

**MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUES OF METAPHYSICS  
AND HUMANIST-POLITICAL CRITIQUES OF HEIDEGGER**

RAAN MICHAEL MATALON

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO  
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

YORK UNIVERSITY

TORONTO, ONTARIO

APRIL 2024

© RAAN MICHAEL MATALON 2024

## **Abstract**

*Martin Heidegger's Critiques of Metaphysics and Humanist-Political Critiques of Heidegger* introduces the reader to the work and controversies of renowned German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). The dissertation aims to situate the critique of Heidegger in his writings as well the impactful meaning of his original and widely acknowledged contribution to philosophy. Heidegger's critique of metaphysics is of the linear-temporal-causality of metaphysical-doctrinal mindsets denoting an undynamic thinking of the spatial-temporal, all too narrowly conceiving the ontological question resulting in a templated use of force which is violent nihilistic, abrupt, and impacts all spheres of life: philosophical-cultural-social-political.

Heidegger took part in the political nihilism of his day. The thinking of the abrupt-end as well as the political crisis of his time also led Heidegger to radicalize the meaning of *Unter-gang* as thinking the tragic-ruin, nihilistic desolation, an apocalyptic end. Heidegger sought to think anew, '*telos*' and '*peras*' as casual-ends-and enclosed-limits, key-core terms that structure metaphysical thought. Heidegger names the event of appropriation: [*Ereignis*], in the realm of the immediate, as the eschatological utter-most-point-limit-edged-stand, a "step-back" [*Schritt zurück*], a new thinking of *phronesis*, an embodied intuitive thinking.

As an original contribution, the dissertation offers a dynamic engagement with Heidegger through a new body-rhythm thinking hermeneutic-phenomenology with the following: *Unter-scheidung* (as separating or dissociating), a re-orientation of

directionality by *Wider-spruch* (opposite in nature, direction in meaning), towards a *Grund-mittle-punkt* (ground negotiated, as a medium-middle-range-as point hold-footing), rethinking the subject in space-time. The dissertation offers an original perspective on Heidegger's reading of the German Idealist poet Friedrich Hölderlin's hymn "The Ister." The dissertation reviews intertwinings of Heidegger and ancient East-Asian thinking: Heidegger's one-stroke-folding-resonance with East-Asian calligraphy. The dissertation reviews thinkers who were influenced by Heidegger's critique of metaphysical enclosures and the phenomenological meaning of otherness, outlining critiques of metaphysics and of Heidegger by a humanist-person-centered approach. The notable thinkers are Herbert Marcuse, Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gayatri Spivak, and Jacques Lacan. The work of these thinkers, the dissertation concludes, lead to the unthought terrain of peripheral thinking, a corporeal engagement, rethinking locality-temporality as situated-otherness, as a new *praxis*.

## **Acknowledgments**

I would like to thank Dr. Shannon Bell for all the wonderful years of supervision, research, guidance and support, for her wonderful teaching and working with me on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. I would like to thank Dr. Jay Goulding for the years of his personal supervision, for teaching me Heidegger and East-Asian thought. I would like to thank Dr. Terry Maley for his support and for his teaching of Herbert Marcuse. I thank the Department of Political Science, York University Toronto Ontario, Canada, for their wonderful support. I thank Erika Biddle for her wonderful help with editing the dissertation manuscript. I thank my parents, RIP, for supporting me throughout my education in Canada and for always believing in me.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .....	ii
Acknowledgments .....	iv
Table of Contents .....	v
Introduction: Martin Heidegger’s Critiques of Metaphysics and the Humanist-Political Critiques of Heidegger .....	1
Chapter 1. The Question of Being, Hermeneutic Phenomenology as Deconstruction: The Critique of Metaphysics.....	29
Chapter 2. Heidegger on Inceptual Ancient Greek Thinking: The Resonance and En-folding.....	62
Chapter 3. Question Concerning Technology and the End of Metaphysics.....	98
Chapter 4: The Venture to the Other Beginning: Heidegger’s Reading of Friedrich Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” .....	113
Chapter 5. Heidegger and Ancient East-Asian Philosophy .....	129
Chapter 6. Herbert Marcuse’s Dimensionality, Negative Thinking, and the Praxis of Emancipation .....	136
Chapter 7. Emmanuel Levinas: The Binding of Otherness on Anarchic Inspiration.....	159
Chapter 8. The Philosophy of Limit Enclosure, the Question of Otherness and Action ...	180
Conclusion .....	204
Bibliography.....	219
Appendix .....	229

## INTRODUCTION

### **Martin Heidegger's Critiques of Metaphysics and the Humanist-Political Critiques of Heidegger**

German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) is acknowledged as the one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Heidegger is also considered one of the most controversial and problematic thinkers of the century because of his audacious claims about philosophy, his promotion of anti-Semitism, his becoming a National Socialist party member in 1933, as well as his promotion of and engagement with nationalism, fascism, and National Socialism in his work. Heidegger's choice of becoming a National Socialist party member shocked many of his colleges and all of his Jewish students. Heidegger had a number of students of Jewish origin, among them: Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, Emmanuel Levinas, Theodor Adorno, and Leo Strauss. Also of Jewish origin is Heidegger's academic supervisor, Edmund Husserl; his colleague Edith Stein; among many others in Heidegger's contemporary academic community, including Karl Jaspers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jacques Derrida.

In a well-known 1966 interview with German weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel*, Heidegger claimed that upon resigning his Rectorship in 1934 and opposing book burnings of Jewish authors, he resumed teaching, claiming in the interview that his "Nietzsche lectures, Hölderlin lectures and on logic" all were "a confrontation with National

Socialism.”<sup>1</sup> It is important to add that after the war, Heidegger never directly critiqued nor addressed his own anti-Semitism, fascism, the crimes of the Nazis, and the horrors of the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi German society against Jews and other minorities, and the world. With these controversies and issues, some academic researchers have not only denounced Heidegger’s philosophy altogether but have called it dangerous, citing it as advocacy for a spiritual and concrete introduction for National Socialism into philosophy, calling for a ban of Heidegger’s philosophy and teachings and any engagement with him whatsoever.<sup>2</sup>

The stance towards Heidegger remains and should remain highly ambivalent because of the dangerousness of his philosophy. And yet, it is also widely acknowledged that Heidegger developed not only a highly methodological and but also original reading of the history of philosophy. He is apprehended as the most original and the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century in that regard.<sup>3</sup> This is because of his original methodological maneuverings into and through philosophy and thinking that inspired a very lively debate upon the meaning of philosophy and the task of thinking and critique.

---

<sup>1</sup> Günther Neske and Emil Kettering (eds.), *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, trans. Lisa Harries; French portions trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 45–51.

<sup>2</sup> Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger, the Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Peter Trawny, *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger’s Anarchy*, trans. Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015); Richard Wolin, *Heidegger in Ruins: Between Philosophy and Ideology* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2022).

<sup>3</sup> Timothy Clark, *Martin Heidegger* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); William J. Richardson *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003); Thomas Sheehan (ed.), *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (New York and London: Routledge, 1981).

The following dissertation will endeavor to bring forward these important elements while considering Heidegger's theory: that is, both his critique of philosophical metaphysical thinking as well as critiquing Heidegger's political anti-Semitism, nationalism-fascism, and National Socialism. The dissertation will offer an in-depth review of Heidegger's critique of metaphysical thinking and his developed method of *deconstruction*<sup>4</sup> by *hermeneutic phenomenology*,<sup>5</sup> to argue for its versatility, applicability, practicality for philosophy, and for political philosophy in particular, as well as its contribution in thinking of and through methods. The dissertation will also argue that Heidegger's critique of structural nihilism and the meaning of the end of philosophy as well as technology in modernity radicalized him personally, and by which he tainted his philosophy by promoting a National Socialist political stance. Ergo, the critique of him or any thought pertaining to any engagement with his philosophy should not be taken separately but together. Here, this will be achieved through a consorted observation upon Heidegger's contemplation of the meaning of the 'end' as end-completion, '*telos*' a directed linear completion, and of 'limits' therein and their meaning. The dissertation will bring forward Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology as contemplation of grounds, conditions of possibility, and forms and ways of thinking.

The terms developed by Heidegger, and the logical dynamics employed by him, will be explored in-depth to provide the reader with the 'ground-laying' preparation to

---

<sup>4</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

<sup>5</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962); Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

engage with Heidegger's thinking through hermeneutic phenomenology as deconstruction of key terms that structure metaphysical thinking and thought. Heidegger's thinking offers an engaging rethinking of the theoretical and practical as an involvement in the world—in the realm of the immediate spatial-temporal as the given environment—from locality to temporality, as the immediate abruptness of being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, thinking through hermeneutic phenomenology, through language that signifies thinking as articulation with and of the body corporeal is to think dynamically. Heidegger thinks through the history of philosophy and the history of the ideas in philosophy, structurally-linguistically and phenomenologically as the articulation of forms and limits, bringing forward their way of thinking and methods and pointing to other ways of thinking. This is done with specific attention to the meaning of methods themselves and their meaning through theory and practice, to think them anew. This is thought through Heidegger by tracing linguistically and re-interpreting hermeneutically key structural definitions as directionality and anchored meaning as grounding premises.

Heidegger traces these key terms to their source in the Greek origin, going through their Latin and German meanings and revisiting them, showing their historical thoughtful appropriation in the history of philosophy, offering a re-interpretation that opens them up hermeneutically and phenomenologically to articulate a revisitation by which those key core definitions are questioned as an un-thought. This unfolds Heidegger's logical proof on the end of metaphysics and the task of thinking. The dissertation will outline Heidegger's influential ongoing dialogue with Ancient-East Asian philosophy and methodologies. Then the dissertation will turn to influences Heidegger had on twentieth-

century thinkers, particularly those who were his students and related to his work in differing ways while very vocally critiquing him. The following thinkers were influenced by Heidegger's end-of-metaphysics thesis and the meaning of metaphysical-enclosures and nihilism upon thinking and the meaning of otherness: Herbert Marcuse, Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Ardent, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, as well as Gayatri Spivak and Jacques Lacan. Their engagements, centering on the meaning of systematic thinking relating to otherness and methodologies, have had an ongoing influential and relevant impact not only on twentieth-century thought but also on twenty-first century thought.

The situatedness of Heidegger's philosophy is found in the meaning of the crisis of his age, the early–mid-twentieth-century crisis in thinking the philosophical, cultural, social, and political. Philosophically, it was signified by the industrial/systemic challenge of positivism/science and technology as the sole and only viable course of thinking and gauging progress. There emerged the Vienna Circle and neo-Kantianism; here, some argued that philosophy should be abolished, and agreed that the only discussion allowed would be an empiricist scientific technological, confined one, for investigating and gauging 'truth' and 'falsehood' statements, one that adheres to the process of experimentation and deductive casual logic as proof and as a cohered standard. This approach adhered to and maintained the cherished meaning of objectivity and rationality for any decision-making process as its sole guarantor.<sup>6</sup> In fact, all human disciplines: academic, social and political, it was contended, should be grouped and guided under the rubric of pure sciences,

---

<sup>6</sup> Michael Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (Chicago: Open Court, 2000); Peter E. Gordon, *Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

understanding solely that any other way of thinking should be regarded as lower rank: unverifiable, not valid, as poetic/ romantic and unscientific, not serious. This so-called lower thinking was considered an opinionated doxical, whimsical, abstracted way of thinking, an unorganized, not mature, not formed and well-rounded: not thought through well and undisciplined one.<sup>7</sup>

Heidegger, while thinking through the meaning of this challenge and crisis of philosophy and the impact of this crisis, was guided by Edmund Husserl's rethinking and reawakening of phenomenology as a scientific discipline, as well as by the hermeneutic tradition and advances by Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Schleiermacher.<sup>8</sup> These adhere to search for methods of interpretation and thinking, while articulating a recursive round-based premised-aboutness thought as an encirclement within and therein, as layers of correspondence and co-relation, while thinking grounds and conditions of possibility of given phenomena. The question of being as a founding ontological is emphasized and explored. As William J. Richardson, in *Heidegger, Through Phenomenology to Thought* writes:

It is from Being, then, that metaphysics derives all its vigor as from its proper element. [Heidegger] makes much of the metaphor suggested by Descartes in his letter to Picot, according to which all philosophy is as a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics and whose branches are all the other sciences. But what, Heidegger asks, is the ground in which

---

<sup>7</sup> Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways*; Gordon, *Continental Divide*.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*; Heidegger, *Being and Time*.

metaphysics is rooted? The unequivocal answer: Being. Being can be called, then, the ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the philosophy tree, is held fast and nourished. To interrogate the ground of metaphysics, we must pose the ‘ground’ question, the question about the sense of Being.<sup>9</sup>

Heidegger’s emphasis of ground as the question of the ontological, points to a focal from out of which any possible scientific discussion, critique, and the critique of its methods is possible. Thomas Sheehan emphasizes in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*:

For Heidegger, the whole history of metaphysics, from Plato through Nietzsche, is structured by this same question, the search for the analogical unity of beingness as the substantial ground and cause of actual beings, regardless of the particular interpretations of beingness that emerge in the tradition. In Professor Werner Marx’s phrase, the history of metaphysics as a whole and in each of its parts is an ‘ousiology’ or doctrine of ousia beingness, where beingness has the double sense of what-things-are and that-they-are. Regardless of whether whatness or thatness is given priority, metaphysics still and always moves within the parameters of the doctrine of ousia. . . . Beingness in all its historical forms conceals, in the broadest sense, a certain relation to man. The beingness of beings is not something “out there” in beings but rather is the meaningful relatedness, the intelligible presentness, of things to and for man. Beingness always includes this implicit

---

<sup>9</sup> Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 7.

referredness, even if it is suppressed or forgotten. Beingness means “intelligible disclosure” or “revealedness,” in Greek: *Alethea*.<sup>10</sup>

As Sheehan thoughtfully articulates, the meaning of beingness and its problematic becomes a *phenomenological* and at the same time *phenomenological*: one of presentness and one of the ways of which this is understood as such,<sup>11</sup> of whose unity of meaning is grouped and housed by the meaning of metaphysics as a discipline. While addressing the meaning of appearance of things and their truth, Sheehan discusses Edmund Husserl’s advancements:

Husserl discusses the phenomenological presentness of the categorial dimension in terms of a “surplus” (*Überschuss*) of meaning over and above the perceptual sensuous presentation. [The] categorial act, to be sure, is founded on sense perception, but it also lets the sensuously appearing object be manifest as what and how it is, i.e., in its beingness-dimension beyond the purely formal beingness of the copula.<sup>12</sup>

As Sheehan notes, Husserl thought of the meaning of the “excess” “surplus” [*Überschuss*] of the “is” of presentences of the phenomena, as an affectation by which temporal dynamics are re-thought and brought as “co-relation” of appearance-thought and challenged by understanding as the meeting of “*eidos* and *logos*.” The problem of “consciousness and

---

<sup>10</sup> Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, x.

<sup>11</sup> Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, xi.

<sup>12</sup> Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, xiv.

objectivity” articulated by Husserl, presented a thoughtful challenge to the meaning of thinking and thought whereby:

Heidegger [. . . entered this problem with intent to] chart its topology. And he did so by pushing the *eidōs-logos* correlation of immediacy and presentness back to the prior question of the kinesis or movement which is the very enactment (*Vollzug*) of the bond between man and beingness. Since kinesis is primarily a matter of presence-by-absence (in Aristotle’s terms: *energeia* that is still bound up with dynamics), Heidegger entered [this realm by . . .] reawakening the question of absence (future, past) as the condition of beingness (presence).<sup>13</sup>

The question of “absence” as a kinetic ripple-effect into the temporal brought Heidegger, to rethinking affectation of the “is” of being hermeneutically, while rethinking the meaning of phenomenology as presentences. The crisis in philosophy is brought by its very definition and its dogma while in pursuit of a complete worldview [*Weltanschauung*].

The result, according to Heidegger, is found in the emergence of thinking the ontical and its ontological context as a categorical linear methodology as the only one that is privileged in thinking. This emergence of thinking as a standard is, according to Heidegger’s critique, an undynamic and narrow way of thinking the unthought dynamics of a given phenomenon, one that does not do justice to its variability, connectivity and as a result attesting to its validity. Heidegger articulates that phenomenology is the only viable

---

<sup>13</sup> Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, xvi.

way that is in fact a scientific adherence of expression and manifestation of the given phenomena to a grounding meaning of any concept as a method to be understood, articulates its meaning by the following emphasis: that phenomenology is understood by its basic component as “the leading back or reduction of investigative vision from a naively apprehended being to being [as. . . ] reduction,”<sup>14</sup> emphasizing a focus back to itself as self.

This emphasis, following Husserl, on the constitution of the “transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic expressions, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness,”<sup>15</sup> for Heidegger, means to return to the “projecting” “unconcealed” of being in the world as “temporality.” The projected-forth of this is named by Heidegger as phenomenological construction.<sup>16</sup> This, for Heidegger, articulates that “construction in philosophy is necessarily a destruction, that is to say a de-construction of transitional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. And this is not a negation of the tradition or condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it signifies precisely a positive appropriation of tradition.”<sup>17</sup> Heidegger’s phenomenological method allows a constant critical evaluation of methods by applying a mutuality for the given that allows a critical stance within as testing hypothesis to transpire as a challenge to thinking and thought. Thereof, Heidegger states that thinking “being” is necessarily thinking

---

<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 21.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 21.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 21–22.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 23.

“*Dasein*” as “the-there-of-being.” By which hermeneutics becomes the meaning of the expressed magnitude of the phenomena of being that is thought through as temporality.<sup>18</sup>

With the thinking of temporality as dynamic affectation, through the excess of the given, as thinking through its modalities, Heidegger aims to re-visit the question of the nothing [*Das-Nichts*], within thinking and thought. The conceptuality of the absences as the given uncanny-estrangement [*Unheimlich*] of daily life, as recesses and clefts and crevasses within thinking, as an unthought affection of dynamics, brought Heidegger to the contemplation of the “existential” as an embodied awareness of being as consciousness and a consorted look-upon the human within the immediate and historical.<sup>19</sup>

The embodied estrangement Heidegger understood by the meaning of ‘end’ ‘limit’ as an ‘edge,’ by which Heidegger thinks the sloped abruptness of the end of its meaning as a perspective within the immediate by offering a re-interpretation of eschatology/the ‘*eschaton*’ as the utter-most-limit-end-point-edge<sup>20</sup> that begets a vision that thinks through and offers a reflection as a re-flection within and therein, of an echoing as inflections-modulations-variations, as a situated stance. By taking things to their announced penultimate limit: their full scope is thereby shown, their logic fully articulated and exemplified as the sum-total-of-their-developments, their shape as *morphe*-form [*Gestalt*] is brought to the full expressed magnitude, being and beings are articulated by the expressed logic as meaning their full *relief*. However, what is shown the most is the way

---

<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*.

<sup>20</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 13.

in which beings and being are understood and brought to the fore, the limit and limitation of the perception thereof and through. This is emphasized by Heidegger, with the usage of the Greek notion of ‘*telos*’<sup>21</sup> as end-directed-causal completion and ‘*peras*’ as boundary /border/limit<sup>22</sup> of expression, with the thoughtful meaning of the abrupt *Augenblick*, as the blink of an eye, a rupture in sight, and a recalibration of thinking of the spatial-temporal.<sup>23</sup> Therein, Heidegger emphasizes, the abrupt as immediacy as a challenge-potentiality as well as a tragic impact.<sup>24</sup>

The contemplation upon the abrupt meaning of ‘end’ and ‘limit’ and directionality as ‘*telos*’ and ‘*peras*’ as boundary, is where Heidegger articulates his critique of metaphysical thinking, which he considers as undynamic and unreflexive enough to cope with the kinetic and elusive question of being. Heidegger revisits the Greek meaning of ‘*alethea*’ as truth, thought anew with the hermeneutic-phenomenological emphasis on the alpha privative linguistic meaning of *alethea* as ἀ-λήθεια of the ‘not,’ as the-uncovered the revealed, that is also logged firmly within Λήθη, *Lethe* the concealed forgotten oblivion, *pseudo*, untrue, *falsum*. Thought through hermeneutic phenomenological revisitation of the pre-Socratic thinkers, Heidegger offers a completely new interpretation of Heraclitus,

---

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 116–119; 236.

<sup>22</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Event*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 29.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 387.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 456. Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 10–18; Heidegger, *The Event*, 40–41.

Parmenides, and Anaximander in which he completely re-interprets philosophy as we know it to be, to becoming an unthought dynamic and articulation.<sup>25</sup>

Heidegger applies a linguistic reinterpretation to the core definitions of metaphysics, thought through their Greek origin: physics [*phusis*] / truth [*alethea*] / logic [*logos*] / ontology [*onta/enai/ousia*] / epistemology [*episteme*] / ethics [*ethos*] / techniques [*techne* and *poesis*] / methods [*methodos*] / theory [*theorin*] / practice [*praxis*]: articulating a rethinking of the question of being as a critique, by which Heidegger demonstrates the historical comported narrow usage by tracing these key terms that reverberate throughout philosophy that structure and ground metaphysics.

The key grounding terms and premises that ground and cohere thought, for Heidegger, have been narrowly construed categorically, linearly and calculatedly and have foreclosed the question of being: all those core definitions Heidegger would re-interpret linguistically and offer a new hermeneutic phenomenology to think through them to an unthought spatial-temporal orientation to the question of being and thinking, as unthought temporal-spatial projections, as expressed magnitude of fullness as relief.<sup>26</sup>

The critique outlined by Heidegger, articulates the systemic confines of forms of thinking, through the linguistic and philosophical meanings of forms-*Gestalt*, representational-perspective of positions as *Vorstellung* and *Stelle* as position outlook to

---

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 256; Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*; Heidegger, *The Event*; Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos*, trans. Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus and Logic*; Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*; Heidegger, *The Event*.

the question of Being, and the definitions of which its meaning as truth, objectivity, and reflexiveness, functionality is thereby brought forth from their grounds. This spiral-encircled confines exists, for Heidegger, since the inception and formalized introduction and thematization of Western philosophies by its known seminal thinkers, since ancient Greek philosophy till today. These encircled-looped-spirals understood by Heidegger as “enclosures” upon the meaning of thinking that governs and structures a given mindset, articulated by the categorical-logical-linear “disseverances”<sup>27</sup> of the ‘spatial and temporal’ of metaphysical templates as quantified grids.<sup>28</sup>

Heidegger’s critique finds its zenith in the meaning of technology as a specific way of thinking science and making sense, inducing for Heidegger’s critique, entrenched and enclosing methodologies of investigation within philosophy and modernity, unreflecting and uncritical to themselves, not questioning their own grounds, articulating a narrow discussion only upon the *techne* of technology as instrumentalization, not its meaning, not its arching grounds. This thus grossly defines and confines the thoughtful, the human, the social and the political spheres. This, for Heidegger, articulates a crisis in thinking as a structural nihilism embedded in metaphysics itself as a system, whereby Heidegger brings forward his critiques of metaphysical thinking of forms [*Gestalt*] and linearity, while thinking abruptness and change.

As Peter Trawny stresses in *Freedom to Fail*, the “topology of relation between errancy and clearing is located in what Heidegger elucidates . . . as ‘unconcealment’

---

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 136.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*.

[*Unverborgenheit*] [as] the Greek word *Alethea*.”<sup>29</sup> In pursuant to the essence of truth Heidegger sees humanity locked within its own looped-spiraled-downwards-slope, of abruptness and errancy, profound helplessness and anxiety encountering the stationary fixed as well as limits and change as the unknown as *Durch-irren*, and is essentially a tragic-catastrophe one that is turned away from its essence.<sup>30</sup> This realization of nihilism, in addition, radicalized Heidegger to the point of tainting philosophy by becoming in 1933 a National Socialist party member and led Heidegger to espouse anti-Semitic views. Trawny states: “Heidegger’s anti-Semitism belongs to the field of the protocols of the elders of Zion,” as well as promoting extreme German nationalism and anti-British and anti-American and anti-Bolshevism nationalism.<sup>31</sup> This places him as the most controversial and problematic philosopher of the twentieth century.

Heidegger declared the meaning of the catastrophe in the abrupt immediacy, as well as the emphasis of the tragic apocalyptic fallenness of the human as a cultural and thoughtful endeavor, brought within him a true Nietzschean “*Unter-gang*,” a tragic downwards-slope-under, a willful embodiment of the meaning of the fall and failure to the unknown-abyssal end, embodying nihilism and the apocalypse itself.<sup>32</sup> The meaning of “*Unter-gang*” as “a tragic fallenness” will be emphasized by the dissertation as that which brought Heidegger to think the edge-limit-end by the unknown as abruptness and expressed

---

<sup>29</sup> Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*, 10.

<sup>30</sup> Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*, 28.

<sup>31</sup> Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*, 32.

<sup>32</sup> Gunter Figal, “The Forgetfulness of God,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 210; John Sallis, “Grounders of the Abyss,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 190.

anxiety, failure and tragedy, but also one that radicalized Heidegger the person, by which Heidegger tainted philosophy with anti-Semitism, racism, and National Socialism.<sup>33</sup>

The radicalization and extremism of Heidegger's thinking as well as the meaning of the "end" as "limit," the "end of philosophy," and the social-political events of his day, brought within him a quest to investigate nihilism in thinking. This quest also led Heidegger to embody nihilism proper and to partake in it. While the academic world denounces and condemns Heidegger's anti-Semitism, racism, ultra-nationalism and National Socialism, there is also an acknowledgment of his originality and his textual philosophical analysis as well as his profound influence upon philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century and in the twenty-first century.

Heidegger's critique of metaphysics is regarded as the most systemic and comprehensive ever written; he thought through "limits" within logical sets and challenged the meaning of structural mindsets. While articulating the end of philosophy and setting to prove it logically within the corpus of metaphysics, Heidegger's challenge is within the task of thinking itself. Heidegger sought to articulate "the tragic" essentiality as a realization of the collapse of metaphysical mind-sets governing ways of thinking for over 2,500 years, as systems, that for Heidegger, started initially with a thoughtful true scientific question of a wonder of the world and of Being and ended-up closing-confining the world

---

<sup>33</sup> Lin Ma, "Thinking through Heidegger's 'Untergang' Star," *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2021): 65–78; Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*.

and the meaning of Being, enclosing it and for-closing it by a categorical calculative-linear thinking.

The question of Being reverberates as an “*echo*”<sup>34</sup> within these system and methods as an elusive unknown and as a challenge. These metaphysical systems for Heidegger, are un-reflecting to themselves, and articulate a dogmatic violence while encountering the ever-elusive question of Being, by trying to countify it within their set-parameters at all costs. This led Heidegger to announce that within the realization of the violent nihilistic dogmatism, a true tragic collapse is rolled-out and pronounced by the meaning of limit-end collapsing thought itself as dogma, announced as one that cannot think anymore, one that cannot think sameness and otherness, and the otherwise as well as change and development but only apply a quantification of a templated-calculative and relies on a structural systemic use of the exerted force in the immediate. Heidegger, as a result, emphasized that a new way of thinking is needed in order to do justice to the dynamic question of Being.

The new way of thinking is one that does not think through the established meaning of a casual-gridded positioned categorical [*Vorstellung*] of forms as *Gestalt* and is nonlinear. What Heidegger termed as “another beginning” to thinking, is achieved as a consorted meditated one, a careful hermeneutic-phenomenological, reading through logical-linguistic structures of core premises and definitions of a given text. This reading invokes a rethinking within the history of philosophy proper, termed by Heidegger as

---

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 5–10; Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, “Contributions to Philosophy and Enowning Historical Thinking,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 105–126.

“deconstruction,” one that thinks through the endeavors and ways of philosophy historically and thoughtfully understood as the “first beginning of philosophy,” meaning metaphysics, of which Heidegger sets out to logically and systemically prove is at its end. “The other beginning” of thinking is for Heidegger a thinking that thinks otherness, is one that Heidegger envisions, is one that would eventually rethink sameness and difference, connectivity, change and abruptness, intuitively as a rethinking of *phronesis*, a new corporeal embodiment of the locality as the spatial and temporal,<sup>35</sup> of which, Heidegger contends, humanity has no tools, ways, methods and means to think adequately.<sup>36</sup> For further discussion of Heidegger’s rethinking of Aristotle’s *phronesis*, see Appendix I to this Introduction.

The following chapter synopsis will guide the dissertation and concludes this Introduction. **Chapter 1. The Question of Being, Hermeneutic Phenomenology as Deconstruction: The Critique of Metaphysics** will introduce Heidegger’s thinking of the question of Being, through Heidegger’s emphasis of Being as *Da-Sein*: the spatial-temporal rethinking of the question of Being by the “there-of-being,” thought through hermeneutic phenomenology as a critical evaluation known as “deconstruction.” This method aims as the critique of metaphysics, centering upon the meaning of linear causality and the meaning of the *magnitude* of the question of Being as an expressed immediacy, brought and thrust

---

<sup>35</sup> William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 321; Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 111; Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger’s Poetic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 49–52.

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 6.

forth as full *relief* to thinking, challenging theory and practice. The meaning of linear-temporal causality articulates Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical orientation of thinking through spatial "*disseverance*" as thought-forms [*Gestalt*] thought through representational *Vorstellung* as thought position of *Stelle* through space-time. This is demonstrated by Heidegger's critique of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel as thinking the "categorical" and "circular" as completion.

The enclosed empirical narrow definitions by which the question of Being is construed, are understood by Heidegger as the meaning of nihilism embedded in the meaning of metaphysics as a doctrinal historical discipline and as the question of Being itself. Centering the critique of the meaning of end-point-sequential-developmental causality, Heidegger rethinks the meaning of *telos* as endpoint and *peras* as boundary-border-limit—announcing the full magnitude of such reformed meaning to thinking and thought. This is thought anew by Heidegger's revisiting of the meaning of *logos* and *alethea* as layered-situational-temporal, the unthought dynamic of kinetic motion. Thus, this also involves rethinking the question of Being. This chapter argues that Heidegger's thinking of limits, and the "end of philosophy" as an "*aporia*" in the domain of thinking of "errancy," as well as the meaning of nihilism as a tragic-catastrophic-philosophical-cultural collapse, brought the embodiment of nihilism proper with the *Unter-gang*. The *Unter-gang* enables Heidegger to actively think the *ruins* and desolation. Humanity, for Heidegger, is locked within downward slopes of "errancy" and "aporias" as dead ends. This rethinking of limits and the end of philosophy radicalized him personally and politically, with his

choice in 1933 to become a National Socialist party member thus tainting his philosophy with anti-Semitism, ultra-nationalism, and fascism and rendering it dangerous.

**Chapter 2: Heidegger on Inceptual Ancient Greek Thinking: The Resonance and En-folding** articulates Heidegger's re-interpretation of philosophy as the meaning of "resonance" as the essentiality of *phusis* to thinking and thought. This is brought by Heidegger's rethinking the meaning of dynamics as an unthought ripple-effect-absence-resonance-as-kinesis, i.e., as temporal, as the full *relief* of presence to the unthought essence of Being. Heidegger thinks this through a hermeneutic phenomenological revisitation of pre-Socratic thinkers such as Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Anaximander. Specifically, he does this through completely new interpretations of these classical thinkers. Employing hermeneutic phenomenology, Heidegger re-interprets philosophy as we know it to be, by offering a completely new interpretation of the core key definitions upon which metaphysics as a discipline is structured and grounded upon. Heidegger re-interprets the following core terms: physics [*phusis*] / truth [*alethea*] / logic [*logos*] / ontology [*onta/enai/ousia*] / epistemology [*episteme*] / ethics [*ethos*] / techniques [*techne* and *poesis*] / methods [*methodos*] / theory [*theorin*] / practice [*praxis*].

Heidegger understands this as the *event of appropriation* [*Ereignis*] in the realm of the immediate, as *eschatological* utter-most-point-limit-edged-stand. By taking things to their announced penultimate limit: their full scope is thereby shown, their logic fully articulated and exemplified as the sum-total of their developments and their shape as *morphe*-form [*Gestalt*] is brought to the full expressed magnitude, Being and beings are articulated by the expressed logic as the meaning their full *relief*. However, what is shown

the most is the *way* in which beings and Being are understood and brought to the fore, the limit and limitation of the perception thereof and through. This for Heidegger invites a revisitation upon the ‘first beginning of philosophy’ as an ‘inceptual’ towards ‘another beginning’ all together.

This thinking aims to think otherness, sameness, and difference through an unthought dynamics, of which, according to Heidegger, humanity has no tools, ways, and means to think adequately, thus presenting a challenge to thinking and thought. This is thought attentively as an enfolding-resonance, understood by Heidegger as the “step-back”—[*Schritt zurück*], a new thinking of *phronesis* an embodied intuitive thinking, rethinking locality-spatiality and temporality, one that thinks through the unknown and abruptness as well as “errancy” and “aporias” as dead-ends. Chapter 2 aims to illustrate and offer an original advance of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology by thinking dynamically *with* Heidegger’s *hermeneutic phenomenology*, questioning methods, through structural linguistics and the unthought meaning of absence/presence.

**Chapter 3: Question Concerning Technology and the End of Metaphysics** aims to articulate the final thrust of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics by critiquing technology as an emerging ideal of metaphysics itself as technical instrumentalization. Technology illustrates this as the logical end-aim of the sum-total-of-developments and meanings of philosophy proper in its present form. This is brought out by Heidegger’s meaning of *Das-Gestell*: the superimposed position [*Stelle*] as positionality of frame-form, the overarching meaning of the “planetary” meaning of technology and technicity as an industrial machination, the complete mechanical ordering of the plant as linear casual technicity of

life-time-space. The categorical-ontic is a 'cybernetic' technological mode of apprehension and control. Heidegger discusses Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of "nihilism" and philosophy and regards Nietzsche as the "last metaphysician of the West." Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's philosophy is centered upon the philosopher's attempt at "Platonic reversal," demonstrated by the meaning of the "eternal return of the same" and the all-encompassing apprehension of modernity as a *Unter-gang*—a catastrophic tragic existentialism.

Embracing the fatedness by the will to power, to become, and be overcome by "active nihilism," by becoming the 'over-man,' a new human. This failed self-overcoming-of-nihilism is demonstrated by Heidegger with the political misreading of Friedrich Nietzsche's doctrine of the will-to-power-to-become-and-be through technological machination. This is brought by Heidegger's critique of Ernst Jünger's writings: *Total Mobilization* (1930) and *The Worker: Domain and Form* (1932). These texts by Jünger have been criticized as being instrumental to National Socialism's appropriation of "techno-animality": the "man-machine" paradigm of "totally mobilized society" as a new planetary order of life, a "new race." This, for Heidegger, demonstrates above all the catastrophe of modernity and its inability to think and be the mark of its end.

**Chapter 4: The Venture to the Other Beginning: Heidegger's Reading of Friedrich Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister"** articulates Heidegger's thoughtful analysis of the German Idealist-national poet Friedrich Hölderlin's hymn "The Ister." The venture to the poetic is brought forward by Heidegger as a rethinking of the spatial-temporal. While for Heidegger, Hölderlin's poetry crafts meaning that thinks through the spatial-temporal

within the poetic journey into the symbolic imagery of language and metaphors. This is brought out by the usage of the ‘sensuous [*Sinnlich*]’ of the ‘symbolic image’ [*Sinnbild*] thinking the kinetic-ripple of the ‘trace’ as a ripple of ‘absence’ by thinking that which presences as an “after-image” [*Nachbild*]. This questions meaning itself as the “*Vor-bild*” [for having an image], appealing for a new *ethos* [*die Ortschaft des Ortes*], as a new appropriation as standing [*Ereignis*]. This is emphasized by the embeddedness of metaphysical categorical-linear-casual thinking that cannot be overcome and the meaning of ‘Being’ and ‘world’ that cannot be comprehended and is uncanny, unhomelike [*Unheimlich*] as the foreign-otherness, that is brought by the realm of the poetic by the meaning of the tragic, announcing poetically the human as a mortal a “vanishing yet full of intimation.”<sup>37</sup>

Heidegger then turns to the choral ode in Sophocles’ *Antigone*, to the domain of the tragic: “manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing beyond the human being prevails more uncannily,” the human is το δῖερόν, the most uncanny [*Unheimlich*]. The human as a thoughtful yet tragic endeavor upon this earth is essentially a *catastrophe*. This seminar brings Heidegger’s thinking of the fated use of the national and finds Heidegger tainting his philosophical thinking with ultra-nationalism, fascism, and National Socialism by thinking of the year 1942 and World War II. The chapter brings forward a critique of Heidegger’s National Socialism and articulates Jacques Derrida’s critique in *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question* (1989). It also brings Heidegger’s 1966 interview to *Der*

---

<sup>37</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 27.

*Spiegel*, where he claims that: he “opposed book burnings of Jewish authors” and that his “Nietzsche lectures, Hölderlin lectures, and on logic” all were “a confrontation with National Socialism.”<sup>38</sup>

**Chapter 5: Heidegger and Ancient East Asian Philosophy** surveys 1945 onwards and Heidegger bringing forward the meaning of “*Gelassenheit*” as releasement with ancient Chinese philosophy of Lao Tzu and Chung Tzu of Daoism, as a challenge to thinking and thought and the task of any future thinking. Thinking “*Nahheit*,” nearness proximity, as the ‘in-between’ ‘leitmotifs,’ thinking otherness and difference. The chapter surveys the academic research developments of the encounter of Heideggerian thinking with ancient East-Asian thought. The chapter specifically turns to the thoughtful philosophical developments of Jay Goulding, who articulates Heidegger’s thinking of ancient Greek philosophical thinking of *phronesis* with ancient Chinese Daoism. Goulding terms this “visceral manifestation.” Goulding’s work demonstrates that “Heidegger’s void [and ‘chaos’ thinking is] more akin to an active Chinese Daoist void of creation” than anything else.<sup>39</sup> The dissertation concludes these ongoing research developments with the articulation of Heideggerian thinking of “one-stroke” enfolding-resonance and East-Asian calligraphy.

**Chapter 6: Herbert Marcuse’s Dimensionality, Negative Thinking, and the Praxis of Emancipation** discusses the works of Herbert Marcuse. A student of

---

<sup>38</sup> Neske and Kettering, *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, 45–51.

<sup>39</sup> Jay Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” ed. David Chai, in *Daoist Resonances in Heidegger Exploring a Forgotten Debt* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), 56.

Heidegger's, Marcuse was influenced by Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, technology and "total mobilization," as well as outlining a Marxist-socialist-humanist critique of Heidegger. The chapter brings forward Marcuse's critique of industrial capitalism and positivism through his Marxist-socialist stance, reviewing the problematic outlined in Marcuse's seminal book *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). The chapter discusses Marcuse's critique of industrial capitalism and the empiricist-positivist-cognitive-behavioral science as modes of control by consumerism and consumerist thinking. Marcuse is critiquing the meaning of "alienation" and the positivism as the objectivism of the human and nature. This is brought together by Marcuse with a Marxist and Hegelian critique as well as Freudian psychoanalytic approach to the social-psychological-political and philosophical spheres, advocating for a new thinking of poetic aesthetics to rethinking socialism.

**Chapter 7: Emmanuel Levinas: The Binding of Otherness on Anarchic Inspiration** introduces the works of Emmanuel Levinas, also a former student of Heidegger, who was influenced by Heidegger's critique of the totality of metaphysics and the meaning of otherness as well as meaning of phenomenology. As a critique of Heidegger, Levinas endeavors to think the meaning of otherness and 'alterity' in the immediate as spatial proximity, emphasizing the human-to-human encounter, beckoning towards a humanist approach as a meeting signifying the immediate, unknown, otherness, an-archē. This approach emphasizes Judaism as a tradition and its ethical meaning, meeting Greek first philosophy as a challenge to thinking and thought by thinking otherness as an unthematized ethical stand denoted as responsibility by the humane meaning of suffering and destitution. The chapter will introduce these meanings through a review of Emmanuel

Levinas's core texts: *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (1969) and *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence* (1974). The chapter will follow Levinas by articulating the unthought dialogue 'between Athens-Jerusalem' and, following subsequent research in Levinasian thinking and thought, presents a mediation through ancient East-Asian philosophies such as Buddhism.

**Chapter 8. The Philosophy of Limit Enclosure, the Question of Otherness and Action** reviews the works of Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gayatri Spivak, and Jacques Lacan. These thinkers and philosophers were influenced by Heidegger thinking of the meaning of metaphysical enclosures and his thinking through the meaning of the 'limit' as boundary 'peras,' 'end,' 'telos' and beginning/governing principle as 'arche' as well as the technologies of epistemological hegemony and power. These thinkers endeavor to think through metaphysical enclosures and the praxis of "alterity" through poverty and suffering as the immediacy of the meaning of Being, thinking otherness and envisioning dimensions of meanings that challenge political praxis. Hannah Arendt, a former student of Heidegger, thinks through the *polis* as both an enclosure and a place for dialogue and action. Arendt demonstrates how the world of the polis operates and how otherness as alterity thinks through limits by democratic participation that empowers plurality as humanism.

