in the implementation process (Türk et al., 2020). This has contributed to the strengthening of the private sector in urban development in Istanbul. The private sector has produced partial solutions to the urban problems in the area by acting with the principle of 'effective' working in the Fikirtepe project, but in some cases, it prioritized the principle of 'profitability', and it has also led to the erosion of public values.

In the implementation process of the Fikirtepe plan, the parcel owners and the private sector were left alone without the guidance of the public sector. The parcel owners would decide on one of the application options proposed in the plan and make an agreement with a development company of their choice, and have their new project built on their land. However, since it was not clear how this method would be applied, this situation caused confusion, and none of the parties took action for a long time (Türk et al., 2020; Gursoy, 2015). Another problem was that landowners did not know whom to trust from the private sector and had no previous experience in this matter. Upon the increasing demands of the local people, the municipality opened 'information

offices' in the Fikirtepe area to explain the planning notes to the public and other stakeholders.

At this stage, the private sector also stepped in and laid the foundations of communication with the local people. Large-scale real estate companies opened their own offices in the planning area to inform the landowners about the plan. While giving information about the plan, the investors also introduced their projects to the Fikirtepe residents. Investors had one-on-one interviews with the landowners, both at information offices and at their homes, to convince them to make a deal. At that point, factors such as the companies' images in the real estate market, the assurances they offer, and the economic returns of their offers were influential in the agreements. Also the marketing strategies companies used for their projects were effective in that. For instance, one project called 'Brooklyn Park' by Selimoğlu and Pana companies was promoted with 'Istanbul's Brooklyn: Fikirtepe', emphasizing successful urban regenerations in Brooklyn, New York.

Some problems emerged during the implementation stage. Some of the companies made changes in their project proposals after they agreed with the landowners. To make the highest profit, they made new arrangements in their projects and gained more space for themselves without getting permission from landowners. When landowners noticed that, they launched lawsuits against these companies. Another problem was that some companies stopped providing rent payments for the landowners after six months projects started as they went bankrupt (Türk et al., 2020). To increase their voice in the public sector and solve the problems that resulted from the partnerships with developers, landowners founded the Fikirtepe Association, called Fikentder. The Association organized public meetings to discuss the problems

and future of the Fikirtepe. They also started to publish reports on the improvements or failures in the ongoing constructions.

The Chamber of City Planners, The Chamber of Civil Engineers, The Chamber of Architects

The Chamber of City Planners, the Chamber of Architects, and the Chamber of Civil Engineers played a 'controller' role in the Fikirtepe process, supervising the plan's compliance with the planning legislation and urban planning principles. These three Chambers, which have closely followed the planning process from the beginning, argued that the Fikirtepe plan was not made in accordance with the planning legislation and urban planning principles and would cause chaos in the area after the implementation (Tarakçı & Türk, 2020).

The lack of population projection in the plan, the uncertainty about the facility areas, and the high floor area ratio were the points that the professional chambers objected to the Fikirtepe plan. In addition, the chambers criticized some of the planning decisions that gave broad authority to the Municipality. They also argued that some of the planning decisions included uncertainties and allowed to make individual and privileged applications. As a result, these three chambers filed a lawsuit together, seeking the cancellation of the plan on the grounds that the plan was against the principles of urbanism, planning principles, upper-scale development plans, and planning legislation. One of the issues in the petition was as follows: "implementation plans are the arrangements in which the types of land use in the urban areas are defined in detail; transportation, parking lot, technical and social facility areas are also defined; and they comply with the definitions and arrangements in the planning regulation" (Gursoy, 2015, pg. 82). In 2013, the court decided to cancel the plan.

While the Ministry was preparing the new plan after the cancellation of the 2011 approved plan, these three professional chambers played the 'controller role' again. Since the new Fikirtepe plan approved by the Ministry in 2013 was essentially the same as the old plan, the chambers also filed a lawsuit against the new plan. The chambers demanded the cancellation of the plan on the grounds that "the social facilities of the area would be affected; it was against the urban planning principles which balance conservation and development utilization, and it was against the public interest" (Istanbul 6th Administrative Court, File No. 2019/1041 and Decision No. 2019/1764). The court canceled the plan on 17 July 2019.

