COLD WAR THERAPEUTIC FORMATIONS: RECONFIGURING POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY IN AMERICAN LITERATURE

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Abstract

This dissertation considers how American fiction from the years of 1947-1967 that engages with psychiatric treatment responds to the expanding cultural authority of psychiatry and its place in constituting Cold War political and economic relations. Moreover, it examines how fiction from this period considers the possibilities for political agency that psychiatric knowledge and treatment enable. By examining novels by Mickey Spillane, Charles Willeford, Ralph Ellison, Norman Mailer, and Kurt Vonnegut, this project identifies how multiple psychiatric approaches, in particular military psychiatry, social psychiatry, and anti-psychiatry, and their place in fiction, theorize political, economic, and sexual alternatives to Cold War liberalism. Reading fiction along with the works of influential figures including sociologist Gunnar Myrdal and psychiatrists including Harry Stack Sullivan, Fredric Wertham, Wilhelm Reich, R.D. Laing, and Thomas Szasz, demonstrates how psychiatry became a prominent terrain for post-World War II writers to debate the prevailing etiological factors of mental illness and theorize new political formations through therapeutic approaches.

The primary texts considered in this dissertation share a skepticism and ambivalence towards biological explanations of mental illness and draw on psychiatric knowledge and treatment methods to disrupt Fordist economic relations and reformulate relations of production and reproduction. These texts, this dissertation argues, consider how pathologized forms of affect can be rechanneled into alternatives to Cold War liberalism and Fordist production in the 1950s as well as the challenges posed to such political alternatives in the midst of the faltering of consensus culture and the transition to post-Fordism that was emerging in the late 1960s.

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Introduction: The Potential of Pathologized Affect

In *Psychosurgery and the Self* (1954), a medical text of the early Cold War era, psychologist Mary Frances Robinson and her co-author, neurologist Walter Freeman, posit psychosurgery as a therapeutic solution to complex and longstanding psychological ailments. According to Robinson, surgery offers an apt opportunity to explore the "brain-mind relationship between man's enormous frontal lobes and his complex personality" (1). Robinson acknowledges the many questions and gaps in knowledge surrounding the relationship between the biological mechanisms and organic structures of the body and the psychodynamics of the individual as she expresses her hope for psychosurgery to produce "fairly predictable changes in behavior" (8) in patients who undergo surgery. In his contribution to the study, Freeman, who was well known for performing lobotomies with psychiatrist and surgeon James Watts, explains that the procedure involves severing the thalamofrontal radiation tract "which, it is believed, mediates the affective component of the neurosis or psychosis" (9). Thus, together Robinson and Freeman posits psychosurgery, and lobotomy specifically, as a method of dulling a range of pathologized forms of affect through a standardized procedure to produce predictable changes in a patient's personality and sense of self.

The results of psychosurgery are interpreted to be therapeutic for patients, allowing them to adjust to their environment without the pang of anxiety or stress that results from a heightened self-consciousness and the stressors of inter-subjective encounters. As Robinson observes, Petrie's postoperative findings are "particularly happy" (6) as he observes that patients' "vulnerability to the 'slings and arrows of outrageous fortune' has decreased. It may be in this way they have lost the use of the barometer they previously had to gauge the climate of the reactions of others" (Petrie as qtd. in Robinson and Freeman 7). Robinson and Freeman's

analysis of the effects of lobotomy on personality make evident the role of psychiatric treatment as a therapeutic apparatus, whereby patients deemed to be at odds with their surroundings and the inter-personal encounters that take place within them are relieved of such pressures. According to Robinson, prefrontal lobotomy results in patients who experience both “a reduction in anxiety and lessened neuroticism” (8) and a reduction in “self continuity” (31), which she defines as “the depth dimension of the self, transcending the present, reaching backward with feelings of responsibility towards the unchangeable past and forward to future possibilities to be worked for or feared as foreshadowed by the past” (40). Patients, then, appear to be released from their previous state of consciousness that entailed the capacity to historicize the place of the self and its futurity within existing social relations. This rupture in self-continuity that lobotomy patients experience, described as a “strange, naive, complacent detachment about the self” (28) in relation to the past and future, suggests the constitution of a psychiatric subject which is capable of being rendered compliant and acquiescent to present conditions outside the hospital that previously caused anxiety and neuroses.

Following the surgery, patients typically describe a marked difference in their own attitudes and conceptions of self when compared to this sense of self prior to surgery, which is indicative of the potential for patients to be adjusted according to their surroundings. Their complacency in some cases highlights the patient’s need to be re-socialized according to familial and economic expectations, as indicated by Robinson’s observation that “in this early period (of convalescence), actual training rather than psychotherapy is needed, with perhaps some good natured pulling and pushing to motivate the patient toward conformity” (20). In some instances, the convalescent periods of the case studies discussed by Robinson and Freeman are also characterized by inertia (20), as patients become unable to act and appear to be suspended in

time, and even a case of a “romantic hangover” (19), a term used to describe the attitude of Case 607, who rejected her family’s suggestion that she find a job, noting that “I went to college to learn how to live, not how to make a living” (19). Robinson describes this as a case in which the patient was “overindulged, though her relatives tried to carry out the psychiatrist’s direction as regards training” (19). The emotional overindulgence of the patient’s relatives at a crucial period becomes an obstacle to recovery from the surgery. By displaying an excess of emotion, the patient’s relatives inadvertently jeopardize, not the therapeutic effects of the surgery, but its function as a form of disciplinary power that constitutes the patient as a pathologized and abnormal subject or a productive, healthy one, or somewhere in between as the patient emerges from an inert and suspended state, on the verge of a new form of consciousness and self-awareness.

It becomes evident that psychosurgery produces a compliant psychiatric subject with a complacent attitude towards their past, presenting various potentialities for the future. Psychiatric power thus becomes highly visible as a productive but crude means of constituting not only conforming or acquiescent individuals, but also, through what Foucault refers to in *Psychiatric Power* as “the microphysics of disciplinary power” (73),[1] subjectivities considered deviant and transgressive. Such subjects are constituted as a result of unintended and undesired effects and

[1] In *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault describes this form of disciplinary power as a “terminal, capillary form of power; a final relay, a particular modality by which political power, power in general, finally reaches the level of bodies and gets a hold on them, taking actions, behavior, habits and words into account; the way in which power converges below to affect individual bodies themselves to work on, modify, and direct what Servan called ‘the soft fibres of the brain.’ In other words, I think that in our society disciplinary power is a quite specific modality of what can be called synaptic contact of bodies-power” (40). Foucault draws this notion of power from the very neurological structures that psychosurgery modifies, but which can also be modified through other, less crude means due to synaptic plasticity. Thus, the mechanism that enables disciplinary power to function also enables synaptic pathways to be changed to alter modes of perception that enable new political relations and formulations.

outcomes of psychiatric power that attempt to coerce patients into various productive subject positions. Significantly, Robinson addresses instances of "lobotomy syndrome" (8), which entails "the appearance occasionally of unpleasant characteristics such as tactlessness, boisterous laughter, and irresponsibility" (8). Such characteristics are indicative of the inability of lobotomy to temper pathologized emotions and channel such ostensibly unhealthy characteristics and forms of expression into normalized behaviours. Symptoms of lobotomy syndrome and the lack of self-continuity, characterized by a sense of immediacy and a lack of self-reflection among patients, that results from the surgery, then, demonstrate subjective experience and expression that psychiatric discourse cannot fully know, measure, and regulate.

Rather than merely a repressive, top-down exercise of disciplinary power upon the individual, psychiatric discourse and knowledge constitute an array of subjectivities, which demarcate the boundaries between normalized and transgressive language, behaviour, and relations. In doing so, psychiatry becomes an apt terrain for interrogating how mental illness functions as a historically and politically contingent set of meanings, particularly in light of the widescale expansion of psychiatric authority from the military into everyday aspects of life in the United States following the Second World War. Psychiatry sought widespread acceptance as an authority on adjusting soldiers to civilian and family life as a central tenet of Cold War liberalism. The importance of acclimating soldiers as well as other men and women to a middle-class lifestyle was expressed through ostensibly objective medical language and therapeutic practices, which permeated many aspects of American culture. Thus, not only were the personal and private political, as Second Wave feminism would declare in the 1960s, but so too was the pathological, as it emerged as perhaps one of the central preoccupations of public discourse and political debate following the onset of the Cold War.

The prominence of psychiatric and sociological discourses throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s is indicative of the emergence of social psychiatry as a terrain for envisioning new forms of political dissent, which sought to mobilize therapeutic formations to challenge existing knowledge and treatment regarding mental illness and pathology. By approaching mental illness, including neuroses, psychoses, anxiety, and sexual disorders, not as an individualized and private form of pathology, but rather as a response to attempts to normalize the conditions of Fordist production under Cold War liberalism, social psychiatry sought to more closely link mental illness to environmental factors, and, more importantly, assert that social change would most effectively alleviate an array of pathologized responses to the various demands of Fordist production and its role in Cold War consensus culture, which orthodox psychiatry responded to with surgical and other somatic treatments.

Positioning psychiatric knowledge and treatment within the terrain of political conflict suggests that the nature of pathology is contingent on an understanding of the patient as a subject which cannot be fully knowable within scientific and empirical modes of representation. Rather, carefully articulating the interplay between, on one hand, social, political, economic, and cultural factors and, on the other, the psychodynamic processes of the individual, as social psychiatry seeks to do, requires and encompasses new modes of representation, which account for subjective psychic experience of those that more orthodox forms of psychiatry pathologize. Thus, one of the central concerns of this dissertation is how and by whom mental illness and pathology are defined, represented, and treated, and how these factors constitute psychiatrists and psychiatric patients as political subjects with agency. More specifically, this dissertation considers how literary representations of psychiatric treatment imagine political subjectivities with the agency to disrupt psychiatric power, including its management of affective flows into

Fordist production in its iteration under Cold War liberalism, and redirect affect into the creation of new economic formations which provide alternatives to capitalism and its attendant forms of consumption, particularly as they relate to the nuclear family and monogamous, heterosexual relations.

Literary culture was immersed in the expansion of psychiatry into the everyday lives of the general public. As social psychiatry grappled with theories of the etiology of mental illness that involved social and interpersonal factors, writers and others involved in cultural production recognized it as a particularly apt site for examining new forms of politically dissenting subjectivities and the therapeutic formations that they enable, particularly in light of the stifling effects of the Cold War on political discourse on the left. As literary representations of mental illness and psychiatric treatment engage with pathologized subjects whose energies and desires are deemed to be in need of cure, containment, or curtailment, writers considered the possibilities to manage productivity through various forms of psychiatric treatment, enabling new libidinal economies wherein affect is channeled into forms of labour that work against Fordist production and may be deemed unproductive in the context of capitalist production. In doing so, writers positioned themselves alongside psychiatrists as theorizers of a new politics of dissent that recognized the capacity for political agency among those deemed to be mentally ill. Literary production, like psychiatry, thus, became a terrain for contesting dominant notions of mental illness that emphasized organic factors over social relations and which sought to adjust psychiatric patients to existing relations of production by pathologizing dissent.

American Psychiatry: A Historical Overview

In order to chart the interplay between psychiatry, cultural production, and Cold War politics, historical accounts of American psychiatry and psychology are necessary. Providing

such historical accounts elucidates the ways in which multiple discourses overlap, interact, and ultimately produce medical subjects that this dissertation tracks throughout the literary and psychiatric texts that are analyzed. Moreover, these historical accounts address the political ethos in which shifts and developments of each discipline occurred in order to begin to theorize the relationship between psychiatry and politics and the bearing this relationship has on Cold War cultural production in the United States.

In the nineteenth century, psychiatry began to congeal as a medical discipline focused on treating and possibly curing those suffering from mental distress, marking a shift from asylums that merely contained those deemed to be mad. The contributions of Benjamin Rush, considered by many to be the first American psychiatrist, provided a basis for later reforms. In *Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind* (1812), Rush outlined his theory of madness or what he refers to as "intellectual derangement" (Rush 16) as consisting of an interconnected relationship between the mind and the body, asserting: "the mind is incapable of any operation independently of impressions communicated to it through the medium of the body" (16). He located the cause of mental illness "primarily in the blood-vessels of the brain" (17), leading him to employ venesection as a frequent treatment method. Rush continued to rely on inhumane methods of treatment such as mechanisms that restrained patients, including his inventions of the gyrator and tranquilizer (Deutsch 79), along with fear inspiring methods, which sought to make patients pliant and malleable (80). Yet, during his time at Pennsylvania Hospital, Rush also implemented humane reforms that included better conditions for patients and displays of kindness and compassion not afforded to those generally deemed to be insane and animalistic.

Moreover, French physician Philippe Pinel's *Treatise on Insanity* (translated into English in1806), which found that organic lesions were not present in most instances of insanity, marked

a significant turning point for psychiatric treatment that influenced American psychiatrists. Pinel's findings and his practices, which included eliminating restraints on asylum inmates, signalled more widespread efforts to enable patients to adjust to their environments by alleviating stressors that emerged with and were exasperated by industrialization and urbanization. In the mid-nineteenth century, the moral treatment, as developed by psychiatrists including Isaac Ray and John Butler as well as Samuel B. Woodward and Eli Todd at the Worcester State Hospital, was emerging as a promising therapeutic approach to those considered insane throughout asylums in the United States. Rather than focusing on organic factors, the moral treatment focused on establishing a dialogue with patients and engaging them in intellectual and physical forms of labour without overexerting or overstimulating them. As Sanbourne J. Bockoven explains:

> moral treatment was in no sense a *single technique*. Yet it had a definable goal—that of arousing the dormant faculties of the mind. Every available means was employed to achieve this end. The very matrix of moral treatment was the communal life of patients and hospital personnel. Every aspect of daily living was utilized by the physician for its therapeutic effect in awakening feelings of companionship in the patients. The chief modalities used in awakening such feelings were those endeavors which required the patient to invest in something outside himself in cooperation with others, namely manual work, intellectual work, recreation, and religious worship. (75-76)

As Bockoven makes clear, the moral treatment was rehabilitative and focused on integrating the individual into a larger network of social relations within the communal setting of the asylum. In this sense, the asylum functioned as a cohesive social field, which resembled a familial structure. As Bockoven notes, "the superintendent of the moral treatment era often made reference to 'our

family' in his annual reports. [. . .] It is not remarkable that he should feel like a father to his patients, for he ate, worked, played, and worshipped with them. It would likewise not be surprising that he should acquire a fundamental understanding of personality through prolonged and intimate contacts with his patients in a wide variety of activities and interpersonal relationships" (78). Such relations, it was hoped, could develop in patients the capacity to function outside of the asylum by channeling what were described as morbid emotions into productive work and leisure. A central tenet of the moral treatment, then, was that engagement with fulfilling forms of intellectual and manual labour would reconfigure the psychodynamics of the patient and his relationships with family and the wider communal networks in which it existed.

Despite the reforms that the moral treatment brough to psychiatry in the United States, a custodial model of institutionalization and insistence on the organic etiology of mental illness persisted and overtook lasting change. The combination of population growth and immigration led to a greater need for mental health facilities; however, those in existence were unequipped to offer the moral treatment. Instead, the capacity of hospitals merely increased without the capacity for adequate treatment. As Bockoven notes when discussing the Worcester State Hospital following the Civil War, "Recurrent cycles of overcrowding were met by depriving patients of recreational space. With each new construction for sleeping quarters, there was a further relative decrease in the space and means for recreation, which in turn demanded an increase in regimentation of patients" (22). The classification of "foreign insane pauperism" used in annual reports of the Worcester State Hospital as early as 1854 also reflects the way in which discrimination contributed to the neglectful custodial model that came to replace the moral treatment in hospitals (Bockoven 25). Custodial care thus shifted the focus from a rehabilitative

form of treatment that intended to equip patients with means of mitigating the stressors of life outside the hospital to an underlying assumption that patients, particularly immigrants, were incurable and therefore in need of confinement, rather than reintegration. The custodial model is indicative of expanding institutional authority over of a wider array of social life, which ultimately attempted to regulate the social relations of everyday life.

While the decline of moral treatment throughout the United States ushered in a custodial model of institutionalization in state hospitals, psychotherapeutic methods provided alternative theories to the organic etiology of mental illness and its corresponding treatment methods. In the early twentieth century, Sigmund Freud's theories became increasingly influential as a method of psychiatric treatment in the United States. Freud's 1909 lectures at Clark University indicated a congealing authority of psychoanalysis in the U.S., even though disagreement and debate surrounding the institutionalization of the psychoanalytic method would continue into the 1920s and 1930s. For instance, a 1927 issue of the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* addressed the issue of lay analysis. American psychiatrists were reluctant to recognize those who were without medical training as qualified analysts, contrary to the views of many analysts in Europe. Furthermore, divisions regarding whether or not analysts themselves were required to undergo analysis created further divisions within increasingly institutionalized use of psychoanalysis.

While the attempts to develop an objective scientific approach of behaviorism sought to render psychoanalytic concepts vague and subjective, psychoanalysis in the United States appeared to be a "haven [. . .] from political persecution" (191) according to C.P. Oberndorf's *A History of Psychoanalysis in America*, published in 1953. According to Oberndorf: "The philosophy of psychoanalysis, with its high regard for individual needs in contrast to those of the supremacy of the totalitarian state, clashed irreconcilably with the tenets of Fascism under which

the individual must sacrifice himself, or be sacrificed, to the will of a dictator or oligarchy" (191). This liberating potential of psychoanalysis in the midst of fascism in Europe indicates that medical discourses were inextricably bound to the political terrain of the era, delineating ways in which psychiatric thought and methods of treatment constitute patient subjectivities as part of the expansion of professional authority. For Oberndorf, the popularity that psychoanalysis achieved during the Cold War highlighted the distinctions between the United States and the Soviet Union, where psychoanalysis was banned, and illuminated the way in which Cold War liberalism and nationalism had a bearing on psychoanalysis. According to Oberndorf, psychoanalysis, like democracy, was recognized for requiring the "active participation" (249) of the patient. Contextualizing psychoanalysis in terms of its parallels with anti-fascism and the ideology of New Liberalism suggests that it was a terrain where the political intelligibility of the psychoanalytic patient was negotiated in ways that were different from the foreclosure of agency for patients under custodial care, yet the patient remained subject to disciplinary and professional regulation.

While psychoanalysts debated specific disciplinary aspects during the early decades of the twentieth century, other psychiatrists utilized Freud's theories as one method among others in the treatment of mental illness. American psychiatrist Karl Menninger's first book, *The Human Mind*, first published in 1930, with subsequent editions published in 1937 and 1945, frames mental illness within a conception of human minds as machines which, when "unable to adjust themselves to their environment" (3) become "mentally unhealthy" (3). Menninger asserts that "[w]e must write about the mind as an adjustment process" (23), wherein the personality faces an array of situations to which it can successfully adjust, or fail to adjust to, leading to an unhealthy mind: "What we call the disease is the logical outgrowth of the particular personality in its

efforts to solve a particular problem (or perhaps several problems). The disease, the psychosis, is a part of him, not an intruder or an invasion from without" (158). The environment to which a personality must adjust, according to Menninger, is not always in accord with a balance of instincts and drives, leading to the symptoms of mental illness. In the third edition of *The Human Mind* (1945), the environment that Menninger depicts is heavily informed by the Second World War and its aftermath and the bearing this has on Americans. In the preface to this edition, Menninger writes: "The war predicted in the preface to the second edition came to pass on precisely the predicated; the conflict between theories of hereditary superiority and theories of environmental determination" (vii). Menninger continues on to align the victory of the Allies with theories of environmental determination and psychiatry, writing: "Psychiatry, since the discoveries of Sigmund Freud, has been dominated by the environmental philosophy and hence finds itself wholly in accord with the spirit of the Allied Nations in World War II" (vii). Here, Menninger presents psychiatry as a means of understanding the problems of the Axis and curing those problems in a way that aligns psychiatry with the values of the Allies. Having defeated the Axis powers in war, psychiatry must now overcome the wake of the war that includes "millions of people [who] have been killed and millions more evicted, orphaned, widowed, wounded, transported, incarcerated" (vii) and account for how "everyone mercifully spared these greater tragedies, the difficulties of life adjustment have become greater" (vii). Ultimately, for Menninger, psychiatry is capable of curing a population struggling to adjust to the aftermath of war by disseminating the theories that played a role in the victory of the Allied forces over the Axis and which would come to establish a prominent place for psychiatric knowledge in postwar America.

The inception of behaviourism during the early twentieth century provides another instance of psychological inquiry as a mode of discerning the relationship between individual and environment and the political imbrications of this relationship. The concerns of behaviorism with the subject's responses to stimuli as a means of understanding the relationship between the individual and the state contrasts with those of psychoanalysis, as discussed above. Behavioural psychology sought an objective method with a corresponding lexicon distinct from psychoanalysis. In the early decades of the twentieth century, American behaviorism as developed by John Broadus Watson attempted to provide an objective model for predicting and controlling human behaviour. In his 1913 article "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it," Watson finds that an "emphasis on analogy in psychology" (248) is limiting and flawed, as he states: "Surely this doctrine which calls for an analogical interpretation of all behavior data may be shown to be false: the position that the standing of an observation upon behavior is determined by its fruitfulness in yielding results which are interpretable only in the narrow realm of (really human) consciousness" (248). Watson sought to isolate the study of behaviour from consciousness, emotions, and the mind with his approach, emphasizing behavioural data as an object of study in itself in order to identify objective principles of human behaviour. For Watson, the environment was composed of stimuli that determine human behaviour through responses. Organisms, both human and animal, "adjust themselves to their environment by means of hereditary and habit equipments [sic]" (Watson 250), making responses to known stimuli predictable.

Watson's behaviorism attempts to depart from a study of states of consciousness, as psychology has undertaken since the nineteenth century under prominent psychologists such as William James, and embark on a study of "the human being's way of shaping his responses to

meet the problems in the terribly complex environment into which he is thrown" (Watson 252). James's highly influential psychology textbook *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), which gained wide-scale authority among psychologists as well as others in the social sciences, would continue to pervade psychological study into the twentieth century. Although James seems to have played a less prominent role in psychology following the publication of *Principles*, as he became immersed more deeply in philosophical inquiry (Taylor 4), many continued to acknowledge his many accomplishments in establishing the field and the wide-ranging study of states of consciousness he provided in his book. The publication of *The Principles of Psychology*, then, marks the summit in James's work as a psychologist, after which, according to Eugene Taylor, experimentalists "criticized him in print for his support of mental healers; they accused him of making a full flight into theology; and they absolutely denied any philosophical bias to their own definition of science" (5), contrary to James's acknowledgement of the metaphysics of science. In proposing an objective study of behaviour as shaped by its environment, Watson also seeks a language that is ostensibly free of metaphysical, ideological, and political implications; however, in doing so, he overlooks the ways in which humans are deeply steeped in environments wherein the ideological and political construction of scientific knowledge complicates the aims of behaviorism that social psychiatry attempts to account for.

Positing the limitations of Watson's behaviorism throughout the 1920s, B.F. Skinner's study of operant conditioning sought a vocabulary of behaviorism that coincided with its object of study, which, according to Skinner entailed more than a relationship between a stimulus and a response. Operant behaviour accounts for "part of behavior of which it may be said, not that no stimulus can be found that will elicit it [. . .] but that no correlated stimulus can be detected upon occasions when it is observed to occur" (Skinner 21). Skinner provides a more complex

understanding of the role of environment in the behaviour of organisms and establishes a framework for examining the ways in which agency appears to be problematized within an environment that always structures the spectrum of potential responses. Furthermore, for Skinner, the system in which Watson worked "accepted an organization of data based upon ancient concepts of which were not an essential part of its own structure. It inherited a language so infused with metaphor and implication that it was frequently impossible to talk about behavior without raising the ghosts of dead systems" (5), making a new linguistic system necessary in order to avoid obscuring a purportedly more objective relationship between the individual and the environment. Ultimately, Skinner's pursuit of behaviorism as an objective science with laws and reproducible results in a laboratory setting and its potential application to human behaviour gestures towards a lack of agency and raises concerns regarding the political implications of such a science. While attempting to devise an ideologically neutral and scientifically rational approach to human behaviour, Skinner does not escape the way in which doing so gestures towards a conception of humans as lacking the potential for agency and the political implications this holds amid concerns over fascism and totalitarianism. This juxtaposition of behaviorism and psychoanalysis as practiced in the United States reveals that psychology and psychiatry were a terrain on which the political and ideological associations and implications of these disciplines took shape and were informed by anxieties over fascism and the limitations on political agency among the subjectivities that scientific and medical discourses constituted.

While the distinct approaches of Watson and Skinner sought to understand, describe, and predict animal and human behaviour throughout the 1920s and 1930s, on the one hand, and, on the other, psychology and psychoanalysis continued to emphasize the unconscious-consciousness relation as an object of study, psychiatry simultaneously attempted to develop methods of

altering both behaviour and emotional states. As Hamilton Cravens has pointed out, American social sciences underwent a “renewed positivistic movement” (119) during the interwar years. Part of this shift entailed American reinterpretations of European social science “in a manner that defanged the political import of their work and ignored the Europeans’ central concerns for the role of values in scientific inquiry and in the building of pathways between scientific inquiry and political reform” (119). Despite different objects of study and methodological approaches to consciousness and behaviour, the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis sought to establish a purportedly more scientific ethos or left political implications unexamined in favour of verifiable laboratory results.

With this emphasis on positivism and the prominence of a custodial model of hospitalization for psychiatric patients, psychiatry came to rely more heavily on organic treatment methods, rendering patients pliable and manageable, rather than attempting treatment or cure. In this sense, psychological and emotional problems were linked to the body and treated in ways that went beyond physical restraints of the nineteenth century asylum. Alongside multiple forms of psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy, hydrotherapy, and insulin coma therapy provided psychiatrists with methods of sedating patients. Focusing on the patient’s anatomy, rather than intersubjective encounters as a means of identifying, classifying, and treating, somatic treatments relied on what Foucault refers to in *Madness and Civilization* (1961) as a “moral therapeutics of the body” (151), wherein treatment takes on a physical nature in a way that suggests and addresses a perceived moral deficit in the patient, as Foucault notes: “The madman’s body was regarded as the visible and solid presence of his disease: whence those physical cures whose meaning was borrowed from a moral perception” (159). Somatic treatments, even in the twentieth century, thus, retain a kind of moral function to the extent that

they render the patient knowable by the extent to which the patient deviates from a norm, rather than the outcome of a natural process.

The prominence of somatic forms of psychiatric treatment in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s suggests a congealing consensus of a theory of the organic etiology of mental illness. American psychiatrist Lothar Kalinowsky's *Shock Treatments, Psychosurgery and Other Somatic Treatments in Psychiatry* (1946) attributes the organic methods of treating mental illness about which he writes to "the belief that psychiatric conditions can be influenced therapeutically by nonpsychological methods" (1). Kalinowsky acknowledges the role of the environment in contributing to mental illness when discussing research on pharmacological methods of treatment, stating that some have found the "greatest value of the tranquilizing drugs to be their ability to insulate organisms from stimuli to which they are subjected, but to which they do not have learned meanings" (333). Furthermore, he points to the work of Soviet psychiatrists who have applied Pavlovian techniques[2] to conclude that chlorpromazine, an antipsychotic drug, is effective "because of its dampening effect on overstimulation" (333), while it also "promotes a reorganization of the disordered conditioned responses" (333). This behaviorist interpretation of the drug's efficacy indicates an application of pharmacotherapy to adjust and condition the patient to external structures, suggesting that the environment plays a crucial role in the etiology of mental illness, while simultaneously emphasizing the need to reformulate the subject's

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[2] Although during the Cold War, Soviet psychiatry came to be a function of political oppression and psychoanalysis, which was flourishing in the United States, was banned in the U.S.S.R., Pavlov had a substantial influence on psychiatry in the United States earlier in the twentieth century. For instance, the Rockefeller Foundation awarded fellowships to Pavlov and his students in 1923 (Rose et al. 463). Moreover, American behavioural psychiatrist W. Horsley Grant worked with Pavlov from 1924 through 1929 and became a strong supporter of his work (464). However, the adoption of Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity by the Communist Party during the Stalin era forced many Soviet psychiatrists who were influenced by non-Pavlovian theories from their positions (Zajicek 258), narrowing the scope of Soviet psychiatry.

relationship to the environment. The somatic treatments on which his work focuses approach the patient as the fundamental site of treatment and readjustment, rather than the environment in which the patient exists. Similarly, in *Psychosurgery and the Self*, Robinson acknowledges that environment may be a contributing factor to a patient's perceived illness while examining the therapeutic effects of lobotomy. According to her, "psychosurgery somehow relieves (patients) of their suffering and makes it possible for them to go back to their homes and to survive in the very environment in which their disorders developed" (15). Yet, the focus on the patient as an object of surgical intervention indicates that environment is secondary to organic treatments.

In the research that Kalinowsky points to, the environment of the hospital ward or psychiatric institution is not a primary means of rehabilitating the patient in order to be reintegrated into society. Journalistic exposés from the 1950s abound with accounts of asylum patients receiving poor custodial care in overcrowded facilities. Sociologist Irving Goffman's *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (1961) examines the various factors that acclimate the mental patient and other inmates to what Goffman refers to as "total institutions" (4), which are characterized by a "barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure" (4). Goffman's book is a result of his fieldwork in the 1950s, done in part at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. In "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient," Goffman examines the socialization of patients to the ward system of psychiatric institutions, noting that "the doctrines of psychiatry can reinforce the social fluctuations of the ward system. Thus, there is a current psychiatric view that the ward system is a kind of social hothouse in which patients start as social infants and end up, within a year, on convalescent wards as resocialized adults" (163). Goffman observes that the institutional arrangement of the ward system constitutes the individual's sense of self. Only through secondary adjustments can

an inmate find "important evidence that he is still his own man, with some control of his environment" (55).[3] The custodial model of institutionalization that Goffman examines as a total institution ultimately constitutes the patient as a function of his environment. The limited means for the patient to adjust to his environment that stem from institutional constraints are, then, indicative of the potential for further exploration of alternative forms of psychiatric diagnosis and somatic treatment by positing new social relations and configurations.

Despite the prevalence of somatic and pharmacological treatments in the United States during the 1950s, Kalinowsky concludes his "Theoretical Remarks" chapter by stating: "At present, we can say only that we are treating empirically disorders whose etiology is unknown, with methods whose action is also shrouded in mystery" (346). In presenting the etiology of mental illness and the methods used to treat it as unknowns, Kalinowsky gestures towards the potential for psychiatric knowledge and treatments to be revamped and reconceptualised in non-empirical terms. In other words, at this juncture of empirical psychiatric treatments on the one hand, and, on the other, disorders and causes that cannot be verified using empirical means, is the patient who is also a non-empirical being, but is, instead, a cultural and political subject. In this sense, then, the subject/patient must be understood within this matrix wherein psychiatric treatment is infused with the cultural and political factors that also constitute the patient as a subject.

Questions surrounding the objectivity of psychiatric treatment methods and knowledge that Kalinowsky points to became much more emphatic in the 1960s, especially considering the rising challenges posed to organic models of mental illness that those associated with anti-

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[3] In his essay "Characteristics of Total Institutions," Goffman defines secondary adjustments as "practices that do not directly challenge staff but allow inmates to obtain forbidden satisfactions or obtain permitted ones by forbidden means" (54).

psychiatry posed. Taken together, the work of Goffman, and psychiatrists including R.D. Laing and Thomas Szasz registers an impetus for new concepts of the etiology of mental illness, new forms of treatment, reconsiderations of the relationship between doctor and patient, and even a re-thinking of the very philosophical underpinnings and meaning of the category of mental illness. While challenging the tenets of psychiatric treatment and organic models of etiology, texts written by these figures demonstrate that the term "anti-psychiatry" encompasses varying and even contrary positions on the nature of mental illness and methods of treatment, providing a regenerative potential for political agency, coinciding with the dissonance of the Cold War liberal consensus. The technological rationality of the Cold War, however, influenced underlying assumptions and aims of science, emphasizing empirical evidence and observable data over social theories into the postwar era. The study of the personality and its adjustment to the environment thus became steeped in empiricism. The publication of the first *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* in 1952 indicates the way in which psychiatry sought standardization, empirical data, and consensus regarding diagnosis and the classification of mental illness and personality types that were incompatible with the Cold War social and political order. It was against the application of such technological and empirical rationality that social psychiatry reacted and sought alternatives to, both within the discipline of psychiatry, and more broadly, including literary culture.

The Politics of Cold War Cultural Production

The Cold War policy of containment, as outlined in George F. Keenan's "Long Telegram" of 1946, characterizes the Soviet Union as being directly opposed to and in conflict with Western capitalism and the United States. According to Keenan, "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and

vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" ("The Sources of Soviet Conduct" 575). The policy of containment, however, also unfolded through a longer strategy of Soviet accommodation to capitalist markets. National Security Council-68 (NSC-68), a report by the National Security Council presented to President Harry Truman in 1950, outlines a Cold War foreign policy stating that:

> By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. (10)

This attempt to reconfigure the position of the Soviet Union within the geo-political division of the globe into spheres of influence describes the way in which the Cold War strategy of the United States entailed global accommodation to its economic and political orientations through coercion.

The mechanisms of the modern security state that enact accommodation and coercion functioned not only internationally, but also domestically. As Arthur Redding illuminatingly argues, the Red Scare of 1919 was a central component in the formation of this function of the state (59). Redding draws on Randolph Bourne's analysis of the state, which Bourne characterizes as "a jealous God [that] will brook no rivals" (14). According to Bourne, during war, "[t]he pursuit of enemies within (the State) outweighs in psychic attractiveness the assault on the enemy without" (14). War, which is intimately tied to the State for its existence and

maintenance, Bourne contends, "automatically sets in motion throughout society those irresistible forces for uniformity, for passionate cooperation with the Government in coercing into obedience the minority groups and individuals which lack the larger herd sense" (9). Thus, during the early Cold War era and into the 1960s, the battle for cultural and capitalist hegemony waged by the U.S. internationally is also closely tied to the role of the state in the production and regulation of political dissidents within the borders of the national United States.

In *State of Exception* (2005), Giorgio Agamben's analysis of extrajudicial state power, Agamben explains the way in which the state of exception is a component of "military and economic emergencies that characteriz(e) the politics of the twentieth century" (22). The declaration of such emergencies leads to "extra or antijuridical" (Agamben 29) actions. The state of exception is not easily definable or locatable because it is "neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference. [. . .] The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition" (Agamben 23). This relationship between the juridical and the state of exception, then, relies on "a force of law without law" (Agamben 39), that constitutes the norm by suspending it (Agamben 40). Drawing on Agamben's work, Donald Pease explains how the state of exception applies to the Cold War, specifically the ways in which NSC-68 outlines the policy of a national security state as one of exception, which becomes the norm: "In conducting the cold war, the state was neither within the order nor outside the order. [. . .] For in order to defend the order it also represented, the state was first required to declare itself an exception to the order it regulated. The State of Exception is marked by absolute independence from any juridical control and any reference to the normal political order" (24). In deviating from the normal political order, which for Pease entails the different iteration of American exceptionalism that has been at work since the Puritans colonized

North America, the state seeks to realign political subjectivity with the aims of the Cold War, making adjusted citizens the product of the national security state. Pease continues to note that: "The cold war state obliged U.S. citizens to imagine their political enemies as intimately involved in the normal functioning of the political order. This image motivated U.S. citizens to transpose the state's construction of exceptions into its political norm" (30). The political norm to which Pease refers becomes the grounds for a new political order where "[n]o matter what the specific contents of their political views, U.S. citizens were obliged to enact the state's will to exclude communism as the precondition for their becoming viable political subjects" (31). While communism came to be seen as a failed political and economic system, and, moreover, the Red Scare of the late 1940s and 1950s made dialogue about any alignment with communism a danger to one's career and reputation, in the wake of the radicalism of the 1930s and 1940s came a fracturing of intelligible political positions beyond adjustment to a congealing liberal consensus.

The relationship between political dissent and cultural production appears to have been a strained one throughout the early years of the Cold War, as this congealing liberal consensus left dissenting voices to accommodate the new political climate of the Red Scare. The contours of this relationship between the increasingly complex ideological terrains of consensus politics and cultural production's role within the influence of anticommunism and the Red Scare, however, go beyond one of mere accommodation. Culture becomes a site that never entirely accommodates the political pressures that shape and reform it according to new political eras and ideologies. While containment functions as a useful model for understanding the dominant paradigm of managing the American population in both U.S. foreign and domestic relations during the early Cold War era, this dissertation explores the way in which attempts to manage, regulate, cure, and treat pathologized subjects informs the relationship between the State, the

subject, and literary production in ways that containment does not account for. Medical and sociological texts from the field of social psychiatry, particularly those associated with anti-psychiatry, and novels that engage with psychiatry and the treatment of mental illness provide particularly apt sites for tracing the ways in which political subjectivity was reconstituted beyond the regulated and coherent positions of Cold War liberalism and psychiatric treatment that were often aligned with each other in their attempts to coerce adjustment to the Cold War liberal consensus.

This dissertation explores how political subjectivity is produced by and inextricably linked to psychiatric discourses that infuse popular and medical texts in ways that both reinforce and disrupt the relationship between cultural production and Fordist production.[4] As Frances Stoner Saunders has pointed out in her history of the involvement of the CIA in the cultural front of the Cold War, the CIA "stockpiled a vast arsenal of cultural weapons: journals, books, conferences, seminars, art exhibitions, concerts, awards" (2). Such cultural weapons would prove

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[4] The tenets of Fordism consist of large-scale mass production methods that employ the managerial techniques of scientific rationality, which define Taylorism, to support mass consumption. Fordism relies on the long-term predictability of markets to remain stable and continue growth by increasing regulation of leisure time and positioning labourers involved in the production process as consumers. Fordism remained the dominant mode of economic production in the United States throughout the 1950s and 1960s, yet began to come under stress in the 1960s, resulting in the shift to a new post-Fordist mode of production that was becoming apparent by the 1970s. Post-Fordism is characterized by greater flexibility of markets and production processes and a shift to a service sector economy. David Harvey defines this new mode of production as one of "flexible accumulation" (147). According to Harvey, flexible accumulation "is characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation" (141). Rather than standardized methods of mass production, post-Fordism relies on small scale or just-in-time production, greater technological innovation, and greater flexibility in the nature of work, including the destabilizing effects of greater reliance on part-time and contract work on workers. Moreover, post-Fordism entails less state intervention, including a weakened welfare state, and less regulation of markets than under Fordism.

to be crucial to the foreclosure of tenable political positions couched in the rhetoric of freedom, which Saunders characterizes as an ideology of "'freedomism' or a narcissism of freedom, which elevated doctrine over tolerance for heretical views" (350). Tracing the reconfiguration and reconstitution of the relationship between the subject, psychiatric knowledge, and cultural production during the early Cold War era sheds new light on the ways in which both medical texts and novels bear the traces and withstand the pressures of the role of culture in disseminating and dissenting from the liberal consensus and the place of psychiatry in engineering and regulating it.

The U.S. Cold War policy of containment[5] involving accommodation and coercive measures had a counterpart in cultural production, which displayed a marked shift from the radicalism of the 1930s and 1940s. According to Philip Rahv, proletarian literature, as one possible avenue of political resistance to capitalism prior to the Cold War, was always enmeshed in the forms and aesthetics of the bourgeois Marxist intelligentsia and not an expression of a proletarian class,[6] yet Rahv's proclamation of the death of proletarian literature also marks a larger shift during the Cold War away from concerns with working class cultural production, which was necessary for its place in the arsenal used by the state to regulate political dissent and

[5] Elaine Tyler May and Alan Nadel have pointed out that containment had corollaries in American society and culture. According to May, "containment aptly describes the way in which public policy, personal behavior, and even political values were focused on the home" (16), drawing attention to the domestic aspects of containment, especially the suburban home and nuclear family, as means of tempering political dissent and social upheaval. In *Containment Culture* (1995), Nadel has shown the way in which containment functioned within widely circulating cultural narratives, drawing attention to their role in regulating and containing discourses surrounding atomic power, gender, sexuality, and race and considered the breakdown of these narratives in light of the advent of postmodernism.

[6] In "Proletarian Literature: A Political Autopsy" (1939), Philip Rahv argues that proletarian literature is not the literature of a distinct class, but a product of the Communist Party, enmeshed in bourgeois forms and aesthetics, which has contributed to its "disintegration" (623).

encourage accommodation to consensus culture. For instance, the co-option of Abstract Expressionism by the New York School of Art and its involvement in Cold War cultural imperialism is well documented and examined by Serge Guibaut and, more recently Saunders, among others. Moreover, Richard Purcell examines the bearing of the Congress for Cultural Freedom on Ralph Ellison's work following the publication of *Invisible Man*, illuminating how Ellison's writing on race in the United States became intertwined with the racial accommodation of Cold War liberalism. These are only a mere two examples among others of the ways in which cultural production became a means of garnering participation in Fordist production and the high consumption of commodities it entails among an expanding middle-class of Americans as an expression of American political values and identity. As Arthur Redding astutely argues: "What was increasingly obsolete was rather the available models of cultural production, which would no longer prove fruitful vehicles for the dissemination of political positions" (15) on the radical Left. The foreclosure of cultural production as a site for political ideas appears to have given way to expressions of private, internal angst, frustration, and feelings of futility of the individual, rather than an articulation of political concerns regarding gender, race, and class, which provide a basis for collective political action.

Literary Representations of Psychiatric Treatment

Fictional narratives about psychiatric treatment and institutionalization from the 1950s and 1960s often emphasize individual stressors and maladjustment in lieu of larger social and class struggles, leaving channels for dissent from the postwar consensus difficult to discern.

Social stressors and tensions become the private, pathologized terrain of the individual's interiority, rather than the terrain of collective politics that characterized proletarian writing of the 1930s and much of the Popular Front writing of the 1930s and 1940s. However, the shift from collective politics to individual interiority exposes the boundaries between state sanctioned forms of "healthy" political expression and expression the state deemed transgressive or pathological. Many literary works by female authors offer a telling glimpse into the pressures bearing on female political subjectivities in ways that both delineate and curtail the possibilities for agency, while articulating the domestic and institutional mechanisms at work on them. For instance, Mary Jane Ward's *The Snake Pit* (1946) tells the story of Virginia Cunningham's treatment under Dr. Kik at Juniper Hill Mental Hospital. As Virginia pieces together how she came to be institutionalized, she recounts the pressures she faced to marry her husband Robert as she grapples with her ambition to become a writer, ultimately leading to her successful treatment when, according to her psychiatrist, guilt over her fiancé's death is resolved. The1948 film adaptation resonated with audiences and contributed to public debate surrounding psychiatric institutionalization, as Virginia encounters both caring and neglectful doctors and staff in the hospital, before her recovery at the hands of Dr. Kik and the affirmation of her role as a wife, as the film ends with Robert placing a wedding ring back on Virginia's finger. Sylvia Plath's *The Bell Jar* (1963) similarly recounts Esther Greenwood's institutionalization and treatment by the benevolent female Dr. Nolan, eventually leading to her recovery and reintegration into postwar society. The novel more overtly criticizes the patriarchal expectations for women as postwar society sought to re-entrench the domestic sphere as the place for women, yet Plath's protagonist ultimately finds a way to reintegrate into society following Dr. Nolan's successfully

administered electroconvulsive therapy. Plath's confessional poetry, along with that of Anne Sexton, similarly conveys a sense of ennui regarding the domestic expectations for women, providing a political element to poetry that is not overtly political. Furthermore, Joanne Greenberg's *I Never Promised You a Rose Garden* (1964) (published under the pseudonym of Hannah Greene) is an account of 16-year-old Deborah Blau's withdrawal from reality into an internal state known as Yr. Deborah's treatment by Dr. Fried reveals Deborah's childhood traumas, including a painful operation to remove a urethral tumor and the anti-Semitism she faced at a summer camp. Dr. Fried encourages Deborah to relinquish Yr, which has become both a source of terror and judgement for Deborah as well as creativity, as a precursor to Deborah's recovery. Deborah's recovery entails channeling her creativity into drawing and successfully earning her high school equivalency, acts which attest to her reintegration into society. However, the novel's ending, wherein Doris Rivera, a patient who returns to the hospital, suggests that Deborah's recovery and ability to channel her creativity into socially acceptable outlets may also be tentative and temporary.

While the above examples of cultural production by female authors focusing on psychiatric treatment and institutionalization posit reintegration as a possibility, other texts focusing on the psychological aspects of women from the 1950s suggest that pathology is more insidious and widespread than an individual approach to treatment accounts for. Perhaps most notably, Grace Metalious' novel *Peyton Place* (1956) consistently flouts the ideals of sexual containment with its portrayal of the violent sexuality of Lucas Cross and a veiled suggestion of incest involving his stepdaughter, Selena. Selena's murder of Lucas in response to her rape and her position in a poor area of Peyton Place known as the Shacks not only depicts a shocking underbelly of the seemingly sanitized New England town of Peyton Place, but also suggests that

class and environment poignantly offer explanations for the criminal and pathologized behaviour that abounds in the novel, as Metalious offers a sensationalized indictment of the ideals of 1950s family and middle-class life. The political dimensions of pathological and transgressive expression, however, are often yet to be coherently organized and recognized as dissent and, thus, remain within a state of liminality in relation to existing political discourse of the time. This dissertation is most concerned with such forms of representation, which emerge within the subjectivities and economic formations that the novels and case studies that the following chapters theorize, by making the political dimensions of psychopathology discernable. In particular, this dissertation explores texts by male authors that posit psychiatry as a terrain of male anxiety and constitute male subjectivities and their engagement with psychiatric knowledge and power as it is exercised along the lines of class, gender, and race.

Literary representations of psychiatric treatment are particularly attuned to the ways in which the psychiatric patient exists on the threshold of the juridical order, enabling the constitution of liberal subjectivity through disciplinary apparatuses of psychiatric power. The psychiatric patient, who is deemed deficient according to the confines of the dominant political order, faces adjustment or accommodation to consensus culture, which often takes the form of a seemingly freely chosen subjectivity. This adjustment involves pathologized forms of affect finding outlets that are aligned with the interests of Fordist production and its attendant economic and familial relations. For instance, Ken Kesey's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* (1962) concludes with patients who have found ways to escape the institution and pursue forms of individual freedom and sexual fulfillment following their encounter with the domineering regulations and disciplinary measures of the ward, personified by Nurse Ratched. Barbara Lupack succinctly encapsulates this reading of the novel by noting: "What makes *Cuckoo's Nest*

so memorable is the way that the individual ultimately triumphs over the institution's anonymous horrors: the inmates learn to run the asylum and finally, like Bromden, they discover how to escape it completely and make themselves whole and potent again" (67). Chief Bromden, a Native American patient of the psychiatric hospital who is believed to be deaf and unable to speak, narrates the novel. He recounts the arrival of Randal Patrick McMurphy at the hospital and McMurphy's influence on his recovery and that of the other patients. The boisterous and virile McMurphy has arrived from a work farm, where he was serving a sentence resulting from an array of charges including "Drunkenness Assault and Battery, Disturbing the Peace, *repeated* gambling" (emphasis in Kesey 39) in addition to an arrest for statutory rape. A veteran of the Korean War who was dishonourably discharged for insubordination, Murphy is at odds with a peacetime environment, which becomes even more evident in the hospital as Nurse Ratched, a former military nurse, attempts to subdue McMurphy and his influence on the other patients on the ward.

McMurphy, in many ways, shares the role of protagonist in the novel with Chief Bromden as Bromden recounts his own path towards freedom from the hospital and the recovery of his voice through a narrative of McMurphy's seeming triumph over Nurse Ratched and the Combine, Bromden's term for the mechanisms of conformity and discipline that Ratched and her orderlies serve. The recovery of Bromden, considered to be one of the Chronics of the ward and thus incapable of regaining his former faculties of speech, as well as some of the Acutes, however, comes at the expense of McMurphy, who undergoes a lobotomy under the orders of Ratched. To prevent McMurphy from becoming a monument to the Combine and a warning to others not to challenge what Kesey portrays as an emasculating and castrating form of female authority, Bromden smothers McMurphy before breaking free from the hospital and returning to

what was once the land of his ancestors before the construction of a dam and the stripping away of land rights by the U.S. government.

Through his experiences with McMurphy, Bromden frees himself from a psychological fog that engulfs him and which, up until McMurphy's arrival, he often allowed himself to become lost in, as he relates how he "is glad when (the fog) gets thick enough you're lost in it and can let go and, be safe again" (92). Comparing the fog he experiences on the ward to the fog machine used to thwart arial attacks during the Second World War, Bromden states that "You were safe from the enemy, but you were awfully alone" (103). After becoming lost in the fog on the ward, Bromden would "turn up at the Shock Shop door" (104) to be brought back to an awareness of his surroundings through electroconvulsive therapy. The fog that Bromden believes Ratched releases onto the ward to regulate and control his and the other Acutes' perceptions also provides the capacity to evade and withdraw from institutional regulations. Bromden relies on the fog to withdraw from the social relations of the ward and turn inward, often revisiting memories of his past with his father and reliving the traumatic experiences of being displaced from the land over which his father ruled as a chief. Bromden's internal withdrawal provides refuge from Ratched and the orderlies and security in the knowledge that he is descended from a full Native American chief, but does nothing to resolve the trauma of losing the name of his father, who married a "town woman from The Dalles" (171) and took her last name, and the land over which he governed as chief.

McMurphy's presence comes to have a profound effect on Bromden and the Acutes as McMurphy challenges the way in which they have adjusted to the conditions of the ward at the expense of their autonomy and masculinity. Bromden relates how McMurphy, in an effort to secure votes to change ward policy to allow the men to watch the World Series on television,

begins to bring the men out of the fog: "I see them, other hands coming up out of the fog. It's like that big red hand of McMurphy's is reaching into the fog and dropping down and dragging the men up by their hands, dragging them blinking into the open" (111). Bromden is careful to distinguish McMurphy's influence from the form of disciplinary power of the Combine, first explaining that "McMurphy's got hidden wires hooked into (his hand), lifting it slow just to get me out of the fog and into the open where I'm fair game. He's doing it, wires" (112-113), before stopping himself to interject in his own version of events: "No. That's not it. I lifted it myself" (113). McMurphy provides an opportunity for agency that otherwise exists in a limited capacity only through Bromden's use of the fog to withdraw from oppressive social relations. As Bromden raises his hand, he demonstrates his ability to hear, speak, and participate in votes in what is said to be a democratic structure of the ward governed by a constitution. Thus, Bromden can conceivably begin to change the oppressive nature of the ward which has relied on the violence of electroconvulsive therapy, physical restraint, and the humiliation of group therapy sessions to purportedly affect a cure in the Acutes. Bromden exercises autonomy further when signing up for and attending a fishing trip organized by McMurphy, which involves alcohol and women, aligning Bromden with McMurphy's virility and offering an alternative form of therapy to that of the doctors at the hospital and Nurse Ratched. Following the fishing trip, Bromden and some of the Acutes are willing to be part of McMurphy's plan to sneak Candy, a prostitute who attended the trip, into the ward overnight to help Billy Bibbit, a stuttering and self-loathing Acute patient, lose his virginity and then help McMurphy escape, mounting the ultimate form of dissent against Ratched.

While the plan goes awry when McMurphy is not awakened before the arrival of the dayshift and Billy and Candy are discovered together by Ratched, ultimately causing Billy to slit

his throat at the thought of Ratched disclosing his sexual conquest to his mother, Bromden and the Acutes have come to weaken and undermine Ratched's authority and her role in the smooth functioning of the Combine. McMurphy's lobotomy indicates that Ratched's authority is not entirely dismantled, but ultimately, the novel can be read as a narrative of the primacy of individualism and non-conformity in the midst of psychiatric power that serves the aims of Cold War containment, particularly in light of Bromden's escape from the hospital by throwing a large, heavy control panel previously used for hydrotherapy tubs through the window of the ward, causing the glass to splash "out in the moon, like a bright cold water baptizing the sleeping earth" (254). Bromden's escape signals McMurphy's therapeutic effect on him, as Bromden has learned to use his brute strength to return to the earth in a revitalized form. As Scanlon, another patient on the ward tells Bromden, McMurphy showed him how to escape, reminding him "if you think back, that very first week" (254) when McMurphy unsuccessfully tried to lift the control panel. Thus, Bromden is freed from the stifling conditions of the ward with the self-knowledge that is necessary to confront the Combine in its other iterations.

McMurphy's therapeutic effect on Bromden and the other patients enables them to free themselves from the machinations of the Combine that act most overtly and violently on them while on the ward; however, *Cuckoo's Nest* also posits greater therapeutic potential (and its curtailment) than experienced by Bromden and the other patients. McMurphy not only disturbs the functioning of psychiatric power, only to be stamped out by it, but also becomes the site on which the means of Fordist production falter and sputter in their demand for affect to be productively managed. McMurphy's earnings from gambling are a direct affront not only to the rules of the ward, which only allow gambling for matches, but also to the rationalism of a Fordist economy with its technological certainty and rigidity of production. Bromden aligns Ratched

with this certainty of the Combine, noting how she manages and controls the passage of time on the ward: “The Big Nurse is able to set the wall clock at whatever speed she wants by just turning one of those dials in the steel door” (64) which sometimes causes the patients “to be driven like mad to keep up with the passing of fake time” (64). According to Bromden, she can also “turn that dial to a dead stop and freeze the sun” (64). Ratched sets the pace and timing of the patients’ lives, operating the ward systematically as though it is subject to the regimentation of scientific management. Bromden’s only escape is in the fog, “where time doesn’t mean anything” (65), as he finds some solace by withdrawing inward.

Ratched’s regimentation ensures efficiency and seeks to eliminate risk, in keeping with the rigidity of Fordist production in the postwar era. Bromden explains how her operation of the ward ultimately ensures that it continues to function in a regulated manner, despite the possibility of risk and disruption: “She’ll go on winning, just like the Combine, because she has all the power of the Combine behind her. She don’t lose on her losses, but she wins on ours. To beat her you don’t have to whip her two out of three or three out of five, but every time you meet. As soon as you let down your guard, as soon as you lose *once*, she’s won for good. And eventually we all got to lose” (92). McMurphy’s gambling indicates that his actions always entail a degree of risk, which will subject him to the discipline of psychiatric power and perpetually threaten to render his seemingly incoherent and chaotic energies into the existing forms of regulation of life on the ward, as occurs with the Acutes, or neutralize such energies. Upon McMurphy’s arrival, Ratched posits that he may be a manipulator whose “own ends are simply the actual *disruption* of the ward for the sake of disruption” (26), indicating the application of psychiatric knowledge to obscure the potential political and economic implications of McMurphy’s behaviour.

McMurphy's diagnosis as a psychotic further suits Ratched's need to create a semblance of order and coherence that is necessary for the maintenance of the relations of Fordist production. McMurphy questions the court's definition of a psychopath, which he states is "a guy [who] fights too much and fucks too much" (16), indicating that judicial and medical authority converge to classify him as someone in need of treatment, which will adjust him to the world outside the ward. However, McMurphy is initially willing to accept this diagnosis in order to be away from the work farm from which he came, and evade the channeling of his energies into productive capitalist labour in favour of gambling. Yet, his markedly virile and aggressive energies ultimately remain subject to the management of capitalist productivity while institutionalized. In addition to being diagnosed as a potential psychotic by the doctor at the work farm, McMurphy points out that the doctor also noted in his medical record that McMurphy has displayed "*repeated* outbreaks of passion" (Emphasis in Kesey 41). While the doctor on the ward points out that McMurphy's record also notes that he may be "feigning psychosis to escape the drudgery of the work farm" (41), McMurphy ultimately appears unable to contain his outburst against Ratched following Billy's suicide. Bromden recounts how McMurphy smashed through the glass of the Nurse's Station to confront Ratched, "grabbed for her and ripped her uniform all the way down the front" (250) exposing "two nippled circles [which] started from her chest and swelled out and out, bigger than anybody had ever imagined" (250), resulting in the "doctors and supervisors and nurses prying those heavy red fingers out of the white flesh of her throat as if they were her neck bones" (250). Thus, McMurphy's violent outburst, which exposes the femininity that Ratched sought to conceal as an agent of dehumanizing regulation, comes to be seen as confirmation of his diagnosis and subjects him to a series of electroconvulsive therapies and a lobotomy.

The pathologizing of McMurphy's affect, with its violence and machismo, also entails the curtailment of his resistance to channeling energy into profitable work processes to disrupt and offer alternatives to profitable labour processes under Fordist production. Significantly, Bromden realizes that McMurphy brings to the ward for the first time "the man smell of dust and dirt from the open fields, and sweat, and work" (83). McMurphy's presence is, then, one of working-class masculinity in peril of being pathologized by scientific rationality. His flouting of ward policies thus entails acts of dissent by a working-class subject seeking to exercise agency within increasingly narrow channels. McMurphy encounters an array of other smells on the ward, which are indicative of psychiatry's role in regulating and containing that which cannot be rendered into productive forms of labour under Fordism. Bromden describes other common smells on the ward including "germicide [and] zinc ointment" (83), indicating the emphasis on eliminating and creating a barrier against bodily by products. Moreover, he notes the smell of Pablum (83), showing the infantilization of the patients, and "sometimes the smell of singed hair" (83) that results from the disciplining of those who stray from the regulatory demands of Fordism, including the division between leisure time and labour—a key point of contention between McMurphy and Ratched throughout the novel as McMurphy rallies for the opportunity to watch the World Series and take the men on a fishing trip. Ultimately, *Cuckoo's Nest* plays out the contestation of psychiatry as a means of managing affective responses, such as McMurphy's, to an intensification of Fordist production and scientific rationality during the postwar era. This shift in the means of production involved enlisting psychiatry to define and shape the psychologically healthy individual within the confines of white-collar, middle-class subjectivities, positioning others as needing readjustment to narrowly constituted productive subjects of Cold War liberalism and its entrenchment in Fordism.

Cultural production that sought to contain expression within Cold War consensus politics and channel it into the construction of a healthy American character worked in conjunction with the aim of psychiatry to integrate those considered to be transgressive into Fordist production and consumption. Psychiatry utilized discourses of adjustment and maladjustment in order to construct the Cold War subject as both medical patient and American citizen. Karl Menninger's *The Human Mind* describes the way in which a personality, which Menninger describes as a confluence of "a great variety of influences" (27) and "accidents of life" (27), comes to adapt successfully to a situation, or, contrarily, fails to do so and becomes maladjusted. According to Menninger: "There are two kinds of failure. Finding himself incapable of fulfilling the requirements of the situation, the personality essaying the adjustment may resort to flight, or he may resort to an attack on the situation. He may retreat from the situation, or he may attempt its destruction. Ordinarily both flights and attacks are disastrous, the former resulting in damage to the personality, the latter in damage to the situation" (30). In sociological and psychological studies of the early Cold War era, researchers situated the personality in relation to a political disposition or "national character," studying and analyzing how environmental factors shaped the political tendencies of individuals. Margaret Mead's 1942 *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, Geoffrey Gorer's 1948 *The American People: A Study in National Character*, and *The Authoritarian Personality* by Theodore Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sandford, published in 1950, posited that environmental factors had the potential to produce personality types that are conducive to a democratic national character in the U.S. or the totalitarian states of Nazi Germany. Working in the vein of Alex de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America,* while drawing heavily on psychological theories of personality development, these

texts sought to align the psychological structure of the individual with consensus politics using sociological lenses.

The production of national character within psychological and sociological studies which came to influence social psychiatry was analogous with U.S. government policy which sought to align nations with a global political order through accommodation to the "character" of the United States. As Leerom Medovoi posits, during the Cold War the U.S. presented its national character "not as the imperial parent but as elder sibling to the world's new nation-states" (12). National characteristics of anti-colonialism, freedom, and individuality of Cold War rhetoric, then, "presented (the United States) as the only reliable model for self-determination" (Medovoi 12). Menninger's text indicates that failure to adjust to the prevailing order is "disastrous," (30), likely resulting in an "attack" or "retreat" (30) from the situation, actions that have the capacity to disturb the prevailing political order and expose a dissenting subject to disciplinary power that reinforces the link between mental illness and political dissent.

Menninger's explanation, while helpful for discerning the possible outcomes for subjects of orthodox psychiatric knowledge, falls short of considering and elaborating on the possibilities of disasters such as flight or attack on a situation to which an individual cannot adjust. In other words, Menninger does not account for the ways in which such instances of disruption and disturbance are also constitutive of subjective experience which can be rendered into a new political discourse. This discourse conveys otherwise unintelligible responses and challenges to the role of psychiatry in normalizing the situations that evoke such as response, while pathologizing the individual who fails to adjust. This dissertation, however, examines literary representations of psychiatric treatment and mental illness wherein subjectivities with political agency emerge within sites of retreat, attack, or other forms of destruction.

Chapter Breakdown

The texts considered in this dissertation engage in the political sphere by theorizing alternative economic formations to capitalism and their attendant conceptions of labour through the constitution of psychiatric subjectivities. New conceptions of labour are not merely concerned only with the physical aspects of work, but the affective components of economic formations, particularly as they are channeled into the process of production. The works chosen are indicative of a shift from class based cultural production to therapeutic formations as a form of political dissent. This shift entails a departure from formal aspects of naturalism and social realism associated with proletarian literature and a focus on the masses to interiority and the consciousness of the subject as a politicized and even commodified space, making it the new terrain of political conflict. In the stead of proletarian literature comes the need to redefine the relationship between Cold War consensus culture and cultural production. This relationship was, sometimes subtly and sometimes more apparently, mediated by psychiatric discourse and representations of mental illness. This makes novels about psychiatric treatment an apt site for exploring an array of political subjectivities that Cold War era psychiatry produced, despite the way in which such novels often present meaningful political engagement as a challenge or problem due to the individualization and privatization of psychological stressors that are intertwined with political and economic factors.

The works selected as primary texts in the following chapters have also been chosen for their representation of and engagement with the theoretical, disciplinary, or professional facets of psychiatry during the Cold War, beginning with Mickey Spillane's *I, The Jury* (1947) and concluding with Norman Mailer's *Why Are We in Vietnam?* (1967). While cultural production from these years is abundant with depictions of and references to psychiatric treatment, the

works included here are characterized by their ambivalent relationship with psychiatry. On the one hand, they portray problematic and even horrific aspects of psychiatry such as the violence of somatic treatments including electroshock therapy and lobotomy as well as more subtle forms of discursive violence used in diagnosing patients and ascribing significance to symptoms, often rendering the experience and language of patients unintelligible. On the other hand, these works also see psychiatry as a social agent with the capacity to reorganize the relations of Fordist production. They approach psychiatric treatment as a means of not only creating new channels for the flow of individual energies, but also new channels for the circulation and investment of such energies in ways that disrupt and reconstitute larger social relations along the lines of sexuality, race, and gender.

Notably, the novels and psychiatric texts discussed in the following chapters are written by males. In some senses, this limits the array of potential economic reformulations and re-conceptions of labour that emerge within the analyses that follow. The writings of R.D. Laing and Norman Mailer are particularly noteworthy. For instance, Laing's selection of female patients in *Sanity, Madness, and the Family* (1964) reflects the wider dominance of masculine authority in the field of psychiatry and medicine more broadly, as does his analysis of his patients, which posits domineering mothers as significant factor in "abnormal" families. This is also consistent with the prominence of the "schizophrenogenic mother" of much of the psychiatric literature of the 1950s and 1960s. Nonetheless, Laing also offers an analysis of his patients' perceived illness as a burgeoning form of political agency that entails the withdrawal of affective energy from the reproduction of the nuclear family. Moreover, Mailer's phallocentric orientation is the subject of much feminist criticism, including works such as Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* (1970), which considers the functions of patriarchy that appear in Mailer's work.

Juliet Mitchell's *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1974) critiques both psychoanalysis and feminist critiques of Freud, including Millet's. Mitchell asserts that Millet overlooks the significance of the unconscious and the detrimental effects that patriarchy plays on its structuring of femininity. According to Mitchell: "Most hostile critics of Freud implicitly deny the very notion of an aspect of mental life [. . .] that is different from conscious thought-processes. Other psychologies are about consciousness, psychoanalysis is dealing with the unconscious –This was a point on which Freud had to insist" (8). Thus, the male authors considered in this dissertation, with their limitations and sometimes even misogynist perspectives, also enable an interrogation of the psychodynamic processes and organizing principles of gender and hetero-normativity that also productively give way to alternative forms of conscious and unconscious investments and affective relations, which enable reconfigured economic and political formations which can provide a basis for a more inclusive politics of dissent.

Chapter One examines the relationship between cultural production in the early Cold War era and the constitution of a psychiatric subject capable of political dissent from Cold War consensus and consumer culture through affective expression. The chapter considers how psychiatric knowledge and discourse function as an emerging and contested terrain for registering political agency by reading two noir crime novels, Mickey Spillane's *I, The Jury* (1947) and Charles Willeford's *Pick-Up* (1955). While both can be classified as popular crime fiction, they offer competing visions of the place of returning G.I.s following the Second World War. Both Spillane and Willeford's novels portray protagonists facing pressures to adjust to the prevailing norms of heterosexual marriage articulated by postwar psychiatry, particularly military psychiatry. More specifically, this chapter considers these novels alongside military psychiatry manuals intended for returning G.I.s such as *Psychology for the Returning*

Serviceman (1945). Spillane's hard-boiled, private investigator protagonist Mike Hammer continues to pursue violence as an outlet for libidinal energies upon his return to civilian life as he investigates the murder of his friend and former soldier, Jack Williams. His investigation leads him to psychiatrist Charlotte Manning. Hammer sees Charlotte as both a potential wife with whom domestic bliss is possible, and a threat to his individual and economic agency and psychic autonomy. Charlotte's professional identity and its basis in the institutionalized knowledge and practices of psychiatry are at odds with Hammer's anti-institutional and individualist ethic as a private investigator. While tempted by Charlotte's sexual allure, Hammer also sublimates his desire for her and the postwar model of marriage into the violent actions that he sees as maintaining a form of masculine psychological autonomy. However, Hammer's sense of autonomy is ultimately revealed to be a conservative fantasy that reinforces and defends the place of heteronormativity within consensus culture.

Willeford's *Pick-Up* takes a more ambivalent approach to psychiatry's role in adjusting returning soldiers to postwar norms. Rather than a threat to masculine and economic agency, Willeford's protagonist, Harry Jordan, discovers that at best psychiatry is inept at articulating his psychological turmoil as a diagnosable disorder. Jordan, a former artist who painted murals during the war, finds that the style of non-objective art he once practiced is an inadequate form of affective expression. His feelings for Helen Meredith, an alcoholic with whom he falls in love, and his marginal socio-economic position become unintelligible within the available forms of representation within consensus culture. Moreover, the revelation that Jordan is black in the final sentence of the novel reflects Willeford's overwrought effort to portray him as an object of psychiatric and legal discourse. Jordan's second encounter with psychiatry following his arrest for Helen's murder further conveys the discursive practices of psychiatry to be a function of

Fordist standardization and normalcy. Jordan's character, however, reveals inherent fissures and failures that provide a basis for a new politics of dissent that remain unarticulated within the novel.

Chapter Two considers the potential of psychiatric power and its institutionalized formations to be reemployed in the constitution of a new political consciousness that relies on the representational capacities and limitations of Cold War cultural production. This chapter briefly charts a shift from Ralph Ellison's proletarian writing and influence by naturalism in the 1940s to the publication of his novel *Invisible Man* (1952), as Ellison grapples with the tempered political discourse of the left during the early Cold War. *Invisible Man* takes what is perhaps a less hostile or ambivalent view of psychiatry than the novels of Spillane and Willeford, as Ellison both registers the tendency of Cold War sociology and psychiatry to pathologize blackness, and orders psychological experience and violence into intelligible political expression. This chapter draws on psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan's three modes of experience, the prototaxic, parataxic, and the syntaxic in its analysis of *Invisible Man* to constitute psychiatric patients as political subjectivities which are constituted via informal, subterranean, and previously unarticulated therapeutic formations that cannot be fully accounted for and harnessed by existing institutions. Ellison's 1948 essay "Harlem is Nowhere" on the Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic in Harlem, run by psychiatrist Fredric Wertham, is indicative of Ellison's turn to a therapeutic approach to political action, which he examines more robustly in *Invisible Man*. This chapter argues that *Invisible Man* positions unarticulated and thus unchanneled violence that conventional psychiatry seeks to discipline and organize into productive capitalist relations at the centre of political conflict between Fordist production and the political representation and agency

of African Americans. At stake is the authority to ascribe meaning to and pathologize violence in ways that either disrupt or reinscribe existing relations between violence and capitalism.

Chapter Three explores the constitution of a countercultural subject in relation to the family's function as a regulator of productive affect. The theory of the family as the etiological basis of mental illness that was prominent throughout the 1950s and 1960s enabled scathing critiques of the nuclear family and its role in the maintenance of Fordist production among the left. This chapter first considers how the work of psychiatrist Dr. Wilhelm Reich in the 1930s provides a precursor to critiques of the nuclear family among the left and the work of those associated with anti-psychiatry in the 1960s. Reich's discredited theory of orgone energy, as explained in *The Function of the Orgasm* (1942), posits that measurable sexual energy is dammed under capitalist production, leading to an array of neuroses and illnesses. Influenced by Reich's notion of sex-economic work, which Reich presents as a healthy alternative to the relations of capitalist reproduction, Norman Mailer and psychiatrist R.D. Laing interrogate the role of the family in consensus culture. This chapter considers how two case studies in Laing's *The Divided Self* (1960), the case of James and the case of Peter, posit how patients' familial relations that have been understood as neurotic symptoms signify a rejection of the family as a site for the management of productive affect for the maintenance of Fordist production. In the case of James, parody and caricature of James' father enables a form of political agency that becomes discernable with the concept of countercultural cool. Laing's analysis of a false-self system, in conjunction with James' performance becomes a double performance wherein Peter rejects the family's role in the reproduction of the conditions of Fordism.

