LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN AN AUSTERE CITY

SECURITY POLITICS AND URBAN RESTRUCTURING IN POST-BANKRUPTCY DETROIT

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Abstract

Detroit's experience with emergency management and municipal bankruptcy has been the subject of intense public and academic scrutiny. Yet, few have explored how this moment of intense urban restructuring helped to reinforce security as a vital pillar of the city's revitalization strategy. In response to this gap in scholarship, this dissertation explores highly experimental, post-bankruptcy securitization efforts with an empirical focus on the origins and growth of the city's 'real-time' crime fighting initiatives and a city-wide CCTV initiative called Project Green Light. Formally introduced in 2016 as a 'public-private-community' partnership, Project Green Light involves a voluntary agreement whereby participating businesses agree to fund the installation and maintenance of cameras on their premises that can be actively monitored in real-time by the Detroit Police Department. In exchange, Project Green Light partners are promised prioritized police response and enhanced police presence. Conceiving of Project Green Light as a form of speculative security, this dissertation examines how the program has expanded despite conclusive evidence of its efficacy, numerous controversies surrounding its objectives and rollout, and resistance from community residents and grassroots organizers. The study draws from a large selection of documents as well as interviews with Project Green Light participants and neighborhood residents in order to explore perceptions and experiences of the program. In doing so, this dissertation unravels the contested politics around speculative visions of security and surveillance that have been intimately bound up in efforts to remake the City of Detroit.

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INTRODUCTION

On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit was forced to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy after it was determined that the city could not meet its debt obligations of $20 billion. This was to become the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history, but was preceded by a wave of bankruptcies that swept across the U.S. after the 2008 financial crisis (see Davidson & Ward, 2014; Ward & Davidson, 2018). Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the State of Michigan had appointed an Emergency Manager, Kevyn Orr, to replace the elected city government, granting him extensive powers backed by the strongest emergency management laws in the country to rectify the city's fiscal woes and re-establish confidence in its finances by any means necessary (Peck & Whiteside, 2016). At his disposal was a common repertoire of neoliberal fiscal austerity measures including the ability to renegotiate and break collective bargaining agreements, impose pension reform, privatize and decommission services, downsize the municipal workforce, and sell off public assets (Fasenfast, 2019; Loh, 2016; Peck, 2012). Many Detroiters opposed this drastic move by state officials. Grassroots coalitions subsequently organized to resist the suspension of local democracy vis-à-vis state takeover and the associated draconian austerity measures that had become the hallmarks of a highly financialized and technocratic model of urban governance (Peck & Whiteside, 2016). Indeed, as an unelected technocrat, Orr's primary allegiance was to the State of Michigan, which was intent on shrinking the city's fiscal gap by shedding much of its soaring debt and unfunded pension and healthcare liabilities (McDonald, 2014; Phinney, 2018).

Various narratives surfaced to explain the city's fiscal crisis including charges of mismanagement and corruption, and an unwillingness of local elected officials and their constituents to make tough choices given worsening fiscal realities (Eide, 2014; Tabb, 2015).

Orr's task, however, was less a thorough diagnosis and more a remedial dose of fiscal rationality that threatened devastating effects to city residents by way of cuts to pensions and benefits, withdrawal and privatization of public and social services, continued shuttering of schools, and liquidation of valuable city assets. Orr deemed these drastic cuts to be necessary sacrifices to right the city's fiscal ship (Blackmer, 2021a; Peck & Whiteside, 2016; Phinney, 2018).

The pursuit of fiscal sustainability by the emergency manager and his team, however, lay not only in reducing $7 billion in debt obligations. It also involved establishing a plan for the future of the city based on selectively restored and rationalized core city services at levels adequate to stem population loss, attract new residents and employers, strengthen the tax base, promote private investment, and foster growth and redevelopment (City of Detroit, 2013a; City of Detroit, 2013c; City of Detroit, 2014a). With public safety as his "paramount concern", Orr suggested that successful revitalization hinged on remedying deficiencies related to the city's first responders, and particularly the city's police department and their ability to manage the city's "exceedingly high crime rate" (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.61). For this task, he drew on a number of consultants from the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank known for its advocacy of market-oriented policies and heavy-handed policing strategies (O'Connor, 2008; Peck & Whiteside, 2017). Their primary objective was to help formulate a post-bankruptcy blueprint for overhauling the city's policing operations based on a fusion of data-driven principles and the 'Broken Windows' philosophy (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Orr also hired a new police chief to drive the department's restructuring based on these visions (City of Detroit, 2013b). By the end of his tenure, Orr would secure approximately $430 million worth of reinvestment funds for public safety, with the majority allocated to policing expenditures to 'modernize' the police department (City of Detroit, 2013b; DPD, 2014a; Kurashige, 2017). The

amount assigned to public safety was considerable given the host of other needs in the city, but one that the emergency manager rationalized as crucial to the city's future viability. Detroit's financially-mediated restructuring would end up profoundly affecting how the city would be policed going forward, not merely by bolstering numbers of officers on the streets, but also catalyzing new experiments in technology-mediated forms of policing and surveillance. While some scholarship has examined Detroit's period of emergency management and Chapter 9 bankruptcy, there remains little in-depth exploration of how this moment of restructuring helped reinforce security as a vital pillar of the city's revitalization strategy and how it led to the proliferation of new, technological means to monitor and regulate city space.

This dissertation explores these new forms of urban regulation and surveillance that emerged from restructuring efforts and the speculative visions aimed at forging a 'New Detroit' (Jay & Conklin, 2020). It takes the city's emergency management period as point of consolidation for market-oriented and financialized reforms and investigates the forward-looking financial reasoning and imperatives that were brought to bear on local security policy. This includes notions of fiscal sustainability and investability that helped rationalize new investments in policing and surveillance when many other 'non-essential' services and municipal obligations were being sacrificed for fiscal austerity. The dissertation's empirical focus is on the development of the city's 'real-time' crime fighting initiatives and expansive monitoring capabilities that emerged after the city's exit from bankruptcy. In particular, it traces the experimental roll-out of the city-wide camera surveillance partnership called Project Green Light. Officially introduced in 2016 as a "public-private-community partnership", Project Green Light was heralded by the city's police department as an innovative, and "first of its kind" public safety initiative to promote the revitalization and growth of local businesses across the city

(Project Green Light MOU, 2021, p.1). An evolution of earlier closed-circuit television (CCTV)[1] programs in the city's downtown core, the program involves a voluntary agreement whereby participating businesses fund the installation and maintenance of cameras on their premises that can be actively monitored in real-time by the Detroit Police Department. In exchange, Project Green Light partners are promised prioritized police response and enhanced police presence through proactive 'special patrols' at and around their locations (Project Green Light MOU, 2021). Beginning with cameras at eight gas stations in 2016, the program grew considerably year over year, with over 900 participating locations as of early 2024 and thousands of cameras whose feeds are relayed directly to the police department (City of Detroit, 2024a). Fuelled by the vision of police officials to have Project Green Light locations on every city block, the program's cameras and unmistakable flashing green lights have become pervasive fixtures of everyday spaces in the city's predominantly Black neighborhoods. Project Green Light cameras have since expanded beyond commercial establishments to residential complexes, churches, schools, parks, community centers, social service providers, and healthcare facilities.

While some Detroit citizens have supported the program as a way to address legitimate community safety concerns, this support has been far from universal. Indeed, the program's expansion has occurred alongside considerable public controversy, scepticism, and resistance. Activists, social justice advocates, and researchers have argued that Project Green Light and the broader surveillance infrastructures that underlie the city's 'real-time' crime fighting approach pose a considerable threat to the civil liberties of Detroiters and reproduce forms of racialized surveillance and overpolicing of the city's Black and brown residents (Logic Magazine, 2020; Riverwise Magazine, 2019; Urban et al., 2019). Moreover, this surveillance expansionism is

[1] Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is an accepted term used to describe camera-based surveillance systems, despite the fact that many of these systems have become increasingly open and connected (Norris, 2012, p.24).

argued to be diverting funds away from the very things that create real safety and promote wellbeing such as clean water, affordable housing, and functional school systems (Urban et al., 2019).

There has also been a degree of skepticism about whether the program has produced any impacts on crime (Herberg, 2022). Absent a formal evaluation that could provide conclusive evidence of its efficacy in preventing or reducing crime, much of its early expansion rested on anecdotal success stories and reductions in crime based on internally-produced statistics from the police department. In 2022, six years after the program was officially launched, the National Institute of Justice gave the program a "no effects" rating, concluding that the program had no effects on disorder occurrences and violent crime and, thus, had failed to achieve its intended purposes (Department of Justice, 2022; see also Circo et al., 2020). That the program has continued to operate and even expand despite this assessment is not entirely surprising and trails broader, global trends that have seen the proliferation of city-wide CCTV surveillance programs in the absence of evidence demonstrating reductions in crime (Doyle et al., 2012; Hier, 2010; Welsh & Farrington, 2009). All of this raises critical questions about the nature and significance of Project Green Light and other surveillance initiatives, and the economic, social, and political factors driving and shaping their development in Detroit.

Scope and Objectives

This dissertation approaches the Project Green Light program as an anchor point for a closer examination of speculative experiments in technology-mediated policing and surveillance in the context of urban revitalization efforts. It builds on the work of scholars who have critically examined CCTV and other camera surveillance initiatives (Armstrong & Norris, 1999; Coleman, 2004; Doyle et al., 2012; Goold, 2004; Hier, 2010; Lippert, 2009; Walby, 2005; 2006). However,

it also focuses on the unique features of Project Green Light which makes it somewhat distinct from previous 'open-street' or 'public area' CCTV programs. Part of the program's novelty lies in the unique qualities of its partnership agreement, whereby Project Green Light partners agree to help build out and maintain the program's sprawling camera network in exchange for the promise of additional police resources and protection. This differs from other camera network expansion schemes that have been funded primarily by governments since its growth relies heavily on funding provided by private businesses, service providers, and non-governmental organizations. Also significant is the program's increasingly 'networked' or 'integrated' nature, whereby feeds from Project Green Light cameras (along with other private and city cameras) are relayed to several real-time crime centers (RTCCs) across the city and are aggregated with other urban sensing and monitoring infrastructures such as automated license plate readers (ALPRs), drones, and shot detection systems (Przeszlowski et al., 2023; Soderlund, 2013; Wiig, 2018). Open-street camera programs are hardly new in a technological sense, but are being iterated and deployed in novel ways. They are becoming central components of a larger and constantly evolving "surveillant assemblage" (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p.608)[2] premised on managing and pre-empting urban security risks. Instead of being driven by evidence of their efficacy in preventing crime, diffusion of these speculative security technologies and practices are instead based on their imagined potential (Jaffe & Pilo, 2023; Przeszlowski et al., 2023). The embrace of technologies and practices on the basis of their anticipated and projected, rather than demonstrated, capabilities warrants deeper scholarly attention.

Rather than suggesting that Project Green Light originated from a single, definitive starting point or developed in a linear way, this research explores how the program emerged out

[2] The convergence of disparate and discrete systems of surveillance reflects what Haggerty and Ericson (2000) have called the 'surveillant assemblage'. They emphasize the constant mutability of networks of surveillance that expand in a rhizomatic manner.

of multiple, historically contingent and situated events, contested processes, and allied interests. Furthermore, consistent with the idea of an assemblage, Project Green Light constitutes only one of several experimental surveillance initiatives rolled out in Detroit under the auspices of enhancing public safety over the last decade, but one through which the contested politics of safety and security have played out in numerous community meetings, in local media, and on the streets through protests and demonstrations. As such, Project Green Light provides a lens to view the complex and nuanced ways ordinary citizens understand, encounter, and engage with expansive and increasingly experimental and speculative forms of surveillance of everyday urban spaces. The study is motivated by several research questions: 1) What explains the growing experimental and speculative nature of local security policy in the City of Detroit? 2) How are expanding policing and surveillance technologies linked to urban revitalization and fiscal austerity? and 3) How do ordinary citizens interpret and ultimately shape speculative securitization processes?

Regarding the research design, this study combines semi-structured interviews and documentary research to better understand the emergence of, and experiences with, the growth of 'real-time' crime monitoring and camera surveillance in Detroit. I draw on interviews with several diverse groups of actors to explore first-hand accounts and perceptions of the Project Green Light program. These include individuals enrolled as partners in the program, members of civic groups (e.g., block clubs, neighborhood associations, and citizen patrols), and representatives of community development corporations. The interviews reveal rich and diverse perspectives on the promises, merits, and pitfalls of Project Green Light surveillance, and provide insights into other value assessments (e.g., ethical/moral) that influence residents' engagement with the program. I also draw extensively from transcripts from public meetings of

the city's civilian oversight and review board (i.e., the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners), which provides a view of citizen-police interactions as well as discussion of Project Green Light and 'real-time' crime initiatives by police officials. The study further supplements these key sources with a large collection of documentary material including news articles, policy and legal documents, financial reports, and grey literature.

In exploring Project Green Light, the dissertation draws from and seeks to contribute to a diverse body of scholarly work and debates on urban securitization spanning the fields of urban studies, critical criminology, and surveillance studies (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014; Eick & Briken, 2014; Lippert & Walby, 2013; Wood, 2013). However, unlike previous analyses that locate securitization efforts within urban entrepreneurialism and struggles to reclaim and remake city centers (see Coleman, 2004; Eick & Briken, 2014; Helms, 2008), I argue that new economic realities shaped by processes of financialization, advances in technology, and changes in contemporary policing and security practices are conditioning how novel and experimental security initiatives are being rolled out in post-industrial cities like Detroit. As such, new theoretical insights are needed to fully comprehend the increasingly speculative nature of Detroit's post-bankruptcy securitization regime that has accompanied the city's restructuring.

The main theoretical framework deployed in this dissertation draws from existing work on what has been called 'speculative security' (de Goede, 2012) and 'speculative policing' (Jaffe, 2019). While these frameworks provide a foundation for appreciating the proliferation of speculative security logics, technologies, and practices, there remain some conceptual blind spots that limit the applicability of these concepts as it relates to the relationship between financialization and security and the role of everyday actors in shaping processes of securitization. This dissertation proposes a reformulated framework of 'speculative security'

sensitive to the shifting political economies of cities resulting from deepening financialization and spatially- and racially-mediated austerity. I argue that securitization is increasingly being influenced by financial dynamics, actors, and processes. While previous analyses in urban political economy have tied urban securitization to local growth machines (see for example, Coleman, 2004; Helms, 2008; Raco, 2003), this dissertation considers the increasingly central role of municipal bond market logics, dynamics, and (extra-local) actors in processes aiming to reproduce cities as secure and profitable assets and investments (Hackworth, 2007; Peck & Whiteside, 2016; Weber, 2002; 2010). In doing so, it not only examines the growing use of municipal debt to fund securitization, but also explores how capital markets and financial imperatives impact local security policy, for example, through assessments of 'credit-worthiness' that discipline cities into bolstering local policing and surveillance capacities (Mitchell and Beckett, 2008, p.79). Acknowledging the growing influence of municipal debt politics and bond market dynamics on processes of securitization, this dissertation investigates how Detroit's emergency management and bankruptcy period represented a key moment of local government restructuring and genesis of new security policy. It explores how the temporary suspension of democracy under the auspices of financial emergency provided an opportunity to "govern through crime" (see Simon, 2007; Coleman, Tombs, & Whyte, 2005) and marshal new investments in security. I argue that these investments provided the scaffolding for a new, experimental and speculative regime of security and racialized surveillance, thus placing large swathes of the city and its majority-Black population under constant watch. However, it is insufficient to understand post-bankruptcy securitization as simply a bid to enhance crime control. Rather, I argue that the city's post-bankruptcy securitization regime has reflected attempts to bring speculative imaginaries of the revitalized and 'orderly' city into being as

political and economic elites strive to secure late-entrepreneurial prospects for growth and manage the dislocations of a more deeply cutting regime of fiscal austerity.

Furthermore, Detroit's post-bankruptcy surge in surveillance cannot be fully explained by imposition of security policy from above. While the imagination of political and technocratic elites may hold considerable sway over policymaking, hegemonic visions of the city's remaking are always contested and require constant stabilization and realignment. It may be tempting to frame the city's recent securitization efforts as a revanchist imposition of urban elites and technocratic managers attempting to take back the city in service of gentrification and speculative urban development (Smith, 1996; 2001), or as part of pacification efforts by the state to "fabricate" capitalist forms of order (Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011, p.26). Though the desires, visions, and outsized influence of political and technocratic elites and corporate place-makers undoubtedly make their mark on the urban landscape in multiple and profound ways, there is much more contingency, nuance, and political contestation in the story of Detroit's post-bankruptcy securitization than acknowledged in these accounts.

Partly owing to its "partnership" approach, Project Green Light provides an especially illuminating entry point for examining contemporary forms of responsibilization that enlist "non-state" actors to play greater roles in the production of security (Coleman, 2004; Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1996). The program also reflects how demands for security are generated from multiple social positions including 'from below' (Hier, 2003; Hier et al., 2006; Walby, 2006). While the police department has expended considerable resources to enrol participants, the rapid expansion of Project Green Light has relied on the buy-in of segments of the population, not least its partners who have had to be convinced of the program's merits. These partnerships, however, have been mired in tensions and contradictions, and anecdotes from some interviewees reveal

that the realities of program do not always live up to the visions and promises made by city government and the police department. Furthermore, the expansion of mass, police surveillance in a predominantly Black city like Detroit has been unsurprisingly controversial. This dissertation brings together the diverse viewpoints of community residents, thus underlining the deeply contested nature of Project Green Light. It reveals that while visions for expanded surveillance may provisionally align with practical safety concerns of some residents and their desires to manage local crime problems, they also run up against perceptions that Project Green Light is contributing to the criminalization of Black and brown residents who feel constantly watched, profiled, and viewed with suspicion.

Overall, I find that theoretical traditions of revanchism and pacification are not well suited to understanding the complexities of securitization in Detroit's neighborhoods. Rather than motivated by a politics of revenge or backlash, I suggest that support for Project Green Light among some citizens stems from a desire for a greater sense of stability amidst the everyday uncertainties and insecurities produced by urban decline, austerity, structural disinvestment, and state abandonment. Seeing securitization in this way helps to avoid falling into the trap of technological or economic determinism that overlooks the on-the-ground politics and the various actors beyond the state who consent to, resist, and ultimately shape processes of speculative securitization. I suggest that programs of speculative security as reflected in Project Green Light reflect a much more fragile and delicate grip over urban life, held together by unstable and contested visions of speculative security and shaped by constantly shifting terrains of consent and legitimacy.

While the story of Detroit's expanding assemblage of speculative security is shaped by locally-specific histories, processes, and forms of agency, this dissertation's findings underline

more systemic patterns and logics of surveillance expansion occurring in and across the post-industrial terrains of the American rust belt. Since new security innovations are often widely shared amongst law enforcement agencies, technology and policy mobilities (Jones et al., 2021; Peck & Theodore, 2015) are fast reproducing similar surveillance infrastructures in other cities. The concept of speculative security is valuable in examining the anticipatory and imaginative dimensions of technological adoption, suggesting that speculative security systems are not merely functional infrastructures, but are constantly evolving socio-technical assemblages shaped by a multiplicity of visions for the future and efforts by different actors to bring these visions into being (Jasanoff, 2015). The significance of the concept lies in its ability to move beyond deterministic narratives and to view the diffusion of speculative security technologies and practices as a complex process of collective meaning-making, alignment of values and interests, and struggles over reimagining city futures.

Organization of the Chapters

This dissertation unfolds in six main chapters. Chapter 1 reviews relevant literature and situates Detroit's post-bankruptcy securitization efforts in a longer historical context of attempts to manage urban growth, decline, and crisis. I provide an overview of role of financialization in cities and the attendant regimes of security that have emerged alongside the deeply financialized terrain of urban politics. I then introduce the theoretical framework of 'speculative security' that informs the dissertation and outline some conceptual refinements which I argue help to better understand contemporary securitization processes. Finally, I outline the study's methodology.

Chapter 2 frames Detroit's period of emergency management and bankruptcy proceedings as a generative moment for new security policy. The chapter traces how security was perceived as a key pillar of the city's resurgence from bankruptcy and how financial

reasoning helped rationalize new investments in novel and speculative forms of technology-mediated policing and surveillance at a time when other city services and operations were being drastically scaled back. It also explores the decisions of the city's emergency manager to hire consultants from the Manhattan Institute to develop a blueprint for reforming police operations that incorporated speculative visions of security based on the fusion of Broken Windows policing (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) and a technological agenda to 'modernize' the police department. These decisions would have profound implications for how the city would be policed post-bankruptcy, with new investments setting the foundation for future experiments in surveillance. Aside from providing context for some of the origins of Project Green Light and the city's turn to technology-mediated policing, the chapter elucidates the key dimensions of financialization and bond market dynamics that have shaped the increasingly speculative characteristics of late-entrepreneurial securitization.

Chapter 3 traces the early origins of Project Green Light including previous iterations of the program that emerged out of corporate efforts to reclaim downtown space. The chapter examines the downtown central business district as a site of speculative city-making and experimental security policy, paying close attention to the public-private arrangements and actors that have contingently aligned to secure visions for Detroit's downtown 'renaissance.' Set against the backdrop of the downtown's enclaved development, the chapter highlights the financial mechanisms and privatized forms of governance that have enabled its corporate remaking. The chapter's empirical focus centers on the Project Lighthouse security partnership in the downtown's central business district which has involved data and camera sharing agreements, coordinated security patrols, and the establishment of corporate 'safe havens' seeking to provide downtown patrons protection and aid in cases of emergency. A key argument

made in the chapter is that the speculative nature of contemporary security in the city stems from its 'pluralized' nature (see Bayley & Shearing, 1996) whereby public-private security partnerships have cultivated an institutional and physical space for prototyping new, emerging surveillance technologies and practices. The chapter concludes by outlining Project Lighthouse's broader significance as a model for the expansion of CCTV partnerships to the city's neighborhoods.

Chapter 4 traces the experimental rollout of Project Green Light as an extension of earlier downtown CCTV partnerships, and explores the police department's efforts to enrol partners in, and build legitimacy, around the program and its broader mission of revitalizing the city's neighborhoods. This has involved mobilizing discursive strategies and speculative security imaginaries such as the 'safe haven' concept to appeal to the everyday insecurities of neighborhood residents and to equate spaces of surveillance with safety. The main objective of the chapter is to understand to what extent these imaginaries and broader promises of neighbourhood surveillance vis-à-vis Project Green Light have resonated with people who work and live in the neighborhoods. The chapter is dedicated to exploring the diverse perspectives and experiences of the program from the standpoint of one group in particular: the Project Green Light partners themselves. It draws from interviews to better understand the rationales for enrolling in Project Green Light, experiences of being a partner, and drawbacks and limitations of the program. The chapter ultimately provides a more nuanced view of securitization that considers demands for security generated from multiple positions including 'from below' (see Hier, 2010; Walby, 2006) as well as the associated tensions within surveillance partnerships that arise from discrepancies between speculative security imaginaries and their realities.

Chapter 5 delves further into the contested politics of speculative security coinciding with the rapid expansion of Project Green Light and other surveillance initiatives into the city's neighborhoods. I outline some bases of support for the program, arguing that the program's rapid expansion owed much to the buy-in of certain segments of city residents, including grassroots, public safety activists that provided much-needed legitimacy for the program. At the same time, I note that community sentiments towards neighbourhood surveillance have been highly fragmented, informed by varied understandings and assessments of the program and differing beliefs about what safety means in the local contexts of their communities. The contested politics surrounding the program are rooted not simply in the technical question of whether Project Green Light 'works', but reflect moral and ethical questions about extending new, experimental forms of surveillance into communities of color historically subjected to disproportionate scrutiny and heightened suspicion by police. The chapter draws from interviews with neighbourhood residents and civic actors from block clubs, community and neighborhood associations, citizen patrols, and community development corporations to explore the complexities of how ordinary citizens interpret the promises and limitations of speculative security technologies as solutions to complex social problems such as crime, violence, and insecurity. The last part of the chapter explores the fractures and fault lines in community support around Project Green Light and forms of resistance that challenged and ultimately shaped its development. The chapter concludes by highlighting the contingent and shifting nature of consent for speculative security, foregrounding how civic actors contribute to, resist, and shape speculative securitization. Addressing the limitations of structural accounts, I elaborate on the utility of locally-situated accounts to provide more nuanced understandings of how forms of speculative security proliferate in spite of their contentious, uncertain, and contested nature.

Chapter 6 highlights the broader implications and potential futures of speculative security. The first section discusses the evolution of Project Green Light, and the pursuit of new policing and surveillance technologies and practices – indicative of both the future of speculative security as well as the increasing focus on speculative security on the future in terms of the logics of prediction and preemption. Informed by the insights of this dissertation, I speculate on the trajectories of open-street surveillance and their associated dangers. The second section argues that securing new urban futures is always a contested, contingent, and open-ended process, shaped by the contours of consent and resistance to sociotechnical and sociopolitical projects. It outlines important work that has been carried out by social justice coalitions to enhance legal protections and forms of oversight over speculative security technologies. I also explore how local activists and community-based organizations are imagining alternative visions of safety while elaborating how the concept of speculative security as developed throughout the dissertation is also important for understanding these more progressive alternatives. The final section revisits the core features of speculative security and the potential value the concept offers in engaging with rapidly evolving assemblages of security and surveillance and their impacts on urban governance, space, and life. The chapter concludes by outlining the dissertation's contributions and limitations, and highlights key directions for future research.

CHAPTER 1: URBAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY

Introduction

Contemporary urban life has been marked by deepening fears and insecurities over ecological catastrophes, economic and financial crises, political strife, and urban violence. Scholars of various traditions have argued that we live in an unprecedented age of uncertainty, risk, and insecurity (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Ericson, 2007; Taylor, 2023). Today, cities are increasingly framed as sites for the convergence of known and unknown threats, and security has become central to how they are planned and governed (Zeiderman, 2016; Müller and Zeiderman, 2021). Security, though notoriously difficult to define, has been explored through various perspectives (Bigo, 2008; Buzan et al., 1998; Lippert & Walby, 2013; Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011). Some have engaged with its imaginary and speculative qualities (Wood & Shearing, 2007), as well as with how security imaginaries and their affective dimensions become spatialized, constituted in concrete forms through the production of the built environment (Caldeira, 2000; Davis, 1998; 2006; Low & Maguire, 2019). As Zedner (2003, p.155) suggests, "Security is both a state of being and a means to that end", a reference to both the subjective conditions of feeling safe and the perceived absence of threat, as well as the very tangible forms of securitization that materialize in the pursuit of security. This dissertation grapples with these more or less abstract and concrete logics, imaginaries, practices, actors, infrastructures, technologies, and spaces of security.

The dissertation is concerned with how the governance of security has evolved alongside broader structural changes in the economy and how new urban realities associated with the financialization of space and life and intensifying regimes of austerity are altering the logics and geographies of securitization. The dissertation is thus grounded in an urban political economy approach and draws from urban studies, urban sociology, and critical criminology to explore

contemporary securitization processes. This first chapter reviews relevant literature and aims to situate Detroit's post-bankruptcy securitization in a longer history of managing the crises and contradictions of capitalist development as reflected in the deindustrializing and declining urban centers of the American rustbelt. It begins by providing historical and geographically-situated accounts of post-war efforts to manage what became known as the 'urban crisis' through policing and mass incarceration. This is followed by an overview of neoliberal efforts to manage growth and decline, and a review of key works on the linkages between urban entrepreneurialism and securitization. The next section explores the impacts of financialization, fiscal crisis, and austerity urbanism on cities and teases out their connections to securitization. Building on this, the chapter sketches the contours of securitization in the late-entrepreneurial period and the evolving assemblages of experimental and speculative security that have been rolled out to manage the uncertainties and dislocations of the new, financialized economy. The following section outlines the framework of 'speculative security' as an adaptation of previous work. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodology underlying the dissertation.

Managing the Urban Crisis

Much has been written about the boom and bust of Detroit. Once heralded as the capital of the U.S. automotive industry, the birthplace of the U.S. middle class, and an epitomization of the 'American Dream', the city is now often used as a metonym for post-industrial decline (Doucet, 2017). Conservative readings use the city's story to warn against the dangers of liberal urban policy including bloated and corrupt bureaucracy, trade unionism, and Black political leadership believed to have squandered the fruits of capitalist growth (Hackworth, 2016a). More critical narratives highlight how the supposed 'Golden Age' of capitalism was founded on deep

economic and racial inequalities where real economic gains remained elusive for the racialized sections of the working class (Sugrue, 1996).

As Sugrue (1996) has shown, Detroit's economic decline was rooted in the accelerating automation of industry layered over a long history of racially exclusionary housing policies, and culminating in what has become known as the "urban crisis." Detroit and the surrounding 'Black Belt' had been key destinations for African Americans escaping the Jim Crow South in search of employment, property ownership, and self-determination that had been systematically denied by Southern post-emancipation racial regimes (Boyd, 2017; Farley, Danziger, & Holzer, 2000; Sugrue, 1996). However, government-endorsed policies such as redlining all but ensured that Black populations were relegated to the most impoverished and decaying neighborhoods. Racial segregation was often reinforced through violence and intimidation by grassroots defenders of white, working-class neighborhoods (Sugrue, 1996). The wartime economic boom that propelled Detroit as the nation's 'Arsenal of Democracy' brought with it a selective prosperity due to discriminatory hiring practices that relegated economic gains to primarily white, skilled workers (Sugrue, 1996; Thompson, 2001). In response, Detroit's Black working class engaged in revolutionary activism on the shop floors against racial discrimination and labour exploitation as well as struggles against unchecked racist abuses of police power in the streets, making the city a locus for labor and civil rights activism (Georgakas & Surkin, 2012[1975]; Kurashige, 2017).

Worsening material conditions, pervasive racial exploitation and socioeconomic and political exclusion, and racially oppressive forms of policing[3] culminated in widespread urban uprisings in the 1960s, articulated by many as the language of the oppressed (Hinton, 2016). Detroit's rebellion became an epicenter of the federal government's inquiries into the 'long hot

[3] For analyses of the longer historical arc of policing and regulation through "crime and disorder" rationales, see work by the Policing and Social Justice History Lab of the University of Michigan Carceral State Project (Lassiter, 2021a) for Detroit including police involvement in the race riot of 1943.

summers' of urban unrest in 1967 (Fine, 2007), with the bipartisan Kerner Commission claiming that the country was fast "moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal" (Kerner Commission, 1968, p.1). The report concluded that white racism and its implication in the ghetto were central to understanding the uprisings, with instances of police brutality and routine harassment representing merely the "spear's tip of much broader systemic and institutional failures" (Cobb, p.xviii). Although the commission made suggestions for improved housing, employment, welfare, education, these were largely ignored by the federal government, which opted instead for policies aimed at restoring 'law and order,' securing domestic tranquility, and managing the persistent threat of urban rebellion (Hinton, 2016).

While conservative readings of the urban crisis explained white exodus from central cities in terms of a growing "tangle of pathology" that permeated the culture and lives of African Americans (Moynihan, 1965, p.29; see also Banfield, 1970; Wilson, 1968),[4] more critical perspectives located the urban crisis in the faltering Fordist regime of accumulation, unable to ensure the promise of equality, let alone secure growth, as industrial capital became increasingly mobile (Brenner, 2004; Gilmore, 2007). Widespread urban insurrections across the U.S. in response to the convergence of economic and social crisis translated into a political crisis in governance and legitimacy where growing opposition to the Vietnam War and class and pervasive race-based subjugation stoked resistance against the racial capitalist system (Camp, 2016; Kurashige, 2017). For many scholars, the formation of the neoliberal security state was legitimated based on the need to quell insurgent demands for wealth redistribution, equality, and self-determination as well as to pacify resistance against the economic and political order that

[4] Such explanations deployed racialized depictions of a 'culture of poverty' that blamed Black families and communities for their own impoverishment and blamed the state for making them welfare dependent (Hinton, 2016; Katz, 2013; Weaver, 2017). Other conservative commentators like James Q. Wilson saw the uprisings as irrational and as a breakdown of law and order (Wilson, 1968).

subsequently became reframed as forms of criminality and disorder (Camp, 2016). For Hinton (2016), managing the urban crisis through the criminal justice system accelerated during the reconfiguration of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs from the 'War on Poverty' to the 'War on Crime' in the late 1960s. Though well under way in prior decades (see Lassiter, 2021a; Murakawa, 2014), the criminalization of urban space intensified as the federal government increased its role in state and local policing and criminal justice (Hinton, 2016; Thompson, 2013).[5] Local police budgets also grew significantly and Detroit saw its budget allocations to public safety (police and fire) increase sharply from 22% in 1967 to about 50% in 1977 (Scorsone, 2013, p.232).

Deindustrialization continued to accelerate in 1970s as automotive plants relocated to the suburbs and eventually overseas in the pursuit of cheap labor (Sugrue, 1996). Continued white flight to the suburbs which were hostile to the in-migration of racial minorities and later to regional cooperation and redistribution (Cox & Jonas, 1993; Galster, 2014) hastened the decline of cities like Detroit, leaving in its wake concentrated, racialized poverty in increasingly disinvested and abandoned city cores (Wacquant, 2009; Wilson, 2007). Rather than addressing the root causes of urban and racial poverty and inequality, criminal justice agencies received substantial investments to manage and warehouse growing 'surplus' populations deemed economically redundant and racially coded as criminal (Gilmore, 2007; Wacquant, 2001; 2009). The new punitiveness exemplified by the 'War on Drugs', which criminalized survivalist activities associated within the informal labor market, came at a time when welfare state spending was under intense political attack (Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007). The retrenchment of

[5] The most notable anti-crime initiatives of the Johnson administration included the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, establishment of the Law Enforcement Administration (LEAA) in 1968, and the Safe Streets Act in 1968 which committed one billion federal dollars annually to help militarize local police forces and provide them with new technologies, enhanced training, and specialized SWAT units (Hinton, 2016; Jefferson, 2020).

the social safety net and the rolling out of punitive state apparatuses in its place, designed to contain the dislocations of structural unemployment and rising economic insecurity would become key features of the neoliberal carceral-security state (Gilmore, 2007; Peck, 2003; Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 2009).

Securing Growth and Managing Decline

As suggested above, the growth of the carceral state was founded not on increases in crime, but as a political response to multiple crises, especially evident in industrial rustbelt cities affected by the twin forces of economic restructuring and dismantling of Keynesian-welfarist state. Detroit's extreme case of post-industrial malaise was compounded by political and metropolitan fragmentation that stemmed from racial resentment and desires of white suburbanites to maintain systems of segregation and control over local governance (Doucet & Smit, 2016; Galster, 2014; Kurashige, 2017). The rise of conservative politics of the 1970s and 1980s and the deployment of images of racialized urban decline helped cement policies that further deprived distressed cities like Detroit of local autonomy (Hackworth, 2019). Such images fuelled antagonisms and biases of the Black, post-industrial city as a place to avoid and built support for policies to manage impoverished Black spaces through a mix of austerity and punitive regulation (Hackworth, 2019; Wilson, 2007).

Racial antagonisms also underpinned a new fiscal geography that produced extreme wealth disparities between the city proper and its neighboring suburbs, while rendering the City of Detroit particularly vulnerable to a "fiscal crisis of the state" as fiscal challenges were worsened by a declining industrial base and dwindling tax revenues (O'Connor, 1973, p.2). Continued devolution under 'fiscal federalism' meant that local and regional governments were assuming greater responsibilities for securing the preconditions for local growth and providing

the collective consumption needs of urban populations, but with diminished intergovernmental transfers (Castells, 1977; Ward & Davidson, 2018; Kirkpatrick; Lobao & Adua, 2011; Peck, 2014). The urban crisis, then, was manifesting in other realms of local governance, especially at the level of municipal finances.

Many scholars have highlighted how, in response to intensified fiscal pressures, cities became experimental testing grounds for a variety of market-oriented policies to resuscitate growth (Mele, 2011; Smith, 1996). This included the turn towards more entrepreneurial modes of governance to lure "capital and people of the 'right sort'" (Harvey, 1990, p.295, see also Harvey, 1989; Hackworth, 2007; Hall & Hubbard, 1998), which by the 1970s, was being led by cities most impacted by deindustrialization. In the context of heightened interurban competition for increasingly mobile capital investment and people, the search for a neoliberal "spatial fix" became a generalized strategy across the North American landscape, reflected in the dramatic redevelopment of formerly devalued inner-cities and the speculative revival of downtown districts (Hackworth, 2007, p.9; Mele, 2013). Detroit, like many other cities committed to experiments in place-making and branding, privatization, deregulation, fiscal austerity, and strategic uneven development in order to "mobilize city space as an arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices" (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.21, see also Keil & Kipfer, 2002). Power and authority for planning and governing central cities became centralized in public-private partnerships, business improvement districts, and other special purpose governments removed from local democratic control and decision-making (Logan & Molotch, 1987; MacLoed, 2011; Zukin, 1991). These dynamics were reflected in the several public-private growth coalitions which emerged in the aftermath of the 1967 rebellion aimed at quelling future racial unrest and remaking the city through economic development

(Darden et al., 1987; Georgakas & Surkin, 2012[1975]; Jay & Conklin, 2020; Neill, 1995; Thomas, 1997). The election of Detroit's first Black Mayor, Coleman Young, in 1973 presented a moment of optimism for Black self-determination and political empowerment after decades of racially discriminatory policies. Young's electoral success also rode on addressing the racialized terror and repression of the white-controlled police department and its infamous STRESS unit that committed routine violence and killings of Black Detroiters (Hinton, 2016). Though he abolished the unit upon taking office and increased the racial diversity of the department, his liberal rather than radical approach was reflected in policies that expanded policing as part of the various wars on crime, drugs, and gangs and that disproportionately criminalized young Black males and poor Black neighborhoods (Lassiter, 2021a). Economically, the Young administration could not turn the tide of the continued loss of industry, and ultimately pandered to corporate interests trying to prevent the total collapse of the city's manufacturing base (Hackworth, 2016a; Neil, 1995). Generous subsidies and land abatements coupled with the diversion of investments away from neighborhoods and to the central business district and riverfront shaped the city's increasingly uneven character (Darden et al., 1987).

Detroit's pursuit of growth through speculative downtown development was mirrored in many other American cities after the 1970s through to the current era. As place-making efforts increasingly focused on sanitizing and rebranding formerly abandoned and devalued inner-city spaces as new sites for development and growth, security became a key consideration for local growth coalitions (Davis, 1990; Sorkin, 1992). A large body of work has investigated how entrepreneurial efforts to spark a commerce-led 'renaissance' in the old, metropolitan centers of the Global North have facilitated expanded forms of security and surveillance (Atkinson & Helms, 2007; Coleman, 2004; Davis, 1990; Eick & Briken, 2014; Helms, 2008; Lippert &

Walby, 2013; Macloed, 2011; Raco, 2003). Eick and Bricken (2014, p.14) argue that, "Cities have become 'incubators' not only for strategies such as commercialization and commodification, privatization, and place-marketing but also for the related 'innovative' experimentations with policing practices, surveillance strategies and coercive control mechanisms". Neil Smith's work analyzed how the terrain of the abandoned and devalued inner-city, previously demarcated as a containment zone for the urban, racialized poor had suddenly become "valuable again, perversely profitable" (Smith, 1996, p.6). Taking New York City as a case study, Smith applied his theory of revanchism to describe the mix of revenge and reaction underpinning the economic reconquest of the city center and associated policies that punished the city's poor for the ostensible theft of New York from the White, middle class (Smith, 1996). As a backlash against the perceived excesses of liberal urban policy and an organized assault on the local welfare state, revanchism espoused decidedly neoliberal policies of economic liberalization, nestled in the fist of zero tolerance policing strategies aimed at reclaiming public space for redevelopment and gentrification (Smith, 2002). Taking inspiration from the 'Broken Windows' theory[6] formulated by conservative criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), the theory was famously operationalized in New York City by then Chief, Bill Bratton and Mayor Rudy Giuliani (Harcourt, 2001; Herbert & Brown, 2006; Vitale, 2008). Under Bratton's reign, New York City became a laboratory for testing new policing tactics including data-driven strategies (e.g., CompStat) and zero-tolerance approaches

[6] The Broken Windows theory posited that a window left broken and unrepaired was a "signal that no one cares" (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p.31). In other words, visual cues like broken windows communicated an absence of people in the community who might otherwise exert guardianship over its spaces, and continued window-breaking in these environments were likely to go unpunished. Wilson and Kelling asserted that disorder was not limited to features of the built environment, but more importantly manifested in the "disorderly" behaviors of "unpredictable" and "disreputable" people such that the, "unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window" (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p.34). Applied to policing, the theory endorsed aggressive enforcement of misdemeanour laws targeting low-level, 'quality-of-life' infractions such as public intoxication, panhandling, public urination, loitering, vandalism, graffiti, turnstile jumping, and prostitution under the premise that failing to act on these signs of 'disorder' invited more serious forms of crime (Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Kelling & Coles, 1996).

that aggressively deployed stop and frisk practices disproportionately targeting the racialized poor (Harcourt, 2001; Rakia, 2014). Bratton and Kelling would take credit for dramatic declines in New York's crime rate during the 90s (despite nationwide crime declines) and would bankroll the 'success' in New York into lucrative consulting work, exporting zero-tolerance policing strategies across the globe (Herzing, 2013; Smith, 2001). Securing the revalorization of cities also involved managing the contradictions, dislocations, and social problems produced by economic restructuring that concentrated in cities' most economically disinvested and racially marginalized spaces. As Wilson (2007, p.5) argues, the neoliberal common-sense suggested that cities' survival came to depend on two chief imperatives: "strengthening the city as a taut entrepreneurial space and meticulously containing black ghettos and their populations".

Financialization, Fiscal Crisis, and Austerity Urbanism

Diminishing returns of early entrepreneurial strategies, reflected, for example, in failed attempts by local governments to resuscitate growth through downtown development were palpable for cities weakly positioned in the interurban competition for capital (Peck & Whiteside, 2016). Continued reductions in revenue-sharing and intergovernmental transfers paired with tax limitations put many post-industrial cities in precarious fiscal positions (Scorsone, 2013). In response to mounting fiscal pressures, many local governments turned to even more speculative ways of funding municipal budgets, and from the 1990s onwards, began leveraging more deeply financialized forms of entrepreneurialism (Leitner, 1990; Peck & Whiteside, 2016; Sbragia, 1996). This included the use of an assortment of more risky and speculative financial tools from obligation, revenue, and fiscal stabilization bonds to interest rate swaps and tax increment financing to chase speculative growth projects, remedy budgetary shortfalls, and meet basic budget expenses (Davidson & Ward, 2014; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Sbragia,

1996; Weber, 2010). As Peck and Whiteside (2016, p.239) argue, it became "debt as much as growth" that was shaping and driving municipal operations as the municipal bond market began playing a more central role in local finances (see also Lauermann, 2018).[7]

Economically, the fates of cities were becoming increasingly tied to the volatility of global financial markets and subject to the interests of- often- distant financial market interests that saw the value of cities primarily as commodities and assets that could generate profits (Hackworth, 2007; Weber, 2002; 2010). Hackworth (2016) has highlighted how cities have become increasingly subject to the discipline of external institutions like bond-rating agencies which act as gatekeepers to credit markets. Under the threat of credit rating downgrades, higher interest payments, and/or redlining from credit markets, local governments often find themselves subservient to assessments of credit-worthiness and rating agencies' demands to institute market-oriented reforms that privatize and cut services, force concessions from labour unions, freeze wages, cut municipal workforces, or close whole departments and agencies (Hackworth, 2002; 2007). Cities have not only been expected to cultivate development- and business-friendly environments through subsidies and public-private partnerships, but have also been expected to behave like efficient businesses themselves, adopting a seemingly contradictory mix of entrepreneurial risk-taking and fiscal restraint (Hackworth, 2007; Omstedt, 2020). For the most fiscally strapped cities, access to bond markets provided a temporary reprieve from immediate expenditure burdens, but only by substituting short-term debt with longer-term debt obligations and using complex and volatile debt arrangements. These forms of speculative urbanism have enabled cities to conceal cash flow imbalances and other signs of deepening financial precarity,

[7] Cities' growing dependencies on municipal debt and the rise of bondholder supremacy also played a role in reproducing racial inequalities within and between cities where historical differences in 'credit-worthiness' between white and non-white communities shaped new, racialized geographies of debt, investment, and development (Jenkins, 2021).

essentially "buying time" (Streeck, 2014, p.xiv) in the hopes that growth will pick up (Scorsone, 2013).

Debt has thus played a central role in the financialized affairs of local governments, and cities have become increasingly beholden to the disciplines of bondholder value and the whims of distant investors and credit rating agencies who "have no formal governing role in any municipality" (Hackworth, 2007, p.16). However, while these financial actors have continued to assert an undeniable grip over cities, it is equally important to consider emergent actors and institutions that *do have formal governing roles* in the disciplining of cities under the very same bond-market dynamics. State-appointed emergency financial managers, for example, have assumed considerable influence over fiscally-distressed cities, granted with legal authority to displace the decision-making abilities of locally elected governments (Loh, 2016; Nickels, 2019; Peck & Whiteside, 2016; Seamster, 2018). Drawing legitimacy from financialized states of exception and the need to restore market confidence in cities' fiscal standing (also see Kirkpatrick, 2016), emergency management has become a pervasive vehicle for experimental strategies of crisis displacement and management vis-à-vis austerity governance and market-oriented reform of local government (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Kirkpatrick & Breznau, 2016; Peck & Whiteside, 2016). Such neoliberal interventions are argued to represent new rounds of "corrective, 'rollout' responses" to neoliberalism's own failures and structurally-embedded contradictions (Peck, 2012, p.630; see also Peck & Tickell, 2002). However, they are also seen as politically and ideologically-motivated means of reframing urban fiscal crises as problems of local government mismanagement, unionized workforces, bloated public-sector pensions, and profligate social spending. It is within this phase of 'roll-with-it' neoliberalism (Keil, 2009) that the normalization of neoliberal governmentalities has resulted in the unquestioned acceptance of

market hegemony and the idea that, for beleaguered cities, there is no alternative to austerity (Blyth, 2013; Clarke & Newman, 2012; Konings, 2016).

