

Home and Away: Diasporas, Developments and Displacements in a Globalising World

Pablo Shiladitya Bose

This paper examines the involvement of Indian diasporic communities in the dynamics of economic development and population displacement within the Indian subcontinent itself. I argue that the category of diaspora can help to critically interrogate and challenge traditional notions of development and displacement and in doing so help to illuminate the complexities of such processes in the light of globalisation and transnationalism. I examine the historical context of diasporas and their involvement in processes of development and consider questions of identity, place, home and connection between people and the nation-state. I also look at the specific case of Indian diasporas and the impact they have had on the financial and cultural development of India in the recent past. While much of the current research on the connections between development and diasporas worldwide has focused on remittances, this paper argues for a wider understanding of both “diasporic capital” – including investments, property ownership and trade – and of “diasporic culture” – as demonstrated by globalised patterns of travel, tourism, communications, cultural production and the creation of living spaces with a self-consciously transnational aesthetic.

Keywords: Citizenship; Economic Development; Ethics; Investment; Migration; Nationalism; Population Displacement; Remittances

This paper seeks to explore the increasingly complex transnational relationships between immigrant, expatriate or diasporic communities and development in their ancestral or putative “homelands”. In recent years such links have become an increasing focal point of academic inquiry (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt; Atkinson;

Pablo Shiladitya Bose is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography, University of Vermont. He is a past recipient of the IDRC Canadian Window on International Development Award for his doctoral research on global diasporas and Indian development. Correspondence to: Dr Pablo Shiladitya Bose, Department of Geography, University of Vermont, 200 Old Mill, 94 University Place, Burlington, VT 05405-0114, USA. Email: pbose@uvm.edu

Maimbo and Ratha; Østergaard-Nielsen; Engberg-Pederson, Nyberg-Sorenson and Van Hear). Numerous national and regional governments as well as development agencies and international financial institutions have similarly identified diasporas as integral components to future developmental visions, as a stable alternative to foreign direct investment and in the face of the global trend towards diminishing foreign aid (Vertovec; Van Doorn; Rauch). Much of the research and discussion on development and diasporas has focused primarily on economic instruments such as remittances, money sent by an individual or family living in a (relatively) prosperous country to family members in their country of origin. Recent figures show the global trend of remittance transfers to be both substantial and on the increase. Recorded remittance flows grew from US\$66 billion in 2000 to over US\$268 billion in 2005 (Ratha "Remittance Flows" 3; "Remittances" 42), with some observers estimating a further 35 to 250 per cent of these amounts transferred through informal channels (Freund and Spatafora 1). Stereotypical situations might describe migrant workers from Latin America and the Caribbean, domestic workers from the Philippines, or skilled craftspeople and professionals from India who work in the Persian Gulf, the USA or Western Europe and send a portion of their income home to help their families with specific needs: food, clothing, building a bigger (and better) house, financing a local water or electrification project, donating funds towards a community hospital or school and so on. Yet there are as many divisions within diasporic groups and variations in the forms of diasporic developmental assistance as there are between sending and receiving countries, distinctions in their identity, nature and character, differences based on class, gender, ethnicity and culture that affect a given diasporic community's relationship to development in their putative homeland. This paper will argue, therefore, for a wider understanding of this phenomenon through "diasporic capital and cultural flows" a broad category that encompasses a range of both economic practices and social, ideological and political projects.

This paper examines several key and emerging questions regarding diasporas and development. For example, at a time of intensified attempts by hometown associations and national governments to court émigrés to help build neighbourhoods and nations, how do diasporic communities engage in activities that aid development? Equally important, what *types* of development do diasporic funds and influences help to enable? Moreover, while the desire to help families, friends and communities "back home" is often an admirable one, can there be costs – social, political, ecological – associated with such assistance? In particular, what of development activities and projects which have significant population displacement or ecological degradation effects? How then might diasporic communities become enmeshed in a paradoxical dilemma, one in which their own connection to "home" and desire to improve it or strengthen their ties to it results in turn, in the disruption of another local community's equally strong link to specific places?

Diasporic communities may take many forms and engage in a substantial range of activities, yet "the diaspora" continues to resonate for many scholars, social movements and national governments as a primary locus for examining transnational

practices, particularly in terms of global capital, migration and political as well as cultural connections. What do diasporas and their activities tell us about identity, citizenship and community – indeed, what do they tell us about the nation-state itself? How are our notions of borders and boundaries disrupted by groups whose idea of a homeland does not fit easily onto a map or a census? This paper explores such questions by looking at the involvement of diasporic communities of Indian origin in the dynamics of economic development and population displacement in contemporary India. The principal contention of the paper is that the category of diaspora can help to critically interrogate and challenge traditional notions of not only development and displacement, but also of citizenship itself. The focus on diaspora in my examination moves beyond looking at displacement as a simple binary of forced evictions and ongoing migration patterns and instead draws attention to the points of departure themselves as well as the reasons for an ongoing connection to “home”. Similarly, examining the historical and evolving links between diasporas and development helps to think about development beyond the trope of the public sector infrastructure project (the dam or the highway) and simultaneously problematises what private sector development might entail. Finally, exploring the relationship between diaspora, development and displacement challenges our understanding of what citizenship, belonging and rights might mean in an increasingly globalised world.

Categories such as “citizens” and “the nation-state” are often meant to fully comprehend or at least represent the complex relationship between geography, politics and habitation; yet the connection between people and places is never so straightforward or easily circumscribed. To where or what does one belong? How are claims of authenticity in terms of pedigree or linkage to a particular soil or community to be judged and by whom? The contestation evident in the diverse ways that the “Indian” – global, local or otherwise – is today conceptualised demonstrates the complexity of these issues. Diasporic Indians – called by a host of names including “desis”, “NRIs” (Non-Resident Indians), “PIOs” (Persons of Indian Origin), “OBIs” (Overseas-Born Indians) and a plethora of other acronyms and nicknames – comprise an often highly mythologised group. Represented narrowly in much of both diasporic and subcontinental culture and politics as a highly successful, mainly professional group of doctors, engineers, accountants, business entrepreneurs, IT workers, academics and scientists, it is these often narrowly construed and intensely idealised Indians whose assumed tastes, interests and financial capacities often drive many current developments within India. Crossing the border has been made easier for this diasporic Indian, as has moving money across time zones and currencies. The diaspora plays an ever-greater role in Indian politics, whether internally or on the world stage. The current boom in land speculation and housing development in and around major Indian cities has also been spurred in large part by the growth of “Western-influenced” condominium projects that often cater to an NRI audience and their assumed tastes. And in Bollywood films and television programmes in both India and many overseas

communities, the NRI has become an increasingly important and visible character. While not necessarily citizens of India, diasporic Indians have even been awarded official recognition and by the Indian state and their historical and cultural attachments to the region are rewarded accordingly; for example, with the ability to own immovable property or obtain special entry visas. In such ways, the diasporic Indian occupies an ever-growing role in the life-space of India both home and away.

