GROWING PSYCHOLOGY AT HOME:

REFLECTIONS ON INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY

BILAL AFSIN

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN
PSYCHOLOGY
YORK UNIVERSITY
TORONTO, ONTARIO

JANUARY 2023

Abstract

This dissertation reflects on the indigenous Psychology movement, which emerged in reaction to the international spread of American Psychology after the Second World War, but whose literature began to expand from 1990 notably and has continued to do so to the present. These reflections adopt an analytical framework following the stages of *critique*, *reconstruction,* and *creation*. In the first, different definitions and meanings of indigenous Psychology and distinctions among its cognate terms (indigenized, indigenizing, and indigenization) are critiqued and reconstructed. Starting from the generic definition of indigenous Psychology as *Psychology specific to a particular culture*, the relationship between the notions of *psychology* and *culture* are discussed. Because the most fundamental critique levelled by indigenous psychologists at the current discipline of Psychology is at the individualistic framework it employs and depends on, *individualism* is conceptually analyzed by dividing it into its various components. Following from each critique exposing confusions in basic concepts such as *indigeneity*, *culture* and *individualism*, the dissertation proceeds in the second stage to reconstruct these to a certain extent by proposing some clarifying analytical distinctions. Finally, in the last stage, the dissertation aims to put the notion of indigenous Psychology on a more concrete case-specific basis by pointing to the lack of indigenization of Psychology in Türkiye and concludes by proposing an undergraduate course syllabus on the historical development of Psychology in Türkiye.

Acknowledgements

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Thomas Teo for the understanding and kindness he has shown me since the first day I started my Ph.D. His tolerance for different worlds, flexibility in critical thinking, and in-depth knowledge in divergent areas broadened my intellectual horizons.

What is most needed during the dissertation writing process is that others find your writing meaningful and valuable. In this sense, I am grateful to my two committee members, Dr. Michaela Hynie and Dr. Wade Pickren, for quickly reading my proposal and dissertation and returning me with encouraging messages.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Michael Pettit, Dr. Katherine Bischoping, and Dr. Jeffery Yen, who agreed to be part of the dissertation examining committee. Special thanks to Jeffery for his hard questions that allowed me to explain the flow of the dissertation better. I am also thankful to Katherine, who read my dissertation with great care and pointed to some mistakes and ambiguous points I overlooked.

I could not have taken this journey without the scholarship the Turkish Ministry of National Education provided me. In addition, many people helped me in this long journey until I reached the final dissertation stage. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Christopher D. Green and Dr. Alexandra Rutherford. As I adjusted to York University in my first year, they treated my quiet presence in the classroom with respect and kindness.

My sincere thanks go to my dear friend Volodymyr Slyvka, who patiently listened to my scattered ideas and rephrased them in an organized way. His cheerfulness and sweet melancholy, sharp intelligence and superior powers in verbal expression made a significant contribution to my progress.

Many thanks also go to my other HTC fellows: Zhipeng Gao, who accompanied me with his guidance and friendship in my first year, and Susannah Mulvale, who read and evaluated the first versions of the chapters of my dissertation.

I would like to thank York University's Writing Centre, at whose door I was persistently present in person or virtually. I cannot forget the help of writing instructor Dominique O'Neill when I was highly amateurish in academic writing in my first year at York. And heartfelt thanks to Brenda... *the* elegant lady of the Writing Centre, Brenda McComb. It would not be an exaggeration to say that she has patiently and kindly read nearly all the academic or non-academic pieces I wrote and rewrote throughout my doctorate. I am sure she knows some parts of my dissertation better than I do. Both her grammatical and stylistic touches to my writings and every piece of advice she made to the content with the warning of "take it with a grain of salt" brought my writings to an entirely different degree.

Of course, there are some friends who are outside of this academic milieu to whom I am grateful. I would like to thank my landlord Nihat Özen for the sense of home he provided me throughout my study. I am deeply indebted to Nazhimiddin Apsatarov, *the* wise man who provided me with deep insight into life. Many thanks also go to Amirali Azimov, Abubakr Ganiev, Seracettin Tatar, Tuncer Özer, Yusuf Ak, and Fatih Uras for their friendship and sincerity.

Finally, thanks should go to my family members who shared my concerns and constantly encouraged me thousands of miles away. And I am grateful to my beloved wife, Şeydanur, who has recently become part of this great family. Just a few months ago, while thinking about expanding the dissertation further, she convinced me I should bid it farewell. Indeed, now I say "goodbye" to what I wrote in order to be able to make a new beginning.

Foreword

When thinking becomes competent, *it* first stops complaining.
Do not complain! Resolve!
Do not humiliate! Criticize!
Do not worship! Think!
Dücane Cündioğlu

In response to the philosopher who gives the recommendations above, one can say that *it is easier said than done*. Nevertheless, just keeping these recommendations in mind is still invaluable. These recommendations are part of my mantra that I repeat to myself while I read about indigenous Psychology and often find myself complaining about what I am reading. I do not know how competent my thinking has/will become on the road, and I do not know to what extent I will stop complaining, but I will try to remember these recommendations when writing the following dissertation.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In reaction to the dominance of the established version of doing Psychology—named variously *mainstream*, *American*, *American mainstream*, *North American*, *Euro-American*, *Western*, *Global Northern*, or *hegemonic*[1]—calls have arisen over the last decades from various locales to search for *indigenous Psychology* (e.g., Kim & Berry, 1993; Sinha, 1997; Kim et al., 2006). These calls are for what can also be roughly named non-Western psychologies or, to use old-fashioned expressions, psychologies of developing or underdeveloped societies. The main objection prompting them is that the bulk of academic psychological ideas today do not represent the majority of the world and that no region should uncritically accept the psychological products of any other. Rather, each should critically adopt the knowledge coming from outside or construct its own Psychology by using its own cultural resources (Pickren, 2009). This large-scale project, ranging from a slight or moderate adaptation to radical creation, can be called "indigenization of Psychology" or "indigenous Psychology" (or sometimes shortly IP in the literature)[2].

Ideally speaking, for a discipline of Psychology to be indigenous, the researcher, participants, questions, concepts, theories, and methods should be derived from within the psychologist`s own culture. In a sense, everything must be homegrown[3] and homemade. Even being educated in Western institutions is a subject of criticism for indigenous psychologists (e.g.,

---

[1] Some acronyms or abbreviations can also be used to refer to this dominant Psychology: W.E.I.R.D. (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (Henrich et al., 2010), W.A.S.P. (Western American Scientific Psychology) (Berry, 2013; Eckensberger, 2015), NoWeMics (The Northern Part of the Western Hemisphere) (Serpell, 2017).

[2] This term is used in the literature both in its singular form (indigenous Psychology) to describe a common international movement and its plural form (indigenous Psychologies) to refer to the psychological diversity specific to each culture. Depending on the various specific contexts, in this dissertation it will occur in both forms.

[3] Similarly, Dueck and Yang`s (2017) review on Sundrarajan`s (2015a) book *Understanding emotion in Chinese culture* is entitled "Homegrown emotions".

Rodríguez et al., 1999). *Growing Psychology at Home* in the title of this dissertation refers to this ideal along with less ideal indigenizing efforts in our discipline.

My original inspiration for this title comes from anthropology. Anthropologists are renowned for going to distant, preferably isolated, lands. They generally try to make sense of unfamiliar places and people. Some anthropologists think that this is a distorted stereotype about anthropology because anthropologists have also always been curious to know about their own homes (e.g., Lewis, 1998), in an effort of defamiliarizing the familiar and trying to look at *us* from within. A group of anthropologists have aimed to reverse the (truthful or stereotypical) tendency of anthropologists to go abroad, and instead intend to do *anthropology at home* (see Jackson, 1987). In a similar sense, what is primarily meant by "indigenous Psychology" in this dissertation is the effort of constructing or reconstructing a discipline of Psychology by indigenous or insider psychologists with culture-based components.

There are a few meanings that are meant when the word "psychology" is uttered. Researchers generally distinguish modern academic Psychology in particular, which has developed roughly in the last 250 years, from more traditional and everyday life-form psychology. For example, the historian of Psychology Benjamin (2014) points to the distinction between academic Psychology and public or popular psychology, and states that public psychology is as old as the history of humanity, but scientific Psychology emerged in the 19th century. Another historian of Psychology, Richards (2009), suggests marking the former with a lower-case *p (*as *psychology)* and the latter with an upper-case *P (*as *Psychology).* I should emphasize at this point that in this work, what I mean by "indigenizing Psychology" is basically with reference to transforming academic Psychology, and psychology in its ancient, folk or traditional or everyday forms can be a component in this process. For purposes of clarity, then, to

adopt Richards' (2009) distinction, I will use psychology in lower-case when referring to psychology more generally as a subject matter and capitalize it when referring to the modern discipline of Psychology.[4] In addition, another distinction I should note is the distinction between psychology as an academic discipline and psychology as a profession, as is also mentioned by Benjamin (2014). This work primarily focuses on academic Psychology and does not include psychology as a profession.

Anthropologist Carrithers (2000), adopting the categorization of the ancient Greek poet Archilochus, classifies cultural researchers into two groups: hedgehogs and foxes[5]. While hedgehogish researchers go deeply after particulars and underline differences and incommensurabilities between cultures, foxish ones go after commonalities or similarities between cultures. It seems that indigenous Psychology is promoted mainly by hedgehogish East Asian researchers, but these hedgehogs try to strike a balance by emphasizing potential global relevance of their works in a foxish manner (e.g., Sundararajan et al., 2020). Although this dissertation is predominantly written in the foxish style, a hedgehogish approach is also represented as the last chapter focuses on Psychology in Türkiye.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters including this introduction. To give a general structure and to provide context for details about each chapter to follow, this first chapter summarizes the theoretical framework of the whole.

---

[4] Exceptions to this, I do not capitalize the word "psychology" in the excerpts that I quote in line with general rules of citation format. Also, while I use capitalized P when I refer to Psychology as a discipline, I do not capitalize any preceding adjectives (e.g., cultural Psychology).

[5] This distinction is originally attributed to ancient philosopher Archilochus who said that "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog knows one big thing". In modern times, this distinction was used by philosopher Isaiah Berlin as the title of one of his essays, *The hedgehog and the fox* (1953/2013) in which he classified scholars into two groups accordingly: those who make sense of the world through a single big idea and those who make sense of the world through variety of ideas. Carrithers (2000) here uses this distinction in a slightly different manner: those hedgehogish researchers who know many details about one culture and those foxish ones who focus on cross-cultural commonalities.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical skeleton of this critical evaluation is based on both Teo's (2020, 2021) and Silver's (2019) recently published works. Both researchers explain the act of theorizing as occurring in different stages. Teo's (2020) tripartite model consists of *critique, reconstruction,* and *creation* stages, while Silver's (2019) quartet model consists of *exegesis, critical conceptual analysis, synthetic reconstruction,* and *explanatory analysis* stages. In this introduction, I will talk about the extent to which the dissertation reflects these steps. Although I benefit from the defining of theorizing steps of both researchers[6], I will only use Teo's nomenclature in the interest of clarity.

Although using different labels for these, both models outline successive stages of exposing the components of an existing idea or problem and describing it in a critical way, reinterpreting it with a new perspective, and finally proceeding to a new synthesis or proposing a new conceptual world. Hence it could be said that the stages of theorizing defined by the two researchers are roughly parallel to each other.

Teo's model explains theorizing by taking a broader perspective and applying the three steps involved in theorizing to the general development of the discipline of Psychology. In his previously published work (2020), he defines this as the professional duty of theoretical psychologists and provides explanations to this end. In his more recently published work (2021), using the same theorizing stages, he conceptualizes theorizing not only as an academic but also as a daily activity within the scope of praxis. Similarly, but more compactly, Silver (2019) regards theorizing activity as a teachable practice for students in the context of sociology and explains it with step-by-step exercises. Unlike Teo, who exemplifies his steps of theorizing

[66] Silver's (2019) last stage, *explanatory analysis*, talks about transforming the concepts produced as a result of theorizing into variables. This point is not part of our discussion in this dissertation.

through the historical development of a discipline, Silver explains his own stages of theorizing through a critical reading of a text by giving some specific instructions.

As both researchers remind us, these distinctions used as steps or stages of theorizing are analytical distinctions; in reality, these processes can appear together in an intertwined way. Nevertheless, these analytical distinctions also have some validity in practice. That is, although stages are intertwined, there is also partial linearity since, in each stage, one feature is more dominant than the others.

Even though this dissertation does not strictly follow either of these schemes, it has a unique synthesis that incorporates some components of both. While it can be seen as a *critique* in terms of pointing out the problematic issues related to indigenous Psychology in general, it includes a *reconstruction* to the extent that the structures underlying these problems are revealed, and some rebuilt. In addition to this, it offers some creative syntheses from time to time in accordance with the stage of *creation*. Accordingly, in the last chapter, the newly constructed syllabus of the course on the *History of Psychology in Türkiye*[7] will be presented.

Critique

According to Teo (2020), theorizing begins with the identification of a problem. The main problem from which this dissertation starts is that the status of the notion of indigenous Psychology in the international literature of Psychology is unsettled. What is the nature of indigenous Psychology? Where does *it* stand in the literature? Is it one of the culture-oriented perspectives in psychological literature? If it pursues local psychological phenomena, can it be seen as complementary to cross-cultural Psychology, which has a universalist understanding? Or

[7] The international official name of the country has been recently changed from Turkey to Türkiye and recognized as such by the United Nations (https://turkiye.un.org/en/184798-turkeys-name-changed-turkiye).

should this notion be envisioned as a totally autonomous movement distinct from the dominant international Psychology? Whom does indigenous Psychology predominantly represent? Does it represent indigenous peoples or non-Western people? If the latter is the case, how can the West and the non-Western be separated from each other? And/or how can Western Psychology or the West be defined?

These questions can be extended and diversified further, but even as they stand, it is difficult to give a definitive answer to them. There may be various reasons for this inability to provide a definitive answer. One of them is the variety of publications under the name of indigenous Psychology. As L. Sundararajan, the chair of the *Task Force on Indigenous Psychology* in APA, once put it, "IP is extremely heterogeneous, so no position that you agree or disagree with is representative of the whole field" (personal communication, March 27, 2019). For her (2019), "a flock of leaderless dragons is an apt metaphor for extreme heterogeneity, namely, diversity untouched by the homogenizing effect of any leadership (p. 65)". There is no comprehensive literature review that represents the extreme heterogeneity[8] of "the whole field" that Sundararajan points to, except for the individual studies by indigenous psychologists in which they summarize the course of Psychology in their own countries (e.g., Hwang, 2019a) or the short chapters/booklets in which psychologists briefly summarize the literature on indigenous Psychology in general (e.g., Allwood, 2018; Sinha, 1997). Although this dissertation will present a *slice* from this extreme diversity, its main purpose is not to provide a comprehensive summary of it. Instead, it can be loosely defined as *reflections on the concept of indigenous Psychology*.

[8] A tiny reference of this extreme diversity can be seen by following the exchanges of the Indigenous Psychology email listserv (iptaskforce@simplelists.com). Through this listserv, a group of researchers from all around the world share a variety of articles, books, news, and poetry in a way connected to the idea of indigeneity, and I doubt whether the content of this hodgepodge would lend itself to even a crude thematic classification.

It starts off from some confusing points in the literature. It acknowledges that the literature on indigenous Psychology is extremely diverse, as Sundararajan (2019) has noted. However, it supplements this observation by clarifying further points of confusion. As Silver (2019) has pointed out in the context of social sciences in general, "many passages that might seem clear or obvious on quick reading become opaque under close scrutiny and call out for some clarifying interpretation" (p. 131). In a similar vein, in the specific context of indigenous Psychology, there are many opaque ideas that appear clear on a cursory look.

"Psychology is a product of Western culture" is one of those initially clear-seeming opaque statements, for example. While the westernness of modern Psychology may be a fact in terms of its historical genealogy, one encounters uncertainty when trying to describe this very westernness. This relates to the difficulty in describing what *West* is itself (see Cousin, 2011). What is implied by this often-repeated idea of Psychology being a Western product? Does it refer to the Western origins of Psychology or its Western characteristic features? Or both? In his chapter entitled "On owning knowledge", Sharrock (1974) points out that even though it is common to think that a particular way of thinking or living can be characteristically seen in a particular collectivity, it is difficult to show that this particular way of thinking, or a corpus of knowledge more generally, *belongs to* that particular collectivity. A similar difficulty of attribution exists in the writings of indigenous psychologists, who often refer to Western and non-Western cultural groups and attribute the ownership of some particular knowledge and understandings to each group. This difficulty is further exacerbated when attributing one corpus of knowledge to a particular cultural group, simultaneously criticizing these very categories themselves (e.g., East, West) as outdated in the context of the intellectual atmosphere of the globalizing world (e.g., Hwang, 2019a). From a different perspective, one could ask, while these

psychologists are, in good faith, pointing to the fact that what is imagined to be universal is, in fact, Western, that is, culturally specific, are they, in Allais`s (2016) words, "wrongly granting the West proprietary rights over any ideas it has happened to investigate, rather than seeing these as belonging to all of humanity"? (p. 537). (Nevertheless, since, in the search for alternative Psychologies, deficiencies and problems of Western Psychology are often foregrounded, for these other Psychologies, it may not be attractive to see Western Psychology as belonging to all of humanity.)

As an alternative to this either/or thinking, perhaps one should think of the idea of indigeneity as a matter of degree. Since modern Psychology has its origins in Europe and was disseminated to and appropriated by the US first and later by non-Western countries, it could be said that this modern scientific inquiry is *more* indigenous to the West, especially to Western Europe. Compared to these indigenous homelands of Psychology, Psychology in non-Western societies has been later adopted/indigenized. Researchers attempted to explain this by introducing the distinction between *indigenous* and *indigenized* Psychologies. According to Yang (2012), for example, while *indigenous* Psychology refers to a more independent and original perspective, which spontaneously stems from a specific religion or philosophy, *indigenized* Psychology accepts the existing dominance of Western Psychology in advance and makes slight or moderate adaptions. In this sense, *indigenized* perspectives will never become a true form of *indigenous* Psychology, which is “spontaneously, naturally, and gradually formed through an endogenous process without intrusion and domination of a powerful alien scientific psychology” (Yang, 2006, p. 299). On the same page, Yang (2006) goes on to say that: “In contemporary world psychology, only psychologies in the Euro-American countries and the former Soviet Union are genuinely indigenous”. The indigeneity of Psychologies in Euro-

American countries may be self-evident for the promoters of IP, but why Yang added the Psychology of the former Soviet Union to this list is unclear[9]. Öngel and Smith (1999) compared the contents of the *Turkish Journal of Psychology* and the *Journal of Soviet Psychology* for the period between 1978 and 1992 and concluded: "Soviet psychology was found to be one of the rare examples of an indigenous psychology" (p. 465). Even though Yang (2006) does not cite this article nor mentions any other specific reason, he grants true indigenous Psychology status to Soviet Psychology. As another example of obscurity, Greenfield (2000) points out that Japanese developmental Psychology exceptionally flourished as an indigenous Psychology but similarly to Yang, she does not give details about why it is so.

Öngel and Smith (1999) note that compared to high indigenization in the *Journal of Soviet Psychology,* there was no interest in the indigenization of Psychology in the *Turkish Journal of Psychology*. Similarly, in her historical account of Psychology in Türkiye, Gülerce (2012) says that "[a] truly indigenous psychology (defined as the emergence of psychology within a particular culture), say modern Turkish psychology, Sufi psychology, Islamist psychology, etc., has not been realized" in Türkiye (p. 567). The reader may suppose that Gülerce laments the lack of (a truly) indigenous Psychology in Türkiye. However, in the following sentence, Gülerce continues that "[n]or do I advocate or even see the possibilities for it, as that would be oxymoronic."

According to these statements, it seems that some Psychologies, that is, Western ones, are categorically indigenous, or their indigeneity is more *genuine* or *true* than others, and those who are not *genuinely* or *truly* indigenous can only be indigenized. The question is, what makes a

[9] Russian psychologists have sometimes (e.g., Lomov et al., 1993) and especially recently (e.g., Pankalla & Kośnik, 2018) participated in the ongoing discussion of indigenization in the international Psychology literature.

discipline genuinely indigenous? What are the criteria[10] for being indigenous or being genuinely indigenous? Since it is not obvious what the criteria of being indigenous are, it is not clear why, for example, Sufi Psychology is an oxymoronic combination. The distinctions made to clear up confusion may not be of much help either. Even though researchers tend to see American Psychology as indigenous and later developed ones as indigenized (or indigenized-to-be) (Brock, 2014a), given that Psychology coming from Europe was adapted to American culture, American Psychology could also be regarded and labelled as *indigenized* as well (see Pickren, 2009).

Another example related to the lack of criteria of being indigenous is that while Adair (1999) sees the separation of Canadian Psychology from American Psychology as the indigenization of Psychology, Kim and Park (2005) do not accept Canadian Psychology as a true form of indigenous Psychology due to its similarity with American Psychology. The question is, for something to be indigenous, truly or not, does it have to be distinctive? Similarly, Smith et al. (2011) ask: "Must a concept be culturally distinctive before it can be considered as indigenous?" (p. 136). In a tentative manner, they note that "processes considered as indigenous in one context may be particularly salient in that context but be present in more a muted form in other contexts" (p. 136).

While Moghaddam (1987) regards the differentiation of European social Psychology from American social Psychology as one of the first manifestations of indigenization, Smith (2005) asks the question of "whether there is continuing usefulness for the notion of an indigenous European social psychology" (p. 260). "By no means all researchers are concerned with the theories that do have indigenous origins" Smith says and adds, nevertheless "there exists

[10] The mission of indigenizing Psychology ultimately involves questioning what Psychology is now, what it could be and what it should be. A person who questions the criteria that make indigenous Psychology indigenous, more fundamentally, can be asked: what are the criteria for being Psychology itself? I acknowledge that these questions lie at the root of my own questioning.

a distinctively strong preference to take account of context in the conduct of studies" (p. 261). However, according to Lunt (1998), although it is called *European Psychology* in general, it is difficult to determine or articulate what distinguishes it, other than the point of geographical location, the European from other Western Psychologies.

Along with opaque sentences/ideas, one can notice that some frequently repeated sentences/concepts in the literature, at least seemingly, contradict each other: while Marsella (2013) says "all psychologies are indigenous psychologies", many psychologists point out that their Psychology is an imported—that is, not indigenous—product (e.g., Nsamenang, 2007; Paranjpe, 2006).

"It is questionable", says Jahoda (2016), "whether any indigenous psychologies actually exist" (p. 169). In a similar vein, Long (2019) criticizes the tendency that although pioneers (specifically referring to A. Marsella and L. Sundararajan here) of this movement insist that all Psychologies are indigenous, they do not give any other name than Western Psychology. Perhaps it is because *Western Psychology* is the umbrella label for many diverse perspectives localized in the West the names of which, as Yang (in Allwood & Berry, 2006) once said, are "too numerous to mention" (p. 250).

The question is, if Western Psychology, compared to the non-Western ones, is the only indigenous Psychology, then how can *all* Psychologies be indigenous at the same time? Is this statement referring to something ideal which is only realized by the West but not actualized by non-Western countries yet?

When Marsella (2013) says, "all psychologies are indigenous psychologies" in fact he refers to the general point that, in his words, "Psychology is a contextual creation" (para. 17). So, in this sense, the idea of indigenous Psychology seems to refer to a general observation that each

phenomenon should be understood in alignment with its contextual background. Marecek and Christopher (2017) ask "is positive psychology an indigenous psychology?" and respond to that question very much in line with Marsella`s (2013) point as follows:

> From our perspective as critical psychologists, we view all psychologies as inescapably grounded in the pre-reflective understandings of those who invent them (Christopher, Wendt, Marecek, & Goodman, 2014). In this sense, all psychologies—including positive psychology—could be said to be indigenous psychologies. (p. 84)

Indeed, if each Psychology is based on the understanding/worldview of its creators, each Psychology must be indigenous by nature. Thus, there seems to be no contradiction between the place where Marecek and Christopher (2017) took off in their chapter and the place they arrived at. Just like Marsella (2013), they recommend *thinking contextually* when thinking about *psychology* or *the psychological* in general. They point out that "[m]uch of the conventional psychological knowledge" faultily assume that "context does not alter the phenomena" (p. 95). In this sense, most psychologists regard *context* as a kind of detail that does not affect the psychology of the individual who is purported to be independent of his/her surrounding environment. Instead, for critical psychologists, Marecek and Christopher (2017) say, *context* represents a phenomenon or condition that constructs or constitutes the very phenomenon of the psychological.

The problem is, even though it is often repeated as a kind of truism by researchers, it is not quite clear what this idea of Psychology/psychology being constructed/constituted by context means. *Context* is, as Coulter (1994) says, "surely one of the most widely used (and widely abused) terms of art in the humanities and social sciences" (p. 689). Similarly, Dohn et al. (2018) point out that this concept is often "left unanalyzed and taken for granted" by researchers (p. 111). Also, Dilley (2002) points out that although the concept of context is widely used in social and cultural anthropology, this concept itself is used in a mysterious manner (for a similar

criticism see Huen, 2009). It could be said that these observations are also valid for indigenous Psychologies that often refer to the centrality of the concept of context. Even though putting Psychology in its context is promoted as one of the central assumptions of indigenous Psychology in general and this concept is generously prefixed with various adjectives (for example, Wallner and Jandl [2006] say: "the indigenous psychologies approach emphasizes understanding rooted in ecological, cultural, political, and historical contexts" [p. 65]), it is not always clear how this central assumption makes the discipline of Psychology fundamentally different.

The concept of context or contextualism as a metatheory have received some attention in the psychological literature in general (e.g., Capaldi & Proctor, 1999; Glăveanu, 2014; Hayes et al., 1993; Morawski, 1986; van Hoorn, 1984). However, these studies are not paid attention by indigenous psychologists. Even though it seems that it is obvious what is meant by the idea of putting everything in its context, as Saranson eloquently puts it, "the implications of the obvious are not themselves obvious" (as cited in Trickett, 2002, p. 516).

One of the most important issues is related to the selection of the *appropriate context* and/or the *content of each context* relevant to the issue at stake. Researchers point out that contextual thinking is boundless, meaning that the content of each context is limitless, and each *context* can be *contextualized* by another *context* (Dilley, 2002). In this sense, while thinking contextually, researchers try to determine the researchable scale of this task which is limitless and boundless by nature. (For this reason, for example, van Hoorn (1984) proposes the idea of "minimal meaningful context" to delimit relevant contextual information of a unit of analysis to a manageable degree [p. 166]). Although *culture* is one of the contexts in which Psychology is evaluated in relation to itself, indigenous psychologists discuss how to determine the cultural

context on which they base their Psychology. For example, African psychologists discuss how to determine the ingredients of the African cultural context on which they base their African Psychology (e.g., Long, 2017; Nwoye, 2015; Ratele, 2017; Oppong, 2022).

Beyond, *culture* may not be the only or the most basic context of Psychology for some. For example, Ratner (2008) criticizes indigenous Psychologies for being constructed apart from political context (or put differently, he criticizes the fact that the cultural context constructed by indigenous Psychologies is often devoid of any political ingredients). Given the existence of many contexts (i.e., political, economic, cultural), the question arises of how the contextuality of Psychology should be grasped most accurately and inclusively or how the relevant content will be chosen.

Not surprisingly, another point is related to the relativist implication of contextualism. According to Scharfstein (1991), taking contextualism to the extreme results in extreme relativity. Indeed, the emphasis on *context* points to the danger of relativism for many researchers. For example, Kağıtçıbaşı (2000) points to this danger for indigenous Psychologies when she says, "contexts are not necessarily unique" (p. 8). The question is, does the emphasis on cultural context in indigenous Psychology necessarily refer to the uniqueness of each Psychology?

Moreover, this truism regarding context-dependency of psychological phenomena, which is itself used for legitimizing the idea of indigenous Psychology, is only an initial step most of the time, generally taken to point to the cultural specificity of purportedly universal Western Psychology. However, researchers often have a following point to make based on this initial observation. Marecek and Christopher (2017), for example, after granting indigeneity to positive Psychology in their chapter “Is positive psychology an indigenous psychology?”, criticize it as

ontologically and *morally* untenable. According to them, by assuming the self "as fundamentally separate from others, from the larger society, and from the natural world", positive Psychology begins from an ontologically problematic assumption (p. 86). This assumption of folk psychologies, in turn, constructs the basis of a collective moral vision that causes the wellbeing and flourishing of humans to be defined in a certain way. So, their initial seemingly descriptive (or not explicitly evaluative) observation turns into an explicit evaluation of positive Psychology. In a similar vein, Becker and Marecek (2008) point out that "positive psychology—like all psychologies" is a "cultural artifact" and draw attention to the *fact* that its ontological basis in the idea of bounded and masterful self is "a fiction" and finally, transforming/promoting the self "in the absence of social transformation" is "morally repugnant" (pp. 1769-1771). It is hard to follow the implications of these kinds of analyses. In fact, these researchers give different verdicts at the same time: first, saying something indigenous to a place indicates, at least primarily or initially, a kind of particularization that this particular phenomenon is one among many and, therefore, it is or could be only valid in this particular context; second, indicating or implying that this particular phenomenon/perspective is *universally* wrong. In other words, what is claimed to be universal is first reconstructed as one among many and then shown to be universally invalid on moral or ontological grounds.

I contend that a paradoxical understanding arises when psychologists use *critical* and *cultural* arguments together; that is, psychologists criticize mainstream Psychology and also substantiate their criticisms with data from other cultures. In those cases, generalized truths that are deduced from a particular context *may* conflict with different truths that are practiced in many different contexts. While *criticism* corresponds to the former, *culture* corresponds to the latter, and the intermingling of these two—when the results of these two are presented together

—is the point where that paradoxical understanding may arise. I believe this is one of the main quandaries in the literature on indigenous Psychology. While researchers tend to generalize *a critique* beyond the context in which it arises, they simultaneously particularize/customize generalized truths by referring to *cultures*. This quandary is not unique to indigenous Psychologies but is more evident in them. It is not very evident in other literatures because the arguments about cultures and the arguments in which the discipline of Psychology is subjected to total criticism are not generally presented together. That is, the *cultural* and *critical* psychological literatures rarely mix with each other. While critical psychologists criticize the relationship of the discipline with society as being limited to the Western context, culture-oriented psychologists avoid such societal criticisms and point to different psychological phenomena located in cultural worlds. For this reason, the two streams don't mix, even if there is a significant convergence in what these two groups say about the nature of the human psyche in general (for a recent dialogue between the two, see Fleer et al., [2020])[11].

However, where the two streams are served together, a mix-up is inevitable. For example, in their article entitled "Critical cultural awareness", Christopher et al. (2014) emphasize the lack of cultural diversity in the discipline of Psychology, which is *universal in appearance* though *indigenous in reality.* They also criticize the conceptualization of the self in Psychology which is supposed to be "embedded in and inseparable from culture" but is wrongly regarded independently of its culture (p. 650). So, while talking about including data from other cultures in Psychology, they simultaneously refer to a more fundamental problem, *a-cultural* understanding of the self in Psychology. The concept of culture has two primary uses here. In the

[11] Bhatia and Stam (2005) point out that although on the surface there are similarities between different approaches criticizing mainstream Psychology, there may be profound ontological and epistemological differences between these approaches. Perhaps this is why different literatures do not mix.

first, it refers to a whole that occurs as a result of a collective construction in which a person lives or is a part of, while in the second, it refers to a meaning about the individual world of a person. It could also be said that while the first is used in an explanatory sense (as an explanans), the second is the one that needs explanation (as an explanandum). These different uses cause an oscillation between universalist and relativist styles of arguments in their analyses. On the one hand, when talking about the a-cultural view of the self in Psychology, they have a universalist tone. On the other hand, when talking about the monocultural structure of the discipline of Psychology, they have a relativist tone. This oscillation seen through the concept of culture can also be followed through the concept of individualism. Christopher et al. (2014) talk about the culturality of Western individualistic ideas and describe these ideas as universally problematic or wrong at the same time. Likewise, in the literature on indigenous Psychology, there is this kind of oscillation between descriptive and evaluative analyses of cultural products.

This could be related to the inherent tension between the particular and the universal which is often seen in cultural analyses. Wang and Kuo (2010) point out that the idea of *culture-specific theory* is a kind of paradox because "theories are by definition aimed at establishing generality and universality, while culture dictates particularity" (p. 153). Of course, these two can be subsumed under a dialectical relation, but how this happens is more often a matter of debate. Alternatively, this is a *dilemma of context*, as Scharfstein (1991) points out, since universalism and relativism necessitate each other. Similarly, *critical cultural* or *cultural critical* analyses include the same problems/paradoxes or points of tension.

In summary, there are many ambiguous and confusing points and oscillations in the literature on indigenous Psychology. Of course, this research project alone does not aim to identify—much less resolve—all these problems, as ambiguities, indeterminacies and

arbitrariness of academic conceptualizations are to some extent unavoidable and even perhaps to an equal extent desirable for urging diverse opinions. Nor does this dissertation aim to make things difficult or to show the impossibility of creating indigenous Psychology by presenting this "critique" part at greater length than those regarding "reconstruction" and "creation" below. Rather it aims to touch on the main elements of the idea and provide some clarification.

I argue that even though on the surface, one may easily grasp the idea of regarding Psychology as indigenous to the culture in which it is developed, and of going deeper to examine the main elements of these ideas (psychology, culture, indigeneity), the simplicity blurs into complexity. The following questions may come up: which Psychology is being referred to? Is it Psychology in a disciplinary sense or in a general sense? How can one culture be distinguished from the other so that one Psychology can be distinguished from the other? What are the criteria of Psychology being indigenous?

For someone who wants to take a bird's eye view of this movement, there seems to be no choice but to be a confusionist. Shweder (2000) explains confusionism as follows:

> A ''confusionist'' (not to be confused with a Confucianist) is someone who believes that the knowable world is incomplete if seen from any one point of view, incoherent if seen from all points of view at once, and empty if seen from ''nowhere in particular.'' Given the choice between incompleteness, incoherence and emptiness a ''confusionist'' opts for incompleteness, while trying to get beyond such limitations by staying on the move between different ways of seeing and valuing things in the world. (p. 219)

In this dissertation, I try to take a look at indigenous Psychology from many points of view at once. For this reason, I have to deal with *incoherence*, which disqualifies me from being a proper confusionist who opts for *incompleteness* in the above sense. But still, I can define myself as a confusionist since there are many confusing points in the context of indigenous Psychology. However, I should note that confusion, albeit a condition that needs to be partially resolved, is not a negative description per se in this dissertation. Rather, I embrace confusion as a flexible

and productive approach since the primary confusing points lead us to a reconstruction of indigenous Psychology.

Reconstruction

While this dissertation presents confusing points of this literature, it also reinterprets these points in a critical manner and undertakes a reconstruction in accordance with the second stage of Teo`s theorizing. It is challenging to distinguish *critique* from *reconstruction*, as Teo (2020) has also stated. For example, re-considering Western Psychology as indigenous involves both a critique and a reconstruction. In this dissertation, based on the criticism pointed out above that the literature on indigenous Psychology is both confusing and difficult to summarize, I present a critique along with a reconstruction in the following chapters.

Indigenous psychologists point to many different meanings using the same concepts. In fact, as also hinted above, the ambiguity of concepts is often seen as the driving force of diversity of opinions in academia in general. Condor (1997) expresses this clearly in the context of critical social Psychology as follows:

> We are all too aware that our ability to speak with one voice, to offer mutual support and affirmation, to inhabit the same edited text, depends largely upon preserving a lack of clarity in our use of keywords such as 'context', 'individualism', 'discourse' and 'social', in not probing the limits of each other's commitment to constructionism or relativism, in pretending not to notice when authors have quite different understandings of 'text' (is there anything beyond it?) and what may be accomplished by its analysis. (p. 112)

Precisely for the reasons above (preserving a lack of clarity in using keywords, not probing the limits of each other`s theoretical commitments, and not noticing different understandings of the very same phenomenon/concept), it is difficult to determine the boundaries of the literature on indigenous Psychology.

As a side note, the problem of the lack of clarity to some extent arises from the lack of specification or lack of specific examples in researchers` writings. When Jahoda (2016) attacks this movement in his review, he accuses indigenous psychologists of having remained "at the high level of abstraction" (p. 169). Perhaps abstraction at a high level is part of academic inquiry in general, but the problem arises when this abstraction is not substantiated by specific examples. In a recently published book *More examples, less theory: Historical studies of writing psychology*, Billig (2019) talks about some of his more and less favourite writers in Psychology. His favorite writers are those psychologists who clarify their arguments by giving more examples. He claims that there is an inverse correlation between providing theory and giving examples: the greater the theory in a psychological work, the less likely it is to give examples. Granting that the lack of theory is another problem per se in Psychology (see Sundararajan, 2022), Billig`s observation about giving a limited number of examples highly resonates with the literature on indigenous Psychology. The main point of departure for indigenous psychologists is the inappropriateness of the existing Psychology, be it Western or mainstream, for other cultures. The idea is that the discipline of Psychology, as it is, is inappropriate because it does not fit other ways of life. Yet the problem is, sometimes the rhetoric of incompatibility outweighs the examples of what exactly are the incompatibles (e.g., Hwang, 2005; Nsamenang, 2007; Yang, 2000, 2012). Researchers might be thinking that the problem is so obvious that they may not feel the need to give examples. However, this exacerbates the problem of clarity in this literature.

Even though one could refer to this current work as a critical assessment of *the* literature, there is no clearly identifiable territory which one can label *the* indigenous Psychology. "The" here refers to my summary or reconstruction of this extreme heterogeneity—the boundaries of which one finds difficult to define. Also, this territory, whose borders cannot be clearly predicted

and has some issues of clarity, is growing by making new connections day by day. For example, Parades-Canilao et al. (2015) point out that indigenous psychologists and critical psychologists are like-minded in addressing the relevance of Psychology and the contribution of Psychology to social change. Accordingly, Sundararajan et al. (2017) note that making a connection between indigenous Psychology and critical Psychology is an emerging trend (e.g., Parades-Canilao & Babaran-Diaz, 2013; Wang, 2013). The other emerging trend that Sundararajan et al. (2017) point to is the study of indigenous populations under the microscope of indigenous Psychology. Even though the growing indigenous Psychology literature predominantly does not include indigenous people`s psychology (e.g., Kim et al., 2006)—which is criticized by Nikora et al. (in Allwood & Berry, 2006)—these two perspectives have recently begun to merge (e.g., Blume, 2020; Ciofalo, 2019; Liu & King, 2021). In addition, this literature expands to include different cultural contexts (e.g., Lambert et al., 2015; Pankalla & Kośnik, 2018; Pasha-Zaidi, 2021).

In sum, this fluid literature—"a mighty river with many tributaries" using Yeh and Sundararajan`s (2019) metaphor (p. 2)—is constantly growing with new connections. For this reason, this dissertation, rather than determining the boundaries of *it*, opens a *corridor* in this highly fluid literature of uncertain boundaries. Declining any attempt at mapping the whole terrain, it constructs a narrow corridor of thought by entering from ambiguous and confusing concepts central to the idea of indigenous Psychology (indigenous, indigenization, culture, psychology, and individualism). It places this corridor within a shared conceptual space since both Western and non-Western psychologists contribute to this literature in a dialectical sense (e.g., Adair, 2006; Hwang, 2019a; Teo, 2013a).

After laying out the confusing points in the critique phase, it clarifies or disambiguates them as much as possible in the reconstruction phase. However, it is useful to remind again that

these stages cannot be separated from each other clearly and will be presented in an intertwined manner. This *reconstruction* stage is more about pointing to illuminating distinctions than giving a definitive meaning to confusing points. Silver (2019) draws attention to points that can cause confusion in a text:

> Perhaps a concept is used in multiple senses without distinguishing them. Perhaps multiple terms are used to cover the same concept. Perhaps the concept is used at different levels of analysis. (pp. 131-132)

It is possible to detect all three points/problems within the scope of indigenous Psychologies. A concept is used in a way that means different meanings without distinction (e.g., indigenous, indigenization, psychology, culture). Secondly, different terms can be used for the same concept (e.g., indigenization and decolonization). Or a concept can be used at different levels of analysis (e.g., individualism). In this dissertation, I will point to each problem in the following chapters.

Creation

At the final stage of theorizing, a new conceptual construction is created based on the previous *critique* and *reconstruction* (Teo, 2020, 2021). In the context of indigenous Psychology, a grand creative project is being discussed under the banner of *Global Psychology* (see Sundararajan et al., 2020). Although it is currently at the theoretical stage, many researchers embrace the idea that a global integration should be achieved by considering the characteristics of all indigenous Psychologies.

Even though there is no such grand creation in this dissertation, it includes some creative elements; for example, the notion of indigenous Psychology is located on a shared conceptual ground which is constructed by Western and non-Western psychologists, and it is also placed on a *spectrum of diversity* in relation to other culture-oriented approaches in Psychology.

Starting off from confusing points regarding indigenous Psychology at the beginning, the dissertation constructs a corridor, and this corridor at the end of the dissertation opens to the author's own cultural world, and questions how indigenous Psychology can be made sense of in the context of academic Psychology in Türkiye. In a sense, this chapter will be a tentative but creative conclusion as the *room* where everything so far has led us to at the end of the corridor. In this last chapter, the recent diversification of Psychology in Türkiye will be discussed within the scope of the indigenization of Psychology; and finally, with regard to how this diversification can transform the history of psychology courses in Türkiye's post-secondary education curriculum. It should be noted that although this chapter is a destination, it is only one of many possible doors opening/connecting to the narrow corridor.

A Scope of *the* Literature

Considering the problems mentioned in this introduction, it could be said that none of them is unique to the indigenous Psychology literature. Every research topic is extremely heterogeneous, and there are no easily identifiable boundaries between any. This diffusion poses risks for the reviewer. As Candea et al. (2015) point out, every review includes the risk of being violent in the sense of not reflecting the complexity of the topic. Kamler and Thomson (2014) note that there is no single literature review but *reviews of literatures* to do justice to the inherent diversity of each topic. Recognizing that it is a difficult task to reflect the complexities and subtleties of each subject, this scope of the literature in this dissertation can be considered as my version of the terrain.

Since indigenization rose in reaction to the Americanization of Psychology across the world after World War II, it is possible to trace the rise of indigenous Psychology literature 60-70 years back. But it can be said that, as Hwang (2005) also points out, mostly after the 1990s it

started to be heard in the international arena. Since then, some influential anthologies, special issues of journals and monographs about indigenous Psychology were published. Kim and Berry`s edited book entitled *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* published in 1993—is accepted as seminal and as being responsible for popularizing the term indigenous Psychology in the international academic arena. The most recent update of this literature can be the book series published by *Palgrave Studies.* This series started to be published in 2018 (Ting & Sundarajan, 2018) and five books have been published so far. The most recent of this series is Matthyssen`s monograph published in 2021. In this sense, this dissertation includes some components from this body of work that has been growing since the 1990s up until today. However, rather than undertaking a thorough analysis of these references, it tries to reveal some recurring patterns relating to the fundamental terms such as *indigeneity*, *culture*, and *individualism*.

I should note that in accordance with the essence of the idea of indigeneity, one would expect to see an indigenous Psychology literature in its own native language. Indeed, there is literature published in each culture`s own language which has not been translated into English yet (a significant part of Filipino Psychology, for example, Porcadas, 2019). This dissertation does not include that literature but only that published in English. In addition to this, although some psychologists produce their works in English, they insist on using words from their indigenous vocabulary and also encourage the supporters of this movement to do so (e.g., Bhawuk, 2021). In this dissertation, since each indigenous concept—be it that of indigenous peoples` psychology or a non-Western culture`s psychology—is qualitatively dense with local meanings mediated by a local language, indigenous vocabulary is used minimally—out of fear of not reflecting the depth of those foreign words. As an important final note, this dissertation does

not directly focus on indigenous[12] peoples` psychology as it understands indigenous Psychology in its generic meaning of the term as *Psychology specific to a culture*.

Some of the works that constitute the material of this dissertation are as follows: *edited books* (Kim & Berry, 1993; Kim et al., 2006; Ting & Sundarajan, 2018; Yeh, 2019; Sundararajan et al., 2020), *monographs* (Enriquez, 2010; Hwang, 2019a; Martín-Baró, 1994; Ratele, 2019); *theses/dissertations* (Peng, 2012; Porcadas, 2019); *encyclopedia entries/handbook chapters* (Hwang, 2013a; Kim, 2001; Brock, 2014; Pe-Pua, 2015; Sundararajan et al., 2017); and *special issues of journals* (Adair & Diaz-Loving, 1999; Hwang & Yang, 2000; Shams & Hwang, 2005; Allwood & Berry, 2006; Hwang, 2015; Sundararajan, 2019); and *various articles* related to indigenous Psychology published in various journals (e.g., Ho, 1998; Sinha, 1998; Church & Katigbak, 2002; Shams 2002); and finally, a *few works* published by *indigenous researchers* can be included as exemplary ingredients of this list (e.g., Blume, 2020; Ciofalo, 2019).

Plan of the Work

In the following chapter (Chapter 2), different meanings of the notion of indigenous Psychology (and its derivative terms—indigenized Psychology, indigenizing Psychology or indigenization of Psychology) will be clarified.

In Chapter 3, a brief historical background of indigenous Psychology will be given.

In Chapter 4, two fundamental conceptions of culture as used in indigenous Psychology literature will be distinguished from each other.

[12] Conventionally, when researchers refer to indigenous peoples, the word “indigenous” is capitalized, i.e., “Indigenous peoples”.

In Chapter 5, emphasis will be placed on the multi-layered-ness of psychologists' critical-cultural analysis, including that of indigenous psychologists. In this direction, different layers of the notion of *individualism* will be revealed.

In Chapter 6, the criticisms of indigenous Psychology will be summarised and a prediction about the future of the indigenous Psychology movement will be made.

In the final chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 7), which will briefly touch on the history of Psychology in Türkiye, the question will be asked whether the discipline of Psychology, more specifically, the history of Psychology undergraduate curriculum in Türkiye can be re-constructed in accordance with notions of indigenization.

CHAPTER 2

"Indigenous Psychology": "What Do You Mean by That?"

A question that I remember from my secondary school years in Türkiye is, "Did we understand what we have read?". We used to hear this question in the first-person plural in our literature classes after reading a passage from a famous writer`s book. I do not know if it is still being asked in my home country, but it is probably discredited in the contemporary philosophy of education because of the unwelcome implication that there is only one true answer to this question, one true understanding of the passage. However, today, many years after my graduation from secondary school, I often find myself asking this question in a country far from my home. It is as if I am in one of those classic Eastern tales whose protagonist goes on a journey and cyclically ends where he had started. In those, despite the sameness of departure and arrival points, cyclical journeys are imbued with spiritual meanings (a kind of spiritual progress). In my own story, I am not sure what kinds of spiritual meanings are hidden but for sure I am having difficulty in decoding the messages of indigenous psychologists. In terms of the degree of understanding various authors, truly I feel like I am right back where I started from. I imaginarily interrogate those indigenous psychologists with a question, not with the one left from my secondary school years, but the one that I have received most as feedback from the native English readers of my own writings: *what do you mean by that?* As a doctoral candidate, it is a bit disheartening to find oneself at such a fundamental stage, but my only consolation comes from reading those articles by which academics critically target each other. In those articles, I "happily" find some mutual allegations of misunderstanding made by authorities in the field.

A striking example of these mutual allegations of misunderstandings can be seen, if a long-term debate between Taiwanese Psychologist K. K. Hwang and Swedish Psychologist C.

M. Allwood about the nature of indigenous psychology is followed (Allwood, 2011b, 2011c, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b. 2014c; Hwang, 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). Both of them are influential figures in the literature on IP. While Hwang is an eager producer of indigenous perspectives in Taiwanese Psychology, Allwood makes only critical-theoretical analyses of this movement. There are many points of contention between them in this debate: the proper understanding of the concept of culture, determining the boundaries between academia and society, identifying the proper methodology and philosophy of science for indigenous Psychology etc.. However, it is interesting to see that a considerable part of their debate is about their respective allegations of misunderstandings, corrections to misunderstandings, and other misunderstandings while making corrections and so on. This discussion gave me the impression that a significant part of the academic world, beyond indigenous Psychology consists of misunderstandings—at least as mutual claims, and this state of affairs is most probably unavoidable, and may even have its advantages. More specifically, I concluded that the world of indigenous Psychology is particularly controversial. So, I find I am not alone. This is indeed a contested topic by nature.

In his review of indigenous Psychology, Jahoda (2016) points to "a striking lack of consistency in the views of different authors" (p. 169). He even sarcastically enlists a comment originally applied to social Psychology as the "epitaph of indigenous psychology": "He seems to do a great deal of packing in preparation for a journey which never starts"[13] (p. 178). Some pioneering researchers in this field responded to Jahoda`s challenge (e.g., Hwang, 2017; Yeh & Sundararajan, 2019), but the debate could not continue because G. Jahoda (1920-2016) passed

[13] Here Jahoda quotes a critic's opinion (without giving his/her name) about William McDougall`s *An introduction to social psychology*. This sarcastic sentence is also cited by McDougall himself also without mentioning the critic`s name (McDougall, 2003, p. 12)

away shortly after publishing his harsh criticism of indigenous Psychologies. Can it be said that he left behind a fair criticism? I can say at least it is true that there are many difficulties inherent in the very nature of this movement—some of which are even contradictory. However, given the various views on the subject, it would be difficult to squeeze indigenous Psychology into a few logical premises and/or arguments and evaluate its status, let alone write its epitaph.

Instead of overemphasizing its inconsistencies or declaring its death, I prefer to point to the inherent difficulties in making sense of indigenous Psychology. One can come across the adjective versions of the term (indigenous or indigenized) or its verbal noun version (indigenization) in the psychological literature; there are some subtle differences between them. Concepts are, as Teo (2021) points out, "basic units of theorizing" (p. 539); hence I start with these central concepts of IP. Moreover, given the highly fragmented nature of Psychology in general (see Green, 2015), it would be unfair to expect the contributors to this movement to have a kind of monolithic and non-contradictory voice. While part of the controversy stems from the extreme heterogeneity of IP, as mentioned in the introduction above (Sundararajan, 2019), there is the additional problem of the polysemic character of the term; it is not always clear what is meant by indigenous Psychology.

Definitions/Distinctions Abound!

