

**Redefining International Peace and Security?
The Discourses and Practices of
Multilateral Security Activity**

Keith Krause

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Multilateral Security Activity**

K e i t h K r a u s e
C e n t r e f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n , W a s h i n g t o n

Number of times President Clinton used the word 'security' in his health care speech to Congress: 12
Number of time he used the word "security" in his speech before the UN: 7.

Harper's, D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 3

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the international arena has been rife with activity that in some fashion deals with matters of "international peace and security." Between 1988 and 1993, fifteen new peace-keeping operations were established by the United Nations. Chapter VII of the UN Charter has been invoked on several occasions, and many smaller-scale fact-finding and conflict prevention missions have been undertaken under UN auspices.¹ These operations have gone beyond the traditional confines of "peacekeeping" to include large-scale humanitarian relief efforts (in Iraqi Kurdistan and the former Yugoslavia), the monitoring of free and fair elections in the transition to democracy (in Cambodia and Angola), and support for "post-conflict peace-building" and social transformation (in El Salvador). On an even broader scale, the members of the Security Council have acknowledged that "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security."² This sentiment has found echoes throughout the global multilateral system, and especially in the debates around human rights and humanitarian intervention, and the environment (which have been the subject of major international summits, in Vienna in 1992 and Rio de Janeiro in 1991). Finally, the multilateral military operation in the Persian Gulf to counter Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait reactivated the debate over the

1. For a recent comprehensive list, see Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 101-102. As of 31 July 1993, more than 78,000 military and related personnel were engaged in UN operations. *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, 22:5 (September/October 1993).
2. See *The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Security*, UN document S/PV.3946 (31 January 1992).

enforcement and collective security provisions of the United Nations system. All of these activities have raised the question of whether or not (and how) recent multilateral action might have redefined the scope and content of "international peace and security." They have also presented an opportunity for students of multilateralism to contribute to the debate on how security is studied.

Parallel (but not directly connected) to this, an expanding and open-ended cottage industry has blossomed, in academic and policy-making circles, around the topic of "new concepts of security." From a scholarly perspective, this debate contains several innovative and thoughtful contributions, but there has been little in the way of a sustained research program that would examine the way in which the discourses and practices of "security" might have changed, or how scholars could or should go about determining this. Further, several seemingly straightforward arguments in the debate float precariously on a sea of unvoiced assumptions and deeper theoretical issues concerning "what and to whom [security] refers".³ It is difficult even to present an overview of the literature that would clarify the central claims and assumptions of the various perspectives that have been articulated.⁴ As Barry Buzan has noted, although few defend

3. Steve Smith, 1992, 506. For an excellent illustration of this, see the list of definitions collected by Barry Buzan, and his commentary on them. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, second edition (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 16-18.

4. Central contributions to the debate have been Buzan, *People, States and Fear*; Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (1991), 3-17; Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (1991), 211-239; Edward Kolodziej, "What is Security and Security Studies?: Lessons from the Cold War," *ArmsControl*, 13:1 (April 1992), 1-31; Edward Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" *International Studies Quarterly*, 36 (1992), 421-438; Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs*, 67:3 (1991), 527-545; Mohammed Ayoub "The Third World in the System of States: A Cute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?" *International Studies Quarterly*, 33 (1989) 67-79; Rob Walker, "The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory," unpublished paper. Other important sources will be cited below.

today a narrow definition of "national security," "that advance does not, however, mean that a consensus exists on what a more broadly constructed conception should look like."⁵ Or, as Helga Haftendorn notes, there is no "common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what its most relevant research questions are."⁶

This paper attempts to link these two debates and to make a modest contribution to building a research agenda in two ways. It is organized around three "optics" (or logics) of "international peace and security," which serve as a basis for organizing and understanding the various stances that have been adopted. The three stances can be provisionally called international security as "stability," as "order," and as "justice."⁷ These terms of course resonate with other meanings in International Relations, and they are not the only way in which these positions could be characterized. But these three categories serve as a useful basis for a discussion of three sets of questions or issues in the debate on "new concepts of security," each of which in turn invoke ontological, epistemological, and prescriptive claims:

- what are the central tenets and foundation of its security *weltanschauung* (security from what, for whom, to protect what, and by what means)?
- what sort of *prima facie* evidence exists that the concepts and practices of security in the multilateral arena might be changing (and how would one study this question)?

5. Buzan, 14.

6. Haftendorn, 15.

7. These parallel Haftendorn's three approaches of national security, international security and global security (which she describes as having Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian roots), or Ken Booth's triumvirate of power, order and emancipation. Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies*, 17 (1991), 313-326. My purpose, however, is to elaborate the implications of these three stances for "multilateral" or "international security" (which makes Haftendorn's terminology confusing).

- what emerges from this account as the desirable scope of multilateral action (i.e., what are its prescriptive commitments)?

Although these questions are couched in theoretical terms, this is not primarily a conceptual paper; many such contributions to the debate have already been published, and my purpose is move towards a research program that could address some of the issues these raise. The analysis instead helps orient the study of changing multilateral practices surrounding security, and offers a preliminary assessment of the current evidence. A premature move towards research without an understanding of the underlying issues at stake would be misguided.

Thus each section of the paper focuses in a preliminary fashion on some concrete issues of evolving practice in the realm of collective or multilateral action to define and address "threats to international peace and security," a conceptual category that has been enshrined by Article 1 and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and which has become a reference point for multilateral action in a variety of areas. In particular, it will look at the way in which UN activities (including primarily "peacekeeping" operations) in the post-Cold War world have reflected and embodied (or not) changes in underlying conceptions of security that have been articulated by the three perspectives outlined. At this preliminary stage, the mode of analysis is impressionistic, not systematic, although this paper points the way to what will become a more sustained examination of emerging international or multilateral practice.

The paper is also driven by three convictions. First, many of the contributions to the debate are not discussing the same thing when they invoke the concept of security. Second, many who argue the case for a "new definition of security" have not come to grips with the genealogy and durability of the "traditional" conception, the preconditions for a reconceptualization, or the broad political consequences of it. Third, ontological and epistemological claims are

inextricably intertwined in this debate: many of the arguments and counter-arguments turn on different understandings of the world in which we live, and can only be "tested" by accepting different claims about the kind of evidence that will be important to validate or invalidate a case.⁸

International Security as Stability

The Foundation of "Security"

The most constricted reinterpretation of the concept and practice of "international peace and security" is motivated primarily by the prospects for attenuating the inter-state security dilemma in the post-Cold War world. Its ontology is a familiar realist one, which takes as its starting point a world of self-regarding states operating under the security dilemma and autonomously defining their own interests.⁹ Aside from a general adherence to the central premises of realism, under this rubric "security studies may be defined as *the study of the threat, use, and control of military force...* it explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war."¹⁰

8. This point mirrors, and is derived from, Kratochwil and Ruggie's observations on the contradiction between the ontology and epistemology of regime theory. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization*, 40:4 (Autumn 1986), 764.