The chapter then reviews Jacques Derrida's adaptation of the practice of deconstruction as the meaning of relation and situatedness of otherness, rethinking text and context, as *differance* and alterity. This is discussed by Derrida as a "becoming-space," a carving out towards thinking as "suspension." This thinks otherness as an "after-effect,"

“dislocation” within and therein, while thinking teleology as finality and structure and that which enables meaning and voicing of otherness, as a subversive underverse.

This chapter surveys the work of Michel Foucault, who was influenced by Heidegger’s emphasis on metaphysical-epistemological-technological enclosures. Foucault demonstrates the physical-enclosure thesis historically by surveying scientific-medical developments impacting the social-political as historical developments that build those enclosures. Foucault’s develops the meaning of “biopower” to demonstrate this principle and surveys the architectural building and meaning of the “panopticon,” articulating the person as a site of “subjugated knowledge” and advocating for thinking through fragmentation as a “genealogy” to counter state control.

The chapter turns to Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” The “subaltern” invoked by Spivak in this work, originally published in 1988, as the notion of the lowest class, marginalized group, cannot speak, but acts in a manner that symbolizes their destitution and lack of recognition. Spivak’s essay discusses the meaning of marginalized women as a barred subaltern other aiming to provide signification and representation within discourse and to reclaim identity, through the questions of subjectivity, choice, and “voice” at the periphery. Spivak is challenging postcolonial studies and the meaning of the political as representation and action and agency.

The chapter then reviews the work of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who theorized the subject as psychologically and socially destitute, a site of the symbolic imprint of the distress, horror, and longing for voice and meaning, and as the site of

articulation of desire for fulfilment. Lacan does this through the question of gender as voice and signification. Lacan, working in response to Sigmund Freud's foundational psychoanalysis, thinks the "unconscious" as that which splits the subject by "repetition" within the phenomena of language structures and social discourse and is visceral and visible as a "gap" and "lack" in thinking and Being. Utilizing Heidegger's thinking through the ontology and the meaning of relational 'absorption,' Lacan thinks the 'unconscious' as an articulation of the 'phenomenological-ethicity' of the-subject-as-a-question-about-gender struggling to find meaning in order to think through the enclosures-of-thought of the symbolic order of social categories. Lacan thinks the symbolic order as bodily narration and language through the Heideggerian "*Wiederholung*"—revisitation and rethinking of grounds. Lacan is drawing on Heidegger's thinking regarding the self encountering the uncanny [*Unheimlich*]. For Lacan, this encounter is a desire to make sense, to find one's voice and agency, and is a striving for social justice. The chapter concludes by articulating the person in its environment and the humane in destitution, as a turn towards peripheral thinking, thinking limits.

## CHAPTER 1

### The Question of Being, Hermeneutic Phenomenology as Deconstruction:

#### The Critique of Metaphysics

*Being and Time* [1927] (1962), Martin Heidegger's magnum opus, opens with the simplest question: "What do we really mean by the word Being?"<sup>1</sup> Heidegger aims to rethink or think anew the question of Being with the underlying thought of time as a 'horizon' of "any possible what so ever for the understanding of Being."<sup>2</sup> The horizon perspective is entered upon consideration of beings and things it encounters in the world. This is understood from the immediate of its 'now' encounter to any modulation and dynamic understood as motion or kinesis.

While the question of "Being" relies on immediate and unfolded relations, its primacy is embedded as an announced investigation and sense [*Sinn*]. Therein Heidegger introduces anew the meaning of *Dasein*, as both existence and an un-thought immediacy of *Da- Sein* as 'there-being' compacted as *Dasein*. The course of the latter immediately developed as the hyphenation residing between the *Da* of *Dort* [there] [of] *Sein* (*Sinn*) sense. This will be discussed in this dissertation as an *unfolded motional*ity, an articulation

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, [1927] 1962), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 1.

unthought that is unpacked by the copula as a relation; a co-relation. With this, the ontological question supersedes all other meanings embedded within the structural definition of metaphysics. This, denoting the *arche* of which ontology ‘is,’ constitutes epistemology and ethics as unfolded within ontology itself.<sup>3</sup> The relation between immediate ontic categories to the ontological perspective becomes, for Heidegger, the modality of the “analysis of *Dasein*.”<sup>4</sup>

With temporality as the meeting ground, phenomenology becomes an unthought appreciation of the historical question within the corpus of philosophy and the thought of being as an investigation in time via tradition, of which all is built, breaks upon, and is dismantled.<sup>5</sup> Heidegger indicates, “the task of ontology is to explain being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full relief. And the method of ontology remains questionable . . . as long as we merely consult those ontologies which have come down to us historically.”<sup>6</sup> Approaching the question of being, which is for Heidegger a fundamental question in philosophy, phenomenology provides the only viable expression for the magnitude of that fundamental question.

Phenomenology as a “methodological conception,” as it is outlined by Edmund Husserl, unfolds the “maxim” as the scientific task of direction “to the things themselves!” in their full scientific totality, fullness as expression.<sup>7</sup> The term phenomenology, Heidegger

---

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 28–35.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 34.

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 44.

<sup>6</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 49.

<sup>7</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 50.

contends, carries the meaning of *phinosthai* as showing manifestation, deriving itself from “*phino*” “to bring to light of day” of which its dynamic approximation, through proximity as a fleeting ‘is’ and ‘not’ as the “semblant,” “semblance.”<sup>8</sup> The world of “appearance” of things remains a mediated one by which “appearance, as the appearance ‘of something,’ does *not* mean showing-itself; it means rather announcing itself by [*Von*] something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself.”<sup>9</sup> This mediated showing functions as a bridge-connector, a passage that constitutes the work of reason as logic, hitherto understood as thought.<sup>10</sup> With this, Heidegger thinks anew the meaning of “*logos*.” Moving from assertion as deduction and ground to link it to “*phinosthai*” as unthought dynamics showing manifestation, he proposes rethinking its Aristotelian meaning through discourse and structured deliberation as “*apophenic*” logic, by which “*synthesis*” is brought to the fore, not through representations but as “*togetherness*” as “binding” in its phenomenological signification, expression, and modality.<sup>11</sup> The rethought or thought anew “*logos*” articulates the scope of “*alethea*” as a dynamic un-hiddenness as truth. This underwrites the layered meaning of “*pseudo*” as a “deceiving in the sense of covering up [*Verdecken*]: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off *as* something which it is not.”<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 51.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 52.

<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 53.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 56.

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 57.

This layered rethinking as a kinetic ripple effect, a dynamic of absence (of past-and-future) as presence, contemplates anew the fundamental structural definitions laid out by Plato and Aristotle, thought as indicative and definitive structural linear grounding in the history of philosophy. Heidegger emphasizes how this completely misunderstood truth assertions and logic as casual and linear, foregoing a layered meaning for certainty and direction. This is exemplified by an embedded structural definition of metaphysics holding the pure sensory perception (*aisthesis*) once it is collapsed into an attained thinking apprehension (*noein*) anchored as an axiom by which it “can never be false,” as it verifies its self and accepts itself as self-same, and as such the principle of noncontradiction prevails, thus sustaining a premise that grounds the standing therein as an understanding. This results in a certain dynamic ability to articulate and reflect that is undercut and exists in a narrow sense, alone, and is insufficient.<sup>13</sup>

Thinking the meaning of *Dasein* as a “phenomenological description as a method lies in *interpretation*,”<sup>14</sup> of which “the phenomenology of *Dasein* is *hermeneutic*,”<sup>15</sup> allows for Heidegger to contemplate the conditions of possibility of any ontological investigation of the question of Being as fundamental. With hermeneutic phenomenology, the meaning of *worldhood* is understood as *knowing relation*. Heidegger brings forward the unthought unveilings of Being and its relation to Being-entity as a “constant presence at hand.”<sup>16</sup> This is considered as a rethinking of any measured, mathematical relation of any and all thinking

---

<sup>13</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 57.

<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 61.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 62.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 129.

whatsoever and of the transcendent thereof, with the dynamics of sense of the extremity differentia which intermit by the engagement of the corporeal with proximity as a now, an immediate concern, and empirical.<sup>17</sup>

These are needed for sense by the differential while rethinking the temporal, as a ground allowing and resisting and challenging sense certainty.<sup>18</sup> The ontological question, via differing “velocities,” problematizes any apprehension of Being-in-the-world as thought “*In-der-Welt-sein zu verstehen*.”<sup>19</sup> This is brought by Heidegger as “the question of Being.” “Ready-to-hand” is established as an epistemology of thinking “closeness [*der Nahe*],”<sup>20</sup> by metaphysical thinking as established by “circumspection of concern.”<sup>21</sup> This brings the meaning of “de-severance and directionality” to abolishing distance, announcing a bordered frame determination of facticity considered as a categorical entity, invested by sense certainty while thinking relatability. This is circumscribed as the “region [*Gegen*]” of directionality as “marked range [*Umkreis*].”<sup>22</sup> Environmentally, the spatial orientation is a navigation or mapping of the “multiplicity round-about-us [*das-Um-uns-herum*],” by which a spatial orientation is sought. This is in the ‘now,’ which is immediately brought as the “three-dimensional multiplicity” of positions [*Stelle*]: of “above-below-on as also

---

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 129.

<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 130.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 131.

<sup>20</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 135.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 135.

<sup>22</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 136.

behind”<sup>23</sup>; “the above is what is ‘on the ceiling’; the ‘below’ is what is ‘on the door’; the ‘behind’ is what is ‘at the door.’”<sup>24</sup>

Overall, on and below against that which stands as a “*Gegen-stand*”—“over and against” that which is thought as a “whereness of that which” is brought forward and ‘is’ free to stand and be<sup>25</sup> as metaphysical guided thinking. This is:

the space which is discovered in circumspective Being-in-the-world as the spatiality of the totality of equipment, always belongs to entities themselves as the place of that totality. The bare space itself is still veiled over. Space has been split up into places. But this spatiality has its own unity through that totality-of involvements in-accordance-with-the-world [*weltmassige*] which belongs to the spatiality ready to hand. The ‘environment’ does not arrange itself in a space which has been given in advance; but its specific worldhood, in its significance, articulates the context of involvements which belongs to some current totality of circumspectively allotted places.<sup>26</sup>

The spatial circumspection is challenged by the meeting of elements and their relatability as plural “Being-with” [*mit-Sein*] phenomenology. The encounter with the other in the world as Other, estranged phenomena heightens *Dasein* innate “disclosure” as “thrown-falling [*Verfallen*],” “attunement” to flux [*Stimmung*], existential, in-potentia, estranged-

---

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 136–137.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 136–137.

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 137.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 138.

to-itself awareness,<sup>27</sup> inducing immense “anxiety.” This fallenness articulates being as self “absorbed and absorbing the world” while seeking the meaning of itself as bound and boundary,<sup>28</sup> as a constitution, within inauthentic strangeness while seeking authentic essence of presence by the appreciation of “alienation.” This thus sends being, as an “entangled” “downward plunge” towards a “turbulence” [*Wirbel*] of confusion,<sup>29</sup> inviting the question of uncanniness/the uncanny to the forefront.

The meaning of “*das Unheimlich*” thus presses forward and is brought anew as extraordinary overwhelming—an unhomely estrangement of the foreignness of which *Dasein* is.<sup>30</sup> Whereby the thought, by the immediacy, is constantly projected to the future “ahead of,” by which the Aristotelian deduction of causality, of endpoint as cause (*telos*), is brought about by the meaning of “*for-the-sake-of-which*” directionality.<sup>31</sup> This is outlined by Aristotle in *Physics*, Book II, Chapter 8:

By gradual advance in this direction we come to see clearly that in plants too that is produced which is conducive to the end – leaves, e.g., grow to provide shade for the fruit. . . . And plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and send their roots down (not up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature. And since ‘nature’ means two things, the matter and the form, of

---

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 219.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 220.

<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 232.

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 233.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 116–119; 236.

which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of ‘that for the sake of which.’<sup>32</sup>

The Aristotelian deductive endpoint causality (*telos*)—as directed causality of limit—is grasped by its readiness as always already a grid that springs forward. It is catapulted into action as immanence; an innate articulation, unpacked and sent forward in motion as a developmental-sequencing; a linear casual-end-form, thereby quantifying other and otherness by the meaning of limit as announced bordered frame. This is grounded and streamlined by Plato’s metaphysical comportment of truth as Idea (in Plato’s dialogue *The Republic*, and best illustrated by the “cave allegory” and “divided line”), in which Plato while thinking of layers of light and shadow, ends up compartmentalizing truth as a fixed binary: either/or.

This is challenged by Heidegger’s meaning of curated attentiveness to the phenomenal world known as “*Sorge*.”<sup>33</sup> This attention to the modulation and meaning of otherness as an inter-twining extends to the unthought meaning of “uncoveredness” of entities announcing the meaning of their truth, presence and essence as phenomena in the world.<sup>34</sup> The uncoveredness, as an unthought dynamic will be explored by Heidegger with attention to the Greek meaning of *ἀλήθεια* (*aletheia*) and the pragma of phenomena as a challenge to thinking and thought. With its innate thrown perpetual fallenness, Dasein is essentially encapsulated by *a-lethea* / *ἀ-λήθεια*, with the emphasis on the alpha privative

---

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle, “Physica,” trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 250.

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 237; 243.

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 262.

linguistic meaning ἀ-λήθεια of the ‘not’ as the uncovered, the revealed, that is also logged firmly within Λήθη, *lethe* the concealed forgotten oblivion, *pseudo*, un-true, *falsum*.<sup>35</sup>

Dasein, while seeking wholeness, meets its end limit as an encounter by which its end is a “going towards” its “ripeness” as completion and potential is embodied. This also articulates, according to Heidegger, its tragic unfulfillment, challenged by “the stoppage of death,”<sup>36</sup> as an innate nullity within the meaning of being, brought by Heidegger’s notion of “Being towards death” [*Sein zum Tod*] and the cleft opening, gaping as the elusive within questions of Being itself.

This thus pushes the un-most to its own-most expirietia, attested by the “face-to-face encounter” with the end as otherness.<sup>37</sup> Wherein temporality breaks upon the question of Being as an “ecstasies,” unrevealing the ‘now’ as a “leveling of space” brought by a “moment of vision” [*Augen-blick*]<sup>38</sup> as rupture. As Heidegger emphasizes, “only on the basis of its ecstatic-horizontal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space.”<sup>39</sup> This brings forward Dasein’s allotted proprium as a givenness potential or time-space fatedness—“*Geschick*” as a “co-historizing determination” being in the world.<sup>40</sup>

This making-history encapsulates Heidegger’s vision for rethinking theory and practice. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger announces the “reckoning”<sup>41</sup> of the self as

---

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 265.

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 288–289.

<sup>37</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 310.

<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 387.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 421.

<sup>40</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 436.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 456.

temporality. Awareness of that which is the end-as-limit fully and truly, as that which making present the end, steers all as a willed plunge to essence as motional of the given estranged. This is part of Heidegger's systemic task of dismantling the question of Being in the course of the history of philosophy and thought, understood as a limit concept by the task of de-construction [*Abbau*]. The descending towards the meaning of Being as abyss enacts a systematic maneuvering towards the grounds of thinking as an edged *slope*.

In his Kant seminars—the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* in 1927–1928 and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* in 1929—Heidegger investigates Immanuel Kant's philosophy outlining a critique thereof of Kantian metaphysics, while acknowledging the magnitude of Kant's influence and thinking on the history of philosophy. Heidegger emphasizes how Kant thinks metaphysics through its “meta” *μέτα* as “*trans*” as a way that ‘transcends’ the “physics” as a realm in itself by which a “transformation” as the full meaning of science is understood as a founding grounding knowledge.<sup>42</sup> As Heidegger states:

[M]etaphysics deals with the supersensible: God, the totality of the world and the soul. These objects correspond to three disciplines of metaphysics. Theology deals with God – as philosophical theology, i.e., from out of reason and not out of revelation: *theologia rationalis* or *naturalis*. Rational cosmology *cosmologia rationalis*, deals with ‘*kosmos*’ or the totality of the world. And rational psychology or *psychologia rationalis* deals with the

---

<sup>42</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 9.

soul. As disciplines of metaphysics, these are not experiential sciences, but sciences of reason—rational sciences. . . . [T]he entirety of metaphysics has its center in rational theology.<sup>43</sup>

As Heidegger emphasizes, this brings to the fore the problematic and elusive question of Being: “the sciences of reason,” a rational-objective enterprise, is at the center, and therefore is central to the way it is thought. Heidegger emphasizes that for Kant, the “science of logic deals with rules of understanding of thinking and knowing”<sup>44</sup> and that with “intuition,” the meaning of thinking relies on a representation of articulation, however, it springs forth in the realm of the immediate. Thinking the aboutness of this springing forth is a “non-sensuous” task of philosophy. Knowledge as a representation is a “mediated one,” whereby intuitions are finite “affectations.” The “concepts” rest on functions of spontaneous understanding, as mediated representations, as “representation of a representation.”<sup>45</sup> This representation [*Vorstellung*] is mediated by a judging assertion understood as the gathering “grasping” *logos* as *coniunctio* or “synthesis” in the “narrow sense.”<sup>46</sup> For Heidegger, this means “judgment, assertion, *logos* is *synthesis* and *diareisis*. *Logos* is a taking together in such a way that the determinations, the *noemata* (*noien, νοιεν*) that are taken together are at the same time taken apart, so what is intuitively given with regard to its determinate characteristics is articulated.”<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 10.

<sup>44</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 116–117.

<sup>45</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 117.

<sup>46</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 117.

<sup>47</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 117.

The faculty of judgment “produces in a roundabout way; thinking moves through the determining representation; thinking is a running through—is discursive.”<sup>48</sup> This recursive aboutness, spatial about and aboutness, “is the ground for its possible falsity, for its being in error . . . judgment is a function of unification.”<sup>49</sup> Thinking links a given object relating to subject as “transcendental logic” by the “categorical.”<sup>50</sup> This outlining of the manifoldness as “*a priori*,” sensibility as an “aesthetic,”<sup>51</sup> is placed forward by the approached categorical, providing a structure of givenness by the work of “imagination,” enabling a framed meaning of thinking as the “*a priori*” to exist. This is understood as a deductive representation; as a form of the subject-related-to-object thinking, as “objectness,” as the work of the “categorical,” “inter-negotiating and discussing *katagori*,” determining the *gene* as a template upon which the constitutive object-character is grounded,<sup>52</sup> enabling judgment.

This representation-formed perspective “stands over and against” [*Aus-einander-setzung*], together, engulfed and apart. It brings forward the “field” of concepts, as the given, accessible nature-to-vision. The territory of concept is announced as a “*territorium*”—as a nature towards a methodological deductive empiricism; as the “region” [*Gegen*] of which the empirical concepts are comported, appropriated to nature of which they belong by the work of science, as a doctrine of objectivity under the investigation of the scientific mode of reasoning, as an empirical methodology, as judging legislative

---

<sup>48</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 118.

<sup>49</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 118.

<sup>50</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 118–119.

<sup>51</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 181.

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 201.

categorical. Finally, the “domicile” [*domocilium*] of the concept, an announced territory where they legally and fully reside as legislative, grounded and proved scientifically to be, established as a given fact of the objective doctrine of science, as they ‘are,’ as ‘is’; established as an “*a priori*” given and announced as a *dominium* at ‘rest,’ a “complete anthropology” allowed by the laws of science to freely self-govern, legislate, and regulate.<sup>53</sup>

For Heidegger, this further emphasizes that “what renders ontic experience possible is a self-enclosed whole of pure ontological knowledge.”<sup>54</sup> The stand of the ‘I’ of *regulato*, represents the work of the synthesis. It is a representation of the ‘I’ of self-identification and belonging to ‘itself’ as ‘self,’ where the self is “fixed and abiding,” “self-standing, acting as subject,”<sup>55</sup> is “*Weltanschauung*” [“world perception”].<sup>56</sup> This formed perception, whereby vision is understood in a specific way, denotes an intentional way of representation [*Vorstellung*] that does not question its grounds as frame “forming and re-forming” [*Nachbilden*] as it is in fact an advanced formation [*Vor-bilden*]; an “image” [*Abbilden*]. This does not question the initial [*Bilden*] of the visionary frame that enables empirical deduction to take hold as ground, by which the ‘*imago*’ crafted and grafted is understood as ‘*transendatio*’ enacting freedom for a givenness by the ‘*a priori*’ comportment as an anchored representation. This understanding of the givenness, as representational thinking, grounds the ‘architectonic,’ and as such relies solely on the work

---

<sup>53</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 220–221.

<sup>54</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 226.

<sup>55</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 256.

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 269.

of its “schematism” as a mathematical inner possibility gridding the “categorical”<sup>57</sup> as a “time-related mode of synthesis.”<sup>58</sup> As Heidegger emphasizes, it is the work of the ‘schemata’ that enables the touchpoint of identification and difference by repetition as thought.<sup>59</sup>

In his lecture *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Heidegger observes the meaning of the “image and the schema,”<sup>60</sup> noting that a “photograph (light image)” remains only “a transcription of what shows itself immediately as ‘image,’”<sup>61</sup> making sensible, intelligible, as representation relies on the image as a ‘relief,’ dimensionality and apprehension embedded as the meaning of difference and replica-sameness as the schema-image [*das-Schema-bild*] for any attainment of the thematic grounding as understanding [*Aus-einander-setzung* of *Gegenstand*]. As such, for the formation [*Vorbild*] of the “form [*Gestalt*]” structuring the “pro-position [*Vor-stellung*]” at hand.<sup>62</sup> The coursing of the standing-over-and-against, as a spatiotemporal orientation, remains an unthought dynamic as well as its grounding as a specific way of thinking about the world as comported of subject-object relations.

Heidegger critiques Kant, noting that he “shrank back” from the “transcendental power of imagination” as “[*Ein-bildung*],” temporal inspiration in fact limiting temporal

---

<sup>57</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 292.

<sup>58</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 292.

<sup>59</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 292.

<sup>60</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 65.

<sup>61</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 66.

<sup>62</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 71.

insight as a “sketched out” analytic.<sup>63</sup> As Heidegger notes: “the formatting [*Bilden*] of the imagination [*Einbildung*] is in itself relative to time, pure imaginary, however is called pure because it forms its fabric [*Gebilde*] from out of itself, as in itself relative to time, must first of all form time . . . time as pure intuition is the forming intuiting of what intuit in one. This gives the full concept of time for the first time,”<sup>64</sup> brought by the conceptualization of the ‘now’ as the “empirical sequencing” of an image, a snapshot of time as time, as a “reckoning” of the letting-springing-forth of the intuited *phusis* as abyssal.<sup>65</sup> Heidegger revisits the meaning of metaphysics by “ground-laying, through retrieval [*Wiederholung*],”<sup>66</sup> thinking concretely the Kantian “architectonic” towards fundamental ontology, upon which metaphysics is grounded as the task embraced by Heidegger towards deconstruction.

Thinking about the limit and “limitation” brought Heidegger to think anew the meaning of edge and abruptness as a descending slope one partakes in as a willed plunge to the depths of the end and limit of thinking self and other as an unhomely, uncanny [*Unheimlich*] encounter, embodying the meaning of errancy, lostness as a given meeting with the unknown, facing it head on, challenging thought to the limit-edge. Facing the abyss as *phusis*. Heidegger argues that thinking the question of being and its ever-conceptualized categorical comportment in the course of the history of metaphysics has brought about a too-narrow definition; a self-enclosed encircled loop that cannot think

---

<sup>63</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 123.

<sup>64</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 123.

<sup>65</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 123.

<sup>66</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 142.

itself and out of itself as self and is alien to itself. The elusive question is grounded in the ‘is’ and the ‘not’ of being itself. Such a question, according to Heidegger, needs to attend itself to core definitions while remaining critical of them and their development within the history of philosophy. The attentiveness seeks clarity while thinking the immense scope of the question, while being engulfed, comported, and challenged by the reflexivity and distortions (understood as anchored confines and closures) of the question at hand.<sup>67</sup>

Therein Heidegger seeks to turn to the “inceptuality” of initial questions and their respected definitions, as well as their openings and their closures, understood as the meaning of “nihilism” as a structural violence, collapsing of the meaning of the “nothing” [*das-Nichts*] embedded within the meaning of Being-itself,<sup>68</sup> wherein the question of Being is as fleeting as “vapor and an announced error,” mist and shadow, potential and violence.<sup>69</sup> Heidegger’s philosophy is acknowledged as the most profound reading of nihilism ever recorded. As Peter Trawny discusses in *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger’s Anarchy* (2015), Heidegger’s personal radicalization is evidenced by his becoming, in 1933, a National Socialist Party member,<sup>70</sup> and by his need for a new way of thinking in the realm of the immediate, embracing of anti-Semitism, ultra-nationalism, and fascism.

Heidegger became a researcher of nihilism and he also partook in it. As Trawny emphasizes, Heidegger’s personal failure found its bedrock in the anarchy of error and

---

<sup>67</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

<sup>68</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 1–9; 26–27.

<sup>69</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 40.

<sup>70</sup> Peter Trawny, *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger’s Anarchy*, trans. Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015).

willed lostness, while embracing the conceptuality of it as thought, and while also radicalizing his thinking that the “human being is essentially a catastrophe”<sup>71</sup> lost within its “*Durch-irren*,” the endless wandering into its own downward slopes of errancy, eschatology, mythos, and tragedy.<sup>72</sup> This radicalism at the root of the collapsing of thinking in nihilism led Heidegger to espouse anti-Semitic views. Trawny notes that “Heidegger’s anti-Semitism belongs to the field of the protocols of the elders of Zion,”<sup>73</sup> promoting nationalism, as well as anti-British and anti-American sentiments, and anti-Bolshevism. Heidegger’s German nationalism,<sup>74</sup> as deep-rooted within him personally, taints his philosophy and thought,<sup>75</sup> placing him as the most controversial and problematic philosopher of the twentieth century. Heidegger announced the meaning of catastrophe within modernity, brought from within him—a true Nietzschean “*Unter-gang*,” as an active thinking of the *ruins* and desolation, a downwards-going-to, a slope-under, a willed tragic fall to the abyssal end, to nihilism, and the apocalypse.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*, 27.

<sup>72</sup> Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*, 22 and 29.

<sup>73</sup> Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*, 32; Martin Heidegger, *The History of Beyng*, trans. William McNeill and Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 60; Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 44.

<sup>74</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 41–42; 50–51.

<sup>75</sup> Trawny, *Freedom to Fail*.

<sup>76</sup> Gunter Figal, “The Forgetfulness of God,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott, Susan Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 198–212; John Sallis, “Grounders of the Abyss,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott, Susan Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 181–197.

Lin Ma's recent engagement with the "*Unter-gang*," "On Heidegger 'Thinking through the 'Unter-gang' Star,"<sup>77</sup> addresses the utilization of the term and its meaning in Heidegger's thinking. As Ma emphasizes, this engagement radicalized Heidegger and tainted his philosophy with ultra-nationalism and National Socialism. Ma draws attention to Heidegger's writings in the 1930s and '40s, specifically: *Ponderings* (1931–1941); *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* (1936–1938); *Black Notebooks* and *On Inception* (1941); and *The Event* (1941–1942). Heidegger's willed *Unter-gang*-downwards-going-fallenness towards inceptuality, Ma argues, articulates Heidegger's appropriation of the term following his reading of Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West* [*Der Unter gang des Abenlandes*]. This text brought into confluence Heidegger's reading of nihilism as the collapse of metaphysical thinking and as the consummation of modernity in the age of will-to-willing of machination as a planetary process of devastation.<sup>78</sup> Heidegger states that the full scope of the planetary devastation will take three hundred years to express itself fully. According to Ma, this thinking brought Heidegger to make a claim about this planetary devastation that is tainted with his own extremist ultra-nationalism and National Socialism: "Americanism will exhaust itself."<sup>79</sup> Quoting Heidegger from *Mindfulness* (1938–1939) and the contemporaneously written *Ponderings*, *Black Notebooks*, Ma emphasizes that for Heidegger a veering towards the "*Unter-gang*" embodies an immensely tragic catastrophe: "The 'tragic' is what takes its

---

<sup>77</sup> Lin Ma, "Thinking through Heidegger's 'Untergang' Star," *Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2021): 65–78.

<sup>78</sup> Ma, "Thinking through Heidegger's 'Untergang' Star," 68.

<sup>79</sup> Ma, "Thinking through Heidegger's 'Untergang' Star," 69.

ascent from its descent, its going-under, because in the abyss it has taken on the task of grounding. . . . The unclosedness toward what is question-worthy belongs to the essential character of a ‘tragedy.’”<sup>80</sup>

When thinking is engulfed and enclosed in categorical nihilism, confining and alienating thinking and Being, systems of thought can no longer offer grounds for support and development. These systems apply an unreflective categorical-mathematical condensation to thinking and Being, to isolate the question of Being from its context, thus enabling its appearance as an abrupt presence devoid of essence. It is standardized by categorical-empirical accounting as the sole mode of thinking sameness and difference. This systematic thinking manifests in any and all walks of life as a mindset, governs and steers all, announcing itself in the educational as the social and political as an arching ground. Heidegger emphasizes in his seminar of *Parmenides* of 1942, with specific regard to this: “The πόλις (*polis*) is neither city nor state and definitely not the fatal mixture of these two inappropriate characterizations. Hence the πόλις (*polis*) is not the notorious city-state but is, rather the settling of the place of the history of Greek humanity . . . the abode of the essence of this humanity.”<sup>81</sup> Heidegger explicates the modern meaning of “the political” in relation to thinking: “the essence of power, as meant in modern thinking about the state, is founded in the metaphysical presupposition that the essence of truth has been transformed into certitude, i.e., into the self-certitude of the human being in his self-positing, and that the latter is based on the subjectivity of consciousness. No modern

---

<sup>80</sup> Ma, “Thinking through Heidegger’s ‘Untergang’ Star,” 74.

<sup>81</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 90.

concept of “the political” will ever permit anyone to grasp the essence of the πόλις (*polis*) [city-state].”<sup>82</sup> According to Heidegger, modernity’s inability to think the *polis* as dwelling has eroded and foreclosed the political concept itself entirely.

Heidegger’s thinking of nihilism and his thesis on the collapse of thinking brought him to an apocalyptic embodiment of failure and tragedy, nationalism and nihilism, whereby desolation is contemplated—both its announced meaning and its invitation upon incept to oblivion. His introduction to Hölderlin’s hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,” originally presented as lectures in German in 1934–1935, concerns “the nature of our beginning”:

A beginning [*Beginn*] is something other than commencement [*Anfang*]. A new weather pattern . . . begins with a storm. Its commencement however is the complete change in air conditions that brings it about in advance. A beginning is the onset of something; a commencement is that from which something arises or springs forth. The world war had its commencement centuries ago in the political and spiritual history of the Western world. The world war began with skirmishes at the outposts. The beginning is immediately left behind; it vanishes as an event proceeds. The commencement—the origin—by contrast, first appears and comes to the fore in the course of an event and is fully there only at its end.<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 91.

<sup>83</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,”* trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, [1934] 2014), 3; and as articulated by

Contemplation of the “end” brought Heidegger to think the *telos* as completeness by the limit as *eschaton terminus*, edge. As added emphasis to *causa finales* as therefore a specific modality or “case” in point where the final is edged. Heidegger clarifies in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, originally published in German in 1935, that etymologically thinking of the Latin “*modus*” as “*casus*” derives from the Greek meaning of “*ptosis*” as a specific “case” situation, denoting the verb “*enklisis*” therein as inclination,<sup>84</sup> within the declination-decline, towards a state of a “falling tipping [point] . . . a dropping off from an upright, straight stance [of which] a stance erected [is] understood [by the] Greek[s] [as the meaning of] Being [itself].”<sup>85</sup> This “stand”—as a “constant in itself”—“runs up against the necessity of its limit, *peras*.”<sup>86</sup> This is further clarified by Heidegger:

[T]hus, a basic characteristic of a Being is its *telos*, which [means] end. Here “end” does not have any negative sense, as if “end” meant that something can go no further, that it breaks down and gives out. Instead, “end” means completion in the sense of coming to fulfillment <*Vollendung*>. Limit and end are that whereby beings first begin to be [in] the highest term that Aristotle used for Being: *entelecheia*, something’s holding- (or maintaining) -itself-in-its-completion- (or limit) what was done with the term “*entelechy*” by later philosophers (see, for example, Leibniz), not to mention to biology, demonstrates the full extent of the decline from what is

---

Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger’s Poetic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 8.

<sup>84</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 64.

<sup>85</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 65.

<sup>86</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 65.

Greek. Whatever places itself into and thereby enacts its limit, and thus stands, has shape, *morphe*. The essence of shape, as understood by the Greeks, comes from the emergent placing-itself-forth-into-the-limit.<sup>87</sup>

This means thinking the limit-edge-slope as an “event” of thinking in the immediate.<sup>88</sup> In *The Event*, originally published in German (1941–1942), Heidegger adds clarification to the practical thinking of the Greek meaning of the “limit and limitless” as *το Περας* “*to peras*,” *το Ἀπειρων* “*to a-perion*.” “The limit” announces a “closure as restriction,” Heidegger writes. He further describes it as “fulfilled exerting force”; “one which simultaneously merely let the restricted thing be seen and also delimit against other ones, and conceals it in its belongingness to them.”<sup>89</sup> Thus, it brings with it the meaning of “the limitless” as “that which dis-confines, holds off boundaries and restriction because itself is unaware of these as what pure emergence itself is . . . presence and absence.”<sup>90</sup> Thus, utilizing hermeneutic-phenomenology, Martin Heidegger proves logically-thoughtfully that the earliest words and meanings ever recorded/spoken by ancient Greek philosophy and inaugurated as philosophy, spoken by Anaximander, hold/sustain and challenge thought to its utmost extreme to this very day, present day included, and hold sway upon the very meaning of thinking and thought: *το Περας*/ *to peras*–*το Ἀπειρων*/*to a-perion*.

---

<sup>87</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 65.

<sup>88</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Event*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

<sup>89</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 29.

<sup>90</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 29.

Whereby the emergence as *φύσις phusis* is but an echo or resonance of the meaning of its revealing and cemented by the collapse of *ἀλήθεια, alethea* is comported to a narrow categorical definition of truth, as a narrowed compartment within the history of thought, “out of the global mountain range”—“crossing out” × the meaning of “beyng,” under the erasure of the standardization of the categorical as a planetary.<sup>91</sup> As Heidegger explains, the task of thinking lies in understanding the distortion as the echo, the meaning of metaphysics as complete end,<sup>92</sup> thereby meeting the most unknown, as the task of thinking the inceptual and its sway. Whereby any thought through the distortion, as a deconstruction, articulates the echo distortion by thinking the maneuvering of its sway of which thinking understands that “the resonating must encompass the entire fissure and most of all must be articulated as a counterplay to interplay [*Spiel-Raum*]”<sup>93</sup> within thought itself. This articulates for Heidegger, the deepest ground of Being as beyng, as the “resonating of the essential occurrence of beyng in the abandonment by Being [as] basically an essential decay [*Ver-wesung*] of beyng. Its essence is distorted and only in that way does it bring itself to its truth, namely as the correctness of representation *noein* [thinking] – *dia-noein* [thinking through] – *Idea* [form, *Gestalt*].”<sup>94</sup> Thinking the distortion and the originary springing forth, invites a rethinking of the unknown and the chaotic.

In his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger notes: “knowing means imposing regulating forms on chaos . . . chaos has its own significance originating from the basic

---

<sup>91</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 40.

<sup>92</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 40–41.

<sup>93</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 85.

<sup>94</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 91.

position of Nietzsche's thinking. The Greek word '*Khaos*' *χάος* originally means 'the gaping,' it points in the direction of the measureless, supportless, and groundless yawning open."<sup>95</sup> In the realm of modernity, chaos means "self-destruction, in which law and anarchy are first formed and dissolve . . . the illusion of the tangled and confused, as encountered by individual living beings. These living beings are, when thought in a Leibnizian way 'living mirrors,' metaphysical points."<sup>96</sup> These self-reflective, shallow-bounced connectors, according to Heidegger, think beings on their surface level and are bound by the tasks of knowledge. Whereas, for Heidegger, "knowing is not like a bridge that somehow subsequently connects two existent banks of streams but is itself a stream that in its flow first creates the banks and turns them toward each other in a more original way than a bridge ever could."<sup>97</sup>

Here, one encounters the situation in thinking within modernity and the history of philosophical tradition itself, of which thinking the *eschaton* becomes a teleological starting point that invites a rupture of a given frame, however innately already circumscribed within in its spatiotemporal playing field of action, and any thoughtful definition thereof, nevertheless exists *in-potentia* for clarification and realization by the meaning of the tragic. Heidegger aims to prove that metaphysics, as a trajectory of thought, has completed itself within the body of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's work—with its

---

<sup>95</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 3, trans. David Farrell Krell, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), 76.

<sup>96</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 3, 82.

<sup>97</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 3, 83.

unresolved limitations—and has totally collapsed, with Nietzsche exemplifying these limitations and the end of the German Idealist tradition.

The following sections in the dissertation will review Hegel's work exploring directed casual linear completion as the teleological conceptual apprehension of the historical. This is brought by Hegel's work on the meaning of the absolute as a full circle, the realization of fulfilment, the course of subjectivity, projected to the work of state institutions and logic as meaning, as well as the impact of the tragic upon thinking and culture as an existence. The section will provide a series of direct quotes demonstrating Hegel's premises and methodology.

In *Reason and World: Between Tradition and Another Beginning*, German Heidegger scholar Werner Marx observes the following:

German idealism stood at the end of a historical development of thought which began with Greek philosophy. Hegel's total conception is guided by the basic concepts of Aristotle, and especially by the concept of *telos*, which derives from Aristotle's theory of substance; moreover, Hegel was especially influenced by the special meanings which this concept obtained through its translation as *causa finalis*. The end, in the sense of the "attained goal" and the "fulfilled purpose," determines from its position at the end – working backwards in time – the beginning and all the developmental stages of a process leading to this end. This purpose allows the form, which was already present at the beginning and in all the stages, and was presupposed

as the real possibility, to appear as cause. . . . In this manner the end, as the highest moment, draws the beginning and all the stages of the development, as lesser moments, up to itself.<sup>98</sup>

For Aristotle, the teleological association of human beings finds its full potentiality, growth and meaning in the city-state, the πόλις [*polis*]: as the *zoon logon politikon*/ζώον λόγον πολιτικόν, commonly translated by metaphysical doctrine as the apex formed, directed development, ‘*telos*,’ and context of the human as the “political rational animal” brought within and throughout the framework of the constitution of the political of the ‘*polis*,’ deriving its grounds and augmenting by enabling the human essence, as *zoon logon echon*/ζώον λόγον έχον, the grounding definition of the human being as ‘the rational animal’ [*l’animal rationale*].<sup>99</sup> By drawing on Aristotle’s teleological insights into the very process and its substantiality, Hegel concretizes a dynamic of forces wherein the stages of development indicated therein, and the potentialities thereof, are brought forward in relation to the process as ground-breaking as the represented representation [*Vorstellung*]. Hegel’s philosophical thinking emphasizes those moments at which differing elements interact and manifest as a stand towards the organic whole as a form [*Gestalt*].

In *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, originally published in German in 1820, Hegel observes the dynamic motionality or motility [*Bewegtheit*], that actuates within its potentiality the ability to reflect philosophically upon rationality and freedom as manifested

---

<sup>98</sup> Werner Marx, *Reason and World: Between Tradition and Another Beginning* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 8.

<sup>99</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T.A. Sinclair (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 1, 2, 59.

by the structure of the state.<sup>100</sup> For Hegel, the ability to comprehend the individual as a constitutive conceptuality embedded within historical processes articulates the notion of the subject's relatability. Accordingly, it also attests to the subject's fulfillment through different institutions that point to its reflective subjectivity. Emphasizing the overarching potentiality in the teleological-rational consummation of subjectivity, in his Preface to *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel states: "What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational."<sup>101</sup> For Hegel, the understanding of philosophy as a contemplative discipline lies in reason's potentiality, via the thoughtful articulation of the recognition of different elements that constitute representation [*Vorstellung*]; that essences thought as a dynamic motionality, motility [*Bewegtheit*]; and as a differing element towards a form [*Gestalt*] that is thought through the elements of its dynamic content. Hegel further explains:

this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy grants to those who have received the inner call to comprehend, to preserve their subjective freedom not in a particular and contingent situation, but in what has Being in and for itself. This is also what constitutes the more concrete sense of what was described above in more abstract terms as the unity of form and content. For form in its most concrete significance is reason as conceptual cognition, and content is reason as the substantial

---

<sup>100</sup> David Rose, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right: A Reader's Guide* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007), 9.

