RETURN TO FORM:
ANALYZING THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN SELF-DOCUMENTING SUBCULTURES

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Abstract

This dissertation examines self-documenting subcultures and the role of media within three case studies: hardcore punk, skateboarding, and urban dirt-bike riding. The production and distribution of subcultural media is largely governed by intracultural industries. Elite practitioners and media-makers are incentivized to document performances that are deemed essential to the preservation of the status quo. This constructed dependency reflects and reproduces an ethos of conformity that pervades both social interactions and subcultural representations.

Within each self-documenting subculture, media is the primary mode of socialization and representation. The production of media and meaning is constrained by the presence of prescriptive formal conventions propagated by elite producers. These conditions, in part, result in the institutionalization of conformity. The three case studies illustrate the theoretical and methodological framework that classifies these formations under a new typology. Accordingly, this dissertation introduces an alternative approach to the study of subcultures.

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"We do not want to see the same movie over and over again, only the same form."

- Robert Warshow[1]

1. Introduction

Media's role as an epistemic apparatus is of particular importance to the study of self-documenting subcultures. Robert Warshow suggests that the repetition of form is inextricably connected to an endless desire to consume. This relationship speaks to an industry of media-making as much as any individual piece of media. Both conceptions yield an understanding of moving-images not merely as texts to be read and interpreted, but as economies of knowledge production and distribution. For the purposes of this study, I examine the conditions under which the practices of subcultural media-makers are circumscribed by the dissemination and internalization of patterns pertaining to the thought and behavior of subcultural members. Such influence addresses the control wielded by those who govern the agenda of media production and those subservient to this agenda. The inequity of power is made plain by predominant modes of representation and long-standing orthodoxies of formal production conventions that shape the constitution and continuation of self-documenting subcultures.

Within these formations, the production and distribution of knowledge occurs principally through media.[2] In the past, interpersonal interaction between members served as the primary method of both communication and social distinction; that is, until the advent of consumer audio-visual technology. This technology paralleled the rise of intracultural media industries, which transformed previous instantiations of subcultures into categorically different formations. Distinction as a method of exclusion was subsumed by inward-facing strictures intended to cohere members and cultivate an ethos conformity.[3] Therefore, the conditions under which such power was extended, and the effect of that influence, is of considerable concern when analyzing the role of media in self-documenting subcultures.

I investigate the upper echelons of self-documenting subcultures, the production of media within them, and the power that emanates from this position. Media's transformative role in altering each subculture's foundation will be touched upon, however, the focus of this writing is the period after such transformations have taken place.[4] The goal is not to "essentialize" the subcultures examined, rather, I address how the existence of both social and media hierarchies engenders essentialism. Further, the elite do not conspire to rule, they are incentivized to maintain the status quo; a mode of one-dimensional thinking that is evinced through the production of meaning tethered to the production of media. The elite's concern with maintaining intracultural ownership over subcultural representation tightens the grip of those who fear a loss of power the most. Industry professionals, practitioners, and proximate media-makers — in various combinations — comprise the elite tier. This coterie authorizes formal conventions that delimit the knowledge circulated to all members. Patterns and formulas of production guide the careful selections of the lived reality and the subsequent manipulated depictions of the subculture on screen. Indeed, as products of intracultural economies, "industry videos" convey the preferred meanings of their producers through aesthetic conventions. A feedback loop emerges in which the social statuses of the elite and thus, the status quo, are continually reflected and (re)produced in subcultural media.

Three case studies are presented — hardcore punk, skateboarding, and urban dirt-bike riding — to exemplify self-documenting subcultures as a social category, the presence of hierarchies that constitute them as such, and the consonant role of industry videos in each seemingly disparate formation. The opening chapters introduce a theoretical framework, which is then coupled with an analysis and contextualization of the methodology employed in the forthcoming chapters. A literature review is included to attenuate past subcultural studies that

rely on distinction as the primary mode of classification. I maintain, however, conformity is a more apt descriptor to categorize all three social formations. This determination, and the arguments extended below, are complemented by and demonstrated through the aforementioned case studies.

The distinctive expressions of subcultural producers and practitioners are outlined to map ambiguities regarding patterns of behavior and thought that accompany membership in each subculture: hardcore punk of the 1980s promoted a do-it-yourself ethic via commercial enterprises that jettisoned dissenting representations; in the mid-1980s and into the 1990s, the consumer skateboard industry emphasized a notion of progress relative to spatial performances, while experimentation in media-making remained stagnant; and urban dirt-bike riders of the 2010s sought both extended visibility in the digital realm and prolonged concealment in the lived reality.[5] Cultural and participatory differences between each formation are apparent, nonetheless, across all three case studies, aesthetic and epistemic criteria, governed by the elite tier, propagate an ethos of conformity.

In foregrounding this ethos, the intention is not to suggest unorthodox expressions do not emerge or exceptions to instituted standards are not present. The arguments laid forth interpret the established conventions of industry videos as indicative of structural conditions that are conducive to conformity — despite the avowed claims of participants who seek freedom from such constraint through subcultural affiliation.[6] These conditions are preserved by subcultural industries that financially incentivize media-makers and practitioners to adhere to prescribed patterns of production. Moreover, the presence of both social and media hierarchies compels members to comply with the status quo or risk exclusion or expulsion from the subculture.[7] Creative expressions are therefore restricted and opposing critiques are elided, not through

physical acts of coercion, but, in part, through the operative function of media as an epistemic apparatus.

The production of media in self-documenting subcultures is sustained by two separate, but mutually reinforcing hierarchies that precipitate conformity and regulate intracultural boundaries. Social hierarchies are governed by the elite (professionals, practitioners, and media-makers) who profit from recorded performances of subcultural activities. Residing below this tier are various levels of subcultural members who have not yet reached or do not seek to obtain professional or pseudo-professional status. I refer to this hierarchy as the social order, "a collection of people that are characterized by a distinct set of patterns that are interwoven across a social organization".[8] The elite can be thought of as a governing body, which through processes of socialization and commodification influence the (in)actions, routines, and norms of members in all tiers of the social hierarchy. Media-makers, however, must conform to dual sets of conventions, one in the social order and another in the virtual order.

Within each self-documenting subculture, an abstract framework governs the post-production process of organizing and constructing images of practitioners performing for the camera. The virtual order is comprised of a media hierarchy that privileges a formula of assemblage over individual producers or singular pieces of media. The order is not managed by anyone in particular *per se*, but instead exerts power through two cultural modes of influence: tradition and authenticity. When followed, the formula presupposes the attribution of authenticity. Authenticity is paramount because it is considered an indicator of an official industry product, rather than a production from an external source outside the subculture. As such, the virtual order legitimates and regulates the production of industry videos.[9] Indeed, compliance from members of the top tier ensures future conformity from members at the bottom.

There is characteristic of deference, rooted in tradition, that permeates each subculture. That is to say, in yielding to tradition and complying with the established formula there are objective rewards. Elite media-makers reinforce the exact system of production that renews and sustains their socio-cultural status. When taken in its totality, the socio-cultural order can be understood as the predominant influence on the production of subcultural media.

During a given era, a dominant socio-cultural order manages to control the agenda of media production and thus, the agenda commodity production. In doing so, it supplies the wider subculture with knowledge, via the distribution of media, which subcultural members consider inviolable. In a sense, the dominant order drives the direction of the entire subculture through this agenda.[10] These conditions engender the formation of a "model franchise", the objectified representation of the "we-ideal". The model franchise is an exemplary version of a subculture's instantiation that is idolized as such, not simply from the lower-tier members of the respective social order, but by subsidiary franchises as well — other socio-cultural orders that accept the model franchise's videos as authentic representations of the subculture's current and idealized state.[11] The model franchise's virtual order supplies the formula for producing (arranging) images of its activities, trends, and styles. Importantly, the continued use of the formula codifies the model franchise's media conventions, which are subsequently adopted by franchisees thereafter. These production practices constitute the "we-image", which serves as its own model for replication. Authenticity is therefore not a marker of originality, but one of convention, repetition, and reiteration. Consequently, conformity is the defining characteristic of each self-documenting subculture's media productions.

The production of media entails multiple functions but hinges on a singular ethos: (re)producing, disseminating, and legitimating conformity. Conformity manifests in the

established editing conventions of each subculture.[12] Post-production begins with media-makers, as gatekeepers, selecting what to make visible based upon the aforementioned formula for how images are to be arranged. The formula also sets boundaries for acceptable permutations. However, disparities and ambiguities materialize in the process. The "screen reality" becomes the we-image through the production of an artificial rendering of the model franchise (we-ideal), which is internalized — through processes of socialization and dependency — by all members as representative of the subculture's current state (the status quo). Both elite and lower-level participants consider depictions of and by these professionals as essential viewing, which results in the renewal of the socio-cultural and virtual order's power. Paradoxically, each subculture tends to be misunderstood by the majority of members as bastions of free expression.[13] Instead, internal power relations stifle alternative conventions — whether consciously understood or not — in order to further the homogenization of subcultural media.[14]

The scope of media production is considerably large, but the commercial infrastructure is not as sizeable, it is actually relatively small. Each subculture's consumer industry is oligopolistic, consisting of a few companies that manufacture goods, finance media productions, and distribute cultural products. Distribution of audio-visual representations takes the form of serial video-magazines, one-off VHS tapes or DVDs, and/or digital media that are sold or exhibited, in tandem with other products, in brick-and-mortar locations, print catalogues, and/or online.[15] Sponsorship (both paid and unpaid) of practitioners is secured by external entities or companies managed and/or owned by current or former professionals — generally one and the same.[16] Practitioners and media-makers are often contractually aligned or financially incentivized to perform and record based on their affiliation to a particular company (skateboarding), music label or group (hardcore punk), or well-publicized city crew (urban dirt-

biking).[17] The depictions of these activities are edited by affiliated media-makers to create industry videos.

On the surface, industry videos appear as documentary reportage of the goings-on of like-minded enthusiasts. Rather, these representations are contrived depictions of celebrity-like figures performing in front of a camera for the commercial benefit of companies they represent or hope to represent.[18] Industry videos are more akin to promotional material or advertisements for each subculture's consumer industry: equipment and clothing (skateboarding), music (hardcore punk), and exposure for various companies outside the subculture that would buoy the intracultural economy (urban dirt-biking).[19] These industries (and the companies within them) are invested in the consumption of media to maintain financial solvency and cultural relevancy. The activities that once defined the subculture are now inextricably linked to the practice of documentation; it is the commodification of the subculture from within. The unified actions of doing and representing are parallel,[20] signifying practices.[21] Stated directly, self-documenting subcultures' consumer industries are beholden to these depictions.[22] Media is not merely another product in the commodified sphere, it is *the essential* cultural product.[23] Maintaining control over the production of media is thus essential as well.

The circulation of goods and the production of media operate through a system of resource management and attribution housed within the virtual order. One of the most important resources in this system is the regulation of individuals who confer authenticity. Authenticity is an immaterial resource with material consequences that is continually renewed by the exact sources of its attribution. In particular, industry videos are awarded authentic status by elite media-makers. These figures are gatekeepers to the subculture's past, present, and future representation.[24] The system operates within a feedback loop: media is "both [a] reflection and

cause, a link in a closed chain."[25] Media-makers and their financial backers are financially and socially rewarded when they perpetuate the preestablished formula that garners such attribution. Authenticity is also a marketing tool that helps retain the power to influence subsidiary franchises.

Subcultural members are influenced by industry videos to the extent that "[s]ocial meanings and social differences are inextricably tied up with representation."[26] The lived realities of participants are guided by the model franchise's production of media. The attribution bestowed from the top-down strengthens members' dependency on media-makers to aggregate subcultural knowledge (representations of elite practitioners, products, performances, and meanings) from the screen reality. I assert that media is the primary source for the production and distribution of subcultural knowledge, thereby precluding the need for interpersonal interactions. Industry videos are the key facilitator of distinguishment (the observation of difference) between those "in the know" and those "out of the loop".[27] In other words, media supplies the necessary parameters for the creation of boundaries that exist in the socio-cultural order.

The dominant order relies on visibility to exert influence: selecting, choosing, and inherently manipulating images to determine what to present and what to exclude. Elite media-makers (gatekeepers) decide what knowledge "flows through the channel" of communication.[28] The extent of this power cannot be understated: "The authority of those who determine the agenda of media production is the authority of commodity production."[29] Media is both enabling and delimiting; it allows for certain expressions to be documented in the lived reality, but it also constrains what is made visible in the screen reality. Embedded in subcultural media is a "preferred meaning", a contrived representation that ultimately engenders an ethos of

conformity. The primary site of inscription, where such meanings are generated, is in the editing room.

Subcultural media-makers, in a given era, ritualistically adhere to editing conventions established by the elite tier and authorized by the consumer industry. Conventions therefore reflect boundaries of innovation and creative restriction. To take one example, during the 1950s, "widescreen" aspect ratio (the proportions of the image on screen) was the Hollywood standard, reaffirmed and reproduced through countless films. The industry-accepted proportions delimited information presented to the viewer — the horizontal frame withheld visual information at the top and bottom of the screen, however, it also emphasized parallel shapes in the *mise-èn-scene*. From a critical perspective, one can view conventions in two ways: conscious adherence or inadvertent patterning. A similar set of circumstances reflect each self-documenting subculture's media productions. However, the majority of editing conventions are reinforced by the notion of tradition and codified by the virtual order. Alternative conventions, then, would be discordant with the standards of production found in the model franchise's videos (we-image), which in turn, would be discordant with the model franchise (we-ideal).[30]

When discussing delimitation in the context of media production, I am referring to epistemic practices that result in a "pre-constituted '*field of possibles*'— which groups take up, transform, [and] develop."[31] The field circumscribes what editing conventions are and are not acceptable by setting parameters for what is shown, how it is arranged, and the inscription of the preferred meaning. The fixity of the preferred meaning can be determined based on the degree of institutionalized norms and conventions within the socio-cultural order.[32] In self-documenting subcultures, if an elite media-maker deviates too far from sanctioned practices and thus, the ethos of conformity, they are effectively excommunicated or maligned within the consumer industry.

Again, elite media-makers are rewarded for compliance because it preserves their status in the top echelon of the social hierarchy and maintains the overall status quo. Rarely, however, are such actions necessary, because the virtual order's force of influence (the system of attribution and the marketing advantages of authenticity) guides the (in)actions of media-makers. The preferred meaning is often constructed intentionally or through unconscious patterning internalized through established processes of socialization, in which media figures centrally.[33] Subcultural media production is therefore sustained by a homologous loop of stability and conformity.[34]

Conformist-driven production practices are the result of each subculture's consumer industry, which rationalizes the entwinement of culture and commodity, privileges homogenization and profit, and emphasizes the established patterns of production over creative innovation. The delimitation of expression in the cultural sphere eschews critiques of the dominant order. In turn, the production of media preserves the social and media hierarchies that govern each subculture's dominant representation. I contend that subcultural media, produced within each model franchise's city and during specific eras, engendered a prescriptive force that influenced media-making practices in subsidiary franchises. These model franchises directed the agenda of media production and the flow of subcultural knowledge: Boston hardcore punk of the early to late 1980s; skateboarders in and around San Francisco city proper during the mid-1980s to early 1990s; and urban dirt-biking of the 2010s in the City of Baltimore. Controlled by dominant orders that inculcate an ethos of conformity into the production process, media shifts and shapes the constitution of self-documenting subcultures. The consequences of such conditions result in the inequitable control over knowledge, which (re)produces inequalities in the social sphere — the distance between what participants can do and what can be done to them.

These contests pivot around questions of authority, power, and inequality that are framed through the production of media and meaning.

2. Defining Self-Documenting Subcultures

For the purposes of this writing, culture should be understood as the "level at which social groups develop distinct patterns of life, and give expressive form" to their experience.[35] Patterns are of particular importance because it is at the level of socialization that individuals develop norms, routines, and behaviors that are specific to each culture. Patterns illuminate cultural practices, providing commonalities that are made meaningful through the production of "expressions".[36] Expressions include "meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in mores and customs, in the uses of objects and material life."[37] In effect, there is a cultural order that provides a set of boundaries that distinguishes varying patterns of behavior, meanings, and morays, from others. This order is interdependent with another.

Cultural orders are generally affiliated with social orders, including the particular processes of distinguishment that cohere around status. The number of orders may vary and may even be innumerable, but hierarchies are at play with respect to both entities. Social, economic, and/or political systems tend to be representative of a distinctive socio-cultural order, which in turn, tends to wield significant power over those systems. The consequences of such conditions are that other socio-cultural orders are considered secondary or inviable in influence; they are subordinate.

Subcultures exist within larger socio-cultural orders and as such, often retain features of the larger socio-cultural order they exist within.[38] However, it is also evident that subcultures include a separate set of self-imposed norms, values, and beliefs that take hold through processes of secondary socialization.[39] Secondary socialization entails a transformation, an "evolution of motives for involvement and a deepening of commitment to the subculture and its ethos."[40]

Within self-documenting subcultures, involvement and commitment principally manifest as fealty to the internal, dominant socio-cultural order. These dominant orders are distinct from subordinate ones.[41] Intracultural hierarchies stratify members with those occupying the top echelon influencing the members below them. Such influence is dependent upon three established, self-imposed norms: socio-cultural status, tradition, and deference.[42] Therefore, the stability of the dominant order is an essential feature of the formations in question.[43]

The notion of three stable and stratified dominant orders may seem farfetched under the supposed dissolution of hierarchies and singular identities.[44] Even more so, discussions of the current era, one of hyper-individuation and fluid membership within diverse socio-cultural formations, veer towards dismissing the usefulness of "subculture" as a term and category.[45] Nevertheless, the self-documenting subcultures examined in this text address these discussions directly. The extent and effect of secondary socialization varies, however, a pervasive ethos of conformity operates as an organizing principle of each subculture's dominant socio-cultural order.[46] Whether consciously or unconsciously internalized, this ethos accompanies voluntary membership because of media's function as the primary transmitter of subcultural knowledge.[47] The integration of the social, cultural, and economic spheres in the production of media engenders a preferred meaning of conformity that transcends spatial and temporal boundaries.[48]

The production of media in self-documenting subcultures is characterized by the practices of producers and the delimitation of formal conventions as determined by the dominant order.[49] Media-makers must adhere to a level of "sacrifice, conformity, and self-discipline" to ascend or maintain their status in the upper echelons.[50] To be clear, the dominant order does encourage some forms of expression outside its governance; so too, challenges to the status quo are rendered continuously. For the purposes of this text, however, I will foreground how

constraint and restriction are the predominant forces of articulation within all three self-documenting subcultures. The subcultural knowledge made visible to members (products, performances, meaning(s), and production practices) is often what is considered known or possible in terms of expression.[51]

Notably, the aforementioned subcultures (hardcore punk, skateboarding, urban dirt-bike riding) were, for a time, idiosyncratic. Membership in each formation was unified through a collective practice of expression that distinguished one subculture from another. However, the once secondary practice of recording became parallel with the first, and as such, bridged the delta between these seemingly disparate formations:

> [T]he difference between the "genuine" original and the reproduction disappears — that aspect of reality which is not dependent on the apparatus has now become its most artificial aspect. The process of reproduction reacts on the object reproduced and alters it fundamentally.[52]

These are self-documenting subcultures, not subcultures that happen to self-document.[53] Consequently, distinguishment was no longer a defining feature; in the realm of subcultural media production, conformity rules.

In comparison to other expressive subcultures, the forthcoming case studies are unique because of the central role of media-making within them.[54] Self-documenting subcultures organize themselves around media as a tool for socialization, interaction, and representation, both within and external to the subculture. Media operates as a form of social communication and a cultural practice that (re)produces the dominant socio-cultural order. To some extent, this notion of self-documenting subcultures is taken from Lisa Gitelman's definition of media:

> [S]ocially realized structure[s] of communication, where structures include both technological forms and their associated protocols, and where communication is a cultural practice, a ritualized collocation of different people on the same mental map, sharing or engaged with popular ontologies of representation.[55]

Protocols are normative rules and default conditions that arrange themselves around a technology or in this case, a technologically-focused subculture.[56] Self-documenting subcultures are constituted, in part, by an established set of shared media production practices and formal conventions that influence what is presented to each subculture's membership.

As a structure of communication, media is particularly important to what Emily Chivers Yochim calls "corresponding cultures".[57] The term refers to cultures where the preponderance of communication between members occurs through media.[58] Specifically, Yochim examines a particular (sub)culture's lower-level participants and their interactions.[59] Intracultural dialogues touch upon the ideological components embedded in the (sub)culture's media productions. Yochim reflects on the influence of these representations relative to the experiences of her study's participants. According to her research, in this instance, a number of viewers reaffirmed the ideology presented on screen in their everyday lives.[60] I examine how elite media-makers embed meaning(s) through accepted patterns and practices of arrangement that are sanctioned by the subculture's dominant socio-cultural order.

David Buckingham and Rebekah Willet's edited collection on "video cultures" also helps to clarify the taxonomy of self-documenting subcultures.[61] Video cultures are groups of amateurs who, with the help of consumer audio-visual technology, produce media within a distinct spectrum or genre of production. These cultures are themselves distinct because both freedom and limitation are principal characteristics. Recurring and widespread practices within video

cultures tend to cohere around certain "formal or aesthetic dimensions of the productions themselves but also the ways in which they are produced, circulated and exhibited."[62] Yet, Buckingham and Willet are keen to point out that creative experimentation with so-called "standards of film-making" is another defining feature. The amateur, unlike professionals, is not beholden to financial rewards, and therefore, exercises considerably more autonomy from established conventions.[63] The separation between amateurs and professionals is important within self-documenting subcultures as well. Professionals (the elite) are financially supported by companies, which incentivizes their compliance with the virtual order because it presupposes the attribution of authenticity. Professionals also seek to maintain their elite status because it reinforces the influential power they hold within the subculture. Thus, the pivotal distinction between amateurs and professionals in self-documenting subcultures is the former "seldom recognize their productive role" in shaping discourses, whereas the latter depend on such power to maintain their hierarchical positions.[64]

One last clarification can be made using studies of "subcultures of consumption", which share certain traits with self-documenting subcultures. Studies of the former treat marketplaces in capitalist systems as the intersection of culture and commerce.[65] Further, cultural products are considered to be embedded with meaning.[66] Subcultures of consumption are also comprised of "identifiable hierarchical" orders in which a shared ethos is reflected in consumptive modes of expression.[67] John Schouten and James McAlexander define these subcultures as a "distinctive subgroup[s] of society that self-select on the basis of a shared commitment to a particular product, class, brand, or consumption activity."[68] The differentiation between Schouten and McAlexander's work and my own stems from the acknowledgment by the authors that this classification "can encompass virtually any group of people united by common consumption

values and behaviors."[69] For example, a group of individuals could be categorized as such merely through the purchase of goods or viewing of media, whereas I investigate the self-conscious and expressive modes of subcultures that engage in media *production*.

Research on how consumption influences the actions of consumers can be appropriated for understanding the processes of production and the role of producers. The practices of both consumption and production are shaped by socio-cultural orders and their respective marketplaces, or, in this case, subcultural media industries. The industry is characterized as:

> an interconnected system of commercially produced images, texts, and objects that groups use — through the construction of overlapping and even conflicting practices, identities, and meanings — to make collective sense of their environments and to orient their members' experiences and lives.[70]

The media industry conveys and frames horizons of conceivable (in)action and thought. As a result, certain meaning(s), along with patterns of behavior and interpretation, are more prevalent than others.[71] Each self-documenting subculture's media industry creates and influences "the lived worlds of consumers; underlying experiences, processes and structures; and the nature and dynamics of the sociological categories through and across which these consumer culture dynamics are enacted and inflected."[72]

Regarding the eras in question, an oligopoly of companies controlled both economic (production of cultural goods) and symbolic resources (subcultural knowledge). Consequently, the production of media remained remarkably orthodox. While decoded meanings can be diverse and heterogenous, the forthcoming case studies reveal a unique set of power relations that inculcated a consistent and preferred meaning of conformity that reinforced the status quo. The

production of media and meaning is a mode through which power is exercised by the dominant socio-cultural order.[73]

2.1 Internal Hierarchies and the Elite

The interdependent relationship of elite media-makers and practitioners, along with its underwriting by corporate entities, is widely considered both natural and legitimate within self-documenting subcultures. The elite's status at the top of the social hierarchy is perceived as such as well. In this position, elite members function as gatekeepers, setting off distinctions between various levels of membership at the social level.[74] Angela McRobbie's study of "enterprise subcultures" argues that within these formations there exists an infrastructure of commodity exchange.[75] Consignment store owners and workers operate as "taste-makers", preselecting the goods for sale that eventually supply the "raw material" for subcultural participants' clothing styles.[76] When the supply of cultural goods is limited to the control of the relatively few, stylistic tastes remain consistent within the subculture as a whole.[77] This concept transgresses its immediate context. The preselection and supply of cultural goods mirrors the production practices of media-makers. Both represent the delimitation of possibilities in respect to their signifying practice. Moreover, once the field of possibles is established, future actions are measured against the already accepted standards,[78] both in the sphere of cultural production and in the socio-cultural order.

Sarah Thornton's study of "club cultures" helps explain the power relations within self-documenting subcultures that are structured, in part, through the production of media.[79] Thornton rightly discerns that culture industries are integral to the formation of certain subcultures in that the former influence and maintain the interest of audiences by providing up-to-date knowledge

of the latter's activities.[80] In short, media does not just "cover subcultures, they help construct them".[81] Construction takes place through the production and circulation of subcultural knowledge used to create boundaries between those in-the-know and mere dilettantes.[82] Thornton observes that boundaries form through claims to authority and presumptions of inferiority enacted through the production of media.[83]

According to Thornton, the dissemination of subcultural knowledge is crucial to the formation and maintenance of boundaries. Exclusionary practices take place when members interact with one another — both internally among their peers and externally in the larger socio-cultural order — and engage in the simultaneous display and transferal of subcultural capital.[84] The economy of subcultural capital flows through a "*network* crucial to the detrition and distribution of cultural knowledge".[85] The term network implies that this flow takes place upon an even socio-cultural plane.

I contend that while the distribution of cultural knowledge through media is a principal concern in the study of self-documenting subcultures, Thornton's notion of subcultural capital weaving through networks assumes that there are equitable opportunities for meaning-making between producers and consumers. Such a network supposes that participants have comparable access and financial backing that would allow for the acquisition of subcultural capital by any member. The subcultural media industries in my case studies generate no such conditions. Each media industry is hierarchical in structure, which delimits creative possibilities for participants, as opposed to expanding networks of expression.[86]

Networks are generally decentralized and flexible enough to accommodate changes to the norms, routines, and behaviors of members. For those wishing to hold power for a sustained period of time, the prospect of doing so is low because leadership roles are typically not

considered in terms of permanence but rather as temporary positions. As such, social mobility is demonstrably greater. This is in stark contrast to hierarchies in which tiered infrastructures are modes of organization that are based upon dominance, where norms and status determine how virtually every level of participants comport themselves.[87] Prescriptive practices are centralized under a consolidated leadership that enacts decisions based upon seniority, expertise, or one's role within the socio-cultural order. In my case studies, all three of these features are found and expressed through the process of gatekeeping. Thornton alludes to gatekeeping in her work, however, she mentions the term in reference to members who garner "respect not only because of their high volume of subcultural capital, but because of their role in defining and creating it."[88] Yet, if those with high levels of subcultural capital define and create more of it, this implies an uneven playing field, with some members capable of controlling the representation of the subculture.

Kathryn Joan Fox's seminal work on internal power relations within a local punk subculture describes an arrangement of "outwardly expanding concentric circles with the most committed members occupying the core, inner roles, and the least involved participants dotting the periphery."[89] The circles are comprised of four typologies: "hardcore" occupying the center, "softcore" in the next outward ring, "preppie punks" encircling the softcore members, and finally, spectators or non-members, which reside in the largest circle. The power wielded by members in ever-restricted circles is summed up by Fox who states that social roles are essentially dictated to outward-ring members by the "hardcores".[90] These elite members strongly influence the trends and standards for less committed participants to follow.[91] The elite's perception of a member's commitment and adherence to "essential values" is what designates their status.[92] Once such standards are established, they function as a way of distinguishing

internal members from others.[93] The act of boundary maintenance is directly mentioned in Fox's study by one softcore member who remarks that the hardcores effectively rule the social order. Whereas Fox witnessed authoritative relations occurring through peer-to-peer communication, the role of media in self-documenting subcultures precludes the need for social interaction.[94]

Elite producers retain control over the distribution of subcultural knowledge.[95] The role of media producers requires, to some extent, the conscious generation of knowledge for circulation, which is concomitant with power.[96] Although such influence does not stop there. By virtue of introducing the subculture at large to certain images over others, elite media-makers instantly confer both credibility and favorability to designated practitioners' (in)actions, dress, and parlance. In this sense, industry videos are not just representations for the socialization of future members, but for existing subcultural participants as well. By examining the organization and directives of subcultural media industries, the "intentions of those who control the content, volume, and direction of media communication" are disclosed.[97]

2.2 The Subcultural Media Industry

In self-documenting subcultures, the production and distribution of knowledge does not principally occur through face-to-face communication.[98] The proliferation of prosumer and consumer audio-visual technology in the marketplace paved the way for media's prominence as both an epistemic apparatus and a marketing tool.[99] The goings-on of celebrity-like, elite members — once discussed between proximate peers — was now capable of being seen and heard simultaneously across multiple geographic locations and time zones.[100] The promotional material of a company, record label, or crew was embedded within the same screen reality that also provided knowledge of the subculture's current state.[101] Subsequently, a fundamental shift

occurred, the primary activity that defined the subculture as such was now equal to the once secondary practice of recording. The activity itself became "indistinguishable from the mediated representation of it".[102] This transformation resulted in the concentration of power. Those who controlled the agenda of media production, controlled the agenda of knowledge production.[103] Subcultural media industries were able to set the standards for the production of media and meaning across the larger subculture.

Media is the dominant order's foremost instrument of capital accumulation. The production of subcultural media is institutionalized and rooted in the cultural products made, legitimated, and deemed essential by the industry.[104] The flow of communication, controlled by the elite, entertains the illusion of choice relative to consumption. Hanno Hardt refers to this relationship as "control through the familiar."[105] In effect, subcultural members consume media as a cultural product without acknowledging the conditions under which norms, routines, and behaviors are delimited based upon this consumption.[106] Moreover, the audio-visual technology is a consumer product onto itself that provides semblances of "participant control". Participation, according to Hardt, is merely "confined to the realm of consumption", a false or misapprehended sense of agency.[107] This misapprehension manifests in the mutually reinforcing relationship between each subculture's consumer industry and social hierarchy. The dominant order controls access to the elite tier (practitioners) and the distribution platforms that circulate productions. Without conforming to the established formula of assemblage or the accepted editing conventions, media is not authorized by the industry nor distributed. Agency is therefore circumscribed under the conditions of compliance with the dominant socio-cultural and economic order.[108]

Each forthcoming case study investigates one city that acted as an incubator or model franchise within a given era. Indeed, the industry videos sold to consumers cohered disparate formations in various geographic locations that I refer to as subsidiary franchises or "franchisees".[109] A characteristic of self-documenting subcultures is that while comprised of many franchisees across geographic and temporal boundaries, they tend to codify around one model franchise that operates in an urban environment during a specific period.[110]

Cities operate, in part, as settings for the intersection of art and commerce, including model franchises and the media-makers within them: skateboarders typically congregate in tightly packed architectural areas, music venues (and thus, shows) are usually located close to public transit within the city proper, and urban dirt-bike riding is eponymously-defined. Claude Fischer's "Towards a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism"[111] relates certain characteristics of cities with factors that lead to the emergence of subcultures.[112] Fischer stipulates that cities are spaces that contain a substantial urban population.[113] The more dense the populace (and socially differentiated), the more subcultural variations manifest.[114] Additionally, the greater the density of a city, the more "intense" its subcultures; the force of "subcultural beliefs, values, norms, and customs" that exist within it.[115] In a sense, the notion that cities play a vital role in shaping subcultures is also conducive to the assertion that model franchises predominantly influence franchisees.

For elite practitioners, having their actions documented presents opportunities for sponsorship, employment, and celebrity.[116] These members embrace their recorded performances as a way to share their "skills, knowledge, [and] promote themselves".[117] Once employed by corporate entities, however, the promotion of the self turns into the promotion of a single company or multiple enterprises.[118] Each practice, the corporeal activity and the production of

media, becomes a marketing tool intended for financial gain at some level.[119] The recording process is undertaken by elite media-makers directly affiliated with these individuals or employed by a company to market their products. Such circumstances lay the groundwork for the role and function of media in each self-documenting subculture.

Bob Edwards and Ugo Corte identify three forms of commercialization that affect the production of industry products within subcultures.[120] The first form is classified as internal and is most pertinent to the forthcoming case studies; it involves the manufacturing, marketing, and consumption of products by intracultural members.[121] The concentration of these commercial facets within an oligopoly of companies leads to a system of vertical integration.[122] Moreover, decreased competition through increased collaboration tends to result in the stability of the industry. Self-documenting subcultures and the concomitant media industries are prime examples of this corporate structure. Yet, industry professionals rarely acknowledge these conditions despite the fact that the commodification of the subculture is often considered a threat by subcultural members.[123] Nonetheless, subcultural media production is directly connected to the commercialization and commodification of these social formations.

Media-makers operate as "mutually interdependent professionals", producing industry videos under the financial direction and cultural behest of larger corporate entities or small-scale enterprises.[124] The difference between self-documenting groups and other subcultures, as noted above, is the former's mutually reinforcing socio-cultural order that is made manifest in the expressive practices of media production: "The media are constantly being made by the very same relationships that they themselves are making".[125] Not only is media indicative of the subculture's current state, but the essentiality of the practice to self-documenting subcultures suggests an additional layer of complexity. The practices and the products reveal the "cultural

form" of each subculture.[126] Media-makers simultaneously author, authorize, and legitimate patterns of production that parallel the restrictive qualities of socially constructed patterns of (in)action. This is internalized by producers as an "aesthetic criterion", a barometer for what designates an acceptable industry video.[127]

The repeated patterning of formal conventions denotes a standardized socio-cultural practice in and of itself. As Andrew Tudor argues, exerting control over media-makers who generate cultural products is a prerequisite to the successful institutionalization of conventions within a given era.[128] Formal conventions are instituted by the dominant order, thereby appearing both natural and legitimate. Pragmatically, routinizing editing practices for the production of cultural products, and thus subcultural knowledge, is more cost-effective for the producer and that much easier for the consumer to consume.[129] However, these conditions also yield little creative differentiation.[130] Conventions dictate the formula of assemblage, and importantly, the preferred meaning(s) embedded within these productions.[131] In each self-documenting subculture, an ethos of conformity manifests through adherence to established editing patterns and an authorized system of attribution.[132]

3. Understanding Authenticity and Media Hierarchies

Subcultural media industries tend to resist change and bend towards conservatism. As part of the dominant socio-cultural order, elite media-makers select what to produce, and therefore, what to advertise as the current state of the subculture.[133] Commercial considerations (like the ease of profitability based upon a lack of competition and innovation) must be downplayed and reconceptualized.[134] These considerations are also important to the attribution of authenticity, which must appear "non-commercialized", within subcultural media industries.[135] The power of the socio-cultural and virtual orders is obscured by such conditions for the purpose of ensuring the continued preservation of the status quo.[136]

Formal editing conventions represent a shared criterion of understanding.[137] Replication is not an issue, in fact, it is authorized by each industry's media hierarchy: the individual producer is subservient to the completed video, and the video's assemblage is guided by established conventions. At the top of the hierarchy is a preferred pattern for the arrangement of shots, scenes, and sequences. Individual media-makers comprise the bottom of tier. They are, much like the products themselves, replaceable. As such, industry videos are in a slightly higher echelon of importance. Adherence to this hierarchy is indicative of the continued stasis of the socio-cultural and virtual order. However, an individual video's intracultural importance is ultimately fleeting in comparison with the formula of arrangement: "[T]he individual works are ephemeral, but the formula lingers on, evolving and changing with time, yet still basically recognizable."[138] Individual acts, events, or styles featured in videos may be remembered, indeed their representations may even serve as historical evidence, but it is the form in which they are presented that shapes our understanding of the subculture and its ethos. To be clear, these portrayals are manipulated elements of the lived reality in visual form (shots, scenes, sequences).

The effect is the preservation of the virtual order's preferred depiction of the subculture and the system of attribution that endows media with the ever-important attribution of authenticity.

An industry video is attributed authentic status based upon the media-maker's compliance with the standards of the virtual order. The act of attribution is governed by the elite tier, and as such, the process sustains the socio-cultural order.[139] Once established, formal conventions are maintained and updated to allow for the attribution of authenticity to continually renew the status quo.[140] A feedback loop materializes in which authenticity is allocated based upon the relationship between producers and the corporate entities that underwrite industry productions.[141]

A tension is always present when discussing authenticity in the context of individual expression and commodification. In the production of subcultural media, authenticity should be understood as a "renewable resource".[142] Conferring this resource entails acts of authorization, differentiation, and credibility: "[S]omething is authentic because it is declared authentic by an authority".[143] Authenticity is not inherent to an object or event, rather, it is externally endowed: "It is people and not products that drive the production and selection of images".[144] Thus, inauthenticity is the absence of this resource and authoritative claim. Authenticity is attributed when cultural producers employ the virtual order's designated formula. Without following such strictures, the media-maker risks losing their social status and financial solvency. In this sense, media literacy is crucial to mediated authenticity; a producer must internalize and understand the formula of assemblage.[145] Both the act of attribution and the formula, in part, are representative of each subculture's ethos of conformity.[146]

This is not to say conventions that are discordant with the established standards are never introduced into the aesthetic lexicon. If not capable of being easily dismissed or appropriated by

the dominant order, alternative conventions are simply not attributed authentic status. However, because authenticity is a renewable resource, the formula can be modified.[147] When such alterations are necessary, seemingly transgressive conventions are incorporated or co-opted into the we-image.[148] Indeed, the system of attribution that operates within each subcultural media industry is dependent upon the renewable resource of authenticity.

Systems of attribution shepherd the flow of products from producers to consumers in media industries.[149] A system is structured as a "single, concrete, and stable" order of "identifiable and interacting components".[150] According to Paul Hirsch, products must be "processed favorably" to reach the consumer, whereas undesirable products, or those that do not align with the established standards, are eschewed.[151] Within this system, certain individuals are tasked with the selection and advancement of products (gatekeepers).[152] In terms of self-documenting subcultures, this process results in the inculcation of "pre-selected" or preferred meanings in media productions and the subsequent attribution of authenticity.[153] Each separate but mutually reinforcing act operates via the respective subculture's dominant and virtual order, both of which are tethered to the guise of tradition.

Deference to tradition reinforces the established standards and codifies how authenticity is understood by members: "created, distributed, evaluated, taught, and preserved."[154] Judgment is deferred to elite media producers and their practitioner-compatriots within the dominant order. These same figures also tend to hold entrepreneurial positions or are indebted to company owners/managers in the subculture's consumer industry. The confluence of this financial relationship and the guise of tradition, in part, results in the majority of subcultural media productions remaining both aesthetically and formally consistent. Such patterning has been shown to produce an "aura of authenticity" that is identified and recreated by consumers in their

own productions.[155] This is especially true with succeeding generations in which incumbent media-makers and practitioners are positioned by industry gatekeepers as natural successors.[156] By employing the authorized formula ("the avowal of commitment to traditions"), the socio-cultural statuses of contemporary media-makers are protected and the status quo is renewed.[157] One way to conceptualize the system of attribution is as a regime of visibility, an infrastructure that decides who and what is made visible to the wider subculture.

3.1 Regimes of Visibility

Not all industry videos are considered equal. Jacques Rancière notes that power is employed through the delimiting of what and/or who is allowed to issue dissent against the dominant order. He calls this the "distribution of the sensible",[158] a system of "self-evident facts of sense perception" that reflects the actions of constituents within a shared collective world.[159] The exclusion of certain actants and acts discloses the social utility of people within the dominant order.[160] Rancière likens this system to a citizen within a governed community: "[W]hat is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak."[161] It is a question of "division and boundaries", Rancière notes.[162] The distribution of the sensible reveals the shared ethos of the dominant order, including where and when certain actions can take place."[163] What Rancière calls "aesthetics" are the forms of visibility and the means for which individuals perceive their world.

When considering "aesthetic practices", the distribution of the sensible is particularly important.[164] I use this conception to examine how conditioned ways of seeing and doing strengthen established power structures (dominant orders) and reinforce formal conventions (virtual orders). Indeed, visual experiences have both aesthetic and political dimensions.[165] The

distribution of the sensible influences the mode in which expressive practices are "perceived and thought of as forms of art *and* as forms that inscribe a sense of community".[166] Aesthetics impact the accepted standards of doing and making, including what comprises the social relations and practices that take place in a community (forms of visibility).[167]

With respect to self-documenting subcultures, the distribution of the sensible is responsible for regulating the attribution of authenticity. The relationship between perceptibility and practice are linked to the "singularity" of a particular regime of art: the connections between producing works of art, the forms that make those connections visible, and the ways of thinking about both of those processes.[168] A regime of art is thus a mechanism of delimitation.[169] To be clear, multiple regimes of art exist at one time. I argue that subcultural media productions operate under two that are simultaneously present.

The "ethical regime of images" regulates the production of media.[170] In this regime, the aesthetic practices of media-making are representative of the "ethos", the "mode of being" of individuals in the dominant order.[171] Audiences identify the source of the production as "credible" based upon the producer's socio-cultural standing (industry-approved) and whether the production features the proper subject matter (elite practitioners).[172] Thus, the ethical regime substantiates elite members' statuses (the dominant order). The second regime of art is "representative" in which aesthetic practices develop into:

> [F]orms of normativity that define the conditions…[of belonging]…within this framework as, good or bad, adequate or inadequate… according to principles of verisimilitude, appropriateness, or correspondence; criteria for distinguishing between and [comparison].[173]

The representative regime defines and delimits industry-accepted standards of production and evaluation (the virtual order).[174] Accordingly, both regimes maintain the system of attribution.

To summarize, within each media industry, the arbiters of authenticity provide the justification of their own elite status and their productions (ethical regime). The elite generate and maintain formal editing conventions that define the conditions for the conferral of authentic status (representative regime). A consensus from those at the top (the dominant socio-cultural order) results in control over the production and evaluation of images (virtual order).[175] The system of attribution preserves continuity by both regulating aesthetic practices and delimiting possibilities for dissent.[176] These conditions constrain creativity and the collective consciousness of subcultural members.

Much the same way audiences and critics understand genre films, conventions speak to the larger culture in which they are constructed, established, and maintained. I argue that cultural products (industry videos) are inculcated with a preferred meaning of conformity that shapes and reflects each subculture. The result of which is a mutually reinforcing relationship in which the lived reality is recorded and manipulated to form the screen reality, and the screen reality reproduces and reinforces the socio-cultural order of the lived reality.[177] This occurs through choices made in the editing room that have the effect of influencing subcultural members' conceptions of their respective subculture. In this sense, aesthetic choices may be initially outside the realm of politics, but "encode politics nonetheless."[178] Patterns of media production play a part in causing and legitimating production practices.[179] In short, there are consequences to media's rhetoric.[180]

Conventions represent a "range of expression" that circumscribe the possibilities for current and future producers.[181] Individual artists may achieve some form of autonomy, but

likely at the cost of their social status. The collective is privileged over the individual. The deindividuation of artists in each subcultural media industry is directly connected to the standardization of formal conventions.[182] Moreover, a cultural product may seem like an original creation, but the nature and breadth of that originality is determined by a formulaic production process.[183] The established formula, which (re)produces the preferred meaning of conformity, is of the upmost importance.[184]

Certainly, conformity does not represent the entire scope of meaning that can be derived from self-documenting subcultures' industry videos. Localized meaning, for instance, can be interpreted from the way shots, sequences, or scenes are juxtaposed to create an overall effect: graphically, rhythmically, spatially, and/or temporally.[185] However, the confluence of the dominant and virtual order establishes what is made visible and what is not.[186] The formula of arrangement (re)produced by elite media-makers impacts both the lived and screen reality.[187]

3.2 The Lived and Screen Realities

Editing involves the crucial act of choice; what to include and what to exclude. It is during the editing process that still images are mobilized, shots are juxtaposed, and entire scenes and sequences are crafted into a unified whole. The editor's material is not fixed, but can be selected, expanded, and contrasted with "raw" material from disjunctive spaces and times in the lived reality. The effect of those decisions is rendered on screen. A new meaning is constructed, separate from the immediate context of the original recording conditions. The limitations of space and time are no longer present. Indeed, screen space and time are boundless.

Subcultural media is not documentary reportage, it is highly constructed and constitutes an artificial rendering of the lived reality. An industry video presents the viewer with a screen

reality, crafted from the raw material of life and patterned by formal conventions that are specific to each subculture — although a preferred meaning derived from the standardization of patterns exists across all three case studies. For editors, the screen reality offers the possibility of near endless creative expression, whereas the established patterns constrain such action.

To theorize the post-production process in subcultural media industries, I turn to Soviet film theorist and practitioner Vseveold Pudovkin.[188] A significant portion of his work explores editing methods that generate meaning through graphic, rhythmic, spatial, and temporal juxtapositions between shots, scenes, and sequences. Pudovkin defines editing as the careful selection and arrangement of shots (individual images projected at a designated frame rate to create movement) into larger series or collections.[189] He advocates for a particular method called "constructive editing".[190] This method has been referred to as serial "linkage"[191] or the additive construction of adjoining shots — like piling bricks on top of one another.[192] Each successive shot is a substantiation and minute continuation of the preceding shot.[193] A connection is made between two separate images (possibly separate spaces and times) when they are juxtaposed. The process can also be used to link different scenes and sequences (collections of shots).[194] Constructive editing configures individual shots into an integrated whole, thereby engineering meaning from the serial linkage. In foregrounding editing, Pudovkin envisioned all prior production stages as subordinate.

According to Pudovkin, a media-maker must envisage the recording stage as secondary.[195] It is in the editing room that images are transformed and rendered into their completed form: "[T]hat is to say, exchange [the shot's] actual, uninterrupted flow for an integration of creatively selected elements".[196] The practice of editing connects the lived reality and the screen reality.[197] Editing is the final act in this process, a fusion of separate elements and

pieces of life into something new.[198] And it is exactly that difference, between the "natural event" and its representation on screen, in which Pudovkin conceptualizes "form".[199] Form is characterized by the organization of separate images into successive sequences. The effect can have powerful consequences on the viewer by synthesizing disparate elements of "life" into a coherent whole.[200] Lived reality is transformed into the screen reality.[201] In the lived world, time and space are fixed, whereas the elements of screen reality (filmic time and filmic space) are nearly unbounded.[202] Pudovkin takes the name "creative geography" from his mentor to define this new filmic space, a concentration and compendium of extra-terrestrial areas.[203] Time too can be manipulated: compressed, eliminated, slowed down, and sped up, thus altering the duration and frequency of separate elements.[204] Pudovkin continually highlights editing's role in generating order out of chaos by creating meaning from disparate images.[205]

Editing is therefore a signifying practice; the linkage of shots, scenes, and sequences to create meaning through different forms (organizations).[206] This is not to say that constructive editing instills the same meaning for every viewer, but that certain patterns are implemented by the editor for the purpose of inducing a particular reaction.[207] In part, meaning rests in the gestalt of the formula, which is conducive to eliciting a preferred meaning. The formula can and does influence the consciousness of the viewer. One of the most important being the creation of a screen reality from the phenomena of the quotidian.[208]

In each self-documenting subculture, carefully selected elements are manipulated and organized by elite media-makers to instill a preferred meaning of conformity in current members and future producers. Franchisees idealize the contrived depictions of the model franchise's lived reality. As a result, the wider subculture is subject to representations that simultaneously preserve the dominant order and align with the media industry's interests.

There are multiple realities competing with one another within a self-documenting subculture at any one time. The lived reality of lower-level participants and the screen reality proffered by the model franchise are constantly at odds. Indeed, consumers construct certain practices and performances around industry-produced representations that differ significantly from their daily life.[209] Angela McRobbie reminds us that media and the everyday are interdependent.[210] Thus, when sociologists, ethnographers, and the like stress that studies of subcultures should account for how a participant's life is *actually* lived, it is reasonable to point out that "[t]hese versions of 'reality' would also be impregnated with the mark of media imagery".[211] In self-documenting subcultures, the system of facts and sense perception that delimits what is made visible — the distribution of the sensible — is to a large extent dependent upon the media industry's relationship with the socio-cultural and virtual order.[212]

Industry videos frame the desired representations of the model franchise, and as such, engender conformity within the larger socio-cultural sphere. I argue this is the operative function of the screen reality: to supply the model franchise's preferred depictions of the subculture's current state.[213] As a result of media's role as a tool for socialization within self-documenting subcultures, industry videos come to influence members' thoughts and (in)actions. For elite media-makers, the designated formula of arrangement presupposes a claim to authenticity and cements the established media hierarchy. Authenticity, then, should be understood as both a resource and a marker of conformity.[214]

4. Context and Methods

As I have argued, the dominant order of each self-documenting subculture influences the lived reality of participants through the production of industry videos. Media operates as an epistemic apparatus, socializing and legitimating the conditions under which control over the subculture's representation appears both natural and inviolable. The concentration of power within each media industry constrains resources and delimits the creative expressions of media-makers. As such, a prevailing ethos of conformity manifests as the defining characteristic of the self-documenting subcultures examined in this text.

The following chapter examines the structure of socio-cultural orders and subcultural media industries, the role of elite gatekeepers, and the patterns that pertain to the production of meaning. Moreover, this is also a study of conformity enacted through modes of influence that result in the renewal of the status quo. Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy are not fully conscious of the inequitable distribution of power authorized from the top.[215] Discontinuities between the reality and the abstract are important. It is in this liminal area where the everyday lives of lower-level participants conflict with the representations of model franchise. Indeed, power is exercised at both the micro- and macro-level. Such an investigation may yield a more complete understanding of self-documenting subcultures by addressing how specific socio-cultural relations are shaped by the elite tier, and how the production of cultural products preserves the dominant order within a given era.

The process of examining self-documenting subcultures necessitates combining sociological and ethnographic approaches, subcultural studies, consumer marketing research, and analyses of film and media. I also rely on the discourse of Critical Theory to explain the structure

and authority of socio-cultural orders.[216] Within all three subcultures, the power that flows from the production and distribution of subcultural knowledge is of primary concern.

Media's capacity to exact influence across multiple localities is rooted in both its technological affordances and the industries that facilitated its advent and proliferation. The parallel rise of media and modernity transformed our understanding of space and time through the dissolution of spatial-temporal divides, resulting in "new forms of action and interaction, and new modes of exercising power".[217] As a technology, media allows for simultaneous viewing of nearly identical products, and culturally, the desire to consume is reinforced by endless reproduction. Both the cultural and the technological are supported by a political-economic system that capitalizes on repetition and rewards conformity to the existing socio-cultural order.

Brian Winston explores how specific technologies are developed and adopted by societies.[218] When looking at the history of technological change over two hundred years, Winston's analysis reveals a "fundamental continuity" of repetition and regularity in patterns of innovation and diffusion.[219] Development is defined as "a series of events" and involves the interdependent relationship of industry and society in the collective creation of new technology.[220] This process is aided by "accelerators" that ramp up development and "brakes" that temper its diffusion ("law of suppression of radical potential").[221] Brakes, in this respect, maintain the status quo.[222] Before a technology moves into the marketplace, it is partially formed by "pre-existing social patterns", which may hinder or disrupt the device's diffusion.[223] Winston suggests that corporations, and the controlling members of them, are primarily focused on protecting and preserving their profit-making interests above societal gain.[224] The attempt to maintain the status quo by delimiting technological affordances is a motivating factor of each

subculture's established socio-cultural order.[225]

Subcultural media industries operate within multiple spheres of influence — the social, the cultural, and the corporate.[226] Financial resources are consolidated in an oligopolist market that is dependent upon accumulating profit, decreasing competition, and homogenizing products.[227] Media industries also exert symbolic power by controlling the means of subcultural communication and therefore, signification.[228] Both economic and symbolic power flow through the production and circulation of media, which is reinforced by the communal function of industry videos within each self-documenting subculture. These interdependent relationships intersect to continually renew the status quo.

Clifford Geertz suggests that there are two types of interdependence: the "logico-meaningful" and the "causal-functional".[229] The first describes culture as expressing characteristics that integrate a unity of style and logical implication, along with meaning and value.[230] The second addresses the social order in which its constitutive parts merge under a "web of significance" that drives the order as a whole.[231] Both types are conceptually integrated.[232] Culture is understood, according to Geertz, through these relationships, which form a "fabric of meaning" that enables individuals to perceive (interpret) and attach meaning to (in)actions (behavior, routines, patterns).[233] As such, a subculture's socio-cultural order is the manifestation of these relations.[234] This informs two approaches that clarify the dominant orders of each forthcoming case study.

Cultural analysis involves the search for and interpretation of meaning.[235] Culture, as Geertz describes it, is comprised of symbolic devices that influence the socio-cultural experience of a society.[236] I will use what Geertz terms "thick description" to identify particular (in)actions of the dominant order and interpret the meaning of those (in)actions.[237] The process entails

considering the particularities of each subculture that speak to the "construction of collective life".[238]

Specifically, I examine the role of media in self-documenting subcultures and its production within three model franchises. The preferred meaning of conformity embedded in industry videos influences and legitimates certain forms of social comportment. Subcultural media (re)creates the context in which it is produced, becoming reified and taking on an objective existence.[239] Once again, media justifies and legitimates the ethos of each subculture, it is "both [a] reflection and cause, a link in a closed chain."[240] I intend to answer the following questions: How do the elite maintain their positions at the top of the social hierarchy? How does the socio-cultural and virtual order preserve orthodoxy? Why do lower tiers tolerate both orders? And finally, how do formal conventions generate meaning, and what are we to make of it?

4.1 The Dominant Order

Any analysis of socio-cultural orders must attempt to balance perceived determinations and independent human agency. To do so, I employ a structuralist methodology adapted from the work of Anthony Giddens, who defines "structure" as rules and resources that are at times both enabling and constraining.[241] Structures are not specific groups, communities, or institutions — those entities retain *structural properties* ("institutionalized features of social systems, stretching across time and space"[242]). The relationship between rules and resources manifests in a reciprocal "duality". Rules and resources maintain the dominant order — "a collection of people, a group, characterized by a distinct set of patterns that are interwoven across a social organization".[243] Part of this organization involves the interdependent connection between individual agency and socialization.[244] These two notions are not in opposition, nor are they

mutually exclusive, but are, in fact, a dialectic in that one presupposes the other. An individual's subjective actions are housed within the bounded limits of the rules and resources established by their socio-cultural order.[245]

The notion of power, in relation to agency, can be understood as the advancement or obstruction of desired outcomes.[246] Agency is the actual or contemplated causal interventions of individuals in the process of achieving certain results, whereas power is the ability to "mobilize resources" to enable or constrain (in)actions.[247] The relationship between rules and resources is vital to this understanding. Rules, as Giddens points out, cannot be conceptualized apart from resources. The interplay between this coupling constitutes the conditions under which social conduct is sanctioned.[248] There is, once again, a duality at play. In short, rules are "normative elements and codes of signification" enacted in the social and cultural sphere. Rules supply the foundation for which socio-cultural practices are (re)produced.[249] Giddens breaks down the concept of resources into two constitutive parts: authoritative resources are grounded in the "co-ordination of the activity of human agents" and allocative resources refer to the control of material products or aspects of the material world.[250]

In the context of media-making, particular rules materialize in the editing formulae that instills the dominant order's preferred representation of the subculture within industry videos. Resources, by contrast, are the mode in which power is enacted and reproduced by the dominant order.[251] Allocative resources are controlled by an oligopoly companies that fund the production of media. Authoritative resources speak to the compulsion of elite media-makers to comply with established formal conventions. Constraining innovation and dissent are of the utmost importance to maintaining the status quo.

The dominant order narrows the range of possibilities to the extent that current or future members of the elite tier are disincentivized to seek out alternatives. To be sure, subcultural members are not merely passive recipients of such constraint but are actively involved in choosing to conform. It is particularly more insidious that conformity is not based upon external coercion or brute force, rather, "it is because only one option exist[s], given that agent's wants."[252] The structural properties of the media industry (institutionalized features) and the structure (rules and resources) of the dominant order, delimit both thought and (in)action.[253] The power of the dominant socio-cultural order is made manifest through the continued (re)production of rules and resources.