9. As Richard Ashley noted, this is rooted in "an understanding of international society...in which... there exists no form of sociality, no intersubjective consensual basis, prior to or constitutive of individual actors or their private ends." "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 276.

10. Walt, 212, emphasis his. Non-military phenomena are excluded on the twin grounds that including them "would destroy [the] intellectual coherence [of the field] and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems," and that "it would be irresponsible...to ignore the central questions [of war and peace] that form the heart of the security studies field." Walt, 213. On realism, see Robert

The four responses offered to the questions posed above ("security from what, for whom, to protect what, by what means?") which are part of this perspective's ontological commitments can be quickly sketched. "Insecurity" is assumed to arise most fundamentally from coercive threats backed up by organized violence and emanating from an external source. The community that is being secured is taken as already constituted or easily recognized (i.e., the "nation-state"); this obviates the necessity to theorize the state, or state-society relations. What is being protected or safeguarded are "core values" (or a "way of life") over which there is presumed (almost by definition) to be a strong societal consensus that is easy to delineate and widely shared.¹¹ Finally, since the fundamental threats arise from organized violence, the appropriate response is also understood to be "forceful," and to concern preparations to use or threaten the use of force, or measures to control or prevent its possible use.¹²

This perspective has many powerful elements, and a strong historical pedigree and justification. Although it does not by definition concentrate exclusively on the threat and use of force (since the general definition of threats to "national values" does not inevitably lead in this direction), the concept of "national security" emerged historically as a tool of statecraft that guided and explained policies surrounding the use of force and the devotion of resources to the defense of the state. This conception of security is intimately linked to the consolidation of the modern state and state system, and it gains its power from a sort of "double movement" in both

Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in *Neorealism and its Critics*, 1-26.

11. This emphasis on "values" can be found in many of the definitions offered by Buzan, 16-17.
12. These ontological commitments do not exclude other issues from being studied or examined elsewhere in International Relations; they merely exclude them from *security studies*. Thus, for example, one need not argue that sovereignty is absolute both juridically and empirically, one need only argue that for the purposes of studying security, one can treat states as self-interested autonomous actors with independently derived preferences.

thought and practice. At the international level, the goal was to establish the pursuit of security and national interest as a means for creating order and harnessing the "uncontrolled" and destructive passions of princes.¹³ At the domestic level, it was concerned with establishing the minimal conditions of loyalty to the state (such as religious tolerance) that would allow for the pursuit of the "good life." In other words, supplying "security" as a public good became the first duty of state rulers, which, as Charles Tilly points out, involved them in an evolving reciprocal relationship between rulers and ruled.¹⁴ The positive ethical and practical aspects to this perspective (i.e., restraint on state rulers, guides to action) also helps explain why the assumptions sketched above became treated as a given, normal condition of international and national life.

Because primacy is given to security from violence, as the prior condition for guaranteeing international order and pursuing other goals in the domestic political realm in relative tranquillity, this conception also presupposes that the goal of achieving security from military threats is politically uncontested within a state. Whatever societal struggles over "the good life" may exist, and however the trade-offs between them (or the means to achieve them) are specified, national security decision-making is in some fashion immune

13. This is brilliantly analyzed by Albert Hirschman in *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), especially 31-42. As he notes, the idea of the "national interest" as a guide that harnessed the passion of princes was summed up in the epigram of the Duc de Rohan, "Les princes commandent aux peuples, et l'intérêt commande aux princes." Duc de Rohan, *On the Interest of Princes and States of Christendom*, in Hirschman, 34.

14. As Tilly argues, "extractive apparatuses came to contain and constrain the military forces...[because] agents of states [in] bargain[ing] with civilian groups that controlled the resources required for effective warring...gave the civilian groups enforceable claims on the state that further constrained the military." *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 206. Or, to quote Thomas Hobbes, "no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose subjects are either poor, contemptible or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies." *Leviathan*, ed. by John Plamenatz (London: Fontana Collins, 1962), 188.

from these struggles, autonomous from political processes within states, and capable of being objectively specified. Further, the concentration on the use of force presents a major hurdle for advocates of expanded definitions of security: they must either argue that "broadening" the definition of security is necessary to bring into the analysis other issues that could result in the use of force (i.e., scarcity of water, massive human rights violations), or that the concept of "security" (and how to achieve it, and what and who to achieve it against) and the use of "force" are not inextricably linked. Neither of these claims (as I will argue below) is easy to make.

Recent Multilateral Practice

Although as sketched above the core commitments of the "security as stability" optic are realist, the same premises inform the "liberal" variant that is manifest in analyses of multilateral practice. The liberal variant regards the end of the Cold War as presenting an opportunity to move towards a system of "collective security" that would create the conditions for greater international stability and reduce the risk of war (major or minor). It conceives of the United Nations as "returning" to the vision and intentions of the founders, in becoming an effective *instrument* for maintaining international peace and security.¹⁵ The end of the Cold War loosens the strict *national* dimensions of security and attenuates the inter-state security dilemma, but there are still relatively narrow limits on what can be achieved, and hence what is important to study. The central concern from the point of view of both research and prescription is ameliorating the more harsh and unpleasant aspects of life in the state system, without either expecting or advocating any radical rethinking

15. Inter alia, one could cite G.R. Berridge, *Return to the UN* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 108-113; Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, 70:2 (Spring 1991), 69-83.

of its fundamental structure.¹⁶ As one influential analysis along these lines has argued, the transformation of the post-Cold War world "poses a conceptual crisis for security establishments"; the appropriate *policy* response "displaces the centrepiece of security planning from preparing to counter threats to preventing such threats from arising, from deterring aggression to making preparation for it more difficult."¹⁷ Such a response virtually dictates greater multilateral cooperation by states in the security field.