The term indigeneity or indigenous, like every other term, is used by different actors with different meanings (see Uddin et al., 2017). It etymologically means "born in (a place)" and "sprung from the land"[14]. As the classical anthropological concept of culture, the concept of indigenous, too, is of being originally related to a particular place or land. For example, in

[14] https://www.etymonline.com/word/indigenous

Türkiye, there is a rising political discourse regarding indigeneity with the often-mentioned expression of *the people of this land* (Mollaer, 2018). This could be a rhetorical basis for various projects, to restore the country, to awaken people in accordance with a certain ideology/worldview, to be aware of their own traditional values, to go back to unspoiled roots before modernization and Westernization to name just a few. Thus, land or soil is not only something that we walk on, but also representative of our soul or mentality[15]. It could be a *point* where we start to make a change.

Indigeneity is not only about place or land but also has a time dimension. To be accepted as an indigenous person one needs to have a past with that place. That person should not be a stranger or latecomer. Even being born in that place might not be enough. Even though there is no explicit set of criteria to be recognized as an indigenous person, what is ideal is that one's roots are cultivated in that place for a long time. For example, in Turkish, if someone says, "I am from Ankara", the other person may ask "içinden misiniz?". Its literal translation is "are you *from within*?" which means "are you native of Ankara or you were just born there?". In a similar sense, there is an ideal of *from within-ness* in the context of indigenous Psychology. The scope of *from within* varies, from the modification of existing approaches to the creation of bottom-up approaches. Sometimes a distinction is made between ideal and less ideal versions as *indigenization from within* and *indigenization from without* (Enriquez, 1993), *indigenization as a goal* and *indigenization as an orientation* (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2000), or as *endogenous and exogenous* indigenization (Pe-Pua, 2015).

There are numerous definitions of indigenous Psychology. Kim and Berry (1993,

[15] This term is used in the sense of physical and spiritual connection to a specific land especially by indigenous people in colonizing contexts. For this reason, it is reported that disconnection or disruption to the land may cause severe mental problems (see Taitumu et al., 2018).

Introduction) define it as “the scientific study of human behavior (or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its people” (p. 2). Kim and Berry here simply combine the dictionary definition of the word “indigenous” and one of the popular definitions (arguably the most popular) of Psychology, that is, Psychology as the scientific study of mind and behavior. However, Sundararajan et al. (2017) point out that “[t]his definition is no longer adequate” since there is a growing realization that “all psychologies are indigenous” and “cultural hybridity is increasingly common in the globalizing era” (p. 6).

Danziger (2006a) defines indigenization as “a self-conscious attempt to develop variants of modern professional psychology that are more attuned to conditions in developing nations than the psychology taught at Western academic institutions” (p. 215). Yeh and Sundararajan (2019) defines it as “an intellectual movement across the globe to resist the hegemony of Western psychology in representations of the human mind, and in investigations of local mentality” (p. 2). Adair (1999) defines it as “an approach that attempts to assess the increasing tendency of researchers within a country to address, within their research, their own cultural and social problems” (p. 398).

As can be seen above, definitions of indigenous Psychology abound. After reviewing several definitions of IP, Yang (2000) points out that all these definitions refer to “the same basic goal of developing a scientific knowledge system … in their native contexts in terms of culturally relevant frames of reference and culturally derived categories and

theories" (pp. 245-246). To provide a better sense of the diversity and to draw attention to the distinctions that I want to underline regarding the term, I will refer to two previous classifications of indigenous Psychology that have been made by C. Ratner and C. M. Allwood.

Ratner`s Understanding of Indigenous Psychology

Ratner (2008) points to three meanings of the term indigenous Psychology. In order not to disrupt the meaning, I quote Ratner's entire explanation:

> 1) The culturally organized emotions, perceptions, self, cognitive processes, developmental processes, sexuality, and mental illness of a particular group of people, e.g., lower caste Indian women in Orissa, India. This sense of indigenous psychology is designated IP1.
> 2) A people's self-understanding of their emotions, self, mental illness, personality, etc. For example, the Hindu belief that the good and bad fortune today reflect good and bad actions one made in previous lives; or the American belief that their behavior is a function of genetic mechanisms. This is IP2.
> 3) A meta theory that endorses studying indigenous self-understanding (IP2) as useful/accurate descriptions and explanations of their culturally organized psychology (IP1). This third sense of indigenous psychology (IP3) is the discipline of indigenous psychology, as in "the Taiwanese movement for indigenous psychology." It strives to be the theoretical and methodological discipline of cultural psychology that elucidates cultural origins, features, and functions of psychological phenomena. (p. 58)

Ratner's distinction[16] is important both in terms of separating the *academic Psychology* (IP3) from psychology in *everyday life* (IP1 and IP2) and further referring to the distinctions of psychology in everyday life at the individual (IP2) and collective level (IP1). As for the first distinction between academia and everyday life, I would like to underline the fact that indigenous psychologists, predominantly, first and foremost problematize the relationship

[16] Indigenous Psychology with its first meaning here is conceptually placed by Ratner in a higher position than the other two meanings. It is "the actual cultural psychology of people", for example, the individualistic self of Western people. According to Ratner, what people, be they laypeople or academics, "seek to describe and explain" is actually "the actual cultural psychology of people" (p. 58). It is difficult to understand this first meaning of the term due to its high abstraction, but I understand it as the macro level where culture objectively exists. He strictly distinguishes this macro-level from people's self-understandings and academic constructions. The idea is that people`s subjective understandings and academic artifacts can be true or false, but this objective level is beyond their subjective understandings. I do not reject but partially bracket Ratner`s tripartite distinction since his idea of cultural level is consistent with his project of macro cultural Psychology (see Ratner, 2016).

between the academic world and the wider cultural world of which the academic world is a part. As many indigenous psychologists have pointed out (e.g., Dalal, 2002; Moghaddam & Lee, 2006), the main problem can actually be defined as psychologists having different (mental) states of being between two worlds, the everyday world and the academic world, or the gap, distance, or alienation between these two worlds. According to Kim et al. (1999), the task of indigenous psychologists is "to translate the phenomenological, episodic, and procedural knowledge that people possess into analytical, semantic, and declarative knowledge" (p. 457). Kim (2001) also claims that "current psychological knowledge, rooted in a western European or American way of being and understanding, in fact may represent the psychology of psychologists and not the psychology of the lay public" (p. 51). For this reason, these psychologists, as Maria (2000) puts it, "attempt to bring the discipline closer to the lives of the people" in non-Western contexts (p. 5).

However, confusion arises when the two understandings regarding the term "indigenous psychology" are conflated: academic and non-academic world. Nsamenang (in Allwood & Berry, 2006) says: "Every cultural community the world over has an indigenous psychology, whether articulated or not. Thus, human psychological functioning predates psychology as an academic discipline" (p. 258). And then curiously asks: "Why is there a gulf between academic psychology and the one that is accumulating as indigenous psychology?". So, the project of indigenous Psychology sits astride this gulf between a foreign academic practice and what is already indigenous in one's culture. "Whether articulated or not" as Nsamenang puts it, each culture has diverse indigenous psychological perspectives. However, it is useful to underline the fact that the difficulty is about articulating or translating this diversity in(to) academic contexts.

There could be myriad indigenous mentalities within a society (alive in people's daily

practices or ideals as in written or oral culture) but academia in general is always limited when reflecting this rich diversity. For example, Sampson (1988) points to two fundamental types of self/individualism: *self-contained* and *ensembled*. While the first one is characterized by a more rigid boundary between self and non-self, which is predominantly seen in American society, and American academic Psychology in general, the latter one is represented by a more fluid boundary between self and non-self and can be seen marginally in American society and predominantly in other parts of the world. Sampson points out that even though self-contained individualism is predominant in society and academia in general, different gender and class groups marginalized by mainstream understandings might have this ensembled individualism. In sum, there is a considerable degree of intracultural diversity in Western world as well and the task of academic psychologists is to be aware of this diversity. One could say that even though both types of individualism are indigenous to American culture, Sampson tries to promote the marginalized one.

In the specific context of non-Western indigenous Psychologies, however, the problem is more acute. It is pointed out that, metaphorically speaking, academic Psychology is kind of an imported product. Even though, in these societies, there are numerous—using Shweder and Beldo`s (2015) definition of culture—"community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient" (p. 583), academic practices are largely devoid of these "true, good, beautiful, and efficient" ideas. Unlike in the American case above, non-Western researchers are not trying to differently re-indigenize what is already indigenous because what is already indigenous may not be truly reflected in academia of these non-western societies.

For this reason, when one refers to the *fact* that "all psychologies are indigenous", this statement is true if what is meant by this statement is that people have various psychological

ideas in their communities, as Nsamenang pointed out above. However, in my view that statement does not refer to academic Psychologies in the non-Western world. Otherwise, it is misleading. One could ask, if all Psychologies are already indigenous, then what is the project of indigenization for?

At this point, one might rightly point out that how to conceptualize the distinction between academic and non-academic world is a matter of debate. This is also one of the central points of the debate between Allwood (2013b) and Hwang (2013d) mentioned above. While Hwang makes a distinction between *scientific microworlds* and *lifeworlds*, Allwood warns Hwang not to make an absolute distinction between academia and society; rather, he thinks that the difference between everyday life and scientific products is a matter of degree. In a similar vein, historian of Psychology Smith (2021) points out it is hard to draw a strict line between *academic* and *everyday* psychologies and since psychology takes many different forms, so it is not limited to these two. (In addition to psychologies as "fields of knowledge" and "states of being human or animal", Smith points to psychologies as "social practices" [p. 2]). Although the distinction between academic and everyday or non-academic worlds is a matter of debate, the main point indigenous psychologists problematize, I intend to underline again, is either the foreignness of academic Psychology to the culture in which it is practiced or the alienation of academic psychologists from their own culture.

Without assuming any superiority of one over another,[17] I think it is important to distinguish the academic from the non-academic world for two main reasons; in other words, I

[17] I would also use folk, naive, common sense, or vernacular psychology to denote this non-academic version of IP. These terms probably differ from each other, slightly or sharply, and each term can be perceived as pejorative (which is criticized, for example, by Smedslund [1984]), positive or neutral in different contexts by different researchers. For example, Kim and Berry (1993) use *naive* psychology in a non-pejorative way to refer to the sophisticated subjective world of laypeople. I prefer to call this macro-world either everyday psychology or non-academic psychology in a descriptive sense.

underline this distinction because overlooking it has two problematic implications.

First, for the non-Western world, there is an implication that once we refer to our indigenous understandings in our culture, we automatically or naturally incorporate these values into our academic practice, in a sense we directly indigenize our discipline. For example, Islam prescribes relational understandings in human beings` relationship with the universe or provides a holistic perspective on the individual's mental and physical health, but beyond introducing these understandings and values, the important question in the context of indigenous Psychology is, whether and how these Islamic understandings or values transform the way Muslim psychologists do psychology in an academic or professional manner? This is now a matter of debate by a group of Muslim psychologists under the banner of *Islamic Psychology* (e.g., Al-Karam, 2018; Seedat, 2021). This will also be further exemplified in the chapter on individualism, but the key issue here—rather than simply presenting local or indigenous perspectives to the international audience in academia, which is undoubtedly valuable—is how the discipline of Psychology can potentially be transformed. Put differently, what is indigenous in our culture is primarily important—but what is ultimately important is how to indigenize our academic Psychology.

To the best of my knowledge, no indigenous psychologist has problematized this conflation in the literature explicitly. As an exception, Lee (2016) is the only psychologist who tried to clarify this point to avoid confusion. He distinguished a *horizontal gap* from a *vertical gap* in the context of indigenous Psychology. The horizontal gap is a gap between cultures, which is the main point of motivation for an indigenous Psychology since dominant Psychology is regarded as a product of Western culture. The vertical gap is a gap between, as Lee (2016) puts it, “the psychology we do and the lives we lead” (p. 159). Lee realizes that there is a shift

between these gaps in the context of IP, meaning while indigenous Psychology researchers talk about, for example, the lack of culture in Psychology in general, they shift their attention to the problem of incorporating other cultures into academic practice. What is important here is that, as Lee (2016) points out, "[n]onetheless, it also becomes clear that even with the recognition of cultural differences, there is no guarantee that such a recognition bridges the first gap of knowledge to life" (p. 159). So, doing Psychology in another cultural context does not guarantee that one can grasp the culturality of humans, which will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.

As for the second problematic implication of overlooking the distinction between academic and everyday contexts, indigenous psychologists sometimes tend to assume that there is a high degree of compatibility between academia and the larger culture in the West (e.g., Yang, 2000). Starting from this assumption, it seems like once non-Westerners indigenize their discipline, they complete their project of reconstructing their discipline of Psychology. Of course, this idea depends on how one sets the criteria of compatibility and indigeneity, but we can intuitively say that this idea is highly problematic from a critical-psychological point of view since critical psychologists problematize the relationship between academia and society. Even if there is compatibility between the two, most of them think that this compatibility is hegemonic and detrimental in Western contexts (e.g., Fox et al., 2009).

Historian of Psychology Watson (1960) says: "Psychology neither reflects culture with passive compliance nor does it exist in a social vacuum. External and internal circumstances are present, and there is a constant interplay between them" (p. 254). Recognition of this complex nature of the discipline of Psychology is sometimes missing in IP, and Psychology may be simply labelled as a cultural product. If the reification of Psychology, metaphorically or literally, is required, one can call it a giant production machine instead of simply labelling it as a product.

It can be said that this machine has a life of its own and relative autonomy from its own context. Nikora et al. (in Allwood & Berry, 2006) make a similar observation and indeed call American Psychology "the production machine" (p. 254). Just as most cultural researchers, while emphasizing the importance of culture, do not want to fall in cultural determinism by totally dissolving the agency or individuality of human beings, I believe indigenous psychologists similarly would not want to dissolve the autonomy of the discipline of Psychology in its cultural context.

There is a subtle but important difference between saying that *Psychology is a cultural product* and *Psychology is only a cultural product*. The "only*"* makes a huge difference here. Just as saying everything is socially constructed does not mean that everything is *only* socially constructed (Gemignani & Peña, 2007), everything is cultural does not mean that everything is *only* cultural. Of course, it depends on what is meant by *cultural* here. Sometimes it means the whole contextual world including literally *everything* but sometimes more specifically a symbolic world of people along with other spheres of human life, say economic and political. But no matter if one uses it in an inflationary or deflationary manner, I assume that there is a point of tension between a single discipline and society/culture along the lines of old metaphysical tensions between *text-context, agency-structure, free will-determinism* or *individuality-collectivity*. For this reason, it is difficult to say that one is totally determined by the other. Just as it is not possible to say that, for example, the text is completely determined by the context, it is not possible to say that a discipline is completely determined by the culture of which it is a part.

In this direction, instead of accepting that Western Psychology is a carbon copy of Western culture or *fits Western culture like a glove*, the question to be asked is: To what extent

does current (Western or non-Western) Psychology reflect cultural diversity? A more general and abstract question is: to what extent does (or should) a culture characterize a whole discipline? These questions do not have non-contentious final answers. But I can say that while some psychologists take a radical stance and say that every Psychology is entirely indigenous (e.g., Marsella, 2013; Sundararajan et al., 2017), some others more cautiously say that every Psychology has indigenous elements or is indigenous *to some extent* (e.g., Triandis, 1996; Teo, 2013a).

In sum, when I discuss indigenizing or indigenous Psychology, what I primarily am referring to is *Psychology on a disciplinary level*. So, the indigenization of Psychology in this sense refers to the indigenization of the discipline of Psychology. For this reason, Ratner`s distinction is important in the sense that he distinguishes *Psychology as a discipline* from *psychology as individual psychological states.* However, the confusion cannot be easily avoided by making this distinction. Indigenizing Psychology generally refers to transforming an academic practice, but it is also used in the sense of *indigenizing people's psychological states*. The latter sense is especially used in the context of decolonization when a psychologist aims to decolonize their fellow citizens` minds. This could be a task that involves transforming their minds, for example, in the sense of saving them from their inferiority complexes (e.g., Enriquez, 1993). Islamization is another example in this context in the sense of providing an Islamic awareness to Muslim populations who deal with modern Psychology (Badri, 2018). At this point, one should be aware that the role of a psychologist changes from being an academic in a traditional sense to being a socially-oriented transformative practitioner. However, to reiterate, what I understand by indigenizing Psychology in this dissertation is primarily transforming academic components. Even though I do not purposely exclude the sense of transforming

people`s psychological states, as stated in the first chapter above, I conceptualize *it* as a component of academic Psychology. This is a distinction that has caused confusion in the literature and therefore needs to be clarified. A similar observation is made by Hill (1994) in his review of Enriquez`s (2010) book entitled *From colonization to liberation: The Philippine experience*. Hill points out that Enriquez`s argument is difficult to follow at some points because he uses the phrase "Filipino psychology" to refer both to the discipline of Psychology and the psychology of Filipino people without clear differentiation.

Apart from the distinction between *academia* and *everyday life*, Ratner`s (2008) distinction is also important since he also distinguishes "culturally organized psychology of a group of people" (IP1) from "people`s self-understandings" (IP2) (p. 58). Indigenous Psychology is generally thought to represent an *emic* approach, which is used to express a phenomenon specific to a particular culture (see Kim & Berry, 1993). On the other hand, *etic* is used to refer to what is generalizable or universal in cultural research[18]. There is an important point neglected in the literature about the *emic* approach. Is *emic* an approach specific to a culture or specific to a person? Is it to look *from within a culture* in general (IP1 in Ratner's distinction) or is it to do research based on a person's experience and his/her understanding of the world (IP2 in Ratner`s distinction)? While cultural Psychology tries to put a person's experience at the centre (e.g., Valsiner, 2014), indigenous psychologists do not take a clear stance on this. For them, an emic approach often refers to a culturally specific psychological phenomenon or involves focusing on

[18] These concepts, which linguist-anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1912-2000) has created based on phonemics and phonetics, have different meanings according to the user. Pike mentions 10 differences between etic and emic in his own work. I will not enumerate them here (see Berry, 1989). For example, etic can sometimes mean an external point of view, and sometimes it can mean an absolute or universal finding. Emic, on the other hand, can mean looking at a system of meaning from the inside or having a holistic perspective within that system. Again, in Psychology, what is meant by emic can sometimes mean focusing on a culture without resorting to people's own understanding. However, sometimes it can also mean to search for the understandings or expressions of the people in that culture; so, first person standpoint is required to be an emic approach. In this sense, for example, making the subject's voice heard can also be seen as emic.

a specific cultural site.

Allwood`s Understanding of Indigenous Psychology

Allwood (2018) points to three meanings of the term:

> *First*, it can denote the type of psychology that is the object of this Element – that is, mostly *non-Western psychologies* that have explicitly declared themselves as indigenous psychologies, in contrast to the Western/US "mainstream" psychology –that is, scientific, but grounded in a specific society's culture. *Second*, the term indigenous psychology is used to mean *traditional ideas* about psychology developed in most societies, religions, and philosophies – for example, theories and concepts about the nature of the human being. *Third*, the term is used as a label for *all modern psychologies*, including Western mainstream psychology. This use points out that all psychologies come from a local cultural context and in this sense are indigenous [emphasis added]. (p. 2)

As can be seen, Allwood`s distinction offers a different taxonomy regarding indigenous Psychology. I can simply put these three meanings respectively as *non-Western academic*, *traditional-folk*, and *all academic psychologies*. Allwood, like Ratner, distinguishes academic from the non-academic sense of the term. The difference between Allwood and Ratner is that Ratner does not emphasize traditional or folk psychology, but instead, he points to contemporary everyday psychology probably by thinking that this everyday psychology includes folk and traditional categories.

As distinct from Ratner, there are two important aspects of Allwood`s distinction that I would like to point to. First, it is important that Allwood (2018) clarifies that indigenous Psychologies are self-declared indigenous because most non-Western psychologists do not label their practice as indigenous. However, is it fair to exclude those perspectives that do not use the label indigenous? I do not think it is. For example, Latin psychologist Martín-Baró (1994) and African psychologist Ratele (2019) do not use the label indigenous. However, they are influential psychologists, and, in a sense, they work(ed) to indigenize their discipline even though they name their practices differently (Liberation and Africanization). Another example is a Mexican

psychologist, Diaz-Loving (2019) who uses *ethnopsychology* to describe his work. These perspectives are worth mentioning. Beyond these specific examples, if all Psychologies are indigenous, each one deserves to be mentioned in a literature review. But another question arises in this case: is it possible to include all the perspectives that are culture-based and distinguish themselves from the dominant disciplinary perspectives? This is obviously impossible unless one aims to write a voluminous encyclopaedic work. So, including self-declared indigenous Psychologies, as in the case of Allwood`s short treatise, is a pragmatic decision. In this dissertation, I mostly embrace this pragmatic decision and mainly focus on those non-Western psychological perspectives that have explicitly used the label indigenous Psychology. So, the point about self-declared indigenous and those who use other labels is the first important point in Allwood`s distinction that I would like to emphasize.

The second important point is about his distinction between Western academic perspectives and non-Western academic ones. The literature on indigenous Psychology is built mainly by non-Western psychologists. Also, as pointed out in the introduction, by referring to context-dependency of any psychological discipline, researchers say that "all psychologies are indigenous" (e.g., Marsella, 2013). For this reason, Allwood is right to make such a distinction between the first sense (non-Western self-declared indigenous Psychologies) and the third sense (all modern Psychologies, including Western mainstream Psychology) of the term. However, one can call Allwood`s distinction into question. Even though those self-proclaimed indigenous Psychologies are predominantly non-Western, it is very difficult to evaluate this literature independent of the literature on Western Psychology. The necessity of constructing indigenous Psychologies is based on the incompatibility of imported Psychology with non-Western cultures, as well as the admission made by Western psychologists that their Psychology is not universal

but indigenous to their particular culture. As I mentioned above, the term *indigenous* in the literature is not predominantly referring to—albeit partially including—any place-based group but rather functions as a generic term denoting the culturality of any psychological perspective or an academic discipline in general.

Although the literature on indigenous Psychology in English is predominantly published by non-Western psychologists, there are some Western psychologists who explain how their Western-based psychological practices can be identified as indigenous Psychologies or at least Psychologies having indigenous characteristics, for example, European social Psychology (Moghaddam, 1987), Canadian Psychology (Adair, 2006; Berry, 1993), and German critical Psychology (Teo, 2013a).

Further to that point, historians of Psychology have applied the idea of indigeneity to American Psychology itself because European characteristics of the discipline were indigenized by the Americans at the turn of the century (Danziger, 2006a; Pickren, 2009). The idea is that Psychology that advertises itself as *the* universal Psychology has already been indigenized to a culture from the very beginning. As Roe (2014) puts it, regarding the dominant psychological practices, "we have always been indigenous" (p. 98).

Besides these psychologists who refer to specific psychological practices (Canadian, German etc.) in the Western countries and a particular historical period, there are psychologists who roughly identify the general characteristics of mainstream—which they roughly call Euro-American—Psychology with its indigeneity. For example, Marsella (2013), one of the supporters of the indigenization movement, lists ten basic assumptions of Western Psychology. According to him, Western Psychology takes its indigenous character by embracing these assumptions: *Individuality, Reductionism, Experiment-based empiricism, Scientism, Quantification/*

Measurement, Materialism, Male dominance, Objectivity, Nomothetic Laws, and Rationality.

These assumptions listed by Marsella are some of the typical (or stereotypical) characteristics of Western Psychology also emphasized by other Western psychologists no matter whether they use or do not use the label *indigenous Psychology* (e.g., Blume, 2020). In addition, non-Western psychologists frequently point to these similar characteristics/problems of Western Psychology (e.g., Kim, et al., 1999). It can be said that attempts to build indigenous Psychologies are partially based on the idea of the indigeneity of the dominant Western psychological practice. Of course, the whole legitimacy of indigenous Psychologies does not depend on their contrast to mainstream Psychology, but this is an important point of departure for most indigenous psychologists. Saying that *any Psychology is indigenous to a place, culture, and history* might be a productive initial step/assumption, but it is not that easy to take a second step and answer the question of what makes a particular Psychology particular? In a sense, each culture decides what it is or what is not, in the mirror of another culture.

As Pratt says with a witty remark in one of her conference talks: "nobody is indigenous till somebody else shows up" (Pratt, 2014, 35:49). By "somebody else" here Pratt specifically refers to the uninvited guests coming from imperial places to indigenous cultures. But this idea is valid in our context too since she simply points to the relational nature of this term. Every concept is relational by nature, but here I refer to a specific juxtaposition of West and non-West in constructing the literature of indigenous Psychology. So, it could be said that this concept is *essentially* relational. On the one hand, most of the time non-Western psychologists construct what is *indigenous* in their Psychology in relation to what is *not indigenous*, what is *imported* or *transplanted*. On the other hand, some Western psychologists contribute to this literature by emphasizing that what is thought to be universal is actually indigenous to a particular culture.

For this reason, although Allwood`s distinction between the first meaning (non-Western self-declared indigenous Psychologies) and the third meaning (all modern Psychologies, including Western mainstream Psychology) of indigenous Psychology is meaningful to narrow one`s research down and accordingly the term indigenous psychology predominantly refers to non-Western perspectives in this dissertation, one needs to bear in mind that this term in fact points to *a shared conceptual space* constructed by both Western and non-Western psychologists. Another reason for putting indigenous Psychology on a shared conceptual ground is that although there is considerable international literature on indigenizing Psychology, mainstream Psychology is still used in many countries. Therefore, discourses regarding indigenous Psychology are taking place in interaction with this mainstream Psychology.

My Definition of Indigenous Psychology

After presenting a slice of the diversity of definitions and denotations of the term indigenous Psychology, I could offer my own definition. I define indigenous Psychology generically as *an academic project to re-describe the mission of Psychology as a discipline and the role of psychologists from within*. One may ask, from within what? I would tentatively say *from within a culture*. I say this tentatively because the problem of *a culture* is one of the main points of dispute in this context, details of which I will provide in Chapter 4. *Folk psychology* in the sense of traditional ideas/values/perspectives conserved in the oral and written sources of the culture and *everyday psychology* in the sense of living psychological schemas/practices can be components of this academic transformation. The difference between *folk* and *everyday* psychologies can be briefly described. On the one hand, *folk psychology*, as Bruner (1990) puts it, "summarizes not simply how things are but (often implicitly) how they should be. When things `are as they should be`, the narratives of folk psychology are unnecessary" (pp. 39-40).

However, things are almost never as they should be. For this reason, *everyday psychology*, on the other hand, always refers to the state of the human being caught between ideals (how things should be) and realities (how things are). This *in-between-ness* is related to human`s *not-yet* nature. Anthropologist Ingold (2015)—by referring to Spanish philosopher J. Ortega y Gasset`s idea that humans are not-yet beings—points out that "to human is a verb" (p. 115), meaning that humans have many seeds to be cultivated provided by the culture in which they reside, and they always aspire *to become* in relation to these cultural ideals. In this sense, one can indigenize or decolonize everyday psychology by ideals preserved in folk psychological understandings.

A Further Note on the Distinction between Indigenous and Indigenized

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, another important point of debate is about the difference between *indigenous* and *indigenized*. Different researchers have concerns about both concepts. For Brock (2014), for example, while the concept of *indigenous* can be used for Western Psychologies that have developed in harmony with their culture, the same concept cannot be used for non-Western societies that are trying to adapt a foreign cultural practice. According to Brock, instead of *indigenous*, *indigenized* is more suitable for those adapted practices. With a different concern, Allwood and Berry (2006) warn against using *indigenized* since it can be faultily understood to suggest the process is complete. Even though this distinction is important to refer to different genealogies of Psychology in various cultures, I do not think that it is of vital importance. Whether *indigenous* or *indigenized*, this term, when used for non-Western psychologies, does not mean something completed, but rather a project that is still marginal in the country of the contributors. In this case, *indigenizing* can be a better label to refer to the psychologists` continuing efforts and the incompleteness of this movement.

At this point, after clarifying the concepts of *indigenized* and *indigenous* and the scope of

this work, I need to point to another related term, *indigenization*, which is frequently used interchangeably with the concepts above.

Two Main Periods of Indigenization

A subtle difference might be noted between *indigenization* and *indigenous Psychology*. As Sinha (1997) points out, while indigenization refers to the process, indigenous Psychology refers to the outcome of this process. However, these two are used interchangeably. I think what is more important is that there are two main periods (earlier and more recent) of indigenization in the literature. In terms of increasing the conceptual clarity of the term, this difference is also spelled out. The earlier version of indigenization refers to the period when the center of Psychology moved from Europe to the US at the turn of the 20th century. According to the historian of Psychology, Danziger (2006a), Psychology first appeared in different centres in Europe; Leipzig, London, Paris are among these important centres. Each centre had a different approach to psychology: searching for underlying physiological processes of psychology with an experimental approach in Leipzig, searching for individual differences with an evolutionary biological approach in London, and searching for treatments with a clinical approach in Paris; Danziger points out that there was an intellectual exchange of information between these different approaches at that time in Europe. However, Danziger (2006a) notes that although this kind of ordinary exchange between different centres could also be labelled as *indigenization* in terms of borrowing knowledge and adapting it to local conditions, indigenization "on a massive scale" occurred during the process of transferring psychological knowledge from Europe to the US (p. 216).

Danziger (2006a) summarizes this *indigenization on a massive scale* period as follows: Before indigenization, the way of doing Psychology in the US was fundamentally different

compared to European centres, especially compared to Wundt's laboratory in Leipzig. A lot of American students working with Wundt in Leipzig were impressed by Wundt's understanding of scientific Psychology. But when these students returned to America, few maintained Wundt's principles. Psychology acquired a different outlook in America. The unit of analysis that psychologists worked on underwent a drastic change with this transformation of Psychology in the United States. While, in Germany, psychologists were working on the individual conscious mind and their methods were predominantly based on self-report of experts or laypeople, in America, Psychology got out of the laboratory and its principles started being applied in real-world domains. In particular, a more functional and behavioral perspective was developed. Self-reports were replaced by reports from experts on ordinary people. It can be said that Psychology was indigenized according to the socio-cultural context in America and the perspectives and needs of the people there. In other words, Psychology was built with characteristics indigenous to American culture.

In accordance with the dominant pragmatic culture in the United States, Psychology was indigenized by focusing on specific and measurable overt behavior instead of looking at the inner consciousness of people, which is more subjective and therefore more ambiguous. One can say that there was a special blend in the American version of the discipline. Along with German, French, and English influences, Pickren (2009) refers to other important sources of this blend as follows: “American psychology also grew from a synthesis of moral philosophy, New Thought, phrenology, boot-strap ideology, and other influences, including religion. All this was melded together under the rubric of science” (p. 89). Even though eclectic academic approaches always existed at that time (Richards, 2009), there were some prevailing characteristics attributed to the Americanness or Americanization of Psychology. Along with the practicality of the discipline,

for example, behaviorism became a dominant perspective among American psychologists.

There are some contextual factors behind this acceptance of behaviorism in the US. As of the end of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s, urbanization increased with the rising industrialization in the United States. New societal problems emerged in the newly established cities. The question was how to manage populations who migrated from the rural areas of the states and migrated from different parts of the world; how to classify and sort them in the factories and schools so that they could reach high societal efficacy. Given these fundamental societal changes and the deep-seated pragmatic philosophy of American culture, it can be said that a specific form of Psychology, which is behaviorist, gained more acceptance (see Jansz & van Drunen, 2004).

In a similar vein, historian of Psychology Christopher D. Green (2018), explains that at the time of this dramatic structural change how Watson's behaviorism fitted Frederick Taylor's idea of scientific management, which was put forward to increase productivity in factories. As Green points out there are some interesting similarities between Watson`s behaviorism and Taylor`s scientific management. For example, both talk about the practice of brick-laying and think about how to make this practice more efficient and productive. It can be said that the behaviorism that Watson pioneered was a particular perspective that fit the social context of America at that time. Metaphorically speaking, if we see the whole society as a factory, it becomes very important how people who come from very different backgrounds and meet on the same social ground will behave. Even though whether behaviorism was/is exclusively American or not is questionable (Dobroczyński & Gruszka, 2019), one can still claim that there was, in accordance with specific contextual features, a special acceptance of behaviorism in the US.

To better understand this specificity, one can look at other cultures where behaviorism

had not received as much attention. For example, Watson's behaviorism was not widely accepted in France in the beginning (Amouroux & Zaslawski, 2020). Instead, J. P. Sartre's or M. Merleau-Ponty's existential or phenomenological understanding of Psychology dominated the discipline in France. One of the reasons for this lack of acceptance, according to Amouroux and Zaslawski (2020), can be found by looking at the socio-political context of France. Faced with the Nazi occupation, the French were divided into two groups—collaborators and the resisters of the occupation. Academics who supported the idea of resistance embraced existentialism and phenomenology since these perspectives emphasize the idea of *freedom and free will*. However, since the *deterministic* sides of human life were emphasized by behaviorists, this approach was not widely accepted by French intellectuals and behaviorism was not indigenized in France for a long time. Behavioral therapy, for example, was not widely accepted in French culture until the 1980s and 1990s (Amouroux, 2017).

Amouroux and Zaslawski (2020) point out that they refer to dominant psychological perspectives seen in different cultures. However, these different perspectives should not be considered in categorical boxes that exclude each other. For example, when Sartre defines freedom, he defines it with behaviourist ingredients (as cited in Amouroux & Zaslawski, 2020, p. 92). Even though Sartre focuses on freedom and free will, he defines human beings as "totally conditioned social beings"[19]. So, there is no absolute freedom nor absolute determinism. Psychologists or philosophers usually try to understand these in a relational way. Nor is it

[19] Amouroux and Zaslawski point to psychologist Simon Kemp`s analysis of Sartre here. Kemp`s (2014) summary along with Sartre`s original definition in French is as follows:

> In 1969, Sartre defined freedom as "ce petit mouvement qui fait d'un être social totalement conditionné une personne qui ne restitue pas la totalité de ce qu'elle a reçu de son conditionnement" ("Sartre par Sartre," 101-2), adopting behaviorist terminology and demonstrating a striking rapprochement with the behaviorist line. (p. 346)

implied that behaviorism is exclusively an American phenomenon. For example, Dobroczyński and Gruszka (2019) give some examples from early Polish Psychology, criticizing Danziger's interpretation that behaviorism is not taken so seriously anywhere but in America. They point out that before the American pioneer of behaviorism John B. Watson (1878-1958), Polish psychologist Władysław Heinrich (1869-1957) expressed his behaviorist ideas without using the term behaviourism. However, they mention that, because of the isolation of Polish Psychology under the Soviet influence at the time, these behaviorist ideas did not encounter and blend with American behaviorism. Dobroczyński and Gruszka (2019) note that two behaviourisms emerged in different contexts (in Poland and in the US) have some similarities and differences. For example, instead of the more practical and applied behaviorism in America, there was a more methodological and theoretical behavioral Psychology in Poland. But it was common for that those mental phenomena should not be taken into account when considering causality. Dobroczyński and Gruszka's (2019) analysis of behaviorisms in different cultural contexts reminds us that when comparing two cultures in the most general sense, differences and similarities should be considered together—these two operations requiring each other by their nature. Also, based on their analysis, one can say that it is difficult to claim that a point of view is completely specific to one culture and does not exist in another culture (see also Miranda et al., 2020).

Recent Indigenization after World War II

So far, I have described the earlier period of indigenization between the discipline of Psychology`s first appearance in Europe and its spread to America leading up to the Second World War. However, it can be said that indigenization, under this label, or under the name of indigenous Psychology, most often refers to the more recent period especially after the Second

World War in the movement that originated in non-western countries as a reaction to the hegemony of American Psychology. As I pointed out in referring to Danziger (2006a) above, historically speaking, Psychology did not have a single source or single point of origin, but it emerged in different ways in different centers in Europe. But after the Second World War, this polycentric nature of the discipline was replaced by American dominance over the world. America's increasing political and economic power and in parallel to this its scientific power made it the strongest voice and exporter in the field of Psychology. Just as American students went to Leipzig to work with Wundt in the late 19th century, students from all over the world started to come to America to study higher education after World War 2. These students, who studied the scientific framework of American Psychology, went back to their home countries, and started to express that there was a discrepancy between what they scientifically learned in the States and what they experienced and observed in their own cultures, and this discrepancy led non-Westerners to search for ways of indigenizing their academic practice. I will mention a brief historical background of this more recent period of indigenization in the following chapters, but the main reason I am now referring to the distinction between two periods of indigenization is to expose the different natures of these two periods.

Psychologists explicitly or implicitly describe these two main periods of indigenization as *spontaneous* and *deliberate* processes[20] (e.g., Brock, 2014, Danziger, 2006a). Fancher and Rutherford (2016) describe indigenization as follows: “the process whereby local (or national) contexts affect the development of psychology, including how ideas from elsewhere are imported and changed in response to local conditions” (p. 17). So, while this process occurred spontaneously in the case of Americanization, the more recent one (for non-Western countries) is

[20] Sometimes they refer to these two periods as unconscious and self-conscious processes (e.g., Diaz-Loving, 1999).

occurring in a more deliberate manner. The main critique is non-Western psychologists uncritically (almost unconsciously) imported Western academic components and now the time came to consciously transform this foreign discipline. So, while Americanization of the discipline of Psychology fits this spontaneous transformation, there is incompatibility in most non-Western contexts and their encounter with the phenomenon of Psychology.

In sum, the distinction between *spontaneous* indigenization and *deliberate* indigenization is important to show that the term indigenization refers to different adaptations of Psychology in different times and places. While the early period of indigenization can be seen as spontaneous and successful, the success of the recent one is debatable. However, at the same time, this distinction may be misleading. Beyond the problematic implication of the current compatibility of Psychology to its own Western society as mentioned above, there is another problematic implication that non-Western academic psychologies have not been *spontaneously* indigenized; therefore, they are totally foreign and irrelevant. In order not to give an impression of fighting a straw man, I should note in advance that to the best of my knowledge no indigenous psychologist explicitly says that Western-based academic Psychology is totally irrelevant to their native culture. However, I suggest that the problem is that they overemphasize the *importedness* of Psychology so much as to create a great expectancy for their future works or the potential of indigenization in general. As if Psychology is an imported product and transplantable organ or something in a *literal* sense, indigenous psychologists start with more purist analyses by saying that Psychology is an imported discipline meaning that it is exclusively Western. For instance, Danziger (2006b) says that "modern psychology is an article of export from one part of the world to another" (p. 271). "Just as McDonald [*sic*] and Pizza Hut have been exported to the rest of the world, so has Western Psychology", say Moghaddam and Lee (2006, p. 169). Considering that

the tests and other tangible equipment used in Psychology are imported from abroad, Psychology is indeed imported in the literal sense of the word, of Danziger also gives an example in testing materials while explaining exporting Psychology gives as an example. But the question is how can we understand the intangible articles of export, for example, worldviews, assumptions or ideas in general? To what extent is the import/export metaphor still useful?

I argue that while psychologists refer to the problem of the reification of culture, there is no reference to the problem of reification of Psychology. Even though they generally end their analyses with a more integrationist and moderate attitude to dream of the peaceful co-existence of their indigenous and imported Western perspectives—which is a problematic and colonialist approach for some—they start with a strong emphasis on the foreignness of Psychology. However, I believe indigenization is generically a natural process. Natural does not refer to a wild plant growing itself autochthonously; rather, it means that people spontaneously—by their natures, their agencies, and individualities, adapt a foreign practice/product to their own conditions. So, this adaptation may have occurred more spontaneously in the case of Americanization of Psychology, and also the degree of adaptation varies from context to context. Nevertheless, the first importers of Psychology in non-Western contexts were probably not just couriers of Psychology who did not know anything about the box they carried, but at least they must have translated psychological principles in their minds. This is a kind of—albeit in a limited sense—indigenization as well.

An Additional Critical Distinction: Indigenization or Institutionalization of Psychology?

There is another issue that is often discussed in parallel with the idea of indigenization of Psychology: the institutionalization of a discipline. The question is, is indigenization a culture's adaptation of a field of knowledge to its local conditions or the institutionalization of an

independent discipline in a culture? Or both? To reiterate, Fancher and Rutherford (2016) define indigenization as follows: “the process whereby local (or national) contexts affect the development of psychology, including how ideas from elsewhere are imported and changed in response to local conditions” (p. 17). Based on this definition, it seems that indigenization first and foremost is related to the adaptation of a discipline in the sense of the transformation of content and characteristics of it. However, this should not be considered totally independent from the institutional development and growth of Psychology. Canadian psychologist John G. Adair merits special attention regarding this issue. Adair (1999, 2004, 2006) repeatedly emphasizes that the institutionalization of a discipline and making research culturally appropriate should be considered together as processes that feed each other. He regards these two processes as the main subgoals of creating an indigenous discipline. He cites Canadian Psychology as an academic discipline that has achieved both these criteria and become, in his own words, “an indigenous, autochthonous, mature, and independent” discipline (p. 414). Adair indicates that in the beginning, the discipline of Psychology had a limited place in Canadian society. Canadian psychologists were funded by US granting agencies and used the APA Ethics Code as well as the APA clinical programme accreditations. From the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, the Canadian government invested significantly in higher education and opened new universities and new Psychology departments. However, most faculty members were US-trained psychologists, so they did not have an interest in Canadian issues. In that period of rising investment in higher education, despite increasing economic resources for academia, there was no indigenization attempt. For example, Berry (1974) was one of the first psychologists who made a call for Canadianisation of Psychology. According to Adair, it took nearly 20 years for gradual indigenization to take place. There were some policies implemented that facilitated this process.

One of those policies is called “Canadian first” by which importing academics was terminated and in turn, the resulting demand for academics was met with new Canadian PhDs who had been trained in recently established graduate programs. Over the years, new journals, textbooks, a code of ethics, and CPA accreditation were created by these faculty members, and they started to tackle some national issues. Some of these issues were, as listed by Adair (1999), “multiculturalism, immigration, acculturation, bilingualism, stereotypes, prejudice” (p. 414). Berry (1993) also pointed to similar issues under the title of indigenization of Psychology in Canada.

Adair, in my view, is right to consider the mutually reinforcing processes of *indigenization* and *institutionalization* together. Referring to structural problems while talking about indigenization is a necessity for most psychologists since there would not be indigenization at all if there were no discipline. In a similar vein, in countries where there is a debate about the indigenization of Psychology, there are generally also structural problems related to the development of Psychology, so these two problems are often presented together. Researchers from non-Western countries refer to some systemic and chronic problems that hinder the flourishing of the discipline of Psychology and therefore impede its indigenization (e.g., Sanchez, 1999). Some of these are as follows: the nationwide lack of scientific development or intellectual independence, limited financial budget allocated for Psychology departments, heavy teaching loads of academics etc..

Lawson et al. (2007) discuss a history of Psychology in the context of globalization and indigenization. Similarly, they point to some systematic deterrents to the development of Psychology in the developing world. According to them, “a lack of economic resources, impoverished living conditions, political instability, and a minimum of perceived value” are

typical “systematic deterrents” to the development of Psychology (Lawson et al., 2007, p. 21). In a special issue on indigenous Psychology edited by Allwood and Berry (2006), 15 psychologists from various parts of the world gave information about the current state of Psychology and most of these psychologists pointed to several structural problems with the development of a discipline in their countries.

However, these two processes are conflated especially when psychologists refer to the stage-based development of Psychology in their countries. For example, Adair examines the development of indigenous Psychology by dividing it into different stages. His observation is purportedly not only based on Canadian Psychology but can also be valid for the development of Psychology in several other countries. These stages are *importation*, *implantation*, *indigenization*, *autochthonization*, and *internalization* (Adair, 2006). In a similar manner, there are other psychologists who identify some sequential stages for the development of Psychology (e.g., Azuma, 1984; Sinha, 1986; Enriquez, 2010; Church & Katigbak, 2000).

To exemplify this stage-based understanding, I will briefly explain Basalla`s model here as used by Allwood (2018). In this model, Basalla describes the dissemination of Western science to non-Western societies as a process that occurs in three stages. Even though Adair`s stage-based model is more detailed, it is similar to Basalla`s model. In the first stage, non-Western societies can only be seen as a *resource* for Western science. In this stage, Western scientists reach non-Western samples with the help of their non-Western colleagues or assistants[21]. In Basalla`s model, the second stage is the *colonial stage*. Non-Western scientists

[21] This first stage is reminiscent of the general criticism of indigenous psychologists against cross-cultural Psychology. Indigenous psychologists complain about the idea of seeing non-Western cultures as only a source of data in cross-cultural Psychology (e.g., Sinha, 2002). They point out that a non-Western culture is used as a *target* to confirm or disconfirm their findings, but it should rather be a *source* by itself as a world of meaningful data and theories in its own right.

form their discipline but still imitate some Western scientific paradigms in classifying knowledge, forming their education curriculum, and standardizing the research procedure. The third and final stage is the *independent scientific tradition* stage. Non-Western researchers finally form an independent research tradition without showing any foreign-source dependency.

Dividing the development of Psychology into stages in this sense may be important to see both its structural development and its qualitative transformation. However, there are some confusing points and problematic implications in these models. First, it is not simple to distinguish the institutionalization of a discipline from the indigenization of it in these models. For example, Jackson (2005) tries to provide a theoretical justification for stage models by referring to Kaufmann`s (1995) *complexity theory*. The details of Kaufmann`s theory and Jackson`s adaptation of this theory are not directly relevant to my point here. Rather, related to the point at stake here is that it seems that Jackson predominantly refers to the institutional growth of Psychology. Even though he also talks about different knowledge landscapes of each local community, which could be seen as indigenization, he does not give further information about these. Kim and Park (2005) point out that Jackson (2005) in fact talks about the institutionalization of the discipline in general while seemingly referring to the complexity of indigenization. However, Kim and Park (2005) go on to say, there is nothing here about the content of this institutionalization. So, what indigenization includes—in terms of theories, methods, and concepts—beyond structural development is missing Kim and Park (2005).

I concur with these scholars but also, I contend that this is not the problem of Jackson alone. Rather, this is a general problem in talking about the stage-based development of Psychology. One can use stage-based models to describe the general institutional development of a discipline. However, unlike Adair and others who use these stage-based models, I think that

these models are not useful and are indeed confusing for describing the indigenization process in general. As mentioned above, indigenization is primarily part of content transformation or characteristics[22], in a sense, ingredients of a discipline. So, it is not about the institutional infrastructure of the discipline of Psychology. However, in stage-based models, indigenization can be confusingly seen as one of the specific stages of the development of a separate indigenous discipline (e.g., Adair`s [1999] and Hwang`s [2019a] models).

Along with the problem of distinguishing indigenization from institutionalization, second, there is also a problem of *teleology*. Stages represent turning points from the infancy of the discipline to the maturation of it. While the infantile stage refers to the introduction of a new science to a society and an uncritical importation of this scientific perspective by the society, the mature stage refers to a healthy integration of different scientific traditions and a self-confident independence of the local-based integration in this society. However, it is not clear what indigenous psychologists mean by independence. For example, Hwang (2019a) says that once the process of indigenization is completed and the social sciences become independent and indigenous, indigenization is no longer needed. He adds that "indigenous psychology has *instrumental* value only, not *terminal* value" (p.57) (emphasis original). According to him, once this instrumental stage is transcended, the term indigenous ultimately becomes obsolete. Hwang thinks that indigenization as a process can be finalized and completed since he regards indigenization as a temporary colonial stage of an indigenous Psychology. However, there is no clear picture with regards to what will happen when this process is completed. Does this mean

[22] I should note that some researchers include structural developments as part of the indigenization process. For example, Kumar (1979) mentions three types of indigenization: structural, substantive, and theoretical. By structural indigenization, he refers to a more fundamental transformation in the sense of creating a separate institution that specifically focuses on producing relevant Psychology. In this case, however, Kumar does not refer to general institutional development of the discipline, but rather specifically the institution of indigenous Psychology.

that Western academic components will no longer be used after the indigenization process is complete (if one is completely distinguished from the other)? One can also ask, what would a Psychology look like after the process of indigenization is complete?

Third, a stage model also implies that all psychologists in a country follow these stages. However, on the contrary, indigenous Psychology is embraced by a limited number of local psychologists in each local context. Most psychologists may not have an interest in the indigenization of their disciplinary practice.

Allwood (2018) points out that it is difficult to appraise the current statuses of indigenous Psychologies because there is not much information about that. In addition, indigenous Psychology does not appear anywhere yet to have the status of an independent discipline practice at a separate institution, although some researchers have a project to actualize this (K. K. Hwang, personal communication, February 19, 2021). More recently, indigenous Psychology can be seen as a separate course or a course project (e.g., Nwoye, 2018; Oppong, 2022). But more generally, it is often seen as a niche subject under some specific publications by a group of psychologists**.** Although the number of indigeneity-oriented psychologists has increased over the years and they have gathered under The *Division 32 Task Force on Indigenous Psychology*, it can be said that indigenous psychological perspectives have marginal status in relation to mainstream psychological perspectives in psychologists` own societies. For this reason, the indigenization stages in those stage-based models do not represent the whole country nor all psychologists in a country.

My suggestion is that, again, one can effectively talk about different stages only while referring to the institutional development of Psychology in a country. Also, although different cultures have similarities—for example, when dividing the development of Psychology in South

Africa into phases, Matoane (2012) uses Japanese psychologist Azuma's (1984) categorization—from a historical point of view, each set of stages can be used to characterize the development of Psychology in one country rather than using them as generic developmental processes. In addition, it would be less confusing if different labels were chosen for these stages instead of indigenization (for example, diversification or pluralization).

CHAPTER 3

Historical-Theoretical Backgrounds and Problems of IP

Brock et al. (2012) point out that historical accounts of the indigenization movement mostly consist of fragmentary narratives of psychologists who briefly write about the development of Psychology in their own countries. According to Bhatia (2019), the reason behind the lack of detailed historiography of this movement is the prejudice that indigenous Psychologies are local, and primitive compared to Western *scientific* Psychology. Concurring with these scholars, Pickren and Taşçı (2021) call on indigenous psychologists to write the histories of their indigenous perspectives from a critical point of view and provide some initial resources to start with.

Beyond this prejudice in Psychology, a difficulty arises when an indigenous psychologist tries to conceptually relate his/her recent Western-based academic practice to their own traditional psychological ideas possibly dating back to ancient times. According to some eminent historians of Psychology (e.g., Danziger, 2013), since modern Psychology as it is understood today emerged in the 19th century, it is a mistake to categorize traditional psychological ideas under the title of modern Psychology. In order to avoid this conflation, researchers distinguish a body of knowledge comprising ancient psychological ideas from Psychology in its modern disciplinary form (e.g., Bhawuk, 2010). Some psychologists try to overcome this dual identity of Psychology by showing conceptual similarities between ancient and modern forms of Psychology with a historiographical link (e.g., Oppong, 2017). However, in those cases, there is a danger of falling into a universalizing discourse as it ignores historicity and culturality of knowledge about human psyche. For example, Oppong (2017) regards African ancient ideas about human psychology as precursors of modern Psychology. While making this connection,

his main inclusion criterion “is the focus on the timeless subject matter of human nature, human mind, human soul or human behaviour, regardless of the varying meanings assigned to them at various times in history” (p. 10). This understanding of “the timeless subject matter” of the discipline of Psychology is conceptually risky for some historians of Psychology, as it ignores the historicity and particularity of human knowledge (e.g., Danziger, 2013; Richards, 2009).