A structural approach should not be viewed as discordant with a cultural perspective. The two approaches are complementary. Social and media hierarchies are preserved in the production of culture. For instance, the structural properties of the media industry affect subsidiary franchises' media productions. Paul Willis concurs, in that structural properties circumscribe the expressive possibilities within a socio-cultural order.[254] Thus, the model franchise accounts for the degree of agency, norms, and production patterns that are considered acceptable in the creative expressions of lower-tier subjects.[255] Interestingly, Willis suggests in his book on "profane cultures" that some subordinate social formations do not necessarily challenge the existing power structures that dominate them, but rather reproduce such structures through expressive acts.[256] What is particularly jarring, and what will be discussed below, is that the dominant order that exists within each self-documenting subculture is continually reinforced in the signifying practices that, in part, encompass the production of subcultural knowledge.

Albert Cohen explains how a foundational aspect to the constitution of subcultures is the authorization of a doctrine known as a "shared frame of reference". Shared frames of reference

reflect the collective knowledge of a socio-cultural order.[257] If an individual seeks to join a subculture, they must adopt the frame of reference. According to Cohen, subcultures remain stable as long as this doctrine is maintained by its creators.[258] I argue, the shared frame of reference of each self-documenting subculture examined in this text is an ethos of conformity. The consequences of these conditions are that every member, regardless of social position, becomes more and more compelled to "seek conformity and to avoid innovation."[259] The elite operate as gatekeepers, only granting access to their restricted tier based on adherence to the frame of reference. Hence, the dominant order rewards members who play by the established rules.

Each subculture's ethos of conformity (frame of reference) acts as a "conceptual manual or guide that outlines a set of subculturally appropriate norms, values, and prescribed beliefs."[260] However, the preservation of the status quo is not a *fait accompli*. The dominant order's power must be continually renewed. The model franchise's media productions are considered the current instantiations of the collective doctrine by subsidiary franchises. Paul Hodkinson describes "translocal" links within subcultures that are formed over time, from city to city, through the production of cultural products.[261] When viewed by consumers as dicta of the elite tier, industry videos propagate specific sets of values, meanings, and practices across the wider subculture.

4.2 The Production and Delimitation of Culture

Richard Peterson characterizes cultural production as the collective "processes of creation, manufacture, marketing, distribution, exhibiting, inculcation, evaluation, and consumption."[262] Peterson is concerned with examining how elements of culture are shaped by

expressive acts tied up in the financial affairs of industries.[263] Essentially, the focus is on the relationship between markets and goods.[264] Peterson and his co-author conclude that a diverse pool of cultural products correlates to increased competition in the market.[265] In contrast, less competition results in a lack of diverse goods and the preclusion of innovation.[266] The marketplace conditions noted here are strikingly similar to those in self-documenting subcultures. The companies and distribution arms may differ in particularities from case study to case study, but they all share similar visual technologies and marketing strategies.

Earlier, I referred to the entrepreneurial activities of a coterie of "cultural entrepreneurs" (gatekeepers) in self-documenting subcultures. To expand on that, Paul DiMaggio suggests that in Boston, Massachusetts during the mid-1800s, elite patrons of the arts formed a consortium that was connected via "kinship, commerce, and participation." He goes on to explain how, as philanthropists, this group controlled and governed access to certain artworks made available to the public.[267] The circumstances served the Boston polity well in the form of educational opportunities and art exhibitions, but the consortium's governance also resulted in a parochial view of aesthetics that remained prevalent into the 1900s. Wealthy entrepreneurs effectively laid claims to "acceptable" cultural expressions.[268] An extrapolated lesson may be derived from DiMaggio's work: those who control regimes of visibility are gatekeepers who exercise power by constituting themselves as arbiters of culture.[269]

DiMaggio offers a notated history of new immigrants to America that were educated in the "proper" artforms of the upper class.[270] His essay details how artworks were exhibited in single-function brick-and-mortar buildings, thereby distinguishing certain cultural forms from others.[271] In doing so, institutions (ways of doing and making[272]) were solidified, which influenced ways of thinking about how culture should be defined. This duality, of access and

control, is a dialogue between an impulse towards both plurality and closure. In the present moment, subcultural studies are often conducted in the context of the former, rather than the latter.

Subcultural media industries are oligopolist, conformist-driven, and buttressed by vertical integration. When taken in the totality, the confluence of all three facets reduces competition at three points in the production of cultural goods: "[C]reative factors, merchandising and distribution".[273] The conditions for producing alternative products are markedly slight because innovation in these organizations is considered "wasteful, inefficient, and unnecessary".[274] A company's profit motive bends toward homogenizing individual markets and investing in additional streams of revenue.[275] Media industries control the agenda of media production within each subculture, and thus the agenda of commodity production. The production of media is a mode to promote various goods, services, and/or experiences.

Elite gatekeepers sustain their social statuses by keeping the circle of influence small, acting as self-assigned purveyors and arbiters of the subculture. This entails instilling both a deference to tradition and the dominant order into the socialization process of new members. By delimiting the creative possibilities found within the production of cultural products, current and future media-makers are not made aware of alternative ventures of doing and making. The field of possibles is constrained, and the social and virtual order persist. Members are not coerced by force into subjugation, rather, media-makers and practitioners are rewarded if the norms and standards are followed. For those without a viable path towards even marginal, social or financial gain, there exists a quiet resignation that facilitates the justification of "the way things are". Such conditions appear so natural and legitimate that anything other than the status quo seems otherworldly.

In discussing media's role as an epistemic apparatus, it is important to remember that the social and the cultural are inextricable. I submit that circumscribed patterns of creative expression within self-documenting subcultures can be understood through the loss of individuality and the delimitation of thought.[276] Such conditions can be traced to the larger socio-economic order from which each subculture emerges. In fact, it is my argument that the internal relations of these formations retain certain traits of mass culture and society cited in studies from the twentieth century. I do not wish to conflate every feature of mass communication models with subcultural media, but merely point out that certain characteristics of each are closely paralleled.[277] Mass media and subcultural media are motivated by the need to commodify cultural products based upon socially constructed values. Both entities are woven into the fabric of their constituents' lives. Specifically, media industries primarily govern the flow of meaning and the process of socialization within self-documenting subcultures.[278]

4.3 Narrow Socialization

Narrow socialization is a form of secondary socialization, in which subcultural knowledge is internalized by members.[279] In the case of self-documenting subcultures, the socialization process facilitates the continuation of the status quo by substantiating the dominant order already in place through one primary mode.[280] A pervasive dependence on media encourages adherence to a "prescribed standard of beliefs and behavior".[281] The production of media and meaning is thus a facet of the socialization process. Industry videos supply the subcultural knowledge for which members internalize, but for future media-makers, these representations also foreground specific production conventions that elicit an attribution of authenticity.

Howard Becker's *Art Worlds* is of particular importance when investigating subcultural media industries and the practices of elite media-makers.[282] Becker argues that artists comprise an integrated, collective unit of creators that develop and maintain technical skills and aesthetic criteria of their respective industry.[283] Works of art are assembled under the traditions laid forth by "progenitors".[284] In part, the standardization of formal conventions defines specific "art worlds" and makes it "easier" or more financially viable for such works to be produced.[285] The agreed upon standards set the bar for future artists to be considered proficient in production and profitable in the commercial sector.[286] The process of evaluation is also tied up in routines that restrict diversions from the norm.[287] These standards are so pervasive that artists tend to imagine the responses of their fellow creators when completing an artwork.[288] Such is the consciousness of conformity found in each self-documenting subculture. The elite do not conspire to rule, they simply think alike. Indeed, adherence becomes habitual.[289] This suggests that individuality and distinction are not important to the integrity of each subcultural media industry; instead, coherence is found through homogeneity.[290]

The established editing conventions of each subcultural media industry are a reflection of the dominant order within a given era. The institutionalized standards of both media- and meaning-making are representative of the elite's interests as a collective.[291] These conditions allow for a degree of replaceability among media-makers.[292] If an elite producer veers from the traditional, their status and livelihood is at risk. Companies entrust media-makers to promote their products as cheaply and efficiently as possible. For such services, the latter are provided financial solvency and cultural relevancy. Both of those rewards depend upon conformity.[293] Thus, the media industry operates as a homogenous collective:

So the point is not that work cannot be distributed, but that contemporary institutions

> cannot or will not distribute it, and that they thus exert, like every other established part of an art world, a conservative effect, leading artists to produce what they handle and thus get the associated rewards.[294]

Rewards are crucial to the continuation of each self-documenting subculture's dominant order.

Diana Crane determines that elite producers conform to established conventions for socio-economic gains.[295] These production standards, coupled with the process of narrow socialization, provide a clear understanding for how media-makers can preserve their statuses and salaries. In other words, a "reward system" is constructed.[296] To assess the extent of standardization within an industry, Crane recommends analyzing the degree of continuity between various cultural products.[297] A high degree of continuity suggests that producers, rather than consumers, predominantly influence production standards.[298] Moreover, if economic resources are concentrated, it is less likely that innovation and/or innovative producers will be introduced into the marketplace.[299] Such influence relies on obfuscation.[300] Norms and standards are rarely expressed as a written code.[301] Conventions are merely viewed as an aspect of tradition and apposite subcultural knowledge within the process of narrow socialization.

Socio-cultural orders are built upon the learned, shared, and adapted knowledge circulated among and communicated to constituents.[302] To be sure, knowledge[303] is a product of social construction.[304] The world is inherently chaotic, and thus, individuals attempt to understand themselves and others to achieve predictability, control, and stability.[305] Maintaining all three is the *raison d'être* of any dominant order that seeks to preserve the status quo.[306]

Relative to self-documenting subcultures, dominant orders construct the we-ideal and the we-image as the traditional and/or normative standard, attempting to maintain power, in part, by containing any dissenting realities.[307] Each order and its respective structural properties

continually (re)produce an ethos of conformity through the production of media.[308] Industry videos reflect the "social organisation and relationships through which the individual becomes a 'social individual'".[309] Standardized conventions are learned and internalized by members from continuous viewing of fixed patterns embedded in industry-approved productions.[310] Ultimately, the elite obfuscate their control over the agenda of media production and the process of socialization.

4.4 Internalizing Production Patterns and Meaning

Individuals express their interior reality through an ongoing, simultaneous and reciprocal, construction of the social order.[311] How one perceives oneself in relation to others is dependent upon a process of cognitive transformation known as the "externalization of actions".[312] In sum, subjective thought becomes external action.[313] These cognitive transformations are always in progress, dissolving and reemerging, throughout everyday life.[314] When the process of adapting and externalizing one's internal subjective reality occurs in conjunction and in relation to other individuals' actions, institutions (established ways of doing and making) are created. Therefore, institutions precipitate the formation of social orders.[315] A social order materializes when something abstract, like a behavioral pattern, "transcends the immediate, concrete face-to-face relationship" of a single social interaction and takes place *en masse*.[316] Through this permeation, a social order is objectified.[317] The objectification of an order masks its social construction and the patterns that preclude certain thoughts, routines, and behaviors.[318]

It is the view of this study that within self-documenting subcultures, certain patterns of (in)action and cultural expression are institutionalized and prescribed by the dominant socio-cultural order.[319] Specifically, the practices of media-making are subject to the guise of tradition,

which is reinforced through the system of attribution. Established patterns are legitimized and made visible in countless industry videos. The normalization of these patterns and practices encompasses the "social stock of knowledge". Such knowledge is often classified as "traditional".[320] The institutionalization process begins internally during narrow socialization and is then externalized during the production of media.

The successful socialization of an individual is directly correlated to the internalization of knowledge and the externalization of actions.[321] This includes learning "typifications" (classifications).[322] Typifications prosper in coherent and consistent social orders. Unless challenged (although never detailed precisely), typifications will determine present actions and are predictive of future actions.[323] The presence of habitual routines, which entail recognizing established classifications and then (re)producing them, initiates the process of institutionalization within the social order.[324] Thus, habitualization and typification precede institutionalization (the "established ways of doing things").[325] The degree of fixity of habits and typifications is dependent upon the extent of the transmission of the social stock of knowledge, that is, knowledge that supplies the standards and appropriate rules of conduct.[326] Individuals are self-motivated to internalize this knowledge because it provides and enables stability in their life.[327] Relative to remaining in the elite echelon of self-documenting subcultures, media producers are also incentivized to internalize the knowledge supplied by the dominant order and (re)produce conventions in a manner that reinforces the ethos of conformity: "[O]ne must understand the social organization that permits the definers to do their defining."[328] Knowledge is therefore crucial to the preservation of the dominant order.[329]

4.5 Tradition and Epistemology

Subcultural media is the vehicle through which knowledge and the guise of tradition is (re)produced and (re)circulated throughout the socio-cultural order. Media's technological affordances enable each subculture's ethos of conformity (embedded in the social stock of knowledge) to transcend geographic location and certain temporal constraints, like the renewal of a dominant order from one generation to another.[330] Tradition is also "delocalized", it can be (re)embedded in numerous subsidiary franchises.[331] The results of which are that patterns of production continue year after year with little change or variation. Viewers look upon such orthodoxy as indicative of a legitimized tradition.[332] Media-makers are custodians and preservers of the dominant order's "definitions of reality".[333] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann refer to these conditions as an oligopoly of tradition.[334]

Tradition and legitimation serve important roles when the knowledge distributed within the socio-cultural order is "no longer self-evident".[335] The oligopoly of tradition invalidates threats to the dominant order's stability. Plausibility is assumed when there appears to be no logic to the elite's (in)actions or members' claims to the highest social echelon.[336] A feedback loop remains evident; traditions are maintained because the dominant order legitimates them, connecting disparate meanings at both the level of individual actions and institutional decrees.[337] Stated directly, it is in the best interests of those at the top to preserve the traditions that keep them there. Implied in this notion of tradition is that individuals must first be aware of certain institutions that define acceptable and indecorous actions.[338] The largest undertaking of the dominant order is therefore focused on consolidating the production and circulation of knowledge, thereby controlling what is made visible and valid.[339]

Two discourses are important in the examination of a dominant order's capability to influence members' thoughts and (in)actions. Social Constructionism, as theorized by Berger and Luckmann, attempts to reveal how social orders appear both natural and legitimate.[340] In doing so, the authors disclose how socio-cultural phenomena are constructed and misapprehended by individuals in the lived reality.[341] Such endeavors are also found in the writings of Critical Theorists, who expose fundamental contradictions in the structure of society and the production of culture.[342]

Berger and Luckmann address the notion of reification in the context of an individual's "lack of awareness that they themselves are causing those problems or disasters *and could stop* doing so."[343] The authors describe the process of reification as "whereby the objectivated world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise and becomes fixated as a non-human, non-humanizable, inert facticity."[344] In sum, the social order is considered both natural and legitimate.[345] An individual's ability to think critically, beyond the established social stock of knowledge, is limited.[346] Yet, the process of reification is not solely tied to the subjective realities of individuals, rather, it is also connected to the production of culture.

According to *History and Class Consciousness* by György Lukács, reification is the basic foundation of capitalism.[347] The concept derives from a Marxist materialist-perspective in which individuals are defined by their socio-economic relation and function. Reification can be characterized as the assessment of an individual's worth based on values associated with efficiency relative to production.[348] As a result of this abstraction, the individual becomes a mechanical part in the increasing mechanization of society.[349] Lukács associates reification with the decline of each individual's "authentic humanity".[350] Importantly, deindividuation parallels the separation of art from culture. Art exists in the realm of commodities by way of quantifying

its value based on the principles of capitalism — instead of determining its qualitative worth.[351] The status quo appears natural, legitimate, and inert.[352] As such, reification obfuscates the introduction of alternative conditions and possibilities within the socio-cultural order.

All three authors agree that reification leads to dehumanization and a lack of individual agency within a socio-cultural order. Lukács stresses that reification imposes a perspective of the social world and of the lived reality that is an illusion.[353] The result of which is a fundamental misapprehension of "our real powers and our conception of them"; the very capacity that makes an individual human.[354] Berger and Luckmann submit that reification gives rise to a set of conditions in which individuals fail to recognize their own "authorship of the human world".[355] In effect, constituents of a socio-cultural order are unaware of their loss of "initiative, responsibility, creativity, [and] autonomous judgement". This misapprehension furthers the process of dehumanization.[356] Even under circumstances in which individuals are confident in their own or other's ability to shape the lived reality, habituation precludes significant intervention.[357] Reification predominantly restrains individuals from comprehending their "real options and capacities."[358] In self-documenting subcultures, the possibilities of critique and the potentialities for change are curtailed by the dominant order's definition of reality (on screen) and the subsequent delimitation of knowledge that is internalized by subcultural members.[359] The confluence of media- and meaning-making propagates an ethos of conformity that attempts to cohere individuals into a uniform collective.

The "Frankfurt School" is particularly concerned with the relationship between deindividuation and the commodification of culture.[360] Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* details a key philosophical principle of Critical Theory; the symbiosis of reason and capitalism results in the decline of the individual.[361] Instrumental reason evaluates

an object and an individual based on their operational purpose in service of capitalism.[362] Anyone or anything that does not make itself applicable to "calculability and utility" is either assimilated into the system or placed in socio-cultural exile.[363]

Herbert Marcuse argues that the production of both culture and commodities occurs within an integrated, industrial system. In part, the mass production and distribution of goods have "claim[ed] the *entire* individual".[364] The commodification of culture delimits "thought and behavior patterns", which leads to the decline of individualism.[365] This industrial system retains the power to "construct 'false needs', to indoctrinate and manipulate men and women into social conformity and subordination."[366] Cultural knowledge becomes a homogenizing instrument.[367] Individuals suffer from the "objectification of the mind" in which conformity is entirely rational.[368] In short, there is an inability to grasp alternatives to the status quo.[369]

The "Culture Industry", as described by Horkheimer and Adorno, transforms culture into a product and constructs false needs to induce consumption.[370] The Industry retains a "montage character" — assembled and controlled like a factory floor — in which films, biographies, novels, and music are standardized into a consumable product. Endless production and the interchangeability of seemingly different commodities conditions consumers to feel only brief moments of satisfaction in their purchase.[371] In turn, the Industry supplies them with more and more products to satiate an ever-growing need. Consumers' choices are therefore not based within a "free market" of competition and innovation, instead products that maintain the Industry's interests and profits are foregrounded.[372] This is not to say that the meaning(s) embedded in products are all alike, rather, each commodity is homologous to the Culture Industry as a whole.[373]

There is a subsequent lack of creative expression and symbolic space, which "discourages the development of critical thought and denies the emergence of individuality".[374] The Culture Industry has "seized all media of artistic expression", and as a result, the threat of emancipatory qualities within autonomous (non-commodified) art is abated.[375] Instrumental rationality empties society of contradictions that would reveal the structure of the capitalist system, thereby removing potentialities for change.[376] The neutralization of autonomous art can be thought of as the negation of style in which the Culture Industry denies anything outside of the established homologous formula.[377] These conditions delude the masses into accepting the status quo with minimal critique.[378]

Subcultural media is produced and consumed under a similar state of affairs. From the perspective of the dominant order, the continuation of the subculture comes at the expense of individual expression. Capitalism and instrumental rationality drive the production of cultural products. Alternative forms of doing and making are socialized out of individual media-makers. If a producer becomes part of the dominant order, the impulse for dissent is mollified because the media industry operates under a "single, unified consciousness".[379] The production of media is not driven by consumers' actual desires, but instead is derived from a rationality that seeks to increase profit, shrink competition within the marketplace, and maintain claims to authority.[380] The dominant order consolidates both economic and symbolic resources to avert the risk of the status quo's dissolution.

Perceptions of the socio-cultural order are circumscribed by those who control the agenda of media production (the dominant order).[381] As an epistemic apparatus, media provides the information necessary to assess the subculture's current state, thereby subsuming an essential function of interpersonal interactions. The knowledge gained from the screen realities of

industry-approved productions is not only perceived by subcultural members as legitimate, but these representations are considered "coextensive with the knowable".[382] The screen reality becomes the world *tout court*: "What is taken for granted as knowledge in the society […] the framework within which anything not yet known will come to be known in the future."[383] Thus, there is a fundamental connection between the production of media and meaning and the restriction of behavior and thought within the lived reality. Industry videos are not just cultural products but are tools for both the socialization of subcultural members and the delimitation of consciousness.[384]

Part of Critical Theory's methodology is to identify mechanisms of power that engender selective understandings of reality.[385] Adorno and Horkheimer are concerned, in part, with the Culture Industry's erasure of autonomous art and the industrialization of artistic expression, whereas Hans Magnus Enzensberger is interested in the "industrialization of the human mind".[386] Enzensberger lists certain precedents that had to have occurred for the emergence of the "Consciousness Industry": the Enlightenment's mythical dependence on instrumental reason and reification; the hyper-efficient production of consumer goods in late capitalism; and finally, the technology that is used to produce, exploit, and "train our consciousness" to perceive it all as natural.[387] For the "self-appointed elites", control over capital accumulation and the means of production is not enough.[388] The consciousnesses of consumers *and* producers, as a "social product", must be exploited to maintain the status quo.[389]

Media institutions delude the masses into accepting a false degree of agency.[390] For Enzensberger, however, electronic ("new") media technology presents opportunities for some degree of autonomy.[391] The key difference between older forms of mass media and new media is that individuals are able to participate in the production process of the latter based on the

technology's form.[392] Although new media technology does not inherently allow for expanded modes of artistic expression or autonomous art; in fact, the Consciousness Industry attempts to prevent such conditions.[393] The ultimate objective of those who control the agenda of media production is to govern the practices of mind- and meaning-making.[394]

In self-documenting subcultures, the dominant order controls the flow of knowledge and institutes standards of media production. Despite the advent and proliferation of new media technology, there is no reciprocity between transmitter (producer) and receiver (consumer).[395] Alternative conventions and dissenting critiques are precluded from widespread distribution. The dominant order invests in the practices of manipulation:

> The most elementary processes in media production, from the choice of the medium itself to shooting, cutting, synchronization, dubbing, right up to distribution, are all operations carried out on the raw material. There is no such thing as unmanipulated writing, filming, or broadcasting. The question is therefore not whether the media are manipulated, but who manipulates them.[396]

The first question, in the context of this work, has already been answered (the dominant order), yet another question remains, what is the end goal of such manipulation? In short, the answer is exploitation.

The production of consciousness parallels the production of subcultural media. Producers are necessary, but only to the extent that they adhere to the standards set forth by their respective dominant order.[397] Without such complicity, media-makers are labeled as mere "amateurs".[398] The media industry is structured to thwart autonomy by disincentivizing producers, both socially and economically, from challenging the status quo.[399] Moreover, the socialization processes of the self-documenting subcultures examined in this text instill in members a deference to

tradition. Each dominant order facilitates both the internalization and (re)production of conformity through the production of media and meaning-making.

4.6 Hegemony and Intracultural Subordination

The dominant order is neither inevitable nor natural, but nonetheless it is misapprehended as such by subcultural members. The social and media hierarchies within each subculture buttress the established power relations. In this context, power is the ability to influence individual agency by securing intended outcomes: "[S]ome have power 'over' others […] this is power as *domination*."[400] Domination is predicated upon legitimation, tradition, and importantly, subordination.[401] These three interdependent factors result in the stability of the status quo. Subordination reinforces the dominant order's claim to legitimacy and reaffirms members' pervasive deference to tradition.[402] The conditions that result in stability can also be understood through the notion of hegemony, the struggle for socio-cultural supremacy of one group over another.[403] Boundaries of acceptable (in)action and thought are (re)produced by industry-approved media productions. Subcultural media is thus a "control mechanism", a hegemonic apparatus that shapes members' consent.[404] The confluence of domination and hegemony manifests in both the collective and the individual.

In the forthcoming case studies, the circumstances that preceded each respective dominant order's reign, and thus, the initial stages of domination and subordination, are not of primary concern. Instead, the eras in question encompass the conditions under which the dominant order's power is well established and continuously renewed. James Scott classifies two types of subordinate groups, non-voluntary and voluntary.[405] I examine voluntary, subordinate groups in which individuals opt into membership. Scott describes a version of subordination

called the "thin theory of hegemony".[406] The thin theory argues that members of (voluntary) subordinate groups conform to standards instituted by the dominant order out of a sense of resignation. Resignation can be understood as the inability to envisage alternatives to the present state of affairs.[407] In accordance with the thin theory of hegemony, domination materializes as such: "[The attempt to regulate] what is realistic and what is not realistic and to drive certain aspirations and grievances into the realm of the impossible, of idle dreams."[408] This is not to say that lower-tier members perceive access to the uppermost echelon as inconceivable — in fact, I would make the claim that self-documenting subcultures rely on such aspirations — rather, compliance is considered the only viable option to attain or retain elite status. Michael Mann proffers a similar notion. "Pragmatic acceptance" refers to an individual's cognitive submission to the dominant order in which veering from the status quo seems unthinkable. It is acceptance via an inability to transcend a "state of consciousness".[409] Both resignation and pragmatic acceptance suggest that (in)action is indistinguishable from thought.[410] Beyond the thin theory, another conception of hegemony helps clarify this determination.

Antonio Gramsci is particularly concerned with power relations that influence individual agency.[411] "Corporate hegemony" ("economic-corporate") occurs when a "given group moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social arena".[412] Stated directly, a dominant order exerts power over subordinate groups across multiple levels of collective, communicative exchange.[413] With this conclusion, Gramsci shifted away from a "simplified" theory of hegemony that argued economic conditions are the principal source of subordination.[414] The theoretical turn began with a new axiom: control over "economic, political and intellectual objectives" engenders power.[415] Hegemony is achieved and maintained by governing the

synthesis of economic, intellectual, and moral orders, thereby guaranteeing control over the widest spectrum of the population.[416] To obtain members' consent — in the form of resignation and/or pragmatic acceptance — a collective way of thinking and acting must be instituted.[417] In other words, hegemony is, in part, dependent upon a shared frame of reference (an ethos) that is rooted in conformity: "We are all conformists of some conformism or other".[418] The institutionalization of this shared frame of reference occurs through hegemonic apparatuses.[419]

Each subcultural industry incentivizes media-makers to follow the accepted standards of production, and as such, (re)produce the ethos of conformity. This ethos becomes coterminous with tradition, suggesting the present state of affairs is outside the control of subcultural members.[420] A determination that aligns with the interests of the dominant order. In short, industry videos are a hegemonic apparatus.[421] The dominant order, from a position of authority, uses media to circumscribe both behavior and thought.[422] As a result, the field of possibles is delimited: "Possibility is not reality: but it is in itself a reality. Whether a [person] can or cannot do a thing has its importance in evaluating what is done in reality. Possibility means 'freedom'. The measure of freedom enters into the concept of [the individual]."[423] Stability through conformity comes at the cost of expressive freedom.[424] Alternative productions are censured and opposing critiques are elided.[425] Nevertheless, the dominant order's power and the pervasive ethos of conformity appear both inevitable and natural.

4.7 The Feedback Loop of Socialization and Cultural Dominance

Social and media hierarchies comprise self-documenting subcultures. A concentrated number of elite media-makers produce industry videos, which adhere to a formula that collectivizes subcultural representations. The screen reality translates into the lived reality. Status

and stability engender homogeneity within the group dynamic.[426] Internal opinions of the elite operate as a regulatory mechanism of consciousness and conduct.[427] The result of which is ever-greater cohesion, extended uniformity, and more acute elaborations of established standards and practices.[428] Consent becomes constraint in ever "less disguised and indirect forms".[429] Policing is conducted by way of a shared "distinguishing code" (frame of reference) that differentiates insiders and outsiders of certain social tiers.[430] Boundaries need not be enforced through physical violence or its threat — if even necessary at all under the delimitation of consciousness that often precludes self-censorship — because members' quiet resignation and pragmatic acceptance are encouraged by the dominant order.

Both the social and media hierarchy sustain and substantiate the status quo of each subculture. Access to the upper echelon of the former is granted upon compliance with the ethos of conformity. Indeed, rarely do established power structures invite dissonance into the social sphere, especially at the top.[431] Preventative measures are also embedded within the sphere of media production. Unorthodox conventions are impeded from entering into the aesthetic lexicon because such representations are simply not granted the attribution of authenticity. Without this attribution, the media industry does not endorse or distribute the production. A feedback loop emerges in which the legitimacy of the dominant order is validated by authorized industry videos produced by members of the elite tier. Subsequently, these producers remain the arbiters and curators of subcultural media, and therefore, subcultural knowledge.

The internal opinions of the elite act as a regulatory mechanism within the social hierarchy. The threat of stigmatization, which can be characterized as a "weapon" of cohesion, hinders discordant behavior and thought.[432] As an elite media-maker, the reward for compliance is access to resources, professionals, and practitioners that would further cement one's status.[433]

These incentives reinforce the dominant order's power by determining, "which moves are open to individuals and which are not".[434] Exclusion from signifying practices that define the current state of the subculture is a powerful, motivating force.[435] Submission to the group, however, comes at the expense of one's individuality and unique creative expression. The singular producer ranks secondary to the collective.

The consonance of the we-ideal and the we-image is paramount.[436] Model franchises (we-ideals) exist within cities of "concentrated cultural practice" that impose a coherence on the terrain of culture.[437] The edges of the "maps of meaning" are shrunk and folded over one another until a preferred and prescribed we-image takes shape.[438] The media produced constitutes a screen reality that translates into the objective world. Both realities are institutionalized, a process that delimits ideas and (in)action, resolving any contradictions to both.[439] Horkheimer claims that "contradictory works" can, albeit briefly, exist, but are inevitably absorbed into the dominant order:

> [Y]ou shall conform, without instruction as to what; conform to that which exists anyway, and to that which everyone thinks anyway as a reflex of its power and omnipresence. The power of the culture industry's [ethos] is such that conformity has replaced consciousness.[440]

Once again, elite practitioners and media-makers do not conspire to rule, they are merely like-minded and deferential to tradition.[441]

The feedback loop described above can be better understood through Raymond Williams' conception of the relationship between tradition and the transmission of meaning. The passing down of norms, standards, and a shared ethos from generation to generation is a "selective tradition", as Williams puts it, in which there is an active shaping of the past and a "pre-shaped

present" that benefits the interests of the dominant order.[442] The construction of the past offers a version of the present that is legitimated because it provides continuity.[443] In each self-documenting subculture, elite media-makers shape the discourses of tradition and meaning in service of stability.

Robert Ulin's study of winemaking in the Bordeaux region of France found that certain groups retain the authority to define what is considered traditional.[444] Conditions that are conducive to this type of control are those in which producers are both manufacturers and arbiters of aesthetic standards. As such, these individuals are simultaneously able to strengthen their social standing and legitimate their cultural products.[445] In the study, Ulin concluded that (self-appointed) elite wine-makers frame the present (status quo) as an inevitable outcome of the past.[446] Wine-makers promote the current standards of production as traditional ways of doing and making. This is described as a "hegemonic tradition".[447] In effect, those who are able to shape the present can shape the past to align with their interests.[448]

Consumers and producers of all tiers rely on the subcultural knowledge that flows through industry videos. The manner in which this information is presented is codified by both the social and media hierarchy. In the effort to maintain stability, the established aesthetic conventions are framed by the dominant order as traditional practices, and thus, media-makers are inclined to comply with the status quo. As Geertz points out, individuals learn from "cultural patterns [and] historically created systems of meaning" that provide order to our lives.[449] It is not ultimately deterministic, but the continual (re)production of the ethos of conformity, embedded in media, engenders the likelihood that certain opinions and (in)actions will prevail.[450] The practices of media and meaning are indicative of each self-documenting subculture's structural properties (institutionalized features of the socio-cultural order) that express forms of domination

(resignation and pragmatic acceptance) and power (resource authorization and allocation).[451] The confluence of rules and resources (the social structure) compels individuals to (re)constitute activities that "reify those systems" of media and meaning.[452] Indeed, Geertz explains that culture is an array of "symbolically mediated programs", which, in part, influence expression and organize social life.[453]

4.8 Cultural Products and the Transmission of Meaning

Industry videos are both promotional advertisements and tools for the socialization of subcultural members. During the editing process, media-makers employ traditional patterns of production and meaning-making as "mechanism[s] for the coordination of recipient response".[454] Media is the ideal vehicle for circulating the ethos of conformity because the consumer is dependent upon industry productions for knowledge of the subculture's current state. These representations encompass the aesthetic and epistemic lexicon for selling products and cohering the collective.

Grant McCracken categorizes subcultures as prolific producers of cultural products, and thus, prolific "meaning suppliers".[455] Within these formations, meaning is bounded by cultural principles that determine how products are "organized, evaluated, and construed."[456] The stronger the connection between cultural principles (organizing ideas) and intracultural suppliers (producers), the more restrictions are imposed upon consumers.[457] Users may engage with products in different ways, but those who control the agenda of cultural production retain the power to embed certain principles. As a result, the preferred meaning of a product serves as the starting point for consumers to develop, oppose, or negotiate new or alternative ones.[458] This determination is the basis of the transmission of meaning.

McCracken proffers a "blueprint" model of cultural production that is comprised of "way-stations" of meaning.[459] The preferred meaning moves in a downward trajectory from producer to consumer, thereby precluding interference from the latter until the product reaches the final moment of transfer.[460] Essentially, "the capacity of recipients to intervene in or contribute to the process of production is circumscribed."[461] McCracken specifically targets media, in comparison to other cultural products, as the foremost facilitator of preferred meanings.[462] Aspects of the socio-cultural order (lived reality) are embedded in cultural products (screen reality), which reappear in the lived reality of consumers during the viewing experience.[463]

Elite media-makers carefully select elements of the model franchise's lived reality and edit these images based on the virtual order's formula of arrangement. In doing so, producers instill the preferred meaning(s) of the dominant order — in this case, the ethos of conformity — into industry-approved productions. The dominant order is (re)produced and reflected in these screen realities: "the creations and the creators of the culturally constituted world."[464] Conforming to this blueprint enables media-makers of the model franchise to (re)constitute and legitimize their status within the socio-cultural order. Moreover, media-makers in subsidiary franchises reiterate the established conventions to preserve their own status and/or gain access to the elite tier.

Two qualifications are necessary to clarify this understanding of reception and signification. I do not wish to argue that audiences are passive observers or recipients. A subcultural member may opt out of the one-way flow of knowledge at any time by simply not watching. However, media's unique role in self-documenting subcultures creates, in part, the conditions under which such a proposition is untenable for the majority of consumers and

producers.

The second qualification pertains to the argument that audiences do not indiscriminately accept the preferred meaning(s) of producers, and therefore, different audiences have varying responses to the same pieces of media. According to Greg Philo and David Miller, audiences maintain a clear understanding of the preferred meaning(s) embedded in media to the extent that they can reproduce it when asked.[465] Stated directly, the ethos transmitted by subcultural producers is received by consumers as intended.[466] There are surely limits to McCracken's model — no one can truly understand the totality of motivations or intentions of another — however, as I have argued, subcultural media-makers are both socialized and incentivized to adhere to the dominant order's prescribed standards. The orthodoxy of formal conventions and the authorial complicities (across both time and space) suggest that conformity is predominantly internalized and enacted within self-documenting subcultures.

4.9 Form and Convention

The duality of formal conventions is made plain in the production of subcultural media. Aesthetic standards both enable and constrain producers and consumers. Conventions allow for visual information to be transmitted and understood in a single video or in the context of the entire subculture.[467] Within the system of attribution, conventions streamline the conferral of authenticity because there is an established pattern to compare videos with one another.[468] This process of evaluation, as Richard Peterson notes, is in the minds of producers during the assembly of a cultural product. The producer is incentivized to maintain standards and curtail expressions that are not aligned with traditional ways of doing and making. Creative expressions are often intended to satisfy "the next gatekeeper in the decision chain".[469] The consumer is then

subject to endless reiterations of form that convey the preferred meaning(s) of producers, specifically, the ethos of conformity. Thus, formal conventions lay at the intersection of socialization and production.

In a given era, certain conventions function as the dominant mode of representation. Raymond Williams defines conventions as the accumulation of "specific elements which socially and historically determine and signify aesthetic and other situations."[470] He argues that during periods of stability (this study), conventions reflect and legitimate the ethos of the prevailing socio-cultural order.[471] This occurs, in part, because conventions are considered products of tradition.[472] Based upon collective use, conventions form an aesthetic criterion, and as a result, adherence becomes a verifiable method of evaluation regarding compliance with the dominant and virtual order. Conventions supply a baseline perimeter for boundary maintenance. To be clear, this determination does not suggest that alternative conventions never arise.[473] The terrain of cultural production is contested at times and restrictions must be renewed.[474] Intrusions are "neutralized, reduced, or incorporated."[475] The continued stability of the aesthetic criterion is essential to maintaining control over the agenda of media production.[476]

Subcultural media industries resemble the once monolithic "Hollywood Studio System" that nearly standardized film production in the United States. Before the 1948 "Paramount Decision", the vertically integrated structures of Hollywood studios restricted the majority of international films from stateside theaters, and importantly, other domestically-produced films from their own venues.[477] Competition shifted towards genres that particular studios were adept at producing — for instance, Universal Pictures horror films or MGM musicals.[478] These studios considered compliance with certain genre conventions a reasonable indicator of revenue.

While it is not uncommon to consider such standardization as necessary to oblige popular demand or for viewing the Studio System as a historical entity, Martin Scorsese's recent diatribe on the state of cinema, in relation to the spate of super-hero films in the past decade, makes the case against such arguments: "If people are given only one kind of thing and endlessly sold only one kind of thing, of course they're going to want more of that one kind of thing."[479] Indeed, one study revealed that even after the collapse of the Studio System, Hollywood film directors were rewarded not for artistic innovation, but for predictability relative to following certain production standards.[480] This is not to say that deviations from conventions are completely expunged from the aesthetic lexicon, but merely that straying from the norm is typically a harbinger of financial failure.[481] In self-documenting subcultures, there are safeguards built into the composition of these formations that are akin to the conditions noted above.

The virtual order institutionalizes production patterns in the screen reality, which are reinforced by the dominant order in the lived reality.[482] Both orders incentivize subcultural media-makers to adhere to formal conventions that express the ethos of conformity. According to John Cawelti, conventions "dictate the abstractions to be used to convey particular ideas or experiences...[and] dictate the form in which materials and abstractions will be combined".[483] Producers and consumers are subject to a "continuity of values".[484] Moreover, when conventions are tethered to tradition, there is a conservative tendency to comply with the aesthetic criterion.[485] Compliance becomes a prerequisite for others to take part in the production of subcultural media at the elite level.

As I have argued, industry videos are manipulated representations of elite practitioners' lived realities. The disparity between the top and lower tiers of the social hierarchy is rendered in the everyday lives of participants of the latter.[486] For the dominant order, one way to alleviate

any problematic aspects that would inhibit cohesion within the subculture as a whole is to allow for some degree of non-conformity to enter into the "fabric of hegemony".[487] However, such instances are generally negligible in the long term: "[N]ew ideas are accepted to the extent that they conform".[488] Like Marcuse's closed, unified system that envelops contradictory works, dissenting threats are ostensibly quashed through acts of incorporation like "partial resolutions, recombination, and limited transformations".[489] These acts preserve both the virtual and dominant order, while rewarding media-makers who follow the "relatively clear subcultural range of acceptable possibilities".[490] Possibilities that pertain to both (in)action and consciousness. The three forthcoming case studies reveal the dominant order's reliance on the production of media to codify the subculture's aesthetic, corporeal, and spatial lexicon in the screen reality.

4.10 Place-Images and Place-Myths

The model franchises of each self-documenting subculture are located in city centers — Boston, San Francisco, and Baltimore. These franchises maintain their prominence through the production of media. The lived realities of elite practitioners in all three cities are recorded and edited to generate preferred representations of the model franchise. Disparate locations within the built environment are united in the screen reality, thereby forming a separate, virtual space.[491]

Rob Shields proffers a unified theory of social spatialization that links geographies and sites of cultural production to explain "normative codes of spatiality".[492] His case studies illustrate how "place-images" and "place-myths" are transformed and circulated beyond their immediate geographic location and temporality.[493] The social and the cultural become interconnected through the convergence of the virtual and the physical.

Space is commodified through certain cultural products that form a visual rendering of a socio-cultural site. Shields refers to this spatial transformation as a "regime of articulation".[494] Categories of spatiality are constructed at the level of the cultural imaginary (collective mythologies).[495] A set of "core images" is distributed widely and, subsequently, is commonly held as the "official" representation of the site. The consequences of these images are both local and far reaching, often resulting in cultural-political implications in a global context — such as patterns of development and financial investments.[496] Images enter into the minds of both inhabitants and outsiders, thereby influencing the "operation of power and the flow of knowledge" relative to the respective site.[497] The extent of this influence is tied to media's circulation and function in the socio-cultural order.[498]

In self-documenting subcultures, knowledge of the subculture's current state is embedded in contrived representations of the model franchise and the city it inhabits. Images are recorded and assembled into industry videos that are distributed to subsidiary franchises for consumption.[499] The manipulation of these images suggests that the dominant order, which governs the production and distribution of media, retains control over the built environment's "constellations of meaning".[500] Constellations crystallize into "place-images" that shape the behavior of both local inhabitants and travelers, even for those touring the city virtually.[501] These place-images manifest in the screen reality and become actualized in the lived reality.[502]

When place-images cluster together, Shields explains, the portfolio forms a place-myth. Place-myths transcend geographic boundaries and temporal constraints: "Images of particular environments or places serve both referential functions (as memory aids, or frameworks for reconstructing events) and *anticipatory* functions (serving as a guide to future encounters at or in given sites and places)."[503] Place-myths become a "guiding metaphor", an organizing force for

"practices of space and regimes of thought" that are institutionalized and rendered natural in the lived reality and on screen.[504]

The we-image and the we-ideal are transformed into industry videos of the model franchise. The dominant order uses these representations to enact an agenda of media production. Subsidiary franchises comply with the established ethos of conformity by preserving the aesthetic criterion. As such, examining media-making practices of the three model franchises yields an understanding of how subcultural representations reflect and (re)constitute the dominant order.

4.11 Interpretation and Analysis

The forthcoming analyses are structured under the guidelines of case study research. I examine three different self-documenting subcultures, in different cities, and in different eras.[505] Each city represents a "research site" for "cross-case analysis".[506] The cases illustrate collective similarities in the production and role of media within all three subcultures.[507] The use of primary documents (news coverage, interviews, promotional material, videos and other cultural products) and secondary sources (critical essays) will support my arguments.

Industry videos will be treated as "visual data". This data generates qualitative interpretations relative to formal conventions and production patterns.[508] Close readings of industry videos are informed by Richard Dyer's definition of textual analysis: "[The objective is] not to determine the correct meaning and affect, but rather to determine what meanings and affects can legitimately be read in them."[509] I do not intend to dismiss alternative readings as invalid; certainly, other meanings can be interpreted from the data.[510] I am, however, arguing that

the conditions of media- and meaning-making within self-documenting subcultures are conducive to entrenched conformity.[511]

I will analyze each subculture's model franchise (including the social and media hierarchy within the formation), contextualize the dominant order (in terms of designated city, time period, and media industry), and then detail the formal conventions specific to the virtual order. Such an endeavor necessitates providing examples (industry videos) to demonstrate that the production practices of elite producers are internalized and adhered to by contemporaneous and future media-makers (other elite or lower-tier producers from subsidiary franchises).[512]

The level of adherence evinced in the practices of production (patterns of media- and meaning-making) are directly tied to the age (length of tradition) and depth of enterprise (capitalist structures) of the media industry.[513] Indeed, as Berger and Luckmann assert, institutions (the established ways of doing things) persist if the elite maintain their power at the top by enacting their definitions of the lived and screen reality: "Such a monopoly means that a single symbolic tradition maintains the universe in question."[514] Deference to the elite and thus, the dominant order, will remain firmly in place as long as tradition is inculcated within the socialization process.[515] The consequences of these conditions go beyond establishing media as the primary transmitter of subcultural knowledge. By incorporating the salient issue of conformity into the study of subcultures, previous accounts of these formations must be reconfigured.[516]

5. Literature Review

Subcultures are typically defined in the negative. Differences are compared and contrasted between subcultures and other larger formations, only then to be extracted and understood as foundations for that particular entity's constitution. Indeed, a historiography of subcultures would reveal a parallel accounting of antitheses and antagonists. Boundary maintenance is thus an essential focus of subcultural studies; a discourse which encompasses a litany of methods and theories in the examination of subcultural members, the role of authenticity, and the uses and users of media.[517] Within the discipline, shifts in subject matter rarely altered the determination that peer-to-peer interactions were the catalyst for acts of direct or metaphoric resistance, expressions of individuality, and the acquisition of (subcultural) capital.[518] However, the prevalence of studies that investigated the interests of individual members, rather than an entire group, signaled an analytical turn.[519] Moreover, media's introduction into the discourse complicated existing binaries that manifested in determining the authenticity of cultural production: creativity versus conformity or inherent qualities versus external attribution. Regardless, subcultures were labeled as contravening forces or adversaries of "mainstream" society, mass culture, and other subordinate formations. The basis of distinction and formation rested on interpersonal communication in both the social and digital sphere.[520]

It is my contention that within self-documenting subcultures, distinction is, in fact, secondary. Conformity is the coin of the realm. Authenticity is not inherent, it is conferred.[521] Notions of originality, creativity, and individuality are trivial within the system of attribution. Adhering to the established formula of arrangement is what counts. Media production and consumption has overtaken one-on-one interaction and public display as the primary expressive act and principal transmitter of subcultural knowledge. Consumer video technologies are

ineffectual on the contested terrain of representation and agency, because the majority of distribution platforms are controlled by elite gatekeepers. Ironically, what is distinct is the "inauthentic"; a beacon of innovative expression among the vast swaths of derivative industry videos produced by subcultural media industries.

5.1 The Chicago School

At the University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s, a series of socio-ecological studies of deviance explored the influence of economics and environmental conditions on urban youth. In *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago*, Frederic Thrasher examines common-aged males (between childhood and maturity) of the lower and working classes who "spontaneously" form gangs. Such groups are "interstitial elements" of society, somewhere between normativity and complete aberrations.[522] Thrasher posits certain conditions that lead to the emergence of these factions. For instance, a neighborhood's proximity to crime. Gangs materialize as a result of a city's failure to provide adequate means of habituation for the lower-classes.[523] A gang's aberrant behavior ("demoralization") is a form of self-reflexivity or "group-consciousness" that offers a "relief from suppression" relative to their environment.[524] Group-consciousness is rooted in deviance or that which is distinct from the norm, in part, based upon a collective ethos of hopelessness rooted in the present. The emergence of gangs is therefore a problem of social causation.[525] The antidote, however, is not to adjust society's standards or embrace changes to particular norms, but to manage aberrations through moral reforms. Prolonged deviance in working-class neighborhoods is simply an interstice or "interim period" of disorganization that can be fixed through "social reorganization".[526] Thrasher does not explicitly use the term

subculture in this work, however the conception of a subordinate group's differentiation from the dominant socio-cultural order lays the groundwork for similar studies.

Deviance in lower-class youth was taken up again by functional theorists at the University of Chicago in the 1950s.[527] Although the societal agita documented in Thrasher's studies had changed and thus, the notion of deviance as well. No longer theorized in binary terms, deviance was understood as a continually moving node on a spectrum that paralleled changes to social mores.[528] In these accounts, certain subordinate members of society recognize their inability to attain normative goals. Subcultural membership provides opportunities to achieve objectives that are different from society's standards of success. While it is the case that in certain circumstances deviant groups are directly oppositional to the dominant order, this was not always apparent.[529] The general consensus among functional theorists suggested that subordinate groups interacted with society in non-conformist ways by exercising power through alternative ventures of doing and making.

Critics of the Chicago School argue these studies depoliticize social issues to avoid the role of unequal power and class-based relations in supposedly "deviant" formations.[530] The act of labeling something or someone as deviant actually discloses more information about the labeler's socio-economic position and moral relation to the established order than the subjects of a particular study.[531] Thus, analyses of "social disorganization" were merely misdirected fears of overall societal change.[532] Although the conclusions were disputed, the foregrounding of class and youth in the study of social formations was considered a viable starting point relative to the distinctions between subordinate and dominant cultures.

5.2 The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS)

Located at Birmingham University, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) examined youth culture in post-World War II Great Britain through a neo-Marxist framework.[533] Distinctions between subordinate groups and the dominant order were based upon class differences, principally, and generational differences, secondly.[534] Class-based structures ignited antagonisms between various social tiers of society.[535] Youth cultures of the lower, working-class were partially defined by expressive acts of resistance directed against the bourgeoisie and established power structures.[536] Power was conceived of through the Gramscian perspective in which youths attempted to "modify, negotiate, resist or even overthrow" the dominant culture's hegemony.[537]

According to the CCCS, hegemony is ideologically-based, but is not necessarily associated with false conceptions of reality, rather, it operates through objective class relations.[538] The dominant culture exercises its authority over lower classes through structural institutions that seek to govern collective action and consciousness: "[T]he limits within which ideas and conflicts move and are resolved".[539] Resistance towards this inequitable distribution of power generally emerges because the working class cannot be completely "absorbed" into the dominant culture.[540] Ultimately, hegemony is rooted in class, thereby distinguishing dominant and subordinate groups from one another.[541]

John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson, and Brian Roberts theorize that society is multi-layered. Subcultures are historically specific and housed within their parent culture's socio-economic tier.[542] This relationship is described as a "double articulation".[543] Subcultures are beholden "first, to their 'parent' culture (e.g. working class culture), second, to the dominant

culture".[544] Therefore, both parent cultures and subcultures are subservient to the interests of the upper class (aristocrat and bourgeoisie).[545]

Subcultural members engage in various strategies, responses, and coping mechanisms to deal with this subjugation: "[C]ertain activities, values, certain uses of material artefacts, territorial spaces, etc."[546] Such expressions are ritualistic, signifying practices that provide brief instances of autonomy and serve as markers of identifiable difference in comparison to other subcultures.[547] Although expressions should not be mistaken as a panacea to the structural inequities that plague the working-class.[548] Solutions to these conditions must be thought of in an "imaginary way," in which "gaps" or fissures in the dominant order's hegemony are briefly exposed, only to be quickly covered over.[549] One such temporary solution is the development of a youth subculture's "group-style", which, in part, entails appropriating commodities from the dominant culture.[550]

The classification of "youth subcultures" refers to the post-war era in which the confluence of age and disposable income became an identifiable commercial category characterized by consumptive practices of particular leisure activities and group-styles.[551] Working-class adolescents purchased and transformed commodities through appropriative acts labeled as "cultural responses" that cohered individuals into collectives known as a subcultures.[552] Style became indicative of the "situations and experiences characteristic of [members'] own distinctive group-life and generational experience."[553] Both expressive acts and stylistic displays were considered "homologous" to the subculture.[554] The emergence of an organized group identity provided members with a unique way of being in the world and resisting the dominant socio-cultural order.[555]

Social interaction and stylistic displays are pivotal to the formation of a subculture's group-identity.[556] Individuals appropriate objects from the mainstream and transform them to elicit a reaction. In the process of transition, the intended function or preferred meaning of the item is "resignified" to align with the collective's values.[557] A subculture's group-identity is crystallized through such alterations of meaning and interaction.[558] In this sense, expressive acts are tantamount to temporary solutions to structural conditions and the foundation of a subculture's constitution.

Working from the CCCS's fundamental principles, subcultural studies were undertaken using semiotic and ethnographic approaches to interpret style and consumption. In *Profane Culture,* Paul Willis provides two ethnographic accounts of the "hippies" and the "bikeboys" of the 1960s.[559] Both groups emerged during an era of low employment and a general state of nihilism.[560] The hippies epitomized the "alienation of the middle-class youth", whereas the bikeboys reflected the "oppression of working-class youth".[561] Temporary solutions to these socio-economic conditions were found in profane expressions that supplied new meanings and experiences.

Each group's "gift" of profanity manifests in the practice of appropriation relative to everyday objects.[562] These items are transformed into something identifiably new, thereby producing a sense of collective identity.[563] Willis summarizes, "from the rubbish available […] these groups do generate viable cultures".[564] An object's function and meaning can change, and thus, the dialectical relationship between the object and its intended usage can be reset.[565] Willis theorizes that these acts of transformation are homologous to the group as a whole.[566] In particular, the bikeboys' group-style is reflective of the collective's values. For instance, a member's status is partially formulated by the distinctive use of clothing and equipment, like

gloves, goggles, or helmets. By abstaining from traditional safety gear, individuals are judged by established members as having embraced the group's cultural response to their subordinate socio-economic position. It is a response rooted in freedom from the rules and norms of mainstream society, and in effect, freedom from the group's structural conditions.[567] The gift of profanity is emblematic of distinction from the dominant socio-cultural order.

Importantly, this is one of the few studies in which distinction between a subordinate culture and its respective dominant order is considered ambiguous. Willis claims that objects' "expressive functions" do not always directly oppose the normative structures of society.[568] Moreover, certain aspects of the dominant order are at times reproduced by subordinate cultures.[569] For example, the bikeboys embraced misogynist and racist views of their parent culture.[570] Although not explicitly stated as such, during intracultural interactions, the bikeboys conformed to an established ethos by reaffirming the larger socio-cultural order's values. Outside of these accounts, a different study addressed a similar process of resignification and object appropriation in contemporaneous subcultures.

Dick Hebdige uses a semiotic method to interpret acts of "conspicuous consumption".[571] He asserts that meaning is generated dialectically from the transition of an object's intended use to its appropriated from, and finally, the subsequent reaction from the dominant culture. This collision, between the dominant and the subordinate, synthesizes into a signifying practice rendered as group-style. Style is theorized by Hebdige as a cultural signifier, a visible display of a subculture's values.[572] As an expressive practice, style issues "symbolic challenges" to the dominant order, attempting to create cultural space and to solve problems engendered by socio-economic relations.[573]

Bricolage is a signifying practice, which reconfigures objects' normative meanings.[574] Mods, a British subculture of the period, were "bricoleurs" who adopted suits as a marker of group-style.[575] The subculture was largely comprised of working-class youth that subverted formal wear's intended use and consumer base. In doing so, Hebdige explains, the hegemonic order was disrupted. Members momentarily denied their subordination and "magically resolved", albeit briefly, their class relation on the terrain of sartorial display.[576] Although challenges to normative culture can also be neutralized through re-appropriation. "Poseurs" or individuals unaffiliated with a subculture may pointlessly engage in acts of bricolage with no underlying intentions.[577] Therefore, subcultural distinction and membership manifest in expressive acts that symbolically resist the dominant order.[578]

Criticisms of Hebdige often translate into critiques of texts associated with the CCCS. Disputes tend to center around what are perceived of as "essentialist" depictions and binary conclusions in which certain subcultural tropes are considered fundamental and without contradiction. For example, the correlation of subordination and resistance.[579] As discussed, symbolic challenges to the hegemonic order are located in the cultural sphere and are frequently conceptualized as both ephemeral and a-political with little possibility of achieving structural change.[580] Thus, neutralization does not occur via capitalistic incorporation, as Hebdige mentions, but through subcultural members' inactions. Another oft-cited critique problematizes the socio-economic relations of the CCCS's subjects. In particular, Gary Clarke takes aim at the presumed correlation between class and subcultures.[581] Clarke asserts that the division between subcultural members and "straights" (normative individuals) is not so easily distinguishable because both groups perpetually shift "in and out of different subcultures".[582] This conclusion prefigures the classification of subcultures as formations with fluid membership and intermittent

coherence. The role of consumerism, however, remained a focus of the discipline beyond the original studies of the CCCS.

5.3 Market-oriented Subcultures

The categorization of "taste cultures" and "subcultures of consumption" gained prominence within academia as researchers addressed the effects of commercialization within subcultures.[583] Class-based resistance was not a focal point; so too, consumerism was no longer characterized as unilaterally negative. Subcultural members were theorized as active participants in the commercialization process, rather than victims or pawns in the capitalist system.[584] Distinction shifted inward as individuals distinguished one another based upon "shared systems of meaning and commodity use" that transformed into subcultural capital.[585] Taste was a marker of commitment and a method for constructing one's identity in contrast to other members.[586] In sum, the production and consumption of commodities was deemed essential to the constitution of each formation.

Sarah Thornton suggests that at the individual level, members of taste cultures imagine their social worlds and measure their cultural worth through subcultural capital.[587] Identity is formulated by the cultivation and display of certain tastes in the effort to "negotiate and accumulate status".[588] Individuals define themselves by what they dislike, an expressive act of distinction.[589] Thornton's work builds upon Pierre Bourdieu's theories of capital and sanctioned taste.