The use of emergency management laws in Michigan has unfolded in spatially and racially uneven ways. Of the eight Michigan cities to be brought under emergency management; seven have been majority non-white (Fasenfast, 2019). One of the more highly publicized cases emergency management occurred in the City of Flint where the emergency manager's decision to switch the water supply to the Flint River in 2014 to cut costs and protect the city's credit rating led to mass poisonings from toxic levels of lead contamination (Fasenfest, 2019; Mohai, 2018; Nickels, 2019). The tragedy, which eventually brought several governing officials, including the Governor Rick Snyder, to trial reveals how technocratic decisions under neoliberal and financialized austerity regimes make highly visible forms of racialized expendability that have been central to the reproduction of racial capitalism (Ponder, 2017; Pulido, 2016).

As Michigan's draconian emergency management law has been heavily resisted (Blackmer, 2021b; Howell, 2019a; Nickels, 2019; Pauli, 2019), political and financial elites have routinely touted the law as a model for other states (Hinkley, 2017, p.2133). Financially-mediated restructuring under the auspices of emergency management[8] has become an exemplary case of what scholars have referred to as "austerity urbanism" (Hall and Jonas 2014; Peck 2014; Peck and Whiteside 2016; Schindler 2016; Tabb 2015). Peck (2012) argues that more recent rounds of austerity urbanism are rolling out across a thoroughly neoliberalized institutional

[8] Emergency management sits alongside other market-oriented and experimental governance strategies (Karvonon & Heur, 2014) including 'rightsizing' experiments seeking to shrink the footprint of municipal service delivery and infrastructural investments (see Aalbers & Bernt, 2018; Berglund, 2020). Under logics of urban triage, visions for a smaller city have been envisioned through plans like the Detroit Future City (DFC) strategic framework, a 50-year roadmap for municipal service provision and land use. According to critics, DFC promises new rounds of racially- and spatially-mediated austerity that designate some 'viable' neighborhoods for investment, while consigning other 'non-viable' neighborhoods to active disinvestment, decommissioning, and 'greening' (Campbell et al., 2020; Clement & Kanai, 2015; Hackworth, 2015; Hackworth, 2016b; Kirkpatrick, 2015; Phinney, 2018; Quizar, 2019; Markus & Krings, 2020).

landscape, cutting even deeper into an already withered social state. Austerity urbanism has also been used to highlight the devolved nature of austerity, whereby budgetary pressures, deficits, and risks are offloaded to the local level, ensuring that it is the most politically and economically marginalized segments of the population that bear the brunt of cuts and privatization of public services, slashing of municipal workforces, reductions in pensions and benefits, and gutting of public assets (Peck, 2014; Peck & Whiteside, 2016). Peck (2012, p.629), for example, argues that it is cities where "austerity bites" (Peck, 2012, p.629) because they are simultaneously sites of concentrated and growing social need and are the lowest scale at which fiscal imbalances can be rectified.

Austerity Urbanism and Security Governance

According to Peck (2012), new waves of neoliberal austerity have not only dismantled the remaining fragments of the Keynesian welfare state, but also the "basic, essential and 'skeleton' services often deemed indispensable (even) to the neoliberal state, such as policing, prisons and public safety" (p.630). Intensified fiscal crises at the federal and state levels have spurred new waves of early release schemes and bipartisan bills to decarcerate federal and state prisons, shifting the fiscal burdens of managing criminalized populations down to county and local levels (Gottschalk, 2016; McQuade, 2019). Resultant crises of jail overcrowding are also fuelling the growth of privatized re-entry, probation, and parole services that rely more heavily on policing and forms of "mass supervision" to manage criminalized and 'risky' populations outside of correctional facilities and directly in communities with the aide of expansive surveillance infrastructures (Jefferson, 2020; McQuade, 2019; Miller & Stuart, 2017)[9].

Additionally, calls for fiscal discipline have directly affected local police departments as some cities have occasionally downsized departments and cut officer salaries in response to

[9] For the rapid growth of Michigan's jail populations, see Michigan Jail Reform Advisory Council (2022).

fiscal pressures. Police departments have also faced growing pressures to allocate resources more efficiently and strategically through a mix of triaged service delivery and data-driven methods (den Heyer, 2014). At the same time, austerity is contributing to other trends such as the commodification and marketization of policing, challenging the idea of policing as a 'public good' (Lippert & Walby, 2014; Loader & Walker, 2001; Millie & Bullock, 2012). While local police departments have not been immune to austerity-induced 'right-sizing', police budgets tend to be spared from the worst of austerity cuts relative to other municipal operations (Beck and Goldstein, 2018; Beck, 2024). A case in point is post-bankruptcy Vallejo, California, where the deterioration of the city's finances forced the city to make dramatic cuts to its police force and to regular patrols (Davidson & Ward, 2014, p.93). The city's post-bankruptcy fiscal recalibration saw nearly three quarters of its post-insolvency budget dedicated to public safety (police and fire) expenses (see Peck, 2014, p.21) reflecting what Anderson (2014, p.1181) has dubbed "minimal cities," with municipal operations "confined to the bare bones of public safety with little or no redistributive spending". Other cases have revealed less extreme cases of budgetary distributions to public safety following fiscal crisis, but nonetheless suggest a primacy of public safety, and particularly policing, as *the* core municipal service and function (see Beck, 2024).

While the role of policing and securitization in local economies has long been a subject of interest (Atkinson & Helms, 2007; Davis, 1990; 1998; Eick & Briken, 2014; Smith, 1996), there has been new works exploring of the central role of policing and security in the economic prospects of cities (Beck, 2020; Bonds, 2019; Dozier, 2019; Graziani et al., 2021; Laniyonu, 2018; Maharawal, 2017). Gordon's (2020) work, for example, has shown how local leaders in collaboration with police engage in triage-based delivery of policing services (e.g., enhanced presence, response to calls for service) to protect areas deemed economically valuable. At the

same time, poor, racialized communities are denied such services, and are instead subject to more repressive forms of policing and surveillance that reproduce conditions of overpolicing and underprotection (see also Balto, 2019; Bell, 2017; 2020; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). Other works have explored the relationships between municipal finance and policing, including how policing practices have been deployed for the purposes of municipal revenue generation through racialized regimes of fees and fines (Wang, 2018; Rios, 2020). The case of Ferguson, Missouri where protests erupted after the police killing of Michael Brown, represented a defining moment that sparked a national conversation not only about police brutality, but long-standing patterns of financially-extractive and predatory policing practices exacted on the city's majority Black residents (Rios, 2020).[10]

One less explored dimension of the financialized dynamics of securitization is the growing significance of credit-rating agencies on local security policy. As Mitchell and Beckett (2008, p.79) argue, assessments of credit-worthiness (i.e., evaluations of municipalities' ability to pay back debt) often reinforce a "perceived need to hire some of America's "top cops" to help local authorities impose order and discipline on urban residents". Beyond some selective works (Mitchell & Beckett, 2008; Wang, 2018), the intersection of bond market dynamics and securitization remains relatively underexplored. Though there is some evidence to suggest that levels of crime influence credit ratings (Guzman & Clark, 2022), it is not entirely clear how exactly cities respond to these types of bond market pressures and how the demands for stable investments by investors translate into concrete security policies. This dissertation explores

[10] Investigations revealed widespread racial bias and discrimination within the Ferguson Police Department and that residents became trapped in a system of recurring fees and fines enforced by courts and police often for trivial ordinance and traffic violations (Rios, 2020). For broader discussions of predatory and financially-extractive forms of urban governance, see Atuahene (2023), Merrifield (2014) and Wang (2018).

Detroit's financially-mediated restructuring to better understand some of the financial logics and rationalities that discipline cities into adopting more intensive forms of policing and surveillance.

Evolving Assemblages of Security

As securitization in cities is being influenced by financialization and austerity, technological change and innovation is also transforming the form, character, and reach of urban security and surveillance apparatuses. The rapid growth of camera surveillance in the City of Detroit follows the global spread of open-street CCTV programs with camera surveillance becoming a regular, often unquestioned, facet of urban life in many cities across the world (Doyle et al., 2012; Graham, 1998; Walby, 2006). In the U.K., long considered the pre-eminent CCTV society (McCahill, 2002; Armstrong & Norris, 1999), sprawling webs of cameras paired with networked sensor infrastructures and automated analytical capabilities are believed to provide a 'smarter' read of the urban landscape. Several U.K. jurisdictions now deploy cameras with live facial recognition capabilities that can scan the faces of individuals and match them against watch lists for persons of interest, but with dubious claims of their accuracy (Fussey & Murray, 2019). Initially premised on preventing serious forms of crime and violence, these technologies are increasingly being used to address less serious offenses like retail theft as part of a 'zero-tolerance' offensive against crime and disorder (Woollacott, 2024). New technologies are also being used to police protests and other forms of political expression, raising concerns about the "chilling effects" of technology-mediated policing and the criminalization of dissent (Fussey & Murray, 2019).

Many cities are following in the footsteps of the U.K.'s experiments in mass surveillance, including in the U.S., where citywide camera networks are becoming commonplace, deployed through experimental prototyping and novel "public-private" partnerships (Wiig, 2018).

Rationalized on preventing crime and enhancing public safety, the effects of open-street CCTV have been assumed rather than convincingly proven (Coleman, 2004; Goold, 2004; Norris 2012). Researchers have concluded that available evidence is, at best, mixed in terms of CCTV's effects on crime, with some studies reporting crime reductions for particular categories of crimes (Caplan et al., 2011; La Vigne et al., 2011; Piza et al., 2014) and others finding little to no impact on crime rates (Cameron et al., 2008; Gill & Spriggs, 2005; Welsh & Farrington, 2009) or case clearance rates (Robin et al., 2021).[11] Systematic reviews suggest that CCTV can 'work' in some circumstances (Piza et al., 2014), but other researchers argue that its efficacy has been largely overstated (Armitage, 2002; Gill and Spriggs, 2005; Welsh & Farrington, 2003). Despite the inconclusive nature of CCTV, many local politicians and police officials view it as necessary to fighting crime and enhancing public safety and studies have revealed for open-street CCTV programs among local populations (Bennett & Gelsthorpe, 1996; Dawson, 2012; Ditton, 2000; Fussey, 2007; Hier, 2003).

At the same time, new iterations of open-street camera networks are becoming more complex, interfacing with larger technological infrastructures that build on top of, augment, and expand the capabilities of camera technologies. Though scholarly research has only recently begun to investigate their inner-workings and logics (see Linder, 2021; Przeszlowski et al., 2023), the rapid incorporation of 'real-time crime centers' (herein, 'RTCCs') into local police departments has become a key component of the offensive against local crime and disorder. Under broader mandates of intelligence sharing and fusion (McQuade, 2019; Monahan, 2011; Monahan & Palmer, 2009)[12] and efforts to bolster local capacities for data-driven and

[11] Generally, studies have found evidence for reduction in property crimes, but not for more serious and violent crimes (Ratcliffe and Taniguchi, 2008; King et al., 2008).

[12] On the basis that weaknesses in information-sharing were considered major contributors to the inability to prevent 9/11 attacks, significant windfalls of federal funds have supported the development of a network of interagency

intelligence-led policing, these localized intelligence hubs have rapidly spread across the U.S., with at least 123 RTCCs currently in operation (Atlas of Surveillance, 2023; Larkham, 2023; Przeszlowski et al., 2023). Their main functions include automatically aggregating, sorting, mining, sharing, and analyzing increasingly expanding flows of data from of urban sensing and monitoring systems ranging from CCTV camera networks and automated license plate readers (ALPRs) to drones, cell-site simulators (also known as 'Stringrays'), and gunshot detection systems (Bohigian, 2022; Brayne, 2021; Ferguson, 2017). As an embodiment of the increasingly automated nature of contemporary policing (see Joh, 2016), RTCCs support the connections that, for example, enable squad cars equipped with ALPRs to automatically alert officers when stolen vehicles passes by, or send alerts to analysts of suspected gunshots detected by acoustic gun detection systems. The hope among local law enforcement agencies is that RTCCs can help improve police response times, enhance 'situational awareness' and officer safety, foster better post-incident investigative outcomes like better case clearance rates, and serve as a 'force multiplier' by relieving officers of duties that can be automated by technology. The anticipated value of emergent RTCC technologies lays in promises regarding the ability to leverage 'big data' to predict and pre-empt future urban threats and dangers as well as forms of algorithmic-based processing (e.g., facial recognition, predictive video analytics) while enabling new functionalities and applications of camera-based technologies. However, according to Przeszlowski et al. (2023, p.558), the diffusion of RTCC technologies and practices "appear to be based more on expectations of what they may accomplish rather than on demonstrable evidence-based outcomes of their effectiveness".

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intelligence centers including state and regional 'fusion centers' and more localized intelligence hubs nested in local police departments (McQuade, 2019; Monahan & Palmer, 2009). The guiding vision of intelligence fusion is that greater collaboration and information sharing can help synthesize often disparate sources of data to better identify larger patterns and trends and "connect the dots" to prevent future terrorist attacks (Monahan, 2011, p.87).

The growth of speculative security technologies and practices can be attributed to several trends including technological advancements, the "smartification" of urban governance (Wiig, 2018; Krivý, 2018; Sadowski, 2020), and broader shifts in policing towards "intelligence-led" and "data-driven" strategies and technologies (Brayne, 2020; Ferguson, 2017) that center on managing and anticipating urban risks and threats through future-oriented logics of prediction and pre-emption (Aradau & Blanke, 2017; de Goede & Randalls, 2009; Jaffe, 2019; McCulloch & Wilson, 2016). Additionally, a growing reliance on technology is underpinned by a pervasive techno-solutionism (see Jaffe & Pilo, 2023) among city managers and police officials that places great faith in the ability of technology to govern urban society's most complex problems- often recast as problems of security. The supposed need for investments in security technologies is also reinforced by a burgeoning security industry seeking to sell the latest, innovative, and experimental security 'solutions' to municipal governments, local police departments, and other security providers (Lippert & Walby, 2022; Walby & Lippert, 2015). The rapid growth of these technologies without much public input or knowledge has inspired various critical works exploring the dangers of 'big data' and predictive forms of policing that undermine constitutionally-protected freedoms and deepen existing patterns of social inequality in efforts to assert new forms of legibility and control over urban space (Brayne, 2021; Jefferson, 2020).

Scholars have also critiqued the racialized nature of algorithmic forms of surveillance and policing (Benjamin, 2019; Browne, 2015). Browne (2015), for example, has argued that anti-blackness has been central to surveillance practices of the racial security state that "reifies boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial lines" (p.16). The logics of contemporary forms of surveillance, according to Browne, can be traced to the historical control of enslaved populations through practices of branding, runaway slave notices, and lantern laws that required constant

hypervisibility of Black subjects (Browne, 2015). Browne's work helps understand the continuity of racialized regimes of security seeking to control racialized populations. In conversation with works on race and political economy (Wang, 2018; Wilson, 2007), Browne's work provides a framework for better understanding why Black cities have disproportionately become testing grounds for experimental and speculative security technologies.

Governing through 'Speculative Security'

The rise of new technology-mediated forms of policing and surveillance requires new theoretical frameworks to help think through the increasingly complex socio-technical systems that are authoring new forms of urban legibility and regulation as part of a wider 'technological turn' in security governance (Jaffe & Pilo, 2023). This includes what Soderlund (2013, p.167) articulates as the "rise of real-time surveillance and monitoring technologies operating across an array of sense and cognitive modalities, together with high-speed and reflexive informational feedback mechanisms, performance-driven and auto-regulatory mechanisms, and computational algorithms" (see also Crang & Graham, 2007). Cameras and their newer, 'smart' incarnations represent just one type of technology interfacing with a constantly evolving, socio-technical ensemble of 'always on' urban sensors that continuously collect audio, visual, and other data inputs; facial and biometric recognition systems to identify 'risky' people and flag 'suspicious' behaviours and movements; and forms of automated data capture, mining, and analytics aiming to render urban circulations and their attendant risks and dangers intelligible and predictable (Andrejevic, 2019; Crang & Graham, 2007). The imagined potential of these technologies thus extends beyond real-time and hyper-reactive responses to risk to include anticipatory, future-oriented, and predictive practices and technologies that leverage machine learning and artificial

intelligence to help forestall threats before they fully materialize and (Anderson, 2010; Andrejevic, 2019; de Goede & Randalls, 2009).

One key dimension of contemporary forms of securitization is their increasingly speculative nature whereby new, relatively untested, and often controversial technologies are rapidly deployed under the banner of revitalization and enhancing public safety. This dissertation seeks to better understand the growing presence of not only speculative security technologies in cities, but also the speculative logics, rationalities, practices, and arrangements that increasingly define local security governance. I borrow Marieke de Goede's (2012) concept of 'speculative security' to denote distinctive, future-oriented modes and practices of late-entrepreneurial security governance aimed at managing imagined urban risks and uncertain futures. Her work helps illustrate how pre-emptive and anticipatory security logics and practices have come to dominate contemporary forms of securitization (see also Anderson, 2010; Amoore, 2014; Amoore & Raley, 2017; Aradau & Blanke, 2017; de Goede & Randalls, 2009; Zedner, 2007). For de Goede, security is best understood as a technology that "works through a probabilistic comprehension, calculation, and colonization of uncertain futures" (de Goede, 2012, p.xxi). However, because knowledge about the future is often finite and there exists a range of incalculable risks or 'unknown unknowns', the limits of risk calculation and management can intensify uncertainty (see also Ericson, 2007). de Goede's work is particularly useful for highlighting the speculative nature of security imaginaries that are "not so much based on prevention of statistically measurable occurrences" as they are on "the imagination of unique and unprecedented disaster scenarios" (de Goede, 2008, p.170). As such, she argues that the growing relevance of "premediation" as a security practice "deploys and exceeds the language of risk" (de Goede, 2008, p.156) by imagining multiple futures in order to govern the present (see also

Zeiderman & Dawson, 2022). de Goede's sketching of speculative security as a conceptual framework, however, has primarily focused on the War on Terror and the speculative imaginaries and practices invoked to intervene in and govern terror financing (de Goede, 2008; 2012). Additionally, her concept focuses primarily on security governance premised on taking precautionary actions to prevent the most catastrophic and disastrous outcomes, while overlooking how speculative security can be anchored to more commonplace and less apocalyptic discourses and imaginations such as making appeals to enhanced security to secure revitalized city futures.

Seeking to expand its applicability to other domains, my use of the concept of speculative security is also heavily influenced by the concept of 'speculative policing'; a term mobilized by activists and academics to denote forms of experimental and anticipatory modes of policing "based on mass suspicion and wholesale criminalization of communities and places" (Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, 2020, p.1; Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, 2021; see also Graziani et al., 2021; Jaffe, 2019). Jaffe (2019, p.448) defines speculative policing as "an experimental, future-oriented form of policing" and a "new mode of urban security governance that is speculative both in its underlying logic and everyday implementation". For Jaffe (2019), the specificity of the concept lies in the conjunction of crime prevention, real-estate speculation, and experimental governance which all operate through shared orientations toward the future. In revealing the connections between securitization and urban revitalization, Jaffe (2019) contends that speculative policing has been deployed primarily in city spaces with the most potential for commercial redevelopment with aims to "render economically productive the differentiated and dynamic value of urban space and populations" (p.448). Citing affinities with the concept of urban revanchism, she argues that rather than an orientation towards restoring a past bourgeois

order, speculative policing "has the future as its point of reference" in terms of strategically managing its uncertainties and unlocking its potential for economic profit (Jaffe, 2019, p.449).

The term 'speculative' mobilized in Jaffe's conceptualization also connotes an absence of evidence, such that the deployment of surveillance technologies may not necessarily be driven by empirical support for their efficacy, but rather by a penchant for "prototyping" new security technologies (Jaffe, 2019, p.450). Underpinned by a pervasive techno-solutionism (Morozov, 2013) that valorizes technology's ability to resolve complex societal problems (Jaffe & Pilo, 2023), the diffusion of speculative security technologies and practices may be driven more by hopes and expectations of what they might achieve rather than their actual capacities and results. Speculative policing, thus, involves experimentation where failure is often reframed as an inevitable part of the process of trial and error, yielding new learnings and opportunities to iterate and improve on technological systems and practices (see also Jaffe & Pilo, 2023).

de Goede and Jaffe have made important contributions to debates regarding the speculative nature of contemporary forms of security and policing, but the theoretical insights they offer, I argue, suffer from a few limitations. Specifically, I seek to extend the conceptual utility of speculative security in several ways. First, I contend that speculative security is not only focused on anticipating future urban threats, harms, and catastrophes, but also appealing to dominant, speculative future city visions typically championed and articulated by powerful political actors. I explore how normative ideals and visions of security and safety supplied by technocratic managers, police 'experts', and city officials are mobilized and articulated through future imaginaries of the city's resurgence. I employ speculative security as a lens to view the deeper entanglements between security governance and speculative urbanisms (Goldman, 2011) unfolding across more deeply neoliberalized and financialized forms of urban governance

seeking to render cities as stable and secure investments not only for local place-makers, but also for distant bondholders and creditors (Hackworth, 2007; Peck and Whiteside, 2016). Previous analyses have largely overlooked the degree to which bond market dynamics play a role in disciplining cities to bolster local capacities to police and surveil city spaces and residents (but see Mitchell and Beckett, 2008). This dissertation explores how local security policy is increasingly shaped by financial actors like emergency managers, bankruptcy court judges, credit-rating agencies, and municipal bond investors and how notions of fiscal health, sustainability, and ability to attract new investment are used to rationalize investments in intensified policing and surveillance. However, in contrast to Jaffe's conceptualization of speculative policing, which tends to focus primarily on areas of a city amenable to real estate speculation, my use of speculative security considers forms of securitization that are not necessarily tethered immediately to the profit opportunities inherent in differentiated land values (i.e., through the "rent gap"), but may be tied to other forms of speculative value generation and extraction. Considering the wider financialized dynamics at play, this would include examining how city managers are increasingly responsive to the desires and disciplinary power of bond market actors as they increasingly depend on the bond market to fund services, infrastructure, and economic development (Hackworth, 2002; Sbragia, 1996). As such, speculative security is increasingly about providing assurances of stable returns on investments from securitized city futures traded on the global bond market and in the form of financialized debt instruments.

Second, in contrast to Jaffe's observation that speculative security and policing are rolled out primarily in spaces with the most potential for commercial redevelopment, I argue that this assertion overlooks speculative security interventions unfolding in other parts of cities that may not have immediate prospects for revalorization. Instead, my version of speculative security

seeks to break out of the tendency of theorizing securitization in ways that focus almost exclusively on the production of *new* economic spaces, typically downtowns and other central city spaces. This focus on newness and centrality presents an incomplete view of the city and city-regions, while privileging processes like revalorization and gentrification as the dominant modes of socio-spatial transformation and key drivers of securitization policies. Taking a wider view of the dialectical nature of uneven development and the mutual interdependence between localized growth and decline (Peck, 2016; Smith, 1984), I explore how the larger structural forces that shape securitization have as much to do with securing speculative prospects for growth as they do with managing and containing the dislocations that stem from urban decline, disinvestment, and the intensification of neoliberal austerity regimes. Furthermore, as austerity urbanism continues to devolve criminal justice functions to the local level, and the management and supervision of criminalized populations is increasingly being undertaken outside of prisons and jails as a supplement to traditional forms of incarceration (Jefferson, 2020; McQuade, 2019). Rather than concrete or physical walls, it is digital walls that are increasingly splicing through and reproducing cities as collections of "territorially-bound-carceral-spaces" (Mei-Singh, 2016, p.703, Story, 2019) and digital borderlands (Muñiz, 2022). Seeing securitization in this way allows for a better appreciation of the variegated spatial dynamics and logics of sprawling forms of surveillance that are rendering cities as spaces of mass supervision and control (Jefferson, 2020; McQuade, 2019).

Third, while Jaffe's (2019) analysis tends to focus on the role of state actors - primarily public police agencies - my use of speculative security assumes that security is not only the preserve of the state, but of a larger, pluralized assemblage of public, private, and civic actors and organizations contingently aligned to regulate urban space through partnerships and forms of

responsibilization (Garland, 1996; Loader, 2000; Dupont, 2004; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 2002; 2006; Zedner, 2007). In fact, I argue that public-private partnerships constitute a key vehicle through which speculative security technologies and practices are trialed, deployed, and augmented. This is one reason why this dissertation opts to use the term 'speculative security' rather than 'speculative policing', with the former emphasizing that security provision is being undertaken actors beyond public police. 'Security' also offers more versatility as a term than 'policing,' since the former simultaneously encompasses both imagined and material qualities. For example, on an individual level, security can refer to a subjective sense of safety or a state of mind which suggests the perceived absence of threat or danger or the envisioned means of achieving this subjective state (Zedner, 2007). These imagined qualities are always speculative since they are constituted without full knowledge of the future (Ericson, 2007).They can also be instilled with, and augmented by, affect such as the fears, hopes, and aspirations of the actor(s) involved. Conversely, security can encompass very tangible practices, programs, and artefacts. The pursuit of security can unfold at various levels, from larger programs of action concerned with the broader biopolitical governance of populations to the mundane and everyday security practices carried out by individuals (Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Zedner, 2007). Finally, security imaginaries, mentalities, and discourses can be spatialized and solidified into more concrete forms such as infrastructures and technologies (Low & Maguire, 2019). It is the "curious dynamic between the security imagination and its infrastructural solidity" (Maguire & Low, 2019, p.4) that constitutes a key focal point of this research. However, as society becomes increasingly digitized, we are again faced with a sort of phantom-like nature of security where practices and technologies of (in)security operate increasingly through data flows, databases, and black-boxed algorithms (Aas, Gundhus, & Lomell, 2009).

Unlike the security guard who patrols a commercial strip, the digitalization of security makes it much harder to grasp its material and physical functions and effects.

Fourth and related to the previous points, de Goede's and Jaffe's analyses tend to focus on speculative security and speculative policing as instituted and deployed by powerful actors. In Jaffe's (2019) analysis, for example, shifting alliances between police and political and business elites are the key locus of revanchist desires to reclaim downtown space. This dissertation takes a slightly different tack in suggesting that securitization cannot be entirely explained by top-down accounts depicting powerful elites and their instrumentalist pursuits (see Anderson; 2020; Atkinson & Millington, 2019). While structuralist accounts are important in explaining how powerful actors exert an outsized influence on urban space and life, these perspectives can underplay the agency of everyday actors in local securitization processes including forms of resistance and contestation as well as 'bottom up' demands for, and everyday practices of, security (see Hier, 2004; Walby, 2006). Thus, I aim to advance a conceptualization of speculative security that is more attuned to the micro-level dynamics of securitization that unfold alongside the broader structural dynamics noted above. It permits a view of everyday encounters with speculative security technologies that is shaped by a contested socio-technical politics and discursive terrains mediated by struggles over different and sometimes competing visions of safety and security as well as varied understandings of the potentials and limitations of security technologies. As it pertains to Project Green Light specifically, this dissertation explores the complex and sometimes contradictory reasons why people may support and resist speculative forms of security and surveillance. It aims to shed light on how ordinary citizens come to interpret, consent to, negotiate, contest, and resist dominant, speculative security imaginaries espoused by powerful urban actors. I argue that these dominant imaginaries are often unstable

and precarious, requiring continuous management, legitimation, and realignment in the face of technological failure, ethical dilemmas, and social and political contestation, which can open up opportunities for alternative visions of safety and living.

Methodology

My initial engagement with the City of Detroit began as a Master's student in Criminology at the University of Windsor where I became interested in the relationships between policing and urban governance. This interest continued as a PhD student at York University and led me to formulate a research study to explore the Project Green Light program which had officially launched during the beginning of my doctoral studies. While my original intention was to spend an extended period in the City of Detroit conducting field work and interviews, the COVID pandemic presented several challenges. Most notably, a new requirement to conduct interviews by phone or teleconferencing as a requirement of my research ethics approval during the pandemic required me to reorient the project around methods that could be carried out from a distance such as interviews and documentary research. Not being able to conduct embedded field work resulted in a more distant view, but nonetheless offered key insights into Project Green Light and speculative security. This dissertation research ultimately employed a two-pronged approach entailing semi-structured interviews and documentary research examining Project Green Light and other security initiatives in the city. To supplement community-based perspectives, I also drew on transcripts of public meetings as well as community-based reports and surveys created by grassroots organizers, social justice advocates, and researchers. The following sections further detail these methods.

Semi-Structured Interviews

Interviews have been a key method employed in social science research as a relational process of knowledge production and understanding of interpretations, experiences, and

spatialities of urban, social life (Cochrane, 2014; Dowling, Lloyd, & Suchet-Pearson, 2016; Hitchings & Latham, 2020; Smyth, Koleth, & Peake, 2023). While an interview schedule was developed for the various groups interviewed, open-ended and probing questions were used to encourage elaboration and pursue unanticipated lines of inquiry. Interviews were conducted both over telephone and through Zoom conferencing based on the preferences of respondents.

Data collection comprised a total of 20 semi-structured interviews conducted between December 2021 to March 2023 and drawn from two subsamples: 1) formal Project Green Light partners; 2) community members and representatives from block clubs, neighbourhood associations, and community development corporations. The first subsample involved representatives of locations that were formally enrolled in the Project Green Light initiative (herein "partners"). The sampling strategy involved purposive sampling based on a list of active Project Green Light locations (City of Detroit, 2024a), which typically included local businesses (e.g., gas stations, liquor and convenience stores, restaurants), community spaces (e.g., churches and other religious places of worship, community centers, parks and gardens), residential locations (e.g., apartment complexes, public housing), and non-profit service providers. In terms of recruitment for this subsample, I sent requests for interviews to email addresses found through internet searches. Recruitment through email skewed the sample such that many gas stations, convenience and liquor/party stores, and other small commercial establishments were underrepresented since many did not list email addresses. The final subsample of Project Green Light partners included locations enrolled between 2018 and 2021. Interview questions were based on understanding how Project Green Light partners first heard of the program, what aspects of the program were appealing to them, reasons for enrolling, experiences of the program with respect to perceived deterrent effects and promised benefits (e.g., enhanced police response

and presence), and feedback from their patrons and residents regarding their enrolment. While many questions were based on Project Green Light, some conversations branched into broader topics of local policing, community safety concerns, and community-based safety initiatives.

The second subsample involved representatives of various community-based organizations and residential/civic associations in the city. In terms of sampling, I drew from several, publicly-available lists of block clubs, community organizations/associations, and community development corporations. As grassroots organizations formed by residents, block clubs represent the smallest scale of residential organization, typically covering a specific street block or several adjacent blocks. Usually informal and voluntary, block club membership revolves around building relationships among residents, collaborating to address neighborhood issues (e.g., safety, housing abandonment, neighborhood aesthetics), and advocating for more resources and services from local government. Community organizations/associations typically encompass a broader range of groups (but often include interests of multiple block clubs) that advocate for the interests of a larger geographic area. Commonly registered as a non-profit, 501(c)(3) organization, these entities may focus on similar, but broader issues including neighborhood safety, advocating for community interests, and representing residents' voices in local governance. Lastly, community development corporations are formal non-profit entities focused on promoting economic development and improving living conditions in underserved communities. Their work typically involves affordable housing development, providing social services, and representing local resident interests in urban development and revitalization. All three types of community organizations played key roles in fostering community engagement, especially as it related to community safety and provided unique perspectives on city-led initiatives like Project Green Light.

Similar to the recruitment strategy employed for the first subsample, I sent requests for interviews via email. Requests for interviews reflected the specificities of each organization type and the work they carried out. For example, when reaching out to block clubs, community/neighborhood associations, and community development corporations, the initial outreach email explained my desire to learn about the work of the organization, involvement in community-based approaches to safety, as well as perspectives on city-led public safety initiatives like Project Green Light. Nearly all respondents were long-time residents in the city and offered a diversity of perspectives on questions of community safety including in relation to Project Green Light. Interview questions were based on exploring the role of their organizations, their organization's relation to local planning and development, local safety concerns, involvement in community-based safety initiatives, and perceptions of police responsiveness and presence. These questions were followed by Project Green Light -specific questions related to how respondents heard about the program, whether Project Green Light was discussed in public meetings attended by respondents, and perceptions of the program's efficacy, and community sentiment associated with the program. Like the first subset, many of the conversations extended beyond Project Green Light to include discussions about the intricacies of local associational life (e.g., maintaining block clubs and community organizations, advocating for community interests, etc.), challenges and issues with local development and planning, the effects of service retrenchment, local safety concerns, and the root causes of crime and violence in their neighborhoods. Interviews with community development corporations provided an interesting perspective given their relatively strong presence in local planning decisions and frequent interface with small businesses.

The details of both subsamples are provided below in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1 - Subsample of Project Green Light Partners (n=10)

Types of Locations
Commercial Establishment: 2
Community Space or Green Space: 3
Residential Complex: 1
Church: 1
Non-profit Service Provider: 3

Geography of Locations (by Police Precinct)
3rd precinct: 3
4th precinct: 1
5th precinct: 1
6th precinct: 3
7th precinct: 1
9th precinct: 1

Demographics of Interviewees
Female, White: 4 Male, White: 4 Female, Black: 1 Other, Male: 1

Table 2 - Subsample of Community Representatives/Organizations (n=10)

Types of Community Organizations
Community Organization/Association (e.g., 5013c, HOA, block club): 7
Community Development Corporation: 3

Demographics of Interviewees
Female, White: 4 Male, White: 1 Female, Black: 4 Other, Male: 1

Of particular note is the racial composition of the two samples, most notably the fact that interview respondents were overwhelmingly white: 80% of the Project Green Light partner subsample and 50% of the community member/representative subsample. This was surprising given that the City of Detroit is more than 80% African American.[13] The recruitment of the sample through email contacts likely omitted a large portion of small businesses that did not have formal websites or associated email addresses (e.g., gas stations, convenience stores, liquor stores). Instead, much of the sample comprised of Project Green Light locations that were non-commercial (e.g., community spaces, non-profit providers, residential, etc.). Considering that the small business community in Detroit is very racially and ethnically diverse, the underrepresentation of small businesses in the sample could also explain a lack of racial and ethnic diversity in the sample. Another possible explanation for the higher representation of white respondents in both samples is that white individuals tend to have a different relationship

[13] See census statistics: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/detroitcitymichigan,MI/PST045222

to policing and surveillance than racialized groups who have been historically targeted and marginalized by the criminal justice system. White individuals may be more comfortable talking about policing and surveillance for several reasons including: having greater levels of trust in local police, seeing surveillance technologies as benign or beneficial rather than invasive or oppressive, and believing that they are less likely to be targeted by surveillance initiatives and law enforcement practices. I supplemented interviews with perspectives drawn from community-based reports and surveys as well as social justice advocacy work by Black-led, social justice organizations and activists.

Recorded interviews were transcribed. No qualitative software was used for analysis. Instead, a manual coding process was employed (Basit, 2003), which, while more time-intensive, allowed for deeper immersion in the data and more nuanced interpretation of the discussions (Saldaña, 2021). The analysis proceeded through multiple stages of coding beginning with a close reading of the transcripts. Line-by-line analysis of transcripts involved highlighting text with multiple colors, circling key words, and making margin notes. These preliminary codes were refined iteratively and concepts were grouped in broader analytical categories based on codes derived from research questions and the conceptual framework as well as codes that emerged from the data. Key quotes and excerpts were collected in a separate document based on thematic headings and sub-headings.

Documentary Research

This study was also interested in the larger policy agenda that surrounded the establishment of city-wide camera surveillance as well as the underlying politics that drove and informed its expansion. Accordingly, much of the dissertation draws on the analysis of documents produced several years prior to Project Green Light's official launch, including

various public meeting transcripts, legal and policy documents, reports, news articles, and grey literature.

Police Oversight Board Meeting Transcripts

I examined transcripts from Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC) meetings which were held bi-weekly, focusing primarily on meetings between January 2011 (the first available transcripts) and December 2020. The BOPC was established after Coleman Young's mayoral election in 1973 as a civilian oversight and review board in the wake of police brutalities and anti-STRESS organizing (Lassiter, 2021e). The aim was to establish civilian oversight that was a middle ground between direct civilian involvement and maintenance of police autonomy. The BOPC was also to serve as a review board overseeing officer promotions, reviewing policies and procedures, investigating citizen complaints, and allowing for public comments at the end of each meeting with the intention of increasing civilian input into police operations (Lassiter, 2021d; Lassiter, 2021e; Smydra, 1993). BOPC transcripts provided an overview of DPD policy, official discourse around policing operations and initiatives, and aspirational visions of the police department with regard to the adoption of technology. BOPC meetings also provided a forum where citizens engaged with, lauded, and critiqued DPD policy. BOPC meetings were hardly a neutral space. As activists and social justice advocates were keen to point out (Riverwise, 2019), the BOPC comprised of appointed rather than elected positions, and many appointees were former law enforcement personnel. Meetings were also often attended by uniformed police officers, and after 2016, were held at the Detroit Public Safety Headquarters, rather than community spaces like churches, community centers, etc. Many activists and residents stated that especially during controversies over the police department's use of facial recognition, opportunities' for public comment were heavily policed. The BOPC's function should also be understood in its broader, historical context, as part of the policing apparatus that, rather than

providing meaningful accountability, has often rubber-stamped police policy, and contained challenges to police authority and legitimacy (Lassiter, 2021d; Lassiter, 2021e; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Smydra, 1993). Ultimately then, BOPC meetings should be seen as a highly politicized spaces where power relations between police agencies, oversight bodies, and citizens are constantly being negotiated and contested (see Gascón & Roussell, 2019). I analyzed BOPC transcripts by reading through and taking notes at key historical moments in the city's emergency management and bankruptcy proceedings as well as in relation to key developments and controversies regarding the city's evolving policing and security strategies. For example, statements by DPD officials regarding the plans for Project Green Light and the city's real-time crime infrastructure provided key insights into how the police department envisioned the functions and utility of new surveillance initiatives and technologies. Given the large number of transcripts, I employed a mix of close reading of entire meeting transcripts as well as systematic scanning and searching of the documents using keywords. Key excerpts were collected in a separate document, with a much smaller number of excerpts being used in the final text.

Legal Documents, Policy Documents, Financial Reports, and Contracts

The dissertation also draws on documents related to bankruptcy and emergency management including publicly-available emergency manager reports, restructuring plans, bankruptcy court eligibility depositions, bankruptcy court proceedings and transcripts, credit-rating agency reports, annual financial reports, and municipal budget documents. These documents were important for understanding how city operations and departments were restructured, as well as how the emergency manager rationalized investments in security deemed crucial for the city's revitalization. Annual financial reports, city budget documents, requests for proposals, and contracts with security vendors provided insights into the acquisitions of technology and equipment to bolster the DPD's technology-mediated policing capabilities.

Formal contracts with the Manhattan Institute think thank provided insights into the restructuring of Detroit's police department, and DPD policy documents such as the 2014 Plan of Action (DPD, 2014a) were analyzed to better understand the shifting policy agenda, goals, and rationalities of the police department as the city exited bankruptcy. I analyzed documents like memoranda of understanding between the police department and other private and non-private security agencies which helped to illuminate public-private security partnerships. Finally, publicly-available DPD policy documents and presentations provided details about the technical aspects, functions, and origins of the city's RTCC infrastructure as well as the department's policy directives which articulated guidelines and procedures regarding how police handled data, used technologies like facial recognition and gunshot detection systems, and operated the city's RTCC(s).

News and Online Media and Grey Literature

Finally, this dissertation draws from a combination of local news coverage, city and DPD press conferences, online media publications, and publications by activist and community-based organizations. These documentary sources helped to synthesize the history and context surrounding Project Green Light's expansion from multiple vantage points. Press conferences hosted on the DPD's YouTube page provided a source for official police discourse on new policing and security initiatives including the promises of new technologies and surveillance programs. Publications by grassroots groups and coalitions organizing against expanded surveillance provided contrasting and critical perspectives to these narratives, while also outlining activist struggles, providing community-based perspectives on initiatives like Project Green Light, and suggesting ways to reimagine security and safety. Publicly-available, online discussion panels with social justice advocates and academics provided an additional source of critical perspectives.

CHAPTER 2: REINVENTING THE MOTOR CITY

Introduction

This chapter situates Detroit's financially-mediated restructuring under emergency management and through federal bankruptcy court proceedings as a generative moment for new security policy. The first part of the chapter provides a brief history of Detroit's fiscal distress and the events that led up to the appointment of the city's emergency financial manager. I explore how emergency management provided an opportunity to restructure the city's operations, rationalize city services, and remake local government along lines of market efficiency and investability. I explore how new investments in public safety and policing authorized by the emergency manager came to be viewed as vital to stemming population loss, attracting future investment, and thus securing the city's resurgence. I highlight the distinctly financial imperatives and forms of reasoning that rationalized investments in policing and surveillance. The second part of the chapter delves into the details of how the city's emergency manager tapped into the expertise and advice of consultants from the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank known for helping fiscally-distressed cities institute market-oriented policy reforms and zero-tolerance policing approaches. I explore how these consultants played an instrumental role in restructuring Detroit's police department and formulating a blueprint for the city's post-bankruptcy policing strategy which aligned with the speculative reinvention of the city. While the Manhattan Institute was well known for helping cities to adopt 'Broken Windows' approach to policing, it was the fusion of this policing approach with an ambitious data-driven and technological policing agenda that was considered central to the city's envisioned resurgence and would lay a foundation for future experiments in surveillance including Project Green Light. I conclude the chapter by discussing the broader implications of

late-entrepreneurial forms of securitization and the powerful actors and interests behind speculative visions of the revitalized and securitized city.

Fiscal Crisis and State Takeover

By the time the City of Detroit filed for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy in the summer of 2013, it was in a fiscally perilous state. The city had lost more than sixty percent of its population since its peak in 1950 (Farley, 2017; City of Detroit, 2013b, p.1) and its economic base had withered to the point where the official unemployment rate was 18.6% (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.1). Home to 333,000 manufacturing jobs in 1947, only 23,000 of those jobs remained by 2007 (Galster, 2017). Despite having the highest income and property tax rates in the state, Detroit's tax revenues continued to decline after the 2000s due in part to high rates of poverty where nearly 40% of residents lived below the federal poverty line and the average income was roughly $24,000 for a family of four (Bouffard, 2015). The subprime crisis in 2008 hit Detroit's neighborhoods particularly hard and devastated rates of homeownership (Kurashige, 2017; Tabb, 2015). Between 2005 and 2014, 36% of properties in the city went into foreclosure, many due to predatory loans disproportionately targeting Black neighborhoods (Phinney, 2018) and plummeting residential property values further crippled the tax base and leaving behind a sprawling, low-density land mass over which to administer services (Farley, 2017).

Prior to the appointment of the emergency manager, the City of Detroit had been running deficits nearly every year since 2003, using various debt arrangements such as Fiscal Stabilization Bonds[14] to cover budget shortfalls, while underfunding its pension funds and deferring maintenance on infrastructure (McDonald, 2014; Peck & Whiteside, 2016; Scorsone, 2013). In the context of mounting fiscal pressures and budgetary constraints, Detroit had become

[14] Under the Fiscal Stabilization Act, 1981 PA 80, cities and counties in Michigan can issue Fiscal Stabilization Bonds to fund operating deficits for a past fiscal year or a projected operating deficit in the current fiscal year (Fiscal Stabilization Act, 1981).

a "proving ground" for increasingly speculative forms of municipal financing (Peck & Whiteside, 2016, p.255) and risky debt arrangements to fund even the most basic operating expenses (Scorsone, 2013). This included the ill-fated interest rate swaps[15] entered into by the Kilpatrick administration in 2005 which accelerated the city's fiscal crisis and became a key factor in the city's bankruptcy filing (Phillips, 2018). At the time, the deals were celebrated by municipal bankers and investors as an innovation in municipal finance only to implode several years later as the Federal Reserve reduced interest rates essentially to zero in 2008 to preserve the financial system (Phillips, 2018). Detroit's fiscal situation rapidly worsened in subsequent years, buttressed by further declines in tax revenues and 30% reductions in state revenue sharing between 2008 and 2012 (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.4). Despite harsh bouts of austerity calling for across-the-board cuts to an already meagre provisioning of municipal operations and services, debt service continued to strain the budget and unfunded pension obligations of close to $6 billion loomed over the city's finances (City of Detroit, 2013a).

The City of Detroit was not the only municipality in the State of Michigan that had been afflicted by protracted fiscal distress, economic restructuring, and deindustrialization. As a result of the state's own fiscal challenges, revenue sharing had already been greatly reduced, leaving many other beleaguered Michigan cities in fiscally precarious circumstances. This, however, did not signal state government's withdrawal from the fiscal affairs of cities. Rather, the State of Michigan opted to manage the fiscal crises in its cities through strong forms of austerity and emergency management laws enabling technocratic managers to suspend local control and displace locally elected government (Loh, 2016; Nickels, 2019). When the newly elected

[15] The complex set of financing deals led the city to enter into a series of swap agreements in 2005 as part of attempts to deal with a mounting budget crisis. The swap agreements converted a large portion of floating rate debt to a fixed interest rate, essentially locking in favourable rates and making a bet on continued rate increases. Phillips (2018, p.74) suggests that interest rate swaps emerged not as a solution to urban fiscal crises, but as a financial innovation that banks could use to generate profits from the vast debt held by U.S. municipalities.

Governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder, took office in 2010, he aggressively pursued revisions of the state's emergency management laws to bolster the already controversial powers of state-appointed emergency managers (Hinkley, 2017; Loh, 2016; Nickels, 2019; Anderson, 2016a). While Michiganders organized to repeal the beefed up, draconian measures which they saw as an affront to self-determination and self-governance, Snyder along with several financial institutions argued that the failure to enact strong emergency management laws threatened the credit-ratings of Michigan's cities and their ability to access debt (Hinkley, 2017). Less than two months after Public Act 4 was successfully repealed, the State of Michigan introduced a new set of referendum proof emergency management laws providing emergency managers with unprecedented authority and power over municipal budget decisions (Fasenfest, 2019; Loh, 2016).

In December of 2011, the City of Detroit came under the crosshairs of the hardened regime of state takeover with Governor Snyder appointing a Financial Review Team (FRT) to monitor and review its fiscal condition. A few months later, Detroit's worsening fiscal situation prompted the FRT to require Detroit's City Council to sign a Consent Agreement outlining a number of "reform initiatives" to restructure the city's operations and finances (City of Detroit, 2013a). While then Mayor Bing was largely acquiescent to demands for austerity in order to stave off the looming threat of state takeover, Detroit's fiscal condition continued to deteriorate. As credit rating agencies further downgraded the city's credit rating, the governor moved to appoint Kevyn Orr as emergency manager who would use his background as a corporate turnaround expert to help repair Detroit's financial situation.