And yet this prominence does not come without its costs. What of all those who do not fit into the mythologised view of the NRI? What of the many millions of Indians or persons of Indian origin overseas who are not doctors or academics or software engineers? There are indeed a far greater proportion of NRIs and PIOs who are descendents of indentured labourers in the Caribbean or South-east Asia, or who live and work in West Asia/Middle East as wage labourers, trades people and domestic help, and many others who do not conform to the "success story" or "model minority" view of South Asian emigration and resettlement (Prashad). A narrow stereotype of the Indian diaspora, reinforced through political and economic practice as well as cultural texts, serves to obscure the diversity of the diasporic experience and its many manifestations. Within India as well, the potential of the diaspora is not only to do good works. There exists equally the possibility of problematic and even harmful effects: the diaspora's involvement in development can lead to political disenfranchisement or manipulation, economic harm and physical dislocation. In the case of housing developments, for example, one sees that the populations being displaced in order to construct luxury condominium complexes marketed towards diasporic Indians are often either Indian citizens or undocumented migrants and refugees from neighbouring regions. Many have been settled in the area for generations, whether with formal property rights or as squatters. Their eviction for the purposes of constructing luxury condominium towers for overseas Indians or for those who wish to "live like them" highlights an ongoing contest over the notion of "home".

The conflict between identities and rights, between hyphenated overseas Indians (-Canadians, -Americans, -British) and Indian "citizens" forces one to consider who is excluded from claims on home and place in this particular developmental process. Diasporic populations feel intimately connected to "place", hence their continued involvement with development in their "home countries". Soon-to-be-displaced populations within those "home countries" feel no less attached to such "places". Should the attachment to place professed by one take precedence over that of the other? Are there ways of balancing these competing claims on space, place and home? This paper examines these questions in two parts. The first section looks at diasporas and development in both the historical and current context. The second part of the paper examines the history of Indian diaspora and recent attempts by both regional and national governments to woo their capital.

Diasporas and Development: An Overview

Defining and Distinguishing Diasporas

Diasporic communities have existed for centuries and in many ways complicate modern notions of geographical and political boundaries. They are multi-faceted social organisations, interwoven in the contemporary context with legacies of colonialism and emerging trends towards cultural, economic, political and social globalisation. Diasporas take many forms beyond the traditional notion of persecuted victims forced to flee their homeland, though the enduring image of diasporic communities remains bound not to the notion of migration, but rather to that of forced displacement. It is the so-called “victim diasporas” (Cohen) that dominate our view, such as Jewish groups persecuted across Europe through the centuries, Africans scattered by slavery over the Americas and the Caribbean, or more recently, Armenians and Palestinians, displaced by genocide or deprived of a homeland.¹

But in recent years many other groups have increasingly been described by the category of diaspora. Alternative labels are often used synonymously – transmigrants, émigrés, immigrants and expatriates among them – though these terms describe sometimes very different forms of population movements. Regardless of the reasons for leaving, it is nonetheless true that generations of communities have flourished away from homelands, retaining strong economic and political ties to their places of origin and often a distinct cultural identity (Levitt and Waters). Scholars have documented many such cases throughout history, and point to similar examples in the contemporary context. These include trading communities such as Lebanese, Chinese, Italian groups who migrated to distant shores, labourers (indentured or otherwise) from various parts of the Indian subcontinent who journeyed to Africa, the Caribbean and South-east Asia, and functionaries and soldiers from ancient Rome and colonial Britain, Russia, France and Belgium who spread throughout their empires. More recently, the postcolonial period has seen massive migration from former peripheries towards self-described cores – East and West Indians in Britain, North Africans and South-east Asians in France, Central Asians in Russia, to name but a few. And indeed migrant labour across the world today represents one of the most significant flows of population in human history, from South Asians in the Persian Gulf to Latin Americans in the USA, and Eastern Europeans in Western Europe and many others besides (Brazier and Mannur; Castles and Miller; Van Hear). The latter example does not only mean seasonal workers who return to their “home” countries following the expiration of a contract or the harvest of a crop (though it might in some instances). Increasingly, whether arriving as legal or undocumented labour, such migrant workers have stayed on in host countries, settling in discrete, identifiable communities and sending financial support to their families left behind (Itzigsohn and Saucedo; Levitt and Waters). It is indeed this dialectic, of connections to both a “new” and an “old” home simultaneously that is characteristic of diasporas, no matter what their origin.

Diasporic Development Initiatives

There is a long history of different émigré groups not simply assimilating and disappearing into a melting pot of their new host country, but rather, participating in efforts to materially and ideologically restructure their putative homelands. Some scholars have defined this dynamic as an essentially transnational one; a “process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic, and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders” (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 6). This participation has taken many forms, including the provision of goods and services and in-kind labour to their former communities, moral support for ideological projects and material economic assistance in the form of remittances and direct investments.