The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization

The plan's cancellation had a shock effect on the Fikirtepe residents and developers as some parties had reached a consensus, and demolitions had already started. An important actor that came into play at that stage was the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. The Ministry became involved in the process after the cancellation of the plan and declared Fikirtepe as "a risky area" within the scope of Law No. 6306 (Bregger, 2020). According to the Law No:6306, "areas which are subject to earthquake risk due to building quality and / or the geological characteristics of the location are designated as Risky Areas by the Council of Ministers / or the responsible local government" (Kisar Koramaz, E. et al., 2018, pg. 185). Thus, it had the planning authority in the area. This step was part of the Ministry's strategy to 'save' the canceled plan and help the developers continue the construction started in Fikirtepe. In this stage, the Ministry took the 'facilitator' role.

In 2013, The Ministry started to work on the plan again in Fikirtepe and approved the a slightly changed document without changing the main framework of the old plan and its implementation methods. They only made a slight adjustment regarding the FAR and road network. One of the changes introduced by the Ministry was to reduce the FAR from 4.14 to 4. This amendment drew the reaction of the landowners and developers who signed the contracts. However, a tax exemption was the mitigating factor. After the approval of the plan, the Ministry transferred all the authorities to MMI again. With this critical move, the Fikirtepe transformation process has been ensured to continue. At this point, this 'passing' between the central and local government units stems from both institutions' desire for the plan to be successful. These moves also ensured the continuation of large-scale projects initiated by the private sector.

However, a lawsuit was once again filed by the Chamber of Architects, the Chamber of Civil Engineers, and the Chamber of City Planners for the plan approved by the Ministry in 2013. As explained above, the Fikirtepe plan, which the Ministry approved in 2013, was primarily the same as the old plan, so the chambers filed a lawsuit against the new plan over the same concerns. The case was fully concluded in 2019. Between 2013 and 2019, the courts made decisions to stop implementing the plan several times, and some amendments were made to the plan accordingly. Finally, in 2019, the court canceled the plan.

Changing Structure of Planning

Fikirtepe Implementation Plan

The 'Fikirtepe Implementation Plan' was a local plan prepared to transform the Fikirtepe site, one of the first squatter settlements in Istanbul, Turkey. The plan had a project-based approach and was referred to as the 'Fikirtepe urban regeneration

project'. It was prepared to develop the region economically and socially, ensuring its integration with the city and defining the transformation strategies specific to the region. Fikirtepe would be an economically and socially prosperous piece of urban land (MMI, 2011). It also aimed to increase the quality of urban life in the neighborhood by providing more facility areas and public spaces. In addition, it envisioned strengthening the building stock in the planning area against all disasters, especially earthquakes.

The complexity of urban problems accumulated in the Fikirtepe region as a result of unhealthy and unplanned development since the 1950s has made it difficult to initiate a planning study to solve the problems. Therefore, planning studies have been delayed in Fikirtepe for many years (MMI, 2011). MMI, which finally started planning studies in 2008, aimed to overcome the urban problems of Fikirtepe by adopting a project-oriented approach within the regulatory planning system.




Figure 8- Fikirtepe Plan Source: (MMI,2011)

According to the Turkish planning hierarchy, the Fikirtepe plan is an implementation plan. Implementation plans are the final stage of municipal planning at the local level and implement the objectives and policies of a master plan that sets the municipality's general policies for future land use. Typically, a development plan provides more detailed policies for the area it covers. It defines the use of land, location and type of buildings, building heights and setbacks, parking requirements, lot sizes and dimensions (Dündar, 2015).




Figure 9- Planning hierarchy in Turkey Source: (Gursoy & Edelman, 2017)

The plan's ultimate goal was to transform the existing urban fabric with small and fragmented parcels, which was identified as the primary source of the problems in the area. Because Fikirtepe developed as a squatter settlement without a registered plan, parcels were created randomly in small sizes in years. Therefore, houses were small covering all the parcel area without gardens. Also, road network were designed poorly based on this land parcellation. According to the plan strategy, small parcels would be combined to form larger building plots defined in the plan, and then urban design projects would be prepared for each of these building plots. To achieve this, 61 new building plots were proposed in the plan, and high development rights were provided

to encourage parcel mergers. According to the plan notes, the more parcels were combined, the higher development rights would be given.




