

CHAPTER 7 - IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PARTITION

How can any outside body complement a plan for a territory opposed by both the majority of the population of that territory and all the surviving states? Only if the outside power had enough military, legal and moral clout. The idea, however, of _____ the U.N. moral clout with the U.K. military and legal clout, backed up, pick up, by U.S. economic might, was a non-starter.

After all, in the 1939 White Paper, the U.K. had repudiated the terms of the Mandate with respect to using Palestine as a homeland for Jews when Jews were most desperate for a homeland. After World War II, the U.K. had consistently refused to allow 100,000 European Jewish refugees, the remnants of the Holocaust, into Palestine against minority of Western public _____, particularly in the U.S.A.

The U.K. had gone further, participating actively in the _____ over the IRO constitution to deny any IRO role in resettling the refugees in Palestine. The U.K. ignored the recommendations of

the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, and were particularly _____ over _____ support for immediate admission of the 100,000 refugees. Formally, the U.K. had it perfectly clear that they would only co-operate with a U.N. recommendation if the recommendation was not opposed by either of the disputants. Therefore, if the recommendation was for a federal state of some sort or, better yet, a waiting state with Jewish minority rights, and if the U.S. could persuade the U.S. to get the Zionists to co-operate or threaten to use force to bring them into line, then there was a possibility of U.K. co-operation. But there was not real prospect of U.K. co-operation or implementation of the recommendation was for Partition.

What could not have been anticipated perhaps was the degree and extent of U.K. non co-operation. Britain moved up the date of its withdrawal for Palestine to May 15th. Britain refused to allow the Palestine Commission entry to Palestine until the last moment - May 1st, two weeks prior to the termination of the Mandate. Britain refused the right of any of its _____ to work for any _____ authority, whether _____, Jews or U.N. Britains

non co-operation amounted to virtual sabotage of the U.N. recommendation.

Thus the best of the three key factors necessary to the success of Partition by peaceful means was missing. This non co-operation was paralleled by and probably reinforced the momentary violent opposition of the belligerents. In the face of Britain non co-operation, in the faces of a _____ Arab commitment against Partition, in the face of the increasing violence in Palestine itself, the implementation of UNSCOP's Partition recommendation was bound to be different.

The Swedish representative on the vote prior to partition summarized its essential weaknesses.

"My government.... view"

Power and administrative organization. Those were the essential weaknesses. There were two areas to attack the problem, the role of the Security council and the structure and function of the United Nations Palestine Commission.

A _____ committee composed of Canada, Gustula, the Soviet Union and the United States was found to work on the problem of implementation. Given the rising tide of violence, the Swedish representative

had already administered the possible future overtures of the Palestine Commission Board,

"It may..... _____"

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What did they recommend. Since Britain had assumed an _____, the regional partition plan had to be modified with respect to the _____ date, giving the Palestine Commission only a few months to get organized. On the other hand, Jewish and Arab _____ of Government and militia were being organized to assume direct governmental responsibility and the Britain would continue to administer the territory in the _____. In other words, the U.N. was backing away from any _____ or resident legal authority in the direct administration of the Arabs and Jews parts of Palestine. The Palestine Committees would only have direct legal and administrative responsibilities for Jerusalem.

Thus, with the exception of Jerusalem, the U.N. was moving further and further away from acting as a _____ legal and administrative authority. But even with respect to Jerusalem, it was not clear how the U.N. would become the successor legal

authority to Britain. Presumably, the U.N. was to act like the Jewish and Arab _____ to directly assume de facto legal and administrative authority. But, unlike the Jewish and Arab groups, the U.N. lacked a militia, lacked a constituency were given very limited terms of reference and, in the end, was a _____ weak group.

The Palestine Commission was certainly too weak to serve as a watchdog of the Arab and Jewish transferred governments to ensure they held to the Partition agreement. In fact, the _____ of the commission was notable for its lack of supporters of partition.

The commission representing Bolivia, Panama, Czechoslovakia, Denmark and the Philippines had no authority or power of decision, no great political weight, and no virtue of loyalty to the idea of the creation of the Jewish state. _____ Lisicky, the hesitant Czechoslovakian, lacked decisiveness and

daring. Federspiel, the Dane, and the delegate of the Philippines, the country that had changed its mind three times and only in the end agreed to vote for partition, were

among its members.

It seemed as though this composition had been deliberately chosen to deprive the body of all power, authority and capacity for effective action. Many thus believed it was the retort of the anti-Zionist forces intent upon whittling down the resolution and defeating it on the enforcement level.(1)

In fact, the Palestine Commission would never set foot in Palestine. An advance group, headed by the Commission's chief secretary, Pablo de Azcarate(2) did go to Palestine in _____. Its main efforts were to _____.

The _____ like of attach of the United Nations lay in resorting to the Security Council. The Security Council's role (or linkage to Palestine) was _____ _____. Though it had not been foreseen that the Security Council would have to act to counter a large-scale Arab invasion from outside of Palestine(1), it was clear from the start that there would be violent Arab opposition to and obstruction of partition.

On passage of the resolution, Lie had immediately gone into action to garner support for

backing the resolution with force to avoid a loss of confidence in the United Nations. His major worry was that the Great Powers would just sit back and let the two sides fight it out.

They would be tacitly admitting that the United Nations was a useless instrument in attempting to preserve peace.(2)

In December 1947, Lie set in motion Secretariat studies of the possibility of creating an international peace force. Lie later told the Palestine Commission,

"You are entitled...to be confident that in the event it should prove necessary, the security Council will assume its full measure of responsibility in implementation of the Assembly's resolution. You have a right to assume, as I assume, that in such a situation the security Council will not fail to exercise to the fullest, and without exception, every necessary power entrusted to it by the Charter in order to assist you in fulfilling your mission."(3)

Lie realized at the time that the statement was bold, but he hoped it would help him get the

Security Council to act, if necessary. His fears were better guidelines for the future than his hopes.