The importance of remittances in particular for the world economy has become increasingly apparent in recent years. A growing body of literature has noted the growth of remittances in both nominal terms and as relative to the receiving countries’ Gross Domestic Product (IMF; Maimbo and Ratha; Orozco; Solimano). Of the US\$268 billion in workers’ remittances in 2005, over US\$167 billion accounted for capital flows to the developing world, second only to foreign direct investment as a source of external funding, and far outstripping traditional development aid (Ratha “Remittance Flows” 3). And unlike foreign aid, remittances are not “tied” to the self-interest of donor nations or the loan conditionalities of multinational institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

For many countries – and indeed for some entire regions – remittances have become an integral part of economic survival. In recent years India, Mexico and China have consistently ranked among the top countries receiving the largest share of remittances globally. Regionally, the two largest sets of global remittance flows occur between North America and Latin America and the Caribbean on the one hand and the Persian Gulf and South Asia on the other. With reference to such important trends, Guillermo Perry, the World Bank Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean argues that:

[foreign] direct investment and remittances are key for Latin America and the Caribbean as it remains more sensitive than other regions to external shocks due to vulnerabilities to capital flow reversals. At a time when debt flows are falling, remittances represent one of the most stable sources of income for the region. (World Bank “Foreign Investment”)

The flows of remittance funds from the USA to Mexico as well as the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean have grown to such an extent that these transnational practices have formed an important part of the national debate on immigration and cross-border labour policies in the USA, with some populist critics charging migrant workers with economic disloyalty for sending money home (Dobbs). In 2002, the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate,

noted that Hispanic families in the USA sent an average of US\$200 seven times a year to relatives in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Committee moreover noted that exorbitant fees charged by money transfer services cost those sending remittances over US\$3.5 billion in commissions alone (Committee on Banking). Commercial banks are now attempting to capture as much of this lucrative market as possible, and in recent years transaction costs for formal remittance channels have in fact reduced substantially (Ratha "Remittances" 43). Despite this, it remains a fact that a large portion of remittances flow through informal channels to friends and family of migrant workers, through a complex network of well-established regional systems of credit, money-lending and exchange such as *hawala* in South Asia and *fei ch'ien* in China (Buencamino and Gorbunov). This presents, in the mind of some economists, both an obstacle and an opportunity:

Harnessing the development impact of these flows with an efficient and effective formal public and private remittance infrastructure in the face of an active parallel informal structure is today's principal policy challenge for governments in the region – a challenge governments in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are taking seriously. (Maimbo and Ratha 62)

Not all see remittances and diasporic capital as an unalloyed boon, however. Some critics suggest that workers remittances in fact have a negative impact on receiving countries' economies in the form of a real exchange rate appreciation, artificially inflating the value of domestic currencies and decreasing productive capacities (Pozo and Amuedo-Dorantes). Additionally, though recognition of the importance of remittances has grown considerably throughout the academic and policy communities in recent years, precise calculations of their volume remain difficult. The international financial community has implemented several measures to try and rectify the situation. Following requests by the G-8 countries to improve remittance statistics a number of international bodies including the UN, World Bank, IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have established an international working group called the Technical Sub-Group on the Movement of Persons to try and capture remittance statistics more accurately (World Bank "Foreign Investment"; *Global Economic Prospects*). Recorded in the balance of payments current account as either "private transfer receipts" or "unrequited capital transfers", most remittance numbers fail to account for more informal money transfers, for foreign exchange that is brought in personally (much of which is recorded as the receipts of tourism) and for personal goods. They are still mainly calculated as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers. Some critics estimate that roughly half of the actual amount sent by foreign workers and émigrés fails to be measured by contemporary national accounting statistics (Debabrata and Kapur). Similarly, given that it is impossible to tell the origin of deposits in external currency accounts and the diasporic nature of much "foreign" direct investment is unclear, these sources of diasporic capital are likewise prone to underestimation; indeed,

despite the best efforts of the international financial community it is likely that the true extent of worker remittances will remain an imprecise measure.

Dependence upon remittances to provide a stable economic support as Perry suggests seems therefore fraught with risk, since their true scale is difficult to gauge, let alone trying to predict their shifting behaviour. Far from insulating economies against "external shocks", there is mounting evidence that in some situations diasporic capital flows can indeed exacerbate crisis situations (Krishnamurty). And as will be discussed presently, there are also potentially serious ethical issues concerning diasporic investments and remittances in terms of their differential and sometimes deleterious effects upon a receiving country's population. Moreover, remittances are not, of course, the only part of the story. An exploration of these dynamics demands a wider understanding of the phenomenon of the diaspora-development connection beyond remittances to include both diasporic capital and cultural flows, a reading which would include a wide range of political, economic and social practices. As Kapur suggests:

[it] is worth asking whether a less visible, quantifiable, and tangible form of remittances – namely social remittances and the flow of ideas – have a more critical impact than their pecuniary counterpart. The overseas experience must have some cognitive effect on migrants. At the same time, the communications revolution has led to an exponential growth of transnational telephone calls and email, as well as a sharp increase in international travel. As a result, not just elites but social groups at the lower end of the social spectrum are exposed to new information, not just new ways of making or selling things, but also new views of what is acceptable in terms of service standards, the role of the state, or the behaviour of politicians. The cumulative effect of millions of conversations – akin to filling a pond one drop at a time – is interesting to speculate upon. (Kapur in Maimbo and Ratha 357)

It is towards this broader developmental impact that diasporas might have and relationship to discourses on identity, modernity, migration, citizenship and belonging that I turn to in the next section of this paper.

Citizenship, Diasporas, Home and the Nation-State

Yet despite the potential problem of remittance flows, given the sheer (estimated) volume it is no surprise perhaps that nation-states the world over are salivating at the prospect of capturing income from departed sons and daughters. As part of the desire to capture these untamed and often informal capital flows, countries have gone so far as to offer an extended form of citizenship to diasporic communities (for example, the Person of Indian Origin cards described in the next section), playing on their ongoing attachments to a notion of home. But it is important not to confuse a longing for "home" and "place" with some kind of primordial connection to the nation-state. Diasporas certainly predate the modern post-Treaty of Westphalia notion of the nation-state, as the historical record clearly demonstrates. There is nothing to suggest that an attachment to place arises from a flight across lines on a

map or displacement from one's nationality. But in an era where the nation-state is seen by many as the ultimate expression of community and its existence appears inevitable (though somewhat altered by globalisation), it seems only logical that migration from the nation would be the point (in some views) at which diasporas are created. Indeed, as Anderson has argued, the very success of the idea of the nation-state has been in first harnessing the latent power of "nationalist" sentiments within the political framework of the state, and second, thereafter exercising control over geography, history, demography and the legitimate use of coercive force in the name of that nationalist sentiment (163–64). The "map, the census and the museum", Anderson suggests, have been amongst the most effective tools in regulating geographical boundaries, population movements and cultural memories within a world system of nation-states.