Figure 10- Example parcel mergers in Fikirtepe Source: (Türk et al., 2020)

The challenge here was to convince hundreds of parcel owners to reach a consensus to merge their parcels to create these building plots, as each plot included hundreds of parcels. The private sector played an important role in achieving this. In addition, the plan also proposed a second option for the owners, allowing transformation on a parcel basis. Landowners who did not want to merge their parcels with other parcels would build a new building on their parcels. However, in this case, they would have the lowest development rights rate. In summary, the plan encouraged parcel mergers, and in order to ensure parcel mergers, special development rights were given. New development rights provided with the Fikirtepe plan was twice higher than the development right given to the rest of the Kadikoy district, where the planning site is located.

In addition, no new public facility was proposed in the plan. The uses shown in the plan were mainly residential, commercial, existing schools, existing health facilities, and existing spaces of worship. According to the plan, MMI would grant special development rights in the Fikirtepe in exchange for the provision of facility areas, which was a similar method to 'density bonusing' used under Section 37 of the Ontario

Planning Act. Thus, the new facility areas would be obtained as a result of parcel mergers. While developers prepare the urban design projects of the building plots formed as a result of parcel mergers, they would also propose new facility areas within their building plots. However, this proposal led to confusion for the landowners and private sector, and then MMI prepared a key map showing the location, type, and size of the amenities to solve the problem.

Marketized Planning Characteristics of the Fikirtepe Plan

Even though MMI calls the Fikirtepe plan an 'implementation plan', the Fikirtepe plan differs significantly from the implementation plan defined by the Turkish planning legislation. What makes the Fikirtepe plan different is the market-oriented planning approaches integrated into it. With the adoption of these methods, the Fikirtepe plan gained a marketized planning character.

One of the features that made the Fikirtepe plan market-oriented is that the plan is not prepared in accordance with the Turkish planning hierarchy. According to Turkish planning legislation, an implementation plan must be prepared in accordance with high-level plans in the planning hierarchy. Accordingly, the Fikirtepe plan had to be prepared in accordance with the 'Kadikoy Master Plan', which comes before it. In the master plan, planning decisions about Fikirtepe include "The population is 30.000 people. 1/1000 scaled Implementation Plan, and an urban transformation project will be prepared. And maximum floor area ratio is 2,07" (MMI, 2005). However, the population was not specified in the Fikirtepe plan, the facility areas were not allocated, and the maximum floor area ratio was determined as 4.14. With these aspects, the Fikirtepe plan does not comply with the master plan. As emphasized in the literature review section, in a marketized planning system, planning does not act in accordance

with the hierarchical system (Falleth, Hanssen,& Saglie, 2010). And Fikirtepe is an example of this.

In this context, another issue is that the Fikirtepe plan went beyond an implementation plan defined through Turkish planning legislation and was loaded with different functions. As described above, an implementation plan is a lower-level plan in the Turkish planning hierarchy that provides details about the implementation. Therefore, the Fikirtepe plan must have provided more detailed policies for the area regarding the use of land, the location and type of buildings, building heights and setbacks, parking requirements, and the lot sizes and dimensions. However, the plan did not provide details about any of these. Instead, it had very detailed planning notes that set rules for the transformation of the area. It was the first of its kind, integrating urban transformation strategies into an implementation plan.

However, this integration was a challenge for the traditional planning process and ultimately led to the plan's cancellation. In the Turkish planning system, urban regeneration is generally planned and realized through urban regeneration projects (Bakır, 2019). In other words, municipalities first announce a piece of urban land as a 'special project area' in the master and implementation plans once they decide to initiate an urban regeneration. Then they propose an urban regeneration project with a holistic approach to transform a piece of urban land in partnership with quasi-public housing development corporations such as TOKI and KIPTAS. The master and implementation plans do not provide details about the transformation, define the projection population, and maximum floor area ratio. In the case of Fikirtepe, however, MMI set up the urban transformation strategies through the plan. This was a new planning approach.

The other feature that made the Fikirtepe plan market-oriented was the planning system. With this system, the plan integrated market logic and mechanisms into the planning. The Fikirtepe plan proposed a regeneration model based on the agreements of the landowners and the private sector companies. This model was aimed to be a pilot for the future urban regenerations in Istanbul. The role of the private sector in urban development in Istanbul has been strengthened with this mode. Another market-oriented feature of the plan was the special development rights. As explained in the chapter 'Principal Actors and Their Roles in Fikirtepe', MMI has provided high development rights through the Fikirtepe plan to facilitate and incentivize urban regeneration. The proposed maximum FAR was 4.14, which was twice higher than the maximum FAR allowed in the rest of the Kadikoy district, where Fikirtepe is located. MMI intended that these special development rights would allow the developers and landowners to finance urban regeneration. As Mäntysalo (1999, p.179) states, "market-oriented planning ...is primarily motivated by creating favorable conditions for economic growth and private investment". This extraordinary FAR was indeed attractive to the large investor companies, and they began to compete to carry out projects in the region (Bregger, 2020). In one of his speeches, Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş stated that this was a different practice in Fikirtepe and that such a FAR has not been given anywhere in Istanbul before and will not be given anymore (Yorgancı, 2012).

