"We Are the Blue Berets:" Problematizing Peacekeeping in Postwar Canada

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Abstract

This dissertation highlights some of the innumerable ways that participation in UN peacekeeping efforts became one of the central symbols employed in Canadian self-identification from 1956 to 1997. What emerges is a web encompassing forty or so years of continuity and change in how messages about peacekeeping and Canada were produced, disseminated, and received by Canadians. The strands which comprise this web are: the political rhetoric of peacekeeping, the use of peacekeeping in high school textbooks, National Film Board [NFB] documentaries about peacekeeping, newspaper coverage of peacekeeping, and editorial cartoons about peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping's growing adoption as a national symbol in Canada depended considerably on writers' and artists' abilities to discuss more than the successes and failures of individual missions or peacekeeping as a governmental policy. UN peacekeeping operations have not been universally successful; Canadians, therefore, did not become attached to peacekeeping through the actual achievements of their peacekeepers. Rather, what largely determined the content of each medium's messages were persistent discussions which foregrounded Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations, as well as the existence of three parallel discourses about peacekeeping which referred to the past, the present, or the future for audiences. The nostalgic and progressive discourses encouraged Canadians to see peacekeeping as a symbolic activity. The words and images associated with these temporal understandings of

peacekeeping helped blunt the impact of any criticisms which were made using functional criteria in the present.

While internationalist in emphasis, peacekeeping was seen through domestic frames far more often. Individual missions mattered less than the idea of peacekeeping and Canada's part in its perpetuation. When missions went awry, the impact on Canada was discussed far more than the effects on the host nations. The domestic production and reception of messages about peacekeeping was therefore influenced by internationalism, but remained centred on the Canadian experience of peacekeeping. This domestic emphasis problematizes the Canadian attachment to peacekeeping while also providing answers to why so many Canadians strongly associate with peacekeeping. Or feel, as Stompin' Tom Connors put it, that "we are the Blue Berets."

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I would also like to thank my family and my friends for their love and support. The McCullough's, Slinger's, William's, and Stewart's were all great at holidays and other gatherings, and did not pester me too much about when I was going to finish. Nate, Laura, Andrea, Jenny, and Sean all read my dissertation and helped with my mock defence. I am glad you only asked for a beer in exchange! All of your respective partners were also good people to share laughs with over the past seven years. The Abuses of the Past reading group influenced my work in ways they cannot appreciate. Our regular meetings always recharged my historical batteries. Alan Stewart also did an incredible job copy-editing this work, though any errors that remain are solely my own.

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And to Reagan, I hope one day you read this and it isn't too boring. You are such a wonder and I am thankful for you every day.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures

Introduction

Canada is a peacekeeping nation. This does not mean there is a singular Canadian character that manifests itself in a desire to prevent the escalation of conflicts. It could be argued, however, that Canada should be called a peacekeeping nation because of the cultural importance of peacekeeping to its history since 1956. To deny this importance is to deny the omnipresent litany of words, images, and objects about peacekeeping that can be found throughout Canadian society and culture. There are songs, monuments, buildings, images on Canadian currency, dramatic plays, and national days of recognition for peacekeeping. Canada is unique in this respect. This is not to say that other countries do not also value peacekeeping. Though peacekeeping has often been associated with other "middle powers" like the Scandinavian nations, only Canada has made peacekeeping a central part of its national identity.[1]

A song by one of Canada's best-known folk singers, Stompin' Tom Connors, provided the title for this dissertation. "We are the Blue Berets" is from the opening line of his song, "The Blue Berets," an ode to Canadian participation in United Nations [UN] peacekeeping operations.[2] The song was written in 1993, when Canadians were involved in new peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia. Never one to criticize Canada, Connors extolled the virtues of Canadians for their service to the UN. In many ways, Connors' song was a Canadian

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[1] Unlike Canada, the Scandinavian countries can draw upon much longer historical pasts for their national identities. They also take pride in their neutrality, not simply their support for the UN. See Cynthia Cockburn and Dubravka Zarkov, eds., *The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping: Bosnia and the Netherlands* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2002).

[2] Stompin' Tom Connors, *The Blue Berets* (Crown-vetch music, 1993).

rejoinder to "The Ballad of the Green Berets," a pro-military song written by Robin Moore and Staff Sergeant Barry Sandler that became popular in the United States in 1966, and was also featured in the John Wayne film, "The Green Berets." In the Canadian version, there is no reference to the peacekeepers dying for Canada, as there was in "The Ballad of the Green Berets." Instead, the "Blue Berets" were said to soon be "marching home to say 'we love you all'." This altered conception of sacrifice enabled Connors to encourage Canadians to celebrate their national distinctiveness through their peacekeepers. The pronoun "we," employed throughout the song, further encouraged Canadians to see themselves in the deeds of their peacekeepers. Yet, the "we" Connors describes represents more than the peacekeepers themselves. It is this universality – the "we" who are "the Blue Berets" – that is the primary focus of this study.

This dissertation highlights some of the numerous ways that participation in UN peacekeeping efforts became one of the central symbols employed in Canadian self-identification from 1956 to 1997. What emerges is a web encompassing forty or so years of continuity and change in how messages about peacekeeping and Canada were produced, disseminated, and received by Canadians. The strands which comprise this web are: the political rhetoric of peacekeeping, the use of peacekeeping in high school textbooks, National Film Board [NFB] documentaries about peacekeeping, newspaper coverage of peacekeeping, and editorial cartoons about peacekeeping. Because state and non-state actors produced messages about peacekeeping, this study provides a

thorough investigation of these different voices. While it would have been possible to examine in more detail just one of the ways in which Canadians could have learned about peacekeeping, it would have prevented a more wide-ranging investigation of how an idea can be embedded in a national symbology. It was only through multiple mediated forms of expression that were contingent upon particular understandings of the nation that peacekeeping became a part of the system of symbols that Canadians mobilized to express their national identity.

This dissertation argues that peacekeeping is more than a governmental foreign policy option. It has been linked to a Canadian national identity. The years 1956 to 1997 saw changing conceptions of Canada as a British, bilingual or multicultural nation, and differences between French- and English-Canadian understandings of the nation. What the sources examined for this study suggest is that there were considerable differences in how peacekeeping was attached to conceptions of the nation in both English and French Canada. In this regard, this dissertation follows Marcel Martel's work, which suggests that after the Second World War French Canada increasingly came to be identified with the physical borders of Quebec. [3] While peacekeeping found favour in Quebec when it was presented as an internationalist policy that countered British imperial efforts, it lost much of its efficacy as a symbol in French Canada as Quebec became more

[3] Marcel Martel, *French Canada: An account of its Creation and Break-up, 1850 - 1967*, vol. 24, Canada's Ethnic Group Series (Ottawa: The Canadian Historical Association, 1998), 25.

concerned with its own foreign affairs after the Quiet Revolution.[4] As this occurred, many English Canadians looked to peacekeeping as a unifying symbol of Canada's past, present, and future, and a counter-weight to what were seen as the divisive discourses coming from French Canada.

Peacekeeping's growing adoption as a national symbol in Canada depended considerably on writers' and artists' abilities to discuss more than the successes and failures of individual missions or peacekeeping as a governmental policy. UN peacekeeping operations have not been universally successful; Canadians, therefore, did not become attached to peacekeeping through the actual achievements of their peacekeepers. Governmental support for peacekeeping was also intermittent between 1956 and 1997, and so the ideational attachment of peacekeeping to a Canadian national identity did not come about solely through the propagandistic efforts of successive political parties who held office, though to be sure they played a significant part. Each collection of sources used in this dissertation also demonstrates that those who produced messages about peacekeeping did not always care about the particularities of individual missions, preferring to espouse messages that linked their cultural products to political discourses about Canada's national identity. Accordingly, this dissertation examines not the government policies and policy-makers, but words and images used to describe peacekeeping.

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[4] The idea that Quebeckers favour isolationism is refuted in Stephane Roussel and Jean-Christophe Boucher, "The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2008).

A fuller understanding of how French and English Canadians came to associate peacekeeping with Canada must begin with an examination of the political rhetoric accompanying peacekeeping, and determine whether such ideas were accepted or challenged by different media. The Canadian government played a foundational role in creating and disseminating the language and associations of peacekeeping with Canada's past, its present, and its future. But education systems and mass media, including films, newspapers, and editorial cartoons also communicated messages about peacekeeping to their audiences. Each successive chapter in this dissertation therefore examines a medium that had less formal governmental influence over the content of its messages than the one which preceded it.

While the Canadian Government and the Department of External Affairs [DEA] paid close attention to the messages that were produced and disseminated about peacekeeping in Canada from 1956 to 1997, this dissertation asserts that there was not a direct correlation between how much influence the government had over a particular medium and the content of its messages about peacekeeping. Rather, what largely determined the content of each medium's messages was the existence of three parallel discourses about peacekeeping which referred to the past, the present, or the future for audiences. The producers of messages about peacekeeping investigated in each chapter made choices about which of these discourses to employ, often combining two or all three into a single text. Those media that discussed the past were likely to present

peacekeeping positively, though they did so by denying a considerable portion of the history of peacekeeping. This *nostalgic* imagining of Canadian peacekeeping consciously denied the shortcomings of operations while linking peacekeeping to an idealized version of Canada's past. In those sources which emphasized the present, authors either argued that Canada's peacekeeping efforts were helping to bring about a better world, or presented criticisms of peacekeeping that suggested that it was not a solution for global and Canadian problems. Such authors shared the language of *functionalism*, which led them to use similar appeals to audiences' "reason" and "common sense" to justify their arguments. The sources which hypothesized about the future through discussions of peacekeeping were more likely than not to present it in positive terms, and to imagine Canada's playing a large role in bringing about a better world. They told audiences that peacekeeping was part of a *progressive* move towards a more peaceful planet, and their claims found widespread appeal among many Canadians.

No study has ever posited the existence of these three different discourses about peacekeeping, or examined the effects of these discourses on how and what Canadians would have learned about peacekeeping, despite their central role in its adoption as a Canadian national symbol. The nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive discourses about peacekeeping co-existed for almost the entire period covered by this dissertation. Each discourse drew on particular constructions of the nation and peacekeeping for audiences. And while each discourse referred to

a different point in time – the past, the present, or the future – all were constructed and modified according to the cultural and political milieux of the time in which they were employed. The politicians, authors, filmmakers, columnists, and cartoonists examined in this dissertation rarely perceived such discourses as constraints, however, and moved freely among functionalism and progressivism or nostalgia.

This study will demonstrate that as early as 1957, a discourse of nostalgia about peacekeeping was being employed by state and non-state actors. Strictly speaking, nostalgia refers to a concept of homesickness. Yet, historians since the 1980s have used the term to represent the "juxtaposition of an idealized past with an unsatisfactory present."[5] In this sense, as Jeanelle Wilson has argued, nostalgia tries to bring a sense of continuity to people's lives and their sense of identity through selected memories and positive associations.[6] Discursive continuity is achieved through making the past appear static and knowable. This provides a discourse of nostalgia with a presumed ability to know the past and to explain it for audiences. For many people, this is a positive experience, though it is often unsatisfactory. This is because nostalgia is an ambivalent concept; "it is about the repetition of the unrepeatable, [the] materialization of the

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[5] George K. Behlmer and Fred M. Leventhal, eds., *Singular Continuities: Tradition, Nostalgia, and Identity in Modern British Culture* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 7.
[6] Janelle L. Wilson, *Nostalgia: Sanctuary of Meaning* (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 2005), 10.

immaterial."[7] Nostalgia calls on people to remember the past as a better time while acknowledging that the present cannot ever fully be that way.

The propensity to recall the past nostalgically was always a response to contemporary events. Uncertainties and fears about current events and the future were, and are, the most common cause of nostalgia in the modern world.[8] The idealized past that Canadians drew upon when discussing peacekeeping was situated in the late 1950s. These were the years when Canada's international influence was considered to be at its peak, thanks largely to Lester Pearson's work at the UN. This apex in Canadian international diplomacy coincided with an era of economic prosperity for most Canadians. Later dissatisfactions caused by rapid changes in gender and class relations, divisions between French and English Canadians, and changing immigration patterns encouraged some Canadians to see the 1950s as a "Golden Age." Many writers and artists mobilized nostalgic feelings which erased past sources of societal conflict, and discussed an imagined past that was shielded from the actual experiences of ordinary people. David Lowenthal suggests that in these nostalgic feelings, "[p]eople tend to believe that life in the past was 'happier'- that families were closer, that pollution was absent, that peace and order prevailed."[9] Hence, the nostalgic peacekeeping discourse focused on what came to be seen as a "Golden Age" for Canada to combat perceived shortcomings in the present.

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[7] Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York Basic Books, 2001), xvii.
[8] Fred Davis, *Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 9.
[9] David Lowenthal, "Nostalgia Tells it like it Wasn't" in Christopher Shaw and Malcolm Chase, eds., *The Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 28.

The second strand of peacekeeping discourse was framed around whether or not peacekeeping was a functional policy for Canada to undertake in the present; it commenced immediately in 1956. Functionalism was the term commonly employed by the DEA to describe Canada's foreign affairs policies and goals after the Second World War.[10] The Mackenzie King government began to employ this term as it ventured into a more active external affairs policy for Canada during and immediately after the Second World War.[11] Functionalism's advocates sought new roles for Canada internationally, based on the principle that states should share in the responsibilities of governing the world in proportion to their ability to do so. Functionalist discussions employed the terms "power" and "influence," "alliances" and "interests" to evaluate peacekeeping's utility.[12] Using these criteria, the functional value of peacekeeping was debated as soon as the first force was created. Peacekeeping was one of the longest-standing commitments of Canadian foreign policy to the belief that international institutions managed by interested powers could promote "peace through pieces."[13] Despite this potential, functionalism was only intermittently advocated by the Canadian government throughout the Cold War, and this is evident in the critical interpretations of peacekeeping's value in the later 1960s and again in 1993.

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[10] John W Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order, 1943-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 4.
[11] A.J. Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," *International Journal* 35, no. 2 (1980): 309.
[12] J King Gordon, ed. *Canada's Role as a Middle Power* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966); Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order, 1943-1957*; Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002); Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998).
[13] Miller, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," 325.

Discussions of functionalism tended to conflate national with international interests. This led its critics to rely on the "realist" theory of international politics. In foreign policy analyses, realism purports to explain the world as it really is, and is based on several assumptions, including one that nations do and should act in their own self-interests. Therefore, peacekeeping had to have tangible benefits for Canada for it to be considered a functional policy. Realism also evaluates nations through their ability to shape the outcomes of international events. From 1956 to 1997, Canada was often described as a "middle power," and its influence was seen to rise and fall according to how large its military was and the importance of its diplomats in bodies like the UN.[14] However, realism also ignores or plays down the importance of culture, national identity, linguistic and gender issues, and racial prejudice.[15] As a result, the functionalist discourse, while apparent in the sources used in every chapter of this study, did not encapsulate many of the domestic and international factors that played a considerable role in determining how Canadians understood peacekeeping as a symbol of their national identity.

The progressive peacekeeping discourse was built upon a belief in a future without conflict that had been popular since the end of the Second World War.[16]

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[14] Gordon, ed. *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*; J.L. Granatstein, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*, Third ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1969).

[15] An excellent study of the idea of "middle power" foreign policy and its assumptions is Mark Neufeld, "Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power," *Studies in Political Economy* 48(1995).

[16] For more on this, see Chapter One, "The Bomb" in Robert Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

Changing the goal from a world without war to one in which there were more peacekeeping efforts broadened the appeal of this progressive discourse after 1956. In Canadian politics, "progressive" has often referred to a rural-based reform movement. However, by the 1930s, left-centred politics in Canada were focused primarily around the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation [CCF]. The CCF concerned itself with anti-imperial struggles in the 1930s, and by the end of the Second World War had become a staunch advocate of the UN and an internationalist Canadian foreign policy.[17] This progressivism sought a strong UN able to intervene anywhere in the world through the use of an international police force. Such ideas were labelled utopian, primarily by those who espoused a "realist" conception of international politics. However, as Ian McKay's work has suggested, those who espouse progressive ideals base their ideas on "concrete utopias" which can be very modest versions of the world that are "better" in the future.[18]

While the Left is normally associated with the concept of progress, in the case of peacekeeping and Canadian foreign policy, progress was also central for Canada's centre-left and centre-right political parties, the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives [PCs]. Within the DEA, there was considerable belief

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[17] James Naylor, "Pacifism or Anti-Imperialism?: The CCF Response to the Outbreak of World War II," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 8, no. 1 (1997): 237.
[18] Ian McKay, *Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada's Left History* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2005), 8.

in the power of the UN after the Second World War.[19] Lester Pearson was among those who held this belief, and his time as the head of the Liberal Party reflected a progressive desire for more peacekeeping. Even the PC Party found cause to adopt peacekeeping as a major component of Canada's foreign policy. The legacy of the Second World War and the fears of a nuclear holocaust because of the Cold War stalemate in the ensuing decades encouraged all the major Canadian political parties, and many ordinary English and French Canadians, to see peacekeeping as a tangible first step that could bring about a more progressive and peaceful world.

It is important to recognize that there were different moments in Canadian history that encouraged authors to discuss the past, present, or future (or some combination of the three) of Canada's peacekeeping efforts. This dissertation focuses on five time periods to demonstrate how peacekeeping became intimately tied to discussions of Canada's national identity. These time periods coincide with either the beginnings or the ends of many of Canada's major UN peacekeeping endeavours: 1956 and 1957 saw the introduction of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] and Lester Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize win, respectively; 1960 saw Canada's participation in *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* [ONUC] under John Diefenbaker's government; in 1964 Canada's forces played a large role in the United Nations Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]; 1967 saw the expulsion of UNEF from Egypt; and in 1993 the Canadian Airborne Regiment

[19] Doug Owram, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea.*

was deployed to act as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia [UNOSOM] and other soldiers worked to keep the peace in the former Yugoslavia in the United Nations Protection Force[UNPROFOR]. These missions, which generated large amounts of media coverage among daily newspapers and their editorial cartoons, were included in NFB documentaries about peacekeeping, were commonly referred to in high school history textbooks, and were the missions that politicians would hearken to most in their rhetoric.

As each chapter demonstrates, these periods also encouraged authors to develop specific arguments about peacekeeping. In 1956 and 1957, writers and artists were still inclined to discuss the promises of Canada's future as an international actor because of a progressive belief in the UN,[20] while uncertainty about Canada's attachment to Britain promoted strong arguments for and against peacekeeping in discussions about the present. When the Liberals were defeated in the federal election of 1957, many people felt that Canada's prominent international presence would disappear. The long-standing Liberal majority in Ottawa was comforting for many Canadians who were largely satisfied with its policies.[21] When the election forced the Liberals out of office, some Canadians felt an immediate longing for the certainties of the King and St. Laurent eras. Diefenbaker and his ministers attempted to maintain the priorities of the St.

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[20] For more on Canadian attitudes to the UN in the early 1950s, see Chapter Five, "Korea: From an Imperial Frying Pan into an American Fire," Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea.*

[21] Patrick H Brennan, *Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal Years, 1935 - 1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 120.

Laurent government, including supporting UNEF, but many newspapers were already lamenting the passing of Canada's "Golden Age" of diplomacy.

By the mid-1960s, the existence of a vibrant and subversive Quebec separatist movement and the Canadian government's inability to influence nations to stop waging war discouraged writers and artists from discussing the future. Instead, circumstances made it seem more appropriate to reminisce about Canada's peacekeeping past. Such discussions accompanied continuing debates about peacekeeping in the present that revolved around language politics and issues of decolonization. The end of the Cold War saw a flurry of positive and hopeful assessments of Canada's peacekeeping future.[22] However, by 1993 the tragedies of Somalia and mixed results of peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia engendered considerable debate in Canada. The spectre of Quebec separatism and cynicism about the Canadian government's ability to resolve economic and social issues also heavily influenced discussions about peacekeeping in the 1990s. The negative political climate once again encouraged authors to look to Canada's peacekeeping past, rather than to project a better future. This study concludes in 1997, when attitudes towards the Canadian Forces were at their nadir owing to the release of a damning report by the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia. The report, when combined with the failure in Rwanda, the mixed results in Bosnia, and an unstable domestic political climate, made peacekeeping a less appealing

[22] Stuart Allan, "Challenging Canada's Nuclear Commitments: An analysis of defence discourse," *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 17, no. 1 (2004): 2; Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995*, 144.

functional policy, and encouraged peacekeeping's proponents to rely primarily on the discourse of nostalgia.

In contrast to these changes, much current scholarly thinking about Canadian foreign policy suggests that during the years 1956 to 2001 a consistent set of principles was applied by successive governments.[23] One reason for this contention is the predominance of the Liberal party in federal politics during this era. The Liberals were the party in power from 1945 to 1957, and they espoused a policy of functionalism in international affairs. Particular attention was paid to enhancing the role of the UN in the fields of peacekeeping and aid distribution. The Diefenbaker years, 1957 to 1963, are recognized for a similar care for the UN and its peacekeeping activities, despite inconsistencies in relations with the United States over the Cuban missile crisis and the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.[24] Pearson's tenure as prime minister is similarly viewed as a continued espousal of functionalist principles and the promotion of the UN. Pierre Trudeau's Liberal governments of 1968 to 1979 and 1980 to 1984 rhetorically emphasized national interests over the promotion of the UN, but in practice his governments continued Canada's active peacekeeping participation in Cyprus and in the Middle East.[25] Brian Mulroney's PC government was in power from 1984 to 1993, and volunteered Canadian forces for the numerous

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[23] Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 1; Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995*, 3.
[24] John F. Hilliker, "The Politicians and the "Pearsonalities": The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations," *Historical Papers* 19, no. 1 (1984): 166; Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995*, 52.
[25] J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), xiv.

missions that were made possible by the easing of the tensions of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mulroney's last year in office was marked by the escalating scandal over the conduct of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia. Jean Chrétien's Liberals inherited this uncertain foreign policy climate, but emphasized the concept of "human security" that grew out of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's work *An Agenda For Peace* (1992). They continued to promote Canadian peacekeeping, but remained cautious in the wake of the findings of the Somalia Commission.

These domestic frames for peacekeeping were not isolated from international conceptions of the UN. In 1956, peacekeeping was seen by many as reviving a UN that had been plagued by Security Council veto use since the Cold War embittered relations between the United States, and the Soviet Union and their allies.[26] By the mid-1960s, the financial cost of peacekeeping threatened to bankrupt the UN. This, combined with the expulsion of UNEF in 1967, cast serious doubts over the future of peacekeeping. Such pessimism did not stop new missions from being undertaken in the 1970s. In the mid-to -late 1980s, under the Secretary Generalship of Javier Perez de Cuellar, numerous new missions were undertaken to places like Cambodia and Afghanistan. These renewed efforts resulted in the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 to UN peacekeeping as an institution.

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[26] For more on this climate, see Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea*; Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

The Cold War also influenced the policies and priorities of Canada's foreign affairs and had a considerable cultural impact from 1956 to 1989. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse have argued that Canada was a strongly anti-Communist state throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and fears about Communist infiltrators within Canada led to purges in many governmental agencies, including the NFB.[27] Robert Teigrob and Stephen Whitfield also suggest that the Cold War culture which pervaded the years following the Second World War encouraged people to accept foreign policy decisions undertaken by their government without question.[28] The Suez Crisis was a major break from such a tendency; it represented a shift in the degree of dissent permitted in Canada, and was indicative of a general thawing in the culture of the Cold War. Peacekeeping therefore had to be presented in such a way that it could endure the criticisms of it now made possible. Its supporters did so by employing a progressive discourse that promised a better world through peacekeeping, as well as arguing for peacekeeping's functional value in the present.

The years between 1953 and 1980 were also more conducive than periods in the past to dissenting discussions because of a general detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Particularly after the 1960s, it became impossible for governments to try to exercise the same levels of control over

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[27] Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957.*
[28] While Whitfield's discussion is on the United States, I argue that a similar climate existed in Canada, based on the exhaustive work of Teigrob and Whitaker and Marcuse. Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 20.

media messages or popular culture.[29] Cold War tensions reappeared in 1980 with the bellicose rhetoric of American President Ronald Reagan. Increased fears in Canada about the possibility of nuclear war in the 1980s led to renewed calls for more UN peacekeeping, as well as a push for neutrality. The utility of peacekeeping as a symbol and its use in discussions of Canada's past, present, and future permitted a policy that was born out of Cold War politics to gain considerable cultural purchase for many Canadians and to outlive the international circumstances that facilitated its birth.

Canada's governments, educational authors, NFB filmmakers, and newspaper writers and cartoonists transposed these ideas about the UN, the Cold War, and peacekeeping, and articulated them through nostalgic, functionalist, or progressive discourses for domestic audiences. While internationalist in emphasis, peacekeeping was seen through domestic frames far more often. Individual missions mattered less than the idea of peacekeeping and Canada's part in its perpetuation. When missions went awry, the impact on Canada was discussed far more than the effects on the host nations. Canadians and their governments also tended to remain more positive about peacekeeping than any other nation in the world. The domestic production and reception of messages about peacekeeping were therefore influenced by internationalism but remained centred on the Canadian experience of peacekeeping. This domestic emphasis problematizes the Canadian attachment to peacekeeping while also providing

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[29] Bryan D. Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

answers to why so many Canadians strongly associate with peacekeeping. Or feel, as Stompin' Tom Connors put it, that "We are the Blue Berets."[30]

Those who have written about Canadian foreign policy have by and large focused on the successes and failures of individual peacekeeping missions rather than address this broader issue.[31] Prior to the middle years of the 1960s, there were few critical examinations of peacekeeping published in Canada. This quickly changed over the next few years. A number of works by political scientists such as James Eayrs and Donald Gordon and historians such as Jack Granatstein evaluated Canada's peacekeeping efforts in light of its failures to find permanent peaceful solutions to the world's problems.[32] Most of these works were published by or emerged out of conferences held by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Such works tended to focus on more "traditional" subjects of Canadian foreign policy, namely who made policy and how it was implemented. Government reports and diplomatic records formed the bulk of the sources used in these works, and as a result, there was little discussion of non-governmental interest in peacekeeping.[33] As governmental interest in peacekeeping declined

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[30] Connors, *The Blue Berets.*

[31] Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945 - 1984* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004); Granatstein, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*

[32] James Eayrs, "Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada," ed. Canadian Institute of International Affairs (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1969); Granatstein, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite*; A.M. Taylor, David Cox, and J.L Granatstein, eds., *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968).

[33] This does not mean that these books did not do a thorough job of examining governmental policy.

during the Trudeau years, so did the work of political scientists and military historians on peacekeeping.[34]

Renewed scholarly work on peacekeeping appeared in the waning years of the Cold War, when Canadian governmental interest was rekindled. These more recent works continued to focus primarily on peacekeeping as a state policy with positive possibilities and potentially negative drawbacks.[35] When they addressed such topics as public opinion regarding peacekeeping, the authors of these works provided overly simplistic and unsatisfactory answers. Canadians were said to have associated with peacekeeping because they wanted to feel good about themselves, or to have listened uncritically to successive governments that were all too willing to praise Canada's peacekeeping tradition to score political points in the present.

In the last decade, the study of peacekeeping has moved beyond the disciplinary boundaries of diplomatic history and international relations with positive results. Scholars such as Kevin Spooner have mined the archives, and employed a variety of sources in their examinations of Canada's peacekeeping past.[36] Political scientist Sandra Whitworth is among those who have emphasized the gendered and racial constructions of peacekeeping operations which adds

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[34] Eayrs' seminal series *In Defence of Canada*, published in five volumes between 1964 and 1983, contains virtually no mention of peacekeeping at all. See James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, vol. 1-5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964 - 1983).

[35] Some of the best examples are Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994); Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995*.

[36] Kevin Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).

crucial new areas for study.[37] Anthropologist Sherene Razack's work on post-colonialism and the peacekeeping mission to Somalia addresses the importance of racial constructions to Canada's peacekeeping past.[38] These authors all focus on single missions, providing their works with temporal and situational specificity. However, because peacekeeping has been such a long-standing part of Canada's foreign policy, a more comprehensive historical examination such as the one provided here can add considerably to the study of peacekeeping.

While positive movements have been made by some individuals in the study of peacekeeping, others have continued to hold that examining government documents is the sole way to get at the "true" history of peacekeeping.[39] There are several problems with how most historians and political scientists have approached peacekeeping. First, they assume a unified Canadian identity, and do not recognize regional and linguistic differences in how messages about peacekeeping were received. Second, these explanations do not account for the rapid support for peacekeeping that marked the Canadian political climate after 1956. Third, they ignore changes over time in how peacekeeping was understood in Canada. Fourth, they make no attempt to deal with the periods between 1956 and 1997 when the Government of Canada tried to dissuade Canadians from their infatuation with peacekeeping. Finally, and perhaps most critically, no author has

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[37] Sandra Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004).
[38] Sherene Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
[39] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*

attempted to look *systematically* at any of the ways in which Canadians learned about peacekeeping.

There has also been a tendency in the historiography and public discourse surrounding peacekeeping to emphasize the accounts of those who "were there" to help Canadians understand how "things really happened."[40] Peacekeeping is not unique in this regard, and Jonathan Vance has noted that at least as far back as the First World War, veterans' voices and understandings have been privileged in Canada's external affairs.[41] Such firsthand accounts provide thorough examinations of the conditions that were experienced on peacekeeping operations by the peacekeepers, which can educate and inform those who advocate for more Canadian participation overseas. While useful, these authors are guilty of ignoring the biases and weaknesses of individual accounts and government documents, as well as of advancing a political position that aims to celebrate the Canadian Forces and continue the rehabilitation of their image that began after the report on the peacekeeping mission to Somalia was released in 1997.[42] Ian McKay and Jamie Swift's recent work situates these tendencies as part of a broader militarization of Canada's past.[43] This dissertation furthers McKay and Swift's contentions by arguing that unless we undertake a thorough

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[40] An example of an author who states that peacekeeping must be seen without the politics or mythologies attached to it is Michael K. Carroll, *Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 182.
[41] Jonathan F. Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 136.
[42] The Somalia report was titled *Dishonoured Legacy* and it contained a series of critiques and recommendations for the Canadian forces in the wake of the killings of several Somalis.
[43] Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012).

examination of how peacekeeping was represented through the nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive discourses of peacekeeping, we cannot come closer to understanding why so many Canadians became enamoured with the idea.

To better understand the Canadian attachment to peacekeeping it is first necessary to consider the hegemonic narrative about peacekeeping that held sway in Canada for most of the years since 1956. This narrative stated that Canadians were the world's preeminent peacekeepers, as evidenced by the fact that Canada was the only nation to participate in all UN peacekeeping operations from 1956 to a point in the 1990s. The motivation to engage in peacekeeping was expressed as a mixture of national interests and an altruistic desire to make a better world. Through peacekeeping, therefore, Canadians were said to be helping themselves and less fortunate nations who suffered from war. This record of consistent support was normally mentioned in the same breath as the name of Lester Pearson, Canada's first and only Nobel Peace Prize winner. Pearson was lauded for creating UN peacekeeping in 1956, and for being its biggest proponent for the duration of his life.

There are distinct parallels between the hegemonic peacekeeping narrative and the peacekeeping discourse of nostalgia. Lester Pearson and his Nobel Peace Prize-winning work to create UNEF were the central foci of the discourse of nostalgia. The numerous acts of commemoration that are discussed in this dissertation were the most public and ceremonial ways that this discourse of nostalgia was presented to Canadians. Yet, the speeches, textbooks, and

newspapers that were systematically examined here all contained frequent and tedious re-statements of a simplified and bittersweet recollection of Canada's peacekeeping past. These nostalgic recollections demonstrate not only an increasing uncertainty about the directions being followed in the present by the Canadian government, but a willingness to continue employing peacekeeping as a symbol of a past time of achievement for Canada.

There is a basis in fact for this narrative. Lester Pearson did introduce the motion to create a peacekeeping force in the UN in 1956, and while it was not his idea, [44] he was instrumental in seeing that it was successfully adopted. Canadians also partook in every UN peacekeeping operation from 1956 through to the 1990s, though they only sent large numbers for a select few, including UNEF in 1956 and UNFICYP in 1964. Many other operations involved small numbers of Canadians in minor administrative or technical support roles.

Peacekeeping's association with a Canadian national identity also represented a modification of a long-standing association between the nation and its military.[45] Ian McKay and Jamie Swift's *Warrior Nation* deconstructs these associations, and notes that peacekeeping found an equal footing with other more militaristic notions of Canadian national identity for most of the latter half of the twentieth century.[46] In large measure, what differentiated peacekeeping's

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[44] Pearson himself openly acknowledged this in 1956 during the special Parliamentary session authorizing the deployment of Canadian forces as part of UNEF. Library and Archives Canada, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 11. "The Middle East Crisis and the Situation in Hungary," 1956.

[45] One of the best works on this topic is Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War.*

[46] McKay and Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety.*

adoption from these earlier associations was the shift from celebrating particular battles to celebrating national values. The years following the First and Second World Wars found local communities and the federal government commemorating specific places and the names of those who had died, in addition to specific values. Peacekeeping's nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive discourses, and the small number of casualties, encouraged those same communities and governments to celebrate Canada as a nation.

When Canadians felt an affinity for peacekeeping, they selectively chose the values they were celebrating in their peacekeepers and in Canada as a nation. These values were not permanent, but rather reflected the contemporary cultural and political climate in which they were being espoused. Some of the pliable values of peacekeeping that were contemporary to the 1990s in English Canada were moderation, communication, mediation, cooperation, caring, and sharing.[47] Others included multiculturalism, tolerance, goodwill, respect for the individual, and collective rights.[48] Less discussed were Cold War political manoeuvrings, the desire to check Soviet power, a willingness to preserve the Commonwealth, a wish to assist in decolonization, or a desire to stop brush fires from spreading.[49] All of these ideas had been associated with Canada's peacekeeping efforts at one

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[47] Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945 - 1995*, 4.
[48] Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, "Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent world," *International Journal* 1, no. 2 (1995): 384.
[49] This very common phrase was used by newspapers, textbook authors and politicians alike. One instance of its being used is LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 26. "Address at the United Nations Day Dinner," 1963.

point or another in the past. This change over time highlights the amorphous nature of Canadian attachment to peacekeeping.

Like any representation of national identity, peacekeeping has been used as a rhetorical device for larger discussions of how the nation should be conceptualized. Many of peacekeeping's critics have sounded off against the values that have been attached to it because they do not think they are ones that a nation should celebrate.[50] Some who attacked peacekeeping found common cause with those who criticized multiculturalism for "feminizing" Canadian culture.[51] The predominantly male composition of Canada's military suggests that this is not an apt criticism. Peacekeeping was and is still undertaken by members of the Canadian Forces who, while trained to participate in peacekeeping, are ultimately still soldiers whose jobs are to kill if necessary.[52] Graham Dawson has argued that "[t]hose forms of manliness that have proved efficacious for nationalist endeavour have been approvingly recognized and furthered with all the power at the disposal of the state, while other subversive or non-functional forms (notably the effeminate man or the homosexual) have met with

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[50] Many of these authors are refuted in the first chapter of McKay and Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*. Some specific examples of attacks against the values of peacekeeping can be found in David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1996), vi; Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* , xix.

[51] Michael Adams, *Unlikely Utopia: The Surprising Triumph of Canadian Multiculturalism* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007), 16.

[52] Some scholars, all of whom are women, have examined the gendered relations of peacekeeping. Their works highlight the problematic practices of peacekeeping as well and ask audiences to question the commonly held assumption that peacekeeping is inherently good for all parties involved. See Charlotte Hooper, *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics* (New York Columbia University Press, 2001), 4-5; Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*, 3; Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 93.

disaprobation and repression in explicitly national terms."[53] Peacekeeping's adoption as a national symbol by successive Canadian governments and the widespread acclaim which media authors showered on Canada's peacekeepers suggest that it was not seen as a subversive form of masculinity. Instead, peacekeeping's values have been melded together with the history and operational mandates of the Canadian Forces.[54] This contradiction once again illustrates the symbolic importance of peacekeeping. Different Canadians can, and have, seen peacekeeping differently. Understanding the nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive discourses of peacekeeping is necessary to comprehend the full implications of associating a gendered concept like peacekeeping with Canada's national identity.

The domestic construction of peacekeeping as a symbol of Canada's national identity was also racialized. Citizenship and national identity are often about defining oneself in opposition to another as much as they are about finding common linkages among people.[55] And while the hegemonic peacekeeping

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[53] Graham Dawson, *Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imaging of Masculinties* (London: Routledge, 1994), 1-2.

[54] The most detailed analysis of this is done in McKay and Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety.*

[55] See for example, Timothy J. Stanley "Whose Public? Whose memory? Racism, Grand Narratives, and Canadian History," in Homi K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 6; Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 167; Ryan Edwardson, ""Kicking Uncle Sam out of the Peaceable Kingdom": English-Canadian "New Nationalism" and Americanization," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 37, no. 4 (2003): 140; Daniel Francis, *National Dreams: Myth, Memory, and Canadian History* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1997), 11; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983); Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds., *Myths and Nationhood* (New York Routledge, 1997), 28-35; José E. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006), 5-6; Eva Mackey, *The House of Difference: Cultural politics and national identity in Canada* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 2-5; Ruth W. Sandwell, ed. *To The Past: History Education, Public Memory, and*

narrative emphasized Canada's willingness to help all other nations find peace, it did so in part by marking out Canada as a special and superior nation. It will be shown throughout this dissertation that by separating the Canadian peacekeepers from the people they were sent to assist, different racial constructions of the host nation could be employed.[56] The constructions of Egypt and Cyprus saw them as places that needed modernization. Those depictions of the Congo and Somalia were more racially prejudiced and employed tropes from the colonial era.[57] The whiteness of the Canadians and their supposedly orderly homeland set the peacekeepers apart from the people they were to help. This racialization was expressed while the value of peace and international cooperation was being proclaimed. This contradiction further problematizes the construction of Canada as a peacekeeping nation.

The inclusion and exclusion of certain elements from the peacekeeping narrative demonstrates clear tendencies in how some Canadians wanted to view their nation's past, present, and future. Despite the use of the term Canadian by many writers, it did not have equal footing in English and French Canada; French Canadians were far less likely to espouse this understanding of peacekeeping.

Citizenship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 32-37; Rinaldo Walcott, ed. *Rude: Contemporary Black Canadian Cultural Criticism* (Toronto: Insomniac Press, 2000), 7; Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*, 39.

[56]The idea of peacekeeping creating "us" and "them" is evident in the work of Sandra Whitworth and Sherene Razack. See Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*, 4; Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*, 15. However, neither of these authors has looked at the racial constructions of Egyptians, Cypriots or the Congolese.

[57] Kevin Spooner's excellent study of the Canadian participation in *ONUC* touches on this issue as part of its larger examination of the experiences of the Canadians there. Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 153.

This dissertation's examination of school textbooks, newspaper articles, and editorial cartoons shows that French Canadians immediately linked peacekeeping to Canada's independence from Britain and praised it as a worthwhile policy as a result. They did not, however, come to strongly associate peacekeeping with their national identity. As separatism and a distinct Québécois identity came to dominate the political discussions within Quebec, Canada's dealings at the United Nations became less relevant to contemporary debates.[58] This did not make the issue of peace disappear from Quebec's educational and journalistic milieux. Rather, distinct images and ideas about peace were presented to Quebeckers that demonstrate the existence of a cultural difference from those found in English Canada. These differences reinforce the need to examine Canada as a divided and changing entity, not as a singular and unified construction.[59]

In English Canada, the post-World War Two era saw a concerted effort on the part of the federal government and many ordinary Canadians to establish traditions and symbols that were Canada's own. [60] In large measure, this occurred

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[58] Sean Mills' work on Montreal in the 1960s suggests that many Quebeckers looked to the decolonization movements from Africa and Asia for guidance. This international reading of their particular situation did not emphasize the role of the UN, but rather favoured the ideas of Frantz Fanon and others, who called on colonized peoples to take power for themselves. See Sean Mills, *The Empire Within: Postcolonial Thought and Political Activism in Sixties Montreal* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 3.

[59] Himani Bannerji, "On the Dark Side of the Nation: Politics of Multiculturalism and the State of "Canada"," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1996): 105; Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*, 2; Mackey, *The House of Difference: Cultural politics and national identity in Canada*, 2; Ian McKay, "After Canada: On Amnesia and Apocalypse in the Contemporary Crisis," *Acadiensis* 28, no. 1 (1998): 80; Ian McKay, "The Canadian passive revolution, 1840-1950," *Capital and Class* 34, no. 3 (2010): 374.

[60] Eric Hobsbawm's work on the "invented traditions" of nations demonstrates how states and often citizens have consciously chosen to adopt certain markers as signifying a nation. He points to symbols like national anthems, flags, and cartoon representations as exemplars of how modern peoples come to adopt certain

because the federal government, and those who supported its policies, sought to create distance between Canada and Britain. Whereas at the turn of the century the Conservative Party in particular had encouraged Canadians to "remain nestled in the Union Jack behind the British lion,"[61] by the 1950s, a different generation sought a Canadian identity that might fit within the British Commonwealth but that was distinctly Canadian.[62] The changing focus from Dominion Day to Canada Day, the flag debate, and the de-emphasizing of Empire Day are all indicative of this shift.[63] José Igartua's work on English Canadian national identity argues that by the 1960s English Canada had undergone a transformation that saw civic values being espoused that made no reference to a British heritage.[64] Peacekeeping's multiple discourses permitted its ready adoption to this new emphasis on Canadian symbols and values.[65] As each

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words and images to represent their nation in its totality. There are elements of the peacekeeping narrative that certainly fit his definition of an invented tradition: peacekeeping was used to symbolize social cohesion in Canada; it legitimized the Canadian Forces and their overseas role both during and after the Cold War; and it also served as a device to inculcate certain beliefs, values, and behaviours that were said to be typical of all Canadians. Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Introduction.

[61] Patricia K. Wood, "Defining "Canadian": Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2001): 50.

[62] Some scholars posit that a strong attachment to Britain continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. See C.P. Champion, "Eminent Pearsonians: Britishness, Anti-Britishness, and Canadianism," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 16, no. 1 (2005).

[63] Matthew Hayday, "Fireworks, Folk-dancing, and Fostering a National Identity: The Politics of Canada Day," *The Canadian Historical Review* 91, no. 2 (2010).

[64]See Chapter Five, "When Tories Roar," in Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71*.

[65]These new symbols did not operate in a complete vacuum. The red-coated member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Mountie, is perhaps Canada's best known national symbol, and its utility as a Canadian symbol endured through the middle decades of the twentieth century. Considerable work has been done on the ways in which Mounties have been used to symbolize Canada's past. The Mountie and the peacekeeper differed in that the former connoted peace and order within Canada, while the latter brought peace and order to other countries. The existence of the progressive discourse of peacekeeping was another difference between the two. Mounties represented a simplified and nostalgic imagining of Canada's past which froze gender relations in the Victorian era and separated white Canadians from ethnic

chapter demonstrates, the actual experiences of soldiers on these missions mattered little to those who used the narratives of the nostalgic past, functionalist present, or progressive future to create Canada as a peacekeeping nation. This abstraction made peacekeeping a more influential idea than might otherwise have been possible.[66]

As peacekeeping became a symbol of Canada largely through domestic frames that were nonetheless influenced by international events, so, too, did English Canadians try to define themselves in terms that nonetheless were influenced by anti-American sentiment. Perhaps the best-known example of this mode of thought is George Grant's *Lament for a Nation*. Appearing in 1965, Grant's book argued that Canada would be swallowed up by the United States in the near future if it did not take more control over its foreign policies.[67] Akin to these views, peacekeeping has been seen as a policy that separated Canada from a more aggressive American foreign policy. Historians such as Jack Granatstein have countered this by emphasizing that there would not be any UN peacekeeping

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"enemies." The peacekeeper was a figure that looked forward - into a future that was free of war. See Michael Dawson, *The Mountie: From Dime Novel to Disney* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1998); Michael Dawson, ""That nice red coat goes to my head like champagne": Gender, antimodernism and the Mountie image, 1880-1960," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 32, no. 3 (1997); Mark Kristmanson, "Love your neighbour: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the National Film Board, 1948-53," *Film History* 10(1998); Mackey, *The House of Difference: Cultural politics and national identity in Canada*; Carolyn Strange and Tina Loo, "From Hewers of Wood to Producers of Pulp: True Crime in Canadian Pulp Magazines of the 1940s," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 37, no. 2 (2002); Keith Walden, *Visions of Order: The Canadian Mountie in Symbol and Myth* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1982).

[66] Examining the views of Canada's peacekeepers could offer insights into how the members of the Armed Forces actively sought to distance themselves from these domestic narratives. This would be a worthwhile project that would add to our understanding of peacekeeping in Canada.

[67] George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), 4. For other examples of this attitude, see James M. Minifie, *Peacemaker or Powder-monkey: Canada's role in a revolutionary world* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1960); Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era*.

without the active support of the United States.[68] Again, this highlights the amorphous nature of the idea of peacekeeping. Those who wanted to separate themselves from US foreign policies have been able to do so through employing each of the three peacekeeping discourses. The nostalgic discourse emphasized Canada's acting as an independent broker at the UN, the functionalist discourse suggested that only "middle powers" like Canada could undertake UN peacekeeping, and the progressive discourse foresaw a day when no superpowers would be able to take aggressive international action without gaining the approval of the UN.

The main purpose of this historical investigation is not to refute the hegemonic peacekeeping narrative. Like all national narratives, it has some basis in fact but is found lacking in accuracy when examined critically. Rather, this dissertation seeks to problematize the Canadian association with peacekeeping by exploring the ways in which messages about peacekeeping were transmitted to Canadians through a variety of different media. It also explores the variations in the peacekeeping narrative which occurred in each different format, as well as the presence of counter-narratives which sought to clarify what was obscured by this hegemonic understanding of Canada and peacekeeping.

Each chapter of this dissertation examines a different set of sources to understand how politicians, textbook authors, NFB filmmakers, newspaper writers, and editorial cartoonists drew upon the nostalgic, functionalist, and

[68]He is quite right in arguing that the US has significantly contributed to the financial cost of peacekeeping and has provided considerable logistical support on many operations. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* , 23.

progressive peacekeeping discourses. As stated earlier, each chapter moves progressively further away from direct governmental influence over the content of authorial messages, and all five chapters address content that was intended for mass audiences. Knowing more about how each of these different media utilized the three peacekeeping discourses significantly increases our ability to understand why some Canadians would have adopted peacekeeping as a national symbol.

The first chapter in this dissertation examines peacekeeping's use in Canadian political rhetoric from 1956 to 1997. Peacekeeping was a well-publicized part of Canadian foreign policy during those years. This chapter focuses primarily on the rhetoric of the Liberal and PC Parties, as they were the parties in power federally. This increased their ability to employ peacekeeping as a policy and a symbol. The Bloc Québécois' views on peacekeeping are also examined to demonstrate how pervasive the three peacekeeping discourses had become after 1968.[69]

The majority of the sources used in this chapter are political speeches. To add to the speeches of politicians such as Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, John Diefenbaker, Howard Green, Paul Martin Sr., and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Statements and Speeches*, an official periodical published by the DEA, was also examined, as were government publications regarding foreign and defence policies released by the DEA or the Department of National Defence [DND]. In

[69] This source base, admittedly, leads to a bias towards the views of whichever party was in power federally, particularly after 1967. This also means that the political rhetoric examined is mostly drawn from urban politicians. There could potentially be different discourses used in Quebec and in rural Canada by backbenchers. However, given the availability of sources and the scope of this dissertation, such a project will have to be undertaken elsewhere.

addition, the Parti Québécois' official party platforms as well as the literature it distributed before the referenda of 1980 and 1995, were examined. When combined, these examples of political rhetoric can tell us a great deal about how peacekeeping was engrained into Canadian culture. These conceptions were not static, and this chapter examines how changes in Canada's domestic political climate often had more of an impact on how peacekeeping was presented by politicians than the results of the peacekeeping missions themselves.

Chapter Two examines the content of high school history textbooks from 1959 to 1997. For this dissertation, an exhaustive study was undertaken regarding the peacekeeping discourses employed in over 99 textbooks. These texts were approved for use in high schools in French and English Canada during these years.[70] Peacekeeping's integration into these texts occurred through the use of the nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive discourses by individual authors. Though history textbooks focused primarily on the past, contemporary politics also influenced the discussions within their pages. As well, because these works were aimed at a younger audience, they often sought to promote behaviours akin to peacekeeping to their readers that emphasized the future utility of peacekeeping. A glimpse into these processes is possible through letters to the Federal Government from students and teachers from 1956 to 1997. By focusing

[70] In education historiography, authors have often chosen to limit their studies to English Canada or Quebec, since the later went through changes in the 1950s and 1960s that were particular to its own circumstances decades after such changes took place in the other provinces. Quality studies that have looked at only English Canada include Northop Frye, *Design for Learning: Reports submitted to the Joint Committee of the Toronto Board of Education and the University of Toronto* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); A.B. Hodgetts and Paul Gallagher, *Teaching Canada for the '80s* (Toronto: OISE, 1978); Hilda Neatby, *So Little for the Mind* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1953).

on textbook contents and supplementing this with what was written in letters by students and teachers, it is possible to see how and why peacekeeping was included as a topic in these texts, though further insights remain elusive.

The third chapter of this dissertation examines fourteen documentaries made by the NFB that either focused exclusively on Canadian peacekeeping efforts or had peacekeeping as a central theme. For the purposes of this dissertation, the films have been divided into two time periods: 1957 to 1965 and 1980 to 1994. Those from the earlier time period employed functionalist and progressive language and imagery to link peacekeeping to a contemporary Canadian identity. Later films maintained their functionalist emphases but offered more critical evaluations of peacekeeping. In this later period, the peacekeepers were presented as exemplary professionals, not a synecdoche for Canada as a whole, suggesting that filmmakers were uncertain about the directions of Canada's foreign policy.

The NFB films about peacekeeping examined in this chapter demonstrate the utility of the progressive, functionalist, and nostalgic peacekeeping discourses. In a visual medium, they remained the preferred manner in which to frame peacekeeping. They also permitted filmmakers to employ narrative techniques that linked the images that appeared on screen about peacekeeping to Canada's national identity.

Chapter Four examines major articles, editorials, and letters to the editor in eleven daily newspapers to explore how authors employed and influenced the

three peacekeeping narratives. These sections contained the opinions of each paper as well as the selected opinions of Canadians who chose to write to a newspaper about peacekeeping. A considerable sample of newspaper and reader opinions has been accumulated, and from this, larger conclusions can be drawn about how meanings surrounding peacekeeping were created and negotiated.

In the late 1950s, the combined circulation of all daily newspapers was higher than the number of households in Canada, and while these numbers would decline, newspaper sales remained strong through to the 1990s.[71] Perhaps the two most important centres for newspaper publishing in Canada were, and remain, Toronto and Montreal, and from these cities, the Toronto *Star*, the *Globe and Mail*, *Le Devoir*, *La Presse*, and the Montreal *Gazette* were all examined. Other important regional papers used are the Halifax *Chronicle-Herald*, the Winnipeg *Free Press*, the Calgary *Herald*, the Vancouver *Sun*, the Regina *Leader-Post*, and the Ottawa *Citizen*. The date ranges examined for each newspaper match those described earlier in this introduction, and are related to the beginnings or conclusions of Canada's major peacekeeping involvements. Through these papers, taken as a whole, it is possible to ascertain whether or not there were differences of opinion among newsmakers in English and French Canada regarding peacekeeping and whether the same language about peacekeeping was to be found across the country.