This chapter then turns to Laing and Aaron Esterson's *Sanity, Madness and the Family* (1964) to analyze the ways in which Laing's approach to female schizophrenic patients within

the larger context of what Laing refers to as the family nexus constitutes a form of cool femininity, while acknowledging the limitations that Laing's role as a therapist plays in ascribing agency to cool femininity beyond the withdrawal of desire from the reproduction of the Cold War nuclear family. After analyzing Laing's work as a critique of the nuclear family that enables countercultural cool, this chapter examines Mailer's 1957 essay "The White Negro" as an articulation of hip that similarly posits conformity to Cold War sexual and gender norms that constitute the nuclear family as a site for political agency. Mailer's discussion of the psychopathic tendencies of the hipster, which entails problematic notions of primitive blackness, articulates the limitations of Cold War political discourse surrounding sex and the centrality of the family. Mailer's essay ultimately posits unproductive forms of sexual relations as a form of political dissent that disrupts the familial unit. Lastly, this chapter approaches Mailer's 1967 novel *Why Are We in Vietnam?* as a reconsideration of the political efficacy of pathologized affect and its channeling into unproductive forms of labour. The discourse of Mailer's narrator, D.J., and D.J.'s relationship with best friend Tex, which D.J. imagines to be pathologized by psychiatric discourse and parental authority, becomes a site of contested signification as the novel explores the pressures facing Fordist production and the nuclear family's role in its emerging economic stagnation.

Chapter Four examines the limitations of liberalism's attempts to provide therapeutic responses to the stressors of Fordist production, particularly in the midst of Fordism's emerging fault lines in the mid-1960s. This chapter reads Kurt Vonnegut's *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* (1965) as a critique of Cold War liberalism's capacity to address pathologized forms of desire within the shifting mode of production to a post-Fordist economy. When Eliot Rosewater, President of the philanthropic Rosewater Foundation, finds the standardized and centralized

structure of liberal philanthropy an inadequate therapeutic response to the types of social ills that social psychiatry has attempted to account for, his reformulated Rosewater Foundation ostensibly provides a viable alternative therapeutic formation. Eliot's utopic project entails therapy for the destitute residents of Rosewater County, many of whom are no longer employable due to automized production processes, through small scale charitable donations that account for the localized conditions of Rosewater County. The chapter considers how Eliot's utopic ideals become subject to the scrutiny of psychiatry and dismissed as viable political principles when a lawyer representing the foundation attempts to remove Eliot from the presidency of the foundation to transfer the fortune to a distant branch of the Rosewater family. Thus, Vonnegut offers a satirical take on the role of psychiatry in regulating economic relations, highlighting psychiatry's role in establishing political alternatives to Fordist production.

This chapter also examines Vonnegut's satire in light of libertarian psychiatrist Thomas Szasz's criticisms of forensic psychiatry in *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry: An Inquiry into the Social Uses of Mental Health Practices* (1963) to show that despite Vonnegut's shared critique of psychiatry as a form of social regulation, he ultimately rejects Szasz's libertarian politics as a solution. Vonnegut sees the privatization of psychiatric treatment, which Szasz advocates as a measure for the protection of individual liberty, as a narcissistic investment that attempts to alleviate Eliot's guilt from his inherited wealth. This narcissistic investment is apparent in Eliot's use of the Rosewater Foundation to alleviate his own liberal guilt, rather than to provide effective therapeutic measures to Rosewater County. Ultimately, Vonnegut suggests that the dispersal of the Rosewater fortune to Eliot's adopted children in Rosewater County is necessary to conceive of a new therapeutic state fantasy that alleviates the need for mental health consumerism as a

response to guilt and an opportunity to reconstitute the familial lines through which it is inherited.

Lastly, the Conclusion reflects on the contested legacy of anti-psychiatry in light of contemporary controversies regarding its relevance today, offering the legacy of anti-psychiatry as a rejection of and alternative to anti-intellectualism in the United States. It also briefly discusses Clancy Sigal's *Zone of the Interior* (1976), which provides a satirical semi-autobiographical retrospect of Sigal's experiences at Kingsley Hall with R.D. Laing in the 1960s through the narration of Sidney Bell. Sigal's fictionalized account of his time with Laing offers a scathing account of Laing's increasingly esoteric theoretical and methodological approaches. However, Sigal's novel also offers a way of understanding the legacy of anti-psychiatry and, more generally, the turn to psychiatry and psychotherapy as a mode of political dissent that existed in various iterations from the Cold War years of the late 1940s through the late 1960s as one of a renewed political fervour. In particular, Sigal's portrayal of his experiences at Conelly House through Bell's narration shifts the perspective from Laing's central position as psychiatrist and spiritual guide to the perspective of an observer and documenter of the experiences of residents. The novel opens by declaring "I am back" (1), signalling a return from an interior withdrawal, which is often used to dismiss political aspirations of the 1960s counterculture as indulgent excesses. Through Bell's narrative, Sigal articulates experiences that remain indiscernible within the neurobiological explanations of mental illness that dominate psychiatry. This articulation marks literary production as a renewed means of making discernable the ways in which current medical and popular discourses dismiss voices that resist the continual expansion of capitalist relations into all facets of mental life. It concludes by briefly reflecting on

the contemporary role of individualized, pathologized affect as a contested site of political signification.

Chapter One: "I knew the kind": Military Psychiatry and Masculine Subjectivities in Noir Crime Novels

The origins of crime novels in pop culture magazines and inexpensive pulp novels of the 1920s and 1930s initially positioned crime fiction on the periphery of political and cultural debates. However, by the late 1940s divisions between proletarian cultural production and the canonical status of texts valued by the New Critics in the Academy were not clearly defined. As Nicola Upson notes in a recent article in *The Guardian* ranking the top ten golden age detective novels, "it took the second world war and its aftermath to bring (crime novels) to maturity; many of the authors whose careers began 20 years earlier wrote their best books in the 1940s and 50s." This rise to maturity is evident in the contested position that crime novels occupied following the Second World War. The Cold War had come to be seen as an inevitability that must be waged via an attempt to champion American culture. Cold War era anxieties surrounding the distinction between high and popular or "low brow" culture indicate that this contested role for such forms existed within a narrowing terrain of politically viable positions.

Andrew Ross' examination of the "'problem' of the political significance of popular culture" (12) for Cold War intellectuals can be parsed productively in noir crime novels by considering how they grapple with political expression and authority. According to Ross, determining their political significance involves the function of "Cultural power," which he describes as "the power to define where each relational category begins and ends, and the power to determine what it contains at any one time" (61). This power contests cultural production along lines of class[7]. For Ross, "the history of this 'problem' does not begin with Marx's elegant

[7] Peter Stanfield also points to the way in which Spillane's novels became involved in debates about the political significance of popular culture. He points to the work of Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel who in their book *The Popular Arts* (1964) assert that "the struggle between

suspicion, in *The Holy Family*, of the tendentious populism of Eugene Sue's novels. But it is a suspicion […] whose contradictions are borne out in the attempts of American intellectuals, in the thirties, to generate alternative cultures" (12). These alternative cultures include a "hard-boiled 'proletarian culture'" (12). The relegation of noir crime novels to "underground culture," which according to David Cochrane "encompassed a wide-ranging cultural critique of American society" (14), enables noir crime novels to be politically significant while also existing on the periphery of, though not entirely outside of or in opposition to, the mechanisms that sought to enlist popular culture as a mode of containment and regulation. In *American Noir*, Cochran notes that "though politically it failed to offer an alternative vision, the underground culture would play a crucial role in the development of a counter-hegemonic culture in the sixties and, in the long run, the growth of postmodernism" (15). Thus, by the late 1940s and into the 1950s, noir crime novels functioned as an emergent form of popular culture that would become a terrain for articulating political alternatives to the consolidation of Cold War liberalism.

Popular culture was by no means the terrain of a cohesive and unified political alternative to Cold War liberalism; instead, it signals an ongoing vying for status as such within contested relational categories. Mickey Spillane's *I, The Jury* (1947) and Charles Willeford's *Pick-Up* (1955) each registers the way in which competing political alternatives sought to establish popular culture as a site for articulating the political signification of psychiatry. Each novel expresses angst stemming from the constitution of Cold War political subjectivity and articulates divergent positions on what is at stake in the expansion of psychiatric thought following the

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what is good and worth while and what is shoddy and debased is not a struggle against the modern forms of communication, but a conflict within these media" (qtd. in Stanfield 72). Stanfield presents this as clear evidence that "[r]egardless of variety, pulp takes a significant place, though its meaning is still in flux" (72).

Second World War. In other words, Spillane and Willeford use emergent popular culture to consider the ways in which psychiatric knowledge and institutions manage the affective flows of psychiatric subjectivities and the political agency that this entails. Although Spillane and Willeford propose diverging political and economic formations and politically distinct subjects within this contested terrain, both authors consider psychiatry as a means of constituting subjectivities with imperiled political agency through the management of affect. As former soldiers in the Second World War, both Spillane and Willeford's protagonists are navigating and responding to the reconfigured political terrain of the Cold War. As such, both encounter the prominence of psychiatry as they adjust to new economic, cultural, and gender norms that require new channels for the flow of affect.

This chapter begins by establishing a contextual basis in the expansion of psychiatric authority in the United States during the Second World War and into the early Cold War era of the late 1940s through the mid-1950s. It examines how psychiatric authority and knowledge that military psychiatrists utilized and expanded continued to be a source of debate during the Cold War. It considers how, despite debate, the use of psychiatry to treat soldiers on the battlefields of Europe during the Second World War shifted to wide-scale use in the United States. The transition from a hot war to a cold one required psychiatry to undergo a transformation to remedy the neuroses of men exposed to the stresses of combat and reintegrate them into civilian life. This entailed psychiatry's involvement in structuring familial relations and gender roles into which returning soldiers would fit and into which they would channel the effects of their war experiences.

This expanded psychiatric authority was enabled by the continued development of social psychiatry by practitioners including Harry Stack Sullivan and Gregory Bateson.[8] Focusing on interpersonal relations, especially those between parents and children, social psychiatry shifted away from an organic or hereditary etiology of psychiatric disorders and sought to understand diagnoses in the familial and social contexts in which patients existed. Moreover, the expanding role of psychiatry and social sciences in the postwar era, as it sought to construct domesticity and the nuclear family as Cold War ideals, also demarcated productive sexual relations. Psychiatrists, then, as they articulated the relations which would serve the productive and consumptive paradigms of Fordism during the Cold War, would also articulate gendered sexual subjectivities, enabling new economic formations.

This chapter reads Mickey Spillane's *I, The Jury* and Charles Willeford's *Pick-Up* as responses to American psychiatry's expansion into regulating affective relations of postwar life, inscribing popular culture with divergent political significations in response to Cold War liberalism and its capacities for economic relations. In Spillane's *I, The Jury*, private detective Mike Hammer investigates the murder of his friend and former brother in arms, Jack Williams. As Hammer pursues the case, he encounters psychiatrist Charlotte Williams, a femme fatale who

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[8]Gregory Bateson is most notable for his highly influential double bind hypothesis concerning the family as the etiology of schizophrenia. According to a paper entitled "Towards a Theory of Schizophrenia," published by Bateson and his colleagues in *Behavioral Science* in 1956, the double bind occurs when an "individual is caught in a situation in which the other person in the relationship is expressing two orders of message and one of these denies the other on a consistent basis" (Bateson 254). This recurring pattern in familial relations leads to schizophrenia, wherein the individual "confuse[s] the literal and the metaphoric" (Bateson 255). Bateson states: "We do not assume that the double bind is inflicted by the mother alone, but that it may be done either by mother alone or by some combinations of mother, father, and/or siblings" (253), suggesting that the nuclear family unit, in order to ensure the health of its members, must adhere to "communicational modes" (Bateson 252) through which "human beings handle communication involving multiple Logical Types" (Bateson 251-252). Therefore, the breakdown in logical communication between the individual and family triggers a pathological state.

turns out to be responsible for Jack's murder after he discovered that Charlotte was operating a heroin ring and using hypnosis to turn her patients into addicts. As he pursues the case, Hammer confronts institutional restraints that he must find his way around to maintain his masculine individualist ethic in the face of transgressive subjects. For Hammer, these restraints are indicative of expectations to temper his behaviour as a soldier that previously enabled the release of libidinal energy through acts of violence on the battlefield. He negotiates the release of this energy within Cold War masculine norms that centre on marital sex and a collective work ethic, while criticizing Cold War liberalism and seeking an alternative to it.[9] *I, The* Jury critiques the reformulation of the relationship between the Cold War state, psychiatric treatment, and the individual by positing psychiatric treatment as a threat to masculine agency. The Cold War production of the free autonomous individual subsumes the notion of hard-boiled masculinity that Hammer values in this conflict with the profession of psychiatry, embodied by Charlotte, rendering what Andrew Hoberek describes as Hammer's "fantasy of entrepreneurial agency" (Hoberek 17) visible as just that—part of a political fantasy narrative in which the individual retains agency amid the expanded authority of postwar American psychiatric knowledge. Hammer ultimately exercises violence against deviant forms of sexuality and channels his affect into the maintenance of a masculine Cold War psychiatric subject that maintains the future possibility of marriage and fatherhood for him.

[9] According to K.A. Cuordileone, Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s 1949 seminal text of Cold War liberalism, *The Vital Center*, articulates "a preoccupation with—and an anxiety about—masculinity which infuses influential strains of postwar liberalism" (2). For Cuordileone the book culminates in Schlesinger's articulation of "the new virile liberal who rebels against the soft, collectivist-oriented tendencies of the extreme right and left" (18). Although Hammer's character finds liberalism repulsive, his masculine individualism ultimately upholds this form of new virile liberalism.

In Willeford's *Pick-Up*, Harry Jordan is an alcoholic and former aspiring artist working for sporadic intervals of time to support his drinking habit. Although there is a stark divergence between Hammer and Jordan, both have a marginal relationship with the hierarchal structure of employment and prefer to maintain only a peripheral relationship with the institutions of post World War II society, including wage labour. *Pick-Up*, however, approaches the criminal from a markedly different perspective than Spillane's hard-boiled detective, Mike Hammer. While both Willeford's Harry Jordan and Spillane's Mike Hammer navigate seedy cityscapes, Jordan finds no order in a chaotic and seemingly meaningless urban existence as Hammer strives to do. Set in San Francisco, *Pick-Up* is poised to engage with the city's "embracing of outsiders" (Willett 38) and "openness to experience" (38) of urban crime fiction set in the city. While this often entails a "blurring of racial lines" (40), Willeford largely mutes his engagement with race. The only explicit mention of Jordan's racial identity comes in the final sentences of the novel, where he describes himself as "Just a tall, lonely Negro. Walking in the rain" (Willeford 160). After meeting Helen Meredith, a fellow alcoholic who encourages him to return to art by painting her portrait, Jordan once again feels the listlessness and apathy that first caused him to abandon his artistic ambitions after completing Helen's portrait. When psychiatric treatment fails to remedy this problem, Jordan and Helen plan a murder-suicide that fails to kill Jordan.

Jordan's attitude towards painting stems particularly from abstract expressionism and its co-option for the promotion of American culture as a Cold War strategy. Jordan struggles to reconcile his affective responses with the commodification of abstract expressionism and its use in the cultural terrain of the Cold War. He turns to psychiatric treatment in hopes of an explanation for his struggle to represent his affective response in the midst the prominence of abstract expressionism's emphasis on psychological processes. Willeford shows the production

of a political and economic subject whose inability to use existing Cold War cultural production as a form of affective expression and means of professionalization becomes pathologized. By constructing Jordan as an African American, Willeford suggests that Jordan's lack of affective investment in art and his disdain for the commodification of cultural production constitute a marginalized and disenfranchised political subject, whose agency depends on the capacity of art to manage creative affect. Art Redding convincingly situates *Pick-Up* within a larger trend of white writers of the late 1940s and early 1950s who "conjured up fantasized, highly stylized, and surrealistically charged images of African American disenfranchisement in order to embellish and articulate their own disenfranchisement" (12), during a time when "white dismay became—at least to some extent—discursively impermissible [. . .] as the ideology of American prosperity became increasingly cemented in the formative years of the Cold War" (12). Willeford's use of blackface in *Pick-Up* is, thus, a response to there being "few public outlets for white working-class discontent to express itself directly" (Redding 12), as Willeford's crime fiction emerges as a site of political and cultural contestation.

In his critique of Cold War liberalism's co-option of cultural production at the expense of working-class culture, Willeford constructs Jordan's search for an affective mode of representation as a means of constituting a form of cultural production that is outside of the popular, and thus highly determined, modes of representation, including Cold War liberalism, the abstract expressionist artist, and noir masculinity, and their immersion in Fordist production. In light of Spillane's attempt to claim noir novels as the terrain of hard-boiled masculine agency, the noir novel emerges as a site for competing political subjectivities that draw on psychiatric institutions and knowledge. Like Hammer, Jordan exhibits a propensity for violence and a tendency to be governed by impulses and desires. However, Jordan's subjectivity is continually

in a state of slippage, revealing gaps and fissures in the political and psychiatric discourses that pathologize and efface his subjectivity, creating the potential for a new, yet to be realized, politics of dissent.

American Psychiatry from the Second World War to the Cold War

During the Second World War, psychiatry provided a means of determining who was fit for combat and how well one could withstand the stresses it brought. The U.S. military developed intelligence testing and psychiatric surveys in hopes of determining which individuals were predisposed to war neuroses and therefore unfit for combat. According to the U.S. Office of the Surgeon General, 7.2% of draftees were found to be unfit due to a perceived high probability for developing a form of neurosis during duty (cited in Jones, Hyams, and Wessely 42). In 1944, Dr. John Appel, chief of preventative psychiatry in the neuropsychiatry consultants' division of the Office of the Surgeon General attempted to implement a standardized set of criteria along with the psychiatric interview to determine fitness for combat among those at induction stations (Cardona and Ritchie 33). However, attempts to prevent draftees deemed to be psychologically vulnerable from entering combat conflicted with the need for high numbers of soldiers. It became apparent that screening methods were inaccurate and were thus inhibiting the numbers of soldiers needed for combat. A 1943 publication entitled *Psychology for the Fighting Man* indicates that psychiatrists were recognizing the environmental conditions of war as a significant factor in the onset of psychiatric disorders, rather than a genetic predisposition. The book was compiled by the National Research Council and consisted of a collaboration of fifty-nine psychologists and psychiatrists. It covered a wide range of topics pertinent to soldiers engaged in battle, including a chapter on "The Soldier's Personal Adjustment," in which the authors note that war neuroses such as anxiety result from "the failure of the nervous system to withstand

such a terrible strain as modern warfare imposes" (Boring 364). This failure is a result of a conflict "between self-preservation and a genuine desire to sacrifice the self in the cause of right" (364). The authors encourage soldiers to understand the stresses they face in order to deal with them effectively and in a short amount of time, allowing them to return to battle. Along with "psychiatric first aid," the book states, this will enable the soldier to promptly "recover to take his place again in a battle unit" (353). To mitigate the conditions of war, the authors advocate the soldier's ability to develop a rational and aloof attitude towards normal fears: "There is, first, the fear of death. It is met by accepting the possibility of death as a natural part of the job, and by being careful not to lose a sense of proportion about it" (348). Thus, the authors offer the soldiers the skills to cultivate a sense of detachment and even aloofness to the possibility of death as one means to alleviate psychological distress.

The publication of Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel's *War Neuroses* in 1945 gave further credence to the environmental etiology of psychiatric disorders among soldiers. According to Hans Pols, Spiegel and Grinker "developed techniques for short-term psychotherapy that could be administered near the front lines. The authors of a widely used manual for medical officers on the treatment of war neuroses, Grinker and Spiegel relied on basic psychoanalytic notions by arguing that under severe battle conditions, even the strongest and most mature soldiers regressed to the condition of a helpless child" (77). A major factor for Grinker and Spielgel is the morale among the members of the Air Force that they treat. They note: "To build up that morale, which must incorporate a feeling of oneness with the goal and recognition of need for the struggle, requires a feeling that the people at home are with him 100 per cent. Psychological warfare *against* the enemy we know is necessary; but psychological warfare *for* our soldiers is even more pressing" (emphasis in Grinker and Spielgel 68). Because

returning soldiers to battle was highly important, psychiatric treatment became a necessary weapon against enemies that enabled soldiers to work through their neuroses. Moreover, the recognition that conditions of war were a significant factor in the etiology of neuroses implied that psychiatry could be applied to a much wider portion of the population, rather than only those who were exhibiting symptoms of illness.

Following the war, social sciences and psychiatry continued to expand, lending these disciplines greater legitimacy. According to David Paul Haney, the four-volume series entitled *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, which was begun in the War Department in 1949, "indicated the extent to which social science had achieved credibility in the United States, for it signified social science's first attainment of large-scale governmental support" (Haney 47). Haney asserts that the four volumes that were published as a result of this study "represented a crucial opportunity for postwar social science to demonstrate its scientific viability by providing the Army with useful, factual information and at the same time to garner respect for social research within American society in general" (47). Social psychiatry's combination of conventional medical and psychiatric approaches and elements of sociological study that account for factors such as interpersonal relations and the individual within the context of a network of social and cultural exchanges and meanings contributed to the increasing pervasiveness of psychiatric thought. These approaches provided a method of gauging and defining an individual's relationship to postwar society and the production of political and cultural meanings within it. Harry Stack Sullivan's 1953 *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* is among the most influential in the development of social psychiatry following the Second World War, positing that the formation of personality occurs in the interaction between individuals, beginning with family members, in varying environments and placed greater emphasis on environmental and

interpersonal factors than on neurological factors. This turn to familial relationships complemented the ideal of domestic containment on the home front of the Cold War, as hegemonic conceptions of masculinity came to entail the ideal of “a strong and at once authoritative and caring father” (Staub 43) as the head of the nuclear family.

The expansion of psychiatry is perhaps most apparent in President Harry Truman’s passage of the National Mental Health Act in 1946, which included the provision of establishing a National Institute of Mental Health. The reliance on psychiatry and social science as tools for understanding the experiences of soldiers would come to aid in reintegrating them into civilian life in somewhat new ways that would permeate American culture as the Cold War intensified. The state created a need for individuals to be responsible for maintaining and strengthening the tenets of democracy and capitalism on the home front of the Cold War that relied in part on a domestic ideal of the nuclear family. As a remedy to the stresses of reintegration into civilian society, psychiatry acknowledged the interpersonal relationships that existed between soldiers during war, which were integral to maintaining morale and a sense of duty to a larger cause among soldiers. Thus, psychiatry sought to aid veterans by providing guidance on familial relationships as a peacetime corollary to the relationships among soldiers during war. Along with The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (more commonly known as the G.I. Bill of Rights), the National Mental Health Act signals the government’s efforts to intervene in the reintegration of soldiers into civilian life, expanding the reach of psychiatric authority.

The commitment to aiding soldiers’ reintegration was also apparent in popular and medical publications of the immediate postwar years. Many were addressed to veterans of the Second World War, attempting to make the transition from military life to civilian life as seamless as possible. Marriage, family life, and employment were key areas of concern for psychiatrists. In

Psychology for the Returning Serviceman (1945), a follow up to *Psychology for the Fighting Man*, the authors focus on marriage as an appropriate outlet for male sexual desire that may have found other outlets during war: "A man needs an outlet for the powerful sex drives within him. And it is much better for many reasons to have a legitimate outlet—one that won't get him talked about, one that is safe from disease and other entanglements, one that is respectable" (69). The authors attempt to persuade men to channel sexual desire into monogamous marriage after encountering and rejecting sexual relations during the war with "camp followers, pick-ups, and semi-prostitutes" (72). They propose that such conditions may have led men to other forms of sexual satisfaction: "perhaps in an effort to keep clean in body and mind you may have avoided all women while you were away. […] You may have resorted to masturbation or attachments with other men" (72). But ultimately they reassure men of the temporary nature of this desire, noting that: "If you got along alright with girls and liked them before you went away, you will probably find them attractive to you when you get back" (72).

Psychiatrists also sought to alleviate what they saw as a potential problem with male promiscuity by reconfiguring male desire. This entails marital sex, "not just in the narrow sense that you want physical relief […] It is sex need in the much broader sense that includes a desire for everything you associated with good women since you were born" (70). Thus, marriage was proposed as a means of diverting potentially transgressive sexual desires into heterosexual relations. By extension, not only the role of a husband was important, but also that of a father. As traditional gender roles were inscribed and women were encouraged to return to domestic work, men were encouraged to strike a balance between being too "soft" and ineffectual as authority figures and "hard" and tough towards their children. In cultivating this in children, especially sons, returned soldiers would come to embody this model of domestic masculinity as well. The

authors of *Psychology for the Returning Serviceman* write "if a father is weak and ineffectual, while the mother is strong and dominant, the boy is not likely to want to be like his father. And he can't get strength and masculinity from his mother" (102). Therefore, the strength and devotion that was to be shown for fellow soldiers was to find a tempered version within the family upon returning home.

While psychiatrists became esteemed among the general population as they published and were quoted in numerous articles and books addressing returning soldiers and their wives, many soldiers also found the onslaught of attention to their circumstances bothersome and overbearing. According to Pols, some veterans "felt that the public only became interested in American soldiers after their return home because of the perceived threat they posed to society" (86). Moreover, Pols points to comments by Charles G. Bolte, organizer of the American Veterans Committee, as an indication that veterans also saw the concern with their reintegration as "attempts to sell particular viewpoints and products to them" (Pols 87). According to Pols:

> Veterans generally resisted the attempts of psychiatrists to transform them into individuals who needed special attention and care. They conceded that veterans with psychiatric problems were entitled to the best professional psychiatric care available but vigorously resisted the expansion of the psychiatric domain to include normal soldiers. The first postwar project of psychiatry, to extend its domain beyond the mentally ill and soldiers who suffered from war-related psychiatric syndromes to include guiding the readjustment of average veterans to postwar society, had failed. The attempt to provide the language and tools for the shaping of the postwar veteran self had found an unappreciative audience. (89)

Although many veterans did not look favourably on psychiatrists' attempts to enlarge their influence beyond enlisted men, psychiatric knowledge and treatment would come to have a widescale but contested role to play in the structuring of Cold War familial and sexual norms as well as their place in reformulating the economic relations in which they were entrenched.

The expansion of psychiatry in the early years of the Cold War also faced scrutiny from within the profession as psychiatrists and psychologists debated the scope and methods of understanding human behaviour and mental illness. In his 1953 book *The Uses and Abuses of Psychology*, psychologist H.J. Eysenck criticizes the popularity of psychoanalysis in the United States. Eysenck, who was German-born, but spent his career in Britain, discusses the prominence of mental illness diagnoses in the Unites States, going so far as to claim that "in the United States it has become almost fashionable to have some form of neurotic disorder, and an upper middle-class person is quite looked down upon if he cannot speak of 'his psychoanalyst' as having advised this, that, and the other" (193). Eysenck's assessment of the effectiveness of psychotherapy reflects continued debate over the etiology of mental illness and its relationship to class. According to Eysenck: "There is good evidence to suggest that neurotic reactions appear largely on an inherited basis and that a person's liability to break down under stress is a property of his nervous system, which is unlikely to be affected to any considerable extent by psychotherapy" (205-206). Such conclusions suggest that psychiatry and psychotherapy were contested terrain as those privileging somatic understandings of mental illness sought to discredit methods of psychotherapy that focused on social, economic, and cultural factors, such as those aimed at returning soldiers and their wives.

Eysenck's *The Psychology of Politics* (1954) takes a positivist approach to understanding how different personality types correlate with political ideologies, as he states in the introduction

to this book that “However much some of the attitudes studied may be anathema to me personally, such feelings are irrelevant and must be prevented from contaminating a purely objective and factual study” (2). As many personality studies did throughout the period, including, perhaps most notably, Theodore Adorno’s *The Authoritarian Personality*, Eysenck’s privileges the individual type as the determinant of social and political attitudes over the influence of social and cultural factors on political configurations. He attempts to invalidate the “low prestige” of social psychology (Thurstone qtd. in Eysenck 2).

In contrast with Eysenck’s fear of “contaminating a purely objective and factual study” (Eysenck 2), by making politically based “value-judgements” (2), some psychiatrists emphasized and employed the relationship between psychiatry and the political climate of the Cold War in ways that evoked and perpetuated fears that the very psychiatric knowledge and methods of treatment that could create a healthy body politic could also be employed to weaken it via communist infiltration and subversion. In this sense, the field of psychiatry that was becoming increasingly responsible for managing the mental health of all American citizens, not just those diagnosed or institutionalized with a form of mental illness, became a site of debate regarding the health and security of the nation and the state. *The Rape of the Mind: The Psychology of Thought Control, Menticide, and Brainwashing* (1956) by psychiatrist Joost A.M. Meerloo equates the “destruction of the spirit” (Merloo 14) with “the threat of total physical destruction through atomic warfare” (14). As Merloo moves his discussion from the “specific subject of planned and deliberate mental coercion to the more general question of the influences in the modern world that tend to robotize and automatize man” (14), he addresses a “general public” (15), emphasizing its inherent vulnerabilities to being manipulated by mind control techniques. Merloo thus suggests that the expansion of psychiatric authority into the lives of healthy

Americans in the early postwar years threatens the autonomy and agency of the general public. Merloo expands the objections to psychiatric authority that soldiers voiced upon their return as he articulates a conflict between individual psychological autonomy and psychiatry's enlistment to regulate social relations in alignment with Cold War ideals.

The Kinsey Reports and Cold War Sexual Subjectivities

Alfred Kinsey's *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (1948) and *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (1953) shaped and influenced discourses concerning gender and sexuality surrounding Cold War psychiatry's ideal of monogamous heterosexual marriage. Kinsey's reports revealed vast divergences from perceived norms of gender and sexuality involving prohibitions on oral sex, homosexuality, premarital sex, and masturbation that were central to Cold War containment culture. The popularity of Kinsey's reports indicates the dynamic nature of discourses of sexuality in the late 1940s and early 1950s, suggesting that state-sanctioned gender roles and sexual norms were by no means firmly entrenched. The reports evoked both praise and criticism for their implications. According to Miriam G. Reumann, criticism of the reports was generally made on "religious, moral, nationalistic, or psychoanalytic" (26) grounds. Responses to Kinsey's report on males, as James Gilbert argues, "implied a therapeutic intervention for which Kinsey had no training but which was certainly implicit in the entire book and potentially present in his interviews" (94). As Kinsey meticulously responded to letters from readers of his first book regarding "their own, their partner's or their children's sexuality" (Gilbert 93), he "found nothing to condemn" (Gilbert 95) in a wide range of sexual behaviours that were otherwise classified as pathologies.

Kinsey's *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* presents various forms of sex as "sexual outlets" that exist in conjunction with marital sex. In contrast with advice books such as

Psychology for the Returning Serviceman, Kinsey refrains from presenting marital sex as the sole means of legitimizing non-reproductive sex or classifying non-reproductive forms of sexual behaviour as evidence of exceptional circumstances or the breakdown of sexual norms during war. In doing so, Kinsey's research made a significant contribution to the deluge of marriage discourse following the war. Most notably, Kinsey's research demonstrated that married men and women were fulfilling their sexual needs outside of marital sex. A section entitled "sources of sexual outlet" includes, among others, "Extra-Marital Intercourse," "Intercourse with Prostitutes," "Homosexual Outlet," and "Animal Contacts," all as observed sites of sexual behaviour among survey participants. Kinsey's section on "Animal Contacts" tellingly states: "Whatever moral issues may be involved, and however long-standing the social condemnation of animal contacts may have been throughout the history of Western European civilizations, the easy dismissal of such behavior by characterizing it as abnormal shows little capacity for making objective analyses of the basic psychology that is involved" (Kinsey 675). While Kinsey, like Eysenck, insists on scientific objectivity, the implications of his research had far-reaching effects on conceptions of sexuality, particularly on the containment family model and the economic relations in which it was enshrined. Kinsey states that some "have feared that a scientific approach to sex might threaten the marital institution" (*Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* 13). Yet, there are also "those who believe that an extension of our knowledge may contribute to the establishment of better marriages" (Kinsey 13). Kinsey's inclusion of a wide spectrum of sexual practices opens and extends the profile of male sexuality in the United States, going beyond the dichotomies of normal and abnormal and conformity and deviance that constituted strategies of political and cultural containment in productive and thought-provoking ways.

The results of Kinsey's research indicating that Americans were fulfilling sexual needs outside of marriage contributed to anxieties about the weakened state of marriage as an institution. Kinsey observed that "only 45.9 per cent of the total outlet of the total population is derived from marital intercourse" (Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin 544). Reumann asserts that this "helped to convince readers that nonmarital sex was seducing Americans away from reproductive marriage" (141). However, Kinsey's findings also helped to expand discourse on sex, enabling greater acceptance of nonreproductive sex within marriage and changing attitudes towards it, as evidenced by a newly emerging notion of marriage. According to Reumann:

> marriage experts and social scientists drew on Victorian ideals and recycled pronouncements about companionate marriage from the 1920s. But 1950s models of marriage were also emphatically different from ones that had come before. […] Postwar Americans insistently envisioned contemporary marriage as something new, an institution revitalized by scientific and psychological knowledge. (163)

This new model of companionate marriage legitimized non-reproductive sexual acts as part of a successful marriage, which was not only a private personal relationship, but also a responsibility to the nation and its fight against communism. Sexually fulfilling marriages would be strong marriages that would promote a healthy relationship between husband and wife as well as a sense of family togetherness among parents and children. Thus, marriage and the family came to be political configurations that would be shored up by satisfactory sexual relations within marriage.

By contributing to and expanding discourse on sex and marriage, Kinsey's research further illuminated not only its pivotal role in the configuration of Cold War politics, but also the potential fault lines of the alignment of sexual norms with national identity. While marriage was

seen to be facing a crisis, leading to its redefinition and an expansion of permissible sexuality between husband and wife, extra-marital sex and other forms of sex that Kinsey reported but which were not legitimized by heterosexual marriage came to be seen as politically subversive. The link between marital sex and Cold War ideals thus cast not only homosexuality as politically subversive through its associations with communist subversion, but also other forms of formerly supressed and repressed sexuality.

The Fantasy of Cold War Masculine Agency in Mickey Spillane's *I, The Jury*

A proliferation of expert material on marriage and sex aimed at fostering political and economic stability following the war through the application of medical and scientific knowledge to the personal and private. While many returning servicemen did not embrace psychiatry's attention to them, they could also not ignore it. It seemed to pervade their lives as experts debated the most effective ways to regulate sexual and familial instability immediately after the war and to maintain it in the years following. Spillane's *I, The Jury* registers the angst that psychiatric knowledge evoked within debates and contentions surrounding this knowledge and authority in the immediate postwar years. Spillane's Mike Hammer negotiates his agency within the potentially agency-quelling functions of psychiatry in service of the Cold War state as well as the parameters of hard-boiled masculinity. Hammer's identity is, in part, responding to a narrowing ability to articulate masculine individualism within the confines of Cold War culture. While Hammer's ultimate victory over psychiatrist Charlotte Manning in the conclusion of the novel suggests that he has safeguarded the political agency of a hard-boiled masculine identity in the face of the insidious nature of psychiatry, his affective energies are ultimately sublimated into the needs of the Cold War state. Thus, his sense of masculine agency and ability to self-regulate libidinal energy becomes an apparent political fantasy that posits Spillane's notion of

the noir crime novel as a terrain for producing subjectivities such as Hammer's within narrowing political possibilities that are imagined to be free from the forms of institutionalized policing and surveillance that Hammer detests.

Hammer's past as a soldier in the Second World War informs his position within and understanding of postwar society, as he adjusts to civilian life. For Hammer, this adjustment accounts for his wartime camaraderie, particularly in the murder case of Jack Williams that he is investigating. For Hammer, justice entails not only a sense of retribution for Jack's murder, but also an obligation to repay Jack's selflessness during the war. Hammer characterizes Jack as "the guy that shared the same mud bed with me through two years of warfare in the stinking slime of the jungle. Jack, the guy who said he'd give his right arm for a friend and did when he stopped a bastard of a Jap from slitting me in two" (Spillane 5). This familiarity and closeness between Hammer and Jack during the war is indicative of the formation of masculine bonds as a displaced form of sexual energy, which psychiatric authority seeks to channel into familial relations. Hammer's allegiance to Jack and the notion of justice through which he proves it have come about in response to experiences and conditions of war in which violence is valorized and killing is justified. Wartime conditions have created the masculine bonds that ensured Hammer's survival and that continue to govern his behaviour upon his return to civilian life.

Both Hammer and Jack have been wounded by the war. The loss of Jack's arm in Japan during the war symbolizes his castration and its corresponding psychological damage, indicating a sense of incompleteness after returning home to the U.S. On the other hand, Hammer's grim outlook on a world he sees as corrupt and unjust signals his grappling with the psychological impacts of returning to civilian life in an effort to stave off its castrating effects. In this context, the search for agency appears even more urgent and pronounced. Following the war, Hammer

expresses a desire to intervene in and change a social structure that currently allows its people to be harmed and exploited, as he states: "After the war I've been almost anxious to get to some of the rats that make up the section of humanity that prey on people" (14). This suggests that Hammer is on the verge of mental instability, in part, as a result of the war. His desire to eradicate what he sees as a detrimental part of the populous is on the cusp of the psychotic. He continues on to acknowledge that the existing social and legal structure is inadequate, making it necessary for him to function as a corrective to these shortcomings: "People. How incredibly stupid they could be sometimes. A trial by law for a killer. [. . .] They crack down on society and I crack down on them" (14). As a former soldier, then, Hammer sees himself within Hobbesian conditions of war even upon his return to civilian life. While psychiatry may provide a form of rehabilitation, reintegration, and adjustment to civilian life, Hammer turns to extra-legal means to adhere to his code of justice and side-step any disciplinary measures that would regulate his behaviour and relations with others. Hammer avoids the disciplinary actions of the state, as his characterization of his actions against those he deems criminals indicates: "The papers make me look like a kill-crazy shamus" (Spillane 14), but through an informal alliance with the police department, Hammer continues to pursue his notion of justice. His relationship with the law, then, is ambiguous, as he both relies on it to legitimize his actions but distances himself from its restrictions. He exercises a sociopathic extralegal form of violence that he perceives to be a form of masculine agency.

By exercising this violence, Hammer seeks to maintain control over the exertion of his affective energies. This seemingly enables him to circumvent the tenets of Cold War liberal masculinity that threatens his hardboiled persona. Under wartime conditions, Hammer's affective energies are channeled into his concern for and loyalty to soldiers such as Jack. In the absence of

sexual outlets, libidinal energies are also either inhibited or sublimated into killing enemy soldiers on the battlefield and protecting fellow soldiers. Hammer's aversion to sexual outlets outside of heterosexual marriage during the war is evident when he books an appointment at a brothel as part of his investigation. When his secretary Velda expresses her horror in response, Hammer tells her: "I'm not going to buy anything. After all those pictures the army showed me of what happens to good little boys who go out with bad little girls, I'm even afraid to kiss my own mother" (63), indicating an aversion to female sexuality, verging on misogyny, which he must regulate himself against. As he aligns himself with good, in contrast with a sexual immorality in terms that threaten the family, he expresses a need for extreme vigilance. After doing so, he reassures Velda that this vigilance is not a reflection of a lack of sexual appeal: "For crying out loud, I'm not that bad off that I have to patronize those places. There's lots of Dames I could park with if I felt like it" (63-64). By ending his statement with a conditional clause, Hammer signals that his sexual desire is tempered. A potential sexual encounter becomes a means of enacting justice for Jack, who is engaged to be married, and delineating boundaries of productive sexuality that pose no threat to the family.

The demands of the military that managed Hammer's desire by displacing it onto his fellow soldiers and sublimating it into the aims of the war continue to structure his desire as a civilian. He continues to manage his desire in accordance with his war experiences, sublimating his aggressive instincts into solving Jack's death as he withholds sexual satisfaction by refusing pre-marital sex. Doing so enables Hammer to adhere to a notion of justice that entails a seemingly wilful relinquishment of individual agency in service of the greater needs of the nation against internal criminal and communist subversion. As Hammer uses knowledge he has gained about venereal disease in the army to self-regulate his desire following the war, he also relates to

police officer Pat Chambers as he related to soldiers. In doing so, he negotiates the boundaries between his own individualism and the institutionalized collectivity fostered and required by the army. *Psychology for the Fighting Man* identifies one of the most difficult factors affecting the ability of men to adjust to the army as “the feeling that they may lose their identity—their freedom of individual expression” (345). The authors note that building morale is an effective means of addressing this problem. This requires soldiers to “think and speak of their units as all one family” (345), wherein men are “welded together into a close-knit group of friends and comrades” (348). Hammer’s relationship with Pat Chambers resembles these conditions in which men adjust to working in the face of strict institutional rules by fostering a sense of camaraderie. Hammer relates how he is both averse to the police department and dependent on it, when he notes that “Pat Chambers keeps (the newspapers) off my neck. Besides, I do my best to help the boys out and they know it” (Spillane 14). Hammer relies on the manpower and evidence that the police department provides during the investigation, while remaining outside of the regulations of the police force. He tells Pat that he “hasn’t got the ways and means of doing the dirty work” (10), making the police also dependent on him. He sees the police force as a detriment to both his own notion of justice and his ability to carry it out as an individual. As he states: “You’re a cop, Pat. You’re tied down by rules and regulations. There’s someone over you. I’m alone. [. . .] No one can kick me out of my job” (Spillane 7). For Hammer, then, the concentration of expert knowledge and professionalization of solving crimes that the police department embodies are the antitheses to the agency that he values. Pat tells Hammer that the police “have every scientific facility at our disposal and a lot of men to do the leg work” (Spillane 10). Hammer will come to rely on these for the ballistic analysis that determines that the same killer shot all the murder victims but was not the same person who shot at him. Moreover, he relies on the labour of the

police when searching stacks of books to uncover the real identity of Hal Kines, a criminal he encounters in his investigation of the murders. As Pat's position as head of the homicide department grants them after-hours access to the public library to continue the investigation, Hammer admits that "Pat's calls were very effective" (Spillane 77). Here, Pat's relationship with Hammer relies on friendship in a way that resembles the relationship between mutually dependent comrades in war.

Hammer continues to serve the aims of the law through an ambiguous relation to its institutions and channels his energy not into the apprehension of criminals, but into the violence he enacts against them. The pursuit of the killer is characterized as a "race" (Spillane 6) between Hammer and Pat, wherein they will "work together as usual, but in the homestretch, (Hammer) want(s) the killer" (Spillane 6) in order to dole out what he views as an appropriate form of justice. In the police, Hammer sees the omnipresence of surveillance against which he must work not only to solve the crime of Jack's murder, but also to reach the murderer before the police so that he can fulfill his promise to Jack to "get the louse that killed you [. . .] with a .45 slug in the gut" (Spillane 7). As Hammer begins to investigate Jack's murder, he correctly anticipates Pat's use of police surveillance to keep track of his progress on the case. Hammer tells his secretary, Velda: "Sure, I'll shake them, but it won't stop there. A couple of experts will take up where they leave off" (Spillane 15). Hammer sees himself as the subject of state surveillance and expert knowledge, aligning him with the very structures he sees as inhibiting his ability to maintain his notion of justice for Jack. When he solves the crime and figures out that Charlotte Manning is Jack's murderer, Hammer enacts this violence against her, telling her: "I'm the jury now and the judge" (146). As he confronts her, she begins to undress, hoping to tempt Hammer; however, he remains resolute: "Beautiful as you are, as much as I almost loved you, I sentence you to death"

(146). The death sentence that Hammer passes on Charlotte to avenge Jack's death is both an instance of extra-legal punishment as well as an effect of Hammer's continual management of libidinal energy according to the demands of the army. As Charlotte stands before him, fully undressed and seductively approaching him, Hammer refrains from allowing himself sexual release. Instead, his desire for Charlotte is displaced onto protecting himself from the encroachment of her sexuality and its attempt to make him vulnerable. By channeling his sexual desire into this violence, Hammer protects the bond between himself and Jack even after Jack's death. When Charlotte gasps "How c-could you?" (147), Hammer replies that discharging his weapon "was easy" (147). The ease with which he discharges his gun and Charlotte's gasp in response suggest the displacement of ejaculation and orgasm onto Charlotte's death. Here, Hammer performs an extra-marital act of penetrating a female body that ultimately avenges an affront to Jack's reintegration into civilian life as a husband.

In avenging Jack's murder, Hammer also avenges a violation of Jack's economic agency that enables both him and Jack to perform police work with few institutional restraints. When Hammer discovers Jack's notebook containing information about a raid at a brothel that was held shortly after Jack's death, he realizes that Jack was investigating the heroin ring that once supplied his fiancé, Myrna, with the drug. Hammer relates how Jack was a police officer prior to the war and continued to investigate crimes in his job as an insurance company investigator following his return to civilian life: "He no longer was a cop, but his heart was with the force. [. . .] Before long he was part of the investigating staff of an insurance company. It had to be police work. For Jack there was nothing else" (8). Hammer learns that Jack, unable to step away from police work, was investigating Hal Kines's involvement in the heroin ring. According to Hammer, Jack's "work with the insurance company was pretty routine" (9). However, Jack

bypasses the restraints of his job and investigates Hal independently to uncover the source of the heroin that Myrna was once addicted to. The murder of Jack, then, is also an affront to the sustaining fantasy of economic agency that Hammer holds in the midst of the rise of white-collar work[10] and an emphasis on the suburban nuclear family as an American ideal.

Psychiatry and the Struggle for Masculine Individualism

For Hammer, the protection of economic agency and the notion of anti-institutional justice with which it coincides also entail masculine agency and the ability to direct libidinal drives into acts of violence. In this sense, psychiatry poses a significant threat as it institutionalizes and consolidates knowledge of Hammer's motivations and behaviours, potentially rendering him vulnerable to others as psychiatric knowledge explores these facets of his personality. Hammer's primary point of contact with professional psychiatry comes in his relationship with psychiatrist Charlotte Manning. Hammer's unease with Charlotte's application of psychiatric principles to his oath to avenge Jack's murder is apparent as he interviews her to collect information for the case. Charlotte condones Hammer's oath to dole out justice "with a .45 slug in the gut" (7) of Jack's killer, explaining: "I'm afraid I justify you, although several of my professors would condemn me if I made that statement public" (27). Charlotte attempts to explain Hammer's motivation, while simultaneously noting her dissent from the consensus of her

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[10] The rise of the professional managerial class and its effects are well documented by Cold War sociology, most notably C. Wright Mills' *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (1951). David Reisman's *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) and William H. Whyte's *The Organization Man* (1956) also examine the transition from earlier entrepreneurial individualism in the U.S. to white-collar work in a corporate structure in the postwar era. For Whyte, the other-directed personality type coincides with this shift away from the inner-directed individual that describes a traditional American character. Reisman defines the emerging professional managerial class according to a "social ethic" (7), which consists of the following: "a belief in the group as a source of creativity; a belief in 'belongingness' as the ultimate need of the individual; and a belief in the application of science to achieve the belongingness" (7).

discipline. In doing so, she positions herself in a similar relation to institutionalized knowledge as Hammer, making her potentially appealing to him. However, Hammer does not voice his agreement out loud when he relates that he “saw what she meant. There’s a school of thought that believes anyone who kills is a victim of a moment’s insanity, no matter what the reason for the killing” (27). Moreover, in a conversation with Pat Chambers, Hammer includes insanity as one way of classifying a murder (24); yet his use of reasoning and logic as he solves the mystery of Jack’s death indicates that he is of sound mind and his pledge to kill Jack’s murderer is not an instance of temporary insanity. Thus, he ultimately rejects Charlotte’s theory regarding his notion of justice and imagines himself to maintain the terrain of his motivations as his own.

Although Hammer is not a professional in the fields of medicine or psychiatry, his methods of solving crimes and enforcing his notion of retributive justice include those of psychology and psychiatry. As Hammer begins his investigation into Jack’s murder, he compiles a list of people at Jack’s party on the night of his murder, noting that “the list was mainly character studies, but things like that can give a good insight into a crime” (43). Hammer’s first step suggests that although he is not trained in the above-mentioned fields, he also produces similar forms of knowledge. Thus, Hammer’s intuition implies a belief in the object of psychiatry but disputes the medical terrain in which psychiatry places it. Charlotte’s position in psychiatry, then, is both akin to and a threat to his role as a detective: “In the back of my mind was the idea that as a psychiatrist, she would have been more observant than any of the others. In her line it was the details that counted, too” (50). Psychiatry requires an astute ability to observe, assess, and classify others, leading to useful conclusions based on evidence; however, unlike Hammer’s role as a private detective, working largely on his own terms and largely without the authority of the law or state, psychiatry has the authority of the discipline and a larger medical

field to legitimate and consolidate its knowledge. Charlotte can classify and diagnose Hammer's personality, while also encroaching on the freedom with which he operates. She thus threatens to pathologize and redirect Hammer's aggressive desires into institutionalized psychiatry and make him an object of its knowledge.

Charlotte also threatens to redirect Hammer's aggressive desires into the institution of marriage, which Cold War psychiatry and sociology touted as a means of reintegrating soldiers into civilian life. During Hammer's second meeting with Charlotte at her apartment, she appears as a model of domesticity as she prepares dinner for him. Hammer describes the scene, stating, "The table was laid out for two. On the table was a big pile of fried chicken and another equally large basket of French fries. [. . .] Charlotte was putting a red-bordered apron on. When she finished she poured the coffee" (51-52). Following the dinner, Hammer notes that he "suggested we do the dishes" (53). He participates in this domestic scene as more than a passive observer by helping Charlotte with the dishes, demonstrating his willing adherence to this domestic ideal. Significantly, he does so while retaining his hardboiled masculinity. In response to his suggestion, he notes that Charlotte "handed me an apron. Very politely, I laid it on the back of a chair. It just wouldn't go well with my mug" (53). As he shows that he will not be subdued by the ideal of domestic containment, he acknowledges his acceptance of it for Charlotte. Charlotte exhibits her ability to create the domestic ideal of containment, which leaves Hammer "contented as a cow" (Spillane 52) and thus susceptible to Charlotte's knowledge of his desires.

Charlotte's demonstration of domesticity also entails a sexual appeal to Hammer. Her provocative dress, coupled with her domesticity, exhibits her suitability as a spouse within newly emergent notions of marriage. Upon seeing her, Hammer states: "Gone was the psychiatrist. Here was Charlotte Manning, the woman, looking delightfully young and beautiful. Her dress

was a tight-fitting blue silk jersey that clung to her like she was wet, concealing everything, yet revealing everything" (51). By sexualizing herself, yet carefully keeping her body concealed, Charlotte displays her potential to be both a faithful and devoted wife and a sexually satisfying partner. By separating her professional role from her domestic role, Hammer appears to relinquish his suspicion of her psychological insights, yet he ultimately upholds his guard. When Hammer remarks that "when the time comes for you to get married, you're not going to have to go out of your way to get a husband" (52), she responds that she has a system which entails luring a man to her apartment and preparing dinner for him and that Hammer is "part of it right now" (52). Hammer once again conveys that he is impervious to this, noting "it's been tried on me before" (52). Her response, "But not by an expert" (53), situates her within her professional role. For Hammer, then, Charlotte's marriageability is questionable because it becomes apparent to him that it is bound up with her professionalized knowledge of his psychology.

Charlotte makes a further appeal to Hammer's masculinity by using her professional knowledge to critique the vulnerability against which he defends himself. As she attempts to legitimize and admire Hammer's personality traits, she again displays a potential duplicity, which Spillane suggests Hammer is privy to. Charlotte remarks that Hammer is "a man who was used to living and could make life obey the rules he set down" (52) and a man with "[n]o repressions" (52). She contrasts him with her patients, who she describes as:

> such little men. Either they have no character to begin with or what they had is gone. Their minds are frail, their conception limited. So many have repressions or obsessions, and they come to me with their pitiful stories; well, when you constantly see men with their masculinity gone, and find the same sort among those whom you call your friends, you get so you actually search for a real man. (52)

Charlotte, then, has the skill and ability to recognize and treat the perceived "masculinity crisis" of the postwar era and does not consider Hammer's hyper-masculinity and use of violence and extra-legal methods as pathological. In doing so, Charlotte shows Hammer's agency to be couched within the psychiatric discourse he attempts to discredit. Moreover, as Hammer attempts to remain impervious to Charlotte's knowledge of him, he ultimately adheres to the logic of Cold War sexual containment. After a long kiss, Hammer tell her: "I'm going now [. . .]. I don't want to do this wrong. I will if you keep me here" (56). The dinner ends when Hammer enforces a prohibition on premarital sex, suggesting greater collusion between him and the state than Charlotte in her role as a psychiatrist, undercutting the novel as a narrative of masculine agency. Hammer's enforcement of Cold War psychiatry's sexual norms positions Charlotte outside psychiatry's function as a means of constituting the domestic ideal she presents to Hammer. Thus, her ability to transgress disciplinary objectives further highlights Hammer's adherence to psychiatry's domestic ideal, despite his anti-institutional attitude.

As Hammer's investigation of Jack's murder leads him to Charlotte's office and later to the brothel that was involved in Jack's investigation of the heroin ring, Hammer's narration draws attention to the duplicitous and potentially transgressive nature of institutionalized psychiatry. During his first meeting with Charlotte at her practice, Hammer notes:

> The anteroom was ultramodern, but well appointed. Chairs that looked angular were really very comfortable. [. . .] The walls were an indescribable shade of olive, cleverly matched with a dull-finished set of drapes. The windows admitted no light, instead, the soft glow came from hidden bulbs installed directly into the wall. On the floor an ankle-thick carpet muffled any sound of footsteps. From somewhere came the muted tones of a string quartet. (26)

Hammer’s description characterizes Charlotte’s practice as a secluded, discreet, and covert space. Its light sources are concealed and it allows in no light from outside. Noise is muted by the carpet and the source of the music is unknown to Hammer, emphasizing the confidentiality of the space, where patients will utter private thoughts and experiences, which, like the music and light in the office, come from obscure recesses. While it is designed to conceal and keep confidential the utterances of her patients, Charlotte’s practice also potentially conceals her hidden intentions and transgressions. Hammer’s description of the anteroom as “ultramodern” (26) aligns Charlotte’s practice with a sense of modernity that is suspect to him. The industrial manufacturing processes of Fordism that make the décor of the room possible are also those that have reconfigured the relations between the individual and his labour. For Hammer, industrial manufacturing processes are indicative of lost autonomy over individual labour. His description is indicative of Charlotte’s white-collar, middle-class professionalism, which comes at the expense of the masculine individualist work ethic that Hammer values and which a fantasy of masculine agency in the midst of psychiatric knowledge and institutions attempts to maintain.

In a similar vein, when Hammer goes to the brothel to question Eileen Vickers (aka Mary Wright) after finding her name in Jack’s notebook, he describes the plain appearance of the brothel’s exterior as “an old brownstone apartment three stories high. [. . .] On the top floor a room was lit up faintly with no signs of life in it” (65). He continues on to note that the building “was flanked on each side by another equally as drab and with as little color to it as the streets of a ghost town” (65). The exterior indicates to Hammer that “[t]his was no regular red-light district” (65). The exterior also conceals a space of criminality and transgression that becomes more apparent as Hammer delves deeper into the building. The interior is “exciting, alive” (Spillane 66). Similar to Charlotte’s psychiatric practice, “The furniture was modern, yet

comfortable" (66) and "no light shone through the windows. They were completely blocked off with velvet curtains" (66). Eileen also notes that the rooms in which men meet with prostitutes are "soundproof" (68). This space, then, like Charlotte's psychiatric practice, conceals its purpose and its illegal source of wealth, thus aligning her practice with criminality.

Criminality and transgression of the sexual ideals of the early Cold War era are also linked to middle-class professional clients at the brothel. According to Eileen Vickers, those who come to see the burlesque show are usually there because "there's a convention in town and prospective buyers are brought here for a little fun" (69). According to her, they are "fairly prosperous people" (69). Hammer also characterizes those who come to the brothel largely according to their middle-class status: "I knew the kind. Fat greasy people from out of town. Slick city boys who played the angles and were willing to shell out the dough. Rich jokers of both sexes who liked smut and filth and didn't care where they got it. A pack of queers who enjoyed exotic, sadistic sex. Nasty people. Clerks who scraped their nickels to go and then bragged on the street corners" (69). This characterization of the brothel's clientele is indicative of Hammer's adversarial relationship with middle-class professionalism. While Hammer emphasizes the middle-class position of clients, his mention of clerks and "queers" (69) also indicates that he sees deviation from an idealized Cold War view of heterosexuality and sexually fulfilling companionate marriage amongst any class as a transgression that justifies condemnation and disciplinary action. For Hammer, middle-class professionalism and the white-collar tertiary sector foster the breakdown of masculine economic agency, enabling an array of non-heteronormative sexualities to emerge.[11] In light of this alignment of criminality, sexual

[11] Unlike the Kinsey reports, *I, The Jury* constructs various forms of sexual behaviour outside of heterosexual marriage as perverse and abnormal and associates these perversions and abnormalities with the middle-class.

deviance, and the consolidation of knowledge among middle-class professionals, Charlotte is a particularly potent threat to Hammer. Charlotte's professional institutionalized knowledge, coupled with her criminal activity, threatens Hammer's role as a private detective with fewer institutional restraints than those on the police force. Secondly, her psychiatric knowledge enables her to manipulate Hammer's mind and skew his judgement while investigating the murders, also threatening his ability to evade the influence of psychiatric knowledge and cause him to transgress sexual norms and the law, as Charlotte has done.

Hammer's pursuit and killing of Hal Kines is indicative of his attempts to eliminate sexually transgressive subjectivities that undermine masculine economic agency by using psychiatric knowledge. As a master of disguise, a recruiter in the prostitution ring operated at the brothel where Hammer finds Eileen, a college student studying psychiatry, and a homosexual, Kines is the antithesis of Hammer. His illegal activity is closely bound to his sexual and economic transgressions. Hammer first suspects Kines of Jack's murder; however, he learns that Kines has also become a target of the murderer when Pat Chambers tells Hammer that Kines and George Kalecki have moved to an apartment in the city after a shot was fired at Hal. Although Hammer no longer suspects Kines of Jack's murder, he remains suspicious of him. When Hammer breaks into the apartment, he notes that "there was only one bed" (34), indicating to him that Kines and Kalecki "did sleep together" (34), as Hammer had suggested in a joking manner during their last meeting. A photo of Kines and Kalecki together causes greater suspicion. Hammer describes a photo of Kines and Kalecki standing together in front of a store window that showed a news release about the "burning of the *Moro Castle*. And the *Moro Castle* went up in flames eight years ago. Yet here was Hal Kines looking older than he looked now" (35). Hammer's suspicion of Kines after discovering the sexual nature of his relationship with

Kalecki and his ability to appear younger illustrates Hammer's function in surveilling sexual transgression and enforcing heterosexual domesticity. Kines's ability to appear younger is also indicative of Spillane's association of homosexuality with sexual regression. Spillane constructs Kines as a sexually transgressive subject, who abnormally returns to an infantile form of sexuality, which becomes a visible component of his appearance in Hammer's construction of Kines's abnormal ability to appear younger.[12] Moreover, through his involvement in the prostitution ring, Kines uses his appearance as a college student to perpetuate further sexual transgressions among men and prostitutes, undermining sexual fulfillment between spouses in companionate marriage and its basis for the nuclear family. Thus, Kines ultimately undermines the position of the United States in the Cold War due to its reliance on the nuclear family and its centrality to domestic consumption.

Kines also poses a threat to Hammer's economic agency and thus his masculinity. Kines tells Hammer that he knows Charlotte on a professional level: "She came to our school last year and gave a lecture on practical psychology. That's what I'm majoring in. She had several students visit her clinic in New York to see her methods. I was one of them. She became interested in me and assisted me no end" (35). This link between Charlotte and Kines further suggests that the psychiatric knowledge Kines seeks has duplicitous qualities that become a greater danger to Hammer's masculine economic agency when consolidated by a discipline.

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[12] In *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1940), Freud attributes homosexuality to "fixations of the libido on states of earlier phases" of sexual development (184). According to Freud, "their urges, which are independent of the normal sexual aim, are called *perversions*. One example of such inhibited development is homosexuality, if it is manifest" (184). The genital phase of sexual development is "weakened by the portions of the libido that have not made the transition and have remained fixated on pre-genital objects and aims. This weakening shows itself in the libido's inclination, in cases where it obtains no genital gratification or where it experiences objective difficulties, to return to its earlier, pre-genital investments (regression)" (Freud 185).

After discovering the extent of Kines's involvement in the prostitution ring, Hammer speculates that Kines may not have been involved with Charlotte to "really study psychiatry to help him with his work" (89). Like Kines himself, the nature of psychiatric knowledge appears potentially illegal and capable of effeminizing Hammer by eroding his economic agency and sexuality. In confronting Kines, then, Hammer confronts the institutionalized knowledge and sexual transgression that demarcate the boundaries of his masculine subjectivity.

Hammer's mention of a textbook belonging to Charlotte entitled "*Hypnosis as a Treatment for Mental Disorders*" (109) signifies his angst regarding the implications of institutionalized psychiatry for his masculine subjectivity. Hammer relates how the book, which was "too wordy" (109), "gave the procedure for putting a patient into a state of relaxation, inducing hypnosis, and suggesting treatment. That way, the patient later went about effecting his own cure automatically" (109). This ability to induce an automatic behavior in others and its explanation in a textbook for professionals contrasts with Hammer's reliance on the layman's autonomous use of knowledge gained through individual experience and self-regulation. Hammer's second choice of textbooks, entitled "*Psychology of Marriage*" (109), is of more interest to him. He describes it as a "dilly" (109) and tells how he "wished they would write stuff like that in language for the layman" (109). His attitude towards the marriage textbook indicates that he sees the appropriate role for psychiatry not in the sphere of producing knowledge on psychological conditioning for and by middle-class professionals, but as a means for both himself and others within his entrepreneurial class to understand marriage as articulated by the ideals of companionate marriage and the domestic ideal of military psychiatry texts written for returning soldiers. Although Hammer imagines himself to be an autonomous agent, his use of the terminology of psychiatry to characterize Mary Bellamy as a "nymphomaniac" (54) belies this.

The term stems from the professional study of medicine, yet Hammer employs this type of knowledge as a "layman" (Spillane 109), as he interviews Mary. Hammer relates how Mary tried to seduce him during his first interview of her, telling how her "negligee fell open, but she took her time to draw it shut. Deliberately, she let my eyes feast on her bosom. What I could see of her stomach was smooth parallels rows of light muscles, almost like a man's" (41). Hammer's observation suggests her sexual appetite transgresses gender norms and diminishes Mary's femininity. Her insatiable sexual appetite makes her unlikely to be satisfied within the ideal form of companionate marriage that psychiatry touted during the postwar years. Moreover, Mary's wealth comes from her position as an heiress to a family fortune, contrasting her with Hammer's entrepreneurial role. Therefore, her character is the coalescence of the sexual deviance and consolidation of capital against which Hammer structures his fantasy of masculine agency regarding sexuality and capital. As he displaces his libidinal energies into policing such transgressive subjectivities, Hammer resists Mary's advances, deferring sex and marriage in favour of pursuing such subjectivities.

Ultimately Hammer thwarts Charlotte's ability as a psychiatrist to understand and manipulate the actions of those around her, including the heroin addicts she created and Hammer himself. Moreover, Charlotte murders Kines to prevent him from divulging her role in the drug ring. This eliminates the need for Hammer to do so to protect his tenuous relationship with psychiatric methods and the specialized knowledge it produces among medical professionals, and the way in which it threatens his agency in enforcing the norms of sex and gender that he espouses. However, Hammer's anxiety stemming from threats to economic and psychological autonomy indicates an emerging consolidation of capital and knowledge within the state funding of knowledge production in the Cold War era that would ultimately reconfigure the relationship

between sexuality, gender, family, and the state. In *Gumshoe America: Hard Boiled Crime Fiction and the Rise and Fall of New Deal Liberalism*, Sean McCann sees Hammer's victory over Charlotte as a "defeat [. . .] of the various kinds of seduction she represents" (203), including, among others, "psychiatric expertise" (McCann 203). Furthermore, according to McCann, "Hammer's defeat of Manning also predicts Spillane's victory over cultural authority, pointing to Spillane's comments on the success of his novels as "cast(ing) literary expertise in the same role as Charlotte Manning" (204). Spillane's criminalization of pre-marital sex and homosexuality illuminate the contested ground of cultural production in the creation of a Cold War political fantasy of masculine agency that the expansion of psychiatry from the military to civilian life bolsters, as evidenced by the American Psychiatry Association's pathologizing of homosexuality in the publication of the first *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*,[13] and the state's lavender scare and normalization of heterosexual marriage in the 1950s. In other words, Spillane's novel ultimately articulates marriage in a way that Hammer has in mind when he wishes "that they would write stuff like that in language for the layman" (Spillane 109) as he reads Charlotte's textbook entitled "*Psychology of Marriage*" (109), despite how the novel seeks to efface the way in which Hammer's libidinal energies ultimately serve the aims of the United States during the early Cold War. Hammer is a character in the type of popular text he wishes to read in place of the textbook for the expert. Yet, by disseminating the psychiatric principles in a repackaged popular form, Hammer, and by extension Spillane, have

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[13] The American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-1), published in 1952, defines homosexuality as a sexual deviation: "This diagnosis is reserved for deviant sexuality which is not symptomatic of more extensive syndromes, such as schizophrenic and obsessional reactions. The term includes most of the cases classified as 'psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality.' This diagnosis will specify the type of the pathologic behavior, such as homosexuality, transvestism, pedophilia, fetishism and sexual sadism (including rape, sexual assault, mutilation)" (38-39).

established only a political fantasy of masculine agency that they are working on terms that remain their own.

Cold War Artistic Production and the Aesthetics of Affective Process in Charles Willeford's *Pick-Up*

Charles Willeford's 1954 novel *Pick-Up* shares many of the characteristics of the noir novel with Spillane's *I, The Jury*. As John T. Irwin notes, "terse, straightforward prose, colloquial American speech, (and) slang" (200) that resemble tabloid reporting of the twenties and thirties are characteristic of the style (200). Beyond this, the similarities are apparent at the level of characterization. Just as Hammer avoids institutional affiliations and, in doing so, exhibits a "conflict between the detective's professional and personal lives as he tries to earn a living and stay true to his code, an action that almost always involves the detective's attempt to become and stay his own boss" (Irwin 182), Harry Jordan, though not a detective, also seeks to minimize institutional affiliations, particularly as a labourer. As he works for short intervals of time to support his alcoholism, Jordan relies on employment from the owners of small restaurants and bars, such as Big Mike, the owner of Big Mike's Bar and Grill. Therefore, despite their differences, both have a marginal relationship with the hierarchal structure of employment and prefer to maintain only a peripheral relationship with the institutions of post World War II society.

Pick-Up approaches the criminal from a markedly different perspective than Spillane's Hammer, a prototypical hard-boiled detective. Jordan's suicide attempt and attempted murder of his partner, Helen Meredith, criminalizes him. In this sense, *Pick-Up* is better understood as an inverted detective story, in accordance with Howard Haycraft's description of the genre. According to Haycraft, this "inside-out crime novel" (147) differs from the detective story

because it is a "penetrating psychological (study) of murder and horror told from the inside out" (147). Haycraft continues on to note that "the element of detection has been subordinated to the fascinating examination of 'the events leading up to the crime' as seen and felt by the participants" (147). Irwin expands on this classification, connecting the inverted crime novel to the novel of manners when he notes that "the hard-boiled detective narrative, in seeking greater realism, developed by moving the story away from being a puzzle in logic and deduction more in the direction of the character-driven novel of manners" (Irwin 193). While *Pick-Up* involves the crimes of (attempted) murder and suicide, Willeford confronts readers with Jordan's damaged psyche and often nihilistic outlook, and the inability of psychiatry to change such characteristics, rather than aligning readers with the hard-boiled detective as he attempts to solve the mystery of who committed a crime.

Jordan's account of his past as a member of the military during the Second World War when speaking to Dr. Fischbach, a psychiatrist evaluating his psychological state prior to his sentencing for Helen's murder, elucidates Jordan's attitude towards the institutionalization of art. In a chapter entitled "Flashback," Jordan explains: "The war, if anything, Doctor, was only another incident in my life. [. . .] I don't think it affected me at all. I was painting before I was drafted and that's all I did after I got in" (Willeford 126). Jordan describes the type of murals he painted after basic training at Fort Benning, Georgia: "Naturally, I knew the type of pictures they wanted and that's what I gave them. If I'd attempted a few non-objective pictures I'd have been handed a rifle in a hurry. So I painted army scenes. Stuff like paratroopers dropping out of the sky, a thin line of infantrymen in the fields, guns tank columns and so on" (126). Here, he recognizes the function of his art in maintaining morale among the troops, contributing to the war effort, despite not actively taking part in battle. Dr. Fischbach asks: "Did you feel you were

sacrificing your artistic principles by painting this way?" (126). Jordan responds: "Not particularly. If I thought of it at all I knew I had a damn good deal" (126). His response suggests a sense of indifference to his role as an artist serving the institutional needs of the army, which extends to his larger attitude towards the war and his fellow soldiers. For Jordan, then, the army and the realist scenes he paints during his time within it do not foster a sense of comradeship or duty in which he is involved, in accordance with the advice of military psychiatrists. The painting he does there provides him no sense of affective release as he serves an institutional goal with a sense of cold detachment from his work. His art is thus a result of a productive process that reproduces the relations of war, which require soldiers to function as a single, cohesive unit, which is fostered in part through the paintings Jordan does. Thus, Jordan is alienated from the commodified paintings he produces while in the army, displaying a sense of detachment, as military psychiatry encouraged solders to feel towards death. His work becomes an object into which others collectively invest their affect to maintain morale for the cause of the war, anticipating the nuclear family's role in commodity consumption in the 1950s. Thus, like Hammer, Jordan attempts to skirt reintegration into civilian life and avoid libidinal investment into collective formations, positing the noir novel as a potential terrain for contesting Cold War liberalism and seeking alternative political formations.

