

REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING
IN A SPLINTERING URBAN WORLD:
THE GREATER TORONTO TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

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ABSTRACT

This Major Paper examines the role of the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority (GTTA) in the planning and provision of regional transportation infrastructure in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). The main objective of this Major Paper is to understand what role the GTTA might play in light of the theoretical literature on the role of the state in transportation infrastructure planning and provision, along with the history of regional planning and governance in Ontario. The GTTA is in a position to have a profound impact on transportation infrastructure planning and provision for decades to come, and will allow it to either contribute to the emerging splintering of the urban environment or to improve and expand transportation options on a collective basis for the region as a whole. The GTTA faces several challenges: limited power and funding, and cantankerous inter-governmental relationships are some of the obstacles it will face. This paper assesses these challenges and develops an understanding of the likely outcomes. A common goal of both the province and the GTTA's member municipalities is to improve the region's global competitiveness through improved transportation infrastructure planning and provision. However, the GTTA is a regional governance body still in its infancy and this research illuminates an uncertainty amongst members about its potential role and abilities.

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FOREWORD

This Major Paper represents the culmination of my graduate studies towards the degree of Master in Environmental Studies, with a specialization in the Planning Stream. It has evolved from my individual Plan of Study and has contributed to my integrating each of the three components of my Area of Concentration: urban politics, urban planning and infrastructure. The Greater Toronto Transportation Authority encompasses these three components and has allowed me the opportunity to explore each of them in great depth. Through researching and writing this Major Paper I have completed two learning strategies and have been able to synthesize several of my learning objectives as set out in my Plan of Study. This Major Paper has contributed to my knowledge and it is my hope that I have made a contribution to knowledge in general. The GTTA is a relatively new and unknown organization and I have been granted extraordinary access to interview some of its members. This opportunity has allowed me to gain a unique insight that would otherwise not have been possible.

Much of the foundation for researching this Major Paper was laid in the course work I completed in the Faculty of Environmental Studies. In particular, the study of global cities introduced me to the work of Stephen Graham and Steven Eerie, who both proved to be influential in my research. My interest in regional infrastructure planning was further kindled by the work I did for the City Institute at York University on their research project *In-Between Infrastructure: Urban Connectivity in an Age of Vulnerability*.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

When viewed from an airplane, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA)¹ might first appear to be one congruous urban region, spanning the shoreline of Lake Ontario from Oshawa to Hamilton and reaching northward to Markham, Vaughan and Brampton (and beyond). Connected in part by the roads and highways that blanket the region in a perfect grid pattern established long before the first private automobile had been driven, the region's physical appearance easily belies its true nature as a series of individual municipalities, each with its own unique characteristics and goals. The municipal governments of the GTA have rarely acted in concert, and more often than not maintain a degree of indifference towards each other. Meanwhile, the 6.06 million people who live in the region (Statistics Canada 2007) cross the political dividing lines on a daily basis in their increasingly frustrating efforts to get to work, to visit family and friends, to shop, or to actually get away from it all.

It is indeed the mounting problems associated with travelling on the region's roads, highways and railway tracks that once again have prompted the Province of Ontario to consider how this area might function as a comprehensive region, and not as a fractured agglomeration of municipalities. The creation of the Greater Toronto

¹The term *GTA* will be used throughout this paper to describe the region that is comprised of the Regional Municipalities of Durham, York, Peel and Halton, and the Cities of Hamilton and Toronto. These municipalities also constitute the membership of the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority.

Transportation Authority (GTTA) in 2006 represents a renewed Provincial interest in regional transportation governance and planning and is a reaction to the notion that *something* must be done to solve the current transportation crisis in the GTA. Roads are congested to the point where *peak hour* has become a day-long affair. Air pollution from vehicle exhaust and a corresponding concern for the planet's health are at an all-time high. Loss of productivity and delays in shipments in the region's global economy are measured in the millions of dollars per year. Existing transportation infrastructure is deteriorating and future projects seem either paralyzed or non-existent, while the social inequities arising from the uneven development of transportation infrastructure continue to worsen.

Over the same time period that this current transportation crisis has been developing, shifts in the political economy across the world have occurred as well. *Splintering urbanism* is a term which describes the growing uneven distribution of infrastructure networks and systems as having a splintering effect on the urban environment, leading to the "fragmentation of the social and material fabric of cities" (Graham and Marvin 2001, 33). Infrastructure networks "unevenly bind spaces together across cities, regions, nations, and international boundaries whilst helping also to define the material and social dynamics, and divisions, within and between urban spaces" (Graham and Marvin 2001, 11). There is an "uneven emergence of an array of . . . 'premium networked spaces': new or retrofitted transport, telecommunications, power or water infrastructures that are customized precisely to the needs of powerful users and

spaces, whilst bypassing less powerful users and spaces” (Graham 2000b, 185, Graham 2000b, 185; Graham 1999, 2000a, Marvin and Guy 1997, Guy, Graham and Marvin, 1997). Examples of these ‘premium networked spaces’ are found across the world and include London’s *ring of steel* surveillance and security measures, Mumbai’s supply of drinking water to gated condominium complexes and the privately owned toll highways found in San Diego, Melbourne, Los Angeles and Toronto (Graham and Marvin 2001). These trends in the shifting nature of infrastructure provision can be linked to a wider, overall pattern of change in the world that includes a shift away from a Keynesian welfare state towards a more neoliberal based style of policy-making and governance (Jessop 2002, 1993, Peck and Tickell 2002), and a rapidly globalising economy of international trade and exchange which has led to the formation of a network of global cities (Sassen 2002).

The main objective of this Major Paper is to understand what role the GTTA might play in light of the theoretical literature of *splintering urbanism* and the history of regional governance in Ontario. The GTTA’s main objectives are to plan for transit and transportation in the GTA, to develop a capital and investment strategy, create a GTA-wide fare card and eventually control GO Transit (Government of Ontario, Ministry of Transportation 2006). These objectives situate the GTTA in a position to have a profound impact on transportation infrastructure planning and provision for decades to come, and will allow it to either contribute to the emerging splintering of the urban environment or to improve and expand transportation options on a collective basis for the

region as a whole. The GTTA faces several challenges: limited power and funding and cantankerous inter-governmental relationships could hamper its ability to achieve its mandated goals and to think and act regionally and not parochially. This paper will assess these challenges and attempt to develop an understanding of what the likely outcomes might be.

CHAPTER 2 – THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE IN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING

This chapter will survey the literature relevant to the state's role in the planning and provision of transportation infrastructure. I will present an argument that the state's role has changed to reflect the overall transition from a Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 1993, 2002), as cities have become globalized and as neoliberalism has influenced policies and decisions of the state (Jessop 2002, 1993, Peck and Tickell 2002). The institutional arrangements of the local state have been the key factor in the planning and provision of transportation infrastructure for the Los Angeles region and this infrastructure has been essential to the development of L.A.'s global competitiveness, although not without conflict (Erie 2004). Infrastructure planning and provision has shifted from the "modern urban infrastructural ideal" of public or private monopolies of integrated and standardised networks to a focus on "seamlessly interconnecting highly valued local spaces and global networks to support new vectors of flow and interaction between highly valued spaces and users" (Graham and Marvin 2001, 100). The result is a splintered urban environment where the assumption of basic rights to access and connect to spaces and networks is challenged (Graham and Marvin 2001, 383). And finally, the Toronto region's transportation networks, uneven, uncoordinated and contested, are nevertheless contributing to the Toronto region's global competitiveness (Keil and Young 2005). Together this body of work will provide a theoretical context for examining the role the state has played in

planning transportation infrastructure in the Greater Toronto Area in the next chapter, and the role it might play through the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority in the concluding chapter.

Fordism

Fordism was a system of large-scale production that relied on the mass consumption of commodities, mainly by paying the working class that manufactured these products a high enough wage that they could afford to also purchase a share of the results of their labour (Harvey 1985, 203). Fordist production methods also required a culture of mass consumption to support its increasing volume of manufacturing. Fordism therefore required an ongoing expansion of its markets, which in turn relied heavily on transportation systems which could import raw materials and distribute the manufactured goods (Harvey 1985, 203). At the same time there was a growing credit and finance capital system which contributed to the “debt-financed production of urban infrastructures” which helped eliminate spatial barriers to production and consumption and “helped further annihilate space with time” (Harvey 1985, 204). But under a Fordist regime of production and consumption, the economy, and thus society, was under the threat of periodic crises, the worst of which was experienced in the United States between 1929 and 1945 (Harvey 1985, 205). This period of “trauma” led the state to switch to a mode of financial management suggested by John Maynard Keynes, where the state played more of an interventionist role in both the economy and society (Harvey 1985, 205).

The Shift from a Keynesian Welfare State to a Schumpeterian Workfare State

The main goals of a Keynesian welfare state (KWS) were “to promote full employment in a relatively closed national economy primarily through demand-side management; and to generalize norms of mass consumption through welfare rights and new forms of collective consumption” (Jessop 1993, 2). Local states also acted in a Keynesian manner, providing local infrastructure to support Fordist production and by providing subsidies to attract and protect jobs (Jessop 1993, 17). By the 1970’s however, Keynesian policies had been overstretched, and rather than financing debts on a short-term basis, “permanent and growing deficits were built up” to the point where they were no longer serviceable. The United States in particular was struggling with a “‘mountain’ of public, private, and corporate debt, much of it wrapped up in urban infrastructures” (Harvey 1985, 206). This crisis signified the end of Fordism and the beginning of post-Fordism which Jessop has argued led to the shift from a KWS to a Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS), along with a hollowing out of the national state (Jessop 1993). With the end of Fordism came a shift in the mode of production, with less emphasis placed on mass production and consumption and more emphasis on flexible production and the ability to switch processes quickly and easily by capitalizing on efficiencies and innovations (Jessop 1993, 8).

As a concurrent process, there has been a shift toward neoliberal policies, beginning in the United States and United Kingdom in the 1970’s. Jessop describes

neoliberalism as the liberalization and deregulation of economic transactions within and across national boundaries, the privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services, and the “roll back” of Keynesian-style state intervention with a simultaneous “roll forward” of new state interventions that encourage a more market-driven, knowledge-driven global economy (Jessop 2002, 454). Neoliberalism is also described as a “mode of free-market economic theory” that “combines a commitment to the extension of markets and logics of competitiveness with a profound antipathy to all kinds of Keynesian and/or collectivist strategies” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 381).

The Schumpeterian workfare state is what Jessop depicts as “emerging hesitatingly and unevenly” and “can be summarized in abstract terms as: to promote product, process, organizational, and market innovation and enhance the structural competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side intervention; and to subordinate social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness” (Jessop 1993, 3). In what Jessop terms “neo-statism”, he outlines a strategy in which states at the nation level are developing “structural competitiveness” through setting “strategic targets relating to new technologies, technology transfer, innovation systems, infrastructure, and other factors”, but are also encouraging similar activities at the local and regional levels (Jessop 1993, 21-22). This is in part what Jessop calls the “hollowing out” of the nation state, where its power is being limited “due to a complex triple displacement of powers upward, downward, and, to some extent, outward” (Jessop 1993, 4). Jessop is not suggesting that its importance has been lost

though, as it maintains its national sovereignty and “central executive authority” (Jessop 1993, 15). But he is suggesting that certain functions are best performed at the local level, where the central state provides general support and resources. Jessop provides two accounts of possibilities arising from this: one is optimistic in seeing cooperation improve between local states, but the other “anticipate[s] growing polarization in localities as well as increased regional inequalities (Jessop 1993, 17-8).

The Global City

The term *global city* typically describes a modern city, although the idea of a global city has been around since the early years of exploration and colonialism. Anthony King suggests that the status of a city as “global” today, is often indicative of its status in history as either a metropolitan capital of a colonial empire (e.g. London) or a regional centre within that empire (e.g. Toronto, Sydney) (King 1990, 34). Globalization today has both elements of spatial dispersal and concentration (Sassen 2002). The global economy is widely dispersed, with production and consumption occurring on a global basis, yet “national and global markets, as well as globally-integrated organizations, require central places where the work of globalization gets done” (Sassen 2002, 91). The “corporate services complex, that is, the network of financial, legal, accounting and advertising firms” represent “a strategic factor in the organization of the global economy and they are situated in an expanding network of global cities (Sassen 2002, 90).