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[71] Paul Rutherford, *The Making of the Canadian Media* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 84.

By producing and disseminating the three peacekeeping discourses, the news media carried an import that they were not often eager to admit.[72] However, the use of the three discourses of peacekeeping by newspapers helped Canadians to make sense of the messages they received and to link peacekeeping to Canada's national identity.[73]

The editorial cartoons that appeared in the newspapers used in Chapter Four form the set of sources for Chapter Five. The cartoons are examined in a chronological manner, within the same date ranges.[74] Presenting conceptions of peacekeeping visually rather than through written narratives allowed these cartoons to offer divergent ideas about peacekeeping. The satirical nature of the editorial cartoon genre also meant that they were a source of considerable criticism of the functionality of peacekeeping from 1956 through 1997.

Early editorial cartoons helped create and disseminate visual forms for peacekeeping to their audiences in an era when access to television was restricted for some Canadians.[75] The cartoons that appeared throughout the forty-year period that spans this dissertation attempted to make connections with viewers

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[72] For a discussion on why the news media tend to think of themselves as reflections of the societies in which they exist, rather than active agents in the creation of those societies see Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson, eds., *Reading the News: A Pantheon Guide to Popular Culture* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).

[73] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991); John N. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 8.

[74] 1 November – 31 December 1956;14 - 19 October 1957; 1 July – 15 September 1960; 15 February – 15 May 1964; 15 May – 15 June 1967; 1 March – 1 June 1993; 1 June – 31 July 1997. The date range from 30 September – 2 October 1988, when UN peacekeeping was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, did not lead to any editorial cartoons.

[75] Paul Rutherford, *When Television Was Young: Primetime Canada, 1952 -- 1967* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 49. By 1956, just over half of all Canadian households had access to a television set, a remarkable feat considering that the first CBC broadcast was in 1952.

by employing particular images that were drawn from the functionalist and progressive discourses about Canada and peacekeeping. Through their single panels, cartoons helped many Canadians understand that peacekeeping was more complex than it was often presented as being, and created a space where Canadian attachment to peacekeeping could be challenged.

This dissertation demonstrates that the nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive peacekeeping discourses allowed for the creation of a language and imagery that Canadians used to associate peacekeeping with their national identity. This makes these discourses central to how and why so many Canadians came to think of themselves as the world's "Blue Berets." The sources examined, governmental or otherwise, were often more than willing to criticize the actual performance of Canadians on peacekeeping operations. These discussions could lapse into negative over-simplifications of race and citizenship, and this rather dark part of peacekeeping's history in Canada should be remembered as an equally important element in the history of peacekeeping in Canada. It was, instead, these sources' willingness to separate peacekeeping from the operations themselves that permitted peacekeeping's continued symbolic relevance.

Peacekeeping, therefore, was not something that politicians "sold" to Canadians, nor was it an example of Canadians' naively believing that they were better than other peoples. Instead, peacekeeping became a concept that could symbolize a longing for a particular vision of Canada's past, a belief in the policies of a government in the present, or a desire for a better future. Until we recognize

that this was occurring as a process of negotiation among particular politicians, book authors, filmmakers, newspaper columnists, political cartoonists, and their audiences, we will fail to understand why peacekeeping was so important to so many Canadians from 1956 to 1997, and why it remains a contested part of Canada's identity today.

Chapter One
"We Want Our Own Kind of Peace"[76]: The Political Rhetoric of Peacekeeping, 1956 – 1997



Figure 1.1 *Time-Screen/Thought-Space*, Charles Gagnon, 1975.

In the lobby of the Lester Pearson Building in Ottawa, home to what is now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT], previously the Department of External Affairs [DEA], there hangs a three-panel mural painted by Montreal-based abstract expressionist Charles Gagnon. Titled *Time-Screen/Thought-Space*, it was commissioned in 1972 as part of the Public Works Fine Art Programme which brought contemporary art into government buildings.[77] The subject of the mural is the life and career of Lester Pearson. The presence of such a large and abstract work in a government building seems at odds with the image that the DEA often strove to project throughout the post-World War Two period. It acts, however, as a visual reminder of how Pearson and

[76] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 13. "The Four Faces of Peace," 1957.
[77]Catherine Anderson-Dolcini, "One-Percent for Whom? Canada's Public Works Fine Art Programme, 1964-1978: Its Rise and Demise" (Carleton University, 2000), iii.

his most celebrated creation, United Nations peacekeeping, have taken on symbolic meanings in Canada. Beyond simply the functional, *Time-Screen/Thought-Space* expresses abstract understandings of peacekeeping which link it to Canada's national identity in the past, present, and future.

This artwork is massive; its three panels stretch over twelve metres in length. The mural is covered with words and phrases that imagine Canada's past by highlighting the diplomatic triumphs of the Pearson era, assess the value of Pearson's ideas about peace and peacekeeping in the present, and call for Canadians to do everything possible to make the future more peaceful. Signposts from Pearson's public life, including the words "Nobel Peace Prize nineteen fifty-seven" in the first panel and "Korea and Suez" in the second, invite the viewer to recall Canada's "golden age" of diplomacy between 1945 and 1957 and realize that no Canadian since has received similar international recognition. These words are intermixed with those intimating the continued relevance of Pearson's ideas in the present such as: "Misunderstanding arising from fear remains the greatest enemy of peace." Gagnon's work also speaks to the future relevance of Pearson's thinking by using a quotation from French existentialist Albert Camus which states: « La vraie générosité envers l'avenir consiste à tout donner au présent. » [78] These words offer hope for a modestly better world if the UN were allowed to intervene to end conflicts around the globe. All this appears on a canvas that is painted in varying shades of grey, creating a camouflage effect in the background.

[78] This phrase was known to be one of Pearson's favourites and he spoke it often to colleagues at the DEA.

That Pearson's legacy in Canada could be open to such an abstract and temporally multifaceted interpretation demonstrates the importance of the three modes of peacekeeping discourse that are central to this dissertation.

The mural's history has largely been forgotten, in both a literal and metaphorical sense, by the contemporary DFAIT. As recently as the spring of 2012, *Time-Screen/Thought-Space* was not labeled in the lobby of the Pearson Building. Official records identified it as the "Lester Pearson Memorial," but not by its proper name.[79] In addition, it is no longer possible for the public to photograph this mural. Instead, official photos must be requested and bureaucratic action taken to gain any glimpse of Gagnon's work. The lack of concern for this mural also indicates a departure from peacekeeping and the Pearsonian legacy by Canada's government in recent years.[80]

At its unveiling in 1975, however, this mural was celebrated. Pearson passed away in 1973 and two years later, in June, *Time-Screen/Thought-Space* was placed in the lobby of the Pearson Building. Those in attendance agreed that it was a fitting tribute to the late Prime Minister. Mitchell Sharp, the former External Affairs Minister, spoke to an audience that included Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Pearson's wife Maryon, and Pearson's PC rival John Diefenbaker. Like the piece of art he was there to unveil, Sharp's words spanned a long-ranging

[79]This is from the author's correspondence with Amy Miville from Public Works and Government Services Canada, 25 April 2012.

[80] For more on the current government's movement away from peacekeeping as a policy, see McKay and Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*.

period, making reference to events from the 1920s through to 1975. [81] He recalled how Pearson had been the "architect of Canada's multilateral diplomacy." Despite his own government's hesitations about peacekeeping, Sharp averred that most of the current Liberal government's foreign policy initiatives were based on Pearsonian ideas, if only "in a germinal state." He further argued that Pearson had been committed to a progressive vision of the future. He believed that Pearson saw "the whole international community" embracing a unified movement for peace.

Gagnon described *Time-Screen/ Thought-Space* as a "spiritual telegram" to Lester Pearson.[82] This implies that he believed all Canadians should continue to think about Canada's irenic role as Pearson did. It also implies that for Gagnon, the Liberal vision of Canadian foreign policy continued to be the most salient. Quotations taken from, and about, Pearson's life ascribed distinct characteristics to the former Prime Minister and to Canada as a nation. Because he was a key member and later leader of the Liberal Party, Pearson's words and ideas could not be fully separated from his political career. Despite this strong attachment to Pearson and the Liberal Party, peacekeeping managed to transcend partisan lines and become a symbol of Canada's national identity.

Time-Screen/Thought-Space and its unveiling provide an entry point into understanding how peacekeeping was expressed in Canada's political rhetoric from 1956 to 1997. This rhetoric was often responsive to, and not responsible for,

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[81] Department of External Affairs, "A Monument More Enduring Than Bronze," *Statements and Speeches* 75, no. 23 (1975).
[82] Eric Bergbusch, "Time-Screen, Thought-Space," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 August 2000.

the language and imagery used to describe peacekeeping. Mass media, particularly the newspapers that will be examined in Chapter Four, were quicker to link Canada's peacekeeping action to the country's national identity. But the statements and speeches made by politicians to various Canadian audiences lent their words an air of legitimacy. Hence, when they talked of a Canadian "golden age" of foreign policy, the present value of peacekeeping, or a desire to use the UN to bring about a better world, Canadians often voiced their agreement. More cynically, politicians often used peacekeeping as a vote-getting tool. But certain, though by no means all, prime ministers and their governments conveyed a genuine commitment to the possibilities that peacekeeping offered the world, and Canada as a "middle power." It is therefore crucial to first know how politicians described peacekeeping before delving into how mass media shared or deviated from these descriptions.

This chapter examines five different periods between 1956 and 1997 to demonstrate how politicians made symbolic links between peacekeeping and a Canadian national identity. It argues that they did so by employing nostalgic, functional, or progressive language to describe peacekeeping to their Canadian audiences. The successes or failures of specific peacekeeping operations and their impact on the host population were regularly ignored in favour of larger discussions that centred on peacekeeping's value to Canadians. And while criticisms could be found in the political rhetoric of peacekeeping, politicians' willingness to reminisce about Canada's past peacekeeping glories, or opine

about the possibilities of peacekeeping creating a more peaceful world in the future permitted them to tell their audiences that Canadians were a nation of "Blue Berets." These claims found widespread acceptance, particularly in English Canada.

One speech about peacekeeping cannot provide sufficient insight into how the term was used by politicians in Canada or why certain messages were better received by audiences than others. This is because political discussions of peacekeeping invested considerable symbolic meaning into the term.[83] Political speeches are delivered orally, but the records examined for this dissertation often remain silent about the numbers of people in attendance and the physical spaces in which the speeches were given. Political messages are also delivered through official government publications on a subject as well as in radio or television addresses. Rather than seeing these messages as part of a peacekeeping myth, this chapter argues that these discourses employed language designed to elicit specific responses from their audiences. In other words, by looking at a large body of speeches, public addresses, and government publications we can glean the political rhetoric of peacekeeping.[84] Messages that were consistent over long periods of time or found multiparty support are used throughout this chapter to demonstrate how the three peacekeeping discourses blended with discussions of

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[83] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 6.

[84] The value of examining a wide array of speeches and publications is expressed in Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950); George N. Dionisopolous and Steven R. Goldzwig, ""The Meaning of Vietnam": Political Rhetoric as Revisionist Cultural History," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 78(1992).

Canada's national identity at different times. This lends these words considerable rhetorical value regarding why and how peacekeeping came to be seen as a marker of a Canadian national identity.

Kenneth Burke saw rhetoric as an instrument used by members of a social group to try to promote social cohesion.[85] He felt that audiences were the key to understanding why certain messages were well received and others were rejected. By emphasizing the messages contained in political speeches, government publications, and radio or television addresses and their reception, rather than the speaker, this chapter argues that "trivial repetition and dull daily reinforcement" were often more effective methods of conveying political messages than "exceptional rhetorical skill."[86] Canadian who listened to or read a political message about peacekeeping had to consider "what they fe[lt] about themselves before, [and] how it fit into their understandings of themselves and the world around them."[87] The rhetoric of peacekeeping presented Canada as a nation of "Blue Berets." To identify oneself with this nation required very little; some people volunteered to join the Canadian Forces and actively participated in UN peacekeeping, while the majority of Canadians affirmed their self-conception as part of a nation of "Blue Berets" by supporting the UN and Canada's peacekeeping efforts through voting for a major political party that endorsed peacekeeping.

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[85] Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, xiv.
[86] Ibid., 26.
[87] Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Québécois*," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73, no. 2 (1987): 138.

But Canadians were not a singular audience. English Canadian audiences were far more likely to hear politicians discuss peacekeeping than were French Canadians. This was partially owing to the Liberal Party's belief that Quebec was a stronghold of theirs that did not require discussions of foreign policy.[88] All the major political parties were also hesitant to discuss international interventions to Québécois audiences because of continued fears stemming from the Mackenzie King era about the province's preference for isolationism.[89] This lack of discussion did not mean that the people of Quebec were ambivalent about peacekeeping. As the Bloc Québécois found when they released their party platforms, UN peacekeeping was a popular policy across French Canada as well. However, peacekeeping's support as a policy and its relationship to a Canadian national identity were different in English and French Canada, as this chapter will show.

The frequency of messages about peacekeeping from 1956 to 1997, as well as the shared use of language among politicians and mass media, helped peacekeeping to become part of Canada's national symbology. What this suggests is that audiences constructed themselves and the Canada they remembered and desired as a peacekeeping nation in part because of what their politicians said during these years. It also suggests that symbolic conceptions of Canada's interests in peacekeeping were a powerful constitutive force in Canada during

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[88] Lester Pearson notes as much in his memoirs. See Lester Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 16.
[89] This view was not exclusive to politicians. See Roussel and Boucher, "The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture," 165.

this period, allowing peacekeeping to remain a useful rhetorical tool that politicians could employ despite the failings and shortcomings of many actual peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping's Rhetorical Beginnings, 1956 to 1957

In 1956, politicians were among the earliest groups of people to discuss peacekeeping. Lester Pearson's speech to the United Nations on 2 November 1956 explaining his government's abstention from voting to censure the British, the French, and the Israelis regarding their invasion of the Suez Canal zone in Egypt was not the first political speech about peacekeeping, though it was arguably the most significant. Pearson had been an important part of Canada's UN delegation since 1945, including serving as the President of the General Assembly in 1952. Accordingly, he was very familiar to the diplomats assembled at the UN that night. Pearson stood up in the Assembly in New York in the early hours of the morning and told his audience that the world needed action, "not only to end the fighting but to make peace."[90] He then pleaded his case for the creation of an international peace and police force which Canada would help to supply with troops and equipment. It was a timely solution to an international situation that was growing more tense by the hour as the United States and the Soviet Union found common cause to denounce the British and the French despite their mutual Cold War antagonism.[91] Pearson spoke again the following

[90] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 11. "Middle East," 1956.
[91] For more on these events and their importance, see John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume II: 1949 - 1972* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1992); Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3.*

day as the proposal for a peacekeeping force was debated in the General Assembly. When a resolution was unanimously passed calling for the creation of UNEF, an act of inspired diplomatic manoeuvring became a reality.

Pearson's dramatic speeches at the UN set the initial framework for governmental discussions of peacekeeping. But daily newspapers across Canada quickly came out either for or against Pearson's proposal and Canada's lack of support for the British and French invasion of Egypt. For the next three weeks, the press seemed in control of the rhetoric of peacekeeping. They were eager to use UNEF as a symbol of Canadian independence or of Canada's having turned its back on its "mother countries." These were not new ideas. The flag debate, arguments over the celebration of Victoria Day, and changes to Canadian immigration laws had all provoked similar divisions among Canadians since the Second World War. [92] Peacekeeping therefore became another symbolic battle for Canada's national identity.

This conceptual framing meant Pearson and St. Laurent's Liberal Government were attacked by the Opposition PCs despite the international acclaim that Pearson was receiving for his actions. On 26 November, the House of Commons met in an emergency session to discuss the funding of the Canadian peacekeeping contingent. Over the next few days, the PCs, led by leadership candidate John Diefenbaker, vehemently attacked St. Laurent and Pearson. By 1956, Diefenbaker was a long-serving member from Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, and he saw an

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[92] See Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71.*

opportunity to improve his chances of becoming the leader of his party, something he had failed to do since 1942. He accused St. Laurent of betraying Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden and for not recognizing the threat that the "new Hitler," Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, represented to the safety and security of the world.[93] Diefenbaker was a fiery political speaker and his accusations echoed through Parliament, challenging the government to respond.

It was St. Laurent who responded to these attacks. The Prime Minister had been in office since 1948 and had developed the image of a kind "Uncle Louis" on the campaign trail; he was a seasoned lawyer and a strong if formal public speaker. However, St. Laurent did himself and his party no favours by telling his PC critics that he had been scandalized by the larger powers of the world, "who have all too frequently treated the Charter of the United Nations as an instrument with which to regiment smaller nations." [94] He went on to suggest that "the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world is coming pretty close to an end." While few observers of the international scene could object to his words themselves, they were anathema to some English Canadians who clung to an older conception of Canada being a junior partner in the British Empire. UNEF, therefore, became a serious test for Canada's foreign policies, though Canada's leading political figures chose to employ terms like "independence" and

[93] Eden was vociferous in his condemnations of Nasser and often invoked Hitler and the 1938 Prague appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain as a cautionary tale for how not to deal with a leader. These sentiments were echoed in the House of Commons by Diefenbaker during the 29 November session in the House of Commons. See LAC, John Diefenbaker Fonds, volume 12 F451, "The Middle East Crisis," 1956.
[94] "Painful Departure," *Montreal Gazette*, Wednesday 28 November 1956, 8.

"mother country" more than they described the actual needs of the peacekeepers or the Egyptians.

Canadian politicians had been discussing the possibility of a UN police force since that international body was created in 1945.[95] Many Canadians saw the soldiers they committed to the UN force that had been sent to Korea from 1950 to 1953 as being akin to a police force though it was actually a United States-led army.[96] UNEF, unlike the Korean Force, was introduced in order to separate two sides that had been in a conflict but had declared a cease-fire. Both parties acknowledged Canada's prior commitments to UN action, and Diefenbaker noted that UNEF was a "step in the right direction."[97] Because the post-World War Two belief in the value of the UN was shared by all of Canada's major political parties, Diefenbaker would have had to challenge Canada's foreign policy priorities if he had chosen not to support UNEF. Instead, he stated that something akin to UNEF "has been the dream and hope of mankind." This allowed many Canadians who listened to the political speeches of the Liberal and PC Parties in the fall and winter of 1956 to place this new peacekeeping action conceptually within a longer tradition of Canadian action through the United Nations.

Diefenbaker tried to steal some of Pearson's newly acquired international credit for himself by pointing out that he had suggested a UN police force be sent

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[95] Pearson notes that Louis St. Laurent discussed the idea at the first assembly of the UN in 1946. See Library and Archives Canada, Lester Pearson Fonds, "The Middle East Crisis and the Situation in Hungary," 1956.

[96] For more on Canadian attitudes towards the Korean force, see Chapter Five, "Korea: From An Imperial Frying Pan into an American Fire" in Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea*.

[97] LAC, John Diefenbaker Fonds, "The Middle East Crisis," 1956.

into the Middle East on 31 January 1956. In the Commons, he quoted from Hansard and proclaimed that "if what was done on November 2 had been brought back before the United Nations earlier the tragic beginnings of this situation as Israel marched might have been averted." [98] Pearson readily acknowledged Diefenbaker's proposal while pointing out that many people had called for such a force in the past but that no one had been able to bring about its creation until UNEF was formed in November. Though ostensibly discussing the Middle East during this debate, these politicians were clearly prioritizing what was taking place in Ottawa instead of the events in Egypt that precipitated the creation of UNEF.

When Nasser and the Egyptians would not permit the Queen's Own Rifles to be the Canadian contingent in UNEF because their name and uniforms were identical to those of the British, the PCs quickly judged that the present value of UNEF could be debated and that claiming conceptual ownership was not where they were going to score political gains. PC MPs wondered why Canada had betrayed its ally and then allowed its participation in UNEF to be dictated by a man who Diefenbaker felt wanted to "take over the Middle East and then, having done that, to take over Africa, [and] to mobilize the people of the Moslem [sic] world."[99] They accordingly centred their attacks on the Prime Minister and Pearson for not supporting Canada's "mother country," Britain, focusing on St. Laurent's use of the term "supermen," and making the Suez Crisis into what José

[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.

Igartua has described as "a litmus test of Canada's sense of place on the international scene, of Canadian values, and of national unity."[100]

Pearson was accused of having become a "chore boy" for the Americans, an old Tory tactic employed to attack Liberal opponents.[101] The PCs also made appeals to Canada's British heritage. Diefenbaker and company shook their heads at how Pearson had "condemned" the British at the UN as though they were no better than the Soviet Union. Pearson, it should be noted, never voiced more than "regret" over the use of military force in his public statements about the Suez Crisis. This exaggeration of what Pearson stated eventually made the Secretary of State for External Affairs angry enough to respond openly in the House and attack those who would have had Canada say, "ready, aye, ready," whenever Britain engaged in foreign adventures, however ill-conceived. Instead, Pearson stated that the Canadian hope at the UN and in UNEF was to play "as constructive a role as possible."[102] Though UNEF was not actually Pearson's idea, and he needed the support of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to make it

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[100] Igartua's work on this topic is the most thorough to date. He combines a discussion of the political speeches about the Suez Crisis with an examination of Canadian daily press editorial opinions. See Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71*, 118. Earlier studies in the 1960s made regular mention of the Parliamentary debate on 26 November but have rarely looked beyond this date. See Donald Creighton, *Canada's First Century, 1867-1967* (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1970); Blair Fraser, *The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1967); Gordon, ed. *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*; Granatstein, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite*; Taylor, Cox, and Granatstein, eds., *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*

[101] For a discussion of these tactics during the 1896 election, see Wood, "Defining "Canadian": Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism."

[102] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 11. "The Middle East Crisis," 1956.

work, the claims that Pearson was in the pocket of the Americans regarding UNEF were unfounded politicking.[103]

The debate over Canadian independence became one of the larger issues during the 1957 federal election. [104] Arguments over the construction of the Trans-Canada oil pipeline in June of 1956 framed it as a struggle for Canadian independence, with the PCs questioning the Liberal choice of routes for the pipeline and how it was to be financed. C.D. Howe, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, was widely criticized for pushing the Liberal plan for having American-owned companies control a large share in the pipeline. When the government imposed closure on the pipeline debate, the PCs called St. Laurent and his government arrogant and subservient to the Americans. The creation of UNEF was linked to the pipeline debate and the Liberals were faced with similar attacks about relying too much on the Americans in their handling of the Suez Crisis.

St. Laurent was seventy-five years old and his energy on the campaign trail often lagged. Pearson, despite the tensions that had surrounded his efforts to create UNEF, became a valuable speaker for the Liberals thanks to his high profile. The Secretary of State for External Affairs often spoke about foreign policy during the campaign, though it was rarely the only topic in his speeches. Instead, UNEF was used as the latest example of the strong Liberal record in

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[103]Pearson openly acknowledged that the idea was not his own. See Library and Archives Canada, Lester Pearson Fonds, "The Middle East Crisis and the Situation in Hungary," 1956.

[104] The CCF was a strong supporter of Canada's efforts through the UN. Because they did not form the government or the official opposition, the speeches of their leaders have not been included in this chapter.

improving the lives of Canadians. Pearson focused on the gains made since 1945 in Canada's international standing from its engagement in the United Nations. His primary tactic when discussing peacekeeping was to sell Canadians a functional understanding that contradicted the PC portrayal of UNEF as an anti-British policy. He noted that the PCs were being hypocritical by criticizing the Liberals for "knifing our best friends in the back" while also supporting UNEF, since the latter would not have come into existence without the former.[105]

There were also progressive elements to Pearson's discussions of peacekeeping. He argued, "Canada stands today respected among nations, as a country which has played a good part in the search for peace and good relations between all peoples."[106] He further averred that Canada was a "strong, united, and forward-looking nation." Pearson commonly centred his discussion on Canada's independence as a nation and its loyalty to the Western alliance system. Peace was the ultimate goal for what he described as his government's "Canadian considerations, Canadian values and Canadian interests."[107]

St. Laurent did a healthy share of campaigning, and his words to Québécois audiences were particularly important, given Pearson's lack of eloquence in French. St. Laurent took to the Radio-Canada airwaves repeatedly to discuss campaign issues for Quebeckers. His discussions of foreign affairs normally came near the end of his addresses, when he would reassure listeners that the Government of Canada was doing everything possible to prevent another world

[105] Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3*, 18.
[106] Ibid.
[107] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 12. "Canadian Foreign Policy," 1957.

war. He called Canada's external policies « indépendante et responsable, selon laquelle nous nous reconnaissons les droits de différer d'opinion. »[108] St. Laurent was also strongly anti-Communist, and his appeals normally conflated Canada's actions at the UN with efforts to check the spread of the Soviet Union abroad.[109] Canada's peacekeeping role was therefore situated as part of the struggle between democracy and communism as well as a marker for Quebec voters of Canadian independence. Though English Canadian audiences would have also heard about Canada's efforts to check the spread of Communism, the Liberals trusted that in Quebec appeals to anti-Communism would be a sounder basis for justifying the use of Canadian troops overseas than making appeals to Canada's international obligations because of the continued belief that most Quebeckers held isolationist views.[110] Quebec audiences by and large accepted this understanding of peacekeeping as a policy and embraced Canada's "adult" foreign policy choices if their overwhelming support for the Liberal Party in the 1957 election is any indicator.

While voters in Quebec supported the Liberals, elsewhere St. Laurent's party had to contend with repeated PC attacks during the campaign. Because of its use as a point of attack by the PCs, "[c]ontemporary observers and politicians alike believed that the Liberals' stand on the Suez crisis cost them votes in the 1957

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[108] LAC, Louis St. Laurent Fonds, MG26-L, volume 294. "Deuxième programme télévision et radio à être enregistre le vendredi 10 mai 1957," 1957.
[109] For more on St. Laurent's anti-Communism, see Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957*.
[110] Roussel and Boucher, "The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture," 165.

election."[111] Yet, when the PCs won the most seats in the June 10 election, Diefenbaker wasted little time in stating his support for the constructive work of UNEF and for Canada's efforts to bring about a more peaceful future through the UN. While at the General Assembly on 23 September 1957, less than one year removed from Pearson's diplomatic triumph there, Diefenbaker took the opportunity to let his audience know that Canada had supplied 1200 of the 6,000 total troops for UNEF, as well as mentioning the pride many Canadians felt that one of their compatriots, Major- General E.L.M. Burns, was the head of UNEF. In no way did his speech set out the roles that the Canadians were performing; only the large number of Canadians and their success at promoting the cessation of hostilities were deemed worthy of inclusion in this address. [112] Diefenbaker's continued attempts to take credit for the idea of UN peacekeeping demonstrate that he wanted to place himself at the centre of Canada's peacekeeping narrative. In so doing, Diefenbaker was articulating a vision of Canada as an international actor who was playing a valuable role on the world stage. By stating that Canada would not alter its international course, Diefenbaker was not asking Canadians to re-think their foreign policy. Instead, Canadians were encouraged to celebrate the achievements of UNEF and to hope for a better world in which more peace among nations would exist.

When Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, it was a major news story, and his speech in Oslo was widely reported and was later

[111] Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71*, 130.
[112] LAC, Progressive Conservative Fonds, MG 28 IV2, volume 111. "Statement to the United Nations General Assembly," 1957.

published under the title *The Four Faces of Peace*. In discussing UNEF during this speech, Pearson emphasized its bringing a modicum of respite to the Israeli-Egyptian border, suggesting that UNEF "may have prevented a brush fire from becoming an all-consuming blaze at the Suez last year, and it could do so again in similar circumstances in the future." [113] Pearson's overall assessment of the future was dreary, and he appealed to the people of the world to choose peace or extinction. Speaking to the entire world, Pearson dwelt less upon Canada-centric issues, focusing more on the problems of the Cold War. Upon returning from Norway, Pearson was celebrated by Liberal supporters and well-wishers in Toronto on 18 December. Two thousand guests gathered at the Queen Elizabeth building of the Canadian National Exhibition to eat a dinner and listen to people praise Pearson and Canada's actions the previous year. By this time, peacekeeping had been debated and discussed by the Liberals and PCs from one end of the country to the other. In conjunction with the reports of the press, these political addresses forged many of the linguistic and symbolic links that would remain in use for the following forty years.

Political Consensus in an Era of Enmity, 1958 to 1967

During his term as Canada's Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker did not win many positive contemporary assessments of his government's foreign policy.[114] Nor have many scholars since tried to alter such views, though some

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[113] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, "The Four Faces of Peace," 1957.
[114] Fraser, *The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967*; Peter C Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963).

have sought to make Diefenbaker's decisions more understandable.[115] A climate of discontent emerged soon after the Liberal defeat in 1957. Much of this arose out of a perceived lack of connection between Diefenbaker's words and his actions. Diefenbaker's campaigns centred on him and contained messages about "One Canada," a "New National Policy," and a "Canada of the North." Peter C. Newman described Diefenbaker's approach to foreign policy as "outdated" and overly concerned with "sloganeering."[116] He believed that Diefenbaker planned and exploited his foreign policies for domestic political gain rather than working to sustain "the notion Canadians so long cherished that their country counted as an influential power in world affairs." Regarding his government's stance on peacekeeping, Diefenbaker continued to advance a progressive vision about the UN creating a "world police force" that would prompt the "settlement of international differences and disputes."[117] Despite such grand pronouncements, he took few steps to see this vision realized.

When the time came for Diefenbaker's government to support a new peacekeeping operation after unrest broke out following the Congo gaining its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, there was considerable hesitation on the government's part. As the province of Katanga seceded, and violence against whites in the Congo escalated, *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* [ONUC] was begun.[118] Diefenbaker did not wish to commit Canadian troops, and

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[115] The best work on this subject is Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64.*
[116] Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years*, 249.
[117] LAC, Burt Taylor Richardson Fonds, MG30 D2896, file 57. "A Formula for Peace," 1958.
[118] See Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64.*

at first offered to send surplus milk and pork to the Congo instead. When his government did finally decide to provide a contingent of bilingual signallers, Diefenbaker took the opportunity to travel down to New York to address the UN General Assembly yet again.[119] Though his audience consisted of representatives from around the world, Diefenbaker centred his speech on Canada. He conflated the Canadian experience of working towards independence with what was occurring in Africa in 1960 and suggested that "there are few here that can speak with the authority of Canada on the subject of colonialism."[120] Despite the large differences between Canada, a white settler colony, and the newly independent nations of Africa, Diefenbaker made the rhetorical connection for his audience. Whether they scoffed at such platitudes is not clear, but Newman argues that the international community eventually came to see that Diefenbaker's "promises meant nothing more than an expression of what he would like to see happen – not what he intended to do."[121]

The PCs also maintained their constructive emphasis when discussing peacekeeping. Diefenbaker noted in 1960, as he had in 1957, that Canada would assume "an equitable share" of the burden of international peacekeeping. He also felt that Canada could serve as a model for other nations because of its policy of

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[119] Diefenbaker described this address as his "most important statement on Canadian external relations." This may have been because he spoke immediately after a fiery diatribe had been delivered by Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Diefenbaker took considerable time in his speech to denounce Communism before addressing UN peacekeeping. John Diefenbaker, *One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker: The Years of Achievement, 1957 - 1962* (Toronto: Macmillan 1976), 121.

[120] LAC, Burt Taylor Richardson Fonds, MG30 D2896, file 58. "Congo Speech," 1960.

[121] Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years*, 250.

having a battalion of its armed forces on standby for use in UN operations. Such policies received the support of the Liberal Party in part because they were continuations of those undertaken while they were in office. This made peacekeeping a foreign policy with consensus support in an era of considerable political enmity. Framing peacekeeping in such a manner is also a reminder that for all his rhetorical flourish, Diefenbaker and his government did commit Canada to UN peacekeeping because they regarded it as a useful policy.[122]

Lester Pearson's Liberals strengthened the symbolic links between peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. Pearson wrote in his memoirs that he was reluctant to exploit his Nobel Peace Prize for political gains, but his campaign speeches, as the leader of the Liberal Party in 1958 and afterwards, often contained references to his role in the Suez Crisis. [123] During a CBC television broadcast, Pearson stated that the question of whether there would be peace "depends on our personal as well as our national identity."[124] Linking Canada's national identity with the world's irenic struggle, Pearson wanted audiences to remember that his party had created peacekeeping. He argued that Canada needed to support UN peacekeeping with "sober realism" as well as "unflagging zeal," linking the functional and the progressive.

By making peacekeeping exemplar of an independent and adult Canada, Pearson continued to tie Canada's foreign policies to its domestic maturity. The

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[122] Spooner argues as much in his study of Canada and ONUC. See Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64.*
[123] Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3*, 28-29.
[124] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 14. "CBC address," 1958.

Liberals had been defeated in 1957 thanks in part to many English Canadians' unwillingness to see Canada as an independent actor rather than a British associate. But Pearson felt his government's past actions could still be employed to rally support in Quebec. He therefore called on his audience to see peacekeeping as a worthwhile policy in the present for an independent nation, as well as a sound policy for a more peaceful Canadian future.

When Pearson's Liberals lost the 1958 election and gave the PCs what was then the largest majority in Canada's federal history, serious rebuilding seemed necessary. But for those who still supported the Liberals, peacekeeping became a means to nostalgically discuss a different way of governing Canada. Along with media voices such as *Maclean's* magazine correspondent Blair Fraser, Pearson began to introduce into his speeches a longing for what his government had been able to accomplish in the past.[125] Pearson argued that because of the self-aggrandizing tactics Diefenbaker was employing in his conduct of foreign affairs, Canada was losing its place of prominence at the UN, and he openly wondered whether Canada might ever recover that position.[126] Such calls became more frequent as Diefenbaker's time in office continued. At the Liberal nominating convention in 1962, Pearson described the need for his party to reverse a period of "uncertainty, doubt, [and] division."[127] He outlined his desire to see Canadians once again taking pride in their international role as exemplified during the Suez

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[125] Fraser had long been a supporter of Pearson and the Liberals and their internationalist foreign policies. See Brennan, *Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal Years, 1935 - 1957*, 164.
[126] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 17. "Interview with Dick Batey, CJVI," 1959.
[127] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 22. "Notes for Nominating Convention," 1962.

crisis. He spoke of a "return again to the days when our friends spoke of Canada in tones of envy and admiration rather than doubt and disappointment." He knew that his audiences would recall the international acclaim that had resulted from his efforts at the UN, and he told one in Sackville, New Brunswick that a Liberal government could reinvigorate "Canada's influence and position in the world."[128]

Using peacekeeping as a means to compare the glories of the past with the inadequacies of the present put further distance between the political rhetoric of peacekeeping and what was actually taking place in the Middle East or the Congo. All three peacekeeping discourses would be employed often by Pearson, along with his Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin, upon becoming the head of successive minority governments in 1963 and 1967.[129] Martin was an experienced politician who had unsuccessfully run for the leadership of the Liberal Party against Pearson in 1958. He took this loss in stride and accepted the External Affairs post, hoping to play a key role in international affairs, as Pearson had done in the 1950s. This commitment was articulated in the 1964 White Paper on Defence. Recognized for mandating the unification the Canadian Forces, this document formally identified international peacekeeping as a primary role for Canada's military.[130] A major opportunity to demonstrate this came in February and March of 1964, when the situation in Cyprus worsened. As Greek and

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[128] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 22. "Issues in the Forthcoming General Election," 1962.
[129] This was formalized in the 1964 White Paper on Defence. For a discussion of it, see "The White Paper and Canada's Peacemaking Role," *Montreal Gazette*, 2 April 1964, 8.
[130] Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping*, 12.

Turkish Cypriots openly clashed, tensions between Greece and Turkey escalated as well; the two members of NATO seemed poised to engage in open warfare against one another. Martin worked with then-UN Secretary General U Thant to organize a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]. Unlike Diefenbaker's reaction to the events in the Congo, Pearson and his ministers did not seem to hesitate about committing Canadian troops. They sent over the Royal 22nd Regiment, better known as the VanDoos, as the initial Canadian contingent.

Rather than dwell on the structural causes of the conflict in Cyprus, Martin spent most of his speeches on the subject discussing Canada. During one speech at the Canadian Club in Brantford, Ontario, Martin told his audience that Canada would support peace in the Mediterranean, but that he was "deeply conscious that a disunited Canada cannot be as strong a force in international affairs as we would wish."[131] By 1964, the Liberals had undertaken the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which sought to create a more equitable relationship between English- and French-speaking Canadians.[132] The Quiet Revolution in Quebec that had been dramatically changing the province's social and economic climate, particularly since Jean Lesage's Liberals came to power in 1960, also influenced the federal Liberal thinking on Canadian unity.[133] Pearson's

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[131] LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 B12, volume 306. "UN Peace-Keeping Operations in Cyprus," 1964.
[132] Leslie Pal, *Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).
[133] Michael Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985).

government had acknowledged the discontent that many Quebeckers faced when they examined their relationship to Canada. In Brantford, Martin called on his audience to work for a strong and united Canada so that his government would be able to exert more of Canada's now "traditional" role as a "policeman for peace." By making such an appeal in southern Ontario, Martin was asking his English-speaking audience to recognize that they were equally responsible for keeping Canada together. By linking peacekeeping to Canadian unity, the Liberals sought to create a bond which all Canadians could share. As in 1956, the events that precipitated the introduction of this peacekeeping force were far less important a topic than peacekeeping's value for Canadians.

Martin was also quick to note that peacekeeping represented a Canadian belief in "high international ideals" that could not be defeated by those cynics who questioned its value.[134] He spoke of the "obvious willingness of Canadians to contribute to the cause of international peace" through peacekeeping.[135] Idealism was not a bad word, as far as Martin was concerned; he felt that Canada's foreign policies needed a touch of idealism to complement their more practical bases. He also expressed his hope that "Canadians [would] never be indifferent or insensitive to the sufferings of peoples, no matter how remote geographically the situation [might] be from Canada."[136] Support for UN peacekeeping was a "sober and realistic" policy as well as a necessary policy if Canadians were to be "true to

[134] LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, "UN Peace-Keeping Operations in Cyprus," 1964.
[135] LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 B12, volume 306. "Speech to the Toronto Empire Club," 1964.
[136] LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 B12, volume 307. "Speech to Ottawa UN Association," 1964.

ourselves, our country to the international community." This was both a progressive and a functional role, as far as Martin was concerned.

In 1967, the expulsion of UNEF from the Sinai region at the request of Nasser, prior to another round of Arab-Israeli conflict in May, presented a great challenge to the contemporary value of peacekeeping.[137] Nasser believed that Canada was too closely linked to imperial powers such as Britain, and was too supportive of Israel's foreign policies. That the Canadians had been singled out by Nasser as the part of UNEF that should be removed first bothered many in Canada. In response, Pearson spoke of the need for Canada to cautiously volunteer for new peacekeeping missions. Yet, he remained firmly convinced of its utility for policing an armistice.[138] Martin remained adamant that the best solution to the problems of the Middle East was the re-introduction of a peacekeeping force, with Canada playing a significant part. Downplaying the inadequacies that had just been revealed, Martin reminded an audience that "it was the leadership of Prime Minister Pearson that first introduced this imaginative concept to a tense and worried world."[139] Canada also still had future responsibilities to advance the campaign for world peace since, according to Martin, "no country on earth [wa]s more dedicated to the cause of peace than Canada."[140] By linking peacekeeping and Canada's national identity, the Pearson Liberals hoped to connect all

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[137] For a discussion of these events, see Chapter Eight, "Goodbye, Farewell, and Amen: The Withdrawal of UNEF, May-Jun 1967," in Carroll, *Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67.*
[138] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG26 N9, volume 43. "Canada and the Middle East," 1967.
[139] LAC, Paul Martin Sr. Fonds, MG32 B12, volume 316. "External Affairs Stand on UNEF," 1967.
[140] Ibid.

Canadians symbolically to the idea of peacekeeping. And while Martin and Pearson equated Canada's domestic unity with a larger goal of international peace, the failure of UN peacekeeping to achieve lasting peaceful solutions in the Congo, Cyprus, and the Middle East challenged peacekeeping as a policy.

A Functional Decline, 1968 to 1984

Thanks in part to the expulsion of UNEF from Egypt, peacekeeping quickly went from being portrayed as a symbol of Canada's past, present, and future national identity to a failing part of its foreign policy. Like Diefenbaker's government, the Trudeau Liberals put more of an emphasis on peacekeeping's potential to relieve tensions between two warring nations than its uses as a symbol of Canada's national identity. Unlike Diefenbaker's government, Trudeau's re-thought the value of peacekeeping for Canada as part of a thorough examination of all Canada's foreign commitments between 1968 and 1970. Trudeau had campaigned as a man of change and an advocate for a "just society." His image as a world traveller made it more likely that he would offer alternate understandings of foreign policy for an age in which the Vietnam War brought many people out to protest against the United States, one of Canada's closest allies during the Cold War.[141]

In 1968, Trudeau told audiences that Canadians as a whole found cause to re-examine themselves and their country because of the centennial a year earlier. He noted, "[W]e found ourselves wondering whether in the world of tomorrow,

[141] For more on this see Chapter Five, "Celebrity and Audacity: Marshall McLuhan, Pierre Eliot Trudeau, and the Decade of the Philosopher King," in Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era*.

Canada can afford to cling to the conceptions and role-casting which served us in our international endeavours of three decades or more."[142] The financial and emotional costs of peacekeeping seemed to be more than Trudeau and his Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp felt Canada should bear.[143] Sharp was a self-professed "amateur" in the field of foreign policy.[144] But like Trudeau, he felt that Canada's policies needed to be re-evaluated. While not overtly attacking the policies of the Pearson years, this Liberal government believed that Canada had changed, and new policies were needed. Sharp remained adamant: "Canada is ready to act as mediator or to provide peacekeeping forces when called upon to do so, but there must be some real hope that the operation will be effective."[145] Trudeau further stated, "Our need is not so much to go crusading abroad as to mobilize at home our aspirations, energies and resources behind external policies which will permit Canada to play a credible and creditable part in this changing world."[146]

This trepidation would manifest itself in *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, the Trudeau government's comprehensive foreign policy publication released in 1970. This publication contained six pamphlets on various subjects, including one on the United Nations, as well as a master summary. The overall focus of the programme laid out in these pamphlets stressed that Canada's foreign policies

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[142] Department of External Affairs, "Canada and the World," *Statements and Speeches* 68, no. 17 (1968).
[143] Sharp expressed a similar viewpoint in Department of External Affairs, "Canada Reviews its Foreign Policy," *Statements and Speeches* 70, no. 15 (1970).
[144] Mitchell Sharp, *Which Reminds Me... A Memoir* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 163.
[145] Department of External Affairs, "Canada Reviews its Foreign Policy."
[146] Department of External Affairs, "Canada and the World."

should serve Canada's national interests. This meant providing economic benefits for Canada and/or advancing the cause of social justice in the world.[147] The document had a considerable pragmatic emphasis as did the language coming out of Trudeau's government at this time. He and his ministers recognized that Canada could play an important, if limited, role in future peacekeeping operations but that indefinite missions and Canada's automatic participation in every peacekeeping operation needed to end.[148] Instead, peacekeeping, like Canada's commitment to NATO, had to be viewed with a critical eye.

Trudeau's government did not want to make predictions about what types of roles Canada would have to assume in the future. But there remained a substantial idealistic side to the rhetoric surrounding peacekeeping during these years. *Foreign Policy for Canadians* talked about peacekeeping's stimulating "a deep-seated desire in this country to make a distinctive contribution to human betterment."[149] They noted that this "altruistic aspiration" seemed to be popular across the country with all Canadians. The document also acknowledged the "special brand of Canadian expertise" regarding peacekeeping, but vowed to employ this "judiciously" and not to make Canada a "helpful fixer."

Despite this cautious use of language to describe peacekeeping, the Canadian government continued to participate in UNFICYP throughout Trudeau's time in power. And when a new UNEF was proposed after the Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1973, Canada joined that force. The Liberals

[147] Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*, 33.
[148] Department of External Affairs, "Foreign Policy for Canadians," (Ottawa, 1970).
[149] Ibid.

were the head of a minority government at the time, and their foreign and domestic policies had to find support within the New Democratic Party. In the House of Commons, Mitchell Sharp reminded MPs that the concept of peacekeeping owed much to "a great Canadian, our former Prime Minister and a Member of this House, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson."[150] By hearkening back to 1956 and Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy, he drew links between the present action of the Liberals and the efforts of 1956 that had brought Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize, and lifted Canada's international stature, arguably, to its highest point ever. But Sharp remained committed to portraying peacekeeping as something that was viable only when conditions were placed on an operation. He noted that Canada had not sought participation in UNEF II, but that it had accepted a role only once the operational mandate was made clear. The minister ended his speech with a look into the future, arguing that Canada had "a responsibility to the world community and to all the people of the Middle East to do what we can to give them another chance to achieve a peaceful settlement when the fighting has stopped." The New Democrats accepted such a formulation of Canada's peacekeeping role, and they supported this action.

Domestic policies were of a higher priority during the Trudeau years, particularly regarding Quebec's place in Canada.[151] Pearson and Martin had expressed the desire for Canada to participate in UN peacekeeping to serve as a common bond between English and French Canadians, and as something that

[150] Department of External Affairs, "Canadian Participation in the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East," *Statements and Speeches* 73, no. 23 (1973).
[151] Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*, 33.

could alleviate tensions between the groups. By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, such appeals were ineffective. The creation of the Parti Québécois [PQ] in 1968 formalized the separatist movement. Under the leadership of René Levesque, the PQ created a political platform for a future Quebec state. It included descriptions of what foreign policies the new state would undertake. At the second congress of the PQ in October of 1969, a platform was adopted that called for Quebec to become « une nation pacifiste en adoptant le principe du rejet du recours à la guerre comme solution aux différends internationaux, en favorisant le désarmement international et en s'opposant aux expériences et à l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires et bactériologiques. »[152] Rather than form a full military and be part of the Western alliance, the PQ sought to have only a small « corps de paix pouvant utiliser le matériel disponible à d'autres fins que celles de la guerre, en cas de conflagrations, feux de forêts, etc. » Despite their desire to separate themselves from the Canadian government, the PQ saw value in peacekeeping as a policy. Part of this was speculative, as the Quebec they envisioned had not yet come into being. But by making peacekeeping a central part of their foreign policy platform, the PQ was also trying to capitalize on the contemporary attraction that peacekeeping held for many Quebeckers.

When the PQ gained office in 1976 they set about preparing a provincial vote on separation. As the vote approached, the PQ put out new platforms that were designed to placate some Quebeckers, but also to alleviate the possible fears of

[152] Le Parti Québecois, "Programme 1970," (Quebec City, 1970).

some foreign governments.[153] Whereas the initial PQ platform had called for a pacifist state, a revised platform in 1979 stated that Quebec would become a member of NATO and NORAD once independence was realized. The emphasis remained on having a small peace force that would work primarily through a UN-peacekeeping apparatus, but this shift was noticeable.[154] As the possibility of a Quebec state became more real, the progressive rhetoric of the PQ was toned down in favour of slight changes to the current Canadian foreign policies.

The defeat of the Quebec sovereignty referendum on 20 May 1980 permitted the Canadian government to shift its focus away from trying to keep the country intact. By 1983, Trudeau had also succeeded in getting a Canadian Constitution passed, satisfying his other primary domestic concern. Despite his limited interest in foreign policy in his last years in office, Trudeau maintained an active desire to advance the cause of peace in the world.[155] This was best exemplified by his international peace tour in 1983. Trudeau announced his intention to travel across the world and visit the leader of any government - whether democratic or communist -who was seriously interested in discussing nuclear disarmament. Trudeau talked to many leaders and found a polite reception, though few tangible results came out of the tour. Despite this, he was more optimistic than he had been before about Canada's irenic role. After travelling around the globe,

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[153] Stephane Roussel, Charles-Alexandre Theoret, and Susan M. Murphy, "A "Distinct Strategy"? The Use of Canadian Strategic Culture by the Sovereignist Movement in Quebec, 1968 - 1996," *International Journal* 59, no. 3 (2004): 570.
[154] Le gouvernement du Québec, "La nouvelle entente Québec-Canada. Proposition du gouvernement du Québec pour une entente d'égal à égal: la souveraineté-association " (Quebec City, 1979).
[155] Pierre Trudeau, *Memoirs* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 202.

Trudeau spoke to a Montreal audience and stated, "If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound."[156] Peace was central to this tour, not peacekeeping, a reflection of the lack of governmental interest in Canada's "helpful fixer" role.

By the time he left office, Trudeau's foreign policies had come around, as Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein have argued, in a full pirouette. The Prime Minister had shown little interest in maintaining Canada's peacekeeping role when he assumed office, but Canada remained one of the world's leading peacekeepers throughout the 1970s. Despite this lack of contemporary enthusiasm for peacekeeping, the Liberals were often willing to remind audiences of Pearson's, and Canada's, great triumph in 1956. They also sought a more peaceful world, and recognized that peacekeeping might play some small part in bringing such a world into existence.

Peacekeeping's Revival, 1988 to 1993

After Trudeau left office in 1984, Brian Mulroney's PC government made concerted efforts to reinvigorate Canadian enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping. Mulroney was a former lawyer who had won his party's leadership from Joe Clark, despite Clark's having been prime minister briefly from 1979 to 1980. Mulroney was also from Quebec, which added to his appeal compared to the Liberal Party's John Turner in the 1984 election. Mulroney happened to be in office for the end of the Cold War when for a few years peacekeeping became a

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[156] Department of External Affairs, "A Global Initiative to Improve the Prospects for Peace," *Statements and Speeches* 83, no. 20 (1983).

vital part of the "New World Order" that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite this new international climate, many of the appeals for Canadians to act as part of the UN that Mulroney's government made hearkened to Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy, while arguing that circumstances permitted Canada to regain its past position of influence.

Clark was Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1984 to 1991. Despite this demotion from his earlier leadership role, he approached Canada's external affairs with enthusiasm. In 1990, speaking in Ottawa to the Canadian-American Committee of the C.D. Howe Institute, a conservative think tank devoted to economic and social policy in Canada, Clark told his audience, "[t]he Canadian experience proves that solutions lie not in grand schemes and blueprints, but in processes that work and produce results."[157] This statement explained how domestic compromises between English and French Canadians made Canada encourage other nations to pursue mediation through peacekeeping. Clark was hopeful that other nations would make the principles of Canadian foreign policy their own, lending a progressive element to this speech.

Clark and Mulroney also spoke on numerous occasions about Canada's illustrious peacekeeping past. In 1991, Clark told the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance that peacekeeping was invented by Lester Pearson because he and others like him sought a more peaceful world.[158] While trying to sell

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[157] Department of External Affairs, "Canada in the World: Foreign Policy in the New Era," *Statements and Speeches* 90, no. 11 (1990).
[158] Department of External Affairs, "Notes for a Speech by Joe Clark at a Meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance," *Statements and Speeches* 91, no. 1 (1991).

Canadians on the value of Operation Desert Storm, the United States-led coalition to remove Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991, Clark always made mention of Canada's peacekeeping history. Speaking to the House of Commons, he stated that if Canada did not participate in the force, it would be "betraying the efforts of Louis St. Laurent, of Lester Pearson."[159] While his PC predecessors had sought to distance themselves from the actions taken by Pearson at the UN, Mulroney's PCs used them as a nostalgic focal point that could be emotionally appealed to whenever Canadians were called upon to act internationally. The Canadian government's attempts to sell all Canadian military action as peacekeeping intimates that working as UN peacekeepers was now the most accepted way the Canadian Forces would be used internationally. Canada's status as a nation of "Blue Berets" therefore changed how the government discussed Canada's armed forces, though this rarely clarified what was taking place on a given mission.