But diasporas disrupt this tidy view of nation, narration and belonging. Take the case of refugee diasporas, for example. These may indeed be a group of people forced by conflict or persecution to flee lands and homes to which they have long-standing political, economic and cultural ties – but it is more often homes that are left behind, rather than nation-states. As a community in exile, refugee diasporas are often defined by their nationality – Somalis, Afghans, Iranians – yet are their connections to "home" predicated on the nation-state? Certainly within the larger diasporic population, the link is not so clear. Try as many national governments might, attempts to fundraise for various nation-building projects in putative homelands have been far less successful than the efforts of hometown associations or the more common informal transfers of funds between family members and friends (Østergaard-Nielsen; Orozco). The ties that bind are more often to place than they are to the grand notions of an imagined community in the form of the nation-state. The exile that the refugee communities experience is from their homes and the lives that they are forced to try and reconstruct might be built as much in another part of their country of origin as in a distant land – though both might be equally foreign to them. The displaced from development projects from central India often end up living in cities on the coasts, for example, in discrete, if often wretched communities. In other cases, populations fleeing conflict and violence cross an international border to become refugees in neighbouring countries whose populations might be quite similar in cultural practices and beliefs to them and whose "difference" has less to do with nationalism and more with the arbitrary boundaries of competing colonial powers (as in the case of many African countries).

All of this is not to say that the nation does not matter. Indeed, for many refugee diasporas who do not come from a nation-state with which they identify the dream instead is of a country of their own, such as elements of the Sikh, Kurdish and Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas have suggested. Still, the claim to place and home is based primarily on what De calls the "territorial referent", rather than on the necessity of the nation-state:

[While] the statehood demand is not a must for nationalism, a territorial referent is. Nationalism proceeds to define people in terms of shared institutions, economic, social and/or political (such as language, religion, customs, etc.) and defends or seeks to increase their autonomy. All the while this demand for autonomy is made in terms of belonging to a particular territory. Often, to make this demand compatible with the territorial referent, nationalists mystify the connections by referring to a remote past (usually heroic) and/or to a better future. Thus, while a nationalist ideology is conditioned by its location in an actual space and time, it is also a unique and creative time-space formulation. Quite naturally, therefore, nationalism can be used by different social groups and classes for different and often conflicting purposes. (15)

It is in the light of these complex and contested claims to both nationalism and what might be termed “sub-nationalism”, therefore, that the idea of the diaspora must be evaluated, paying particular attention to the different reasons for departure, the diverse ongoing connections to “homelands” (real or imagined) and the differences in experiences of diasporas. Many of these groups, for example, have developed vibrant, established diasporic communities in their countries of refuge or migration; others remain marginalised, often continuing to live for decades in camps under less than ideal conditions and denied the rights and privileges enjoyed by their immediate neighbours, or segregated into low-wage labour and low-income housing. Examining the diverse and complex experiences of resettlement, integration and ongoing relationships with putative homelands is a key component in understanding the make-up and mentality of diasporas. A focus on these differences is also an important part of not treating these groups as monolithic entities but rather as varied as any other community. The next section examines one particular set of experiences of the diaspora with relation to development in the postcolonial period, those of Indians overseas.

Wooing Diasporic Capital: India's Twenty-First-Century Developmental Visions

Traditionally investment in the bond market is done after looking at security, liquidity, safety and returns. We will add Emotional Property to tap funds from NRIs. We would appeal to their emotions and ask them to lend for development in the motherland. (Raghu)

With these words, the then-Minister for Major Irrigation and Narmada in the Indian state of Gujarat announced in December 2000 a new strategy aimed at raising money for public expenditures, in particular the massive scheme to build interlocking dams in the Narmada Valley of North Western India. The specific objective was to tap the lucrative NRI market of wealthy expatriates and loyal émigrés for financial aid to fund the project. Three years later, in his opening speech to the first Indian Diaspora conference, held in New Delhi in January 2003, former Prime Minister of India Atal Behari Vajpayee made clear that the linkage between émigrés and development was both recognised by and a priority for the federal government of India (as it is for

many others elsewhere). He thanked members of the Indian diasporic community for their contributions to intellectual, financial, cultural and political developments throughout the world. He also suggested that members of the Indian diaspora played an important role as ambassadors of goodwill for the Indian state. Vajpayee repeatedly exhorted émigrés to return to India – in spirit if not in body:

I have always been conscious of the need for India to be sensitive to the hopes, aspirations and concerns of its vast diaspora. We invite you, not only to share our vision of India in the new millennium, but also to help us shape its contours. We do not want only your investment. We also want your ideas. We do not want your riches; we want the richness of your experience. We can gain from the breadth of vision that your global exposure has given you.

Though he emphasised that it was not only the wealth of the diaspora that was so attractive to the Indian state, Vajpayee's assurances that India had a positive investment climate and was firmly entrenched on a path towards modernisation and equitable development implied a clear policy of wooing diasporic capital. Vajpayee also indicated several rewards for the Indian diasporas' support for the Indian state over a decade of tumultuous economic and political upheavals. Two years earlier, the Government of India had created an NRI and PIO Division within its Ministry of External Affairs. The Indian central government also established a High Level Commission on Indian Diaspora, whose policy recommendations as released in January 2003 proposed the extension of dual citizenship rights to NRI and PIO individuals – though initially only to those residing in the USA, Canada, European Union member nations, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, but not the Middle East or the Gulf. This proposal has since been amended by the current Indian central government to extend to NRI and PIO individuals within other countries.