The United Nations Palestine Commission duly reported to the Security Council on February 16, 1948, that it would be unable to implement partition without military forces of adequate strength. It depicted the implications of not backing up the will of the United Nations in very stark terms:

In the view of the Commission, a basic issue of international order is involved. A dangerous and tragic precedent will have been established if force, or the threat of force, is to prove an effective deterrent to the will of the United Nations.(1)

Bunche, the principal secretary of the Commission, estimated that one mechanized division would suffice to keep peace, since it would only be needed to work alongside the Haganah to protect the Jewish areas.(2) The Jewish Agency thought that 10,000 troops would be adequate. But the Palestine Commission itself wanted 100,000.(3)

Differences of opinion about the number of

troops needed were, in the event, an academic debate because none were to be provided despite Lie's prodding and despite the dire implications of not giving forceful backing to the resolution. Relations between Security Council members would dictate

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inactivity on the part of the Council.

At this point in time, United States objections stood in the way of the formation of an international police force. A police force was anathema to Washington for a number of reasons. At the time of the partition vote, Truman had unequivocally stated that the United States would not commit armed forces to implement partition.(4) The United States would argue that the Security Council was not authorized to take enforcement action to enforce a political settlement, but only to remove an actual threat to peace.(5) This option was shared by a number of other members of the United Nations. But its use by the Americans as a justification for not authorizing enforcement was somewhat disingenuous. A legal paper prepared in the State Department supported the finding of a United Nations legal study that the United Nations

was entitled to use force to implement partition.

The true justification for American objections to enforcement measures lay elsewhere. A very obvious explanation was concern about further affronting the Arabs. The Policy Planning Staff argued against American participation in enforcement activities based on the fear that this would lead to suspension or cancellation of base rights, pipeline construction contracts and a decline or even an embargo on United States trade with the Arabs.(1)

The Soviets had sponsored a putsch in Czechoslovakia. the Italian Communist party seemed poised to win the Italian elections. by March of 1948, an atmosphere of crisis enveloped Washington. On March 5th, General CLay in Berlin sent a top secret telegram to the Director of Intelligence of the Army General Staff saying,

Within last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it [war] may
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come with dramatic suddenness.(2)

On March 17, 1948, truman gave a special

message to Congress on the "critical" situation in Europe, recommending immediate measures to build up military power, including universal military training, selective service, and an increase in the military budget of 25%.(3) Preoccupied as it was with a perceived threat in Europe from its most powerful enemy, the U.S. administration was loathe even to consider sending troops to the Middle East. Likewise, it refused to countenance the possibility of sending Soviet or a Soviet proxy's troops to Palestine.

As an added consideration, Truman adamantly refused to take up Britain's burden in Palestine. The United States, according to Truman's instruction, was

"not going to pick up the present United Kingdom's responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine."(1)

The State Department echoed Truman's fear that Britain was trying to corner the United States in Palestine,

Rusk warned that the United Kingdom would like to trap us into an arrangement where we would have to take on the responsibility of

government which the United Nations might not be able to handle.(2)

In short, the American policy was to thrust responsibility onto the United Nations while denying the U.N. the tools to fulfill that responsibility.(3) Great Britain was hellbent on escaping enforcement. the U.N.'s policy was getting nowhere fast.

The U.N. policy was based on three pillars, as described by Lester Pearson of Canada:

... the plan proposed by Subcommittee 1 was feasible; both theoretically,

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practically, it was capable of being put into effect. Three factors were particularly important. In the first place, he was firmly convinced that the U.K. would cooperate with the commission in the implementation of any plan accepted by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations. Secondly, the support of the permanent members of the Security Council was essential. Lastly, it was to be hoped that the people of Palestine, as well as all the Members of the United Nations, would

accept a decision taken by a two-thirds majority.(4)

All three pillars were _____. The U.K. did not co-operate and was deliberately obstructive in the administration steps necessary to implement the plan and adamantly refused to participate in any enforcement _____. Why would anyone believe that moral persuasion of even a two-thirds U.N. vote would force a sovereign state to risk its diminishing power and _____ economic strength in a perhaps futile effort which conflicted with its own self-interest?

The presumption that the Security Council would back the policy was also naive. though the responsibility of the determination in East-West relations and the accelerated _____ of Soviet-_____ _____ could not perhaps have been contemplated,, the rivalry could. More importantly, the consistent and increasing U.S. opposition to U.S.S.R. involvement, and, hence, Security Council, involvement had never _____ or waivered. though the U.S. seemed to behave as a Yo-Yo on the other key issues, one would not hope for a different U.S. behaviour in one of the key areas where it had been

persistently consistent and _____.

Finally to hope the support of the population of Palestine, in particular, the majority population of Arabs, ran counter to the previous 30 years of

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experience and history now inherited by the shame, humiliation and anger that fueled Arabs _____ and whether _____.

the problem was not on these three pillars, but in the fact that the policy makers had constituted pillars of _____ _____ on horse rather than hand analysis.

If their were these pillars to the U.N. policy role, there was a _____ implement pillar of hope, _____ resided _____ the U.N.

Whatever the U.N. was or was not able to accomplish, it was hoped that he individual members of U.N., particularly those who voted for partition, would back partition with determination and resolution. Even this hope _____ _____ is not only the U.S.A., but the expression of that hope reneged via that commitment and determination.