Service Delivery Insolvency

When Orr took the reins of municipal governance in the spring of 2013, the City of Detroit was in dire straits. In fiscal terms, the city was practically insolvent, with major cash-flow problems, debt obligations totalling approximately $18 billion, and a credit rating that had deteriorated to "junk" status, effectively precluding the borrowing of funds (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.3; Eisinger, 2014; McDonald, 2014). Orr noted that by 2012, the city had accumulated a general fund deficit of roughly $326 million and a cash-flow shortfall of approximately $115.5 million, severely hampering the ability to provide even the most basic municipal services (City of Detroit, 2013b). This 'service delivery insolvency', as it was later described by the bankruptcy courts, was hardly lost on Orr and his team of restructuring consultants who referenced the fact that approximately 40 percent of the city's streetlights were non-functional, the city's remaining parks were in major disrepair, IT systems were obsolete, trash pickup was sporadic, and the public transit system was barely functioning (City of Detroit, 2013a). Orr was particularly concerned with the state of the city's public safety services noting that police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS) were understaffed and under-resourced, having endured significant budget cuts. Despite public safety expenses commanding 46% of the 2012 budget, Orr noted that many first responders were coping with severely out-dated and poorly maintained vehicles, equipment, and facilities hindering their ability to respond to emergencies and provide life-saving services (City of Detroit, 2013a).

Identifying public safety as his "paramount concern" (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.19), Orr stated: "The City believes that its reorganization and successful redevelopment depends on its ability to offer adequate public safety services to existing City residents and those who may consider relocating to Detroit in the future" (City of Detroit, 2014a, p.114). Orr's concerns not

only reflected a desire to retain tax-paying residents and stem rates of population loss, but also intimated that improving services was a necessary pillar of a revitalization strategy that looked outwards to expand the city's tax base:

> By reducing crime and blight, providing adequate levels of services and rationalizing the City's bureaucratic and tax structures, the City believes that, going forward, it can attract and retain employers – and encourage the growth of local startup ventures – that will expand (or, at a minimum, arrest the shrinkage of) the City's income tax base by providing more jobs, higher wages, or both. Fostering conditions that promote economic growth also could help to expand the City's property tax base by encouraging both new construction and the appreciation in value of existing real estate. (City of Detroit, 2014a, p.132)

In his first month in office, Orr issued critical orders including one to ensure that the city's new $60 million Public Safety Headquarters was operational. The headquarters would consolidate the operations of police, fire, EMS, Homeland Security, I.T. departments under one roof and reflected a new commitment to public safety in the city. Orr also initiated a comprehensive review of public safety services with the assistance of third-party consultants, and authorized a search for a new police chief who could take the lead on restructuring the police department (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.6).

Though Orr spoke of public safety as encompassing fire, EMS, and police, it was clear that his focus was on the city's police force and its ability to manage increasingly high levels of crime which he considered a key obstacle to the city's revitalization (see Jay & Conklin, 2020, p.55). In an early restructuring proposal to creditors drafted by Orr and his team, it was stated that "the city must reduce high crime rates" (City of Detroit, 2013b, pg.9), a reference to the fact that in 2012 Detroit had the highest violent crime rate of any U.S. city with a population over 200,000 - five times the national average. The document cited extremely low case clearance rates and average police response times of 58 minutes for the highest priority emergencies compared to a national average of 11 minutes (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.13-14). Orr reasoned that previous

administrations had pursued cost-cutting and the deferral of critical investments that had reduced Detroit Police Department (DPD) personnel by 40% over the previous 10 years and left the department with aging and out-dated vehicles, equipment, facilities, and IT infrastructure (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.14). Attempting to underline the severity of the problem, Orr and his team noted that "residents and business owners have been forced to take their safety in their own hands", and that "some relatively well-off sections of the City have created private security forces" (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.9). Additionally, it was noted that business owners routinely hired off-duty officers for additional patrols and protection (City of Detroit, 2014a, p.59). Orr's observations spoke to a larger loss of confidence among residents and small business owners in the police department's ability to serve and protect. A poll commissioned by the Detroit News in the year prior to his appointment found that nearly 40% of residents planned to leave the city within 5 years, with many of those citing crime as their most significant daily challenge (Macdonald, 2012). Orr also believed that more funding for the police alone would not fully resolve these operational issues. There were also more deeply rooted issues around the department's culture and officer morale. These issues were exacerbated by several scandals and frequent changes in leadership where the police department had seen five different police chiefs over the span of five years with varying approaches to rehabilitating the department's operations and image (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.6; Macdonald, 2012; Yaccino, 2012). Additionally, the department had been under federal consent decree since 2003 for patterns of excessive force and unlawful arrests, with costing the city millions of dollars per year in federal monitoring expenses (Department of Justice, 2003; Gurman, 2017). Taken together, these issues provided an impetus for a complete overhaul of the department's operations and leadership, which Orr deemed necessary for the city's recovery.

Remaking Local Government

As emergency manager, Orr was responsible for devising a comprehensive plan to adjust the city's debt and restructure its operations with an eye towards efficiency, fiscal accountability and sustainability, and "rationalized" city operations (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.21). Orr noted that it was "imperative that a stable financial foundation for the City be established in a manner that also promotes private investment in the City and revitalization of the community in a sustainable fashion" (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.1). To achieve this, Orr outlined plans to repurpose local government in ways that would make the city attractive for future employers, residents, and most importantly future bondholders and creditors who would provide the ability to raise new capital through the municipal bond market to fund city operations. In this respect, making the city investable again would require repairing the city's credit rating by reinstating a positive balance sheet, restoring confidence in the city's ability to generate future revenues while minimizing expenses, and satisfying notions of "credit-worthiness" (Hackworth, 2002; Omstedt, 2020). Only then could the city regain access to capital markets- the lifeblood of a functioning municipality- and borrow on more favourable terms (see Hackworth, 2002; Hall & Jonas, 2014; Sbragia, 1996).

The plan was itself an exercise in speculating on future unknowns. Orr and his team produced a number of financial projections and estimates based on assumptions about future business and economic conditions and favourable outcomes of restructuring efforts (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.ii). These involved various accounting techniques and processes of valuation (see Chiapello, 2015) that, for example: ascertained the value of city assets that could be sold to fund creditor recoveries, estimated cumulative future expenses associated with unfunded liabilities and other debt obligations, used cash flow projections to forecast future cash inflows

and outflows, and estimated capitalized cost savings derived from "cost efficiencies" as well as from new investments in certain city services, such as public safety (Moore Deposition, 2014, p.31, see also City of Detroit, 2013a; 2013b). Such calculative technologies reflected a form of fiscal managerialism derived from financialized and future-oriented principles of public investment rather than economic logics focusing on current or consumption spending (Chiapello, 2015; Lepont, 2023). Informed by an 'asset rationale' (Mennicken & Muniesa, 2017), these financial practices required viewing the city as a collection of assets that could create value and generate future returns for the city and investors. Technocratic financial management, thus, reflected aspects of what Lepont (2023, p.3) calls the "investor state", intent on making 'productive' investments, while legitimating cuts to 'non-essential' and 'non-productive' functions and services (see Muniesa & Doganova, 2020). Although critics argued that such "off-the-shelf" forms of municipal accounting failed to take into account root causes and important contextual factors associated with the city's economic conditions (see Hammer, 2015), these forms of "rule by accountancy" (Peck, 2012, p.649) were draped in the language of fiscal prudence and common-sense budgetary necessity (see also Heil, 2020).

In order to realize a leaner municipal government, Orr outlined the need to confront the city's operations which in his view had become "dysfunctional and wasteful" and plagued by "budgetary restrictions, mismanagement, crippling operational practices and, in some cases, indifference or corruption" (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.21). He cited the need to realign them with the best practices of "21st century government" (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.21). In more practical terms, this meant reducing "unnecessary bureaucracy", restructuring pensions for city workers, enacting labor reforms to rid "unproductive employment terms", reducing health benefit coverage, and employing a mix of consolidation, outsourcing, spinning off, and privatization of

departments and operations to promote cost savings and efficiencies (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.21-22). One of the larger and more contentious moves involved Orr's decision to privatize Detroit's water and sewerage department and transfer its responsibilities to a regional, private authority governed by a board comprised mostly of suburban representatives (Eisinger, 2021). Under his watch, the department undertook one of the largest water shutoff initiatives in the country to clear its balance sheets, depriving thousands of Detroiters of water (Phinney, 2018; Sabourin, 2016). At the recommendation of his advisors, Orr also privatized municipal trash collection, transitioned the electrical grid to DTE Energy, transferred responsibilities for street lighting to a special authority, and transferred managerial control of city assets including the Cobo Center, Eastern Market, and Belle Isle away from the city's direct control to non-profit, quasi-public boards (Biles & Rose, 2019; Eisinger, 2021; Gallagher, 2017). The plans would leave behind what some considered an "anaemic" list of 'essential' services' (Hammer, 2015, p.40) that was in essence a "public safety budget" providing for little more than core emergency services (Phinney, 2016, p.85). In effect, Orr's visions of "Reinventing Detroit" promised a thoroughly downsized and skeletal government, approaching what could be seen as a localized version of a night-watchman state (Anderson, 2014; Peck, 2014).

Not all departments were subjected to the same treatment of slash-and-burn cuts. Orr suggested that the city's successful recovery relied on selectively restoring and reinvesting in city services "essential to the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" which he saw as vital to Detroit's long-term fiscal health and its ability to attract future investment and to "drive savings in the future" (City of Detroit, 2013a, p.19). With respect to the police department specifically, Orr reasoned that the overhaul of the police department required new investments in information technology, infrastructure, equipment, fleet, facilities, and personnel (City of

Detroit, 2013a, p.7). Having laid out the financial condition and pressing needs of the city to creditors, especially with respect to public safety, Orr proposed new investment initiatives to the tune of $1.25 billion in municipal bond funds over 10 years to bolster public safety departments, modernize IT systems, and remediate blight (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.61). For Orr, improving city services, and particularly public safety, was the only objective more important than "maximizing recoveries" for creditors (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.41). New investments, however, would require funds that the city did not have and would potentially require tapping into funds owed to the city's various creditor groups including bondholders, bond insurers, city unions, and retiree associations (Bomey, 2016).

Privileging city services over repayment would place Orr in a tough position of having to strike a deal with creditors who balked at the idea of receiving less than they were owed (Bomey, 2016). Orr, however, was insistent that the reinvestment initiatives were critical for fixing the city's budget, stemming long-entrenched trends of population loss, remedying service delivery problems, and providing avenues for residential and commercial growth in the city (City of Detroit, 2013e; City of Detroit, 2014b). Without new investments, Orr was convinced that the city would continue its "death spiral" (CBS News Detroit, 2013). As such, he noted that "shared sacrifice" was required from all stakeholders to achieve maximal returns for creditor constituencies "while simultaneously establishing the framework for a healthy and growing Detroit moving forward" (City of Detroit, 2013b, p.100).[16] Unable to strike a deal with existing creditors, Orr immediately requested relief under Chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code (see City of

[16] Upon presenting the restructuring proposal to invited representatives of the city's creditors in a closed-door meeting, Orr met with willing creditor constituencies to negotiate the details of the proposals including cost recoveries on debt owed to creditors. Secured creditors (e.g., holders of water and sewerage bonds) would receive 100 percent recoveries, while unsecured creditors (e.g., holders of UTGO bond funds) were offered 10 cents on the dollar (Bomey, 2016, p.48). Pensioners, who had provided a lifetime of service to the city, and many of whom were living pay check to pay check, faced more than a 50% cut to pensions and near-removal of their health benefits despite the perception that under state law, pension rights were constitutionally protected and off limits from cuts (Bomey, 2016, p.76).

Detroit, 2013c), and in July of 2013 moved to continue restructuring efforts under the federal bankruptcy process. In his recommendation for Chapter 9, Orr cited the "endemic" nature of crime and the fact that residents had paid for persistent cuts to city services with "a diminishing quality of life in a City that, over time, has increasingly struggled to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens" (City of Detroit, 2013c, p.3). He went on to reference mismanagement and the "financially imprudent" ways the city continued to fund deficits that ultimately undermined its ability to access capital markets for credit (see City of Detroit, 2013c, p.4). Often considered a last resort, Chapter 9 held out the possibility of providing some relief from debt obligations contingent on judicial approval of a "Plan of Adjustment" outlining how the debt would be adjusted and how the city would be restructured to ensure it could meet future financial obligations. Luckily for Orr, the bankruptcy court agreed with the need to improve city services, with Judge Rhodes claiming that: "while the City's tumbling credit rating, its utter lack of liquidity, and the disastrous COPs and swaps deal might more neatly establish the City's 'insolvency'… it is the City's service delivery insolvency that the Court finds most strikingly disturbing in this case" (Opinion Regarding Eligibility, 2013, p.108). Through the remainder of 2013 and into 2014, the emergency management team would continue to carry out restructuring of the city's departments while developing a plan to adjust the city's debt and secure new investments for improved city services. As it pertained to the city's policing operations, Orr drew on outside 'experts' to restructure the police department and help craft a post-bankruptcy blueprint for policing that aligned with visions for the new, revitalized and securitized Detroit.

Manhattan Institute Comes to Detroit

Detroit's restructuring was significantly shaped by the work of external consultants, including the Manhattan Institute, a neoliberal urban consulting firm and think tank. Since the

1970s, the Manhattan Institute has been a major conservative voice in urban policy, advocating for free-market interventions including pro-corporate development, privatization of municipal and social services, welfare reform, workfare policies, and zero-tolerance policing (Keil, 2007; O'Connor, 2008; Peck & Whiteside, 2017). The think tank's neoliberal policy prescriptions, often framed in terms of the "new urban paradigm", were forged against the backdrop of New York City's near encounter with its own municipal insolvency (O'Connor, 2008). The Manhattan Institute was also a key launch pad for the careers of conservative thinkers and policymakers, the likes of Roger Starr who had proposed policies of 'planned shrinkage' suggesting the deliberate reduction of city services and supports to 'non-viable' neighborhoods as a means to encourage residents to leave economically depressed areas (Audirac & Hackworth, 2021. To no one's surprise, the neighborhoods slated for decommissioning and aggressive policies of triage under Starr's plans were all poor, minority communities (Merrifield, 2014). By the 2010s, the New York-based think tank was a regular disseminator of opinion pieces on municipal bankruptcy and neoliberal tactics for turning around distressed and insolvent cities ostensibly afflicted by the malaise of liberalism and government largesse (Davidson & Ward, 2014; Peck, 2014; Peck & Whiteside, 2017).

The think tank's direct influence in Detroit would primarily fall within the scope of reforming the city's approach to policing. Prior to emergency management in 2012, the DPD had already been working with the Manhattan Institute to pilot their infamous brand of 'Broken Windows' policing in Detroit with the help of the late George Kelling, one of the criminologists credited with pioneering the approach. With his Manhattan Institute associate, Michael Allegretti, at his side, Kelling worked with the DPD to deploy the model in Detroit's Grandmont-Rosedale neighborhood, as a test case to demonstrate its merits and assess its

suitability for other neighborhoods. Grandmont-Rosedale was perhaps a logical first choice for testing the viability of Broken Windows strategies. The neighbourhood had been a bastion of the city's Black middle-class which boasted relatively high rates of homeownership, strong traditions of civic volunteerism and associational life, and long-standing community development corporations who could serve as potential community partners. Neighborhood residents had also been well organized around public safety concerns, having their own crime prevention task force, hosting regular safety meetings, and maintaining one of city's oldest and most active citizen patrol groups (GRDC, 2020; Greenberg, 2021, p.227).[17]

In an interview discussing the pilot, Kelling argued that if Detroit were to survive, it would have to concentrate its resources on helping to revive the city's "viable middle class neighborhoods" that were relatively stable, but were "in real need of protection" (Public Sector Inc., 2013). He suggested:

> Broken windows is very important in those particular areas, in the sense that, as soon as you begin to see any deterioration, it has to be taken care of right away, not only by the police, but by community groups as well… In other areas, conditions would be almost impossible to improve on through broken windows, except in terms of behavior. You can still focus on public urination, prostitution, and other kinds of low level behaviors which are precursors to more serious crime. But I think the focus for broken windows has to be in those areas that are still thriving and will be salvageable. Those areas are going to need special police protection, strong neighborhood groups, and a commitment by government to make the decisions about making sure there's lighting there, making sure that the infrastructure works, and so on.

Kelling argued "you really have to be thinking in terms of triage" and was frank about the fact that this level of special police protection and services could not be afforded to the city's poorer areas (Public Sector Inc., 2013).

[17] According to the official statements by the Manhattan Institute, this neighborhood had been initially selected because DPD precinct leadership and the local neighborhood development corporation were "were both found to be receptive to the project and able to serve as credible and active partners. Further, the high home ownership rate in this area meant that members of the community had a definitive stake in the preservation of this particular community" (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013, p.30).

In an editorial article, Allegretti (2013) suggested that aside from the "city's troubled finances and high public-sector labor costs", the city's woes have been equally attributable to "it's failure to keep citizens safe" and argued there were many lessons to be learned from New York City's turnaround in the 1990s. He went on to conjure an image of "two Detroits" functioning:

> … in complete isolation from one another. One is known as Downtown and Midtown, where urban renewal is quickly taking shape… Here, crime is declining, and joggers and diners can be found on the streets at night… The other Detroit is known simply as the 'neighborhoods', where vacant homes line almost every block, crime continues to increase, and outdoor civil life has been hijacked by fear. (Allegretti, 2013)

In articulating a somewhat crude simplification of Detroit's diverse geography, Allegretti went on to make the case for concentrating police resources to protect the city's still "viable" neighborhoods:

> … in between these two Detroits are pockets of civic life that have gone largely unnoticed. These places are counted among the 'neighborhoods' because they are residential and far away from the glow of the downtown renaissance. These are places like Grandmont and Rosedale in Northwest Detroit, East English Village and Cornerstone Village in East Detroit, Green Acres and Palmer Woods in West Detroit, and Mexicantown in Southwest Detroit. These neighborhoods have not been lost, but they are in trouble. Good people live in these places -- paying their mortgages and taxes, revitalizing vacant homes, shopping, participating in neighborhood patrols, and educating their children. They work double time as citizens and public servants. (Allegretti, 2013)

Permeated by a variety of cultural assumptions about homeownership, consumerism, and civic duty, Allegretti's statements reflected a belief that there were easily distinguishable groups of 'good', upstanding, and law-abiding citizens who were deserving of protection versus others who were not.[18] Additionally, the notion of neighborhoods "not yet lost, but in trouble" reflects Kelling's earlier ideas about neighborhood at the "tipping point" and "where the public order is deteriorating but not unreclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive

[18] Such depictions are crucial for justifying what Bernard Harcourt argues is a philosophy "premised on society being divided into two groups, the 'orderly' upstanding law-abiding citizen and the 'disorderly' criminal-in-the-making" (as cited in Rakia, 2014).

people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered" (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p.38).

With an emphasis on maintaining order, reducing citizen fear, and reducing home invasions and burglaries in the area, the Grandmont-Rosedale pilot sought to increase the felt presence of police in the area, including through increased patrols and use of investigatory traffic stops with a focus on crime prevention and intelligence-gathering rather than merely issuing tickets. As part of added training, members of the Traffic Unit were brought to Milwaukee to learn from their "aggressive traffic enforcement efforts" (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013, p.26). Felt presence also involved "proactive contacts" with known offenders through collaborations with the Michigan Department of Corrections including increased home visits to parolees and probationers living in the neighborhood and to instil in them the idea that they were being watched (Manhattan Institute, 2013; Peek, 2013; Zabawa, 2012). Additionally, the pilot involved collaborative partnerships with neighborhood groups and concerned residents, allowing the police to leverage the "community as the eyes and ears to report suspicious/criminal activity" (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013, pg. 26). Lastly, efforts beyond the Grandmont-Rosedale neighbourhood included Manhattan Institute consultants assisting existing community policing initiatives in other neighborhoods like Ceasefire, and re-implementing CompStat citywide (see Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013, p.26).

When Orr was appointed in March 2013, the year-long pilot was nearing its completion. Hoping to win a formal contract with the city, the Manhattan Institute cited a 32% reduction in burglaries in the Grandmont-Rosedale pilot over a six-month period and claimed they could reproduce the success of the pilot to help revitalize several other 'tipping point' neighborhoods in Detroit (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013). In June of 2013, several months after his

appointment, Orr authorized the first formal contract with the Manhattan Institute worth $621,578. The scope of work would include the continuation of Kelling's efforts to implement Broken Windows policing in other middle-class neighborhoods in Eastern and Southwest Detroit to demonstrate best practices and create "short-term wins" with hopes of eventually scaling the program citywide (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013, p.30).

The 21st Century Police Department

Expanding Broken Windows tactics was only one dimension of the Manhattan Institute's larger project in Detroit. The contract would also involve planning and overseeing a thorough restructuring of the police department's operations and organizational structure. This would be headed by Bill Bratton of the Bratton Group working in collaboration with the Manhattan Institute and other consultants involved in the city's restructuring. The main deliverable would be a strategic blueprint called the 'Plan of Action' developed in consultation with Orr, his team, and the yet-to-be appointed police chief which sought to align the department with national best practices and equip the force with the technological sophistication of "21st century" police department (DPD, 2014a, p.78). More generally, the post-bankruptcy blueprint for policing was intended to promote an image of Detroit as a safe and secure city for business, investment, tourism, and residence, considered key elements of a successful resurgence.

Recommendations for revamping the DPD would be derived from the Bratton team's systematic evaluation of the department's operations including those related to staffing (e.g., civilianization, hiring new officers, command staff reorganization), patrol (e.g., resource allocation, calls-for-service, workload), investigations (e.g., case management), training, crime reduction strategies, administration, finances, facilities and fleet management, and technology (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013). Aligning with the principle and philosophies espoused by

Kelling and Bratton throughout their careers (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 1982) and in line with 'best practices', the plan would suggest a shift away from 'reactive' approaches that defined police work mostly in terms of calls for service and towards a more 'proactive' approach using data-driven and technological modes of policing including the reinstatement of data-driven practices such as CompStat to help analyze and forecast crime patterns and 'quality of life' concerns, allocate patrol resources, and hold officers accountable for their areas (Detroit Police Department, 2014). According to common policing wisdom, it was the coupling of Broken Windows tactics with a data-driven approach attuned to diverse, local geographies that could make the most impact in reducing crime (Bartosiewicz, 2015). The plan would also seek to decentralize and flatten command hierarchies so that precinct captains could be held accountable for designing and carrying out geographically-specific strategies to deal with problems arising in their assigned areas. In keeping with the tenets of Kelling and Wilson's philosophies, each neighbourhood was seen to have distinct issues and needs, and thus required different strategies and tactics (Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Kelling & Coles, 1996; see also Herbert, 1997). Additionally, police beats that were congruent with neighborhood boundaries could have officers assigned on a stable basis and could become familiar with local crime and "quality of life" issues and seek to resolve them in collaboration with community members through a "problem-oriented approach" (Kelling & Coles, 1996, p.160). The logic of a geographically-differentiated form of policing also followed an economic logic in the sense that policing was viewed as a potential economic development tool to support local revitalization efforts in economically valuable parts of the city (see Jay & Conklin, 2020; Story, 2019). For example, the Plan of Action outlined intentions to match precinct and scout car area boundaries with "natural" neighborhood boundaries and "coordinate with Detroit Future City and its vision for the Detroit

neighborhoods" (DPD, 2014a, p.27). This would allow for the reallocation of patrol resources in line with calls for service and corresponding to the triage logics underpinning evaluations of future neighbourhood viability in the contentious Detroit Future City planning framework.[19]

Throughout the process, Bratton's team worked closely with the emergency manager, meeting regularly and providing updates to ensure the consultants' Plan of Action would address specific areas of concern identified by the Emergency Manager team including budgeting[20] and the need to update the department's technology systems (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013, p.31). With respect to the latter, the Bratton Group summoned experts who brought expertise from LAPD's Information Technology Division and who maintained close, private-sector connections with leading security technology firms. Bratton himself offered considerable experience in this regard having introduced "predictive policing" to the LAPD in the early 2000s as Chief and using the federal consent decree as a basis for new reforms through technological means (Brayne, 2021; Rakia, 2014; Winston, 2015). Over a span of seven years, Bratton worked with various technology companies to deploy cutting-edge surveillance technologies and bolster the LAPD's intelligence capacities by establishing real-time crime infrastructures, piloting early versions of predictive policing software, deploying gunshot detection systems, and developing an expansive CCTV network equipped with facial recognition and automated license plate readers (Bartosiewicz, 2015; Davis, 2007). By the time he left the department in 2009, Los Angeles had

[19] Gordon (2022) documents similar processes in another city where the redrawing of police boundaries and strategic allocation of patrol resources coincided with forms of differential policing which helped to craft neighborhoods deemed important to the city's economic fate.

[20] The Bratton Group drew on team members who oversaw police budgets in Los Angeles and New Orleans to ensure that the overhaul was in line with DPD budgeting process (Manhattan Institute Contract, 2013, p.28). The plan sought to identify opportunities for revenue generation by the department including from grants and gifts, increases in fees for service, and more aggressive ticketing and collections (DPD, 2014a, p.5, 98).

become one of the country's most surveilled cities and "a proving ground for corporations to test out new surveillance technologies" (Bartosiewicz, 2015, p.50).

Bratton's enthusiasm for technological policing would unsurprisingly be reflected in the Plan of Action's goal to introduce an "ambitious technology agenda" to bring "21st-century policing technology" to the Detroit Police Department (DPD, 2014a, p.4). For instance, the plan sought to establish a Real-Time Crime Center eventually located in the Public Safety Headquarters to enable active monitoring of crime occurrences, data-mining and intelligence analysis to "determine possible linkages to known criminals and past events", and to provide real-time information to responding officers and investigators (DPD, 2014a, p.63). The plan also recommended the acquisition of new, experimental technologies such as ShotSpotter gun detection systems funded through forfeiture funds. The plan further aimed to absorb Homeland Security and emergency preparedness functions into the police department, with personnel at the Public Safety Headquarters serving as a main contact point for regional and state fusion centers (see McQuade, 2019; Monahan, 2011).[21] As such, enhancing information sharing and interoperability between public safety departments, as well as with other law enforcement agencies and intelligence entities was a key priority (DPD, 2014a). The consultants' final task would be to assist the emergency manager in transitioning in a new police chief; ideally one who could carry out the recommendations laid out by the Manhattan Institute.

While the Manhattan Institute and their approach to policing were welcomed with open arms in some of Detroit's neighborhoods, the think tank's presence concerned those who were familiar with its history of promoting contentious policies and ideologies (Blac Detroit, 2013).

[21] Fusion centers are high-tech, intelligence-sharing hubs typically located within state and local police departments. Their stated purpose is to promote sharing threat-related information across law enforcement and intelligence entities for the purposes of pre-empting terrorist, criminal, and other threats. For more information on fusion centers, see McQuade (2019), Monahan & Palmer (2009), Monahan (2011), and Regan & Monahan (2013).

The ACLU of Michigan, for example, was troubled by the fact that the Manhattan Institute contract was vetted and signed by Orr without public input or oversight (ACLU of Michigan, 2013). Furthermore, they worried about the organization's reputation as the architects of NYPD's 'stop and frisk' practices which had resulted in racially disproportionate stop and frisk practices and had been deemed unconstitutional in a major federal court decision (ACLU of Michigan, 2013; Stateside, 2013). Moreover, Orr's choice of the Manhattan Institute and the Bratton Group was a curious one in the sense that the Broken Windows policing approach was not only contentious in terms of its tendency to amplify racialized policing and civil liberties violations (see Camp, 2012; Herzing, 2013; Parenti, 1999), but had been thoroughly debunked as an effective means to prevent crime (Harcourt, 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). However, what Broken Windows offered was on the one hand ideological, providing a way to think about social problems like crime and violence in terms of individualized moral failure rather than a consequence of larger structural forces of austerity and disinvestment (Ansfield, 2020; Herbert & Brown, 2006; Vitale, 2008; Wacquant, 2009). As such it provided a common lexicon and ideological grounds through which concerned, middle-class residents could work with police to 'take back' their neighborhoods by cracking down on local nuisances and reasserting 'community norms' about the appropriate use of public spaces (Harcourt, 2001; Parenti, 1999). On the other hand, the Broken Windows paradigm provided a pseudo-scientific cover for more invasive interventions such as stop and frisk and aggressive traffic enforcement that imposed a type of order on the streets consistent with the economic goals of revitalization. Fused with a data-driven strategy and new forms of technology-mediated policing, Broken Windows promised a much more intensive, but spatially-differentiated, form of regulation and surveillance of Detroit's uneven geography. And while residents and community advocates voiced strong

opposition,[22] it was clear that city leadership was intent on carrying through with the blueprint laid out by the Manhattan Institute. The only thing needed now was a new police chief who could give the blueprint legs.

A New Chief in Town

Orr's appointment of the new police chief, James Craig, in the summer of 2013 was considered a key step in improving perceptions of safety in the city. There seemed to be a clear preference by Orr and his team for Craig's leadership, a Detroit native, known for his expertise in community policing, and described by former Mayor Bing as someone who could leverage policing as an economic tool and a means to rebuild the tax base (Berglund, 2023; Burns, 2013b). Craig was also recognized for overseeing the implementation of Broken Windows policing in Los Angeles under Bratton in 2002, and then later as chief of police in Portland and Cincinnati. As part of overhauling DPD operations, Orr gave Craig wide latitude to make changes to the department independent of the City Charter and overriding the civilian oversight and review board (Ikonomova & Perkins, 2021). With ongoing assistance from the Bratton Group, Craig replaced the old two-district system with a decentralized 12-precinct system and restructured personnel by eliminating the entire executive command and promoting a new leadership team. Craig also authorized pay raises and ended the unpopular 12-hour shifts to boost officer morale. To address poor response times, Craig reclassified high-level emergencies, reducing the types and number of calls that would receive Priority 1 response and reallocated

[22] Beyond the initial contract amount of $621,578, the Manhattan Institute received additional payments of $248,630 and $124,315 in 2014 for consulting work (City of Detroit, 2013f, p.6). Manhattan Institute's contract was not renewed formally by the city, likely due to heightened public scrutiny and pushback. However, the think tank's work continued through funding from the Detroit Public Safety Foundation according to fiscal year filings (ProPublica, 2013). Earlier filings in 2012 reveal that the foundation also provided funding for the initial pilot in the Grandmont-Rosedale neighborhood ($47,576) and sending retired NYPD commanders to train DPD in the use of CompStat ($85,038). The executive director of the foundation mentioned that during the bankruptcy, it was difficult to get money for the police department, and that they had helped bring in Bratton and others (BOPC 07-06-2017, p.27) and would be "happy to help provide more broken windows training in the future" (Hackman, 2014).

staff to ensure quicker response to calls for service (Wilkinson, 2017). In a bid to restore community confidence and trust in the police department, the new Neighborhood Police Officer (NPO) program assigned officers to each neighbourhood to work with neighbourhood residents to resolve local 'quality of life' issues and reduce fears and manage perceptions of crime (DPD, 2014a). The community-oriented thrust of Craig's restructuring also included greater involvement and responsibilization of community members through Precinct Community Councils and revamping of the Citizen Radio Patrol program which enlisted volunteers to patrol their neighborhoods and serve as an additional set of 'eyes and ears' for police (DPD, 2014a).

Craig's 'soft' community-oriented approach would be supplemented with a number of more aggressive law and order strategies and tactics. Staying true to the zero-tolerance policing approach, Craig defended the use of stop and frisk practices and elevated nuisance offenses to a top-five priority to target scrappers and illegal dumpers, and to increase the use of citations against business owners for lack of cleanliness (Ikonomova & Perkins, 2021). To bolster proactive policing, Craig created a mobile, proactive unit to work hot spots and revived the controversial Gang Squad under the new name Gang Intelligence Unit which would target suspected gang activity (DPD, 2013). In late 2013, the DPD orchestrated a series of paramilitary raids in the city's poorest neighborhoods (Ikonomova & Perkins, 2021; Jay & Conklin, 2017; 2020; Story, 2019). Though the operations led to arrests for mostly trivial, low-level offenses, they continued on a roughly monthly basis for the next two years (Jay & Conklin, 2017). Rationalized as a way to show that something was being done to curb violence and to send a message to would-be offenders, Craig told media, "This starts the wave of what the new DPD is all about" (Felton, 2015; Jay & Conklin, 2020).

The most significant changes overseen by Craig, however, would be the department's adoption of the "ambitious technological agenda" outlined in the Plan of Action, which would set the stage for new experiments in technological policing and surveillance (DPD, 2014a, p.4). The centerpiece of the city's embrace of new policing and surveillance technologies was the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) located within the new Public Safety Headquarters, which Craig had advocated for since he joined the department. Construction of the 9,000 square foot facility represented a major stepping stone in the police department's proactive, data-driven, and intelligence-led policing strategies, with the RTCC serving as a local, centralized intelligence hub. The center would eventually be staffed with over 150 personnel, including sworn officers, crime analysts and intelligence specialists housed within the Central Intelligence Unit (Crime Intelligence Unit, 2021). Staff duties included producing crime maps and analytics, identifying emerging crime patterns, supporting active investigations, monitoring sensor technologies in real-time (e.g., ALPRs, ShotSpotter, etc.), running history and background checks on suspects, using facial recognition software, monitoring watch list hits and social media, monitoring communications from the volunteer citizen radio patrol program, and providing real-time intelligence and support to police units responding to 911 calls and other incidents (Crime Intelligence Unit, 2021). RTCC staff also played a key role in coordinating CCTV partnerships like Project Green Light, and managing the thousands of video feeds relayed to the RTCC from private and public cameras which provided an unprecedented visibility over nearly all public spaces in the city.[23]

In laying the groundwork for the city's expanded surveillance infrastructure, the DPD made site visits to other police departments across the country to adopt best practices and

[23] Includes public sources such as mounted on various city-owned properties, at traffic intersections, in city buses and at bus stops, in Detroit Public Schools, and hidden dumping cameras. Also includes private sources relayed through PGL, Project Lighthouse, and Ring cameras (see Keith, 2019).

identify aspects other programs they wanted to implement in Detroit (NPSP, 2021). The DPD also developed close relationships with several major security technology providers including Motorola who would end up securing millions of dollars in contracts with the city to outfit the RTCC with cutting-edge data management and analytics solutions. One of the major installations was Motorola's CommandCentral Aware, marketed as an all-in-one software suite for the centralization, management, analysis, and real-time monitoring of camera feeds, automated license plate readers, shot detection systems, social media alerts, computer-aided dispatch incidents and 911 calls, and radio and vehicle locations (Motorola Solutions, 2016a; Motorola Solutions, 2023). The software's key value proposition was the ability to leverage modern technology as a "force multiplier," automating analysis of growing troves of data into "actionable intelligence" for investigations (e.g., leads), enabling more efficient allocation of policing resources, and enhancing real-time "situational awareness" for frontline officers responding to emergency calls (Motorola, 2015a; Motorola, 2016b). For an additional price, Motorola also offered police departments the alluring possibility of policing the future through its predictive software suite that claimed to "predict 30% of next-day crime" and make tactical recommendations for officer deployments (Motorola, 2015b). As Motorola's advertising brochures suggested, "Success means that police officers will not only respond more effectively to crimes, but also anticipate and prevent crimes before they happen by leveraging the data they have available today, tomorrow, and into the future" **(**Motorola, 2015a)**.**[24]

[24] Speaking directly to the RTCCs technological sophistication, a member of the DPD suggested that the city's RTCC had capabilities comparable to that of state and regional-level fusion centers: "All the products that we have here are on the same level as being a fusion center with counter-terrorism, with the statistical data, with the crime patterns and trends, with the camera footage… That's what's unique about us, we got everything right here, and a lot of Real Time Crime Centers don't have that. We're able to do all the things that a fusion center can do" (Clarke, 2018).

Behind the technical verbiage associated with Motorola's RTCC technologies lay new capabilities to closely monitor and identify citizens. From a public relations standpoint, it was important to play up the public benefits of these new capabilities, framing new, experimental, and speculative surveillance technologies as guarantors of safety and benevolent watchers of public space. For example, in a BOPC meeting discussing new RTCC's capabilities, one officer remarked: "by improving the level of comfort our citizens have towards the safety when they visit – when they go out on our streets, they visit the friends, neighbors and families. They feel safer in knowing that this Realtime Crime Center is watching over them and making sure that they are safe" (BOPC 9-22-16, p.46).

Bond Market Carcerality

Beyond its technological features, what was also unique about the adoption of new RTCC technologies and related transformations of the department was how they were financed. As part of the city's exit from bankruptcy in 2014, the bankruptcy court authorized new debt issues to fund post-bankruptcy reinvestment initiatives over the next 10 years.[25] The largest proportion of reinvestment funds would be earmarked for blight remediation, receiving $460 million. This was followed by public safety investment of $430 million, with the majority of funds devoted to policing for civilianization and hiring of new officers, vehicle upgrades, new IT systems, facility upgrades, and new equipment (see Moore Deposition, 2014, p.22). The reinvestment funds would also support the development of a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) and related technologies. Over the next few years, the city would continue to draw on municipal debt, in addition to forfeiture funds, and state and federal grants, to further develop the police

[25] In November of 2014, the bankruptcy court judge accepted the Plan of Adjustment including new issues of $245 million of "Quality of Life Bonds" to kick-start the longer $1.7 billion in post-bankruptcy, reinvestment initiatives projected to save the city $358 million and generate $483 million in future enhanced revenues over ten years (Moore Deposition, 2014, p.2).

department's technological arsenal. In 2018, having spent nearly all of its post-bankruptcy financing, the city tapped into the bond market on its own accord for first time since its Chapter 9 filing to issue new, Unlimited Tax General Obligation (UTGO) bonds worth $255 million backed by future collections of tax revenues (City of Detroit, 2018a, p.12).[26] Funds made available by the issues were leveraged to expand the police department's arsenal of speculative security technologies including surveillance drones, continued expansion of the RTCC and supplemental CCTV cameras, construction of two satellite/precinct RTCCs on the east and west sides of the city, and major upgrades to the city's public safety IT infrastructure (City of Detroit, 2018a).

The trend of leveraging municipal debt to fund additional public safety expenditures above and beyond the police department's regular operating budget continued in subsequent years. Relying on forms of debt-leverage through the bond market to fund new, emergent technologies reflects the unique financial dimensions of speculative security. For the emergency manager and restructuring consultants, investments in technological policing and surveillance were believed to play a crucial role in rebranding the city as a safe and secure place for tourism, commerce, residence, and investment. I argue that efforts by the emergency management team were geared not merely towards satisfying the political and economic interests of the local growth coalition, but a much broader array of financial market actors such as future bondholders and credit-rating agencies seeking secure and stable investments in securitized city futures. The disciplinary forces of the bond market and notions of 'credit worthiness' thus constitute an

[26] The city's Chief Financial Officer believed that Detroit's ability to borrow without the assistance of the state or appointed managers was "the next big step for the junk-rated city to signal it has come full circle from its historic 2013 Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing". It was suggested that not borrowing was "viewed as a sign of weakness by the rating agencies" (City of Detroit, 2018b, p.3). However, since the city was not AAA rated, it would have to pay a "significant spread" above rates that were offered to AAA rated municipalities and the issuance would ultimately raise property tax rates (City of Detroit, 2018b, p.8).

increasingly influential and distinctive feature of late-entrepreneurial securitization that has required local governments to consider wider notions of security and risk and how perceptions of crime and disorder extend into the spaces of finance and markets (Mitchell & Beckett, 2008). Indeed, especially as cities' economies have become increasingly driven by debt (Peck, 2012; Peck & Whiteside, 2016), perceptions of fiscal health and sustainability have become closely intertwined with matters of policing and security (Mitchell & Beckett, 2008).

In this regard, the selection of the Manhattan Institute in collaboration with the Bratton Group to help restructure the police department and formulate a post-bankruptcy blueprint was seen by the emergency manager as an important component of aligning policing strategies with the city's broader economic and financial goals. Placing bets on the notion that improved policing and surveillance could help spark Detroit's resurgence meant subscribing to visions of security that merged zero-tolerance policing and a focus on clamping down on signs of 'disorder' with speculative security technologies enabling new forms of visibility and control over the urban landscape. Camp (2012) refers to the Manhattan Institute as one of the neoliberal think tanks that have engaged in ideological struggle to legitimate revanchist solutions, and are closely aligned with city mayors, police departments, and finance capital. Their involvement in Detroit's restructuring reflects the sometimes subtle, yet significant influence that non-state actors like conservative think tanks and urban consulting firms have in shaping policy outcomes. Detroit was one among several cities that the Bratton Group visited during its consultancy tour to turn around 'troubled' police departments in the early 2010s.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the emergence of Detroit's new security policy in the context of the city's financially-mediated restructuring vis-à-vis emergency management and bankruptcy court

proceedings. It traced the imposition of market-oriented reforms and policies under the auspices of emergency and examined processes of securitization unfolding across the deeply financialized terrain of urban politics. One of the objectives of the chapter was to outline intersections between bond market dynamics and securitization. In doing so, it examined how security came to be viewed as a vital pillar of the city's successful restructuring and how financial forms of reasoning helped rationalize new investments in policing and speculative technologies at a time when other city services and operations were being drastically scaled back. The chapter also aimed to contextualize the city's technological turn in security and related investments that laid the foundation for future expansions of surveillance in the city and that are the subject of the following chapters.

CHAPTER 3: SECURING AN URBAN RENAISSANCE

Introduction

Detroit's emergency management and bankruptcy period not only involved prolific privatization, rolling back of the public sector, and rolling out of new security policy, but also set the stage for new rounds of speculative city-making and "postcrisis experiments in privatized regeneration" (Peck and Whiteside, 2016, p. 264). A major plank of Detroit's economic recovery has been reclaiming the downtown as a safe space for renewed investment, corporate enterprise, tourism, high-end consumption, and residence. Insulated from the vagaries of austerity and fiscal discipline imposed elsewhere in the city, the much-celebrated downtown resurgence has been taken by some as evidence of Detroit's comeback, in effect masking the highly uneven and exclusionary nature of the city's post-bankruptcy recovery (Anderson, 2016b; Jay & Conklin, 2020; Kreichauf, 2017; Moskowitz, 2017).

Moving on from the city's emergency management and bankruptcy period, this chapter focuses on present-day Detroit to explore the contours of the city's selective revival by examining forms of experimental governance at the nexus of development, finance, and security. It examines the powerful public-private coalitions that have contingently aligned to secure Detroit's highly uneven 'renaissance'. The chapter draws on documents and interview material detailing the emergence of novel public-private security and CCTV partnerships that have accompanied attempts to lure new businesses, residents, tourists, and investment to the downtown core. An empirical focal point of the chapter is the development of the downtown's Project Lighthouse program (in many ways, a predecessor to Project Green Light) which was introduced to reduce crime and public disorder and enhance perceptions of safety. My examination of the Lighthouse program provides a lens to examine the intersections between speculative securitization and broader place-making efforts to re-imagine the downtown as a safe

and secure place for business, residence, tourism, and investment. The program is also revealing of how public-private security partnerships have cultivated an institutional and physical space for prototyping and circulating new, speculative security technologies and practices. The chapter concludes by discussing the broader implications of the relationship between speculative security and speculative urbanism. I outline Project Lighthouse's significance as a model for the expansion of CCTV partnerships to the city's neighborhoods, thus laying the groundwork for the Project Green Light initiative.

The 'Comeback' City

There has been a buzzing optimism in the aftermath of Detroit's bankruptcy that is hard to ignore. Media outlets have celebrated Detroit's resurgence as the "greatest turnaround in American history" (see McFarland, 2014) playing out through pockets of new development in the city's downtown and Midtown areas. Few would argue that these areas have transformed dramatically over the last decade. Today, the central business district includes freshly renovated and luxury residential towers, lavish hotels, and a resurgent retail presence that had all but vanished by the 1990s. Though the once barren and derelict streets now boast a livelier presence of young professionals and tourists, there remains a greater hope of luring more suburban consumers and creating new residential densities to nurture a renewed "sidewalk ballet" which Jane Jacobs (1993) considered a crucial indicator of urban vitality. For those visiting the city, there is much on offer including a vibrant art scene, boutique shops, artisanal restaurants, entertainment and sports venues, and a bustling nightlife. In the heart of downtown, Campus Martius hosts a "uniquely" Detroit experience: a "beach oasis" lined with comfortable lounge chairs where patrons can enjoy tropical cocktails or build castles in the sand (DDP, 2024a). And in the colder months, the area around Monroe Street and Cadillac Square transforms into a winter

wonderland, inviting families to enjoy an arctic slide, skating, winter bumper cars, and igloo dining all within walking distance.

Boosters optimistic about the prospects of a development-led recovery will often cite the recent arrival of major tech giants Microsoft and Google to the city, or Ford Motors' construction of a 30-acre "innovation district" in Corktown as part of a renewed commitment to the city and its future as the center for global mobility and autonomous driving (SXSW, 2023). Media outlets that had long dismissed the Motor City as a perilous, post-industrial wasteland now celebrate the tethering of the fate of a once "dying" city to wealthy business magnates who subscribe to the mantra of "do good and do well" (Wayland, 2011). These perceived saviors include corporate place-makers like Dan Gilbert and Mike Ilitch, two hometown heroes who have leveraged their successes in the business world to spark the city's rebirth through ambitious wagers on a downtown revival (Biles & Rose, 2019; Moskowitz, 2017). With slightly different visions of how the city's rebirth will play out, both have converged on a common mission to enhance the city's desirability as a "world-class" tourist destination and place of residence and play for a new, entrepreneurial 'creative class' (Florida, 2012). Nearly all of their investments have concentrated within a redevelopment zone of Greater Downtown Detroit known as the '7.2', a tiny 7.2 square mile sliver of the city's larger 139 square miles of land mass (Doucet, 2017). The hope is that the successes of downtown revitalization efforts will eventually trickle outwards to the city's neighborhoods, but both men have also been quite candid about the simpler imperatives driving their work; notably the lucrative opportunities presented by the downtown's cheap real estate which bottomed out when the city entered bankruptcy (Story, 2019).