<sup>101</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood; trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20.

essence of both ethical and natural actuality; the conscious identity of the two is the philosophical Idea.<sup>102</sup>

As Hegel emphasizes, philosophical insight actualizes when its meaning is brought to the fore through the work of the concept as a representational constitution of rationality as logic. As the meaning of the state and its culture as a complete form realization of point-end, *telos*, completion, fulfilled as well as the unfulfilled by the meaning of the tragic facing oblivion and doom. Hegel writes in *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*:

how the world ought to be: philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to perform this function. As the thought of the world, it appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its completed state. This lesson of the concept is necessarily also apparent from history, namely that it is only when actuality has reached maturity that the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world, which it has grasped in its substance, in the shape of intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old and it cannot be rejuvenated but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva begins its flight only at the onset of dusk.<sup>103</sup>

As American philosopher Allen W. Wood, the book's editor, explains thoughtfully: "the owl is the sacred bird of Minerva (Greek: Athena), goddess of wisdom. The apparent

---

<sup>102</sup> Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 22.

<sup>103</sup> Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 23.

meaning of this famous saying is that culture's philosophical understanding reaches its peak only when the culture enters its decline."<sup>104</sup> In essence, philosophical reflection begins only when knowledge has attained its full growth in understanding itself and has essentially reached its limit as absolute. Consequently, philosophy becomes a thoughtful discipline that reflects on its own content and meaning as "circularity."<sup>105</sup> The appreciation of the tragic as reflection comes at point-zero when a circle is brought to its full encirclement. This invites, according to Hegel, a thinking of the "organic unity" as the meaning of the Platonic *Idea*, a developmental, building [*Bildung*] towards a completion accord wherein elements, in a polemic confrontation, contradict each other, clash with one another and complement each other towards a dialectical relation that grounds as an organic representational rational whole of life as "the bud disappears when the blossom breaks through," going towards as a dynamic "motility [*Bewegung*]" a motility [*Bewegtheit*], as differing shapes to its completed form, "representational *Vorstellung*" a complete *Gestalt*<sup>106</sup> of the actual building the conceptual as it is brought forward.

The representation of the object in thought entails the work of "consciousness" [*Bewusstsein*] as the apprehended; "awareness of being" as interrelatedness between subject and object. Hegel writes:

---

<sup>104</sup> Allen Wood (ed.) in Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 392. Also see Gary K Browning, *Hegel and the History of Political Philosophy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

<sup>105</sup> Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 26.

<sup>106</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J.B. Baillie (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), 68.

When I think of an object [*Gegenstand*], I make it into a thought and deprive it of its sensuous quality; I make it into something which is essentially and immediately mine. For it is only when I think that I am with myself [*bei mir*], and it is only by comprehending that I can penetrate an object; it then no longer stands opposed to me, and I have deprived it of that quality of its own which it had for itself in opposition to me. . . . Every representation [*Vorstellung*] is a generalization, and this is inherent in thought. To generalize something means to think it. ‘I’ is thought and likewise the universal . . . ‘I’ is totally empty, it is merely a point – simple, yet active in this simplicity. The colourful canvas of the world is before me; I stand opposed to it and in this [theoretical] attitude I overcome [*Aufhebe*] its opposition and make its content my own. ‘I’ is at home in the world when it knows it, and even more so when it has comprehended it.<sup>107</sup>

Hegel brings forward the work of the subject as “differentiated determination”<sup>108</sup> and the work of subjectivity (and the definition of the human and society thereof) resting on the realization of consciousness manifested in the understanding of history and temporality, and the human as *zoon-logon-echon*, ζῶον λόγον ἔχον, animal rational, *l’animal rationale*. As Hegel sees it, this is understood by the dialectical overcoming, reconciliation or “sublation [*Aufgehoben*].”<sup>109</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup> Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 35–36.

<sup>108</sup> Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 39.

<sup>109</sup> Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 39.

As Hegel explains:

Every self-consciousness knows itself as universal, as the possibility of abstracting from everything determinate, and as particular . . . content, and end. . . . [T]he particular as its opposite, thought its reflection into itself, has been reconciled [*Ausgeglichen*] with the universal. This unity is individuality, but not in its immediacy as a single unit – as in our common idea [*Vorstellung*] of individuality – but rather in accordance with the concept of individuality . . . in other words, this individuality is in fact none other than the concept itself. . . . [I]t is the third moment, the true and speculative . . . which the understanding refuses to enter into, because the concept is precisely what the understanding always describes as incomprehensible. The task of proving and explaining in more detail this innermost insight of speculation – that is, infinity, as self-referring negativity, this ultimate source of all activity, life, and consciousness – belongs to *logic* as purely speculative philosophy.<sup>110</sup>

Hegel's work of logic as propositional, linear, categorical gives the subject its kinetic shapes and forms and is understood as a developmental process visible through history and time. In explicating Hegel's dialectical operation and the meaning of sublation [*Aufgehoben*], Heidegger writes the following:

---

<sup>110</sup> Hegel, *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 41–42.

This “sublation’ is threefold: The shapes of consciousness that have been traversed not only are each taken up in the sense of a *tollere* [to pick up from the ground], they are at the same time preserved [*Aufgehoben*] in the sense of *conservare* [to preserve]. This preservation is a transmission in which consciousness gives itself over to those of its shapes that it has traversed, namely picking them up and by preserving them in the essential succession of their appearance, whereby it “sublates” them in a double sense. Consciousness, presenting itself, thus realizes its appearance in a history, a history that serves the formation of its essence, namely in such a manner that in this formation consciousness knows itself in the completeness of its appearance.<sup>111</sup>

Observing the operative elements of shapes and forms that are apprehended by consciousness [*Bewusstsein*], Heidegger explicates the essentiality of the working of dialectic as a mode of reasoning and thinking: “the mere taking up and ascertaining of the object-of-consciousness as thesis; the taking back of that which is thus posited for consciousness as an object-of-consciousness into self-consciousness as antithesis; and the taking together of the two into the higher unity as synthesis.”<sup>112</sup> These elements comprise Hegel’s methodology of reasoning. They entail conceptuality itself and its singularity as an idea of and for thought, whereby individual subjectivity is reflected and manifested as

---

<sup>111</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Hegel*, trans. Joseph Arel and Niels Feuerhahn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 67.

<sup>112</sup> Heidegger, *Hegel*, 69.

the representation within state institutions. These are comprehended as *reason* and *reasoning-in-itself*, thus bringing forth the possibility for ethical life.

With Heidegger's understanding of the historical as reflection as thinking, thought is understood as the "essential succession of appearance," by the Hegelian dialectical dynamic "motionality [*Bewegung*]," motility [*Bewegtheit*] of shapes towards a form-formation representation '*Vorstellung*,' towards the form of the '*Gestalt*' as the conceptual rational. This grounds the concept as a complete set, denoting within the indicative of the logical deductive-empirical categorical, understood as an ascending linearity that becomes one that announces itself as thinking by logic counting itself as the reflective 'historical.' This analysis articulates Heidegger's critique of metaphysical linearity as a complete logical-formed meaning-apprehension.

## CHAPTER 2

### Heidegger on Inceptual Ancient Greek Thinking:

#### The Resonance and En-folding

What brings forward an established “in-tense,” however complimentary and thoughtful to a ‘relation,’ its becoming ‘accorded’ and ‘sustained’ and how? What of the meaning of apartness and difference of these elements? How is this flux to be understood within the domain of metaphysics; are these subject to both sustainment and review, by the meaning of the conceptual emerging as the anchored within the ground as such? This “anchored understanding of the ground as such” articulates a teleological announcement that:  $I=I/A=A$  as a given conceptual incept or premise of which any realization and development of dynamics is possible at all. This anchors metaphysical thinking, grounds the meaning of the subjective as an intermediary, holds and sustains this upon its ability to reflect, the subject [topic in question] to object [of thought], bringing the reflective proposition of “*Die Sache sein selbst*” to hand in questions of “consciousness” [*Bewusstsein*] awareness of being at all.

Throughout the history of metaphysics are reverberations through a particular prism, scope, and gaze. According to Heidegger’s analysis, this is what grounds and enables the establishment of a particular understanding of the question of Being itself and any orientation thereof, by the pivotal question of the “that-ness” and “what-ness” of the “is” of the subject as “*ti estin*,” of “it” as “it” at all. This elusive question of Being, as

brought by metaphysical thinking therein-and-of, is only visible and contemplable if one assumes its grounds as premises and practice, as a formed [*Gestalt*] that is constructed upon logical representation [*Vorstellung*], where the “I”—subjective interrogative and reflective—brings about the task of individuality, as representing self and world in a deductive-causal logical conception, as the grounding of “concept” as a way that enables human society as *ethos* to exist at all.<sup>1</sup> Heidegger, while thinking these questions, seeks a way that does not second an already formed dialectical formation of representational categorical thinking of shapes and forms as *Gestalt*, *Vorstellung*, of which, Heidegger claims, that as for the question of being and beings in the world, the dialectical is too linear and confined to provide a layered dynamic answer to.

These questions of harmony, sameness, and apartness of elements in thinking that are clashed against each other towards an accord are brought forward by Heidegger, by turning to the inceptual as founding questions. Hegel regarded Heraclitus as not only a founding thinker, but one who thought the dialectical most concretely and who inspired him the most. As Hegel emphasizes in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 1*, published posthumously in 1840: “there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my logic.”<sup>2</sup> With this, Heidegger seeks to bring a completely new interpretation

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus. The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine of the Logos*, trans. Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

<sup>2</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 1*, trans. E.S. Haldane (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 279.

of Heraclitus. This is brought forward in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* of 1935 with a rendition of Heraclitus' Fragment #53, known as the “Πόλεμος (*polemos*) fragment”:

the *polemos* named here is a strife that holds sway before everything divine and human, not war in the human sense. As Heraclitus thinks it, struggle first and foremost allows what essentially unfolds to step apart from each other in opposition, first allow position and status and rank to establish themselves in coming to presence. In such stepping apart, clefts, intervals, distances and joints open themselves. In confrontation [*Die Auseinandersetzung*] world comes to be [conformation does not divide unity, much less destroy it. It builds unity; it is the gathering (*logos*). *Polemos and logos are the same*].”<sup>3</sup>

Heidegger regards his dialogue with the history of metaphysics and thinking as a thoughtful confrontation [*Die Aus-einander-setzung*] an over-above-under-and against-towards which-of the given and complete presence and essence, as which for Heidegger articulates a deconstruction towards the unthought as struggle.<sup>4</sup>

His seminar of 1943–1944, *Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic* (2018), considers the fragments of Heraclitus and their ground-breaking impact on the history of thinking. The fragments in question are meant to announce a reflective whole,

---

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 67–68.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 159–161.

by which the meaning of the fragments—as a challenging incomplete-apartness<sup>5</sup>—are thereby rethought by Heidegger, as complementing each other in the *broken corpus* of Heraclitus himself, by the task of thinking *φύσις-phusis* as hermeneutics.

In his discussion of fragment #51 *παλίντροπος Ἀρμονία*, “*paliántropos harmonia*” “cosmic harmonia is thought to be the tension of the bow and the lyre,”<sup>6</sup> Heidegger seeks to clarify the meaning of the Harmonia as the “jointure [*fug*].” This for Heidegger articulates the subsequent inadequacy of logic to think through this meaning as the task of the dialectic. Heraclitus’ fragment #123, of “*φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ*” “*phusis kryptistahi phili*” “nature loves to hide”—later to be adopted by scholastic thinking as “God works in mysterious ways”<sup>7</sup>—is understood by Heidegger as the inadequacy of the logic as the dialectical; its tendency to bring forward the enormity of the meaning of being and to narrowly quantify it. As Heidegger explains:

The dismissal of the competency of ‘logic’ has the following purpose: to make clear the actions of placing, placing-forth, and displacing, taken on their own . . . can neither ground, establish, nor even constitute or ‘replace’ the domain within which ‘Being’ itself becomes clear. It is one thing to carry out thinking interpreted in terms of ‘logic’ (in the sense of the placing of presentation of things) . . . and another thing entirely to set forth blindly this ‘logical’ thinking as the guideline along which the question of the Being

---

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 16.

<sup>6</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 115–120.

<sup>7</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 118–119.

of beings is placed and considered decided. The appeal to a ranking of priority between the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ is, in a manifold sense, ‘logically’ correct: however, it does not guarantee the relation to Being itself, because it (and the mere pointing out of the formal representational placements) not only presupposes the relation of Being to us, but also at the same time obscures and disguises it . . . we force *φύσις* [*phusis*] and *κρύπτεσθαι* [*kroptistahi*] into what is for them a thoroughly foreign relation when we interpret the jointure, in and as which both are in essence united, as the chain of logical connection between the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative.’<sup>8</sup>

Heidegger seeks to bring about a rethinking of the “guiding keywords” that structure the foundation out of which the core definitions of metaphysics are grounded upon, structured, and guided as a *corpus*, discipline, and history. Thus enabling any whatsoever ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ outcome as logically to be understood as grounding, or a structural dynamic apprehension thereof. With this, Heidegger seeks to re-interpret and rethink the meaning of *φύσις* “*phusis*” from “nature” to “a rising emergence” that rethinks the meaning of ‘truth’ understood as *ἀλήθεια* “*Alethea*,” the “not concealed the revealed [*A-Lethe ἀ-λήθεια*]” as “presence.” This “thinking through the alpha-privative, [as] it is shown within [the linguistic and thoughtful apprehension of the key guiding term of] *Alethea* that in emerging the relation to concealing and concealment originally prevails as *Λήθη* [*Lethe*] . . . the enigma is this: that *φύσις phusis*, names a once emerging in distinction to submerging (i.e.,

---

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 118.

*phusis* in its relation to *κρύπτεσθαι kryptistahi*) and also names the united essence of the jointure of *phusis* and *kryptistahi* [. . . as an-unthought] *relata*<sup>9</sup> of connectivity as *φιλεῖ* “*phili*.” This for Heidegger invites a grounding attentiveness [*Stimmung*] to the communicative hitherto un-thought as a relation, a jointure, as the meaning of the phenomenology of the given [*Es gibt*].

Thinking “*phusis* as the rising emergence” visibility of presence of “*pur*” *πυρ*, “enkindled fire,” emphasizing that: “the essence of fire assembles and shows itself in what we call ‘lighting’ . . . enkindling jointure . . . concerns beings as a whole . . . fire as lightning ‘steers,’ surveys and shines over the whole of beings in advance and permeates this whole pre-luminosity . . . in a blink of an eye [*Augenblick*]. The whole joins itself.”<sup>10</sup>

This “conjoinedness” articulates the meaning of a “kindling catching” as “one stroke,” an “incept,” a “one-folding.”<sup>11</sup> This for Heidegger announces the “showing” of phenomena as phenomenology as “conjoined boundaries of its form.”<sup>12</sup> Whereby “fire (*phusis*), perpetually emerging, the expenses ‘*to metron*’ (meter) igniting themselves [announcing and showing themselves], the expanses [*to metron*, meter, measurement] extinguishing themselves.”<sup>13</sup> With this granting-enclosing and for-closing of themselves as a form-announced boundary, the ever-fleeting essence is brought by revelation and the

---

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 119.

<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 122–123.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 123.

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 123.

<sup>13</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 127.

tragic “presence and absence” of which past-present-and future, are announced as being and time/being of time /being in time ‘*ecstasis*.’<sup>14</sup>

With these, Heidegger turns to the meaning of “dimensionality”: “what is ‘measure’? Why is a ruler a *metron*? Because with it, length can be measured. What is measurable by measures and other measurement tools . . . is what is capable of being measured across and measure through—i.e., the di-mention. The fundamental meaning of *metron* . . . is the expense, the open, the sprawling and widening clearing [. . . as] the conjoined expanse of its appearance and its distinctive look [*Ereignis*]”<sup>15</sup> by which one stands within the “emerging-projecting into the clearing as the ekstasis *eksitent*,”<sup>16</sup> of which any orientation is sought and by which any understanding of measure and justice [*dike*] as judgment is thought through.

Heidegger rethinks the meaning of “logic as the doctrine of assertion (concept, judgment, inference). *Logos*. *Ratio* reason.”<sup>17</sup> This challenges the “depth allotted to thinking,” whereby Heidegger explains that:

*Logos* is understood in Roman and medieval terms as *enuntiatio*, assertion; at the same time it is understood as *proposito*, a placing before, a statement, i.e., *recta determination iustorum*, the correct determination of what is right, *iudicium*, judgment: *logos* is assertion judgment. The elements of a

---

<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 126–129.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 128. Also see “to *metron*” in Richard Capobianco’s *Heidegger’s Being: The Shimmering Unfolding* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022), 17–19.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 130.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 168.

judgment are concepts. Judgments themselves are related to one another in the form of inferences ('deductions'). Logic, as the doctrine of the assertion—that is, of judgement—is at the same time the doctrine of the concept and the inference.<sup>18</sup>

According to this rubric the human becomes “*homo est animal rationale*,” the *animal-rational* as a re-vamped understanding of ζῷον λόγον ἔχον (*zoon logon echon*) of which its “anthropology” is announced, grounded, pronounced.<sup>19</sup> This universalizes humans as ranked-ordered categoricals, narrowly and interpreting grossly the “animal” and the “ratio” thereof. This collapsion, and its inability to think, is articulated by Nietzsche by the task of the “will to power” of the “over-man,” in the “eternal return of the same,” by the meaning of “nihilism” as the collapsion of thought in the modern age.<sup>20</sup>

The rethinking initiated by Heidegger invites and reinterprets the grounds of this ranked-order rubric by an attentiveness to the meaning of *logos* (λόγος) as Heidegger charts “three paths as access” to and through it: 1) *logos* (λόγος) as Ἐν-Πάντα the one, “*hen panta*” of all “*enai*” [Being] of which Being enfolds itself in its relation to the whole jointure; 2) through the “original meaning of λέγειν *legin*. The harvest [. . . as] harvesting finds its end only in that very act of picking up that preserves what has been taken and brought in.”<sup>21</sup> The “third path access as the *logos* of the *psyche* concerning *homo-legin*,” concerning “the essence of *logos* for the human. The human is the harvesting as that which is harvested life

---

<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 168.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 169.

<sup>20</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 169–170.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 199–203.

as *phusis* [and the] *psyche* as the breath of life [by the] deep meaning of drawing in and drawing out as the meaning of ζῶον λόγον ἔχον as ‘the living-Being anchored by language.’”<sup>22</sup> Heraclitus emphasizes that *logos* is a *chorizon/chora* Χώρα region, Heidegger interprets the meaning of fragment #118, denoting that according to conventional metaphysical interpretation the *logos* is “cut-off” from everything, totally independent from all, thus refining towards its objectivity as independent. However, this in fact achieves the “cut-off” as a category unreflecting its essence of that which is gathered as a sheltering in the gathering of the *logos*, as the “cut-off” itself, as separation-separating-region *chorizion (chora)*.<sup>23</sup>

According to the Heidegger’s interpretation: “the nouns *chora*, *choros* trace back to *chao* [from which chaos is derived] yawning, gaping, opening up, self-opening.”<sup>24</sup> *Chora* as the “region” [*Gegen*], *topos τόπος* that “comes forth, is present and persists.”<sup>25</sup> This “away from one another and necessarily a relation” brings “*chorizion* as a rethinking the Greek meaning of *diarexis* and *sunthesis* as *synthesis*.”<sup>26</sup> This thus rethinks *ethos ἦθος*, not as ethics “moral disposition” but rather as a “sojourn” “in the sense of dwelling amidst beings.”<sup>27</sup> This ‘sojourn’ is the ‘steering’ ‘*kubernan*’ ‘captain at sea’ in the midst of difference. Heidegger notes that “in distinction to human sojourn the divine has a *genoma* [fundamental mood, disposition, constitution determination vision].”<sup>28</sup> As Heidegger

---

<sup>22</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 212–214.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 250.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 250.

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 250.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 251.

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 262.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 263.

explains: “to be sure, the human relates to beings and espies them in the light of Being. However, this light of lightening is not something the human accomplishes alone rather he only stands within this light. The preparing of what can be seen [. . . as] this vision steers all things [. . . as Being] yet each in its own way appear conjoined with all others and everything appears in joint [*harmonia*] with everything else.”<sup>29</sup> These comprise the “*hen to sophon*,” “the one knowledge consisting of *epistathai*, standing before . . . not only in the later sense of *episteme and techne* [. . . rather] to stand before means: to reside before and in the presence of the originary gathering.”<sup>30</sup> The bringing-forth as a placing-forth articulates the meaning of *techne* and *poesis* for the ancient Greeks. As the articulation of *phusis*, as a knowing-relation, to *legin* denotes the meaning of *praxis*, in which *legin* corresponds to *theorin* as “pure looking and considering.”<sup>31</sup>

*Poesis* articulates the highest form of thinking: *phusis* as art-*techne*. This articulates an attentiveness to the human as a *homo-legin*, as a “breath” of *psyche*, as a standing *poesis*. This attentive reflection is called “philosophy” as “reflective jointure.”<sup>32</sup> It is with this that Heidegger reinterprets philosophy as we know it to be, to becoming a completely new unthought: “The thinker [brings] something once unsaid and never fully sayable into the word,”<sup>33</sup> in the event of appropriation [*Ereignis*].<sup>34</sup> This brings the thinker residing in obscurity (as did Heraclitus, known as the “obscure one”) into the in-between-nearness,

---

<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 263.

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 264.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 275.

<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 277–278.

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 281.

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 281.

embodying difference, as the uncanny, the “presencing of the extraordinary in the ordinary,”<sup>35</sup> a thinking-poetizing.<sup>36</sup>

Standing in the meaning of difference [as a *Stand*], and that which remains to be differentiated, the thinker-poetizes the event of appropriation as an apprehension in-sight, out of the given, out of the now, towards the givenness as the folding. It is a ‘one stroke’ that un-folds dimensionality and motion, stands on the edge-slope, witnessing the *eschaton* as an un-folding *kiros*—a moment of conflagration. As Heidegger thinks through in “The Anaximander Fragment”: “justice [*dike*] and the recompose of its measure is brought through the passage of time [*chronos*] as an *arche*.”<sup>37</sup> With this standing “recompense of its measure,” the dispensation and meaning of justice unfolds through the edge-*eschata*:

The antiquity pervading the Anaximander fragment belongs to the dawn of early in the land of evening [*Abendland*]. But if that which is early outdistanced everything late; if the very earliest far surpassed the very latest? What once occurred in the dawn of destiny would then come, as what once occurred, at the last (*eschaton*), that is, at the departure of the long-hidden destiny of Being. The Being of beings is gathered (*legesthai*, *logos*) in the ultimacy of its destiny. The essence of Being hitherto disappears, its truth still veiled. The history of Being is gathered in this departure. The gathering in this departure, as the gathering (*logos*) at the outermost point

---

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 9.

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*, 286.

<sup>37</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 13.

(*eschaton*) of its essence hitherto, is the eschatology of Being. As something fateful, Being itself is inherently eschatological . . . we do not understand the term ‘eschatology’ as the name of a theological or philosophical discipline. We think the eschatology of Being in a way corresponding to the way the phenomenology of spirit is to be thought, i.e., from within the history of Being. The phenomenology of spirit itself constitutes a phase in the eschatology of Being, when Being gathers itself in the ultimacy of its essence, hitherto determined through metaphysics, as the absolute subjectivity [*Subjektivität*] of the unconditioned will to will. If we think within the eschatology of Being, then we must some-day anticipate the former dawn in the dawn to come; today we must ponder this former dawn through what is immanent.<sup>38</sup>

Contemplating the West as the land of the evening [*Abendland*] attends to the sways of the revealing-concealing motionalty of being through time as history, that en-steers the meaning of *Aletheia*, misinterpreted by beings as truth in the narrow categorical sense by its ever-present absence. With this misinterpretation, “Being sets beings adrift in errancy,”<sup>39</sup> as Heidegger explains: “beings come to pass in that errancy by which they circumvent Being and establish the realm of error . . . error is the space in which history unfolds [. . . this concern with] man’s inability to see himself corresponds to the self-concealing of the lighting of Being [. . . ]; as it reveals itself in beings Being withdraws.

---

<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 18.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 26. Also see Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1981), 191–193.

Being holds to its truth and keeps it to itself . . . we may call this luminous keeping to itself in the truth of its essence the epoch of Being.”<sup>40</sup> This articulates the meaning of the “*epoche*” (a holding ground), the “epochal” essentiality out of which destining (*eschaton*) unfolds as “world history.”<sup>41</sup>

Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology unfolds the Aristotelian premise of humanity and the human as the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον (*zoon logon echon*), commonly translated as the “animal-rational” to a rendition of “living Being anchored by language,” thus proclaiming the human to be, as such, and the meaning of its “measure.” Justice denotes for Heidegger “the experience of beings in their Being which here comes to language is neither pessimistic nor nihilistic; nor it is optimistic. It is tragic.”<sup>42</sup> This allocation as a dispensation, and allocation of “measure” as an “allotted,” “fatedness potentiality” [*Geschick*], as the “destined,” which holds the human as an anchor, is historic. This is how Heidegger thinks through the meaning of “*Moirai*” of Parmenides (1952). *Μοῖρα* [*Moirai*] is understood as “sending” to the pen-ultimate; as totality. He explains that: “*Moirai* is the destining of Being . . . *Moirai* has dispensed the destiny of Being . . . into a duality [of thinking and being as the same, as a way and a measure] and thus has bound it to totality, and immobility from which and in which the presencing of what is present comes to pass.”<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 26.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 7.

<sup>42</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 44.

<sup>43</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 97.

The understanding of this presencing as a bounded duality as “self-same, *kathe to auto*,” thinks through the “*estin*” of being, as “*ti estin*,” of the thatness and whatness of the “is” of being; as a subject; as a “*noein*” [“thought”]. This is the “gathering perception of the presencing of what is present,” whereby “truth” is understood “as a disclosure of the duality.”<sup>44</sup> From the didactic poem of Parmenides, Heidegger unpacks the known statement: that reality is only comprehensible and truth is only discernible “as long as thinking and being are understood as the same” [*to gar auto noein estin te kai einai*], understood within the course of philosophy as a template for a “*eidios-idea*” “form” of “*enai*” of being a “*visio*,” “disclosure” that grounds reason and the way reason is understood as “truth,” a self-same certainty anchoring subject-object relation of consciousness to thought [*noein*];<sup>45</sup> Heidegger explains that the meaning of “self-same” [I=I/A=A] remains an unthought anchorage, a dynamic incomplete fragment, a portion of ‘*Moirai*’ to be thought.

The deconstruction initiated by Heidegger thinks through the embeddedness of metaphysical doctrine and comportment of definitions, unrevealing the Cartesian meaning of “*cogito-ergo-sum*” [“I-think-therefore-I-am”] as categorical. Heidegger denotes that which thinks the “I” as the “is” of being; in fact, rethinks being by challenging this assumption, the very grounds of the categorical, conjecture as difference and repetition as postulation and thought to an unthought relation.<sup>46</sup> As Heidegger explains in *Modern*

---

<sup>44</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 97.

<sup>45</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 97.

<sup>46</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 52.

*Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics* of 1962: “when we say ‘cogito-sum’ we express what lies in the *subjectum* (*ego*). If the assertion is to be an assertion, it must always posit what lies in the *subjectum*. What is posited and spoken in the predicate may not and cannot speak against the subject . . . in the proposition as proposition, and accordingly in the highest principle as I-principle of avoidance of contradiction (briefly: the principle of contradiction).”<sup>47</sup>

The rethinking of “self-same” as grounding invites un-thought dynamics to the uncanniest of all—presencing the present as the most foreign and most extreme of all meanings of an in-tensed harmony and apartness of difference of which thought does not do justice to. The contemplation of, for Heidegger, is the task of “thinking poetizing.” “Becoming at home in the unhomelike,”<sup>48</sup> for Heidegger, means “enduring the difference” whereby  $I \neq I$ ,  $A \neq A$  to embody the “dwelling in foreignness” as phenomenology “towards another beginning of thinking.”<sup>49</sup>

In *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* (1936–38), Heidegger writes:

The inter-play [*Spiel-Raum*] commences with the first beginning playing over to the other beginning, in order to bring the latter into play such that out of this mutual inter-play [*Spiel-Raum*], the preparation for the leap develops. The leap into being. The leap into the abyss of the fissure and so

---

<sup>47</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), 305.

<sup>48</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Event*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 286.

<sup>49</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 286.

for the first time attains the necessity of the grounding *Da-sein*, which is assigned to *beyng*.”<sup>50</sup>

This dynamic unfolds, according to Heidegger, the “disposition of thinking in the other beginning” as an “oscillation” within “shock,” “restraint,” and “diffidence.” Whereas “shock and restraint” are “presentiment,” “shock in contrast to the basic disposition in the first beginning which is wonder,” towards “restraint “the pre-disposition of readiness of the refusal of the gift [*es Gibt*, givenness] in restraint there reigns . . . a turn. . . . Restraint is the centre for shock and diffidence [. . . determining] the style of inceptual thinking in the other beginning.” Leading to “diffidence” as the “necessity of reservedness . . . drawing near and remaining near to what is most remote as such (the last god) . . . (the disposition guiding the leap).”<sup>51</sup>

Whereby the *Da* [there-giveness hyphenated], leads [towards-an oscillated-rotation-of and as] *Sein* [Being], as *Da-sein*, *Dasein*. The hyphenation reveals itself as the “leap itself” as the “*Fug, Anklang*,” jointure, as the “stillness” invoked by the “passing-by of the last god,”<sup>52</sup> as the realization of thought and history as a collapsion in the most extreme, that brings the realization that the first beginning of thinking as metaphysics has exhausted itself and is complete. It finds its realization in proscribed nihilism, as violence of the categorical. This is ensued by representational thinking that cannot answer anymore,

---

<sup>50</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012); Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poetic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 22, 38–40.

<sup>51</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 15.

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 16.

and self-critique, and cannot answer the otherwise, regarding these as an existential threat to its meaning as thought and doctrine. With the realization that the first beginning is initially anchored by wonder of the world.

The other beginning to thinking and being must embody “foreboding” as the extreme foreignness, utmost fear and anxiety as an omen of evil, as a mark of an immense failure and tragedy to think and be,<sup>53</sup> as “such dark clouds forebode a storm.”<sup>54</sup> The other beginning thinks the catastrophe of the fissures of the first, as an *Unter-gang*— the ruins and desolation, a down-going-slope-fallenness as a “*fulcrum* of turning.”<sup>55</sup> The “turn” for Heidegger reflects the meaning of the “people,” with the question “who are we?”; with Heidegger opening up the question of the human being and the German nation as a *Volk*.<sup>56</sup> Stating that “philosophy as a mediation on the self can be carried out only as ineptual thinking of the other beginning, this meditation on the self has put all ‘subjectivism’ behind itself even the most dangerously lies concealed in the cult of personality [as with] the genius [for whom the thinking of personality] the body is placed first . . . in biological liberalism [as] Platonism . . . with it the question of who are we?] is in in fact more dangerous here than any other opposition encountered on the same level of certainty about the human being.”<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 14–18.

<sup>54</sup> See <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forebode>.

<sup>55</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 25.

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 39–40.

<sup>57</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 43–44.

Heidegger then takes a stance against the modern world and the final form of Marxism as Bolshevism, the meaning of technology, the masses, as well as the traditions of Judaism and Christianity. Heidegger states the following: “in so far, however, as the supremacy of reason, qua equalization of everyone, is merely a consequence of Christianity, which is itself basically of Jewish origin [Nietzsche’s idea of the slave revolt in morals] Bolshevism is in fact Jewish but Christianity is also basically Bolshevistic!”<sup>58</sup> Heidegger’s stance against modernity which he condemns as nihilistic is rooted in his “metaphysical anti-Semitism,”<sup>59</sup> tainting his philosophy with racism and National Socialism. Heidegger further articulates this as the meaning of “transition [*Über-gang*]” to a “down-going [*Unter-gang*].”<sup>60</sup>

In his reflection on the “*Unter-gang*,” Heidegger envisions the *ruins* and desolation as a downwards-going-slope to the catastrophe and the apocalypse of modernity and the ‘West,’ thinking as a “resonance” through being as nihilism. Heidegger notes: “the abandonment by being, made closer to us through a meditation on the darkening of the world and the destruction of the earth in the name of speed, calculation, and claim of the massive . . . the simultaneous ‘reign’ of both the powerlessness of mere attitude and the brutality of institutions.”<sup>61</sup> With this downwards-going-slope into the resonance withstanding the nihilistic distortions, Heidegger thinks through the calculative,

---

<sup>58</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 44.

<sup>59</sup> Peter Trawny, *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger’s Anarchy*, trans. Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015).

<sup>60</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 53.

<sup>61</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 94.

representational delivery and presentation as the work of technicity, technology, and machination.<sup>62</sup>

This is understood as a systematic and apparatus brought by the meaning of “total mobilization.”<sup>63</sup> As an “organic worldview imposed upon nature and life as the consummation of the mechanical.”<sup>64</sup> With imposing, as a position of positionality, of which the emerging of super-imposition of technology as a privileged mode of thinking, being, doing and production, Heidegger asks: “what is technology supposed to be? . . . Is technology the historical path . . . to the reversion of the last human being to the technicized animal, the one that thereby loses even the original animality of the inserted animal?”<sup>65</sup> This question surfaces with heightened clarity as a clarification on the meaning of positionality as an order [*Ordnung*] of life-time-space.

As Heidegger notes: “since every living thing is organismic, i.e., bodily, it is possible to take this bodily thing as a body-object and then consider it mechanistically . . . directed toward effort [motuality, change] and toward its overcoming . . . within machination!”<sup>66</sup> This is understood by Heidegger as nature, Being, beingness brought through the ordered meaning of “*metabole*” as motion related to being as “*ousia*,” as “*dunamis*,” “*energeia*.” This is brought forward as the rubric of Aristotle’s “ontology,” and the first philosophy articulating “the meaning of essence as *koinon* [universals] as truth.”<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 100.

<sup>63</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 112.

<sup>64</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 121.

<sup>65</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 216.

<sup>66</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 217.

<sup>67</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 226.

With the following trajectory as guideline: “1) *ousia as idea*; 2) *ousia* as discussed by Aristotle; 3) the *essentia* of middle ages; 4) the Leibnizian concept of *possibilitas*; 5) the condition of possibility, in Kant, the transcendental concept of essence; 6) Hegel’s dialectical-absolute idealistic concept of essence.”<sup>68</sup> As a full circle, this trajectory of thought walls being upon itself enclosing it by the meaning of its assumed empirical correctness, as *adaequatio* as a mathematical assumed truth, in the narrow sense. This ever narrowing enacts the question of the “walling” itself, to rethink essence as an assumed guide to the question of being by being adequate to the task of its meaning.

The echoing-into-and-through-the-enclosures that are foreclosing being and thinking, instill an opening that brings about the question through the near-proximate to the innermost—“the emptiest of the empty” as a “inner recess [*Hohle mitte*].”<sup>69</sup> Heidegger explains:

[this inner recess . . .] e.g., that of a jug, yet it must be recognized that the inner recess is not just a haphazard emptiness which arises purely on account of the surrounding walls and which happens not to be full of things. It is just the opposite: the inner recess itself is what determines, shapes, and bears the walling action of the walls and of their surfaces. The walls and surfaces are merely what is radiated out by the original open realm which allows its openness to come to play by summoning up, round about itself and toward itself, such-and-such walls [the particular form of the vassal].

---

<sup>68</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 227.

<sup>69</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 268.

This is how the essential occurrence of the open realm radiates back from  
and in the embracing walls . . . pertains to being itself and its trembling of  
the event in the intimation of self-concealing.<sup>70</sup>

This intimation of the relational jointures manifests resonance, upon which a step-inward is taken to investigate its make-up, template, action as essence, structure, as a principality, as sovereignty, paradigm, system. This is thought by Heidegger as hermeneutic-phenomenology questioning methods, as *methodos*, μέθοδος μέθα-οδος ‘on’ and ‘through’ [*meta*] as ‘way-path’ [*odos*] within and therein.

This layered attentiveness to the cyclicity enacts a *re-capitulation*, as a *re-collection* by *re-interpretation*. Heidegger’s determining ‘key guiding words,’ with their frequency of use and gravitas of meaning as premises that anchor significance. Interpreting methods, conditions of possibility as grounds, are brought as the task of hermeneutic phenomenology, while thinking through structural linguistics, with the meaning of the “pre-fix” as a “gathering”/parsing/ denoting [of] a rethinking through structural linguistics.<sup>71</sup> This thus rethinks the structure of a sentence: subject, verb, and noun (as declension/variations)-to-the-object, within sentence structure, as a ‘*Satz*,’ a statement of the given-there-is.

---

<sup>70</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 268.

<sup>71</sup> Jena Elsen, “On Difference within the Same: A Reading of Martin Heidegger’s ‘Was Heisst Denken?’,” PhD diss., 2017, University of Sussex, 144, [https://sussex.figshare.com/articles/thesis/On\\_difference\\_within\\_the\\_same\\_a\\_reading\\_of\\_Martin\\_Heidegger\\_s\\_Was\\_Heisst\\_Denken\\_/23447399](https://sussex.figshare.com/articles/thesis/On_difference_within_the_same_a_reading_of_Martin_Heidegger_s_Was_Heisst_Denken_/23447399).

Etymology (word origination) and philology (structural development, appropriation, and history) are utilized for a *re-collection* of sentence structure as *re-interpretation*, towards a *re-capitulation* that articulates the task of hermeneutic-meaning within, thus thinking-through essence and presence as the ‘grammatical-essentiality-of meaning’ by re-orienting the text *corpus*. This is done by outlining “key guiding words/terms.” Just as Artemis/Hermes is understood as the goddess of the hunt,<sup>72</sup> the task of hermeneutic phenomenology is tracking by tracing the maneuverability of meaning. This is achieved by reading the text carefully, physically, and numerically counting words that become ‘key’ within the text-work: the ‘key blocks’ of “blocks quarried from the bedrock”<sup>73</sup> that build and structure, and are invested<sup>73</sup> in the making of premise and meaning, understood as “key guiding terms.” These are understood as an abode-locale of the text, whereby the topology-mapping of the text is articulated. (The flat page becomes a living breathing landscape of dimensionality and life.)

The trace within the text is done by underlying the meaning and importance of the ‘guiding key terms’ to the work as base-ground premises. These ‘guiding’ terms are understood as a gliding, sliding, then swaying, upon which a question enters or is brought forward. Heidegger explains *guiding questions* as “the question of beings verses the *basic question*: the question of being as the question of the truth of being.”<sup>74</sup> While thinking towards the *basic question*, Heidegger brings an intermediary “*transitional question*: why there are beings at all and not rather nothing . . . asks about beings and at first is to be

---

<sup>72</sup> Heidegger, *Heraclitus*.

<sup>73</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 344.

<sup>74</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 8 and 61.

developed exclusively before an essential step: the *hovering* of being.”<sup>75</sup> This is entered to the text, utilizing a prefix (-), mid-stream, that ‘parses’ the statement and its coursing. The articulation of the meaningful-premise is sought by a position perspective, as a re-flection (mirror-reflection), one that rethinks the meaning of juxtaposition as positioned directionality, by flipping the statement and separating it in half. As with taking a “measuring rod”<sup>76</sup> to a water stream then applying it to the water, and by placing it in the water flow creating a small eddy and testing the coursing speed, motionality, depth, and agility of the stream itself—is the power of the statement to un-fold [un-pack] the argument’s meaningful-premise. This then parses the water for “a while.”

The maneuver tests the articulation of the premise by the statement as an inward perspective within the text itself. This is done by posing the question of the ‘whatness’ that makes up the ‘is’ of the statement as premise possible at all [*ti estin enai*]? For example, the statement “this is a person”; the question as testing maneuverability, by which the unfolding of the premise is sought, flips the statement to ask the question: what [is that by which] makes [the *is* of a] person [this or that, *as that which* and *for-the-sake-of which*, possible at all]? With the playful placing of a prefix (-) to noun titles, the sentence is re-thought, as the German language is known in its history as a language that compacts two elements together into one time differential, thus re-orienting temporality and tempo of the statement-given there-is.

---

<sup>75</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 400.

<sup>76</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 52.