A change in government, from the Hindu-right Bharatiya Janata Party, under whose tenure the above initiatives were launched, to the centre-left United Progressive Alliance has not significantly changed the Indian state's attitudes towards the diaspora. In the most recent iteration of the Indian diaspora conference, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, echoed his predecessor Vajpayee's sentiments:

I would like you to reach out and invest in a new India. Invest not just financially, but intellectually, socially, culturally and, above all, emotionally [...] Come engage with India. (NDTV.com)

This attention paid by the central (as well as by regional governments) to the Indian diaspora is unsurprising if one considers the size and significance of the diasporic population. At present, Indian émigrés are estimated to number between 25 and 40 million people worldwide (depending, as always, on how one defines inclusion in a particular diasporic community). And while it is true that many new immigrants from India to countries such as Canada struggle socially and economically to adjust to their new surroundings, it is becoming equally apparent that significant sections of the Indian diaspora across the globe are highly successful and indeed prosperous in

their new homes (Motwani, Gosine and Barot-Motwani). In 2002, India outpaced Mexico as the country receiving the largest volume of remittances in the world, totalling over \$16 billion (IMF). The Gujarati diaspora alone, which makes up less than 0.01 per cent of the population of the USA, is estimated to control over 5 per cent of that country's wealth (High Level Committee 169–77).²

The attempt by the Indian state to attract diasporic capital is not a new phenomenon. Within decades of Independence, the extensively planned Indian economy combining a strategy of heavy and commodity-based industries teetered on the verge of collapse. In the face of massive trade deficits, the Indian rupee had been devalued by 20 per cent by 1967, with its value seemingly on an inexorably downward spiral. The Indian government sought to staunch the bleeding of its domestic economy by looking to the resources of successful Indian émigrés (Seshadri). The decades since the end of the Second World War and India's Independence had led to a steady stream of migration towards industrialised nations such as the USA, Britain and Canada, as well as workers who flocked to the oil-rich Persian Gulf. As well, older diasporic Indian communities – many the descendants of indentured labourers – had deep roots in East Africa, the West Indies and South-east Asia (Motwani, Gosine and Barot-Motwani).

And the money did flow, not only in the form of remittances, but also in the form of foreign currency deposits. The state-controlled Reserve Bank of India initiated two programmes in the late 1970s to attract funds in foreign currency from overseas Indian communities. The first was to create Foreign Currency Non-Resident Accounts, which insured the depositor against exchange rate fluctuations by providing a fixed rate. The second scheme was called the Non-Resident (External) Rupee Account which offered a higher interest rate without the guarantee of a fixed exchange rate. By 1982 these initiatives were further refined to make it even more attractive for NRIs to deposit their money in Indian banks, to invest in and to buy real estate in India, including offering assured repatriation of funds and a further 2 per cent extra interest on foreign currency deposits held in India (Nayyar).

The success of this strategy to woo NRI money was considerable, although ultimately it was only a temporary solution. Throughout the 1980s NRI money helped to balance India's trade deficits – but “leakages” in the trade account and elsewhere helped to substantially offset these gains. Indeed, as V. Krishnamurty argues, to a large extent the support provided by NRI funds merely put off the economic reforms that sooner or later needed to be undertaken by the Indian state. Krishnamurty also points out that diasporic capital has a complex and often contradictory effect on the receiving country's economy. Deposit flows, he suggests, come out of savings and wealth, while remittances come out of income. There are two different trajectories and class implications for these types of diasporic assistance – and possibly two different outcomes. Krishnamurty goes so far as to suggest “remittances bring down the measured deficit while deposits help to finance it” (7).

The differences between the nature of these forms of diasporic capital – and the risks of informally relying on the flow from remittances for financial stability – became

stark when the growing economic crisis finally reached meltdown status in 1991. Inflationary pressures, coupled with overvalued exchange rates and rising fiscal deficits had severely staggered the Indian economy. It could not, however, recover from the body blow dealt by a series of external shocks, the most severe of which was the 1991 Gulf War. Not only was the Indian state responsible (at considerable expense) for repatriating hundreds of thousands of workers threatened by war, the flow of foreign exchange from the Gulf dried up and the sudden spike in oil prices further crippled the economy. The credit rating of India in the international loan market plummeted, as commercial lenders shied away. Furthermore, the second part of the diasporic capital equation – foreign currency deposits – abruptly abandoned ship. Nearly US\$1 billion in NRI deposits exited the country. Capital flight in general was precipitous, often citing severe exchange restrictions as the motivation, but also following the general trend of unease regarding the Indian economy. As a result of this economic collapse, India was forced eventually to accept a series of economic reforms (aimed at trade liberalisation) as part of a loan package from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, accelerating a process of liberalisation already underway since the late 1970s and early 1980s (Nayyar).

Despite this experience with the problems of looking to émigrés and their funds, the Indian government has continued its pursuit of diasporic capital. Between 1991 and 2001 the central government floated three separate savings schemes. Each followed a particular political or economic event that placed the Indian state in a precarious financial position. In 1992, the government issued “India Development Bonds” following the debt crisis described above. In 1998 and 2000, the government launched “Resurgent India Bonds” and “India Millennium Development Bonds”, respectively, with the former a direct appeal for diasporic assistance following global sanctions on India due to nuclear weapons testing. Approximately US\$2 billion was raised by the first set of bonds and roughly US\$4–5 billion by the following two. Each offering was targeted towards infrastructure financing in India, though in actual terms less than one-third of the funds were directed in this manner, with the rest entering general revenues (Bajpai).

The basic assumption underlying these efforts is that despite increasing globalisation and economic, cultural and political integration across the world, locality, place and “the nation” all still matter. Preliminary studies of investment by NRIs indicate that “emotional ties with India” ranks as the single highest motivating factor spurring these diasporic capital flows (Krishnamurty 11).³ Such surveys would suggest that diasporic communities demonstrate a strong desire to participate in the material as well as ideological restructuring of their places of origin.

It is not only “nation” that is of importance in the search for diasporic capital, however. Several regional governments within India – including those of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh – have established agencies in order to woo NRI money to their states, playing up notions of not simply “Indian-ness” but “Marathi-ness” and “Andhra-ness” as well. Parallel in many ways to the nationalist appeals that laid the foundation for development projects of the early post-colonial

period, these calls by regional governments for extended civic duty to departed sons and daughters tie identity not to the nation-state, but rather to specific regions and localities. And as the evidence from other instances of diasporas and development indicates, the efforts of hometown associations, regions, neighbourhoods and families have far outstripped nation-states in their ability to raise funds from overseas connections (Orozco).