Of course, the brief historical background in the current work is not intended to resolve such problems. Rather, it aims to conceptualize/understand how indigenous Psychology fits into the broader relationship between the discipline of Psychology and the concept of culture in general.

I have stated in the introductory chapter that the literature on indigenous Psychology occupies a conceptual space jointly shaped by non-Western and Western psychologists. Although this conceptual space in which indigenous Psychology is situated sometimes diverges from or finds its own niche within the wider discipline, it often intersects with cross-cultural Psychology and cultural psychology under the banner of the cultural turn of Psychology (e.g., Seeley, 2003). At this intersection, there is a recurring two-layered problem that culture-oriented psychologists frequently point to. I will explain this two-layered problem in detail in the following part on culture, but it can be briefly stated as follows: when psychologists talk about the problematic relationship between Psychology and culture in general, simultaneously they refer to two distinct but related problems: first, Psychology is culture-blind since the individual is usually examined in supposedly culture-free environments; second, Psychology is culture-bound since people who do Psychology and the academic tools they use are predominantly Western. This two-fold problem prompts psychologists both to understand the cultural nature of human-beings in general and to try to reveal the (psychological or cultural) diversity of humankind

across the world (Jahoda & Krewer, 1997). It can also be said that whereas the first meaning of culture refers to *the ontological* realm, the latter refers to *the anthropological* realm (see Fornäs, 2017). Indigenous psychologists also frequently emphasize this two-layered problem (e.g., Rodriguez et al., 1999; Sinha, 2002), saying, for example, that while psychological phenomena are usually discovered in isolated laboratories and predominantly understood as *culture-free* universals, the tools[23] (Berry et al., 1992) that we use when doing Psychology are ethnocentric (Teo & Febbraro, 2003). Because of their frequent reference to this dual problematic, indigenous Psychologies can be placed in the history of Psychology's relationship with culture in general.

Plan of the Chapter

The story of Psychology`s relationship to *culture* is not continuous or linear. Moreover, this story has many threads—distinguished by pioneering figures, geographical locations, methodologies and philosophies of science. Cross-cultural Psychology (CCP), cultural Psychology (CP) and indigenous Psychology (IP)[24] can be counted among the most prominent of these research areas, although Psychology's relationship with *culture* is not limited to them. To the best of my knowledge, to date, no study has analyzed and systematically compared all these different culture-focused research areas. The extent to which this is possible is also a matter of debate because it does not seem possible to sharply distinguish one from the other, whether in terms of content or methodology. In addition, since most of these fields are regarded as inclusive and interdisciplinary fields by the researchers who defend them (e.g., Shweder, 1991), it may be

[23] Berry et al. (1992) point to four main components that make Western Psychology ethnocentric: stimuli in tests, methods and tools, theoretical concepts, and topics.
[24] Even though I keep using lower-case for adjectives preceding the word Psychology denoting an academic discipline, I will capitalize all of them in parentheses to highlight the differences among culture-oriented approaches.

a distortion in the view of these researchers to conceptualize these approaches as sub-fields of Psychology.

Despite this problem of categorisation, one can tentatively distinguish one culture-based approach from another by using the labels that psychologists use to name their own academic practice. In this section, some examples from cross-cultural Psychology arising in the 1960s and from cultural Psychology arising in the 1990s will provide historical signposts of the relation between *culture* and Psychology, and the discourse of indigenous Psychology will be located in relation to these signposts. The section also considers how this discourse of indigenous Psychology has arrived in its current form by changing and diversifying since the 1990s, and to what extent indigenous Psychology differs from cross-cultural/cultural Psychologies to what extent indigenous Psychology contains *postcolonial* or *decolonial* perspectives.

Before embarking on this agenda, we can first start from a place widely used as a historical beginning by indigenous psychologists, Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and his *Völkerpsychologie*. The question is, do indigenous psychologists use Wundt as a founding myth?

Is Wundt's Völkerpsychologie the Foundation Myth of IP?

As noted above, the story of Psychology`s relationship to *culture* is not continuous or linear. Although the founding figures took *the cultural* into account when the discipline of Psychology was being established in the late 1800s, as Jahoda (2012a) points out, this orientation towards *the cultural* was quickly suspended until the 1960s. This neglect of culture in Psychology was mentioned by several works at different times (see Cahan & White, 1992; Gergen et al., 1996; Misra & Gergen, 1993; Segall et al., 1998; Valsiner, 2009). As among those who were interested in culture in the early period of Psychology, Jahoda (2012a) cites W. H. R. Rivers (1864-1922), F. C. Bartlett (1886-1969), F. H. Allport (1890-1979), and most notably, as

an antecedent to these names, W. M. Wundt (1832-1920). However, the turn to culture had not transformed into an institutional-wide and collaborative movement at that time and remained in the margins of Psychology. The rise of the natural-scientific schools of Psychology and the development of behaviourism[25] are generally important causes behind the discipline`s eclipse of *culture*.

Another important reason for Psychology`s neglect of culture is that there was an interdisciplinary division of labour between anthropology and Psychology. This division of labour was not strictly delineated in the late 1800s, but later became obvious as both disciplines became institutionalized. While psychologists focused on the abstract individual, anthropologists focused on both the cultural nature of human-beings and cultures in general. In this sense, when writing the history of Psychology's relationship with the concept of culture, psychologists usually start with pioneering anthropologists such as Edward B. Taylor (1832-1917) and Franz U. Boas (1858-1942) and loosely attach themselves to this anthropological lineage (e.g., Jahoda, 2012a; Kashima & Gelfand, 2012).

The most important psychologist in these historical accounts is Wundt. For those who talk about the history of Psychology, Wundt's name is among the first to be cited since he secured the scientific identity of Psychology with his establishment of a laboratory in 1879 in Leipzig. Nearly a century later, Blumenthal (1975) claimed that Wundt`s scientific legacy was misrepresented over the years by psychologists who overemphasized his experimental Psychology—in E. G. Boring`s historiography in particular. In 1979, on the 100th anniversary of

[25] Jahoda (2012a) does not find this explanation involving behaviourism satisfying, since some behaviourists were concerned with culture, for example F. Allport (for Skinner`s understanding of culture see also Muchon de Melo & de Rose, 2013). However, as I mentioned in the introduction of this work, eclectic academic approaches always existed during early periods of Psychology (see Richards, 2009). Nevertheless, behaviorism as a prevailing perspective of the time could be seen as one of the reasons behind the demotivation towards having *culture* as a subject matter.

the laboratory, along with Blumenthal (1979), critical historian of Psychology Danziger (1979) highlighted that whereas the experimental side Wundt's Psychology was overstated by mainstream psychologists, the equally important cultural-scientific side of his Psychology was being neglected. According to this new historiography, Wundt distinguishes higher mental processes from lower or simpler mental processes and points out that the study of higher processes requires a methodology other than experimentation. This alternative methodological perspective is called "Völkerpsychologie".

Based on this newer historiography, Wundt's Völkerpsychologie is particularly emphasized as a neglected *second* Psychology by culture-oriented psychologists (e.g., Cahan & White, 1992; Kim, 2001). In addition to Völkerpsychologie, *culture and personality* studies[26], an interdisciplinary field of inquiry to which some anthropologists, psychologists and psychiatrists contributed, is another important cultural-oriented approach that existed pre-World War Two (see LeVine, 2001). For example, Valsiner (2012) regards his culture-inclusive theory, which emerged in the 1990s along with other cultural-psychological perspectives as a continuation of both Völkerpsychologie and culture-personality studies, as the third disciplinary turn to *culture* by psychologists**.**

Similarly, indigenous psychologists understand their work as a continuation of Wundt and the cultural sciences tradition that emerged in the German context (e.g., Diaz-Loving, 1999; Hwang, 2016; Kim & Berry, 1993). In fact, the forerunners of Wundt's point of view are names such as G. Vico (1668-1744), J. G. Herder (1744-1803) and W. Dilthey (1833-1911), which represent the romantic rebellion against the Enlightenment. For example, Shweder (1991) regards his cultural Psychology as a continuation of Herder's tradition of romantic revolt against

[26] This field of inquiry has later transformed and continued under the banner of *psychological anthropology* (see LeVine, 2001).

the natural-scientific perspective of the Enlightenment and he later places indigenous Psychologies in the same lineage (see Shweder, 2020).

However, there are two problems in this genealogy. While the first problem is specifically about the status of Wundt's Völkerpsychologie within the discipline of Psychology in general, the second problem is about the duality of *nature* and *culture* on which the distinction between the natural-sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) and the cultural-sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) arises.

First, almost none of the genealogical references to Völkerpsychologie in the literature on indigenous Psychology gives a detailed account of Wundt's point of view. It is only said that Völkerpsychologie corresponds closely to today's folk Psychology or cultural Psychology or ethnopsychology, and that which cannot be studied experimentally, namely higher-level phenomena, are to be studied within the framework of this methodology. Moreover, these accounts do not elaborate on what constitutes higher or lower-level phenomena and are thus limited in their adoption of the Wundtian framework.

In this vein, Allolio-Näcke (2007) claims that Wundt's Völkerpsychologie is a founding myth for cultural psychologists. He indicates that although cultural psychologists cite Wundt to justify their point of view since he is the famous founding father of the discipline, in fact they do not make use of Wundt's ideas in a meaningful way. Moreover, he finds Wundt's ideas problematic in their adaptability to the present day (for a similar criticism of Wundt's ideas see also Greenwood, 1999). For instance, Wundt believed in a culturally shared soul within which the individual mind develops; he did not have direct contact with cultures but created speculative accounts; and he thought that cultures develop from primitive stages to advanced stages. Allolio-Näcke notes that none of these ideas are embraced by today's cultural psychologists. In addition,

Allolio-Näcke emphasizes that although Wundt refers to the importance of Völkerpsychologie, his main approach is experimental Psychology. In Allolio-Näcke`s (2014) encyclopaedic entry on Völkerpsychologie, he indicates that this approach can be counted among the genealogical roots of anthropology, not cultural Psychology[27]. According to him, the main root of cultural Psychology is the *linguistic and semiotic* turn that emerged in cultural anthropology under the leadership of Clifford Geertz in the 1980s.

Like Allolio-Näcke, I too think that Wundt's Völkerpsychologie is the origin myth for indigenous Psychologies. This kind of origin myth may be related to, as (Peng, 2012) puts it, a "paradoxical desire" (p. 18), in which researchers in colonized countries reject, but simultaneously want to be recognized by a Western approach. Without totally aligning with that interpretation, I argue that Wundt`s complementary Psychology provides a rhetorical starting point for indigenous psychologists. When we look at the citations made by indigenous psychologists to Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie*, they superficially repeat each other and do not give detailed information about the content of the work. For this reason, it is indeed difficult to say which researchers have actually read this 10-volume work published in German. At the very least, it is clear that fantasy, myth, religion, customs, which are considered among the components of Völkerpsychologie, are not popular topics among indigenous psychologists. Similarly, Poortinga (1999) criticizes Völkerpsychologie as a starting point for indigenous Psychology because Wundt`s aim was to reach the laws of myth, custom and language, which does not coincide with the primary aims of indigenous psychologists[28].

[27] In another work, Allolio-Näcke`s (2016) also criticizes the view that Völkerpsychologie is seen as the ancestor of (modern) Psychology of religion.

[28] Hatfield (2019) recently opened the contemporary historiography of Wundt's Völkerpsychologie for discussion. Although Hatfield does not completely dismiss the newer historiography of Wundt`s scientific legacy, he sees the newer portrayal of Wundt as problematic. According to him, the distinction between higher and lower phenomena is not clear in Wundt`s original works. Moreover, Wundt does not think that psychological phenomena cannot be studied experimentally but regards Völkerpsychologie as complementary to his experimental Psychology.

Beyond the problem of origin myths or founding fathers, another issue is that indigenous Psychologies see themselves as belonging specifically to the tradition of cultural science (e.g., Kim, 2001). Although some accept Psychology as both a natural science and a cultural science (e.g., Yang, 2012), the latter tradition is considered more essential than the former for indigenous Psychologies. However, as Kashima (2005) points out, this scientific distinction between *cultural sciences* and *natural sciences* is rooted in a cultural distinction. The cultural distinction, widely used in Western societies, refers to the dualism between *nature* and *culture* or between *nature* and *humans or humanity* in general (for a history of this dualism in Western thought see Tulloch, 2015). Some influential anthropologists report that this dualism does not exist in many cultures (e.g., Strathern, 1980). Even when it does exist as a distinction, it is not conceptualized in an antagonistic manner as in Western societies (see Valsiner, 2014). For example, while indigenous psychologists often identify their own cultures with the value of *harmony with nature*, these same researchers identify Western cultures with the principle of *controlling nature* (e.g., Hwang, 2019a; see also Sugg et al., 2020).

Although the nature-culture distinction and the academic division of labour based on this distinction is fundamental in the scientific world, most indigenous psychologists do not address or criticize it. Only some of them talk about their fundamental cultural values in contrast to Western dualist values, but they do not explain how these cultural values are *to be processed* in an academic discipline. For example, Kashima (2005) talks about East Asian monism in contrast to Western dualism in his work, but he does not give a detailed account as to how this cultural framework might specifically shape his disciplinary practice (for a recent example see Singh, 2022).

The use of a foreign cultural framework and division of scientific labour by psychologists who claim to build a culture-based discipline seems like a contradiction. Allwood (2018) has recently touched on this issue and criticized the use of the nature-culture distinction by indigenous psychologists, saying it is a type of scientific classification that is not as sharp as it used to be. In response to this criticism, L. Sundararajan[29] points out that natural-sciences/cultural-sciences distinction is still a valid classification in the current academic world.

There is a concern that this distinction between types of sciences emerged from a particular cultural world and therefore may not be appropriate to embrace in different cultural contexts (Kashima, 2005). While there is some justification for this type of concern, I find it appropriate to use these kinds of fundamental distinctions because even though researchers might start with provincializing these dichotomies, their criticisms usually end up being superficial.

Related to this, the literature on IP tries to resolve these dichotomies by bridging between the philosophical and cultural understandings of East Asian (ancient process philosophy) and the recent theories of natural sciences (Quantum mechanics). For example, Bedford and Yeh (2020) emphasize *process philosophy* as the main underlying mentality behind their indigenous Psychology. Instead of assuming the existence of isolated entities/essences and their interactions, they focus on *relations* per se. In their view, this idea truly corresponds to their Daoist, Confucianist, Buddhist, and Neo-Confucianist orientations. In this case, nothing stands out as being unconventional in their article for the context of indigenous Psychology. However, Bedford and Yeh (2020) make an unusual move: by citing the work of a biologist and a theologian, they promote an ecological model in contrast to a mechanistic model of science for an indigenous Psychology work. In their work, a biologist, Birch, and a theologian, Cobb, talk

[29] The email exchanges between C. Allwood and L. Sundararajan has been published at: https://www.indigenouspsych.org/Discussion/forum/Archives/PDF/Allwood%20on%20IP.pdf

about a paradigm shift in the natural sciences from a mechanistic to an ecological model (see Birch & Cobb, 1990). Bedford and Yeh (2020) follow their lead and indicate how this paradigm shift is congruent with the Chinese deep-seated process philosophy. Even though Bedford and Yeh (2020) do not directly discuss the status of Psychology in general in regard to whether or not it is a natural science, they nevertheless refer to paradigm shifts in the natural sciences and draw some parallels between natural scientific paradigms and Chinese philosophy and culture in general. But one can ask, why would they need to justify their indigenous Psychology via natural scientific paradigms? I believe that their philosophy of life reveals itself in this particular sentence: "all humans and nature are part of the same continual process of change in the universe" (p. 101). Here they refer to the prevalent monist understanding in their culture and indicate how it differs from prevalent dualist or mechanistic understanding in the West (for a similar analysis see Singh, 2022). While the former is based on event-thinking in the sense that processual understanding is prioritized, the latter is based on the substance-thinking meaning that entities and their substances come first. However, the question is, what kind of theoretically sound point of view can we derive from a combination of ancient philosophical understanding and a cutting-edge natural scientific paradigm? Another question is, how competent are a psychologist or a group of psychologists to combine these two? By citing a controversial work in the natural scientific field (for a criticism of Birch and Cobb`s work see Polkinghorne, 1982), they present a combination of indigenous psychological perspective, which is mostly understood within the framework of cultural sciences, and a natural scientific paradigm. These kinds of cursory criticisms of dichotomies or combinations that warrant specific expertise may be more problematic than using the dichotomies in the field. Moreover, as Eckensberger (2015) points out, despite their potential problems, dualisms/dichotomies are useful most of the time. I think

that unless a major criticism is brought and a comprehensive construction regarding the scientific division of labour is proposed, one can use dualisms in a constructive way. Each duality can be embraced as an initial assumption to be deconstructed later.

The Rise of *Culture* in Psychology in the 1960s

It is not easy to give a certain date for the beginning of *culture* work in Psychology, but studies that construct this conceptual area can be found roughly from the period after 1960 to the present. After the 1960s, the institutionalization of the discipline of Psychology accelerated in non-Western countries and the consequent international collaborations between psychologists and the literature on the relation between culture and Psychology have accordingly begun to expand (Lonner, 2013). Segall et al.`s (1968) study about cultural influences on visual perception may be one of the first examples in the field. In 1966, the *Journal of International Psychology* and in 1970, the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* were established (Segall et al., 1998). For Western researchers, the need for international collaboration and going abroad predominantly stems from the need to both overcome the *a-cultural* profile of mainstream Psychology and test its universality by expanding limited samples. For non-Western researchers, there was an urge to make their voices heard in the international scientific arena.

Since the 1960s a considerable amount of literature has been accumulated under the banner of cross-cultural Psychology (e.g., Triandis, 1980). Cross-cultural Psychology arose from a more disciplinary and scientific concern about whether or not equivalent psychological phenomena could be found in different cultural contexts. The search for compatibility between two cultures has been problematized with different types of *equivalence* (see van de Vijver & Leung, 2011). The main issue here is to obtain comparable analyses from different cultural contexts.

The 1960s is also the period in which indigenization emerged as a discourse in the context of Psychology. In this period, the nations that had gained their political independence also sought intellectual independence (e.g., India). The discourse of culture[30] had been adopted by the governments of these countries that had entered the process of re-establishment. During the beginning of the Cold War period, many countries tried to stay away from both capitalist and communist bloc countries in order to establish/maintain their intellectual independence. For this reason, the idea of indigenous Psychology became important as an independent national-cultural project.

The same Cold War period was an important impetus for the increase in American investment in cross-cultural research. The American government's desire to prevent other cultures from turning towards communism during this period led psychologists and anthropologists to have some financial support to do cross-cultural research. Greenfield (2000) gives examples of cultural researchers (including herself) who were funded by institutions such as the US Peace Corps and the US-based Ford Foundation to work in "third world" countries. Following this, she concludes that America's political-economic power has contributed to the rise of cross-cultural Psychology[31].

The idea of indigenization began to be expressed more in this period as a counterforce against the rapid world-wide dissemination of American Psychology (Pickren, 2009). One of the early calls for indigenization comes from Indian psychologists who wanted to create a resistance against expansionist American Psychology and search for solutions for the practical problems of

[30] This discourse emerged with the rising nation-state-ization in the late 1800s (Szeman, 2003), more specifically the *Volkgeist* in the sense of a shared mentality specific to a place, which was used to refer to the unique German identity against the expansionist French Enlightenment ideals (Wrong, 1997).

[31] In a similar vein, Asad (1973) claims that the encounter of the first-world anthropologist and Indigenous people was in fact *a colonial encounter*, and that the transformation of the once colonized countries into a research field is one of the important reasons for the rise of the discipline of anthropology.

their newly independent country (e.g., Sinha, 1965). Again, in this period, there were also Western psychologists who stated that international Psychology has Western indigenous characteristics (e.g., Campbell, 1968).

According to Sinha (1997), the idea of indigenous Psychology predates cross-cultural Psychology since it began with the independence and decolonization period right after the Second World War. However, the idea of indigenous Psychology was not quickly transformed into an international movement and the gathering of researchers under the banner of cross-cultural Psychology prepared an important ground for the calls for indigenization that would later arise. Although there were some major cross-cultural studies and calls for indigenization leading up to the 1980s, culture was still a marginal area of concern within Psychology (see Kashima & Gelfand, 2012) and social science in general managed to maintain its claim to be universal until the 1980s. With the rising East Asian power after 1970, the discourse of indigenization began to show itself more strongly in East Asian countries (Mukherji & Sengupta, 2004).

While this discourse on indigenous Psychology was rising, in parallel with the globalization of the economy in the 1980s, the need for cross-cultural management/communication also came to the fore, and comparative studies between cultures increased. It was during these years that organizational psychologist G. Hofstede (1928-2020) began to build his cultural theories based on his field studies with IBM (Hofstede, 2001). The main assumption was that each employee was a representative of his/her own home culture. In this study, four dimensions (which later became five), each consisting of a binary value set, emerged to be used in cross-cultural comparisons. The most important of these, the one that would later become the most popular in Psychology, is *individualism-collectivism*.

This post-1980 rise in cultural studies can be related to the rise in what Bhatia (2018) describes as "corporate cross-cultural psychology" (p. xxiv). Culture now had a value in the market meaning that awareness of cultural differences brings financial benefits to people who run international businesses. The primary importance of this concept does not come solely from the idea of understanding *others* and recognizing different worlds, rather, knowledge about cultures was now more of a strategy for making profits in international business. As Dirlik (1995) points out, cultural values or tradition are reinvented in accordance with the political and economic needs of the period. According to him, this change can also be followed in the titles of articles written by influential figures in the field of cross-cultural research, for example, Bond and Hofstede`s (1989) article: “The cash value of Confucian values”. In other words, culture was now perceived as the set of values or a strategy needing to be quickly learned before a business encounter (see Brislin, 2005). Culture still has this market value—so much so that some mobile applications (e.g., *Hofstede Insights*) are now being used with this understanding to assist business people in having a smooth meeting with people from other cultures.

The Rise of (Indigenous) Psychology in non-Western Countries

Looking at the development of Psychology in numerous non-Western countries, it can be seen that this discipline appeared as a discourse in the late 1800s or early 1900s in a way similar to its rise in the West, but compared to that in Western countries, its institutionalization or spread was delayed (for example, the establishment of first departments of Psychology in 1903 in Japan; in 1920 in China; in 1916 in India; in 1946 in Korea; in 1954 in the Philippines; in 1961 in Indonesia) (Turtle, 1987). In some of these countries, Psychology as a specific area of research continued to lead its academic existence as a part of the departments of philosophy or education until its institutionalization as a separate discipline.

As Turtle (1989) points out, Psychology was seen as a technological device for the modernizing elites/politicians in these societies at this period. For example, Miranda et al. (2020) point out that behavioral analysis has been adopted and indigenized in Brazil as a tool for modernizing society beyond being merely a scientific method. In some other countries as well, such as India and Taiwan, the search for the psychological factors underlying the economic development of the developing countries urged psychologists to turn to the issue of indigenization of Psychology. Topics such as investigating the psychological precursors of success or failure or inability to adapt to modern tools or the psychological consequences of poverty were covered. For this reason, the rise of indigenous Psychologies coincides with the same period, in the 1970s, during which the institutionalization of Psychology in non-western societies accelerated. In this sense, in many non-Western countries, the rise of indigenous Psychology actually proceeded with the institutionalization of Psychology in general and started after the 1970s. Around the 1970s and 1980s, students returning from abroad (mostly from the US) questioned the validity of Psychology for their own countries. In this sense, indigenous Psychology represents the version of *native anthropology* or *insider anthropology* in Psychology that is about transforming a scientific discipline learned in the West or learned from Western sources (see Kuwayama, 2003).

Some of the pioneering psychologists who spearheaded this project include D. Sinha (1922-1998) from India, R. Díaz-Guerrero (1918-2004) from Mexico, K. S. Yang (1932-2018) from China/Taiwan, and V. G. Enriquez (1942-1994) from the Philippines[32]. These pioneering researchers and their followers proposed various theories, models, concepts and methods for indigenizing Psychology. Every component of academic Psychology may be indigenized

[32] I should note that all of these pioneering psychologists and some other pioneers alike received their higher education in Psychology in Western countries.

meaning that psychologists may construct theories and methods, use concepts based on their classical cultural sources or everyday life[33].

For example, Taiwanese Psychologist Hwang constructs his theories based on Confucian relationalism; according to this metatheoretical framework, East Asian people construct their relations and more generally their cultural worlds by using Confucian principles/values (Hwang, 2019a). Another example is that Filipino researchers introduce an indigenous method called *pagtatanong-tanong* meaning "asking around" (Pe-Pua, 1989). This is similar to participatory observation in which researchers try to establish more intimate relationships with their participants. The degree of intimacy depends on the situation which may vary from a colder professional one to friendly relationship.

While it would seem IP shares the general problem of lack of theory in Psychology, researchers predominantly try to construct this approach around specific cultural concepts/values. For example, Filipino researcher Enriquez talks about some core values of his society. *Kapwa* is one of them, meaning a shared identity of Filipinos in the sense of being fellow human beings (Enriquez, 1978). One of the goals of introducing these concepts to the academic world is to correct Western misrepresentations, especially of non-Westerners. Western researchers selectively emphasize certain non-Western values, values that emphasize the indebtedness, submissiveness, or fatalism of non-Westerners, to be able to justify the colonial or neocolonial system. This kind of selective reading is being corrected with a counter selective reading. One may guess that this kind of counter-discourse could also be criticized with reverse

[33] This transformation can be so fundamental and concrete that even architecture can be indigenized. Though from a different discipline, it would be inspirational to consider Malay sociologist Syed Hussein Alatas (1928-2007), who worked on the de-westernization of social sciences in Malaysia. He designed an institute with an architecture inspired by Andalusian Islamic architecture (International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization [ISTAC]).

ethnocentrism or another essentialism (e.g., Estrada-Claudia, 2020). But this could also be seen as a kind of *strategic essentialism* as well.

What these researchers fundamentally questioned was the dichotomy, or even conflict, between the academic knowledge they have acquired and the life they live. Some of them even said that they live between two different worlds, the world of academia and their daily world (e.g., Dalal, 2002). This problem is still present today, and academia maintains its Western identity in many non-Western countries. Based on this conflict, these psychologists pointed to the incompatibility between academia and society and questioned the cultural character of the Psychology that was gradually being institutionalized in their country. For psychologists such as Enriquez (1993), the problem was more than a simple mismatch between academia and society; rather, it was the malevolent colonial character of academic Psychology. According to him, Filipino culture had been defined by researchers from colonialist cultures in a way that would help to protect the colonial structure. For example, the docility of the Filipinos was emphasized so that they could continue to be ruled. As noted above, against this selective and pragmatic reading of Filipino culture, Enriquez embarked on the task of redefining fundamental Filipino values.

Beyond the cultural mismatch of academic tools, the indigenization movement points to a more acute mentality problem of researchers in the "third world" countries. The Malaysian sociologist Alatas (1974) identifies this problem as researchers having a *captive mind*. Instead of using Western concepts and theories selectively and constructively, *a captive mind* refers to a wholesale import of Western academia including problem selection, conceptualization, analysis, generalization, description, explanation and interpretation. This intellectual dependency is seen in parallel with economic and political dependence. However, the relative decrease in political

and economic dependency may not automatically reduce intellectual dependency[34]. For this, the kind of deliberate and comprehensive effort for indigenization that we have pointed out in the introduction of this current work is required.

To justify these calls for indigenization, researchers in general referred to the irrelevance of social sciences and Psychology in particular. In this sense, the indigenization literature and the relevance literature have progressed in parallel since the 1980s (e.g., Atal, 1981; Mukherji & Sengupta, 2004).

In his book *A history of relevance in psychology*, Long (2016a) points out that debates related to the relevance of the discipline of Psychology go back to the beginning of the discipline itself. Psychology`s relevance to society has always been a matter of controversy, and especially in the times of social crisis the benefit of Psychology is more frequently discussed and questioned[35]. For example, in the 1970s, the crisis of Psychology was discussed in the context of social turmoil including student protests and the anti-war movement in the West. As for the non-Western world, it could be said that there is always a crisis. For this reason, the role of Psychology and psychologists has always been a matter of debate in the context of ongoing social change and constant instability of the developing world (e.g., Sinha, 1984; Serpell, 1984).

The colonization process in general, economic problems, and military coups in the developing world have always been listed as the factors that hinder the development of the non-Western world in general. All these factors also caused the underdevelopment or slow development of academia in non-Western countries, so much so that these problems of

[34] The idea of indigenization is not specific to the discipline of Psychology. Since the 1980s, similar ideas/discussions have been expressed in other social science areas, for example, in anthropology (e.g., Fahim, 1982); in sociology e.g., Saberwal, 1983); in social sciences in general (e.g., Mukherji & SenGupta, 2004). Similar issues under the name of indigenization or decolonization of different disciplines still continue to be discussed and remain current (e.g., Onwuzuruigbo, 2017).

[35] Long (2016a) also indicates that the meaning of relevance varies from context to context. He mentions four types of relevance in the South African context: *social*, *cultural*, *market*, and *theoretical*.

development were interchangeably discussed with the indigenization literature, as pointed out in the previous chapter.

To answer these problems of development, the need to indigenize the discipline of Psychology appeared under the banner of these relevance debates. With the rising institutionalization of Psychology in the non-Western world, the use-value of the accumulated psychological knowledge was questioned. As Jahoda (1973) indicates psychologists in the developing world could not afford to be purely theoretical and intangible. Because of the pressing social and economic problems, promoting a *merely* academic (i.e., theoretical) discipline was seen as a kind of luxury. For this reason, in the initial writings on IP, psychologists emphasized the practical aspect of Psychology (Kim & Berry, 1993)[36].

I contend that the important reason behind this overemphasis on practicality comes from the estimation that American Psychology—accepted as a true indigenous Psychology by indigenous psychologists (e.g., Yang, 2012)—has always been very practical and pragmatic since the beginning of its establishment (e.g., Jansz & van Drunen, 2004). In the early period of the discipline, in the US, psychologists found many sites of application in the context of expansive urbanization and industrialization of their society (see also Green, 2018). In this sense, this nascent discipline was highly relevant to American society.

This striking practical character of American Psychology is one of the main inspirations of indigenous psychologists in the non-Western world. In addition to this, for a discipline in its infancy, having an applied character has some other specific advantages. For example, by

[36] In the context of indigenous Psychology, against the overemphasis on practice, Sundararajan (2019) has recently reminded us that a good theory is as important as practice for indigenization.

bringing the applied character to the fore, psychologists have a chance to prove the importance of themselves and their discipline to both policymakers and the public[37].

Culture in the 1990s

Despite the rapidly growing literature of cross-cultural Psychology, its conceptualization of culture as a mere variable, that is, understanding it as either an antecedent or a mediator or moderator, has been found too reductionist by many psychologists (e.g., Boesch, 1996; Cole, 1996)[38]. By the 1990s, with the claim to take culture more seriously, various researchers who distinguished themselves from the reductionist approach in cross-cultural Psychology presented their views under the banner of cultural Psychology. With the linguistic and semiotic turn in the West, represented by Geertz (1979) in anthropology and by Bruner (1990) in Psychology, this field found its niche in Psychology and still progresses with different perspectives and journals today (e.g., Valsiner, 2019). As I pointed out above, it is difficult to talk about a monolithic research community since there are many different perspectives under this label (see Greenwood, 1999; Allolio-Näcke, 2007). Despite many differences, what these approaches have in common is the emphasis on the human capacity to make meaning as a cultural being, and as a more

---

[37] This relevance issue is still being discussed in Psychology, especially within the scope of social Psychology (see Giner-Sorolla, 2019). One of the main problems is how to determine the criteria of relevance and how to make an applied work more attractive.

[38] It has not been clearly demonstrated how the ontology of *culture* should be understood (Lonner & Adamopoulos, 1997). We have stated above that in cross-cultural Psychology *culture* is generally understood as a precursor or antecedent of behaviour and can also sometimes be understood as a moderator or mediator. However, it is difficult to determine what is a precursor and a successor in the relationship between culture and Psychology. Sometimes psychological states can be perceived as the cause of culture, while sometimes psychological states are thought to be determined by culture. In fact, sometimes *the psychological* and *the cultural* are perceived as identical with each other and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. But the point most emphasized by the researchers who criticize the concept of culture in cross-cultural Psychology is that *the cultural* and *the psychological* construct each other, yet this reciprocal structuring is not easy to grasp (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Another issue lies in whether culture should be included as an element of a causal explanation. While some attribute causal power to culture (e.g., Hofstede, 2001), others say that culture is not a reality but an abstraction and therefore causality cannot be attributed to culture, but only to people who utilize cultural resources/components (e.g., Voestermans & Verheggen, 2013).

general assumption, the constituting feature of mind and culture or the co-constitutive relation between psyche and culture.

According to this understanding, culture is a phenomenon that not only affects or influences but also *constitutes* human psychology. Also, the psychological world constituted by *culture* constitutes *culture* at the same time. Because of this feature, it is claimed that *cultural Psychology* takes culture or human culturality in general more seriously than cross-cultural Psychology. However, in this mutually constitutive relationship, researchers can place emphasis on different points. While there are researchers who center the meaning and experience of the human being and his will and intention (e.g., Valsiner, 2014), there are also researchers who say that human intentionality and will are strongly constituted by macro-cultural structures (e.g., Ratner, 2016). In other words, while the former ones emphasize the constitutive role of the psychological, the latter ones put emphasis on the constitutive role of the cultural. This dialectical relationship between *culture* and human psychology seems like a puzzle waiting to be solved or at least better understood (see Stetsenko, 2018).

Parallel to this growing literature on cultural Psychology, one can see that the literature on indigenous Psychology also started to expand, and a group of researchers produced publications. In the first works published on IP`es (e.g., Kim & Berry, 1993), the attempt to determine the position of indigenous Psychology within the discipline of Psychology is salient. Two important points can be highlighted in these works. These two points correspond to *two problems of demarcation* in social and human sciences (see O`Donohue et al., 2019). While the first demarcation problem refers to the problem of how to distinguish the scientific from the non-scientific, the second demarcation problem refers to the problem of how to distinguish the methods of cultural sciences from the methods of natural sciences. In this sense, in the

pioneering anthology and the first special issue on indigenous Psychology (Kim & Berry, 1993; Adair & Diaz-Loving, 1999), psychologists engage in two *boundary works* (see Gieryn, 1983). They emphasize that indigenous Psychology is scientific and *primarily* belongs to the *cultural sciences* tradition. One may not see a strict set of criteria in these discussions as to what is scientific and what is not or what belongs to the cultural-scientific perspective. Rather, while indigenous psychologists distinguish themselves from mainstream Psychology, they try to show that they still aim to be scientific. Thus, they rhetorically respond to the challenges of other psychologists, especially the accusations of IP`s being unscientific and parochial (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 2000).

Despite all this emphasis on being scientific, the legitimacy of indigenous Psychologies has been questioned because of the juxtaposition of the emphasis on culture implying particularity and the emphasis on the aim of producing some generalizable, if not universal, ideas (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 2000; Lonner & Adamopoulos, 1997; Poortinga, 1999). Of course, this kind of questioning is more knotted in the dilemma of what is cultural and what is universal and the question of *is science a cultural product* per se (see Candea, 2016).

In these early works on IP, the advocates of this movement try to eliminate some misunderstandings. For example, the 1999 special issue of *Journal of Applied Psychology* on indigenous Psychology aimed to accurately determine the position of this movement (Adair & Diaz-Loving, 1999)—in particular, to clear up the misunderstandings caused by the use of the word “psychology” in its plural form in the title of the anthology, *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (Kim & Berry, 1993). The implication of relativity in this early work is targeted in the following anthology by using it in a single form and aligning it with cultural Psychology as can be seen in the title *Indigenous and cultural psychology:*

Understanding people in context (Kim et al., 2006). Another special issue on IP published in 2000, to justify why another culture-oriented perspective is needed, tries to separate IP from the fields of cross-cultural Psychology and cultural Psychology (see Hwang & Yang, 2000). It would be useful to take a brief look at where indigenous Psychology falls in relation to these culture-oriented perspectives. Comparing different culture-oriented perspectives in Psychology, according to Greenfield (2000), "indigenous psychology aims to go one step further" than "the empirical research tradition of cultural psychology" by transforming informal "folk theories of psychological development" into "a source of formal psychological models" rather than regarding these folk theories as merely "an object of empirical study" (p. 225). One can ask, does indigenous Psychology indeed go one step further than other culture-oriented perspectives?

Is IP Going *One Step Further* Than Other Culture-Oriented Approaches?

As argued above, there are various culture-oriented perspectives in Psychology. cross-cultural Psychology, cultural Psychology, and indigenous Psychology can be counted as the three popular labels in academic Psychology. Even though it is difficult to clearly distinguish one from the other, cross-cultural Psychology can usually be criticized for its understanding of *culture as a variable* and therefore conceptually distinguished from the others. In addition to this, the world of cultural Psychology is diverse. Allolio-Näcke (2007) points to two main streams of cultural Psychology. There is a stream based on the Soviet social-historical tradition and emphasizing action theory, as well as a stream close to the more classical cultural anthropology. The former, as distinct from the classical ethnographic understanding in cultural Psychology, is connected to the Soviet social-historical tradition developed in the 1920s through the writings of Russian psychologists, especially Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934), Alexander Luria (1902-1977), and Alexei Leontiev (1903-1979). This tradition is today labelled as *cultural-historical Psychology*. The

latter of cultural Psychology stresses the importance of the ethnographic approach, emphasizing the requirement of observing cultures more closely (e.g., Shweder`s [1991] cultural Psychology).

One should note that Psychology's relationship with *culture* is not limited to these research areas. For example, Seeley (2003), along with cultural and indigenous Psychologies, talks about *Multicultural Psychology*, which tackles the cultural diversity in American society and specifically focuses on indigenous groups. Ratner (2018), on the other hand, points to the perspective of *Macro-Psychology*, which aims to make sense of culture in the larger context of political economy.

Moreover, researchers have different classifications for culture-oriented perspectives and the approach that each researcher regards as the most inclusive one also differs. Each of them can be seen as the most comprehensive one, embracing the others by its promoters (e.g., Yang, 2000; Ratner, 2018; Berry, 2000).

As pointed out above, no study has analyzed and systematically compared all these different culture-focused research areas. Although not very detailed, Ratner (2018) and Allolio-Näcke (2018) presented their own classifications. Whereas Ratner (2018) talks about four main approaches (including cross-cultural Psychology) under the banner of cultural Psychology, Allolio-Näcke (2018), under the same banner, refers to five main approaches (excluding cross-cultural Psychology but including indigenous Psychology). Although these classifications have some similarities with each other, these are outweighed by the differences. In this sense, it seems quite difficult even to compare these *classifications*.

For example, criteria of distinction vary from researcher to researcher. Whereas Ratner makes a distinction according to the forms of understanding of culture and political content, Allolio-Näcke makes his classification mostly according to pioneering psychologists (e.g.,

Vygotsky) and sometimes according to geographical location (e.g., German cultural Psychology tradition)[39]. In sum, as Allolio-Näcke points out, researchers identifying themselves by the same label do not necessarily share the same content. Rather, their identification can be regarded as a strategic collaboration to promote the cultural perspective that has been missing in mainstream Psychology.

Where is Indigenous Psychology Located among Other Culture-Oriented Approaches?

In the introduction of the first anthology published about IP, the editors pointed to the complementary relation between indigenous Psychology and cross-cultural Psychology (see Kim & Berry, 1993). This complementarity was expressed through the distinction between the approaches of *emic* and *etic*, who coined by linguist Kenneth L. Pike (1912-2000), and pioneered by Berry (2000), who has regarded himself as a member of all three culture-oriented perspectives (cross-cultural, cultural, and indigenous) among others. *Emic* is used to express a phenomenon specific to a particular culture and is represented by indigenous Psychology, while *etic* is used to express what is generalizable or universal and is represented by cross-cultural Psychology. This symbiotic relation between indigenous Psychology and cross-cultural Psychology was emphasized by other researchers as well (e.g., Ho, 1998).

The question here is, since every cultural study necessarily starts from an emic point of view, how do we generalize from this particular point of view to an etic understanding? Berry (2000) emphasized that when trying to reach an etic level, a culture-specific understanding should not be *imposed* on another culture (i.e., *imposed etic*); rather, it is necessary to find the same or similar phenomenon in another culture, and by combining different cultural-specific

[39] For example, Jahoda and Krewer (1997) note that "Psychologie Interculturelle" in France also differs from cultural Psychology and cross-cultural Psychology in the Anglo-Saxon world**.**

phenomena, one can reach a *derived etic* understanding. The extent to which such an integration is possible is a matter of debate (e.g., Jahoda, 1977). Those who do not find this scheme sufficient suggest other methods in which the emphasis on indigeneity is more dominant (e.g., Yang, 2012; Enriquez, 1993). But the main points of these different methods are to truly understand one cultural phenomenon and by combining other cultural phenomena to reach an integrated and generalizable knowledge of people and cultures[40].

Like Berry (2000), another cross-cultural psychologist, Triandis (2000) sees indigenous Psychology as an emic approach that is a steppingstone to an etic approach[41]. As mentioned above, although the relationship between cross-cultural and indigenous was seen as complementary in early publications, in the anthology of indigenous Psychology published in 2006 (Kim et al., 2006), indigenous Psychology was paired up with cultural Psychology[42]. Greenfield (2000) and Shweder (2000), as representatives of cultural Psychology, point to the differences and similarities between indigenous and cultural Psychologies. For Greenfield (2000), cultural Psychology represents a more ethnographic perspective and studies the *cultural other*, whereas indigenous Psychology emphasizes the psychologist's study of his or her own cultural fellow. She also notes that although indigenous researchers emphasize their opposition to mainstream Psychology, the methods they use may nonetheless resemble those of the mainstream researchers (e.g., survey research with undergraduate students). Shweder (2000)

---

[40] There is an important point neglected in the literature about the *emic* approach. Is *emic* an approach specific to a culture or specific to a person? Is it to look *from within a culture* or is it to do research based on a person's experience and his/her understanding of the world? While cultural Psychology tries to put a person's experience at the centre (e.g., Valsiner, 2014), indigenous psychologists do not take a clear stance on this. For them, an emic approach often refers to a culturally specific psychological phenomenon or involves focusing on a specific cultural site. This distinction is also formulated as emic from an insider perspective and etic from an outsider perspective. In other words, different meanings are attributed to this distinction, and it is difficult to guess which meaning is used.

[41] Peng (2012) draws attention to the difference between Berry (2000) and Triandis (2000) regarding the emic-etic relation saying that while Berry (2000) seeks to establish a more egalitarian and symbiotic relationship between *emic* and *etic*, Triandis (2000) places an emic approach hierarchically lower than an etic approach.

[42] Eckensberger (2015) also notes this convergence between indigenous and cultural Psychologies.

describes indigenous and cultural Psychologies as *kindred* approaches and distinguishes them from the cross-cultural one, since indigenous and cultural Psychologies focus on *mentalities* but the cross-cultural one focuses on *the universal mind*.

How the relationship between the three perspectives is conceived differs among researchers. Although these differences might indicate contradictions or ambivalences for IP, in my view, it shows the difficulty of drawing boundaries between culture-oriented perspectives. Kashima (2005), for example, emphasizes that in the face of the dichotomy between *hermeneutic* and *experimental* methods, indigenous psychologists should not reject the experimental one outright. In this sense, the disciplinary characteristics, be they mainstream (experimental) or not (hermeneutic), described as Western, are not rejected outright by indigenous researchers but transformed and adopted, which in turn poses a challenge in determining what makes indigenous Psychology different.

In my opinion, what makes indigenous Psychology different is that it goes, at least rhetorically, beyond emphasizing the culturality of psychological phenomena and underlines that an academic discipline as a whole is a cultural phenomenon. However, this still does not allow us to draw a clear boundary between indigenous and other approaches. For example, Ratner (2016) encodes both psychology of people (small p) and Psychology as an academic activity (capital P) themselves as cultural products. But his umbrella approach is called cultural Psychology.

Placing Indigenous Psychology on a Spectrum

I suggest using a spectrum in order to grasp the relationality of these three perspectives rather than trying to distinguish them entirely from each other. We can call this spectrum *the spectrum of human diversity*. From left to right across the spectrum, the four main concepts used to understand human diversity are *sameness*, *similarity*, *difference*, and *alterity*.

Human diversity here refers to both psychological and cultural diversity, so, in this context, it is not necessary to make a clear distinction between the two. Every conversation about cultures, implicitly or explicitly, involves a comparison. Each comparison is conceptualized through the spectrum of human diversity (*sameness-similarity-difference-alterity*). While making this comparison, we sometimes emphasize similarities and sometimes differences between societies. We always look at one point of the spectrum, which may cause us to miss the other points, or we may choose to deemphasize other points. Once we start talking about cultural differences, we accept, at least implicitly, that there are similarities and vice versa.

On the left side of the spectrum, closer to *sameness*, cross-cultural Psychology can be located. Although cross-cultural Psychology frequently refers to cultural differences, a deep-rooted idea of *unity* is embraced by its promoters that manifests itself with the understanding of harmony or unity in diversity (Bond, 1999). The idea is that even though we are all different, deep down, we have the same universal psychological processes. In the field of cross-cultural Psychology, researchers assume this sameness, which is also called "psychic unity of human beings" (see Berry et al., 2011, p. 2). We can find an expression of this in the concept of culture that is analogically explained with the onion metaphor (see Poortinga et al., 1989). If we think of the reality of culture as an onion, even though there are culture-based differences in sight, that is, the outer membranes of the onion, the onion's innermost structure symbolizes the unity of humans—though how to grasp this innermost structure, through biology or genetics or evolutionary theory, is another matter.

By moving from left to right on the spectrum, cultural Psychology can be located around *difference*. Cultural psychologists generally criticize the idea of psychic unity (see Shweder, 1991). They think cross-cultural psychologists do not take differences seriously and wrongly

embrace *universalism* in the sense of *uniformity*. For this reason, cultural psychologists are closer to the right side of the spectrum. However, they generally do not go further than *difference* and do not embrace *alterity* or *radical alterity* at the right end of the spectrum. Even though these researchers emphasize distinct mentalities, they reserve some universals (e.g., Shweder, 2000).

Then who goes to such an extreme point to embrace *alterity*? Could it be indigenous Psychology? Anthropologists who embraced the idea of *ontological turn* can be counted among those on this point of the spectrum (see Heywood, 2017). In the classical cultural-comparative understanding in anthropology, it is thought that *cultures* represent different *worldviews* of people living in the same *world*. In this case, *nature* is understood as a common denominator of all humans, and *cultures* are thought to enclose different views of this common nature. The advocates of the ontological turn go beyond this idea of having different worldviews and begin their intellectual investigation by assuming that people live in different *worlds*. This group of anthropologists do not understand ontology in its classical philosophical sense of the term that designates the nature of reality; instead, they conceptualize ontology as people`s own worlds. Although how to understand this idea is a matter of debate (e.g., Carrithers et al., 2010), and there are various criticisms of it (e.g., Graeber, 2015), the ontological turn is an approach that has been recognized in recent years in academic circles.

So, where do indigenous Psychologies fit on this spectrum? Could indigenous Psychology be Psychology`s ontological turn? It is hard to determine its position. Sometimes they are closer to the left side of sameness and other times to the right side of alterity. It is a highly heterogeneous field, so it is hard to locate researchers at a specific point on the spectrum. It can be said that, on the one hand, indigenous Psychology gets close to cultural Psychology by emphasizing the differences in the dialectic of *similarity* and *difference*; on the other hand, it gets

close to cross-cultural Psychology by emphasizing psychic unity and using some mainstream methods. In this sense, IP has a more mobile status on this spectrum. What, then, is IP`s relation to radical alterity? I do not think that there is an intimate relation between the two since IP researchers frequently underline the purpose of being scientific and not going towards extreme relativistic points.

In recently published studies, however, some researchers attempt to reframe indigenous Psychology in the context of ontological turn, therefore, placing it in the territory of alterity. (Sundararajan & Yeh, 2022; Yeh et al., 2022). We noted a confusing point above (see Footnote 18) regarding the emic approach and asked: is it about looking *from within a culture* or looking *from within a person*? IP advocates generally understand the emic approach as focusing on a particular culture without the obligation to look from ordinary people's eyes. So, the question is, do they embrace a more radical emic approach in the sense of penetrating people's subjective worlds? Similarly, Shweder (1991) asks whether psychologists would enter the metaphysical world of *the folk* and try to understand them from their point of view. By attaching a political framework to this approach, Bhatia and Priya (2019) said that IP should move away from using objective methodologies of mainstream Psychology and become the *voice* of the marginalized. These calls have been partially responded to in recent studies, and it can be said that IP has undergone a transformation. There are researchers who emphasize taking a close look at a culture and understanding its concepts through the eyes of the locals, sometimes marginalized ones (Ting & Sundararajan, 2018). Some of these researchers explicitly describe their works under the banner of the *ontological turn* (e.g., Matthyssen, 2021; Sundararajan & Yeh, 2021), which is a novel point of view in IP[43].

[43] According to L. Sundararajan, although IP *contained* an ontological turn from the very beginning, this point has not been articulated until now (personal communication, March 3, 2021).

The portrait I have drawn above and the historical context within which I have placed IP can be criticized by those who ascribe higher and deeper meanings to IP. For example, Ratele (2019)[44] rejects the idea that African-centered Psychology is a subdiscipline of the larger Psychology but regards it as a more fundamental orientation of African mentality. It is not only a discipline formation but also a *future* formation of Africans.

Even though indigenous psychologists think that IP is primarily a disciplinary transformation, it should ultimately serve a more general social and individual transformation. In this sense, indigenous Psychologies go one step further than merely establishing a discipline. This further step is at least expressed as an ideal, if not explicitly taken. It can be a means of coming to terms with a very deep past and decolonizing the mind to form a future beyond the current colonial times.

Is IP Going *One More Step Further* and Taking a Postcolonial/Decolonial Turn?

Just as it is difficult to determine the position of indigenous Psychologies in relation to other cultural perspectives, the relationship of indigenous Psychologies with *postcolonial* and *decolonial* approaches is another difficult problematic. An important reason for this lies in the fact that the postcolonial or decolonial character of IP is both *obvious* and *invisible*.

Historically speaking, postcolonial and decolonial thinking styles accompanied the idea of indigenization (see Ansloos, 2014). The common goal of all these perspectives is to argue that the dominant Western scientific paradigms or ways of living are not universal. In the context of

[44] Ratele (2019) does not use the label indigenous Psychology.