Mulroney's government also officially commemorated Pearson on several occasions during his time in office. On 26 September 1990 the Lester Pearson statue was unveiled outside Parliament in Ottawa. Mulroney gushed over Pearson at the unveiling: "He was a man who embodied our country more than any who preceded him, and perhaps any who will follow."[160] This was likely a direct jab at Pierre Trudeau, Mulroney's predecessor, meant to undermine his public image

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[159] Department of External Affairs, "Notes for a speech in the House of Commons by Joe Clark on the Situation in the Persian Gulf," *Statements and Speeches* 91, no. 3 (1991).
[160] Brian Mulroney, "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney at the Unveiling of the Pearson Statue," (Ottawa, 1990).

and the favour which Trudeau still held among many Canadians. Despite these political undertones, Mulroney also called Pearson's actions during the Suez Crisis his "finest hour" and credited him with advancing a foreign policy in which Canada's voice would not simply be heard, but would also impress. Parallel to this commemoration of Pearson were Mulroney's words which spoke of the "realities of power" that Pearson knew better than anyone. He also felt that a true community of nations would come about only if more people acted as Pearson had. By employing the three peacekeeping discourses in many of his addresses, as he did at this unveiling, Mulroney was rhetorically consistent with earlier Liberal governments.

Though the situation in the Gulf was reaching a climax when this statue was unveiled, Mulroney's words also had relevance to Canada's domestic politics. Since 1987, his government had been trying to amend the Canadian constitution through the Meech Lake Accord process. By the summer of 1990, tensions between English, French and Aboriginal Canadians had made the new constitutional formula one that many in Quebec and elsewhere could not accept. To counter such divisions, Mulroney often cited Lester Pearson and Canada's commitment to peacekeeping as an example of how Canadians could work together. At the unveiling of the Pearson statue, Mulroney spoke of Pearson's "deep commitment to his country" and his belief that Canada would become a better and more whole nation through its foreign policies. He also repeatedly stressed Pearson's knack for compromise as a central element of Canada's

success in the past. By making such a link, the Prime Minister called on his audience to see how peacekeeping could help heal Canada's internal divisions between English- and French- speakers, a tactic that Pearson's government had employed often during the 1960s.

This domestic emphasis continued when Mulroney spoke at the unveiling of the peacekeeping monument, "Reconciliation," in Ottawa on 8 October 1992. In front of an audience of thousands, Mulroney spoke of the "courage and patriotism of generations of Canadians who have been willing to risk their lives to preserve, for them, for us, and for others, that which is most precious for all of humankind: liberty and peace."[161] He spoke of Canada's peacekeeping past while marking it as a "Canadian idea, pursued in the midst of conflict, and now recognized globally as pivotal to world peace." But he frequently reminded the audience that Canada was able to become a world leader in peacekeeping because it stood "united." Ignoring the deep domestic divisions that accompanied the first year of peacekeeping in Canada, Mulroney believed that the only way Canada could continue its peacekeeping role, which he averred all Canadians supported, was to stay together. This monument was unveiled less than three weeks before the country was set to vote on yet another constitutional formula agreed upon in Charlottetown. Though he did not explicitly state that peacekeeping should be a motivating factor in why people should vote yes, the Montreal *Gazette* reported that Mulroney used "the pomp-filled ceremony to pitch subliminal messages for a

[161] Brian Mulroney, "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Unveiling of the Peacekeeping Monument," (Ottawa, 1992).

Yes vote."[162] Such appeals were not ultimately successful, but they do demonstrate the wider political influence that peacekeeping was seen to possess.

Mulroney's PCs, like Pearson's Liberal government in the 1960s, were enthusiastic in their deployment of Canadians on UN peacekeeping operations. Where Trudeau's Liberals had called for caution with regard to Canadian involvement, the PCs pushed for more UN peacekeeping. In 1988, they volunteered Canadians to participate in missions to Iran, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. And when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeeping as an institution, many Canadians, including the government, took special pride in the part Canada had played.[163] In 1992, they signed up Canadians for duty in the Balkans as well as in Somalia. These two missions were new kinds of peacekeeping operations. In Bosnia, the Canadians took part in the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] that intervened among Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims without any effective peace treaty operating. The peacekeepers found themselves unable to control the violence there, and ethnic cleansings occurred despite their best efforts. In Somalia, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was sent to be a part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia [UNOSOM] in December of 1992. They were based in the town of Belet Huen.

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[162] Terrance Willis, "PM, Hnatyshyn make pitches for Yes at unveiling of statue to peacekeepers," *Montreal Gazette*, Friday 9 October 1992, A8.
[163] "Prize salutes peace forces," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Friday 30 September 1988, 22.

Members of the Airborne executed several Somalis, including Shidane Arone, a teenager who had been lured onto their base and subsequently tortured.[164]

Details about the killings in Somalia were first announced to Canadians by New Democrat MP John Brewin in the House of Commons. Brewin was told by the wife of Barry Armstrong, a doctor stationed in Somalia, that members of the Airborne were responsible for the "deliberate homicide" of an unarmed Somali man.[165] These allegations led to sustained Opposition attacks against the PCs. In the midst of a leadership campaign to replace Mulroney, Kim Campbell, then Minister of Defence, became a target for attacks. Rather than focus on what was actually taking place in Somalia and trying to help those who had been affected by the actions of the Airborne, the Opposition emphasised how Campbell would make a poor prime minister for Canada. Campbell was accused of spending all her time on the campaign trail rather than dealing with what Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy described as "the serious problems affecting us in Somalia."[166]

The Canadian government changed its discussions of peacekeeping in light of these events. Barbara McDougall, who had taken over from Joe Clark as Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1991, spoke vaguely of the tragedies of Somalia in many of her speeches. The situations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia were described as being more complex than those which had been experienced on earlier peacekeeping missions. She also noted, « il règne un

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[164] A detailed examination of these events in Somalia can be found in Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*.
[165] Geoffrey York, "Somali death 'deliberate,' MP says," *Globe and Mail*, Thursday 22 April 1993.
[166] Geoffrey York, "Campbell ignoring crisis in Somalia, opposition charges," *Globe and Mail*, Friday 23 April 1993.

atmosphère de pessimisme et d'inquiétude au lieu de l'optimisme de 1990. »[167] Few would deny such an assessment, but the government also preferred not to discuss what had actually taken place on those missions. The Somalis who were killed were not the central foci of the speeches of the PCs, nor were the people of Bosnia who were being killed despite the best efforts of the peacekeepers. Instead, the focus stayed on Canada and how peacekeeping remained part of its national character. Peacekeeping, despite the terrible actions of the Canadian Airborne, remained something which reflected proper Canadian values like « [la] paix et sécurité, [le] respect des droits de la personne et des libertés démocratiques et [l']influence sur les décisions qui façonnent le monde. »[168]

Throughout their time in office, the PCs emphasized Canada's peacekeeping past in an attempt to bring the nostalgic peacekeeping discourse to the fore. As in the last years of Pearson's time in office, the early years of the 1990s saw high levels of governmental support for peacekeeping but serious flaws in actual peacekeeping operations. Mulroney and his ministers spoke of the present value of peacekeeping in broad language that belied the underlying issues that had been exposed in Canada's participation in Somalia and Bosnia. As a result, the vision of a world in which Canada would participate in more and more

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[167] Department of External Affairs, "Allocution de l'honorable Barbara McDougall, Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, à l'America Society," *Déclarations et discours* 93, no. 36 (1993).
[168] Department of External Affairs, "Allocution de l'honorable Barbara McDougall, Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, devant le comité permanent des Affairs étrangéres et du commerce extérieur," *Déclarations et discours* 93, no. 11 (1993).

peacekeeping missions that had been spoken of so often just a few years earlier largely disappeared from the political rhetoric of the PCs.[169]

A Revised Peacekeeping Rhetoric, 1993 to 1997

The PCs would not remain in office long after the tragedies in Bosnia and Somalia took place. Under the leadership of Jean Chrétien, the Liberal Party swept to power after the PCs managed to win only two seats in the House. Chrétien had been an influential cabinet minister in Pearson and Trudeau's governments. Like Trudeau, Chrétien seemed cautious to engage Canada in any future peacekeeping operations. And given the recent record of Canada on those peacekeeping missions, he cannot be blamed for holding such views.

Despite these hesitations, there were continuities in how peacekeeping was discussed by Chrétien's government. His first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Ouellet, spoke in the House of Commons about Canada's proud peacekeeping past, giving credit, as per usual, to the actions of Lester Pearson.[170] When he spoke of peacekeeping in the present, however, Ouellet stated: "Canada cannot be everywhere, and do everything." He called on his fellow politicians to understand that Canada did not have the resources to participate in every peacekeeping mission and to recognize that often Canadians were better suited to administrating roles than to providing the central contribution to a force. This

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[169] This discussion of the Canadian government's rhetoric about peacekeeping is limited by the lack of access to the speeches of Brian Mulroney, Kim Campbell, Barbara MacDougall and Jean Chretien at Library and Archives Canada.

[170] Department of External Affairs, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Andre Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on Canada's Role in Peacekeeping," *Statements and Speeches* 94, no. 52 (1994).

was a discreet admission that the decision to send the Airborne to Somalia had been a mistake.

Like Trudeau's, Chrétien's government also focused more upon domestic concerns than upon its foreign policies. The Quebec separatist movement reached its apogee during the narrow defeat of the 1995 sovereignty referendum, and the desire to drastically reform the economic relationship between the federal government and the provinces took up much of the Chrétien Liberals' focus.[171] Defence spending was also slashed as part of the Government's attempts to balance the budget. But Chrétien's Liberals were not immune to changing ideas about peacekeeping that emerged in the middle years of the 1990s. "Peace-building" and "Human Security" became the buzz words at the UN and among the DEA. These terms were supposed to reflect more accurately the varied tasks that a UN force might be asked to perform on any given operation. The terms acknowledged that peace was a process that could be encouraged before conflicts began, necessitated certain steps while conflicts were openly being waged, and required justice and demobilization to be at the heart of efforts when those conflicts came to an end.[172] The Liberals therefore remained interested in discussing peacekeeping, while expressing a reluctance to actually send more Canadians abroad.

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[171] For a detailed discussion of the latter, see Michelle Weinroth, "Rituals of Rhetoric and Nationhood: The Liberal Anti-Deficit Campaign (1994-1998)," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2004).
[172] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a Meeting of the National Forum on Foreign Policy," *Statements and Speeches* 96, no. 57 (1996).

In their publication *Canada and the World*, the Liberals set out such ideas for Canadians. This document openly discussed the "shortcomings in UN capabilities" in the 1990s.[173] However, it mentioned only the delays in deploying personnel in Somalia and Rwanda, rather than addressing the more serious issues at the hearts of these operations.[174] *Canada in the World* also contained language which talked of Canada's "strong values, strong institutions, strong traditions and a committed and knowledgeable public." The Liberals believed that the Canadian commitment to tolerance, democracy, equality, and the peaceful resolution of differences, among others, made it able to do its "fair share for the world" in terms of peacekeeping.

Speaking at the UN in 1996, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy stressed that the world needed to show itself "capable of restoring the spirit of 1956 when, in the deepest freeze of the Cold War climate, the UN gave birth to peacekeeping, and changed international relations forever."[175] As with earlier Canadian addresses at the UN, these words were meant as much for a domestic Canadian audience as they were for the peoples of the world. Axworthy was trying to motivate his compatriots to not give up on the UN and on peacekeeping, despite the disastrous outcomes of Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. By making an

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[173] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: The Government of Canada, 1995).

[174] Romeo Dallaire's account of what took place in Rwanda is a gripping and disturbing assessment of the UN's failings. See Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House, 2003).

[175] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloydy Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations," *Statements and Speeches* 96, no. 37 (1996).

appeal to 1956, he hoped to remind his audience of Canada's once great position in international affairs and to pledge his government's support for trying to find useful solutions in the present that might, however unlikely, recapture that role.

The Liberals would continue to talk about peacekeeping, but the findings of the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia begun in November of 1994 to investigate what had taken place on UNOSOM discouraged the sending of Canadian troops abroad. This Commission condemned the systemic racism and sexism in the Canadian military, called for the dissolution of the Airborne Regiment and for significant changes in the institutional culture of the Canadian Forces.[176] Chrétien's government shut down the investigation before the issue of Arone's death could be investigated which was well in advance of what the Commissioners desired, and before claims that the Canadian Forces had perjured themselves or obstructed the Inquiry could be fully explored.[177] This tense political climate made peacekeeping far less appealing as a functional policy. [178] The present therefore held numerous obstacles that needed to be overcome for Canada to continue its peacekeeping role.

Conclusion

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[176] Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, "Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair," (Ottawa, 1997).

[177] Peter Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-up: A Commissioner's Journal* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997).

[178] Speaking to a National Press Club audience, David Kilgour, the Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, stated: His government's reluctance to engage in peacekeeping operations that seemed ineffectual was the central theme in his address. He also spoke with a critical bent when he noted, "We are proud of our role as international peacekeepers, but we need to start developing new tools as well, to respond to new challenges." Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable David Kilgour, Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) at the October Meeting of the Diplomatic Press Attache Network National Press Club," *Statements and Speeches* 97, no. 41 (1997).

As the Chrétien government dealt with the fallout from the Somalia Commission's report, peacekeeping appeared to have lost much of its discursive value for Canada's politicians. That it had remained a powerful rhetorical tool as long as it did was largely because of the symbolic connection between peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. This connection was made early on in the events of the Suez Crisis. The prevalence of domestic debates about Canada's independence from Britain encouraged discussions of peacekeeping to be similarly framed. This meant politicians focused upon peacekeeping's effects on Canada, not on the host nations or the UN forces. At the same time, neither the Liberals nor the PCs questioned the necessity of Canada's commitments to the UN which had been a central part of Canada's foreign policies since 1945. But where people stood on the Suez issue said more than whether or not they approved of the UNEF – it was a statement about whether or not they saw Canada as a British nation.

Under Pearson's Liberal government after 1963, peacekeeping became a more symbolically Canadian activity. The domestic uncertainty regarding Quebec's place in Canada permitted many people, including Pearson and Martin, to look back to Canada's "golden age" of international action, when French-English concerns seemed to pale in comparison to the importance of making the UN a success. By hearkening to a past that saw great Canadian success under a Liberal Government, Pearson and Martin encouraged Canadians to forget the domestic debates over Canada's relationship to Britain. Instead, they positioned

peacekeeping as a once, present, and future method of restoring, achieving, and promoting a strong and unified Canadian identity measured in international influence. During the middle years of the 1960s, therefore, peacekeeping became more than a constructive policy or a way to dream about a more peaceful future. It became a way to discuss an unchanging Canadian past as well, making it an increasingly symbolic concept that was detached from the outcomes of individual operations.

In making these links to both the past and the future, politicians played a vital part in causing peacekeeping to become adopted into Canada's national symbology. This temporal malleability permitted many Canadian politicians and their audiences to envision peacekeeping as a part of Canada's interests despite intermittent governmental support, particularly during the Diefenbaker and Trudeau terms, and the shortcomings of many missions. What I have termed the nostalgic discourse of peacekeeping saw politicians consistently recalling the work of Lester Pearson in creating UNEF. Times of uncertainty about Canada's identity in the present, like the middle years of the 1960s as well as the late 1980s, encouraged the use of this language more than others. Mulroney and his ministers were particularly prone to recalling the deeds of Lester Pearson with a glowing nostalgia that erased the past conflicts and shortcomings of the actual peacekeeping operations. They promoted Pearson's time as a knowable and more stable era that should be celebrated and envied.

Politicians' use of a progressive discourse about world peace in the future also remained centred around the perceived value of the UN as an organization. In the 1960s, Paul Martin spoke often of the need for idealism in Canada's foreign policies and his fondness for peacekeeping because it could provide an outlet for such thinking. However, international peacekeeping failures in the late 1960s and the early 1990s made this rhetoric more hollow than hopeful. The failures of UNPROFOR and UNOSOM, in particular, necessitated new thinking about peacekeeping.

PC and Liberal politicians used similar language to describe peacekeeping, suggesting not only a consensus on foreign policy during these years, but a shared desire to symbolically link Canada and UN peacekeeping. This support further immunized peacekeeping from much effective criticism from 1956 to 1997. Trudeau's government came closest to re-thinking Canada's peacekeeping role, but in practice, if not in thought, it maintained Canada's position as a world leader in UN support. It was only after the events in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda that Jean Chretien's Liberals began to speak less of peacekeeping than of peace-making.

In light of these factors, the political rhetoric of peacekeeping provides important insights into why and how so many Canadians associated their national identities with peacekeeping between 1956 and 1997. Though politicians made their appeals regularly, their voices did not exist in a vacuum. Non-state actors also influenced how Canadians understood themselves as a nation of "Blue

Berets." How their messages deviated or stayed similar to these "official" discourses is equally crucial for understanding why so many Canadians identified themselves with peacekeeping.

Chapter Two
"Wasted Hours and Abject Boredom": Peacekeeping in Canadian High School History Classrooms, 1959-1997

Politicians were not solely responsible for "official" discussions of peacekeeping which situated it as part of a Canadian national identity. While federal leaders took to the national stage to address various audiences, individual Canadians also learned about their country's peacekeeping acumen in their homes and their school classrooms. The adoption of peacekeeping as a national marker would not have been possible without sites like the classroom reinforcing messages that were produced by politicians and newspaper authors. The texts used within those classrooms required approval from the various ministries of education which discouraged students and teachers from challenging their versions of the past. Textbooks also sanitized the version of Canada's past which students were taught. This erased many of the conflicts and ambiguities surrounding Canada's peacekeeping role and promoted young people's taking on the methods and goals of peacekeeping in their daily lives. While the reception of these messages is difficult to ascertain, these textbooks provide clear evidence of an important way that messages linking Canada's national identity to peacekeeping were disseminated from 1959 to 1997.

For those who entered high schools in Canada any time after 1959, their approved teaching materials often included discussions about peacekeeping and Canada's role in its creation. Until 1997, peacekeeping in some high school textbooks and other audio-visual materials increased from perhaps a paragraph

to several chapters; however the actual amount of history that was taken by most students in Canada shrank considerably.[179] By examining changes in the contents of high school textbooks, the form in which they delivered that information, and how students and teachers used that language when writing to the federal government, this chapter presents a major way in which messages about peacekeeping were transmitted to Canadians.

School classrooms have been perceived as crucial sites where ideas about national and self identity are formed in children, adolescents, and teachers. Not surprisingly, given its high level of support from politicians, filmmakers, and newspaper authors, peacekeeping came to garner a place in classroom materials that was disproportionate to the successes achieved in any operation. Equally unsurprising were individual authors' emphases on the Canadian role in UN peacekeeping and their lack of content about the host nations. Unlike numerous other media, a predominant number of history textbooks disregarded the controversies that surrounded the creation of UNEF because this did not fit with their positive narratives of Canadian history. Most textbooks symbolically linked peacekeeping to Canada's national maturity and independence, particularly during the first twenty years it was mentioned. Some texts were more critical of Canada's later peacekeeping endeavours, but few failed to praise Lester Pearson and his actions in 1956. In the 1980s, progressive language was increasingly

[179] In Ontario, for example, the percentage of history classes taken out of the total for all high school classes in 1964 was 11.4% while in 1981 it had dropped to 6.6%. Bob Davis, *Whatever Happened to High School History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-95* (Toronto: James Lormier and Company Limited, 1995), 48. In Quebec, on the other hand, history became a regularly-taught subject but the emphasis of such classes was the history of Quebec

employed as a means to encourage young Canadians to adopt peace in their lives and authors devoted whole chapters of their works to peacekeeping. Accordingly, the symbolic attachment of peacekeeping to Canada's national identity permitted it to be a subject that could be used for a number of educational purposes. This encouraged its inclusion in high school history courses where young Canadians could learn about themselves as part of a nation of "Blue Berets."

This chapter is divided into four sections which describe how the peacekeeping discourses accorded with textbook requirements across Canada, though the emphasis will be on Ontario and Quebec.[180] In each section, the similarities and differences between English and French Canadian textbook discussions about peacekeeping will be apparent, particularly after the 1960s. Many historians believe that examining approved textbooks provides a way to glean the "official ideologies regarding identity, community and citizenship" that a country endorses.[181] In Canadian education historiography, authors have often chosen to limit their studies to English Canada or Quebec, since the latter went through changes in the 1950s and 1960s that were particular to its own

[180] Looking at Canadian history textbooks across the provinces is simplified by almost all textbook production during this time period coming from either Toronto for English-language history texts, or Montreal for French-language history texts. In 1960, Montreal accounted for 21% of the entire printing industry in Canada and Toronto 31%; textbooks in particular were centrally located in these urban areas for their historical links to the publishing industry, as well as Ontario and Quebec being by far the largest market for texts. Hence, the books that were approved in the West or the Maritimes were almost always the same as those that were approved in Ontario. Guy P.F. Steed, "Centrality and Locational Change: Printing, Publishing and Clothing in Montreal and Toronto " *Economic Geography* 52, no. 3 (1976); George S. Tomkins, *A Common Countenance: Stability and Change in the Canadian Curriculum* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 410.

[181] Amy Von Heyking, *Creating Citizens: History and Identity in Alberta's Schools, 1905-1980* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2006), 5.

circumstances decades after such changes took place in the other provinces.[182] More often, Quebec and its education system are treated as a separate topic of study in books, and Ontario is allowed to represent English Canada.[183] In looking at the time period 1959 to 1997, however, comparing English and French Canadian textbooks provides insight into why authors used specific language to discuss Canada's peacekeeping role during a particular era.

The form of the history text allows the inclusion and exclusion of certain topics to become quite transparent. Since classroom materials are under the purview of the provinces and not the federal government, there was not always a strong correlation between federal attitudes towards peacekeeping and what appeared in a given text. However, the choice of mandatory subjects, what was taught or omitted from course curricula, and what information was included or excluded from textbooks, all required an exercise of authority by authors, publishers, and government officials regarding the broader goals of an education, as well as an insistence on the value of certain topics over others. Textbooks can therefore help demonstrate what a nation recognizes as legitimate and truthful stories about itself and its past.[184] A glimpse into these processes is possible through letters written to the federal government by students and teachers from 1956 to 1997. Several dozen of these letters have been preserved, and their

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[182] Quality studies that have looked at only English Canada include Frye, *Design for Learning: Reports submitted to the Joint Committee of the Toronto Board of Education and the University of Toronto*; Hodgetts and Gallagher, *Teaching Canada for the '80s*; Neatby, *So Little for the Mind.*

[183] This is not altogether a bad idea, since Quebec is very much deserving of its own studies. As well, Ontario seems to be the testing ground for most educational policies in Canada, and the home of most educational materials for use in classrooms, so giving it priority in books is justified.

[184] Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian Smith, eds., *The Politics of the Textbook* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 4.

language and understandings of Canada as a peacekeeping nation suggest that for some students, the "official" messages contained in their textbooks were a part of their historical education.

The 99 history textbook authors whose works were examined for this chapter told the whole story of Canadian history while highlighting certain themes in order to gain approval by the various provincial Ministries of Education. In these texts, the pronouns "our" and "us" were commonly used in describing Canada's past.[185] Peacekeeping and other topics were taken to be reflections of "our" history that were worthwhile for "us" to remember. Historian Timothy Stanley has argued that the use of such pronouns cannot help but lead to racial exclusion because, "[i]f certain people and things are thought to be Canadian and others not, it is because lived histories have associated particular representations and particular physical characteristics with being Canadian."[186] The figures depicted as "our" peacekeepers are white men, selectively excluding most of Canada's population from being one of its national symbols. At the same time, by using such pronouns, these textbooks consciously attempted to make students associate themselves with Canada and its past in order to further what Benedict Anderson calls an "imagined community."[187]

The narratives of Canada's past that included peacekeeping also served to reinforce symbols of national identity. Education historian Ian Grosvenor has

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[185] Linda Lesvik in Peter N. Stearns, Peter Sexias, and Sam Wineburg, eds., *Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 290.
[186] Sandwell, ed. *To The Past: History Education, Public Memory, and Citizenship in Canada*, 34.
[187] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.*

looked at ordinary people's conceptions of what it means to be British and found a correlation with ideas in textbooks, posters found in classrooms, and the films that were shown to students.[188] New symbols of national identity are rarely created in the school classroom, owing to the wide variety of learning styles that teachers can employ, the time lag between events and their inclusion in teaching materials, and the classroom's being a site of consensus-building, rather than innovation, in the teaching of history.[189] As a result, the narratives about peacekeeping that were presented in textbooks had to resemble the dominant discourses being used by other state and non-state actors. Textbooks are therefore best viewed as disseminators of the nostalgic, functionalist, and progressive peacekeeping discourses, and not their creators.

State control over educational content must be tempered with the understanding that it is impossible to know what occurred in every history classroom across Canada during this time period. Individual teachers and students played an active role in shaping what was learned in their Canadian history classes. [190] Undoubtedly, there would have been those who read every word of the prescribed textbooks, believed what they said about peacekeeping, and remembered that information for many years to come. Yet, there would also have been students who were simply not interested in learning about Canadian

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[188] Ian Grosvenor, "'There's no place like home': education and the making of national identity," *History of Education* 28, no. 3 (1999): 238..

[189] Jocelyn Letourneau, a scholar who works on Québécois educational history, has suggested that "[i]f the teacher says something that is not reinforced by other information outside the class, or something that does not belong to a dominant common way of seeing, then it might well be cast aside." See Sandwell, ed. *To The Past: History Education, Public Memory, and Citizenship in Canada*, 80.

[190] Paul Axelrod, "Beyond the Progressive Education Debate: A Profile of Toronto Schooling in the 1950s," *Historical Studies in Education* 17, no. 2 (2005): 240.

history, or read for their tests, and quickly forgot all that they had learned. Some teachers also likely skipped over the sections of the texts that included peacekeeping, or chose to add their own emphasis on topics that strayed from the official textbook accounts. Standardized provincial examinations were also eliminated from high schools in some Canadian provinces in the 1960s, which helped to free up what was taught to a considerable extent. Many students and teachers alike no longer had to focus primarily on learning for these exams, which could allow for different topics of study to be encountered in some history classes.

In the last decades of the century, however, teachers became more bound to the guidelines of the various education ministries. In the 1990s in Ontario, the PC government instituted a number of reforms, including the return of standardized report cards and province-wide curricula, and reduced the number of school boards by one half.[191] Such reforms occurred across the country in the wake of parents and politicians raising concerns about students not receiving a "proper education."[192] As a result, teachers were pushed to rely upon textbooks to a greater extent, which makes their contents an even more valuable topic of study.

Peacekeeping's symbolic association with Canada's national identity proved useful for satisfying the desires of "progressive" reformers, as well as those parents, teachers, and policy-makers who held fast to more traditional techniques

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[191] George J. Bedard and Stephen B. Lawton, "The Struggle for Power and Control: Shifting Policy-Making Models and the Harris Agenda for Education in Ontario," *Canadian Public Administration* 43, no. 3 (2000): 250.
[192] Michael Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canadian History, the Sundering of Canada," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 26, no. 4 (1991); J.L Granatstein, *Who Killed Canadian History?* (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd., 1998).

for learning. As an almost universal experience for young people, the classroom was a significant site for learning about Canada's peacekeeping past, its present, and its future. The events, names, themes, and images about peacekeeping that were to be taught (and hopefully learned) by students shed considerable light on how the state and ordinary Canadians negotiated Canada's identity as a nation of "Blue Berets" from 1959 to 1997.

Peacekeeping and Canadian Independence, 1959 to 1967

Owing to the time lag between when events occurred and when they were included in history textbooks, the first descriptions of Canada's peacekeeping efforts were not published until 1959. By that time, as shown in Chapter One, the PCs and the Liberals expressed bipartisan agreement about peacekeeping's functional and progressive value. This section describes how peacekeeping was narrated in English- and French-Canadian textbooks by examining individual textbooks and their authors. These authors made choices about what to include and what to omit from their works, significantly influencing the contents of later texts.

Peacekeeping was first discussed in the 1959 textbook, *Canada: A Political and Social History* by Edgar McInnis. Originally written for students in Grade 10 history classes in 1947, this text had Canada, the United States, and Great Britain in the twentieth century as its focus. This is significant because Grade 10 would

have provided many students' last exposure to Canadian history, as a large proportion left school for work at the end of the tenth grade.[193]

McInnis' work was a linear narrative of Canadian history. In a later chapter dealing with Canada and the Cold War, three text-only pages detailed the Canadian role at the UN. A little more than one of these pages covered the Suez Crisis by focusing upon Lester Pearson's role in solving the threat to world peace. McInnis' book noted that Canada had acted on its own during that fall: "[t]he Canadian government shared Washington's opposition to the use of force, but went further than the American administration in its desire not merely to end the fighting, but to strive for a new approach to a permanent solution instead of merely returning to the status quo ante."[194] Independent action was emphasized through descriptions of *Canadian* efforts that led to the creation of UNEF, as well as *Canadians* who provided the largest part of the forces sent to the Canal region.[195] By giving Canada credit for solving this international problem and by placing it in a very positive light, contrary to how many PCs had understood the actions of Pearson and the Liberal government in 1956, McInnis' text exposed Canadian adolescents to a particular version of the events of the Suez Crisis. This account did not dwell on the rifts that had been caused between those who felt Canada should support Britain and those who felt that the cause of world peace

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[193] Paul Axelrod notes that in 1950, most students in Ontario left high school for work after Grade 10, but that by 1960, this number had dropped dramatically. Axelrod, "Beyond the Progressive Education Debate: A Profile of Toronto Schooling in the 1950s," 232.
[194] Edgar McInnis, *Canada: A Political and Social History* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, and Company Limited, 1959), 532.
[195] Ibid.

was of higher import. Nor did it note that the Liberals had lost a considerable number of votes because of how the Suez Crisis was handled. Instead, its version of the events gave Canada the starring role as world peace broker.

In Quebec, mention of peacekeeping first appeared in the 1960 textbook *La civilisation catholique et française au Canada* by Gérard Filteau. Filteau's texts, including this one, were criticized by Marcel Trudel and Genevieve Jain in their report to the Bilingual and Bicultural Commission for being "rarely realistic, sometimes heroic (reading like a fairy tale or a succession of miracles), and sometimes rancorous or vengeful."[196] Chapter 28, "Le canadien français d'aujourd'hui," included the subsection, "Regard sur le monde," in which peacekeeping received a brief mention in one paragraph. In discussing peacekeeping, Filteau's text took a different tone than McInnis'. Instead of applauding Canada's commitment to world peace, he wrote «Ainsi a-t-il applaudi avec ardeur son premier ministre lorsque celui-ci, en 1956, à l'occasion de la crise de Suez, fit savoir à la Grande-Bretagne que le Canada ne la suivrait pas dans sa politique. »[197] In a text designed for a Quebec audience, Canada's refusal to go to war alongside Britain was highlighted, and students would have understood that this decision was in contrast to what took place in the First and Second World Wars as issues of conscription were covered at length in this text. While both Filteau's and McInnis' texts applauded Canada's independence, in the Quebec

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[196] Marcel Trudel and Genevieve Jain, *Canadian History Textbooks: A Comparative Study*, Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), 16.
[197] Gérard Filteau, *La civilisation catholique et française au Canada* (Montreal: Centre de psychologie et de pedagogie, 1960), 459.

text peacekeeping became something that could be praised for keeping Canada out of a war rather than something that actively led to world peace.

Filteau's and McInnis' texts represented the beginning of a wave of textbooks that would make their way into Canadian classrooms throughout the 1960s. These newer works were commissioned after repeated criticisms were levelled against older works that tended to focus more on heroes in history and contained overtly racist language.[198] These newer texts, however, maintained their emphasis on the political and military history of Canada by making wars, rebellions, and prime ministers their central figures. Canadian external affairs also received significantly less space in the history texts for Quebec schools than in their English counterparts, as the former spent more time on the internal history of Quebec.[199] In both cases, the Suez Crisis was condensed into a small number of actors, a few dates, and facts that could be memorized and tested easily. Peacekeeping was therefore considered a useful topic in Canadian history textbooks because it could be part of what was traditionally emphasized in history classrooms.

Throughout the 1960s, many of the leading writers in Canadian history produced works that were used in high school classrooms. 1963 saw the publication of two texts co-authored by Ramsay Cook: *Canada and the United*

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[198] For examples of these texts, see Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71*.

[199] The standard format for a Quebec history text in this time period was three sections: the first dealt with European contact to 1763; the next, from 1763-1867; and the third, from 1867 to the present. In each section, chapters would normally include a brief description of what was happening in Canada generally, and then spend the bulk of the text on what was occurring in Quebec.

States: A Modern Study with Kenneth McNaught, and *Canada: A Modern Study* with John C. Ricker and John Saywell. That same year, J.M.S. Careless' *Canada: A Story of Challenge* was published, and he would also write *The Canadians: 1867-1967* four years later. Many authors, including Ramsay Cook, had links to the Liberal Party, and their texts were overwhelmingly positive in their discussions of peacekeeping and Lester Pearson's conduct during the Suez Crisis. Cook was well-known for publicly supporting Pierre Trudeau's 1968 campaign to become Prime Minister, and was a Liberal supporter prior to that as well. His works treated peacekeeping as an issue in which a consensus had been reached; dissenting voices were not included.

These newer works were intended for use in upper-year history courses that had Canada in the twentieth century as their focus. As with McInnis' text, they all included between one and five pages of text about Canada's peacekeeping efforts. In *Canada and the United States: A Modern Study*, peacekeeping was described as an appropriate foreign policy for a "middle power" like Canada, and Pearson's efforts were applauded as being contrary to the actions of the British, which were "unquestionably a violation of the United Nations Charter."[200] In Careless' work, Canada was given the leading role in the Suez affair, and also a newfound independence; he wrote, "[a]s she had not previously followed the United States in bristling antagonism to Communist China, so now she did not endorse Anglo-French armed intervention at Suez. Instead she sought once more to find a means

[200] Ramsay Cook and Kenneth McNaught, *Canada and the United States: A Modern Study* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, Ltd., 1963), 479.

of peaceful adjustment through the United Nations."[201] These authors preferred to downplay the tensions that the creation of UNEF had caused by emphasizing its initial success at separating Israel and Egypt, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Pearson, and by suggesting that this was a sign of Canada's independent foreign policy.

In 1963, W.L. Morton's *The Kingdom of Canada* was published and included two text-only pages discussing peacekeeping. Morton was a supporter of the PC Party, though as Carl Berger has suggested, this had more to do with his revulsion at the tactics of the King-era Liberal government and its handling of Parliament and the national symbols of Canada, than a PC set of beliefs.[202] Despite this, his description of the Suez Crisis relied upon a language similar to that found in the books of more Liberal-minded authors. Lester Pearson's actions were called "brilliant," and the efforts of Canada to solve the Suez Crisis were applauded, though Morton did note that some people in English Canada were angered by the Liberal handling of the Suez Crisis.[203] Thanks to his Nobel Peace Prize and because of the perceived utility of peacekeeping as a policy, Pearson seemed to be beyond reproach from both Liberal and PC authors.

All of these authors were respected university professors who helped to disseminate a positive narrative about peacekeeping to students in the 1960s. They represented a generation of university-level scholars who took an active role

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[201] J.M.S. Careless, *Canada:A Story of Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), 423.
[202] Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English- Canadian Historical Writing, 1900-1970* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 251.
[203] W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada: A general history from earliest times* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963), 511.

in writing for younger Canadians, following the paths of Donald Creighton, Arthur Lower, and others. Their works were also, in part, an answer to the call put out by Northop Frye in his introduction to his 1962 work *Design for Learning*, which asked the question "does teaching in the schools, or at least the secondary schools, reflect contemporary conceptions of the subjects being taught?"[204] Frye's work answered with a resounding no, but the publication of high-school level textbooks by leading historians during the middle years of the 1960s suggests that some authors tried to bridge the gap between high school and university history. These authors did this in part by making their works positive narratives of Canadian history. The reverence for Pearson was a significant part of many texts which celebrated Canada in the 1950s as the culmination of decades of advancement in numerous fields, including international affairs. In so doing, they sought to cultivate a national consciousness in young Canadians that might lead them to greater achievements in this field.

Despite a proliferation of positive messages about peacekeeping, such works did not entirely control how the events of the fall of 1956 were taught in Canadian history classrooms. A.B. Hodgetts' 1960 work *Decisive Decades: A History of the Twentieth Century for Canadians*, which would be revised in 1973 and remain in print for almost two decades, took a more critical tone. Hodgetts was a high school teacher in Port Hope, Ontario, and his voice would remain one of the loudest calling for reform in the teaching of Canadian history through the 1980s.

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[204] Frye, *Design for Learning: Reports submitted to the Joint Committee of the Toronto Board of Education and the University of Toronto*, 3.

He spread his discussion of the Suez Crisis over ten pages and included a small photo of Pearson, as well as a larger image of Nasser, in his text. Hodgetts noted that there was "bitter controversy" over the Suez Crisis and "[a]lthough Pearson received wide overseas acclaim and a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, his failure to give unquestioning support to Great Britain at the time of the Suez crisis undoubtedly helped to defeat the Liberal Party in the Canadian general election of 1957."[205] This text recognized that the Suez Crisis had caused domestic discord and that Pearson's winning the Nobel Peace Prize did not make this disappear entirely. However, Hodgetts' text approved of peacekeeping as a policy and argued that Pearson deserved his international recognition. This allowed his narrative not to stray too far from the other books in use at the time.

Hodgetts did not end his narrative complimenting Canada on how far it had progressed.[206] He called for Canada to do more to bring about a more peaceful planet, but he doubted Canada's commitment to such a cause. This foreshadowed some of the texts approved for use later in the decade, when the limitations of peacekeeping became more widely known, and optimism about Canada's international standing began to wane.

By 1961, the Canadian role in ONUC could also be mentioned in textbooks, though discussions of it often remained absent. After 1965, UNFICYP also began to be briefly mentioned in many textbooks. These missions could be fit into textbooks with little difficulty, since they showcased Canada's exerting itself in

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[205] A.B. Hodgetts, *Decisive Decades: A History of the Twentieth Century for Canadians* (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons (Canada) Limited, 1960), 547.
[206] Ibid., 548.

the international community in the name of peace. Those authors who mentioned ONUC did not find it necessary to go into much detail or depth about the mission to the Congo or its causes. Instead, phrases like "chaos in the Congo" and "the need to go and establish order" were employed.[207] This emphasis on Canada's role was indicative of the discourse that surrounded the Congo at the time.[208] The whiteness of the Canadians and the inferiority of the Black Congolese was also expressed in a limited number of texts.[209] These texts made the Congo into a place that was un-modern, since it required vast Canadian efforts to overcome the "immense Congo jungle."[210]

The longest description of ONUC appeared in Lucien Brault's 1965 textbook *Le Canada au XXe siècle*. Brault's work contained eight pages of text about Canada's peacekeeping role, the longest description of peacekeeping operations in any Quebec-approved work to that point. Generally espousing a functional narrative, the description of ONUC was accompanied by pictures on three full pages. These photos showed white Canadian soldiers helping out the Congolese in a variety of ways, including setting up a radio station while several civilians looked on.[211] In the photos, the white Canadians were listed by name and place of birth (with most coming from Quebec), while the Congolese remained nameless.

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[207] Hugh W. Peart and John Schaffter, *The Winds of Change: A History of Canada and Canadians in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1961), 444.
[208] See Colin McCullough, "'No Axe to Grind in Africa': Violence, Racial Prejudice and Media Depictions of the Canadian Peacekeeping Mission to the Congo, 1960-1964," in *New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of a Global Consciousness*, ed. Karen Dubinsky et al. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009).
[209] Gerald W.L. Nicholson, H.H. Boyd, and R.J. Rannie, *Three Nations: Canada, Great Britain and the United States in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Mcclelland and Stewart Limited, 1962), 373-74.
[210] Peart and Schaffter, *The Winds of Change: A History of Canada and Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, 444.
[211] Lucien Brault, *Le Canada au XXe siècle* (Scarborough: Nelson, 1965).

Though the photos that were used may have been issued by the Canadian military and hence included information only about the Canadians, such details made the Canadians the more important figures in the photos and the text, and suggested to students that Canadians were more important as peacekeepers than the people whom they were sent to help.

All the textbooks used at this time combined positive descriptions of Canada's peacekeeping efforts with the valorization of Lester Pearson and his work to bring about world peace. In McInnis' 1959 work, Pearson was said to "embody" Canada's foreign policy, due to his role in drafting and implementing Canada's international actions.[212] Most texts also mentioned Canada's increased international reputation because of Pearson's actions in founding UNEF. Indeed, if there was one fact in a textbook about peacekeeping, it was that Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Additionally, if there was to be a photo relating to peacekeeping, then it was most likely one of Pearson receiving his Nobel Prize.[213]

The language used to describe peacekeeping and making Lester Pearson its personification intimates strong approval for peacekeeping in these years. Whether expressed by J.M.S. Careless as "constructive achievement," or by Edgar McInnis as "a new self-confidence," this independent thinking in foreign policy

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[212] McInnis, *Canada: A Political and Social History*, 530.

[213] A picture of Pearson winning the Nobel Prize appears in Paul Cornell et al., *Canada: Unity in Diversity*, English Edition ed. (Toronto, Montreal: Holt, Rineheart and Winston of Canada, Ltd, 1967); D.M.L. Farr, J.S. Moir, and S.R. Mealing, *Two Democracies* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1963); John C. Ricker, John T. Saywell, and Elliot E. Rose, *The Modern Era* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1960).

was done with a purpose.[214] And while in English-Canadian texts friendly relations with both Britain and the US were seen as vital, in French texts, echoing the ideas of Filteau, what was most admired was Canada's ability to refuse outside interference in its politics. [215]

Including peacekeeping as part of a general discussion of "Canada in the 1950s" presented it as part of a narrative of growth and independence, culminating in the successes of the 1950s and hope for Canada's future. [216] Such a narrative, authored as it was by both Liberal and PC voices, demonstrates peacekeeping's adoption as an activity that suited Canada as an independent nation. A former high school teacher, Bob Davis, described the books produced in this period as having realized that "this new conception of our own nationhood had also given us a new conception of our role in international affairs, a role many people associate with Lester B. Pearson."[217] By linking Pearson, peacekeeping, and a new national identity, these texts furthered the symbolic attachment of many Canadians to peacekeeping.

Remaining Functional, 1967 to 1980

The expulsion of UNEF from Egypt in 1967 forced many Canadians to re-examine their country's commitment to international peacekeeping. While peacekeeping's value as a foreign policy declined after Pierre Trudeau became

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[214] Careless, *Canada:A Story of Challenge*; Edgar McInnis, *The North American Nations* (Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons (Canada) Limited, 1963).
[215] Robert Lacour-Gayet, *Histoire du Canada* (Paris: Fayard, 1966), 546.
[216] J. Bartlett Brebner, *Canada: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), 544.
[217] Davis, *Whatever Happened to High School History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-95*, 34.

Prime Minister in 1968, such a shift never took place in Canadian history texts. In English works, the Suez Crisis remained the focal point of any discussion of peacekeeping and it was still presented as evidence of Canada's independence and maturity as a nation. Descriptions of peacekeeping continued to be positive, though newer texts more frequently addressed the limits of peacekeeping as a policy, and some came to express a longing for the 1950s. In French works, the post-Quiet Revolution period saw Quebec's history courses centred on the history of Quebec, which left little space to discuss peacekeeping's history or its present value. Peacekeeping's symbolic nature permitted its continued inclusion in most textbooks during this period though the overall educational goals of each province affected its use in a given text.

From 1968 to 1980, new curricula introduced in English Canadian high schools allowed students more elective courses, fewer mandatory history ones, less reliance on textbooks, and the use of more audio-visual materials.[218] In Alberta, "value issues" such as "Is war a legitimate means of settling disputes among nations?" were central in the Department of Education's *Program of Studies for Senior High Schools*.[219] In Quebec, conversely, a decided increase in the state control of education occurred after 1963, though the new Ministry of

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[218] Two important examples of this shift are the Parent Report released in Quebec in 1963 and the widely-influential 1968 report, *Living and Learning* for the Ontario Ministry of Education. These reports, and the many others that were submitted to various Ministries of Education across the country, led to the end of standardized examinations at the end of high school in some provinces, which freed teachers to explore new topics in their classrooms. In English Canada, Canadian Studies Classes became mandatory in grades 9 or10. In Quebec, more history courses were required, though many of these were during the elementary school years. Ibid; George Martell, ed. *The Politics of the Canadian Public School* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1974).

[219] Von Heyking, *Creating Citizens: History and Identity in Alberta's Schools, 1905-1980*, 204.

Education did share many of the same policy goals as its English counterparts. Textbooks published during these years reflected these goals by getting students to examine primary source materials, evaluate bias, investigate themes, and come to their own conclusions.[220]

As part of these units, peacekeeping was now more often described using language that centred upon Canada's contribution to world peace. One teacher, Mrs. R.A. Proulx of Chateauguay, Quebec, sent a letter to the Department of External Affairs in the spring of 1968 asking for resources for her class to use to meet these standards. She noted in her letter that the class would be using the "inquiry method" to understand Canadian history, and asked for "information on Canada's role in the UN especially in peace keeping endeavours."[221] The DEA sent back several speeches and two books on Canada and the UN to assist Mrs. Proulx with her course construction. Teachers like Mrs. Proulx demonstrate how peacekeeping continued to be employed by teachers to satisfy educational goals.

Many changes to history curricula came in response to criticisms of high school history which appeared in the second volume of the Bilingual and Bicultural Commission and in works such as A.B. Hodgetts' 1968 *What Culture? What Heritage?*[222] Though a textbook author, he chastised teachers for relying too heavily on texts to help tell the story of Canadian history. This suggests that

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[220] Davis, *Whatever Happened to High School History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-95*, 48.
[221] LAC, Mrs. R.A. Proulx, RG 25-A-3-c, file 3. "Gentlemen," 1968.
[222] Trudel and Jain found that "all teaching is centred on them [textbooks]; it is their content rather than the teacher's commentary which is retained by the student." Trudel and Jain, *Canadian History Textbooks: A Comparative Study*, xi.

the content of the textbooks in Canadian history to this point remained relevant in most classrooms. Hodgetts called the teaching of Canadian history defective because for him, "the countless hours wasted by the students each week, going through the mechanical motions of attempting unsuccessfully to find purpose in so many Canadian studies classrooms, sitting in abject boredom, and developing with each passing forty-minute lesson a deeper apathy, is a condition that should be tolerated no longer in our schools."[223] For Hodgetts, the positive narrative of Canadian history that appeared in most textbooks to describe topics like peacekeeping was not helping young people learn about their country. And, with the disappearance of some provincial exams in subjects like history during the 1960s, such adherence to a textbook seemed far less necessary than in the past.

One text which addressed these concerns was *Canada: Unity in Diversity,* a collaboration among French and English authors Marcel Trudel, Paul Cornell, Jean Hamelin, and Fernand Ouellet, approved for use in classrooms in 1967.[224] Their book took Anglo-French relations to be the central theme of Canadian history, not the progressive narrative common to most English texts, or *La Survivance,* common to most French texts. Approved for use in both English and French classrooms, and remaining in use throughout the next decade, this text was a highly-regarded attempt to break down the barriers between English- and French-Canadian history. Peacekeeping was included in a large part of the chapter, "Canada in the post-war World." There were four pages of text about

[223] A.B. Hodgetts, *What Culture? What Heritage?: A Study of Civic Education in Canada* (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1968), 16.
[224] The French title was *Canada: Unité et diversité.*

Canada's peacekeeping role, accompanied by a chart which listed all of the UN peacekeeping missions in which Canada had served, as well as photos of Pearson at the UN and peacekeepers in the Sinai and Cyprus.[225] By including pictures that matched the text that appeared on the page, the authors appealed to what was often seen as an increasingly visual adolescent culture. *Canada: Unity in Diversity* covered peacekeeping in a favourable manner, and the authors noted that "[h]aving no territorial ambitions and never having had colonies, Canada's advice has been acceptable on occasion to Afro-Asian countries deeply suspicious of most European nations."[226] They also lauded Pearson and the Liberals for trying to advance the cause of world peace, and emphasized Pearson's being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a key event. Therefore, those students who took the minimal Canadian history requirements continued to encounter positive descriptions of Canada's peacekeeping role in their texts.

Another way peacekeeping could be taught was through the use of audio-visual materials. One example was *The Tenth Decade: The Diefenbaker- Pearson Years* series co-produced by the CBC and the National Film Board. This eight-part film offered one-hour-long segments about the years 1957 to 1967. Made in 1971, the films primarily consisted of interviews with some of the larger figures of the time in Canadian politics, including Lester Pearson and John Diefenbaker. In looking at the Suez Crisis, the theme of "international applause versus domestic

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[225] The inclusion of pictures also forced this text, and many others, to increase in size and length to cope with the increased amount of information.
[226] Cornell et al., *Canada: Unity in Diversity*, 478.

divide" for Pearson's actions was of central concern.[227] While the textbooks of the early 1960s rarely spoke of such divides, they could be presented in the 1970s because new leaders and issues had come to the fore.

Additional resources included audio cassette interviews with Lester Pearson and John W. Holmes, a leading Canadian diplomat. The former was part of the *Canadian Public Figures on Tape* series made by the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education [OISE], in 1972. The latter, titled *Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, was also produced by OISE in 1974. As one can expect, these tapes suggested that "nothing is more important for Canada than a peaceful world."[228] Peacekeeping was presented as something that was, and remained, an important Canadian international role. Despite peacekeeping's waning popularity with the Trudeau government, these materials continued to espouse positive assessments of peacekeeping and Lester Pearson as the central figure in peacekeeping's creation.

Elective upper-year classes in Canadian history often offered alternative conceptions of peacekeeping. One of the best texts available was Jack Granatstein's 1969 edited work *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* This work contained excerpts from speeches by Lester Pearson, articles by diplomats and members of the Department of External Affairs, as well by academics like Granatstein himself. These academics doubted the present and future utility of Canada's peacekeeping role. Though all the

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[227] "Prologue to Power," (Canada: CBC, National Film Board, 1971).
[228] Arthur Andrew and John W Holmes, *Diplomacy and Foreign Policy* (Toronto: OISE, 1974), audio cassette recording.

authors lauded the 1950s as a "golden age" of foreign policy, they called peacekeeping the "most attractive and idealistic" opportunity for Canada after the Second World War in the realm of foreign policy.[229] Such assessments were in line with the thinking of the Trudeau government, and tried to separate peacekeeping as a policy from its more symbolic connotations.