The desire for diasporic capital extends in the Indian context beyond the central and state governments and public sector financing, however. While remittance-driven development has indeed played a major role in regions such as Gujarat and Kerala, and the amounts raised by investment schemes such as the India Development Bonds, Resurgent India Bonds and India Millennium Development Bonds have been significant, there are multiple other ways in which the influence of the diaspora in India's contemporary development can be seen and felt. Perhaps one of the most apparent in the present context has been the impact of diasporic capital, aesthetics and values on both private and public urban development throughout India's many cities. The sheer pace and scale of such urban redesign is remarkable and the political, economic, social and ecological consequences as yet unclear. In cities such as Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Kolkata and Cochin – to name but a few – construction work is booming. "Development" in India today is more than the infrastructure projects – dams, highways, irrigation canals, resource extraction enterprises – that have traditionally been conjured by the concept. Indeed, what is most striking about the process of urbanisation in these cities is not the attempted recreation of the developed world in the image of London, New York or Paris, but rather as suburban California, Colorado and British Columbia. In rapidly developing new towns such as Gurgaon (in Haryana, just outside of Delhi), and on the fringes of a host of other cities, malls, gated communities, entertainment complexes, country clubs and all the markers of conspicuous middle-class affluence and consumption abound. Additionally, diasporic investors are increasingly sought to aid in setting up new businesses, launching joint ventures and establishing trading ties, all activities that have potentially significant impacts on local communities. In the final section of this paper, I will examine some of the potentially deleterious effects that such activities might have.

Dilemmas of Diasporic Longing? Political Involvements and Social Impacts

Much of the discussion regarding development and diasporas so far has focused on the potential good that these relationships might bring – development assistance, economic aid, increased trade, greater cultural connections and understanding, and so on. The links between émigrés and former homelands is often seen through what Orozco refers to as the "five T's" of transnational practices: transportation, tourism, telecommunications, trade and transfer of remittances. And for the most part such practices have been generally discussed – certainly by the majority of literature on diasporas and development – in terms of the benefits they will bring to former

homes. However, many critics have noted that there is nothing inherently positive or productive about the linkage between diasporas and development. As mentioned above, an infusion of remittances into a given community may have inflationary effects on local economies. Additionally, the phenomenon of migrant workers may lead to a situation of "brain drain" or perhaps more accurately "capacity drain" whether of doctors, engineers and other professionals from a country's service infrastructure, or parents who are absent from a local community in order to work as domestic labour in an overseas location (Özden and Schiff). Some critics have argued that in many instances communities supported by remittances often do not have the institutional resources to maintain the structures and services built through such funding (Kapur in Maimbo and Ratha). Diasporic assistance in this sense is detrimental to the broader social health and function of the community imbricated by the largesse.

Others point out that the range of diasporic transnational practices is not monolithic but instead governed by differences in class, gender, race, sexuality and a host of other distinctions. It is not only who is able to invest from savings and who is forced to remit a portion of income that is at issue here; patterns of migration are themselves affected by such differences. In countries such as Canada and city-states such as Singapore, the emphasis is on attracting wealthy entrepreneurs and highly trained professionals for long-term immigration and seasonal or short-term workers for lower-skilled wage labour, guests who are rather firmly asked to leave once their welcome has been worn out (Gaur). It is important to recognise therefore that development continues to impact diasporas as much as the reverse is true.

Beyond such impacts, actual physical displacement, economic loss and political repression may represent a further dark side to diasporic involvement in displacement. This has certainly been the case in many of the urban developments described previously. Hand in hand with these developments have come the wholesale displacement of the former populations that used to live there, agrarians, horticulturalists, landless labourers, migrant workers and others. The more fortunate have found jobs as drivers, domestics and the ubiquitous security guards for the new housing estates and their affluent denizens; others have been pushed out into city slums and rural villages and into conflicts with the working poor and marginalised in those spaces. In some of these situations those evicted are directly making way for the living spaces of the transnational elites; in others the dislocation is in service of the lifestyles supposedly embodied in such figures and expressed through the building of golf courses, country clubs, movie theatres, luxury condominiums and other amenities.

A similarly problematic case is that of the Narmada Valley Development dams, the hydroelectric project referred to above whose proponents are now turning to the wealthy Gujarati diaspora to help bankroll the scheme. This is among the most controversial development projects in the world that has seen decades of political infighting amongst the various state governments involved in its construction. The planned dam has also engendered a vigorous and internationally recognised popular

movement, the *Narmada Bachao Andolan*, which has fought for the rights of the hundreds of thousands who would be displaced by the project. If NRIs were to help facilitate the project with their overseas monies, they would become implicated in a moral, economic and political quagmire. Their love of country or region might have led some to "engage with India" as Prime Minister Singh has urged, but it would result in this case in the disenfranchisement and dislocation of some of the very people who the diaspora might have believed they were helping through their developmental "good works" (Kothari).

Of course not all diasporic development initiatives can be categorised under the umbrella of altruism, charity or duty. Diasporas have long been entangled in ideological projects to reshape, resurrect, defend or even enlarge homelands, ancestral or putative. Nationalist struggles and sectarian strife have lengthy histories of overseas assistance from departed sons and daughters. Fundraising for the Irish Republican cause in Boston, political support for early twentieth-century Indian nationalism amongst the Ghadr Party in California, Palestinian and Jewish demonstrations on behalf of respective positions in Middle East conflicts, or Tamil and Sikh agitation in Canada for separatist movements in South Asia are but a few examples. This involvement can take the form of moral support and encouragement, it can manifest through material assistance in money and materials, and it can even take the form of physical presence in armed struggles, as in the case of Canadians of Serbian and Croatian origin who took part in the civil war in the Balkans (Satzewich and Wong 273).

Another example more directly related to the idea of development as itself a political project is the case of the strong support demonstrated by large segments of overseas Indian communities for the resurgent Hindu right that has dominated much of Indian politics since the 1990s (Lele; Bhatt and Mukta; Chatterji; Biswas).⁴ One of the myriad entities that comprise the *Sangh Parivar*, or "family" of organisations that collectively espouse the ideology of *Hindutva* – an aggressive form of right-wing Hindu nationalism – is the *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (VHP or World Hindu Council). The VHP plays an important role alongside the official political wing of the *Hindutva* movement (the Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP), the "cultural" organ known as the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), trade unions, professional associations and women's organisations, amongst many others. Its youth wing, the *Bajrang Dal*, has been the jack-booted, saffron-shirted muscle behind many of the most notorious attacks on those deemed to offend against the supposed "Hindu-ness" of India – Christian missionaries, Muslim villagers, lower-caste Hindus and tribal peoples; in other words, any who do not conform to the national vision of the RSS (Mukta).