Psychology, the salient feature of being decolonial or postcolonial[45] is the purpose of undermining the dominance of *a* Psychology that accepts itself as universal and belittles or, at the very least, neglects scholarly perspectives from other cultures. As opposed to this ideology, postcolonial or decolonial perspectives provide some ways of provincializing the hegemonic ideas. Due to this apparent similarity, indigenous Psychologies can be counted as postcolonial and/or decolonial.

For example, on the homepage of the indigenous Psychology website (indigenouspsychology.org), the factors on which this movement is based are listed, and the anti-colonial character of IP is one of them. Similarly, Allwood and Berry (2006) point out that one of the common themes in the answers they received from 15 indigenous Psychology advocates about the reason for IP`s rise is its *postcolonial* character. In this sense, the postcolonial or decolonial rhetoric of IP is evident.

However, on closer inspection, it is difficult to answer what makes indigenous understandings specifically post-colonial or decolonial. So, the superficially *obvious* actually starts to become *invisible* at this point.

Uddin et al. (2017) look at the historical transformation of the concept of indigeneity and draw attention to the fact that even though this concept is sometimes used in a purely political way, some disciplines use it independently of its political meaning. They give the discipline of Psychology as an example. Indeed, even though the discourse of IP emerged in a post-colonial context after the Second World War and the idea of anti-colonization has been embraced by

[45] While *postcolonial thought* refers to the more recent colonization period from the 19th century up to now, *decolonial thought* refers to the intertwinement of modernity and coloniality that goes back to the 15th century (Bhambra, 2014). These perspectives also differ in terms of their advocates (e.g., Said, Bhabba and Spivak as postcolonial researchers, and Quijano, Mignolo and Lugones as decolonial) and the geographical locations they problematize (e.g., Middle East and South Asia as postcolonial, and South America as decolonial).

some researchers in this field (e.g., Enriquez, 1993; Nsamenang, 2006; Ratele, 2017), its postcolonial character has remained in the background. For this reason, it is difficult to tell how different IP is from other culture-oriented approaches, except for its claim to take *culture* more seriously.

Similarly, when enumerating the criticisms of IP, Bhatia and Priya (2019) pointed to the problem of "unfounded allegations on colonialism" (p. 32). For example, Taiwanese psychologist Hwang (2019a), who regards himself as having an anticolonial understanding, criticizes Yang, another Taiwanese psychologist, for not having a postcolonial perspective. However, it is difficult to find an explicit reference to anticolonial or postcolonial thought in Hwang's (2019a) work, unless we regard producing something that is merely an alternative understanding to the West as anticolonial or postcolonial. Moreover, considering the works of the researchers citing Said's (1978) *Orientalism*, one can see a rather superficial criticism of orientalism; for example, merely using the concepts of East and West can be criticized as being orientalist (e.g., Hwang, 2015; Sundararajan, 2015b). However, among the same researchers, Huntington`s (1993, 1996) geographical classifications based on his conceptualization of *clash of civilizations*[46]—which is harshly criticized by Said himself (2003)[47]—may be embraced as a foundation of indigenous approaches without any criticism (e.g., Hwang, 2019a).

---

[46] Before Huntington, this phrase was used by Protestant missionary Basil Mathews (1926) and historian Bernard Lewis (1990). Both authors discuss the possibility of coexistence or clash of Islamic and the Western cultures.

[47] Said (2003), in his chapter entitled "Clash of definitions" (2003) targeting Huntington`s conceptualization of "clash of civilizations", refers to the fundamental errors of homogenizing and essentializing in conceptualizing cultures. By falling into these errors, says Said, Huntington reproduces the cold war era conflict. Said goes so far as to claim that the "Clash of civilizations" article was written from the standpoint of Pentagon and defense ministry executives who were trying to protect their jobs in the post-cold war era. Against Huntington's sweeping generalizations about large geographies, Said points out that defining cultures is a democratic endeavour by nature since it is about a collective whole or something that is allegedly shared by the larger whole. Therefore, the main issue is, according to Said, not a clash *of civilizations* but rather a clash *of definitions* in how "culture" is defined by different actors of the same society, for example, politicians, intellectuals and the public or individuals. For this reason, it is interesting to see that although Hwang criticizes sweeping generalizations when talking about cultures, he uses Huntington`s distinctions.

Because indigenous Psychologies lack a decolonial character, in his dissertation, Peng (2012) claims that the recognition of IP by Western psychologists is actually a misrecognition. According to him, regarding indigenous Psychologies as a sub-discipline of Psychology or recognizing it as a simple emic approach by Western and non-Western psychologists means that this movement is not understood at all. Beyond that, this misrecognition shows a particular pathology of the colonial mind since they grossly misrepresent the potential of IP and *appropriate* it for their own intellectual ends. For him, IP represents *others* who have been exoticized and despised as subhuman, barbarian and primitive by European scholars/missionaries/politicians for centuries and who are starting to speak for themselves. In this sense, ideally speaking, IP should represent a decolonial perspective that takes a stand against dehumanization based on a long historical background. Considering that modernity and coloniality are mutually constitutive processes (Mignolo, 2002), IP can be regarded as a response to this coloniality/modernity. In this sense the project of IP has a greater meaning or mission than constructing an academic discipline; it is a matter of self-determination. It is a project that aims to come to grips with a long historical process. However, this project does not yet seem to have been fully realized[48].

[48] In order to accomplish this important task, psychologists have to undertake a long historical analysis and attach their projects of indigenization to it. When we look at Peng's (2012) work on the history of Psychology in Taiwan, one can see that, unlike other IP researchers, he refers to the critical history of Psychology. However, we should note that the critical history he accounted for is specifically the critical history of Western Psychology.

CHAPTER 4

At Least Two Primary Concepts of Culture[49]

While it is notoriously difficult to define any concept academically, this is particularly the case with the concept of *culture*, as is pointed out by many anthropologists and psychologists (e.g., Jahoda, 2012b; Valsiner, 2012; Street, 1991). Or perhaps on the other hand, it is all too easy to define *culture* but difficult to limit the number of definitions of it; for example, while Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) listed 162 definitions of this term as is used in anthropology, Soudijn et al. (1990) collected 128 definitions of it as is used in Psychology. How to make sense of *it* is still a matter of debate in Psychology (see Chaudhary et al., 2022).

Williams (2015) starts his entry on *culture* in his *Keywords* with this sentence: "Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (p. 49). This is a highly popular introductory sentence for those who want to say something about the whatness of culture and ask for the mercy of readers in advance due to the high probability of doing injustice to the complexity of this term in their analyses (e.g., Goddard, 2005; Brinkmann, 2008). Even though Williams does provide a succinct analysis that refers to the prevalent uses of the term, he humbly acknowledges its barely manageable subtlety and complexity.

In line with Williams (2015), numerous important researchers from various disciplines have drawn attention to the prevalent uses of culture in the literature (e.g., Fornäs, 2017; Hammersley, 2019). While some of these uses refer to the *ontological*, *aesthetic*, and

[49] My original inspiration for the title of this chapter comes from philosopher of science I. Koskinen. In her article entitled "At least two concepts of culture", Koskinen (2014) points out that as in other disciplines, numerous different cultural concepts can be found in contemporary folkloristics, but she focuses on two primary ones. Likewise, while I acknowledge that there are probably many different concepts of culture even in the specific context of indigenous psychologies (e.g., Sher & Long, 2015), I refer to only two primary concepts of culture in this particular chapter.

evolutionary development of a person or society and appear in a singular form, others refer to different *ways of living* and *processes of meaning-making* and appear in a plural form.

As McCauley and Lawson (1996) put it: "Nobody owns culture. Anyone with a viable theoretical proposal can contend for the right to determine the concept`s fate" (p.171). However, as they also admit, anthropology historically seems to stand in a more unique and proprietary place in regard to this concept. Since the beginning of their discipline, anthropologists have been seeking to define this concept properly, and especially since the 1970s, they have been discussing the fate of their precious concept. For some, this concept is the main culprit behind many problems in the social sciences in general. Shweder and Beldo (2015) provide a brief summary of these criticisms as follows:

> [m]any types of humanists and social scientists (cognitive revolutionaries, structuralists, poststructuralists, sociobiologists, feminists, skeptical postmodernists, postcolonialists, subalterns, globalization theorists) …would associate the concept of 'culture' with a variety of supposed sins. Sins such as 'essentialism,' 'primordialism,' 'representationalism,' 'monumentalism,' 'reification,' 'idealism,' 'positivism,' 'functionalism,' 'relativism,' 'sexism,' 'racism,' 'ethnic conflict,' 'colonialism,' 'Orientalism,' and just plain old-fashioned stereotyping. (p. 582)

Because of these sins, some anthropologists *write against culture* and offer their disciplinary fellows the opportunity to leave this concept behind (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2008). But some others still *write for culture* with revisions in order to keep it on the disciplinary agenda (e.g., Brumann, 1999). Similarly, in Psychology, in response to Poortinga`s (2015) claim that *affluence* is more important than *culture* in explaining psychological diversity and that the use of the concept of culture can be abandoned, Smith (2016) says that the concept of culture is only a tool and can be used for many purposes and psychologists do not need to abandon it. Like Smith, Shweder defends the concept of culture and points out that these problems are not specific to it (in Borofsky et al., 2001). He goes on to say that any concept used in social/human sciences is

ambiguous; the concept of culture is among these, and it is just a tool to think with. Moreover, Shweder adds, this concept has a place in colloquial speech in many languages and it is futile and unwise to advise academics to stop using it (see also González, 1999). However, anti-culture anthropologists think that this tool obscures more than it reveals. It obscures the problems of demarcating cultures, hybridity, and intra-diversity of societies, as well as the complex relation between agency and structure (or other spheres of life) (see Borofsky et al., 2001 for a typical discussion among anthropologists). Of course, indigenous Psychology cannot be expected to remain immune from all of these typical accusations against and discussions about the concept of culture. Accordingly, various researchers have criticized the understandings of *culture* in indigenous Psychologies as nationalist, essentialist and orientalist (e.g., Allwood, 2011; Bernardo, 2009; Gjerde, 2004).

In this chapter, I do not embark on the same definitional adventure. Nor do I aim to present an exhaustive list of definitions about whatness of this term. The reason I point to this brief anthropological background is to note that, as a movement in which psychologists locate their disciplinary practices exclusively within the realm of culture, IP is likely to receive the same or similar criticisms. Even though the term culture is thought to be either undefinable or overdefined, without exhausting the term itself and exhausting the reader, two concepts of culture in the context of indigenous Psychologies can be clarified.

Two Concepts of Culture and Two-fold Problem of Psychology

The globally dominant version of doing Psychology has been criticized by numerous psychologists from various perspectives (e.g., Fox et al., 2009; Paredes-Canilao et al., 2015; Sinha, 1997; Teo, 2005, 2015). But what are the problems or what is the main problem of the discipline in a nutshell? Freeman (2019) defines “the gist of the problem” as follows:

> Much of psychological science has eliminated from view some of those very features of human reality that render it human. In doing so, it has therefore dehumanized the human, all the while imagining that its objectness is coextensive with its realness. Again, therefore, the problem isn't only that the discipline hasn't been sufficiently pluralistic, in the sense of welcoming new and different approaches to inquiry. It's that much of what we have been left with presents a crude and false image of who and what we are. (p.17)

Of course, these are not the only problems of Psychology, but here Freeman succinctly summarizes two fundamental problems of Psychology. Psychology is not pluralistic, and—further—it embraces a false image of humans. What Freeman (2019) means by Psychology`s lack of pluralism here is primarily the lack of "alternative modes of exploration and inquiry" that should go beyond the natural scientific methodology of traditional psychology (p.8). However, in the context of the current work, pluralism can be understood not only as the diversity of methodologies but also as the diversity of cultures. Accordingly, these two problems (or a two-fold problem) can actually be interpreted to coincide with two different concepts of culture in this chapter.

To many psychologists, Psychology as a discipline lacks culture (e.g., Wang, 2016). But what does this mean? Fundamentally this statement refers to two distinct but related concepts/problems. First, the culturality or cultural nature of humans in general is thought to be missing or lacking in Psychology and therefore the image of human is at best reductionistic and at worst distorted (see Misra and Gergen, 1993; Gergen et al., 1996; Segall et al, 1998), or as Freeman puts it above, it has "a crude and false image of who and what we are" (p. 17). Second, Psychology has been mostly blind to other cultural inputs, so it has been reflecting certain characteristics of Western societies in general. Most of the participants and authors of psychological studies are White and North American, and although this problem was statistically exposed nearly 15 years ago (see Arnett, 2008), not much has changed since then (see Thalmayer et al., 2021). For this reason, Psychology is regarded as an ethnocentric discipline to the extent

that it reflects the understandings of its creators (Teo & Febbraro, 2003), or, as Freeman (2019) puts it above, “it hasn`t been sufficiently pluralistic”.

In short, in accordance with the two-fold problem of Psychology, *culture* has been used to refer to two different phenomena here: whereas in the first and ontological sense of the term, it is primarily talking about the cultural nature or cultural aspect of the individual regardless of his/her cultural background (see Pyysiäinen, 2002), in the second and anthropological sense of the term, it is talking about the collective entity whose manifestations can also be seen in the individual members of this entity. It is often emphasized that the discipline of Psychology is problematic in both ways.

According to Berry`s conceptualization, while the first problem refers to the *culture-blindness* of Psychology, the second problem refers to its *culture-boundedness*. Psychology is both *culture-blind* and *culture-bound*—that is, it does not explain our cultural nature sufficiently nor does it include other cultural perspectives in its body of knowledge. As noted above, this dual problematic is frequently pointed out in the writings of indigenous psychologists (e.g., Protacio-De Castro [in Allwood & Berry, 2006]; Rodriguez et al., 1999; Singh, 2022; Sinha, 2002). Berry (1993) notes that “the development of indigenous psychologies is thus an essential remedy for the culture-blind and culture-bound nature of general psychology” (p. 277). Similarly, by referring to the rationale of indigenous Psychology, Sinha (1997) says “[c]ulture-bound and culture-blind tendencies of mainstream psychology constitute the principal reason for this process” (p. 131).

This is “the gist of the problem” in Psychology as mentioned above by Freeman (2019) in a different context. I argue that “the gist of the problem” is also where the confusion starts, since cultural specificity of Psychology is one thing, and the falseness of this specific Psychology is

the other, and indigenous psychologists often address both simultaneously. As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, “the implications of the obvious are not themselves obvious” (Saranson, 1981, as cited in Trickett, 2002, p. 516). In fact, in this case, there are contradictory implications when two arguments are presented together. The idea is that the dominant way of conceptualizing humans, naturalistically or objectively, however defined, in Psychology is by no means universal. Rather, it is cultural; it is Western-culture-bound. The concept of culture represents, says Dilley (2002), what is “local, particular and distinctive, compared to the global, general and common” (p. 449). Accordingly, by referring to the culturality or indigeneity of Western Psychology, psychologists explicitly say or strongly imply that Western Psychology is “local, particular and distinctive”. However, at the same time, it is also said that this culturally specific discipline is *inherently* invalid, regardless of culture since it embraces a mistaken view of human nature. In this case, this criticism ultimately implies that Psychology is “globally, generally and commonly” false which moves in the opposite direction of the field represented by the concept of culture. In other words, what is claimed to be universal is first reconstructed through the indigenous psychological lens as *one among many* and then shown to be *universally invalid*. Its invalidity is based on either moral or ontological grounds which will be exemplified in the chapter on individualism below, but for the purpose of this chapter only two concepts of culture will be underlined.

I suggest that these two concepts of culture and two problems of Psychology should be analytically distinguished from each other to clarify the intended implications and avoid confusion. For example, what is truly, or genuinely universal or global Psychology is at once understood as *grasping* the human being as a whole entity, and also as *reaching* all humanity, all the people in the world. While conducting research in Psychology by taking into account the

cultural aspect of human beings serves the former project (understanding the wholeness of humans), expanding the research to include other cultures serves the latter project (reaching all humanity). Both are challenging tasks indeed. However, before taking up these challenging tasks, it is necessary to observe the distinction between the two purposes in order to see when they conflict with or contradict each other, since different cultures may define the wholeness of human beings differently. By way of example, for some cultures, the spiritual aspect of human beings is the most important aspect in understanding human wholeness, and how spirituality is defined is also a further variable matter. In some parts of Africa, a human being can become a true human as long as that human is in contact with and receives guidance from his/her physically dead but spiritually alive ancestors (see Nwoye, 2015). While promoting an African relational moral theory, for example, Metz (2022)—in aiming to make his argument "philosophically defensible to a global audience" (Preface, para. 7)—excludes from his analysis this African "belief", though it is central in African morality. In other words, while Metz tries to enrich the morality literature under the dominance of Western philosophy with reference to another culture, he also does not accept simply any value/belief on the grounds of its merely coming from Africa but only those meeting the criteria of Western moral understandings.

Referring to this dual problem of Psychology, Berry (1996) adds a cautionary note: "many of our current controversies might have been avoided had we taken these two steps in sequence, rather than simultaneously" (p. 90). According to him, cross-cultural comparison can be made once researchers make sure that a specific aspect of the human-culture relationship of a certain society is well understood. I am not sure whether one can analyze these two problematics in two consecutive steps, but surely the lack of analytical distinction between the two creates confusion in the literature on *culture*. Confused by this dichotomy, a reader might ask: Is a

reductionistic way of looking at humans in psychological research *appropriate* at least for Western culture since this way of looking is particularly Western or is it *inappropriate* for any culture? If this is inappropriate for the discipline of Psychology regardless of cultural context, do we need a cultural theory to dismiss this understanding? It is possible to extend the questions further. One can ask[50]: do indigenous psychologists criticize the Western understanding of humans for failing to grasp the accurate human nature or do they suggest a form of ontological relativism; in other words, do cross-cultural differences reflect cross-cultural ontological differences or merely cross-cultural differences? It is not always clear what is ultimately meant by the researchers who use the dual meaning of culture simultaneously.

In fact, this distinction and the confusion it causes are not unique to the indigenous Psychology literature, nor to Psychology in general. A slightly different but similar distinction is also made by historian Sewell (1999) between "culture as a theoretically defined category or aspect of social life" and "culture as a concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices" (p. 39). For Sewell, culture in the sense of "a theoretically defined category" refers to any cultural aspect of human nature and also this term can be understood as referring to the cultural human sphere along with other aspects of social life, say, economic and political. He thinks that this understanding of culture should be distinguished from a more problematic understanding of culture, which is the set of characteristics of bounded worlds. Even though these two are "quite distinct", Sewell says, they are "seldom distinguished meanings in academic usage" (in Boggs, 2004, p. 202). One of the problems of the lack of distinction for Sewell is that researchers may unnecessarily reject using the concept of culture while particularly intending to criticize the idea of culture as a "bounded world of beliefs and practices". In line with Berry (1996), Sewell (1999)

[50] These questions are the restatements of the questions that Zahavi (2022) asks in the context of the self. Zahavi's original questions are used as a direct quote on page 143 of this dissertation.

suggests that researchers need to prioritize the two sides of this distinction, and claims that once the human-culture relationship is understood well theoretically, the particular culture of a society can also be analyzed.

Berry (1996) and Sewell (1999) point to similar distinctions regarding the term culture in the context of specific academic disciplines (Psychology and anthropology respectively). There are also researchers who situate this distinction in a wider context, as a distinction of Western modernity in general. For example, anthropologist Blaser (2009) distinguishes, slightly differently, two fundamental uses of the term as follows:

> In effect, in Euro-modernity, the concept of culture has two related yet different meanings, which I underscore by capitalizing one of them. As I have been arguing, 'Culture' (with a capital C) is an ontological category that gains its meaning by its contrast to Nature, and together both constitute the central categories in the ontological armature of modernity (in its plurality). In contrast, 'culture' is a sub-category subsumed within Culture and emerges from the differences among human groups, that is, different human groups have different cultures. (pp. 888-889)

In a similar sense, Van Den Bouwhuijsen et al. (1995) point out that:

> 'Culture' has always been burdened with an inherent tension between 'Culture' and 'cultures'. Put differently, it has always been burdened with two different concepts of 'wholeness'. There was the whole of Culture-as against Nature-and there was the whole of a culture-as against other cultures. (p. 167)

I should note that these researchers` analyses and the contexts of their analyses are different from mine. While Blaser (2009) and Van Den Bouwhuijsen et al. (1995) point to or problematize the culture-nature dichotomy in the West and Blaser calls this an ontological category, what I refer to as *ontological* is the cultural-natural development of the individual`s psyche. In other words, while they use the culture-nature distinction on a broader cultural-societal level, I use it on the individual level. Further, unlike in Sewell`s (1999) analysis, I do not problematize the distinction between the cultural and the other human spheres of life, for example, the economic, the political. Nevertheless, their distinctions correspond to the distinction I make in this chapter

between *the cultural part of our life/ourselves* and *distinct cultural worlds*. Although the distinctions are somewhat different from each other, they can be broadly defined as the distinction between the use of *uncountable* (culture) and the *countable* versions (a culture or cultures) of the term itself.

I admit that it is a difficult task to distinguish one use of the term from the other. Science deals with analytical distinctions but lives are lived as whole. These two are sometimes intertwined and overlapped. Just as it is difficult to analytically distinguish the psychological from the cultural (see Sperber, 1996), it is also difficult to distinguish culture's reference to human ontology from culture's reference to the characteristics of individuals and societies. According to Jahoda (2012b), for example, pioneer psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), too merges this dual meaning of the term culture while explaining his Völkerpsychologie, not sufficiently distinguishing one from another. Granting that it is difficult even for the influential founding father of our discipline, nevertheless, as Garland[51] (2009) points out, making a distinction has its benefits to avoid confusions. His solution is to regard this distinction as two different *aspects* of *culture*. In another context, but in a similar sense, Guerin (2020) points out that analytical distinctions refer to differences when one defines different aspects of reality. He goes on to say that even though those analytical distinctions are not clear in real life, they are very important in academic contexts. Concurring with these scholars, I argue that there is a constant slippage between the two in the writings of indigenous psychologists, and by way of upholding this distinction one can see that psychologists both refer to methodological problems

[51] Garland (2009) uses the distinction of Sewell in the context of the sociology of punishment.

(culture-blindness is one of them) and broader cultural values (related to the idea of the discipline as being culture-bound) and draw some parallel between the two.

The simultaneous use of these two concepts of culture by psychologists can be interpreted in different ways. First, as indicated above, it is challenging to distinguish one from another and in fact the two concepts refer to two aspects of the same reality since we make sense of and generalize about the human in the abstract sense through concrete and unique persons. In a similar vein, Diaz de Rada (2011) points out that there is an inherent tension in using the concept of culture. By citing Stocking`s (1992) distinction between *anthropos* and *ethnos*, he clarifies this tension as follows: it is

> [t]he tension between producing knowledge about the human species, Homo Sapiens, as the universal anthropos, and producing knowledge about each of the local ethnic varieties of the species. In parallel, the concept of culture has developed at the very heart of this tension, as a concept that describes the species as a unit, and as a concept that describes each of its social manifestations differentially. Anthropology's commitment to scientific universalism has thus been affected by a kind of ontological pluralism: *what describes the human being is diversity in the ways of being* (one of which is, of course, being a social scientist). (pp. 253-254) [emphasis added]

One can say that what we see as a slippage in the writings of indigenous psychologists is nothing more than that same tension between *scientific universalism* and *ontological pluralism*. Accordingly, the slippage between the two concepts of culture in the writings of indigenous psychologists can also be read as a *tactical* oscillation; so, indigenous psychologists, *on the one hand* refer to the culture-blindness of Psychology, aiming to correct the one and only Psychology`s mistakes to find the true nature of humans and eventually remain under the aegis of scientific unity and universalism, while *on the other hand*, they refer to the cultural boundedness of Western Psychology, aiming not to own the faults of this discipline, and simultaneously to introduce the cultural characteristics of their own societies and ultimately preserve, rhetorically at least, the diversity of ways of being.

Another implication of using the two concepts of culture together is related to the further meaning of *indigenization*, which we can move to now, as if we had not already exhausted the topic—and the reader—with various meanings of the term presented in Chapter 2. Clinical and philosophical psychologist Barbara Held (2019) distinguishes two categories of indigenous Psychologies: "culturally contextualized" approaches specific to geographical locations and "unique" approaches that challenge "the naturalism of natural sciences" regardless of their geographical origins (p. 178, footnote). She does not sympathize with the former of these and embraces the latter;[52] so, for her, indigenous Psychologies commonly challenge naturalism in mainstream Psychology. Indeed, this could be a reasonable position considering the prevalence of criticism of naturalism in indigenous Psychology writings (e.g., Kim & Berry, 1993). Even though indigenous approaches come from various locales, it seems that the main target of indigenous psychologists is common: the naturalistic approach of Psychology (e.g., Kim, et al., 1999). According to Held (2019), a discipline of Psychology based on a phenomenological philosophy characterizes a unique indigenous approach, no matter which culture it derives from. In this vein, for example, Lee (2016) promotes phenomenology as a method for indigenous Psychology by acknowledging the cultural rootedness of phenomenology in a Western world.

One may well ask: What does this have to do with two fundamental concepts of culture presented in this chapter? If we follow Held`s distinction and accept that the main target is naturalism in Psychology, the most important issue is the culture-blindness of Psychology rather than its culture-boundedness. It could be said that even though there could be myriad indigenous understandings—be they folk or every day—in a society, in understanding human beings

[52] Even though Held does not explicitly say that she does not sympathize with the idea that indigenous Psychologies are *culturally contextualized* approaches specific to geographical locations, I drew this inference from her highlighting and sampling of the other definition of IP in her work (Held, 2019) and from her separate critical analysis regarding indigenous Psychologies (see Held, 2020).

through an academic discipline, there might be more commonalities between different cultures than we suppose. In other words, even though psychologists point out that Psychology is both culture-blind and culture-bound, when it comes to academic tools, the most important thing is to correct its culture-blindness. With little modifications, a perspective that has grown in one culture, for example, can easily be used in another culture, as Lee did with Western phenomenology. In this sense, as Smith et al. (2011) point out, perhaps not every psychological phenomenon is *culture-bound* but some of them are only *culture-related*. Definitely, there is tremendous cultural and psychological diversity in life, but a systematic understanding of these diversities may not be as diverse as the diversity itself. For this reason, perhaps, indigenous psychologists coming from various cultural backgrounds often converge on similar problems/criticisms of Psychology.

At this point, one criticism may be that both the concept of culture and this very distinction are Western constructions, as some prominent anthropologists claim (e.g., Strathern, 1980). Putting it in a somewhat enigmatic way, *culture* itself is a cultural invention (Heywood, 2017). Accordingly, one does not need to explicate these concepts/distinctions; but instead, he/she can regard them as enduring symptoms of not being able to ditch colonialist frameworks or impositions. This is certainly one way of avoiding this duality. But, as mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation locates indigenous Psychologies on the shared conceptual ground constructed by psychologists from all around the world and points out that most indigenous psychologists prefer to negotiate with Western Psychology rather than permanently cancel the deal.

In sum, these two implications or reasons, along with many other possible ones, can be discerned behind the use of the two concepts of culture in the context of indigenous

psychologists, and it is important to analytically distinguish one from another to expose these and further implications.

Cultures as Bounded Entities Opposed to Each Other!

The distinction regarding the term culture pointed out above can also be dismissed by saying that—in the globalizing world—*culture* in the sense of bounded worlds is no longer valid (e.g., Hermans & Kempen, 1998). Indeed, the idea of culture as a bounded and collective entity and a person being a member of a culture is utterly rejected by some researchers, especially those who subscribe to the semiotic understanding of the term (culture as a symbolic activity that enables people to make sense of the world) (e.g., Carriere, 2014). When making the distinction mentioned above, Sewell also tries to preserve the semiotic understanding of the term and directs his criticisms at the concept of *culture* as bounded worlds of beliefs and practices. In line with this criticism, anthropologist Thornton (1988) points out that in the concept of culture "it is the final 's' that makes all the difference" in the sense that its plural form opens this concept to political abuse of ethnocentrists, for example (p. 17).

In the context of indigenous Psychologies, the static and bounded understanding of culture has been criticized by many leading researchers (Allwood, 2011; Bhatia & Priya, 2019; Danziger, 2006b; Dueck & Morassy, 2019; Gergen, 2015; Gergen et al., 2019). While indigenous psychologists put the classical place-based anthropological concept of culture at the center of their inquiry, they also try to embrace critical modifications of the concept of culture that point to the mobility and hybridity of cultures. For example, in more recently published studies, indigenous psychologists emphasize *culture*`s dynamism (e.g., Chiu et al., 2019), contextuality (e.g., Hwang, 2015; Sundarajan, 2015), and processuality (e.g., Kim et al., 2006). By pointing out that the previous definitions of culture used in IP do not reflect the complexity

and dynamism of culture, Kim et al. (2006) offer the following definition in the context of IP: "Culture is an emergent property of individuals interacting with, managing, and changing their environment" (p. 34). This emergentist/processual definition, on the one hand, underlines the importance of the sense-making of human psychology in its cultural context, on the other hand; it tries to preserve human agency or the capacity of sense-making of the individuals. For example, Gergen et al. (2019) point out that with the transformation in anthropology, "cultures were no longer linked to particular places"; rather, cultures represent "continuously unfolding processes", and one should embrace the idea of "culturing always in the making" (pp. 49-50).

I argue that this perspective is important but overdrawn at the expense of the classical understanding; to be able to embrace this critical view, indigenous psychologists do not have to altogether dismiss the classical understanding of culture which is more static and place-based. On the contrary, they need this understanding perhaps more than any other research group that focuses on culture. As Shams (2002) also points out, this is a useful and necessary initial assumption of indigenous psychologists.

This same problem of overdrawing can also be seen in Hermans and Kempen`s (1998) article entitled *Moving cultures*. A further and separate critical note follows here about this article, since it has become one of the most cited in Psychology regarding the hybridity of cultures in the globalizing world.

Cultures are Constantly on the Move!

The main message of Hermans and Kempen`s (1998) article is that cultures are changing and interacting and becoming hybrid, and therefore one should conceptualize the term culture accordingly. Hermans and Kempen admitted to being inspired by anthropologist/historian James Clifford`s (1992) idea of *travelling cultures*. However, even a superficial comparison between

the two works can show that the gist of Hermans and Kempen`s article fundamentally diverges from that of Clifford.

In his chapter, Clifford points out the problems in traditional ethnography and poses some research questions for anthropologists. He indicates that anthropologists usually assume that their informants are isolated insiders. In fact, Clifford says, informants are chosen among those native people who travel abroad a lot and speak other languages. These people are generally a mixture of different profiles, being at once place-based natives and mobile travellers. So, the problem of classic ethnography, according to Clifford, is that it assumes the existence of natives dwelling and being there in one particular place. Behind this practice, he says, there is an assumption or idealization of anthropologists who try to contact untouched people and cultures. What needs to be done is to construct a dialectical relation between travelling and dwelling and between *getting there* and *being there*. So, the task is to truly picture how anthropological knowledge is constructed in the field in relation to the external world. While recommending this new perspective, Clifford also reminds the reader that he does not try to replace classical and more static place-based understandings of culture in anthropology. Rather, he points to something that is missing and argues that the current dominant approach in ethnography needs to be supplemented with this new perspective.

However, Hermans and Kempen, who named the title of their article “Moving cultures” with explicit reference to Clifford`s “Travelling cultures”, point to the need to replace the old approach with a new one. While the old approach refers to the classical anthropological understanding which is based on the idea of static and bounded cultures, the new approach refers to the more recent understanding which is based on the idea of hybrid cultures. Hermans and Kempen place the ideas of the complexity, hybridity, and heterogeneity of culture against the

static place-based cultural dichotomies commonly used in the psychological literature. They regard these relatively old conceptualizations as outdated approaches. The authors indicate that cultures are increasingly on the move and by using Pratt`s (1991) phrase they assert that *contact zones* where different cultures meet should be our unit of analysis. Starting from this approach, they see globalization as a process that intensifies the hybridization of cultures.

Beyond this main difference, on a cursory look at both works, there are some other striking differences between the two. First, Clifford adopts a highly reflexive attitude. Even though he is putting forward the idea of travelling as a supplementary component, he is aware that this concept/practice is class and gender biased. For example, the idea of travelling is generally praised by certain classes and genders as freedom, independence, discovery. For this reason, there is a potential danger in proposing or engaging in this activity that one might callously overlook other people's experiences, such as those of indentured labourers and coerced migrants. Unlike Clifford, Hermans and Kempen also do not mention gender and class issues or coerced movements of people. According to them, cultures come into contact with each other and spontaneously create a kind of cultural mixture.[53]

In addition to this, Clifford says we do not have to think about travelling in its literal sense. People's imaginations can travel with new technological devices without any bodily movement. As distinct from Clifford, however, Hermans and Kempen, in addition to the idea of replacing the old cultures with the new ones, seem highly celebratory of cultural globalization. I argue that the problem is, as in Hermans and Kempen`s article, psychologists sometimes

[53] In line with Clifford, M. L. Pratt (2014), the critical linguist who introduced the concept of "contact zones" and whose work is cited by Hermans and Kempen (1998), criticizes the tendency of privileged Westerners to romanticize traveling or moving, and points out that we should talk about "the right not to migrate" as a new human right. Given the huge number of people who are on the borders for various reasons involving coercion today, this human right is highly relevant.

mistakenly praise the benefits of *economic globalization* while intending to celebrate *cultural globalization*. In other words, they mix up the economic benefits of globalization available to a limited number of people with the cultural benefits of it. Some examples used in the article about *glocalization* confirm this interpretation.

The first example is global brands that tailor their services and goods to sell in local markets, a process which is referred to as "micromarketing" in the article (p. 1114). The second example is television enterprises such as MTV and CNN that produce content tailored to cultural diversity. According to Hermans and Kempen, these are "clear-cut" examples that demonstrate "the interpenetration of global and local" (p. 1114). To provide yet another example: every Ramadan (the holy month of Muslims), Coca-Cola makes advertisements to sell its fizzy drinks to people who fast from dawn to dusk. In these advertisements, people cheerfully break their fast with a sip of Coca-Cola. I do not know if Herman and Kempen would count this advertisement as a "clear-cut" glocalization example, but since Muslims` traditional *sherbets* (a variety of diluted fruit juice) are replaced by a global fizzy drink, many Muslims probably would regard this change on their dinner table as a kind of cultural assimilation rather than hybridization or glocalization.

To conclude for this section, I concur with Shams (2002) who points to the "Moving cultures" article and say: "This theoretical stance overlooks the important issues in the construction of psychological knowledge that are primarily located within an indigenous culture and does not offer anything novel to the development of indigenous psychologies" (p. 83). Beyond the specific problems of Herman and Kempen`s article, the idea of moving and hybrid cultures is overdrawn at the expense of classical understanding of culture, as also observed by Wierzbicka (2005).

Of course, cultures are, particularly at this time of globalization, constantly changing. Accordingly, there are important works that point to new hybrid identities in a critical and effective way (e.g., Bhatia, 2018). However, I do not think indigenous psychologists need to totally dismiss the idea of cultures as bounded entities.

Contrastive Method

As if it were not enough that indigenous psychologists regard cultures as bounded entities with certain borders, most of the time they make sense of these entities through a contrastive method. This method involves choosing one or two dominant characteristics of a society (or a group of people) and comparing it/them with the other society's dominant characteristics as in the well-documented but controversial comparison between individualism and collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 2018).

How could one speak of the character of a great whole such as a society? As mentioned above, this is a style of talking about *culture* that is seen as problematic, especially in the rapidly globalising world. Of course, there are many problems in summarising a community of millions of people with a few characteristics. In these analyses, nebulous labels like Western and Eastern are often put in a contrastive relation. McSweeney (2012) points to three problematic categories used by researchers in cross-cultural comparisons: civilizations, countries, and subnational groups. The problematic idea inherent in each category is the claim that people belonging to these categories share certain characteristics. Sharedness of certain cultural mentalities or characteristic seen as a highly problematic idea in anthropology (see Bashkow, 2004) has also been discussed in Psychology (see Chiu, 2014). Some of the problems this causes are the neglect of diversity within a culture and the minimising of the uniqueness of individuals and the power of agency, or in sum the overlooking the individuality of each person in the most general sense.

The further question is, how can a value or worldview inherited from philosophy or a religion be sufficient to understand a whole human community? For example, many researchers present Confucianism as the founding philosophy of both Chinese Psychology in particular and Asian Psychology in general (e.g., Hwang, 2019a; Liu, 2014). Referring to Confucianism, McSweeney (2012) says: "Explaining the values of the 4 billion Asians on the basis of one person's writings is as absurd as claiming to explain the behaviour of three-quarters of a billion Europeans from the Bible" (pp. 152-153). I don't know if it's absurd, but clearly, it's a generalization that ignores a lot of issues in understanding cultures/persons. Likewise, defining *the* Western mentality as Cartesian based on Descartes' imagination is a similar problematic generalization, which is also criticized by Western researchers (e.g., Murray, 1993).

So, all these criticisms address important points in understanding cultures. However, first and foremost, it is only reasonable to assume that a group of people that share a certain region resemble each other and even share (whatever that means) certain understandings. Also, what we should not forget is that the researchers` main focus is on describing/explaining the *prevailing* understanding, not the entire culture (see also Metz, 2015).[54] In addition, a philosophical imaginary, albeit inherited from a single person, can be thought to affect the social imaginary (see Pirruccello, 2008). For these reasons, while seeing the validity of the criticisms, I still find it understandable that researchers continue using this somewhat outdated understanding of cultures.

[54] Metz (2015) explains this as follows:

> [g]eographical labels like "Western" and "African" refer to features that are salient in a locale, at least over a substantial amount of time. They pick out properties that have for a long while been recurrent in a place in a way they have tended not to be elsewhere. They denote fairly long-standing characteristics in a region that differentiate it from many other regions. (p. 1176)

There are also some other (pragmatic) reasons behind using the contrastive method. Graeber (2013) says that "culture" is actually about a "creative refusal" (p. 1). According to him, many societies in history, either to be able to survive or to establish their existence, embraced values/behaviors opposite to those of their neighbouring cultures. In a similar sense, we see that Western Psychology and the west are sharply separated from the indigenous in the indigenous Psychology literature (e.g., Hwang, 2019a). Indigenous psychologists homogenize a giant production machine whose boundaries we do not know and call this *mainstream*. This could be seen as a kind of strategic essentialism, and it may be understandable for the initial phase to establish one`s disciplinary practice. Similarly, Kuper (2000) pointed out that despite the problems of these cliched and crude comparisons, these concepts are important tools for initiating a cross-cultural analysis.

Also, by *culture*, researchers refer to a set of taken-for-granted assumptions and use the water-fish analogy to describe the relation between the individual and culture (e.g., Vukov & Lassiter, 2020). So, *water is to fish as culture is to humans* meaning that our culture is transparent and invisible to us, or we are too familiar to be able to see *it*. It is "invisible obvious" as Smedslund (1984) puts it in the title of his article. Paradoxically, it can't be seen easily because it's so obvious. The familiar world needs to be defamiliarized and an important way of doing so is to juxtapose it with its contrast, and of course, this also includes exaggeration of each contrasting point to a certain extent, as anthropologist Cohen (1994) also points out. This may be another reason why researchers bring together generalisations that seem to be opposite to each other (e.g., Slife et al., 2017).

I argue that, despite all these criticisms, this outdated use of culture is still essential to many researchers, especially indigenous psychologists. In his chapter entitled "East and West:

From an insidious dichotomy to incomplete deconstruction", Arnason (2003) pointed out that although comparisons using nebulous geographic labels like East and West have some *insidious* consequences, such as overgeneralization and stereotypical thinking about people/regions, the criticisms directed at these comparisons ultimately lead us nowhere in the discussion; for these reasons these kinds of criticisms are generally *incomplete*. For example, Hwang (2019a), on the one hand, criticizes the individualism-collectivism dichotomy as an orientalist framework, on the other hand, in the same work, he uses Huntington's categories of civilization. One can ask, while individualism and collectivism are orientalist categories, how could Huntington's categories, which were harshly criticized by the father of orientalism himself (For further information, see Footnote 47), be embraced by indigenous psychologists without seeing any problem?

In sum, despite all the criticisms, when researchers talk about cultures in plural to refer to different societal characteristics, most of the time they still use a contrastive method (e.g., Adjei, 2019; Kim, 2000, Nwoye, 2015; Riggs, 2004). This method is choosing one or two dominant characteristics of a society (or a group of people) and comparing it/them with the other society's dominant characteristics. While embracing the outdated understanding regarding the concept of culture, almost all researchers are well aware of the fact that no characteristic reflects all the people in a society and that this contrastive method may lead us to stereotypes. But they keep using it for heuristic reasons even in a table-form comparison (see Marovic, 2020). Researchers assume strict boundaries between two cultures and in a sense exaggerate the contrast between them. And there is a concept that often conspicuously accompanies them in this exaggerated method (see the following chapter).

CHAPTER 5

Individualism

> It should stop! Every time that our small country is startled by something nasty, individualism has done it! While nobody knows exactly what it means, individualism. A wonderful ghost concept that gets our tongue into trouble but constitutes a welcome repository for all evil which happens to our society, and a lot more. Often it is mentioned together with downtrodden terms such as norms and values. A dog run over on the street; individualism drunk on the driver's seat. Books stolen from the library lie home with individualism. A girl drowned in a recreation lake while a hundred bystanders did nothing: individualism. (p. 3)

Musschenga (2001) begins the introduction of the book *The many faces of individualism* with this reproachful excerpt posted on the internet by a social science student. I too start with this excerpt since the student`s complaint resonates with my concerns. The reference to “our small country” in the excerpt can be replaced or complemented by “our discipline”, and one can say that “every time that our discipline is startled by something nasty, individualism has done it!”. If someone who attempts to have an inclusive view of the critiques of Psychology had to reduce the problems to one word, that word would be “individualism” (for some exemplary criticisms of individualism see Fowers et al., 2021; Reber & Slife, 2021).

It is said that Psychology as a discipline is WEIRD—an acronym characterizing psychologists' orientation to Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries (see Henrich et al, 2010). But the word "WEIRD" is also used as an adjective. Psychology is weird because Western Psychology or Western people`s psychology is peculiar, and individualism is one of the first elements identified to describe this peculiarity. It is often used in a pejorative sense. For example, individualism is, as Watts (2017) puts, “morally”, “factually and scientifically wrong” (p. 381).

But what is meant by this frequently used term? Actually, this question can only be answered depending on what level or aspect of individualism we are talking about. Usages

abound. According to Bunge (2000), “individualism comes in at least 10 modes: ontological, logical, semantic, epistemological, methodological, axiological, praxiological, ethical, historical, and political” (p. 384). Similarly, Vincent (1995) points to 6 types of individualism: “methodological, epistemological, religious, ethical, political and economic” (p. 127). However, the boundaries between these different forms of individualism are not clear. So, in a sense, they are barely distinguishable. Distinguishing one form of individualism from another is “only a half truth”, Vincent (1995) says (p. 127). This chapter explores this half-truth by trying to distinguish one aspect of individualism from another as it is used in Psychology, especially in cross-cultural comparisons.

Why am I trying to distinguish one aspect of individualism from another? As I have already suggested, I believe that the term that best illustrates the oscillation between the different uses of culture I mentioned above is individualism. Also, even though individualism is a highly popular term for those psychologists who characterise Western Psychology and Western society in general, there is no robust conversation in the literature referencing individualism. My hope is to clear up some of the confusion in the literature by distinguishing between different aspects (or levels) of individualism.

Of course, much has been critically written about the dichotomy of individualism and collectivism (e.g., Killen & Wainryb, 2000; van Zomeren, 2014). Findings of these critical explorations include: first, a meta-analysis of the studies regarding these constructs shows contradictory and meaningless results (Oyserman et al., 2002); second, there is no dichotomy; rather these two should be understood in a dialectical relation (Sinha & Tripathi, 1994; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996); third, it is problematic to use these constructs when characterising societies; rather, they refer to different tendencies of each person regardless of culture (Sundararajan,

2015b); and finally and more fundamentally, these concepts are completely invalid and should be discarded since they are "no longer scientifically useful" (Uleman, 2018, p. 5).

Nonetheless, although not casting the pair in the form of a dichotomy, many researchers identify individualism as an important feature that characterises Western societies (e.g., Fowers et al., 2021; Kirmayer, 2007; Wheeler, 2000). I should note that by "Western", researchers generally mean all countries, without any explicit elaboration, that are culturally considered Western: The United States, Canada, Western European countries, Australia, and New Zealand. However, special emphasis is almost always placed on America. American individualism can be emphasized as an exception or an extremism apart from the other Western individualisms[55] (e.g., Bellah et al., 1985; Bishop, 2022; Cushman, 1990; Martin, 2014; Roe, 2014; Sampson, 1988). In the cases in which individualism is not used to characterise societies and people, it is at least used as a core assumption that characterises and pervades the entirety of the discipline of Psychology (e.g., Guerin, 2020; Wilson, 2004). Despite the widespread use of this term, it is surprising that there has been no comprehensive conceptual analysis of individualism itself in Psychology.[56]

Regarding the binary of individualism-collectivism, by referring to Schimmack et al.`s (2005) analysis, indigenous psychologists complain that even though it is clear what individualism means in questionnaires, collectivism is an ambiguous concept (e.g., Hwang, 2020, Sundararajan, 2015b). Also, as noted above, they go on to say that this pair shows the orientalist mentality of researchers since Eastern collectivism is defined through the lens of

[55] From a historical perspective, Lukes (1971) points to different meanings of individualism for different countries in the West. However, we will not emphasise these differences here.

[56] Although there is a considerable discussion regarding individualism in the field of philosophy of mind (e.g., Burge, 1986), there is no study that discusses individualism as it is used in different contexts. However, Stam`s (1993) and Madva`s (2016) works can be cited as exceptions since both discuss individualism in its societal and disciplinary forms.

Western individualism. As Strauss (2000) pointed out, individualism is generally unproblematically mentioned and attributed to the West in cross-cultural research; however, the meanings of collectivism or relationality needs further elaboration in researchers` eyes. Individualism may be clearer than collectivism in the context of questionnaires. However, if there is anything in the literature that the concept of individualism is the furthest from, I would say that it is clarity.

In this chapter, although a very broad and deep concept such as individualism is not defined in a comprehensive and detailed way, the different aspects of individualism used within the scope of Psychology and culture will be enumerated. Even though I will focus especially on the writings on indigenous Psychology to unpack individualism, this unpacking is also valid for other culture-oriented Psychologies.

Multi-Layered Nature of the Term

In the APA online dictionary, individualism is defined as follows[57]: "a social or cultural tradition, ideology, or personal outlook that emphasizes the individual and his or her rights, independence, and relationships with other individuals". As its second meaning of the term, the dictionary refers to "the view that individuals have intrinsic value" as used in ethical and political theory. Indeed, as in this definition, psychologists use the word in a variety of ways to refer to its personal, social and cultural, ethical, political, and ideological meanings. One additional meaning of the term, which is not covered by the APA definition, can also be added to this list, is related to its *ontological* aspect. As the ground of other aspects mentioned above, as

[57] https://dictionary.apa.org/individualism

also pointed out by Vincent (1995), *ontological individualism*[58] is the most important aspect of individualism.

In the context of Psychology, as noted above, individualism is mostly used pejoratively in the sense of going to an extreme in, for example, individual-oriented interests at the expense of social-oriented interests or explaining a psychological phenomenon by reducing it to solely the individual-based mechanisms/processes. This pejorative use of individualism is especially salient when it is used in comparison with *individuality* (e.g., Ames, 2019; Hendry, 2017; Hoffman, 2000). But from time to time, it can also be used in the sense of a worldview or lifestyle adopted by a particular group of people without any explicit evaluation (e.g., Kim & Park, 2005).

To see the different aspects of individualism in a single paragraph, one can look at Bishop's (2022) analysis:

> In the West—particularly in America—we live as largely autonomous individuals with our separate, though coordinated, agendas. This is the atomistic picture of individualism and instrumentalism that most mainstream psychological research takes for granted as objective, ontologically real selves; hence, it is the picture that such research perpetuates. The unexamined cultural ideals underlying such research shape how psychologists examine, analyze, and interpret research subjects. In turn, the research conceptions and interpretations influence research subject's—and that of citizens more generally—self-conceptions (notice how psychology vocabulary and concepts are so much a part of TV sitcoms and everyday conversations). (p. 10)

In this paragraph, one can see all the aspects of individualism that I want to refer to in this chapter. Bishop first describes the dominant cultural understanding of daily life in the West, especially in America, that is, he points out how the majority of people perceive themselves in a particular way. How people define themselves in a certain way (as unique/autonomous, for

[58] When the term "ontological individualism" is used within the scope of social ontology, it refers to the idea that social realities can be explained by ontological mechanisms pertaining to individuals (e.g., Epstein, 2009). However, when used within the scope of psychology, it refers to the idea that psychological processes can be explained by individual or internal processes without the involvement of an external mechanism. How to distinguish between the internal and the external, or the individual and the social, is one of the important topics of discussion.

example) can be called *psychological individualism*, and its dominance at the collective level can be called *cultural* or *societal individualism.* This particular understanding, which is dominant in the West, in turn, has largely determined the way psychologists deal with human beings (i.e., its ontology, epistemology and methodology)—individualism at the disciplinary level in the most general sense, which we can call *disciplinary individualism*. A parallelism between the discipline of Psychology and the larger culture to which the discipline belongs and emerges is frequently established by researchers (e.g., Frie, 2011; Greenfield, 2000; Ingleby, 1990). But of course, if individualism is a problem, these are two different levels or aspects of the problem yet remain unrelated to some researchers. For example, there is an error of psychologists, says Waterman (1981), which "stems from the mistaken belief that the values implicit in our psychological theories are the same as those embodied in our contemporary social institutions" (p. 771). So, for him, there is no direct correlation or causal relation between the two. However, for many researchers, the individualistic methodology in Psychology reflects the values of the larger society. Christopher et al. (2014) describe this as follows: "U.S. psychology, cut from the mold of a folk psychology of individualism, is likewise the heir to individualist ideology and a disregard for culture" (p. 651). Bishop (2022) points out that this understanding, which is seen both in the larger societal culture and more specifically in the view of the discipline, is accepted without questioning, assumed to be based on an ontological reality. Although he refers to this assumption only briefly and implicitly in the above paragraph, in other parts of his chapter, he explicitly points to the fallacy of *ontological individualism*, which could mean many different things, but in Bishop`s case, it means the belief that the individual can build his/her existence independently of society. This understanding, which is ontologically baseless or incorrectly based, according to Bishop, is nevertheless dominant in the larger culture. Despite its incorrect

basis, it is reconstructed academically at the disciplinary level, and this understanding is maintained/reinforced, and the status quo is preserved. Thus, there is an ideological link between academic Psychology and society in terms of preserving and reproducing what is perverse (see Nightingale & Cromby, 2001). This is individualism at the *ideological* level as a distinct aspect of individualism. While this is not the focus of this chapter, suffice it to say that this aspect of individualism is frequently mentioned by critically-minded researchers (e.g., Rose, 1998). Similarly, Fowers et al. (2021) and many other psychologists (e.g., Becker & Marecek, 2008; Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008) also refer to individualism as an *ideology*.