These factors, plan system and the special development rights, have served to strengthen the role of the private sector in the transformation of Fikirtepe and integrate 'market logic' into planning. Along with the process, the Fikirtepe site has been the subject of commodification and bargaining for profit sharing. In the process, large

investor companies, acting with the logic of maximizing profits, have made agreements with the property owners and started to gain properties in the area. In the meantime, the some property owners, who expected the "highest profit," did not make immediate agreement with the companies and wanted to wait to see different proposal from different companies. They slowed down the process to get more profit. Özdemir and Aydın (2016, p.57) criticize that "the high development rights granted by the public revealed that the project was designed not for the transformation of the area to protect the local people (against the natural disasters), but for land speculation based on its (Fikirtepe's central) location". They define this situation as "the visible intervention of the public sector to the invisible hand of the market in Fikirtepe" (2016, p.53).

One of the marketized planning features of the Fikirtepe plan is its flexible structure. The plan contained strategy and methods that provided 'flexibility' regarding the size, location, and type of facilities, undermining the 'certainty' principle of a regulatory implementation plan. This method brought 'flexibility' into the planning system. Decision-making on the location, type, and size of the facility areas was left to the developers. According to the planning decisions, facility areas would be designated with the urban design projects prepared by the private companies after the parcels were merged (MMI, 2011). This was a considerable handicap of the plan. According to Turkish planning legislation, a local plan has to include the location, type, and size of the facility areas in addition to all other required uses.

Furthermore, developers did not know on what ground they decide on the location, type, and size of the facility areas as they had never done this before. To resolve the confusion by developers and public, MMI prepared a 'key map' showing the facility areas' types, sizes, and locations to address the concerns. However, this method of

preparing a keymap was also unknown to the Turkish planning system (Tarakçı & Türk, 2020).

In addition to the flexibility for facility areas, there was also flexibility for the road network and building plots. The planning systematic built on the principle of parcel mergers provided several implementation options for the property owners. Accordingly, a parcel owner would be able to build on their parcel independently, or they could combine their parcel with other parcels and get a higher development right. Since it was unknown how many parcels would be combined in the area, it was impossible to draw a planning scheme showing the final picture of the development. Thus, MMI could show only one of the possible development scenarios on the plan map. In other words, the plan map did not reveal the final situation. As in the Quayside project, the planning in Fikirtepe was designed as an ongoing process. With flexible building blocks, a flexible road system, and flexible facilities, the plan could have taken a new shape according to the developments.

Due to this flexible plan systematic, it was impossible to predict the future population in Fikirtepe. Therefore, Fikirtepe's population projection was not included in the plan report. The fact that the lack of facility areas, the ambiguity of the plan population, and the special development rights led the three professional chambers, the Chamber of City Planners, the Chamber of Architects, and the Chamber of Civil Engineers, to object to the plan. They released a public notice explaining that the Fikirtepe plan is characterized by an "unacceptable inconsistency and ignorance." They also added that "We take it as our duty to present to the public once again that the urban plans of the cities are not the means of distributing the development right of 'buy one, get one free during the discount seasons (election periods) of the municipal councils" (The

Chamber of City Planners, 2011). Then these three Chambers launched a lawsuit to cancel the Fikirtepe plan. The plan was canceled with a court decision in 2013 after three years from the approval.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Urban planning is being renewed to keep up with the changing city agendas locally and globally. In this study, especially the effects of Neoliberalism on urban planning are emphasized. Planning through neoliberal marketization processes adopts a market-oriented approach and produces solutions to urban problems with market logic. However, these market-oriented planning approaches can cause various complications.

