

**Spaces of Individual/National Security:  
Geopolitics, Citizenship, and Cultural Economy**

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... we should focus on security as a pervasive and complex system of political, social, and economic power, which reaches from the most private spaces of being to the vast flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global economic circulation.

-Anthony Burke, "Aporias of Security"<sup>1</sup>

Over the past ten years, the concept of national security has been at the centre of a range of complex debates and controversies in International Studies and in Foreign Policy Analysis. Both the post-cold war moment and the intensification of processes of globalization have provided contexts in which a number of approaches have questioned and re-examined the basic parameters of security and its status as a key, if often unproblematized, concept in the discipline. From a range of different directions, new approaches to or conceptualizations of security have emerged in analysis of foreign policy which have framed themselves around a new vocabulary of 'securitization,' human security or critical security studies. The most critical edge of this debate has been occupied by a research agenda focused around 'critical geopolitics.' Emerging from different strands of post-structuralist analysis in International Relations (IR), Feminism and Political Geography, critical geopolitics has effectively pursued a discursive approach to security and an analysis which situates foreign policy as a source of national/state identity made possible within discourses of identity/difference. This has contributed greatly to highlighting the 'constructedness' of an object — security — which was often left outside of the reach of critical analysis or interrogation. One of the most far-reaching claims — and successes — of this approach of critical geopolitics has been an attempt to connect foreign policy analysis, and IR more generally, to broader strands in critical and cultural theory; a divide which has been, accordingly, emblematic of a discipline often viewed as parochial, self-referential and overly narrow.<sup>2</sup>

On one hand, critical geopolitics has usefully brought questions of foreign policy and security into broader contact with some strands of cultural or critical theory by bringing foreign policy into dialogue with approaches from anthropology, geography, and cultural analysis. On the other hand, however, critical geopolitics has cultivated only limited contact with disciplines that are primarily concerned with the 'economic'. Although political economy was one of the early participants in the emergence of a critical geopolitics agenda, there has been less recent dialogue between critical geopolitics and a whole range of new critical, cultural, or sociological approaches to the question of economic or commercial life, including, especially, the emerging field of cultural economy. This dissonance seems particularly striking given the range of possible affinities between critical geopolitics and a form of analysis — cultural economy — which seeks, like critical geopolitics once did, to bring an object often immune to cultural analysis (the 'economy') into contact with new and innovative forms of critical assessment.

The objective of this paper is to contribute to one line along which a connection might usefully be forged between critical geopolitics and the kinds of economic analysis made possible with/through cultural economy. This line of connection, I argue in this paper, could be traced through a particular kind of analysis of economic citizenship. Shifting definitions of everyday economic citizenship, like shifting discourses of foreign policy, often hinge upon the question of risk. In both historical and contemporary moments over the past century, everyday economic citizenship, especially in the American context, has often attempted to locate

individuals directly in economic contexts as direct bearers of particular forms of risk. Although given a particular kind of force in the context of globalizing financial markets, this citizenship-risk connection has long been a key feature of forms of everyday economic conduct. This individual risk, so central to conceptions of economic citizenship, has not, however, been separate from or outside of the risk nations bear in geopolitical space. The main point of this paper argues that, in many respects, the risks individuals are asked to bear in everyday economic life (risks that are often situated at the centre of effective forms of individual self-government) have often been deeply implicated in the ways in which the nation secures/bears itself in the context of geopolitical danger. At the core of many forms of economic citizenship, I will argue, is a connection (a deep mutual implication) between the risk individuals face in the spaces of the market and the risks confronting nations/states in geopolitical space — forms of risk that are constitutive of both citizen and nation. In this way, I suggest, the construction of the nation relies not only on discourses of identity/difference which demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’ in the performance of national security. The construction of nation, a concern central to critical geopolitics, is also deeply reliant on the constitution of citizens capable of bearing individual risk and, in so doing, making themselves active in the securing of the nation.

To accomplish an analysis in these terms this paper is divided into three main parts. A first section briefly reviews some of the territory of critical geopolitics as an innovative approach to foreign policy which has provoked critical assessments of national security as a practice deeply implicated in the constitution of national/state identity and in discourses of identity/difference. A second section briefly highlights cultural economy as an approach which occupies a terrain analogous to critical geopolitics in its attempt to train critical attention onto an object often conceived as an already-existing or unproblematic category; the space of the economy. A third and longer section reviews a series of examples from campaigns of ‘popular finance’ from over the past 150 years — more or less organized campaigns committed to encouraging prudent financial, saving and investing practices among everyday, popular or working class populations. Examples from these diverse campaigns usefully highlight the connections that have often been sought between individual and national security. These connections, this section argues, hinge on a kind of mutual implication of the risks encountered and confronted by individuals in the spaces of private markets with the risks nations confront in geopolitical space; risks constitutive of both citizen and national/state identity. A conclusion reviews these suggestive connections between cultural economy and critical geopolitics and stakes out some of the ways in which research questions connecting the two approaches could be developed further.

### **Critical Geopolitics**

Over the past ten or fifteen years several strands of foreign policy analysis have attempted to subject the concept of security to critical attention and disruptions. The ‘critical geopolitics’ approach has been central to these attempts to assess and interrogate security not as an already-existing reality, but as a form of geopolitical reasoning. A key objective, argues John Agnew, is “to open up the traditional terminology by exposing it as anything other than natural or innocent.”<sup>3</sup> Drawing upon a range of approaches relating to post-structuralism, feminism, and cultural studies, critical geopolitics has attempted to situate security at the centre

of forms of power/knowledge which themselves are deeply implicated in the construction of political identities. David Campbell, for example, has developed an important analysis of the politics of identity in American foreign policy. For Campbell, drawing upon the work of William Connolly and others, a key effect of American foreign policy is the constitution and stabilization of American identity. In Campbell's configuration, identity is a fundamental, if highly contested condition of political, economic, and social life. No space, body, or category has a natural or unproblematic identity. Rather the identity of all bodies is constituted in language, discourse and in complex practices which constantly perform and enunciate its basic contours.<sup>4</sup>