Various aspects of individualism, which we have seen together in Bishop's analysis above, can be briefly detailed under the following subheadings. In this chapter, I will point to three aspects of individualism (societal/psychological, academic and ontological) that I find important in the critical-cultural analyses of psychologists, which, in turn, will correspond to two main references that psychologists refer to using the concept of culture. By critical-cultural psychologists, I mean those psychologists who point to the culturality of the discipline of Psychology and also simultaneously criticize it.

1. Individualism as a Distinguishing Characteristic of the Individual and Society

The characteristic most mentioned by researchers in their analyses of Western society in comparison to other cultures is individualism. In the broadest sense, researchers emphasize that the West is more individualistic when compared roughly with the rest of the world. References are too numerous to mention here. For the moment, in accordance with the contrastive method mentioned above, we can point to some *countries*, *communities* or *continents* identified as being either non-individualistic or less individualistic in contradistinction to the individualistic West. These various regions are as follows: Africa, South Africa, Cameroon, (Ratele, 2019;

Nsamenang, 2006; Nwoye; 2015), Latin America (Martín-Baró, 1994), Korea (Kim, 2000), China, Taiwan (Hwang, 2019a, Yang, 2012), India, (Sinha, 1993), Mexico (Diaz-Loving, 1999), Türkiye (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996), Greece (Georgas, 1993), and Indigenous Peoples (Ciofalo, 2019; Blume, 2020). If individualism is specific to a certain time in a certain geography (modern West), as some researchers[59] claim, then the number of contrasts to be positioned against the West are too numerous to include here.

What is meant when individualism is used as the character of a society or an individual? In this sense of the term, there are many concepts in the content of individualism. Since it refers to various features, individualism can be called "the individualism complex", as Henrich (2019) calls it (p. 23). But we can say that as a core assumption individualism starts from how an individual sees and defines himself/herself internally. For example, Spence (1985) defines it as "the belief that each of us is an entity separate from every other and from the group" (p. 1288). In other words, how a person understands himself/herself is the place where the seed of individualism is planted. Accordingly, the self can be understood in different ways as bounded, autonomous, independent, self-contained, self-determined, self-sufficient, self-mastered etc.. In addition to the self-conceptualization, individualism can also mean many things, such as focusing on the parts rather than the whole in analyses, focusing on the content rather than the context, attributing causality to psychological tendencies rather than the situation, and prioritising the individual over the group to name a few. But most fundamentally, we should underline that the core assumption of individualism is the way people understand themselves.

[59] Talmor (1986) points out researchers who join the debate of individualism can be divided into two groups: those who think that individualism is an exceptionally Western phenomenon and those who think that this phenomenon is not unique to the West.

In contrast to this individualist understanding of the self, many concepts in Psychology and anthropology have been proposed. Psychologists and anthropologists have determined that in many cultures, the individual is perceived in different ways as unbounded, interdependent, dividual, partible, distributed, composite, fractal, multiple, porous etc. (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Smith, 2012; Strathern, 2018). As Robbins (2015) states, all these concepts actually refer to different cultural forms, that is, they are not the same, but by ignoring the differences between them, they can all be evaluated under the category of *non-individualistic.*

To refer to the non-universality and peculiarity of Western understanding of human, researchers (e.g., Henrich, 2019) generally cite this particular excerpt from eminent anthropologist Geertz (1979):

> The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures. (p. 229)

This paragraph of Geertz is one of the most commonly-cited excerpts used to explain that what is supposed to be universal is actually culturally specific, even peculiar and weird.

Needless to say, this kind of comparison between Western and non-Western or indigenous is always criticized because of its stereotypical classification (e.g., Spiro, 1993). To reiterate my caveat mentioned above, my point is different. I argue that regardless of the truth of these claims, researchers speak of different aspects of individualism, and these need to be separated to clear up the confusion.

2. Individualism as a Distinguishing Characteristic of the Discipline of Psychology

When we use individualism as a feature that characterizes the discipline of Psychology, we are talking about the general framework of psychologists in understanding the human being

and the psyche. For many researchers, one of the most central assumptions of Psychology is its individualism (e.g., Fowers & Richardson, 1993; Harré 1989; Martín-Baró, 1996).

What is meant by the discipline being individualistic? In its most general sense, it is the examination of the individual in isolation from the context to which the individual is attached. It is generally used to describe the abstraction and isolation of the individual from outer space in laboratory-based studies (for a detailed design of a typical psychological laboratory see Baldwin, 1892). In this typical setting, the psychological is sought only in the individual and the individual's boundaries are also limited to our skin and skull, which is also where the internal is, at least hypothetically, distinguished from the external. Therefore, in this sense, we can say that the individual, the psychological and the inner are synonymous words/worlds[60]. In response to this, critics of the individualism of Psychology briefly say that "the psychological is not in our heads". They say that Psychology is both internal and external, and even further, it is neither internal nor external, that is, it cannot be localised (e.g., Shweder, 1995).

We can say that the assumption of individualism permeates every component of academic Psychology[61]. Individualism is a metatheory existing in most theories of Psychology (see Sinha, 2016). Psychologists build their theories to reveal individual characteristics. For example, when they consider intelligence, they ignore the social aspect of intelligence, seeing it as an individual ability (see Durojaiye, 1993). Psychology`s methods are created to find the individual and his/her psychological processes as a unit of research (Ho, 1998). In research, the well-being of the individual is considered essential and collective well-being is ignored (Bulhan,

[60] As a side note, there are concepts such as mentalism, solipsism and internalism, and even atomism, which are cognate with individualism. Despite their similarity to individualism, all these concepts slightly or fairly refer to different phenomena (see De Jong, 1997). We will not go into the nuances between these here, but we should say that they often appear together in the literature when criticizing mainstream Psychology.

[61] In psychotherapy, too, the main framework is individualism, that is, psychological problems are tried to be understood and resolved only at the individual level (see Ingle, 2021), but here we focus only on academic Psychology.

1985). Since Western researchers try to understand the concepts of foreign cultures from their own individualistic framework, they often misunderstand these foreign concepts or assimilate them in accordance with their own individualistic frameworks (Sundararajan, 2015b).

The individualistic nature of Psychology is generally assessed pejoratively, as is the way in which society and the individual are viewed to be individualistic in a pejorative sense. As Moghaddam (2010) puts it, "[t]raditional research adopts the embryonic fallacy: the assumption that as soon as life begins, the individual becomes the source of psychological experiences" (p. 465). For this reason, the discipline of Psychology is generally far from grasping the dialectical nature of the relationship between the psychological and the social (Dafermos, 2021). That is, it is far from grasping the complexity of human psychology. Indian psychologist Sinha (1993) describes this problem as the chronic problem of western Psychology as follows: "to vivisect complex human phenomena into bits and pieces, thereby missing their complexity" (p. 39). This is such a fundamental problem that has spread everywhere in the discipline. It is especially prominent in positive Psychology (Cabanas, 2018)—so much so that even social Psychology (particularly its American version), which is supposed to be social for obvious reasons, is not social (Greenwood, 2000), as Senn (1987) points out, but rather is "myopic" and unable to see anything beyond the individual (p. 45).

As mentioned above, when talking about the problematic individualism of Psychology, a parallelism is often drawn between the discipline and the larger culture from which this discipline emerged or developed. For example, Baumeister (1995) makes sense of the asociality of social Psychology by drawing parallels between American society and the discipline of Psychology:

> There is a paradox in the way social psychology is practiced today: It isn't always all that social. Ironically, most social psychologists think of people as largely self-contained

> units, conceding only that occasionally these units come into contact with each other. Perhaps this is not too surprising. The United States is the nation of rugged individualism, and so American thinkers turn out to be oriented toward individuals. (p. 75)

The dominant ideology in culture has spread to every part of the discipline (see Becker & Marecek, 2008). This parallelism between the society and the discipline is also often established by indigenous psychologists (Bulhan, 1985; Choi et al., 1993; Ratele, 2019; Yang, 2006).

I have to note that while the first two meanings of individualism explained above correspond to the anthropological meaning of culture, the third meaning below corresponds to the ontological meaning of culture.

3. Individualism as the Ontology of Human-Beings

In the analyses and criticisms of individualism, researchers sometimes address the root of the problem, that is, ontology. The question is, what is the nature of *being*? More specifically, what is the nature of human-being? Is there any metaphysical[62] essence of human-being?

In this sense, what is on the surface and what is deep and fundamental are separated from each other. Dominant understandings in culture, people's self-perceptions or the psychologist's view of people are the features that appear on the surface, which are, in turn, tied to a deeper ontological commitment.

Since researchers from various disciplines think that individualism is ontologically problematic or baseless, these researchers often describe it as a myth, fallacy, or fiction (see Callero, 2017; Martín-Baró, 1994). Becker and Marecek (2008) summarize this point by referring to important researchers:

> Many psychologists and others have criticized the way in which individualism has permeated American psychology (e.g., Baumeister, 1991; Becker 2005; Cushman, 1995; Sampson, 1993; Spence, 1985; Taylor, 1985). The bounded, masterful self, as they see it,

[62] Metaphysics and ontology can be used to refer to similar things, despite the nuances and fundamental differences in the history of philosophy. In this chapter, I prefer to use the term “ontology”.

> is a fiction. It is impossible to separate out the self from the social because what is taken as the private domain of the self is defined by the social (Cruikshank, 1999). (pp. 1170-1171)

In fact, American society by this assessment relies heavily on this myth of individualism (see Paul, 2014, Chapter 7). People regard themselves as self-contained and autonomous beings; however, in reality (that is, ontologically speaking), they are not. This is the assumption that lies at the very heart of Psychology and puts the discipline on fundamentally false ground (Wilson, 2004). Ironically, ontological individualism refers to something that does not exist ontologically (Epstein, 2014). In this sense, ontological individualism is an oxymoron expression (see Bunge, 2000). The individual does not precede society nor has he/she an independent existence from society. An individual who accepts himself/herself as autonomous and even as autonomously disembodied, in a sense, denies others` contribution in the constitution of his/her subjective world. “In the end”, say Coelho and Figueiredo (2003), the question of subjectivity is “a question of how debts to others, contracted in the constitution of the self, can be faced up to and accepted by each individual” (p. 193).

Epstein (2014) draws attention to a distinction between *causality* and *constitution* that has been overlooked in discussions of ontological individualism. In these discussions, the influence of other people is accepted, that is, causality is not denied, but it is not accepted that other people or social life in the most general sense *ontologically constitute* the individual.

Among the critics of individualism, there are those moderate ones who say that Psychology focuses too much on the individual and denies the influence (in the sense of causality) of the social on the individual (e.g., Senn, 1987). Also, there are radicals who criticise individualism of Psychology since psychologists ignore the idea of the social constitution of the psychological (e.g., Guerin, 2020). For these radicals, since the origin and source of the

psychological is the social realm, there is no psychology other than the social. In this understanding, the individual is inherently or essentially social. One can say while the moderate ones try to *supplement* the existing disciplinary practice, the radical ones attempt to *supplant* the prevailing understanding in the discipline.

When Bishop (2022) says "humans are indelibly social beings" (p. 6), he does not refer to the trivial fact that people establish social relations. Rather, he refers to the social constitution of human-beings. In a similar sense, feminist researchers often refer to the same distinction. For example, Keller (1997) distinguishes being relational in a "socially-constituted" sense from being relational in the sense of "being relationship-oriented" (p. 157). Armstrong (2009) makes a similar distinction between causally relational and constitutively relational autonomy. In the first sense, we acquire our autonomy via certain kinds of social relationships. Relationships work here as a kind of background requirement. However, in the latter sense, autonomy is an intrinsically social "process that requires the maintenance of certain sorts of ongoing relations with others" (p. 61).

An Attempt to Undo the *Individualism* Knot by Using These Distinctions

After briefly distinguishing these three aspects of individualism from each other, I will talk about the problems posed by their non-distinguishing from each other in the critical-cultural writings of psychologists. These problems can be grouped under two subheadings.

The first of these is not to distinguish *academia* from *society*. Sometimes, *individualism* is used to refer to characteristics of academia, sometimes of society. It is important to distinguish one from another.

The second is not to distinguish between the *cultural* and the *ontological*. By *culture*, most of the time researchers talk about the distinguishing characteristics of society in general and

academia in particular. But sometimes, they go to a deeper level and address the ontology of humans. Even though there is a fine line between *culture* and *ontology*, it is also important to distinguish these two from each other. This conflation between the cultural and the ontological is also described as the conflation between the ontic and the ontological, to which I will refer below.

1. The Problem of not Distinguishing Academia from Society

As noted above, critical-cultural psychologists generally start criticising Western Psychology as a discipline as a whole and they also draw parallels between the characteristics of the discipline and the characteristics of the larger culture. To explain and exemplify this parallelism further, we can take the example of the notion of *fundamental attribution error*. It is said that, compared to non-Westerners, Westerners tend to attribute causality to dispositional factors rather than to situational factors when explaining their own and other people's behaviours in daily life (Henrich, 2019). For example, if someone is late for class, their classmates tend to associate it with the laziness of that student, but they tend not to think about the possibility that the student may have been late on the way to class because of an accident. Or they explain unhappiness with the intra-psychological phenomena like the lack of motivation instead of some situational factors like economic problems. Accordingly, Western psychologists tend to explain the realm of the psychological with intrapsychological phenomena. They tend to regard isolated dispositions as the primary or sometimes the only explanatory points of psychological states in their disciplinary practices. It could be said that Western psychologists as members of Western culture make a fundamental attribution error. Nothing is surprising so far. The dominant understandings of the broader culture in which the discipline of Psychology flourished have naturally characterized the discipline itself. At the end of the day, academics are laypeople, and

they breathe the same cultural air with the other people in their society. However, academia or a discipline refers to a specific community in a larger society therefore it does not necessarily have to reflect all the characteristics of the wider culture in which it is situated. For this reason, it is important to distinguish one from another.

However, there is a conflation between the two, which in turn leads to some problematic implications for the indigenous Psychologies. This conflation can be seen when looking at the literature in general, or it can be seen in a single study. Some examples are presented below.

Contextualism

In a cross-cultural Psychology article, Owe et al. (2013) say: "we propose the construct of contextualism, referring to beliefs about the importance of context in understanding people, as a facet of cultural collectivism" (p. 24).

In Slife et al.`s (2005) book, *Critical thinking about psychology*, it is said that: "...contextualism implies that the meanings or qualities of any individual, part, or element are not self-contained or inherent in the part, individual, or element, but derive instead from its relationship to other parts or elements and the larger whole (or context) within which it is situated" (p. 172).

Even though these two explanations above have a very similar meaning and the very same label, they refer to two distinct phenomena. While Owe et al. (2013) refer to an individual or cultural tendency which is generally seen in members of collectivist cultures, Slife et al. (2005) primarily refer to a professional framework of psychologists. So, in a sense, Slife et al. refer to what is missing in mainstream Psychology. Similarly, Crawford and Marecek (1989) point out that many psychologists criticise "the methods of experimental psychology for context-stripping, that is, for isolating social phenomena from the situations in which they normally take

place" (p. 159). At the same time, Indian psychologists, for example, point out that *context sensitivity* or *context-dependency* is a key characteristic of Indian people`s thinking meaning that they focus on contexts for appropriate behaviors instead of abstract rules (e.g., Ramanujan, 1990; Shweder & Bourne, 1982) On the one hand, *context-stripping* is a general problem of Psychology, on the other hand, the tendency to interpret life by relying on context, situation etc. is a feature of people in general, which is adopted more by a particular group of people.

On the Place of Culture in Psychological Science

In their article, Misra and Gergen (1993) talk about the problem of individualism and acultural understanding in Psychology. While talking about the problems of the discipline of Psychology, they compare Western culture to Indian culture by listing some dominant characteristic values from each culture. For example, some of those Western values are "anthropocentric and individual-centred worldview", "liberal ontological individualism and belief in freedom", "knowledge (science) as amoral (value free) and secular", and some of those Indian values are "holistic-organic worldview", "a socially constituted/embedded and relational concept of person", "knowledge as moral and sacred" (pp. 232-233).

The main confusion here is that sometimes they refer to sociocultural values and other times they refer to methodological problems. For example, Indian people may overemphasize the social aspects of their personality, or they can be more context-dependent in sense-making of other people's behaviors than Westerners in their daily life. In this sense, Misra and Gergen (1993) point to a similar cultural feature to *contextualism* as a facet of collectivist cultures mentioned above. If social individuality and context-dependency (or contextualism) are mentioned in these senses, they are socio-cultural values. However, these values can also be conceptualized as general methodological/theoretical approaches. In this sense, it can be said that

there are no context independent psychological phenomena. Similarly, individuality is social in general no matter where you go, and how to conceptualize this social individuality is a general problem for any psychologist. One is a cultural tendency, but the other is a theoretical burden of psychologists.

My point is that due to this conflation, in Misra and Gergen`s study there is an implication that since non-Western cultures have certain values, say contextualism, psychologists from these cultures will automatically or naturally solve the methodological/theoretical problems of a-contextual mainstream Psychology. But methodological/theoretical problems cannot be directly replaced by sociocultural values. For example, Indian people can have "contextualized relationships depending on time, place and person", as Misra and Gergen (1993) point out (p. 233); however, conceptualizing the context-dependency or social embeddedness of the individual in academic practice is another matter. Similarly, Holdstock (2003) points to the contextual embeddedness of the individual as one of the main principles of African indigenous Psychology. In response to Holdstock (2003), Kagee (2014) points out that "most Western psychological models accept and embrace the notion of embeddedness" (p. 358), and he gives Bronfenbrenner`s (1979) social ecological model as an important example. I agree with Kagee, if we slightly modify his sentence as follows: most Western *critical* psychological models accept and embrace the notion of embeddedness.

Additional Examples

In a similar sense, as often mentioned by indigenous psychologists (e.g., Nsamenang, 2007), holism may be an important value for many non-Western cultures but understanding the human-being as a whole in one's academic practice is another matter. In other words, there is no

automatic way of incorporating one`s cultural values into one`s academic practice. However, culture-oriented psychologists present these general paradigmatic issues as if they are some unique or culturally specific methodological/theoretical approaches. For example, Korean psychologists, Kim and Park (2005) point out that "indigenous psychologies represent the transactional scientific paradigm in which individuals are viewed as agents of their action and collective agents through their culture" (p. 82). Similarly, by pointing to non-Western cultures, Adair (1999) says, "methods that are holistic, qualitative, and phenomenological, are felt to be more appropriate and compatible to their cultures" (p. 404). As a matter of fact, the whole field of cultural Psychology sees, using Adair's words, "individuals as agents of their action and collective agents through their culture" and many psychologists seek holistic, qualitative, and phenomenological approaches to capture the whole of human-beings (e.g., Shweder, 1991; Valsiner 2012).

Even though it is not limited to them, this conflation is particularly pertinent in the writings of indigenous psychologists since they criticise and characterise Psychology as a discipline as a whole while simultaneously introducing their cultural values; however, one (a cultural value) is not guaranteed to solve the problems of the other (the discipline).

2. The Problem of not Distinguishing the *Ontic* from the *Ontological*

When the concept of culture is used in an anthropological sense, it refers to what is valid in a particular place or specific to a particular place. Even if the invalidity of a particular cultural value out of its cultural context is not automatically assumed, the possibility of the validity of it is suspended. In classical anthropology, these analyses generally do not include ontological analyses (P. Heywood, personal communication, May 25, 2021). In other words, they do not include claims about the existence of entities. Rather, they refer to meanings of something, for

example, what it means to be an individual is different in a certain place as opposed to another place. In Psychology, too, when a researcher refers to an individual's self-understanding or a prevailing mentality in a culture, the nature of the individual as an entity is not at stake. If one is talking about the two at the same time in a single study, that researcher is basically talking about two distinct things. This distinction between the two can be labelled as the cultural and the ontological, as well as ontic and ontological. Although the two are not completely separate from each other, when we talk about the ontological, we are talking about the truths about human beings in general (i.e., the nature of being) that are considered to be valid at all times and places. When we refer to the ontic, however, we mean that there are some particular characteristics of certain human communities or individuals in a certain time and place. Roughly speaking, while the ontological speaks of the deeper, fundamental and abstract, the ontic speaks of the more superficial and mundane and concrete.

I will prefer *the ontic* instead of *the cultural* since *culture* and *cultural* are used as umbrella terms in this chapter. In accordance with this distinction, individualism can appear in different forms in the literature.

Ontology is Just Another Word for Culture?

In the discussion entitled “Ontology is just another word for culture” (Carrithers et al., 2010), various eminent anthropologists discuss the commonalities and differences of these two terms. Although at the end of the discussion it was rejected by the majority of the audience in the motion that “ontology is just another word for culture”, it was widely accepted that these two evoke highly similar things. M. Candea eloquently puts the tension between the two: “I don’t think that any of us is quite saying that ontology is the same thing as culture, but same-ish” (in Carrithers et al., 2010, p. 198).

Since these two are “same-ish”, they are often conflated. For example, in anthropology, Al-Mohammad (2011) points to "the error of using field-work as a basis to support what are essentially metaphysical, ontological claims" (p. 123). According to him, even though anthropologists do not actually investigate the ontological level, they use ethnographic information to argue for ontological claims; so, they are conflating the cultural/phenomenological level with the ontological level. Similarly, Craig (2015) says that the ontic and the ontological are often confused in the context of psychotherapy: “Especially problematic is the failure to distinguish what is ‘merely’ ontical or quotidian, that is, concerned with everyday life, from what is truly ontological, that is, universal and invariant” (p. 82). Some other researchers have also pointed to the confusion between ontic and ontological (e.g., Muller, 2015; Vallelly, 2019). According to Cushman (2016), this conflation underlies the imposition of Western Psychology in other cultural contexts since the ontic is perceived as ontological and it is wrongly tried to be generalised to the whole world by many Western psychologists.

In cultural analyses, even though researchers` main aim is to find the diversity of, using Craig`s (2015) words mentioned above, the “ontical and quotidian”, they occasionally refer to the “universal and invariant”. For this reason, I believe, when it comes to individualism, there is an oscillation between individualism being culturally specific and individualism being universally incorrect. While the first refers to a descriptive cultural analysis, the latter refers to an ontological verdict. Similarly, when an example is given from the relational values of Eastern societies, it usually refers to the relational nature of human beings independent of culture (Ho, 1998). Again, this conflation can be seen when looking at the literature in general, or it can be seen in a single study. Some examples are presented below.

Social Embeddedness

In the book, *Indigenous psychology of spirituality*, Dueck (2019) points out that: "Hefner (1993) noted that an individualistic Christian message is less appealing to cultures or communities that see the individual as socially embedded" (p. 305). Also, Heu et al. (2019) rank countries in terms of the degree of their social embeddedness. According to this, some countries have a more socially embedded life style than others.

In their chapter "The sociocultural self", Oyserman and Markus (1993) define the *social embeddedness of the individual* as follows: "…an individual located within an interpersonal space and defined by his or her past and current contact with significant others such as family, friends and coworkers" (p. 194).

Although these two groups of researchers use the same term social embeddedness, they refer to distinct phenomena. While Dueck (2019) and Heu et al. (2019) classify cultures/individuals as more or less socially embedded, Oyserman and Markus (1993) refer to the invariable aspect of human beings no matter where you go. How can we make sense of the two? Should we say something like: every person is socially embedded, but some persons are particularly socially embedded? Indeed, anthropologist Strathern (2018) says a similar thing. She points to Sahlins`s discovery of the dividual understandings of the self in other cultures. Strathern points out that Sahlins reconceptualizes the self as a dividual being instead of the individual. This is a universal definition for Sahlins based on his observation in a particular place. Everybody is dividual by nature but this dividuality is particularly salient in some cultural groups. Based on Sahlins`s understanding, Strathern (2018) eloquently says that "the everywhere seems especially evident in particular somewheres" (p. 239). However, since *culture* is primarily

about the particular somewheres or particulars at least, talking about everywheres or universals simultaneously in a single study, from time to time, can be very confusing.

Relational Being

In his book entitled *Relational Being*, Gergen (2009) criticises the dominant tradition of bounded being in the West. This bounded being refers to the understanding of our selves or being as an individual, independent or self-contained being. He points out that bounded self is our culturally and historically contingent construction and offers the idea of relational being as an alternative to this dominant construction. He substantiates his analysis by giving examples from relational cultures. However, from time to time, Gergen goes further and claims all psychological processes are already relational. We may think that we are self-contained and independent individuals, but we are deeply relational beings. Even our independence or individualism is collectivistically or relationally constituted. As mentioned above in the context of feminism, this goes beyond the idea that we are relationship-oriented human beings. Rather, we are socially constituted and inherently relational.

Culture and the Self

Similar oscillation/confusion can also be found in, as one of the commonly-cited articles in the literature on culture, Markus and Kitayama`s popular article entitled "Culture and the Self" published in 1991 about *independent* and *interdependent* self. They start their abstract with the statement below:

> People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. (p. 224)

In accordance with this aim, Markus and Kitayama give a lot of examples that refer to different consequences of these different self-construals. However, towards the end of the article, they point out that:

> Even within highly individualist Western culture, most people are still much less self-reliant, self-contained, or self-sufficient than the prevailing cultural ideology suggests that they should be. Perhaps Western models of the self are quite at odds with actual individual social behavior and should be reformulated to reflect the substantial interdependence that characterizes even Western individualists. (p. 247)

It is hard to follow what Markus and Kitayama`s ultimate message is. So, despite all the differences between different cultures, that is, all the examples given throughout the article, do they say, "individualism or the idea of independent self is mostly an ideology that does not accurately reflect reality"? What does "the substantial interdependence that characterizes even Western individualists" mean? Do they refer to the ontological interdependence or the actual interdependence? Are people not that culturally different at the end of the day? Then what about striking differences that they point to at the beginning of the article? Are they just on the surface? Are we deep down the same?

Similar examples can be given from the literature on *culture* (e.g., Christopher et al., 2014; Elias, 1969; Klein, 2016; Riggs, 2004). This kind of dilemma or oscillation actually exists in many researchers' analysis of the West. It results from doing cultural and critical analysis at the same time. First, the claim of universality is particularized by cultural analysis of what is imagined to be universal (that is, the West). But later, or at the same time, an ontological analysis is made and said that this particular understanding is in fact universally incorrect or invalid. This oscillation is endemic in cross-cultural comparisons between Western individualism and non-Western non-individualistic approaches. While individualism is culturally particularised, it is also universally and ontologically rejected. The question is, is the issue of individualism a

problem of cultural incompatibility or is it more fundamentally an ontological problem? It's hard to determine. Zahavi (2022) points to this intractable issue as follows:

> As radical as such claims might sound, it is, however, not always entirely clear how one ought to interpret them. Is the focus on the conception, experience, and/or nature of selfhood? And do the authors intend to criticize the Western conception for failing to grasp the true interdependent nature of self or are they rather propounding a form of ontological relativism: Cross-cultural conceptual differences reflect or mirror or constitute cross-cultural ontological differences? (para. 7)

After criticizing the individualistic understanding of mainstream Psychology and giving examples from relational cultural perspectives of Africa, Nsamenang (2006) says: "it would be enriching to scrutinize the relational script as a challenge to, or alternative or complement to, the individualistic ideology of mainstream developmental psychology" (p. 195). I think the problem arises when researchers simultaneously want to do all of them together: to challenge, to offer an alternative and to complement the individualism of Psychology.

Relationality: A New Framework for Psychology?

"Must psychology be individualistic?" asks Egan (1991, p. 179). According to him, this is not an obligation and whether or not to be individualistic "depends on the *goals* of psychological theorizing" (p. 202). He goes on to say that:

> If the goal of a theory is to characterize the mechanisms underlying some cognitive capacity, then we might well expect the theory to employ an individualistic taxonomy. …If, on the other hand, the theory takes cognitive capacities as given, and tries to give an account of a subject's behavior in a particular environment, as social psychology does, then the theory is unlikely to be individualistic. (p. 202)

According to Egan, Psychology as it exists already adopts both individualistic and non-individualistic understanding in accordance with the particular goal of the research. But for many researchers, the reference to social determinants of behavior is not enough for Psychology to move away from individualism. "Most of current psychology", Guerin (2020) says, "is just

looking in the wrong places for answers and explanations", which means psychologists are still focusing on "what is going on in the head" (Preface). For this reason, he says, it needs "turning inside out" to make the social construction of psychology as the ground of analysis. According to Fowers (2021), who started his criticism of individualism 30 years ago, nothing much has changed for 30 years, that is, Psychology still considers individualism as essential. Stam (1993) asks, "can psychology ever be non-individualistic?" (p. 150). He says that this is actually a wrong question because Psychology has been rising on the ground of individualism for 100 years. He concludes that: "whether it is still possible to have a non-individualistic psychology has yet to be demonstrated" (p. 150). It is hard to determine what changed and what has not changed since Stam came to this conclusion nearly three decades ago (see also Claiborne, 2007), however, a relational ground is still seen as the future vision of various psychologists (e.g., Brown & Reavey, 2018). When summarizing indigenous Psychology, Paredes-Canilao et al. (2015) points out that:

> Perhaps the most important contribution of indigenous psychologies to psychology's transformation, is a new paradigm, both in the Kuhnian senses of the term, (related to wide-ranging changes brought about by scientific revolutions), and Agamben's innovation upon 'paradigm' (referring to the philosophical element in an idea or event that is productive of infinite possibilities). Specifically Asian in origin, this new paradigm is methodological relationalism, which takes relations, rather than individuals, as the primary datum (Ho et al., 2001). (p. 362)

Likewise, commenting on indigenous Psychologies, Danziger (2006b) says that there is a new possibility for a Psychology that is based on relational metaphysics. According to him, we can redefine the subject of Psychology by drawing on the conceptual connection between indigenous Psychologies that emphasize relationality and the new understandings of cognition in the West, such *distributed cognition* and *situated learning*, which examine human mental activities in relation to the social environment to which they are connected. Indeed, relationality is a common

theme of indigenous psychologists in their writings. Whenever they criticize individualism, they highlight by contrast the relational values or understandings that exist in their own culture.[63] For example, Kim and Park (2006) say that "[t]he Chinese, Japanese, and Korean word for human being is 人間, which can be translated literally as 'human between'"(p. 38).

However, the question to be asked here is, is there a necessary relationship between metaphysical individualism/relationalism and cultural or moral individualism/relationalism? That is, when we adopt relational metaphysics, should we change our lives in line with this metaphysics or our way of living automatically changes by adopting different metaphysics? Does being wrong metaphysically entail being wrong morally as well? Reformulating the question differently, if individualism is "morally", "factually and scientifically wrong", as Watts (2017) says (p. 381), is there an essential connection between all of these different aspects of individualism?

On the one hand, in his (1995) article entitled "The self: Metaphysical not political", Luban says that communitarian theorists use metaphysical theses to defend communitarianism in normative and political terms, but that these theorists do not elaborate on how to make connections between metaphysical and normative/political arguments. He says that this relationship between metaphysical and normative arguments needs to be made stronger. However, while defending this argumentative link, he rejects communitarian metaphysic and says the self is not collectively but individually constituted. On the other hand, in her article

---

[63] Lanselle (2017) regards indigenous Psychologies as a search for an answer to modern human's alienation from himself/herself, others, and nature. As distinct from the common understanding in the literature, he deals with the idea of indigenous Psychology at the level of one's subjectivity rather than at the broader cultural level. According to him, indigenous Psychologies are trying to revive relational values/ontologies existing in their traditions against the increasing individualism in general in the modern world, and this search is a result of human needs at the subjective level.

entitled “The liberal individual: A metaphysical or moral embarrassment?”, Carse (2014) has a slightly different point. She does not target the social constitution as a metaphysical thesis but says that to criticize liberal individualism on a political and societal level, some scholars refer to our socially constructed nature. According to her, this is irrelevant. Instead, we should talk about what kind of social world we should live in. So, just pointing to our deep reality is not enough. Carse (2014) does not target a metaphysical thesis, but she thinks that we need a moral or political argument against a moral individualism. A metaphysical commitment does not automatically entail a moral way of living in her view.

Even though these two scholars have different perspectives, they both point to the distinction between different levels of individualism. I believe the connection that Danziger established between *relational metaphysics* and *relational cultural values* should be re-evaluated by considering these different layers. For example, is it better to adopt values in line with more accurate metaphysics? Kirschner (2011) points out that “relationalists eschew the still-prevailing cultural and methodological emphases on individualism as an ontology and as a moral value” (pp. 178-179). In a similar vein, I argue that criticisms of individualism in Psychology ignore that individualism is a cultural and methodological problem/value as well as an ontological and moral issue and psychologists should explicitly, not only implicitly, deal with ontological and moral aspects of individualism/relationalism.

Another important question here is about being descriptive and evaluative about cultures. In his book, *The concept of culture: A history and reappraisal*, Hammersley (2019) points to four main conceptions of culture used in academic discourse. Two of them are used in a singular form: culture as an aesthetic cultivation and culture as evolutionary development of societies. And the other two are used in plural form: cultures as whole ways of life and cultures as

processes of meaning-making. While the first two are used in a singular and evaluative sense, the latter two are used in a plural and descriptive sense. Hammersley (2019) points out that at the turn of the 20th century scholars used the concept of culture to describe other societies in a more neutral and non-evaluative way, pushing back against the racism of the time. By using the word "culture" in a plural form, anthropologists opposed the other usages of the term by which societies or people are ranked from less cultured/civilized to more cultured/civilized. Rather, in this understanding, no culture is less valued than the other, and each one is equal to another. So, there is a benign egalitarian urge behind using this concept in a plural manner. As Strathern (1995) puts it, "the nice thing about culture is that everyone has it" (p.153).

Hammersley (2019) says that when this term is used to refer to different ways of life and processes of meaning making, evaluations about cultures are suspended and researchers talk about these cultures in a descriptive manner. That is, every group of people has their own way of life and process of meaning making. As the saying goes in Turkish, every human being has their own way of eating yoghurt. However, the problem is, as Hammersley (2019) points out, even though talking about cultures is supposed to be only descriptive and non-evaluative, anthropologists do not always remain purely descriptive and at times transcend this boundary and become evaluators of cultures. What is particularly problematic here, according to him, is that it is hard to tell when they use *culture* in a descriptive sense and when they use *it* in an evaluative sense. This makes it difficult to follow their arguments, according to Hammersley. A similar problem can be seen in writings about Western individualism contrasting with non-Western relationality.

For example, again, in his book *Relational being*, even though Gergen (2009) remains in the descriptive realm by saying that he does not want to demolish or replace the dominant

cultural understanding (self as a bounded being), he transcends this realm by saying that this understanding is a threat to human wellbeing and even to the wellbeing of the whole planet. In other words, he describes our inherent and already existing relationality. Also, he makes a prescriptive analysis by saying that we, in the west, have not lived in accordance with this dynamism, or rhythm of life, if you will, and that there are harmful consequences of the illusory bounded self. In his review of Gergen`s book, O`Doherty (2011) finds this point highly contradictory because Gergen`s stance "oscillates between offering a relational approach as `just another perspective` (i.e., no more or less true than any other) and implying the moral and epistemic superiority of relational over individualist approaches" (p.64).

This kind of oscillation between descriptive and evaluative analysis of cultures is, again, endemic in the writings of critical-cultural psychologists. Most of the time, Western critical psychologists explicitly criticize Western individualism; and while doing that, they link mainstream premises of the discipline to malaises of Western society. Following the criticism of the understanding of the individual as an isolated and discrete phenomenon in the discipline of Psychology, Nightingale and Neilans (1998) note: "notice also that these quotes challenge the everyday beliefs of members of the Western world" (p. 73). Stam (1993) reminds that Psychology's individualism problem is not just a problem of Psychology but of the entire culture.

But what about evaluating non-Western cultural values or non-individualistic values in general? In his book, *Evaluating culture*, Johnson (2013) says:

> What struck me, in thinking about harms which appear culturally induced, was that people often resort to relativism when dealing with 'traditional' ways of life, while surreptitiously endorsing objectivist, universalist critiques of Western or modern cultural forms. This is dishonest and unhelpful. (p. 4)

This kind of duality of universalist and relativist analyses is prominent in critical-cultural writings of psychologists. I do not know if it is dishonest, but it is indeed unhelpful in

establishing what the ultimate message of these psychologists is. What do they say eventually? When do they merely describe and when do they also evaluate? It is interesting enough that sometimes psychologists are both descriptive and evaluative of cultures but not prescriptive. For example, Marecek and Christopher (2017) criticize the ideology of individualism and its influences on the discipline of Psychology, and the dominant way of living in the West. They also refer to other ways of living from other cultural groups that have a more relational lifestyle. It seems that they recommend people to have relational ways of living/being. However, they give the reader this caveat:

> Let us be clear: We are not urging that Europeans and Americans somehow adopt sociocentric conceptions of the self; this would be impossible. Rather, we hope that the description of a sociocentric conception of the self will throw into relief some elements of the individualist conception of self that shapes positive psychology. (p. 87)

After observing their criticizing, the manifestations of individualism in the discipline and in the Western society, I do not understand why they are *not* urging Westerners to embrace a non-individualistic conception of self or way of living in general. Is it because it is impossible? Even though they attempt to clarify their overall aim I do not think that they accomplish this aim eventually. This note complicates their analyses further.

Another Implicit Evaluation/Prescription Lurking behind an Ontological Analysis

Along with any explicit evaluation and prescription, there is another implicit prescription lurking behind the ontological statements of researchers. While talking about the ontology of persons/selves, one may imply an ethical way of living not for a particular society but for all people in the world. This is the perennial problem between ontology and ethics. Westerners are more alert to the notion of *naturalistic fallacy*, which is the fallacy of deriving *ought* from *is* (e.g., Metz, 2014). But, for example, African researchers talk about *ontologized ethics*, meaning

that these two are *not unrelated* (Gädeke, 2020). East Asians also talk about the intricate relation between ontology and ethics (Rosemont, 2006). There are different types of arguments referring to the relation between ontology and ethics. The promoters of the relation of the two claim that even though an ontological commitment does not directly lead us to a certain ethical commitment, it *necessitates*, *entails*, or *circumscribes* an ethical understanding. Also, westerners take part in this discussion (e.g., communitarians like Charles Taylor and his analysis about the relation between ontology and advocacy [Taylor, 2003]). I do not go into details here, but I can at least note that it seems like there is a consensus on two points. First, the ontological and the ethical are connected in some way. They are entangled. Second, there is no automatic or natural relationship between these two. So, even though *is* and *ought* are not totally irrelevant to each other, their connections or entanglements need to be explicitly articulated and exposed. I think this kind of transparency between arguments is missing in the literature on indigenous Psychology. Even if the defenders of the thesis of the social constitution of the individual are right, for example, one can still ask this question: why should I live in accordance with my true relational nature? Just as the cultural cannot automatically replace the academic, the ontological does not explicitly specify the moral. I admit that all these levels (cultural, methodological, ontological, and moral) are entangled but the connections among them need to be exposed in academic writings.

Do Psychologists Touch the Same Part of *the* Cross-Cultural Elephant?

In the parable of the blind men and the elephant, six blind men touch a different part of an elephant, and each tries to understand what it is and describe it from their specific point of view. Two main questions can be asked about *culture* in general. First, what do we refer to as cultural? and how do we speak of cultures? Do psychologists touch the same part of the elephant

when speaking about culture or cultures? One can go beyond this question and ask: is there an elephant at all? Cook et al. (2009) ask: “what if there is no elephant?” and question the assumption of holism in anthropology (p. 47). According to them, anthropologists talk about cultural findings as if these findings are part of a greater whole. They point out that we do not have to assume the existence of a whole; instead, we can talk about just fragments. Similarly, in Psychology, Yan and Poortinga (2017) point to the important studies of cross-cultural Psychology by concluding that all these various studies make sense if we think of them as *army of ants* instead of *a big elephant*. My point is a bit different since I do not focus particularly on cross-cultural differences in the literature. Rather, in this and the previous chapter, my aim is to track the grand concepts of psychologists, like *culture* and *individualism*, and try to figure out what psychologists point to when they use these concepts. So, I believe, yes, there is an elephant in cross-cultural talk, but by saying idiomatically, *elephant in the room*. That is, cross-cultural researchers, including indigenous psychologists, touch various parts of this elephant and sometimes overlook the important differences between these parts. “My hope is”, as Madva (2017) says, “that like many conceptual oversights, once they’re pointed out, they seem obvious” (para. 2).

CHAPTER 6

Where is the Indigenous Psychology Movement Heading?

Where indigenous Psychology is *headed* as a movement has been questioned in recently published works (e.g., Sundararajan, 2019). There are doubts that this movement is really going somewhere (e.g., Long, 2019), and it has also been stated that it is difficult to describe a direction for this increasingly heterogeneous movement (e.g., Sundararajan, 2019). Of course, as in this dissertation, despite all indigenous Psychology`s heterogeneity, as a heuristic technique it is mentioned as if it is a monolithic movement. However, in fact, by *indigenous Psychology*, psychologists refer to dazzling diversity gathered under the same title.

Although its legitimacy and its impact are still questioned by some (e.g., Jahoda, 2016; Kirschner, 2019a), we see that the promoters of this movement no longer deal with positioning indigenous Psychology within the larger discipline of Psychology but emphasize that this discourse can be potentially diversified and enriched by contacting other fields of Psychology, for example, critical Psychology (e.g., Sundararajan et al., 2017). By looking at the criticisms of indigenous Psychologies, a prediction can be made about where this movement might evolve in the future.

Criticisms of Indigenous Psychology

The idea of indigenous Psychology has received many criticisms by both those who sympathise with this idea and those who are sceptical of it. It is difficult to classify these criticisms under definitive categories. They are often based on a selective reading of indigenous Psychologies, and starting from a particular aspect, such as one of their shortcomings, these criticisms often point to some general problem in the Psychology discipline as a whole. As exceptions, Jahoda`s (2016) and Ratner's (2008) criticisms can be distinguished from others with

their relatively broad scopes and focuses on the foundations of indigenous Psychology. While Jahoda's (2016) criticism, in a more compact way, focuses on some inconsistencies (or, from a more sympathetic point of view, heterogeneities) in the literature, Ratner (2008), in a detailed manner, draws a broader framework, referring to the ontological and epistemological foundations of indigenous Psychologies and comparing them with other major culture-oriented perspectives in Psychology (i.e., cultural Psychology and cross-cultural Psychology). Other researchers are more oriented to some specific problematic aspects of indigenous Psychology.

One of the first criticisms that may come to mind about indigenous Psychologies is expressed by Poortinga (1999). He asks how many Psychologies there will be if each culture needs to develop a specific Psychology. He continues questioning the idea of indigenous Psychology by asking: how do we draw the boundaries between different cultures? Or simply put, how can we distinguish one culture from another? However, in a subsequent article, Poortinga (2005) evaluates the work of Shams (2005) who has a more communitarian perspective and promotes the idea that each community has a local understanding of Psychology. He points out that the number of Psychologies is not a problem from this communitarian perspective because it does not address culture in its broadest sense, but instead aims to focus on the communities within a culture and their specific understanding of Psychology.

Even though the problem of cultural boundaries has been partially resolved in Poortinga`s eyes, the concept of culture in general is one of the main problematic points for IP. As mentioned earlier, one of the main points with which indigenous Psychologies try to justify their own existence is that cross-cultural Psychology treats culture as a quasi-independent variable and therefore minimizes the role of culture in determining our psychological world. Indigenous Psychologies can be distinguished from cross-cultural Psychology, in Boski`s words, “in terms

of the role and amount of culture they postulate for psychology" (Allwood & Berry, 2006, p. 261). Boski also says: "the more of culture in research material, the better" (Allwood & Berry, 2006, p. 262). What is meant by the amount of culture or the more of culture is a separate subject of discussion, but basically, in indigenous Psychology, culture is not seen as a statistical variable that externally influences the individual's psychology; rather it is considered an element that structures the individual's behavior and psychology. On top of these perspectives, culture also structures scientific practices in general and the entire discipline of Psychology in particular.

But attributing too much importance (or the emphasis it deserves) to culture certainly raises new questions. The point Poortinga questions above is about what separates one culture from another and implies in this the question of how each culture is defined. Culture in general can basically be understood as an integrated and coherent whole, which simply gives a society its character. If society is accepted as the whole of the network of relationships established by a group of people, culture gives this network of relationships a unique identity. However, although this understanding provides a hypothetical starting point for researchers, it brings up problems such as essentialism and homogenization, as also critically noted by San Juan (2006) and Estrada-Claudio (2020) in the context of Filipino Psychology.

Especially with the critical and reflexive turn of their disciplines after the 1980s, anthropologists have opened up the idea of integrated or coherent culture for discussion (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2008). Similarly, Bhatia and Priya (2019), Gergen et al. (2019) and Danziger (2006b) criticize indigenous psychologists' conceptualization of culture as generally static, homogeneous and bounded. The understanding of bounded cultures brings to the fore the problem of cultural boundaries mentioned above by Poortinga. The idea that the boundaries between cultures are clear leads us to the idea of homogeneity in a sense, and in turn places

indigenous Psychologies within a nationalist paradigm. Allwood (2011) puts this nationalist paradigm included in indigenous Psychology as one of its most fundamental problems. According to him, indigenous Psychologies ignore the political aspect of defining culture, and with the understanding of culture that includes nationalistic urges, they might neglect the different understandings of minorities and marginal groups in society and knowingly or unknowingly suppress their voices.

In response to this problematic understanding, it is thought that *cultures* should be perceived as heterogeneous, unbounded, moving, hybrid, or transnational (e.g., Bhatia, 2008; Gjerde, 2004). Ng and Liu (2000) are involved in this debate on culture from a somewhat more radical point of view and ask, "why culture?" (p. 292). That is, why do indigenous psychologists have to focus on the concept of culture at all? They go on to say that, for example, without prioritizing the idea of culture, European social psychologists have done important studies on concepts such as social identity or social representation. In a similar vein, Gao (2022) suggests that “the critical potential of indigenous psychology has been moderated by its positioning of culture as the core of its identity” (p. 975).

One of the important handicaps of overemphasizing the concept of culture is the problem of relativity. Prominent figures of cross-cultural Psychology have warned indigenous psychologists against the potential danger in moving away from the idea of universal Psychology by relativizing everything (Azuma, 1984; Berry, 2000; Kağıtçıbaşı, 2000; Poortinga, 1999; Triandis, 2000). Similarly, Ng and Liu (2000) regard the outright neglect of the existence of any universal psychological processes as a problem and point out that scientific methodology could

also be universal in certain aspects[64]. Ratner (2008) also directs his criticisms to this relativist side of indigenous Psychology. He regards ontological relativism, epistemological relativism and the priority of the insider's perspective as three principles of indigenous Psychologies. Ratner's main criticism is that indigenous psychologists give undue privilege to the insider's perspective and lead psychological research into a relativistic trap. Interestingly, many indigenous psychologists have explicitly rejected relativism and attributing unquestioned privilege to insiders. Ratner (2008), however, builds his criticism by looking at what indigenous Psychology ought to be in a Weberian *ideal type* of sense rather than at what IP currently is.

Since the first publications on IP (e.g., Kim & Berry, 1993), psychologists have emphasized that, on the one hand, the main idea of this approach is to create a culturally specific discipline. On the other hand, in a sense balancing this relativistic rhetoric, they have also reminded us that their ultimate goal is reaching a truly or genuinely universal Psychology. Indigenous psychologists try to balance the relativistic approach by emphasizing the importance of reaching human universals. Researchers use this balancing style with an emphasis on producing scientific knowledge or by separating their approaches from a more anthropological sense of the term indigenous, that is, folk psychological understanding. Nevertheless, it is controversial how the ideal of being culture-specific can be realized together with the ideal of reaching universal knowledge. For example, Sinha (1994) addresses this controversial point in his book review of the anthology edited by Kim and Berry (1993). He asks, if everything is built on a cultural basis, then how will the criteria of scientific Psychology be established?

[64] Ng and Liu (2000) here refer to one of the classic discussions about the separation of process and content. There are several different positions in this debate: the primacy of process over content, the primacy of content over process, the separability of process and content, the inseparability of process and content (see Kashima & Gelfand, 2012).

While many researchers see a threat of relativity in indigenous Psychologies, the same indigenous approaches are criticized for not being relativist enough or adopting a universalist rhetoric. For example, by referring to the articles in a special issue on indigenous Psychology in the *International Journal of Psychology*, Danziger (2006b) laments that many indigenous psychologists criticize individualism but none of them criticize the ideal of universality that is inherently related to the idea of individualism. Brock (2016) also repeats Danziger's criticism and emphasizes that the problem of universalism, as a default assumption of the discipline of Psychology in general, continues to be a problem in indigenous Psychologies. Similarly, Bhatia and Priya (2019) criticize the prevalent assumptions about science, objectivity and universality in indigenous Psychology and make a call for having a critical indigenous approach.

One of the main criticisms of critically oriented psychologists concerns the fact that indigenous Psychologies have not undermined the global hegemony of Western Psychology, or more specifically, American Psychology. In fact, given the rhetoric of the emergence of indigenous Psychologies after the second world war, it can be seen that there is a postcolonial reaction. If we look at the historical background of indigenous Psychologies, and the rhetoric of their emergence after the second world war, this can be seen as a postcolonial reaction. This movement is not limited to the formerly colonized countries, but more generally, is about taking a stand against Euro-American cultural hegemony. This principle of opposition to hegemony is one of the most emphasized principles of indigenous Psychology (Allwood & Berry, 2006). However, critical psychologists point out that the criteria of this hegemonic structure are embraced by indigenous psychologists without questioning, and therefore, in a sense, indigenous Psychologies have not fulfilled the promise to stand against hegemony (for a similar criticism see Okazaki, 2018). Of course, it may be too soon to fall into despair, but what critical psychologists

expect from indigenous Psychologies is a more fundamental critique of Western Psychology and Western cultural hegemony in general. For example, it may not be enough to simply change the theories, concepts or methods of the discipline because this kind of practice would be limited to *content indigenization* (Sinha, 1997). They should go further than that to question and challenge the scientific division of disciplinary labour that emerged under specific historical and cultural circumstances in the West. This culturally specific structure should be reorganized by indigenous psychologists in a culture-specific manner (Staeuble, 2006; Danziger, 2006b; Weidemann, 2013). As Nsamenang argues with reference to Mignolo (1998), there is a "connivance" in the interdisciplinary division of labor with colonization (in Allwood & Berry, 2006, p. 258). In this sense, most psychologists are not aware that they are in a knowledge production network that emerged as a result of colonization, and they avoid more fundamental and structural criticisms. Although they are rhetorically opposed to the hegemony of Western Psychology, indigenous psychologists try to produce a Psychology in accordance with the criteria created by this hegemonic structure. For example, as Eckensberger (2015) also points out, the attitude of indigenous psychologists towards mainstream Psychology is ambivalent. On the one hand, there is a rhetoric of developing Psychology specific to their own society as distinct from mainstream Psychology. On the other hand, they talk about contributing to mainstream Psychology by transforming it.