For example, the word ‘*Talgrund*’ is translated as ‘valley,’ a complete supposed and imposed. This rethinking aims to articulate, the parsing-tonality as ‘*Tal-grund*,’ a linguistic emphasis on tonality-tempo designed to separate *Unter-scheidung* (as separating or dissociating), and speak the opposite *Wider-spruch* (opposite in nature, direction in meaning) to rethink meaning as coursing as a flow: ‘Tal’ [hyphen (-) pause – parse-to] ‘*Grund*.’ This thus articulates the ‘valley’ *towards* a ‘valley ground-floor’: done tonally to flip as to flush out the meaning and premise, and its assumed directionality, by posing (as re-positioning) the following question: “what as that by which, grounds the valley *as* a floor, and *by which makes it possible, for-the-sake-of-which*, and any what so ever?” Thus in a situatedness “that does not allow any foothold”<sup>77</sup> to think through, enact a maneuverability, that is separating and by tonally thinking *towards* another tempo, the appropriation of meaning, as an altogether un-thought, as a *Grund-mittle-punkt* [ground negotiated, as a medium, middle-range-as-point foothold].

This, Heidegger understands as “the leap into the ‘between’ [that] must be carried out instantly—in pursuit of the question of the truth of being. The ‘between’ of Da-sein overcomes *chorismos* [separation] not by slinging a bridge between beyng [beingness] and beings as if they were two objectively present riverbanks but by transforming together, into their simultaneity, both beyng and beings. The leap into the ‘between’ is what first reaches and opens Da-sein and does not occupy a ready-made standpoint.”<sup>78</sup> This enacts a ‘sending’ into the ‘open’—‘presence’ of ‘that which is,’ understood as ‘*Mit-sein*,’ being and being-

---

<sup>77</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 6.

<sup>78</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 13–14.

with. The proprium as its own most is an appropriation of that which resides therein: as a ‘valley’ [and its ways] as a ‘ground’ [and its meaning], a ‘*Tal-grund*’ givenness (phenomenology). This maneuver helps [as a field path in the woods, *Feldweg*] by articulating the ‘is’ (verb) with noun (variations), thus placing in question the subject-relating-to-object—as a matter, substance and materiality, as a given anchor—by testing the articulation of its ground-premise, course and way, i.e., its *method*.

The next step is then to trace these premises in their meaning as they are launched and ‘sent-to-limit’ totality [*Geschick*] by which they define and reflect as an edge spectrum within to other works of the author, as other situated writings and works and their meaning to the author: her/his philosophy. The following step is to take these tracings as ground key terms and words and to track their course appropriation, usage, and development therein and through their apprehension by observing any variations or comportment within the corpus of philosophy at large. Finally, placing these all in *question*: the premises of the ‘grounding’ of ‘key words/terms’ as to open them up, utilizing etymology (word origination), philology (structural development, appropriation and history) *towards* hermeneutics by the underlined, unthought, temporal-layered question of phenomenology of presencing, essencing, and situatedness understood by Heidegger as the “resonance”/ “echo” and as a challenge within the *corpus* of philosophy and the task of thinking at large. This is understood as ‘*Abbau*’—*deconstruction*: working through logical systems, to a hermeneutic-phenomenological unthought.

The articulation of these are brought by Heidegger in his working through the history of philosophy and key well-known philosophers. Heidegger seeks to deconstruct

and parse their thinking by applying hermeneutic phenomenology as a question. In his 1955–1956 seminar *Der Satz vom Grund* [*The Principle of Reason*], Heidegger investigates Leibniz’s statement that “*nihil est sine ratione*” [“nothing is without a reason”].<sup>79</sup> Heidegger inquires into the meaning of ground as “*Satz*,” that which enacts a stand towards the object. *Gegen-stand* is a “*principium reddendae rationis*” of which “*reddere*” as a “rendering back” [*Zu-stellen*] or “self-referring” is the “hold-ground”; the “epoch-making and naming [of] the hold.”<sup>80</sup> This “hold” thinks through essence as “*Geschick*”—as “sending” to and through.

As Heidegger notes, “sending,” understood as “*Geschick*,” points to a limit of which its start-up is brought to the fold as enfolding of the thereof; as condensation. Therein, Heidegger articulates Leibniz’s historical relationship with Kant, and how Leibniz inspired Kant’s understanding of “the critique of reason” and the “architectonic, a priori.”<sup>81</sup> This is apprehended by Heidegger—the meaning of ‘relief’ as ‘dimensionality’ and ‘contras’—as a folding-enfolding temporal as history, that is reflected by the completeness initiated by reflection as “rendering back” and as a “re-collective.” There is an opening in thought towards possibilities as grounds and assumed premises, what-so-ever and as a statement, ‘*Satz*,’ of the given.

This attentiveness invites an exploration of the fundamentals of “grounds,” as a phenomenological reflection of that which articulates ground as surroundings and as such

---

<sup>79</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 9.

<sup>80</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, 23.

<sup>81</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, 72–73.

is understood poetically and thoughtfully: as modality of topology of locality as the “bottom of the sea” [*Meeres-grund*], “a valley floor” [*Tal-grund*], “a meadowland [*Wiesen-grund*],”<sup>82</sup> also as “to go to ruins” [*Zum grunde gehen*],<sup>83</sup> thinking through the accounting of presencing of the process of grounds and reason—“how bifurcated, divergence [occurs as] held in the one stem of balanced reason, as the roots of a tree trunk forked”<sup>84</sup>; a *rhizome*. Inviting a closer look upon its “*relata*,” *logos* as such, to be rethought as an unfolding: a reflection as a re-flection within and therein, an echoing as inflections-modulations-variations-a situated stance.

Indicated by a decisive step inward as “a glancing back, as it were to metaphysics,”<sup>85</sup> thinking the *μέτα* [“*meta*”] of *φύσις* “*phusis*” as metaphysics as completeness reflection towards the “*meta*” as “on”—“within and therein of” the meaning of motion itself of *phusis*, as a “turning back inwards,”<sup>86</sup> understood as the “step-back” [*Schritt zurück*].<sup>87</sup> Heidegger thinks through the curvatures of errancy, lostness, as going-down-the slopes and through “the timber-trails,” as the meaning of the “*Holzwege*,”<sup>88</sup> being on the wrong track or in a cul-de-sac.<sup>89</sup> As Heidegger explains with regards to being on a “timber trail”:

---

<sup>82</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, 96.

<sup>83</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, 97.

<sup>84</sup> Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, 104.

<sup>85</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 358.

<sup>86</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 356–358.

<sup>87</sup> Martin Heidegger. *Identity and difference*. translated with an introduction by Joan Stambaugh. Chicago, Ill.; University of Chicago Press. [1957]. 2002. 49-51

<sup>88</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 222–223.

<sup>89</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ix, translator’s preface.

The trails and paths of the enduring [*Der Austrag*] are always timber trails, i.e., ones which lead some distance into the woods, into the forest and suddenly end in the forest gloom. Otherwise no one traverses them and they are properly disparaged. Timber trails are ‘false’ perverted paths, because on them there is no advancement no getting anywhere. These trails are eerie. The enduring is always on a timber trail, and these trails are unknown to each other; they are disjointed but only to the unique one is it determined to clear the timber so as to leave it undamaged in its emergence, and the many are determined to the concealedness that essentially occurs along such trails. Timber trails are then overgrown paths; they are forgotten, and yet on them was borne and transported the felled wood which, although its origin is forgotten and impossible to search out, somewhere allowed a fire to be kindled. The enduring of the difference (i.e., the thinking of the history of being) bears, on the timber trail, the burden of speaking.<sup>90</sup>

This is how Heidegger thinks through the meaning of a paradox (a “*para-doxa*,” beyond /over/above the common “*doxa*” as a way of thinking)<sup>91</sup>; an “*aporia*,” a no-way-out, sending thinking and being into a state of confusion.

---

<sup>90</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 222–223.

<sup>91</sup> See <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paradox>.

As articulated by Jacques Derrida in his book *Aporias* (1993),<sup>92</sup> “*il y va d’un certain pas* [it involves a certain step/not, he goes along at a certain pace) [. . . noting that] *pas* <step, not> involves the line that terminates all determination; the final or definitional line-*peras*, this time rather than *telos* . . . end or limit [denoted from] *perao* (a place or a country).”<sup>93</sup> This rethinks the unfolding of a passage entry [*perao*] on the path of the *aporos* or of the *aporia* as the “impossible passage, prohibited passage,”<sup>94</sup> an abrupt no way out. This articulates a confusion that eliminates any orientation, obstructs the task of contemplative thinking and practice, and any and all seeing-and thinking-through as an ultimate un-thought errancy; as a misstep in calculation, in thinking.

This is brought about whereby thinking (*noein*) as memory-reflective, and its understanding as ground—as self-standing apprehension by consistency, as ‘objectivity’ connoted as the meaning of truth—is thereby challenged. It is challenged by sensory perception, worldview (*aesthesis*) as the aesthetic collapsing the ontic ‘objective’ self-standing space and time into-one-another in such a way that thinking as the nonsensory (*noein*) cannot contemplate sameness and difference and absorption in a relational ontological perspective. It cannot do this in any way, whether it be dynamic or situated. Everything is collapsed into noncontradiction—as a frozen frame in time and in space; a fixed stand-still as an impending collapse. That is in fact an overwhelming total contradiction that ‘interlocks,’ superimposing by overwhelming, locking and securing

---

<sup>92</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Aporias: Dying—Awaiting (one another at) the “limits of truth”* [*mourir – s’attendre aux “limites de la vrit”*], trans. Thomas Dutoi (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

<sup>93</sup> Derrida, *Aporias*, 6–7.

<sup>94</sup> Derrida, *Aporias*, 8.

everything in place with no movability in thought and action. These are brought with an abruptness whereby aporias are announced by their equality of measure, force, and shape; particularly as down-slope abruptness of collapse, an undercurrent of difference, an unthought, reaching an endpoint. This limit shows itself in its fullness, by which it is set loose as an abruptness, chance-accident in the immediate, inducing a total paralysis.

Derrida explicates three types of aporia: 1) A paradoxical (contradictory) division, that is “the haunting of the one in other” as it fluctuates within self-same. 2) Non-passage as “intermediacy,” as no limit, “there is no longer a home and a not-home,” an in-betweenness, as a rupture/gaping/abyss/cleft within and therein. 3) The very meaning of “the impossible” that “does not allow for something that could be called passage, step, walk, gait, displacement, or replacement, a kinesis in general. There is no more path (*odos*, *methodos*, *Weg*, or *Holzweg*),” full stop. It’s an abrupt immediate end whereby a full collapse occurs, brought by its speed and abrupt causality, as inevitable once set in motion as the ultimate stoppage (as in the case of death, or Being towards death [*Sein zum Tod*], as Heidegger explicates in *Being and Time*).<sup>95</sup>

Heidegger seeks a new philosophical method that intuitively thinks limits, motion, and abruptness as a new dynamic attuned to flux; that thinks through the situatedness, whereby an ‘aboutness’ as range-gauging, re-flection within and therein, of an echoing of inflections-modulations-variations, as a situated-mirror-reflected-stance, is needed. The thinker needs to ‘step back’ to gain immediate perspective, for a re-orientation of the

---

<sup>95</sup> Derrida, *Aporias*, 20–21.

spatial-temporal, as rethinking the relational as absorption. This is thought anew by Heidegger, by the emphasis on the step-back [*Schritt zurück*], within, on, and in-real time as a new way yet unthought of intuitive thinking. A new thinking of “*phronesis*,” of the body-corporeal engagement and situatedness, embodying locality in space-time, a dynamic engagement with the unthought.<sup>96</sup> These maneuverings are aimed to prepare the thinker as being along a path, *Unter-weg*, towards the unknown and unbearable by a new way of dynamic thinking that thinks the ‘always-already’ while encountering a constant ‘presence and absence’ as an emphasis of a gaping/cleft/abyss in metaphysical thought of causality. For Heidegger, this is too narrow, late, and undynamic in its thinking of errancy, abruptness, and change.

These added clarifications on the set-limit of the metaphysical, categorical, calculative mind set into thinking and practice aim, for Heidegger, a rethinking of the insight-of-that-which-sets-and secures motionality, as the task of thinking itself. These insights challenge the meaning of thinking and thought, the *prasso* as passage as *praxis*, by rethinking the meaning of *theorin*, theory as vision, a contemplative vision, as the meaning of intuitive in-sight. Whereas for Heidegger these are brought forward and flushed out and re-thought through the step-back [*Schritt zurück*] as a contra-distinction footing thinking difference as *Unter-scheidung* [as separating or dissociating], *Wider-spruch* [opposite in nature, direction in meaning] towards *Grund-mittle-punkt* [ground negotiated,

---

<sup>96</sup> William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 321. See also: Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 111; Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger’s Poetic Writings*, 49–52.

as a medium-middle-range, as a point for a foothold], a mid-lay. The entry into the untrodden path [*terra nova*], begets a recalibration of vision. By the phenomenology of *In-der-Welt-sein* [Being in the world], as a taking in (a breath), rethinking balance as a new breathed *rhythmia*; an attunement to the peripheral as an edge.

This challenging phenomenological exercise is where Heidegger revisits the “excess of vision of the ancient Greeks,”<sup>97</sup> thinking towards a point-incept, as Heidegger notes in *Four Seminars in Le Thor* 1969 (2003): “it is the overabundance, the excess of what presences. Here one should recall the anecdote of Thales: he is that person so struck by the overabundance of the world of stars that he was compelled to direct his gaze towards the heavens alone. In the Greek climate, the human is so overwhelmed by the presencing of what presences, that he is compelled to the question, concerning what presence as what presences. The Greeks name the relation to this thrust of presence *thaumazien* [shock] . . . concerning Thales who is so struck by what he sees that he no longer attends to the common things before his feet and falls into a well.”<sup>98</sup> This overwhelming articulates the phenomenological awareness of surrounding while thinking the meaning of *fug* as a new rhythm, as a rethinking of Aristotle’s ‘medium and mean,’ the *proprium-orthos-logos*, as causal relations by the *event of appropriation*.

---

<sup>97</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Four Seminars: Le Thor 1966, 1968, 1969, Zähringen 1973*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 38. Also see Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 144–148.

<sup>98</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 38.

The challenge is that of an awareness and an unthought therein, whereby episteme is thought anew by a breathed *poesis*. The articulation of “thinking-poetizing” proves to be an immense challenge. It involves rethinking intuition, allowing any and all thrust of understanding as a footed standing therein a systemic of which is an unthought dynamic “playing over” as a “relay course” (hermeneutics)<sup>99</sup> a “counter-play to the inter-play” [*Spiel-Raum*]<sup>100</sup> of space-time brought by hermeneutics and phenomenology towards “another way all together.” As Heidegger states: “the age of systems has passed. The age that would elaborate the essential form of beings from out of the truth of being has not yet come. In the interim, in the transition to the other beginning, philosophy needs to have accomplished something essential: the projection, i.e., the grounding and opening up, of the temporal-spatial playing field of the truth of being.”<sup>101</sup> This run-down-through-and-throughout the untrodden path of which ‘path-marks’ [*Wegmarken*] therein ‘sign-posts,’ we have no tools or ways and means to think adequately.

This, for Heidegger, outlines the challenge of thinking the rift [*Riss*] as a fundamental [*Grundriss*]. The challenge is brought by any comprehension and articulation of the *Grund-riss* of which the meaning of a sketch [*Auf-riss*] towards any outline [*Um-Riss*] is sought as articulation of both “rupture and outline.”<sup>102</sup> At this very juncture of perspective which a field of vision is sought, a pattern emerges however at that very point, mid-lay-to-over-lay the flattening of space and time, occurs favoring the grouped meaning

---

<sup>99</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 329.

<sup>100</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 85.

<sup>101</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 6.

<sup>102</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 38.

of *koinon* (as a “common-community,” a *Mit-sein*) to the universal, or uni-form. This occurs towards a concrete apprehension that seeks the work of *techne* or craft.

This is brought about by thinking about measurement and dimension as a folding of time-space, solely in the realm of the mathematical. This is brought about by the gridding as the education of metaphysical thinking of form-figure [*Gestalt*] denoting a construct [*Das Ge-stell*]<sup>103</sup> a complete set of ordered linearity. Working backwards in *The Origin of the Work of Art* of 1936, while thinking the meaning of experience through art and craft-making, Heidegger brings attention to that which the artwork openly beckons towards. Using the example of a well-known painting by the artist Vincent Van Gogh, *A Pair of Shoes* (1886), Heidegger draws the reader’s attention to a detail often overlooked as a silent indicative within the artwork: “From out of the dark opening of the well-worn insides of the shoes the toil of the worker’s tread stares forth.”<sup>104</sup> Heidegger thinks through that which arises and comes forth, articulating from out of the crevasses and rifts a darkness-in-motion as echo/resonance.

In another example, Heidegger utilizes the example of the building of a Greek temple, explaining that the building craft is brought out of the earth, of which “this resting of the work draws out of the rock the darkness of its unstructured yet unforced support.”<sup>105</sup> From this, it unfolds its purposeful opening-meaning “we will get closer to what *is* if we think everything in reverse—assuming, of course, that we have, in advance, an eye for how

---

<sup>103</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 38.

<sup>104</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 14.

<sup>105</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 21.

differently everything then faces us. A mere reversal, made for its own sake, reveals nothing.”<sup>106</sup> This projected reversal, rethinking the eye and gaze as a stand (as theory and praxis) therein, as a turning attentiveness, is brought forward through the meaning of thinking the limit as “*peras*”—“as a limit-boundary of a fixed position of the outline [*Um-riss*].”<sup>107</sup> It is an edged peripheral vision attuned to the ‘rims’ of the rift [*Grund-riss*], as thinking of the sketch [*Auf-riss*] towards any outline [*Um-riss*].<sup>108</sup> This is brought through the work and the workable material as well as equipment as an in-stalling [*Ein-richten*]. As the erection [*Er-richten*] taken up and through as a setting-froth [*Hergestalt*],<sup>109</sup> that brings forward the concealment therein of which the work gravitates toward, beckons to, as a bringing forth. This is in fact opened up by what is ambiguously absent, concealed in the work itself as a hollow that articulates an absence. It is a resonance therein of the unsaid and unportrayable; the unseen as any essencing of its truth. As Heidegger states:

Earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It turns every merely calculational intrusion into an act of destruction. Though such destruction may be accomplished by the appearance of mastery and progress in the form of the technological-scientific objectification of nature, this mastery remains nonetheless, an impotence of the will. The earth is openly illuminated as itself only where it is apprehended and preserved as the

---

<sup>106</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 21.

<sup>107</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 53.

<sup>108</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

<sup>109</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 23.

essentially undisclosable, as that which withdraws from every disclosure, in other words, keeps itself constantly closed up.<sup>110</sup>

In pursuit of thinking the reverberating rift as peripheral to vision, as that which presences the meaning of *Um-Riss*, Heidegger articulates the meaning of the outline. Through the meaning crafting the art work [*Werk*] and production of planning and sketching [*Auf-riss*] a design—as thought-design—*techne* overtakes the thinking of *poesis* as a building-block to sketch towards points of fixed [*Feststellen*] position, a placing *thesis* denoting the meaning of *Stellen* as ‘stand’<sup>111</sup> within an arising figure as the *gestalt*-formed formation.<sup>112</sup> According to Heidegger, by this process the work comes to presence as a structure, of which *poesis* is but an echo, shadow, and mist; a tragic ruin in the course of thinking. The thinking of the outline, design as a distribution out and through production, denotes for Heidegger the meaning of the acceleration in thinking of the present by a systemic thinking of that which presences; by *techne* as a mode of thought and technology as its emerging ideal.

---

<sup>110</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 25.

<sup>111</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 52–53.

<sup>112</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 38.

## CHAPTER 3

### Question Concerning Technology and the End of Metaphysics

In *The Age of World Picture* (1938),<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger thinks through the meaning of frame as the defining design of the modern age: “the decisive unfolding of the character of modern science as constant activity produces therefore a human being of another stamp. The scholar disappears and is replaced by the researcher engaged by research progress. These and not the cultivation of scholarship, are what places his work at the cutting edge [*Geben seiner Arbeit die scharfe luft*] . . . the researcher presses forward into the sphere occupied by the figure of it in the essential sense, the technologist.”<sup>2</sup> With the meaning of objectification as *prote estin* of the subject emerges the ‘world picture’ as a form of representation. This grasped essence is understood as a technological *paradigma*—as a *prisma* by the snapshot, a closeup of a system at work, under the ‘micro-scope.’<sup>3</sup> This condensing of the meaning of perception encapsulates the calculative “corresponding to the cause of creation (*analogia entis*).”<sup>4</sup> As Heidegger states:

the fundamental event of modernity is the conquest of the world as picture  
. . . the decisive unfolding of modern relationship to beings becomes a

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, “The Age of World Picture,” in *Off the Beaten Track*, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, [1938] 2002), 57–85.

<sup>2</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 64.

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, [1936–38] 2012), 125.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 68.

confrontation of world views . . . humanity set in motion . . . the unlimited process of calculation, planning and breeding. Science as research is the indispensable form taken by this self-establishment in the world . . . with speed unrecognized by those who are involved, modernity races towards the fulfilment of its essence . . . the gigantic presses forward in the form which seems to make it disappear in the destruction of great distances by the airplane, in the representations of foreign and remote worlds in their everydayness produced at will by the flick of a switch.<sup>5</sup>

This pictured world order condensing time-space, which can be compacted at the “flick of a switch,”<sup>6</sup> serves as a tipping point or positional-axial-rotation towards Heidegger’s *Question Concerning Technology*.<sup>7</sup> This is where Heidegger articulates the “planetary” within technology as positionality: as an outline to a positioned stand [*Stelle*], to-point-lift, to jump-start-up, jump-start-lift, to the aerial [*Luft*] as [*Aluft*] within [the acceleration of building momentum as speed for the positioned technological guided leap] as technology [accelerant] assisted by machination [*Machenschaft*]. Heidegger thinks through this apparatus of the engine craft comporting *energeia*, by the hydro-electric power plant on the River Rhine with the dynamo motor. Heidegger emphasizes that technology is a mode of revealing by the *techne* [craft] of its *episteme*. The *techne* thinks *phusis* by a certain kind of *episteme*, overshadowing *poesis* by instrumentalization. It is an instrumentalization of

---

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 71.

<sup>6</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 71.

<sup>7</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, [1954] 1977).

positionality [*Stellen*] that seeks “to order commend (*Be-stellen*)”; “entrap (*Nach-stellen*)”; “to block or disguise (*Ver-stellen*)”; “to produce to set (*Her-stellen*)”; as to “exhibit (*Dar-stellen*).”<sup>8</sup>

The systematic apprehension of the instrumentalization as a mode of thought of the ‘inter-lock’ as an engine-gear that “sets-secures” by manipulation of ordered command enacts the “standing-reserve [*Be-stand*].”<sup>9</sup> As that which “stands-by” at the ready at all time, and in all circumstances, at the disposal of necessity. That which is anchored by the power of penetration and manipulation; the extraction of the world. Whereby the object world [*Gegen-stand*] dissipates all together into the “objectless” quantification of functionality of which it is “channeled” by a mathematical order understood as the “real” the “thing-in-itself.” The order of the “real” is understood and announced as such only if it can be measured, denoting a mathematical super-imposed instrumentalization of functionalism of the spatial-temporal as set or given coordinates.<sup>10</sup> This signifies nature as a quota of energy comported by the accelerated trajectory to-the-power-of-multiplication, the multiplier.<sup>11</sup> This is understood, by Heidegger, as a planetary construct [“*Das Ge-stell*, as enframing”],<sup>12</sup> the super-imposition of positionality. This construction of the planetary mechanic of instrument of ordering obstructs and obscures thinking and Being by the order of the unison, the uni-form. The super-imposed position [*Das Ge-stell*] projected, scaled

---

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 15.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 17.

<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 19.

<sup>11</sup> Richard Rojcewicz. *The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 71–126.

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 19.

up to the order of the planetary as a set standardization of life-time-space amounts to the social engineering of the “one” [*Das man*] as a cohesive form [*Gestalt*] of Being and the objectification of nature and the human.

As Heidegger writes: “so long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it.”<sup>13</sup> Thinking becomes professional in the calculative, accelerated vectoral mode. The question of “Being” is broken up, scattered in pieces, fragmented and unrecognizable to it-self. Heidegger concludes *The Question Concerning Technology* with the announcement that “where the danger is also grows the saving power.”<sup>14</sup> Quoting Hölderlin’s “poetically dwells man upon this Earth,” he adds that “the poetical brings the true into the splendor of what Plato in *Phaedrus* calls *ekphanestaton*.”<sup>15</sup> Heidegger underlines the power of thinking the ripple as an observance of the *eschata* as *topos*—*eschaton*—a point limit-end, remote viewing, unfolded visibility therein, a spectrum perspective.

Thinking the technological planetary as the manifestation of the calculative is for Heidegger the end of metaphysics as a consummation. In *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* (1962), Heidegger emphasizes that philosophy has reached an endpoint. Thinking through the meaning of a “given-type-character to a will to power positing values”<sup>16</sup> the situation of philosophy is as such that “philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all that can become for man the experiential object of his technology,

---

<sup>13</sup> Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 32.

<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 34.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *Question Concerning Technology*, 34.

<sup>16</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), 432.

the technology by which he establishes himself in the world . . . the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be determined and regulated by a new fundamental science that is called cybernetics . . . cybernetics transforms language into exchange of news. The arts become regulated-regulating instruments of information [as a] technological character [as totality], directing ‘appearance’ of the world and the position of man in it.”<sup>17</sup>

As Heidegger explains, the dynamics of the sciences are “completing the stated aim of philosophy, presenting the ontologies of various regions of being (nature, history, law, art) . . . are the supposition of the categories in their cybernetic function, but denied any ontological meaning. The operational and model-based character of representational-calculative thinking becomes dominant.”<sup>18</sup> This brings a renewed appeal for the task of thinking and for ethics. The disjointedness of thinking invites, for Heidegger, a concerted look upon Nietzsche as an “untimely thinker”<sup>19</sup> and as the last metaphysician of the West.<sup>20</sup>

In *Nietzsche’s Word: God is Dead* (1943),<sup>21</sup> Martin Heidegger, discusses the essence of nihilism brought by Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy and thought. This thought posits Nietzsche at a “place” where Western metaphysics has reached its final stage. This understood by the denial of essential possibility of reflection of the other, signified by Nietzsche’s attempt at “Platonic reversal” in thinking resulting in “non-essence.”<sup>22</sup> This is

---

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 435.

<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 435.

<sup>19</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation*, trans. Ullrich Haase and Mark Sinclair (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016).

<sup>20</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1–2, trans. David Farrell Krell, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 8.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 157–200.

<sup>22</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 157.

brought forward, according to Heidegger, as the “supersensory” ideal that is de facto dismissed while favoring the “sensory” in the realm of the categorical, this dismissing achieves a lack of reflection. This lack of correspondence or relation, eliminating altogether the “pure sensory” as a differentiation between the sensory, which it regards as “*aiesteton*” [“perception-worldview”], and the nonsensory, which it regards as “*noeton*” [“thinking-knowing”] “ending in [the] senseless.”<sup>23</sup>

Therein, and with accordance to the history of metaphysics as a systematic developmental discipline, and also the “abrupt [violent] epochs of [categorical] truth [that flatten time-space],” Heidegger regards this as “the advent of nihilism,” as difference unintelligible, the senseless and obtruding.<sup>24</sup> This obstruction within thinking itself brings thinking to a crossroad where it becomes strange to itself. In the vacuum and crange, science and technology become the sole mode of thinking through epistemology, to make sense and account for difference. The task of thinking itself logged therein cannot fathom its meaning and sense properly and becomes unreflective to it, abruptly and suddenly, in the service of technology to test sense and science to make sense. This unreflective is ill-equipped to meet difference, collapsing thought and mind to a one-dimensional method; as a framed form [*Gestalt*] and *praxis*. Nietzsche reflects on this meaning and effect in *The Gay Science* (1882), in the section “The Mad Man” (section 125), with the statement: “God is dead because man has killed him.” As Heidegger explains:

---

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 157.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 158.

[T]he supersensory has no effective power. It does not bestow life. Metaphysics, which for Nietzsche is Western philosophy understood as Platonism is at its end. Nietzsche understood his own philosophy as a countermovement against metaphysics . . . against Platonism . . . remains trapped like everything anti-, in the essence of what it is challenging. Since all it does is turn metaphysics upside-down remain[ing] embroiled in it and has no way out . . . to such a degree that is sealed off from its essence.<sup>25</sup>

As Heidegger emphasizes, where “God” as the “ideal” of everything is the “real” is “dead” then the “world of ideas” is bereft and cut off from “inspiration and correspondence” and any orientation therein and of whereby the nothing as nihilism as the “eerie[est] [uncanniest] of all guests stands at the door.”<sup>26</sup>As a “historical movement” nihilism stands not as pure negative but as the meaning of “the highest values devaluating themselves.”<sup>27</sup> Nietzsche’s remedy to this is announced by the thought of the “will to power” enacting sovereignty as *Herrschaft*, as an “overcoming” by “becoming,” bringing forward, according to Heidegger, a failed subjective psychology as a willed mask replacing theological reflection.

This epidemic is brought by Nietzsche as the will-to-will; the will to master the becoming of its Being. The will to power is understood by the task of the “over-man” breaking free from the “enternal return of the same,” where thought and Being are locked and “stamped” by modernity. This, however, replaces God as Beingness as the highest

---

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 162.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 163.

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 166.

value.<sup>28</sup> In the realm of the tragic, this is understood by Nietzsche's "Zarathustra," teacher of the will to power and how to be. The tragic figuration of which, according to Heidegger, in the realm of the actual locks and interlocks the non-essence in a confusion as a fusion and suffusion by the rubric of becoming, announcing an epochal end that is "unknown and strange to itself."<sup>29</sup>

Nietzsche writes in *European Nihilism* (1885–1888): "what I relate is the history of the next two centuries . . . the advent of nihilism . . . our whole European culture has moving as towards a catastrophe."<sup>30</sup> Nihilism for Nietzsche signifies an unreflective "decadence" for the institution of the categorical ending its grounding as meaningful thought and announced solely by the power of its authority and its institution as force and doctrine. With this stratifying of the meaning of thought, embedding it in the "mediocre," power as force announces itself as "pessimism" and "disintegration" of the thoughtful, the psychological, the social, and the political by the "corruptive."<sup>31</sup> The collapse "with no end," ever-enclosing and fore-closing, collapsing thought upon itself, is understood as "the eternal return of the same."<sup>32</sup>

This, according to Nietzsche, is akin to locking humanity in self-enclosed "hyperbolic naivete."<sup>33</sup> Meeting this, Nietzsche announces his project as "the will to power;

---

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, 194.

<sup>29</sup> Here with bringing the opening statement of Nietzsche in the preface to *Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), 1.

<sup>30</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967), 3.

<sup>31</sup> Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 18–26.

<sup>32</sup> Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 35–36.

<sup>33</sup> Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 14.

an attempt at revaluation of all possible values.”<sup>34</sup> In order to break this ever-cyclical enclosed collusion, Nietzsche tries to get ahead of it by not only presupposing it, but more so to actively embodying it, understood as the will to power by becoming *in-potentia*, as a holding at its center an active will-to-nihilism in thinking as the tragic. Catastrophe as chaos. Nietzsche notes in Section 1067 of *The Will to Power*:

[D]o you know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world; a monster of energy, without beginning, without end: a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expand itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income enclosed by ‘nothingness’ as by a boundary; not something blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be ‘empty’ here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces . . . a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its storms . . . coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory . . . out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord . . . as a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my *Dionysian* world, the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying,

---

<sup>34</sup> Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 3.

this mystery world . . . ‘beyond good and evil’ without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself—do you want a *name* for this world? A *solution* for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? —*this world is the will to power—and nothing besides!*

And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!<sup>35</sup>

Towards this perfect storm, Nietzsche refers to his embodied inspiration announcing the tragic end and the will to meet it by *Zarathustra*, writing a book for “everyone and no one” [*Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen*], with the meaning of “*amor fati*”—the embrace of the fated as the realization and acceptance of the “eternal return of the same”—used to both understand the tragic and also to overcome it.<sup>36</sup> In his treatise, Nietzsche embarks on poetic existentialism to reflect the immediate as tragic. Nietzsche impresses upon the reader: “I teach you the overman. Man is something that shall be overcome . . . the overman shall be the meaning of the Earth!”<sup>37</sup> For Nietzsche, this is a new, as-yet-unexplored power, a new *phusis*, articulating the tragic: “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be lived in man is that he is an overture and going under. I love those who do not know how to live, except by going under for they are those who cross over.”<sup>38</sup> With the

---

<sup>35</sup> Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 550.

<sup>36</sup> Nietzsche, *Will to Power*.

<sup>37</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A book for All and None*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books 1978), 12–13.

<sup>38</sup> Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 15.

emphasis of those who “go-down-under” to the *ruins* and desolation [*Unter-gang*] to the abyss [*Ab-grund*] as to “cross-over” and reach the other-side.<sup>39</sup>

Heidegger’s reading contradicts Nietzsche’s philosophy and reflects the meaning of “overman” as “*Über-mensch*,” with the emphasis on “*Über*” of “*Übermensch*,” not as the over-man to the new unseen, as above of man, but understood by Heidegger, as a treatise ‘on’/‘of’ and within man himself, as underlined in the line “*Über Die Linie*” itself of underwriting nihilism and being. Heidegger regarded Nietzsche’s philosophy as a failed attempt to overcome metaphysics and to be solely understood as an existential treatise at the end of metaphysics that is bounded by the meaning of the tragic. Other readers of Nietzsche saw his doctrine as a call to think the “new man.”<sup>40</sup>

David Farrell Krell discusses in his introduction to Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures—originally delivered 1936–1945, in Nazi Germany, the task of the will to power to empower thinking as becoming, as will to will, as brought forward within and through the political context of Heidegger’s day.<sup>41</sup> Krell notes in particular:

---

<sup>39</sup> See also Gunter Figal, “The Forgetfulness of God,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott, Susan Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 198–212; John Sallis, “Grounders of the Abyss,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott, Susan Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 181–197. For more on “*Unter-gang* and crossing over,” see Mathias Warnes, “Heidegger and the festival of being: from the bridal festival to the round dance,” PhD diss., 2012, University of British Columbia, 273, <https://open.library.ubc.ca/soa/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0073516>.

<sup>40</sup> David Ohana, *Dawn of Political Nihilism: Volume I of the Nihilist Order* (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1–2, xix.

Heidegger's indebtedness to Ernst Jünger's writings *Total Mobilization* (1930), and *The Worker: Domain and Form* [*Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt*] (1932). Jünger's influence on Heidegger's thought concerning planetary technology is profound. Technology constitutes the political dilemma of our time, according to both Jünger and Heidegger, a dilemma that no known political system is capable of discerning, much less solving. Yet Heidegger resists Jünger's 'cultic' and 'numinous' celebration of technology to rethink the human. He resists Jünger's technophilic 'symbols,' spurns his language. Heidegger's opposition to Jünger's notions of the will and power translates eventually into a resistance—quite strong by 1939—to Nietzsche's notion of the will to power. Will to power is will-to-will [as] machination.<sup>42</sup>

The emergence of technological instrumentalization as planetary order as the will to power, signified for Heidegger, the enclosing encirclement of the modern age. An age in which the human and nature are objectified and harnessed to the meaning of production and understood as a quota of energy to be molded, crafted and understood only as a standard form-formation, a *Gestalt*, a template, in the service of the planetary economic order of "total mobilization." This imperative of servicing denotes productive-industrial work [*Arbeit*] and production as the prism for human fulfilment and for Heidegger in-fact forecloses the human and its meaning.

---

<sup>42</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1–2, xix.

Vincent Blok writes in *Ernst Jünger's Philosophy of Technology: Heidegger and Poetics of the Anthropocene*: "According to Heidegger, Jünger is the only real follower of Nietzsche . . . his way of thinking is itself a gestalt of the will to power; in Jünger's language: thinking itself has work-character."<sup>43</sup> As "the totality of the mobilized world," Blok explicates Heidegger's position on Jünger, as a thinker articulating the "consummation of modernity" whereby "the consummation of modern metaphysics as end (limit) consists of it being delimited and this delimiting is the encircling, which shows itself in the circular course of the descriptions of the Worker . . . delimiting reality as work as the object for the worker as thinking subject, which means that the Worker as such is the end (*Ende*) or *Vollendung* of modernity."<sup>44</sup>

The meaning and importance of Jünger's *The Worker*, to Nazi Germany in particular,<sup>45</sup> is reviewed by Bernhard Radloff in *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt* (2007) with the following emphasis: "Jünger's reflections on *Gestalt*, the Worker, and work emerge [as] the order of the 'total mobilization' of the planet which becomes visible with modern technology."<sup>46</sup> Jünger's concept of "total mobilization" catapults and rethinks the order of the planetary using Nietzsche's concept of the will to power. Total mobilization "names the process of the disintegration of entities, their functional redefinition and integration into one all-

---

<sup>43</sup> Vincent Blok, *Ernst Jünger's Philosophy of Technology: Heidegger and Poetics of the Anthropocene* (London: Routledge, 2017), 76.

<sup>44</sup> Blok, *Ernst Jünger's Philosophy of Technology*, 77.

<sup>45</sup> Ohana, *Dawn of Political Nihilism*.

<sup>46</sup> Bernhard Radloff, *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 371.

encompassing system of the production and consumption of energy.”<sup>47</sup> Technology is the operating force that allows these “newly formed relations” and possibilities to exist.

These “forms as *Gestalt*,” as different kinds of “imprinting” and “stamping,” are understood as the “Platonic Ideal” of forms and the “state.”<sup>48</sup> The omnipresence of mobilization, through the “gestalt of the worker,” is according to Jünger “set” to provide a new way of “existence by rank order,” by creating a “commitment to tradition,” a willingness for “risks and sacrifices for the future.” It is the act of conscious choice towards an “aristocratic society.”<sup>49</sup> This society announces itself as a new planetary subordinating “politics to aesthetics” by a “new type,” a “*typus*,” an “archetype” of the “worker” as a “ruling race,” a “new race of [the] work world,” announced by a new way of education, discipline, and a new style of “organic construction”<sup>50</sup> of “man-machine” as “techno-animality.” A new race.<sup>51</sup> This ‘master race’ with its ‘*Arbeit Macht Frei*’<sup>52</sup> is considered to be the blueprint of the National Socialist racist-fascist state, with its adaptation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power of the new man by becoming an aristocratic race type steered by technology. This signified the epidemic of nihilism incarnate and provided

---

<sup>47</sup> Radloff, *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism*, 372.

<sup>48</sup> Radloff, *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism*, 373.

<sup>49</sup> Radloff, *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism*, 374.

<sup>50</sup> Radloff, *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism*, 375–379.

<sup>51</sup> Radloff, *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism*, 380. See also Heidegger’s discussion of “techno-animality” in *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, 216; as well as this dissertation.

<sup>52</sup> Ohana, *Dawn of Political Nihilism*.

the rationale resulting in the horrors of the Holocaust, perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jews and other minorities and the world itself.<sup>53</sup>

Heidegger considered Nietzsche to be the last metaphysician of the West: “in the thought of the will to power, Nietzsche anticipates the metaphysical ground of the consummation of the modern age . . . thinking itself completes itself in advance. Nietzsche . . . is the last metaphysician of the West . . . this final age is the conclusion of Western history or the counterpart to another beginning.”<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> Ohana, *Dawn of Political Nihilism*.

<sup>54</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 3, trans. David Farrell Krell, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 8.

## CHAPTER 4

### The Venture to the Other Beginning:

#### Heidegger's Reading of Friedrich Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister"

The venture to the other beginning as a down-going-under-slope, as catastrophic, nihilistic, tragic realization into thinking and thought, is brought by Heidegger's reading of the poet Friedrich Hölderlin from the German Idealist tradition.<sup>1</sup> Heidegger regards Hölderlin's engaging of an "interpretive attempt to think the inceptuality of the beginning,"<sup>2</sup> remarking that Hölderlin is one "*who poetized the furthest ahead.*"<sup>3</sup> This is outlined in Heidegger's seminar *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister"* (1942). This seminar also lays bare Heidegger's extremist nationalism. Heidegger begins his review of Hölderlin by clarifying that 'hymns' are songs of praise and honor of the heroic by a 'consecration' as a gathering, a 'festival,'<sup>4</sup> a 'commemoration' that 'anchors' a specific 'local' to Being by which the community 'remembers,' re-counts its members as a *saga*, a *logos*, as *mneme* of 'remembrance' as

---

<sup>1</sup> Gunter Figal, "The Forgetfulness of God," in *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott, Susan Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 198–212; John Sallis, "Grounders of the Abyss," in *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott, Susan Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 181–197.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Event*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, [1941–42] 2013), 291.

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, [1936–38] 2012), 160.

<sup>4</sup> Mathias Warnes, "Heidegger and the Festival of Being: From the Bridal Festival to the Round Dance," PhD diss., Interdisciplinary Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2012, <https://open.library.ubc.ca/soa/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0073516>, 226–228; see also 259–270, the 'holy' as a gathering, for Hölderlin and Heidegger, referring to *chaos*.