Donald Creighton's *Canada's First Century: 1867-1967* was also available to use in these classes. Then one of the foremost names in Canadian history, Creighton was also an adamant PC critic of the Liberal government's actions in 1956. Creighton titled his chapter on the 1950s "Point of no return," and lamented Canada's turning away from Britain and, in his eyes, embracing the United States. In his attacks, Creighton chose to aim his words at former Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent rather than at Pearson. He noted that "St. Laurent shared this characteristically American suspicion of 'British imperial interests' in the Middle East; and nothing could irritate his prickly French-Canadian susceptibilities faster than the operations of British diplomacy."[230] In this single phrase, Creighton degraded French Canadians, attacked the Liberal Party, questioned the future survival of Canada, and expressed his desire for a return to closer ties between Canada and Britain. Pearson, however, seemed to be above his attacks, and received credit for solving the Suez Crisis, as well as for winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Like the PC politicians in 1956, Creighton did not question

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[229] Granatstein, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?* , 149.
[230] Creighton, *Canada's First Century, 1867-1967*, 298.

the value of peacekeeping as a policy, though he could not accept its more symbolic associations with a less Anglophilic Canada.

Quebec-approved texts did not try to change how peacekeeping was perceived by students because they had domestic politics as their primary concern. But texts that had come into use in the previous decade continued to discuss peacekeeping as a constructive step towards Canadian independence. *Canada-Québec: Synthèse Historique,* approved for use in 1969, contained two pages of text on peacekeeping, along with photos of Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson. It remained a popular textbook through to 1980, along with Trudel et al *Canada: Unité et Diversité.* A 1979 revision of Michel Brunet's 1963 work *Histoire du Canada par les Textes, Tome II (1855-1960)* also contained a discussion of the Suez Crisis as one of its last issues covered. Brunet included St. Laurent's speeches in Parliament in 1956 about the crisis, as well as a speech by Raoul Poulin, an independent member from Beauce, Quebec. Poulin was quoted as saying « J'approuve également, non par plaisir mais par devoir, ce geste pénible, tragique et douloureux par lequel l'ONU a du réprouver la conduite de nos alliés, l'Angleterre et la France. »[231] Because this text was updated from a decade earlier, it still presented peacekeeping as being compatible with the Québécois desire for isolationism.[232] It is also a reminder that revised editions of older works could still be used in classrooms, and these works often maintained older narrative forms and included minimal changes to remain in use.

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[231] Michel Brunet, *Histoire du Canada par les textes, tome II (1855-1960)* (Fides, 1979), 230.
[232] Ibid., 216.

By 1977, most Quebec texts focused more on language issues, which had been so prominent over the past twenty years, than on the narrative of Canadian independence. Peacekeeping had been included in earlier texts as an example of Canada's shedding its colonial past, but it had no real place in these later texts. Newer works like Gerard Cachat's *L'aventure française en Amérique: un défi, 1534-1976* contained only brief mentions of peacekeeping. In discussing the 1950s and Canada more broadly, Cachat wrote : « il y joue un rôle important et souvent méconnu: Lester B. Pearson y a été un des principaux artisans d'une politique pour le "maintien de la paix. »[233] No details about specific peacekeeping missions were given, and the Suez Crisis and Pearson's Nobel Prize win were both lacking from this text. Instead, the Quiet Revolution and the rise of the PQ dominated the section on modern Canada and modern Quebec. This suggests a shift in Pearson's legacy in Quebec from a politician who was best known for his worldly actions, to the domestic Liberal leader of the 1960s. If Pearson was mentioned at length in the texts of the 1970s in Quebec, it was usually for issuing the new Canadian flag, or for instituting the Bilingual and Bicultural Commission, rather than for having conceived peacekeeping.

These Quebec texts, while almost always marginalizing Canadian foreign policy after the Second World War, did reflect a pan-Canadian movement to return to a more structured high school curriculum. The declining enrolment numbers and reduced school budgets of the 1970s during the years of stagflation

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[233] Gerard Cachat, *L'aventure française en Amérique: un défi, 1534-1976* (Montreal: Lidec, 1977), 50.

resulted in many courses that had been created by teachers being cut in favour of a core group of courses.[234] George Tomkins suggests that Nova Scotia and Quebec led what he called a PC backlash against the open-concept running of high schools, and the return of textbook-centred history curricula.[235] In Quebec, Bill 71 was passed in December of 1979, which reinforced the ability of the Minister of Education to set curriculum organization and content, giving the Ministry considerably more power to exercise some form of control over the content of all history courses.

Discussions of peacekeeping in English Canadian textbooks changed little from 1967 to 1980 despite new educational goals, new textbooks, and new audio-visual resources. It continued to be presented to young people as a role that suited Canada. This speaks to the resilience of this version of peacekeeping's past and also to the inertia of textbook authors. Peacekeeping, as an entrenched subject in Canadian history textbooks, continued to have a place in English Canadian texts, though its relevance in Quebec was disappearing.

Peacekeeping and the Peace Studies Movement in the 1980s

After 1980, there were concerted efforts in many English textbooks to promote peacekeeping as a behaviour for young Canadians to adopt in their lives. Descriptions of Canada's peacekeeping past co-existed with such language, though peacekeeping's weaknesses were normally addressed as well. Lester Pearson's career also became viewed nostalgically, as writers realized with some

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[234] Tomkins, *A Common Countenance: Stability and Change in the Canadian Curriculum*, 315.
[235] Ibid., 413.

bittersweetness that no other Canadian had taken such a large role in promoting peace in the world. This led to whole chapters of many textbooks being devoted to peacekeeping in English Canada. At the same time, in the 1980s a vibrant peace movement in Quebec used progressive language to try to change the behaviours of children and parents while finding little need to refer to peacekeeping to make such claims. The success of this movement will be contrasted to what was gained through English depictions of Canada as a nation of past and future "Blue Berets."

In the early months of 1982, two grade ten classes in Medicine Hat, Alberta worked on a unit examining Canada's role in peacekeeping operations. As a part of that unit, each student was required to write a letter either in support of or against peacekeeping to then Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan.[236] One of these letters was written by "a concerned citizen," 16-year-old Richard Pomareinke, who provided seven reasons that he was impressed with Canada's peacekeeping efforts. They were:

1. Canada has a reputation of being impartial and willing to pay the cost.
2. Canadian forces are highly experienced in peacekeeping.
3. Peacekeeping prevents major wars from breaking out.
4. Canada has refused to make nuclear and atomic weapons even though it possesses the technology to do so.
5. By peacekeeping we have become friendly with many important nations.
6. Peacekeeping has been a part of Canada's identity for many years.
7. Canada has earned international gratitude and admiration for its role in peacekeeping.

[236] LAC, Medicine Hat High School, RG 25-A-3-c, "To the Minister of External Affairs," 1982.

Richard's arguments, like those of many of his classmates, matched the language of English Canadian textbooks from the 1960s onwards. This suggests that at least for the purposes of writing letters to the Ministry, Richard and his classmates read and adopted the language of a Canadian history textbook. Those letter-writers who did not like peacekeeping, and there were some, also learned the criticisms of peacekeeping that were specific to the texts of the 1980s, namely that Canada was paying too high a financial cost, that peacekeeping missions had cost too many Canadian lives, and that other nations were not doing their share to pay for peacekeeping operations. Though peacekeeping had not been a central focus of the Trudeau government's foreign policy, these students, their teachers, and the texts they read for this assignment all gave peacekeeping a central role in how Canada would engage in the world in the 1980s.

The textbooks available for use in classrooms across Canada in the 1980s differed in many ways from those published earlier. [237] The form of the textbook continued to change. Aides such as teacher's guides, an introductory page, summary questions, activities for students, key terms, and side boxes that highlighted topics that appeared in the main body of the text began to become standard features in approved textbooks. It was no longer the case that Canadian history textbooks would present their narrative in a linear format without pictures or breaks in the text.

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[237] The (often reluctant) inclusion of women's history, as well as a new emphasis on social and cultural themes meant that the older political narrative familiar to most history textbooks began to be altered in favour of newer topics of study. See Virginia Robeson and Christine Sylvester, *Teaching Canadian Studies: An Evaluation of Print Materials, Grades 1-13* (Toronto: OISE Press, 1980), vii.

In contrast to the notable authors who wrote textbooks in the 1960s, by the 1980s most were written by high school teachers who had taken on administrative roles within their schools. These authors collaborated with an academic to ensure their works were accurate and met ministry guidelines.[238] There was a shift away from producing texts for high school audiences among university level historians after the 1960s and 1970s. As writers became increasingly interested in producing works for a specialized audience, the dislocation between the most current historical research and what was being taught in history textbooks widened.

Textbooks used in classrooms in the 1980s were similar to those of decades earlier in one respect: many of the texts from twenty years earlier were still in print and in use in classrooms across Canada. Keeping a book in print for as long as possible, as well as producing two language versions, were ways for publishers to maximize their sales across the country and to try to maintain their slim profit margins. Trudel's, Cornell's, Hamelin's, and Ouellet's textbook was still one of the more popular textbooks across English Canada. Education critic Paul Bennett noted that *Canada: A Modern Study* by Ramsay Cook and Kenneth McNaught was still in use in many classes seventeen years after its initial publication, as were many of the other texts approved for use since 1963.[239] These realities made it possible for the student in 1980 to receive in many ways the same narrative

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[238] Patricia Baldwin and Douglas Baldwin, "The Portrayal of Women in Classroom Textbooks," *Canadian Social Studies* 26, no. 3 (1992): 110.
[239] Paul W. Bennett, *Rediscovering Canadian History* (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1980), 144.

about peacekeeping as a student in 1963, though teachers were being urged to rely more on their textbooks in the 1980s than they were when these works were newly published.

Peacekeeping had merited inclusion in every approved textbook for the previous twenty years, and this entrenched it in the overall narrative of most Canadian history texts.[240] However, many authors and teachers of Canadian history stressed the need for new topics of study, including peace in the 1980s. The peace studies movement in education had its roots in the efforts of the 1960s to raise awareness about the dangers of nuclear power. Those who wanted more peace education believed that the renewed Cold War rhetoric of Ronald Reagan in the United States and the nuclear arms build-up made the immediate threat of a nuclear war more pressing than it had been for twenty years.[241]

One call for more peace education came from *History and Social Science Teacher*. Published from 1974- 1990, *History and Social Science Teacher* provided a forum for teachers across Canada, at all levels, to discuss trends and issues that were relevant to their careers.[242] This publication dedicated a double issue in 1985 to the topic of peace education, receiving an "enthusiastic response" to its call for submissions. Ken Osborne, an educational historian and also the editor of *History and Social Science Teacher*, wrote: "[a]s teachers, we are concerned with children and can hardly avoid their questions and their fears,

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[240]For more on why textbook authors rarely remove topics from their works, see Apple and Christian Smith, eds., *The Politics of the Textbook*, 10.
[241] Ken Osborne, "Peace Education: Introduction," *History and Social Science Teacher* 20, no. 3/4 (1985): 7.
[242] Davis, *Whatever Happened to High School History?: Burying the political memory of youth: Ontario, 1945-95.*

which increasingly revolve around 'the bomb' and its impact on the future."[243] These concerns were echoed by Terry Carson, a professor at the University of Alberta, who believed that students were learning about nuclear proliferation and African destabilization from the media, and so teachers needed to engage with those subjects.[244] The educators who contributed to this issue all recognized the nuclear threat, and placed a great responsibility on teachers and students to bring about peace in the world. These English-Canadian authors also believed the school classroom was the appropriate forum for students to learn about such issues and to engage critically with them.

At the same time, not all of the contributors felt comfortable asking for peace studies to become a mandatory part of the Canadian history curriculum. Some believed this could lead to the various education ministries setting the framework for studying peace. Osborne felt, "peace education ... needs to raise a sceptical eyebrow if it attracts the support of those in power in any significant way, since this means that it is probably asking the wrong questions or that it has been unknowingly co-opted."[245] Despite these fears, many school boards, including the Toronto Board of Education, as well as institutions such as OISE, were in favour of adding peace studies to the content of history classes.[246]

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[243] Osborne, "Peace Education: Introduction," 7.
[244] Terry Carson, "Relating Peace Education and Social Studies in an Age of Insecurity," *History and Social Science Teacher* 20, no. 3/4 (1985): 10.
[245] Ken Osborne, "Peace Education and the Schools: What Can we Learn from History?," *History and Social Science Teacher* 20, no. 3/4 (1985): 40.
[246] Margaret Wells, "Peace Education in the Toronto Board of Education," *History and Social Science Teacher* 20, no. 3/4 (1985): 54.

Walt Werner, a professor of education at the University of British Columbia, felt that simply telling students about the dangers of war was not enough to change their behaviour. Instead, to affect student attitudes, he suggested that role models and symbols of peace should be given a place of prominence in history classrooms. He argued: "[i]f the accomplishments of peacemakers are neglected in historical or contemporary studies, then generals become heroes by default, the tough talk of political leaders may be equated with strength, and the use of military force may be viewed as legitimate foreign policy."[247] And while he was not mentioned by name in this article, Lester Pearson, and peacekeeping, would become central to how peace studies would be brought into Canadian classrooms in the 1980s.

Though perhaps not in line with what some peace studies advocates envisioned, several textbooks that came into use in the 1980s devoted considerable space to issues of peace in Canada and in the world. The peace studies issue of *History and Social Science Teacher* was reporting on a trend in education, and several works had already appeared and been approved for use in classrooms that drew upon the topic of peace in the 1980s. These texts normally suggested that peacekeeping could be a unifying force in Canada, as it met the approval of both French and English Canadians.[248] This language was popular with the Pearson government in the 1960s, but also found considerable purchase with Brian Mulroney's PCs in the 1980s (It is notable that the use of this language

[247] Walt Werner, "Conceptions of Peace Education," *History and Social Science Teacher* 20, no. 3/4 (1985): 32.
[248] Daniel Francis and Sonia Riddoch, *Our Canada: A Social and Political History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 407.

in textbooks pre-dated the Mulroney government, making textbooks an early site of a renewed belief in the symbolic power of peacekeeping).

Canada Today was a popular textbook which argued that all Canadians should be peacekeepers. Approved for use in classrooms for over twenty years, it was written by three high school educators, Angus L. Scully, Carl F. Smith, and Daniel J. McDevitt.[249] Though changes were made between the first edition, which appeared in 1977, and the second edition, which appeared in 1988, the basic structure of the textbook remained the same. The fifth unit of this text, "*Canada and the World,*" had chapter 14, "*Canada and Peace,*" as one of its units of study. It began with a discussion of peace in the everyday lives of Canadians. Students were told to follow certain procedures that replicated the peacekeeping process when they faced conflict in their lives. Compromise should be sought whenever possible, and the authors also recommended students, "[a]sk for a break. Take a cooling off period to think things over. During the break write down what you want and what others want."[250] Such actions mimicked the peacekeeping process, and were accompanied by images of young people disengaging from high-stress situations. According to these authors, peacekeeping need not simply be a foreign policy option. Instead, it appeared as a model for all conflict resolution, and was also described as a means to solve disputes between different nations, thus giving Canadians a role in the 1980s that

[249] Scully was the head of history at Brampton Centennial Secondary School, Smith was a consultant for the gifted programme in history and the social sciences with the Peel Board of Education, and McDevitt was the head of history at Glenforest Secondary School in Mississauga.
[250] Angus L. Scully, Carl F. Smith, and Daniel J. McDevitt, *Canada Today Second Edition* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 380.

suited their peaceable natures and allowed peacekeeping to become one of the most important ways in which Canadians engaged with other people in the world.

Later in the chapter, the individual missions that Canada had participated in were described in depth, including UNEF, ONUC, and UNFICYP. There was also an interview with Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, who supported future Canadian peacekeeping efforts. By presenting the missions of the past in tandem with calls for Canadians to play an active peacekeeping role in the 1980s, this textbook promoted an active Canadian internationalism in the name of peace. Some of the hazards of peacekeeping were presented in this work, as students were asked to look critically at the financial cost of peacekeeping, as well as debate whether Canada should continue to take part in such actions through the United Nations. However, the summary of the chapter suggested that both peacekeeping and peace were of vital importance to all Canadians. The text argued,

> [i]n our society it is not up to others to create and keep peace. It is up to us to take steps to have the kind of world that we want. Canada is committed to peace through involvement in the United Nations and through its various attempts to advance the cause of peace in the world. There are a variety of ways in which Canadians can express themselves about peace. It is up to all citizens to make their voices heard.[251]

The goal of global peace was emphasized in this text, and a renewed sense of Canada's potential to help in this process through peacekeeping was seen as a key role for Canada to play in the 1980s.

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[251] Ibid., 404.

Lester Pearson was also featured in a section on "Heroes of Peace," which praised his efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the Suez Crisis and his Nobel Peace Prize win. The treatment accentuated his positive traits while acknowledging that no Canadian since him had played such a key role on the international stage. The "Heroes of Peace" section also discussed the life and work of Mother Teresa, creating a direct link between her work and that done by Pearson.[252] Later, activities for students included a "Reading Better" section which said to "describe in your own words what Lester Pearson and Mother Teresa did for peace," and, "write headlines that could have been used when it was announced that Nobel Prizes had been awarded to these two people."[253] Such valorizations of Pearson seem to be directly taken from the article by Walt Werner in *History and Social Science Teacher*, in which he called for Canada to praise the peacemakers. By providing students with activities that linked Pearson and Mother Teresa, this text allowed more time to be spent on Pearson as a figure of importance, helping to reinforce his central role in the narrative of peacekeeping in Canada.

Canada Today was not alone in equating peacekeeping with a Canadian national identity or a progressive vision of Canada's potential to actively promote peace in the world in the 1980s as it had in the past.[254] Other new works normally

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[252] Ibid., 382.
[253] Ibid., 383.
[254] Other examples include Gillian Bartlett and Janice Gallivan, eds., *Canada: History in the Making* (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1984); Allan Campbell and Derald Fretts, *Canada in the World: Choosing a Role* (Edmonton: Weigl Educational Publishers Limited, 1985); Allan S. Evans and I.L. Martinello, *Canada's*

included a teacher's guide as part of their materials. In the guide to one such text, *Canada in the World: Choosing a Role*, teachers were told they could discuss the benefits of peacekeeping by asking their students to think about how Canadian actions had benefited the world and what other methods existed to stop conflicts internationally.[255] Some of the activities recommended included making a map of all the places that Canada had sent peacekeepers, inviting a guest speaker from the Canadian Forces, and having students write a short essay on whether Canada should continue to be a part of peacekeeping efforts. Other texts encouraged students to engage in role-playing exercises and imagine themselves as Canadian peacekeepers. [256] Alternatively, students were told that they could express their feelings on the topic of peacekeeping by collecting "pictures, poetry to songs" into a "peace book" for their class.[257] In all these cases, students were being encouraged to think about the issue of world peace, and peacekeeping was seen a uniquely Canadian solution to this issue.

Though peacekeeping was being portrayed in symbolically diverse ways in English Canadian texts, the works that were being used in Quebec did not share such ideas. The textbooks that were approved for use in high school history classrooms maintained their focus on the events that had taken place inside

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Century, Second Edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1988); Francis and Riddoch, *Our Canada: A Social and Political History*.

[255] Campbell and Fretts, *Canada in the World: Choosing a Role*, Teacher's Guide, 31.

[256] Francis and Riddoch, *Our Canada: A Social and Political History*, 407.

[257] Ian M. Hundey and Michael L. Magarrey, *Canada: Understanding Your Past* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1990).

Quebec after the Second World War.[258] Most textbooks had a single page of Canadian content at the outset of each chapter, followed by numerous pages of content related to life in Quebec. In a chapter on "La société québécoise d'après-guerre (1945-1960)," in one such text, *Nouvelle-France, Canada – Québec: Histoire du Québec et du Canada,* peacekeeping was given a brief mention as an action which the Canadian government undertook to try to stop a war between the Israelis and the Egyptians.[259] No mention of Britain, the domestic controversy, or Lester Pearson followed, which suggests peacekeeping had minimal importance in the Quebec high school curriculum. It was only at the end of the book, when a timeline of events which occurred in Quebec, Canada, the United States and the world was presented, that Pearson and the Nobel Prize were mentioned, and the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez garnered seven words.[260]

Despite the approved ministry textbooks emphasizing domestic political and social issues, a very strong peace studies movement that was international in its scope emerged in Quebec in the 1980s. Unlike in English Canada, an emphasis on international peace did not lead to students learning primarily about peacekeeping. Instead, local celebrities, politicians, and ordinary Quebeckers were tasked with encouraging peace in the world.

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[258]Claude Bouchard and Robert Lagasse, *Nouvelle-France, Canada-Québec: Histoire du Québec et du Canada* (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1986); Francois Charbonneau, Jacques Marchand, and Jean-Pierre Sansregret, *Mon Histoire* (Montreal: Guerin, 1985).
[259] Bouchard and Lagasse, *Nouvelle-France, Canada-Québec: Histoire du Québec et du Canada*, 275.
[260] Ibid., 370.

Efforts to introduce peace education into Quebec classrooms were spearheaded by a group called Pacijou, who created a wide variety of teaching aids and multimedia materials that were to be used in elementary to college level classrooms. As with their English counterparts, Pacijou recognized that, « [d]epuis l'arrivée du président Reagan et de sa rhétorique belliqueuse aux États-unis, les jouets de guerre n'ont cessé de prendre une part croissante d'un marché colossal. »[261] The threat of nuclear conflict forced the organizers of Pacijou to look at the toys, video games, and other forms of adolescent entertainment that glorified conflict and to attempt a boycott of such entertainment.

Unlike the approach taken by peace studies in the English Canadian curricula, the Pacijou group actively tried to sway the parents, teachers, as well as the students who were reading their materials, to reject war toys and violent ideas in Quebec culture. Almost all their materials on peace education included a page directed at parents, to try to discourage them from buying war toys for Christmas. The reasoning for this was as follows: « Si on donne à son enfant une trousse d'infirmier, on peut s'attendre qu'il joue à soigner. Si on lui donne un jeu de construction, on prévoit qu'il va construire quelque chose. Et si on lui donne un jouet de guerre, il faut bien s'attendre qu'il joue à la guerre, qu'il fasse, la journée

[261] Christophe Auger, *Cessez le feu!: guide pédagogique* (Montreal: Editions Fides, 1987), 1.

même, la guerre à quelqu'un d'imaginaire ou de réel, dans la maison ou le quartier. »[262]

Parents were seen as vital to the project of teaching children about peace. Pacijou saw an immediacy in the nuclear threat that led to their issuing a challenge to parents to make change in the world. One initiative of Pacijou that was aimed at parents was the desire for a "vote populaire" to be taken in Quebec that would force those who might advocate for war to opt for peace, something that students could long for, but only their parents could help to endorse.[263]

In taking these steps, the Quebec peace studies movement was more innovative than its English Canadian counterpart. Rather than wait for textbook writers to include sections on peace, and rather than rely on the various education ministries to accept the themes and spirit of the peace movement, Pacijou produced materials and made them available for use in classrooms from kindergarten to college. These works were specialized and would not include peace studies in only a single chapter, as the approved textbooks would. These *cahiers* also tried to engage students in a variety of ways besides presenting them with a story about Canada's contributions to the world. The teaching aids that were produced for use in the elementary classrooms had children fill out crossword puzzles and word searches that contained the language of human

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[262] Ibid., 21.
[263] Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, *Éduquer a la paix pour désarmer le monde: Guide d'intervention pédagogique* (Montreal: Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, 1987), 2.

rights, peace, and environmental change.[264] Those for high schools asked students to work on publicity campaigns that tried to change consumer habits. Rather than celebrate a concept like peacekeeping and its global attempts at conflict resolution, which English Canadian textbooks discussed at length, Pacijou's materials invited students to "reach down into their very own culture to see how they [we]re being conditioned to accept the inevitability and excitement of organized violence."[265]

These efforts also had some striking results in Quebec. Pacijou reported that over 400 schools had participated in its campaign calling for the inclusion of peace studies at all levels of Quebec schools. In addition, 12,000 children donated over 25,000 war toys to help build a peace sculpture at Laval University. Finally, over 100,000 signatures were gathered on a petition asking for the removal of violent television programming and an increase in government funding for non-violent alternatives.[266] The success of the peace studies movement in Quebec was also due to its support from the Catholic Church, women's groups, and the Montreal Transit Authority, all of whom raised funds, donated space for Pacijou to use, and helped organize the signing of the petitions. Such a broad array of supporters helped foster a strong peace studies movement in Quebec in the late 1980s and early 1990s, though it was a movement that was specific to Quebec.

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[264] Robert Cadotte et al, *Pacijeu: Cahier de jeux pour la paix, les droits humains et l'environnement* (Montreal: Pacijou et Les Cercles de Fermieres du Quebec, 1991), 19-23.
[265] David Clandfield, "Pacijou and the War Toys Project in Quebec," *Our Schools, Our Selves* 2, no. 2 (1990): 33.
[266] Ibid., 35-36.

The 1980s saw a remarkable increase in the discussion of peace-related issues in textbooks and other materials for use in high school history classrooms. In English Canada, peacekeeping was central to learning about Canada's past, present, and future. Perhaps more surprisingly, many of these texts presented peacekeeping as an effective strategy for young Canadians to employ in their day-to-day lives. Such calls did not find resonance in Quebec, in part because by the 1980s textbooks had largely dropped any references to peacekeeping. Despite this decreased relevance for the Quebec curriculum, peacekeeping occupied a larger and more privileged place in English textbooks and educational materials at the end of the 1980s than it ever had before.

Peacekeeping and the New World Order, 1990 to 1997

The belief in Canada's potential to help promote world peace and exert a part of its national character on the international stage through peacekeeping changed after the missions to Somalia and Yugoslavia were undertaken. Some authors chose to section off these newer missions as different from Canada's peacekeeping past. Others took the bold step of detailing the problems raised by these missions, and asked students and teachers to reconsider Canada's long-standing peacekeeping commitment. This decline in the perceived utility of peacekeeping also encouraged authors to focus more upon its symbolic value, which further distanced the content in textbooks from what was taking place on a given mission. In Quebec, peacekeeping continued to hold little value in the history curriculum, and any mentions of it remained inconsequential.

As with all events, there were a few years between UNOSOM and UNPROFOR and their inclusion in textbooks. John Saywell's 1994 textbook *Canada: Pathways to the Present* was the first to mention these missions as part of its four pages discussing peacekeeping. In a chapter titled "The World Beyond," Saywell called what occurred in Somalia a tragedy, though he did not mention the details of the killings by the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Rather, the text stated: "Canadians were on the ground and in the air, but it was soon clear that there could be no long term solution to the problem in Somalia until political stability and peace were restored in the country."[267] Saywell believed peacekeeping's popularity with the media was a reason why Canada had sent its troops to Somalia.[268] By ignoring the ugly ending to UNOSOM, this text asked students to question the utility of peacekeeping as a policy in the present without presenting the actual harm that such a mission could cause. Saywell's text also noted that during UNPROFOR, Canada's peacekeepers were impotent in the face of a hostile Serb army. The peacekeepers "were really the prisoners of the large armies surrounding them, and routinely were shot at and roughed up without capacity to fight back."[269] It was also possible to see UNOSOM and UNPROFOR as isolated failures in an otherwise commendable history of Canadian peacekeeping. Discussing this history, Saywell noted that "[w]hen the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeepers, Canadians rightly believed that much of the

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[267] John Saywell, *Canada: Pathways to the Present* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994), 133.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Ibid., 134.

prize was theirs."[270] This legacy was hurt by the events that transpired in Somalia, but for Saywell and many authors, peacekeeping and Canada could still be linked with positive associations.[271]

Other textbooks that produced new editions in the middle years of the 1990s took a critical tone towards peacekeeping. *Canada: A North American Nation,* edited by Paul Bennett and co-authored by historian Cecilia Morgan, one of the most popular textbooks across Canada by the author's own admission, was one such text.[272] Peacekeeping was discussed in nineteen pages of this text, making it a subject of considerable importance. In a section titled "Canada's UN role: The Peacekeeper," the authors described the good that Canadians had done internationally as part of peacekeeping missions but also the challenges that this had presented both domestically and abroad. The tensions that the Suez mission inflamed were detailed, as were the financial costs and the very pressing issue of the Canadian Forces' being over-stretched and under-equipped. In summing up this section, however, the authors noted that, "[n]o other nation has done as much as Canada to advance the cause of UN peacekeeping," which suggested that despite the costs in both lives and dollars, Canada should maintain this functional role.[273]

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[270] Ibid.
[271] Other examples of the positive narrative of peacekeeping remaining after the events in Somalia are Janis Barr et al., *Twentieth Century Canada* (Calgary: Weigl Educational Publishers Limited, 1996); Diane Eaton and Garfield Newman, *Canada: A Nation Unfolding* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1994).
[272] Paul W. Bennett et al., *Canada: A North American Nation* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1995), vii.
[273] Ibid., 507.

Peacekeeping also received space in Chapter 21, "Principal Power in a Superpower World: 1968-1988," as well as in Chapter 23, "Towards the New Millennium: the 1990s and Beyond." This later chapter made the distinction between the peacekeeping missions of the 1950s and the 1960s, and the peace*making* missions that Canada had helped undertake in the 1990s. Both UNOSOM and UNPROFOR were of this newer sort. In describing both, it is clear the authors did not support Canada's participation. UNOSOM is stated to have "ended with a trial, public censure, and a suicide over a teenaged Somalian who had been tortured and killed while in Canadian custody. The unit stationed in northern Somalia found its reputation sullied, as cases of murder, torture, racist slurs, and obscene initiation rituals surfaced. The Canadians left Somalia, but a string of court-martials and media revelations demonstrated that peacekeeping could have a darker side."[274] The authors did not shy away from describing the reasons for the failure of the mission to Somalia, as well as the very public nature of the Somalia Affair afterwards, which made it one of the largest controversies in Canadian politics in the 1990s. This suggests that some authors and publishers were moving away from the consensus-based version of Canadian peacekeeping history that had dominated the texts of previous decades. This text also continued to emphasize the individual heroes of peacekeeping, celebrating the achievements of Lester Pearson while applauding the efforts of Canadian generals Lewis Mackenzie in Bosnia and Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda, despite their

[274] Ibid., 625.

failures to bring quick and peaceful solutions to these regions. By making a distinction between Canada's peace*keeping* past, and the peace*making* missions of the 1990s, these authors were sectioning off the criticisms of peacekeeping as a policy, and allowing the spirit of peacekeeping to remain a source of pride for Canadians.

The Third Edition of *Canada Today* included similar descriptions of contemporary peacekeeping history in its 1996 edition. There remained a section about how to bring peace into the lives of individual Canadians, as well as many flattering descriptions of Lester Pearson's actions in 1956. The teacher's guide for *Canada Today* included a number of handouts that teachers could use to help their students learn about peacekeeping, with the titles "Thinking Skills: Peacekeepers are like a Family Friend," "Canadians and Peacekeeping: What they Did," and "Canadian Peacekeepers in Action."[275] Similar to other texts, the financial costs of continued peacekeeping efforts across the globe were considered to be one of the contemporary problems that Canada had to deal with, and students were asked to think about whether Canada "should increase participation in peacekeeping, given the financial squeeze?"[276] The end of the "Canada and Peace" chapter had a section called "Inquiring Citizen," which posed much tougher topics for students and teachers to consider in class. One asked students to look into the Somalia Affair, and then discuss the difficulties of urging

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[275] Carl F. Smith, Daniel J. McDevitt, and Angus L. Scully, *Canada Today, 3rd Edition Teacher's Guide* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Ginn Canada, 1996), 255.
[276] Carl F. Smith, Daniel J. McDevitt, and Angus L. Scully, *Canada Today third edition* (Scarbourough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc, 1996), 409.

war criminals to be brought to justice when there were Canadian peacekeepers committing crimes against humanity. Such an exercise marked an increase in the level of critical thinking about the peace missions that were being undertaken by Canadians in the 1990s. In part, this content was an expression of the shock that many Canadians felt upon hearing about the murder of Shidane Arone, and also of the disappointment when Canada was not able to do more to help bring about peace after the fall of Communism.

The textbooks that were approved for use in high school classrooms in the 1990s, unlike those from earlier decades, normally recognized the failings of peacekeeping, and asked students to question peacekeeping's utility as a policy as well as what this meant for Canada's national identity. In the teacher's guide for one text, *Canada: Our Century, Our Story*, the authors provided a breakdown of the arguments both for and against Canadian suitability for being peacekeepers. These arguments were virtually identical to those that Richard Pomareinke had included in his letter to the Ministry of External Affairs in 1982: Canada was a middle power, it did not have a colonial past, it was multicultural, and it had the capacity to help others thanks to its wealth. The points against future participation included Canada's participation in NATO making it less than objective in many situations, Canada's traditional ties to Britain and the United States, its racially diverse population taking sides in a conflict, and the need to

spend money within Canada before seeking to help others abroad.[277] Despite these rather broad arguments against peacekeeping, the guide did also include the major points that students should know about UNOSOM. These included knowing that the Canadian forces were over-extended, that a combat unit should never have been sent for a humanitarian mission, and that "photos and videotapes of the crimes committed against these Somali citizens horrified Canadians at home and tarnished Canada's peacekeeping role, which had been a source of pride for the nation."[278] Textbook discussions such as this would have provided students with more knowledge of peacekeeping as a policy rather than framing it only as a Canadian triumph and a part of "our" national identity.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping found rapid entry into ministry-approved textbooks across Canada. While never the central issue in any of these texts, peacekeeping's place in English Canadian textbooks grew from a short mention as a part of the final chapter to an entire chapter, including audio-visual components recounting its past successes, its present utility, and its future potential to help make the world more peaceful. This larger presence occurred as students increasingly had to opt into Canadian history classes, rather than being forced to take them throughout their high school years.

This adaptability was something that emerged only after peacekeeping had achieved consensus support in English Canada. However, most texts approved

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[277] Rosemary Evans and John Fielding, *Canada Our Century our Story: Teacher's Resource* (Scarborough: Nelson, 2001), 292.
[278] Ibid., 431.

during the 1950s and the 1960s adopted the Liberal conception of peacekeeping as a symbol of independence from Canada's colonial master, Britain, and its present ally, the United States. The historians who wrote the textbooks approved for use in Canadian classrooms in the decade after 1956 did not invent the standardized version of peacekeeping, but rather recognized that this Liberal conception was germane to the positive narratives of Canadian history at the heart of their works. In so doing, they helped cement peacekeeping's status as a symbol of Canada. In Quebec, this narrative involved Canada refusing to go to war with Britain, in contrast to what had happened in the First and Second World Wars. In all these texts, Lester Pearson's legacy allowed him to be canonized as a hero of Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy and a man of peace who deserved international recognition, as did Canada herself for allowing Pearson to solve the Suez Crisis.

But peacekeeping as a topic of study was also separated from other events of the era through its malleability. In school curricula, peacekeeping could be used as a tool of rote memorization, as a way to tell a traditional story of great men acting in the world, as part of interactive discussions of how to investigate a historical topic, or as part of a teaching unit about alternatives to global conflict. Textbook writers, curricula crafters, and some teachers seemed to find in peacekeeping something worthwhile for students. Particularly after 1980, as teachers rather than historians wrote most of the approved texts, peacekeeping took on more symbolic associations as young people were encouraged to emulate

Lester Pearson and other "heroes of peace." Such narratives emphasized a unified Canadian penchant for peacekeeping abroad and at home while acknowledging that problems could arise on such operations. In French Canada, by contrast, peacekeeping barely garnered a mention in most textbooks. Ministerial guidelines did not demand much discussion of Canada's external policies, and so teachers interested in promoting peace looked to change a culture that encouraged war toys and violence in children instead. Their results were often more successful than English Canadian efforts, as the Pacijou campaigns made clear.

While school textbooks did not create the narrative of peacekeeping, they are one powerful way in which a consensus-based narrative of its central events and figures was learned by many Canadians from 1959 to 1997. As a result it is possible to see when peacekeeping came to be associated with a Canadian character, and to some extent, why it remains such a prevalent symbol of a Canadian national identity.

Chapter Three
"You can't say anything that contradicts the pictures": The National Film Board of Canada's representations of peacekeeping, 1957 – 1995

The National Film Board of Canada [NFB], an organization renowned for its animated short films and high-quality documentaries, made fourteen films between 1957 and 1995 that either dealt solely with peacekeeping or had peacekeeping as a major component. One such film, *A Life of Adventure* (1965), was a recruitment piece made for the Canadian Forces. Just over fourteen minutes in length, this film was shown to Grade 11 and 12 high school students to entice them to sign up for the Regular Officers' Training Program.[279] It depicted, among other opportunities that might await a young Canadian in the Armed Forces, excitement in the Gaza Strip in Egypt. A young peacekeeper is shown working for the UN while the narrator notes: "Canada supplies officers and men to the United Nations for this vital job, and if you choose a life of adventure in the Canadian Forces, you too may someday find yourself in this exotic part of the world."[280] After the film presents scenes of sand and jeeps in "one of the world's trouble spots," the soundtrack makes a sudden shift to surf music, and shots of men riding the waves on their surfboards appear. The narrator then states: "Many a Canadian officer has reported that the scenery here is unexcelled," while the film shows young women at a resort sunbathing in bikinis. Surfing and beach culture were wildly popular forms of entertainment in the 1960s, with movies

[279] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "A Life of Adventure File, May Budget," (Montreal, 1965).
[280] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "A Life of Adventure File, Commentary " (Montreal, 1965).

such as *Gidget* (1959) and the music of the Beach Boys capturing the excitement many young people felt about the ocean and the beaches of California. *A Life of Adventure* transplanted those beaches to the Middle East, and suggested that young men would be free to pursue that same lifestyle that they had seen or heard about, but had probably never experienced for themselves in Canada. While many politicians, school textbook authors, journalists, and editorial cartoonists talked about Canada as a nation of "Blue Berets," this film promised young people a "life of adventure" if they donned the Canadian Forces uniform.

Figure 3.1 *A Life of Adventure* (1965)

The NFB's other documentaries about peacekeeping similarly focused on Canada's peacekeepers, though they never glamorized the military experience to the same degree. These films are little remembered and rarely studied.[281] Yet, they are important texts that can enrich our knowledge about how peacekeeping was presented to Canadians and how it became a symbol of a Canadian national

[281] One of the only articles that discusses an NFB film about peacekeeping is David Jefferess, "Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the Mythology of Canada as a Peacekeeper," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 78, no. 2 (2009).

identity. The NFB was subject to federal oversight, particularly in the 1950s and the 1960s, which caused its films about peacekeeping to accentuate the constructive role the Canadians were playing, while ignoring any domestic controversies from the past. In doing so, they propagated a particular version of the past and present for their audiences that accorded with how peacekeeping was being remembered and understood only a short time after the creation of UNEF. They were, however, careful to not force these films to repeat a political line – instead, they accentuated peacekeeping's importance to *Canadians*. This censorship made these early films similar to English Canadian high school textbooks in that they were designed to highlight peacekeeping as a Canadian activity that exemplified the nation's rising status in the 1950s. Akin to that of textbooks, the time lag between events taking place and their appearing in a documentary also provides insight into how particular peacekeeping operations were constructed after they had taken place.

This chapter examines why these peacekeeping films were made, how they were produced, and what messages they presented to their audiences about Canada and peacekeeping.[282] Files from the NFB Archives are used to present a fuller picture of the production of four films in particular: *The Thin Blue Line* (1957), *You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus* (1964), *Keeping the Elephants Away* (1986), and *The Price of Duty* (1995). Equally important are the images that

[282] The number of people who saw each of these films is impossible to know because of the distribution methods of the NFB. Films would have been screened in cities across Canada, shown on television (particularly on the CBC), and also shown in school classrooms, and the information on each of these methods of distribution is not available.

appeared in each of these films and how they linked Canadians and their peacekeepers during these years. Though peacekeeping was framed as a Canadian activity in these films, they were all English productions; there were no films dealing with French Canadian perceptions of peacekeeping. [283]

The NFB's documentaries about peacekeeping primarily discussed its present utility and largely ignored discussions of Canada's past or its future. As the shortcomings of UN operations became more glaring these films became more critical. But it was peacekeeping, not Canada's peacekeepers, that would be criticized from the 1980s onwards. By not employing the nostalgic or progressive discourses as often as politicians or textbook authors did, these films offer insights into how the functional language of peacekeeping was sometimes unsuccessful at symbolically linking peacekeeping to a changing Canadian national identity from 1957 to 1995.

These documentaries have been subdivided into two time ranges, from 1957 to 1965 and from 1980 to 1995, to identify differences between how peacekeeping was portrayed in these decades. Ordinary soldiers were filmed doing their everyday routines - a small number of seemingly unexceptional men are therefore at the centre of their narratives. The films also made the actions of the peacekeepers relatable to Canadians by drawing links between their "Blue Berets" and ordinary Canadians. By avoiding the domestic circumstances that

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[283] While the NFB never made a film about peacekeeping using its French Canadian unit, many of the films covered here were translated and available as French films. This was a process known as "versioning." D.B. Jones, *Movies and Memoranda: An Interpretative History of the National Film Board of Canada* (Ottawa: The Canadian Film Institute, 1981), 91.

surrounded the creation of UNEF in 1956 and not showing Canada's political leaders, these documentaries presented peacekeeping as a non-controversial aspect of Canada's foreign policy. This non-confrontational emphasis suggests that both the PC and Liberal governments of the time sought to make peacekeeping a centrepiece of Canada's foreign policy, regardless of the debates these operations engendered in other media sources and during political campaigns.

Because of changes in how peacekeeping was understood in Canada, as well as changes in the relationship between the government and the NFB, the Film Board documentaries made from 1980 to 1995 presented peacekeeping quite differently. They critically examined Canada's peacekeeping role and its shortcomings in light of increasing fears of nuclear war in the 1980s and the failures on UNOSOM, while nostalgically celebrating Canada's illustrious peacekeeping past. Audiences were therefore provided with another venue where the utility of the Canadian Forces in the 1980s and the 1990s could be debated. These films also made the peacekeepers exemplary men who were serving their country rather than framing them as synecdoches for Canada's national identity. Such positive depictions in light of what had taken place on UNOSOM reflected a more partisan approach to documenting peacekeeping, intimating that peacekeeping's symbolic value to Canada's identity was being contested by different groups in the 1990s.

Each of the films made about peacekeeping represents a negotiation among the federal government, the NFB, and the filmmakers. The NFB was formally created in May of 1939, just months before Canada's entry into the Second World War. It was headed through the war years by John Grierson, who is credited with instilling a culture of "craftsmanship and persistent hard work."[284] The NFB's operational mandate has remained similar throughout its institutional life, particularly since the 1950 National Film Act. This Act declared that the NFB should "promote the production and distribution of films in the national interest," to "interpret Canada to Canadians and to other nations."[285] Because it was a part of the federal government, however, the head of the NFB, its Film Commissioner, had to answer to many different departments, including the DEA, the Secretary of State, and the Department of Communications.[286] Particularly relevant to this discussion are the relations between the NFB and the DEA, as peacekeeping was one of the latter's primary responsibilities throughout this time period, and it kept a keen eye on depictions of Canada's efforts through the UN.

The relationship between the federal government and the NFB and its filmmakers has garnered renewed attention from scholars since the 1990s. Older works tended to see the relationship as either one of unnecessary restriction on artistic achievement or one of benevolent interference in the name of some ideal

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[284] D.B. Jones, *The Best Butler in the Business: Tom Daly of the National Film Board of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 11.
[285] Government of Canada, "An Act Respecting the National Film Board," (Ottawa, 1950).
[286] For a detailed investigation of the negotiations between film commissioners and the government, see Gary Evans, *In the National Interest: A Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

of Canadian art.[287] However, recent studies have shown the relationship between the federal government and the NFB to be more complex. Zoe Druick's work situates the NFB as an organization that sought to represent the Canadian population in "realistic" ways, much as the census tries to categorize the population.[288] Other authors have noted that NFB films about a particular group can have a great impact on social policies as well as on cultural attitudes towards different Canadians.[289] These authors see a direct relationship between social changes in Canada and changes in what Brian Low describes as "NFB society," or the world as it is depicted in NFB documentaries.[290] Hence, the documentaries about peacekeeping examined for this chapter were made to reflect ideas that were central to Canada's national identity. In recognizing this reciprocal relationship between filmmakers and the societies in which they operate, a fuller understanding of how and why particular images of peacekeeping appeared at certain points from 1957 through 1995 can be gained.

The particularities of the documentary genre also influenced the content and reception of messages in these films. Several scholars have noted that a formula tends to be employed in historical documentaries: an all-knowing narrator describes the images on the screen, "talking head" experts and witnesses

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[287] See, for example, ibid; Jones, *Movies and Memoranda: An Interpretative History of the National Film Board of Canada.*

[288] Zoe Druick, *Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 5.

[289] Ted Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Roger M. Picton, "Selling national urban renewal: the National Film Board, the National Capital Commission and post-war planning in Ottawa, Canada," *Urban History* 37, no. 2 (2010).

[290] Brian J. Low, ""The New Generation": Mental Hygiene and the Portrayals of Children by the National Film Board of Canada, 1946 - 1967," *History of Education Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (2003): 541.

add their voices, and historical footage is used as evidence for the speakers' arguments.[291] Many of the documentaries examined in this chapter follow this formula to a great degree. Other films, however, were made during or immediately after the events they depict, and so the "talking heads" are not present; instead, it is the narrator that interprets the images.

Narration serves as a valuable part of the documentaries on peacekeeping covered in this chapter, making the scripts of these films additional sources of meaning that were studied. For some film scholars, a reliance on a narrator to interpret the images presented to the viewer betrays a "lack of confidence in both the power of the visual and the ability of the audience."[292] The use of omnipresent narration to interpret the images that appeared in a documentary was prevalent at the NFB between 1957 and 1965, since John Grierson and many of his successors believed that images came symbolically loaded with too many messages for an audience to understand on their own. The effects of those images were said to be uncertain because their interpretation was based upon "instinct."[293] Instead, Grierson and those who shared his opinions held that words, which were based on reason and intelligence, were more reliable for ensuring the reception of a message. These narrative texts complicate how peacekeeping films might have been understood by audiences since the acts of seeing and the acts of listening are inherently different.

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[291] Jon Weiner, "The Omniscient Narrator and the Unreliable Narrator: The Case of *Atomic Cafe*," *Film and History* 37, no. 1 (2007): 73.
[292] Ibid., 76.
[293] Peter Morris, "'Praxis into process': John Grierson and the National Film Board of Canada," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 9, no. 3 (1989): 278.

While documentaries may be non-fiction accounts of the present or the past, by employing narration and by editing for time and content, a single linear narrative is created for the viewer that can compress the past and limit the present.[294] Documentaries should therefore be seen as texts that mediate our understanding of the present and the past.[295] The process of filming and editing a documentary involves selecting what images to use and which to exclude. Putting limitations on content is a necessity in a genre in which a narrative must move along at a certain pace and in which, as NFB documentarian Gwynne Dyer once noted: "[y]ou can't say anything that contradicts the pictures."[296] Like all sources about peacekeeping, these documentary films ultimately show "not the events themselves, and not the events as experienced or even witnessed by participants, but selected images of those events carefully arranged into sequences to tell a story or to make an argument."[297] It is these narratives and arguments that can guide us towards a better understanding of how peacekeeping came to hold such an important place in Canada's national identity.

Interpreting Peacekeeping's Early Years, 1957 to 1965

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[294] Robert A. Rosenstone, "History in Images/ History in Words: Reflections on the Possibility of Really Putting History onto Film," *The American Historical Reivew* 93, no. 5 (1988): 1174.
[295] Hayden White, "Historiography and Historiophoty," *The American Historical Reivew* 93, no. 5 (1988): 1198.
[296] Frank Faulk, "Warring on TV: A Conversation with Gwynne Dyer," *Cinema Canada* 1986, 16.
[297] Rosenstone, "History in Images/ History in Words: Reflections on the Possibility of Really Putting History onto Film," 1180.

The NFB has often found itself in conflict with the federal government. In the 1950s, the Film Board tried to recover from a sustained campaign to discredit it as a hotbed of Communist activity.[298] Well-documented by Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse in their book, *Cold War Canada*, the decade following the end of the Second World War saw the NFB under suspicion from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP], and the subject of a campaign by periodicals such as the *Financial Post* to get the organization shut down. Whitaker and Marcuse are adamant that this was the result of the Canadian government's and the Canadian media's acting within a climate of virulent anti-Communism, and was not based on actual Communist infiltration.[299] However, the NFB films on peacekeeping produced between 1957 and 1965 were made in an institutional climate that was still recovering from the deep suspicions raised by the RCMP probe. These films were often greeted with opposition from the DEA or the DND if their messages or images were too negative or controversial. This unease encouraged filmmakers to present peacekeeping as a successful and functional policy. These documentaries ignored controversies within Canada over the deployment or operational mandates of the peacekeepers, instead depicting the day-to-day work that was being accomplished by the Canadians. Conscious choices placed the peacekeepers at the centre of the films and addressed contemporary discussions of Canadian independence without taking a direct stance either for or against a particular political party. Audiences were therefore shown apolitical peacekeeping films that

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[298] Evans, *In the National Interest: A Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989*; Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957*.
[299] Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957*, 249.

encouraged them to associate with their "Blue Berets" and the work they were doing on behalf of Canada.

The NFB documentaries about peacekeeping made between 1957 and 1965 examined Canada's participation in its three most prominent missions: UNEF, ONUC, and UNFICYP. Zoe Druick and Ted Magder argue that the primary goals of the NFB during these years were education, internationalism, and citizenship.[300] In the fifteen years following the end of the Second World War, Druick feels the UN was seen as a great hope for the world in many films, and she also notes that Canada was often portrayed as a "mini UN," which was interpreted as high praise for Canada.[301] The NFB's films about peacekeeping replicated these goals by educating their viewers about what the Canadian Forces were doing on their peacekeeping missions, promoting positive depictions of Canada's peacekeepers, and making members of the Canadian contingents a synecdoche for all Canadians.[302]

With its mandate to interpret Canada for Canadians, it might seem inevitable that the NFB would be charged with making films about peacekeeping. The first such documentary, however, was not undertaken at the behest of the Canadian government. Rather, it was the UN Film Section that wanted footage of UNEF operating in the Suez Canal region. Shot in the winter of 1956 and the early

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[300] Magder, *Canada's Hollywood: The Canadian State and Feature Films*, 59.
[301] Druick, *Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board*, 85.
[302] This desire to accurately depict the lives of the peacekeepers was in direct contrast to fiction films about the RCMP, which were far more interested in presenting that group as pillars of a past manliness and of a more straightforward time. See Dawson, ""That nice red coat goes to my head like champagne": Gender, antimodernism and the Mountie image, 1880-1960."

months of 1957, *Blue Vanguard: The Story of the United Nations Emergency Force* was privately screened for then-UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and an audience of UN officials.[303] The director of the film, Ian MacNeill, and the producer, Tom Daly, were told that the film was "everything they had hoped for" but that it could not be released because it might re-ignite British, French, and Israeli anger towards the UN and the other Western powers who had condemned their invasion of the Suez region. Instead, the project was shelved and never released.[304]

One year later, in 1958, the NFB released a documentary of its own about the Canadians taking part in UNEF. Titled *The Thin Blue Line*, the film was made using colour footage provided by the DND. The Photography Division of the DND had contacted the NFB to inform them that they were sending two men to film the Canadian Forces' role in UNEF in June 1957. A memorandum from Herbert Holmes, the Director of Photography at the DND, stated that the goal was "merely a matter of obtaining footage of the lives and activities of service personnel in the Middle East, that will in all probability be eventually made into some type of training or recruiting film, at which time the National Film Board

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[303] Accounts of this meeting appear in two works: Evans, *In the National Interest: A Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989*; Jones, *The Best Butler in the Business: Tom Daly of the National Film Board of Canada*, 100. These authors offer a full description of the problems the NFB faced in trying to get the film released.