For Campbell, however, the identity of all bodies is performed not in any completely arbitrary manner, but often in relation to and as a confrontation with difference. American identity marks itself (especially, in a particular way, in the discourses of foreign policy) by demarcating itself against an external space of estranged otherness. All bodies constitute themselves and invest themselves with meaning and identity (render themselves identifiable in a particular kind of way) by sharpening a line between themselves and what they are not and by invigorating themselves against contrasting otherness and opposition. "The definition of difference," notes William Connolly, "is a requirement built into the logic of identity, and the construction of otherness is a temptation that readily insinuates itself into that logic."<sup>5</sup> In this formulation identity and difference form an often unacknowledged yet inextricable dialogue (a domain of identity/difference) in which each (re)constitutes the other:

Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. Inescapable as it is, identity-whether personal or collective- is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behaviour. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference... Whether we are talking of 'the body' or 'the state' or of particular bodies and states, the identity of each is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a 'foreign.'<sup>6</sup>

Critical geopolitics focuses not on the conventional logistical assessments of security threat and danger, but rather on the practices and processes through which that danger is constructed and represented as danger/risk in the first place. This refers to the pursuit of what Shapiro has called a kind of 'anthropological' stance (or a 'reverse ethnology') in which in/security is assessed not in objective terms (in terms of how borders may be defended or transgressed) but with respect to how those dangers are represented and how they serve to define state/national identity in particular ways. Particular attention, according to Shapiro, needs to be paid to constructions of danger (in official discourses, popular culture, media representations) which demarcate relations of self/other, inside/outside and domestic/foreign. This approach, claims Shapiro, "is aimed first at disclosing how representations of alterity (dangerous others) reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence."<sup>7</sup>

Security is particularly central to this process of identity-formation. The definition of American state identity, for example, in terms of an exceptional mission dedicated in a unique manner to international intervention and responsibility, is partially made possible in and through a discourse which conceives of the

space beyond American borders as a site of danger, threat, risk and insecurity. It is the danger and insecurity that American foreign policy imagines and pictures outside of American borders (and as emanating from sites of difference) that most forcefully serves to reinscribe ideas of America and the identity of American exceptionalism.<sup>8</sup> These discourses which sketch global space in terms of danger and insecurity simultaneously establish the boundary between inside (specified in terms of order) and outside (often described in terms of anarchy, war, or conflict). “Insecurity,” write Weldes *et al.*, “is the product of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, are constituted.”<sup>9</sup> In contrast to conventional approaches to global politics and foreign policy, insecurity and danger are not automatically understood as threats to the internal integrity of the nation, but are discursive materials from which that national body itself gains identity and definition. “The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy,” attests Campbell, “is thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.”<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps the most striking achievement of this critical approach has been the space it has opened in which a range of concepts central to geopolitical reasoning — security, danger, geopolitics — can be subject to novel and critical forms of examination. The dangers, risks, and emergencies which form the basic vocabulary of foreign policy are not left unexamined as given or self-evident claims, but are unsettled as discourses deployed for specific purposes in the construction of particular political, social, or cultural spaces and identities. What has been less developed within the critical geopolitics literature, however, has been the connection between this risk and danger experienced at the level of geopolitical space and the forms of risk increasingly central to global and local economic spaces. Although economic and geo-economic fields have been important to critical geopolitics in some ways, little attention has been focused on the risks associated with (and constitutive of) economic spaces and identities.<sup>11</sup> As Dodds suggests, “future research in critical geopolitics...will undoubtedly be concerned with...the dangers and vulnerabilities that appear emblematic of global capitalism.”<sup>12</sup> It is precisely to this concern, to the connection between critical geopolitics and the ‘dangers and vulnerabilities’ of global economic life, that cultural economy can contribute.

### **Cultural Economy**

One approach to the economic which shares with critical geopolitics a scepticism of received or unquestioned categories, is an emerging research agenda organized around the concept of cultural economy. Cultural economy has emerged as a critical concept that can be used to focus analyses which stress the ‘cultural’ constitution/construction of ‘economic’ identities, spaces and processes; all of the diverse processes, agents and systems that have come to exist as ‘economic.’<sup>13</sup> Cultural economy aims to interrogate the ‘cultural’ construction of the economic and of ‘economically relevant activity.’ Contrary to its self-image as a material and naturally-existing category, the economic is treated in this approach as a ‘constructed’ realm and as a site constituted in a range of practices, knowledges and discourses. Before ‘economic’ persons or processes can be governed, they must first be represented and constituted in particular ways.

In more specific terms, a cultural economy approach foregrounds the ways in which one set of practices which often have a role in defining and constituting the economic are those practices assigned to or defined as ‘cultural.’ Although often defined or named as a part of a separate ‘cultural’ sphere, many

cultural practices make visible, help define, muse about, or bear upon the economic, changing definitions of economic activity and shifting configurations of economic space, conduct, and identity. Cultural economy reconceives of the economic not as a material or naturally-existing ‘reality’ but as a constructed realm and as a site of practices discursively constituted at a range of locations, including those formally assigned to or categorized in the ‘cultural’ domain itself:

This particular understanding of economics as ‘culture’ focuses attention on the practical ways in which ‘economically relevant activity’ is performed and enacted. It serves to show, in other words, the ways in which the ‘making up’ or ‘construction’ of economic realities is undertaken and achieved; how those activities, objects and persons we categorize as ‘economic’ are built up or assembled from a number of parts, many of them supplied by the discipline of economics but many drawn from other sources, including, of course, forms of ostensibly noneconomic cultural practice.<sup>14</sup>

In this pursuit, cultural economy shares with critical geopolitics a concern to disrupt the status of a key concept — ‘economy’ and ‘security’ respectively — as an already-existing or unproblematic category. In both cases these objects, ‘economy,’ ‘security,’ are not already-existing, but are categories themselves, the ‘making up’ of which requires explanation. Economy and security share a status, in these critical interventions, as categories that are both central to the politics of contemporary social and cultural life, but which also remain relatively unexamined and unquestioned. At another level, however, economy and security also occupy an additional important point of connection; a shared preoccupation with the peculiar and constitutive force of ‘risk.’