During this interview with Dr. Fischbach, Jordan makes his belief that art is a form of individual affective expression more apparent when he suggests that an art teacher should be free to critique the work of students and determine who has a natural ability to convey internal emotions in visual form: "Painting can't be taught, Doctor. Either a man can paint or he can't. I felt that most of the students were being duped, cheated out of their money" (539). According to Jordan: "There were too many art students who thought they were artists who should have been

mechanics" (445). Furthermore, he believes that such students should not continue to pursue art if they do so at their own expense. In other words, they should be compensated for the labour they perform in the production process: "It's one thing to study art with money furnished by a grateful government" (539), Jordan states, as he did during his time in the military and after the Second World War when he studied on the G.I. Bill. He continues on to state that "it's something else to pay out of your own pocket for something you aren't getting" (539). Jordan suggests that the process of artistic production should have a non-monetary value for the artist. His position implies that only those who perform labour for the state by producing cultural artifacts that bolster the morale of troops or purport to show the democratic character of the United States for Cold War liberalism, should be paid for this labour. In contrast, capital should not be a factor for those with an artistic talent that enables them to experience an affective response that occurs beyond the flows of capitalist production. Significantly, Mansfield, where Jordan taught art, "wasn't accredited under the G.I. Bill" (539), and, he explains to Dr. Fischbach, "[t]here isn't much money in the endowment and the regents wouldn't accept state aid" (539), indicating that the students receive only private independent funding and were required to pay to study art. This absence of state funding, then, is problematic because it suggests that artists may be enlisted in the promotion of the new liberalism of the Cold War without even the recognition of their labour as such. From Jordan's perspective, those who cannot reap the educational benefits of the GI Bill should not be enlisted in a form of U.S. cultural imperialism that commodifies art as a signifier of the benefits of American capitalism. Ultimately, Jordan imagines an economy of affect that functions separately from consumerism and commodification, leaving art unspoiled by the economic value of a finished commodity.

In response to Helen's encouragement to paint again, Jordan states: "I knew exactly what she had on her mind. The Great American Tradition: *You can do anything you think you can do!* All Americans believe in it. What a joke that is! Can a jockey last ten rounds with Rocky Marciano? Can Marciano ride in the Kentucky Derby? Can a poet make his living by writing poetry? The entire premise was so false it was stupid to contemplate" (emphasis in Willeford 24). Jordan's rejection of this notion of American individualism and ingenuity notably involves his acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of cultural production and the capitalist mode of production, where, Jordan implies, a poet, like an artist, must accept a market value for the product of his labour. While Jordan recognizes the entrenchment of art in capitalism, he attempts to remain on the periphery of Cold War commodity production. Andrew Pepper astutely reads Jordan's attitude towards the commodification of art as "a very particular rejection of the normative assumptions underpinning the transition of one phase of capitalist development to another" (104). Jordan's rejection of art as a commodity of marketable value occurs "when Fordism reaches its zenith or high point in the years following the Second World War" (Pepper 92). In contrast, Helen does not see a tension between art as affective process and its commodification. For her, Jordan's decision to stop painting is intelligible in terms of the role of art as a commodity with a market value that coincides with its cultural capital. Helen explains that her knowledge of painting comes from Mills College, "where they taught us something about everything" (429). Helen's liberal arts education at Mills College aligns her view of art with the State Department and intelligentsia's promotion of abstract expressionism as exemplary of American values suitable to be marketed internationally, as her question regarding Jordan's

decision to quit painting due to the advice of "Some critic" (429) further indicates.[14] Helen is aligned with a Cold War critical apparatus that was employed in the promotion of capitalism, democracy, and freedom abroad as the only viable alternatives to Soviet totalitarianism or progressivism on the left.

Following the war, Jordan completes art school on the G.I. Bill, but begins to have difficulty transitioning from his detached state, serving the institutional needs of the army by doing realist paintings, back to the non-objective style he began practicing before the war. He makes a distinction between the academic style of art he was required to produce as a student and the non-objective art he began practicing prior to the war, as he explains: "Things didn't go well for me after the war. I had difficulty returning to my non-objective style [. . .]. It was easy to paint academically and I could draw as well as anybody, but that wasn't my purpose in painting" (128-129). Now painting independently of the demands to produce art for the collective morale of American troops, Jordan turns to art through which he can express himself and into which he can invest affect as a form of individual expression. His painting becomes a struggle due to his desire to render internal processes visible, rather to respond to external demands. He explains: "I was unable to finish any picture I started. I still can't understand it. I could visualize, to a certain extent, what my picture would look like on canvass, but I couldn't achieve it" (128). As he conveys his inability to express himself when he returns to non-objective art, he reveals a shift in emphasis from the artistic product to the process of producing it. This disjunction becomes

[14] In the late 1940s, critical responses to abstract expressionism emphasized formal elements that could be made compatible with the purported universality of the art that enabled it to be promoted for the needs of Cold War cultural imperialism. Serge Guilbaut notes that in a 1947 article in *Nation*, Clement Greenberg positioned Jackson Pollack's work as an example of specifically American characteristics, contrasting him with French artist Jean Dubuffet. In the article, Guilbaut states, "an authoritarian tone took the place of serious and careful analysis of the works discussed, *only the formal aspects of which were treated*" (176 emphasis added).

apparent in light of the characteristics of abstract expressionism, including an emphasis on movement and action, conveyed though gestural lines and splattered paint as well as abstract expressionism's concern with unconscious processes[15] and attempts to reveal difficult to detect pre-social traces of a subject. According to Michael Leja, "When the New York School painter tried to bring his art into some productive relation with beliefs about primitive residues in human nature or about unconscious contents of the mind—two of the ingredients most prominent in this school's artistic theories—he was engaging conceptual categories with rich and complex lives and roles in his own national culture" (6). Thus, abstract expressionism entails an emphasis on psychological processes of mediation that are continually in flux and engaged with existing discursive structures, despite an artist's attempt to convey individual experience. The richness and complexity of the production process and its therapeutic effects are effaced when the work of art is received as a stable and fixed commodity resulting from a completed production process needed for the market, as Jordan discovers following the war.

Serge Guilbaut describes abstract expressionism's seemingly apolitical and individualistic aesthetic, stating that abstraction "emphasized the individual aspect of creation but at the same time laid bare the process, the mechanics of painting, and the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of describing the world" (197). By the early 1950s, rendering the processes experienced by the artist during the production process visible requires a new mode of representation that must also always exist in tension with existing forms of representation that

[15] Robert Motherwell made a distinction between process and finished product during a Studio 35 symposium in 1950 in which he associated a finished work with the School of Paris and process with the New York School, explaining: "I noticed in looking at the Carrè exhibition of young French painters who are supposed to be close to this group, that in 'finishing' a picture they assume traditional criteria to a much greater degree than we do. They have a real 'finish' in that the picture is a real object, a beautifully made object. We are involved in 'process' and what is a finished object is not so certain" (qtd. in Guilbaut177).

are commodified and thus subject to the imposition of a stable meaning. Jordan's non-objective style appears to have been unable to bear this tension between the commodification of abstract expressionism and the representation of affective processes due to Cold War liberalism's eisegesis of New York School painters, such as Jackson Pollock. As Frances Stonor Saunders notes: "As early as 1946, critics were applauding the new art as [. . .] 'a true expression of the national will, spirit, and character;" (213). Abstract expressionism, as a non-objective style with which Jordan became dissatisfied, was celebrated by some critics as "independent, self-reliant, a true expression of the national will, spirit and character" (Taubes qtd. in Saunders 213). As Saunders shows, during the early Cold War era, the "CIA was an active component in the machinery that promoted Abstract Expressionism" (229). According to Saunders, the CIA's influence on the promotion of American culture on a global scale led the Museum of Modern Art to "(manufacture) a history for Abstract Expressionism. Ordered and systematic, this history reduced what had once been provocative and strange to an academic formula, a received mannerism, an *art official*" (emphasis in Saunders 231).

Jordan's desire to fully "achieve" (128) his aesthetic vision for Helen's portrait is at odds with the psychological processes and affective flows that he sees as the terrain of the artist and which characterize the non-objective style on which he once relied to render affective flows in visual form. He explains how painting Helen's portrait entails a process that begins with a sketch, which he then covers with oil paint, to create a finished product:

> The all-important drawing which takes so many tedious hours is destroyed with the first stroke of the brush and replaced with shades of brown oil paint. The completed drawing, which is a picture worthy of framing by itself, is now a memory as the turpentine and oil

> soaks up the charcoal and replaces it with a tone in a different medium. But it is a base that will last through the years when the colors are applied over it. (32)

As Jordan explains, the process of painting a portrait involves multiple layers of representation, some of which are no longer visible in the final product. This leaves only shadows of the original representation as he adds colour over the base of the oil paint. Only a trace of the oil paint will remain apparent as evidence of an underlying but inaccessible drawing that, hereafter, is never fully knowable. Unlike non-objective painting, a portrait such as this is intended to imitate and capture a real likeness of its subject, which should be apparent in the final product of the artistic process. The process of creating a unified image through lines and shading is concealed by the unity and coherence of the finished product, which is then subject to market forces and commodified. Jordan, however, yearns to achieve a recognizable representation of Helen that accounts for the processes of production and mediation that are concealed as he laments the covering of the charcoal drawing. Thus, he seeks an aesthetic of production that is at odds with the portrait as an aesthetic object and marketable commodity.

For Jordan, artistic representation as a form of mediation and concealment of the production process in favour of a recognizable finished product is problematic because it is incongruent with his conception of the relationship between the artist and his work. He describes painting as “a love affair” that provides “a substitute for love” (24). The painting becomes a process into which the artist invests his affect, constituting the artist’s subjectivity. Jordan describes painting as a process in which “the pain in your stomach drives you on to a climax of pure feeling, and if you’re any good the feeling is transmitted to the canvas. In color, in form, in line and they blend together in a perfect design that delights your eye and makes your heart beat a little faster” (24). His conception of the artist’s subjectivity entails the ability for individual

self-expression through the process of artistic production as an alternative to reintegration into civilian life as a producer of a marketable commodity, positing artistic production as a therapeutic process capable of remedying the effects of consensus culture for those outside of its trappings. However, art as a form of therapy which enables the form of therapeutic self-expression that Jordan seeks is tempered by the available means of reception. Jordan's intention to convey the process and flows of "pure feeling" (24) in his art aligns him with the New York School and the meanings ascribed to its art under Cold War liberalism and its model of hegemonic masculinity.

Jordan's character displays a more ambiguous relation to the masculine subjectivities associated with the New York School, complicating his relationship with non-objective art. Jordan shows a degree of measured restraint by posing Helen as Olympia, tempering his virility and aggression, despite a propensity for violence in other instances. His attempt to transcribe affective flows to the canvass requires an aesthetic that is distinct from the New York School, most notably that of Jackson Pollock. Pollock's painting, perceived as an expression of masculine aggression and violence stemming from traces of a pre-social other, contrasts with Jordan's need to expel notions of primitivism, which becomes more pronounced upon the revelation of his race. The critical work of Harold Rosenberg played a pivotal role in creating Pollock's masculine persona. As Gregory Minissale notes, "Rosenberg coined the phrase 'action painting' based on the equation of physical strength and mental struggle directed outwards through the bold and sweeping gestures of the limbs upon the grand stage of the abstract expressionist canvass" (74). Pollock's associations with virility and violence unsettle Jordan's resemblance to the New York School's associations with virility and thus highlight Jordan's

need for an aesthetic that transgresses the limitations of Cold War artistic production as a means of reintegrating into civilian life.

Jordan's conception of art and its affective investment also entails freedom from the demands of the market, which requires a finished product that effaces the process of its production. For him, painting should not be tied to an "ideology of freedom, of free enterprise" (Saunders 213), as abstract expressionism came to be during the Cold War. Rather, Jordan attempts to convey his affect for both the trace of Helen's past, apparent in her childlike features, and her maturity. His shortcomings become evident when he explains: "Despite my attempts to create the faint, tiny lines around her eyes and the streak of silver hair, it was the portrait of a young girl" (33), which becomes more apparent as he describes how he took a non-academic approach to the portrait. Jordan acknowledges his desire for Helen and seeks an alternative to abstract expressionism as a mode of affective expression by situating Helen within an artistic lineage that includes Edouard Manet's *Olympia*: "I rearranged her arms, her right hand in her lap, her left arm stretched full length on the bed. Her legs were straight out, with the right ankle crossed over the other. The similarity between Helen and the woman in the *Olympia* almost took my breath away with the awesomeness of it" (26). Manet's *Olympia* is both a reference to and a departure from the kind of Classical and Renaissance art that Jordan associates with academia. Jordan hopes, like Manet, to depart from an academic style that favoured the idealized portrayal of the mythological figure of Venus. After finishing the portrait, Jordan refuses to attribute a marketable value to it, declaring: "My price for this picture is one hundred thousand dollars" (34). He deliberately prices it above a marketable value to show his refusal to allow Helen's portrait and his feelings for her to become investments in the Cold War cultural market.

However, this “fairly happy period” (Willeford 31) when Jordan is painting the portrait, during which he quits drinking and seeks an economy of productive affect outside of capitalist production, is short lived. As he describes the initial process of painting, he notes: “I didn’t have the feeling of detachment an artist is supposed to have toward his model. I was definitely aware of Helen’s body as an instrument of love” (30). Although Jordan sought a new mode of affective representation, he acknowledges that after intercourse with Helen, he continues work on the portrait “with the proper, necessary detachment an artist must have if he is to get anywhere” (31). He experiences a tension between artistic production as a process of constituting a visual mode of desire and a sense of detachment that enables the realist portrait of Helen and her resemblance to Olympia.

The need for representation ultimately compromises Jordan’s artistic vision for the portrait due to its effacement of the process of production and affective investment. After completing it, he comes to see it as a failed attempt to make his feelings for Helen intelligible and recognizes its derivative nature: “Of course, the painting was all right, but any artist with any academic background at all could have done as well. And my temerity in posing Helen as *Olympia* was the crowning height to my folly” (35). Jordan renders his attempt to depart from an academic style and to convey the centrality of the subject’s experience of Helen’s beauty and sexuality futile. His view of the portrait as one that “[a] good amateur or Sunday painter would be proud of” (39) reflects a failed attempt to develop a form of artistic expression that evades the concerns of abstract expressionism, renders an academic style outmoded, and eludes the commodifying forces of the capitalist market.

Helen’s portrait gestures back to the popularity of portrait painting in the nineteenth century and avoids the co-opted modernist style of abstract expressionism, yet it bears signs of

the market relations of commodity capitalism. The way in which the portrait resembles *Olympia* positions Helen as the courtesan in Manet's painting and, thus, a marketable commodity. Jordan refuses Helen's suggestion that he include a background of "an open sky, or the ocean and clouds" (32), which would resemble classical representations of Venus. By leaving the background blank, however, Jordan underscores his inability to make visible the conditions of the portrait's production process within the working-class rooming house in which he lives and paints. Moreover, he does not avoid elements of idealized beauty as Helen's youthful features in the portrait overshadow Jordan's attempts to portray her silver hair and lines around her eyes, causing her to resemble Venus, a figure born as a sexually mature woman with the capacity to continually renew her virginity. Due to the academic elements of the portrait, Jordan resembles an artist working in service of a patrician woman, positioning him as a domestic servant, rather than a creative subject. The portrait's resemblance of Manet's *Olympia* also suggests that Helen's gaze positions her as a subject, rather than merely an object. The absence of a background, which in Manet's *Olympia* depicts a black servant delivering flowers, positions Jordan, a working class African American, as a servant,[16] who is not visible in Jordan's portrait. Helen, as an arbiter of the Cold War critical apparatus, is both Jordan's patron and Olympia. Thus, his absence from the painting is indicative of the effacement of his place as a desiring subject and the labour he performs for Helen. In this sense, the portrait effaces the affective expression that produces the portrait, indicating a prohibition against Jordan's appreciation of Helen's beauty and sexuality, which becomes more pronounced when Jordan's race is revealed.

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[16] Notably, in a note that Jordan leaves for Helen while she is asleep, he refers to himself as "Your slave" (77).

Following the completion of Helen's portrait, Jordan becomes overwhelmed with a sense of meaninglessness and hopelessness as he describes a bleak outlook for the future in which "the only thing that could possibly happen would be a gradual lowering of standards, and they were low enough already" (42). As he confronts the limitations of artistic representation, Jordan also comes to confront the limitations of his own subjectivity. Willeford implies that Jordan is in a tenuous and untenable relation to the New York School of painting and its affinity with noir masculinity. In his analysis of the relationship between abstract expressionism and film noir, Leja explains a shared approach to masculine psychological processes, involving male protagonists "who commit crimes or act violently, brutally, and irrationally for reasons they do not understand and cannot control" (258). He notes: "The *noir* male must recognize that the source of the problem is within him, and it is the character and framework of that internal dynamic—the impulses and desires that the *noir* woman merely activates and personifies—that is at issue" (259). Helen[17] certainly activates Jordan's search for an aesthetic capable of transcribing affect; however, Jordan's rendering of her image entails a break from the non-objective style of abstract expressionism, and, although an imitation, Jordan's painting also marks his own absence from Cold War artistic production and the political discourse in which it engages. As Jordan attempts to channel his productive affect into a non-commodified means of artistic production, rather than into capitalist wage labour as a working-class subject, his subjectivity experiences slippage and comes to reveal fissures that are indicative of his psycho-

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[17] Leja points out a common noir narrative theme involving "a male protagonist who is incapable or returning a good woman's love until he has played out his powerful, irresistible attractions to a dangerous destructive woman" (258), which often ends tragically. Helen, contrarily, encapsulates the same destructive impulses as Jordan while providing an intersubjective exchange that paradoxically enables him to represent the effacement of his artistic agency. Thus, she is a more complex representation of noir feminine subjectivity.

political state in the midst of the rise of the professional managerial class in the 1950s, which have not been remedied by artistic expression.

Jordan’s search for an affective process of production outside of firmly entrenched aesthetics is also apparent in his attitudes towards discourses of marriage within the context of the Cold War. During a psychiatric interview while in prison, he tells Dr. Fischbach that “an artist paints and a husband works” (537) to justify his abandonment of his own wife and son, marking his rejection of the advice of military psychiatrists. For Jordan, the role of a father and husband within the nuclear family is incompatible with an artist’s need to channel his affect into artistic production. He tells Dr. Fischbach that he considered his son “an unnecessary expense” (128) that would prevent him from pursuing his painting. The prominence of marriage in postwar society, bolstered by military psychiatry as a means of readjusting soldiers to civilian life, informs Jordan’s decision to complete art school as an act of defying the subject position of husband and father. His lack of active combat during the war has not created a sense of comradery with fellow soldiers that can be reinvested into marriage and raising children, as military manuals on readjustment recommend.

Jordan’s relationship with Helen reveals his diverging attitude from psychiatric knowledge, marriage, and familial ideals and enables him to bypass such ideals and return to art. He refuses to articulate his feelings for Helen according to popular discourses on love. Jordan tells Helen: “‘One thing I want to get straight is this,’ I said. ‘I’ll never tell you that I love you.’ [. . .] Couples work themselves into a hypnotic state daily by repeating to each other over and over again that they love each other. And they don’t know the meaning of the word. They also say they love a certain brand of tooth paste and a certain brand of cereal in the same tone of voice” (18). As with his art, Jordan imagines his affective investment in Helen to be free of the

corrupting forces of a capitalist economy. His understanding of their relationship entails a freedom from the use of the term love and its function in discourses of both commodification and consumption that is necessary for the subjectivity of the artist.

Jordan's attempts to wrest the representation of his feelings for Helen from Cold War institutions falters, however, not only in his artistic representation of Helen, but also in his function as a narrator. His use of visual art and his refusal to tell Helen that he loves her are indicative of the inability to represent his relationship with her outside of hegemonic Cold War discourses of marriage and family. Therefore, Jordan's use of visual art and his belief that the role of the artist is incompatible with that of a husband and father provides a potential alternative to such discourses; however, Jordan's narrative and articulation of his relationship with Helen also slips into this discourse. After first having sex with Helen, Jordan tells her that he will introduce her to his landlady, Mrs. McQuade, by explaining that Helen is his estranged wife, with whom he is reconciling. He goes on to tell Helen that, despite this "thin story" (21), "For all practical purposes, we are married" (21). Furthermore, their perceived marriage will also be subject to economic condition as Jordan states that with Helen living with him, he "could expect an increase in rent" (22). Jordan must rely on marriage to legitimize his relationship with Helen and, despite Helen's wealth, their feelings for each other do not free their relationship and the terms with which it is expressed from economic restraints.

As Jordan and Helen's relationship devolves after Jordan completes her portrait, his narrative comes to rely further upon his relation to the domestic ideal of marriage and the family, registering the slippage in Jordan's subjectivity. Jordan describes a scene as he and Helen walk to Saint Paul's Hospital in search of treatment for their alcoholism after a failed suicide attempt. Jordan describes "Noisy children [. . .] playing in the streets" (52), "Bright, shiny, new

automobiles" (52) and "House-wives in house-dresses, their arms loaded with groceries in brown-paper sacks" (52-53). This scene conveys the coalescence of a domestic ideal of family, including children and conventional gender roles, with the abundance and prosperity of the postwar Fordist economy. Jordan observes this scene as an outsider, asking: "How long had it been since I had a home? I had never had a home" (52). His vision of the scene also takes on the qualities of non-objective art as he then begins to notice:

> non-objective designs created with charm and simplicity on every wall, every fence, every puddle of water we passed; the designs of unconscious forms and colours, patterns waiting to be untrapped by an artist's hand. The many-hued spot of oil and water surrounded by blue-black macadam. The tattered, blistered, peeling ochre paint, stripping limply from a redwood wall of an untenanted house. The clean, black spikes of ornamental iron-work fronting a narrow stucco beauty shop. Arranged for composition and drawn on soft pastels. (52-53)

On the surface, the scene Jordan observes appears to be a coherent and unified image of white, middle-class life which he rejects and which is also inaccessible to him, particularly in respect to his race. Jordan, however, perceives this scene with an artist's eye, noting its potential to be aesthetically rendered on the canvas as an expression of form and beauty. For him, this scene of domesticity and consumer abundance contains within it the germ of a different mode of perception as the homes and the fences that contain them become expressions of an unconscious that does not resemble the New York School's expressions of primitivism and violence, and the motor oil from the automobiles becomes a study in colour contrast, rather than the residue of mass-produced goods. Jordan recognizes the capacity of abstraction to convey his own affective

process, rather than that of white hegemonic masculinity, which was then co-opted by Cold War liberalism.

Jordan's outsider status and exclusion from the domestic ideal he observes become a source of astute sensibility which enables him to see the constructed nature of the scene before him and, thus, the process of production involving disparate visual components that the scene conceals to present a cohesive vision of the Cold War liberal consensus.[18] The designs, forms, colours, and patterns underlying the scene Jordan observes have been covered by the signification of middle-class affluence and U.S. cultural imperialism, much like the completed charcoal drawing of Helen that forms the base of the portrait Jordan paints. The "portrait of a young girl" (33) bears only a trace of the charcoal when Jordan has finished painting. As Jordan continues to observe this scene, he begins to consider how these colours and designs would suit the interior of a home: "what delicate pictures these would be for a young girl's bedroom. For Helen's bedroom. For our bedroom" (53). As Pepper points out, Jordan has "an unexplained impulse to infantilize Helen" (105).[19] However, Jordan's posing of Helen to resemble *Olympia* also suggests that her place as a desired and fetishized girl is an effect of his desire for her in a previous form, one in which she is something other than a mediated image of Venus. In this sense, Jordan's desire for Helen is a desire to see her as something other than a wife or daughter, which, according to Cold War discourse of marriage and family, positions him as a perverse and transgressive subject. Jordan continues on: "If we had a house and a bedroom and a kitchen and a

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[18] Jordan's outsider status aligns him with many of Willeford's other protagonists. Cochrane describes "a series of Willeford protagonists who outline the darker soul of postwar American culture beneath the dominant consensus" (40), which also includes a world "in which the innate human appreciation of artistic beauty is cruelly distorted by the exigencies of mass culture" (40).
[19] According to Pepper, the portrait of a younger Helen and a photo of Helen when she was seven years old that Jordan carries in his wallet provide "unsettling paedophilic undertones" (105).

living-room and a dining-room and maybe another bedroom and I had a job and I was among the living once again and I was painting again and neither one of us was drinking…" (53). This run on sentence and stream of consciousness technique indicates that he is longing for a reconciliation of the fissured, fragmented, abstract qualities he observes on his way to Saint Paul's Hospital with his desire for Helen. He can describe his desire for a life with Helen only in a way that entails a collapse of the distinction between wife and daughter, describing her as "just a little girl" (19) just before their first time having sex and also noting that "If it hadn't been for the single strand of pure silver hair she wouldn't have looked more than thirteen years old" (21). By collapsing this distinction between wife and daughter, Jordan obscures and rejects the role of father and husband within the available perceptive framework of Cold War domesticity, suggesting the need for a new artistic subjectivity constituted through an aesthetic capable of expressing unadulterated and incoherent desire as something other than perverse or commodifiable. To reconcile the despair he feels as a result of the unresolved tension between his subjectivity as an artist and his inability to develop an aesthetic of affect, Jordan turns to psychiatric treatment and its process of mending the fissures and shoring up the slippages of pathologized subjectivities.

The Artist as Cold War Psychiatric Subject

Jordan's inability to develop an aesthetic of affective process signals a political dilemma that has been obscured by the Cold War production of an autonomous self. In this sense, *Pick-Up* registers the way in which popular culture contemplates and gauges the ability of culture itself to reimagine and reconstitute political subjectivity at the level of the psyche of the individual. As Redding argues, "[s]elfhood—atomized, individuated, free, conscious, relatively articulate, market-savvy, freely chosen and formed, self-styled, capable of consent—was *the* great cultural

invention of 1950s America" (emphasis in Redding 22-23). Psychiatry, particularly the psychotherapeutic methods that Jordan encounters, is a primary mode of the production of a "free" self in the 1950s. In his 1953 book *A History of Psychoanalysis in America*, Clarence Oberndorf writes: "The philosophy of psychoanalysis, with its high regard for individual needs in contrast to those of the supremacy of the totalitarian state, clashed irreconcilably with the tenets of Fascism under which the individual must sacrifice himself" (191), emphasizing the way in which psychoanalytical treatment privileges the individual self and safeguards against the reproduction of political ideologies that would contrast with the Cold War production of a free individual self as a principle of American national identity. Furthemore, Oberndorf accounts for the success of psychoanalysis in the United States, in part, by stating that "American psychiatrists, teachers, professors, and sociologists reared in democracy and less awed by tradition, although not uncritical, were far more ready than their European colleagues to examine and test Freud's ideas in an experimental spirit" (233) of John Dewey's educational theory (Oberndorf 232). Oberndorf's history of psychoanalysis, then, works in tandem with the production of the free individual self as a mechanism of Cold War political ideology.

Jordan turns to psychiatry in an attempt to comprehend and alleviate the tension between the slippages in his subjectivity and the need for an aesthetic capable of rendering this subjectivity intelligible, only to be met by psychiatric discourses that seek to mend these fissures by constituting him as a pathologized, deviant subject. Willeford yokes such discourses to Jordan's race in the final line of the novel, when Jordan reveals himself to be "Just a tall, lonely Negro. Walking in the rain" (160). While Jordan expresses his feelings of alienation and hopelessness in psychological terms—for instance, he claims to be "depressed" (57)—the etiology of his perceived mental illness lies beyond his individual psyche. Jordan explicitly

questions his need for psychiatric treatment and its potential effectiveness when he ends a conversation with Helen about their future by stating, "Right now I'm concerned with getting hospital treatment for whatever's the matter with me, if there is such a thing, and there's anything the matter with me" (53). His uncertainty about how to articulate his problem suggests that his psychological state is an outgrowth of the larger cultural and political conditions of the Cold War during the 1950s rather than an individual pathology. By developing a character who expresses and seeks to treat a cultural and political problem by turning to psychiatry, Willeford interrogates the turn from class politics and collective forms of identity that characterized the old Left and New Deal artistic initiatives prior to the Second World War to the production of the individual self as a political expression of American freedom and democratic values in the 1950s. Jordan's experiences with psychiatric treatment (or lack thereof) to which this chapter now turns show Willeford's articulation of a political and cultural problem that was left unresolved by psychiatric knowledge and diagnosis.

The shortcomings of a psychiatric approach to Jordan's psycho-political state become apparent during his meeting with Dr. Davidson, a psychiatrist at Saint Paul's Hospital, where Jordan and Helen first seek psychiatric treatment. Dr. Davidson's questions demonstrate the way in which he approaches Jordan as an object of sexual curiosity and potential sexual pathology, as he asks Jordan: "How were your carnal relations with Mrs. Meredith? [. . .] Where did it feel the best? The tip, the shaft, where?" (65). By approaching Jordan in this way, Dr. Davidson overlooks Jordan's alcoholism and psychological state and reduces him to his sexual functions as he examines him for sexual abnormalities. Furthermore, Dr. Davidson continues on to ask Jordan: "Is Mrs. Meredith colored?" (65), positioning interracial relationships as a form of sexual deviance. This question implies that Jordan may fail to recognize sexual taboos and thus lack

self-awareness and experience a deficit in intersubjective relations. However, his response showing his awareness that Helen is white shows that this is not the case. When Jordan asks Dr. Davidson why he'd ask this question, Dr. Davidson's reply suggests that he has done so as a result of observing specific physical characteristics that he attributes to a specific, and likely inferior and animalistic, race: "Her expression and eyes, the bone structure of her face" (65). Dr. Davidson's interests in attributing physical characteristics to a racial identity and in Jordan's sexual relationship with Helen suggest that he is inept at both understanding and articulating Jordan's psychological processes and their effects. The psychiatric interview is an exercise in taxonomy that, rather than expand knowledge of sexual habits as the Kinsey Reports did, ultimately reduces Jordan to a sexualized and animalistic object, who can be read, classified, and pathologized by ascribing meaning to biological factors. Dr. Davidson's line of questioning suggest that he fails to see Jordan as having the psychological complexity necessary to suffer from a disorder and need treatment.

Jordan is further reduced to a sexualized and animalistic object while he is in jail, awaiting a prison sentence for Helen's death after being found psychologically fit. When he is given the opportunity to draw portraits of the prison employees, Mr. Benson, a prison guard, arranges for Jordan to draw a nude portrait of a stenographer. He leads Jordan into an examination room, which contains "the kind of couch you sometimes see in psychiatrists' offices and doctor's examining rooms" (142). Jordan recognizes that the stenographer, a woman with skin he describes as "creamy white" and "faintly rosy" (143) is not primarily interested in being drawn. As he begins to kiss her, he becomes increasingly forceful before acknowledging her fear: "You're frightened, aren't you? That's part of the thrill. That's what you want, isn't it? To do it with a freak. A dangerous freak. And a murderer!" (143). For the stenographer, this

interracial sexual encounter is a transgressive act in which Jordan is used to subvert Cold War discourse of marriage and sexuality.

Her positioning of Jordan in this encounter is an effect of the discourse of sexual abnormalities and deviance that warn against the violence of the sexual psychopath[20]. Thus, in attempting to use Jordan in a sexual fantasy entailing criminality, violence, primitivism, and danger, the stenographer shows the channeling of sexual desire not only into heterosexual marriage to be a norm, but also marriage within racial boundaries. The stenographer, then, casts Jordan's relationship with Helen as a mere fantasy of violent sexual deviance, in accordance with Dr. Davidson's line of inquiry during his interview with Jordan. Jordan's subjectivity becomes a function of his perceived rogue and violent sexuality. His affective processes once again become distorted as his actions with the stenographer come to be perceived as the expression of a primitive psyche and its affinity for sexual violence. Not only is Jordan's non-objective art subject to a means of reception that channels his affect into politically productive meanings, but his bodily actions and behaviours are also read according to psychiatric diagnostic criteria.[21] Such criteria shore up the parameters of permissible sexuality. The setting of this encounter in a psychiatric examination room frames it according to psychiatry's pathologizing of sexual

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[20]As Estelle B. Freedman notes in her analysis of the formation of sexual psychopath laws in the U.S. from the 1920 to 1960: "Psychiatrists, journalists, and politicians all helped create the sexual psychopath, but a public concerned with changing gender relationships seized upon the threat of 'uncontrolled desires' to help redefine sexual normality and deviance in modern America" (87). According to Freedman, "The sexual psychopath represented man unbounded by the controls of female purity, a violent threat not only to women, but to children as well" (86).

[21] *DSM I* classifies a diagnosis of a sexual deviation as "deviant sexuality which is not symptomatic of more extensive syndromes, such as schizophrenic and obsessional reactions" (38). This term "includes most of the cases formerly classed as 'psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality.' The diagnosis will specify the type of pathologic behavior, such as homosexuality, transvestism, pedophilia, fetishism and sexual sadism (including rape, sexual assault, mutilation)" (39).

violence as it was used to demarcate the boundaries of non-procreative sex within heterosexual marriage. Rather than attempt to cure Jordan of a perceived pathology, psychiatric knowledge renders his behaviour an expression of sexual pathology.

While in prison, Jordan recounts his time in the psychiatric ward at St. Paul's Hospital, telling an assistant district attorney that "[t]he psychiatric help we received was negligible" (111). His characterization of his time at Saint Paul's, however, is not due to a neglectful model of custodial care in overcrowded and underfunded hospitals, as many journalistic exposés of the period revealed.[22] Dr. Fischbach may assume this model of care to be the problem when he tells Jordan: "If you and Mrs. Meredith had come to me in the first place you would have been all right" (120). However, Dr. Fischbach's methods also appear unable to articulate the curbing of artistic agency that governs the reception of Jordan's work. Jordan responds to a Rorschach test saying: "I studied it [an ink blot] for a moment. It looked like nothing" (121). He then relates how he told Dr. Fischbach that the ink blot "looks like an art student's groping for an idea [. . .] Sometimes, Doctor, when an artist is stuck for an idea, he'll doodle around with charcoal to see if he can come up with something. The meaningless lines and mass forms sometimes suggest an idea, and he can develop it into a picture. That's what these ink blots look like to me" (121). Jordan's reply suggests that his response to the ink blots used in a Rorschach test are, like abstract expressionism, available to be imbued with circulating meanings upon its reception by an elite intellectual class. Jordan's psyche is subject to the lens of psychiatry through which Dr. Fischbach views it. In conjunction with the perception of Jordan as a violent sexual deviant, his response is subject to being rendered to fit the corresponding diagnostic category. The

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[22] Robert Deutsch's 1948 *The Shame of the States* and John Maurice Grimes's 1954 *When Minds Go Wrong* made these conditions public, among others.

resemblance between the ink blots and the charcoal sketching of an art student that Jordan sees is reminiscent of his own struggles to transmit affective processes of production to the canvass while evading dominant reading practices. For Jordan, the abstract nature of the ink blots, like abstract expressionism, enable the constitution of an invisible or deviant subject. Jordan tells Dr. Fischbach: "I'm an artist, or at least I used to be, and as an artist I can see anything I want to see in anything" (122). Thus, Jordan's response to the Rorschach test links psychiatric methods to abstract expressionism's production process; the production process of both is concealed in the reception of a commodified work of art or a politically useful deviant subject. Psychiatry shares with abstract expressionism a capacity for multiple modes of signification and their subsequent effacement in the acts of diagnosis and reception, respectively. Jordan elucidates the slippages between psychiatric discourse and knowledge, on one hand, and, on the other, the psychiatric subject constituted as the product of this discourse and knowledge in service of Cold War liberalism.

Aside from the Rorschach test and an array of physical tests that Jordan undergoes, Dr. Fischbach employs other methods that align psychiatric assessment and diagnosis with the cultural production and the effacement of its process that Jordan encounters. Dr. Fischbach provides Jordan with cards containing different images and asks him to create a narrative for each. Jordan describes the pictures on the cards as being "progressively impressionistic" (123) and notes that the final "three reproductions were in color, in a surrealistic vein, and they bordered on the uncanny and the weird" (123). Thus, techniques of modernist art, which previously questioned epistemological and ontological grounds have become institutionalized in psychiatric treatment to constitute deviant subjectivities. Jordan's responses to Dr. Fischbach's questions during a series of psychiatric interviews provide him an opportunity to counter

psychiatry's reliance on abstract and non-objective forms of representation in distinguishing pathology from a "free," "autonomous" "individual" within the discourse of Cold War liberalism. Jordan's description of how Dr. Fischbach "skipped around with his questions as he daily dug for more revelations from my past" (133) places modernist narratives in the terrain of psychiatric knowledge, collapsing the division between art as a form of affective expression and artistic agency and the institutional production of the psychiatric subject. In place of Jordan, Dr. Fischbach is granted creative agency under the guise of the scientific objectivity in the narrative Jordan derives from the images. However, the process of constituting Jordan as a subject through his responses bears a closer resemblance to the reception of art and its political and cultural contingencies. Dr. Fischbach's method suggests a lack of compatibility between the production of psychiatric knowledge and the scientific method, with its concern with observable and measurable data.

The psychiatric inquiry that Jordan faces clearly infuriates him. He not only criticizes Dr. Fischbach for being illogical and foreign, but also accuses him of gaining enjoyment from hearing of his sexual experiences "second-hand" (131) and "digging for filth into other people's minds" (131). Furthermore, Jordan accuses Dr. Fischbach of employing psychiatric methods to render his desires into perverse or even pornographic material, which Fischbach then consumes. When Dr. Fischbach inquires about Jordan's sexual relations with Helen, Jordan describes him as someone who "sat behind a desk digging for filth in other people's minds" (131). Jordan expresses his resentment of Dr. Fischbach's "vicarious enjoyment of my life's history and your dirty probing mind" (132), as he exclaims with disgust: "I can't believe anybody would sink so low just for money. I've gone down the ladder myself, but I haven't hit your level yet" (132). As both a commodifier and consumer of Jordan's desire, Dr. Fischbach stands at the centre of

Jordan's objections to the limitations of creative and psychological agency. While Jordan is the producer of his art and the affect for Helen that inspires it, he is unable to reform the terrain on which the reception of his work and even his intimate thoughts and feelings takes place.

Upon being freed from prison after it is discovered that Helen died from natural causes, Jordan appears to be free to search for a mode of affective expression that is not infringed upon by Cold War discourses of sexuality and their enshrinement in Fordism. Yet, he recognizes the way in which freedom is enshrined in economic relations that will continue to efface his creative agency: "Freedom meant nothing to me. [. . .] I was free. I was free to wash dishes again, free to smash baggage, carry a waiter's tray, dish up chili beans as a counterman. Free" (156). Jordan's critique of freedom counters Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s articulation of new liberalism in his 1949 book *The Vital Centre*. For Schlesinger, the freedom that is characteristic of liberal individualism is inseparable from feelings of anxiety: "The eternal awareness of choice can drive the weak to the point where the simplest decision becomes a nightmare. Most men prefer to flee choice, to flee anxiety, to flee freedom" (Schlesinger 52). Willeford, however, suggests that such freedom is highly contingent on a subject's capacity to transgress and render anew existing aesthetics and discursive practices and the subjects they constitute in the midst of the co-option of modernism. Throughout the novel, Jordan's character demonstrates the limitations of Cold War liberalism, *noir* masculinity, the abstract expressionist artist, and psychiatric knowledge. His transgressions of the demands of capitalist wage labour under Fordism and its corresponding Cold War nuclear family ideal leaves Jordan invisible or pathologized.

Willeford offers African American subjectivity as a possibility for expanding Cold War cultural production beyond the existing confines of the noir crime novel, but to read Jordan as an African American reduces the possibilities for expanding political subjectivity more broadly.

Willeford, knowingly or not, employs race in a way that potentially narrows the available terrain for popular culture to be a form of political dissent, specifically terrain that reconstitutes psychiatric discourse—that is unless the final lines revealing Jordan's race are seen as one more instance in which the gaps and fissures in Jordan's racialized subject position become apparent to readers. In other words, by revealing that Jordan is African American, Willeford draws attention to the inability of existing aesthetics, discourses, and subjectivities to articulate alternatives to the white, middle-class subjectivities against which Jordan is measured by psychiatric knowledge.

Both Spillane's *I The Jury* and Willeford's *Pick-Up* engage with the role of psychiatric knowledge and authority in the reintegration of soldiers following the Second World War, as these novels seek to articulate alternatives to psychiatry's management of productive affect. Spillane and Willeford reveal the ways in which masculine subjectivities imagine themselves to be impervious to the forces of capitalist production into which their productive capacities are channeled, as both Hammer and Jordan hold firm convictions regarding the necessity of maintaining economic and psychological autonomy in the midst of the professional managerial class and the ramping up of Fordist production. Thus, these noir crime novels, reflect and grapple with the way in which popular culture becomes a site for the reconfiguration of political subjectivities within the terrain of psychiatry. Such subjectivities, then, rather than become agents of political dissension, emerge as means of reinforcing the Cold War liberalism. While Spillane offers Hammer's ambiguous relationship to the law and his extralegal use of violence as a means of retaining masculine agency over the Cold War state's use of psychiatry as a regulatory apparatus, *I, The Jury* ultimately provides a political fantasy of masculine agency that reinforces the Cold War familial ideal by policing transgressive and pathologized subjectivities. Willeford shows the ineffectiveness of psychiatric discourse and diagnosis to articulate political

dissent and its affective dimensions beyond constituting pathologized subjects that demarcate the boundaries of Cold War liberalism. While the affect and libidinal energies of pathologized subjectivities in both novels are deemed to be in need of cure, containment, or curtailment, they are always constituted in ways that leave their fractured and atomized nature discernable, opening the potential for a new symbolic order in which the formerly pathologized emerges as a new politics of dissent. One such symbolic order and its political potential will be examined in an analysis of Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* in the next chapter.

Chapter Two: Psychiatric Violence and African American Political Consciousness in Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*

Ralph Ellison's 1952 novel *Invisible Man* is pervaded by images of psychiatric treatment, from the insane asylum near the protagonist's college campus to the electrified lobotomy performed on him. Invisible, Ellison's protagonist and unnamed narrator, recounts the events of his time as a college student in the South as well as his involvement with the Brotherhood, an organization loosely based on the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). Over the course of his life, he has violent encounters with methods of psychiatric treatment both as a witness and a subject of these methods. Such encounters are indicative of how *Invisible Man* critiques psychiatric treatment and knowledge, particularly the ways in which sociology and social psychiatry position African Americans as objects of disciplinary power and violence. However, the novel is not merely a condemnation of these disciplines. As evidenced by his involvement with the Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic, Ellison found psychiatry to be a potentially fruitful site for African American subjects to become politically conscious and pursue political agency by disrupting institutional forms of power and violence. For Ellison, this disruption enables an expanded and reformulated therapeutic formation that articulates the previously pathologized psychic experiences of Harlemites.

While Ellison does not advocate a complete dismissal of sociological concepts or psychiatric knowledge, he reconsiders how sociological concepts in psychiatry and institutional frameworks can be reformulated to make meaningful contributions to psychiatric treatment. In doing so, Ellison engages with the increasing popularity and credibility of social psychiatry[23]

[23] Jerzy Krupinski notes that social psychiatry became more prevalent in the years follow the Second World War, as indicated by the publication of multiple textbooks on the field (92). He

occurring in the early Cold War era. Ellison looks to social psychiatry for its capacity to go beyond treating African Americans as pathologized bodies to be disciplined and subjugated in the social order of the United States. In doing so, he shares common ground with Richard Wright, a significant influence on and mentor to Ellison, and psychiatrist Dr. Fredric Wertham, who were both involved with the Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic in Harlem.

As this chapter demonstrates, Ellison's views on the potential of social psychiatry as practiced at the Lafargue Clinic also diverge from those of Wright and Wertham in two significant ways: Ellison posits the experience of violence as an unarticulated form of expression within existing psychiatric discourse, which must come to be understood as such, in contrast with Wertham, known for his crusade against crime and horror comics for their representations of violence. Secondly, Ellison ultimately recognizes significant limitations to the political efficacy of existing institutionalized social psychiatry in the mid twentieth century, shown by the lack of institutional affiliations the protagonist of *Invisible Man* exhibits by the novel's conclusion. By choosing to withdraw into what he calls a state of "hibernation" (Ellison 573), Invisible has not yet fulfilled the potential for political action he recognizes in social psychiatry. While the institutions in which Ellison saw great potential for the realization of African American political consciousness result in a state of inactive contemplation of their mechanisms, in his underground state the "Invisible" narrator harnesses the uncontained, surplus violence to disrupt existing

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explains: "There is, however, no comprehensive definition of 'Social Psychiatry'" (92); however, he attempts to extract some central tenets from the several sources. According to Krupinski:

> Everybody will, however, agree that social psychiatry deals with:
> 1. Social factors associated with the onset, course and outcome of psychiatric disorders.
> 2. Social effects of mental illness
> 3. Psycho-social disorders, and
> 4. Social approach to prevention, treatment and rehabilitation of the psychiatrically ill. (92)

political and economic relations as a seemingly paradoxically invisible and unrepresented subject. In doing so, Ellison discerns and articulates an invisible flow of violence within the disciplinary apparatuses that Invisible encounters throughout the novel proper. This invisible flow of psychiatric violence mounts political resistance against institutionalized knowledge and its embeddedness in capitalism. While this violence functions on a subtle level, it does, in fact, demonstrate a degree of political agency exercised by a disembodied subject which Invisible has begun to deploy by the novel's epilogue. Throughout Invisible's narrative, this violence undercuts assertions of the novel's affirmation of liberal individualism as it suggests the emergence of a new therapeutic politics of dissent based on reconceptualized relations between psychiatric violence and African Americans.

This chapter begins by discussing how Ellison's early non-fiction engages with and critiques the application of sociological concepts to discourse on race in the United States, particularly the work of Gunnar Myrdal. It considers how environmental determinism was employed in social psychiatry on race during the early Cold War, by briefly examining Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey's *The Mark of Oppression* (1951). Ellison's early non-fiction that predates the Cold War, such as "Recent Negro Fiction" (1941), responds to the influence of environmental determinism on literary naturalism and proposes a theory of African American cultural production that complicates sociological explanations of racial inequality in the U.S. Ellison's theory of African American cultural production synthesizes proletarian fiction and African American folk culture as a means to constitute African American political subjectivity. Ellison's "Hymie's Bull" exemplifies this synthesis of proletarian fiction and African American folk culture as Ellison conceives it in "Recent Negro Fiction" by traversing boundaries between races and regions of the U.S. in favour of the possibilities of class-based alliances. More

specifically, this chapter reads violence in "Hymie's Bull" as a basis for working class agency, as the violence inflicted on the bull provides a basis for the alliance between Hymie and the narrator, positing violence as a productive political force, rather than an environmentally induced reaction.

This chapter then considers how Ellison takes up his earlier critiques of social psychiatry and his call for a new African American political consciousness in response to the Cold War in his essay "Harlem is Nowhere" and his novel *Invisible Man*. "Harlem is Nowhere" reflects Ellison's turn from a more direct engagement with class politics to a form of therapeutic politics, which Ellison links to the Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic in Harlem. Founded in 1946 with the help of Dr. Fredric Wertham, the clinic, with which Richard Wright and Ellison were also involved, sought to provide psychotherapy to the citizens of Harlem at little or no cost. This section of the chapter argues that Ellison draws on the social psychiatry of Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan to present the Lafargue Clinic as an institution that reformulates violent and nightmarish psychological experiences of Harlemites into syntaxic experience[24] that enables political agency

[24] According to Harry Stack Sullivan's *Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (1953), experience "is in final analysis experience of *tensions* and experience of *energy* transformations" (emphasis in Sullivan 35). Experience as tension entails "potentiality for action, and tension *may* have a felt or representational component" (emphasis in Sullivan 36). Syntaxic experience is one of three modes of experience which also include the prototaxic and the parataxic, which correspond to different stages of the development of the self system. Syntaxic experience entails "meaning(s) [which] have been acquired from group activities, interpersonal activities, social experience. Consensually validated symbol activity involves an appeal to principles which are accepted as true by the hearer" (Mullahy qtd in Sullivan 28-29). According to Sullivan, "any experience that can be discussed—that is, any experience in the syntaxic or parataxic mode—is always interpreted by elements of the near past, sometimes even the distant past, and by elements of the near future—anticipation, expectation, and so on. These elements are powerfully influential in determining the way that tensions are transformed into activity—that is, the way in which potentiality in the tension becomes action" (Sullivan 38-39). Language as a form of representation should, thus, be considered a form of action that is influenced by the past and anticipation of the future, which entails political agency when this representation occurs as syntaxic experience. Sullivan uses the term parataxic to denote the experience of tension that

via a subjectivity that is perpetually in a state of non-identity or misrecognition. In *Invisible Man*, Ellison renders the parataxic violence of psychiatric treatment into ordered syntaxic experience. Thus, psychiatric knowledge and violence constitute Invisible as a psychiatric subject, as his encounter with disciplinary violence becomes a basis for disrupting the flow of institutional violence, wresting it from existing structures to be organized into a new therapeutic form of political dissent, thus demonstrating the capacity of the novel to disrupt and change the social meaning of violence from a form of discipline delivered via psychiatry to a therapeutic expression of political dissent.

Ellison's Critique of Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*

In his non-fiction writing, Ellison explicitly addresses the sociological concepts that his fiction also explores. In his 1944 review of sociologist Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944), Ellison critiques Myrdal's reliance on environmental determinism to explain the social position of black Americans in the United States. In doing so, Ellison begins to develop the basis for his theory of African American cultural production as a synthesis of proletarian fiction and African American folk culture. Ellison elucidates the way in which Myrdal's sociological study relies on some common aspects of sociology and the application of scientific principles by white writers that have influenced literary naturalism. In his review of Myrdal's book, Ellison notes that "[s]ince its inception, American social science has been closely bound with American Negro destiny" (304), which has entailed "a sensation that (the Negro) does not exist in the real world at all" (304). Instead,

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involves "momentary, unconnected" (Sullivan 28) states that are not logically connected, which can be represented only by symbols which are used in a "private or autistic way" (xiv). Parataxic experience begins the development of individual consciousness which precedes syntaxic experience and its representation as a capacity for political agency in relations to the past and others.

Ellison asserts that African Americans are known only through the "nightmarish fantasy of the white American mind" (304). Sociological thought, despite its claim to objective empirical knowledge, has been no exception to this construction of African Americans. While Ellison praises Myrdal for moving away from forms of fantasy and myth-making that have been central to sociological thought and the representation and knowledge of African Americans, he simultaneously criticizes Myrdal for failing to acknowledge adequately the existence of African American folk culture. Ellison writes that the mythmaking of American sociological literature consists of "'scientific' justification of anti-democratic and unscientific racial attitudes and practices" (305), undermining the scientific objectivity of sociological thought that has constructed African Americans as a site of white bourgeois knowledge. He continues on to assert: "If Myrdal has done nothing else, he has used his science to discredit all of the vicious non-scientific nonsense that has cluttered our sociological literature. He has, in short, shorn it of its mythology" (305). In doing so, however, Myrdal has reduced African American culture to an entirely reactionary phenomenon that lacks the agency that Ellison attributes to African American folk culture. Ellison calls attention to Myrdal's conclusion on the "Negro problem," which Myrdal sums up as follows: "the Negro's entire life and, consequently, his opinions on the negro problem are, in the main, to be considered as secondary reactions to more primary pressures from the side of the dominant white majority" (Myrdal qtd. in Ellison 315). In response to Myrdal's conclusion, Ellison asks: "But can a people [. . .] live and develop for over three hundred years simply by *reacting*? Are American Negroes simply the creation of white men, or have they at least helped to create themselves out of what they found around them?" (315). Ellison will insist that there is much more to be gleaned from African American folk culture and African American cultural production more broadly than Myrdal recognizes. His assertion that

"[i]t will take a deeper science than Myrdal's—deep as that might be—to analyze what is happening among the masses of Negroes" (316) plays out in Ellison's short fiction and his novel *Invisible Man*.

The Mark of **Oppression: Kardiner & Ovesey and Cold War Social Psychiatry**

Ellison's consideration of sociological knowledge as a site that registers African American political agency should also be contextualized within a wider body of knowledge that psychiatrists were producing on the "Negro problem." Notably, *The Mark of Oppression: A Psychological Study of the American Negro* (1951) by psychiatrist Abram Kardiner and psychoanalyst Lionel Ovesey relies on a similar environmental determinism as Myrdal's work to explain African American psychology. Kardiner and Ovesey do not anticipate the kind of criticism that Ellison levelled against Myrdal and other social scientists who fail to acknowledge the nuance and complexities of African American culture. Like Myrdal, Kardiner and Ovesey see a pronounced division between African Americans and the dominant culture that emphasizes exclusion: "the Negro occupies a unique position in American culture, being separated from the majority white group by a caste barrier. The Negro still bears the psychological scars created by caste and its effects" (xv). Kardiner and Ovesey understand the consciousness of African Americans to be inherently scarred and damaged, due to the "hang-over of slavery" (Kardiner and Ovesey xv-xvi). As a result, they assert, African Americans are without a fully formed culture and have only partial access to a "majority white" (xv) culture: "the Negro is a participant in American culture insofar as he is permitted to participate" (xvi). The barriers to the notion of American culture that Kardiner and Ovesey have documented foreclose the possibility of African American political agency. Therefore, like Myrdal, Kardiner and Ovesey see African Americans as merely reactionary. They are, according to *this* logic of sociology, subject only to the terms of

cultural production and political agency set out by a distinct different-race majority and only able to access cultural institutions to the extent to which this distinct different-race majority allows them. In other words, the relationship between African Americans and (always only white) culture is one in which they always bear the "mark of oppression" (Kardiner and Ovesey xv). Kardiner and Ovesey, drawing on sociological principles such as the environmental determinism that characterizes Myrdal's work, thus conceive of social psychiatry as an apparatus that accounts for the residual effects of slavery and current social barriers created by Jim Crow which contribute to stark inequalities between races, constituting African Americans as merely a function of racism.

Ellison's engagement with sociological thought as it would be applied to social psychiatry was also, of course, shaped by his relationship with Richard Wright. While the relationship between Wright and Ellison would deteriorate throughout the 1940s, Wright's role as mentor provided Ellison with an early model for writing fiction that placed the social environment as a central factor in understanding and representing the consciousness of African Americans. Although Wright encouraged Ellison to write fiction, as many critics have noted, Ellison diverged from the sociological perspective of Wright's fiction as it appears in works such as *Native Son* and *Black Boy*. Ellison's 1945 review of Wright's *Black Boy*, "Richard Wright's Blues," published in *The Antioch Review* demonstrates both Ellison's sense of admiration for Wright's ability to confront the barriers that Jim Crow placed on the relationship between African Americans and cultural production in the United States and to capture the psychological impact of the social structures of the South. Yet, Ellison's review also indicates that his conception of the relationship between African American cultural production and politics diverges from and is more nuanced than Wright's formulation. Ellison asserts that despite

Wright's ability as a writer, Wright's first novel, *Native Son*, shows Bigger Thomas as an individual whose consciousness is formed via a reaction to his environment, without the agency to shape that environment and its culture: "Between Wright's skill and knowledge and the potential of Bigger's mute feelings lay a thousand years of conscious culture" (89). Furthermore, Ellison characterizes *Black Boy* as "an almost unrelieved picture of a personality corrupted by brutal environment" (81), while continuing on to note that "it also presents those fresh, human responses brought to its world by the sensitive child" (81). Here, Ellison suggests that environmental determinism provides an inadequate explanation of culture. Instead, he emphasizes the unacknowledged potential of the complex psychological lives of African Americans in the Jim Crow South. While the Jim Crow South, as *Black Boy* depicts it, has caused African American culture to be seen as merely a product of its environment, Ellison insists: "Negro life does not exist in a vacuum, but in the seething vortex of those tensions generated by the most highly industrialized of Western nations. The welfare of the most humble black Mississippi sharecropper is affected less by the flow of the seasons and the rhythm of natural events than by the fluctuations of the stock market" (88-89). While acknowledging that the environment and the economic base both bear on African American life, Ellison sees the expression of culture occurring within the circulation and exchange between African American subjects and social and economic formations as precursors for political agency.

Sociology, Literary Naturalism, and African American Political Agency

Ellison's consideration of African American cultural production is apparent in his early, pre-Cold War non-fiction, such as his 1941 publication in *New Masses*, "Recent Negro Fiction." Here, he expresses his concern with the relationship between literary naturalism of the early twentieth century and writers from a small black middle-class. "Recent Negro Fiction" considers

the work of these writers to "echo the worst efforts of the 'Harlem' writers of the twenties" ("Recent Negro Fiction" 22), who are writing for a white audience and are, therefore, unengaged with black folk[25] culture and class struggle. Ellison places black proletarian fiction in relation to literary naturalism, explaining that the "themes and problems with which these writers [Theodore Dreiser and Upton Sinclair] were concerned were not recognized by Negro writers as being related to American Negro experience" (23), due to the exclusion of the black working class from intellectual and political life in the United States. Ellison yearns for a form of black proletarian writing that accounts for the specific ways in which African Americans transmit their experiences in the American South into the urban industrialized conditions of the northern cities, as it has done for white writers. In presenting the migration from South to North as a central tenet of African American fiction and distinguishing this from, yet, also drawing on, naturalist fiction of white writers such as Dreiser and Sinclair, Ellison sees writing as a central process in the constitution of African American political consciousness. However, he identifies a problem that inhibits the development of a "new Negro consciousness" (24), explaining that there exists a "division between the themes of which the (African American) writer is becoming aware, and the techniques necessary to give them dynamic treatment" (24), which "is traceable to the Jim Crow retardation of the natural flow of Negro folk consciousness into the machines and institutions which constitute the organism of North American society" (24).[26] A new Negro consciousness, according to Ellison, "demands new institutions" (24). He implies that a form of

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[25] Although Ellison was critical of some Harlem Renaissance writers, the importance of folk culture in his conception of African American consciousness is indebted to Langston Hughes, to whom Ellison was introduced by Alain Locke in New York City.

[26] For Ellison, Richard Wright's *Native Son* develops a new consciousness through Wright's involvement in the Chicago John Reed Club.

proletarian naturalism that encapsulates both industrialization and African American folk culture is necessary to convey the experiences of African Americans.

Ellison suggests that while the potential of naturalist fiction to form a new African American political consciousness exists, naturalism[27] also imposes limitations. The division

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[27] Ellison's use of the term naturalism should be considered within the context of its various characteristics and competing definitions that arise within critical debates. Ellison's use of the term suggests that naturalism is thematic, rather than temporal, and focuses on economic and psychological determinism, rather than scientific or hereditary laws. This is a variation on George Becker's influential characterization of naturalism as "pessimistic materialistic determinism" ("Modern Realism as a Literary Movement" 35). Donald Pizer's understanding of naturalism beginning in the 1960s is akin to Ellison's attempt to use naturalism as a mode of writing that recognizes individual agency within seemingly deterministic systems. For instance, according to Pizer, Stephen Crane's use of irony and symbolic expressionism in *Maggie: A Girl of the Streets* (1893) suggests that Crane is not focused solely on determinism. Pizer writes:

> Crane, then, is a naturalistic writer in the sense that he believes that environment molds lives. But he is much more than this, for his primary concern is not a dispassionate, pessimistic tracing of inevitable forces but a satiric assault on weaknesses in morality. He seems to be saying that though we may not control our destinies, we can at least destroy those systems of value which uncritically assume we can. (175)

Donna Campbell points out: "From the 1960s to the present, Pizer's interpretations draw attention to and reconcile the tensions within naturalism, such as those between a deterministic world view and the seemingly heroic qualities shown by naturalistic characters, a tension that renders the naturalistic novel a dynamic rather than an inert chronicle of life" (506). Thus, Pizer recognizes the capacity for naturalism to go beyond Becker's definition of naturalism as "pessimistic materialistic determinism" (35).

More recently, Eric Carl Link's *The Vast and Terrible Drama: American Literary Naturalism in the Late Nineteenth Century* (2004) considers naturalism in terms of themes, asserting that a naturalistic narrative "integrate(s) naturalist theory into the narrative in such a way as to elevate it to thematic or structural significance" (20). Link seeks to expand the definition of naturalism by positioning its use of determinism in a dialectical relationship with "indeterministic interpretations of nature and experience" (131). Thus, Link locates a variation on the determinism through his thematic approach to canonical naturalist writers, such as Crane, Norris, and London.

As Marc Egnal points out, the definition of naturalism most often includes four white male writers: Theodore Dreiser, Frank Norris, Stephen Crane, and Jack London. Egnal asserts the need for a new definition of naturalism that focuses on the period from 1893 to 1913 and encompasses the works of women and African American writers often excluded from considerations of naturalism to expand the definition of naturalist narratives, while limiting its temporal definition. Egnal points out that the work of African American and women writers of

between themes and the use of literary techniques that Ellison discerns in the work of Arna Bontemps, Zora Neil Hurston, William Attaway, and Waters Edwin Turpin exemplifies the limitation of naturalism ("Recent Negro Fiction" 22-24). He does, however, see the proletarian fiction cultivated by writers in the John Reed Clubs as an avenue for African American writers to move beyond hereditary and environmental determinism of naturalistic narratives. Ellison's remarks on Wright are indicative of the way in which he sees proletarian fiction as a means of developing a political consciousness that has been stymied by racial and class oppressions: "As a member of the Chicago John Reed Club (Wright) encountered attitudes, assumptions, and aims towards American civilization that were inarticulate in the Negro's folk consciousness" (24). For Wright, this culminated in "the attainment of a new sensibility, of a rebirth" (25) that Ellison locates in Wright's *Native Son*. Thus, Ellison articulates the relationship between Wright's

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the era he emphasizes in his re-definition of naturalism relies on the centrality of heredity and environmental factors in determining human behaviour. For Egnal: "The 'proletarian novels' of the 1930s, celebrated by critics as the reinvigoration of naturalism, cannot be easily grouped with the works of 1893–1913" (185). Contrary to Egnal, Campbell seeks to expand the temporal definition of naturalism:

> In contrast to the earlier naturalists' emphasis on biological determinism, the naturalists of the 1930s relied more heavily on representing psychological and economic determinism, with Freudian theories of sexuality and repression and Marxist analyses of class and capital replacing earlier theories of hereditary traits. [. . .] In the 1940s, African American writers such as Richard Wright (Native Son) and Ann Petry (The Street) employed naturalism to register disillusionment with, and a protest against, the injustices visited upon Black Americans by a racist U.S. society" (503).

While Ellison's consideration of naturalism also recognizes the exclusion of African Americans, he includes the proletarian writers of the 1930s that Egnal seeks to exclude from his redefinition. Link and Campbell, in accordance with Ellison, sought to move beyond narratives structures that strictly adhere to environmental and hereditary determinism.

influence by the proletarian literature fostered within the John Reed Clubs and naturalism as a central tenet for African American cultural production.

Wright first encouraged Ellison to write short fiction in the late 1930s, resulting in the acceptance of Ellison's "Hymie's Bull" by *New Challenge* in 1938.[28] The story demonstrates Ellison's engagement with proletarian fiction[29] as a mode of expressing the interconnectedness of capitalism and white supremacy. Raymond A. Mazurek asserts that Ellison's early short stories, including "Hymie's Bull," "might be counted among the best proletarian fiction of their era" (118). In the story, Ellison's black narrator recounts the story of Hymie, a fellow "bum" (83) who is riding the rails along with him as they return to Alabama from Chicago. The story focuses on an altercation between Hymie and a railroad detective whom Hymie murders after Hymie is violently attacked. The narrator observes that when "the bulls get the worst of it, and whenever one is missing at the end of a run and they find him all cut up and bleeding, they start taking all the black boys off the freights. Most of the time, they don't care who did it, because the main thing is to make some black boy pay for it" (83). The description elucidates the relationship between the narrator's experience as a member of the working class and the further complexities of race that inform his experience. The narrator describes the sympathy he felt for

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[28] "Hymie's Bull" was not published due to the failure of *New Challenge*.

[29] Michael Denning addresses the challenge of defining proletarian literature by proposing that it is a formation in Raymond William's usage and thus asking: "What was the proletarian literary formation? What kinds of writers did it produce? What effects did it have on the writers who were drawn to it? What kinds of writings, what genres, forms, and formulas did those writers produce?" (202). Denning points to Michael Gold's manifestos and his work with *New Masses* as significant elements of this formation but extends proletarian literature beyond this. According to Denning, proletarian literature as a literary formation entails "a cultural politics and an aesthetic ideology" (202). For Ellison, proletarian literature consists of the possibility for working-class alliances across racial lines. Nathaniel Mills contends that Ellison's short fiction of the 1930s entails "linking the lumpenproletarian experience of social displacement to political possibility" (545).

Hymie as he observed him lying on the top of a box car after becoming ill from some bad food: "I felt sorry for the poor guy out there alone. I wished there was something I could do for him" (85). Here, the intersecting class interests and experiences of the narrator and Hymie allow a kind of alliance to form briefly. This occurs again when the narrator attempts to warn Hymie of the approaching bull as he sleeps on the top of the boxcar. In these instances, the narrator's sympathy for Hymie entails an identification with him, disrupting capitalism's reliance on the suppression of African Americans and the formation of a working-class class consciousness among them.

Ellison's narrator comes to articulate a sense of Du Boisian double consciousness that reveals a division between himself and Hymie following his initial concern. Soon afterwards he tells how he then "thought, To Heck with Hymie. A few miles down the road when we got South, he and the other guys would go into another car anyway" (85). When the train pulls into the yards in Montgomery, Alabama, prior to the discovery of the corpse of Hymie's bull, the narrator recognizes this as the moment when "some black boy had to go" (Ellison 88) in response to the bull's death. The narrator notes that "luck must have been on our side" (88) when he and the other black men riding the rails manage to escape without anyone being killed, causing them to be "happy as hell" (88) as they "grab something going far away from where Hymie got his bull" (88). Ellison draws attention to the narrator's need to bridge a disunity with Hymie in light of their similar class interests. The narrator, then, ultimately struggles with a tension between his alignment with Hymie and the white working-class and a sense of racial unity among African Americans. Ellison thus points to a need to reconsider the separation of race and class that results in the inability of the narrator fully to ally with Hymie, due to class. An

opportunity for racial division to be resolved is apparent on the rails in the form of a fluid and contingent alliance but is not entirely fulfilled.

"Hymie's Bull" provides a "basis for a new proletarian literature" (Ellison, "Recent Negro Fiction" 22) that deviates from environmental determinism and heredity. The death of Hymie's bull suggests that violence is a politically effective response to exploitation as a parallel between Hymie, a Jewish character, and the narrator is established. This moves beyond pessimistic determinism of a capitalist mode of production and the slavery system on which its establishment in the South depended. "Hymie's Bull" presents riding the rails as a transversal experience of transitory subjects, momentarily bridging North and South and the individuals who inhabit these geographies of the United States. In his analysis of Ellison's short fiction, Nathaniel Mills emphasizes the role of technology in bringing Ellison's characters out of isolation from each other and from various locations, providing "a precondition for the formation of interracial political alliances" (541). The characters not only literally cross between North and South, but also transport with them their customs and culture, as the narrator uses "Texas Slim, who'll kill a Negro as quick as he'll crack down on a blackbird" (83) as a means of relating to the violence of the bulls of Chicago. Moreover, the narrator describes the rhythm of the train as sounding "like kids in Harlem beating empty boxes around a bonfire at nightfall as they play along the curbs" (85). In its crossing of boundaries and fusion of customs, then, "Hymie's Bull" demonstrates Ellison's early attempt to articulate a "partly urbanized, somewhat distorted folk culture, found in Negro streets, slums, cabarets, and dance halls" (Ellison, "Recent Negro Fiction" 22) that relies on a synthesis of proletarian fiction and African American culture and experience. This positions violence not as a mere reaction of brutality, but a potentially viable mode for resisting

state violence and exercising a form of political agency in a fleetingly constituted political alliance.

The Cold War and the Emergence of Harlem's Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic

At the onset of the Cold War, Ellison continued to engage with the relationship between class politics and social science as the authority and influence of social science was expanding. For many professional practitioners, social science was coming to provide a useful methodology for explaining and alleviating the discrepancy between U.S. foreign policy and the status and treatment of African Americans within the borders of the country. More specifically, social psychiatry sought to locate the roots of racism in slavery and account for the role of segregation in understanding the social ills of the United States. This was done in order to overcome the paradox of how a national character that touted democracy, freedom, and individualism as core components could coexist with a nation wherein Africans Americans faced violence and systemic discrimination as part of their daily lives. In his discussion of Carl Rowan's role in the U.S. State Department during the 1950s, Michael L. Krenn points out that, "as the evidence makes clear, nearly all appointments of African Americans to high-profile positions in the State Department and the foreign service contained aspects of tokenism" (67). The calculated inclusion of African Americans in countering Soviet propaganda and advancing the image of American national character extended into the role of culture in foreign policy.

