

# **Post-Colonial State and Violence: Rethinking the Middle East and North Africa outside the Blindfold of Area Studies**

By

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## **In Lieu of an Introduction A Bridge over Troubled Waters**

Many an independence movement in the post-colonial world has unleashed extremely brutal forms of violence, especially against the peasantry and the minorities. Such violence, which has bewildered those with the conviction that statecraft in the Global South has never included orchestrated acts of violence before independence, cannot be explained by vague references to ‘culture.’ Nor could it be counted as an expression of greed and self-interest of the newly rising classes or ethno-religious communities alone. Instead, orchestrated violence perpetrated by the state, when it is no longer in the hands of the colonial or imperial powers, must be seen in the light of issues that have fomented rebellion and uprisings in the first place. Often, incumbent regimes of the post-colonial era possess a questionable monopoly of power while lacking sufficient legitimacy in the aftermath of the collapse or take-over of the former, colonial or imperial order.

Moreover, post-imperial and post-colonial humanscapes of nationhood have a highly problematic relationship with liberation wars conducted under the banner of a united ‘nation.’ The term itself begs question in the midst of a canopy of peoples with different loyalties and a relatively dubious conception of citizenship as a form of belonging. This is due to the fact that colonial and imperial histories do not bestow upon the colonized or the dominated ‘subjects’ a sense of pride and joy in relation to their forced allegiance to the state. In that sense, independence has nothing much to offer to those who are not in a position to declare it in the name of the nation and who have to the means to resort to violence in order to control its results. That precondition translates into military-bureaucratic classes, aristocratic

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elements, westernized bourgeoisie and the elite, and such other conglomerations, who extend the promise of Eden on earth to the suffering masses in return for supporting or taking part in the revolutionary turnover. And yet, however coherent their objectives may appear, and however ideologically sound their methods may be, post-colonial statehood nonetheless reflect a serious societal malaise that needs to be addressed with regard to 'casting out' those who do not befit the grid. That constitutes the essential link between nation building, forced migration and dismemberment. It also is one of the clear points of continuation between colonial/imperial and post-colonial forms of statecraft.

The object of this article is to raise questions concerning this lineage/linkage between forced migration and statehood in post-colonial and post-imperial societies. The main argument is premised on the historical specificity of such societies with a qualifier regarding the common nature of their experiences regardless of the geographical location they inhabit. This common character arises from structural affects and changes brought about by the experience of societal domination and its signature feature of alignment amongst certain classes at the expense of the masses. It is true that discussions on tribalism, sectarianism, regionalism, supposed primordial sentiments and ethno-religious identities have long preempted the understanding of the state as a vessel for social conflict, an economic suzerain and a game stopper for political and class negotiations.<sup>1</sup> This is not to suggest that the state maintains a privileged position as an autonomous social force. However, at least in the Middle East and North Africa, otherwise known as the MENA region in the area studies parlance, the state very seldom exists in the registers of what matters to be studied.<sup>2</sup> The only exception to this trend is Israeli historical scholarship that compares and contrasts Israel with her neighboring Arab states. That is an interesting turn in post-colonial scholarship indeed, since both the producer of the gaze and the object of the gaze are post-colonial subjects themselves in this instance. However, due to the complicated context within which most Israeli debates on the Middle Eastern state take place, there is only limited applicability for this framework for analyzing statecraft in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup> Hence, the work that was done during the late eighties and nineties must be resumed with a renewed zeal and from a wider perspective.

Currently, this lack of focus on the intricacies of statecraft and foundational paradigms of statehood creates and perpetuates blindfolds about post-colonial and post-imperial societies in the region. Content becomes subsumed by the presumed form and changes in the form of the state; the dynamic relationship between histories of governance, creation of new subjectivities and agencies, and suppression of yet others becomes invisible to the area studies scholar. As a result, for instance, institutionalized political movements and grand projects concerning state capability in affecting social change are rarely touched upon in the context of the study of post-colonial and post-imperial statecraft in the region. This blind spot is perhaps best witnessed in the puzzlement that comes with each wave of state-orchestrated or state-sponsored forced migration and mass reshuffling of populations through displacement. Another barely discussed phenomenon is the

superstructure of political and administrative institutions established in this former context of being a colony or a ruled over territory of an empire. The fact that these structures continue their lifecycle in mutated forms and maintain or even increase their overall efficacy in the post-colonial/post-imperial era goes amiss. In particular the special role played by the military-bureaucratic oligarchies, in addition to the fantastic scenarios of liberation and welfare for all developed by nascent bourgeoisie of the nationalist-conservative yoke in orchestrations of mass movements of forced migration and population reshufflings is a very troubling absence in analysis.<sup>4</sup> Despite the saliency of such phenomenon in the MENA region and beyond, for whichever reason, our keen interest in adhering to the artificial divisions and walls erected by area studies hinders our vision and thus our ability to see such prominent formations and commonalities.

For generations, scholars hid behind the façade that in the specific instance of the Eastern Mediterranean, perhaps the culprit was Islam or rather our inherited perception of what Islam is capable of—in particular, what it does to state-society relations. Seeing Islam as a *tour de force* for collective enforcement of moral litanies easily leads to a common misconception about the Middle East and North Africa and its immediate beyond as a *terra incognita* for a genuine politics of statecraft. If Islam were always there to legitimize, coat and coax the actions of the elite, indeed not much else would be needed assuming that almost entire populations of the region are generically pious.<sup>5</sup> In the meantime scholarship, as well as critical political debates on the Middle Eastern states, make the siren call of not ‘weak states’ but in fact ‘deep states’ which are far too powerful and sinister for their own sake. The formal resources and bureaucratic institutions of the state across the MENA region are anything but feeble. There is in fact even a ‘civil society’ in the Middle East and it existed much before the celebrated and yet saddening events of the Arab Spring.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the public is not limited to the periphery of the mosque and the marketplace as the neo-orientalist or occidentalist yearnings would dictate. Neither are aspirations for a just order limited to fundamentalist plots of complete collapsing of this-worldly desires with the other worldly dictates of a good life. There have always been classes in the Middle East and North Africa, and there have always been bureaucracies.

Just like South Asia, politics of the Middle East and North Africa have never been geographically circumscribed.<sup>7</sup> Emergence of new political forms and social movements in the region owe their existence not only to internal suppression and exploitation of classes but a carefully crafted story of independence that hides the less than arms-length relationships between local and Metropolitan capitalist classes. Here, my aim is to show that the essential features of the post-colonial/post-imperial set-up in the MENA region invite a fresh analysis of the relationship between statehood and violence, the kind of analysis that has repercussions beyond any specific sub-section of area studies literature in the Global South. After all, who is confined to area studies and who is invited to the ordained benches of disciplinary interventions reveal a lot of about our convictions regarding how we think, imagine and relate to our own societies as academics, activists, writers and public intellectuals from

the Global South.<sup>8</sup> Seeking to identify lawful regularities and patterns, when it is done in the name of charting the pathways to ‘progress’ or ‘great social transformations’, receives common acceptance as a noble act. Such regularities are not meant to be context-bound though no doubt they would exhibit an admirable degree of historical specificity. In order to advance this agenda pertaining to the seemingly necessary separation between what happens to the West and then what happens to the rest of us either in reaction to, or under the influence of, or simply separate from the unfolding of history in the West, one must first and foremost choose one’s side and proudly embrace an ‘area studies expert’ identity. Unless, of course, accreditation of valid knowledge is not sought after at the usual centers of authority situated in the old Metropolises of the world alone.<sup>9</sup>

A very interesting shift occurs when we do this kind of exercise. Changing the notions of professional merit in knowledge production directly alters the balance of power that kept the global academic order relatively intact when it came to analyzing the events, formations and trends in the Global South. Old field hands situated at the best and oldest academic institutions of Europe and North America lose their claim to sole proprietorship for educating new generations of specialists who really know how to study Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East. Even a new set of standards may emerge as a result. No doubt pressures from outside the academia amplify these changes and underline the broader relevance of the ‘native experience’ untainted by the lens of Orientalist or neo-colonialist schools of thought.