### **Individual/Geopolitical Risk**

Like the state bodies that occupy geopolitical space, risk is also central to the ‘making up’ of economic citizens. Throughout the twentieth century, especially in the American context, one of the key ways in which everyday forms of economic citizenship have been framed is in terms of individual exposure to risk. Various attempts to cultivate or ‘make up’ economic citizens have often required or asked citizens to locate themselves directly in economic or market contexts or to expose themselves in some direct fashion to the risk of market spaces. This citizenship/risk connection has been a particularly key aspect of recent processes of globalization and ‘risk society’ in which individuals come to experience risk in an increasingly direct and unmediated fashion. Much of the marketing and ‘culture’ of the world of personal finance, for example, increasingly asks individuals to take direct control of their financial/investing life and to assume the risk of that world directly. E-trade, and other direct investing services, frequently promote themselves in terms of individual control over financial life and its associated risks:

In this kind of market hire the most cunning, goal-oriented, financial mercenary you can find.

You’d be perfect.<sup>15</sup>

Modes of economic citizenship which ask individuals to locate themselves directly in economic spaces, and to assume the risks of those spaces, however, have not only been central to recent neo-liberal trajectories, but have been characteristic of a more persistent line of economic citizenship throughout the twentieth century.

Writing in 1925, a moment which witnessed a dramatic increase in ‘popular’ involvement in equity and security markets, William Ransom developed an argument which links popular forms of share-holding with greater exposure to the risks of economic life. Because it facilitates direct ownership in productive enterprise, the popular ownership of securities could, argues Ransom, provoke a more democratic form of citizenship by providing direct experience of the risks and ‘hazards’ of economic life. “Small-investor ownership,” argued Ransom, “seems to be the basic and important thing in America...if each small investor is encouraged to...gain an owner’s sense of interest in the conditions and risks affecting at least several of the industries of the country.”<sup>16</sup>

Throughout the entire postwar period, in addition, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) developed a range of special educational, public service and marketing programs designed to encourage everyday or working class populations to occupy a more direct stake in the economy. Echoing Ransom’s call for an ‘owner’s sense of interest,’ the NYSE conceived of broad share-ownership as the very core of a special American economy which situated everyday citizens in a direct relation to risk and, in so doing, allowed individuals to occupy economic space in a direct and unmediated manner. “Since the end of World War II,” summarizes one former NYSE President, “this country’s economic growth has been uniquely fuelled by the willingness of individual Americans to risk at least part of their savings in equity investments and to acquire a direct personal stake in the performance of our private enterprise economy.”<sup>17</sup>

This individualized risk so central to forms of economic citizenship has not, in any simple way, however, been separate from or located outside of the space of national security and geopolitical danger. At a number of levels, the individual risk which constitutes economic citizens has been deeply implicated in formulations of national security. At one level, the images around which programs of economic citizenship were promoted often mobilized geopolitical risk in ways that not only identify an external threat but also reinforce ideas about domestic identity, values, and culture. The marketing of programs of popular finance mobilize images of ‘foreign’ space, ‘otherness’ or geopolitical danger as a way to more clearly define and reiterate the contours of national identity. The various war financing campaigns across the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, for example, constitute a most obvious effort to connect popular finance to a sense of nation framed in terms of and out of geopolitical danger. The Canadian campaigns, for example, consistently depict participation in war bond initiatives as a literal act of investment in the nation; an act made necessary by events and threats emanating from the external/international realm. International space, often framed as dark and only half-intelligible, is not only a source of threat and risk but also a key force requiring the reassertion of national identity. In the context of external threat (and in its most oblique moment of war) the reassertion of national values, identity and space is made even more urgent. As one sales kit from the Canadian World War II Victory Bond campaign instructs, the presence of Nazi atrocities and threat is a source of endangerment to Canadian values and yet can only be met by manifestations of those particularly Canadian values of nobility and freedom. “If we don’t do this,” the sales kit affirms referring to investment in victory bonds, “one thing that is likely to happen is that we shall never again have the opportunity to make our own decisions...You and I are making our choice between freedom and Nazi slavery.”<sup>18</sup>

This connection is also frequently developed in American campaigns. Much of the advice and advertising targeted to everyday investors (especially in terms of the US Savings Bonds program) diagram American identity in terms of America's unique location in global space. Figure 1, from one of the US Savings Bonds programs from the early 1950s, is indicative of many examples of Cold War campaigns organized around images of an external threat. Depicting a kind of simultaneity between personal and national security, this image features a lone figure using his savings to fight a menacing Soviet presence. What is striking in this image is the clear reference to a distinctive American identity. The real danger represented by this external threat is not violence or blunt instruments of force, but rather the risk of losing a particular kind of American identity dedicated to freedom and individualism. By figuring investment as a mode of action capable of "hitting out at the enemies of our way of life," the whole question of international threat becomes connected to the intimate contours of American culture and values.



**Figure 1: *Hit Him Hard! and do Yourself a Favor***<sup>19</sup>

American notions of national identity often hinge upon a discourse of American exceptionalism; a sense of the special role ordained upon the American nation and the special form of obligation this entails within the international realm. In the context of the Cold War American identity became squarely focussed on the exceptional burden of American obligation to maintain and organize a free world. Internal American values are required to meet this international obligation and yet are also threatened by forces external to the nation. The advertising of popular financial vehicles (including of course those connected to US Savings and Defence Bonds) often diagrams this exact kind of international obligation and exceptionalism. In one example



from a Savings bonds series, the continuation of the ‘good American life’ is clearly (and perhaps most fundamentally) connected to an almost unknowable amount of ‘trouble in foreign places.’ Maintaining American identity entails an immense burden (‘its going to take some doing, starting right now’) in the international realm. In this formulation American culture (the ‘kind of future we want’) is most clearly defined in opposition to the instabilities and difficulties of ‘foreign’ space. This narrative develops an equation between domestic culture/values and a particular requirement to respond to foreign ‘trouble’:

Sometimes I can’t understand all I see in the newspapers about trouble in foreign places. But nowadays we can’t turn our backs on what’s happening somewhere else. The world’s too small. If my youngsters are going to grow up to enjoy the good American life, it’s going to take some doing, starting right now...the money goes toward keeping America’s guard up and that’s mighty important, too, if there’s going to be the kind of future we want...Savings Bonds are a kind of ‘insurance policy’ for me and my country.<sup>20</sup>

Much of the advertising associated with these early forms of popular finance can be read, in these terms, as artefacts of nation-ness; as places where this particular sense of nation (figured against geopolitical danger) is made real in a range of everyday settings. Because they are targeted explicitly to working-class or everyday actors and because they draw connections between nation and danger with particular clarity, the images of popular finance are a special location where a sense of American identity is made real and given a particular resonance.