[304] Copies of the film still exist, and are now known as revised versions of the film. Ian MacNeill, "Blue Vanguard: The story of the first United Nations Emergency Force 1956," (Canada National Film Board, 1957).

will be approached with a view to undertaking the production."[305] Because UNEF was a new role for the Canadian Forces, the DND wanted to gather footage so that recruits could be shown what peacekeepers did on UN operations.

The NFB was not thrilled that a director and cameraman who were not its own were sent to do the filming. Subsequent memoranda indicate that there was some bitterness at the DND presenting the Film Board with a *fait accompli* in terms of production personnel and scheduling.[306] In particular, the Film Board did not trust that the director, A.W. Acland, a captain in the Canadian Army, and the cameraman, R.C Ferguson, a sergeant in the Royal Canadian Air Force, would be able to gather sufficient quality footage to compile a complete film. Regardless, by October of 1957, the footage had been gathered and was sent to Montreal to be turned into a film. The final budget for the project was $9910.00, a comparatively small amount for a thirty-minute documentary.[307]

Despite its lack of control over the footage, the NFB was responsible for many key aspects of *The Thin Blue Line*. One of its own people, Dennis Sawyer, was the editor of the film, and his cuts and pacing made the footage similar in many ways to other documentaries that the Film Board was making at this time.[308] The film's

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[305] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "The Thin Blue Line File, Letter from Herbert W. Holmes Director of Photography, DND to Michael Spencer, Chief Liason Officer NFB, 25 June " (Montreal, 1957).
[306] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "The Thin Blue Line File, Letter from Michael Spencer, Chief of the Liason Division to Herbert W. Holmes, Director of Photography, Department of National Defence 2 July " 1957).
[307] The Film Board had paid $42,460.71 for *Blue Vanguard*, by comparison. National Film Board of Canada Archives, "Blue Vanguard File, Production Manager's Offce Memo 15 September," (Montreal, 1961). For more on the costs of other films about peacekeeping, see Appendix 2.
[308] For more on the NFB style of documentary in this era, see Druick, *Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board*; Evans, *In the National Interest: A Chronicle of*

producer, Walford Hewitson, suggested the title for the film during a post-production meeting. The narration for the film was also written by the NFB, which significantly affected the messages conveyed to viewers. Though not ideal collaborative partners as far as the NFB was concerned, the Photography Division of the DND did prove to be capable of letting the Film Board make its film and expedited the process to ensure a finished product was available in the early months of 1958.

Figure 3.2 *The Thin Blue Line* (1958)

While the DND had hoped for a recruiting tool, *The Thin Blue Line* project turned out to be more than a short film that could be shown in high school classes. Instead, it was decided that *The Thin Blue Line* would be shown on the

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the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989; Jones, *The Best Butler in the Business: Tom Daly of the National Film Board of Canada*.

CBC, greatly expanding its potential audience.[309] Though not officially documented, this change in status may have been undertaken because of the UN's withholding the release of *Blue Vanguard*, and there not being any other films about UNEF made for distribution. The PCs supported UNEF's work in the Middle East and appear to have wanted its story to be shown to Canadian audiences. The primary narrative goal of *The Thin Blue Line* therefore became to tell "the story of the Canadian Contingent as part of the UNEF in the Middle East, showing the role they are playing in patrolling and maintaining the peace on the demarcation line."[310] What was outlined in the proposal for *The Thin Blue Line* played a considerable role in determining what was depicted and what was omitted about Canada's involvement in UNEF. By focusing on the peacekeepers, the documentary de-politicized peacekeeping's beginnings in favour of a positive pragmatic narrative. Such a narrative reflected the PC government's support for UNEF but not its manner of creation.

The film opens with a shot of an empty desert. Beginning as a far-away object, an armoured vehicle comes to a halt directly in front of the camera. A soldier motions for the vehicle to advance as the film's credits appear on screen. A hasty account of how the Canadian contingent came to be in Egypt is then provided for viewers. Footage of a plane taking off and flying is followed by the appearance of an animated map of the world that traces the distance, and the direction in which, the Canadians flew to take part in UNEF. Several figures are then shown

[309] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "The Thin Blue Line File, Film Budget February," (Montreal 1958).
[310] Ibid.

aboard a ship in the Suez Canal heading towards UNEF headquarters. The documentary spends much of its remaining time going through the various duties that the Canadians are performing as part of UNEF. There are scenes of Canadians surveying, clearing landmines, setting up barbed wire, constructing a hangar, re-painting jeeps with UN and Canadian insignia, repairing telephone wires, running the postal service, performing medical and dental operations, and going out on reconnaissance patrols. Interspersed among the images of work are those of the Canadian troops relaxing in their base camp, at headquarters, and on leave in Egypt and Lebanon. The final scene recalls the film's opening by once again depicting a lone armoured vehicle coming to a stop in front of the camera. Against the backdrop of a setting sun, the standing figure continues to use his binoculars to search the surrounding area for danger as the end credit screen appears.

Figure 3.3 *The Thin Blue Line* (1958)

By the time the film was released, Canada's peacekeepers had been in the Suez region for over a year. In looking back at the events of November 1956, this film chose not to depict the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, which deprived viewers of much of the context for the mission. The divisions that appeared in English Canada regarding the invasion and Canada's refusal to support Britain also remain absent from the film, despite their central place in the story of Canada's UNEF involvement. Nor are Lester Pearson's speeches at the United Nations calling for the creation of UNEF shown to viewers. Those speeches were largely responsible for Pearson's winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, but the film chose to ignore these facts that were so crucial to how peacekeeping was discussed in almost every other format at the time. The NFB had footage of Pearson at the UN and of the invasion (they had both been included in *Blue Vanguard),* but not depicting the man who by 1958 had become the leader of the Opposition appears to have been a conscious choice. Diefenbaker's PCs preferred to accentuate the functional value of Canada's peacekeepers rather than dwell on these past events in their rhetoric at this time, and this may have had considerable bearing on the choice of subject matter for the film.

Instead of directly tackling the debates of 1956 that had been so heated in Canada, *The Thin Blue Line* educated its viewers on the experiences of the Canadian peacekeepers. Early on, the narrator describes how the film will focus on Canada's "soldiers of peace" and their role in the "unique force" in Egypt.[311]

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[311] A.W. Acland, "The Thin Blue Line," (Canada: National Film Board, 1958).

Though the stated purpose of the film was to depict Canada's peacekeepers, these men were not allowed to speak for themselves. This is likely attributable to the costly and cumbersome process of synchronizing the sound with the 35mm film.[312] Instead, the narrator was tasked with interpreting for the audience all of the images which appeared on screen. In some cases, the narration allows the actions of the soldiers to be understood as an integral part of the larger mission of the UN peacekeepers, as when RCAF engineers and signal corps members build a hangar, repair motorized vehicles, and put up telephone wires. At other times, the narration serves different purposes, as when it states that the creation of UNEF coincided with the Edmonton Eskimo's winning the Grey Cup. Shifting the focus from the tense political climate of the time to a sporting event de-politicized the film and encouraged audiences to see Canada's peacekeeping actions in a positive light.

One of the major ideas presented to the audience was that the Canadian peacekeepers were performing their duties on behalf of Canada.[313] Peacekeeping was undeniably presented in a manner which encouraged Canadians to relate to the individuals on screen. The use of so much on-the-job footage specifically had the effect of making the Canadian soldiers into typical Canadian men. As machinists, telephone workers, truck drivers, postmen, and a host of other occupations, the peacekeepers had jobs that were shared by many Canadians at

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[312] Jones, *The Best Butler in the Business: Tom Daly of the National Film Board of Canada*, 67.
[313] Zoe Druick discusses citizenship in this era as a process of inclusion and she sees that individual Canadians were normally taken to be representatives of the nation as a whole. Druick, *Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board*, 46.

the time. This would have been in contrast to the ordinary soldiers of the Canadian Forces, whose daily routines of drills, weapons training, and marching were not as relatable. While politicians and media commentators of the late 1950s were not always sure how to categorize the peacekeepers -were they a police force, something akin to traditional soldiering, or something entirely new? – this film argued that the peacekeepers were Canadians, and that was what was most important.

Citizenship can also involve defining oneself in opposition to another. While engaged in their day-to-day labours on UNEF, the Canadians often interacted and worked side-by-side with the Egyptians, and these scenes appear throughout the film. In one shot, both groups build a hangar in which planes for the UN can be stored. The Canadians are bare-chested, in contrast to the Egyptians, who all wear white button-down shirts and slacks. Visually, the Canadians, with their casual dress, are not obviously in charge of the site. However, the narration for the film refers to the Egyptians as carpenters "plying their ancient trade" next to the "Canadian technicians." Such characterizations recur throughout the film, as when another scene shows the Egyptians rowing boats, "handled just as they were in Pharaoh's time," to try and navigate along the Suez Canal, which was full of shipwrecks from the 1956 conflict. These examples established a clear relationship of superiority and inferiority between the Canadians who are modern thinking and the Egyptians who are living in the past. Canada's identity as a modern and thriving nation was being expressed to the television audience

through its peacekeeping activities, and this set it apart from the Egyptians and other "backward" peoples of the world.

Figure 3.4 Egyptian / Canadian interaction,
The Thin Blue Line (1958)

For a large portion of the film, the Canadians were depicted off-duty and enjoying their time in Egypt. In one scene, engineers use their skills to create a makeshift shower for the other members of UNEF in the desert. This is followed with shots of the men using the shower, wearing bathing suits or their underwear. These showers are not private, and the men are shown talking and interacting with one another while cleaning themselves. Later, a large group of soldiers run and splash in the Mediterranean. The men are depicted enjoying themselves heartily, with laughs and smiles all around. Such images of the men's bodies in various states of undress in the absence of women are tempered later by narration that counters any questions regarding the heterosexuality of the Canadians. Showing the postal service that the Canadians had created and were

staffing, the narrator notes that any cares the men are experiencing in Egypt are tolerable if "there's a letter from wife or mother," in which case, "the soldier's day is made." Alluding to women back home was a long-standing trope in military films of the time as it allowed the men to engage in a full life on screen while implying the continued importance of the heterosexual bonds of marriage.[314] Hence, the peacekeepers lived and interacted with other men while on duty, but the audience was told that their sexual lives remained in stasis until they returned home to Canada.

The Canadians are also shown enjoying themselves through recreational activities on the base. In one scene, the Canadians sit in their cantina playing darts and cards and eating pickled eggs, which are jokingly described as a delicacy from home. Another scene shows a parade that the soldiers stage in honour of Canada Day which is attended by the head of UNEF, Major General E.L.M. Burns, himself a Canadian. The soldiers ride on three separate "floats" which are flat-bed trucks that had been made available for re-painting. Each vehicle represents a different duty that the Canadians are undertaking in Egypt:

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[314] Though the films examined in this chapter are all non-fiction documentaries, it is nevertheless useful to see them as part of the larger cinematic genre of the military film. Some authors have drawn links between the fictionalized characters that have appeared in war movies and the real soldiers in documentaries and newsreels. Robert Eberwein argues that military films put male bodies on display for their audiences and that the actions of the soldiers/actors are contingent on understandings of masculinity at a particular time. The NFB's peacekeeping films, like fictional films about the military in Canada and the United States, also promoted a close relationship between filmmakers, the film distribution companies, and the military. Lawrence Suid's work suggests that fictional films about the military also tended to depict an "all-powerful, always victorious armed services," prior to the late 1960s. Since then some films have played an active role in rehabilitating the image of the military. See Robert Eberwein, *Armed Forces: Masculinity and Sexuality in the American War Film* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2007); Lawrence H. Suid, *Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film* (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 2002).

medical and dental care, laundry, and the postal corps. The soldier riding the postal truck has on a Bedouin headdress, and smokes a cigar while delivering his letters. The narration from this scene let the audience know that the Canadians can "mak[e] light of local habits and hardships" experienced in their day-to-day duties.

Figure 3.5 On leave, *The Thin Blue Line* (1958)

The numerous scenes of the peacekeepers off-duty have a significant influence on the overall narrative of *The Thin Blue Line*. They suggest to the audience that duty on UNEF was fun and that it did not involve a considerable amount of risk. Only the minesweepers, a small portion of the force, seem to be in any danger since they are dealing with explosives. The rest of the soldiers have jobs to perform, but they seem unconcerned with whatever dangers might be present. The sole reference to the gravity of the peacekeepers' duty comes in the final voice-over, when the narrator mentions that "only their [the Canadians'] constant

vigilance can prevent fresh violence." Putting this dialogue so late in the film intimates that it was not a primary message the filmmakers were trying to impress upon the audience.

By focusing the film on positive images of peacekeepers enjoying themselves in far-away places, Acland's film demonstrated the importance of the original mandate given by the DND to make a recruitment film. The Canadians were shown performing a variety of tasks that were similar to those worked by men and women back in Canada. That these tasks were being done well and were crucial to the success of UNEF furthered the idea that peacekeeping was a constructive policy for the Canadian Forces. The peacekeepers also relaxed and enjoyed themselves much as any other Canadian would hope to, given the chance of a Mediterranean vacation. *The Thin Blue Line* therefore tried to make the peacekeepers typical Canadians, while making Egypt an exotic place where a young man could find ready access to excitement.

The beginning of the mission to Cyprus spurred the creation of two new films about peacekeeping in 1964 and 1965. For Lester Pearson, Paul Martin Sr., and their supporters, UNFICYP demonstrated Canada's willingness to be the world's leading peacekeeper. At the same time, some newspapers attacked the operational restrictions that the UN had invoked which forbade the Canadians from disarming the Cypriots.[315] This discursive climate remained staunchly political. With peacekeeping's leading figure, Pearson, now the Prime Minister, it

[315] For more discussion of the newspaper coverage of UNFICYP, see Chapters Four and Five.

would have made sense if the films produced at this time mentioned the Liberal commitment to peacekeeping, but however unlikely, the films made in 1964 and 1965 about peacekeeping refrained from discussing Pearson's involvement in the beginnings of UNEF or the Liberal government's key role in getting UNFICYP underway. The domestic political climate of 1956 also remained off-limits for these films regardless of the political consensus around peacekeeping that had developed in the eight years since. Instead, the films continued to endorse Canada's internationalist commitments through the UN as appropriate policies, while symbolically linking Canadians to their peacekeepers.

In the summer of 1964, director Richard Gilbert was sent to Cyprus and Egypt to shoot footage for two films about the Canadian peacekeepers there. Gilbert arrived in Cyprus soon after the Canadians were introduced, and he remained there until at least September of 1964.[316] As with *The Thin Blue Line,* the original film description for *You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus*, whose title was a reference to the Shakespearean tragedy, *Othello*, which was situated on the Mediterranean island, influenced the final product that was made. In this case, the NFB sought to make, "a theatrical film depicting the Canadian UN role in Cyprus, its duties and responsibilities."[317] Unlike *The Thin Blue Line,* this film was designed for a theatrical release, though at a little over twenty minutes in length, it is not clear whether it would have been shown before a feature film, or

[316] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Press Release," (Montreal, 1964).
[317] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Budget September," (Montreal, 1964).

whether it would have been made directly available in classrooms and to film clubs.[318]

While the NFB had dealt with the UN Film Section and the DND on previous efforts, it sent over its own people to make *You Are Welcome, Sirs*, which it would distribute itself. Despite this higher level of autonomy, the NFB was not free to construct their film as it saw fit. The DEA took an active interest in its production and asked to view a rough version of the film before it was finished. Upon viewing the film, it asked Gilbert and the film's editor, once again Dennis Sawyer, to move an interview with Cyprus' President Archbishop Makarios from the beginning to the middle of the film. The DEA felt that this would make the Canadian film seem more "neutral" and not pro-Greek.[319] A memorandum was sent to Richard Gilbert, and he made the changes requested, despite the extra work it would entail. Though the edits seemed relatively benign, the NFB continued to find its films about peacekeeping influenced by the Canadian Government.

The film opens with a landscape shot taken from an airplane. After cutting away to the opening titles, the film moves to a ground shot of an airport and the Canadian base. What follows is a narrative of why the Canadians were called to Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios is the first of several notable political figures to interpret Cyprus' history. The inclusion of interviews with Makarios and several other political figures helps situate *You Are Welcome, Sirs,* as a "talking head"

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[318] Ibid.
[319] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Letter from "Muriel" to "Dick" [Gilbert] 29 July," (Montreal, 1964).

documentary film. [320] The leading political figures are asked to describe why Cyprus is involved in its conflict and how a peaceful solution can be achieved. Their words correspond to images of Cyprus' past, as well as images of its present that show ordinary people struggling to prosper in a climate of conflict. These "talking heads" are named at the bottom of the film as they appear, which lends extra importance to their words since the civilian Cypriots are not granted such identification.

Most of the film depicts the operations that Canadians are undertaking. [321] All white men in blue helmets or blue berets, the Canadians are shown heading out on patrol in armoured vehicles or on foot across the "Green Line" in the capital city of Nicosia. At one point, the Canadian troops are relieved by a new unit and the film shows the recent arrivals being acclimatized to their new base. Throughout the film, Cyprus is presented as a geographically bipolar country: the countryside is beautiful and full of abundant resources in contrast with city life, particularly in Nicosia, where violence and danger are constant. The film also mixes shots of the Canadian peacekeepers on patrol with those of Turkish and Greek Cypriot civilians. It concludes with a shot of the Othello Tower, and the end credits scroll upwards in front of this historic artefact before the screen goes black.

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[320] Other interviewees include the Vice President, Dr. Kutchuk, a Turk, whose understanding of the conflict largely matched that of Makarios. This compatibility permits the film to maintain a consistent understanding of the conflict in Cyprus and its causes.

[321] Richard Gilbert, "You Are Welcome, Sirs, to Cyprus," (Canada: National Film Board, 1964).



Figure 3.6 *You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus* (1964)

As in *The Thin Blue Line*, the narrator most often interprets the footage in *You Are Welcome, Sirs*, for the audience. This narration describes what the Canadian peacekeepers are doing on Cyprus and how they are different from the host Cypriots. It begins with a description of Cyprus as a place of strategic importance and one which has been ruled by fifteen different nations. The Canadian audience for this film would have understood that their own country had not experienced such a past and was not a place where war, as the narrator comments, "has dwelt too long." By presenting the Canadians as strong and helpful white men and the Cypriots as either foolishly destructive or unable to govern themselves, a clear contrast in national identities was being furthered in this film.

The narration also provided text which was used as part of the promotion campaign for the film, since it was not possible to capture the essence of the film in a single image. The press release for *You Are Welcome, Sirs*, paraphrased the dialogue of the film to encapsulate what viewers would see. It stated: "They came at the request of the United Nations, leaving snow and ice in Canada to place themselves between the warring Greeks and Turks on the sun-parched island of Cyprus."[322] The release also included three images: one of the interview with Makarios, one of a Canadian peacekeeper in uniform looking off into the distance, and one of Canadian peacekeepers talking to a group of men standing next to a camel. The soldier pictured was Guardsman Donald Long, who was serving in Cyprus as part of the First Canadian Guards regiment.[323] Though Long was in Cyprus, he did not appear in *You Are Welcome, Sirs*. Instead, he was one of the three soldiers profiled in the other film Gilbert made on Canada's peacekeepers in 1965, *Postmark UNEF*. That image of Long was at the Theatre of Salamis, an architectural landmark that he visited for the film. Long was a youthful, clean-cut white man. His looks were clearly thought to be marketable by the NFB and Gilbert as he also appeared on the press release for *Postmark UNEF*. The image of the peacekeepers talking to the group of men near the camel was also taken from this other film, and is inexplicably from Egypt, not Cyprus. The use of the image from Egypt suggests that the NFB believed its audiences would expect to see scenes from the desert in any documentary about

[322] "You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus File, Press Release," (1964).
[323] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "Postmark UNEF File, Post-production script," (Montreal, 1965).

peacekeeping. Presumably, the NFB felt that viewers would not be concerned with the particularities of its promotional images, and would fail to notice that the images were not of Cyprus.



Figure 3.7 Press Release, *You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus* (1964)

The positive value of Canada's service to the UN was repeated several times in *You Are Welcome, Sirs*. The filmmakers interview UN General Thimayya of India, who describes the work of the Canadians as "terrific." The peacekeepers also speak about UNFICYP in several scenes of the film. It had become much

easier to synchronize sound and images, which meant that audiences could now directly hear these men talk about their experiences. The scenes in which the peacekeepers speak are staged shots of meetings and of patrols across Cyprus. They typically involve a single officer giving details about the situation in Cyprus that help explain what is taking place there politically or militarily. At other times, the officers explain what is appearing on screen during a Canadian peacekeepers' patrol. The staging of these scenes makes the dialogue appear to have been controlled, and its delivery by the peacekeepers feels wooden and unnatural. These scenes, however, all emphasize the good the Canadians are doing on Cyprus, and are part of a consistent narrative that emphasized the practical aspects of UNFICYP.

One large contrast with the earlier peacekeeping films was the central role that violence and danger played in the narration and framing of the film. The opening sounds of *You Are Welcome, Sirs* are gunfire, which set quite a different tone from the more positive films of the 1950s. The situation in Cyprus as the filming was taking place saw the Turkish and Greek irregular forces engaging each other in battles in the hills throughout the country. The film notes this, and describes how guns are "everywhere, always." Despite this potential to address an important issue regarding the operational mandate for UNFICYP that was being debated in newspapers back in Canada, the film espoused a positive narrative that emphasized the need for Canadian engagement in peacekeeping.

The ongoing violence in Cyprus enabled the narrative of this documentary to resemble a traditional story of an army trying to defeat an enemy while protecting innocent people. This narrative was one that contrasted the professional Canadian soldiers of peace with the aimless and suffering civilian population of Cyprus. The Canadians frequently appear onscreen riding atop armoured vehicles that have large guns on their turrets. The individual soldiers also carry rifles around with them, and the film offers several shots of the Canadians standing at the ready, guns in hand, keeping an eye out for any dangers that might approach. These film images are identical to Canadian Press photographs which appeared in many Canadian newspapers in 1964. They are, however, vastly different from the images of UNEF which appear in *The Thin Blue Line* in 1958. No scenes of the Canadians are included that show them at rest. Such images presented the peacekeepers as professional soldiers who were accomplishing extraordinary things in Cyprus. This made them figures worthy of respect.

Figure 3.8 *Your Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus* (1964)

Audiences were, however, presented with visuals differentiating the Canadians from the host population. The Canadians appear strong and confident on screen in contrast to the Cypriot civilians. Both the Turkish minority and the Greek majority are shown suffering as a result of the conflict. The Turks are depicted starving, and scenes of children are contrasted with images of robust, adult Canadian forces. Shots of a Greek wedding also make a clear differentiation between the Canadians, who see the larger problems that need to be addressed before anyone can live safely, and the Greeks, who engage in traditions that have not helped keep the island at peace. These civilians are, according to the narration, "determined but confused, often violent yet sick of war." Such narration pitied the Cypriots, but also placed the blame for their suffering on

their shoulders. The Canadian soldiers would do what they could, but ultimately the film wondered if the Cypriots would ever learn to get along with one another and live in peace.

Figure 3.9 *You Are Welcome, Sirs, To Cyprus* (1964)

The films the NFB produced on peacekeeping between 1957 and 1965 crafted narratives that emphasized positive aspects of the story of peacekeeping.[324] In every film that had peacekeeping as its focus, or as a major component, the domestic conflicts that had arisen in 1956 were ignored. The major political figures involved in Canada's peacekeeping role were also absent from these films, even when they had played a foundational role, as Lester Pearson and Paul

[324] Two other films about peacekeeping were made during this era: G.L Polidora, "Overture," (Canada: National Film Board, 1958). ; V.R Sarma, "The Security Council," (Canada: National Film Board, 1963). These films were made for the UN and did not have Canada as the central peacekeeping nation. They did however present peacekeeping in very positive terms.

Martin had in 1956 and 1964 respectively. These figures and details were exchanged for a narrative which stressed the value of peacekeeping as a policy of the Canadian Forces. In some cases, Film Board personnel pitched their documentaries in such a way as to omit these issues, and in other instances the Canadian Government censored or influenced their contents. In focusing on the peacekeepers, these films gave Canadians a glimpse into the operational world of peacekeeping that could not be gleaned elsewhere at this time. The films also made narrative choices which tended to emphasize the leisure and tourism possibilities for those who were taking part in peacekeeping operations, particularly UNEF. Differences between the Canadian peacekeepers and the people living in the host nations were also accentuated in these documentaries, which helped to reinforce a particular conception of what it meant to be Canadian. Audiences were therefore encouraged to see themselves in their peacekeepers and to acknowledge the constructive work they were accomplishing overseas.

Revising Canada's peacekeeping past and present, 1980 to 1995

The NFB did not produce any films about peacekeeping from 1965 to 1980, a period which saw the expulsion of UNEF in 1967 and the Trudeau government's reassessment of peacekeeping's value as a foreign policy. These events would have discouraged schools and other venues from showing the earlier films about peacekeeping, particularly those about UNEF.[325] However, the

[325] See Appendix B for more information about how many copies of each film were sold after 1982.

following fifteen years saw the production of a number of films that had peacekeeping as either their exclusive focus or as a major component. This reflected the return of peacekeeping to a place of prominence in Canada's political rhetoric, as well as in school textbooks, as discussed in the previous two chapters.

The files that the NFB Archives make public regarding these films are not as complete as those relating to the films of the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, less can be known about internal decisions made by the NFB, or any possible issues that External Affairs had with these later productions. The proposals for these films, their budgets, press releases, and the scripts of each production are available, and when combined with critical reviews of these films in newspapers and magazines, they help to flesh out the production and reception of these documentaries.

The films made about peacekeeping from 1980 to 1995 demonstrate changes in the operational mandate of the NFB, as well as changes in how peacekeeping was understood in Canada. Each of the films was proposed to the NFB as helping to better inform audiences about Canada's peacekeeping role, as had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s. However, a significant difference between these two time periods was the different willingness of filmmakers to be critical of the federal government. The DEA and the DND no longer seemed interested or able to restrict the contents of NFB documentaries about peacekeeping, which freed the editorial choices in these later films. As a result, in the 1980s peacekeeping

could be presented as an alternative to Canada's NATO role and a check on the increasing United States-Soviet antagonism. Filmmakers could also nostalgically look back at Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy while hoping their country would resume that leading role at the UN.

This increased artistic liberty also permitted some filmmakers to challenge the connection between peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. In many films, the peacekeepers were portrayed as an elite and professional group who were always doing their utmost to fulfil their duties. Particularly during the 1990s, filmmakers looked at how the media portrayed Canada's peacekeepers, and tried to use their films to "set the record straight" about their conduct on various UN operations. As a result, these films were more overtly partisan than those of previous decades, and the NFB and its documentarians sometimes disagreed about peacekeeping's value in the present and the future. These disagreements are evidence of Canadians' trying to grapple with the strong attachment between peacekeeping and Canada's national identity and the actions of the Airborne in Somalia.

Newspaper columnist-turned-documentarian Gwynne Dyer was responsible for several of the most successful - and also most talked-about - films produced by the NFB in the 1980s, and many of these films had peacekeeping as a central component. Dyer first worked with the Film Board on the seven-part series *War*, which aired on the CBC in the fall of 1983. The third film in the series

was a nominee for a Best Documentary Academy Award.[326] Each part of *War* was seen by an audience averaging over one million Canadians, and aimed to give an "in-depth analysis of warfare - its history, its institutions, its causes and its consequences."[327] It was shown at a time when the issue of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was re-emerging as a major political issue in North America. The seven parts of *War* were aired the same fall as the made-for-TV movie *The Day After,* which depicted what life would be like on Earth after a nuclear war.[328] This was also the same year as Pierre Trudeau's peace tour, and ordinary Canadians were increasingly vocalizing their fears regarding the threat that nuclear war posed to North American life, making the timing of Dyer's series maximal for its possible impact.[329]

When Dyer and his collaborator Tina Viljoen proposed three additional films that would focus on the Canadian military, the NFB agreed to fund the project in conjunction with the CBC.[330] They pitched it to the NFB in the summer of 1984 while their earlier series was finding a still-wider audience on the American Public Broadcasting System. The new documentaries Dyer and Viljoen proposed would be also be shown on the CBC, since their earlier collaboration had done so well for all parties involved.

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[326] This film, *The Profession of Arms*, lost the award to Emile Ardolino's *He Makes me feel like Dancin'*.
[327] National Film Board of Canada, "Goodbye War Press Materials," (1983).
[328] Michael Dorland, "War Review," *Cinema Canada*, January 1984.
[329] Orlando French, "Battling global insanity," *Globe and Mail*, Tuesday 15 November 1983.
[330] Dorland, "War Review."

Keeping the Elephants Away, the second film in the *Defence of Canada* series, explores Canada's involvement in military alliances with other nations.[331] It begins with a shot of the graduating class at Canada's Royal Military College [RMC] in Kingston, Ontario. The new generation of armed forces officers is quickly replaced by a current naval officer who gives a summation of the operational mandate of the Canadian Forces in the 1980s. The opening credits appear on screen in front of an aerial shot of three Canadian warships, taking the viewer away from the naval officer. The film then cuts to footage of the cenotaph in Ottawa on Remembrance Day. The new officers of RMC are visually contrasted with their elder predecessors, who have appeared to mourn their fallen comrades. The film spends a considerable amount of time tracing the activities of the Canadian Forces between the Second World War and the 1980s. Footage of Canada's major diplomatic figures is interspersed with talking-head interviews with other diplomats of the post-World War Two era. The final third of the film jumps to present-day Cyprus and follows the Canadian peacekeepers in their daily activities. The last scene brings viewers back to Canada with an aerial shot of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa and a fighter jet about to take off from a runway, visually linking the government and the military.

The narration used in *Keeping The Elephants Away* differed from earlier documentaries about peacekeeping because of the appearance of Dyer, the film's writer and narrator, on screen. As in the *War* series, Dyer is shown walking

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[331] Tina Viljoen, "Keeping the Elephants Away," (Canada: National Film Board, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1986).

through various locales, describing peacekeeping and how Canada had tried, and was still trying, to make the UN a more functional organization by promoting peacekeeping. Many filmmakers were increasingly cognizant of their own role in shaping their films' subjects.[332] By embracing the narrator as an individual, filmmakers hoped to remind audiences that choices had been made about how to present a particular topic, and that each film framed its story subjectively. The effect of this framing was to make Dyer the central focus in the documentary, and this series was successful in large part because audiences believed Dyer's arguments and found him an engaging figure.[333]

Canada's peacekeeping past is looked at as a sometimes useful but sometimes flawed pragmatic policy. Lester Pearson is said to have invented peacekeeping, and the Liberals are credited with making Canada's foreign policy achieve a "golden age" after the Second World War. This is done while omitting any discussion of the debates that ensued over Canada's siding with the UN instead of supporting Britain and France. Similar to many other media offerings at this time, *Keeping The Elephants Away* sought to remind Canadians that they had strong ties to peacekeeping in the past and the present, while forgetting to remind viewers of the conflicts that peacekeeping caused *inside* Canada in the 1950s and the 1960s.

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[332] Weiner, "The Omniscient Narrator and the Unreliable Narrator: The Case of *Atomic Cafe*," 75.
[333] Rick Groen, "A rational analysis of an irrational act," *Globe and Mail*, 1 October 1983, E3. This article credits Dyer's on-screen presence for much of the success of the *War* series, and the same can be said for the *Defence of Canada* films.

The film uses talking heads to explain Canada's peacekeeping past and present. *Keeping the Elephants Away* features interviews with E.L.M. Burns, External Affairs' John W. Holmes, Louis St. Laurent's Secretary Dale Thomson, and Lt. General Rene Gutknecht. These men all helped to guide Canada's external affairs policies, and their opinions support the filmmakers' contention that Canada's armed forces are good at peacekeeping, but really "they're designed for fighting the Russians." Their thoughts also provide interludes between shots of Canadian leaders at the UN and soldiers performing peacekeeping duties.



Figure 3.10 Lester Pearson, *Keeping the Elephants Away* (1986)

The documentary frames the start of UNEF as a political act governed by Cold War calculations. This framing of peacekeeping's history supports the central argument of the film: that formal alliances with other nations in a nuclear age are

foolish. Despite Canada's past successes as part of UN peacekeeping operations, the utility of such alliances is questioned because it often served the interests of the US or the USSR. The film recognizes the popularity of peacekeeping in Canada, but calls it "a last-ditch invention by the disillusioned idealists of the '40s when they found their dream of world order through the UN collapsing around their ears." [334] The narration notes that the UN has only gone into certain areas of the world where Cold War interests are not at play. The failure to provide lasting peace in the Middle East and in Cyprus also allows this film to take what it describes as a more "cynical" tone regarding the potential of peacekeeping. Dyer's narration notes that peacekeeping gives Canada and other nations "something useful to do, and it certainly provides good training for their soldiers," but restrictions on UN operations limit their effectiveness. Ultimately, the film depicts peacekeeping as something that could benefit the world more if nations like Canada disengaged from their military alliances, and the superpowers allowed the UN to be more than a political debating forum.

Keeping The Elephants Away also hoped, as earlier films did, to educate viewers on the Canadian Forces' daily operations, and what Canada's peacekeepers were like. Dyer and Viljoen visited Canadian troops on duty in Cyprus, and the film follows two peacekeepers patrolling the streets of Nicosia. The soldiers carry guns, ride in armoured vehicles, and are portrayed as professional soldiers, as they were in *You Are Welcome, Sirs, to Cyprus*. Dyer and

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[334] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "Keeping the Elephants Away File, Script 19 February " (Montreal, 1986).

Viljoen also interview the Canadian peacekeepers about whether they feel they are making a difference. One soldier in particular, Captain Rick Peters, describes how the Canadian Forces appreciate the chance to experience "a real mission." Unlike the peacekeepers who were shown contentedly doing their jobs in the 1950s and 1960s, Captain Peters expresses the limitations of what the Canadians can accomplish on a peacekeeping mission. Particularly, he notes that if the two sides in a conflict do not want to settle their dispute peacefully, then the peacekeepers cannot, either. The film sympathizes with the soldiers, and hopes that these ineffectual restrictions will one day disappear.

The soldiers are presented in a very positive light, despite the film's anti-war message. The narration describes the Canadian peacekeepers as "fairly honest people," which Dyer claims is a "by-product of the profession."[335] Audiences were therefore encouraged to see their peacekeepers as skilled professionals who were interested in keeping the peace, and capably serving Canada abroad. There was no attempt to differentiate the Canadians from the Cypriots or any other host nation. Attempts to link peacekeeping to ordinary Canadians through either shared commonalities or in opposition to other foreign nationals was not a primary goal of Dyer's documentaries about peacekeeping.

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[335] This dialogue appears in the film as well as in Faulk, "Warring on TV: A Conversation with Gwynne Dyer."

Figure 3.11 *Keeping the Elephants Away* (1986)

Keeping the Elephants Away and the entire *Defence of Canada* series were not as successful as Dyer and Viljoen's earlier films had been. Many Canadians shared the films' vision of peacekeeping as a policy that could be more useful if the superpowers and the UN would let nations like Canada better utilize their knowledge and personnel. Others felt that their argument against Canada's place in the Western alliance was too critical.[336] The series drew a large television audience all the same, and a thirty-minute version of the series was also made, entitled *Harder Than It Looks*. Interest in these films was somewhat diminished by the rapid change in the international Cold War climate after they were made. As the Soviet Union collapsed, and the world no longer seemed divided into East

[336] "Media and disarmament," *Globe and Mail*, Monday 14 April 1986; Evans, *In the National Interest: A Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949-1989*.

and West, the possibility that Canada's peacekeepers could finally play that larger role became a reality, making these films seem more outdated. Dyer did, however, come to be known as a "rising star with the peace movement," and his syndicated newspaper column continues to be read around the world.[337]

The failures and challenges encountered by Canada's peacekeepers in the 1990s illustrated the dangers of Canada's increasing peacekeeping involvement. As the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien created the Inquiry into Somalia, the NFB funded the production of three films about the Canadian peacekeeping experience on UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. The political climate of the mid-1990s influenced how Calgary-based writer and director Garth Pritchard created his films. Pritchard had been a photographer for the Calgary *Herald* and the Montreal *Gazette* before setting off to film Canada's armed forces overseas for the NFB.[338] His films were pitched to the Edmonton division of the NFB, and Pritchard proposed to follow the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry and the Lord Strathcona's Horse, two Canadian Forces units that were based in Western Canada.[339]

The documentaries Pritchard made about the Canadian peacekeepers in Croatia were *Caught in the Crossfire*, *In God's Command*, and *The Price of Duty*. All three films were shown on the CBC; *In God's Command* shown as a half-hour documentary called *Padre* on the *Man Alive* program in April and *Caught in the*

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[337] Matthew Fisher, "Journalist's new film advocates neutrality," *Globe and Mail*, Monday 10 November 1986, A10.
[338] Bob Blakey, "Troops show valour in the Balkans," *Calgary Herald*, 6 September 1995, A13.
[339] Pritchard was convinced that this regional focus was the only reason his projects were approved. See Helen Metella, "NFB helps filmmakers profile peacekeepers," *Edmonton Journal*, 27 November 1994, C6.

Crossfire and *The Price of Duty* as one-hour films in September of 1995.[340] The films were generally very well received. At the 1996 Annual Alberta Film and Television Awards, *The Price of Duty* won the award for the best overall production and best documentary over thirty minutes, and Pritchard won best director (non-dramatic).[341]

Pritchard's original film proposals helped determine his subject matter and narrative. Each of the films that he proposed had a separate purpose, but the one attached to the first film, *Caught in the Crossfire*, was applicable to all three: "to document the role Canadian peacekeepers are playing in Bosnia and to come to grips with the reasons behind the realities confronted by the Canadians in the exercise of their responsibilities."[342] Similar to that of most of the earlier films about peacekeeping made by the NFB, the central purpose of these documentaries was to show what the Canadian peacekeepers were doing overseas, making the soldiers the central figures. Coming to grips with what was taking place on UNPROFOR also meant discussing peacekeeping's shortcomings. Akin to the films of the 1980s, these documentaries noted that operational restrictions encumbered the ability of the peacekeepers to protect themselves. Pritchard made it clear that any restrictions on the peacekeeper's behavior were unnecessary handicaps. By making such a suggestion, his films argued that

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[340] Richard Helm, "'One minute you're alive, the next you're dead': NFB's The Padre takes viewers into war, where army chaplain ministers to soldiers and civilians on both sides," *Edmonton Journal*, 13 April 1995; NFB, "Protection Force," *Globe and Mail*, Sunday 2 September 1995.
[341] "Jake and the Kid wins two awards," *Edmonton Journal*, 19 March 1996, B10.
[342] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "Caught in the Crossfire File, Budget," (Montreal, 1995).

Canada's peacekeepers should be free to engage in behaviour that would normally be permitted only in war and not in peacekeeping.

The Price of Duty, in particular, has had a considerable impact because of its depictions of the last days of the life of Corporal Mark Isfeld, an engineer whose job it was to clear mines in Croatia. Minesweepers had been depicted in almost all of the films about peacekeeping that were made by the NFB before 1995, and their jobs were always said to be among the most dangerous. Pritchard dedicated an entire film to peacekeepers disarming mines, focusing on three men: Isfeld, Sergeant Greg James, and Warrant Officer Dan Hartford.

The Price of Duty opens with a sequence shared by the other films in the series. Quickly-cut scenes of the former Yugoslavia depict civilians fleeing gunfire and explosions before a map appears to indicate the geographic setting for the film. Ruined buildings are then shown, including one with the graffiti: "Welcome to Hell." The film shifts to a sombre shot of peacekeepers standing at attention at Isfeld's funeral. After this scene, the documentary goes back in time several months to depict the duties and untimely death of Isfeld. The minesweepers are shown going out on patrol to several different locations and helping to remove deadly dangers. The officers detail the hazards of their occupation throughout the film. The last section is a verbal description by Hartford and James of the day Isfeld died, footage of the funeral, and an interview with Isfeld's parents.

Figure 3.12 *The Price of Duty* (1995)

As in Dyer's films in the 1980s, the peacekeepers in *The Price of Duty* are framed as skilled professionals. Their identities as members of the Canadian Forces make them exceptional people worthy of admiration. Isfeld, in particular, is presented as something of a martyr figure in the film. *The Price of Duty* is bookended by his funeral, and he is the emotional centre around which all of the other figures orbit. Young, blond haired, and light-eyed, Isfeld is presented as a man who "collected little hearts, little smiles, big eyes, you know..."[343] Isfeld's mother knit little dolls that she sent over to her son so that he could distribute them to children. These "Issy Dolls," as they have come to be known, are still given out today, and are permanently enshrined on the monument to peacekeeping in the Garrison Green community in Calgary, Alberta.[344] The dolls are described as one way that Isfeld connected to the children of Croatia. Atypical of the other soldiers, Isfeld is said to have often left a vehicle to present gifts to

[343] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "The Price of Duty File, Script," (Montreal, 1995).
[344] See the conclusion for a discussion of the Garrison Green community. Bruce Cheadle, "Izzy Dolls delight kids 12 years after Master-Cpl. Mark Isfeld died on duty," *Canadian Press*, 28 April 2006.

small children he saw on the way to a minefield. Hartford, near the end of the documentary, comments upon Isfeld's penchant for giving out gifts to the children and agrees with the sentiment behind Isfeld's gift-giving. He remarks: "They're not part of the problem. They're just kids, for Christ's sake. They deserve to live. They deserve to have a childhood, you know. They deserve to have two legs and a face."[345] By caring for children he did not know, and by extension, dying for those children, Isfeld becomes a caring and sacrificial figure. It was the noble sacrifices of Canada's peacekeepers that Pritchard sought to convey to his audiences, and all of his films share such depictions.

Figure 3.13 Corporal Mark Isfeld, *The Price of Duty* (1995)

The bonds among Isfeld, Sergeant James, and Hartford are at the centre of this documentary. Both Hartford and James have strong non-sexual feelings of

[345] "The Price of Duty File, Script," (1995).

love for Isfeld, as evidenced by their desire to attend his funeral and the difficulty they find in choosing the right words to say to Isfeld's family. Hartford recalls how he has had recurring nightmares that involve him standing

> in a church or a chapel of some type and the coffin was laid out behind me and I was some kind of guard, some kind of Buckingham Palace type of statue and I wasn't allowed to blink or shift around or anything. His wife was right up in my face screaming at me and spitting on me and clawing at me and tearing all the insignia and what not off my uniform. His kids were there and doing the same thing. All I could do is just stand there and stare straight ahead at attention. Everybody in the church was cheering her on.[346]

Hartford believes that this dream was motivated out of both fear and guilt for not having done more to protect Isfeld in Croatia. Sergeant James expresses similar guilt when he describes how difficult it will be to speak to Islfed's mother, knowing, "you were responsible for someone's life. Not his death, but his life." In both these instances, the soldiers were willing to overcome their fears because Isfeld's family was owed as much.

These close bonds of camaraderie also suggest to the audience that unless you have fought alongside someone, you cannot know everything about them. The affection among the peacekeepers is not atypical of that which appears among soldiers in other dramatic war movies. As early as 1925, silent films such as *The Big Parade* were depicting male friendships in the armed forces that had nothing to do with male sexuality.[347] The passing of a fellow soldier has often permitted men to express emotions on screen that they would not normally exhibit; because of the militaristic setting, tears, sorrow, and anguish are not considered un-

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[346] Ibid.
[347] Eberwein, *Armed Forces: Masculinity and Sexuality in the American War Film*, 18, 20

manly. In *The Price of Duty*, Isfeld's wife and parents are told about his heroism, but they are not privy to the details of his actual death, which the male peacekeepers alone experienced. James and Hartford, on the other hand, are shown overwhelmed with emotion for Isfeld and compare his death with their own fears of how they might die while peacekeeping.

The men talk directly to the camera, providing narration for the scenes throughout the film. Hartford, in particular, seems to have been favoured by Pritchard for his willingness to be candid about the lives of the peacekeepers and the limitations they face in trying to perform their duties, and to curse on screen. At one point, while the others are attempting to disarm a mine that has been placed near the pump in a farmers' field, Hartford describes the utility of a small flashlight that he calls "the cat's ass for this type of work," before criticizing the DND for making the peacekeepers purchase them themselves.[348] Pritchard and his crew had been allowed to stay with the Canadians in several different parts of the former Yugoslavia for three months, and this allowed them to gather a considerable amount of footage that detailed the daily routines of the peacekeepers. His belief in having the peacekeepers speak for themselves motivated this decision, and encouraged the peacekeepers to discuss their apprehensions and their frustrations.

Isfeld's commitment to helping children could be celebrated as an honourable personality trait, but the Serbian and Croatian adults who appear in the

[348] "The Price of Duty File, Script," (1995).

Protection Force films are not portrayed in a positive light. The Canadians did not resort to violence, and this marked them as better than the non-Canadians depicted in Pritchard's films. For example, the Croatian and Serbian forces that the Canadians interact with are shown the respect of fellow-soldiers, but they also struggle to keep drunken civilians with guns from shooting at other civilians. The two sides in the conflict are described by one of the peacekeepers in *In God's Command* as hating each other "almost genetically."[349] Many of the villagers are also depicted as helpless victims or willing to commit atrocities, dig up graves, and generally prevent the Canadian peacekeepers from bringing order to the region. This distinction between the Canadian peacekeepers and the Serbs and Croats provided another level of differentiation that set the peacekeepers apart as exceptional people.

The critical response to Pritchard's films often referred to the value of letting the exceptional Canadian peacekeepers speak for themselves. Many reviewers stated that only the peacekeepers could describe peacekeeping accurately, since they had actually participated in these operations. One reviewer called *The Price of Duty* and *Caught in the Crossfire* "refreshing and innovative" because "the story has no stars, no obtrusive millionaire news anchors or TV reporters, a minimum of political charlatans, lying diplomats and howling victims, all of which most viewers are no doubt mightily sick of [sic]."[350] Most reviewers, Pritchard, and the film's producer Jerry Krepakevich, made the tarnished image

[349] National Film Board of Canada Archives, "In God's Command File, Script " (Montreal, 1995).
[350] John Haslett Cuff, "Two samples of the value of public TV," *Globe and Mail*, Wedesday 6 September 1995, C1.

of Canada's peacekeepers in the 1990s one of the central foci of their discussions of the films. Assailing what they felt were overly negative depictions of Canada's peacekeepers elsewhere, the filmmakers and many reviewers found the films' "honesty" and "intimacy" to be their strongest points.[351] The filmmakers and those who found the films to be more "honest" than other media depictions ignored Pritchard's directorial and editorial choices, since the finished product matched their political views on peacekeeping.

Pritchard's choice of narrators also reflected his personal politics. This narration was done by Gwynne Dyer, creating a link to the very successful films he had made for the NFB in the 1980s that were also quite critical of the restrictions on the Canadian Forces. Dyer's narration is more limited than it had been in his earlier films, and his voice does little beyond introduce the location of each scene and provide some detail that explains who the parties are on screen. Of particular note is the narration's referring to Corporal Isfeld by his nickname, "Issy." This use of informalities is done by all the soldiers in the film. But having the narrator use similar language asked the audience to identify with Isfeld as "Issy" as well.

There were, however, differences between how Pritchard and Krepakevich discussed the film and how the NFB marketed it. The press release for *The Price of Duty* and *Caught in the Crossfire* began by asking the question, "Ten Canadian

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[351] Blakey, "Troops show valour in the Balkans," *Calgary Herald*; Helm, "'One minute you're alive, the next you're dead': NFB's The Padre takes viewers into war, where army chaplain ministers to soldiers and civilians on both sides," *Edmonton Journal*.

soldiers have died in the Balkans, is it worth it?"[352] By questioning the value of peacekeeping as a concept, the press release did not take the same attitude towards peacekeeping as the filmmakers had in their interviews. The Canadian contribution to peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia was also called "costly" and a huge trial for the Canadians. This language addressed the debates over whether Canada was still suited to its peacekeeping role. The press release argued that Pritchard's films, which they described as "totally unique," would add to this debate and help Canadians see the dangers that peacekeeping posed. All of this was not nearly as positive towards the Canadian Forces as many reviewers or the filmmakers seem to have been. This suggests that the NFB recognized the value of Pritchard's films, but did not agree with his personal politics.[353]

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[352] NFB, "Protection Force," *Globe and Mail.*

[353] These differences have become more apparent in the years since 1995, as Pritchard has repeatedly spoken out about how his experiences working with the NFB and the CBC have not allowed what he considers to be "truthful" accounts of Canada's military to be shown to national audiences. See Bruce Garvey, "CBC 'abandoned our military': Award-winning filmmaker tells heroic tales," *Calgary Herald*, 22 November 2003, A7.

Figure 3.14 *The Price of Duty* (1995)

All three of Pritchard's films focused on the Canadian peacekeepers rather than overtly addressing the political debates that surrounded peacekeeping in the 1990s. Despite this apparent desire to avoid the political controversies surrounding peacekeeping, Pritchard's films were arguments in favour of a particular form of peacekeeping and against what he called "retired colonels and professors being called on as the expert of the day to talk about something that they know nothing about."[354] After Canada's peacekeepers found themselves scrutinized in a number of media outlets for the conduct of the Airborne Regiment in Somalia and back in Canada, many Canadians lashed out against these critics and voiced their strong support for what the individual troops were accomplishing. For the last twenty years, Pritchard has shared these more

[354] Helm, "'One minute you're alive, the next you're dead': NFB's The Padre takes viewers into war, where army chaplain ministers to soldiers and civilians on both sides," *Edmonton Journal*.

supportive views. In an interview in 1995, Pritchard suggested it was a shame that hardly any Canadians knew the names of those peacekeepers who had died in Croatia, and yet "lots of Canadians know the name of the young Somali who was killed."[355] This indicates that Pritchard could not accept that Shidane Arone was more notable than one of Canada's peacekeepers. He also ignored the differences between Canada's peacekeepers who volunteered to risk their lives, and Arone, a teenager who had been tortured and killed against his will. In so doing, Pritchard demonstrated the willingness of many Canadians to forget what had taken place in Somalia in 1993. His insistence that films and news media depict the peacekeepers in a positive light highlights the backlash against those who sought to reform Canada's military and rid it of white supremacists, misogynists, and other "un-Canadian" types. It also demonstrates how Canada's peacekeeping identity was being contested in the 1990s.

The films the NFB made about peacekeeping from 1980 to 1995 are texts that illuminate changing Canadian attitudes about peacekeeping and the changing institutional goals of the Film Board.[356] Each of the films discussed in this section reflected a specific historical understanding of Canada's capacity to help the world through peacekeeping. These films helped to educate many Canadians about what their peacekeepers were doing overseas by focusing on their day-to-day operations. At the same time, the conscious choices of the filmmakers made

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[355] Ibid.

[356] The other film made about peacekeeping during this era that was not discussed is Martin Duckworth, "Peacekeeper at War: A Personal View of the Gulf War," (Canada: National Film Board, 1994). This film was more concerned with Canada's involvement in the Gulf War against Iraq and contrasting that to Canada's legacy as a peacekeeping nation.

the Canadian peacekeepers exemplary professionals. Civilian policy-makers and those who had not experienced an operation for themselves were not given such favourable treatment, and the functional value of peacekeeping, but not Canada's peacekeepers, was challenged because of the operational restrictions enforced by the UN and by the Canadian government. These divisions between the Canadian Forces and the Government would continue to be publically debated after 1995, and these films offer important insights into how Canadian audiences were exposed to contested visions of peacekeeping's place in Canada's national identity.