In the following pages, I shall thus propose that the human costs of events that reshaped the demographical make-up of the Middle East under the aegis of the chain of clashes and uprisings dubbed as the Arab Spring are by no means unique to the region, neither are they singularly important in terms of establishing a link between state violence and forced migration in the post-colonial/post-imperial context. This particular cycle of perpetuation of violence against civilians and the accompanying cleansing impulse need to be interpreted in terms of the alignment of the respective interests of the exploiting/dominant classes in the post-colonial/post-imperial context.

In post-colonial and post-imperial states, various strands of the indigenous bourgeoisie, the Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisies, and the landed/learned classes join hands for a renewed mode of capital accumulation. Under veiled Metropolitan patronage, select classes of the post-independence era unite in their zeal for extracting unduly from the society at large via the subordination of the relatively highly developed colonial State apparatus to their agendas and interests.<sup>10</sup> Exercising dominion over the society and its resources becomes a highly developed political art and leads to the creation of deep and powerful states with strong undertones of nationalist loyalties. Adding to this picture the element of bureaucratic-military oligarchies allows for the mediation of competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands through organized and orchestrated state violence. This context acquires a relatively autonomous force to become the spokesperson of the underclasses and the dispossessed that is not an

instrument of any one of the dominant classes. Such a relatively autonomous role taking a principled position against the state apparatus as well as organized class power had found its embodiment in the suffering and denial of the legitimacy of the post-colonial system by refugees and asylum seekers, as well as the internally displaced. These communities vote on their feet clearly displaying the dangerously dark underbelly of the post-colonial order and its deficits in terms of legitimate representation. Though they may not have defined class interests, the dispossessed in effect challenge the entire system by virtue of not being in a position to negotiate anything with the *status quo*. Although there are no doubt differences between the experience of direct colonial rule and colonial exploitation under indirect rule, in addition to the category of being under imperial domination with limited sovereign administration, it is still possible to formulate a general theory of the state in post-imperial and post-colonial societies without doing injustice to regional specificities. By establishing links between forced migration and the post-colonial/post-imperial state, it is indeed possible to look at both from a much wider lens, above and beyond the constricted view bestowed upon us by area studies.

In the final analysis, this paper provides an overall assessment of migration before and after the uprisings in the Southern Mediterranean. In particular, it reviews state policies regarding forced migration in the MENA region. Notably, migration (forced displacement as well as voluntary flows) to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, apart from a short-lived movement from Tunisia, but has simply continued along previous trends. In sharp contrast, migration within the Southern Mediterranean as a region has been deeply impacted by the events as outflows of migrants and refugees fleeing instability and violence in Libya and Syria.<sup>11</sup> This is a noteworthy phenomenon in terms of understanding and deciphering global migration flows in the Global South and constitutes fertile grounds for comparison between the Middle East and other regions living under the aegis of post-colonial/post-imperial states such as South Asia.

### **The Middle Eastern State as a Parable**

Let me begin with the proposition that it is indeed possible to include the MENA region and in particular the Middle Eastern state in the rubric of post-coloniality. Though there is the formidable obstacle of Ottoman historiography maintaining that the whole region was once under imperial suzerainty and thus carries the markers of imperial administration rather than colonial rule, there is enough reason to see continuities between the Ottoman and later on French, British and Italian colonial rule that created a critical mass of state-building shaping the post-colonial and post-imperial trends of socio-political change in specific ways. The sheer insistence on bracketing the Middle Eastern state as a genus in as a member of its own class leads to the syndrome of the blind man touching parts of an elephant and trying to understand what kind of an animal he has come across while being lost in amazement and confusion.

Here, a brief diversion on what post-coloniality means is in order. Although discussions about the effects of colonial and imperialist domination are by no means new, the various meanings attached to the prefix 'post' and different understandings of what characterizes the post-colonial continue to make this term a controversial one. Among the criticisms leveled against it, already reviewed comprehensively by Stuart Hall, are the dangers of careless homogenizing of experiences as disparate as those of settler colonies, such as Australia and Canada; of the Latin American continent, whose independence battles were fought in the 19th century; and countries such as India, Nigeria, or Algeria that emerged from very different colonial encounters in the post-World War II era.<sup>12</sup> Still, again as Hall suggests, 'What the concept may help us to do is to describe or characterise the shift in global relations which marks the (necessarily uneven) transition from the age of Empires to the post-independence and post-decolonisation moment.'<sup>13</sup> Following Ali Rattansi's proposition<sup>14</sup>, it also makes sense to make a distinction between post-coloniality to designate a set of historical epochs and related conditions, and, post-colonialist studies to refer to a particular form of intellectual inquiry that has as its defining theme the mutually constitutive role played by the colonizer and the colonized in shaping the identities of both the dominant power and subjects of imperial and colonial projects.<sup>15</sup> Within the field of post-colonial studies itself, further deliberation suggests that, à la Bart Moore-Gilbert there appears to be a divide between post-colonial criticism, which has its antecedents in the writings of those involved in anti-colonial struggles, and post-colonial theory, which distinguishes itself by the incorporation of methodological paradigms derived from contemporary fields of cultural studies and literary theory into discussions of colonial/post-colonial systems of representation and cultural politics.<sup>16</sup> Whatever the various interpretations of the term or the various temporalities associated with it might be, the post-colonial as a suffix signifies a critical interruption into that grand historiographical narratives including Western Marxism allocating a subordinate presence and agency to those who have been colonial and imperial subjects. In what follows, I will attempt a brief discussion of some of the key characteristics of the post-colonial/post-imperial state and interrogate the extent to which this definition lends itself to a meaningful analysis of the contemporary trajectories of social change in the MENA region.

Examination of the political trajectory of Middle Eastern states since the terminal phases of colonial/protectorate period suggests that, by the 1990s, the 'post-colonial' label has lost its pertinence. The term acquired widespread currency immediately after independence movements in acknowledgment of the importation into new states of the practices, routines and mentalities of the colonial state. These no doubt served as a platform for a more ambitious form of political monopoly, whose legitimating twin discourses were nativism and nationalism. In the immediate aftermath of jubilations, the colonial state legacy often decanted into patrimonial autocracies many of which fell into deep crisis of socio-economic legitimacy by the 1980s. The serious erosion of the statehood of Middle Eastern and North African polities by the 1990s then opened the door for a complex web

of civil conflicts and internal warfare. As local communities, dissenting political fractions and marginalized minorities adapted to diminished state presence and service provision on the one hand, and increased military and police-level involvement of the state in the everyday lives and livelihoods of its citizens on the other, what was known as the post-colonial moment of celebratory freedom has passed.<sup>17</sup>

Still, this intervention will not present a compilation of definitions and/or theoretical approaches concerning failed, fragile or weak states, nor will it offer recipes or policy recommendations for countering the ills of post-colonial sovereignties. Instead, my intention is to present some food for thought on the general premises that these concepts rely upon and to point out dilemmas and paradoxes that mark the current discourse and practices of statecraft in the Global South. Thus, I start with the question of whether it is the states (in the South) that are failing, or the analysis of these states (undertaken mostly in the North) that is inadequate, misleading or incomplete.<sup>18</sup> Given a situation where statecraft and statehood have rather distinct pedigrees that were introduced to the South through colonial and imperial governance techniques, this question needs to be thoroughly addressed.

