THE COST OF BEING "TRUE TO YOURSELF" FOR MIXED SELVES: FRAME

SWITCHING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS BICULTURALS' PERCEIVED AUTHENTICITY,

IMPACTING WELL-BEING, INTERCULTURAL PERSON PERCEPTION AND DATING

PROSPECTS

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN

PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR

OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PSYCHOLOGY

YORK UNIVERSITY

TORONTO, ONTARIO

JULY 2020

Abstract

As diversity increases throughout the world, a growing number of biculturals—people who are regularly exposed to and identify with at least two cultures—navigate multiple cultural contexts on a daily basis. Despite the growth of this population, we know relatively little about what it is like for biculturals to manage the demands of their multiple cultures and how the ways in which they do so affect their characteristics and experiences. This dissertation research examines the psychological and social consequences of one common way that biculturals negotiate their cultures known as frame switching, whereby a bicultural adapts their ways of thinking and behaving to meet the demands of their immediate cultural context. Situated within North America contexts (Canada and the US), biculturals' frame switching behaviour may violate the Western conception of authentic behaviour and carry unintended costs for biculturals. This dissertation contains two papers that explore the consequences of biculturals' frame switching across an array of non-trivial outcomes, providing statistical and causal-chain evidence that these negative effects are mediated by perceived inauthenticity. Paper 1 presents two experiments addressing the negative effects of frame switching on: 1) biculturals' self-perceived authenticity and the subsequent impact on their well-being and 2) monocultural Canadians' perceptions of a bicultural's authenticity and the subsequent impact on impressions of the bicultural on multiple desirable traits. Paper 2 presents four experiments addressing the negative effects of biculturals' frame switching behaviour on monocultural Americans' perceptions of their authenticity and the mediating role of authenticity on subsequent consequences for general impressions and dating prospects of biculturals. Finally, the contribution of this dissertation within the broader fields of biculturalism, social identities, and intergroup research and future directions are discussed.

DEDICTATION

"For the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the Pack."

Rudyard Kipling, The Jungle Book

For my pack.

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DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION

As diversity increases throughout the world, a growing number of individuals are learning to navigate multiple cultural contexts, and especially for biculturals, this is a salient part of their daily lives. *Biculturals*—people who are regularly exposed to and identify with at least two cultures (e.g., first- and second-generation immigrants, biracial individuals)—are one of the fastest growing groups in ethnically diverse societies. For instance, in 2016, over 41% of Canadians identified with multiple ethnicities (Statistics Canada), and biculturals are projected to account for 88% of the total U.S. population growth over the next 45 years (Pew Research, 2018). On a global scale, there are over 258 million people living outside their country of birth (United Nations, 2017). Despite the growth of this population, we know relatively little about what it is like for biculturals to manage the demands of their multiple cultures and how the ways in which they do so affect them psychologically and socially.

This dissertation research takes a nuanced look at one common way that biculturals negotiate their cultures known as *frame switching*, whereby a bicultural adapts their ways of thinking and behaving to meet the demands of their immediate cultural context (Hong & Khei, 2014; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). To illustrate, a second-generation Chinese Canadian may behave more formally and not laugh or smile excitedly during a Chinese wedding's tea ceremony, but at a Canada Day parade, they may be less reserved and more gregarious. Presumably, the intention of frame switching is for biculturals to gain acceptance by being mindful of each of their cultures' norms and values (David et al., 2009; LaFromboise et al., 1993; Mistry & Wu, 2010; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997). While past work has documented biculturals' frame switching in many domains (e.g., identity, personality, attributions, etc.), the

effects of frame switching have been understudied and its potential unintended consequences have not been explored (West, Zhang, Yampolsky, & Sasaki, 2017). For example, we know that when an Indian Canadian bicultural frame switches in response to being with their Indian family members, they are likely to adjust their behaviour to meet Indian cultural norms (e.g., greeting elders with palms together and bowing the head), whereas with their Canadian family members, they adjust their behaviour to meet Canadian cultural norms (e.g., greeting elders with an enthusiastic hug and direct eye contact).

Research to date has not examined how adjustments of behaviour between cultural contexts impacts the way biculturals see themselves or are seen by others who are aware of their frame switching. In Western cultural contexts, where people are expected to behave consistently across situations and where behavioural inconsistency signals inauthenticity (English & Chen, 2011; Kashima et al., 2004), it is possible that frame switching could carry negative consequences. The studies that follow—a series of six experiments—test the prediction that in North America, biculturals who frame switch see themselves as less authentic and are less satisfied with their lives, and are seen by Canadian and American monoculturals as less authentic, which subsequently impacts general impressions of the bicultural and their intercultural romantic relationship prospects.

The Scope of Biculturalism

At the outset, it is pertinent to explain who is included in the category of biculturals. In theory, any person whose sense of self and related experiences are influenced by the norms, values, and beliefs (i.e., culture) of multiple meaningful social groups could be considered bicultural. Culture is a system of expectations and perspectives shared by a social group that is shaped and passed between members through implicit (e.g., nonverbal approval or disapproval)

and explicit means (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Shweder, 1990). Human groups naturally form

their own cultures partly to promote order and predictability among members (Dunbar, 1998;

Geertz, 1973; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) but also to create a social identity that binds the group

together and differentiates them from other groups, providing a sense of belonging that is critical

to well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

"Culture"—in reference to a group itself (Heine, 2016)—can refer to countless types of social

categories, and empirically, has been studied in many different forms, including not only the

more familiar categories of ethnicity and nationality, but also race, religion, socioeconomic

status, region, institution, etc. (Cohen, 2009). Using this broad lens, one might consider that we

are *all* in some sense bi-, tri-, …*n*-Culturals (Pekerti, Moeller, Thomas, & Napier, 2015)—a

point that could serve as a potential bridge between so-called monoculturals and biculturals.

For the sake of simplicity and to provide the clearest, testable research questions for this

dissertation, I use the term *bicultural* in reference to a person who identifies with two national

cultural groups (e.g., Mexican, Chinese), and focus on the cognitive and behavioural ways that

such biculturals adapt themselves to their two cultures through the process of *frame switching*.

Theoretical Framework: Negotiating Cultures Transforms Biculturals into More than the Sum of their Parts

In the past, biculturalism theories typically posited that biculturals' characteristics and

experiences could be understood by considering the relative influences of each of their two

cultures in an additive manner: take X amount of Culture A and add it to Y amount of Culture B,

and the sum will tell you what to expect from AB biculturals. In contrast, the *transformative

theory of biculturalism* (West et al., 2017)—which guides this dissertation—posits that

biculturals' characteristics and experiences result not only from the direct influences of each of

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their cultures, but also from the processes they use to negotiate their cultures (e.g., frame switching). In order to fully understand what it is like to live biculturally, researchers must also consider how using different strategies to manage one's multiple cultures transforms a person into more than the sum of their parts.

The earlier additive models of bicultural identification are rooted in acculturation research, which examines the adaptation process that individuals—such as first- and second-generation immigrants—undergo via contact with their heritage (i.e., minority) and mainstream (i.e., majority) cultural groups (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Redfield, Linton & Herskovits, 1936). Relying primarily on an individual differences approach, acculturation researchers have examined the correlates of biculturals' higher versus lower involvement in and motivation to maintain connections to their heritage and mainstream cultures (Berry, 1997; Berry et al., 2006; Ryder et al., 2000). Some pivotal findings have been that biculturals tend to thrive most when they feel a stronger sense of belonging with both of their cultures (Berry et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013; Sam & Berry, 2010; Torres & Rollock, 2011) and are able to express the parts of themselves (i.e., cultural identities) that are associated with each of their cultures (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Hong, Zhan, Morris, & Benet-Martínez, 2016). That is, for individuals who live at the crossroads of multiple cultures, being able to embrace and express their biculturality fosters their psychological and sociocultural adjustment more so than attempting to fit themselves into a monocultural mold (Hong et al., 2016).

Although acculturation research has advanced the study of biculturalism in crucial ways, by transitioning away from the pathologizing of biculturalism (e.g., identity diffusion syndrome, Akhtar, 1984) and from recommendations for biculturals to "choose a side," the agentic nature of

biculturals' engagement with their cultures and the diversity of what this looks like may have at times been overlooked. In order to advance theoretical models of biculturalism, researchers may benefit from considering how the different *processes* of negotiating multiple cultures affect biculturals (Cheng, Lee, Benet-Martínez, & Huynh, 2014; Meca, Eichas, Schwartz, & Davis, 2019; West et al., 2017) and how mainstream cultural expectations and values shape the meaning and consequences of these processes (Mistry & Wu, 2010; Schwartz & Unger, 2010; West et al., 2017). With these considerations in mind, this dissertation takes a closer look at the bicultural negotiation process of frame switching and its potential effects for biculturals in North American contexts.

A Novel Focus on the Process of Frame Switching

Leaders in the field of cultural psychology have recently called for a new epoch of research in which the processes biculturals use to navigate their cultures ought to be a major focus (Meca et al., 2019; Sam, 2019; Ward et al., 2018). Cultural frame switching has been identified as one such process (West et al., 2017) that captures biculturals' experience of adapting to situationally salient cultural contexts by activating cultural systems of knowledge (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). The "cultural frame" refers to a broad network of interrelated schemas, scripts, and knowledge structures that represents the internalization of each culture in the bicultural mind (West et al., 2017). When a bicultural frame switches, one of their cultural frames temporarily informs and guides their cognition and behaviour (personality, emotions, attributions, social behaviours, etc.) relatively more than another cultural frame (Briley, Morris, & Simonson, 2005; Chen & Bond, 2010; Hong et al., 2000; Mok & Morris, 2009; Perunovic, Heller, & Rafaeli, 2007; Ramirez-Esparza et al., 2006; Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; Verkuyten & Pouliasi, 2002; Wong & Hong, 2005). Previous research demonstrates that

biculturals are often aware of their frame switching (Doucerain, Dere, & Ryder, 2013; Schwartz et al., 2019; Ward et al., 2018), suggesting that biculturals can frame switch consciously and intentionally (Meca et al., 2019). However, frame switching can also be triggered by subliminal cues (Mok & Morris, 2013), suggesting that biculturals can frame switch unconsciously and automatically (Zou, Morris, & Benet-Martínez, 2008).

Despite these contributions to our understanding of frame switching, previous research has focused little attention on the *switching* aspect of frame switching—the cognitive and behavioural shifting ability and the "if–then" scripts whereby different situations trigger different responses. In prior work, researchers have captured still frames or snapshots of frame switching, demonstrating the influence of each situationally active cultural frame. However, the act of switching between cultural frames may itself affect biculturals psychologically and socially in ways that go beyond the effects of the specific cultural frame. Thus, a major contribution of this dissertation is to provide research that may be the first to directly test the effects of switching between cultural frames on biculturals' experiences, namely, biculturals' own and others' perceptions of their authenticity.

Frame Switching in Context: Interpreting Inconsistency Through the Lens of the Western Authenticity Ideal

In Western, individualist societies such as Canada and the United States, authenticity is promoted (by many academics and by popular media) as a virtue of moral character and touted as a requirement to cultivating our best self and living our best life. A problem for biculturals is that these messages tend to revolve around the idea of having a singular, "true" self that should be the only driver of behaviour. The self is seen as the global, stable essence of person that ideally operates independently of external influences (Chiu et al., 1997). As such, an authentic

person's behaviour is expected to change very little across situations and time (English & Chen, 2011; Knowles et al., 2001) as evidence of their bold ability to stay true to themselves and resist pressure from others to be persuaded, conform, or obey. Within this context, a bicultural who frame switches may be judged as inauthentic because of their inconsistent, context-dependent behaviour. Support for this hypothesis is found in previous research showing that North Americans who behave less consistently see themselves and are seen by others as less authentic, which predicts many consequences for their well-being and relationships (e.g., Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Suh, 2002). Indeed, inauthenticity comes with several costs in North America: perceiving oneself to be inauthentic is negatively associated with subjective and objective well-being markers (e.g., Kifer et al., 2013; Sheldon et al., 1997; Wood et al., 2008); perceptions of inauthenticity in others have diffuse negative associations with impressions of likeability, trustworthiness, and social competence (e.g., English & Chen, 2011; Krumhuber et al., 2007); and perception of a romantic partner's inauthenticity undermines relationship success (e.g., Josephs et al., 2019). As such, frame switching may come with costs for North American biculturals despite its intended rewards.

Dissertation Research Overview

The overarching hypothesis of this dissertation is that the Western conception of what it means to be an authentic person creates a context in which biculturals' frame switching can evoke negative consequences. These shared authenticity beliefs lead both monocultural North Americans and bicultural North Americans themselves to see biculturals who frame switch as inauthentic, and this hit to biculturals' authenticity has downstream consequences that negatively impact their subjective well-being (i.e., life satisfaction), the impressions others form of them (i.e., likeability, trust, warmth, and competence), and even their intercultural dating prospects.

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Notably, breaking away from the majority of prior biculturalism research, I tackle the challenge of developing and using experimental procedures that enable testing of causal relationships from biculturals' behaviour to their perceived authenticity to a host of downstream consequences.

In the two papers that follow, I present a series of six experiments that demonstrate the consequences of biculturals' frame switching across an array of non-trivial outcomes, providing statistical and causal-chain evidence that these negative effects are mediated by perceived inauthenticity. Paper 1 presents an original research article entitled "The Potential Cost of Cultural Fit: Frame Switching Undermines Perceptions of Authenticity in Western Contexts", published in *Frontiers of Cultural Psychology* in 2018. In this paper, two experiments address the negative effects of frame switching on: 1) biculturals' self-perceived authenticity and the subsequent impact on their well-being and 2) monocultural Canadians' perceptions of a bicultural's authenticity and the subsequent impact on impressions of the bicultural on multiple desirable traits. Paper 2 presents another original research article entitled "The Cost of Being 'True to Yourself' for Mixed Selves: Frame Switching Leads to Perceived Inauthenticity and Downstream Social Consequences for Biculturals", currently in press in *Social Psychological and Personality Science* (2020). In this paper, four experiments address the negative effects of biculturals' frame switching behaviour on monocultural Americans' perceptions of their authenticity and the mediating role of authenticity on subsequent consequences for general impressions and dating prospects of biculturals. Following these two papers, I provide a final discussion that situates the contribution of my dissertation within the broader fields of biculturalism, social identities, and intergroup research and offer future directions for this area of work.

The Potential Cost of Cultural Fit: Frame Switching Undermines Perceptions of Authenticity in

Western Contexts

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Abstract

Behaving consistently across situations is fundamental to a person's authenticity in Western societies. This can pose a problem for biculturals who often frame switch, or adapt their behavior across cultural contexts, as a way of maintaining fit with each of their cultures. In particular, the behavioral inconsistency entailed in frame switching may undermine biculturals' sense of authenticity, as well as Westerners' impressions of biculturals' authenticity. Study 1 had a diverse sample of biculturals ($N = 127$) living in the US and Canada describe an episode of frame switching (vs. no switching control vs. neutral control) and report on their state authenticity during the episode. Results showed that biculturals recalled feeling less authentic during an instance of frame switching compared to no switching control and neutral control. Study 2 had mainstream Canadians (White and of American, Canadian, or Western European cultural heritage, N = 97) read a hypothetical vignette, from a third-person perspective, about a bicultural who frame switches (vs. no switching control vs. neutral control) and provide their impressions of the bicultural's authenticity and multiple other desirable traits. Participants rated the bicultural as less authentic when he frame switched compared to no switching control and neutral control, and rated him as less likeable, trustworthy, and warm (but not competent) as downstream consequences of seeing him as less authentic. These results demonstrate that frame switching can come at a cost to authenticity, both in terms of how biculturals see themselves and are seen by others, at least in Western societies. These findings highlight that the way biculturals negotiate their cultures affects them psychologically and socially. In the context of cultural fit, the active process of establishing and maintaining fit with one's cultures can have unforeseen consequences.

The Potential Cost of Cultural Fit: Frame Switching Undermines Perceptions of

Authenticity

"This above all: To thine own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man." Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1.3.78–80.

Authenticity is a virtue, a quality we strive toward for ourselves and prize in those around us. It is most commonly defined as knowing and behaving according to our true selves (Barrett-Lennard, 1998; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Harter, 2002; Rogers, 1961; Wood et al., 2008). Resisting external influence can signal that our behavior reflects our true selves, at least in Western cultures, hence one essential way that people in these cultures maintain authenticity is by behaving consistently across different situations with different people (Wood et al., 2008). Behaving consistently may be simple enough for people who mainly interact with relatively homogenous social groups but can prove problematic for those whose social groups are more distinct. Biculturals, who identify with at least two cultures, often adapt themselves to each of their cultural contexts — a process called frame switching (Hong et al., 2000). Frame switching enables biculturals to fit in with both of their cultural groups, which can benefit them in many ways (David et al., 2009; LaFromboise et al., 1993; Mistry and Wu, 2010; Phinney and Devich-Navarro, 1997). Yet, because adapting to distinct cultures often requires behaving inconsistently overall, it is possible that biculturals may experience certain costs in contexts where the mainstream culture highly values consistency. Here we focus on Western contexts in which the mainstream culture is defined by the expectations, values, and beliefs held by White monoculturals descendant from Western Europe. The present research examines the

consequences of biculturals' behavioral inconsistency for their own sense of authenticity and others' impressions of their authenticity in the United States and Canada.