These choices shape how one would study emerging multilateral practice in the field of "international peace and security." First, since state policy and practice remain the central focus, collective multilateral action is seen as only an extension of, and not a limitation upon or substitute for, the unilateral powers and activities of states.¹⁸ Any autonomy possessed by international organizations is conditionally granted to them by sovereign states to serve their interests, and they are mechanisms for "putting into effect, or for merely publicly endorsing, purposes that have been arrived at...by those states that dispose of the resources necessary for attaining them."¹⁹ This has important analytical consequences: the activities of the United Nations in the field of international peace and security, for example, are comprehended primarily through the prism of "the logic of collective action" in which the central function of

16. For an overview with elements of this perspective, see Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics," in Thomas Weiss, ed., *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 3-18.

17. Ashton Carter, William Perry and John Steinbrunner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), 4, 7.

18. See Michael J. Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter," *American Journal of International Law*, 85:1 (January 1991), 74-88; Ernest Lefever, "Reining in the U.N.: Mistaking the Instrument for the Actor," *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (Summer 1993), 17-20. For a dismissal of this argument see Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel, "UN Police Action in Lieu of War: 'The Old Order Changeth'," *American Journal of International Law*, 85:1 (January 1991), 63-74.

19. Robert Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order," *Review of International Studies* 18:2 (April 1992), 167.

international organizations is to induce coalition-formation, and (perhaps) create the conditions under which defection from cooperation can be monitored and punished.²⁰ This is best studied by beginning (and in some cases ending) with the study of the interaction of the *national* interests of strong states in, for example, the Security Council.

Given this, how would the recent historical record be studied in order to determine if the concepts of security that underpin state action in the multilateral arena may be changing? The central case for recent debate is undoubtedly the 1990-91 Gulf War. The determination that "there exists a breach of international peace and security," and the various subsequent Security Council resolutions, led ultimately to the mobilization of a large multilateral force acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to expel Iraq from Kuwait.²¹ From this perspective, two possible lines of interpretation emerge. The first is that the exercise was driven by narrow "national interests" (such as protecting allies or securing access to oil); in this case the United Nations did not exercise "autonomy" in authorizing or legitimizing the Gulf war beyond that which was in the interests of some of the permanent members of the Security Council. The second is that the action represented the resuscitation of the idea of collective security on which the United Nations was founded, and that it was based on a somewhat broader (but still state-centred) interest in maintaining respect for state sovereignty.²² More

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20. See Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), especially chapter one and the chapter by Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation."
21. Resolution 660, 2 August 1990, second preambular paragraph. It is important to note that the language focused on a "breach of peace"; this mirrors exactly the language of the 1950 Korean resolution. Its fourth preambular paragraph reads: "determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace." This is *not* the language used in the case of Somalia.
22. On these two approaches see Oscar Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," *American Journal of International Law*, 85 (1991), 452-473; Brian Urquhart, "The Role of the United Nations in the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict in 1990," *SIPRI Yearbook 1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 617-626.

importantly, the case presents little evidence of the invoking of a broader conception of international security. From a legal perspective, the "threat to international peace and security" arose from the invasion of a member-state of the UN by another and hence the Chapter VII action authorizing the use of "all necessary means" (Security Council Resolution 678) reinforced the rules of the state system. Further, the UN resolutions requested and did *not* obligate states to come to the aid of Kuwait; the military enforcement was largely an American operation that was "multilateral" only in a constrained sense; and the entire exercise was only possible because of the vital interests at stake, and the shift in the global balance of power (with the fall of the Soviet Union from superpower status and Chinese reluctance to be outside the general consensus).

The only two cracks in this argument would be the intervention of foreign forces to deal with the repression of the Kurds in northern Iraq and the imposition of a severe arms control regime on Iraq under the mandate of UNSCOM. Both of these actions would *prima facie* appear to move beyond the straightforward conception of security by referring to citizens within states, and by acting coercively without consent. Both can be explained, however, under the "security as stability" approach, in three ways. First, the military actions of the United States, Britain and France to establish protected enclaves in northern Iraq was *not* authorized by the Security Council (and was condemned by some member-states). Second, the basis of UN humanitarian efforts in northern Iraq (which, although it included UN guards, could hardly be called a use of force) was Iraqi consent to a memorandum of agreement governing the operation, *not* Resolution 688 (which Iraq rejected). Third, both the intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan and the UNSCOM operation could be (and were) justified on the grounds that these actions countered *transborder* (and hence international or

regional) threats to peace and security, for which considerations of state sovereignty can be overridden.²³

An examination of other recent UN operations can amplify this analysis. All other operations (with the partial exception of Somalia) observed the principle that the consent of the recognized government was necessary for multilateral action, and that when this consent was in question (such as in Cambodia and El Salvador), the entire operation was jeopardized. The case for forcible intervention in Somalia was argued on the basis that no recognized central authority existed, and even here the debate over Security Council Resolution 794 stressed the uniqueness of the case and the desire of member-states to retain focus on the humanitarian relief aspects of the operation.²⁴

With respect to the existence of a more general sentiment to expand UN operations beyond traditional understandings of "threats to international peace and security," this account need only point to the inability of the UN to act in several cases where the interests of great powers were not deemed to be at stake, or where they could not achieve a consensus on action. Multilateral action has been completely unable to end the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, and the lack of a consensus among the major powers (including European states) has prevented the enforcement measures available to the Security Council from being invoked (beyond an embargo and a no-fly zone). Likewise, multilateral action did

23. As Security Council Resolution 688 stated, "repression of the Iraqi civilian populations...led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers...which threaten international peace and security in the region." On the Kurdish operation in general see Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights," *International Affairs* 69:3 (July 1993), 436-439. On the UNSCOM operation mandate, see Security Council Resolution 687.

24. The Zimbabwean delegate noted that, "the question of Somalia is a unique situation that warrants a unique approach"; the Ecuadoran that it was "an exceptional one"; the Chinese delegate that "the military operation...is an exceptional action in view of the unique situation." As far as the focus was concerned, the Ecuadoran stressed that the operation had "a defined and limited objective." All in S/PV.3145, 3 December 1992.

not prevent a renewed civil war in Angola, enforce the agreement for the return to democracy in Haiti, implement the terms of the resolution concerning the plebiscite in the Western Sahara, protect civilians in Burundi, or support forceful intervention in the bloody Sudanese civil war.²⁵ All of these cases would seem to confirm the central thesis that little has changed in the understanding of "international peace and security," except that states have one more (possible) avenue for achieving their national interests.