Specifically, the central premise of this article is that the politicization and engineering of demography is to be accepted as a key aspect of modern state-building in the Global South, Middle East constituting a prime example for it. For supposedly, only when the people and the state are directly related to each other, the question of who is regarded as the state's legitimate owner could finally be put to rest.<sup>19</sup> Forced displacements and partitions can thus be interpreted as struggles for totalistic claims over the collective goods of the state. Within this framework, historical analysis with a postcolonial spirit could reveal under which conditions state-building leads to an ethnicization of primarily political or class conflicts, rebellions and civil wars. Variations in the extent to which post-colonial state institutions rely upon pre-existing ones account for the incongruence among different regions of the Global South.<sup>20</sup> However, the commonalities in the practice of state power and the relative power payoffs to domestic elites of adopting neo-patrimonial policies with a zestful approach to forced displacements and dispossession of communities trump these differences. We must indeed offer substantial qualifications to the 'imported state' hypothesis operative in the Middle East in particular, and across the Global South in general. What we are dealing with is a masterpiece of hybridity, albeit often used to suppress, to dispossess and to erase.

Canonized studies of state building have focused primarily on the European experience, with selective application to cases in the colonial/post-colonial world. The applicability of the predatory theory of the state, derived from the European experiences pertaining to the modernity-capitalism duo, is much wider than anticipated in the context of the postcolonial world. Trajectories of state development in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia indicate that there has been a marked increase in the extractive capacity of the state during the post-colonial era in a manner similar to the experiences of early modern Europe.<sup>21</sup> This is by no means to suggest

that the Middle Eastern state is five centuries behind its European counterparts. It does however signal a pattern whereby organized political violence becomes the most distinguishing feature of statehood given the demands and insatiable desires of rising classes. Indeed, a broad examination of the political trajectory of post-colonial states as offered by Hamza Alavi, Roger Murray, John Saul and others strongly suggest that the overzealous performances of state bureaucracy constitute a façade for class alliances that keep the state in place as an extraction machine with minimal redistribution.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, the import and genuine adaptation of colonial/imperial mechanisms of sustaining centralized political authority and ordaining market-society relations led to a certain set of practices, mentalities and routines that mark the post-colonial state. Along with the discourses of developmentalism and nativist nationalism, this type of state found its purchase among the hopeful masses that found a place for themselves in its futuristic projections of restored glory and honor. Across the MENA region, the emergent configurations of state power more often than not amorphed into patrimonial autocracies and military dictatorships. Accompanied by a complex web of civil conflicts and wars, perhaps what rendered the Middle Eastern state a parable rather than a paradigmatic example of the post-colonial state is the predominance of the ethno-religious parlance as a language of discontent.<sup>23</sup>

### State and Violence: Multiple Legacies of Blame-worthiness in the Middle East and North Africa



Figure I: Map of Independent nation-states in the Middle East and North Africa (source <http://www.library.illinois.edu/ias/middleeasterncollection/countries.html>)

Though both colonialism and imperialism had a profound and lasting impact on the development of contemporary states in the MENA region, only a select few scholars assess these effects in depth.<sup>24</sup> A predominant feature of

the colonial and imperial legacies is ethno-religious conflict in ever changing forms. Despite the pervasiveness of ethno-religious strife in post-colonial states across the board, grievance-based approaches have had only limited success in understanding these conflicts. For instance, the distinctive colonial styles of the British and French created fundamentally different systems of ethno-religious stratification, which left contrasting legacies for post-colonial conflicts.<sup>25</sup> Specifically, the indirect, decentralized rule of the British fostered an unranked and fluid system of ethno-religious stratification, while the legacy of the centralized French style approximated a ranked and rigid system. Unranked systems foster competition between marked groups, which can and did readily spiral into long-term conflict over access to resources or privileges vis-à-vis the state. Former French colonies, on the other hand, were left with a heavily centralized bureaucratic power structure that impeded ethno-religious mobilization and authoritatively suppressed even the non-violent challenges, thus leading to separatist and often violent scenarios of conflict and civil war. Looking at the MENA region, one sees the effects of both of these legacies imprinted upon the Ottoman system of administrative hierarchies and creation and suspension of local aristocracies based on their degree of loyalty to the imperial center, as well as fairly rigid demarcation lines that separate communities along the lines of religion more so than anything else. The result is a true multi-dimensionality of potential and actual conflicts in the absence of, or sometimes due to the presence of, a strong nationalist ideology to supplant the post-imperial/post-colonial states in the region.



Figure II: Map of Ottoman Rule in the MENA Region  
(source <http://uncensored.co.nz/2010/02/04/middle-east-history-colonial-rule-before-world-war-ii/>)

Since the 1970s, a steady chorus of neo-Orientalist scholars trained at the best area studies institutions in North America and Europe insistently

argued that it became abundantly clear that things had gone wrong in the Middle East. Compared with Christendom, the argument goes, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and ignorant. Supposedly, the primacy of the West was clear for all to see, invading every aspect of Muslim societies' public and private lives. As the argument goes, it is true that modernizers and reformers of the Middle East concentrated their efforts in military, economic, and political revival. Yet none seemingly achieved the desired results of becoming *on par* with the West. Though the new states in the Middle East brought some alleviation to limited elements of the population, and some benefit, they all failed to deliver what they promised—equality, welfare and restored honor to their independent nations. This narrative is the product of a dangerously misguided kind of scholarship at multiple levels. First of all, it presumes that societies in the Middle East are marked solely by Islam—an imprint that cannot be erased despite the passage of almost a millenium. Its inner logic also eradicates the possibility of discussing social change and political upheaval in class terms. Finally, it divides the world into the impossible chasm of Christendom versus Islam as if we are locked into the times of the Crusades, never to be released. Accordingly, all the anger that circled the Middle East is really a form of self-hatred: following behind would have been bad enough but limping in the rear has proven even worse. In this framework of psychologizing post-colonial histories, neo-Orientalism is quick to suggest that what came next is pointing the finger of blame on someone else, namely the former imperial and colonial powers for the ills of Middle Eastern and North African societies. This twist in the all too common narrative of doomed competition with the metropolis renders efforts to employ historical consciousness in terms of paying attention to institutional and ideological continuities in the post-imperial and post-colonial periods practically null.



Figure III: Map of Colonial Rule in the MENA Region  
(source <http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east>)

The rise of nationalism led to a new economy of communal desires and new perceptions of honor. Prior to the wave of Arab nationalism, Arab societies could lay the blame for their troubles on the Ottomans, who ruled the area for many centuries and then the European colonial rulers. Turks, on the other hand, could lay the blame for the stagnation of their civilization on the dead weight of the Arab past, and, the South East European and non-Muslim Ottomans' [*aka* Armenian, Greek, Arab Christian and Kurdish communities of the Empire] stabbings from the back as the standard Turkish nationalist narrative dictates. The final straw that broke the camel's back of course was the European imperialist designs that devoured the remains of the ill Empire. Persians could lay the blame for the loss of their ancient glories on Arabs, Turks, Mongols and then the Europeans. Everyone had someone else to blame. Nativist nationalisms took that opportunity away, yet only temporarily.