The global city literature tends to rank Toronto as a “Secondary City” (Friedmann 1986, 69), a “Second-tier” urban core (Brenner and Keil 2006, 3), a “Major Link” city

(Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor 2000, 101) and a “Beta” city (Krätke 2006, 328) in the network of global cities. Like many other global cities, Toronto has a burgeoning FIRE sector, an acronym for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (Abu-Lughod 1999, 43), a concentration of producer services such as legal and accounting practices, and is home to several offices of transnational corporations. Toronto’s physical space also serves as a large trade entrepôt for the import and export of manufactured goods (Keil and Young 2005, 9).

Advancing telecommunications technology has played a major role in the networking of global cities, including Toronto, allowing crystal clear communications across the globe through electronic mail, telephone conversations, video-conferencing and the internet. But face-to-face communications are still an essential part of the global economy, meeting in person to sign contracts or to negotiate an agreement (Graham 1999). This reinforces the continuing, and perhaps increasing, importance of transportation networks that move people efficiently both internationally and locally. The same is also true of shipping consumer durables, manufactured goods, natural resources and food; these products require streamlined efficiency in transportation, allowing for on-demand consumption and just-in-time manufacturing.

Infrastructure, then, plays a major role in the formation of a global city. The Greater Toronto Area has a number of immense infrastructure networks that have enabled it to become a very economically strong and competitive region, including a system of roads and highways that rival the biggest cities in North America, two Canadian-based

railway companies that excel in shipping freight across the continent and whose tracks criss-cross the city and region, and Canada's busiest airport, Lester B. Pearson International and two smaller airports (Hamilton's John C. Munro International Airport and the Toronto City Centre Airport located on an island in Toronto's harbour).

Los Angeles: Infrastructure Provision and the Role of the State

Steven Erie has examined the importance of transportation infrastructure in the development of Los Angeles as a global city, putting it on equal footing with the telecommunications, technology, and information sectors and situating L.A. to become a world leader in trade (Erie 2004). Erie illustrates two important arguments: first is that the extensive development of Los Angeles' transportation infrastructure has placed L.A. at the very forefront of the United States' economy through its trade and shipping activities. This has allowed Los Angeles to be the gateway to the Pacific Rim, and one of the most important trade entrepôt cities in the world. Erie's second argument is that the success of these transportation projects is a direct result of the public ownership and control of this trade-transportation system through the use of "powerful municipal proprietary departments (semi-autonomous agencies armed with formidable city-charter protections and powers)" (Erie 2004, 5). This governance structure "shielded" L.A.'s ports and airports from "excessive political oversight and micro-management by elected officials" (Erie 2004, 78).

Despite some claims that transportation systems have become “antiquated and primitive”, Erie argues that the economy “depends fundamentally on the global connectivity supplied by gateway airports such as LAX” (Erie 2004, 8). He points out the “potent stimulus provided by a superior import/export infrastructure” and how “metropolitan areas that build world-class transportation infrastructures lower transportation costs (including time and reliability) for businesses, thus strengthening their competitive advantage in the global economy” (Erie 2004, 12). He also gives urban governance a new importance, suggesting “that what local governments do to provide trade infrastructure fundamentally matters to their global competitiveness (Erie 2004, 12). In addition to Los Angeles’ global advantages there are also local benefits gained through employment. During the 1990’s, while Los Angeles was experiencing painful job losses, employment in the trade sector actually continued to grow through direct employment, as well as the thousands of construction jobs that were created through mega projects at the Ports of San Pedro Bay and the Alameda Corridor separated-grade rail project (Erie 2004, 117).

Erie also discusses the growing difficulty of constructing massive new transportation infrastructure projects, identifying three main changes that occurred during the 1990’s: economic recession had placed a strain on government budgets and finances; environmental regulations had become more stringent; and relations had soured between the transportation authorities and the communities that proposed projects would travel through (Erie 2004, 117-118). For example, the Alameda Corridor rail project had raised

community concerns about increased traffic congestion, air pollution, train noise and vibration, and general disruption from construction, and “became ground zero for escalating conflicts between the forces of globalization and community” (Erie 2004, 118). The project would consolidate 90 miles of rail tracks with over 200 at-grade crossings into one 20 mile high-speed “toll train”, linking the ports at San Pedro Bay to the transcontinental rail yards in downtown L.A. (Erie 2004, 149). But there was also confusion over the perceived purpose of the project; the communities wanted it to be about economic development, the transportation authorities saw it as a transportation project. The project was eventually completed after a lengthy 20 year period, and served as “an important lesson for future projects ... to explain early and honestly to community residents what the local benefits and associated time horizon likely will be; such explanations can reduce the potential for disappointment and backlash” (Erie 2004, 162).

Toronto: Regional Competitiveness

Roger Keil and Douglas Young have written a detailed study of Toronto’s “highly uneven and potentially unjust” transportation infrastructure (Keil and Young 2005, 4). Also labelling it as an “underfinanced, increasingly decentralized” system, they claim that there are contradictions within the infrastructure and the policies and governance responsible for planning and providing it (Keil and Young 2005). Comparing the region’s “spectacular new four billion dollar airport redevelopment” with the Toronto Transit Commission’s buses that “operate long past their normal life expectancy on potholed public streets” illustrates this contradiction (Keil and Young 2005, 11). They

also examine the tensions between various users and their needs, referring to the “exchange value” of “globalized superstructures” which attend to the needs of “global capital accumulation” on the one hand, and the “use value” of local transit systems which serve people’s daily needs of commuting and travel on the other (Keil and Young 2005, 6). They dispel the notion that these are actually opposite needs however, suggesting that a competitive city intertwines both to create an attractive urban environment which supports a highly productive economy (Keil and Young 2005, 9).

Keil and Young also examine the role of governance, institutional arrangements, decision making and policy, especially in light of Toronto’s post-Fordist experience. They propose that “regional governance appears crucial in the regulation and success of networked flows” while lamenting the dismal failure of the Greater Toronto Services Board (the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority, although in its early proposal stage, had not yet been created) (Keil and Young 2005, 5). The Greater Toronto Airport Authority is given special attention, with a governance model that is unique in the region for its lack of public scrutiny, not being a branch of government, the clear power to raise money, and being a “product-oriented” and “technologically advanced” organization (Keil and Young 2005, 12, 17). They describe it as “perhaps the least democratic but perhaps the most effective (in terms of getting things done at all cost), regional governance institution in the area” (Keil and Young 2005, 18).

They also examine an organization which represents the “‘other’ of the airport/automobile regime which has built the global city region”, the Toronto Transit

Commission (Keil and Young 2005, 22). Referring to the TTC's *Ridership Growth Strategy* implemented in 2003, they link the transit authority's planning to wider regional growth strategies and goals of upper levels of state, describing it as a "regional niche strategy" (Keil and Young 2005, 24):

This regional policy by default potentially supports plans at various scales of regional policy making to achieve a new sustainability fix for the region and to solve major capacity problems in the regional transportation system, where globally oriented superstructures have to be brought in working contact with the locally calibrated systems of daily commutes and everyday mobilities (Keil and Young 2005, 25).

Keil and Young also argue that the *Ridership Growth Strategy* reflects the overall neoliberal approach to governance, moving from the ideal of rolling out a network which would include subway expansion to a mode of system upkeep and maintenance (Keil and Young 2005, 23).

The Toronto region is sometimes described as two separate geographical areas: the '416', based on the telephone area code that covers the City of Toronto, and the '905', the area code for the surrounding regional municipalities. Keil and Young claim that this divide is also seen in the transportation policies of the two distinct regions. The City of Toronto typically consists of higher density urban form, ideally suited to public transit and pedestrian travel, while the 905 area has been developed with the car in mind, and strives to attract investment through their "truck, rail and airport cargo advantages" (Keil and Young 2005, 27). Interestingly, despite this division, it is suggested that these differences actually work together "in support of the stated elite goal of selling the Toronto city-region as a competitive city" (Keil and Young 2005, 28). Instead, Keil and

Young offer that the real problem might be the system of municipal governance found in the GTA:

It is possible that the political system – particularly the arcane regions of municipal politics – is structurally inept to create a set of policies that would consolidate the region and increase regional identity ... While it is the shared opinion of many knowledgeable people in the region that better transit is needed, that its quality has an influence on Toronto’s competitiveness, and that it has a lot of other social, health and environmental benefits, decisions on transit expansions are piecemeal and ‘political’” (Keil and Young 2005, 34).

The rift amongst municipal governments in the GTA has long been the source of provincial policies designed to improve the governance of the region, especially in the areas of infrastructure provision and land-use planning. It is also a core motivation for the creation of the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority. The next chapter discusses these municipal issues at length.

Splintering Urbanism and Infrastructure Analysis

Stephen Graham views the critical focus on infrastructure networks as an important way of viewing cities and urban regions as “staging posts in the perpetual flux of infrastructurally mediated flow, movement and exchange” (Graham 2000a, 114).

Graham has laid out three key starting points for an analysis of urban infrastructure networks in the contemporary city. His first point deals with the “messy” practice of building infrastructure networks and the political nature of its provision:

Infrastructure networks make up considerable portions of the material, economic and geopolitical fabric of contemporary cities. As capital that is literally ‘sunk’ and embedded within and between the fabric of cities, they represent long-term accumulations of finance, technology and organizational and geopolitical power. . . . The ‘messy’ practice of embedding, building and maintaining infrastructure networks

beneath, through and above the fabric of cities thus infuses the politics of metropolitan areas, requiring complex regulatory articulations between markets and national and local states (Graham 2000a, 115).

Graham's second point of analysis stresses the importance of urban infrastructure as a symbol of progress:

Infrastructure networks are invariably invoked in images, representations, and ideologies of urban 'progress' and the modern city by all sorts of actors – developers, planners, state officials, regulators, operators, futurists, appliance manufacturers etc. (Graham 2000a, 115).

Graham's third point is that urban infrastructure is an integral element of enabling modes of economic production and social reproduction:

Finally, with their complex 'network architectures', infrastructure networks work to bring heterogeneous places, people, buildings and urban elements into dynamic articulation and exchange. They provide the uneven distribution grids and topological connections which link systems and practices of production with systems and practices of consumption and social reproduction across space and time (Graham 2000a, 115).

These three points of analysis are important to set up a framework in which modern infrastructure provision can be examined. Modern infrastructure represents a physical articulation of mobility as well as a network which establishes a social realm of activity.

Premium Networked Spaces

There is an "uneven emergence of an array of 'premium networked spaces': new or retrofitted transport, telecommunications, power or water infrastructures that are customized precisely to the needs of powerful users and spaces, whilst bypassing less powerful users and spaces" (Graham 2000b, 185). Examples of these 'premium networked spaces' are found internationally and include London's *ring of steel*

surveillance and security measures, Mumbai's supply of drinking water to gated condominium complexes and the privately owned toll highways found in San Diego, Melbourne, Los Angeles and Toronto (Graham and Marvin 2001).

Stephen Graham identifies four processes of sociotechnical and political economic changes that are supporting the emergence of 'premium networked spaces' (Graham 2000b, 186):

1. The unbundling of urban infrastructure provision
2. The erosion of comprehensive urban planning
3. The emergence of infrastructural consumerism
4. The widespread shift towards extended and automobilized cityscapes

These sociotechnical and political economic changes are important factors in understanding the splintering of modern urban environments and will be used to examine the Greater Toronto Area and the GTTA.

The owners and operators of infrastructure during the first half of the twentieth-century were often nationally based, and their supply of power, water, sewerage, communications and transport systems were "'rolled out' across the geographical territories as public or 'quasi-public goods'", in a vast network that was part of a "wider elaboration of national welfare states" (Graham 2000b, 184). The unbundling of urban infrastructure provision refers generally to the privatisation of these incumbent public utility and infrastructure monopolies, opening them up to new forms of regulated competition and allowing "many types of infrastructural capital to unevenly colonize

their spaces” (Graham 2000b, 187). The unbundling of infrastructure networks can also take forms other than explicit privatisation including “the vertical disintegration of incumbent monopoly suppliers and the separation of local and national infrastructure; the erosion of standardized tariffs and the concomitant reduction of cross-subsidies between profitable and non-profitable parts of the network; public re-regulation to stimulate competition between public or private suppliers; a growing segmentation of parts of the market; or the easing of restrictions of new market entrants and a restriction on general public investment” (Graham 2000b, 187-8). This unbundling of infrastructure networks has been written largely from a United Kingdom perspective where the splintering urbanism literature is based, but evidence of this has appeared internationally, including in Canada. The privatisation and unbundling of several former public monopolies including Air Canada, Bell Canada, Ontario Hydro and CN Rail suggests that Canada has actively been involved in the unbundling process.