Frame Switching as a Cultural Fit Process

Cultural fit refers to the match between a person's characteristics (e.g., traits, values, attitudes) and those of their cultural group (Searle and Ward, 1990; Ward and Chang, 1997). Past research has primarily examined cultural fit as a relatively stable, individual-level quality that people possess to different degrees, and it has focused on the outcomes associated with having more or less fit with a culture in general. Complementing this individual differences approach, we emphasize that cultural fit is also a dynamic psychological process through which people actively fit aspects of themselves (e.g., self-concept, emotions, behaviors, etc.) to the surrounding cultural context. In studying immigrants' emotional cultural fit, for instance, findings on individual differences have highlighted the predictors of biculturals' overall fit with their host and heritage cultures (De Leersnyder et al., 2017; De Leersnyder et al., 2011). However, in addition to a bicultural having the relatively stable ability to maintain a certain level of fit with both of their cultures, they can also dynamically shift their emotional patterns to fit each of their cultural groups (De Leersnyder et al., 2017). Thus, cultural fit is not only a static, global quality but also a process that results in changing levels of fit with each culture depending on the context. For biculturals, this dynamic aspect of cultural fit is analogous to frame switching, which involves adapting the way they think and behave to suit one of their culture's norms and values at a time.

There is no single way biculturals negotiate their cultures. Biculturals use multiple strategies and vary in how much they employ different processes (LaFromboise et al., 1993; West et al., 2017), though most may be able to use each process to some extent. Frame switching

is a commonly used process that involves activating one culture's knowledge structures (i.e., cultural frame) in response to contextual cues (Hong et al., 1997; Hong and Khei, 2014; Hong et al., 2000). Through the process of frame switching, biculturals act as cultural chameleons who adapt the way they think and behave to meet the demands of the current cultural context. For instance, research has shown that Mexican American biculturals expressed their personalities differently depending on which language they were using (Ramírez-Esparza et al., 2006). When reporting on their traits in Spanish, their personality profiles were more similar to Mexican monoculturals than when they reported on their traits in English, presumably as a result of activating their Mexican cultural frame. The reverse also occurred, whereby their personality profiles were more similar to mainstream American monoculturals when they reported on their traits in English compared to Spanish, presumably because using English activated their American cultural frame. Replicating this demonstration of biculturals' frame switching, Chen and Bond (2010) found that Hong Kong Chinese biculturals behaved differently when they were speaking to a mainstream American compared to a Hong Kong Chinese interviewer, manifesting traits that reflect the perceived personality prototypes for each culture (e.g., more extraverted for American, less open for Chinese). In other frame switching research, biculturals have been shown to adapt not only their personality and social behavior, but their values, emotions, and cognitive styles in response to cultural contextual cues (Chen et al., 2014; Doucerain et al., 2013; Hong et al., 2000; Mok and Morris, 2009; Perunovic et al., 2007; Ralston et al., 1995; Verkuyten and Pouliasi, 2002). Past researchers have generally considered frame switching an adaptive skill for biculturals because it helps them fulfill core human needs for competence and belonging with each of their cultural groups (David et al., 2009; LaFromboise et al., 1993; Mistry and Wu, 2010; Phinney and Devich-Navarro, 1997). Frame switching may indeed be an essential strategy for

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maintaining fit with multiple cultures, but might biculturals' constant switching have

consequences, particularly in cultural contexts that value consistency?

Western Cultures Expect and Value Consistency

It is well established that people in Western cultures tend to dislike inconsistency.

Research going back to classic investigations of cognitive dissonance, which were mostly based

on observations of Americans, suggests that awareness of one's inconsistencies can cause

discomfort (Elliot and Devine, 1994; Festinger, 1957). We see everyday evidence of this in the

condemnation of people who are "two-faced," "flip-floppers," or hypocrites. While Westerners

are known to react negatively to many types of inconsistency (e.g., inconsistency between

attitude and behavior), their reactions to inconsistency in behavior across contexts is most

relevant in the case of frame switching. Western philosophical traditions broadly assume that

unchanging, absolute truths form the basis of reality, in contrast to naïve dialectical assumptions

of constant flux and contradictions (Peng and Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). This

abstract assumption gives root to more explicit cultural beliefs underlying preferences for

consistency. Specifically, the cultural aversion to behavioral inconsistency may be the product of

two interrelated lay theories: dispositionism, which assumes that behavior is primarily caused by

internal attributes, and an entity view of the self, which assumes that internal attributes are stable

across situations and time (Chiu et al., 1997; Knowles et al., 2001). Together, these lay theories

create a framework in which people in Western cultures expect themselves and others to behave

consistently (English and Chen, 2011; Markus et al., 1997). In reality, people in all cultures are

influenced by external forces and by internal attributes leading everyone to some degree of

consistency as well as variability (e.g., Church, 2000; Fleeson, 2004). The point, however, is that

these shared lay theories result in a cultural prescription for behavior in Western contexts: you *should* be consistent.

When consistency is expected, inconsistency can be costly. The effects of behavioral consistency have typically been studied by measuring how similarly a person enacts their traits with different people. Traditionally, researchers have used a cross-sectional, self-report approach to examine the consistency of the traits a person manifests across various social roles (e.g., friend, student, etc.; Boucher, 2011; Church et al., 2008a; English & Chen, 2007; Sheldon et al., 1997; Suh, 2002). Recent research using experience-sampling methods and statistical techniques that correct methodological confounds has challenged prior conclusions about the extent to which cultures differ in actual, as opposed to perceived, cross-role consistency (Church et al., 2008b, 2013; Locke et al., 2017) and whether actual consistency (vs. flexibility) is associated with greater well-being (Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006; Magee, Buchtel, Human, Murray, & Biesanz, 2018). Even though researchers are still investigating cross-cultural differences in actual behavioral consistency, many find self-reported differences in how consistent people perceive themselves to be. Importantly, these differences may reflect participants' awareness of the desirability of consistent behavior in their respective cultures (Edwards, 1953) and their endorsement of overarching lay theories of behavior (Church et al., 2006, 2012). Relevant research has shown that although people in most cultures generally perceive themselves to be more consistent than inconsistent across roles, consistency is sometimes higher in non-dialectical cultures – for example, perceived cross-role consistency is higher in the US versus Japan (Church et al., 2008a, 2012; Locke et al., 2017) and for European Americans versus Asian Americans (English & Chen, 2007, 2011). Other studies suggest that, at least when it comes to perceived behavioral consistency, there may be negative consequences for Westerners violating

this culturally-expected norm. Cross-role inconsistency, examined cross-sectionally, has been associated with lower psychological and subjective well-being (Donahue et al., 1993; Sheldon et al., 1997; Suh, 2002), worse relationship quality (English and Chen, 2011), and lower informant ratings of social skill and likeability (Suh, 2002). Other cross-sectional studies have found perceived cross-role inconsistency to be linked with lower adjustment outcomes (e.g., life satisfaction, affect, etc.) even in non-Western cultures, but the strongest negative relationships generally occur in more Westernized and less dialectical samples (Boucher, 2011; Church et al., 2008a, 2014; Suh, 2002).

Although actually varying one's behavior may be a flexible, adaptive skill for people in general (Church, 2000; Fleeson, 2004), perceived violations of a culture's prescribed level of behavioral consistency may still have negative effects. This presents a problem for biculturals in Western contexts who use frame switching as a primary way of negotiating their cultures. For a bicultural who identifies strongly with both of their cultures, the main goal of switching may be to align themselves to either of their cultural groups in order to feel like they belong and are accepted by both. Ironically, their attempts to make themselves consistent with each of their cultures may backfire because doing so requires them to be inconsistent *between* their cultures. If biculturals' inconsistency is made salient, frame switching may create fallout for the way biculturals see themselves and are seen by others, particularly in a dominant cultural context that discourages inconsistency such as the US and Canada.

The Heart of the Problem: Inconsistency Can Signal Inauthenticity

A key factor in the potential negative effects of frame switching may be authenticity. The concept of authenticity has come to refer to several interrelated characteristics (e.g., genuineness, fidelity, credibility, sincerity, etc.) that are highly valued and sought in many spheres of life – we

want to have authentic experiences, consume authentic products, be and be with authentic people (Cohen, 1988; Grazian, 2010; Handler, 1986; Lindholm, 2008; McCarthy, 2009; Sims, 2009; Wang, 1999). The latter desire, which requires us to judge our own and others' authenticity, is most relevant for our research and at its core rests on cultural expectations for what authenticity, or being true to oneself, should look like. Though people in all cultures experience authenticity (Slabu et al., 2014) and attempt to gauge others' authenticity as a valuable social indicator (e.g., this person is a fraud, someone to trust), cultures differ in their understandings of what constitutes authentic behavior (Boucher, 2011; English & Chen, 2011; Kanagawa et al., 2001; Kashima et al., 2004; Kokkoris and Kühnen, 2014). We focus here on Western understandings of authenticity as a personal characteristic and its impact. Authenticity has long been considered a virtue in Western societies, and the writings of many philosophers, poets, and social scientists evidence its extensive intellectual tradition (Braman, 2008; Handler, 1986; Harter, 2002; Kernis and Goldman, 2006; Lindholm, 2008; Trilling, 1971). Over this time, scholars across and within disciplines have struggled to unanimously agree on the core features of authenticity. Some have focused on self-knowledge, or awareness of the true self, and others have focused on the importance of behavior, emphasizing that behavior must reflect and be directed by the true self (Harter, 2002; Rogers, 1961; Wood et al., 2008). The philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau was a pivotal contributor to the Western understanding of authenticity and fervently argued that being authentic meant behaving only in line with one's essence without regard for others' opinions or inherently repressive social norms (Lindholm, 2008). On this point, the psychological literature has debated whether consistency and rejecting external influence are essential to authentic behavior. At times, research has treated cross-role consistency as a defining manifestation of authenticity (e.g., Block, 1961; Roberts and Donahue, 1994; Sheldon et al., 1997). Such research

posits that variation between roles is caused by behavioral deviations from the true self in at least some of these roles (Deci and Ryan, 1985; 1991; Ryan, 1995; Sheldon et al., 1997), presumably due to external pressures rather than autonomous motivations (Wood et al., 2008). More recent investigations of the features of authentic and inauthentic states, however, suggests that people can still feel authentic even when accepting external influence (Lenton et al., 2016; Slabu et al., 2014). This debate highlights the potential dissociation between lay people's (and even researchers') actual experiences of authenticity and their beliefs about what authenticity should be.

Whereas scholars may still be exploring the nature of authenticity and debating the necessity of consistency to the construct for the purpose of research, the typical Western lay understanding of authenticity seems fundamentally at odds with behavioral inconsistency. Shakespeare's famous quote, "To thine *own self* be true," [emphasis added] is frequently cited by researchers and lay people alike for its defining embodiment of authenticity (e.g., Kernis and Goldman, 2006; Kifer et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2008). This prescription underscores the cultural expectation that people's behavior should be expressive of their core self-understanding and that to do otherwise is to misrepresent oneself. Behavior which is inconsistent across situations, therefore, may be perceived negatively because inconsistent behavior can indicate that a person is being influenced by external factors rather than being their "true self" (Wild, 1965; Wood et al., 2008). Empirically, Kashima and colleagues found that Western participants in the U.K., Australia, and Germany believed that a more context-sensitive self is less consistent and less of a true self (2004), demonstrating their shared cultural associations between accepting external influence, inconsistency, and inauthenticity. This stands in contrast to certain Eastern cultures where people are believed to have malleable selves and are expected to adjust their behavior

across roles (Markus and Kitayama, 1991, 1994, 1998), and doing so is not seen as inauthentic (English and Chen, 2011). For example, the same study (Kashima et al., 2004) found that Japanese participants believed that a more context-sensitive self, despite being less consistent, is more of a true self. As evidence of Westerners' internalized understanding of authentic behavior, other studies show that Americans who see themselves as less consistent across social roles see themselves, and can be seen by others, as less authentic (Cross et al., 2003; English and Chen, 2011, Sheldon et al., 1997; Suh, 2002). Importantly, people's judgments of their own and others' authenticity based on behavior may draw more heavily on these shared cultural expectations of what authenticity *should* look like than how authentic behaviors actually feel in the moment. To illustrate, research on lay beliefs about authenticity in the US suggests that Americans intuitively hold the dominant cultural belief that people should behave in line with their traits in order to be authentic (Fleeson and Wilt, 2010). For example, although introverts actually feel more authentic during moments in which their behavior is more extraverted, those who are asked to recall such an event remember feeling less authentic presumably because they believe that acting out of character reflects *in*authenticity, and this influences the way they reconstruct and interpret their experience (Fleeson and Wilt, 2010). Similarly, we posit that although adjusting one's behavior to match a particular context may not feel inauthentic in the moment, reflecting on the inconsistency of one's own or another's behavior across contexts may negatively affect impressions of authenticity because of internalized Western associations between behavioral consistency and authenticity. This assertion may hold not only for mainstream members of Western cultures (i.e., White monoculturals of Western European cultural heritage), but also for biculturals living in these societies. Regardless of their heritage cultures, biculturals may still be affected by expectations to be consistent in the mainstream culture and they may at times judge

themselves through this lens. Thus, frame switching in a Western context may negatively impact not only others' impressions of whether a bicultural is authentic, but also the bicultural's judgments about their own feelings of authenticity.

Diminished authenticity has a host of consequences. Previous studies of authenticity in Western contexts have shown that self-perceived inauthenticity predicts lower subjective and psychological well-being in terms of life satisfaction, role satisfaction, affect, self-esteem (e.g., Kifer et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2008), self-actualization, vitality, stress and coping (e.g., Kernis & Goldman, 2006), and anxiety and depression (e.g., Sheldon et al., 1997), among other negative outcomes. Other research points to the interpersonal consequences of and inauthenticity. For example, people who perceive their romantic partners as less authentic subsequently view them as less trustworthy, and are less committed to them (Wickham, 2013). Research on the authenticity of emotions shows that people feel less authentic when they hide their feelings, and this negatively affects their relationships in terms of satisfaction and social support (English and John, 2013) and their own and their partner's emotional state, satisfaction, and commitment (Impett et al., 2012). These consequences are more pronounced for those who more strongly endorse the typically North American, independent self-construal (Le and Impett, 2013) or non-dialectical self-beliefs (Boucher, 2011). The social consequences of inauthenticity are thought to occur, at least in part, because inauthentic people can be seen as less honest, trustworthy, likeable, and socially competent (Kernis and Goldman, 2006; Krumhuber et al., 2007; Reis and Patrick, 1996; Lopez and Rice, 2006; Suh, 2002; Wickham, 2013). Taken together, these findings suggest that the cost of frame switching for North American biculturals may not stop at authenticity, but may have widespread downstream consequences as well. Specifically, the secondary predictions of the present research are that biculturals' diminished authenticity due to

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frame switching will have subsequent costs to their subjective well-being and to the impressions people form of them on fundamental trait dimensions.

Present Research Overview

The present research explores the complexity of maintaining cultural fit with multiple cultures, unveiling psychological and social consequences of biculturals' frame switching. Although frame switching can enable cultural fit when a bicultural is in each frame, it may paradoxically undermine their fit with Western culture because the behavioral inconsistency involved in switching between frames violates cultural expectations and values (English and Chen, 2011; Markus et al., 1997; Sheldon et al., 1997; Suh, 2002). Thus, frame switching may come at a cost to biculturals' authenticity in the US and Canada, both in terms of how they see themselves (Study 1) and how they are seen by mainstream members of such societies (Study 2).

An overarching goal guiding our research is to understand the shared experiences of biculturals who may negotiate their cultures in similar ways despite the diversity of their specific backgrounds (West et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017). Thus, the present research is designed to capture the frame switching experiences of a diverse population of biculturals in a shared Western context. In Study 1, we sampled people living in Canada or the United States who identified as bicultural, regardless of their specific cultural backgrounds. Importantly, the manipulations for both Studies 1 and 2 target the effects of switching between cultural frames rather than the effects of specific cultural frames. In order to more broadly understand the experience and consequences of frame switching for American and Canadian biculturals, we examine both biculturals' perception of their own past experiences via a recall task (Study 1) and mainstream members' perceptions via a hypothetical vignette (Study 2).

Study 1 aimed to test whether frame switching makes American and Canadian biculturals feel less authentic, subsequently lowering their well-being. Bicultural participants recalled an experience of frame switching (vs. no switching control vs. neutral control) and reflected on how authentic they felt during the experience, followed by a report of their current sense of subjective well-being. We hypothesized, first, that frame switching would decrease state authenticity relative to the two control conditions. Second, we also hypothesized that frame switching, compared to either control condition, would negatively impact well-being via lower authenticity.

Method

Participants. One hundred and seventy-seven biculturals completed the study online for pay (1 GBP) on a crowdsourcing platform, Prolific Academic. Using prescreening items, eligibility criteria were that participants identified as multicultural (vs. monocultural)[1], currently resided in the US or Canada, and were fluent in English. Prior to any data analysis, we excluded participants who failed more than one of four attention checks (e.g., recall a term described on the previous page; select the "agree" response option for this item) or responded "No" to an item asking if they felt they completed the study honestly and attentively ($n = 38$). We also excluded participants from analysis if their responses on the manipulation task did not conform to the task's instructions ($n = 12$). These exclusions resulted in a final sample of 127 participants[2] (60 female, $M_{age} = 30.70$, $SD_{age} = 10.41$). The ethnic breakdown of this sample was approximately 37.8% White, 21.3% Mixed, 18.1% East Asian, 8.7% Black, 5.5% South Asian, 4.7% Latin American, 2.4% Native, and 1.6% Other.

Design and procedure. After providing informed consent, all participants indicated the two cultures with which they most strongly identify and were then randomly assigned to one of

three conditions of the recall manipulation: 1) Switching ($n = 43$), which emphasized behavioral inconsistency when frame switching, 2) No Switching control ($n = 40$), which emphasized behavioral consistency when actively not frame switching, or 3) Neutral Control ($n = 44$), which emphasized mundane behavioral inconsistency across different times of day. Finally, participants completed state authenticity, well-being (life satisfaction including social approval)[3], and demographic measures, followed by debriefing.

Materials.