The Prescriptive Agenda

An implicit prescriptive agenda for change emerges from this perspective. If the central problem of multilateral action is to determine how problems of coordinating collective action are overcome, given exogenously determined goals, then the prescriptive project is limited. Nothing in changing multilateral practice can affect the way in which states determine their interests and goals, hence the discussion concentrates on how to reform or enhance the technical or operational aspect of United Nations peace and security operations. Proposals concentrate almost exclusively on reforms that would enhance the UN apparatus through such measures as creating standing (or stand-by) forces under Article 43 to allow a rapid response to global crises, enhancing the UN's capability for information gathering, creating a 24-hour "situation room" to monitor UN operations around the world, or improving the financing of these operations in order to allow some flexibility of action.²⁶

25. On the MINURSO operation in Western Sahara, see Armand Roy, "The Western Sahara," in *Peacekeeping: Norms, Policy and Process*, 1993 Peacekeeping Symposium, (Ottawa: York University, 1993); on Angola, see the special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), document 5/25140 and Add.1, January 1993; "Angola and Unita Rebels Agree to Cease-Fire," *New York Times*, 5 December 1993; on Sudan see Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, "Do International Ethics Matter? Humanitarian Politics in the Sudan," *Ethics and International Affairs* 5 (1991).

26. Johan Jorgen Holst, "Enhancing peace-keeping operations," *Survival*, 32:3 (May-June 1990), 264-75; Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse'," *Survival*, 32:3 (May-June 1990),

The best example is the concept of "second generation multinational operations," which include tasks ranging from the monitoring of a cease-fire line to protecting humanitarian assistance to collective enforcement.²⁷ The central policy dilemma posed is how to "improve" the collective threat and use of force; deeper questions concerning the *political determination* of what constitute "threats to international peace and security" that multilateral forces are designed to meet are often raised, but left unaddressed. In other words, the goals of "peace operations" remain exogenous to, and not influenced by, activities within the UN system.

Several avenues of research and ways of conceiving of the problem of "international peace and security" are occluded by this approach, and these occlusions form the starting point for the other two optics I wish to examine.

International Security as Order

The Foundation of "Security"

The conception of "international security as order" draws upon two lines of critique to construct its understanding of multilateral action to create "international peace and security." The first, (which has been most clearly articulated by Mohammed Ayoub), argues that the problem of security as seen from the perspective of most states in the developing world has little to do with the orthodox conception of "national security," and instead must be seen as a result of the process of state-building and the incorporation of post-colonial states into the contemporary world order.²⁸ Security

196-205; Paul F. Diehl and Kumar Chetan, "Mutual Benefits from International Intervention: New Roles for United Nations Peacekeeping Forces," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 22:4 (1991), 369-375;

27. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *The Washington Quarterly* 15:3 (Summer 1992), 113-131.

28. As he notes, "any paradigm with sufficient power to explain the behaviour of Third World states in the international system will have to be built around an expanded concept of security" Ayoub, "The Third World in the System of States,"

from the threat of organized violence remains a central preoccupation, but it is subsumed under the broader umbrella of vulnerabilities that "threaten state boundaries, institutions or regime survival."²⁹ Factors such as famine or environmental degradation can therefore become security issues, but only if such "vulnerabilities...threaten...to bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally."³⁰

What motivates state action therefore (i.e., the "thing" to be secured) is *not* an unproblematically constituted nation-state or self-defined community, but the state structure itself, or often simply the *regime* in power. Maintenance of its grip on power, or of the existing state structures, is the central "value" being protected, rather than any larger image of "core values" that reflect the desires and aspirations of citizens. The *means* by which this sort of security is to be achieved can be open-ended: since threats "emanate to a substantial extent from within [state] boundaries rather than from outside" and can emerge from non-military sources, state rulers can mobilize a range of instruments to cope with them.³¹ The central point, however, is that the central aim of security policy is the creation of "strong" states and state structures that can function as full-fledged members of the community of states.³²

This formulation of the security problematique is not captured by the "international security as stability" optic,

78. See also Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, "Third World National Security: Toward a New Conceptual Framework," *International Interactions*, 11:2 (1984), 103-135.

29. Mohammed Ayoub, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics*, 43 (January 1991), 259.

30. "The Security Problematic of the Third World," 259.

31. Mohammed Ayoub, "Regional Security and the Third World," in Mohammed Ayoub, ed., *Regional Security in the Third World* (Boulder: Westview, 1986), 8.

32. Ayoub, "The Security Problematic," 267, citing Buzan.

because it takes as a given "the powers and interests of already constituted state actors." The second line of critique extends this to argue that the first perspective therefore also has no way to explain the role or importance of "the domestic and international institutions that constitute [states] as empowered and [self]-interested subjects in the first place."³³ As Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall have noted, "state-centred choice-theoretic formulations of the problem of creating international institutions and orders blinds scholars to some equally important, if not even more fundamental, processes of 'ordering' in the international system."³⁴ In other words, the possibility that UN actions to maintain and create "international peace and security" could be one of these ordering processes by which the state system is sustained is excluded.

The historical account of the "international security as order" approach consequently emphasizes the role of state-building and the consolidation of centralized power in defining and "solving" the problem of security. As "strong" states emerged in Europe, they developed the ability to offer citizens some protection from threats as part of a reciprocal relationship between rulers and ruled. This almost always involved the brutal suppression of *internal* sources of threat (from minorities, for example). The rest of the international community most often tolerated or acquiesced in this, as long as the goal remained the consolidation of state power. States in the developing world (and even some in the North, such as the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia), have seldom concluded this process, and are often "quasi-states," that do not meet the minimal requirements of independent statehood. They are "weak" sovereign entities that can neither secure themselves nor their "citizens" (many of whom reject the

33. Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), 56.

34. Wendt and Duvall, 51-52.

mantle of citizenship).³⁵ What is of interest to this perspective therefore, is the "logic of world order" that informs the way in which the international community responds to a collapse of "empirical sovereignty" that results from the pressures of the process of state-formation.

Recent Multilateral Practice

In order to study the possibility that UN action to ensure international peace and security is driven by a commitment to supporting an orderly process of state-formation, one must attempt to uncover the underlying norms and ideas that inform the multilateral responses to (and definitions of) "threats to international peace and security." So, for example, a textual analysis of the *Agenda for Peace*, which would be irrelevant from the perspective of "international security as stability," would be a possible site for locating a normative consensus on the ideas of international governance that provide the basis for (or set the limits of) multilateral practice.³⁶ This sort of question is absent from the first optic, since multilateral action is deemed to be motivated purely by exogenously-determined state interests, and public justifications of policy are regarded as an imperfect reflection of these interests (occasionally accurate, occasionally dissembling).