Music provides an apt example of the way in which President Dwight Eisenhower's Cultural Presentations Program would export American culture as the U.S. government sought to appeal to nations that became the ideological battlegrounds of the Cold War. Paul Robeson's outspokenness against the treatment of African Americans further highlights the discrepancy between an ethos of freedom and equality that the U.S. sought to project during the 1950s and

the tightly controlled dissemination of African American culture. As Lisa Davenport recalls: "As jazz musicians traveled abroad, the U.S. government actively curtailed and censured the activities of some black intellectuals they regarded as firebrands in the international and domestic arena, including W.E.B Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Josephine Baker" (142). Furthermore, as Tony Perucci convincingly argues, Robeson's "detractors pathologized him by linking his alleged madness and his status as an actor with his Communist sympathies and activism for civil rights and anti-colonial movements" (2). Perucci's analysis underscores the way in which a "politicized discourse of psychopathology" (2) sought to regulate Cold War dissent among African Americans. The coupling of mental illness and political dissent that occurred during the Cold War is apparent in Robeson's treatment following a suicide attempt in Moscow in 1961. After receiving fifty-four electroconvulsive therapy treatments in eighteen months and being treated with barbiturates, Robeson no longer performed (Perucci 16). Robeson's experiences demonstrate the way in which psychiatry became a significant site for explanations and treatments of those calling attention to the blatant discrepancy between national ideals and lived experience for African Americans.

Wright, like Ellison, was also attuned to the problems of social psychiatry in studying and understanding the marginalization and oppression of African Americans, particularly in Harlem. Prior to his correspondence and subsequent work with Frederic Wertham, Wright corresponded with psychiatrist Benjamin Karpman. In *Freud Upside Down: African American Fiction and Psychoanalytic Culture*, Badia Sahar Ahad comments on this correspondence, noting that Karpman primarily saw the use of Wright's notoriety in literary circles as a means of disseminating his own psychoanalytical insights among a broader audience, rather than an opportunity to cultivate a collaborative relationship based on "genuine cooperation" (Wright qtd.

in Ahad 88) in which Wright had expressed an interest while corresponding with Karpman (Ahad 88). Ahad points to Karpman's letters to Wright, in which Karpman refers to himself as a "specialist in minorities" (qtd. in Ahad 89), as evidence of "his tendency and the tendency of psychoanalysis in general to pathologize so-called minority behaviours" (89). As an alternative to Karpman, Wright found his sociological approach to fiction compatible with the work of psychiatrist Dr. Frederic Wertham. Wertham's work played a significant role in U.S. race relations as he helped to dismantle segregated schools through his testimony in the infamous case of Brown v. Board of Education in Topeka, Kansas. Prior to his testimony in the case, Wertham held a position at the Phipps Psychiatric Clinic at Johns Hopkins Hospital that allowed him to examine closely and interrogate the medical and scientific basis of mental illness after being influenced by Kraepelin's work in the nosology of mental illness. After departing from the Phipps Clinic, Wertham returned to Munich and sought a position outside of clinical psychiatry as a fellow of The National Committee for Mental Hygiene in 1930. Upon his return to the U.S. in 1931, Wertham accepted a position as the director of the Mental Hygiene Clinic at Bellevue Hospital which marked a shift from somatic approaches to psychiatry to criminal psychopathology. His position would involve work with the Court of General Sessions that required him to testify in criminal court cases.

Wertham's 1941 publication *Dark Legend: A Study in Murder* reflects this shift in his career. According to Gabriel N. Mendes, Wertham and Wright wrote similar accounts of two men who committed murder as a result of social forces, drawing a close relationship between Wright's *Native Son* and Wertham's *Dark Legend*. According to Mendes, Wertham and Wright wrote their respective books "[w]ithout any knowledge of one another's existence" (80). As Mendes explains, upon later reading Wertham's book, Wright wrote to Wertham asking him to

examine Clinton Brewer (2). Brewer was an African American man who, after his conviction for murdering his wife, was paroled from prison as a result of Wright's plea to the governor of New Jersey (Mendes 1-2). Shortly after his release, Brewer committed another murder, prompting Wright to ask for Wertham's insight into the impetus of Brewer's actions. According to Mendes: "The Clinton Brewer case was for Wright and Wertham the genesis of both a personal friendship and a shared commitment to providing psychiatric care to those who had been previously excluded from it: the poor, the oppressed, and, above all, black people" (4).

This commitment to those considered to be most vulnerable to mental illness, yet had the least access to psychiatric care, materialized in March of 1946 in the form of the Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic. The opening of the clinic in the basement of a small church in Harlem signalled what was perhaps the expansion of psychiatric care to those whose class and race had most often excluded them from its potential benefits and were weary of white medical authority. Furthermore, and more in line with the central argument of this chapter, Wertham, Wright, and Ellison[30] conceived of the Lafargue Clinic as a site where the experiences of Harlemites, which conventional psychiatric institutions often pathologized, could be rearticulated in ways that allowed for the constitution of political subjects, rather than pathologized subjects. The clinic's approach sought to balance the role of environmental factors in Harlem with an anti-racist conception of African American psychology. Wertham recognized the necessity of mitigating the potential for sociological knowledge on race to construct African Americans as being impervious to mental illness and unsuitable for psychiatric care. The Lafargue Clinic's location in the basement of St. Philip's Episcopal Church enabled it to develop into a means of meeting an array

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[30] Psychiatrist Dr. Hilde Moss, Journalist Earl Brown, and Rev. Shelton Hale were also instrumental in establishing the Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic.

of communal needs for the residents of Harlem. According to Dennis Doyle, Rev. Shelton Hale fused his role as a church official with community activism, which he then attempted to link to Wertham's use of social psychiatry. He points to Hale's words in a 1947 *New York Herald Tribune* article where Hale states: "Doctor Wertham's idea of social psychiatry is the same common-sense approach to living in peace with one's neighbors that I used in making these two gangs bury the hatchet" (qtd. in Doyle, "A Fine New Child" 191), referring to his work to reconcile a conflict between rival gang members in Harlem. Hale shared Wertham's concern with juvenile delinquency as he also opened the St. Philip's Community Centre in the church in 1944 to provide an alternative to gang membership for the youth of Harlem (Doyle 187). Hale's counselling was compatible with the Lafargue Clinic's psychotherapeutic methods, which helped to bridge the gap between African Americans in Harlem and treatment by white psychiatrists such as Wertham.

Social psychiatry, as practiced by Wertham, Moss, and other mental health professionals at the Lafargue Clinic, sought to account for the lived experiences of Harlemites that often entailed economic stressors, without a reductionist view of the psychology of race. The clinic focused on psychotherapy, using different methods of talk therapy, including "counseling, group therapies, play therapy for children, and short term analysis" (Doyle, "Where the Need is Greatest" 753). Dennis Doyle notes that "social assistance was an integral component of therapy" (759),[31] indicating the incorporation of economic and social factors to treatment

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[31] Doyle's research on the remaining records from the Lafargue Clinic provides specific cases where the clinic aided patients with social services as part of their treatment. For instance, he describes how a case file for a patient named Martha shows that the "physician in charge and two social workers helped Martha to file with the New York Housing Authority and assisted her in acquiring beds and furniture. Lafargue staff also worked with the Department of Welfare to help locate Martha's estranged husband and, in the process, helped her to navigate New York City's labyrinthine public assistance bureaucracy" ("Where the Need is Greatest" 759).

methods. Moreover, Wertham and Moss applied these treatment methods in accordance with the principle of universalism, which Doyle describes as "the application of modern psychiatric principles to African Americans without making adjustments on the basis of race. Such a practice was predicate on a belief that blacks and whites shared the same complex 'emotional landscape' described by psychodynamic and psychosexual theory" ("Where the Need is Greatest" 750).[32] Thus, the Lafargue Clinic used psychotherapeutic methods of treatment that accounted for socio-economic conditions, yet did not reduce African Americans to solely reactive roles, due to the false perception of an inferior psychological makeup, in contrast with sociology's construction of the pathologized black urban subject. Utilizing this approach provided African American Harlemites with a stake in determining their diagnosis and the direction of their treatment. This approach, therefore, positioned patients to elude the pitfalls of more conventional psychiatric institutions such as New York City's Bellevue Hospital, where patients were often subjected to racist psychiatric practices and the shortcomings of custodial care.

Wright represents the Lafargue Clinic as an institution that is on the periphery of the economic and political controls that govern other psychiatric clinics and institutions. In his 1946 essay "Psychiatry Comes to Harlem," he writes of the difficulty of securing finances and a location for the clinic, emphasizing its distinct function in Harlem. Wright opens the essay by presenting the establishment of the clinic as a radical act of seizing the foundations of psychiatric treatment from a ruling class, as he declares: "It would be far easier to confiscate private property than to violate, under however laudable a pretext, the contemporary metaphysical

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[32] Doyle notes: "Extant memoranda regarding the Lafargue method of taking case histories did not instruct staff to look for evidence of racism's emotional impact. [. . .] In practice, staff only examined the 'race question' if a patient brought it up" (765).

canons of organized medicine in America" (49). Wright positions Wertham as the central figure in the approach of the Lafargue Clinic, describing him as "the one psychiatrist who is striving to build a 'social psychiatry,' a bold *sub rosa* idea as to how to break the deadlock and subvert the defensive ideal of psychiatry" (50) that has prevented the allocation of resources for a psychiatric clinic in Harlem. Wright goes so far as to associate the clinic with "almost lawless or criminal methods" (49) in its attempt to address the disparities that African Americans face "in housing, jobs, education, and social mobility" (49-50), which, according to Wright create "an environment of anxiety and tension which easily tips the normal emotional scales towards neurosis" (50). In this sense, the Lafargue Clinic appears to have "challenged American psychiatry's fundamental orientation, directing it to the social aspects of mental disorders among the oppressed" (Mendes 13) by making psychotherapy and social services available to Harlemites.

Wright's praise for Wertham's attention to the underlying recognition of the social needs of the individual in "Psychiatry Comes to Harlem" is also a cornerstone of Harry Stack Sullivan's interpersonal theory of mental disorders. Significantly, Wright's terminology is more akin to Sullivan's explanation of needs and anxiety, rather than the psychoanalytic terminology on which Wertham often draws, even as he is critical of ego psychology and other adaptations of Freud's work. According to Wright: "Social needs, too, go underground when they have been emotionally or morally rejected, only to reappear later in strange channels and in guises as fantastic as the images of a nightmare" (49). This view shares Sullivan's theory of anxiety, which he would later explain in *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (1953), where he draws on sociological elements in exploring the relationship between mental illness and environmental conditions. Sullivan's interpersonal theory postulates that psychiatry can seek to understand only that which is observable between the psychiatrist and patient. As an interpersonal interaction,

this relationship is inseparable from its social context. Sullivan's emphasis on the degree to which a social formation meets the needs of an individual departs from an organic etiology of mental illness, making his formulations of the tensions of needs and the tensions of anxiety central components of his interpersonal theory. These concepts provide the basis for the individual's conception of a self and provide a diagnostic model for mental illnesses that organic diagnoses do not account for. Furthermore, these formulations inform the trajectory of psychotherapy for the patient. According to Sullivan, from the time of birth, humans experience tension when a need goes unsatisfied: "the relaxation of the tensions called out by lacks of this kind I call *satisfaction* of the specific need which was concerned" (Sullivan 37, emphasis in original). Because the infant depends on another to fulfill the mothering role from the very beginning of life, the satisfaction of a need is interpersonal (Sullivan 40). Sullivan characterizes the initial satisfaction of the needs of an infant, such as tenderness, as the first of three modes of representing experience: prototaxic, parataxic, and syntaxic. When needs remain unsatisfied, however, or they are not properly or adequately satisfied, the result is anxiety. According to Sullivan's explanation of the tension of anxiety, "the relaxation of the tension of anxiety, the re-equilibration of being in this specific respect is the experience, not of satisfaction, but of *security*" (Sullivan 42, emphasis in original). Sullivan distinguishes between needs which can be satisfied by acting to bring about security, and anxiety, where "[n]o action of the infant is consistently and frequently associated with the relief of anxiety" (Sullivan 42).

Sullivan traces the function of anxiety beginning in infancy throughout all the stages of development. Notably, anxiety plays a role in interpersonal relations, as a person attempts to satisfy needs and minimize anxiety. However, when needs are unsatisfied and the level of anxiety in a person reaches a higher level, the result is a form of a mental disorder, which

Sullivan refers to as “inadequate or inappropriate personal relations” (313) in order to distinguish them from conventional clinical classifications or organic illness. Significantly, Sullivan established a lexicon of terms to mark his divergence from established clinical psychiatry and, in some instances, psychoanalysis. In some cases, his use of established clinical terms deliberately altered their meaning, as he employed them ironically: “Sullivan’s use of the word psychopathology in the title of his first book *Personal Psychopathology*, may have been one of many examples of the way he used irony to get across his point of view” (Evans 139). In the abovementioned book, Sullivan sought to shift the emphasis away from individual pathology. Ultimately, he sought to depart from what he saw as the limitations of psychiatric thought that failed to account adequately for the role of interpersonal relations throughout personality development, which came to influence Wright and Ellison’s attitudes towards social psychiatry as practiced at the Lafargue Clinic.

Though Ellison would be most directly involved with psychiatry during his time volunteering at the Lafargue Clinic, his early experience in New York City working as a temporary receptionist for Sullivan exposed him to Sullivan’s thought, even if only briefly. In August of 1936, Ellison began working for Sullivan at his townhouse. Ellison would later write that Sullivan asked him “to read excerpts from a book he was writing” (qtd in Rampersad 84). Furthermore, Ellison indicates that he and Sullivan reached a level of familiarity when, according to Ellison, “under his quiet questioning I learned to relax and talk quite freely” (qtd. in Rampersad 84). It is difficult to gauge Ellison’s familiarity with Sullivan’s theories of interpersonal psychiatry based on Ellison’s short working relationship with Sullivan in 1936; however, Ellison’s later involvement with the Lafargue Clinic indicates that his thinking about sociology and its application in psychiatric treatment are, like Wright’s, indebted in part to

Sullivan's contributions to psychiatry and the development of his interpersonal theory of mental disorders, despite Wertham's criticism of Sullivan's work.

Ellison provides an etiology of mental illness based on social factors, emphasizing the effects of anxiety. According to Ellison's formulation of the relationship between anxiety and social factors, psychotherapy plays a significant role in alleviating the vulnerable position of African Americans. Ellison writes:

> For whatever the assigned functions of social institutions, their psychological function is to protect the citizen against the irrational, incalculable forces that hover about the edges of human life like cosmic destruction lurking within an atomic stockpile. And it is precisely the denial of this support through segregation and discrimination that leaves the most balanced Negro open to anxiety. ("Harlem is Nowhere" 299)

For Ellison, as for sociologists focusing on the "Negro problem" in the United States, anxiety stems from the disruption of interpersonal relationships due to uneven social factors. Moreover, Ellison characterizes anxiety as arising from social factors that lie beyond the individual's ability to satisfy a need. When social institutions fail to satisfy needs and initiate and mediate interpersonal relations, the individual experiences anxiety. Ellison's reference to "the irrational, incalculable forces that hover about the edges of human life" (299) that institutions are to protect citizens from is akin to Sullivan's parataxic mode of experience,[33] which entails experience that one struggles to convey logically and linguistically. The Lafargue Clinic's intervention provides a means of rendering the anxiety inducing experiences of Harlemites into comprehensible

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[33] In *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (1953), Sullivan describes the parataxic mode as "relatively primitive, unelaborated" (163) experience characterized by symbols which are used in a "private or autistic way" (xiv). Sullivan describes this experience as "momentary, unconnected" (28). Its representation is distinct from logical communication through language. This is preceded by the prototaxic, in which experience is "incapable of any formulation" (28).

language that accounts for parataxic experience. Here, Ellison implicitly echoes his earlier assertion in “Recent Negro Fiction” that broader social change is imperative for African Americans to achieve a “new Negro consciousness [that] must of necessity go beyond the highest point of bourgeois consciousness and work toward the creation of conditions in which it might integrate and stabilize itself; it demands new institutions, a new society” (24) that accounts for parataxic experience without merely pathologizing it. The Lafargue Clinic, then, was one such institution that, by accounting for social inequalities and the expression of their consequences, could contribute to the creation of a new consciousness for African Americans, one in which the anxiety of social tensions could be reduced and governed in ways that reveal and challenge social and economic inequalities.

While Ellison largely shared Wertham’s hopes for the Lafargue Clinic as a means of alleviating the effects of anxiety inducing social factors for African Americans and characterized the clinic as “an underground extension of democracy” (295), Ellison also acknowledged the limitations of the Lafargue Clinic. In other words, although the clinic was an extension of democracy to a significant portion of the population of Harlem that otherwise could not access it, Ellison declares that “a thousand clinics could not dispel the unreality that haunts Harlem” (“Harlem is Nowhere” 302). Due to the unique circumstances that allowed the Lafargue Clinic to open, the task of recovering and recording its history remains highly important. The work of Gabriel N. Mendes in his book *Under the Strain of Color* (2015) makes a significant contribution in this regard. Mendes asserts: “At the foundation of this plan (for the establishment of the Lafargue Clinic) lay a social philosophy and scientific orientation that read black psychological suffering as linked to an oppressive social and economic order, and saw therapy as transformative rather than palliative” (Mendes 10). Yet, for Ellison, the greatest ability to

transform a dysfunctional democracy lies beyond the reach of one clinic. Ellison echoes his reference to "the unreality that haunts Harlem" (302) in a later letter to psychiatrist Karl Menninger, wherein he describes the "Battle Royal" in *Invisible Man* as "a realism dilated to deal with the almost surreal state of our everyday American life" (qtd. in Rampersad 218). Ellison first articulates the use of this aesthetic in *Invisible Man* in his non-fiction. In the letter he describes a sense of the surreal,[34] drawing attention to the limits of naturalism and realism in

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[34] Ellison's use of the term surreal to designate a mode of representation that captures Black experience in Harlem in "Harlem is Nowhere" and his reference to a "dilated" (qtd. in Rampersad 218) form of realism in *Invisible Man* is indicative of his engagement with the complex and debated legacy of French surrealism in the United States. The influence of Surrealism has been traced to American writers in the 1930s. Most notably, in fiction, the work of Djuna Barnes and Nathanael West has been posited as Surrealist. In *American Superrealism: Nathanael West and the Politics of Representation in the 1930s* (1997), Jonathan Veitch uses the term superrealism, an early translation of the French term, to designate a strain of surrealism in the work of West, Marcel Duchamp, Max Ernst, and Rene Magritte in which the unconscious on which this work draws is "a reflection of the possibilities and limitations that a particular culture makes available to it in any given historical moment" (20) or "readymades" (20) rather than primitive innate knowledge. West's superrealism thus "caricatures-burlesques-deconstructs the mimetic codes and conventions upon which more traditional forms of realism rely. It is, as its name implies, an 'excessive realism' that aspires to turn its particular kind of joking into a distinct mode of social criticism" (15).

In 1949, Maurice Blanchot acknowledged the dispersal of the French school of Surrealism, noting that "a state of mind survives. No one belongs to this movement anymore, and everyone feels he could have been part of it" (85). In her assessment of Beat literature's engagement with French Surrealism, Joanna Pawlik points to scholarship which asserted that Breton's French Surrealism had a minimal impact on literature in the postwar United States, including Anna Balakian's *Surrealism: The Road to the Absolute* (1959), Wallace Fowlie's "Surrealism in 1960: A Backward Glance" (1960), and Roger Shattuck's introductory essay in *The History of Surrealism* (1968) entitled "Love and Laughter: Surrealism Reappraised." Thus, Ellison's use of the term surreal appears to be distinct from Andre Breton's articulation of it in the first *Manifesto of Surrealism* (1924) and the variations of it in the United States. Notably, Ellison's articulation of surreal experience is akin to Chester Himes' postwar surrealism. Himes asserted that he had "no literary relationship with what is called the Surrealist School" (qtd. in Fabre and Skinner 140). According to Himes, "it just so happens that in the lives of black people, there are so many absurd situations, made that way by racism, that black life could sometimes be described as surrealistic" (qtd. in Fabre and Skinner 140). In his analysis of Himes' crime writing for the Série noire, John P. Eburne explains:

> What Himes referred to as his vision of surrealism, a vernacular surrealism allied with the blues, thus has less to do with the formal descriptions of surrealist practices found in

their ability to capture African American experience and the violence that is a prominent part of this experience in modernity. This is apparent in "Harlem is Nowhere," where Ellison classifies Harlem itself as a place that is beyond the representation of naturalistic and realistic modes of writing that privilege environment at the expense of agency: "the most surreal fantasies are acted out upon the street of Harlem" (297). Ellison follows this with a sequence of violently surreal images that includes: "a man ducks in and out of traffic shouting and throwing imaginary grenades that actually exploded during World War I; a boy participates in the rape-robbery of his mother; a man beating his wife in a park uses boxing 'science' and observes Marquess of Queensbury rules" (297). Significantly, Ellison explains that these fantasies constitute "a world in which the major energy of the imagination goes not into creating works of art, but to overcome the frustrations of social discrimination" (297) that the Lafargue clinic sought to

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> Breton's manifestos than with the political legacy of the group in the postwar public domain. This legacy [. . .] lingered as an insistence on the conflicts and even falsehoods of language, the resistance of writing and its motives to an immediate political use-value. This is not to suggest that writing could have no voice in the world of politics, but [. . .] that this voice speaks [. . .] a language perpetually misdirected, exaggerated, and broken into bits. (Eburne 819-820)

Ellison's notion of the surreal shares with Himes' an attempt to articulate Black experience in Harlem as a grappling with political discourse in the 1950s and a search for an alternative to naturalism and social realism as political discourses.

In "Afro Surreal Manifesto: Black is the New Black" (2013), Scot D. Miller posits that the experience and perceptions of Rinehart and Invisible in Ellison's *Invisible Man* are surreal for their ability to behold the invisible, as the marquee of Rinehart's church declares. Miller characterizes this ability as a component of Afro-Surrealism: "Afro-Surrealism sees that all 'others' who create from their actual, lived experience are surrealist, per Frida Kahlo. The root for 'Afro--' can be found in 'Afro-Asiatic', meaning a shared language between black, brown and Asian peoples of the world. What was once called the 'third world,' until the other two collapsed" (Miller, "Afro-Surreal Manifesto"). Thus, the surrealism Ellison refers to becomes part of the inheritance on which a later Black surrealist aesthetic builds, as Miller notes Amiri Baraka's characterization of Henry Dumas' work as well the work a number of more contemporary writers and artists as Afro-Surrealism.

address not by reinforcing such images as white fantasies of black pathological violence, but by rendering the psychological trauma of violence into a new mode of syntaxic representation.

Ellison constructs these fantasies of the citizens of Harlem as living within what Sullivan refers to as a parataxic distortion,[35] wherein the subject's experience of reality does not adhere to syntaxic representation, but instead draws on a distortion of previous interpersonal relations in a way that alleviates current anxiety. According to Sullivan, parataxic distortion occurs "when, beside the interpersonal situation as defined within the awareness of the speaker, there is a concomitant interpersonal situation quite different as to its principle integrating tendencies, of which the speaker is more or less completely unaware" (92). The distinction that Ellison draws here between the use of the imaginative energy to create art and the use of this same energy to cope with social conditions collapses in his fiction, which becomes a means of both representing parataxic experience and rendering it into syntaxic experience of political subjects. Thus, in "Harlem is Nowhere," the constitution of political subjects for Ellison entails the parataxic mode of experience among Harlemites, which often involves forms of violence that conventional psychiatric treatment pathologizes. The scenes that Ellison depicts in "Harlem is Nowhere" suggest that this form of violence that comes about as a response to the individual's social, economic, and political conditions is also a form of aesthetic violence, as it functions within the surreal scenes of Ellison's essay. The role of the Lafargue Clinic in constituting African American subjects, in part, requires an encounter with the violence that conventional psychiatry

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[35] In *The Psychiatric Interview* (1954), Sullivan observes that parataxic distortion

> displays before another some of its gravest problems. In other words, parataxic distortion may be an obscure attempt to communicate something that really needs to be grasped by the therapist, and perhaps finally to be grasped by the patient. Needless to say, if such distortions go unnoticed, if they are not expected, if the possibility of their existence is ignored, some of the most important things about the psychiatric interview may go by default. (27)

utilizes and directs at African American bodies and psyches. However, when this violence is read by and channeled into the nowhere that is Harlem, the underground of the Lafargue Clinic, it can be harnessed by cultural production to challenge existing economic and political inequalities, which provides agency to Harlemites. Thus, parataxic experience and its use of violence become the basis for African American political subjectivities capable of forming new institutions. The psychiatric violence inflicted on African Americans yields only a distorted and seemingly uncommunicative form of communication in the syntaxic mode of experience. Violent methods of psychiatric treatment are jarring, fragmenting, and disorienting, rendering existing forms of syntaxic representation incapable of conveying this experience, leaving the fragmentary language of parataxic experience. Similarly, the experiences of Harlemites that appear to be violent and aggressive are expressions of parataxic experience that cannot be represented as syntaxic experience. The Lafargue Clinic recognizes the basis of this experience in the conditions of Harlem and seeks to channel this experience and the language through which patients convey it into a new institutional model.

The pivotal role of Fredric Wertham in the Lafargue Clinic cannot be denied; however, Wertham directly criticized Sullivan's theoretical basis in ego psychology, suggesting some divergence in the respective attitudes that Wertham and Ellison held regarding the political potential of social psychiatry, particularly as it pertains to psychoanalysis.[36] Wertham criticized

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[36] While both Wertham and Sullivan departed from the dominance of ego psychology during the postwar years in the United States, their approaches also varied from each other. Sullivan's interpersonal psychiatry shared with Wertham a consideration of non-biological factors and departed from the one-person psychology that included the paradigm of ego psychology. In "The Growth and Transformation of American Ego Psychology," Robert S. Wallerstein describes "an object-relational, interpersonal, and social-constructivist theoretical perspective, a 'two-person psychology' (analyst and patient as coparticipants in an interactional relationship, to which they each bring their psychologies and pathologies as co-creators of the therapeutic situation)" (146), the origins of which he traces to Sullivan's interpersonal psychiatry (146). Wertham's criticism

Sullivan's use of Freud's theories as part of a broader problem he identified with the popularization of psychoanalysis and its role in mass culture occurring in the post World War II era. According to Wertham, psychoanalysis has become a fashionable trend that one "can wear [. . .] at cocktail parties, in the evening and at work" ("Cult of Contentment" 22). In part, Wertham sees psychoanalysis and its adaptation into a popular form becoming dogmatic and conservative, hindering new advancements in psychiatric thought and research. Wertham bemoans an abundance of "recent American psychoanalytic generalizations" (23), among which he includes Sullivan's *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry*. According to Wertham's review, Sullivan's book is "composed of affected platitudes and pseudo-erudite pronouncements" (24), leading Wertham to characterize it, along with an array of other works, as "typical of the you-can't-get-cured-if you-don't-pay school (which) suggests that practically everybody should undergo a prolonged orthodox analysis" (24). Wertham's criticism of the broader trend of popular publications on psychoanalysis suggests that works such as Sullivan's hinder the cultivation of a "new Negro consciousness" (24) for which Ellison calls in "Recent Negro Fiction." Instead, the "Cult of Contentment" that Wertham identifies firmly entrenches psychoanalysis within a bourgeois consciousness. As Bart Beaty points out: "In contemporary usage, Wertham suggested that politically conservative psychiatrists in private practice had emphasized the conservative tendencies of late Freudian thought to such a degree that Freudianism was no longer a help to anyone" (25). Wertham asserts that the popularization of psychoanalysis in recent publications not only adds no new insights into the field, but also brings psychoanalysis to a middle-class

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of Sullivan stems largely from his concern with the effects of mass culture and juvenile delinquency. Furthermore, Wertham's influence by Adolph Meyer's conception of mental hygiene and preventative psychiatry, which could be applied to the general population, entails a significant difference from Sullivan's interpersonal approach with its emphasis on the relationship between analyst and patient.

readership as another component of mass culture. In doing so, Wertham implies a distinction between the use of psychoanalysis in the expansion of psychiatric treatment to the masses, as the Lafargue Clinic does, and Sullivan's work as a precursor to object-relations theory. For Wertham, Sullivan's use of psychoanalysis provides a general readership with a vague and sometimes inaccurate overview of psychoanalytic concepts, while failing to alleviate the most pressing concerns of this readership. In other words, Wertham distinguishes between providing psychiatric care to the masses and selling the masses a commodified version of psychoanalysis focused too closely on the individual. In doing so, Wertham seeks to establish the Lafargue Clinic as a means of addressing the meaning and representation of violence that is often symptomatic of class inequalities and cultural hierarchies.

Wertham's critique of Sullivan notwithstanding, Sullivan's role in advancing psychiatry beyond somatic considerations is significant. As Ahad points out, Sullivan worked with black sociologists, including Charles Johnson and E. Franklin Frazier, and contributed a psychoanalytic perspective to Johnson's *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (1941). Ahad continues on to make the important point that "while most of Sullivan's patients were white, wealthy New Yorkers, his work with Johnson and Frazier allowed him greater psychical insight into African Americans" (102). As a result, "Sullivan was one of the first major analysts to take seriously the formation of black subjectivity, particularly in his treatment of the role geography plays in the construction of one's psychological life" (Ahad 102). Despite Wertham's criticisms of Sullivan, the two shared an underlying belief that psychiatry held the potential to reconstitute African American subjectivity in ways that accounted for the complexity of broader conditions, rather than limiting subjectivity according to constructions of race. Ellison's involvement with the Lafargue Clinic indicates that he shared with Sullivan and Wertham a critical perspective on

mainstream psychiatry's organic etiology of mental disorders and saw Lafargue as a potential site for constituting African American political subjects. By addressing the social stresses of discrimination and segregation that limited African Americans' access to psychiatric treatment, the Lafargue Clinic could redirect the therapeutic tendencies of psychiatry to the citizens of Harlem. In doing so, Wertham and Ellison sought to reformulate the relationship between African Americans and their environments in ways that challenged sociological concepts as well as the popular conceptions of psychoanalysis, all within a set of altered relations of capitalist production.

A fundamental component of the way in which Wertham, Ellison, Wright, and others who contributed to the Lafargue Clinic sought to reformulate the relationship between African Americans and the larger social structures which constitute them as subjects involves redirecting the circulation of disciplinary forms of violence. If, as a central tenant of Wertham's social psychiatry insists, psychopathology must account for both social and biological factors, then a restructuring of social relations among African Americans and whites would in turn contribute to the reformulation of African American consciousness. To reiterate, Ellison posits psychiatric treatment as apt terrain for this reformulation of social and economic relations, with the Lafargue Clinic making a deliberate and ambitious attempt to do so by way of its new approach to psychiatric treatment. Measures such as affordability or the waiving of fees for those who could not afford to pay anything for treatment and Wertham, Moss, and the entire staff of the clinic working on a volunteer basis certainly contributed to the reformulation of economic relations between the predominately African American patients and psychiatrists. These measures bypassed the need for government funding and enabled Wertham to put into action a new approach to the doctor-patient relationship that would provide a basis for psychiatry to become

an avenue for African American political consciousness. Removing the clinic's function as a means of providing capital to state funded psychiatric clinics mitigated the effects of racial and class hierarchies for those receiving treatment. The Lafargue Clinic was firmly enmeshed in the particular conditions of Harlem and the concerns of its residents, providing an alternative to custodial care of institutions such as Bellevue.

In *Invisible Man*, Ellison explores the potential for psychiatric institutions and treatment to constitute African Americans as political subjects and considers how such subjects may exercise agency. While critical about the shortcomings of psychiatric treatment, including both psychotherapy and psychosurgery, Ellison, like Wertham, also sees the potential for social psychiatry to constitute political subjects within the narrowing political potential of the Cold War. While political agency is never absolute or constant, Ellison uses the novel to consider the way in which the role of psychiatry as a disciplinary and regulatory apparatus can be disrupted and reconfigured. For Ellison, disrupting the flow and harnessing the extraneous and uncontained violence, often a component of parataxic experience, provides a promising method of mounting political dissent. Ellison's recognition of a new politics of dissent comes about through a recognition that although violent "natural forces [. . .] can be safely enslaved by human masters through a kind of technology [. . .] that force can never fully be enslaved, can never be contained fully by disciplinary technologies" (Gilmore 124). In other words, *Invisible Man* demonstrates how extraneous forces that always exist beyond the margins of disciplinary technologies of psychiatry and the experiences of subjects deemed to be beyond institutional discourses can be seized and used to open new political and cultural terrain in which such violence can circulate and disrupt existing political relations and economies.

Douglas Ford astutely argues that electricity provides access to discourses of power and strategies of resistance in *Invisible Man* (888), emphasizing the role of electricity in acts of "sabotage against social norms and conventions" (888). According to Ford: "Ellison radically imagines black subjectivity maintaining an underground presence along the same currents previously used to render such subjects invisible" (890), seen when the narrator wires his own underground basement, adding new links to a network of power (897). In a different vein, J. Bradford Campbell analyzes the novel's tenuous relationship with psychiatry, arguing that "Ellison both debunks the primitivist insistence that blacks have no interiority and claims for them a complex, modern, American subjectivity" (445), while the novel "challenges many of the larger tenets of psychoanalysis and psychiatry" (445). Lindsay Reckson points out that Ellison's protagonist is part of a "series of counternarratives" (58) that respond to James Weldon Johnson's "attention to the disfiguring potential of electricity" (58) in his *Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man*. While Ellison's representation of psychiatric treatment and electricity have both been seen as means of subverting barriers to and boundaries of African American political subjectivity and the possibility for agency, a focus on the intersection of these forces in the light of Ellison's call for "new institutions" ("Recent Negro Fiction" 24) that articulate a politics of dissent in the Cold War remains largely unexamined.

The views of the function and potential political significance of psychiatry for Wertham and Wright entail some key differences from those that Ellison develops in *Invisible Man*. In "An Unconscious Determinate in *Native Son*," Wertham's attempt to psychoanalyze Wright, Wertham expounds the psychological process of writing by rooting this process in Wright's own experiences as a teenager, working in the home of a white family. According to Wertham, the scene from *Native Son* in which Bigger Thomas unintentionally smothers Mary Dalton, a white

girl whose family he works for as a chauffeur, is rooted in Wright's experience in the home of the white family for whom he once worked. Wertham relates how Wright was able to recall how "he opened the door and came suddenly upon the lady of the house before she had dressed. She reprimanded him severely and told him he should always knock before entering. These recollections had great emotional power" ("Unconscious Determinate" 113). An experience such as this demarcates the boundaries between African American male sexuality and bourgeois femininity wherein bourgeois femininity polices and disciplines a threatening male presence. This policing of African American sexuality also plays out in Ellison's *Invisible Man*, providing an instance in which disciplinary forms of violence such as those exercised on Wright are redirected in the constitution of African American subjectivity.

Ellison diverges from the naturalism of *Black Boy*, representing a more complex and dynamic relationship between the discipline of the white bourgeois and the African American male psyche. Ellison's first iteration of *Invisible Man* appeared as a short story entitled "Battle Royal" in *Horizon* as well as in '*48: The Magazine of the Year*. Despite the absence of explicit representations of psychiatric treatment, "Battle Royal" shows that Ellison was beginning to consider the potential for psychiatric treatment to function as more than a disciplinary technology and writing as more than a means of registering the psychological conflicts and anxieties of a writer. In "Battle Royal" components of psychiatric violence provide a means of reformulating relations involving racial and class differences as Ellison had done in "Hymie's Bull," moving beyond Wertham's reading of the "relationship of psychiatry to literature" (111) in which "Wright accounted for a certain element in this novel in a manner which was rational and fitted a political and social framework rather than a true emotional personal one" (111). Wertham's reading highlights Wright's representation of environmental factors that shape

Wright's unconscious, allowing for the recovery of "the real existence of persons, names, and places" (113). By reading the novel as a reflection of unconscious fears and anxieties rooted in lived experience, Wertham approaches *Native Son* as a representation of lived experience of African Americans. This complements Wright's emphasis on environmental factors which is clear in his essay "How Bigger Was Born," as he states: "The urban environment of Chicago, wording a more stimulating life, made the Negro Bigger Thomases react more violently than even in the South. More than ever I began to see and understand the environmental factors which made for this extreme conduct" (Wright, "How Bigger was Born"). Wright develops Bigger's character according to what he terms a behavioristic pattern" (Wright). Ultimately, as Wright and Wertham see it, literature within the tradition of realism and, for Wright, more specifically naturalism can help to illuminate the problems that psychiatry seeks to treat. Literature renders these problems intelligible and places them within broader social conditions, which for Wright, calls attention to the need for revolutionary action that the CPUSA could have once mobilized.

***Invisible Man* and Ellison's Critique of Social Psychiatry**

In *Invisible Man*, Ellison not only seeks to articulate the way in which African Americans have, in fact, "helped to create themselves out of what they found around them" (315), but also pursues a "deeper science" (316) than sociology enables. For Ellison, this science is not synonymous with Cold War social science, although it does draw on elements of it. Moreover, this "deeper science" (Ellison 316) also relies on medical science, particularly its fusion with sociology to form the approaches of social psychiatry. For Ellison, then, *Invisible Man* is involved in refuting the claims of sociology that overlook the significance of African American cultural production and, more specifically, positing the novel as a cultural form that articulates the political aspects of psychiatric knowledge and psychodynamic processes in ways that

constitute new political formations. As he challenges notions of African American psychology and its relationship with sociology and psychiatry, Ellison presents the novel as a mode of constituting a political subject with the agency to utilize psychiatry, specifically psychiatric violence, within a newly emerging politics of dissent. The novel emerges as the site on which Ellison grapples with the representation of this political subjectivity as he turns to it to formulate how the "energy of the imagination" which typically "goes not into creating works of art, but to overcome the frustrations of social discrimination" ("Harlem is Nowhere" 297) renders the violence of psychiatry and its pathologizing of parataxic distortions and fantasy into politically constitutive experience. Thus, as a form of cultural production, the novel rejects the pathologizing of African American psychology in favour of African American political subjectivity, drawing on reconfigured psychiatric treatment and knowledge to make formerly pathologized cognitive experience challenge existing relations. In other words, for Ellison culture is the site on which the meanings of violence and pathology are constituted and reconstituted. Therefore, the novel, with its limited capacity to constitute a fully centred subject, reveals the therapeutic function of formerly pathologized forms of violence and the potential for the disciplinary function of psychiatric violence to be reformulated in the constitution of a newly emerging politics of dissent, which is at odds with popularized forms of psychiatric treatment that serve a standardized form of middle-class relations, corresponding to Fordist production.

Ellison's most direct engagement with sociology in *Invisible Man* occurs in a scene involving Jim Trueblood.[37] In his analysis of Trueblood's function, Houston A. Baker Jr.

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[37] Daniel Y. Kim points to Ellison's comments on sociologist Robert E. Park's characterization of "the temperament of the Negro" (Park qtd. in Kim 310). In *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1919), a textbook that Ellison read as a student at Tuskegee, Park writes "The Negro is [. . .] so to speak, the lady among the races" (qtd. in Kim 310). Kim asserts that Ellison's

explains how Trueblood's account of an incestuous act with his daughter is a reversal of Freud's totem myth in *Totem and Taboo*. According to Baker: "From Freud's point of view, Trueblood's dream and subsequent incest seem to represent historical regression. [. . .] Insofar as Freud's notions of totemism represent a myth of progressive social evolution, the farmer's story acts as a countermyth of inversive social dissolution" (832). Baker asserts that this dissolution of social and sexual norms into a "presocial and unaccommodated state" (832) provides Trueblood an alternative to surrounding institutions that produce men who are either psychologically damaged, in the case of the veteran's home and the insane asylum that appear in the novel, or impotent, in the case of the students at the black college operated by white philanthropy (832). In the midst of the quelling of masculine agency by these institutions, Trueblood goes beyond a merely reactionary response and exercises a degree of agency in an environment that is only partially determined by a history of slavery and its aftermath. Trueblood draws on mythology and his storytelling abilities to employ his narrative as a form of agency that retells Freud's version of the totem myth as it pertains to African Americans in the United States. Trueblood, then, does not evolve from a pre-social state by murdering and then internalizing the father, resulting in a prohibition on incestuous relations, as in Freud's telling of the myth. He enters social relations with white men by rendering the parataxic experience of a dream that, he explains, initiated incest into a narrative that constitutes him as subject of sociological knowledge, but which repulses those at the black college. This sense of repulsion stems from the way in which Trueblood's place in such relations belies the notion of linear historical progress. Paradoxically,

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writing, including *Invisible Man*, is concerned with dismantling this characterization and creating "a more virile image of African American aesthetic agency" (311).

Trueblood plays on a recurrent historical process of exploitation, which those at Invisible's college seek to dispel, to enhance his position in his relations with white sociology.

Trueblood's account of how his wife, Kate, struck him in the face with an axe after waking to discover his incest with Matty-Lou becomes a focal point of Trueblood's narrative, one which Invisible notes Trueblood relates to Mr. Norton with "a deep, incantatory quality, as though he had told the story many, many times" (54). Trueblood recounts how he awaited the blow of the axe: "I waits—ten million back breakin' years, it seems to me like I waits. I waits so long I remember all the wrong things I ever done; I waits so long I opens my eyes and closes 'em and opens my eyes again" (64). Trueblood's repetition of "I waits" and suspension of narrative time here is indicative of his dream as previously unformulated parataxic experience, which is not perceived in accordance with a logical sequence of events following linear time. Trueblood's narrative retains a trace of its source that was yet to be formulated into meaningful language that constitutes his subjectivity in relation to Norton and the institutional knowledge he represents. As Trueblood renders parataxic experience of his dream into syntaxic experience through the language of his narrative, he disrupts Mr. Norton's conception of time as moving towards the fulfillment of what he calls "fate" (Ellison 44), a fate which he feels is linked to African Americans and the college. This disruption of a narrative of racial progress facilitated by Norton's white philanthropy and the acquiescence of college officials such as Dr. Bledsoe shows Trueblood's burgeoning agency.

Trueblood's reversal of the totem myth enables him to articulate a lack of social relations as his syntaxic experience becomes part of sociological discourse. Trueblood tells Norton that "the white folks took to coming out here to see us and talk with us" (53), providing Trueblood an opportunity to tell his version of the totem myth. Trueblood states: "Some of 'em was big white

folks, too, from the big school way cross the State. Asked me lots 'bout what I thought 'bout things, and 'bout my folks and the kids, and wrote it all down in a book" (53). The recording and re-writing of Trueblood's narrative by a white academic institution entails the potential for Trueblood's agency in his relations with such institutions to be neutralized as his narrative is subsumed by the production of sociological knowledge; however, in addition to undermining Norton's notions of fate and racial progress, Trueblood's relations with academia also enable him to transition from being a sharecropper, a position where he is closer to that of a slave, to playing a part in the production of cultural capital. Trueblood's narrative is evidence of what Ellison refers to as his people's ability to "create themselves out of what they found around them" (Review of *American Dilemma* 315), as his experience of poverty and marginalization by the college becomes the basis for articulating experience through which he accesses economic relations. Trueblood tells Norton: "I got more work now than I ever did have before [. . ..] Things is pretty good now" (53). He relates how his wife, Kate, "took the new clothes I bought for her up in town and now she's gettin' some eyeglasses made what she been needin' for so long" (67-68). By telling his story, Trueblood also performs the cultural labour that white-collar workers use in their production and dissemination of knowledge while simultaneously undermining sociology's totalizing constitution of African American subjectivity. Trueblood's narrative is not merely evidence of incest as a form of racial pathology. Instead, by telling his narrative, Trueblood accesses the institutions that produce sociological discourse and knowledge by transforming previously unarticulated parataxic experience into a representation of syntaxic experience, exercising a degree of agency through this act of representation. Thus, for Trueblood, disruption becomes a means of accessing the production of knowledge and its embeddedness in capitalist relations.

Furthermore, Trueblood's dream that initiates his incest with Matty-Lou ends with "a great big electric light in my eyes [that] scalded me all over. Only it wasn't a scald, but like I was drownin' in a lake where the water was hot on the top and had cold numbin' currents down under it again" (59), which ultimately leads to Trueblood feeling "relieved" (59). This use of electricity followed by a sense of relief is repeated as Trueblood describes the aftermath of Kate striking him in the face with an axe: "more'n the pain and numbness I feels relief. [. . .] I wants some more and I waits" (64). This infliction of violence becomes, like the violent electrical currents to which Invisible is later subjected, an instance in which disciplinary power that evokes repentance from Trueblood also enables his performance of primitiveness for Norton by rendering the experience of violence into syntaxic representation. By claiming to have welcomed the violent blows of the axe, Trueblood fashions a narrative that is more suited to the sensibilities of Mr. Norton, humbling himself before his white audience as in a slave narrative, while covertly unwriting a deterministic narrative by consciously fashioning a narrative of primitiveness for Norton. Trueblood, the father of both his daughter's and his wife's children, casts himself as the primal father when he tells Norton of "the young boy what was startin' to hang 'round (Matty-Lou). I didn't like him and he kept comin' through my thoughts and I made up my mind to warn him away from the girl" (54). As he casts himself attempting to maintain the primal horde, Trueblood becomes a subject of sociological knowledge based on his own ability to construct a narrative from his parataxic experience. Thus, what white sociologists perceive as a "relatively primitive, unelaborated" (Sullivan 163) or pathological experience is, in effect, Trueblood's syntaxic experience as a speaking subject, which elaborates on and thus changes the relations between the producers of sociological knowledge and what was previously its object.

Trueblood's narrative, as a means of exercising agency, ultimately improves his economic position through a larger institutional network that obscures, but does not efface this agency and labour. In this sense, Trueblood's role as a producer of folk culture enables participation in formal work, while illuminating its shortcomings. It highlights the poorer conditions in which Trueblood and his family lived prior to his involvement with the white college. Like the founders of the Lafargue Clinic, Trueblood utilizes available institutional structures of sociology and the economic system in which it is embedded to divest these systems of their treatment of him as passive and reactionary. Trueblood tells Norton: "I went up there a long time ago looking for some book learning and some points on how to handle my crops. That was when I had my own place" (52). Trueblood's narrative, then replaces physical labour and material production with a form of cultural production which disrupts a syntaxic representation of economic and environmental determinism by intervening in the language of knowledge production. His disruption provides access to other forms of production as a form of agency, while lacking a greater revolutionary capacity.

Ellison, like Wertham, provides a critique of Freudian psychoanalysis in *Invisible Man*, which this chapter will now explore briefly before beginning a more in-depth analysis of Ellison's consideration of the novel's engagement with psychiatry as a mode of political agency. Soon after arriving in New York in hopes of earning money to return to college in the south, Invisible delivers letters of introduction he has received from Dr. Bledsoe. After failing to secure a meeting with any other addressees of the letters, he is granted an appointment at Mr. Emerson's office. As he enters, he notes that Emerson's office is "like a museum" (Ellison 180) that is "decorated with cool tropical colors. One wall was almost covered by a huge colored map" (180). He then notes the presence of "paintings, bronzes, tapestries" (180), all indicating that

Emerson owns an importing firm. This is reinforced by the way in which "narrow red silk ribbons stretched tautly from each division of the map to a series on ebony pedestals, upon which sat glass specimen jars containing natural products of the various countries" (180). Along with the exotic décor and foreign specimens, Ellison's narrator notices that Emerson's secretary, soon to be revealed as Emerson's son, was reading "something called *Totem and Taboo*" (180). This scene addresses the popularization of psychoanalysis in the United States occurring in the 1950s, which was also a concern for Wertham. In this sense, the appearance of *Totem and Taboo* in an importing firm among other foreign artifacts signals Ellison's concern with the Americanization and popularization of psychoanalysis occurring in the post-World War II years. The framing of *Totem and Taboo* by other imported goods in the museum-like setting is indicative of its place in U.S. Cold War imperialism. As its focus on the individual complemented American individualism, psychoanalysis became a means of making distinctions between those who fit in the Cold War body politic as normalized subjects and those who were pathologized. Young Emerson indicates that he is positioned by psychoanalysis as a pathologized subject, telling Invisible: "I had a difficult session with my analyst last evening" (185) and revealing that his father "considers *me* one of the unspeakables" (188). As "one of the unspeakables" (188), a homosexual, he is both a medically and politically pathologized subject. From a psychoanalytic perspective wherein the word of the father is law, young Emerson has not entered homosocial relations, according to Freud's *Totem and Taboo*. From this marginalized position, young Emerson attempts to establish an intersubjective exchange with Invisible: "I know many things about you—not you personally, but fellows like you. [. . .] I know the conditions under which you live" (187-188). While young Emerson claims to know Invisible based on their shared marginalization and exclusion from the social order, he also aligns him with exotic specimens of

the importing office and the savages of *Totem and Taboo*. In doing so, young Emerson's psychoanalytic understanding of Invisible denies him the ability to participate in this exchange as a subject with the agency to speak.

Although young Emerson is marginalized within homosocial relations, he is also economically aligned with his father's wealth and upper middle-class status. It is this very status that gives him access to psychotherapy and his copy of *Totem and Taboo*,[38] with which Invisible has no familiarity. Invisible's hampered agency, then, is the result of young Emerson's psychoanalytic reading of him by a member of the white bourgeoisie. In this sense, young Emerson attempts to constitute Invisible as a sexualized subject within the incestual and homosexual relations that Freud attributes to primitive tribes in *Totem and Taboo*. Young Emerson offers Invisible a form of social organization that is distinct from Emerson's place within homosocial relations as he asks Invisible if he believes it possible for "the two of us, to throw off the mask of custom and manners that insulate man from man" (186). In doing so, Young Emerson asks to speak outside of the homosocial relations among the white middle-class that Invisible is attempting to enter. While young Emerson reveals Invisible to be outside of the social relations of his father which Freud's *Totem and Taboo* accounts for, Invisible's subject position is not constitutive of the freedom which young Emerson ascribes to it. When he states that Invisible is "free of (Emerson) now" (192), Invisible is "still his prisoner" (192). Although

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[38] In *Totem and Taboo* (1913), Freud accounts for the incest taboo and the beginnings of "social organization, of moral, restrictions and of religion" (501) by hypothesizing that the brothers of Darwin's primal horde "who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde" (500). To avoid sexual competition for the women of the horde, which would destroy the social organization following the end of the patriarchal horde, a law against incest was instituted by the brothers. According to Freud: "In this way they rescued the organization which had made them strong—and which may have been based on homosexual feelings and acts, originating perhaps during the period of their expulsion from the horde" (502).

young Emerson sees Invisible as free of the social and sexual constraints that Emerson's father imposes through psychoanalysis, he also attempts to position Invisible as the primitive man of *Totem and Taboo*. Therefore, young Emerson positions himself as a primal father of the freedom from social and sexual constraints that he imagines Invisible to enjoy. Invisible, then, as a primitive son, must kill young Emerson to dispel his use of psychoanalysis to position him as primitive man. Young Emerson's attempt to constitute Invisible as a subject outside existing social and sexual relations functions as a critique of the application of psychoanalysis to African Americans by middle-class psychiatrists in the postwar United States. Invisible remains a function of the privileged position of white middle-class institutions that seek to exclude him from accessing wealth and knowledge. He remains within the constitutive capacity of psychoanalysis only to the extent that he affirms its authority over him. Ellison's critique suggests the need for an institution such as the Lafargue Clinic, which can mitigate racial and class barriers to psychotherapy by reemploying Freud's totem myth to grant agency to African American subjectivity and wrest its representation capacity from the economic relations that Emerson represents.

Psychiatric Violence and the Therapeutic Politics of *Invisible Man*

In its critique of the reductive tendencies of scientific rationalism and determinism in sociology and psychiatry, *Invisible Man* exemplifies Ellison's conception of cultural production as a site for the articulation of a new African American political consciousness. The novel articulates this consciousness not through a total rejection of scientific rationalism and determinism, but by reformulating the institutionalized structures and cultural meanings through which such principles constitute African American subjectivity. In *Invisible Man*, Ellison confronts the dissolution of the John Reed Club that first fostered his attempts to fuse African

American cultural production with proletarian fiction. With the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, proletarian fiction no longer provided a politically viable mode of representation for Ellison, creating the need for a new mode of cultural production that articulates a politics of dissent among the left. As Donna Campbell notes:

> by the late 1940s and early 1950s, social realism, naturalism, and the proletarian novel were out of fashion, condemned as reductive and artistically inadequate. The conservative political climate of the 1950s encouraged critics such as Malcolm Cowley to turn against communism and replace the socially conscious, activist criteria of literary value that they had earlier promoted with supposedly "apolitical" formalism and an emphasis on close reading. (506)

Ellison was therefore required to confront the implications of this political shift for cultural production by considering the possibilities and limitations of the novel to formulate the oft pathologized parataxic experience of African Americans into a political syntaxic. More specifically, *Invisible Man* constitutes African American political consciousness by rendering paratactic experiences of psychiatric violence into syntaxic experiences that redirect this violence. This redirected psychiatric violence circulates through previously unrecognized economies that ultimately enable psychiatry to disturb and resist capitalist structures that pathologize African American subjects.

The battle royal scene of *Invisible Man* depicts violence being inflicted on the titular character and his fellow students at the hands of the white, male bourgeois when Invisible is invited to deliver his graduation speech at an event attended by "the most important men of the town" (18), including "bankers, lawyers, judges, doctors, fire chiefs, merchants, teachers" (18). However, the delivery of his speech comes only after his participation in a degrading spectacle

for the audience. His desire to be acknowledged as a member of this society by speaking is continually deferred until he has been humiliated and emasculated by fighting in a battle royal with other black men. Moreover, Ellison's narrator describes a naked blonde woman with an American flag tattooed on her stomach who enters the room and parades around in front of the male audience as part of his disorienting experience that seems unintelligible to him as it happens. While the tattoo of the American flag on the blonde woman's body was removed for both publications of "Battle Royal" in *Horizon* and '*48: The Magazine of the Year*, Ellison included it in *Invisible Man* (Rampersad 217). In his letter to Menninger, Ellison describes the woman as being "at once a woman; a symbol of a debased 'white' democracy; an object of fascination comb[in]ing a threat of death with overtones of possible beauty; and, to make the list brief, the embodiment of a most potent sex taboo" (qtd. in Rampersad 218). The woman's function as a symbol of the nation, in which Ellison sees both danger and debasement on the one hand and potential for beauty and a liberal democracy on the other, reflects Invisible's struggle to orient himself within the United States, with its promise of freedom and equitable treatment of all citizens, while simultaneously functioning according to a social system that divests African Americans of their subjectivity. Thus, Invisible conveys this contradictory and illogical experience of being an African American by rendering the parataxic into the syntaxic experience that he describes as "a realism dilated to deal with the almost surreal state of our everyday American life" (qtd. in Rampersad 218) that also functions in his description of Harlem.

During the battle royal scene, Invisible describes how he viewed the naked blonde woman with a mix of sadistic desire, shame, and disgust: "I wanted at one and the same time to run from the room, to sink through the floor, or go to her and cover her from my eyes and the eyes of others with my body; to feel the soft thighs, to caress her and destroy her, to love her and

murder her, to hide from her, and yet to stroke where below the small American flag tattooed upon her belly her thighs formed a capital V" (19). He notes a similar sense of shame and arousal in another black student, Tatlock, who was "wearing dark red fighting trunks much too small to conceal the erection which projected from him" (20) as he unsuccessfully "tried to hide himself with his boxing gloves" (20). The white male spectators attempt to assert themselves over both the bodies and sexualities of the woman and the black men. The spectacle of the white woman elicits black male desire from Invisible and the others, as the white middle-class men objectify her. The white men use the blond woman to elicit, curtail, and contain black male desire within sanctioned channels, urging the black men to both look and not look at the woman (Ellison 19-20). In this sense, Invisible and the other men are covertly disciplined by the quelling of overt violence that a lynch mob of white men would enact on black men who express sexual desire for white women. Rather, the white men see this violence enacted on the black men by other black men without overtly enacting it themselves. In a similar vein, Daniel Y. Kim reads the battle royal as an instance in which "the townsmen use the bodies of black men to give vicarious expression to desires that are ordinarily repressed" (314). Invisible and the other young black men become subject to the expression of white male desire for black bodies, which Ellison links to the professional middle-class. Although Invisible desires joining this class and shares with it a degree of arousal for the blond woman as a representation of American ideals, in this instance his body remains a vehicle for the men to subjugate and discipline him through the socially sanctioned violence of the battle royal.

This scene calls attention to disciplinary apparatuses that the black men face, such as the electrical currents to which Invisible is subject, alluding to both the electric chair as well as the use of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) on psychiatric patients. Invisible notes how at one point

he "saw attendants in white jackets rolling the portable [boxing] ring away and placing a small square rug in the vacant space surrounded by chairs" (26). Here, Invisible describes an image of orderlies replacing a portable boxing ring, wherein he and other black men were not only subject to the sexual desires of the white men, but were also subject to their desire for the spectacle of violence inflicted on the bodies of black men, with a rug that sends electrical currents through their bodies as they scramble to collect gold coins. This image of the orderlies with a device that imparts electrical currents through the bodies of the men is suggestive of orderlies of a psychiatric hospital preparing for the administration of ECT, foreshadowing Invisible's manipulation by the forces of psychiatric treatment, specifically electroshock therapy, later in the novel. The disciplinary function of the electrified rug becomes more apparent when Invisible and the other men begin attempting to collect coins from it. Invisible describes how he "lunged for a yellow coin lying on the blue design of the carpet, touching it and sending a surprised shriek to join those around me. I tried frantically to remove my hand but could not let go. A hot, violent force tore through my body, shaking me like a wet rat" (27). This violence comes as Invisible once again desires and strives for access to the middle-class, only to be disciplined for overreaching beyond the parameters the white men have established for black men, ultimately resulting in disciplinary violence. Invisible's narrative is a result of his ability to ascribe social meaning to the violence he has experienced here and recognize that his opportunity to deliver his speech at the event was always contingent on the maintenance of his position as an object of the desire and violence of the white middle-class.

In the midst of this disciplinary violence, however, Invisible discovers his ability to intervene in the exercise of institutional violence that the men use to discipline black bodies. He increasingly comes to realize that such power governs his social position in both the South and

the North of the United States, though through different formations. The battle royal scene begins Invisible's strategic attempt to turn the use of violence against those who exercise it on his body as a form of discipline, revealing the capacity of the novel to disrupt[39] and change the social meaning of violence from a form of discipline delivered via psychiatry to a therapeutic expression of political dissent. Invisible notes that he "was fighting automatically" (24) when in the portable boxing ring moments earlier, indicating that his reflex is merely a response to conditions he faces, rather than existing as a subject with the capacity to act. Much like the operant in a behavioural experiment, Invisible and other young black men in the boxing ring appear to be subject to the laws of electricity as they react to an external stimulus. However, Invisible's account of being violently shocked counters a deterministic narrative that would present the bodies of the young black men as being subject to the natural laws of electricity. Invisible learns a valuable strategy for using violence as a means of exercising agency. During the scramble to gather the coins, he states: "I saw a boy lifted into the air, glistening with sweat like a circus seal, and dropped, his wet back landing flush upon the charged rug, heard him yell and saw him literally dance upon his back" (27). In this instance, the boy foreshadows Todd Clifton's manipulation of a Sambo doll, which Invisible will view with disgust for its representation of the coalescence of capitalist exploitation and racism. The boy's body also resembles a response to electroshock treatment as it reacts to the current without the subject's ability to exercise agency.

Invisible seizes an opportunity to interrupt the use of electricity to render black bodies reactive objects, while black subjectivity remains void of the agency needed to respond to the

[39] Like Trueblood, Invisible recognizes the capacity of a narrative, in this case written, rather than oral, to disrupt and then enter existing relations from which he was previously excluded as a speaking subject.

violence of white desire for a lack of African American consciousness. At this point, Invisible recognizes the potential of this current to be put to use for his own purpose as he responds to a white man trying to push him onto the rug by "trying to topple *him* upon the rug" (emphasis in Ellison 28). Eventually Invisible "sent the rug sliding out of place" (28) as he hears "the coins ringing against the floor and the boys scuffling to pick them up" (28-29). Not only does Invisible disrupt the electricity running through the coins, but he also recognizes that the current can be turned against the men who send it coursing through the bodies of the men, causing *them* to contort against their will: "a contradiction, but it works" (emphasis in Ellison 27). Ellison evaluates this strategy throughout the novel as Invisible is continually subject to various forms of violence, especially those stemming from psychiatric knowledge and treatment. Ultimately, it will be Invisible's ability to seize and ascribe meaning to the violence that confronts him that will determine the extent to which he can exercise political agency. Invisible's narrative ultimately demonstrates his capacity to convey violent and surreal experience as a therapeutic form of political representation.

Paul Gilmore points to the way in which the aesthetics of Fredrick Douglass' writing use electricity to "offer the possibility of fostering connections, alliances, and recognition across racial lines without denying the real differences in experiences produced by such distinctions, thus foregrounding the aesthetic's indeterminate yet powerful potential for reshaping racial politics" (114). The electric aesthetic that Gilmore analyzes in Douglass' writing signals the way in which technology is never capable of entirely containing naturally existing phenomena, such as electricity (Gilmore 124). Ellison draws on this same aesthetic to depart from and complicate a naturalistic form of representation that sees African Americans as solely reactionary. In this sense, the experience of electric shock is akin to parataxic experience which may be rendered

into a therapeutic form of syntaxic representation. Ellison disputes assumptions of Myrdal, Kardiner, and Ovesey which fail to account for Invisible's ability to disrupt and reformulate the relations between Invisible and the white middle-class men by directing a form of psychiatry's disciplinary power outside of its established channels.

The way in which Invisible recognizes the possibility of harnessing the extraneous flow of electricity in the battle royal scene further distinguishes his understanding of the role of violence in social psychiatry from Wertham's. Wertham's notoriety as the author of *Seduction of the Innocent* (1954) and his role as a central figure in the regulation and censorship of comics through the Comics Code Authority clearly sheds light on his views towards violence. Wertham's work in the court system and his attempts to understand criminality in relation to social factors appears to have informed his view of violent acts and depictions of violence in popular culture. For Ellison, the violence of psychiatric treatment, like the violent fantasies acted out in the minds of those in the streets of Harlem and the surreal scenes in *Invisible Man*, is politically useful. By redirecting the violent force of the electrical current, Invisible sees the capacity for opening up new extra-institutional modes of resistance that, like the extraneous force of an electrical current that must be neutralized or made productive in other forms, is observed by scientific discourse as an overload or excess of electricity. This violence as a form of resistance, then, circulates within an informal or perhaps, to use the novel's trope, invisible economy, which constitutes "activity that is not recorded in official statistics and which operates in the absence of administrative monitoring and control" (Leonard 2) and formalized modes of representation that stem from Fordist standardization. The invisible economy of violence in Ellison's work articulates the ways in which discipline and violence that the state sought to regulate and monitor in mobilizing a Cold War American national identity and standardized

patterns of production and consumption transgress boundaries of this regulation and monitoring or escape notice or representation within such systems. Ellison's mode of dilated realism functions as an aesthetic equivalent that attempts to represent and account for that which naturalism and Wertham's approach to social psychiatry cannot account for or recognize.

Ellison approaches the seizure and redirection of extraneous violence as a means of dismantling the Cold War institutions that sought to pathologize or pacify African Americans with platitudinal notions of democracy and freedom. One such way of constituting African American political subjectivity is illustrated in reading the Golden Day scene as an instance of the dismantling and reconfiguring of institutionalized psychiatry using non-institutionalized violence. As Invisible enters the Golden Day to obtain some whiskey to revive Mr. Norton following his encounter with Trueblood, he makes his way through a group of veterans from the nearby insane asylum. In doing so, he notes that "Many of the men had been doctors, lawyers, teachers, Civil Service workers; there were several cooks, a preacher, a politician, and an artist. One very nutty one had been a psychiatrist" (74). As former members of the professional middle-class, these men mirror those at the event where Invisible first experienced electricity as a disciplinary form of violence. He recognizes the way in which these men, however, are also outside the class boundaries to which they once belonged, noting: "They were supposed to be members of the professions towards which at various times I vaguely aspired myself" (74). Once possible professional colleagues of the men to whom Invisible delivered his speech, these men are now objects of institutional and disciplinary power. In particular, the man who tells Invisible and Mr. Norton that he was a physician has now become an object of the medical gaze under the authority of Supercargo, an attendant from the asylum. At the Golden Day, the patients appear to be in a situation similar to that of Invisible during the battle royal. The patients at the Golden

Day are contained within a space that enables the release of sexual desire, just as the middle-class men at the earlier event release previously repressed sexual desire and violence in a sanctioned environment. As a brothel where the patients receive a form of therapy, the Golden Day seeks to alleviate any potential for more widescale dissent and disorderly violence. The potential for dissent, however, appears beneath the surface of accusations against the white middle class. As J. Bradford Campbell points out, the claim of a patient that he has found a way to turn blood into money only to have his formula stolen by John D. Rockefeller is "absurd but the implication is clear: his paranoia is rooted in a belief that rich whites are somehow capitalizing on him" (454). The violence released during the scene at the Golden Day, then, functions as an alleviation of what is, in fact, a desire for a form of agency that the patients can exercise against the institutional formation of the asylum.

A conversation between two patients about the 1910 boxing match between Jack Johnson, an African American, and the white champion James Jeffries provides further insight into the way in which the potential for African American resistance is both recognized and obfuscated at the Golden Day through sanctioned forms of disciplinary violence. Invisible describes how one of the men gives an account of this match, stating:

> Johnson hit Jeffries at an angle of 45 degrees from his lower left lateral incisor, producing an instantaneous blocking of his entire thalamic rine, frosting it over like the freezing unit of a refrigerator, thus shattering his autonomous nervous system and rocking the big brick-laying creampuff with extreme hyperspasmic muscular tremors which dropped him dead on the extreme tip of his coccyx, which, in turn, produced a sharp traumatic reaction in his sphincter nerve and muscle, and then, my dear colleague, they swept him up,

> sprinkled him with quicklime and rolled him away in a barrow. Naturally, there was no other therapy possible. (75)

While this historically inaccurate account of the fight may sound like the ramblings of a psychiatric patient, the patient's knowledge of human anatomy indicates his intelligence and medical training. His reference to the other patient as a colleague suggests a conversation between two medical practitioners. Moreover, the account of Johnson's defeat of Jeffries in this medical discourse indicates that the men using this language produce knowledge about the white body and show its vulnerability to the same form of violence to which conventional psychiatric treatments subject black bodies, such as Invisible's. The patient's reference to the "shattering of his autonomous nervous system" (75) shows the white body subject to the same reactions that conventional psychiatry places on black bodies. In this sense, the account of Jefferies' loss of autonomy positions him as a figure capable only of reacting and convulsing, rather than exercising agency as a subject. In this state, he is reminiscent of the boys at the battle royal as they scramble to collect coins from the electrified rug. Moreover, the psychiatric patient's narrative of the fight draws on medical discourse to legitimize the violence of boxing as a form of sanctioned violence, while simultaneously employing this discourse to render Jeffries' white body an object of the patient's narrative. Significantly, the psychiatric patient achieves this by constructing a narrative and mythologizing the fight, as he re-employs medical knowledge. As an act of cultural production, the patient reveals the way in which the function of violence is contingent on its place within the narratives that render it visible. The patient thus uses medical knowledge and discourse to tell a counter-narrative that renders the white male body an object of sanctioned violence.

The psychiatric patient's account of the boxing match between Johnson and Jeffries has implications for the way in which the violent events at the Golden Day play out as the patients burst into riotous behaviour. The patients beat Supercargo, who, although black, is "the white folks' man" (84), as a patient says. Invisible recognizes Supercargo by the "hard-starched white uniform" (82) that he wears as he walks "around threatening the men with a straight jacket which he always carried over his arm" (82). While Supercargo attempts to restore the Golden Day to a semblance of order, the patients refuse to acknowledge his authority as they beat him to the point of unconsciousness and stretch him out on the bar "with his arms folded across his chest like a corpse" (85). The overthrow of Supercargo, Ellison suggests, leads to a previously unrealized reality for Invisible. Supercargo's loss of consciousness links him to Mr. Norton, as he also passes in and out of consciousness at the Golden Day. The absence of order and authority signalled by Mr. Norton and Supercargo losing consciousness leads Invisible to hear but not understand the words of a patient who was once a doctor and brain surgeon. Despite this patient's attempts to provide Invisible with what he calls a deep knowledge, Invisible does not comprehend the patient's warning that he is functioning as a "mechanical man" (94) or "an automaton" (95) at the whims of wealthy white men such as Mr. Norton. The patient's account of how his role as a skilled brain surgeon failed to grant him any respectability and equality among whites in the United States is ultimately a missed opportunity for Invisible to see the limitations of the college at this point. In this sense, Ellison equates Invisible's experiences in the South with parataxic experience, which he is unable to formulate into a socially meaningful account at this point. The patient's account, then, conveys his failed attempt to use conventional medical knowledge and institutions as means of being granted subjectivity among white professionals. Yet, the narrator's earlier recognition that the patients are men who once belonged to the

professional class indicates that they have used their professional knowledge that was initially intended for the accumulation of wealth to exercise agency through violence against Supercargo, an agent of white authority. Invisible describes how one man "measured carefully" (84) "a spot beneath the lower rib and above the hip bone" (84) to kick in order to achieve the desired reaction in Supercargo, exercising his knowledge of human anatomy to make a black unconscious body react to force, while also employing this knowledge to disrupt Supercargo's role in channeling the patients' sexual desires into sanctioned actions at the Golden Day. Having disrupted Supercargo's attempts to straight jacket the violent and unruly patients, the patients have straight jacketed Supercargo as an agent of white psychiatric authority and its channeling of sexual desire and violence into socially sanctioned outlets. Thus, the patients at the Golden Day use their medical knowledge to neutralize Supercargo's threats of psychiatric violence against them, quelling his agency and applying their own knowledge without institutional restraints.