‘history.’ This reaffirms the gathered as a grouped *homo-legin*, by the homage as a tribute to the fallen, those who ventured to the ruins and abyssal desolation and fissures [*Untergang*] and are no longer with us, though maybe they are alive.

They are an echo therein, as they sacrificed themselves or were sacrificed by the idea of Being and its meaning. This gathering thinks and rethinks through its *logos* as the harvested ‘grouped members’ as a ‘*koinon*,’<sup>5</sup> a collectivity affirming (or thinking through, by questioning) its universals by the singular act of being and acting in its name. This ‘remembrance’ articulates those who are gone, by the saga of which their ‘memory’ is told and articulated. This is brought by the act of ‘glorification’ and acknowledgment of the uniqueness of the fallen by the way in which they fell, as a turning lesson (*padia*) for the collective history, brought through the locality by which this meaning as temporality is inter-twined as a bedrock-articulated being. The ‘ode’ itself contemplated as a unique ‘place’ as a ‘path-way’<sup>6</sup> of the turning lesson. Heidegger places an emphasis on the opening of “The Ister,” written by Hölderlin between 1803–1805:

Now come fire!

Eager are we to see the day and when the trial has passed through the knees  
may someone sense the forest’s cry. We, however sing from the Indus  
arrived from afar and from the Alpheus, long have we sought what is fitting.

Not without pinions may someone grasp at what is nearest

---

<sup>5</sup> Warnes, “Heidegger and the Festival of Being,” 292.

<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 1.

directly

and reach the other side. Here, however we wish to build. . . .”<sup>7</sup>

Heidegger stating that the “now” poetized by Hölderlin indicates an “already occurred” [*Sich ereignet*] appropriative event [*Ereignis*].<sup>8</sup> The naming of the river in the poem and its coursing—the Ister River as “the designation of the upper Donau, *Danubius*, the upper course of the river . . . just as if the lower Donau had returned to the upper and thus turned back to its source.”<sup>9</sup> The river crosspaths of water ‘passages,’ inflows and outflows, articulate for Heidegger the meaning of ‘errancy’ while thinking of the resonances of the river and its coursing. The telling [*Sagen*], saga of the gathering ‘remembrance,’ as a ‘festival,’ as a ‘commemoration’ of which the river is of its terrain beckons an ‘attunement,’ while tracing the river coursing as a realized knowing relation to it.

This for Heidegger articulates the “moment of vision” [*Augenblick*], brought by thinking of the Rhine poetically. For Heidegger this poetic thinking brought by the river and its convoluted coursing and paths articulates the meaning of the ‘sensuous [*Sinnlich*]’ of the ‘spiritual image’ as a poetic-written ‘symbolic image’ [*Sinnbild*] to an ‘allegory’ of the question of being as common open public ‘*agora*’ articulating the “gathering of the people” and its meaning through the locality of the river and its coursing through space-time.<sup>10</sup> These are understood as a ‘sign,’ ‘in-signina,’ a metaphor as a “transference,” in

---

<sup>7</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 4.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 6–9.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 10.

<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 13–16.

motion to the telling of a people and its spiritualism. This ‘non-sensuous’ and ‘suprasensuous’ meeting is “the realm that which lies over and beyond the physical [as] the relation to the physical and ‘suprasensuous’ is the metaphysical.”<sup>11</sup>

With the attention brought by Hölderlin to a coming together of the human, the locality and coursing of the river to the poetic, noting that “here we wish to build,” Heidegger complements by noting that “the river determines the dwelling place of the human beings upon the earth” as a ‘dwelling’ abode, intimated by the locality as an opening. Rethinking temporality anew as an ethos [*die Ortschaft des Ortes*]; as a new appropriation.<sup>12</sup> The meaning of the “symbolic image,” according to Heidegger, rethinks the ground of the meaning of aesthetics and underwrites the Kantian ‘archtectonic’ as a “*Vor-bild*” [for having an image], “primary image” as well as the *paradigma* as a representation of the Platonic ‘*idea*’ by the affectation brought therein as the “after-image” [*Nachbild*], articulation by the work of *meta-phora*—transition/into—and through the *diaphora*—difference, ripple, as an impression, echo, shadow, reflecting the vibration, resonance of the ‘thing in it-self’ as a holding ground, *epoche*, as the work of art, contemplating the real.<sup>13</sup>

As Heidegger notes in his Nietzsche lecture “The Will to Power as Art,”<sup>14</sup>—on art as ‘*mimesis*’ and truth as ‘*idea*’ as contemplated in Plato’s *Republic*—with ‘*mimesis*,’ art

---

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 16.

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 17–21.

<sup>13</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 24.

<sup>14</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1–2, trans. David Farrell Krell, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991a), 171–187.

is thought in the realm of production as a particular semblance, mirroring and thinking-embedded distortion. This is clarified by Plato by the need to adhere to the meaning of a balanced exactness, avoiding any distortion, reflecting the work of *alethea* appropriating the ideal as a form of metaphysics. This is achieved by Plato, who acknowledges the higher appreciation of *poiein* and of *phusis* but as secondary to *techne* by the meaning of *tropos*, production by uni-form making, as proportion. Thinking the aesthetic as an ideal of the real, of the 'orthos logos' of its measure of distance-proportion while visioning the aesthetic as holding ground, signifying the balanced meaning of both the sublime and grotesque articulating the ambivalence as truth.

According to Heidegger, the challenge is that *poesis* has not been allowed to be thought properly throughout the course and coursing of the history of thinking as philosophy by metaphysics; a history spanning over 2,500 years. This challenge and its meaning cannot be overcome overnight and will only be brought to the fore after a long mediation into the meaning of thinking itself and its history. Using Book 10 of Plato's *The Republic*, its concepts of 'graphike' and 'mimeke' [*techne*], to reflect on the meaning of art as the untamed removed from truth, Heidegger states the following: "thinking philosophy stands higher than art, Nietzsche then says the reverse: Art is worth more than truth (*The Will to Power*, No. 853) . . . and as a consequence, Nietzsche designates his own philosophy as inverted Platonism; because Platonism is metaphysics so too is Nietzsche's philosophy metaphysics."<sup>15</sup> Heidegger emphasizes that by the attempt of the poetic to an aesthetic, the

---

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 25.

‘after-image’ affectation rethinks ‘schematization’ articulating a gap in motionality as repetition and difference; as the ellipsis and chaos. As Heidegger states, art as another way of thinking has a discrete presentation of it by way of the workable material of its occupation [*techne*], as a resonance of the “trace,” thinking *poesis*—a form of *phusis*—as a new way and a neglected way of articulating its way and truth.<sup>16</sup>

The unthought *poesis* thrusts towards an opening as a grounding attunement, challenges the meaning of metaphysical representational thinking of linearity by the excess intimation of vision-in-sight [*Ein-blick*] therein and of [*Augen/Ereignis*]. This for Heidegger upon reading Hölderlin opens a rethinking to the meaning of the ‘*Mnemosyne*’ the ‘muses’ as an inspiration but also the dreaded meaning of ‘*Mnemosyne*.’<sup>17</sup> The ‘*Mnemosyne*’<sup>18</sup> of which is grounded in the tragic-catastrophic madness. As Heidegger states in “The Anaximander Fragment”:

[T]he seer stands in sight of what is present, in its unconcealment, which has at the same time cast light on the concealment of what is absent as being absent. The seer sees inasmuch as he has seen everything as present. . . . The seer . . . is the ‘*maninomenos*,’ the madman. . . . The seer is outside himself in the solitary region of the presencing of everything that in some way becomes present.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 24–25.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 26–27.

<sup>18</sup> Warnes, “Heidegger and the Festival of Being,” 139–140.

<sup>19</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 35.

The seer, who appears as a ‘manic,’<sup>20</sup> ‘de-ranged,’<sup>21</sup> is one who is swayed into the ripples-resonance as a sharp anamorphic pain of difference and sameness, as the tragic by the meaning of a *mneme*—the ‘memory’/‘remembrance’—of the muses, a ‘commemoration’ that is a traumatic imprint into thinking and being as a mark of the poetic, the song of sirens, *Circe*.<sup>22</sup> It is the poetic challenge to think the unthought [*Die Gedenke die An-denkende*].<sup>23</sup> The articulation of the phenomenology of nature, world *phusis* and the place of the human therein is brought to the fore by the poetic thinking of locality to temporality; by the gliding of the ‘as’ in temporality itself. Bringing forward the human as mortal is a “vanishing yet full of intimation” that dwells upon the earth as a new *ethos*,<sup>24</sup> with the meaning of a journey [*Wanderung*] as discovery [*Wonderschaft*] by the local [*Ortschaft*] as the own-most appropriation of human essence by thinking in Hölderlin’s hymn. The coursing and course of the river appears as a new care-ethics for self, world, and community in an environmentally attuned manner.<sup>25</sup>

In Hölderlin’s hymn “The Ister,” the river coursing from its source “proceeds from the Indus, thus from the East via Greece . . . towards the upper Danube towards the West,”<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 323–325.

<sup>21</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “Remembrance,”* trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 40–41. As Heidegger writes: “Hölderlin’s de-rangement as entering the range of a different essential locale,” preceded by a biographical lecture commentary on the poet Hölderlin as a depiction by Herbert von Hellingrath from 1915 on “Hölderlin’s madness” (38–40).

<sup>22</sup> Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, ed. Edmund Jephcott, trans. Gunzelin Schmid Noeri (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2002), 35–62.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 26.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 27.

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 34.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 36.

the river flows backwards from the land of the morning [*Morgenland*] to the land of the evening [*Abendland*], East to West. This for Hölderlin and Heidegger brings about a rethinking of the flow of time.<sup>27</sup> According to Heidegger, this rethinking prepares a leap towards another beginning as a counterplay to an interplay of time-space of which there is a gradual playing over to another jointure [*fug*] yet unthought. This according to Heidegger articulates yet again the challenge of thinking through and out of as thinking throughout the course and path [*Austrag*] of the spatial-temporal metaphysical set ‘co-ordinates’ of Being and time as linearity. This is where Heidegger outlines the meaning of actuality as the dynamic metaphysical thought of causality as:  $a=f(b)$  as the cause-effect temporal relation of functionalism by a definite rule and aim as end of Being as *causa-finales-telos*.

This orderability coheres to a ‘world order’ that defines thinking as we know it to be. As Heidegger articulates any thinking through this orderability is “enough to destroy any semblance of clarity [of and by it]” by questioning it, however, is blocked by the violence brought about by its sustained doctrine as technicity that ensures its imposing immovability and force while leveling or flattening the unknown in any and all ways for the ‘one’ method and doctrine.<sup>28</sup>

In Hölderlin’s Hymn “*The Ister*,” the river enfolds the meaning of the foreign and the familiar by thinking the homely and the un-home like, challenging the question of being with the meaning of dwelling in the foreign-otherness, the unknown, and so letting

---

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 38.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 42.

otherness be apart and with: at home in the unhomelike [*Unheimlich*].<sup>29</sup> The “singularity” of that which is foreign and those who encounter it and endure the difference is reflected by Hölderlin and Heidegger by relating to the ancient Greeks, specifically the poets Pindar and Sophocles, as contemplating the “tragic” as a realization of the human as a being in the world.<sup>30</sup> Thinking the tragic as the guiding word, Heidegger then turns to the choral ode in Sophocles’ *Antigone*. The emphasis upon the Greek tragedy *Antigone* was utilized by Heidegger in the 1935 *Introduction to Metaphysics* lecture course.

With Hölderlin’s Hymn “*The Ister*,” the emphasis resides in the meaning of dwelling with articulating the manifold as the uncanny. As: “manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing beyond the human being prevails more uncannily.”<sup>31</sup> The emphasis on ‘*to polla*’ as the many or manifold, and ‘*deina*’ as the ‘*deinatoron*’—*δίεινόν* the uncanny [*Unheimlich*]. Heidegger emphasizes that: “places, sequences of events in human history [are understood as] dimensions.”<sup>32</sup> These are thought through Hölderlin’s poetic to the underlying materialistic and spiritual realms of the national as encounters of the human—as a tragic fatalism of Western “ahistoricity” interacting with the foreign. This foreignness rethinks the homely as its challenge.<sup>33</sup> Here also, Heidegger veers and appeals to the nationalism of the German and brings forward his own National-Socialist fascism

---

<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 43.

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 49–50.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 52.

<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 53.

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 53–54.

with attacks against Anglo-Saxon and American traditions, which he denounces with disdain. In 1942, during World War II, Heidegger writes the following:

[W]e know today that the Anglo-Saxon world of Americanism has resolved to annihilate Europe, that is the homeland [*Heimat*] and that means: the commencement of the Western world . . . America's entry into this planetary war is not its entry to history; rather it is already the ultimate American act of American ahistoricity and self-devastation . . . the concealed spirit of the commencement in the West will not even have to look of contempt for this trial of self-devastation without commencement but will await its stellar hour from out of the releasement [*die Gelassenheit*] and tranquillity that belong to the commencement . . . we stand at the beginning of historicity proper, that is of action in the realm of the essential. Only when we are able to wait for what is to be destined for one's own [*die Zu-Schickung des Eigenen*]. . . . Being able to wait is a standing that has already leapt ahead, a standing within what is indestructible, in whose neighborhood desolation belongs like a valley to a mountain. Yet could such a thing happen without . . . pain and sacrifice, the historical humankind of this commencement first becoming ripe for whatever is of the commencement as its own?<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 54–55.

Heidegger's thinking of the uncanny is radicalized and tainted by the emphasis on nihilism and the tragic. It brings forward frightening and violent abruptness as well as thinking the uncanny through the "extraordinary exceeding the historical."<sup>35</sup> These exceedings of the overwhelming as a recess, for Heidegger, is what in fact grounds the human as a *manifoldness*, the en-folded tragic.<sup>36</sup> Thus, Heidegger comments that this unfolding is the 'to polla' as 'pelas' a near-hood of presence, a 'pelagos' the sea, steering itself, abiding its 'surging'<sup>37</sup> cross-currents and cleft. The extreme unhomely and most profound limit embodying an "irruption of autonomous power that ventures forth in all directions . . . becomes acquainted with everything . . . and yet remains without experience [. . . without] attaining insight into its own essence."<sup>38</sup> As Heidegger articulates, within the uncanniest, the human is revealed as a "catastrophe," a "*kata-strophe*," "a reversal that turns away from essence."<sup>39</sup>

This overwhelming catastrophe is where Heidegger thinks the 'polis' Πόλις and its 'political' as a 'pole,' 'polos,' Πόλος, axis a point-foot-hold around of which the swirl [*Wirbel*] in which and around everything turns, as a 'vortex,' 'turbulence,' '*Wirbelstrum*,' '*Wirbelwind*,' also an 'eddy' or 'whirlpool.'<sup>40</sup> This is where Heidegger thinks through and reinterprets the second antistrophe of the choral ode in *Antigone* of Sophocles,<sup>41</sup> that

---

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 63.

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 68.

<sup>37</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 71–72.

<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 75.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 77.

<sup>40</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 81. Also see p. 174, fn 70; as the translators note, the term "*Wirbel*" is used in *Being and Time* to indicate *Dasein's* falling [*Verfallen*] and is translated as "turbulence."

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 59–60.

connotes the concealing site “[as . . .] counterturning abode therein *ὑψιπόλεις* [*uropolis*], towering high above the site: *ἄπολεις* [*apolis*] forfeiting site. The *πόλεις* [*polis*] is here not some indifferent space that in turn admits of the empty possibilities of ‘towering high’ and of downfall; rather, it is the essence of the *πόλεις* [*polis*] to thrust one into excess and to tear one into downfall, and in such a way that the human is destined and fitted into both these counterturning possibilities and thus must be these two possibilities themselves.”<sup>42</sup>

The gathered site locality brings forward the temporal as a ‘tension’ upon which the human is defined as such, as the ‘*zoon logon politikon*’ *ζῶον λόγον πολιτικόν*, ‘*zoon logon echon*’ *ζῶον λόγον ἔχον*, to the depth of ‘risk’ ‘*tolma*’ “in which nonbeings must appear as beings, is the tension of the bow upon which the essence of human beings extends into the counterturning tension of the unhomely,”<sup>43</sup> of which the “political” as a locale, a spatial-temporal landing site of the uncanny, a grounding site, is the meeting place for the in-betweenness of thinking and thought.<sup>44</sup>

Heidegger’s willed *Unter-gang* towards catastrophe invokes the Greek meaning of the ‘hearth,’ the ‘*estia*,’ as a gathered emerging glow, a determinate middle that evolved into the Roman ritual of ‘*vesta*,’ the ‘homestead’ and the ‘state,’ the national and sacrifice. Heidegger’s emphasis of the tragic meaning of the ‘expulsion’ draws upon Sophocles *Antigone*’s choral ode—it attends, homes, beckons, inclines as it declines, as declination, slopes, and turns towards. Heidegger notes that the chorus is composed of the tension

---

<sup>42</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 86.

<sup>43</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 89.

<sup>44</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 89.

between experienced old and the favoring of inexperienced youth, of which the ‘expulsion’ of the experienced and the ‘old’ announces the depth of the tragedy, outlining a ‘delusion’ that all “so readily descends into and becomes set in mere madness.”<sup>45</sup> For Heidegger, the ‘chorus’ in *Antigone*, a site of tension, is the tragedy of the ‘inner-middle-voicing’ of the in-determinate that is the un-thought, yet to be poetized and explained.<sup>46</sup>

This voicing finds Heidegger invoking Friedrich Beisner’s attribution of Hölderlin’s meaning of the poet in the tragic that: “namely at home is spirit not at the commencement, not at the source. The home consumes it. Colony, and bold forgetting spirit loves. Our flowers and the shades of our woods gladden the one who languishes. The besoular would almost be scorched.”<sup>47</sup> Spirit, as the meaning of the poet meets the consummation of that which is home-familiar in the daring forgetfulness of what is near by the physical distant far, of which the unhomey becomes one’s own home brought by Heidegger’s visitation into Hölderlin veering towards the ‘*Isthmus*’ sultry, cold-windy-narrow-steep ‘passage,’ while ‘going back wards’ towards the source of the Ister to the ‘East.’<sup>48</sup> In the land of Asia, the poet poetizing the enigmatic distance from the familiar point-start is already in the ‘midst’ of the nearness as the utmost foreign, the source. This for Heidegger brings forward by the realm of the ‘need and necessity’ the struggle for the articulation as a ‘sign’ denoted by the most uncanny as the ominous<sup>49</sup> of which the poet [and its lesson] is a nation, at a crossroads facing a turning point [as Heidegger writes to

---

<sup>45</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 106.

<sup>46</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 118–119.

<sup>47</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 125–126.

<sup>48</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 141–143.

<sup>49</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 148–149.

the German nation in 1942, during World War II, and addressing its future as] a “we” [plural-singular] that “almost lost our tongue in foreign parts,”<sup>50</sup> by which the *glossa* and the word are of the most catastrophic nihilism engulfed in sadness, shock and trauma in the uttermost-limit, that of which, for the poets “are a sign that is not read.”<sup>51</sup>

The journey to the other beginning at the collapse of metaphysics into the deepest and most remote regions of the uncanny [*Unheimlich*] finds Heidegger at his most radical as a nationalist and National Socialist. This places Heidegger as the most controversial and problematic philosopher of the twentieth century. For Heidegger, this also means a call for “historical decisionism”—for humanity in the course of thinking and being, pressing more to the ‘now’ by the ‘need necessity’ pressed by uncertainty. Heidegger does articulate and stress that such path cannot be charted and undertaken by existing methodologies, ways of thought, and politics, but only prepared gradually [*Unter-weg*] over time by rethinking. Within that—the ever-growing desert of desolation, of nihilism, and the ruins in thinking and acting-being—Heidegger was radicalized to a point where he carelessly and willfully promoted and espoused dangerous social and political ideas and ideologies: anti-Semitism, racism, ultra-nationalism, fascism, and National Socialism.

In his book *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question* (1989), Jacques Derrida states: “I shall speak of ghost [revenant] of flame, and of ashes, and what for Heidegger avoiding means.”<sup>52</sup> Derrida notes that Heidegger’s thinking is part of an onto-theology whose

---

<sup>50</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 152.

<sup>51</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* 152.

<sup>52</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1989), 1.

tradition he himself critiques; he developed an avoidance and is uncritical of his choices of National Socialism, Derrida also denounces Heidegger's silence about the Nazis and the Holocaust and his emphasis on "decisionism" while adhering to the nationalism and fascism of his day. It is an "existential self-affirmation," or "self-affirmation of spirit," of which he himself partook.<sup>53</sup> He elaborates, for one example, how in Heidegger's Rectoral address of 1933, he glorifies the historical task before the German nation, as *Volk*, for the idea of the spiritual National Socialist community:

[T]he spiritual world of a people . . . is the power that most deeply preserves the people's strengths, which is tied to earth and blood and as such it is the power that most deeply moves and most profoundly shakes its being (Dasein). Only a spiritual world gives the people the assurance of greatness. For it necessitates that the constant decision between the will to greatness and a letting things happen that means decline, will be the law presiding over the march that our people has began into its future history.<sup>54</sup>

In their book *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers* (1990), Günther Neske and Emil Kettering address Heidegger's 1966 interview with the journal *Der Spiegel*, where he defends his 1933 Rectoral address, maintaining that it was directed

---

<sup>53</sup> Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, 42; 44–45.

<sup>54</sup> Karsten Harries and Herman Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University, Address, Delivered on the Solemn Assumption of the Rectorate of the University Freiburg 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts" *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 38, no. 3 (March 1985): 474–475.

at the so-called political science of his day,<sup>55</sup> noting that he opposed book burnings of Jewish authors,<sup>56</sup> and that he voluntarily resigned his Rectorship in 1934 and resumed teaching. Further to this, he claims in the interview that his “Nietzsche lectures, Hölderlin lectures, and [lectures] on logic” all were “a confrontation with National Socialism.”<sup>57</sup>

With this critical “avoidance” by Heidegger, it is also important to add that even after the war, he never directly critiqued nor addressed his own anti-Semitism, fascism, and the crimes of the Nazis and the horrors of the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazi German society against the Jews, and other minorities, and the world. With these controversies and issues, some academic researchers have not only denounced Heidegger’s philosophy altogether but have called it dangerous, citing it as an advocacy, a spiritual and concrete introduction, for National Socialism into philosophy,<sup>58</sup> calling for a ban of Heidegger’s philosophy/teachings and any engagement with him whatsoever.

---

<sup>55</sup> Günther Neske and Emil Kettering (eds.), *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, trans. Lisa Harries; French portions trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 45.

<sup>56</sup> Neske and Kettering, *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, 46–47.

<sup>57</sup> Neske and Kettering, *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, 51.

<sup>58</sup> Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). See also: Peter Trawny, *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger’s Anarchy*, trans. Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015); Richard Wolin, *Heidegger in Ruins: Between Philosophy and Ideology* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2022).

## CHAPTER 5

### Heidegger and Ancient East Asian Philosophy

1945 onwards saw Heidegger bringing forward the meaning of ‘*Gelassenheit*’ as releasement with ancient Chinese philosophy—such as in *Country Path Conversations* [*Feldweg*] (1944–1945) where Heidegger is thinking through en-regioning [*Gegen*] by the meaning of nearness,<sup>1</sup> with the ancient Chinese philosophy of Lao Tzu and Chung Tzu of Daoism, in relation to his own thinking. In *On the Way to Language* (1959) Heidegger states:

The word ‘way’ probably is an ancient primary word that speaks to the reflective mind of man. The key word in Laotse’s poetic thinking is Tao, which properly speaking means way, but because we are prone to think of ‘way’ superficially as a stretch connecting two places, our word ‘way’ has all too rashly been considered unfit to name what Tao says. Tao is then translated as reason, mind, *raison*, meaning *logos*.

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, trans. Bret W. Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

Yet Tao could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think what reason, mind, meaning logos properly mean to say—properly by their proper nature.<sup>2</sup>

In the past few decades, there has been a flurry of research activity articulating Heidegger's interaction with East-Asian thinking and thought and the historical interaction Heidegger himself had with his students from Japan and China. In *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event* (2008),<sup>3</sup> Lin Ma discusses Heidegger's dialogue with ancient East-Asian philosophy, outlining the sustained research bringing together Heideggerian theory and Zen Buddhism and Daoism, notably by his students from Japan and China as well as Heidegger's own dialogue with these respected philosophies.<sup>4</sup> Ma argues that with these advancements in research there exists an eclectic confusion that bundles Heidegger's theory, unreflectively and comparatively, with East-Asian philosophies. This concern is articulated by Heidegger himself, and brought forward by Graham Parkes in *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (1987). Heidegger was at the time addressing conference participants at the University of Hawaii in 1969. Heidegger commended the conference organizers on their research and thinking, on their path of relating his theory to East-Asian thought. With that, he also noted that the greatest challenge undertaken with West-to-East dialogue lies in the command of Eastern languages by European and US-based researchers.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 92.

<sup>3</sup> Lin Ma, *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event* (Milton: Routledge, 2008).

<sup>4</sup> Ma, *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue*, 10–15, 15–17.

<sup>5</sup> Graham Parkes (ed.), *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 12.

Comparative work is ongoing, notably by Chang-Chung Yuan, who was one of Heidegger's students from China.<sup>6</sup> This contribution is complemented by the works of Jay Goulding (“‘Visceral Manifestation’: Chinese Philosophy and Western Phenomenology,” 2003<sup>7</sup>; “New Ways Toward Sino-Western Philosophical Dialogues,” 2007<sup>8</sup>; “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” 2022)<sup>9</sup>; Steven Heine (*Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen*, 1985)<sup>10</sup>; Reinhard May (*Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences on his Work*, 1996)<sup>11</sup>; Graham Parkes (1987)<sup>12</sup>; Bret Davis (2007)<sup>13</sup>; David Chai (2022)<sup>14</sup>; Nico Jenkins (2019)<sup>15</sup>; Graham Archie (2000)<sup>16</sup>; and Eric Nelson (2017),<sup>17</sup> among others. This chapter will outline key developments, in particular those noted by Jay Goulding (2003, 2007, 2022).

---

<sup>6</sup> Chang-Chung Yuan, *Tao – A New Way of Thinking a Translation of the Tao Tê Ching with an Introduction and Commentaries* (London and Philadelphia: Singing Dragon, 2014).

<sup>7</sup> Jay Goulding, “‘Visceral Manifestation’: Chinese Philosophy and Western Phenomenology,” in Fang Keli (ed.) *Chinese Philosophy and the Trends of the 21st Century Civilization*, Vol. 4 (Beijing: Commercial Press Inc., 2003), 360–417.

<sup>8</sup> Jay Goulding, “New Ways Toward Sino-Western Philosophical Dialogues,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 34, no. 1 (2007): 99–125.

<sup>9</sup> Jay Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” ed. David Chai, in *Daoist Resonances in Heidegger Exploring a Forgotten Debt* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), 47–102.

<sup>10</sup> Steven Heine, *Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).

<sup>11</sup> Reinhard May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences on his Work*, trans. Graham Parkes (New York: Routledge, 1996).

<sup>12</sup> Parkes, *Heidegger and Asian Thought*.

<sup>13</sup> Bret Davis, *Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007).

<sup>14</sup> David Chai (ed.), *Daoist Resonances in Heidegger Exploring a Forgotten Debt* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022).

<sup>15</sup> Nico Jenkins, *Echoes of No Thing: Thinking between Heidegger and Dōgen* (Brooklyn: Punctum Books, 2019).

<sup>16</sup> Archie S. Graham, “Art, Language, and Truth in Heidegger’s Radical Zen,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 27, no. 4 (2000): 503–543.

<sup>17</sup> Eric Nelson, *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).

Goulding applies a new method of thinking the body-corporeal. Rethinking the meaning of *phronesis* the phenomenological way and guided by ancient East-Asian Daoist appropriation to “visceral manifestations,”<sup>18</sup> he offers a guided vision of Being in the world [*in-der-Welt-Sein*] towards a new praxis. Goulding articulates Heidegger’s meeting with ancient Chinese philosophy, situating Daoism as an inspiration for Heidegger and a guide towards a way:

What Heidegger implicitly learned from Chinese thinkers is the idea of *Yin-Yang* polarity. ‘Being’ does not have to win over ‘being’ or ‘Being’ does not have to conquer ‘time.’ The two parts of pairing can be mutually conditioning or co-constitutive as *Yin-Yang*. This constitutes Dao. China’s long history of the complementary of Daoism and Buddhism helps Heidegger understand this possibility . . . in early Heidegger, this was attainable through rigorous ‘philosophizing’ [and] in later Heidegger, through poetic meditation. In both cases, Chinese philosophy gently situates Heidegger’s vision of East/West dialogue with language and speech, Being/being, nothing/being and Being/time standing as topical polarities. *Lichtung* serves as the between, the void, the opening in which these pairings come to be . . . the idea of *Lichtung* ‘reaches inside’ to be ‘clear and still’ that it reaches ek-statically into the inbetweeners of Heaven and Earth . . . the world becomes a phenomenological body in which we live.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Goulding, “Visceral Manifestation.”

<sup>19</sup> Goulding, “New Ways Toward Sino-Western Philosophical Dialogues,” 109–110.

In further work exploring “Heidegger’s Daoist phenomenology,” such as the chapter in David Chai’s (ed.) *Daoist Resonances in Heidegger: Exploring a Forgotten Debt*,<sup>20</sup> Goulding traces Heidegger’s thinking of resonance, inspired by Schelling’s *Das Syens* and the deepest grounds of being. Goulding intertwines Heidegger’s idea of the ‘fourfold’ [earth-sky-divinities-mortals, as fundamental attunements of care, *Sorge* towards *Da-Sein*] and Daoism, emphasizing the following:

*Erklüftung* (enclave) is replaced by *Leere* (the empty nothingness) from 1943 [onward inspired by] chapter 11 [of Laozi]. This enclave shows itself in the 1950’s interpretation of the valley, the jug, and Van Gogh’s shoes. The temple does not reside within the valley but the openness of the valley arises by means of the temple; the jug is not only a retainer but the clay on its outside ‘shapes the void [*Leere*].’ The openings of the valley, the cup and the shoes connect to Laozi’s chapters 11, 15, and 28. Heidegger observes three of Van Gogh’s paintings by spectating *all sides* of the shoes, the temple, and the cup. I explain: ‘the *dunklen Öffnung*’ (dark opening, cleft, aperture, cave, hollow) . . . the potential of the *schwingt* [hovering, reverberation] as a resonating, oscillating, vibrating void. Heidegger’s Void is not a passive Greek Void of emptiness but more akin to an active Chinese Daoist Void of creation.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” 47–103.

<sup>21</sup> Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” 56.

Following Jay Goulding's profound comparative analysis and theorizing the following addition is offered by this dissertation as an 'over-lay' by the meaning of '*pelagos*' [the sea], referring to Heidegger's invocation in *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister."* The reference to '*pelagos*' as the surging within and in all directions, the wave, crosscurrents, an eddy, by way of '*In-wirbeln,*' '*Wirbelstrum*' whereby the surging, that en-steers that en-joins by its cleft, of which its sliding signification is announced by its parsing of itself. In order to rethink the given and its ways '*pelagos*' by which a stand-that-steers-navigates, is taken towards its arising and sway motionalty by the '*elenchus*' chosen to lead,<sup>22</sup> towards the rising-to-and-through their '*echon,*' laying anchor at sea, holding sway. As brought forward by Plato in the dialogue by Parmenides, "the sea of discourse"<sup>23</sup> outlines an innate confusion. This emphasis directs our attention to the locality of the sea and its unexplored terrain as meaning.

'*Pelagos*' connects Socrates-Heidegger-Dao, runs through them as an irruption venturing forth, revealing its motionalty as sway, as lived awareness of *phusis*. It thus beckons towards its thoughtful interrogation as *palianthropos harmonia*.<sup>24</sup> Its *logos* as such, its way of being in the world, and its locality to temporality by the unthought of the poet thinking-poetizing the event of appropriation [*Ereignis*]. This emphasis joins with Goulding's theorizing Zhuangzi as "the boundless of boundary": noting that Chung-Yuan

---

<sup>22</sup> Gary Alan Scott (ed.), *Does Socrates Have a Method?: Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002).

<sup>23</sup> Massimo Verdicchio and Robert Burch, *Between Philosophy and Poetry: Writing, Rhythm, History* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 36.

<sup>24</sup> Goulding, "Heidegger's Daoist Phenomenology," 73.

Chang, in his reading focusing on ‘*Ming*’ as the luminosity of ‘Being nothingness’<sup>25</sup>—Goulding adds that the opening up of Chinese characters, ‘glade’ or ‘clearing’ as ‘*linjian kongdi*’ 林間空地 denote an “empty in-betweenness of forest and earth.”<sup>26</sup> This approach integrates Reinhard May’s emphasis of ‘*Lichtung*’ and the Chinese character of ‘*Wu*’ of nothingness to ‘wood clearing’ or ‘felding.’ According to Goulding, Heidegger’s Parmenides seminar (originally delivered in 1942)—in particular, his discussion on *Alethea/Lethe* with his thinking of the *polis* as the *polos* [pole]—is pivotal; a pivot as ‘overturning.’

Goulding concludes his review with the historical emphasis of Heidegger’s fascination with Chinese thinking, attested to by Heidegger’s letters to Karl Jaspers in the mid-1940s describing his efforts, with the aid of one of his students from China, Shih Yi Hsiao in 1946 to translate the *Daodejing* of Laozi.<sup>27</sup> The connection that Goulding and others have established outlines the future challenge to thinking and thought: the “one stroke,” “incept,” and “one folding”<sup>28</sup> of Heidegger’s thinking, thought with the calligraphy of the East.

---

<sup>25</sup> Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” 66.

<sup>26</sup> Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” 66.

<sup>27</sup> Goulding, “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology,” 6–66.

<sup>28</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus. The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine of the Logos*, trans. Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 123. Also see Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 16.

## CHAPTER 6

### Herbert Marcuse's Dimensionality, Negative Thinking, and the Praxis of Emancipation

Drawing upon Martin Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, technology, and "total mobilization," this chapter engages the critique of modernity outlined by Herbert Marcuse in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964)<sup>1</sup> and with Marcuse's turn to criticism as thinking. "Critical thinking" signifies for Marcuse the urgent task before philosophy and society to bring about alternatives to instrumental, technological, metaphysical rationality that interlock industrial capitalism and logical positivism. As Marcuse outlines, these industrial and operational prescribed practices result in a destructive enclosure of the social and political by way of indoctrination as commodity-object-self management. It is an administrative control of the self which comports its own psyche by managing its needs and desires for the social-political order. These are aspects of social engineering by capitalism, which—with its instrumental positivism—steers society towards the mobilizing of conformity, totality, and segregation.<sup>2</sup> In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse brings into circulation—with a discussion of "one-dimensional thought and behavior" as

---

<sup>1</sup> Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

<sup>2</sup> Arnold Farr, *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2009). See also: Vasilis Grollios, *Negativity and Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2017); Barry Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography* (London: Thetford Press, 1982); Douglass Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* (London: Macmillan, 1984); Terry Maley, *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On: The Struggle Continues* (Winnipeg: Fernwood Press, 2017).

the total enclosure of thinking—the following key critical terms: “total mobilization”; “total administration”; “performance principle”; “repressive desublimation”; “technological rationality”; “determinate negation”; and “great refusal.” The chapter will examine these terms as they were developed by Marcuse.

For Marcuse, “dialectical thinking” interrogates that which ‘is’ as well as that which determines conceptuality by necessity [*Ananke*] as contingent relation, critically exposes its organic material substance, its actuation and conceptuality and its grounding as a history. The substitutive potentiality allows a new sensibility as an alternative history to emerge by the work of negation as movement.<sup>3</sup> With this interrogation, Marcuse brings Hegel, Marx, Freud, and phenomenology into a dialogue on the potentiality of otherness by reflection and the question of embodiment and subjectivity, as the bedrock of critical thinking that rethinks the self with the social sphere by way of alienation and fulfilment.

This chapter argues that Marcuse’s turn towards dialectical thinking, through sublation [*Aufhebung*] surfaces the ontological contradictory relations as the work of negativity, as a phenomenological “over and againstness” [*Auseinandersetzung*], enabling reflection towards the grounding of the historical as the meaning of conceptuality by a gathered circularity of potentiality and actuality. These aim to manifest the ontological relation of sameness and otherness as the tension that holds the interrelated dimensionality therein.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Marcuse, *Hegel’s Ontology*; Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*.

<sup>4</sup> Marcuse, *Hegel’s Ontology*; Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*.

The phenomenological otherness and foreignness of these hidden relations are brought by Marcuse as the critical substitutive potentiality; as a new historical materiality by way of an attentive praxis of the estrangement of negation and of motility; as movement that comports self-consciousness and contemplation towards dialectical sublation [*Aufhebung*]. The dimensionality brought by critical dialectical thinking, for Marcuse, is encapsulated by the potentiality of art and desire as *Eros* for wholeness and an aesthetic of daily life by its negation and refusal by the act of recollection as remembrance [*Erinnerung*], transposed as an interrogation on substantive relations. The thinking of dimensionality by Marcuse developed, in *One-Dimensional Man*, outlines a thematic alternative towards empowerment developed in later texts by Marcuse where art is considered more concretely as an aesthetic and revolutionary dimension, specifically *An Essay on Liberation* (1969), *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (1972), and the *Aesthetic Dimension* (1978).

For Marcuse, the turn to art as a dialectical motility engenders a “new sensibility” as an “aesthetic dimension” and a new vision for individuality as well as the social-political as a praxis of emancipation.<sup>5</sup> This, for Marcuse, brings the meaning of embodiment and the contemplation of fragmentation into a phenomenological emancipation of the uncanny and refusal, by which the notion of ‘play’ as free association (Freud) augments and informs negativity, motility, and conceptuality (Hegel) meeting historical materialism, class struggle, and socialism (Marx) as an ethical sensibility. The urgent task is envisioned by

---

<sup>5</sup> Farr, *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision*; Grollios, *Negativity and Democracy*; Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation*; Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*; Maley, *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On*.

Marcuse as reclaiming the critical role embedded in dialectical thinking that interrogates the grounds and conditions of possibility of the historical as phenomenological potentialities of negativity in contemplating contradictions as metabolic change by ‘motility’ [*Bewegtheit*] as “determinate negation.”<sup>6</sup>

*One-Dimensional Man* starts with Marcuse questioning the meaning of freedom and autonomy in modernity arguing that these concepts are new forms of social control.<sup>7</sup> On its surface, Marcuse argues, “technological progress and mechanization and standardization might release individual energy into a yet-uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity . . . [of which] the individual would be free to exert autonomy over life that would be his own. If the productive apparatus could be organized and directed towards satisfaction of vital needs . . . such control would not prevent individual autonomy, but render it possible.”<sup>8</sup> In fact, Marcuse argues, the opposite has occurred. In a society driven by industrialization and wealth, these concepts have been eroded of their critical function.

As Terry Maley argues, Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* (*ODM*) is considered a key influential text encapsulating a moment in time, specifically 1960s North America:

At the height of the Keynesian era, *ODM* was scathingly critical of modern industrial capitalism—its consumer culture and commercialized, *Mad Men* aesthetics, its exploitation of the environment and people, and new forms of ideological and social control in the advanced industrial societies of the

---

<sup>6</sup> Marcuse, *Hegel’s Ontology*.

<sup>7</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 2.

Global North. It was a stunning critique of postwar U.S.-led modernization, capitalism, liberal-democracy, culture and the ideology of progress just as American hegemony was at its apex and, at the same time, beginning to show cracks. *ODM* appeared just as the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War and mass student protests began to shatter the complacency of postwar American prosperity and the mythology that this particular historical configuration of circumstances had produced the best of all possible worlds, the ‘end of ideology.’<sup>9</sup>

In the postwar period, according to Marcuse, reality is regulated beyond critique by the technical manipulation of the perception of reality within the realm of immediacy: “the apparatus imposes its economic and political requirements for defence and expansion on labor time and free time, on material and intellectual culture. By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian.”<sup>10</sup> Political power too resides in mechanized production as the force of mobilization.<sup>11</sup> This force regulates the self and its ‘needs,’ determining even the standards of truth and falsehood.<sup>12</sup> Working through the meaning of ‘reification and alienation’—concepts influenced by both Hegel and Marx—Marcuse provides a layered thinking to these concepts by employing Freudian psychoanalytic theory.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Maley, *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On*, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 2–3.

<sup>11</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 3.

<sup>12</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 4–9.

<sup>13</sup> Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 238. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*.