At another level, however, what is perhaps most striking about this connection between national and geopolitical identity are the ways in which the risks central to individual economic security are often conceived as internal to (part of the same moment as) the dangers of geopolitical space. The discourses of economic citizenship both locate individuals directly within forms of economic risk and situate that form of citizenship as the basis of how the nation bears itself in the context of international risk/danger.<sup>21</sup> These programs often diagram individual saving or investing as practices with which citizens could make themselves active in the security of the nation. The capacity of the nation to bear itself in the context of international life relies, in this view, on the self-governing capacities and conduct of its citizens. Everyday actors, in this respect, are implicated directly and actively in the making of national space and in the ways in which the nation is actualized as a strong and cohesive body. The ability of the nation to bear itself within international space (and to confront its international obligations and dangers) is directly connected to individual citizens and their capacities to bear and govern themselves in the little risks they face in economic and financial life.

Another striking example (*They Saved a Frontier for You...*) is a set of advertising copy proofs from the early postwar period providing advertisers with copyimages for use in local US Savings Bonds campaigns. Here 6 images make visible the role of bonds in national development/consolidation (the national railway, the expansion of national territory) and in the successful confrontation with external threats and obligation (San Juan Hill, Okinawa, etc.). What is striking in many of these images is a connection which is sought between these geopolitical dangers and an appropriate form of economic conduct capable of sustaining the nation against these dangers. Savings bonds are depicted as a form of capital which accompanies and animates — literally breathing life into — the dangerous struggle for national security in different contexts.

The risk that everyday populations confront in pursuing individual financial security is also connected to the risk states face and confront in global space. “Now it’s your turn,” the ad copy suggests, “to make America grow” and to pursue individual security simultaneously.<sup>22</sup>

This discourse connecting individual practice (and individual self-government) with the broader confrontations of geopolitical space is first hinted in some of the modes of economic citizenship associated with nineteenth century imperialism. Attempts to promote thrift among the working class, for example, was often directly figured in terms of geopolitical and imperial danger. Attempts to encourage working class individuals to save and govern themselves in an appropriate manner (in this case to deny the passions of their ‘lower’ self<sup>23</sup> is also an obligation to the nation. John Lubbock’s guidebook (1894) connects thrifty and self-governing conduct with the unique dangers of imperial rule. For Lubbock the imperial nation is confronted with a range of dangers including, most explicitly, the ‘magnitude and extent of our Empires’ and the different ‘ideas and aspirations’ of the many races governed by the imperial nation. Confronting this danger and allowing the nation to bear itself within global space, requires appropriate individual conduct (fitting oneself for the ‘great responsibility’ of imperial governance). In this racist/orientalist formulation, making ourselves ‘fit’ for imperial responsibilities and dangers is not only a question of preparing the nation and its defences, but also a matter of citizenship and of appropriate forms of individual conduct. Thrifty self-government and the management of colonial bodies are parts of the same equation of government and danger:

We are all part of the Government of this country, and one of the most important of our duties is to fit ourselves for the great responsibility. This requires study and thought as well as mere good-will. The very magnitude and extent of our Empires is itself a source of danger. We govern many races of men, some of them with ideas and aspirations very different from our own.<sup>24</sup>

This discourse which emphasizes the simultaneity of individual and national security, is also articulated in many American twentieth century campaigns. The unique global dangers and obligations of American leadership in the context of the Cold War and the postwar order require a particular kind of individual conduct which is both consistent with and constitutive of this global leadership. Figure 2 (*Is the Island Shrinking?*) is a striking diagram of this kind of relationship. A part of an advertising supplement produced directly by the Advertising Council in support of US Savings Bonds and related initiatives, this depiction features an image of the Statue of Liberty, the shadow of which is a silhouette of the Kremlin tower. This transfigured Statue of Liberty, made precarious by its own shadow, is framed by the single question ‘*Is the Island Shrinking?*’ This question, which clearly invokes America’s responsibilities in the context of global danger, is squarely answered in relation to individual conduct. Emphasizing themes of American exceptionalism the text invokes the practice of freedom as an individualized practice key to successful confrontations with international danger. The practice of freedom is located not in broad institutions but rather in the action and conduct of individual citizens. “In the past, those tired of rule by force and hungry for rule by reason looked to America because here everybody took part in government.” Government, in this configuration, is a matter of individual conduct and practice; a democratic freedom of individual responsibility. The government of the nation is ultimately reducible to the ways in which individual citizens

govern themselves. Reminding individuals that ‘Freedom is Everybody’s Job,’ the text clearly connects the fate of the nation (especially with respect to its international obligations) to the individual freedom practised by its citizens; a practice of individual freedom available, for example, in prudent investing practices. “Like anything else that lives and has being and grows,” the text asserts, “Freedom itself withers and dies when not practised by those who enjoy its privileges. Is the island shrinking in your own heart.” Making a direct appeal to individuals, this image squarely formulates the question of national space and integrity as an issue of appropriate individual conduct and practices of citizenship.