Both the battle royal scene and the Golden Day scene depict controlled environments for socially sanctioned violence that ultimately end with instances of non-sanctioned violence that transgresses its disciplinary function. In both scenes, Invisible notes that he reacted "automatically" (24, 86) before the disruption of environments that are seemingly determined by a nexus of economic, racial, sexual, and disciplinary structures. In these scenes, Invisible can react to and disrupt channels of violence, but he continues to struggle to reformulate larger institutional channels that give authority to this violence. The intent of the battle royal and the veterans' visit to the Golden Day to sublimate socially unacceptable behaviours, Ellison suggests, provides discernable but, at this point, limited possibilities for violence to be formulated into a coherent form of political dissent.

Following these scenes in the South, Invisible's experiences in the North continue to examine the role of violence, particularly in psychiatric treatment, as a site for constituting African American political subjectivity. Invisible encounters further violence at the hands of psychiatry in the Liberty Paints factory hospital. He discovers that he was working as a scab during a strike at the factory after causing an explosion. Because of the strike, Liberty Paints sees the explosion as an obvious and deliberate act of sabotage. The electroshock therapy that Invisible receives as part of a new method of lobotomy, then, is a form of discipline for this perceived attack on the production of Liberty White paint, the colour used on national monuments. The explosion disrupts both the nation's symbols of democracy for white Americans, while registering its racial contradictions for Invisible, as well as the ability of the factory to accumulate capital with cheap labour.

As an object of disciplinary violence, Invisible is once again in a position where he can only react as such. He recalls the violent procedure following the explosion in the Liberty Paints factory: "A whirring began that snapped and cracked with static, and suddenly I seemed to be crushed between the floor and ceiling. Two forces tore savagely at my stomach and back. A flash of cold-edged heat enclosed me. I was pounded between crushing electrical pressures; pumped between live electrodes like an accordion between a player's hands" (232). The violence of these electrical shocks renders him unable to communicate with the medical professionals performing the procedure, causing his words to appear unintelligible and illogical. He recognizes that he is receiving medical treatment when he deciphers a "man with a circular mirror attached to his forehead—a doctor. Yes, he was a doctor and the women were nurses; it was coming clear. I was in a hospital. They would care for me" (233). However, the doctors performing a procedure in the hospital indicate their intention of a reorientation of his consciousness that is disciplinary

rather than therapeutic. The doctors performing the electroshock therapy see Invisible only as a series of automatic responses, referring to him as a "primitive instance" (236), whose tendency for dissent they can curtail. The psychiatrists state that as a result of the procedure he will "experience no major conflict of motives, and what is even better, society will suffer no traumata on his account" (236), leaving him pliable, docile, and free of the psychological complexity attributed to white patients of psychoanalysis, thus leaving existing channels of Fordist production and disciplinary violence intact.

Invisible explains how during the procedure he is blasted with electrical shocks "until I fairly danced between the nodes. My teeth chattered. [. . .] Warm blood filled my mouth" (237). His narrative recounting how he laid enclosed within the machine immediately following these violent shocks is fragmentary, conveying his confusion and attempts to make sense of this experience. He recounts: "I lay experiencing the vague processes of my body. I seemed to have lost all sense of proportion. Where did my body end and the crystal and white world begin? Thoughts evaded me, hiding in the vast stretch of clinical whiteness to which I seemed connected only by a scale of receding grays" (238). Invisible renders this parataxic experience into a narrative of his newly emerging consciousness, conveying his awareness of self in relation to the practices of white psychiatrists. He struggles to find a means of formulating his experience into coherent thoughts as his body becomes perceptible to him as an object that is beyond his control and linked to its position within the hospital. His consciousness begins to emerge in contrast with the construction of his physical body and the violence inflicted upon it. As he narrates this experience, Invisible conveys how he struggled to comprehend the language he heard around him: "I heard a friendly voice, uttering familiar words to which I could assign no meaning. I listened intensely, aware of the form and movement of sentences and grasping the now subtle

rhythmical differences between progressions of sound that questioned and those that made a statement. But still their meanings were lost in the vast whiteness in which I myself was lost" (238). Although the words are familiar to him, their meanings have become disassociated from their previously understood meaning for Invisible. This disassociation of experience from his previous comprehension of language, rather than becoming entirely incomprehensible, enables the formulation of parataxic experience into syntaxic representation as a step towards political action. Invisible's narrative is not merely fantasy, as it may be characterized by psychiatric discourse, but instead becomes capable of rendering violent experience into a new politicized mode of syntaxic experience.

As Invisible is asked questions by the doctors, he is unable to respond, further signalling his newly emerging consciousness. In contrast to the event where he delivered his speech, where his opportunity to speak to white professionals was continually deferred, here his inability to speak as a subject constituted by the authority of white professional psychiatrists indicates that he is on the verge of new relations, wherein he does not answer directly to the expectations of the white professional class. He notes that while being questioned, he saw one of the men's eyes "blaze with annoyance" (241) when he smiles and is unable to answer his question. After speaking with an official of the hospital, Invisible recounts that he "had the feeling that I was talking beyond my self, had used words and expressed attitudes not my own, that I was in the grip of some alien personality lodged deep within me. [. . .] perhaps I was catching up with myself and had put into words feeling which I had hitherto supressed" (249). Invisible's recognition of a disjuncture between the language he uses and his experience prior to the electroshock procedure signals that his initially jarring and seemingly disempowering situation yields his capacity to formulate the violence that produced a fragmentary and illogical

experience into a syntaxic mode of experience that dissents from the discourse of white psychiatrists. He emerges from the subway on Lenox Avenue with “wild, infant’s eyes” (251) as his experience in the North formulates violence into political consciousness.

For Ellison, psychiatric violence must be wrenched from institutionalized discourse that mystifies this violence as a form of psychiatric treatment. Only then can it constitute an African American psychiatric subject capable of politicizing formerly pathologized subjects. This mystification is apparent in Invisible’s initial belief that the doctors and nurses in the Liberty Paints factory hospital were there to provide him with medical care: “They would care for me. It was all geared toward the easing of pain. I felt thankful” (233). However, the measurable electricity shown in the machine’s dials and controls, indications of Invisible’s subjection to attempts to constitute a standardized subject of Fordist relations, conceals a disjuncture between its institutional purpose and its potential to reformulate a political consciousness of dissent. Unlike the overt act of sabotage of the capitalist accumulation of wealth in the explosion in the Liberty Paints factory, the electroshock treatment that Invisible has received indicates the potential for a covert economy of political violence that is yet to be harnessed by technology and registered within reformulated institutional discourse. These covert relations recognize violent fantasies and parataxic distortions as a new syntaxic mode of political dissent that cannot be registered within existing Cold War political discourse. The effects of the electric shocks that Invisible experiences are consistent with medical accounts of electroconvulsive therapy. According to *Psychosurgery and the Self* (1954), by neurologist Walter Freeman, a notorious advocate of prefrontal lobotomy who performed the procedure thousands of times in the United States, and psychologist Mary Frances Robinson, following the procedure, patients commonly experience less tension with their environments that “make[s] for effective social adaptation

outside the hospital" (13), echoing the doctor's words in *Invisible Man*. Robinson and Freeman discuss the effects of lobotomy on "the capacity for the feeling of self continuity" (40) that "involves feelings of responsibility towards the unchangeable past and forward to the possibilities of the future to be worked for or feared as foreshadowed by the past" (40). They observe that psychosurgery reduces the "complex integration of self-continuity" (90), which they observe with the onset of psychosis. Invisible experiences similar results, noting that as he became aware of his surroundings, he "realized that I no longer knew my own name" (239). This effacement of the past, while intended to continue the work of the Liberty White paint that covers the history of slavery and racial oppression in the United States, marks a rupture with his aspirations to join the white middle-class, as he recognizes that he "was no longer afraid. Not of important men, not of trustees and such; for knowing now that there was nothing which I could expect from them, there was no reason to be afraid" (249). The electric shocks have made him aware of new pathways for the violence inflicted on him by these men to circulate. He notes that during the electroshock procedure he "yelled, punctuating the rhythmical action of the nodes" (232). He disrupts the direction of the electricity by punctuating the nodes with his voice as he screams, but cannot render this into syntaxic experience until speaking as a narrator in the novel. His screams, therefore, both influence and are influenced by the flow of electricity, making him more than a fearful, reactionary object as he will later formulate his experience into a political and therapeutic narrative.

Ellison suggests that the disrupted and disorganized psychiatric violence constitutes Invisible as an emerging political subject, rather than an object of psychiatric authority. As he experiences the violent electroshock treatment, Invisible grapples with the difficulties of organizing and articulating his experience in words, yet comes to recognize the possibility for the

organization of violence in the figure of Rinehart, a zoot suited hipster who haunts the streets of Harlem. As Invisible flees Ras the Exhorter, a figure representative of black nationalism, and his followers in Harlem, he finds safety in a disguise consisting of dark glasses and a large white hat, leading people in Harlem to mistake him for the notorious but equally allusive Rinehart. As Cheryl Alison notes in her examination of critical interpretations of Rinehart across Ellison's oeuvre, Rinehart has at least two effects: "on the one hand, an awesome sense of possibility for those of us quite 'taken' by Rinehart, and on the other, the risk that, in essence, anything can be said" (13).While donning his disguise, Invisible is misrecognized as Rinehart, leading him to see Rinehart's fluidity and boundlessness as a potential strategy for the constitution of a new political subjectivity with agency. Invisible also comes to see these characteristics of Rinehart as a limitation. His fluidity is not a political strategy, but rather only a means of evasion and elusiveness, a retreat into the apolitical. Invisible's disguise as Rinehart merely enables a form of misrecognition among Harlemites that is akin to a parataxic distortion wherein Harlemites see Invisible as one of the multiple modalities of Rinehart, including "Rine the runner and Rine the gambler and Rine the briber and Rine the lover and Rinehart the Reverend" (498) and an unrecognizable other, whom they cannot name. In such encounters with Invisible disguised as Rinehart, Harlemites see beyond Rinehart as a criminal produced by Harlem. These encounters rupture the capacity of syntaxic representation among Harlemites. For instance, while dressed like Rinehart, Invisible characterizes his encounter with Barrellhouse, a Harlem bartender, as entailing "recognition of a kind [. . .] but not for me" (486). Similarly, other encounters entail instances of misrecognition that unsettle ways of seeing Rinehart as merely a subversive criminalized subject. Invisible describes his view through the green sunglasses of his Rinehart disguise as "dreamlike" (488), indicating a change in his perception of experience as well.

However, Invisible does not want to become Rinehart; it is Rinehart's perception and, perhaps more importantly, his ability to be experienced in different modalities that Invisible seeks to harness as the basis for political agency.

For Ellison, a newly emergent political subjectivity reveals the inadequacies of existing representational strategies of syntaxic experience by describing Rinehart only as the invisible—a presence which is unmeasurable with existing modes of representation aside from those which construct such subjects as pathological and in need of cure, but whose ability to enable new modes of experience and meaning is measurable. Thomas Heise asserts that Rinehart is recognizable as 'a racial phantasm, a congealed set of social anxieties about race and space that assumes the status of being real through discourse and rumor, much like the black underworld subject we find in studies of sociology and urban planning" (154). Although Rinehart is ghost-like and never becomes visible in the novel, Invisible's disguise as Rinehart also inflicts a form of psychological violence on those who encounter Invisible wearing it, rupturing their relations to Rinehart as a pathologized and criminalized subject. Instead, the fragmentary and disorienting elements of Harlem that have constructed Rinehart interrupt the coherence of this pathologized subject in a way that is akin to a parataxic distortion, but one that reveals, rather than distorts. Invisible goes on to explain that he does not want "the freedom of a Rinehart" (575), but also contemplates: "I could tell them [the people of Harlem] to hope until I found the basis of something real, some firm ground for action that would lead them onto the plane of history. But until then I would have to move them without myself being moved. . .I'd have to do a Rinehart" (507). To do a Rinehart suggests a reliance on the fluidity and fragmentary nature of subjectivity to rupture the relationship between consciousness and representation. Thus, Invisible will use his knowledge of Rinehart to disrupt the consciousness of others without himself becoming

disoriented. Invisible states: “I should search out the proper political classification, label Rinehart and his situation and quickly forget it” (498). Yet, in the epilogue, he notes: “Without the possibility of action, all knowledge comes to one labelled ‘file and forget,’ and I can neither file nor forget” (579). Unable to classify or forget Rinehart, he remains a point of contemplation for Invisible which enables him to speak as a form of therapeutic politics.

Invisible’s narrative accounts for the difficulty of organizing the experience of psychiatric violence into the syntaxic experience of a new African American political consciousness as it draws on the disassociation of his experience from professional and popularized discourses of psychiatry, which initially appeared to promise citizenship and democratic ideals that African Americans struggled to see realized throughout the Civil Rights movement. Ellison uses the novel to convey “the almost surreal state of our everyday American life” (Ellison qtd. in Rampersad 218) as experienced by African Americans, which professional and popular psychiatric discourses and literary naturalism fall short of articulating. Yet, because this consciousness draws on the parataxic experience of violence, it can never be fully articulated in the novel. Consequently, for Invisible this violence remains to be adequately organized into a coherent political institution that is capable of significantly alleviating the anxieties that arise from the failure of Fordism to meet the social needs of Harlemites, as Ellison imagines the Lafargue Clinic to play a limited role in doing. Following Invisible’s first speech for the Brotherhood, Brother Jack asserts that the speech was “only one step in the experiment. The *initial* step, the release of energy” (350). He continues on to assert that “it's up to you [the Brotherhood] to organize that energy” (351). The chaotic rioting that breaks out in Harlem affirms that the energy was not organized in the surface world.

Ras the Exhorter's use of violence, unlike Invisible's disruption and redirection of violence, is unbridled. Invisible's first encounter with Ras upon arriving in Harlem evokes in him the feeling that "a riot would break any minute, against whom I didn't know" (160). Later, Ras openly courses through the streets on horseback to incite a riot. The approach of the Brotherhood stands in stark contrast to the violence of Ras and his followers, as Brother Jack explains: "The Brotherhood is against violence and terror and provocation of any kind—aggressive, that is" (365). During a street fight with Ras, Todd Clifton lands blows on Ras only in retaliation, in keeping with the Brotherhood's policy on violence. During this interaction, Ras denies the ability of the Brotherhood to fight racism and rejects its attempts to organize African Americans, asking: "Three black men fighting in the street because of the white enslaver? Is that sanity? Is that consciousness, scientific understanding? Is that the modern black mahn of the twentieth century?" (372). Invisible explains that listening to Ras here made him "suddenly alive in the dark with the horror of the battle royal" (372). This memory elicits in him the horror of violence inflicted on black bodies for the maintenance of white institutions that purport to provide racial equality, registering Ellison's attempts to distance himself from the CPUSA.

While Invisible's disillusionment with the Brotherhood and its abandonment of Harlem indicate that Ras' criticisms are valid, Invisible's account of Ras in the riot that concludes his narrative of his time in Harlem presents Ras as a marker of the limit of the efficacy of unorganized parataxic violence. Invisible describes Ras, now Ras the Destroyer, "upon a great black horse [. . .] dressed in the costume of an Abyssinian chieftain; a fur cap upon his head, his arm bearing a shield, a cape made of the skin of some wild animal around his shoulders. A figure more out of a dream than out of Harlem, than out of even this Harlem night, yet real, alive, alarming" (556). This image of Ras in "supervillain-like regalia" (Cloutier 304) is indicative of

Ellison's use of the novel[40] to represent the violence of the Harlem riots in the novel as a form of cultural production that aids in articulating the challenge of political subjectivity. In this moment, Invisible sees Ras as reacting to his "confusion over the nature of a reality that *seemed* solely controlled by white men" (559 emphasis added). Yet, by formulating this experience into a narrative, Invisible, and by extension Ellison, organize the violence of the riot into an articulation of a political impasse. In "Harlem is Nowhere," Ellison writes that the "frustrations of Negro life [. . .] (which) permeate the atmosphere of Harlem" (326) are referred to by Wertham as "'free-floating hostility,' a hostility that bombards the individual from so many directions that he is often unable to identify it with any specific object" (326). Ras attributes this frustration to white supremacy, which, according to Invisible only seems to create conditions for reaction, but not organized political action. For Invisible, Ras' espousal of black nationalism cannot reconstitute this free-floating hostility into a unified movement, in much the same way that the Brotherhood has failed to organize the political fervor of Harlemites into an institution that effectively alleviates their social stresses.

In the epilogue of the novel, a return to the underground terrain first introduced in the prologue indicates that the violence that the Brotherhood seeks to organize within a scientific framework functions more effectively for Invisible within an underground, non-institutionalized framework of covert and unseen channels. In the prologue, he explains how he steals electricity from Monopolated Light & Power, stating: "In my hole in the basement there are exactly 1,369

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[40] Jean-Christophe Cloutier reads *Invisible Man* as a text that draws on comic book conventions, demonstrating Ellison's shared concern with Frederic Wertham regarding the relationship between popular culture and violence. Cloutier sees Ellison's allusions to comic books and his use of comic book conventions in the Harlem riot scene as underscoring "the productive, imaginative dynamism comics possess as models of urban nimbleness and adaptability necessary for the promise of future leadership" (296) in ways that are not representable in the form of the novel.

lights. I've wired the entire ceiling, every inch of it" (7), which "allows me to feel my vital aliveness" (7). In this sense, the electrical currents coursing through the electrified rug during the battle royal and the machine in the Liberty Paints factory hospital, the currents that enter Invisible's body, have been syphoned off from the disciplinary apparatuses of Fordism that seek to monopolize its flow and now bypass monetized exchanges of capitalism. Upon hearing of the Brotherhood's new program for Harlem, which Hambro claims is based on the cultivation of "scientific objectivity" (505), Invisible "saw the hospital machine, felt as though locked in again" (505). Invisible responds to Hambro, stating: "The only scientific objectivity is a machine" (505). Hambro's retort, "Discipline, not machinery" (505), tellingly conveys how the Brotherhood has come to resemble psychiatry by functioning as a disciplinary apparatus that purports to be scientifically objective, while distorting African American political consciousness. Invisible recognizes that the Brotherhood could not draw from and organize the disciplinary violence of the middle-class, psychiatry, and the people of Harlem and redirect it into a new and therapeutic institution. In his basement dwelling, he severs violence from its regulatory framework in hopes of using it as the basis for a new therapeutic institution that enables political agency.

Significantly, in the epilogue of the novel, Invisible refers to his invisibility as an illness, stating: "you carry part of your sickness with you, at least I do as an invisible man" (575), situating his presence in the basement as a kind of treatment, but not a cure. He treats his invisibility not by relying on the channels of treatment known to exist, but within his attempts to reformulate the hostility and violence that maintain existing channels of discipline and economic inequalities, as he relates how "having tried to give pattern to the chaos which lives within the pattern of your certainties, I must come out" (581). In doing so, he suggests that his "socially

responsible role" (581) will continue to give pattern to the chaos of violent force and the economic channels that direct it. He implies that he has found a way to impact and shape the relations between himself and those within psychiatric and other disciplinary institutions by drawing from them in unforeseen ways, articulating a new politics within the seemingly contained structures of psychiatry under Fordism. In "Harlem is Nowhere," Ellison recalls the struggles to establish the Lafargue Clinic, noting that: "Finally it was decided to establish the clinic without money or official recognition" (*Shadow* 302), situating it on the periphery of the flow of capital and the disciplinary violence of psychiatry. His short but telling statement that "The results were electric" (302) indicates that the Lafargue Clinic was founded on the violent potential of Harlem. The voice of this hip, underground subject, who reorganizes power from disciplinary technologies, will come to resonate within cultural discourses of psychiatry, including the work of Norman Mailer, as well as psychiatrists associated with anti-psychiatry, such as R.D. Laing, both of which the next chapter explores.

Chapter Three: Norman Mailer, R.D. Laing, Anti-Psychiatry and the Economics of Desire

When Norman Mailer and R.D. Laing appeared together on a WNET talk show entitled *Madness, Part I: A Conversation between RD Laing and Norman Mailer* in 1972 (Mezan 17), Mailer's "The White Negro" was fifteen years old. R.D. Laing, having recently returned to London from Ceylon, was past the height of his notoriety among the counterculture for his role in the anti-psychiatry movement. Both men were well established among the left, yet they had not met prior to this appearance. Following the talk show, Mailer described his expectations for meeting Laing as follows: "I was feeling very equivocal and uncertain about it. I wasn't sure what to say. Usually it's easy—you have one charged mind and one empty one, and it's just a matter of pouring from one into the other. But this was two charged minds, and I had no idea what was going to happen" (Mailer as qtd. in Mezan 17). The fact that the two had had no direct interaction prior to this point in their lives as public intellectuals may not initially appear to be surprising. However, both Mailer and Laing identify a political potential of psychiatric knowledge and discourse. For both, this potential requires the intervention of an outsider, capable of wrenching psychiatric discourse and knowledge from psychiatry's reliance on a Cold War nuclear family ideal of the 1950s to sustain and expand the productive and consumptive capacities of capitalism. Their approaches to reformulating capitalist relations in the midst of a crisis of Fordist production entail recognizing the family's role in managing productive capacity, including desire. While recognizing the possibility to reconfigure familial relations to constitute desiring subjects typically deemed transgressive and unproductive under capitalism, Mailer and Laing confront capitalism's increasing expansion into the internal, medicalized, pathologized, and even abject terrain of psychiatric subjectivities by positing this terrain, which psychiatry

attempts to render into productive affect, as a basis for the political agency needed to establish alternatives to capitalist labour and production.

Mailer's 1957 essay "The White Negro" attempts to articulate a means of circumventing the conformity that Mailer sees as a rampant problem linked to the nuclear family in the 1950s. While Mailer was certainly not alone, as the works of C. Wright Mills and William Whyte indicate, Mailer's turn to the figure of the psychopath marks a departure from Whyte's sociological approach to understanding the factors that make the Organization Man a prominent symptom of postwar conformity. Departing from conventional sociological and psychiatric discourses of psychopathology, Mailer sees the existential hero's immediacy as a defining psychological feature of political consciousness in the second half of the twentieth century. He asserts the need to "encourage the psychopath in oneself, to explore that domain of experience where security is boredom and therefore sickness, and one exists in the present, in that enormous present which is without past or future, memory or planned intention" (301). The need to foster this consciousness and the language of experience that it entails within a wider field of social relations posits the existential hero's angst as a pre-condition for political confrontation. In this sense, this language of hip offers an opportunity to organize experience that is ostensibly spontaneous, decentred, and incoherent. In "The White Negro," Mailer poses the problem of organizing the experience of African Americans into a readable text, as Ellison does in *Invisible Man*. Mailer's attempt to do so is, however, fraught by his reduction of African American interiority to a primitive sexuality. In his attempt to employ the pathologized psyche as a mode of political agency, Mailer also falls into the very shortcomings he seeks to dissolve. However, his attempt to constitute the sexual psychopath as a political agent renders psychological

experience intelligible and readable. In doing so, Mailer re-signifies this diagnostic category with a political impetus that challenges sexual norms within Fordist production.

R.D. Laing's 1960 book *The Divided Self* similarly reconstitutes psychiatric patients beyond the limitations of clinical discourse. Laing's existential approach to schizophrenia attempts to forego clinical discourse that construct patients and their use of language as evidence of pathology and locates the patient in a pre-social condition alongside Mailer's black hipster. Laing bases the schizoid personality on the subject's perceived threat to autonomy, which results in a need to defend what Laing understands as an inner, authentic self from external threats. Such threats initiate a state of ontological insecurity in the self, which includes three forms of anxiety which Laing describes as engulfment, implosion, and petrification (Laing, *Divided Self* 43). These forms of anxiety are indicative of a consciousness that is both internally divided and potentially disembodied. According to Laing, the transition from the schizoid personality to psychosis may be marked by a rift between the self and the individual's body, which Laing refers to as the "unembodied self" (69). In this state, according to Laing, "*The body is felt more as one object among other objects in the world than as the core of the individual's own being*. Instead of being the core of his true self, the body is felt as the core of a *false self*, which a detached, disembodied, 'inner', 'true' looks on at with tenderness, amusement, or hatred as the case may be" (italics in Laing 69). For Laing such conditions should not be pathologized, but rendered intelligible by examining the language of the individual. What are labelled as nonsensical utterances of schizophrenese, according to Laing, articulate the subject's fraught place within a network of familial relations.

Laing's schizoid personality consists of a split psyche which occurs as a response to the omnipresent potential for the destruction of the self. This appears to render the subject's

language incomprehensible or at least divergent from the symbolic in which familial communications take place. For Mailer, the duality of the hipster's psyche and the language of hip that mediates his experience must come to accost Cold War liberalism's inability to reconfigure the relations of production. While Laing articulates subjectivity in less overtly political terms in *The Divided Self*, he positions the confrontation between self and other, especially at the level of the family and its role in the reproduction of capitalist relations, as one in which agency is at stake. His concern with familial relations, which he elaborates with Aaron Esterson in *Sanity, Madness and the Family* (1964), posits the foundation for considering not only intersubjective relations more closely, but also the political implications of familial relations within the Cold War nuclear family. The existential subjectivities of both Mailer's hipster and Laing's theorization of schizophrenia emerge as political subjectivities with the capacity to articulate and reconfigure the economic and political relations they enter from prior positions of marginality. In doing so, both Mailer and Laing draw on previously unrepresented and unacknowledged forms of consciousness and representation within political discourse of the left in the late 1950s through the 1960s.

Mailer's "The White Negro" and Laing's *The Divided Self* share a concern with the familial structure as an effect of capitalist production and reproduction. More specifically, by drawing on the work of psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Dr. Wilhelm Reich, Mailer and Laing respectively reformulate the notion of sex-economic work, amending it from Reich's position on Fascism in the 1930s, to disrupt the pressures of capitalist production. In doing so, Mailer and Laing turn to psychiatry to constitute political subjectivities which, unlike the relations of Fordist capitalist production, are not based on the reproductive labour necessary for the expansion of capitalist markets. As they draw on Reich's earlier work in response to the limitations of Cold

War liberalism, Mailer and Laing articulate the possibilities for nonproductive forms of desire and labour within capitalism to become forces of political resistance. According to Reich, under capitalism "[o]nly small amounts of biological energy can be discharged in an interest in work" (137). This "makes a natural circulation of energy in the organism impossible" (136). Within an economy that enables what Reich calls "sex-economic work" (137), "biological energy oscillates between work and sexual activity" (137) without conflict. For Reich, achieving an economic system in which labour enables an individual to subsist while reducing or eliminating the necessity of repressing sexual needs in favour of the concentration of wealth is possible.

In 1942, Reich published *The Function of the Orgasm*, which was the first of his works to be translated into English. Within it, he defines the political formation of a "work democracy" (320). According to him, this entails: "A rational democratic organization based not on formal and political democratic mechanisms, but on actual achievement in work and actual responsibility of each individual for his own existence and social function. As yet non-existent, it is that form of democratic organization into which present-day formal democracy might possibly develop" (320). Here, Reich highlights the potential for an informal political and economic formation to develop from and in contrast with the existing formalized economic structure of Fordism. For Reich, the sex-economic work that this structure entails counters the rise of fascism in Europe throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. Mailer and Laing, facing the postwar consensus in the United States and Britain throughout the 1950s, each recognized the capacity for Reich's attention to the economic basis of psychiatric theories to be re-deployed to distinguish themselves from existing disciplinary and political Cold War tenets of liberalism and its attendant conception of psychopathology.

This chapter begins by situating Mailer and Laing in relation to Wilhelm Reich's attempts to fuse psychoanalysis and Marxism in a theory of political resistance to sexually repressive capitalist production. Reich's theories of orgone energy and his marginalization from the discipline of psychiatry provide theoretical and professional precursors for Laing's involvement with anti-psychiatry and Mailer's view on the place of the writer as a political subject. This chapter then examines how R.D. Laing's *The Divided Self* reconfigures the relationship between therapist and patient as Laing seeks to make "madness and the process of going mad comprehensible" (Laing 9) within the tension between capitalist expansion as a response to economic crisis and resistance to this response from the anti-psychiatric New Left. Laing elucidates both the limitations of the clinical discourse of psychiatry and the political potential of the patient's subjectivity through a capacity for unproductive labour that can be situated within the concept of postwar cool. This tension becomes more apparent in Laing's *Sanity, Madness and the Family*, where Laing further grapples with the constitution of political subjectivity of female patients, demonstrating the centrality of the family in managing the productive capacities of sexual desire. This chapter argues that, here, Laing's work elucidates the mechanisms of the family under Fordist production and reveals his patients' perceived illnesses as responses to Fordism and attempts to shore it up through the maintenance of the nuclear family. Laing ultimately constitutes the therapist as an authorizer of female political subjects who withhold productive affect as a limited form of political resistance to the nuclear family's role in capitalist production. This chapter then examines how Mailer's "The White Negro" reproduces and appropriates the discourse of black pathology, attempting to expand political discourse, particularly through the figure of the sexual psychopath. Mailer draws on Reich's idea of sex-economic work to disrupt and reformulate an economy through unproductive forms of

sexual relations, problematically constituting Mailer as author of black political subjectivity. Lastly, this chapter turns to Mailer's 1967 novel *Why Are We in Vietnam?* to analyze Mailer's reconsideration and re-evaluation of the political efficacy of nonproductive labour in the midst of deregulation and the expansion of capitalist markets in efforts to sustain the economy and the dissolution of the postwar consensus. Ultimately, *Why Are We in Vietnam?* registers the expansion and decentering of capitalism, apparent in the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, which also entails an increasing tendency of capitalism to absorb and render productive formerly marginalized and abjected subjects that Mailer saw as having the potential to expand political discourse beyond Cold War liberalism. In this sense, the discourse of Mailer's narrator, D.J., and D.J.'s relationship with Tex, which D.J. imagines to be pathologized by psychiatric discourse and parental authority, becomes a site of contested signification. *Why Are We in Vietnam?* suggests that to do more than merely disrupt and disturb capitalist relations and the flow of capital requires nonproductive sexual relations that reconfigure the familial structure. For both Mailer and Laing, then, the pathologized individual is never capable of being fully contained or curtailed in a way that serves the consumptive and productive function of the family and the political consensus as it appears in the mid-1950s and early 1960s, nor can psychiatric discourse, as it is reshaped by anti-psychiatry and the novel, fully articulate new modes of political resistance in the wake of the erosion of Cold War liberalism.

Wilhelm Reich: Anti-Psychiatric Precursor

Wilhelm Reich's expulsion from the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1933 due to his increasing work with Marxism and the tension this generated with Freud highlights not only his unorthodox strain of psychoanalysis and psychiatry, but also the role of his therapeutic approach as a form of political action. In *The Function of the Orgasm*, Reich recounts how his

research culminated in a previously undiscovered form of sexual biological energy, which he refers to as orgone energy. According to Reich, the inhibition and blocking of this energy stems from the inability of the individual to achieve a fully satisfactory orgasm. *The Function of the Orgasm* culminates in Reich's assertion that the damning of orgone energy begins with the oppressive nature of the familial structure under capitalism. For Reich, as for an array of other psychiatrists,[41] the family plays a pivotal role in the interpersonal relations responsible for the diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. The family is crucial for the reproduction of social relations that hinder orgiastic potency. He places the familial structure as it exists under the conditions of capitalism as means of not only regulating, but also suppressing the potential for sexual fulfillment from childhood to marriage in adulthood. Reich distinguishes "between what is natural love between parents and children, and what is familial compulsion" (*The Function of the Orgasm* xxxii); however, his focus remains on identifying the pathological effects of the family under capitalism. In his discussion of family, Reich addresses the function of marriage, asserting:

> Marriage is neither merely a matter of love, as claimed by some, nor merely an economic institution, as claimed by others. It is the form into which sexual needs were forced by socio-economic processes. [. . .] The sexual needs can be satisfied with one and the same partner only for a limited period of time. Economic dependence, moral demands and habituation, on the other hand, work towards permanence of the relationship. (152)

Reich's theory of orgone energy entails the revolutionary potential of sexuality to overthrow the repressive institutions of the family and its hinderance of sexual satisfaction, particularly under industrial capitalism.

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[41] Among the most notable is Gregory Bateson and his double bind theory, which presents the family as the central factor in the onset of schizophrenia.

While psychoanalysis gained widespread popularity in the United States during the 1950s, as the previous chapter addressed, Mailer and an array of other American writers found Reich's work to escape the conformity that critics of psychoanalysis such as Fredric Wertham associated with its popularization. As Andrew M. Gordon points out, J.D. Salinger, Paul Goodman, Isaac Rosenfeld, and Saul Bellow were drawn to Reich's theory of orgone energy (Gordon 227) as an alternative to the streamlining of psychoanalysis for wider middle-class consumption. Mailer's 1955 essay "The Homosexual Villain," in which Mailer purports to acknowledge a shift in his limited view of homosexuality in his writing, links Reich and a broader recognition of historical "examples of the link between sexual repression and political repression" (Mailer 225). Reich's influence on Mailer, as Gordon notes, indicates that, like Reich, Mailer had become dissatisfied with psychoanalysis and assumed the role of "countertherapist, an unorthodox, guerilla doctor to the sick mind, body, and spirit of his society" (238). In the historical context of the Cold War, Reich's credence among Mailer and his contemporaries enabled an assessment of bourgeois conformity. Drawing on Reich, Mailer seeks to locate and render intelligible how a capitalist social structure shapes sexual relations and, in turn, how sexual relations hold the potential to reconstitute alternative social relations that generate forms of resistance to capitalism. For Mailer and Laing, this will require some consideration of the economic conditions of the late 1960s, particularly the problem of stagflation that initiates the state's response by turning to new markets and arms production during the Cold War and the Vietnam War. While capitalist economic and sexual relations and labour constitute subjectivities through forms of conformity, discipline, and, in Reich's terminology, morality, Mailer, articulates the disruption of such disciplined, repressed, and inhibited subjectivities. Such disrupting and undisciplined subjectivities that emerge from within

capitalist relations do so through Mailer's use of Reich to articulate the political significance of the hipster, a markedly sexually potent figure that is aided by Mailer's reading of Reich. In this sense, Mailer locates the dammed sexual energy that Reich identifies as a product of capitalism in subjects in the psychiatric discourse of sexual pathology.

Laing also represents Reich as a dissenting voice whose work should continue to hold a place within psychiatric thought through the 1960s. In a 1968 article entitled "Liberation by Orgasm," Laing asserts that Reich has been deliberately effaced from the foundations of medical knowledge. According to Laing, this effacement of Reich stems from the way in which "psychiatric textbooks [. . .] screen out information that only advanced students can be trusted to know about, when they, it is hoped, will be so brainwashed theoretically, or hooked to professional practices, that no one can do anything about it" (76). Laing's interest in phenomenology and the relationship between psychiatric patient and therapist shares with Reich and Mailer a concern with the relations of capitalist production that reconfigure the subject that psychiatric discourse constitutes in its engagement with familial and sexual relations. They elucidate the psychiatric subject's agency in reconfiguring the type of labour that the therapist and patient perform as they articulate a response to Fordist production.

Reich's fusion of Marxism and psychiatry provides Laing and Mailer with a framework for delineating how psychiatric thought can detect the seemingly hidden potential to disrupt the Cold War consumption economy of the 1950s. In "The White Negro," Mailer relies on Reich's analysis of the psychotic to reveal how the relations of capitalism obscure the sexual and economic function of the psychotic in the context of Cold War liberalism. According to Reich, the psychotic experiences the sexual frustration that is inherent in capitalist societies but deemed to be an individual case of psychopathology. While other psychiatrists have made this

observation, Reich admits, it is only secondary to their approaches: “Official psychiatry only classifies, and the contents of conflicts are only a disturbing complication. What it finds important is whether a patient is disoriented only in space or also in time. What it is that brought about one or the other kind of disorientation is a matter of indifference” (*Function of the Orgasm* 41). Reich’s endeavour to trace the etiology of psychosis entails the resignification of the patient’s thoughts. What conventional psychiatric assessments understand as the signification of a disease that causes the patient to disconnect from an external reality in which the individual exists signifies the marginalization of the patient’s perspective for Reich. In contrast to the approach of conventional psychiatry, Reich claims that “if one is able to establish contact with psychotics, they show themselves capable of conversing very seriously and sensibly on the many peculiarities of life” (42). He traces such peculiarities to the conflict between moral regulation of sexual gratification and sex-economic self-regulation. These categories correspond to the political-economic systems of a formal democracy and a work democracy, respectively. The condition of the psychotic individual, then, results from the tension between the need for sexual gratification and the repressive socio-economic conditions under industrial capitalism.

While acknowledging that the family unit in and of itself is not the sole progenitor of mental illness, Reich shows how the familial structure under capitalism produces the conditions to pathologize those who transgress its communicative boundaries, especially in articulating a desire for sexual agency. This begins with the economic function of marriage as a monogamous relationship; however, the economic functionality of monogamous marriage under capitalism simultaneously hinders a state of “natural sexual freedom” (*The Imposition of Sexual Morality* 226). According to Reich: “it is only the private enterprise form of society which has an interest in sexual repression, and which requires it for the maintenance of two of its basic institutions, the

permanent monogamous marriage and the patriarchal family" (237). Under capitalism, this often becomes an "uneconomic sexual regimen" (234), resulting in "neuroses, perversions, pathological changes in character, the antisocial phenomena of sexual life, and not least, disturbances in the capacity for work" (235). Such diagnoses, then, provide an apt terrain for cultural production to examine how psychiatric discourse and knowledge about the sexual psychopath is embedded in the role the nuclear family plays in regulating sexual norms.

The role of the nuclear family as an economic and political institution in the United States perhaps came to be more predominant than at any other point in the 1950s. Its centrality within Cold War culture has been well established by an array of scholars. Most notably, Elaine Tyler May has shown the way in which the domestic ideal of containment placed family life at the centre of Cold War culture for its protective function against internal political agitation. To assuage political activism regarding class, race, gender, and sexuality, "Americans turned to the family as a bastion of safety in an insecure world, while experts, leaders, and politicians promoted codes of conduct and enacted public policies that would bolster the American home. Like their leaders, most Americans agreed that family stability appeared to be the best bulwark against the dangers of the cold war" (May xviii). While the Marxist influence on Reich's work was perhaps most pronounced in the 1930s, the reconfiguration of his analysis of sexual relations and the nuclear family under capitalism by Mailer and Laing continued to challenge the prevailing therapeutic approaches in the United States during the 1950s. As May points out:

> The therapeutic approach that gained momentum during these years geared toward helping people feel better about their place in the world, rather than changing it. It offered private and personal solutions to social problems. The family was the arena in which that adaptation was expected to occur; [. . .] In this way, domestic containment and its

> therapeutic corollary undermined the potential for political activism and reinforced the chilling effects of anti-communism and the cold war consensus. (xxv)

If the nuclear family was the basis for the adaptation to Cold War norms, then psychiatrists and social scientists turned to the family to find explanations for the behaviours of those who appeared unable to adjust. However, they were confronted with the expansion of capitalist production and its management of desire as they did so. As psychiatry offered "private and personal solutions to social problems" (May xxv), economic crisis in the 1960s made therapeutic attempts to remedy these problems productive and profitable.

In *Madness is Civilization: When the Diagnosis Was Social, 1948-1980*, Michael Staub asserts:

> Laing and all other medical and ethnographic researchers who pursued theories of the familial etiology of mental illness were initially not at all seeking through their research to disrupt a Cold War consensus about the desirability of the nuclear families. [. . .] On the contrary, it is apparent that they did not question the prevailing ideal of strong and at once authoritative and caring fathers and of nurturing, self-sacrificial mothers. (Staub 42)

Yet, from this beginning of inquiring into the schizophrenogenic family, Laing's work developed into a pointed critique of the nuclear family that is indebted to Reich, along with Mailer's indictment of conformity in the 1950s. Moreover, Laing's early investigation into the potential link between schizophrenia and familial communication provided the counterculture with explanation for familial discord. Staub explains:

> The normative Cold War origins of early theorizing about familial dysfunctionality had not prevented the New Left and counterculture from reversing the lessons of that research into something useable for their own radical purposes. For activists in the 1960s [. . .]

> what mattered about those psychiatric investigations into the familial causes of mental illness was that they appeared above all to legitimate their revolt against—and revulsion at—their own families. (Staub 65-66)

The publication of Laing's 1964 book entitled *Sanity, Madness and the Family: Volume 1: Families of Schizophrenics* is further evidence that for Laing the family structure was not inherently flawed. He initially planned to write a second volume, which examined the characteristics of normal families. However, the fact that Laing never wrote this second volume may attest to a change in his initial approach to the family.

Mailer and Laing posit reconfigured forms of psychiatric knowledge and discourse as a politically effective means of interrupting capitalism and potentially bringing about new sexual, familial, and economic relations. Reich, then, serves as a precursor to Laing's anti-psychiatric work, which also emerges in Mailer's turn to psychiatric discourse for this reconstitution of sex-economic relations that he sees as a new form of therapy. Both Laing and Mailer recognize the capacity of the pathologized subject of psychiatric discourse to achieve this, as they attempt to articulate psychopathology deemed to be in need of readjustment to Cold War norms as political consciousness. Furthermore, following Reich, both Laing and Mailer reconceptualize the nature of labour and production performed by the psychiatric subject, rendering it intelligible within the postwar mass production and consumption economy of the United States during the 1950s.

Moreover, as the stresses of Fordist production began to emerge and white-collar jobs reconfigured the very nature of work with increasing technological advancements, the need for a politics of dissent in response to this and increasing institutionalized knowledge became necessary. The institutionalized knowledge of psychiatry was not only a disciplinary apparatus, but also a terrain on which the left reconfigured psychiatric knowledge to disrupt its

consolidation with capital and the political and economic interests of the Cold War state. In other words, writers such as Mailer and anti-psychiatrists including Laing sought to have a stake in knowledge production that was becoming increasingly embedded in institutionalized bodies and bureaucratic mechanisms that served the Cold War defence economy. They recognized the threat of narrow possibilities for political dissent on the left and their fleeting ability to go oppose consensus politics during the 1950s. Hence, the discursive shifts away from clinical discourse that Laing and Mailer undertook were conceived as radical departures from disciplinary parameters. Mailer writes in *The Partisan Review* in 1952: "Society has been rationalized and the expert encroaches on the artist" (299). Morris Dickstein points out that the "Our Country, and Our Culture" symposium to which Mailer contributed this view "has often been seen as a turning point, marking the postwar reconciliation between the once alienated writer and American society. Mailer's contribution, however, was an angry, dissenting one" (150). Mailer's comments are indicative of an attempt to forge a relationship between the primacy of psychiatric discourse in postwar culture and the writer's alienated position. In this sense, Mailer seeks to make this discourse a new radical terrain of political resistance wherein the writer is at the forefront. In "The White Negro," he links the role of the expert to a tepid form of liberalism, noting that the mind of the "average liberal […] has been dulled by the committee-ish cant of the professional liberal" (356), indicating his concern with the writer's ability to establish political discourse outside of institutionalized networks.

Similarly, Laing's *The Divided Self* is recognized for its radical departure from disciplinary boundaries into existentialism. This is perhaps most apparent in an oft-cited passage on Emil Kraepelin, where Laing demonstrates that Kraepelin's diagnosis of catatonic excitement is a function of the psychiatrist's "standard professional outlook and manner" (Laing 29) that has

carried on into contemporary psychiatric treatment. According to Laing, Kraepelin's observation that the patient's responses to his questions demonstrate that the patient's inaccessible state of mind is limited by the clinical perspective and language that structures the interaction between Kraepelin and the patient. Laing posits that the patient's responses, however, are understandable as objections to "being measured and tested" (31). Laing understands the boy's outburst in response to Kraepelin's questions as a "dialogue between himself and a parodied version of Kraepelin" (30). For instance, when the boy asks: "You don't whore for me?" (30) he is using this dialogue to express that "he feels that Kraepelin is objecting because he is not prepared to prostitute himself before the whole classroom of students" (30). Thus, Laing begins to reorient the therapist's perspective by drawing attention to disciplinary blind spots that render the patient mute and prevent the therapist from engaging with the patient as a subject capable of communicating with and criticizing psychiatric authority and the scientific rationalism characteristic of Fordist production and scientific management. In this sense, both Laing and Mailer see themselves facing disciplinary restraints that threaten to make them, like their patients and readers respectively, deeply immersed in conformity to the orthodoxies of their disciplines.

R.D. Laing's Cool Psychiatric Subjectivities

Laing's association with anti-psychiatry, whether as a term he accepted throughout the 1960s and rejected retroactively, or as a term he consistently found troubling, indicates his intent to first and foremost shift the epistemological terrain of treatment away from its existing position within the discipline of psychiatry. Laing's focus on the family does not sharply diverge from other approaches to schizophrenia in the 1950s through the 1960s. His turn to the interpersonal

basis of mental illness occurred with a larger shift away from biological explanations.[42] As Michael Staub points out in his discussion of Fromm-Reichman, this shift to social and familial factors

> fit well also with what might be termed a post fascist imperative—that is, an ethical position that explicitly rejected eugenic thinking about human behavior. It was certainly possible, as legal scholar Martha Minow has argued, that "the shock of Nazism" encouraged postwar Americans to question approaches that dismissed innate humanness of persons previously considered "abnormal" or "different." (Staub 6-7).

Laing's approach to treating the etiological factors of schizophrenia, however, differs from those of mainstream psychiatry, as he attempts to reformulate larger social relations in a way that increasingly departs from an elusive conception of a healthy nuclear family.[43] Laing's departure from a biological or genetic basis of mental illness entails his endeavor to elucidate how the schizophrenic's language disrupts and rejects the role of the family in reproducing the economic relations of Fordist production. Laing negotiates a departure from the concept of a healthy

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[42] The double bind theory of schizophrenia developed by Bateson and his team came to have widespread influence within research on the social etiology of mental illness. A significant precursor to the double bind theory existed in the work of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, who shows the link between the etiology of schizophrenia to the mother to be crystalizing into a foundational principle in the approach to schizophrenics. In a 1948 article, written while conducting clinical research at the private Chestnut Lodge in Maryland, Fromm-Reichmann presents the effect of a schizophrenogenic mother as "one of the basic schizophrenic dynamics which have guided the psychoanalysts in developing and changing the psychotherapeutic approach to schizophrenia" (265). According to Fromm-Reichman, the schizophrenogenic mother is largely responsible for the "severe early warp and rejection he (the patient) encountered in important people of his infancy and childhood" (265).

[43] Laing, of course, was also not the only psychiatrist to diverge from the concept of a healthy family. David Cooper, who coined the term anti-psychiatry (a term which Laing would later come to denounce as a classification for his work) also sought to reformulate the economic and political relations bound to the nuclear family. Most notably, Cooper's Villa 21 experiment provided an alternative therapeutic community.

nuclear family guided by an authoritative father and nurturing mother that ultimately remains incomplete. Similar to Mailer's articulation of the sexual psychopath in "The White Negro," Laing delineates the process by which the subject of psychiatric discourse unsettles and transgresses the sexual boundaries that inform liberalism and its corresponding consumption economy, while also reaffirming the centrality of masculine authority.

By first reconstituting the psychotic within a phenomenological approach rather than a clinical approach in *The Divided Self*, Laing critiques the tendency of clinical discourse to objectify the patient. While Laing departs from a biological basis for schizophrenia, the body maintains a significant role in the individual's psyche, which becomes apparent when the therapist identifies a logic in the schizophrenic's language. In his discussion of the unembodied self, in which the individual experiences his body as an entity that is separate from his consciousness, Laing relays how the embodied self, in contrast, "is fully implicated in his body's desires, needs, and acts, and is subject to the guilt and anxiety attendant on such desires, needs, and actions. He is subject to the body's frustrations as well as its gratifications" (*The Divided Self* 68). The body and the psyche are bound together and experience the outcome of the satisfaction or circumvention of bodily needs. In this sense, Laing, aligning his work with Reich's, posits the body as a site through which this satisfaction or circumvention of needs can be read. Within the schizophrenic individual, however, the body becomes unhinged from the self, creating a disembodied self, leading to a "hierarchy of possibilities" (68). Laing's analysis of the ontologically insecure individual articulates a struggle for the constitution of a subject with the capacity to exercise agency. According to Laing, the possibilities for the unembodied self are different from those open to "the individual genuinely based on his body" (68). The unembodied

self is thus a mechanism to defend the self from an external threat to agency; however, this defence potentially progresses to a schizoid condition.

The disembodied self, which is initially a means of protection, may become a form of internal self-destruction. Actions that Laing classifies as "mechanical behavior" (95), which, in the non-schizoid individual, do not "encroach on every aspect of everything he does" (95) and do "not arise with such painful intensity that he must attack and destroy this alien reality within himself" (95) "are *very much present* in the schizoid false-self system" (95 emphasis added). The parallel between Laing's characterization of this system and anxieties of conformity in the midst of the Cold War is apparent. The role of the family as a kind of democratic collective bulwark against an internal threat of communism and the need for internal surveillance and regulation appears as an impulse towards the schizoid false-self system. While Cold War liberalism purported to maintain and protect a national character based on democratic ideals and individual liberties, McCarthyism infringed on political agency, degenerating into internal discord within the body politic. Laing's concern with the subjectivity of the schizoid individual arises within an interpersonal exchange that is registered both in the split of the psyche and within the body's restriction to mechanical functions. In *The Divided Self*, then, the interpersonal relations that Laing identifies as psychiatry's etiology of a pathologized individual become an expression of political angst appearing throughout the 1950s, setting the groundwork for anti-psychiatry to reconfigure the relations that produce such angst.

In seeking the political potential within anti-psychiatry, Laing expounds the patient's interaction with the therapist as a means of affecting interpersonal relations to defend the schizoid's agency. The patient thus seeks to defend his self from the potential to become an object of psychiatric knowledge in his attempt to explain a fear of the loss of agency to the other.

Laing provides an example of an unnamed schizoid patient experiencing a separation of a sense of a true self from his relations with others. The patient describes his relationship with his wife as one in which "he could never have intercourse with his wife but only with his image of her" (86). Laing explains that "his body has physical relations with her body, but his mental self, while this was going on, could only look on at what his body was doing and/or *imagine* himself having intercourse with his wife as an object of his imagination" (emphasis in Laing 86). Laing's analysis of the patient's complaint becomes intelligible as an expression of the patient's existential condition, as Laing explains, "the above patient said that, although Kinsey might put down that he had intercourse two to four times per week for ten years, 'he' knew that he had never had intercourse 'really'" (87). Laing's distinction between the pronouns used by the patient uncovers the logic of a subject split between the patient's external objectification within a permitted form of sexual relations, which he fears will ultimately engulf him entirely, and the consciousness of the inner "true" self that must be defended.

In making this distinction between the speaking subject and a false external self, Laing provides a basis for what Alessandro Duranti classifies as "ego-affirming agency" (Duranti 455). According to Duranti, this "most basic level of agency—an agency of an existential sort which, however, needs others (whether as a real or imaginary audience)—does not need to rely on referential or denotational meaning. It is language *per se* as a human faculty rather than the meaning of its words that is sufficient for agency as ego-affirming to be at work" (455). Laing's approach further considers what Duranti refers to as act-constituting agency, which "always entails the accountability of the language user(s)" (459). According to Duranti, such constitutive agency is perhaps most apparent in John L Austin's Speech-Act theory as explained in Austin's Harvard University lectures in 1955 and subsequent publication of *How to Do Things with*

Words (1962). The classification of performative verbs becomes apparent "when our labor is recognized" (Duranti 459) and "we also become accountable for the implications and consequences of such labor" (459). In this sense, the speaking subject has agency in being recognized by the therapist as such, yet, according to Laing, the subject, in speaking, also rejects accountability for the utterance, hindering act-constituting agency, due to the existence of an outer "false" self that is therefore unaccountable for the labour of his utterance. Laing points out: "There is something final and definitive about an act which this type of person regards with suspicion. Action is the dead end of possibility. It scleroses freedom" (87). Laing draws on Hegel to fully elaborate on the act in order to show its limitations: "The act is something simple, determinate, universal, to be regarded as an abstract distinctive whole [. . .] It *is* such, and such, and its being is not merely a symbol, it is the fact itself. It *is* this and the individual human being *is* what the act *is* (Hegel qtd. in Laing 87). Therefore, the language of the speaking subject is both ego-affirming and an act of resistance against the constitution of a unified subject that is speaking as an other, as Laing acknowledges in the distinction between the pronouns used by the patient. In other words, Laing recognizes the speaking subject as a subject with the agency to remain a divided self and resist the unity of a speaking "I." In *The Divided Self*, he describes the patient's state of ontological insecurity in which one "may lack the experience of his own temporal continuity" (42). According to Laing, this "individual feels guilt at daring to be, and doubly guilty at not being, at being too terrified to be, and attempting to murder himself if not biologically, then existentially" (157). In contrast to the ontologically secure individual, this individual's "guilt is the urgent factor in preventing active participation in life, and maintaining the 'self' in isolation, in pushing it further into withdrawal" (157). Accounting for this fractured and doubly guilty subject becomes possible only through Laing's departure from a clinical

psychiatric approach as does articulating the ontologically insecure individual as a form of political consciousness which understands the political implications of marital relations.

Rather than a form of translation in which the therapist comes to function as a ventriloquist for the patient, the therapist draws out the previously unregistered hierarchy of possibilities that exist within the dialogue between patient and therapist. These possibilities are both assertions of agency, as they resist the totalizing discourse of conventional psychiatry, and an index of the individual's divided subjectivity, which poses a risk of psychosis and a complete break between the subject's existential state and his place within interpersonal and social relations. In both constituting and resisting constitution as a speaking subject, the patient maintains the potentialities of a "hierarchy of possibilities" (68) to which Laing refers, while also failing to demonstrate political efficacy. Laing characterizes the individual's conception of his inner self as "endless possibility, capacity, intention. The act is always the product of a false self" (88). Although the subject exercises ego-affirming agency, act-constituting agency is recognized only as potential that maintains the individual's perception of an inner self. Like Ellison's invisible man at the conclusion of the novel, the ontologically insecure individual remains conscious of potential, but is unable to organize his angst into political action. According to Laing: "Without reference to the objective element it (the self) can be all things to itself – it has unconditioned freedom, power, creativity. But its freedom and omnipotence are exercised in a vacuum and its creativity is only the capacity to produce phantoms" (89).[44] This tentative subjectivity that the patient describes emerges in response to the subject's fear of

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[44] The condition of the subject that Laing describes here, consisting of an internal recognition of the potential for action, aligns with the position of Ellison's narrator in *Invisible Man*, as both have the capacity to reflect on and consider their positions as subjects. However, as the previous chapter argues, Ellison's invisible man begins to disrupt and redistribute an existing economy of violence established by psychiatry as a first step to a therapeutic form of politics.

committing to an act that will be registered within the available meanings of marital sex and heterosexual marraige. The withholding of his sexual desire from his wife provides a limited sense of autonomy from the familial relations of the Cold War nuclear family ideal. Thus, early on Laing's work shows a concern with the family structure that will come to occupy a central role in how anti-psychiatry more broadly conceives of the obstacles to a therapeutic form of politics.

The Case of Peter

Another case from *The Divided Self* also conveys an existential double bind, similar to that of the unnamed patient mentioned above. In this case, the problem involves the patient's relationship with familial figures of authority, rather than his spouse. In this sense, Laing begins to examine more closely the role of the family in reproducing the relations of capitalist production through less overt concerns with sexual relations than in his previous example. Laing's example of Peter, a schizoid case of an unembodied self, links the schizoid condition to Peter's relationship with family members and his teachers. According to Laing, Peter "was beginning to have a growing sense that he was being put by everyone in a false position. [. . .] He felt that he had to spend all his time and energy in being a credit to his father, his mother, his uncle, or his teacher. However, he was convinced in himself [. . .] that all this effort to be somebody was a deception and a pretence" (Laing 123). "It was at his second office (job) that he first experienced attacks of anxiety" (124), a job his uncle has found for him, Laing reports. Moreover, Peter states that his father "never gave me any place in the world" (122) and referred to him as "useless Eustace [. . .] and a big lump of dough" (122). Peter functions with limited agency as the product of a family that will ultimately seek to render him a useful and productive body within the white-collar workplace, while threatening his subjectivity. As others demand a

productive function of him, he is expected to affirm their existence and authority of the family unit as a being-for-others, rather than an autonomous self. Peter's family has also instilled in him feelings of worthlessness that create "a sense of pointlessness, of lack of direction, of futility" (Laing 125), while ridiculing him for being unproductive, or useless.

Moreover, Laing links Peter's feelings of uselessness and guilt for merely existing in the world to Peter's masturbation and sadistic sexual phantasies. According to Laing, "Peter's guilt [. . .] was not simply that he masturbated and had sadistic phantasies but that he did not have the courage to do with others what he imagined himself in phantasy to be doing with them" (132). However, as Laing explains, Peter also felt such phantasies were necessary for the maintenance of an inner self, as a defence against a psychotic state that entails a complete loss of the conception of the self. The masturbatory and thus unproductive phantasies, for a time, were, as Laing explains, a schizoid defence system that, though difficult to sustain, provides a "feasible way of living in the world" (129) that ultimately gives way to a kind of self-annihilation in the schizophrenic. In this sense, Peter's masturbatory phantasies remain merely internal. Peter's false-self system seems to yield a political dead end for the schizoid that cannot go beyond a guilt and angst-ridden phantasy that sustains an inner autonomous self. Like political subjects of Cold War liberal discourse, Peter subsists on a form of what Frances Stonor Saunders refers to as "'freedomism' or a narcissism of freedom, which elevated doctrine over tolerance for heretical views" (350), wherein Peter is granted opportunities and freedom to be a productive citizen. While Laing's analysis of Peter's case re-articulates Peter's problem in existential terms within the dynamics of his family, Laing ends his case study without advancing beyond a new diagnosis, leaving Peter's desire for act constituting agency unrealized.

The Case of James

Laing offers Peter's schizoid condition of limited political efficacy as a precondition for the constitution of an emerging political subjectivity. Similar to Peter, James faces an untenable position in his familial relations. James exemplifies a schizoid false self, like Peter, but Laing writes that James "could express his 'true' self very clearly and forcibly in *words*. He knew this: 'I can only make sounds,'" (emphasis in Laing 97-98), he tells Laing. Laing goes on to recount how James's statement that he can make only sounds, not actual words, becomes intelligible in a caricature of James's father. Caricature is a common component of being-for-other, which is an aspect of the false self-system Laing discusses. This caricature of James's father, Laing states, "may be more that of a figure of phantasy than of any actual person" (100), which becomes apparent in James. According to Laing:

> James 'took after' his father in this respect: he always made a point of politely inquiring this (if they had had enough to eat) of guests at table. At first it appeared as no more than a generous concern that others should have enough. But his solicitations then came to be compulsive and to be carried past all tolerable bounds, so that he made himself a complete nuisance and occasioned general embarrassment. In this, he took up what he sensed were the aggressive implications in his father's actions, and exposed these implications, through exaggerating them in his own adaptation, to general ridicule and anger. He, in fact, evoked from others the feelings he had towards his father but was unable to express directly to his face. Instead, he produced what amounted to a satirical comment on his father through the medium of a compulsive caricature of him. (102)

James's parodic caricature of his father is, in a sense, an instance of conformity to his father. James speaks his words and internalizes his mannerisms and expressions, showing his

identification with his father. One of James's complaints, like those of Peter, is that he feels that he is living for others, not as an autonomous subject.

Yet, this exaggerated repetition of his father's behaviour and parody of the situation opens up a node for the subject to emerge from the confines of the familial structure by performing his grotesque image of the other and parodying the situation his father often creates. Although James's performance is a citation of his father, although he acts out what is a false, mimicked self that seems to produce only more familial strife and discord, in doing so he performs a kind of "linguistic labor" (Duranti 459) that entails act-constituting agency through parody. James's ostensibly unproductive utterances rupture and disrupt familial relations, just as Peter fears his masturbatory phantasies may do if others come to know his internal self. James's words and actions may be citing his father's, but the exaggerated mannerisms, gestures, and expressions are a destructive phantasy, constituting a subject that exercises agency in his relations with his father and criticizes his authority.

This affords James a degree of countercultural political agency, as James's internal feelings towards his father manifest in this parodic caricature of him. According to Alan Liu's *The Laws of Cool: Knowledge Work and the Culture of Information*, a look at the history of affect in the twentieth century indicates that rather than the family, "the great impersonal organizations of modernity—above all, the workplace—have set the tone of modern emotional experience" (88). Liu points, for instance, to Peter Stearn's observation that "later editions of Dr. Spock's book on childcare 'drew from the areas of management and sales' for examples of the 'work goals for which children were being prepared'" (Liu 88). Liu contends that the family played a key role in "managing the allowable range and intensity of productive affect, displacing excess affect into indirectly productive acts of consumption" (88). In this sense, James's

caricature of his father is a refusal to displace this excess affect into consumption or manage it according to capitalist productivity. This caricature is an assertion of this affect and a form of resistance against the family's role in managing it to align the expectations of his family members with those of the workplace. Recall that in the previous case, Peter's anxiety first emerged after his uncle found him an office job. While Peter and James first sustain their selves via outer false selves as a defence against being-for-others, James's caricature of his father is an expression of an internal self that no longer provides "a feasible way of living in the world" (Laing 129). Laing notes that the "false-self system would seem to act analogously to the body's reticulo-endothelial system, which walls off and encapsulates dangerous and intruding foreign matter and thus prevents these alien intruders from spreading more diffusely throughout the body. But if such is its defensive function it must be judged a failure. The inner self is not more true than the outer self" (103). Here, then, James's refusal to displace his affect into capitalist channels also signals a breakdown of the family's strategy of managing affect and the breakdown between James's conception of true and false selves as he expresses his inner anger through an externalized performance.

Laing's delineation of James's rebellion against the management of affect and the conditions for capitalist reproduction through parody ascribes to James a concept of cool that Liu attributes to the expansion of white-collar work beginning in the 1950s. In the postwar era, cool provided "a public mode of covert resistance" (Dinerstein 14). In *The Origins of Cool in Postwar America*, Joel Dinerstein classifies two phases of postwar cool: *Postwar I* (1945-1952) entails "dignity within limits, a calm defiance against authority with little expectation of social change" (13), whereas *Postwar II* (1953-1962) consists of "a certain wild abandon, a bursting of emotional seams reflecting a hopeful surge against obsolete social conventions" (13-14). Liu

locates cool within a reciprocal relationship between the "cold" detachment that characterizes the affect of the workplace and the "hot" of "expressiveness, social and sexual fluency, (and) violence" (Liu 101) associated with leisure time, which yields a sustaining phantasy for white-collar knowledge workers. For Liu, cool first appears within figures of subcultures that provide a sustaining fantasy for white-collar workers, drawing on both cold technological rationality and hot expressiveness of sexuality or violence attributed to different ethnicities and the lower classes. Liu, like Dinerstein, traces the evolution of cool from this point into the emergence of the counterculture of the 1960s, which Liu states, "transformed leisure into a lifestyle transcending consumption" (103). The counterculture thus seeks to reformulate economic relations, beginning at the level of the family, through labour performed "for *unproductive* purposes" (Liu 101), such as James's parodic caricature of his father that disrupts the management of violence and expressive affect necessary for the cold rationality of capitalist productivity.

Liu positions counterculture in a complex "relation of reciprocal appropriation" (Liu 136) between the mainstream, entailing technological rationality and the management of emotion in the workplace, and, on the other hand, subculture, with its fantasy of rebellion through consuming icons of cool: "Counterculture interiorized in its identity the complex relation between mainstream and subculture. It was an appropriation of appropriation, a mimicry of mimicry, a parody of parody" (136). James's false self-system, wherein his external, false self is a mimicry of a self, a being-for-others, while maintaining an inner, "true" self through phantasy, comes to caricature the others for whom he first mimics a self, in a rebellion against the authority figure of his father and the rationality of the workplace with which James identifies him. In his parody of a mimicked self, or his parody of the self he performs, James employs this

appropriation, a performance of a performance for unproductive purposes, as a form of agency against the familial unit and its function in managing affect. This unproductive performance, however, is only unproductive in the sense that it disrupts capitalist production and the relations of reproduction at the level of the family. Laing situates James within the counterculture's use and disruption of the division between the mainstream and subcultures. Laing's analysis of James's parody of his father dissolves the conventional relationship between father and son and doctor and patient, as Laing "draws on psychotic possibilities" (34) of James and, in doing so, Laing emerges as an unacknowledged legislator of the laws of countercultural cool, as Liu's book has it. James's ability to direct excess affect into a parodic caricature of his father, which is recognizable to the audience for which he performs, and away from the reproduction of familial relations, then, provides a basis for a newly emergent subject whose desires can rupture and disturb existing relations in an act of political agency that shows the limitations of "a narcissism of freedom" (Saunders 350) and posits James's compulsive performance as a cool, intelligible political act.

***Sanity, Madness and the Family* and the Emergence of Cool Femininity**

In *Sanity, Madness, and the Family,* Laing and Esterson's analysis appears within a larger range of relations that encompass not only the family, but also economic relations. This is evident in Laing's[45] conceptualization of a "family *nexus*" (Laing *Sanity* 7), which refers to "that multiplicity of persons drawn from the kinship group, and from others who, though not linked by kinship ties, are regarded as members of the family" (7). The patients of mental hospitals selected for the study "had been diagnosed as 'schizophrenic' by at least two senior psychiatrists and who were regarded as such by the staff" (1). Patients were admitted to the East Hospital "for

[45] From this point on, I will refer only to Laing as the author for brevity.

one year or more at the beginning of the investigation" (2). Moreover, every third patient from the West Hospital met the same criteria as the study continued (2). Laing begins from clinical diagnoses of schizophrenia not to entirely refute the existence of mental illness, but to recodify its attempt to position the patient within a limited range of pathologized subjectivities.[46] In doing so through the family nexus, he reveals new political potentialities that reach beyond the discourse of organic illness. Ultimately, through seemingly rigid institutionalized practices and the knowledge such practices formulate, Laing's work constitutes forms of consciousness with agency that disrupt capitalist relations and reformulate economic and familial relations.

Laing's conceptualization of the family nexus considers a multiplicity of relations amongst family members as well as those who function within similar kinship relations, without restricting families from study based on whether or not the patient had siblings, a spouse, or children. Yet, the sample of patients plays a significant role in constituting the psychiatric subject. Laing notes with little elaboration that the families studied are those only of women (1). Zbigniew Kotowicz acknowledges that gender would appear to be a significant factor in the study; however, "it is just as difficult to read any particular significance into it" (46). This section of the chapter will now consider how possibilities for Cold War psychiatric subjectivities that the book enables are couched in the ability of female sexual agency to reconfigure the family's role in reproducing economic relations through a form of postwar cool. Kotowicz notes that many of

[46] Erving Goffman's *Asylums* (1961), an essay collection often associated with anti-psychiatry, examines the functions of what Goffman refers to as total institutions. In particular, Goffman's "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient" considers the ways in which various phases of hospitalization teach the patient "that he can survive while acting in a way that society sees as destructive of him" (165). Goffman situates this assertion within an institutional framework in which "[e]ach moral career, and behind this, each self, occurs within the confines of an institutional system" (168), wherein the "institutional arrangement does not so much support the self as constitute it" (168).

the case studies focus on mother-daughter relationships, laying the groundwork for feminist studies (46). In each case, they attempt to "show to what extent the experiences and actions that are taken to be symptoms or signs of organic or psychic pathological process are explicable as social praxis within the context of the praxis-process of the social system of her (the patient's) family" (191). The family nexus appears to result in praxis that contradictorily denies and restrains female sexuality, attempting to regulate it within this nexus. In this sense, female patients experience sexuality as a restraint on their agency against which they attempt to rebel by withholding potentially productive affect that would sustain the family. According to Laing, this simultaneous denial of and attempt to regulate affect and sexual desire entails the contradiction that those diagnosed with schizophrenia encounter.

Laing's analysis of the Church family exhibits the parental role in foreclosing sexual relations for Claire Church, a 36-year-old schizophrenic patient. According to Laing, Claire shows an "impoverished affect" and she "seemed highly charged with violent energy seeking apparently random discharge" (61). Laing draws attention to Claire's parents' "fear of what they called a 'crowd'" (88) in the interviews and he notes that he "must look more closely at what this word denoted for them" (88). The particular connotation of this word in the family nexus, Laing writes, entails "a collection of people not bound together by strong personal rights or obligations. It is without organizational or institutional safeguards. Mrs. Church was terrified of 'crowds'—especially those small 'crowds' (in ordinary language, a party) where sexual and other possibilities arise" (88-89). Mrs. Church's fear of crowds, in her parlance, registers her attempt to limit Claire's sexual agency within the confines of the social system in which the family exists. Mrs. Church's elaboration of her conception of crowds delineates the boundaries placed on Claire through the limited circulation of other family members, in this case Claire's parents

and grandparents. In the interview, Mrs. Church states the following to Claire: “you take after your mother and father because *I* don’t mix with crowds . . . And your father doesn’t. We have our little sets, but that’s sufficient. . . and your grandparents were just the same—never went with crowds” (89). This distinction between set and crowd positions the family, to which Claire is bound, within a limited set of sexual relations which are intelligible and legitimized only within the family nexus. Sexual relations with members of a crowd, then, are implied to be impossible for Claire, due to the constitution of her subjectivity within the confines of the family set by her mother.