Bourdieu conceptualizes taste as part of a multi-dimensional, non-linear network of distinction that plays out in the daily interactions between members of different social classes.[590] Social capital (who you know) is beholden to class, whereas cultural capital, that which is

learned through one's upbringing and education (what you know), becomes a way to designate taste.[591] According to Bourdieu, these preferences are the "practical affirmation of an inevitable difference […] asserted purely negatively, by the refusal of other tastes".[592] Taste can thus be understood as a sign system that transforms into "objectified capital" and operates in the consumer economy.[593] In contrast, Thornton's conception sheds the yoke of class determinacy to reconfigure subcultural capital as a product of symbolic interactionism.

Symbolic interactionism focuses on micro, as opposed to macro, communications. This perspective of social behavior argues that individuals are routinely and regularly engaged with others in an interdependent, learning relationship.[594] Within subcultures, members' understanding of experience and meaning are derived from these interactions.[595] Standards of distinction are formed through interpersonal negotiation and constructive agreements between peers. Such a theory emphasizes a network structure of agents and agency, as opposed to hierarchical relations.[596] As such, institutions (established ways of doing and making) are fluid because negotiations between members take place without the presence of hegemonic power relations.[597] The negotiation of meaning and the subjective experience of the individual are prioritized.

According to Thornton, capital is attained in taste cultures through interpersonal exchange between a member with high capital and another member seeking recognition.[598] For example, Thornton states that individuals may purchase specialized commodities that are germane to the subculture, which would then result in acknowledgement from established members that the person in question is "in the know".[599] The process is both a demonstration of knowledge and a consumptive act of display.[600] Distinction is rooted in taste, as opposed to objective manifestations of power.[601] Criticisms of Thornton's work suggest that her conceptions

of taste cultures are depoliticized, especially in the context of excluding class attributes from her theory of capital.[602] These same critiques could be levied against subcultures of consumption.

John Schouten and James McAlexander define subcultures of consumption as "distinctive subgroup[s] of society that self-select on the basis of a shared commitment to a particular product, class, brand, or consumption activity."[603] These subcultures foreground individualism and "unregulation" as constituting principles.[604] Participants understand their sense of self in relation to commodities. One's identity is formed and social status established through associations with specific brands or products.[605] Essentially, subcultural capital is amassed by "eclectically and individualistically combining elements of subcultural meaning" under the guise of unregulated expression.[606] Distinction between members manifests in the negotiation of appearance, the discovery of brands, and the renewal of stereotypical wear.[607] A member can introduce new forms of meaning, reinforce already sanctioned tastes, or rescue brands from the stigma of cliché. Subcultures of consumption can thus be classified by the prioritization of the individual in service of maintaining the collective. Through shared interactions, the pageantry and curation of goods is pivotal to the construction of identity and the preservation of community.[608]

Such loosely outlined membership requirements and vague expressions of individuality are indicative of a larger revisionist shift in the discipline of subcultural studies.[609] Critiques of taste cultures and/or subcultures of consumption echo Gary Clarke's assertation that members tend to weave in and out of these social formations throughout adolescence and adult life. At times, subcultures are relatively homogenous and clearly delineated, while during other periods, participants are affiliated with multiple formations simultaneously. In turn, the conceptualization of subcultures as a social category became a focus of scrutiny.

5.4 The Discipline at a Junction: New Terms and Conditions

Evidence of transient membership within a group typically nullifies the determination of its status as a subculture. Accordingly, social formations that are defined by semi-permanence are considered entirely different classifications. Michel Maffesoli argues that within mass culture, individuals continually flow in and out of heterogenous groups called "tribes".[610] Characterized by the simultaneous entrance and immersion of members, tribes manifest "as the occasion arises".[611] Even though such membership seems chaotically unstable, shared values and ideals constitute some form of cohesion. The explicit function of tribes materializes in their emergence.[612] Examples include sports fans or local political parties that include disparate individuals, yet when taken as a whole, members are markedly like-minded.[613] The process of distinction occurs internally, within one's own thoughts, beliefs, and motivations, in contrast to external pressures or directives from varying groups. The epiphenomenal result is that individuals' "intrinsic pluralities" and external fluidities are emphasized.[614]

David Hesmondhalgh argues that classifications of tribes or "scenes"— including each aforementioned term in this chapter — are not viable for the study of "mutual collectivities" in contemporary society.[615] As a construct, tribes treat the connections between members as far too "malleable and fluid", which undervalues the objective, fixed relationships of certain tribal formations.[616] On the other hand, definitions of subcultures tend to overemphasize the stability of membership.[617] A scene is somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. Scenes are comprised of members that are bound to certain values, beliefs, or styles, however, most participants subscribe to numerous groups that are often contradictory and ephemeral.[618] Instead, Hesmondhalgh claims that "genre" is a more useful label because it provides a comprehensive understanding of the "ambivalence and complexity" of these formations, which would include multiple articulations

of difference and heterogeneity that do not rely upon class, race, or dress.[619] Beyond this proposal, some researchers have excavated past sociological categories, put forth new classifications, and abandoned some terms altogether.

5.5 Post-subcultures and the Taxonomic Turn

The supposed fragmentation of the social[620] resulted in a parallel shift in methodological approaches within the discipline. Sociological and ethnographic studies analyzed participants' subjective, everyday experiences in localized environments.[621] New sets of conditions and past issues were (re)investigated. Questions regarding identity, distinctions between mass and subordinate culture, and the collective in contrast to the singular were foregrounded.

In evaluating subcultural studies, Rupert Weinzierl and David Muggleton narrate a litany of inconsistencies with previous accounts, while arguing for more specificity in future analyses. The authors note that with respect to youth cultures examined in the tradition of the CCCS, the notion of resistance is overwrought, whereas recent scholarship on taste cultures and tribes eschew such discussions entirely.[622] Moreover, the term subculture is inadequate for studies of political "youth formations" that do not dwell on issues of identity or distinction and instead favor "direct action" against purported inequities in civil society.[623] In Muggleton's solo work, he classifies social formations in terms of belief systems in which the "post-subcultural" ideology privileges "hyper-individualism".[624] These formations are better defined by "self-expression, individual autonomy and cultural diversity" that materializes in both political objectives and style.[625] The individual is favored over the group and difference is emphasized over "collectivism and conformity".[626] Therefore, distinction emanates from the externalization of the self during intracultural interactions.[627]

For some scholars, however, the diversity and plurality of these collectives renders the term subculture irrelevant. David Chaney declares that the ubiquity of fragmentary memberships within various formations is evidence of the term's ineffectiveness.[628] Certain styles or particular identity markers, which once previously distinguished subcultural members from the mainstream, are now features of normative society.[629] The classical opposition between mass culture and subcultures is inapplicable, and as such, the use of the latter term as a social category must be reconsidered.

Todd Crosset and Becky Beal problematize the use of the term as well. The authors argue that most sociological studies do not provide enough clarity regarding the differences between subordinate cultures and conceptions of groups or occupations.[630] Borrowing from the writings of the Chicago School, Crosset and Beal suggest the term "social world" is a more apt categorization for the majority of formations labeled subcultures.[631] A social world is comprised of people that share common interests, forms of communication, and coordinated efforts of evaluation that are not in opposition to the dominant socio-cultural order.[632] Within these social worlds, there exists "subworlds" that are defined by accordant "spheres of communication" and the production of "social objects".[633] A subworld engenders its own sphere of discourse in which members interact with one another through particular modes that generate meaning. For example, participants "create, distribute, and evaluate social object[s]", like baseball cards, and discuss these objects through various channels and sites, such as clubhouses.[634] The relationship between the user, the object, and the sphere of communication distinguishes one subworld from another.[635]

The basis or fundamental factor in the classification process is also under scrutiny. According to James and Laura Dowd, subcultures, subworlds, and social worlds exist on a

continuum of commitment.[636] A formation may start as a subculture, with members dedicated full-time to the collective will, but slowly, as more social responsibility is accrued, the formation idles as a subworld, before finally transitioning to a social world.[637] The authors conclude that commitment is dynamic rather than static, and so too, these categories.[638] Distinction is thus on a continuum as well, mirroring the changes that occur in comparison to different stages of commitment.

The protean quality of the term subculture has cohered disparate individuals and distinguished the norm from the abnormal. Christopher Jenks considers this as evidence of misuse and grounds for the category's retirement in its current form.[639] The targets of Jenks' ire are sociologists and social theorists of the last twenty years, who, in his view, have used subcultural studies as a vehicle to champion the diversity of popular culture.[640] Even more egregiously, because contemporary subcultures are not wholly distinct from mass culture, theorists should posit alternative ways of explaining both terms.[641] An entirely different approach reconceptualizes the ontological status of subordinate cultures.

Jenks contests the notion that subcultures are objective, social entities.[642] Instead, he foregrounds the term's epistemological function.[643] Subcultures are better understood as theoretical devices ("ways of seeing") that guide collective action for specific rhetorical, political, and moral purposes.[644] In this sense, Jenks is not concerned with individual agency, but with frames of mind that manifest as distinctions from other knowledge practices. This argument is also fundamental to questions that surround digitally mediated subcultures.

5.6 Virtual and Digital Subcultures

Although digital networks proffer increased inclusion and access, in practice, preestablished standards of exclusion are extended into the digital realm. New affiliations are made, but by and large, the Internet sustains or advances existing subcultural boundaries. Andy Bennett maintains that online communities "actively define" and disseminate subcultural knowledge through everyday interactions in reality and then "accentuate" identity markers in the digital realm.[645] For example, the global dance culture Psytrance (psychedelic trance) maintains its boundaries through both face-to-face and virtual interactions.[646] The material realm of musical events and the online community are interdependent. The status and membership of participants are evaluated based on the "values, practices and belief systems" that are negotiated in both physical and virtual spaces.[647] The Psytrance culture problematizes the notion that both global youth styles and virtual subcultures are symptomatic of the seemingly "depthless, transitory and internally fragmented" conditions of contemporary society.[648] The daily transitions between online and offline, in fact, reflect a stable and homogenous group still clinging to established standards that aspiring members must meet for the possibility of inclusion.[649] Accordingly, traditional modes of distinction remain intact.

For some subcultures, the entwinement of the virtual and the physical has created more obstacles to negotiate. Skateboarders often develop digital identities that coincide with their lived personae by recording activities in the material world and subsequently uploading those images online.[650] Individuals must translate entrenched methods of evaluation and develop new ones to retain their social status through digital channels.[651] Codes of distinction are therefore taken from the lived reality and reaffirmed in the virtual realm.[652]

J.A. McArthur argues that the Internet is a secondary resource for the display of one's membership and self-expression.[653] "Elements" within the concrete world are "reinscribed" in the virtual world. Preexisting modes of distinction based on identity and one's relationship to resistance, consumption, and style are housed online. For example, ravers extend traditional interactions by having "virtual parties", sharing digital copies of music, and developing personalized webpages and fan accounts.[654] Consumptive acts that used to take place at shows, clubs, or underground events are now reproduced online.[655] In turn, however, the Internet also provides access to subcultural knowledge for those who might have been excluded in the past.

Within the subculture of hardcore punk, the Internet is a source of concern. Established members seek out venues and face-to-face interactions to exchange information and reaffirm members' statuses.[656] The threat of the subculture's neutralization or the perceived weakening of once stable boundaries is elevated with the prospect of online forums becoming the primary mode of communication.[657] The advent and proliferation of these forums can be considered indicative of the subculture's dwindling ability to police outsiders and control the flow of subcultural capital.

According to Geoff Stahl, the digital realm has fundamentally altered the flow of symbolic capital in established subcultures and burgeoning virtual ones. Stahl compares and contrasts what he calls "virtual neighborhoods" with taste cultures, suggesting that capital displayed and transferred between users in the digital realm is not bound by geographical localities. Moreover, virtual exchanges translate into the material world.[658] Stahl refers to this process as the global flow of capital.[659] For taste cultures, previous boundaries are dissolved as digital communication channels enable members to affirm their statuses by "legitimizing" particular forms and practices that are specific to online interactions.[660] The result of which is

that power relations shift within taste cultures because access and opportunities for attaining capital are now more equitable.[661] Regardless of these changes, Stahl explains, both virtual neighborhoods and taste cultures operate under the guise that amassing and displaying subcultural capital is fundamental to distinguishing members' cultural worth.[662]

In the past, the majority of subcultural studies were concerned with interpersonal interactions and practices of distinction. The Chicago School analyzed deviant formations in the effort to establish how these groups surfaced and cohered in comparison to the larger socio-economic organization of their specific locality. Studies of working-class, youth factions centered around the distinguishing relationships between contemporaneous groups and the dominant culture. The appropriation of everyday objects in the effort to (symbolically) resist conventional norms and construct group-styles were also explained in terms of distinction. The shift away from these analyses moved toward the central role of consumerism and the circulation of subcultural capital in taste cultures and subcultures of consumption. Divisions were constructed internally between members or externally between other (sub)cultures. These boundaries were often extended in the digital realm. The reemergence of sociological and ethnographic approaches brought to the fore debates over standards of classification and methods of communication that continue today.

5.7 Subcultural Authenticity

In self-documenting subcultures, authenticity is a socially constructed resource that is conferred by a system of attribution. This system rewards media-makers that comply with a derivative formula for the production and evaluation of industry videos. In short, authenticity is a marker of conformity. Literature on the subject tends to expound on the definitions, uses, and

qualifications of authenticity that are found in objects or events and are rendered by an individual or a collective.[663] Distinction rests upon those with or without authenticity, whereas inauthenticity is typically conceived of as the opposite of whatever exact specifications are listed.[664] For the purposes of this chapter, authenticity is examined in the context of being versus doing, which reconfigures particular understandings of subcultural capital. The notion of meditated authenticity is introduced as well, in an attempt to understand its relation to subcultural media.

The construction of one's identity and the externalization of the authentic self implies some form of distinguishment from others.[665] The guiding motivation in this process is an important point of analysis, because it relates to two different modes of achieving or maintaining authenticity: "[Through] an individual authenticating act or a collective authoritative performance".[666] Both motivations are strongly connected to questions surrounding who has agency and who is capable of defining the self. Moreover, authenticity is considered either rooted in self-referentiality or a state of conformity.[667]

"Being" authentic materializes through self-authentication (individual authenticating acts) or behaviors that reveal or produce the "true" self. These behaviors are connected to personal motivations and/or goals.[668] Self-authentication naturally presumes the criteria for retaining or achieving authenticity is left to the individual to decide whether their motives are "true, consistent, [or] sincere".[669] In this sense, attaining social status through internalizing and exuding the standards of external forces betrays the purpose of self-authentication and is inauthentic.

An authoritative performance is the "doing" of the collective's primary objectives. The construction of identity is dependent upon compliance with external conceptions of

authenticity.[670] Rather than considering this mode and its concomitant motivations as a Machiavellian gambit in service of climbing the social ladder, performances are primarily influenced by a desire for belonginess. This desire manifests through an individual's interpersonal (in)actions and expressive displays. In seeking group acceptance, a subcultural member might associate with already vetted participants, adhere to particular clothing styles, or pursue experiences that the collective has already deemed authentic.[671] From the perspective of existing subcultural members, the individual and their choices are looked upon as subjects of evaluation. One's social identity must comply with the established boundaries of the group's membership criteria. Thus, inauthenticity is either a state of incompatibility or the absence of believability that an individual will conform.[672] Although if certain behaviors or styles are followed too closely or prompt questions regarding inconsistency, these conditions could indicate that the individual is inauthentic.[673] When discussing authenticity in the context of being versus doing, additional dialogues emerge.

Within the discipline of subcultural studies, authenticity is examined in relation to both production and consumption. Authors in the tradition of the CCCS tend to equate authenticity with the appropriation and transformation of objects for the purposes of (symbolic) resistance. Commodities from the mainstream are reconfigured to "magically" and ephemerally solve problems associated with members' socio-economic conditions. Accordingly, authentic objects become inauthentic when the possibility of "solving" such problems is neutralized because of expropriation by the dominant culture or individuals lacking the collective's intentions.[674] Relative to studies of taste cultures and subcultures of consumption, consumptive acts are intracultural demonstrations and negotiations that translate into subcultural capital.[675] Authenticity is defined by a multitude of factors that reflect various material/immaterial objects,

internalized notions of the self, and expressive practices that are "activated" both online and offline.[676] In both the digital and social sphere, authenticity is evaluated through interpersonal interactions.

Belinda Wheaton and Becky Beal maintain that subcultural consumers have a role in shaping the authenticity of products and practices.[677] Through "symbolic exchanges" between members, a brand's commitment to the subculture (its authenticity) is assessed.[678] Authenticity is dependent upon the extent of a brand's dedication to manufacturing cultural and utilitarian products for use within the subculture.[679] Brands are labeled inauthentic when members decide that certain products or advertisements of products are intended to attract mainstream consumers.[680] As such, a person is deemed inauthentic if they purchase various commodities from a brand not sanctioned by the collective. Participants communicate their subcultural knowledge by displaying specific brands' equipment or clothing.[681] Doing so indicates a level of commitment on the part of the individual consumer.[682] Materiality is not resisted or dismissed then, rather, certain commodities are connected to subcultural standards, status, and capital.[683] Therefore, consumption influences both exclusionary practices and conceptions of authenticity.

In accordance with this text, Michelle Donnelly states that authenticity is a strategic construct used by gatekeepers or "self-identified" gatekeepers to label and malign anyone deemed inauthentic or indecorous.[684] Such acts of in-authentication also serve to reinforce gatekeepers' social standings.[685] Donnelly claims that through interpersonal evaluations, judgments are rendered that influence the subculture's status as a whole, its neutralization or advancement.[686] Instead, I argue that the status of each self-documenting subculture is principally communicated through media. The virtual order, and the system of attribution housed within it, legitimize productions and the ethos of conformity. The production of media precludes

the need for individual gatekeepers to directly interact with members, because the majority of media-makers comply with the standards of authenticity presented on screen.[687] These images are accepted by lower-level members as authentic representations of the subculture because they are authorized by industry gatekeepers.

Questions of provenance and uniqueness generally accompany evaluations of a media object's authenticity.[688] Walter Benjamin complicates this criteria in his discussion of the industrialization of art.[689] Media's form (inherent reproducibility) suggests that assessments of an object's worth with respect to its singularity are problematic.[690] Although media is relegated to the realm of the "non-auratic", the effects of reproduction are still worthy of examination.[691] Benjamin salvages media from the "rubbish heap" of everyday objects by revealing its capability to represent "entirely new structural formations".[692] Despite Benjamin's belief that the potentialities of media are located in its form — thereby reducing the individual to a secondary role — his work provides a foundation for considering immaterial authenticity and the disruption of the traditional producer/consumer relationship.[693]

Alexis Lothian investigates "subcultural fandoms" and the practices of "textual poaching": the collectives that form around the transfer and resignification of digital data.[694] Subcultural fandoms are virtual networks that prioritize the production of "fan fiction, art, and remix video".[695] Examples of poaching include the widespread reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted material, such as memes, in online "anarchist archives" and 'zines.[696] Much like the appropriation practices detailed by Hebdige, poaching flouts the "laws and norms" of the original producers (companies under the aegis of media conglomerates) by subverting a product's intended use.[697] These fandoms contest the notion of "originality" (the intrinsic quality of an object) and reconfigure the criteria of authenticity in terms of creative use.[698] While online,

members engage in dialogues about intellectual property and digital media, including efforts to actively subvert hierarchical power structures.[699] Thus, the production of media is tantamount to the cultivation of symbolic resistance and the circulation of subcultural knowledge, both of which are vital to the formation of subcultural fandoms.

According to Sarah Thornton, when media functions as a vehicle for subcultural knowledge, it is essential to the subculture's constitution.[700] As a result, media's authenticity directly correlates to both the producer and consumer's subcultural status and worth. The consumption of authentic media demonstrates knowledge to fellow members, which translates into subcultural capital.[701] For producers, a media object's authenticity is based, in part, on the extent of the "emergence, exposure, and legitimization" of subcultural knowledge.[702] Thornton argues that the attribution of authenticity is guided by the exclusion of outsiders from the process of representation and knowledge production.[703] "Channels of communication" must remain in the control of subcultural members, as opposed to conceding representative power to the mass media.[704] Yet, regardless of the original source, the entwinement of commercialization and cultural production is central to understanding the role of media in contemporary subcultures.

5.8 The Uses and Users of Media

Interpretations of subcultural media generally begin with either a contrasting, macro perspective of external representations or an internal, micro perspective of intracultural productions. With respect to the former, the standard characterization of mass media suggests that subordinate groups are labeled and depicted as deviant to amplify tensions within normative society. The latter position tends to examine various technologies and platforms that are essential to a subculture's formation and continuation.[705] The implications of both perspectives underline

issues of access to communication technology. Social media and consumer audio-visual cameras purportedly offer users the opportunity to construct and control their representation. Such claims necessitate analyzing whether eliminating barriers to representation actually challenge or merely reinforce existing power structures.[706]

Stanley Cohen determines that local and national newspapers deliberately exaggerate and describe certain subcultures as deviant formations in the effort to delimit societal values.[707] Deviancy, as a label, pre-dates the groups themselves and is used interchangeably to cohere different formations under one umbrella-term.[708] The mass media "protects" society's norms from "folk devils" by prompting consumers to recall similar disruptive groups from the past.[709] Internal control over the group's representation is neutralized, regardless of whether the subculture in question is accepting of their deviant label.[710] In turn, the mass media does the bidding of normative society in determining the motivations and composition of subcultures within the public sphere.

The advent and proliferation of "digital public spheres" ostensibly enabled subcultural members to gain control over their representation by becoming producers.[711] Social media and other content distribution platforms actively promote the disruption of broadcast and print media's top-down hierarchy.[712] Online "posts" allow users to "actively construct" and participate in communicative exchanges both within and outside the subculture.[713] For example, YouTube encourages users to post and discuss uploaded images, thereby facilitating the two-way production and consumption of media.[714] YouTube appears as an egalitarian platform, yet, this is a fundamental misapprehension of the website's data-driven functions.[715] The platform privileges the commodification of users' lives and the synergistic practices of corporate entities.[716] To take one example, in 2010, eighty percent of the highest ranking "channels" on

YouTube were produced by independent users or groups. Yet, in 2019, seventy-two percent of the top one hundred channels were underwritten, either entirely or partially, by corporations.[717] Such conditions mirror those within subcultural media industries.

According to Tyler Dupont's study of (lower-tier) skateboarders' user-generated representations, individuals curate their social media posts based on the aesthetic conventions circulated by industry videos.[718] If certain conventions are elided, individuals are maligned in the digital sphere and in the lived reality.[719] In this case, social media provides access to distribution, but not autonomy from institutionalized standards of production:

> Without the gatekeepers deciding whose images the audience received and how these images were framed, the skaters' self-curation created the possibility that they — especially the younger skater — may consume many "inauthentic" images and messages. Accounting for this risk, the established skaters assisted the younger skaters in developing the proper tastes by suggesting which producers to follow and which messages to internalize.[720]

In effect, the authority of those who determine the agenda of media production determine the boundaries for creative expression.[721]

The production and distribution of media is governed by a dominant order within each self-documenting subculture. This power is buttressed by both social and media hierarchies. Recall the earlier discussion of hierarchies versus networks; Thornton determines that the production of "niche media" (subcultural media) establishes an intracultural network that cultivates the "active and creative participation" of members.[722] However, the presence or emergence of media industries is scarcely mentioned.[723] In each forthcoming case study, commercial infrastructures consolidate control in the uppermost tier of the social hierarchy,

which delimits the production of media and meaning. Although this is not to say that lower-level participants do not engage in the production or distribution of media. Each subculture openly cultivates and will circulate conformist-driven representations that maintain the status quo. Thus, traditional uses of subcultural media do not offer the possibilities of subversion, rather, such practices renew the existing power structures.[724]

Subcultural participants often overlook their respective media industry's power to shape discourses and modes of representation in service of its financial interests. One study suggests that this is because members purposefully ignore cultural products' commercial inscription as a way to justify their own consumption.[725] The same study argues that cultural producers adhere to specific formats and formulae of production that encode a restricted number of possible meanings made available to the consumer.[726] Indeed, what the majority of subcultural members perceive as the "democratization" of communication technology — and as such, the dissolution of hierarchies between producer and consumers, access and distribution, and the elite and lower tiers — is merely a radical fortification of conformity.

6. Hardcore Punk: "The Boston Crew" (1980-1990)

Hardcore punk emerged as an internal reaction to the subculture of punk, a splinter faction that coalesced into a subculture of its own.[727] Comparisons between punk and hardcore tend to begin with musical notation. Hardcore punk (hardcore) is played faster, more aggressively in downstrokes on the guitar and snare hits on the drums. With respect to dress, hardcore is more "clean-cut" and uniformist with cuffed jeans and hooded sweatshirts, as opposed to participants engaging in expressions of pastiche or bricolage typically associated with punk.[728] For the purposes of this writing, however, it is hardcore's militant "straightedge" regiment, as well as the subculture's ethos of conformity, that differentiates this faction from earlier punk instantiations. The values and expressions in question are related to a specific corporeal and cognitive mode of ascetism.[729]

Straightedge, as a lifestyle, is inseparable from the emergence of hardcore as a subculture.[730] In the early 1980s, a particular hardcore music group called Minor Threat, led by vocalist Ian MacKaye, propagated what would become the core tenets of straightedge: a purity of body and mind — the absence of alcohol and drugs, and at times, promiscuous sex.[731] A follower of the lifestyle must maintain self-discipline, eschewing excess and gluttony. In practice, this is described as going "straight", and in doing so, a person is afforded an "edge" over inebriated individuals.[732] Such practices were conceived of as a countermeasure to both the "sell-out", drug-fueled bands that prevailed throughout the previous decade and to society in general, which was supposedly tarnished by the unmooring of its constituents.[733] Straightedge provided a "community of meaning" in which new possibilities were opened to participants.[734] By maintaining the lifestyle — definitively different from leisure activities in both adherence and militancy — the prospects of generating a cultural rebellion were elevated.[735] If the message was

spread as far as possible, members reasoned, inspiration to engage in self-improvement could shift socio-cultural norms.[736] The primary purveyors of such dicta were straightedge bands who claimed to offer the choice of abstention.[737] Instead, however, the set of conditions enacted and perpetrated by straightedge groups merely engendered widespread uniformity. Choices were not so much made but maintained. Enacted through socialized compulsion, strictures delimited dissenting practices of both thought and (in)action.

The uniform tenets that cohered disparate members across North America during this era simultaneously authorized and perpetrated an ethos of conformity. To be sure, hardcore members existed on a spectrum of commitment and adherence to varying ideals, however, it is the argument of this writing that for the majority of the 1980s, straightedge was the dominant homogenizing force within the subculture. Subsequently, the industry videos produced by elite straightedge bands were the dominant mode of representation. The emergence of social and media hierarchies paralleled the rise of the elite tier and a series of rules, mores, and aesthetic stratagems of media production.[738] Such determinations are evinced through an examination of the subculture's consumer industry and its products, which invariably included or made reference to the word "unity", thereby conveying the preferred meaning of the dominant order. Yet, unity was simply a codeword for conformity. Despite avowed declarations of choice and individual expression, the elite tier demanded compliance. Moreover, hardcore groups and record labels purported autonomy from the mainstream, suggesting that the intracultural production of media was absolved from a debased capitalist system. In fact, such enterprises retained central capitalistic features. The ambiguities surrounding elite members' supposed ideals and the subculture's ethos of conformity are evident in the industry's media productions.[739]

The model franchise in question, the "Boston Crew" (the "Crew"), formulated its own local and hierarchical infrastructure that utilized the "Do-It-Yourself" (DIY) aesthetic and economic strategies of cultural production. Forgoing contracts with major record companies was seen as compulsory. However, this did not preclude the consolidation of allocative and authoritative resources in the elite echelon. Boston acted as a hub for the production of media, and as such, afforded members with opportunities for recognition within the subculture. In part, this was owing to the close "proximity to key subcultural members, companies, and spaces".[740] Record labels were created, 'zines were crafted, and distribution streams were established. While the DIY ethic is often conceptualized as encompassing alternative practices of doing and making, such strategies retain consumptive influences and engender power struggles over representation. In hardcore, these contests manifested in the production of industry videos.

Media is fundamental to the subculture's model and subsidiary franchises. Industry videos were both constitutive and reflective of the hardcore elite in the 1980s. Footage from local shows (the lived reality) captured and condensed the era's aesthetics, embodied practices (dance maneuvers), and place-images of various venues in cities that emerged as subcultural nurseries of sorts. The assemblages of live recordings were carefully edited into industry videos (the screen reality), which generated place-myths that were internalized by subcultural members of all tiers. The dominant order instituted standards of media production: framing and composition, the juxtaposition of certain shots, and a lack of explicit authorship. By analyzing these videos, one can observe relatively stable formal conventions across contemporaneous bands located within Boston and music groups that surfaced on the other side of the country well into the latter half of the decade.

Live sets were recorded and edited to create a mythology of the subculture's model franchise, the Boston Crew. Video recordings were sold — under the management of intracultural record labels owned, operated, and/or affiliated with members of the Crew — through local and national fanzines ('zines), record shops, and other brick and mortar locations.[741] Put simply, the elite tier effectively controlled the means of production. The consequences of these conditions influenced the lived reality of viewers, especially media-makers, who replicated and reiterated established tropes in service of producing and distributing their own footage of subsidiary franchises. Formal conventions disseminated contrived representations of the elite tier, which became codified in the screen reality.

The relative conformity of industry videos reflects the homogeneity of hardcore during this period. Videos were initially conceived of as promotional material for the band, label, and city. However, the subcultural knowledge gleaned from these representations demonstrates the authority held by the elite tier, which directly influenced the boundaries of subcultural membership and media-making. Media production was both a social and cultural practice that articulated the relationship between hardcore and capitalism. Through the extreme pursuit of purity and distinction, an ethos of conformity materialized as the principal organizing force, which hindered creative expression and eschewed critique.

6.1 A Brief History of Punk: Commercialization and Capitulation

The histories of punk and hardcore are interconnected. Cycles of internal reactions by members led to various outgrowths and subsects that differentiated certain factions from others. However, in examining hardcore and punk, tensions surface that problematize notions of resistance and anti-commercialism. Among numerous punk instantiations, there is a

demonization of capitalism paralleled by a "fetishization of independence" that manifests in aesthetic and economic stratagems.[742] DIY's culture of production creates "punk commodities", quantitatively different in scale, but no less beholden to endless consumption. Punk commodities are considered the collective endeavors of like-minded members looking to generate alternative means of representation. Yet, these same practices and products yield to consumptive impulses and profit-driven schemes. The ambiguities between these principles and mechanisms encapsulate hardcore's media industry and its collective ethos.

The term "punk" appeared as a moniker of disrepute wielded by rock music critics to disparage "garage bands" formed under the auspices of apathetic musical notation and innovation.[743] Characterized by four-four time signatures, simplistic chord progression, and few solos, in its ideal state, punk challenged the notion of stardom by emphasizing collectivity over celebrity. Regardless, the derogatory label was transformed into a badge of honor actively used by members to cultivate an image of nihilism and anti-commercialization. Such ideals were specious at best. The influence of commercial interests was apparent almost immediately. Stacy Thompson determines that from 1974-1977 — a period he labels "early punk economics" — aesthetic influences did, in fact, far outweigh commercial considerations.[744] At the outset of 1977, however, the tide began to turn in favor of economic interests. Thompson clarifies that punk bands in the United Kingdom resisted commodification, but ultimately succumbed to incorporation in the form of signing to mainstream labels.[745] A similar phenomenon occurred in New York with bands capitulating to record companies that were not solely dedicated to the subculture.[746] Commercial interests shifted the trajectory of punk from aesthetic differentiation to commodification.

As a reaction to outside interventions, a subset of the subculture known as "anarcho-punk" formed under the stewardship of the band Crass. The band's intentions focused on managing the representation of this particular punk outgrowth by controlling the means of cultural production. Crass negotiated such issues through DIY practices aimed at separating the major record labels from the process of music-making, the promotion of bands, and the distribution media. Thompson refers to this liminal area as the "punk zone of exchange", an attempt to generate an alternative form of production that privileged cultural worth over use-value.[747] In lieu of money, subcultural knowledge operated as currency and was disseminated through the practices of doing and making that characterize DIY's aesthetics and economics.

Supporting DIY enterprises and entrepreneurs materializes as an active alliance between producers and consumers. By preserving the circulation of capital within the subculture, members minimize external interference. Although even under such "small-scale capitalism", as described by Thompson, the conditions for profit overtaking innovation and the privileging of conformity over creativity are ever-present.[748] In theory, DIY strategies resist capitalistic impulses, however, in practice, the distinction between independent production and commodification is significantly blurred.

Supplanting capitalist market strategies with DIY practices did not absolve the subculture from power struggles encompassing representation and control, nor did it dismiss the role of gatekeepers and proselytizers of aesthetic standards and social comportment. Thompson suggests the DIY craft is a collective, socialized system of production and exchange that creates cultural and material spaces for punks to own the means of production.[749] The members of Crass imagined a *network* of producers and distributors that would cultivate an alternative economic system, thereby spawning additional DIY producers.[750] For example, Crass started an

eponymously titled record label to release various bands' music for and by the subculture.[751] The problem was, the more successful Crass became — both musically and in the advancement of the DIY ethic — the more it was necessary to maintain the group and the record label's cultural relevancy and financial solvency. Indeed, the band was a promotional tool in and of itself, living the practices of DIY, while simultaneously commodifying such ideals to consumers invested in the notion of an alternative market.[752] According to one co-owner of Crass Records, the band had become commodified, "salespeople for anti-authoritarianism", and in effect, marketers of small-scale capitalism.[753] Many punks, including some producers, foresaw the production and consumption of DIY products as an investment in the subculture, but many more misapprehended anarcho-punk's reliance on the dominant economic system.

The DIY vision conjures the idea that musicians starting their own record labels, writing their own music, and overseeing the promotional material are free from corporate influence and the supposed evils of commodification. The subculture as a collective could authenticate and legitimize productions based on its own standards of media- and meaning-making. Thompson points out, however, that such thinking avoids the necessary implications of the surrounding mechanisms and modes of consumption that preclude such a determination.[754] Furthermore, I would argue that the notion of stoking interest through cultural production in service of representational control lends itself to an inevitable struggle over the "correct" or appropriate uses and users of media. "Steve Ignorant", a member of Crass and co-owner of Crass Records, concedes: "[We] would be playing to packed houses of anarchist Punks who [would] know all our songs, records, and ideas by heart. We were up there saying 'be individuals' while leading a movement full of followers."[755] Punk audiences were no different than rock audiences or moviegoers, they wanted to consume what was easily commodified: an identifiable culture and

its products. Despite the efforts of Crass to inspire a collective movement of alternative networks and productions, at the end of the 1970s, six major record labels in the United States accounted for ninety percent of the record market.[756] Anarcho-punk's blossoming wilted under the pressure of commercial considerations and the subculture's reification.

Although Crass eventually acknowledged the futile nature of their vision, DIY aesthetic and economic practices inspired future adherents to similar ideals. What sprung forth in the United States during the early 1980s was an upstart faction aligned with a fundamentally different ethos in comparison to the infamous punk bands of the previous decade. Hardcore punk (henceforth referred to simply as hardcore) marked a significant departure from the productions of the "New York Dolls' or the "Sex Pistols". In one sense, a litany of drug and alcohol related deaths simultaneously mired and established the era of 1970s punk. This legacy also inspired the countermeasures against it in the 1980s.[757] Notions of cognitive and corporeal purity in hardcore were inextricably linked to the straightedge lifestyle. If punk history can be understood as a series of reactions, then a conservative riposte, dominated by a single mode of representation and socialization, aptly summarizes hardcore's emergence.

6.2 Hardcore's First Wave: The We-Ideal

Hardcore bands surfaced in the early 1980s and so too, the straightedge tenets that were embedded in music and video recordings. The subculture sought to construct a set of social mores seemingly missing from the fabric of society. Although not initially present in the faction's beginnings, the militant straightedge lifestyle was exemplified by Boston-area bands who adopted extreme doctrines of purity and policed members through social coercion. Social patterns of thought and (in)action were reflected in patterns of media productions. The militancy

of these groups filtered into the visual recordings of live sets and carefully crafted industry videos.

The "Boston Crew" was the model franchise of hardcore from the beginning of the decade onward. As the dominant socio-cultural order, the we-ideal of the Boston tradition swept across North America spawning contemporaneous iterations well after the Crew's foundational bands had quit touring or formed other groups. Boston's primary influence can be found in the visual representations of subsidiary franchises that further spread an ethos of conformity. Elite practitioners integrated this preferred meaning into media productions, which resulted in the delimitation of knowledge, a codification of principles, and the homogenization of the wider subculture.

As any claim to provenance should be, the origins of hardcore are murky, although it is generally considered that the term itself was initially published in the form of a vinyl pressing titled "Hardcore '81" (the year of production) by the Vancouver-based band, D.O.A.[758] However, a 1980 record by the group Bad Brains is typically regarded as the progenitor of hardcore's sound.[759] Conceptually, the subculture is best understood as the incarnation of "the absolute most punk", matched only by the absolute purity of the straightedge lifestyle: "Straight edge is a phenomenon that came out of hardcore and hardcore alone. If straight edge is allowed to die out, or stops being present in the music, then, in a way, hardcore will have let itself down and will lose a bit of legitimacy as a bona fide subculture."[760] Ryan Moore differentiates hardcore from the punk bands of the 1970s based on modes of subcultural practice.[761] The latter represents a "culture of deconstruction" and semiotic "disruption", while the former denotes a "culture of authenticity" reflected in DIY aesthetics.[762] The transition from punk to hardcore, says Moore, is the result of the fetishization of independence and purity.[763] Self-empowerment

through adherence to the dogma of straightedge is rooted in the "constructive" aspects of hardcore, rather than punk's apathetic nihilism.[764] Hardcore members sought control over the notion of authenticity by tethering it to standards of media production and representation.

The "First Wave" of hardcore in North America is associated with the work of Ian MacKaye, lead vocalist for three successive music groups (The Teen Idles, Minor Threat, and Fugazi), who professed the straightedge principles of asceticism, purity, and self-fulfillment.[765] Hardcore members of this period consisted of mostly young, white, middle to lower-class males that lived in or near urban centers.[766] Teetotaling members formed their own bands and preached the gospel of straightedge in cities like Boston, Reno, and Los Angeles.[767]

At the time, hardcore was celebrated at "all ages shows" open to adolescents. The relatively small gatherings were cobbled together through an ephemeral inventory of rented veterans halls, home or church basements, community centers, and art galleries.[768] The specificity of the all ages policy is notable because straightedge bands cultivated a following that complemented the affordable entry prices intended to fill the undersized venues.[769] Drinking or drug use was typically not tolerated. Although for most business operators and building proprietors, illicit activities would have been preferable to the slam-dancing and mosh pits that precipitated fights, shattered light fixtures, splintered walls, scattered debris, and the overall shambolic activities that constitute the embodied practices of the subculture as a whole; hence the short-lived residences at most show locations. Initially employed as a marker of distinction and disparagement, the "X" symbol, drawn on underage concert attendees' hands to preclude alcohol consumption, was subverted and transformed into a marker of pride and distinction.[770] Hardcore members ritualistically and preemptively drew the symbol on their hands before

entering venues.[771] The stylistic adornment was one mode that members used to police their boundaries.

Hardcore's veneer cultivated a space for winning ownership over one's self, community, and subcultural representation. Yet, such ideals created tension over agency and control, with questions arising over who had more claims to legitimacy than others. Put simply, elitism and essentialism are inseparable from the historical register of hardcore and the production of culture within it. Members of the elite tier shaped their personae to appear as the most militant straightedge adherents and as such, entitled to the top echelon of the social hierarchy.[772] Status was aligned with those dedicated to cultivating and preserving the subculture's we-ideal in its extreme form. The we-ideal was not achieved by simply speaking the mythology of militancy into existence, it required crafting a reputation through media productions on screen (the we-image).[773]

Media productions buttressed the subculture's social hierarchy. Future and lower-level participants looked upon the elite as the essential arbiters of hardcore. The preferred meaning of conformity embedded in these representations espoused the benefits of membership:

> [I]ndividual freedom, corporate resistance, personal empowerment, family history, defying family history, defying social norms regarding substance use and abuse, challenging a sick, corrupt society in general, stepping toward enlightenment, keeping a clear mind for other pursuits, and being an example for other young people.[774]

While in theory, such expressions appear as promising ideals of a relatively inclusive social order, in the lived reality, the elite facilitated and engendered a one-dimensional consciousness: "Hardcore mutated from a potent revolutionary force into another codified social caste, in some ways even more intolerant than the narrow-mindedness it initially rebelled against."[775]

Institutions (established ways of doing and making) manifested in the lived reality and were (re)produced in the screen reality.[776] For media-makers and musicians, those who gave up the hardcore doctrine or "sold out" to commercial interests were shamed and excluded from intracultural distribution deals that would promote their band to the wider subculture.[777] The elite foresaw the benefits of preserving resources in ever-constricting tiers of influence. The more barriers to entry established, the more those inside the upper echelons appeared infallible.

As a lifestyle, straightedge offered a choice against society's supposed hedonism in the form of self-restraint. Importantly, however, the we-ideal constructed by the elite created a separate status quo, inducing lower-tier members to trade one regime (normative society) for another (hardcore). Ross Haenfler's study of the subculture argues that membership was more akin to an "oath" than mere adherence. For instance, those who defied their pledge of purity were frequently labeled as "traitors".[778] This is not to say conformity yielded no benefits, members achieved a sense of belonging; an enticing prospect in the face of society's intemperance. The concentration of power in the elite tier, entrusted with setting parameters for the socialization of new members through cultural production, ensured future stability through conformity.

6.3 A Do-It-Yourself Commercial Industry

DIY can be characterized as "the production of music by the artist and label with no links to a major label organization," in which "the writing, recording, promotion, and distribution is done by the bands and labels themselves."[779] However, independence from the mainstream record industry, coupled with small-scale profitability, is no less dependent upon cultural relevancy and capitalist enterprises to justify production. The marketing of the DIY ethic made it appear as if anyone with the creative will and access to basic materials could distribute

representations of the subculture *en masse*. However, this was not the case. During the 1980s, the elite tier actually stifled such endeavors. A vertically-integrated system of production and distribution removed the bothersome barriers of talent and popularity. The elite simply elevated musicians and media-makers who adhered to the status quo. To be sure, an infrastructure geared toward controlling aesthetic programming and the means of production was not a novel concept at the time.

For context, at the beginning of the decade six major record labels controlled ninety to ninety-five percent of the commercial market.[780] This was not mere happenstance. The music industry was vertically integrated.[781] Large-scale companies engaged in synergistic practices, resulting in consolidated control over multiple levels of production and distribution: from talent scouting and artist representatives to production and distribution centers.[782] The bulk of money was made, not on the road, but in the recording studio. The cost of manufacturing a single record or tape was relatively low. For most companies then, vinyl records offered higher profit margins than national tours.[783] Hardcore subverted this scheme; live shows were a way to promote music and the straightedge lifestyle without having to invest in the large-scale production or distribution of analog recordings. A DIY-centric media industry ostensibly shielded the subculture from external threats from major labels and empowered bands to invest in their own creative endeavors.

Appropriating a similar framework instituted by Crass years earlier, the identifiable model for DIY productions was initially advanced by two formative hardcore groups: Black Flag and Minor Threat. Both bands cemented their legitimacy in the subculture by producing their own music and releasing the work of like-minded groups on record labels solely dedicated to hardcore. The model facilitated small-scale distribution through a mail order system and direct

sales to record stores, including advertising in industry 'zines.[784] Control over the means of production was rooted firmly in the subculture. Operating out of Los Angeles, Solid State Transformers (SST) was a record label formed in 1978 by two members of Black Flag. SST represented bands from all parts of the country.[785] Two years later, in Washington D.C., Jeff Nelson and Ian MacKaye started Dischord records to release their band's first album.[786] Dischord's management style was famous for its hands-off approach, objecting to signing bands to long-term contracts. Nonetheless, SST and Dischord functioned as regulatory mechanisms. Each label chose which bands to promote and distribute, thereby legitimizing musical acts that conformed to the burgeoning industry's vision of hardcore.[787]

The seemingly amateurish and haphazard production strategies of the DIY aesthetic tempt the observer to perceive hardcore as an anti-commercial and inherently resistant subculture. However, the relatively few record labels that were present during this era inevitably concentrated power in the hands of the few. SST and Dischord solidified an infrastructure that was no less capitalistic than their industry predecessors. The aesthetic and economic strategies employed by these record labels was constitutive of hardcore itself by providing contemporary audial renderings of the subculture's current state. Consolidating the means of production did not provide an alternative mode to capitalism, it merely invested in intracultural control over hardcore's representation.

Hardcore's media productions encapsulate the contradictions and ambiguities of DIY aesthetics and economics. The desire to consume runs parallel with the desire to produce. The elite were complicit in the appropriation of marketing strategies established by the mainstream record industry. Promotional advertisements, to take one example, were embedded in various textualities produced by the elite tier. Fanzines, colloquially known as 'zines, operated as

industry trade publications in the same manner as the broader Culture Industry (like *Billboard* or *Variety*). It is true that the majority of these 'zines did not produce a net profit; however, power is cultivated by controlling the dissemination of subcultural knowledge. By determining what is made available for purchase, the elite govern what is known to the subculture as a whole. Producers were therefore beholden to the established social and media hierarchy, which authorized photos, interviews, reviews, and importantly, industry videos.

Two 'zines were particularly prominent within the subculture during the 1980s: *Maximum Rock 'n' Roll* (1982-Present) and *Flipside* (1977-2000).[788] The publications provided the space for labels to advertise their band's records and videos for purchase. Each issue consisted of photos, interviews, reviews, and postal addresses for customers to purchase cultural products. The textual content mostly consisted of bands, editors, writers, and fans (through op-ed sections) debating the subculture's boundaries:

> [The subculture was] overwhelmingly concerned with defining what punk is and what punk is not, complaining about people who think they are punk but really are not, distinguishing between true originators and "trendy" followers who just "look cool," accusing certain bands of selling out or at least trying to sell out, and so on.[789]

The concentration of epistemic control via the production of media was apparent in hardcore from its beginnings: "In 1979, the typical hardcore candidate read *Flipside*".[790] The average print run was ten thousand copies per issue.[791] Recall Paul Hodkinson's assertion that "translocal" links are formed over time, from city to city, through the production of cultural products.[792] The same international mail order business that sustained 'zines like *Flipside*, also distributed video tapes of live recordings that, when compiled together, were the formal elements or raw material of industry videos.[793]

Industry videos were assembled using recordings of live sets (lived reality) from various venues and shows. By editing together disparate times and locations, a new screen reality was formed, which foregrounded the most sensational aspects of straightedge militancy. In many cases, and as we shall see with a focus on Boston, record labels were closely aligned with 'zines. The very members of the elite tier that produced and distributed music were the same individuals that placed ads in these publications — effectively funding the operations. By controlling the processes of recording, promotion, and distribution, the dominant order governed the agenda of commodity production and as a result, instilled an ethos of conformity within subcultural members.

Claims to hardcore's commercial independence are frequently rooted in discussions of differentiation between hardcore and punk or hardcore and the mainstream music industry. However, capitalistic endeavors were always present in the subculture's production practices.[794] The imagined purity of the straightedge lifestyle was mirrored by the imagined purity of media production.[795] The we-image, based on the audial-visual rendering of the we-ideal (the model franchise), became the dominant mode of representation.

6.4 Boston's Militancy and Mythology

The extreme end of the straightedge spectrum is personified in three bands from Boston. The triumvirate were notorious for operating within the fray and controlling what appeared to outsiders as utter chaos. Such infamy emerged at the outset of the 1980s. The Boston straightedge tradition became the model franchise for the subculture during the aforementioned era.[796] Notions of purity through ascetism engendered an ethos of conformity that sprouted in local venues and eventually spread across America through the DIY record labels owned,

operated, and/or affiliated by members of the three bands. The Crew promoted their mythology through 'zines and videos that spread the lore and infamy of Boston's shows. Society System Decontrol (SSD), Department of Youth Services (DYS), and Negative FX ranked atop hardcore's social hierarchy.[797]

Boston cultivated an image of being the most extreme, physical, and tightly-knit crew in comparison to other cities' hardcore bands.[798] For example, DYS is frequently associated with the phrase "brotherhood, true 'til death'".[799] Such aspirations to unity were more akin to socialized compulsion and homogenization. One hardcore member remarked, "If there was such a thing as Right-Wing Hardcore, or more conservative Hardcore, it came from Boston."[800] The power and control held by the triumvirate is encapsulated in SSD's lyrics, "Who cares what we do…Cause we are the Boston Crew".[801] Not just bands, per se, the Crew was a coterie of individuals, musicians, and producers united by a particularly dogmatic version of hardcore. Boston's productions reflected a parochial mindset and inspired other bands to think alike. The militancy of the model franchise transformed into lore through the production of industry videos. The raw material necessary for the video's creative assemblage was initially recorded in the city proper.

Located in the "Leather District" (near accessible public transportation stations), art spaces such as the Media Workshop and Gallery East housed the Boston Crew and its most virulent followers.[802] Attendees were expected to slam-dance and mosh regardless of the legitimate fear of being physically injured during the process.[803] In short, you needed to prove yourself under the guise of "unity" by emulating the aggression seen on stage and recorded in videos.[804] Drinking was not only indecorous, it was grounds for dismissal.[805] The standards of social comportment were deliberately institutionalized. Appropriating the DIY aesthetic and

economic strategies of SST and Dischord, the triumvirate circulated their images and "brand" to the wider subculture. Effectively, the Crew sought to mythologize Boston's reputation as the "most hardcore".

Promotion was handled by the bands and their respective record labels, however, nearly all representations were routed through the elite tier. In an interview with one former affiliated member of the Boston Crew, Chris Doherty (founder of the hardcore group Gang Green) intimates the power of one band in particular, SSD: "They were a band, and they were promoters, too. You were lucky if you got to play with [them]."[806] The legitimacy conferred by playing with SSD provided instant credibility. The ascent into the elite tier, however, came at a cost. The band had to espouse similar tenets or feign the straightedge lifestyle. Further, control over media distribution occurred primarily through local labels managed by the Crew.

Two record companies were the primary distributors of Boston's industry videos and vinyl recordings. SSD guitarist Al Barile owned and operated the label, X-Claim!, which released DYS's first album ("Brotherhood", 1983). Negative FX's eponymously-titled recording (1982) was released two years later by local label, Taang! Records. The emergence of X-Claim! coincided with SSD's first album, "The Kids Will Have Their Say", a seminal work long sought after by hardcore enthusiasts because of its limited pressings. Barile's image-conscious tactics relied on exploiting deference to tradition in an attempt to legitimize his label, the bands affiliated with the company, and the Boston Crew as a whole. In a pivotal move, Barile convinced Ian MacKaye to co-release SSD's first album on Dischord Records.[807] This was the first of many tactics Barile employed to develop the framework established by his predecessors. Barile crafted a team around him: a sibling of SSD's lead vocalist was the still-image photographer and a clique of women (some friends and eventual wives of SSD band members)

provided behind-the-scenes help as photographers, filmers, and 'zine writers.[808] Whereas, SST and Dischord Records created a rudimentary model for the subculture's media industry, the Boston Crew expanded the methods of promotion.[809] MacKaye acknowledges as much, stating that the Boston Crew established what would become the industry standard.[810] Put simply, "Minor Threat wrote the script, and then SS Decontrol codified the message."[811] Promoting Boston as the model franchise was essential to the Crew's productions and eventually, the subculture's representation as a whole.

Tony Rettman's indispensable oral history of the subculture features interviews and private discussions with bands and figures throughout the era. One interviewee remembered being particularly taken with the photographs of the Boston Crew to the degree that they essentially copied the images' formal elements for his band's promotional material: "These things were all done intentionally and planned out for maximum visual effect, right down to the last detail. Making sure that you were jumping in the air in pictures with your fist out [displaying the X symbol], that sort of thing."[812] The visuals were rooted in a thematic and formal style of the established period. While it is true that various media textualities influenced the subculture at large — including record covers, 'zines, and still photographs — industry videos supplied the consumer with knowledge that enveloped all previous audio-visual aspects of the subculture, such as music, fashion, parlance, and corporeal practices.[813]

Industry videos permitted virtual admittance to individuals seeking subcultural knowledge, but such information was carefully selected and edited to emphasize the Boston tradition. Speaking about his role in aggrandizing the mythology of the Crew, Negative FX vocalist, Jack "Choke" Kelly, asserted, "it's not my job to correct the legend. It's my job to

further it."[814] The delta between the reality and the artificial was quite literally embodied in the members of the Crew and in their productions.

Beyond the contradictions of the DIY economic model, the straightedge lifestyle espoused by the Boston Crew propagated notions of freedom, independence, and choice that resulted in conformity. In discussions over the ubiquity of alcohol at the time and a desire to provide a different path of living "straight", Barile is quoted: "I believe in creating choices, not eliminating choices."[815] An apocryphal story details Barile dragging an inebriated individual outside of a venue in Boston, while screaming not to mess with "my scene".[816] Yet, according to Rettman's interviews, the lead vocalist of SSD was known for "breaking edge" (before and after shows) within mere moments of singing lyrics that professed the straightedge lifestyle.[817] Accuracy and legitimacy are not the same. Most bands in the Boston area, and notably within the Crew itself, participated in drinking.[818] The brand of unity, however, was more important than the truth. Even in regard to fashion, the aesthetic look became a uniform for straightedge bands. The Boston Crew are often credited with originating the "hardcore look", Nike shoes instead of Doc Martin boots, jeans and hoodies instead of trousers and leather jackets.[819] Recalling the era, Dave Smalley of DYS suggests that the notion of unity was a misapprehension of reality: "It's easy to forget that conformity can happen even among proudly declared nonconformists. Sometimes we can get so locked into being "against" everything that we forget to be against conformity itself."[820]

Nonetheless, the lore of Boston spread, in part, through the work of Mike Gitter, chief writer and editor of Boston's *xXx* fanzine (the predominant 'zine on the East Coast) and future artist scout for Atlantic Records (Warner Music Group), Century Media (Sony Music Entertainment), and Roadrunner Records (Warner Music Group). According to one Rettman

interviewee, during the Boston Crew's ascendency, Gitter was a "publicity machine".[821] He developed a mythology around the militant tradition that would catapult the Crew to the forefront of the subculture. Gitter's marketing strategies did not end with his own publication.

In issue forty-four of *Flipside* (1984), a two-page spread simply titled "Boston" gifted Gitter a sizable amount of column inches to wax poetic about Dave Smalley's (lyricist for DYS) thoughtful writing. Affiliated Boston bands Gang Green and The FU's are also mentioned, with follow-up addresses for Taang! and X-Claim! to purchase each band's products. A description of *xXx* and another local 'zine (edited by Jack "Choke" Kelly of Negative FX) provided customers with even more opportunities to learn of and from the Boston tradition. Notably, the write-up provides reassurance to followers that at the time of publication, the Crew had not changed its lifestyle choices or gone "metal" — the intimation being the bands had collectively stopped playing hardcore and renounced straightedge ascetism.[822] The Crew's image was paramount despite the lived reality of its members: "[W]e started taking the character home," says DYS guitarist Jonathan Anastas, "then the mythology took over."[823] The proverbial mask had eaten the face. So too, the fine line between the lived and the screen reality became blurred through the production and dissemination of industry videos.

6.5 The Formation and Circulation of the Screen Reality

The Boston Crew consolidated both allocative (the control of material products) and authoritative (the activity of human agents) resources to promote a militant lifestyle and engender a homogenous fanbase. In doing so, the Crew preserved their social status and sustained the status quo. Videos were constructed based on authorized patterns of production, which reflected and reproduced the ethos of conformity that, at the time, was pervasive in

hardcore's elite tier. The primary activity of recording music was certainly pivotal to the subculture. However, industry videos so often overlooked by scholars, provide an understanding of how the elite's power was renewed through screen realities. In the context of media-making, established media conventions inculcate the preferred meaning (ethos of conformity) of the dominant order. As a result, the screen reality reinforces and (re)stabilizes the socio-cultural order of the lived reality.