Recall manipulation. Participants were instructed to spend three to five minutes writing about a past experience. In the Switching condition, participants wrote about a situation where they were with one of their cultural groups, and their behavior would have been different had they been with their other cultural group. In the No Switching condition, participants described a situation where they were with one cultural group, and their behavior would have been the same had they been with the other cultural group. In the Control condition, participants wrote about an instance of mundane switching: how they were different while completing their morning routine compared to their evening routine on an average day.

State authenticity. Lenton and colleagues' (2013) measure of state authenticity was slightly reworded to ask about participants' sense of authenticity during the situation they wrote about in the recall task rather than the present. The resulting 12-item measure ($\alpha = .90$) assessed feelings and beliefs covering three defining factors of authenticity (Wood et al., 2008): *authentic living* (e.g., "I behaved in accordance with my values and beliefs"), *accepting external influence* (e.g., "I felt greatly influenced by other people", reversed), and *self-alienation* (e.g., "I felt as if I didn't know myself very well", reversed). Participants reported their agreement with each statement on 7-point Likert scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Subjective well-being.

Satisfaction with life. The 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; α = .88) assesses how globally satisfied participants are with their lives (Diener et al., 1985) and has frequently been used to measure subjective well-being in previous work addressing similar research questions. Participants indicate their extent of agreement from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) with statements about their life satisfaction in terms of their own standards (e.g., "In most ways, my life is close to my ideal;" "So far I have gotten the important things I want in life").

Social approval. We also added two items (α = .70) to the traditional Satisfaction with Life Scale to assess how much participants believe that important others approve of their lives: "I feel that I live up to the expectations of people close to me" and "People close to me approve of how I live my life" (Kim et al., 2008). We included these two items to be more inclusive of the cultural diversity of our sample, given that previous research suggests that social approval may be an important aspect of subjective well-being in many non-Western cultures (e.g., Suh, 2002).

Results

Addressing our first hypothesis on the effect of condition on state authenticity, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect, $F(2, 124) = 7.62$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$ (see Figure 1)[4]. The results of a priori contrasts between the conditions were consistent with our primary hypothesis; participants in the Switching condition ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 1.17$) reported feeling significantly less authentic than those in the No Switching condition ($M = 4.99$, $SD = 1.23$), $t(124) = 2.54$, $p = .01$, $d = 0.52$, and the Control condition ($M = 5.29$, $SD = 0.94$), $t(124) = 3.83$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.87$. The No Switching and Control conditions did not significantly differ on authenticity, $t(124) = 1.21$, $p = .23$, $d = 0.27$.

To test the downstream effects of frame switching on well-being via authenticity, we conducted simple mediation analyses with ordinary least squares using Hayes' PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2012), following procedures for models with a multicategorical independent variable as outlined in Hayes and Preacher (2014). Conditions were dummy coded to specify the Switching condition as the reference group, resulting in two contrasts: 1) Switching vs. No Switching, and 2) Switching vs. Control[5]. Our original model amalgamated life satisfaction and social approval items into a single well-being outcome variable. After finding no significant indirect effects with this model, however, we conducted further exploratory mediation analyses on separate models for life satisfaction and social approval[6]. These analyses revealed that frame switching indirectly negatively influenced life satisfaction through its negative effect on authenticity but did not indirectly affect social approval.

In the life satisfaction model (see Figure 2), consistent with the ANOVA results, participants in the Switching condition reported having felt less authentic compared to those in the No Switching ($a_1 = -0.62$) and Control ($a_2 = -0.92$) conditions. Second, authenticity positively predicted participants' life satisfaction, $b = 0.35$, $p < .01$[7]. Thus, when participants remembered feeling less authentic during the recalled event, they felt less satisfied with their life currently. Supporting our prediction, bias-corrected bootstrap (10,000 samples) confidence intervals for the indirect effects were below zero, indicating that frame switching significantly decreased life satisfaction by negatively affecting authenticity. Switching had negative indirect effects on life satisfaction via authenticity compared to No Switching ($a_1b = -0.22$, [95% CI: −0.53, −0.04]) and to Control ($a_2b = -0.32$, [CI: −0.63, −0.11]).

Discussion

As predicted, the results from Study 1 show that frame switching decreases state authenticity and indirectly decreases life satisfaction via reduced state authenticity. Specifically, when biculturals reflect on a time when they adapted their behavior to fit with one of their cultures, they also recall having felt less authentic. This decrease in authenticity held whether frame switching was compared to actively not switching, where biculturals' behavior did not change in response to cultural context, or an instance of mundane switching, where biculturals' behavior changed in response to the time of day[8]. Further, the mediation results suggest that the consequences of frame switching may go beyond authenticity, having downstream repercussions for biculturals' well-being in terms of life satisfaction.

The results of this study point to the complexity of the advantages and disadvantages of frame switching. An interesting implication of the current findings is that biculturals may willingly accept certain consequences of frame switching as a necessary sacrifice in order to fulfill their relationship and belonginess needs. Although frame switching can make them feel less authentic and lower their personal well-being, biculturals may feel that the relational well-being gained by maintaining their connection to and acceptance by each of their cultural groups outweighs their sacrifices. However, the results showed that whereas switching made biculturals feel less authentic and subsequently less generally satisfied with their lives, it did not directly or indirectly affect their impressions of social approval. One possible explanation for the latter null finding is that frame switching in a Western context has two opposing effects on social approval. On the one hand, the purpose of frame switching may well be to gain or maintain social approval by fitting in with each culture. Thus, when biculturals are focusing on their successful fitting in with others, they may anticipate that others approve of them more when they are switching. On the other hand, the inconsistency necessitated by frame switching is likely met with social

disapproval in the mainstream culture. Thus, when biculturals are focusing on their behavioral inconsistency, they may realize that others might disapprove of them when they are switching. These two opposing effects on social approval highlight the paradox of frame switching in Western societies: biculturals' attempts to gain acceptance from both of their cultures despite personal costs can actually undermine their chances of acceptance from one of their cultures.

The findings of Study 1 provide some initial evidence that frame switching can come at a cost to biculturals, particularly when their behavioral inconsistency is made salient within a dominant cultural context that associates inconsistency with inauthenticity. Biculturals living in Western societies may compromise their sense of authenticity and personal aspects of their well-being in their attempts to fit in with both of their cultures.

Study 2

Study 1 demonstrated that frame switching can negatively impact the way biculturals see themselves, highlighting potential intrapersonal consequences. Biculturals may readily bear these consequences in exchange for the interpersonal gains of being accepted by each of their cultures. Ironically, however, these sacrifices may be made for naught when members of certain cultures ultimately disapprove of biculturals' inconsistent behavior. In Study 2, we explore possible social consequences of frame switching in a Western context. Mainstream members of these societies—typically White monoculturals of Western European cultural heritage—may be even more likely than biculturals to have strongly internalized their culture's values and expectations regarding behavioral consistency and its ties to authenticity. Thus, mainstream individuals may be especially likely to react negatively to others' frame switching, forming less favorable impressions of biculturals who do so. Consistent with the way biculturals saw themselves in Study 1, we predicted that mainstream participants in this next study would judge a bicultural to

be less authentic if he frame switches than if he does not. Further, the damaging effect of switching on authenticity would lead participants to also evaluate the bicultural less positively on fundamental trait dimensions.

Method

Participants. One hundred and sixteen mainstream Canadian undergraduates completed the study online for course credit. Eligibility criteria were that participants were White and had only White parents, were born in Canada, and had parents born in the US, Canada, or Western Europe excluding Southern Europe[9] (e.g., Italy, Portugal, Greece; Lalonde et al., 2013). Prior to any data analysis, we excluded participants who failed more than one of four attention checks (e.g., recall the name and cultures of the bicultural in the vignette) or indicated that they did not complete the study honestly and attentively ($n = 19$). These exclusions resulted in a final sample of 97 participants[10] (66 female, $M_{age} = 20.73$, $SD_{age} = 4.45$).

Design and procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to read a vignette about a bicultural in one of three conditions: 1) Switching ($n = 38$), where the bicultural's behavior differs depending on which cultural group he is with, 2) No Switching Control ($n = 30$), where the bicultural's behavior is the same regardless of which cultural group he is with, or 3) Neutral Control ($n = 29$), where no information is given about how the bicultural behaves with his cultural groups. After the manipulation, participants rated the bicultural's authenticity and then rated his likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence[11]. Finally, they completed demographic measures and were debriefed.

Materials.

Bicultural Vignette. All participants read a short vignette about Miguel Wong, a Canadian-born Mexican Chinese bicultural. We chose Mexican and Chinese because we

believed that mainstream Canadian participants would be familiar with these cultures while also

perceiving them to be distinct. Both cultures also represent out-groups for participants, which

should isolate the intended effects of frame switching from any potential confounding effects of

in-group bias that may have arisen if the target had been of mixed White heritage. The three

vignettes start with the same basic information about Miguel:

> "Miguel Wong is a 27-year-old graduate student completing a Master's degree in
>
> Kinesiology. He is passionate about health and exercise and plans to have a career related
>
> to these interests. Miguel's hobbies include playing sports, reading, and cooking. Miguel
>
> is Canadian, and his cultural background is Chinese on his father's side and Mexican on
>
> his mother's side. He identifies with both his Chinese and Mexican cultural heritage, and
>
> he regularly spends time with members of each culture, including friends, family, and
>
> coworkers."

The next part of the vignette differed by condition. The Switching condition read:

> "Miguel behaves differently depending on which cultural group he is with, so his
>
> behavior is more typically Chinese when he is with Chinese people, and more typically
>
> Mexican when he is with Mexicans. For instance, Miguel tends to be more calm, rational,
>
> and introverted when he is with Chinese people, but he tends to be more energetic,
>
> original, and extraverted when he is with Mexicans."

The No Switching condition read:

> "Miguel doesn't tend to behave any differently depending on which cultural group he is
>
> with, so his behavior is largely the same regardless of whether he is with Chinese people
>
> or Mexicans. For instance, Miguel tends to be consistent, tactful, and athletic when he is
>
> with Chinese people and when he is with Mexicans."

In the Control condition, the vignette did not provide any additional information.

The traits chosen to describe Miguel's behavior in the Switching condition were based on previous cross-cultural research showing that Chinese and Mexican groups, on average, differ on extraversion and openness to experience (McCrae and Terracciano, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007). In the No Switching condition, traits were not necessarily tied to one culture more than the other culture; they also fit with other aspects of Miguel's description (e.g., interest in exercise and sports). Before finalizing the vignettes, we pretested a list of potential traits: 10 for behaviors more typically shown in Mexican groups (e.g., outgoing, energetic, creative), 10 for Chinese (e.g., reserved, calm, traditional), and 10 neutral (e.g., active, consistent, motivated). In a pre-test, 46 mainstream Canadian undergraduates rated the desirability of each of the 30 traits, and the final traits were selected so that there were no differences in desirability by trait-category (Mexican vs. Chinese vs. neutral, all ps > .48) or by condition (Switching vs. No Switching, p = .50). The pre-test ensured that any effects of the vignettes were driven by whether Miguel frame switches or not rather than by the desirability of the set of characteristics he manifests in each condition.

Authenticity. English and Chen's (2011) 4-item measure of subjective authenticity (adapted from Shelton et al., 2005) was reworded in order to assess impressions of a target's authenticity rather than one's own authenticity. We replaced one item from the English and Chen (2011) measure that would have stated "Miguel changes himself to get along with others" because we believed this to be too explicitly tied to the content of the Switching and No Switching vignettes, thus resembling a manipulation check more than a measure of impressions of authenticity. This item was replaced with a created item asking for a global assessment of perceived authenticity: "Overall, I think Miguel is an authentic person." The other three items (α

= .89) were "Miguel is being himself with others", "Miguel is artificial in his interactions with others" (reverse-scored), and "Miguel expresses his true attitudes and feelings during his interactions with others," rated on 7-point scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Trait Evaluations.

Likeability. To gauge Miguel's likeability, participants responded to nine items ($\alpha = .87$) on 7-point ratings (1: *strongly disagree* to 7: *strongly agree*, Cila & Lalonde, 2015). Example items include "If I met Miguel, I think I might get along with him", "Miguel seems like a person I would try to avoid" (reverse-scored), and "Overall, I think Miguel is a likeable person".

Trustworthiness. We created a single item on impressions of Miguel's trustworthiness, "Overall, I think Miguel is a trustworthy person", rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Warmth and Competence. Participants also rated how warm (e.g. "friendly", "good-natured"; $\alpha = .86$) and how competent (e.g., "skillful", "independent"; $\alpha = .85$) they perceived Miguel to be, using 13 items from previous measures (Cuddy et al., 2007, 2008; Fiske et al., 2002). Responses were recorded on 5-point scales from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*).

Results

Testing our first hypothesis about the effect of condition on authenticity, a one-way ANOVA revealed that authenticity ratings differed significantly across condition, $F(2, 94) = 33.85, p < .001, \eta^2 = .42$ (see Figure 3). As hypothesized, participants believed that Miguel was less authentic in the Switching condition ($M = 4.18, SD = 1.16$) compared to the No Switching condition ($M = 6.14, SD = 0.70$), $t(94) = 8.18, p < .001, d = 2.04$, and to the Control condition ($M = 5.23, SD = 0.96$), $t(94) = 4.34, p < .001, d = 0.98$. Unexpectedly, the No Switching condition increased authenticity compared to Control, $t(94) = 3.56, p = .001, d = 1.08$.

Given the multiple dependent measures, we built one path model in order to test the downstream effects of frame switching via authenticity simultaneously instead of conducting separate mediation analyses for each outcome. We first dummy coded the three conditions such that the Switching condition served as the reference group; the two resultant contrasts (Switching vs. No Switching, Switching vs. Control) represented the two comparisons of interest and were thus specified as the orthogonal predictors in this multivariate mediation model. The rest of the model included authenticity as the mediator and likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence as outcomes. Tested with Mplus Version 8 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2017), the initial path model showed an unsatisfactory fit to the data: $\chi^2(8) = 18.24$, $p = .020$, CFI = .965, TLI = .912, RMSEA = .115, 90% CI [.04, .19], SRMR = .033. Two fit indices (TLI and RMSEA) exceeded conventional thresholds for an acceptable fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999), and the significant chi-square was noteworthy due to the relatively small sample size (Kline, 2011). As suggested by correlation residuals and modification indices, one major area of the model–data discrepancies was that the direct effects of both contrasts on competence were non-zero, indicating that authenticity did not fully mediate the effects of frame switching on competence. As such, we added the two direct pathways, and the model fit became excellent: $\chi^2(6) = 6.46$, $p = .38$, CFI = .998, TLI = .995, RMSEA = .028, 90% CI [.00, .14], SRMR = .049. See Figure 4 for final model.

Mirroring the ANOVA results, participants in the Switching condition rated Miguel lower on authenticity compared to those in the No Switching ($a_1 = -0.72$) and Control ($a_2 = -0.38$) conditions. Authenticity ratings significantly predicted ratings on the four other desirable traits. When participants saw Miguel as less authentic, they also saw him as less likeable ($b = 0.53$), trustworthy ($b = 0.65$), warm ($b = 0.53$), and competent ($b = 0.22$). More importantly,

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bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals with 2,000 resamples for each of the indirect

effects were below zero for three of the four outcomes, indicating that frame switching

significantly decreased Miguel's rating on likeability, trustworthiness, and warmth by negatively

affecting authenticity. Compared to No Switching, Switching had negative indirect effects on

likeability −.64 [95% CI: −.90, −0.38], trustworthiness −1.14 [CI: −1.56, −0.77], and warmth

−.49 [CI: −0.70, −0.31], but not competence −.21 [CI: −0.45, 0.06]. Compared to Control,

Switching also had negative indirect effects on likeability −.34 [95% CI: −0.56, −0.16],

trustworthiness −.61 [CI: −0.99, −0.29], and warmth −.26 [CI: −0.44, −0.12], but not competence

−.11 [CI: −0.28, 0.02]). In sum, this model revealed that frame switching indirectly negatively

influenced likeability, trustworthiness, and warmth through its negative effect on authenticity.

There was no significant indirect effect of frame switching on competence via authenticity, but

frame switching directly lowered competence.

Discussion

These results generally support both of our hypotheses about the socially damaging

effects of frame switching in a Western context. Mainstream Canadians rated the target bicultural

as less authentic when he frame switched compared to when he actively did not frame switch and

when they did not know anything about his behavior. Moreover, in both comparisons, when

frame switching compromised the bicultural's authenticity, he was subsequently seen as less

likeable, trustworthy, and warm, though not less competent.

These findings have potentially impactful implications for biculturals in Western

contexts. They identify a possible cultural barrier, in that mainstream members may not give

allowance to biculturals' behavioral inconsistency on account of their belonging to multiple

cultures. We were surprised by the magnitude of differences between the three conditions on

authenticity – each about a full point on a 7-point scale, producing a large standardized effect (Cohen, 1988) – because our sample consisted of undergraduates at a liberal, very culturally diverse university in a Canadian city that prides itself on its multiculturalism. Before initiating this study, we were concerned that this sample may not endorse Western cultural associations between consistency and authenticity strongly enough to affect their reactions to our bicultural. The results show, however, that these mainstream Canadians did penalize frame switching in their impressions of authenticity, and this lead to less positive impressions on other desirable traits as well. Thus, the results from our sample might underestimate the effect compared to Western cities that are relatively less diverse. These downstream consequences are worth noting because they themselves could foster further social consequences for biculturals. For instance, if mainstream Westerners see frame switching biculturals as less likeable, trustworthy, and warm, these impressions may make them less likely to form close relationships with biculturals and behave less prosocially, among other consequences. On this topic, it is worth noting that although frame switching did not indirectly affect the bicultural's competence through authenticity, it did decrease impressions of competence on its own. This effect may come with its own host of penalties for biculturals living in Western societies because being seen as less competent by members of the power-holding mainstream culture may cost frame switching biculturals opportunities in their education, career, etc. However, testing any of these suggested downstream consequences of frame switching require future studies where participants directly interact with biculturals rather than judging them from a third-person standpoint, as was the case in this initial investigation.