Active in fundraising and nationalist calls directed at raising patriotic fervour especially amongst Indians living abroad or diasporic Indian communities, the VHP has been tremendously successful at fundraising for the *Hindutva* cause in places ranging from the UK to the USA to Australia. In some Indian regions where the *Hindutva* movement had proved particularly strong (such as Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and other parts of the so-called Hindi Belt), the VHP's success in recruiting overseas

support (and even leadership) for the right-wing cadres has had far-reaching consequences.⁵ Perhaps most alarming has been the vocal support and justification offered by some within diasporic Hindu communities in North America and Western Europe following the pogroms against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. VHP functionaries abroad were particularly active in their defence of the shocking events and sought to minimise the evidence that state authorities were complicit in the murders and brutalisation of the Muslim community in Gujarat.

A similar controversy has been simmering over the activities and intentions of the India Development and Relief Fund (IDRF), a US-based, tax-exempt fundraising initiative meant to concentrate on the "interaction and convergence of development and relief work, particularly in relation to the needs and welfare of the poor" (India Development and Relief Fund). To its supporters the IDRF is an invaluable source of funds and psychological aid for development efforts in education, housing and sanitation (amongst others) as well as in reconstruction and rehabilitation needs following natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. But critics of the IDRF have pointed out that the vast majority of the funds raised have gone to RSS-affiliated organisations and have been directed at promulgating *Hindutva* beliefs under the guise of relief and development activities, especially in marginalised and tribal areas. Dismayed by the clear linkages between diasporic-fundraising and the growth of right-wing politics in India, critics of the IDRF launched a very public and successful "Campaign to Stop Funding Hate" to highlight these pernicious and problematic connections (Campaign to Stop Funding Hate).

Conclusion

The significance of diasporic groups in financing development activities, policies and projects in countries across the world is both considerable and on the increase. Through remittances, investments, property ownership and cultural influences, diasporic communities continue to reshape the material, aesthetic and ideological landscapes of their homeland. In India, diasporic capital and cultural flows have played a profound role in its recent history, particularly in its economic history. Yet such connections are not without their costs, sometimes particularly negative ones such as population displacement. It is for these reasons that groups such as the National Alliance of People's Movements, a broad-based coalition of grassroots social justice movements spread across India, have called explicitly for diasporic communities to participate more knowledgeably and more ethically in their investments in the "homeland". Transnational solidarity and support networks based in other countries, such as the Association for India's Development, a US-based organisation, have similarly urged a focus on ethical behaviour by NRI's, suggesting that members of the diaspora ask themselves: "What kinds of developments in India are the Indians in the U.S. (and other countries) making possible?" (Association for India's Development).

Notes

- [1] While in this paper I have used the term diaspora synonymously with transnationalism, there is an ongoing debate regarding this conflation. Some have argued strongly that such usage is problematic and that the term diaspora should be dependent upon the shared experience of group expulsion and of community-in-exile as in the case of the Jewish or the African slave diaspora (Ong). Others suggest, however, that creating these exclusions are both morally problematic and analytically unhelpful and that diaspora describes experiences of hybridity and culture that are not necessarily predicated on primordial ties to either land or blood (Walsh; Gilroy; Hall). It is in this vein that I have adopted the use of diaspora, as a way of illustrating the contested, shifting and creative relationships between space, place and power.
- [2] Such statistics may help to explain the steady stream of Gujarati politicians making their way to the USA in recent years, as supplicants to wealthy expatriates, seeking funds for a variety of causes.
- [3] The second highest motivation is the prospect of higher returns on investment, followed by a stated familiarity with Indian economic conditions.
- [4] There has been support across the political spectrum and indeed during the 2004 elections, several overseas Indians ran as candidates for different parties, one of them winning a seat as a Congress MP from a rural district outside of Hyderabad while maintaining a corporate and immigration law practice in Manhattan (Yelaja). However, it is the Hindu right that has been by far the most successful in encouraging such overseas political activism.
- [5] Indeed, one could argue that political battles in Indian states such as Gujarat were being waged as much in the Garden State as in Gandhinagar, if the number of Gujarati politicians from all parties making trips to New Jersey during the 2002 state elections or in the interest shown in the polls by overseas Gujaratis was any indication (Nanda and Bhatt).

Works Cited

- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised and extended ed. London and New York: Verso, 1992.
- Association for India's Development. Projects: Rights and Social Justice, Your Voice Counts homepage, 2004 [cited 14 September 2004] <http://www.aidindia.org/hq/misc/vcounts/voice_counts.shtml>.
- Atkinson, A. B., ed. *New Sources of Development Finance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Bajpai, V. C. Interview with Assistant General Manager (NRI Services), State Bank of India International Banking Group, Mumbai, 9 March 2004.
- Basch, Linda, Nina Glick-Schiller, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc, eds. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach, 1994.
- Bhatt, Chetan, and Parita Mukta. "Hindutva in the West: Mapping the Antinomies of Diaspora Nationalism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23.3 (1 May 2000): 407-41.
- Biswas, Shampa. "Globalization and the Nation Beyond: The Indian-American Diaspora and the Rethinking of Territory, Citizenship and Democracy." *New Political Science* 27.1 (March 2005): 43-67.
- Brazier, Jana Evans, and Anita Mannur, eds. *Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
- Buencamino, L., and S. Gorbunov. *Informal Money Transfer Systems: Opportunities and Challenges for Development Finance*. Discussion Paper of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) No. 26, 2002 [cited 3 January 2007] <<http://www.un.org/esa/esa02dp26.pdf>>.