All Ages: The Boston Hardcore Film (2012) features interviews with members of the Boston Crew and offers novel insights into the triumvirate's logic behind investing in both the audial and the visual. According to interviewees, the musical recordings never properly reflected the movement and feeling of the live shows.[824] Coupled with the lack of touring, industry videos bridged the gap between the lived reality and audiences' spatial and temporal constraints. Notably, the sound intelligibility in the productions is poor, however, the point is not simply to listen, but to take in the totality and particularities of the subculture. This includes the music, but also the fashion, parlance, and embodied practices that constitute, in part, subcultural knowledge. In short, the events were ritualistic, and therefore, the videos provided largely unencumbered access to the ritual.[825] Lead vocalist of Negative FX, Jack "Choke" Kelly, summarizes the logic behind recording and selling videos through X-Claim! and other local labels: "It was another marketing technique, a way to get the word out."[826] The portrait drawn from the images and the subsequent ethos conferred, stoked the desire for ascending to and complying with the subculture's elite tier.

The production and distribution of promotional material was essential to intracultural commerce and consumption. Media preserved hardcore's continuation in its nascent form.[827] Recordings of live performances were used to assemble industry videos, thereby supplying an

understanding of the subculture to audiences not in direct contact with bands that admittedly did not travel very far from their home base.[828] Produced by elite media-makers and sanctioned by the dominant order, industry videos substantiated the subculture's "mediated sociality", the sense of belonging or unity.[829] The argument has been made that the primary activity of music production (once solely supported by attendance at shows and interpersonal contact) was no longer reliant upon material access. The parallel activity of documentation circulated subcultural knowledge that was previously unattainable in prior iterations of punk. Yet, the flow of this knowledge was one-way. The confluence of elite gatekeepers and concentrated distribution streams delimited the information made available to lower tiers. In effect, viewers of industry videos were witnessing a manipulated representation of the subculture at the hands of those actively shaping it to their own interests.

It should be noted that the dissemination of subcultural knowledge through industry videos does privilege the viewer in multiple ways. However, such privileges speak to the prior (in)actions of media-makers before the consumer's point of purchase. The mail order system streamlines the process of seeking out bands, absolves any fears associated with facing physical evaluation, inspires those who wish to engage in embodied practices, and aids in identifying visual markers that would signal affiliation to the straightedge lifestyle. For example, moving-images of mosh pits, where the "chaotic blends into something uniform", are disembodied from the corporeal experience and situated sociality of the venue.[830] This once specific type of subcultural knowledge, internalized through physical exposure, was supplied to all who purchased the video and paid the shipping fee. The collective interaction of the mosh pit yielded to the simultaneous and collective viewing of the video. Indeed, mediated sociality is encapsulated by the production of subcultural media: "Because commodities are the bearers of

desire, they can be read as expressions of the forces that shaped and became embodied in them."[831] Whereas in the past, "the show" was the lynchpin of subcultural interaction, the proliferation of industry videos dissolved the boundaries of space and time and elevated audio-visual representation over interpersonal communication as the main source of acquiring new members and maintaining the status quo. For cultural producers and their affiliated record labels, the selection of images (from live sets) is incredibly important: choosing which bands to highlight, what songs to showcase, and importantly, how to best convey the we-ideal through the we-image. Each selection must conform to the prescribed patterns of production found in the virtual order and sanctioned by the elite tier.

Tacit production and distribution agreements between bands and record companies allowed for a core base of fans in disparate locations to engage with the subculture. Viewers conceived of these images as authentic based upon the band and label's relationship. One can speculate that the mythology of the Boston Crew might have been dispelled if the band toured across the country at length. The lack of such interactions, however, enabled the Boston Crew to craft their past, present, and future representations.

The distorted, lived reality of the Boston Crew, and the place-images of the group's live sets, became the place-myths of industry videos. This established formula precipitated the media productions of subsidiary franchises and iterative hardcore bands. Venues and embodied practices were sutured together to form a creative geography in which recorded images of hardcore participants formed the basis for identifying like-minded brethren and founding musical groups. One former vocalist and record label owner matter-of-factly states how such representations influenced his own band: "I wanted to be the dudes in the old videos I got in the mail."[832] The same distribution system that circulated 'zines across the country, circulated

industry videos. Video cassette tapes were advertised in publications partially owned, funded, or affiliated with established record labels. The system was governed by gatekeepers who produced the recordings and edited images with the help of consumer communication technology.[833]

The equipment necessary for creating and disseminating industry videos was made available to the public years prior.[834] Although without professional services, the process of editing was considerably more time-consuming. An individual would first insert a recorded tape into an electronic cassette reader that was linked to a television's input channels. The output channel of the television would then be connected to a separate cassette reader that held a blank tape. By pressing "play" or "pause" on the first console and "record" on the second one, images on the television could be transmitted and logged onto the blank cassette. The consumer technology was admittedly lower quality than broadcast television productions — the former's two hundred and twenty lines of resolution for a half-inch cassette tape compared to the three hundred and twenty three lines of resolution on the latter's three-quarter inch tape.[835] Yet, the amateurish, low-fi aesthetics were both economical and homologous to the subculture's minimalistic musical notation and DIY ethic.

A general overview of industry videos reveals certain regularities. Color and monochrome recordings are frequently interwoven in the same timeline, and the camera lens' depth of field is unfailingly poor, partially due to the technology's inability to adjust to multiple light sources.[836] Further, the camera's microphone — attached to the apparatus, and as such, the worst possible location — captures audio that strains the spectator's ears. Nonetheless, industry videos were self-conscious attempts to promote the elite tier's preferred representation and an ethos of conformity. What followed was a set of conventions (patterns of production) that marked bands' media productions as authentic based upon adherence to the virtual order's

aesthetic criterion. The lived reality of the Boston Crew was recorded and manipulated to form the we-image of hardcore. The screen reality reinforced the dominant order's status as arbiters of the subculture and compelled future media-makers to generate iterative media productions.

6.6 The We-Image of Hardcore

Consumers seek meaning from the products they purchase; subcultural products are no different: "Hardcore fans didn't want their bands to grow beyond established parameters. They wanted their heroes to sound the same, over and over again."[837] I would add, so too, industry videos. Despite its avowed anti-capitalist sentiments, hardcore's media industry engenders a desire to consume and thus, conform. Elite media-makers influence future media-makers to comply with established conventions, which taken in the aggregate, creates a groundswell of like-minded producers and homogenized products. The form of these products and the practices of production reflect the established institutions (ways of doing and making). As such, this section traces the conventions and influence of the Boston Crew's media productions that include recordings of live sets and edited industry videos. The pervasiveness of this aesthetic criterion illuminates the dominant order's epistemic authority. I argue, the dominant order institutionalized representations of hardcore that established the standards for the attribution of authenticity and influenced the consciousness of its members far into the decade. These standards were bound by the subculture's fundamental precept: unity through homogeneity. The consequences of these conditions produced an unyielding conformity to the status quo.[838]

According to members of the Boston Crew, the portrayal of Los Angeles punk bands in the 1981 documentary *The Decline of Western Civilization* was pivotal to the emergence of the model franchise's media-making.[839] The opening scene of *Decline* is set in a music venue.

Audience members stir as a band plays in the distance. Close-up shots punctuate the crowd's movement, seemingly chaotic, but ordered in its actions. These initial images are juxtaposed with a cut to a medium long shot, in which the lead singer of an unknown band listlessly reads into the microphone the consent disclaimer in order to attain the audience's implied consent to record them. Garnering the crowd's attention, he shouts, "[You're] representing L.A. [Los Angeles]…You don't want people in Philadelphia to see a bunch of deadbeats."[840] The Boston Crew internalized (unconsciously or consciously) this rendering of the screen reality's power to traverse geographic boundaries and temporal constraints. The dominant mode of representation that followed cemented the status of the Boston Crew as the model franchise within the greater subculture.

The Boston tradition influenced media-makers from across the country, both contemporaneously and later in the decade. The images instilled an ethos of conformity in viewers who internalized the productions of the model franchise as authentic representations of the subculture's current state. The most salient formal elements and conventions produced by the Boston Crew are found in the selection of raw material from recorded sets, the intercutting between camera angles, and the deindividuation of producers; all encompassed by the guiding principle of compiling the most aggressive performances of the collective — from the macro (various cities and venues) to the micro (shots that feature individuals slam-dancing, stage-diving, and moshing). As stated, the footage achieves very little sonic coherence because of the technological limitations of capturing audio. Therefore, the primary signification of industry videos rests in the images.

The lived reality supplies the raw material for conventions of the screen reality. Live recordings of DYS, SSD, and Negative FX can aptly be summarized by the exclamation of

DYS's vocalist, "We are the Boston Crew".[841] Generally, two cameras frame the action from a high angle or just above head height. One camera is firmly positioned in an extreme long shot facing the front of the stage. The crowd in silhouette frequently forms a crescent shape with the bulge swelling in front of the vocalist. Usually hand-held and perched near the amplifiers, the second camera zooms in and out to track the interdependent movements of the collective (the crowd and the band as one). If an audience member enters the frame, each camera tends to follow the participant and their subsequent actions. The lighting on stage cues the protagonists in the crowd to enter the spotlighted area and leap forward or crash into adjacent figures. In effect, the images and the lived reality are shared spaces: "[T]he interchangeability between individuals and the collective […] speak to how this collective energy breaks down barriers and dissolves differences."[842] The audience and the performers are captured together. The collapse of distinctions elevates the sense of mediated sociality invoked in the screen reality.

At times, the high angled camera facing the stage pans to the left and right, attempting to capture the edges of the mosh pit. Such stilted movement mimics that of a surveillance camera recording illicit activities. Aggression and sites of agitation are highlighted as the focal point for the camera and the viewer's gaze. In other moments, the camera zooms steadily, building the kinetic energy by matching the tension created by following abstract limbs as they slash and careen. These images convey the dominant order's preferred meaning: Boston is the most hardcore of all, the subculture's aesthetic brand.

Performances from various venues are edited together, with media-makers carefully selecting the most aggressive acts for presentation. The foregrounding of live recordings differentiates hardcore's industry videos from mainstream music videos produced by the aforementioned six major record labels of the era. To take one genre in particular, Jim Collins

notes that the majority of rock music videos during this time period eschewed live recordings as raw material. Instead, band members typically acted out the lyrics in miniature fictionalized plots, if included in the narrative at all.[843] This distinction suggests that hardcore's media productions are "pure documentary". However, such overt fictionalization in mainstream music videos situates the viewer as a complicit partner in the creative process, whereas the contrived representations of hardcore's elite tier forges a misapprehension of the subculture's current state.

Two general formats appear in examinations of the model franchise's industry videos. Both formats aggregate footage from live sets of the respective band to emphasize a veneer of aggression that seemingly pervades the City of Boston and the subculture at large. The run-time is typically the length of the song, with an introductory text or a voiceover briefly designating the band's name. SSD's video "Get It Away", from the 1983 album of the same name, was originally released by Barile's X-Claim! — the current copyright is held by the affiliated Boston label, Taang Records!.[844] The opening text serves as an interlocutor between the band and the myth of the Boston Crew: "Fueled by a lunging bulldozer (Al)… and a following so fucking dedicated that the entire city was covered by the blood of SSD (graffiti)…invading their conservative city of Boston." The writing cues the spectator to the aggression the band is infamous for and that which will be seen in the video. Cutting between different venues, the minimalistic editing mimics the song's musical notation: faster cuts made to highlight multiple instances of aggressive dancing and slow motion footage synched with an elongated symbol crash just as a crowd member flies into the drum set. Synchronous sound is employed only when necessary, the majority of the video's audio is disconnected from the original recording. Essentially, sound is displaced in favor of the visual.

The format for SSD's video is the ur-manifestation of hardcore's subcultural media industry and its use of creative geography. Indeed, live sets from different shows across Boston and the country are combined together. Cross dissolves link various spaces and times into one artificial venue that concentrates the action into a one-dimensional sphere of aggression. The screen reality is made manifest through constructive editing, a Pudovkian form of serial linkage. The subculture's representation is seemingly comprised entirely of militant figures slam-dancing (echoed in the song lyrics and materialized in the uniform dress of the band) with visual prominence given to those who physically assert themselves to the utmost extreme.

The second format is best exemplified by Gang Green, an affiliated group of the Boston Crew. "Alcohol", released by Taang! Records in 1986, features B-roll (supplemental) shots of commercial businesses juxtaposed with footage of the band's live sets.[845] The selection of supplemental shots is an attempt by the media-maker to call attention to the trivialness and gluttony of mainstream society. The impact of these connections, however, actually enhances and underlines the social fissure between the uniformity of subcultural members and the diversity of non-affiliated figures. Moreover, the song's satirical take on drinking anthems — making reference to the tune "99 Bottles of Beer on the Wall" — is discordant with the band's relationship to the straightedge lifestyle.[846]

"Alcohol" shifts between two formats and color schemes: electronic video captures footage of live sets in monochrome, whereas tricolor eight-millimeter film supplies the footage for B-roll inserts. Cross dissolves are utilized to cover rough cuts between various cameras and connect different locations and times. The sound periodically filters in and out of synch based upon the camera's framing — for example, if a guitarist's strumming appears to line up, it is generally foregrounded. Screen time is dominated by crowd fights that showcase the severity of

corporeal practices. Inserts are carefully placed throughout the song (although this requires listening to the music separately) at the moment when the vocalist of Gang Green professes, he cannot live without a certain commodity. Signs of Disneyland and patrons exiting a Hard Rock Café franchise are shown during these instances. Additionally, B-roll footage of diverse attendees of New York City's Central Park appear languid when contrasted with the crowd of hardcore members churning as one. Footage of alcohol commercials, containing scantily clad women, are also interlaced with passages of the song that directly invoke the notion of impurity and dependency. The localized significance of these juxtapositions influences the viewer to conclude that mainstream society is asleep to their own excesses. Straightedge's abstinence from such glut is underscored by cross-cutting between live sets and intertextual references. This particular format foregrounds the clear demarcation between hardcore and normative society as well as the codification of values associated with the subculture.

The screen time allocated to the collective, in both videos, is an obfuscation of unity and control perpetrated by the elite tier. The "performative balance" between the crowd and the band is only temporarily leveled.[847] Scholars have referred to such spatial equity as a mutual investment or inherent "alterity to corporate consumer culture."[848] Yet, significant ambiguities arise in relation to these issues. While the proximity between bands and fans ostensibly blurs the distinction between the two, the practices of production elide the inequities of representation that materialize during the editing process.[849] Although there appears to be both a spatial and role reversal in the lived reality, with respect to the screen reality, what is made visible is selected by gatekeepers for attribution and circulation.[850] This is one of many institutionalized standards of subcultural media production.

A lack of clear authorship is another marketing strategy evident in each of the video recordings. David James interprets such decisions as indicative of the subculture's "autonomous self-representation and self-expression".[851] However, ownership and distribution rights were primarily handled by X-Claim! or Taang! Records. Without authorial attribution, the control and influence of the elite tier in shaping the culture at large was only further obscured. The camera positioning — akin to surveillance camera footage — compounded this notion. Images appeared as unadulterated, objective renderings of the lived reality. Such conventions are rudimentary in nature, but the impact of these decisions was widespread. The model franchise's influence is apparent in contemporaneous productions and in the work of future media-makers from within Boston and on the opposing coast.

The production and distribution system propagated by Boston-area record labels was taken up and enlarged by *Flipside's* "Video Fanzines", volumes one through ten (circa 1983-1985).[852] In the text publication of *Flipside* (issue forty four, 1984), the sale of video fanzines is advertised in the opening pages. The ad mentions that video-cassette tapes (NTSC and PAL) of both VHS and Betamax formats were available for purchase. Video fanzines contained assembled footage of numerous bands performing, interviews with members, and recordings of the general goings-on of the subculture.[853] Complementary to their print 'zine, Flipside appropriated Boston's model around the time of SSD's release of "Get It Away". The opportunity for other labels or independent groups to produce their own industry videos presented itself. Bands could send the edited footage to the magazine's offices for compilation and circulation. However, *Flipside* retained "final cut" of the video, and as such, the subculture's overall representation was firmly in the hands of industry professionals and commercial "DIY" entities.

An overview of the collected volumes suggests that while some bands adopted the format of Gang Green's video — juxtaposing live sets with B-roll shots of homeless encampments, archival material, Hollywood films, and commercials for example — the majority of groups adhered to SSD's model of combining multiple recordings of shows into an artificial rendering of the lived reality. Collectively, the videos linked various venues and bands from across the country, thereby aggrandizing the subculture's pervasiveness and simultaneously reinforcing the Boston Crew's preferred representation of the subculture.

Flipside's videos adhere to a one-hour format and the instituted formula of assemblage. Each volume begins with opening credits that precede individual segments. These segments last anywhere from the length of a single song to as long as fifteen minutes. A band is introduced by text or voice-over, either in a studio or at venue, and their pre-edited video starts to play.[854] At times, truncated discussions with band members are inserted between two songs of the same band, providing up-to-date news on their recent album or future plans.[855] Invariably, the videos are bookended with prominent musical acts of the time period. In theory, every band is provided the opportunity to edit their segment however they please, yet the overwhelming majority of segments follow the Boston model's two-camera set-up, shot selection, and editing techniques.[856]

Direct deference to SSD is exhibited in the second volume in which a trivia segment asks viewers to identify the band performing on screen.[857] Subcultural viewers are expected to recognize the band's music, visuals, and effect on the crowd. Once again, the Boston tradition of embodied practices and the established formula is foregrounded. *Flipside's* video catalog relies on such formal conventions to authenticate and legitimize their own productions — in the same vein as SSD co-releasing their first album on Ian MacKaye's Dischord Records.[858]

The pervasiveness of these conventions is evinced in the contemporaneous media productions of subsidiary franchises. According to Tony Rettman's oral history of hardcore, the band 7 Seconds was one of the first direct iterations of the Boston tradition to emerge in the early 1980s on the West Coast.[859] Dave Smalley of DYS recalls thinking around this time that the Boston Crew's production model (we-image) and values (we-ideal) were spreading across the country. This determination was echoed by Mike Gitter of *xXx* fanzine: "Here were some guys from Reno, Nevada, that espoused a familiar ideology to what we knew in Boston."[860] In terms of live recordings, 7 Seconds's footage follows the aforementioned camera set-up and prescriptive intercutting techniques.[861] A compilation of these sets was featured in *Flipside's* "Best of Series".[862] Moreover, a band based in New York City, "Agnostic Front", released video segments in *Flipside* that carefully adhered to the traditional norms and standards of media production. The group cultivated a similar image of Boston's militant straightedge lifestyle and corporeal ascetism.[863]

Footage of Agnostic Front's live sets are facsimile copies of SSD's videos, and in total, the group's contrived representations mirror the promotional strategies of the Boston Crew. In one recording, Vinny Stigma, lead vocalist of the group, acknowledges the camera's presence and shouts at the crowd, "See what you believe". In a follow up, he yells, "You're being videoed (sic), let's stand high"; a reference to the notion of posterity repeated in early DYS videos, and a refrain akin to the opening scenes of *The Decline of Western Civilization*.[864] An interview segment featured in *Flipside*'s "Video Fanzine Vol. 8" captures the band's marketing tactics. Stigma mentions that the "Agnostic" half of the band's name refers to the lack of absolute truth, while "Front" suggests standing your ground. The band makes plain their dedication to a lifestyle that dismisses alcohol use and resists commercial consumption.[865] Yet, once again, the screen

reality does not align with the lived reality. At least one member of Agnostic Front was known to imbibe before sets, and the band was notorious for outsourcing the writing process (espousing the straightedge tenets) to other artists.[866] Agnostic Front's perceptual brand was just as formulaic as their media productions.

During the "Second Wave" of hardcore (1985-1991), three new bands were the posterior iterations of the Boston tradition.[867] After the dissolution of Negative FX, DYS and SSD, another local Boston band was formed from the remaining members of the triumvirate.[868] In 1986, Slapshot released their album "Back on the Map" (Taang! Records). One member conceded that the band was more like a team of professional wrestlers than musicians. Live sets created opportunities for Slapshot to play up the pageantry and infamy of the militant lifestyle.[869] The same could be said of bands like Youth of Today and Chain of Strength.

Both bands have been criticized for their deliberate imitation and engineered formation. In reference to Chain of Strength, one hardcore musician remarked, "They were a manufactured band. When I look back on them, I consider them almost a fraud."[870] Chain of Strength was known for copying the production techniques of early Boston bands to the extent of staging images to meet the established standards of slam-dancing and crowd fighting underscored in the subculture's media productions.[871] Youth of Today was virtually no different. The band first appeared in 1985 — on the record label owned and operated by a 7 Seconds band member — and in 1988 released the video for "No More". The video's format is the confluence of both Gang Green and SSD's foundational models.[872] It should be noted that within the subculture, Youth of Today was distinct relative to the group's vegan ideals. Such principles were embedded in their lyrics and in the poignant use of B-roll footage featuring butchers carving and maneuvering animal carcasses. Images from live sets were intercut with the band's refrain of "no

more"; a rallying cry for the end of meat consumption. The lead vocalist is prominently featured screaming "Are you with me?!", the uniformity of both the social and media hierarchies made manifest. Youth of Today's video recreated the content necessary for intracultural acceptance: aggression in embodied practices and the foregrounding of the collective over the individual.[873]

Ultimately, Youth of Today, Chain of Strength, and Slapshot were not artificial renderings of previous bands — they were authentic instantiations of the subculture during this era. In fact, each band received the attribution of authenticity at the time, because they complied with the ethos of conformity that sustained the status quo. Certainly, the pressure to conform was felt by countless bands: "By the late '80s, the mind-set about straight edge became codified and something you had to live up to."[874] Fanzines and industry videos institutionalized the formula of assemblage. The industry's consolidated power and aesthetic criterion supported the system of attribution that afforded bands opportunities to perform, as long as they adhered to the culturally relevant and financially solvent model institutionalized by the Boston Crew. In effect, the Second Wave's media productions are representative not just of mediated sociality, but also of "mediated historicity", the selective traditions of the past reflected in images of the present.[875]

The recombinant nature of hardcore's industry videos reflects the fundamental aesthetic and economic ambiguities of the subculture's media productions. The small-scale enterprises promulgated by the Boston Crew lasted well into the next decade but were still considered by many adherents to be indicative of the subculture's anti-commercial, DIY ethic. In the next chapter, we will see that similar misapprehensions, brought about by the production and consumption of cultural products, existed in another self-documenting subculture. Skateboarding's ambiguities are unique in comparison to hardcore, but nonetheless, each

formation is beholden to the we-ideal of its practitioners and the we-image of its media-makers.[876]

7. Skateboarding: San Francisco and the "Progressive Era" (1987-1997)

The ebb and flow of the skateboard consumer industry accounts for various trends in the subculture as a whole: maneuvers, equipment, clothing, and sites of practices and performances. Yet, despite these changes, post-production norms have remained virtually the same since the seminal industry videos produced during the mid-1980s to early 1990s. Such a determination is indicative of tensions between the subculture's emphasis on "progression" in relation to the act of skateboarding and the creative limitations found in the production of media. The power and prominence of the intracultural media industry disincentivizes producers from altering the traditions and standards perpetuated by the dominant order.[877]

The dominant order is comprised of industry professionals, elite practitioners (skateboarders), and proximate media-makers. Although elite skateboarders are the most visible emissaries, media-makers facilitate this visibility. It is a partnership dependent upon funding provided by industry professionals (company owners) who retain the authority to circumscribe the agency (actions and inactions) of prominent subcultural figures.[878] Without sponsorship or employment, one's status as a professional skateboarder and media-maker is at risk. The threat of losing such funding, coupled with the veneration of subcultural traditions, compels aspiring practitioners and media-makers to comply with established norms in order to attain or maintain their status in the upper echelons of the dominant order. This tacit agreement, between company owners and those tasked with performing and recording, results in a self-propagating consumer industry that remains steadfast on preserving the status quo.

During the era in question, the dominant order relied on visual documentation to sustain the industry's financial solvency and the subculture's staying power.[879] Elite skateboarders performed maneuvers for the camera to promote consumption of other cultural products. Indeed,

the recording of practitioners was paramount to the industry's growth, as well as the growth of the elite tier. Prior to industry videos, formal skateboard competitions supplied the benchmark for an individual to achieve professional status. Practitioners were expected to win competitions — documented in magazines — which would then precipitate sponsorship offers from equipment manufacturers and other corporate entities. This created a feedback loop: the more individuals competed and won, the more coverage they received in magazines; the more coverage they received, the more profitable they became in the eyes of company owners who would encourage them to compete in more contests. Investments in competitions as sites of documentation would reach their pinnacle just as the advent of consumer video production technology transformed the marketing stratagems deployed by industry professionals.[880] So too, the primary locations of skateboarding as a practice and a performance transitioned from the defined spaces of skateboard parks to the contested terrain of city streets.[881] "Street-style", as it came to be known, was promoted by the industry as the natural and inevitable development of the subculture. In a series of corporate maneuvers, the dominant order reconceptualized the labor of professional skateboarders and reconfigured the production of promotional material disseminated to consumers.

Advertising the trend of leaving designated skateparks for urban spaces staved off the decline of a slowly disappearing consumer base. One city in particular was uniquely situated to capitalize on the marketing phenomenon that was street-style skateboarding. As the model franchise, San Francisco was the cradle of the media industry and the epicenter of documenting progression.[882] Two companies, H-Street and Plan B, relied on audio-visual recordings of their sponsored professionals to increase each brand's cultural relevancy and product sales. Although these companies did not devise this new promotional scheme, ownership effectively utilized the

era's video technology to define the subculture's we-ideal through the we-image. In turn, subsidiary franchises propagated iterative media productions directly influenced by the model franchise. The consequences of elite practitioners performing for the camera, along with the preferred editing formula that guided the production of industry videos, resulted in an ethos of conformity that characterizes the "progressive era".

The transition from competitions to industry videos precipitated the transformation of skateboarding into a self-documenting subculture. Practitioners were required less and less to participate in competitions and were instead incentivized to record their endeavors for eventual viewing. Videos served as continual verification of one's abilities and status in the subculture: "With each new video, a skater renews this membership and revises the status associated with it."[883] Concurrently, product sales were no longer buttressed by magazine coverage of the spatial *practices* of professionals in the lived reality, but were couched in depictions of skateboarding's progression as a spatial *performance* in the screen reality. This tradition continues today. Members of all tiers, but especially the elite, depend upon industry videos to contextualize their status within the social hierarchy, understand the current trends, and keep abreast of the newest corporeal maneuvers. More specifically, visual representations of professional skateboarders influence the lived realities of other elite members, hopeful aspirants, recreational skateboarders, and the majority of intracultural media-makers. Recorded performances became and have remained essential to the subculture's constitution and continuation.

To be sure, industry videos are not documentaries of the lived practices of participants nor strict reportage of celebrity-like figures. The formula of assemblage and the careful selection of the lived reality distorts the spatial practices of sponsored practitioners. Numerous attempts at accomplishing maneuvers are recorded by media-makers and then condensed into a single

"make" (the one successful attempt). These successes are aggregated and authenticated under the behest of the media industry.[884] The screen reality proffers a preferred representation of skateboarding as a commodified performance, in which the elite exist as inviolable figures.[885]

The majority of recreational (lower-tier) skateboarders are simply not capable of meeting the standards of progression that would garner sponsorship or fame within the subculture. Their lived realities are discordant with representations of the elite tier. To resolve this ambiguity, both the content and form of industry videos are constructed to transform the elite's accomplishments into the subculture's collective achievements. Videos also serve as instructional material and practical guides that suggest "the world depicted on screen is a world available to skateboarders everywhere."[886] The screen reality appears not just accessible to recreational skateboarders, but knowable and familiar. Ultimately, industry videos are carefully packaged commodities that obscure the profit-driven motives of the dominant order. Industry professionals rely on lower-tier participants to purchase cultural products that are advertised by practitioners and media-makers. Alternatives modes of practice and production that deemphasize progression are maligned or eschewed. In this context, progression and conformity are inextricable. This one-dimensional consciousness is misapprehended by subcultural members as both inevitable and natural, because it is all that is made visible.[887]

7.1 A Notion of Progress

The historical register of skateboarding, as a practice and a performance, is typically understood in terms of elite practitioners' successful maneuvers or "tricks".[888] Particular attention is paid to the colloquial distinctions of "ABD" (already-been-done) and "NBD" (never-been-done). The dominant order uses these terms to assess the progress of elite skateboarders

and the subculture as a whole. Progress is defined as the "perfection of form [and] expansion of possibility".[889] Gregory Snyder asserts that this notion of progress is "inclusionary", because it provides any and every skateboarder opportunities to make their mark.[890] Although progression, as an expression and ideal, is governed by an industry that standardizes the practices of documentation and the dissemination of performances.[891]

Maneuvers are documented and circulated as evidential proof of a skateboarder's progress. This institutionalized practice is indicative of media's influence.[892] Industry videos (rather than still or sequence photography, magazines, and/or 'zines) define and constitute the subculture's current state: a screen reality in which advertisements of cultural and utilitarian products and the historical register of maneuvers coalesce. Skateboarders of all levels must be educated in a common media literacy to establish themselves as members:

> [Skateboarders] use [media] to analyze tricks and techniques, to document the stages of their learning and socialization into the group, to set community standards, to build a sense of belonging with their "crews" and to imagine "idealized futures" for themselves and their communities.[893]

These idealized futures are rooted in the consumption of industry videos that are discordant with the majority of participants' lived realities (based on skill level alone). Nonetheless, progress is considered vital to the subculture's growth. The production and distribution of media essentializes the spatial performances of elite skateboarders.

The prioritization of progress can result in the stifling of creative expression. Pontus Alv, professional skateboarder and company owner, conceded that the endless pursuit of perfection caused him to feel less interested in skateboarding because of the seemingly unattainable maneuvers showcased year after year in industry-funded videos.[894] The insecurity felt by Alv

points to the dominant order's epistemic control: "Progression therefore is dependent upon the communication of ideas".[895] Such communication, however, is less a two-way exchange and more of a one-way flow of subcultural knowledge. What is seen and made visible is what is known and considered possible. The tension between freedom of expression and performative progression materializes in the subculture's description as at once artistic, creative, and unique — with members engaging in spatial critiques and transformations that reflect "independent-mindedness and self-discipline" — and its institutionalization at the hands of industry professionals.[896] Indeed, although skateboarding has been characterized as a "socially democratic enterprise where individuals can freely participate", the industry itself is built upon an ethos of conformity and a concerted concentration of power.[897]

7.2 A Critical Accounting of "Core" and Competition

The structure of the skateboard industry is hierarchical.[898] The majority of elite practitioners are required to record their spatial performances in service of flaunting the brands they are paid to represent. This is known as being sponsored: the bottom tier are "flow" riders who are provided free equipment; amateurs (ams) or semi-professionals are situated in the next higher tier and are paid minimally; and finally, the highest echelon is occupied by professionals (pros), independent contractors under fixed-term contracts, if contractually bound at all.[899] "Core brands" — companies that manufacture products for predominantly intracultural consumption — reinforce this hierarchy by incentivizing members to conform.[900] The economic incentives are discussed below, but the social ones are clear; to ascend or sustain one's position in the elite tier, a skateboarder must remain invested in the promotion of their sponsors' products.[901] Moreover, if an individual wishes to join the industry's manufacturing realm (as a significant amount of

retired professionals do), they invariably operate within the established distribution system. This hierarchical model was advantageous to the oligopoly of core companies that governed the industry during the era in question.

A historical accounting of the subculture could diverge into multiple paths, but for the purposes of this chapter, the relationship between skateboarding as both a spatial practice and a documented performance is the principal concern.[902] It is worth noting that the following examination consciously divides the everyday activities of lower-tier members from the skateboard consumer industry. While it is true that the majority of participants do not seek fame or fortune, it is also true that a considerable amount of participants do aspire to achieve professional status.[903] Indeed, the desire to gain access to the elite tier is cultivated by the production of media.[904] The entwinement of the activity and the industry is part and parcel with establishing what Gregory Snyder calls a "subcultural career". These careers provide a relatively small number of industry professionals, practitioners, and media-makers with both economic and social capital.[905] However, the average skateboarder would not immediately recognize that less than two hundred industry executives and mid-level managers are estimated to comprise the entire industry and, in part, the dominant order.[906] The extreme concentration of allocative (material products) and authoritative resources (the activity of human agents) constitutes the industry's power.[907]

The industry is trapped in a feedback loop of dependency that operates via circumscribed visibility. Manufacturers and magazine publishers (at times owned by the same individual or group of individuals) decide which skateboarders are publicized based upon, among other factors, who best fits the style or trends of skateboarding they are willing to market as the current (and elite) representation of the subculture.[908] If an individual does not comply with the status

quo, they are simply not rewarded with the status necessary to continue their subcultural career. Such strictures of power are embedded in the rhetoric of "core" that also operates as a mode of distinction within the subculture's social hierarchy: "It's a strict set of values, a moral and aesthetic code for skaters who want to fit into established skate culture and, subsequently, gatekeep it."[909] I argue, the term core is better understood as a set of knowledge practices that encompass aesthetic standards of production, the delimitation of spatial performances, and the concentration of capital and commerce within the subculture. Put simply, core represents a deference to the dominant order and a justification of its power to define what is acceptable. Once elite status is obtained, it is within one's own interests to not challenge or critique the hand that feeds. By complying with core standards and values, aspiring professionals signal that they are "in-the-know" or "industry friendly" and thus, complicit in the continuation of the status quo.

The professionalization of skateboarding dates back to the early 1970s, however, skateboarding as a spatial practice "has always been a product for sale, and it never enjoyed a precapitalist moment when it existed primarily for a mythically pure subcultural group."[910] As such, beyond skateboarding's "origin" as a toy, fad, and/or trend during the 1950s, followed swiftly by its association with 1960s "California teen surf culture", this text's entry point begins in the 1970s.[911] Competitions were held to rank skateboarders as amateurs or professionals and were mainly reported in intracultural print publications. Despite claims of skateboarding's intrinsic DIY/anti-commercialist values — similar to those discussed in the previous chapter — the industry's cooperation with outside enterprises was always apparent.[912] To some degree, this was necessary. Money incentivized the progression of maneuvers. Competitions coincided with a rise in skateboarding's popularity due, in part, to the rapid manufacturing of products in concert with advertisements in trade publications. As Lance Mountain (former professional skateboarder

and company owner) put it, prior to industry videos, competitions were essentially compulsory to maintaining a professional skateboarder's career.[913] Both videos and competitions create an "aura of tradition" within the subculture and an air of celebrity around participants.[914] Moreover, the industry invests in these modes of publicity to increase consumer interest and generate profit.

The standardization of skateboarding as a spatial practice became integral to the formation of the subculture's consumer industry and its elite tier.[915] By the early 1980s, regional networks located in California supplied the logistics for contest circuits in which contestants' aggregate point totals provided them and the industry with a national ranking.[916] Two networks in particular created a stream of professionals that defined the decade, The National Skateboard Association (NSA) and the California Amateur Skateboard League (CASL).[917] The latter circuit acted as a farm system for the former — similar to Major League Baseball — in which the top amateur skateboarders with the best overall scores would compete as professionals in the NSA.[918] If an individual consistently placed in the top ten across the entire NSA circuit, the possibility of elite status and relatively lucrative sponsorships awaited.[919] The consumer manufacturing industry relied on skateboarders' point totals to determine who was a professional and therefore, worthy of sponsorship. Speaking from the present, Lance Mountain suggests that the goal of contests was to showcase a specific concentration of talent, "an inner circle", and mark those figures as "leaders".[920] The elite tier's expansion was indicative of the subculture's overall growth, and so too, the expansion of possibility in terms of spatial practices. Although becoming a leader required compliance with an arbitrary formula for measuring success.[921] According to Steve Caballero, a prolific contest skateboarder, industry-approved judges evaluated contestants based on a balance between progression and consistency. Skateboarders were compelled to showcase new maneuvers but were penalized for any unsuccessful

attempts.[922] As a result, maneuvers were often packaged into choreographed routines known as "runs". A "compulsory run" was also integrated into the scoring sheet. Each skateboarder had to establish a baseline of competency: "[T]wenty-five percent of your score was the compulsory, everyone had to do the same eight tricks, it was set."[923] The tension between skateboarding's progression as a spatial practice and the industry's need to establish standards for the professionalization of skateboarders is epitomized by the compulsory run. Moreover, the industry's reliance on contests to codify the elite tier engendered a tradition rooted in both exclusion and conformity.

Industry professionals significantly benefitted from the institutionalization of competitions. In 1986, the NSA became a private/public non-profit association in contract with the State of California, whose board of directors included the "chief executive officers of the major corporations who market to skateboarders", including owners invested in industry publications.[924] The mutually-dependent relationship between these entities resulted in increased interest and membership within the subculture. However, it also socially and economically compelled skateboarders to participate in contests and comply with organizational standards. A feedback loop of dependency materialized and was buttressed by trade publications that reported on competitive professionals' point totals in each issue. Contests supplied the "raw material" for magazine coverage. Failure to rank within the top ten meant that a skateboarder was effectively devalued.[925] Winners were featured, either in photo or in text, and thus, were provided with a platform to garner sponsorships and/or remain culturally relevant.[926] Magazines also provided industry professionals with spaces to advertise their products. Photos of practitioners performing maneuvers (using and displaying brands' wares) obfuscated the essential marketing function of these images. This stratagem, couched in a visual rhetoric, became the dominant mode of

representation and eventually was transposed into video productions, in part, because the industry's popularity was declining.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the marketplace had shriveled, and the flow of money had run dry. The writing was not so much on the wall but in the magazine pages. According to Lance Mountain, "I opened a [skateboard] magazine up, and there was a two-page photo of a horse jumping a rock. Skateboarding was over."[927] Although the lack of external funding created opportunities for those within the subculture to capitalize on a new marketing strategy. An oligopoly of companies emerged with specific organizational structures that would come to define skateboarding's consumer industry.

7.3 "Core" Ownership and an Industry of Dependency

A concerted push towards intracultural ownership in the 1980s consolidated power in the dominant order, which maintained governance of the means of production (manufacturing equipment) and the distribution of subcultural knowledge (trade publications).[928] Industry professionals ushered in new product categories specially made for skateboarders and at times, by skateboarders.[929] Companies were branded and marketed as "skater-owned" and "core", thereby fostering a "credible" image palatable to both intracultural and mainstream consumers.[930] A small set of companies became responsible for manufacturing and distributing equipment, promoting brands, funding practitioners and media-makers, and reporting on the subculture's current state in print publications. The economic model was akin to the vertical integration of the "Hollywood Studio System". Similarly, the skateboard consumer industry was both insular and diminutive, as well as incredibly profitable relative to its size.[931] Conservative estimates suggest that by the end of the 1980s, the industry, in total, generated approximately three hundred million

dollars per year.[932] During this time, the cultural relevancy and financial solvency of certain brands changed, but the corporate entities that managed the distribution of both magazines and equipment largely did not.[933] These companies were the *de facto* arbiters of aesthetic standards and curators of subcultural knowledge.

In particular, three California-based conglomerates had significant financial interests in the subculture's reconfiguration at the beginning of the decade:

> Fausto Vitello's Deluxe Distribution [manufacturing], High Speed Productions [publication firm], Santa Cruz/NHS [manufacturing] and *Thrasher* [publication] in Northern California; Steve Rocco of World Industries [manufacturing] and *Big Brother* [publication] in Los Angeles; and Larry Balma of Tracker Trucks [manufacturing] and *TransWorld Skateboarding* [publication] in Torrance.[934]

The companies mentioned above were (and some still are) major international distributors of equipment, clothing, and importantly, media (magazines and industry videos).[935] Some reports state that by 1994, the three men accounted for seventy percent of all skateboard equipment sales in the United States.[936] One writer from the *San Francisco Bay Guardian* put the industry under a microscope and summarized it neatly as such: "It's the story of a lucrative business controlled by a handful of men, whose vertically integrated companies thrive in large part on the image of the wild young skaters who represent them."[937] Obscuring the concentration of ownership was essential to the continuation of the oligopolistic industry.[938]

When the writer for the *Bay Guardian* asked Larry Balma how many companies he owned, "[he] paused for several seconds and then asked why this story was being done". Such a statement was followed by his acquiescence that "it is important that he remain low-key about his involvement so as not to destroy in the eyes of young customers the image of where the

boards and clothing come from."[939] The same is true for Vitello, who partially or fully owned companies under two seemingly separate distribution firms that manufactured multiple brands' products. Yet, Vitello proclaimed in *Thrasher* (his own publication) that the industry is comprised of a preponderance of "small skater-run companies".[940] Rocco's influence stretched the farthest. In some form or fashion, he was responsible for nearly twelve manufacturing and distribution companies.[941] To be sure, however, the industry was not entirely uncontested.[942] Vitello, Balma, and Rocco limited the promotion of each other's products in their own publications.[943] Such acts of censure extended to include skateboarders who defected to competitors' companies.[944] The quantitative and qualitative impact of this synergistic business model is still felt in today's market. The number of distribution firms fluctuates between twenty to thirty companies, but on average, each entity manages between five and fifteen brands.[945] Stated directly, a relatively small number of people were and are capable of influencing an entire subculture's manufacturing and distribution, and importantly, the production of knowledge.

7.4 The Marketing Phenomenon of Street-Style

Beginning in the early 1980s, a small group of industry professionals funded print publications, in tandem with manufacturing and distribution firms, which simultaneously catered to the market they helped create. In becoming their own silent partners, the aforementioned men (with compliant followers) shaped the subculture to align with their economic interests. Street-style emerged as a substitute to the vertical-style of skateboarding made prevalent by the proliferation of skateboard parks and the appropriation of concrete pools. Due to the subculture's downturn in popularity at the onset of the decade — partially because of increasing construction costs and rising insurance premiums — the business of ramp building and skateboard park-

operating became untenable.[946] As an alternative, cities were natural skateparks with obstacles that comprised the built environment. Urban spaces also required no price of admission. The idea of street-style, however, as the "natural" progression of skateboarding as a spatial practice is not entirely attributable to happenstance. Manufacturing companies and their publishing counterparts capitalized on the very trend they were pushing to the fore. Magazines made visible what was always available, the streets. Except now, money funneled through vertically-integrated companies simultaneously generating the demand for the supply that industry professionals controlled. It is no coincidence that both *Thrasher* (1981-Present) and *TransWorld Skateboarding* (1983-2019) sought to promote street-style as the then current representation — and state of progression — of the subculture, and in doing so, share in the profits.[947] In short, the average skateboarder saw what was presented to them as all the subcultural knowledge that the magazines could fit to print. Chet Thomas, former professional skateboarder describes the power of each publication: "Remember skaters study the photographs in the magazines, they look to the photos on what products to buy and what equipment to use. You influence their lives".[948] Indeed, such dependency benefits the manufacturers that produce both cultural and utilitarian products. One former professional recalled that he was photographed wearing particular clothing and holding equipment he himself never used. He summarized the photoshoot as such: "It was basically like, 'This is what the kids are being programmed to want, so you better look the part or your [skateboards] aren't going to sell'."[949] Street-style did not change the publications' business strategies, rather, the established visual rhetoric was merely updated to reflect the new practices and products being sold to consumers.[950]

As street-style became a viable prospect for the subculture's growth, manufacturing and distribution companies had to re-group. The industry was stalling yet again, but instead of

needing corporate money from external sources, intracultural ownership provided the necessary financial support to shift marketing and manufacturing dollars. Lance Mountain is particularly forthcoming about this era, stating that both *Thrasher* and *TransWorld* promoted street-style as a "new" spatial practice through contests and magazine coverage.[951] Mountain goes on to declare, "The major companies worked together through most of the '80s […] with the early street skating [...] [they] manipulated it and put it in magazines and created a healthy thing together as an industry. They didn't fight one another."[952] The "they", in this instance, refers to the aforementioned companies and the concomitant collection of brand managers, elite practitioners, and media-makers. At the time, contests were still the primary mode of status-distinction and communication in the form of interpersonal gatherings that featured the best-known skateboarders in the world. The first industry-sanctioned "street-style" contest was organized by *Thrasher* and designed to convey a grungy, DIY aesthetic.[953] The rationale was simple, promotion generates consumer demand.

Manufacturers invested in re-tooling and design to market new specialist equipment to established and emerging enthusiasts. Street-style skateboards required lighter materials and less dense wood so as to allow practitioners to generate speed and become airborne on horizontal ground, rather than solely curved ramps or concrete waves. An added bonus for companies was that the lighter material "wore out and broke faster."[954] As a result, manufacturers accelerated the turnover rate of products to the extent that by 1987, ninety percent of sales were intended for street-style use.[955] The industry was rebounding at a time when professionals of an older vintage were required to adapt or risk losing their professional status. New careers were formed, and others were cut short.[956] Signals to the established pros associated with vertical-style skating were not so much intimated but stated outright. Co-owner of Powell-Peralta skateboards, Stacy

Peralta recalled meeting with the company's sponsored professionals at the time: "We kept telling [them], 'Streetstyle is going to exist. We've got to do this.' And what happened? A year later Lance [Mountain] is a street skater, [Steve] Cab[allero] is a street skater, and even Tony Hawk becomes a street skater."[957] Consumers were provided with evidence to the subculture's transition, and no evidence to the contrary.

Prior to street-style's ascendency, vertical-style skateboarding was the subculture's dominant spatial practice. The top practitioners were the Powell-Peralta skateboard team known as the "Bones Brigade", and their exploits were featured in a video series that became a marketing phenomenon. As co-owner of the company, video director, and team manager, Stacy Peralta developed editing conventions that emphasized brand-visibility over progression and mythology over integrity. In doing so, he effectively triggered the decline of magazines as the primary transmitter of subcultural knowledge and divined the future of skateboarding as a performance embedded in moving-images.

7.5 The "Bones Brigade" and "Powell Magic"

Peralta's marketing stratagems resulted in The Bones Brigade's brand supremacy for much of the 1980s. The company's impact on the skateboard consumer industry was not only far-reaching but global. Powell-Peralta was, for a number of years, the largest manufacturer and distributor of utilitarian products and industry videos in the world.[958] Maintaining significant authoritative resources sustained the brand's allocative resources. Peralta assembled the best skateboarders in the subculture at the time — Lance Mountain, Tony Hawk, Mike McGill, Rodney Mullen, Tommy Guerrero, and more — to form the Bones Brigade team and produce the accompanying video series: *Skateboarding in the Eighties* (1982), followed by *The Bones*

Brigade Video Show (1984), *Future Primitive* (1985) featuring what some consider the first street-style section performed by Tommy Guerrero, *The Search for Animal Chin* (1987), and *Public Domain* (1988), which in total sold tens of thousands of copies.[959] The videos utilized expensive filmmaking equipment and highly coordinated production set-ups to record the team's choreographed maneuvers.[960] Separate from recordings of contests that circulated infrequently, Peralta emerged as the leader of this new facet of the media industry, albeit with supplemental support from the magazines he remained beholden to for advertising space.[961] Videos provided another marketing opportunity that Peralta explained years later: "We were there trying to create a dream, a mythology about our company."[962]

The editing conventions perpetuated by Peralta provide a counterpoint to future industry productions. Peralta was not concerned with progression, but with underscoring his team's prowess, which was normally on full display in contests that mainly featured vertical-style skateboarding: "There was a divide between pros who could skate well live, and pros who spent a lot of time getting that one progressive trick on video. There were pros doing never been done tricks on video who weren't capable of going to a demo[nstration] and skating consistently."[963] The consistency sought after in contests was constructed in the Bones Brigade videos. Editing techniques sutured together unsuccessful maneuvers to construct "makes" (successful completions).[964] In effect, the method bridges two different moments and constructs an artificial screen reality of progression without integrity. Peralta willfully distorted his team's maneuvers in service of developing the brand's mythos. Such a technique was known by elite skateboarders of the era as "Powell Magic". Rudy Johnson, former Powell-Peralta team member, revealed that in the final edition of one video, some "makes" that were presented were not successful but appeared so: "That was my first taste of what editing can do. It's perfect in the final cut!

(laughs)".[965] Nevertheless, viewers accepted the images as the current representation of the subculture because the videos were produced and distributed by the consumer industry.

Peralta was cautious to maintain the lore of the Bones Brigade, even seizing upon the minute details of fashion to cement the team's elite status. He encouraged his sponsored skateboarders to wear the same clothes throughout the filming process, which lasted anywhere from one day to at most three, in an attempt to convey that the team's skills were accessible at will and without significant exertion.[966] Certainly, we can approach this from an economic standpoint, the Bones Brigade's productions were costly and Peralta sought continuity during the filming process. But in one interview, Tommy Guerrero maintained that Peralta removed certain amateur skateboarders' recorded "makes" from Bones Brigade videos because not doing so would have devalued established professionals.[967] The mythology could live on as long as it could be preserved; as long as those who controlled the agenda of media production controlled the agenda of commodity production.[968]

At its peak in 1987, Powell-Peralta was generating upwards of twenty-seven million dollars in annual sales and an ever-increasing global fanbase.[969] Peralta continued directing the video series into the latter half of the decade, investing in production values every year by employing skateboard mounted cameras, dolly shots, studio lighting sources, editing overlays, and computer-animated graphics to maintain the brand of the Bones Brigade.[970] In retrospect, Lance Mountain provides a sobering view of Powell-Peralta's legacy: "So we basically rigged the scene to show people 'this is going on and you should get on board with it,' even if it wasn't really going on! We just kind of made the whole thing up until it became real".[971] Powell-Peralta's videos were more aligned with contests that sought to prioritize consistency and publicity instead of progression. This was particularly problematic as new maneuvers were

concomitant with street-style's growing popularity.[972] The failure of Powell-Peralta to acknowledge this shift in spatial practices resulted in the brand's loss of revenue and cultural relevancy. Upstart companies were able to capitalize on the changing pace of the market.[973]

The mid- to late 1980s was a period of significant transition. Skateboarders left restrictive skateboard parks and negotiated city streets. Street-style precipitated the innovation of new maneuvers and the progression of existing ones, including the appropriation of new obstacles. While Powell-Peralta's supremacy was certainly aided by the high-budget productions of the Bones Brigade video series, Peralta encouraged his team to compete in contests to provide evidence of their consistency.[974] This was the industry norm until near the end of the decade, when the standards of being or achieving professional status changed. Newly-formed companies funded media-makers to capture their sponsored practitioners in the streets with consumer audio-visual cameras. The technology helped to propel two companies, H-Street and Plan B, to the forefront of the subculture. The preferred representation that followed was cultivated from each brand's *raison d'être*, expanding the possibilities of street-style skateboarding. That is to say, the two companies demanded its sponsored team members demonstrate progression through spatial performances made manifest in the screen reality.[975] Careers were no longer made by contest rankings and earnings (followed by coverage in the trade magazines), instead, video "parts" or segments promoted skateboard sales, and thus, sustained a practitioner's salary and justified their sponsorship.[976] Elite skateboarders were forced to trade one arbitrary, but sanctioned formula (compulsory runs in contests) for another one, a formula that dictated the assemblage of industry videos; so too, one method of evaluation (contest judges and point totals) for another, the system of attribution. In turn, the collective progression of the subculture was accentuated through formal editing conventions.[977] This new prioritization, however, yielded extended conformity.

Skateboarding's spatial performances, and the subculture's dominant mode of representation as it exists today, remain beholden to patterns of media production that were institutionalized nearly three decades ago.

7.6 The We-Ideal and the We-Image: The "EMB Crew"

Skateboarding as a spatial practice is certainly pivotal to the subculture's continuation and constitution, however, an analysis of industry videos produced during the period in question provides an understanding of how power is renewed through screen realities. In the context of media-making, established production conventions instill the preferred meaning (ethos of conformity) of the dominant order, and as a result, the screen reality reinforces the status quo of the lived reality. Simply stated, media acts as a tool for socialization in which the dominant order exerts its ability to define the subculture's current representation.

This section traces the operative roles of industry videos, and in doing so, examines the model franchise of the era, the "EMB Crew". Place-images of San Francisco, the Crew's home base, transformed into place myths, and an emphasis on progress in relation to spatial performances was embedded in the accompanying visual representations. The result of which was the emergence of subsidiary franchises that reproduced accepted patterns of thought, behavior, and production. In sum, these videos established continuity across the subculture as the we-ideal of the EMB Crew was promoted through the construction of the we-image.

The epistemic and performative effects explained below illustrate the impact of industry videos. Recall Paul Hodkinson's assertion that "translocal" links are formed over time, from city to city, through the production of cultural products.[978] The consequences of which are the delimitation of knowledge, the codification of subcultural principles, and the homogenization of

cultural products. These representations do not simply influence varying subcultural trends, such as apparel and equipment, industry videos also communicate the communal aspects of skateboarding, a sense of mediated sociality.[979] Notwithstanding the advent and proliferation of consumer audio-visual technology, skateboarding's preferred representation is and was largely controlled by the dominant order. Only a small number of producers have access to distribution platforms that depict the subculture in a given era, and thus, consciously or unconsciously, they enact a form of epistemic restriction. That is to say, the degree of participant control is severely limited. The orthodoxy of media productions, both as a tool for promotion and socialization, remains largely uncontested. I argue this is indicative of an industry that steadfastly attempts to obscure the commercial and rhetorical power of the dominant order.

Implied in this argument is the subsumption of print publications as the primary distributor of subcultural knowledge.[980] The proliferation of industry videos precipitated elite skateboarders competing in contests less and less, forgoing interpersonal competition for self-motivation. As a result, magazines needed to fill their pages and columns with other sources of information. *Thrasher* and *TransWorld* regurgitated lists of tricks performed in videos that had been released between issue publications.[981] Although photography remains a staple of brands' marketing strategies, videos are considered more aligned with the spatial performance of skateboarding: "[Media] is the best way to represent this activity, capturing [a] skateboarder's vivacity in a manner far more dynamic than […] any text or photograph."[982] Moving-images also allow for more "credible" means of substantiating the successful completion of maneuvers and the possibility to learn from them.[983] In essence, still photos and sequence photography do not provide a thorough rendering of a skateboarder's style — the fluid motions of the body in space.[984] Indeed, industry videos' greatest asset is rooted in both form and technology; the

capability to capture and replay movement. However, these affordances also entail an implicit regulatory function.

Industry videos serve as instructional material for new or lower-level participants and evidential proof of elite members' accomplishments. Iain Borden suggests that for all skateboarders, the spatial practice is rendered through a stream of consciousness.[985] An individual skateboarder internalizes images of other skateboarders performing, only to then reinterpret such images: "[A]t once replaying visual material through their own bodies, and transforming this imagery and themselves into complex intersections of each other."[986] Borden refers to this as the "lived image" and is describing movements that transpire both in the material world and in the screen reality.[987] If we begin with this precept, in conjunction with the aforementioned roles of industry videos within the subculture, then moving-images influence the potentialities of both practice and performance. Skateboarders of all tiers witness and internalize images, but representations of elite practitioners take precedence over the lived realities of lower-level members — the former features the best skateboarders in the world pushing the limits of progression. These images are legitimized by the dominant order, which governs patterns of production with respect to both media- and meaning-making.

The screen reality delimits the spatial performances made visible to subcultural members, which in turn, authorizes the established standards of behavior and thought in the lived reality. Spatial performances that privilege progression are emphasized and those that do not are elided: "Anything that was not progressive was not accepted as legitimate professional skateboarding."[988] For both practitioners and recreational skateboarders, such depictions are misapprehended as the scope of possibility.[989] Under the guise of progression, media-makers and elite skateboarders are compelled to only document maneuvers that have never been done,

thereby reinforcing what the industry values rather than what is possible. Such standards of production generate a one-dimensional consciousness internalized by both consumers and producers.[990]

Elite media-makers, also known as "filmers", perform multiple functions within the industry: spot (location) scouts, negotiators with security, intermediaries between professionals and their sponsors, part-time coaches, video editors, and sound-mixers.[991] However, no task is greater than media-makers' responsibilities regarding upholding aesthetic standards and curating the subculture's overall representation. In other words, media-makers select what is made visible for attribution and circulation. Editing is therefore generally considered the most important stage of production.[992]

Media-makers are subservient to the formal conventions institutionalized by established industry producers. Whereas style is privileged as being unique to each individual skateboarder, the process of documenting and presenting practitioners' performances on screen is incredibly formulaic. The socialized tradition of media production and the precariousness of employment influences producers to comply with the status quo.[993] Unlike their practitioner counterparts, media-makers frequently work for multiple companies on a freelance or fixed-term basis.[994] As one conversation between a professional skateboarder and media-maker suggests, "[t]here's always a new [producer] who will just do it for free…and [industry brands] prey on that."[995] The notion of interchangeability is not merely economic in nature, rather, it also speaks to the ethos of conformity that compels future media-makers to create iterative media productions.