Today, global cities are arenas of economic and social development goals and active application areas of neoliberal policies. With the influence of Neoliberalism, global cities are adjusting their urban policies to ensure economic growth and turning urban areas into experimental areas to test innovations that will accelerate and facilitate the growth. Neoliberal market-oriented urban policies are favorable in creating the conditions for stimulating economic growth and testing urban innovations. For this reason, urban planning adopts market-oriented approaches and internalizes the market logic.

The adaptation process of the market logic in planning occurs with the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector. Transformations in planning begin when the public sector cooperates with the private sector and strengthens the role of the private sector in urban development. With the increased role of the private sector in planning, the business methods and values of the private sector using market-oriented approaches are also transferred to the planning. While the values of the private sector, especially profitability, come to the fore in the planning processes, public values such as public interest, transparency, and accountability are eroded.

The role, purpose, and content of planning change when the planning work, which is primarily a public action and carried out by public authorities, is focused on attracting the private sector and forming a partnership with it. Traditional planning that guides urban land use with a regulatory role under public leadership has hierarchy, rigidity, and certainty. On the other hand, plans prepared by the private sector or prepared to attract the private sector with the motivation of market thinking do not comply with the planning hierarchy and have flexibility and discretion as features. However, market-oriented planning methods integrated into the regulatory planning system force the system and cause various complications.

The Fikirtepe and Quayside projects provide insights on how neoliberal market-oriented thinking penetrates planning systems to operate according to the market rules and how -this penetration leads to implications.

Marketized planning characteristics of Fikirtepe and Quayside

- *an entrepreneurial spirit that public administrations adopt, a shift in the focus of planning from answering the public needs to promoting economic growth and competition in the international arena*

The Fikirtepe and Quayside projects have been prepared with an entrepreneurial spirit to increase Istanbul and Toronto's prestige and enhance the competitiveness of these cities in the world. The focus of both projects was on promoting economic growth and competition in the international arena more than serving the public interest. The visions of both

plans differ from the vision of a conventional urban regeneration plan. The Fikirtepe project would bring Istanbul, which aims to become a global financial center, closer to this goal, while the Quayside project would represent Toronto in the international arena with the smart city concept. Both projects would be models for their own countries and would also increase the global importance of the cities they were designed.

In order to address this global vision, ambitious plans were prepared for both areas, which include innovations. One of the key strategies of these plans was to attract investors and accelerate economic growth. In order to achieve this, market logic and market-oriented components were used in the plans.

- *the increasing role of the private sector in urban development and planning*

The increasing role of the private sector in urban development and planning was the case in both projects. While the private sector leadership was the issue at Quayside from the beginning of the process, the private sector became involved in the implementation phase at Fikirtepe. SL, which WT authorized to prepare a plan at Quayside, played an active role from the beginning of the process. The roles that SL defined for itself in the project, “planning partner; real estate research and development; real estate economic development catalyst; infrastructure financing; horizontal development partner; advanced infrastructure facilitator; technology deployment; investments in economic development, and value sharing (Robinson & Coutts, 2019, p.339)”, shows how effective SL was.

As for Fikirtepe, after the MMI prepared and approved the plan, the private sector took the lead in the implementation phase. Unlike the Quayside project, at Fikirtepe, the public sector did not formally cooperate with the private sector and did not formally delegate its planning authority to the private sector. However, the application options proposed in the plan led the private sector companies to become leaders in the project while convincing landowners and making agreements with them. MMI's passive role in the implementation phase was influential in strengthening the private sector's role.

In both projects, municipalities took a passive role. At Quayside, the municipality's role in the process was to check the MIDP's compliance with current plans and the municipality's priorities. At Fikirtepe, the municipality did not take any active role after preparing the plan other than opening information offices to inform about the plan only upon requests from the public. Property owners agreed with the companies of their choice and started the urban transformation.

- *adapted market logic and market principles*

Market logic and market principles are included in the components of both projects.

SL's market-oriented business model was based on private sector values. Moreover, the resulting product, MIDP, envisioned the effective use, in other words, commercialization of components of the plan. Information of every movement that would take place in the planning area would be collected in a data pool with cameras and sensors, and needs and trends would be

determined accordingly. In this way, SL integrated the 'market orientation' method into planning in Toronto.

SL's business model prioritized profitability. Determining all critical roles in the project for itself, having ownership of any intellectual property generated through the project, and gaining revenues from data ownership would serve the SL's profitability strategy. While SL prioritized 'profitability' through the Quayside project, the company neglected 'responsiveness', 'transparency', and 'accountability' values of the public sector. This neglect in public values mounted critics against the project and undermined the SL's credibility among Torontonians.