Figure 2: *Is the Island Shrinking*<sup>25</sup>

These themes are also present in the images produced directly by the US Savings Bond programs — In *in his hand*, for example, a 1954 copy from the US Savings Bonds series, male obligation to and sacrifice for the unspeaking members of his domestic space, is conceived not only as an act of family necessity, but also one of national security. The requirement to save, here, is expressed as both an act of prudential manliness as well as a godly act of national freedom and security. This is a formulation in which the ‘strength of America’ is most visibly connected to the security provided by its individual citizens in the pursuit of their own personal or (gendered) family obligations:

...the pattern is security, and it is Dad's privilege to supply his part of it for the little hearts in his care...The security of our homes is our worthiest goal. And providing it is a privilege unique in a country like ours...And think: The security that begins in your home, joined to

that of other homes, builds the strength of America. Saving for Security is easy!...For your sake, and your family's, too, how about signing up today?<sup>26</sup>

An 'intimate association' is depicted in this formulation between the risk that the nation faces in geopolitical space and the risks individuals directly confront by managing their own savings or investments in a prudential manner. It is in these terms that those who sought to provoke certain forms of economic citizenship, were also, and at the same time, pursuing a kind of geopolitical reasoning. These experts and advocates were trying to strengthen the nation and its security by 'making up' an individual form of citizenship capable of bearing/securing both individuals and the nations they populate. This 'making up' of economic citizens — a project pursued in a variety of ways by a range of different actors — was more than a merely economic pursuit. At the same time these projects were also a way to insert citizens into the nation as a whole and a method with which individual citizens could become active in the government of themselves and the nation — a way of securing the nation within the geopolitical spaces it inhabits.

### **Conclusion: Towards a Cultural Economy of Individual/Social/National Security**

In many respects capital has always been connected to discourses of geopolitics or to forms of geopolitical reasoning. Writing in 1866, Amasa Walker — one of the key contributors to the early field of political economy in the American context — became preoccupied with defining capital, and the spaces it occupied, in some clarity. For Walker capital is a world-historical force central to imperial conquest, international adventurism or successful confrontation with 'savage' danger:

Capital...has gone abroad to colonize. It has carried on great wars in which it had no interest...Capital has gone round the world in the same boat with the inspired discoverer. It watched with Columbus the weeds drifting from an unknown land; it 'stared at the Pacific' by the side of stout Cortes; it debarked with the gallant Cook, nor was it frightened at the savage violence which took his life...It freighted vessels for countries not named; it sent fleets to ports never visited by civilized man.<sup>27</sup>

In this paper I have tried to delineate a different relationship between geopolitical reasoning and economic knowledges/practices. The most central vector connecting economic and geopolitical practice that I have foreground in this paper is a line that has often been drawn between the risk of individual economic life and the danger the state confronts in geopolitical space. Not only, I have argued, is risk/danger central to the ways in which both nations and economic citizens are constituted (relational identities given form only in frames of identity/difference). In addition, and at a more complex level, I have also argued that these seemingly different forms of risk/security are often deeply implicated in each other. The diverse experts, authorities and activists who have tried to cultivate forms of economic citizenship over the past century have often conceived of the risks inherent in those forms of citizenship as internal to or as deeply constitutive of the nation and the ways in which the nation bears itself in the dangers of geopolitical space.

The full contours of this territory of economic risk and geopolitical danger are clearly more complex than this paper could delineate. Rather, this paper has gestured at a few historical examples as a way of

mapping out some of the broad outlines of this territory. By way of conclusion, I want to review three key sets of questions that might provoke more detailed investigation and which might be usefully explored in relation to this economic citizenship/geopolitical connection. First, and in general connection with the key concerns of critical geopolitics, assessing the links between geopolitical and economic practice could help further open and disrupt the concept of security. In particular, by investigating this relationship between citizenship and geopolitical reasoning, more detailed accounts of the ways in which geopolitical and national identity are inscribed in and lived in terms of daily life could be developed. Because programs of economic citizenship — including the programs of popular finance reviewed in this paper — targeted themselves to everyday, popular or working-class populations, they are particularly useful glimpses into the ways in which geopolitical reasoning was lived and experienced for a particular audience. In addition, attention to economic citizenship could also help provide a more ‘material’ or concrete focus to geopolitical ambitions and identities. Critical geopolitics, and post-structuralist approaches more generally, are often accused of being preoccupied with the play of language and with the determinant status of narrative, knowledge, or discourse. A focus on programs concerned with economic citizenship, and on the concrete practices those programs seek to cultivate, could help turn attention to the ways in which identities connected to geopolitical reasoning are made real in a set of ‘material’ practices/techniques and within particular institutional contexts. This, in turn, could deepen the connections between foreign policy analysis and the broader contours of critical and cultural theory, including the agenda of cultural economy; an approach interested not only in the knowledges of economic life but also in the techniques, practices and institutional networks in which those knowledges have been made a practical reality or transformed into forms of practical ‘know-how.’

Second, more detailed elaboration of the connections between economic and geopolitical identity could more precisely address the historical and contemporary connections between national and social security. A key aspect of both critical and mainstream critiques of security throughout the last decade has been an attempt to broaden the concept of security and its relation to a broad set of social and political processes. Appeals to human security and ‘securitization,’ for example, have attempted to foreground the role of security in a broader set of issues beyond national security (political, environmental, individual security) and to develop a useful concept of ‘societal security.’<sup>28</sup> Despite this broadening, however, there has been little attention to the connections between economic forms of social security and national security. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver argue, for example, that economic issues are not frequently connected to or articulated within the language or practices of security.<sup>29</sup> As this paper has emphasized in only a cursory gesture, however, economic and national security have often been riddled with deep forms of mutual-implication. With more detailed inquiry into the links between economic citizenship and geopolitical identity, the connections between national and social security could be sketched in more detail; a line of analysis key not only to the broadening of the concept of security but also to the wide-ranging and urgent debates across many contexts relating to social security reform.<sup>30</sup>

Third, and perhaps most importantly, more attention to the connections between economic and geopolitical practices could help generate critical analyses of the increasingly complicated relations between national security and the economic webs central to our globalized present. Although increasingly subject to

and located within global economic spaces, articulating economic citizenship in terms of national security remains a highly fertile pursuit. This has been only most visible in much of the national security discourse mobilized in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Much of this national security discourse mobilizes everyday economic conduct and citizenship as a force central to and deeply implicated in the strength and security of the nation. Speaking on 20 September 2001 in an address to a joint session of Congress, President Bush clearly links the response to ‘terror’ (a task itself critical to the confrontation with geopolitical danger) to the economic conduct and enterprise of American citizens. “Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity,” Bush affirms in his speech, however “they did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work and creativity and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11, and they are our strengths today.”<sup>31</sup> It is this striking formulation — a line of force connecting enterprise, citizenship and national security — which, even in our seemingly globalized present, continues to exert a special if idiosyncratic kind of pressure over the contours of political, economic, and geopolitical life.