The central case for this argument would be the UN efforts in Somalia. Although only the Somalia example will be dealt

35. As Robert Jackson notes, "The ex-colonial states...possess the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states...[H]owever...their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organized power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare." *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 21.

36. In other words, which make such multilateral actions both authoritative and legitimate. Of course, to the first perspective the *Agenda for Peace* could express a consensus among great powers about the "rules of the game" regulating their behaviour, but this would largely be demonstrated by looking at state practice. The *Agenda for Peace* is formally the "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992," General Assembly Document A/47/277, 17 June 1992.

with here, a *prima facie* case can be made that the concepts underpinning multilateral security operations might be moving in this direction in other cases as well. It is difficult to explain *why* the United Nations (or various of its member states) has acted at all Somalia (and to a lesser extent, this holds for Iraqi Kurdistan or Cambodia), without some reference to the *internal* plight of peoples, and the response this triggered within the media and public opinion in several Western states. This opens the way to arguing that the conceptions of security that motivate multilateral action cannot be entirely state-centric (or blind to the security of individuals). A close examination of the "logic of international order" contained in the resolutions and discussions, however, suggests that something else was at work.

As early as January 1992, the Security Council determined that the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia, if it continued, might constitute a threat to international peace and security.³⁷ When UNOSOM I was mandated (Resolution 751) in April, however, it was not constituted under Chapter VII, but presented as a classic "cease-fire monitoring" operation that would facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. The nature of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security was altered though, by Security Council Resolution 794, which argued that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security."³⁸ This resolution, which

37. "Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes...a threat to international peace and security." Resolution 733, preambular paragraph 4. S/RES/733, 23 January 1993.

38. S/RES/794, 3 December 1992, third preambular paragraph. This resolution put into effect one of the four options suggested by the Secretary-General in his report of 30 November 1992 (S/24868). Most significantly, that report presented the justification for the move to Chapter VII and was underlined by the Secretary-General's earlier observation that "it may become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia."

authorized the original intervention by the American-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992, invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and authorized action (including the use of force) "to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."

Two things are significant about this justification for Chapter VII action. First, the language used to invoke Chapter VII is different than in the Korean and Iraqi wars, which rested on a determination that a *breach of peace* had occurred. In the Somali case, the existence of a *threat* was deemed sufficient to warrant action. This (together with the nature of the situation) represents a broadening of the potential for action under Chapter VII³⁹. Second, although there was no attempt (unlike in the Iraqi Kurdish case) to link this putative threat to international peace and security to any transborder, regional or international implications, it was still necessary "to make a determination under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region."⁴⁰ This point suggests that although the "international" dimensions of "peace and security" can be more broadly conceived, it remains a critical justifications that sets a boundary on the permissible scope of UN action.

The practical content of these shifts emerges when one examines the long-term goals of the UNOSOM operation. The justifications offered by states during the debate on Resolution 794 (which was adopted unanimously) rest almost entirely on the magnitude of the unfolding human tragedy, and the failure of the less dramatic action mandated

S/24859, 27 November 1993.

39. This broadening had already occurred in the Bosnia case, although no forcible action has been mandated. Resolution 713 (25 September 1991), which was the first resolution concerning the fighting in Yugoslavia, decided, under Chapter VII, to implement an arms embargo on Yugoslavia (operative paragraph 6). It was, however, only "concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security" (preambular paragraph 5).

40. Secretary-General's report of 30 November 1992 (S/24868).

under the five previous resolutions to resolve the crisis.⁴¹ But an exclusive focus on the proximate reasons for intervening obscures the equally important goals being sought in the long run. Here Resolution 794 emphasized "facilitating the process of a political settlement...aimed at national reconciliation," and the Secretary-General's reports of 24 and 29 November 1992, argued that "efforts are also required to create the political conditions in which Somalia can begin to resolve its political problems."⁴² Similar commitments underlie the UN's actions in Iraqi Kurdistan, Cambodia and elsewhere. However, what is significant here is the political project that informs this somewhat expanded interpretation of threats to international peace and security.

The Prescriptive Agenda

There is an implicit or explicit emphasis on the creation of "international order" in this reading of UN activities. What lies underneath the response to the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia has been described in general terms by Robert Jackson as "the undertaking of contemporary international society to promote their [quasi-states'] development."⁴³ Or, to put it more concretely, "nation-building is becoming an essential aspect of peace-operations": the goal of UN operations is to create relatively strong state structures to fill the void created by the collapse or weakness of existing structures.⁴⁴ The Djibouti representative to the Security Council made this clear in the Somali case: "Somalia...is a land with no effective mechanism for governance...[It] is in key respects a non-State...Perhaps our role in Somalia is at bottom to provide a secure basis for its re-emergence

41. See the speeches on resolution 794, doc. S/PV.3145.

42. S/24868, 30 November 1992; see also S/24859, 27 November 1992. Resolution 794 echoed this in preambular paragraph 14.

43. Jackson, 21-22.

44. *Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change*, staff report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (August 1993), 11.

institutionally." ⁴⁵ The goal is to restore empirical sovereignty to a single entity in the juridically sovereign territory of "Somalia." It is *not* to allow the people to freely determine their political destiny in ways that might fracture this sovereignty. For example, northern Somalia, which declared its independence (as the Republic of Somaliland) has not been recognized or supported internationally, nor even acknowledged as a possible outcome of the reconciliation process. Likewise, humanitarian assistance offered to Iraqi Kurds in no way changed the political status quo. The debate on Security Council Resolution 688 highlighted this, as France pushed (but failed) to have the Security Council authorize the use of force to liberate the Kurds. ⁴⁶

That the political project is bounded in this way can also be demonstrated by counter-example, namely the difficulties encountered by the UN when faced with situations in which restoring empirical sovereignty encounters strong local resistance. In the case of humanitarian intervention in the Sudan in 1989, the UN, because it was forced to deal with the government in Khartoum on an ongoing basis, was unable to break out of a framework that put a high priority on maintaining Sudan as a single state (and which therefore limited its ability to aid the South and gain the trust of the people). "[Operation] Lifeline paradoxically illuminated the extent to which the world organization itself may be one of the last bastions of national sovereignty as traditionally understood," and "the nature of the UN's primary constituency and accountability helps explain a number of problems associated with its effort to respond to a humanitarian crisis involving an insurgency as well as a recognized government." ⁴⁷ In the case of El Salvador and the Central American peace process, "the state-centricity

45. Security Council document S/PV.3188, (26 March 1993), 8.

46. Discussed in Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War," *Indiana Law Journal*, 67:4 (Fall 1992), 904-909.