The second process of change that Graham identifies as contributing to the emergence of ‘premium networked spaces’ and the undermining of the “standardized infrastructural ideal” is the erosion of comprehensive planning (Graham 2000b, 190). The “technocratic and comprehensive” methods of urban planning espoused through much of the twentieth-century have not easily adapted to “an increasingly globalised political economy driven by liberalized flows of capital, technology and information”. Comprehensive planning “has also lost much of its legitimacy in western and post-socialist nations as a result of being undermined by powerful social and cultural

critiques” (Graham 2000b, 190). Urban planning is now often largely project-based, without an overall vision, and this has made it difficult to provide large scale infrastructure. This has resulted in planners competing for the best possible infrastructure for their district, often a specialized space such as a heritage or sports district, shopping malls, or financial districts, rather than looking to coordinate infrastructure networks across the whole city (Graham 2000b, 191).

The third development leading towards “premium networked spaces” is the emergence of “infrastructural consumerism”, where the end of Fordism and the “standardized mass society” has meant that individual choice has become more important to a consumer society, and thus infrastructure has also become a consumable product (Graham 2000b, 192). Where more choices in infrastructure services have been made available, they “become less and less a basic means to sustain modern urban life and more and more a means to support and construct diverse cultural identities and symbolic identity politics” (Graham 2000b, 192). Rather than the ideal concept of providing everyone with a basic infrastructural service, providers are now attempting to attract wealthier customers with custom-tailored “brands”, targeting concentrations of customers where “the costs of building or operating profitable infrastructure are minimized whilst the return is maximized (Graham 2000b, 192). Examples of this infrastructural consumerism include green electricity generators in the U.K., U.S., and elsewhere (including Canada with Bullfrog Power), gated communities where “filtering local connectivity to the wider city” is achieved through walls, gating, Closed Circuit

Television and private security, and in an example that refers to Toronto, electronic highways such as the GTA's Electronic Toll Route, Highway 407, where consumers have the choice of a "'premium' roadspace of higher speed and guaranteed congestion-free highways, over the 'free', grid-locked and public highways that were the legacy of the standardized infrastructural ideal" (Graham 2000b, 193-4).

The fourth and final process of change that is enabling the construction of premium infrastructure networks is the "apparently pervasive shift towards extended and polynucleated urban regions" where highways and automobiles are the dominant form of transportation (Graham 2000b, 195). These highways and automobiles have helped to define the shape of urban landscapes over the last 50 years, and now make it very difficult to roll out "singular or coherent urban infrastructures" (Graham 2000b, 195). Malls, theme parks and resorts are used by Graham as case studies of this phenomena where "inward-looking developments are placed within a *cordon sanitaire* of car parks, highways and defensive landscape architecture, exaggerating the sense of social and spatial separation from the wider urban fabric" (Graham 2000b, 195). They are entirely automobile oriented, and access by foot or by transit is often "virtually impossible or extremely hazardous" (Graham 2000b, 195). Graham also mentions dedicated, privately run people-mover rail systems as in Darling Harbour in Sydney and skywalks that connect one building site to another as seen in various North American cities, including Calgary and Winnipeg, as other forms of separating people from the traditional street patterns of the "standardized infrastructural ideal".

Graham has neatly packaged his ideas into a list of processes and the examples that articulate them, but he is also careful to qualify his theory as simply a starting point for examining infrastructure provision. He warns of the dangers of over-generalizing, and of relying on examples that only represent the most visible and extreme instances of the construction of premium networked spaces. He also notes that the change from standardised, rolled out infrastructure networks to a series of unbundled, privatised and customised networks is not a “simple, binary transition”, but instead perhaps a continuance of past practices of uneven development and the maintenance of socioeconomic enclaves (Graham 2000b, 197). Finally, Graham reminds us that the “dream of a totally purified, hermetically-sealed world of premium urban spaces is exactly that—a dream”, and that many barriers remain to prevent total secession:

For even in the interlinked premium networked spaces of the contemporary cities where their construction has gone farthest, ambivalent tensions remain. The ‘messy’ realities of urban life creep back in. Total secession is never possible. There are limits in the degree to which full sociotechnical bypassing of public, monopolistic networks is possible. As in the cases of the City of London, [foreign direct investment] enclaves and malls, premium network spaces actually require continued connectivity to wider public networks in order to function (Graham 2000b, 197).

Infrastructure Provision

In examining how infrastructure is planned and provided for in today’s world Simon Marvin and Simon Guy suggest a new relationship is emerging between planners, developers and the infrastructure providers. The common relationship in the past has often been an adversarial one, pitting the three against each other and revolving “around the strength of developers to resist public authority demands to meet ‘costs’, and/or the

powers of planners to extract benefits to mitigate the ‘impact’ of development on local communities” (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2023).

This new relationship is built on the changing nature of infrastructure provision in a liberalised marketplace, where infrastructure networks have been unbundled and privatised and its providers look for new ways to extract value from their network. Marvin and Guy make two main arguments: first is that the focus on the ongoing debates between planners, developers and infrastructure providers “is blinding us to these shifts and is obscuring significant changes in the relations” (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2024); second is that “if the debate is not extended to take account of these new infrastructure practices then planners will miss a significant opportunity for promoting new communities of interest which encourage environmentally sensitive development activity that may provide wider community benefits” (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2024).

Previous to this new era of liberalisation and privatisation, infrastructure provision was extended across the entire country and “provided a standardised level of service at nationally agreed tariffs” (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2024). It was a supply-oriented system, where infrastructure was provided ahead of its actual need, but from the 1970’s onward, funding became a problem, and the state “increasingly looked towards developers to fund network extensions and connections to the mains” (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2025).

Through an examination of different infrastructure projects in the water, energy and transportation sectors Marvin and Guy have identified what they refer to today as the

“new logic” of demand-oriented infrastructure (Marvin and Guy 1997). Rather than expanding existing networks, infrastructure providers might now consider how to reduce the leakiness of its water pipes and have its customers reduce water use. For energy the same would apply with conservation measures and improved appliances, and for transportation there are efforts to reduce the use of the automobile through land use planning that “spatially harmonises” work, live and play (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2028). Their case study of infrastructure provision in the transportation sector provides a possible manner in which future transportation planning and provision could occur in the GTTA.

A growing acceptance of the expensive nature of road-building in the U.K., evidence that building more roads simply equals more cars travelling on them, along with rising pollution levels and other environmental concerns regarding automobile use have prompted a high level of social resistance to road-building. Through demonstrations and political pressure the regulatory and financial frameworks for transportation infrastructure provision has led to a more demand-oriented management strategy (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2031-2). Hounslow, which is located along a major arterial road between central London and Heathrow International Airport, decided that public transportation improvements, along with restrictions on the use of automobiles, would be the only scenario under which they would consider new office developments. In exchange for strict controls on parking and contributions towards improving new and existing bus routes and the reopening of a closed train station, developers were given the right to

develop at higher densities than normally permitted (Marvin and Guy 1997, 2032).

Marvin and Guy argue that this type of arrangement regards development not exclusively through its “impact”, but also through creating new forms of value. They also suggest that by focussing on the adversarial nature of infrastructure provision it is too easy to overlook these emerging relationships.

Conclusion

The literature presented in this chapter represents a very general analysis of the transitioning role of the state and the provision of infrastructure. Broadly speaking, the state in the western world has changed from a collectivist provider of infrastructure to a more neo-liberal based institution that utilizes market-led philosophies and policies. The emergence of the *global city* and the economic goal of city-regions to be competitive in a global economy have led the state to react accordingly, providing the necessary transportation infrastructure and governance to enable new modes of production and accumulation. The next chapter will take a more concentrated look at the role of the state and regional governance in the Toronto context, relating the broader changes in western society to the specifics of infrastructure planning and provision.

CHAPTER 3 – REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROVINCIAL POLICIES AND THE GREATER TORONTO AREA

This chapter provides a factual account of more than half a century of provincially legislated governance reforms, reports and studies aimed at the City of Toronto and the surrounding GTA region in light of the theoretical framework of the literature examined in the previous chapter. This account focuses primarily on regional governance as it pertains to transportation issues, but at times logically overlaps with other issues of urban governance such as public finance, political representation, land-use planning and the provision of infrastructure. Further, an overview of some of the critical analyses of these reforms from a variety of academic perspectives will be presented as a means to better understand the relative success and/or failure of these past initiatives. To that end, it is important to view the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority through this historical analysis of regional governance for several reasons, but perhaps most important is the idea that the GTTA has not evolved without precedent, and is not the *first*, but only the *most recent*, attempt at regional transportation planning and governance. The last 50 years has seen an overall transition in the role of the state and its role in the planning and provision of transportation infrastructure has kept pace with these changes. How the GTTA is different from previous efforts, how its governance has been structured, and the goals and political will of those who have been appointed to the board are all worth comparing to what has come before, for the similarities are often remarkable, and in

many ways the foresight of the past has caught up to the present while the economic goals behind policy decisions remain the same.

Canada and the Province of Ontario

A discussion of regional governance in Canada is not complete without an understanding of the supreme role that provincial governments have in administering local government and municipal institutions. Under Canada's *Constitution Act, 1867*, section 92(8) gives provincial legislatures exclusive power over municipal institutions in the province (Constitution Act, 1867-1982). This has an important bearing on the establishment and continued emergence of local governments, including regional governments in the GTA, as this constitutional authority has allowed the Province of Ontario to "create and destroy municipalities" (Slack, Bourne, and Gertler 2003, 21). Over the last fifty years the Ontario government has demonstrated a "willingness to assert its constitutional authority over 'municipal institutions' and the services it delegates to them even in the face of local resistance to change" (Friskin 2001, 513). This resistance to change has sometimes been vociferous, but in each of the following accounts of governance reform it is the Province who has had the final say in determining how the region's governments will be structured.

The role of the national state in Canada is also important, especially with its jurisdictional authority over sea, rail and air transport. The Canadian government also has significant land holdings throughout the GTA which directly impact both land-use planning and transportation decisions, with the long-proposed Pickering airport as a

prominent example. Interestingly, the national government's role in these affairs is often relevant, but its involvement usually negligible (Frisken 1998).

Metropolitan Toronto

Through an act of the Ontario Legislature in 1953 the City of Toronto and 12 surrounding municipalities were federated into a two-tier municipality known as Metropolitan Toronto. The *Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, 1953* brought together the City of Toronto, the Townships of East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough and York, the Towns of Weston, Mimico, New Toronto, Leaside, and the Villages of Forest Hill, Swansea and Long Branch (Government of Ontario 1953, s.1(a), s.2 ss.1). The first day of January 1954 marked the inauguration of the new Metropolitan Toronto Council.

Calls for regionally-based governance and metropolitan reform for the Toronto area had actually begun as far back as 1925 with the introduction of a bill in the Ontario Legislature to establish a metropolitan Toronto area, but it did not make it to a third reading (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 24). Subsequent calls for reform in the decades to follow emanated from such bodies as the Toronto and Suburban Planning Board, the Toronto and York Planning Board and the Civic Advisory Council of Toronto. Each of these groups had existed for different purposes but their common goal was to solve the "metropolitan problems" of the time (Plunkett 1961, 38). By 1950 both the City of Toronto and the Town of Mimico had made separate applications to the Ontario Municipal Board for a metropolitan amalgamation to occur (Plunkett 1961, 38).

The OMB ultimately heard and dismissed both applications, but having considered the arguments for reform during the hearing, it recognized the need for a solution to the issues that had brought both municipalities to the quasi-judicial board. Chairman Lorne Cumming in his Decisions and Recommendations of 20 January 1953 which became known as the *Cumming Report*, stated the importance “of the idea that the establishment of a strong central authority is the best method of dealing with vital problems affecting the entire area, and a conviction that the retention of local governments for local purposes is not only desirable but necessary” (Ontario Municipal Board 1953, 45). His report proceeded to recommend a system of Metropolitan government which was soon after enacted by the Province, although with significant and “startling” changes (Rose 1972, 122).