In the literature on indigenous Psychology, the emphasis related to this rhetoric of universality and relativity is on a golden middle way between two extremes. This is not limited to indigenous psychologists since it is commonly seen in psychologists who research the relationship between culture and Psychology: they want to identify two extremes and place themselves in the middle of them. These extremes take different names according to different

researchers. For example, Kim and Berry (1993) place *universalism* in the middle of *absolutism* and *relativism* and claim that the ultimate aim of indigenous Psychologies is to reach this middle point. The same understanding has been emphasized by Segall et al. (1998) to explain the most proper way of relating culture to Psychology. Yang (2000), however, determines *universalism* and *relativism* to be two poles and places *integrationism* in the middle, which is, for him, the right approach in the context of indigenous Psychologies. In a similar vein, Kim (2000) places indigenous Psychology in the middle integrationist point but labels the extreme pole as *contextualism* instead of *relativism*. One can ask, just who would be those researchers who locate themselves on extreme poles? Do they even exist? For example, what psychologists would explicitly call themselves absolutists or even implicitly embrace absolutism?

Kusch (2017), who works on relativism, points out that he has not come across any radical relativist who completely rejects the idea of universal standards in science. He gives an example from philosopher P. Feyerabend (1924-1994) who is regarded as one of the radical relativists with his saying *anything goes*. However, Kusch says that what Feyerabend means by *anything goes* is that every rule or epistemological criterion can be disqualified, but he does not actually mean that all points of view are equal to one another, nor there would be no justifiable approach in science. Even though there is no radical relativist in this sense, Kusch says, relativists are accused of being radical by universalists. There may be a similar problem in the context of indigenous Psychologies: universalists are accused of being radical absolutists by relativists. Thus, we can ask: is there any psychologist who wholeheartedly embraces absolutism or universalism as an extreme point? Or we might ask: is there any indigenous psychologist who adopts relativism all the way to the end? For example, the criticism that Ratner (2008) repeats the most is that the insider's perspective is given an unquestionable authority by indigenous

psychologists. But since the early works of indigenous Psychology (see Kim & Berry, 1993), researchers emphasize that the insiderness of laypeople is just one aspect of their approaches but not in an unquestionable manner. They also conceptually distinguish their approaches from the anthropological sense of the term indigenous which is folk understanding. In fact, when it comes to the insider's perspective, most of them refer to the insiderness of psychologists and not lay people. So, we can also ask Danziger the question of who the unnamed radical indigenous psychologists are to whom he refers, who radically reject Western scientific standards?

I think that the main issue here is about the fair reading of any literature. Beyond that, the question is, how can we truly understand other people's point of view? We tend to reject the idea we are against by pushing it to its extreme edges, or we construct two hypothetical extremes and safely and securely place ourselves in the middle of these two extremes. In this sense, it can be said that there is a lack of the *principle of charity*. So, while dealing with opposing or different ideas, instead of dealing with the strongest and most rational form of the approach, we take this idea to extremes that actually do not exist and build a straw man analysis. Or by creating these hypothetical extreme points, we place ourselves in the safe middle way.

In Which Directions Do Recent Criticisms Lead Indigenous Psychology?

In his article in which he discusses the foundations of eclecticism in social theory, Sil (2000) points to three factors used in explaining the social life of human beings: structure, culture and rationality. According to him, every social theorist pays particular attention to one of these factors. That is, researchers see one factor as ontologically more determinant in shaping our social life and give it more epistemological significance while the others are pushed into the background. Other researchers then respond to this by putting forward another factor that they consider ontologically more determinant and therefore attribute it with more epistemological

significance. For example, on the one hand, while structuralists think that it is more important to know about the material aspects of social life, culturalists emphasize that knowing symbolic meaning systems should be prioritized. Rationalists, on the other hand, claim that the thinking skills of the individual actually explain change and order in the social realm and try to draw attention to the rational capabilities of the individual. In this sense, each researcher thinks that he/she tries to account for that which is left out by another researcher. It can be said that structuralists, culturalists and rationalists touch the issue from a specific side and overall, an eclectic picture emerges at the end in the context of social theory. The important point here is that, according to Sil (2000), these groups are not separated by sharp boundaries; social theorists who form one group, say culturalists, most of the time do not outright dismiss other factors as unimportant, but rather do not give priority to those factors. For example, although structuralists think that rationality is not unimportant, they think that primarily they should know material structure. In other words, when we truly explain the structural, according to them, we also explain the individual realm to a great extent. "[S]cholars essentially state that X is consistently important, although Y and Z are also sometimes important, thus according X an epistemologically central position" (pp. 373-374). Even if there is a kind of flexibility in this sense in the analyses of social theorists, often they do not hesitate to accuse each other of being reductionist. For example, culturalists may accuse structuralists of reducing the cultural realm to an epiphenomenal by-product of the structural. Likewise, structuralists may accuse culturalists of reducing everything to a symbolic world of meaning. As for rationalists, they can be accused of

reducing the processes of the supra-individual (social, economic, political in general) to the individual or even intra-individual realm, that is, with a kind of methodological individualism.[65]

It is obvious that the main emphasis of indigenous Psychologies is on culture. Based on the criticism that traditional Psychology focuses solely on the individual or intra-individual processes, indigenous psychologists put culture at the centre of their analyses as the main influencing or constitutive factor of the psychology of people. In other words, by focusing on culture, they try to supply a deficiency of mainstream psychologists. Of course, they do not dismiss the individual or intraindividual processes; rather, they try to make sense of the individual realm in relation to the larger cultural realm. For example, by adopting the transactional paradigm of human development, Kim and Park (2005) emphasize the interaction between the cultural context and human psychology. They define culture as "the collective utilization of natural and human resources to achieve desired outcomes" (p. 85). While emphasizing culture, they also refer to some characteristics of individual human-beings which they think are underemphasized in mainstream psychological literature such as meaning, agency and intentionality. The individual acts in line with certain goals in the social world and attributes meaning and value to his/her actions through culture. Of the factors emphasized by Sil (2000) above, Kim and Park highlight both the cultural and the individual realms here. In fact, it is often not possible to distinguish the individual realm from the cultural realm in the psychological literature—especially if researchers assume a co-constitutive relation between the two.

Considering Kim and Park`s explanation, one can ask, what is missing, not mentioned or

[65] In the continuation of his analysis, Sil (2000) credits Giddens' understanding of structuration, claiming that Giddens does not prioritize any factor but rather calls us into a true eclecticism of the three factors mentioned above. I will not go into this part of Sil`s analysis, but I would like to emphasize the important points for the context of indigenous Psychology.

underemphasized in their analysis? According to Ratner (2008), Kim and Park`s (2005)[66] transactional paradigm overemphasizes the individual's agency, intentionality, and meaning-making skills and ignores structural issues. It is as if the relationship between the individual and culture takes place within a social vacuum. In Kim and Park`s scheme it seems that people construct different goals and act freely in line with these goals—according to Ratner, a highly distorted picture of reality. He thinks that what is missing in Kim and Park`s analysis in particular and in indigenous Psychology in general is the structural realm. In indigenous Psychologies, the individual is wrongly characterized as freer than he/she actually is. The typology of the individual who sets goals and constructs meaning in a free manner and proceeds voluntarily towards these goals portrays a utopia that does not exist, according to Ratner:

> To maintain the idealization that indigenous people are active agents who construct their society and psychology, indigenous psychologists minimize the idea that institutions, concepts, artifacts, politics, and power relations organize, or structure, psychology. Indigenous psychologists rarely mention the coercive power of social institutions, artifacts, concepts, and conditions. Equally foreign to indigenous psychology is an analysis of inequities in socioeconomic power and capital, and the way ruling classes control social life. Instead, macro factors are regarded as tools that ordinary people utilize for their own purposes. (p.82)

Here, Ratner aims to reach a more holistic analysis by considering structural issues whose importance is not appreciated enough by indigenous psychologists. To the best of my knowledge, Kim and Park or other indigenous psychologists have left Ratner`s criticism unanswered. But we can assume that they probably accept these criticisms by showing theoretical flexibility, yet, while agreeing Ratner talks about important things, regard these as not the priority of indigenous Psychology. Our assumption appears more likely to be true given that the leading figures of indigenous Psychology in fact refer to Ratner's critique in their recently

[66] In fact, Ratner (2008) here refers to Kim and Park`s (2006) chapter which is also similar to Kim and Park`s (2005) article in content.

published works but do not respond (e.g., Sundararajan, 2019; Hwang, 2019b). One can also see a more multifaceted version of the rift between Ratner and Kim and Park in recent debates on indigenous Psychologies. In the special issue of the *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology* devoted to indigenous Psychology (2019, Vol. 39, No. 2), Sundararajan and Hwang as leading figures in indigenous Psychology present the two main target articles, followed by responses to these articles (Allwood, 2019; Bhatia, 2019; Dueck & Marossy, 2019; Long, 2019). Sundararajan provides a general analysis of the indigenous Psychology movement in her article, while Hwang explains his own model of indigenous Psychology based on Confucian relationalism, which he has repeatedly described in his previous works (e.g., Hwang, 2019a).

When we look at the criticisms/commentaries directed at these target articles, we can see that there is a divergence between researchers according to Sil`s three factors (the cultural, the structural, the individual). I leave Allwood`s and Dueck's and Marossy`s commentaries aside here because while Allwood emphasizes a general point—the political aspect of conceptualization of cultures—Dueck and Marossy have a more specific point—expanding the scope of indigenous Psychology by including spirituality. So, their comments do not fit the three-factor structure that I would like to emphasize here.

Looking at Bhatia`s, Long`s and Kirschner`s commentaries, we can actually arrive at Sil's three-factor eclecticism (the cultural, the structural, and the individual) mentioned above. If we regard indigenous psychologists as culturalists, this does not mean that they deny the importance of other factors, but it can be said that they deemphasize structural issues. As opposed to these culturalists, Bhatia and Long focus on structural issues, and between these culturalists and structuralist arguments, Kirschner points to the neglected aspects of the individual. Bhatia argues that although indigenous psychologists emphasize the importance of culture, these psychologists

predominantly remain on the axis of mainstream Psychology by embracing a more individualistic methodology. According to him, indigenous psychologists should analyze the consequences of structural inequality in their societies. So, analyses of culture should be done in relation to structural problems. For example, psychologists should be concerned with more concrete issues such as the sanitation problem or children dying from diarrhea. Similarly, Long urges indigenous psychologists to return to matter, that is, to material reality.

By reiterating Ratner's criticisms, Long claims that indigenous Psychologies cannot justify their own existence and as a way to address this deficiency; they should get rid of the endless discussions about true cultural identity or cultural characteristics of their societies and return to "the bare facts of material existence" (p. 118). Although Eckensberger (2015) says that indigenous Psychologies purportedly address some concrete problems and therefore are able to be distinguished from cultural psychological perspectives that are based on a semiotic approach, indigenous Psychologies continue to be harshly criticized by these researchers for not being concrete enough. In this sense, we can regard Bhatia`s and Long's analyses as having a more structuralist orientation as opposed to the purely culturalist orientation of indigenous psychologists. Again, one should not think that these theoretical identities are mutually exclusive. For example, Bhatia does not oppose the determination of cultural characteristics, but thinks that culture should be understood as a transnational phenomenon in the globalizing world which should be evaluated in relation to more demanding structural problems. However, it can be said that Long is sharper or less flexible than Bhatia about welcoming other factors. As he points out in his other articles as well (Long, 2016b, 2017), the question of what Africanness means, or what the essence of African Psychology is, should be abandoned altogether. Instead, it is necessary to focus on issues such as inequality and violence—and, of course, there are other

African psychologists who oppose Long's more structural orientation from a more culturalist position (e.g., Nwoye, 2018, Oppong, 2022). Even though I place Hwang in the culturalist camp, for example, he argues for the consideration of the cultural system and the structural system (also called the sociocultural system in his analysis) together. Nevertheless, while giving credit to their importance, he does not refer explicitly to structural issues. For this reason, it can be said that he deemphasizes or brackets structural issues by prioritizing the cultural system for indigenous Psychologies.

Kirschner takes a different path in her criticism of indigenous Psychology. She thinks that the influence of the cultural or the structural in understanding our psychological world might be exaggerated by psychologists. She points out that “although we are formed by sociocultural texts and contexts, they are not all that we are” (p. 104). The over-emphasis of indigenous Psychologies on the cultural may cause them to bypass our purely individual sides. Even though our subjectivity is shaped by our sociocultural context, we still have, in her own words, “some wishes, desires, envies, aversions, and fears” that do not fit our cultural conventions and moral frameworks (p. 104). Kirschner likens this anti-cultural and anti-social side of us to an undertow. In her commentary on indigenous Psychology, she does not explain much in terms of what she means by “undertow” and only points to it, but if we look at her other latest publications (Kirschner, 2019b, 2020), what Kirschner means can be understood a little more clearly. In the book she co-edited with Jack Martin (2010), she supports the discipline of Psychology`s turn, which they call the sociocultural turn, from an individualistic understanding towards a more socio-cultural approach. However, she currently thinks that this turn, which she also contributed to in her own works, has kept us away from some of the classical phenomena that Psychology has been interested in since its establishment. While thinking it necessary to approach

psychological phenomena from a socio-cultural perspective, Kirschner (2019b) argues that the indispensable subject of Psychology is interiority or inner life in general. According to her, what will not change according to the culture, which is also mentioned by some pioneer psychologists like William James, is that the inner world of each of us is unique and singular and not entirely accessible by another person. And in her latest publication (2020), by referring to sociologist Dennis H. Wrong's concept of *oversocialized man* (Wrong, 1963), Kirschner takes the position that psychologists who have contributed to the sociocultural turn of the discipline "go too far in the ways they foreground sociality as foundational for a psychology of individual human beings" and therefore the “subject” in Psychology is “oversocialized” (p. 772). One of the points Kirschner emphasizes is that there are some “counter-currents or undertows” against the social and cultural world in the subjective world of the individual (p. 778). What she means by the counter-currents and undertows is that every individual has desires and wishes that can disrupt the social order. According to her, these desires and wishes precede culture. Following sociologist Wrong (1963) again, for Kirschner, the question that needs to be asked is how social order is possible and maintained despite all these counter-currents in the inner life of human beings. She admits that the ways of regulating these counter-currents vary from culture to culture. However, she emphasizes that the counter-currents of inner life are a kind of commonality that can be seen in all cultures. She also admits that counter-currents or the idea of desires preceding culture is difficult to articulate. However, she thinks that her work is a provocative beginning for arguments against the oversocialized subjectivity of Psychology.

In sum, in these recent criticisms of IP, one can see here the tension between the three basic factors in social theory, which pointed out above with reference to Sil (2000). Different researchers draw attention to the factor they attach greater importance to, or the side they think it

is lacking in the literature. To the extent that they respond to these marked shortcomings, one can predict that indigenous Psychologies will transform by swaying between these tension points—the cultural, the structural, and the individual, and acquire a more eclectic structure in the future.

CHAPTER 7

Indigenizing Psychology Curriculum in Türkiye

This dissertation is not an exhaustive review of the numerous iterations of indigenous Psychologies. Rather, within the structurally complex literature of indigenous Psychology, it can be thought of as a narrow *corridor* opening to many side rooms. After providing its theoretical framework in the first chapter, it clarified the main conceptual elements of the notion of indigenous Psychology (Chapter 2) and put this notion in its place among the other culture-oriented perspectives in the history of the discipline of Psychology (Chapter 3). Following this, it distinguished between two fundamental conceptions of culture that are used in indigenous Psychology literature (Chapter 4). Afterwards, using a multi-layered analytical structure, it addressed one of the most—arguably *the* most—mentioned notions in this literature, individualism, and separated it into its components (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 summarized some of the criticisms of indigenous Psychology.

In this last chapter (Chapter 7), the dissertation contextualizes itself in the author`s own cultural world and concludes by proposing an undergraduate course syllabus on the historical development of Psychology in Türkiye. In a sense, this chapter will be a tentative conclusion as the *room* at the end of the corridor to which everything so far has led us. It should be noted that although here this chapter serves as the destination, it is but one of many possible doors off the narrow corridor.

Although Türkiye shows similarities to other countries participating in the discussions about the indigenization of Psychology in terms of the course of Psychology (that is, having late institutionalization; having visiting academics from abroad and Turkish academics educated abroad; and adopting the structure of American Psychology after the 1950s etc.), the academic

community in Türkiye has not effectively participated in this discussion so far. In this sense, first and foremost, this chapter has been written to draw Türkiye into this discussion. Moreover, I believe that the exponential institutional growth of Psychology in Türkiye in the last 20 years and the diversity of content that comes with this growth creates an interesting case for the international literature on *indigenization*. In addition, considering the problem that indigenous Psychologies predominantly remain an academic niche subject and are not reflected in the curricula of universities the world over, the course syllabus on the historical development of Psychology in Türkiye (see Appendix) makes a modest contribution to the gap in the literature.

Introduction to the Chapter

A quick look at the history of Psychology in Türkiye will reveal patterns similar to the discipline`s history in other non-Western countries, for instance: Psychology's first entry in Türkiye was at a more or less the same time as that in Western countries (the late 1800s); the disciplinary practice was largely established independently of its own tradition by visiting scholars or foreign-trained academics; after 1950, it has been highly influenced by the rising American Psychology; for a long time the discipline of Psychology remained underdeveloped due to lack of resources, and although it is now institutionally entrenched and developed in the country, there are still no or limited indigenous components in the content of the academic Psychology.

As many indigenous psychologists have pointed out (Dalal, 2002; Moghaddam, 1993), the main problem in the context of indigenization can be defined as psychologists having different (mental) states of being between two worlds—the everyday world and the academic world—or as experiencing a gap, distance, or alienation between these two worlds. This incompatibility can also be seen as a mismatch between the modern institutions of society and its

traditional understandings (Moghaddam & Taylor, 1985). In my view, the story of Psychology in Türkiye is no exception to this; in Türkiye as well, there is a gap between the everyday world of psychologists and their academic practice. This may not be a problem for some or even may not be seen as a gap, so much as a common jargon-related difference between expert knowledge and everyday knowledge. But for the promoters of the notion of indigenous Psychology, this gap represents a point of discrepancy between *academia* and *society* that needs to be resolved.

In terms of its problems, even though Psychology in Türkiye does not differ from the countries where the proposals for an indigenous Psychology arose, Türkiye is rarely mentioned among countries that have made contributions to the indigenization movement in Psychology – those such as India, Korea, the Philippines, China, and Mexico. Certainly, one can say this movement has not attracted many psychologists and can be regarded as on the margin of Psychology not only in Türkiye but also worldwide. Yet still, in comparison with many other developing countries, Türkiye is not seen as an active participant in either this indigenization movement or discussion, except by its absence. Several accounts about Turkish Psychology address the lack of indigenous perspective (e.g., Acar & Şahin 1990; Başaran & Şahin, 1990; Boratav, 2004; Gülerce, 2012; Öngel & Smith, 1999), but just a few of them provide an insight into the reasons for this. For example, Batur, (2011) pointed out that as a peripheral country, Türkiye's political/economic dependence on center countries caused it to be under the influence of these centers, and this situation has also been dramatically reflected in its academia. In a similar vein, Vassaf (1992) summarizes the development of Turkish Psychology as follows:

> The changing dependency of Turkish psychology from one Western country to another has meant that the discipline has not established its own independent tradition. Instead, an export-import relationship has prevailed, with Turkey importing concepts and instruments, not on the basis of its needs or intellectual tradition, but rather on the basis of what is readily available from the West. Furthermore, what is to be imported has been

> determined not by conscious scientific choice, but by the particular political alliance of the country at the time. (p. 384)

Although it is not possible to pinpoint separate periods, it is possible to observe the French and British influence on the Turkish elites in the last period of the 19th century, the German influence towards the First World War, and the American influence after the 1950s. In the context of Psychology, accordingly, one can see translations of French and English books in the last period of the 19th century, German visiting scholars and their attempt of establishing laboratories around the First World War, and American visiting scholars and scholarship opportunities after the 1950s. Since then, Psychology in Turkey has protected and developed its American mainstream character. However, there are some signs of diversification within the recent *Psychology boom* in the country, albeit limited one.

The Psychology Boom in Türkiye

Despite Psychology's early appearance in the 1860s in Türkiye (then the Ottoman Empire), its institutionalization as an independent department was actualized much later, around the 1930s, with the number of Psychology departments increasing only slowly until 2002 (Batur, 2006). The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 and aimed to disseminate higher education throughout the country, embracing a policy of *a university in every city*. Besides founding a university in each city, the AKP expedited the neoliberal transformation by reducing state regulation, increasing privatization, and encouraging free enterprise, which in turn prompted entrepreneurs to found private universities. These measures had their effects. There has been a general increase in enrollments in higher education and Psychology has become one of the most popular majors in Türkiye. While there were only 14 Psychology departments in 2002, there are now 116 Psychology departments. More than one hundred Psychology

departments have been inaugurated in the last 20 years and the total Psychology student intake has increased exponentially[67] (Sümer, 2016).

Although academic Psychology in Türkiye has been shaped in a monolithic way and is still far from reflecting the cultural richness of the society, with the recent growth of the discipline, one can see that the content of Psychology has diversified, and psychological knowledge started to spread more into everyday language. Along with the dramatic increases in departments and enrollments, academic Psychology in Türkiye is *slightly* transforming from a more monolithic to a more pluralistic discipline. This recent political transformation, on the one hand, has prompted an Islamic stream of Psychology as well as a neoliberal popular psychology; on the other hand, opponents to the currently dominant political discourse have embraced a critical psychological perspective focused on social justice.

Since Islam is the identity of the majority in Türkiye, one can say that the rise of Islamic Psychology is a sign of indigenization in terms of going back to our cultural reality. It could also be said that the rise in the critical psychological perspective may potentially re-construct Psychology in Türkiye. However, this diversification still remains on the margins of academia and more importantly, recent changes have not been reflected in the curriculum.

In 1982, with the purpose of controlling the increasing number of universities, the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) was established. This council is still active and responsible for planning higher education and regulating university curricula. In 1990, Başaran and Şahin introduced the four-year bachelor's degree program of Psychology which was regulated by the Council. According to this program, Psychology was neatly divided into five subfields: social, developmental, experimental, clinical, and psychometry. Though to my knowledge there is no

[67] The updated information can be found on this website: https://www.psikolojiarsiv.com/turkiyenin-psikoloji-bolumu-haritasi/

systematic inquiry regarding the content of curricula today, a quick glance at the web pages of Psychology departments may reveal that, compared with those of thirty years ago, not much has changed: the national curriculum still predominates, and its contents and materials are mainly based on mainstream Psychology.

Despite the expanding literature on indigenous Psychologies worldwide, indigenous psychologists note that no fundamental change has been observed in the curricula of Psychology departments in general. As noted above, the ideas generated around the notion of indigenous Psychology still remain largely in academic books and conferences as a niche interest. Only sometimes do these ideas find a place in the curriculum of culture-related courses. In a similar vein, in Türkiye, despite the dramatic growth and partial diversification of Psychology—that could be seen as a partial indigenization—the academic Psychology curriculum across the country generally maintains its standardized Western content and form. The content of the history of Psychology course is particularly important, as it is its historiography to a degree that restructures the identity of Psychology (Pickren, 2009). Based on this idea, this chapter seeks to answer the question of how a new history of Psychology course can be structured so that it prompts Psychology undergraduate students to ask questions about the identity of Psychology and kindle further change in Psychology in Türkiye. Before answering this, it would be useful to take a brief look at the history of the institutionalization of Psychology in Türkiye to see what historical context such a course would be placed in.

A Brief History of Psychology in Türkiye

The word psychology, in a Turkishized version *psikoloji*, was first seen in the late Ottoman Era (Batur, 2006). When Ottoman statesmen established the first modern university, the *Darülfünun* (meaning the house of sciences, now İstanbul University), to be able to keep up with

the Western world, it was decided to teach a course entitled Psychology (or with its Ottoman equivalent, *İlm-i ahval-i ruh*). It was not actualized at that time, but one can see some original and translated Psychology-related books in this period (e.g., Bilgin, 1988). Many authors used psychology and the science of the soul (ilmun nefs or ilmi ahvali ruh) together in their titles with the conjunction "or" between them[68].

Those scholars tried to make sense of this new discipline within their traditional scientific or philosophical understanding. I regard this as a pre-disciplinary phase and these books as attempts to reconcile the old scholarly works with the new scientific inquiry.

According to the widely accepted historiography of Turkish Psychology, Psychology`s institutional beginning can officially be dated to *Darülfünun* with Georg Anschütz (e.g., Acar & Şahin, 1990; Başaran & Şahin, 1990; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1994; Gülerce, 2006, 2012). Anschütz was one of the German-speaking scholars who came to the Empire at the invitation of the government of the day in 1915. According to Batur (2005), this starting point reflects an origin myth far from reality. Most probably, situating Anschütz at the starting point has allowed Turkish institutions to claim the so-called long tradition of experimental Psychology in Türkiye. In fact, Anschütz did not find a fertile academic milieu and returned to Germany after three years in 1918. Because of the war environment and military mobilization, the number of male students was insufficient in the *Darülfünun*, not to mention the complete absence of female ones. What he left behind him was only a five-page article and unfortunately, the chair of experimental Psychology remained empty for quite a while (Batur, 2005). So, while the official history starts with German experimentalism, after the German-speaking scholars left the Empire, this attempt at educational

[68] Tümer (2008) points out that the conjunction *or* (*yahut*) is used in most of the titles of Turkish literary books—especially translations—in the 19th century. Authors of the time used both new words and their traditional equivalents. This trend could be seen in the Ottoman Empire's Psychology-related books of the 19th century.

reform failed to take root. In the meantime, in 1919, along with experimental Psychology division, the General Psychology division was established under the department of philosophy again in the *Darülfünun*. Mustafa Şekip Tunç—who had received his Ph.D. in the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute—was appointed as the first chairman.

In 1923, the Ottoman Empire was transformed into the Republic of Türkiye. Following the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the incomplete attempt at educational reforms was taken over by the first republican elites under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). Although Türkiye has never had colonial rule, it went through a strict modernization/ secularization project conducted by these elites, which included the abolition of the caliphate, the alphabet change from Arabic to Latin, a new dress code, a new legal system and so on. According to Batur (2011), the discipline of Psychology in Türkiye derives from the politics of these modernizing elites.

In fact, for a long time Psychology as a new concept had a limited place in academia being overshadowed by philosophy. For this reason, the dramatic influence of the Republican reforms can be better understood in the context of philosophy. Philosophy was an important, classic academic branch with deep roots in the Turk-Islamic tradition and therefore, it became one of the main targets of these reforms. After the 1933 University Reform, the department of philosophy was re-founded by Hans Reichenbach—one of the famous positivist philosophers of the time (Irzık, 2011). Philosophy was re-structured as a positivistic discipline to erase any Islamic philosophical perspective from the University. Direk (1998), a contemporary academic philosopher in Türkiye, describes this period as violent in the sense of violently silencing our past. In a similar vein, traditional science of the soul was excluded from the university

curriculum. It could be said that academia in general and Psychology in particular were founded upon the modernization/secularization project of Türkiye[69].

In 1933, a university reform was undertaken and the *Darülfünun*—the only institution of higher education at the time—was transformed to Istanbul University. Following this reform, Psychology became an independent discipline in Istanbul University. Until the 1950s, this was the only Psychology department across the country along with one Psychology chair under the department of philosophy in Ankara. In this period, new visiting experimental psychologists like Wilhelm Peters (in Istanbul) and Egon Brunswick (in Ankara) came. However, the positions they occupied were short-term academics posts, and all the laboratories they established were closed and forgotten once they departed, leaving no scientific continuity for subsequent researchers. The most remarkable study during this period was about the IQ levels of Turkish school-children which was conducted by Wilhelm Peters (Batur, in press). At the time of rising Turkish nationalism, the choice of this research topic was no coincidence. For Batur (2006), this study had an ideological role in proving scientifically that there was no obstacle (at least mentally) to the Westernization of Turkish people. In this kind of political environment, the development of an indigenous or other perspective which that incompatible with the dominant political discourse was unlikely.

After the 1950s, Psychology began to grow institutionally in tandem with the country's inclusion into the orbit of western powers. Türkiye first joined the United Nations (1945), and second, joined NATO (1952) and became a close ally of the US. Only four Psychology departments were established after the 1950s up until the 1980s. As in other parts of the world,

[69] According to Batur (2006), as an exception, Mustafa Şekip Tunç tried to reconstruct Bergsonian philosophy through the lens of the Ottoman tradition. It can be argued that Şekip`s perspective can be regarded as the first attempt at an indigenizing Psychology—albeit not with this name; however, all of these small efforts faded away with Americanization after the 1950s.

Psychology in Türkiye especially started to build its American character after World War II. Students from Türkiye were sent to the US through the scholarships systems of UNESCO and Fulbright and also American scholars sponsored by the same scholarships gave lectures for short periods in Türkiye.

So, the disciplinary rise of Psychology and the general rise of higher education in Türkiye coincided with Türkiye`s American turn in politics. This was no coincidence, of course. Türkiye was getting financial support from the States in return for their mission of being an anti-communist buffer against the Soviets. Pickren (2009) points to the Bandung conference organized by the Non-Aligned Movement and to the importance of this conference for indigenization movements in social/human sciences. At first Türkiye did not want to join the Bandung conference, but eventually sent a representative on the advice of the USA and declared its deep antipathy towards communism there (Baba & Ertan, 2017). This was Türkiye`s task assigned by its allies.

After 1980, with newly-established departments, Psychology started to grow more institutionally. But especially after 2002, Psychology has experienced a dramatic growth.

Recent Growth and Partial Diversification of Academic Psychology

It is difficult to say that Psychology in Türkiye is a totally imported discipline, but in terms of its concepts, theories, methods, and research questions, it did not arise from the Turkish tradition of philosophy and its cultural heritage; rather it has been largely imitative of American mainstream Psychology. Admittedly, as a remainder of an ethnically diverse empire, the Republic of Türkiye has been trying to deal with a heavy inheritance since its foundation. However, this modern nation-state narrowly defined its appropriate citizen and culture and structured its national education based on its narrow nationalist ideology. Considering

Psychology`s dependence on politics in Türkiye, we can say that the underrepresentation of *culture* in academia and the underrepresentation in politics go hand in hand. For example, Başaran and Şahin (1990) surprisedly point out how American mainstream Psychology did not face any rival discourse in Türkiye. Gülerce (2012) curiously asks "why an indigenous psychology did not emerge over the past century in this land, which is known both geographically and metaphorically as the `oldest cradle of civilizations`" (p. 548). This question is indeed a matter of curiosity because Psychology in Türkiye has not interacted much with the existing culture. The fact that the academic milieu in Türkiye, as mentioned by Batur (2006) above, has been derived from the Turkish state`s modernizing politics and the fact that a free intellectual environment has not been formed in this milieu can be shown as two important reasons.

Further reasons can be mentioned. Türkiye was not colonized by a Western state and therefore did not take a rigid anticolonial attitude reactively. In particular, given the political and economic alliance that developed between Türkiye and the United States after 1950, an anti-American attitude did not develop. So, there was no anti-Western or more specifically anti-American tendency that would serve as catalyst for an indigenous defensive move. In addition, the fact that during Ottoman times, the Empire developed a policy that was more open to integration with the West in the interest of conquering it economically, politically and in terms of religion may be a reason for the lack of a general anti-Western attitude in Türkiye (Kalın, 2016). It can be said that this recent and distant historical background has created an intellectual ground for Turkish academics for integration rather than reaction against and rejection of the Western world. Of course, besides this historical background, some systemic problems based on economic underdevelopment can be perceived to lie behind the disciplinary underdevelopment.

But the intriguing question for today is: despite recent significant institutional growth in Psychology, why isn't there a corresponding diversification (in the sense of indigenization) in the discipline of Psychology in Türkiye? As noted above, more than one hundred Psychology departments have been inaugurated in the last 20 years and the total Psychology student intake has increased exponentially. Yet little to no diversification has developed in tandem with such institutional growth.

Albeit limited, there is a content change in Psychology in Türkiye along with its institutional growth. Most of the newly established Psychology departments are based in private universities (60-70 %), and some of those are funded by conservative individuals or foundations. In these universities, one can see some endeavours to reconcile modern Psychology and the traditional science of the soul. For example, in 2018 in the new private Ibn Khaldun University, two academics held a six-week dialogue on the relation between *ilmun nefs* (the science of the nafs) and modern Psychology[70]. In another example, the *International Association of Islamic Psychology*[71] held its inaugural conference at another newly established university, Zaim University, in October 2018[72]. It is doubtful one could see this kind of discussion or a conference having this title happening in other relatively old Psychology departments. Although Islamic Psychology is a growing international movement, researchers note that active participation and contribution from Türkiye to this movement is limited to a few researchers (Ağılkaya-Şahin, 2019). At this point, as an exception, a recently launched platform can be mentioned. Established

[70] https://psy.ihu.edu.tr/en/ilm-i-nefs-and-modern-Psychology-dialog
[71] Founded in 2017, this association continues to grow with the participation of researchers from many parts of the world. Currently, there are a few diploma and certificate programs on Islamic Psychology certified by this association (e.g., in Cambridge Muslim College).
[72] https://www.izu.edu.tr/en/events/2018/10/26/default-calendar/islamic-Psychology-conference

in February 2020, this new platform is called *Psychology/Psychotherapy in Islamic Thought*. On the website of this platform[73], the group describes themselves as follows:

> The Platform of Psychology/Psychotherapy in Islamic Thought is a platform based on voluntariness that aims to examine theoretical discussions in the context of Islamic thought and modern science/psychology, and the practical contributions to the use of concepts and actions in Islamic thought in psychotherapy practices, and organizes seminars, symposiums, reading groups and publications in line with this purpose.

It brings together academics from philosophy and theology departments who currently study the classical texts of Muslim thinkers, and Psychology students, and explores how these texts from the past can be related to current Psychology concepts/findings. The first work incorporating the discussions and activities on this platform has been published recently in Turkish (see Toprak, 2021).

It seems as though all of those attempts to reconcile tradition with change at the beginning of Psychology in the late Ottoman Era, which were stifled by the Republicans, are coming back in a new guise. Historian of Psychology Danziger in his book (1997) *Naming the mind* indicates that when he visited Gadjah Mada University in the 1950s, he was surprised to see that along with modern Psychology, a traditional psychological course was being taught entitled *ilmu djiwa*, which roughly translates as science of the soul. Although he notes in an interview (see Brock, 1995) that during his later visits to Indonesia in the 1980s this traditional course was no longer being taught, Danziger's earlier testimony about the 1950s continued to be enlisted as evidence by psychologists who critically point out that Western Psychology is not universal and there are or may be different Psychologies across the world. In the near future, it is likely to see some courses that incorporate a traditional psychological understanding similar to *ilmu djiwa* in Türkiye with a similar nomenclature: *ilmun nefs* and/or *ilmu ahvali ruh.* Although

[73] https://islamvepsikoloji.com/?lang=en

this traditional understanding was alive when modern Psychology first appeared in Türkiye at the end of the 1800s, it was not included in the curriculum of the Psychology department newly institutionalized at the time of the secular transformation of the Turkish Republic; nor, since then, has modern Psychology in Türkiye been challenged by any alternative understanding. However, with the recent rising discourse of returning to the roots, which has grown in parallel with the last twenty years of sociopolitical change in Türkiye, one can see that Islamic traditional terms (such as *ilm*, *nefs* and *ruh*) have recently started to circulate again among Psychology academics and students, albeit in limited circles.

Since Islam is the identity of the majority in Türkiye, one can say that there is a sign of indigenization in terms of going back to our cultural reality. But while we go back to our tradition, we should be aware that we are reinventing our tradition in a different context. We should be vigilant that the discipline of Psychology is being diversified in an economic and political context in Türkiye, which is currently undergoing a neoliberal change, and that the discipline of Psychology is being transformed accordingly. Even though there is no explicit political agenda specifically concerning Psychology, one can see that Psychology is being infused with neoliberal influences.

Let me share one striking example: a dramatic incident occurred in 2018 in Kocaeli, a city of Türkiye. A Turkish man—who used to work as a machinist but was left unemployed after injuring his arm because of a work-related accident—committed suicide. According to the claim of some journalists, because he could not afford to buy trousers for his son’s school uniform, he thought he was inadequate to maintain his family and killed himself. After many people disseminated this dramatic news in social media by criticizing the officials, the governor's office

of the city had to make a statement:[74] "... As a result of the research and investigation, it is understood that this news does not reflect the reality and that the cause of the incident is based on *psychological* reasons …" (my translation). They meant he committed suicide not for out of economic but psychological hardship. I think this dramatic incident is just one example of the rising popularity of the terms of *psychology* and *psychological*, which are used in a merely personal sense, in a sense of neoliberal responsibilization and individualisation.

This neoliberal attraction to Psychology can also be seen in the rising popular psychology in Türkiye. For example, consider some of the best-selling titles: *Everything starts with you; Everything starts in your brain*. One can find these kinds of books in best-selling lists of the bookstores in Türkiye. Besides these standard self-help books, there are also some Sufi self-help books. For example, some of the best-selling titles are like: *Tears of love; Sufi therapy; If your heart is clean, your story ends happy*.

There is a soothing entanglement between the distorted version of Sufism and neoliberalism in self-help books. It is distorted because this kind of Sufism is a benign conservative element in the service of neoliberalism. The idea is that the most important thing is inner peace and inner development, while practice is mundane relatively unimportant. For instance, there is nothing about rising consumerism and extravagance unlike what we see in some classical Islamic approaches, while internalization or internal happiness is emphasized. However, it is generally acknowledged that Sufism is the inner core of Islam and practice is important as well as inner faith (e.g., Karamustafa, 2007). Lipton (2011) calls this *secular Sufism* which is supported by American neoconservatives. This secular Sufism is generally

[74] https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-45611757

conceptualized as a so-called tolerant moderate Islamic understanding against a radical Islamic understanding.

Another notable development or variation in academic Psychology is a burgeoning critical Psychology group mainly comprised of young Turkish and Kurdish leftists who emphasize social justice (see Kayaoğlu & Batur, 2013). In 2010, the *Association of Psychologists for Solidarity* (TODAP) was established by a group of independent psychologists. The stated aim of this occupational organization is to provide psychologists "an egalitarian and libertarian basis of social solidarity" and to discuss psychological theories and practices from a critical stance (see www.todap.org). For instance, the first critical Psychology book was translated into Turkish by this organization. A symposium of Critical Psychology is organized by TODAP biennially. They publish the *Critical Psychology Bulletin* online intermittently.

In brief, while academic Psychology in Türkiye begins to include Islamic and critical perspectives, we can also note the rise of popular psychology and psychologization in daily life. It would be intriguing to see such kind of diversification of psychological literature in a history of Psychology course.

Course and Syllabus Design

As mentioned above, the structure of academic Psychology in Türkiye does not reflect the diversity of the society. Also, no recent developments are reflected in the curriculum. Of course, the history of Psychology undergraduate course is no exception. On the contrary, it is conducted in a highly uniform and standardised manner. In these classes in general, students see some pioneers of Psychology and schools of thought from the development of Psychology in the West. But they do not see anything about any contribution from their own country. For example, one of the best-selling Psychology textbooks is Schultz and Schultz's (2000) book *A history of*

modern psychology. The publishing house of the Turkish translation of this book, *Kaknüs*, markets this book as "the Most Read Resource Book of the History of Psychology in the World"[75]. Although some other history of Psychology books with a more critical perspective have been translated into Turkish, for example, Graham Richards`s (2009) *Putting psychology in its place,* it seems that these books have not even made their second edition.

In this chapter, my question is, how can I indigenize a history of Psychology course in Türkiye? In other words, how can I make this course relevant in the Turkish context? The most pressing question that I face in this task is whether I should merge *our* history of Psychology in Türkiye into *a* history of modern Western Psychology or I should follow a separate path by reconstructing a history of Psychology in Türkiye in its own right? Simplistically stated, will it be an integrated or an independent course? Based on a couple of factors, I have chosen the second path: teaching a history of Psychology in Türkiye as an independent course. Since the discipline of Psychology in Türkiye, compared to its Western counterparts, is in an underdeveloped phase, writing or teaching a comparative or integrative history would be a daunting task. In this sense I do not want to present a meaningless hodgepodge like adding a little bit Turkish flavour on a Western main course and stirring. Moreover, another problem which complicates this kind of integration is that there is not only *one* history of modern Psychology. It would be much more appropriate to approach various histories of (Western) Psychology in their own right. For this reason, I have constructed a separate course on a history of Psychology in Türkiye to be taken along with a prerequisite of a history of modern Western Psychology course. Despite mine being a separate course, it will make more sense comparatively placed in a general historiography of Psychology. This kind of

[75] http://www.kaknus.com.tr/urun/modern-psikoloji-tarihi/

contextualization will be possible only with having a critical prior knowledge of contextual histories of Psychology in the West.

Questions to Consider: Where to Start and What to Include?

After setting my general task as teaching a separate course on a history of Psychology in Türkiye, one of the first questions come to mind is where to start? Limited historiographies of Psychology in Türkiye usually begin with pre-scientific or pre-disciplinary times in the late Ottoman era. Mentioning first books written under the name of psychology is a typical start. For example, in Bilgin`s (1988) bibliographical work, 86 Psychology-related books are listed, published between 1876-1928. Half of them comprise translations, written by philosophers who use Psychology in their works. According to Bilgin, the other original monographs mainly reflect the Islamic theological notion of *ruh* (soul). Besides these books, psychologists usually refer to the first Psychology courses given (or planned) in the first modern higher education institution of the Ottoman Empire, *Darülfünun*. Following this pre-disciplinary period, as noted above, psychologists generally point to Georg Anschütz's (1886-1953) name as a founding figure. As historian Kılıç (2015) points out, before determining a starting point for Psychology in Türkiye, we should discuss which Turkish term or concept was used for psychology and how it was classified among the other sciences in the late Ottoman era. But psychologists confine themselves to mentioning this pre-scientific period in passing. For this reason, in this course, I plan to urge students to discuss different terms related to human psychology used in everyday or academic settings.

While constructing such a new course, another pertinent question becomes: what should be included and what should be excluded in a history course? As Danziger (2006a) points out, finding your unifying and thematic principle is an important point which requires "decisions

about what to include and what to exclude" (p. 208). In other words, what is my unifying principle in this course? Should I trace the paths of schools of thought, great psychologists or institutions in Türkiye? Whatever one I follow, I will be facing a dearth of literature. The historiography of Psychology in Türkiye is very limited to its beginning or emergence. This literature is mostly comprised of the writings of the eminent psychologists who are not specialized in the history of the discipline (e.g., Acar & Şahin, 1990; Başaran & Şahin, 1990; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1994). These kinds of historiographies generally repeat a standardized story of Psychology in Türkiye. As an exception, Sertan Batur, who is distinguished by training as a psychologist-historian, critically writes on the history of Psychology in Türkiye by placing it in its socio-political context (e.g., Batur, 2005, 2006, 2011). In addition to this, Rüya Kılıç, as a professional historian, recently published a couple of articles on the history of Psychology in Türkiye (e.g., Kılıç, 2015, 2017). To the best of my knowledge, she is the only historian who writes on this topic. To this list, one can add Kutluğhan Soyubol who is a young historian working on the psy-disciplinary practices (mostly psychiatry) of the early Republic of Türkiye (e.g., Soyubol, 2018, 2021).

I will benefit from this existing literature on the history of Psychology, but if I confine myself to it, I will be only focusing on the emergence and/or intra-disciplinary developments of the discipline. However, I would like to bring the story of Psychology up to date and put it into its context. To do this, I will make sense of the history of Psychology in the context of socio-political change of Türkiye. Batur (2006) points to Psychology`s heightened *dependence* on politics as the main characteristic of the discipline in Türkiye. There is probably no discipline of Psychology independent of politics in the world, but this is more evident in our case. As

mentioned above, Batur makes this observation about the early development of Psychology in Türkiye (roughly for the period between 1908-1960).

I think this dependency is, albeit indirect, still valid in the context of the current Psychology in Türkiye (An example would be the rise of Islamic Psychology today in the era of culturally conservative government). By using this dependency as my unifying theme, I will try to place the history of the intra-disciplinary development of Psychology (including important figures, studies and institutions) in a history of the larger socio-political change in Türkiye. In doing so, I will be presenting the contextual picture of Psychology in Türkiye and bringing its story from the constitutional monarchy of the Ottoman Empire (from the times when we first heard the word psychology in a Turkishized version *psikoloji*) to today`s neoliberal democracy of modern Türkiye (to the times Psychology has become a popular discipline).

What is My Objective?

I regard a history of Psychology course as a kind of practice to think about the *identity* of Psychology in general. This practice urges us to ask a basic question: what is psychology? I remember that in my very first undergraduate class, our professor—an eminent cognitive psychologist, who has a doctorate from a birthplace of cognitive science, Dartmouth College—was surprised to hear that his first-year students predominantly think that Psychology is the science of the soul. In a dismissive manner, he pointed out that psychologists cannot work on something that they cannot define and measure. However, in my view, the problem is that the science of the soul is a dictionary definition of Psychology in Turkish, not an academic one of course, so it is understandable to receive this answer from a bunch of new students who know little about Psychology. I believe that some of the students even did not imply religious soul but meant the interiority of human-beings. But the problem is when academics just dismiss and close

the discussion, they are not solving the problem; instead, they are "helping" students to repress their curiosity. Especially, if religion is at stake, this kind of dismissive attitude is more problematic because it may cause you to *over-sacralise* your banned perspective.

This personal experience inspires me about how a course should not be taught. As I mentioned in the very beginning, my aim is to make a *history of Psychology* course relevant for undergraduate students in Türkiye. In a sense, this is to ask, how have we made sense of psychology? and what does it currently mean to us? In my view, there lies one deep question behind these disciplinary questions: what does it mean to be human? Considering the vastness of this question, I respect students` own conceptualizations about psychology and their current living understandings (be they folk, scientific or popular) about human psyche. For example, I do not regard positivistic Psychology as a totally foreign product since people may use it to make sense of themselves. I do not rigidly classify perspectives as *Western* or *Indigenous*. Rather I regard some of them as older and some of them as more recent traditions. Starting from these fundamental questions, in this history course, I plan to present the story of the emergence and expansion of the discipline of Psychology in Türkiye. My aim is to look at our disciplinary history and its main outcomes in order to expose our narrow-minded perspective on Psychology in Türkiye and urge our students to enrich their notions of psychology. This is basically saying that "Psychology is not unified and monolithic as it seems". As *a kind of reflection on the discipline`s own practices* such a history course might open an agentic space for students to reflectively think about themselves and their cultures.

What is My Philosophy of Teaching?

I regard my teaching practice as a democratic endeavour in the sense of *fostering diversity* and *increasing inclusivity*. My vision for this course reflects my larger vision for my

country. Türkiye is a beautifully diverse country, and it has a huge potential for a democratic co-existence of all its differences. However, its pluralist potential is not truly represented by academia. What I mean by the pluralist potential of Türkiye is closely related to my way of describing the cultural reality in Türkiye. Inspired by Blaser`s (2009) conceptualization, I would like to describe my culture with a different framework: *political ontologies*. I think the concept of political ontology may help us to understand the divergences/contradictions between academia and society in Türkiye and the conflictual picture around the subject matters of Psychology.

I use this concept to refer to the heterogeneous culture of Türkiye. I do not want to refer to a specific or unique reality in my culture but to reveal the heterogeneity of my society. People may polarize around limited and ideological conceptualizations about the notion of *our culture*. However, the prevailing culture of Türkiye is a kind of hybrid culture comprising different political ontologies. For example, there are different beliefs regarding the existence of things; some of them are more traditional (e.g., Unity of existence or Islamic apparentism) and some others are more recent (e.g., Positivism). Different ontologies in one society/culture or in an individual's mind can interact and mingle with each other. And politics is actively involved in these meaning-making activities.

Sait Başer (2013), cultural historian, points out that people who belong to different political identities in Türkiye use the same word with different meanings. The question is, in what ways and with what kind of *faith* are we using the word *psychology*? In other words, what kind of meanings are we attributing to it? I think it is vital to reveal competing *political ontologies* behind the ways of making sense of psychology because different ontologies cause conflicts, disputes and crises of meaning between people in Türkiye. This is a critical obstacle to the democratization of Türkiye. Apparently, in my very first undergraduate class, we witnessed a

kind of repressed crisis of meaning between our professor and some of his undergraduate students. In this sense, the concept of *political ontology* may better reflect the tension between the dominant ideology of the state/academia and the pluralistic nature of the society in Türkiye.

History as an academic discipline and daily topic of conversation is a contested field in Türkiye. It is a huge political battlefield which is generally used by a range of interested parties to support a certain understanding of human nature and a certain type of citizen. People go back to different historical beginnings and embrace different historiographies in accordance with their preferred ontologies and political ideologies. For instance, whereas the more secular faction may see their Ottoman past as dark ages of Türkiye, the other more religious faction may feel Türkiye entered a heretical age with the Kemalist (Secularist) regime. We are ideologically split between the prescientific, traditional, religious, imperial Ottoman Empire and the scientific, modern, secular Republic. Similarly, psychologists generally dismiss our pre-disciplinary phase as religious, unscientific or they mention this period in passing.

However, the science of the soul is not only a pre-disciplinary phase of Psychology in Türkiye but also an existing culture in Turkish daily life. An encounter of a religious culture and a secular education produces hybrid minds. So, the transition from a religious to a secular political ontology is never a linear or consistent transition but always a peculiar and individual mixture. The challenge is how to do justice to this hybridity in an undergraduate course.