Conclusion

Films tell us much about how Canadians understood peacekeeping between 1958 and 1995. While each film tells us something about the era in which it was produced, some continuity exists over time; the focus on individual peacekeepers in NFB films and the visual depictions of the activities of peacekeepers was something they all shared. There were, however, differences in the portrayals of peacekeeping which were due in part to changes in the technology and the use of narration being employed by filmmakers at the NFB. Since the intended audiences for these films included school-aged young Canadians as well as broader television or cinematic audiences, the differences between how peacekeeping was portrayed in these films compared to in other media are glaring. The specificities of the NFB's operational mandate to interpret Canada to Canadians played a key role in these differences, as did the restrictions that were

imposed on the contents of documentaries made about peacekeeping between 1957 and 1965. More important, the different documentary depictions reflect changing understandings of Canada's peacekeeping role at particular times from the 1950s to the 1990s.

These films show the complexities that can arise when the federal government is involved in the production of culture and cultural policy. The NFB's peacekeeping documentaries demonstrate how even films that aimed to be apolitical can provide important lenses through which to examine how Canadians and their "Blue Berets" were linked. The early films discussed in this chapter were made with considerable governmental interference. The DEA and the DND both took an interest in how peacekeeping was portrayed to Canadian audiences. This suggests that these branches of the government were concerned with controlling the messages that Canadians received about peacekeeping. In these films, Canada's peacekeepers were shown engaging in valuable work, and appeared to be similar to ordinary Canadians. The later films most likely did not have such controls in place regarding their contents, and the peacekeepers were shown as professionals who performed specialized tasks. This made them honourable figures who were worthy of positive documentaries about their work. Such framings permitted the filmmakers to more critically examine peacekeeping, though the individual peacekeepers were never criticized.

By focusing on the peacekeepers, these documentaries did not employ nostalgic or progressive language as often as did other media. Early films did

downplay the tense political debates that surrounded peacekeeping's origins, and it was only thirty years later that such topics or Lester Pearson would feature in an NFB film about peacekeeping. These omissions were quite different from the political rhetoric and high school history textbooks that celebrated Pearson and made peacekeeping a bipartisan expression of a Canadian national identity. The NFB's documentaries on this subject instead emphasized the functional value of peacekeeping, which was more open to questioning, particularly after the 1980s. In so doing, they demonstrate the necessity of comprehending the diverse ways peacekeeping was understood in Canada between 1958 and 1995.

Chapter Four
"Peace is not front page news:" English and French Canadian newspaper coverage of peacekeeping operations, 1956-1997

An article in the Calgary *Herald* in 1993 stated that peacekeeping was "a thankless task" that rarely led to accolades amongst local populations and Canadians back home.[357] Instead, the editorial declared: "[p]eace is not front page news." While peace in and of itself did not garner many banner headlines in Canadian daily newspapers, Canada's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations grabbed considerable front page and editorial space. At the outset of new peacekeeping missions, or when things went awry for the Canadian forces serving under the United Nations flag, daily newspapers in English and French Canada paid attention and letters to the editor suggest that their readers did, too.[358]

Canada's newspapers, more than any other medium, provided the language and imagery which linked peacekeeping to the country's national identity. Being the first responders to international events permitted articles and editorials to set the frameworks within which peacekeeping would be discussed in each of the time periods covered in this dissertation. Politicians were often left addressing the linkages made by the press, and their words in turn reinforced what newspapers had already said regarding peacekeeping. As will be shown, this

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[357] "Mission Accomplished," *Calgary Herald*, 12 May 1993.

[358] This is not to say that letters to the editor provide a perfect sample of readers' opinions. Rather, as Valerie Korinek has argued in her work, letters to the editor provide an indication of opinions, both positive and negative, that a periodical believes their readership holds as well. See Chapter Three, "A Faithful Friend and Tonic: Reading *Chatelaine*" in Valerie Korinek, *Roughing it in the Suburbs: Reading Chatelaine Magazine in the Fifties and Sixties* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

could be problematic, as newspapers advanced ideas about peacekeeping being representative of the best or worst Canadian international action and encouraged peacekeeping to be framed in domestic terms, largely ignoring its relevance to the host nations. This domestic emphasis came about because newspapers wanted to make stories relatable to local audiences. The tendency for newspapers to laud the actions of the past while forgetting any sources of tension further permitted the narratives of peacekeeping to mythologize a sanitized version of the past centred on Lester Pearson and Canada's wonderful work with the UN. Such understandings influenced how politicians, and later how textbook authors and documentary filmmakers, presented peacekeeping. This also encouraged politicians, authors, and artists to see peacekeeping in nostalgic or progressive terms, which helped to cement its place in the pantheon of Canada's national symbols.

This chapter is divided into six sections that correspond to the start of UNEF, ONUC, UNFICYP in 1956, 1960, and 1964 respectively, when the Canadians serving on UNEF were expelled in 1967, the months surrounding the revelations about the Airborne's conduct on UNOSOM in 1993, and the time around the release of the report of the Inquiry into Somalia in 1997. These time periods saw frequent mention of peacekeeping in front page articles, major articles in the first ten pages of a newspaper, editorials, letters to the editor, and also in minor stories buried in the back pages. As a result, both the casual and the dedicated reader would have been exposed to this news coverage.

Because they sought to inform but also influence their readers, newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the editor provided some of the most dramatic language in support of, and against, peacekeeping. Considerable time will be spent here on the Suez Crisis, as newspapers symbolically linked peacekeeping and Canada's national identity immediately after Lester Pearson made his speeches at the UN General Assembly. Newspapers also employed simplified narratives about the peacekeeping past after reporting a decline in Canada's international standing during the Diefenbaker years. From then onwards, newspapers combined nostalgic, functional, and progressive discussions of peacekeeping to express particular conceptions of Canada. These conceptions encouraged Canadians to see themselves as suited for all peacekeeping endeavours, which would have disastrous effects in the 1990s.

The peacekeeping discourses also came to provide journalists and letter-writers with clear narrative frameworks to follow. Meg Spratt has noted that journalists use recurring cultural themes, and rely on tropes to tell their stories.[359] Lester Pearson, in particular, served as shorthand for all that was good about peacekeeping and Canada in the world. Audiences were encouraged to contextualize and interpret every peacekeeping story, editorial, or letter to the editor by drawing upon cultural knowledge about Pearson and Canada as a peacekeeping nation.[360]

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[359] Meg Spratt, "When Police Dogs Attacked: Iconic News Photographs and Construction of History, Mythology, and Political Discourse," *American Journalism* 25, no. 2 (2008).
[360] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*; Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 8.

Newspapers also communicate collective memory when they discuss the past. If people rely on language and imagery that is culturally specific, then they must draw upon social knowledge in order to think about the past in any way.[361] According to communications scholar Jill Edy, journalists provide an avenue for collective remembrance by using commemorations, historical analogies, or historical contexts. She argues that journalists can help particular memories remain current in the minds of readers, or can help other memories re-emerge long after their events have occurred, by writing about them in newspapers.[362] When a peacekeeping operation was placed in a historical context, or Canada's peacekeeping efforts were commemorated, a cultural collective memory of peacekeeping that was almost entirely positive was invoked. Canadians were said to have a duty to help other nations and to have demonstrated an aptitude for peacekeeping operations. Such ideas were employed in an attempt to create linkages with Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy. This collective memory was challenged by the expulsion of UNEF in 1967 and the Somalia Affair in 1993, but such shortcomings were always forgotten in favour of a positive narrative.

In the Canadian context, the concentrated ownership of newspapers among a small number of publishers partially accounts for peacekeeping being presented in similar language and imagery across large geographic divides. This mattered more than political affiliation after 1956 because in most cases papers had a favoured political stance, but were willing to change according to the issue at

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[361] Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (New York Harper Colophon Books, 1980), 51.
[362] Jill A. Edy, "Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory," *Journal of Communication* 49, no. 50 (1999).

hand.[363] The Thomson Corporation, Southam Incorporated, and later the Hollinger Group, have had control over most of the daily newspapers published in Canada for the past sixty years.[364] This concentrated ownership has not, as David Taras has noted, always meant that newspapers were controlled with a tight rein by their owners, or that the papers under the ownership of a single person or group espoused the same political line. As will become clear, papers across the country found peacekeeping a policy with considerable practical value for the Canadian Forces as well as considerable symbolic value as a marker of Canada's national identity.

All the newspapers used in this chapter relied on the Canadian Press [CP] or the Press Canadienne [PC] to obtain many of their articles relating to international events.[365] Hence, if the CP or PC chose to transmit stories about Canada's peacekeepers, they were made available to readers all across the country. Between 1956 and 1997, most newspapers also cut down on their coverage of international events to focus more on local or national stories. These two factors placed boundaries on what stories and what story angles each paper could follow, and also allowed for continuity between papers.

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[363] Rutherford, *The Making of the Canadian Media*; David Taras, *The Newsmakers: The Media's Influence on Canadian Politics* (Scarborough: Nelson, 1990).
[364] Taras, *The Newsmakers: The Media's Influence on Canadian Politics*, 15.
[365] For more on the development of the CP and the PC, see Gene Allen, "The (Bi)national news: Canadian Press and the *Service Francais* in the 1960s," at The Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association (Montreal, 2010).

As a result of these editorial choices, international stories had to be made relatable to Canadian audiences.[366] International crises were often not the most important news stories in a given day, but a Canadian connection to far-away places through peacekeeping allowed stories about the Middle East, the Congo, Cyprus, and Somalia to receive more newspaper space than they would have otherwise. Making these stories suitable for a Canadian audience resulted in certain themes being repeated in these articles, and certain actors - those who were in the nations that needed peacekeeping interventions - receding into the background. These preferences reflected conceptions of Canada as a peacekeeping nation that was unique in the world.

Canada's daily newspapers played an active part in forging the links between peacekeeping and Canada's national identity. They often provided the language and metaphors that would be adopted by politicians, textbook authors, and filmmakers to discuss peacekeeping because of the short turnaround between events occurring and their being reported. They also employed regular narrative frameworks for their audiences that helped routinize discussions of Canada as a nation of "Blue Berets." How they conceptualized Canada's peacekeeping actions was therefore crucial to how and why peacekeeping became and remained so popular from 1956 to 1997.

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[366]Michael Schudson's work on journalism has been influential in making scholars aware that "there is interaction between what the world is and how it gets reported...The reporter not only relates stories but makes them." See Manoff and Schudson, eds., *Reading the News: A Pantheon Guide to Popular Culture*, 4.

Framing the Suez Crisis, 1 November to 30 December 1956 and Lester Pearson's Nobel Prize win, October 1957

As Lester Pearson won accolades around the globe for his role in bringing the Suez Crisis to an end with his proposal for the creation of a peacekeeping force, newspaper coverage of Canada's role in the crisis remained heavy and sustained from 1 November to 30 December 1956. His actions were far more divisive in Canada than elsewhere, and newspapers sided either with the PC's pro-British stance or the Liberals' pro-UN position. The former included the *Herald*, the *Globe and Mail*, the Vancouver *Sun*, and the Montreal *Gazette*, while Liberal-supporting papers included *Le Devoir, La Presse*, the Toronto *Star*, the Halifax *Chronicle-Herald*, the Winnipeg *Free Press*, the Regina *Leader-Post*, and the Ottawa *Citizen*. Each paper relied upon particular constructions of Canada to support their positions. These divisions have been described by Jose Igartua as "a significant juncture in the dissolution of English-speaking Canada's self-representation as a British nation."[367] This section builds on Igartua's argument by demonstrating the mechanics through which a new Canadian identity came to have meaning and expression. Newspapers found cause to make historical analogies, connect peacekeeping to discussions of Canada's national identity in the present, and to forecast what might be in Canada's future in their pages. By examining the early language used to describe Pearson's actions at the UN and the composition of UNEF, it is possible to determine how Canadian daily newspapers played a foundational role in establishing the narrative frameworks

[367] Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71*, 115.

through which peacekeeping would be discussed. Tracing this language forward one year to when Pearson received his Nobel Peace Prize, it is possible to see a consensus narrative emerging about Canada and its peacekeeping role.

Because the Suez Crisis was the first large-scale peacekeeping operation undertaken by the UN, newspapers and their readers used varied language to describe UNEF. In many instances, papers made reference to the "police action" in the Middle East, which was similar to how they had described the force sent to Korea in 1950.[368] The *Star*, on 20 November, reminded its readers: "[t]he important thing is not the glamour of Canada's role, but the success of the police project."[369] In *Le Devoir*, an editorial spoke of the « formation d'un corps de police charger -- d'imposer et de maintenir la paix. »[370] Though peacekeeping and police action are not entirely different, policing is an action that Canadian readers would have been familiar with in their everyday lives.[371] Negative portrayals of peacekeeping would come to dwell on the differences between it and policing. Conversely, as peacekeeping came to be understood as a separate activity, its positive aspects -- impartiality and mediation among them -- would be emphasized in the press.

To try to understand the events of 1956, many editorials and letters invoked the lessons that the recent past could provide. Pro-British newspaper editorialists

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[368] Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea*, 174.
[369] "Nasser Bars QOR," *Toronto Daily Star*, Tuesday 20 November 1956, 6.
[370] Gerard Filion, "Les Hongrois seront les victimes de l'agression de Suez," *Le Devoir*, Saturday 3 November 1956, 6.
[371] Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free," in *Nationalism in Canada*, ed. Peter Russell (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 15-16; Walden, *Visions of Order: The Canadian Mountie in Symbol and Myth*.

and letter-writers often commented that the world would come to see the Suez invasion as a helpful action and not one based on colonial assumptions. Several authors in both PC- and Liberal-supporting papers expressed concerns about the Second World War's being repeated in the Middle East with Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser portrayed as a new Hitler, the same language used by Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden and later by John Diefenbaker.[372] Unlike politicians, who often referred to the Korean example, these editors and letter-writers selectively made a historical analogy with the Second World War that they felt was more appropriate. Britain's more positive role in the Second World War, and the disastrous legacy of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, gave the Hitler analogy predictive power to forecast to newspaper readers what would transpire in the near future.[373] Uncertainty about the present, therefore, became cause to make references to the past, as well as to the future.

These same editorialists and letter-writers often framed their discussions of the Suez Crisis as a Cold War battle. They warned that Canada was unwittingly encouraging a Communist expansion through its lack of support for Britain.[374] This opportunity would come through the increased ability of the Soviet Union to influence the other Arab nations through its "pawn," Egypt, and to quell an uprising that was simultaneously occurring in Hungary. The Cold War and the threat of Communism were rarely far from the surface in any international

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[372]"Can Get Peace," *Toronto Daily Star*, Monday 12 November 1956; "Letter to the Editor," *Ottawa Citizen*, Tuesday 6 November 1956.
[373] Edy, "Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory," 77.
[374] "A Way Out," *Ottawa Citizen*, Tuesday 6 November 1956, 6.

coverage in Canadian daily newspapers in the 1950s.[375] What these authors did not note in taking the Liberals to task for their "attacks" against Britain and France was that the latter two nations had probably done far more than Canada to assist the Soviets by destabilizing Egypt and encouraging it to seek more aid from Communist sources.

But peacekeeping was presented as more than a Cold War policy to Canadian audiences. Newspapers were quick to frame the events in the Middle East as symbolic of Canada's independence or as a "betrayal" of Britain. When discussing Canada's international policies, authors often relied on metaphor to describe Canada's relationship to the UN, to Britain and France, and to the United States. The most common linguistic device used was a child-adult comparison, famously expressed by Lester Pearson in Parliament, that Canada would not be Britain's "choreboy."[376] Described as one of Canada's mother nations, Britain was seen as an independent actor which made its own decisions (right or wrong, depending upon one's political stance) and a "grown-up" state.[377] Canada, on the other hand, was depicted as either a child in relation to Britain, or in language used in Liberal-supporting papers, as an adult of equal stature.

This child-adult metaphor was employed in both French and English Canada. In a *Le Devoir* editorial of 3 November, Canada's foreign policy was described as

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[375] For more on this, see Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea*; Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957.*

[376] An example of this, which also details Pearson's statements is "Canada "No Choreboy"," *Ottawa Citizen*, Tuesday 27 November 1956, 1.

[377] "Canada's Lead," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Monday 5 November 1956; "Letter to the Editor," *Ottawa Citizen.*

"plus adulte" in the midst of a discussion against flag-waving and supporting the British in what the paper felt was another Boer war.[378] Along similar lines, a reader responding to an editorial in the Calgary *Herald* argued that Canada had finally "severed her apron strings from Britain's imposed rule, and stayed out of a war that was not her business."[379] In both English and French Canadian newspapers, in these cases and many others, language was used which averred that Canada was a nation that no longer relied on its "mother" to make decisions, something which appealed to many Canadians in the late 1950s. It also implied that Canada need not forget its past with Britain, but like all children, it needed to define its own identity.

While Liberal-supporting papers chose to call Canada an independent adult in their pages, PC-supporting papers used strong language to attack the split between Canada and Britain over the Suez Crisis. It should be remembered that they did this weeks in advance of the PCs' formally debating the Liberals' policies in Parliament.[380] One article in the *Herald*, perhaps the strongest critic of the Liberal government's efforts at international mediation, called Canada's stance at the UN "shameful."[381] Continuing with the child-adult metaphor, the *Herald* referred to the UNEF as "[s]ending a boy on a man's errand."[382] These papers used this comparison to imply that the Canada-Britain bond had to remain strong

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[378] Filion, "Les Hongrois seront les victimes de l'agression de Suez," *Le Devoir*, 6.
[379] "The Shameful Day That Canada Ran Out," *Calgary Herald*, Thursday 1 November 1956, 4.
[380] For more on this, see Chapter One, "We Want Our Own Kind of Peace."
[381] "The Shameful Day That Canada Ran Out," *Calgary Herald*, 4.
[382] "Sending A Boy On A Man's Errand," *Calgary Herald* 19 November 1956, 4.

and to argue against what they saw as a policy that altered Canada's relationship with Britain.

Other voices wondered about Canada's future if its traditional ties with Britain were severed, and blamed the Liberal government for presenting such a possibility.[383] PC-supporting letter-writers posited that Canadian independence was just a shift in dependencies from Britain to the United States. In a letter to the *Gazette,* Harry J. Delaney from Ottawa argued that Canada's "independent course" was really another step in the Americanization of Canada. He lamented the "unjustifiable parental-resentment complex, which seeks every opportunity to express its independence in an exaggerated manner often petty, if not downright malicious."[384] Letter-writers such as this viewed Canadian participation in peacekeeping as an unwelcome change in how it was defining itself internationally. Because the US had condemned the British action in the Suez, and Canada had not supported Britain, many people falsely felt that the events surrounding the creation of UNEF were orchestrated solely by the Americans to shame the British. Rather than accept that Canada would agree more with the US on a matter of foreign affairs, they preferred to think of Canada as a member of the Commonwealth, and rejected the Liberal promulgation of Canadian independence through its foreign policies that had gained traction with many Canadians at this time.

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[383] "Rift Between Britain, US Could Leave Canada in Cold," *Vancouver Sun*, Monday 3 December 1956, 4.
[384] "Canada's Independent Course," *Montreal Gazette*, 7 December 1956, 8.

Editorialists and letter writers further related peacekeeping to domestic political issues by invoking the flag debate. A letter printed in the Toronto *Star* on 13 November stated, "[i]f there was ever a time in Canadian history that it was imperative that we have a distinctive flag for our nation, it is today."[385] J. Spofford of Toronto, the letter-writer, argued that Egyptians, and others, would misinterpret the "true meaning and function" of the Canadian forces if they were serving under a Union Jack or a Red Ensign. An editorial on 27 November in *Le Devoir* titled, "le drapeau distincif n'est pas un luxe," suggested it was well past time for Canada to stop using the Red Ensign, which contains a Union Jack in the corner, as the flag of its armed forces.[386] This editorial and others argued that Canadian honour was being sacrificed for the sake of an outmoded fidelity to Britain, and only a new flag would help Canada achieve its independence. This connection caused the Suez Crisis to become another instance in which debates about Canada's national identity would be waged.

As Canada's politicians formally spoke about UNEF in Parliament, their views were influenced by, and helped influence, the linkages that had been made in Canada's newspapers. Louis St. Laurent, as the Prime Minister, was one of the prominent figures in newspaper coverage during the later days of November and early December of 1956. He did not feature as much in earlier coverage, as his parties' actions were judged based upon what Pearson said and did at the UN. When St. Laurent stood up to PC attacks in the House on 26 November, most

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[385] "UN Police Force Plan Too Limited," *Toronto Daily Star*, Tuesday 13 November 1956, 6.
[386] "Le drapeau distincif n'est pas un luxe," *Le Devoir*, Tuesday 27 November 1956, 6.

Liberal-supporting papers applauded the Prime Minister's stance on the Suez Crisis. French language papers, in particular, were incredibly supportive of St. Laurent and his government throughout this period. *Le Devoir* published an editorial on 1 December which stated that St. Laurent's speech was « un discours qui fera époque » in the history of Canadian foreign relations, and the paper applauded what it saw as the Prime Minister's standing up for Canada's independence, as it had advocated since the start of the Suez Crisis.[387]

Yet, when St. Laurent dramatically announced in the House of Commons that "the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world" was coming to an end, pro-British papers blasted the Prime Minister for openly insulting Canada's allies. The *Gazette* called St. Laurent's words a "painful departure" from his usual attitude to foreign affairs, and other papers targeted St. Laurent's French Canadian temper in editorials dealing with that speech.[388] An editorial in the *Globe and Mail* went for a more dramatic effect in calling St. Laurent's speeches in Parliament in favour of UNEF a "grotesque spectacle."[389] Such attacks were levelled against the Prime Minister as the leading representative of a government that had, in their opinions, mishandled a chance to help Britain quash a tyrant in the Middle East.

Lester Pearson, on the other hand, won almost universal acclaim for his proposal to create UNEF. From the outset of the crisis, his actions were described as an expression of the desires of the Canadian government and its people for

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[387] Gerard Filion, "Un discours qui fera epoque," *Le Devoir*, Saturday 1 December 1956, 4.
[388] "Painful Departure," *Montreal Gazette*, 8.
[389] "Our Only Real Hope," *Globe and Mail*, 29 November 1956, 6.

world peace. In an editorial in the *Chronicle-Herald* from 1 November, Pearson was said to have sanity, wisdom and determination.[390] Using ideas from the Bible, several letter writers praised the high values of Lester Pearson as an individual. A letter writer to the *Citizen* declared her support for Pearson's "Christian decision to send a police force to Egypt" and her outrage at the bombing of "Egyptian children."[391] Other phrases associated with Pearson were "freedom-loving" and "hard-working." In several editorials, these character attributes were noted to be ones that Canadians could be proud of, or could share in. He was said to be acting in a way that was exemplary of Canadian values at their finest, which gave peacekeeping a Canadian, and not simply an international, association.

Numerous editorials and letters to the editor from PC supporters challenged the government on the composition of the Canadian contingent to UNEF. Once the tangible details of UNEF were made available, support for the Liberals seemed to slide as the realities of the operation became more apparent. Authors attacked the "typewriter army" of signallers and communications officers that Canada sent to join UNEF after Nasser and the Egyptians refused to allow the Queen's Own Rifles to be part of the force.[392] These voices felt that Canada was not adding to its international reputation by allowing Nasser to dictate which Canadian units would be allowed into Egypt. They saw no problems with either the British invasion of the Suez region, or with Canada's proposing to send the

[390] "The Sane Course," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Thursday 1 November 1956, 6.
[391] "Letter to the Editor," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6.
[392] "Our Only Real Hope," *Globe and Mail*, 6.

Queen's Own, which served under a flag that was similar to the British Union Jack.

Conversely, the peacekeepers sent to participate in UNEF were also cast as "Canadian ambassadors" in many editorials across the country. Canadians were reminded that their soldiers were leaving a place with high living standards and high pay to enter a country where poverty, illiteracy, and starvation were widespread.[393] Such distinctions should not, according to the *Chronicle-Herald*, lead to Canadians acting as "contemptuous... braggarts or bullies," but rather as people filled with the spirit of "charity, decency and justice."[394] Being both a soldier and an ambassador was asking much of the peacekeepers and of Canadians as a whole. Echoing the ideals of the colonial era, it was assumed the forces would display "a standard of discipline and control of the highest order."[395] By making the peacekeepers representatives of Canada, and making Canada better than the host nations, an imbalance of power was being written into their relationship.

Editorials and letters to the editor during this time, in focusing on Canadians and ascribing to them a moral mission that only they were capable of performing, certainly did not cast the Egyptians as equals to Canadians. For example, Nasser was usually the sole Egyptian mentioned by name, one of the hallmarks of whether persons were of value in a newspaper article. He was described, in addition to being a new Hitler, as a Fascist, and elsewhere as a lackey for the

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[393] "Canada's Task," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Tuesday 13 November 1956, 6.
[394] Ibid., 6.
[395] Ibid.

USSR.[396] These negative traits at least gave him a character, unlike ordinary Egyptians, who were essentially absent from daily newspaper coverage. Instead of being compared to Egypt and its citizens, Canada and its peacekeepers were judged in comparison to Britain, largely using the child-adult metaphor. The names and ranks of Canadian soldiers also appeared in photos or in local stories about heading to the Middle East as members of UNEF.[397] These extra details made the Canadians important subjects in this coverage. Such understandings of Canada as a nation capable of helping others through its good conduct encouraged readers to symbolically associate their "Blue Berets" with their national character, and downplayed the importance of peacekeeping for the host nation.

The Suez crisis caused a serious division among newspapers and their readers along partisan lines, and partially caused the defeat of the Liberal government by John Diefenbaker's PCs in 1957. Yet the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lester Pearson in October of 1957 brought a host of articles from across the country that not only accepted but praised Canada's peacekeeping role and Pearson as the creator of UNEF. Liberal-supporting papers linked Pearson's actions with the attributes of the country as a whole. [398] The *Globe and Mail*, which had been so critical of Canada's stance against Britain, also published an editorial with the title "Deserved Distinction" that praised Pearson and the UNEF

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[396] "Nasser Bars QOR," *Toronto Daily Star*.
[397] An example of this can be seen in "Way is Cleared for UN Middle East Police Force," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Tuesday 13 November 1956, 1.
[398] "Pearson the Peacemaker," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Tuesday 15 October 1957, 6.

that he helped to create.[399] In both Liberal- and PC-supporting papers, Pearson and UNEF were seen as significant international actors from the previous year, and something for which the rest of the world was grateful. This was based largely on the record of UNEF's successfully helping to keep the Egyptians and the Israelis separate from one another, and re-establishing shipping traffic through the Suez Canal. But it was also based on the belief that Canada's international policies should be centred on the UN and the promotion of peace in the world.

By October of 1957, a consensus about UNEF had emerged in the press. The strong partisan attacks that characterized editorials and letters to the editor were no longer present. Britain's actions were no longer being defended as loudly, and some commentators recognized that the invasion of the Suez region had been a mistake. Canada's role in mediating the Suez Crisis also seemed to silence any talk about Canada's being anything other than an adult nation. In their place were commemorations of the leading role that Canada had played in helping to diffuse the crisis in Egypt. The daily routines of Canada's peacekeepers were not popular stories, nor were updates about Egyptian reconstruction common. Instead, attention remained focused on Lester Pearson and the ideals behind the peacekeeping force. By facilitating this shift in attention, the press consciously shaped a positive narrative of peacekeeping as a Canadian activity that would increasingly be promoted in the coming years.

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[399]"Deserved Distinction," *Globe and Mail*, 15 October 1957, 6.

Reporting ONUC, 1 July to 15 September 1960

In 1960, Canadian newspapers strongly encouraged their nation's peacekeeping role. Accordingly, ONUC received heavy and sustained coverage in all the daily newspapers examined during the first two months of its actions. Newspaper coverage of the mission to the Congo reflected the peacekeeping experiences of 1956 and 1957, as well as the particularities of going to the Congo. Because of a greater sense of confidence about Canada's identity at the time and the involvement of Belgium rather than Britain in these events, a consensus about the value of Canada's contribution to ONUC quickly emerged. Canada was compared and contrasted to the Congo in most articles, which helped reinforce the differences between a white nation, Canada, and a Black decolonized country, the Congo.[400] These differences involved discussions of the respective pasts, presents, and futures of the two nations. The positive narrative that had emerged following Lester Pearson's Nobel Prize win also provided reasons for Canada to resume a leading role in a peacekeeping operation. Despite this interest from journalists and letter-writers, after the UN peacekeepers arrived, and a routine was established, stories about the Congo faded from the front and editorial pages to the depths of the international section.

Canadian newspapers have often received credit for forcing the government to get involved in ONUC.[401] Kevin Spooner has produced the best and most comprehensive work on this operation, and he dispels this notion. In its

[400]"Our Challenge in Africa," *Toronto Daily Star*, Thursday 7 July 1960, 6.
[401] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* Spooner mentions J.L. Granatstein by name in his work.

place, he argues that the Diefenbaker government was swayed not by press coverage and public opinion, but rather decided to participate because of self-interest and a desire to stop the spread of Communism.[402] By employing a larger analysis of the press, this section demonstrates that while newspapers may not have played a central role in shaping the government's foreign policy, they did continue to help shape how Canadians understood their peacekeepers and their own national identity, as well as the places to which their peacekeepers were sent.

Initial descriptions of the Congo after its independence was obtained on 30 June emphasized its colonial past and its current backwardness. These portrayals contrasted Canada, an independent and bilingual peacekeeping nation, with a vastly different Congo. The Congolese were rarely named as individuals, other than Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, President Joseph Kasavubu, and head of the breakaway province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe. In such discussions, tropes about the Congo from the colonial era were employed.[403] A month before the Congo gained its independence, an article in the *Star* by Smith Hempstone stated, "Belgium's act of abdication after little more than half a century of colonial rule has left the Congo...with its loin cloth down."[404] A *Chronicle-Herald* editorial from 9 July argued that the Congolese had a "complete lack of control" thanks to their never having been an independent nation, and any mutiny or rape was the result of "the impact on the half-educated mind of the forcible acquisition

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[402] Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 8.
[403] I have relied on Edward Said's arguments about how the West represents the 'Other' and I believe that it applies to Africa as well as the "Orient", see particularly Chapter One, 'Knowing the Oriental,' in Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
[404] "Congo Leaders Burst into the Light of Freedom," *Toronto Daily Star*, Friday 3 June 1960, 7.

of independence itself."[405] English Canadian newspapers also occasionally used the term "primitive" to describe the Congolese.[406] Such terms may have been used to rally support for the UN action in the Congo, on the basis that the Congolese would not be able to run the country themselves, but they were also over-simplifications and negative stereotypes.

One reporter, Ron Haggart, made the Congo's "backwardness" the central theme of his many on-the-spot reports from the Congo. In one front-page article in the *Star,* Haggart wrote about the Congolese being afraid of Aunt Jemima pancake boxes, since the Congolese believed "it really [wa]s Aunt Jemima ground up inside that box."[407] In a later article from 30 August published in both the *Star* and the *Sun,* Haggart reported on a discussion with a Canadian soldier who was arrested and taunted near a pot of boiling water while some of the Congolese mimicked eating sounds with their mouths and hands.[408] The article, titled, "Thought they would eat me alive -- Canuck tells Haggart," later allowed that this was all a joke by the Congolese and that the soldier was released without being harmed. Such language would have only reinforced the idea that the Congo was a backwards place where modern consumer goods were wasted and human flesh was likely to be on the menu at dinner.

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[405] "Premature Freedom," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Saturday 9 July 1960, 6.
[406]"Congolese Exercise New Rights," *Calgary Herald*, 1 July 1960, 4.
[407] Ron Haggart, "Tragedy of Congo There are no Teachers," *Toronto Daily Star*, Saturday 13 August 1960, 1.
[408] ""Thought they would try to eat me alive' Canuck tells Haggart," *Toronto Daily Star, Vancouver Sun*, Tuesday 30 August 1960, 1.

Letter-writers employed racially-prejudiced language and imagery to describe the Congo. A letter to the *Chronicle-Herald* from 6 August contrasted Canada, "lusty and naturally born," with the Congo, "delivered by caesarean, premature if not still-born."[409] The letter writer, A.St.G. Abbott, also ascribed to Canada a "tradition of civilization," while the Congo was "the inheritor of centuries of witchcraft, carnage and fear." Another *Sun* reader used his personal experience of having "many Africans under his control" to give credence to his view that the Congolese, like the Black population of South Africa, were simply not ready to take control of their own country.[410] Such opinions expressed in two newspapers at opposite ends of the country show how the colonial-era discourse surrounding the Congo remained in use by many Canadians at this time. That letter writers would use such graphic and negative language about the Congo indicates that some newspaper readers really did see it and its people as different from their Canadian self-image.

Canadian Christian missionaries who had been forced to flee when violence against the white population broke out were also used as sources for reports on conditions in the Congo. Papers across the country carried stories from those who had returned home with harrowing tales of danger and escape. Because of their Canadian connection, missionaries, rather than the Congolese themselves, were used as sources for what was taking place in the Congo. These stories emphasized certain aspects of Congolese society that played into

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[409] "Canada's Role in the Congo," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Saturday 6 August 1960, 6.
[410] "'Let 'Em Stew!'," *Vancouver Sun*, Saturday 16 July 1960, 4.

conventional understandings of the Congo. In a *Sun* article, a missionary described how the Congolese believed "the whites eat people at night" and also mentioned that boxes of food with labels were not trusted because they might contain the person on the box.[411] The relationship between the missionaries and the Congolese and why the missionaries were trying to bring their religion to the people of the Congo were never mentioned. Instead, their views were used to confirm the backwardness of the Congolese and the dire need for Canadian participation in ONUC.[412]

Despite the prevalence of such descriptions, some letter-writers actively challenged the racially-charged views of other Canadians. George Maxwell wrote to the *Sun* to oppose the views of one of its regular columnists, Harold Weir, noting that the argument Weir used was "built around emotionally charged words and phrases such as rape, murder, footsie with the Russians and Congolese bestiality."[413] These voices blamed the Belgians for having run their former colony so poorly, and expressed sympathy with the Congolese for the difficult task they faced. Belgium was widely known to have done a horrible job of administering the Congo since it took control of the Congo Free State in 1908. Few Canadians had qualms about condemning these colonial efforts that had resulted in the deaths of millions and inspired Joseph Conrad to pen *Heart of*

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[411] Jerry Brown, "B.C. Missionary Caught in Congo," *Vancouver Sun*, Thrusday 14 July 1960, 1.
[412]"Congolese Incited to Flout Law, Says BC Missionary," *Vancouver Sun*, 1 August 1960; Roger Newman, "The Congo is in Chaos," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Tuesday 9 August 1960.
[413] "Sweeping Statements," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 August 1960, 4.

Darkness.[414] Such letters framed Canada as having a duty to help less fortunate nations through its aid and peacekeeping efforts because of its international reputation as a supporter of the UN.[415]

Though considerable space was devoted to descriptions of the Congo and its people, it was the Canadian connection that garnered most of the coverage of Congolese events in Canadian daily newspapers. In these articles, editorials, and letters, Canadians and their peacekeepers were rarely criticized. While members of UNEF had been attacked for being a "typewriter army," the members of ONUC were celebrated for reflecting Canada's bilingual nature. The troops sent to the Congo were largely bilingual members of Canada's signal corps, and provided essential communications and logistics services for ONUC during its four-year operation.[416] Because of this, the *Chronicle-Herald* argued that Canada's French and bilingual population made it uniquely suited to guide the Congolese on "the road of Western democracy."[417] The *Citizen* and the *Leader-Post* also made reference to Canada's bilingual nature to strengthen arguments for why Canada needed to help the new republics of Central Africa, and portrayed Canada as a suitable member of the UN force.[418] These papers positioned Canada as a successful democratic and bilingual country which reflected a confidence in Canada's identity that was absent four years prior.

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[414] These condemnations often painted the British rule in Kenya or the Gold Coast as examples of how to properly administer a colony and secure its independence.
[415] "Blames Belgians," *Toronto Daily Star*, Thursday 14 July 1960, 6.
[416] Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*.
[417] "Canada in the Congo," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Wednesday 27 July 1960, 6.
[418] "I want to protect you," *Ottawa Citizen*, Wednesday 3 August 1960; "A shock from the Congo ", *Regina Leader-Post*, 20 August 1960.

The French Canadian press was less sure of Canada's "bilingual" makeup, and several articles questioned whether the members of the Canadian contingent were actually French speakers.[419] Despite these concerns, a common language was one of the reasons that both *Le Devoir* and *La Presse* were in favour of Canadian participation in ONUC. *La Presse* published an editorial on 14 July titled "Pas de neocolonialisme!" which argued it was necessary for Canada to ensure that the gains of Congolese independence could be enjoyed by the Congolese, and not their former rulers, the Belgians.[420] When three Canadian signalers were attacked by Congolese troops who mistook them for Belgian paratroopers, *La Presse* stated that the Congolese « ignorant la différence entre les nationalités occidentales tout autant que nous ignorons nous-mêmes les distinctions qui existent entre les gens de couleurs. » [421] Turning the situation around in this manner, this editorial suggested that stones should not be cast the Congolese's way before Canadians considered their own attitudes towards those they were attempting to assist.

Editorials in *Le Devoir* concurred with these sentiments about the need to end the legacies of colonialism, arguing that it was time Canada established stronger economic, cultural, and diplomatic ties not only with the Congo, but with all of French Africa. Such ideas about ONUC can be seen as the germ of Quebec's efforts to reach outwards to an international *Francophonie* later in the 1960s. These French Canadian papers did not look at Canada as the success story it

[419] "Des militaires (canadiens) bilingues au Congo?," *Le Devoir*, Saturday 6 August 1960, 4.
[420] "Pas de néocolonialisme!," *La Presse*, Thursday 14 July 1960, 4.
[421] "Le Congo contre les Blancs," *La Presse*, Friday 19 August 1960, 4.

appeared to be in the English press. However, they did see language issues as central to Canada's politics of the time, and understood how important they could be to the new Congolese nation.

Further Canadian qualifications for peacekeeping included its independent and peaceful character. The *Globe and Mail* was perhaps the loudest voice calling for Canadian participation in the UN operation. One of its editorials noted that Canada had "no special interest in the Congo dispute" and "no record of colonialism."[422] Many editorials acknowledged that Canada was a white nation, but felt that this was of little consequence, since Canada was both willing and able to play a constructive role in ONUC.[423] A 14 July editorial in the *Globe and Mail* also mentioned that Canada was particularly suited to UN service as it had "no axe to grind in Africa, no interest save that of protecting human lives, black and white."[424] In contrast to four years earlier, Canada was now portrayed as an experienced and independent peacekeeping nation.

No longer were allusions to Canada's infancy raised in the daily press. Instead, Canada was conceptualized as *the* leading peacekeeping nation in the world. Papers like the *Globe and Mail* expressed concern that Diefenbaker's government was letting Canada back away from its world-leading role in peacekeeping that had been established in 1956. The *Citizen* also noted that if Canada had not volunteered its forces to ONUC, the country would have suffered a great embarrassment because of the time and effort that diplomats and

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[422] "Waiting on Conscription," *Globe and Mail*, Wednesday 20 July 1960, 6.
[423] "Our Challenge in Africa," *Toronto Daily Star*.
[424] "Canada's Defence Duty," *Globe and Mail*, Thursday 14 July 1960, 6.

politicians had put into enhancing Canada's role at the UN.[425] These two papers had taken opposing views of the creation of UNEF, but found common cause in promoting Canada's peacekeeping role in 1960. They also did this with no reference at all to the war of words that had taken place four years prior. This consensus demonstrates the popularity peacekeeping was enjoying among Canada's daily newspapers because of its perceived utility.

Diefenbaker's reluctance to send peacekeeping forces to the Congo, even when asked by then UN Secretary of State Dag Hammarskjold to be a part of the force, led to his being called "miserly" and accusations that he was "shunning responsibility."[426] Lester Pearson, by contrast, advocated for more Canadian involvement, which was seen as the right and "honourable" position for Canada to take.[427] The press wholly embraced Pearson's enthusiasm, saw this as a continuation of Canada's long-standing support for the UN's endeavours, and challenged the Diefenbaker government's decision to alter Canada's record of participation on such operations.

Newspaper coverage of ONUC captured the views of many different Canadians about the Congo and their country's irenic role in 1960. The journalists who wrote about this operation employed racially-prejudiced language when discussing the Congolese, and letter writers were often worse in their descriptions. Yet the perception of Canada as a peacekeeping nation had changed dramatically from 1956. In the span of four years, peacekeeping had

[425] Charles Lynch, "Canada Role in UN Set," *Ottawa Citizen*, Saturday 6 August 1960, 6.
[426] "Canada Miserly to Congo," *Toronto Daily Star*, Wednesday 27 July 1960, 6.
[427] "Waiting on Conscription," *Globe and Mail*, 6.

gone from a policy that was questioned thoroughly to one that represented the pinnacle of positive Canadian engagement in the world. Canada's peacekeepers were held to be exemplars of the best that a now independent and mature Canada could offer. The Congo mission was also one of the first instances in which all major daily newspapers were in favour of Canada's peacekeeping operations, and, in fact, most actively sought a larger role for Canada than the Diefenbaker government thought prudent. This desire for more UN peacekeeping came from its perceived utility as a practical policy for the Canadian Forces as well as its being perceived as a symbolically proper policy for an independent and peace-loving nation like Canada.

Covering UNFICYP, 15 February to 15 May 1964

Lester Pearson's electoral victory in 1963 brought renewed enthusiasm for Canada's potential to play a leading international role through UN peacekeeping. The following spring, when Canada volunteered for duty on UNFICYP, daily newspapers found an occasion to commemorate Canada's peacekeeping past, discuss the value of UN service in the present, and hypothesize about future opportunities for Canada's peacekeeping talents to be employed. Unlike in 1960, however, uncertainties over Canada's domestic stability influenced discussions of peacekeeping. Disagreement over bilingualism in Canada caused doubts regarding the appropriateness of Canada's role in Cyprus to be expressed in both English and French Canada. When peace was not forthcoming in Cyprus, editorials and letters to the editor also criticized the manliness of the

peacekeepers because of restrictions imposed by the UN. Though 1964 was the acme of press-government consensus about peacekeeping, alternate conceptions of Canada as a peacekeeping nation were being more frequently reiterated. These promoted its symbolic value while casting doubts on its practical worth, further focusing Canadian understandings of peacekeeping on its domestic import.

Newspapers across the country greeted Canada's rapid deployment of the VanDoos to Cyprus with enthusiasm. The major role Canada played in creating and staffing the peacekeeping force sent to Cyprus was generally seen as a return to its elevated reputation of 1956. Many papers hearkened back to 1956 and saw the events of the time as a revival of Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy.[428] They recalled the international praise Pearson and Canada had received, while selectively ignoring the domestic debates that ensued over Canadian participation in UNEF. The Diefenbaker years were attacked as a "back-slide," and the *Sun* even went so far as to write, "[t]he kindest thing to say about the Diefenbaker government's records in foreign relations and international diplomacy is nothing."[429] Many newspapers had turned against the former Prime Minister by 1964 and looked for new directions in leadership reminiscent of the Liberals from the 1950s. Paul Martin and Lester Pearson were cast as those who would save Canada's reputation by being, in the words of a *Gazette* editorial, "moderate, practical and reliable."[430] Peacekeeping was by this point an established

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[428]Gerald Waring, "We're Regaining Our Old Prestige," *Vancouver Sun*, 14 May 1964, 4.
[429] Ibid.
[430] "Canada Sets Example," *Montreal Gazette*, 20 March 1964, 6.

Canadian role and mentioning 1956, Pearson, or the Suez Crisis could convey a positive understanding of the recent past.

Positive opinions about Canada's involvement in Cyprus gave editorialists and letter writers cause to hope for a more peaceful future as well. Pearson spoke often of his dream of a permanent international police force. Though it was never realized, many papers expressed support for Pearson's plan for a more permanent UN peacekeeping "army."[431] They saw peacekeeping as the primary means through which Canada could make a positive impact on international affairs. In the *Citizen*, one letter-writer credited Pearson for his "victory over war in Cyprus," forecasting the eventual resolution of this "flare-up."[432] Pearson's efforts to promote peace in Cyprus and to eventually achieve permanence for what remained a mission-by-mission ad hoc force were roundly applauded, adding a progressive bent to discussions of the events in Cyprus.

Though many Canadians remained optimistic about peacekeeping's future value, its perceived value at the time was affected by rising tensions between English and French Canadians. While Canada's French heritage was one of the reasons given for its participation in ONUC in 1960, by 1964 language rights issues in Canada had become more complicated. Clear differences existed in the editorials of English Canada and Quebec regarding whether it was appropriate for Canadians to serve in Cyprus. According to the *Sun,* having French Canadians make up the largest part of the force would showcase Canada's bilingual talents.

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[431] Examples include "Creation of a new UN force," *Ottawa Citizen*, Tuesday 21 April 1964; "Mr. Pearson's Plan for the UN," *Montreal Gazette*, Thursday 23 April 1964.
[432]"Letter to the Editor," *Ottawa Citizen*, Friday 20 March 1964, 6.

And a letter to the editor attacked the forces of separatism, and celebrated "our indissoluble Canadianism."[433] Hence the French Canadian soldiers in the peacekeeping force would "become indistinguishable Canadian citizen-soldiers for whose individual and collective welfare and safe return we unanimously experience the deepest concern." These authors employed traditional arguments about war's uniting a country to cover up deeper tensions in Canadian society.

Other English newspapers took a more cynical tone regarding the use of French Canadian forces for peacekeeping. An editorial in the *Herald* wrote that Canadian assistance to Cyprus had "sad irony" because of the many parallels between the Cypriot situation and Canada's.[434] Both countries had two main linguistic groups, with the minority population seeking a more equitable stake in the country, so the comparison was in many ways an apt one. This editorial even hypothesized about a time in the future when, however unlikely, these tensions might cause Canada to ask for assistance from the UN for its domestic problems. Though such ironies existed, Canada was still said to be a better country than Cyprus because armed warfare was not taking place in Canada. Instead, it was engaging in "international good citizenship" by sending peacekeeping forces to help in the Mediterranean.

Such views were not held by the French Canadian press or by the English press in Montreal. The French Canadian press considered it strange that Canada was sending forces to Cyprus. Editorials in *Le Devoir*, in particular, wondered

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[433] "A Job of UN Police Work Brings a Thrill of Pride," *Vancouver Sun*, 20 March 1964, 6.
[434] "Cyprus Force," *Calgary Herald*, Friday 6 March 1964, 4.

about the wisdom of Canadian participation in an operation that had «quelques analogies avec le malaise constitutionnel actuel du Canada »[435] The editorials in *Le Devoir* refused to accept that peacekeeping was a panacea that could mend all Canada's internal problems. This did not prevent the paper from supporting Canada's peacekeeping role or its desire to strengthen the UN. In this, they agreed with their English Canadian counterparts. Rather, they emphasized the functional value of peacekeeping for the Cypriots, as they had done with the Congolese in 1960.

A letter-writer in the *Gazette* wrote that Cyprus should be seen as a warning to Canada and other countries that war and strife would be the outcome when "two races in one nation accuse each other of domination and discrimination."[436] This letter writer was far more pessimistic about the situation in Cyprus, which can be read as unease about the situation in Quebec in 1964. Conversely, a letter published in *La Presse* expressed sympathy with the Cypriots who had risen up against a majority that had denied them their rights.[437] As they were situated in the midst of heated debates over language rights, these letter writers used this domestic situation as a framework for the events in Cyprus. As a result, their views were darker than those expressed elsewhere in Canada.

While Canada's internal issues dominated the press coverage of UNFICYP, the operational mandate of UNFICYP also caused negative views to be aired. The Canadian forces were ordered to fire on any Cypriots only if they had been fired

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[435] "Le Canada et la crise de Chypre," *Le Devoir*, Saturday 11 April 1964, 4.
[436] "Troubles in Cyprus Pinpoint Dangers of Bickering Races," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 March 1964, 6.
[437] "Chypre et la lutte pour la liberté," *La Presse*, Friday 13 March 1964, 6.

upon first and they were not to disarm any of the civilian population. These orders were typical of UN peacekeeping operations, but the PC opposition under Diefenbaker and many daily newspapers questioned these restrictions on the effectiveness of the Canadian forces. Diefenbaker referred to the peacekeepers as "passive policemen,"[438] and believed that the UN restrictions on their behaviour would "emasculate" them.[439] Such language was carefully framed not to attack the soldiers themselves, but only the UN operation and its goals. Papers used similar phrases and described the mission as "peacekeeping with hands tied," called the peacekeepers "Handicapped Policeman," "Cardboard Soldiers," and noted that the Canadians would be frustrated, but they"[could] only grit their teeth and bear it."[440] These terms suggested that the soldiers who were operating under UN auspices in Cyprus were not "full" soldiers because they could not shoot their guns or use force to subdue situations. Such desires for more aggression coexisted with statements praising Canada's desire to promote peace, and one did not seem to rule out the other.

These challenges to the soldiers' masculinity were countered by stories that told of the Canadians' anger at not being able to use their guns, and their eventual enforcement of rules on the ground that were not in line with the UN mandate.[441] Pictures of the VanDoos with their guns and artillery often

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[438] "UN's difficult role in Cyprus," *Ottawa Citizen*, Friday 3 May 1964, 6.
[439] Arthur Blakely, "Opposition Says UN Orders Great Danger to Cyprus Force," *Montreal Gazette*, 20 March 1964, 6.
[440] "Peacekeeping with hands tied," *Toronto Daily Star*, Monday 22 March 1964, 6.
[441] Robert Miller, "Crackdown In Cyprus Decided by Canadians," *Globe and Mail*, Thursday 16 April 1964, 1.

accompanied these articles. An article about the VanDoos' "retaliating" appeared next to a photo of a peacekeeper in a tank with a large tank gun. Another story about the VanDoos' taking up dangerous positions in the capital city of Nicosia had a photo next to it of a soldier holding a large bazooka on his shoulders while two other soldiers stood nearby. The caption for the photo read: "Canadians on Cyprus prepare to go to work today."[442] Such photos and stories painted the VanDoos as soldiers in a traditional sense, carrying weapons, ready to use them if necessary; rugged and assertive, rather than peacekeepers who were designed to be inserted into tense spots around the world to facilitate diplomacy. Indeed, newspapers often portrayed peacekeeping as just another activity of the armed forces, rather than a specialized task that required different training and a different kind of soldier.

Canada's participation in UNFICYP allowed newspapers to reaffirm their support for an internationalist foreign policy. They did this by making reference to the past Canadian peacekeeping success in 1956 while ignoring the tensions this mission created among many Canadians. Most English Canadian papers also noted that this mission was a chance for Canada to show that its language problems were not nearly as bad as Cyprus's. In Quebec, both English- and French-language newspapers found the problems in Cyprus all too similar to the political climate they were experiencing. In their view, Canada's status as a nation seemed to be on the decline as domestic problems threatened the unity of the

[442] Ibid.

country. Further challenges appeared when some newspapers questioned the wisdom of sending Canadian soldiers into harm's way in Cyprus without allowing them to respond with their guns. These difficulties allowed criticisms about peacekeeping to be expressed concurrently with statements praising Canada's illustrious peacekeeping past and its plans to bring about a more peaceful future. Peacekeeping remained a popular policy in both English and French Canada, therefore, but doubting voices began to grow louder.