Ilitch, who passed away in 2017, built his wealth on the success of the Little Caesar's Pizza chain and has been an ardent advocate for a sports and entertainment-led resurgence (Biles

& Rose, 2019). Through his subsidiary, Olympia Development, he and his family have colonized the 50-block area in northern part of the central business district around Comerica Park and Little Caesar's Arena, popularly referred to as 'District Detroit'.[27] The project, first proposed in the 90s, has been made possible by steady acquisitions of discounted downtown properties and generous public subsidies, tax abatements, and land giveaways worth millions (Biles & Rose, 2019; Perkins, 2018; Singer & Taylor, 2023). In 2013, shortly after the city declared bankruptcy, the Ilitch family announced their intentions to build the Little Caesar's Arena and invest millions more to develop several adjacent mixed-used neighborhoods, parks, and commercial spaces (Grish, 2020). They would end up securing $324 million in public tax dollars to fund the $863 million construction costs associated with the arena, but much of the other promised development did not materialize. The latest proposed vision for District Detroit supported by an incentive package estimated at $1.8 billion (among the largest for any redevelopment project) is promised to bring in new jobs, infrastructure upgrades, and a tax base increase (Barrett, 2023a; Perkins, 2023). Proponents have defended the proposal and its generous incentives, arguing that the city's general fund revenues will be untouched and that the city is not legally entitled to downtown's tax captured dollars. This is due to state laws established in the 1970s meant to spur public and private investment in downtowns enabling "Downtown Development Authorities" to capture increases in property tax revenues through tax increment financing (TIF).

The use of TIFs to make wagers on future development has been at the center of downtown Detroit's rapid, financialized growth. Emerging first in the 1950s, the use of TIFs has grown considerably since the 1990s (Pacewicz, 2016; Weber, 2002; 2010). These financing

[27] The Illitch family has drawn considerable ire for their development practices including intentionally allowing adjacent parcels to deteriorate and become blighted in order to drive down prices, a strategy that critics have called "dereliction by design" (Perkins, 2017). They have also gained a reputation for making grand promises for large developments and securing public subsidies, while not fully delivering on the promises for redevelopment and maintaining large portions of their land as surface parking lots (Grish, 2020).

tools, which are a type of municipal bond, enable the borrowing of funds against future, expected increases in tax revenue to finance upfront (re)development costs and developer subsidies in designated TIF districts (Davidson & Ward, 2014; Weber 2002; 2010). As property values and associated property taxes increase, the original debt can be paid down gradually. TIF proponents suggest that tax captures enabled through TIFs can offset the rising and exorbitant costs of property acquisition, site remediation, and construction, and encourage new development activity that would not otherwise occur. Critics, however, argue that tax captures ensure that much of the fiscal benefits of new development will be retained in downtown, diverting funds that would otherwise fund things like Detroit's libraries and public schools (Citizen's Research Council of Michigan, 2024; Mondry, 2022; Perkins, 2023). When city council inquired in 2024 about the city's plentiful use of tax incentives and entertained the question of whether it was time to dissolve the Downtown Development Authority, a city-commissioned report found that high taxes and development costs made it difficult to stop using tax inducements to incentivize new development (Barrett, 2024; City of Detroit, 2024b). Moreover, it was estimated that the $571 million in outstanding bonds accrued by the authority mostly used to support the development of Little Caesar's Arena could take at least until 2053 to pay off through future tax captures on new growth.

Dan Gilbert has leveraged similar financing mechanisms and tax breaks to build his rapidly expanding property empire such as those enabled by "Transformative Brownfield" bills (Marini, 2022; Pinho, 2018). Around the time of the city's bankruptcy, Gilbert made his largest wager on the city's future spending nearly half a billion dollars to acquire properties at fire sale prices and committing several billions more in renovations (Biles & Rose, 2019). A few years prior, he made the decision to relocate his mortgage business empire, Quicken Loans, to

downtown from the suburbs and incentivized his employees to abandon their daily commutes for life in the rapidly transforming and "cool urban core" (Falk, 2012). His vision for "Detroit 2.0" sees the downtown as a hub for venture-backed tech startups, and a range of urban amenities and experiences to court young entrepreneurial talent (Opportunity Detroit, 2013a; 2013b). Gilbert's portfolio has grown to 130 downtown properties (Putzier, 2024), including a yet-to-be-completed skyscraper on the former site of the iconic Hudson's Department store, the commercial successes of which paralleled Detroit's historical arc of industrial boom and bust. At the ceremonial ground-breaking of the new $900 million project in 2017, Gilbert mourned the loss of the former commercial giant: "When we lost Hudson's, it symbolized how far we had fallen" (Moutzalias, 2018). The lament, however, was offered in anticipation of a new urban identity in the making, forged through processes of creative destruction and corporate place-making and seeking to anoint the new Hudson's site development as a symbol for Detroit's future. One of several Bedrock developments claimed to generate thousands of new jobs and millions in new tax revenue in the coming years (Witsil, Tompor, & Reindl, 2017), its 58-storey tower is poised to rival the height and dominance of another iconic artefact: the Renaissance Center, which for several decades towered over the city, embodying the hopes of resurgence from a previous era (Desiderio, 2009; Georgakas & Surkin, 2012[1975]; Martelle, 2012).

Securing the "BIZ" and Downtown Detroit through Privatized Governance

Corporate place-makers have evidently assumed considerable influence over the trajectory of downtown development. Critical scholars suggest that Chapter 9 bankruptcy was pivotal for remaking Detroit on corporate terms, such as Howell and Feldman (2017, p.212) who argue that the city's bankruptcy filing: "became the means to displace African-American political power, attack unions, and shift city assets into private hands… to develop a whiter,

wealthier Downtown core, surrounded by darker, poorer neighborhoods". These rapid changes have led to the displacement of long-term residents and Black business owners from downtown spaces (Azikiwe, 2013; Mah, 2021) and an influx of a disproportionately white and more affluent demographic, wooed by rental subsidies and forgivable loans (Biles & Rose, 2019; Doucet & Smit, 2016; Hackworth, 2014; Kreichauf, 2017; Reese, Eckert, Sands, & Vojnovic, 2017). Others similarly suggest that emergency management and bankruptcy provided a moment of intense governmental intervention and a "Stage 0", helping to pave the way for corporate-led redevelopment and gentrification in the city's downtown, Midtown, and Corktown areas (Moskowitz, 2017, p.7).

Part of the story of consolidated private power and authority in Detroit's downtown lies in an large architecture of public-private partnerships, 'special districts', 'special authorities', and other 'special-purpose' governments that have adopted growing responsibilities for planning and managing city space and life (see Eisinger, 2021; Judd, McKenzie, & Alexander, 2021). Partially a reflection of the further "rationalization" of city government and the idea that development decisions are best made by the private sector, nearly all planning and governance of Greater Downtown has been ceded to private, corporate interests and visions under the auspices of these privatized and fragmented forms of governance (Biles & Rose, 2019; Doucet & Smit, 2016). Sometimes described as 'shadow governments' (see Judd, McKenzie, & Alexander, 2021)[28], they exist beyond direct democratic control and oversight, with policy decisions typically made by unelected boards representing a coalition of public and private interests.

[28] Shadow governments depict an evolving institutional structure of quasi-public and wholly privatized entities that are increasingly carrying out roles traditionally assumed by public governments such as local planning, infrastructure development, service provision, and policing and regulation (de Magalhães, 2010; Judd, McKenzie, & Alexander, 2021; Murray, 2017). By no means new, some argue that they have increasingly become financalized (Kirkpatrick & Smith 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2016).

One example is the above-mentioned Downtown Development Authority which, while in existence for several decades, has been a key player in post-bankruptcy efforts to spur downtown development. Retaining the ability to issue tax-exempt municipal bonds like TIFs through its independent bonding authority, the development authority has enabled speculation in development in ways not encumbered by constitutional debt limitations or the need for citizen approval (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011). In effect, the use of the development authority has helped insulate speculative development projects in the Detroit's downtown from democratic challenge and the larger landscape of austerity that have fiscally disciplined other parts of the city. Another example is the Business Improvement Zone (BIZ). Established in Detroit's downtown area in 2014 as a special assessment district, the BIZ is responsible for promoting business and property interests and administering services related to sanitation, beautification, marketing, and security funded by levies on property owners[29]. Funded by levies on properties within its boundaries, it is managed by the Downtown Detroit Partnership, a public-private partnership which was formally established in 2005 to represent downtown's corporate and propertied interests and serve as the promotional wing of the downtown renaissance.[30]

Safety and security have become key preoccupations of the Downtown Detroit Partnerships's place-making efforts reflected, for example, in branding campaigns aimed at changing perceptions about the downtown to attract otherwise hesitant visitors (DDP, 2024b).

[29] The BIZ operates much like a business improvement district (BID), but differs slightly under Michigan Public Act (PA) 120 of 1961 such that a BIZ is created by private property owners whereas a BID is created by a municipality. Similar to business improvement districts (BIDs), The BIZ represents a form of privatized governance that has been likened to "private, self-taxing, urban micro-states" (Parenti, 1999, p.96) intent on maintaining good business climates, delivering "urban liveability" (Ward, 2007, p.665), and cultivating risk-free zones of commerce and consumption in revitalizing downtowns and other strategic growth areas (Lippert & Sleiman, 2012; Marquardt & Füller, 2012).

[30] Although the partnership was officially announced in 2005 as a merger of the Greater Downtown Partnership and Detroit Downtown Inc., its history lies in a longer lineage of business interest groups dating back to the formation of the Business Property Association in 1922 by J.L. Hudson and other business leaders (DDP, 2022). Today, the DDP reports to an executive committee and board comprising several of the city's major corporate interests, private equity firms, real estate developers, private foundations, and civic leaders (DDP, 2022).

Through the **“**Safety and Security Committee”, the Downtown Detroit Partnership gathers security representatives from more than 30 downtown businesses and non-profit entities and local and regional law enforcement agencies to collaborate on local security planning. The group meets several times a month to discuss pressing security issues, analyze crime trends using crime-mapping and CompStat data, coordinate patrols across different security districts, share information and technology, and plan the downtown’s security in advance of major events (Cwiek, 2011; DDP, 2022; Kaffer, 2015; Welch, 2013). On any given day, an assemblage of public, quasi-public (or ‘hybrid’), and private actors can be seen jointly patrolling the downtown core. For example, Detroit’s downtown areas enjoy a strong presence of DPD officers including those from the Central District who conduct foot patrols in the downtown’s busier parks and who join downtown residents on neighborhood walks to “take back” their neighborhoods (see BOPC 03-14-2013, p.9). Downtown police presence is also enhanced through secondary employment where DPD officers moonlight as security guards (see Lippert & Walby, 2019), carrying out proactive patrols, safeguarding commercial establishments, and supporting large events. Downtown Ambassadors supplement their primary roles of keeping the downtown streets clean and welcoming by serving as an additional set of ‘eyes and ears’ for the BIZ (DDP, 2022). They relay potential physical security threats and ‘quality of life’ concerns, as well as more general information pertinent to the district’s operation and maintenance, conveyance of ‘clean and safe’ aesthetics, and optimization of the consumptive possibilities of its patrons (see Lippert, 2012; Lippert & Sleiman, 2012). Hundreds of private security guards employed by some of the larger corporate and non-profit entities headquartered in the core provide an additional layer of security presence, including Gilbert’s expansive private security force that patrols the BIZ twenty four hours, seven days a week.

Natural surveillance of security personnel on the ground is complemented by thousands of CCTV cameras that form a latticework of 'friendly eyes in the sky' (see Norris, Moran, & Armstrong, 1998, p.15). Presented as benevolent purveyors of the public realm, many cameras are privately owned and operated, feeding into numerous corporate command centers dispersed across various private property holdings. As part of information sharing agreements, the feeds are also relayed to the city's RTCC and are shared with a number of state and federal law enforcement agencies. Gilbert's own Rock security force monitors the streets from its primary, state-of-the-art command center housed in the 'Qube' (formerly Chase Tower). The center is staffed by security operations analysts who share video intelligence, conduct threat assessments and risk analyses, assist with ongoing investigations and incidents, and gather records and information that have "potential to threaten Rock Ventures personnel, physical assets, image or reputation or that of other stakeholders" (Salary.com, 2020). Much like the DPD's RTCC, Gilbert's command center has attained a technological sophistication at the cutting edge, but is not subject to the types of civilian oversight or requirements for privacy safeguards typically imposed on local police departments. With the assistance of private security vendors, the company's corporate security executives have enjoyed a freedom to prototype the latest technologies and software, enabling real-time monitoring of the thousands of cameras and urban sensors (e.g., automated license plate readers, intrusion detection, access control, infrared cameras) that blanket the downtown and protect Gilbert's property holdings (Bedrock, 2018).

The Ilitch family's security personnel author a similarly expansive gaze from command centers housed in the Little Caesars arena, Comerica Park, and the FOX theater. In 2018, it was revealed that Ilitch Holdings Inc. contracted with Motorola Solutions and its subsidiary Avigilon to install a "complete security solution" outfitted with 1,600 cameras powered by video analytics

software, real-time monitoring capabilities, and facial recognition (Avigilon, 2018; Kaffer, 2019). That year, District Detroit earned an award for best security design that incorporated cutting-edge technology and adherence to the Department of Homeland Security's strict security standards that helped Little Caesars Arena become the first arena to receive SAFETY Act Certification[31]- a designation that represented the highest level of anti-terrorism protection for sporting venues under legislation passed by congress in the aftermath of 9/11 (Lasky, 2018). In developing the district's security arrangements, security consultants helped bring various security vendors together to design a fully interoperable system including vendors specializing in intrusion detection, infrared illumination, and biometric and face recognition. Consultants sought a holistic design that provided "100 percent video surveillance coverage of the patrons" across the district while combining high-tech solutions and novel iterations of traditional security measures such as "Vapor Wake (VWK9)" surveillance dogs specially trained to detect body-worn explosives (Lasky, 2018). The overarching strategy was to develop a forward-looking and constantly evolving security design to address "tomorrow's threats", requiring an anticipatory speculation about the various known and unknown vulnerabilities and dangers that permeate the urban landscape. As one of Ilitch's corporate security representatives explained "… bad guys are always thinking of different ways to hit you… The Safety Act actually requires you to look at the changing landscape and to continuously improve" (Lasky, 2018).

Improving perceptions of safety has been on the minds of the city's philanthropic community as well. The Hudson-Webber Foundation, a philanthropic vestige of the Hudson retail empire, has been a major funder of Midtown's resurgence and has played an active role in

[31] The SAFETY Act signed into law in 2002 aims to incentivize the development, commercialization, and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by offering liability protection to technology manufacturers against claims for damage resulting from acts of terrorism (SAFETY Act, 2002). The act was passed due to concerns that liability would hinder the development of new and innovative security technologies.

ensuring the security of what the CEO sees as the city's "cultural capital" (Hudson-Webber Foundation, 2013, Kozlowski, 2016).[32] With leadership well-versed in policing matters, the foundation has funded a number of crime prevention and security initiatives in the area including bi-weekly, Midtown CompStat meetings where local law enforcement agencies, private security groups, and residents come together to identify hotspots and discuss data-driven crime prevention strategies (Kozlowski, 2016). Midtown is also served by the Wayne State University Police Department, which has been certified to perform the same functions as sworn DPD officers (Dickson, 2017a). In terms of patrol, the University's police force has taken responsibility for more than half of calls for service in the Midtown area with a reported 90 second response time and expanded patrol where nearly 80% of patrol areas are located outside university boundaries (Archambault, 2016; Dickson, 2017b). As for CCTV coverage, the university police force maintains over 850 cameras that are monitored in real-time, and in 2013 announced intentions to implement facial recognition technology (Burns, 2013d).

Though my interviews focused primarily on the Project Green Light partnership introduced in the city's neighborhoods, I spoke to one respondent who was familiar with some of the security arrangements and partnerships in Detroit's downtown areas and which he described as a major catalyst for the downtown's transformation. He mentioned several collaborations cultivated through neighbourhood councils:

> [T]hose meetings that happen every few weeks, the police are part of those meetings. So you've also got a real ongoing dialogue between business owners and community partners and the police department over what's working, what's not working, what can we change, how do we do it together? … I think that community, business, and organizations like the police and city government working together create a much more cohesive, unified approach than either one operating on its own. And I think that

[32] The Hudson-Webber Foundation is one of several organizations that makeup the New Economic Initiative, a consortium of local and national foundations including the philanthropic arms of major industrial and commercial titans that have made considerable investments in the city, especially in the downtown area, since 2007 (Whyte, 2014).

> programs like this are extremely effective because its people with diverse interests coming together to create a better outcome, a safer environment. (DT01)

The interviewee also described the various entities working in concert to enhance emergency response:

> When you talk about the broader Rocket, Rock, BedRock family of companies and businesses, they have their own security division and they absolutely work with the City of Detroit police department and Homeland Security depending on huge events like the fireworks… [T]hey're working together to try and make high density, high attendance areas safe and so they're using cameras both on buildings and traffic cameras to try and ensure that the potential for an incident is minimized if not avoided, and that when something starts, there's an opportunity to respond quickly and try to provide the best resources available… those partnerships are great because they do enhance safety and they ensure when something unfortunate happens, there is a very swift and cohesive response. (DT01)

One of the benefits to downtown patrons has been quick and effective response: "There's no question the response time is faster. And again, not only is it a faster response, but the right types of units are responding in the right way" (DT01).

These various collaborations between a diverse patchwork of security actors are seen as contributing to Downtown's and Midtown's reputations for being the safest areas of the city (Archambault, 2016). During our conversation, the respondent described downtown's dramatic transformation in recent years:

> I never avoided going downtown, but it's a different city. People that either grew up in and around Detroit or people that had only visited once and hadn't been here in six, seven years, forget ten or twelve, it is night and day. It is completely, completely different. There is so much new development, so much more activity, so much more vibrancy, there are more people out, there are more small businesses and residences that have opened or been renovated. So the amount of blight, the amount of unsavoury elements on the average is down tremendously, but add to the fact that there's just more for people to do... there's safety in numbers and there's safety in activity. (DT01)

He further noted:

> The way that you attract businesses and residents and frankly people that are coming to dine and drink and go to entertainment venues is not just by giving them a good experience, but you have to help them feel safe and secure. People aren't going to go somewhere if they're not going to feel safe. (DT01)

As his comments suggest, it is the *feeling* and *perception* of safety that has been deemed vitally important to luring new businesses, residents, visitors, and investment to the city center; a feeling that is ultimately difficult to define but trades on common wisdoms of neoliberal place-branding that include assuaging fears of victimization and addressing loosely defined notions of 'quality of life'[33] (Coleman, 2004). In practice, the focus has been on promoting the safe passage of certain advantaged groups, while permitting the targeted surveillance and removal of 'risky' others believed to threaten local growth aspirations.[34]

Project Lighthouse: Linking Private and Public Surveillance

As evidenced thus far, public-private partnerships have figured centrally in Detroit's downtown renaissance, helping to coordinate strategies of place-branding, redevelopment, and security. Security-specific partnerships have played a key role in negotiating complex divisions of labour for patrol, surveillance, and security intelligence responsibilities and have served as a vital conduit for prototyping new surveillance technologies and practices. The Lighthouse Private Sector Security Initiative (herein 'Project Lighthouse') reflects the formalization of these longer-running, public-private security and surveillance partnerships that have evolved alongside efforts to regenerate the downtown core. Initially developed as a 'corporate neighborhood watch' program for the central business district, Project Lighthouse is a data sharing and partnership agreement between public law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and private sector partners

[33] Coleman (2004, p.81) argues that the notion of 'quality of life' is a key discursive device deployed in place-marketing initiative to build popular legitimacy for neoliberal statecraft and city building insofar as it enables the "development of crime prevention projects which are not necessarily directed at 'crime' in the legal sense of the word". Vitale suggests 'quality of life' has come to mean more than a set of policies; the terminology encapsulates a way of thinking about urban social problems that attributes neighborhood decline to the presence of visible disorder, focused on individualized moral failure rather than structural factors (Vitale, 2008, p.3).

[34] Take for example, dispersal tactics that have involved steep fines and the threat of jail time for panhandling as well as the controversial practices of taking unhoused individuals for a "ride" away from downtown areas to remote neighborhoods (ACLU of Michigan, 2013). Other efforts emphasizing outreach and shelter placements rather than forms of banishment have given the perception of a more humane approach to the management of marginality in the downtown core (DDP, 2022).

located in the Greater Downtown (Project Lighthouse MOU, 2015). The program seeks to improve coordination and combine intelligence-gathering efforts to enable communication between participating entities[35] in real time for rapid response to incidents: "Project Lighthouse can mobilize 300-500 public and private officers as needed by tapping into the private security forces of more than 30 corporations and non-profits in the area stretching from downtown to the riverfront and Midtown" (Welch, 2013). As part of the agreement, private sector partners volunteer to share information including feeds from thousands of private CCTV cameras dispersed across the downtown with public law enforcement agencies including the DPD and state and regional fusion centers. The more public-facing aspect of Project Lighthouse has been built around the idea of establishing a network of 'safe havens' for downtown patrons, which are described by the Downtown Detroit Partnership as providing:

> shelter, aid, safety, information and potential lodging for those in temporary need of assistance. Each participating business, known as a Lighthouse, has security personnel available 24 hours a day, seven days a week to assist those in need. With a simple phone call… help will be provided to anyone who is lost, separated from friends, having vehicle trouble or has other safety concerns. In addition, any business displaying a Project Lighthouse banner is considered a safe haven. Project Lighthouse is available to augment, not replace, 9-1-1. (DDP, 2021)

Map of Project Lighthouse Locations (Open Data Portal, 2024)

[35] The initial partnership included 20 participating locations including: Atheneum Hotel, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Comerica Park, Compuware headquarters, Detroit Athletic Club, Detroit Medical Center, Detroit Opera House, Detroit Police Headquarters, Detroit Riverfront Conservancy, DTE Energy, Ford Field, Fox Theatre, the Renaissance Center, Greektown Casino-Hotel, Hilton Garden Inn, Joe Louis Arena, Marriott Courtyard, MGM Grand Detroit, MotorCity Casino Hotel, Wayne County Sheriff locations, and Westin Book-Cadillac.

At the inaugural launch of the program in 2011 held at the General Motors headquarters in the Renaissance Center, the CEO of General Motors made opening remarks about new beginnings for the city:

> As you know, the Renaissance Center is one of Detroit's iconic symbols. Recent times have been tough for the city. Yet today, the new lights on the top of our building not only signify a new General Motors, they are helping to light the way for what we believe is the revitalization of Detroit. (DPD, 2011)

Citing the Renaissance Center's nearly full occupancy rate, daily foot traffic, and events at the Riverwalk and around the city as a testament to his belief that Detroit was returning to "its former vibrancy", he went on to recognize several individuals who developed the initial concept for Project Lighthouse including his own security director and a corporate security executive representing Ilitch's Olympia Development. Then-police chief Godbee took the microphone next, describing the program in more detail:

> We have the ability to leverage public-private partnerships in a way that I don't think has been done in the United States of America and maybe in the world… we have eyes and ears that blanket the downtown area so that we're leveraging our resources, we're speaking the same language, talking at the same time, and leveraging a tremendous amount of camera resources. (DPD, 2011)

A key factor that helped the program come to fruition was the already extensive, CCTV network built and maintained by the private sector and local businesses and corporations that agreed to front the costs of Project Lighthouse at no additional cost to the City. As Chief Godbee acknowledged, "To be quite frank, if the Detroit Police Department had to build an infrastructure of this nature simply to use for law enforcement purposes, we would not have the resources to do so" (DPD, 2011). The Chief also applauded the persistence of corporate security leaders who advocated for the program: "[T]hey have been tenacious and they have continued to push this agenda until somebody listens" and suggested it was a model that could be replicated across the city.

Following the Chief's remarks, a corporate security executive from Ilitch's Olympia Development presented a more detailed narrative of Project Lighthouse's earlier origins: "Project Lighthouse began with initial discussions in the Fall of 2004, when a large group of public and private sector representatives began discussing the need for the establishment of a fusion center in the City of Detroit". He explained that funding from the Department of Homeland Security including Buffer Zone protection grants,[36] "brought a variety of resources including technical services, advisors, various enhancements to the facility structures of the various players and most importantly moved the group forward to develop new ideas and initiatives" to prepare for major sporting events,

> … planning, for example, for the 2005 Major League Baseball All-Star Game focused on the need to develop the camera project where CCTV images in the public areas would be shared with various intelligence centers during the event. This need was expanded during Super Bowl 2006 where approximately 14 private-sector entities came together, shared CCTV video for 5 different federal, state, and local law enforcement intelligence centers. (DPD, 2011)

[36] The Buffer Zone Protection Program was a program established by the Department of Homeland Security to provide targeted funding to local jurisdictions to purchase technology and equipment to protect the outside perimeter of critical infrastructure and key resource sites from terrorism (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007).

The 2005 All-Star Game and 2006 Super Bowl[37] would end up serving as catalysts for new development projects in the downtown core. Though the sporting events would lasted only a few days, their preparation involved years of security-driven planning combined with revitalization and beautification projects to "show Detroit in a different light" to the hundreds of thousands that would be visiting the city (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010; Maynard, 2006).

In the years following its formal launch in 2011, Project Lighthouse continued to enrol new private sector partners and served as a key pillar of the downtown revitalization strategy (DDP, 2024c; Hour Detroit, 2012). During city's bankruptcy, Project Lighthouse took on a renewed significance as various public, private, and non-profit stakeholders (re)aligned around the idea that a vibrant downtown was the crucial backbone of the city's economic recovery. The DPD, under the new leadership of Chief Craig, also took a more active role in leveraging partnerships with downtown business interests and the vast private CCTV networks which they managed. One key objectives of the police department was to eventually integrate all public and private CCTV feeds and sensor infrastructures located in the downtown area into the city's RTCC that was, at the time, still under construction. The police department would also tap into the expertise and knowledge of private sector partners who had already experimented with real-time surveillance technologies in their own command centers. In a bid to garner additional funding for the development of the city's RTCC infrastructure, the DPD applied for numerous grants including the Technology Innovation for Public Safety (TIPS) grant. The grant encouraged the implementation of innovative technology and data-driven strategies and projects

[37] Deploying speculative technologies to securitize the downtown has continued as a common practice. In 2022, the city signed a four-year contract to test ten AI-based Evolv weapons detection systems with $1.4 million in bond funds (Rahal, 2022). Resembling metal detectors, the screening systems were used to create mobile security checkpoints in downtown, and could be requested at block parties at no extra charge to residents (Rahal, 2022). Although the technology was been found to have problems with accuracy (Polansky, 2023), the city expanded its use of the technology, deploying 60 Evolv systems for the 2024 NFL Draft (Rahal, 2024; Smith, 2022).

to address “precipitous increases in crime” that could be replicated in other jurisdictions (U.S. Department of Justice, 2018). In its grant application, the DPD highlighted the potential for enhancing information sharing capabilities of the RTCC to address larcenies from motor vehicles (LMVs) in Detroit’s “most thriving commercial and entertainment districts” of Downtown and Midtown (TIPS Narrative, 2015, p.1). The DPD argued that: “Unless addressed, LMVs will forestall Detroit’s resurgence” (TIPS Narrative, 2015, p.1) and outlined potential cost-savings from leveraging existing camera and sensor infrastructures maintained by public and private entities:

> The RTCC will receive feeds from sensor tools such as camera feeds, license plate recognition and gunshot detection - allowing early detection of incidents, crowd information and monitoring of special events. It will save millions of dollars in capital expenditures by leveraging existing camera and other sensor infrastructure that is in place and maintained through various public and private entities in the City. In addition to these data sources, Detroit's RTCC will include proactive monitoring of social media sites, surveillance footage and homeland security intelligence. (TIPS Narrative, 2015, p.3)

It also noted private sector partners’ existing deployment and familiarity with real-time security technologies, which would play a critical role in assisting with the police department’s own RTCC development:

> Discussions are underway with potential vendors regarding donations of software and hardware to support the RTCC’s development. DPD’s private sector partners already have the technology in place to support the RTCC’s efforts and share data, which makes this project much more cost effective than if DPD were to take it on alone. DPD’s private sector partners have the equipment and deep technical knowledge needed to play a critical role in implementing this proposed project. (TIPS Narrative, 2015, p.6)

Positioning the proposed data-sharing solution as a “national model for sharing information between law enforcement agencies and private sector security”, the DPD also suggested that their strategy “could provide a replicable model for agencies that serve fewer than 100,000 residents” (TIPS Narrative, 2015, p.5).

The formalization of downtown security partnerships through the Project Lighthouse program has several implications for understanding the speculative dynamics of contemporary securitization in cities. First, the examples provided above demonstrate that the increasingly privatized nature of Detroit's downtown spaces and governance has served as an urban laboratory for prototyping speculative surveillance technologies and practices. In the case of downtown Detroit, public-private partnerships have provided an institutional space for technological experimentation that has intensified in the post-9/11 era as urban planning and management have become increasingly permeated with the need to build 'resilience' and insulate strategic city spaces from the ever present, but not fully knowable, threats of terrorism (Ball & Webster, 2003; Coaffee & Murakami Wood, 2006; Cowen & Bunce, 2006; Maguire & Fussey, 2016; Reese, 2009; Schimmel, 2011; Shelby et al., 2020). And as federal funds have flooded large cities to bolster emergency preparedness and intelligence fusion (McQuade, 2019; Mohahan & Palmer, 2009), they are also being reproduced as sites of experimentation and marketing of new, transferable security innovations and practices (Boyle & Haggerty, 2018; Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010; McCann & Ward, 2013). Interestingly, much of this anticipatory experimentation with emergent and speculative security technologies in Detroit's downtown has been led by corporate place-makers', frequently as part of efforts to satisfy rigorous security standards of major league sports and the Department of Homeland Security and in preparation for 'mega' sporting and other events. The 'legacies' or vestiges of this security build-up have not only been used to pre-empt catastrophic events, but have also become attuned more mundane criminal threats[38] and forms of disorder believed to undermine revitalization efforts (Coaffee, et al., 2011; Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010).

[38] For the shift of intelligence-gathering and fusion from a focus on domestic counter-terrorism to the regulation of street crime via the "all-crime, all hazards" approach, see Regan and Monahan (2013) and Rollins (2008).

Second, Detroit's downtown public-private partnerships have played a central role in both stewarding development and coordinating attendant security arrangements as part of broader efforts to enhance the legibility of and assert greater control over new city spaces. These partnerships have provided a means to coordinate an increasingly "pluralized" assemblage of "private", "public", and "quasi-public" actors (Bayley & Shearing, 1996; Brodeur, 2010; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 2002; Loader, 2000) that share responsibilities for patrolling and surveilling downtown space partitioned into distinct security zones (see Graham, 2010; Németh & Hollander, 2010; Wiig, 2018). Thus, the downtown's speculative securitization has involved complex divisions of labor which often remain opaque to the lay public and involve dispersed responsibilities for intelligence gathering and analysis carried out by private security intelligence networks (Lippert & O'Connor, 2006, p.51; see also Dupont, 2004). Take for example the various corporate command centers and corporate security forces that routinely conduct social media surveillance or one of the DPD's "external partners" staffed by former law enforcement which uses big data analytics platforms like Datameer to help identify human and crime relationships and vet large events taking place downtown (Nicholson, 2014)[39]. Forms of data gathering, mining, and automated analysis of large, publicly and privately consolidated databases reflect the diversity of increasingly invasive forms of 'dataveillance' (see Clarke, 1988) that are converging in the hopes of identifying and pre-empting future risks and threats before they materialize. Other than sporadic media coverage or press releases from security vendors, the fine details of the types of surveillance technologies and territorialized security practices deployed by corporate entities is shrouded in secrecy and is not subject to the types of public oversight or accountability traditionally required for public police departments. For example in the U.S., the private use of facial recognition and other contentious biometric

[39] See also BOPC 07-20-2017, p.25 for explanation of how the Detroit Crime Commission helps vet large events.

technologies in public spaces is relatively unregulated and the constitutional right to privacy with private companies is largely absent (for example, see Rowe, 2020). Blurred lines of authority and control over downtown's decreasingly public spaces have been occasionally demonstrated, for example, by instances where private security and surveillance has been used to undermine freedom of movement and expression. In one case, demonstrators opposing the city's bankruptcy proceedings in 2014 were surveilled and removed from the downtown's Campus Martius park by private security (Burns, 2015a). In a lawsuit filed against a subsidiary of the Downtown Detroit Partnership that managed the park (*Moratorium Now! v. Detroit 300 Conservancy, 2015*), the ACLU alleged that Rock security had snooped on activists' social media accounts and provided information to the security firm that helped remove demonstrators from the space. An ACLU representative said: "with a growing number of city assets being overseen through public-private partnerships, citizens cannot allow public spaces to be converted into Constitution-free zones." (ACLU of Michigan, 2015). Undeterred by ACLU's challenge, the subsidiary installed an additional 2000 cameras throughout the park in late 2017, many of them in discrete locations (Brody, 2019). Acknowledging the potential discomfort that came with being watched, Downtown Detroit Partnership's leadership firmly stated that there is no right to privacy in public spaces (Guillen, 2017).

Third, public-private security partnerships have served as a conduit for the diffusion of speculative security technologies, infrastructures, knowledges, and practices from the private to public sector. They have enabled local police departments to leverage and integrate privately funded and maintained surveillance infrastructures including CCTV cameras and urban sensor infrastructures into their own operations and technological infrastructures. Though Memorandums of Understanding lay out some of the terms of data sharing agreements between

public and private entities, there is no explicit mention of the types of technologies and urban sensor infrastructures being used by private security partners to collect this data and which are then integrated with networked surveillance infrastructures managed by public police. The integration of these private surveillance infrastructures raises important questions about accountability, since private entities are not subject to forms of oversight or transparency that regulate public police departments. Thus, public-private partnerships have the capacity to operate as a backdoor for the integration of privately-maintained, speculative and potentially controversial technologies into publicly-operated surveillance infrastructures without much public deliberation or even public awareness. Furthermore, partnerships have allowed public police to draw on local, private sector knowledge, expertise, and relatively uninhibited experiments with cutting-edge and speculative surveillance technologies, thus informing their own data-driven and intelligence-led strategies. A case in point is the DPD's RTCC infrastructure. While the DPD toured police departments in other cities to identify aspects of their technological policing strategies they wanted to implement in Detroit (NPSP, 2021), many lessons were drawn directly from the private experiments in surveillance undertaken by Detroit's own corporate business community. The development of the DPD's RTCC infrastructure, then, should be viewed as a collaborative and iterative process of procuring, piloting, circulating, and linking otherwise disparate and disconnected technologies that began long before the actual RTCC was formally established. Indeed, one report claimed that the DPD's accumulation of RTCC technologies "can be traced back as far as 2002, though agency officials said that they didn't realize they were putting in pieces for what would ultimately become the RTCC" (Brooks, 2018, p.16). Further demonstrating the speculative forms of experimental improvisation (see Aradau, 2022) is the observation that, before establishing the city's main RTCC, the DPD

deployed a temporary site to "test the need and value of the centre" (Brooks, 2018, p.16). In other words, the need for, and potential value of, speculative technologies need not be pre-determined, but are instead realized through the continuous process of prototyping and trial and error (Jaffe & Pilo, 2023). Such forms of technological experimentation, when conducted without scientific or ethical protocol (see Aradau, 2022), raise important questions. These include questions not only about claims of efficacy by end users and vendors, but also about potential, risks and harms associated with the experimental deployment and not all too uncommon failures of surveillance and biometric technologies (see Jacobsen, 2015; Magnet, 2011). It is the arrangements and practices through which speculative technologies are constituted, deployed, and iterated that require as much, if not more, consideration as the technologies themselves.

Securing the 'New Detroit'

In addition to providing insights into shifting forms or modes of securitization, Project Lighthouse also reveals the critical links between processes of speculative securitization and speculative urbanism as embodied in local revitalization agendas. As a key plank of the corporate remaking of the city, security partnerships reflected in programs like Project Lighthouse have been at the center of efforts to promote the downtown core as a secure and sequestered zone of new corporate enterprise, residence, tourism, flagship development, and speculative investment. While these objectives have long been the entrenched in urban entrepreneurialism, they are being pursued within a more deeply financialized operating environment (Fainstein, 2016; Peck and Whiteside, 2016). The growing use of TIFs, which introduce new pressures to maintain continual increases in property values and tax revenues to ensure that bonds reach maturity, are closely linked to securitization efforts aiming to safeguard

real estate investments and new development. Speculative security thus reflects a form of security governance oriented towards cultivating protected zones of speculative (re)development and unfettered speculation in land, property, infrastructure, and municipal debt (Aalbers, 2019; Chu and He, 2022; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Story, 2019) alongside more long-standing entrepreneurial concerns of safeguarding corporate enterprise, commerce, consumption, and local tourism (Sorkin, 1992; Zukin, 1991). Thus, assurances of security are made not only to satisfy the desires and demands of local growth coalitions, but also distant, financial market actors including bondholders and rating agencies seeking stable financial returns from securitized city futures (Mitchell & Beckett, 2008).

Beyond a uniquely financial logic, initiatives such as Project Lighthouse have also unfolded in distinctly spatial terms, as forms of social sorting through intensified surveillance and security arrangements have helped to maintain Detroit's downtown as a securitized and privatized 'citadel', increasingly separated from the rest of the city (Marcuse, 1997).[40] While corporate place-makers have enjoyed generous public subsidies and land giveaways to develop the downtown core, many of the city's majority-Black and brown neighborhoods have borne the full brunt of neoliberal retrenchment, outsourcing, privatization, and urban triage amplified during the emergency management period. This enclave development has many historical parallels in the city of Detroit, not least in successive attempts by liberal elites to revitalize the city center after the urban uprisings of 1967 (Georgakas & Surkin, 2012[1975]; Jay & Conklin, 2020; Neill, 1995). Not dissimilar to today, attempts to reinvigorate the city's image were crafted through public-private partnerships such as the Detroit Renaissance, Inc. and New Detroit, Inc., which allowed the downtown to be shaped in accordance with corporatized and commercial

[40] In Marcuse's interpretation, the citadel was, by its very nature, exclusionary and self-sufficient: "places where their residents can live isolated and protected from the outside world… in which all their needs are provided internally in the spaces in which they are concentrated" (Marcuse, 1997, p.319, see also Mele, 2016).

interests and visions (Georgakas & Surkin, 2012[1975]; Jay & Conklin, 2020; Orr & Stoker, 1994). One of the key symbols of these earlier regeneration efforts was the imposing and fortress-like Renaissance Center constructed in the 1970s, which for some stood as the Motor City's prototypical corporate citadel as it was symbolically and geographically cordoned off from the rest of the city (see Davis, 1985; 1990; Desiderio, 2009; Marcuse, 1997). In the 1980s, Detroit would become one of the first U.S. cities to operate a downtown, open-street CCTV program. The program was the "largest of its kind to date in any American city" (Granholm, 1987, p.687), with approximately 20 cameras. Like its contemporaries, cameras were funded by local businesses and monitored at police headquarters. Interestingly, the deployment of CCTV cameras in Detroit's downtown would precede the rapid proliferation of similar programs in the U.K. in the mid-90s, a country that is typically recognized as the pioneer of open-street CCTV surveillance (Armstrong & Norris, 1999; Coleman, 2004; Monahan & Murakami Wood, 2018). These historical precedents suggest that there is much continuity in the processes that continue to shape the city.

Conclusion

The triumph of the 'downtown-first' approach is commonly celebrated by referencing rapid growth in development projects, the doubling of downtown residential rental prices, and booming rates of employment in the '7.2'. Others have gone as far as to position Detroit's revitalization as a model for other fiscally-strapped cities and a "living laboratory where the future of American cities is being demonstrated, one project, one investment at a time" (Katz & Bradley, 2013, p.140). However, narratives of the Detroit's 'rebirth' largely obscure the city's highly uneven recovery and how new investments to enhance the appeal of Detroit's downtown have largely been divorced from the concerns and needs of long-time residents (Hackney, 2014;

Moratorium Now, 2018). The glaring contrast between the gentrifying downtown and the rest Detroit is often framed as a tale of two cities. However, as Jay and Conklin (2020) suggest, the 'New Detroit' may be better understood as simply a tale of one city subjected to the unmitigated headwinds of market forces and the 'seesaw' of uneven development (Smith, 1984).

As discussed in this chapter, the downtown as a protected enclave has been a locus of speculative investment, financialized development, and experimentation with emergent and novel security innovations. In contrast to other analyses that have focused on the speculative nature of public policing (Jaffe, 2019), Detroit's downtown security governance demonstrates the increasingly pluralized character of speculative securitization and the outsized role that private, corporate place-makers have played in deploying, testing, and diffusing speculative security technologies and practices. The question explored starting the next chapter is exactly how the dynamics, forms, practices, and legacies of speculative security have played out beyond the downtown core, with Project Lighthouse serving as an impetus and inspiration for the expansion of CCTV surveillance partnerships to Detroit's neighborhoods under the Project Green Light initiative. Though Project Green Light retained its own distinctive features, public officials leaned on the 'safe haven' concept to appeal to the everyday insecurities of neighborhood residents, seeking to equate spaces of surveillance with safety. The discussion now turns to what this novel program has looked like, the extent to which it reflects the features and logics of speculative security, and the links between securitization and revitalization.

CHAPTER 4: ‘LIGHTHOUSES’ FOR THE NEIGHBORHOODS

Introduction

As mentioned in the previous chapter, much of the Detroit's post-bankruptcy trajectory of redevelopment has favoured downtown areas as the locus for concentrated investment and corporate-led "revivification" (Tabb, 2015, p.4). In stark contrast to the full complement of functioning public services provided to the downtown's increasingly white constituency, many of the city's majority-Black and brown neighborhoods have continued to endure structural disinvestment, systematically inflated property taxes, school closures, water shutoffs, expensive and unreliable water and utility costs, and withdrawal and inadequacy of public services including emergency services (Atuahene, 2020; Cohen, 2021; Howell, Doan, & Harbin, 2017; Jones, 2019a; Palmer, 2022; Pedroni, 2011; Phinney, 2018).

Amidst criticisms from long-time residents who have felt excluded from the city's comeback, as well as a realization that economic recovery could not entirely ignore the city's outlaying neighborhoods, the city embarked on a series of triage-based investments to stabilize and promote growth in select "tipping point" neighborhoods through the Strategic Neighbourhood Fund announced in launched in 2016 (Invest Detroit, 2015, p.22).[41] The need to broaden the geographical scope of the city's revitalization efforts was echoed by credit rating agencies including Moody's which stated: "Steady downtown and midtown investments are attracting a skilled cohort of new residents that is putting new upward pressure on property values. The key to Detroit's sustained recovery is reproducing this revitalization in neighborhoods throughout the city" (City of Detroit, 2017, p.79). In their credit rating opinion,

[41] The Strategic Neighborhood Fund has leveraged a mix of philanthropic donations and bond-financed capital to support revitalization of commercial corridors, beautification of neighborhood streets and green spaces, and development of affordable housing. Initial revitalization efforts targeted "neighborhoods considered to be at economic tipping points" (Invest Detroit, 2015, p.22) and which were believed to benefit the most from investments based on assessments of higher population densities, existing commercial corridors, good housing stock, and improvable infrastructure.

Moody's reiterated that attracting a steady inflow of residents to the neighborhoods was essential to expanding the city's economic base and enhancing revenue growth needed to meet rising fixed costs and continued debt obligations (see also Colomer, 2018).

Closely tied to initiatives to extend revitalization beyond the confines of the downtown core were efforts by city officials to address public safety concerns in the city's neighborhoods through enhanced policing. One of the products of these securitization efforts was the establishment in 2016 of a city-wide CCTV partnership called Project Green Light, which helped connect privately-owned cameras to the city's police department and enabled police to monitor camera feeds in real-time. Building on earlier iterations of CCTV partnerships tested in the Detroit's downtown areas, DPD Chief Craig described Project Green Light as the "second evolution of the Lighthouse Project", and a logical extension of camera surveillance to the neighborhoods (DPD, 2014c).

This chapter explores the rapid growth of the Project Green Light program as a form of speculative security. Much like its downtown predecessor, the program has unfolded in decidedly experimental ways - with limited evidence supporting its efficacy, but backed by a strong coalition of public, private, and civic actors united by concerns about public safety. Over the last eight years, the program has expanded rapidly and now boasts over 1000 participating locations collectively deploying thousands of privately-owned and -maintained CCTV cameras across the city (City of Detroit, 2024a). Project Green Light's growth has occurred alongside considerable controversy, not least on account of its connection to facial recognition technology which led to three highly publicized cases of misidentification and false arrest of Black Michiganders (Neavling, 2023). Both the Mayor and the police department have stood by the program and have played central roles in promoting it as a way to extend particular visions of

neighborhood safety buttressed by advancements in technological policing. However, I argue that the city-wide expansion of surveillance infrastructure under the Project Green Light program cannot be read simply as a top-down implementation by city government and its police department, but rather lies in a more complex story of legitimacy building, civic activism, and contestations over visions of safety. While the police department expended considerable resources to enrol participants, the rapid expansion of Project Green Light owes much to the buy-in and advocacy of certain segments of the population, most notably the project partners who have, to varying degrees, been convinced of the merits of the program. This chapter explores some of nuances of Project Green Light's expansion story. In the process, it aims to shed light on the various ways police attempt to secure consent for speculative security under the auspices of public safety, and how civic actors contribute to, resist, and ultimately shape these speculative securitization processes.

The chapter unfolds in two main sections. The first provides a rough sketch of the experimental roll-out of Project Green Light into Detroit's predominantly Black and brown communities. Drawing on documentary research, it explores the program's early origins as a pilot program that began shortly after the city exited bankruptcy in 2014. During this time, police and city officials were seeking to extend CCTV partnerships and the 'safe haven' concept beyond the downtown core. It then discusses the program's official launch in 2016 including the initial enrolment efforts carried out by the DPD and its subsequent growth. The second section draws from interviews with existing Project Green Light partners to explore their experiences and perceptions of the program, but also shares the perspectives of others who considered enrolling in the program. The aim is to examine the diverse range of views on the promises, merits, and pitfalls of Project Green Light surveillance as a tool for deterring and preventing

crime and enhancing public safety. The chapter concludes by discussing the substantive and theoretical implications of Project Green Light as a form of speculative security.