## Endnotes

1. Anthony Burke, "Aporias of Security," *Alternatives* 27 (2002): 2.
2. For the interdisciplinary context of critical geopolitics see, for example, Klaus Dodds, "Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics After Ten Years," *Progress in Human Geography* 25:3 (2001): "By the 1990s, geopolitics had become a thoroughly interdisciplinary affair as world systems theory, quantitative currents of international relations thought, work on gender and post-structural writings on world politics transformed the intellectual landscapes of political geography." 470.
3. John Agnew, "Global Political Geography Beyond Geopolitics," *Political Geography*: 97. Agnew continues: "In particular, terms such as 'international' and 'security' are questioned as insecure and unstable signifiers rather than fixed and reliable concepts."
4. This does not mean that there is no 'real' world outside of discourse or language. Rather, Campbell's claim revolves around the specific contention that the identity of 'real' objects or categories can only be knowable through (and hence made real in) discursive processes.
5. William Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991): 9. Many thanks to Daniel Pierre-Antoine for insightful analysis regarding the work and importance of Connolly in this regard. Due mainly to space constraints, much of my summary of critical geopolitics focuses on David Campbell, especially *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [Revised Edition] 1998). Other relevant pieces in this literature include Michael J. Shapiro, "Globalization and the Politics of Discourse," *Social Text* 17:3 (Fall 1999): 111-129, R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Richard Ashley, "Living on the Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War," *International/Intertextual Relations*, James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Eds.), (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), David Campbell, *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), and Michael Shapiro and Hayward Alker (Eds.), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), and the sources reference in the notes below. For a useful review of 'discourse' in International Relations, see Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5:2 (1999): 225-254.
6. Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9. The constitution of bodies, including the body of national states, entails a process of construction that relies upon the continual inscription and definition of boundaries between those bodies and the external world from which they differ. It is in this field of identity/difference that categories and bodies come to have meaning and are invested with identities that are political, partial, and dynamic. See Campbell, *Writing Security*:  
 The importance of these perspectives is that they allow us to understand national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities that do not possess prediscursive, stable identities. As a consequence, all states are marked by an inherent tension between the various domains that need to be aligned for an 'imagined political community' to come into being... In other words, states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constituted it can never be fully resolved. 12.

7. Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis: University of Michigan Press, 1997): 31. Shapiro explains his method of 'reverse ethnology':

Rather than naturalizing spaces of enactment by focussing on the actions by which boundaries are policed, defended, and transgressed-the familiar focus of war and security studies-the emphasis must be on the practices...for constructing space and identity, on the ways in which self-alterity relationships are historically framed and played out. 31.

See also Gearoid O'Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996): "Rather than assuming a fully formed state system and state-delimited identities, my concern is the power struggle between different societies to speak sovereignly about geography, space, and territory." 11-12. For Campbell foreign policy, rather than the expression of a fully-formed and codified state, exists, in a particular set of ways, as a source of that state and its identity. It is in the language, practices and narratives of foreign policy and the security that policy pursues, that American identity is (re)defined, performed and continually reworked. "This argument proposes," writes Campbell, "that United States foreign policy be understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production and maintenance of American political identity." See Campbell, *Writing Security*, 8.

8. Central to this analysis, by extension, is a disruption of borders. Borders and boundaries do not surround or 'hold together' categories that naturally exist, but rather help define the identities of those categories by marking them out in space, defining their shape and delineating the frontiers within which categories are contained. Like all bodies, the state and nation are given identity by processes which establish a boundary between inside and outside and which shape the external contours of the body in a clear manner. For an apt discussion of the role of boundary see Richard Weiskopf, "Deconstructing 'The Iron Cage'-Towards an Aesthetic of Folding," *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 5:1 (2002): "The boundary constitutes 'this' and 'that', 'inside' and 'outside', 'good' and 'bad', 'beautiful' and 'ugly' ...The boundary serves a dual function: (i) it divides or separates 'this' and 'that'-that is, it constitutes a difference and at the same time and (ii) it joins that is, it constitutes a relation." 84.

9. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, "Introduction: Constructing Insecurity," *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*, Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (Eds.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): 10.

10. Campbell, *Writing Security*, 13.

11. Although centrally concerned with the ways in which risk is mobilized and framed, critical geopolitics has often neglected the production, mobilization, and discursive formation of economic risk.

12. Dodds, "Critical Geopolitics After 10 Years," 478. For one useful intervention that links security and geopolitical reasoning with issues in the global economy, see Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Identities: Arctic Ecology and Global Consumption," *Geopolitics* 8:1 (Spring 2003): 181-202.

13. For this approach, 'culture' and 'economy' (and the supposed divide between them) are not reified as unproblematic or already-existing categories, a tendency common to much social science, but are themselves conceived as products of particular discourses at specific moments in time. On this point see also Rob Aitken, "'The Democratic Method of Obtaining Capital': Culture, Governmentality and Ethics of Mass Investment," *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 6:4 (2003): 293-317. As Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke claim, cultural economy has been invoked to destabilize and render problematic the common image of the cultural and the economic as naturally autonomous and separate categories. For



other approaches and examples of this approach see Sean Nixon and Paul du Gay, 'Who Needs Cultural Intermediaries?' *Cultural Studies* 16:4 (2002): 495-500, as well as Liz McFall, 'What about the Old Cultural Intermediaries? An Historical Review of Advertising Producers.' *Cultural Studies* 16:4 (2002): 532-552. This "conception of 'culture' effectively overturns, or, at the very least, side-steps, the critical representation of 'culture' as always already on one side of a presumed opposition-between 'culture' and 'politics', 'culture' and 'economics', and so on." Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke, "Cultural Economy: An Introduction," *Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and Commercial Life* Eds. Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke (London: Sage Publications, 2002): 4.