In his conference talk, historian K. Soyubol eloquently describes our relation to our past: Türkiye “consciously severed all ties with its Islamic past and unconsciously continued almost imperceptible conversation with structures and categories inherited from this path” (Soyubol, 2017, 05:32). In the spirit of Soyubol`s perception, I would argue that conceptual or historical continuity in a history of Psychology is important for non-Westerners. In constructing a history

of Psychology in non-Western contexts, the challenging is to avoid a certain presentism while linking present modern Psychology to past traditional ideas. Some indigenous psychologists go back to their past and find some scholars/ideas and label them as psychologists/psychological (e.g., Paranjpe, 2015). As also mentioned above in Chapter 3, historians of Psychology criticize this as indeed presentism because no such discipline as Psychology existed before the 19th century and even the word of "psychology" was not heard before the 16th century (e.g., Brock, 2015a). So, those cultural accounts can only be reflexive discourses about what it is to be human. For this reason, even the concept of indigenous Psychology may be an oxymoron for some (e.g., Brock, 2015a). According to these historians, Psychology is Western in origin and cannot be indigenous to non-Western contexts at the same time. In a similar vein, there is a long discussion in the *Advances in the History of Psychology* (AHP) newsletter about distorting the entry on the history of Psychology in Wikipedia. A person who used the nickname *Jagged 85* changed the entry and added some Muslim scholars` names as the first psychologists. This presentist distortion is discussed by some psychologist-historians (e.g., Green, 2008) and the Jagged 85 himself/herself (2008). This discussion is later continued in an issue of the *Psychological Studies* journal with a target article written by Brock (2015a) and commented on by different psychologists (Hartnack, 2015; Hopkins, 2015; Paranjpe, 2015; Valsiner & Brinkmann, 2015). Brock (2015b) replied to these comments.

In this debate, on the one hand, Brock as a historian-psychologist criticizes other commenters as being non-specialists in the history of Psychology (Brock, 2015a, 2015b). On the other hand, some of the commentators (e.g., Paranjpe, 2015; Valsiner & Brinkmann, 2015) give reasons to go back to a distant past before the rise of the modern discipline. They claim that even though there might be some presentist errors in these accounts, their ultimate aim is to

reconstruct their discipline and indigenize their history of Psychology by using these presentist perspectives.

There is a similar debate about going back to ancient roots in historiography. In this debate, Robinson (2013) makes a distinction between *historical discontinuity* and *conceptual discontinuity*, and he claims that the former does not presuppose the latter. That is, there might be some recurring issues like insanity, but this issue can be traced in different conceptual forms throughout human history. In other words, with respect to explanations about human psychology, although there may be no historical continuity between different periods, this does not mean that there is no conceptual continuity at all. However, Danziger (2013) cautions that we should investigate psychological objects in their discursive framework without falling prey to the idea of an unchanging psychological essence. Teo (2013b) argues that these two styles of thought (history of Psychology and philosophy of Psychology) come into conflict with one another, and critical historians of Psychology sometimes wrongly disqualify philosophers of Psychology who use historical knowledge for their theoretical arguments.

These kinds of illuminating debates demonstrate that there are many different and important aspects of this issue. I think that both Brock and Danziger point to potential problems in going back to pre-disciplinary periods. Concurring with Teo (2013b), however, I believe non-Western psychologists can approach their historiographical accounts from their own philosophical perspectives and find some intergenerational thematic connections. I also think that Robinson`s distinction (historical and conceptual continuity) is highly important for non-western contexts. Seeking a continuity in a distant past may not be of paramount interest to Westerners, but it is very important for non-westerners who support the calls for indigenization of Psychology.

I contend that conceptual/historical continuities can partially remedy discontinuities in identity and connect our generation to previous ones. For this reason, we need to reveal a conceptual or historical continuity/discontinuity between the late Ottoman period and the Republic era. By doing so, we may re-form our identity and connect our generation to previous ones. These kinds of historical reconstructions can provide self-confidence. I am aware that there are many problems of going back to the long past of psychology as a subject matter. For this reason, talking about modern Psychology as a discipline by starting from the establishment of laboratories/clinics is safer in the sense of not falling into some historiographical problems like the risk of presentism. However, we should not overlook the fact that history can be loaded with meaning in different contexts and overlooking pre-disciplinary history can be costly in some contexts. Especially for countries having identity crises like Türkiye, a history of a discipline is never just a history of a discipline. People go back to the past to reclaim their identity and vision about the future of their society. I believe the idea of going back to the past for reclaiming one's identity is valid in the context of the discipline of Psychology as well.

As noted above, when a professor dismisses the past as merely religious, non-modern, and non-scientific, he/she may tempt some of his/her students to praise this untouchable past as unmixed and sacred. Our past is probably not as sacred (in the sense of pure) as we imagined but neither is it worthless or to be ignored or just mentioned in passing. Scholars claim that the significant part of Islamic philosophy includes the reinterpretation of Greek philosophy (Fakhry, 1998). It is important to see how scholars in the past appropriated knowledge coming from the West and how Islamic resources were cross-fertilized with other philosophical texts.

My point of departure is the idea that we should respect our students as novice psychologists and their conceptualizations as living. Those pre-disciplinary concepts are still

alive in our daily life. A history of Psychology course can play an important role to urge us to ask questions about the past and present ingredients of Psychology—for example, psyche, life, soul, body, mind, brain, and *nefs* and *ruh* as two concepts used interchangeably in Turkish for *soul*. At this point, I should say that Vidal`s (2011) book *The sciences of the soul: The early modern origins of psychology* is inspirational for me in the sense of demonstrating how Psychology was transformed from the science of the soul to the science of the mind. Starting his account from the 16th century, Vidal meticulously presents different meanings attributed to the word "psychology". Psychology first existed as the science of *the soul as the form of all living organisms in an Aristotelian sense* and later transformed to *the soul as an exclusively human mind*. What distinguishes Vidal`s analysis is that he claims that Psychology as a discipline did exist in the 18th century. This claim may be questionable for some historians (e.g., Brock, 2014c). To me, Vidal`s claim has merit because, I think, histories of Psychology are much focused on institutions and overlook the idea of psychology or its practice. This kind of approach makes non-Western Psychologies seem more imported and foreign than they actually are. As Vidal did for the Western context, psychologists in Türkiye should work on the genealogy of psychology-related words in Turkish. For example, in the context of Türkiye, one can ask: what are the differences between traditional science of the soul and today`s returning science of the soul? And how can we refine the concept of the soul considering contemporary neuroscience? I think these are important questions. Even though such a project is beyond the scope of this work, it is still important to see hybrid meanings attached to the word "soul" in our pre-disciplinary past. Otherwise, we may mistakenly think that our conceptualization of soul is based on only our Islamic canonical texts. Thus, by starting from the appearance of Psychology, I will bring this story up to date to the recent disciplinary expansion or the Psychology boom.

Towards *a* Critical Indigenous Psychology in Türkiye

A history of Psychology course can effectively demonstrate how the discipline of Psychology has remained in a relatively narrow framework of its positivistic rhetoric. For this reason, in the background this course will try to historically discuss the reasons behind the lack of indigenization. In this sense, my work can be labelled as indigenizing (by identifying its absence) a history of Psychology in Türkiye. This is also a critical historiographical approach which, as Rutherford (2014) describes, "often goes beyond the question of what was, to the question of what could be" (p. 867). The question of *what could be* might give new answers to the question of *what might/should be* for the future.

In conclusion, today the political conservatism in Türkiye has been entangled with rising neoliberalism. This political transformation has prompted an Islamic view of Psychology as well as a neoliberal popular Psychology. Even though by consequence academic Psychology is being diversified in Türkiye, it remains a highly apolitical and uncritical practice, no matter whether it is conducted by secular or religious people. As noted above, there is a burgeoning critical Psychology movement mainly comprised of young Turkish and Kurdish leftists who emphasize social justice. But this is still an independent organization and critical Psychology has a very limited place in universities and their curricula. For this reason, being indigenous in a *merely cultural sense* does not solve any issue. We should discuss how to build a critical indigenous Psychology. As a modest step on this path, in this course, I plan to critically present past and present conceptualizations of psychology and urge students to critically think about our discipline`s past and future. I hope people who have different understandings about psychology can engage in a democratic dialogue.

What is the Value of this Course Project?

I place the historiography of Psychology and indigenization of the discipline side by side. This perspective is originally suggested by Danziger (2006a) under the title of *polycentric history*, which is later embraced by other historians (e.g., Pickren & Rutherford, 2010; Brock, 2014b). The idea is that alternative indigenous or indigenized Psychologies should be supported, and their histories should be written by their own centres. My humble task is more providing a program for teaching, rather than writing a history of Psychology in Türkiye. Indigenization, in my understanding and in this case, is to focus on theoretically and practically deepening and expanding the notion of Psychology in Türkiye to be culturally more encompassing of the pluralist potential of the society. With this understanding, I believe that there is a potential, albeit limited, in writing/teaching a history of Psychology to at once democratize the disciplinary identity of Psychology and support the democratization of one's society. I aim to utilize this potential to make Psychology a more inclusive discipline in a sense that every person in a society can find oneself in it. Since an undergraduate student will understand the nature of Psychology and make sense of himself/herself and his/her society through this course, I think that I have a moral responsibility in giving a message about the pluralist identity of Psychology. I have a duty to exercise a scientific agency to narrow it down or expand it in a more democratic way. This agency is especially vital in a country like Türkiye which has many democratic issues on its agenda waiting to be solved. A history of Psychology course can make a humble contribution to this endeavour.

CODA

In general, a long dissertation may deserve a long conclusion. However, for this dissertation, it may be more appropriate to utter final words in a more condensed manner. I think the main issue that the theory of indigenous Psychology hover over and around is the unification of the *whole* of the human being and of *all* humans; Psychology is criticized both because it has difficulty seeing the whole human being and because it ignores most human beings. The indigenous Psychology movement is making a call for Psychology to embrace the *whole* and *all* simultaneously. To pursue these two challenging tasks—ones not always compatible since each person, community or culture may have a slightly or completely different understanding of the whole of human psychology—is a noble ambition of indigenous Psychologies. Of course, this goal remains an elusive one. But to whatever extent it is even possible that the human story can be completed or wholly addressed by any one discipline, involving as many people as possible in this grand project will enrich Psychology at an international level and bring Psychology one step closer to adequately reflecting and serving all of humanity. This dissertation can be considered as a very modest step on this path.

REFERENCES

Abu-Lughod, L. (2008). Writing against culture. In T. S. Oakes and P. L. Price`s (Eds.), *The cultural geography reader* (pp. 62-71). Routledge. (Original work published in 1991)

Acar, G., & Şahin, D. (1990). Psychology in Turkey. *Psychology & Developing Societies*, *2*(2), 241-256.

Adair, J. G. (1999). Indigenization of psychology: The concept and its practical implementation. *Applied Psychology, 48*, 403–418.

Adair, J. (2004). On the indigenization and autochthonization of the discipline of psychology. In B. N. Setiadi, A. Supratiknya, W. J. Lonner, & Y. H. Poortinga (Eds.), *Ongoing themes in psychology and culture: Proceedings from the 16th International Congress of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology*. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/iaccp_papers/268

Adair, J. G. (2006). Creating indigenous psychologies. In U. Kim, K-S. Yang, & K-K. Hwang. (Eds.), *Indigenous and cultural psychology* (pp. 467-485). Springer.

Adair, J. G., & Díaz-Loving, R. (1999). Indigenous psychologies: The meaning of the concept and its assessment: Introduction. *Applied Psychology*, *48*(4), 397-402.

Adjei, S. B. (2019). Conceptualising personhood, agency, and morality for African psychology. *Theory & Psychology, 29*(4), 484-505.

Ağılkaya-Şahin, Z. (2019). Müslüman psikologlar kertenkele deliğinden çıktı mı? İslami psikoloji alanindaki gelişmeler [Have Muslim psychologists come out of the lizard hole? Developments in the field of Islamic psychology]. *Turkish Studies, 14*(2), 15-47.

Alatas, S.H. (1974). The captive mind and creative development. *International Social Science Journal, 26*(4), 691–700.

Al-Karam, C. Y. (2018). Islamic psychology: Towards a 21st century definition and conceptual framework. *Journal of Islamic Ethics, 2*(1-2), 97-109.

Al-Mohammad H. (2011). Less methodology more epistemology please: The body, metaphysics and 'certainty.' *Critique of Anthropology, 31*(2):121-138.

Allais, L. (2016). Problematising Western philosophy as one part of Africanising the curriculum. *South African Journal of Philosophy, 35*(4), 537-545.

Allolio-Näcke (2007). The foundation myth of cultural psychology. In V. van Deventer, M. T. Blanche, E. Fourie, P. Segalo (Eds.), *Citizen city: Between constructing agent and constructed agency* (pp. 206-219). Captus University Publications.

Allolio-Näcke, L. (2014). Völkerpsychologie. In: Teo, T. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of critical psychology* (pp. 2065-2068). Springer.

Allolio-Näcke, L. (2016). Why Wilhelm Wundt's Völkerpsychologie can hardly be seen as an ancestor of (Modern) psychology of religion. In J. A. Belzen (Ed.), *A hundred years of the IAPR* (pp. 48-53). Brill.

Allolio-Näcke, L. (2018). Roots and rise of cultural psychology. In G. Jovanović, L. Allolio-Näcke, C. Ratner (Eds.), *The challenges of cultural psychology: Historical legacies and future responsibilities* (pp. 111-124). Routledge.

Allwood, C. M. (2011a). On the foundation of the indigenous psychologies, *Social Epistemology, 25*:1, 3-14.

Allwood, C. M. (2011b). On the use of the culture concept in the indigenous psychologies: Reply to Hwang and Liu, *Social Epistemology, 25*: 2, 141-152.

Allwood, C. M. (2013a). The role of culture and understanding in research. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2*, no. 5: 1-11.

Allwood, C. M. (2013b). On the advantages of an empirically oriented culture concept in the indigenous psychologies. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2*, no. 8: 60-65.

Allwood, C. M. (2013c). On the virtues of an empirically oriented culture concept and on the limitations of too general and abstract characterizations of understanding. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2*, no. 11: 54-61.

Allwood, C. M. (2014a). On the issue of an appropriate culture concept for the indigenous psychologies and on the limits of philosophy. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3*, no. 3: 41-48.

Allwood, C. M. (2014b). What type of culture concept will help the indigenous psychologies and why? An answer to Hwang. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3*, no. 7: 44-49.

Allwood, C. M. (2014c). Culture, language, identity and the properties of a useful culture concept for the indigenous psychologies. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3*, no. 10: 30-33.

Allwood, C. M. (2018). *The nature and challenges of indigenous psychologies*. Cambridge University Press.

Allwood, C. M. (2019). Future prospects for indigenous psychologies. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39*(2), 90–97.

Allwood, C. M., & Berry, J. W. (2006). Origins and development of indigenous psychologies: An international analysis. *International Journal of Psychology*, *41*(4), 243-268.

Ames, R. T. (2019). Against individualism, for individuality: The Emersonian Henry Rosemont, Jr. *Philosophy East and West*, *69*(1), 7-20.

Amouroux, R. (2017). Beyond indifference and aversion: The critical reception and belated acceptance of behavior therapy in France. *History of Psychology, 20*(3), 313–329.

Amouroux, R., & Zaslawski, N. (2020). "The damned behaviorist" versus French phenomenologists: Pierre Naville and the French indigenization of Watson's behaviorism. *History of Psychology, 23*(1), 77–98.

Ansloos, J. P. (2014). Indigenization, overview. In T. Teo (Ed.) *Encyclopedia of critical psychology* (947–949). Springer.

Armstrong, A. (2009). Autonomy and the relational individual: Spinoza and feminism. In Moira Gatens (Ed.), *Feminist interpretations of Benedict Spinoza* (pp. 43-63). Pennsylvania State University Press.

Arnason, J. (2003). East and West: From an insidious dichotomy to incomplete deconstruction. In G. Delanty and E. Isin (Eds.), *Handbook of historical sociology* (pp. 220-231). Sage.

Arnett J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: why American Psychology needs to become less American. *American Psychologist, 63*(7), 602–614.

Asad, T. (Ed.). (1973). *Anthropology & the colonial encounter* (Vol. 6). Ithaca Press.

Atal, Y. (1981). The call for indigenization. *International social science journal, 33*(1), 189-197.

Azuma, H. (1984). Psychology in a non-Western country. *International Journal of Psychology, 19*(1-4), 45-55.

Baba, G., & Ertan, S. (2017, June 15-17). *Turkey at the Bandung conference: A fully-aligned among the non-aligned* [Conference Presentation]. ISA International Conference 2017, Hong Kong.

http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/64185d87-7a01-44f1-acbc-1566b192398f.pdf

Badri, M. B. (2018). *The dilemma of Muslim psychologists*. Islamic Book Trust. (Original work published in 1979)

Baldwin, J. M. (1892). The psychological laboratory in the University of Toronto. *Science, 19*(475), 143-144.

Basalla, G. (1967). The spread of Western science. *Science, 14*, 611–22.

Başaran, F., & Şahin, N. (1990). Psychology in Turkey: Country status report. *Social and Human Sciences in Asia and Pacific RUSHAP Series, 34*. UNESCO.

Başer, S. (2013). Kimlik, Kişilik, Ontik Kimlikler ve Türkiye. [Identity, Personality, Ontic Identities and Türkiye]. *Türk Düşüncesi Dergisi, 3,* 4-5.

Bashkow, I. (2004). A Neo-Boasian conception of cultural boundaries. *American Anthropologist, 106*(3), 443-458.

Batur, S. (2005). Psikoloji tarihinde köken mitosu ve Georg Anschütz`ün hikayesi [Origin myths in history of psychology and the story of Georg Anschutz]. *Toplum ve Bilim, 102,* 168-188.

Batur, S. (2006). Türkiye`de psikolojinin kurumsallaşmasında toplumsal ve politik belirleyenler. [Determining political and social factors in the institutionalization of psychology in Türkiye]. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 107, 217-230.

Batur, S. (2011, June 27-July 1). *Peripheralization and history of psychology: An example from Turkey* [Conference Presentation]. 14th Biennial Conference of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology, Thessaloniki, Greece.

Batur, S. (in press). İmkansizliklar, belirsizlikler ve siyasi cekişmeler arasında bir Alman psikolog: Wilhelm Peters`in Türkiye yılları [A German psychologist between impossibilities, uncertainties, and political conflicts: Wilhelm Peters in Türkiye]. *Toplum ve Bilim.*

Baumeister, R. F. (1995). The personal story of an interpersonal psychologist. In G. G. Brannigan and M. R. Merrens (Eds.), *The social psychologists: Research adventures* (pp. 74-96). McGraw-Hill.

Becker, D., & Marecek, J. (2008). Dreaming the American dream: Individualism and positive psychology. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(5), 1767-1780.

Bedford, O., & Yeh, K. H. (2020). The contribution of Chinese process thought to psychology as a global science: Filial piety as an example. *Review of General Psychology*, *24*(2), 99–109.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). *Habits of the heart: middle America observed.* Hutchinson.

Benjamin, L. T. (2014). *A brief history of modern psychology* (Second Edition). Wiley.

Berlin, I. (2013). *The hedgehog and the fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history.* Princeton University Press. (Original work published in 1953)

Bernardo, A. B. I. (2009). Culture and Philippine psychology: Progress and prospects. In M. L. T. Camagay (Ed.), *Pi Gamma Mu Diamond Lectures* (pp. 31-50). Pi Gammu Mu International Honor Society in Social Science, Philippine Alpha Chapter.

Berry, J. W. (1974). Canadian psychology: Some social and applied emphases. *Canadian Psychologist, 15*, 132–139.

Berry, J. W. (1989). Imposed etics-emics-derived etics: The operationalization of a compelling idea. *International Journal of Psychology, 24*, 721–735.

Berry, J. W. (1993). Psychology in and of Canada: One small step toward a universal psychology. In U. Kim & J.W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 260-276). Sage.

Berry, J. W. (1996). On the unity of the field: Variations and commonalities in understanding human behavior in cultural context. *Revista Latinoamericana de Psicologõ ́a, 30,* 89–98.

Berry, J. W. (2000). Cross-cultural psychology: A symbiosis of cultural and comparative approaches. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*, 197–205.

Berry, J. W. (2013). Global psychology. *South African Journal of Psychology, 43*(4), 391-401.

Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and application*. Cambridge University Press.

Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelmans, S. M., Chasiostis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and application* (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Bhambra, G. K. (2014). Postcolonial and decolonial dialogues. *Postcolonial studies, 17*(2), 115-121.

Bhatia, S. (2008). Rethinking culture and identity in psychology: Towards a transnational cultural psychology. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 28,* 301–321.

Bhatia, S. (2018). *Decolonizing psychology: Globalization, social justice, and Indian youth identities.* Oxford University Press.

Bhatia, S. (2019). Searching for justice in an unequal world: Reframing indigenous psychology as a cultural and political project. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39*(2), 107-114.

Bhatia, S., & Priya, K. R. (2019). From representing culture to fostering ‘voice’: Toward a critical indigenous psychology. In K. Yeh (Ed.), *Asian indigenous psychologies in the global context* (pp. 19-46). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Bhatia, S., & Stam, H. J. (Eds.). (2005). Critical engagements with culture and self [special issue]. *Theory & Psychology*, *15*(4), 419-430.

Bhawuk, D. P. S. (2010). A perspective on epistemology and ontology of Indian psychology: A synthesis of theory, method and practice. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 22*(1), 157–190. https://doi.org/10.1177/097133360902200106

Bhawuk, D. P. S. (2021). Building cultural bridges between China and India. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 33*(1), 103–120.

Bilgin, N. (1988). *Başlangıcından günümüze Türk psikoloji bibliyografisi*. (Bibliography of Turkish Psychology from its beginning to today). Ege Üniversitesi Matbaası.

Billig, M. (2019). *More examples, less theory: Historical studies of writing psychology*. Cambridge University Press.

Birch, C., & Cobb Jr, J. B. (1990). *The liberation of life: From the cell to the community*. TX.

Bishop, R. C. (2022). Introduction. In F. Richardson (Ed.), *Hermeneutic dialogue and shaping the landscape of theoretical and philosophical Psychology: The work of Frank Richardson* (pp. 1-17). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Blaser, M. (2009). Political ontology: cultural studies without ‘cultures’? *Cultural studies, 23*(5-6), 873-896.

Blowers, G. H., & Turtle, A. M. (Eds.). (1987). *Psychology moving East: The status of Western psychology in Asia and Oceania*. Westview Press; Sydney University Press.

Blume, A. W. (2020). *A new Psychology based on community, equality, and care of the earth: An indigenous American perspective*. Abc-Clio.

Blumenthal, A. L. (1975). A reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundt. *American Psychologist, 30*(11), 1081–1088.

Blumenthal, A. L. (1979). The founding father we never knew. *Contemporary Psychology, 24,* 547–550.

Boesch, E. E. (1996). The seven flaws of cross-cultural psychology. The story of conversion. *Mind, Culture, and Activity, 3*(1), 2-10.

Boggs, J. (2004). The culture concept as theory, in context. *Current Anthropology, 45*(2), 187-209.

Bond, M. (1999). Unity in diversity: Orientations and strategies for building a harmonious, multicultural society. In J. Adamopoulos, & Y. Kashima (Eds.), *Social psychology and cultural context* (pp. 17-44). Sage.

Bond, M. H., & Hofstede, G. (1989). The cash value of Confucian values. *Human Systems Management, 8*(3), 195-199.

Boratav, H. B. (2004). Psychology at the cross-roads: The view from Turkey. In M. J. Stevens & D. Wedding (Eds.), *Handbook of international psychology* (pp. 311–330). Brunner-Routledge.

Borofsky, R., Barth, F., Shweder, R. A., Rodseth, L., & Stolzenberg, N. M. (2001). When: A conversation about culture. *American Anthropologist, 103*(2), 432-446.

Brinkmann, S. (2008). Culture as practices: A pragmatist conception. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 27*(2-1), 192-212.

Brislin, R. W. (2005). Culture and behavior: An approach taken in psychology and international business. In J. R. Baldwin, S. L. Faulkner. M. L. Hecht, & S. L. Lindsley (Eds.), *Redefining culture: Perspectives across the disciplines* (pp. 83-90). Routledge.

Brock, A. (1995). An interview with Kurt Danziger. *History and Philosophy of Psychology Bulletin*, *7*(2), 10-22.

Brock, A. C. (2014a). Indigenous psychologies. In T. Teo (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of critical psychology* (pp. 949–955). New York: Springer.

Brock, A. C. (2014b). What is a polycentric history of psychology? *Estudos e Pesquisas em Psicologia*, *14*(2), 646-659.

Brock, A. C. (2014c). The Sciences of the Soul: The Early Modern Origins of Psychology by Fernando Vidal. *Centaurus*, *56*(3), 198-200.

Brock, A. C. (2015a). Presentism and diversity in the history of psychology. *Psychological Studies*, *60*(4), 373-379.

Brock, A. C. (2015b). Thinking outside the disciplinary box: A reply to the comments. *Psychological Studies*, *60*(4), 395-401.

Brock, A. C. (2016). The universal and the particular in psychology and the role of history in explaining both. In *Centrality of history for theory construction in psychology* (pp. 29-46). Springer, Cham.

Brock, A., Mueller, C., Schrott, R., Kappelhoff, H., Mar, R., & Goldberg, A. (2012, July 22-27). *Towards a history of the indigenisation movement in psychology* [Conference presentation abstract]. XXX International Congress of Psychology, Cape Town. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207594.2012.709109

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). *The ecology of human development: Experiments by nature and design*. Harvard University Press.

Brown, S. D., & Reavey, P. (2018). Embodiment and place in autobiographical remembering; a relational-material approach. *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25*(7-8), 200-224.

Brumann, C. (1999). Writing for culture: Why a successful concept should not be discarded. *Current anthropology, 40*(S1), 1-27.

Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Harvard university press.

Bulhan, H. A. (1985). *Frantz Fanon and the psychology of oppression*. Plenum Press.

Bunge, M. (2000). Ten modes of individualism—none of which works—and their alternatives. *Philosophy of the social sciences*, *30*(3), 384-406.

Burge, T. (1986). Individualism and psychology. *The Philosophical Review*, *95*(1), 3-45.

Cabanas, E. (2018). Positive psychology and the legitimation of individualism. *Theory & Psychology*, *28*(1), 3-19.

Cahan, E. D., & White, S. H. (1992). Proposals for a second psychology. *American Psychologist, 47*(2), 224–235. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.2.224

Callero, P. L. (2017). *The myth of individualism: How social forces shape our lives.* Rowman & Littlefield.

Campbell, D.T. (1968). A cooperative multinational opinion sample exchange. *Journal of Social Issues, 24*: 245-256. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1968.tb02678.x

Candea, M. (2016). Science. In F. Stein, S. Lazar, M. Candea, H. Diemberger, J. Robbins, A. Sanchez, & R. Stasch. (Eds.), *The Cambridge encyclopaedia of anthropology* http://doi.org/10.29164/16science

Candea, M., Cook, J., Trundle, C., & Yarrow, T. (2015). Introduction: reconsidering detachment. In M. Candea, J. Cook, C. Trundle and T. Yarrow (Eds.), *Detachment: essays on the limits of relational thinking* (pp. 1-31). Manchester University Press.

Capaldi, E. J., & Proctor, R. W. (1999). *Contextualism in psychological research? A critical review*. Sage.

Carriere, K. R. (2014). Culture cultivating culture: The four products of the meaning-made world. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 48*(3), 270-282.

Carrithers, M. (2000). Hedgehogs, foxes and persons: Resistance and moral creativity in East Germany and South India. In N. Roughley (Ed.), *Being humans: Anthropological universality and particularity in transdisciplinary perspectives* (pp. 356-379). Walter de Gruyter.

Carrithers, M., Candea, M., Sykes, K., Holbraad, M., & Venkatesan, S. (2010). Ontology is just another word for culture: Motion tabled at the 2008 meeting of the group for debates in anthropological theory, University of Manchester. *Critique of Anthropology, 30*(2), 152-200.

Carse, A. L. (1994). The liberal individual: A metaphysical or moral embarrassment? *Noûs, 28*(2), 184-209.

Chaudhary, N., Misra, G., Valsiner, J., Bansal, P. & Singh, T. (2022). Making sense of culture for the psychological sciences. *Review of General Psychology, 26*(4), 399–415.

Chiu, C. Y. (2014). What culture could be. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 45*(1), 3-4.

Chiu, C. Y., Shi, Y. Y., & Kwan, L. Y. Y. (2019). The story of culture in psychology and the return journey to normology: Comments on the global relevance of Asian indigenous psychologies. In K. Yeh (Ed.), *Asian indigenous psychologies in the global context* (pp. 91-113). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Choi, S. C., Kim, U., & Choi, S. H. (1993). Indigenous analysis of collective representation: A Korean perspective. In U. Kim & J.W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp.193-210). Sage.

Christopher, J. C., & Hickinbottom, S. (2008). Positive psychology, ethnocentrism, and the disguised ideology of individualism. *Theory & Psychology, 18*(5), 563-589.

Christopher, J. C., Wendt, D. C., Marecek, J., & Goodman, D. M. (2014). Critical cultural awareness: contributions to a globalizing psychology. *American Psychologist, 69*(7), 645–655. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036851

Church, A. T., & Katigbak, M. S. (2002). Indigenization of psychology in the Philippines. *International Journal of Psychology, 37*, 129–148.

Ciofalo, N. (Ed.). (2019). *Indigenous psychologies in an era of decolonization.* Springer.

Claiborne, L. B. (2007). Exploring 'figuration' as a theoretical construct: Mobilising Deleuze, Guattari, Braidotti, and Haraway with education professionals. In V. van Deventer, M. T. Blanche, E. Fourie, P. Segalo (Eds.), *Citizen city: Between constructing agent and constructed agency* (pp. 364-370). Captus University Publications.

Clifford, J. (2008). Traveling cultures. In T. S. Oakes and P. L. Price`s (Eds.), *The cultural geography reader* (pp. 328-336). Routledge. (Original work published in 1992)

Coelho Jr, N. E., & Figueiredo, L. C. (2003). Patterns of intersubjectivity in the constitution of subjectivity: Dimensions of otherness. *Culture & Psychology, 9*(3), 193-208.

Cohen, A. P. (1994). *Self-Consciousness. An alternative anthropology of identity*. Routledge.

Cole, M. (1996). *Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline*. Harvard University Press.

Condor, S. (1997). And so say all of us? Some thoughts on 'experiential democratization' as an aim for critical social psychologists. In T. Ibáñez & L. Íñiguez (Eds.), *Critical social psychology* (pp. 111-146). Sage.

Cook, J., Laidlaw, J., & Mair, J. (2009). What if there is no elephant? Towards a conception of an un-sited field. In M. Falzon (Ed.), *Multi-sited ethnography: Theory, praxis and locality in contemporary research* (pp. 47-72). Ashgate.

Coulter, J. (1994). Is contextualising necessarily interpretive? *Journal of Pragmatics*, *21*(6), 689-698.

Cousin, G. (2011). Rethinking the concept of ‘western’. *Higher Education Research & Development, 30*(5), 585-594.

Craig, E. (2015). The lost language of being: Ontology's perilous destiny in existential psychotherapy. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 22*(2), 79-92.

Crawford, M, & Marecek, J. (1989). Feminist theory, feminist psychology. *Psychology of Women Quarterly 13*: 477–91.

Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty: Toward a historically situated psychology. *American Psychologist, 45*(5), 599–611. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.45.5.599

Cushman, P. (2016). Abelove’s historical vision: Gentle warnings against moralism, colonialism, and an apolitical identity politics. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 17*(2), 86-94.

Dafermos, M. (2021). The metaphysics of psychology and a dialectical perspective. *Theory & Psychology, 31*(3), 355-374.

Dalal, A. K. (2002). Psychology in India: A historical introduction. In G. Misra & A. K. Mohanty (Eds.), *Perspectives on indigenous psychology* (pp. 79–108). Concept Publishing Company.

Danziger, K. (1979). The positivist repudiation of Wundt. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 15*(3), 205-230.

Danziger, K. (1997). Naming the mind: How psychology found its language. Sage.

Danziger, K. (2006a). Universalism and indigenization in the history of modern psychology. In A. C. Brock (Ed.), *Internationalizing the history of psychology* (pp. 208–225). New York University Press.

Danziger, K. (2006b). Comment on indigenous psychology. *International Journal of Psychology, 41*, 269-275.

Danziger, K. (2013). Psychology and its history. *Theory & Psychology, 23*(6), 829-839.

De Jong, H. L. (1997). Some remarks on a relational concept of mind. *Theory & Psychology, 7*(2), 147-172.

Díaz-Loving, R. (1999). The indigenisation of psychology: Birth of a new science or rekindling of an old one? *Applied Psychology, 48*(4), 433-449.

Díaz-Loving, R. (2019). *Ethnopsychology: Pieces from the Mexican research gallery.* Springer Nature.

Díaz de Rada, A. (2011). The concept of culture as an ontological paradox. In I. C. Jarvie, & J. Zamora-Bonilla (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of the philosophy of social sciences* (pp. 252-271). Sage. https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781473913868.n12

Dilley, R. M. (2002). The problem of context in social and cultural anthropology. *Language & Communication, 22*(4), 437-456.

Direk, Z. (1998). Türkiye'de felsefenin kuruluşu [The establishment of philosophy in Türkiye]. *Defter, 33*, 85-95.

Dirlik, A. (1995). Confucius in the borderlands: Global capitalism and the reinvention of Confucianism. *Boundary 2, 22*(3), 229-273.

Dobroczyński, B., & Gruszka, A. (2019). Generations of "wasted chances": Władysław Heinrich and psychology in Poland. *History of Psychology, 22*(2), 163–185.

Dohn, N. B., Hansen, S. B., & Klausen, S. H. (2018). On the concept of context. *Education sciences, 8*(3), 111-128. https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci8030111

Durojaiye, M. O. (1993). Indigenous psychology in Africa: The search for meaning. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 211-221). Sage.

Dueck, A. C., (2019). Indigenous psychologies of spirituality: Remembering, excavating, and individuating. In A. Dueck (Ed.), *Indigenous psychology of spirituality* (pp. 293-312). Palgrave Macmillan.

Dueck, A. C., & Marossy, M. (2019). A future for indigenous psychology of spirituality? *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39*(2), 120–126.

Dueck, A. C., & Yang, Y. (2017). Homegrown emotions. *Theory & Psychology, 27*(1), 135–138. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354316669024

Eckensberger, L. H. (2015). Integrating the emic (indigenous) with the etic (universal)—A case of squaring the circle or for adopting a culture inclusive action theory perspective. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 45*(1), 108-140.

Egan, F. (1991). Must psychology be individualistic? *The Philosophical Review, 100(*2), 179-203.

Enriquez, V. G. (1978). Kapwa: A core concept in Filipino social psychology. *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, 42* (1–4). 100-108.

Enriquez, V. G. (1993). Developing a Filipino psychology. In U. Kim & J.W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp.152-169). Sage.

Enriquez, V. G. (2010). *From colonial to liberation psychology: The Philippine experience*. University of Hawaii Press. (Original work published in 1994)

Elias, N. (1969). Sociology and psychiatry. In Foulkes, S. H., & Prince, G. S. (Eds.), *Psychiatry in a changing society* (pp. 117-133). Tavistock.

Epstein, B. (2014). What is individualism in social ontology? Ontological individualism vs. anchor individualism. In J. Zahle & F. Collin (Eds.), *Rethinking the individualism-holism debate* (pp. 17-38). Springer, Cham.

Estrada-Claudio, S. (2020). Has Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino Psychology) become Sikolohiya ng mga Pilipino sa Pilipinas (the psychology of Filipinos in the Philippines)? In R. Pe-Pua (Ed.) *Handbook of Filipino psychology (Vol. 1)* (pp. 235-251). University of the Philippines Press.

Fakhry, M. (1998). Greek philosophy: Impact on Islamic philosophy. In *The Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy*. Taylor and Francis. https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/greek-philosophy-impact-on-islamic-philosophy/v-1. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-H011-1

Fahim, H. M. (Ed.). (1982). *Indigenous anthropology in non-western countries: proceedings of a Burg Wartenstein Symposium*. Carolina Academic Press.

Fancher, R. E. & Rutherford, A. (2016). *Pioneers of psychology: A history* (Fifth Edition). W.W. Norton & Company.

Fleer, M., Rey, F. G., & Jones, P. E. (2020). *Cultural-historical and critical psychology: Common ground, divergences and future pathways.* Springer.

Fornäs, J. (2017). *Defending culture: Conceptual foundations and contemporary debate*. Springer.

Fowers, B. J. (2021). The long and winding road from the critique of individualism to a social ontology of humans. In *Hermeneutic dialogue and shaping the landscape of theoretical and philosophical psychology* (pp. 46-59). Routledge.

Fowers, B. J., Novak, L., Calder, A., & Sommer, R. (2021). The distorting lens of psychology's individualism and a social realist alternative. In B. D. Slife, S. C. Yanchar, F. C. Richardson (Eds.) *Routledge international handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology: Critiques, problems, and alternatives to psychological ideas* (pp. 78-97). Routledge.

Fowers, B. J., & Richardson, F. C. (1993). Individualism and aggression: A hermeneutic analysis of Huesman and Eron's cognitive theory of aggression. *Theory and Psychology, 3*(3), 353–377.

Fox, D., Prilleltensky, I., & Austin, S. (Eds.). (2009). *Critical psychology: An introduction.* Sage.

Freeman, M. (2019). Toward a poetics of the other: New directions in post-scientific psychology. In T. Teo (Ed.), *Re-envisioning theoretical psychology* (pp. 1-24). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Frie, R. (2011). Culture and context: From individualism to situated experience. In R. Frie & W. J. Coburn (Eds.), *Persons in context: The challenge of individuality in theory and practice* (pp. 3–19). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Gädeke, D. (2020). Is and ought? How the (social) ontological circumscribes the normative. *The Journal of Ethics, 24*(4), 509-525.

Gao, Z. (2022). Indigenous psychology: Difficult engagements with culture and power. *Theory & Psychology*, *32*(6), 974–976. https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221094551

Garland, D. (2009). Concepts of culture in the sociology of punishment. *Theoretical Criminology, 10*(4), 419-447.

Geertz, C. (1979). From the native's point of view: On the nature of anthropological understanding. In P. Rabinow & W. M. Sullivan (Eds.), *Interpretive social science* (pp. 225-242). University of California Press.

Gemignani, M., & Peña, E. (2007). Postmodern conceptualizations of culture in social constructionism and cultural studies. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 27-28*(2-1), 276–300.

Georgas, J. (1993). Ecological-social model of Greek psychology. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 56–78). Sage.

Gergen, K. J. (2009). *Relational being: Beyond self and community.* Oxford University Press.

Gergen, K. J. (2015). Culturally inclusive psychology from a constructionist standpoint. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 45*(1), 95-107.

Gergen, K. J., Gülerce, A., Lock, A., & Misra, G. (1996). Psychological science in cultural context. *American Psychologist, 51*(5), 496-503.

Gergen, K. J., Sharma, C., Sameshima, T., Wu, S. J., & Yang, L. (2019). Cultures in motion: Challenges to future inquiry. In K. Yeh (Ed.), *Asian indigenous psychologies in the global context* (pp. 47-67). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. *American sociological review*, 48, 781-795.

Giner-Sorolla, R. (2019). From crisis of evidence to a "crisis" of relevance? Incentive-based answers for social psychology's perennial relevance worries. *European Review of Social Psychology, 30*(1), 1-38.

Gjerde, P. F. (2004). Culture, power, and experience: Toward a person-centered cultural psychology. *Human Development, 47*(3), 138-157.

Glăveanu, V. P. (2014). Theorising context in psychology: The case of creativity. *Theory & Psychology, 24*(3), 382-398.

Goddard, C. (2005). The lexical semantics of culture. *Language sciences, 27*(1), 51-73.

González, N. (1999). What will we do when culture does not exist anymore? *Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 30*(4), 431-435.

Graeber, D. (2013). Culture as creative refusal. *Cambridge Journal of Anthropology, 31*(2), 1-19.

Graeber, D. (2015). Radical alterity is just another way of saying "reality": A reply to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, *5*(2), 1-41.

Green, C. D. (2008). Presentism in the service of diversity? *Advances in the History of Psychology*. Available at http://ahp.apps01.yorku.ca/?p= 299.

Green, C. D. (2015). Why psychology isn't unified, and probably never will be. *Review of General Psychology, 19*(3), 207-214.

Green, C. D. (2018). *Psychology and its cities: A new history of early American Psychology.* Routledge.

Greenfield, P. M. (2000). Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go? *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*(3), 223-240.

Greenwood, J. D. (1999). From Völkerpsychologie to cultural psychology: The once and future discipline? *Philosophical Psychology, 12*(4), 503-514.

Greenwood, J. D. (2000). Individualism and the social in early American social psychology. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36(4), 443-455.

Guerin, B. (2020). *Turning psychology into a social science*. Routledge.

Gülerce, A. (2006) History of psychology in Turkey as a sign of diverse modernization and global psychologization. In A. C. Brock (Ed.), *Internationalizing the history of psychology*, (pp. 75-93). New York University Press.

Gülerce, A. (2012) Turkey: A case of modernization at historical, political, and socio-cultural cross-roads. In D. B. Baker (Ed.). *The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global Perspectives.* (pp. 547-570). Oxford University Press.

Hammersley, M. (2019). *Concept of culture: A history and reappraisal.* Palgrave Macmillan.

Harré, R. (1989). Language games and texts of identity. In J. Shotter & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), *Texts of identity* (pp. 20–35). Sage Publications, Inc.

Hartnack, C. (2015). Presentism and difference: on the inclusion of indigenous psychologies in the history of psychology. *Psychological Studies, 60* (4), 388-392.

Hatfield, G. (2019). Wundt and "higher cognition" elements, association, apperception, and experiment. HOPOS: *The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 10*(1), 48-75.

Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., Reese, H. W., & Sarbin, T. R. (Eds.). (1993). *Varieties of scientific contextualism.* Context Press.

Held, B. S. (2019). Testing the limits: Theoretical psychology re-envisioned in light of boundary-pushing trends in theoretical physics, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of psychology. In T. Teo (Ed.), *Re-envisioning theoretical psychology* (pp. 161-188). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Held, B. S. (2020). Epistemic violence in psychological science: Can knowledge of, from, and for the (othered) people solve the problem? *Theory & Psychology, 30*(3), 349-370.

Hendry, J. (2017). Individualism and individuality: Entry into a social world. In *An anthropological lifetime in Japan* (pp. 201-215). Brill.

Henrich, J. (2019). *The WEIRDest people in the world: How the West became psychologically peculiar and particularly prosperous.* Penguin.

Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33*(2-3), 61-83.

Hermans, H. J., & Kempen, H. J. (1998). Moving cultures: The perilous problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society. *American Psychologist, 53*(10), 1111-1120.

Heu, L. C., van Zomeren, M., & Hansen, N. (2019). Lonely alone or lonely together? A cultural-psychological examination of individualism–collectivism and loneliness in five European countries. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 45*(5), 780-793.

Heywood, P. (2017). Ontological turn, the. In F. Stein, S. Lazar, M. Candea, H. Diemberger, J. Robbins, A. Sanchez, & R. Stasch (Eds.), *The Cambridge encyclopedia of anthropology.* https://doi.org/10.29164/17ontology.

Hill, R. C. (1994). Book Review: From colonial to liberation psychology: The Philippine experience, by V. G. Enriquez. *Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 8*(2), 263–266.

Ho, D. Y. (1998). Indigenous psychologies: Asian perspectives. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29*(1), 88-103.

Hoffman, D. M. (2000). Individualism and individuality in American and Japanese early education: A review and critique. *American Journal of Education, 108*(4), 300-317.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations*. Sage.

Holdstock, L. T. (2003). *Re-examining psychology: Critical perspectives and African insights.* Routledge.

Hopkins, N. (2015). Psychology and culture: Back to the future? *Psychological Studies, 60*(4), 384-387.

Huen, C. W. (2009). What is context? An ethnophilosophical account. *Anthropological Theory, 9*(2), 149-169.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs 72*: 22–49.

Hwang, K. K. (2005). A philosophical reflection on the epistemology and methodology of indigenous psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8*(1), 5-17.

Hwang, K. K. (2011). Reification of culture in indigenous psychologies: Merit or mistake? *Social Epistemology, 25* (2): 125–31.

Hwang, K. K. (2013a). Indigenous psychology. *The encyclopedia of cross-cultural psychology, 2,* 716-718.

Hwang, K. K. (2013b). Linking science to culture: Challenge to psychologists. *Social Epistemology* 27, no. 1: 105-122.

Hwang, K. K. (2013c). The construction of culture-inclusive theories by multiple philosophical paradigms. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 2, no. 7: 46-58.

Hwang, K. K. (2013d). Science as a culture in culture with deep-structure across empirical studies in psychology. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2*, no. 10: 38-51.

Hwang, K. K. (2013e). A disciplinary horizon for comprehending the third wave of psychology. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3,* no. 1: 44-55.

Hwang, K. K. (2014a). All roads lead to Rome. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3,* no. 5: 56-66.

Hwang, K. K. (2014b) Preserving cultural identity and subjectivity for a psychology of multiculturalism. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3,* no. 9: 7-14.

Hwang, K. K. (2014c). Outside observer vs. inside doer: Divergent perspectives on 'culture' in the indigenization movement of psychology. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3,* no. 12: 92-103.

Hwang, K. K. (2015). Cultural system vs. pan-cultural dimensions: Philosophical reflection on approaches for indigenous psychology. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *45*(1), 2-25.

Hwang, K. K. (2016). Philosophical switch for the third wave of psychology in the age of globalization. *Japanese Psychological Research*, *58*(1), 97-109.

Hwang, K. K. (2017). The rise of indigenous psychologies: In response to Jahoda's criticism. *Culture & Psychology, 23*(4), 551-565.

Hwang, K. K. (2019a). *Culture-inclusive theories: An epistemological strategy.* Cambridge University Press.

Hwang, K. K. (2019b). Enhancing cultural awareness by the construction of culture-inclusive theories. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39*(2), 67–80.

Hwang, K. K. (2020). Escape from Kantian Eurocentric bias in cross-cultural psychology. *Culture & Psychology, 26*(4), 863-878.

Hwang, K. K., & Yang, C. F. (2000). Guest Editors' preface [Introduction to special issue on indigenous, cultural, and cross-cultural psychologies]. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*(3), 183.

Ingle, M. (2021). Western individualism and psychotherapy: Exploring the edges of ecological being. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 61(6), 925-938.

Ingleby, D. (1990). Problems in the study of the interplay between science and culture. In F. J. R. van de Vijver & G. J. M. Hutschemaekers (Eds.), *The investigation of culture: Current issues in cultural psychology* (pp. 59–73). Tilburg University Press.

Ingold, T. (2015). *The life of lines*. Routledge.

Irzık, G. (2011). Hans Reichenbach in Istanbul. *Synthese, 181*(1), 157-180.

Jackson, A. (Ed.). (1987). *Anthropology at home*. Tavistock Publications.

Jackson, P. R. (2005). Indigenous theorizing in a complex world. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8*(1), 51-64.

Jagged_85. (2008). Comment. *Advances in the History of Psychology*. Available at http://ahp.apps01.yorku.ca/?p=299.

Jahoda, G. (1973). Psychology and developing countries: Do they need each other? *International Social Science Journal, 25*(4), 461-474.

Jahoda, G. (1977). In pursuit of the emic-etic distinction: can we capture it? In Y. J. Poortinga (Ed.), *Basic problems in cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 55-63). Swets and Zeitlinger.

Jahoda, G. (2012a). Culture and psychology: Words and ideas in history. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 25-42). Oxford University Press.

Jahoda, G. (2012b). Critical reflections on some recent definitions of "culture". *Culture & Psychology, 18*(3), 289-303.

Jahoda, G. (2016). On the rise and decline of 'indigenous psychology'. *Culture & Psychology, 22*(2), 169-181.

Jahoda, G., & Krewer, B. (1997). History of cross-cultural and cultural psychology. In J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, & J. Pandey (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Theory and method* (Vol. 1, pp. 1-42). Allyn & Bacon.

Jansz, J., & van Drunen, P. (Eds.). (2004). *A social history of psychology*. Blackwell.

Johnson, M. (2013). *Evaluating culture: well-being, institutions and circumstance.* Springer.

Kagee, A. (2014). South African psychology after 20 years of democracy: Criticality, social development, and relevance. *South African Journal of Psychology*, 44(3), 350-363.

Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1994). Psychology in Turkey. *International Journal of Psychology, 29*(6), 729-738.

Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1996). The autonomous-relational self. *European Psychologist*, 1(3), 180-186.

Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (2000). Indigenous psychology and indigenous approaches to developmental research. *Newsletter of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, 1*(37), 6-9.

Kalın, İ. (2016). *Ben, Öteki ve Ötesi* [I, the Other, and Beyond]. İnsan Yayınları.

Kamler, B., & Thomson, P. (2014). *Helping doctoral students write: Pedagogies for supervision*. Routledge.

Karamustafa, A. T. (2007). *Sufism: The formative period.* Edinburgh University Press.

Kashima, Y. (2005). Is culture a problem for social psychology? *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8*(1), 19-38.

Kashima, Y., & Gelfand, M. J. (2012). A history of culture in psychology. In A. W. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe. (Eds.), *Handbook of the history of social psychology*, (pp. 499-520). Psychology Press.

Kauffman, S. (1995). *At home in the universe.* Oxford University Press.

Kayaoğlu, A., & Batur, S. (2013). Critical psychology in Turkey: Recent developments. *Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 10*, 916-931.

Keller, J. (1997). Autonomy, relationality, and feminist ethics. *Hypatia,* 12(2), 152-164.

Kemp, S. (2014). Stimulus and response: Behaviorism, tropisms, and twentieth-century French thought and literature. *Romanic Review, 3,* 341–360.

Kılıç, R. (2015). Türkiye'de modern psikolojinin tarihi: 'İlm-i ahvâl-i ruh, 'İlmü'n-Nefs/Ruhiyyat. [History of modern psychology in Türkiye: The science of the states of the soul, the science of nafs]. *Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmalı Dergisi, (40)*. 21-36.

Kılıç, R. (2017). Türk psikiyatri ve psikoloji tarihinde Freud [Freud in the history of Turkish psychiatry and psychology]. In R. Acun &, S. Kucuk (Eds.), *Avrupa tarihinde Türk eli* [Turks' contribution to the European history] (pp. 183-193). Hacettepe Üniversitesi.

Killen, M., & Wainryb, C. (2000). Independence and interdependence in diverse cultural contexts. *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, (87)*, 5-21.

Kim, U. (2000). Indigenous, cultural, and cross-cultural psychology: A theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological analysis. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*, 265–287.

Kim, U. (2001). Culture, science, and indigenous psychologies: An integrated analysis. In D. Matsumoto (Ed.), *The handbook of culture and psychology,* (pp. 51-76). Oxford University Press.

Kim, U., & Berry, J. W. (Eds.). (1993). *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context.* Sage Publications, Inc.