The potent combination of Ottoman rule and British/French/Italian imperialism indeed left formidable structures of domination and administrative oppression behind, across the MENA region. Western political domination, economic penetration, and considered the most insidious of all, cultural influences changed the face of the region and transformed the lives of its people, arousing new hopes and fears, creating new dangers and new expectations about their communal futures. All these hinged upon nationalist dreams, and a centralized state was expected to deliver it all at once. No centralized state could have done this, keeping all constitutive classes of a society simultaneously happy, and the Middle Eastern one could not do it either. Furthermore, there was the issue of who the nation was, and what to do with the myriad minorities in the so-called mosaic of Middle Eastern societies.

Then came the attempt to transfer the guilt to America, along with blaming the Jews for all that goes wrong. Jews in Israel became the sole culprits in terms of the catastrophes that engulfed the Middle East. Regardless of the tyrannical conditions they have created in Occupied West Bank and Gaza, to claim that a few million Jews locked into a European created settler-state should be declared the cause of all ills in the MENA region is somewhat surreal bordering on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion conspiracy. In fact, Middle Eastern societies tended to be dismissive rather than suspicious and obsessive about the Jews until after the Second World War and the creation of the state of Israel. Anti-Semitism and its image of the Jew as a scheming, evil monster provided a soothing antidote for this renewed sense of defeat against the presumed Western plot of giving away part of the Arab lands to the contemptuous and pitiful nation of left-over European Jews. The treatment of Palestinian peoples greatly facilitated the acceptance of the anti-Semitic reinterpretation of the region's history, and led some to attribute all evil in the Middle East to secret Jewish plots. This interpretation then pervaded much of the public discourse in the region, including that seen in education, the media, and even entertainment.

All in all, state cadres, military, rising classes, elites, discontented masses and disenfranchised peasantry all had someone to blame for the

demise of the MENA region despite the emergence of new nation-states in the post-Ottoman and post-imperial period from 1918 onwards.<sup>26</sup> The backdrop to this sense of injustice was the knowledge that for most of the Middle Ages it was neither the older cultures of the Orient nor the newer cultures of the West that were the major centers of civilization and progress, but the world of Islam. It is through the Persian and Ottoman Empires that governments and societies achieved a degree of freedom of thought and expression that led persecuted Jews and even dissident Christians to flee Europe for refuge in the Middle East. If so, Islam was not an obstacle to freedom, to science, to economic development, as Muslim Empires of the past were pioneers in all three areas. And if so, the current day failures and shortcomings of the modern Middle East and North Africa must have been afflicted upon these lands because they adopted alien notions, institutions, identities and practices. The curse must have fallen upon those who strayed away from the authentic and the traditional. Those known as modernists or reformers no doubt found the cause of this loss of grandeur not in the abandonment but in the stubborn retention of old ways combined with the inflexibility and ubiquity of the Islamic clergy and elites blocking the way to creative and progressive change in accordance with the needs of the times.

In examining the incidence of state 'malfunction' in the Global South, two central themes emerge, one concerned with the search for causalities and the other concerned with restorative responses.<sup>27</sup> There is often a misplaced tendency to look for single causes and explanations of state collapse or tyranny-like behavior, constituting two poles of the same spectrum of 'excess.' Instead, in the case of the Middle Eastern state for instance, what is called for is a more nuanced and historicized scrutiny that differentiates the factors leading to organized forms of societal and/or state-sponsored violence. In other words, we must examine patterns across the post-colonial/post-imperial world and take our clues from there rather than going deeper and deeper into the mystical world of religion and culture as the main harbingers of life in the region. If so, instances of state failure, collapse or excess could be addressed within the broader context of the evolution of statehood in the Global South.<sup>28</sup> Largely a product of European colonialism and imperialism, and adopted as a global norm during the processes of decolonization, the post-colonial/post-imperial state inherited all the structural difficulties of state legitimacy, maintenance of loyalties, and securing class alliances and more from its colonial and imperial counterparts. Poor, displaced, dispossessed and dispersed peoples of the newly independent states of the twentieth century have found the demands of loyalty to these supposedly new states especially burdensome.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, consecutive waves of forced migration movements and population displacements reveal the hollowness of existing models of sovereign statehood in its post-colonial mold, and challenged the triple narratives on which the project of modern statehood has long depended: the narratives of security, legitimate representation, and, redistribution of wealth and welfare. While individual cases of state failure or collapse may owe much to specific circumstances, they must also be understood within the context of a world in which maintaining states has become increasingly intertwined with

the cleansing and reordering of populations in order to create a semblance of order.

### **Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Forced Migration as a Management Tool for Dissent**

Since the nineteenth century reshuffling of borders, every society in the MENA region has witnessed large migratory movements, both internally and across changing borders. The majority of the displaced were forced out by conflicts and civil wars, sometimes under the aegis of bilateral treaties and other times under conditions that amount to crimes against humanity. Contrary to the common misconceptions, Palestinians do not constitute the largest group to have been displaced in this region any more.<sup>30</sup> The original number of Palestinians who left their homelands is much smaller than the Iraqi or Syrian refugees and asylum seekers produced by waves of warfare in the region during the last three decades.<sup>31</sup>

The term Palestinian refugee originally included both Arabs and Jews whose normal place of residence was in Mandatory Palestine under the British rule but who were displaced and lost their livelihoods as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Today, the term primarily refers to the patrilineal descendants of persons who meet UNRWA's Palestine Refugee criteria. In 2012, the number of registered patrilineal descendants of the original definition was estimated to be 4,950,000, of which an estimated 1,5 million live in permanent UNRWA camps. The number of original refugees meeting the UNRWA criteria has declined from 711,000 in 1950 to approximately 30,000 to 50,000 in 2012. Of the close to five million Palestinian refugees today, it is thus about one percent of the population who were classified as first generation refugees.<sup>32</sup> This is due to two factors. On the one hand, in 1948 and then again in 1967, most of the Palestinian population of current-day Israel were displaced to West Bank, Gaza and the surrounding countries of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. With the passage of more than half a century, many of the original refugees died and some of their descendants accrued citizenship in neighboring countries. Still, they remain the world's largest unsettled refugee population mainly amassed in long-term camps. Their numbers may not be as large as Syrians or Iraqis who are currently displaced but these new waves of refugees and asylum seekers are scattered throughout the region and are generally not hosted in camps on a semi-permanent basis.

Today, one in six Iraqis is displaced. After a conflict that has now lasted as long as the WWI, over two million Iraqis are in exile and a further two million are internally displaced. Most Iraqi refugees are in Syria and Jordan—the latter hosting the largest number of refugees per capita of any country on earth.<sup>33</sup> The vast majority of Iraqi and Syrian displaced peoples survive with little or no assistance from the international community. Almost two decades later, eight million Iraqis are still in need of humanitarian assistance. The government of Iraq lacks the capacity to respond to the crisis and inflexible funding mechanisms stand in the way of adequate support for

agencies that are better able to assist vulnerable Iraqi communities. The situation for the Syrians is even worse. Almost 7 million displaced people inside Syria make this the largest IDP crisis in the world, with possibly also the largest number of people who are 'trapped'. In addition, the number of refugees from Syria continues to increase on a daily basis, coming closer to 2,5 million by April 2015.<sup>34</sup> Syrian exodus is, at least to a degree, related to the Arab Spring, but the Iraqi one is not.