14. Du Gay and Pryke, "Cultural Economy," 5. This view is a welcome antidote to a general neglect in cultural analysis of the economic. That is, although many domains have been increasingly subject to 'cultural critiques' (the state as an imagined community, gender, class, and sexuality as contingent identities), the economic is still largely immune to this type of cultural analysis. For a review of this problem in cultural and critical theory see Timothy Mitchell, 'Fixing the Economy,' *Cultural Studies* 12:1 (1998), 82-101; Timothy Mitchell, 'Society, Economy and the State Effect,' *State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn* Ed George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999): 76-97; and Timothy Mitchell *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For an important review of Cultural Economy, see Gavin Jack, 'After Cultural Economy,' *Ephemera: Critical Dialogues on Organization* 2:3 (2002): 263-276. I should note also that an approach to cultural economy may also serve as a useful countervailing influence to overly 'textual' approaches to culture. For these approaches, culture is not simply a set of ideas, texts or expressions confined to the realm of the ideal. Rather, culture can be conceived in terms of a certain materiality, exists within institutional contexts, have conditions of production and can be conceived as 'technologies.' In addition, I should note that although it refuses to accept a reified conception of 'culture' and 'economy,' cultural economy does not necessarily render the divide between the two categories analytically invisible. Rather, it investigates the ways in which the divide between the two has been the artefact of and bound up in particular rationalities of government. In this sense, the divide between the cultural and the economic is not a generalized and unproblematic division but a 'divide' that is only possible when situated in or the outcome of particular moments or programs of government; including those programs concerned with the use of cultural resources and technologies. 'What one should, perhaps, avoid trying to do,' affirm du Gay and Pryke, 'is to impose a general analytic distinction between 'economy' and 'culture' on one's material prior to examining, anthropologically, its practical constitution.' See du Gay and Pryke, "Cultural Economy": 12.

15. E-trade Canada, In this Kind of Market. Toronto: E-trade Canada, 2000. Originally published in the *Globe and Mail* [Toronto]: 15 September 2000.

16. William L. Ransom, "Property Ownership as a Social Force," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* XI:3 (April 1925): 521.

17. William M. Batten (Chairman NYSE), "Introduction," *Shareownership 1975* (New York: New York Stock Exchange, 1975): 1-2. This attempt to delineate economic citizenship in terms of a direct stake in economic life (and a direct exposure to economic risk) was echoed in a range of other campaigns and institutional settings. The Advertising Council began, as early as 1945 and 1946, for example, to market US Savings Bonds as a mechanism that could provide Americans with a financial 'stake' in the national body and in the national economy. In 1946 it began to instruct advertisers to market Savings Bonds explicitly as an imminently tangible practice which could both foster a sense of enterprise and ensure a certain kind of social stability. The US Savings Bonds campaigns clearly figured investing as a special kind of pursuit capable of integrating popular and working class sectors into projects of enterprise, and as

a consequence, into the fabric of the national body as an integrated and stable field:

The way to boot these 'isms-peddlers' clear out of America to see that every American has as big a financial stake as possible in his country, his government and the American way of life. No other way of doing this can come close to matching, in effectiveness, the sale of U.S. Savings Bonds-particularly through the Payroll Savings Plan. Today, millions of Americans...[have become] shareholders with a stake in our system. Americans who own bonds take an interest in their Government-in taxes, in spending. They want to know what is happening to their investment. Americans who are saving money and making progress toward personal goals have little sympathy for those who would upset their apple carts and whose goals are turmoil and revolution.

See, The Advertising Council, *How You Can Help...Check Inflation, Avoid Depression, Give Free-Enterprise a Boost, Defeat the isms, make more and Better Customers for Your Business...All at Once*, (New York: The Advertising Council, 1946).

18. Seventh Victory Loan Committee, *War Finance Worker's Sales kit and Record of Sales* (Ottawa: Seventh Victory Loan Committee, 1944): Courtesy Hartland Molson Library, Canadian War Museum, Ottawa.

19. The Advertising Council, *Hit Him Hard! and do Yourself a big Favor*. Ca. 1950-1955 (undated). Durham NC: John W. Hartman Centre for Advertising and Marketing History, Rare Book, Manuscript and Special Collections Library, Duke University. J. Walter Thompson Archives, Domestic Advertisements Collection, Advertising and Public Service Collection, 'U.S. Savings Bonds,' Box #5.

20. The Advertising Council, *America Depends on Americans*. Ca. 1950-1955 (undated). Durham NC: John W. Hartman Centre for Advertising and Marketing History, Rare Book, Manuscript and Special Collections Library, Duke University. J. Walter Thompson Archives, Domestic Advertisements Collection, Advertising and Public Service Collection, 'U.S. Savings Bonds,' Box #5.

21. This relation is also developed in a series of mid-century 'mass investment' campaigns. See for example: Quality Petroleum Products, *The World's Finest Home*. 1952. New York: Archives, New York Stock Exchange, Box (Record Group): Press Relations/Public Information Folder: 'UNSTED tie-in ads, 1952':

The World's Finest Home. The home we're talking about has 36,000,000 cars in its garage, 14,000,000 television sets in its living room, 43,620,000 telephones on its hall table, millions of acres under mechanized civilization in its back yard. Immigration walls have had to be built high around this home, for in it live the most envied people on the globe. It costs billions of dollars to build and maintain such a home where do these dollars come from? From men and women who work, save, and put their savings to work to provide the world's finest home with every modern convenience...These savings dare to live dangerously. They often risk their lives financing a new product-somebody's dream. They build factories and buy tools, on the calculated risk that the dream-child will grow up and produce on its own.