Piloting Surveillance in the Neighborhoods

Since coming into office in 2014 in the wake of Detroit's historical bankruptcy, Mayor Mike Duggan was adamant about the need to invest in police and other first responders, asserting that, "if we don't do a first-class job on public safety, nothing else is going to matter" (BOPC 12-03-2015, p.14). Chief Craig, who was described as someone who could "use the power of policing as an economic tool" (see Berglund, 2023) and help rebuild the city's tax base, was also unequivocal about the need to securitize the neighborhoods. Under his leadership, camera surveillance was rapidly expanded city-wide through the Project Green Light initiative officially launched in 2016. Presented as a "public-private-community partnership", Project Green Light (herein 'PGL') was heralded by city and police officials as an innovative public safety initiative aimed at promoting the revitalization and growth of local businesses (Project Green Light MOU, 2021, p.1). PGL retained many aspects of Downtown's Project Lighthouse, including the leveraging of privately-financed and -maintained camera infrastructures and real-time connections to the police department that enable police to actively monitor cameras. The basic elements of the partnership include an agreement whereby participating businesses and organizations agree to fund the installation and maintenance of cameras that can be actively monitored in real-time by the DPD. Partners are also required to install a visible, flashing green light, enhanced lighting, and signage indicating their participation in the program and with the intention of signalling that their location is a "safe haven" for those seeking emergency assistance, while also serving as a deterrent to potential offenders (City of Detroit, 2016a; Project

Green Light MOU, 2021). In exchange, PGL partners are promised prioritized police response to calls for assistance and enhanced patrols and police presence at and around their locations.

Though most accounts suggest that PGL began in 2016, its official launch was preceded by an experimental testing phase which began in 2014 and aimed to bring the CCTV partnership approach developed in the Downtown and Midtown areas to the city's neighborhoods. The seeds of the program lay in a collaboration between the DPD and a gas station owner who was quoted saying, "We took the Lighthouse Project that Rock (Ventures) and Ilitch (Holdings) were doing downtown and moved it out to the neighborhoods" (as cited in Michigan Saves, 2014). In its early phases, the pilot was promoted under the umbrella of the Lighthouse Project, with officials sometimes referring to it as 'Lighthouse II', or 'Lighthouse for the Neighborhoods'. However as the pilot matured, officials began referring to the program as 'Project Green Light', denoting the unmistakable flashing green lights that adorned participating businesses.

For Chief Craig, the expansion of CCTV partnerships to the neighborhoods held the potential to reduce violent crime, but also address 'quality of life' issues, which in his view, attracted criminal activity: "It's going to help us in our efforts to abate violence, but also dealing with quality of life issues. I've been very critical of locations, liquor stores and gas stations that attract loitering and other criminal behavior" (DPD, 2014b). The program would also help grow the overall reach of integrated CCTV infrastructure with the intention that DPD could monitor video feeds in real-time from a provisional command center at the Coleman A. Young Airport. Chief Craig's ultimate vision was to have a "safe haven" on every block (DPD, 2014b; King, 2014), and to eventually centralize camera feeds into the yet to be completed RTCC which would be located in the new Public Safety Headquarters.

To make a compelling case for the program, Chief Craig routinely leaned into the 'safe haven' concept. Recounting the origins of the program in a later BOPC meeting, Craig noted that:

> Part of the whole early concept of Greenlight – you remember, police stations were closing in the city of Detroit… So there were no safe havens for people in the neighborhoods… in downtown and midtown [they had] the lighthouse project, the little blue lights, and they signify safe havens. So I began to reflect and say what if we can create the safe havens in the neighborhood… that was the birth of the Greenlight, those clean gas stations or party stores that have a welcoming feel. (BOPC, 07-20-2017, p.36)

One of Craig's leading officers explained the program's premise in more detail:

> … it is a safe haven for our citizens. It is a clean community. They're working with us in guaranteeing that when the customers, visitors, other folks within the city visit those locations or are in distress in the area… We have various gas stations that are onboard that are clean. That will offer assistance and render aid, and also at least call 911 for a citizen. We've had several incidents in the past that occurred where – I can bring to mind the veteran who was car jacked at a gas station a couple years ago. Guess what? Nobody called 911. We all saw the video. But you'd be surprised to know that nobody called 911. These locations right here, their staff, the ownership is committed to assisting our citizens. They're 24-hour locations. They will let residents in the area use their restrooms. So they want to be a part of the new Detroit. (BOPC 11-20-2014, p.29)

The quotations above reflect forms of 'responsibilization' (Crawford, 1999; Garland, 1996) that aimed to activate and tie small business owners to new visions of the securitized and revitalized city. The police department's initial focus was on enrolling gas stations that were open 24/7 and could provide emergency refuge and assistance late at night (Dado, 2014). In preliminary meetings with gas station owners, Craig expressed frustration with how few gas stations had enrolled in the program, claiming that being a PGL location was a privilege (Dado, 2014)[42]. Urging business owners to enrol in the program, Chief Craig frequently drew on the aspirations

[42] Partnering with gas station owners seemed initially to be a challenging endeavour. Some gas station owners were cynical and disillusioned about the police department's ability to respond to 911 calls and felt routinely disrespected by officers (Dado, 2014). In the absence of police protection, some felt forced to make uneasy alliances with drug dealers, fearing they would experience retaliation if they told them get off the property (Lengel, 2013).

of local business owners to be 'good neighbors', framing participation as a demonstration of their commitment to the safety of their patrons and the broader community.

Responsibilization strategies were not only concerned with cultivating a willingness of participating businesses to call 911 or provide aid in the event of emergencies, but were also interlaced with expectations of maintaining particular aesthetic qualities of urban spaces consistent with local revitalization efforts. Drawing on assumed relationships between the built environment and crime reminiscent of Broken Windows theorizing, Craig often asserted that 'dirty' places attracted criminality. In a Board of Police Commissioners meeting, Craig recalled one of the initial meetings with gas station owners: "when I met with the gas station owners some were offended. I said this is not reflective of all [gas stations], but if you have a dirty gas station clean it up… we all know that when a place is filthy it does what, it attracts criminal activity" (BOPC 07-20-2017, p.38). Craig's views were reflective of the Manhattan Institute consultants who, according to the ACLU, had suggested to residents during their Broken Windows consultations that much of the crime in their neighborhoods stemmed from "dirty gas stations" (ACLU of Michigan, 2014). The consultants went so far as to recommend residents pressure property owners to "clean up their businesses or else their homes and/or communities would become the sites of pickets and demonstrations" (ACLU of Michigan, 2014). Though these exhortations were divisive and heavily criticized by the ACLU for the potential to stoke tensions between Black Detroiters and business owners of Middle Eastern descent, they were not fully divorced from resident concerns regarding safety at gas stations, especially at night (Lengel, 2013).

Prior to the pilot program, some neighborhood residents took to the Board of Police Commissioners meetings to express their concerns and frustrations about conditions at gas

stations that made them feel unsafe, ranging from the threat of shootings and carjackings to loitering and unkempt conditions. In one meeting, a resident commented:

> It's time for Detroiters to say enough is enough. We are a part of the group that's going to go speak to gas station owners that raise your standards like they're all over the city out of Detroit that they clean up, so when you go to a gas station that's well lit, beautifully clean, don't you feel better?... We are not going there as bold and intimidating them, but just let them know we want you to bring your standards up to make our city beautiful and make it safe for our women and men to pump gas without being threatened. (BOPC 10-10-13, p.39)

In 2014, after a series of high-profile violent crimes at several gas stations, city council passed an ordinance requiring all gas stations to install CCTV cameras (AlHajal, 2014). With gas stations as the focal point, the police department pursued several strategies to stamp out crime and disorder at local businesses across the city. A more hardline approach, reserved for businesses that were deemed to permit criminal activity and loitering on their property, involved raids, warrant sweeps, and tickets (Greenwood, 2015). In contrast, the softer approach involved partnering with business owners who were willing to become active participants in providing safer, cleaner, and more inviting environments for their patrons. In one of the earliest iterations of the partnership, cooperating businesses could earn the distinction of a "model business", receiving window stickers from the police department (Slezak, 2013). Both the camera ordinance and the model business program foreshadowed some of the components that were eventually adopted in the more formalized PGL partnership. By May of 2015, Craig revealed that they had enrolled 15 gas stations as Green Light locations, and 11 McDonald's restaurants were set to come online soon thereafter (see BOPC 05-28-2015, p.34).

Official Launch and Expansion

The PGL pilot was expanded to several other restaurant and convenience store chains (DPD, 2014c) before the program was officially unveiled in early 2016. For the Mayor and DPD,

PGL promised to be the "next generation of violence reduction", placing Detroit at the cutting edge of public safety innovation (City of Detroit, 2016b). At the first PGL press conference, Chief Craig proudly asserted, "… I will tell you, I'm excited because I think we're posed to do something that's not being done anywhere" (City of Detroit, 2016a). Craig mentioned that the "first iteration" of the city's new RTCC was operational, providing new capabilities to monitor multiple camera feeds in real-time and to conduct "virtual patrols" where the DPD could identify crimes in progress based on previous crime trends and analysis. Having expressed his ambitions for a state-of-the-art RTCC early in his tenure, he often described the potential of RTCC technologies to serve as a 'force multiplier' that could improve effectiveness and capabilities of existing personnel. Optimistic about the combined potential of PGL and new technologies, DPD personnel explained during a meeting:

> For those that don't know, at the very basic level it is video feed from gas stations into the realtime crime center, which we use for a variety of reasons, not just crime, but gathering intel… There are a lot of things that we're looking to do there from using technology to help fight crime, everything from facial recognition technology and a lot of other things that we're going to do as we move forward with that program. (BOPC 1-14-2016, p.12)

One of the first gas station owners who had piloted the program and had been influential in its development saw the potential of to contribute the city's resurgence:

> Two years ago, when we came to Chief Craig with this idea of bringing cameras to the neighborhoods, we looked at Downtown Detroit and Midtown, and we saw how well cameras helped in reducing crime in those areas. But unfortunately, the neighborhoods don't have an Ilitch or a Gilbert, so it fell upon us as small business owners to be that catalyst because for Detroit to be a great city and come back, the neighborhoods have to come back, they have to be safe. (City of Detroit, 2016a)

Over the next few months, the DPD pursued ambitious recruitment efforts through radio commercials and other media campaigns. Early recruitment and outreach to local businesses were driven by precinct commanders and Neighborhood Police Officers (NPOs) who visited

locations to encourage business owners to sign up. One community member I interviewed who was familiar with early recruitment efforts explained the role of NPOs: "they're the ones that really talk to businesses and work with the businesses to get the green lights going and installed and join the program. So, they also do regular rounds of businesses they would like to see have a green light" (C01). Though much of the initial focus was on gas stations, enrolment eventually expanded to other commercial establishments including liquor stores, convenience stores, and restaurants. In deciding which businesses to approach, the police department relied on a number of metrics to identify ideal locations including historical crime reports, calls for service, and risk modeling to predict hot spots for certain crimes. Officers would also approach business owners after a crime had occurred, and in some cases would be accompanied by residents who had raised concerns about safety to convince owners to join the program (Circo et al., 2020; Donnelly, 2019; DPD, 2017; NPSP, 2021).

Leveraging existing relationships with community residents and leaders, especially those who held a positive view of the police, was a key strategy in promoting PGL. This included approaching civic groups like citizen patrols and "block clubs to support the Green light at the very beginning of it" (BOPC 04-19-18, p.25). Several respondents noted that the program was promoted through community meetings by the Department of Neighborhoods and the DPD, where residents were asked to invite their local businesses to join PGL. One interviewee recalled:

> … when I first heard of it was at a CompStat meeting when it was still in planning stages and then they had community meetings all across the city, every precinct. Because all precincts have police-community relations committees. They were at all of those meetings, letting people know what it was, telling them about it, asking you to invite businesses. (C01)

As part of their involvement in the program, participating businesses were expected to meet a number of formal, technical requirements related to: the purchase and placement of cameras (typically a minimum of four cameras), high standards of exterior ambient lighting, cloud storage and high-speed internet enabling the sharing of feeds with the police department, installation and maintenance of signs and decals featuring the Project Green Light logo, and a highly visible green light to indicate that the property was a Green Light partner (Project Green Light MOU, 2021). Altogether, upfront installation costs to businesses were advertised to range between $4000-6000 on average, with about $150 in monthly maintenance costs (see City of Detroit, 2024c). In exchange, business owners received 'priority one'[43] response to calls for service and additional, 'special patrols,' where DPD officers would periodically visit the location, sometimes signing a logbook to document their visit.

Keeping one's property 'clean' and maintaining aesthetic standards was an important, albeit implicit, aspect of becoming a PGL partner[44]. But it also implied broader expectations that some business owners would take a tougher stance on signs of 'disorder' such as loitering, selling loose cigarettes, and panhandling as well as suspected drug dealing. In the words of Chief Craig:

> [W]e know that one of the problems in some of the stations has been that they're dirty, loitering has occurred, drug dealing in and out around the property. Those certainly are not locations that would meet the criteria that we've established for what would be a Green Light location. (BOPC 01-21-2016, p.53)

Thus, at least for some businesses like gas stations, becoming a PGL partner meant more actively regulating their immediate environments to create a sanitized and welcoming atmosphere in line

[43] The priority one status designates the highest priority runs. Amidst controversy, the police department has had to clarify that 'priority one' runs to PGL locations were not prioritized over serious crime incidents at non-PGL locations such as a shooting or active robbery.

[44] Though the MOU does not explicitly mention requirements around aesthetics, the DPD has threatened to decommission locations that do not meet certain beautification standards (see Urban et al., 2019, p.9).

with a broader police offensive against visible signs of disorder. Such forms of responsibilization also reflected the aesthetic and normative ideals of neighborhood revitalization efforts.

In a bid to encourage greater participation, the DPD partnered with several corporate partners to offset some of the costs associated of joining the program. For example, DTE Energy offered reimbursements for upgraded lighting installations and Comcast provided cost reductions and multi-site discounts for camera installations (Helms, 2016). For a short period, Invest Detroit (CDFI) and the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC) offered 'microdistrict' grants providing reimbursements for installation and monthly costs (Circo et al., 2020). Some locations, including public housing facilities were able to access U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funding (Circo et al., 2020; Gross, 2018c). In 2018, Detroit's Department of Neighborhoods rolled out a mini-grant program to install PGL at commercial corridors, selecting 14 community groups to receive prepaid $500 gift cards (Cities of Service, n.d.). To support additional PGL expansion in business improvement districts, the city leveraged its Community Development Block Grant program to reimburse select businesses for half of the costs associated with joining the program, with priority for BID members (SDBA, 2018). Other business associations were also active in helping local businesses join the program. In one case, the Detroit Association of Black Organizations offered to pay half of the setup costs for a local gas station that had been the scene of a fatal shooting (Spencer, 2017). Interviews revealed that some partners also received help with installation costs from private donors in the community. Whereas many CCTV infrastructures have traditionally been built out through government funding, PGL tapped into a much more diverse funding base including funds from the partners themselves as well as various public and private financing arrangements.

While interviews revealed that some residents casually brought up PGL to business owners in their community and encouraged them to become partners, some residents were more emboldened, organizing marches on business properties to demand their enrolment in the program (Mason & Herberg, 2017). For example, at one gas station on the east side of the city, local residents marched several times during 2017 demanding the owner to become a Green Light location to address loitering and drug activity that made residents feel unsafe (Mason & Herberg, 2017). Another community leader shared their strategy to implore owners to enrol:

> We went back to our neighborhood and gathered a core group that we as community leaders would go to the different gas stations, party stores, wherever we know crime was prevalent and we explained it from our level that the police may go to the business people, but sometimes they get intimidated by our beautiful officers. We're not intimidated by them because we love them. We know they're out there for us, but business people are not like that… We have been to four different locations within the 11th precinct to present it from the aspects of a community leader. We explained to them that if I come to your place of business and I don't see the Greenlight, that makes me think well, why should I go here. You don't care enough about me to get the Greenlight, and I hate for them to mention money, because they have money. So when we present ourself that I'm going to shop here and recommend other people to shop here, that encourages them to want to get the Greenlight… (BOPC 04-13-2017, pg.43)

In a BOPC meeting, Chief Craig applauded residents who pressured businesses to join PGL:

> We, as a matter of practice, we don't go out and – I don't want to use the word strong-arm. I know many of our community members have taken upon themselves to go in in group {sic} and they will go to the location. It's amazing to hear and read about this, but they will go to a neighborhood and basically tell the management or the owner that you need to become a Greenlight. You want us to patronize your business, we expect you to become a Greenlight, because we don't feel safe, your place is filthy, you allow loitering. And so that phenomenon is happening in different parts of the city. It's certainly not something that we coerce, but it does happen. (BOPC 07-20-17, p.28)

One board of police commissioner urged community members at a BOPC meeting to push businesses to join the program:

> It's making a difference. So you need to push hard on these business folks who are not wanting to invest. We just need – we, the community, have to do that. We have to push

> hard to make sure they understand that's something we want. Don't be driven by the media, the PR, that they can't afford it because they can afford it. (BOPC 01-11-18, p.56)

At a press conference celebrating the 100th installation of PGL at a convenience store, Mayor Duggan stated that there was no question that PGL had played a significant role in reducing carjackings in the city. Reminiscing about early conversations with Chief Craig, Duggan elaborated on early visions of PGL:

> The Chief and I thought, what happens if you create a zone of safety where you have high definition color cameras that can be monitored live at the police station, you have the area lit so bright you could read a magazine, you could see all the license plates and the faces of the individuals? (City of Detroit, 2017b)

Equating "zones of safety" or "safe havens" with highly surveilled spaces reflected the kind of model and vision of safety the Mayor and Chief were attempting to conjure: one defined primarily by creating places of refuge from potential criminal violence, secured through the constant and watchful gaze of the police. The notion that PGL locations represented 'zones of safety' also seemed to imply that the spaces external to them were unsafe, in effect painting large parts of the city as landscapes of unpredictable danger and violence and playing on stereotypes of Detroit as a dangerous, crime-ridden city.

Over the next several years, PGL cameras rapidly expanded across the city. No longer confined to identified hotspots of violent crime or commercial establishments, PGL expanded to churches, community centers and spaces, rental and public housing apartments, service providers, and schools. Project Green Light Corridors enabled bulk installations for five or more businesses within a 2-3 block radius (Gross, 2018a). By 2021, it was estimated that the city had more than 3,000 PGL cameras and more than 700 participating locations. Together with various DPD and city-owned cameras installed at traffic intersections, bus stops, highways, city-owned buildings, and dumping sites, PGL's rapid expansion afforded the police a new degree of

visibility over the city that only a few years prior had been unimaginable by most, including top police officials. Initially premised on promoting "the revitalization and growth of local businesses" (Project Green Light MOU, 2021, p.1), the program's expansion beyond commercial properties signalled a much a more extensive revitalization agenda. As of August 2024, the program had 1000 participating locations (Click on Detroit, 2024). The three figures below show PGL locations by type and year (Figure 1), organized by precinct (Figure 2), and plotted on a map (Figure 3).



Figure 3: Map of PGL Locations (2024)



This figure was retrieved from the Project Green Light location dataset updated on November 3, 2024 from the City of Detroit Open Data Portal available from: https://data.detroitmi.gov/datasets/project-green-light-locations/explore?location=42.375911%2C-83.104626&%2C11.00

Although many residents have welcomed PGL as a tool to help reduce crime and improve neighborhood safety, many others have been predictably concerned about the rapid expansion of CCTV and other surveillance technologies in the city's majority Black and brown neighborhoods. That PGL has been met with suspicion is not surprising considering that historically, Black Detroiters have been subject to numerous layers of racialized policing and surveillance through 'red squads', the FBI's COINTELPRO program, and the DPD's infamous proactive STRESS unit (Hinton, 2016; Lassiter, 2021b, Lassiter, 2021c, Donner, 1992). Additionally, in the post-9/11world, many migrant and communities of color across the U.S. have become targets of experimentation for new surveillance technologies (Aas, 2011; Zupancic, 2021). Local activists and critics have argued that surveillance technologies are being deployed

in the very communities that have been traditionally been neglected and disinvested by the state and have been procured and deployed without adequate transparency by the police department (Howell, 2019; Logic Magazine, 2020). Many activists and residents have expressed deep scepticism about the potential of surveillance to make their communities safer (Baker et al., 2023; Green Light Black Futures, 2022; Urban et al., 2019).

Furthermore, according to community advocates, the police department has relied on fear-mongering to expand the program, exploiting legitimate safety concerns of Detroiters, and providing little real evidence to support its efficacy (Riverwise, 2019). Indeed, while city and police officials regularly touted the program's efficacy in reducing the crime levels, including carjackings, to promote the program, many of these claims were not backed by formal scientific evaluation, which further highlighted its speculative nature. For example, roughly two years into the program, police officials regularly cited a 40% reduction in violent crime at the first 8 PGL[45] locations as well as an 11% reduction across all 200 PGL locations in 2017 compared to a 7% reduction for the rest of the city (Gross, 2018b). Officials continued to make similar claims, but none were produced by independent evaluators, with most coming from historical comparisons and without a control group. Unsurprisingly, researchers took issue with the way the crime figures were produced, suggesting that the year-to-year comparisons involved too small a sample size and time frame to adequately assess the program's effects and to determine whether decreases in crime were actually attributable to the program (Gross, 2018b). Absent a counterfactual, it would also be difficult to distinguish reductions crime from more general

[45] According to the DPD narrative, the issue of recurrent robberies and carjackings in close proximity to gas stations had been raised during several CompStat meetings, prompting further crime mapping and analysis. DPD crime analysts determined that along with gas stations, other establishments open late at night such as bars, liquor stores, and convenience stores were found to be "significant risk factors" in homicides and non-fatal shootings (NPSP, 2021). Following a meeting with the DPD, the mayor, and several other interested gas station owners, an initial Green Light pilot program was established comprising a cohort of eight participating gas station locations. Not knowing fully what the outcome would be, the gas station owners agreed to cover installation and maintenance costs and participate in a media campaign to talk about the program regularly (NPSP, 2021).

declines in crime rates that were occurring nationally and citywide (see Herberg, 2022). In 2018, the former monitor of the police department's consent decree was quoted as saying that Chief Craig was "relying on his gut, rather than science" and that PGL created a "civil liberties nightmare by placing everyone under constant surveillance" (as cited in Gross, 2018b).

It was not until 2020, that an evaluation was released by researchers at Michigan State University in collaboration with the DPD (Circo et al., 2020). The study found limited impact of PGL on crime and no measurable changes in violent crime post-implementation. In 2022, the legitimacy of PGL as a crime prevention program would receive one of its largest blows, when the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which evaluates criminal justice programs on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice, gave the program a "no effects" rating. While the NIJ found some evidence to suggest that PGL may have reduced property crimes at participating locations, they reported that there were "no statistically significant effects on disorder occurrences or violent crime" and ultimately concluded that "the program did not have the intended effects" (Department of Justice, 2022).

Amidst the various criticisms of the program, part of the police department's strategy has been to argue that the program has been well received by the 'community' (see for example, BOPC 04-26-18, p.19). The reality, however, is that the 'community' exists in much more heterogeneous forms than police narratives tend to give credence to and opinions about PGL differ quite considerably depending on who you ask. To better understand the diverse landscape of public opinion on the program, I conducted interviews with several groups of people who shared their experiences and perceptions of PGL. One of the groups were the businesses and organizations that had either formally enrolled as PGL partners or have considered enrolment at some point. As voluntary participants, current and prospective PGL partners provide a unique

vantage point into the program and the promises of surveillance as a means to address local safety concerns including everyday realities and perceptions of crime and violence. The interviews examined the program's appeal and understandings of how it worked. They also explored participants' assessments of PGL's promised benefits regarding deterrence, improved response times and police presence, real-time monitoring, and enhancements (both real and perceived) to community safety.

PGL Partners

The discussion of the perspectives of PGL partners is informed by ten interviews conducted between 2021 and 2023. Insights were also drawn from two additional interviews with respondents who had considered, but ultimately decided not to enrol in the program. The sample is by no means representative of the city's population, and the types of locations skewed towards non-commercial establishments (see the methodology section in Chapter One). PGL partners included people involved in managing properties that were enrolled in the program: two commercial establishments, three community or green spaces, three service providers, one residential complex, and one church. In terms of demographics, eight of the ten PGL partners were white, which informed their perspectives, but not always in expected ways. Some white respondents discussed PGL surveillance as more innocuous than other forms of security such as those provided by private security guards or public police, but did not view the expansion of police surveillance in a majority Black city as entirely unproblematic. Many were aware of the contentious nature of the program, especially in the context of historical practices of racialized surveillance and policing, as well as problems around the use of facial recognition and misidentification that disproportionately affected the city's Black and non-white residents.

Respondents also occupied unique social positions as managers of space, requiring them to not only think of their own interests, but also to take into account the desires, wishes, anxieties, and interests of the wider community and the people who frequented their spaces. This required balancing various roles, as both residents (most resided within city limits) and as managers of communal spaces. As such, the decisions around whether to enrol in PGL were never fully divorced from the communities in which respondents were situated. Some mentioned that their enrolment was influenced by concerned residents and the quest for safer community spaces in the context of insecurities produced by widespread disinvestment and state abandonment. A common theme was the uncertainties regarding poor and inadequate police response, which was a key concern for residents. Ultimately, unreliability of police response and protection served as an important context for the popularity of PGL, and in some cases, enrolment was a bid for additional police resources that were perceived as scarce and/or inadequate.

Motivations for Enrolling in the Program

Discussions with PGL partners revealed a variety of motivations for enrolling in the program while also shedding light on the aspects of PGL that held particular appeal. Joining the program was sometimes dictated by pragmatic considerations such as replacing what felt like more costly and less efficient forms of security. Several spoke about their enrolment in terms of an investment informed by considerations around 'value for money'. For example, one respondent noted, "I had been paying private security that was pretty ineffective and more expensive and so I decided that I would try this as an alternative" (P01). The respondent went on to explain that, "safety and security are primary in my business. Obviously it's an apartment community so you want everyone to feel comfortable where they live. That's first and foremost. And so, it seemed like a very cost-effective solution" (P01). Others spoke to how PGL provided

an added feeling of safety for those who visited the property or used their spaces. Several respondents noted that PGL held the potential to provide parents with a sense of ease when children frequented their locations. In this respect, enrolment in the program was a communicative act: "[I]t was very important to me that the community knew that this is a safe place" (P02). Another respondent elaborated on the symbolism of PGL's flashing lights at local businesses and how they communicated a broader commitment by PGL partners to safety and service:

> Speaking as someone who lives in the city, I knew that if I were driving on the road at any time of day and I needed gas, and I came to an intersection, there was a gas station on the left-hand side that had the flashing green light and one on the right side that didn't, I would probably choose the one with the flashing green light. It would give me an added level of sense of safety, but it would also suggest to me, at least my theory of that would be is, that's probably an owner-operator who cares more about his customers, who is probably more… is going to go the extra effort… in terms of the provision of that service. And I had the sense again that both from a criminality perspective as well as a residential safety perspective that… the site of that flashing green light had a meaning… not to overstate it by any means, but that it had a value beyond the technological capabilities of the camera system itself. (P03)

By speaking to the broader symbolic value of the program, the respondent revealed that video camera systems are not merely technological, but 'socio-technical systems' (Norris, 2012) that hold meaning and are believed to actively shape behavior. These symbolic meanings are, however, understood to be interpreted differently by different people such that a PGL location can represent both a "safe haven" for law-abiding citizens and a place to avoid for those with more nefarious intentions:

> [N]ot only is it a preventative measure because we have the visual aspect of the flashing Green Light on a prominent corner of our building, we also have signs on the doors, a metal sign next to our main entry doors which just says Project Green Light partner. And it was a police initiative to start this and criminals know about it. Obviously they know about it. (P04)

This respondent also spoke to the appeal of the program for helping to improve police response, while also acknowledging that poor police response was a pervasive problem across the city:

> At the time we signed up, their average response time was over 14 minutes. If you look into, say, active shooter scenarios, they're done in five to seven minutes. And we deem 15 minutes is just not conducive. Unfortunately a lot of people in Detroit use the shots fired verbiage on their 911 calls to try and evoke a quicker response because they think they're the only person in need at that moment. And I understand it. When you have a standard call that might be just in a queue of calls… they might not see anybody for… till the next day… if they're lucky, in a few hours. (P04)

Although there had been several instances reported in the media where businesses (mostly gas stations) had been approached by community members and pressured to enrol in the program, none of the interviewees experienced such direct pressures and many interviewees enrolled of their own accord[46] usually after hearing about the program at a community meeting, on the news, by word of mouth, or seeing flashing green lights pop up in the neighborhoods. As noted by one participant:

> I think we just started asking like why are there little flashing green lights all over the place… and once we learned what it was and the statistics associated with it… that once you get Project Green Light on your property, that crime goes down by 60%. And we were at the point where we weren't really experiencing crime… a couple catalytic converters here or there and what not. So hey, if we can reduce it by 60%, that's even better, we'll take it, right? (P05)

Perceptions of Deterrent Effects

As a program, much of the anticipated effects of PGL on crime are rooted in understandings of deterrence shaped by decades of criminological research and theorizing. At the heart of this thinking is the idea that potential offenders are rational and calculating, engaging in decision-making that weighs the benefits of a particular criminal act against being arrested and punished (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Clarke & Felson, 1993; Pratt & Cullen, 2005). PGL was

[46] Only one respondent in the sample had mentioned being approached by the police department because of the businesses' strategic location in Downtown/Midtown.

developed with the intention of producing a deterrent effect through visible CCTV cameras, signage, enhanced lighting, and a flashing green light. These elements are meant to signal to potential offenders that the location may be actively monitored by police, and that the cameras increase the odds of identification and arrest. Distinguishing PGL from other CCTV programs are the components of real-time monitoring, special patrols, and enhanced response times that are assumed to provide additional deterrent value. To gauge whether these theoretically-informed features matched actual experiences of the program, I asked whether partners felt that the program had deterred crime in or around their location.

Overall, respondents were mixed regarding whether they felt the program was having a deterrent effect. A slight majority of respondents felt the program was serving as a deterrent at their locations, mostly for minor property crimes such as car break-ins and thefts of catalytic converters, but one respondent suggested that the program had deterred armed robberies at their location. In contrast, two respondents felt the program had no effects. The remainder spoke more cautiously, unable to give a definitive sense of whether they perceived any changes in crime due to the program and because crime rates were traditionally low in their area. When asked if the program was deterring crime at their location, one respondent who spoke positively of the program remarked:

> Yeah, it's been an exceptional program. Probably the most bang for my buck for any of the improvements that I've done within my business. The prospective residents love it. It gives them an incentive to choose our community over others and for the current residents, they've definitely noticed the benefits. I'm in an area where it's not too uncommon to have catalytic converters stolen, or vehicles stolen, that's almost something that's to be expected to some degree… maybe every half a year, or quarterly I probably have a catalytic converter stolen or some sort of incident in the parking lot. But since I've been involved in this program… I've had maybe one car attempted to be broken into in the last four years. It's driven crime down significantly. (P01)

Another respondent said they believed the program may have helped deter property crimes:

> You know, I think it has, just because it's so blatant. I mean, there's a bright, flashing green light on the corner of our building and signs on every entrance that say, "Hey, if you're going to break in or you're going to do something here, the cops are going to know about it, you're going to be on video". So, we've had less crime than in the past. But even in the past, it was sporadic. I can't like give you hard data to say we had an X amount of things happen the year prior. All I can tell you is that in two years, we've had two catalytic converters stolen. (P04)

Another respondent shared their account of perceived reductions in crime:

> I do believe the Green Light, both the program and the camera technology itself are a deterrent and… during this time which would now be… 3 and half, 4 years… one measure of things might be well, "have you had any theft of your cars in your parking lot either smashing and grabbing at any time of the day or night, or have you had any car thefts?" And there would have been examples in the past… where there would have been some car thefts or thefts from cars. And we've not had a single, literally not a single incident in that time whatsoever, which is… I think a pretty remarkable track record. (P03)

Another respondent mentioned that they had not seen a lot of crime and did not know if that was directly related to Green Light or if economic conditions had improved. However, later in the interview, they speculated that the program had seemed to contribute to broader decreases in crimes across the city: "the party stores and the gas stations were having robberies and that was going on. That's where it started to kind of stem the crime at those locations. That seemed to have worked because we just don't see the crime like the carjackings and the robberies" (P10).

One respondent who had, at one point, helped several businesses to enrol in the program speculated on how the program's impact may have diminished as program expanded:

> I think that when Project Green Light was first rolled out and there was a very small number of businesses that were very rigorously monitored, I think that it probably had a higher impact. Now that the system has been rolled out city-wide and there's probably less eyes on it, I think it's another one of those technology workarounds that basically have an impact, [but] the law of diminishing returns is at play and I just don't think it has the same impact when it was first done. (NP01)

One interviewee, claiming cameras helped, but qualified the statement further:

> I think the short answer is yes, but not as much as they used to. I think cameras help. End of statement. I don't think they help by some… it's three or four times. I don't have actual statistics, but my sense is where I think things like that help the most… is it creates a moment of pause because you know there is some surveillance, and it lends a sense of safety to the people in those areas that they have somewhere they can go to seek support and assistance. I think those are the benefits. (P06)

Others revealed a drastically different experience. One respondent employed at social services organization stated: "we've been in the project probably less than a year, and we've been vandalized twice in the last month and so I am about the call the city to figure out if it's really worth the investment" (P07). The respondent went on to say:

> … it just hasn't served as a deterrent for us. It may have worked for other businesses like gas stations and stuff like that. But for us, we shut down at six and so if anybody is watching us, they know between six in the evening and six at the next morning, they can come in here and can get whatever they want off the vehicles and that's what they're doing. (P07)

A representative from another social service organization was similarly sceptical of PGL's deterrent effects, using the example of public urination: "No, absolutely not. Yeah, absolutely not. No. Sorry. Nothing… I'm going to be honest with you, I don't think anybody is going to see the Green Light above our building and go, "Oh, I better not pee over there". No… ain't going to happen (P08). In some cases, anecdotes seemed to suggest that individuals had been aware of the presence of cameras, but this fact alone did not ultimately prevent a theft from occurring. In one case, one respondent mentioned, "Part of the fence was stolen, but they found the smallest sliver of the fence that wasn't covered by the cameras and they took that part of the fence" (P05).

Another aspect of deterrence theory is whether individuals believe that they will be swiftly and successfully prosecuted for a crime (Pratt & Turanovic, 2018). Like more conventional CCTV programs, PGL is believed to enhance the capacity to identify offenders using high-definition video footage that is made directly available to the police department and

to help improve case closure and prosecution rates. One respondent mentioned an incident where "there was an item stolen from the car right across the street… And we were able to provide information to the police department about the individual… and those times, where we've tracked back something that we perceived that happened, we would contact them and they would obviously have access to the footage (P03). Another respondent remarked: "it is used in prosecutions. Now what happens in the prosecutions… if they actually succeed in convicting people or if that even has a deterrent effect, I don't know. But it does, I think, play into the way the police investigate." (NP01)

Response Time and Police Presence

One of the core promises of PGL enrolment is the benefit of receiving quicker responses to 911 calls. While the partnership agreement, referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) does not explicitly mention this aspect, the notion that PGL locations would receive a "priority one" patrol response has been regularly promoted (Crime Intelligence Unit, 2020). When asked whether response times had improved, the participant who had initially mentioned concerns about response times said: "Yeah, absolutely… I have noticed that whenever I've had to call the police, they do come almost immediately" (P01). Another respondent mentioned:

> Well police response is phenomenal on our end, so we really appreciate [it], but we have that relationship, right? And we work with the police already… we even have cell phone numbers of some of our officers... the reduction in violence… I mean, we didn't have a big problem before, but we pretty much have none now. (P05)

According to another respondent: "Response time is good, but of course there's a shortage of police officers and that's a problem. But we are a priority one call, when we call… so far, things have gone very well and we haven't had to call on them too much" (P02). Another respondent mentioned that they did not notice a particular difference in response based on their enrolment in PGL:

> there's occasions from time to time to call for police. Might be just a disruption or maybe somebody's just gotten out of control outside when we've been in the building or whatever. But I've not noticed a difference one way or another in the response. We have had going back before my organization, but certainly continued through my organization… a rather strong relationship with the local precinct. (P03)

Several other respondents were unable to discern much of a difference due to relatively few instances when police were called.

Enrolment in PGL was also advertised to provide participants with enhanced police presence through 'special patrols' or visits. The partnership agreement suggests these patrols are discretionary and may involve officers entering the location, signing a logbook, patrolling parking lots and other parts of the property, and engaging loiterers (Project Green Light MOU, 2021). Other sources note that these special attention patrols were typically conducted during officer's downtime to increase visibility and typically led officers to encounters involving public order offenses such as loitering and vagrancy rather than serious or violent crimes (Circo et al., 2020; NPSP, 2021). One respondent said, "the police officers stop and sign in and… they ask how things are going and stuff like that. Sometimes they'll drive by and just sit for a minute and report that they did their check in" (P02). When asked whether police had made visits to sign the logbook, another respondent remarked, "they've done that and… that provides a little extra presence at that time, again more of a deterrent perhaps than anything" (P04). Others had a different experience: "they not coming in and checking on us or anything. So there may be more in the neighbourhood, but just not where we can see them" (P07). Another partner who had been enrolled in the program for two years said, "You know, that's my only complaint. They left us a three-ring binder with a daily log sheet where they could stop by and sign in and say they were here. There isn't one mark in that book" (P04).

One major criticism that arose during its rollout was the idea that PGL unfairly prioritized response to calls for service for businesses with the ability to pay (Hunter, 2018a). One respondent said:

> I know some of the community advocates were very critical because what they were beginning to say is that if you had a Green Light camera, police response was quicker than other areas. And you could have the same crime going on, but if you had a Green Light camera, police response would be quicker. (P10)

Another similarly mentioned, "I hear from a lot of businesses is they feel like it's pay for play. And so that's the challenge that you have with Green Light." (NP02). Indeed, nearly all participants noted that the costs of PGL were substantial (see also Mason & Herberg, 2017). Some respondents noted that the police department worked with them to make it as feasible as possible, but others admitted the costs were more than expected. One partner revealed: "It ended up being more than what I had anticipated. I couldn't believe that it cost four hundred dollars for the actual Green Light, costs four hundred dollars for the sign. I mean it was… it was crazy" (P02). Another commented, "… to a non-profit, it's a pretty big chunk of change once you add the internet, and add the cameras, add the Green Light, add the signage, and add the monthly fee for all of it altogether" (P05). Another partner who was able to secure a grant said:

> … our installation for a limited time was free and you got your first three months free and you had this reduced rate for the first year which made it very doable. But the reality is, it is a costly endeavor financially and so where it could have an impact in places that really need it, those business owners probably can't afford it. We pay over 200 a month for that. That's a lot of money. (P09)

One respondent acknowledged the potential inequalities in service that PGL could create despite being a beneficiary of the arrangement:

> The prioritization of response should be based on the type of call. And put in the queue with anyone else. I don't think it should be a more rapid response just because we're able to afford to do it. So, I don't like that aspect of it, but being partner, if we got a quick response I wouldn't complain either. But I could certainly see the other side of that. (P04)

Overall, respondents perceived the benefits of priority response and enhanced police presence differently, with some noting improvements while others were far less certain that the program made any differences in response times or police presence. Fewer incidents requiring calls for service also made it difficult for some respondents to discern clear differences in police response. Many respondents acknowledged the considerable financial costs associated with being PGL partner, while also recognizing possible inequalities in police protection between locations that could afford to participate and those who could not.

Real-Time Monitoring and Virtual Patrol

Another element of PGL is the notion that PGL camera feeds can be monitored in real-time by the police department. This is presumed to offer an additional layer of tactical and strategic intelligence support to officers responding to calls, as well as the ability to 'virtually patrol' PGL locations and pre-empt crimes.[47] Interviews provided a limited view of this aspect of the program, and few were able to share instances where they had been aware of their location being monitored in real-time. One respondent explained that when calling their neighborhood police officers for assistance, an officer told them to: "Call 911, you'll get a faster response, call them right now. I'm on my way, but call 911" (P05). The respondent explained, "when you call 911, they flip over to your Project Green Light camera immediately. They're looking at what's happening, and they immediately send you a team" (P05). Another respondent suggested that the real-time linkages between PGL locations and the police department was an important aspect that differentiated PGL cameras from conventional, standalone security camera systems:

> I mean we still have quite a few businesses, "Oh, I've got my security system and it's better than that one". And my thing is as a business, you should want to do whatever it

[47] It is not entirely clear how the department conducts virtual patrols. Some DPD sources suggest virtual patrol locations are determined based on mapping and predicting hotspots as well as calls for service (Crime Intelligence Unit, 2020; IACP, 2018).

> takes to make your customers safe. Because sometimes it's not just about having that security camera, it's about who it's linked to and who has access. Right? (P02)

Regarding virtual patrols, no respondents indicated that police had pre-emptively alerted them of a crime in progress or had intervened in a situation identified by participants' video feeds. One respondent said: "the only time police called me is when we didn't pay our bill and our camera went out, which puts us in violation of the Green Light" (P08). For this partner, who had earlier suggested that PGL did not seem to have a deterrent effect at their location, the value of PGL had been reduced to that of a conventional CCTV system which could be used by staff to monitor the exterior of the building and call police if necessary:

> [W]ell one of the things we use Green Light for, for the most part is the cameras. To see… if there's a fight outside, what's going on. Things like that. We don't use it for the police… Police don't come because of Green Light, they come because someone's called them if you know what I mean. (P08)

Suggesting that the police department was not actively monitoring their cameras, the respondent later commented on their continued use of PGL cameras, "we're still using them, but I'm not sure if it's related to why Green Light was invented" (P08).

Respondents varied in their expectation of whether the police department was actively monitoring cameras. One respondent who had a generally positive view of the program said: "I am not foolish by any means sufficiently to think that the police department is able to monitor the four or six or however many tens of thousands of cameras that are right now subscribed across the city" (P03). For others, the expected benefit of having the police actively monitor their location was an important factor in their decision to enrol,

> [P]art of joining this program for us was for it to be a crime deterrent and it hasn't proven to be that way. This weekend, at least four vehicles were vandalized, they stole the catalytic converters. And probably… not even a month ago, they got two. So I don't know if the cameras aren't being monitored or what. (P07)

The respondent's experience is not dissimilar to those of other PGL participants who have publicly questioned the program's deterrent effects where robberies, thefts, and other crimes have occurred in plain view of PGL cameras (for example, see Colthorp, 2016; Hunter, 2017a; Ikonomova, 2018a; Lange & Komer, 2021). One partner who had experienced repeated break-ins at their daycare facility told a reporter, "I want to see what was promised to me. When I had the Green Light installed, I was promised that there is someone monitoring these cameras twenty four hours a day" (Wimbley, 2022). Another aggrieved business owner told reporters after experiencing multiple thefts: "We're paying every month… So if the police is watching, what are they doing for us?... right now, to me, it's just like a blinking green light. It don't mean s---. It's not protecting nobody" (Colthorpe, 2016). Though the official MOU does not obligate the police department to monitor partners' cameras at any time, the apparent lack of real-time monitoring raises further questions about how the program was promoted, and perhaps oversold, to prospective partners and residents.

Patron and Community Sentiment

Respondents were asked how their patrons and community members felt about their enrolment in PGL. While respondents were careful not to speak for the wider community, some offered anecdotes of how they believed the program had been received. One respondent said, "I can't speak for the whole community. But the people I have spoken to are, 'Get the crime out of here. We want to live in a safe neighbourhood and if this is what it takes great'" (P05). When PGL was first presented in a community meeting, the respondent said, "the parents actually started clapping… 'This is what we need, this is perfect'" (P05). The respondent added: "And by the end of 2023, we'll probably have about a block and a half of city property covered by Project Green Light. And it's just seen as a necessity. I mean, our community members are incredibly excited we're getting it put up" (P05). Another respondent said, "From what I've heard, people

feel safer using a gas station or going to a drug store or party store that has it, rather than going to one that doesn't" (P04).

However, this was not a universal appraisal. The idea that PGL made people feel safer was complicated by the fact some perceived PGL's flashing lights to signal danger (see Herberg, 2022). For example, in one case of installations along a commercial corridor, there was a reconsideration of the program's signature green lights with a report noting that, "although the flashing lights wan [sic] off criminals, they communicate a sense of unease to potential patrons along the corridor" (DEGC, 2018, p.119). Similarly, critics and social justice advocates such have suggested that PGL's flashing green lights "look like Scarlet letters that are marking these territories as dangerous", further fuelling territorial stigmatization and criminalization of Detroit's neighborhoods (Miller, 2020, p.15). That the program's defining features could elicit multiple and contradictory perceptions suggests that the meaning and symbolism ascribed to PGL and its flashing lights, and the association with feelings of safety, is highly contested.

Interviews also revealed deeper complexities regarding community sentiment. Reflecting shifts in program legitimacy, one representative of a community development corporation (CDC) shared that they had initially helped building owners join the program, but had ceased to do so after pushback from the community:

> I mean, we have advocated for Project Green Light. The way crime sort of works over is, there will be a rash of criminal activity, people will freak out and they'll be like, "You need to get involved". I'll be like, "Well, what about Project Green Light?" And so, we've worked with building owners to have it installed and then like in the Summer of 2020 people were like, "Mmm, this is police surveillance, we don't like this, we need to get rid of it"… it's I think… a very emotionally-driven thing. So we did used to have a little bit more of a presence in it, but after 2020, I'm just like, 'This is mostly downside for us.' (NP01)

In considering options of how to ensure the security and safety of a commercial corridor, one CDC representative talked about the need to find a balance,

> … how do we find that balance? Because we have [redacted] million dollars worth of development coming in. That's going to be fairly significant for our neighborhood-based commercial corridor... So how do we make sure there's more of a public safety presence on the corridor. Is it a couple of security cars that are running each night? Is it Green Light? What does public safety really look like? But how can we do it in a way where it doesn't feel like overpolicing or a military state? (NP02)

The respondent went on to say,

> [W]e want people to feel safe, but like downtown you have Project Lighthouse and things like that… goes way beyond what Green Light even does and so it's like you can't set a foot in downtown without, now you're digital footprint is completely everywhere… and that's what I've been trying to gauge from our neighborhood, is how do we find that balance between public safety and a militarized zone. (NP02)

One respondent framed PGL as a "mixed blessing" in that it may have contributed to decreases in the theft of catalytic converters in the area, but:

> [I]t's also because we are a Latino immigrant community and so a lot of people have to come… to obtain their licenses and their tax, their papers. So it's a must location, but a lot of people don't want to be videotaped. There probably isn't a single family in these three zip codes that they have someone that's undocumented or somebody for whatever reason doesn't want to be videotaped. So it's a deterrent to crime, but it also doesn't allow communities to feel comfortable… if they're feeling like they're going to be picked up for no reason. (P10)

The respondent also revealed that PGL added a layer of surveillance to an already extensive latticework of state agencies keeping residents under a close and constant watch: "We have a lot of police… we have the Ambassador Bridge, we have ICE, we have border patrol, we have immigration… so there's a lot of vehicles in this area" (P10). When asked if the respondent had a chance to talk to people in the community about the program, they responded:

> Some of the community advocates, both in the Latino community and the Middle Eastern community, congresswoman Rashida Talib, they're on the surface very opposed to this, they think it's profiling… because there are people that aren't documented… that somebody is at risk of being picked up and deported. So they were very much against it. I don't hear anything from individuals. Individuals tend to not get into those discussions because like I say there probably isn't a family in these three zip codes that doesn't have

> somebody that wants to fly below the radar. People drive very carefully, they don't want to get stopped for various reasons. (P10)

Thus, while PGL was seen to represent safety for some individuals, the program could also be seen in distinctly different terms for other historically marginalized groups- i.e., as an extension of oppressive forms of racialized surveillance and overpolicing of communities of color and migrant populations (Boyce, 2018; Martinez-Aranda, 2022). Initial correspondence with a Black business owner was telling when they revealed: "… we had green light removed before we opened [redacted] two years ago. It was offensive to our patrons and we do not support it." (personal communication, December 5, 2022).