The End of UNEF, 15 May to 15 June 1967

Newspapers, like Canada's politicians, were shocked to learn of President Nasser's insistence that the Canadian contingent in UNEF be removed in May of 1967. What followed was an outpouring of stories, editorials, and letters to the editor which commented upon this setback in Canada's fortunes as a peacekeeping nation. The "death of UNEF," as it was labelled in some newspapers, was blamed on two figures: Nasser and U Thant. Nasser was an easy target, since he was a dictator, and had a history of trying to intimidate the UN peacekeeping forces. Thant was perhaps a less-likely villain, but his willingness to accede to Nasser's demand to have UNEF withdrawn attracted the ire of many Canadian newspapers. Paul Martin was portrayed struggling with Thant over the end of the force, and several papers noted that this was the first time in recent memory that Canada and the UN had disagreed.[443] Thant's authority to remove the force was questioned, and Martin was described as fighting to keep the peace

[443] Tom Hazlitt, "Martin in battle for peace force," *Toronto Daily Star*, Friday 19 May 1967, 1.

in the face of weakness at the UN.[444] In attacking Thant, many papers referenced the League of Nations' refusal to take action against the Italian aggression in Ethiopia, and some of the predictions of doom came from papers seeing parallels between the organizations and their unwillingness to be active in world affairs. If Canadians wanted to avoid a repeat of the end of the League of Nations, so it seemed, they needed to affirm their government's support for the UN and international peacekeeping.

Across English Canada, CP articles and editorials eulogized peacekeeping by referring to Canada's peacekeeping past. Canada was said to have worked hard for the UN in the past, and the expulsion of its forces from Egypt in 1967 was therefore unjust. The *Star* published several editorials, including two titled, "Can UN peacekeeping survive Sinai Crisis," and, "The end of illusion for Canadian policy," which looked back over the previous ten years and ahead to an increasingly murky future for peacekeeping. These editorials and many others commemorated the Suez Crisis as a high point in Canadian foreign policy, while ignoring the debates and challenges that had occurred about Canadian participation in missions to the Suez, the Congo, and Cyprus. There was a palpable bittersweetness in such editorials. One piece from the *Star*, for example, argued, "If the UN cannot find a peacekeeping role for those which have been proving their impartiality and devotion for 11 years in this work, then its own future will be dark, and the great hope on which Canada has centred its foreign

[444] "Cairo says go but...", *Ottawa Citizen*, Saturday 20 May 1967, 6.

and defence policies will dissolve."[445] These events were sobering for many advocates for peacekeeping, though its past remained a source of pride in most newspaper articles and editorials.

The future of Canada's international participation in peacekeeping operations was also thrown into doubt despite the continued presence of Canadians on other peacekeeping operations around the globe, including UNFICYP. Such discussions made a correlation between the current setback and peacekeeping's future utility.[446] The unification of Canada's Armed Forces in 1964, which had anticipated a large Canadian role in peacekeeping operations, now seemed an unwise choice. An article in the *Chronicle- Herald* noted that the machinery of peacekeeping was falling apart, there was a malaise among those in charge of peacekeeping, and questioned whether international peacekeeping operations would continue to be used across the globe.[447] The *Star* wrote of Canada's need to choose its international commitments more carefully and to concentrate more on domestic issues rather than "playing a dramatic role on the world stage."[448] These views predated almost identical statements being made by Pierre Trudeau and Mitchell Sharp during their foreign policy reviews from 1968 to 1970. When the press changed its views about peacekeeping, these astute politicians seem to have paid attention.

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[445] "Can UN peacekeeping survive Sinai crisis?," *Toronto Daily Star*, Wednesday 24 May 1967, 6.
[446] "Canada and Peace-Keeping," *Montreal Gazette*, Tuesday 30 May 1967, 6.
[447] "Dynamite Planted," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, Saturday 20 May 1967, 1.
[448] "The end of illusion for Canadian policy," *Toronto Daily Star*, Wednesday 31 May 1967, 6.

However, it was not all doom and gloom for Canada's peacekeeping identity. Despite peacekeeping's being seen as a "dead" policy, some papers continued to perceive it as something for which Canada was suited as a middle power. The *Sun* stated that Canada was lucky to have Lester Pearson as Prime Minister because of his international standing and past history with peacekeeping. An editorial noted that Pearson's experience and "fibre" would ensure the survival of peacekeeping and a strong Canadian role in future operations.[449] The mission to Cyprus was to continue, and Pearson stated that Canada would not hesitate to send more peacekeepers around the globe if asked by the UN. These sentiments were applauded in the *Sun*, which believed that Canadians, "regardless of politics," would be behind their Prime Minister. Having a strong political advocate in Pearson allowed many people to believe Canada would continue its irenic role in the future.

The French Canadian press, on the other hand, saw peacekeeping solely as a functional policy option. As a result, their views of the events of May 1967 were far less dramatic. Editorials called on Canadians to follow the French line in trying to bring peace to the world and to shed their close associations with Britain and the United States.[450] Paris was portrayed as having an independent foreign policy that gave it more freedom to negotiate with Cairo and Moscow in crisis situations. This position was consistent with the papers' earlier discussions about ending colonialism and strengthening the ties between Canada and the new

[449] "Where Canada Stands," *Vancouver Sun*, Thursday 1 June 1967, 4.
[450] "Le rôle du gouvernement canadien dans la crise du Moyen-Orient," *Le Devoir*, Tuesday 30 May 1967, 4.

nations of the world. *La Presse* and *Le Devoir* argued that the Canadian government was not really impartial, and that Canadian participation in peacekeeping missions served Western interests. In so doing, they sought to frame peacekeeping as a policy that had achieved tangible results in the past and could again. By ignoring peacekeeping's symbolic relevance to Canada's national identity, these papers found no need to eulogize the end of UNEF. The French Canadian press maintained its approval of peacekeeping as a policy, but also recognizied that it was not what made Canada a unique country.

It was, instead, the Montreal Exposition that appeared in most headlines in the French press during the spring of 1967. Both *Le Devoir* and *La Presse* gave Expo '67 far more coverage than the Middle East crisis and the expulsion of the peacekeepers. Making the story local, one editorial worried about « les effets menacent même de rejaillir gravement sur l'Exposition universelle de Montréal. »[451] By presenting peacekeeping as a pragmatic policy, it could be reduced to something that might have adverse effects on the success of Expo rather than something of vital concern to all Canadians. As a local story, Expo '67 managed to garner more interest and column space than an international one, despite Canada's involvement in both.

Across English Canada, newspapers offered dour assessments of the present and future utility of Canada's peacekeeping role. They did so while applauding Canada's efforts in the past on behalf of world peace. In French Canada,

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[451] Ibid.

peacekeeping was viewed as something that could be of value for Canada, but only if it continued to move towards a more independent foreign policy – a position that had been advocated since 1956. Such editorials continued to focus on Canada and its peacekeepers while largely ignoring the consequences of another war in the Middle East. In English Canada this meant discussing peacekeeping's symbolic value to Canada, while in the French press stories about Expo '67 were deemed more important. The positive narrative of Canadian participation in peacekeeping faced its toughest challenge to that point, but with Pearson as Prime Minister, a strong political desire for more Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping remained.

Over the next fifteen years, the Canadian government's position on peacekeeping seemed in line with these more conservative assessments offered by most newspapers about the good that Canada could accomplish in the present and the future. Trudeau's Liberals continued Canadian participation in UNFICYP, and volunteered Canadians for service in UNEF II in 1973 despite the government's not showing interest in being a "helpful fixer." By participating in every UN peacekeeping operation that was undertaken, Canada preserved links between the present and the country's "golden age." In all these cases, peacekeeping remained framed as an appropriate Canadian role, and its peacekeepers in their blue berets, or "casques bleus," were celebrated for their glorious past.

Breaking News from Somalia, 1 March- 1 June 1993

When the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeeping, Canadian newspapers took the opportunity to commemorate Canada's peacekeeping past. An editorial in the *Globe and Mail* referred to peacekeeping as "the proudest postwar tradition in the Canadian military," and noted that Canada's record of service on peacekeeping operations was unparalleled.[452] Peacekeeping was described in this account and others as a Canadian activity and something that all Canadians had excitedly supported for the previous forty years. In both English and French Canadian dailies, Canadians were told to remember Pearson, and to honour Canada's peacekeeping legacy.[453] These papers shared the Mulroney government's enthusiasm for peacekeeping, and as the tensions of the Cold War lessened, the calls for more Canadian peacekeeping grew louder. These calls, and the resultant Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq/Iran, ignored both the French-Canadian press' earlier pragmatic views and the editorials in the English press in 1967 which hoped future Canadian involvement in peacekeeping would be more measured.

This enthusiasm carried over into the early 1990s. Beginning in December 1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment participated in "Operation Deliverance" in Somalia as part of UNOSOM, then as word of the deaths of several Somalis at

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[452] Paul Koring, "Role as peacekeeper now proudest tradition of Canadian military," *Globe and Mail*, Friday 30 September 1988, A12.

[453] "Canada's Share in Nobel Prize," *Vancouver Sun*, Friday 30 September 1988; "A Fitting Nobel Prize," *Toronto Star*, Saturday 1 October 1988, D2; "Maintenir la paix," *Le Devoir*, Friday 30 September 1988; "A prize for the UN peacekeepers," *Globe and Mail*, Tuesday 4 October 1988; "Prize salutes peace forces," *Winnipeg Free Press*; Roman Cooney, "UN Peacekeepers modest about prize," *Calgary Herald*, 30 September 1988.

the hands of the Airborne emerged in March of 1993, newspapers became sites of intense debate over the proper role of Canada's peacekeepers. These debates pitted those who continued to advance a positive narrative of Canada as a peacekeeping nation and were interested in rehabilitating the image of the Canadian Forces against those who saw its armed forces as unsuited for their role in Somalia. What made the events in Somalia so polarizing was the torture and taking of glory photos that dehumanized the Somalis and seemed to make the killings by the Airborne premeditated. When information about soldiers in the Armed Forces being part of white supremacist groups became known soon after, Canada's current peacekeepers could not be linked to their historical predecessors. This dislocated a major source of Canadian identity from the present and forced Canadians to re-evaluate their status as a peacekeeping nation.

Newspaper coverage of the Somalia mission has never been studied systematically or placed within a broader historical context. Sherene Razack's book, *Dark Threats and White Knights* uses newspaper coverage of the Somalia mission to make the argument that peacekeeping is a colonial endeavour.[454] Her work employs newspaper sources to aptly demonstrate how a national narrative about peacekeeping was threatened by what happened in Somalia. Razack argues that it was only by isolating the Airborne as un-Canadian that mythologies about Canada being a peacekeeping nation survived. Her study, and that of other

[454] Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*.

anthropologists, Catherine Besteman and I.M. Lewis, makes generalizations about Canada and its institutions without investigating the historical development of the language and ideas that surrounded peacekeeping in Canada.[455] This section demonstrates that peacekeeping was simultaneously a means of expressing a nostalgic longing for Canada's past, a functional expression of Canadian policy, and a way for post-colonial inequalities to be perpetuated. It provides a richer understanding of peacekeeping's changing place in Canada's national symbology.

Throughout UNOSOM, newspapers presented Canada as superior to Somalia.[456] Descriptions of Somalia in the press mentioned that it was behind the times, slipping backwards to an older era, and failing to keep up with the modern world.[457] Many articles blamed the Somalis for the state of their country, denying the role of the Cold War and arms shipments from both the United States and the Soviet Union for the country's current state. There were, however, some articles that recognized that Somalia was another in a long line of "basket case countries" who were given brief media coverage and then left to their own devices.[458] Though such descriptions appeared regularly in the fall and winter, the news

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[455] Catherine Besteman, "Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia," *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (1996); I.M. Lewis, "Doing Violence to Ethnography: A Response to Catherine Besteman's 'Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia," *Cultural Anthropology* 13, no. 1 (1998).
[456] "At risk for peace," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Monday 3 May 1993; Nick Martin, "Peacekeeping mission leaves children confused," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 April 1993; Paul Watson, "Canadian MD totes gun in his bag of tricks," *Toronto Star*, Thursday 25 February 1993.
[457] B.J. Phillips, "Somalia is retreating into the past," *Calgary Herald*, 29 March 1993, A4.
[458] Tom Harpur, "Somalia: Pop media view ignores West's meddling," *Toronto Star*, Sunday 3 Janurary 1993 B1, 7.

cycle habit of largely forgetting about Canada's peacekeepers and the host nations had occurred by February 1993.

The Somalis, when they were discussed, were typically portrayed as famine victims or lawless tribal warriors.[459] They were cast as so different from Canadians that the peacekeepers had difficulties relating to them. A *Star* article on 21 March written by Paul Watson, a reporter who was in Somalia with the Canadian peacekeepers, captured a sense of restlessness, boredom, and isolation among the Airborne.[460] This piece appeared less than a week after the killing of Shidane Arone and less than a month after two other Somalis had been killed "execution-style." Watson, however, would not have been aware of these killings as they had not been made public while he was writing. The article described peacekeepers who felt they were being underutilized in famine relief efforts, and were upset at the lack of leadership and political change in Somalia. Unnamed troops also admitted that they wished they could shoot their guns more, and were said to have opened fire on Somalis who threw rocks at them. They used racial slurs such as "Smuftie" against the local population, and were in the practice of "shouting racist cracks from the top of armoured vehicles, figuring no one would understand English but their buddies." The article focused on how the Canadian peacekeepers needed different duties to try to keep themselves occupied, not on what the consequences of such thinking and behaviour could be. While informative, such pieces did little to criticize the troops for holding such views,

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[459] Geoffrey York, "The Price of Peace," *Globe and Mail*, Thursday 12 November 1992.
[460] Paul Watson, "Tense Vigil in Somalia," *Toronto Star*, Sunday 21 March 1993, F1.

the Canadian Forces for sending troops who held such attitudes over to Somalia, or the government for believing that any part of the Canadian Forces could be suitable for peacekeeping duties.

Newspaper coverage of Somalia changed in April 1993 when Major Barry Armstrong's letter detailing the killing of two Somalis was made public.[461] Articles, editorials, and letters to the editor suddenly returned their attention to the Canadian peacekeepers. The press's role in covering the peacekeeping operation became central to how these events were reported, with editorials and letters to the editor strongly disagreeing about whether the peacekeepers were being treated fairly.

As with earlier operations, the Canadians were the central focus of news stories. Ex-military members and the families of soldiers who were serving in Somalia wrote to newspapers defending the Airborne from what they considered a smear campaign by the media. These letters posited that newspapers and television news programs were presenting stories about the Airborne's assaulting, torturing, and killing Somalis without "all the facts." One wife writing to the *Citizen* found it unacceptable that she was being "bombarded" by stories about the reprehensible conduct of her husband's regiment.[462] An article about the experiences of wives near the Canadian Forces base in Petawawa, Ontario noted the unfair backlash that wives of the soldiers faced. Re-printed in several papers across the country in both English and French, this story described the

[461] For more on this see Chapter One, "We Want Our Own Kind of Peace:" The Political Rhetoric of Peacekeeping in Canada, 1956 – 1997.
[462] Jennifer Young, "Insults hit morale of a proud regiment," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 15 May 1993, A11.

experience of Veronica Gibson, nine months pregnant, who, while walking in a mall wearing her husband's Airborne sweatshirt, had someone "growl" at her, and a woman "hiss" that her husband was a murderer.[463] The pregnant wife's humanity while facing animalistic attacks against her, her husband, and Canada's peacekeepers made her the heroine of the article. It was further reported that many wives feared their husbands would be subject to a homecoming similar to that which awaited US soldiers returning from Vietnam.[464] All these family members believed that the killings had been justified, and one wife noted that the Airborne were all highly trained soldiers who "must have felt something was wrong" to act as they did. The views of these family members mattered far more than those of Somalis, who were not contacted on how they viewed the killings.

Though many family members of the peacekeepers came to their defence, few stories in daily newspapers were combative towards the Canadian Forces, and, in fact, many were apologetic towards the Airborne as a whole. Articles often quoted returning soldiers who stressed the humanitarian relief work that the Canadian peacekeepers had accomplished in Somalia.[465] Another described the peacekeepers as "far from being trigger-happy killers," suggesting that the suspicious deaths were an aberration in an otherwise excellent peacekeeping unit.[466] An article in the *Leader-Post* argued that the Airborne was getting a black

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[463]"Somali slayings soil force, families," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Tuesday 4 May 1993, A7.
[464] "Soldiers' wives 'boil' over Somali backlash," *Toronto Star*, Sunday 25 April 1993, A8.
[465] Charles Rusnell, "Airborne troops 'gave and gave'; Soldiers, observers say controvversy eclipsed dedicaiton in Somalia," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 31 May 1993, B1.
[466] Paul Watson, "Canadian troops known for restraint," *The Vancouver Sun*, 29 April 1993, A8.

eye that it "did not deserve" through media reports.[467] Several editorials focused on the end of the famine, the removal of militias, and the building of schools, to frame the Somalia mission as a success.[468] These editorials posited that all peacekeepers should not be tried for the crimes of a few soldiers, and suggested that the military could administer justice properly within its own ranks.

Many newspapers used articles from reporters who were with the Airborne in Somalia to show the good that the Canadian Forces were accomplishing there.[469] An article in *La Presse* went to a francophone member of the Armed Forces for an update about relations between the Canadians and the Somalis. By using the white Canadian soldiers as sources for reports about how Somalis felt about the Canadian peacekeepers, these articles continued to cover international events in ways that centred on their Canadian connection. Despite some peacekeepers' being under investigation for murder, the white soldiers were taken at their word for how the mission was going, and no attempt was made to talk to Somali's about their feelings, to counter such a narrative.

Regardless of the presence of these articles, the details of the deaths of Shidane Arone and others at the hands of the Airborne cast doubt on the Canadian Forces as suitable peacekeepers. But what mattered far more than the deaths of the Somalis was the presence of white supremacists in the Airborne. It was discovered that Corporal Matt McKay, one of the men being held for the

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[467] John Best, "Airborne Regiment likely receiving black eye it doesn't deserve," *Regina Leader- Post*, 19 May 1993, A7.
[468] Examples include, "Defending the Army," *Calgary Herald*, 21 May 1993; "A job well done in Somalia," *The Gazette*, 6 May 1993, B2.
[469] Parker Robinson, "'Fantastic' Canadians," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, 7 April 1993, A1.

March 1993 death of Arone, was a known member of a white supremacist group, and a photo of him wearing a Hitler T-shirt and giving a Nazi salute appeared in some papers.[470] Canadians were not prepared to support those who believed the deeds of Hitler and the Nazis had been justified. The killings, combined with the presence of "un-Canadian" beliefs among the Airborne, resulted in newspapers' no longer employing language that symbolically linked Canada and its peacekeepers, marking the end of almost forty years of such language. As peacekeeping lost this metaphorical connection with Canada, stronger criticisms about its practical value came from editorials and letters to the editor, especially as no political actors rushed to defend peacekeeping as an institution, as they had in 1967.

The *Free Press,* the *Chronicle- Herald*, the *Star*, *La Presse* and the *Globe and Mail* suggested that both the Canadian Forces and the PC government needed to be held accountable for the killings. These newspapers lambasted Minister of Defence and PC Party leadership front-runner Kim Campbell, while Liberal politicians similarly attacked her. The partisan attacks of the House of Commons from this time were echoed in the news coverage of Campbell's performance as Minister of Defence. The *Chronicle-Herald* wrote, "Canadians will not tolerate a glossing over of accountability in order to suit the political needs of a party -- and a defence minister -- knee-deep in a leadership race."[471] Language such as this targeted Campbell as part of the reason for the failures in Somalia. By shifting

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[470] "Murder plot suspected in soldier's story," *Vancouver Sun*, Thursday 13 May 1993.
[471] "Death probe is warranted," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, 28 April 1993, D1.

their attention from the peacekeepers to higher level government officials, these newspapers perpetuated the idea that the peacekeepers were different from those who gave the orders. Such a distinction would ultimately make the number of figures blamed for the Somalia Affair quite limited and would also serve to reduce the calls for whole-scale reform of the military and its operations.

The military leadership was, however, painted as an "old boys club" that needed to have its business aired. The Canadian Forces and Campbell were challenged in a *Free Press* editorial for not dealing with the presence of white supremacists in the Airborne earlier. Noting that the "proud record" of the Airborne should not be thrown out because of the actions of a few "bigots," this editorial nonetheless commented, "[i]t makes no sense at all to send those highly-trained racists to nations populated by black people and order them to keep the peace."[472] A *La Presse* editorial gave examples of racists in the Canadian Forces, including Cpl. Matt McKay and a sergeant who, upon being passed over for a promotion by a francophone officer, called that officer a "frog." This editorial argued that even ideal candidates might be susceptible to « des positions idéologiques incompatibles avec certaines missions. »[473] It went on to suggest that it was anachronistic not to hold the members of the Armed Forces to the standards of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These were important criticisms, but because of Canada's long and positively-portrayed history as a

[472] "Getting rid of racists," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 May 1993, A6.
[473] Pierre Gravel, "L'armée doit cesser d'être un État dans l'État," *La Presse*, Thursday 13 May 1993, B2.

peacekeeping nation, the larger question of whether Canada was suited for a peacekeeping role was not addressed.

When news about the killings in Somalia became public, many people rushed to defend peacekeeping as a policy and the Canadian Forces as an institution. As evidence of beliefs in white supremacy in the Airborne became known, however, these challenges to the Canadian Forces' peacekeeping reputation made it increasingly difficult for authors who supported the military to effectively link the Airborne with Canada's peacekeeping past or to mobilize those who sought a larger Canadian role through the UN in the future. Such attacks focused on the peacekeepers as Canadian ambassadors, while downplaying the actual damage they had caused in Somalia. As in 1967, this latest downturn in Canada's status as a peacekeeping nation was followed by a change in political leadership that spoke of the need for more selective Canadian involvement in UN operations. But the creation of the Commission of Inquiry into Somalia shortly thereafter ensured that larger-scale changes to Canada's peacekeeping status would ensue.

The Somalia Inquiry and its Fallout, 1 June- 30 July 1997

In July of 1997, the Commission into Somalia released its large, multi-volume report, titled *Dishonoured Legacy*. The Report was released on Canada Day weekend of 1997, in what some saw as an attempt to bury its findings. If that were the intent, it failed, as every daily newspaper in Canada published extensive coverage of the Report in their 3 July editions and for the remainder of July.

Newspaper coverage of the release of the Report revived debates over the utility of Canadian peacekeeping efforts. Most papers did not attack peacekeeping as a policy, preferring to note that it remained the most popular role of the Canadian Forces since the Second World War. Instead, such articles criticized the Canadian Forces' leadership and the Chrétien government for not allowing a satisfying end to the Somalia Affair to occur. Where English Canadian newspaper editorials and letter writers wondered how Canada's international reputation could be rehabilitated, their French Canadian counterparts prior to the Report saw Canada as a flawed country, and applauded the Commission for plainly pointing out what needed to be changed. English and French newspaper coverage remained primarily concerned with Canadian decisions and actors, and framed these events as being part of a larger political culture in Canada in the 1990s that was riddled with uncertainty about the country's present and future.

As with the other events in the history of peacekeeping discussed in this chapter, news coverage of the Report of the Somalia Commission made Canada the central focus, and largely neglected where the peacekeepers had been sent.[474] Few reporters went back to Somalia, nor were the killings of Shidane Arone and others the central foci of the press coverage. What occurred in Somalia was therefore not covered as a UN failure, but primarily as the largest failure in Canada's peacekeeping history.

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[474] An exception is the following article, which suggested that what took place in Somalia was indicative of larger worldwide trends of intolerance against non-whites: Francois Brousseau, "Les vrais sauvages: Le scandale somalien en Italie révèle un véritable pattern internationale," *Le Devoir*, Friday 20 June 1997, A12.

English and French Canadian newspapers used the past differently when discussing the Report. Though Pearson had become shorthand for all the good that Canada had accomplished while peacekeeping, in 1997, editorials and letters to the editor in English papers rarely referred to Canada's history as a "peacekeeper to the world." The events in Somalia disrupted the use of a positive narrative of peacekeeping's past, and made newspapers focus on the present. Only a single article in *Le Devoir* invoked Pearson, to contrast Canada's peacekeeping past with what had taken place recently and to remind Canadians of their proud legacy of international assistance.[475] In the French press, a historical analogy was found in the Dreyfus Affair in France of 1894 to 1906. In that case, a Jewish officer had been accused of treason, and was wrongly convicted, which led to appeals and a long-standing division in the country over the power of the armed forces and the prevalence of anti-Semitism in France as a whole. An article in *Le Devoir* by Yves Cloutier made this connection to the Somalia Affair and argued that justice was missing from the end of the Commission. There remained among the Forces « de mercenaires cruels, excites à la haine des civils en général, et des non-Blancs en particulier, par un entrainement stupide et une mentalité de groupe primitive qui déshonore ceux et celles qui exercent leur métier humainement. »[476] And until they and the military culture that permitted them to kill and torture people in Somalia were changed,

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[475] Lise Bisonnette, "De déshonneur en déshonneur: L'éthique du gouvernement Chrétien épouse celle de l'armée canadienne," *Le Devoir*, Friday 4 July 1997.
[476] Yves Cloutier, "Le rapport de la Commission d'enquête sur les événements de Somalie: L'affaire Dreyfus, les cadavres en plus " *Le Devoir*, Thursday 10 July 1997, A7.

Canada could not be counted among « le plus meilleur pays du monde. » Here again, peacekeeping's present lost touch with its history, and any positive narrative was replaced by referring to a nation divided, as France had been over the Dreyfus Affair.

Many articles and letters to the editor commented upon the reputation of the Canadian Forces. The individual peacekeepers responsible for the killings were condemned, and the Airborne was roundly criticized for its part in the Somalia Affair. As an example of this, the *Free Press* published a letter from a former member of the Airborne who wanted to remind Canadians of the good that the peacekeepers had accomplished in Somalia. The letter was adjacent to a large photo of Master Corporal Clayton Matchee standing over a beaten Shidane Arone, with the caption: "The torture and death of Shidane Arone marked Somali mission."[477] In so doing, the paper was making its readers aware that the events in Somalia were not all school buildings and police operations.

When transcripts of interviews with members of the Airborne which de-humanized Somalis were released, some letter writers wrote of their belief that all Canadians shared in this disgrace. A letter in the *Sun* from 5 July expressed disgust at the language members of the Airborne had used.[478] Another letter-writer in the *Star* felt that the Canadian flag was metaphorically bleeding on Canada Day because of what the Report had uncovered.[479] Such letters were also often filled with resentment at the Commission for bringing to light details that

[477] "Somalia mission misunderstood," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 5 July 1997, A11.
[478] Merlet R. Shukrieh, "Uncivilized soldiers," *The Vancouver Sun*, 5 July 1997, A22.
[479] "Our flag flies free, but it bleeds," *Toronto Star*, Tuesday 8 July 1997, A14.

would hurt Canada's reputation internationally as well as domestically. Many Canadians still held that their country was "strong and free," though it had been through a tragic series of events. Canada was simply "no longer quite perfect," but still potentially a force for good in the world.

Newspaper articles and editorials in English Canada often referred to the nation's fragile institutions when discussing the Somalia Inquiry's Report.[480] With the failure of the constitutional reforms of Charlottetown in 1992 and the near-victory of separatists in Quebec in 1995, many Canadians viewed their country's institutions as holding a fragile nation together. Particularly in English Canada, the Somalia Inquiry's Report was read as one more way that the Canada they knew and loved was being erased from existence.[481] The heads of the Commission, and specifically Judge Gilles Letourneau, also had their motives questioned by several columnists, including Jack Granatstein and Richard Gwynn. Granatstein wrote a commentary for the *Globe and Mail* which called on the government to make many of the changes recommended by the commissioners, while cautioning that its attacks on individuals were too harsh and arguing that replacing the entire Canadian Forces leadership was too impractical.[482] Gwynn made similar arguments, and expressed the hope that the Canadian Forces would maintain their place as a vital national institution.[483]

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[480] "Canadians deserve better," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, 2 July 1997; Tim Harper, "'Proud legacy dishonored'," *Toronto Star*, Thursday 3 July 1997.
[481] "Portrayal of Somalia report too harsh on forces," *Regina Leader- Post*, Wednesday 9 July 1997, A6.
[482] Jack Granatstein, "A report on the Somalia Commission," *Globe and Mail*, Friday 4 July 1997, A13.
[483] Richard Gwynn, "Somalia report is mean-spirited smear job," *Toronto Star, Regina Leader- Post*, Sunday 6 July 1997, F3.

These English Canadian voices took issue with Letourneau in particular for challenging the military during the Inquiry and for stating publicly that the Commission had been hamstrung by both the government and an uncooperative military leadership. The underlying sentiment in such pieces was that Canada was not as flawed a nation as it was presented in the Report. Individuals could be chastised for their actions, but Canada had to emerge from the Somalia Affair a better and stronger peacekeeping country.

French authors, in contrast, universally expressed admiration for what Letourneau and the Commission had undertaken. This was because their conceptions of Canada were not shaken as profoundly by the release of the Report. One letter to the editor stated: « Son [Letourneau's] courageux refus de se laisser bâillonner par le pouvoir politique me rassure quelque peu quant à l'état de santé de notre démocratie. »[484] The commissioners were described as responsible, courageous, and having integrity and a desire for truth that were contrasted with the views of the Liberal government. These pieces continued to express a belief that peacekeeping could be a useful policy for Canada in certain circumstances but that greater efforts needed to be made to change the discriminatory institutional climate of the Canadian Forces. Such descriptions expressed an understanding of Canada that was not as tied to institutions like the military or symbols like peacekeeping. Rather, many Québécois' experiences with language rights issues made them view Canada as an inherently flawed nation.

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[484] "Un traitement odieux," *Le Devoir*, Monday 14 July 1997, A6.

The military was therefore one of many institutions, and peacekeeping one of many policies, in need of change.

The French and English press did share common targets for much of their anger: Jean Chrétien and his Defence Minister Art Eggleton. This was because of the Liberal government's premature ending of the Inquiry and its open criticisms of the Commission and its Report. Chrétien was attacked in almost every letter to the editor in the newspapers examined in this chapter for giving the country "lies and duplicity" as well as denying Canadians a satisfying conclusion to what had started in 1993 in Somalia.[485] A letter in *La Presse* chastised the Chrétien government for « son infinie capacité à banaliser les sujets les plus sérieux. »[486] The recent memory of Chrétien's perceived mishandling of the Quebec referendum in 1995 caused one letter-writer to deride him as "the very same man who professed to know nothing about a Quebec problem almost to the eve of the narrowest referendum mishap, which very nearly cost us the country."[487] Eggleton was attacked for describing the Report as unfairly critical to the Armed Forces while admitting that he had not read it in its entirety.[488] The actions of Chrétien and Eggleton also helped fuel conspiracy rumours that suggested a massive government and military cover-up and a purposeful obstruction of justice.[489] The reaction to the Liberal government suggests that many Canadians

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[485] "Letters to the Editor," *Globe and Mail*, Tuesday 8 July 1997, A10.
[486] "Scandales en rafale," *La Presse* Friday 11 July 1997, B2.
[487] "Letters to the Editor," *Globe and Mail.Globe and Mail* Tuesday 8 July 1997, A10.
[488] "Response no surprise," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, 12 July 1997, A26.
[489] Jeff Sallot, "Somalia questions remain unanswered," *Globe and Mail*, Monday 30 June 1997; Gilles Toupin, "Somalie: Chrétien nie tout camouflage," *La Presse*, Friday 4 July 1997.

took the Report very seriously. They sought reforms for what clearly was a flawed Canadian Forces, which would allow future Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping to occur. By obstructing such processes, Chrétien and Eggleton were guilty of either denying the problems that many Canadians knew existed, or doing less than was necessary to return the country to its once proud place as the world's preeminent peacekeeper.

Though some newspapers had defended the Airborne in 1993, few expressed regret when the unit was disbanded. The reports of torture, death, hazing, and white supremacy by this unit severed any connection it might have had to Canada's peacekeeping history. By ridding the Canadian Forces of these men and their leaders, it was hoped that Canada's peacekeeping role could be revived, as there were still missions like the ones to Haiti or to the former Yugoslavia that cried out for Canadian participation. The Canadian Forces' leadership preferred to talk of "peace making," which allowed soldiers to operate with fewer restrictions than those found on peacekeeping operations. As seen in Chapter One, the government also began to employ this language which further challenged the continued relevance of Canada's role on traditional peacekeeping operations. The Somalia Affair's impact on all of these occurrences was substantial. A letter-writer in the *Globe and Mail* wrote, "[t]he ghost of Shidane Arone has not been laid to rest. It walks abroad in Canada haunting the soul of

our nation."[490] Editorials and letters to the editor in daily newspapers argued that only by holding the politicians and the military accountable could Canada as a nation move past this crisis. Meeting this challenge would determine whether peacekeeping remained a viable policy for Canada in the present and the future, or whether it would become relegated solely to commemorations of the past.

Conclusion

Daily newspapers' coverage of peacekeeping was crucial to the creation and dissemination of the peacekeeping narratives central to this dissertation. Newspapers quickly linked peacekeeping to discussions of Canada's national identity, and emphasized its domestic purchase rather than commenting upon its value to the host nations. These linkages were then picked up and adapted by many of Canada's leading politicians, and became the basis for the heated debates that occurred through the 1957 federal election. Once the PCs gained office, newspapers employed a positive narrative about Canada's involvement in peacekeeping that stressed its value to the present and its potential future benefits for the cause of world peace. After Pearson won his Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, this positive understanding of the value of UN peacekeeping was solidified. For the next ten years, there existed a consensus view about the value of Canada's potential as a world peacekeeper. Whether it was serving in the Middle East, aiding the cause of Congolese independence, or helping to stop a "brush fire" in Cyprus from spreading, the Canadian government was encouraged to commit

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[490] Mohamud Siad Tognae, "When Somalis think of Canada, they think 'safe and secure'," *Globe and Mail*, Saturday 26 July 1997, D2.

more peacekeepers to UN service. This enthusiasm became tempered in 1967 when UNEF was expelled from Egypt. Editorials and letters to the editor in both English and French Canada called for the more selective use of Canadians on future UN operations, which came to be adopted as the Liberal Party policy throughout Trudeau's time in office.

In general, though, the government's intermittent fascination with peacekeeping, from its highest point in the Pearson era to the lows of the late 1990s, was not reflected in this newspaper coverage. This was because of the invocation of glowing historical commemorations of Canada's peacekeeping past. From 1957 onward, any time Canadians participated in a new UN operation, they shared in this proud tradition. Lester Pearson was mentioned often for his commitment to international peace and for his Nobel Peace Prize victory. Debates over Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations were largely forgotten or ignored, whether they were substantial ones like the questions over Canada's relationship with Britain in 1956 or more minor episodes such as whether the Canadians should be able to disarm the Cypriots. By selectively framing peacekeeping as a policy that also embodied Canada's national character, the press contributed to an overly rosy view of Canada's potential as a world peacekeeper.

This language associating Canada with its peacekeepers helped to solidify the bonds between readers and their peacekeepers. It could also have harmful consequences, most clearly seen when years of press support for an increased

Canadian peacekeeping role merged with the Mulroney government's desire to engage the Canadian Forces more abroad, and the Airborne were sent to participate in UNOSOM. To be sure, this language was different in English- and French-Canadian newspapers. The French press consistently stressed the need for Canada to engage in the world as an independent middle power. As part of this, they advocated more participation in UN peacekeeping operations and more aid for newly independent nations, particularly in French Africa. In English Canada, it was more likely that Canada's peacekeepers were also presented as exemplars of what was best in the country as a whole. This stronger bond between English Canadians and peacekeeping was consistent with what has been presented in previous chapters.

After the killings by the Airborne became known, more editorials and letters to the editor questioned the validity of Canada's peacekeeping policies. The authors lost a common language in which to situate discussions of Canadian peacekeeping when it no longer became appropriate to compare the Airborne with Canada's illustrious peacekeeping past. This emptied peacekeeping of much of its symbolic value and challenged the perception that Canada was a nation of "Blue Berets." As the Report of the Commission into Somalia was released, articles, editorials, and letters to the editor demonstrated that their primary concern was making sure that Canada was able to move on from what had been done in Somalia. Authors across the country blamed Chrétien and a select group of military leaders for allowing Canada's peacekeeping reputation to be tarnished

and for not actively trying to make the country's military reflect a more tolerant image that had been a part of the narrative of Canada as the world's peacekeeper.

Newspapers offered their readers regular coverage of peacekeeping when Canadians participated in new missions and when the Canadians failed to keep the peace. These articles, editorials, and letters to the editor created and disseminated particular understandings of peacekeeping as a Canadian policy, which makes their contents vital for the understanding of why so many Canadians closely associated their national identity with peacekeeping. But they also framed these articles so that their Canadian audiences would find them more palatable. In the case of the Congo and Somalia, this meant employing racially-prejudiced language to describe the host nation. Stories about the peacekeepers also tended to disappear to the back pages when the missions were no longer new or exciting. Newspapers were, therefore, culpable in making peacekeeping more than just a pragmatic policy, and from 1956 to 1997 they actively encouraged their audiences to see themselves as part of a nation of "Blue Berets."

Chapter Five
From Policeman to Klansman: Depictions of Peacekeeping in Newspaper Editorial Cartoons, 1956-1997

The now-defunct Canadian Museum of Caricature presented its exhibit "The Perils of Peacekeeping" in Ottawa from 7 June to 25 October 1992. During the fall of 1992, Canadians were on display as peacekeepers in missions around the globe and in the newly built peacekeeping monument "Reconciliation." To add to these displays, the museum showcased 85 editorial cartoons from newspapers across the country in both English and French. The official guide to the exhibit told viewers they would see cartoons which were drawn during important events in Canada's peacekeeping history.[491] It emphasized the contributions of cartoonists and their cartoons to helping Canadians understand "the contradictions and ambiguities of Canada's role in world affairs." Conceding that editorial cartoons had often adopted a critical tone regarding peacekeeping, the exhibit nonetheless framed Canada as a nation of "Blue Berets." It described how any criticisms of peacekeeping came from Canadians wanting to make the world a safer place because of their "genuine commitment to world peace." In so doing, the exhibit celebrated Canada's peacekeeping identity, and actively encouraged its existence.

Editorial cartoons are the subject of this final chapter because they were the medium with the least governmental control over its contents. Newspapers had considerable freedom to present peacekeeping as they wished, and editorial

[491] "The Perils of Peacekeeping: Canada and World Affairs after 1945," (Ottawa, 1992).

cartoonists, by the symbolic nature of their drawings, were even less bound to present peacekeeping with any accuracy. As a result, their works were more critical of Canada's peacekeeping role than were the articles and editorials found in their papers, and considerably more so than the high school textbooks and NFB documentaries discussed earlier. Satire was the cartoonists' primary weapon, and peacekeeping was a topic which was lampooned for different reasons from 1956 to 1997. Yet, while cartoonists offered prescient criticisms of Canada's peacekeeping efforts, they were rarely sustained; audiences were more inclined to focus on other topics when cartoonists did as well, which blunted the impact of their satire. While newspapers sought to be the first to report a story about peacekeeping, and politicians sought to provide an official account of those events, cartoonists made metaphorical connections to popular culture to both challenge and inform their audiences. That this was the medium which offered the most criticisms of peacekeeping in Canada in part explains how peacekeeping endured numerous setbacks from 1956 to 1997, and remained a central part of the nation's symbology.

This chapter examines selections from the over 150 editorial cartoons related to peacekeeping made between 1956 and 1997 because cartoonists saw more "perils of peacekeeping" than the 1992 exhibit let on. These cartoons were another medium in which visual depictions of Canada's peacekeepers appeared to

audiences across the country.[492] Whether describing the host nations, Canada's politicians, or its peacekeepers, cartoonists offered Canadians satirical criticism of their country's UN participation. Depictions of the host nations relied on racial stereotypes, though more often these figures were not central to how peacekeeping was portrayed. Instead, the Canadian connection was emphasized, and the Prime Ministers and their Secretaries of State for External Affairs frequently appeared in these images. Of particular importance are editorial cartoon depictions of Canada's peacekeepers. While Canada's peacekeepers were largely above reproach in the political rhetoric, school textbooks, NFB documentaries, and regular newspaper coverage examined earlier, cartoonists were not so kind. In depicting peacekeepers as bumbling policemen or later as members of the Ku Klux Klan, cartoonists caused strong reactions from newspaper readers at particular times. That these criticisms resonated only at select times provides insight into the resilience of peacekeeping as a symbol of a Canadian past and future that could withstand multiple challenges in the present.

While cartoons appeared in newspapers on the same pages as written text, current historical research on the daily press differentiates between the written and visual elements contained within their pages. A newspaper editorial can name its major characters, describe an event in detail, and provide historical analogies. Editorial cartoons, by contrast, normally tell their narratives in a single

[492] These visuals were particularly important before the prevalence of television in Canada. By 1956, just over half of all Canadian households had access to a television set, a remarkable feat considering that the first CBC broadcast was in 1952. Rutherford, *When Television Was Young: Primetime Canada, 1952 -- 1967*, 49.

panel. Cartoons are also thought to be the most frequently viewed items on newspaper editorial pages because of their humour, their short narratives, and their occupying large spaces on the page.[493] They also use elements of the fantastic to describe actors and situations, which written newspaper articles cannot.[494] Such fantasy elements allow for more interpretation on the part of viewers than might be possible with written texts.

Many studies of political cartoons in Canada have focused on the careers of important individuals such as Len Norris at the Vancouver *Sun,* Duncan MacPherson at the Toronto *Star,* or Aislin (Terry Mosher) at the Montreal *Gazette.*[495] These artists, and the roughly two dozen other cartoonists who have normally worked in Canada at any given time, developed unique styles that viewers recognized, and they often published books of their most popular cartoons for wider consumption.[496] Despite the importance of these artists, this chapter will focus on the content of their cartoons. Cartoonists operated in a milieu that provided them with the language and imagery of peacekeeping, and they, in turn, influenced it with their visuals. Because no cartoonist operated in a cultural vacuum, it is more productive to examine how ideas from Canadian

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[493] Lucy Shelton Caswell, "Drawing Swords: War in American Editorial Cartoons," *American Journalism* 21, no. 2 (2004): 15.

[494] Janice L. Edwards, *Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and Narrative* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1997), 19.

[495] Each of these cartoonists has published collections of his cartoons from years past. These cartoonists also figure prominently in the works of Raymond Morris and Peter Desbarats and Terry Mosher. See Peter Desbarats and Terry Mosher, *The Hecklers: A History of Canadian Political Cartooning and a Cartoonist's History of Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Raymond Morris, *Behind the Jester's Mask: Canadian Editorial Cartoons about Dominant and Minority Groups, 1960-1979* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).

[496] This statistic about the number of cartoonists appears in Morris, *Behind the Jester's Mask: Canadian Editorial Cartoons about Dominant and Minority Groups, 1960-1979*, 62.

society, its political leaders, and its media made their way into images about peacekeeping, rather than to examine individual cartoonists' political views.

For an editorial cartoon to have relevance, it had to speak to both a contemporary news item and established cultural conventions. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into six sections, with the same date ranges that were used in the previous chapter. But unlike newspaper articles and editorials, cartoons about peacekeeping came in more restricted time frames. Rather than appear steadily for weeks or months after the start of a new operation, most cartoons were printed within a few days of a specific occurrence. These depictions were more sporadic than those done in other media forms since sustained coverage of stories by cartoonists was rare.

Cartoons about peacekeeping were, in addition, almost exclusively critical, which speaks to the particularities of this medium and cartoonists' reliance on satire to make their arguments. Some of these criticisms were particular to a given mission though others continued to be used for longer periods of time. Artists also tended to focus their attacks on specific individuals while leaving Canadian society relatively unscathed. Anne Rubenstein similarly argues that comic strips are important markers of both modernity and tradition in a political culture.[497] Though they often expressed a desire for change indicative of modernity, most cartoons, sometimes hypocritically, also criticized new ideas.

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[497] Anne Rubenstein, *Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation: A Political History of Comic Books in Mexico* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 42.

Editorial cartoons did, however, play an important role in the production, dissemination, and reception of media messages about peacekeeping. As late as 1989, Canadian cartoon scholar Raymond Morris wrote, "[w]hile some may miss the point, the cartoons are designed for quick comprehension by most adults, are more readily grasped than most art forms, and can therefore be studied without serious concern that readers will regularly and substantially distort their meaning."[498] Communications scholars and historians reject such an approach, and point to how cartoons are interpreted through the audiences' "visual literacy."[499] For communications scholar Elisabeth El Refaie, being visually literate requires viewers to be familiar with the conventions of cartoons, to have considerable knowledge of figures from current events, and to be able to make the metaphorical links that the cartoonist's do in their illustrations.[500]

Some editorial cartoon conventions include using size as a marker of importance for a particular figure, using stereotypes for people and places who are considered different from the cartoonist and their audience, and drawing upon popular comic strip characters. In the first case, a direct correlation between the status of a figure and its size in comparison to everything else in a cartoon can be made. Canada's political leaders were normally portrayed as

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[498] Morris, *Behind the Jester's Mask: Canadian Editorial Cartoons about Dominant and Minority Groups, 1960-1979*, 5.

[499] The term visual literacy is employed by Caswell, "Drawing Swords: War in American Editorial Cartoons."; Edwards, *Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and Narrative*; Elisabeth El Refaie, "Multiliteracies: How Readers Interpret Political Cartoons," *Visual Communication* 8, no. 2 (2009); Chris Lamb, "Drawing Power: The Limits of Editorial Cartoons in America," *Journalism Studies* 8, no. 5 (2007); Paul Messaris, "Visual Aspects of Media Literacy," *Journal of Commuication* (1998); Linda Trimble, Laura Way, and Shannon Sampert, "Drawn to the Polls? Representations of Canadian Voters in Editorial Cartoons," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 44, no. 2 (2010).

[500] El Refaie, "Multiliteracies: How Readers Interpret Political Cartoons," 182.

smaller versions of themselves, intimating their lack of power. Stereotyping, on the other hand, occurred when Egypt's President Nasser in 1956 and 1967 and the Congolese Prime Minster Patrice Lumumba in 1960 were portrayed as either fools or devils.[501] While participating in peacekeeping, by definition, meant that Canadians were not taking part in a war, depictions of the host nations often relied upon cultural conventions of the "enemy" that were reminiscent of wartime cartoons. Images of good animals, like the dove, and evil animals, such as snakes or alligators, filled these cartoons with over-simplified but coded characters. Many cartoonists also made reference to comic strips while lampooning the leading political figures of the era.[502] These figures may have been familiar to audiences, and helped convey additional meaning based upon the profile of such characters. Interpreting such processes is not automatic, and scholars of cartoons and comic strips therefore give audiences a considerable role in determining which cartoons resonate more than others.[503]

Visual literacy is culturally specific, which means that images appearing in English and French Canadian editorial cartoons often drew upon different

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[501] Such depictions were similar to those employed during the Second World War. See Caswell, "Drawing Swords: War in American Editorial Cartoons."

[502] Since the late 1980s comic strips and comic books have received more scholarly attention as sources of popular culture. See Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester, eds., *Arguing Comics: Literary Masters on a Popular Medium* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2004); Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester, eds., *A Comic Studies Reader* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009). Both of these works talk about recent trends in the study of comics, and the struggles of scholars to overcome the belief that their source materials are only for juvenile audiences. By contrast, the importance of editorial cartoons has been noted since nineteenth century depictions of Boss Tweed helped expose corruption in New York City, to name one famous example.

[503] El Refaie, "Multiliteracies: How Readers Interpret Political Cartoons," 191.

cultural ideas about the host nations, Canada's military, and the nation.[504] Cartoons from French Canadian newspapers alluded to ideas that were more prevalent in the newspaper coverage from Quebec, particularly a stronger desire for Canada to break from its colonial past with Britain, the importance of minority rights, and the existence of a *Francophonie*. Individual artists in both English and French Canada, however, made careers out of attacking politicians in a similar manner.[505] Hence, the distinctiveness of French Canadian cartoons as well as the shared artistic community among cartoonists in Canada can be gleaned.

Cartoonists further helped encourage their audiences' visual literacy by using anchors in their drawings. Anchors label people, places, and things in a cartoon, and allow audiences to better understand what is being depicted. This practice was popular in the 1950s, but as the decades progressed, far fewer anchors were used in cartoons about peacekeeping because television's wholesale adoption by North Americans made people better able to recognize political leaders on

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[504] Much of the best literature on political cartoons examines the impact of visual literacy on cartoon representations of specific events. Janis Edwards' work highlights a cartoonist's ability to use metaphor, allusion and metonymy to create and disseminate images of political candidates that form a web of imagery along with the candidate's self-presentation and other media messages. A study by Linda Trimble, Laura Way and Shannon Sampert of the Canadian election campaigns of 2004, 2006 and 2008 employs similar understandings about the potential of cartoons to be agents of change. Seeing cartoons as a part of the process of image creation and dissemination allows these authors to argue that cartoons are powerful rhetorical tools that give the media considerable agency in their presentation of a political figure. See Edwards, *Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and Narrative*; Trimble, Way, and Sampert, "Drawn to the Polls? Representations of Canadian Voters in Editorial Cartoons."

[505] Raymond N. Morris, *The Carnivalization of Politics: Quebec cartoons on relations with Canada, England, and France, 1960- 1979* (Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, 1995), 129.

sight.[506] Nonetheless, anchors provided assistance to audiences who viewed cartoons on peacekeeping which contained figures with exaggerated facial features and bodies, the use of buildings and animals as metaphors for people, sports, and movie references, allusions to other political events of the time, and historical analogies that seemed appropriate to the cartoonist. These metaphors permitted multiple meanings to be read into a given text. The repeated use of certain visual representations was therefore quite important because it implied a stable conception of Canada's peacekeepers and the host nations.

The cartoons that appeared in Canadian daily newspapers between 1956 and 1997 made connections with viewers by employing particular images that related their country and peacekeeping. These images changed over time as understandings of peacekeeping were altered by domestic circumstances, the use of different narratives in newspapers and political speeches, and the experiences of Canadians on peacekeeping operations. Through their single panels, therefore, cartoons presented peacekeeping as something more complex than it was often portrayed in other media, and created a space in which the Canadian attachment to peacekeeping could be challenged. At the same time, these criticisms were not able to question Canada's peacekeeping role effectively because of the strength of peacekeeping's symbolic discourses and the transient nature of the editorial cartoon itself.

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[506] James R. Beninger, "Does Television Enhance the Shared Symbolic Environment? Trends in Labeling of Editorial Cartoons, 1948-80," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 1 (1983): 103.