The analog technology employed by industry media-makers is similar to that of hardcore punk producers discussed in the previous chapter. While it is not uncommon to see eight- or sixteen-millimeter film, the majority of media-makers utilized electronic video-cameras and

cassettes like Hi8 (electronic eight-millimeter), VHS, and Betamax.[996] In 1989, this technology was sold at a rate of over two million per year.[997] By February of 1990, sixty-four percent of the population owned video-cassette recorders and players.[998] Newly formed companies appropriated these consoles to assemble videos, via tape-to-tape linear editing (as previously described), in mere weeks.[999] This was in stark contrast to some of Powell-Peralta's videos that required nearly eight months to complete.[1000] The economy of production yielded certain benefits.[1001] Up-and-coming companies were able to exploit gaps in the market, such as the lack of visual evidence documenting progression, by utilizing distribution platforms already established in the heyday of Powell-Peralta.

The widespread circulation of media precipitated and reinforced the continuity of aesthetic and utilitarian products within the consumer industry. Videos were sold in magazines and to specialist skateboard shops. The former served as the primary advertising platform and point of purchase for consumers.[1002] In effect, a "more unified skateboarding culture [enabled] skaters to feel themselves [as] part of a larger community as they gathered around VCRs in urban skate[board] shops and suburban basements to compare the style, technique, fashion and attitudes of their various heroes."[1003] Yet, these videos are and were often misinterpreted as verité recordings of life. Rather, as I have argued, such representations are carefully selected renderings of the lived reality.[1004]

Urban cities were hubs of progression that housed professional skateboarders and key players in the manufacturing and publishing industry. San Francisco was uniquely well-positioned to embrace street-style in terms of the built environment and established economic infrastructure — Fausto Vitello's magazine (*Thrasher*) and distribution company (Deluxe) were located within the city proper. The city encompassed all the obstacles and natural terrain that

benefited street-style's progression: hills, stairs, concrete pads, loading docks, and especially, mix-use plazas. Plazas are, in effect, skateboard parks, and one in particular located at the Embarcadero Business Center (Justin Herman Plaza), was known to locals for years as Embarco.[1005] The various heights and diameters of obstacles were ripe for the technical progression of maneuvers.[1006] Put another way, Embarco was a "laboratory" of innovation:

> For a few short years, the nondescript square at the bottom of San Francisco's Market Street was skateboarding's undisputed epicenter […] It was where tricks and trends originated. And if you aspired to a career as a skater, it was where you sought out some kind of spotlight.[1007]

If *Thrasher* was the "bible", then Embarco was the "mecca".[1008] The rapid evolution of maneuvers that occurred on the plaza's grounds produced the next elite tier of skateboarders. Manufacturing companies recruited members of the EMB Crew to promote their new products through industry videos, which by then were the standard tool of status-measurement: "[A] pro's job was simply to film a progressive street part."[1009] San Francisco as a media-economy and hub of progression is best represented by a pull-quote from one industry advertisement, "Embarcadero's the Hollywood of Skateboarding".[1010]

Place-images of San Francisco and Embarco defined the era in question, engendering mass decampments of aspiring and current professionals, along with industry media-makers, to embark on journeys to mecca; all in service of documenting and performing never-been-done maneuvers. San Francisco's streets were not just seen in industry videos, but also in magazine articles that featured actual diagrams and maps of the city.[1011] It was incumbent upon skateboarders and media-makers of all tiers to internalize and commit to memory maneuvers that remained never-been-done or risk the loss of their social status.[1012] The distribution of this

information (subcultural knowledge) is important at both the local and global level. Each new trick reinforces the subculture's prioritization of progression and adds to the cluster of place-images that eventually transform into place-myths. In terms of San Francisco, one former professional skateboarder remembered, "[E]ven through photos and videos, you could tell that it was basically like Disneyland for a skateboarder. You had to be there."[1013] Such compulsion speaks to the epistemic effects of subcultural media.

The industry legitimizes both maneuvers and locations as worthy of documentation, and in turn, the pressure to progress delimits the creative possibilities presented on screen. One article titled "The Seven Kook Commandments" features a list of rules to follow as a skateboarder — a kook being someone not "in-the-know". The second commandment establishes, "Don't film what's already been done", ironically followed by, "Be creative with your tricks".[1014] Even professional media-makers acknowledge the negative consequences of the relationship between the notion of progress and the act of documentation. In another article titled, "Has This Thing Ruined Skateboarding?", with an accompanying photo of a video camera, the introductory text reads, "[N]owadays, a pro skater who never appears in videos pretty much doesn't exist".[1015] Without continually producing footage, an elite practitioner is without value to an industry concerned with endless consumption.[1016] The impact of subcultural media is not just rooted in the careers of professionals, but also in the scope of possibility regarding skateboarding as a spatial practice: "What [viewers] see in videos is reality — that a pro can do the tricks first try, every try, that they live in a different world, that everything is perfect. They don't always realize how hard a trick is, how long it took to make or what was involved to get it on film."[1017]

The form and structure of industry videos mimics the strategic succession of maneuvers attempted in the lived reality of competitions. However, the shift from contests to urban spaces

(as sites of earning professional status) meant that more time was allotted for skateboarders to strive for increasingly complex maneuvers: "[S]katers, encouraged by camcorder technology, attempted ever more intricate moves until they had just one 'make' recorded."[1018] Videos transformed the spatial practice of skateboarding to a performance largely without error or effort. No skateboarder moves through city streets fluidly and without delay or executes their technical maneuvers without multiple attempts. Moreover, editing produces a creative geography absent of temporal restrictions and comprised of disparate locations: "[A] series of discontinuous ledges, steps, walls and banks […] being recomposed into a new unity through the editing together of skateboarders' multiple runs through the city".[1019] This mosaic materializes in the screen reality. One industry professional asserts that the spatial performances captured on video "condition" skateboarders during a given era to the extent that such representations become the *tout court* of possibility.[1020] For the average viewer and the subculture at large, the consequences are epistemological in nature and widespread in influence.

7.7 H-Street, Plan B, and Beyond

Two upstart brands, H-Street and Plan B, institutionalized a formula of assemblage (the we-image) that would establish the standards thereafter for the attribution of authenticity and the production of knowledge. What followed was a set of conventions that marked the brands' videos as authentic based upon adherence to aesthetic and epistemic criteria constructed by affiliated media-makers. The pervasiveness of this criteria illuminates the dominant order's governance over the preferred patterns of production and meaning. Members of the EMB Crew (the model franchise during this era) were sponsored by both companies. The subsequent media productions featured the technical maneuvers of Embarco locals and visitors. Indeed, one cannot

understate the authority a model franchise holds: "[T]he power to influence others' perception of reality, label others within the social field of skateboarding, and define the most honored or prestigious way of being a skateboarder."[1021] The legacy of each company, however, is largely grounded in the guise of progression.

Mike Ternasky co-founded H-Street skateboards in 1986 and adopted the role of team manager and self-proclaimed, chief marketer.[1022] Instead of investing in expensive production setups like Stacy Peralta, Ternasky reasoned that his brand could exploit the benefits of quantity over aesthetic quality. Electronic video-cameras and cassettes allowed for swift turnaround times from production to distribution. To compete with established brands, H-Street videos were released every year to renew and cement the company's status as culturally relevant. Even with this schedule, skateboarders were given considerable time to achieve maneuvers to the degree that Ternasky would frequently caution his sponsored skateboarders from attempting tricks that had already been recorded.[1023] These instructions were further codified by letters he sent baiting his team members with tales of their fellow skateboarders performing never-been-dones.[1024] According to Danny Way, one time H-Street member, Ternasky would intentionally pit skateboarders against one another, while "flowing" numerous up-and-coming hopefuls to encourage competition.[1025] In doing so, Ternasky churned out a series of videos that upped the level of technical prowess year after year.[1026] In mapping the dominant editing conventions found in H-Street and Plan B's videos, including future productions, the ethos of conformity that pervades the production of industry videos comes into view.

H-Street videos are highlight-reel assemblages, in which the team's collective accomplishments are hierarchically ordered based on a formula and set of conventions. The influence of this ranking system, conceived of by Ternasky, is not without importance: "Every

video you look at today uses [his] format."[1027] Ternasky would evaluate his stock of footage with other brands' videos — an act of contextualization — to decide where each skateboarder's compiled maneuvers would be located in the video's timeline or if such footage was worthy of inclusion. Once selected, individual or shared parts (segments or sections) were synched with distinct musical tracks. Maneuvers were edited together to display different tricks in quick succession, briefly (if at all) interrupted by interviews or B-roll.[1028] Ternasky incentivized his sponsored skateboarders to be prodigious in both the documentation and progression of their skills.[1029]

Progression is built into the formal composition of both H-Street and Plan B's videos. From the skateboarders' order of appearance to the juxtaposition of shots, a ranking system establishes which team members are presented and in what order. The second-best compilation of maneuvers opens the video, while the best compilation is last, colloquially known as the "ender". An individual part or segment follows this same formula: best trick (most difficulty or greatest risk) last, second-best maneuver first. The serial linkage of Pudovkin's constructivist editing theory is made manifest: "The tricks have to be placed in an order that seems logical, and inevitable. Same with the order of parts. Each should be a reaction to the last, and inform the next, and so on."[1030] The formula requires situating the then current stock of achievements (comparing skateboarders on the team) within the subculture's history of spatial performances. A skateboarder who amasses enough clips to garner an individual song or multiple songs, a "full part", is privileged over a "shared part", which features a variety of skateboarders.[1031] Regardless, each part usually begins with some form of on-screen text or voiceover introducing the skateboarder(s), followed by a series of maneuvers. These maneuvers are patterned and linked via the careful maintenance of screen direction. If a skateboarder enters frame left and

continues in the direction of frame right, this movement generally resumes in the next shot — entering frame left and exiting or moving in the direction of frame right. The viewer is led on a lineal, visual journey of progression bookended by an individual's most spectacular achievements and in the case of the video, the team's most impressive parts. The formula of assemblage effectively transposes the consistency of contest runs into the screen reality.[1032]

H-Street's *Shackle Me Not* (1988) introduced certain "core" editing conventions that were codified in the company's next two videos, *Hokus Pokus* (1989) and *This is Not the New H-Street Video* (1990).[1033] These preferred patterns of production became the industry standard that the subculture's elite media-makers habitually followed. In contrast to Peralta's editing style, Ternasky stipulated that each maneuver had to be presented without the segmentation of time or space facilitated by a cut to another camera angle. Stated differently, instead of cutting *in medias res*, the integrity of a maneuver was to be preserved by presenting a skateboarder's full range of motion, uninterrupted. Viewers of Fred Astaire's films would understand the purpose; long-takes allow the succession of maneuvers to occur without the help of cuts to suture together different attempts. Moreover, the majority of skateboard parts, if not all of the performances, are accompanied by music that would emphasize the take-off or landing of a trick. The editing is meant to strengthen or elevate the impact of the achievement. Maneuvers are synchronized with a recurring beat from the soundtrack, thereby conveying that consistency is coterminous with rhythm. The speed of the skateboarders' maneuvers are deliberately aligned with the tempo of the music.[1034] Socrates Leal, a prominent media-maker at the time, recalls H-Street's influence on his own work: "I'm used to watching these H-Street Videos, cause that was what I wanted to emulate […] And you know that's what skateboarding *should be seen as*."[1035] The ultimate

confluence of the we-ideal and the we-image would be found one year later in Ternasky's follow-up venture.

Plan B skateboards was formed in the summer of 1991 with an exceeding amount of consumer interest.[1036] *Questionable* (1992), which featured Embarco and the EMB crew prominently, was considered the "most anticipated skateboard video of all time".[1037] Plan B's team had been winnowed down to include H-Street's best practitioners, arguably the best skateboarders of the era. According to one member of the Crew, during the recording stage, the group had free reign over the plaza, new maneuvers were piling up, and NBDs were recorded at length.[1038] Mike Carroll, one of the most visible members of the EMB Crew, compiled enough footage to warrant a part that lasted the length of four different songs. In total, viewers were gifted nearly one hour of some of the most progressive and technical maneuvers ever caught on video at the time. The success of Plan B's first industry video resulted in even bigger anticipation for the second, *Virtual Reality* (1993). Yet, the pressure to perform prompted Carroll and fellow team member Rick Howard to leave and form a separate company, Girl Skateboards (distributed by a Vitello-owned company).[1039] In retrospect, Carroll explicitly states that Ternasky taught him how to run a business, and importantly, how to edit videos.[1040] The end of the EMB Crew is synonymous with the end of the plaza itself. By 1997, Embarcadero Business Center was shut down by officials, before the space's eventual demolition.[1041]

The format instituted by Ternasky, and reiterated by future producers, represents the ur-manifestation of the subculture's emphasis on progression and its ethos of conformity. Media-maker Ty Evans presumes that H-Street's videos were the "modern skate video formula" in which "[you] can see from that point on, all we've been doing is just copying that form."[1042] The same year as *Virtual Reality*, Real Skateboards' *The Real Video* (1993) employed Ternasky's

editing techniques and placed San Francisco's Transamerica Pyramid on the video's cover.[1043] By the mid-1990s, the format was still prevalent, even as a shift in spatial performances occurred. Toy Machine's *Welcome to Hell* (1996) heralded the end of technical prowess in favor of progression with respect to risk — big airs, longer rails, and ever-increasing stairs to sail over. Despite this, the editing formula lingered on.[1044] The era's production conventions are so ingrained within the subculture that those who claim to deviate from the norm do so within certain parameters. Contemporary media-maker Colin Read opined that traditional skateboard videos are too restrictive, marketing his own work as a necessary antidote to the derivative sickness plaguing the industry.[1045] Upon closer inspection, however, his independent video *Open* (2012) follows Ternasky's formula of assemblage almost exactly. Although images are presented via a recording of a camera's viewfinder, the established editing conventions are evident.[1046] Despite Read's implicit call for experimentation, the format holds, and the paradigm persists.[1047]

The nostalgia for the place-myths of San Francisco remain firmly entrenched as well. In 2020, a Brazilian skateboarder traveled to the city and captured his spatial performances using the same recording technology found in H-Street and Plan B's videos. An industry article reporting on the journey noted that the trip was a "pilgrimage to the Embarcadero neighborhood to pay homage to the spots and skaters [that] inspired him and a whole generation of skaters."[1048] Yet, perhaps the era's greatest influence is not found in industry videos, but in the depth of enterprise supported by the production of media:

> [T]he sheer audacity of skateboarding subculture, which has created its own infrastructure and industry to facilitate the dissemination of products and information (news, tricks, gossip, knowledge) on a massive scale. This business generates billions in currency, exists globally, in real time, in digital as well as physical space, in the past,

> present, and way into the future, and it was made, created, managed, and, for much of its history, owned by skaters.[1049]

Within this self-documenting subculture, a constant tension remains between claims of boundless expression in the lived reality and the endless iterations of conformity in the screen reality.

8. Urban Dirt-bike Riding: Baltimore's "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz" (2010 – Present)

As a contemporary self-documenting subculture, urban dirt-bike riding is a relatively recent phenomenon. Already though, a particular faction of urban dirt-bike riders has appeared as the model franchise; so too, the development of traditions, place-myths, and a subcultural media industry. There is no intracultural economy currently in place, and as such, the prospect of a subcultural career is based upon external corporate sponsorships.[1050] Promoting various riders and crews occurs through a codification of performances in the screen reality and the escalating delimitation of practices in the lived reality.[1051] The presence of both social and media hierarchies reveals the conditions under which those in control of the agenda of media production compel certain forms of conduct and predominantly shape the subculture's current state.

Two representations of Baltimore emerge from digital videos of the "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz" (WoWBoyz), a group of urban dirt-bike riders. The common representation of the WoWBoyz on YouTube and social media is that of adolescent and adult men who navigate Baltimore's streets on all-terrain vehicles and dirt-bikes. While one could view these acts as purely recreational, they actually allude to tensions between the primarily poor, African American population of East Baltimore and city officials — tensions which incur a long history. As the WoWBoyz challenge the local authorities' rule by driving their dirt-bikes out of their neighborhood and into the city's wealthier areas, law enforcement responds with extensive operations and measures aimed at defaming and suppressing them. The result is a tacit agreement between the two parties in which digital media plays a central role.

The WoWBoyz produce media to showcase their exploits online in an effort to reach both a local and global audience. Law enforcement, in turn, uses digital surveillance programs to

thwart riders' efforts. In the process, two different cities appear, which the United States Department of Justice (DoJ) poignantly refers to as the "Two Baltimores": "[O]ne wealthy and largely white, the second impoverished and predominantly black".[1052] This divide has been further rendered through the (in)actions of both the WoWBoyz and Baltimore officials. Videos of riders traversing city streets are uploaded online in excess, thereby undermining the authorities' control of the city's "brand". The WoWBoyz's effective exploitation of media has generated international notoriety, which has cyclonically advanced the efforts of officials to eliminate the subculture and their productions. As a result, a paradoxical dependency has emerged. The police must amplify, through aggrandizement, the WoWBoyz's devious reputation to legitimize their oppressive measures. The WoWBoyz respond by celebrating this characterization to substantiate their status as the dominant order. The Baltimore Police Department's (BPD) actions and the WoWBoyz's responses to them simultaneously elevate the subculture's commercial appeal and incentivize continued hostilities.

Urban dirt-bike riding in Baltimore is a burgeoning media-economy; one that is dependent upon the antagonistic relationship between the subculture and local authorities — as well as the central role of digital media — to strengthen the former's online following, garner sponsorships for elite riders, and stimulate the growth of subsidiary franchises. Indeed, city officials' agita is housed within the media productions of the WoWBoyz, the subculture's model franchise (the we-ideal). Dirt-bike riding, as a practice and a performance, amplifies provocations between members and the police through established formal and thematic conventions (the we-image). In turn, the authorities point to distorted representations of the lived realities of dirt-bike crews and so does this writing, however, the disparities uncovered suggest that subcultural participants are compelled to aggrandize hostilities with law enforcement to

achieve socio-economic power. A cycle of tensions unfolds in which neither party can escape.

In the hopes of attaining online viewers and potential sponsorships, dirt-bike riders are expected to negotiate traffic, perform stunts, and importantly, play up tensions with police. There is little ambiguity regarding the extensive laws aimed at eradicating riding within Baltimore's city proper. Yet, the presence of ambiguities abounds in the construction of the we-image. By participating in certain exploits in the lived reality and conforming to production conventions of the screen reality, aspiring riders are granted entrée into the elite tier and opportunities for commercial sponsorship. External corporations seek to capitalize on a "moral panic" and the "folk devils" caught in the crosshairs of both newspapers, online followers, and local authorities. These sponsors do not seek to produce their own media or invent novel branding opportunities, instead, corporate entities invest in the already authenticated and legitimized intracultural representations. Within the subculture, power is accrued through extended publicity and prolonged evasion (escaping imprisonment and prosecution). An ambiguity that speaks to what Dick Hebdige refers to as "hiding in the light": "[N]either simply affirmation nor refusal, neither 'commercial exploitation' nor 'genuine revolt'."[1053] The WoWBoyz's use of media as a publicity tool and an epistemic apparatus delimits the practices and performances of the subculture as a whole. The standard created by the WoWBoyz for both sponsorship and elite status is one that emphasizes a united front of conflict, and in doing so, the inertia that is conformity trudges on.[1054]

8.1 The WoWBoyz: "Folk Devils" and "Moral Panics" Revisited

The act of riding was pivotal to the subculture's initial formation, however, with the proliferation of cellphone and consumer digital video cameras in the early 2000s, traversing city

streets as a practice transformed into a performance.[1055] "Prosumption" — recording and commodifying one's (in)actions — became integral to the subculture's expansion.[1056] This shift also begat the transformation of the subculture from a local phenomenon, largely seen and heard by Baltimore constituents, into a global phenomenon. Long-simmering antagonisms between the BPD and the city's dirt-bike riders transcended the spatial and temporal boundaries of the lived reality and settled in the digital domain. The popularity of the WoWBoyz's productions resulted in countermeasures enacted by the city to end both the practices and performances of riding. What followed was a struggle over differing pretenses (representations) regarding Baltimore's global "brand".

Interviews with prominent figures within the subculture and journalistic accounts from the *Baltimore Sun* reveal that Baltimore is the principal "hub" of urban dirt-bike riding. The city is also home to the subculture's model franchise, the WoWBoyz.[1057] Subsidiary franchises emerged in different metropolitan centers that remain active in the present moment, but Baltimore has built a reputation for being the global capital of dirt-bike riding.[1058] According to M. Holden Warren, collaborator and administrator of the crew's YouTube pages, the history of the WoWBoyz can be traced to the late 1980s and early 1990s.[1059] Dirt-bike riding was initially a recreational distraction, but soon negotiating traffic did not provide enough thrills. Staging increasingly complex stunts became the norm, and the inclination to document followed. Wheelies (aggressively throttling the engine and simultaneously leaning back on the rear end to cause the front tire to lift) differentiated novices from practitioners. Advanced riders were able to point the front tire of the vehicle to the sky or the twelve o'clock position on a clock. Locals later referred to the vast swath of riders as the "12 o' Clock Boys", but soon separate factions surfaced. The WoWBoyz matured under the leadership of Steven Burden, known as "Steven

Honda", along with his brother "Honda Hoon" and friend "Sconyroc". The cohort grew and later attracted fellow riders "Charlie Boy", "WJZ Lor Dev", and Chino Braxton or "Lil' Chino", in addition to media-maker "John R Bmore".[1060] The WoWBoyz as a stable formation slowly materialized into the we-ideal under such leadership.

The influence of the WoWBoyz is evinced in the derivative media productions of subsidiary franchises. Certain conventions were, consciously or unconsciously, instituted and authenticated. As such, aspiring members and media-makers are both socially and economically compelled to follow this aesthetic criterion. This compulsion speaks to the model franchise's power to (re)produce intracultural traditions and reinforce an ethos of conformity that is similar to the self-documenting subcultures previously examined in this writing. One of the important differences between those social formations and urban dirt-bike riding is that allocative resources of the latter are noticeably limited. On the other hand, authoritative resources (elite practitioners), and the subsequent place-myths that accompany the documentation of their performances, are abundant.

Reisterstown Road, the border between East and West Baltimore, is the central gathering point for Baltimore's dirt-bike groups.[1061] Members congregate and perform stunts for the viewing of other riders and residents. Invariably, the police intervene and break up the meeting, interventions which are recorded and published on YouTube and social media pages. The *Baltimore Sun* has repeatedly reported on the crowds watching the preliminary maneuvers before the mass of riders are confronted by police and regularly travel from East Baltimore toward wealthier neighborhoods. The interactions are documented by mobile media-makers in a "trail car" (a vehicle that provides gasoline to refuel/flee the area). The WoWBoyz's videos foreground extensive riding in East Baltimore and throughout the city at large. The local press

uses these videos as evidence of the deviant nature of the subculture and subsequently, city officials use these documents to lobby for and authorize legislation outlawing the practice within the city proper.

Baltimore's local newspapers label dirt-bike riders and the BPD as antagonists, with the former recklessly impinging upon the city's peace and the latter resolving to end such disruptions. In total, reportage depicts the WoWBoyz as "folk devils" at the center of a "moral panic":

> A threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.[1062]

According to Stanley Cohen, part of this distortion involves classifying objects, like dirt-bikes, as a scourge to the status quo.[1063] Cohen explicitly states that these conditions generate a "structural conduciveness" in which the labelling phenomenon that produces folk devils and stokes the development of moral panics is considered by the public to be a legitimate concern.[1064] In the case of the WoWBoyz, the "power differentials" outlined below reveal the riders' structural "vulnerability".[1065] Although vulnerability, in the sense of exposure, is not intrinsically negative. Indeed, the WoWBoyz artfully subvert their marginalization by publishing their performances online, which results in increased publicity and ripostes from law enforcement. A cycle of antagonisms occurs that intensifies the branding efforts of both the WoWBoyz and city officials.[1066]

The WoWBoyz's actions continue to challenge local authorities' control of the city's global image, thereby making them an ever more pressing concern for Baltimore's elected officials.[1067] News reports inherently proffer the subculture as a spectacle to behold, investing in the enmity between the BPD and the WoWBoyz to sell the threat of current and future conflicts.[1068] A *Baltimore Sun* article referred to the WoWBoyz's relationship with law enforcement as a waiting game, one in which both parties seek to "reclaim their territory".[1069] After authorities reduced Reisterstown Road to one lane on Sundays in an attempt to curb rallies there, riders swapped weekend gatherings for "Wheel Deal Wednesdays".[1070] Such challenges are not necessarily politically motivated, but are rooted in visibility as the guiding principle: "[B]oth a declaration of independence, of otherness, of alien intent, a refusal of anonymity, of subordinate status […] a confirmation of the fact of powerlessness, a celebration of impotence […] a play for attention and a refusal."[1071] Stated directly, exposure is cultivated by the WoWBoyz. The group embraces their label as folk devils by providing fodder for further exaggeration through the production of their own media. In doing so, the prospect of attaining sponsorships and social mobility within and outside the subculture is considered attainable.

By leveraging mass media as one source of exposure and producing intracultural representations of their own, the WoWBoyz generate publicity for their performances on multiple fronts. The hyperbole published in local newspapers, coupled with distorted representations of riding in the screen reality, engenders hype and intrigue.[1072] Importantly, the classical model of appropriation that is generally considered a harbinger of subcultural exploitation is subverted.[1073] Angela McRobbie and Sarah Thornton suggest that "[d]isapproving mass media coverage legitimizes and authenticates" folk devils and provides them with some semblance of socio-economic power that can be extended through self-documentation.[1074] The

subculture's external representations percolate on the front pages of newspapers and internal productions proliferate in the digital realm. One affiliated media-maker suggests that: "[The WoWBoyz] have totally replaced the basketball player everyone looked up to. It just doesn't seem realistic anymore, but now you can have ten thousand Instagram followers as a dirt-biker."[1075] A chance to escape East Baltimore is now synonymous with riding, and the end result relies on publicity. WoWBoyz member Lil Chino may be the epitome of this dream; by maintaining a global following, he garnered a sponsorship deal and an indefinite relocation to Los Angeles.[1076] Nonetheless, the BPD consider the collective actions of the WoWBoyz as lawless endeavors, and so too, some members of the public worry riders' behavior stems from utter malevolence. I argue, the development of a moral panic in Baltimore resulted in the development of internal social and media hierarchies within the subculture as a whole, in which the WoWBoyz rose to the top tier, in part, because of the city's aggressive policing practices. The aura of "discomfit" surrounding riders is indicative of the marginalization of East Baltimore's residents relative to poverty, high crime rates, displacement, and disenfranchisement.[1077] While authorities have historically tended to respond to these conditions with more policing, community leaders have emphasized the role of urban neglect as the decisive source of the neighborhood's destitute state. It follows that the emergence of the WoWBoyz as the model franchise is part and parcel of the neighborhood's history.

8.2 Mobility and Stasis in East Baltimore

East Baltimore has been an impoverished neighborhood as far back as the early twentieth century, but for decades, residents have responded to the community's structural and environmental conditions with varying forms of mobility. Since the northward migrations of

African Americans in the 1920s, East Baltimore's Druid Hill Avenue serves as an invisible border separating both income and skin tones.[1078] An absence of community organizations weakened East Baltimore's agency to lobby for the neighborhood's affairs.[1079] The population felt further demoralized by periodic divestment and displacement resulting in the community's subjugation by corporations and private/public partnerships.[1080] Already in 1976, Sherry Olson wrote, "It became obvious to everyone (it had always been obvious to the black community) that urban renewal meant black removal."[1081] Compounding these problems, an extensive shortage of local government assistance contributed to a severe "distrust" between both residents and city administrators.[1082] Community advocate Marisela Gomez summarized residents' sentiments in the late 1990s:

> [They were] tired of asking their city council representatives to advocate for changes in their community. They were tired of calling the police and waiting hours for a response […] They had grown tired of the disrespect with which the city and private services […] regarded their community and them.[1083]

On top of poverty and neglect, the neighborhood suffers from considerable crime. According to the *Baltimore Sun*, East Baltimore retains one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths in the country. Reverend D. Doreion Colter has claimed that when gunshots ring out in the neighborhood, residents figure the victim will be dead before ambulances arrive.[1084] In contrast, some of the most affluent communities in the city listed zero deaths attributed to gun-violence between 2010 and 2015.[1085] A previous police commissioner strove to eradicate the violence by instituting a "zero-tolerance" approach to minor offenses, believing it would abate felony crimes. Instead, it caused even greater tensions between the neighborhood and the police.

The "Two Baltimores" refers to a perceptual and measurable divide between predominantly white and predominantly minority neighborhoods. This is demonstrated, among many other factors, by differences in policing standards. An independent study by the privately run "West Baltimore Commission on Police Misconduct" and the community-led advocacy organization "No Boundaries Coalition" examined putative wrongdoing by Baltimore law enforcement from 2005 to 2015. Interviews collected from residents of opposing racial demographics indicated that white persons were more likely to receive assistance from emergency services and sustain an overall positive relationship with patrol officers. In areas like East Baltimore, however, more than half of the respondents confided that they experienced anxiety or fear when interacting with the police.[1086] A fourteen-month investigation of the BPD by the DoJ's Civil Rights Division revealed that street officers tended to "view themselves as controlling the city rather than as *a part* of the city".[1087] In fact, almost seventy-five percent of BPD officers live outside of Baltimore City's official boundaries.[1088] In other words, they do not share a personal stake in the welfare of the neighborhoods they serve. But proximity is only one part of the problem. Most commentators agree that tensions stem from aggressive legislation enacted nearly two decades ago.

At the turn of the millennium, Baltimore homicides exceeded three hundred per year, and as a reaction, Democratic candidate for mayor Martin O'Malley vowed to restore order. Once in office (1999–2007), he instructed the BPD to focus on quality of life arrests such as open-container violations, trespassing, loitering, failing to obey, disturbing the peace, and so forth.[1089] At its peak, O'Malley's initiative produced "more than 100,000 arrests in a city of 636,000 [people]".[1090] While some welcomed the policy, critics cited litigation from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) regarding scores of illegal arrests — later settled out of court — as

indicative of its failure.[1091] The succeeding Democratic mayor, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, repudiated the policy for begetting the fractured relationship between the BPD and African American communities.[1092] The DoJ's report argued that the zero-tolerance policy of the BPD led to a disproportionate number of unconstitutional stops in mostly African American neighborhoods. Arrests often lacked reasonable suspicion and infringed upon citizens' constitutional rights.[1093] The DoJ found "reasonable cause to believe that [the] BPD engages in a pattern or practice of discriminatory policing against African Americans".[1094] With respect to dirt-bike riding, affiliates of the WoWBoyz do not dispute the charge that some members are involved in illicit trades, however, the intracultural consensus is that the vast majority of riders do not engage in criminal activities.[1095] Despite the overwhelming structural and systemic issues that plague city residents, repressive measures were imposed upon riders.

Indeed, the authorities found the actions of the WoWBoyz so disturbing and threatening that by the end of the 1990s, legislation was introduced to end riding altogether. In 2000, a mandate was instituted stating that any operation — without the proper permits — of all-terrain vehicles and dirt-bikes on the streets of Baltimore was illegal.[1096] The following two mayors, Rawlings-Blake and Catherine Pugh, continued the ban on dirt-bikes within the city proper, excluding persons who secure their property in a locked area or with devices to prevent use. Without taking these precautions, ownership or guardianship, momentary or otherwise, is prohibited in Baltimore City.[1097] If the statutes appear so draconian that it is difficult to foresee their enforcement, consider this: in 2007 a seven-year-old boy was arrested — although never formally charged with a crime — for sitting on a dirt-bike that was not properly "immobilized".[1098] Furthermore, service stations and private citizens are not allowed to "sell, transfer, or dispense" motor fuel intended for dirt-bikes.[1099] Violation of any individual sanction

carries a misdemeanor charge, which incurs up to a one thousand-dollar fine, imprisonment for no longer than ninety days, or in occasional circumstances, both.[1100] City administrators declare that by removing the "threat" of dirt-bike riding, East Baltimore will prosper, however community members cite the neighborhood's neglect and the BPD's policing practices as the roots of the problem.

At the time of the order outlawing off-road vehicles in 2000, the neighborhood was in a state of incomparable socio-economic decline. Marisela Gomez recalls:

> [T]he community was primarily African American, low-income residents. Its social, economic, and health characteristics, among the worst in the city, included a majority of unoccupied houses, high rates of crime, drug dealing, high unemployment, overgrown vacant lots […] The community had been abandoned. It had been allowed to deteriorate to this level of blight (decay) with little or no systematic process to address the abandoned houses or the increasing crime and trash that come secondary to increasing abandonment and decreasing tax bases and public city services. This outcome had been decades in the making.[1101]

The WoWBoyz's emergence as a social formation and their subsequent actions can therefore be perceived as a way of dealing with (or: escaping) their community's destitute conditions. There is even historical precedence regarding such forms of mobility. That is to say, the WoWBoyz were not the first community residents to engage in riding as a mode of (temporarily) subverting their marginalization.

East Baltimore in the 1980s experienced an analogous crisis and also lacked the body politic that could articulate such ills and lobby for improvement. Participation in community organizations subsided due to itinerant renters and successive waves of decampment by

homeowners.[1102] Those who remained sought alternative ventures to experience physical, albeit brief, departures. Photographer Robin Schwartz documented the activities of young and old men in the 1980s at the Retreat Street Stables located just across Druid Hill Park. The article and accompanying photograph collection tells of the neighborhood's disrepair and the advent of a "men's club of sorts".[1103] Certain residents appropriated horses used to pull street vendors' ("arabbers") carts and race in back alleys.[1104] The horse-riding stunts eschewed visibility on the main roads, presumably to avoid punishment. However, concealment limited the scope of awareness and possibility. Despite being considered part of Baltimore's "cultural brand", *Baltimore Sun* writer Dan Rodricks noted that city officials "harassed" the salesmen to near "extinction".[1105] A similar fate threatens dirt-bike riders today. Remarkably, according to M. Holden Warren, some of the first urban dirt-bike riders in Baltimore were arabbers, and without coincidence, the WoWBoyz adapted their practices to stoke publicity: "It's about being seen […] It's an illegal and active 'fuck you' to the police. Baltimore is a 'wild west' situation. It's pretty lawless and [riding is] a representation of that, a cry for freedom."[1106] In this respect, the WoWBoyz recognize the power that stems from publicity — a power renewed by continually uploading videos of their performances online.

The WoWBoyz's YouTube "channels" produce hundreds of thousands of views, which generate sponsorship opportunities for riders.[1107] As such, the patterns of production that seem inherently tied to this success become the *de facto* standards of subsidiary franchises. The compulsion to follow these production conventions is linked to the prospect of attaining socio-economic success. Moreover, to join the elite tier, aspiring members sometimes travel to Baltimore to ride with the WoWBoyz — and in effect, against the BPD — to gain social clout and prove one's credibility. The homogenization of practices in the lived reality results in the

amplification of altercations in the screen reality. The subculture's guiding principle can then be aptly described as publicity through hostility. Riders must actively cultivate both visibility online and concealment in their everyday life. The dominant mode of representation supplies the place-myths that fuel the patently real and assuredly magnified tensions between riders and the BPD.

8.3 The Branding of Baltimore: Places-Images and Place-Myths

Digital promotion is inherent to the WoWBoyz and the city of Baltimore's public image, both locally and globally. Politicians look upon the subculture as a branding nightmare, appealing to the wrong kind of tourists, bystanders, and online viewers by reinforcing what they consider a false narrative of harmless fun. Reflecting on the general attitude of authorities, one former writer for the *Baltimore Sun*, Carrie Wells, presumes, "[T]he dirt-bikers are a symbol of lawlessness in a city that's trying to shake this image of high crime and poverty."[1108] In this instance, the symbolic power of representation flows both ways. Riders push their otherness into visibility, thereby subverting their exclusion. Indeed, there is little documentation that dirt-bikers were deemed bothersome until they started to regularly cross Druid Hill Avenue into wealthier neighborhoods *and* document their travels. Prior to social media and digital (audio-visual) recording technology, the WoWBoyz's practices remained isolated to local neighborhoods.[1109] Once the notoriety of dirt-bike riding increased, city officials became driven by an agenda to impede the subculture's growth, but such actions would ultimately lead to its expansion.

Baltimore's brand is of particular importance to elected officials. Michael Silk notes that cities are increasingly adopting entrepreneurial tactics to refashion or "refurbish" their identities in the minds of tourists and residents.[1110] Silk terms such practices as "image-marketing" in which specific depictions are used to "to reinforce existing positive images, [and] neutralize and

change unfavourable ones".[1111] For a city looking to rebuild its brand and commodify its image, the subculture's illicit activities are viewed as hindrances to attracting prospective investors and maintaining credibility in the minds of residents.[1112] The BPD, in concert with city officials, developed strategies to expunge the WoWBoyz within the city proper and subsequently, any future media productions by their members.[1113]

Although the subculture's participants act on a local level, anonymous virtual viewership gives rise to the WoWBoyz's increasing global visibility. When asked why aspiring riders travel to Baltimore and record their escapades, M. Holden Warren responded, "credibility" — verification one can rival with the top practitioners in the world.[1114] Carrie Wells agreed, stating, "Baltimore is the birthplace of [urban] dirt-biking. People come from France, all over the country, and the world to learn from the dirt-bikers here."[1115] Inspired by the WoWBoyz, French film director Lola Quivoron titled a fictional film about dirt-bikes, *Dreaming of Baltimore* (2016).[1116] Moreover, in one video on the model franchise's YouTube page, an unknown rider from New York City claims, "You ain't anyone until you're here."[1117] The power cultivated by the WoWBoyz extends into civil society as well.

Albert Hirschman asserts that disadvantaged communities, like East Baltimore, can choose between "exit" and "voice" as a form of protest. However, the threat of exit, a withdrawal from the community, is generally unfeasible when residents are economically vulnerable.[1118] On the other hand, the voice alternative encompasses methods of blazon communication to encourage those in power to take notice.[1119] Visibility (or the lack thereof) in Baltimore becomes progressively salient relative to each practice. For East Baltimore's citizens, there are few plausible scenarios for a lasting escape. As a result, "If residents cannot get away from an undesirable neighborhood, they may be able to make the neighborhood go away instead, by

denying the existence of a distinct and identifiable residential aggregate to which they belong."[1120] A new community and sense of mediated sociality materializes:

> The sense of belonging derives, to some extent, from a feeling of sharing a common history, and a common locale, a common trajectory in time and space […] so too our sense of the groups and communities with which we share a common path through time and space, a common origin and a common fate, is altered: we feel ourselves belonging to groups and communities which are constituted in part through the media.[1121]

The actions of the WoWBoyz can be seen as a partial enactment of both exit and voice. Their rides are ephemeral escapes from their immediate neighborhood and their videos, a "cry for freedom" on a global scale. Except the WoWBoyz's brand requires riders to remain tethered to East Baltimore to maintain legitimacy, both within and outside the subculture. Riders are trapped in a cycle of dependency of their own making. Those seeking freedom through sponsorships are compelled to stay in the neighborhood to sustain cultural relevancy by aggrandizing their conflict with what can be considered the most aggressive law enforcement practices in the country that, moreover, specifically target urban dirt-bike riding. City officials show support for these policing measures by characterizing riders' actions as unacceptable challenges to the status quo, the socio-economic order the subculture exists within.

Readers of the *Baltimore Sun* tend to inculpate dirt-bike riders, with one responding anecdotally that if his father were still a traffic cop, the participants would be beaten into submission.[1122] Such threats of bodily harm are not daunting to riders: "Of course we know [riding is] dangerous — but not as dangerous as our public schools and militarized police force."[1123] The risk of incarceration and the hyperbole of moral panic is fomented by city authorities who deem the WoWBoyz a gang of illicit drug dealers and "gun-toting criminals".[1124]

One member of the WoWBoyz, WJZ Lor Dev, was accused of selling drugs at the same time as he was contacted by Honda Motor Company (a manufacturer of dirt-bikes and off-road vehicles) propositioning a sponsorship deal based on his online following. Tragically, he was murdered in a gun-related incident in Northeast Baltimore before an agreement was reached.[1125] The WoWBoyz's videos generate both intracultural power and the prospect of socio-economic mobility:

> Instead of performing symbolic forms of resistance or addressing society with a political message, deviant and criminal subcultures have, in contradiction to themselves, embraced the new media potentials specifically to mediate their skills, share knowledge, promote themselves.[1126]

Place-myths of Baltimore compound the conception of the city as ungovernable and reveal the potentialities of the subculture's burgeoning media industry.

8.4 Digital Platforms and Circumscribed Performances

The media industry in question is in the initial stages of development.[1127] Without the benefit of an established (intracultural) economic model, the commodification of performances is principally founded on the simultaneous exploitation of visibility and concealment. Riders publish their criminalized endeavors as spatial performances in service of seeking sponsorship that would bring further publicity and fame to their respective crew. As a result, the subculture's media productions induce an intensifying ethos of conformity that emphasizes conflict as the dominant mode of representation. Put simply, to attain authentication within the subculture, tensions between police officers and riders must be amplified in the lived reality and on screen. As the model franchise, the WoWBoyz invest in their label as folk devils to stoke their otherness

and aggrandize their excesses. This promotional strategy influences members to continue riding at the risk of imprisonment.[1128] From blighted row-houses to corporate downtown structures, the visuals are striking, yet the aesthetics alone are not the sole source of power. It is, in part, the quantity of videos on YouTube and other social media websites that are the subculture's most vital asset. An increase in online viewers raises the market value of the WoWBoyz and other riders in subsidiary franchises. Publicity (negative, positive, or otherwise) generates potential interest from sponsors.[1129]

YouTube is the foremost site of communality and access to the elite tier, save for traveling to Baltimore. Content produced by the WoWBoyz is uploaded under pseudonyms to designated channels. These representations act as a barometer for measurement used by riders of subsidiary franchises to contextualize their status. The comments and ratings generated by members renew a sense of mediated sociality and (re)affirm the authentic status of certain productions.[1130] Images that do not adhere to the preferred patterns of the WoWBoyz's videos are maligned — if brought to the attention of viewers at all. Iterative productions by subsidiary franchises (re)authorize the elite's power and substantiate the WoWBoyz's status as the subculture's dominant order.

The WoWBoyz and affiliated members manage the most popular distribution streams within the subculture. As a result, strictures are implemented, which legitimize conformist productions. According to Kris Paulsen, YouTube is often misapprehended as an equitable exchange network, in which consumers and producers act as content-creators; however, the uses of media remain qualitatively similar to established mass communication models.[1131] Stated directly, "The consumer is still consumed […] the viewer may feel independent, free, and even subversive, but [they] are caught in the web's snare, held captive for advertisers."[1132] As

discussed in chapter five of this writing, the platform privileges commercialization and consumption over communication.[1133] YouTube is a private corporation that "uses the free content uploaded by users to lure in viewers and to sell them to advertisers."[1134] Users act as research and development agents for corporations without any financial compensation by providing likes, views, and discussions that stimulate interest in iterative productions. Much like leveraging the reportage of Baltimore's local newspapers, the WoWBoyz embrace YouTube's advertising stratagems to attain global sponsorships.[1135] The intention is not to subvert the platform, but instead to invest in its market strategy.[1136]

Representations of the subculture are circumscribed to align with the interests of the model franchise.[1137] Not only is subcultural knowledge (practices and performances) delimited, but boundaries form within online venues.[1138] Indeed, Instagram and other social media platforms act as additional sites to enforce standards and authorize productions.[1139] Gatekeepers select which images, and thus, what preferred meanings, are to be received by viewers. The cost of not adhering to certain prescriptive practices materializes in both the lived and screen reality — social marginalization and evaluative actions that include downvotes, blocks, and content removals respectively.[1140] The enforcement of such standards in the digital realm suggests that these sites are not free from constraint, but are extensions of the subculture's social hierarchies. With respect to the development of an internal economy, urban dirt-bike riders currently rely on external business models to accumulate cultural relevancy and maintain financial solvency. Ultimately, the nascent media industry is dependent upon the concentration of videos on YouTube to cohere and codify the representation of the subculture as a whole, as defined by a coterie of practitioners and media-makers that comprise the model franchise.

8.5 Enmity and Visibility: The We-Ideal and the We-Image

Intracultural representations of riders engender a mythic omnipresence, conveying the preferred message that at any time a group of fifteen to twenty riders may drive through one of Baltimore's predominantly white and more affluent neighborhoods. For nearly five minutes of one video, "Sunday BikeLife", WoWBoyz media-maker John R Bmore pans left and right to capture dozens of intersecting riders maneuvering down a single avenue in West Baltimore.[1141] The intimation of near-total control of a city street, with no apparent recourse from authorities, implies it could happen anywhere. By posting their videos to YouTube and social media, the WoWBoyz effectively rebuke city officials twice over, first in the initial physical act and then again in the digital domain.

In the majority of videos, the WoWBoyz's logo is the first image presented, followed swiftly by sequences that feature official and affiliated members of the group maneuvering through traffic and stoking antagonisms. The editing preserves riders' wheelies in long-takes to capture the performative skill and prowess of prominent figures positioned in solo or two-person shots. Accidents and falls sustained from dirt-bike riding do not exist in the WoWBoyz's productions. If we accept the media as a highlight reel, the rationale is understandable. However, accidents are inevitable with any physically dangerous activity. The omission of crashes is a premeditated decision to convey a representation of the WoWBoyz as omnipotent. Bystanders dot the backgrounds, transfixed on street corners and sidewalks, waiting to catch a glimpse of riders. Although if one were watching in person, it would be difficult to make out the rider's identity. The same is true for the digital voyeur. This breeds a level of anonymity that protects riders from arrest, while subsequently raising the mythical status of the riders known largely by their *noms de guerre*. For example, at the conclusion of the video "A Day in the Life of Chino,"

Instagram monikers of the original members (Sconyroc, Honda Hoon, Steven Honda, and John R Bmore) are displayed with a prompt that encourages further viewing on other media platforms.[1142] In doing so, this allows for videos to proliferate on multiple sites with some semblance of assurance that the foregrounding of the WoWBoyz's brand will remain evident.

Predominant editing conventions are constructed to identify "leaders" for viewers to seek out on other sites, but also to amplify the number of riders within the subculture at large. Parallel editing links different members and various parts of the city, thereby forging an impression that groups are riding simultaneously across greater Baltimore. Adding to this suggestion is the recurrent use of cuts made *in medias res* and transitions known as crossfades or cross-dissolves that slowly superimpose two shots together, while both play coterminously. Various riders' maneuvers and exploits are connected without breaks or inserts that would serve as pauses between independent motions. This serial linkage engineers a notion that riding is both inexhaustible and everywhere. In one video, nearly twenty riders descend on a highway as the lyrics profess, "Eastside, Westside, Southside, we come through."[1143] Indeed, the highway system that funnels traffic into the city center is also used by the WoWBoyz to subvert, subsume, and replace place-images cultivated by city officials — like that of the Baltimore sports arena and the city skyline — with the place-myths of urban dirt-bike riders. Identifiable areas in the WoWBoyz's oeuvre include the aforementioned neighborhoods, with the most prominent being Druid Hill Park: the historical dividing line between the "Two Baltimores" and the staging of the model franchise's gatherings.

The subversive self-image of the WoWBoyz is typically celebrated in their productions with participants ostensibly provoking and evading the police. Yet, as one Baltimore dirt-bike rider acknowledges, a very small number of individuals carry weapons or directly attack police

officers.[1144] Notably, verbal threats do occur, but physical altercations are rarely presented. In one sequence, shots of a police car driving at night are inserted between riders maneuvering at dusk. Through this suture, the cruiser appears to be chasing after the vehicles. The footage is juxtaposed with the preceding sequence in which WoWBoyz member Honda Hoon raps, "Middle fingers up. Tell that bitch to come get me."[1145] The videos deliberately foment the enmity between the WoWBoyz and the police by orchestrating appearances of conflict with law enforcement. Sirens tend to be seen by the viewer as isolated inserts or are heard as ambient background noise.[1146] One recurring motif depicts riders maneuvering wildly down Druid Hill Avenue apparently alone, until the camera reveals they are surrounded by inert police cruisers.[1147] The most striking example shows a group of close to twenty riders in front of a gated building. The camera trains its focus on the barred windows, panning down to an exterior plaque that reads, "The Ferelene Bailey Infirmary", an outpost of the Baltimore City Youth Detention Center and Maryland Correctional Complex. In the following shot, the group idles in formation in front of the penitentiary, revving their engines in a synchronized din with one individual raising his fist to the sky. Finally, WJZ Lor Dev punctuates the irony by wheelieing past the camera.[1148] It is implied that if the group were apprehended immediately, this would be the site of their imprisonment — though arrests are conspicuously absent from videos as well. The WowBoyz advance the proposition that by inflaming antagonisms between riders and the police, increased publicity will follow, and sponsorships will materialize. In one video titled, "WoWBoyz Fuck the City Up," an unknown figure seemingly directs his statements to the authorities shouting, "We here, and we ain't going nowhere."[1149]

Riders' open enthusiasm for spurning law enforcement and risking incarceration also reflects the structural conditions of East Baltimore's residents, specifically, the yearning for

social and economic power. Warren summarizes the WoWBoyz's attitudes: "They have nothing to lose. They can get shot tomorrow, you can get shot on the corner. Riding a bike is nothing. You're already out there, the police are already looking for you."[1150] The WoWBoyz's weekly rallies stimulate a sense of pride and unity for East Baltimore as a community and serve as demonstrations directed towards city officials.[1151] Indeed, many of the WoWBoyz's videos frame their actions as acts of defiance that invoke calls to arms: "Fuck the police. They know what it is. We're gonna fuck them up."[1152] At a rudimentary level, the imagery is a highlight reel of riding. But the WoWBoyz's media also endeavors to capitalize on both perceived and genuine conflict. By documenting their escapades, the WoWBoyz elevate the myth of their grandiosity. The ability to generate publicity through performances inspires subsidiary franchises to record their groups' exploits and fuel animosity between local officials. As Paul Hodkinson notes, "translocal" links are formed over time in various cities through the production and dissemination of cultural products, in this case, subcultural media.[1153] The screen realities underline the development of traditions regarding both practices and performances.

During the early 2010s, subsidiary franchises emerged on the East Coast of the United States. In particular, the "Go Hard Boyz" (Harlem, NY), "Harlem Legendz" (Harlem, NY), "1Down 5UP" (Bronx, NY), and "Philly Hang Gang" (Philadelphia, PA), to name a few.[1154] Despite the multiplicity of crews in New York's boroughs, the media productions follow the established formula of assemblage and the thematic motifs instituted by the WoWBoyz. The presence of iterative content and formal conventions suggests that the model franchise wields influence throughout the wider subculture.

Editing practices mimic that of the WoWBoyz's videos, in which the majority of maneuvers (riders wheelieing in the twelve o'clock position) are captured in long-takes and

linked without stoppages in motion. Cross-dissolves and cuts *in medias res* serve to elicit the notion that riders are ever-present, waiting to reclaim territory or counter law enforcement's spatial tactics. More so, B-roll inserts of police cars are typically presented in slow motion, emphasizing the threatening presence of authorities in proximity to the riders — although a majority of shots do not include direct interventions. Similar to the WoWBoyz's media, verbal threats are far more prevalent. The trope of antagonisms is exemplified by one Harlem Legendz rider who exclaims into the camera's microphone, "The police are out here…we're gonna creep past them", while a fellow rider revs his vehicle's engine. The same individual goes on to explain in direct address to the potential viewer that the crew will strategically position a trail car in between members and any police that may intervene for the purpose of accruing "a lot of footage". Later in the video, an unknown rider shouts, "There they are," referring to the police, "right there". Yet, no law enforcement figures are seen in the frame. The shot is even distorted by the media-maker's use of a "whip pan" followed by a quick cut to another rider.[1155] Indeed, the digital strategy of these media-makers is made plain: "Do something illegal and exciting, record it, post it, get fame, translate fame into fortune."[1156] By emphasizing conflict, both real and perceived, recognition and sponsorships are considered possible.

To distinguish different crews from one another, videos posted online adopt the methods used by the WoWBoyz. Logos at the beginning of each video act as branding mechanisms. *Noms de guerres* delineate different riders and provide confirmation of their affiliation. Moreover, in videos produced by the Harlem Legendz and the Philly Hang Gang, specific areas of their respective cities are marked with titles, such as "North Philly" and "South Philly", along with Harlem and the Bronx.[1157] Expository text complements verifiable place-images, like landmarks and highway signage. The aforementioned New York crews frequently convene at Yankee

Stadium, a home base to embark as a collective — akin to the WoWBoyz's depictions of Baltimore's stadium and the gatherings located at Druid Hill Park. The videos typically conclude with requests to subscribe to social media channels hosted by varying accounts. In the aggregate, the content initiates the process of transforming particular place-images of these cities into place-myths. Nonetheless, Baltimore remains the focal point of the subculture. One video, produced by the 1Down 5Up crew, highlights the journey to join members of the WoWBoyz.[1158] In doing so, the visiting group gains credibility in both the lived and screen reality. Recall the New York-based rider's remark: "You ain't anyone until you're here."[1159] The WoWBoyz's status as the model franchise and the concomitant place-myths of Baltimore persisted into the latter half of the decade.

In more recent subcultural productions, the technology for capturing riders' performances has improved to incorporate high-definition recording equipment, however, conventions remain stagnant.[1160] The aforementioned editing transitions (cross-dissolves and cuts *in medias res*) are prevalent, save for the introduction of "blinks" or quick cuts to black, which synchronize individual riders' movements with soundtracks. Further, logos frequently bookend productions in tandem with text listing supplemental YouTube or social media channels for future viewing. Within contemporary videos of the WoWBoyz, Reisterstown Road is still a meeting space, where weekly rallies are held and potential sites of conflict are renewed.[1161] Indirect interactions with police continue to be emphasized through B-roll footage or sound inserts of sirens (without synchronized video), and evidence of arrests or physical assaults are noticeably sparse. However, what has emerged in this period is a shift in focus relative to the promotion of individual riders. "Vlogs" are a new marketing strategy to entice potential sponsors. One New York rider, "Lean Da Bikestar", generates productions specific to him and titles his videos with dirt-bike

manufacturers' brands.[1162] Despite these changes, the formula of assemblage amounts to a reiteration of form. The major differentiation between the model franchise and subsidiary franchisees is the sustained presence of a moral panic in Baltimore, which preserves the former's status as the dominant order.

8.6 Conflicting Representations of the WoWBoyz and the BPD

While the residents of East Baltimore await tangible improvements to policing practices, the development of measures to suppress dirt-bike riding escalates due, in part, to city policy sanctioning officers from pursuing riders. Traditional law enforcement tactics were replaced with novel approaches.[1163] Digital surveillance schemes were deployed by the BPD — at times with consent of the local government and at other times without — to restrict and eliminate riding in the city. The WoWBoyz's effective use of digital and social media made them prime targets: "Subculture forms up in the space between surveillance and the evasion of surveillance, it translates the fact of being under scrutiny into the pleasure of being watched."[1164] An indirect result of the BPD's reconnaissance programs was a reversal of roles relative to the established moral panic. The BPD were labeled as transgressors of legal and civil norms because of surveillance schemes that affected the entire population of Baltimore. In comparison, the WoWBoyz's practices and performances were perceived as less criminal in nature. The place-myths of Baltimore that convey a lawless city were justified, but the perpetrators were the police.

The role reversal began in 2016. Police investigators claimed that more and more guns were being recovered from weekly dirt-bike rallies as well as trail cars.[1165] Additionally, several accidents, including one involving an off-duty detective who was physically assaulted after their car struck a dirt-biker's companion, bred public derision.[1166] City authorities responded in July of

that year with the establishment of the BPD-led "Dirt-Bike Task Force". Former police commissioner Kevin Davis created the unit under the pretense that riders were "guntoting criminals who travel throughout the city recklessly, lawlessly and with impunity" — evidently the irony of such a statement made by the head of the police department was lost on Davis.[1167] The BPD even asked for the public's help by establishing a hotline in which "anyone with information can call or text a tip, photo and video".[1168] The Dirt-Bike Task Force on the other hand was entrusted with finding definitive proof of riders' violent tendencies. With this goal in mind, dirt-bikes could be impounded without a warrant if an officer suspected that the handler violated any provisions of the aforementioned statute.[1169] In a few short weeks, the Task Force reportedly seized no less than one hundred off-road vehicles — but no more than five firearms.[1170] Initiatives like these suggest to Warren (a WoWBoyz affiliate) that the city administration was concocting a "smear campaign" in order to legitimize further aggressive measures and sway public opinion against dirt-bike riders.