47. Weiss and Minear, "Do International Ethics Matter?", 214, 208.

of...international organizations like the UN...[left] the irregular forces in the region outside the formal negotiation framework on establishing a peacekeeping mission," making peace-building difficult.⁴⁸ Similarly, in the case of the Western Sahara, the UN has been mandated by Resolution 690 to hold a referendum on self-determination for the between 100,000 and 200,000 inhabitants of the territory. This could (depending on how the UN arbitrates the issue of the electoral lists) result in the creation of yet another juridically sovereign but empirically weak micro-state. Relative inaction by the UN to implement the terms of the resolution in the face of Moroccan resistance is in part explained by the realization that "a referendum which favours Morocco might prove to be the best means of resolving the problem in human and institutional terms."⁴⁹

This formulation of the problem of "international peace and security" as "maintaining order" and continuing the state-building project of the Westphalian state system is significantly broader than the first formulation, for it incorporates the shared interest of all actors in preventing the collapse of one part of the Westphalian edifice, from which they derive their own legitimacy. This goes beyond the narrow first-order "self-interests" of the "international security as stability" optic, and helps explain why the international community has taken up certain challenges. The American position on the Bosnian conflict captures some of the difference between these two types of interest: Secretary of State Warren Christopher has argued that the conflict "does not involve our vital interests," but President Clinton has noted that "we do have fundamental interests...particularly...as a member of the world

48. Stephen Baranyi and Liisa North, *Stretching the Limits of the Possible; United Nations Peacekeeping in Central America*, Aurora papers 15 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1992), 7.

49. Roy, 62. Major-General Roy is a former force commander of MINURSO. As the Secretary-General argued in the *Agenda for Peace*, "if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve" (para. 17).

community."⁵⁰ Unfortunately, this formulation also side-steps some central issues: it contains no room for the possibility that creating or strengthening empirically sovereign states might itself be part of the problem, and it has no means for "theorizing community" or the role of individuals. This challenge is in part taken up by the third optic.

International Security as Justice

The Foundation of "Security"

The third optic on security travels most often under the heading of "broadening" the concept of security to include potential threats that are excluded from the "security as stability" optic, such as economic well-being (individual and social), protection from environmental degradation, the safeguarding of basic human rights, and the preservation of communal harmony.⁵¹ It derives its force from the argument that the transformation of world politics has progressively "hollowed out" the purpose and ethic behind the concept of "national security," which was a product of the establishment and consolidation of the state system. Thus the four initial questions are answered somewhat differently. "Security" is a condition that *individuals* enjoy, and they are given primacy both in the definition of threats and of who (or what) is to be secured. Security also has a "holistic character": protection of a "way of life" or the safeguarding of basic values form the broad umbrella; this includes, but is not confined to, countering external threats from organized violence. In fact, proponents of broadening the definition almost always

50. *New York Times*, 4 June 1993.

51. For general statements, see Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987); Yezid Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries," *Adelphi paper 251* (London: IISS, 1990). On specific issues see, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 68:2 (Spring 1989), 162-177; Brad Roberts, "Human Rights and International Security," *Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 1990), 65-75; Gil Loescher, "Refugee Movements and International Security," *Adelphi Paper 268* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992).

suggest that external threats of force are far less urgent contingencies than, for example, the consequences of continued environmental degradation, or economic transformation and instability. Protection of individuals within a community is *not* equated with support for states: as Ronnie Lipschutz puts it, "perhaps the difficult lies not so much with how security is being defined (or redefined)...as with the *entity* being made secure."⁵² The question of the means employed to provide security is a thorny one, especially in the international realm, as some have been willing to advocate the use of forcible means to create security for peoples (which effectively forces the problem back to "the state"), while others have defined force outside of the equation. What is clear, however, is that many of the problems considered as potential threats to security are *not* amenable to forcible solutions.⁵³

The two strongest variants of this argument have been manifest with respect to human rights and the environment, both of which have received much recent attention in the multilateral arena. I will concentrate here on human rights, and specifically on recent multilateral action to offer or protect humanitarian assistance, as this falls directly within the concerns of this paper.⁵⁴

52. Ronnie Lipschutz, "Reconstructing Security: Discursive Practices, Material Changes and Policy Consequences," Working paper 2.7, Center for German and European Studies, University of California-Berkeley, (November 1992), 2. Emphasis his. The title of Patricia Mische's article, "Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize Sovereignty," *Alternatives*, 14:4 (1989), 389-427, also captures this sense.

53. See Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium*, 19:3 (1990), 461-476.

54. On the linkage between multilateralism and environmental security, see Philippe Sands, "Enforcing Environmental Security: The Challenges of Compliance with International Obligations," *Journal of International Affairs*, 46:2 (Winter 1993), 367-390; Catherine Tinker, "'Environmental Security' in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the Security Council," *Tennessee Law Review*, 54:4 (Summer 1992), 787-801.

Recent Multilateral Practice

In order to argue that the conception of security informing multilateral practice has been broadened to incorporate the elements of "security as justice" outlined above, two possible types of evidence could be offered. The first would focus on *state practice*: the justifications extended by states or international actors for action that safeguards individuals in other states (or groups within states) from threats. The second would attempt to outline deeper changes in the underlying norms and principles that inform the behaviour of states and international institutions and that are incorporated into their practices and procedures.⁵⁵ Both approaches have difficulties: the absence of evidence that state practice has changed would not disprove the case that the underlying discourse is evolving, while evidence that new norms and ideas are articulated (or old ones contested) could foreshadow future change in practices but would not signify that these changes will occur. Some combination of the two approaches would seem to be necessary to make the case, at least provisionally.

The case for a changed conception of "security as justice" that would open the way to new conceptions of sovereignty and world politics is weak if the standard of proof is a discernable evolution in the behaviour of states or international institutions towards effective compliance with, or enforcement of, internationally recognized norms.⁵⁶ Definitive proof would be concerted action under Chapter VII within the domestic jurisdiction of a state in response to

55. For an example of how one would uncover these norms (and of their concrete impact), see Sandra Whitworth, "Gender, International Relations and the Case of the ILO," *Review of International Studies*, 20:4 (forthcoming, October 1994). Another example would be the way in which UNESCO incorporated into its founding ethic the principle of the "free flow of information," based on the principle that news was "neutral" and "objective," and a commodity that should be traded in a fashion analogous to the economic principle of comparative advantage. Herbert Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1969), 34-39.