- Campaign to Stop Funding Hate. CSFH homepage, 2006 [cited 11 May 2006] <<http://www.stopfundinghate.org/>>.
- Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. 3rd ed. New York and London: Guildford Press, 2003.
- Chatterji, Angana. "Myths and Dreams: Hindutva Nationalism and the Indian Diaspora." Countercurrents homepage, 2003 [cited 9 August 2005] <<http://www.countercurrents.org/comm-anganac26303.htm>>.
- Cohen, Robin. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. London: UCL Press, 1997.
- Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate. Senate Hearing 107-909: Issues Regarding the Sending of Remittances, 28 February 2002.
- De, Soumitra. *Nationalism and Separatism in Bengal: A Study of India's Partition*. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1992.
- Debabrata, Michael, and Muneesh Kapur. "India's Worker Remittances: A User's Lament about Balance of Payments Compilation." Sixteenth Meeting of the IMF Committee on Balance of Payment Statistics, Washington, DC, 1-5 December 2003.
- Dobbs, Lou. CNN/Lou Dobbs Tonight homepage, 2004 [cited 15 April 2006] <<http://edition.cnn.com/2004/US/07/16/broken.borders/index.html>>.
- Engberg-Pederson, Poul, Ninna Nyberg-Sorenson, and Nicholas Van Hear. *The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options*. Geneva, Switzerland: International Organisation for Migration, 2002.
- Freund, Caroline, and Nikola Spatafora. "Remittances: Transaction Costs, Determinants and Informal Flows." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3704, September 2005.
- Gaur, Seema. "Indian Professional Workers in Singapore." *Mobility, Labour Migration and Border Controls in Asia*. Ed. Amarjit Kaur and Ian Metcalfe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 193-212.
- Gilroy, Paul. *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000.
- Hall, Stuart. "Cultural Identity and Diaspora." *Colonial and Post-Colonial Theory*. Ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 392-403.
- High Level Committee. *Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora*. New Delhi: MEA, 2002.
- India Development and Relief Fund. IDRF homepage, 2006 [cited 16 May 2006] <<http://www.idrf.org/>>.
- IMF (International Monetary Fund). *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*. Washington, DC: IMF, 2004.
- Itzigsohn, Jose, and Silvia Giorguli Saucedo. "Immigrant Incorporation Transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 36.3 (2002): 766-99.
- Kothari, Smitu. "Development Displacement: Whose Nation Is It?" *People Centred Development Forum*, 10 July 1995.
- Krishnamurty, V. *Study of Investment Preferences of Expatriates from India*. New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1994.
- Lele, Jayant. "Indian Diaspora's Long-Distance Nationalism: The Rise and Proliferation of 'Hindutva' in Canada." *Fractured Identity: The Indian Diaspora in Canada*. Ed. Sushma J. Varmaand and Radhika Seshan. Jaipur and New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2003. 66-119.
- Levitt, Peggy, and Mary C. Waters, eds. *The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.
- Maimbo, Samuel Munzele, and Dilip Ratha, eds. *Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.
- Motwani, Jagat, Mahin Gosine, and Jyoti Barot-Motwani, eds. *Global Indian Diaspora: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. New York: Global Organization of People of Indian Origin, 1993.

- Mukta, Parita. "The Public Face of Hindu Nationalism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23.3 (1 May 2000): 442–66.
- Nanda, Tanmaya Kumar, and Shakti Bhatt. "The NRIs Reaction to the Gujarat State Election." *Rediff Online* homepage, 11 December 2002 [cited 11 May 2006] <<http://www.rediff.com/election/2002/dec/11spec.htm>>.
- Nayyar, Deepak. *Migration, Remittances, and Capital Flows: The Indian Experience*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- NDTV.com. "Invest in New India: PM to Diaspora." 7 January 2007 [cited 18 January 2007] <<http://www.ndtv.com/morenews/showmorestory.asp?category=National&slug=Invest+in+new+India%3A+PM+to+diaspora&id=99046>>.
- Ong, Aihwa. "Cyberpublics and Diaspora Politics among Transnational Chinese." *Interventions* 5.1 (2003): 82–100.
- Orozco, Manuel. "Transnationalism and Development: Trends and Opportunities in Latin America." *Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects*. Ed. Samuel Munzele Maimbo and Dilip Ratha. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005. 307–30.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*. Basingstoke, NH and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Özden, Çaglar, and Maurice Schiff, eds. *International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Portes, Alejandro, Luis Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt. "Introduction: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (1999): 463–78.
- Pozo, Susan, and Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes. "Workers' Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A Paradox of Gifts." Homepage, 2002 [cited 17 July 2003] <<http://homepages.wmich.edu/~pozo/remit.real.feb6.pdf>>.
- Prashad, Vijay. *The Karma of Brown Folk*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Raghu, Sunil. "Gujarat Plans to Raise 5,000 cr viz Bonds." *Economic Times of India*, 6 December 2000.
- Ratha, Dilip. "Remittances: A Lifeline for Development." *Finance and Development* 42.4 (December 2005): 42–44.
- . "Remittance Flows Top \$268 Billion." *Finance and Development* 43.4 (December 2006): 3.
- Rauch, James. "Diasporas and Development: Theory, Evidence, and Programmatic Implications. A Special Study of the US Agency for International Development Trade Enhancement for the Services Sector." Washington, DC: USAID, August 2003.
- Satzewich, Vic, and Lloyd Wong. "Immigration, Ethnicity, and Race: The Transformation of Transnationalism, Localism, and Identities." *Changing Canada: Political Economy as Transformation*. Ed. Wallace Clement and Leah Vosko. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003. 363–84.
- Seshadri, R. K. *From Crisis to Convertibility: The External Value of the Rupee*. Bombay: Orient Longman, 1993.
- Solimano, Andrés. "Remittances by Emigrants: Issues and Evidence." *New Sources of Development Finance*. Ed. A. B. Atkinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 177–99.
- Vajpayee, A. B. Address to the First Indian Diaspora Conference, New Delhi, 9 January 2003.
- Van Doorn, Judith. *Migration, Remittances and Development*. Migrant Workers, Labor Education, International Labor Organization (ILO), Social Finance Program. No. 129 (2002).
- Van Hear, Nicholas. *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities*. London: UCL Press, 1998.
- Vertovec, Steven. "Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation." Centre for Migration and Development Working Paper Series, Princeton University. Working Paper, 2003 [cited 14 April 2004] <<http://cmd.princeton.edu/papers/wp0309m.pdf>>.
- Walsh, Rebecca. "Global Diasporas: Introduction." *Interventions* 5.1 (2003): 1–11.