Claire’s sexuality is thus highly regulated by the boundaries of heteronormativity, significantly foreclosing the potential for a wider range of sexual subjectivities. Claire’s evaluation of the situation suggests that her position outside of those who “mix with crowds” (89) indicates the further foreclosure of sexual subjectivity. In this sense, the family attempts to contain and manage Claire’s desire within familial parameters. Laing notes that “Claire’s view was that she had had affection for her parents as a child but had lost it for them very early because she said they did not have any real affection for her, and did not really want her to have any, though they wanted to pretend that they were an affectionate family” (64). Claire expresses her family’s desire to adhere to an ideal nuclear family image, while indicating that the family sought to mitigate the effects of Claire’s affection. According to Claire, her mother “was more interested in business than in being a mother and she brought the business-woman’s attitude into the home” (63). The discrepancy between Claire’s experience and her mother’s indicates Claire’s recognition of the role of the family in “managing the allowable range and intensity of productive affect” (Liu 88). Claire’s delusion “that she had an atom bomb insider her” (Laing

61), then, is an expression of Claire's opposition to the Cold War nuclear family ideal, which in its attempt to contain her desire potentially destroys her subjectivity.

Mrs. Church's role in the economic function of the family also becomes apparent in Laing's attention to the discrepancy between her responses during the interview and the tone of her voice. Laing states:

> The incongruence between what Mrs. Church said she said, and what she did say, that is, between metastatement and statement, as well as incongruencies between tone of address and content was quite confusing even to the interviewer. One could listen to the 'paralinguistic' music of her statement, and have to pinch oneself to realize that she was in the course of describing how, during all those happy years, she had lain in bed most of the time. (64-65)

Mrs. Church displays a cold detachment from the content of her speech, indicating her immersion in the family's function as a means of managing productive affect and her restriction of Claire from the lack of institutionalized regulations and boundaries she ascribes to crowds. Here, Laing recognizes the inability of the written text to represent fully the family nexus in which Claire's diagnosis become intelligible, while ultimately remaining aware of Claire's political efficacy in illuminating the limitations of the institutionalization and containment of productive affect within the family.

Claire's lack of affect, which her family sees as a symptom of her illness, is a result of the displacement of this affect within her relations with her parents. Her family functions to effectively manage her affect into productive relations by ensuring the perpetuation of the family within a closed system that does not permit expressiveness or social or sexual fluency. In part, this maintains the Church's family business. The institutionalized nature of the family suits its

stability. The instability of the family's economic situation and their emotional and psychological problems coincide, as Laing relates how Claire's younger brother Michael "became psychotic" (65) when he was sixteen, a time when "the family business was clearly failing" (65). Laing continues on to explain that during this time Claire "refused to kiss her mother and father, and refused to let them kiss her. She also said she was fed up having to 'nurse' Michael: that is, to spend so much time in his bed or bedroom, or have him in her bed to stop him having asthma" (65), which, Laing explains seemed to be the family's method of treating his asthma. Claire's withdrawal of affect, particularly at a time of economic and emotional insecurity, disrupts the family's institutionalized functioning that Mrs. Church so highly values. In attempting to direct Claire's productive energy into the maintenance of the family, Claire mimics her mother and withdraws into a cold detachment that demonstrates her recognition of the family as a bureaucratic institution.

Claire's withdrawal of affect from her family in her refusal to show affection or care for her brother also entails an attempt to preserve her own existence, separate from the encroachment of her mother and the family. Like Peter in *The Divided Self*, Claire seeks to maintain an interior reality. Moreover, her withdrawal of productive affect from the family is a response to the contradictory demands of her mother, who sees Claire's lack of affection as a sign of illness, yet also remains detached from any affection Claire has tried to express for her in the past. In this sense, Claire's withdrawal of productive affect creates the potential for her to be reconstituted as a sexual subject within the very kinds of relations that her mother sees as a threat to the family structure. Laing states that for Mrs. Church, "sexual feelings were tolerated only if they functioned institutionally. Sexual feelings that Claire kept entirely to herself were condemned in the strongest terms as much as sexual behaviour. This condemnation appeared to

stem from her mother's enclosure in a form of relatedness in which each person feels himself duty-bound to fulfill the role that the institution requires of him" (85). In this sense, Claire's withdrawal of affect from the family, which initially appears as an unproductive form of labour, comes to disrupt the nuclear family bonds needed to sustain the functioning of the family business.

Ultimately, Claire's agency remains limited by the internalization of her sexual energies. She has found no outlet for the flow of affect into a new form of anti-capitalist production and, instead, she remains, as Reich would have it, with dammed energy. Laing leaves Claire with potential, which appears to be dammed due to the family nexus in which Mrs. Church sets rigid institutional boundaries that Claire mimics. Mrs. Church appears as a dominating presence in the family's management of productive affect with Mr. Church playing nearly no role in Laing's case study, despite his inclusion as a participant in the interviews.

The case of the Kings similarly shows how Laing's analysis relies on the absence of an authoritative father figure and the dominance of a schizophrenogenic mother. In the case of the Kings, Laing describes sixteen-year-old Hazel, who was admitted to the hospital in a catatonic state. Gradually, she began to talk of her mother's desire to "poison her, or otherwise get rid of her" (209). Laing contextualizes the interviews within the family history of economic relations, writing that Hazel's mother "wished to divert the family fortune from the older sister's line (mother's aunt and grandmother's sister) to the line of the second oldest (she and her mother)" (211). It becomes apparent that Hazel's existence within these relations has a strong bearing on her consciousness. In order for Mrs. King (Hazel's mother) to fulfill her desire to concentrate the family wealth within her familial line, she was required to have "the eldest male grandchild. With this in view, she indeed did marry *before* her older sister, and produced the first grandchild.

Unfortunately, however, it was a girl, Hazel" (emphasis in Laing 211). Mrs. King's older sister subsequently married and gave birth to a son shortly thereafter, frustrating Mrs. King's attempt to shift the family wealth. Hazel has become the object of ridicule and criticism by her parents, while remaining firmly entrenched within these relations. From interviews with Hazel's father, Laing extracts that Hazel's mother and grandmother maintain a close relationship at the expense of the marriage between Mr. King and Mrs. King, as Laing notes that "Mrs. King would not leave her mother, and so they had no honeymoon. Only on condition that her husband acquire a house *directly* across the street from her parents' house did she agree to live with him" (emphasis in Laing 212). Laing discerns Mrs. King's inability to sever ties from her parents and establish sexual relations with her husband outside of those intended to secure wealth are intricately bound. Rather than cool, Mrs. King might be described as frigid, due to her refusal of marital relations, as indicated by the absence of a honeymoon to consummate the marriage. The maintenance of familial ties here solidifies a closed system of economic relations, which frustrates the sexual relations between Mr. King and Mrs. King. Hazel's position within this series of relations, as Laing notes, is confusing and unstable: "Both Hazel's 'breakdowns' become much more intelligible when placed in this utterly confused context" (218). Hazel appears to be mired in a closed system of economic relations that coincides with the faltering marriage of her parents.

Mr. King acknowledges that he "wondered whether we hadn't encouraged Hazel to mix enough, the family being sort of too closely knit" (214). While Mrs. King attributes this to Hazel's own behaviours, it becomes apparent that Hazel is forced to reproduce the parental relations deemed appropriate by her mother, leading Hazel to struggle against a system that forecloses her sexual and economic agency and leaves her affect in the form of unproductive

potential. Laing reads this, not as a pathological process, but as a result of praxis: "Our impression, comparing the families of schizophrenics with other families, is that they are relatively closed systems, and that the future patient is particularly enclosed within the family system. In no family was this so much the case as with the Kings" (213). This closed system, then, intended to maintain the family as an economically productive unit, comes to restrict its capacity for reproduction and, more specifically, Hazel's capacity for social and sexual autonomy.

In Laing's analysis, Hazel appears to have little recourse to exercise the potential of her dammed and therefore unproductive affect. However, Laing gestures towards the way in which Hazel's silence during her catatonic state and fear of her mother that she expresses as she emerges from this state can be overcome with an assertion of masculine authority that appears to be lacking in the family. This lack becomes apparent in Laing's account of a single chance interaction with Mrs. King's father. Laing describes him as "the most pathetic figure of all in this family" (218). He relates how Mrs. King prevents him from interacting with the interviewers, as she tells him that Mr. Brown "can tell you nothing that I have not told you" (218). Laing relates how Mr. Brown tells him that Hazel has been turned against him as he "didn't wipe away the tears that ran down the lines of his small round face—as though perhaps he was too used to having them there to notice" (219). Laing links this image of a vulnerable and fragile man, who seems "hesitant about talking" (219) with him to the domineering presence of his daughter, who, Mr. Brown notes, is "going to be asking about your visit" (220). Laing relates how, despite his silence and limited presence in the home, Mr. Brown recognizes that Hazel "might want friends of her own now" (220), but she feels that he is responsible for keeping her "a prisoner" (220) in the home. Laing's representation of Mr. Brown as an insightful yet ineffective and impotent male

implies that rupturing the closed system of the family requires an assertive masculine presence, enabling a new network of relations for Hazel.

This is indicative of Laing's initial attempt to identify the characteristics of schizophrenic families. However, Laing's characterization of the Kings suggests that his conception of a normal family under conditions of capitalist production, in which excess affect is channeled into leisure time and consumption and managed according to the demands of white-collar work, includes the centralized authority of a male figure. If, however, this structure becomes confused, as in the case of the Kings, the male authority figure, Laing suggests, can reassert the relations necessary for production. Laing, then, provides an explanation of the way in which schizophrenia is comprehensible within familial relations that attempt to reproduce economic relations, but fail to allow an accompanying capitalist mode of sexual relations necessary for reproduction.

Ultimately, Laing's analysis of female patients in *Sanity, Madness, and the Family* implies that reconstituting the family, whether as "normal" or in a new formation that disrupts the channeling of affect into capitalist production, is possible with the knowledge and assertiveness of a masculine subject. Laing does not examine the implications of gender in a sustained and explicit manner, despite his focus on female patients in this book and the way he illuminates the sexual repression of his interview subjects. This oversight is particularly telling of the role of the therapist that Laing conceives as his work develops beyond *The Divided Self* and *Sanity, Madness and the Family*. As Elaine Showalter points out, Laing came to have an increasing critical view of *The Divided Self* by 1964: "he described it as the academic work of an 'old young man,' and by 1972 he thought it could be 'filed away in a phenomenological museum as examples of how people were thinking in the Fifties'" (226-227). The masculinist ethos of Laing's work is less discernable than in his later work, such as *The Politics of Experience* (1967),

wherein he constructs the therapist as the patient's guide into what will be an enlightening journey through madness. This is Laing at his most romantic and masculine or even macho. In *The Politics of Experience*, he writes: "We respect the voyager, the explorer, the climber, the space man. It makes far more sense to me as a valid project—indeed as a desperately and urgently required project for our time—to explore the inner space and time of consciousness" (126-127). Here, Laing makes explicit his role as hero and paternal figure to a newly emergent consciousness that is liberated from the trappings of the child's role in the nuclear family's reproductive function, as he takes on the role of the father as therapist.[47] In this sense, Laing's

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[47] The case of Mary Barnes, a patient at Laing's Kingsley Hall therapeutic community, is perhaps the most well documented case of this experiment. Kingsley Hall was intended to be a radical departure from conventional psychiatric treatment, wherein patients were given freedom from the restrictions of the conventional psychiatric hospital under Laing's premise that madness was a healthy process. By creating conditions in which individuals could withdraw from the familial and economic relations that led to diagnosis, these individuals could experience what Laing often deemed madness as a form of liberation. Kingsley Hall was, of course, never entirely free of economic relations; however, it did establish an informal economic structure where capital was disbursed, rather than accumulated, within the community, creating the possibilities for new intersubjective relations. Letters between Laing and Sidney Briskin reveal continual financial strain (Wall 72). In order to dissolve institutional divisions between doctor and patient and allow residents to approach madness as an experience, rather than a form of pathology, Laing attempted to operate Kingsley Hall according to a fluid economic structure:

> Unlike the classic structure of a therapeutic community in which the psychiatrists are paid for treating patients, in Kingsley Hall every resident paid rent to the Philadelphia Association. This, in turn, paid the rent on the building as well as the bills and for the food which was consumed communally. Nobody was paid for their work at the hall; no distinction was drawn between residents who were trained psychiatrists or doctors and patients; and similarly nobody was expected to act as the doctor or caretaker of another person. The idea was that no resident should feel financially obligated to interact with other people, or even to simply be at the hall if they did not want to be there. (Wall 72)

However, critics have pointed out, Mary Barnes' narrative demonstrates a different experience from the one in which the therapist plays the role of a heroic guide. In *Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness*, Barnes and Joseph Berke, an American psychotherapist who became a member of the Philadelphia Association, provide accounts of Barnes' schizophrenia while at Kingsley Hall. Barnes' act of writing her narrative indicates a degree of agency and the formation of a subject that conventional psychiatry would foreclose and leave to case studies,

work conveys the inextricability of the psychiatric patent's political subjectivity as an unproductive subject and the centrality of male authority in the psychiatric episteme that renders this subject intelligible.

The female patients in *Sanity, Madness, and the Family* ultimately appear to have their agency curtailed not only in their familial structures, but also by Laing's role as authorizer of female subjectivity. The management of affect and sexual desire that enables disruptive and

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which privilege psychiatric discourse. Elaine Showalter points out that Berke's section of the book, however, includes "a number of narrow psychoanalytic ideas about femininity and female sexuality" (235). Furthermore, she asserts that despite the significance of Barnes' artistic expression in her recovery, Berke "sees her primary drives as sexual rather than vocational and does not comment on the powerful ambitions she had repressed and defined as 'masculine.'" (235). Thomas Szasz sees Barnes' narrative as an affirmation of Kingsley Hall's reproduction of the repressive structures of conventional treatment in a psychiatric hospital, noting that Barnes admits to being sick, that Kingsley Hall is a hospital, and that Berke and Laing function as doctors there (69). Moreover, Szasz asserts that Barnes' recovery relied on "her ability to manipulate her therapists—and their willingness to be manipulated by her; and on her eagerness to play the role of special patient, saved by Kingsley Hall—and her therapists' desire to cast, and commercialize, her in the role. In all these ways Mary Barnes was reinflated, and inflated herself, with self-esteem" (74). Szasz, then, emphasizes Barnes' rise to notoriety in a way that suited Laing's reputation. In his review essay on Barnes' book, "Mary Barnes' 'Trip,'" Felix Guattari sees in Barnes' regression to an infantile state an inability to get beyond "the yoke of simplistic reductions to the tired triangle—father, mother—child—which presses any situation considered to be outside the bound of normalcy into the mold of Oedipal psychoanalysis" (46). In rare instances, when Berke is on the verge of locating a new psychiatric practice, "the psychoanalyst recovers and reinstates his familialist coordinates" (50). For Guattari, the lack of attention to the economic flows and their relationship with the production of desire is a significant shortcoming that Barnes cannot overcome as she reproduces the familial structure of oedipal psychoanalysis, thus preventing her from being constituted as a new psychiatric subject. Guattari asks: "Who handles the money, who decides what to buy, and who gets paid?" (48). He points out that the "question of the flow of money" (48) never arises for Barnes. Although Barnes' painting was an attempt to reconstitute herself as an economic and feminine subject, her writings and paintings were not produced directly under conditions of capitalist consumption. However, her ultimate position as an arbiter of Kingsley Hall's efficacy limited this attempt. She became a producer of cultural and economic capital as a painter in ways that were not easily accessible to women; however, Barnes' and Kingsley Hall's reliance on capitalist productivity ultimately renders Barnes' art a function of it, which Laing would also come to authorize, ultimately tempering the political efficacy of antipsychiatry and leaving its tenants the future terrain of medical consumerism and deinstitutionalization.

unproductive flows in "cool" subjects, such as James in *The Divided Self*, remains an unrealized potential in patients such as Hazel and Clare. As Dinerstein notes: "Cool is based on *self*-authorizing: its characteristics are independence, rebellion, and a capacity for violence. Lacking autonomy and agency, the female caretakers of homes, husbands and children could hardly resonate in a similar manner in the cultural imagination" (170). Laing's representation of domineering women as schizophrenogenic mothers is a case in point. However, the ability of Laing's female patients to withdraw their affect from the reproductive relations of capital within the familial structure entails a degree of cool detachment that mocks familial authority. In his discussion of Postwar cool and women, Dinerstein attributes a form of cool to Billie Holiday that entails a tension between "great power held under aesthetic control and artistic will" (179). This resembles Dinerstein's conception of Postwar I cool as "dignity within limits, a calm defiance against authority with little expectation of social change" (13). The withdrawal of productive affect, most visible in Hazel's catatonic state, is thus an iteration of this energy held in check, on the verge of being expressed through the forms of mimicry such as parody or caricature as seen in James. Yet, unlike both Laing's male patients, who use mimicry as a defence against their interpellation by the nuclear family and Mailer's masculine hipster and his racial mimicry, Laing's female patients appear to have no outlet available to them as a form of mimicry, aside from mirroring cold detachment, which would constitute them as cool countercultural subjects. While Hazel's relation to Postwar I cool aligns her with Holiday, Laing leaves her without a form of artistic expression or cultural production capable of enabling the self-authorization needed for greater female political and cultural agency.[48]

[48] Dinerstein points out that "the dominant artistic genres that carried cool into American and global consciousness—jazz and film noir, philosophy and literature—were dominated by male authors and critics" (170). Yet he also refers to Lauren Bacall as an iteration of Postwar I noir

Thus, as Laing breaks down the division between therapist and patient, the masculine subject becomes responsible for the political signification of his patients' affect and its capacity for new a conception of labour. This new conception of labour enables affect to be directed away from capitalist production and into new sexual and, thus, new kinship relations. By articulating the underlying mechanisms of the family under Fordist production that stifle such relations, Laing made a significant contribution to the prevalent role of psychiatric thought within the counterculture of the 1960s, while ultimately remaining within the confines of a masculine subjectivity that limits female agency to a form of internal withdrawal that falls short of the agency needed to re-signify affect.

Norman Mailer's "The White Negro" and the Discourse of Sexual Psychopathy

In his 1957 essay, "The White Negro," Mailer also considers the psychological implications of the relationship between capitalism and sexual agency. Like Laing after him, Mailer posits masculine libidinal energies as a potential catalyst for sexual liberation from the restraints of capitalism. Mailer's exploration of this relationship between capitalist production, sexuality, and familial relations takes a more politically radical approach to the masculine subject of psychiatric discourse than Laing. While Laing gestures towards male authority in the constitution of a Cold War political subject, Mailer, echoing Reich, insists on a place for a violent masculine subject within "a neo-Marxian calculus [. . .] capable of translating the

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cool and Anita O'Day as an iteration of Postwar I jazz cool (182). Furthermore, there were forms of popular culture that enabled the expression of female sexuality outside of the nuclear family and heterosexual relations. For instance, during the 1950s and early 1960s, lesbian pulp novels were abundantly available in bookstores and corner drug stores, offering women representations of homosexuality which were otherwise repressed or pathologized when represented at all. Yvonne Keller points out that "several pro-lesbian authors claim that when they saw how homophobic the pulps were, it fueled their desire to write their own versions" which Keller sees as an assertion of agency (392).

economic relations of man into his psychological relations and then back again, his productive relations thereby embracing his sexual relations as well" (319), "if a revolutionary time should come again" (319).

Mailer's turn to African Americans as the best model for the uninhibited sexuality and violence that he sees as a revolutionary force, as many critics note, limits the viability of Mailer's essay as a text that reconstitutes political subjectivity. "The White Negro" is deeply steeped in the very practices of pathologizing blackness that marginalize African Americans or construct them as criminal or otherwise unproductive citizens. Morris Dickstein notes that the essay "makes painful reading today" (150); however, this was also the case at the time of its publication. Critics lambasted Mailer for the primitivist view of African Americans in "The White Negro." As Dickstein points out: "Some of it—the portrait of the Negro as the violent, jazz-soaked primitive, the fumbling vocabulary of Hip—is simply embarrassing, a primitivist myth left over from prewar modernism" (151). In her essay "Genet, Mailer and the New Paternalists," Lorraine Hansberry criticizes Mailer's contempt for African Americans with middle-class aspirations, noting that for him and other new paternalists, this is an "ugly fall from naturalness" (14) which is out of synch with Mailer's portrayal of African Americans as "down-and-outers" (10) or outsiders. However, Mailer's purportedly enlightened view, which, according to Hansberry, the new paternalists think is "a demonstration of their liberation from the hanky-panky of liberalism and God knows what else" (14) is, in fact, like Genet's "The Blacks," "a conversation between white men about *themselves*" (emphasis in Hansberry 10). Hansberry was also critical of the existentialism that Mailer draws on in conceptualizing the "white negro" as a subject capable of navigating the conformity and threat of technological violence of the postwar years. Hansberry refutes the existentialist view of the absurdity of life and counters that

"attention must be paid in equal and careful measure to the frequent triumph of man, if not nature, *over* the absurd" (*To Be Young, Gifted and Black* 176). While Dinerstein points out that the debate between Mailer and Hansberry was "the only open debate between Mailer and an African-American writer" (424), Ralph Ellison privately expressed his views on "The White Negro" in a letter to Albert Murray. Ellison characterizes Mailer's essay as "The same old primitivist crap in a new package" (197-198). He writes that Mailer and the Beats in Greenwich Village "keep score à la Reich on the orgasm and try to verbalize what has to be basically warmth, motion, rhythm, timing, affection and technique" (197). While Ellison's criticism is valid, it also highlights Mailer's attempt to wrest sexual experience from its normalization in psychiatric discourse and translate it into a form of expanded political discourse. For Ellison, this translation appears to be better suited to music than the written word. He implies that Mailer is an outsider here, who does not understand the relationship between music and orgasm, stating that "these characters [. . .] have strange problems in bed" (197), further highlighting Mailer's problematic representation of African American sexual experience. Moreover, in "The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy," James Baldwin reacts to Mailer's essay by asking: "Why malign the sorely menaced sexuality of Negroes in order to justify the white man's own sexual panic?" (278). While Mailer is attempting to attack the menacing of black masculinity by psychiatry and sociology, he merely appropriates it, urging Baldwin and Ellison to point to Mailer's imperiled masculinity and his turn to mimicking a flawed conception of African Americans as a means of redressing this through a performance of hip.

In "The White Negro," Mailer posits capitalist labour as creating the neuroses of the mid-twentieth century among the hegemony and making barely discernable the subjectivities constituted in the peripheral spaces of capitalist relations occupied by the hipster. Mailer states:

"Knowing in the cells of his existence that life is war nothing but war, the Negro (all exceptions admitted) could rarely afford the sophisticated inhibitions of civilization, and so he kept for his survival the art of the primitive, he lived in the enormous present" (303). The lack of inhibitions that Mailer attributes to black masculinity echoes with resonances of young Emerson's invitation to Ellison's narrator of *Invisible Man* to attend the Club Calamus. Young Emerson sees Invisible as the embodiment of pre-civilized man of Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, which Young Emerson is reading. In the figure of the white hipster, Mailer desires the sexual potency he ascribes to black masculinity in its relationship with jazz music and hip. Baldwin makes a similar point about "The White Negro" in "The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy," when he states that "to be an American Negro male is also to be a walking phallic symbol" (269-270). Tellingly, young Emerson relates to the narrator that the Club Calamus is where "[m]any of my Harlem friends go [. . .]. It's a rendezvous for writers, artists and all kinds of celebrities" (Ellison 185). In this sense, Mailer is enticed by the problem of invisibility that Ellison identifies and seeks to use as a form of political agency that can be exercised fleetingly through tentative relations with institutional forms of knowledge and the violence such knowledge enacts through technological rationality. For Mailer, black masculinity symbolizes a largely unutilized and unrecognized potential that he seeks to enable through writing "The White Negro," while for Ellison, this potential was always discernable in the ability of African American culture to do more than react, as Ellison's critique of sociology, especially in his review of Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*, indicates. Falling into a similar trap that associates African Americans with primitivism and violence, Mailer seeks to harness what he views as the unintelligible position of African Americans within capitalist relations and deploy this position as a sexual revolutionary force.

In a vein similar to the work of Myrdal, as well as Kardiner and Ovesey's *The Mark of Oppression* (1951),[49] Mailer posits that African Americans' contributions to American cultural production are undetected because they remain steeped in the conditions stemming from slavery. For Mailer, it seems, African American political consciousness is unrecognized because of disenfranchisement and economically impoverished conditions. A history of slavery has rendered African Americans invisible in narratives of class struggle, due to an inability to possess capital, just as Ellison's *Invisible Man* asserts that narratives of exceptional individuals obscure the role of African American narratives, as Norton sees Invisible as only a function of his own destiny. One function of Ellison's novel, then, is to provide a counter-narrative to Norton's destiny. Mailer's conception of the "white negro" similarly makes African American males a function of a seemingly imperiled form of white masculinity and political agency. As Eric Lott notes in his discussion of the minstrel show, such dynamics between black and white masculinities are the terrain of both homosocial and homosexual relations. According to Lott, "The White Negro" is "the twentieth-century reinvention of these homosocial and homosexual fascinations. [. . .] Early minstrel performers would not have been able to articulate it, but Mailer's dream of the black male may stand as a fairly close description of their fascination" (55). Mailer's attribution of the revolutionary potential of black masculinity, then, is steeped in a history of appropriation even as it seeks to constitute a radical political subjectivity that acknowledges the marginalization of African Americans.

While Mailer attempts to constitute a form of political agency by projecting a fantasy of black masculinity onto white men, he draws on Reich's conception of the revolutionary potential

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[49] Chapter Two contains a more detailed discussion of Kardiner and Ovesey's *The Mark of Oppression* (1951)

of sexuality and the orgasm. Reich's assertion that the damning of sexual energy (due to the need of capitalism to perpetuate the patriarchal family structure) is the etiology of various forms of psychosomatic ailments provides Mailer with the basis for expounding the revolutionary potential of black masculinity. However, for Mailer, unlike Reich, any revolutionary potential of reformulated sexual relations is explicitly phallocentric. Mailer's privileging of the male orgasm contrasts with Reich's treatment of female orgasms. As Juliet Mitchell notes, Reich regarded the privileging of clitoral orgasm as "a conservative argument used to limit the scope of women's sexuality, to reduce it to a pale imitation of man's" (199). For Reich, the privileging of clitoral orgasm failed to fully acknowledge the potential for women's sexual pleasure, which for both men and women entails "the muscular movement of the *whole* body" (emphasis in Mitchell 200). Mailer, on the other hand, gives no direct attention to the function of the female orgasm in his concern with the violence as a form of sexual release, positing political agency as the domain of a virile subject, resembling Laing's therapist as voyager and explorer.

Kate Millett was also one of Mailer's most pronounced feminist critics with her response to his work in her 1970 book *Sexual Politics: A Manifesto of Revolution*. Focusing on *An American Dream*, Millett illuminates how Mailer's protagonist, Stephen Rojack, exhibits a lack of concern with female orgasm as Mailer posits Rojack's sexual exploit with Ruta, a maid employed by Rojack's wife, as form of "sexual honor" (13), which disregards female pleasure. Moreover, Millett points to how Rojack sees anal sex as a lost opportunity for Ruta to bear his child: "The fact that his precious semen has been discharged in her rectum and not in her cervix is a source of bemusement, not uncomfortably experienced as guilt" (13). Rojack's lack of concern with female orgasm and lost opportunity to impregnate Ruta appears to express existential dread, as Millett posits: "Perhaps it is this monomania about his own sexual discharge

that has made Rojack a specialist in existentialist dread" (13). Like Baldwin, Ellison, and Hansberry, Millett sees Mailer's existential hero as an expression of sexual insecurity masquerading as a form of political rebellion against sexual conformity. Mailer presents Rojack's sexual encounter with Ruta as a pivotal moment in his choice "between the Devil (sodomy) and the Lord (procreation), or death and life, [in which] Rojack once again opts for death" (Millet 15). Millett sums up Mailer's valorization of his machismo hero by stating that "*An American Dream* is an exercise in how to kill your wife and be happy ever after" (15), aptly bringing attention to the expense at which Mailer's conception of masculine agency comes and the sexual violence it entails.

Millett extends this critique in her discussion of "The White Negro," describing the essay as Mailer's "attempt to 'cash in' on black alienation" (327) by valorizing sexual violence. According to Millett, Mailer confuses "the simply antisocial with the revolutionary" (317) as he applies "a subtle critical method" (317) to the "virtues of violence [. . .] as a personal and sexual style" (317) of hip. She links Mailer's interest with the potency of the orgasm to Reich, noting that Mailer "once put himself forward as a hero of the sexual revolution, and true to form, saw it in terms of a stirring combat" (322). Millett notes that by the 1960s, "sexual libertarianism [. . .] managed to exceed anything Mailer desired, and in the course of time his attitudes have hardened so they might do credit to a parish priest" (322). Yet, Mailer attempts to conceive of the hipster as a political subject in the midst of an expansion of liberal psychiatric discourse which regulates and pathologizes some forms of sexuality. As he proposes new interracial and sexual relations along with new potentialities for capital production, Mailer disturbs notions of heterosexual relations, marriage, and the reproduction of the nuclear family as an economic mainstay to Fordist production.

Mailer's use of the phrase "white negro," as Michael Szalay points out, places two antithetical categories in relationship so as to rewrite the differences and thereby predicate a new category" (18). As the critics discussed above point out, the essay does not escape many racist assumptions regarding African American psychological complexity, hyper sexuality, and promiscuity in creating the category of "The White Negro." For Mailer, these marginalizing characteristics are integrated into the figure of the "white negro" as he articulates the potential for psychiatric classifications to make visible and redraw the boundaries of sexual relations. He does so with the hopes of disturbing the liberal consensus and the role of domestic production and consumption that bolsters it. In this sense, Mailer is both acknowledging and sharply diverging from a discourse of sexual pathology of the 1950s. The sexual psychopath that Mailer associates with black masculinity is familiar in non-racially specific constructions of sexual deviance. For instance, Estelle B. Freedman points out that in the period from 1935 through 1960:

> the male sexual deviant became the subject of special attention, particularly if he was inadequately masculine (the effeminate homosexual) or hypermasculine (the sexual psychopath). Both categories of deviant males were thought to attack children, thus simultaneously threatening sexual innocence, gender roles, and the social order. The psychopath neatly fit these concerns. From the origin of the concept, the psychopath had been perceived as a drifter, an unemployed man who lived beyond the boundaries of familial and social controls. (Freedman 89)

In the characteristics of the "psychopath and part-psychopath" (Mailer 307) that Mailer attributes to hipsters, he sees the possibility "to create a new nervous system for themselves" (307), describing a psychiatric subject that is at the centre of reconstituting the Cold War social order.

The sexual potency and potential for violence that Mailer attributes to the hipster are registered in psychiatric discourse as demarcating the limits of sexual mores which were endorsed as elements of a healthy family dynamic that was expanding sexual practices within heterosexual relations. In other words, the sexual psychopath to which Mailer turns, by dictating sexual practices that threatened the safety of the social order, in particular women and children, gave license for expanded sexual relations beyond those of liberalism. Freedman notes that such sexual license expanded "within marriage or outside it" (85). She points out that "[t]he response to the sexual psychopath helped legitimize less violent, but previously taboo, sexual acts while it stigmatized unmanly, rather than unwomanly, behavior as the most serious threat to sexual order" (Freedman 87). Women were becoming less subject to policing, while sexually violent acts by men that threatened society with either hypermasculinity or inadequate masculinity emerged as increasingly important subjectivities of discourse surrounding sexual pathology. Mailer's turn to the sexual psychopath, then, appears as an intelligible means of beginning to think through the political capacity of subjects constituted by psychiatric discourse to occupy the margins of society in the midst of expanding sexual norms of liberalism.

To begin dismantling the sexual norms of consensus politics, Mailer acknowledges expanding sexual norms and the marginal subjectivities on which they rely. His concern with and even celebration of forms of what were deemed to be deviant sexuality, then, are Mailer's often problematic and limited attempts to theorize a pathway through narrowing political possibilities by writing as a kind of anti-expert on social psychiatry to distinguish himself from the conformity and technocracy of the medical establishment, similar to the position taken by anti-psychiatrists such as Laing. In this way, Mailer retains the alienated position as a writer, which he expounds in *The Partisan Review*, while demonstrating his ability to engage with and

reformulate expert psychiatric discourse. In "The White Negro," he positions himself in relation to the technologies that are celebrated by Cold War liberalism, which extend into psychiatric knowledge. Mailer states:

> we have been forced to live with the suppressed knowledge that the smallest facets of our personality or the most minor projection of our ideas, or indeed the absence of ideas and the absence of personality could mean equally well that we might still be doomed to die as a cipher in some vast statistical operation in which our teeth would be counted, and our hair would be saved, but our death itself would be unknown. (300)

Invoking the specter of the concentration camps, he points to the continued potential for a dehumanizing technocracy that is responsible for an existential death. The effects of such dehumanizing technological rationality, while most visible in the holocaust of the Second World War, reappear within the state mental institutions.[50] Mailer thus conveys the proliferation of psychiatric patient producing apparatuses into which he hopes to intervene and reconstitute political subjectivity via the contested terrain of pathology and health.

Mailer links conformity to psychiatric knowledge and discourse by coupling masculinity with heterosexual marriage as the healthy ideal of the Cold War security state. This conformity entails a collective "failure of nerve" (300) that leaves only "isolated courage of isolated people"

[50] There is a multitude of publications documenting the poor conditions of state mental hospitals, due to underfunding and overcrowding. For instance, Albert Deutsch's 1948 expose *The Shame of the States* provides an array of chilling photos to accompany his indictment of custodial care in state run psychiatric institutions. Furthermore, John Maurice Grimes' 1954 *When Minds Go Wrong* asserts that partisan politics play a large role in funding hospitals, which leads to ineffective custodial care. According to Grimes, functional mental illnesses such as dementia praecox (schizophrenia) can be treated effectively, rather than deferring to long term institutionalization.

(300).[51] Such conformity draws from Reich's thought in two significant ways in that Mailer links the conformity that black masculinity evades to "socially monolithic ideas of the single mate, the solid family and the respectable love life" (340). Mailer positions monogamous heterosexual marriage here as agency quelling sexual relations that perpetuate existing conditions of conformity to a technocratic society. Secondly, this conformity and closure to new modes of experience, according to Mailer, will "attack the body and imprison one's energy until one is jailed in the prison air of other people's habits" (300), echoing Reich's theory of body armor, which functions as a defence mechanism against socially transgressive sexual behaviours by containing the orgone energy that is freed in orgastic potency.

Mailer privileges the often unintended effects of coercion and conformity. These effects are most pronounced in the regulatory aims and disciplinary technologies of psychiatric treatment, including diagnosis, which produces subjectivities that are deemed deviant, such as the sexual psychopath. The effects, then, are not only conformity and the economic relations that rely on the nuclear family, but also the attempts of psychiatry to re-classify and legitimize heterosexuality in contrast to the construction of deviant or subversive subjectivities, which converge in Mailer's construction of the violent, homosexual, and hypersexual hipster.

For Mailer, turning to Reich's recognition of the revolutionary potential of sexuality offers an apt means of dissenting from the political discourse of liberalism. Unlike Reich, however, Mailer sees violence as a necessary element for the disruption of 1950s consensus politics. Mailer turns to transgressive sexual subjects because he identifies them as having the greatest ability to unsettle sexual and economic mores. The psychopathic tendencies and

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[51] Ellison's narrator in *Invisible Man* may be a representation of this isolation, as his participation in an informal economy occurs on a largely individual basis.

unrestrained sexuality of the hipster provides Mailer with a key figure for conveying a new terrain for Cold War political resistance. As Freedman notes, "the image of the sexual psychopath revealed a deep discomfort with the potential violence of male sexuality unconstrained by female purity of 'uncontrolled desires'" (196). For Mailer, female purity was hardly a consideration. Moreover, by focusing on the psychopathic personality, Mailer is not "[c]onfusing the simply antisocial with the revolutionary" (Millett 317); instead, he is identifying an undercurrent of mainstream society with an often covert "cultural influence" (Mailer 307) that regulated sexual and economic relations. Cold War liberalism's concern with American masculinity, the anxiety surrounding softness towards communism, and attempts of cold warriors to assume the posture of a rebel have become too steeped in conservative tendencies for Mailer. As K.A. Cuordileone asserts: "It was in liberal circles [. . .] that the rebellion against conformity became *de rigueur*, and while the style took numerous cultural and literary forms, it achieved its political expression in the image of the new cold warrior—the liberal" (163). Mailer's "white negro," however, evades the stylized posturing of liberalism in favour of a hip or cool performance and posturing of violent sexual transgression. Thus, similar to Laing's cool male patients, the "white negro" exercises agency by imitating Mailer's fictional imitation of hip, in this case, white sociology's representation of black pathology.[52] If the image of pathologized and hyper-sexual black masculinity on which Mailer draws to flout the confines of liberalism and rebel against the conformist pressures facing the writer is recognized as an imitation of sociological constructions of blackness, then Mailer's "white negro" appears as an iteration of postwar cool in which Mailer extrapolates from the "race problem" and "social pathology" of

[52] In a similar vein, Joseph Wenke asserts that "The White Negro" is "essentially an act of myth-making, a work of fiction" (71) as he analyzes the hipster as an early iteration of Mailer's Romantic hero.

African Americans the political agency of the writer. In doing so, he posits pathologized blackness as a kind of discursive performance that provides an opportunity for the writer as rebel to engage with alternatives to Fordist production that were maligned by the 1950s.

Mailer's consideration of alternatives to capitalism relies on Reich's yoking of Marxism and his theory of orgone energy as a form of biological energy, yet Mailer significantly departs from Reich in his emphasis on the transgressive nature of sexual acts that demonstrate courage in order to release dammed sexual and creative energy. Echoing Reich, Mailer asserts that a sexual revolution is necessary, but it will not come about "until the crises of capitalism in the twentieth century would yet be understood as the unconscious adaptations of society to solve its economic balance at the expense of a new mass psychological imbalance" (319). Despite criticisms of Mailer's use of Reich from Ellison and contemporary critics, such as Morris Dickstein who refers to "Reichian boilerplate" (151) in "The White Negro," Mailer here intervenes into not only Reich's Marxist discourse, but also his professional psychiatric discourse to stake a claim for writers to the authority of social psychiatry and to expand popular and sociological discourse beyond the existing parameters warning of the sexual psychopath. The creative courage and energy that Mailer privileges becomes the basis for a call to political action for the writer as he attempts to wrestle authority from the expert and the institution and place it in the grip of what he conceives as a courageous form of manhood. This notion of masculinity is evident in Mailer's claim that the hipster "must find his courage at the moment of violence, or equally make it in the act of love, find a little more between his woman and himself, or indeed between his mate and himself (since many hipsters are bisexual)" (312). Mailer's equation of violence and sex as a pinnacle moment of productive courage is ultimately what he posits as a necessity for creating a

"new nervous system" (307), one in which sexual constraints are loosened through an act of cool mimicry.

For Mailer, expert authority is couched in the economic and political formations that sublimate the liberal's willingness to be a "sexual adventurer" (Mailer 317). The writer, by contrast, whose synapses must come to resemble the hipster's, is capable of employing his status as "sexual adventurer" (317) to disrupt the "socially monolithic ideas of the single mate, the solid family and the respectable love life" (Mailer 302). The psychopath's experience and adventurous nature are apparent in his regression to an infantile state, which, according to Mailer, makes the psychopath "difficult to analyze because the fundamental decision of his nature is to try to live the infantile fantasy" (308). This infantile fantasy enables the psychopath to access previously sublimated energies to reconfigure sexual and economic relations. Mailer states: "if one is to change one's habits, one must go back to the source of their creation, and so the psychopath exploring backward along the road of the homosexual, the orgiast, the drug-addict, the rapist, the robber and the murderer seeks to find those violent parallels to the violent and often hopeless contradictions he knew as an infant and as a child" (308).[53] By positing an array of sexual relations as socially transgressive and violent acts, Mailer seeks to claim sublimated energies as the terrain of the writer, who must find a way to articulate such energies into a form of political rebellion.

The writer's ability to ascribe meaning to sublimated energies makes the psychopath's ability to halt the reproduction of the familial unit and the habits of consumption under Fordism which it sustains apparent. In this sense, should the writer effectively harness the energies of the

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[53] Despite Mailer's purported shift in perspective in "The Homosexual Villain," he continues to align homosexuality with criminality.

psychopath, new habits of non-capitalized production can emerge, dismantling the proliferation of consumer products and reconfiguring the structure of leisure time during which Americans consume these products as an outlet for energies that are not conducive to Fordist production. Mailer points to the ability of sexual energy to manifest and circulate through bodies in ways that are not contained within the familial unit. His conception of the "white negro" seeks sexual relations deemed to be deviant and unproductive because they do not contribute to the nuclear family and therefore the stability of the Cold War consumption economy. "Unproductive" or nonprocreative sexual acts, some going beyond the expanding boundaries established by discourse on the sexual psychopath, including interracial sex or homosexuality, allow for the circulation of previously sublimated energy, prompting new sex-economic relations that disrupt the Fordist economy of the 1950s as a central component of the Cold War strategy of the United States. By attempting to render the potential of the psychotic intelligible, Mailer locates a therapeutic informal economy of sexual relations, similar to Reich's attempt to render biological energy visible and reconfigure the flow of energy into labour. In representing this potential, Mailer constitutes the writer as a political subject from the abstractions and unregistered flows of the Fordist economy and Cold War liberalism, which seek to constitute productive, and, thus, healthy subjects. His representation of sexually transgressive acts both enable and limit the extent to which his attempt to thrust the pathologized subject into political discourse succeeds.

Unproductive Sexual Economies and Corporate Productivity in *Why Are We in Vietnam?*

By the late 1960s, in the midst of the dissolution of the Cold War consensus and mounting pressures of stagflation, Mailer further contemplates the representation of sexually transgressive acts of violence as the terrain of the masculine, politically engaged writer. Mailer's 1967 novel *Why Are We in Vietnam?* is also concerned with articulating a new therapeutic

economy that involves sexual violence. By this point, however, Mailer grapples with the shortcomings of his attempts to change liberal political discourse of the 1950s. The pathologized "white negro," as a figure of mimicry and duality, is linked to Mailer's disembodied narrator of *Why Are We in Vietnam?*, D.J. Jethroe. D.J. speaks from a liminal space, signalling the duality of his psychic state; he is both a white eighteen-year-old at a dinner party in Texas and a "real crazy-ass broken-legged Harlem Spade" (Mailer 52). D.J.'s narrative voice also straddles divergent economic positions as the son of Rusty Jethroe, a corporate executive with Central Consolidated Combined Chemical and Plastic (4C and P), and a black man living in Harlem. D.J.'s language clearly conveys his alignment with Mailer's sense of hip. According to Mailer in "The White Negro," the language of hip "cannot really be taught" (348). It is "an artful language, tested and shaped by an intense experience" (310). Mailer's characterization of this language suggests that it conveys authentic social experience. Mailer explains:

> if one shares none of the experiences of elation and exhaustion which it is equipped to describe, then it seems merely arch or vulgar or irritating. It is a pictorial language, but pictorial like non-objective art, imbued with the dialectic of small but intense change, a language for the microcosm, in this case, man, for it takes the immediate experiences of any passing man and magnifies the dynamic of his movements, not specifically but abstractly so that he is seen more as a vector in a network of forces than as a static character in a crystallized field. (310)

While D.J.'s race remains unclear, he ostensibly has access to the psychological experience that this language conveys. He uses psychiatric discourse to construct himself as a sexual deviant, but Mailer ultimately complicates and reformulates his view of the efficacy of this discourse to critique liberalism and respond to Fordist production in *Why Are We in Vietnam?* D.J.'s

narrative, as it seeks to re-employ language relating to that which is deemed perverse or abject, both re-inscribes and disarticulates the capacity of the writer to discursively enact the political and sexual violence of hip that Mailer once deemed a necessary part of Cold War political discourse.

D.J.'s narrative employs the psychiatric discourse of sexual pathology to construct the nuclear family as an assemblage of short-circuited desires and contained bodily flows. D.J.'s seemingly vulgar language appears to flout productive labour and the familial relations through which it occurs, constituting him as a speaking subject capable of exercising agency against the family's role in sustaining corporate capitalist production and undermining Rusty's role as father. Mailer uses D.J.'s language to articulate new familial and sexual relations through non-productive labour performed in ways that transgress the sexual boundaries of the nuclear family. Sexual transgression and violence in D.J.'s narrative enact a therapeutic economy which entails an "apocalyptic orgasm" ("The White Negro" 309) that is stifled by capitalist production. However, Mailer also suggests that the pathologized desires and abjection of bodily flows that psychiatric discourse pathologizes will come to be rendered profitable and productive by the expansion of corporate capitalism, as he explores the reciprocal relationship between the corporate co-option of an intervention into the pathological and D.J.'s employment of it to disrupt the familial and sexual relations on which corporate capitalism is coming to depend, particularly as it reacts to the emerging crisis of Fordist production in the late 1960s.

D.J. relates how Rusty is now head of a division focusing on "the cancer market" (29) after 4C and P "wanted to get in on the bright new fortunes being made along the rim-scab of Carcinoma Curds and Craters which D.J. is here to tell you is America's last frontier" (29). Pure Pores, the cigarette filter designed by 4C and P, absorbs nicotine and saliva, but, D.J. notes,

"causes cancer of the lip" (29-30). Pure Pores both perpetuates consumer desire for an addictive product, securing this market, and mitigates this product's addictive effects by filtering out nicotine. However, there remains a need to continually expand the market due to the lip cancer caused by Pure Pores, which potentially reduces the market. As a corporate executive in the division of 4C and P that sells Pure Pores, Rusty is, then, responsible for the continual production and expansion of a cancerous capitalist market that creates consumer desire. Pure Pores is a means of continually expanding a market for tobacco consumption that is also always potentially in recession. Therefore, Fordist production must seek new terrain to expand its markets. Rusty and 4C and P's expansion into this final frontier of cancer suggests a crisis of Fordist production that is becoming pathological.

Rusty is fully implicated in the grotesque need to expand the capitalist market for increased consumption, which becomes apparent to D.J. when he looks at Rusty while high. For D.J., smoking marijuana provides a hip perspective on the corporate mind and body. D.J.'s scatological and ostensibly pathological discourse, which Mailer makes the reader labour over, relays the unseen nature of the corporate executive: "On pot, (Rusty's nose) looks suddenly like a hand, got a red mean finger at the tip, stab you right in the middle of your lie, or grab your mouth and twist it off. It's a shit converter of a nose" (34). Rusty, in other words, has a nose for the waste that D.J. associates with the output of the corporate mind. This becomes apparent as D.J. describes his belief that "America is run by a mysterious hidden mastermind, a secret creature who's got a plastic asshole installed in his brain whereby he can shit out all his corporate management of thoughts. I mean that's what you get when you look in Rusty's eyes" (34). D.J. sees the output of capitalist production as waste that stems from the minds of corporate executives like his father. Mailer links waste and cancer in "The Twelfth Presidential Paper"

when he explains that the solution to economic crisis "is more likely to be found over the years in the concealed nature of the waste within the industry, the poor workmanship, the deterioration of materials, the inflated value, and the literal cancers (such as institutional advertising) which are to be found in the industry's mode of production" (292). D.J.'s hip perspective enables a view of Rusty's interior, exposing "the rude, the unseen, and the unsayable" ("Twelfth Presidential Paper" 293) of corporate discourse. A product like Pure Pores, then, is a symptom of economic crisis. It is on the verge of ceasing to be productive and expansive, which demands that Rusty conquer new territory and expand markets.

The shit that comes from the plastic asshole of the corporate mind is a necessity of corporate relations, which becomes apparent during Rusty and D.J.'s hunting trip to Alaska. D.J. relates how along with himself and his friend Tex, two of Rusty's "flunkies—call them Medium Asshole Pete and Medium Asshole Bill" (46) accompany Rusty on the hunting trip to the Brooks Range Mountains. The hunt comes to include "ego status embroilments between numbers, guides, and executives" (46). Rusty is unwilling to heed the advice of his guide, Big Luke Felinka, and his assistant Big Ollie, as he resorts to any means necessary to kill a grizzly, securing his dominant position within the corporate hierarchy. Rusty relies on the testimony of Bill and Pete to affirm his kill because, D.J. notes, "they can read each other's corporate ass voices" (46) and detect a lie. For Rusty, using a helicopter and high-powered weapons to kill a grizzly is not beyond the lengths to which he's willing to go to assert his position. In this sense, Rusty is seeking to expand his productive capacity into the Alaskan wilderness, as he uses leisure time of a hunting trip to bolster his masculinity over Pete and Bill. He turns to technologies of war for continued productivity and expansion of capitalist markets, as he sublimates his libidinal energies into the violence of the hunt that makes this expansion possible.

Rusty's position within the corporate structure of 4C and P is indicative of the familial relations that exist between him, D.J., and Alice (Haleloo) Jethroe. As Rusty's son, D.J. is in line to be the inheritor of his father's responsibility for opening channels for the flow of production into new markets. D.J. tells of Rusty's position as Oedipal father, as he defends his place against the son to ensure his role as patriarchal producer of offspring and consumer products. D.J. links Rusty's sexual potency to his corporate productivity, noting that "D.J.'s father, big Daddy, old Rusty, has got the dynamite" (14) that Alice uses for a phallus. Rusty "don't come, he explodes, he's a geyser of love, hot piss, shit, corporation pus, hate, and heat" (14). Rusty is among the Texas husbands whose wives relate their sexual peculiarities to their psychiatrists. These men include "ex hot rodders, hunters, cattlemen, oil riggers, corporation gears and infrastructure finks" (12). Rusty belongs to two categories and as such his ability to orgasm is linked to the violence of a firearm: "every one of these bastards has the sexual peculiarities of red-blooded men" (13) who "can't come unless [. . .] squinting down a gunsight" (13). The Alaskan hunting trip is, then, a pivotal event for Rusty because it provides an opportunity for the release of violent libidinal energy that is unreleased in marital sex. For Mailer, then, the corporate executive finds sexual release through the discharging of ammunition as he asserts his position over his corporate "yes-men" (48). Mailer thus positions Rusty and 4C and P within an economic system, where, according to Reich "[o]nly small amounts of biological energy can be discharged in an interest in work" (137). This "makes a natural circulation of energy in the organism impossible" (*Function of the Orgasm* 136). Rusty's investment of libidinal energy in the hunting trip thus demonstrates a damming of libidinal energy that emerges in violent acts, resembling his position within the family structure. As Rusty confronts the Alaskan wilderness with high powered

weapons, he seeks to not only expand the terrain of corporate relations, but the masculine productivity which is invested in it.

The crisis of production that Rusty faces with 4C and P is also apparent in D.J.'s incestual desire for his mother. Rusty faces D.J. as a rival both for her attention and as a corporate mind, capable of the ingenuity and inventiveness that capitalist expansion requires. D.J. tells of Rusty's competitive nature, which has become evident in their relationship as father and son. The narrator of Intro Beep 3, referring to D.J. in third person, tells how D.J, feeling sorry for his father at age thirteen, allowed his father to tackle him: "He let him tackle him just once. Jes once—right in the dry linty Dallas old navel of Texas. Rusty was so het up he *flung* D.J. and—mail in your protests—he bit him in the ass, right through his pants, that's how insane he was with frustration, that's how much red blood was in his neck" (38). The narrator explains how D.J. took his father's advice on competitiveness and "picked up a pick-axe handle, and bopped his daddy over the dead center of his head" (39). Rusty's aggression towards D.J. is an expression of his unfulfilled desire for D.J.'s mom, as the narrator explains that Rusty was "too chicken to bite Hallelujah's beautiful butt" (39). D.J. closely resembles his father in appearance; however, he is "full of mother love received in full crazy bitch perfume aromas from Hallie" (141). Rusty's biting of D.J. is then an act of competitive sexual aggression that has been displaced from wife to son.

Rusty's view of sex as a sport makes sexual and economic competition within the family apparent, as D.J. explains his father's view that sexual competition is a site for the assertion of white masculinity: "Yeah, the time is soon coming, thinks Rusty, when fornication will be professional athletics, and everyone will watch the national eliminations on TV" (96). He sees in this sexual competition the potential to expand the television market by making the private act of

sex into a public competition that channels desire into consumption, effectively managing it for the purposes of capitalist production. Rusty considers how there will be competition for "happy magnification by Color Vision RCA" (96), which will cause America to "really be looking for a white hope" (96). Rusty's sexual angst is linked to his perception that his status as a white male is in decline, along with his competitiveness in the market, as he is reduced to a consumer of sexual desire: "Of course, thinks Rusty, I'll be having to watch. Oh, the ignominy" (96). Rusty sees D.J. as a potential participant in this competitive professional fornication, as he wonders: "Will boys like D.J. and Tex be in the finals with a couple of Playboy bunnies or black ass honeys?" (96). Rusty's fear and angst that D.J. will usurp him as a figure of sexual prowess and productive capacity is apparent in the familial dynamic. While Rusty sees the hunting trip as an opportunity to reassert his dominance, D.J. recalls a childhood memory of Rusty beating him for interrupting an act of fornication with Alice. This initiates a competitive urge in D.J., which causes him to pose a further threat to Rusty's corporate status. As D.J. and Rusty pursue a grizzly, D.J. associates the bear's "familiar intimate family rub of itching hide" (120) with "all that dried-out sunbaked smoked jerkin of meat (Rusty's) cowboy fore-ass bears used to eat" (31-31). He notes that "they used to use that hide for everything before they'd eat it" (32). The bear's hide and the hide of Rusty's "cowboy fore-ass bears" (32), as D.J. puns on forebearers, links Rusty to his ancestors and positions D.J as a hunter who is seeking to inflict violence on this familial lineage. As they pursue the grizzly, D.J. becomes aware of his "desire to turn his gun and blast a shot into Rusty's fat fuck face" (120) as he recalls the "memory of Rusty's belt on his back, he five years old and shrieking off the fuck of his head" (121) possibly as a result of "a child's screaming in the middle of, and so interrupting, a Hallelujah Sir Jet Throne fuck" (121). However, D.J was "saved by cunt" (121) as his mother intervenes. D.J.'s derogatory reference to

his mother signals his recognition of his diseased mind. He refers to a “tumor if that’s what D.J.’s got in his brain” (121), a “pretty seed of backed-up murder passed from valve asshole Rusty’s heart to the seat of D.J’s brain” (121). D.J., like Rusty, experiences a short circuiting of desire, directed into murderous rage in competition for Alice and positing the nuclear family as a pathologized, potentially unproductive, and in need of a therapeutic reformulation. Both Rusty and D.J. experience the short circuiting of sexual desire within the familial structure, which manifests in their desire to expand the terrain of sexual aggression into the hunting trip in Alaska and establish themselves as masculine heroes by exerting displaced sexual energy into acts of violence, which are potentially productive.

As D.J. hunts the grizzly as the embodiment of his father, he also seeks to differentiate himself from Rusty’s role as patriarchal corporation man, always on a conquest to conquer new capitalist markets for his sexual potency. D.J.’s description of the tumor inherited from Rusty (121) is indicative of his understanding of the pathological nature of the father-son relationship. The narrator, however, also refers to “something black-ass and terrible, black as a tumor in your brain, black as the black-ass consciousness of the crippled Harlem genius which D.J. shoves up as gambit for one possible embodiment for his remarkable brain” (52). This pathologized blackness, not unlike Mailer’s representation of black masculinity in “The White Negro,” also functions as “a new kind of flesh, sarcoma, melanoma, carcinoma” (53). It is both cancer and, as blackness, a threat to Rusty’s sexual potency, as he expresses in his angst about televised professional fornication. While Rusty is a forbearer of D.J., who inherits Rusty’s sexually charged and violent energy which is exerted in the expansion of corporate productivity, D.J.’s cancerous brain also poses a threat to Rusty by enabling sexual desire within existing familial

relationships to be redirected into channels that would displace Rusty or render his position as father unintelligible.

D.J.'s discussion of Rusty's ancestor's many innovative uses of hide places Rusty in a long familial line of inventive individuals, which presumably includes D.J. Rusty's ancestors find a wide array of uses for this commodity, especially by applying it to the management of bodily flows: "they'd […] wipe their own ass with it, pick up the pus from the corner of their eye, blow their nose, mop the piss off their boots, even use that dry old piece of meat to wrap around their dick for stuffing when they want to sodomize a real big fat slack cow" (32). The multiple uses are not capitalized; yet, in a later phase of capitalism, a keen eye for profitability like that of Rusty or D.J. might recognize the potential in the hide. D.J. positions Rusty alongside these relatives, noting that Rusty's "cells are filled with the biological inheritance and transmissions of his ancestors" (32). D.J.'s cancerous brain, however, entails a mutation of his DNA, which no longer adheres to normal mechanisms of cellular reproduction. Thus, this form of cellular reproduction is unproductive and deemed pathological, but it is also the source of a new consciousness that enables D.J.'s hip relationship to capitalist production.

As a rival who fears and despises Rusty's corporate position, D.J. works to distinguish himself from his father. As Robert J. Begiebing explains, "D. J. fears that his 'success' will be to become like Rusty, and in this fear D. J. represents a generation of disaffected youth. Such 'success,' D. J. warns us, stimulates 'you to suffocate,' to abandon the power of the authentic self" (19). Begiebing's analysis indicates that D.J presupposes the existence of an authentic, pre-social self that is infringed upon by the pressures of the family and corporate capitalism; however, D.J.'s subjectivity is constituted within the flux of capitalist means of production. Mailer gives no indication of an authentic self that exists prior to the familial tensions produced

by the nature of desire under Cold War Fordist production and its crisis. D.J. calls his inheritance of Rusty's biological traits into question, making apparent the instability of his disembodied narrative voice as a disc jockey. He links the recording of his voice to the genetic record that DNA provides: "I mean just think of the good Lord, Amen! Amen! Why, there's that Lord, slipping right into us, making an *operation* in the bowels of Creation so there's a tiny little transistorized tape recorder not as big as a bat's gnat's nut, why a million angels can dance on the idiot pinhead of that tape recorder, DNA, RNA, right? And it takes it all down" (emphasis in Mailer 24). By likening the tape recorder to DNA, D.J. first presents an archive that links him to Rusty. However, he soon undermines the ability to identify him in this way, suggesting that the genetic archive that would link him to Rusty is also not indicative of a clear lineage between them. D.J. states: "the Lord hears your beep, the total of all you […] Unless you can put false material into the tape recorder. Think of that" (25). Here, D.J. opens the possibility that he is "sheer fucked right out of (his) mind" (25) or is "a Spade writing like a Shade" (26) in Harlem. In calling his lineage into question, D.J. extends relations outside of familial lines of inheritance as represented by DNA. The productive desire that occurs within the Oedipal family can circulate into wider networks, enabling a new mode of production that frees D.J from Rusty's productive violence as a form of capitalist labour. The short circuiting of incestual desire within familial relations can be remedied by turning to a new mode of representation which, although it posits D.J.'s brain as cancerous, also undermines medical discourse by employing technology in the form of the tape recorder to undermine DNA as a determiner or race. By modifying the material of the tape recorder, D.J. suggests DNA may not represent the speaking subject. Rather, the subject becomes constituted through the language of hip that D.J. uses to sever familial relations and the limited channels for desire that they enable.

In opening up new channels for desire, Mailer shows the potential for Reich's concept of sex-economic work to supplant capitalist production. However, this is far from a foregone conclusion. Mailer continues to blur the distinction between Rusty's attempts to satisfy his desire through the expansion of markets for corporate production and D.J.'s attempts to divest himself of any kind of value to the corporate world. His ability to do this is dependent on the distinct perspective he has as a narrator who, like Mailer's hipster, is open to exploring the wilderness of the unconscious. In "The White Negro," Mailer encourages the hipster to explore the urban wilderness; in this novel, the Alaskan wilderness becomes the terrain on which an unstable consciousness expands. D.J.'s ability to see through the "corporate management of thoughts" (Mailer 34) distinguishes him from Rusty as well as his yes men, Medium Asshole Pete and Medium Asshole Bill: "Now D.J. suffers from one great American virtue, or maybe it's a disease or ocular dysfunction—D.J. sees right through shit. There's not a colon in captivity which manufactures a home product that is transparency proof to Dr. Jekyll's X-ray insight" (45). D.J. sees "the secret of the corporation—it is filled with men who are professional bullshit packers" (48). D.J.'s unique perspective on corporate products enables him to reconfigure their place within the market. His reference to a "home product" (45) indicates the role of consumer products made by corporations in the constitution of Cold War domesticity. While Rusty confronts the need to expand the market for such products and therefore would find D.J.'s perspective advantageous to the corporation, D.J. uses it to further disrupt the already ailing nuclear family structure and domestic consumption by redirecting potentially productive flows of affect into other sexual relations, expanding the possible range of sexual relations beyond the Cold War familial ideal.

While D.J's expansion of the terrain for productive affect outside of the family parallels Rusty's need to expand consumption beyond domestic markets, D.J.'s ability to reconfigure the consumer products of corporate capitalism thwarts the potential for the corporation to constitute new desiring consumer subjectivities that are suitable for the expansion of capitalist markets. D.J.'s reconfiguration of the relationship between desiring consumer, consumer product, and desire forecloses capitalist productivity and expansion of markets. This becomes apparent as D.J. constructs himself as a hip Thomas Edison: "Edison was hip, baby, the way you make it is on the distractions" (10). He is capable of bypassing the strictures of capitalist production that render consumer products profitable. As Michael Szalay puts it, D.J.'s reference to Edison indicates: "The most valuable work gets done creatively, off task, on break from routinized labor" (216-217). For Szalay, "this new science of leisure opens up new areas for production and profit" (218). However, Szalay continues, "unproductive labour doesn't stay unproductive. Edison takes a break from his efficiency work and opens expansive leisure markets with a new invention" (217). D.J. points this out, noting that Edison invented the phonograph while attempting to improve the speed of the Atlantic Cable (Mailer 9-10). For D.J., the problem that Edison poses is how to employ unproductive labour in an economic formation that does not reproduce the relations of the nuclear family and the patterns of consumption that sustain it in a capitalist market. Instead, D.J. seeks to reconstitute pathological desire and unproductive labour as central components of a therapeutic politics that remedies the sexual and economic shortcomings of capitalism. Doing so will enable D.J. to constitute a subjectivity that is not a function of the corporate masculinity to which Rusty adheres. Like Laing's patients, D.J. seeks a form of autonomy from the family structure, and thus turns to the redistribution of productive affect to find it.

While D.J. presents relations within the nuclear family as being responsible for the damming of affect that capitalist production requires to be directed into domestic consumption, he also conveys psychiatry's role in normalizing this formation and pathologizing relations that do not adhere to it. Speaking as his mother, Alice Jethroe (aka Halleloo or Hallelujah), D.J. equates psychiatric discourse with the family's tendency to render his relationship with Tex abject for its inability to reproduce heterosexual relations that sustain consumption. According to D.J., "she don't talk that way, she just thinks that way" (22). D.J's appropriation of Alice's voice enables him to demonstrate the abject nature of his relationship with Tex, which "disturbs identity, system, order [and …] does not respect borders, positions, rules" (Kristeva 4) and thus how it disturbs the familial structure and the sexual relations needed to perpetuate it. Alice sees Tex as having "dirty vile polluted cesspool Eenyen blood like Mexican" (19), which is distinct from "my daddy's and my Rusty's daddy's daddy" (22). Tex is the product of "the filthiest of the Indians and the slimiest red hot sexyass Nazis fucking each other" (22). By speaking for his mother, D.J. conveys her acknowledgement and subsequent rejection of any similarities between her family and the Hydes. Moreover, she is repulsed by the fact that Tex is the son of an undertaker who "grows up in his daddy's big booming business which is stuffing corpses and doing God knows what to their little old pithy bowels and their dropped stomachs and whatever else corpses got which must be plenty or why pay thousands of dollars for a funeral unless it's a fumigation" (19). She avoids making any comparison of the similarity between Tex's father's business and Rusty's position with 4C and P in "the cancer market" (29), which both rely on the expansion of the capitalist market into the internal flows of the body to constitute new consumer subjectivities.

Such subjects, like Alice, become bodily sites of regulation, contained by consumer products. D.J. notes how she keeps her armpits perfumed and washes "three times a day" (16) so that her scent is "just enough to keep the breed alive" (17). For her, this regulation of the body is acceptable because it is reproductive and manages the abject. However, Gottfried Hyde Senior's undertaker business puts Tex in contact with "all sorts of black occult steamy grimes of things, swamp music and black lightning and soundless thunder—purple wonders, […] intuitions that inflame the brain" (22). She sees Tex as a kind of black pathology, resembling the tumor that D.J. locates in his brain and with the ocular disease that enables him to "see right through shit" (45), which provides D.J. with the inventiveness of Edison. In this sense, the abject blackness of Tex has entered D.J., signaling her fear of homosexuality, as she presents it as an inflammation of the brain and therefore a case for psychiatric treatment. The construction of the abject and the pathological that D.J. locates in the conversation between his mother and her psychiatrist, then, is at the centre of a competition for signification between D.J and corporate capital. As anti-psychiatry makes clear, psychiatric knowledge and practices may be utilized for the production of desire that serves corporate markets, or it may be wrested from the crisis of Fordist production and rendered unproductive in informal economic flows within new and unstable subjectivities, such as D.J., providing autonomy from the family.

For Alice, the relationship between D.J and Tex entails a sense of abjection. D.J. relates how she sees the two as breaching the boundaries between self and other, narcissistically hindering sexual reproduction. Rather than recognizing her hinderance of D.J.'s autonomy outside of the family unit, she imposes this on D.J. as he seeks to differentiate himself from his parents. In this sense, the Laingian ontological insecurity that D.J.'s relationship with Tex entails becomes a means of seeking autonomy from the family and its regulation of productive desire.

Speaking as Dr. Rothenberg in another instance of hip mimicry, D.J. attributes an array of disorders to himself including “incest fixes” (15) and being “a latent homosexual highly over-heterosexual with onanistic narcissistic and sodomistic overtones, a choir task force of libidinal cross-hybrided vectors” (15). By doing so, D.J. also constructs himself as being unable to distinguish himself from others or enter into a sexually productive relationship. According to psychiatric knowledge, his onanistic, narcissistic, and heterosexual characteristics are the result of misdirected libidinal energies. Speaking as Alice, D.J. relates how he and Tex are closely bound together in their masculine pursuits: “They’re stuck to each other like ranch dogs in a fuck. Hunting together, playing football together on the very same team, riding motorcycles together, holding hands while they ride, studying karate together, I bet they can’t even get their rocks off unless they’re put-putting in the same vaginal slime” (20). In their shared sexual pursuits, D.J. and Tex penetrate what is characterized as grotesque and abject together, further linking them to the kind of capitalist expansion that Alice fails to acknowledge in Rusty. She hopes that D.J. will take a more productive approach than Tex: “I hope at least Ranald has got the taste and sentiment to be putting it in the young lady’s vagina rather than going up her dirt track where old Tex Hyde belongs” (20-21). While she attempts to distinguish D.J. from Tex, the construction of pathology and the abject here binds D.J. and Tex together, contrasting with Alice’s conception of productive labour and consumption that reproduces the familial structure to sustain the Fordist economy.

The abjection and misdirected desire that D.J. sees his mother attributing to his relationship with Tex not only disturbs the familial structure and its role in sustaining the Cold War consumer economy, but also reformulates an economy of desire. Here, D.J. applies his innovativeness and inventiveness to products that do not serve capitalist production. For

instance, D.J. describes his idea for an "electric come machine" (10), which involves conductive metals cooled to absolute zero:

> take a cunt, put her near absolute zero, work up a ring of troth (this is a wedding, you nut) composed of Old Thallium, Mother Mercury, Lemuel Lead, Timothy Tin or Ike Indium, any one of those soft spooky witch metal elements will do, cool it till it's as cold as that beauteous cunt out near Absolute Zero, and then, man, hold your hairy jewels cause a shock is coming up, you just take and run and plunge your dick through the near absolute zero ring, zing into that gone ice snatch, whoo-ee! whoo-ee! pull it out before you rock stone ice pinnacle prick. You just set up a current, man, is going to keep that cunt in charge for months. (152-153)

D.J. applies his scientific knowledge to creating perpetual sexual stimulation, rather than to the destruction of a remote wilderness and its inhabitants in Alaska, Mailer's metaphor for Vietnam, or for cancer causing products such as cigarettes, as Rusty does with 4C and P. His application of scientific knowledge to sexual arousal also roughly parallels the development of vibrators from their origins as medical tools to products for personal sexual pleasure.[54] D.J.'s idea thus draws from scientific and medical knowledge and redirects this knowledge to the release of sexual energy in a non-violent manner. Here, D.J. performs the kind of "reciprocal appropriation" (101) that Allen Liu sees as characteristic of the counterculture's cool camouflage-technology or *camo-tech* (101) which was "the construction of a bodily or social pose that perfectly expressed the

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[54] According to Haillie Lieberman and Eric Schatzberg, the evidence that Rachel Maines uses in her book *The Technology of Orgasm* to substantiate her argument that physicians regularly used vibrators to induce clitoral orgasms in women in the 19th century as a treatment for hysteria is insufficient. They argue that electric vibrators were marketed to physicians as medical tools to be used on other parts of the body until the 1950s, when they first began to be marketed to consumers as massagers. See "A Failure of Academic Quality Control: *The Technology of Orgasm*" in *The Journal of Positive Sexuality.*

adjustment of technique to technology—but for *unproductive purposes*" (italics in Liu 101). The electrically charged ring reconstitutes reciprocal marital relations as D.J. refers to "a ring of troth" (153). However, within this reciprocal marriage with technology, orgasm has been separated from procreative sex and its need to reproduce commodity consumption.