The creation of Metropolitan Toronto was in part, a response to the growing concern of “the inability of the thirteen existing municipal governments to engage in concerted action to solve their obviously common problems” (Milner 1957, 570). Milner also points to the financial difficulties that the individual municipalities had in providing local services, and the improved efficiency of providing certain services over a larger area as reasons for federating the municipalities. Infrastructure provision was often cited as a reason for creating a metropolitan style government in Toronto. A dispersal of population beyond the central city of Toronto in the post war years had created a need for inter-municipal roads that crossed political boundaries. This, along with increased

automobile congestion and the need for mass transportation were specific metropolitan problems that led to the creation of Metropolitan Toronto (Plunkett 1961, 32).

In line with a Keynesian approach to the collective roll-out of services and infrastructure, Metropolitan Toronto was in many ways a provincial response to the need for improved regulation of transportation networks in order to sustain the region's economy. Chairman Cumming identified one basic metropolitan problem that arose from the OMB hearing: "the significant contrast between the underlying social and economic unity of the area on the one hand, and the illogical and inequitable but extremely rigid divisions of political jurisdiction and available taxable resources on the other" (Ontario Municipal Board 1953, 43). Cumming felt that in a system where local governments could only legislate, tax and provide services to persons and property within strictly defined territories, they would be unlikely to concern themselves with issues beyond their borders, even though they may have been directly affected by them. By federating the individual municipalities the widespread provision of infrastructure would become more efficient

Frances Frisken, in her comprehensive study of regional governance in the GTA, identifies the three main concerns that led to the creation of Metropolitan Toronto. They were "1) to secure the area's economic future by providing the infrastructure needed to support residential development in outlying districts, 2) to protect the city's economic and social well-being by renewing its aging residential districts and relieving traffic congestion on downtown streets, and 3) to reduce the unequal distribution of property tax

revenues and low rental housing among the area's 13 municipalities" (Frisken 2001, 517). Each of the three concerns relates to issues of finance and/or the economy, and this, Frisken argues, is the main motivation for provincial action on Toronto area governance reform, both with the creation of Metropolitan Toronto and subsequent policies (Frisken 2001, 536). Frisken's first two points clearly illustrate the enabling of Fordist modes of production and consumption by providing the transportation network necessary to move goods and people, and the third point illustrates the Keynesian strategy of ensuring social welfare (Harvey 1985).

Political representation in Metropolitan Toronto began with a system of municipally-nominated members, with the City of Toronto sending 12 representatives to the new Metro Council, and the remaining 12 suburban municipalities each sending one. The Province of Ontario initially appointed the inaugural chair, Frederick G. Gardiner, but the position was subsequently elected by the members of the council after the first year (Government of Ontario 1953, s.4 ss.4, ss.6). The initial makeup of the Metro council was intended to maintain a balance between the central City of Toronto, which contained half of Metro's population, and the 12 suburbs where the other half of the population resided (Frisken 1991, 272).

The responsibilities for Metro Council included matters of metropolitan-wide importance like property assessments, major physical infrastructure (sewer and water mains and major roads), and the administration of justice. The 13 lower-tier municipal councils continued to be responsible for local issues like residential streets and parks, fire

protection and libraries. Two very significant municipal functions were delegated to newly created, special-purpose bodies that fell under the control of the new Metro council and represented a comprehensive approach to service and infrastructure planning and provision: the Metropolitan Planning Board (MPB) and the Toronto Transit Commission (Frisken 2001, 518).

Metropolitan Planning Board

The MPB was made responsible for land-use planning on a Metropolitan scale, and was ordered to create an Official Plan not only for Metropolitan Toronto, but interestingly, also for an additional 480 square miles of land that fell outside its political boundaries (Frisken 1991, 273). The extra-territorial responsibility stemmed directly from the Ontario Municipal Board's (OMB) recommendation to the Province of Ontario to give the new Metro council planning control over the rural areas outside of its jurisdiction (Frisken 2001, 518). In his decision, Chairman Lorne Cumming of the OMB derided the surrounding rural areas for failing "to recognize the need to control and direct their physical development until irreparable mistakes have been made" and therefore felt it "essential that a truly regional plan of development must be made for the entire metropolitan area and the adjacent areas required either for its expansion or its protection" (Ontario Municipal Board 1953, 72). This broad land-use planning responsibility indicated a rational and comprehensive approach to planning. Overall planning responsibility however, was split between upper-tier Metro who would devise a

metropolitan Official Plan, and the lower-tier municipalities that were to bring their local plans into conformity with Metro's (Frisken 1991, 273).

Toronto Transit Commission

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) was an expansion of the City of Toronto-owned Toronto Transportation Commission (Frisken 1991, 273). Ownership of the Toronto Transit Commission was transferred to Metropolitan Toronto in 1953, giving it five board members instead of three and a mandate to provide public transit service to an area of 622 square kilometres, a significant increase in responsibilities from the 91 square kilometres of the City of Toronto (Frisken 1994, 503). A clear mandate for providing a public network of transportation infrastructure was provided in Metro's legislation: the TTC's main duties were to consolidate and coordinate all forms of local passenger transportation, with the exception of steam railways and taxis, and to construct, maintain, operate and extend passenger transportation systems in Metropolitan Toronto (Government of Ontario 1953, s.106(a-c)). The local state was made responsible for providing infrastructure that would play an important role in the region's economy (Jessop 1993).

The new TTC was composed of the three currently appointed members of the former Toronto commission, and two newly appointed members who were required to reside in one of the area municipalities outside the City of Toronto (Government of Ontario 1953, s.103 ss.2). By 1970, after years of attempting to make the TTC more "directly accountable to Metro Council", legislation was passed by the Province that

allowed Metro to appoint its own councillors to the TTC, although it did continue to appoint some citizen members until 1989, when it became a board of five elected politicians (Friskin 1993, 167). The governance change of the TTC in 1989 was “symptomatic of a more general tendency in local government in Ontario—a gradual rejection of institutional arrangements that conform to the ‘apolitical ideal’ of progressive reformers (who advocated the protection of politically sensitive or costly public services from interference by elected councils) in favour of arrangements that increase the powers of persons elected at the ward or district level” (Friskin 1993, 167).

The first ten years of the new TTC were filled with conflict between the transportation needs of the city-centre and the suburban areas of Metropolitan Toronto, especially because the TTC was unable to keep up with growing suburban demands for better service (Friskin 1994, 505). The TTC at this point was now operating its first subway line, the Yonge line, which opened in 1954, an extensive streetcar system and a series of suburban bus routes that it had purchased as a result of its creation (Friskin 1994, 504). It was also required by statute to pay both its capital and operating costs out of the fare box, something it was finding impossible to do (Friskin 2001, 520). Although the OMB had foreseen this issue and felt a provision for future deficits should be given formal recognition in any new legislation (Ontario Municipal Board 1953, 62-3), the Province ultimately determined that the TTC should remain self-sustaining, and should set its fares and fare zones accordingly (Government of Ontario 1953, s.107(c)). The fare zone system allowed the TTC to charge fares based on distance travelled, which meant

suburban commuters paid more to travel from their home to downtown than a city-dweller would. When the TTC requested additional sources of funding, the fare zone system caused suburban representatives on Metro Council to initially refuse an operating subsidy for the TTC (Frisken 1994, 504). Left in a stalemate, the TTC found it difficult to expand its services, its financial burden became larger, and suburban dissatisfaction continued to grow. Beginning in 1971 Province of Ontario took a renewed interest in public transit, and through the 1970's it subsidised operations and capital costs to varying degrees (Frisken 1994, 505). The 1980's also saw a fluctuation in provincial transit investment, ranging from statements about withdrawing capital for transit improvements to prioritizing funding for Metro and TTC's Network 2011 plan (Frisken 1994, 506, 509-10). Funding for Network 2011 along with other provincial projects was part of a \$5 billion programme titled "Let's Move", but the NDP government of the early 1990's, although determined to continue it, faced a deep recession and were unable to implement it (Filion 2000, 175).

Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto

In 1963 the Province of Ontario issued an Order-in-Council to form a Commission that would inquire into and report on the structure and organization of Metropolitan Toronto, its purposes and objectives, and its boundaries. There had been many successes accomplished by Metro that were not in dispute, but there were still problems that Ontario and the thirteen area municipalities felt needed to be addressed. Carl Goldenberg was appointed head of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto

and his report was produced in 1965 after meeting with local mayors, reeves and councillors, and receiving 75 briefs at public hearings (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, xi, xv).

The *Goldenberg Report* offered a comprehensive summary of Metro Toronto's successes and failures, and concludes with a recommendation for reorganizing the structure of Metro Toronto. The issues of greatest overall concern were the same ones that were described in the *Cumming Report*, namely the inequities in political representation, taxable assessments, and service provision. One example Goldenberg provided was the equal political representation on Metro Council of one councillor each for both Swansea and North York, even though Swansea had a population of 9 300 while North York was home to 340 000 residents (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 172). As for the imbalance in property tax assessments, an "unhealthy inter-municipal competition for new industry" had been generated (Plunkett 1961, 44).

Specifically on the transportation front, the *Goldenberg Report* revealed that in the first 10 years the TTC had greatly increased its services, adding surface routes, doubling its bus mileage, and carrying 271 million passengers. The TTC had built the University subway line from Union Station to Bloor Street, and was building the Bloor-Danforth subway line from Keele Street to Woodbine Avenue with a projected completion date of 1965. At the same time it had reduced its fare zones from 5 to 2, appeasing the suburban municipalities and making the TTC a more socially equitable operation (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 43). However, as

predicted by the OMB's Chairman Cumming, the TTC had started to accumulate significant debts. A contributing factor was the overall decline in the number of fare-paying passengers, which was simultaneously occurring across Canada and the United States (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 44). This, along with the reduced number of fare zones and increased capital and operating expenditures, had forced the TTC and Metropolitan Toronto to revise its agreements, with necessary approvals from the Ontario Municipal Board. Starting in 1956, Metro Council had begun to give the TTC grants and operating subsidies, while the TTC began a series of fare increases (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 44). The Province also became involved with the funding of new subway roadbed costs in 1964 (Frisken 2001, 525). Provincial subsidies and stable funding from Metro meant that the Metro Council could persuade the TTC into eliminating its zone fare system, and provide better transit services for people in the outer suburbs (Frisken 2001, 526). It also meant that the TTC's relationship to Metro had changed, and prompted Goldenberg in his report to suggest a more formal coordination between the two bodies, as well as with the MPB, and that the Chair of Metro Toronto be an ex-officio member of the TTC (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 46). This recommendation stemmed from an astute observation, as planners at the time believed Metro's enabling legislation was ambiguous on who was really in charge of transportation planning, with authority divided between the TTC and MPB (Rose 1972, 109).

The Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board had completed a draft Official Plan in 1960, revised it in 1964, but never officially adopted it, in part because of “considerable opposition” from the area municipalities which feared “interference with their traditional autonomy in these matters” (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 71). The Metro Planning Commissioner at the time suggested that Metro staff regularly worked with the area municipalities, and that local plans reflected the basic principles of the *unofficial* Metro plan, but Goldenberg was critical of this nonetheless, and felt that the MPB’s authority was not clear, and was relying on persuasion rather than enforcement to curtail urban sprawl (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 71).

The practice of “planning by assessment”, also known as “fiscal zoning”, was an issue that was raised in many of the submissions to the Commission. Area municipalities, particularly the suburban ones, were being accused of permitting high-density high-rises without due regard for their proper location or availability of services. This was leading to the same sort of inter-municipal competition that was mentioned earlier with regard to industrial sites (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 73).

Based on submissions, especially from the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, the expansion of Metro’s planning boundaries was given some thought in the Commission’s report. According to Goldenberg, “there appeared to be general acceptance of the principle that regional planning should not be restricted by municipal boundaries (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 74).

Goldenberg did recommend a minor extension of the Planning area controlled by the MBP, in alignment with a recent Ontario Municipal Board decision, but went much further with recommendations of expanding and clarifying the MPB's authority, formally adopting its Official Plan and to "secure the conformity of local official plans and zoning by-laws" with it (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto 1965, 76). Following the reorganization of Metropolitan Toronto in 1967, the development of an Official Plan continued but eventually proved fruitless, and the process described as "tortuous" (Rose 1975, 132). Eventually, the province disbanded the MPB, which never did complete an approved Official Plan. Instead, the Province had already begun its own regional planning exercise in April of 1966 with a policy statement titled *Design for Development* (Rose 1975, 145).