Still, it is true that with the Arab spring, between Syria, Libya and Egypt, more than 15 million asylum seekers spilt out of their homelands, many of them never to return.<sup>35</sup> A further 33.3 million people became internally displaced within their own war-torn countries, forcing many of them to cross the border to whichever destination available and further. Complicating the picture even more is the scale of unrest in the Middle East in general, including in the countries in which asylum seekers originally seek sanctuary. In Egypt, up to 300,000 refugees from the Syrian war were initially welcomed with open arms. However, after Cairo's regime change in the summer of 2013, the atmosphere turned sour and led to institutional xenophobia against the Syrians followed by arrests and detentions of those who did not carry the correct residency paperwork. Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that more than 45,000 migrants risked their lives crossing the Mediterranean to reach Italy and Malta in 2013 alone. Of those, at least 700 died during the journey. The number of the journey-dead rose more than four times for the same route and reached 3,224 in 2014. It continued to rise in the first half of 2015. Jordan and Lebanon now house more than 1 million Syrian refugees. Their presence has created an unprecedented strain on national resources, leading to the Lebanese government tightening restrictions on Syrians entering the country. Turkey is the only country where Syrians are integrated into the labor market with embellished rights for asylum seekers. However, the way the Syrians are treated in Turkey is very similar to the way Turks were once treated in Germany cheap, disposable labor with attached socio-cultural stigma and alienation in addition to severe economic hardship. Libya, another major point on the migration route from the Middle East and North Africa, is now producing its own waves of forced migration. It is no longer a safe haven after the eruption of the civil war in 2011. The plight of refugees there, as well as across the region, makes a mockery of those who suggest the wave of migration is caused by economic reasons. After every outbreak of violence and repression, there is a new wave of people from the area that has just experienced the conflict.

Overall, the MENA region is now host to the largest refugee population in the world, estimated by the US Committee for Refugees at 5,289,400 million back in 2003, reaching up to 15 million at the first quarter of 2015.<sup>36</sup> As already mentioned, there are of course many millions more subjected to forced population movements including the internally displaced, and those forced to move for economic or environmental reasons induced by privatization and liberalization schemes.<sup>37</sup> While the exact number of such migrants cannot be determined, it is likely to be significantly larger than

projections made on the basis of standardized, strict definitions. What is important to remember at this juncture is that prior to the Arab Spring, the Arab states have already witnessed vast refugee population flows out of Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, into Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria.<sup>38</sup> Although there are conventions tying countries to accept refugees and provide them protection, such as to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, about half the countries in the Arab world are not signatories to these conventions. This list of non-signatories includes Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Libya. In other words, while Middle Eastern states regularly accept refugees and asylum seekers, they do so without adjacent rights. Non-Arab states like Turkey and Iran, on the other hand, constitute a category on their own. Both of these post-imperial states have long been regional hubs for arrival of dispossessed populations from surrounding territories. They are also known for massive displacements within their own borders and forced population exchanges throughout their history as states. The Turko-Greek forced population exchange is just but one example.

At this point, I have to question the way we often deal with forced migration in academia. Needless to say, the role forced-migrants play in the social and economic fabric of their host societies is manifold.<sup>39</sup> Yet equally important is the role they play in the sustenance of otherwise faulty and oppressive political patronage embraced by the post-colonial/post-imperial state. If we continue to turn a blind eye to the brutal regimes of demographic engineering modern statehood relies upon, our ways of making sense of the world are becoming increasingly compromised. Joining the dots and lines together and becoming aware of the patterns of forced migration, displacement and dispossession are essential practices for a thorough reassessment of migration in the Global South. Similarly, if people and communities are not forced by the violent or persecutory actions of their state to seek protection elsewhere but feel compelled to leave their home due to structural inequalities, natural disasters or endemic poverty, prejudice, segregation and insecurity, questioning the extent they could be considered forced migrants is an outdated mode of inquiry. Widening our analytical vision beyond standardized definitions of forced migration as well as historicizing our understanding of successive and regionalized waves of forced migration is the first step towards dealing with the intricacies of statecraft in the MENA region in a holistic way. To illustrate this point with the vividness it deserves, let's try to image what today's states and societies in the region looked like prior to some of the more recent events of mass expulsion of civilian populations.

To start with Iraq, though the current emphasis is on the post-Allied Force invasion exodus of mainly Sunni and Christian Iraqis, massive waves of demographic engineering started with the 1991 uprisings in Iraq. These were a series of popular rebellions in northern and southern Iraq that occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Often referred to as the Sha'aban Intifada among the Arabs and as the National Uprising among the Kurds, they were a

response to the Baathi state's systemic social repression of Shia and Kurdish Iraqis. In their aftermath, nearly two million Iraqis, 1.5 million of them Kurds, escaped from strife-torn cities to the mountains along the northern borders, into the southern marshes, and to Turkey and Iran. By April 1991, the UNHCR estimated that about 750,000 Iraqi Kurds had fled to Iran and 280,000 to Turkey, with 300,000 more gathered at the Turkish border. Though this exodus was sudden and chaotic with thousands of desperate refugees fleeing on foot or crammed onto open-backed trucks and tractors, very few returned back.<sup>40</sup> The victims of the exodus were gunned down by the Republican Guard helicopters, deliberately strafing columns of fleeing civilians--an act that clearly constituted a crime against humanity. Numerous refugees were also killed or maimed by stepping on land mines planted by Iraqi troops near the eastern border during the long war with Iran.

Many Shia refugees fled to Syria, where thousands of them settled in the town of Sayyidah Zaynab and inside the Turkish border, their numbers mounting to hundreds of thousands. Iraqi Kurds were first settled in refugee camps inside Iraqi and Turkish borders. Faced with the meagerness of life in exile, some of the displaced Kurds have returned to Iraq, where they have been forced to live in government-planned and policed new settlements. Estimates of how many Kurds were compelled to live in these newly built communities, distant from their original homes, range from a conservative million to more than 1,5 million. Some of the returnees have been arrested, executed or "disappeared." Iran and Turkey traditionally absorbed large refugee influxes, such as the Bulgarian Turks and the Afghan refugees, into their economies with relative ease. However, neither have done so for the Iraqi Kurds, since both countries already have significant Kurdish populations of their own and are apprehensive about increasing their numbers. All four of the principal countries of refuge for the Iraqi Kurds -- Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Greece -- have tried to unload the problem onto others. Iraqi Kurds surviving massacres, genocidal attacks, chemical warfare and mass exodus many times over somehow survived their ordeal to declare a semi-autonomous zone of Iraqi Kurdistan today. In effect, the exodus of the 1991 created the basis for Kurdish self-rule. In 1992, Kurdish major political movements established the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, which then became a self-ruling region after the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq in 2005.

This is a true story of perseverance and survival, though not every Iraqi who has become the subject of forced migration has had such a lucky turn of events. The exodus of Middle Eastern Christians from Iraq is a case in point. The mass flight and expulsion of Assyrian Christians was initiated from the beginning of Iraq Civil War in 2003.<sup>41</sup> Leaders of the community estimate that over two-thirds of the Iraqi Assyrian population have already fled the country or have been internally displaced since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Whole neighborhoods of Assyrians have been cleared out from the cities of Baghdad and Al-Basrah, and both Sunni and Shi'ite insurgent groups and militias have been engaged in the displacement and dispossession of Assyrian Christians. Following the campaign of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

in northern Iraq in August 2014, one quarter of the remaining Iraqi Assyrian Christians fled the Jihadists, finding refuge in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. The violence faced by Assyrians has led to a drop in their numbers in Iraq from 1.5 million in 2003 to under 300,000 by 2014. The UN High Commission for Refugees estimated in 2007 that one third of 1.8 million were Assyrian Christians. A similar percentage of the 1.6 million internally displaced within Iraq in 2007 were likely Assyrian Christian, many of whom had fled Baghdad, Basra and Mosul for Northern Iraq, only to be displaced yet again.<sup>42</sup>