   An especially illuminating result was that the negative effects on authenticity and other traits held when frame switching was compared to a control condition that did not give

participants information about the biculturals' behavior, instead providing only basic information that included his cultural background. If there was no difference between the switching and control conditions, and participants had penalized the bicultural in both compared to the no switching condition, we might have inferred a general bias toward the bicultural that was alleviated by adhering to the mainstream cultural preference for consistent behavior. The results show, in contrast, that impressions of the bicultural with no behavioral information were mildly positive, and that frame switching cost him his authenticity and other desirable traits. This implies that mainstream Canadians' negative reactions were driven by the bicultural's frame switching rather than by simply any bias they might have toward his particular minority cultures or toward his bicultural status in general. Further, the unexpected finding that actively not switching boosted the bicultural's authenticity strengthens our assertion that mainstream Westerners value and reward behavioral consistency, which is fundamentally at odds with the act of frame switching.

General Discussion

The present research unveils psychological and social consequences of frame switching for biculturals. Western philosophical traditions and lay theories create a normative cultural framework in which behavioral inconsistency is equated with inauthenticity, inherently setting up frame switching biculturals for a fall. When biculturals frame switch, their main goal may be to achieve cultural fit with both of their cultures by matching themselves to each one at a time, without permanently sacrificing their fit with one for the other. Paradoxically, for biculturals in Western contexts, this way of maintaining cultural fit creates a fundamental misfit with the mainstream culture's beliefs and expectations, as the inconsistency of their behavior while frame switching makes them see themselves, and makes others see them, as less authentic which can

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have downstream consequences. Thus, despite frame switching's benefits of increasing cultural fit within each frame (e.g., Hong et al., 2000; Lafromboise et al., 1993), we show that the act of switching between frames can be costly in certain cultural contexts.

Complexifying Cultural Fit

This research takes a novel approach to examining cultural fit by considering it as an active process, asserting that the way people attempt to fit with their cultures may be as important to consider as their overall levels of cultural fit. In the case of biculturals, for instance, a more traditional focus may have been to examine the outcomes associated with the overall amount of overlap between a bicultural with each of their two cultures (e.g., values, personality, etc.). While such an individual differences approach would likely be informative, it might provide an incomplete picture of how cultural fit affects biculturals because it neglects the fact that their level of fit with each culture changes depending on context, and that doing so interacts with the larger cultural context shaping the experience and consequences of cultural fit. By considering frame switching as a process of cultural fit, we have unearthed a set of possible negative effects of cultural fit in a Western context that may have otherwise been missed. In doing so, we not only challenge assumptions that cultural fit is always beneficial, but also reveal the potential quagmire biculturals may face when trying to fit in with both of their cultures in a Western context – frame switching to increase their fit benefits biculturals in each frame, but if their behavioral inconsistency is made salient to themselves or others, it may undermine the very thing they are trying to achieve – cultural fit. Our work, therefore, broadens the scope of cultural fit research to include the ways people achieve fit and unveils complex relationships between the advantages and disadvantages of cultural fit.

Understanding Biculturals' Shared Experiences

Situated within biculturalism research, the findings of these studies add to a growing body of work examining the unique products of the common processes biculturals use to negotiate their cultures (Saad et al., 2013; Tadmor et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2017). As advocates of a transformative theory of biculturalism, we have elsewhere encouraged researchers to find the ways that biculturals are more than the sum of their parts (West et al., 2017); how do the specific ways biculturals negotiate their cultures affect their experiences and characteristics, beyond the effects of each of their cultures independently? The current studies demonstrated potential consequences of frame switching amongst a diverse array of biculturals within a shared cultural context. In Study 1, the biculturals we sampled named 38 different national cultures as those they felt most personally connected to. Despite this diversity, our results suggest that their common experiences of frame switching can have similar repercussions in a shared Western context, coming at a cost to their sense of authenticity and consequently their personal well-being. In Study 2, even though our bicultural target had a specific cultural background, the design and results of our manipulation affirm that the negative social effects were driven by mainstream Canadians' reactions to frame switching rather than the particular cultures. Thus, these studies emphasize how the process of frame switching can uniquely affect biculturals' experiences. To our knowledge, this is some of the first work to establish causal relationships between a specific bicultural negotiation process and psychological and social outcomes.

Limitations and Future Directions

Though this research contributes some preliminary, novel findings to the literature on cultural fit and biculturalism, the studies presented are limited in at least the following ways. First, Study 1 relied on biculturals' recollections of an instance of frame switching and their feelings of authenticity during the event. This method does not allow us to observe participants'

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real-time experiences and so our findings may not reflect how biculturals actually feel while they are in a particular frame. However, what is interesting about these results is that biculturals' memory may be biased toward feeling less authentic when recalling frame switching regardless of how they feel when actually doing so. This highlights a point that was made early on in this article, about the distinction between the moment-to-moment experiences of authenticity and recall about authenticity, the latter of which may be more heavily influenced by cultural expectations and beliefs. Biculturals may commit an error similar to introverts who remember feeling less authentic when acting extraverted despite actually feeling more authentic when doing so (Fleeson and Wilt, 2010). During the meta-cognitive process of retrospecting, biculturals in Study 1 may have been influenced by internalized associations between behavioral consistency and authenticity, which served as an interpretive lens for making sense of their frame switching experiences. Future experience sampling or daily diary-based studies could examine how authentic biculturals feel during moments of frame switching, to see if these states differ from what biculturals might expect to feel based on shared lay beliefs about what constitutes authentic behavior.

Another limitation concerns the cultural background of participants in relationship to the bicultural's background in Study 2. Participants were mainstream Canadians who learned about how a bicultural behaves with his two other cultures. In this study we intentionally chose two non-Canadian cultures for the bicultural's background in order to avoid possible in-group signaling effects that might have biased participants' reactions to frame switching. If the participants' culture was one that the bicultural was described as switching between, participants may have reacted negatively because of the bicultural switching away from participants' own culture, as would be predicted by research on prejudice and intergroup processes (Johnson and

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Ashburn-Nardo, 2014; Johnson and Kaiser, 2012; Jones, 2005) and evidence of cultural

matching (De Leersnyder et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2008; Kokkoris and Kühnen, 2014; Taylor et

al., 2007; Tsai, 2017), and not necessarily because of a preference for not-switching.

Nonetheless, because in the current study participants' culture was not one of the cultures that

the bicultural was described as frame switching between and engaging with, it is unknown how

intergroup processes may play a role in this phenomenon. In order to address this limitation,

future research should examine the reactions of individuals who belong to one of a bicultural's

groups (e.g., minority perceivers) when they are aware versus unaware that a bicultural frame

switches. Follow-up studies like this that integrate intergroup processes would allow us to model

richer situations that would feasibly occur in biculturals' lives.

A related limitation of Study 2's method is that participants were assigned an

"omniscient" role by receiving explicit information about the bicultural's behavioral

(in)consistency and then gave their impressions without directly interacting with him. A

detached, third-person perspective may not reflect how people naturally form impressions of

biculturals. In real life, others may be most likely to learn that a bicultural frame switches when

they are interacting with a bicultural in a mixed-cultural setting where one of the bicultural's

other cultural groups are also present (e.g., a wedding, family gathering, party). Perceivers'

reactions to frame switching in situations where they are actually interacting with biculturals

may differ from the more artificial scenario we created in this study. To address this issue, we

intend to build on the initial observations presented here by examining more naturalistic frame

switching situations to see if perceivers react differently to biculturals when interacting face-to-

face.

Another consideration for both studies surrounds the issue of demand characteristics elicited by the explicit manipulation of behavioral consistency and ensuing judgments of authenticity. Although the manipulations and design of both studies likely made evident our focus on the effects of consistency on authenticity, we believe that participants' ability to respond in the predicted ways depends on the accessibility of the cultural lay beliefs about the consistency–authenticity association. Thus, any demand characteristics were likely shaped at least as much by the Western cultural expectations that we intended to study as by participants' desire to fulfill a "good subject" role (Nichols and Maner, 2008; Orne, 1962). It may also be worth noting that responding according to our hypotheses in both studies required participants to go against competing incentives: to protect their own self-esteem in Study 1, and to avoid appearing racially biased in a multiculturalism-promoting setting in Study 2. Nonetheless, future studies should include subtler ways of testing our hypotheses that would reduce demand characteristics that are not driven by shared lay beliefs.

A final limitation of both studies is that we have focused only on a Western context. Although our findings suggest that frame switching can have negative consequences for biculturals in the US and Canada, we do not know how frame switching is received in other cultural contexts or by minority groups in Western contexts. Some research on culture and consistency calls into question the extent to which people from different cultures actually differ in personality consistency across roles (Church et al., 2008, 2013; Locke et al., 2017). Similarly, authenticity may be a universally important characteristic that people gauge and value in others, and experiences of authentic states may be more similar than different across cultures (Slabu et al., 2014). However, cross-cultural differences may still exist in prescriptions surrounding what being authentic should look like (e.g., Kashima et al., 2004), as authenticity is undoubtedly a

multifaceted construct with criteria that vary between people across different contexts, and these internalized guides likely color the way different people construct and interpret their own and others' experiences. To illustrate, certain aspects of Study 1 (e.g., materials in English) may have prompted biculturals to particularly rely on Western expectations and beliefs about behavioral consistency, external influence, and authenticity when recalling how they felt while frame switching and reporting their current well-being (Zhang & Noels, 2013). It would be interesting to see if activating a different cultural frame would change the results we obtain – for instance, if eligible biculturals completed this study in Japanese, would that culture's emphasis on dialecticism and social role fulfillment reverse our pattern of results, leading participants to recall feeling more authentic when frame switching than not? Future cultural priming studies could test this hypothesis, seeing whether different cultural frames change how biculturals interpret their frame switching experiences. Relatedly, mainstream Canadians in Study 2 presumably drew on their Western cultural understanding of authentic behavior in deeming the bicultural least authentic when he frame switched. But how might perceivers from other cultures react? If we conducted the study in East Asia, for instance, and this culture expects people to adapt their behavior, accept external influence, and fulfill social roles (as researchers have traditionally thought, e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1998), and associates doing these things with authenticity rather than inauthenticity, then frame switching may not have the same misfit with this surrounding culture and may not evoke the same negative reactions as in Western contexts. Including conditions in future studies that emphasize other potential components of authenticity, pitting them against behavioral consistency alone, would be an insightful test of the necessity and centrality of consistency to authenticity. On the other hand, frame switching may elicit similarly unfavorable reactions for biculturals in East Asia but for reasons other than

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inconsistency signaling inauthenticity. Many East Asian cultures promote strong in-group/out-group boundaries and racial essentialism, and any behavior that indicates that a person has divided alliances to different groups may be construed as disloyalty[12], especially when those other groups have clear ethnic or racial markers (Chen et al., 2018). Thus, biculturals could face similar consequences in East Asian and Western contexts but through different mechanisms. Future research with other cultural samples and in other cultural contexts is needed to determine differences and similarities in how frame switching affects biculturals' psychologically and socially.

Are Frames Masks or Faces?

In general, these studies suggest that frame switching could come at a cost to biculturals' authenticity in Western cultural contexts. Whereas this may have been expected in Study 2, in which mainstream Canadians reacted negatively to switching, the effects on authenticity may not have been quite as foreseeable for the way biculturals feel about themselves. Previous research on role-consistency has suggested that a person can still feel authentic within roles despite reporting a certain amount of inconsistency between them (Sheldon et al., 1997) and that the association between cross-role inconsistency and authenticity differs between individuals and cultures (Boucher, 2011; Cross et al., 2003; Kashima et al., 2004). Therefore, biculturals may differ as to whether their cultural frames feel like masks, that inauthentically obscure the self, or like faces, that authentically express the self. Based on this, in Study 1 we explored whether the negative effects of switching on authenticity would be moderated by biculturals' cultural identity structures (see Notes 3 and 8). Though these results did not support this prediction, it remains possible that biculturals vary in the extent to which frame switching makes them feel less authentic and in the circumstances that evoke this effect. It may be that being in a certain cultural

frame feels more authentic to biculturals than being in another, or that being in certain social roles within each frame (e.g., friend, son/daughter) may feel more or less authentic. Feelings of authenticity may also depend on the motivational nature of biculturals' frame switching, as accepting external influence may not undermine authenticity if doing so feels self-directed and self-expressive (i.e., in line with truly held preferences and values) rather than driven solely by external pressures (i.e., seeking reward and avoiding punishment; Kernis and Goldman, 2006).

As to the process of switching itself and the inconsistency it necessitates, negative effects on authenticity may depend on the degree to which biculturals have internalized and endorse Western cultural associations between consistency and authenticity. Even biculturals who generally feel authentic within each of their cultural frames may interpret their inconsistent behavior between contexts as a sign of their own inauthenticity when their frame switching is brought to their attention in Western societies. This suggests that biculturals may not necessarily feel less authentic in the moment when frame switching unless they reflect on the inconsistencies involved. Thus, we encourage further research into the situational and individual factors that influence biculturals' experiences of frame switching, affecting whether the switching process ultimately feels like changing masks or faces.

To Switch or Not to Switch?

The results of these two studies are particularly relevant in our increasingly diverse Western societies, as they identify a potential source and multiple consequences of intercultural barriers. As we have argued, frame switching seems fundamentally at odds with Western cultural prescriptions that associate consistency and authenticity. Additionally, frame switching between cultures is likely an unfamiliar phenomenon to mainstream monoculturals, and this unfamiliarity may exacerbate their negative reactions to the inherent violation of their culture's idealized

expectations and beliefs. As such, learning that a bicultural frame switches may be difficult for mainstream Westerners to understand and accommodate, and the knee-jerk reaction may be disapproval, suspicion, and distance. Study 2 showed that mainstream Canadians—even in a highly liberal, diverse, multicultural context—deemed a frame switching bicultural to be less authentic, and this had subsequent consequences for likeability, trust, and warmth. In the real world, it is possible that the downstream implications could go beyond impressions. For instance, if mainstream Americans and Canadians dislike and distrust a frame switching bicultural, they may act less prosocially toward them, afford them less opportunities in society, and be less open to intimate, meaningful social or romantic relationships.

Despite these hypothetical implications for biculturals, the worst of these consequences may be restricted to contexts in which authenticity is highly valued and consistency is strongly associated with authenticity. Research within psychology and from other social sciences contests the necessity and centrality of consistency to evaluations of authenticity and suggests that this varies by context *within* as well as between cultures. A campaigning politician, for example, may face harsh fallout for endorsing different values more strongly to one cultural group of voters than another. Former US president Obama, for instance, drew media attention by behaving differently with Black versus White people, sparking controversial reactions from Americans who questioned his authenticity and claim to each of his cultural identities (e.g., McWhorter, 2016; Timm, 2016). An international businessperson, in contrast, is less likely to be scorned (and in fact, may be praised as savvy) for adapting her pitch to fit the cultural norms of investors in one country versus another. In fact, research and training in the business world often highlights cross-cultural competency by adapting one's behavior to contextual demands as an essential skill for leadership and success (Ang et al., 2011; Adair et al., 2007; Earley and Mosakowski, 2004;

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Johnson et al., 2006). Hence, frame switching does not necessarily doom biculturals in the eyes of mainstream Westerners and may potentially have positive social effects in certain circumstances. Future studies should uncover the domains within Western culture that differ in terms of emphasizing consistency and authenticity, as this may identify the boundaries of frame switching's negative effects.

Further hope for biculturals may come in the form of intervention studies aimed at weakening mainstream Americans' and Canadians' associations between consistency and authenticity, or by increasing their familiarity and understanding of biculturals' frame switching. Empirical evidence, and common knowledge, makes it clear that even the most monocultural Westerner behaves somewhat inconsistently in response to situational demands (e.g., expressing personality traits differently across social roles; Sheldon et al., 1997), and doing so is often acceptable and even expected (Cialdini et al., 1991; Locke et al., 2017; Nelson, 1981). Thus, Westerners are capable of approving, or at least not disapproving, of behavioral inconsistency across contexts. In future studies, we plan to capitalize on familiar forms of behavioral adaptation across social roles (e.g., with a boss versus with a partner) in order to coax mainstream Americans and Canadians into relating to biculturals' frame switching experiences, hopefully mitigating the negative effects found in the present studies.

Conclusion

Biculturals face the complicated task of trying to fit with multiple cultures. The major implication of the current research is that the way biculturals go about doing this can affect them psychologically and socially. When biculturals frame switch, adapting themselves to each of their cultures, the inconsistency of their behavior violates Western expectations and, within this cultural context, has consequences for biculturals' authenticity in terms of how they see

themselves and are seen by others. While frame switching is undoubtedly a valuable skill for biculturals, and its benefits surely outweigh its potential costs, our work unveils the complex and sometimes paradoxical effects of frame switching, shedding light on challenges biculturals face as they go about negotiating their complex cultural worlds.

Notes

[1]Prolific's multicultural prescreen item asks "Some researchers are interested in researching the experiences of monocultural individuals (that is, people who grew up mostly in one culture). Other researchers are interested in exploring the experiences of multicultural individuals (that is, people who are members of, or have a lineage from, more than one cultural group). Do you identify yourself as a monocultural or multicultural individual?"

[2]Focusing on our primary hypothesized effect of frame switching on authenticity, we conducted a power analysis for a one-way ANOVA with three conditions. With $\alpha = .05$ at 80% power, we needed a sample of $N = 159$ to detect a medium effect.