56. For a comprehensive statement of this case see Roberts, "Humanitarian War."

(for example) massive human rights violations.⁵⁷ No case corresponds to this, although Somalia comes closest: Resolution 794 marked the first time that an essentially domestic humanitarian crisis had been defined as a threat to international peace and security, and as warranting the use of force under Chapter VII. It also affirmed "that those who commit or order the commission of...acts [that violate international humanitarian law] will be held individually responsible."⁵⁸ The main (and important) difference from the "hard case" is that the intervention was not conducted against the wishes of a recognized sovereign authority. Also detracting from its force as a potential precedent was the fact that many states were careful to note the *sui generis* nature of the Somali case.⁵⁹

Similarly, the fact that the UN has not moved towards a greater use of force (despite the invocation of Chapter VII) in Bosnia, despite the manifest humanitarian need, suggests that Somalia may remain unique. In addition, many states have been emphatic in their resistance to the development of a generalized right or duty of humanitarian intervention. As the Non-aligned movement's draft response to the *Agenda for Peace* noted:

the Movement is concerned over the recent tendency to intervene in the internal affairs of other states under the pretext of protecting human rights or preventing conflicts which in effect would erode the concept of national sovereignty. In this regard, the Movement could not accept those elements contained in the Secretary-General's report

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57. As Adam Roberts notes, "Sooner or later, UN or NATO members will be challenged by events to back up their pronouncements of humanitarian concern, their opposition to war crimes, or their efforts at a peace plan, with some greater use of force than has been seen so far." Roberts, "Humanitarian war," 444.
58. Operative paragraph 5. The Secretary-General's report of 17 August 1993 also noted that ongoing investigations might lead to the apprehension of suspects in major human rights cases, and that these persons would be tried by international justices. S/26317 (17 August 1993), 27.
59. This was especially the case for China, which noted that the Somali operation was "an exceptional action in view of the unique situation in Somalia." Security Council document S/PV/3145, (3 December 1992), 17.

"An Agenda for Peace" that could be detrimental to the sovereign rights of states.⁶⁰

The reaffirmation of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states is echoed in various regional organizations' charters and declarations, suggesting that resistance to any rethinking of "security" that would dilute sovereignty is strong.

Looking to states alone for evidence that changing concepts of security are eroding state sovereignty would, however, confuse the endpoint (state practice) with the process (norm change). If the focus is *not* exclusively on state practice, but rather on the "discourse" (or governing ideas) that might be more subtly entrenched in the formal and informal practices of institutions (and not directly manifest in state practice), the case is not so bleak. Former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar pointed the way to a different standard of proof, when he asserted that "the right to intervene has been given a renewed relevance by recent political events... We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."⁶¹ No work has been done to test, however, whether or not "public attitudes" have in fact changed (and where), or on how this change might ultimately be manifest in multilateral practice. Of course, to sustain such a study one must assume that state practice is not informed solely by an easily grasped and uncontested "national interest," and that state action is embedded in a web of norms that ultimately give it direction and meaning.

60. Draft "non-paper" from the Non-aligned movement for discussion at the Jakarta summit of the NAM, 1992. This sentiment was echoed in many of the General Assembly speeches from the NAM, in particular those of Mexico, Brazil and Indonesia. See General Assembly debates, 9, 14, 26, 27 October 1992.

61. UN Press Release, SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991, Secretary-General's speech at the University of Bordeaux, cited in Gene Lyons and Michael M. Mastanduno, *Beyond Westphalia? International Intervention, State Sovereignty and the Future of International Society*, summary of a conference held at Dartmouth College, May 1992, 2.

Without offering a comprehensive analysis, this paper can point to three specific areas in which one could look for the articulation of new norms (or the challenging of old ones) that would incorporate an understanding of "international security as justice." These represent *prima facie* cases that the international community (and international institutions) were extending some form of protection to individuals (i.e., providing security) regardless of their status. The first would be the activities surrounding the creation and work of the UN war crimes commission and the international war crimes tribunal, which were established to investigate and ultimately try accused perpetrators of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. The tribunal, established under Resolution 827 (25 May 1993), determined that "continuing reports of widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia" constituted a "threat to international peace and security." Noteworthy also is the fact that the tribunal was established under Chapter VII, thus making explicit the linkage between grave breaches of human rights, threats to international security, and possible enforcement action by the UN.⁶² Although states have not enthusiastically supported this effort, it was clearly the result in part of public pressures responding to media coverage of the atrocities, and a vast array of non-governmental organizations have mobilized to supply the tribunal with information and support.⁶³ Its ultimate success cannot yet be judged, but it represents an important reaffirmation (and possible extension) of the principle that individuals are entitled to some forms of protection (i.e., security). Some states (Brazil and Spain) expressed disappointment that Resolution 827 did not push

62. Resolution 827 (25 May 1993), preambular paragraphs 3 and 4, operative paragraph 2.

63. NGOs have been encouraged to collect and supply information on violations of international humanitarian law to the Security Council as early as Resolutions 771 (13 August 1992) and 808 (22 February 1993). For current details see "War Crimes Court Takes First Steps," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 28 November 1993.

directly for the creation of a permanent international criminal court; if such a court were created this would (depending on its powers) almost certainly indicate some acceptance of the "international security as justice" principle.⁶⁴

The second would be the recently amplified debate concerning the existence of a right or duty of humanitarian intervention.⁶⁵ The case against humanitarian intervention rests primarily on a positive conception of international law (as codified state practice), while the contrary case rests on a broader understanding of the forces for change in world politics, and a different "epistemology." As one scholar notes with respect to the debate over Article 2(4) of the Charter, "while there remain protagonists...of the traditional strict doctrine that a human rights problem concerns none but the state where it takes place, this is becoming an increasingly eccentric position."⁶⁶ The degree to which a position is "eccentric" is a reflection of an underlying normative consensus, and this suggests some shifting in the ground. In addition, the argument that a *collective* right of humanitarian intervention is enjoyed by the UN is gaining some force, as a way around the problem that an individual state's right to intervene is inextricably bound up with other interests.