Utilizing his earlier work on Freud, Marcuse argues that the mechanized forces of society stratify the ‘self’ rendering it conformist and helpless with the disruption of the dynamics of ‘introjection.’<sup>14</sup> He re-engages these implications in *One-Dimensional Man* to argue that “*mimesis*” and reproduction are co-opted as the mechanism of both conformity and performative accomplishment, resulting in social engineering of the self, the social and political.<sup>15</sup> The mechanical stamping of conditioning—by which the self is determined, categorized, apprehended, and regulated—forecloses the dynamic of ‘introjection’ as an ‘inner dimension’ of negation, movement, individuality, and dissent whereupon the playing field that holds sway thought, reflection, and choice is anchored, resulting in brute alienation.<sup>16</sup>

This affectation of alienation without recourse manifests itself as the concretization of nihilism brought by the violence of technicity of production. The new modern “technological rationality,”<sup>17</sup> with its endless output of uniformity, unleashes a narrow spectrum of expression singled out by commodities and a specific method upon which the self, society, the political and the progressive is understood, foreclosing the dimensionality of reflection and meaning in favor of the standardization of output and production. This “one-dimensional society” is an enclosed society of indoctrination and manipulation:<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 238.

<sup>15</sup> Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 236–238.

<sup>16</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 10–11.

<sup>17</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 11.

<sup>18</sup> See Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 12; Farr, *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision*, 79; Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 235–238.

The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole. The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And as these beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a way of life. It is a good way of life—much better than before—and as a good way of life, it militates against qualitative change. Thus, emerges a pattern of *one-dimensional thought and behavior* in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension. The trend may be related to a development in scientific method: operationalism in the physical, behaviorism in the social sciences. The common feature is a total empiricism in the treatment of concepts; their meaning is restricted to the representation of particular operations and behavior.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 12. Bold letters my emphasis.

As Marcuse outlines, the scientific operational methodology embedded within capitalist systems manipulate the social and political spheres, isolating, quantifying, and steering thought and behavior towards a unified mobilization of society. This restricts and forecloses any meaningful discussion. While social engineering mobilizes the social and political in its totality, for production by “containment”<sup>20</sup> and pacification of social-political consciousness, whereby qualitative change is thought only in terms of technical instrumentation.

The one-dimensional society is a society of servitude,<sup>21</sup> indoctrination, domination, and is “in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this universe.”<sup>22</sup> The “state of permanent mobilization” induces a specific “form” [*Gestalt*], whereby the meaning of one-dimensionality is projected onto and transposed into the political sphere as homogeneity, comported by an epistemology that coheres and forecloses thought and praxis by its apprehension of technicity, progress, and development. For Marcuse, this unfolds as the phenomenal and critical significations at stake for social and political “total mobilization.”<sup>23</sup>

“Total mobilization” bears the teleological meaning of metaphysics as a totality and as a process. In twentieth-century thought, the term is associated with the writings of Ernst Jünger, the German soldier-essayist known for his writings on militarism, technology, and protofascism—in particular, *Total Mobilization* (1930) and *The Worker: Dominion and*

---

<sup>20</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 17.

<sup>21</sup> Grollios, *Negativity and Democracy*, 178.

<sup>22</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 18.

<sup>23</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 19.

*Form* (1932). These works had great influence over Nazi society. In *The Worker*, Jünger envisions the world of the “technocrat” whereby the state of total mobilization as a new society is readymade to meet any challenge and the operational mechanics of war and conflict are transposed to the realm of work, grounded by a scientific methodology understood as a new form [*Gestalt*] and a new “type” for humanity as its ideation.<sup>24</sup>

In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse describes Jünger’s use of “total mobilization” as a template for fascism and National Socialism.<sup>25</sup> Marcuse points to total mobilization as a guiding operational aim of modernity that requires urgency to appreciate both the moral and historical dangers of this trajectory. Marcuse outlines the affectation of total mobilization as a systemic form of hegemony and praxis. Marcuse notes: “The society of total mobilization, which takes shape in the most advanced areas of industrial civilization, combines in productive union the features of the “Welfare State” and the “Warfare State.” Compared with its predecessors, it is indeed a “new society,” with the political aim as a “marked unification or convergence of opposites.”<sup>26</sup>

Marcuse analyzes the political meaning of this methodology, claiming that it pervades political difference as a new form of ideology. He reviews how in the West, corporations and business interests are coopted, subsuming and eroding organized labor

---

<sup>24</sup> David Ohana, *The Dawn of Political Nihilism: Volume 1 of the Nihilist Order* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 16–22. See also, Michael Zimmerman, *Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity Technology, Politics, Art* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 57–60.

<sup>25</sup> Herbert Marcuse, *Technology, War, and Fascism*, ed. Douglas Kellner (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 152–153.

<sup>26</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 19.

unions as a national interest, and “in the East, the gradual reduction of direct political controls testifies to increasing reliance on the effectiveness of technological controls as instruments of domination.”<sup>27</sup> He discusses how form [*Gestalt*] substitutes and counts for content; how cohesion and hegemony is maintained and difference is construed by specific methodological coordinates that superimpose themselves as a doctrine of which the totality of nihilism is epitomized.

Above all else, this enunciates for Marcuse the political ideology of *technological rationality as totalitarianism*. In this unified totality, the very act of suspension is embedded by the machination of mobilization. The social-political sphere is mobilized towards an external threat that maintains cohesion and unity, thereby stimulating production and providing economic and social stability.<sup>28</sup> This is brought about by “containment of societal change.” This containment is at the very foundation of the totality of metaphysical technicity harnessed in production and thought. It thus presents a direct challenge to all forms of alternatives and pervades them all.

Indeed, as Marcuse notes: “classical Marxian theory envisages the transition from capitalism to socialism as a political revolution: the proletariat destroys the political apparatus of capitalism but retains the technological apparatus, subjecting it to socialization.”<sup>29</sup> Marcuse brings attention to the challenge brought about by the

---

<sup>27</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 20.

<sup>28</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 21.

<sup>29</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 22.

gravitations of the “embodied technical rationality of advanced capitalism” for the Marxist socialization process and the rethinking of Marxist theory:

To be sure, Marx held that organization and direction of the productive apparatus by the ‘immediate producers’ would introduce a qualitative change in the technical continuity: namely, production toward the satisfaction of freely developing individual needs. However, to the degree to which the established technical apparatus engulfs the public and private existence in all spheres of society—that is, becomes the medium of control and cohesion in a political universe which incorporates the laboring classes—to that degree would the qualitative change involve a change in the technological structure itself. And such change would presuppose that the laboring classes are alienated from this universe in their very existence, that their consciousness is that of the total impossibility to continue to exist in this universe.<sup>30</sup>

The brute immediacy of alienation thwarts any reflection, dissention, and movement, leaving the laboring class adrift and compartmentalized within systemic configurations. This process of machination and technological rationality assimilates by its forced standardization. This operationalizes society as a whole, whereby the “blue collar” working force decreases while there is an increase in “white collar” occupations, resulting in non-production workers and an administrative workforce.<sup>31</sup> This form of servitude exists as a “vicious circle” socially and politically. It challenges thinking and being by its own

---

<sup>30</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 23.

<sup>31</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 25–32.

completed totality. The tensions induced by this trajectory of totality presents the question of how would the social and the subjective be articulated and dynamically critically thought?<sup>32</sup>

The enclosed segregated universe of mobilization, production, and indoctrination induces a fragmented apprehension of reality by its forced totality. With such overwhelming intensities conjoined by technological rationality the very act of meaning and expression is narrowed down and categorized in a mechanical manner. Marcuse identifies this process as “repressive desublimation.”<sup>33</sup> Augmenting insights from Freudian theory with his previous work on *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse articulates the phenomenological impact of machination upon the psyche and upon ontology, understood as the categorization and schematization of *Eros* as a force of desire, continuity, reflexivity, and fulfilment. This fragmented part-object relational reality violently opposes wholeness and reflection. The limitation on the very meaning of sublimation is a pronounced limitation upon thought, reflection, and progress of the subject and of subjectivity as a historical contingent.

Fragmented reality is understood by Marcuse as a “performance principle”<sup>34</sup> with its destruction of the reflective tensed dynamic of the “pleasure principle” and “reality principle” imposing a nonreflective helpless existence within the realm of necessity, effectively barring and cutting off the historical capacity of any reflection upon the ‘is,’ the

---

<sup>32</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 33–37; Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 252.

<sup>33</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 72.

<sup>34</sup> Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 35.

‘not,’ and the ‘ought’ within the scarcity of reality; its *Ananke*, meaning, and conditions of possibilities of continuity, development, and civilization.<sup>35</sup> The destruction is brought by a particular form of *Logos* underwriting *Eros* as nothing more than a raw manifestation of biology to explore, dissect, and dominate.<sup>36</sup> This compartmentalized form of *techne* results in the manipulation and reification of the subject by the act of indoctrination. This infuses an institutionalized “happy consciousness”<sup>37</sup> that comports to the subject a forced prefigured meaning of harmony. Systematic manipulation is manifest. The course of philosophy itself is harnessed towards production and an epistemologically driven political theory, bringing together capitalism and scientific positivist thinking as an ideology of life and domination.<sup>38</sup>

The operational feature of thought enclosing the universe of discourse is characterized by a foreclosed language of “total administration.”<sup>39</sup> This operationalized neo-positivist thinking is a functional perception of speech and language in which specific vocabulary and syntax is used, structurally and aesthetically, as technological reasoning. Marcuse identifies this form of reasoning as one that shapes and maintains the social and political, cognitive and behavioral, one-dimensional universe: “At the nodal points of the universe of public discourse, self-validating, analytical propositions appear which function like magic-ritual formulas. Hammered and re-hammered into the recipient’s mind, they

---

<sup>35</sup> Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 35–36; 150–151; 213–214.

<sup>36</sup> Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 254–257. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 75–79.

<sup>37</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 79.

<sup>38</sup> Workman, “Marcuse’s Critique of Science,” 20–26.

<sup>39</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 85.

produce the effect of enclosing it within the circle of the conditions prescribed by the formula.”<sup>40</sup>

This enclosed structural systemic analytical structure of language and thought produces an uncritical, self-validating, and affirming tautology of structural circularity, imposed repetitiveness, and expression. This enclosed universe is endowed by an “Orwellian language” that obstructs meaning, thinking, impedes any contextual historical insight, and is totalitarian in its functional dictations.<sup>41</sup> The syntactic unification of opposites characterized by the structural and repressive analytic of language utilizes the establishing of images as its goal and perceived outcomes, as well as a structural abridging of terms and concepts identifying functionalities with technicities.<sup>42</sup> As Marcuse explains:

The unified, functional language is an irreconcilably anti-critical and anti-dialectical language. In it, operational and behavioral rationality absorbs the transcendent, negative, oppositional elements of Reason . . . the tension between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ between essence and appearance, potentiality and actuality—ingression of the negative in the positive determinations of logic. This sustained tension permeates the two-dimensional universe of discourse which is the universe of critical, abstract thought. The two dimensions are antagonistic to each other; the reality partakes of both of them, and the dialectical concepts develop the real

---

<sup>40</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 88.

<sup>41</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 88–90; Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 258–261; Farr, *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision*, 93–94.

<sup>42</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 90–97.

contradictions. In its own development, dialectical thought came to comprehend the historical character of the contradictions and the process of their mediation as historical process. Thus the ‘other’ dimension of thought appeared to be historical dimension—the potentiality as historical possibility, its realization as historical event. The suppression of this dimension in the societal universe of operational rationality is a suppression of history.<sup>43</sup>

The enclosed system negating contradiction and thought to materialize bars the meaning of remembrance [*Erinnerung*] as mediation of which thinking, choice, individuality, and history are construed.<sup>44</sup> The destruction of philosophical discourse for Marcuse is understood as the destruction of humanity itself and any form of perceived progress and development in the name of a forced schematized prescription of technicity working on and through the self, the psyche, the social, and the political.<sup>45</sup> The resultant technological rationality has been in the making since the establishment of philosophy as a discipline and as a metaphysics. This instrumental rationality and its objective scientific endeavor yielded an enclosed unreflective construct of which the very task of an operation supersedes its cause and its affectation, as Marcuse notes: “Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology.”<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 97.

<sup>44</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 98–99.

<sup>45</sup> Asger Sorensen, “The Role of Dialectics in Marcuse,” in *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On: The Struggle Continues*, ed. Terry Maley (Winnipeg: Fernwood Press, 2017), 40–46; Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation*, 166–167.

<sup>46</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 125.

Marcuse observes how the meaning of wonder, fulfillment, and desire noted by the work of *Eros* was superseded by the act of *Logos*. While denoting the latter as the higher form of progression by its technicity and thought while as the former, *Eros*, designated as a lower subjectivist meaning of which the technicity of *Logos* is the only objective measure rod for meaning and truth.<sup>47</sup> Working by the rule of the *techne* of *Logos*, ontology has been comported by the judgements and correctness of this “*apophantic logos*” of Aristotle.<sup>48</sup> The appreciation of actuality and potentiality, immediacy, latency, appearance, and essence as a contradictory two-dimensional thought of inner and outer subject and object, ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ as an ontological condition of being itself, thought by the meaning of negation as movement has been eroded and essentially cut off. The resultant analytical, positivist, technological epistemology shifts towards a categorical thinking, negating and narrowing the meaning of theory as a mode of vision and insight and the pivotal meaning of praxis—practice, as an ethical pursuit, streamlining a technicity of and for production.<sup>49</sup>

The harnessing of technicity as a mode of reason understood as the motion of higher rationality has narrowed the perception of transformation and the meaning of practical application into a homogenous unification of opposites. This quantification of nature has been visible in thought since Aristotle. As Marcuse notes:

The tension between Reason on the one hand, and the needs and wants of the underlying population (which has been the object but rarely the subject

---

<sup>47</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 127.

<sup>48</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 130

<sup>49</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 132–143.

of Reason) on the other, has been there from the beginning of philosophic and scientific thought. The ‘nature of things,’ including that of society, was so defined as to justify repression and even suppression as perfectly rational. True knowledge and reason demand domination over—if not liberation from—the senses. The union of Logos and Eros led already in Plato to the supremacy of Logos; in Aristotle, the relation between the god and the world moved by him is ‘erotic’ only in terms of analogy. Then the precarious ontological link between Logos and Eros is broken, and scientific rationality emerges as essentially neutral. What nature (including man) may be striving for is scientifically rational only in terms of the general laws of motion—physical, chemical, or biological.<sup>50</sup>

As Marcuse emphasizes, the meaning of possibilities, relations, and events as an objective pursuit or that which constitutes meaning has been interpreted by a form of technicity propositionally outlining and claiming the phenomenology of that ‘which is.’<sup>51</sup> While the claim for objectivity is noted as an ideal pursuit of philosophy and of thinking, the supremacy of technicity by which reasoning operates is understood as detrimental for thinking and for humanity itself. Here, Marcuse is influenced by the critique of philosophy of modernity and technology, existentialism, and hermeneutic phenomenology engaged by Heidegger and the criticality of phenomenology and Marxism.

---

<sup>50</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 147.

<sup>51</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 150–151.

Marcuse's project brings forward a critique of modernity and philosophy utilizing existentialism, Hegelian dialectical thinking, Marxism, and Freudian psychoanalysis with phenomenology as a challenge to thinking and thought.<sup>52</sup> Marcuse's thinking through phenomenology seeks to contemplate a 'worlding' of phenomenology by its historical ontologies and ideations. These critiques emphasize the disintegration of structure, concepts, and methods, confounding the meaning of objectivity resulting as a purely subjective manner outlining its own *telos* by the supremacy of technological rationality as a political process and as "the great vehicle of *reification*."<sup>53</sup> For Marcuse this 'streamlining' of thinking negates the process of criticality, resulting in a narrow philosophical propositional process which is nothing more than a therapeutic outcome explicated by affirmation and instrumentalization.<sup>54</sup> The propositional 'therapeutic' outcome of the instrumentality of philosophy is, for Marcuse, signified by the emergence of positivism and of Ludwig Wittgenstein's analytic philosophy (with its metalanguage) as the destruction of a dimension of experience by its instrumental standardization.<sup>55</sup> This instrumentalization, Marcuse emphasizes, renders the apprehension of substance and alienation null and void. This results in a mutilated experience of the world in which one-dimensional thinking operates to repress and restrict experience and thinking.<sup>56</sup> For Marcuse, the alternative is to reclaim thinking as a critical act of emancipation, ontology,

---

<sup>52</sup> Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation*. See also Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*; Farr, *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision*.

<sup>53</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 168.

<sup>54</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 170–171.

<sup>55</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 171–176.

<sup>56</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 182.

and praxis, thus dislodging the meaning of universals proclaimed as a hegemony by analytic philosophy resulting in the mutilation of phenomenology and of thought.<sup>57</sup>

To think through this critical dimension, Marcuse conducts a careful revisitation of Hegelian philosophy, interrogating the conditions of possibility of ‘the historical’ by the task of negativity thought as ‘motility’ [*Bewegtheit*]<sup>58</sup>—as that which anchors, holds sway, and determines negation. The constitution of history is realized as a movement of shapes united in their phenomenal tension by their determined negation and estrangement as differing moments of potentiality.<sup>58</sup>

Marcuse’s re-visitation of the role of Hegelian dialectic in *One-Dimensional Man* aims to open up an alternative towards technological categorical thinking, bringing together Hegel, Freud, Marx, and phenomenology as a challenge to thinking and thought.<sup>59</sup> This proposed alternative brings to the fore Marcuse’s previous work on both Hegel and Freud but also catapults towards Marcuse’s later work on art as a praxis of emancipation: *An Essay on Liberation* (1969), *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (1972), and *The Aesthetic Dimension* (1978).

The focus of these later texts builds upon Marcuse’s work on Freud in *Eros and Civilization* with Hegelian criticality and Marxian ethicality. These interventions aim towards reclaiming the meaning of reflection and desire by emphasizing a developed

---

<sup>57</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 203.

<sup>58</sup> Marcuse, *Hegel’s Ontology*, 313.

<sup>59</sup> Sorensen, “The Role of Dialectics in Marcuse.” See also: *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*; Farr, *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision*.

thinking towards alienation and community as a reflective psychological and philosophical meaning of contemplation and potentiality as a temporal-spatial-playing-field [*Spielen-Raum*]. This reclaims interiority as a reflective interrogative dimension within the tension of necessity as a grounding reality principle, tensed by the uncanny of daily life.<sup>60</sup> Marcuse turns to art as a radical emancipatory praxis, contemplating desire and negativity as an aesthetic. The art form has capacity, as Marcuse argues, to parse and suspend actuality by a contemplative utopian potentiality. Thus, it creates its own “collective environment” by rethinking and reinventing the meaning of *Eros* as liberation and as a reflective dimension of inspiration and potentiality.<sup>61</sup> Marcuse envisions a “radical sensibility” that infuses critical thinking with the dynamic psychoanalytical thinking of *Eros*, wholeness, and history.

This “radical sensibility” is how Marcuse reinterprets the meaning of substantive material relations as the act of Marxist ethics:

[T]he concept stresses the active, constitutive role of the senses in shaping reason, that is to say, in shaping the categories under which the world is ordered, experienced, changed. The senses are not merely passive, receptive: they have their own ‘syntheses’ to which they subject the primary data of experience. And these syntheses are not only the pure ‘forms of intuition’ (space and time) which Kant recognized as an inexorable a priori *ordering* of sense data. There are perhaps also other syntheses, far more

---

<sup>60</sup> Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 222–233.

<sup>61</sup> Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*, 31.

concrete, far more ‘material,’ which may constitute and empirical (i.e., historical) a priori of experience. Our world emerges not only in the pure forms of time and space, but also, and *simultaneously*, as a totality of sensuous qualities – object not only of the eye (synopsis) but of *all* human senses (hearing, smelling, touching, tasting).<sup>62</sup>

Marcuse envisions this radical sensibility rethinking what constitutes experience and pointing towards aspects of sense data and materiality as unthought aesthetic embodied cognition and relation often neglected in Marxian thinking; in particular, the economic and philosophic manuscripts. For Marcuse, the emancipation of the senses appears as a new dimension of human appropriation and thought.<sup>63</sup> The domain of art is that which holds and sustains these sensibilities and renders art in potentiality as a revolutionary dimension and as an embodiment. This dimension inspires, by its praxis of estrangement of the uncanny and alienation, a representation of memory and of the sensuous rethinking of *mimesis* as a representation by its aesthetic suspension into and through the act of recollection [*Erinnerung*], desire, and negativity.<sup>64</sup>

The aesthetic dimension allows a critical distance of reflection that rethinks technology and its purpose. By thinking teleologically, thus purposefully, it allows the potentiality of the social-historical to enter the domain of labor as a contemplative and emancipatory dimension. The process of this reflective motility within and through

---

<sup>62</sup> Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, 63.

<sup>63</sup> Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, 64–69.

<sup>64</sup> Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension*, 67.

thinking and art, called an “aesthetic dimension” by Marcuse, rethinks the course of materiality, its appropriation, and the process of the thinking of materiality itself by negation within art as *Eros*. Herewith, the full aspect of Marcuse’s thinking comes to light with the call towards a social synergy of critical thinking—as a “great refusal” and an unwavering commitment towards Marxian thought—as ethics through and challenged by phenomenology.<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>65</sup> Farr, *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision*. See also: Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*; Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation*; Grollios, *Negativity and Democracy*.

## CHAPTER 7

### **Emmanuel Levinas: The Binding of Otherness on Anarchic Inspiration**

Chapter 7 will explore the work of Emmanuel Levinas, a former student of Martin Heidegger (1928–29), who sought to think the meaning of Otherness and alterity in the immediate as spatial proximity, the face-to-face relation. Levinas was influenced by Heidegger’s critique of the totality of metaphysics and the meaning of otherness as well as phenomenology as thinking. Levinas sought to distance his work from Heidegger’s by emphasis on the human-to-human encounter, beckoning towards a humanist approach as a meeting signifying the immediate, unknown, otherness, an-archē.

Levinas puts forward an unthematized ethical stance that is fraught with anxiety, danger, and is inspired by its anarchic potentiality—which erupts as an utterance in the realm of the ethical as responsibility. This is anchored by an innate ethical binding of self and other with the biblical edicts of “thou shall not kill” and “love thy neighbor as thy self.” These are core Judaic social responsibility customs towards the ‘stranger,’ the ‘orphan’ and the ‘widower,’ the ‘destitute,’ all those without a voice. Levinas understands these ethical meanings and social caring customs as an infinite human aspiration while encountering the total totalizing tragic meaning of metaphysics as imposing a violent system of thought. Levinas articulates this in his preface to *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*:

We do not need the obscure fragments of Heraclitus to prove that being reveals itself as war to philosophical thought. . . . In war reality rends the words and images that dissimulate it, to obtrude in its nudity and in its

harshness. Harsh reality . . . harsh object-lesson . . . when the drappings of illusion burn war is produced as the pure experience of pure being. The ontological event that takes form in this black light is a casting into movement of beings hitherto anchored in their identity, a mobilization of absolutes, by an objective order from which there is no escape.<sup>1</sup>

Levinas approaches Judaism as a tradition and its ethical meaning, meeting Greek first philosophy, as a challenge to thinking and thought by otherness. A meeting that paves and thinks the exterior, the outside, as infinity by thinking the ‘totalizing’ presence that commands and thinks presence, essence, and absence.

This chapter considers the “an-archē challenge” that Levinas outlines in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. In particular, Levinas’ discussion of otherness and subjectivity with regards to the binding to the other as an inspirational an-archē. Additionally, the chapter presents Levinas’ description, in *Totality and Infinity*, of a resilient presence of otherness: one that resonates as the encounter with otherness through “patience,”<sup>2</sup> as suspension. The encounter with the ‘exteriority’ as the ‘face’ of the Other, and its commanding effect that ‘overflows’ language and discourse, the very subjective ‘I,’ is rethought by plunging the very notion of discourse and that which makes it possible into question:

---

<sup>1</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2011), 21.

<sup>2</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 238–239.

the face brings a notion of truth which [is . . .] expression . . . abolishing the distinction between form and contact . . . to approach the other is to welcome his expression in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain . . . overflowing the idea of infinity, puts the spontaneous freedom within us into question.<sup>3</sup>

For Levinas this welcoming of the other invites a rethinking that overflows, whose presence distills the I as self, understood as the immediacy of its questioning and as its teaching.

In *Otherwise than Being*, the “knots of subjectivity”<sup>4</sup> are unfolded through the binding to the other. This binding is emphasized by Levinas with the notion of proximity. Proximity “is the relationship with what is not disproportionate to the ἀρχή [archē] in thematization, but incommensurable with it, with what does not derive its identity from the kerygmatic logos, and blocks all schematism.”<sup>5</sup> The unthematized encounter is where the disruptive intimation of proximity suspends and rethinks the social relation, understood by

---

<sup>3</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 51.

<sup>4</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2011), 25.

<sup>5</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 100.

Levinas as a challenge to thinking and thought that unfolds: “Proximity is thus anarchically a relationship with a singularity without mediation of any principle and ideality.”<sup>6</sup>

The an-archē of otherness, through its presence, challenges and inspires by rethinking the very notion of thinking and thought.<sup>7</sup> The presence of the other as that which splinters and requires the subject to rethink the ‘I’ subject, is for Levinas where the notion of the an-archē of otherness is: “An anarchic liberation, it emerges, without being assumed, without turning into a beginning, in inequality with oneself. It is brought out without being assumed, in the undergoing by sensibility beyond its capacity to undergo. This describes the suffering and vulnerability of the sensible as the other in me.”<sup>8</sup>

With his concept of the “excluded middle,”<sup>9</sup> Levinas rethinks the very foundations of thinking and thought and thereby unfolds the question of the other and the challenge of otherness as an unmediated “exteriority.” This is brought by Levinas with the example of the axis of “Athens-Jerusalem.”<sup>10</sup> As noted by Levinas: “both the hierarchy taught by

---

<sup>6</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 100.

<sup>7</sup> Miguel Abensour, “An-archy between Metapolitics and Politics,” *Parallax*, Vol. 8, no. 3 (2002): 5–18. See also: Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*; Adriaan Peperzak, *Beyond the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 124–125.

<sup>9</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 184.

<sup>10</sup> Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (eds.), *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 24 and 162. See also: Silvia Benso, “The Breathing of the Air: Presocratic Echoes in Levinas,” in *Levinas and the Ancients*, ed. B. Schroeder and S. Benso (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 9–23; Roger Burggraeve, “Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker between Jerusalem and Athens,” *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 28, no. 11 (Spring 1997): 110–126; Christopher Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” PhD diss., 2003, University of Memphis, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/305231182/abstract/F05DCEE6B6D54EC9PQ/1?accountid=15182>; Catriona Hanley, “Aristotle and Levinas on War and Peace: The One against the Other,” in *Levinas and the Ancients*, ed. B. Schroeder and S. Benso (Bloomington: Indiana University

Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress violence.”<sup>11</sup> Athens is thematized as the site for first philosophy and Jerusalem as the site of Judaism, monotheism, and social caring laws for the ‘stranger,’ the orphan,’ the ‘widower,’ the ‘destitute.’ The challenge brought by Levinas with the interrogation and rethinking of the subjective “I” by the anarchic proximity of the other, in particular the Western assumptions therein, invites a rethinking of the very foundation of Western philosophy itself.<sup>12</sup>

Rethinking the West and its philosophical tenets, as well as the grounding for social responsibility, the venture to the East opens with the question of whether the West can think itself—through its own tools and modalities—on the questions of “exteriority” and of “emptiness.”<sup>13</sup> As Gad Horowitz indicates in his theorization of Levinas’ other and otherness (2013):

Buddhist insight into devoidness/emptiness, whether we think of it prior to or co-arising with compassion, is at bottom discovery of the *pour-l’autre* of the human self – its (non) essential dispossession or home-leaving. It’s not a matter of taking refuge/leaving home. Rather, leaving home is the I

---

Press, 2008), 127–143; Ephraim Meir, “Judaism and Philosophy: Each Other’s Other in Levinas,” *Modern Judaism*, Vol. 30, no. 3 (October 2010): 348–362.

<sup>11</sup> Peperzak, Critchley, and Bernasconi, *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*, 24 and 162.

<sup>12</sup> Peperzak, Critchley, and Bernasconi, *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*.

<sup>13</sup> Asher Horowitz, “Adorno and Emptiness,” in *Subversive Itinerary: The Thought of Gad Horowitz*, ed. Shannon Bell and Peter Kulchyski (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 256–278.

correctly understood. In Levinas's words, 'its very closing or selfhood 'is a turning inside out . . . an inside out without an inside.'<sup>14</sup>

Levinas aims to articulate two core traditions (Athens' "first philosophy" and Jerusalem's Judaism), and by its invitation of 'exteriority' and the notion of 'suffering' 'compassion,' its coursing into thinking and thought as a rethinking of the West opening towards the immediacy of East-Asian traditions, as a meeting ground thought anew.<sup>15</sup> The chapter will advance through three sections: Section I. Exterior-Singularity; Section II. Anarchic Proximity; Section III. The Excluded Middle on Athens-Jerusalem, and the Opening towards the East.

### **Section I. Exterior-Singularity**

Levinas' notion of exteriority is understood as an alterity that unfolds a singularity, whereby Levinas redefines social relations and discourse. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas outlines the notion of Otherness out of which the "idea of infinity" and the grounding of the I is founded upon, as well as the very challenge of distinctness to language and thought as 'infinity' itself.<sup>16</sup> Levinas writes:

---

<sup>14</sup> Gad Horowitz, "Emmanuel, Robert," in *Subversive Itinerary the Thought of Gad Horowitz*, ed. Shannon Bell and Peter Kulchyski (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 296.

<sup>15</sup> Horowitz, "Emmanuel, Robert," 296. See also: William Edelglass, "The Self and the Suffering Other: Levinas and Santideva on the Ethics of Compassion," PhD diss., Emory University, 2004, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/305078470/abstract/F4BBE83AB60C426EPQ/2?accountid=15182>; Leah Kalmanson, L. Frank Garrett and Sarah Mattice (eds.), *Levinas and Asian Thought* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2013); Annabella Pitkin, "Scandalous Ethics: Infinite Presence with Suffering," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 8, no. 5–7 (2001): 231–246.

<sup>16</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 27. See also Shin Lee, "Emmanuel Levinas's Face-to-Face Ethics: Taking the Other Seriously," PhD diss., SUNY Binghamton, 2004,

The production of the infinite entity is inseparable from the idea of infinity . . . infinity does not first exist, and then reveal itself. Its infinity is produced as revelation, as a positing of its idea in me, it is produced in the improbable feat whereby a separated being fixed in its identity, the same the I, nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither contain nor receive solely by the virtue of its own identity. Subjectivity realizes these impossible exigencies . . . this book will present subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is consummated.<sup>17</sup>

This Otherness-alterity cannot be understood by the interdiction of the self-same; it is a “metaphysical totality” that is a wholly other, “outside” “exteriority.”<sup>18</sup> The outreach from the I to the other that does not yield a totality, Levinas understands by the notion of the encounter that disrupts and overflows through “conversation” and rethinks “desire.” As noted by Levinas: “a relation whose terms do not form a totality can hence be produced within the general economy of being only as proceeding from the I to the other, as a face to face, as delineating a distance in depth—that of conversation, of goodness, of Desire.”<sup>19</sup> Levinas understands conversation as an interaction with otherness by an intimation that dissolves totalizing postulations carving out and engulfing the I subject:

---

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/305074764/abstract/96436D9C50EB4EBEPQ/14?accountid=15182>.

<sup>17</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 26–27.

<sup>18</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 35 and 262.

<sup>19</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 39.

Alterity is possible only starting from me. Conversation, from the very fact it maintains the distance between me and the Other, the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the reconstitution of a totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a right over this egoism . . . the breach of totality is not an operation of thought, obtained by a simple distinguishing of terms that evoke one another or . . . opposite one another. The void that breaks the totality can be maintained . . . only if thought finds itself faced with another refractory to categories.<sup>20</sup>

The encounter with Otherness is signified by its radical “strangeness,” that which suspends and “calls into question” language and discourse which Levinas understands as “ethics.”<sup>21</sup> The approach of the other is understood by Levinas with the notion of the “face.” For Levinas, the face is the ‘way’ upon which “the other presents himself exceeding the idea of the other in me.”<sup>22</sup> This ‘overflow’ is where Levinas understands the immediacy of the “teaching of the other,” by the “epiphany of the face”<sup>23</sup> that rethinks and challenges the very idea of language and discourse by its “plurality.”<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 40.

<sup>21</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 43. See also Lee, “Emmanuel Levinas’s Face-to-Face Ethics,” 44.

<sup>22</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 50.

<sup>23</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 51. See also: Francisco Gonzalez, “Levinas Questioning Plato on Eros and Maieutics,” in *Levinas and the Ancients*, ed. B. Schroeder and S. Benso (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 40–61; Lee, “Emmanuel Levinas’s Face-to-Face Ethics.”

<sup>24</sup> Lee, “Emmanuel Levinas’s Face-to-Face Ethics,” 44n55; Gonzalez, “Levinas Questioning Plato on Eros and Maieutics,” 53.

The Other perforates “punctuality,” understood here as the temporal underpinning of discourse by rethinking its meaning, by putting into question the very notion of an “economy” of thinking and thought. The approach to otherness as a “welcoming paralysis of possession” rethinks the underpinnings of discourse by way of “communication”<sup>25</sup> as its immediate effect. Joseph Libertson (1982) notes:

The parole of the visage is the pressure of exteriority which inclines, forces and, in Levinas’ words, ‘obliges’ interiority toward the Other. The parole of the exterior animates and escapes interiority. It is neither a transitivity nor the correlate of a relation. It is rather the excess of communication over closure, and thus the principle of the economy. The Same, in its totality, veers toward the Other—whose very distance is an approach and a dispossession. The *pour l’autre* is the secret inclination of all autonomy.<sup>26</sup>

With the dislodging and rethinking of the notion of ‘communication,’ Levinas brings forward the immediacy of the eruption of the Other in and through ‘conscience and Desire’ affecting the subject by its overwhelming ‘command.’<sup>27</sup>

This command is brought forward by the irreducibility of the ‘frankness of the face’<sup>28</sup> of the Other denuding and dislodging discourse and thought as suspension and the call for equality. As noted by Levinas: “the face in its nakedness as a face presents to me

---

<sup>25</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 56; 101; 171.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph Libertson, *Proximity: Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication* (Boston: Springer, 1982), 295.

<sup>27</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 101.

<sup>28</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 182.

the destitution of the poor one and the stranger; but this poverty and exile which appeal to my powers, address me, do not deliver themselves over to these powers as givens, remain the expression of the face. The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal.”<sup>29</sup> The infinite commanding ‘equality’ of the presence of the Other’s ‘face’ as an approach is a call that rethinks any ‘judgment’ by the ‘justice’ of the ‘infinite’ within and therein of otherness. This announces the I and the social relation as ‘judgment’ by the ‘singularity’ of the Other as ‘responsibility.’<sup>30</sup> Levinas notes:

The invisible offence that results from judgment of history, a judgment of the visible, will attest subjectivity to be prior to judgment or to be a refusal of judgment, if it is only produced as a cry and protestation, if it is felt within me. But it is produced as judgment itself when it looks at me in the face of the Other—whose very epiphany is brought about by this offense suffered, by this status of being stranger, widow, and orphan . . . the exaltation of the singularity in judgment is produced princely in the infinite responsibility of the will to which the judgment gives rise.<sup>31</sup>

With the ‘singularity’ of the Other, Levinas rethinks the subjective I, and lays bare the social relation as a challenge by ‘responsibility’ and attentiveness, understood as the teaching of Otherness. With the primacy and challenge, the Other denotes the subjective I as an ethical demand. With the insight of exteriority, Levinas challenges the very notion of

---

<sup>29</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 213.

<sup>30</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 244. See also Abensour, “An-archy between Metapolitics and Politics.”

<sup>31</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 244

the ‘state’ as the guarantor, as the ‘idea’ of thinking and thought, by the call of the Other as a ‘plurality.’<sup>32</sup>

## Section II. Anarchic Proximity

In *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas outlines the meaning of the Other, working through the I as a subject in proximity to otherness as an encounter that rethinks the very notion of thinking and thought understood as knowledge and communication. This is understood by Levinas as *the enigma of the otherwise*. Levinas queries this otherwise: “if transcendence has meaning, it can only signify the fact that the event of being, the *esse*, the essence, passes over to what is other than being. But what is Being’s other? . . . transcendence is passing over to being’s other, otherwise than being. Not to be otherwise, but **otherwise than being**.”<sup>33</sup>

The “otherwise” for Levinas, by working through the notion of “transcendence,” lays out by its distinction a formidable challenge that burrows through the “constellation” and consecutive foundations of any formal suppositions of thinking and thought within the tenets of philosophy.<sup>34</sup> By working in and through language from the ‘said’ to the ‘saying,’<sup>35</sup> Levinas brings forward the very disparity of discourse and its constitutive rationale that is both committed and commits to a call that it cannot answer that is struck

---

<sup>32</sup> Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 244; 246; 304–307. See also Abensour, “An-archy between Metapolitics and Politics.”

<sup>33</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 3. Bold text my emphasis.

<sup>34</sup> Peperzak, *Beyond the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, 83–84.

<sup>35</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 6–7.

upon the encounter with the face of the Other. This call that breaks upon the encounter with the Other is the constitution of the subjective I. As noted by Levinas:

[The] trace lights up as the face of the neighbour, ambiguously him before whom (or to whom, without any paternalism) and with for whom I answer. For such is the enigma or exception of a face, judged and accused. What is positive in responsibility, outside of essence, conveys the infinite. It inverts relationship and principles, reverses the order of interest . . . the infinite is non-thematizable . . . exceeds every capacity and manifests, as it were in reverse, its exorbitance in the approach of a neighbour, obedient to its measure. Subjectivity . . . obliged to with regard to the neighbour, is the breaking point, where essence is exceeded by the infinite. It is a breaking point, but also the binding place.<sup>36</sup>

With the trace, Levinas outlines the paradox that brings forward the notion of the I subjective as utterance that is bound to a displacing discourse to the Other prior to utterance itself. With this Levinas understands with the notion of “diachrony” in and through “time.”<sup>37</sup> As Adriaan Peperzak notes: “‘Time’ thus hides two radically different temporalities: the time of essence and the time of responsibility. The latter happens in Saying not in the epos—the word or the epic of the Said—of thematic and historical

---

<sup>36</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 12.

<sup>37</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 13 and 24. See also Lee, “Emmanuel Levinas’s Face-to-Face Ethics,” 38–39.

synthesis. Saying signifies otherwise than the Said . . . the secret of its enigma is its difference from Being, insofar as this difference is expressed in time.”<sup>38</sup>

The disjunctive temporal denotes a disturbance that cuts through the very experience and perception of the I subject, as Christopher Fox explains: “The isomorphism between saying and diachrony in the lapse becomes clearer through the distinction between formal and concrete. The concrete experience of the Other’s face, in which the trace of the infinite withdraws, corresponds to the formal stratification into two times which shows itself for synchronic thought as a lapse of time.”<sup>39</sup> This is understood by Fox as the following: “The lapse names the anarchical dephasing that is solidified into the synchronic self, which is also the opening to the other. In fact, the lapse reorders the priority of the terms, since interruption now precedes and establishes the self’s consolidation of itself.”<sup>40</sup> The diachrony understood as lapse within discourse brings forward a temporal injection where the encounter with the other as “proximity” is brought forward.

For Levinas this is where the “knots of subjectivity”<sup>41</sup> are conjoined as responsibility for the other prior and as a condition of its “birth.” Levinas notes: “the ‘birth’ of being in the questioning where the cognitive subject stands would thus refer to a before the questioning, to the anarchy of responsibility, as it were on this side of all birth. We will try, with the notion of the saying without the said, to expose such a modality of the

---

<sup>38</sup> Peperzak, *Beyond the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, 101.

<sup>39</sup> Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 195–196.

<sup>40</sup> Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 196–197.

<sup>41</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 25; Peperzak, *Beyond the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, 107.

subjective, an otherwise than being.”<sup>42</sup> With the notion of the “anarchic responsibility,” and the an-archē binding to otherness, a concrete challenge to thinking and thought is brought forward by Levinas: “the trace of a past in a face is not the absence of a yet non-revealed, but the anarchy of what has never been present, of an infinite which commands in the face of the other, and which like an excluded middle, could not be aimed at.”<sup>43</sup> The challenge understood as the anarchic bind to the other is that which unfolds the tears of the I subject as a responsibility. This tearing that spaces out the I subject in itself, facing the “erasure” of the other within discourse as an “excluded middle,”<sup>44</sup> is for Levinas where the question of the other as a call has an incontestable ripple effect that reaches beyond and through the I subject to become an ‘inspirational’ one.<sup>45</sup>

The meaning of the an-archē working as the I subjective approach to the other, is outlined by Levinas most notably in Chapter IV “Substitution” of *Otherwise than Being*. Levinas presents the meaning of proximity as “an exposure to the other”<sup>46</sup>; as an-archē that binds by rethinking the I subject, underwriting the notion of discourse and thought. As noted by Levinas:

Proximity appears as the relationship with the other, who cannot be resolved into ‘images’ or by exposed in a theme. It is the relationship with what is

---

<sup>42</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 26.