[3]Participants also completed the Multicultural Identity Integration Scale (Yampolsky et al., 2016) prior to the recall manipulation. This measure was included because we hypothesized that participants' cultural identity configurations (i.e., integration, compartmentalization, categorization) might moderate the effects of frame switching on authenticity. However, the results did not support this prediction.

[4]To address the concern that the Accepting External Influence factor may be implicitly tied to the switching condition's task instructions, thus functioning as a manipulation check rather than an outcome, we ran the analyses with and without this factor. The results are not contingent on the inclusion of the Accepting External Influence factor of state authenticity. When this factor is excluded, the overall effect of condition remains significant, $p = .017$, and the switching condition remains significantly lower on authenticity compared to the no switching condition, $p = .014$, and to the control condition, $p < .001$. The indirect effects of frame switching on life

satisfaction via authenticity also remain significant for the switching vs. no switching contrast [95% CI: .05, .63] and the switching vs. control contrast [95% CI: .05, .58].

[5]Though the contrasts between conditions had to be coded with the switching condition as 0 to specify it as the reference group (for indicator coding), we explain the results here and in Study 2 in terms of switching's negative effects and therefore present the data as if switching had been coded as 1.

[6]The two social approval items were significantly correlated with each of the five life satisfaction items, rs > .35, ps < .001, except for the "…live up to expectations of people…" and "…I would change almost nothing" items. Exploring the factor structure of the seven items using via a parallel analysis and EFA using ordinary least squares estimation suggested a single factor was sufficient, RMSEA = .08, 90% CI [.01, .13], SRMR = .05, therefore we emphasize the exploratory nature of the mediation model in Study 1. The direct effects of condition were not significant for either life satisfaction or social approval, Fs < 1, ps > .65.

[7]The relationship between state authenticity and life satisfaction was not moderated by condition. None of the condition contrasts by authenticity interactions were statistically significant, bs < |.47|, ps > .11.

[8]Surprisingly, biculturals felt less authentic when switching regardless of how integrated, compartmentalized, or categorized their identities were. Prior work shows that biculturals' perceptions of the relationship between their cultural identities influences how they respond to their environments in many ways (e.g., Cheng et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2014) and are also associated with different social factors (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005; Yampolsky and Amiot, 2016) and differing levels of well-being (Yampolsky et al., 2013; 2016). We did not find

evidence that identity configuration moderated frame switching's effects, though our sample size may not have provided sufficient power to detect such an interaction. In future research, we will continue to suss out potential differences between biculturals that may affect their frame switching experiences.

[9]Though in this research we use race and ancestry as a proxy for culture to recruit mainstream participants, we posit that their hypothesized reactions are the result of Western cultural influence rather than racial or genetic influences.

[10]Power analysis for a one-way ANOVA with three conditions at $\alpha = .05$ and 80% power indicated that a sample size of N = 159 was needed to detect a medium effect. Despite our efforts to collect this planned N, the specificity of our inclusion criteria greatly restricted the eligible members of our undergraduate pool. Given that our final sample fell short of our planned N, some amount of caution is necessary in interpreting these results, and replication with a larger sample would be ideal in future research.

[11]We also measured participants' preference for consistency in others (Cialdini et al., 1995) to see if individual differences in the endorsement of this Western cultural preference would moderate the negative effects of frame switching. However, responses on this measure were affected by our manipulation, with participants in the Switching and No Switching condition reporting higher preference for consistency compared to those in the Control condition, $p = .03$ and $p < .01$ respectively, but Switching and No Switching did not differ. Interestingly, this suggests that thinking about another person's consistency or lack thereof bolsters Westerners's personal adoption of the cultural preference for consistency.

Ethics Statement

The present studies' protocols were reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee of York University, conforming to the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans. All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.

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Figures

Figure 1. Study 1: Average state authenticity (± *SE*) by condition.

Figure 2. Study 1 mediation model showing the effects of frame switching on life satisfaction via state authenticity with relative direct effects of condition on life satisfaction, *p* < .05, **p < .01, ***p <.001.

Figure 3. Study 2: Average authenticity ratings (± *SE*) by condition.

Likability

Switching (0) vs. No Switching (1)

.72***

Authenticity

.53***

.65***

Trustworthiness

Switching (0) vs. Control (1)

.38***

.53***

.34**

.22*

Warmth

.26**

Competence

Figure 4. Study 2 multivariate mediation model showing the effects of frame switching on trait evaluations via authenticity with relative direct effects of condition on competence, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

The Cost of Being "True to Yourself" for Mixed Selves: Frame Switching Leads to Perceived

Inauthenticity and Downstream Social Consequences for Biculturals

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Abstract

A growing population of biculturals—who identify with at least two cultures—often frame switch, adapting their behavior to their shifting cultural contexts. We demonstrate that frame switching biculturals are perceived as inauthentic by majority Americans and consequently seen as less likable, trustworthy, warm, and competent compared to biculturals who do not frame switch or a neutral control (Studies 1-3, N=763). In Study 2, describing the bicultural's behavior as authentic despite its inconsistency partly alleviated the negative effects of frame switching. In our preregistered Study 3, majority American women were less romantically interested in and less willing to date a bicultural who frame switched in his dating profiles (mediated by inauthenticity). The way biculturals negotiate their cultures can have social costs and create a barrier to intercultural relations.

The Cost of Being "True to Yourself" for Mixed Selves: Frame Switching Leads to

Perceived Inauthenticity and Downstream Social Consequences for Biculturals

"Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)"

-Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself"

As diversity increases in many nations, including the US (Horowitz, 2019), so too has the population of *biculturals*—people who belong to at least two cultural groups. Biculturals themselves are also diverse and can include immigrants and their progeny, biracials, and people who are immersed in multiple cultures. Being bicultural can be challenging—not only must biculturals negotiate different cultural norms, but they also face misunderstandings and discrimination from others. Mainstream Americans may be suspicious of biculturals' dual cultural identification (Kunst, Thomsen, & Dovidio, 2018) and assume biculturals are confused about their identity and are untrustworthy (Albuja, Sanchez, & Gaither, 2018). Yet, in addition to biases against biculturals based on who they *are*, another source of bias may come from what they *do*. We posit that biculturals' *behavior* as they negotiate their cultures can have powerful effects on the way others perceive them (West, Zhang, Yampolsky, & Sasaki, 2017, 2018).

Here, we focus on the bicultural phenomenon of *frame switching*, or adapting oneself in response to the immediate cultural context (Hong & Khei, 2014). This process can occur consciously or unconsciously (Doucerain, Dere, & Ryder, 2013; Mok & Morris, 2013) and involves shifting between culturally normative styles of cognition, emotion, and behavior (e.g., Perunovic, Heller, & Rafaeli, 2007). Frame switching enables biculturals to gain acceptance and maintain relationships within each of their cultural groups, fostering their well-being

(LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). Although frame switching has a clear function for biculturals, its potential consequences are not well-understood. Does frame switching come with social costs for biculturals, even as they strive to be true to themselves?

Inconsistency Signals Inauthenticity

Western cultures emphasize the individual as an autonomous agent, ideally uninfluenced by external forces (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Behaviors ought to reflect one's singular, true self and not change across situations (Cross, Gore, & Morris, 2003). People who behave inconsistently are seen as inauthentic (Kashima et al., 2004), and authenticity is upheld as a virtue (Kernis & Goldman, 2006). This is problematic for biculturals because frame switching requires changing the way they behave according to the cultural context, and this inconsistency might undermine their perceived authenticity and have downstream social costs.

Social Costs of Inauthenticity

One reason biculturals frame switch is to gain acceptance by being mindful of each cultures' norms and values. Paradoxically, frame switching may undercut biculturals' acceptance in Western society because switching *between* cultural frames violates the dominant culture's expectation of behavioral consistency (English & Chen, 2011). The social consequences of frame switching may be far from trivial, as inauthenticity comes with many costs.

At a person-perception level, frame switching may damage general impressions of biculturals as fallout of being seen as inauthentic. Extant research with majority Americans shows that perceived authenticity strongly relates to impressions of likeability and trustworthiness (Krumhuber et al., 2007). Further, authenticity is related to perceptions of warmth and competence (West et al., 2018), which are considered universal dimensions in impression formation (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). Thus, we hypothesize that a bicultural's

frame switching will undermine their perceived authenticity and subsequently, their likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence.

Frame switching may have additional, powerful consequences for biculturals, particularly in romantic relationships. In Western societies, feeling and being perceived as authentic is fundamental to forming and maintaining romantic relationships (Josephs et al., 2019), and perceived inauthenticity can diminish relationship satisfaction, commitment, and support (Lopez & Rice, 2006; Wickham, 2013). Our final study examines the consequences of frame switching on biculturals' online dating prospects, an impactful real-world context in which concerns about authenticity are heightened (Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008).

In the current research, we test our key prediction that frame switching undermines a bicultural's perceived authenticity, subsequently damaging general impressions and their romantic relationship prospects in America.

All studies' materials, data, syntax, and the preregistration for Study 3 are available on Open Science Framework (osf.io/4397c/); pretests, power analyses, additional and meta-analyzed results are also in the Online Supplementary Materials.

Study 1

We hypothesize that participants will see a bicultural as less authentic if he frame switches than if he does not and that this reduction in perceived authenticity will have downstream consequences such that the bicultural will be seen as less likeable, trustworthy, warm, and competent.

Method

Participants. Majority Americans (*N*=150) participated online via Prolific. Power analyses (α=.05) based on the effect size of frame switching (vs. no switching) on authenticity

obtained in a pilot study (d=2.04, West et al., 2018) indicated 99.9% power with N=150. To be eligible, participants had to be White, US citizens, born and residing in the US, English as first-language, and had parents born in the US, Canada, or Western-Europe excluding Southern-Europe (Lalonde et al., 2013, n=9 excluded). We excluded participants who failed more than one of four attention checks (recall the bicultural's name and cultures, n=8) or indicated that they did not complete the study honestly and attentively (self-report item, n=0). Final sample N=133 (57 females, M_{age}=34.38, SD_{age}=13.46).

Procedure. Following informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of three vignettes: 1) *Switching* (n=44), the bicultural's behavior differed depending on which cultural group he is with, 2) *No-Switching* (n=46), the bicultural's behavior was the same regardless of which cultural group he was with, or 3) *Neutral* (n=43), only background information and none on how a bicultural behaved with his cultural groups. After reading the vignette and answering attention checks, participants reported their impressions of the bicultural's authenticity and provided their impressions of his likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence. Finally, participants completed demographics before debriefing.

Materials.

Bicultural vignettes. Participants read vignettes featuring Miguel Wong, a US-born Mexican Chinese bicultural American (West et al., 2018). We selected two minority cultures as the focus of switching to avoid any confounding effects of ingroup/outgroup biases (e.g., concerns about disloyalty). Both cultures represented minority outgroups for participants, which isolates the effects of frame switching from group biases that may occur if the bicultural was switching between his majority American and a minority culture. Vignettes began with the same description of Miguel as an American graduate student who identifies equally with his father's

Chinese culture and his mother's Mexican culture. The next part of the vignette differed by condition.

The *Switching* condition described, "Miguel behaves differently depending on which cultural group he is with, so his behavior is more typically Chinese when he is with Chinese people, and more typically Mexican when he is with Mexicans" and then provided examples of how his behavior changes with each culture."

The *No-Switching* condition described, "Miguel doesn't tend to behave any differently depending on which cultural group he is with, so his behavior is largely the same regardless of whether he is with Chinese people or Mexicans" and provided examples of how he behaves with each culture.

The *Neutral* condition vignette did not provide any additional information.

Pretesting ensured that the descriptions of Miguel's specific behaviors did not differ in desirability by condition.

Authenticity. We adapted a 4-item measure of subjective authenticity (English & Chen, 2011, α=.94), to assess a target's perceived authenticity rather than one's own authenticity, e.g.,"Miguel is being himself with others." (1:*strongly disagree* to 7:*strongly agree*).

General impressions.

Likeability. Participants responded to nine items gauging how likeable they found the bicultural (Cila & Lalonde, 2015; α=.88), e.g.,"*Miguel seems like a really nice guy.*" (1:*strongly disagree* to 7:*strongly agree*).

Trustworthiness. A single item asked, "*Overall, I think Miguel is a trustworthy person*" (1:*strongly disagree* to 7:*strongly agree*).

Warmth and Competence. Participants also rated two fundamental trait dimensions: warmth (6 items; α=.87) and competence (7 items; α=.84; Cuddy et al., 2007) on 5-point scales (1:*not at all* to 5:*extremely*).

Results

See Table 1 for descriptive statistics.

A one-way ANOVA revealed that authenticity ratings differed significantly across conditions, $F(2, 130)=82.11$, $p<.001$, $\eta_p^2=.56$. Consistent with our primary hypothesis, participants saw Miguel as less authentic when he frame switched compared to when he actively did not frame switch, $t(130)=12.38$, $p<.001$, $d=2.17$ and to when no information was given about his behavior, $t(130)=9.08$ $p<.001$, $d=1.59$.

One-way ANOVAs on likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence showed significant effects of condition, Fs$(2, 130)>4.18$, ps$<.02$, η_p^2s$>.06$ (Table 2–total effects). Across all measures, participants in the *Switching* condition formed less favorable impressions of Miguel compared to those in the *No-Switching* condition [likeable $t(130)=2.07$, $p=.04$, $d=0.36$, trustworthy $t(130)=3.20$, $p=.002$, $d=0.56$, warm $t(129)=3.00$, $p=.003$, $d=0.53$, competent $t(129)=3.56$, $p=.001$, $d=0.63$] and compared to those in the *Neutral* condition [likeable $t(130)=2.79$, $p=.006$, $d=0.49$, trustworthy $t(130)=1.98$, $p=.05$, $d=0.35$, warm $t(129)=2.51$, $p=.01$, $d=0.44$, competent $t(129)=2.64$, $p=.009$, $d=0.47$].

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Study 1

	Switching	No-Switching	Neutral
	M [95% *CI*]	*M* [95% *CI*]	*M* [95% *CI*]
Authenticity	4.30 [4.06, 4.54]	6.40 [6.17, 6.64]	5.87 [5.62, 6.11]
Likeability	5.23 [4.98, 5.47]	5.58 [5.34, 5.81]	5.71 [5.46, 5.95]
Trustworthiness	5.02 [4.70, 5.35]	5.76 [5.44, 6.08]	5.49 [5.16, 5.82]
Warmth	3.81 [3.65, 3.98]	4.12 [4.00, 4.31]	4.10 [3.94, 4.27]
Competence	3.71 [3.55, 3.86]	4.10 [3.95, 4.26]	4.01 [3.85, 4.17]

To test whether frame switching negatively affected general impressions by reducing authenticity, we conducted mediation analyses using (PROCESSv.3) following procedures for multicategorical independent variables (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Conditions were coded to into two orthogonal contrasts: *Switching* vs. *No-Switching* and *Switching* vs. *Neutral*. Supporting our prediction, confidence intervals for all indirect effects were below zero (Table 2–indirect effects), demonstrating that frame switching significantly decreased evaluations on all traits by diminishing Miguel's perceived authenticity.

Table 2

Total and Indirect Effects of Frame Switching (vs. No-Switching and vs. Control) for Study 1

	Total Effect of Condition			Switch vs. No Switch via Authenticity		Switch vs. Neutral via Authenticity	
	F	p	η_p^2	b (*SE*)	95% *CI*	b (*SE*)	95% *CI*
Likeability	4.18	.02	.06	−1.14 (0.18)	−1.51, −0.79	−0.85 (.16)	−1.17, −0.56
				−1.37 (0.19)	*−1.77, −1.02*	*−1.02 (.17)*	*−1.36, −0.72*
Trust	5.20	.006	.07	−1.52 (.22)	−1.94, −1.10	−1.13 (.19)	−1.53, −0.77
				−1.34 (.16)	*−1.66, −1.04*	*−1.00 (.15)*	*−1.31, −0.72*
Warmth	5.18	.007	.07	−0.71 (.12)	−0.95, −0.49	−0.54 (.10)	−0.75, −0.36
				−1.27 (.20)	*−1.67, −0.90*	*−0.97 (.17)*	*−1.33, −0.66*
Competence	6.84	.002	.10	−0.45 (.12)	−0.69, −0.23	−0.35 (.09)	−0.54, −0.17
				−0.83 (.20)	*−1.22, −0.42*	*−0.63 (.16)*	*−0.96, −0.32*

Note. For total effects, $df_1=2$, $df_2=130$. For indirect effects, non-italicized coefficients refer to the unstandardized indirect effects and italicized coefficients below refer to the partially standardized indirect effects. 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals (10,000 samples) that do not contain zero indicate a statistically significant effect. All indirect effects above are significant.

Study 2

Study 1 demonstrated that majority Americans saw a frame switching bicultural as less authentic compared to when he actively did not frame switch and when no information was given about his behavior. This loss of perceived authenticity consequently damaged general

impressions of the frame switching bicultural. However, statistical mediation in cross-sectional designs is limited to only testing a correlation between the mediator and outcome (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005), thus our next study manipulates the mediator to establish a causal chain between frame switching to authenticity to general impressions. If the consequences of frame switching are truly due to perceived inauthenticity, then assuring participants that a frame switching bicultural is still being authentic should mitigate the harsher impressions found in Study 1. We predicted that majority Americans would form more favorable impressions of a frame switching bicultural when told that he *is* behaving authentically with each culture compared to when his authenticity is not affirmed.

Method

  Participants. Majority Americans (*N*=435) participated online via Prolific. Eligibility and exclusion criteria were consistent with Study 1; final sample *N*=390. Power analyses based on an initial study (see OSM) indicated that *N*=390 provided 80% power (α=.05) to detect the smallest observed effect—authentic switching vs. switching on competence, *d*=0.29.