Moving onto Turkey, back in 1914, only nine years before the declaration of the Republic of Turkey as a successor state to the Ottoman Empire, close to half of the population of the Asia Minor were of non-Muslim by religious affiliation.<sup>43</sup> By 1924, only a handful of these communities remained alive and in their historical homes. There are two major events that led to such a reshuffling. The first one is the mass killings and exile of Anatolian Armenians, an event otherwise known as the Armenian genocide. The second one is the cleansing of Asia Minor Greeks en masse, either through violence or via the forced population exchange dictated by the Turkish State and organized under the authority of international agencies.<sup>44</sup> Of these two, I shall briefly look at the latter one as the former is already widely known and studied. The systematic ethnic cleansing of the Ottoman Greek population from their historic homelands in Asia Minor was completed during a relatively short period of a decade, roughly between 1914 and 1924. It was originally instigated by the government of the Ottoman Empire against the Christian populations of the Empire and it included massacres, forced deportations involving death marches, summary expulsions, arbitrary arrests and removals, confiscations of land and property, and the destruction of the Christian Orthodox cultural, historical, and religious monuments. Most of the refugees and survivors fled to Greece, amounting to over a quarter of the prior population of Greece at the time. Some, especially those in Eastern provinces, took refuge in the neighboring Russian Empire, and later on moved onto the New World. By the end of the 1919-1922 Greco-Turkish War, Greeks of Asia Minor had become largely extinct except a very small group remaining in Istanbul. Those remaining were then transferred to Greece under the terms of the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, formalizing the forced exodus and stripping Greeks of Asia Minor from having any claim on their land, property or former citizenship.

The story of modern Turkish statehood includes other such episodes of mass forced migration and exile as well, the most widely known one related to the Ottoman Armenians of Asia Minor.<sup>45</sup> Turkey is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, and its official policy on the Armenian Genocide is the denial of its occurrence. Whereas the convening of courts-martial to try the Young Turks for war crimes by the post-World War I Ottoman government amounted to an admission of guilt on the part of the Ottoman state, the successor Nationalist government based in Ankara rejected Turkish responsibility for the acts committed against the Armenian population. In fact, the Republic of Turkey obtained a series of concessions from France and England specifically absolving the post-imperial Turkish state from any future

political or material responsibility vis-à-vis the surviving Armenians. These concessions were formalized in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. In this sense, the Treaty of Lausanne legitimized the late-Ottoman/Turkish Nationalist program of ethnic consolidation by expelling, cleansing or repressing minorities in order to create a new nation-state. It reversed the terms agreed upon by the Ottoman Empire in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres that had legally obligated the Ottoman government to bring accused war criminals to justice. It also provided the legal platform for the transfer of populations between Greece and Turkey thus completing the forced exodus of the Ottoman Greeks from Asia Minor.<sup>46</sup>

As a final group which did not fit the mold of Turkish nationalism, Kurds of Turkey have been subjected to a various policies of Turkification and that failing, forced migration. Kurdish was banned in 1924 and Kurdish ethnic identity was officially denied by the Turkish state until the 1980s. By forcefully promoting Turkism, in the aftermath of the cleansing of Ottoman Armenians and Greeks, the Republican Turkish Ankara government continued to strive for the creation of an ethnically homogeneous Turkish state. In the course of the following decades its treatment of the remnant minorities oscillated from neglect to repression. As Turkey remained neutral during World War II and continued trading with Nazi Germany until nearly the end of the war, the Republican state used the occasion of the world crisis to impose extraordinary taxes upon remaining Greeks, Jews and Armenians in Asia Minor. The discriminatory exactions economically ruined these small minority communities already confined mostly to Istanbul by the 1940s. In a more violent episode, such as the 1955 rampage in Istanbul, the government encouraged the expulsion of the majority of Greeks remaining in Turkey. Many Jews emigrated to Israel as a result as well, and the Armenian population dwindled from an estimated 150,000 after World War I to less than half that number by the 1990s. The estimated tally of displaced Kurds of Turkey between 1980s and today is ranging between 4 to 6 million, which makes approximately one third of their total population of 15 million in Turkey.<sup>47</sup>

Since the 1970s, the Turkish state waged a campaign to prevent official recognition of the Armenian Genocide or the adoption of commemorative legislation in countries such as the United States and Canada by threatening to cancel business contracts and reduce levels of military cooperation. Turkey has also sponsored publications challenging the basic facts of the Armenian Genocide in a well-financed and state-orchestrated campaign. Turkey's overseas embassies have been engaged as its primary instruments for the dissemination of this denial literature. Turkey's policy of denial has had an obstructionist character as well. For example, Turkey continues to interfere in the construction of memorial monuments by Armenian diaspora communities abroad. Furthermore, the Turkish state rehabilitated the Young Turk criminals by according them posthumous honors and reburials. It has repatriated the remains of the masterminds of the Armenian Genocide, Ottoman General Talat from Nazi Germany in 1943 and Ottoman General Enver from Tajikistan in 1996 after the breakup of the

Soviet Union. Indicative of the destructive dimension of denial and the policy of erasing the record of a once-Armenian presence in Turkey, historical Armenian structures ranging from thousand-year-old churches to entire ancient cities have been subjected to complete obliteration. Today, no archeological site in Turkey is permitted the designation as historically Armenian and all place names have been changed into new Turkish names.

Perhaps these historical events look small in size and less significant in their effects compared to the exodus of civilians during and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. It is true that at present, more than 11 million Syrians are either displaced from their homes inside the country, or have fled across the border. However, each of them was an important or sometimes essential building block of a new regime of statehood at the time. Furthermore, they were either declared as an absolute necessity or totally denied in their significance in the aftermath, a kind of reaction that reveals much more than what it hides. Coming back full circle, post-colonial and post-imperial states in the MENA region have heavily relied upon forced migration as a management tool for suppressing and eradicating dissent. As already mentioned, the general conception is that Palestinians constitute the only sizable refugee community in the Middle East, while the rest of the forced migration movements have been sporadic and much smaller in volume. The above-mentioned figures clearly prove otherwise, though this is not to reduce the significance of the Palestinian suffering in the region.

In summary, dispossession of peoples has come to be a defining feature of life in the MENA region throughout its post-independence history.<sup>48</sup>In this essay I attempted to intertwine two seemingly distinctive historiographies pertaining to statehood, postcolonial and Middle Eastern. I did so by addressing how the relationship between statehood and forced migration figure so dominantly in the making and management of sociopolitical identities in the Global South as a common feature. In conjunction, I proposed two interventions: on the one hand, I called for paying attention to the analytic convergences in the treatment of forced dispossession of peoples in the making and sustenance of states; on the other, I underlined the need for the recognition of the distinctive conceptual commitments and political investments that identify post-colonial statehood not as a separate disciplinary venture and analytical domain but as part and parcel of the global history of capitalist accumulation.

As already mentioned, I use the term post-colonial/post-imperial state somewhat in a generic sense. Some scholars use the term postcolonial to signal a cross-disciplinary political project, akin to cultural studies, that rejects colonial categories and Orientalist scholarship. Others retain the term in order to underscore a serious concern for the local and labor histories of formerly colonized societies while acknowledging the continuities in the political, economic, and cultural landscape in which once-subjugated populations now live. I am of the opinion that it is also possible to treat colonialism and imperialism as histories of the present, to focus on the aftermath of empire and on contemporary hybrid metropolitan cultural and political forms that emanate from it.<sup>49</sup> Here, I go back and forth between these several takes on

postcoloniality. In the end, all of the above designations indicate a concern with the politics of scholarship, and, knowledge production and dissemination. The corruption, the grotesquerie, the complicities, the cult of the leader, the systematic elimination of autonomous or critical groups on the left as well as the right, the sedimenting of new class alliances and power dispositions always centering upon the possession of the state often cited as staple characteristics of the Middle Eastern state do not suffice to erasure of our responsibility and commitment in understanding what brought it to life in the first place.