The end result of Goldberg's Royal Commission was a major shuffling of the structure of Metro Toronto and its Council. The 13 area municipalities were consolidated into the City of Toronto and five boroughs: North York, Scarborough, Etobicoke, York and East York. The City of Toronto would now include Forest Hill and Swansea; Etobicoke included Long Branch, Mimico and New Toronto; York included Weston; and East York included Leaside (Rose 1972, 114). Representation on Council was also reformed, with 32 indirectly elected members each representing approximately 55 000 – 60 000 people, plus a Chair elected by the Metro Councillors (Rose 1972, 115-6).

In 1985 the City of Toronto switched its method of Metropolitan representation from appointments to direct election, followed in 1988 by new provincial legislation that

required all of the Metro municipalities to directly elect Metro councillors. It was felt that Metro councillors were paying too much allegiance to their local municipalities, and had failed to act on a series of important issues, including the expansion of new rapid transit lines (Frisken 1998, 180).

GO Transit

As a response to the high cost of building new roads, the Government of Ontario in 1967 created GO Transit, a provincial transit agency that began operating commuter trains on 145 km of existing railway lines owned by Canadian National Railways and Canadian Pacific Railways (Frisken 1994, 504). These trains delivered suburban commuters to Union Station in downtown Toronto, creating a radial network of train routes with Toronto as its hub. The operating deficits of GO Transit were 100% subsidised by the province, along with all capital costs (Frisken 2001, 525). It was initially operated under the administration of the Department of Transportation, but it later established a provincial-regional agency called Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority (TATOA) to operate it (Frisken 2001, 524). TATOA was composed of the chairs of Metropolitan Toronto and the regions of Durham, York, Peel, Halton and Hamilton-Wentworth and chaired by a provincial appointee (Frisken 1993, 162). In 1974 the province had considered creating an agency that would coordinate GO with local transit operators, but instead deferred to the local municipalities to design their own bus transit systems (Frisken 2001, 526). Subsidies were used as persuasion to create linkages in place of a coordinating agency, but the developing pattern of suburban land use

ultimately had little regard for transit operations (Frisken 1994, 507, 509). GO Transit has continued to expand over the last forty years, though its service is still focussed on delivering commuters to downtown Toronto. Further developments of GO Transit are examined in a later section.

York, Durham, Peel and Halton Regional Governments

As a response to some of the similar difficulties that Metro Toronto had experienced, the Province amalgamated the suburban areas outside of Toronto into four two-tier regional municipalities; Durham, York, Peel and Halton all became regional municipalities between 1969 and 1974, each comprised of a series of lower-tier local municipalities. As with Metro, an eye towards more comprehensive land-use planning was one significant reason that these two-tier regional governments were created (Frisken 1993, 187). The province initially wished to make public transit a responsibility of the new regional governments, as it had done with Metro and the TTC, but instead left it in the hands of local municipalities after objections from these local governments and their transit systems (Frisken 1994, 508). A major responsibility of each of these new regional governments that was legislated was the requirement to develop a regional Official Plan within their first three years of existence, although Durham and Halton were the only two to do this (Frisken 1993, 187). Several reasons are offered for this, including a “reluctance of local councils to surrender control over their development choices to a second-tier of government”, an “uncertainty among planners and politicians about the nature of and requirements for regional plans, and how they are to differ from local

plans” and “the loss of enthusiasm for regional government among provincial officials after 1974” (Frisken 1993, 187).

The creation of these regional governments also meant that the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board was no longer responsible for the land-use planning of these new jurisdictions, and instead only for Metropolitan Toronto (Frisken 2001, 526). This in many ways brought an end to the original objective of planning on a regional scale as first envisioned by the Cumming Report, at least for a few years (Filion 2000, 172).

MTRTS, Design for Development and the Toronto-Centred Region Plan

By the 1960’s the pattern of urban development in south central Ontario had given rise to a number of earlier identified concerns, including unstructured sprawl, the inefficient provision of infrastructure, and the lack of a coordinated plan or vision for Toronto and the surrounding region (Government of Ontario 1970). Transportation issues were one of the primary motivators for the Government of Ontario to begin investigating its possible role as a regional planner. In 1962 it established the *Metropolitan Toronto and Region Transportation Study* (MTRTS), which was tasked with recommending plans, policies and administrative arrangements for transportation in the Toronto-centred region, an area 3200 square miles in size, stretching from Hamilton to Bowmanville along Lake Ontario, to Barrie in the north and Guelph in the west (Government of Ontario 1967, 1). MTRTS released a report in 1968 titled *Choices for a Growing Region*. Recognizing links between existing patterns of economic development, land-use and major transportation routes, the report presented an analysis of present

conditions and identified “trends” that had emerged, and set them against 12 objectives of regional planning, which had been suggested by a sub-committee of the study, and largely revolved around ideas of minimizing pollution and the loss of agricultural land, reducing commuter travel time and the associated costs of infrastructure provision and goods movement (Government of Ontario 1967, 21-25).

Stating that “[t]he seeds of the future form are planted in the present pattern” (Government of Ontario 1967, 3) the report purposefully rejected any theoretical concepts of planning, and instead presented 4 “goals” which were based on averting future problems that might arise from the trends that had been identified: concentrated growth in Metropolitan Toronto, a lack of development to the north and east of Metro, urban sprawl and the loss of agricultural land, and the high cost of new urban services (Friskin 1993, 172).

Overlapping with MTRTS, the Province in 1966 had also begun a study of regional economic development called *Design for Development*, which divided the province into 10 economic regions with the goal of balancing intraprovincial disparities in wealth and uneven rates of economic growth (Friskin 1993, 171). In the words of the Honourable John Robarts, Prime Minister of Ontario in 1970, the objectives of the *Design for Development* programme “are the provision of the best possible social and physical environment for the people of Ontario and the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere which will encourage economic growth throughout the Province” (Robarts

1970, 4). Together, MTRTS and *Design for Development* formed the basis for the Toronto-Centred Region concept (TCR), released in 1970.

The TCR proposed to address many of the issues that had been identified in the MTRTS and Design for Development studies, and to encourage a coordinated planning approach between the province, the region's municipalities and the private sector. There was a sense that growth was seen as inevitable and necessary, but that it needed to be controlled and shaped in order to realize potential gains for both the private sector *as well as* the residents of Ontario. In line with the results of the earlier studies, the TCR had three main purposes: "i) shape the growth of the Region's metropolitan core into a two-tiered urbanized area, ii) encourage growth in selected communities beyond easy commuting range of Metropolitan Toronto, and thus help to decentralize the Region and prevent a swollen growth within and near Metropolitan Toronto, and iii) set basic guidelines for regional land use (Government of Ontario 1970, 2-3). Transportation planning was highlighted as an essential element of the TCR, and would "not only satisfy the demands of current trends in each region but also stimulate recommended patterns of development" (Robarts 1970, 6).

Despite the broad vision and promise of the TCR, it was never fully implemented and the development of the region persisted in an uncoordinated, though somewhat predictable manner, as forecasted by MTRTS' "trends". Provincial officials insisted the TCR was only a concept and not an official plan (Friskin 1993, 171), and although it

received approval in the Ontario legislature, it “remained only a statement of principles without a prescribed means of implementation” (Frisken 2001, 526).

The Central Ontario Lakeshore Urban Complex Task Force (COLUCTF) was set up in 1974 to review the TCR and to refine it. Referring to land-use proposals to the north and west of Metro that the Province had approved, the COLUCTF Report stated that the Province had violated its own principles of the TCR, and should either reaffirm the policy, or abandon it. In place of either course of action, the Province “instead allowed the plan to languish” (Frisken 1993, 173). One example of the Province violating its own planning principles was the approval of a York-Durham sewer system that extended well beyond a planned greenbelt north of Toronto, and allowing future urban sprawl to occur (Filion 2000, 173). Another example of the failure of the TCR was the gradual development of GO Transit routes to the north, north-west and north-east that brought commuters to downtown Toronto, a pattern which conflicted “with the TCR goals of population and employment decentralization” (Frisken 1993, 175). Frisken summarises the failure of the Ontario government to “adhere to the TCR policy . . . as an unwillingness to follow a course of action that conflicted with the aspirations and activities of private sector interests and with the government agencies that were most responsive to private sector demands or heavily dependent on private sector investment” (Frisken 1993, 176).

The failure of the TCR in many ways represented the end of an era for regional planning by the provincial government. Frisken argues that provincial government

decisions to merge local school boards, create regional governments in the GTA, implement market-value assessments of property, and create the TCR concept, all contributed to the Progressive Conservative party's inability to win a majority government in 1975 for the first time in 32 years, which was followed by a twenty-year period of political instability where all three major political parties took turns holding office, often as minority governments (Friskin 2001, 527). Partly as a result of the above political reasons, along with a general slowdown in the economy, high rates of inflation, and trends to reduce government spending, from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's the provincial government for all intents and purposes took no action on issues of regional planning or governance (Friskin 2001, 527-528). This time period also relates to the rise of neoliberalism, where Jessop has noted that state-provided services and Keynesian-style state interventions were "rolled back", along with the simultaneous "roll forward" of new state interventions that encouraged a more market-driven, knowledge-driven global economy (Jessop 2002, 454). In the Ontario example, according to Friskin, the private sector had become a major player in influencing provincial action (or inaction), and thus the state had fallen in line with a progression to a more neoliberal state.

Greater Toronto Coordinating Committee and Office of the Greater Toronto Area

The next significant provincial foray into regional governance and planning occurred in 1988 with the establishment of the Greater Toronto Coordinating Committee (GTCC) and the Office of the Greater Toronto Area (OGTA). Created by the Liberal government led by the Honourable David Peterson, the GTCC was composed of

provincial and municipal officials with the purpose of examining ways to address regional servicing issues, while the OGTA was formed to represent GTA interests and concerns to the provincial bureaucracy (Frisken 2001, 529). Together the GTCC and OGTA developed a land-use strategy that would accommodate an anticipated growth rate of 100 000 people per year for the next 20 years, while protecting the environment and encouraging efficiencies in the provision of infrastructure and services (Frisken 2001, 530). After much effort on the part of these two bodies, 33 of 35 GTA municipalities had grown to support the ideas of compact development and concentrated growth strategies (Frisken 2001, 530).

Initially the OGTA was headed by a Deputy Minister, first from the Ministry of Treasury and Economics and then from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. In 1990 the new NDP government led by the Honourable Bob Rae, shifted the responsibility to the Ministry of the Environment, signalling the newly important role that they placed on environmental issues within the region (Frisken 1993, 161). The NDP eventually wrote new policy statements based on the OGTA's strategy which emphasised the use of public transportation and the protection of environmentally sensitive lands. The new policies also led to the creation of new land-use planning legislation in 1993 (Frisken 2001, 530). Although it had no legislative mandate, the OGTA defined its role "as one of (a) fostering communication among units and levels of government with an interest in the area's future development, (b) seeking solutions to immediate problems that no single government can solve on its own, and (c) helping governments in the area 'develop a consensus on what

the Greater Toronto Area should look like 20 years from now” (OGTA 1989 in Frisken 1993, 161). Although it had had some success with its advocacy of a new land-use planning strategy for the GTA, the OGTA was ultimately “bereft of legal and implementation powers” and “solely an advisory agency”, leaving the GTA “without an agglomeration-wide planning agency” (Filion 2000, 172).

Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront

The Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront (RCFTW) offered a completely different perspective on the GTA, defining the region as a watershed, rather than using political boundaries or patterns of economic development. The RCFTW was initially created by the federal government in 1988 with the mandate to “make recommendations regarding the future of the Toronto Waterfront, and to seek the concurrence of affected authorities in such recommendations, in order to ensure that, in the public interest, federal lands and jurisdiction serve to enhance the physical, environmental, legislative and administrative context governing the use, enjoyment and development of the Toronto Waterfront and related lands” (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront 1989, 3). Beneath the glossy description of the mandate however, Toronto’s “failure to exercise sufficient planning control” over a 100 acre parcel of waterfront land given to the City by the federal government in 1972, along with the federal government’s lack of attention paid to their federal agency, the Harbourfront Corporation, are more critical reasons for the creation of the RCFTW (Frisken 1998, 173).