Facial recognition was another frequent topic of discussion where respondents had differing views and expressed different levels of comfort with the technology. One respondent was adamant that many had made false equivalences between PGL and facial recognition and felt that PGL was misunderstood:

> You know… some people, even though there is signage, some people don't realize what it does. There's still some negative thoughts about it… thinking about the facial recognition stuff, but that is NOT what Project Green Light is about. So there is no facial recognition technology in Project Green Light. (P02)

Another respondent felt the technology still contained flaws, especially regarding accurate identification: "I don't necessarily like the facial recognition right now, but they've got some work to do on that. And until it could be used with a very high rate of success, then it should be shelved until then" (P04). Others were more sceptical about whether PGL partners were forthcoming about the use of facial recognition technology: "Yeah, I mean… I think you talk to the folks who are running Green Light and they tell you that, 'No we do not use facial recognition'. But, I'm like, 'If the cameras are up there and the infrastructure are there, are you

sure that you are not?' I don't even necessarily trust that" (NP02). One participant mentioned that when facial recognition was becoming a "hot topic citywide at city council meetings", they,

> asked the question point blank of the police department… I wanted to confirm that indeed the cameras on my site do not have facial recognition capabilities and they do not. So I have been able to share that if somebody asks that… and that… to the best of my knowledge answers the question sufficiently. (P03)

Acknowledging the potential of the technology to misidentify Black residents, the respondent said, "I would have qualms about having those cameras if they had facial recognition capabilities… or even you know entered into that whole sphere of things… It would certainly put a strain on my belief system" (P03). These examples show that rather than a common understanding, many respondents had varied interpretations of how facial recognition worked and how PGL interfaced with it. Varied interpretations of the functions, imagined potentials, and pitfalls of technology, thus, seemed to reflect a contested 'technopolitics' at the heart of PGL (see Müller & Richmond, 2023).

PGL in a High-Crime Neighborhood

Most of the PGL partners cited thus far had experienced relatively few, if any, encounters with violent crime. In most cases, PGL had been adopted as a potential deterrent to relatively infrequent property crimes ranging from vandalism and auto and catalytic converter theft to instances of breaking and entering. Overall, respondents gave the impression that the communities in which they were situated were spared from the high rates of interpersonal violence and harm that were considered a fact of life in some of the city's more economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. The one exception was an interview with a middle-aged, white woman who managed a local business in one of Detroit's poorest and most disinvested communities. The woman, who I refer to as Maria, was also involved in community work spanning several decades and had a unique perspective on the issues residents faced on a daily

basis. Maria mentioned that the neighborhood was also known for having a high violence rate, where residents were forced to navigate the everyday reality of interpersonal violence. When I asked her about the major challenges facing the community, she said:

> Well, I'll start with a joke from somebody in the neighbourhood… They said, 'If we didn't have crime, we wouldn't know what to talk to each other about'. And I thought to myself, 'Boy, there is some truth to that unfortunately'. And so, it has its peaks and we've seen some spikes recently and that's always a concern… it's a major topic. I'd say housing is probably the number one issue in the community and crime would be the other. A lot of car theft. Robbery, not so much burglary. But yeah but robbery of a person. (P09)

In providing her diagnosis, she stated simply, "you know… there's a reason there's the violence and the reason there's the violence is the high poverty level here". Maria mentioned that the pandemic and rapid inflation had created a precarious economic environment: "we've got eggs that cost five or six dollars a dozen. You can't even afford basic food items" (P09). Despite the neighborhood seeing a recent spike in crime, Maria suggested that incarceration was not an answer to what ailed the community:

> … it's tough out here. There's a spirit of desperation right now. And when you're desperate, you don't care about human life. You just don't. And so we've gotta address it from that level as much as from a criminality perspective. Locking people up is not the answer for so many non-violent criminal offenses. It's not. It doesn't rehabilitate people. If it does, let's do it to everybody. But it doesn't. So there's gotta be alternative means to incarceration for non-violent crimes. And we aren't willing as a society to look at that, we just aren't. We spend our money on prisons, it's a great industry. It's been privatized even… But we love to build prisons as Americans. Americans love to build prisons. And it's not how the rest of world operates quite honestly. (P09)

Despite Maria's critical remarks about the reliance on incarceration, it came as a surprise when Maria expressed great praise for PGL. In fact, among all PGL partners I interviewed, Maria was among its strongest advocates, going as far to say, "They could put me on a commercial, that's how much I'm a believer in it now when I wasn't before because I saw the dramatic impact it had on our business" (P09).

The disjuncture between, on the one hand, seeing the futility of incarceration to address problems of poverty, and on the other hand, supporting a program that arguably represented the cutting-edge of contemporary carceral expansion, was unexpected and further revealed the complexity of people's opinions about surveillance. When I asked how she had first learned of the program, she told me that she heard about it off and on for several years and was initially sceptical: "who needs that? I mean… I was very sceptical myself in terms of what it could do or whether the police would really respond based upon it" (P09). However, her interest peaked when some local foundation money became available to cover the costs of the initial installation and first few months of associated maintenance costs. She explained that she had been encountering escalating problems with a group of local drug dealers that came to a head when they began to use her business as a preferred location to dispose of drugs during police raids:

> [T]hey could walk out and the police would frisk them and whatever and there's nothing on them. Well, we can't have that. We can't have that kind of horror show in our property. And it was just… you can't stand in front of our property, they kept taunting. And so we got the Green Light… Immediately, they wouldn't step over the alley line because it keeps real time, you know, in terms of what's going on. And how it's monitored? I don't have a clue because if there's 50,000 green lights in the city of Detroit, what kind of system is really monitoring all of them? But that's not what these guys think about. They think, the police are watching me right now. I better behave. You know… Hey, it cleaned everything up just so immediately. (P09)

Maria also suggested that prior to enrolling, the drug dealers seemed to be self-assured that they would avoid repercussions for their actions: "drug dealers come and take what they can… It's a test. They want to test and see what you're going to do" (P09). Maria referenced an event in the prior year when one individual pulled out a:

> concealed weapon and held everybody up and stole all of their watches and wallets… we all know who he was but he figured nobody was going to do anything. Cuz what are you going to do?… because, see the issue is in poor communities, you're afraid because the police don't usually do anything. And so, you're not going to make all this mess and

> scream and then nobody presses charges or he gets off on some technicality and so people don't go to the police. (P09)

Maria's revelation that in poor communities, police did not usually "do anything" supports the notion that poor, racialized communities tend to be 'overpoliced and underprotected' (Balto, 2019; Bell, 2017). Maria's decision to enrol in PGL could be perceived as an effort to access additional police resources and protection in an environment where such protection was not only constrained (e.g., exemplified by poor 911 response), but was being categorically denied. However, when I asked Maria whether PGL had improved police response, she replied that her staff did not usually call police even though the assumption was that, as a partner, the location would receive prioritized response: "I will say just in general I think the police have been more responsive, but I don't think the staff that work at [redacted]… it's not their first thought to call police… they think the police won't come. So it's an untested theory as to whether the police come quicker if called" (P09). Thus, for Maria, a primary benefit of PGL centered around its deterrent value, which appeared to provide an immediate resolution to recurring issues that police were unable or unwilling to deal with directly. Since the property was an important place of local communal life, Maria also seemed to appreciate the ability of PGL to alleviate a significant source of anxieties and fear among those who frequented the business:

> It's a building that only has one entrance and exit. But people know that, so once you're in there, you're cornered if somebody comes in like that guy did with a gun. And so I don't think that way when I go into a place, but a lot of neighbors do and they're always looking for where the exit is... Well, what that means too is that sometimes people don't feel safe in there because no one can see what's going on. So to have Green Light… it just assuages a lot of that fear and discomfort. (P09)

Commenting again on her assessment of the program, Maria proclaimed the program "has really been an answer to our needs" (P09). When asked if anyone in the community had raised concerns about her property being a PGL location in relation to the broader implications of surveillance, she responded, "No… No. When it comes to crime, it's interesting how people are

willing to give up some of their rights and this neighborhood has been plagued with drug dealers for so long" (P09).

I still had many questions after my conversation with Maria. I wondered whether her patrons would feel similarly about PGL and the "trade-offs" between individual rights and security, and whether PGL was the answer that they were looking for. After all, Maria occupied a particular position of privilege as a white, manager of a business in a predominantly Black neighbourhood, with the ability to make key decisions about security and surveillance, the impacts of which would be primarily borne by Black residents. If the intention to install PGL cameras was made under the premise of deterring the tyranny of local drug dealers, did it not also intensify the police gaze over lesser, trivial, yet criminalized behaviors such as selling loose cigarettes or hanging out in front of the establishment? Did it alter the nature of the space and how people traversed through it, where the enhanced presence and gaze of police officers could make even the most upstanding, law-abiding citizens uncomfortable? And what happened when residents moved outside the view of PGL cameras? What guarantees were there to ensure they were not victimized on the way home or at another commercial establishment a block away?

At the same time, Maria left me with the impression that she made many of her decisions with the community in mind and often with the input of other community leaders. She revealed the very real, visceral, and human dimensions of people's desires and needs to feel safe, and how a program like PGL could be seen as a solution to a specific set of problems in a context where residents could not fully rely on the police to protect and serve them, and where sources of communal safety had been eroded by decades of disinvestment and austerity. In this case, PGL could be seen to have offered a 'technological fix' to deal with an acute threat of violence that undoubtedly provoked a great deal of fear and disruption in the community. It was also a 'fix' in

the sense that it provided a technological workaround to more pervasive issues around inadequacies of police response and protection in poor communities. Far from a robust solution that sought to address any root causes of the crime and violence (undeniably, a far more difficult proposition and one that many communities do not have the luxury to wait for), PGL offered the promise of simply deterring it and likely displacing it elsewhere.

The Promises and Limitations of Speculative Security Fixes

The conversations with PGL partners revealed the complicated and nuanced ways people grapple with the promises and limitations of speculative technologies promoted as solutions to complex societal issues including crime and violence. Partners discussed varying rationales for enrolling in PGL, conferred value differently to the various aspects of the program, and harbored diverse views about what it could accomplish for them and for the city as a whole. Interviews suggested that PGL's initial appeal was typically linked to its deterrent potential and a number of promoted benefits related to enhanced police protection (e.g., prioritized response and increased police presence and monitoring). The degree to which partners felt that the police department made good on these promises played a role in their overall evaluation of the program. Though some were confident that police response and presence had improved after joining the program, the experiences of others revealed that some of the core benefits like priority one response, 'special attention' visits, and virtual patrol were not always guaranteed, perhaps superseded by other logics of prioritization and resource allocation decided by the police department. The program is likely to have been particularly disappointing to those partners who, under the expectation that their cameras were actively monitored by the police department, have seen the program fail to serve as a deterrent. One respondent who had not experienced any of the

promised benefits shared that when they initially looked into PGL, they "thought it was a good investment, but now we're second guessing" (P07).

Interviews also revealed that some of the program's components such as real-time monitoring were subject to the law of diminishing returns as more partners joined the program (see Gross, 2018b; 2018c). To some degree, prioritized response and special patrols were also very likely subject to dilution as the pool of participants grew. This has been a criticism of some long-time partners including one of the first gas station operators to enrol as a partner who told reporters: "At the beginning it was perfect… We were one of the people who first put that green light, but now we're at square one, to be honest with you… Everybody has it and when you call the police they are overwhelmed and they don't respond" (Ikonomova, 2018a). PGL partners who have had relatively few crime incidents and have rarely had to call police for emergencies, may have been spared this particular reality of the program's growth. However it does raise questions about the police department's intentions on fulfilling its promises to partners and allowing the program to expand beyond its capacities. While the Memorandum of Understanding outlines a long list of partner responsibilities, it is careful not to obligate the department to provide the aforementioned benefits, making no mention of priority response and stating that special patrols and real-time monitoring are provided at the DPD's discretion. Indeed, it is explicitly stated that the "MOU does not oblige DPD to monitor the Entity's camera at any time" (Project Green Light MOU, 2021, p.5). These power asymmetries built into the agreement, and the failures of the program to live up to its promises for some partners, highlight the tensions underlying novel security partnerships as well as discrepancies between the visions and the on-the-ground realities of speculative security.

Despite these shortcomings, many respondents mentioned that, above all else, PGL helped to create a greater sense of safety. The idea that PGL could provide a *feelin*g of physical safety was something that participants highly valued, sometimes independent of whether other benefits had actually been realized. Whether infused with the added social expectations and legal responsibilities and liabilities associated with being a manager of space, or out of a desire of trying to meet community needs for safe spaces, the pursuit of safety seemed to be one of core drivers of program participation. Yet at the same time, it was less clear to what extent these feelings of safety were tied to actual changes in levels of crime and violence and were attributable to PGL, or whether the program was merely an "expensive placebo" for resident insecurities and fears of victimization (Goold, 2004, p.27, see also Miller, 2020). As one respondent suggested, "Project Green Light with the sign, with the cameras, with the light, it's almost like a security blanket, like it gives you that nice feeling" (NP01).

This is not to say that PGL's deterrent effects were completely illusory. For example, in Maria's case, PGL did appear to deter a group of local drug dealers who became immediately reluctant to cross an alley line once they learned that PGL cameras had been installed. The cameras thus created a perceptible, yet invisible, 'circuitry' of digital borders around the property mediated by the sightlines of PGL cameras (see Muñiz, 2022). This is in many ways represents the idealized deterrent value and vision that is implicit in the 'safe haven' concept; the idea that the presence of PGL cameras can communicate to certain undesirable groups (e.g., drug dealers, loiterers, panhandlers) a greater likelihood of identification and attention from police, while also imbuing a sense of safety for desired consumers and patrons. In Maria's case, PGL seemed to provide value as a socio-technical 'fix' (see Coleman, 2004), insofar that it offered an immediate reprieve from a source of insecurity that threatened to unsettle local, communal life and that

police were unable or unwilling to address directly. Such speculative technological 'fixes', however, can ultimately prove to be fallible and their assumed benefits temporary, fleeting, and never fully guaranteed. For Maria, PGL's effects rested on a set of brittle assumptions about the deterrence it wielded and the hope that individuals would continue to be deterred by the belief that police were actively monitoring the location's camera feeds; an assumption that is less sustainable as the growth in partners outstrips the police department's ability to monitor growing numbers of PGL locations. In entertaining these imaginaries of deterrence, one must also reckon with their geographical limitations and the possibility that unwanted activities may be displaced to other locations not under PGL surveillance. In this sense, PGL may simply mimic broader security interventions informed by theories of situational crime prevention and/or 'Crime Prevention through Environmental Design' (CPTED) that are not necessarily premised on addressing root causes, but rely on temporary fixes and interventions in the built environment to move social problems around or 'fortress up' against them (Davis, 1990; Fyfe, Bannister, & Kearns, 1998). It is here where security's aesthetic dimensions, reflected in an assembly of cameras or PGL's strobing green light, serve as a projection of an idea of security that simultaneously render spaces inclusionary and exclusionary (Caldiera, 2000). These aesthetics are differentially interpreted and elicit diverse affective responses, while also intricately shaping the material world (Ghertner et al., 2020).

These points of discussion highlight some challenges of sustaining the speculative visions of security that underpin PGL. As a form of speculative security, PGL's rapid growth has occurred independently of conclusive evidence of its efficacy as crime prevention tool. Securing buy-in for PGL has involved building legitimacy around the imagined potential of new technology and aspirational visions of safety through which to imagine the future, revitalized,

and securitized city. In trying to stabilize these dominant sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim, 2013), police and city officials have regularly extolled the promises of new iterations of 'networked' CCTV and 'real-time' surveillance technology paired with highly spatialized visions and discursive constructions such as the 'safe haven' concept. First piloted in the city's downtown through Project Lighthouse, officials reformulated the security imaginary of 'safe havens' to appeal to concerned residents by seeking to equate areas under camera surveillance with places of refuge from the unpredictable dangers and disorder of the city's neighborhoods.

As with many crime prevention initiatives, PGL has also been tied to various ethics of revitalization. The goals of the program have been about much more than 'crime' in the legal sense of the word, having as much to do with creating inviting city spaces and rooting out forms of disorder antithetical to hegemonic visions of the 'New Detroit'. A central component of PGL has involved responsibilizing partners to maintain the aesthetic standards of their properties, which was evident in the cases of gas stations and other commercial establishments open late at night. Infused with Broken Windows-inspired ideas about relationships between signs of disorder and crime, Chief Craig routinely expressed his disdain for 'dirty' gas stations and businesses that tolerated disorderly behaviours such as loitering and panhandling, suggesting that they would not meet the criteria for a PGL partner. Thus, for certain locations, being a PGL partner also meant taking a more active role in co-regulating the urban landscape and helping to clamp down on signs of disorder inconsistent with revitalization and commercial vibrancy. As such, a key component of the program has been its novel partnership agreement through which new responsibilities for surveillance and the production of welcoming and orderly city spaces have been distributed.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the expansion of CCTV surveillance partnerships as part of wider efforts to securitize and revitalize Detroit's neighborhoods. In contrast to publicly-funded, open-street CCTV schemes familiar in the UK, Australia, and Canada (Carr, 2016; Coleman, 2004; Hier, 2010), PGL has relied much more heavily on non-state actors, and particularly its enrolees, to help finance, build, and maintain camera networks utilized by police. That partners have been asked to fund their participation, which grants them access to priority police response and additional police protection, reflects how policing as a 'public good' is becoming commodified in new and complicated ways (Jones & Newburn, 2006; Loader & Walker, 2001). Municipal offloading and responsibilization through partnerships epitomizes the type of policing that resonates in an age of austerity; one that is even more reliant on private extensions of the surveillant assemblage (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997) and cultivating "surveillant citizenship" across civic and commercial realms (see Stumpf, 2020, p.119).

At the same time, PGL has revealed the distinct challenges of extending these forms of surveillance and security beyond the highly privatized and corporatized downtown to the city's majority Black and brown neighborhoods. While PGL partners' were generally motivated to enrol in the program to enhance safety and security at their locations, feelings of improved safety were not universal sentiments. As anecdotes revealed, PGL sometimes failed to deliver its promised benefits. It also had the potential to produce feelings that were quite the opposite of safety, as reflected in anecdotes that described flashing green lights as giving an impression of danger and unease. There was also a potential for community perceptions and sentiments associated with the program to change over time. Such was the case where participation in PGL was discontinued after community concerns about police surveillance heightened in the summer

of 2020, following nation-wide protests against police brutality following the murders of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd. Additionally, PGL's connection to facial recognition technology and its proclivity for misidentifying non-white faces undoubtedly complicated public approval of PGL, thus revealing the distinctly contested nature of PGL as a form of speculative security. Exploring some of these controversies and contentions, the next chapter seeks to further interrogate the deeply contested politics of speculative security as reflected in PGL and camera surveillance initiatives in Detroit.

CHAPTER 5: THE CONTESTED TERRAINS OF SPECULATIVE SECURITY

Introduction

In contrast to the increasingly privatized and corporatized spaces of the city center, where security partnerships were negotiated primarily between police and larger corporate entities, PGL's expansion into Detroit's everyday, residential spaces has revealed a more complex story of legitimacy and coalition building by the city and police department. The previous chapter aimed to illuminate to what extent these visions and the value propositions of the PGL partnership appealed to prospective and existing partners, and explored their experiences and perceptions of the program. The current chapter seeks to build on these insights, drawing from a wider selection of interviews with community members and community development professionals to understand the diverse perspectives and sentiments associated with the expansion of this speculative form of security.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of existing literature on public attitudes towards open-street CCTV while considering some limitations of this research in light of the growing complexity of contemporary camera surveillance networks. I then draw on several intersecting literatures on community policing, responsibilization, and citizen watching to explore how the state has traditionally relied on activating forms of 'surveillant citizenship' to supplement policing initiatives (Stumpf, 2020; van der Land, 2014). Informed by these debates, I argue that to garner support and build legitimacy around PGL, the police department tried to appeal to segments of the citizenry actively involved in collective efforts to stabilize their communities in the midst of successive waves of disinvestment and city service retrenchment. I explore some of PGL's strongest bases of support, found most notably in civic volunteerism and grassroots 'public safety activism'[48] that has arisen in the context of accumulated anxieties over local

[48] I refer to 'public safety activism' as a generalized embodiment of logics, rationalities, beliefs, and practices that center on addressing public safety concerns. It is perhaps best represented by groups that adopt informal practices of

decline, violence, and the unreliability of police response. The discussion is informed by interviews with members of block clubs, neighbourhood organizations, and citizen patrols who discuss the prospects of PGL as a community safety initiative.

The next section explores the intersections between PGL and the work of community development corporations (CDCs). It highlights the challenges of producing consensus around definitions of community safety and of gauging community sentiment associated with speculative security interventions like PGL. The subsequent section examines the fractures and fault lines in community support for PGL, especially with respect to debates concerning the police department's use of facial recognition technology. Drawing on BOPC transcripts, media coverage, and interview material, the section explores efforts by the police department to secure consent and stabilize dominant security imaginaries in the face of challenges and resistance from residents, activists, and social justice advocates. The chapter concludes by highlighting the contingent and constantly shifting nature of consensus (and dissensus) around speculative security, foregrounding how civic actors contribute to, resist, and shape speculative securitization processes and practices. Addressing some of the limitations of structural accounts, I argue that locally-situated accounts that recognize the agency of everyday actors may provide more nuanced understandings of how forms of speculative security proliferate in spite of their contentious, uncertain, and contested nature.

Public Attitudes Towards Open-Street CCTV

Researchers in surveillance studies and adjacent fields have been occupied with the perplexing questions of why, in spite of a lack of conclusive evidence and potential privacy and civil liberties concerns, CCTV has continued to proliferate, why some citizens seem so

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lateral surveillance and may partner with police on crime prevention and other safety initiatives (see also Doering, 2020; Patillo, 2007).

ambivalent about its growth, and why some have demanded its adoption (Doyle et al., 2012; Germain et al., 2013; Hier, 2010; Kroener, 2014; Norris, 2012; Webster, 2009). Previous studies exploring citizen perceptions of CCTV provide some possible, but partial answers. Typically, public support for CCTV derives from its perceived efficacy as a tool to reduce crime, to allay fears of crime, and enhance feelings of safety (Ditton, 2000, see also Leman-Langlois, 2008). In many cases, high-profile crime incidents and heightened fears associated with rising rates of crime and disorder has resulted in greater local demands for CCTV surveillance (Norris et al., 1998; Walby, 2006). However, CCTV's relation to increased perceptions of safety has not been straight-forward. For example, Ditton (2000) found that popular support for CCTV in Glasgow's city center was based on the belief that CCTV cameras would improve feelings of safety, but installation of cameras yielded no improvements in perceived safety. When it came to installation in residential areas, Gill et al. (2007) found that while CCTV was generally supported by the public, support fell significantly after implementation. The authors concluded that the idea of CCTV may have been far more appealing than its reality and that the loss of public support was partially attributable to a realization that CCTV cameras played little or no part in influencing fear of crime among survey respondents. Critical accounts suggest that there is a tendency for the public to overestimate the effectiveness and capabilities of CCTV and that lay publics often misunderstand how the technology works in practice (Armstrong & Norris, 1999; Webster, 2009). Others argue that the apparent consensus around the idea that CCTV 'works' seems to have been largely "constructed through the media, audits, surveys, evaluations, legislation, and so forth" (Hempel & Töpfer, 2009), revealing that public opinion regarding CCTV is often shaped by larger social and political contexts.

At the same time, there is also a sense in which "CCTV"[49] no longer adequately encapsulates the types of systems reflected in programs like PGL, whose cameras interface with broader array of emergent technologies like shot detection systems, facial and other biometric recognition software, and video analytics (see for example, Ferenbok & Clement, 2012). This certainly raises questions around evaluation and how to properly assess these larger, complex webs of technology to determine if they 'work' (e.g., determining causation and effects). But it also suggests that a reappraisal of popular support of camera surveillance programs may be needed in the context of their growing complexity. In other words, prior studies of citizen support for open-street CCTV may be less accurate in forecasting public perceptions of evolving assemblages of new, speculative security technologies that are being built on top of camera surveillance. Since it is becoming more difficult to dissociate cameras from this larger, networked architecture of surveillance technologies (e.g., facial recognition, video analytics, etc.) gauging public sentiment is also becoming more complex. Indeed, concerns and resistance associated with the adoption of experimental surveillance and policing technologies, particularly in communities of color, have grown over the last several years, prompting calls for the dismantling of entire systems of city surveillance (see, for example, Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, 2021). As such, there is a need for greater recognition of the contingent and shifting nature of popular support and resistance associated with these larger, constantly evolving ensembles of speculative security. Thus, the first key contribution of the chapter centers on examining the extent to which public attitudes, political valences, and common understandings

[49] While Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) tends to be the accepted terminology, contemporary camera surveillance are increasingly open rather than closed systems and can be linked to other components over the internet and may employ real-time analytics (see Ferenbok & Clement, 2012 for a more extensive discussion). These paradigm shifts in CCTV has sometimes been differently reflected in terms such as "2nd generation" (Surrette, 2005), "smart" (Gates, 2010), algorithmic (Armstrong & Norris, 1999; Introna & Wood, 2004), and "automated" CCTV.

associated with surveillance reflect the deeper complexity of PGL, not simply as a traditional, open-street CCTV network, but as a complex, mutating socio-technical assemblage.

In addition, as this dissertation has thus far maintained, it would be difficult to sustain an explanation of PGL's growth as simply a top-down implementation by powerful social and political actors. In line with other scholars who argue that structuralist accounts (e.g., theories of revanchism) tend to overlook the nuances of bottom-up demand for carceral expansion and surveillance (for example, see Atkinson & Millington, 2019; Anderson, 2020; Hier, 2003; Walby, 2006), there is a need for more nuanced explanations of why some residents have come to support speculative forms of surveillance in their communities. Rejecting the determinism of perspectives that pin surveillance expansion on the instrumental desires of powerful elites, Hier (2003, p.401), suggests that a "complete understanding of contemporary surveillance systems must take seriously the social and cultural forces which give rise to, and sustain, assemblages" as well as the foundations of local, popular support for surveillance which are not always driven by financial or material interests (see also Hier, 2010; Walby, 2006). Taking into account the diverse set of actors involved in PGL's expansion, the chapter's second main contribution is to provide a different explanation of the multiple and contested interests and visions through which speculative security is constituted.

Routinized Watching and Surveillant Subjectivities

Scholars have been keen to point out that before surveillance ever became associated with digital and technological forms, there existed various non-technological practices and cultures of routinized watching and monitoring (Lyon, 2018). Early U.S. history provides numerous accounts of the racialized nature of surveillance that emerged during colonial and antebellum periods. This included slave patrols that deputized white populations to surveil and

capture runaway slaves and lantern laws that reinforced the hypervisibility of Black, mixed-race, and indigenous enslaved populations (Browne, 2015; see also Williams, 2015; Walcott, 2021). Drawing on an extended genealogy of surveillance in the U.S., from the hue and cry and colonial town watch systems to contemporary neighborhood watches, Reeves (2017) argues that American society has continuously nurtured cultures of mutual suspicion, vigilance, and surveillance, prompting ordinary citizens to engage in rituals of watching or what he refers to as 'lateral surveillance' (see also Andrejevic, 2004; Chan, 2008).

In the inter- and post-war period, forms of lateral surveillance figured prominently in civic life and neighborhood associations. Some of the more regressive and racist incarnations of citizen-watching were found in highly segregated cities like Detroit, where anti-integrationist neighborhood associations carried out lateral surveillance informed by suspicions, fears, and antagonisms of Black residents and racialized decline (Sugrue, 1996, see also Meyer, 2001). As one interview respondent remarked, the term 'civic association' was once a watch word for white resident groups formed "to keep Black people out of the neighborhood" (CO02).[50] During the civil unrest of the 1960s, forms of citizen watching became increasingly institutionalized with the federal government calling for civilians to become more involved in local crime prevention and order maintenance. The Kerner Commission, for example, expressed optimism about the role of neighborhood associations in preventing and reducing civil disorder by helping: "to open channels of communication between government and ghetto residents" (Kerner Commission, 1968, p.150). During Detroit's 1967 urban rebellion, local residents and homeowners fearing

[50] Citizen watching also existed alongside forms of civic participation that espoused mutual reciprocity, care, and progressive politics. For example, in many segregated Black neighborhoods, block clubs served as vehicles for mutual aid, civil rights leadership, challenges to urban renewal policies, and expressions of socialism (see Dillard, 2007, p.224; Laskey, 2019; Seligman, 2016). In researching citizen watch groups, some scholars note their ambiguous nature and argue that citizen-based surveillance is not always founded on, or leads to, a culture of generalized suspicion (Purenne & Palierse, 2016).

looting and destruction of property made recommendations to the mayor to mobilize civilian "peace patrols" as a way to "use citizens to try to control the situation" accompanied by a "forceful crackdown" by the police (Kerner Commission, 1967, p.53). It was suggested that block clubs could help "seal off areas from potential disorder" (West, 1970, p.84), while aiding law enforcement in the protection property and restoration of order. According to Reeves (2017, p.97), some citizen patrols were organized to "fight rioting" which, in the context of the rebellion, meant mobilizing citizen-based surveillance targeting Black residents. Seeing the value of civic volunteerism and enrolling citizens in state-led crime and social control efforts, subsequent federal interventions aimed to nurture citizen responsibilization and forms of surveillant citizenship including Nixon's 1968 taskforce on violence, the national Neighborhood Watch Program established in 1972 by the National Sheriff's Association, and 'Citizen Action Programs' of the mid-1970s which encouraged volunteer citizen patrols (Caplan et al., 1977; Reeves, 2017; Seligman, 2016, p.199). These efforts coincided with local police departments' early experiments in community policing and community relations initiatives seeking to further responsibilize residents to play a larger role in policing their own communities (Collings-Wells, 2019; Neighborhood Patrols and the Law, 1973; Yin et al., 1976).

In the aftermath of Detroit's rebellion, citizen radio patrols (also known as 'CB patrols') became a mainstay, with 26 patrols established across the city (Greenberg, 2021). Though many subsequently disbanded, several remained active, and new ones emerged seeking to bolster neighborhood security, watch out for fellow neighbors, and provide mutual aid.[51] One

[51] I noted that citizen patrols in Detroit were typically (though not exclusively) found in neighborhoods with higher levels of homeownership. In some cases, they operated alongside private security forces funded by special assessment district levies on homeowners. Though many citizen radio patrols were likely to have varying degrees of autonomy and independence from the police department prior to 2010, this changed with active efforts by DPD to formalize patrols and eventually integrate citizen patrol radios into the city's RTCC.

respondent commented on the (dis)continuities between these earlier and contemporary citizen patrol movements:

> … patrols probably had a little bit of roots in racism in the areas that were still predominantly [white]… not just racism, but classism. You kind of have different tiers of neighborhoods in the city. Like, those top-tier neighborhoods, your Grandmont Rosedales, your University Districts… your Sherwood Forests… They all had some form of patrol probably since the 1950s when that stuff kind of came into existence really. I think initially there was more of that [racism], but now it's more neighbourhood stabilization. (CDC01)

Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, citizen patrols became heavily involved neighborhood stabilization efforts, seeking to mitigate the multiple effects of widespread foreclosures and housing abandonment (Kinder, 2016).

Today, citizen patrols and other forms of citizen-based surveillance can be understood as one part of a larger collective of civic volunteerism and associational life that has filled the void of municipal withdrawal, structural disinvestment, and inadequate and/or unreliable public services (Kinder, 2016). In exploring 'do-it-yourself urbanism' in Detroit, Kinder (2016) highlights how residents partake in security labors including performing territorial and communicative acts that "create illusion of authority and control over space" (Kinder, 2016, p.38) such as mowing unkempt lawns, boarding up abandoned houses to disguise vacancy, and using their "eyes on the street to negotiate shared landscapes of belonging and exclusion" (Kinder, 2016, p.146). Such self-provisioning activities are understood to help to improve perceptions of safety, retain neighbors, maintain functioning property markets, and mitigate the manifold effects of residential vacancy, decay, and blight (Kinder, 2016). In some interviews with members of neighborhood associations, I noted that forms of citizen watching were organized in response to sudden ruptures in local community life. For example, in the midst of an unprecedented vacancies in their neighborhood following the 2008 subprime crisis, several

members of a neighborhood association got together to keep an eye on neighboring vacant homes to prevent squatting:

> So we had a group of folks on their own just decide we're going to help watch these properties and make sure that folks aren't… they're not trying to take them over, they're not living in them illegally, and that they also that they don't turn into blight… because people are going in and trashing them or just because they are in disrepair and open to the elements and stuff like that. (CO01)

One elderly, Black leader of a community association mentioned that her neighbourhood had gone "through a transition... the city went broke, people couldn't keep up with their homes and… they walked away from their property" (CO06). "We had older people who wanted to do something and not just let the neighborhood go to ruins" (CO06), she said. Interestingly, while her association had formed its own citizen radio patrol, she revealed that they were given official lights and decals to put on their patrol car, but "a lot of people don't like that. They don't want people know that they're part of CB patrol… I don't have a problem with it… when they see us during Halloween, we have little lights on so people do get comfortable" (CO06). Her remarks suggested that some patrollers were uneasy about others knowing that they were conducting lateral surveillance in their neighborhoods, but she also opined that community residents found comfort in fellow neighbors patrolling the streets.

Though many associations seemed to be about much more than local safety concerns (e.g., they were also community hubs of sociality, disseminators of information, and providers of mutual aid), several respondents said they had originally established or revived their neighborhood associations due to local, violent crime incidents. For example, one respondent said her association was resurrected after being dormant for about 10 years when a neighbour was robbed at gunpoint outside their home. She recalled: "[W]e had a captain for each block and a newsletter deliverer. And we started neighborhood newsletters organized around safety and

meetings… you know to inform the community" (CO02). Another respondent had mentioned that her association had formed after a young woman had been raped and murdered:

> I went to door to door talking to people about the fact that we can organize to look out for each other. I guess you could say it was more like a watch program that I wanted to do initially, but then I also knew that we needed to keep track of each other… So I figured the best way to build relationships was for us to have monthly meetings and then I started talking to the city and they started encouraging having either a block club or an association for the area. I wanted to get us organized and get us looking after each other and maybe offering some programs in the community as well. (CO03)

Several respondents suggested that community safety was a frequent point of discussion in neighborhood meetings. Highlighting the varied nature of public safety concerns, one respondent said,

> [I]t comes up in meetings and it shows up in different ways. So it may show up where people are concerned about folks who drive fast on the street. It may show up where we have this… mental health drop off facility and overnight shelter… it has increased crime in the neighbourhood. (CO07)

Residents typically espoused much broader conceptions of safety that were not necessarily tethered to categories of violence or even crime. This included fixing deteriorating sidewalks, creating places for children to play as alternatives to dilapidated and vacant houses and structures, and advocating for speed bumps to prevent speeding. Sometimes, safety issues blended together with quality of life concerns, defined by some residents to include nuisance issues. Some respondents recalled engaging with local officers to help deal with loud music or neighbors leaving their garbage cans out. One respondent mentioned: "you have really strong engaged neighbourhood associations too that know what small crimes are happening, that want their residents ticketed if they leave their garbage can out" (CDC01). He mentioned that several, more affluent, middle-class neighborhoods experienced rapid loss in homeownership during the mortgage foreclosure crisis, and an influx of speculative investors had drastically reduced rates of homeownership. As a result, remaining homeowners sought greater code enforcement by

police: “you had investors coming in that were bringing in more renters and so the neighbourhoods probably went from about 90% homeowners to about 60% homeowners because the foreclosures had happened. Things like that, which had led to higher crime rates” (CDC01). In this regard, police were often viewed by some residents as potential partners in neighborhood stabilization efforts and key players in the larger quality of life equation as they observed rapid changes in the character of their neighborhoods. This included not only the idea that police could address violent crimes that elicited the most fear among residents, but also more mundane acts that contributed to improvements in local perceptions of the neighbourhood such as helping residents clear and secure vacant and blighted housing, investigating suspected drug houses and squatters, addressing dumping and stripping of properties, and carrying out code enforcement and nuisance abatement. In many ways, the establishment of a neighbourhood association was a bid for more city resources including from police, and a means to ensure that their concerns were being taken seriously, as one respondent articulated,

> [B]efore we started our organization, it used to be difficult to get an officer to come to the home if you were having a problem. And a lot of people had a bad image about police in the community as well. So once we started attending their meetings, started building relationships with them, it seemed like we were able to get a better response with the community and the police when they came to the need of having officers in the neighborhood. And we felt like we were being listened to when things happened. (CO03)

Tapping into the Civic Realm

The building of informal partnerships with residents and the leveraging of collective civic capacities was a particularly important aspect of the DPD’s community policing strategy in the lead up to PGL. Beginning in 2010, the police department in conjunction with the city worked to recreate a better block club system and “revitalize” citizen patrols and neighborhood watches (see BOPC 02-09-12, p.13; BOPC 11-08-12, p.16; Kinder, 2016). In 2012, 26 citizen patrol groups began receiving reimbursements from the DPD for mileage to patrol their neighborhoods

and serve as the 'eyes and ears' of the police (BOPC 01-26-12, p.14; Svoboda, 2015). Recognizing the value of the patrols, Chief Craig continued to partner with residents organized around community safety concerns when he joined the department in 2013. By 2014, the number of patrols had grown to 36, with Detroit being one of the only cities in the nation where patrols received police funding (Burns, 2013c). Commenting on support of citizen radio patrols, one respondent said, "he put time and effort into establishing radio patrols over the city. And when you involve people, you get a buy in, you get people to give their time to help the police department" (CO02).

An interview with a citizen patrol volunteer revealed that her patrol had been inactive prior to working with the DPD: "I know that it did dismantle for a little bit and then… we ended up partnering and really working more with the police department in regards to the police radios and stuff like that" (CO04). The volunteer further described the role of patrol:

> you have a driver, an observer, and a base operator. Our radios are connected to the live time crime center downtown. We… it's like I said before, crime doesn't like to be seen. So we drive around and within Detroit… we try to help and maintain and keep the community clean. We also make sure we're available in case anyone needs anything. (CO04)

She went on to say:

> Some of the radio patrols are actually bigger than others… we're all our own individual entities. But our main guidelines and rules are all the same through the police department. But I mean, there's a couple of them that they have a couple a hundred people on their radio patrol… it's awesome. But it's all volunteerism… you know, it's just a bunch of people that get together that care about the safety of their neighbourhood and that's something very important. (CO04)

Her patrol doubled as providers of mutual aid, for example, during power outages when volunteers drove around to distribute batteries and:

> when we had all that flooding, we drove around and anybody we saw outside, we were giving them the information of who to contact about their flooding. You know, I mean

> we do stuff like that, we just try to make sure we're out there and available to provide as much information as possible. (CO04)

As part of the police department's post-bankruptcy restructuring plan developed with the help of the Manhattan Institute, citizen patrols became an integral component of the department's community safety strategy, with patrol groups receiving radios that could be directly monitored at the RTCC (DPD, 2014a; DPD, 2022).

Aside from activating and mobilizing concerned residents to help police and surveil their own communities, the police department's efforts to organize civic groups around issues of public safety would prove to be important for cultivating alliances and supportive audiences in anticipation of its new surveillance initiatives like PGL. In the initial phases of launching PGL, part of the police department's strategy to gain support for the program involved approaching neighborhood associations like block clubs and 501(c)(3) community organizations to help spread the word and encourage local businesses to enrol, likely knowing that they could reach concerned residents who might be more receptive. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some residents petitioned businesses in their community to join the program. For example, members of one neighborhood's safety committee visited local businesses twice a week to encourage owners to enrol (GRDC, n.d.). Another respondent who was in charge of her neighborhood's citizen patrol said, "We've done Peace and Safety Walks[52] with different organizations and asking these businesses that did have more crime in them than some of the other ones, and asked them to please, help our community be safe and please get Project Green Light" (CO04). I asked if businesses were receptive, and she replied: "It was mixed… some of them said, 'I have my own security system it's better than that one.' And others it was a money thing, you know, there were

[52] Peace Walks have been organized by the AmeriCorps Urban Safety program, with collaboration from the Center for Urban Studies at Wayne State University, to encourage community partners and residents to encourage high-crime business locations to become a Green Light location (see, https://amusdetroit.org/our-services/).

different opinions. There are some… new businesses that come in and they don't question it. That's the first thing they do" (CO04). I spoke to a white leader of another community organization who mentioned: "We keep trying to get that party store to be a Green Light, and it's a consistent effort that hasn't gone away, but… they do have cameras already and they don't want to pay the monitoring fee" (CO02). She added: "But we're a pretty low crime area, so it's not as much of an issue as it would be in a lot of other neighborhoods" (CO02). Another Black community leader suggested that a large reason why there were many PGL locations in her area was because of organizing efforts she had been involved in. She said, "I am very supportive of having Green Light. I have encouraged all of our gas stations and any locations that are open late to be a part of Green Light and I believe that we've seen that happen because of some of the work that's been doing [sic] to encourage businesses to participate" (CO03). Another white respondent who headed a community association mentioned that while there was support for PGL in her community, many local businesses felt differently. She recalled one owner that:

> … got the green light per my encouraging them to do that. They were fine with the investment and you know, the community feeling safer to come to their store. They had a problem though. The police wouldn't come when they had a problem. And you know, they didn't feel comfortable handling it themselves and being on camera doing it. They didn't feel comfortable at all. So I think they stopped the green light. They stopped the cameras going to the police station directly. And the other problem, those cameras aren't on your business 24/7 like they advertise… businesses are paying a lot of money for the cable hook up and they're not getting results from the police. So the store that set it up, they still have the green light flashing, but they're not in the program really. (CO05)

When I mentioned that it was interesting to hear since one of the selling points was that PGL locations would be treated as a priority one response location, she said, "Yes, they didn't feel that" (CO05).

Despite various objections from businesses, some respondents felt that local businesses had a responsibility to enrol in the program to protect their patrons. In the words of one

respondent: “if you’re a business, if you want us to come and do business with you, put a Green Light up there if it helps. Put a guard. Do what you can… for people to spend their money” (CO06). Though she admitted she would not go to a PGL-enrolled gas station at night, electing instead to buy gas in a neighboring suburb, she said, “It seems like it should be mandatory, with all this money the mayor has… Buy the green light and give it to the gas stations” (CO06). Her conviction was based on her perception that PGL seemed to be working, though she mentioned that she had not really “grasped anything about people catching anybody” (CO06). Another respondent said, “Well it’s definitely been able to help identify perpetrators, especially carjackings and robberies at gas stations. I also know that most people I know, if they’re going to get gas in Detroit, it’s going to be at a Green Light location in this area. Especially if it’s after dark” (CO02). She went on to say that these stations, “get attention from people in the community who want to be in a safer location because you know if there’s people selling drugs, they’re gonna call and report it. If there’s people just standing around the corner… That kind of that stuff gets reported.” (CO02)

I was curious to know if respondents had a pulse on how other members in their community felt about PGL. One white respondent said: “a lot of the negativity that comes about Project Green Light is from lack of information. Or just not wanting to hear the truth, right? I mean, our police department is very open about all of this. And what it does and what it doesn’t do.” (CO04). Another white respondent said:

> I would say most of the people that I come in contact to are community-oriented people who want to live in a safe community and have their kids be able to play in the streets. So I would say that most of the people, I would say 99% of the people that I come in contact with or know in the city would say that Green Lights have a positive impact on crime and especially on perception. Because crime is all about perception… So much of it is just perception. Is it safe or isn’t it safe? (CO02)

With regard to perception, one Black respondent felt that things had changed over the years, "people are bolder. It's just a no care attitude… You know, I felt better twenty years ago, but now it's open carry, drugs, sex, I mean it's just everything" (CO06). "Security and crime prevention is something that we really need to get invested in" (CO06) she said. However, she also acknowledged that not everyone felt the way she did and when a proposal to install CCTV cameras at traffic intersections was presented: "A lot of people are upset… I'm not. A lot of people are upset because they said it's going to be geared to Black people. And I said it's going to be geared to people who's doing the crime" (CO06). Another Black respondent highlighted ambivalence among her neighbors: "Some people think that it's a good idea and they feel a little bit safer going into a gas station that may have a green light. And then other people… I've talked to a resident who absolutely doesn't like it and said he doesn't go into any gas stations with a Green Light" (CO07). Similarly, one white respondent said, "People say things like, 'We want more police presence'. And there's a whole thing about the Green Light, you know, if people feel safer. It's mixed reviews on that honestly. And the same thing with cameras on the street lights, people are like… In one respect they want it, and another respect like a privacy respect, they don't want it." (CO05). Though she had encouraged a local business owner to enrol early on, she had become more of a sceptic over time:

> As far as the Green Light and putting more money into that… I think it's a façade that they're saying this is our safety project… this is our safety protection for you. And if people believe that, they think it's going to work… okay… whatever. But if the police aren't coming and if they don't have the criminal on camera like they say they're going to do, then it's not really helping at all. It's just… they're hiding behind this fantasy that the Green Light is going to solve all the safety issues… and it isn't. (CO05)

Another Black respondent drew a line in her support of the program:

> "I definitely support it. What I can't, I guess you could say, support is the identification program that they're coming out with because I've been told that that particular program

> kind of makes it so that African Americans are not able to be seen properly. And so the images are distorted." (CO03)

A similar sentiment came from another Black respondent who said, "You know, people don't like that facial recognition technology because it's like, we've seen on the news people who have similar features may get caught up and have to go to jail for something they didn't do" (CO07). Others showed how resident support for PGL and camera surveillance more generally manifested in multiple, and seemingly contradictory ways. One Black respondent from a more affluent part of the city said:

> In general, our neighborhood is supportive of it. Interestingly enough, we're very supportive of cameras being other places, but not here {laughs}. Because there was a plan that the mayor was heading… to get cameras at major intersections … most of us we're okay with it, but there were a few people in the neighborhood that didn't want it at intersections that would lead directly or be close enough to the entrances to our neighborhood. (CO01)

Attitudes towards PGL were thus complex, enmeshed in everyday, situated experiences of PGL surveillance as well as its imagined effects on crime, violence, and neighborhood safety.