### **Conclusion: Forced Migration as a Form of Organized Violence**

I will conclude my paper with a reiteration of my call for greater conceptual precision in our analyses of the relationship between post-coloniality and violence, for both academics and activists. The great demographic transitions of the late 20th and early 21st centuries have shifted the locus of population movements from the global North to the global South. This recalibration also necessitated that recent work on neoliberalism, despite its global relevance, is 'provincialized' in order to create intellectual space for alternative ideas that may be more relevant to the changes and events in the Global South where the majority of the population movements take place.<sup>50</sup> To this end, we must explore in earnest bodies of work that address issues of global and historical injustice. For instance, there is a significant amount of practice and social activism related literature on poverty and its amalgamation into a resurgent force focused on the right to the city in line with such an aspiration.<sup>51</sup> A related theoretical framework that could form a counterpoint to the neoliberal discourse on globalization and subsequent homogenization of populations is the debate on the postcolonial state in its myriad forms. Indeed, if the state is made to be an important component in the analysis of the Global South, all sorts of initiatives would emerge, giving substantially greater attention to understanding historical change about hitherto under-researched dimensions of politics of everyday life.<sup>52</sup>

One often comes to an analysis skewed towards what may be called 'Third Worldism' through an historical critique of the liberal development project.<sup>53</sup> In this context, Third Worldism could be described as a moment in a broader series of resistances to capital accumulation, colonial logic of governance, and, to the techniques used by the post-colonial/post-imperial states to maintain the already existing rules of hegemony. Viewing the Global South in this wider context enables us to explain the failure of post-colonial states to fully deliver their vision of emancipation from colonialism and the violent measures the post-colonial states took in order to sustain their reign. It also equips us with a richer insight about the possibilities of contemporary resistance to the world capitalist order in its embodiments in the Global South. The theory and practice of development depends on a certain kind of bio-politics, rooted in a particular regime of sovereign state control, and designed to mobilize and mold citizens in ways favorable to capital accumulation. Contemporary resistances to neoliberalism have recognized the

complicity of the post-colonial/post-imperial state with global capital. Concomitantly, there is even the possibility of the emergence of 'new internationalisms' arising from the ashes of Third Worldism, with an altered understanding of 'sovereignty' that challenges the trajectory of the post-colonial state.

A major consequence of the new global restructuring in the Global South has been the contradictory helix of integration and legalization, on the one hand, and social exclusion and informalization, on the other. These processes have meant further growth of a marginalized and deinstitutionalized subaltern in many of the metropolises of the world. How do these disposed populations including but not limited to denizens, stateless, precarious laborers and urban grassroots, mostly made of underclasses and minorities of the post-colonial/post-imperial state respond to these endemic trends of marginalization and exclusion? What form of politics do they espouse? Critically navigating through the prevailing perspectives including the culture of poverty, survival strategy, new social movements and everyday forms of resistance, it is indeed possible to argue that the global restructuring is reproducing colonial subjectivities in post-colonial settings in the form of marginalized and deinstitutionalized groups. The unemployed, homeless, marginal, seasonal, precarious and casual labor, street subsistence workers, street children, refugees and asylum seekers, illegal migrants and trafficked communities redefine the humanscapes of the postcolonial state.<sup>54</sup> As a result, a new terrain of political struggles emerged that current theoretical perspectives cannot fully account for. An alternative outlook, such as a 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary', might be useful to examine the subaltern subjectivities across the Global South. This conversation has to include the analysis of the post-colonial/post-imperial state as a nexus that engages in regular forms of organized violence leading to mass human displacements.<sup>55</sup> The analysis presented here was based on the experiences of the state in the MENA region. However, it is indeed possible to argue that the paradigmatic Middle Eastern state is not an archaic monstrosity but simply one of the many examples of the post-colonial/post-imperial state that is capable of reorganizing the life worlds of the masses that are not gainful participants of the independence projects across the Global South.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Lisa Anderson, 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa', *Comparative Politics*, 1987, pp. 1-18 and Milton Jacob Esman and Itamar Rabinovich. *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, Ithaca: Cornell Univ Pr, 1988.

<sup>2</sup>Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006 (Third Edition).

<sup>3</sup>Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Ethnopolitics and the Middle Eastern State', *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, pp. 71-94; Amatzia Baram, 'Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East', *Middle Eastern Studies* 26.4, 1990, pp. 425-448; Nazih Ayubi, 'The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12.04, 1980, pp. 481-499 and his *Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, London and New York: IB Tauris, 1996.

<sup>4</sup> Meyda Yegenoglu, *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Pierre Englebert, 'Pre-colonial Institutions, Post-colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa,' *Political Research Quarterly*, 53.1, 2000, pp. 7-36.

<sup>5</sup> Nazih N Ayubi, 'The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 12.4, 1980, pp. 481-499.

<sup>6</sup> Nada AlMaghlouth et al, "Who Frames the Debate on the Arab Uprisings? Analysis of Arabic, English, and French Academic Scholarship," *International Sociology*, 30.4, 2015, pp 418-441.

<sup>7</sup> Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol. 2. Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 2001.

<sup>8</sup> Robert H Bates, 'Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 30.2, 1993, pp. 166-169; Robert H Bates, Chalmers Johnson, and Ian Lustick, 'Controversy in the Discipline: Area Studies and Comparative Politics,' *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 30.2, pp. 166-169.

<sup>9</sup> See Hamza Alavi, 'India and the Colonial Mode of Production', *Economic and Political Weekly*, X.33-35, 1975, pp. 1235-1262 and his 'The State in Post-colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review*, 74.1, 1972, pp. 59-81.

<sup>10</sup> Ananya Mukherjee Reed, 'Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Praxis', *Pacific Affairs*, 70.2, 1997, pp. 235-251 and her edited book titled *Corporate Capitalism in Contemporary South Asia: Conventional Wisdoms and South Asian Realities*, Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 'Invisible Refugees and/or Overlapping Refugeedom? Protecting Sahrawis and Palestinians Displaced by the 2011 Libyan Uprising', *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 24.2, 2012, pp 263-293.

<sup>12</sup> Stuart Hall, 'When was "the Post-Colonial"? Thinking at the Limit,' *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996. P. 246.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ali Rattansi, 'Postcolonialism and its Discontents', *Economy and Society*, 26.4, 1997, pp. 480-500.

<sup>15</sup> Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray (eds), *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, Oxford: Blackwell and Wiley, 2000.

<sup>16</sup> Bart Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*, London: Verso, 1997.

<sup>17</sup> Crawford Young, 'The End of the Post-colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics,' *African Affairs*, 103.410, 2004, pp. 23-49.

<sup>18</sup> Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, 'On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing—states in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?' *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation Dialogue Series 8* (2009): 15-35.

<sup>19</sup> Young, 'The End of the Post-colonial State in Africa?'

<sup>20</sup> Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *The Post-colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, New York: Routledge, 1990; Ella Shohat, 'Notes on the " Post-Colonial"', *Social Text*, 1992, pp. 99-113; Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray (eds.), *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*.

<sup>21</sup> Cameron G Thies, 'State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post Colonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975–2000', *International Studies Quarterly*, 48.1, 2004, pp. 53-72.