64. See speeches by Brazil and Spain on Resolution 827, document S/PV.3217.

65. See, *inter alia*, Barry Benjamin, "Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities," *Fordham International Law Journal*, 16 (1992-93), 120-158; Roberts, "Humanitarian War," 444-449; Nigel Rodley, ed., *To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights* (London: Brassey's, 1992); Fernando Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality* (Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publishers, 1988); Michael Bayzler, "Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia," *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 597-606; Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15 (May 1993); Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality and Politics," *Journal of International Affairs*, 37:2 (Winter 1985).

66. Nigel Rodley, "Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The Legal Framework," in Rodley, ed., 21-2.

Finally, proponents of a case for a more universally recognized conception of "international security as justice" that could inform multilateral practice must come to terms with the conflicting claims over human rights advanced, for example, at the 1993 UN Human Rights conference in Vienna. This linkage between security, intervention, and human rights was recognized by many delegates and by the Secretary-General, who argued in his opening speech that "the state should indeed be the best guarantor of human rights...[However] the international organization is called upon if states...violate the basic principles of the Charter, and if they no longer ensure the basic protection of the individual."⁶⁷ At precisely the same time as the case for linking security with justice is being made, the ethical foundations of a universal conception of justice are being challenged. If what emerges from this debate is a complete lack of consensus (and *not* just among states) over what a core of universal rights that warrant enforceable protection by international institutions might be, then the case for conceiving of "international security as justice" would be significantly weakened.⁶⁸

The Prescriptive Agenda

Prescription and analysis are closely intertwined in this perspective, and the argument that we need a new definition of security is actually most often advanced in the cause of

67. Speech reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, FBIS-WEU-93-113, 15 June 1993. See also *Calgary Herald*, 15 June 1993. His speech actually enforces the perspective of "international security as order," as he argues that "the international community of states has the duty to take the place of those who fail," to protect basic rights, and that states do not "have the right to demand absolute respect from the international community of states if...sovereignty itself becomes the ultimate argument used...to justify their violations of...rights."

68. See "Differences are Narrowed at U.N. Talks on Rights," *New York Times*, 21 June 1993; "Rights Forum Ends in Call for a Greater Role by U.N.," *New York Times*, 26 June 1993. For background on the issue see Alison Dundes Renteln, "The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 7:4 (November 1992), 514-540.

political advocacy, rather than to change the way in which scholars study the phenomenon of "security." The most clear implication of this for multilateral practice is that at a minimum, UN institutions should be endowed with a greater capacity to act in the human rights and environmental realms, and that this action should be motivated by concern for the individual and the community (rather than the state) as the *objects* of security. In the process, the entire legal/institutional edifice in which current multilateral peace and security operations are embedded (such as the requirement of consent, the inviolability of sovereignty, or the threshold for military intervention) will need to be reshaped. In the case of humanitarian intervention, the norms articulated in the various human rights instruments of the UN system would have to be embedded in "a normative doctrine and a routinized organizational response for protecting groups of people victimized and exploited by governments."⁶⁹

There are, of course, large obstacles to the realization of this vision. One is political: it requires a strong underlying consensus within the UN, as UN actions cannot ultimately succeed unless the majority of member-states accept some common concept of law and legitimacy. Perhaps the largest barrier, however, is that such a vision requires a change in the fundamental assumptions underlying the state-centric conception of security concerning the role of force, or the nature of the relationship between individual, communities, and sovereign entities. Advocates of expanded UN humanitarian intervention acknowledge that this would require that "a state would be truly independent in its internal affairs only so long as it observed internationally recognized human rights."⁷⁰ But although one can grant this perspective's

69. Thomas Gillespie, "Unwanted Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention to Advance Human Rights," *Peace & Change*, 18:3 (July 1993), 220. In the case of environment and security, the goal is to "make the right to environment as justiciable as other previously defined human rights." Melissa Thorme, "Establishing Environment as a Human Right," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, 19:2 (Winter 1991), 301.

70. Gillespie, 240.

claim that one needs to study different phenomena (such as norm creation and change) in order to grasp the possibilities of an emergent conception of "international security as justice," none of the contributions to the debate can advance evidence that ideas have yet changed in such a fundamental way.

Conclusion

UN actions in the realm of "international peace and security" have undergone profound changes since the end of the Cold War. At the most prominent level, Chapter VII has been invoked as the basis for collective action in Somalia and Iraq, and several other operations have threatened the use of force in order to establish "peace and security" in different conflicts. There are three ways in which scholars might understand the evolutionary trajectory of recent UN practice, each of which rests on a different understanding of "international peace and security." Overall, there is strong evidence that current multilateral actions are based upon more than a commitment to "security as stability," understood as the multilateral expression of the traditional ideas of "national security." The governing idea of "security as order" appears to provide the most widely accepted and consistent rationale and explanation for UN actions (and inactions). There is some evidence for an emergent norm of "security as justice" that could underpin multilateral action for international peace and security, but, as the debate on humanitarian intervention illustrates, this concept is not widely accepted.

A second goal of this paper was to clarify some of the ways in which the study of "new thinking on international peace and security" involves not only different visions of world politics, but a shift in way in which scholars study security. This is a more difficult proposition to demonstrate, and perhaps this paper can only issue a promissory note. At minimum, however, it is evident there is no scholarly

consensus on the standards and evidence to be used to determine if the concept of "international peace and security" is changing. This is clearly illustrated by Haftendorn's argument that the goal of security studies is "to construct an empirically testable paradigm," which involves defining the "set of observational hypotheses," the "hard core of irrefutable assumptions," and the "set of scope conditions" that...are required for a 'progressive' research program."⁷¹ Although she eschews a narrow positivist conception, little in this approach would make room for the study of norm change and the role of ideational elements in structuring the environment within which actors take specific decisions. Since the arguments from both the second and third optics depend to some extent on such claims, they cannot easily be advanced without an openness to the influence of structures, ideas and social forces on the behaviour of states and multilateral institutions, especially in the area of human rights and humanitarianism.

Perhaps I can close with a concrete example. The Permanent Court of International Justice noted in 1923 that "the question of whether or not a certain matter is or is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question: it depends on the development of international relations."⁷² Determining how we could study whether or not international relations have "developed" should be a major focus of the future research agenda for studying multilateral action to advance "international peace and security."

71. Haftendorn, 12.

72. In the 1923 decision on the nationality decrees in Tunis and Morocco. The Court went on to note that "It may well happen that, in a matter which...is not, in principle, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its discretion [i.e., in matters solely of domestic jurisdiction] is nevertheless restricted by obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States."