This section aimed to illuminate some of the contours of resident support for PGL by situating it within a larger context of civic volunteerism and activism organized around community safety. Wading through the messiness of PGL's origins reveals longer and complex social histories characterized by locally-situated cultures of informal surveillance and negotiated alliances between the state and responsibilized citizens that preceded the program. In teasing out some historical parallels of enrolling ordinary citizens in state-led crime prevention efforts, the section revealed that community policing initiatives served as an important plank on which to build support and advocacy around technological forms of surveillance.

The interviews with members of civic associations revealed diverse and nuanced perspectives on the extension of PGL surveillance into the everyday spaces of their

neighborhoods. The complexity of perspectives was further reflected in the fact that opinions, attitudes, and common sensibilities associated with PGL did not fall neatly along lines of race, class, or place. For example, one's racial background did not necessarily inform whether they supported the program or not, though Black respondents seemed to be more opposed to the use of facial recognition in conjunction with PGL. Clearly, many respondents felt strongly about community safety which had been woven into the foundational missions of their work. For some, the technological form of surveillance authored by PGL may not have seemed like a marked departure from the types of informal surveillance and voluntary citizen watching that had existed for many decades. Indeed, some respondents perceived PGL to provide an extra layer of protection and quicker police response in an environment where such resources were perceived as scarce and unreliable. Alongside the more determined expressions of public safety activism that saw resident groups pressure local businesses to enrol in PGL (see Chapter 4), the efforts on part of respondents to canvass and make informal appeals to businesses to enrol in PGL reflected a faith in the idea that PGL surveillance could help make their communities safer. As such, some residents showed a willingness to not only be the 'eyes and ears' of the police department, but their voices too (see Gascón & Roussell, 2019). The most supportive respondents held views of the program that were underwritten by generally good relationships with the DPD and local neighborhood officers. These respondents were also generally aligned with, and trusted, the visions and goals of the police department and its efforts to expand PGL surveillance to improve community safety. Others expressed skepticism about the promises of PGL and technological surveillance. One white member of a neighborhood association who had become increasingly disillusioned with PGL felt that the promoted visions of the program did not match its realities. "I don't think Green Light is the answer" (CO05), she said. Instead she suggested that:

> [C]ommunity involvement and a feeling of cohesiveness when you have block clubs and people… that's key. That is key to safety in any neighborhood. When people… all your neighbors kind of know each other… even if you don't know each other, you know who lives in that house. You see them going in and out. You would know if somebody didn't belong there. When you have a closeness with your neighbors like that, and you… look out for each other, then your neighborhood's going to be great… my block… we look out for each other… so you know what? I feel safe. I feel safe in my neighborhood. (CO05)

Community Safety and Community Development

In trying to better understand the intersections between PGL and local planning and development, I also interviewed several members of community development corporations (CDCs) about their perspectives on PGL. If block clubs were the most localized expression of associational life, and community associations represented several blocks, then CDCs were civic-based organizations that covered the largest land area of the three. CDCs also tended to play a distinctive role in the local planning of the city's neighborhoods. Originating in the 1960s, CDCs emerged out of demands for greater community control over local governance and economic development in distressed neighborhoods (Heil, 2018). Though the neoliberalization of CDCs has been argued to curtail their more progressive and community-oriented missions (see Heil, 2018), I recognized that many residents saw CDCs as a potential means have a greater say in local development decisions. For example, CDCs could serve as a vehicle to bring more residential and commercial development activity to the neighborhoods and not just to Detroit's downtown. The work of CDCs was also not strictly about new commercial development, but also involved obtaining funds and resources to mitigate the 'seesaw' of uneven development and associated disinvestment (Smith, 1990). CDC activities often included distributing funds for home repair and managing development of affordable homes, while also trying to mitigate the displacement of long-time Detroiters by newcomers (Heil, 2018). In the words of one CDC member: "we are just seeing a lot of change in our neighborhoods. There has been some

gentrification that has moved forward into our neighbourhood… and some of that's okay, but we gotta' make sure that there's enough affordable housing" (CDC02).

Perhaps overlooked in existing research on CDCs is the extent to which many CDCs are involved in initiatives to improve security and safety.[53] In Detroit, several CDCs have been directly involved in efforts to increase the number of PGL locations within their respective communities. In addition, the city's community development financial institution (CDFI), Detroit Invest,[54] which provides financial assistance to local revitalization efforts, funded several CDCs over the years to carry out community safety work (including PGL installation grants). Some CDCs have had more expansive safety programming including funding additional police patrols, organizing block clubs and citizen patrols, and hosting neighborhood CompStat meetings and crime prevention workshops. Others have worked at the frontlines of addressing violence in their communities through innovative and community-led violence intervention models. CDCs' efforts to increase PGL coverage typically emerged alongside the planning and development of local business districts and commercial corridors which also involved beautification initiatives, clean teams, and enforcing property standards. Though it looked different from place to place, the goal of improving community safety appeared to thread through the work of many of these organizations.

When inquiring why some CDCs seemed to have a larger focus on safety than others, one CDC representative said it really depended on the issues in the community, the charter and mission of the organization, and "also depends on is there that crime and violence really

[53] From a policing standpoint, CDCs have proven to be valuable partners for local police departments. As Bill Bratton has mentioned, "There is no better investment at the neighbourhood level than alliance between dedicated cops and grassroots community developers" (The Crime Report, 2014).
[54] CDFIs emerged in the context of growing loan and investment funds aimed at providing financial assistance to revitalization and community development efforts in distressed and low-income communities (Greer & Gonzales, 2017).

happening in your neighbourhood" (CDC01). Another remarked that housing and infrastructure took precedence over safety programming in the community in which he worked: "We don't really have the capacity. If there was programs that could work, I think we'd look at it. But we just exist in such this sea of need" (CDC03). One respondent whom I will refer to as Brenda said, "Well, I'll start with this first. Safety, I think, encompasses everything we do in the respect that we have a… budget for transportation. So, youth do not walk here. We pick them up and we take them home because we don't want anything to happen to them in between. And it's just too precarious." (CDC02). Brenda mentioned that her organization had originally started their work as a means to help address high youth violence and poverty rates in one of Detroit's most economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. She said:

> So we began to look at that and say, 'How do we tackle some of these problems?' What are pathways for people to get out of poverty? What are things that we can be doing to alleviate the injustices of systemic racism and things like that happening in our community. But trying to be very grassroots and trying to make sure it really came from the community… you know… instead of us helicoptering in and saying, 'This is what you need.' (CDC02)

When it came to dealing with violence in the community, Brenda mentioned a number of instances where she was forced to confront issues directly, sometimes without the immediate assistance of police which, in her words, reflected the "gritty work of community development" (CDC02). Like other neighborhoods, hers faced issues with poor police response:

> I will often tell people, our biggest issue is not police brutality, our biggest issue is getting police to come out for anything. And so… to see a better police force or better response, people are excited… the hope is on one level that they begin to trust the police again, but there's a lot of reasons for an African American community to not trust police. And the recent incident in Memphis and George Floyd and… Breonna Taylor and all those incidents just continue to weigh on people for reasons to not trust. And so, in a sense, to be that intermediary, there's people who will tell me things that they won't go to the police directly and tell. (CDC02)

However, “you walk a fine line. You don’t want to be recognized as allies with the police… you don’t want crime in your neighborhood either. But if you have such a tight relationship with the police, people aren’t going to trust you either. So it’s a real… it presents some awkwardness,” she said (CDC02). Despite potential awkwardness around the optics of enrolling in a police surveillance program as well as initial doubts about whether the program could deliver on its promises, she revealed that pressing safety concerns from residents had pushed her CDC to enrol one of the organization’s properties in PGL.

I spoke to a member of another CDC in a community, not far from Brenda’s, but with a considerably different set of needs and challenges with respect to commercial corridor development. Steven, who had been with the organization since its inception, said: “we kind of started to see what we can do to make sure that development is done right over in our community here. But acknowledging that you know… unfortunately you do have to start somewhere when there’s been 40-50 years of disinvestment and that there are huge gaps in the city where nothing is currently happening” (CDC01). Steven mentioned that one of the major pillars of his work was helping to develop “commercial corridors outside of downtown and Midtown, which you know… 15 years ago weren’t bankable” (CDC01). Part of the work also involved considerations of security and safety, which along with the equitable thrust of the organization’s development decisions, was based around engaging community members to help decide what types of initiatives they wanted to see as part of developing the commercial corridor. This was undoubtedly an arduous task, and my conversation with Steven revealed the kinds of complex considerations involved, especially when it came to programs like PGL. He suggested, “Green Light, I think, is a tool. But I think what I look at is improved infrastructure, creating density of

businesses, those are the things that are going to help deter crime more than cameras" (CDC01).

He continued:

> I think there are some good benefits too. I mean with police having eyes and if they see a crime happening in real time, they can respond to it quicker right? You don't have to wait to see it on your camera… It's there and they already have the footage for XYZ and things like that… but I also see it as more of a reactionary tool than a lot of other tools that are out there… like just having a security guard out there being a visible presence so a car doesn't get broken into… and maybe the cameras being there will prevent it from getting broken into… but that's not a guarantee. So I think that… that's like kind of my hesitancy around Green Light where you're really paying for the infrastructure, you're not paying for the actual service. It's just… you're giving the city access basically. (CDC01)

He went on to discuss the tensions around public safety and the need to find a balance with respect to investments in security and policing:

> [Private] Security would be nice, but there's only a couple approved vendors from the City for special assessment districts, and they're driving like… H2 Hummers and wear tactical vests. So it almost feels like an extra layer of policing which isn't necessarily what you want… So I think there's a challenge there. I think that the real question that we need to be asking is what does public safety look like in Detroit? And how do we do it? and that's what I've been trying to gauge from our neighborhood, is how do we find that balance between public safety and a militarized zone. (CDC01)

Steven described the types of issues that were common:

> [F]rom a commercial corridor standpoint… some of the businesses will have a little bit more of an issue with a hold up here or there. But most don't. I think a lot of it comes down to… are you from the community? Do you treat your customers with respect? Things like that. Now, crimes of opportunity happen anywhere. But… I find it's like it's the liquor store down the street that is really shitty to people ends up getting held up more than any other place around here. So I think there's just a certain level of trust and respect that you have to build with the community too. (CDC01)

Steven opined that density of business would help both support small businesses and bring more 'eyes on the street' (see Jacobs, 1993[1961]): "as we have more eyes on the street, that will reduce a bit… we've got… really good restaurants coming and things like that. That's going to bring foot traffic and our space is designed to really push foot traffic around the corridor"

(CDC01). Coming back to the prospects of PGL, he acknowledged the potential of the program, but was ultimately sceptical about its benefits:

> … seeing it operate on a broader commercial corridor scale is more a benefit… I see more benefit to me than an individual business. I feel like it's not the obnoxious flashing Green Lights, but it's the tasteful sign, it's monitoring the entire corridor. And you're able to kinda see in real time what's going on in the corridor... But if I've got a camera here but I don't have one on the other side of my building and then the crime happened over there and I have no way to really know, then what's the point? But if there's eyes on the entire corridor, you can see what's going on… But if it's just one business, it wasn't caught on that one camera then I don't see as much as a benefit. So I think from a community standpoint, I think there's some data out there to support that Green Light really doesn't deter crime, it just deflects crime to another area. Kind of like ShotSpotter, kind of like all these different things, these different initiatives that come up. And it's like great maybe for that individual business owner, but does it really prevent crime on the commercial corridor overall?… if we were able to get it on the full commercial corridor, well maybe they just say, 'Okay, we're going to next commercial corridor, right? (CDC01)

Steven's recognition of possible displacement effects at the scale of well-defined retail spaces and across entire corridors played into his broader questioning of the potential viability of PGL.

I asked Steven if he had a sense of how people in the community felt about PGL. "I think it's mixed" (CDC01) he said. He continued:

> And I talked to some of my neighbors and they're like, 'I don't see what the big deal is, we want those cameras!'… so I saw both sides… but a lot of the Black Lives Matter protestors are like, 'Yeah, no, this is not a good thing'. And I'm kind of on that side too, where I don't necessarily think it's a great thing. At the same time, I'm trying to figure out how do we solve for commercial corridor safety. (CDC01)

The broader question of what public safety should look was an important one that he often returned to throughout our conversation, and one that was highly complicated in terms of coming to a consensus among community members. He suggested:

> I think everyone wants safer streets, it's just like… what does that look like? And I think that's what I struggle with on a daily basis trying to figure out… When I ask what does public safety look like, I'm trying to get a broad spectrum from our community. But even when I just throw it out there on social media, it tends to be like the three white people

> that moved to the neighbourhood that have the opinion on it. It's not the long-time residents. So, how do we gauge for that and figure out how to make sure we are getting a really representative view of what public safety looks like? (CDC01)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, a representative from a different CDC mentioned that his organization had advocated for PGL to businesses after residents had asked the organization to get more involved in local public safety issues. However, when the police killing of George Floyd took center stage in the country's consciousness in 2020, many local residents became increasingly critical of police surveillance, demanding PGL cameras be removed. The decision by the CDC member's organization to discontinue its advocacy for PGL after 2020 was perhaps made easier by a general uncertainty about the program's impacts on revitalization and crime: "I think that revitalizing small business is going to be dependent on deterring and reducing crime. You know, the corollary to that is… is Project Green Light successful in that? I don't know" (CDC03).

Another theme that emerged during interviews with CDC representatives was the issue of gentrification. Many CDC representatives noted the challenges associated with neighborhood change such as issues of affordability and displacement as wealthier and often whiter populations moving in. One respondent mentioned that new developments and corporate relocations in the city's downtown have meant new workforces coming in and populating adjacent neighborhoods. An interesting remark by a PGL partner illustrated the apparent affinities between PGL and new development in areas adjacent to the city's downtown:

> In the area that I worked, a few blocks away was an area called the New Center area, and we started seeing Green Lights go up and within a year… and I don't know if the two are related… but within a year, we started seeing new, locally-owned businesses pop up like a coffee shop or a deli where nobody would really venture into those areas before. (P04)

Another respondent mentioned that his neighborhood had seen more investment than others which had resulted in new residential and commercial developments. He was aware of some

larger development projects where developers were doing "wholesale installations" of PGL (CDC03) and surmised that the rationale was to provide an improved *feeling* of safety to attract new residential and commercial tenants: "because if you're putting a multi-million dollar project in, they're going after a couple things, they're going after maybe they want money, they're going after bringing in residential tenants, and they're going after bringing in stable commercial tenants" (CDC03). The marketing of PGL surveillance as a feature of new, safe, revitalized spaces added another dimension to the question of whose safety was being prioritized. Here, the premise of new densities of camera surveillance seemed to cater to two main types of clientele: 1) commercial interests who valued PGL as a place-branding tool that communicated an added degree of protection for new businesses and patrons; and 2) new residents who similarly associated camera surveillance with enhanced protection and safety and thus were more comfortable under the gaze of cameras. However, it also meant that long-time residents, and especially those of color, faced an additional force that was changing the nature of public space in their neighborhoods and potentially further fuelling their displacement.

Fault Lines of Speculative Security

Public opinion of PGL surveillance is complicated by the fact that, as the program expanded, it became entwined with other speculative technologies and surveillance initiatives rolled out by the city. The use of facial recognition technologies produced new fractures in public attitudes towards PGL and created fault lines in support for expanding neighborhood surveillance. At the same time, debates about facial recognition technologies also carved out new terrains for questioning, and voicing dissent against, PGL's underlying visions. I encountered some interview respondents whose awareness of the limitations of facial recognition, specifically inaccuracies in identifying faces belonging to people with darker skin tones, made them hesitant

about the technology and its connection to PGL.[55] Several interviewees also noted growing skepticism and resistance among people in their communities especially when debates about the police department's use of facial recognition took center stage in 2019, and when plans were announced to deploy an additional 500 high-definition cameras at traffic intersections across the neighborhoods under the "Neighborhood Real-Time Intelligence Program" (see Gross, 2019a). The $9 million investment represented a ratcheting up of the city's camera surveillance initiatives and signaled a much more ubiquitous presence of cameras in the neighborhoods. During his 2019 State of the City address, Mayor Duggan unveiled the program as one that would help build the "most extensive and modern camera system in the country" (City of Detroit, 2019a). Though the program's 'smart' cameras were initially introduced as a means to manage vehicle traffic, Mayor Duggan subsequently advertised the program as a crime-fighting initiative (Gross, 2019a). Using funds from local bond issues and federal traffic modernization grants, he stated that the new cameras would "fill in the holes of the Green Light system" (City of Detroit, 2019a; Gross, 2019a; Mayor's Address, 2019). The announcement also revealed plans to build two 'mini' RTCCs in the 8th and 9th precincts costing $2 million and to spend an additional $2 million raised through bond issues for improvements to the main RTCC at the Public Safety Headquarters downtown (Gross, 2019a; 2019d). Following the address, emails were circulated to residents and block clubs asking for pledges of support and suggested that the eventual goal was to have a mini-RTCC in every precinct across the city (Gross, 2019a). According to city representatives, the Mayor's office received numerous calls and inquiries from residents and leaders of block clubs and other neighborhood associations who were excited about

[55] For research exploring the flaws of facial recognition technologies, see Buolamwini & Gebru (2018), Garvie et al., (2016), Garvie & Moy (2019), Grother et al. (2019), and Klare et al., (2012).

the potential of the camera expansion project to improve community safety (City of Detroit, 2019b; Gross, 2019a).

However, for community advocates and social justice organizers who had been following the city's efforts to enlarge the city's surveillance infrastructure, the sudden wave of proposed expansions with little to no prior community input raised deep concerns. Though it had been nearly three and half years since PGL had been formally introduced, there was still little evidence to support the program's effectiveness in reducing or preventing crime, and the results of the program's formal evaluation study had yet to be released. Many residents and grassroots community groups also questioned the underlying premise that camera surveillance equated to safety (Urban et al., 2019). Instead, it was argued that unchecked expansion of surveillance threatened to deepen inequalities and infringe on basic liberties and constitutional rights including freedom of movement, peaceful assembly, and free speech (Garvie & Moy, 2019; Williams, 2018). Critics also argued that surveillance associated with programs like PGL contributed to the reproduction of discriminatory practices and overpolicing of Black and brown communities in the city (Urban et al., 2019; Detroit Community Technology Project, n.d.). Resistance to surveillance expansion began to grow, and as plans emerged in 2018 to expand PGL in schools across Detroit, students organized petitions and protests in response, concerned that PGL cameras could further criminalize youth and bolster the school-to-prison pipeline (Hicks, 2018; Ikonomova, 2018b; Urban et al., 2019). Continued organizing and coalition building led to the creation of a number of campaigns, many Black-centered and youth-led, against 'hyper-surveillance' in Detroit's neighborhoods (Green Lights Black Futures, 2022).

The topic of surveillance and facial recognition became particularly contentious after digital justice and legal activists were alerted to a proposed DPD policy directive that mentioned

connecting facial recognition to both live and record video (Garvie & Moy, 2019; Riverwise, 2019, p.3). Social justice organizers became increasingly vocal about the fact that the police department had been using facial recognition technology for years without any policy governing its use, community oversight, or public input by way of public hearings or input vis-à-vis the Board of Police Commissioners (Riverwise, 2019, p.12; Urban et al., 2019). In addition, the DPD's own statistics revealed that facial recognition was being almost exclusively used on Black suspects, a group that was more likely to be misidentified by the technology (DPD, 2020; Huffman, 2021).[56] Several reports soon followed, warning about the dangers of unregulated use of speculative and flawed surveillance technologies like facial recognition as well as the implications of mass surveillance citing Detroit's PGL initiative (Garvie & Moy, 2019; Urban et al., 2019). Organizers and critics argued that many residents were initially unaware of the scope of expanded surveillance, due in part to efforts by the police department and city to obfuscate connections between PGL and facial recognition (Logic, 2020; Riverwise, 2019). This included failure to disclose in any MOUs or signed agreements with participating partners that video footage from their cameras could be used in conjunction with facial recognition technologies, failure to mention the technology's use on the PGL website, and explicit denials that PGL and facial recognition were connected (Garvie & Moy, 2019).[57]

While the police department routinely argued that it had been open about the technology and surveillance initiatives, critics alleged that city officials had a habit of presenting controversial and speculative initiatives disingenuously, playing on the hopes that residents

[56] Concerns about facial recognition use were echoed by state representatives who introduced bills proposing moratoriums and bans on the technology (Neavling, 2019; Winn, 2019). In a September 2019 memo, David Whitaker, director of the City Council's legal team, expressed concerns about potential abuses of facial recognition technology by the DPD, suggesting a need for better regulation and oversight (Hunter, 2019c; Whitaker, 2019).
[57] A report by the city's Legislative Policy Division stated that the Mayor and police department deny that facial recognition is being used in connection with Project Green Light security cameras (City of Detroit, 2019c). For example, in a media interview, Craig said, "Facial recognition technology is stand alone. It is not integrated into Green Light" (WXYZ, 2019).

might not understand how the technology works (Riverwise, 2019). This included attempts by the city and the police department to present various surveillance initiatives as distinct and separate, when in reality they were intricately tied together. Eric Williams, an attorney for the ACLU said: "The city itself doesn't really make a distinction between these cameras internally. I think part of the reason they describe these programs as distinct when they're talking to the public is if people really realized the extent of police surveillance in the city they would be mortified" (as cited in Gross, 2019c). Social justice advocate Tawana Petty similarly argued:

> They didn't hide the idea of putting cameras everywhere like they later hid their adoption of facial recognition. In fact, they were trying to separate the two ideas, saying that Project Green Light was different than facial recognition. But the two systems needed each other; the city needed to overhaul itself with all these surveillance cameras in order to make facial recognition a viable system. The DPD just kept saying, 'Facial recognition is not embedded within the cameras,' and, 'We'll only use the facial recognition if we absolutely have to.' Meanwhile, they were proposing policy directives that were asking for real-time live tracking on mobile devices, drones, traffic lights, and more. (Logic, 2020)

The mayor's and the police department's position that PGL and facial recognition were "not connected" or "separate" is hard to defend, especially considering how often city officials expressed their excitement about their integration. As mentioned previously, Mayor Duggan expressed his enthusiasm early on during PGL's inaugural launch, saying: "We've got facial recognition software coming next. We're going to be able before too long to match outstanding warrants against these cameras" (City of Detroit, 2016a).[58] BOPC transcripts also reveal that the DPD had admitted to using facial recognition technologies in 2016, long before they had signed any public procurement contracts with providers of the technology (see, for example, BOPC 01-14-16, p.12; BOPC 09-22-16, p.21; BOPC 06-15-2017, p.54). Additionally, request for proposals from 2015 seeking vendors to help integrate facial recognition technologies at the RTCC suggest

[58] DPD acknowledged it had used facial recognition capabilities from other agencies including the Michigan State Police prior to contracting with Data Works Plus (see Hunter, 2017b).

the technology was intended to be used with both live video feeds and static images (Gross, 2019b). In 2017, the city signed a 3-year contract with a facial recognition software vendor, DataWorks Plus, which explicitly mentioned its use for Green Light Locations and real-time screening that allowed the monitoring of 100 concurrent feeds (DataWorks Contract, 2017; Logic, 2020; see also Garvie & Moy, 2019; Gross, 2019c). All of this is to suggest that it was likely that using facial recognition in conjunction with PGL feeds both retroactively and on live footage in real-time was intended from very early on.

Community organizing prompted many concerned residents and social justice organizers to vocalize their opposition at several BOPC meetings (Logic, 2020).[59] This included one particularly contentious meeting where one of the board's own members who had been critical of how the city and the DPD and BOPC were approaching the issue was arrested (Hunter, 2019a). A few days later, the Mayor released a statement trying to clarify his stance on the use of the technology titled "I strongly oppose the use of facial recognition technology for surveillance". In it, Mayor Duggan said:

> DPD is not permitted to use facial recognition software *for surveillance* and I will never support them doing so. The technology is just not reliable in identifying people from *moving images* and research has shown it is even less reliable in identifying people of color. I have spoken to several members of the Detroit Police Commission and have encouraged them to continue this practice by formally adoption a "no surveillance" policy for facial recognition technology and providing serious discipline for any DPD employee who violates this policy. There have been a number of misleading reports that have confused Green Light or traffic cameras with facial recognition technology. They are not correct. The *Green Light cameras do not have any facial recognition technology- they are security cameras*. The traffic cameras we are proposing to purchase do not have any facial recognition technology- they are standard traffic cameras. (Mayor's Address, 2019; emphasis added)

The statement, while technically true, was worded strategically to avoid some of the more controversial issues at hand. First, it declared opposition to a type of surveillance defined in a

[59] For public comments on facial recognition technology from June 2019, see (BOPC 06-13-19, 06-27-19, 07-11-19, 07-18-19, 07-25-19, 08-08-19; 08-15-19, 08-22-19; 09-19-19).

very narrow sense- one that was rooted in real-time tracking and identification from live video. In doing so, it not only masked the fact that CCTV cameras and facial recognition were surveillance technologies in-and-of themselves, but also drew a line between the types of practices deemed permissible - i.e., facial recognition on still photos was okay, but on live video it was not (see Gross, 2019c). Second, it misrepresented the conclusions of existing research which found that facial recognition technology was highly inaccurate regardless of the medium - still or live (Bualamwini & Gebru, 2018). Third, the idea that Green Light and traffic cameras did "not have any facial recognition technology" embedded in them obscured the fact that their feeds could be used as sources for facial recognition software.

For opponents of facial recognition, the question was never whether it was permissible to use the technology with live video or static images, but whether a technology proven to be flawed in both instances would be used in any capacity. Critics argued that attempts by the city to draw a line between the two were disingenuous and a distraction, and condemned the tactics of relying on semantics and general confusion around the technology to pursue its agenda (Gross, 2019c). Not long after, the ACLU and a large coalition of community and advocacy groups expressed opposition to the use of facial recognition and urged the Board of Police Commissioners to reject the proposed facial recognition policy (ACLU of Michigan, 2019). The Detroit Coalition against Police Brutality (DCAPB), which had been a vital presence in BOPC meetings since the board's establishment, released a statement, which read in part:

> For the record, we at (DCAPB) are against the use of facial recognition in any form. Be it in the use of 'Still Photos' or in 'Real Time Surveillance.' The contract procurement process was extremely messy. How in the world could the Detroit City Council approve the contract to Data Works for this purpose in 2017, and there was no policy regarding its use, there was no public input in the form of Public Hearings, and no input from the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners? Can we trust any elected official pertaining to this issue moving forward? I would argue no. (see the full statement in Riverwise, 2019, p.12)

After considerable resistance and pleas from residents to oppose the use of facial recognition, the BOPC approved a revised, yet still controversial policy directive in September of 2019 (Jones, 2019b). The revised directive more clearly specified: prohibitions against any use of facial recognition on live feeds, permitted use only in the investigation of violent crimes, provisions to hold officers accountable for misuse of the technology, and requirements for the DPD to provide weekly reports on how facial recognition was being used (Logic, 2020). The DPD also made reassurances that proper protocols would be in place to ensure matches were used only as an investigate lead and not as a positive identification and they would be peer reviewed to ensure their veracity. The board's approval was disappointing for many social justice advocates and residents who held deep reservations about expanding surveillance in the city. None of the new safeguards or provisions mitigated the fact that the technology was inherently flawed in its ability to identify people with darker skin tones, a demographic that represented more than 80% of people living in the city (Logic, 2020). However, resistance and scrutiny from organizers, community advocates, and concerned residents played a pivotal role in raising awareness about the inherent flaws and dangers of facial recognition and helped bring changes to the policy directive that was initially much more permissive and ambiguous.

BOPC meetings were merely one of several sites of resistance and contention, but one where the politics of security and surveillance played out in plain view. Though the majority of public comments between the months of June and September of 2019 were those of opposition, they clashed with other perspectives from those who saw value in the technology. The discordance between these two positions was not a disagreement about the need to improve community safety, but rather about what community safety looked like and how it could be

achieved, as one previous respondent alluded to. In a conversation about facial recognition, one respondent who supported PGL shared her opinion on facial recognition:

> … this is what I think about facial recognition. I think you have a small number of people making a big deal about the inaccuracy of facial recognition in some instances, but especially for people of color... But the thing about facial recognition is the way it's used. Once people understand the way the police department uses facial recognition… that it's not… the only identifier in a crime, most people are on board with it because it's only one tool that's used to significantly reduce the number of suspects for this crime. So if they get a facial recognition… they may use it to question the person, but they don't rule out other people because they have a facial recognition match. And if they don't have a case built around elements besides the facial recognition, they don't go to court with it. So, they've had public meetings about how facial recognition works through the board of police commissioners and I've been at some. (CO02)

She went on to say, "Part of it is a trust issue. I'm very trusting of the police" (CO02). Indeed, trust in the police department and the process through which new technologies were being introduced constituted another important facet of differential public attitudes associated with surveillance. For critics, lack of transparency and accountability was expressed as a key concern and had the potential to breed significant mistrust in the adoption of new policing technologies. Tawana Petty, a social justice organizer and community advocate who had vocalized her opposition PGL and facial recognition argued that community concerns had been routinely disregarded[60] during BOPC meetings:

> Detroiters have had to navigate marginalization in meetings, sometimes relegated to a mere 30 seconds to make a public comment, but we have stood firm on our beliefs and persisted. We were consistent in our pushback against facial recognition and Project Green Light, making clear that we know that #SurveillanceAintSafety. (Petty, 2021a)

She noted the contention at BOPC meetings:

[60] Critics felt that proper oversight had been hampered by a civilian oversight body that was chaired by former law enforcement, many of whom were not elected, and who often rubber-stamped police policy (Riverwise, 2019, p.12, see also Petty, 2021a). Another suggested that with the exception of a few commissioners, the BOPC was a "completely captive agency" and spent "more time lauding the police for their efforts than actually engaging in any legitimate oversight (Wright Museum, 2020).

> Initially, when we were showing up to meetings at the Board of Police Commissioners, there were a lot of residents, mostly senior citizens, who were really angry with us. They felt that we were getting in the way of a system that would make them safe, and that we were attacking police because we just wanted to cause trouble. (Logic, 2020)

Dissensus and the Precarious Imaginaries of Speculative Security

Despite much controversy and resistance, the DPD seemed intent on continuing the use of facial recognition, touting the new policy directive as "model policy" with protection and safeguards and that could be replicated across the country (BOPC 10-01-2020, p.60). The DPD insisted that potential facial recognition matches would be carefully verified through a peer review from a second trained analyst, which would subsequently require a supervisor to concur with both analysts. Police Chief Craig reiterated in one meeting: "I will tell you using this technology we *cannot* and will not ever arrest somebody solely on a facial recognition match. We won't do it. We *can't* do it. There has to be other issues in investigative work that corroborate that this image that we believe is a suspect is based on a number of factors" (see BOPC 07-18-19, p.38, BOPC 08-01-19, p.23). Despite assurances of rigorous "checks and balances" built into DPD procedures (Hunter, 2019c), it was later revealed that the technology had led to misidentifications and wrongful arrests of three Black citizens between 2018 and 2023.

The first false arrest linked to facial recognition was reported in 2020, involving a Black man accused of theft from a Shinola store in downtown Detroit in 2018 (ACLU, 2024; Williams v. City of Detroit Civil Cover Sheet, 2021). This was soon followed by a second case of a Black man who was wrongfully arrested for larceny after it was alleged he had grabbed and threw a phone that belonged to a teacher who was filming a schoolyard brawl in 2019 (Gross, 2020). The DPD claimed that the two false arrests were the result of "sloppy detective work" based on facial recognition hits produced before the new policy directive was approved (BOPC 10-01-2020,

p.61). Following news of the wrongful arrests, the DPD vowed that under a new, revised policy directive, such incidents would not be possible (Gross, 2020). The two cases, however, violated promises made by the department as early as 2017 that the technology would only be used as an investigatory tool for *violent* crimes (Hunter, 2017b). Addressing the media, Chief Craig defended the technology and attributed blame to human error:

> it's really the human factor, our crime analysts who are very diligent and once they come up with a person, it is peer reviewed and then a supervisor then weights in to make sure this is the person we want to move to the next level of the investigation. Even then there is no guarantee a person will be arrested. (Gross, 2020)

He later disclosed publicly that if officers only relied on the facial recognition software alone to identify subjects, it would likely lead to a misidentification 96% of the time (Koebler, 2020), ultimately raising questions about its utility as a tool.

The false arrests vindicated activists and critics who had long warned of the dangers of experimental and flawed biometric and surveillance technologies, and had criticized the police department for its lack of transparency and their use of facial recognition technology without any governing policies (Logic Magazine, 2020). In the midst of clear evidence of its flaws and major opposition to its use voiced through protests and public comments and BOPC meetings, city council voted to renew the facial recognition contract with DataWorks Plus in the summer of 2020 (Abdel-Baqui, 2020; Ferretti & Rahal, 2020). Any assurances that facial recognition was being used responsibly were once again shattered in 2023 when officers made the third wrongful arrest of a pregnant woman who was falsely identified as a suspect in a robbery and carjacking (Sahouri, 2023). Again, DPD excused the error as 'shoddy police work' despite a policy directive required several levels of verification. Denying that the errors had been technological and instead citing human error and procedural slip ups, the DPD defended its continued use of facial recognition technology as a valuable tool in helping to address violent crime in the city,

proposing further refinements to policy that would, once again, safeguard against future misidentifications (see BOPC 8-10-2023). All three cases led to lawsuits seeking millions of dollars in damages from the tremendous toll and physical, emotional, and social harms inflicted by the false arrests.

Intent on having the city become a leader in the use of surveillance technology for public safety, city and police officials seemed reluctant to fully acknowledge the skepticism and resistance that formed around PGL and other surveillance initiatives. Narratives instead tended to focus on anecdotal success stories, the dire need to address serious and violent crimes, and the notion that the 'community' supported the program as if community was a single homogenous entity.[61] City officials and police were also somewhat dismissive of PGL partners who had joined the program but had failed to reap its promised benefits and others who questioned the fairness of having to pay additional fees to receive police service (see Colthorp, 2016; Hunter, 2018a; Ikonomova, 2018a; Jones, 2018; Lange & Komer, 2021). Mayor Duggan, for example, was quoted as saying: "Our resistance comes almost entirely from people who appear to have a relationship with the people up to no good in their parking lots" (Hunter, 2018a). Aside from the dubious implication, Duggan's comment reflected a wider denial of the possibility that citizens could have valid criticisms and concerns about the expansion of surveillance in their city. Such "legitimacy discourses" (see Smith, 2012) that expunge narratives of scepticism and resistance have been integral to the shaping of public support for surveillance and stabilizing speculative security imaginaries as envisioned through PGL and other surveillance initiatives in Detroit. However, rather than producing consensus around these security imaginaries, their contested and fragile nature more accurately reflected a 'dissensus' requiring constant negotiation and

[61] Craig, for example, dismissed a critical piece by the Detroit Free Press on the efficacy of PGL (Gross, 2018b) claiming it was "clear that there was an agenda", subsequently remarking, "The community is highly supportive. They view the Green Light as a safe haven" (see BOPC 04-26-18, p.19).

management (Hall et al., 2013[1978]). As Rancière (2010) notes, dissensus is not merely a conflict of interests, opinions, or values, but a conflict about what is heard, who speaks, and who counts as political subjects in the space of politics.

The role of race has played a key role in influencing the terrain of politics with forms of Black resistance at the forefront of calls to curtail and abolish mass, racialized surveillance and the subjugation of communities of color to experimental security technologies. These movements have been shaped not merely by the disproportionate harms of flawed facial recognition technologies on people with darker skin tones, but have been underpinned by broader struggles for Black self-determination, equitable resources, and alternative visions for safety that align with the wellbeing of the city's predominantly racialized population. Thus, while concerns about facial recognition animated forms of resistance, social justice advocates and community organizers were keen to point out that the larger problem was the rapidly proliferating forms of monitoring of majority Black communities at the expense of their basic needs (Riverwise, 2019). Furthermore, critics have argued that does not cater long-time residents, but rather to more affluent and whiter populations who do not have the same relationship to police surveillance as poorer, racialized residents. Thus, some may see intensified surveillance vis-à-vis PGL cameras as an amenity and form of protection rather than a form of repression or suspicious gaze.

At the same time, PGL reveals more complicated relationships between race and surveillance. Support for PGL on the part of some Black residents suggested that class dynamics are likely also at play. Class positions may explain why PGL found pockets of support among resident groups, typically middle-class, homeowners that had traditionally authored their own forms of informal surveillance and vigilant citizenship to protect their communities. This support was likely mediated through more favourable relationships with neighborhood officers and

alignments with police visions regarding local security issues and their ostensible solutions. Yet this support was also undecidedly provisional, contingent, and nuanced, and partnerships with police were fraught with tensions and contradictions.

One of the main objectives of the chapter was to better understand how forms of speculative security proliferate in spite of their contentious, uncertain, and contested nature. There is little question that local government and police officials have played significant roles in shaping the politics of speculative security in Detroit. However, to chalk up PGL's sustained growth to the city's and police department's organizational interests alone would overlook how a variety of non-state actors have shaped processes of securitization. Interviews, BOPC meetings, and media accounts paint a much more nuanced and complicated view of the politics of speculative security and the imprint of everyday citizens on PGL and related surveillance initiatives. Accordingly, securitization cannot be entirely explained by accounts depicting powerful elites and their instrumentalist and institutional pursuits as part of broader social ordering strategies or top-down theories such as revanchism that theorize securitization as a conscious political and class project of revenge (see Anderson, 2020; Hier, 2004). This is not to diminish the power of institutional or political-economic imperatives that drive law enforcement agencies and other allied interests towards technological surveillance as a means of exerting social control or to deny that revanchist tendencies are not operating at certain levels of governance or even in particular domains of civic life (see Vitale, 2008). Rather, such structuralist accounts can overlook bottom up demands for carceral interventions (Atkinson & Millington, 2019, p.44), can downplay agency of a diverse mix of everyday residents in local securitization processes, and often occlude the complex and sometimes contradictory reasons why people may support and resist speculative forms of security and surveillance. As Hier (2010,

p.27) notes, forms of resistance to open-street camera initiatives represent "struggles over knowledge about social problems and proposed surveillance solutions". As it relates to social problems, citizens may conceive of real or imagined sets of risks and "seek out regulatory measures for their own communities based on the problematization of some behaviour(s) considered risky, immoral, or harmful" (Walby, 2006, p.33). In this sense, demand for PGL was also 'generated from below' (see Walby, 2006) where forms of surveillance were perceived as a means to mitigate social anxieties associated with fear of crime and violence, victimization, disorder, and localized decline.

Interviews also revealed contested meanings and understandings of the technologies behind PGL and their imagined effects. Perspectives and experiences of the program showed that neighborhood residents may not only contest hegemonic and dominant security visions presented by city and police officials, but may also harbour conflicting views with neighbors regarding the imagined potential and harms of technological surveillance, what safety means, and how to best address local safety concerns. These views were informed by diverse, situated experiences and social positions mediated by race, class, and place in not entirely straight-forward ways. Differential assessments and sentiments associated with PGL reflect how forms of speculative security are subject to "ongoing, contested processes of valuation" (Jaffe & Pilo, 2023, p.79) through which technologies can come to mean different things and hold value differently across different groups of social actors, and which figure into the production of consent and legitimacy around their use. Seeing the politics of speculative security in more nuanced ways helps reveal the messiness, indeterminacy, and contingencies of dominant, speculative future imaginaries as well as forms of agency from below that contribute to, resist, and shape regimes of speculative security.

Anderson's (2020, p.XXIV) concept of "precarious hegemony" is helpful in framing how hegemonic formations, and in this case speculative security regimes, are held together by "enactments of ordinary people who consent to them largely out of concern for what they perceive as the precarity of their own everyday lives and positions". In other words, citizens may support or at least tolerate potentially problematic or controversial interventions to the extent they feel such interventions enable them to live their lives "free from real or imagined threats" (Hier, 2010, p.25). In response to the question of why some residents supported PGL despite the various controversies surrounding it, Steven poignantly articulated: "you have a lot of people that… they just want to live in a safe neighbourhood, they want cars not to speed, they want very simple things in life and whatever means it's going to take to keep their neighbourhood safe, they want to take those means" (CDC01). Sentiments can, and often do, change as many examples in this chapter have shown. While studies exploring public support for open-street surveillance programs have explored public support in typically static and fixed terms, the case studies above reveal the temporal and contingent nature of consent for speculative security technologies and practices, especially as they evolve, become more complex, and adopt more overtly controversial applications.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the contested politics of speculative security and popular sentiments and attitudes associated with PGL. Using a mix of interviews, BOPC meeting transcripts, media accounts, and community-based reports and writings, it explored various actors beyond the state who consent to, resist, constrain, and ultimately shape processes of speculative securitization. In trying to better understand PGL's expansion, the chapter explored how surveillance fits into citizen's everyday efforts to navigate the uncertainties and insecurities

that accompany urban decline, erosion of public services, and disinvestment. Far from a simple technical process, the implementation of PGL has involved complex, socio-cultural processes of generating, shaping, and consolidating public consent around PGL as a community safety project. I argue that forms of community policing have played an important role in leveraging agreeable segments of 'responsibilized' citizens (Garland, 2001) to advocate for the program's expansion. I have revealed how, in trying to build up support for PGL, police and city officials sought to tap into the city's rich associational life to cultivate informal partnerships and make appeals to residents about the prospect of new technological forms of surveillance. To the extent that these efforts were successful, community support for PGL nevertheless remained decidedly varied, contingent, provisional, and nuanced. Interviews revealed the promises, limitations, and ethical implications of evolving forms of technological surveillance and showed how public sentiment tended to deviate based on the types of speculative technologies being deployed. In particular, PGL's connection to facial recognition became both a fault line in support for the program as well as a rallying point for organizing resistance against racialized, technologically-mediated surveillance to monitor Detroit's neighborhoods. In this regard, the politics of public opinion surrounding PGL and other surveillance initiatives must take into shifting nature of consensus (and dissensus), a reflection of the emergent and speculative features of surveillance systems themselves as a kind of imaginary onto which individuals can project different kinds of hopes and fears.

CHAPTER 6: FUTURES OF SPECULATIVE SECURITY

Introduction

Having explored the key aspects of Detroit's ongoing experiment with PGL and related surveillance initiatives, this chapter turns to the broader implications and potential futures of speculative security. The first section discusses the most recent evolution and extensions of PGL, and the pursuit of new policing and surveillance technologies and practices – indicative of both a potential future of speculative security as well as the increasing focus of speculative security on the future in terms of prediction and preemption. The second section explores sites of resistance, refusal, and reimagining. In light of the critiques and contestations associated with PGL and other forms of speculative security, the section outlines some of the important work that has been carried out to enhance legal protections and forms of oversight over speculative security technologies. I also explore how Detroiters are imagining alternative visions of safety including community-based safety initiatives and ways of seeing each other founded on relationships and care rather than fear, hostility, and suspicion. The subsequent section revisits the core features of speculative security and reflects on the value of the concept and its potential role in informing future discussions around security and surveillance. The chapter concludes by outlining the dissertation's contributions and limitations, and highlights key directions for future research.

Governing Uncertain Futures through Automated Ways of Watching

Since the city's municipal bankruptcy, Detroit has become a site of unprecedented experimentation for new forms of technology-mediated policing and surveillance. This has been in no small part a result of the DPD's ambitious agenda to equip the force with "21st century of policing technology", crafted in conjunction with the 'experts' from the conservative-based think tank, Manhattan Institute, and carried out by ambitious city and police officials (DPD, 2014a). Detroit's 'technological turn' in security governance can also be understood as the result of a

major restructuring program under the auspices of emergency management and enforced through bankruptcy court proceedings which provided considerable amounts of capital to invest in the city's policing and surveillance infrastructure. From this vantage point, ambitious experiments in speculative securitization have figured prominently into strategies to secure the confidence of municipal bond investors and credit market gatekeepers who provide access to the essential lifeblood of municipal governments. Bolstered security can also be seen as part of the efforts to help rebrand Detroit as a safety city for investment, tourism, and residence after decades of dramatic depictions of its inherent danger and disorder. Here, providing the conditions for corporate and commercial activity in the downtown areas has been framed as an essential first ingredient to rebuilding the city's tax base. This task has been taken up not only by local government who have authorized generous subsidies for new development, but by corporate place-makers who have been at the forefront of experimentation, implementation, and diffusion of speculative security technologies. Moreover, much of the city's expanded camera network would not have proliferated in the way that it did without many diverse, private and civic actors who have helped fund, advocate, support, and shape its growth. This includes formal PGL partners who have, to varying degrees, been convinced of the program's merits and have agreed to subsidize its associated costs. It also includes the various civic groups that have rallied around the program's visions to enhance security and safety in their neighborhoods. At the same time, these speculative visions have been heavily contested and resisted, influencing how they have been spatialized and enacted.