David Crombie, former Mayor of the City of Toronto from 1972-1978, and a Member of Parliament from 1978-1988, was appointed Chair of the Royal Commission by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Honourable Brian Mulroney. David Crombie submitted his first interim report in 1989, which dealt specifically with issues on the Toronto waterfront such as the Toronto Island Airport and the Toronto Harbour Commission, as mandated. The Province of Ontario, upon receipt of the report, gave Crombie a further mandate to continue his work, but with an expanded area of study: the Toronto watershed. The Toronto watershed was described as the waterfront of Lake Ontario from Newcastle in the east to Burlington in the west, and north to the Oak Ridges Moraine (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront 1990, 11). This extension of the Commission reported with a second interim report in 1990 titled *Watershed*. *Watershed* presented an ecological approach to planning and managing the Greater Toronto Bioregion with principles of a “clean, green useable, diverse, open, accessible, connected, affordable, and attractive” waterfront (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront 1990, 51). It represented an environmental focus on regional planning and endorsed urban intensification as both a means to improve the natural environment as well as the economic and social conditions of the region. In 1992 Ontario established the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, designed to implement the recommendations of the final report of the RCFTW, with the primary focus on a Waterfront Trail that connects this watershed region.

The RCFTW is uniquely relevant to the ongoing development of regional planning and governance because it introduced a new bioregional way of looking at the GTA, and also for the involvement of the federal government. Up to this point in time the federal government had typically been involved in local affairs through its jurisdiction over housing, airports and harbours, railways and national highways, along with federal land holdings, including parts of Toronto's waterfront; but notwithstanding its jurisdictional authority, it "was having major impacts on urban places while taking virtually no interest in urban affairs" (Friskin 1998, 171). The RCFTW represented a new direction in the federal government's approach to the Toronto area, though perhaps short-lived. As for the bioregional aspect of the RCFTW, it was well aligned with the other planning initiatives of the day, with urban intensification, the protection of natural and rural environments, and the promotion of public transportation, walking and cycling being the keywords in virtually all plans (Filion 2000, 174).

The Greater Toronto Area Task Force

In April of 1995 the New Democratic Party (NDP) government of Ontario appointed Anne Golden, president of the United Way of Greater Toronto, as chair of the Greater Toronto Area Task Force (GTATF). Formed as a response to the region's "lagging economic recovery from the post-1989 recession", a sense that people felt "over-governed and unfairly taxed" and a worry that "the systems they have relied on – from municipal finance to public transit – are broken or no longer meet their needs" (Greater Toronto Area Task Force 1996, 17). Its mandate was to "set the Toronto region

on a new course for the new century”, specifically providing direction on governance restructuring with the aim of maintaining a “healthy, vibrant, and economically competitive city-region (Greater Toronto Area Task Force 1996, 17). The Task Force was clearly mandated to devise a new governance structure that would improve the region’s global competitiveness and facilitate participation in the global economy.

Frances Frisken describes the Toronto region in the early 1990’s as being “undergoverned” as well as “overgoverned”. It was “undergoverned” because it was unable to achieve regional planning goals, provide necessary infrastructure and services, or balance its costs in a manner which the municipalities viewed as fair. It was “overgoverned” simply because there was too much government, which resulted in duplication or interference (Frisken 1998, 182). Frisken also identifies the “state and future of the Toronto region economy” as the main concern of the GTATF (Frisken 2001, 533).

Less than three months after the GTATF had been created, a provincial election occurred and a neoliberal Progressive Conservative (PC) party formed the new government under the banner of a “Common Sense Revolution”. Mike Harris, the new premier, shortened the task force’s mandate, and ordered it to report by January 1996 (Sancton 1999, 190). The GTATF submitted its report, to become known as the “Golden Report” with the most significant recommendation of replacing Metropolitan Toronto and the four regional municipalities of Durham, York, Peel and Halton with a regionally-based Greater Toronto Council (Greater Toronto Area Task Force 1996, 166). This

indirectly elected Greater Toronto Council (GTC) would have fewer responsibilities than the former regional governments it would replace, while local governments would be strengthened with more powers and responsibilities. A total of 51 recommendations were made, including property tax reforms based on Actual Value Assessment, a simplified Environmental Assessment process for urban infrastructure projects, an introduction of user-fees on private automobiles, and the coordination of regional public transit while maintaining local transit operations (Greater Toronto Area task Force 1996, 217-225). It was also proposed that capital funding for transit would continue to be jointly funded between the province and the new GTC (Greater Toronto Area Task Force 1996, 198).

Some criticism has been made of the GTATF for not holding public hearings, (although it did receive written briefs), and falling in line with a long tradition of other provincial government reports “in which distinguished personages receive expert advice, weigh the alternatives, and declare what needs to be done” (Sancton 2001, 549). On the other hand, it “drew extensively on writings that argued the growing importance of urban regions in the global economy” (Wolfson and Frisken 2000, 369) although the premise of governance restructuring in order to adapt to global pressures of competitiveness has also been criticized (Keil 2000, 768).

Ultimately, despite allowing the GTATF to complete its assignment, albeit in four months instead of 18, the PC government flatly ignored most of its advice (Frisken 1998, 162, 183; Sancton 2001, 549). Rather than reforming local government on a regional basis, Mike Harris’ government instead amalgamated the City of Toronto and its five

suburban municipalities into one municipality, known at the time as the “Mega-City”, while leaving the four regional municipalities untouched. Nowhere in the Golden Report was this discussed, and although it was something originally petitioned for by the City of Toronto in the early 1950’s, this decision resulted in massive protests from Metropolitan Toronto residents and officials alike.

Toronto Amalgamation

The municipalities of East York, Etobicoke, Toronto, North York, Scarborough and York were officially amalgamated on January 1, 1998 and became known as the City of Toronto. Although this policy had not been mentioned in the PC election campaign as part of their Common Sense Revolution, it was one of their first major actions, announced in late 1996 by Al Leach, the Minister of Municipal Affairs (Sancton 1999, 192). As mentioned previously it was not one of the Golden Report’s recommendations either. Nor, in fact, was there an “existing theory or body of literature that [was] at all helpful in explaining why the Harris government introduced the megacity” (Sancton 1999, 193). Instead, a number of writers have accused the conservative government of trying to silence a left-wing council in the former City of Toronto, which was often critical of the new provincial government (Sancton 1999, Filion 2000).

Citizen opposition to this amalgamation was widespread and vehement, with angry citizens forming a protest group called Citizens for Local Democracy. Opposition to amalgamation was as equally strong in the suburbs of Metropolitan Toronto as it was in the old downtown City of Toronto, and a non-binding referendum organized by the six

municipalities of Metro resulted in a 76% ‘NO’ vote against amalgamation (Keil 2000, 765-6). The Harris government proceeded with amalgamation anyways, catering to its core political support located outside of the megacity by perhaps avoiding any “institutional links” to problems experienced within Metro that an amalgamated GTA might have brought (Sancton 1999, 194). In addition to the amalgamation of Toronto, the Conservative government also ended provincial transfer payments to all local municipalities and downloaded several responsibilities like road construction, public transit operation and social housing subsidies entirely on to local governments. This would have a particularly detrimental effect on the new Toronto with its “extensive public transit system” and a “disproportional concentration of social housing” when compared to the remainder of the GTA (Filion 2000, 177). The refusal to integrate the GTA into one regional governance system would also perpetuate “intercity competition between the City of Toronto and surrounding exurbs” (Kipfer and Keil 2002, 241).

Greater Toronto Services Board

The Greater Toronto Services Board (GTSB) was created in 1998, and is the closest the Province of Ontario came to implementing one of the Golden Report’s recommendations. Its only mandated function was to operate the regional transit system formerly known as GO Transit, which was renamed the Greater Toronto Transit Authority, or GT Transit for short (Government of Ontario 1998, s. 3 ss.2, s. 40). This remains its legal name today, though it is still known as GO Transit (GO Transit 2007). The GTSB’s only other defined purpose was “[t]o promote and facilitate co-ordinated

decision making among the municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area (Government of Ontario 1998, s. 3 ss.1). The GTSB was a 40-person board, with one member from each constituent municipality in the GTA except Toronto who had 11 members and Mississauga who had 2, plus each of the chairs of the four regional municipalities (Sancton 1999, 192). For the first time Hamilton was included in a regional governance body initiated by the province, but explicitly for the purposes of GT Transit (Government of Ontario 1998, s. 5).

The creation of the GTSB is an example of the hollowing out of the state and the displacement of state powers (Jessop 1993); in this case a downloading of the province's GT Transit system to the municipalities. The GTSB's constituent members would now be responsible for paying the entire capital and operating costs of the regional rail and bus system, and individual municipalities would also have to pay the full costs of their local systems. Along with this downloading and devolution of responsibility came another cancellation of approved additions to the TTC's subway network (Frisken 2001, 534-5).

Criticism of the GTSB was rife. A review conducted by Deloitte Consulting in 2001 highlighted concerns about the GTSB's ability to tackle the growing problems of transportation and growth management (Frisken 2001, 536). The GTSB's lack of power or authority is often cited as a reason for its eventual demise, along with having no dedicated source of funding, and a board composed "entirely of municipal representatives, some of whom have always opposed any kind of regional organization as

a threat to their autonomy” (Wolfson and Frisken 2000, 370). It has been suggested that the province actually devised such a weak agency “confined to the promotion of infrastructure, service and economic development coordination, and to the operation of the GO commuter train system” in order to pander to municipal and regional administrations that wanted little to do with the broader GTA region (Filion 2000, 177). Sancton estimates that the provincial government wanted to insure the GTA remained globally competitive but at the same time was “tempered by its desire not to alienate its core political support” (Sancton 1999, 194).

Recognizing the GTSB’s failure at “filling the vacuum” that the province had created by abandoning regional planning (Sancton 2001, 551), the province uploaded the responsibility of GT Transit, though not all the costs (Toronto Star 2004, A18), and pulled the plug on the GTSB in late 2001. Ironically, in its final meeting in December of 2001, the GTSB adopted a consultant’s report outlining the urgent need for public transit and a network of rapid-bus routes throughout the GTA (DeMara 2001, B02).

Conclusion

Over a fifty year period the Province of Ontario has attempted many times to restructure and reform the way the Toronto region is administered. These attempts, however, have often failed to have their desired impact. Metropolitan Toronto and GO Transit are two examples where the province was successful at creating regionally-based bodies. Yet despite their successes, Metropolitan Toronto was brought to an abrupt halt and the consequences remain in flux, and GO Transit has never expanded in a manner

which fully serves the needs of GTA residents, particularly beyond its hub and spoke system with downtown Toronto as the focus. The remainder of provincial initiatives went unexecuted and remained simply as plans or policies without any effect. The problems that in the past have led the province to initiate a Commission, a plan, or a study continue to exist and worsen; urban sprawl, inefficient provision of infrastructure and services, and an uneven distribution of property tax bases have continued to develop to the point where what once were projections and forecasts are now a stinging reality that could have been mitigated but weren't.

It appears that the thoughts of early reformers and policy-makers are still quite valid today. The OMB's Chairman Lorne Cumming's observation that the social and economic unity of the region was starkly poised against a map of sharply divided, "illogical" and "inequitable" political boundaries remains a particularly apt description of today's Greater Toronto Area. The trends that were identified in the Toronto-Centred Region concept have mostly been realised, with regular commuting occurring across distances that at the time, must have seemed untenable.

In the above examples of regionally-based policies it has been the economic goals of a strengthened city-region that have driven the province's agenda, although issues of equity have also at times been motivating factors (Friskin 2001, 515). And though the province's actions have usually centred on Metropolitan Toronto, its policy choices "were seldom motivated by an interest in strengthening the city *per se*, however. Rather, they emerged out of the government's recognition (often arrived at reluctantly) of the

importance of the Toronto area to the province's economy and to the political fortunes of the government in power" (Frisken 1998, 225). This reluctance, coupled with a lack of concern among successive provincial governments over the Toronto region's need for provincial assistance, has meant that that it was up to the provincial bureaucrats to advocate for the region, as they recognized how its economic well-being affected the rest of the province (Frisken 1998, 177). However, even when the province has acted, it has never gone as far as creating a "body that could perform as a GTA government", the result being a body which could claim to represent nearly half of the province's population (Frisken 1998, 177). That reality could certainly be a strong reason for a province who is supposed to have supreme authority over its municipalities to have an aversion from creating a government bigger than itself.