D.J.'s idea for an alternate use for Pure Pores, the cancer-causing cigarette filter manufactured by 4C and P, is also indicative of his inventiveness and ingenuity. D.J. explains that the product can also be used as form of birth control: "should a petting party hose-down and gism shoot occur, as it may with the best of young friends and associates, why, stick our plastic filter up said girl's tootle and all misdirected gism will be absorbed" (29). D.J. thus positions this use of Pure Pores within non-procreative sex. His appropriation of the voices of both a corporate executive or advertisement here and his mother is also indicative of his attempt to wrest the signification of bodily flows, especially those that are couched in unproductive or pathologized behaviour, from capitalist markets. Richard Godden points out in his economic reading of *Why Are We in Vietnam?* that to address the problem of stagnation in the fifties and sixties, "there is a large increase in service sector investment. The aim is to transform collective, familial or private services into separate industries, and so into separate chances for corporate surplus" (187). Godden explains that from the perspective of corporate capital, "[a]ny gap or hole that yields no profit must be commodified" (187). Yet, D.J. resists this commodification by corporate capital, instead attempting to sever the link between the body's production of abjectness and pathology, on one hand, and corporate productivity on the other. With corporations like 4C and P seeking to commodify such areas, including his own brain, D.J. must compete by appropriating abjectness and pathology into an economic formation that is not driven by corporate profits.

D.J's relationship with Tex, which D.J. conveys as being pathologized by his mother and her psychiatrist, is a problem for the commodification of private bodily functions because D.J. and Tex are closely bound together in their non-productive sexual acts, as Alice complains, thwarting the transformation of the private into surplus value. D.J.'s description of the use of Pure Pores as a form of birth control entails a further mimicry of his mother's voice, as he recognizes that the product can be used to absorb "underarm funk" (29), but warns that one should "never, unless you're the Earl of Roderick, try to proctate it up her ass or she will never again be able to tinkle and she will die" (29). D.J. echoes both Alice's concern with body odor and her prohibition of anal penetration, but inverts them. Alice perfumes her armpits and ensures that her scent is "just enough to keep the breed alive" (17). Furthermore, her prohibition of anal penetration entails a hope that D.J. will engage in vaginal intercourse. Ultimately, she manages bodily flows and orifices for productive purposes. D.J., on the other hand, emphasizes the absorptiveness of Pure Pores so that there is no scent at all and by proposing the use of Pure Pores as a vaginal contraceptive, commodifying an orifice, leaves anal intercourse as a non-procreative and therefore noncommodified option. By mimicking the voice of a corporate executive, referring to "the best of young friends and associates" (29) and "our plastic filter" (29), D.J. shows the potential for 4C and P to be not only parodied and criticized by a youthful counterculture, but also the ability of cool to affect the corporation. D.J. appears not as a subject constituted through consumption or corporate productivity, but within an emergent economic formation in which the goals of work and knowledge production and the performance of work prescribes not only that "biological energy oscillates between work and sexual activity" (Reich 137), but that such work enables a wider array of non-productive sexual relations.

In this sense, the distinction between corporate productivity and unproductive labour has begun to collapse along with the signification of the pathological and the abject. This points to what Thomas Frank refers to as "a hip consumerism driven by disgust with mass society itself" (28). D.J.'s voice, then, speaks to the immersion of a critique of corporate productivity within the corporation itself. His ability to transgress corporate productivity is linked to his resemblance of Rusty, with more ingenuity and inventiveness. As Frank asserts: "Transgression of outdated social convention was directly linked to increased consumption" (153) during the creative revolution of the 1960s. While D.J.'s resemblance of Rusty's corporate mind undercuts his agency as a politically subversive subject, his appropriation of psychiatric discourse and the unproductive sexuality that it articulates is indicative of a contested site for the constitution of the Cold War psychiatric subject. D.J.'s narrative voice is capable of constituting a consumer subject, which attempts to transgress sexual mores by consuming products such as Pure Pores and the electric come machine, thus disrupting the reproduction of the nuclear family and its patterns of consumption. Reconfiguring large patterns of consumption, however, requires D.J. to work within the confines of a formalized corporate structure with access to large markets. The fluidity of his narrative throughout the novel resists any kind of firm positioning of D.J. within such a formalized economic formation, thus leaving psychiatry's construction of transgressive sexuality open to both a corporate regeneration of capitalist production and a countercultural economy that privileges sexual gratification and leisure over productivity. Thus, Mailer is grappling with the efficacy of marginalization and sexual pathology he sees as the terrain for the alienated writer to expand political discourse in "The White Negro" as it becomes an apparent component of corporate productivity and the expansion of capitalist markets.

Rusty ultimately begins to exert more definitively his productive labour over D.J.'s disturbance of the expansion of consumerism into the contested terrain of the pathological and abject. By claiming the grizzly as his own as he fires a second bullet into the already dying bear during the hunting trip and shattering D.J's encounter with it as he saw in its eyes "the peace of the forest preserved for all animals of the forest as they die, the unspoken cool on tap in the veins of every tree" (130), Rusty interrupts any possibility for the trip to be anything other than an assertion of corporate masculinity. As D.J. and Tex venture deeper into the Alaskan wilderness, leaving behind all the consumer products that mark the hunting trip as a further blurring of the distinction between corporate productivity and unproductive labour, they seek an escape from the flows of corporate capital and consumer goods that have encroached on what was perhaps the last vestige of American wilderness. As Mailer's hipster, however, D.J. comes to further explore the potential outlets for pathologized and sexually transgressive desire with Tex, hoping to "get the mixed shit tapeworm out of fucked-up guts and overcharged nerves" (187). D.J. seeks to separate corporate productivity from the unproductive, enabling him to distinguish himself from the corporation that threatens to render his labour productive and profitable. His overcharged nerves here are indicative of the dammed sexual energy, an effect of corporate capitalism, which D.J. is attempting to discharge with an "apocalyptic orgasm" (Mailer, "The White Negro" 309). As they proceed, D.J. notes how their dialogue builds to become increasingly sexually violent, as Tex states that he will end an act of fellatio with D.J. by biting off his genitals and "send(ing) the bloody abomination to your momma" (157). Like D.J.'s mimicry of Alice's voice in a conversation with her psychiatrist, here their language is an approximation of psychiatry's construction of transgressive sexuality through D.J.'s narration. It expresses not only what is deemed to be unproductive sexual activity, but also appropriates the violence of Rusty's

corporate masculinity, rendering such violence obscene and abject. D.J. and Tex do not engage in the acts of sexual violence they articulate here, as D.J. states: "they don't ding ring a ling on no queer street with each other, shit, no, they just talk to each other that way to express Texas tenderness than which there is nothing more tender than a flattened pan-fried breaded paper thin hard ass Texas steak" (191). This tenderness of a Texas steak once again calls up Rusty and his ancestor's use of hide. In this sense, D.J. is invoking Rusty, only to separate himself from his father and lineage. He conveys the pathological nature of Rusty's sexual aggression and hypermasculinity while talking to Tex, yet distances himself from engaging in the same behaviour as Rusty on the hunting trip. D.J's discourse, then, mimics Rusty's corporate masculinity to convey sexual desire for Tex through a caricature of Rusty.

When D.J. and Tex reach the most remote wilderness of the Brooks Mountain Range, this dialogue ceases. In their encounter with nature, they come to realize "how silent silence could be" (159). They find themselves "lying next to each other like two rods getting charged with magnetism in electric coils, the ante going up and up under the blanket, […] saying not a word in an intensity of hung suspension" (177). Here, removed from the trappings of corporate productivity and the violence that sustains it, D.J. and Tex encounter a potential release of energy. Drawing on Reich here, Mailer presents a potentially climactic, orgasmic moment that will affirm their removal from the short circuiting of desire that occurs within the nuclear family and that will also enable D.J. to rupture his connection to Rusty and corporate productivity. D.J and Tex are on the verge of homosexual relations, withdrawing from the productive relations of corporate capitalism and its reliance on heteronormativity. As D.J. and Tex watch the release of energy in the sky, "D.J. raised his hand to put it square on Tex's cock and squeeze" (178), but ultimately ceased to do so "for fear that Tex was strong enough to turn him around and brand

him up his ass" (178). This branding would simultaneously mark D.J. as Tex's kin, distinguishing D.J.'s hide from Rusty's, and violate psychiatry's pathologizing of homosexuality.[55] However, Tex has sublimated his desire for "Halleloo and her sweet ass [which was D.J.'s] sweet ass" (178) "because D.J. once become a bitch would kill him" (179). The cessation of this potentially violent release of sexual energy thus forecloses the possibility for D.J. to escape the Cold War nuclear familial structure and its entrenchment in the consumer economy. Instead, existing familial bonds are reconstituted when D.J. and Tex retreat from exercising "courage at the moment of violence, or equally (making) it in the act of love" ("The White Negro" 312) and thus become "twins, never to be near as lovers again, but killer brothers" (*Why Are We in Vietnam?* 179).

This affirmation of an expanded nuclear family is also an affirmation of an expanding corporate market for Rusty and 4C and P. As D.J. and Tex prepare to leave for Vietnam, they do so as subjects of this corporate productivity. Their refusal of a sexually violent confrontation is thus a lost opportunity to consummate their sexual union and prevent their sexual energies from being channeled into capitalist productivity. D.J.'s unstable and fluid role as narrator, as he alternates between countercultural hipster and corporate genius, is indicative of Mailer's recognition of the incapacity of the novel to construct a stable political subject with the capacity to intervene in a discursive structure. While Mailer saw potential for the writer to exercise such agency in "The White Negro," this potential now must confront the expansion of capitalism as it constitutes new consumer subjectivities and markets, rendering fewer possibilities for transgressive political discourse.

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[55] Homosexuality was not removed from *DSM II* as a diagnosable psychiatric disorder until 1973.

D.J. and Tex's send off to the Vietnam War is thus an initiation into corporate subjectivity, which historically expanded further following the widespread diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder among soldiers who fought in the war. Mailer's construction of psychiatric discourse as an emergent site of tension between the counterculture and corporate interests anticipates the long-term effects of some fundamental tenets of anti-psychiatry, particularly deinstitutionalization and an end to somatic treatments such as electroconvulsive therapy. Ultimately, critiques of psychiatric institutions and treatments throughout the 1960s resulted in significant challenges for those in need of psychiatric care. As Luigi Espositio and Fernando M. Perez point out, psychotropic drugs "would provide a form of psychiatric therapy that was emblematic and consistent with the emerging new cultural narrative regarding deviance and sanity during the 1960s and 1970s—a narrative clearly expressed by a growing antipsychiatry movement that was critical of, among other issues, widespread hospitalization and the violent treatment methods of psychiatry's past" (424). They point to the way in which "social control becomes largely a self-induced form of violence as people, mostly willingly, chemically modify themselves to better adjust to the market reality demanded by neoliberalism" (425). This signals the lost potential for a form of therapeutic politics that offers an alternative to capitalism.

Moreover, the large numbers of homeless Vietnam War veterans in need of psychiatric care further evidences the way in which the Vietnam War highlights mental illness as a new frontier of American corporate productivity. This convergence of consumerism and psychiatric care (or lack thereof) is apparent in Gerald Weissmann's description of New York City in 1982. He describes "a subclass of 'deinstitutionalized' mental patients who have congregated in our cities in a kind of behavioural mockery of the consumer society" (Weissmann qtd. in Burnham 48) with bags from upscale department stores in their possession. However, unlike D.J., whose

voice is a composite of middle-class corporate ingenuity and mockery, these individuals lack access to the corporate flow of capital and technological innovation that would enable them to change the nature of work. Thus, the legacy of anti-psychiatry appears to have been channeled into the desire for profitable psychiatric care, delivered through an expanding service sector that corresponds with the emerging post-Fordist economy, as the next chapter examines in Kurt Vonnegut's work.

Chapter Four: Therapeutic Responses to the Emerging Crisis of Fordism in Kurt Vonnegut's *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater*

Kurt Vonnegut's 1965 novel *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, Or Pearls Before Swine* begins with Vonnegut's narrator introducing "a sum of money" as "a leading character in this tale about people just as a sum of honey might properly be a leading character in a tale about bees" (9). Thus, the narrator's analogy suggests that money, like honey, is the result of a process of labour performed by workers which is necessary for their own sustenance and well being as well as that of the highest economic class and social structure, analogous to the queen bee and the entire hive. While honey sustains and nourishes the queen bee, she is dependant on the workers who produce it. Thus, the worker bees play an integral role in the maintenance of the hive and the queen's capacity to reproduce the relations of production within it. The analogy, then, suggests that commodities are similarly a necessary component for the continued production of wealth, making those who contribute their labour to produce them necessary for the reproduction of conditions in which a privileged class possess a great share of wealth and privilege. Using this analogy, then, Vonnegut's narrator suggests that something is out of sync; in a "tale about people" (9), a sum of money should not be given such a privileged status over the labourers who create it in the service of the top of a social hierarchy who reap the most benefits of the production process. In this sense, *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* considers the way in which the response to an emerging economic crisis of Fordist production in the mid-1960s entails the privileging of capital over the labour and needs of humans, particularly in relation to technological advancement, unemployment, and its attendant problems of ostensibly unproductive subjects.

As president of the Rosewater Foundation,[56] Eliot Rosewater can direct the flow of this sum of money "unless proved legally insane" (Vonnegut 2), as the charter of the Foundation declares. He attempts to change the function of the Rosewater Foundation from fulfilling its intended aims of reproducing capital for the Rosewater family under the guise of philanthropy to providing a therapeutic service for himself and the destitute people of Rosewater. Eliot's purpose in establishing this service is to "love these discarded Americans" (Vonnegut 44) of Rosewater County as "a work of art" (44). For Eliot, the role of president becomes a means of pursuing an array of liberal causes in an attempt to alleviate the guilt that comes from his inherited wealth. For Eliot, then, the way in which this sum of money is privileged over the interests of human wellbeing creates an acute need for psychiatric therapy—for both himself and the destitute and seemingly useless people of Rosewater County, which he provides by reorienting the Foundation towards utopic ideals in an act of fatherly love.

Eliot's channeling of the Rosewater family's wealth into his utopic project also causes others to subject him to the scrutiny of psychiatry as a disciplinary apparatus. When he begins to disperse the Rosewater family fortune to Rosewater County, he also begins to disrupt the familial line of inheritance and thus the familial structure itself. Psychiatric authority stands to remove Eliot from the presidency of the Foundation, restoring its function as a means of protecting the family fortune. In other words, psychiatric therapy may be employed to secure the Rosewater

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[56] Vonnegut's fictional Rosewater Foundation shares many similarities with the Ford Foundation, established in 1936. Henry Ford's son, Edsel Ford, established the foundation following the Revenue Act (1935), which imposed taxes on large estates, indicating a tension between the Ford Foundation's philanthropic intentions and the intention to retain control of the family's wealth. In the 1950s, following the death of Henry Ford, the Ford Foundation expanded and took on a wider array of philanthropic causes, including legal education, Civil Rights, birth control, and liberal arts funding. According to Michael Gillette, in the 1960s the Ford Foundation began its Grey Area program, led by Paul Ylvisaker who would later become part of the Johnson administration's war on poverty (19), which sought to reduce inner-city poverty.

line of inheritance, or, with Eliot as president of the Foundation, psychiatric therapy may be employed for therapeutic means within cultural production to remedy those afflicted by dehumanizing conditions of capitalism and its use of technology to replace human labour, including Eliot himself, through a reorganization of economic relations that reverses the privileging of capital over human needs. Ultimately, Eliot's work with the Foundation subjects him to a tension between sustaining his position as the revered president by investing in a utopian project and relinquishing this position in a therapeutic act of love for Rosewater County that is capable of bringing about an alternative to the guilt inducing inherited wealth that capitalism enables.

This tension between corporate interests and psychiatric therapy stands at the centre of *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater*. Vonnegut examines the potentialities of psychiatry to remedy the dehumanizing and guilt inducing conditions of Fordist production when this economic configuration is on the verge of a crisis that culminates in the recession of 1973. This emerging crisis of Fordism makes reconfiguring psychiatric institutions necessary. As the left resurges to challenge the limitations of liberalism and counter claims by the right that the New Left and counterculture are pathological, utopic dreamers, the novel confronts the need to account for the shifting political and economic terrain and the capacity of psychiatric treatment to constitute political subjects with the agency necessary to confront mental health consumerism and provide a therapeutic alternative to those of capitalism through cultural production. This confrontation emerges in the highly contested cultural terrain that engages with psychiatric and therapeutic approaches to political and economic problems. More specifically, at stake in this confrontation into which *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* intervenes is the nature and meaning of mental illness and pathology among the Left and the Right. Ultimately, psychiatric subjectivities exercise

agency through therapeutic or disciplinary measures, indicating that such psychiatric subjectivities have emerged as significant agents within political and economic relations of the post-World War II years, even as more overt forms of class struggle were pushed to the periphery of political discourse.

The relationship between Eliot and a lawyer named Norman Mushari working to remove him from his position as president of the Foundation is illustrative of how *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* posits psychiatric therapy as a contested terrain for reorganizing the psychodynamics of desire and guilt to enable new economic relations in the midst of an emerging crisis. Those associated with anti-psychiatry, in particular psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, grappled with the authority that the legal system afforded psychiatrists and the implications this has for individuals in free market capitalism in the United States. In *The Myth of Mental Illness* (1961), Szasz asserts that psychiatrists must draw a clear distinction between a medically diagnosed disease and mental illness, acknowledging that mental illness entails problems in interpersonal and social relations, rather than organic diseases. Szasz addresses the problem of punitive psychiatry most directly in *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry* (1963) and considers the legal implications of what he identifies as the medicalization of such problems. When read alongside Szasz's *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry*, *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* considers and satirizes the yoking together of psychiatric expertise and liberal economics under Fordist production as it enters a state of crisis in the mid-1960s. With the limitations of Fordism's ability to deliver on the promises of consumption becoming apparent, neuroses stemming from the emerging failures of Fordism were becoming apparent, enabling a reorganization of the therapeutic approaches available to remedy these neuroses in ways that constitute political subjectivities. Szasz's work is an angst-ridden response to this uncertainty and a proposal for the right-libertarian politics that he

articulates throughout *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry* to provide a solution to the coupling of psychiatric expertise and liberalism. While Vonnegut registers a similar concern with psychiatry's role in aligning psychiatric treatment with political and economic values in *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater*, the novel also critiques the political and economic values underlying Szasz's ethics of psychiatry and the libertarian consensus Szasz offers, while showing the limitations and responses to this position through a poignant parody of 1964 Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater with the character of Eliot Rosewater.

This chapter begins by situating Vonnegut's *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* within the emerging crisis of Fordist production. An examination of Eliot's letter to the next president of the Rosewater Foundation, which includes a history of the family's fortune, reveals the way in which Vonnegut positions Eliot's philanthropic aims in his work with the Foundation as a response to feelings of guilt that stem from inherited wealth and efforts to retain its reproductive capacity. Following his return from the Second World War, Eliot's therapeutic efforts are embedded in the Fordist mode of production and limited by the political capacity of Cold War liberalism. Eliot's libidinal investment in his utopic project in Rosewater County emerges as a seemingly more effective form of therapy for both himself and his clients. His attempts to subvert the rigidity of Fordism and the need to maintain productivity by channeling the Rosewater family fortune into loving the residents of Rosewater County, rather than into the reproduction of inherited wealth, are, however, once again undercut by the way in which his utopic aims are pathologized. Drawing on Jacqueline Rose's *States of Fantasy*, this chapter examines how *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* posits psychiatric therapy as a facilitator for the channeling of libidinal energy and its attendant guilt into available political and economic relations and the initiation of new relations into which such energies can be channeled to form a

new collective will. The tension between Eliot's utopian ideals and his father's attempts to maintain lines of inherited wealth is indicative of how the novel considers the possibility for a new state fantasy that entails an alternative to capitalism to be at stake as the crisis of Fordism becomes increasingly apparent.

Through its representation of Eliot's reconfigured Rosewater Foundation, this chapter then considers how Vonnegut's novel provides a critique of Thomas Szasz's *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry* (1963) as a libertarian response to the crisis of Fordism and suggests the need for a further reorientation of psychiatric therapy in response. Private psychiatric care, which Szasz advocates in accordance with libertarian politics, resembles the emerging post-Fordist economy, which entails narcissistic investments in an attempt to alleviate guilt. Thus, Eliot's inherited guilt, which previously posed a problem for productivity, comes to be profitable through the Rosewater Foundation as an example of mental health consumerism delivered via the service sector. The commodification of guilt which enables mental health consumerism becomes apparent in Eliot's narcissistic relationship with the people of Rosewater County. Lastly, in light of the ending of *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater*, Vonnegut suggests that Eliot's utopian ideals can be realized only by dispersing the Rosewater fortune to a communal Rosewater family. Doing so enables them to pursue utopian ideals, without the guilt that stems from the need to produce lines of inheritance. Thus, their libidinal energies are free to be more widely invested in acts of love, kindness, and cultural production without the demands of a narcissistic father of capitalist relations and the limitations of small-scale transactions as means of alleviating distress.

The Rosewater Family History and the Emerging Crisis of Fordism

As the basis for the postwar compromise between labour and capital, the Fordist mode of production appears to be under increasing pressure in *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater*. Its promise

of economic prosperity, material comfort, and a wide array of consumer products intended to make leisure time more plentiful and enriching for the nuclear family appeared to sublimate political dissent through less formalized and deregulated economies and institutional affiliations. Political dissent, however, did not dissolve in the midst of the postwar political consensus; it took on new therapeutic formations. The establishment of formal processes[57] for addressing class concerns that were previously fought through forms of open dissent, such as strikes, smoothed over class tensions on the surface. Although the achievements of the postwar compromise and the political consensus rendered resistance to capitalism less visible, the always-present fault lines became more pronounced throughout the 1960s. The relations of production that Fordism regulated became visibly destabilized as the consumer economy moved towards the recession of 1973.

In *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater*, Eliot and his father, Senator Lister Ames Rosewater, are confronted by the increasing strain on Fordist production and the attendant psychological pressures that this creates. Eliot writes a history of the Rosewater family and the sum of money that constitutes its inherited fortune in a letter to the next president of the Rosewater Foundation, which is to be read after Eliot's death. In the letter, Eliot relays the economic history of the United States through his family's accumulation of their fortune. The transition to Fordism and its emerging instability becomes apparent as Vonnegut articulates the way in which money as a form of productive capital confronts a crisis wherein it no longer reproduces wealth. The letter begins with Eliot's account of Noah Rosewater, "a humorless, constipated Christian farm boy turned speculator and briber during and after the Civil War" (Vonnegut 13). The beginning of the

[57] The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) and the Landrum-Griffin Act (1959) provided such formalized avenues for attempting to resolve tensions between labour and capitalism, but also restricted the ability of labour to seek broader social reforms.

fortune with Noah's inherited saw factory turned munitions factory during the Civil War is embedded in the ineffectiveness of government controls on the accumulation of wealth, as Eliot records how Noah "made this discovery: Government objections to the price or quality of his wares could be vaporized with bribes that were pitifully small" (14). Hence, the family fortune has, nearly from its beginning, grown as a result of inherited wealth and corruption. Noah's corrupt methods evade government regulations intended to curb the accumulation of wealth and its reproductive capacity. Hence, Noah's wealth continues to increase as he buys farms in Rosewater County and becomes "the largest individual hog farmer in the North" (14).

The corruption that creates an unregulated market instills in Noah a fear of being undercut by others, leading to his purchasing of the entire supply chain. Eliot writes: "in order not to be victimized by meat packers, he bought controlling interest in an Indianapolis slaughterhouse. In order not to be victimized by steel suppliers, he bought controlling interest in a steel company in Pittsburgh. In order not to be victimized by coal suppliers, he bought controlling interest in several mines. In order not to be victimized by money lenders, he founded a bank" (14). Eliot conveys Noah's actions as a result of his "paranoid reluctance to be a victim" (14). This paranoia stems from Noah's own corruption, which enables him to channel unregulated capital into productive channels of largely unregulated monopoly capitalism. The very same unregulated channels of capital that enable Noah to concentrate wealth and bribe those in the government are also open to market competition. The free market, according to Vonnegut's narrator, stems from a "folly of the Founding Fathers" who "had not made it the law of the Utopia that the wealth of each citizen should be limited" (15). This lack of oversight that would ensure a more equal distribution of wealth, rather than merely an equal right for all to pursue wealth, appears as an inherent flaw in a free-market economy because "Noah and a few

like him perceived that the continent was in fact finite" (15). Therefore, Noah's productive capital under this system of monopoly capitalism is always at risk of becoming unproductive by unregulated channels, such as corruption.

Noah's paranoia that his capital will cease to be productive, Eliot's letter suggests, is perpetuated by monopoly capitalism and the way in which it enables the accumulation of vast wealth. Eliot portrays Noah as an exemplar of a more appropriate motto of the United States: "*Grab much too much or you'll get nothing at all*" (Italics in Vonnegut 16). Noah's unfulfilled desire for greater wealth cannot be satisfied fully and completely by accumulated money, leading him to attempt to satisfy this desire with fictitious capital. Noah's fears of the loss of productive capital "caused him to deal more and more in valuable papers, in stocks and bonds, and less and less in swords and pork" (14) because he soon realized that "worthless papers [. . .] could be sold effortlessly" (15); therefore, "his first enthusiasm became peddling watered stock" (15). In selling watered stock that consists of artificially inflated value, Noah recognizes and exploits the discrepancy between the apparent value of the stock and its actual value. Eliot presents Noah's response to the advancement of capitalism as a pathogenic but inherent component of monopoly capitalism. In his attempt to maintain productive capital and his striving to satisfy a desire for infinite wealth, Noah has utilized the very instability of capital that causes his paranoia that a market established on fictitious capital will result in the collapse of his wealth.

The Rosewater family's economic history in Eliot's letter is also a case history of Rosewater family pathology that is embedded in the development of free market capitalism. Eliot's letter indicates that the development of industrial processes that enabled Fordism[58] to

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[58] This included higher wages, leisure time, consumption, assembly line mass production and standardization, as well as the application of Fredrick Winslow Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911).

become the dominant industrial paradigm began prior to Ford's implementation of them.[59] He writes about how the saw factory that Noah inherited, made profitable, expanded, and passed down to his son, Samuel Rosewater, greatly reduced the need for human labour, indicating a continual deskilling of work. As Eliot notes in a letter describing Rosewater County to his wife, Sylvia: "The factory, the farms, the mines across the river—they're almost completely automatic now. And America doesn't even need these people for war—not anymore" (41-42). As the letter reflects and recounts the larger historical development of industrialization of the United States, presenting industrialization under monopoly capitalism as laying the groundwork that enabled Ford to establish his particular system of mass production and de-skilling of labour, it also conveys the implementation of what will become Fordist production methods as a neurosis that compels the Rosewater family to desire productive capital at the expense of any capacity for the realization of utopic principles. This is particularly apparent in Samuel, who, Eliot writes, disseminated through newspapers and preachers the idea that "*Anybody who thought that the United States of America was supposed to be a Utopia was a piggy, lazy, God-damned fool*" (italics in Vonnegut 16). Samuel's rejection of a more equal distribution of wealth is intertwined with what will become the production of a psychiatric subject whose psychodynamic energies are deemed by conservatives on the Right to need readjustment to the economic individualism of the United States, while Samuel continues to invest his energies into pursuing infinite wealth, which Eliot's father will inherit.

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[59] Fordism, as David Harvey points out, "did little more than rationalize old technologies and a pre-existing detail division of labour, though by flowing the work to a stationary worker he achieved dramatic gains in productivity" (125). Harvey asserts: "What was special about Ford (and what ultimately separates Fordism from Taylorism), was his vision, his explicit recognition that mass production meant mass consumption" (125-126).

The solidification of Fordist production that occurred with the postwar compromise initially appears to alleviate the inherited paranoia of the Rosewater family by sustaining desire for productive capital through increased desire for consumer goods. The productive capacity of capital remained high during the postwar boom, obscuring the potential for capital to lose its value, thus temporarily ensuring that the Rosewater fortune retained its reproductive capacity. Although the potential for capital to become unproductive remained beneath the surface of high productivity, the desire for greater productivity was sustained by the value of money that appeared to secure the Rosewater family fortune. As a means of securing reproductive wealth, the profits of the fortune were "stashed into a foundation in order that tax-collectors and other predators not named Rosewater might be prevented from getting their hands on it" (Vonnegut 9). By making the profits "the core of a charitable and cultural foundation in 1947" (9) of which Eliot becomes president, the family intends to secure it as an inheritance for future generations of Rosewaters. As profit from the principal sum of money constituting the family fortune, the wealth of the Rosewater Foundation is the result of the reproduction of wealth, which requires the reproduction of the family, specifically in the form of Eliot fathering a son, to enable its continued reproduction.

Paranoia stemming from the tentative nature of the reproductive capacity of both the fortune and Eliot, however, continues to haunt Eliot's father, Senator Rosewater, as a form of transgenerational inheritance. Eliot's letter recounts how his father "left the manipulation of his assets to lawyers and banks" (17) and notes that "the fortune has never amused, worried, or tempted him" (17). Senator Rosewater displays no apparent angst regarding the reproduction of wealth as he focuses his attention on "teaching morals" (Vonnegut 17) in his political position and relies on others to direct the money into productive channels. He has, however, attempted to

legally constitute and regulate the body by curtailing its visibility and restricting its functions to sexual reproduction, indicating that he channels his anxieties stemming from the reproduction of wealth into his political position. As Freese points out, the Senator's "pathological obsession with physical and spiritual cleanliness makes one suspect that his name is meant to allude to the well-known mouthwash *Listerine*" (244). Senator Rosewater's attempts to regulate bodily cleanliness and sexual reproduction are indicative of his concern with the regulation of capital and the efficiency of production. Rather than transfer such urges into the terrain of money, the Senator instead attempts to regulate reproductive capacity and efficiency on the site of the body, as a depreciating asset which, similar to capital, must be regulated and managed. By regulating the body, he seeks to make reproductive sex an efficient means of perpetuating familial lines of inherited wealth, while eliminating what he deems to be superfluous and non-reproductive bodily functions.

The energy he invests into regulating sexual reproduction and bodily functions is apparent in his most famous piece of legislation, known as the Rosewater Law. The Senator's attempt to legislate obscenity, and thus alleviate paranoia and anxiety about the inability to maintain the reproductive capacity of wealth, relies on the idea that the law "actually defined obscenity" (82). According to the legislation, obscenity "is any picture or phonograph record or any written matter calling attention to reproductive organs, bodily discharges, or bodily hair" (82). Senator Rosewater draws on the Roman Empire as a source of authority for his own political actions, declaring in a famous speech that the current era is similar to that during which Caesar Augustus ruled. He characterizes the era as a "degenerate period" (29). According to the narrator, at the time the Senator wrote the law, he was "rallying the Republican forces of reaction

that had been shattered by the election of Dwight David Eisenhower (28)[60] placing the Senator's speech approximately in 1953, during the postwar economic boom in productivity. In his speech, the Senator attacks Cold War liberalism, declaring "there were soft headed liberals then as there are bubble-headed liberals now, and they said what liberals always say after they have led a great nation to such a lawless, self-indulgent, polyglot condition: 'Things have never been better! [. . .] Look at all the equality! Look how sexual hypocrisy has been driven from the scene!" (29). He sees Cold War liberalism as an overtaking of the nation by laziness and representations of obscene sexuality into which he must intervene and regulate, further drawing a parallel between the Roman Empire and the United States: "Rome was a paradise for gangsters, perverts, and the lazy working man, just as America is now" (29). He claims that this is contrary to the founding economic principles of the United States: "The Senator said that the carrot and the stick had been built into the Free Enterprise System, as conceived by the Founding Fathers, but that do-gooders, who thought that people shouldn't ever have to struggle for anything, had buggered the logic of the system beyond all recognition" (31). Therefore, Senator Rosewater's law aims to regulate cultural production by quelling representations of obscenity and shoring up the ability of Fordism to provide seemingly stable production and consumption that was necessary for the United States to garner support not only for domestic Cold War policies, but also international hegemony. As David Harvey contends, Fordism was based on a rigid structure in order to assure the continual accumulation of capital. Harvey notes that Fordism was established upon "the rigidity of long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass-production systems that

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[60] Eisenhower was elected on November 4, 1952. Freese pieces together a timeline for the novel through various references to American history and significant events in Eliot's life. According to him "one can infer that the major events in Vonnegut's fifth novel take place in 1964 and 1965" (Freese 264).

precluded much flexibility of design and presumed stable growth in invariant consumer markets" (142), as well as "rigidities in labour markets, labour allocation, and in labour contracts (especially in the so-called 'monopoly' sector)" (142). These rigidities were necessary for the U.S. to form a hegemonic centre of international power that would secure its economic stability and productive capacities. Thus, the Rosewater Law links the regulation of the body and its sexual functions as a moral code to the stability of the U.S. economy and its sustainability as he seeks to channel seemingly unproductive feelings of angst and paranoia into legislation that will eliminate obscenity and its attendant economic unproductivity while securing the nuclear family as a source of inconspicuous consumption for the products of Fordism.

By rigidly defining obscenity in accordance with a moral imperative that touts free market capitalism, Senator Rosewater's legislation has a potentially therapeutic function in that it attempts to alleviate fears of the loss of reproductive capacities among wealthy Republicans under Fordism. The Rosewater law identifies a perceived malady in the body politic and, after diagnosing it, provides a corresponding treatment for this pathologic element. In this sense, a diagnosis that identifies an illness and prescribes a treatment sheds light on the way in which the rigidity of the economic system produces the illness and the way in which the therapeutic mechanisms of Fordism are employed to treat the anxieties and paranoia that Fordism has produced among wealthy conservatives.

Senator Rosewater's legislation, however, signals that a crisis in the ability of Fordism to channel its productive capacities into the reproduction of wealth and contain unproductive subjects is possible. As Harvey notes, "it seems there were signs of serious problems within Fordism as early as the mid-1960s" (141). Harvey attributes these problems to the need to create new markets for surplus output "which occurred at the very moment when the success of Fordist

rationalization meant the relative displacement of more and more workers from manufacturing" (141). Moreover, Harvey notes that between 1965 and 1973, when the rigidity of Fordism encountered the need for flexibility due to increasing market volatility, problems within Fordism became apparent (141-142). Thus, the Rosewater Law's attempt to bear down on non-productive desire and bodily functions to ensure the channeling of desire into productive functions such as procreative sex comes to be inadequate as the unemployed become increasingly beyond the reach of the regulatory function of labour, creating a class of "discarded Americans" (Vonnegut 43) considered to be "useless and unattractive" (43). In this sense, the regulatory effects of the Rosewater Law, intended to maintain productivity and profitability, come into tension with the interests of workers who are becoming increasingly unnecessary and even inhibitory to the interests of the wealthiest class. Hence, as will become apparent through Eliot's work with the Rosewater Foundation, by the 1960s, the welfare state as a configuration of programs to address social ills becomes increasingly incompatible with the need to seek more flexible means for the accumulation of wealth.

The Rosewater Foundation and Fordist Rigidity

In contrast with his father and the Rosewater Law, Eliot's work with the Rosewater Foundation in the years 1947 through 1953, when "the Rosewater Foundation spent fourteen million dollars" (20), reflects his efforts to use the existing centralized structure of Fordism to advance the treatment of social and economic maladies identified by the New Deal liberalism. During these years, Eliot showed his serious intentions for the foundation: "He hired a suite of offices in the Empire State Building. [. . .] He proclaimed them the headquarters for all the beautiful, compassionate and scientific things he hoped to do" (20). Eliot's location of the Foundation within the Empire State Building makes it a highly visible figure of centralized

capital under Fordism's regulation and formalized control. Eliot's donations to a variety of liberal causes upon first assuming the presidency of the foundation are indicative of his attempts to build on Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism following his death in 1945. The narrator notes: "Eliot's benefactions covered the full eleemosynary spectrum from a birth control clinic in Detroit to an El Greco in Tampa, Florida. Rosewater dollars fought cancer and mental illness and race prejudice and police brutality and countless other miseries, encouraged college professors to look for truth, bought beauty at any price" (20). Under this structure, the Foundation is bureaucratic with formalized donations. Rather than making charitable donations to individuals, Rosewater Foundation dollars went to institutions that targeted clearly defined social ills that liberalism sought to address through investments. The establishment of the Foundation shows a clear intent and design for the flow of capital that is characteristic of a rigid Fordist economic model.

On his return from the Second World War, Eliot is unable to integrate into existing conditions of the reproduction of wealth, despite his best attempts to utilize the Rosewater Foundation to do so. Like Senator Rosewater, Eliot also develops a neurosis that stems from the faltering of Fordism and his inability to alleviate the tension that he experiences between the philanthropic aims of the Rosewater Foundation and the demands placed on him to reproduce the wealth of the Rosewater family. His alcoholism and his meandering throughout the country, which eventually lead him to relocate the Foundation to Rosewater County, are responses to these competing demands. During his drunken wanderings, Eliot spends a large part of his time visiting volunteer fire departments. This fascination with fireman stems from his personal traumatic experience of mistakenly killing three firefighters in a burning building in Bavaria during the Second World War. Eliot sees firefighters as heroic members of the working class,

describing them as "what's good about America" (Vonnegut 27) and claiming that in the event of a Russian invasion, they would be the ones who "take to the woods with hunting knives and Springfields, who'll go on fighting for a hundred years" (27), while the "phony bastards who get all the good jobs in this country by kissing ass will be down to meet the conquers with vodka and caviar" (27), demonstrating his alignment with the anticommunism of Cold War liberalism. Moreover, Eliot cloaks himself in the clothing of those he encounters on his travels, attempting to efface his class privilege. The narrator notes how "Eliot eventually traded away everything in his wardrobe but his tails, his dinner jacket, and one grey flannel suit. His sixteen-foot closet became a depressing museum of coveralls, overalls, Robert Hall Easter specials, field jackets, Eisenhower jackets, sweatshirts and so on" (28). Despite Eliot's attempts to aid liberal causes with the inherited wealth of the Rosewater Foundation, he remains unable to discern a measurable effect by using existing economic channels, fueling his alcoholism and feelings of guilt.

Eliot struggles with guilt that comes from his inherited wealth and the transgenerational greed dating back to Noah Rosewater when attaining this wealth. Eliot's guilt manifests when he expresses his conscious wish of fulfilling the utopic ideals of the United States for the people he meets in his travels. His utopic ideals in conjunction with his heavy alcohol consumption and aimless travels throughout the country come to be seen by those around him as evidence of a diagnosable psychiatric illness. Initially, however, he is left to his own devices and receives no therapy, despite the fact that, as the narrator notes, "Eliot was a flamboyantly sick man, even then [in the period ranging from 1947 to 1953], but there was no one to hustle him off for treatment, and no one was as yet entranced by the profits to be made by proving him insane" (28). Moreover, treating Eliot is not in accordance with the social and class position he occupies

with his wife, Sylvia, and would threaten Eliot father's political aspirations: "Sylvia, raised among rich and charming eccentrics, was too European to have him put away. And the senator was in the political fight of his life" (28) against the presidency of Harry S. Truman. Thus, treatment for Eliot would risk disrupting the Senator's efforts to secure the reproductive capacity of capital in a regulated economy as well as Eliot and Sylvia's marriage, which will potentially produce an heir and president of the Rosewater Foundation to follow Eliot, insuring further reproductivity. When Eliot does eventually receive psychoanalytic therapy, he does so because his excessive alcohol consumption and erratic behaviour have come to threaten the Senator's political reputation, Eliot and Sylvia's place within the upper echelon of society, and, ultimately, the future of the Rosewater family fortune.

Eliot begins to receive psychoanalytic treatment due the perception of it as a form of private therapy for the bourgeois. This is intended to restore him to a productive position within the Fordist formation that enables the reproduction of the Rosewater family fortune. His treatment occurs within a therapeutic formation that resembles the standardized and rigid structure of Fordist production. After beginning psychoanalytic therapy, he "expressed enthusiasm for the arts and sciences [again and], won back many friends" (Vonnegut 32) that he had criticized prior to treatment. As the narrator notes:

> He drove away his rich friends by telling them whatever they had was based on dumb luck. He advised his artist friends that the only people who paid any attention to what they did were rich horses' asses [. . .]. He asked his scholarly friends, "Who has time to read all the boring crap you write and listen to all the boring things you say?" He alienated his friends in the sciences by thanking them extravagantly for scientific advances he read about. (32)

It appears that Eliot's earlier criticism of those representing the various causes he attempted to support through the Rosewater Foundation are behind him and that he has come to see the goals of Cold War liberalism as a worthwhile endeavour to which he can make a measurable contribution. Yet, Eliot's analyst resigns after one year. Despite Sylvia's belief that Eliot is cured, the analyst insists that Eliot "has the most massively defended neurosis I have ever attempted to treat" (33). He explains to her that all Eliot will talk about during their sessions is American history (33). When the analyst asks Eliot about his father's appearance in dreams, he responds by stating that his father does not appear in his dreams, but Samuel Gompers, Mark Twain, Alexander Hamilton, and Thorsten Veblen do (33). The resistance that Eliot's analyst encounters is indicative of Eliot's guilt regarding his inherited wealth, which enables him to subsist in comfort without performing any form of labour, while various social ills continue to fester and technological advancement erodes the ability of others to obtain wealth as it decreases the necessity of their labour. Therefore, his aims as president of the Rosewater Foundation upon his return from the war and his valorization of the working class have a therapeutic intent for him that ultimately falls short of alleviating his guilt. Eliot recognizes that his wealth is inherited not from the founding of a utopia in which the needs of all are met and technological rationalization will eliminate the need for labour. Instead, his inheritance comes from a neurotic desire for wealth. The attempt to satisfy this desire is enabled by a failed conception of the state which entails the perpetuation of the idea of "perverts and the lazy working man" (Vonnegut 29) by Senator Rosewater and Republican forces to account for vast inequalities. Thus, Senator Rosewater's conception of the economic problems of the country is linked to sexual deviance and its cultural representation along with its attendant lack of productivity as forms of pathology.

Eliot's initial attempts to help others through the Rosewater Foundation by donating money to liberal causes manifest due to his feelings of liberal guilt.[61] Liberal guilt, as Julie Ellison explains, "arises precisely when people are convinced that utopian projects are failing" (347). For her, when experiencing liberal guilt, "all actions become gestures, expressive of a desire to effect change or offer help that is never sufficient to the scale of the problem" (349). Yet, liberal guilt, she asserts, "is forced to constitute the subject, the object, and the moral importance of their relation" (357), indicating that guilt entails "political malleability" (347) as it forces an encounter between the privileged and the exploited that evokes a response in the privileged. As Eliot channels the money of the New York City based Rosewater Foundation into helping liberal causes, he fails to fully alleviate the guilt that comes from his inherited wealth. Thus, he then seeks to alleviate this guilt by pursuing a new utopian project in Rosewater County as part of an unconscious fantasy that involves complete freedom from guilt. Senator Rosewater recalls a recent meeting with Eliot's psychoanalyst, telling Sylvia and a lawyer for the Rosewater family named Norman Mushari that, according to the analyst, "any diagnosis he made of Eliot's disease would have to be irresponsible speculation" (83). After Senator Rosewater urges the doctor on, he reveals his diagnosis that Eliot "certainly has his wires crossed, but the inappropriate thing to which the short circuit has caused him to bring his sexual energies isn't

[61] In an article entitled "A Short History of Liberal Guilt" Julie Ellison analyzes the development of the concept of liberal guilt and describes it as "symptomatic" (346) of embarrassment for utopic political tactics. In part, she examines its role in response to Rudi Giuliani's victory over David Dinkins in the New York City mayoral race of 1993. In her analysis of a political cartoon following the race, she notes that the cartoon suggests that Liberalism "operates as a repressed youthful cathexis that requires psychiatric help to work through" (347). Vonnegut points to an earlier iteration of this in Senator Rosewater's embarrassment by Eliot's support for liberal causes and utopian ideals and Norman Mushari's attempts to frame Eliot's behaviour as symptoms of a mental illness. Such examples also demonstrate this conception of liberal politics as evidence of a need for Eliot to receive psychiatric treatment, according to conservatives.

necessarily such a very bad thing" (83). This thing, according to the doctor, is "Utopia" (84). Thus, Eliot seeks to constitute a new utopian project to replace the flawed utopian nation first conceived by the Founding Fathers then later transformed into a Fordist economy under Cold War liberalism, which has enabled him to inherit reproductive capital.

Rosewater County and the Therapeutic Effects of Narcissism

In her book *States of Fantasy*, Jacqueline Rose delves into the social function of fantasy and its connection to the constitution of a political state, noting that "Fantasy is not therefore antagonistic to social reality; it is its precondition or psychic glue. But fantasy surely ceases to be a private matter if it fuels, or at least plays its part in, the forging of the collective will" (3). In her reading of Freud, Rose notes that "In 1897, the examples Freud gives could all be grouped under what has come to be known today as 'trans-generational haunting,' forms of remembrance—most often of hidden and shameful family secrets—which hover in the space between social and psychic history, forcing and making it impossible for the one who unconsciously carries them to make the link" (5). Eliot's shameful family history beginning with Noah Rosewater and extending to the Rosewater Law is evidence of this haunting that occupies a liminal space between the social and the psychic. Eliot carries with him guilt from the death of his mother, whom he accidently knocked into the water while sailing, causing her to drown,[62] making his familial relationship a further source of guilt. Lawrence R. Broer reads Eliot's failed marriage to Sylvia and an "obsession with utopian reform" (78) as the manifestation of his traumatic war experiences. Broer notes that "memories of war have deepened Eliot's guilt and

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[62] The narrator explains: "The statement that Eliot killed his beloved mother was, in a crude way, true. When he was nineteen, he took his mother for a sail in Cotuit Harbor. He jibed. The slashing boom knocked his mother overboard. Eunice Morgan Rosewater sank like a stone" (Vonnegut 33).

crippled his ability to function in a way that a head filled with idealistic hopes, a doctorate in international law from Harvard, and presidency of the Rosewater Foundation cannot hope to cure" (73). Following the killings of the firefighters in Bavaria, Eliot laid down in front of a moving truck before entering a catatonic state and became "so rigid" (72) that the soldiers who picked him up after the truck stopped in time "might have carried him by his hair and his heels. He stayed like that for twelve hours, and would not speak or eat" (72). Following this incident, he was hospitalized in Paris where he "suffered what was diagnosed as combat fatigue" (19). Following the war, Eliot's guilt from mistakenly killing the firefighters is linked with his admiration for the social function of firefighters who perform selfless acts. Moreover, Broer further attributes Eliot's condition to his relationship with his father. The two men appear unable to express their love for each other, causing the Senator to divert his "libidinal energies into the quest for money and power" (Broer 79). Broer concludes that Eliot "must renounce the illusory peace and comfort of fantasy utopias" (78) that he uses to avoid facing familial and war trauma otherwise, "[h]is creative energy will remain stifled or displaced until he stops writing and living fictions as romantic as those practiced by the founders of Rosewater County" (78). Broer's analysis, however, leaves the extent to which this guilt is bound to inherited wealth and the therapeutic mechanisms through which Eliot attempts to alleviate it under examined.

Eliot's guilt has a larger social function that stems beyond his individual internal psychic state. An unconscious fantasy of alleviating the guilt he feels from trans-generational hauntings of corruption and greed by channeling the Rosewater fortune into an array of liberal causes functions as what Rose refers to as a state fantasy. She points to the psychological connotation of the word *state*, explaining:

> the word 'state' has a psychological meaning long before its modern-day sense of polity, or rather one which trails beneath the shifting public and political face of the word. To take a relatively modern instance: in his 1854 psychology book, *Unsoundness of Mind*, J. C. Bucknill commented of one insane: 'he was *fully conscious of his state*, and had great hopes of being cured in an asylum.' Here 'state' is almost a synonym for 'insanity.' (emphasis in Rose 6-7)

Eliot's utopian project in Rosewater County enables a new state fantasy that is at odds with Senator Rosewater's regulation and containment of the Rosewater fortune in defence against its circulation in unproductive channels among pathologized subjects and cultural representations of obscenity. Eliot's concern with historical figures such as Samuel Gompers and Thorsten Veblen is indictive of how his libidinal energies are channeled into a new political formation that is at odds with the concentration of wealth and its pathogenic effects. Ultimately, the competing fantasies of Senator Rosewater and Eliot are at the centre of a battle to forge "the collective will" (Rose 3) of the state.

Vonnegut places the Rosewater family fortune at the centre of the competing fantasies that sustain Eliot and Senator Rosewater's respective psychic relationships with the state. Eliot's initial work with the Rosewater Foundation from 1947–1953 leaves him unsatisfied and continuing to wander the country in an alcohol induced stupor. During this time, his love for science fiction and his appearance at a science fiction convention in Milford, Pennsylvania makes apparent his channelling of the Rosewater fortune into cultural production that conveys his desire for a utopia to alleviate his guilt. His appeal to writers at the convention to "think about all the silly ways money gets passed around now, and then think up better ways" (26) indicates the centrality of capital to his utopic fantasy. While there, he writes a cheque for two

hundred dollars for every person in attendance. Eliot tells them "*There's* fantasy for you [. . .]. And you go to the bank tomorrow and it will all come true" (25). He hopes that giving away the family fortune will enable the writers to find a solution to the inequalities they encounter. Thus, his generosity is an attempt to provide therapy for both himself and those to whom he gives the money. He tells the science fiction writers that they are "the only ones with guts enough to *really* care about the future" (21) and that they are "more sensitive to important changes than anybody who was writing well" (22). His monetary gift to the authors suggests that Eliot sees a future in which fictitious and utopic ideas, made possible by his generosity and love for that which is often deemed low brow genre fiction or even smut, are enacted as a therapeutic means of reconfiguring economic relations.

Kilgore Trout, Eliot's favourite science fiction author, is subject to the same marginalization as the people of Rosewater County. Eliot laments Trout's absence from the science fiction convention, telling the writers in attendance that Trout, "this society's greatest prophet" (22), could not leave his menial job as "a stock clerk in a trading stamp redemption centre in Hyannia" (22) to attend. Trout's work is obscure and unknown outside of the niche market of sci-fi readers and writers. It is difficult to obtain, as Mushari discovers while attempting to buy a copy for a dossier on Eliot. Mushari, seeing Eliot's speech at the science fiction convention as evidence that Eliot is insane, hopes to find a copy of Trout's *2B0R2B*, which Eliot mentions. Mushari finally finds one in "a smut dealer's hole in the wall [. . .] amidst the rawest pornography" (23), along with copies of all of Trout's other novels.[63] Eliot's view of

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[63] Science fiction novels of the 1960s were arguably most concerned with race, Second Wave Feminism, and environmentalism, rather than explicitly articulating new economic relations, including technologically enabled alternatives to capitalism, as earlier utopic science fiction novels had, such as Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward: 2000–1887* (1888) and H.G. Wells's *A Modern Utopia* (1905). However, New Wave SF of the 1960s and 1970s introduced new

the potential for science fiction, particularly the work of Trout, to articulate new economic relations thus entails a form of underground circulation of private capital and cultural products between individuals. This formation functions beyond the hegemony of American popular culture that was being exported throughout western Europe and Asia by government agencies as a Cold War strategy. This underground status is evident in Mushari's misconception that "Trout's books were very dirty books, since they were sold for such high prices to such queer people in such a place" (24). His inability to see that "what Trout had in common with pornography wasn't sex but fantasies of an impossibly hospitable world" (24) and the fact that Mushari "never saw anything funny in anything, so deeply immured was he by the utterly unplayful spirit of the law" (23) aligns him with a cultural hegemony, including Eliot's father, that would supress underground culture and, as he does with Eliot, attempt to deem those who use it to challenge dominant Cold War culture mentally ill or aligned with communism. As a form of speculative fiction that deals with technological advancements not yet made, the genre also entails elements of the fantastic. Therefore, Eliot's turn to science fiction enables him to tout utopic ideals that sustain his present condition. He strives towards a state in which he is free from the guilt of his inheritance which is untenable under the existing economic relations that have provided his wealth.

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formal and stylistic techniques to the genre, articulating an array of different modes of perception and social organization. According to Mark Bould and Sherryl Vint, Harlan Ellison's anthology *Dangerous Visions* (1967), Judith Merril's anthology *England Swings SF* (1968), and the British Magazine *New Worlds* edited by Michael Moorcook best define New Wave SF (110). Ann and Jeff VanderMeer assert that New Wave SF writers "were helped in their ascendency by the continued popularity of writers from outside of genre fiction whose work existed in sympathy to the New Wave, like Kurt Vonnegut Jr. and William S. Burroughs" ("The Rise of Science Fiction from Pulp Mags to Cyberpunk" n.p.).

Eliot turns to similar economic channels when he decides to leave New York for Rosewater County in hopes that the Rosewater Foundation will bring his utopian project to fruition. He decides that he is "going to love these discarded Americans, even though they're useless and unattractive" (43), which will be his own "work of art" (43) as an alternative to the previous centralized structure of the Rosewater Foundation. The diagnosis of Eliot's wife, Sylvia, who enters psychiatric treatment after suffering a nervous breakdown and burning down the firehouse in Rosewater County, makes apparent the problems of turning to therapeutic channels under Fordism. Eliot commits her to a private mental institution where Dr. Brown, Sylvia's psychiatrist, diagnoses her with a condition he refers to as "'*Samaritrophia*,' which he said meant '*hysterical indifference to the troubles of those less fortunate than oneself*'" (italics in Vonnegut 48). Dr. Brown's explanation of the etiology of Sylvia's condition shows that he attributes it to the suffering created by class inequalities, as Vonnegut satirizes attempts to pathologize psychological responses to an economic problem. An article published by Dr. Brown, Vonnegut's narrator explains, states that Samaritrophia "is the suppression of an overactive conscience by the rest of the mind" (49). The conscience and "the other processes [. . .] note, too, that the outside world has not been even microscopically improved by the unselfish acts the conscience has demanded" (49). In response, the other faculties "rebel at last" (49) against the conscience and "the mental processes look about for a new leader, and the leader most prompt to appear whenever the conscience is stilled, Enlightened Self-interest, *does* appear" (italics in Vonnegut 49). Sylvia's condition begins with her inability to withdraw the libidinal energy she has invested into helping others from this cause and reinvest it into other therapeutic channels. This ultimately leads to an investment of such energies in the self, resulting in secondary narcissism, which Vonnegut associates with the wealthy's philanthropy.

Sylvia initially resembles Eliot here because, like him, she recognizes the need to improve the wellbeing of those around her and seeks an alternative to existing economic relations. While Eliot, as Freud has it, suffers from "hysteria or obsessional neurosis" ("On Narcissism" 456), which entails retaining erotic relations to people and things in phantasy (Freud 546), Sylvia's condition appears to progress to paraphrenia or schizophrenia. According to Freud, the paraphrenic has "withdrawn his libido from people and things in the external world, without replacing them with others in phantasy. [. . .] The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism" (546). Dr. Brown takes a somatic approach to treating Sylvia. He writes: "I made it my goal of my treatment, then, to keep her conscience imprisoned, but to lift the lid of the oubliette ever so slightly" (49), which he achieves "[t]hrough trial and error with chemotherapy and electric shock" (50). Dr. Brown acknowledges that this treatment is inadequate and leaves Sylvia "shallow" (50). His treatment is based on adjusting Sylvia's psychodynamic processes to the Fordist model of production, in which the desire to help others is repressed to avoid feelings of guilt, in accordance with prevailing norms: "The therapist [. . .] was bound to conclude that a normal person, functioning well on the upper levels of a prosperous, industrialized society, can hardly hear his conscience at all" (50). His treatment methods thus resemble and reproduce the standardized scientific approaches of Fordism. Sylvia's body becomes a site of psychiatric knowledge and treatment that Dr. Brown manages with the intent of maintaining her role as a productive citizen. For Sylvia, this entails a largely social function within an elite and wealthy segment of society, to which she returns after her treatment, rather than remaining in Rosewater County with Eliot. Sylvia's treatment remedies the divergence between the economic conditions she finds herself in and a pathologized desire to

reformulate them. After recognizing the failure of Cold War liberalism to mitigate the scientific rationalism of Fordism, she is once again subjected to psychiatry's inability to do the same. Sylvia's case suggests that psychiatric diagnosis under Fordist production curbs political agency by adjusting the dynamics between guilt and libidinal energies to the narrow possibilities of Cold War liberalism, thus maintaining an existing state fantasy.

Vonnegut suggests that while Fordism offered a method of standardizing and stabilizing production, as seen in the postwar boom of the 1950s, this turn to a rigidly structured economy mystified the underlying instability of the reproduction of wealth and the inability of Fordism to address the problem of unemployment and overproduction on a long-term basis. The diminishing capability of the consumption of mass-produced goods to prevent lost reproductive capacity and alleviate its attendant pathological effects is apparent in Eliot's office in Rosewater County. The narrator relays how Eliot's office contained numerous mass-produced commodities, including "a family size box of *Tide*, the wash day miracle" (Vonnegut 64), the shoes Eliot once tried to polish "with Johnson's *Glo-Coat*, which was a floorwax, not intended for shoes" (63) as well as "a bar of *Dial* soap, a bottle of *Absorbine, Jr.* for his athlete's foot, a bottle of *Head and Shoulder's* shampoo for his dandruff, a bottle of *Arrid* deodorant, and a tube of *Crest* toothpaste" (180). These products fail to give Eliot a respectable appearance and remedy his various physical ailments suggesting that mass production and consumption are failing to maintain not only Eliot's physical hygiene, but also his previously restored "mental hygiene" (Vonnegut 34) needed to make such products effective. Moreover, this failure of the hygiene products in Eliot's office to contain various odours and bodily waste indicates the faltering attempt to constitute and regulate a bodily subject and the consumer economy that is responsible for this, as Senator Rosewater desires and seeks to do with the Rosewater Law. In light of this, Eliot appears as a

deviant subject because he makes apparent the inability of Fordism to manage that which it deems obscene and unproductive, even among those who stand to benefit most from the maintenance of this mode of production.

According to the charter of the Rosewater Foundation, the president's duties are "as flimsy or as formidable" (Vonnegut 20) as he deems them to be. Eliot utilizes this flexibility to distribute portions of the Rosewater fortune to the people of Rosewater County. According to Stanley Schatt, Eliot's first name invokes the modernism of T.S. Eliot, while Rosewater joins 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater and former president Franklin D. Roosevelt (70). In his initial philanthropic role in the Foundation, Eliot's actions more closely resemble President Harry Truman's Fair Deal, which tempered Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism and weakened the welfare state as a result of a Republican conservative coalition's control of Congress, making Eliot a composite of Roosevelt and Goldwater. Eliot's previous attempts to use the Foundation to advance the traditional causes of liberalism including civil rights, feminism, mental health, and the arts correspond with Truman's presidency. Eliot's relapse into mental illness during this time suggests that he remains unfulfilled by his philanthropic acts, leading him to create a model of psychiatric treatment for both himself and the people of Rosewater County that aims to provide care and compassion for those deemed useless by capitalist production, a task for which liberalism is unsuited. At the outset, Eliot's acts towards the people of Rosewater County stand in stark contrast to the conservativism of Senator Rosewater. Eliot's actions oppose the advice of Old McCallister, a Rosewater family lawyer, who advises his clients that "Giving away your fortune is a futile and destructive thing. It makes whiners of the poor without making them rich or even comfortable. And the donor and his descendants become undistinguished members of the whining poor" (Vonnegut 140). Eliot's acts of kindness include comforting Diana Moon

Glampers, “a sixty-eight-year-old virgin who, by almost anybody’s standards, was too dumb to live” (65). Diana calls Eliot when in need of comfort as a result of lightning. As the narrator notes, “Lightning had killed her mother and father at a Rosewater Lumber Company picnic in 1916” (67). Eliot’s attempt to comfort Diana appears to be therapeutic for her, but also for Eliot, since Diana’s parents were killed at a picnic held by a company owned by his family. Eliot’s love for Rosewater County is thus also an attempt to atone for the wrongdoings of his family’s role in the misery brought about by Rosewater family enterprises. Moreover, Diana complains to Eliot of kidney pain, which cannot seem to be cured. She notes that when she was examined by Dr. Winters, “He said my kidney trouble was all in my head” (69). Diana refers to Eliot as a doctor, despite his insistence that he is not (69). Yet, Diana exclaims, “my kidneys have stopped hurting, just hearing your sweet voice [. . .] and the thunder and lightning’s stopped” (70), positing Eliot as a therapeutic demi-god. Furthermore, Eliot also asks an anonymous suicidal caller to “name the rock-bottom price you’d charge to go on living for just one more week” (89) and talks the man down to a hundred dollars (89) before telling him to “come on over and talk” (89). Eliot evades a crisis and at least temporarily keeps the man living, but the extent to which his donation has made any substantial change to this man’s and Diana Moon Glampers’s psychological turmoil remains ambiguous.

Critics have seen Eliot’s work with the Foundation within the context of his role as either a prophet or Christ-like figure in an Eden turned wasteland. In his analysis of the novel’s use of the Eden myth, Leonard Mustazza points to Eliot’s resemblance to figures of the New Testament including the Good Samaritan, John the Baptist, and Christ (96). More recently, Brian McCammack traces a strain of Marxist humanism in the novel, focusing on Vonnegut’s influence by socialist reformers. For McCammack, the novel asserts that “by observing socialist

principles and, more specifically, acting upon the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount and of socialist reformers like Eugene Debs and Powers Hapgood, American society has its best chance at what one could term a secular salvation" (162). McCammack sees in the novel "an emphasis on the individual, private sphere aspects of social humanitarianism rather than mass, public sphere manifestations" (162), yet the capability of the private sphere and the psychiatric treatment that takes place within it to bring about a form of political agency capable of providing an alternative to capitalism and fulfilling the utopic ideals that Eliot aspires to fulfill remains in question. Rather, the novel posits a turn to the private sphere as a realigning of neuroses with the shifting means of production, which privatize and individualize psychological processes to render them profitable. Robert T. Tally Jr.'s consideration of Vonnegut's humanist principles, wherein he identifies a kind of strong "misanthropic humanism" (xv) in Vonnegut's early novels captures the "paradoxical and parodic" (xv) of humanity's inability to change, even following revolutionary action. In this sense, Eliot's concern with loving the people of Rosewater County can be seen in a more equivocal light. Contrary to Broer's assertion that "the real insanity that looms before Eliot has little to do with opposing the capitalistic madness of his father" (78), the capitalist mode of production bears heavily on Eliot's relationship with his father and Eliot's ability to reconstitute familial relations through new political and economic formations. In other words, Eliot's familial strife, trauma, and guilt as well as the possibility of remedying such problems are deeply steeped in the emerging crisis of Fordism and psychiatry's individualized responses to it.

The efficacy of Eliot's religious or therapeutic impacts is ultimately suspect. His acts of uncritical love, as Tony Tanner astutely points out, become an "unworkable dream, remaining more of a private obsession than a public solution" (Tanner 193), evidenced, for example, by the

small donations that Eliot records in a ledger he refers to as his *"Doomsday Book*" (90), which could only be interpreted by Eliot or Sylvia (90). In this book Eliot records the information of the suicidal man who visits him after calling: "Eliot had recorded him a Rosewater Fellowship of $300" (90). As Eliot records, the man is named Sherman Wesley Little and is "a suicidal tool and dye maker who had been laid off, a veteran of the Second World War with a wife and three children, the second child suffering from cerebral palsy" (90). Little, however, "departed a little sulkily, as though suspecting that he had been swindled or mocked, but couldn't imagine how or why" (90). Eliot's attempt to aid the man appears trivial and ineffective since the sum of money will only briefly mitigate the effects of his job loss and do little to secure medical care for his son. In this sense, the man remains affected by the automatization of production which likely increases the profits of the Rosewater family. A more common method of treatment prescribed by Eliot for "people who were down in the dumps for every reason and no reason in particular" (91) is to "take an aspirin tablet and wash it down with a glass of wine" (91). Such prescriptions, which Eliot uses in his attempts to treat his own guilt for the exploitation and misery brought upon the people of Rosewater County by his family's greed, ultimately fail to reconfigure the social and economic relations between Eliot and Rosewater County to alleviate his guilt. His inability to identify with the hardships that Little faces calls into question Eliot's ability to function as a therapist. For instance, here he appears unable to transpose himself into the psyche of his patient and reserve any form of judgement in accordance with the phenomenological approach that Laing advocates in the relationship between therapist and patient.

Eliot's utopic project in Rosewater County becomes a source of humour to those around him and creates questions about his mental stability. Eliot's resemblance to biblical figures leads to an array of nicknames for him: "Eliot was spoken of by Mushari's co-workers variously as

'The Nut,' 'The Saint,' 'The Holy Roller,' 'John the Baptist,' and so on" (12). These reactions to Eliot's acts of love and his questionable therapeutic methods are indicative of the inadequacies of the Foundation to make the relationship between the means of production and available therapeutic approaches visible; instead, Eliot's methods are intelligible as only the idiosyncratic actions of an ill individual who others mock. Another of Eliot's treatment methods entails having his clients "come at a specific time in order to rid his office of flies" (91). He feels this is effective because it fulfills the "desperate need to do something nice for Eliot" (91) that people often felt. This "Augean task" (Vonnegut 91), however, the narrator suggests, is ultimately fruitless and humiliating. Furthermore, Eliot's methods have also been dangerous, as in the case of a client for whom he made the last payment on a scooter. The result of this was the death of the client and his girlfriend two days later, after smashing up the scooter (Vonnegut 99). Eliot appears blind to his own ineptness. From his perspective, as he tells his father, bankers, and lawyers who all urge him to change his behaviour, the people he is helping are "the same sorts of people who, in generations past, had cleared the forests, drained the swamps, built the bridges, people whose sons formed the backbone of infantry in times of war" (65). Yet, Vonnegut's narrator notes that the "people who leaned on Eliot regularly were a lot weaker than that—and dumber, too" (65). Ultimately, Vonnegut satirizes what emerge as Eliot's neoliberal economic reforms to the Rosewater Foundation in his efforts to provide meaningful work and freedom from debt caused by conspicuous consumption to his clients. Eliot's inability to effectively reformulate the economic relations of Rosewater County by investing his libidinal energies into those who are seen as no longer having a use within Fordist production gives way to a new form of precarity for the people of Rosewater County as they become subject to Eliot's individualized approach.

These efforts to implement utopic ideals and Eliot's romanticizing of his clients convey not just Eliot's individual failure; Vonnegut satirizes the prevailing attitudes towards radically reconfiguring economic relations and the limited scope of neoliberal economics as a means of doing so. Vonnegut reveals a disjuncture between the admiration Eliot expresses for socialist reformers such as Eugene Debs and Thorstein Veblen, on one hand, and political discourse that dismisses radical reforms as utopian and thus unachievable projects. The various nicknames for Eliot and "the common gossip in the office that the very first president of the Foundation, Eliot Rosewater, the Senator's son, was a lunatic" (12) contributes to the easy dismissal of Eliot's utopic aims, yet when gathering evidence to have Eliot deemed legally insane, Mushari acknowledges: "This characterization was a somewhat playful one, but as Mushari knew, playfulness was impossible to prove in a court of law" (12). As a utopic project, Eliot's work of art in Rosewater County is also easily dismissed as the work of a lunatic when it fails to bring about significant change. The framing of Eliot's work within the aims of Cold War liberalism renders it beyond the scope of feasible political action. Despite its place in political discourse in the 19th century, by the 1960s socialist reform is dismissed as an unrealistic ideal of the counterculture. Similarly, Eliot refers to himself as a "Utopian dreamer, a tinhorn saint, an aimless fool" (18), recognizing the perception of his political aims. In his 1961 essay "Utopic Thinking," Paul Goodman asserts that it is "characteristic of our period that [. . .] moral choices are considered irrelevant" (4). According to Goodman, "ideas are 'utopian' when [. . .] they work and do *not* win their way" (emphasis in Goodman 5). In other words, "when they seem to be useful but they propose a different style, a different procedure, a different kind of motivation from the way people at present do business" (5), Goodman asserts, ideas are deemed utopic. Framing Eliot as a moralist with utopic aims thus places him beyond the scope of an achievable

political and economic formation, rather than within viable political alternatives to capitalism and the crisis of Fordism due to unemployment and overproduction.