As for Fikirtepe, the planning framework was set up with market logic to appeal to market actors. High development rights, which are explicitly given to the plan area and not seen in other Istanbul districts, were granted to attract the private sector to the area and accelerate the transformation. Although the planning work in the area initially started to solve the existing urban problems in Fikirtepe and provide a planned development, it has served the purpose of 'obtaining the highest profit' in the end. Fikirtepe has already had some advantages for new developments regarding its central location in Kadıköy, one of the most popular districts of Istanbul; its proximity to the central business area; and its proximity to the Istanbul Financial Center. The high construction rights granted by the plan have made the area more attractive for investors.

- *the introduction of new planning tools to meet the demands and needs of the private sector*

For both projects, planning areas were designed as test-beds for new planning policies and innovations. Quayside was planned as a test-bed for the smart city concept, while Fikirtepe was planned as a test-bed for the new urban transformation model.

SL integrated the innovations it developed with market logic into the Quayside plan. Digital layer, flexible zoning, automated decision model, data collection through sophisticated technology, demand-based planning approach were some of the innovations SL proposed for the Quayside. With these innovations, planning was designed as a constantly renewed and ongoing action.

At the Fikirtepe plan, innovative plan decisions, which were new in the Turkish planning system, were proposed. The plan went beyond a conventional implementation plan and developed strategies focused on urban transformation. Parcel mergers, increasing development rights based on parcel mergers, different application options, flexible facilities, and flexible land use were some of these innovations.

- integrating flexibility and discretion into planning to accelerate urban development and facilitate the private sector's participation in urban development

The innovations mentioned above and proposed in the Quayside and Fikirtepe plans envisioned efficient and easy plan implementations. At the same time, these innovations provided flexibility and discretion in the planning systems. For example, flexible zoning, demand-based approach, and automated decision

model suggested in the Quayside plan were applications that brought flexibility to planning. Likewise, the proposed system based on parcel mergers in Fikirtepe, different application options, flexible facilities, and flexible land use were innovations that brought flexibility to planning.

In conclusion, Fikirtepe and Quayside projects have the marketized planning characteristics mentioned above. These two planning projects, prepared with market logic and active participation by the private sector, have undoubtedly brought innovations to the planning practice in Istanbul and Toronto. However, these innovations could not be realized as both projects were canceled. The cancellation of these two innovative plans is an indication that the realization of marketized planning approaches within regulatory planning systems causes implications.

The factors that were common to both projects and negatively affected the success of the projects can be explained as follows. Both projects went beyond the existing planning system. Quayside was made as a comprehensive planning study rather than a development proposal defined in an Ontario planning hierarchy. Fikirtepe was designed as an urban transformation strategy plan rather than an implementation plan defined in the Turkish planning system. These approaches were reflected in the systems of the plans, and both plans included complicated plan decisions. This situation made understanding of the plans by the public difficult. Another factor was that both plans developed planning methods that included flexibility. Methods involving this flexibility were not defined in existing regulatory plan systems. Also, both plans proposed 'a city within a city' in Toronto and Istanbul with the rules different from other areas. Furthermore, the public sector's passive role and the private sector's active role in the two projects were not internalized and criticized by the public.

This research indicates that normalizing neoliberal practices and concepts and adapting market mentality and mechanisms into planning is a complicated process. The realization of marketized planning approaches within regulatory planning systems causes implications. There are critical issues to be solved regarding implementing marketized planning approaches. At this point, some of the questions raised by this research can be the subject of future research and may contribute to the planning literature. I transformed the lessons from my analysis into questions. In this context, how should the roles of the private and public sectors be balanced in urban development while integrating marketized planning approaches into planning? How can the public sector maintain control when testing urban innovations where the private sector is more experienced and knowledgeable? Is the public sector ready to put the principle of profit-making alongside or on top of public interest in cooperation with the private sector? How can the conflict between the public and the private sector's values be avoided? Can being less open to the public or ignoring the accountability in marketized planning be adapted to the public sector? Does taking privileged urban planning decisions for a part of the cities comply with the nature of urban planning? How can a regulatory planning system balance controlling the development and use of land and promoting economic growth and competition in cities? How should flexibility and certainty be balanced in regulatory planning? Can urban developments be achieved with methods not defined in planning legislation?

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