<sup>43</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 97.

<sup>44</sup> Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 236.

<sup>45</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 134–135. See also Abensour, “An-archy between Metapolitics and Politics”; Benso, “The Breathing of the Air: Presocratic Echoes in Levinas”; Peperzak, *Beyond the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*.

<sup>46</sup> Abensour, “An-archy between Metapolitics and Politics,” 11.

not disproportionate to the ἀρχή [archē] in thematization, but incommensurable with it, with what does not derive its identity from the kerygmatic logos, and blocks all Schematism. . . . Proximity is thus anarchically a relationship with a singularity without the mediation of any principle, any ideality.<sup>47</sup>

With the notion of “proximity,” the “singularity” of the other unfolds within the in-betweenness of the I subject and disrupts the thrust of “thematization.” This disruptive “irreducible” within the work of “consciousness,” is an excess that “obsesses” and “takes hold” of the subject, operating in the flow of history.<sup>48</sup> As Levinas explains:

How in consciousness can there be an undergoing or a passion whose active source does not, in any way, occur in consciousness? This exteriority has to be emphasized. It is not objective or spatial, recuperable in immanence and thus falling under the orders of—and in the order of—consciousness; it is obsessional, non-thematizable and, in the sense we have just defined, anarchic. It is in a responsibility that is justified by no prior commitment, in the responsibility for another—in an ethical situation—that the meta-ontological and metalogical structure of this anarchy takes form, undoing the logos in which the apology by which consciousness always regains its

---

<sup>47</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 100.

<sup>48</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 101–102.

self-control, and commands, is inserted. This passion is absolute in that it takes hold without any a priori.<sup>49</sup>

This passion pushes, carves itself out and inside, by the work of the consciousness where the subject, in proximity, is taken by the occurrence of the other as a ‘hostage’ and where the I subject is torn by the presence of the other and ‘acknowledges’ the place of the other in its own ‘flesh,’ “not . . . in order to appropriate one’s own objectivity, but in order to answer his need to supply for his want with one’s own substance.”<sup>50</sup> This is understood by Levinas as “substitution.”<sup>51</sup>

This for Levinas, is where the I ‘incarnates’ in the very ‘tear’ of materiality as its being for the Other.<sup>52</sup> As a displaced materiality “the self emptying itself from itself,”<sup>53</sup> is proclaimed by the command of the resonance of the other as ‘anarchical.’ This is where for Levinas the signification of the meaning of responsibility as a challenge for subjectivity as thinking and thought is brought forward: “I exist through the other and for the other, but without this being alienation: I am inspired. This inspiration is the psyche. The psyche can signify this alterity in the same without alienation in the form of incarnation, as being-in-one’s-skin, having-the other-in-one’s-skin.”<sup>54</sup> With the corporeality and the impossibility

---

<sup>49</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 102.

<sup>50</sup> See Alphonso Lingis, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2011), xxviii.

<sup>51</sup> Lingis, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxix; Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 112; Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 275.

<sup>52</sup> Lingis, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxix. See also: Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 112; Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 275.

<sup>53</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 111.

<sup>54</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 114–115.

of the other, Levinas re-interprets the notion of ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’ by way of the challenge of the an-archē.<sup>55</sup> Levinas notes: “an anarchic liberation, it emerges, without being assumed, without turning into a beginning, in inequality with oneself. It is brought out without being assumed, in the undergoing by sensibility beyond its capacity to undergo. This describes the suffering and vulnerability of the sensible as the other in me.”<sup>56</sup> Levinas rethinks the social and political by the an-archē, bind of the otherness as responsibility, by challenging the very notion of ‘communication’ as an irreducible “unconditioned excluded middle.”<sup>57</sup>

### **Section III. The Excluded Middle on Athens-Jerusalem, and the Opening towards the East**

The challenge of ‘communicability’ by the encounter with the other, for Levinas, is understood by the notion of ‘uncertainty’ that thrusts the subject meeting into “exteriority.”<sup>58</sup> This for Levinas, is brought by the notion of the “excluded middle,” as that which is under discourse and thought, as the opening fissure of otherness. With the interrogation of the “trace” in the encounter with the other, Levinas, “subverts” the laws of the “excluded middle” by the ethical relation.<sup>59</sup> Fox explains:

---

<sup>55</sup> Abensour, “An-archy between Metapolitics and Politics.” See also: Benso, “The Breathing of the Air: Presocratic Echoes in Levinas”; Peperzak, *Beyond the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, 103.

<sup>56</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 124–125.

<sup>57</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 183–184. See also Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas.”

<sup>58</sup> Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 120.

<sup>59</sup> Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 188.

Excluded middle asserts that everything is either A or ~A. However, the various phenomena/non-phenomena of saying, diachrony, and proximity are shown to reveal a problematic middle or trace between presence and absence. Therefore, the binary logic of mutual exclusion and self-identity breaks down, equipping thought with a non-interstitial between to explain the peculiar relation between A and ~A in which the terms remain distinct but related by co-implication. . . . At one formal level the ethical must differ from justice as A differs from ~A. This difference is the source of their tension. However, in the above denial of excluded middle, Levinas will employ the trace to open something between A and ~A by means of which justice and ethics may show themselves in one another.<sup>60</sup>

With the overflow of the presence of otherness, discourse is brought to its limit and spaced out by the ethical demand for justice. For Levinas, this is where the silent call of “religion” is brought to the fore. As noted by Fox: “Levinas reserves the term ‘religion’ for those occasions where it is necessary to concretize the denial of excluded middle as the connection/nonconnection between ethics and justice.”<sup>61</sup> This, for Levinas, enters the challenge of the communicability of tradition by way of inspiration of the ‘Athens-Jerusalem’ axis.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup> Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 210–211.

<sup>61</sup> Fox, “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas,” 227.

<sup>62</sup> Burggraeve, “Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker between Jerusalem and Athens.” See also: Hanley, “Aristotle and Levinas on War and Peace”; Peperzak, Critchley, and Bernasconi, *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*; Meir, “Judaism and Philosophy.”

The 'Athens-Jerusalem' axis is central in Levinas' thinking and proclaims the challenge and task of the rethinking of the ethical relation as primary and as a challenge to thinking and thought. It is the unthought thematization of Athens as the site for first philosophy and Jerusalem as the site of Judaism. Indeed, the meaning of tradition of the West within thinking and thought and the rethinking of its meaning, embodies in mind and spirit Levinas' education and contributions to thinking and thought. It is what denotes Levinas as the "Thinker between Jerusalem and Athens."<sup>63</sup> With the 'pole' of Athens, Levinas understands the foundation of systematic thinking, knowledge, and reasoning. With the 'pole' of Jerusalem, Levinas values the foundation of Judaic ethical-social imperatives of "love thy neighbour,"<sup>64</sup> of hospitality and of action through words responsibility and inspiration. With the emphasis on the 'in-between' as that which is the opening of otherness to thinking and thought, Levinas, addresses the challenge therein of the 'poles' to thinking and thought. Catriona Hanley explains the challenge Levinas brings to thought:

It could be said that [Levinas] fights the entire corpus of Western philosophy. It is not so much that he thinks that the West is set purposefully on a course toward war as that he finds the ontological tradition, rooted in Athens, is consistent with an ethics that results in war. This tradition he opposes philosophically . . . to the wisdom of Jerusalem and its revealed

---

<sup>63</sup> Burggraeve, "Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker between Jerusalem and Athens"; Meir, "Judaism and Philosophy."

<sup>64</sup> Hanley, "Aristotle and Levinas on War and Peace," 129.

truths, and he attempts to translate the core of this revelation into philosophical language.<sup>65</sup>

With the challenge of the communicability of the relationship “Athens-Jerusalem” brought by Levinas, appears the opening of an ‘in-between’ as that which rethinks the project of the West in its entirety as a foundation. Levinas notes: “both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress violence,”<sup>66</sup> with the need to think through the meaning of both in a ‘simultaneous’ manner, the revival of the poles of Athens and Jerusalem is helped and enabled by the opening towards the undercurrent of East-Asian thinking and thought, brought forward as the contribution to the immediacy of the gaping fissure of otherness that interrogates phenomenologically.

The meeting of Levinas’ thinking and thought with East-Asian philosophies is a continuing endeavor among Leviansian scholars, in particular with regards to mutuality of thought on the “ethical,” “nonviolence,” “the self,” “suffering,” “compassion,” “emptiness and nothingness,” and “paradoxical thinking,” to name a few.<sup>67</sup> As Frank Garrett explains:

considering that Levinas posits ethics as being prior to ontology and also that Buddhism seeks a middle path within its own emptiness as it articulates an attempt to perform a metaphysics founded upon an antimetaphysical

---

<sup>65</sup> Hanley, “Aristotle and Levinas on War and Peace,” 128.

<sup>66</sup> Peperzak, Critchley, and Bernasconi, *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*, 24 and 162.

<sup>67</sup> Edelglass, “The Self and the Suffering Other.” See also: Horowitz, “Emmanuel, Robert”; Kalmanson, Garrett, and Mattice, *Levinas and Asian Thought*; Pitkin, “Scandalous Ethics.”

gesture, the putting into dialogue of Levinas and Buddhism here seems to be a fruitful path to pursue with the intention of making a more meaningful critique, or of coming to a better understanding of the other as well as the self.<sup>68</sup>

The ‘decentering’ ‘self-emptiness’ as altruism that occurs in both Levinas’ thinking and East-Asian Buddhist philosophies with the meaning of alterity,<sup>69</sup> provides mutual inspiration and insights that call into question the very notion of thinking and thought. This understands the meaning and operation of the ‘simultaneous’—with ‘Athens–Jerusalem’ as a revival in Levinasian thinking and thought, as the encounter and as the ethical challenge of the Other.

---

<sup>68</sup> Kalmanson, Garrett, and Mattice, *Levinas and Asian Thought*, 25.

<sup>69</sup> Kalmanson, Garrett, and Mattice, *Levinas and Asian Thought*, 5.

## CHAPTER 8

### The Philosophy of Limit Enclosure, the Question of Otherness and Action

This chapter brings forward philosophers influenced by Martin Heidegger's thinking on the meaning of metaphysical enclosures (thinking through the meaning of the 'limit' as boundary or '*peras*,' 'end' as '*telos*,' and 'beginning/governing principle' as '*arche*') as well as the technologies of epistemological hegemony and power. Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gayatri Spivak, and Jacques Lacan are brought together to argue for a new peripheral thinking, emphasizing the meaning of enclosures to thinking and thought re-envisioning the meaning of alterity augmenting any thought of the political.

In *Between Past and Future*,<sup>1</sup> Hannah Arendt proposes a reclamation of indicatives of thinking and listening to otherness in the social-political-thoughtful as an ellipsis; as a 'gap.' The book centers the alienation of modernity and augments a theory of action through participation in thinking and the political, one that rethinks political theory by participation and is methodologically attuned to the hardships and suffering of the other.

*Between Past and Future* opens with a quote from Rene Char: "Our inheritance was left to us by no testament."<sup>2</sup> This indicated lostness denotes the problematic of thinking and context by the problem of fragmentation upon thinking and the challenge of thinking

---

<sup>1</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 3.

dimensionality and temporality. For Arendt, this indication adds a point of reclamation to the very meaning of thinking and an alterity of which both thinking and its point of reference as tradition by which this ‘gap’ cannot be thought through but is enacted.<sup>3</sup> As Arendt writes:

seen from the viewpoint of man, who always lives in the interval between past and future, time is not a continuum, a flow of uninterrupted succession; it is broken in the middle, at the point where ‘he’ stands; and ‘his’ standpoint is not the present as we usually understand it but rather a gap in time which ‘his’ constant fighting, ‘his’ making a stand against past and future, keeps in existence. Only because man is inserted into time and only to the extent he stands his ground does the flow of indifferent time break into tenses; it is in this insertion – the beginning of the beginning . . . which splits up the time continuum into forces which then, because they are focused on the particle or body . . . gives them their direction[.]<sup>4</sup>

According to Ronald Arnett, Arendt’s argument concerns a past that is not reconciled and a non-contemplated future.<sup>5</sup> This is understood by Arendt as the ‘gap’ of standing ‘in between’ the meaning of temporal. This is where “the notion of the between is not a linkage; it is a space that functions as a dwelling between past and future as a revelatory

---

<sup>3</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 13.

<sup>4</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 10.

<sup>5</sup> Ronald Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Rhetoric of Warning and Hope* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University, 2013).

location of meaning, a dwelling place for lived tradition that reshapes and reclaims itself in the ongoing meeting of past and future.”<sup>6</sup>

In *Between Past and Future*, Chapter 1 on “Tradition in the Modern Age,” Arendt offers three examples of thinking through tradition by Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche as cases in point “just before the break came” as a total collapse in thinking and confusion.<sup>7</sup> Arendt notes Kierkegaard’s leap from doubt into belief was a reversal and a distortion of the traditional relationship between reason and faith and that:

Marx’s leap from theory into action, and from contemplation into labour, came after Hegel had transformed metaphysics into philosophy of history and changed the philosopher into the historian to whose backward glance eventually, at the end of time, the meaning of becoming and motion not of being and truth would reveal itself. Nietzsche’s leap from the nonsensuous transcendent realm of ideas and measurements into the sensuousness of life, his ‘inverted Platonism’ or ‘transvaluation of values’ . . . was the last attempt to turn away from tradition, and it succeeded only in turning tradition upside down.<sup>8</sup>

Arendt emphasizes that these three thinkers rebelled against a tradition which had lost its *arche*—its “beginning and principle.”<sup>9</sup> Above all, this loss denotes the breaking of

---

<sup>6</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 48.

<sup>7</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 27–29.

<sup>8</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 29.

<sup>9</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 30.

hegemony in modernity and the inability in modernity to think through its *arche* concretely within its time as a fragment of that which is. Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche pointed towards the meaning of practice. It is in the political sphere where those ‘gaps’ are manifested and performed that can give rise to tyrannical and authoritarian regimes.<sup>10</sup> According to Arnett: “Arendt suggests that totalitarianism finds a foothold when the public arena is no longer a place of freedom. This freedom requires ‘inter-spaces’ between persons and ideas in a public domain that is composed of difference. When we move freedom to private life alone, it is generally a sign of public decline.”<sup>11</sup>

It is with the echoing of the meaning of the ‘*polis*,’ as Arendt states in *The Human Condition*,<sup>12</sup> that thinking of the law governing human discourse resides. It is thinking that thinks “the boundary line” as *nomos*.<sup>13</sup> The law of the city-state (was quite literally), as Arendt writes, “a wall without which there might have been (only) an agglomeration of houses, a town . . . but not a city, a political community. This wall-like law was sacred, but only the enclosure was political (as the polis is a ring-like encirclement), without it a public realm could no more exist than a piece of property without a fence to hedge it in, the one harbored and enclosed political life as the other sheltered and protected the biological life process of the family.”<sup>14</sup> Arendt elaborates thinking of the human as ‘body’ and ‘mind’<sup>15</sup> belonging to the realm of action by which contemplation is rendered possible,<sup>16</sup> as the

---

<sup>10</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 99.

<sup>11</sup> Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times*, 55.

<sup>12</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

<sup>13</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 63.

<sup>14</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 64.

<sup>15</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 73.

<sup>16</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 176.

human distinction, as lived ‘*alteritas*,’ or otherness as plurality.<sup>17</sup> This interrogates ‘beginnings and ends.’<sup>18</sup> Arendt states: it “has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries.”<sup>19</sup> That the frame upon which “the human frailty of human institutions and laws and, generally, of all matters pertaining to men’s living together, arises from the **human condition** of natality,”<sup>20</sup> brings the innate communication by the proclaimed hardship-of-life as differing accounts of living and being, by which the *saga* of each is a unique telling of its being as speech.<sup>21</sup>

The city-state as a gathering facilitates the contemplative conditions of the possibility of human sociality at large by performative-action-based-debate; a ‘performance’<sup>22</sup> based on a ‘plurality’ of thinking self and community as the practice of otherness, or as collective care.<sup>23</sup> This is explicated by Arendt in Chapter 3 of *Between Past and Future*, “What is Authority?”—with its emphasis on participation in the performing arts and political institutions.<sup>24</sup> Arendt brings forward the importance of visible participation in the public sphere in Chapter 4. “What is Freedom?” Here, alterity and alienation are brought about, with Arendt noting that “the Greek polis once was precisely that ‘form of government’ which provided men with a space of appearances where they

---

<sup>17</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 176.

<sup>18</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 177.

<sup>19</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 190.

<sup>20</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 191.

<sup>21</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 191–192.

<sup>22</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 206.

<sup>23</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 238.

<sup>24</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 152.

could act, with a kind of theatre where freedom could appear.”<sup>25</sup> Further to this, Arendt explains that:

if, then, we understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or *raison d’etre* would be to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity can appear. This is the realm where worldly reality, tangible in words which can be heard, its deeds which can be seen, and in events which are talked about, remembered, and turned into stories before they are finally incorporated into the great storybook of human history.<sup>26</sup>

For Arendt, performativity enacts alterity in the public sphere, augments the work of democracy and means by which tradition and thought are brought to their present time where theory and praxis are contemplated together. As Arnett explains: “Arendt equates freedom with action—to act in performance, referring to the Greek doing of the arts—in order to emphasize the importance of performing in public space. The realm of the public is in the space of human appearances and action. She contends that it takes courage to leave the protection of the private space and enter the public realm and reminds us of the importance of the doing of freedom in the public domain.”<sup>27</sup> It is by transforming story into action that the ‘plurality’ and ‘distinctness’ of ‘otherness’ and ‘*alteritas*’ can be contemplated and thought through in the public political domain of action signifying the

---

<sup>25</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 152.

<sup>26</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 153.

<sup>27</sup> Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times*, 55.

meaning of a community.<sup>28</sup> Arnett elaborates: “the polis brings together the fragile union of the story and behaviour that creates products through deeds understood within the realm of the story, which keeps them from perishing.”<sup>29</sup> This inclusive participation brings ‘action and speech’ narrative, thought and action into the work of rethinking the community, ever flowing with plurality, attuned to others and otherness, in empowered plurality as humanism.

Jacques Derrida explicates the power of the meaning of relation and situatedness of otherness, rethinking text and context. His practice of deconstruction, in which the self is presented as a “refugee,” is discussed thoughtfully in *Aporias: Dying—Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth.”* This self is in the world, caught in-between perpetual war, nullity, and otherness. It is being devoid of voice and context. With Derrida’s placing of *differance* and alterity as the focal point of both contemplation and practice—a praxis of difference articulates the totalizing impact of metaphysical enclosures and destitution and rethinks theory and practice. The chapter will discuss the meaning of difference in Derrida’s work to outline the stand of alterity within as the passage through the ‘*prasso*’ of ‘*praxis*’ thus augmenting the work of transformation traversing meaning with the work of difference within systems of thought.<sup>30</sup> As Derrida explains in *Positions*:<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> Anna Yeatman, “Individuality and Politics: Thinking with and beyond Hannah Arendt,” in *Action and Appearance: Ethics and the Politics of Writing in Hannah Arendt*, ed. Anna Yeatman, Philip Hanson, Magdalena Zolkos, and Charles Barbour (New York: Continuum, 2011), 76.

<sup>29</sup> Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times*, 72.

<sup>30</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Theory and Practice*, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2019), 30–31.

<sup>31</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Continuum, 2004).

The gram difference, then is a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of opposition presence/ absence. *Differance* is the systemic play of differences, of the traces of difference, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *differance* indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the ‘full’ terms would not signify, would not function. It is also the becoming-space of the spoken chain—which has been called temporal or linear; a becoming-space which makes possible both writing and everyday correspondence between speech and writing, every passage from one to the other.<sup>32</sup>

This “becoming-space” denotes discourse and interpretation,<sup>33</sup> which contours any question on the “authority of presence.” This questioning refers to that whatness of the text and its author, bringing forward its context as ‘archi-trace.’<sup>34</sup> This context is where the political is; it is a site of interpretation and meaning. This is parsed by the meaning of alterity, and a carving out of space within the text and con-text.

*Differance* is the becoming by which motion is set, by alterity as critique of ontology and discourse, by the trace, and is beyond ontology proper. This ‘after-effect’ of

---

<sup>32</sup> Derrida, *Positions*, 24.

<sup>33</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 8.

<sup>34</sup> Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 10–12.

‘dislocation’ at the site articulates an ‘erasure.’ This is announced by its displacement of interpretation and meaning, thus challenging the political by its activity and passivity as its simultaneity. This is the aporia of thought facing radical alterity. This movement contemplates the *margin* as a limit point of which the text is both present and absent, announced, set, and dislocated. In describing the essentiality of *différance*, David Wood notes the following: “dialectics is understood as always serving untimely to restore identity. *Différance* on the other hand, aims to break out of this system, to renounce identity and meaning.”<sup>35</sup> *Différance* is the work of an excessive act of transgression that rethinks praxis as the *prasso*-passage through the thought of *peras* as limit-boundary, in its relation to theory as a crossing<sup>36</sup>; therein rethinking otherness.

For Derrida, this alterity as a dislocation brings forward the meaning of deconstruction. It thinks of architecture as *arche*, point origin, as a commanding presence. As Derrida writes in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II*<sup>37</sup>—in his essay “No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture”—the condition of the architecture and the thinking of it as “signifying or symbolic value of this meaning must command the structure and syntax, the form and functioning . . . it must command from the outside, according to the principle (*arche*), a grounding or foundation, a transcendence or finality (*telos*) whose

---

<sup>35</sup> David Wood, “Différance and the Problem of Strategy,” in *Derrida and Différance*, ed. David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 67.

<sup>36</sup> Derrida, *Theory and Practice*, 84 and 86.

<sup>37</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II*, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

locations are not architectural. The anarchitectural topic of this semanticism”<sup>38</sup> articulates the condition of deconstruction.

Through this meaning—the act of deconstruction as a peripheral engagement—Derrida thinks through the trace, signifying the political by the meaning of suspension. This suspension is the subversive, allowing an under-verse within thought as action. It is a positive space, a shelter and a refuge in the course of thinking-to-Being, contemplated as an excess of absence.

With this emphasis on alterity as a subversive act, we will now turn to Michel Foucault. Foucault was influenced by Heidegger’s emphasis on the metaphysical-epistemological-technological-enclosures of thinking. He set out to demonstrate the physical-enclosure-thesis historically by surveying scientific-medical developments impacting the social-political as the historical developments that build the enclosures as developed epistemological technologies, anchoring the social and political hegemony of the state apparatus’ project of power and control. Foucault thinks through the meaning of the fragmentation and otherness, while posing ways to counter the regimes of enclosures and state surveillance and control brought about by technological epistemologies. In his seminar “Society Must Be Defended” (1975–1976), Foucault articulates the power by which society is ordered and developed as the meaning of war.<sup>39</sup> In this seminar, Foucault addresses how:

---

<sup>38</sup> Derrida, *Psyche*, 91.

<sup>39</sup> Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003).

History can be used as means not only of reporting struggle, but as a weapon itself in the ongoing struggle, and this not merely during the war, but in the ensuing peace. How do models of war move from being the means of the constitution of society to the conserver of society, when struggle gets turned inward as a defence from within rather than against what is without? This is a society that uses war in peacetime, internally rather than externally, as a defence of society against the dangers which are born in its own body. For Foucault, this is ‘the great reversal’ from history to biology, from the constituent to the medical.<sup>40</sup>

Foucault’s discussion of war aims at the ‘exceptionalism’ of its meaning and its normalization into and for discourse by which the indicated meaning of Clausewitz’s phrase that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” is examined.

The discourse of war is invested in the social constitution of all activities. In *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault “raises the spectre of marginal political subjectivities, constituted through the discourse of war who inhabit that boundary and bring it back inside. Their existence subverts the modern politics/war dialectic not only by conceiving of politics as the constitution of war by other means but through their constitution as subjects of the very intra-societal war that modern politics must expel.”<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> Stuart Elden, “Strategies for Waging Peace,” in *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 38.

<sup>41</sup> Andrew Neal, “Goodbye War on Terror?,” in *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 44.

This element is placed in contention with thinking and subjectivity, whereby the subject is a by-product of conflict and a site of tension. The operating method by which Foucault seeks to envision the subject as a counterpoint to the apparatus of discourse is the meaning of “subjugated knowledge.” Foucault discusses the meaning of the term “subjugated knowledge,” stating that: “When I say subjugated I mean two things. On the one hand . . . historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations . . . second . . . a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity.”<sup>42</sup> This conceptualization leads Foucault to thinking about “genealogies” that are “anti-sciences” and are about the “insurrection of knowledges.”<sup>43</sup> Foucault explicates further: “archaeology is the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them.”<sup>44</sup>

Genealogy is how Foucault thinks through historical fragments and is contoured to fragmentational thinking.<sup>45</sup> This thinking envisions the subject as a platform of ‘insurrection’ and as desubjugated knowledge. Rudi Visker notes that through genealogy, Foucault “refers not only to a discontinuity which destroys the illusion of a linear

---

<sup>42</sup> Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” 7.

<sup>43</sup> Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” 9.

<sup>44</sup> Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” 10–11.

<sup>45</sup> Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” 11.

development, but also to a deeper continuity which is a product of a sequence of transformations.”<sup>46</sup> Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow also address this in their earlier work on Foucault:

The genealogist recognizes that the deep hidden meanings, the unreachable heights of truth, the murky interiors of consciousness are all shams. Genealogy’s coat of arms might read: Oppose depth, finality, and interiority. Its banner: Mistrust identities in history; they are only masks, appeals to unity. The deepest truth that the genealogist has to reveal is the secret that [things] have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.<sup>47</sup>

This subversion of the meaning of thought is indicative of Foucault’s methodology, which aims to think discourse from the bottom-up with the over-arching or the top-down of “biopolitics” and “biopower.”<sup>48</sup> This concerns how even the biological is under state control, and the invention of different technologies of power (of surveillance and control of the population) start from the eighteenth century, with a decisive paradigm of social engineering of the “biopolitics of the human race.”<sup>49</sup> Whereby “it is indeed the emergence of this biopower that inscribes it in the mechanism of the state. It is in that moment the

---

<sup>46</sup> Rudi Visker, *Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique* (New York: Verso, 1995), 16.

<sup>47</sup> Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (London: Routledge, 1982), 107.

<sup>48</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 240 and 254.

<sup>49</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 240–243.

racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of power.”<sup>50</sup> As Elden explains, this racism is brought forward by the very politicization of the biological, scientific meaning of biopower:

in ‘Society Must Be Defended’ [biopower] involves the building up of profiles, statistical measures and so on, increasing knowledge through monitoring and surveillance, ‘extremely meticulous orderings of space,’ and control through discipline. Birth and death rates and measures of longevity become important; fertility, illness, diet and habitation become measured; statistics and demographics come together with economics and politics.<sup>51</sup>

This form of control, exhibited as a new form of ‘administration of the body’ and of the subject in space-time, concedes itself to the gaze of the state and its meaning as control. This meaning observes the subject as a mathematical, statistically construed element of which the power of the state is enacted by scientific values. Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow explain:

The object to be understood by administrative knowledge was not the rights of people, not the nature of divine or human law, but the state itself. However, the point of this knowledge was not to develop a general theory; rather, it was to help define the specific nature of a specific historical state.

---

<sup>50</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 254.

<sup>51</sup> Elden, “Strategies for Waging Peace,” 25.

And this required the gathering of information on the state's environment, its population, its resources, and its problems . . . a whole array of empirical methods of investigation had to be developed or advanced to generate this knowledge. The history, geography, climate, and demography of a particular country became more than mere curiosities. They were crucial elements in a new complex of power and knowledge. The government, particularly the administrative apparatus, needed knowledge that was concrete, specific, and measurable in order to operate effectively. This enabled it to ascertain precisely the state of its forces, where they were weak and how they could be shored up. The new political rationality of biopower was therefore connected with the nascent empirical human sciences.<sup>52</sup>

This emphasis on the power-state-control as an apparatus aims to mathematically quantify and rank order otherness and to control it. The enclosures specify any element of the other as an 'enemy' to vanquish and/or to unleash the powers of production understood under the rubric of human 'curiosity' for the development of itself by viewing the other as a scientific project/object to study and control.<sup>53</sup>

The enclosures are exemplified by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*, where he articulates a foreclosed, tyrannical historical development. The book surveys the epistemological-medical-technological developments that brought 'biopower' to the social and political by natural, biological calamities such as, earthquakes, floods, plagues,

---

<sup>52</sup> Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 137.

<sup>53</sup> Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended."

illnesses, draught and famine as well as by manmade means such as war and crime, in the course of human history and the scientific development of the state as territorial sovereign apparatus, as a working-governance.<sup>54</sup> These induced ‘quarantined,’ ‘frozen-in-time,’ surveillance-prison enclosures, where the state is an ‘omnipresence’ through and by its bricked-architectural-designed-enclosed-local and operates as an epistemological mindset of control that secures-locks-down-everything-and-anyone-in-place, as an unveiled all-seeing-surveying-enclosing-foreclosing “Panopticon”<sup>55</sup>; a governing-sovereign apparatus.

This functions as an “enclosed segmented space, observed at any point . . . in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and periphery.”<sup>56</sup> A prison system encasing-by-total-lockdown the individual, for the ‘total visibility’ and validity of the state as a governing power and force, a territorial sovereign, observing the periphery and pinning visibility to the wall as its announced enclosure and circumference.<sup>57</sup> This control is employed by technologies of power that regulate the subject, socially engineering it, enfolding it, and foreclosing its meaning as a given to a set of parameters of profiling and ordering. This “biopower,” according to Foucault, found its zenith in the Nazi and Socialist states, where eugenics, racism, and social engineering were the platform of the governing state at war.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 195.

<sup>55</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 195.

<sup>56</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 197.

<sup>57</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 200.

<sup>58</sup> Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended*,” 258–262.

The question of alterity, the otherness within discourse, becomes a focal point of thinking for both the meaning of enclosed-foreclosed discourse and its counter as the thinking of the subject meeting the political through thinking the fragment of its genealogy as suffering and rendered speechlessness. The thinking of the fragment is the method by which Foucault devises an investigation that is pointed towards meaning of the periphery both inwards and outwards, as ways of both thinking biopower and countering it.

Following from this discussion of “subjugated knowledge,” as a political rethinking of the subject, the chapter will investigate the meaning of the “subaltern” as brought forward by Gayatri Spivak in her essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?”<sup>59</sup> Spivak focuses on those who stand in difference as an alterity in Hindu society:

Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, Aboriginals, and the lowest strata of urban subproletariat . . . we must confront the following question: on the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education . . . **can the subaltern speak?**<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Rosalind C. Morris (ed.), *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

<sup>60</sup> Morris, *Can the Subaltern Speak*, 37. My bold print.

The 'subaltern' is invoked by Spivak as the notion of the lowest class, following Antonio Gramsci's concept of the "subaltern classes."<sup>61</sup> For Spivak, the subaltern is a marginalized group. It cannot speak, but acts in a manner that symbolizes their destitution, malaise, and lack of recognition by their bodies. This embodiment is the act of alterity in thought and being.<sup>62</sup>

*Can the subaltern speak?* This question reverberates throughout the work as a call to rethink theory and praxis by the action attended to alterity. The subaltern women other is reflected on by Spivak, by the questioning of articulation of the marginal, in academic thinking and explication. This is understood by Spivak as the neglect of locality of Indigenous voices in postcolonial studies as well as the academic prioritization of critiques set from the vantage-point of a male European mentality and philosophy (this is Spivak's critique of Foucault and Deleuze). Through the figure of the women-other as "subaltern," the meeting of otherness is conjoined in Spivak's paper by the exemplar of the ritual suicide and self-immolation of widows in Hindu society and the meaning of the political through colonial rule. Without condoning this practice, which was outlawed by British colonial rule, Spivak addresses the silence of the women in and through the symbolic order and law.<sup>63</sup>

The importance of gender as subaltern further emphasizes the barring of the symbolic and the individuation within the discourse of women, essentially foreclosing the

---

<sup>61</sup> Morris, *Can the Subaltern Speak*, 37.

<sup>62</sup> Morris, *Can the Subaltern Speak*, 54.

<sup>63</sup> Morris, *Can the Subaltern Speak*.

women as self, thus denoting the body as a site of sacrifice and the self as a subaltern. The self is understood as a dislocated fragment. According to Gairola, this ties Spivak's text to Bataille's notion of "expenditure":

In 'The Notion of Expenditure' Georges Bataille claims that the word 'expenditure' should be reserved for the designation of 'unproductive forms, and not for the designation of all the modes of consumption that serve as a means to the end of production.' Bataille goes on to say that 'in each case of unproductive expenditure the accent is placed on a loss that must be as great as possible in order for that activity to take on its true meaning.' In our context, the death of the widow leaves an indelible mark that testifies to the intensity of expenditure. This is expenditure at its core: the loss is so great that it generates meaning at the site of its own conspicuous annihilation.<sup>64</sup>

The expenditure signifies the erasure of the women as a symbolic other. With this question—"can the subaltern speak?"—Spivak posits critical questions of subjectivity, choice, and 'voice' at the periphery.<sup>65</sup> The periphery as a site of the subaltern is brought under the meaning of the political, by which representation is questioned by rethinking

---

<sup>64</sup> Rahul Gairola, "Burning with Shame: Desire and South Asian Patriarchy, from Gayatri Spivak's 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' to Deepa Mehta's 'Fire,'" *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 311.

<sup>65</sup> Birla, "Postcolonial Studies: Now That's History," 89.

class struggle and domination. This is a specific challenge for postcolonial studies and the meaning of the political as representation and action and agency.

Thinking the body both psychologically and socially as a site of symbolic imprint longing for voice, meaning and the articulation of desire for fulfilment raised by Spivak's question of gender as voice, is approached and augmented by the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, in his seminar XI *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*.<sup>66</sup>

In this seminar, Lacan discusses the body as the site of articulation and manifestation of the 'unconscious,' a realization of the 'self' through the "the passage to the limit" that is denoted as a split between levels of awareness meeting the Real as the unknown, the thing-in-itself, the phenomenal world. Working through Sigmund Freud's foundational psychoanalysis, Lacan thinks the "unconscious" as condensation and displacement within thought that splits the subject by 'repetition' within language-structures and social-discourse. For Lacan the unconscious is symptomatically visceral and visible as a 'gap' and 'lack' in thinking and being, by apprehension.<sup>67</sup>

Apprehension is detached and incomprehensible as "the navel of dreams . . . to their unknown centre," a "discontinuity," where the "appearance/disappearance takes place between two points, the initial and the terminal of this logical time-between the instant of seeing, when something of the intuition itself is always elided, not to say lost, and that elusive moment when the apprehension of the unconscious is not, in fact, concluded, when

---

<sup>66</sup> Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Taylor and Francis, 2018).

<sup>67</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 19–25.

it is always a question of an ‘absorption’ fraught with false trails [*une recuperation leurree*]. Ontically, then, the unconscious is the elusive.”<sup>68</sup> Utilizing Heidegger’s thinking through the “timber-trails [*Holzwege*]” as false paths, and the meaning of relational “absorption,” Lacan thinks the “unconscious” as an articulation of the “phenomenological-ethicality” of the-subject-as-a question-about-gender by which the subject is struggling to find meaning, to think through the enclosures-of-thought, of the symbolic order of social-categories, a struggle that is manifested by silence and as ‘abruptness,’ as an ever-elusive ‘absence’ depicted as a trauma and as a paradox.<sup>69</sup>

With this, Lacan thinks through this challenging that unfolds a body-phenomenology through narration and language as ‘*Wiederholung*,’ drawing on Martin Heidegger’s thinking, repetition as re-visitation of grounds and meanings.<sup>70</sup> This is manifested as Lacan emphasizes by the layered internal ‘split between the eye and the gaze,’<sup>71</sup> leading to an “ontological turning back” as an interrogation of ‘form,’<sup>72</sup> meaning, theory and practice. Consciousness turns back upon itself as a gapped-optical-inversion, denoting an uncanny [*Unheimlich*], bringing Freud’s founding thinking together with phenomenological situatedness of the un-homely-eerie-dread of nihilation; a suspension brought by the-gaze-of-the-phenomenal-world-itself-upon-the-self-on-looking, that opens

---

<sup>68</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 23; 25; 32.

<sup>69</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 36–38.

<sup>70</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 67.

<sup>71</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 67.

<sup>72</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 72.

up a chasm as an encounter with its Real as the phenomenal ellipsis, a “sliding away,”<sup>73</sup> a presence and absence-abruptness.

This lack and gap within thinking and the corporeal is where Lacan invokes the elusive by referring to the Ancient Chinese Daoist thinker Chung-Tzu and his account of the “dream of the butterfly.” As Lacan recounts, upon dreaming of the butterfly Chung-Tzu wakes up from the elusive, surreal dream, asking himself: “is he the butterfly who [all along] dreams he is Chung-Tzu?”<sup>74</sup> A dream within a dream, a sliding-mirroring-within, and therein, a conundrum of endless-slopes and dead-ends, an ‘evanescent’ of appearances and illusions, desire and dread of otherness, a viscerally lost articulation as a symptomatic traumatic “*anamorphosis*.”<sup>75</sup> Whereby the self-meeting, the uncanny [*Unheimlich*] encountering, in utter nullity and nihilation, with a desire to make sense and to find one’s voice and truth as one’s ethics-in-life. This desire beckons to think the self anew in time-space, and to provide the self with stamina and attention, while giving space to the destitution and poverty of the subject-itself, at the limit of the utmost personal pain and uncertainty, as well as the hope for meeting the Other in the social sphere for recognition, articulation, equality, and empowerment.

For Lacan the subject is split within itself and is barred from the symbolic order-the subject is left naked alone in destitute and as a desire-to-be, Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory aims to empower the subject with her/his quest for recognition-by-equality by the

---

<sup>73</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 75.

<sup>74</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 76.

<sup>75</sup> Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 87.

knowledge in the traumatic elusive Real as an embodiment and articulation of the destitution and relation of self and others. Lacan thinks the body as a focal and local of desire and articulation of abruptness and situatedness embodied as gender in destitution and hope for reflection of self-knowledge in the symbolic of narration of self-situatedness and relations to and with others, by attentive social institutional articulation in lawful rights and equality.

This chapter reviewed the meaning of metaphysical enclosures as a mindset of governance. This follows from Martin Heidegger's emphasis on otherness as difference, an announced phenomenological alterity articulated by the corporeal body and language. The thinkers explored here—Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gayatri Spivak, and Jacques Lacan—while influenced by Heidegger, promote a *humanist approach*, one that articulates Heidegger's interrogation of the 'limits' '*peras*,' 'end' as '*telos*' and '*arche*' beginning. These thinkers argue for equality and societal change, voicing the destitute by rethinking locality and temporality as singularity and the context of the body as a text-*corpus*. These thinkers exemplify how alterity is thought through in theory and action-to-praxis.

This is understood with Arendt's thinking on modernity-enclosures, and alterity as a site of performativity of otherness and the political, as well as democracy as plurality and participation. With Derrida, this is considered as the meaning of enclosures-in-thought and being through *differance*; the trace as deconstruction and thinking that enables a rethinking of the practice of the political. For Foucault, it is thinking physical confinement, enclosures of the body and self, by metaphysics as epistemological technologies of control and

governance; also thinking [historical] fragments as genealogies countering the political meaning of biopower. With Spivak, this involves questioning the meaning of representation and subjectivity with the subaltern- marginalized-destitute-barred-women-other through the periphery of the political in thought and action. The chapter discussion of metaphysical enclosures ends with Lacan's empowering the self by rethinking the corporeal body as a given uncanny site of unknown and abrupt destitution, articulating the work of the unconscious that is a narrativized otherness as lack. Namely, empowering the self by the desire to be in the world and to have a voice for societal change.

This chapter concludes with a short commentary on peripheral thinking. It is in the *topos* of periphery that a consorted contemplation could begin on core elements of the center as a tensed point encircling thinking as praxis. The remotest part enfolds the core, the first order and principle by the act of the *epoche*, as the work of alterity. As noted by Slavoj Zizek (addressing the philosophical work of Catherine Malabou): “an *epoche*, a suspension, a bracketing of sociality, is sometimes the only access to alterity, a way to feel close to all the isolated people on Earth.”<sup>76</sup> Peripheral thinking should not be understood as exclusively geographical from the center point but rather a point where systemic thought differentiates itself within self as a hierarchy of values and priority. This emphasis points to the very core of the ‘whatness’ of that ‘is’ of thought challenging the political as the bedrock of meaning and the pivot of both theory and praxis.