A clandestine surveillance program was implemented by the BPD in the effort to attain more tangible evidence of violence. Geofeedia, a third-party contractor, was hired in 2016 to monitor public social media accounts and posts for wanted criminals.[1171] In partnership with the city's closed-circuit television cameras called CitiWatch, the software permitted access to federal and state databases. Additionally, the use of a "stingray" program, which helps define a cellphone user's location by connecting to other mobile devices in the surrounding area, enabled the BPD to monitor individuals or groups as they moved throughout the city.[1172] The WoWBoyz's online presence was ripe for proving the efficacy of digital policing programs. A potential lawsuit from the ACLU prompted Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook to revoke Geofeedia's access for violating their respective terms of service.[1173] The impression of

impropriety prompted calls for an investigation and revealed that the BPD took deliberate pains to avoid detection. Geofeedia received an annual contract below the amount that would entail a review by the City Board of Estimates.[1174] This was not the first program instituted by the BPD to curtail riding that fell outside the scope of elected officials.

Aerial surveillance was another deterrent method utilized by the BPD to restrain the WoWBoyz's actions within the city proper. Law enforcement employed a helicopter nicknamed "Foxtrot" to hover above the city as officers nearby perused social media pages for leads. When riders heard the helicopter approaching, they would hide until the aircraft changed direction or had to refuel. The helicopter's disadvantage was also its greatest force of deterrence, namely visibility. Because of this, the BPD soon switched to another form of aerial reconnaissance. Beginning in June 2016, over the course of four months, a Cessna airplane routinely disembarked from a small airport outside Baltimore. The plane logged the movements of any individual or vehicle within its cameras' range of thirty square miles. Up to ten hours a day, software accumulated data and relayed images in real-time to an archive, all without public knowledge.[1175] Published by *Bloomberg Businessweek*, the story broke in August 2016.[1176] Curiously, Baltimore officials and administrators including former mayor Rawlings-Blake, the State's Attorney, and Public Defender's Office, along with other state and federal lawmakers, were not privy to the surveillance. A financial disclosure document was never brought before the City Board of Estimates.[1177] After test flights in February 2016, surveillance began in June and one of the program's first objectives was the city's dirt-bike riders.[1178] Days after the program began, the aforementioned assault of an off-duty detective by a rider occurred. The plane was flying, and the Task Force was watching. Officers were able to successfully coordinate the alleged perpetrator's route by connecting with CitiWatch cameras on the ground, resulting in the

capture of the assailant and his vehicle.[1179] The arrest was celebrated until it became apparent the aerial recon was not reported in court filings establishing probable cause.[1180] After the program's disclosure, Rawlings-Blake avowed her tacit support by calling the plane "cutting-edge technology".[1181] Despite all these measures, however, dirt-bike riding continues in the city of Baltimore.

Both the WoWBoyz and the authorities use digital media to create and shape their own representations of urban dirt-bike riding. The WoWBoyz shift between two self-images, one that celebrates their subversive nature and one that emphasizes their good relations with the neighborhood. According to journalist Colin Campbell from the *Baltimore Sun*, community members of East Baltimore liken the riders to "athletes choosing a productive and entertaining alternative to the drugs and violence that plague the city's streets".[1182] By supporting them in public (congregating, waving, clapping, etc.) and contributing to their online following, residents effectively actuate the WoWBoyz's agency as a voice of the community.[1183] To reinforce these claims, Warren points to an opinion poll in which a majority of respondents backed a proposition to create a new space or appropriate an existing structure to house the dirt-bike gatherings.[1184] Embracing the proposal, he speculates, "It could be a potential turn around for these neighborhoods […] the death of these communities, [and] give people a reason to come and engage with them."[1185] However, such a proposal is contradictory to the practice of disruption that defines the social formation and generates the potential for socio-economic mobility. According to Wells, riders "thrive on doing something illegal, more appealing, more dangerous".[1186] The authorities portray the WoWBoyz as a gang and, in part, use the WoWBoyz's own productions to strengthen these claims. The Task Force eventually doubled down on its efforts, instituting what was known colloquially as a "crackdown". As of June 2017,

after one year of the initiative, forty-five riders were arrested and more than two hundred bikes seized.[1187] Law enforcement continues to discredit members by labeling the subculture *en masse* as criminals, thereby justifying increases in policing and the institutionalization of surveillance programs. The underlying motivation for each group corresponds to the continuation of conflict.

Media production plays a central role in the debate between the WoWBoyz's actions and the authorities' responses to them. The WoWBoyz embrace their image as folk devils to achieve fame and seek profit. In the process, place-myths merge with evidential hostilities and inequities. The BPD and the local government fear that videos of the WoWBoyz damage Baltimore's conceptual brand and reduce its global image to that of a lawless city. At the same time, authorities contribute to this image themselves by touting the lawlessness of the WoWBoyz's exploits in order to garner support for repressive measures. The same media documents create leverage for both the WoWBoyz and authorities to perpetuate stereotypes and authenticate valid grievances, thereby muddying the realities that overlap. The notion of the "Two Baltimores" revitalizes the *raison d'être* of both riders and the police. Riding in spite of the risk of incarceration reinforces the WoWBoyz's claims to the elite tier. In a similar mode, the police legitimize their oppressive policies by criminalizing the practices of subcultural members. Thus, the WoWBoyz and the BPD are inextricably linked; both require the other to stake claims to authority and (re)produce the status quo. In the case of the former, performances are published online to preserve the dominant order for the foreseeable future. The subculture's present state exists within the liminal ambiguity of prolonged concealment in the lived reality and extended visibility in the screen reality.

9. Conclusion

The balance of creativity and constriction is often misapprehended by members of self-documenting subcultures. Power is distributed unevenly, tilting the scales of equity towards the elite tier who control the agenda of media production, and thus, the agenda of commodity production. The ambiguities between aesthetic and economic stratagems employed by members of the highest social echelon intersect with the tensions between each subculture's ethos of conformity and externalized expressions. Media functions as an epistemic apparatus, a socially homogenizing force that influences prescriptions of both thought and behavior. In tandem, subcultural media industries financially incentivize media-makers to eschew dissenting critiques of the status quo. A conclusion that may seem pessimistic in its perspective, yet, such a determination is intended to provide a foundation, rooted in form, from which previous analyses of subcultural media may be clarified and future examinations of self-documenting subcultures can build upon. In its present state, however, this work is not without limitations.

The length of each case study precludes a more thorough examination of the respective era's media productions, some that would elicit pause and others that would advance the central tenets of this writing.[1188] Moreover, the connections between each subculture could be examined further by tracing accordant textual content in all three media industries. Particularities regarding other stages of production and the role of individual media-makers that perform a variety of duties are important areas of research as well. Even more apparent, the act of consumption and sites of exhibition, both physical (homes and brick and mortar stores) and virtual (online communities), provide ample opportunities for extending existing discourses. A historical examination of the intertextualities between primary and secondary forms of communication,

including the conventions that are specific to such media forms, would also afford additional insight into these self-documenting subcultures.

As points of departure, the theories and methods used to construct this writing's arguments may serve to broaden the scope of examination, including the following inquiries: How do alternative conventions enter into the aesthetic and epistemic lexicon? To what degree are these challenges adopted or externalized by members? Are the introductions of discordant conventions harbingers of momentary revolutions or sustained eras of experimentation? Do such instances undermine the boundaries between industry-approved professionals in contrast to upstarts and amateurs? With the proliferation of digital platforms, are entrenched distribution streams fundamentally altered? In what ways do these issues play out in localities between a cross-section of members not solely connected by voluntary affiliation? Regarding such localities, do hierarchical structures appear more defined or fluid, and how do generational changes affect transitions of power? These questions address important areas of study that I intend to pursue in future research endeavors.

Social and media hierarchies engender disparities pertaining to the material, participatory, and epistemic consequences of subcultural representations.[1189] To be sure, members do not experience the effects of homogenization in the same manner, both externally in cultural groups and internally as social subjects. At the margins of these social hierarchies, unorthodox production practices that do not cohere with the status quo represent challenges to the dominant order. Subsequent research will deploy the theoretical and methodological frameworks used in this writing to investigate *networks* of internal resistance within self-documenting subcultures: media productions that supply alternative conventions while intentionally using the aforementioned industries' consumer platforms to challenge established power structures. In

circulating this media, new forms of collaboration, multi-dimensional thinking, and yes, even more egalitarian modes of communication and distribution could destabilize the limits of possibility. Such mediated acts of resistance may also complement discourses of protest and activism both within and outside of subcultural studies. Research of this kind would potentially yield a more comprehensive understanding of the political practices of subcultural members in the contemporary moment.

The fundamental argument that permeates throughout this writing is that the role of media in subcultures of the past, present, and future is far more significant than previously considered. I have attempted to reframe the discussion around the conditions under which media performs a regulatory function as an epistemic apparatus. The self-propagating nature of internal hierarchies ultimately suggests that the production and distribution of knowledge within self-documenting subcultures is indicative of each formation's ethos of conformity. This argument runs counter to notions of subcultures as bastions of unencumbered creative expressions. As such, we must continually attune our understanding of the processes of media- and meaning-making at the level of both the (sub)social and the (sub)cultural.

[1] Robert Warshow, *The Immediate Experience: Movies, Comics, Theatre and Other Aspects of Popular Culture* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), 147.
[2] By knowledge, I am referring to representations of elite practitioners, products, performances, and meaning(s).
[3] My definition of ethos is taken from Clifford Geertz's: "[A] people's ethos is the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood; it is the underlying attitude toward themselves and their world that life reflects" (*The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays* [New York: Basic Books, 1973], 127). This ethos of conformity is not representative of an ideology. John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson, and Brian Roberts suggest that subcultures have ideological dimensions, but are not "ideological" ("Subcultures, cultures, and class," in *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain*, eds. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3-59, 35). Indeed, ideologies are comprised of numerous ideas, ideals, and beliefs that shape individuals' worldviews.
[4] Periods of transition are certainly worthy of future study.
[5] Expressions include "meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in mores and customs, in the uses of objects and material life" (Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4). While this definition does not explicitly define such expressions as art forms, it does follow that the use of objects to generate cultural meaning(s) would fit into that category. However, for the purposes of this writing, I am seeking to uncover subcultural media's relationship with internal and/or external media industries and economies.
[6] A tangential intention of this work is to provide a counterweight to the litany of depictions and descriptions of subcultures (both inside and outside the academy) as inherently resistant formations. More so, this work runs counter to analyses that suggest distinction is the principal mode of subcultural constitution. I attempt to reframe the discussion around subcultural conformity and constraint. To be sure, self-documenting subcultures are not necessarily directly opposed to unbounded expression. However, power structures within the aforementioned case studies certainly present and invest in conditions that delimit the boundaries of creativity and critique in service of those who control the agenda of media production.
[7] As opposed to infallible determinants of all behavior and thought within each subculture.
[8] Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, *Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 16.
[9] Media-makers of all tiers are subject to the virtual order if they seek distribution within their respective intracultural economy.
[10] The dominant order is "a collection of people, a group, characterized by a distinct set of patterns that are interwoven across a social organization" (Broom and Selznick, *Sociology*, 16).
[11] The idealization of the model franchise is akin to religious fanaticism. For a more detailed analysis of skateboarding and religion, see Paul O'Connor, *Skateboarding and Religion* (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). The intersections between religion and hardcore punk are examined by Francis Stewart in *Punk Rock is My Religion: Straight Edge Punk and Religious Identity* (London: Routledge, 2017). In terms of urban dirt-bike riding in Baltimore, for some time, weekly gatherings took place on Sunday with crowds greeting dirt-bike riders after church services. In this way, riding could be conceived of as ritualistic for both participants and crowds.
[12] I define conventions based on Howard Becker's use of the term: "[T]he shared ways of seeing and hearing that were known by everyone involved and thus formed the basis for their collective action" (*Art Worlds* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008], x). More specifically, Raymond Williams characterizes conventions as elements which "socially and historically determine and signify aesthetic and other situations" (*Marxism and Literature* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977], 157).
[13] See: Belinda Wheaton, "Selling Out?: the Commercialization and Globalization of Lifestyle Sport," in *The Global Politics of Sport: The Role of Global Institutions in Sport*, ed. Lincoln Allison (London: Routledge, 2005), 127-146, 142. Richard Peterson cites a similar issue in the country music industry (*Creating Country Music: Fabricating Authenticity* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997], 88).

[14] Anthony Giddens' work attends to this question by stating that the production or constitution of society, and thereby the rules and resource sets that comprise it, are never fully understood or comprehended by the members of it (*New Rules of Sociological Method*: *A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies* [London: Hutchinson & Co. 1976], 102).
[15] For the purposes of this text, the term media will refer to audio-visual images in both analog and digital form.
[16] While this may seem similar to the "do-it-yourself" ideal, these industries are actually highly commercialized. Future research is needed to explicate this differentiation.
[17] As argued throughout this text, subcultural media is similar to marketing material or promotional videos (highlight reels and recorded concerts) in contrast to documentary film and media. While some aspects may appear common between them — hand-held cameras for instance — industry videos should be understood as cultural products.
[18] Kameliya Encheva, Oliver Driessens, and Hans Verstaeten,"The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures: An Analysis of the Media-Related Practices of Graffiti Writers and Skaters," *MedieKultur: Journal of Media and Communication Research* 29, no. 54 (2013): 8–25, 20.
[19] Paul Hodkinson makes a similar observation in his book *Goth: Identity, Style and Subculture* (Oxford: Berg, 2002). He states that subcultural media, from fanzines to online discussion groups, connect people together and promote events, retailers, record labels, and bands (115).
[20] Characterized by a situation in which the "practical accomplishments of actors in a field are inherently connected to the visual apparatus available to them" (Niklas Woermann, "On the Slope Is on the Screen: Prosumption, Social Media Practices, and Scopic Systems in the Freeskiing Subculture," *American Behavioral Scientist* 56, no. 4 [2012]: 618-640, 632, 626).
[21] This is in direct reference to Dick Hebdige's *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (New York: Routledge, 2004 [1979]). Hebdige defines signifying practices as the combination of "experience, expression and signification" (126-127). However, rather than analyze style as a signifier, as Hebdige does, I instead treat the production of media as a set of distinct cultural expressions.
[22] Mark Stranger identifies a similar set of conditions in surfing culture: "[T]here is no part of the culture that has not been affected; no uncommodified space with which to contrast it" ("Surface and Substructure: Beneath Surfing's Commodified Surface," *Sport in Society* 13, no. 7-8 [2010]: 1117-1134, 1121). The subculture's internal consumer industry mediates the "collective consciousness" of its group members and is the prime transmitter of "images and meanings, myths and legends" (1120). The difference is that three major companies ("The Big Three") are not governed by "core" intracultural members, they merely placate them with "insider products", while promoting the culture to the mainstream public (1122).
[23] By cultural product, I am referring to the term as defined by Paul Hirsch: "'[N]onmaterial' goods directed at a public of consumers, for whom they generally serve an esthetic or expressive, rather than a clearly utilitarian function" ("Processing Fads and Fashions: An Organization-Set Analysis of Cultural Industry Systems," *Journal of Sociology* 77, no. 4 [January 1972]: 639-659, 641). Examples include movies, plays, books, and art prints (642).
[24] This is referred to as "mediated historicity" (John Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995], 4, 34). Robert Anthony Petrone stipulates that newly minted subcultural participants use media to learn up-to-date cultural information, whereas participants that are already established members tend to use media to clarify the present in terms of the past ("Shreddin' It Up: Re-thinking 'Youth' through the Logics of Learning and Literacy in a Skateboarding Community" [doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 2008], 183).
[25] Andrew Tudor, *Image and Influence: Studies in the Sociology of Film* (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1974), 218.
[26] Angela McRobbie and Sarah Thornton, "Rethinking 'Moral Panic' for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds," *The British Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (December 1995): 559-574, 570.

[27] William Ryan Force, "Consumption Styles and the Fluid Complexity of Punk Authenticity," *Symbolic Interaction* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 289-309, 294. I will also argue that magazines are secondary, because they render physical practices immobile and practitioners lifeless.
[28] Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (New York: The Free Press, 1955), 119.
[29] Hanno Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 10 (March 1993): 49-69, 60.
[30] I do not wish to claim that participants are explicitly aware of this ethos, merely that participants are conscious of the patterns in media production and meaning-making that are ingrained in the subculture.
[31] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4-5. Emphasis added.
[32] Douglas B. Holt, "Poststructuralist Lifestyle Analysis: Conceptualizing the Social Patterning of Consumption in Postmodernity," *Journal of Consumer Research* 23, no. 4 (March 1997): 326-350, 344.
[33] Stuart Hall, *Culture, Media, Language*, eds. Dorothy Hobson and Stuart Hall (London: Unwin Hyman, 1980).
[34] To be more specific, I refer to homology as the appropriation of objects, or in this case, formal production conventions that reflect the central ethos held by the dominant order. However, this is not to say that all aesthetic conventions are homologous to each subculture (Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 44). See also: David Hesmondhalgh, "Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above," *Journal of Youth Studies* 8, no. 1 (March 2005): 21-40, 31; and Paul Willis, who defines his study of profane cultures as the "examination of social groups" and "their preferred cultural items" (*Profane Culture* [London: Routledge, 1978], 192).
[35] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4.
[36] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4.
[37] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4.
[38] The forthcoming case studies investigate subcultures in North America. The economic system they exist within can most aptly be described as capitalistic, a system defined by the growing concentration of industrial and commercial capital by corporations across multiple sectors (Fredric Jameson, *The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998*. [London: Verso, 1998], 73). With respect to each subcultural media industry, capital is accrued through control over the production and distribution of cultural products (media). These subcultures are indeed subordinate but need not be thought of as completely oppositional to each formation's larger socio-cultural order.
[39] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), 130, 138. It is this stability that I will later reference as a fundamental trait of subcultures, in contrast to say a tribe or scene.
[40] John Schouten and James McAlexander, "Subcultures of Consumption: An Ethnography of the New Bikers," *Journal of Consumer Research* 22, no. 1 (June 1995): 43-61, 56.
[41] Distinction can be conceived of as a process that demarcates imbricated patterns of socio-cultural organization.
[42] Social (status) hierarchies are found in ethnographic studies of subcultures relative to sport, leisure, youth, and deviance. See: Schouten and McAlexander, "Subcultures of Consumption;" Barry Kinsey's work on drug-oriented subcultures ("Killum and Eatum: Identity Consolidation in Middle Class Poly-Drug Abuse Sub-Culture," *Symbolic Interaction* 5 [Fall]: 311-324); and Alan Klein's essay on bodybuilding communities ("Pumping Irony: Crisis and Contradiction in Bodybuilding," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 3 [June]: 112-133).
[43] Indeed, Paul Hodkinson suggests that the entwinement of media and commerce is commeasurable with a stable subculture built upon what he titles "cultural substance." This substance materializes as a "shared identity distinctiveness, commitment and relative autonomy" (*Goth*, 138). In lieu of describing cultural substance in its entirety, Hodkinson substitutes the term subcultures. Both typologies retain an internal and coherent set of "ideals and tastes" that form a "collective sense of distinction" (*Goth*, 29-30, 35). Subcultures maintain boundaries both externally between different subcultures and internally between insiders and "part-timers" (*Goth*, 62, 80).

[44] For instance, see: Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Jim Collins, *Uncommon Cultures: Popular Culture and Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Chris Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social* (London: Sage Publications, 2005).
[45] See: David Muggleton, *Inside Subculture: The Postmodern Meaning of Style* (Oxford: Berg, 2000); David Muggleton, "The Post-Subculturalist," in *The Club Cultures Reader: Readings in Popular Cultural Studies*, eds. Steve Redhead, Derek Wynne, and Justin O'Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 167-185; Rupert Weinzierl and David Muggleton, "What is 'Post-subcultural Studies' Anyway?," in *The Post-subcultures Reader*, eds. David Muggleton and Rupert Weinzierl (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 3-26; Michel Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society* (London: Sage, 1996); Mike Featherstone, *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism* (London: Sage, 1991).
[46] Broom and Selznick, *Sociology*, 55.
[47] Sarah Thornton, *Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 5. Again, subcultural members often view the manifestations of conformity (patterns of media and meaning) as integral to subcultural membership and traditional institutions (ways of doing and making).
[48] In the past, and without a central media industry, certain instantiations of subcultures were operationally different. See: Harold Levine and Steven Stumpf, "Statements of Fear Through Cultural Symbols: Punk Rock as a Reflective Subculture," *Youth and Society* 14, no. 4 (June 1983): 417-435; Stephen Baron, "Resistance and Its Consequences: The Street Culture of Punks," *Youth & Society* 21, no. 2 (December 1989): 207-237; and Ryan Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture: Cultures of Authenticity and Deconstruction," *The Communication Review* 7 (2004): 305–327. Today, when considering the impact of media in the formation and operations of self-documenting subcultures, those differences are marginal.
[49] Broom and Selznick, *Sociology*, 63. We shall also see that these limits do involve "variation[s] in conformity" (Robert Wood, "Threat Transcendence, Ideological Articulation, and Frame of Reference Reconstruction: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Subcultural Schism," *Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 21 [2000], 23-45, 26).
[50] Michael Atkinson and Brian Wilson, "Bodies, Subcultures and Sport," in *Theory, Sport & Society*, eds. Joseph Maguire and Kevin Young (Amsterdam: JAI Press, 2002), 375-396, 387.
[51] Certainly, unorthodox production practices and alternative conventions are introduced into the aesthetic and epistemic lexicon, however, they are not authorized or legitimated by the dominant order. Knowing the parameters is paramount to gaining access to the elite tier and maintaining this status. As such, some form of media literacy is required by all members of self-documenting subcultures so that the intentions of people are circumscribed and so too, their capabilities to act upon those intentions (Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984], 9).
[52] Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry: On Literature, Politics, and the Media* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 125.
[53] By self-documenting, I am referring to the primacy of this act over the previously distinctive activity of each subculture.
[54] Another important characteristic of self-documenting subcultures is the presence of social and media hierarchies that exist within them. However, this may not be universal.
[55] Lisa Gitelman, *Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 2006), 7.
[56] Gitelman, *Always Already New*, 7.
[57] Emily Chivers Yochim, *Skate Life: Re-imagining White Masculinity* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010).
[58] Yochim, *Skate Life*, 4.
[59] Yochim is interested in a group of skateboarders from Michigan. As such, while she refers to them as part of a corresponding culture, I explicitly state that skateboarding is a subculture.
[60] Yochim, *Skate Life*, 4. Specifically, she states that white, heteronormative masculinity is the prevailing ideology of skateboarding as a corresponding culture (4).

[61] *Video Cultures: Media Technology and Everyday Creativity*, eds. David Buckingham and Rebekah Willett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
[62] David Buckingham, "A Commonplace Art? Understanding Amateur Media Production," in *Video Cultures: Media Technology and Everyday Creativity*, eds. David Buckingham and Rebekah Willett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 23-50, 40.
[63] David Buckingham, Maria Pini, and Rebekah Willett, "'Take back the tube!' The Discursive Construction of Amateur Film- and Video-Making," in *Video Cultures: Media Technology and Everyday Creativity*, eds. David Buckingham and Rebekah Willett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 51-70, 58.
[64] Douglas Holt, "How Consumers Consume: A Typology of Consumption Practices," *Journal of Consumer Research* 22, no. 1 (June 1995): 1-16, note 2, 7.
[65] Hodkinson, *Goth*, 29, 109. However, Hodkinson privileges face-to-face interactions as the main factor in the acquisition and dissemination of subcultural capital (96).
[66] Eric Arnould and Craig Thompson, "Consumer Culture Theory (CCT): Twenty Years of Research," *Journal of Consumer Research* 31, no. 4 (March 2005): 868-882, 875; Hodkinson, *Goth*, 32.
[67] Schouten and McAlexander, "Subcultures of Consumption," 43.
[68] Schouten and McAlexander, "Subcultures of Consumption," 43.
[69] Schouten and McAlexander, "Subcultures of Consumption," 59.
[70] Arnould and Thompson, "Consumer Culture Theory," 869.
[71] Arnould and Thompson, "Consumer Culture Theory," 869. A considerable amount of research in this field is dedicated to looking at the "dynamics of fragmentation, plurality, fluidity, and the intermingling (or hybridization) of consumption traditions and ways of life" (869). See also: Featherstone's *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*.
[72] Arnould and Thompson, "Consumer Culture Theory," 870.
[73] Mica Nava, "Consumerism and Contradictions," *Cultural Studies* 1, no. 2 (1987): 204-210, 209-210. This is to say, enterprise often gets in the way of subcultural ideals. Self-documenting subcultures are not necessarily directly opposed to unbounded expression or capitalistic practices; however, I do argue that the dominant order (in these case studies in particular) invest in conditions that delimit the boundaries of creativity and critique.
[74] Peter Donnelly, "Toward a Definition of Sport Subcultures," in *Sport in the Sociocultural Process*, eds. Mabel Marie Hart and Susan Birrell (Dubuque: W.C. Brown Company, 1981), 565-587.
[75] Angela McRobbie, "Second-Hand Dresses and the Role of the Rag Market," in *The Subcultures Reader*, 2nd edition, ed. Ken Gelder (London: Routledge, 2005), 132-142, 139, 137.
[76] McRobbie, "Second-Hand Dresses," 134, 132. These markets also function as meeting sites for the dissemination of cultural knowledge and the distribution of goods (132-133).
[77] Hodkinson, *Goth*, 146.
[78] Richard Peterson and N. Anand, "The Production of Culture Perspective," *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): 311-334, 317.
[79] According to Thornton, various forms of media are essential to the formation and development of these rave and dance subcultures (*Club Cultures*, 163-164).
[80] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 117, 161. Thornton is interested in both niche- or micro-media.
[81] A clear distinction between this text and Sarah Thornton's work is her use of the term "subcultural ideology". She explains that a subcultural ideology consists of shared ideals and a collective understanding within the subculture (*Club Cultures*, 232). Subcultural ideologies fulfill the cultural agenda of those who disseminate such ideals and understandings (Sarah Thornton, "The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital," in *The Subcultures Reader*, eds. Ken Gelder and Sarah Thornton. London: Routledge, 1997, 200-209, 201). In this context, my argument pertaining to the effects of the dominant order's control over the agenda of media production is in concert with her conclusion.
[82] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 151, 118, 161. Thornton claims this also occurs when the mass or mainstream media ("communications media") label them as subcultural members (*Club Cultures*, 162). Within club cultures, the circulation of cultural knowledge occurs through insider or niche-media (*Club Cultures*,

118). The accumulation of subcultural capital, based on the production and consumption of this media, distinguishes members internally (Thomas Leigh, Cara Peters, and Jeremy Shelton, "The Consumer Quest for Authenticity: The Multiplicity of Meanings Within the MG Subculture of Consumption," *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science* 34, no. 4 [2006]: 481-493, 483).
83 Thornton, "The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital," 201.
84 Thornton, "The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital," 203.
85 Thornton, "The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital," 203, 208-209. Emphasis added. The critical difference between her work and Pierre Bourdieu's book is that class is not a determining factor for Thornton (Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984]).
86 This is in contrast to Thompson's optimistic opinion (*The Media and Modernity*, 211).
87 Thornton does reference cultural hierarchies while discussing the differences between internal members and the mainstream, which dictates certain conceptions of authenticity and artificiality (*Club Cultures*, 3-4).
88 Thornton, "The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital," 203.
89 Kathryn Joan Fox, "Real Punks and Pretenders: The Social Organization of a Counterculture," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 16, no. 3 (October 1987): 344-370, 350. Her analysis of each typology's status and designation is based on a participant's "perceived commitment" to the subculture (344-345, 350).
90 Fox, "Real Punks and Pretenders," 350.
91 Fox, "Real Punks and Pretenders," 350. But this deference appeals to softcore members as well. Preppie punks aspire to reach the next smaller, inner ring (350).
92 Fox, "Real Punks and Pretenders," 360. This is ironic since these same members cite a "distrust of authority" (352).
93 Hodkinson, *Goth*, 80
94 Fox, "Real Punks and Pretenders," 365.
95 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, "Adolescents' Uses of Media for Self-Socialization," *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 24, no. 5 (1995): 519-533, 526. Hodkinson asserts that a similar infrastructure exists in the goth subculture as well (*Goth*, 32). Additionally, it should also be noted that Hodkinson references the existence of "semicommercial and voluntary activities" within higher intracultural tiers (*Goths*, 32).
96 Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, 123. The elite practitioners are gatekeepers as well, selecting what actions to perform in front of the camera. Whereas, elite media-makers choose whether to record such actions at all. I argue the latter is more important because practitioners rely on media-makers to promote or make themselves culturally visible. In this sense practitioners are subordinate to media-makers.
97 Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 63.
98 Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 211. Thompson clarifies that by face-to-face, he is referring to persons that are in a "context of co-presence" in which they share a common spatio-temporal "reference system" (82, 22).
99 For more on the advent and history of consumer and prosumer audio-visual technology, see: Rebekah Willett, "In the Frame: Mapping Camcorder Cultures," in *Video Cultures: Media Technology and Everyday Creativity*, eds. David Buckingham and Rebekah Willett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1-22.
100 Media is a tool of control that can influence "action at a distance" (Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 82, 114).
101 As such, industry videos conceal the commercial messages by foregrounding the activity itself.
102 Jeff Ferrell, Dragan Milovanovic, and Stephen Lyng, "Edgework, Media Practices, and The Elongation of Meaning," *Theoretical Criminology* 5, no. 2 (2001): 177-202, 178.
103 This first half of this phrase is taken from Hanno Hardt's work ("Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 59-60). The subsumption of distinction and the elevation of conformity as a defining feature of each subculture's constitution was another factor.

[104] The production and distribution of knowledge is necessary to the continuation and growth of the socio-cultural formation.
[105] Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 60.
[106] Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 53, 55.
[107] Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 57. I define agency not as the "intentions people have in doing things", rather, it is "their capability of doing those things in the first place" (Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 9). More specifically, agency is "the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world". This suggests that events in the world are not predetermined. In addition, there exist multiple scenarios of action or inaction that *could* take place (*New Rules of Sociological Method*, 75).
[108] Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 62. The relationship between power and agency (action and inaction) is inextricable. According to Giddens, action inherently involves an individual's "'means' to achieve outcomes, brought about through the direct intervention of an actor in the course of events" (*New Rules of Sociological Method*, 110). Power is the ability to mobilize resources to produce the "means" to enable or constrain actions (*New Rules of Sociological Method*, 110).
[109] Wood, "Threat Transcendence," 27. Sarah Thornton describes a similar situation in club cultures in which a cluster of subcultures share territorial affiliation, but maintain their own dress codes, dance styles, music genres and catalogue of authorized and illicit rituals" ("The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital," 200).
[110] Wood, "Threat Transcendence," 27.
[111] Claude Fischer, "Towards a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism," *American Journal of Sociology* 80, no. 6 (May 1975): 1319-1341.
[112] Fischer's essay is an attempt to clarify whether one's physical environment contributes to social relations, including a city's influence in the formation of subcultures ("Towards a Subcultural Theory," 1319, 1324). Fischer defines the term subculture as a distinct social subsystem composed of interpersonal networks and institutions with a "set of modal beliefs, values, norms, and customs" that differ from the larger social system (1323).
[113] Fischer, "Towards a Subcultural Theory," 1323.
[114] Fischer, "Towards a Subcultural Theory," 1325. He continues, "[t]he more urban a place, the greater its subcultural variety" (1324).
[115] Fischer, "Towards a Subcultural Theory," 1325, 1327.
[116] Encheva, Driessens, and Verstaeten, "The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures," 8.
[117] Encheva, Driessens, and Verstaeten, "The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures," 13.
[118] Encheva, Driessens, and Verstaeten, "The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures," 21.
[119] This is in contrast to the production of zines, which does not operate under this pretense. See: Chris Atton, *Alternative Media* (London: Sage Publications, 2002).
[120] Bob Edwards and Ugo Corte define commercialization as a "multifaceted process conducted by multiple collective and individual actors" ("Commercialization and Lifestyle Sport: Lessons from 20 Years of Freestyle BMX in 'Pro-Town, USA'," *Sport in Society* 13, no. 7-8 [2010]: 1135-1151, 1135-1137).
[121] Edwards and Corte, "Commercialization and Lifestyle Sport," 1142.
[122] Richard Peterson and David Berger define vertical integration as the "total production flow from raw materials to wholesale sales" ("Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music," *American Sociological Review* 40, no. 2 (April 1975): 158-173,162).
[123] For a similar proposition, see: Encheva, Driessens, and Verstaeten, "The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures," 10.
[124] Woermann, "On the Slope Is on the Screen," 633.
[125] Lawrence Grossberg, *MediaMaking: Mass Media in a Popular Culture*, 2nd edition, eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Ellen Artella, D. Charles Whitney, and J. Macgregor Wise (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 2006), 7.
[126] Grossberg, *MediaMaking*, 15.

[127] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 94-95, 128.
[128] Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 60.
[129] Woermann, "On the Slope Is on the Screen," 626.
[130] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 35.
[131] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 29; Grossberg, *MediaMaking*, 15.
[132] As I will later detail, this includes the creative arrangement of shots, sequences, and scenes in a preferred order, thereby creating meaningful effects through graphic, rhythmic, spatial, and temporal juxtapositions.
[133] Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 228.
[134] Depending on the subculture, this often manifests as "for the good of the collective" or maintaining intracultural ownership, rather than inviting in external appropriation.
[135] Michael Beverland, "Brand Management and the Challenge of Authenticity," *Journal of Product & Brand Management* 14, no. 7 (2005): 460-461, 461.
[136] Beverland, "Brand Management and the Challenge of Authenticity," 461.
[137] How a formula becomes institutionalized is an inquiry for another text.
[138] John Cawelti, *The Six-Gun Mystique* (Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Press, 1995), 25.
[139] Force, "Consumption Styles and the Fluid Complexity of Punk Authenticity," 290.
[140] Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 207.
[141] Joseph Kasof, "Explaining Creativity: the Attributional Perspective," *Creativity Research Journal* 8 (1995): 311-366, 366.
[142] Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 33. Peterson's study of country music argues there is a dialectic of influence that occurs between "performers, diverse commercial interests, fans, and the evolving image" (6). This is in contrast to this text. However, we both agree there is an interplay between aesthetic and commercial interests (155).
[143] Theo Van Leeuwen, "What is Authenticity?," *Discourse Studies* 3, no. 4 (November 2001): 392-397, 393, 396.
[144] Brian Moeran, "Tricks of the Trade: The Performance and Interpretation of Authenticity," *Journal of Management Studies* 42, no. 5 (July 2005): 901-922, 920. Such a positioned is also echoed by Kasof in "Explaining Creativity."
[145] Belinda Wheaton and Becky Beal, "'Keeping it Real': Subcultural Media and the Discourses of Authenticity in Alternative Sport," *International Journal for The Sociology of Sport* 38, no. 2 (2003): 155-176, 172.
[146] An ethos of conformity is not the sole meaning proffered by industry-approved conventions, however, it is the *preferred* meaning of the dominant order. In other words, conformity benefits those that control the agenda of media production, and thus, the agenda of commodity production (Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 59-60). Authenticity, in this sense, is not the opposite of conformity, rather, it is a resource used by the dominant order. In short, an attribution of authenticity indicates whether a piece of media is compliant with industry standards.
[147] Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 220.
[148] Norbert Elias and John Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems*, 2nd edition (London: Sage Publications, 1994), xliii, xxiii.
[149] Hirsch, "Processing Fads and Fashions," 639.
[150] Hirsch, "Processing Fads and Fashions," 642. Hirsch uses the term network, but for already established reasons, systems within self-documenting subcultures are governed by hierarchies.
[151] Hirsch, "Processing Fads and Fashions," 640.
[152] Hirsch, "Processing Fads and Fashions," 643-644. Although Hirsch perceives artists and gatekeepers as separate, in self-documenting subcultures they are frequently one and the same (644).
[153] Hirsch refers to this as "value added" ("Processing Fads and Fashions," 642, 649).
[154] Peterson and Anand, "The Production of Culture Perspective," 311.
[155] Michael Beverland, "Crafting Brand Authenticity: the Case of Luxury Wines," *Journal of Management Studies* 42, no. 5 (July 2005): 1003-1029, 1025; Michael Beverland, "The 'Real Thing':

Branding Authenticity in the Luxury Wine Trade," *Journal of Business Research* 59 (2006): 251-258, 257.
156 Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 111.
157 Beverland, "Crafting Brand Authenticity," 1008, 1025; Force, "Consumption Styles and the Fluid Complexity of Punk Authenticity," 306.
158 Jacques Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible: Politics and Aesthetics," in *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (New York: Continuum, 2004), 12-45, 12.
159 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 12, 42.
160 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 12.
161 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 12, 13.
162 Jacques Rancière, "Literature, Politics, Aesthetics: Approaches to Democratic Disagreement," *SubStance* 29, no. 2 (2000): 3-24, 4.
163 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 12.
164 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 13.
165 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 13, 18.
166 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 14.
167 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 13.
168 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 20.
169 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 14.
170 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 20-21.
171 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 21.
172 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 32.
173 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 21-22.
174 Rancière, "The Distribution of the Sensible," 22.
175 Becker, *Art Worlds*, 230.
176 Becker, *Art Worlds*, 134.
177 Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 29.
178 Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins, *Reading National Geographic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 201.
179 Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 232.
180 Lutz and Collins, *Reading National Geographic, 117.*
181 Thomas Schatz, "Film Genre and the Genre Film," in *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*, 7th edition, eds. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 564-575, 568.
182 Cawelti, *The Six-Gun Mystique*, 25. Cawelti suggests that Western capitalism suppresses the creation of individual art and engenders the standardization of formal conventions.
183 Thomas Schatz, *Hollywood Genres: Formulas, Filmmaking, and The Studio System* (New York: Random House, 1981), 6.
184 Cawelti, *The Six-Gun Mystique*, 25.
185 Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 120.
186 Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 180, 114.
187 Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 113-114.
188 To be sure, I do not intend to compare every feature of Pudovkin's editing theories with subcultural media. I wish to merely map the parallels of Pudovkin's notions of constructive editing and creative geography with certain conventions found in the production of media within self-documenting subcultures.
189 Peter Dart, *Pudovkin's Films and Film Theory* (New York: Arno Press, 1974), 89. Shots are images of recorded reality, a manipulated version of the world that is limited and focused. Constraints imposed by the recording apparatus, like the image's frame, focal length, camera angle or lens, provide a narrow and directed view of the world.

[190] Vsevolod Pudovkin, *Film Technique and Film Acting*, trans. and ed. Ivor Montagu (New York: Grove Press, 1960), 31.
[191] Paul Burns, "Linkage: Pudovkin's Classics Revisited," *Journal of Popular Film & Television* 9, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 70-77, 70.
[192] Amy Sargeant, *Vsevolod Pudovkin: Classic Films of the Soviet Avant-Garde* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), 87.
[193] Dart, *Pudovkin's Films and Film Theory*, 117.
[194] Vsevolod Pudovkin, *Vsevolod Pudovkin: Selected Essays*, trans. Richard Taylor and Evgeni Filippov, ed. Richard Taylor (Oxford: Seagull Books, 2006), 78.
[195] Pudovkin, *Vsevolod Pudovkin: Selected Essays*, 18.
[196] Pudovkin, *Film Technique and Film Acting*, 113-114; Vsevolod Pudovkin, "Introduction to the German Edition," in *Film Technique*, trans. Ivor Montagu (London: George Newnes Limited, 1933), xiii-xviii, xv.
[197] Sargeant, *Vsevolod Pudovkin*, 100.
[198] Pudovkin, *Film Technique and Film Acting*, 90, 100.
[199] Pudovkin, *Film Technique and Film Acting*, 86.
[200] Pudovkin, "Introduction to the German Edition," xv.
[201] Dart, *Pudovkin's Films and Film Theory*, 91.
[202] Pudovkin, *Film Technique and Film Acting*, 89-90.
[203] Pudovkin, *Vsevolod Pudovkin: Selected Essays*, 71, 61.
[204] Pudovkin, *Vsevolod Pudovkin: Selected Essays*, 84, 87.
[205] Pudovkin, *Vsevolod Pudovkin: Selected Essays*, 8-9.
[206] Pudovkin, *Film Technique and Film Acting*, 132.
[207] Dart, *Pudovkin's Films and Film Theory*, 118.
[208] Dart, *Pudovkin's Films and Film Theory*, 93.
[209] Arnould and Thompson, "Consumer Culture Theory," 875.
[210] Angela McRobbie, "Settling Accounts with Subcultures: A Feminist Critique," in *Culture, Ideology and Social Process*, eds. Tony Bennett, Graham Martin, Coli Mercer, and Janet Woollacott (Maidenhead: The Open University Press, 1981), 111-124, 121.
[211] McRobbie and Thornton, "Rethinking 'Moral Panic'," 571.
[212] Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, 52, 62.
[213] Thomas O'Guinn and L. J. Shrum, "The Role of Television in the Construction of Consumer Reality," *Journal of Consumer Research* 23, no. 4 (March 1997): 278-294, 291. The authors investigate television programming and its role in providing consumers/viewers with manipulated information and representations of the material world (278-279).
[214] As stated, authenticity is a renewable resource that is conferred based upon compliance. Cultural producers employ the virtual order's formula for editing industry videos. If followed, the formula presupposes the attribution of authenticity. Inauthenticity is the absence or lack of authenticity as a resource and authoritative claim. The role of authenticity is also indicative of the importance of media literacy within self-documenting subcultures.
[215] Michael Clarke, "On the Concept of 'Sub-Culture," *The British Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 4 (December 1974): 428-441, 429.
[216] An emphasis is placed on the specificity and autonomy of practices that are germane to each case study.
[217] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 4.
[218] Winston chooses to use the term development over invention because he defines the latter term as the final stage of a technology's adoption by society (Brian Winston. "How are Media Born?," in *Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd edition, eds. John Downing, Ali Mohammadi, and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi [California: Sage, 1995], 54-74, 68, 62).
[219] Brian Winston, *Media Technology and Society, A History: From the Telegraph to the Internet* (London: Routledge Press, 1998), 2.

[220] Winston, "How are Media Born?," 64-65. According to Winston, a catalyst known as a "supervening social necessity" brings about collective innovation (*Media Technology and Society*, 6). A single or multiple supervening social necessities explain why at a point in time a device is considered viable and put to use ("How are Media Born?," 68).
[221] Development involves three "transformations", each dependent upon specific factors. The first transformation appeals to competence (science). There must be some knowledge within society (social sphere) that posits the use of a technology for it to move from an idea to "technological performance". For an idea to take hold, the "constraints of culture" (limits and pressures) must not impede the technologists' minds (Winston, *Media Technology and Society*, 4-5). The second transformation entails the collective generalized social forces (supervening social necessity) providing the agency for which the technology may develop, including, but not limited to, three sub-types: another technology creating the urgency to innovate further; addressing the perceived needs of a society by directly innovating technology that offers similar affordances of a previous, existing technology (albeit he acknowledges that this is difficult to discern); and "strictly commercial" development, where corporations define the need for new products. Yet, Winston is careful to mention supervening social necessities are not the sole causal factor of development. The second transformation creates "fertile ground" or facilitates the process of innovation (*Media Technology and Society*, 9). This process can be affected by an accelerator but also by a brake, the third transformation. Brakes "slow the rate of diffusion", thereby allowing for society to adjust to any fundamental changes (Winston, *Media Technology and* Society, 11).
[222] Winston, "How are Media Born?," 69.
[223] Winston, *Media Technology and* Society, 11. Factors such as "inertia, lack of vision, institutional constraints" are some examples of this impediment (58).
[224] Winston, *Media Technology and* Society, 11.
[225] Winston, *Media Technology and* Society, 11.
[226] Such a structure is partially representative of the political-economic system each media industry exists within.
[227] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 17.
[228] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 16-17.
[229] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 145. The term "causal-functional" is problematic because he espouses his many issues with functionalism in the book.
[230] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 145.
[231] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 145.
[232] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 164, 169.
[233] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 145.
[234] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 145.
[235] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 20, 5.
[236] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 52.
[237] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 27.
[238] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 28.
[239] Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 39.
[240] Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 218.
[241] Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 169, 25. I choose not to extend his theory of structuration that is described at length in this work, because, as he acknowledges, structuration theory is built upon social interaction models (25). However, a key portion of this theory asserts that structure is both enabling and constraining (169). Furthermore, as Giddens notes, the structuration theory is "incomplete" without being linked to a "conception of social science as critical theory" (287).
[242] Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*, 121; Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 185.
[243] Broom and Selznick, *Sociology*, 16.
[244] Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*, 121.
[245] By volunteering to undergo the socialization process, members are subject to the dominant order within each subculture. Aspiring or current members of the elite tier (the main focus of this text) are

socially and financially incentivized to maintain the status quo (the dominant order). The presence of both social and media hierarchies compels members to comply or risk expulsion from the subculture. Later in the chapter, there is a more thorough discussion of members' pragmatic acceptance and apathetic resignation in relation to these conditions (section 4.6). To be clear, however, "*no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practical human energy, and human intention*" (Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 125).

246 Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*, 111; Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 257.

247 Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*, 75, 110.

248 Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 18.

249 Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, xxxi, 18.

250 Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, xxxi.

251 Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 16.

252 Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 309.

253 Giddens classifies norms as a sub-category of rules. Rules elicit other entities beyond norms, such as morals and morays (*New Rules of Sociological Method*, 114).

254 For instance, Paul Willis' understanding of structure and determination is class-based, whereas, this text argues that members opt into such conditions (*Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1981], 171, 173-174, 202). Willis defines structuralism as the process in which an individual becomes a social subject within a cultural community (amongst other factors), and how this pre-determined social position supplies a "set of future possibilities" ("Cultural Production and Theories of Reproduction," in *Race, Class and Education*, eds. Len Barton and Stephen Walker [London: Croom Helm, 1983], 112). These limitations manifest in issues related to race, gender, and sexuality (Willis, *Learning to Labor*, 174).

255 Willis, "Cultural Production and Theories of Reproduction," 128, 112.

256 Willis, *Profane Culture*, 43. Willis discusses instances in which certain "profane cultures" reproduce values or norms of their "parent culture" (8).

257 Albert Cohen, "A General Theory of Subcultures," in *The Subcultures Reader*, 2nd edition, ed. Ken Gelder (London: Routledge, 2005), 50-59, 56. Geertz refers to a similar notion when discussing one's "world view", which constitutes knowledge of the social order: "[A] picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society" (*The Interpretation of Culture*, 127).

258 Cohen, "A General Theory of Subcultures," 56.

259 Cohen, "A General Theory of Subcultures," 54.

260 Wood, "Threat Transcendence," 27.

261 Hodkinson, *Goth*, 173, 146-147.

262 Richard Peterson, "The Production of Culture," *American Behavioral Scientist* 19, no. 6 (July/August 1976): 669-684, 672.

263 Peterson and Anand, "The Production of Culture Perspective," 311.

264 See: Peterson and Anand, "The Production of Culture Perspective," 324; and Peterson and Berger, "Cycles in Symbol Production."

265 Peterson and Berger, "Cycles in Symbol Production," 167.

266 Peterson and Berger, "Cycles in Symbol Production," 158-159.

267 Paul DiMaggio, "Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston: the Creation of an Organizational Base for High Culture in America," *Media, Culture and Society* 4 (1982): 33-50, 38.

268 DiMaggio, "Cultural Entrepreneurship," 38.

269 DiMaggio, "Cultural Entrepreneurship," 33, 35.

270 DiMaggio, "Cultural Entrepreneurship," 33.

271 DiMaggio, "Cultural Entrepreneurship," 45.

272 Broom and Selznick, *Sociology*, 31.

273 Peterson and Berger, "Cycles in Symbol Production," 158.

274 Peterson and Berger, "Cycles in Symbol Production," 159, 169.

275 Peterson and Berger, "Cycles in Symbol Production," 159, 169.

[276] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 30. Thompson acknowledges that cultural products need not circulate amongst a vast swath of people, but merely be in heavy circulation amongst a few (31).
[277] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 27, 29.
[278] Arnett, "Adolescents' Uses of Media for Self-Socialization," 519. See also: O'Guinn and Shrum, "The Role of Television in the Construction of Consumer Reality."
[279] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 158. Primary socialization occurs from birth via institutions such as the family, the education system, and mass media.
[280] Arnett, "Adolescents' Uses of Media for Self-Socialization," 526.
[281] Arnett, "Adolescents' Uses of Media for Self-Socialization," 526.
[282] The book focuses on the socio-cultural factors of art worlds, which span the processes of production, distribution, and consumption. These processes determine the conditions of profane collaboration.
[283] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 306.
[284] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 138.
[285] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 229. An art world is described by Becker as an "ensemble of people who do something together" that entails "real people who are trying to get things done, largely by getting other people to do things that will assist them in their project" (379). However, Becker also issues a caveat stating that, at times, artists do not always work co-operatively (67).
[286] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 35, 29, 131. Becker is careful to mention that these standards are at times consciously and unconsciously determined (199).
[287] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 203.
[288] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 202.
[289] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 197.
[290] Diana Crane, "Reward Systems in Art, Science, and Religion," *American Behavioral Scientist* 19, no. 6 (July/August 1976): 719-734, 733.
[291] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 34.
[292] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 231.
[293] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 306.
[294] Becker, *Art Worlds*, 129.
[295] Crane cites the work of Peterson and Berger ("Cycles in Symbol Production"), as an example of such a process. The record industry limited the range of innovations by enabling a small coterie of firms to control the merchandising and distribution of records with little incentive to innovative (Crane, "Reward Systems," 727).
[296] Crane, "Reward Systems," 720.
[297] Crane, "Reward Systems," 726.
[298] Crane, "Reward Systems," 726.
[299] Crane, "Reward Systems," 726.
[300] Joshua Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 66.
[301] Kai Erikson, "Notes on the Sociology of Deviance," *Social Problems* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1962): 307-314, 310.
[302] Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism: Three Reference Points in The Philosophy of Science," in *Reflexive Methodology*, 2nd edition (London: Sage Publications, 2012), 15-52, 16.
[303] Berger and Luckmann's book is interested in the "knowledge that guides" the comportment of individuals within everyday life (*The Social Construction of Reality*, 19). Indeed, any theory of society must come to terms with the question of how knowledge in society is created ("[Post-]Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 35).
[304] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 16.
[305] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 26.
[306] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 26.
[307] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 5-6.

[308] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4.
[309] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4.
[310] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 26.
[311] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 26.
[312] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 26.
[313] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 61.
[314] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 33.
[315] Broom and Selznick, *Sociology*, 31.
[316] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 26.
[317] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 20.
[318] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 89.
[319] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 22.
[320] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 33, 43, 41.
[321] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 65.
[322] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 54, 28.
[323] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 31. Although the authors indicate that this process of determination occurs primarily through face-to-face interactions (31).
[324] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 54.
[325] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 54; Broom and Selznick, *Sociology*, 31.
[326] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 65.
[327] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 65-66.
[328] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 116.
[329] An individual possesses knowledge when they concede to the objectification of reality and take part in its production (Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 66).
[330] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 196; Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 93.
[331] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 197, 180.
[332] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 198.
[333] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 107.
[334] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 121.
[335] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 28.
[336] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 28.
[337] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 28; Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 55.
[338] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 93.
[339] Certain knowledge can be legitimized and signify different things at different times (Alvesson and Sköldberg, "[Post-]Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 27).
[340] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 15. One of the objectives of Berger and Luckmann's book is to explicate the knowledge of everyday life, to understand the objectifications of subjective realities, objectives processes, and symbolic meanings. Essentially, the authors have sought to understand the objective macro relationships of the social with the subjective micro relationships of the personal (Alvesson and Sköldberg, "[Post-] Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 25).
[341] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "(Post-)Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 24-25.
[342] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "Critical Theory: the Political and Ideological Dimension," in *Reflexive Methodology*, 2nd edition. London: Sage Publications, 2012, 179-221, 145. It should be noted that social constructionism does not necessarily agree with the concepts of alienation and false consciousness (Alvesson and Sköldberg, "[Post-] Positivism, Social Constructionism, Critical Realism," 27).
[343] Hana Fenichel Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," *Theory and Society* 16, no. 2 (March 1987): 263-293, 285.
[344] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 89.

[345] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 89, 64.
[346] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 64.
[347] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 136.
[348] Paddy Scannell, "Benjamin Contextualized: On 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'," in *Canonic Texts in Media Research*, eds. Elihu Katz, John Durham Peters, Tamar Liebes, and Avril Orloff (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), 74-89, 83.
[349] György Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), 88-89.
[350] Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 136.
[351] Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 236.
[352] Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 270.
[353] At the center of Lukács', at times, moving target is the "mechanization of work and the assembly-line nature of labor and life (Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 265, 271-272).
[354] Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 265, 271, 273.
[355] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 89; Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 271. Berger and Luckmann argue that reification is a universal phenomenon that begins during infancy and continues through maturation. However, reification can be educated out of one's consciousness (Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 27).
[356] Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 278.
[357] Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 275; Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 89
[358] Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 281.
[359] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 100.
[360] To be clear, rarely, if ever, did the following theorists refer to themselves by this nomenclature.
[361] Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, (New York: Continuum, 1997), 26-48, 36. Modern society is governed by reason, which privileges social interests over the individual's "natural wants" ("The End of Reason," 29). Moreover, individuals align their actions with "objective ends" that are engendered by reason ("The End of Reason," 47). Reification only further debilitates the subjective interests of the individual by relegating the notion of the self to one's socio-economic relation ("The End of Reason," 37).
[362] Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. by Edmund Jephcott, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 18. This type of reason is rooted in action, which helps us progress from a starting point to a conclusion — the rational means to certain ends we want to achieve. This type of reason is not directed to discovering "truthful" statements about the world.
[363] Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 3.
[364] Herbert Marcuse. *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 10. The "sheer *quantity* of goods, services, work, and recreation" represses and restricts the individual (242).
[365] Marcuse traces the concept of individualism from the Enlightenment to modern technological society. Individualism used to be characterized as the "pursuit of self-interest", whereas self-interest today is considered coterminous with rationality (Herbert Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1997), 138-162, 138-141, 157.
[366] Nava, "Consumerism and Contradictions," 205.
[367] Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," 146.
[368] Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 21, 29, 115.
[369] Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 11, 88, 7-8.
[370] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "Critical Theory: the Political and Ideological Dimension," 145. Although this brings up a major critique in that Critical Theory presupposes individuals in society share similar, conscious reactions to various cultural products (158).
[371] Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 218.

[372] Theodor Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, ed. J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991), 160.
[373] Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 94, 97.
[374] Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 61, 108.
[375] Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, 137, 101. According to Scannell, Adorno linked autonomous art with freedom from the Culture Industry. This type of art applies its own internal rules "free from heteronomous constraint" like the profit motives of the Culture Industry ("Benjamin Contextualized," 85).
[376] Theodor Adorno and Anson Rabinbach, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," *New German Critique*, no. 6 (Autumn 1975): 12-19, 12.
[377] Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 129. This is also why the authors privilege the notion of the avant-garde, a seemingly complete rejection of prescriptive formulae.
[378] Adorno and Rabinbach, "Culture Industry Reconsidered," 19.
[379] Pitkin, "Rethinking Reification," 273. To be clear, members rarely consider the system of media production as a threat to their individuality.
[380] Peterson and Berger, "Cycles in Symbol Production," 161.
[381] Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 59-60.
[382] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 66.
[383] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 66.
[384] Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 2.
[385] Alvesson and Sköldberg, "Critical Theory: the Political and Ideological Dimension," 167.
[386] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 4. Enzensberger states control over the means of production is not the main source of systematic oppression anymore (*The Consciousness Industry*, 11).
[387] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 7-10.
[388] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 11.
[389] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 4-5.
[390] Specifically, film and television (Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 97).
[391] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 105.
[392] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 97.
[393] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 97.
[394] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 113, 12-13.
[395] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 97.
[396] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 104.
[397] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 14.
[398] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 107.
[399] Enzensberger, *The Consciousness Industry*, 13.
[400] Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*, 111.
[401] James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 45.
[402] Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 10.
[403] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 30-31. As the forthcoming discussion will demonstrate, hegemony is multifaceted. However, the definition provided is a basic understanding of the term.
[404] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 60, 55; Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in *Culture, Ideology and Social Process: A Reader*, eds. Tony Bennett, Graham Martin, Colin Mercer, and Jane Woollacott (Maidenhead: The Open University, 1981), 219-234, 226-227.
[405] Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 85. Other forms of voluntary membership that Scott cites include religious orders, in which there is an accepted subservience to the principles of the dominant socio-cultural order (note 33, 82). Subordination, however, can appear legitimate under either circumstance (Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 85).
[406] The "thick theory of hegemony" supposes that domination is achieved through active consent of the subordinate group (Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 72).