<sup>22</sup> This is a 1970s debate that still has resonance for our understanding of the post-colonial state today. See Roger Murray, 'Second Thoughts on Ghana', *New Left*

*Review*, 42, 1967, pp. 25-39; Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Post-colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review*, 74.1, 1972, pp. 59-81. Leys is particularly concerned to open a debate on John Saul's 'The State in Post Colonial Societies: Tanzania', published in *The Socialist Register*. See Colin Leys, 'The "Overdeveloped" Post Colonial State: A Re-evaluation,' *Review of African Political Economy*, 3. 5, 1976, pp. 39-48 and John S. Saul, 'The State in Post-colonial Societies: Tanzania,' *Socialist Register*, 11.11, 1974, pp 349-372.

<sup>23</sup>Roger Owen, *State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*.

<sup>24</sup>Juan Ricardo Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's Urabi Movement*, Cairo: American Univ in Cairo Press, 1999; Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003; Keith David Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

<sup>25</sup>Robert T. Blanton, David Mason and Brian Athow, 'Colonial Style and Post-colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa', *Journal of Peace Research*, 38.4, 2001, pp. 473-491.

<sup>26</sup>The dates of the establishment of key independent nation-states in the MENA region is as follows: Republic of Iran 1921; Egypt, 1922; Republic of Turkey, 1923; Kingdom of Iraq, 1932; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1932; Arab Republic of Syria, 1945/1963; Lebanon, 1943; Hashemite Kingdom of TransJordan, 1946; Republic of Yemen, 1947; State of Israel, 1948; Kingdom of Libya, 1951; Morocco, 1956; Cyprus, 1960; Chad, 1960; Algeria, 1962.

<sup>27</sup>Martin Doornbos, 'State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections', *Development and Change*, 33.5, 2002, pp. 797-815; Mark Beissinger and M. Crawford Young (eds), *Beyond State Crisis? Post-colonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002; Crawford Young, 'The End of the Post-colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics,' *African Affairs*, 103.410, 2004, pp 23-49.

<sup>28</sup>Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, 'State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies,' *Development and Change*, 33.5, 2002, pp. 753-774.

<sup>29</sup>Christopher Clapham, 'The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World,' *Development and Change*, 33.5, 2002, pp. 775-795.

<sup>30</sup>This is despite the claim made by the respected Palestinian refugee scholar Sari Hanafi on the subject. In terms of actual numbers in 2015, Syrians resumed the unglorious throne of 'the largest group of dispossessed people' in the Middle East. See Hanafi (2014) for his description of forced migration tallies in the MENA region, which concentrates mainly on Palestinians and Kurds as predominantly dispossessed groups.

<sup>31</sup>For the total number of displaced Palestinians displaced, Iraqis and Syrians, see respective UNHCR sites at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/>.

<sup>32</sup>Terry M Rempel, 'Who are Palestinian Refugees?', *Forced Migration Review*, 26, 2006, pp. 5-7.

<sup>33</sup>See <http://www.fmreview.org/iraq#sthash.AvH09QEa.dpuf>.

<sup>34</sup>See <http://www.fmreview.org/syria#sthash.IacNpWQt.dpuf>.

<sup>35</sup>Amin Saikal and Amitav Acharya (eds), *Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia: Social Protest and Authoritarian Rule After the Arab Spring*, 72, London and New York: IB Tauris, 2013.

<sup>36</sup>For further references for refugees in the Middle East and numbers, see [http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/regions/egypt\\_themiddleeast.html](http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/regions/egypt_themiddleeast.html)

<sup>37</sup>Karen Bakker, 'The "Commons" Versus the "Commodity": Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South,' *Antipode*, 39.3, 2007, pp. 430-455.

<sup>38</sup> Nazih N. Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, London and New York: IB Tauris, 1996; Sari Hanafi, Jad Chaaban and Karin Seyfert, 'Social Exclusion of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Reflections on the Mechanisms that Cement their Persistent Poverty,' *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 31.1, 2012, pp. 34-53.

<sup>39</sup>Just as an example, until the mid-1950s, Egypt was largely a country of immigration. However, with the oil boom in the Arab Gulf countries and the resulting demand for labor, emigration to the Gulf States took over as the dominant trend. In terms of sheer numbers, an estimated 2.7 million Egyptians live outside of Egypt but in the Middle East. In addition, over 5 million Egyptians moved internally to survive poverty in the rural hinterlands. For further debate, see Grabska Katarzyna, 'Who Asked them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in Egypt,' *Forced Migration and Refugee Studies*, American University in Cairo, Egypt, 2006.

<sup>40</sup>For a detailed and historical discussion see Denise Natali, *The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005. There are many other publications on the Kurds of the Middle East, but often the authors avoid in-depth discussion of Kurdish refugee populations' faith and impact.

<sup>41</sup>Kelly O'Donnell and Kathleen Newland, 'The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need for Action,' *Migration Policy Institute*, 2008, pp. 1-24.

<sup>42</sup> Mohamed Kamel Dorai, 'Iraqi Refugees in Syria,' *Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa*, The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Programme, American University of Cairo. <http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/Documents/MohamedDorai.Pdf>;

Kristin Dalen and Jon Pedersen, 'Iraqis in Jordan Their Number and Characteristics,' Oslo: Fafo, 2007.

<sup>43</sup>Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*. London and New York: Zed Books, 2004.

<sup>44</sup>FatmaMüge Göçek, *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*, 103, London and New York: IB Tauris, 2011.

<sup>45</sup> In an effort to address these forgotten displacements, the International Association of Genocide Scholars passed a resolution in 2007 declaring the Ottoman campaign against Christian minorities of the Empire, including the Greeks, as genocide.

<sup>46</sup>Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor: And the process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth century*, 4, California: University of California Press, 1971.

<sup>47</sup> Bilgin Ayata, *The Politics of Displacement: A Transnational Analysis of the Forced Migration of Kurds in Turkey and Europe*, Diss. Johns Hopkins University, 2011.

<sup>48</sup> See Dawn Chatty's theoretical contributions in this area at

<http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/research/dispossession-forced-migration-middle-east>.

<sup>49</sup>Asef Bayat, 'From "Dangerous Classes" to "Quiet Rebels": Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South,' *International Sociology*, 15.3, 2000, pp. 533-557.

<sup>50</sup>Susanne Soederberg, *The Politics of the New International Financial Architecture: Reimposing Neoliberal Domination in the Global South*, London and New York: Zed Books, 2004.

<sup>51</sup>Susan Parnell, and Jennifer Robinson, '(Re)theorizing Cities from the Global South: Looking beyond Neoliberalism,' *Urban Geography*, 33.4, 2012, pp. 593-617.

<sup>52</sup> Deniz Kandiyoti, 'Post-colonialism Compared: Potentials and Limitations in the Middle East and Central Asia,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34.02, 2002,

pp. 279-297; Jonathan Rigg, *An Everyday Geography of the Global South*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007.

<sup>53</sup>Rajeev Patel and Philip McMichael, 'Third Worldism and the Lineages of Global Fascism: the Regrouping of the Global South in the Neoliberal Era,' *Third World Quarterly*, 25.1, 2004, pp. 231-254.

<sup>54</sup>Stephanie JNawyn, Nur Banu Kavakli Birdal and Naomi Glogower, 'Estimating the Extent of Sex Trafficking: Problems in Definition and Methodology,' *International Journal of Sociology*, 43.3, 2013, pp. 55-71.

<sup>55</sup>Hermann Herlinghaus, *Violence without Guilt: Ethical Narratives from the Global South*, New York: Macmillan, 2009.