A number of advertisements from the period also echoed this theme. See also, Nabisco, *Its Easy To Be a Capitalist*. January 1952. New York: Archives, New York Stock Exchange, Box (Record Group): Press Relations/Public Information Folder: 'UNSTED Tie-in Ads, 1952':.

We have over the years since our founding, labored and saved and invested. This has meant sacrifice on the part of millions of men and women but it was a sacrifice without which we could not have built up a tremendous industrial machine....The job of investment, of keeping our national industry in its traditional place of leadership is now the job not of tycoons but of these many millions of American wage earners...It is the most democratic system that could possibly be devised...No small group of investors could supply this lifeblood of capital...mostly these investors are the so-called 'little people' men and women of small income who have worked and saved, and set aside a little of their income to buy this share in industrial effort...Out of this more intimate association with the industrial enterprise of America will assuredly come a better understanding of our economic structures....It is because there has been such an incentive in the past that we have been able to build America to its place of world leadership.

22. US Savings Bond Program, *The Saved a Nation For You...* Ca. 1947. Courtesy: Advertising Council Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

23. Explicitly targeted to working-class audiences, many advice writers defined sound financial practice as an act of denying the 'savage' self within. The capacity to govern the self autonomously is an act of overcoming the 'natural' tendencies of the 'lower' or 'animal' self (often conceived as a trace of savage life) by denying appeals to sensual gratification and impulse. Careful and regulated saving was one prescription through which working class individuals could deny the dangers of their internal 'animal' self and could begin to develop capacities for autonomous self government. This control of the internal 'animal' self, however, (and the development of a particular kind of working class conduct and citizenship) was not a simple expression of individual conduct, but was also a direct source of the nation and of national strength and vigor.

24. John Lubbock, *The Use of Life* (Freeport NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1972 [1894]): 168.

25. Mercantile Commerce, *Is the Island Shrinking?* Courtesy: D'Arcy Agency Archives, Champaign Illinois: University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Communications Library, Reel #12. Originally published in the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 June 1948.

26. 'in his hand,' 1954 U.S. Savings Bond Advertisement. From J. Walter Thompson Archives, Domestic Advertisements Collection, Advertising and Public Service Collection, 'U.S. Savings Bonds,' Box #5. Folder 1. John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising and marketing History. Durham NC: Duke University, Special Collections Library. Emphasis in original.

27. Amasa Walker, *The Science of Wealth: A Manual of Political Economy. (Embracing the Laws of Trade, Currency and Finance)* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866): 66.

28. For some of the debate on securitization and 'societal security' see Olav F. Knudsen, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," *Security Dialogue* 32:3 (2001); Michael C. Williams, "The Practices of Security: Critical Contributions," *Cooperation and Conflict* 34:3 (1999); Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003); Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable?: The Copenhagen School Replies," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997); Johan Eriksson, "Observers or Advocates?: On the Political Role of Security Analysts." *Cooperation and Conflict* 34:3 (1999); Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998); Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization,"

*On Security* Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Ole Waever, “Securitizing Sectors?” *Cooperation and Conflict* 34:3 (1999); Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Bill Mcsweeny, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” *Review of International Studies* 22:1 (1996): 81-93.

29. Buzan *et al.*, *Security*: Because “of the essentially competitive nature of market relations,” Buzan *et al.* argue, “much of it does not properly rise above the merely politicized.” 99.

30. There is also a theme in the advertising of some private firms. Merrill Lynch, the largest American brokerage firm and a significant presence in markets for everyday financial actors, has recently published a series of ad campaigns focusing precisely on ‘national security.’ In these ads the basis of national security remains rooted in the financial security of its individuals. “When its people are financially secure,” the ad attests, “a nation’s security is enhanced.” National security is framed at multiple levels, one of which is a concern with individual conduct and financial practice. The language of national security and vitality, connected in this regard to the financial security of individuals, remains centrally articulated to the financial practices of everyday individuals. National and individual security remain forged together along chains of financial practice:

on National Security When its people are financially secure, a nation’s security is enhanced. But the costs of aging populations are raising issues that must be addressed in the U.S. and in other countries around the world. At Merrill Lynch, we’ve conducted groundbreaking research on the problem and how to solve it. Advocated sound public policies. And developed expertise to advise governments, industries and individuals.

Preserving the quality of a long life makes a difference. The difference is Merrill Lynch.

Merrill Lynch and Co. Inc., *Merrill Lynch on National Security*. New York: Merrill Lynch and Co. Inc, 1997. Originally published in the *Economist* 10 May 1997, p. 37.

31. President George W. Bush, Address to a joint session of Congress, 20 September 2001. There is, in addition, a longstanding discourse around the New York Stock Exchange which has consistently — both before and during the context of 9/11 — invoked a special line connecting the NYSE to the security of America. See Chapter 4 for more details of the NYSE. This is also a discourse that was central to the many calls after 9-11 for the development of Patriot, War or Freedom bonds, culminating in the passage, in October 2001, of The Freedom Bonds Act. These bonds are depicted as a mechanism through which individuals can connect their own security to the security of the nation and can help the nation sustain itself in the context of extraordinary geopolitical danger. The confrontation with extraordinary danger and external threat requires not only decisive practices of national security, but also a coherent body of citizens capable of unity and strength. National security, in a gesture that resembles the confrontation with Cold War insecurity, is a reflection of everyday individuals and the unity they can cultivate. Representative Levin, speaking in the Congressional Freedom Bonds debate, echoes the line of force which figures the war against terrorism as a fight rooted, in some regard, in the conduct and unity of individual citizens:

If we are to win the long war against global terrorism, it is clear that the fight must be waged not only by the Federal Government, but by the united American people. The war bond is both a symbol and an expression of this unity...This bill is one way to tap the resources of individuals, of countless citizens of this country, to help fight, keeping within American traditions, the fight against terrorism.

See Congressional Record-House 23 October 2001, Freedom Bonds Act of 2001, page H7138.