  Procedure. Overall, the design and procedure followed Study 1. The major difference was adding a new *Authentic-Switching* condition (*n*=129) which was based on the previous Switching condition vignette but included an additional paragraph affirming the bicultural's authenticity. This study also included the same *Switching* (*n*=132) and *No-Switching* (*n*=129) conditions from Study 1, allowing us to test if the previous effects replicated along with the current hypothesis. Thus, there were three randomly-assigned conditions: *Switching*, *Authentic-Switching*, and *No-Switching*. After reading one of the vignettes, participants rated the bicultural's likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence. They also rated the bicultural's authenticity as a manipulation check before completing demographics and debriefing.

Materials.

Bicultural vignettes. The *Switching* and *No-Switching* vignettes were identical to those in Study 1. The new *Authentic-Switching* vignette provided the same content as the Switching vignette, followed by information affirming the bicultural's authenticity:

> "Miguel is not trying to pretend or misrepresent himself when he is with either cultural group, and he has no intention to deceive or manipulate others through his behaviour. Rather, Miguel's behavior with each cultural group reflects different sides of himself that are both equally a part of who he truly is."

Pretesting these vignettes confirmed the effectiveness of the manipulation—Miguel was deemed more authentic in the *Authentic-Switching* (vs. *Switching*) condition.

General impressions. Measures of likeability ($\alpha=.91$), warmth ($\alpha=.89$), and competence ($\alpha=.86$) were the same as in Study 1. To improve our assessment of trustworthiness beyond a single item, we adapted a three-item measure (Fletcher, Simpson, & Thomas, 2000; $\alpha=.93$). All response scales ranged from 1(*strongly disagree*) to 7(*strongly agree*).

Authenticity. The authenticity measure from Study 1 provided a manipulation check; results ensured that the authenticity manipulation in the Authentic-Switching condition was successful.

Results

See Table 3 for descriptive statistics.

One-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences between the three conditions on all four general impressions: likability, $F(2, 385)=5.28$, $p=.005$, $\eta^2_p=.03$; trustworthiness, $F(2, 387)=8.42$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.04$; warmth, $F(2, 385)=6.70$, $p=.001$, $\eta^2_p=.03$; and competence, $F(2, 385)=8.37$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.04$. Negative effects of the *Switching* (vs. *No-Switching*) condition also

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replicated on all impressions, ts(385–387)>3.17, ps<.002, ds>0.32. Assuring participants of

Miguel's authenticity when frame switching (i.e., *Authentic-Switching* vs. *Switching*) partially

mitigated the negative consequences of frame switching: Miguel was judged less harshly in

terms of likeability, t(385)=2.19, p=.03, d=0.22 and warmth, t(385)=2.65, p=.008, d=0.27, but

not trustworthiness, t(387)=1.00, p=.32, d=0.10 or competence, t(385)=0.98, p=.33, d=0.10.

Further, affirming Miguel's authenticity when frame switching partially nullified the benefits of

actively not frame switching (i.e., *Authentic-Switching* vs. *No-Switching*), as his perceived

likeability and warmth did not differ significantly between these two conditions: likeability,

t(385)=0.97, p=.34, d=0.10; warmth, t(385)=0.85, p=.40, d=0.09. However, actively not frame

switching still produced advantages over authentically frame switching (i.e., *No-Switching* vs.

Authentic-Switching) for Miguel's perceived trustworthiness, t(387)=2.94, p=.004, d=0.30, and

competence, t(385)=2.95, p=.003, d=0.30. Thus, affirming the bicultural's authenticity countered

some, but not all, of the costs from frame switching as well as the benefits from actively not

frame switching.

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics for Study 2

	Authentic-Switching	Switching	No-Switching
	M [95% CI]	M [95% CI]	M [95% CI]
Likeability	5.56 [5.40, 5.72]	5.31 [5.16, 5.47]	5.67 [5.51, 5.82]
Trustworthiness	5.12 [4.95, 5.30]	5.00 [4.82, 5.17]	5.49 [5.32, 5.67]
Warmth	4.03 [3.92, 4.13]	3.83 [3.72, 3.93]	4.09 [3.99, 4.20]

| Competence | 3.89 [3.79, 3.98] | 3.82 [3.72, 3.92] | 4.09 [4.00, 4.19] |

Study 3

Next, we raise the stakes on the social consequences by examining how frame switching negatively impacts biculturals' romantic relationship prospects. We also address two limitations of the prior studies. First, Studies 1-2 used vignettes explicitly describing the bicultural's frame switching and so may have had high demand characteristics—participants may have felt expected to react negatively to the bicultural's inconsistency). Although we would argue that the demand characteristics are likely outweighed by the social desirability of not appearing prejudiced (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), we improve our manipulation in Study 3 to be less explicit by using online dating profiles that display frame switching (or not) in more discrete ways. Second, reading third-person vignettes may not reflect how people naturally learn about others. Study 3 simulates a more realistic situation: seeing a bicultural's frame switching in action in dating profiles that one could find easily online. We predict that 1) frame switching (vs. No-Switching vs. Neutral) will negatively affect majority Americans' perceptions of a bicultural's authenticity and, 2) majority Americans will form less favorable general and dating-relevant impressions of a frame switching bicultural, and these effects will be mediated by authenticity. Our preregistration is available here: osf.io/8yp7x

Method

Participants. Heterosexual, mainstream American women (*N*=292) participated online via Prolific or MTurk. Power analyses approximated that *N*=300 provided 94% power (α=.05) to detect the effect of Switching vs. No-Switching on authenticity (*d*=.50) observed in a pretest.

As preregistered, we excluded participants who did not meet eligibility criteria: majority American, heterosexual women (age 18–40) not currently in a relationship (*n*=49 excluded). We excluded participants who indicated they did not complete the study honestly and attentively (self-report item; *n*=1) or did not provide post-debrief consent (*n*=2). Attention check items were also included, and all participants passed. Final sample *N*=240.

Procedure. Participants were led to believe that they would see five single, American men's profiles from one or more dating websites. In reality, all participants only saw dating profiles ostensibly created by Miguel Wong from Studies 1–2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) *Switching* (*n*=81): Miguel had profiles on two cultural-niche dating websites, each highlight different aspects of himself depending on the cultural context of each site; 2) *No-Switching* (*n*=79): Miguel had nearly identical profiles on the same two cultural-niche sites and did not emphasize either culture over the other; 3) *Neutral* (*n*=80): Miguel had one profile on a general (not cultural-niche) dating site and did not emphasize either culture, thereby establishing his bicultural background without demonstrating his (in)consistency. The *No-Switching* condition presented the same content in each profile with slight variations in how statements were worded to isolate the effects of actively not frame switching from a more mundane form of consistency (i.e., exactly duplicating content).

Participants opened website links to pdfs of Miguel's profile(s) and were instructed to review them carefully. After freely perusing the profiles, we directed participants' focus to key aspects with attention checks about the profile photo and content. Participants then rated Miguel on authenticity, general impressions from prior studies, and new dating-relevant impressions. Further, we assessed hypothetical dating intentions toward Miguel. Finally, participants were

informed there were no other profiles currently available to rate and provided demographics before debriefing.

Materials.

Bicultural dating profiles. All participants saw either one (*Neutral*) or two dating profiles (*Switching* or *No-Switching*). All profiles contained the same basic information about Miguel's demographics, lifestyle, and cultural background. His profile photos (Figure 1) and subtle aspects of the profile content varied between conditions.

Figure 1. Study 3 profile photos (left to right): 1) Mexican profile photo in the Switching Condition, 2) Chinese profile photo in the Switching condition, 3) profile photo in the No-Switching and Neutral condition. For full profiles, see OSM or OSF page.

In the *Switching* condition, Miguel had profiles on two real cultural-niche dating websites: MexicanCupid.com and ChinaLoveCupid.com. His MexicanCupid profile photo showed him wearing a shirt with a calavera (Day-of-the-Dead skull) and the profile content emphasized his interest in more Mexican-associated foods, hobbies/sports, and travel. In

contrast, his ChinaLoveCupid.com profile photo showed him wearing a shirt with a Chinese dragon and the profile content emphasized his interest in more Chinese-associated foods, hobbies/sports, and travel. Importantly, nothing stated in either profile was mutually exclusive—for instance, saying he visited Mexico City in one profile does not contradict the trip to Beijing described in his other profile.

In the *No-Switching* condition, Miguel also had two profiles on the same two cultural-niche websites. In both his MexicanCupid and ChinaLoveCupid profile photos, he was wearing a blank shirt, and the content described his interest in international foods, exercise and sports in general, and a trip to Sydney. Again, the intention here was to demonstrate Miguel's active non-switching with culturally-neutral content.

In the *Neutral* condition, Miguel had just one profile on the fabricated, culturally-neutral LoveCupid.com which we created by covering elements of the ChinaLoveCupid.com layout. His photo showed him wearing the same blank shirt and the profile content was the same as the No-Switching condition.

Pretests ensured that participants noticed Miguel's frame switching between profiles in the *Switching* condition and made the intended cultural associations (e.g., recognized highlighting of Mexican/Chinese culture) and did not see Miguel as more or less American in the *Switching* versus *No-Switching* profiles.

***Authenticity*.** Measured the same as previous (α=.93). Two additional exploratory mediators, deceptiveness and manipulativeness, assessed malicious forms of inauthenticity.

Dating-relevant impressions. Impressions of Miguel as a potential dating partner were assessed using a 4-item measure of Interpersonal Attraction and Intentions to Meet (Alves, 2008; α=.94), e.g., *"How much would you like to meet Miguel?"* (1:*not at all* to 9:*extremely*). We also

created two new items to assess how attractive (physically and more broadly) participants found

Miguel to be (α=.84), and another two items to assess how interested participants were in Miguel

as a dating partner (α=.95), e.g.,*"Miguel seems like someone I would be open to dating."*

(1:*strongly disagree* to 7:*strongly agree*). Participants also reported how likely they would be to

recommend Miguel as a dating partner to a friend using an existing Dating Endorsement item

(1:*strongly disagree* to 5:*strongly agree*; Rycyna, Champion, & Kelly, 2009).

    Dating intentions. Next, participants indicated how likely they would be to engage in

three dating behaviors with Miguel (α=.91). Imagining they had come across Miguel's profile(s)

outside of this study, participants reported their willingness to 1) send Miguel a message, 2)

respond to a message from Miguel, and 3) go on a date with Miguel (1:*strongly disagree* to

7:*strongly agree*).

    General impressions. Participants also evaluated Miguel's likeability, trustworthiness,

warmth, and competence using four single-item measures (1:*strongly disagree* to 7:*strongly

agree*), e.g.,"Overall, I think Miguel is a likeable person.".

Results

    See Table 4 for descriptive statistics.

    Effects on authenticity. One-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences between

conditions on ratings of authenticity, $F(2, 237)$=56.21, p<.001, η^2_p=.32. Participants who

witnessed Miguel's frame switching saw him as less authentic compared to both control

conditions (*No-Switching* and *Neutral*): *Switching* vs. *No-Switching*, $t(237)$=9.68, p<.001,

d=1.26; *Switching* vs. *Neutral*, $t(237)$=8.55, p<.001, d=1.11. Miguel was not seen as any more or

less authentic when he actively did not frame switch (*No-Switching*) compared to when no

information about his behavior was given (*Neutral*), $t(237)=1.15$, $p=.25$, $d=0.15$. Thus, frame switching had strong negative effects on authenticity, the proposed mediator.[1]

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics for Study 3

	Switching	No-Switching	Neutral
	M [95% *CI*]	*M* [95% *CI*]	*M* [95% *CI*]
Authenticity	4.07 [3.84, 4.30]	5.69 [5.45, 5.92]	5.49 [5.26, 5.73]
Interpersonal Attraction & Intentions to Meet	4.58 [4.19, 4.97]	5.94 [5.54, 6.33]	5.62 [5.23, 6.02]
Attractiveness	3.80 [3.52, 4.09]	4.79 [4.50, 5.08]	4.39 [4.11, 4.68]
Dating Interest	3.33 [2.98, 3.68]	4.35 [4.00, 4.71]	4.01 [3.66, 4.37]
Dating Endorsements	2.80 [2.58, 3.03]	3.82 [3.60, 4.05]	3.71 [3.49, 3.94]
Dating Intentions	3.12 [2.77, 3.48]	4.08 [3.72, 4.44]	3.86 [3.51, 4.22]
Likeability	4.91 [4.70, 5.12]	5.89 [5.68, 6.09]	5.73 [5.53, 5.94]
Trustworthiness	4.14 [3.89, 4.39]	5.59 [5.34, 5.84]	5.34 [5.09, 5.58]
Warmth	4.71 [4.46, 4.96]	5.58 [5.32, 5.83]	5.21 [4.96, 5.46]
Competence	5.14 [4.92, 5.36]	5.87 [5.65, 6.10]	5.70 [5.48, 5.92]

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[1] Miguel was also rated as more deceptive and manipulative in the Switching condition (vs. No-Switching and vs. Neutral). When authenticity, deceptiveness and manipulativeness were entered simultaneously into parallel mediation models, only authenticity produced unique indirect effects consistently across all outcomes.

Consequences for dating-relevant impressions. ANOVA results indicated significant differences between conditions on each of the dating-relevant impressions, Fs(2, 237)<8.48, ps<.001, η^2_ps>.07 (Table 5–total effects). When Miguel frame switched instead of actively not switching or when only one non-cultural-niche profile was presented, majority American women formed less favorable dating-relevant impressions. Miguel's frame switching reduced participants' Interpersonal Attraction and Intentions to Meet, ts(237)>3.70, ps<.001, ds>0.48; their attraction to him physically and more broadly, ts(237)>2.90, ps<.004, ds>0.38; their interest in him as a dating partner, ts(237)>2.70, ps<.007, ds>0.35; and their endorsement of him as a dating partner, ts(237)>5.61, ps<.001, ds>0.07. To test the role of authenticity as mediating these negative effects, simple mediation models were constructed in line with the analyses described in Study 1. Supporting our hypothesis, confidence intervals for all of the indirect effects were below zero, showing that frame switching significantly diminished majority Americans' dating-relevant impressions (vs. *No-Switching* and vs. *Neutral*) because they saw Miguel as less authentic (Table 5–indirect effects). These results show that frame switching in a dating context can make majority Americans feel that a bicultural is being less authentic, and in turn, a less appealing potential romantic partner.

Consequences for dating intentions. The strength of participants' intentions to communicate with and date Miguel significantly varied between conditions, F(2, 237)=7.77, p=.001, η^2_p=.06 (Table 5–total effects). Participants felt that they would be less likely to send or respond to a message, or go on a date with Miguel when he frame switched compared to when he actively did not frame switch and compared to neutral control, ts(237)>2.91, ps<.004, ds>0.38. Further, simple mediation results revealed that frame switching reduced participants' dating intentions (vs. *No-Switching* and vs. *Neutral*) because Miguel's frame switching undermined his

perceived authenticity (Table 5–indirect effects). Thus, majority Americans were not only less impressed with Miguel as a potential partner when he frame switched, but felt they would also be less likely to actually engage with him romantically if they had found these dating profiles on their own in the real world.

Consequences for general impressions. Finally, the results show a significant effect of condition on each of the general impressions, Fs(2, 237)>11.41, ps<.001, η^2_ps>.09 (Table 5–total effects). Specifically, frame switching cost Miguel in terms of his likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence compared to when he did not frame switching and compared to neutral control, ts(234–237)>2.77, ps<.006, ds>0.36. Mediation analyses confirmed that these consequences of frame switching on general impressions, compared to *No-Switching* and to *Neutral*, are all mediated by a loss of Miguel's perceived authenticity when he frame switches (Table 5–indirect effects). These findings directly replicate the second pretest's results and conceptually replicate each of the earlier studies' results, adding strong evidence that majority Americans' dislike frame switching because they infer that inauthenticity drives the bicultural's behavior.

Table 5

Total and Indirect Effects of Frame Switching (vs. No-Switching and vs. Control) via Perceived

Authenticity for Study 3

	Total Effect of Condition			Switch vs. No Switch via Authenticity		Switch vs. Neutral via Authenticity	
	F	*p*	η_p^2	*b (SE)*	*95% CI*	*b (SE)*	*95% CI*
Interpersonal Attraction & Intentions to Meet	12.66	<.001	.10	−1.47 (.24) *−0.79 (.12)*	−1.98, −1.02 *−1.03, −0.57*	−1.30 (.23) *−0.69 (.11)*	−1.79, −0.90 *−0.92, −0.69*
Attractiveness	11.85	<.001	.09	−0.76 (.17) *−0.56 (.12)*	−1.11, −0.45 *−0.80, −0.35*	−0.67 (.15) *−0.50 (.11)*	−0.99, −0.39 *−0.72, −0.30*
Dating Interest	8.48	<.001	.07	−0.88 (.20) *−0.53 (.12)*	−1.32, −0.52 *−0.80, −0.32*	−0.77 (.18) *−0.47 (.11)*	−1.16, −0.45 *−0.69, −0.28*
Dating Endorsements	23.84	<.001	.17	−0.60 (.14) *−0.53 (.12)*	−0.88, −0.35 *−0.77, −0.32*	−0.52 (.13) *−0.47 (.11)*	−0.78, −0.30 *−0.69, −0.27*
Dating Intentions	7.77	<.001	.06	−0.83 (.20) *−0.50 (.12)*	−1.25, −0.46 *−0.75, −0.28*	−0.73 (.18) *−0.44 (.11)*	−1.13, −0.40 *−0.67, −0.25*

Likeability	24.71	<.001	.17	−0.91	−1.26,	−0.80	−1.11,
				(.16)	−0.63	(.15)	−0.53
				−0.89	*−1.14,*	*−0.78*	*−1.02,*
				(.12)	*−0.67*	*(.11)*	*−0.57*
Trustworthiness	37.90	<.001	.24	−1.19	−1.55,	−1.04	−1.41,
				(.18)	−0.85	(.18)	−0.71
				−0.93	*−1.16,*	*−0.82*	*−1.05,*
				(.11)	*−0.71*	*(.11)*	*−0.59*
Warmth	11.41	<.001	.09	−0.98	−1.35,	−0.86	−1.20,
				(.18)	−0.66	(.17)	−0.56
				−0.82	*−1.08,*	*−0.72*	*−0.98,*
				(.13)	*−0.59*	*(.12)*	*−0.50*
Competence	11.84	<.001	.09	−0.82	−1.16,	−0.72	−1.03,
				(.16)	−0.53	(.15)	−0.46
				−0.78	*−1.02,*	*−0.69*	*−0.92,*
				(.12)	*−0.57*	*(.11)*	*−0.69*

Note. For total effects, $df_1 = 2$, $df_2 = 237$. For indirect effects, non-italicized coefficients refer to the unstandardized indirect effects and italicized coefficients below refer to the partially standardized effects. 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals (10,000 samples) that do not contain zero indicate a statistically significant effect. All indirect effects above are significant.