CHAPTER 4 – THE GREATER TORONTO TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

Introduction

The Greater Toronto Transportation Authority (GTTA) represents a renewed provincial interest in regional planning and governance in the province of Ontario. This interest has been sparked by several factors including environmental problems such as air pollution and urban sprawl, economic issues of freight delays and lost productivity, jurisdictional disputes and inter-municipal competition. As discussed in the previous chapter, these issues are not new to the region and this is not the first time the province has attempted to address them. What *has* changed is the timeframe; when the Toronto Centred Region concept was developed many of these issues were on the horizon, and anticipatory action was advocated to manipulate emerging trends. Today these problems are very real and can be measured in actual costs to the GTA's social and economic welfare. This chapter will present the argument that the GTTA, through the planning and implementation of transportation infrastructure, is a state actor in the goal of improving the regional competitiveness of the GTA by planning and providing a network of transportation infrastructure that attracts capital investment, professional workers and service providers, and reduces commute times for intra-regional travel. The argument will be made in part through an analysis of the GTTA in light of the literature review presented earlier. Linking concepts of Graham and Marvin's *splintering urbanism*, Erie's role of the state in transportation infrastructure provision, and Keil and Young's work on

the GTA and transportation will form a basis for analyzing the role that the GTTA will play, and what its potential outcomes might be. As Erie has argued, local governments play a fundamental role in contributing to a region's global competitiveness (Erie 2004). The possible challenges and problems the GTTA faces such as inter-municipal competition and the risk of bypassing certain localities in favour of connecting more valued spaces will also be presented. Although the views of the current members of the GTTA are aligned with the ideals of publicly built and owned transportation infrastructure, the limited amount of funding and the uncertain relationship with its parent ministry are inherent organizational problems that might prevent reaching that goal. The common themes that have been identified through primary research will be drawn out and discussed to highlight some of these issues.

The Greater Toronto Transportation Authority: A Legislative Framework

On 24 August 2006 the legislation governing the GTTA came into force (Government of Ontario 2006a, 2831). The GTTA is a Crown agency which falls under the jurisdiction of Ontario's Ministry of Transportation. It is composed of its board of directors who have been nominated by the municipalities that form the "regional transportation area" as defined by the province: the City of Toronto, the City of Hamilton, and the Regional Municipalities of Durham, Halton, Peel and York (Government of Ontario 2006, s.1). Each member municipality is required to nominate one member to the GTTA, with the exception of the City of Toronto which has four representatives on the board. In each case, the Mayor or Regional Chair was nominated

to represent the municipalities: Mayor David Miller (Toronto), Mayor Fred Eisenberger (Hamilton), Chair Roger Anderson (Durham), Chair Gary Carr (Halton), Mayor Hazel McCallion (Peel), and Chair Bill Fisch (York). The City of Toronto's three additional members are City Councillors Brian Ashton² and Adam Giambrone, and former City of Toronto Chief Planner Paul Bedford. The Province of Ontario appointed Rob MacIsaac as Chair and Peter Smith as Vice-chair. With the exceptions of Paul Bedford, Rob MacIsaac and Peter Smith, the board is composed entirely of municipally elected officials and represents a continuation of the preference, at the municipal level, for governance that increases the powers of locally elected people, rather than the "apolitical ideal" of the earlier reform movement (Friskin 1993, 167). It is also in stark contrast to L.A.'s experience with semi-autonomous, non-political agencies that were "shielded" from political oversight and micro-management (Erie 2004, 78).

The GTTA's mandate currently includes four specific areas: "1) Responsibility for the GTA Fare Card system, GO Transit and the coordination of municipal transit purchases, 2) Development of an integrated transportation plan for local transit, GO Transit and major roads for the GTTA region, 3) Development and submission of a five-year capital and investment strategy, and 4) Ensuring that the transportation and capital plans align with the province's Growth Plan objectives for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, Greenbelt objectives, provincial policy statements and municipal official plans" (Government of Ontario, Ministry of Transportation 2006).

² Councillor Ashton has recently been replaced on the GTTA by Councillor Norm Kelly.

Proposals to create the GTTA have been around since the demise of its predecessor, the Greater Toronto Services Board in 2001. Many proponents of the GTTA have been unanimous on the reasons for needing a regional transportation authority. Often cited are increasing levels of air pollution and greenhouse gases due to transportation-based emissions, growing traffic congestion, longer commute times, chronic under-investment in transportation infrastructure and poorly integrated local transit systems (Southern Ontario Gateway Council 2006; Toronto Board of Trade 2006; Urban Development Institute / Ontario 2006). The estimated total social and economic costs of traffic congestion exceed \$2 Billion annually (Toronto City Summit Alliance 2006, 3), and the figure for capital costs required to improve transit in the GTA ranges from \$17.5 Billion to \$100 Billion (Bedford interview 2007).

Many of those who appeared before the provincial legislative committee responsible for writing the GTTA's enabling legislation were speaking on behalf of business groups such as the Toronto Board of Trade and the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (Legislative Assembly of Ontario 2006). These interest groups see transportation networks as their lifeline, moving both goods and people; traffic gridlock has been consistently cited as a top concern of the 10 000 members belonging to the Toronto Board of Trade (Toronto Board of Trade 2006, 19). The Southern Ontario Gateway Council, an advisory organization primarily concerned with goods movement and economic development, pressed for better public transit by arguing that "the more people can access public transit the more road capacity is freed up for the movement of

goods and services” (Southern Ontario Gateway Council 2006). The Urban Development Institute, representing the land development and construction industries, felt strongly that the GTTA should not focus on public transit “to the exclusion of the rest of the transportation network, and claimed that “congestion is impairing Ontario’s productivity and obstructing the realization of its true economic potential” (Urban Development Institute 2006). These business interests clearly expressed the importance of regional transportation planning to the growth of the economy and pressed the government of Ontario to create the GTTA.

The members who have been appointed to the GTTA have similarly described the GTTA’s role as one of promoting economic and regional competitiveness, although some members have also demonstrated a strong commitment to public transit improvements for constituents. Chair Rob MacIsaac believes the GTTA will approach transportation planning on the scale of the regional economy, which transcends municipal boundaries and is an approach that “no individual municipality could take in terms of planning transportation infrastructure” (MacIsaac interview 2007). Councillor Ashton feels similarly, and describes the GTTA as a response to a relative decline in the GTA’s global competitiveness and a need to invest “in the next 50 years of prosperity building”. Ashton acknowledges the GTA is competing with other global city-regions that have responded to similar transportation infrastructure problems a lot faster, “have demonstrated a great deal more foresight” and are “less embattled by structural restraints”. He uses this point to demonstrate the important role that transportation

infrastructure plays when it comes to economic investment in the region, because people make their decisions “based on how they get their people to work, [and] how do they get their goods out of their plant” (Ashton interview 2007). Overall, there is a sense among the members that the GTTA needs to be visionary and bold in its planning, that a world class regional transportation system is the long-term goal, and that the time to act is now (Bedford, MacIsaac, Anderson interviews 2007).

Overall Provincial Context

The Liberal government of Ontario led by Premier Dalton McGuinty in its first term in office has introduced three pieces of legislation that have firmly placed the province back in the arena of regional planning. The Greenbelt Act, the Places to Grow Act, and the GTTA Act have been described as the “three legs of a growth management stool” (MacIsaac interview 2007). The Greenbelt Act enabled the development of a Greenbelt Plan that protects over 700 000 hectares of green space, agricultural land and forests and wraps around the urbanized area of southern Ontario known as the Greater Golden Horseshoe (Government of Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2007). The Places to Grow Act enabled the development of a Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan, complementary to the Greenbelt Plan by directing urban growth to 25 selected centres (Government of Ontario, Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal 2007). Although criticized for being unable to meet its own objectives (see Neptis Foundation 2006), the growth plan nevertheless represents a comprehensive attempt at planning the region. With the responsibility for transportation planning, the GTTA in

many ways is an important facilitator of the partnering greenbelt and growth plans, acting as the “change agent and key enabler” of an overall attempt at strengthening the region (MacIsaac 2007).

The GTTA is often compared to the Greater Toronto Services Board, but has significant differences which are hoped will lead to more chances of success. The GTTA is considerably smaller, with only 11 members instead of 40. It also has a more focussed mandate, whereas the GTSB was perceived to be out to “take over everything” (Anderson interview 2007). Although financial details have yet to be worked out for the GTTA, including accessing new sources of revenue, Premier McGuinty recently announced *Move Ontario 2020*, a \$17.5 billion, 12 year public transit investment plan that makes the GTTA’s membership hopeful they’ll have more success at implementing their plan than the GTSB did. Rob MacIsaac, in contrast to some popular opinion, believes the GTSB achieved some very important initiatives, including the creation of a conceptual plan that the premier’s office ended up using when making its *Move Ontario 2020* announcement (MacIsaac interview 2007).

Premium Networked Spaces: Four Processes of Change:

Returning to the earlier discussion of Stephen Graham’s four processes of socio-technical and political economic change is useful in assessing the GTTA’s role in shaping the urban environment. Graham suggests that these four processes support the emergence of “premium networked spaces” and forms an important part of the *splintering urbanism* thesis. One of the questions that Graham and Marvin ask in the

conclusion of their book is “how do different state and intergovernmental systems support different experiences of urban and infrastructural changes” (Graham and Marvin 2001, 418). Based on recent planning initiatives like the Greenbelt and the GTTA, the Province of Ontario is poised to play an essential role in the shaping of the GTA’s urban environment in the coming decades and will determine how just and equitable the region’s transportation network is.

The unbundling of urban infrastructure provision

This is perhaps the least occurring process of change when applied to local transportation issues in the GTA. The TTC and GO, the region’s two largest transit agencies, do not appear to be at risk of being *unbundled*, or opened up to privatization or division. In fact, the current members of the GTTA appear unanimously in favour of keeping these agencies in tact, with some of them having served on the GO Transit board in the past. The success of GO Transit has been linked to its board’s sense of cooperation, a shared vision and agreement on the fair distribution of expansion opportunities (Anderson interview 2007). It should also be noted that the privatization of GO Transit, for example, is not an option, as currently written, in the GTTA’s enabling legislation which requires the eventual assumption of the transit agency by the GTTA. The role of public-private partnerships – private sector involvement in public projects such as infrastructure provision – is another potential element of privatization. Support for public-private partnerships appears to be mixed on the GTTA’s board, with some

members being firmly in favour of it and others very much against it. It could prove to be an eventual point of contention in the GTTA's planning process, and will need to be addressed by the board.

There are a couple of examples of what might be referred to as peripheral unbundling however. The unbundling of Canadian National Railway's (CN Railway) network of public rail lines could be argued to have had an indirect negative impact on regional transportation. As GO Transit rents its use of railway tracks and related infrastructure from the now private CN Railway, it has found it increasingly difficult to negotiate track time and performance standards, and takes a back seat to CN's priority – shipping freight (Jandt 2007). Canadian Pacific Railway (CP Rail), which has always been a private company, also owns tracks that are used by GO Transit trains. However, according to Gary McNeil, Managing Director and Chief Executive Director of GO Transit, CP Rail charges so much money for this use that GO Transit has refused to run any extra trains on these tracks, even though it would like to. In addition, when the rare opportunity arises to purchase abandoned railway corridors from one of the two private railway companies, GO Transit is forced to pay “an arm and a leg” and have no choice but to pay a monopolistic rate for this “critical infrastructure” (Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities 2006).

In a further example, the operation of York Region Transit (YRT) bus services is contracted out to four separate private sector operators. YRT retains ownership of the buses but has contracted out the actual operation, dividing its routes amongst private

bidders based primarily on local municipal boundaries. In a recent labour dispute between one of the operating firms and the Amalgamated Transit Union, 46 of YRT's 94 bus routes were at risk of being cancelled due to a strike. YRT completely dismissed itself of any involvement or responsibility in the issue, claiming it was between two outside parties (McGran 2006). This peripheral unbundling of infrastructure networks, therefore, can still impact the region's transportation network in indirect ways, leaving vast areas under-serviced and without the protective intervention of the local government.