Eliot's turn away from the centralized structure of the Rosewater Foundation in New York to a localized structure in Rosewater County is a drastic change from the bureaucratic functions of the Foundation's offices in the Empire State Building. Leaving behind his efforts to aid liberal causes through a centralized approach signals his attempt to account for the failings of the welfare state and its various attempts to eliminate poverty through initiatives such as Truman's Fair Deal and, concurrent with Eliot's move to Rosewater County, John F. Kennedy's New Frontier, and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. As the site of a failed utopia, the community of New Ambrosia in Rosewater County is an apt location for a new utopic project. Vonnegut's narrator notes that the community is a result of the failure of a now stagnant canal that bisects the county, describing it as "the one dash of reality added by Eliot's great grandfather to a stock and bond fantasy" (43). The community "invested everything it had in the canal, and lost. They were Germans, communists and atheists who practiced group marriage, absolute truthfulness, absolute cleanliness, and absolute love. They were now scattered to the winds, like the worthless papers that represented their equity in the canal" (44). Despite this failure, the Rosewater family profited when Noah bought up the farms of those who lost all their assets when the canal failed. Eliot comes to remedy the failure of Rosewater County, which is populated by decaying remnants of the past, such as a Parthenon situated in the centre of town "built of honest red brick, columns and all. Its roof was green copper. The canal ran through it, and so, in the bustling past, had the New York Central Monon, and Nickle Plate Railroads. When Eliot and Sylvia took up residence, only the canal and the Monon tracks remained, and the Monon was bankrupt, and its tracks were brown" (44). The centralized hub of the town has fallen into decay and unproductivity, leaving

the citizens of the county destitute and largely unemployed. The effects of automatization are apparent in the old Rosewater Saw Company: "To the west of the Parthenon was the old Rosewater Saw Company, red brick, too, green roofed, too. The spine of its roof was broken, its windows unglazed. It was a New Ambrosia for barn swallows and bats. Its four tower clocks were handless. Its big brass whistle was choked with nests" (44). The saw company's construction out of the same red brick and copper roof as a decaying Parthenon in the centre of the town positions it as part of the United States that was once seen as a new classical world, a pastiche, now depleted and deteriorated.[64]

Rosewater County appears to offer Eliot a viable opportunity to implement utopic ideas that are in accordance with Goodman's utopian proposals. A new iteration of the Rosewater Foundation can provide decentralized channels for capital, as opposed to its former centralized structure. As an alternative to the existing mode of production, Goodman proposes decentralization, noting: "We seem at present to be trying to choose between more public goods or more leisure goods; we could even choose more leisure without more goods, but this would perhaps involve moral and political alternatives that are excluded" (5). For Goodman, this involves a new conception of work geared towards vocational development, rather than the production of wealth. This work contributes to particular communal needs and the development of knowledge for a future vocation. The work camps that he proposes, then, are conceived as part of a community, rather than a precondition for reintegration. In this sense, rural renewal is an apt

[64] As Robert T. Tally Jr. points out, Vonnegut's novels include elements of both modernism and postmodernism: "In his persistent longing for a perceived, former unity [. . .] Vonnegut betrays his thoroughgoing, elegiac modernism; however, his formal techniques and his more philosophical content suggest an insinuation of the more postmodern vision in Vonnegut, where the author seems to admit that such comforting ideas of past glory are nothing but [. . .] useful lies" (6).

terrain for this new conception of work. Goodman explains "fifty thousand small towns in America are ugly, shapeless, and neglected—nowhere to belong to, nothing to be proud of. [. . .] Maybe some of them can be improved by artists and youth" (272). Thus, Rosewater County with its decay, "shithouses, shacks, alcoholism, ignorance idiocy and perversion" (Vonnegut 45) stands poised for renewal through a utopic economic formation. Eliot's conception of himself as an artist capable of making Rosewater County his canvass, however, remains steeped in private monetary transactions, undermining the fulfillment of this conception of work. Goodman notes that urban renewal will not be achieved "by private promoters whose notion of a community center is not a green but a supermarket" (272), highlighting the need to separate communal work from corporate interests. Eliot hopes that employing the Foundation to bypass the regulated economy and centralization of Fordism and its attendant foreclosure of channels for the alleviation of inherited guilt will enable a form of work that entails loving others. The impending inability of Fordism to deal with overproduction and unemployment, however, reveals the limitations of Eliot's artistic endeavour. His private investments are channeled into narcissistic relations, leaving Rosewater County unrenewed and putting any potentially therapeutic effects for the residents of Rosewater County at the peril of those who seek to make Eliot's guilt from inherited wealth profitable. Thus, Eliot ultimately diminishes the capacity of his clients to engage in a new form of work that would constitute an alternative economic formation that privileges the communal and local and grants them political agency, leaving them positioned as pathologized individuals by conservatives.

The charter of the Rosewater Foundation, as a document intended to enshrine wealth within the Rosewater familial lineage, specifically "the closest and oldest heirs of the Foundation's creator, Senator Lister Ames Rosewater" (10), includes measures that protect the

profits of the family fortune from being squandered or diverted into non-profitable channels, as many fear Eliot is doing in Rosewater County. The charter, Norman Mushari discovers, calls for "the immediate expulsion of any officer adjudged insane" (12). Therefore, Eliot's actions make him subject to removal. This creates an ideal situation for Mushari to profit from Eliot's guilt and his attempts to alleviate it by channeling the wealth of the Foundation into a utopic project. Mushari operates according to the advice of his former law school professor, aptly named Leonard Leech, who tells him:

> In every big transaction [. . .] there is a magic moment during which a man has surrendered a treasure, and during which the man who is due to receive it has not yet done so. An alert lawyer will make that moment his own, possessing that treasure for a magic microsecond, taking a little of it, passing it on. If the man who is to receive the treasure is unused to wealth, has an inferiority complex and shapeless feelings of guilt, as most people do, the lawyer can often take as much as half of the bundle, and still receive the recipient's blubbering thanks. (12)

Such a transaction becomes possible when Mushari discovers the distant Rhode Island Rosewaters, who have no knowledge of their familial ties to Eliot and the Rosewater Foundation. In order to transfer the Foundation's money to Fred Rosewater, a distant cousin of Eliot's in Rhode Island, and take a portion for himself, Mushari must first have Eliot declared legally insane. In this sense, psychiatric treatment and knowledge are a site of struggle between Eliot and Mushari over the economic function of guilt and meaning of mental illness. For Mushari, guilt provides access to economic channels that make inherited wealth profitable, while Eliot seeks to redistribute his wealth for therapeutic purposes.

Obtaining access to the Foundation's wealth provides Mushari with an opportunity to increase the productive capacity of the fortune that Vonnegut's narrator suggests Mushari otherwise lacks. Mushari's incapacity for guilt enables him to focus on directing Eliot's guilt into profitable channels. His entrenchment in the law and his inability to see the value of the work of Kilgore Trout reflects the deficiency of his capacity for investing his libidinal energies in others. He is described as "the youngest, the shortest, and by all odds the least Anglo-Saxon male employee in the firm" (11) of McCallister, Robjent, Reed and McGee. "He was of Lebanese extraction, the son of a Brooklyn rug merchant. He was five feet and three inches tall. He had an enormous ass, which was luminous when bare" (11). He lacks in virility and wealth in comparison to the white males of the firm, but has an ample buttocks and nefarious nature: "He never would have been hired if the other partners hadn't felt that McCallister's operations could do with just a touch more viciousness" (11). Mushari, then, feels no guilt about obtaining a large portion of a sum of money that passes through his hands, while relying on the guilt of others to obtain profits. Thus, for Mushari, the guilt that causes Eliot to channel the fortune into utopic aims is a potential means of expanding markets and increasing profitability when directed through the appropriate channels, positing guilt as a determining factor in the reiteration of the flawed state fantasy of the Founding Fathers or the initiation of a new utopia

Eliot's sanity is called into question due to his excessive drinking and his overt expression of morality, which is deemed to be unruly behaviour. This provides Mushari with an opportunity to gather evidence to make his case that Eliot is legally insane. As Peter Freese points out, the question of Eliot's sanity "becomes a case study in the social definition of 'insanity'" (240). Freese finds Laing's work relevant to the novel as he notes that it illustrates Laing's explanation of schizophrenic behaviour as he outlines it in *The Politics of Experience*

and The Bird of Paradise (1967). According to the passage Freese cites from Laing, schizophrenic behaviour is a coping method for individuals in untenable positions that become apparent when the entire web of social relations is visible (Laing 95 as cited in Freese 240). Following the traumatic incident with the firefighters during the war, Eliot responded in a way that substantiates Laing's positing of mental illness as a coping method as he became rigid and entered a catatonic state. Yet Sylvia's father, whose string quartet played for psychiatric patients when Eliot was hospitalized, found Eliot to be "the sanest American he had ever met" (74) and "the only American who has so far noticed the Second World War" (74). Moreover, Sylvia's father sees Eliot's attitude towards art as a sign of his sanity, explaining that when Eliot claims to despise art, "What he's saying, I think, is that art has failed him, which, I must admit, is a very fair thing for a man who has bayoneted a fourteen-year-old boy in the line of duty to say" (74). To Laing's point, Eliot's response to the war and his attitude towards art are not exceptions to the conditions he faces. His reaction to traumatic war experiences, which is understood by others as an illness, is produced by and discernable when contextualized historically by the outbreak of the Second World War following the unprecedented atrocities of the First World War. The contingent nature of Eliot's diagnosis becomes more apparent when his attitude towards art is contextualized within the inability of the welfare state to create an economic formation in which the work of artists is performed as an act of communal service. Following the Second World War, previous attempts to employ artists, such as Roosevelt's Works Progress Administration during the Great Depression, gave way to artistic production for Cold War cultural imperialism.

Following the war, Eliot is once again in an untenable position as the available channels for the alleviation of his guilt stemming from inherited wealth are inadequate. His divergence from established familial relations that protect the Rosewater family fortune and ensure its continued

reproduction makes this apparent. Eliot's drunken wanderings, his speech at the science fiction convention, and the services he offers to Rosewater County, which all become evidence for Mushari's case, therefore, are responses to his refusal to assume a place in the familial line while simultaneously relying on the family's profits in his attempts to alleviate his guilt. The unofficial diagnosis of a sexual perversion by Eliot's analyst lends further support to the evidence Mushari is collecting, yet it also fails to provide Mushari with any form of definitive legal evidence to have Eliot declared insane, frustrating Mushari's use of the law to formalize and legislate mental illness. In this sense, the novel undercuts psychiatry's attempt to articulate psychiatric disorders in legal, objectively clinical, and politically neutral terms. The construction of illness thus depends on the signification of Eliot's behaviour and its capacity to reproduce the Rosewater family's wealth.

On the other hand, Eliot's letter to Sylvia from Elsinore, California in which he refers to her as Ophelia and himself as Hamlet as well as his interest in Kilgore Trout's novel *2B0R2B*, which repeats the question from Hamlet's famous soliloquy, all indicate that at this point, Eliot may be feigning insanity to escape his position within his family and the Foundation. These aspects of Eliot's behaviour also become evidence for Mushari's case against Eliot. Mushari obtains "a private detective's report that was in the files of McAllister, Robjent, Reed and McGee. Old McAllister had hired the detective to retrace Eliot's steps, to find out if he had done things that might later legally embarrass the Foundation" (21). Upon receiving Eliot's letter, Sylvia "immediately had a recording device attached to her telephone, another nice break for Norman Mushari. Sylvia did this because she thought that Eliot had at last gone irrevocably bananas" (38) and "wanted to record every clue as to his whereabouts and condition, so that she could have him picked up" (38). Thus, Eliot is under the surveillance of competing interests that will employ

what is interpreted as evidence of his pathology to serve different ends, but which ultimately both have strong implications for how wealth is channeled through and concentrated within the Rosewater family.

Thomas Szasz's *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry* and Post-Fordist Psychiatric Therapy

The authority of psychiatrists to diagnose Eliot as a neurotic positions Eliot's guilt at the centre of how economic relations are reproduced as the Rosewater family protects its line of inherited wealth. Mushari's use of psychiatry to initiate the transfer of the presidency to Fred Rosewater is indicative of the way in which pathologizing Eliot's guilt is a potentially profitable means of disrupting this line of inheritance, while ultimately maintaining the transfer of wealth along lines of inheritance. The function of psychiatry in determining if the profits of the Rosewater fortune will change lines of inheritance resonates with Thomas Szasz's critique of forensic psychiatry in his 1963 book *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry*: *An Inquiry into the Social Uses of Mental Health Practices*. Szasz expresses his concern with the ways in which psychiatry has entered into various contexts outside of medicine, most notably law. According to Szasz, psychiatry's function as a social institution poses a danger to individual liberty which, he asserts, is a fundamental right of American citizens that must be defended. Szasz qualifies this criticism, acknowledging that "no society is possible without social institutions" (86) before continuing on to assert that the current state of social psychiatry, which entails "absolute dominance of the psychiatrist over the patient" (86) is "affecting other areas of life—particularly politics, criminology, and civil law" (86). Szasz asserts that there is a need to recognize that psychiatry has a potentially agency-quelling social function, rather than seeing it solely as a medical discipline: "For psychiatry—in contrast to the nonmedical branches of social science—has acquired much social prestige and power through an essentially misleading association with the

practice of medicine" (23). For Szasz, psychiatry's status as a medical science imbues it with undue authority. Therefore, the ways in which the opinions of a psychiatrist, particularly in a court of law, are a function of the law's role in maintaining the status quo need to be critically examined.

As Mushari seeks evidence that a court of law will accept as definitive proof of Eliot's insanity, he faces the problem of psychiatry's role as a mode of social regulation. Szsaz critiques this function of psychiatry by contrasting the ethical component of the law with the medical treatments of psychiatry, noting: "The norms from which deviation is measured, when one speaks of a mental illness, is a *psychosocial and ethical* one. Yet, the remedy is sought in terms of *medical* measures which—it is hoped and assumed—is free from wide differences of ethical value" (emphasis in Szasz 14). This disconnect between psychosocial norms and the medical measures through which psychiatry regulates them raises a crucial question about psychiatry as a form of political agency that arises as Mushari attempts to prove Eliot legally insane as well as when Eliot takes on the role of therapist for the residents of Rosewater County. Szasz asks: "Whose agent is the psychiatrist?" (14) to which he responds that "the psychiatrist (or nonmedical psychotherapist) may be the agent of the patient, the relatives, the school, the military services, a business organization, a court of law, and so forth" (14). The convergence of social psychiatry and law sows the seeds for Szasz's alarm over the potential of psychiatry to infringe upon the principle of individual liberty and its role in determining access to markets, which comes to include mental health care. He fears that this convergence will lead to despotism, stating: "Most of the legal and social applications of psychiatry, undertaken in the name of psychiatric liberalism, are actually instances of despotism" (xvii). For Szasz, liberalism, by aiming to protect those who are historically disadvantaged, threatens to infringe on the self

sufficiency of others and their access to free markets, implying the relinquishment of social and economic freedoms under a guise of medical authority.

Ultimately, Szasz proposes an ethics of psychiatry based on the principle of individual liberty. According to him, the concept of liberty as it is articulated in the Constitution of the United States should extend to psychiatric treatment. He explains that according to constitutionalism, “the liberty we enjoy, as well as the necessary limits on it, are not regulated by the opinions of experts, but by laws rationally conceived, carefully formulated, and impartially administered. This principle, best known as the rule of law, is threatened by many contemporary psychiatric practices” (7). Szasz’s proposal to limit the authority of psychiatry within the framework of the Constitution grounds the discipline in the Enlightenment principles that shaped the founding of the United States. Szasz, like Vonnegut, recognizes the role that the influence of legality on psychiatry plays in constituting and regulating patients as economic subjects. However, while Szasz responds by advocating the strengthening of individual liberties, Vonnegut points to the ways in which liberalism under the development of capitalism and through to the emergence of post-Fordism and neo-liberal economic reforms are incapable of providing economic relations that alleviate anxiety, paranoia, and guilt stemming from inherited wealth and the forms of labour that enable it to be maintained as forms of individual and private pathology.

In *Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry*, Szsaz argues that psychiatric treatment violates individual liberty and asserts that there is a need to remove the moral aspects of psychiatric treatment from the legal system: “Scientific knowledge does not contain within itself directions for its ‘proper’ humanitarian use. Legal psychiatry has proved impervious to this simple fact” (92). Both Szasz and Senator Rosewater propose a similar choice between an overt system of punishment for

those who fail to self-regulate according to the logic of individual freedom and justice that constitutes the founding state fantasy of the United States as a free market or the regulation of individuals through economic principles that are purportedly separate from the morality of liberalism. Senator Rosewater explains: “We can write morals into law, and enforce those morals harshly, or we can return to a True Free Enterprise System, which has the sink-or-swim justice of Caesar Augustus built into it” (31-32). Similarly, Szasz asserts: “We must choose between regulating persons *indirectly*, by prescribing rules of conduct and penalties for violations, and controlling them *directly*, through compulsory therapy” (94). Both favour a form of individual self-regulation, a consequence of which is adherence to an implied moral code that sustains liberty and justice to uphold the free enterprise system, while discouraging individuals from being unproductive and thus pathologized.

Szasz sees this indirect method of regulation based on the concept of liberty as a means of safeguarding individuals from the potential abuses of psychiatry. He posits involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients to institutions as the ultimate violation of individual liberty. As Peter Sedgwick points out, “Involuntary hospitalization is for Szasz the central paradigm of modern psychiatry” (153). Sedgwick illuminates Szasz’s rhetorical method, stating that it involves taking “a particularly disputable type of psychiatric action and defining the rest of psychiatry around it” (153). As an alternative to forms of institutionalized psychiatric treatment that were often the object of well-deserved scrutiny and criticism, especially in state psychiatric wards in the United States throughout the 1950s, Szasz proposes a relationship between patient and therapist that is free of the punitive function of institutionalized treatment. As an alternative to hospitalization, he looks to the way in which the British Mental Health Act (1959) enabled patients to be “hospitalized informally, although not necessarily voluntarily” (Szasz 44).

According to Szasz, the shifting structures of psychiatric treatment to outpatient care and open hospitals that was taking place throughout the 1960s in the United States and Britain retain a punitive function. He asserts that the open hospital is "a form of penal reform" (220) that resembles Soviet corrective labour camps. For Szasz, then, an ethical form of psychiatric care that maintains liberty consists of consensual treatment in a private clinic, while leaving non-consensual forms of commitment to legal institutions.

This turn from institutionalized psychiatry sought in a hospital setting to a privatized transaction on the free market that Szasz advocates is exemplified in the treatment Eliot offers the people of Rosewater County. His therapeutic methods consist of small-scale exchanges resembling those of the post-Fordist service sector. His telephone greeting, "This is the Rosewater Foundation. How may we help you?" (86), makes this apparent. His work departs from the hallmark manufacturing of Fordism that once took place in Rosewater County as Eliot deals primarily with managing capital. After leaving the economic hub of New York City, the Rosewater Foundation can subvert the formalized economy of Fordism and the political consensus on which it depends. This unregulated, free market model of psychiatric care that Szasz advocates, however, emerges as a dominant characteristic of the post-Fordist economy. As Sedgwick notes, "as the post-war consensus on the priorities of welfare spending and economic pump-priming became eroded, this marginal, pro-capitalist libertarianism[65] began to move into the centre of the political stage" (159). The post-Fordist mode of production to which Eliot turns when reconfiguring the Rosewater Foundation will become more visible and pronounced with the recession of 1973. Harvey describes the "rapid growth of 'black,' 'informal,' or

[65] Sedgwick identifies a fringe New Right, apparent in organizations and publications such as the Pennsylvania Society for Individual Liberty, Libertarian Forum, and Capitalist Books (159) that countered the New Left.

'underground' economies [. . .] documented throughout the advanced capitalist world" (152) that can provide "new survival strategies" (153) or be a means of "organized tax-dodging" (153), as in the case of the Rosewater Foundation. Under post-Fordism, the flexibility of such economies becomes the dominant organizing principle, rather than a means of survival among the underground. Flexible accumulation would reorganize the tension between centralization and decentralization, Harvey notes, through smaller and less formalized economies (159). In this sense, the very strategies for reconfiguring psychiatric institutions begin to falter in their function as a means of exercising agency to address the limitations of Fordism. The channels for the redistribution of capital away from lines of inheritance that Eliot aims to establish as a therapeutic method for alleviating his guilt become the basis for the continued reproduction of wealth. Thus, the psychiatric liberalism that Szasz critiques due to what he perceives as an imposition on economic and individual liberty fails to address his critique of psychiatry as a form of social control as psychiatry is coupled with economic interests of post-Fordism and neoliberal economic reforms. The Rosewater Foundation comes to resemble an array of consumer services available on a free market, into which Eliot can channel his libidinal energies as he seeks to alleviate his guilt through decentralized flows of capital.

Senator Rosewater's fears of sexual excess and bodily by-products and his criticism of a social safety net in his speech introducing the Rosewater Law suggest the coupling of the containment of sexuality within the nuclear family and the rigidity of Fordist production to ensure the investment of libidinal energies into the reproduction of inherited wealth. The Senator's later reaction to Eliot's nakedness is indicative of the failure of the Rosewater Law to contain the bodily within the reproductive processes of the nuclear family as a place for the concentration of inherited wealth, further indicating the need for a new economic formation to

sustain productivity. The narrator notes that "pubic hair was to (Senator Rosewater) the most unmentionable, unthinkable of all materials" (184). When Eliot "came out of the lavatory, all naked and hairy, drying himself with a tea towel" (184), Senator Rosewater "was petrified, felt beset by overwhelming forces of filth and obscenity on all sides" (184). Not only has Eliot disrupted the stability of the Rosewater Foundation's capital by not having a child, but his open nudity disrupts his father's desire for a regulated and contained body. Eliot narcissistically displays the effects of his refusal to channel his libidinal energies into the reproduction of the Rosewater family, disturbing Senator Rosewater's imposition of a harsh mode of regulating sexual and economic relations.

Eliot's refusal to channel his libidinal energies into sexual reproduction is apparent in a poem he writes for Sylvia in which he describes a form on non-reproductive sex that repulses Senator Rosewater. In the poem, Eliot describes his desire to "draw a straight line five inches long / Above your pubic hair. / And then I might take the index finger / Of my right hand, / And insinuate it just over the rim of the right side / Of your famous belly button, And leave it there, motionless, for maybe half an hour" (183-184). In his poem, Eliot acknowledges the peculiarity of this implied sexual act that circumvents procreative sex: "Queer? / You bet" (184). In this sense, Eliot's sexual desire for Sylvia is also a refusal to assume his place as a father and the sex role that this entails. According to Freud's theorization of sexual awareness in his analysis of a dream by Sergei Pankejeff, also known as the Wolf Man, the primal scene entails "genital organization" (*History of an Infantile Neurosis* 47) in which the child comes to an awareness of the significance of sexual difference, which can be discerned from an analysis of Pankejeff's dream where he fears being eaten by a wolf. According to Freud, Pankejeff:

> understood now that active was the same as masculine, while passive was the same as feminine. His passive sexual aims should now have been transformed into a feminine one, and have expressed itself as 'being copulated with by his father' instead of 'being beaten by him on the genitals or on the bottom'. This feminine aim, however, underwent repression and was obliged to let itself be replaced by fear of the wolf. (47)

The primal scene for Eliot, however, does not result in the genital organization that Freud describes. Eliot makes clear to his father that he does not identify with the active masculine role of the father as he invests his libidinal energies in the people of Rosewater County in both active and passive roles. He explains to Senator Rosewater: "To these people around here, Father, I'm no particular sex at all" (183). Thus, the people of Rosewater County do not see Eliot as a father who inflicts violence, as the child believes the father to be doing in the primal scene, when he observes his mother and father engaged in sex. Instead, Eliot attempts to become a non-violent, sexless individual who is free of his inherited father role and the guilt of the wealth that comes with this inheritance. By channeling his libidinal energies into Rosewater County through capital investment, Eliot seeks an escape from the guilt of his inheritance, while still retaining his place as president of the Rosewater Foundation, where he can be loved without the signification of sexual difference.

The adaptation of the Fordist mode of production that entails flexibility and niche markets is already apparent in Rhode Island, where Fred Rosewater, like Eliot, grapples with inherited guilt by selling insurance to the working class. Fred seeks a sense of security and fulfillment in his job as an insurance salesman, where, like Eliot, he tries to alleviate the anxieties of others by dispersing minimal amounts of wealth, while wracked with his own guilt. While Fred visits both the coffee houses of the rich and the poor to find clients, he sells only to

the poor. As the narrator notes, "All of his business was with the working class. His cavorting with the sailboat rajahs next doors bluster, bluff. It impressed the poor to think that Fred sold insurance to the canny rich, too, but it was not true" (114). Moreover, like Eliot, Fred seeks benediction from his clients. He tells one that his "greatest satisfaction comes [. . .] when I have a bride come up to me and say 'I don't know how the children and I can ever thank you enough for what you've done. God bless you, Mr. Rosewater'" (122), echoing the words that Diana Moon Glampers says to Eliot. For Fred, investing in "the miracle of life insurance" (Vonnegut 121) which he speaks of as a doing "something for our brides" (121) is a channel for investing libidinal energies into the nuclear family. However, his job as an insurance salesman is also menial work that offers little return for his labour. Although Fred attended Princeton University, "for Pisquontuit, he was gruesomely poor" (113) and although he lives among the rich, their lives, too, "were precisely as pointless and unhappy as lives led in Rosewater, Indiana" (113). While Mushari and the Senator fear that Eliot is depleting the family fortune by giving away portions of it, Fred's similar position in Pisquontuit suggests that such transactions are unlikely to alter the existing economic relations.

As a Rosewater, Fred also has inherited feelings of guilt and inadequacy from his family. He is the son of a suicide and is "more rootless than most, even in a notoriously rootless nation" (120). According to the narrator, he suffers from an expectation that he, too, will probably kill himself, in addition to "twitches, aversions and listlessness special to his own case" (121). Fred's inadequacies also extend to his sexuality. In the eyes of Harry Pena, who is "one of the few men in Pisquontuit whose manhood was not in question" (127), Fred appears to be a "bleak, sexless person" (127). Harry openly jeers at the image of the woman on the cover of *The American Investigator*, a low brow tabloid, while Fred feigns a contemptuous attitude toward it and its

readers, despite regularly reading it with a sense of titillation. Moreover, Fred is intrigued by the personals section and the ads in *The Investigator*, yet he "lacked the nerve to become a part of it, to correspond with all the box numbers there. Since he was the son of a suicide, it was hardly surprising that his secret hankerings were embarrassing and small" (126). For Mushari, Fred is an ideal member of the Rosewater family to transfer the presidency of the Foundation and its fortune to since he is unlikely to miss the portion Mushari plans to take for himself. Fred's complacency and lack of virility are characteristic of both Rosewater, Indiana and Pisquontuit, Rhode Island, where Eliot and Fred respectively seek outlets for their desires within service sector industries.

The attempts of both Fred and Eliot to alleviate their inherited Rosewater guilt entails reformulating the nature of work that they perform in response to the pressures facing the working class due to accelerating technological advancements and the faltering of Fordism. Eliot's work with the Rosewater Foundation does not consist of finding new ways to make those deemed to be "morons, perverts, starvelings and the unemployed" (47) useful and employed once again in new, sustainable forms of work. Nor does his work entail making earlier forms of manual labour relevant once again. Bunny Weeks, owner of a restaurant in Rhode Island and a bank director, states that the type of work done by Harry Pena and his sons that involves "men working with their hands and backs" (152) is over with and no longer needed. Harry's work as a trap fisherman has become valuable only as "animated wallpaper" (150) for Bunny's restaurant. Harry was once, like Fred, an "insurance bastard" (Vonnegut 126) before following in his father's footsteps and becoming a fisherman. Harry's lack of economic value is indicative of a shift away from economic relations based on manual labour that enables working-class men to invest libidinal energies in communal work. Instead, the work that Eliot and Fred perform under

the crisis of Fordism is increasingly done in a service sector that is based on financial markets. This offers little hope for those who are marginalized by its eclipse of manual labour, such as Harry Pena. Ultimately, then, the Rosewater Foundation and the emerging service sector of which it is a part has limited therapeutic effects for former members of working class, now deemed useless and pathologized. Like Szasz's model of transactional psychiatry, the Rosewater Foundation alleviates the guilt of those who provide therapeutic services, while offering little to remedy the suffering of an increasingly marginalized class of the unemployed and unemployable, denying them agency within existing economic relations.

The post-Fordist model of psychiatric care delivered via a service economy ultimately sustains a fantasy of the alleviation of guilt for Eliot and Fred, while maintaining existing class relations. This fantasy entails a reconfiguration of the nature of work. Rather than people being valued according to their usefulness as workers who create profits for the wealthy, it entails the labour performed by Eliot and Fred as they love such people after they are no longer useful as workers. As an insurance salesman, Fred sees himself performing this kind of work by selling life insurance that provides a false sense of security to both himself and his clients. Fred's inability to fulfill his desire by channelling his libidinal energies into loving and protecting his clients is apparent in the way in which the personal ads in the *American Investigator* provide him with an additional outlet. Fred's interest in the ads sustains a tension between desire and guilt, thus making his guilt a source of profit in the popular market in which the magazine circulates.

The inadequate therapeutic effects of Fred's work become apparent not only here, but also more widely in light of the formation of a flexible decentralized economy in Pisquontuit that also relies on the frustrated release of libidinal energies. Lila Buntline, the daughter of the wealthy Stewart Buntline, utilizes an unregulated economic structure in her role as

"Pisquontuit's leading dealer in smut" (131). As such, she also reveals the inability of the legal measures such as the Rosewater Law to regulate morality effectively through the economics of Fordism. She is motivated by a desire for profit as she takes advantage of her "playmates at the Pisquontuit Yacht Club and Pisquontuit County Day School [who] were so rich and foolish they would pay her almost anything for almost anything" (131). As part of a family whose wealth is inherited, she continues to deploy the principles of a free and unregulated market to accumulate as much wealth as possible. Her merchandise includes *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and an image of "two fat, simpering, naked whores, one of whom was attempting to have impossible sexual congress with a dignified, decent, unsmiling, Shetland pony" (163) that she sold to Fred Rosewater's son. Thus, Lila's use of the free market fails to alleviate any aversion to "reproductive organs, bodily discharges, or bodily hair" (82). Instead, these become prolific as Lila relies on the narcissistic libidinal investments in the materials that she sells to her customers. In doing so, the guilt and shame of her customers drives her profits rather than enabling their libidinal energies to be channeled into others. This economic formation forecloses investment in new forms of work based on utopic ideals or disrupted lines of inheritance. In this sense, the unregulated and privatized transactions that constitute the economy in which Lila operates utilize the economic measures that Eliot has employed, but in order to limit a wider spectrum of economic possibilities and constitute those attempting to satisfy desires as consumer subjects in a pathogenic market that reproduces guilt.

Although those whom Eliot helps often regard him as a doctor or a saint, despite his rejections of such labels, his function as president of the Rosewater Foundation is complicated by his attempt to establish a reciprocal relationship between himself and those he helps. On the one hand, Eliot's approach dissolves the barriers between therapist and patient, paralleling

Laing's assertion in *The Divided Self* that "the therapist must have the plasticity to transpose himself into another strange and even alien view of the world" (34). Laing explains that the therapist "must be able to effect this reorientation without prejudging who is right and who is wrong" (26). Eliot's meager lifestyle in Rosewater County and his actions including trading away all of his expensive clothing for coveralls and other garments of the working class indicates his attempt to reorient himself in relation to those he tries to help. Yet, this way of positioning himself and the Foundation raises questions about the possibilities regarding the agency of his clients. As one caller to the foundation tells Eliot, beneath a sticker in a phonebooth for the Foundation which states: "*Don't Kill Yourself. Call the Rosewater Foundation*" (italics in Vonnegut 87), someone has written: "*Eliot Rosewater is a saint. He'll give you love and money. If you'd rather have the best piece of tail in southern Indiana, call Melissa*" (italics in Vonnegut 87). This juxtaposition of Eliot's services with those of a prostitute entails a doubling of Eliot's role in an exchange where he pays out money and acts of kindness and receives benediction and reverence that becomes a narcissistic return on his investment. His clients receive kindness and a modest amount of money in exchange for revering Eliot; however, they are also left feeling cheated or unsatisfied, making Eliot both a financial and a narcissistic beneficiary of the exchange at the cost of his client's libidinal investments.

The political implications of Eliot's shift from a standardized Fordist approach by the Rosewater Foundation to the flexibility he demonstrates in his donations in Rosewater County are also visible within the context of the 1964 Presidential election.[66] The narrator links Mushari to Goldwater when Mushari reads Goldwater's *Conscience of a Conservative* as he flies into Rhode Island to tell Fred Rosewater of his link to the Rosewater fortune (142). Goldwater's

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[66] See page 70 of Schatt.

conflict with the publication *Fact* in the Fall of 1964 illustrates the role that psychiatric knowledge and authority played in the election. The September-October issue of *Fact*, entitled *The Unconscious of a Conservative: A Special Issue on the Mind of Barry Goldwater*, contains the responses of 1189 psychiatrists to a questionnaire on Goldwater's psychological fitness for the presidency of the United States.[67] Within the responses, opposing views of psychiatry are discernable. Those in support of Goldwater's Presidency criticize the role of psychiatry in the election, echoing Szasz's criticisms of its application in non-medical disciplines. For instance, one of the 657 who believed that Goldwater was fit to be President responded with the following:

> If most psychiatrists do not prefer Goldwater, it is certainly no surprise. Psychiatrists have a strong tendency to be "do-gooders" and are therefore more politically liberal. Since I am a practicing psychiatrist I feel free to criticize my profession. Among MD's, we are the most psychologically disturbed of the group. That is what motivates us to be interested in other people's problems. Compared to Harry Truman and John Kennedy, Barry Goldwater is a psychological "superman" in my opinion. (Boroson 29)

This respondent shares Szasz's criticism of liberal psychiatry and its social aims embedded within the place as medical professionals. Another responds, in part: "It is unfortunate that there are so many Utopian Left-leaners. They would not vote Republican no matter what" (Boroson 36) after expressing his opinion that Goldwater is fit for the Presidency, based on his own

[67] According to *Fact*, 1189 psychiatrists responded that Goldwater was psychologically unfit to be President, while only 657 found him to be fit, according to their observations of Goldwater in the media and public. Goldwater subsequently filed a libel suit against editor and publisher of *Fact*, Ralph Ginzburg (Goldwater v. Ginzburg). In 1969, the court ruled in favour of Goldwater. The issue of *Fact* that initiated the conflict with Goldwater led to the American Psychiatric Association's "Goldwater Rule" in 1973, which made it a violation of its ethics for a psychiatrist to "to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement" (*The Principles of Medical Ethics With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry* 9).

personal knowledge of him. Such responses are indicative of the centrality of psychiatry in the discourse of the 1964 Presidential Election and Vonnegut's use of his novel to engage in such debates. Eliot, too, is deemed a psychologically disturbed "Utopian dreamer" (Vonnegut 18) in his attempts to provide therapy for himself and Rosewater County. This view of Eliot, shared by Mushari and Senator Rosewater positions liberal guilt, such as that which Eliot exhibits, as a symptom of a pathology, rather than a legitimate political impetus. This dismissal of liberal guilt as utopic ideas precludes a mechanism for a new state phantasy capable of providing more equitable political and economic relations.

The impact of this pathologizing of liberal guilt is visible in Eliot's reconfigured Rosewater Foundation and the limited possibilities it provides for new libidinal economies. Vonnegut satirically draws parallels between Eliot and Barry Goldwater, suggesting that Eliot's libidinal energies are also dammed by conservatism, such as that of Goldwater. Like Goldwater, Eliot assumes the presidency of a family business following a nervous breakdown. Ralph Ginzburg, editor and publisher of *Fact*, in an article in the Goldwater issue entitled "Goldwater: The Man and the Menace" cites a source which notes: "In 1936, after a stretch of intensely hard work in the family store, Goldwater suffered a nervous breakdown. Following a period of rest he returned to the business, took on the presidency of the company, and plunged in again" (Toffler qtd. in Ginzburg 10). Moreover, Sylvia says that Eliot "was writing the same message in men's rooms all over town" (79). Similarly, Ginzburg notes the "Senator's lifelong interest in bathrooms. He is not only addicted to obscenities dealing with scatology" (14), but also has photos of military and civilian aircraft and "candid photos of family friends" in a guest bathroom (*American Home* qtd. in Ginzburg 14). Significantly, an unfinished novel by Eliot also abounds with bawdy jokes and scatological humor written on the wall of heaven (93). These similarities

indicate Vonnegut's use of Eliot to parody Goldwater, suggesting that despite Eliot's guilt and social conscience, his efforts to provide therapy to others remain limited by the reduction of psychiatric therapy to free market transactions. This enables a return on Eliot's libidinal investments as a therapist. When his clients invest their libidinal energies in him as an ideal ego whom they revere and express benediction for, unlike Eliot, they are left with a deficiency of ego-libido[68] that remains unfulfilled by the conditions of Rosewater County and leaves them feeling discarded and useless. Ginzburg cites Arthur Frommer's observation on Goldwater's views of the role of charity and a social safety net, which conveys Goldwater's disregard for the alleviation of suffering, such as measures provided by a welfare state:

> When one reads the Senator's repeated suggestion that programs to alleviate suffering and insecurity be attempted first by charities; then, if they fail, by local communities; then by states; and only in a last resort by the federal government, one asks where he has been for the last fifty years? Is this not precisely the evolution these programs have traveled, until it was realized that certain problems demanded a national solution? (qtd. in Ginzburg 22).

The way in which Vonnegut aligns Eliot with Goldwater, then, suggests that Eliot's attempt to shift his therapeutic services to individual free-market transactions will ultimately fail those it seeks to treat and serve only the emerging post-Fordist reliance on niche markets and less regulated economic relations. The informal economies of psychiatric care that once enabled subversion and resistance to the postwar consensus, Fordist production, and the centrality of the nuclear family begin to appear as the very avenues that Fordism will co-opt to address the fault

[68] In "On Narcissism: An Introduction," Freud notes "a person who loves has, so to speak, forfeited a part of his narcissism, and it can only be replaced by his being loved" (560) as occurs as Eliot's clients love him.

lines in the economy of the United States and offer psychiatric care to those in need. Vonnegut suggests that providing therapy in a way that addresses the economic conditions that exasperate the need for it entails a further reconfiguration. This reconfiguration must account for the shifting economic terrain as Fordism falters, the gains of the New Deal are rolled back, and the ability to subvert capitalism becomes further complicated by its de-centralization of work that serves profits over communal well-being.

The Legacy of Eliot Rosewater: Towards a New Utopic State Fantasy

As Eliot prepares to leave Rosewater County for Indianapolis to sign divorce papers, Senator Rosewater appears at his unkempt and dirty office to urge him to leave Rosewater County for good. The Senator informs him of the plan that Mushari and the Rhode Island Rosewaters have to prove Eliot legally insane. This long-coming confrontation between father and son appears to mark the onset of a clear form of mental illness in Eliot. The narrator tells of how the Senator "raved on" (186) at Eliot and, although he could not hear the words of his father, "he lip-read the terrible story of how he had ruined the life and health of a woman whose only fault had been to love him" (186) before Eliot "froze as stiff as any corpse" (187). Eliot then enters a catatonic state and moves mechanically through the motions of boarding a bus for his destination and leaving Rosewater County with no definite plans to return, despite the pleas of residents such as Dianna Moon Glampers. As he travels on the bus, he sees a firestorm engulfing Indianapolis before emerging from an amnesic state a year later in "Dr. Brown's private mental hospital" (206), where he "had brought (Sylvia) many years before" (206). It is here that Eliot begins to remember the past year, including "the straightjacket, the shock treatments, the suicide attempts, all the tennis, all the strategy meetings about the sanity hearing" (220), which Senator Rosewater hopes will allow Eliot to retain the presidency of the Foundation. The similarities

between Eliot's treatment and Sylvia's suggest that he too will continue to relapse into what Dr. Brown diagnoses as Samaritrophia. Sylvia's condition, Eliot learns, has led her to be institutionalized, as if following Hamlet's advice to Ophelia, in a "Belgian nunnery, where the rule of silence was observed" (211). With the divorce about to be finalized and Sylvia institutionalized, Eliot's capacity to become the father in a nuclear family and continue the Rosewater inheritance appears to be stifled.

The novel's ending has produced various readings which range from seeing Eliot's final act of giving all the wealth of the Rosewater Foundation away as an effective act of uncritical love to the futile actions of a lunatic. Eliot learns from McAllister that fifty-seven women in Rosewater County have claimed that he is the father of their children. This began with a scheme by Mushari, but it backfired on him. After assuring that he still has legal control over the foundation as president, Eliot instructs McAllister to "draw up papers at once that legally acknowledge that every child in Rosewater County said to be mine *is* mine, regardless of blood type. Let them all have full rights of inheritance as my sons and daughters" (221-222). To conclude this gesture, Eliot "raised his tennis racket as though it were a magic wand" (221) and directed McAllister to "tell them to be fruitful [. . .] and multiply" (221). This gesture may be read as an indication that Eliot has withdrawn his libidinal energies from Rosewater County and is suffering from megalomania as he constitutes himself as an all-powerful entity. In a more optimistic vein, Mustazza reads Eliot's final act in the novel as a regeneration of Eden (101). Moreover, Raymond Olderman sees this act as a celebration of human possibility (207). Donald E. Morse astutely reads the conclusion of the novel as a regeneration of Thomas Jefferson's attempts to "radically limit inherited wealth as the basis for pseudo-aristocracy of wealth and birth by preventing the accumulation of wealth in the forced breakup of estates" (156). Schatt, on

the other hand, sees the ending as "shrouded in ambiguity" (79) since Eliot's wellness remains in question. According to Freese,[69] "any optimistic reading of the ending of *God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater* seems rather untenable" (281) which he supports by reading the empty fountain in the garden of the mental hospital as being symbolic of a wasteland "with the life-giving waters having dried up" (281). While Morse warns that "some critics of Vonnegut become so preoccupied with Trout that they attach more importance to him than his actual place in this particular novel deserves" (163 n1), Trout's presence alongside Senator Rosewater in the novel's ending deserves some attention.

When Eliot finds himself in the garden of Dr. Brown's private hospital, the Senator's attitude towards Trout has drastically changed. This change is attributable to Trout's ability to explain Eliot's actions in Rosewater County in the upcoming sanity trial. Previously, Senator Rosewater warned Eliot that during the trial, "it would be just as well if you didn't mention your enthusiasm for Trout. Your fondness for all that Buck Rogers stuff might make you look immature in the eyes of a lot of people" (181-182). However, Trout explains to Senator Rosewater that "what (Eliot) did in Rosewater County was far from insane. It was quite possibly the most important social experiment of our time, for it dealt on a very small scale with a problem whose queasy horrors will eventually be made world-wide by the sophistication of machines. The problem is this: how to love people with no use?" (213). Should Trout's explanation of Eliot's actions be taken as proof that Eliot is sane, then not only would the Rosewater fortune be secured, but Eliot's restructuring of the Foundation would also continue to increase the family fortune, causing Senator Rosewater to exclaim: "We've got the greatest idea

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[69] Freese's analysis of the novel provides a comprehensive overview of critical readings on the novel's ending (278-281).

man in the world on our side!" (209) and soon after tells Trout: "You should have been a public relations man! You could make lockjaw sound good for the community!" (215). McAllister, the lawyer representing the Foundation, reveals to Eliot at this point that "Eliot's Rosewater County operation had been cheaper than staying in a sanitarium" (220), even with legal fees and large donations to Harvard and Trout which Eliot has made over the past year. Eliot's best intentions, then, have resulted in a series of small-scale private donations that, while purporting to have a therapeutic function for the residents of Rosewater County, serve to further consolidate wealth within the Rosewater Foundation. Amidst the faltering of Fordism, Eliot's libidinal investments in establishing Rosewater County as a utopia have proven to be economically viable, and thus for Senator Rosewater and potentially a court of law, perfectly sane. For Senator Rosewater, then, Eliot's "work of art" (Vonnegut 42) that consists of loving the "discarded people" (42) of Rosewater County merges a moral imperative with post-Fordist economics to redress the insecurity of wealth in a way that the Rosewater Law has not.

The Senator acknowledges the economic function of the Foundation and Trout's useful explanation of it when he says to Trout: "I just wish you'd stop saying you're a socialist. You're not! You're a free-enterpriser!" (216). Trout's claim that he is a socialist, however, indicates that he is unable to see the way in which his explanation of Eliot's Rosewater County operation will sustain the Rosewater family profits. At stake in the diverging uses of Trout's fiction here is the state fantasy that will take hold as the U.S. economy grapples with the emerging crisis of Fordism. Trout's fiction, including his explanation of Eliot's restructured Rosewater Foundation, as a "fantasy of an impossibly hospitable world" (21), serves the Senator's desire to concentrate wealth within the family, while presenting an image of compassionate therapy. Eliot's bequeathing of the Rosewater Foundation's wealth to the children of Rosewater County,

however, instantiates the possibility for inherited guilt to form a new state fantasy. By bequeathing his wealth, Eliot divests himself of the guilt that he has inherited and passed it along to his adopted children. In doing so, Eliot abdicates his role as therapist to Rosewater County and frustrates Senator Rosewater's use of the Foundation to sustain the flawed state fantasy of the Founding Fathers.

Eliot's children are now responsible for using their inheritance to structure a new state fantasy that strives for the alleviation of guilt. They become responsible for investing their libidinal energies into channels that balance libidinal investments in the ego with the products of their labour. In this sense, by dissolving the post-Fordist Rosewater Foundation, Eliot provides his adopted offspring with the capacity to be loved via a return on their libidinal investments. He creates conditions that make possible for them "the return of the object-libido to the ego and its transformation into narcissism [which] represents, as it were, a happy love" (Freud 561). Creating conditions for his children to love and be loved, in which libidinal energies are no longer pathogenically repressed as experienced by Eliot's clients, suggests that Eliot has also created an opportunity for the formation of a super-ego among his children that will enable work to be performed not out of a fear of draconian measures imposed by a paternal state or for a narcissistic father figure, but as an investment in reciprocal relations.

Eliot's attempt to love uncritically has not established Rosewater County as a utopia with an adequate mechanism for alleviating guilt; hence, Eliot provides his children with an opportunity to direct their inherited guilt into a familial structure that more effectively channels libidinal energies into others, rather than into a narcissistic ego. In doing so, the novel echoes Szasz's criticism of the liberal state as a therapeutic institution capable of constituting a familial

structure with therapeutic effects that manage the interplay of libidinal investment and guilt to constitute healthy subjects. According to Szasz:

> If, however, the state assumes the roles of parent and therapist, the citizens will be forced to assume the complementary roles of child and patient. This is bound to lead to the parentification of the government, and the infantilization of the governed. Thus, by offering to care for the health of its citizens, the state may succeed in depriving them of certain opportunities to become self-reliant individuals. The resulting political system might resemble the unhappy family: a submissive but greedy people, the spoiled children, faced by an indulgent but irresponsible and despotic government, the spoiling parent. (222)

Szasz's characterization of the state's role as therapist resembles Eliot's reconfiguration of the Rosewater Foundation and its failures, wherein Eliot comes to be an inadequate father to those seeking therapy as subjects of a flexible form of free market capitalism. The subjectivities of those seeking therapy from Eliot are left with a lack of the fulfillment of their desire due to Eliot's narcissism. However, Szasz's solution, analogous to a nation of self-reliant individuals who freely choose familial ties based on the profitability of exchanges on a free market, fails to provide a mechanism for alleviating guilt produced by market forces. By bequeathing the capital of the Rosewater Foundation and the guilt it entails, Eliot provides his children with an opportunity to "think up better ways" (26) for money to be passed around, just as he told science fiction writers to do. Thus, through cultural production, Eliot enables the constitution of a new state fantasy by investing in new configurations of love and family that are not deemed obscene. The guilt stemming from a large sum of inherited wealth that was pathogenic under emerging post-Fordist conditions will enable Eliot's children to invest in a new state fantasy with a

therapeutic function. As children who are free from the inheritance of a large family fortune, Eliot's inheritance constitutes subjects whose libidinal energies are free from being channeled into securing lines of inheritance for wealth through a service sector consisting of mental health consumerism. Therefore, Eliot's guilt, which resulted from his libidinal investment in a "queer" (Vonnegut 184) form of love for Sylvia and Rosewater County has come to reconfigure Rosewater County as a communal family, now freed from a narcissistic father.

Conclusion: The Legacy of Psychiatric Critique

A 2011 editorial published in the *Guardian* poses the question of R.D. Laing's contemporary relevance as follows: "He's been unfashionable for decades, but in an era of big-pharma and proliferating diagnoses is it time to reassess?" ("Unthinkable?"). Some scholars have responded to such questions over the last decade, as anniversaries of the publications of some of Laing's major works and his death drew near. For instance, a 2015 book entitled *The Legacy of R.D. Laing: An Appraisal of his Contemporary Relevance* provides fresh insights on Laing's work from a variety of perspectives including psychology, psychiatry, and philosophy. The contributors to this book collectively demonstrate the theoretical insights that Laing provides to their respective disciplines, while engaging with sometimes seemingly disparate strains and phases of Laing's thought from his early work in *The Divided Self* to his more mystical approach to mental illness. More recently, Maggie Tonkin has examined the place of Laing's work in relation to feminism, noting: "In the earliest days of the British Women's Liberation movement, Laing's ideas were influential since they buttressed the feminist critique of the nuclear family and exposed the complicity of institutional psychiatry in policing gender roles" (252). Tonkin examines Laing's unpublished manuscript, *The Politics of Birth*, in light of feminist critiques of Laing from the 1970s, which pointed out his inattention to gender. Tonkin sees a strong link to feminist concerns in *The Politics of Birth*, as Laing critiques the medicalization of childbirth. Tonkin's work is indicative of Laing's legacy as an often satirized, polarizing, and contentious figure, but whose ideas, despite cycles of waning interest and resurgence, have never entirely disappeared from critical attention, along with the wider aims and ideas of anti-psychiatry with which Laing is synonymous.

While Laing is perhaps the most notorious psychiatrist associated with the term anti-psychiatry movement, contributions to a reassessment of his work set the groundwork for a more wide-ranging reconsideration of the legacy of anti-psychiatry and its emphasis on social factors as well as the longstanding contentions it raises and explores. On one hand, a reassessment of anti-psychiatry may raise fears of a historical precedent for undermining medical authority. Current skepticism and even outright rejection of medical authority, highlighted and exacerbated by the Covid-19 Pandemic, may be made all the more palatable to some in light of the current iteration of anti-intellectualism that exists in the United States. Thus, a reassessment of medical authority is prone to raise concerns about the implications of interrogating the theoretical and political underpinnings of medicine and science, as anti-psychiatry and other critiques of psychiatric knowledge do. For instance, in 2016, the establishment of the Bonnie Burstow Scholarship in Antipsychiatry at the University of Toronto's Ontario Institute of Studies in Education (OISE) was met with backlash, stimulating debate about the merit of anti-psychiatric thought as an area of academic study. In a *Huffington Post* article titled "The Truth Behind U of T's Anti-Psychiatry Scholarship," Marvin Ross, an advocate for those diagnosed with a mental illness, notes that the OISE was established "to engage in field development activities in education. [. . .] not medicine and not science" and that the About section of their webpage makes "[n]o mention of science, neuroscience or medicine" to assert that there is a fundamental disconnect between the stated aims and purpose of the OISE and the area of study that students who receive the scholarship will pursue. Moreover, Ross writes: "The antipsychiatry bursary, I assume, will enable non scientists to disprove" discoveries made by the Faculty of Medicine as well as the contributions of Dr. Philip Seeman, a professor emeritus in pharmacology and psychiatry. Ross points to expression of approval of the scholarship by the Citizens Commission

on Human Rights, a non-profit organization founded by the Church of Scientology, as evidence of its flawed and misguided nature and continues on to snidely ask: “What next, scholarships to study anti-evolution or anti-vaccination?”, associating anti-psychiatry with a distrust of scientific consensus.

Ross’ characterization of the aims of the Bonnie Burstow Scholarship in Antipsychiatry as well as his attempt to malign it by emphasizing its entanglement with the Church of Scientology and psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, however, misses an important point. Ross overlooks many of the tenets of anti-psychiatry in the 1960s and the common ground shared with social psychiatry, which is perhaps a better descriptor than David Cooper’s misnomer anti-psychiatry. Anti-psychiatry and other critiques of the discipline are not “anti-science,” as psychiatrist Stephen B. Seager, whom Ross quotes in his article, asserts. Moreover, a mental health advocate who commented on Facebook that “the scholarship founders must be voting for Trump” (qtd. in Ross) conflates a critical inquiry into how medical science intersects with gender, class, and race in detrimental and often violent ways with anti-intellectualism. Ross’ failure to make this critical distinction places anti-psychiatry with anti-intellectualism that outright rejects medical science and risks dismissing other constructive critiques of psychiatric knowledge and its role in constituting cultural understandings of the relationship between medical authority and patients. Moreover, Ross and Seager, by weighing in on the establishment of the Burstow scholarship, participate in the very phenomenon that this dissertation explores regarding the cultural authority of psychiatry and its place as a politically contested site, demonstrating the ongoing relevance of such debates.

Bringing attention to the anti-intellectualism that undergirds anti-vaccination and anti-evolution, as Ross does, is certainly a worthwhile endeavour, particularly because of current

political and cultural unrest that gave rise to and bolstered the Trump Administration. According to a recent *Studio ATAO* article, Richard Hofstadter's definition of anti-intellectualism as "a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life" (Hofstadter as qtd. in Huang et al.) has taken on a new dimension, giving way to a working definition of anti-intellectualism in the United States as "a social attitude that systematically denigrates science-based facts, academic and institutional authorities, and the pursuit of theory and knowledge" (Huang et al.). The authors of the abovementioned article also note that "fully combating anti-intellectualism requires us to actively challenge our own assumptions with new perspectives and embrace the discomfort of recognizing how much we simply do not, and cannot, know" (Huang et al.), particularly when anti-intellectualism is used to uphold existing power relations. Thus, aligning critiques of psychiatry with anti-intellectualism threatens to overlook the continued authority of psychiatry in the management of everyday life and the political and economic implications of psychiatric authority that the texts examined in this dissertation bring to light in favour of a perspective that uncritically rejects specialized expert knowledge as a form of tyranny.

The continued authority of neuroscientific explanations of mental illness and strong reliance on psychopharmaceuticals to treat those diagnosed with mental disorders bolster the firm position of psychiatry and its medical expertise, making criticism of it appear to be a form of anti-intellectualism that coincides with conservative anti-authoritarianism. A recent study by Matthew Motta found that "[a]nti-intellectualism discourages citizens from siding with experts on matters of scientific consensus and can more broadly help explain why voters support candidates who criticize and denigrate scientists and experts" (487). According to Motta, "citizens eschew heeding experts' insight about the facts surrounding politically relevant matters

and lend support to candidates and political movements that are hostile to allowing expert-based evidence to inform policy decisions. (488). Politicians, such as Trump, who typically reject the knowledge of scientists and experts to retain their own positions of authority and trust, even in the midst of evidence that undermines such positions, demonstrate one manifestation of anti-intellectualism in American political life that contrasts with the aims of anti-psychiatric critiques and an impetus among academics and experts for a new approach to mental illness. Rather than maintaining psychiatry's role in constituting unequal social relations or denying the existence of mental illness, anti-psychiatry and its shared ground with social psychiatry are attempting to initiate a debate about disciplinary boundaries and their political and economic underpinnings, rather than the merits and validity of scientific inquiry. Interestingly, Motta found that "individuals holding high levels of verbal intelligence are less likely to hold anti-intellectual views than those with lower levels of verbal intelligence" (487), suggesting that anti-intellectualism can be mitigated by finding new verbal and representational strategies to articulate psychic experiences that are often pathologized by psychiatric discourse and establish new relations between doctor and patient. Doing so will move towards dissolving the kind of false dichotomy between existing medical knowledge and anti-intellectualism that Ross presents. Cultural production, and, in particular, the novels considered in this dissertation, enable the kinds of new representational approaches and perceptual modalities necessary for reformulating the political and economic relations that have given rise to the often limited agency of psychiatric subjects these texts portray.

The preceding chapters have attempted to remain attuned to the ways in which the primary texts analyzed offer therapeutic formations as a terrain of Cold War politics and negotiating the agency of subjectivities constituted through such formations. In doing so, these

analyses have sought to articulate how writers turned to psychiatric knowledge and treatment as both an object of critique, due to institutional and disciplinary limitations, as well as a productive site for conceiving of new, non-exploitative relations of production. The often ambivalent attitudes towards psychiatry in the texts examined throughout this dissertation are indicative of how writers did not completely reject medical science, even those considered to be anti-psychiatrists, such as R.D. Laing and Thomas Szasz. Thus, the analyses offered in the preceding chapters demonstrate how psychiatric thought was a means of coping with the stifling conditions of Cold War liberalism and articulating alternative relations that were not intelligible within existing discourses of Cold War anti-communism and liberalism. In other words, like anti-psychiatry, the novels analyzed are not evidence of an anti-intellectual turn, but rather a response to a need to address narrowing modes of political expression in the midst of the privatization and medicalization of political concerns under Fordist production. Ultimately, Laing and others who have sought a more humane approach to mental illness that accounts for social factors, and, who have gone as far as assessing the capacity of psychiatric knowledge and institutions to reform foundations of intersubjective encounters, offer a political alternative to the anti-intellectualism of today, suggesting a place for anti-psychiatry and its counterparts.

As capitalist formations such as Fordism and post-Fordism pervade and increasingly commodify the pathologized and unproductive, ever absorbing modes of dissent and mutating into new productive arrangements, the need to forge anew the relationship between theory and praxis emerges. Such periods of crisis occur not only for Fordist production, but also for the modes of dissent they foreclose and enable—a factor which psychiatry as a mode of political resistance was forced to confront along with the decline of the left. Clancy Sigal's 1976 semi-autobiographical novel *Zone of the Interior* considers one such period as Sigal satirizes his

experiences with anti-psychiatry in the 1960s as part of the New Left's response to the Cold War anti-communism that tempered political activism. Sid Bell, Sigal's alter-ego and narrator of the novel, recounts his time at Conolly House, a ward of King Edward Hospital operated by psychiatrist Dr. Dick Drummond. Conolly House is modelled on Sigal's experiences with psychiatrist David Cooper at Villa 21, an experimental psychiatric ward of Shenley Hospital in England, which Cooper operated from 1962 until 1966. Sid describes his previous experience with psychiatry in the United States during the 1950s which caused him to avoid "psychotherapists when I saw how they influenced comrades to 'adjust'—that is drop out of radical politics" (5), and made him unsurprised by the "blinkered Toryism of English shrinks" (5). However, Sid finds Dr. Willie Last to be an exception to the "smug superiority, the middle-class philistinism behind a pose of scientific detachment" (5) of other psychiatrists.

In London, Sid finds a modicum of refuge from politically stifling conditions through his sessions with Willie Last. He sees Last's methods as a potential avenue for reorienting the New Left, which, Sid notes, had come to consist of "comrades [who] were no longer free socialist spirits but job holders" (22). Thus, Sid seeks a form of political dissent for the professional class that is capable of reformulating its relations with and even radically undermining the demands of capitalist production. After weighing his options, Sid arrives at the question of "politicizing psychoanalysis" (22), or at least Last's LSD induced methods of psychotherapy. Sid initially finds Last's methods a refreshing alternative to potential electroconvulsive therapy as Last does not force therapy sessions, shows forthrightness about his own personal life, and uses accessible diagrams from his book to help explain to Sid the nature of his relationship problems. Last's somewhat unorthodox methods breakdown barriers between doctor and patient and make Sid less reliant on the plethora of pharmaceuticals he turns to during a breakdown, as Last's analysis

posits Sid's LSD trips as a "Heroic Voyage" (16) which will resolve his Oedipal conflict and result in his rebirth.

In addition to the promise that Last's treatment shows for Sid, Dr. Dick Drummond's Conolly House also provides a potentially effective therapeutic alternative for Sid, as he documents the functioning of the experimental ward as a writer. Drummond's methods include minimal use of drugs, no restraints, and "mild attempts to radicalize (patients) by relating their personal problems to larger social issues" (74). Sid observes the dynamics of Conolly House as neither doctor nor patient, enabling him to recognize the relationship between institutional roles into which the patients are placed and their behaviour, while also seeing that loosening such restraints enables patients to take on new subjectivities. This liminal position as a writer suggests that Sid is advantageously placed to render his observations of a new institutional formation into an articulation of a new form of political dissent through the text he produces. However, Les O'Brien, one of the nurses whose observations Sid records, explains that while Drummond encourages "the abolition of 'role bound' rituals—compulsory reveille, basket weaving O.T., floor polishing, etc." (58-59), he also contributes to confusion among staff and patients, many of whom have long histories of psychiatric institutionalization. Les tells Sid: "So—patient and staff alike—all our energy goes into sustaining the organization of a mental hospital, bolstering it. Nobody around here wants to do themselves out of a job" (59). Ironically, the need to be continually interpellated into the subjectivities of staff and patients becomes all the more crucial in light of the scrutiny of hospital administration that continually threatens to end the experiment of Conolly House in favour of more conventional and restrictive treatment. Thus, Sid's articulation of a new institution as the basis for a politics of dissent is compromised by the persistence of institutional rationality.

As the doctor-patient relationship between Last and Sid dissolves into regressive LDS trips, Sid becomes part of Last's inner circle and its attempts to establish a more autonomous therapeutic institution. Along with Drummond and others, they found Clare Community Council for the Study and Treatment of Mental Illness, an organization modelled on Laing's Philadelphia Society. Clare Council was to be a touted as a "*new direction in family therapy*" (Italics in Sigal 89), while covertly functioning as a radical political organization devoted to showing the nuclear family as an etiological factor in schizophrenia.

After the search for an appropriate property, Clare Council establishes Meditation Manor, an experimental "anti-hospital." Unlike Conolly House, Meditation Manor is not subject to the institutional regulations of a larger hospital, allowing residents the freedom to experience schizophrenia as a therapeutic journey, in accordance with Last's belief in the theory that schizophrenia was a normal response to dysfunctional family and social dynamics. However, Sid comes to realize that Meditation Manor has a different ethos than Conolly House where the loosening of roles and restrictions had a therapeutic effect among its residents. Contrary to Conolly House, where residents were selected from hospital admittees, the residents at Meditation Manor are subject to the discretion of Clare Council and its biases. Sid explains: "Though we didn't deliberately plan it this way, Clare Council's liberal, middle-class version of the old-boy network effectively screened out tough working class nuts like Jerry Jackson and Willy Walters in favor of ones like Anna and Sir Marlo—people whose private hells were socially insulated by professional status, expensive educations or artistic ability" (201). Although Conolly House residents were not exclusively working class, Sid's observation posits its admission process as being better suited to raising the class consciousness than withdrawing from exterior pressures of the family and its relationship with capitalist production into the

privileges that professionalism and status afford, making Meditation Manor hardly a refuge at all.

Sid expresses his initial zeal for Clare Council as he recalls how its approach to the family offered insight into its pathogenic machinations: "I wondered what really went on behind the tightly drawn curtains of the semidetacheds my train zipped past. Last and Petkin's family studies tore the curtains aside, satisfying both my journalistic zeal and political hungers—and not only for England" (102). Thus, Sid reflects on his initial view of Clare Council as a conflated source of textual production and political activism that he once saw as productively supplanting the shortcomings of the Old Left. As he draws a comparison between his Old Left activism and anti-psychiatry, Sigal retrospectively satirizes his zeal for anti-psychiatry and, in doing so, suggests that the shortcomings of anti-psychiatry to effectively take up the legacy of the Old Left after its decimation by consensus culture and McCarthyism ostensibly result from the same shortcomings attributed to the failures of communism and the decline of the Old Left:

> Once *again* I'd 'accidently' found myself inside a small, mobile cadre (like the early CIO organizers) so strategically placed that a few clever men pressing on a weak point could overturn the system, move it. Here was a power base beyond my wildest fantasies. And this time we wouldn't be held back by "laggardly elements," sympathizers with minds of their own. Clare Council was so deeply rooted in the fertile soil of schizophrenia, people whose psyches were so tuned into (and anyway were so deranged), that we never needed to consult them. (Italics in Sigal 102)

As Sigal satirizes his zeal for anti-psychiatry, he critiques explanations for the collapse of the Old Left through Sid's view of Clare Council as an elite group with the power to dupe unwitting schizophrenics. By responding to the characterization of the CPUSA as an instrument of the

Kremlin through Sid, Sigal ironically casts Laing/Last's followers as dupes in a movement which degenerated into authoritarianism. Sigal's satire also includes the voices of psychiatric nurses such as Les O'Brien who, without irony, recognize a need to withdraw from the interior of Last's radical psychiatry, rather than from radical politics entirely. Through this comparison of his experience with the Old Left, Sid implies that although anti-psychiatry did not bring the revolutionary change it promised, as becomes apparent throughout the novel, dismissing and abandoning the concerns of the rank and file or withdrawing to the political centre in response to McCarthyism and blacklisting, as many CPUSA members and fellow travellers did, will lead to another political dead end.

Moreover, the relationship between individual consciousness and political action becomes increasingly convoluted within Meditation Manor, as doctors and residents lack a collective and coherent form of therapy. Sid humorously describes Last's theoretical turn to a synthesis of "science fiction and existentialism with Lenin, Harry Stack Sullivan and Aleister Crowley" (158) before diverging into mysticism and a "world ootluik and a political perspective" (Sigal 218) which consisted of a notion of oppression that "was the same whether it occurred in small family units and mental hospitals or exercised by whole governments" (218). The disconnect between theory and praxis culminates in Last forcibly injecting Sid with Largactil when he attempts to leave the manor, signalling the eclipse of a new therapeutic politics by coercion within a clearly delineated doctor-patient relationship. Sid also describes Last's withdrawal from the material labour necessary to maintain Meditation Manor, noting that Last "might occasionally wash a symbolic dish or change a soiled sheet but, by and large, we accepted his view of himself, that his real job was ceremonial" (220), indicating that Last's retreat from relations with others, aside from sexual gratification with female residents. Sid

conveys his feeling of being an outsider as he becomes unproductive as a writer, noting that he "shut down his novel-journal" (222), while the doctors, "[a]way from their nagging wives and kids, and turned on by the Manor's abundance of libidinal outlets, [. . .] churned out an impressive number of monographs and book chapters" (221), suggesting their motivations of professional opportunism, rather than a commitment to a new therapeutic political paradigm.

Sigal's satire of Laing, while humorously portraying the shortcomings of anti-psychiatry, nonetheless suggests that cultural production that engages with psychiatric thought as a terrain for constituting new political subjectivities in the midst of the medicalization of political and economic problems is a worthwhile endeavor. As a narrator, Sid presents his experiences at Conolly House and Meditation Manor as playing a part in alleviating the multiple ailments that he associates with writing, which include: "Head- and stomachaches, vertigo, cold sweats, unexplained fevers, a rising anxiety: all the discomforts I'd suffered prior to my first book" (5). Sid/Sigal's role as both participant in and observer of anti-psychiatric practices positions *Zone of the Interior* as a form of cultural production and cultural criticism, which culminates in a politically conscious therapeutic act of writing that parodies Laing, while also drawing on Laing's turn away from scientific and technological rationalism to posit the writer as an alternative expert to medical authority. Thus, as a patient seeking therapy for writing related ailments and a critic of the therapeutic practices he observes, Sid inhabits the tenuous place of the cultural critic that Theodor Adorno outlines in his 1951 essay "Cultural Criticism and Society." According to Adorno, the cultural critic faces a tension between transcendent criticism and immanent criticism. The transcendent "critic assumes an as it were Archimedean position above culture and the blindness of society, from which consciousness can bring the totality, no matter how massive, into flux" (30). On the other hand, "immanent criticism of intellectual and

artistic phenomena seeks to grasp, through the analysis of their form and meaning, the contradiction between their objective idea and that pretension. It names what the consistency or inconsistency of the work itself expresses of the structure of the existent" (31). Adorno asserts that neither approach is adequate independently of the other, declaring: "either calling culture as a whole into question from outside under the general notion of ideology, or confronting it with the norms which it itself has crystallized – cannot be accepted by critical theory" (30). For Sigal specifically, merely associating Laing's anti-psychiatry with the culture industry in which it became immersed or dismissing the capacity of psychiatry and therapeutic approaches to express political dissent and constitute political subjectivities is problematic for political agency. Rather, Sid tells a narrative of his return to political consciousness that alleviates his writing-related ailments through a return to radical politics. He recounts that during an LSD trip:

> I scrawled out in the dust of the floor of the main hall the highest, most sophisticated literary from known to Aldermaston Man:
>
> SUPPORT OUR STRIKE
>
> WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE
>
> NO PASARAN
>
> BAN THE BOMB
>
> I was a writer again. (266)

Sid's rebirth is indicative of Sigal's novel as a form of political expression and knowledge production that posits affect as a response to the external material conditions to which Sid recommits himself when declaring "I am back" (1) in the novel's opening line, rather than accepting the meanings which psychiatric discourse and its notions of adjustment ascribe to affect. Sid assumes the place of the writer within relations of knowledge production not to

dismantle medical knowledge and authority, but to engage with the political and cultural dimensions of psychiatry. Sigal's engagement with psychiatry marks his return to a political approach that would unfortunately, like political discourse on class, become largely absent throughout the 1970s and beyond as psychiatric-based political critique was attributed to the excesses of the counterculture that Sigal also portrays. The shrouding of political and economic based diagnoses by greater reliance on neurochemical explanations of mental illness and the acceleration of deinstitutionalization during the Reagan administration reinforced the bonds between capitalist production and the management of psychiatric patients.

Currently, as Democrats and pundits express hope for moving on from the detriments of the Trump administration, contemporary insult-laden political discourse, which made its way to mainstream television perhaps most notably during debates between Gore Vidal and William Buckley Junior as part of ABC's 1968 Presidential Election coverage, suggests that understanding adjustment to political and economic conditions and the expression of political dissent demands attention to affective dimensions that are not discernable in rationalist medical discourse. The continual existence of Donald Trump's base in the midst of his often uncontained and hysterical outbursts and exaggerated facial expressions[70] in response to opponents and journalists that has been part of recent political debate suggests that among the right, affect resulting from a perceived threat of liberalism to Trump's position as a wealthy, white, heterosexual male has found an outlet and an audience. Such affective expression from Trump, which often disparages women and undermines public trust in the media and medical authority,

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[70] British protestors have responded to these aspects of Trump's character and political style by caricaturing him with the Trump Baby Balloon, which portrays Trump as a giant, orange, angry, snarling baby. The balloon was first flown over Parliament Square in London in 2018 during Trump's official visit to the United Kingdom.

has come to provide a rallying point among many Trump Republicans, revealing the persistence of affective expression as a politically contested terrain for constituting and contesting normalcy, which may be reclaimed by the left.

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