[407] Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 72. To be certain, Scott foresees the idea that even if domination is perceived as inevitable, resistance to such conditions is not out of the realm of possibility (*Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 79-80). However, as I have attempted to point out, within self-documenting subcultures, such possibilities are severely limited.
[408] Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 74.
[409] Michael Mann, "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," *American Sociological Review* 25, no. 3 (June 1970): 423-439, 425; Michael Mann, *Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 31.
[410] Mann, *Consciousness and Action*, 39.
[411] Gramsci's work tends to lay out the condition for social change, whereas my focus is on the exercise of power that comes with stability.
[412] Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, "Preface," in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), ix-xvi, xiv. This shift is also echoed in Chantal Mouffe's understanding of hegemony ("Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," 221).
[413] Tony Bennett, Graham Martin, Colin Mercer and Jane Woollacott, "Antonio Gramsci," in *Culture, Ideology and Social Process: A Reader*, eds. Tony Bennett, Graham Martin, Colin Mercer, and Jane Woollacott (Maidenhead: The Open University, 1981), 191-218, 199.
[414] Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," 224. For instance, Gramsci called this earlier version of hegemony "vulgar materialism" (Bennett, et al, "Antonio Gramsci," 192.
[415] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 180-183.
[416] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 180-185.
[417] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 324-325.
[418] Gramsci refers to ideology under similar terms but tends to frame the latter as a "certain set of ideas and assumptions that become the dominant material forces in society" (Bennett, et al, "Antonio Gramsci," 207). Rather than examine an entire set of ideas and assumptions, I instead choose to look at a single, central ethos that is pervasive in all three self-documenting subcultures.
[419] Gramsci specifically cites schools, churches, etc. (Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," 226-227).
[420] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 29.
[421] Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere*, Volume 2, ed. V. Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), 1380; Bennett, et al, "Antonio Gramsci," 92; and Mouffe. "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," 225.
[422] Gramsci discusses the notion of the "collective will", which is the cement that binds and gives expression to the bloc (Mouffe. "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," 225; Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 57). Under the behest of the dominant order, the collective will is transformed into a "hegemonic principle" (Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," 231). This principle can best be understood in relation to self-documenting subcultures as the ethos of conformity.
[423] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 360.
[424] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 366.
[425] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 104. Gramsci, at times, even refers to the elite as "entrepreneurs" (Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 5, 12).
[426] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders*, xliii, xxiii.
[427] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders*, xxxix.
[428] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders*, 152.
[429] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 61.
[430] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders*, 151.
[431] Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, 62.
[432] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders*, xviii.
[433] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders*, xxxix.

[434] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders,* 152; Thompson, *The Media and Modernity,* 210.
[435] Elias and Scotson, *The Established and the Outsiders,* 151.
[436] Recall that the we-ideal is the model franchise and the we-image is the established formal conventions found in the model franchise's videos.
[437] William Sewell, Jr., "The Concept(s) of Culture," in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture,* eds. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 35-61, 56.
[438] By maps of meaning, I am referring to "definitions of the world", which express the lifestyle and relations of those who exercise power in a socio-cultural order. This power translates into both influence and legitimacy (Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 5).
[439] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 29.
[440] Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 61, 56. See also, Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, 90.
[441] Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, 50-53.
[442] Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 115-116.
[443] Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 116.
[444] Robert Ulin, "Invention and Representation as Cultural Capital: Southwest French Winegrowing History," *American Anthropologist* 97, no. 3 (September 1995): 519-527, 526. Ulin refers to this as "invented tradition".
[445] Ulin, "Invention and Representation as Cultural Capital," 519.
[446] Ulin, "Invention and Representation as Cultural Capital," 526, 523.
[447] Ulin, "Invention and Representation as Cultural Capital," 519, 526, 520.
[448] Ulin, "Invention and Representation as Cultural Capital," 526.
[449] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 52.
[450] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 59.
[451] Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 18, 185.
[452] Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 185, 25.
[453] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 52, 48. Specific connections (examples) between the social life and subcultural expressions of members will be provided in the upcoming case studies. Particular attention will be given to the ambiguities between subcultural ideals (thought) and (in)actions (social comportment) of elite members, including the production practices of elite media-makers that delimit representations of the subculture. This occurs principally through the transmission of knowledge via subcultural media.
[454] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 113. One example provided is a 'laugh track" that audibly cues audiences to elicit the intended reaction. Earlier, I provided the example of a frame's aspect ratio.
[455] Grant McCracken, "Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of the Structure and Movement of the Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods," *Journal of Consumer Research* 13, no. 1 (June 1986): 71-84, 76-77. McCracken uses the term consumer goods, whereas I use the term cultural product.
[456] McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 73.
[457] McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 73-74.
[458] The blue-print model is grounded in advertising and consumer research. Indeed, McCracken states that "advertising serves as a lexicon of current cultural meanings" ("Culture and Consumption," 75-76). McCracken's model has been criticized for suggesting that cultural meanings are fully formed and taken indiscriminately as such by the consumer. However, the text does not explicitly make this assertion.
[459] Meaning is mobile at certain times and stable during others (McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 71).
[460] McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 71.
[461] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 29. However, this is not to say the consumer has no influence. Indeed, the lived reality and the cultural product in which it is made are interdependent (McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 75). To be clear, McCracken indicates that the consumer is an essential part

of the final stage of the transmission of meaning (75). However, it is the initial stage that is the focus of this study.
462 McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 74-75.
463 McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 72.
464 McCracken, "Culture and Consumption," 74.
465 Greg Philo and David Miller, "The Active Audience and Wrong Turns in Media Studies: Rescuing Media Power," *Soundscapes* 4 (September 2001). http://www.icce.rug.nl/~soundscapes/VOLUME04/Active_audience.shtml.
466 Thank you to John McCullough for this insight.
467 Becker, *Art Worlds*, 30.
468 Tudor, *Image and Influence*, 130.
469 Richard Peterson, "In Search of Authenticity," *Journal of Management Studies* 42, no. 5 (July 2005): 1083-1098, 1091.
470 Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 157.
471 Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 179. The quote is as follows: "For it is of the essence of a convention that it ratifies an assumption or a point of view, so that the work can be made and received" (179).
472 Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 174.
473 Indeed, Williams proffers categories of conventions labeled the "dominant", "residual", and "emergent" — dominant conventions being the focus of this work (*Marxism and Literature*, 122-124). Residual conventions are "effectively formed in the past, but [are] still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present (122). Aspects of residual conventions that are oppositional or alternative tend to be incorporated into the dominant culture (122). Emergent conventions are "new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship are continually being created" (123). These new meanings are effectively introduced into and by the current dominant order, and therefore, are provided with a social basis for their emergence that renews the dominant order's power: "To the degree that [a new convention] emerges, and especially to the degree that it is oppositional rather than alternative, the process of attempted incorporation significantly begins" (124). These conventions "exist at the margins" and if made available for consumption, "they are part of the corporate organization" (Collins, *Uncommon Cultures*, 21).
474 Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 112-113.
475 Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 114. Importantly, meaning can be conveyed through compliance with or deviation from formal conventions as well (Ann Swidler, *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001], 184).
476 This includes the stability of producers and the companies that underwrite these productions.
477 From pre-production through the exhibition stage, the "Big 5" film studios controlled the flow of films. See: Schatz's *Hollywood Genres*.
478 Thomas Elsaesser, *Weimar Cinema and After: Germany's Historical Imaginary* (London: Routledge, 2000), 110. Another feature that codified the system of production was long-term contracts with creators and actors.
479 Martin Scorsese, "Martin Scorsese: I Said Marvel Movies Aren't Cinema. Let Me Explain," *New York Times* (New York, NY), November 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/opinion/martin-scorsese-marvel.html.
480 Robert Faulkner and Andy Anderson, "Short-term Projects and Emergent Careers: Evidence from Hollywood," *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (1987): 879-909, 904.
481 Becker, *Art Worlds*, 35.
482 Once again, the virtual order governs the system of attribution and regulates the formula of assemblage.
483 Becker, *Art Worlds*, 29.
484 Cawelti, *The Six-Gun Mystique*, 28.

[485] Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 288.
[486] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 5.
[487] Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 204.*
[488] Crane, "Reward Systems," 720-721.
[489] Willis, *Learning to Labour*, 124; Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 61, 88. Swidler refers to a similar process as "incoherent coherence" (*Talk of Love*, 184).
[490] Hodkinson, *Goth*, 40.
[491] Recall the term creative geography (Pudovkin, *Vsevolod Pudovkin*, 71, 61).
[492] Shields' notion of social spatialization focuses on the period he labels "modernity". I use his theories to examine contemporary subcultures (*Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity* [London: Routledge, 1992], 64).
[493] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 225, 31. For instance, Shields cites tourist attractions.
[494] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 275.
[495] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 31.
[496] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 199.
[497] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 64.
[498] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 60-61.
[499] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 6, 14.
[500] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 31, 256.
[501] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 162.
[502] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 56. Shields mentions the figure of the flâneur in outdoor shopping malls as an example of this type of transference. Although the flâneur would most likely be captured and viewed in still-images (53, 55-56).
[503] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 63, 14.
[504] Shields, *Places on the Margin*, 255-256, 261.
[505] John Creswell, "Five Qualitative Approaches to Inquiry," in *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 2013), 69-110, 73.
[506] Creswell, "Five Qualitative Approaches to Inquiry," 75.
[507] Creswell, "Five Qualitative Approaches to Inquiry," 75.
[508] Hubert Knoblauch, Alejandro Baer, Eric Laurier, Sabine Petschke, and Bernt Schnettler, "Visual Analysis: New Developments in the Interpretative Analysis of Video and Photography," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 9, no. 3 (September 2008): paragraph 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-9.3.1170.
[509] Richard Dyer, *Stars* (London: BFI Publishing, 1982).
[510] There are of course other features or conventions of industry videos that may be analyzed for their signification, but for the purposes of this text, editing conventions are foregrounded.
[511] For instance, Lutz and Collins' survey of *National Geographic* from the beginning of the "colonial era" to the 1960s, suggests to the authors that cultural messages were embedded in printed photographs that specifically targeted white, educated, middle class men (*Reading National Geographic*, 6).
[512] Specifically, videos produced within the model franchise's city and subsidiary franchises' cities, during the given era and at times, beyond.
[513] Again, media's transformative role in altering each subculture's constitution will be touched upon, however, the process of transition is for another text. For now, I am examining these subcultures after such transformations have taken place.
[514] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 121.
[515] Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 121, 117.
[516] I am referring to accounts that suggest distinction is the defining characteristic of subcultures.
[517] The following disciplines, methodologies, and approaches include sociology, Marxism, semiotics, ethnography, symbolic interactionism, and taxonomy.

[518] The discipline concerned itself with examining deviance, then class-based youth cultures, followed by taste cultures and subcultures of consumption, and now, academics are currently focused on the classification of terms.
[519] The motivations of members were studied to underline binary disparities like individual expression or collective will, as well as issues of authenticity relative to external attribution or internal sincerity.
[520] As previously stated, media is generally treated as an ancillary mode of communication and transmitter of subcultural knowledge. The Internet is also typically considered a secondary marketplace for consumption or an extended, possibly innovative, space for participants' control over representation. External portrayals by mass media, in contrast, are understood as merely reinforcing the dominant discourse by neutralizing subcultural members' ability to define or label its formation and objectives.
[521] As a renewable resource, authenticity is attributed to a product based upon compliance with an established production formula that is specific to each subculture. Inauthenticity is the absence or lack of this resource. Cultural producers employ the virtual order's formula for editing industry videos, and as a result, the products are considered authentic. Although this is not to say that unorthodox conventions are never introduced into the aesthetic lexicon. Indeed, alternative conventions tend to be incorporated into the dominant culture or "exist at the margins". The use of unincorporated conventions would result in the denial of authentic status and a lack of distribution through industry-accepted platforms (Collins, *Uncommon Cultures*, 21). For a more thorough discussion of authenticity as it pertains to this writing, see section 3. Additionally, see section 4.9 for an extended discussion of conventions and form.
[522] Frederic Thrasher, *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963 [1927]), 10, 21, 46, 66-67, 32. Importantly, a gang is in a constant state of flux in which no two gangs are alike, but also in which "solidarity" is fleeting (31, 5, 48). While this conclusion can be considered common to both gangs and crowds, Thrasher differentiates the two formations. A gang has the capacity to deliberate, plan, and co-operate with one another over competing interests (200).
[523] Thrasher, *The Gang*, 4.
[524] Thrasher, *The Gang*, note 2, 258, 26, 33, 26.
[525] Thrasher, *The Gang*, 14.
[526] Stephen Pfohl, *Images of Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological History* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 135-136.
[527] Some examples include: Albert Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955); Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957); and Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).
[528] The binary distinction was between difference and normality.
[529] This is at times referred to as "semi-deviance". See: Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Some Patterns of Semi-Deviance on the Israeli Social Scene," *Social Problems* 22 (1975): 356-367.
[530] Pfohl concludes that deviance is labeled as such because it is a threat to a given era's normative power structures. Deviance exposes the boundaries of social behavior (*Images of Deviance,* 12, 143, 168).
[531] Pfohl, *Images of Deviance*, 4.
[532] Pfohl, *Images of Deviance*, 137, 136.
[533] One of the CCCS's axioms was that class conflict is institutionalized and is a "fundamental base-rhythm" of society" (Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 31, 26).
[534] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 7. For a more in-depth examination of generational consciousness, Graham Murdock and Robin McCron's essay suggests that rather than class, subcultural members' generational differences should be foregrounded ("Consciousness of Class and Consciousness of Generation," in *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain,* eds. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson [New York: Routledge, 2006], 162-176, 169). According to the authors, generational consciousness is composed of a shared cognizance, which enables new stylistic practices that are distinctive from the older generation's "dominant style" (166). Methodologically, Murdock and McCron argue for an empirical, rather than interpretive, "symmetrical analysis" of both adolescent and adult consciousness and style (175).

[535] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 37-38.
[536] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 6. By structures, the authors are referring to "socially-organised positions and experiences of the class in relation to major institutions" (44).
[537] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 6.
[538] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 8. The "basic problematic" shared by all members of subcultures is rooted in class-based distinction (8).
[539] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 29.
[540] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 6, 31. However, subordinate cultures do not always oppose the dominant ones.
[541] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 5.
[542] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 41. It distinguishes them conceptually as well.
[543] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 8. Subcultures tend to share similar traits with their parent culture (6).
[544] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 8.
[545] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 6, 8.
[546] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 44, 6-8.
[547] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 7-8.
[548] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 35.
[549] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 35, 37, 17.
[550] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 34.
[551] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 11-12, 8-9.
[552] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 41.
[553] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 9, 4, 35, 41.
[554] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 34-35, 41.
[555] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 41-42.
[556] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 35.
[557] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 42, 44, 46.
[558] Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 44.
[559] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 1, 7.
[560] Willis, *Profane Culture*, note 2, 204
[561] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 1.
[562] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 170, 192.
[563] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 171.
[564] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 3. Willis is clear that the relationships between objects and profane cultures do not have to be consciously acknowledged by members (189).
[565] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 4.
[566] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 10.
[567] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 52, 55, 61.
[568] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 61, 176.
[569] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 43, 177.
[570] Willis, *Profane Culture*, 43-44.
[571] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 103, 2.
[572] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 116.
[573] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 88, 92, 81.
[574] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 119.
[575] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 104.
[576] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 17. Indeed, these are only temporary solutions to long-standing structural conditions.
[577] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 95-96, 122.
[578] Style becomes a form of "refusal" issued "obliquely" against the hegemonic order (Hebdige, *Subculture*, 2, 17). Although subcultural members rarely identify these actions in such terms (139).

[579] Oliver Marchant, "Bridging the Micro-Macro Gap: Is There Such a Thing as a Post-subcultural Politics?," in *The Post-subcultures Reader*, eds. David Muggleton and Rupert Weinzierl (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 83-100, 85.
[580] Weinzierl and Muggleton, "What is 'Post-subcultural Studies' Anyway?," 8.
[581] Gary Clarke, "Defending Ski-Jumpers: A Critique of Theories of Youth Subcultures," in *The Subcultures Reader*, 2nd edition, ed. Ken Gelder (London: Routledge, 2005), 169-174, 170.
[582] Clarke, "Defending Ski-Jumpers," 170, 172, 174. It should be noted, however, that some texts by members of the CCCS do suggest that individuals may enter or move in and out of many youth cultures throughout their adolescence (Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 9).
[583] Kevin Young and Michael Atkinson, "Introduction: A Subcultural History," in *Tribal Play: Subcultural Journeys Through Sport*, volume 4, eds. Michael Atkinson and Kevin Young (JAI Press, United Kingdom, 2008), 1-46, 23. For clubbers, the mainstream is a contrasting source of distinction (*Club Cultures*, 5).
[584] Wheaton and Beal, "'Keeping it Real'," 157, 173.
[585] Young and Atkinson, "Introduction: A Subcultural History," 24.
[586] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 3.
[587] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 96.
[588] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 163.
[589] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 164.
[590] Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 244, xiv. Daily life is conceived of as an objective social space determined by "interactions and representations" that are paralleled by mental structures connected to one's social class (244, xiv). It is here that Bourdieu introduces the concept of relationality with respect to the practices of everyday life between products, producers, and "social conditions of existence" (xiii).
[591] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 10. Ultimately, taste is defined by the dominant social class (Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 260, 99). To be sure, one's class condition also entails its own distinct, internal properties, however, the working-class "aesthetic" is always, in part, constituted by the taste of the dominant class (170-171, 41). How taste is expressed, characterizes the habitus (lifestyle) of each class, which "organizes [the] practices" of individuals and their "perception of the social world" (260, 170). Thus, habitus structures taste, which is then embodied in individuals.
[592] Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 56.
[593] Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 175, 231, 1. Therefore, the appropriation of different cultural materials can be conceived of as a "symbolic struggle" of classifying practices and goods (249).
[594] Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 52.
[595] Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 57.
[596] Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 57-58.
[597] Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 58.
[598] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 11-12.
[599] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 11-12.
[600] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 137.
[601] Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 127.
[602] Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 127.
[603] Schouten and McAlexander, "Subcultures of Consumption," 43.
[604] Wheaton, "Selling out?," 142.
[605] Wheaton, "Selling out?," 139.
[606] Steven Kates, "The Protean Quality of Subcultural Consumption: An Ethnographic Account of Gay Consumers," *Journal of Consumer Research* 29, no. 3 (December 2002): 383-399, 396.
[607] Kates, "The Protean Quality of Subcultural Consumption," 392.
[608] Wheaton, "Selling out?," 135.
[609] Schouten and McAlexander, "Subcultures of Consumption," 59.
[610] Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes*, 127, 7, 97.
[611] Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes*, 139, 88-89.

612 Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes*, 96.
613 Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes*, xi, 98, 10, 14.
614 Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes*, 147.
615 Hesmondhalgh, "Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above," 21-22.
616 Hesmondhalgh, "Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above," 38.
617 Hesmondhalgh, "Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above," 30.
618 Hesmondhalgh, "Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above," 23.
619 Hesmondhalgh, "Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above," 32, 35.
620 The notable absence of the term "postmodernism" or its examination in depth in this work is a conscious attempt to avoid suggesting that a cultural zeitgeist or the periodization of culture is the pivotal, formative entity in determining social formations. Instead, I leave it to other researchers to argue for or against such conclusions.
621 Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 127-128.
622 Weinzierl and Muggleton, "What is 'Post-subcultural Studies' Anyway?," 14. Muggleton also considers another failure of the CCCS to be the notion that economic factors are the primary catalyst for the emergence of subcultures. However, he does mention that socio-economic relations are factors in the motivations and goals of the collective. (*Inside Subculture*, 3, 6, 48).
623 Weinzierl and Muggleton, "What is 'Post-subcultural Studies' Anyway?," 14-16, 19.
624 Muggleton, *Inside Subculture*, 29, 79.
625 Muggleton, *Inside Subculture*, 4.
626 Muggleton, *Inside Subculture*, 158, 93, 49. Muggleton suggests that the self is fluid and polysemic.
627 Muggleton, *Inside Subculture*, 6, 93, 140.
628 David Chaney, "Fragmented Culture and Subcultures," in *After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture*, eds. Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 36-48, 36-37, 41.
629 Chaney, "Fragmented Culture and Subcultures," 42. Moreover, certain subcultures share similar features and/or members.
630 Todd Crosset and Becky Beal, "The Use of 'Subculture' and 'Subworld' in Ethnographic Works on Sport: A Discussion of Definitional Distinctions," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 14 (1997): 73-85, 73.
631 Crosset and Beal, "The Use of 'Subculture'," 73, 74. According to the authors, the term subculture should only be used when discussing a group that is defined as oppositional and legitimately marginalized by the dominant culture (80). Social worlds can turn into subcultures, but this would only occur under the conditions in which members of the social world comport themselves in ways that ignore certain societal "norms, values, or practices of the broader culture" (81).
632 Crosset and Beal, "The Use of 'Subculture'," 81. As such, the designation of these groups as subcultures would be incorrect.
633 Crosset and Beal, "The Use of 'Subculture'," 80-81.
634 Crosset and Beal, "The Use of 'Subculture'," 81.
635 Crosset and Beal, "The Use of 'Subculture'," 80. However, this determination must be made in comparison to the larger social world's reactions to these formations. Thus, the power to label such formations remains with the dominant order (81).
636 James Dowd and Laura Dowd, "The Center Holds: From Subcultures to Social Worlds," *Teaching Sociology* 31, no. 1 (January 2003): 20-37, 21.
637 Dowd and Dowd, "The Center Holds," 21, 23, 30, 32.
638 Dowd and Dowd, "The Center Holds," 32.
639 Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 144-145.
640 Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 130-131.
641 Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 131.
642 Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 96.
643 Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 10.
644 Jenks, *Subculture: The Fragmentation of the Social*, 10.

[645] Andy Bennett, "Virtual Subculture? Youth, Identity and the Internet," in *After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture*, eds. Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 162-172, 170, 167. Stated another way, the Internet facilitates negotiations and discussions of offline behavior (165).
[646] Tracey Greener and Robert Hollands, "Beyond Subculture and Post-subculture? The Case of Virtual Psytrance," *Journal of Youth Studies* 9, no. 4 (2007): 393-418, 396, 399.
[647] Greener and Hollands, "Beyond Subculture," 394.
[648] Greener and Hollands, "Beyond Subculture," 395.
[649] Greener and Hollands, "Beyond Subculture," 395, 413, 411.
[650] Tyler Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities and Social Media: American Skateboarders and Instagram," *Deviant Behavior* 12 (April 2019): 1-16, 13.
[651] Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities and Social Media," 3.
[652] Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities and Social Media," 3, 12.
[653] J.A. McArthur, "Digital Subculture: A Geek Meaning of Style," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 33, no. 1 (January 2009): 58-70, 58, 65.
[654] Brian Wilson, "The Canadian Rave Scene and Five Theses on Youth Resistance," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 27, no. 3 (2002): 373-412, 402.
[655] Wilson, "The Canadian Rave Scene," 404.
[656] Brian Wilson and Michael Atkinson, "Rave and Straightedge, The Virtual and the Real: Exploring Online and Offline Experiences in Canadian Youth Subcultures," *Youth and Society* 36, no. 3 (March 2005): 276-311, 305.
[657] Wilson and Atkinson, "Rave and Straightedge," 301-302.
[658] Geoff Stahl, "Tastefully Renovating Subcultural Theory: Making Space for a New Model," *The Post-subcultures Reader*, eds. David Muggleton and Rupert Weinzierl (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 27-40, 39, 36.
[659] Stahl, "Tastefully Renovating Subcultural Theory," 29.
[660] Stahl, "Tastefully Renovating Subcultural Theory," 28, 33-34.
[661] Stahl, "Tastefully Renovating Subcultural Theory," 37.
[662] Stahl, "Tastefully Renovating Subcultural Theory," 31.
[663] Beverland, "Crafting Brand Authenticity," 1006-1007.
[664] For instance, the manifestation of banal sameness with respect to an object or event, or the insincerity of motivations in relation to one's self, affiliated group, or an opposing entity.
[665] Muggleton, *Inside Subculture*, 91.
[666] Michael Beverland, Francis Farrelly, and Pascale Quester, "Authentic Subcultural Membership: Antecedents and Consequences of Authenticating Acts and Authoritative Performances," *Psychology and Marketing* 27, no. 7 (July 2010): 698-716, 698.
[667] Beverland, et al, "Authentic Subcultural Membership," 700-701.
[668] Beverland, et al, "Authentic Subcultural Membership," 701, 704.
[669] Muggleton, *Inside Subculture*, 89, 93; Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 209; Peterson, "In Search of Authenticity," 1091.
[670] Beverland, et al, "Authentic Subcultural Membership," 709-710, 712, 701, 704.
[671] Peterson, "In Search of Authenticity," 1087-1088.
[672] Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 208.
[673] Force, "Consumption Styles," 300; Rachel Gershon and Rosanna Smith, "Twice-Told Tales: Self-Repetition Decreases Observer Assessments of Performer Authenticity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (March 21, 2019), http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000183.
[674] Hebdige, *Subculture*, 95-96.
[675] Force, "Consumption Styles," 303, 305.
[676] Muggleton, *Inside Subculture*, 91.
[677] Wheaton and Beal, "'Keeping it Real'," 169.
[678] Force, "Consumption Styles," 290, 292, 303.
[679] Wheaton and Beal, "'Keeping it Real'," 169.

[680] Wheaton and Beal, "'Keeping it Real'," 172; Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 6.
[681] Wheaton and Beal, "'Keeping it Real'," 172.
[682] Wheaton and Beal, "'Keeping it Real'," 167.
[683] Force, "Consumption Styles," 296.
[684] Michele Donnelly, "Studying Extreme Sports: Beyond the Core Participants," *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* 30, no. 2 (May 2006): 219-224, 220. These figures are complicit in the ongoing commodification of certain subcultures (219).
[685] Donnelly, "Studying Extreme Sports," 220.
[686] Donnelly, "Studying Extreme Sports," 220.
[687] These standards are also reinforced by the social hierarchy as well.
[688] Peterson, *Creating Country Music*, 107.
[689] Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968): 217-252. Benjamin is specifically discussing film and other art forms in his work, but for the purposes of this text, media is the object of discussion.
[690] Benjamin, "The Work of Art," 218, 234, 221, 223. To be sure, Benjamin acknowledges reproducibility has always been a principle of art (218).
[691] Benjamin, "The Work of Art," 222-224, 235-236.
[692] Benjamin, "The Work of Art," 235-236. By rubbish heap, I am alluding to Paul Willis' comment that is cited earlier in the chapter (*Profane Culture*, 3).
[693] Paddy Scannell champions Benjamin's implicit suggestion that consumers play an active role in shaping the discourse. For example, Scannell mentions editorial sections of newspapers, in which the public influences authors to "serve the interests of the people". This is characterized as a collaboration between "authors, products, and audience" ("Benjamin Contextualized," 79).
[694] Alexis Lothian, "Archival Anarchies: Online Fandom, Subcultural Conservation, and the Transformative Work of Digital Ephemera," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 16, no. 6 (2012): 541-556, 545.
[695] Lothian, "Archival Anarchies," 545.
[696] Lothian, "Archival Anarchies," 546, 551.
[697] Lothian, "Archival Anarchies," 545-546.
[698] Lothian, "Archival Anarchies," 546.
[699] Lothian, "Archival Anarchies," 544, 546.
[700] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 29, 5.
[701] Wheaton and Beal, "'Keeping it Real'," 162.
[702] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 29-30, 66.
[703] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 124. This includes providing equitable access for internal members.
[704] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 161. Thornton mentions niche or micro-media as examples of subcultural production.
[705] Specifically, modes of distinction and the dissemination of subcultural capital.
[706] I am referring to corporate entities and/or those who control the agenda of media production.
[707] Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1.
[708] Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 76.
[709] Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 10-11, 184.
[710] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 129.
[711] Mike Wayne, "Hans Magnus Enzensberger and the Politics of New Media Technology," in *Revisiting the Frankfurt School*, ed. David Berry (Farnham, Surrey: Ashegate, 2012), 117-138, 122.
[712] Wayne, "Hans Magnus Enzensberger," 124-125.
[713] Wayne, "Hans Magnus Enzensberger," 134.

[714] Paul Gilchrist and Belinda Wheaton, "New Media Technologies in Lifestyle Sport," in *Digital Media Sport: Technology, Power and Culture in the Network Society*, eds. Brett Hutchins and David Rowe (London: Routledge, 2013), 169-185, 178.
[715] The website relies on algorithms to suggest content and keep viewers watching. Advertising dollars support these practices because YouTube provides companies with data that explicitly identifies users' preferred tastes and interests.
[716] Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 54.
[717] The rankings were based on subscribers. "Top 100 Influential YouTube Channels (Sorted by SB Rank)," Social Blade. https://socialblade.com/youtube/top/100/mostsubscribed.
[718] Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities," 12.
[719] Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities," 12.
[720] Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities," 6.
[721] Indeed, expressions are delimited both inside and outside the media industry, along with inside and outside of the elite tier.
[722] Thornton, *Club Cultures*, 14, 161, 117. Thornton also mentions the presence of cultural hierarchies in larger socio-cultural orders and individual taste cultures (3-4). In terms of the latter, the "authentic versus the phony, the 'hip' versus the 'mainstream', and the 'underground versus 'the media'" are some examples (3-4). Moreover, the differences between mass media and subcultural media are rooted in the process of distinction. While the mass media's portrayal of subcultures is typically negative, it is "not the final verdict", but merely the catalyst for a subculture to reclaim control over its mediated representation (137).
[723] However, Thornton does suggest that micro-structures of power emerge based on taste and distinction (*Club Cultures*, 163).
[724] Wayne, "Hans Magnus Enzensberger," 133. Enzensberger's comment on the dissolution of the boundary between the public and private consciousness echoes these conditions (*The Consciousness Industry*, 6).
[725] Robert Kozinets, "Utopian Enterprise: Articulating the Meanings of *Star Trek's* Culture of Consumption," *Journal of Consumer Research* 28, no. 1 (June 2001): 67-88, 85.
[726] Kozinets, "Utopian Enterprise," 83.
[727] Hardcore is a subculture, as opposed to a scene. Current and former subcultural participants, including some scholars, use the latter term to identify various pockets of growth in cities across the United States. However, as stated in the previous chapter, a scene denotes a relative ephemeral gathering and a fluid set of values. It will be made clear throughout this chapter that hardcore maintains a stable set of values situated around a "straightedge" lifestyle. This lifestyle influences the everyday experiences of its members. Moreover, hardcore still exists today in various conurbations across the world. For a contrasting source, see: J. Patrick Williams and Heith Copes, "'How Edge Are You?': Constructing Authentic Identities and Subcultural Boundaries in a Straightedge Internet Forum," *Symbolic Interaction* 28, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 67-89.
[728] Ross Haenfler, "Rethinking Subcultural Resistance: Core Values of the Straight Edge Movement," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 33, no. 4 (August 2004): 406-436, note 2, 432.
[729] Once again, expressions refer to "meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in mores and customs, in the uses of objects and material life" (Clarke, et al, "Subcultures, cultures, and class," 4). Such a definition does explicitly consider expressions as art forms. However, the use of objects to create cultural meaning(s) would align with certain definitions of art and artwork. For the purposes of this writing, I investigate the production of media as a subcultural industry and an economy. Media is thus considered a commodified, subcultural product, rather than an autonomous art form. Adorno classified autonomous art, in part, as that which exists outside of the Culture Industry. Regarding this differentiation, see section 4.5 of this work for more details.
[730] Ross Haenfler, "'Straight Edge' by Minor Threat," in *Rebel Music: Resistance through Hip Hop and Punk*, eds. Priya Parmar, Anthony J. Nocella II, Scott Robertson, and Martha Diaz (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2015), 131-142, 133. Also, Tony Rettman, *Straight Edge: A Clear-Headed*

Hardcore Punk History (New York: Brazilian Points, 2017), 577. Straightedge, as a label, is sometimes written as "straight edge" or "straight-edge".
731 Ryan Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture: Cultures of Authenticity and Deconstruction," *The Communication Review* 7 (2004): 305–327, 321; Wilson and Atkinson, "Rave and Straightedge," 295; Robert Wood, "'Nailed to the X': A Lyrical History of the Straightedge Youth Subculture," *Journal of Youth Studies* 2, no. 2 (1999): 133-151, 146. In one Minor threat song titled, "Straight Edge", the lyrics disparage recreational drug use and promiscuous sex. In "Out of Step", the lyrics "I don't smoke, I don't drink, I don't fuck, at least I can fucking think!" are typically cited in discussion of Minor Threat's influence on the values of straightedge (J. Patrick Williams, "Authentic Identities: Straightedge Subculture, Music, and the Internet," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 35, no. 2 [April 2006]: 173-200, 175-176).
732 Haenfler, "'Straight Edge'," 135.
733 Wilson and Atkinson, "Rave and Straightedge," 292; Wood, "'Nailed to the X'," 146.
734 Ross Haenfler, "Collective Identity in the Straight Edge Movement: How Diffuse Movements Foster Commitment, Encourage Individualized Participation, and Promote Cultural Change," *The Sociological Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 785-805, 799.
735 Wilson and Atkinson, "Rave and Straightedge," 292.
736 Haenfler, "Collective Identity," 798.
737 Haenfler, "Collective Identity," 790.
738 Williams makes a similar argument in reference to the actions of subcultural members on the Internet ("Authentic Identities").
739 Specifically, these ambiguities manifest in both content and form. To be sure, independence and conformity are not mutually exclusive. Claims to the former are often precipitated by cultural orthodoxies. In this writing, the tensions and ambiguities are evident when examining the production of subcultural media and the avowed claims of elite members that speak of certain fundamental, subcultural ideals. Elites seek to capitalize on notions of independence and nonconformity, yet, the production of media within the subculture — and the knowledge that is transmitted — coheres members into a homogenous social formation.
740 Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities," 3.
741 It is also true that these videos could evade the commercial market via peer-to-peer sharing in the form of "bootleg" copies.
742 Stacy Thompson, *Punk Productions: Unfinished Business* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004), 47.
743 Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 309. Although simplicity itself could be viewed as innovative.
744 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 140.
745 Such labels include CBS, Warner Brothers, MCS, EMI, WEA, RCA, PolyGram, and Capitol records. For example, the Sex Pistols signed to one of the largest record labels in the world (EMI) in 1976, albeit quickly moving to the upstart Virgin Records, their third label in less than three months (Bruce Dancis, "Safety Pins and Class Struggle: Punk Rock and the Left," *Socialist Review* 8, no. 3 [May-June 1978]: 58-83, 65-66).
746 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 31, 17, 35-36. In the United States, the New York Dolls signed with Mercury records in 1972, a division of Universal Entertainment Group. The group was later dropped from the label after their second album.
747 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 140.
748 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 156.
749 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 179.
750 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 105.
751 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 103.
752 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 91-92.
753 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 90.
754 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 133-134.

[755] Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 90.
[756] Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 141. Again, these labels were CBS, RCA, WEA, MCA, Polygram, and Capital.
[757] Haenfler, "'Straight Edge'," 132. Haenfler records the list of deaths as such: "In 1972 New York Dolls drummer Billy Murcia, drowned in the course of a drug overdose, [and] began what would become a string of drug-related deaths of musicians connected to punk rock. The Sex Pistol's Sid Vicious died of a heroin overdose in 1979, and the Germs' Darby Crash followed suit a year later in an OD/suicide" (132).
[758] Steven Blush, *American Hardcore: A Tribal History*, 2nd edition, ed. George Petros (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 2010), 46.
[759] Blush, *American Hardcore*, 46.
[760] Blush, *American Hardcore*, 45; Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 577.
[761] Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 307, 323. Moore suggests that the Sex Pistols, under the direction of Malcolm McLaren, are exemplary of the tenuous connection between punk and popular culture.
[762] Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 307-308.
[763] Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 323.
[764] Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 321.
[765] This naturally implies that there were successive waves of hardcore, which cements hardcore's status as a subculture (Wilson and Atkinson, "Rave and Straightedge," 293). These principles are also analogous to certain religious groups and fanatics. The intersections between hardcore and religion are discussed at length in Stewart's *Punk Rock is My Religion*.
[766] Kevin Mattson, "Did Punk Matter?: Analyzing the Practices of a Youth Subculture During the 1980s," *American Studies* 42, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 69-97, 72. For a more complete discussion surrounding issues of gender, race, and queerness in hardcore, both in North America and in a global context, see: David Ensminger's *Visual Vitriol: The Street Art and Subcultures of the Punk and Hardcore Generation* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2011) and *X: Straight Edge and Radical Sobriety*, ed. Gabriel Kuhn (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2019).
[767] Ross Haenfler, *Straight Edge: Clean-Living Youth, Hardcore Punk, and Social Change* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 9, 218. Some examples include Boston's SSD, DYS, Negative FX; New York's The Abused; California's Justice League, Uniform Choice, and Stalag 13, among many others.
[768] Mattson, "Did Punk Matter?," 75.
[769] Mattson, "Did Punk Matter?," 76-77. It should also be noted that without the need to procure alcohol licenses, promoters could arrange for impromptu sets in a variety of locations. So too, the need for authorities to approve of these gatherings was limited to the proprietor of the venue. Thank you to John McCullough for this insight.
[770] Haenfler, "Collective Identity," note 5, 801.
[771] Tattoos of the "X" and other affiliated symbols were and are quite common. See: Michael Atkinson, "The Civilizing of Resistance: Straightedge Tattooing," *Deviant Behavior* 24 (2003): 197-220.
[772] Haenfler, *Straight Edge*, 88.
[773] Stephen Baron, "The Canadian West Coast Punk Subculture: A Field Study," *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie* 14, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 289-316, 289, 310; Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 343.
[774] Haenfler, "Collective Identity," 795. Ironically, Ian MacKaye would later clarify that he did not intend for the literal meaning of abstinence to refer to all sexual interactions. However, the opaqueness of the lyrics underlines the power of cultural production to inspire others, regardless of whether such producers were conscious or unconscious of such influence (Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 51).
[775] Blush, *American Hardcore*, 1175.
[776] For example, there are rules to slam-dancing and moshing that revolve around when to begin and how to interact with others (Black Hawk Hancock and Michael Lorr, "More Than Just a Soundtrack: Toward a Technology of the Collective in Hardcore Punk," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 43, no. 3

[2012]: 320-346, 339, 331). In contrast, Robert Wood adjures that these tenets are more flexible for lower-level participants and exist on a spectrum of *self-adherence*, rather than social coercion ("The Straightedge Youth Sub-Culture: Observations on the Complexity of Sub-Cultural Identity," *Journal of Youth Studies* 6, no. 1 [2003]: 33-52, emphasis added).
777 Haenfler, "Collective Identity," 793.
778 Haenfler, "Rethinking Subcultural Resistance," 418.
779 Alastair 'Gords' Gordon, "Sell-Out Bastards! Case-Study Accounts of the Dilemmas of Authenticity in UK/US Punk 1984-2001 and Beyond," in *The Punk Reader: Research Transmissions from the Local and the Global*, eds. Mike Dines, Alastair 'Gords' Gordon, and Paula Guerra (Porto, Portugal: Universidade do Porto. Faculdade de Letras, 2017), 31-45, 33.
780 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 36.
781 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 141.
782 Mattson, "Did Punk Matter?," 74.
783 Dave Laing, *One Chord Wonders: Power and Meaning in Punk Rock* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2015), 10-11, 69.
784 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 43.
785 Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 319. Some examples include, The Descendants, Bad Brains, Firehose, and The Meat Puppets. Some of these groups will later appear in *Flipside's* "Video Fanzines" noted below.
786 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 43-44, 145.
787 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 146.
788 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 4.
789 Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 321.
790 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 49.
791 Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 320.
792 Hodkinson, *Goth*, 173, 146-147.
793 Mattson, "Did Punk Matter?," 75-76; Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 122; David James, "Hardcore: Cultural Resistance in the Postmodern," in *Power Misses: Essays Across (Un)Popular Culture* (London: Verso, 1996), 215-230, 224.
794 Moore, "Postmodernism and Punk Subculture," 308.
795 Gordon, "Sell-Out Bastards!," 42.
796 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 601.
797 Other Boston groups include Gang Green, Jerry's Kids, and The F.U.s.
798 Haenfler, "'Straight Edge'," 137.
799 Wood, "'Nailed to the X'," 140.
800 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 608.
801 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 600. The refrain is taken from the song "Boston Crew", off the 1993 album "Power".
802 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 596; *All Ages: The Boston Hardcore Film*, directed by Drew Stone (2012: New York, NY: StoneFilmsNYC, 2012), video.
803 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 608; Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 68.
804 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 603.
805 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 606.
806 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 593.
807 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 69.
808 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 69; Blush, *American Hardcore*, 108, 628.
809 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 56, 58.
810 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 271. DYS bassist Jonathan Anastas concurs in the same publication (75).
811 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 58.
812 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 264-265.
813 Moreover, the consumer was not expected to risk bodily harm for such knowledge.

814 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 82.
815 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 64, 577.
816 Ssdecontrolofficial, "Don't Fuck with My Scene," Instagram, April 22, 2020, https://www.instagram.com/ssdecontrolofficial/?hl=en.
817 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 634.
818 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 77-78; Blush, *American Hardcore*, 634, 185.
819 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 256-258, 264.
820 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 158.
821 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 196. The lead singer of Negative FX also published a 'zine titled *Forced Exposure*. No existing copies could be found by this researcher.
822 Mike Gitter, "Boston," *Flipside* 44 (1984): 66-67, https://archive.org/stream/Flipside441984/Flipside%2044%20%281984%29_djvu.txt.
823 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 84.
824 Stone, *All Ages*.
825 Stone, *All Ages*.
826 Stone, *All Ages*.
827 Wilson and Atkinson, "Rave and Straightedge," 297, 304.
828 Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 34. Thompson refers to this as "mediated worldliness" (34).
829 Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 35.
830 Hancock and Lorr, "More Than Just a Soundtrack," 329.
831 Thompson, *Punk Productions*, 6.
832 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 273.
833 Specifically, electronic video cameras and consoles.
834 In 1965, Sony released one of the first (relatively) affordable consumer model video cameras (CV-2000) and then followed up with the cordless, battery operated Portapack (CV-2400) two years later. Importantly, the advent of consumer tapes (half-inch) shifted the user-base of electronic video-cassettes away from television's broadcast tape format (three-quarter inch). See: Kris Paulsen, "Half-inch Revolution: The Guerilla Video Tape Network," *Amodern* 2 (Fall 2013). http://amodern.net/article/half-inch-revolution/.
835 Paulsen, "Half-inch Revolution."
836 James, "Hardcore," 225.
837 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 137.
838 While there were certainly bands that did not align with the conformist principles of the era, such as Bad Brains, the argument laid forth is that straightedge was the predominant homogenizing force during this period. Therefore, while the presence of Bad Brains was certainly instrumental to the foundation of hardcore's sound (as noted in the body of the text), the band's lack of straightedge ascetism was not in concert with the subculture's overall thrust. Moreover, Bad Brains's style of music changed in parallel with the introduction of Rastafarian principles into the group members' lives. As a result, the group's strict affiliation with hardcore was problematized. A similar set of circumstances occurred with the Cro-Mags as well — members of the band became affiliated with the Krishna religion (Blush, *American Hardcore*, 115).
839 *The Decline of Western Civilization*, directed by Penelope Spheeris (1981; Culver City, CA: Media Home Entertainment, 1981), video; Stone, *All Ages*.
840 Spheeris, *The Decline of Western Civilization*.
841 "D.Y.S. – Live Set (1982)," Taang! Records, January 22, 2015, video, 12:47, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JCu3WwrUNkQ. Moreover, the following observations and interpretations are taken from the listed videos: "D.Y.S. – Yellow (Live 1983)," Taang! Records, January 22, 2015, video, 01:32, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9qgNs2Ey_nU; "DYS – City to City," Alltheluck, November 6, 2006, video, 01:46, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nhXv65W-LAk; "D.Y.S. – Love Hall Philladelphia (sic) 1.1.84," Bostoncrew82, November 25, 2011, video, 33:06, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGL7UMU0rC0; "Negative FX – Might Makes Right Live (1983),"

Taang! Records, January 22, 2015, video, 01:26, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8h12IyMCs4; "SSD – Eagles Lodge, Kalamazoo, M.I. 26.9.82," Bostoncrew82, January 1, 2015, video, 28:29, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1L4Q_oHcnBk; "SSD – The Channel, Boston 27.3.83," Bostoncrew82, January 24, 2012, video, 24:42, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5M4qhgvhirU; "SSD – Love Hall, Philadelphia 31.12.83," Bostoncrew82, June 1, 2012, video, 20:31, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w04aPX4-5U; and "SSD – Buff Hall, Philadelphia 20.11.82," Bostoncrew82, January 23, 2012, video, 37:33, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rbacedhNEg.

842 Hancock and Lorr, "More Than Just a Soundtrack," 338-339.

843 Collins, *Uncommon Cultures*, 120.

844 "SS Decontrol – Get It Away," Taang! Records, January 22, 2015, video, 03:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vF3rU9pNN6A. This recording does not feature the text, however, a second link contains the extra fourteen seconds that includes the write-up: "SS Decontrol – Get It Away," Mistah D 2, February 7, 2006, video, 03:24, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QdvF5bhDChY. Both Negative FX and DYS followed a similar setup, although their industry videos are incredibly rare (Stone, *All Ages*).

845 "Gang Green – Alcohol," Taang! Records, January 22, 2015, video, 02:03, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_R_632-EW8. As we shall see in future instantiations of this format, different shots are used to create connections between live sets and B-roll footage.

846 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 185.

847 Hancock and Lorr, "More Than Just a Soundtrack," 338.

848 Hancock and Lorr, "More Than Just a Soundtrack," 338; James, "Hardcore," 225.

849 This is in contrast to Hancock and Lorr's understanding of the lived reality of hardcore shows in which bands abdicate their leadership by handing over vocal control to attendees ("More Than Just a Soundtrack," 339, 341).

850 Hancock and Lorr, "More Than Just a Soundtrack," 340.

851 James, "Hardcore," 225.

852 The following observations and interpretations are based on these videos: *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 1," Bostoncrew82, October 7, 2016, video, 01:00:41, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPpYbnDZoZ4; *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 2," Bostoncrew82, November 25, 2012, video, 01:02:43, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCS757lAfa8; *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 3," Bostoncrew82, October 7, 2016, video, 01:01:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLuNWSj7MeQ; *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 4," Bostoncrew82, December 17, 2011, video, 58:07, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S14OeP52EfI; *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 5," Bostoncrew82, December 12, 2011, video, 01:02:01, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ol5IUR6W91I; *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 8," Bostoncrew82, November 25, 2012, video, 59:13, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7X12UxGVTX4; *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 10," Bostoncrew82, December 16, 2011, video, 01:00:21, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TEN_6eN2WvY.

853 "Video Fanzines," *Flipside* 44 (1984): 4, https://archive.org/stream/Flipside441984/Flipside%2044%20%281984%29_djvu.txt.

854 The ultimate version of creative geography is evinced in volume 4, which was dedicated to one band touring across multiple venues (*Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 4").

855 In the very first video fanzine, screen time is dedicated to a discussion of the differentiation between other subcultures, punk iterations, and dancing techniques (*Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 1").

856 For instance, the use of cross-dissolves and superimpositions dominate the editing punctuation found throughout *Flipside's* video catalog.

857 *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 2."

858 *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 2." In one recorded interview with Ian MacKaye — Minor Threat lead vocalist, progenitor of straightedge tenets, and record company owner — he claims, "we [the band] don't promote ourselves like most [mainstream] bands do". Ironically, the statement was made

within a production dedicated to advertising bands and cultural products (*Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 2").
859 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 99.
860 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 91.
861 "7 Seconds – Flipside Video," Bostoncrew82, October 9, 2011, video, 36:40, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAYuNrfMp3o.
862 *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 10."
863 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 100, 723. *De facto* leader of the band, "Vinny Stigma", publicized the band's straightedge lifestyle in his personal 'zine "Agnostic Front: A Growing Concern" (Blush, *American Hardcore*, 723; *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 8").
864 *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 8."
865 *Flipside*, "Flipside Video Fanzine Vol. 8."
866 Blush, *American Hardcore*, 723, 729.
867 Haenfler, *Straight Edge*, 218. A timeline of the "Third Wave" plots its beginning around 1989 and ending around 1995 (218).
868 The lead singer of Negative FX and guitarists from DYS and SSD formed a "super-group" of Boston-area hardcore.
869 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 193, 197-198; "Slapshot - Moment of Truth (Live 1990)," Taang! Records, January 22, 2015, video, 01:11, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5H26nSIwcs.
870 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 287.
871 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 287, 255-257.
872 "Youth of Today – 'No More'," Tim McMahon, February 18, 2007, video, 03:21, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nFUqrzCZOuo.
873 "Youth of Today – Hamilton, Ontario 12.12.86," Bostoncrew82, February 20, 2012, video, 21:45, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Y_Cff52ev8; "Youth of Today – Wigan Unity Club 2.4.89," Bostoncrew82, February 20, 2012, video, 21:50, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bbBU12m4D7A; "Youth of Today – CBGB's 16.10.86," Bostoncrew82, February 19, 2012, video, 37:40, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAqEai43-kQ. Another fundamental goal was to promote the vegan, straight-edge lifestyle that would ostensibly precipitate the end of the consumption of animals in mainstream society.
874 Rettman, *Straight Edge*, 496.
875 Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 34.
876 The emergence of hardcore's dominant mode of representation paralleled the rise of skateboarding's media industry. Such happenstance was not entirely coincidental. Jake Phelps, eventual editor of the seminal skateboard publication *Thrasher* and former member of the Boston Crew, understood the effect and importance of controlling subcultural production. Phelps was included in the photospread for SSD's first album (Al Barile, "Al Barile," *Thrasher*, June 2019, 80; Blush, *American Hardcore*, 57, 601). Although Phelps was not affiliated with any particular band at the time, he later started his own (hardcore) punk band called "Bad Shit".
877 I attribute this power to the limited market competition — the aggressive consolidation of allocative and authoritative resources — and the intracultural hierarchies that comprised the subculture during this era.
878 Once again, for the purposes of this writing, agency is defined as such: "[Not the] intentions people have in doing things but their capability of doing those things in the first place" (Giddens, *The Constitution of* Society, 9).
879 It should be noted that in its contemporary form, scholars have questioned the categorical distinction of skateboarding. Issues pertain to whether skateboarding should be considered a subculture, a subworld, sport, leisure activity, artform, and/or a religion to name a few. See for instance, O'Connor, *Skateboarding and Religion*; Crosset and Beal, "The Use of 'Subculture' and 'Subworld';" and the edited collection *Skateboarding: Subcultures, Sites and Shifts*, ed. Kara-Jane Lombard (London: Routledge, 2016). For a more extensive list of categories and particularities, architectural scholar Iain Borden

provides this comprehensive run-down of the subculture's multitude of expressions relative to the debate between the aforementioned distinctions: "Skateboarding is inherently plural and contradictory, being at once authentic and corporate, playful and serious, rebellious and conformist, street-based and skatepark-bound…skateboarders act between categories, disrupt conventional codes and produce new spaces — mental, physical, creative and social — to inhabit" (*Skateboarding and the City: A Complete History* [London: Bloomsbury, 2019], 282).

880 Today, the cultural products produced by the skateboard industry are relevant to both mainstream consumers and practicing adherents, but the marketing strategies of industry professionals have, by and large, not changed.

881 According to Borden, skateboarding as a subculture "is enacted not as a purely socio-economic enterprise, but as a physical activity, undertaken against the materiality of the modern city" (*Skateboarding and the City*, 171). Borden refers to this as a performative critique and explains that this critique manifests when skateboarders disrupt the "highly ordered districts and economic logics of cities [by] taking advantage of space without paying for it", and in doing so, "reassert use values" (220, 224-225, 264).

882 Recall Dupont's notion of subcultural hubs in which the close "proximity to key subcultural members, companies, and spaces" generates the visual content and subcultural knowledge distributed to all participants of the subculture ("Authentic Subcultural Identities," 3).

883 Rodney Jones, "Sport and Re/Creation: What Skateboarders Can Teach Us About Learning," *Sport, Education and Society* 16, no. 5 (October 2011): 593-611, 602.

884 In most productions, media-makers elide any unsuccessful attempts. However, for a time, "slam sections" — dedicated parts in industry videos that featured unsuccessful attempts or "slams" — were found in a majority of productions. This practice has since tapered off, and now, a limited number of slams are found videos. Most of these shots are included in individual parts, rather than as compilations of multiple skateboarders.

885 Maintaining elite status is, in part, dependent upon the quality of maneuvers and the quantity of recordings.

886 Yochim, *Skate Life*, 143. The author's research suggests that heteronormative expressions of white masculinity in industry videos are reproduced by consumers (skateboarders) in their everyday interactions (141, 147).

887 The words of Jenkem Magazine's current managing editor are the distilled version of this argument: "We talk all the time about making videos. We all know that these are the way videos should look" (Alexis Castro, "How 'Baker 3' Banged Us Over The Head," Jenkem Magazine, November 25, 2019, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2019/11/25/baker-3-banged-us-head/). In addition, a non-industry representative, speaking of the everyday experiences of lower-level members, reflects, "We watch other skateboarders who are better than us, remember what those performances look like, and gradually get a sense for what 'good skateboarding' is. This sense of 'good skateboarding' – which must come from outside of us (as no one could have a sense of what good skateboarding is without ever watching it) – sticks with us and heckles us whenever we're trying to skate" (Morley Musick, "Psychoanalyzing You and Your Skateboard," Jenkem Magazine, October 14, 2015, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2015/10/14/psychoanalyzing-you-and-your-skateboard/). And finally, an elite practitioner of skateboarding, in conversation with a part-owner of *Thrasher*, mentions how industry videos influence his own practices and performances: "I definitely think about it [other videos] when I'm trying a similar trick or skating a similar spot [location of obstacle], but only so that I can use that experience to help me with the trick I'm currently trying" (Tony Vitello, "Jake Johnson: The GX Interview," Thrasher, February 23, 2016, https://www.thrashermagazine.com/articles/jake-johnson-the-gx-interview/).

888 Gregory Snyder, *Skateboarding LA: Inside Professional Street Skateboarding* (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 154.

889 Willy Staley, "Thrashed," *California Sunday Magazine*, March 24, 2016, https://story.californiasunday.com/jake-phelps-thrasher. Innovation, the invention of new tricks, is also

important (Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 188; Kara-Jane Lombard, "The Cultural Politics of Skateboarding and the Rise of Skate Urbanism," in *Skateboarding: Subcultures, Sites and Shifts*, ed. Kara-Jane Lombard (London: Routledge, 2016), 1-14, 4).

890 Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 72.

891 It should be noted that lower-tier skateboarders can also take part in the collective goal of progression, however, this requires compliance with the standards institutionalized by the dominant order. Without doing so, the media piece is not distributed via industry-approved platforms. In certain circumstances, the industry makes exceptions for images based on cultural relevancy. Regarding progression and the production of media, the "perfection of form" is more akin to refinement, a deindividuation of meaning-making that conveys the preferred meaning of conformity.

892 Such influence also manifests in influencing the spatial practice of skateboarding in the lived reality (including the appropriate clothing worn or equipment used) and the patterns of production made manifest on screen. See: Ian Michna, "The Marc Johnson Interview," Jenkem Magazine, July 16, 2013, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2013/07/16/the-marc-johnson-interview/. Professional skateboarder and company owner Pontus Alv concurs, stating, "From the 80s to the early 2000s, there were all these rules. In the '90s everyone had to ride small wheels, make pressureflips and there was a clear uniform etc. It was not about skateboarding but about trends" (Stefan Schwinghammer, "Inside the Mind of Pontus Alv," Solo Skateboard Magazine, April 23, 2016, https://www.soloskatemag.com/inside-the-mind-of-pontus-alv/?lang=en).