The erosion of comprehensive urban planning

Despite the province's comprehensive greenbelt and growth management plan, there is still a number of gaps that need to be addressed to ensure an overall vision is achieved. Graham's reference to project-based planning without overall vision (Graham 2000b, 191) appears to be a widespread problem in the GTA. The City of Burlington, in response to an application to permit a Wal-Mart store next to its central GO Station, placed an Interim Control By-Law (ICBL) on all lands adjacent to the three Burlington GO Stations. In essence, the ICBL restricted those site's land-uses to existing purposes for one year while the City completed a review of its land-use policies in reference to the province's Places to Grow initiative. This decision was appealed by Wal-Mart's proponent to the Ontario Municipal Board where the ICBL was ordered repealed (Ontario Municipal Board 2006). Paul Bedford uses this example to illustrate the difficulty of trying to link land-uses to transportation infrastructure, especially when the OMB

becomes involved. He believes that the OMB should be removed from the GTTA's planning process, and like the Greenbelt, leave final authority to Ministerial approval, or the Premier's office (Bedford interview 2007).

Linking land-use to transportation planning and the creation of new types of value was discussed in the Hounslow case study conducted by Marvin and Guy (1997), and appears to be an emerging concept in the GTA. Members of the GTTA appear to agree that land-use planning should be linked to their decisions, as the relationship of transit to land-use is well established (Eisenberger interview 2007), and that funding decisions for new services or infrastructure can be linked to local land-use policies (MacIsaac interview 2007). There is, however, also the belief that land-use planning remain a local process, that local government is best suited to this purpose, and that the GTTA should remain firmly outside the realm of making any land-use decisions (Anderson interview 2007). Marvin and Guy (1997) have argued that focussing on traditional antagonistic methods of planning prevents taking advantage of opportunities to create new forms of value, and the GTTA needs to be aware of this.

The emergence of infrastructural consumerism

The privately owned Electronic Toll Route, Highway 407, is an excellent example of emerging infrastructural consumerism in the GTA (Graham 2000b, Keil and Young 2005). It allows users to by-pass the busier, often congested, public Highway 401 in exchange for paying a fee. Blue 22, a proposed rail link from Pearson International

Airport to Toronto's Union Station, is another example of a private sector transportation provider allowing people to pay a higher price for the transport of their choice, linking what Graham refers to as *premium networked spaces*, and by-passing the spaces in between. Blue 22 is touted as a public-private partnership, privately owned and operated, but financially supported by both the Federal Government and the Province of Ontario. It will largely operate on new track in the existing right-of-way owned and maintained by CN Railway and currently used by GO Transit and VIA Rail. Other than the two terminals, the Blue 22 service would only make one additional stop at the TTC's Dundas West subway station/GO Transit's Bloor station (Transport Canada 2003). Steven Erie identified the Alameda Rail Corridor as "ground zero for escalating conflicts between the forces of globalization and community" (Erie 2004, 118). The proposed Blue 22 is a similar example of this conflict as community resistance continues to grow in the neighbourhood of Weston, which is at risk of being by-passed by this elite transportation service (see Weston Community Coalition). How the GTTA will fit into this planned transportation service is uncertain, as many of the decisions around it were made prior to its inauguration. At least one member has expressed his desire to have the GTTA involved in such an initiative, but was unclear on how (Giambrone 2007). The fact that such plans are in progress but appear to be outside the GTTA's jurisdiction does not bode well for achieving its mandate of planning a regional transportation network.

Another example of infrastructural consumerism is the idea of appealing to transit riders with modes of transport that are "better than a bus" (Anderson interview 2007).

Roger Anderson, Chair of Durham Region, firmly believes “that the only way you’re going to get people out of their cars is to give them something better than a bus to ride on” (Anderson interview 2007). Anderson would like to see clean, quiet and efficient high speed electric rail transit to move people across the region, which he believes would appeal to commuters who would otherwise drive.

The widespread shift towards extended and automobilized cityscapes

A review of the province’s Places to Grow policies revealed that of the 24 identified urban growth centres, only 4 have achieved the level of development that qualifies as high-density, mixed-use and public transit-oriented. One of the barriers to achieving the province’s target is the preponderance of urban form that is tailored to the automobile at the expense of public transit, particularly in the suburban nodes and small downtowns of the GGH (Filion 2007). Graham and Marvin link the dependence on the automobile to a “broader shift towards urban physical and social fragmentation and separation (Graham and Marvin 2001, 119). Brian Ashton commented on the role the car has played thus far in the GTA’s development, describing an “entire urban structure [designed] around mobility based on the automobile”, where “the car is king”. He feels it will not be an easy task to get people out of their cars and onto transit, citing a need to recognize how people currently move about. He sums up the challenges by saying “we built [it], what are we going to do with it now?” (Ashton interview 2007).

Challenges and Obstacles

One of the recurring themes that is emerging from the GTTA is the difficult inter-governmental relationships that exist in the GTA. This theme was identified in the earlier chapter on regional government and remains an issue with the GTTA. There is a certain level of competition that has always existed amongst the member municipalities of the GTTA. Attracting investment and development to raise the property tax base and disputes around services and infrastructure planning and provision have long contributed to an ongoing disunity. Where the real potential for difficulty lies, however, is the division between the municipal members of the GTTA and the provincial government.

The GTTA is an agency mandated by the province, but its role, in the opinion of its Chair, still needs more definition. One of the fundamental challenges MacIsaac sees is the need “to create a role for ourselves, because the field is pretty well occupied at the moment”. Convincing the GTTA’s parent ministry, the Ministry of Transportation (MTO), and its member municipalities to cede a little jurisdiction is one way he thinks the role can be defined (MacIsaac interview 2007). Some of the other members of the GTTA have been more direct in stating their dissatisfaction with the province during the publicly held meetings of the GTTA. Despite the GTTA’s legislation, Mayor Miller would nevertheless like to learn “what the *province* thinks our role is”, while Mayor McCallion thinks the GTTA is being “kept in the dark” over funding, and even if the GTTA does define a role for itself, “the province could wipe us out tomorrow” (GTТА 2007b). Mayor McCallion has also asked “when will [MTO] become involved with the

GTТА, what is it working on, what is it in the middle of? We only have part of the picture if there is only local input” (GTТА 2007a).

There is a real sense that the GTТА is not in control of its own activities, as evidenced by the fact that the details of its budget could not be immediately disclosed to the members due to provincial “cabinet confidentiality”, despite the fact that GTТА staff had been seconded from MTO and consultants hired to perform studies—decisions which GTТА members are ostensibly responsible for (GTТА 2007a). The concerns about financing the GTТА’s activities easily overlap with the member municipalities’ overall concerns about funding; as Mayors and Regional Chairs of the GTТА, the membership of the GTТА is acutely aware of the overall deficiencies in the funding mechanisms in the province, especially after the years of cutbacks and reductions of the neoliberal Harris government. Chair Fisch made note of approximately 12 revenue tools that the GTТА and its municipalities could utilize, but don’t have the legislative power to do so (GTТА 2007a).

The inter-municipal competition in the GTТА is another ongoing issue that will have to be dealt with if the GTТА is going to be successful. Each of the GTТА’s members has a direct responsibility to local constituents, and not the region at large, so overcoming the challenges of being self-serving, and having to “check the egos at the door” is a potential problem of having a municipally populated agency (Ashton interview 2007). The Toronto representatives on the GTТА have stressed the importance of protecting Toronto as the core of the region (Ashton, Bedford interviews 2007), and

Chair Anderson on a couple of occasions has expressed his worry that Durham Region is being ignored (GTТА 2007a). Overall, however, there is a sense that these differences can be overcome – Mayor McCallion has noted the successful relationships built during the short existence of the GTSB (GTТА 2007b). Councillor Giambrone believes that the GTТА’s mandate should extend beyond the idea of simply increasing overall transit ridership—something that he feels would necessitate investing in Toronto alone—and instead should attempt to integrate the region, in part, for social justice reasons (Giambrone interview 2007, Giambrone 2007).

Although there seems to be unanimous agreement on the GTТА that the public should be consulted for the purposes of planning and decision-making, there is a worrying trend that this process will be sped up, to ensure the efficient delivery and implementation of plans. A lot of focus has been aimed at the province’s Environmental Assessment (EA) procedure, with Mayor Miller claiming that the GTТА should be exempt from conducting EA’s, much the way garbage incinerators have been (GTТА 2007a). Acknowledging a need for public engagement, Councillor Giambrone also feels the need for projects to go ahead (Giambrone interview 2007). Paul Bedford has pointed out the difficulty of addressing a population as large as the GTA’s and referred to the difficult public consultation process he went through while developing the City of Toronto’s new Official Plan (Bedford interview 2007). Councillor Ashton examines this topic with a broader sense of opportunity, pointing to the availability of mass communication technologies, and the ability of people, if given sufficient information, to

make and understand difficult choices. But he also refers to the difficulty of reaching out to such a diverse and large population as found in the GTA (Ashton interview 2007). Steven Erie in his book on Los Angeles wrote about the difficult lessons learned in that city when the population was not consulted sufficiently. If the goal of the province, through the GTTA, is to improve the region's competitiveness, it would do well to make sure that the public has an opportunity to participate, and that the GTTA "explains early and honestly" what it intends to do (Erie 2004, 162).

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

The Province of Ontario has been in the business of planning regionally for over 50 years. Since the creation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1954 the province has attempted to coordinate the region's governance, land-use planning and transportation networks in ways which could improve its economic competitiveness. The goal of competitiveness has always been the source of motivation for these initiatives, although environmental and social issues have also played significant roles in the formation of policies. The history of regionally based initiatives in the GTA reads much like the present story today, with inter-municipal competition and an inability to coordinate on joint issues as common themes. But a provincial failure to implement its strategies also runs through the storyline, and this should worry those concerned with issues of public transit and environmental and social justice. This failure in the past has been linked to “an unwillingness to follow a course of action that conflicted with the aspirations and activities of private sector interests” (Friskin 1993, 176). The private sector today remains an influential force in the decision-making at all levels of government and will continue to do so, especially in light of neoliberal attitudes towards governance and policy. These factors, coupled with an overall retreat of the state from collectivist notions of public infrastructure provision (Graham and Marvin 2001, 96) could mean that the GTTA is a functionally weak organization.

Today the Greater Toronto Area is a region in need of serious transportation infrastructure improvements, on economic, environmental and social scales. The goal to

be regionally competitive in a global economy, coupled with ideals of sustainability and a collective outlay of public transit infrastructure are all presenting a need for a regional transportation authority to exist. Upper levels of state have retracted their funding and provision of services, often downloading the responsibility on to the local level of government. The GTTA is a perfect example of this downloading; the province is in the best position to plan on a regional basis, and has done so with its Greenbelt and Places to Grow plans. Yet it has delegated the responsibility of transportation planning to a provincially-mandated, municipally-populated authority. Local input into the planning of a regional transportation plan is essential, but if the local level does not have the tools to finance or implement a plan, it raises questions about the very nature of its existence. Fears of it being a “flow-through board for provincial funding” (Giambrone interview 2007) or used by the province “as a shield, or way of deflecting their responsibility” (Ashton interview 2007) are backed up by a history of provincial inaction and more recent punitive dealings like the amalgamation of Toronto and the downloading of services. The Province of Ontario has retreated from the planning of a regional transportation network, but remains firmly in control of the funding of such projects.

The GTTA clearly represents the province’s interest in creating a regionally competitive GTA; the province created the organization and can also terminate it – a fear that some members have expressed. Local leaders also share the goal of regional competitiveness, but have not been given the political structure to act regionally until now. Unfortunately, the GTTA may not allow the local levels of government the

autonomy they want or need to implement the type of transportation infrastructure network they would like. Compromised by a lack of funding and power, the GTTA creates a municipal stakeholder body that is clearly under the thumb of the province. Provincial announcements of funding have been made, and if the money follows through, will go a long way to funding new projects in the GTA. However, the difficult decision of where to invest this money will have to be made, and will likely result in a continuing pattern of linking premium networked spaces to each other, while by-passing the less desirable, less profitable areas. The next stage of research on this topic can occur after the upcoming provincial election has been held, the GTTA's status and financial situation has been stabilized and the GTTA has proposed a regional transportation plan.

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