---

<sup>76</sup> Slavoj Zizek, *Pandemic!: COVID-19 Shakes the World* (New York: Polity Press, 2020), 98.

## CONCLUSION

In his recent article “The Surprise of the Event,” François Raffoul notes the following:

The event is no longer anchored in a principle or ground that is itself not happening. Being is not a substance but an event. Being ‘is’ not, but happens, and can happen only to the extent that nothing founds or preexists it. As Martin Heidegger put it, ‘The essence [of being] cannot be exhibited like something present at hand; its essential happening must be awaited like a shock.’ Thus preceded by nothing and grounded in no essence, the event of being can only come as a surprise.<sup>1</sup>

Thinking Being is thinking the *event of Being*—meaning the abrupt, happening of corporeal engagement with the surroundings as a rethinking of an intuited rhythm of *phronesis* by locality as temporality. Thinking limits and periphery become an education through which theory and *praxis* are rethought and crafted. Heidegger discusses this in his 1942 *Parmenides* seminar. The “Greeks’ final word concerning the hidden counter-essence of ἀλήθεια *alethea*, Λήθη, *lethe*” is observed by Heidegger at the ‘end’ of Plato’s Book X of *The Republic/Politeia* as the district of the uncanny, unhomelike [*Unheimlich*],<sup>2</sup> denoting it as a δεινόν, *deinamos topos*, a place which Plato designates as a forbidden realm of forgetfulness, oblivion, and deceit. It is a region that one must not enter. As “*Lethe* appears

---

<sup>1</sup> François Raffoul, “The Surprise,” *Qui parle*, Vol. 31 (2022): 329.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 118.

as the counter essence to *phusis* . . . the field of *Lethe* prevents every disclosure of beings, of the ordinary. In the essential place of *Lethe* everything disappears.”<sup>3</sup> The meaning of *Lethe* as a field and as a river, for Heidegger “eludes all containment” as it brings the meaning of lostness and absence to play. To think the revealed of the present as that which presences [*Es-gibt*] is to think phenomenologically: ἀλήθεια *alethea* [and/with] *Λήθη*, *Lethe* anew. This is to think the modality of that which ‘is’ that which is ‘not’ and that which is shown and how, meaning to think-with as a “look-into as a looking of the gaze into the essence, i.e., the gaze of ‘philosophy’ [by] *phronesis*.”<sup>4</sup> In essence, where Plato ends his thought and becomes an anchored philosophical doctrine achieving a full encirclement by streamlining the meaning of truth and falsehood as a category, a full logical presence/essence, a method of observation. The task of thinking must begin to rethink its meaning of essence from the ground up, rethinking Plato and his philosophical assumptions entirely. That is to think the modality of meaning itself as a layered temporal one that thinks “dis-closure” and “un-veiling”—one that provides crafted new thinking of *pseudos*’ as *falsum*, the false. As Heidegger explains:

At the outset, ‘dis-closure’ could only say as much as ‘un-veiling,’ the removal of the veiling and the concealment. But disclosure or dis-concealment does not mean the mere removal and elimination of concealment. We must think dis-closure exactly the way we think of dis-charging (igniting) or dis-playing (unfolding). Discharging means to release

---

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 118–119.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 120.

the charge; displaying means to let play out the folds of the manifold in their multiplicity . . . disclosure, however does not simply result in something disclosed as enclosed. Instead, the dis-closure [Ent-bergen] is at the same time an en-closure [Ent-bergen] . . . the word ‘dis-closure’ is essentially . . . ambiguous in that it expresses a two-fold with an intrinsic unity; on the one hand, as *disclosure* it is the removal concealment . . . and then also of distortion and displacement (*pseudos*); on the other hand . . . as *disclosure* it is a sheltering en-closure, i.e., an assuming and preserving in unconcealedness . . . it is itself of a concealed essence. We see this first by looking upon *Lethe* and its holding sway, which withdraws into absence and points to a falling away and a falling out.<sup>5</sup>

Thinking phenomenologically and hermeneutically, Heidegger set out to prove that the first, the earliest words and meanings ever recorded/spoken by ancient Greek philosophy that inaugurated it as philosophy, spoken by Anaximander, hold/sustain and challenge thought to its utmost extreme to this very day, present day included, and is the most practical and challenging ever, one that holds sway upon the very meaning of thinking and thought: *το Περαζ/ to peras–το Άπειρων/to a-perion* [the limit and limitless].

Heidegger’s challenge is to think the absence as a ripple resonance, a layered meaning reverberating-ripple-motationality, that is to think the meaning of transitional meanings of sheltering and layers inter-acting as laws within and therein as the “borrowed

---

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 133.

home” and its “*oiko-nomia*,” a “metaphor,” thinking “the motifs of light and home,”<sup>6</sup> in transition. The hovering radiance dim glow as the meaning of the go-between within the overall in-between.

Heidegger brings forward his meaning of “*doxa*—gleam, shine, radiance,” in section 46 of *The Event* (2013), as “emerging out of itself and yet remaining with itself—continuously radiating out from itself . . . radiating self-concealing,”<sup>7</sup> as a layered relatability “the moon—not itself luminous-can emerge, but borrowed light. In the same way *doxa*: self-showing only under the precedence of *Alethea*.”<sup>8</sup> As a layered correlation—and a *pseudos*’ unthought veiled-inter-action, an unthought relational meaning, by which *doxa* articulates in fact a reverberation of meanings of ripples and shadows, while allowing thinking to materialize: achieved only if the thinker is mindful with the practice of attention to its reverberations /echoes therein of the enclosures thereof-through and throughout. John Sallis explains, in his book *Echoes after Heidegger* (1990),<sup>9</sup> the tragic mutilated meaning and distortion of being, that the echo “must be an image of the originating sound, like the shadow that a thing casts on the opposite wall”<sup>10</sup>; this is a rethinking of Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave,” the meaning of *Alethea*, the courage for truth to encounter the tragic violent meaning of lostness, of governing mindsets, deception, bondage and errancy. This, while

---

<sup>6</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Vol. I*, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 61.

<sup>7</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Event*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 24.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *The Event*, 26.

<sup>9</sup> John Sallis, *Echoes after Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

<sup>10</sup> Sallis, *Echoes after Heidegger*, 8.

also bringing forward the myth portrayed by Ovid in “Echo and Narcissus.”<sup>11</sup> The echoes as shadows, *doxical*, are in fact “dismembered voices” of endless “doubling” and “returns”<sup>12</sup> an endless turning, a tragic lesson, of limits and their meaning, of lostness, appearance, essencing and presencing of that which ‘is.’ In the tragic tale by Ovid, the self-realization and knowledge of Narcissus is brought about by the endless mutilation of Echo tragically turning to a violent self-same glorification of enclosure as a narrowing-collapsing of mind and thought towards a total-tragic obliteration and nihilation ending in nothing.

Heidegger’s journey within the course of being took him to a realization of the meaning aimed by nihilation, as David Farrell Krell notes: “Heidegger is concerned to show that all the sundry diagnosis and proffered therapies of nihilism are bound to fail. . . . For Heidegger, nihilism results from our persistent failure to think the nothing, to confront in our thought the power of the *nihil* in human existence, which is mortal existence, and in history, which is the history of the oblivion of being and the abandonment *by* being. Such thinking requires a protracted confrontation with the history of Western thought since Plato.”<sup>13</sup> This radicalized Heidegger personally and led him to partake in the nihilism of his day, tainting his philosophy with National Socialism, Anti-Semitism, fascism, and ultra-nationalism. Heidegger’s announced meaning of catastrophe and tragedy within the course of modernity, brought him to radicalize the meaning of the ‘*Unter-gang*,’ that is to think the end, as an active thinking the ruins, tragedy, and desolation a downwards-going-

---

<sup>11</sup> Sallis, *Echoes after Heidegger*, 1.

<sup>12</sup> Sallis, *Echoes after Heidegger*, 9.

<sup>13</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1–2, trans. David Farrell Krell, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), xviii.

to a slope-under, as a willed tragic fall to the abyssal end, willing the end. The ‘going-under’ down the slopes of the abyss as the all-encompassing meaning of thinking of *phusis* itself, as perpetual ruins and failures of culture, thinking and being, finds its way in Heidegger thinking through theology by the downfall of humanity and thinking through the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as the last word ever spoken by the West, and for Heidegger concludes it entirely.

John Sallis writes on Heidegger’s utilization of the *Unter-gang*: “the allusions to Nietzsche, to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, could hardly be more transparent: set apart from the last men, those called grounders of the abyss and grounds of the truth of beyng are to go under. Somewhat as Zarathustra went under so as to expose what underlies Platonism (a ‘Platonism for the people’) and to bring about the going-under [*Unter-gang*] of man himself . . . they are the ones to come, those of the future [*die Zukünftigen*].”<sup>14</sup> The meaning of the tragic, failure and errancy, led Heidegger to a theology of nihilism and the apocalypse in a willed National Socialism.<sup>15</sup> While in 1966 Heidegger stated that he confronted this ideology at the time in his own way, he did not provide an adequate critique of his own anti-Semitism, ultra-nationalism, fascism, and National Socialism that appear in his writings and lectures. This issue, which is highly problematic and dangerous, will

---

<sup>14</sup> John Sallis, “Grounders of the Abyss,” in *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 190.

<sup>15</sup> Peter Trawny, *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger’s Anarchy*, trans. Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015); Lin Ma, “Thinking through Heidegger’s ‘Untergang’ Star,” *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2021): 65–78; Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger, the Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Richard Wolin, *Heidegger in Ruins: Between Philosophy and Ideology* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2022).

continue to impact Heidegger and any dealings with his philosophy; any new biographical and philosophical writing is subject to ongoing research efforts, publications and archival research. The dissertation also maintains that Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, is highly versatile, original, and practical. The dissertation argues that Martin Heidegger indeed proved philosophically-logically-thoughtfully his thesis on the "end of philosophy and the task of thinking," thinking through thought-forms [*Gestalt*] of metaphysics by its developmental-historical construct of premises and ways of thinking. In addition, hermeneutic phenomenology as deconstruction, developed by Heidegger, is a highly practical method for thinking and teaching.<sup>16</sup>

The dissertation in this regard aims to provide a 'ground-laying' preparatory introduction for any engagement and discussion what-so-ever with Martin Heidegger and his work. This dissertation was guided by the 'rubric' Heidegger develops in *Contributions to Philosophy of the Event* (2012), with its six-joinings [*Fugung*]. These, as Heidegger articulates, enter at the end of systemic apprehension and its bygone age and are not to be taken linearly or sequentially. These six-joinings [*Fugung*], which are intertwined, outline Heidegger's critique of metaphysics of causality: "The Echo-Playing Forth-Leap-

---

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Sheehan (ed.), *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (New York and London: Routledge, 1981); Richard Capobianco, *The Shimmering Unfolding* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022); Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poetic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018); William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003); Timothy Clark, *Martin Heidegger* (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2012); Charles E. Scott (ed.), *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).

Grounding-The Ones to Come-The Last-God.”<sup>17</sup> The rubric itself challenges metaphysical representational thinking, causality and linearity representing an immense challenge to thinking and thought.

Heidegger in his lecture course for science teachers at a vocational school in 1962, in a lecture called “Traditional Language and Technological Language,”<sup>18</sup> presents the following argument: the school system of today is too focused on a certain type of education, an education that relies on the practicality of the use of terms to designate specific categorical unambiguous meaning with the stated aim of eliminating any confusion. The referral back to grounding histories within terms and language is considered redundant and not useful for the course of education more so in vocational schools.<sup>19</sup>

Heidegger states that the meaning of education as a reflective amounts to a grounding orientation allowing critical reflection of and within this training and education itself. Heidegger tells the audience of science teachers the fable of the ‘useless tree’ by ancient Chinese Daoist thinker Chung-Tzu, that any perception of the useless, grounds any thinking thereof as “it is wrong to apply the standard of usefulness to the useless. The useless has its own greatness and determining power since it does not let anything be made out of it. In this manner, useless is the sense of things”<sup>20</sup>; the same applies to the task of language and thinking. In thinking the meaning of terminology in the technological

---

<sup>17</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).

<sup>18</sup> Martin Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” trans. Wanda Torres Gregory, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 23 (1998): 129–145.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 130.

<sup>20</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 131.

industrial age means to think a cybernetic enclosed mode of deliverance for production of its template. This templated operation within the techno-jargon geared for control coordinates of life-time-space “confirms the anthropological character of technology”<sup>21</sup> and the prism it sees-through, interprets and constructs the human and life as a “standard of thinking.”<sup>22</sup>

This construct is articulated by the German physicist Max Planck, the founder of quantum physics, with his paradigm that reality itself is understood only if the “‘Real’ is that which that can be measured.”<sup>23</sup> Thinking that is articulated by language adheres to the following meanings: “Speech is: (1) A faculty, an activity and achievement of humans. It is: (2) The operation of the instruments for communication and hearing. Speech is: (3) The expression and communication of emotions accompanied by thoughts in the service of information. Speech is: (4) A representing and portraying of the real and unreal.”<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, relying on the definitions of Wilhelm von Humboldt, states that:

Wilhelm von Humboldt then based these four characterizations of language, which in themselves are still ambiguous, on deeper grounds, and he defined the whole essence of language in a more comprehensive fashion. It suffices to extract this single sentence from his observations on language: If in the soul the feeling truly arises that language is not merely a means of exchange for mutual understanding, but is a true world that the spirit must set between

---

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 133.

<sup>22</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 134.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 136.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 138.

itself and objects through the inner labor of its power, then it [the soul] is thus on the true way towards finding ever more in it [namely, in language as world] and in placing ever more into it.<sup>25</sup>

The meaning of language is—an instrument of information, an instrument that is “expression, namely of an inner, i.e., of mind, through an outer—communication and writing.”<sup>26</sup> The act and burden of speaking, writing, and silence thinks through the meaning of that which presences [*Anwesen*] and what is absent [*das Abwesende*].<sup>27</sup> Language as a referral point needs to be allowed to be and exist in order for thinking, orientation, and critical reflection to transpire as education. This task expresses itself more urgently through the current modern day guided by technological vocation and pursuit, as Heidegger concludes:

That is why it would have to be considered whether instruction in the mother tongue, in view of the forces in the industrial age, is not something altogether different from a merely somewhat general education as opposed to a professional training. It would have to be pondered whether this language instruction must be, instead of an education, rather a reflection, namely, on the danger that threatens language, and this means the human being’s relation to language. However, this must be at the same time a reflection on the saving power that conceals itself in the mystery of

---

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 139.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 139.

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 140.

language, insofar as it always brings us into the nearness of what is unspoken and what is inexpressible.<sup>28</sup>

The challenge of thinking the technological global standards is to think the limits, aims and enclosures set by them as a mindset while thinking the challenge of the locality and its temporal as the sways towards the global as a community. Thinking sameness and difference within language refers to what Derrida thoughtfully called *phantology* a ripple-effect haunting within the gathering *logos* of difference as self-same, as it eludes the subject of thought at hand as a stand.<sup>29</sup> The haunting within the enclosures thinks through the echo, resonance, by the meaning of *aporia*.

The dissertation set out to show, in Chapters 1–5, the meaning of linear-temporal causality that articulates Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical orientation, demonstrated by Heidegger surveying the history of the metaphysics of thinking through spatial ‘disseverance’ as thought-forms [*Gestalt*-thought through representational; *Vorstellung* as thought position of *Stelle* through space-time]. Centering the critique of the meaning of end-point-sequential-developmental causality is Heidegger rethinking the meaning of *telos* as end-point formation and *peras* as boundary-border-limit-announcing the full magnitude of such meaning to thinking and thought. The meaning ‘end of philosophy’ as an ‘*aporia*’ in the domain of thinking of ‘errancy,’ as well as the meaning of nihilism as a tragic-catastrophic-philosophical-cultural collapse, brought Heidegger to embody nihilism proper

---

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” 142.

<sup>29</sup> David Farrell Krell, *Derrida and our Animal Others: Derrida’s Final Seminar, “The Beast and the Sovereign”* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 142–143.

with the meaning of the *Unter-gang*—to actively think and envisit/envisage the ruins and desolation, as humanity for Heidegger, is locked within its own downward slopes within ‘errancy’ and ‘aporias’ as dead-ends and failure to think and be.

This critique articulates Heidegger’s re-interpretation of philosophy as the meaning of ‘resonance’ as the essentiality of *phusis* to thinking and thought. This is brought by Heidegger rethinking the meaning of dynamics as an unthought ripple-effect-absence-resonance-as-kinesis temporal, as the full relief of presence to the unthought essence of Being. Thought through hermeneutic-phenomenological revisitation of pre-Socratic thinkers such as Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Anaximander. This enabled Heidegger’s re-interpretation of the core key terms of: physics [*phusis*] / truth [*alethea*] / logic [*logos*] / ontology [*onta/enai/ousia*] / epistemology [*episteme*] / ethics [*ethos*] / techniques [*techne and poesis*] / methods [*methodos*] / theory [*theorin*] / practice [*praxis*], understood by Heidegger as the *event of appropriation* in the realm of the immediate, as *eschatological* uttermost-point-limit-edged stand, taking things to their announced penultimate limit. Their full scope is thereby shown, their logic fully articulated and accounted for and exemplified as the sum-total-of-their-developments. Their shape as *morphe*-form [*Gestalt*] is brought to the full expressed magnitude, Being and beings are articulated by the expressed logic as meaning their full relief. However, what is shown the most is the way in which beings and Being are understood and brought to the fore, the limit and limitation of the perception thereof and through. This is understood by Heidegger as the “step-back”—[*Schritt zurück*], a new thinking of *phronesis*, an embodied intuitive thinking, rethinking locality-spatiality and temporality, one that thinks through the unknown and

abruptness. The dissertation brought forward an original advancement of its own with Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, questioning methods through structural linguistics and language by bringing forward hermeneutic phenomenological maneuverings and meanings of the *Unter-scheidung* (as separating or dissociating) a re-orientation of directionality by *Wider-spruch* (opposite in nature, direction in meaning), towards a *Grund-mittle-punkt* (ground negotiated, as a medium-middle-range-point, as foot-holding).

The dissertation brought this advancement with Heidegger's thinking through nihilism and planetary technology by Heidegger's meaning of *Das-Gestell*: the super-imposed-position [*Stelle*] as positionality of frame-form, the overarching meaning of the "planetary" meaning of technology and technicity as an industrial machination, and its objectifying the human and nature. Heidegger advanced elements towards another beginning of thinking, a thinking that thinks dynamically the fissures and aporias of metaphysics and embodies the tragic-failure and the unknown. These meanings, also argued and demonstrated by the dissertation, radicalized Heidegger with his nihilistic choice of National Socialism. The dissertation then surveyed the research developments of Heidegger and ancient East-Asian thinking ending in what the dissertation understands as the ultimate uncharted terrain of thinking: ancient East-Asian paradoxical thinking of emptiness/nothingness/resonances with Heidegger's thinking, ending in the penultimate challenge of Heidegger's one-stroke-folding-resonance with East-Asian calligraphy. The dissertation then discussed, in Chapters 6–8, Heidegger's thinking regarding metaphysical enclosures, limits, and otherness as a challenge to thinking the limit-periphery bringing

forward humanist critiques of Heidegger by Herbert Marcuse, Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gayatri Spivak, and Jacques Lacan.

Herbert Marcuse was influenced by Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, technology and "total mobilization," as well as outlining a Marxist-socialist-humanist critique of Heidegger. Marcuse thought an enclosed dimensionality as the objectification of the human through alienation by industrial capitalism and cognitive-behavioral mindsets of positivism, countering this one-dimensionality by empowerment of the self and the social through the arts as a rethinking of aesthetics. Emmanuel Levinas was influenced by Heidegger's critique of the totality of metaphysics as a violent enclosure and the importance of otherness to phenomenology. As a critique of Heidegger, Levinas endeavours to think the meaning of Otherness and "alterity" by the emphasis on the human-to-human encounter. This approach emphasizes Judaism, as a tradition and its ethical meaning centering on societal caring for human suffering and destitution, meeting Greek first philosophy towards an unthought ethical phenomenology. Hannah Arendt, thinking through the *polis* as enclosure, interrogating otherness and limits by democratic participation thought through the performativity of the fine arts, empowers plurality as humanism. Jacques Derrida's adaptation of the practice of deconstruction, rethinking text and context as a plural difference that questions the edge by suspension, allows for a carving out of space as a pause, as an empowerment, by *differance* as otherness.

Michel Foucault who was influenced by Martin Heidegger's emphasis on metaphysical-epistemological-technological-enclosures, demonstrates the physical-enclosure-thesis historically, seeking to empower the meaning of the subject while thinking

through physical enclosures and epistemological mindsets. Gayatri Spivak, thinking through the “subaltern” as the notion of the lowest class, marginalized-colonized group, aims to provide signification and representation within discourse and to reclaim identity, through the questions of subjectivity, choice, and ‘voice’ at the periphery. Jacques Lacan thought through the body of the subject as destitute, both psychologically and socially, as a site of a symbolic imprint of distress and also desire. In doing so, Lacan addresses the ‘phenomenological-ethicity’ of the-subject-as-a question-about-gender struggling to find meaning, to think through the enclosures-of-thought-of the symbolic order of social categories.

This dissertation, *Martin Heidegger’s Critiques of Metaphysics and Humanist-Political Critiques of Heidegger*, has aimed to provide grounding indicators for a thoughtful discussion within the corpus of political theory that articulates the challenge of thinking itself while providing an outline to the meaningful advances in thinking and thought, its controversies and potentialities for theory and practice, in a systemic and situated, thoughtful way.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abensour, Miguel. "An-archy between Metapolitics and Politics." *Parallax*, Vol. 8, no. 3 (2002): 5–18.
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Life of the Mind*. New York: Harcourt, 1981.
- . *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- . *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought*. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
- Aristotle. *The Politics*. Translated by T.A. Sinclair. London: Penguin Books, 1992.
- . "Physica." In *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Translated by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Modern Library, 2001.
- . *The Nichomachean Ethics*. Translated by David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Arnett, Ronald C. *Communication Ethics in Dark Times. Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University, 2013.
- Barker, Ernest. *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*. New York: Dover, 1959.
- Benso, Silvia. The Breathing of the Air: Presocratic Echoes in Levinas. In *Levinas and the Ancients*, 9–23. Edited by Brain Schroeder and Silvia Benso. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
- Birla, Ritu. "Postcolonial studies. Now that's history." In *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*. Edited by Rosalind C. Morris. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Blok, Vincent. *Ernest Junger's Philosophy of Technology: Heidegger and Poetics of the Anthropocene*. London: Routledge, 2017.
- Browning, Gary K. *Hegel and the History of Political Philosophy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
- Burggraeve, Roger. "Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker between Jerusalem and Athens." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 28, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 110–126.
- Capobianco, Richard. *The Shimmering Unfolding*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022.
- Davis, Bret. *Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007.

- Chai, David. *Daoist Resonances in Heidegger Exploring a Forgotten Debt*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.
- Chance, Roger. *Until Philosophers Are Kings*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1968.
- Clark, Timothy. *Martin Heidegger*. Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2012.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Margins of Philosophy*. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- . *The Truth in Painting*. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- . *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
- . *Aporias: Dying–Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth” (Mourir – s’attendre aux “limites de la vrit”)*. Translated by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
- . *Positions*. Translated by Alan Bass. Continuum. London UK. 2004.
- . *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Vol. I*. Edited by Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- . *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Vol. II*. Edited by Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- . *Theory and Practice*. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019.
- Dreyfus, Hubert and Paul Rabinow. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. London: Routledge, 1982.
- Edelglass, William. “The Self and the Suffering Other: Levinas and Santideva on the Ethics of Compassion.” Emory University. PhD dissertation. 2004.  
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/305078470/abstract/F4BBE83AB60C426EPQ/2?accountid=15182>.
- Elden, Stuart. “Strategies for Waging Peace.” In *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*. Edited by Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Elsen, Jena. “On Difference within the Same: A Reading of Martin Heidegger’s ‘Was Heisst Denken’?” PhD dissertation. 2017. University of Sussex.  
<https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.720411>.

- Farr, Arnold. *Critical Theory and Democratic Vision*. Toronto: Lexington Books, 2009.
- Faye, Emmanuel. *Heidegger, the Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935*. Translated by Michael B. Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
- Feenberg, Andrew. *Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and the Redemption of History*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Figal, Gunter. “The Forgetfulness of God.” In *Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, 198–212. Edited by Charles E. Scott et al. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- Foucault, Michel. “Society Must Be Defended” *Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76*. Translated by David Macey. Edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fortana. New York: Picador, 2003.
- Fox, Christopher. “Structures of the Holy Religion in Hegel and Levinas.” PhD dissertation. 2003. The University of Memphis.  
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/305231182/abstract/F05DCEEBB6D54EC9PQ/1?accountid=15182>.
- Friedman, Michael. *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger*. Chicago: Open Court, 2000.
- Gairola, Rahul. “Burning with Shame: Desire and South Asian Patriarchy, from Gayatri Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ to Deepa Mehta’s ‘Fire.’” *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 307–324.
- Gonzalez, Francisco. “Levinas Questioning Plato on Eros and Maieutics.” In *Levinas and the Ancients*, 40–61. Edited by Brian Schroeder and Silvia Benso. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
- Gordon, Peter. E. *Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.
- Goulding, Jay. “‘Visceral Manifestation’: Chinese Philosophy and Western Phenomenology.” In *Chinese Philosophy and the Trends of the 21st Century Civilization*, Vol. 4, 360–417. Edited by Fang Keli. Beijing: Commercial Press Inc., 2003.
- . New Ways Toward Sino-Western Philosophical Dialogues. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 34, no. 1 (2007): 99–125.

- . “Heidegger’s Daoist Phenomenology. In *Daoist Resonances in Heidegger Exploring a Forgotten Debt*, 47–102. Edited by David Chai. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.
- Graham, Archie S. “Art, Language, and Truth in Heidegger’s Radical Zen.” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 27, no. 4 (2000): 503–543.
- Grollios, Vasilis. *Negativity and Democracy*. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Hanley, Catriona. “Aristotle and Levinas on War and Peace: The One against the Other.” In *Levinas and the Ancients*, 127–143. Edited by Brain Schroeder and Silvia Benso. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Phenomenology of Mind*. Translated J.B. Baillie. London: Allen & Unwin, 1949.
- . *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Edited by Allen W. Wood; Translated by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- . *Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Vol. 1*. Translated by Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper, 1962.
- . *Early Greek Thinking*. Translated by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.
- . *Question Concerning Technology*. Translated by William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- . *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translation by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- . *On the Way to Language*. Translated by Peter D. Hertz. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982.
- . Rectoral address, “The Self-Assertion of the German University, 1933.” In Karsten Harries and Herman Heidegger, *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 38, no. 3 (March 1985): 467–502.
- . *Nietzsche. Vol. 1–2*. Translated and edited by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991.
- . *Nietzsche. Vol. 3. Part 1*. Translated and edited by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco. 1991.

- . *Parmenides*. Translated by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- . *Basic Writings*. Translated and edited by David Farrell Krell. London: Routledge, 1993.
- . *The Principle of Reason*. Translated by Reginald Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- . *Holderlin's Hymn "The Ister."* Translated by William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- . *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- . *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Translated by Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- . *Pathmarks*. Translated and edited by William McNeill. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- . "Traditional Language and Technological Language." Translated by Wanda Torres Gregory. *Journal of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 23 (1998): 129–145.
- . *Identity and Difference*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- . *Off the Beaten Track*. Edited and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- . *On Time and Being*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- . *Four seminars: le Thor 1966, 1968, 1969, Zähringen 1973*. Translated by Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2003.
- . *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Translated by Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2009.
- . *Country Path Conversations*. Translated by Bret W. Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
- . *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.
- . *The Event*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

- . *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Translated by Gregory Fried. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.
- . *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine."* Translated by William McNeill and Julia Ireland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014.
- . *The History of Beyng*. Translated by William McNeill and Jeffrey Powell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.
- . *Hegel*. Translated by Joseph Arel and Niels Feuerhahn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.
- . *Interpretation of Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation*. Translated by Ullrich Haase and Mark Sinclair. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.
- . *Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking. Logic: Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos*. Translated by Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.
- . *Holderlin Hymn Remembrance*. Translated by William McNeill and Julia Ireland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018.
- Heine, Steven. *Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1985.
- Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Edited by Edmund Jephcott. Translated by Gunzelin Schmid Noeri. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Horowitz, Asher. "Adorno and Emptiness." In *Subversive Itinerary: The Thought of Gad Horowitz*, 256–278. Edited by Shannon Bell and Peter Kulchyski. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013.
- Horowitz, Gad. "Emmanuel, Robert." In *Subversive Itinerary: The Thought of Gad Horowitz*, 293–302. Edited by Shannon Bell and Peter Kulchyski. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013.
- Jenkins, Nico. *Echoes of No Thing: Thinking between Heidegger and Dōgen*. Brooklyn: Punctum Books, 2019.
- Kalmanson, Leah, L. Frank Garrett, and Sarah Mattice, ed. *Levinas and Asian Thought*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2013.
- Kats, Barry. *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation*. London: Thetford Press, 1982.
- Kellner, Douglas. *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*. London: Macmillan, 1984.

- Krell, David Farrell. *Derrida and our Animal Others: Derrida's Final Seminar, "The Beast and the Sovereign."* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
- Lacan, Jacques. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2018.
- Lao Tzu. *Tao – A New Way of Thinking. A Translation of the Tao Tê Ching with an Introduction and Commentaries*. Translated by Chung-yuan Chang. London and Philadelphia: Singing Dragon, 2014.
- Lee, Shin. "Emmanuel Levinas's Face-to-Face Ethics: Taking the Other Seriously." State University of New York at Binghamton. PhD Dissertation. 2004.  
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/305074764/abstract/96436D9C50EB4EBEPQ/14?accountid=15182>.
- Levinas, Emmanuel. *Basic Philosophical Writings*. Edited by Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- . *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2011.
- . *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2011.
- Libertson, Joseph. *Proximity, Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication*. Hingham, MA: Kluwer Boston Inc., 1982.
- Ma, Lin. *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event*. New York and London: Routledge, 2008.
- . "Thinking through Heidegger's 'Untergang' Star." *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 52, no. 1 (2021): 65–78.
- Maley, Terry. *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On: The Struggle Continues*. Winnipeg: Fernwood Press, 2017.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
- . *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- . *An Essay on Liberation*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
- . *Counterrevolution and Revolt*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.

- . *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978.
- . *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*. Translated by Seyla Benhabib. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
- . *Technology, War, and Fascism*. Edited by Douglas Kellner. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
- . *Heideggerian Marxism*. Edited by Richard Wolin and John Abromeit. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.
- Marx, Werner. *Reason and World: Between Tradition and Another Beginning*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971.
- May, Reinhard. *Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences on his Work*. Translated by Graham Parkes. New York and London: Routledge, 1996.
- McNeill, William. *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Meir, Ephraim. "Judaism and Philosophy Each Other's Other in Levinas." *Modern Judaism*, Vol. 30, no. 3 (October 2010): 348–362.
- Morris, Rosalind C., ed. *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Neal, Andrew. "Goodbye War on Terror? In *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*. Edited by Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Nelson, Eric. *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought*. New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.
- Neske, Günther and Emil Kettering, ed. *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*. Translated by Lisa Harries. French portions translated by Joachim Neugroschel. New York: Paragon House, 1990.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Translation by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Edited by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus, Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books, 1978.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1989.

- Ohana, David. *The Dawn of Political Nihilism: Volume I of the Nihilist Order*. Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- Pakaluk, Michael. *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Parkes, Graham. *Heidegger and Asian Thought*. Edited by Graham Parkes. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.
- Passerin d'Entrèves, Maurizio. *The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt*. New York and London: Routledge, 1994.
- Peperzak, Adriaan. *Beyond the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999.
- Pitkin, Annabella. "Scandalous Ethics Infinite Presence with Suffering." *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol. 8, no. 5–7 (2001): 231–246.
- Polansky, Ronald, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Radloff, Bernhard. *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007.
- Raffoul, François. "The Surprise." *Qui parle*, Vol. 31 (2022): 329–338.
- Richardson, William J. *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2003.
- Rojewicz, Richard. *The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006.
- Rose, David. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right: A Reader's Guide*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007.
- Sallis, John. *Echoes after Heidegger*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.
- ". "Grounders of the Abyss." In *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, 181–197. Edited by Charles E. Scott. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Scott, Gary Alan. *Does Socrates Have a Method?: Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond*. Edited by Gary Alan Scott. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002.
- Sheehan, Thomas, ed. *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*. New York and London: Routledge, 1981.

- Sorensen, Asger. "The Role of Dialectics in Marcuse." In *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On: The Struggle Continues*, 40–56. Edited by Terry Maley. Winnipeg: Fernwood Press, 2017.
- Trawny, Peter. *Freedom to Fail: Heidegger's Anarchy*. Translated by Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015.
- Vallega-Neu, Daniela. *Heidegger's Poetic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018.
- Verdicchio, Massimo and Robert Burch. *Between Philosophy and Poetry: Writing, Rhythm, History* (New York: Continuum, 2002).
- Visker, Rubi. *Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique*. New York and London: Verso Books, 1995.
- von Hermann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. "Contributions to Philosophy and Enowning Historical Thinking." In *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, 105–126. Edited by Charles E. Scott. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Warnes, Mathias. "Heidegger and the Festival of Being: From the Bridal Festival to the Round Dance." PhD Dissertation. 2012. University of British Columbia.  
<https://open.library.ubc.ca/soa/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0073516>.
- Wood, David. "Differance and the Problem of Strategy." In *Derrida and Differance*. Edited by David Wood and Robert Bernasconi. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988.
- Wolin, Richard. *Heidegger in Ruins: Between Philosophy and Ideology*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2022.
- Workman, Thom. "Marcuse's Critique of Science." In *One-Dimensional Man 50 Years On: The Struggle Continues*, 20–39. Edited by Terry Maley. Winnipeg: Fernwood Press. 2017.
- Yeatman, Anna. "Individuality and Politics: Thinking with and beyond Hannah Arendt." In *Action and Appearance: Ethics and the Politics of Writing in Hannah Arendt*. Edited by Anna Yeatman, Philip Hanson, Magdalena Zolkos, and Charles Barbour. New York: Continuum, 2011.
- Zimmerman, Michael. *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.
- Zizek, Slavoj. *Pandemic!: COVID-19 Shakes the World*. New York: Polity Press, 2020.

## Appendix I.

### Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle's *Ethics*

Heidegger envisions a rethinking, one that would contemplate anew sameness and difference, connectivity, change and abruptness; intuitively a re-thinking of *phronesis*, as a new corporeal embodiment of the locality with the spatial and temporal,<sup>1</sup> which, Heidegger contends, humanity has no tools, ways, methods and means to think adequately.<sup>2</sup> In rethinking *phronesis*, Heidegger revisits and re-interprets Aristotle's ground-breaking work *The Nicomachean Ethics*,<sup>3</sup> as the grounds of "first philosophy."

According to Ronald Polansky (2014),<sup>4</sup> Aristotle's work on *Ethics* is considered to be one of the core tenets of Western philosophy, for within and throughout Aristotle sets out the art of what makes the good decision making that brings together the intricacies of life experience as a methodological observance of the measured and proper distribution of

---

<sup>1</sup> William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 321; Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 111; Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poetic Writings, From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 49–52.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 6.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Ronald Polansky (ed.), "Introduction," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1–13.

justice within the city-state by the virtuous pursuit of excellence as the art and craft of Political Science.<sup>5</sup>

Aristotle begins the *Ethics* (2009) with the aim of clarifying excellence and purpose as the penultimate movement that understands action as praxis whereby contemplation allows the meaning of excellence to be understood. Aristotle states:

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities.<sup>6</sup>

*Agathos* [good], *telos* [end], *praxis* [action], and *techne* [craft] are key terms indicating hermeneutically observed openings towards contemplative observance. They are preparations towards a methodological grounding for the revelation of action itself understood by its end. Collectively constituting an opening towards the meaning of the craft itself and crafting, these four terms bring to fruition their own excellence and perfection. Heidegger's *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, originally published in

---

<sup>5</sup> Ernest Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (New York: Dover, 1959); Roger Chance, *Until Philosophers Are Kings* (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1968); Michael Pakaluk, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, I.1.1094a.

1924,<sup>7</sup> brings together hermeneutics and phenomenology reflecting on these key terms discussed in Aristotle's *Ethics*. Heidegger's intention is to let hermeneutics and phenomenology speak for themselves, by unpacking the four terms: *agathos*, *telos*, *praxis*, and *techne*. Heidegger seeks to de-center these terms in order to elucidate their originary meaning and their inherent interrelatedness. In essence, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* considers how we grasp Greek thinking and its relation to our being in the world, as far as our being in the world is our concern, "every care has a definite end, a *telos*."<sup>8</sup> Our care, understood as the *praxis* of *agathon*, is "the genuine being-character of human beings."<sup>9</sup>

In regard to the gathering meaning of the four terms, one expression encapsulates them all '*zoon logon echon*,' translated by Aristotle and subsequent metaphysical thinking, as the definition of the human. The animal rational is the primordial manifestation of the entirety of Aristotle's works:

. . . (and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate virtue: if this is the case), human good turns out to be activity

---

<sup>7</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2009).

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 46.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 46.

of soul exhibiting virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.<sup>10</sup>

Heidegger's interpretation seeks to unpack this gathered meaning of Aristotle's '*zoon logon echon*' to articulate the following : 1) *zoe* is a being-in-the-world; 2) this particular being-in-the-world is characterized by *logos*; 3) this way of expression as speaking is an equiprimordially grounded meaning, of being-as-held-anchored-to-action in the concern for the everyday through language ; 4) hence, being-with-one-another is being-in-the-discourse of the local of the *polis*.<sup>11</sup>

For Aristotle, this way of being-in-the-polis is understood by our virtuous action as indicated by our everyday experience. Thinking through these daily experiences is what Aristotle understands as virtue. As Aristotle notes:

Virtue, then, being, of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (*ethike*) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word *ethos* (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. . . . Neither by nature, then, nor contrary

---

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1.7.1098a.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 47.

to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.<sup>12</sup>

As interpreted by Heidegger, one of the key elements of ethos as a meaningful-virtuous pursuit within a discursive comportment that articulates the virtuous good by the course of education, manifested as an intuitive-practice within the habitation of daily-life, thinking-and-being-through the habitual-locality is *phronesis*.

*Phronesis*, for Heidegger, is an engaged-embodied spectating or observance within discourse itself in the midst of our there-being-in-the-world.<sup>13</sup> Being-in-the-midst-of-things while observing their occurrences is how Aristotle unfolds the doctrine of the mean.<sup>14</sup> As noted by Aristotle: “Virtue then, is a state of character concerned with choice lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”<sup>15</sup> The mean is illuminated by thinking through particularities while understanding their universal operations as scientific knowledge. Through philosophy as education: justice and the measured is to be understood intuitively and grounded in the attentive practice of the problematic of daily-life, as a focused-seeing-through-the locality, which according to Aristotle, *phronesis* is a key element through which this practice unfolds.

---

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, II.1.14-21; II.1.24-26.

<sup>13</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 111.

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, II. 3. 1104a 25; II. 6. 1107a5-8.

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, II. 6. 1107a.

The translation into a form of observed demonstrated knowledge and the appreciation of said knowledge is how Aristotle understands the meaning of philosophic wisdom as *nous* or the apprehension [*Vernehmen*]. It is coupled with a demonstrated observation of *episteme* as a form of collectivity equaling *sophia* or contemplative thinking. For Aristotle, the ability of *praxis* to bring forward and hold these together as a legislative universal that names (*logos*) the laws of nature (*phusis nomos*) is the meaning of justice as allocated by its measured distribution, which is understood as *orthos logos*.

This is what governs the city-state or *polis* as the indicative meaning of the art and craft of Political Science. According to Aristotle, the political philosopher, practically utilizes this form of contemplation to think through the measured and the mean. As appropriated to daily life, this measured distribution of justice brings together life experiences and allows one to think through the function of different associations. By the contemplation of focused-targeted tasks of daily-life understood as an end-form completion (*telos*) which, according to Aristotle's first philosophy, the political philosopher is the architect of measured justice whose ultimate goals are perfection and excellence in the city-state. By thinking and re-interpreting the core meaning of *phronesis* as that which grounds and articulates this practice, Heidegger aims to re-interpret and re-think the dynamic intuitive thinking-locality through attentiveness to the spatial-temporal, rethinking core definitions and meanings from the ground-up. This enables Heidegger to re-interpret and re-think philosophy entirely, while re-thinking the meaning of grounds as a condition of possibility, to a completely new unthought as a critique of metaphysics and modernity, a 'ground-laying' preparatory for any current and future thinking.