893 Jones, "Sport and Re/Creation," 593.

894 Schwinghammer, "Inside the Mind of Pontus Alv."

895 Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 74.

896 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 276. See also "Christian Hosoi: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 77," The Nine Club, December 25, 2017, video, 02:44:34, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_JFNhr6fVU; Atkinson and Wilson, "Bodies, Subcultures and Sport;" Wheaton, "Selling Out?." See also: Becky Beal, "Disqualifying the Official: An Exploration of Social Resistance Through the Subculture of Skateboarding," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 12 (1995): 252-267, 254, 261; Becky Beal, "Symbolic Inversion in the Subculture of Skateboarding," in *Play & Culture Studies, Volume 1: Diversions and Divergences in Fields of Play*, eds. Margaret Carlisle Duncan, Garry Chick, and Alan Aycock (Greenwich and London: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1998), 209-222. An exception would be Emily Chivers Yochim who argues that this "reverence" for individualism is, in effect, a "strategy through which [skateboarders] can evade developing a definitive critique" of both commercial culture and skateboarding's relationship to it" (*Skate Life*, 109).

897 Matthew Atencio, Becky Beal and Charlene Wilson, "The Distinction of Risk: Urban Skateboarding, Street Habitus and the Construction of Hierarchical Gender Relations," *Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise* 1, no. 1 (March 2009): 3-20, 6.

898 Not to mention the social and media hierarchies that constitute this self-documenting subculture in its totality.

899 Hanson O'Haver, "A Crime and a Pastime," *The Baffler* 40 (July/August 2018): 66-72, 70.

900 Tyler Dupont, "From Core to Consumer: The Informal Hierarchy of the Skateboard Scene," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 43, no. 5 (2014): 556-581, 561. In contrast to my own position, Dupont stipulates that this hierarchy is not objectified in a structural sense. However, in concert with this text, he does believe the consequences of such a hierarchy, "real" or not, impact the everyday lives of participants (561).

901 Professional skateboarders are in a precarious position with contracts often originating with a handshake, which is the industry standard prevalent then and today, although slowly in decline (Joel Rice, "The Art of the Bro Deal," ESPN, March 28, 2012, https://www.espn.com/action/skateboarding/story/_/id/7739768/contracts-rise-handshake-deals-remain-skateboarding-core).

902 For more extended historical accounts of skateboarding, see Borden, *Skateboarding and the City* and Michael Brook, *The Concrete Wave: The History of Skateboarding* (Toronto: Warwick Publishing, 1999).

[903] I would argue the industry specifically markets this "dream" to youths and adolescents to sell cultural products. Additional research could identify these specific instances in the textual content of advertisements and in other media forms.
[904] Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 154.
[905] Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 15, 12.
[906] Kyle Beachy, "Primitive Progressivism," Free Skateboard Magazine, June 5, 2018, https://www.freeskatemag.com/2018/06/05/primitive-progressivism-by-kyle-beachy/.
[907] Moreover, substantial inequities, epitomized by the dominant order's control over the production and distribution of knowledge, are rarely identified or mentioned by elite subcultural members.
[908] The equivalent would be similar to "Sports Illustrated owning both the Chicago Bulls and Nike and paying Michael Jordan to play basketball, pose for magazine photo spreads, and promote Nike shoes — all in the same contract" ("Hell on Wheels," *San Francisco Bay Guardian* [San Francisco, CA], May 1994). Industry media-maker Patrick O'Dell concurs with this assessment in an interview discussing the industry (Ian Michna, "The Inside Perspective with Patrick O'Dell," Jenkem Magazine, May 31, 2012, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2012/05/31/the-inside-perspective-of-patrick-odell/).
[909] Max Harrison-Caldwell, 'Let's Put this Shit to Bed," Skateism, May 31, 2019, https://www.skateism.com/lets-put-this-shit-to-bed/. As stated, the term "core" is also used to describe brands and companies that produce the majority of their products for intracultural consumption.
[910] Yochim, *Skate Life*, 55.
[911] Yochim, *Skate Life*, 28, 32.
[912] Becky Beal argues that skateboarding is "fundamentally democratic" because the "sport" is "participant-run; it thrives on a do-it-yourself (DIY) ethos" (*Skateboarding: The Ultimate Guide* [Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2013], xi, 1). However, Borden provides a more comprehensive description of the subculture's values: "Most skateboarders rightly consider that their personal skateboarding is largely devoid of economic motivation…Yet skateboarding has always been part physical pleasure and part commercial enterprise" (*Skateboarding and the City*, 273). Kara-Jane Lombard asserts that notions of the subculture's inherent resistance to incorporation from the mainstream or other outside influences are not historically accurate ("Skate and Create/Skate and Destroy: The Commercial and Governmental Incorporation of Skateboarding," *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 24, no. 4 [August 2010]: 475–488, 479, 475). In the 1970s, external sponsors, like Pepsi Corporation, envisioned the fledgling subculture as a realm to market to new demographics. The corporation sponsored the "world-famous" Pepsi Skateboard Team (Beal, *Skateboarding*, 18; Sean Mortimer, *Stalefish: Skateboard Culture from the Rejects Who Made It* [San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2008], 83). This is also echoed in the ethnographic studies of Becky Beal, among others, who stresses that recreational (lower-tier) skateboarders do not fully embrace corporate or anti-corporate rhetoric (Beal, "Disqualifying the Official," 255; Becky Beal and Charlene Wilson, "'Chicks Dig Scars': Commercialisation and the Transformations of Skateboarders' Identities," in *Understanding Lifestyle Sports: Consumption, Identity and Difference*, ed. Belinda Wheaton [London: Routledge, 2004], 31-54, 40).
[913] "Lance Mountain: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 127," The Nine Club, January 7, 2019, video, 03:45:14, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lPG1xvG-flA.
[914] Yochim, *Skate Life*, 48. According to Borden, Russ Howell earned over fifty thousand dollars in 1976 from "demonstrations and other deals, including those with Levi's, Coke, and GMC-Holden" (*Skateboarding and the City*, 49). See also: "Steve Caballero: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 155," The Nine Club, July 22, 2019, video, 03:32:09, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K78XBhLmwZo.
[915] Specifically, the delineation of status based on prowess and the marketing power of brands based on their "team" of professionals. Competitions also serve as interpersonal gatherings that bring together skateboard practitioners and professionals into coexistent spaces (Beal, *Skateboarding*, 19).
[916] Contest circuits continue today in the form of Street League, the Maloof "Money Cup", and the "Dew Tour", which frequently accept sponsorships from external corporations (Beal, *Skateboarding*, 57). Tampa Am and Tampa Pro are two, non-circuit, competitions hosted by the Skatepark of Tampa that for

decades have helped to establish the professional ranks and renew the statuses of those with such a ranking (Beal, *Skateboarding,* 54; Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 139).
917 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 133; "Christian Hosoi: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 77;" "Steve Caballero: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 155;" Beal, *Skateboarding,* xvii, 23; Beal, "Disqualifying the Official," 257.
918 Jesse Martinez, "Kareem Campbell," Juice Magazine, May 1, 2014, https://juicemagazine.com/home/kareem-campbell-2/.
919 "Jeff Grosso: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 85," The Nine Club, February 19, 2019, video, 02:22:13, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I16Vj4_xdxY. Former professional skateboarder, Kevin Harris recalls, "you had to know somebody major in California to get a legitimate sponsor" (Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 69).
920 "Lance Mountain: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 127."
921 Of all the groundbreaking contests at the time, the 1975 Del Mar Nationals is frequently cited as pivotal to the history of skateboarding. A new style of skateboarding was introduced, a form that mimicked surfing and wave-riding and "more or less ended the era of skateboarding as gymnastics" (Conor Dougherty, "Jay Adams, Who Revolutionized Skateboarding, Dies at 53," *New York Times* [New York, NY], August 17, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/sports/jay-adams-who-changed-skateboarding-into-something-radical-dies-at-53.html?_r=1). This new style also cemented the professional status of its practitioners, the Z-Boys (Zephyr skateboard team). Prior to Del Mar, the idea of a professional skateboarder was fluid and less defined: "[N]o thought was given to the contest as being a 'pro' event" (Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 126). The distinctions would codify quickly after the contest, as professional status indicated a skateboarder received money in service of representing a brand or company. However, Borden identifies this moment as later in mid-1979 (*Skateboarding and the City*, 174).
922 Caballero estimated he competed in twenty-five to thirty contests before being sponsored ("Steve Caballero: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 155").
923 "Lance Mountain: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 127." This is echoed by Mountain's contemporary, Steve Caballero, in another interview ("Steve Caballero: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 155").
924 Beal, "Disqualifying the Official," 257. The board of directors included owners of Vision, Powell-Peralta, Santa Cruz, and *TransWorld Skateboarding* magazine and *Thrasher* magazine.
925 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 176. This is also echoed by Christian Hosoi and Steve Caballero ("Christian Hosoi: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 77;" "Steve Caballero: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 155."
926 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 128. For instance, the Randolph Rubber Company provided shoes to skateboarders and at one time was the "Official Shoe of the National Skateboard Championship Association." This quite literally paid off with the company's shoes on the feet of winning riders, who were documented in reportage of various contests (Thomas Turner, "Transformative Improvisation: The Creation of the Commercial skateboard Shoe, 1960-1979," in *Skateboarding: Subcultures, Sites and Shifts*, ed. Kara-Jane Lombard [London: Routledge, 2016], 182-194, 195, 186). Turner also provides a comprehensive history of skateboard footwear.
927 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 116.
928 To encapsulate the skateboard industry from the 1980s on, it is fruitful to begin with the manufacturers of the majority of skateboard products during this decade: "Powell-Peralta (George Powell and Stacy Peralta), SIMS and Vision (Brad Dorfman), [and] Santa Cruz (Rich Novak)" (Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 55-56).
929 Mackenzie Eisenhour, "The Freestyle Fellowship," *The Skateboard Mag* 11, no. 8 (June 2002), 70. The industry encompassed multiple tiers and divisions of labor including, but not limited to, skateboarders, filmers, photographers, "video editors, writers, journalists, shoe designers, clothing designers, graphic artists, and team managers" (Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 10).
930 Stranger, "Surface and Substructure," 1123. Stranger details a similar model in the surfing industry.

931 One estimate put it at twenty to thirty companies in total (Aceolus, "List of Skateboard Distributors," Skate Products, Skateboard City, January 6, 2013, http://www.skateboard-city.com/messageboard/archive/index.php/t-281169.html).
932 Iain Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City: Architecture and the Body* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 157.
933 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 19; Aceolus, "List of Skateboard Distributors." Even seemingly "underground" or independent companies, like Traffic, Magenta, Hopps, or Polar Skate Co, operate under and through a distribution company (Theories). Toy Machine, a company started by two skateboarders and frequently cited as an example of a small, but independent company, is housed under TUMYETO distribution. In 2013, TUMYETO was affiliated with seven separate companies (Aceolus, "List of Skateboard Distributors;" Rice, "The Art of the Bro Deal"). Before this, Toy Machine (in its original instantiation as TV) partnered with Brad Dorfman of Vision Skateboards. Notably, at the time, Vision was considered a dying company, yet their financial assets and manufacturing capabilities made them an ideal partner. Without naming Dorfman as an investor and business partner, the two professional skateboarders that co-owned the company could market the company as "skater-owned" (Rice, "The Art of the Bro Deal;" Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #50: Jerry Fowler," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), November 2, 2012, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2012/11/chrome-ball-interview-50-jerry-fowler.html).
934 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 55-56.
935 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 56.
936 "Hell on Wheels."
937 "Hell on Wheels."
938 Recall that decreased competition through increased collaboration tends to result in the homogenization of products and larger shares of profit (Beverland, "Brand Management and the Challenge of Authenticity," 461).
939 "Hell on Wheels." These companies included Tracker, A-1, and House of Kasai, to name a few (Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 56).
940 "Hell on Wheels." Some examples of Vitello's investments in companies included Think, Hubba, Spitfire, Venture, and Thunder (Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 56).
941 Mackenzie Eisenhour, "The Rocco Seed: The World Industries Family Tree," *The Skateboard Mag*, June 2001. During his portfolio's heyday (the late 1980s and early 1990s), Rocco owned and operated the most profitable distribution company in the industry, World Industries. The company was earning over ten million dollars per year before Rocco sold his equity for a reported twenty-nine million dollars in 1998. The profit was so large, in part, because Rocco adopted a highly successful business model of selling outside of the "core" market and instead focusing on children and recreational skateboarders (Ian Michna, "The History of World Industries and its $29 Million Dollar Sale," Jenkem Magazine, September 23, 2014, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2014/09/23/the-history-of-world-industries-and-its-29-million-dollar-sale/).
942 The companies would frequently spar with one another through advertisements or articles in their own publications. Rocco's infamous "Dear [Company Owner]" advertisements specifically called out George Powell (aerospace engineer) and Larry Balma (enthusiast) for not being skateboarders themselves; although no such advertisement targeted Vitello (Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #111: J. Grant Brittain," *The Chrome Ball Incident* [blog], January 9, 2018, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2018/01/chrome-ball-interview-111-j-grant.html; Friendly dave, "Re: What was the Woodstock ad Calling out Steve Rocco?," Useless Wooden Toy Banter, SLAP, May 24, 2012, https://www.slapmagazine.com/index.php?topic=62345.0. Rocco would extend this courtesy to former riders who switched brands and distribution companies as well.
943 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 56. All three men would promote their own products in their magazines to some degree. For instance, the *Bay Guardian's* article found that thirty-five percent of skateboard advertisements in one issue of *Thrasher* were tied to Vitello-owned or associated companies ("Hell on Wheels").

944 This policy was revived and, in a sense, deepened by Jake Phelps when he ascended to the position of editor at *Thrasher*. Periodically, Phelps would ban individual skateboarders for various reasons. See: "Top 5 wiht (*sic*) the Mouthpiece of the Mag, Jake Phelps," *Crailtap* (blog), August 2007, http://www.crailtap.com/c3/feature_features/fives/fives_phelper.html; and Ian Michna, "What Happened to Danny Gonzalez," Jenkem Magazine, July 20, 2011, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2011/07/20/what-happened-to-danny-gonzalez/. The insular market also creates tacit agreements between owners, who collectively pay all skateboarders a relatively similar rate, essentially, wage-fixing. One former professional recalled that he was sponsored by four brands under Deluxe Distribution's purview. He alleged, if he had been paid by four separate companies managed by different distribution firms, his labor would have netted him considerably more based on his market value (Ian Michna, "The Stuff You Want to Know About: Jeremy Wray," Jenkem Magazine, December 28, 2011, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2011/12/28/the-stuff-you-want-to-know-about-jeremy-wray/). More so, the ability of a skateboarder to annually explore their market value as a free agent is severely frowned upon to the extent that "roster- or sponsor-hopping", as it is known, is considered anathema to one's subcultural career (Rob Dyrdek, "It Reflects in Checks, Dyrdek's 10 Career Tips," *The Skateboard Mag*, 52).

945 Aceolus, "List of Skateboard Distributors;" Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 60.

946 Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, 174-176.

947 The differentiation between *Thrasher* and *TransWorld* is often played up in terms of content and imagery: the former's "Skate and Destroy" theme and wonky production quality juxtaposed with the glossy veneer and corporate friendly content of the latter's "Skate and Create" motif (Louise Balma, "Early Tales of Tracker Trucks and *TransWorld* and *Skateboarding* Magazine," *Being There* [blog], September 26, 2018, https://www.larrybalma.com/2018/09/26/early-tales-of-tracker-trucks-and-transworld-skateboarding-magazine/). However, the two companies' goals converged more often than not. So too, the notion that *Thrasher* is more "core" does not hold up under scrutiny. According to former employee Lance Dawes, very few workers, "maybe a handful", at High Speed Productions (the publishing company of *Thrasher*) were skateboarders (Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #122: Lance Dawes," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), November 8, 2018, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2018/11/chrome-ball-interview-121-lance-dawes.html). *TransWorld*, on the other hand, openly accepted corporate investors in favor of the magazine's placement on newsstands and in retail chains (Hanson O'Haver, "An Oral History of 'TransWorld Skateboarding' Magazine," Vice, May 30, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nea4vd/an-oral-history-of-transworld-skateboarding-magazine).

948 "Chet Thomas: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 154," The Nine Club, July 15, 2019, video, 01:52:04, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y09u5itMaA8.

949 Ian Michna, "The Story of Alex Moul's Cult Electronic Music Career," Jenkem Magazine, August 28, 2019, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2019/08/28/story-alex-mouls-cult-electronic-music-career/.

950According to Stacy Peralta, co-owner of Powell-Peralta skateboards, the industry collectively "realized we're selling all these boards to kids and maybe 20 percent of them have access to vertical terrain" (Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 167).

951 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 116.

952 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 178-179.

953 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 167, 37, 136; Lowboy (Craig Stecyk III), "Interview: Stacy Peralta," *Thrasher* 2, no. 5 (May and June 1982): 15-21, 16-17. Tommy Guerrero also stipulates that the contest was a marketing tool (Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 37). Although prior to this event, *Action Now* (formerly *Skateboarder* magazine), printed the first "major coverage" of street-style skateboarding in 1981, with *Thrasher* following up in April 1982 with the "Gnarly Street Issue" (Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 195).

954 "Hell on Wheels;" Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 57.

955 Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, 25-26.

956 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 35, 37, 170.

957 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 136.
958 Timothy Sedo, "'Deadstock' Boards, 'Blown-out' Spots, and the Olympic Games: Global Twists and Local Turns in the Formation of China's Skateboarding Community," in *Cultural Autonomy: Frictions and Connections, eds.* Petra Rethmann, Imre Szeman, and William Coleman (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 265-269, 266.
959 "Powell-Peralta – Skateboarding in the 80s (1982) (60fps)," LilShootDawg's Skate Archive, September 15, 2018, video, 07:46, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7c1krz5YQc; "Powell Peralta Presents: The Bones Brigade Video Show," Powell Peralta, May 15, 2019, video, 35:54, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQyneVJN9yw; "Powell Peralta Presents: Future Primitive," Powell Peralta, May 22, 2019, video, 52:09, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VG74o7aafpc; "Powell Peralta Presents: The Search for Animal Chin," Powell Peralta, June 19, 2019, video, 01:05:39, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bV1b_-7zf-s; "Powell Peralta Presents: Public Domain," Powell Peralta, June 5, 2019, video, 01:04:23, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4w77MN75TEs. *The Bones Brigade Video Show*, by some estimates, sold thirty thousand copies alone. Some videos were even available to rent in video rental stores (Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 120; "Aaron Meza: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 90," The Nine Club, March 26, 2018, video, 01:36:54, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxWDfWypJX8; Keir Johnson, "RB Umali: 2007," *48 Blocks* (blog), 2007, http://bklyn.48blocks.com/rb-umali-2007/).
960 The majority of productions utilized Sony video's three-quarter inch tape and thirty-five-millimeter film cameras to define the brand's visual style (Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 84; Sam Griffin, "Skateboarding in the Age of Mechanical Image Reproduction: From Powell Peralta to T-Puds," in *Do Not Think*, ed. Chiara Santini Parducci [Berlin: Oxylane Art Foundation, 2015], 121-140; Mortimer *Stalefish*, 35).
961 Indeed, the aforementioned magazines did not cease publication entirely, although they were subsumed by video's capability to advance and delimit the boundaries of the subculture more effectively. Magazine's subservient position is perhaps best epitomized by the prevalence of "video grabs." In an era of technical progression, shooting film was expensive. To save money, individuals would photograph a series of still images by pausing video footage on television sets and printing them in magazines (Skin Phillips: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 66," The Nine Club, October 2, 2017, video, 01:33:14, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QLNF4ETfvkI).
962 "Stacy Peralta On Strombo: Full Interview," Strombo, June 6, 2012, video, 10:44, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1CUWOCAiNc8.
963 Sean Mortimer, "The Evolution of the Pro Skater's Job According to Lance Mountain," Jenkem Magazine, January 6, 2016, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2016/01/06/the-evolution-of-the-pro-skaters-job-according-to-lance-mountain/.
964 Eric Swisher, "Rudy Johnson," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), May 13, 2014, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2014/05/chrome-ball-interview-73-rudy-johnson.html.
965 Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #73: Rudy Johnson."
966 Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #104: Ray Barbee," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), July 27, 2017, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2017/07/chrome-ball-interview-104-ray-barbee_28.html?m=0; "Tommy Guerrero: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 87," The Nine Club, May 21, 2018, video, 02:14:46, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VM6Cc_hCuaI; "Steve Caballero: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 155." The notable exception to this schedule was the Bones Brigade production, *The Search for Animal Chin* (1987). Tony Hawk recalls the team received multiple days to film their parts on a specially designed ramp built for members to pursue new maneuvers (Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #102: Tony Hawk," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), June 4, 2017, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2017/06/chrome-ball-interview-102-tony-hawk.html).
967 "Tommy Guerrero: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 87."
968 Hardt, "Authenticity, Communication, and Critical Theory," 59-60.
969 "Bones Brigade: An Autobiography," About the Movie, Bones Brigade, https://bonesbrigade.com/about/.

970 Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, 117.
971 Colin Bane, "Skate History for Sale," ESPN, October 9, 2012, https://www.espn.com/espnw/news-commentary/story/_/id/8482703/lance-mountain-explains-why-bones-brigade-selling-collectibles-fans-release-film.
972 By the end of the 1980s, products geared toward street-style accounted for over ninety percent of industry sales (Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, 25).
973 Joel Patterson, "Who is Lance Mountain?," *The Skateboard Mag* 19, no. 3 (February 1998): 169-177 & 240-241, 173, 240.
974 "Steve Caballero: The Nine Club With Chris Roberts - Episode 155."
975 Lance Dawes, "'Skate on Film' Chronicles Videos," ESPN, June 30, 2012, video, https://www.espn.com/action/xgames/summer/2012/story/_/id/8117815/skate-film-chronicles-importance-skate-video.
976 Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 121; Mortimer, "The Evolution of the Pro Skater's Job."
977 This is also to say that Peralta was not the only media-maker engaging in fabrication via the screen reality. Indeed, manipulation is part of the tradition of skateboarding's industry productions.
978 Hodkinson, *Goth*, 173, 146-147.
979 Jones, "Sport and Re/Creation," 603. Studies of skateboarding's industry videos routinely focus on the role of media in the constitution of individual and group identities. See: David Buckingham, "Skate Perception: Self-Representation, Identity and Visual Style in a Youth Subculture," in *Video Cultures: Media Technology and Everyday Creativity*, eds. David Buckingham and Rebekah Willett (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 133-151. Yet, as I argue, this imagery is a manipulated representation of skateboarding, and thus, the focus here is on the processes of manipulation that lead to such influence. More so, Peter Donnelly and Kevin Young have advocated for analyses of identity construction that are not static, but dynamic: "[Identities are] constantly undergoing revision and change due to a variety of processes both within and outside the subculture" ("The Construction and Confirmation of Identity in Sport Subcultures," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 5 [1988]: 223-240, 237).
980 Ultimately, the demise of magazines as the primary communicator of subcultural knowledge may be aptly characterized by professional skateboarder Mark Gonzales (affectionately known as "The Gonz"), who, when asked about his involvement in the 1991 industry production titled *Video Days*, summarized the meaning behind the title: "It was no longer magazines, it was skateboard videos that were dictating [the culture]" ("MOMA-History of Skate Videos Part 1," Patrick O'Dell, August 11, 2010, video, 05:42, https://vimeo.com/14079384).
981 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 86.
982 Iain Borden, "Skateboard City: London in Skateboarding Films," in *London on Film*, eds. Pam Hirsch and Chris O'Rourke (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 177-192, 181-182.
983 Images acting as evidential proof have always been under question within and outside the subculture. For instance, a number of industry professionals conceded that they published photos of practitioners purportedly accomplishing maneuvers, even when they knew the maneuver was not successfully completed ("Skin Phillips: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 66;" Colin Bane, "Tommy Guerrero on the Release of 'Bones Brigade: An Autobiography Trailer'," ESPN, August 22, 2012, https://www.espn.com/action/skateboarding/story/_/id/8293000/autobiography-trailer).
984 An exact definition of style is difficult to ascertain, however, former professional skateboarder Scott Johnston states that "style is personality through physical movement — how someone does their skating" (Eric Swisher, "The Chrome Ball Incident for ABD #2 Scott Johnston," *Already Been Done* (blog), January 4, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20150109224847/http://alreadybeendone.com/content/2011/01/04/the-chrome-ball-incident-for-abd-2-scott-johnston/). Without "proper" style, sponsorship or industry acceptance is rare (Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 59).
985 Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, 120.
986 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 190.
987 Borden, *Skateboarding and the City*, 190.

[988] Mortimer, "The Evolution of the Pro Skater's Job."
[989] Certain practitioners speak of using videos to "correct" their style or contextualize their level of prowess. See: "Jamie Thomas: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 68," The Nine Club, October 16, 2017, video, 03:33:43, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hc5AlRTTNx0. In fact, industry-sanctioned magazine articles have been written in service of listing tricks that are so abhorrent stylistically, the chances of seeing them on screen are slim (Anthony Pappalardo, "Dolphin Flips and 9 Other Skate Tricks Nobody Does Anymore," Complex, November 1, 2013, https://www.complex.com/sports/2013/11/extinct-skateboard-tricks).
[990] This also occurs with lower-level participants as well. Indeed, Dupont asserts in his localized study that "established skaters assisted the younger skaters in developing the proper tastes by suggesting which producers to follow and which messages to internalize" ("Authentic Subcultural Identities," 6). In an ethnographic study conducted by Emily Chivers Yochim, one lower-level participant acknowledged that videos provide evidence of both possibility and progression (*Skate Life*, 139).
[991] With complex urban centers, "spot-hunting", the search for obstacles in which skateboarders can perform never-been-done maneuvers, occurs frequently.
[992] Famed media-maker Josh Stewart, when asked what makes a good industry video, stated, "the whole package", which included good skating, decent editing, and proper text and/or graphics; evidently the recording stage was not as important as it would seem ("Josh Stewart: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 82," The Nine Club, January 29, 2018, video, 02:04:37, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5feuB1AiULw). Media-maker Jason Hernandez offers this, "I learned how to film for the edit […] Editing helped me film better" ("Jason Hernandez: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 19," The Nine Club, October 17, 2016, video, 01:04:27, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mve9WJjuw04). Such sentiments are reiterated by Heath Brinkley in the same interview series ("Heath Brinkley: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 92," The Nine Club, April 16, 2018, video, 02:17:07, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1IUwNjPbCOM).
[993] This is no better understood then when aspiring skateboarders and their proximate media-makers produce "sponsor me videos", which are akin to musicians' "demo" tapes (Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 153). Sponsor me videos invariably follow the exact conventions and formula of arrangement that industry videos propagate, in a sense, verifying the skateboarder (and media-maker) is compliant with industry-standards (Yochim, *Skate Life*, 168, 140, 142).
[994] Today, the exact number varies, but general salary estimates for an individual sponsored by a skateboard manufacturing company are as follows: in their first year as an amateur, they would earn roughly one thousand dollars per month. In the second year as an amateur, twenty-five hundred dollars per month. Once professional status is obtained, the skateboarder earns roughly five thousand dollars per month. This is not counting additional sponsorships such as footwear, clothing, and other equipment ("Money in Skateboarding: The AVNI Interviews 0038 with Mikey Taylor & Eric Bork," Avni Intelligence, February 5, 2019, video, 59:19, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUYVz3ui0KA).
[995] "How Much Should Skate Filmers Make?," The Nine Club, December 31, 2019, video, 25:16, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xaITntxcMEA.
[996] Nic Dobija-Nootens, "Tracing the History of Skateboarding's Most Famous Camera," Jenkem Magazine, July 13, 2018, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2018/07/13/tracing-history-skateboardings-most-famous-camera/.
[997] Douglass McGill, "The Media Business; Camcorders Spread Video's Power," *New York Times* (New York, NY), June 26, 1989, D1.
[998] William Mayer, "Poll Trends: The Rise of the New Media," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 124-146, 129.
[999] "Aaron Meza: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts – Episode 90;" "Jamie Thomas: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 68;" and "Spike Jonze: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 78," The Nine Club, January 1, 2018, video, 02:26:42, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9it7xFFbJb4.
[1000] Mortimer, *Stalefish*, 119.

[1001] The tradeoff, however, was that the transfer process often degraded the image with each translation from console to tape.
[1002] Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, 117. Although surely bootleg copies were exchanged between peers, even outside the subculture.
[1003] Jones, "Sport and Re/Creation," 598.
[1004] In another sense, the "fish-eye" (wide-angle) lens, an industry standard, is frequently used to capture maneuvers. The lens' inherent distortion causes obstacles to appear larger than they exist in the built environment (Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 158). This is consciously understood by members, and the use of the lens is often championed by industry professionals. One publication provided a list of situations and obstacles that a fish-eye was best suited for (Eric Swisher, "#758: What Does Your Soul Look Like?," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), February 26, 2012, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2012/02/758-what-does-your-soul-look-like.html).
[1005] Groups of skateboarders informally commissioned the plaza as their own territory and enforced prescribed rules, which included harsh restrictions on non-locals. Jamie Thomas, an amateur seeking professional status at the time of his arrival to the plaza, commented on the EMB Crew: "The roughest crowd, the hardest people to be accepted by" ("Jamie Thomas: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 68").
[1006] A comprehensive list of obstacles would include: "[T]he seven, the stage, the big stage, the medium stage, the little three, the big three, the ledge at the bottom of the big three, the C-block, the fountain curb, the fountain gap, the Gonz gap, and the wave" (Sam Smyth, "15 Things You Didn't Know About Embarcadero," *The Skateboard Mag*, 112, currently hosted by Men's Journal, https://www.mensjournal.com/adventure/15thingsembarc/). It should also be noted that these were not the first skateboarders to discover this plaza, merely the ones that made it famous. Indeed, The Bones Brigade team filmed maneuvers at Embarco that were showcased in *The Search for Animal Chin*.
[1007] Lucas Wisenthal, "The Oral History of Embarcadero," The Ride Channel, October 30, 2014, http://web.archive.org/web/20160803025429/http:/theridechannel.com/features/2014/10/an-oral-history-of-embarcadero.
[1008] Wisenthal, "The Oral History of Embarcadero." The EMB Crew and Embarco's legacy remains intact, despite the fact that once Jake Phelps became editor of *Thrasher* in 1993, he declared in the ninth issue of his tenure that skateboarding was dead because of the "technical" nature of tricks performed by skateboarder's striving for progression (Staley, "Thrashed"). It is also worth mentioning that "Pier 7" was another pivotal spot in San Francisco that provided a space for the development of new maneuvers (Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #135: Karl Watson," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), November 25, 2019, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2019/11/chrome-ball-interview-135-karl-watson.html).
[1009] Mortimer, "The Evolution of the Pro Skater's Job;" Wisenthal, "The Oral History of Embarcadero;" "Mike Carroll: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 52," The Nine Club, June 12, 2017, video, 01:47:41, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHZpPgj6LHM; Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #135: Karl Watson."
[1010] Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Incident #446: Crack Raider," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), March 22, 2010, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2010/03/chrome-ball-incident-446-crack-raider.html.
[1011] Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Incident #700: The C-Block," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), November 10, 2011, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2011/10/chrome-ball-incident-700-c-block.html.
[1012] This is still the case today. Without keeping track, one risks performing ABDs (already-been-done maneuvers), which would result in the skateboarder being marked as unoriginal, a stain on the skateboarder's reputation (Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 154). Gregory Snyder notes, in his ethnographic study of the industry, that most media-makers are all but required to inform their practitioner counterpart of the previous maneuvers that took place at a designated location (Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 157, 176) This, in turn, reinforces the media-maker's status and their credibility as worthy of the task (Michael Jeffries, Sebastian Messer, and Jon Swords, "He Catches Things in Flight: Scopic Regimes, Visuality,

and Skateboarding in Tyneside, England," in *Skateboarding: Subcultures, Sites and Shifts*, ed. Kara-Jane Lombard (London: Routledge, 2016), 57-72, 65).
1013 Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #129: Ronnie Bertino (2019)," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), May 21, 2019, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2019/05/chrome-ball-interview-129-ronnie_21.html.
1014 Alex Klein, "The Seven Kook Commandments," hosted by Eric Swisher, "I am I be #636," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), May 16, 2011, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2011/05/i-am-i-be-636.html.
1015 Swisher, "#758: What Does Your Soul Look Like?."
1016 Swisher, "#758: What Does Your Soul Look Like?."
1017 Swisher, "#758: What Does Your Soul Look Like?." This sentiment is also echoed in another interview with a professional media-maker ("Socrates Leal: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 160," The Nine Club, August 26, 2019, video, 02:46:30, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kryIq_AOBwU).
1018 Borden, *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, 121.
1019 Borden, "Skateboard City," 184.
1020 "Paul Schmitt: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts: Episode 174," The Nine Club, December 9, 2019, video, 03:55:33, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18MRZq0bhpE. See also: Yochim, *Skate Life*, 139.
1021 Dupont, "From Core to Consumer," 561.
1022 "Resurrection of a Revolution," *H-Street*, https://h-street.com/pages/history; Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Incident #792: The Pecking Order," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), May 21, 2012, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2012/05/chrome-ball-incident-792-pecking-order.html.
1023 Swisher, "Chrome Ball Incident #792: The Pecking Order."
1024 "Mike Carroll: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 52."
1025 Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #100: Danny Way," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), April 19, 2017, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2017/04/chrome-ball-interview-100-danny-way.html.
1026 Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #100: Danny Way."
1027 Mackenzie Eisenhour, "The Rise and Fall of Plan B (Version 1.0)," July 17, 2014 [Originally published in *The Skateboard Mag*, November 2003], http://deadhippie.net/b-sides/2014/7/17/the-rise-and-fall-of-plan-b-version-10-plus-bonus-text.html.
1028 For instance, H-Street's first video captures amateur skateboarder Ray Simmonds working as a gas-station attendant.
1029 A plaza, therefore, affords an apt space to do so. I argue that the EMB Crew emerged as the model franchise of the "progressive era", in part, because of Embarco's architectural composition. To be sure, other San Francisco spots and other cities are included in these videos. However, the prominence of Embarco as a hub of progression is a focal point of this work.
1030 Ben Powell, "Auteurs: Colin Read," *Slam City* (blog), March 14, 2019, https://blog.slamcity.com/auteurs-colin-read/.
1031 A skateboarder with only a few "clips" or shots is usually placed among others in a shared section that is typically located in the middle of the video's timeline.
1032 "Jason Hernandez: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts – Episode 19."
1033 *Shackle Me Not*, directed by Mike Ternasky (1988; H-Street, 1988), video. However, *Shackle* does not necessarily maintain screen direction and provides less of an emphasis on synching the skateboard maneuvers with the music. Both editing conventions were prevalent in the next two videos. Additionally, *Shackle* opens with shared parts without care to the hierarchy noted in the body of this text. This all changes with the company's sophomore video, *Hokus Pokus*, directed by Mike Ternasky (1989; H-Street, 1989), video; and *This is Not the New H-Street Video*, directed by Mike Ternasky (1990; H-Street, 1989), video.
1034 Eric Swisher, "Chrome Ball Interview #137: Jake Rosenberg," *The Chrome Ball Incident* (blog), March 15, 2020, https://chromeballincident.blogspot.com/2020/03/chrome-ball-interview-137-jake-rosenberg_15.html. Some conventions are partially appropriated from photography standards instituted by

industry magazines. See: “Spike Jonze: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 78;” Swisher, “Chrome Ball Interview #111: J. Grant Brittain;” and Michael Nevin Willard, “Cutback: Skate and Punk at the Far End of the American Century,” in *America in The Seventies,* eds. Beth Bailey and David Farber (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 181-207.

1035 “Shoot All Skaters: Socrates Leal,” The Berrics, May 30, 2011, video, https://web.archive.org/web/20150129024025/https://theberrics.com/shoot-all-skaters/shoot-all-skaters-socrates-leal. Emphasis added. This is also echoed by RB Umali in the same interview series (“Shoot All Skaters: RB Umali,” The Berrics, May 20, 2014, video, https://web.archive.org/web/20160810224932/http://theberrics.com/shoot-all-skaters/shoot-all-skaters-rb-umali-part-1/; and Johnson, “RB Umali: 2007”).

1036 Steve Rocco managed the manufacturing and distribution of the company’s products (Eisenhour, “The Rise and Fall of Plan B [Version 1.0]”).

1037 “Mike Carroll: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 52;” *Questionable*, directed by Mike Ternasky (1992; Plan B, 1992), video. In part, this was because of the overall team and the foregrounding of Mike Carroll (Mackenzie Eisenhour, “Video Days in Video Years,” *The Skateboard Mag*, 58).

1038 Eisenhour, “The Rise and Fall of Plan B (Version 1.0).”

1039 Eisenhour, “The Rise and Fall of Plan B (Version 1.0);” Stephen Cox, “Mike Carroll Interview by Stephen Cox,” Sidewalk Magazine, October 31, 2014, https://sidewalkmag.com/features/mike-carrolls-top-ten-sections.html/2.

1040 “Mike Carroll: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 52.”

1041 Smyth, “15 Things You Didn’t Know About Embarcadero.”

1042 “MOMA-History of Skate Videos Part 3,” Patrick O’Dell, August 11, 2010, video, 07:34, https://vimeo.com/14079181.

1043 *The Real Video* (1993; Real Skateboards, 1993), video. The production also included footage shot by Ternasky.

1044 *Welcome to Hell*, directed by Jamie Thomas (1996; Toy Machine, 1996), video. Thomas has repeatedly admitted to paying skateboarders for the successful completions of maneuvers and cited Ternasky’s editing formula as a major influence in his work (“Jamie Thomas: The Nine Club with Chris Roberts - Episode 68”).

1045 Larry Lanza, “What Inspires Some of Skating’s Best Filmmakers?,” Jenkem Magazine, March 20, 2020, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2020/03/20/inspires-skatings-best-filmmakers/.

1046 “Open – Promo (2012),” Colin Read, September 1, 2017, video, 02:37, https://vimeo.com/232039154.

1047 Companies like Converse create content, hosted on *Thrasher*’s website, like “filming tips” with established media-makers. Such content effectively actualizes the tradition of media-making and serves to reinforce the status quo (“Filming Tips with Ewan,” Thrasher, January 16, 2015, video, 03:13, https://www.thrashermagazine.com/articles/trash/filming-tips-with-ewan/). There are even media production workshops held by Woodward [Skateboard] Camp, in which instructors provide the necessary tutelage to conform to the proper standards of filming and editing (Alexis Castro, “Creating New Spaces in Skateboard Media,” Jenkem Magazine, April 3, 2019, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2019/04/03/creating-new-spaces-skateboard-media/). Moreover, Krooked Skateboards (distributed by Deluxe) released the industry video *Gnar Gnar* (2007), which was recorded in the same lo-fi technology (Hi8 and VHS cameras) used to capture industry videos of the era in question (“Gnar Gnar,” Krooked Skateboarding, April 17, 2019, video, 23:13, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tuql5qr-IAc).

1048 Johnny Campos and Goob Kult, “Watch Anderson Pereira’s Tribute Part to SF in the ‘90s,” Jenkem Magazine, April 8, 2020, http://www.jenkemmag.com/home/2020/04/08/watch-anderson-pereiras-tribute-part-sf-90s/.

1049 Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 152.

1050 Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 15, 12. The industry, as it exists today, is more akin to the initial professionalization of skateboarding’s elite tier in which external corporate sponsors funded competition to delineate the status and prowess of subcultural members. Without such statistical rankings, the degree

of conflict between riders and the police is the main factor in differentiating tiers within the subculture of urban dirt-bike riding. See the previous chapter for a more in-depth discussion of this period.
1051 That is also to say, the activities of this particular model franchise extend beyond the social practices of like-minded enthusiasts and address a larger civil discourse regarding structural inequities.
1052 The Civil Rights Division of the US Department of Justice, *Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department* (Washington: US Department of Justice, 2016), 5.
1053 Dick Hebdige, *Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things* (London: Routledge, 1988), 35.
1054 It should also be noted that the financial emancipation sought by recording and presenting such performances in the digital public sphere cannot always be sustained in the lived reality. Structural inequities delimit the socio-economic mobility of subcultural members.
1055 M. Holden Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
1056 Woermann, "On the Slope Is on the Screen," 632.
1057 Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities," 3.
1058 Dupont discusses the process of "authenticating" images based on the production of media in "hub" cities ("Authentic Subcultural Identities and Social Media," 3).
1059 Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018. Archived video pages: Oneson450r, March 25, 2008, https://www.youtube.com/user/oneson450r/featured; and Wild Out Wheelie Boyz, June 1, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEshK44o50sI7lJysi68_-Q/feed.
1060 Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018. Individual names are provided in full where previously published.
1061 Interestingly, the WoWBoyz tend to gather at Reisterstown Road bordering Druid Hill Park, the same boundary between East and West Baltimore known to hold the arabbers' horse stables of the 1980s discussed later in this chapter. See: Dan Rodricks, "On Baltimore Crime, Dirt Bikes, Arabbers, and Buses," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), August 10, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-md-rodricks-0811-20150810-column.html; Colin Campbell, "As Dirt Bikers Play Cat-and-Mouse Game with Baltimore Police, Officials Seek a Lasting Solution," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), August 25, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-dirt-bikes-20150823-story.html.
1062 Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 1, 3, 10-11.
1063 Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 37. Cohen determines that youth cultures' depictions in the mass media (local and national newspapers) are deliberately exaggerated and labeled deviant to delimit normative values (1). This is not due to a generational divide but is class-based (211). The mass media "protects" conventional norms from "folk devils", an umbrella term used to "trigger" collective memories of similar groups from the past (10-11, 184).
1064 Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 14.
1065 Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 225.
1066 Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 11-12.
1067 A more thorough explanation of Baltimore's "brand" and the supposed threat against it will be discussed later in this chapter.
1068 Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 185.
1069 Campbell, "As Dirt Bikers Play."
1070 Edward Ericson Jr. and Brandon Soderberg, "For What?: A Recent Crackdown on Illegal Dirt Bikes Leaves the Community Embattled, While Talk of a Legal Track Gains Momentum," *Baltimore City Paper* (Baltimore, MD), October 27, 2015, http://www.citypaper.com/news/features/bcp-102715-feature-dirtbikes-20151027-story.html.
1071 Hebdige, *Hiding in the Light*, 35.
1072 For further analysis of this appropriation model, see: McRobbie and Thornton, "Rethinking 'Moral Panic'," 565, 560, 562.
1073 See Hebdige, *Subculture*.
1074 McRobbie and Thornton, "Rethinking 'Moral Panic'," 565, 559. The authors refer to this as "niche media", using the term developed by Thornton in *Club Cultures*.

[1075] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1076] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1077] Hebdige refers to certain subcultures' "power to discomfit" (*Hiding in the Light*, 18).
[1078] Mary Ellen Hayward, *Baltimore's Alley Houses: Homes for Working People Since the 1780s* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 237.
[1079] Marisela Gomez, *Race, Class, Power, and Organizing in East Baltimore: Rebuilding Abandoned Communities in America* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 24-25.
[1080] Gomez, *Race, Class, Power*, 69.
[1081] Sherry Olson, *Baltimore* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1976), 54.
[1082] Justin Fenton and Tim Prudente, "Chief Backs Cop Who Shot Boy, 14," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), April 29, 2016, 1A.
[1083] Gomez, *Race, Class, Power*, 70.
[1084] Justin George, "Neighborhood Violence," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), October 9, 2016, 1A.
[1085] George, "Neighborhood Violence."
[1086] West Baltimore Commission on Police Misconduct and the No Boundaries Coalition, "Over-Policed, Yet Underserved: The People's Findings Regarding Police Misconduct in West Baltimore," March 8, 2016, 1-32, 18, http://www.noboundariescoalition.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/No-Boundaries-Layout-Web-1.pdf.
[1087] Civil Rights Division, *Investigation*, 157. Emphasis added.
[1088] Civil Rights Division, *Investigation*, 16.
[1089] John Fritze, "Rawlings-Blake Criticism Highlights Debate over Police Strategy Under O'Malley," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), October 13, 2014, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-police-omalley-politics-20141007-story.html.
[1090] Fritze, "Rawlings-Blake Criticism Highlights Debate over Police Strategy Under O'Malley."
[1091] Civil Rights Division, *Investigation*, 17-18.
[1092] Fritze, "Rawlings-Blake Criticism Highlights Debate over Police Strategy Under O'Malley."
[1093] Civil Rights Division, *Investigation*, 5-6.
[1094] Civil Rights Division, *Investigation*, 47.
[1095] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1096] Campbell, "As Dirt Bikers Play."
[1097] Baltimore City Department of Legislative Reference, Baltimore (BCDLR), inv.nr., *Article 19, § Subtitle 40 Police Ordinances* (As Last Amended by Ord. 16-593) 2016, 103.
[1098] Civil Rights Division, *Investigation*, 86-87.
[1099] BCDLR, inv.nr., *Article 19, § Subtitle 40 Police Ordinances*, 104.
[1100] BCDLR, inv.nr., *Article 19, § Subtitle 40 Police Ordinances*, 108.
[1101] Gomez, *Race, Class, Power*, 2-3.
[1102] Gomez, *Race, Class, Power*, 69-70.
[1103] Christopher James Richter, "Amidst the Chaos of the 1980's, the Boys of Baltimore Rode High: Retreat Street," *Fader*, no. 41 (October/November 2006): 140–147, 146, http://robinschwartz.net/FaderSchwartzArabbers.pdf.
[1104] Richter, "Amidst the Chaos of the 1980's," 146.
[1105] Dan Rodricks, interview with Wheelie Wayne and M. Holden Warren, *Baltimore Sun*, podcast audio, September 28, 2016, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/dan-rodricks-blog/bal-roughly-speaking-wheelie-wayne-story.html. Recall Cohen's assessment that objects are associated and labeled problematic.
[1106] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1107] Wild Out Wheelie Boyz, June 1, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEshK44o50sI7lJysi68_-Q/feed; Oneson450r, March 25, 2008, https://www.youtube.com/user/oneson450r/featured.
[1108] Carrie Wells, in discussion with the author, January 2018.

[1109] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018. Warren does mention that the WoWBoyz compiled their performances into a DVD at one time, but no existing copies could be found or acquired by this researcher.
[1110] Michael Silk, "'Banga Malaysia': Global Sport, The City and The Media Refurbishment of Local Identities," *Media, Culture & Society* 24. No. 6 (2002): 775-794, 777-778.
[1111] Silk, "'Banga Malaysia'," 778.
[1112] Silk, "'Banga Malaysia'," 778. By rebuilding the brand, I am referring, in part, to the tragic and preventable death of Freddie Gray. Trivial in comparison, the television series *The Wire* (2002-2008) is also a branding disruption according to city officials. See Campbell, "As Dirt Bikers Play" for more discussion of officials' interest in the branding of Baltimore.
[1113] These strategies will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
[1114] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1115] Wells, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1116] "Au Loin, Baltimore: Dreaming of Baltimore Trailer," Lola Quivoron, June 8, 2017, video, 00:55, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wXqgRI18h8.
[1117] "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz - Black Sundayz Baltimore # Baltimore BikeLife," Wild Out Wheelie Boyz, June 1, 2015, video, 09:58, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nzem2WQurn8.
[1118] Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 55. The exit option materializes when the decline of a state prompts the withdrawal of its constituents.
[1119] Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, 4.
[1120] Matthew A. Crenson, *Neighborhood Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 116.
[1121] Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 35. This is also echoed by Encheva, Driessens, and Verstaeten, "The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures," 18.
[1122] Andrew Thomas, "Don't Glorify Dirt Bikers: A Lifelong Resident Says Illegal Dirt Bike Riders Are a Menace, Not Practitioners of an 'Art Form'," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), October 3, 2015, 17A; and Mark Wilson, "Readers Respond," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), September 30, 2015, 18A.
[1123] D. Watkins, "The Art of Street Riding: Dirt Bikes Are as Important to Baltimore's Culture as Crabs and the Ripken Family," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), September 27, 2015, 25A.
[1124] WBAL Newsradio 1090, "Baltimore Police Announce New Dirt Bike Tip Line," July 7, 2016, http://www.wbal.com/article/175222/2/baltimore-police-announce-new-dirt-biketip-line.
[1125] Watkins, "The Art of Street Riding."
[1126] Encheva, Driessens, and Verstaeten. "The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures," 13.
[1127] As opposed to the self-documenting subcultures examined earlier.
[1128] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1129] Encheva, Driessens, and Verstaeten. "The Mediatization of Deviant Subcultures," 8.
[1130] Woermann, "On the Slope Is on the Screen," 631-632.
[1131] Paulsen, "Half-inch Revolution."
[1132] Paulsen, "Half-inch Revolution."
[1133] In 2010, eighty percent of the highest-ranking channels on YouTube were produced by independent individuals or groups. Yet, in 2019, seventy-two percent of the top one hundred channels were underwritten, either entirely or partially, by corporations ("Top 100 Influential YouTube Channels (Sorted by SB Rank"). See chapter five for more details.
[1134] Paulsen, "Half-inch Revolution."
[1135] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1136] Thus, a romanticized depiction of the WoWBoyz should at least be tempered by the inclusion of the profit-driven motives of the group's members.
[1137] Woermann, "On the Slope Is on the Screen," 631; Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1138] This mainly takes place when established members comment or manage the discussion through their moderator- or host-accounts. Paul Gilchrist and Belinda Wheaton suggest that web-based media should

not be "uncritically laud[ed] […] as instruments for self-expression, creativity and enhanced democratic communication" for this very reason ("'New Media Technologies' in Lifestyle Sport," 183).
1139 Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities and Social Media," 6. Dupont mentions that Instagram's supplemental role is similar to magazines or 'zines. The social media platform provides only partial performances based on the truncation of videos' runtimes.
1140 Dupont, "Authentic Subcultural Identities and Social Media," 12.
1141 "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz - Sunday BikeLife – Baltimore," Wild Out Wheelie Boyz, June 1, 2015, video, 06:44, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1BntvJu57A.
1142 "WoWBoyz 'A Day in the Life of Chino'," Oneson450r, November 13, 2012, video, 11:51, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p1C4A-D6p1M.
1143 "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz - Sunday BikeLife – Baltimore."
1144 Rodricks, interview with Wheelie Wayne and M. Holden Warren.
1145 "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz - Hottest in The City Pt 2 #BikeLife Baltimore," Wild Out Wheelie Boyz, June 1, 2015, video, 06:57, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edL5M45GlHQ.
1146 "Baltimore Allstarz Lost Tapes BMore Xtreme/Wildout Wheelie Boyz," Oneson450r, October 31, 2012, video, 07:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNnrCKi4-js.
1147 "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz - Sunday BikeLife – Baltimore."
1148 "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz - 1 Down 5 Up Bmore Edition #BikeLife," Wild Out Wheelie Boyz, June 1, 2015, video, 08:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3avMhns0sI.
1149 "WoWBoyz Fuck the City Up," Oneson450r, April 17, 2012, video, 08:40, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Z9dG8kGOws.
1150 Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
1151 Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
1152 "Baltimore Allstarz Lost Tapes BMore Xtreme/Wildout Wheelie Boyz."
1153 Hodkinson, *Goth*, 173, 146-147.
1154 The following discussion and analyses is based on the productions listed here: "Harlem Legendz Lost Episodes," BDSENTERTAINMENT, June 9, 2009, video, 09:44, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ8O16NqnQk; "Go Hard Boyz," Abutta492, June 18, 2013, video, 05:02, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H3EnMiYLvFs; "1 Down 5 Up," Abutta492, June 11, 2011, video, 07:13, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e7kLUlUeZTY; "1Down5Up BMORE EditionPt2," Abutta492, April 11, 2012, video, 07:04, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_BMp18BWl8; "Philly Hang Gang Video," Eyekon Productions, January 15, 2013, video, 11:53, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fx9EWRKZxYg.
1155 "Harlem Legendz Lost Episodes."
1156 Snyder, *Skateboarding LA*, 173.
1157 "Philly Hang Gang Video;" "Harlem Legendz Lost Episodes."
1158 "1Down5Up BMORE EditionPt2."
1159 "Wild Out Wheelie Boyz - Black Sundayz Baltimore # Baltimore BikeLife."
1160 This analysis encompasses the following videos: "BX Bikelife 'Bronx Shooterz' (Directed by X @Abutta492)," Abutta492, November 21, 2016, video, 09:05, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysUeTLG2ZAI; "NYC Bikelife (Directed by X @Abutta492)," Abutta492, December 9, 2017, video, 04:02, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDWrcELLtNA; "NYC Bikelife 'The Life' (DIR X @Abutta492)," Abutta492, June 12, 2018, video, 03:57, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sGhVla1JZGs.
1161 "Baltimore #BikeLife pt 2 (Directed by X @Abutta492)," Abutta492, December 4, 2016, video, 07:31, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bF-HjuagDC8.
1162 "Yamaha Yz450f Goin Crazy @ddots_ (Bike Stars Moto Vlogs)," Dat Bikestar, June 16, 2020, video, 03:33, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQBCjTfXJ-g; "Bike Life With Lean Da Bike Star (Bike Star Moto Vlogs)," Dat Bikestar, September 27, 2019, video, 05:39, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rl_CpkltYVg.
1163 WBAL Newsradio 1090, "Baltimore Police Announce New Dirt Bike Tip Line."

[1164] Hebdige, *Hiding in the Light*, 35.
[1165] WBAL Newsradio 1090, "Baltimore Police Announce New Dirt Bike Tip Line."
[1166] Jessica Anderson, Justin Fenton, and Justin George, "Around the Region," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), June 27, 2016, 3A.
[1167] WBAL Newsradio 1090, "Baltimore Police Announce New Dirt Bike Tip Line."
[1168] WBAL Newsradio 1090, "Baltimore Police Announce New Dirt Bike Tip Line."
[1169] BCDLR, inv.nr., Article 19, § Subtitle 40 Police Ordinances, 104.
[1170] Dan Rodricks, "Wheelie Wayne Backs a Dirt Bike Park," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), August 14, 2016, 3A.
[1171] Alison Knezevich, "Police Monitor Social Media," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), September 6, 2016, 1A.
[1172] Kevin Rector and Alison Knezevich, "Maryland's Use of Facial Scans Decried," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), October 18, 2016, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-sun-investigates-surveillance-cases-20160829-story.html. As of August 2016, the number of cameras is approximately seven hundred with an additional two hundred and fifty managed by businesses and residences ("Square Off, August 26, 2016," Howard Maleson, video, 21:33, https://vimeo.com/180352151).
[1173] Kevin Rector and Alison Knezevich, "Social Media Rescind Access to Data by Police Contractor," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), October 12, 2016, 1A.
[1174] Knezevich, "Police Monitor Social Media," 1A.
[1175] It is worth noting the DoJ's investigation made no mention of this or other surveillance programs.
[1176] Monte Reel, "Secret Cameras Record Baltimore's Every Move from Above," Bloomberg Businessweek, August 23, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/.
[1177] Kevin Rector and Ian Duncan, "Laws Eyed to Regulate Surveillance by Police," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), September 4, 2016, 1A.
[1178] Reel, "Secret Cameras Record."
[1179] Reel, "Secret Cameras Record."
[1180] Kevin Rector, "Halt Demanded to City Air Surveillance," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), August 30, 2016, 1A. The *Sun* also determined the plane may have recorded nine homicides and close to twenty-one shootings in the area it surveilled (Kevin Rector, "Surveillance May Have Caught Homicides," *Baltimore Sun* [Baltimore, MD], October 9, 2016, 4A).
[1181] Kevin Rector and Luke Broadwater, "Aerial Video Raises Issues," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), August 25, 2016, 1A.
[1182] Campbell, "As Dirt Bikers Play."
[1183] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1184] "Baltimore Dirt Bike Park [Poll]," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), August 13, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/bal-baltimore-dirt-bike-park-poll-20150813-htmlstory.html.
[1185] Warren, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1186] Wells, in discussion with the author, January 2018.
[1187] Carrie Wells, "Baltimore Police Say Dirt Bike Crackdown Is Working," *Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, MD), June 23, 2017, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-dirtbike-task-force-20170623-story.html.
[1188] I have attempted to avoid a teleological argument that would suggest the development of videos was a strictly linear process. Rather, in self-documenting subcultures, the epistemic function of media and the processes of narrow socialization tend to result in iterative conventions across geographic boundaries and temporalities.
[1189] This is particularly relevant to depictions of race, class, and gender that are specific to the cultural contexts of the larger socio-cultural order within which a subculture exists.

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