General Discussion

Biculturals frame switch as a way to navigate their complex cultural worlds. Across four experiments, however, we demonstrate that frame switching is perceived as inauthentic, and in turn, has social costs. In all studies, the hit to authenticity led to worse impressions of a bicultural's likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence. Affirming the bicultural's authenticity in Study 2 partly mitigated frame switching's negative effects on likeability and warmth, but not trustworthiness or competence. Study 3 targeted the impactful arena of romantic relationships, demonstrating that frame switching in dating profiles diminishes biculturals' perceived authenticity and reduces their chances of dating success with majority Americans. These results illustrate how frame switching creates a paradox for biculturals living in Western cultures: it allows them to fit in with their cultural groups, but it can backfire when behaving inconsistently violates perceivers' expectations and values. That is, frame switching biculturals can incur powerful social penalties to impression formation and romantic relationships.

These findings illuminate a novel barrier to intercultural relations in Western society. Previous research has shown that majority Americans are suspicious of biculturals by default because of their dual identities (Kunst et al. 2018) that are assumed to confuse biculturals about who they truly are (Skinner, Perry, & Gaither, 2019). While these biases may be at play, our results showed that the negative effect on authenticity and its downstream consequences held when frame switching was compared to a neutral control condition in which participants only knew about the bicultural's dual cultural identities but did not about his behavior with his cultural groups. This implies that majority Americans' reactions were driven by the way the bicultural *behaved* beyond any biases they may hold against his particular cultures or against his dually-identified bicultural status.

Recent studies have uncovered that "passing" behavior, whereby a biracial presents as only one racial identity based on the context, also evokes negative reactions from majority Americans (Albuja et al., 2018). In our studies, we were able to isolate a different source of bias against biculturals—switching between their multiple identities—providing some of the first evidence that biculturals' overt behavior *across* cultural contexts affects the way they are seen by others. Cumulatively, the previous and current work unveil the quagmire that biculturals face in Western society—they are punished by majority members not only when they deny one of their identities, but also when they present both identities and adapt themselves to their cultural contexts by frame switching. This raises the question: is there *any* socially-accepted way to be "true to yourself" for mixed selves?

Limitations and Future Research

These studies have some limitations. We only created one bicultural target used across the studies, and so we have not examined how target gender or how other minority cultures might change reactions to frame switching. Because Study 3 participants were heterosexual women, we do not know how men or non-heterosexual people would react to prospective bicultural partners' frame switching. We anticipate that the shared Western understanding of authenticity and its incompatibility with frame switching would be strong enough to influence most majority Americans' reactions to biculturals, but future research is needed to uncover potential moderators of frame switching's negative effects. Additionally, the control conditions in these studies depicted a particular form of "not frame switching" whereby the bicultural's behavior was intended to be not directly linked to either culture, rather than aligned with one culture over the other (e.g., always more Chinese, as in assimilation) or uniquely mixed together (i.e., hybridizing; West et al., 2017) . Future studies should pit frame switching against these and

other cultural negotiation strategies for a more complex understanding of how biculturals'

behavior is perceived.

Notably, Study 2 failed to explicitly affirm the biculturals' authenticity to mitigate the

damage of frame switching on trust and competence, even though Studies 1 and 3 establish

authenticity as a statistical mediator. It is possible that our manipulation did not cover aspects of

authenticity more relevant to trust and competence, or that other mediators may factor more

heavily for these two outcomes. Alternatively, affirming authenticity may have weaker benefits

for a frame switching bicultural because Americans may not hold an authentic mixed self in as

high regard as they would an authentic singular self that personifies their understanding of

authenticity. Of these two downstream consequences, implications for trustworthiness are

particularly impactful because trust is regarded as fundamental to harmonious relationships

(Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). This fits well with results of Study 3 that examined a

romantic relationship domain and also suggests that frame switching may lead to particularly

harsh penalties in contexts where trust is important. Future research may investigate the fallout

of frame switching for bicultural politicians, job applicants, and those already in intercultural

romantic relationships. In contrast, Study 2 successfully restored impressions of likeability and

warmth by affirming authenticity—results with implications for ameliorating intercultural

relations. At least for these traits, our results demonstrate that Americans can form favorable

impressions of a bicultural despite their frame switching. Due to the limits of cross-sectional

mediation, this data is not ideally suited to comparing alternate models (e.g., parallel or

sequential mediation between perceived authenticity and other trait impressions). Future

longitudinal studies should examine how impressions may change and develop over the course

of multiple interactions with a frame switching bicultural to more comprehensively test the role of perceived authenticity over time.

Conclusion

A growing population of biculturals endeavor to be true to their mixed selves. However, the strategies biculturals use to successfully navigate their multiple cultures can have social costs. As many nations become increasingly diverse, it is more important than ever to identify and break down these barriers to intercultural relations so that all people can thrive while being true to themselves.

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Online Supplementary Materials

Study 1

Study 1 Power Analysis

Sample size was determined based on power analyses conducted with effect size information (frame switching vs. no switching conditions) obtained in a pilot study (West et al., 2018). We conducted the power analyses using a Monte Carlo procedure in SAS with the conditions' means and standard deviations for authenticity. At alpha = .05, only 5 participants per condition were needed to achieve 80% power to detect the observed effect on authenticity. We decided to increase the sample size to 50 per condition, our lab's standard minimum sample size, resulting in approximately 100% (over 99.99%) power.

Study 1 Materials

Full bicultural vignettes.

Switching Condition:

Miguel Wong is a 27-year-old graduate student completing a Master's degree in Kinesiology. He is passionate about health and exercise and plans to have a career related to these interests. Miguel's hobbies include playing sports, reading, and cooking. Miguel is American, and his cultural background is Chinese on his father's side and Mexican on his mother's side. He identifies with both his Chinese and Mexican cultural heritage, and he regularly spends time with members of each culture, including friends, family, and coworkers. Miguel behaves differently depending on which cultural group he is with, so his behaviour is more typically Chinese when he is with Chinese people, and more typically Mexican when he is with Mexicans. For instance,

Miguel tends to be more calm, rational, and introverted when he is with Chinese people, but he tends to be more energetic, original, and extraverted when he is with Mexicans.

No Switching Condition:

Miguel Wong is a 27-year-old graduate student completing a Master's degree in Kinesiology. He is passionate about health and exercise and plans to have a career related to these interests. Miguel's hobbies include playing sports, reading, and cooking. Miguel is American, and his cultural background is Chinese on his father's side and Mexican on his mother's side. He identifies with both his Chinese and Mexican cultural heritage, and he regularly spends time with members of each culture, including friends, family, and coworkers. Miguel doesn't tend to behave any differently depending on which cultural group he is with, so his behaviour is largely the same regardless of whether he is with Chinese people or Mexicans. For instance, Miguel tends to be consistent, tactful, and athletic when he is with Chinese people and when he is with Mexicans.

Neutral Control Condition:

Miguel Wong is a 27-year-old graduate student completing a Master's degree in Kinesiology. He is passionate about health and exercise and plans to have a career related to these interests. Miguel's hobbies include playing sports, reading, and cooking. Miguel is American, and his cultural background is Chinese on his father's side and Mexican on his mother's side. He identifies with both his Chinese and Mexican cultural heritage, and he regularly spends time with members of each culture, including friends, family, and coworkers.

Pretest

Pretest of vignettes. The behaviors used in the vignettes were based on past research and a

pretest. Descriptions of Miguel's behavior with each cultural group in the *Switching* condition

(e.g., energetic, calm) were initially drawn from cross-cultural comparisons showing that, on

average, Mexican participants are higher in extraversion and openness to experience compared to

Chinese participants (McCrae & Terracciano, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2007). In the *No Switching*

condition, the examples of Miguel's behavior were intended to be as unassociated with these

cultures as possible and instead coincide with other aspects of Miguel's description (e.g., interest

in exercise and sports). We then pre-tested 30 potential examples: 10 behaviors more typical of

Mexican groups (e.g., outgoing, energetic, creative), 10 for Chinese (e.g., reserved, calm,

traditional), and 10 neutral (e.g., active, consistent, motivated). Forty-six majority Canadian

undergraduates rated the desirability of each trait, and we curated the final traits so that there

were no differences in desirability by culture (Mexican vs. Chinese vs. neutral, all ps > .48) or by

condition (*Switching* vs. *No Switching*, p = .50; West et al., 2018). This pre-test ensured that any

effects of the vignettes were driven by Miguel's frame switching rather than by the desirability

of his specific behaviors in each condition.

Study 1 Additional Results

Effects on authenticity. Actively not frame switching also increased Miguel's authenticity

compared to the *Neutral* condition, $t(130) = 3.13$, $p = .002$.

Study 2a

Study 2 was conducted first with a smaller sample as Study 2a, and then we conducted a high-powered replication Study 2b which we report in the paper. The following are the methods and results for a pretest used to develop the manipulation and the methods and results for Study 2a.

Study 2a Method

Participants. Majority Americans ($N = 154$) completed the study online via Prolific for compensation. Eligibility criteria and data quality exclusion criteria were consistent with Study 1, resulting in final samples of 137 participants in Study 2a.

Design, procedures, and materials. All materials and procedures in Study 2a were exactly the same as Study 2b reported in the paper.

Full bicultural vignettes. Note that only the Authentic Switching vignette differs from Study 1.

Authentic Switching Condition:

Miguel Wong is a 27-year-old graduate student completing a Master's degree in Kinesiology. He is passionate about health and exercise and plans to have a career related to these interests. Miguel's hobbies include playing sports, reading, and cooking. Miguel is American, and his cultural background is Chinese on his father's side and Mexican on his mother's side. He identifies with both his Chinese and Mexican cultural heritage, and he regularly spends time with members of each culture, including friends, family, and coworkers.

Miguel behaves differently depending on which cultural group he is with, so his behavior is more typically Chinese when he is with Chinese people, and more typically Mexican when he is with Mexicans. For instance, Miguel tends to be more calm, rational, and introverted when he is with

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Chinese people, but he tends to be more energetic, original, and extraverted when he is with Mexicans.

Miguel is not trying to pretend or misrepresent himself when he is with either cultural group, and he has no intention to deceive or manipulate others through his behaviour. Rather, Miguel's behavior with each cultural group reflects different sides of himself that are both equally a part of who he truly is.

Pretest

Pretest of authenticity manipulation in vignettes. Prior to these two studies, we conducted a pre-test of the vignettes to ensure that the Authentic Switching vignette successfully increased Miguel's perceived authenticity compared to the Switching vignette. Eighty-nine majority Americans read either the *Switching* vignette ($n = 30$), *No Switching* vignette ($n = 29$), or the *Authentic Switching* vignette ($n = 30$), and then provided their impressions only of Miguel's authenticity (not any general impressions). As intended, Miguel was seen as more authentic in the *Authentic Switching* condition ($M = 5.66$, $SD = 1.17$) compared to the *Switching* condition ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.44$), $p < .001$. Additionally, replicating a key result from Study 1, Miguel was seen as less authentic in the *Switching* condition compared to the *No Switching* condition ($M = 6.14$, $SD = 0.90$), where he was seen as most authentic, $p < .001$. Miguel's authenticity ratings did not differ significantly between the *No Switching* and *Authentic Switching* conditions, $p = .13$, although the condition means show that perceived authenticity was highest in the *No Switching* condition.

Study 2a Results

Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistencies for Studies 2a.

	Authentic Switching (n = 47) M [95% CI]	Switching (n = 42) M [95% CI]	No Switching (n = 48) M [95% CI]
Likeability (α = .90)	5.54 [5.28, 5.80]	5.20 [4.93, 5.48]	5.80 [5.55, 6.06]
Trustworthiness (α = .94)	5.13 [4.83, 5.43]	4.71 [4.38, 5.03]	5.53 [5.22, 5.83]
Warmth (α = .87)	3.99 [3.81, 4.17]	3.66 [3.46, 3.85]	4.12 [3.93, 4.30]
Competence (α = .84)	3.92 [3.76, 4.09]	3.73 [3.56, 3.90]	4.12 [3.96, 4.28]

A series of one-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences between the three conditions for likability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence, Fs(2, 134) > 4.94, ps < .008, η_p^2s > .07 (see Table 2). Post-hoc LSD comparisons demonstrated that the differences between the *Switching* and *No Switching* conditions replicated our previous results. Miguel was less liked, $t(134) = 3.14$, $p = .002$, $d = 0.54$, less trusted, $t(132) = 3.65$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.64$, and seen as less warm, $t(134) = 3.43$, $p = .001$, $d = 0.59$, and less competent, $t(134) = 3.29$, $p = .001$, $d = 0.57$, when he switched between cultures compared to when he did not. Our attempt to reduce the negative effects of frame switching in the *Authentic Switching* (vs. *Switching*) condition was only somewhat effective. Affirming Miguel's authenticity despite his frame switching significantly improved perceptions of his warmth, $t(134) = 2.49$, $p = .01$, $d = 0.43$, and marginally improved

likeability, $t(134) = 1.74$, $p = .08$, $d = 0.30$, trustworthiness, $t(132) = 1.88$, $p = .06$, $d = 0.33$, and

competence, $t(134) = 1.65$, $p = .10$, $d = 0.29$. The *No Switching* and *Authentic Switching*

conditions did not differ significantly on any of the impression measures (all ps > .07), although

the benefits of not frame switching on trustworthiness and competence were marginally

significant ($p = .07$ and .10, respectively).

Study 2b

Study 2b Power Analysis

Sample size was determined based on power analyses conducted with effect size information

(authentic switching vs. switching conditions) obtained in Study 2a. We conducted the power

analyses using a Monte Carlo procedure in SAS with the conditions' means and standard

deviations for competence, the smallest effect observed in Study 2a. At alpha = .05, 130

participants per condition were needed to achieve 80% power to detect the observed effect on

competence. Further analyses were conducted to determine how much each additional 15

participants added to our power to detect effects across the four dependent variables. We

oversampled the $N =390$ by approximately 10% ($N = 435$).

Power by Total Sample Size for Authentic Switching vs. Switching Contrast

N Total	Trust	Warmth	Competence	Likeability
345	85.9%	97.9%	75.6%	79.9%
360	87.3%	98.3%	77.4%	81.5%
375	88.6%	98.6%	79.1%	83.1%

390 (130 per condition)	89.8%	98.9%	80.6%	84.5%

Studies 2a and 2b Meta-analysis

Given that studies 2a and 2b are identical in methods (Study 2b is an exact replication of 2a), we have meta-analyzed effects observed in these two studies. Below, we present the condition estimates (means and standard errors), the pairwise contrast estimates (raw mean differences and standard errors), and forest plots.

This single paper meta-analysis was conducted using McShane and Böckenholt's (2017) online application available here: https://blakemcshane.shinyapps.io/spmeta/

McShane, B.B. and Böckenholt, U. (2017), 'Single Paper Meta-analysis: Benefits for Study Summary, Theory-testing, and Replicability.' *Journal of Consumer Research* , 43(6), 1048-1063.

Meta-analysis of Studies 2a and 2b, Descriptive Estimates by Condition

|	Authentic-Switching *M* (*SE*)	Switching *M* (*SE*)	No-Switching *M* (*SE*)
Likeability	5.55 (0.06)	5.28 (0.08)	5.70 (0.06)
Trustworthiness	5.12 (0.08)	4.94 (0.09)	5.50 (0.07)
Warmth	4.02 (0.05)	3.79 (0.05)	4.10 (0.03)
Competence	3.90 (0.04)	3.80 (0.05)	4.10 (0.04)

Meta-analysis of Studies 2a and 2b, Effect Size Estimates (Raw Mean Differences) by Contrasted

Conditions

	Authentic-Switching vs. Switching M_D (SE)	Auth.-Switching vs. No-Switching M_D (SE)	Switching vs. No-Switching M_D (SE)
Likeability	0.27 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.42 (0.10)
Trustworthiness	0.19 (0.12)	-0.38 (0.10)	-0.58 (0.11)
Warmth	0.23 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.32 (0.06)
Competence	0.10 (0.06)	-0.20 (0.06)	-0.30 (0.06)

Meta-analysis of Studies 2a and 2b, Forest Plots

Note: The forest plots below correspond to the contrast estimates in the preceding table. Contrast 1 refers to Authentic Switching vs. Switching, Contrast 2 refers to Authentic Switching vs. No Switching, and Contrast 3 refers to Switching vs. No Switching. Study 1 in the plots refers to Study 2a in this paper, Study 2 refers to Study 2b, and SPM refers to the single paper meta-analyzed estimates.