Kim, U., & Park, Y.-S. (2005). Integrated analysis of indigenous psychologies: Comments and extensions of ideas presented by Shams, Jackson, Hwang and Kashima. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8*(1), 75–95.

Kim, U., & Park, Y-S. (2006). The scientific foundation of indigenous and cultural psychology. In *Indigenous and cultural psychology* (pp. 27-48). Springer.

Kim, U., Park, Y-S., & Park, D. (1999). The Korean indigenous psychology approach: Theoretical considerations and empirical applications. *Applied Psychology: An International Review, 48,* 451-464.

Kim, U., Yang, K. S., & Hwang, K. K. (Eds.). (2006). *Indigenous and cultural psychology: Understanding people in context.* Springer Science & Business Media.

Kirmayer, L. J. (2007). Psychotherapy and the cultural concept of the person. *Transcultural Psychiatry*, *44*(2), 232-257.

Kirschner, S. R. (2011). Critical thinking and the end(s) of psychology. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 31(3), 173-183.

Kirschner, S. R. (2019a). Indigenous psychology compared to what? Some complexities of culture, language, and social life. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39*(2), 98–106.

Kirschner, S. R. (2019b). The indispensable subject of psychology: Theory, subjectivity and the specter of inner life. In *Re-envisioning theoretical psychology* (pp. 131-159). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Kirschner, S. R. (2020). Beyond the oversocialized conception of the subject in psychology: Desire, conflict, and the problem of social order. *Theory & Psychology*, *30*(6), 768-785.

Kirschner, S. R., & Martin, J. (Eds.). (2010). *The sociocultural turn in psychology: The contextual emergence of mind and self*. Columbia University Press.

Klein, E. (2016). *Developing minds: Psychology, neoliberalism and power*. Routledge.

Koskinen, I. (2014). At least two concepts of culture. *Folklore*, *125*(3), 267-285.

Kroeber, A., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). *Culture.* Meridian Books.

Kumar, K. (1979). Indigenization and transnational cooperation in the social sciences. In K. Kumar (Ed.), *Bonds without knowledge: Exploration in transcultural interactions* (pp. 103-119). University Press of Hawaii.

Kuper, A. (2000). *Culture: The anthropologists' account.* Harvard University Press.

Kusch, M. (2017, January 23). *Martin Kusch: Relativism (4/5)* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=niGAYMmIFAo

Kuwayama, T. (2003). "Natives" as dialogic partners: Some thoughts on native anthropology. *Anthropology Today*, *19*(1), 8-13.

Lambert, L., Pasha-Zaidi, N., Passmore, H. A., & York Al-Karam, C. (2015). Developing an indigenous positive psychology in the United Arab Emirates. *Middle East Journal of Positive Psychology, 1*(1), 1-23.

Lanselle, R. (2017). Self as other—indigenous psychology and the defining of a chinese subjectivity. In Dervin, F. & Machart, R. (Eds.) *Intercultural communication with China* (pp. 41-58). Springer.

Lawson, R. B., Graham, J. E., & Baker, K. M. (2007). *A history of psychology: Globalization, ideas, and applications.* Pearson.

Lee, W. L. (2016). Phenomenology as a method for indigenous psychology. In C. T. Fischer, L. Laubscher, and R. Brooke (Eds.), *The qualitative vision for psychology: An invitation to a human science approach* (pp. 156-172). Duquesne University Press.

LeVine, R. A. (2001). Culture and personality studies, 1918–1960: Myth and history. *Journal of Personality, 69*(6), 803-818.

Lewis, B. (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. *The Atlantic Monthly*, *226*(3), 47-60.

Lewis, H. S. (1998). The misrepresentation of anthropology and its consequences. *American Anthropologist*, *100*(3), 716-731.

Lipton, G. A. (2011). Secular Sufism: Neoliberalism, ethnoracism, and the reformation of the Muslim other. *The Muslim World, 101*(3), 427-440.

Liu, J. H. (2014). What Confucian philosophy means for Chinese and Asian psychology today: Indigenous roots for a psychology of social change. *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 8*(2), 35-42.

Liu, J. H., & King, P. (2021). What is an appropriate philosophy of human science for 21st-century indigenous psychologies? In D. Ludwig, I. Koskinen, Z. Mncube, L. Poliseli, & L. Reyes-Galindo (Eds.), *Global epistemologies and philosophies of science* (pp. 220-230). Routledge.

Lomov, B. F., Budilova, E. A., Koltsova, V. A., & Medvedev, A. M. (1993). Psychological thought within the system of Russian culture. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 104-117). Sage.

Long, W. (2016a). *A history of "relevance" in psychology.* Palgrave Macmillan.

Long W. (2016b). On the Africanization of psychology. *South African Journal of Psychology, 46*(4), 429–431.

Long, W. (2017). Essence or experience? A new direction for African psychology. *Theory & Psychology, 27*(3), 293-312.

Long, W. (2019). Indigenous psychology: Going nowhere slowly? *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39*(2), 115-119.

Lonner, W. J. (2013). Chronological benchmarks in cross-cultural psychology. Foreword to the encyclopedia of cross-cultural psychology. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 1*(2), 1-13.

Lonner, W. J., & Adamopoulos, J. (1997). Culture as antecedent to behavior. In J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, & J. Pandey (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Theory and method* (pp. 43–83). Allyn & Bacon.

Luban, D. (1995). The self: metaphysical not political. *Legal Theory, 1*(4), 401-437.

Lukes, S. (1971). The meanings of "individualism". *Journal of the History of Ideas, 32*(1), 45-66.

Lunt, I. (1998). Psychology in Europe: Developments, challenges, and opportunities. *European Psychologist*, *3*(2), 93-101.

Madva, A. (2016). A plea for anti-anti-individualism: How oversimple psychology misleads social policy. *Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy,* 3. 701-728.

Madva, A. (2017). *Reply to commentators.* https://philosophyofbrains.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Alex-Madva-Reply-to-Commentators.pdf

Marecek, J., & Christopher, J. C. (2017). Is positive psychology an indigenous psychology? In N. J. L. Brown, T. Lomas, & F. J. Eiroa-Orosa (Eds.), *The Routledge international handbook of critical positive psychology* (pp. 84–98). Routledge.

Maria, M. S. (2000). On the nature of cultural research. *Newsletter of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, 1*(37), 4-6.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological review*, *98*(2), 224.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2003). Culture, self, and the reality of the social. *Psychological Inquiry*, *14*(3-4), 277-283.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2010). Cultures and selves: A cycle of mutual constitution. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *5*(4), 420–430.

Marovic, Z. (2020). Cross-cultural indigenous training: The South African experience. *Culture & Psychology*, *26*(3), 605-621.

Marsella, A. J. (2013). All psychologies are indigenous psychologies: Reflections on psychology in a global era. *Psychology International, 24*(4), 5-7.

Martin, J. (2014). Psychologism, individualism and the limiting of the social context in educational psychology. In T. Corcoran (Ed.), *Psychology in education* (pp. 167-180). Brill.

Martín-Baró, I. (1994). *Writings for a liberation psychology*. Harvard University Press.

Mathews, B. (1926). *Young Islam on Trek*. Friendship Press.

Matoane, M. (2012). Locating context in counselling: The development of indigenous psychology in South Africa. *Psychotherapy and Politics International*, *10*(2), 105-115.

Matthyssen, M. (2021). *Ignorance is bliss: The Chinese art of not knowing*. Springer.

McCauley, R. N., & Lawson, E. T. (1996). Who owns 'culture'? *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion*, 171-190.

McDougall, W. (2003). *An introduction to social psychology*. Dover Publications. (Original work published in 1919)

McSweeney, B. (2012). Constitutive contexts: The myth of common cultural values. In G. Wood, & M. Demirbag. (Eds.), *Handbook of institutional approaches to international business*, (pp. 142-172). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Metz, T. (2014). Questioning African attempts to ground ethics on metaphysics. In J. Bewaji & E. Imafidon (Eds.), *Ontologized ethics: New essays in African meta-ethics* (pp. 189–204). Lexington Books.

Metz, T. (2015). How the West was one: The Western as individualist, the African as communitarian. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 47*(11), 1175-1184.

Metz, T. (2022). *A relational moral theory: African ethics in and beyond the continent*. Oxford University Press.

Mignolo, W. D. (1998). Globalization, civilization processes, and the relocation of languages and cultures. In F. Jameson & M. Miyoshi (Eds.), *The cultures of globalization* (pp.31–53). Duke University Press.

Mignolo, W. M. (2002). The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. *South Atlantic Quarterly, 101*(1): 57–96. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-101-1-57

Miranda, R. L., Torres, J. A., Alves, R. G., & Cirino, S. D. (2020). Indigenization of behavior analysis in Brazil. In *Oxford research encyclopedia of psychology*. Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.688.

Misra, G., & Gergen, K. J. (1993). On the place of culture in psychological science. *International Journal of Psychology, 28*(2), 225-243.

Misra, G., & Paranjpe, A. (2012). Psychology in modern India. In R. W. Reiber (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of the history of psychological theories* (pp. 881-892). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0463-8

Moghaddam, F. M. (1987). Psychology in the three worlds: As reflected by the crisis in social psychology and the move toward indigenous third-world psychology. *American Psychologist, 42*(10), 912-920.

Moghaddam, F.M. (1993). Traditional and modern psychologies in competing cultural systems: Lessons from Iran 1978-1981. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp.240-259). Sage.

Moghaddam, F. M. (2010). Commentary: Intersubjectivity, interobjectivity, and the embryonic fallacy in developmental science. *Culture & Psychology, 16*(4), 465-475.

Moghaddam, F. M., & Lee, N. (2006). Double reification: The process of universalizing psychology in the three worlds. In A. Brock (Ed.), *Internationalizing the history of psychology* (pp. 163–182). New York University Press.

Moghaddam, F.M., & Taylor, D. M. (1985). What constitutes an 'appropriate psychology' for the developing world? *International Journal of Psychology, 21*, 253-267.

Mollaer, F. (2018). *Yerliciliğin retoriği* [The rhetorics of indigenism]. Phoenix Yayınevi.

Morawski, J. G. (1986). Contextual discipline: The unmaking and remaking of sociality. In R.L. Rosnow, M. Georgoudi (Eds.), *Contextualism and understanding in behavioral science*, (pp. 47-66). Praeger.

Muchon de Melo, C., & de Rose, J. C. (2013). The concept of culture in Skinnerian radical behaviorism: Debates and controversies. *European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 14*(2), 321-328.

Mukherji, P. N., & Sengupta, C. (Eds.). (2004). *Indigeneity and universality in social science: A South Asian response*. Sage.

Muller, R. J. (2015). Psychotherapy's ontic–ontological divide: Going beyond the hyphen. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 22*(2), 99-102.

Murray, D. W. (1993). What is the Western concept of the self? On forgetting David Hume. *Ethos, 21*(1), 3-23.

Musschenga, A.W. 2001. The many faces of individualism. In A. van Harskamp & A.W. Musschenga (Eds.), *The many faces of individualism* (pp. 1-23). Peeters.

Ng, S. H., & Liu, J. H. (2000). Cultural revolution in psychology. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*(3), 289-293.

Nightingale, D. J., & Cromby, J. (2001). Critical psychology and the ideology of individualism. *Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy, 1*(2), 117-128.

Nightingale, D., & Neilans, T. (1998). Understanding and practicing critical psychology. In D. Fox, & I. Prilleltensky (Eds.), *Critical psychology: An introduction* (pp. 68-84). Sage.

Nsamenang, A. B. (2006). Human ontogenesis: An indigenous African view on development and intelligence. *International Journal of Psychology, 41*, 293–297.

Nsamenang, A. B. (2007). Origins and development of scientific psychology in Afrique Noire. In, M. Stevens & D. Wedding. (Eds.), *Psychology: IUPsyS global resource*. Psychology Press.

Nwoye, A. (2015). What is African psychology the psychology of? *Theory & Psychology*, *25*(1), 96-116.

Nwoye, A. (2018). African psychology and the emergence of the Madiban tradition. *Theory & Psychology*, *28*(1), 38–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354317742204

Okazaki, S. (2018). Culture, psychology, and social justice: Toward a more critical psychology of Asians and Asian Americans. In P. L. Hammack (Ed.), *Oxford handbook of social psychology and social justice* (pp. 141-156). Oxford University Press.

Öngel, U., & Smith, P. B. The search for indigenous psychologies: Data from Turkey and the former USSR. *Applied Psychology*, *48*(4), 465-479.

Onwuzuruigbo, I. (2017). Indigenising Eurocentric sociology: The ‘captive mind’ and five decades of sociology in Nigeria. *Current Sociology*, *66*(6), 831-848.

Oppong, S. (2017). History of psychology in Ghana since 989AD. *Psychological Thought, 10*(1), 7–48.

Oppong, S. (2022). Indigenous psychology in Africa: Centrality of culture, misunderstandings, and global positioning. *Theory & Psychology*, *0*(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221097334

Owe, E., Vignoles, V. L., Becker, M., Brown, R., Smith, P. B., Lee, S. W., ... & Jalal, B. (2013). Contextualism as an important facet of individualism-collectivism: Personhood beliefs across 37 national groups. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 44*(1), 24-45.

Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. *Psychological Bulletin, 128*, 3–72. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.128.1.3

Oyserman, D., & Markus, H. R. (1993). The sociocultural self. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (pp. 187-220). Psychology Press.

O`Doherty, K. (2011). Relational being. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 31*(1), 61–64.

O`Donohue, W. T., Burleigh, K., & Kinzler, A. D. (2019). Capturing the unique nature of the human sciences: The second demarcation problem. *Behavior and Philosophy, 47*, 15–33.

Pankalla, A., & Kośnik, K. (2018). Religion as an invaluable source of psychological knowledge: Indigenous Slavic psychology of religion. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 38*(3), 154–164. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000080

Paranjpe, A. C. (2006). From tradition through colonialism to globalization: Reflections on the history of psychology in India. In A. Brock (Ed.*), Internationalizing the history of psychology* (pp. 56-74). New York University Press.

Paranjpe, A. C. (2015). Comments on presentism and diversity in the history of psychology. *Psychological Studies, 60* (4), 393-394.

Paredes-Canilao, N., & Babaran-Diaz, M. A. (2013). Sikolohiyang Pilipino: 50 years of critical-emancipatory social science in the Philippines. *Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 10*, 765-783.

Paredes-Canilao, N., Babaran-Diaz, M. A., Florendo, M., Nancy, B., Salinas-Ramos, T., & Mendoza, S. (2015). Indigenous psychologies and critical-emancipatory psychology. In I. Parker (Ed.), *Handbook of critical psychology* (pp. 356-365). Routledge.

Pasha-Zaidi, N. (2021). Indigenizing an Islamic psychology. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, *13*(2), 194–203. https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000265

Paul, H. (2014). *The myths that made America: An introduction to American studies.* transcript Verlag.

Pe-Pua, R. (1989). *Pagtatanong-tanong*: A cross-cultural research method. I*nternational Journal of Intercultural Relations, 13,* 147-163.

Pe-Pua, R. (2015). Indigenous psychology. *International encyclopedia of the social and behavioural sciences* (2nd ed., pp. 788-794). Elsevier.

Peng, R-B. (2012). *Decolonizing psychic space: Remembering the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan* [Doctoral dissertation]. Duquesne University. https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1036

Pickren, W. (2009). Indigenization and the history of psychology. *Psychological Studies, 54*(2), 87-95.

Pickren, W., & Rutherford, A. (2010). *A history of modern psychology in context.* John Wiley & Sons.

Pickren, W., & Taşçı, G. (2021). Indigenous psychologies: Resources for future histories. In D. McCallum (Ed.), *The Palgrave handbook of the history of human sciences* (pp. 1-22). Springer.

Pirruccello, A. (2008). Philosophy in the ten directions: Global sensibility and the imaginary. *Philosophy East and West, 58*(3), 301-317.

Polkinghorne, J. (1982). [Review of the book *The liberation of life* by C. Birch and J. B. Cobb]. *Theology, 85*(707), 365–367.

Porcadas, M. D. C. (2019). Evolution of discourse: Identifying Sikolohiyang Pilipino in the classroom [Master's thesis, San Francisco State University]. https://sfsu-dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.3/214005/AS362019EDUCP67.pdf

Poortinga, Y. H. (1999). Different psychologies? *Applied Psychology, 48*(4), 419-432.

Poortinga, Y. H. (2005). The globalization of indigenous psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8*(1), 65-74.

Poortinga, Y. (2015). Is "culture" a workable concept for (cross-) cultural psychology. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2*(1), 1-21.

Poortinga, Y., van de Vijver, E, Joe, R., & van de Koppel, J. (1989). Peeling the onion called culture: A synopsis. In Ç. Kağıtçıbaşı (Ed.), *Growth and progress in cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 22-34). Swets & Zeitlinger.

Pratt, M. L. (1991). Arts of the contact zone. *Profession*, 33–40.

Pratt, M. L. (2014, November 2) *The rough guide to geopolitics with Mary Louise Pratt* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AnyBlkqaxw

Pyysiäinen, I. (2002). Ontology of culture and the study of human behavior. *Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2*(3), 167-182.

Ramanujan, A.K. (1990). Is there an Indian way of thinking? An informal essay. In M. Marriott (Ed.), *Indian thought through Hindu categories* (pp. 41-58). Sage.

Ratele, K. (2017). Four (African) psychologies. *Theory & Psychology, 27*(3), 313-327.

Ratele, K. (2019). *The world looks like this from here: Thoughts on African psychology*. Wits University Press.

Ratner, C. (2008). *Cultural psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and indigenous psychology*. Nova Publishers.

Ratner, C. (2016). Culture-centric vs. person-centered cultural psychology and political philosophy. *Language and Sociocultural Theory*, *3*(1), 11-25.

Ratner, C. (2018). The genesis of macro cultural psychology's culture theory from traditional cultural psychology. In G. Jovanović, L. Allolio-Näcke, C. Ratner (Eds.), *The challenges of cultural psychology: Historical legacies and future responsibilities* (pp. 368-395). Routledge.

Reber, J. S., & Slife, B. D. (2021). Psychology's flawed focus on individuals and individualism: A strong relationality alternative. In B. D. Slife, S. C. Yanchar, F. C. Richardson (Eds.), *Routledge international handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology* (pp. 30-54). Routledge.

Richards, G. (2009). *Putting psychology in its place: Critical historical perspectives.* Routledge.

Riggs, D. W. (2004). Challenging the monoculturalism of psychology: Towards a more socially accountable pedagogy and practice. *Australian Psychologist, 39*(2), 118-126.

Robbins, J. (2015). Dumont's hierarchical dynamism: Christianity and individualism revisited. *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 5*(1), 173-195.

Robinson, D. N. (2013). Historiography in psychology: A note on ignorance. *Theory & Psychology, 23*(6), 819-828.

Rodriguez, W. C., Bravo, M., & Moreno, M. A. (1999). Psychological research in Puerto Rico. *Applied Psychology, 48*(4), 497-509.

Roe, R. A. (2014). We have always been indigenous: Thoughts about the past and future of psychology. In S. Cooper &, K. Ratele (Eds.), *Psychology serving humanity: Proceedings of the 30th International Congress of Psychology, Vol. 2. Western psychology* (pp. 98–115). Psychology Press.

Rose, N. (1998). *Inventing our selves: Psychology, power and personhood*. Cambridge University Press.

Rosemont, H. (2006). Two loci of authority: Autonomous individuals and related persons. In P. T. Hershock & R. T. Ames (Eds.), *Confucian cultures of authority*, pp. 1-20. SUNY Press.

Rutherford, A. (2014). Historiography. In T. Teo (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of critical psychology*, (pp. 866-872). Springer.

Saberwal, S. (1983). For a sociology of India: Uncertain transplants: Anthropology and sociology in India. *Contributions to Indian Sociology, 17*(2), 301-315.

Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism: Western concepts of the Orient.* Pantheon.

Said, E. (2003). The clash of definitions. In E. Qureshi & M. A. Sells (Eds.), *The new crusades: Constructing the Muslim enemy*, (pp. 68-87). Columbia University Press.

Sampson, E. E. (1988). The debate on individualism: Indigenous psychologies of the individual and their role in personal and societal functioning. *American Psychologist, 43*(1), 15-22.

San Juan Jr, E. (2006). Toward a decolonizing indigenous psychology in the Philippines: Introducing Sikolohiyang Pilipino. *Journal for Cultural Research*, *10*(1), 47-67.

Sanchez, L. M. (1999). Psychology in Venezuela: Perceptions and opinions of research psychologists. *Applied Psychology, 48*(4), 481-496.

Scharfstein, B-A. (1989). *The dilemma of context.* New York University Press.

Schimmack, U., Oishi, S. & Diener, E. (2005). Individualism: A valid and important dimension of cultural differences. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9,* 17–31.

Schultz, D. P., & Schultz, S. E. (2000). *A modern history of psychology*. Harcourt College Publishers.

Seedat, M. (2021). Signifying Islamic psychology as a paradigm: A decolonial move. *European Psychologist, 26*(2), 131–141. https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000408

Seeley, K. M. (2003). Cultural turns in psychology. In D. B. Hill, & M. J. Kral (Eds.), *About psychology: Essays at the crossroads of history, theory, and philosophy* (pp. 109-125). SUNY press.

Segall, M. H., Campbell, D. T., & Herskovits, M. J. (1968). The influence of culture on visual perception. *Studies in Art Education, 10*(1), 68-71.

Segall, M. H., Lonner, W. J., & Berry, J. W. (1998). Cross-cultural psychology as a scholarly discipline: On the flowering of culture in behavioral research. *American Psychologist, 53*(10), 1101-1110.

Senn, D. J. (1987). Myopic social psychology: an overemphasis on individualistic explanations of social behaviour. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, 3(2), 45-52.

Serpell, R. (1984). Commentary: The impact of psychology on Third World development. *International Journal of Psychology, 19*(1-2), 179–192.

Serpell, R. (2017). How the study of cognitive growth can benefit from a cultural lens. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12*(5), 889-899.

Sewell, W. H. Jr. (1999). The concept(s) of culture. In V. E. Bonnell and L. Hunt (Eds.), *Beyond the cultural turn* (pp. 35–61). University of California Press.

Shams, M. (2002). Issues in the study of indigenous psychologies: Historical perspectives, cultural interdependence and institutional regulations. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 5*(2), 79-91.

Shams, M. (2005). Developmental issues in indigenous psychologies: Sustainability and local knowledge. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8*(1), 39-50.

Shams, M., & Hwang, K. K. (2005). Special issue on responses to the epistemological challenges to indigenous psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8*(1), 3-4.

Sharrock, W. W. (1974). On owning knowledge. In R. Turner (Ed.), *Ethnomethodology: selected readings* (pp. 45-53). Penguin Education.

Sher, D., & Long, W. (2015). Cultural discourses in apartheid-era psychology, 1980-1994. *South African Journal of Psychology, 45*(4), 452-465.

Shweder, R. A. (1991). *Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology*. Harvard University Press.

Shweder, R. A. (1995). The confessions of a methodological individualist. *Culture & Psychology, 1*(1), 115-122.

Shweder, R. A. (2000). The psychology of practice and the practice of the three psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*(3), 207-222.

Shweder, R. A. (2020). Foreword: Indigenous psychology and the moral challenge of robust cultural pluralism. In A. Dueck (Ed.), *Indigenous psychology of spirituality* (pp. v-x). Palgrave Macmillan.

Shweder, R.A., Beldo, L., 2015. Culture: Contemporary views. In: J. D. Wright (editor-in-chief), *International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences*, 2nd edition, Vol 5 (pp. 582-589). Elsevier.

Shweder, R. A., & Bourne, E. J. (1982). Does the concept of the person vary cross-culturally? In A. J. Marsella & G. M. White (Eds.), *Cultural conceptions of mental health and therapy* (pp. 97-137). Springer.

Sil, R. (2000). The foundations of eclecticism: The epistemological status of agency, culture, and structure in social theory. *Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12*(3), 353-387.

Silver, D. (2019). Theorizing is a practice, you can teach it. *Canadian Review of Sociology, 56*(1), 130-134.

Singh, K. (2022). There isn't only cultural blindness in psychology; psychology is culture blind. In R. W. Hood & S. Cheruvallil-Contractor (Eds.), *Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 32* (pp. 399-426). Brill.

Sinha, C. (2016). Decolonizing social psychology in India: Exploring its role as emancipatory social science. *Psychology & Society, 8*(1), 57-74.

Sinha, C. (2019). What if discipline is not interdisciplinary? The case of social psychology in India. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 53*(3), 504-524.

Sinha, D. (1965). Integration of modern psychology with Indian thought. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 5*(1), 6-17.

Sinha, D. (1984). Psychology in the context of Third World development. *International Journal of Psychology, 19*(1-4), 17-29.

Sinha, D. (1986). *Psychology in a Third World country: The Indian experience.* Sage.

Sinha, D. (1993). Indigenization of psychology in India and its relevance. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* (pp. 30–43). Sage.

Sinha, D. (1997). Indigenizing psychology. In J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, & J. Pandey (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Theory and method (2nd ed.).* (p. 129–169). Allyn & Bacon.

Sinha, D. (1998). Changing perspectives in social psychology in India: A journey towards indigenization. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 1*(1), 17-31.

Sinha, D. (2002). Culture and psychology: Perspective of cross-cultural psychology. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 14*(1), 11-25.

Sinha, D., & Tripathi, R. C. (1994). Individualism in a collectivist culture: A case of coexistence of opposites. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, Ç. Kâğitçibaşi, S.-C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), *Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and applications* (pp. 123–136). Sage.

Sinha, Y. (1994). [Review of the book *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context* by U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.)]. *Psychology and Developing Societies, 6*(2), 193–201.

Slife, B. D., O'Grady, K. A., & Kosits, R. D. (Eds.). (2017). *The hidden worldviews of psychology's theory, research, and practice.* Taylor & Francis.

Slife, B. D., Reber, J. S., & Richardson, F. C. (2005). *Critical thinking about psychology: Hidden assumptions and plausible alternatives*. American Psychological Association.

Smedslund, J. (1984). The invisible obvious: Culture in psychology. In *Advances in Psychology* (Vol. 18, pp. 443-452). North-Holland.

Smith, K. (2012). From dividual and individual selves to porous subjects. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 23*(1), 50-64.

Smith, P. B. (2005). Is there an indigenous European social psychology? *International Journal of Psychology, 40*(4), 254-262.

Smith, P. B. (2016). *Yes, we still need a concept of culture.* https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=4&article=1139&context=orpc&type=additional

Smith, P. B., Huang, H. J., Harb, C., & Torres, C. (2011). How distinctive are indigenous ways of achieving influence? A comparative study of guanxi, wasta, jeitinho, and "pulling strings". *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43*(1), 135-150.

Smith, R. (2021). Psychologies: Their diverse histories. In D. McCallum (Ed.), *The Palgrave handbook of the history of human sciences* (pp. 1-28). Springer.

Soudijn, K. A., Hutschemaekers, G. J. M., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (1990). Culture conceptualisations. In F. J. R. van de Vijver, & G. J. M. Hutschemaekers (Eds.), *The investigation of culture: Current issues in cultural psychology* (pp. 19-39). Tilburg University Press.

Soyubol, K. (2017, August 8). *Kutlughan Soyubal-From Jinns to Genes* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XaBVSv80cw&t=1519s.

Soyubol, K. (2018). Turkey psychoanalyzed, psychoanalysis Turkified: The case of İzzettin Şadan. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, *38*(1), 57-72.

Soyubol, K. (2021). In search of perfection: Neo-spiritualism, Islamic mysticism, and secularism in Turkey. *Modern Intellectual History*, *18*(1), 70-94.

Spence, J. T. (1985). Achievement American style: The rewards and costs of individualism. *American Psychologist, 40*(12), 1285-1295.

Sperber, D. (1996). *Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach*. Wiley.

Spiro, M. E. (1993). Is the Western conception of the self" peculiar" within the context of the world cultures? *Ethos, 21*(2), 107-153.

Staeuble, I. (2006). Psychology in the Eurocentric order of the social sciences: Colonial constitution, cultural imperialist expansion, postcolonial critique. In A. C. Brock (Ed.), *Internationalizing the history of psychology* (pp. 183–207). New York University Press.

Stam, H. J. (1993). Is there anything beyond the ideological critique of individualism? In *Recent trends in theoretical psychology* (pp. 143-151). Springer. https://doi: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2746-5_13

Stetsenko, A. (2018). Natureculture in a transformative worldview: Moving beyond the "interactionist consensus". In G. Jovanović, L. Allolio-Näcke, C. Ratner (Eds.), *The challenges of cultural psychology: Historical legacies and future responsibilities* (pp. 37-56). Routledge.

Stocking, G. W. (1992). *The ethnographer's magic and other essays in the history of anthropology.* University of Wisconsin Press.

Strathern, M. (1980). No nature, no culture: The Hagen Case. In C.P. MacCormack and M. Strathern (Eds.), *Nature, culture and gender* (pp. 174–222). Cambridge University Press.

Strathern, M. (1995). The nice thing about culture is that everyone has it. In M. Strathern (Ed.), *Shifting contexts: Transformation in anthropological knowledge* (pp. 153–76). Routledge.

Strathern, M. (2018). Persons and partible persons. In M. Candea (Ed.), *Schools and styles of anthropological theory* (pp. 236-246). Routledge.

Strauss, C. (2000). The culture concept and the individualism-collectivism debate: Dominant and alternative attributions for class in the United States. In L. Nucci, G. B Saxe, & E. Turiel (Eds.), *Culture, thought, and development* (pp. 85-114). Psychology Press.

Street, B. V. (1991). Culture is a verb: Anthropological aspects of language and cultural. In D. Graddol, L. Thompson, & M. Byram (Eds.), *Language and culture* (pp. 23-43). Multilingual Matters Ltd.

Sugg, H. V., Richards, D. A., & Frost, J. (2020). What is Morita therapy? The nature, origins, and cross-cultural application of a unique Japanese psychotherapy. *Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 50*(4), 313-322.

Sundararajan, L. (2015). *Understanding emotion in Chinese culture*. Springer.

Sundararajan, L. (2015b). Indigenous psychology: Grounding science in culture, why and how? *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 45*(1), 64-81.

Sundararajan, L. (2019). Introduction to the special issue on "Indigenous psychology: What's the next step?". *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39*(2), 65-66.

Sundararajan, L. (2022). Cultural blindness: The price we pay for theory neglect in psychology. In R. W. Hood & S. Cheruvallil-Contractor (Eds.), *Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion*, Volume 32 (pp. 302-322). Brill.

Sundararajan, L., Hwang, K. K., & Yeh, K. H. (Eds.), (2020). *Global psychology from indigenous perspectives. Visions inspired by K. S. Yang*. Palgrave.

Sundararajan, L., Kim, U. & Park, Y.-S. (2017). Indigenous psychologies. In J. Stein (Ed.), *Reference module in neuroscience and biobehavioral psychology* (pp. 1-7). Elsevier.

Sundararajan, L., & Yeh, K. H. (2022). Strong ties and weak ties rationality: Theory and scale development. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 56*(2), 405-419.

Sümer, N. (2016). Rapid growth of psychology programs in Turkey: Undergraduate curriculum and structural challenges. *Teaching of Psychology, 43*(1), 63-69.

Szeman, I. (2003). Culture and globalization, or the humanities in ruins. *CR: The New Centennial Review, 3*(2), 91-115.

Taitimu, M., Read, J., & McIntosh, T. (2018). Ngā Whakāwhitinga (standing at the crossroads): How Māori understand what Western psychiatry calls "schizophrenia". *Transcultural Psychiatry, 55*(2), 153-177.

Talmor, S. (1986). Historical individualism. *History of European Ideas, 7*(6), 661-667

Taylor, C. (2003). Cross-purposes: The liberal-communitarian debate. *Debates in contemporary political philosophy: An anthology*, (pp. 195-212).

Teo, T. (2005). *The critique of psychology: From Kant to postcolonial theory.* Springer Science & Business Media.

Teo, T. (2013a). Backlash against American psychology: An indigenous reconstruction of the history of German critical psychology. *History of Psychology, 16*(1), 1–18.

Teo, T. (2013b). Agnotology in the dialectics of the history and philosophy of psychology. *Theory & Psychology*, *23*(6), 840-851.

Teo, T. (2015). Critical psychology: A geography of intellectual engagement and resistance. *American Psychologist, 70*(3), 243-254.

Teo, T. (2020). Theorizing in psychology: From the critique of a hyper-science to conceptualizing subjectivity. *Theory & Psychology, 30*(6), 759-767.

Teo, T. (2021). The praxis of theorizing in psychology: From traditional to critical perspectives. In B. D. Slife, S. C. Yanchar, & F. C. Richardson (Eds.), *Routledge international handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology* (pp. 537-551). Routledge.

Teo, T., & Febbraro, A. R. (2003). Ethnocentrism as a form of intuition in psychology. *Theory & Psychology, 13*(5), 673-694.

Thalmayer, A. G., Toscanelli, C., & Arnett, J. J. (2021). The neglected 95% revisited: Is American psychology becoming less American? *American Psychologist, 76*(1), 116–129.

Thornton, R. (1988). Culture: A contemporary definition. The uses and abuses of political concepts. In E. Boonzaier & J. Sharp (Eds.), *South African keywords* (pp. 17–28). David Philip.

Ting, R. S. K., & Sundararajan, L. (2018). *Culture, cognition, and emotion in China's religious ethnic minorities: Voices of suffering among the Yi.* Springer.

Toprak, T. B. (2021). (Ed.), *İslam düşüncesinde psikoloji ve psikoterapi* [Psychology and psychotherapy in Islamic thought]. Muhit.

Triandis, H. C. (1980). (Ed.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Vols. I–VI.* Allyn and Bacon.

Triandis, H. C. (1996). The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. *American Psychologist, 51*(4), 407–415.

Triandis, H. C. (2000). Dialectics between cultural and cross-cultural psychology. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*(3), 185-195.

Triandis, H. C. (2018). *Individualism and collectivism.* Routledge. (Original work published in 1995)

Trickett, E. J. (2002). A future for community psychology: The contexts of diversity and the diversity of contexts. In T. A. Revenson (Senior Editor), *A quarter century of community psychology* (pp. 513-534). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8646-7_23

Tulloch, L. (2015). Is Emile in the Garden of Eden? Western ideologies of nature. *Policy Futures in Education, 13*(1), 20-41.

Tümer, C. Ş. (2008). 19. yüzyıl metinlerinde genel bir tercih: "Yahut"lu başlık kalıplaşması [A common preference in the texts of the 19th century: The title casting with "or"]. *Turkish Studies*, *3*(1), 380-398.

Turtle, A. M. (1987). Introduction: A silk road for psychology. In G. H. Blowers &, A. M. Turtle (Eds.), *Psychology moving East: The status of Western psychology in Asia and Oceania* (pp. 1–21). Westview Press.

Turtle, A. M. (1989). Psychologising Asia or Asianising Psychology: A new prescription for Dr. Watson? *Psychology and Developing Societies, 1*(1), 65-90.

Uddin, N., Gerharz, E., & Chakkarath, P. (2017). Exploring indigeneity: Introductory remarks on a contested concept. In E. Gerharz, N. Uddin, & P. Chakkarath (Eds.), *Indigeneity on the move: Varying manifestations of a contested concept* (pp. 1-25). Berghahn.

Uleman, J. S. (2018). I/C: Individualism/collectivism or individuate/categorise? *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 21*(4), 317–323. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12330

Vallelly, N. (2019). The relationality of disappearance. *Angelaki, 24*(3), 38-52.

Valsiner, J. (2009). Integrating psychology within the globalizing world: A requiem to the post-modernist experiment with Wissenschaft. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43*(1), 1-21.

Valsiner, J. (2012). Introduction: Culture in psychology: A renewed encounter of inquisitive minds. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology.* (pp. 3-24). Oxford University Press.

Valsiner, J. (2014). *An invitation to cultural psychology.* Sage.

Valsiner, J. (2019). Culture & Psychology: 25 constructive years. *Culture & Psychology, 25*(4), 429-469.

Valsiner, J. & Brinkmann, S. (2015). Could presentism in the histories of psychology actually be futuristic? *Psychological Studies, 60* (4), 380-383.

Van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (2011). Equivalence and bias: A review of concepts, models, and data analytic procedures. In D. Matsumoto & F. J. R. van de Vijver (Eds.), *Cross-cultural research methods in psychology* (pp. 17–45). Cambridge University Press.

van den Bouwhuijsen, H., Claes, T., & Derde, W. (1995). Recovering 'culture'. *Cultural Dynamics*, *7*(2), 163-186.

van Hoorn, W. (1984). The minimal meaningful context. *Revista de Historia de la Psicología, 5*(1-2), 163–171.

van Zomeren, M. (2014). Synthesizing individualistic and collectivistic perspectives on environmental and collective action through a relational perspective. *Theory & Psychology*, *24*(6), 775-794.

Vassaf, G. Y. H. (1992). Turkey. In A. R. Gilgen & C. K. Gilgen (Eds.), *International handbook of psychology* (pp. 383-389). The University of Nebraska Press.

Vincent, A. (1995). The ontology of individualism. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, (85)*, 127-149.

Vidal, F. (2011). *The sciences of the soul: The early modern origins of psychology.* University of Chicago Press.

Voestermans, P., & Verheggen, T. (2013). *Culture as embodiment: The social tuning of behavior*. John Wiley & Sons

Vukov, J., & Lassiter, C. (2020). How to power encultured minds. *Synthese, 197*(8), 3507-3534.

Wallner, F. G., & Jandl, M. J. (2006). The importance of constructive realism for the indigenous psychologies approach. In U. Kim, K-S. Yang, & K-K. Hwang. (Eds.), *Indigenous and cultural psychology* (pp. 49-72). Springer.

Wang, B. (2013). Working at the borders: Reconstructing the history of Chinese psychology from the perspective of critical psychology. *Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 10,* 257-276.

Wang, G., & Kuo, E. C. (2010). The Asian communication debate: Culture-specificity, culture-generality, and beyond. *Asian Journal of Communication, 20*(2), 152-165.

Wang Q. (2016). Why should we all be cultural psychologists? Lessons from the study of social cognition. Perspectives on psychological science: *A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science, 11*(5), 583–596.

Waterman, A. S. (1981). Individualism and interdependence. *American Psychologist, 36*(7), 762-773,

Watts, S. (2017). Relationships: From social cognition to critical social. In B. Gough (Ed.), *The Palgrave handbook of critical social psychology* (pp. 365-385). Palgrave Macmillan.

Watson, R. I. (1960). The history of psychology: A neglected area. *American Psychologist, 15*, 251-255.

Weidemann, D. (2013). Three decades of Chinese indigenous psychology: A contribution to overcoming the hegemonic structures of international science? In M. Kuhn & S. Yazawa (Eds.), *Theories about and strategies against hegemonic social sciences* (pp. 105–118). Center for Global Studies, Seijo University.

Wheeler, G. (2013). *Beyond individualism: Toward a new understanding of self, relationship, and experience.* Gestalt Press.

Wierzbicka, A. (2005). In defense of ‘culture’. *Theory & Psychology*, *15*(4), 575-597.

Williams, R. (2015). *Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society* (New Edition). Oxford University Press. (Original work published in 1976)

Wilson, R. A. (2004). *Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences.* Cambridge University Press.

Wrong, D. H. (1963). The oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology. In N. J. Smelser & W. T. Smelser (Eds.), *Personality and social system*s (pp. 68–79). John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1037/11302-004

Wrong, D. H. (1997). Cultural relativism as ideology. *Critical Review*, *11*(2), 291-300.

Yan, S., & Poortinga, Y. H. (2017). Cultural differences in behavior: A few big elephants or an army of ants? *Advances in Psychological Science*, *25*(4), 523-541.

Yang, K. S. (1997). Indigenizing Westernized Chinese psychology. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), *Working at the interface of culture: Twenty lives in social science* (pp. 62–76). Routledge.

Yang, K. S. (2000). Monocultural and cross-cultural indigenous approaches: The royal road to the development of balanced global psychology. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *3*, 241–263.

Yang, K. S. (2006). Indigenized conceptual and empirical analyses of selected Chinese psychological characteristics. *International Journal of Psychology, 41*(4), 298-303.

Yang, K. S. (2012). Indigenous psychology, westernized psychology, and indigenized psychology: A non-western psychologist. *Chang Gung Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, *5*(1), 1-32.

Yeh, K-H. (Ed.). (2019). *Asian indigenous psychologies in the global context.* Springer.

Yeh, K-H., & Sundararajan, L. (2019). Introduction. In K-H. Yeh (Ed.). *Asian indigenous psychologies in the global context* (pp. 1-15). Springer.

Yeh, K-H., Sundararajan, L., Ting, R. S.-K., Liu, C., Liu, T., & Zhang, K. (In press). A cross-cultural study of strong ties and weak ties rationalities: Toward an ontological turn in psychology. *The Humanistic Psychologist.* https://doi.org/10.1037/hum0000284

Zahavi, D. (2022). Individuality and community: The limits of social constructivism. *ETHOS: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology*. Advance Online Publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/etho.12364

Appendix

A History of Psychology in Türkiye

Course Description: This is a history of Psychology course designed to introduce the story of Psychology in Türkiye to undergraduate students. From the appearance of the word to the expansion of it as a discipline, we will trace "Psychology" in the context of Türkiye. We will basically ask: "how have we made sense of Psychology?" and "in what socio-political conditions have we made sense of Psychology?". Starting from these questions we comparatively ask: "what does it currently mean to us?" We will critically and historically think over *folk, scientific and popular* understandings of the word psychology. Our ultimate aim is to look at our disciplinary history in order to expose our narrow-minded perspective on "Psychology" in Türkiye and urge us to enrich our notions of "psychology".

Course Requirements and Assessment:

Presentation: 30%

Students will choose a figure (recognized or unrecognized) from the history of Psychology in Türkiye and talk about the biography and studies of that person. The important questions are: what kind of subject matter is problematized in the psychologist's studies? And how does he/she approach this problem? Students need to contextualize the psychologist's studies by integrating his/her individual life to the socio-political context of his/her day.

Bibliometric Analysis: 20 % (750 words)

Students will present a basic bibliometric analysis of one volume of the *Turkish Journal Psychology*. This is the flagship journal of the discipline of Psychology in Türkiye. Each volume includes two issues and 12-14 articles on average. Students will identify the subjects and authors of the articles and classify the articles according to the subareas of Psychology. They also present

which types of sources (articles, books, etc.) get cited more often in these articles and address the proportion of Turkish sources.

Reflection Paper: 20% (750 words)

Students will write one reflection paper on the question below:

What do you think should be the subject matter of Psychology in Türkiye? Identify an issue which is not addressed in our discipline of Psychology and discuss the possible contributions of tackling your issue to our society.

Test: 20%

Even though the raw information about the history of Psychology will be limitedly presented in this course, some chronological information and names of people and institutions should still be tested. The test will include multiple choice and short-answer questions.

Participation: 10%

Considering the limited population in a Psychology classroom in Türkiye, students` participation is valued.

Summary of the Course Schedule:

This course starts with the pre-disciplinary phase of Psychology in Türkiye. In the first two weeks, we try to make sense of our traditional concepts (*ruh* and *nefs*) by reading encyclopaedic entries and discuss how psychology was conceptualized under the scope of the science of the soul. In the 3rd week, we talk about the establishment of *Darülfünun* as the first modern education institution. The history of higher education in Türkiye is something of a history of *Darülfünun*. We will ask some important questions: what was its difference from the traditional education institutions? And why did they need this kind of institution? Psychology was first *disciplined* here as two divisions (General and Experimental) in the Department of

Philosophy. With all its economic problems and political missions, the history of *Darülfünun* can give us an insight into the slow development of Psychology in Türkiye. In the 4th and 5th weeks of the course, we move to the independence of Psychology from philosophy. At this point, the 1933 University Reform is important to understand the transition from *Darülfünun* to Istanbul University. We also take a look at the works of Wilhelm Peters and Mustafa Şekip Tunç who remained two chairs for a long time in the experimental and general Psychology areas of the department. We summarize the institutionalization of Psychology by putting it in its socio-political context.

The new departments were established after the 1950s and psychology started to become a professional practice. As of the 6th week, we exemplify psychological practices from several fields. In the 1980s, mental tests were applied, and psychology as clinical practices were seen in the increasingly populated cities of Türkiye. We also try to understand how Psychology was used to make sense of social change especially in the face of increasing urbanization and migration. As of the 9th week, we bring this story up to date to the rapid growth of the discipline of Psychology since 2002. By using some academic reports, we try to see a general academic picture of Psychology in Türkiye: numbers, structures of departments, their course plans etc..

Along with this dramatic increase, academic Psychology in Türkiye is transforming from a more monolithic to a more pluralistic discipline. This recent transformation, on the one hand, has prompted the reappearance of an Islamic view of Psychology alongside neoliberal popular psychology; on the other hand, opponents to the currently dominant political discourse have embraced a critical Psychology focused on social justice. In the 10th, 11th, and 12th weeks of the course, we try to touch each perspective with an exemplary reading. We wrap up this course by

discussing our political ontologies, identities in Türkiye in the context of indigenization and we discuss how our Psychology could be different and how it might be different in future.

Course Schedule

Week 1: Psychology or the Science of the Soul-I

Readings:

Kutluer, I. (1988). İlmü`n Nefs [The Science of Nafs]. *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, 22*, 148-151.

Kutluer, I. (1988) Ruh. [Soul]. *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, *22*, 193-197.

Week 2: Psychology or the Science of the Soul-II

Readings:

Kemal, Y. (1878, 2014). *İnsanin hakikati hakkında en son açıklama yahut psikoloji.* [Definitive explanation of the true essence of humankind or psychology]. Çizgi Kitabevi.

Kılıç, R. (2015). Türkiye'de modern psikolojinin tarihi: 'İlm-i ahvâl-i ruh 'ilmü'n-nefs/ruhiyyat. [History of modern psychology in Türkiye: The science of the states of the soul, the Science of Nafs]. *Kebikec: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak Araştırmalı Dergisi*, (40). 21-36.

Week 3: Psychology as a Division of Philosophy in *Darülfünun*

Readings:

Batur, S. (2005). Psikoloji tarihinde köken mitosu ve Georg Anschütz`ün hikayesi [Origin myths in history of psychology and the story of Georg Anschutz]. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 102, 168-188.

İhsanoğlu, E. (1995). The genesis of Darülfünun: An overview of attempts to establish the first Ottoman university. In D. Panzac (Ed.), *Historie economique et sociale de l`Empire ottoman et de la Turquie (1326-1960),* (pp. 827-847). Peters.

Week 4: The Republican Era and the Institutionalization of Psychology-I

Readings:

Arslan, H. (2013). Aydınlanmış devlet patronluğunda bilim: 1933 Türk Üniversite Reformu ve sürgün Alman bilimadamları. [Science under the enlightened state patronage: 1933 Turkish University Reform and the exiled German scientists] *Muhafazakar Düşünce, 9*(35). 25-54.

Batur, S. (in press). İmkansızlıklar, belirsizlikler ve siyasi çekişmeler arasında bir Alman psikolog: Wilhelm Peters`in Türkiye yılları [A German psychologist between impossibilities, uncertainties, and political conflicts: Wilhelm Peters in Türkiye]. *Toplum ve Bilim.*

Bayraktar, L. (2002). Mustafa Şekip Tunç'un insan anlayışı. [The idea of human in the philosophy of Mustafa Şekip Tunç]. *Felsefe Dünyası, 2* (36). 130-136.

Week 5: The Republican Era and the Institutionalization of Psychology-II

Readings:

Batur, S. (2006). Türkiye`de psikolojinin kurumsallaşmasında toplumsal ve politik belirleyenler. [Determining political and social factors in the institutionalization of Psychology in Türkiye]. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 107, 217-230.

Gülerce, A. (2012) Turkey: A case of modernization at historical, political, and socio-cultural cross-roads. In D. B. Baker (Ed.). *The Oxford handbook of the history of psychology: Global Perspectives.* (pp. 547-570). Oxford University Press.

Week 6: Psychology as an Applied Science (Mental Tests)

Readings:

İkiz, T. (2011). The history and development of the Rorschach test in Turkey. *Rorschachiana*. *32*, 72-90.

Vassaf, G. (1982). Mental Massacre: The use of psychological tests in the Third World. *School Psychology International, 2*, 43-48.

Week 7: Psychology as a Clinical Practice

Readings:

Mocan-Aydın, G. (2000). Western models of counseling and psychotherapy within Turkey: Crossing cultural boundaries. *The Counseling Psychologist*, *28*(2), 281-298.

Week 8: Psychology for Social Problems (Social Change Studies)

Readings:

Kağıtçıbaşı, C., & Ataca, B. (2005). Value of children and family change: A three-decade portrait from Turkey. *Applied Psychology*, *54*(3), 317-337.

Kandiyoti, D. (1974). Some social-psychological dimensions of social change in a Turkish village. *The British Journal of Sociology, 25*(1), 47-62.

Week 9: The Critical Psychology Movement in Türkiye

Readings:

Batur, S., & Aslıtürk, E. (2006). On critical psychology in Turkey. *Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, *5*, 21-41.

Kayaoğlu, A., & Batur, S. (2013). Critical psychology in Turkey: Recent developments. *Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 10*, 916-931.

Week 10: The Recent Rapid Growth of Psychology Programs in Türkiye

Readings:

Arık, E. (2015). *Türkiye'deki Psikoloji Bölümleri Akademik Değerlendirmesi* [Academic evaluation of psychology departments in Türkiye]. http://akademi.enginarik.com/2015/12/psikoloji-bolumleri-ogretim-elemanlar.html.

Sümer, N. (2016). Rapid growth of psychology programs in Turkey: Undergraduate curriculum and structural challenges. *Teaching of Psychology, 43*(1), 63-69.

Week 11: The Return of the Repressed: The Science of the Soul

Readings:

Rothman, A., & Coyle, A. (2018). Toward a framework for Islamic psychology psychotherapy: an Islamic model of the soul. *Journal of Religion and Health*, *57*(5), 1731-1744.

Week 12: Popular Psychology on the Rise

Readings:

Sekman, M. (2006). *Her şey seninle başlar* [Everything starts with you]. Alfa Yayınları.

Week 13: Wrapping Up: Do We Need to Indigenize Our Psychology?

Readings:

Başer, S. (2013). Kimlik, kişilik, ontik kimlikler ve Türkiye. [Identity, personality, ontic identities and Türkiye]. *Türk Düşüncesi Dergisi*, *3*, 4-5.

Öngel, Ü. & Smith, P. B. (1999). The search for indigenous psychologies: Data from Turkey and the former USSR. *Applied Psychology*, *48*(4), 465-479.