Although forms of resistance have placed important limits on surveillance expansion in the city, continued investments in speculative technologies by the city and police department demonstrate how technological experimentation has become deeply engrained and

institutionalized in contemporary forms of city governance. Local police departments are subject to intensifying incentive structures and organizational cultures that encourage conformity with technological prototyping and innovation (Brayne, 2021; Ferguson, 2017). Moreover, in the context of what McQuade (2016, p.2) calls the "small politics of interagency rivalries", local police agencies have become ensnared in forms of interjurisdictional competition, with many vying to become leaders in technological policing. Top DPD officials, for example, have often boasted that the City of Detroit has been at the cutting-edge of the rapidly evolving technological landscape. For example, prior to the RTCC's formal opening, Craig said,

> [W]e are always seeking and looking for new technology… once we expand to the full center, we will probably have the state of the art in the country. I know New York and Los Angeles have some phenomenal real time centers. But there's no one using the Green Light Initiative like we are. We are a leader in that now… nobody is using this technology in this way. And it's about public-private partnership. (BOPC 06-16-16, p.42)

When the RTCC officially opened in 2017, it was heralded by Craig as "one of the most technological Real Time Crime Centers in the country" (BOPC 11-16-2017, p.36). In agreement, his assistant chief responded:

> Absolutely… I got a little pushed back on that. Because one out there is competing against us in New York… But I think we got the best in the country. They've got us a little bit on the data analytics but no one is using their Real Time Crime Center like the City of Detroit is using theirs. So I think we have the best in the country. (BOPC 11-16-2017, p.36)

In a community panel event, Craig suggested "Green Light is becoming what CompStat was in the 90s. That was the big thing in policing and just went around the country. I will tell you that there are so many police departments interested in Green Light. I think that's the next big innovation in policing" (DPD, 2017, 27:15). Under Craig's leadership, PGL became a recognized national model for public-private CCTV partnerships, winning several awards and garnering attention from other city mayors and law enforcement agencies (IJIS, 2024). Former New York City mayor, Mike Bloomberg, praised PGL as part of Detroit's 'turnaround', saying:

> There are mayors like Mike Duggan around this country who are turning cities around that nobody thought had a chance… We are all trying to share best practices, and on my way up here, the mayor pointed out these green lights… on the businesses. I think it's one of the smartest things I've seen in a while and I'm going to connect the mayor of Baltimore, where I went to school, with Mike… to see how they could use that same technology there to fight crime. (Hunter, 2018b)

Despite an absence of conclusive evidence of its efficacy and considerable controversy and community resistance surrounding the program, several cities have modelled aspects of their open-street camera surveillance programs after PGL including Highland Park, Ecorse, Flint, Dallas, New Orleans, Miami, and Los Angeles (City of Los Angeles, 2023; City of Flint, 2016; Cokely, 2018; Fausset, 2018; Kelley, 2021; Miami-Dade County, 2024). The DPD has also hosted tours of the RTCC from police officials across the U.S. and around the world, and Detroit's PGL pilot with the first eight gas stations has been used by Motorola as a success story and testimonial for its RTCC technologies to secure contracts in other cities (Motorola Solutions, 2016). The appeal of programs like PGL for policing agencies has stemmed not only from its technological sophistication (e.g., integration of cameras into the wider RTCC infrastructure), but also from the program's underlying partnership approach and the various discursive strategies wielded to build legitimacy and responsibilize non-state actors in funding and maintaining sprawling camera networks. Offloading costs and responsibilities for surveillance reflects the types of translocal policy mobilities that resonate in an era of neoliberal austerity and devolved responsibilities for security (Jones & Newburn, 2021; McCann & Ward, 2013; Peck & Theodore, 2015).

Interestingly, the misidentifications and false arrests that resulted from flawed facial recognition technologies seem not to have significantly deterred its use in Detroit. Though the City of Detroit accounts for fifty percent of all false arrests based on flawed facial recognition

matches in the country (Neavling, 2023), the technology has remained a key component of the police department's technological arsenal alongside other speculative technologies including ALPRs, cell-site simulators, shot detection systems, drones, and video analytics. One might expect that failures associated with camera surveillance technologies (including failures to achieve intended objectives regarding crime) would warrant their discontinuation. However, as Jaffe and Pilo (2023, p.89) note, "technological failure has become a mundane event rather than a political problem" insofar as lessons learned and opportunities for improvement serve as a justification for further expansion of and investments in speculative technologies.

The developments thus far suggest that there is considerable inertia behind experimentation with speculative security, and reveals potential futures of city-wide surveillance already taking shape. Indeed, as camera and 'always on' sensor infrastructures continue to expand in geographical and functional scope, they will collect more and more data. Detroit's RTCCs have served as key points of centralization of this larger assemblage of urban sensing modalities, employing cutting-edge software to aggregate, sift through, automatically analyze, and make intelligible the vast data flows they produce. Automated forms of watching powered by artificial intelligence and machine learning are also being marketed as purported solutions to remedy the inability of human operators to concurrently monitor vast and expanding camera networks, a key tension revealed in the rollout of PGL, especially as the program expanded.

Seen as a market opportunity, it is here, in the realm of 'smart' video surveillance and video content analytics, where security technologies are arguably taking their most speculative turn. According to Kwet (2020), the multi-billion dollar video surveillance and analytics market is one of the fastest growing sectors of the urban security industry, with vendors vying for market share and riding the wave of venture capital and advancements in computing power and

artificial intelligence. Previously catering to retail and commercial settings, video analytics companies have increasingly set their sights on urban police departments and the possibility of securing long-term, lucrative public safety contracts. Vendors suggest their video analytics solutions can: provide law enforcement with new investigative insights that can index and search through days-worth of video data relayed from large camera networks; produce real-time "actionable intelligence" to aid first responders; and pre-emptively detect security risks and threats through object recognition, facial and other biometric identification, and behaviour analysis (Kwet, 2020). According to security experts, the dream and full potential of technology as a 'force multiplier' lies not only in operationally hyper-reactive stance to risk, but in a security posture that is forward-looking such that the future presents as new frontier to be colonized through prediction and pre-emption (Andrejevic, 2019; Campbell, 2024; de Goede, 2008; Zedner, 2007).Used in an anticipatory fashion, video analytics can utilize rules-based alerts that prompt analysts when cameras pick up vehicles of a certain make, color, or that have a 'hot listed' license plate (see for example, BriefCam, 2024). Product offerings have been highly experimental and speculative in their use cases, with some vendors claiming their technologies can proactively monitor for "suspicious" behavioural patterns, identify 'suspicious loitering', and can predict future violence and criminal behaviour using deep-learning (Accenture, 2018; Kwet, 2020). So-called 'second-generation' [62] biometrics claim to "capture more elusive dimensions of human life, such as basic emotional states, deception cues, and, potentially, emotional signs of hostile intent" (Maguire & Fussey, 2016, p.34).

In 2017, when the use of video analytics for law enforcement was still considered a new and emerging field, the RAND Corporation co-hosted a workshop to explore its current and

[62] The 'newness' of such use cases can be tempered by earlier accounts such as Ericson (2008) who noted that such systems to, for example, monitor suspicious loitering were being deployed in cities more than a decade ago.

future use cases. The goal of the workshop was to reflect on high-priority needs for innovation of video analytics and sensor fusion, to enhance their effectiveness, as well as highlight safeguards needed to protect privacy and civil rights (Hollywood et al., 2018). Panellists collectively noted that being able to detect crimes in progress held high societal value and should be the highest prioritized business case for innovation in video analytics. The pre-emptive aspirations of the workshop were captured by a comment from one panellist, later published in a summary report from the event: "we want to stop [crime] from happening, not investigate it later" (Hollywood et al., 2018, p.1). Noting the inherent limits and costs associated with the human monitoring of growing open-street camera networks, the panel explored the possibilities of automated video analytics and sensor fusion as the next logical progression of open-street surveillance to "detect crimes and precursors, hazards, and suspicious activity" (Hollywood et al., 2018, p.8). Panellists referred to video analytics "as one application of a broader capability of computer vision, or an automated understanding of the world", with the ability to detect new objects in a video feed, classify them, and track their movement (Hollywood et al., 2018, p.6). "Sensor fusion", on the other hand, would aggregate and strive to make actionable inferences from the analysis of multiple streams of video and non-video sensor data while reducing uncertainties (Hollywood et al., 2018, p.5). Some suggested that because public safety applications of video analytics and sensor fusion had a long way to go to reach their full potential, a general innovation philosophy of "crawl, walk, run" should be pursued (Hollywood et al., 2018, p.2). The report suggested that models will require extensive "training to capture the implicit knowledge of officers and monitors" to determine the appropriate law enforcement response based on their own judgements of the video and sensor hits involving a "human-in-the-loop interaction" (Hollywood et al., 2018,

p.13). However, there was also the expectation that models would become increasingly sophisticated over time, eventually being able to provide "black box predictions":

> At the start, decision rules for alerting will be based on object and behavior recognition and will be linked to facial and license plate recognition for wanted persons. The models will progress toward using simple predictive capabilities with features as inputs, and eventually proceed to more complex, black box predictions of future crimes or other incidents of concern. (Hollywood et al., 2017, p.9)

The observations and takeaways of the workshop provide a window into the envisioned trajectories of video analytics as a law enforcement tool in its relatively nascent stages. Seven years on, video analytics has become the next phase in the progression of sprawling open-street camera networks, and a purported solution to the constraints of police departments and their inability to continuously monitor and make sense of vast amounts of video feeds. In many respects, video analytics and the new forms of normalized and "automated suspicion" (Joh, 2016, p.15) reflect a true embodiment of the anticipatory logics and "algorithmic world-making" capacities (see Amoore & Raley, 2017, p.6) accompanying the shift towards future-oriented, predictive policing strategies (Ericson, 2008). Resembling what Zedner (2007, p.262) has called "pre-crime", these forward-looking and highly speculative logics of security seek to intervene much earlier in the chain of events presumed to precede a 'crime' event, involving probabilistic inferences about the relationships between 'suspicious' characteristics, 'furtive' movements, or 'unusual' behavioural patterns and crime (Anderson, 2010; Andrejevic, 2019; Zedner, 2007).

Despite this rapid growth of video analytics in policing, there have been relatively few critical assessments of these speculative technologies and the potential dystopian futures they present. As Ferenbok & Clement (2012, p.225) noted, "This shift to 'smart' video surveillance is being made almost entirely out of public view", posing significant challenges to civilian and even governmental oversight. Its 'black-boxed' nature also derives from the opaqueness of

algorithms that conceals their socio-technical inner-workings and disguising traces of human judgement, decision-making, and (un)intentional biases, while projecting a veneer of objectivity (Brayne, 2021; Pasquale, 2015). Video analytics thus presents some of the very same concerns associated with racialized and 'coded bias' of predictive policing technologies which have been examined at length (Benjamin, 2019, Brayne, 2021; Browne, 2015; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; van Brakel, 2016). Such technologies have the very real possibility of reinforcing racial hierarchies by incorporating ways of seeing that assume whiteness as normative, while non-white populations are subjected to heightened suspicion (Mirzoeff, 2023; Stoddart, 2022). Such systems need not be intentionally programmed to reproduce racialized biases, but such biases may arise, for example, from how data is collected and labelled and how systems are trained on data (see van Brakel, 2016). Industry practices of non-disclosure[63] and secrecy among police departments also make it increasingly difficult to ensure meaningful accountability (Joh, 2016; 2017). As Joh (2016, p.30) argues, "police are notoriously secretive" and many researchers and journalists have found that unregulated use of new, experimental technologies by law enforcement has become a systemic trend (Crump, 2016; Manes, 2019; Rector & Winton, 2020; Sadowski, 2020; Stein, 2018; 2020; Winston, 2018).[64] According to Fyfe et al. (2017, p.13), there is also a "general lack of willingness by policing services to acknowledge, at least externally, the high degree of uncertainty and possibility of error involved in predictive policing strategies". And when problems with technologies arise, advocates of new technologies

[63] Practices of non-disclosure have been used as a tactic not only to protect trade secrecy, but I argue, to deflect inquiries into and criticisms of the speculative facets of new technology. See for example how some manufacturers view data collection as proprietary information that should not be made unavailable to the public (Joh, 2017). Such practices hamper proper evaluation. In Detroit, the DPD had purchased a cell-site simulator in 2016, but because the department had signed an NDA with the vendor, they were prohibited from disclosing the specifics of the device and how it was being used (Fassett, 2019).

[64] When faced with growing controversies and questions over the department's use of facial recognition, Craig veered towards secrecy, saying: "The thing is, we don't always publicize the tools we use… Many times our work is confidential, and we always want to be concerned about the impact it has on future prosecution, so we don't always talk about our methodologies" (Hunter, 2019b).

frequently frame issues in terms of the need for more and better data and/or better training models for algorithms (Andrejevic, 2019).The danger according to some is not merely seeing that speculative security technologies are potentially fallible (see Magnet, 2011), but that we subscribe to the techno-optimist belief that they can be perfected over time (Andrejevic, 2019). In the meantime, society, and particularly the most marginalized and disenfranchised, are expected to shoulder the disproportionate burdens of experimentation and techno-failure (see Jaffe & Pilo, 2023).

The rapid pace of development in video analytics, and predictive policing technologies more generally, is also far outstripping the capacity of laws and regulations to ensure civil liberties are safeguarded, and that inequalities along lines of race, class, gender, able-ism are not amplified (Garvie & Moy, 2019; Joh, 2016). In the race to build out predictive policing infrastructures, notions of privacy and constitutionality seem too easily cast aside, often seen as barriers to police innovation. Consider the perspectives of top-tanking law enforcement officials such as the Executive director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association who foretold in 2017: "There will no doubt be significant legal debate about privacy rights and the like… It will be important for public safety advocates to assert that there is no expectation of privacy in a public place, nor when engaged in a direct interaction with a uniformed police officer" (Wyllie, 2017). Similarly, an AI expert at the FBI's Training Division said:

> Dedicated video is only part of the AI story… Consider the IoT [Internet of Things]. Consider clouds full of data – warehouses ripe for the tapping and AI extracting. Consider also that – well into the digital information age – we cling desperately to industrial-age concepts such as privacy, confidentiality, anonymity and secrecy. 'Them cows done left the barn.' Sooner or later, we'll realize that for most of what we want to hide the cost of keeping them hidden is way beyond the value. (Wyllie, 2017)

To be sure, while personal privacy is important, it is not the only thing at stake in the context of rapidly expanding assemblages of speculative security technologies (Marwick, 2022; Stalder,

2002). The disproportionate suspicion and surveillance of Black and brown communities stemming from constructions of these populations as 'dangerous', 'deviant', and 'extremist' (Muhammad, 2011; Selod, 2018) reveals that respect for privacy rights have been highly unequal, reserved primarily for whiter and more affluent populations. Furthermore, the pervasive use of facial recognition (Garvie et al., 2016), aerial surveillance (Lippert & Walby, 2022), 'intelligent' streetlight systems (Xie, 2022), and other technologies across the U.S. to keep tabs on Black Lives Matter protestors demonstrates how speculative security can double as architectures of repression that stifle freedom of expression, movement, and other First Amendment protected activities, effectively criminalizing political dissent. And while many police departments have rationalized the deployment of speculative security technologies like smart cameras, video analytics, and facial recognition to deal with the most violent and devastating crime and terror threats, there is much evidence to suggest that use cases are often expanded once technologies have been adopted.[65]

Finally, public investments in new, automated ways of watching may simply be lining the pockets of private security vendors who can successfully leverage fears and insecurities, while purporting to provide solutions that may end up having little to no effect on levels of violence or even perceptions of safety (Zedner 2003). If there is any humanity to be deduced from automated forms of watching, it would reflect a psychological state of high alertness, low trust, and deep anxieties of others where every individual presents the possibility of harm; an environment more akin to a modern warzone. Humanity fortunately offers much more than this paranoid mode of watching, and humans are equipped with a much wider range of cognitive capacities for deeper

[65] See, for example, predictive policing technologies to enforce civility and nuisance laws (McGrory & Bedi, 2020; Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, 2021) and to detect those owing delinquent property taxes (Joh, 2016). In Detroit, cameras were used to help monitor crowd sizes, enforce social distancing during the pandemic, and issue citations for up to $1000 per violation (House, 2020).

contextualizations, rationalizations, and appraisals of events, as well as the ability to see others with empathy, compassion, and understanding. That emergent forms of video analytics indicate a move towards seeing the world and its people as inherently suspicious or dangerous is not necessarily a bug, but a feature of systems that have been developed, tested, and honed in foreign battlefields, occupied territories, and securitized borderlands (Graham, 2010; Muñiz, 2020).

In an era of unprecedented uncertainty, fear has become a powerful logic of organizing urban space and life (Aas et al.; 2009; Davis, 1998; Kinder, 2016; Pali & Schuilenburg, 2020; Tulumello, 2015; Zeiderman, 2016), contributing to significant compromises in citizens' liberties for the promise of security. This is not at all to say that fears associated with violence and victimization are unwarranted. Neither is it to suggest that problems of crime and violence are non-existent in the city. Rather, fear-based models of security tend to define safety in narrow terms such as being *free* from particular threats and dangers (see Norris, 2020), underplaying the multitude of harms and forms of structural violence and inequalities not addressed by the criminal justice system. Tawana Petty has argued that decades of denigrating Detroit has affected how residents see their city and made them overly fearful, arguing that "a city that has been taught to fear itself can easily become a city that conflates safety with militarized policing and surveillance" (Petty, 2021a). Aside from the multiple violences exacted through differential forms of surveillance and policing, fear-based models of security may crowd out or take precedence over interventions that may be better positioned to reduce harms and address the wide spectrum of citizens' immediate and longer-term needs, and shift attention away from the broader material conditions, "life-building institutions" (as cited in Davis et al., 2022), and social bonds and relations that are vital for creating safe communities (Clear, 2007). Instead of bastions of safety, fear-based technological solutions may serve merely as placebos while reproducing "us

vs. them" mentalities and cultures of mutual suspicion with "neighbors recast as strangers" (Gilmore, 2007, p.16; see also, Doering, 2020; Reeves, 2017). Rather than reducing fear, "technologies of (in)security" can amplify fear and distrust (Aas et al., 2009, p.2). As many have argued, increased reliance on technologies may undermine forms of natural surveillance as well as social bonds based on trust, reciprocity, and mutual aid, leading to further social fragmentation, atomization, fortification, and 'bunkering up' (Davis, 1990; Kroener and Neyland 2012). For Andrejevic (2019, p.8), the danger of a society that increasingly relies on automation is the continuous displacement by technology of social relations and human judgement so as to "foreclose the symbolic space for politics".

This raises the question of who ultimately benefits the most from the diffusion of speculative security technologies. Police departments may very well find procedural value in many of these technologies (e.g., to help produce evidence, apprehend suspects, close cases, etc.), even if they do not ultimately achieve promised goals of reducing levels of crime. However, the greatest beneficiary is perhaps the security industry that, rather than fulfilling existing technical needs, is seeking to create demand for new technologies and new use cases while trying to convince police services of their need for these novel technical capabilities (Brayne, 2021)[66]. The neoliberal cultivation of the security marketplace has also been facilitated by federal programs seeking to bring novel technologies to market through grant funding and government-backed venture capital as well private equity investments (Lakhani, 2023; Perez et al., 2021). Top security technology firms are well organized (and connected) to sell their

[66] Brayne (2021) argues that investments in technology are reinforced by path dependencies and sunk costs, and that police departments have vested interests in maintaining cash flow from granting agencies and private sources regardless of whether the originally funded technologies are effective or not. Lippert & Walby (2022, p.7) argue that police are a "greedy institution", desiring resources beyond their needs and means.

technology, maintaining somewhat incestuous relationships with top police brass[67] which they use to get their products into as many police departments as possible (Burrington, 2018; Perez et al., 2021). In trying to entice potential customers, companies often offer free trials at low or no cost, or make donations to police departments and/or police foundations (see Lippert & Walby, 2022; LittleSis, 2021)[68] in the pursuit of longer-term service contracts and licenses. The danger of all of this is that such quid-pro-quo arrangements may lead to police departments becoming less accountable to average citizens, while allowing profit-motivated actors to sell speculative visions of technology as ostensible solutions to crime, violence, fear, and insecurity. Rapid expansion of speculative security technologies and the powerful interests behind them are shaping a future world on which many urban populations have not been given ample opportunity to deliberate in meaningful ways. If urban populations were to fully grasp the implications of these techno-visions and were empowered to determine their own futures, they might choose another way.

Sites of Resistance, Refusal, and Reimagination

The imagined trajectory of speculative security technologies by security industry experts and police officials may seem an inevitable outcome of technological advancements and the visions of actors occupying powerful positions in the governance of cities. However, rather than a forgone conclusion, forms of speculative security are always constituted through "multiple

[67] Bill Bratton, a vocal proponent of predictive policing and surveillance technology and who has overseen the approval of multi-million dollar contracts with tech vendors as chief of the LAPD and NYPD (see Bartosiewicz, 2015), has sat on the corporate boards of major security companies including Motorola Solutions, Axon (formerly Taser), ShotSpotter, and other security tech vendors receiving salary and stock options in return (Burrington, 2018; Goodman, 2013).

[68] In Detroit, for example, Motorola Solutions was awarded over $35 million in contracts to equip the city's main RTCC with much of its IT infrastructure as well as for pole cameras, box cameras, ALPRs, and radio communications system maintenance. Many of the contracts were awarded after the company had donated equipment as well as $80,000 to the Detroit Public Safety Foundation, which according to Blackmer (2021a), "was a part of a broader pattern for Motorola, which reportedly donated over $25 million to 'public safety-related foundations' since 2008 while cozying up with police and fire departments nationwide" (see also Perez et al., 2021).

sites of contestation, negotiation, resistance, and refusal" (Amoore & Raley, 2017, p.8). This dissertation has maintained that people on the ground- activists, social justice advocates, and ordinary citizens- play a key role in shaping the contours of securitization. In various cities across the U.S., people have contested and organized against the expanding ecologies of surveillance that have disproportionately impacted communities of color by reproducing patterns of overpolicing and racialized hypervisibility. For example, grassroots organizing in Los Angeles by the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition led to the dismantling of several of the LAPD's speculative policing programs that relied on place-based and person-based prediction to contain and banish poor, racialized populations (Brayne, 2021; Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, 2020). In Oakland, where surveillance had been frequently used to monitor protests and other First Amendment protected activities, activism led to the banning a number of surveillance technologies including voice and facial recognition and other forms of biometric surveillance (Sheard, 2021). These efforts also led to the Community Control of Police Surveillance (CCOPS)[69], a regulatory framework to protect residents from unchecked proliferation of surveillance technologies and which became a template for other cities including Detroit (Sheard & Schwartz, 2021). In San Diego, social justice advocacy groups and residents pushed back against the city's growing network of 'smart' streetlights capable of capturing video, recognizing license plates, and picking up audio (Holder, 2020). New Orleans' plans for an open-street camera network inspired by PGL, which included the eventual integration of "intelligent threat analytics" (City of New Orleans, 2017, p.6), were stymied by resident pushback and new ordinances that banned facial and character recognition, cell-site stimulators, and other surveillance technologies that had been controversially deployed by the New Orleans Police Department (Stein, 2020).

[69] The framework also helped establish a Privacy Advisory Commission that oversees adoption of surveillance technology, requires impact analyses that weight threats to civil liberties, requires policy to mitigate any negative impacts, and involves the public in decision-making around surveillance policy and its adoption (Sheard, 2021).

In Detroit, persistent grassroots efforts to contest PGL and associated surveillance initiatives have undoubtedly stifled more pernicious uses of surveillance technologies (Petty, 2021a; Riverwise, 2019). In this regard, the BOPC as a form of citizen oversight and means to regulate the use of speculative technologies proved to be somewhat limited, as noted by social justice advocates and activists (Riverwise, 2019). However, BOPC meetings represented just one of several sites of resistance where activists and concerned residents voiced their opposition and raised awareness about the potential dangers of expanded surveillance. Beyond BOPC meetings, grassroots coalitions took to the streets in protest (Dale & Spangler, 2020; Green Light Black Futures, 2022; Kaye, 2021). In 2020, social justice organizers helped draft a Detroiter's Bill of Rights that aimed to enshrine racial equity and justice into the city's constitution and address many of the problems created under emergency management and municipal bankruptcy (Petty, 2021a). The bill centered on addressing pervasive issues of affordable water, housing, and public transit, corporate welfare and development subsidies, and militarized policing and surveillance (Howell, 2020). Regarding the latter, the bill included restrictions on surveillance and would require the implementation of a surveillance ordinance that would draw from model legislation first adopted in Oakland to provide better oversight and accountability with regard to the city's adoption and use of surveillance technologies by police (Barrett, 2023c; Perez et al., 2021). The bill also aimed to strengthen the power of the BOPC and make it more equitable by making positions elected rather than appointed and preventing former law enforcement from serving (Petty, 2021a). While the Bill of Rights was ultimately defeated, the proposed visions provided a detailed framework for action to address the multiple racial injustices that plagued city residents, and highlighted how resistance to racialized surveillance was intimately tied to broader fights for equitable distribution of resources and questions around social reproduction (Petty, 2021b;

Rahal, 2021). As with other cities, safeguarding against abuses associated with the use of speculative security technologies has been a continuous fight, requiring constant vigilance and oversight (see van Brakel, 2021 for discussion on oversight).

Like most other major cities, Detroit has had its share of problems with violence, provoking legitimate anxieties and fears over safety, and often animating calls for more policing resources. The belief, however, that new and relatively unproven technologies will remedy these deeply complex problems seems to emanate from aspirations and imagined potentials rather than conclusive evidence. When such technologies also produce negative impacts, whether through technological error and bias, the infringement of civil liberties, or by reproducing racialized practices of policing and surveillance, there is an ethical obligation to consider less contentious and harmful alternatives (see Goold, 2004). As one respondent remarked about PGL, "there's good points and bad points, but when the cons outweigh the pros, then you know, you have to start looking at other things" (CO05). Once again, the question becomes, what does safety look like?

My interviews revealed a diversity of opinions and ideas about how safety could be improved in their neighborhoods. Most, if not all respondents commented on the inadequacy of police response, and some supported the idea that the neighborhoods needed more police, especially as a large proportion of police services were dedicated to the downtown. However, others were not in favour of more police and were sceptical of the notion that a greater police presence translated into greater security,

> if you took a general consensus of the neighborhood, I don't think more people would want the police… I don't. I want to live in a safe neighborhood, but that doesn't mean the police swarming all the time. That makes it seems like it's a problem neighborhood. (CO05)

Instead, some respondents suggested ways of watching that did not necessarily involve police, such as more citizen radio patrols, or presence of more businesses which would increase foot traffic and natural surveillance, or simply more people looking out for one another as espoused by residents, social justice advocates, and activists (Investing in Us, 2020, p.61). One CDC representative I interviewed said, "I'm more interested in how do we provide more jobs on our commercial corridor so more people are employed and making money through legal means rather than join the informal economy" (CDC01).

There was also a clear theme that emerged around tackling issues around basic needs and resources. For example, one CDC representative spoke positively of community policing initiatives that tried to put a more friendly face on policing in Detroit's neighborhoods, but admitted, "Some needs in our community are so dire. People are on such straights that it doesn't always translate well" (CDC02). She mentioned that needs around housing and home repair were at the top of the list in her neighborhood:

> The number one call that we get… here is housing. It's a place to live or 'I need home repair'. Home repair probably being the biggest thing… these homes in this neighbourhood are all over a hundred years old now… You gotta make a choice… Am I eating or am I fixing my gutters? When you are faced with that, there's just a lot of deferred maintenance on these homes. (CDC02)

Though some respondents suggested there were ample services and supports in their neighborhoods, others revealed a dire need for more resources and social services in their community:

> [T]hey don't have the resources. People get out of jail, they don't have anywhere to live, they don't have a job. They can't find a job where they live, they need a bus ticket, they need a lot of resources that even at a community organization level I can't help them with. I don't have bus tickets, and I don't have a clothes closet for a suit or anything for people to interview… it's not all about calling the police on em. That's not the solution. Sometimes its mental health… therapy or talking to someone, or you know, regular resources that people with money have no problem with. (CO05)

Others echoed the respondent's views on the need for additional resources and services, especially as it related to addictions and mental health:

> [T]here isn't enough around mental health being done to really support mental health issues and publicly funded mental health. I think the more we can actually deal with that root cause, that would go along ways to crime prevention and having the right social workers that are there on the scene and things like that to help negotiate and make things happen. (CDC01)

Another respondent mentioned that mental health issues had proliferated during the pandemic, exacerbated by austerity-induced closures of mental health service providers:

> [The] last governor we had, they closed down all these centers to people with mental health, and believe it or not I have people calling me and saying "that's why I'm going to the doctor because I think something wrong with me". Because these people tell me so many horror stories that they've gone through during COVID. (CO06)

This same respondent mentioned the unprecedented loss of life due to illness and suicide which had taken a toll on people in her neighbourhood. Another mentioned an epidemic of domestic violence that had erupted during the pandemic in her neighbourhood, which she opined was fundamentally a social issue. She questioned whether police were adequately equipped to "be able to manage life and death situations… Psychiatrists would need years of sessions with this person to get them whole, but we're expecting police to figure it out?" (CDC02). She also argued for investments in conflict resolution, suggesting, "If we could teach kids at the younger age how to deal with conflict, at the teenage years, its huge… And in this day and age and with peoples' access to guns, I mean you have to take all this very seriously (CDC02). She said,

> And I know there's other more radical things I could be saying, but I'm choosing not to. But I think there just needs to be better training for our officers… I don't even think there needs to be more officers necessarily, but at the same time, putting more money into mental health and putting more money into conflict resolution and domestic violence situations into our social service arena. (CDC02)

I asked her how she thought a fiscally-strained city like Detroit could balance demands for more policing resources while providing the types of resources and services to meet the needs of communities plagued by poverty and disinvestment. She responded:

> It's never going to happen from the city. Because the city is political and they're going to go with what the whims of the ebb and flow is of their constituents because they want to be re-elected. So it's going to be incarceration, it's always going to be a stronger police force… more cops on the street. It's always going to be that because that's what people think is the way to be safe and to feel safe. So it's going to take the other people intervene… other entities, institutions, organizations, whatever it is, to say, "this is the better way." (CDC02).

Some of the suggestions from interviewees echo the ideas articulated by social justice advocacy groups and organizers, many of whom have offered alternative and emancipatory visions of safety. Tawana Petty, a social justice organizer, has argued that "Black communities who have been under-resourced and ignored for decades, want to be seen, not watched" (Petty, 2020). Petty, along with others, have advocated for cultivating a culture of safety through community-based and transformative justice principles, mutual aid, and community care (Logic, 2020; Petty, 2021a). She points to organizing efforts that resulted in a counter-campaign to PGL called "Green Chairs Not Green Lights" seeking to push back on the conflation of surveillance and safety. The campaign calls on residents to "return to our front porches and see each other as neighbors" and to "see the humanity in each other" (Brogna, 2020; Green Chairs Not Green Lights, 2024). In contrast to social control perspectives that emphasize watching neighbors as a practice of territoriality and defensible space (see Knoblauch, 2018; Norris, 2020), the campaign focuses on more holistic practices and ethics of care, strengthening community bonds, mutual solidarity, and the ability look out for one another (see also, Baker et al., 2023; Lu et al., 2023). Additionally, as a response to the lack of community input and control over decisions about surveillance, the Green Light Black Futures coalition published a community safety survey in

2022 of neighborhood residents' opinions and experiences of surveillance (Green Light Black Futures, 2022). The resulting report explored how respondents understood safety primarily in terms of knowing that others were looking out for them. Respondents' understandings of safety diverged considerably from the limited framing of policing and crime rates, and many asserted that police were often a source of anxiety and unsafety as Black residents tended to be disproportionately subjected to stops, and that calling police could potentially escalate situations and perpetuate violence against the very residents and communities in need of protection. Rather than always calling police, the report advocated for the ability to communicate and mediate disputes between neighbors where possible.

Many voices critical of PGL and other surveillance initiatives have argued that funds have been misdirected to policing and surveillance that could have been used to create real safety. Eric Williams of the Detroit Justice Center has said:

> Picture the safest place you can imagine… if you look around, you will see "safe parks, safe schools, vibrant commercial districts, you see people walking down the street. That's what we all picture when we think about a safe place. What you do not see are cameras... police officers on every corner… metal detectors in schools… surplus military equipment. These things that are a real big part of what we're told will create safety in our neighborhoods don't exist in anyone's idea of what actually is a safe place. And when you spend money on those things… you are taking public funds away from all the things in your head that really equated to safety. (Herberg, 2022)

Instead, residents and social justice advocates argue that investments in infrastructures for clean water, schools, community centers, parks, healthcare, and transportation are a core component of creating safer communities (Green Light Black Futures, 2022). Such proposals are not in themselves necessarily utopian, but aim to repair some of the significant damage done by decades of disinvestment, austerity, abandonment, and uneven development. Organizations in Detroit have also been participating in their own experiments in reimaging safety based on restorative justice interventions that encourage mediation, conflict resolution, and de-escalation

to promote healing and peaceful relationships. The Detroit Safety Team as well as the Detroit Coalition Against Police Brutality's Peace Zones 4 Life program are just a few of the better known examples of efforts to address violence while shifting away from the reliance on police and surveillance (Baker et al., 2023; Kurashige, 2017; One Million Experiments, 2024). Taking inspiration from collective experiments and visionary organizing unfolding in other cities underpinned by abolitionist visions of a world without the need for prisons and police (Kaba & Ritchie, 2022; Pasternak, Walby, & Stadnyk, 2022), community-based struggles to cultivate relations and cultures of safety built on mutual aid, caring human relationships, understanding, and community self-determination are helping to redefine what safety can look like in Detroit and beyond. At the same time, these struggles encompass broader transformative goals of creating new ways of living (Kurashige, 2017) and liberatory spaces where, as Reese & Johnson (2022, p.38) contend, "people can both have their needs met and practice relationality that is not rooted in extraction".

Reflections on the Concept of Speculative Security

Having articulated several contrasting future trajectories, I now turn back to the conceptual framework of speculative security to draw out its key takeaways and theoretical value. As a conceptual framework, speculative security speaks to the idea that the value of emergent and experimental security technologies is always socially and politically constructed, operating through expectations, aspirations, and imagined potentials of what technology can achieve. As demonstrated in this dissertation, expansion of speculative security technologies can, and often does, transpire in the absence of robust evidence of their efficacy. Like many open street camera programs before it, PGL has been heavily influenced by political appeals and demands to do something about local crime problems, a case where rigorous assessments of

security technologies may be less important to lay publics than demonstrated action (Norris et al., 2004). At the same time, the rather loose attachment to empirical evidence is in part a result of the growing challenges around evaluating increasingly complex and interconnected technological systems. It is becoming more difficult to make causal determinations and separate out the distinctive effects of disparate technologies within the larger, networked assemblage in which they are embedded. Opaque algorithmic black boxes protected by NDAs and institutional secrecy on behalf of police departments further complicate true assessments and contribute to the seemingly unfalsifiable nature of speculative security technologies. In the absence of robust evidence, top policing officials may rely on anecdotal success stories, statistics produced internally or from vendors, or simply 'gut feelings' about their potential efficacy and utility (Herberg, 2022). What counts as evidence and whether technologies are deemed a success or not is thus highly politicized and shaped by uneven distributions of power that privilege some voices and disempower others. Even when certain technologies are prone to significant inaccuracies and flaws (e.g., facial recognition), or they fail to meet their intended objectives, city and police officials often rationalize their continued use by appealing to the urgent need to address high levels of crime and violence. As Jaffe & Pilo (2023) assert: "Definitions of success and failure derive not only from the positions of evaluators but also serve to legitimize their situated interests" (p.79). Furthermore, technological adoption is increasingly driven and rationalized by the imagined potential of technologies to render city spaces more safe and secure (Morozov, 2013; Przeszlowski et al., 2023). In other words, the needs for, and 'value' of, certain security technologies need not be specifically articulated or pre-defined, but are more and more being realized through experimentation and determined only after implementation in *a posteriori* fashion. There are no guarantees that these technologies will be or are effective in their

prescribed objectives of preventing crime or pre-empting risks. Rather, it is perhaps the *perception* of security that they foster, however fleetingly, that remains the more salient aspect of speculative securitization.

This dissertation explored PGL as one manifestation of speculative security. Rather than suggesting that PGL originated from a single, definitive starting point or developed in a linear way, this research explored how the program emerged out of and was shaped by multiple, historically contingent and situated events and processes, allied interests and actors, and contested visions. Chapters Two and Three explored some of the larger processes, interests, and rationalities that shaped the program. In considering the dynamics of 'late-entrepreneurialism' (Peck & Whiteside, 2016), this dissertation argued that PGL emerged within an increasingly financialized terrain of urban politics and governance. This includes technocratic decisions of the emergency financial manager to restructure city operations and to leverage municipal debt so as to better align policing with the economic and financial goals of an envisioned 'urban renaissance'. Moving beyond theorizations of urban securitization that focus primarily on forms of revalorization constituted in differentiated land values (Jaffe, 2019), I employed the concept of speculative security to explore some wider financialized dynamics at play including how security is increasingly comprised of appealing to the interests of distant financial actors like credit-rating agencies and bondholders. Speculative security, thus, can take on a second meaning in the sense that cities are increasingly being framed and thought of as investments and sources of future financial returns extracted from securitized city futures traded on the global bond market. The growing interdependence between experimental policing and surveillance and speculative forms of financial extraction (see Weber, 2021) is a key node and critical vantage point from which to analyze what Akers (2013) has called the "Market City". Relatedly, the

extent to which debt-leveraged investments in speculative security expand forms of racialized carceral control in place of funding of education, healthcare, and basic needs speaks to the multi-faced "violence of municipal debt" (Ponder & Omstedt, 2022, p.273) that structure processes of austerity, dispossession, and discipline in majority-Black cities like Detroit.

Additionally, the second and third chapters also touch on the influence of conservative think tanks and urban consultants in shaping new security policy, the evolving landscape of intelligence fusion and interjurisdictional rivalries between law enforcement agencies, the techno-optimism of high-ranking police and city officials, profit motives of a burgeoning security industry, and the reclamation of city spaces by corporate and financial elites. However, to limit an analysis of speculative security to the material and instrumental objectives and interests of these elite actors and dynamics would overlook the considerable agency and influence of everyday civic actors that contribute to, contest, resist, and ultimately shape securitization processes. This dissertation sought to provide a framework for thinking about the multiple sources of agency, meaning-making, and imagination involved in constituting projects, practices, logics, and spaces of speculative security. The theoretical framework, it is hoped, provides a contrast to the rather deterministic perspectives that have tended to emphasize top-down understandings of speculative security solely dictated by a revanchist impulse to exact revenge or by pacification efforts intended to reproduce capitalist relations and order (Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011). While not denying the power of these larger rationalities and structural forces, the concept of speculative security recognizes that the political terrain over and through which PGL has unravelled is informed both by these larger structural contexts as well as local contingencies, situated experiences, forms of agency, knowledge, and imagination.

Relatedly, the concept of speculative security is helpful for exploring hegemonic, yet deeply contested, security imaginaries mobilized as shared understandings of technologies and their speculative potentials to assuage anxieties over crime, violence, and localized decline and to improve quality of life for everyday residents. These imaginaries have figured centrally in building consent, legitimacy, and support around speculative security projects that appeal to fears, hopes, and aspirations rather than merely empirical evidence or realities. This dissertation explored one particular security imaginary reflected in the "safe haven" concept through which city and police officials anchored their visions of the revitalized, securitized, and orderly city. Equating surveillance with safety, the spatialized imaginary worked to present PGL locations as clean, safe, and welcoming spaces in a sea of constant and unpredictable danger. Beyond a shared vision, the "safe haven" imaginary provided the capacity for action and a vehicle to responsibilize PGL partners to surveill, co-regulate, and maintain their immediate environments in ways that aligned with broader visions of revitalization. However, the extent to which these speculative security imaginaries provided a convincing narrative frame and vision for city residents has been decidedly mixed, with some embracing its assumptions, and others fiercely contesting them. As a conceptual lens, then, speculative security permits a view of the political struggles unfolding across the contested terrain of imagined city futures. As dominant visions of security are mobilized to capture popular imaginations about the future through hopes and fears, they require constant stabilization, legitimation, and realignment in the midst of technological failures, contestations, resistance, and competing visions. In contrast to theoretical frameworks that emphasize top down accounts of surveillance expansion, speculative security is better attuned to multiple and diverse valences, imaginations, collective agencies, and labours beyond the state and 'from below' (Fussey, 2007; Hier, 2010; Smith, 2012; Walby, 2006) that help

constitute and shape securitization processes. As such, speculative security allows for a more nuanced account of how the desires, demands, activities, and practices of ordinary citizens fit into the larger, messy patchwork of 'public' and 'private' security practices and arrangements operating in and across urban space in sometimes coordinated and other times contradictory ways (see Anderson, 2020; Brayne, Lageson, & Levy, 2023; Colak, Lombard, & Guarneros-Meza, 2023; Hier, 2010; Walby, 2006). By the same token, it allows us to see the influence of contestation and resistance to hegemonic visions of speculative security which are constituted and (de)stabilized through a multiplicity of actors, revealing a fragility, indeterminacy, and open-endedness of securitization projects that are not immune to the agency of everyday citizens. As revealed through interviews and other sources, there was a temporal dimension to shifting lines of consent and dissent surrounding PGL that were influenced by personal experiences of the limitations and failures of program, and by local and national political struggles that challenged the racialized nature of contemporary policing and surveillance. Speculative security thus highlights how the provisionality of hegemonic visions can give way to alternative visions of safety that contest not only infrastructures of racialized surveillance, but also highly commodified and securitized visions that see city futures as objects of capitalist speculation and seek to colonize the terrains of city futures for profit-making and extraction. Speculative security, thus, can also encapsulate community-based initiatives that are speculative and experimental in their own right, seeking to cultivate more progressive and democratic visions for the future.

Additionally, the concept of speculative security may also help better understand the ways that novel and experimental security technologies and practices become spatialized and operate or are implemented according to spatially-differentiated logics. This follows other

scholars who have highlighted the need to appreciate differences in CCTV implementation between commercial and residential spaces where the latter may be more likely shaped by public demands, pressure, and opinions rather than commercial and business interests (Fussey, 2007). Take for example the differences between speculative securitization in the downtown versus the neighborhoods. In the former case, speculative forms of security have unfolded in unison with speculative reimaginings of a corporatized downtown citadel, where security is provided as assurances to investors, corporate employers, and tepid tourists- many of whom may harbour misconceived notions of the city as a place of (racialized) risk and danger shaped by decades of media portrayals. Here, security arrangements have been primarily negotiated through heavily privatized geographies and institutional landscapes of elite, security public-private partnerships and, special authorities, and special districts, aiming to shift perceptions of the downtown, protect business interests of commercial and corporate enterprise, and secure the prospects of financial speculation in land and flagship developments. The speculative nature of security has been shaped by the imaginations of powerful private security actors who have been at the forefront of protopying and disseminating novel security and surveillance technologies behind the opacity of public-private security partnerships with little to no requirements for transparency, accountability, or public consent. The dynamics driving securitization in the downtown are, to some extent, reminiscent of interest-based explanations that place an emphasis on corporate reclamation and revalorization of city centers (Coleman, 2004; Helms, 2008). Yet, such interest-based perspectives fail to explain some of the more complicated dynamics of speculative securitization especially as one moves beyond the downtown and into the everyday, residential spaces of the city. The spread of CCTV to the city's neighborhoods is still undoubtedly ensconced in some larger structural processes, such as the fact that the city's future fiscal health

as deemed by credit-rating agencies will rely on extending revitalization efforts beyond the downtown. Thus security via citywide camera networks is likely seen by city and police officials as an important accompaniment to the spatially-selective revitalization of key commercial corridors and neighborhoods deemed "viable". However, the expansion of surveillance into Black and Brown residential communities has involved much more complex processes of consent- and alliance-building and contestation that differ from the contexts of central business districts and downtown spaces. Furthermore, many theorizations of securitization and surveillance tend to overemphasize the production of new economic spaces through processes of urban development and gentrification, having less to say about spaces where the prospects of future investment may be absent or not immediately realizable. As such, it is equally important to consider how forms of speculative security are also deployed as part of extended efforts to manage decline, administer intensified regimes of neoliberal austerity and urban triage, and contain subsequent social dislocations of state abandonment and neglect. That rapid expansion of speculative security technologies is unfolding in predominantly in Black communities and cities - the very spaces that have been traditionally abandoned by capital and the state - is a continuation of longer-running processes that have subjugated and criminalized Black life (Muhammad, 2010) while rendering Black and other non-white groups vulnerable and expendable under racial capitalism.

Study Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

This study was limited by various factors related to sampling and access to respondents, availability of data, restricted timeframe of research, and lack of embedded field work. Specifically, the interview sample represented a small segment of experiences and perceptions of the PGL program. While I drew on community-based reports and other documentary research to

supplement interview data, there were various other groups that could have provided additional insights including: philanthropic organizations, community justice and advocacy organizations, and community organizers that were involved in promoting community wellbeing and safety. Due to time constraints, interview respondents were recruited primarily through email. Sampling methods could have been expanded to reach PGL participants by phone, which would have potentially broadened the types of PGL locations to include more retail establishments (e.g., gas stations, liquor and convenience stores). The study would also have been enhanced by inclusion of respondents who had initially enrolled in PGL, but later un-enrolled or were removed from the program. Their views may shed more light on the tensions, problems, and limitations of public-private surveillance partnerships.

Since the majority of the data collection was conducted from a distance and given my outsider status, I was not able to build rapport prior to recruiting interview respondents. These factors likely contributed to lower response rates to interview requests and potential distrust or scepticism of my motives as a researcher. A lack of embedded research also led me to rely more on transcripts of public meetings. While providing valuable documentary evidence, reliance on transcripts presents several key limitations compared to in-person observation in that they cannot capture the atmosphere or interactional dynamics at play, nor do they allow for informal insights that may emerge through casual conversations and shared experiences in the field. I also relied heavily on documents like police department restructuring plans, partnership agreements, budgets, BOPC transcripts, and press conferences to understand and discern policing strategies, objectives, and programs. The risk is that these sources may only reflect formal, sanitized versions of decision-making while obscuring negotiations, internal contradictions, and power dynamics that shape policies and their outcomes. Another risk is that interpreting bureaucratic

processes without insider knowledge can lead to assumptions that do not reflect the full reality of, for example, whether an aspirational plan outlined in a document fully materialized in the way that was described. Where possible, I sought to triangulate multiple data sources to confirm observations about department operations and strategies.

Future research could include interviews, site visits, FOIA requests, and ethnographic methods to study processes of technological adoption from the perspective of police agencies and private security providers, some of which has already been undertaken (see for example see, Brayne, 2021; McQuade, 2019; Monahan and Regan, 2012). Given rapid advancements of automated and algorithmic forms of surveillance and security, research will be needed to investigate the implications of new technologies and necessary safeguards. A study of public-private security partnerships in relation to technological adoption and diffusion could also be an important subject of critical inquiry, yielding insights for establishing regulations, public oversight, and safeguards of civil liberties and privacy. However, such a study would also come with its own methodological challenges and considerations (see Monahan & Fisher, 2014; Walby & Luscombe, 2019). Beyond the regulatory domain, more research could help examine and uplift promising community-based safety initiatives that help interrupt violence and harm and address their deeper roots without relying on forms of technological policing and surveillance. Acknowledging that each place and community has its own unique needs and circumstances, a multi-site study which explores experiences and lessons from these initiatives could help inform work in other localities.

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