Likeability Forest Plot

Trustworthiness Forest Plot

Warmth Forest Plot

Competence Forest Plot

Study 3

Pretests

Pretests of profiles and authenticity manipulation. Prior to starting the main Study 3, we conducted two pretests to develop and ensure the validity of our manipulations. In the **first pretest**, majority-member, single, heterosexual American and Canadian women ($N = 46$) evaluated seven photos of Miguel that we considered for his profiles using a within-subjects design. Participants saw photos presented randomly, and after each photo, indicated how much they felt that "Miguel shows his _____ culture in this photo" in three items asking about his Mexican culture, Chinese culture, and American culture. They also reported on the quality of the photo (e.g., looks natural, flattering). The final profile photos described above were effective in

eliciting the intended cultural associations in the *Switching* condition (e.g., strongest Mexican culture shown in MexicanCupid photo) and ensuring that there were no differences in how American he seemed across the conditions' photos, *p*s > .36. The quality items revealed that the final Chinese photo was generally more appealing than the Mexican or neutral photos, *p*s < .04; however, this difference would not provide an alternate explanation for the *negative* effects in the *Switching* condition as this difference should theoretically work in the opposite direction (i.e., participants should respond more positively to the better photo included in the *Switching* vs. *No Switching* and *Neutral* conditions).

In the **second pretest**, majority-member, single, heterosexual American and Canadian women (*N* = 94) evaluated the *Switching* (*n* = 50) and *No Switching* (*n* = 44) full profiles in a between-subjects design. Manipulation checks confirmed that participants noticed the greater inconsistency in the *Switching* compared to *No Switching* profiles, *p*s < .001, and recognized that "Miguel has adapted his profile content to the characteristics of other users on each dating website" more in the *Switching* (vs. *No Switching*) condition, *p* < .001. We also verified that participants were still making the intended cultural associations in the *Switching* condition, and they did not see Miguel as more or less American between conditions, *p*s > .20. We also found preliminary evidence that participants saw Miguel as less authentic, more deceptive, and more manipulative when frame switched compared to when he did not, *p*s < .02. Further, frame switching had significant negative indirect effects on general impressions (likeability, trustworthiness, warmth, and competence) via authenticity, *or* deceptiveness or manipulativeness, *b*s: −77. − −.37, [95% CIs: −1.25, −.07]. Given these results, we will also explore deceptiveness and manipulativeness—which may be considered intentionally malicious

forms of inauthenticity—as potential mediators in the main study (see OSM Study 3 Additional Results).

Study 3 Power Analysis

Sample size was determined based on power analyses conducted with effect size information obtained in a pretest of our manipulation (frame switching profiles vs. no switching profiles). We conducted power analyses using a Monte Carlo procedure in SAS with the pretest conditions' means and standard deviations for authenticity and trustworthiness. We selected authenticity given its primary focus in the research, and we selected trustworthiness because we considered it to be most conceptually relevant to the dating outcomes to be examined in the main Study 3. At alpha = .05, 64 participants per condition were needed to achieve 80% power to detect the observed effect on authenticity, and 142 participants per condition were needed to have 80% power to detect the observed effect on trustworthiness. Further analyses were conducted to determine how much each additional 20 participants added to our power to detect effects on trustworthiness and authenticity. Our initial preregistered decision (osf.io/8yp7x) was to recruit 150 participants per condition, providing 99.1% power to detect the observed effect on authenticity and 82.1% power to detect the observed effect on trustworthiness. However, due to slower recruitment than anticipated, we updated our preregistration (osf.io/eymn6) and lowered the sample to 100 participants per condition, providing approximately 94% power to detect the observed effect on authenticity.

Power by Total Sample Size for Switching vs. No Switching

N Total	Authenticity	Trustworthiness
130	80.9%	47.1%
150	86.6%	52.8%
170	90.1%	58.1%
190	93.0%	62.9%
210	95.1%	67.3%
230	96.6%	71.2%
250	97.6%	74.8%
270	98.4%	78.0%
280	98.7%	79.5%
300 (150 per condition = original target)	99.1%	82.1%

Study 3 Materials

Full bicultural dating profiles. Available on our OSF page: https://osf.io/4397c/

Exploratory mediators. In addition to impressions of authenticity, we asked participants to report their impressions of Miguel's deceptiveness and manipulativeness, considering these to be intentionally malicious forms of inauthenticity that people may be particularly on the look out for in an online dating context. Participants indicated how much they felt that "Miguel is being [deceptive/manipulative] with his profiles." All responses were recorded on 7-point scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Study 3 Additional Results

Direct effects. Additional one-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences between the conditions on ratings of manipulativeness and deceptiveness, Fs $(2, 237) > 73.60$, ps $< .001$, η^2_ps $> .38$. Participants in the Switching condition compared to both the No Switching and Control conditions saw Miguel as more manipulative and more deceptive, ts$(239) > 10.32$, ps $< .001$, η^2_ps $> .31$, whereas the No Switching and Control conditions did not significantly differ, ps $> .55$. Thus, frame switching had strong negative effects on all three proposed mediators.

Indirect effects. Additional analyses where manipulativeness or deceptiveness was substituted as the only mediator also produced significant indirect effects of Switching (vs. No Switching and vs. Control) for all dating and general impression outcomes, bs < -0.46, [95% CI range: -1.77, $-.16$]. However, when authenticity, manipulativeness and deceptiveness are parallel mediators in the models, only authenticity produced significant unique indirect effects consistently across all outcomes.

DISSERTATION DISCUSSION

Achieving its broadest goal, this dissertation research demonstrates that studying the *ways* that biculturals negotiate their cultures matters. By focusing on cultural frame switching—that is, targeting the switching process rather than the specific cultural frames—this work is among the first to establish that the processes biculturals use to manage their cultures affects them psychologically and socially beyond the effects of their specific cultures or their bicultural status. The act of frame switching causes biculturals in North America to see themselves as less authentic, indirectly impacting their life satisfaction as a result. Moreover, biculturals' frame switching causes monocultural North Americans to see them as less authentic, indirectly impacting general impressions, romantic appraisals and behavioural intentions toward biculturals. In doing so, these studies provide proof of concept for the transformative theory of biculturalism and may also be the first to demonstrate the effects of frame switching. Several theoretical and applied contributions of this research are discussed in each of the papers; I expand on these next and present additional avenues of future research before concluding.

Theoretical Advances

A central aim of this research, broadly, is to advance our understanding of biculturals' lived experiences from a psychological perspective. The study of cultural psychology is relatively young in comparison with topics like cognition, attitudes and behaviour, that have been central topics in social psychology. Considering early trajectories of psychology, a preference for these topics that more closely resembled the empirical, experimentally testable subject matter of the "hard sciences" reigned. These preferences pushed out so-called "softer" subdisciplines captured by Wilhelm Wundt's *volkerpsychologie* which focused on the communal and cultural aspects of human life that the father of psychology considered to be an equally

important counterpart to experimental psychology (Danzinger, 1983). It was not until the late 1980s and primarily since the 1990s that psychologists would reignite a popular interest in the ways that culture shapes the minds of individuals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1991; 1999), and only more recently that we began to learn about the impact of having multiple cultures on an individuals' experiences (Giguere, Lalonde, & Lou, 2010; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997; Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; Stroink & Lalonde, 2009).

Although a relatively new topic in psychology, other social sciences have a longer tradition of considering the unique experiences of people who straddle cultural worlds of nation, class and race. Venerated sociologist and historian, W. E. B DuBois, for example, observed the "double consciousness" experiences of Black Americans in the late 1800s and early 1900s whereby the separation and hierarchy of their Black versus mainstream American cultural worlds was internalized as a rift in the self, a "two-ness" that threatens to pull the individual apart (1903). Such insights help root this current psychological work in the perspectives and lived experiences of biculturals, drawing on accounts of what it is actually like to negotiate multiple cultures and cultural identities rather than assuming what it may be like from an outside observer perspective. The "double consciousness" experience, for example, sets the stage for considering frame switching and what this behaviour might do to a bicultural's sense of self in their own eyes and in others'. Placing DuBois' phenomenon in its sociohistorical context of post-civil war, pre-civil rights America also evokes consideration of the role of broader cultural attitudes and beliefs in shaping the bicultural experience. The current work draws on this and illustrates the impact of the dominant culture's beliefs on the consequences of biculturals' behaviour, namely how Western ideals of what it means to be an authentic person constrain the ways biculturals are

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"allowed" to negotiate their cultures without incurring penalties. This research taps into the flow between sociological and psychological processes by showing how the beliefs shared by a dominant group in a society, here about the nature of authenticity, can permeate into the minds of its individuals and influence their judgments of themselves and each other. Further, by highlighting the misfit of the dominant Western conceptualization of authenticity to the realities of people who hold multiple identities, this work adds to renewed debates over the nature of authenticity as a characteristic and its manifestations in day-to-day behaviour (e.g., Schmader & Sedikides, 2018), a once central topic in the field of philosophy disputed by its most influential scholars (e.g., Rousseau, Nietzsche, Sartre).

Returning to the most proximal area of biculturalism research, this dissertation advances theory on some of the field's most established topics. Namely, experiments eliciting cultural frame switching were arguably the first to capture the effects of cultures on the mind—Hong and colleagues (2000) found that priming biculturals with different cultural icons shifted the types of causal attributions they made for a target's behaviour. Soon after, studies of bicultural identity integration (BII) demonstrated its moderating influence on frame switching (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2006; Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Cheng, Lee, & Benet-Martínez, 2006). For instance, biculturals reporting higher BII frame switched by assimilating to the cultural context (e.g., behaving more Chinese in a Chinese context) whereas biculturals reporting lower BII frame switched by contrasting to the cultural context (e.g., behaving more Chinese in an American context, Benet-Martínez et al., 2002).

After decades of research on frame switching and bicultural identity integration, we had learned a great deal about the antecedents and moderating factors of the frame switching experience for biculturals. What has been missing prior to this dissertation work, however, were

investigations into the *consequences* of frame switching. Filling this gap is one of the major contributions of the current studies to biculturalism research. Building on my proposed transformative theory of biculturalism (West et al., 2017), in which I put forth the novel assertion that the processes by which biculturals negotiate their cultures have important consequences, the work I present in this dissertation is (to the best of my knowledge) the first in the field to capture the effects of the process of frame switching. Further, drawing on the extensive previous literature on bicultural identity integration, I considered the moderating role of BII in frame switching through a new lens: as a potential moderator of the consequences of frame switching rather than a predictor of the experience. Specifically, Study 1 in the first paper explored whether the negative effect of frame switching on biculturals' self-perceived authenticity and subsequent life satisfaction differs depending on how integrated (vs. compartmentalized or marginalized) their cultural identities were. Given that integration involves seeing one's cultures as compatible and complimentary despite their differences whereas compartmentalization involves seeing one's cultures as irreconcilable and conflicting (Yampolsky, Amiot, & de la Sablonnière, 2016), it is possible that frame switching only feels inauthentic (or more inauthentic) to biculturals with compartmentalized rather than integrated identities. Although results did not reveal evidence of moderation (likely due to low power), this study lays groundwork that can help inform future investigations into interactions between identity configurations and the outcomes of bicultural negotiation processes such as frame switching.

Broad Limitations and Future Directions

A limitation of the current studies, and arguably of frame switching research in general, is that the effectiveness of being in frame is largely assumed rather than directly tested. In looking at biculturals' own reactions toward their frame switching, I did not include questions

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about their sense of belonging and acceptance by their cultural group in response to their adapted culturally-appropriate behaviour, which would have shed more light on what biculturals may feel is lost versus gained by frame switching. Similarly, in looking at others' reactions toward the bicultural's frame switching, there were no conditions that matched the perceivers' culture to either of the cultural frames the bicultural enacted. Doing so in the future could elucidate how biases against frame switching might interact with long-established biases in the intergroup perception literature. For example, ample work has documented White American's history of applying *hypodescent*, or a "one drop rule", by which anyone with a non-White minority parent is excluded from the White in-group in terms of how they are categorized and, often, subsequently discriminated against (Davis, 1991; Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011). Hypodescent is attributed, at least in part, to the perceived threat that non-White minorities pose to the White majority (Chen, Pauker, Gaither, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2018; Ho, Sidanius, Cuddy, & Banaji, 2013; Hollinger, 2003). Traditionally, the "one drop" is provided by a target's racial heritage, but recent work on other types of dually-identified individuals (e.g., minority biculturals, fans of two soccer teams) provides evidence that monocultural groups hold biases against *any* individuals who make their connection to an out-group known (Albuja, Sanchez, & Gaither, 2018; Kunst, Thomsen, & Dovidio, 2018). One might expect then that majority Americans' negative reactions to frame switching would be more extreme if the target bicultural had been switching between his majority American and his minority Chinese or Mexican cultures. Such a study may capture the benefits of frame switching to the majority culture along with the costs of switching away from it for biculturals in the eyes of majority perceivers. Further, the methods developed here can be adapted to gauge monocultural minorities' (e.g., Mexican or Chinese perceivers using the current materials) reactions to a bicultural who frame

switches between perceivers' culture and either the majority or another minority culture. Such research would contribute to the understudied perspective of minorities in intergroup relations research (Vedder, Wenink, & van Geel, 2017) and provide cross-cultural tests of the extent to which non-White groups hold similar intergroup biases (e.g., hypodescent) against dually-identified individuals (Chen, Kteily, & Ho, 2019; Ho, Kteily, & Chen, 2017).Considering topics from intergroup psychology also raise questions about how stigma or hierarchy associated with a biculturals' particular cultures may influence reactions to their frame switching between them. In the current studies, the bicultural target was intentionally depicted as Mexican and Chinese because we expected majority American perceivers to be familiar enough with these two cultures to recognize when the bicultural was being culturally-congruent with either and see these cultural groups as relatively equivalent given that they are both out-groups for the participants. However, the historical and modern reality of North America is that groups are perceived hierarchically in terms of their status in society with racial hierarchies placing Whites at the top, followed by the "model minority" Asians, and Blacks and Latinx on the lowest rung (Pew Research, 2019). As such, it is possible that frame switching to a higher status culture away from a lower status culture (e.g., to Chinese away from Mexican) would be perceived more favourably than the reverse. The conditions in the current studies were designed to test the presence versus absence of frame switching rather than the effects adopting specific cultural frames, but these materials could be adapted in the future to investigate the impact of stigma or status of specific cultures. Additional studies that vary the order in which a bicultural switches between cultural frames (e.g., from higher status to lower and vice versa) and that target other cultures differing in stigma or status (e.g., the more romanticized Italian American culture) could suss out the complexities of how we may react differently to frame switching depending on the cultures involved.

Further, future iterations of these studies should test the boundary conditions of frame switching's negative effects, asking for whom and when is frame switching perceived as less or more authentic. In particular, daily diary (e.g., Cultural Day Reconstruction, Doucerian et al., 2013) or experience sampling methods can be used to better understand how frame switching actually feels in the moment for biculturals and what factors contribute to a sense of authenticity or inauthenticity when doing so, e.g., intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation, amount of prior experience being in each frame, endorsement of racial essentialism, etc. One might predict, for example, that frame switching feels more authentic when it feels more autonomous. Choosing to sing at a Bollywood karaoke night for an Indian Canadian bicultural, for instance, may feel more like proudly expressing one of their cultural identities than pretending to be something they are not. Similarly, emphasizing the autonomy of a frame switching bicultural may lessen others' negative reactions, and in instances where such behaviour is costly (e.g., risks social ostracism), may even be lauded as more authentic (Crain, Bettman, & Luce, 2017).

The most immediate future direction that I have begun pursuing is to challenge the Western authenticity ideal in order to bring alignment between biculturals' multiple identities and negotiation experiences with their own and others' expectations. Having identified authenticity as a mechanism driving certain negative experiences for biculturals and as a barrier to minority–majority intercultural relations, key next step will be to design a novel intervention encouraging bicultural and monocultural North Americans to reconsider what it means to be an authentic person. Contemporary authenticity research shows that, even in Western societies, people actually *do* feel authentic when they follow norms surrounding their different social identities (e.g., teacher, mother) rather than rejecting contextual demands (Lenton, Slabu, & Sedikides, 2016; Schmader & Sedikides, 2018; Slabu, Lenton, Sedikides, & Bruder, 2014). Thus,

North Americans' actual experiences of authenticity are at odds with their beliefs about what authenticity should be.

This reality—that everyone holds multiple identities and flexibly adapts to their different environments (Gaither, 2018; Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015)—highlights the potential for an alternate understanding of authenticity that promotes a multifaceted and dynamic self over the traditional Western notion of a singular, stable self. For example, acknowledging multiple social identities increases cognitive flexibility across the lifespan (Gaither, Fan, & Kinzler, 2019; Gaither, Remedios, Sanchez, & Sommers, 2015) and decreases intergroup bias (Tadmor et al., 2012) and prejudice against other multiply-identified minorities (e.g., bisexual individuals; Brewster, Moradi, DeBlaere, & Velez, 2013). Thus, updating the Western authenticity ideal may provide benefits not only to a growing population of biculturals but to all members of increasingly diverse and inclusive North American societies.

Concluding Remarks

In both papers, I discuss what might be thought of as a paradox of frame switching. The intended outcome of frame switching is presumably for biculturals to be able to maintain and express each of their cultural identities in a way that is met with approval and acceptance from each of their cultural groups. In as much as frame switching effectively accomplishes these intended effects, a paradoxical set of unintended effects—negative reactions to their switching behaviour—arise from the mismatch between their behaviour and the broader Western cultural expectations for how people ought to behave. Future research aimed at untangling this paradox will deepen our understanding of the relationship between frame switching and authenticity, unpack the nuances of both biculturals' frame switching experiences and the Western concept of authenticity and explore potential alternative conceptions as intervention strategies. In doing so,

this work will contribute more to our knowledge of what it is like to live biculturally and how

shared, overarching cultural expectations constrain and shape these experiences.

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