The Suez Crisis, 1 November to 30 December 1956 and Lester Pearson's Nobel Prize Win, October 1957

When newspaper coverage of the Suez Crisis was at its peak in November and December of 1956, numerous editorial cartoons commented upon Canada's role in the international conflict. Negative portrayals of Egypt's leader, Nasser, appeared across the country, though there was a general lack of cartoons about other Egyptians. As with the editorial coverage of this time period, cartoons tended to portray the Canadian side of the Suez Crisis, largely ignoring the difficulties facing the Egyptians. When they appeared in cartoons, ordinary Egyptians were drawn atop or beside camels and dressed in flowing robes. One cartoon used the cultural stereotype of the Middle Eastern oil baron, and showed two men next to their Cadillac, with five covered women in the back seat.[507] Nasser was, however, a key figure in these cartoons. Though his country had been invaded by the British, French, and the Israelis, he was vilified as the leader of an enemy government. Cartoonists did not like his autocratic manner or his ties to the Soviet Union. [508] They focused on Nasser's nose as the dominant feature on his face and usually exaggerated it. He was also drawn as an aggressive and self-important bully. One cartoon in the Montreal *Gazette* showed him in the back seat of a UN police car, giving directions to two white officers in the front. The caption of the cartoon was "Back Seat Driver."[509] It spoke to the improbability of Nasser's dictating the composition of the UN force in the Middle East, by making

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[507] Len Norris, "Just as I feared, Fusiloil... they've rung a bunch of Canadian policemen in on us after all..."," *Vancouver Sun*, Tuesday 27 November 1956, 4.
[508] "Riding High," *Regina Leader- Post*, 30 November 1956, 23.
[509] John Collins, "Don't Take Dictation Down," *Montreal Gazette* Friday 30 November 1956.

the allusion to a criminal doing so in a police car. Though he was not technically an enemy during the Suez Crisis, Nasser was labelled as a "new Hitler," and his ties to the Soviet Union and his demand that the Canadian units not be from the Queen's Own made him a villain in cartoons. By focusing on Nasser alone and on the Canadian connection, cartoonists encouraged their audiences to see the crisis as something that had little to do with ordinary Egyptians.

Because of his efforts at the UN, Lester Pearson was frequently portrayed in a positive light throughout the Suez Crisis. Cartoons of Pearson often depicted him as what I term, "Little Mike," with his signature bowtie and smile, but with very short arms and legs. Cartoonists embraced Pearson's nickname, Mike, and used the bowtie and "boyish" smile to represent him in their images.[510] It was a common convention in cartoons to depict those vying for party leadership, or to be the head of a country, as smaller versions of themselves.[511] A cartoon from the Ottawa *Citizen* showed "Little Mike" driving a car up a hill with the sign "Calmness and Thought" alongside his car.[512] He chose this, the high road, instead of "Hysteria and Violence" which was the road leading downwards. The cartoon gave Pearson credit for helping Canada and the world through his rational thinking, which was implicitly contrasted with the British example. Cartoonists did not attack Pearson's actions at the UN. Instead, they approved of

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[510] John Collins, "Egyptian Hieroglyphics," *Montreal Gazette*, Friday 16 November 1956, 8.
[511] Edwards, *Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and Narrative*, Chapter Five.
[512] ""Mike" takes the high road," *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 November 1956, 6.

his advocacy for a greater Canadian role in international politics, something that had been a part of Canada's foreign policies since the creation of the UN in 1945.

Figure 5.1 Ottawa *Citizen* 13 November 1956

Louis St. Laurent was not depicted as frequently as Pearson in editorial cartoons, but images of him appeared soon after his speech to the House of Commons declaring the end of the era of the "Supermen of Europe."[513] Though the editorial line of the *Gazette* argued that St. Laurent's attacks against Britain and France were too strong, a cartoon on 27 November showed St. Laurent

[513] "Greatness is not always a matter of size," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Wednesday 28 November 1956, 6.

working to get Britain and France "in focus" with one another.[514] In the *Star,* a cartoon showed St. Laurent driving a car towards "Nationhood Ave." rather than turning down streets with the signs "Chore Boy" for UK and USA, respectively.[515] Other papers that held contrary opinions about the Suez events did not publish cartoons questioning St. Laurent despite frequent editorial challenges to the Prime Minister. Whether this was a decision made by the cartoonists themselves or by the newspaper editors is not clear, but it does stand as an instance of silence.



Figure 5.2 Toronto *Star* 28 November 1956

[514] The editorial in question was from a day later, 28 November. See "Painful Departure," *Montreal Gazette*, 8. The cartoon of St. Laurent is from John Collins, "Trying To Get Them In Focus," *Montreal Gazette* Tuesday 27 November 1956, 8.
[515] Les Callan, "The right road is straight ahead," *Toronto Daily Star*, Wednesday 28 November 1956, 6.

Cartoonists did not stay silent about the Canadian contribution to UNEF. Many depicted the members of this force as policemen.[516] Positive depictions of policemen had them strong and sure of their purpose, and armed in case trouble broke out. These portrayals made the members of UNEF into an actual police force, which was not their task in Egypt. A cartoon appearing in the Toronto *Star* on 3 November titled, "The man for the job," showed a white man looking off to the west towards the words "world peace disturbance."[517] Les Callan, the artist, had been working at the Star since 1937. The frequent use of anchors was typical of his style of drawings and helped the audience decipher what was being depicted. [518] This figure, dressed in a uniform which had "Intl. Police Force" written on the chest, appeared in front of the words "UN International Law- and Conscience" written on the UN building. This illustration was reminiscent of those that had appeared in the popular syndicated comic strip of the 1930s and 40's, *King of the Royal Mounted*.[519] This strip depicted Mountie Dave King fighting for order in the Canadian North-West.[520] Callan drew UNEF as though it were simply a variation on Canada's Mounties, which implied that Canada was well-suited to such an international role.

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[516]Robert Chambers, "Deputizing a Posse," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Friday 9 November 1956, 6.
[517] Les Callan, "The Man For the Job," *Toronto Daily Star*, 3 November 1956, 6.
[518] An example of how Canadian soldiers from the Second World War were portrayed is Les Callan, "'Welcome Home Son'," *Toronto Daily Star*, 13 March 1946, 6.
[519] Walden, *Visions of Order: The Canadian Mountie in Symbol and Myth.*
[520] For discussions of the origins of many of these myths, see R.C. MacLeod, *The NWMP and Law Enforcement, 1873 --- 1905* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976). The fictional and non-fictional dissemination of these myths is the topic of Walden, *Visions of Order: The Canadian Mountie in Symbol and Myth.*

Figure 5.3 Toronto *Star* 3 November 1956

Akin to written newspaper coverage and the political rhetoric of the time, cartoons drew upon language that tied UNEF to Canada's domestic concerns. A cartoon in *Le Devoir* by Robert Lapalme, who worked for the paper from 1950 to 1959, also depicted the peacekeeping force as police officers. Captioned "Un drapeau pour identification," it showed a man with a moustache being attacked by another man carrying the Union Jack.[521] The figure being attacked yells, "S'cours! Police! Police!" but his face is horrified as another figure running to the scene also carries the Union Jack. This was Canada, holding a policeman's

[521] Robert Lapalme, "L'ONU constabulaire en Égypte," *Le Devoir*, Saturday 1 December 1956, 4.

truncheon with a broad grin on his face. Though anxious to help, the cartoon implied that without a unique flag, Canada could never gain the respect and trust of the Egyptians. As with many editorials at the time, Lapalme linked Canada's peacekeeping role to the country's status as an independent nation. Canada was found lacking and the cartoon implied that a change should occur soon.

The link between peacekeeping and police work opened UNEF to more negative depictions commonly found in dime novels, comic strips, and film.[522] These depictions made the ordinary police officer into a heavy-set "clod" who was inept at his job, and relied upon either a private eye or a super-hero to solve the crimes that were plaguing the city. At the Winnipeg *Free Press*, Peter Kuch, an artist at the paper since 1952, was responsible for a number of images about UNEF. A cartoon of his from 5 November 1956 presented a police figure carrying a truncheon with the anchor "UN police" on it, standing amidst two sets of fighting figures: Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden versus Egypt's President Nasser and Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev versus a figure labelled "Hungary."[523] The police officer was heavy around his midsection, and had a double chin. He was also indecisive and was not shown engaging in either of the fights that were taking place. Newspaper editorials did not invoke the image of the timid and fat policeman, but cartoonists had this cultural image at their disposal, and some employed it for satirical effect.

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[522] James A. Inciardi and Juliet L. Dee, "From Keystone Cops to *Miami Vice*: Images of Policing in American Popular Culture," *Journal of Popular Culture* 21, no. 2 (1987): 89-90.
[523] Peter Kuch, "Khrushchev: Hey you! Stop that fight over there!," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 5 November 1956, 21.

Figure 5.4 Winnipeg *Free Press* 5 November 1956

While certain cartoons drew parallels between domestic and international police work, others chose to criticise the peacekeeping force for its being different from normal soldiering. The warm and pleasant conditions that soldiers could expect on UNEF appeared often in cartoons, to suggest that the mission would be an easy one.[524] A Kuch *Free Press* cartoon of 16 November showed a soldier in Egypt reading a book while being served a drink by a fellow soldier in front of an ideal suburban home.[525] Instead of a car in the garage there was a tank; a garden grew in front of the house; there was even a woman, presumably the officers' wife, just inside the window. The home had also been outfitted with a television, with the CBC on. The caption for the cartoon quoted Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent saying that he did not want the soldiers on UNEF duty to live under "less

[524]Len Norris, "Volunteers wishing to participate," *Vancouver Sun*, Tuesday 6 November 1956, 4.
[525] Peter Kuch, "Mr. St. Laurent: "We do not want our forces to be living under less comfortable conditions than they have had at home."," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Friday 16 November 1956, 13.

comfortable conditions than they have had at home." Such cartoons made UN duty into a vacation for the Canadian soldiers and satirized how the soldiers were living compared to others back home who might not enjoy all those amenities.



Figure 5.5 Winnipeg *Free Press* 16 November 1956

When the Queen's Own Rifles were scrapped in favour of a logistics force, cartoonists lampooned the Canadians who would take part in UNEF by altering their bodies from those of normal soldiers. Some cartoons visually portrayed the Canadian contingent to UNEF as effeminate. A *Free Press* cartoon depicted a group of Canadian peacekeepers as a female drummer with a typewriter, a male flag-bearer with a giant pencil, and a male flautist with a pen.[526] The inclusion of a female member of UNEF highlighted that this was not a typical armed force. It went further than other cartoons by not only taking away the soldiers' guns, but also their identities as men. Other visual markers of the forces' effeminacy

[526]Peter Kuch, "Spirit of '56," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Tuesday 20 November 1956, 17.

alluded to their being "bookish," rather than rugged soldiers. The most identifiable way cartoons conveyed this was with the presence of eyeglasses in cartoons. A direct result of the Canadians having eyeglasses was their being drawn with smaller muscles and less confidence than regular soldiers. Glasses appeared on Canadians members of UNEF in several cartoons, as did their use of typewriters.[527] In a play on words, one cartoon labelled the Canadians the "1st Chairborne" for their reliance on desks, typewriters, and calculators. In these cartoons, difference was visually marked as something that was not good for Canada or its armed forces, though the actual utility of the logistics forces in the Middle East was considerable.[528]

Other cartoons placed the Canadians in women's clothing to make similar arguments. One artist, Len Norris, who had been at the *Sun* since 1950, and was well-known for his incisive criticisms of Canadian society, showed a barracks full of soldiers scrubbing the floors and polishing their uniforms while an officer relayed that "housekeeping units" were being sent instead.[529] A Calgary *Herald* cartoon from 22 November depicted two sailors mocking the departing Canadians, who appeared in maid's skirts and chef's hats, and carried brooms

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[527] Other cartoons that used glasses and or typewriters include "I hope these bullets can read English!," *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 November 1956; "One rapid-fire duplicator, two mobile field calculators, six medium and light typewriters and one thirty-calibre cheque protector. Is armed to the teeth...", *Calgary Herald*, Thursday 29 November 1956 1956, 4.
[528] Carroll, *Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67.*
[529] Len Norris, "Our trip to Egypt's called off.. they're only sending 'housekeeping' units..." *Vancouver Sun*, Tuesday 20 November 1956, 4.

and mops.[530] The Canadians were shown beside supplies for the mission: deodorant, doilies, bug powder, and a vacuum. The gendered work of the "housekeeper" became an avenue through which the masculinity of the men in the Canadian contingent could be mocked, something not discussed in editorials. By calling the logistics units "housekeepers," however, these cartoons framed the UNEF as different, and arguably inferior to, other regular soldiers, who not only cleaned, but killed.

Figure 5.6 Calgary *Herald* 22 November 1956

[530] "And will mother's little helper promise to be careful about housemaid's knee?," *Calgary Herald*, Thursday 22 November 1956, 4.

Other cartoons used size to convey that UNEF was a lesser force. A Regina *Leader- Post* cartoon anchored a tiny member of UNEF who was dressed as a crossing guard, "Inadequate Authority," for attempting to stop a much larger Nasser riding in a giant tank.[531] Cartoonists, like many of their readers, were not sure what to make of Canadian participation in the peacekeeping operation under the UN's rules. This, combined with the satirical nature of editorial cartoons, presented the peace force in a more negative light than elsewhere in newspapers.

Despite this criticism, after learning that Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1957, several cartoons praised his actions from a year earlier. Not surprisingly, these cartoons appeared in Liberal-supporting papers. Most often they referred to the impending Liberal leadership race, and Pearson's improved chances of winning the nomination because of his success.[532] A cartoon in the *Chronicle - Herald* from 16 October showed a now grown-up Pearson being adored by a winged female figure.[533] This figure wore a sash anchored "Lester B. Pearson fan club," and she also held a laurel in her hands, a symbol of peace. The caption for the cartoon, "A New Star is Born," suggested that Pearson was now the man to beat in the Liberal leadership race, and a figure worthy of idolization for Canadians.

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[531] "The policeman's lot is not a happy one," *Regina Leader- Post*, 21 November 1956, 17.
[532] "The Search for Cinderella," *Montreal Gazette*, Wednesday 16 October 1957, 8; Robert Chambers, "Tough Competition," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Saturday 19 October 1957.
[533] Robert Chambers, "A New Star is Born," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Wednesday 16 October 1957, 6.

Figure 5.7Halifax *Chronicle - Herald* 16 October 1957

Cartoonists also offered commentary on the debates over the Suez Crisis, one year removed. An image from the *Star*, instead of depicting Pearson, showed his Nobel Peace Prize crashing down on to a number of angry men.[534] The men were anchored with the words, "Angry debate on Canada's role in UN-Suez developments of 1956." The title for this cartoon, "End of the Debate," implied that any questioning of the Liberal government's policy from a year before was now irrelevant because the world had recognized Pearson and Canada's contribution to global peace. The Nobel Prize was addressed to Pearson and

[534] Les Callan, "End of the Debate," *Toronto Daily Star*, 16 October 1957, 6.

Canada, linking them together. Few newspaper articles in 1957 acknowledged the strength of the debates that had occurred in 1956. For a cartoon to remind its viewers about the controversies surrounding Canada's involvement in UNEF underscores how cartoons were able to transmit messages to their audiences that differed from those contained in newspaper editorials.

As the Suez Crisis was tempered by the presence of UNEF, cartoonists no longer felt the need to depict its major actors. What had been drawn by 1957 were images of peacekeepers as policemen who embodied both the positive and negative associations that came with such a linkage. The Canadian soldiers, alternatively, were shown in the Middle East on an easy mission, womanly, and bookish compared to regular soldiers. These critical presentations of the Suez Crisis differed from the editorial content of daily newspapers because of the satirical nature of editorial cartoons and their allusions to other popular cultures' understandings of policemen and soldiers. Canada's increasing stature in world affairs was, by contrast, a source of pride in many cartoons. Lester Pearson's Nobel Prize win also seemed to confirm that Canada should take a more active role in promoting peace in the world. Cartoonists therefore believed in Canada's rightful place as an important world actor, but seemed less convinced about peacekeeping because it did not conform to earlier conceptions of soldiering.

The Congo, 1 July to 15 September 1960

When the UN asked Canada to assist on ONUC in July 1960, peacekeeping was understood by many to be an activity that showcased the best qualities

Canadians had to offer the world. Despite the repeated criticisms found in cartoons four years earlier, the positive experience of Canadian involvement in UNEF made peacekeeping an accepted role for the Canadian Forces. Cartoon depictions of this operation differed from political speeches and newspaper editorials because they centred on the Congolese and not the Canadians. Across English Canada, the Congolese were portrayed as primitive, dangerous, and sometimes cannibalistic. Earlier images of the peacekeeper as a lesser soldier or a bumbling policeman were less prevalent, though not entirely absent at this time. The leading figures of the Congo crisis, Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, and Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev were also made into figures from the Africa of Stanley and Livingstone. By making use of these tropes and drawing upon popular culture, cartoonists encouraged their viewers to hold on to long-standing beliefs about the Congo and the inferiority of its people. The use of such racially-prejudiced imagery underlies the reluctance of many cartoonists to see Canada's role in decolonization, a new role, as something more than a subject for satire.

Few cartoonists depicted Canada or its peacekeepers as characters in their images about the Congo. However, negative images of policemen and soldiers could still be employed as in a cartoon in the *Chronicle- Herald* from 26 July which showed a heavy-set and wrinkled male police officer peering into a

cauldron that sat atop a fire.[535] The police officer carried a truncheon in his left hand, but seems out of place in the jungle setting. As with the mission to Suez, marking the peacekeepers as different allowed cartoonist Robert Chambers, who had been drawing visuals of Canada for Halifax audiences in such a manner since 1932, to employ visual images that were not flattering but would have been familiar to many readers. The cauldron into which the peacekeeper peered also had large bones scattered around it - a visual reminder that the Congo was a place where cannibals lived. The presence of the peacekeeper was as a result little more than an excuse to convey a trope about the Congo.

Figure 5.8 Halifax *Chronicle - Herald* 28 July 1960

[535] Robert Chambers, "Did Somebody Call on Policeman?," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Tuesday 26 July 1960, 6.

Interactions between the Congolese and Canadians were portrayed in a far more positive manner in French Canadian cartoons. This was consistent with the anti-imperial stance taken by *Le Devoir* and *La Presse* in 1956. A cartoon by Robert Lapalme, now working for *La Presse*, on 4 August used the fable of Cinderella to advance an anti-colonial position. A figure anchored "Canada Français" played the role of "Nouvelle Cendrillon."[536] She was a white female figure holding a broom while a slipper was placed on her foot by a Black male figure with the anchor "Colonies Nègres" on him. Both figures were smiling, and the anchor "le français" was placed next to the slipper to let viewers know that it was a common language that made the two compatible. The ugly stepsisters in the Cinderella fable were played by the United States, Great Britain, and "Canada Anglais," all of whom appeared in the background looking sad and surprised at the success of "Canada Français." By using such a metaphor, LaPalme made a visual argument about decolonization and the *Francophonie* drawing part of Canada and the Congo into a closer and mutually beneficial relationship.

[536] Robert Lapalme, "Nouvelle Cendrillon," *La Presse*, Thursday 4 August 1960, 4.

Figure 5.9 *La Presse* 4 August 1960

English Canadian cartoons, in contrast to their French counterparts, preferred to remind their viewers that Canada was a good country that undertook peacekeeping operations for the benefit of the world. A cartoon by John Collins, who had been working as a cartoonist at the *Gazette* since 1941, from 13 August, contrasted Canada's portrayal as an "Aid to an Imperialist Aggressor" in Soviet propaganda with an "average" Canadian.[537] The Russian image of Canada was a domineering figure who carried a whip in his right hand, and had a snarl on his face. The "average" Canadian in the cartoon was a balding man with glasses who wore a Hawaiian shirt, socks to his knees, and had a heavy mid-section but skinny arms and legs. Both figures represented Canada as a man, but the elderly vacationer pointed to himself and declared, "Who, me?" upon seeing himself

[537]John Collins, "Our Turn in the Distorting Mirror," *Montreal Gazette*, 13 August 1960, 6.

portrayed as an imperialist aggressor. Such an image drew upon the perception of Canada as a nation without a colonial past. It was Canada's actions as an independent nation, not simply the functional shared use of the French language, which made it suited for peacekeeping duty.

While Canadian editorial cartoons generally lacked of images of Egyptians in 1956, most cartoons about ONUC featured cultural tropes about the Congolese people. These images dehumanized the Congolese, and constructed them as exaggeratedly simian-like. The cartoonists who employed this trope drew upon images that had populated numerous comic strips before the Second World War.[538] Such representations encouraged Canadians to differentiate themselves from the Congolese, which helped to further segregate Canada's peacekeepers from the host nation.

A topless Black, male figure was the most common representation of the Congo. Figures like this were normally shown in tattered clothes or grass skirts. Equally prevalent were depictions of physical defects or portrayals of the Congo as a child. Cartoons often conflated the health of the depicted Black man with the Congo as a nation.[539] A *Leader-Post* cartoon from 16 July showed a seemingly ill figure, with the words "Congolese Independence" written on his tattered pants, lying before a witchdoctor who was anchored "political unpreparedness."[540] Cartoons used images that denoted backwardness in the Congo – including

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[538] Bruce Lenthall, "Outside the Panel: Race in America's Popular Imagination: Comic Strips before and after World War II," *Journal of American Studies* 32, no. 1 (1998): 43.
[539] Other health defects included being blinded after coming out of life in the jungle, in John Collins, "The path out of the jungle," *Montreal Gazette* 2 August 1960, 6.
[540] "The witchdoctor," *Regina Leader- Post*, 16 July 1960, 15.

mystical forms of medicine– to make arguments that the Congolese were not ready for independence. In this case and many others, the physical health of the Congolese, as individuals and as a nation, was questioned.

Popular songs about the Congo also influenced the content of editorial cartoons. "Civilization" was a song written in 1947 for the play *Angel in the Wings*.[541] It was recorded by Danny Kaye and the Andrews Sisters and was periodically re-recorded in the years between then and 1960. The song was written from the point of view of a Congolese "savage" whose village had been visited by missionaries extolling the virtues of Western society. The "savage" was not interested, and intended to stay in "the jungle" rather than face the complications of modern life. The *Chronicle- Herald* printed a cartoon by Chambers that featured the chorus to "Civilization:" "Bongo, Bongo, Bongo, I Don't Want to Leave the Congo."[542] It contained the omnipresent Black male figure bare-chested and beating the drums and singing the refrain. A cartoon appearing in the *Globe and Mail* on 2 August 1960, reprinted from the Indianapolis *Star*, quoted the same song lyric while showing a Belgian officer playing the bongos and letting out his sorrows.[543] In the background, two Black male figures also half-naked appear through the grass. Their features were exaggerated -- their ears, noses and mouths were more simian than human. These cartoons invoked a popular song about the Congo to make a comment on the political situation there. In doing so, they over-simplified what was taking

[541] "Civilization" was written by Bob Hilliard and Carl Sigman.
[542] Robert Chambers, "Popular Song Revival," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Wednesday 20 July 1960, 6.
[543] "Bingo, Bango, Bongo, I Don't Wanna Leave the Congo!," *Globe and Mail*, Tuesday 2 August 1960, 6.

place in the Congo, and made its people into those of the song: "savages" who were not willing to change to a modern life.

Figure 5.10 *Globe and Mail* 2 August 1960

In cartoons the Congo's political leaders were also portrayed as different through animal analogies. These depictions oscillated between those which presented Lumumba as a danger to world peace and those which saw him as inferior to other world figures. A cartoon in *Le Devoir* on 13 September made Lumumba a spider that had caught UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold in its

web.[544] By September of 1960, Lumumba was being portrayed in the Western press as a Communist sympathizer, if not a Communist himself.[545] Drawing him as a spider coded him as a dangerous figure. The implication of such a cartoon was that Canada and the UN needed to beware of the dangers of the Congo. Yet, just a few days earlier, Lumumba was portrayed as an infant in *Le Devoir*. This cartoon used animal imagery and depicted Hammarskjold and Lumumba as a kangaroo mother and her joey, implying that Lumumba relied upon Hammarskjold to survive. Cartoons in both English and French Canada made Hammarskjold and the UN into mother figures who had to deal with infantilized Congolese.[546] Making Lumumba an infant denoted the age of the Congo as a country, despite his being middle-aged at the time, and was also a visual marker of the Congolese being unfit to govern themselves.

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[544] "Lumumba vs. Hammarskjold," *Le Devoir*, 13 September 1960, 6.
[545] See Spooner, *Canada, The Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, Chapter Four.
[546] Some examples include "Canadian Soldiers in the Congo," *Montreal Gazette*, Saturday 20 August 1960; "La Congorou," *Le Devoir*, Wednesday 7 September 1960; "Permanent UN force Needed," *Toronto Daily Star*, Tuesday 19 July 1960; "Problem Child," *Ottawa Citizen*, Friday 22 July 1960.

Figure 5.11 *Le Devoir* 7 September 1960

The perceived Soviet threat in the Congo also encouraged cartoonists to depict Khrushchev regularly. Through depictions of Khrushchev either "going native" or as an explorer, cartoons conveyed anxiety about the Congo's turning Communist. Several cartoons showed "Mr. K" dressed in a manner similar to the Congolese: in a grass skirt, shirtless, with a bone or skull accessory.[547] To the viewer, it would have been obvious that Khrushchev was not Congolese as his skin was not Black,

[547] "Me Friendly Savage," *Regina Leader- Post*, 3 August 1960; "The Specialist," *Globe and Mail*, 19 July 1960.

and he had an identifiable hammer and sickle on him. However, the Congolese were in one instance shown confused at this outsider, suggesting that it was possible Khrushchev would be able to fool the Congolese into thinking he was helping them. As an explorer, Khrushchev donned a pith helmet, always carried trade goods in the form of beads for the Congolese, and was sometimes armed with an elephant gun.[548] These depictions made Khrushchev a figure of danger by showing his infiltrating the Congo, just as Communism was said to be doing. The Soviet offers of trade and aid were depicted as enticements that had strings attached, or as nothing more than pretty beads, but the Congolese had to be told about such dangers before it was too late.

Figure 5.12 Regina *Leader - Post* 3 August 1960

[548] John Collins, "The Big Game Hunters," *Monreal Gazette*, 16 July 1960; John Collins, ""Dr. Livingstone, I presume"," *Montreal Gazette*, 22 July 1960.

English Canadian cartoonists mobilized long-standing Western cultural images of Central Africa to make statements about the political events of the summer of 1960. Viewers saw cartoons which envisioned the Congo as a land of grass skirts, cannibalism, dangerous animals, and people who were not ready for self- government. By having such tropes on hand, cartoonists did not need to give Canada a central role in their images, as was the case during the Suez mission. In contrast to such presentations, French Canadian cartoonists supported their papers' editorial positions regarding the need for the *Francophonie* to usher the Congolese into a larger world community. Overwhelmingly though, cartoonists depicted Congolese decolonization as something that could be dangerous, and likely beyond the cognitive abilities of the Congolese. This racial prejudice towards Africans, at a time of consensus about the appropriateness of Canada's peacekeeping efforts, serves as a reminder that Canada's status as a peacekeeping nation did not preclude people's making distinctions between the West and the colonized peoples of the world. Such distinctions would, however, disappear from the Canadian memory of ONUC, as cartoons about this mission were infrequently made after September 1960.

Cyprus, 15 February to 15 May 1964

Four years later, cartoonists rarely used cultural tropes to describe Cyprus when UNFICYP commenced. The leading figures of the crisis, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin and UN Secretary- General U Thant, were instead depicted interacting with the Canadian peacekeepers in these

cartoons. Cartoonists seemed far more accepting of Canada's contingent of regular army units than they had been of the logistics units sent in 1956. Akin to the press coverage at this time, it was not the Canadians who were specifically targeted for criticism but the UN's operational mandate. These sources of contention provided cartoonists with an opportunity to again challenge the Canadian peacekeeping role despite the high level of support found in both government and media sources at this time. While peacekeeping had become an established duty for the Canadian Forces, cartoonists longed for a more assertive peacekeeping role that would permit the Canadians to behave like regular soldiers.

Though the Canadian peacekeepers were the most common figures depicted in cartoons about Cyprus, several major political figures were also caricatured. Archbishop Makarios, the leader of Cyprus' government, was occasionally depicted, though ordinary Cypriots were not commonly included in cartoons. Paul Martin, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, appeared more often than any other politician. Martin was often shown in a military uniform, a visual marker of his status as the leader of External Affairs.[549] His head was exaggerated in many drawings, taking up most of his body size. Unlike the "Little Mike" caricatures, these depictions of Martin were not cute. They showed him with lines on his forehead, a curled upper lip, and a receding hairline. As an identifiable politician, Martin was a ready stand-in for the Canadian government. And while

[549] Two examples include "Let them first send us an engraved invitation," *Ottawa Citizen*, Wednesday 11 March 1964; "What do you think? Should we help him?," *Ottawa Citizen*, Friday 6 March 1964.

most of the cartoons featuring Martin seemed to agree with his desire to create a peacekeeping force to enter Cyprus, these physical depictions of him suggest less confidence in his abilities than those of Pearson a decade earlier.

As Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant also frequently appeared in Canadian cartoons. Thant's short stature was often exaggerated, perhaps because he was Burmese, and not a Scandinavian, as his predecessor Dag Hammarskjold had been. Hammarskjold was sometimes portrayed as a motherly character, but always a man of equal size, if not larger than, the leaders with whom he dealt. Relying on a pre-existing trope, cartoonists found it easy to make an Asian man small.[550] His role as Secretary-General did not afford him any increase in height, and he was almost always shown as a small person, connoting his lack of power. Often shown begging for new troops or some form of guidance from Martin or the peacekeepers themselves, the Secretary- General was not kindly portrayed by cartoonists.

The Canadian peacekeeper/policeman analogy would be employed for the last time during UNFICYP. A cartoon by Chambers, who had been depicting Canadian peacekeepers as policemen since 1956 in the *Chronicle-Herald*, showed an overworked policeman being told his beat was being increased.[551] While the policeman of 1956 appeared in many papers as a strong, young white man, in 1964 Canada was balding, wrinkled, and tired. One of his feet was labelled

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[550] Some examples of Thant in cartoons include "Better give another blast on that jolly old bugle," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Tuesday 24 March 1964; "High finance," *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 March 1964 1964; "What do you think? Should we help him?," *Ottawa Citizen*.

[551] This cartoon was depicted elsewhere as well. See "The role of peacekeeper," *Ottawa Citizen*, Saturday 14 March 1964, 6.

"Congo," the other "Gaza," and both were called "aching dogs." U Thant delivered the bad news to the Canadian peacekeeper/policeman as a police chief without remorse. Rather than suggest Canadians were eager for another UN mission, Chambers depicted Cyprus duty as more of a necessity. This contradicted the editorial stance of most newspapers of the time, as well as the political opinions of all the major political parties in Canada, implying that cracks in the facade of a peacekeeping consensus could easily appear.

As the policeman metaphor fell out of favour, cartoonists preferred to show the Canadian peacekeepers struggling in the midst of operational restrictions. Several cartoons showed bombed-out buildings, bullets flying through the air, and UN peacekeepers ducking to protect themselves.[552] The potential dangers the Canadians faced in Cyprus were a source of contention in Diefenbaker's speeches about "passive policemen" and in newspaper editorials that discussed "cardboard soldiers." These phrases provided cartoonists with ample material. A cartoon in the *Globe and Mail*, reprinted from the Montreal *Star*, showed a peacekeeper being carted to a medical tent by two other soldiers.[553] The cause of the peacekeepers' injuries was "turning the other cheek," - a commentary on the inability of UNFICYP to disarm either the Greeks or the Turks. Another cartoon from the *Chronicle-Herald* showed a peacekeeper being struck in the head by a

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[552] "Dear Mom: Don't worry, this place is run by a kindly old clergyman," *Globe and Mail*, Tuesday 7 April 1964; "War and Peace," *Calgary Herald*, 4 April 1964; Parker Kent, "A UN Force," *Calgary Herald*, 4 May 1964.

[553] "'Another one.. Same thing... Turned the other cheek.'," *Globe and Mail*, Saturday 2 May 1964, 6.

rock.[554] Although he held a gun in his right hand, UN restrictions dictated that he "use his head" instead of firing back against his attacker. Both of these cartoons took maxims that could be applied to UN peacekeeping and made them into terms of derision. Turning the other cheek and using one's head were lampooned as bad advice for a military unit entering an active situation regardless of its peacekeeping mandate and UN backing.

Some cartoonists felt that the UN mandate of not shooting unless fired upon would lead to the peacekeepers' being humiliated. A cartoon captioned "UN police force salute" in the *Citizen* mocked the tactics of the UN force in Cyprus by depicting a group of UN soldiers standing in a line with their arms raised in surrender. Their shortcomings were made evident in this cartoon, as the cartoonist criticized the peacekeeping force's being more reactive than proactive. The peacekeepers were also drawn smiling at the captors, who were not visible in the panel. The police, or regular soldiers, would not surrender in such a fashion, but these forces gladly placed themselves at the mercy of another. Cartoons such as this questioned the larger peacekeeping role that the Canadian Forces were being asked to perform, and satirized any operation that prevented the Canadians from acting like proper soldiers.

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[554] "The Letter of The Law," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald*, Saturday 25 April 1964, 6.



Figure 5.13 Ottawa *Citizen* 10 April 1964

Canada's domestic politics provided cartoonists with additional content for their depictions of UNFICYP. The French Van Doo's made up the majority of the force sent to the Mediterranean, and so the use of the French language in Canada became an important subject. A cartoon by Norris that appeared in the *Sun* and the *Free Press* depicted several soldiers boarding an RCAF plane loaded down with gear.[555] Unlike the soldiers who were portrayed bringing household items to the Middle East in 1956, these soldiers wore full backpacks and unadulterated military uniforms. The soldiers were French Canadian, and were shown speaking

[555]Len Norris, "One goo ting I hear about dis Cyprus- she's bicultural.," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Monday 23 March 1964, 21.

about one of the advantages of Cyprus: "she's bicultural." This cartoon referenced the feeling among many Quebeckers that there was not real biculturalism in Canada. In the English Canadian press at the time, peacekeeping was normally lauded as an activity that promoted the bicultural nature of Canadian society. Pointing out the flaws within Canada was yet another way for cartoonists to challenge the perceived value of UN service.

While some cartoons sympathized with Québécois grievances, another cartoon that appeared in the *Sun* found Canada's willingness to send troops overseas foolish because of tensions in Quebec. In it, a square-jawed white man in a UN uniform with a gun at his side and a bag of belongings over his shoulder walked past three figures, one of whom was a witch, the other a monkey who smoked cigarettes, and the third a fuzzy and unkempt man.[556] These three figures were darker than the UN soldier, and were shown hunched over a device that was labelled "FLQ." The caption for the cartoon was "Off to solve Cyprus's bicultural dispute, mon brave? Au 'voir!" Such an image implied that dangers inside Canada needed the attention of the military before troops were sent to help Cyprus. By making such a statement, this cartoon gave readers an alternative view of the Canadian actions overseas which was far more critical. Unlike in 1960, when language issues were already prevalent in Quebec cartoons, by 1964 English Canadians were acknowledging that a considerable amount of unrest was

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[556] "Off to solve Cyprus's bicultural dispute, mon brave? Au 'voir!," *Vancouver Sun*, Monday 16 March 1964, 4.

brewing in Quebec. Cartoonists wondered who would keep the peace at home if Canada's attention were perpetually turned elsewhere.

Figure 5.14 Vancouver *Sun* 16 March 1964

Cartoon renderings of the Cyprus mission once again made Canada's role in the crisis their central concern. By focusing on the Canadians, cartoonists also encouraged their audiences to think about themselves and not the troubles of the host nation. Most cartoons dealt with the shortcomings of the force, and raised domestic issues that seemed more pressing than helping in Cyprus. These unflattering depictions were consistent with the criticisms being made by some politicians and newspaper editorials at this time. As the situation in Cyprus returned to a relative calm, cartoonists redeployed their concerns about Canada's

national identity on more prescient topics. This left their criticisms of Canada's peacekeeping role to languish in the past.

UNEF, 15 May to 15 June 1967

When UNEF, operating in Egypt for over a decade, was brought to a premature end in 1967, peacekeeping as an institution appeared in various manifestations, as cartoonists echoed editorial declarations about its death and the end of Canada's premier international role along with it. Cartoonists found the UN lacking as an organization because of its refusal to stand up to Nasser's demand that UNEF be withdrawn from Egypt. One cartoon portrayed the UN as an older man with a suitcase, surrounded by notes telling him he was not welcome.[557] This enfeebled the UN by ageing it well beyond its twenty-two years. Another image showed the UN building, anchored "UN peacekeeping," being broken apart by a massive crack, connoting that if the UN lost its peacekeeping role, its status as an organization would be jeopardized.[558] During this time of crisis, cartoonists wondered if the UN would be able to survive this test, or end up going the way of the League of Nations.

Nasser's forced eviction of the UN units led to depictions of him as a strong bully and a repentant weakling. Several cartoons caricatured his face on the Sphinx to mark him as Egyptian.[559] As in 1956, Nasser stood as the personification of all Egyptians. His Sphinx persona was aggressive; it either

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[557] "No place to go," *Regina Leader Post*, Wednesday 7 June 1967, 19.
[558] "The cracks are showing," *Regina Leader-Post*, 8 June 1967, 21.
[559] "Do you sometimes get the feeling you're not wanted?," *Winnipeg Free Press*, Tuesday 23 May 1967; Duncan MacPherson, "Nasser Sphinx," *La Presse*, Saturday 27 May 1967.

stalked UN troops, or pinned a tiny U Thant under one of his legs. This latter image was done by Duncan MacPherson, who had been working at the Toronto *Star* since 1958, and was regarded by many as the best cartoonist in the country. Some cartoonists were not eager to give Nasser this strong image, and revived his earlier "bully" persona used during the Suez Crisis. In these images, Nasser, dominated by his nose, was seen to be two-faced, capable of calling for UN help in one instance and forcing their departure in another.[560] When his war against Israel had gone awry, images of Nasser made him seem foolish for removing UNEF and repentant as he asked for its return.[561] As a prominent world leader for many years, Nasser was a popular character in cartoons about the eviction of UNEF. His portrayals in the media made him into the villain of the narrative, and cartoons eagerly depicted his getting his comeuppance.

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[560] John Collins, "What a change a few years makes " *Montreal Gazette*, 29 May 1967, 6.
[561] "Saturday 10 June 1967," *Regina Leader- Post*, Saturday 10 June 1967, 19.



Figure 5.15 Toronto *Star* 25 May 1967

Lester Pearson's attachment to UNEF and his being Canada's Prime Minister encouraged cartoonists to depict him during the crisis. Their renderings, however, were far less flattering than they had been a decade prior. Macpherson, in the *Star*, made Pearson into a modern-day Lawrence of Arabia for one cartoon.[562] Dressed in Bedouin robes and riding atop a camel, Pearson was shown galloping off towards Aqaba, a city in Egypt that Lawrence famously captured by land when many said it could not be done. This image drew upon the then-popular film *Lawrence of Arabia* which had been released in 1962, to

[562] Duncan MacPherson, "Cartoon," *Toronto Star*, 31 May 1967, 6.

satirize the efforts of the Prime Minister to bring peace to the Middle East. Both Lawrence and Pearson were men who claimed they could bring peace to a region that was considered too dangerous, and this cartoon captured the gallant, but somewhat futile, efforts of the Prime Minister to keep the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East.

Figure 5.16Toronto *Star* 31 May 1967

Pearson was also depicted as being out of touch with political realities in cartoons from this period. One image showed him swimming in a river with Paul Martin and Secretary of Defence Paul Hellyer while Nasser ran off with their

clothes, which had been anchored "Our peace keeping role."[563] Another French Canadian cartoonist made Pearson into a weak, elderly man who was not in touch with the needs of Quebec.[564] In all these images, Pearson was drawn as an old man, not the youthful Minister he had been in 1956. Pearson tried to keep Canada engaged in the world, but cartoonists questioned the futility of his efforts, and suggested that someone more in touch with Canadian public opinion would have behaved differently.

Canada's peacekeepers were not depicted nearly as often as Pearson, but they too were subject to satirizing. English cartoonists did not draw the Canadians returning home, presumably because they did not want to add further insult to what was taken to be an injury to Canadian pride. However, a cartoon in *La Presse*, by Berthio [Roland Berthiaume], showed a line of Canadian soldiers departing from a plane anchored "Force ONU."[565] These forces were met by their superiors, with the leading soldier stating as the caption: « L'opération 'départ d'urgence' accomplie, Mon commandant... » The Canadian plane had the words "Vive Nasser" painted on its side, yet another reference to the Canadian acquiescence in Egypt. The soldiers departing from the plane were drawn identically, a technique Berthio used often when drawing either soldiers or police officers.[566] In their haste, the soldiers managed to lose their uniforms and appear naked except for the helmets on their heads. This cartoon once again chastised

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[563] John Collins, "Stealing Their Clothes," *Montreal Gazette*, 31 May 1967, 6.
[564] "Croyez-moi, pour maintenir la paix, je suis un expert..", *La Presse*, Tuesday 30 May 1967; Berthio, *Les cents dessins du Centenaire* (Montreal: Partis Pris, 1967).
[565] Berthio, ""L'opération d'urgence accomplie, mon commandant.."," *La Presse*, Thursday 1 June 1967, 2."
[566] See Berthio, *Les cents dessins du Centenaire*.

Canada's peacekeepers for being different from its regular forces, since the peacekeepers had left Egypt without firing a shot, and had been stripped of their uniforms and, metaphorically, of their identities as soldiers, as a result. Berthio was a Quebec nationalist who was never shy about criticizing the Canadian federal government. His depiction of Canada's peacekeepers should therefore be read as a statement about the impotence of the Canadian government as well.

Figure 5.17 *La Presse* 1 June 1967

The end of UNEF caused many Canadians to reconsider the continued relevance of their country's peacekeeping role. Cartoonists did not offer messages of hope about peacekeeping's future, but rather found issue with the major political figures of the time and the overly-regulated UN conduct of UNEF. While Pearson tried to remedy this situation by using his diplomatic acumen, cartoonists preferred to portray him as old and out of touch with reality. Canada's peacekeepers were also lampooned for obeying the commands of this weak UN, and their role was framed as an unwelcome deviation from traditional soldiering. These criticisms were variations on those employed during the Suez crisis and the first months of UNFICYP. Yet, they had added relevance given the pervasiveness of criticism about Canada's peacekeeping present and future at this time in both the political rhetoric of people like Pierre Trudeau and frequently-appearing editorials announcing the death of UN peacekeeping. Negative cartoons about Canada's peacekeepers were, therefore, yet another blow to its status as a nation of "Blue Berets." But as with earlier times of criticism, the negative depictions offered by cartoonists about the end of UNEF faded as attention turned to Expo '67 and other large news stories. This permitted these criticisms to be forgotten in the coming decades.

Somalia, 1 March to 1 June 1993

As with older missions, cartoonists' renderings of UNOSOM complicated Canada's peacekeeping efforts while keeping the focus squarely on Canada. Somalia was not the primary focus for cartoonists' attentions; the lack of a clearly

identifiable political leader also discouraged cartoonists from depicting Somalis. Many images depicted peacekeeping as a messier activity than many Canadians imagined. After members of the Airborne Regiment killed several Somalis, the Canadian peacekeepers were presented as soldiers who were "un-Canadian." These peacekeepers were not policemen, nor were they effeminate or bookish. They were, instead, white supremacists who were ruining Canada's international reputation through their actions. Canada's political leaders, particularly Minister of Defence Kim Campbell, were also harshly criticized in cartoons for sending the Airborne overseas and allowing white supremacists to be a part of the Forces. Cartoonists questioned whether it was wise for Canada to be engaged in peacekeeping at all, and the image of Canada as a peacekeeping nation was once again challenged.

While newspapers actively encouraged the Mulroney government to volunteer Canadians for peacekeeping duty around the globe, cartoons across the country did not visually endorse these sentiments. Images appeared in December of 1992 that mocked the media attention that had surrounded the landing of US marines on the beaches of Somalia. Three months later, local issues were far more likely to be depicted, whether they involved the Toronto Maple Leafs' and the Montreal Canadiens' being in the National Hockey League playoffs or the West Coast salmon stock being depleted. As always, individual cartoonists and their editors judged what issues would resonate with their readers. These preferences were the subject of a cartoon by Serge Chapleau in *Le Devoir*. Two men were shown at a

Montreal Expos game. The first expressed concern about South Africa, Yugoslavia, and Somalia, while the second was more concerned about the health of Expos second baseman Delino DeShields.[567] Chapleau's image was a commentary on the lack of interest shown by people in international crises. At the time though, Somalia was seen as a qualified success, and so positive cartoons about peacekeeping would not have had much resonance, particularly when other issues were taking up considerable space in newspapers, and stories about UNOSOM were being pushed from the front page.

Figure 5.18 *Le Devoir,* 14 April 1993

[567] Serge Chapleau, "As-tu lu le journal à matin!?," *Le Devoir*, Wednesday 14 April 1993, A8.

Newspapers were confused by the lack of state structure when reporting on Somalia.[568] Unlike in Egypt, the Congo, and Cyprus, this meant that no single figure was able to stand as representative of Somalia as a whole. Cartoonists also did not choose to rely on the cultural tropes that had been so prevalent during the peacekeeping mission to the Congo in 1960. Upon being introduced into the country, members of UNOSOM were sometimes depicted next to starving or confused Somalis, who were normally shirtless male figures. These images were, however, far less prevalent than depictions of the Canadians or other members of UNOSOM. And by April of 1993, the Somalis were not given an active role in cartoons. In fact, the dead body of a Somali draped across Kim Campbell's back was one of the rare instances when a Somali figure, dead or alive, was depicted.[569] The absence of the Somalis was a different form of prejudice, and suggests that Canadian cartoonists remained tied to presenting images that were supposed to have a direct relationship to their readers, rather than showing alternative views of those stories.

Cartoonists chose instead to depict the challenges that would await peacekeepers upon their arrival in trouble spots.[570] One image from the *Star* showed a chaotic world that peacekeepers had to step into every day.[571] Relying on cultural tropes about gender and work, this cartoon showed a male

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[568]Several examples of this appear in Chapter Four. The implications of the Western media focusing on the clan structure in Somalia is also discussed in Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*.
[569] "Gee Kim," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald* 24 April 1993.
[570] "United Nations Peacekeepers- 1993," *Regina Leader- Post*, 4 April 1993, A6.
[571] "Have a nice day," *Globe and Mail*, 28 January 1993 1993, A22.

peacekeeper being sent off to work by his wife, who stood on their front porch holding a mug of coffee. The peacekeeper held a briefcase in his right arm, not any sort of weapon, and his wife said: "...have a nice day." Facing the peacekeeper was a wide arc of wreckage, with several signs strewn throughout, indicating where peacekeeping missions were taking place: Cambodia, Angola, the Balkans, and Somalia. Such images depicted peacekeeping as a difficult and perhaps impossible task, a very different message from what Mulroney's government was suggesting in its political rhetoric. They also emphasized the differences between countries that participated in peacekeeping operations, Canada foremost amongst them, and the host nations.

When the news of the killings of several Somalis by the Airborne broke in Canada in April 1993, cartoonists responded by attacking the Canadian Forces. Several images showed the Canadian peacekeepers sick and in need of medical assistance.[572] These Canadians were large men, physically bulky and very different from the bespectacled and rotund signallers that were caricatured on UNEF. Peacekeeping was not portrayed as an effeminate role for the Canadian Forces. Instead, it was seen as a job for men who were intimidating because of their size. That they were being attacked by the "virus" of public opinion, which they could not fight on their own, made them into even less-flattering figures. While the press was being lambasted by letters to the editor from families of those in the Canadian Forces who believed that undue attacks were being made

[572] "'Medic'," *Globe and Mail*, Friday 21 May 1993, A26.

against their loved ones, cartoonists made visual statements about the duplicity of the Canadian peacekeepers. The military might attempt to bury the details, politicians could spin the events to their favour, but cartoonists believed the killings by the Airborne demanded action.

What particularly drew the ire of cartoonists were the revelations about white supremacists serving in the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia.[573] The apologetic tone present in many editorials across English Canada was not echoed amongst cartoonists. A cartoon appearing in the Winnipeg *Free Press* on 13 May depicted several rows of mounds which all looked identical, but for a single figure which stood out. It wore the headdress of the Ku Klux Klan, and had an armed forces helmet with a Canadian flag on its side.[574] This cartoon took a news story and created an image that could speak as loudly as any article by clearly attacking the Canadian Forces for their permissive attitude to the white supremacist views of some of their members.

Instead of depicting the peacekeepers as Klansmen, another cartoon, which appeared in the Ottawa *Citizen* on 13 May, showed four members of the Airborne goose-stepping past a raised platform on which several higher-ranking members of the military gave a Nazi salute.[575] The artist, Alan King, implied that the military establishment should be held responsible for the presence of neo-Nazis within the Canadian military, and that the soldiers who held those views were not solely to blame. Some of the paper's audience took issue with King's

[573] See Chapter Four, "Peace is not front page news," for more details about these news stories.
[574] "One in every barrel," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 13 May 1993, A6.
[575] Allan King, "Airborne " *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 May 1993, A14.

characterization. A letter from the wife of a member of the Airborne described this cartoon as "disgusting." She wrote that the only thing giving her hope was the sentiments from friends across the country that also found this cartoon outrageous.[576] Other letters from current and retired members of the military used words like "hate literature," "repugnant," "irresponsible" and "unjust" to describe the cartoon.[577] To counter such views, the *Citizen* included a column from one of its writers which defended the image. It stated, "King's cartoon did a little ridiculing to point out a truth. The truth seems to hurt."[578] The paper did not seem to object to the negative reaction this cartoon received, and used it as an example of when freedom of the press should be celebrated.

Figure 5.19 Ottawa *Citizen* 13 May 1993

[576] Young, "Insults hit morale of a proud regiment," *The Ottawa Citizen*, A11.
[577] "Cartoon on the military comes under intense attack," *Ottawa Citizen*, Friday 14 May 1993.
[578] Chris Cobb, "Military strike: Cartoon won't ruin Forces' excellent image," *Ottawa Citizen*, Saturday 15 May 1993.

While the Canadian Forces were targeted more often, cartoonists also attacked the Minister of Defence, Kim Campbell, for her role in covering up what had taken place.[579] As detailed in earlier chapters, Campbell was a target for Liberals in the House of Commons and in many Liberal-supporting newspapers. The *Chronicle-Herald* published a cartoon about Campbell on 24 April that questioned her political future in the wake of the Somalia killings.[580] Campbell was shown standing next to a bald man with a moustache and glasses who comments, "...gee Kim, is it me, or have you put on some weight?" A dead body, anchored "Somali killings," draped across her shoulders visually placed the blame for the killings on Campbell. By making the comment into a joke about her weight, something which women were supposed to care about more than men, this cartoon also satirized the fact that she was a female politician in a traditionally male-dominated profession. While espousing a clear moral line on behalf of all Canadians against the killings in Somalia, this image was a further instance in which change, in this case having a female Prime Minister, was also being criticized.

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[579] "Getting to know Kim," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 May 1993, B2; Serge Chapleau, "La nouvelle stratégie de Kim Campbell," *Le Devoir*, Friday 26 May 1993.
[580] "Gee Kim," *Halifax Chronicle- Herald* C1.

Figure 5.20 Halifax *Chronicle – Herald* 24 April 1993

Canadian cartoonists made some of their harshest attacks against Canada's peacekeepers during UNOSOM. As with other host nations in the past, the Somalis' struggle was ignored in favour of commentaries on Canada and its peacekeepers. Cartoon images of the Airborne chastised them for behaving in a manner unbecoming a peacekeeping nation. When it was revealed that several members were in white supremacist groups, the unit as a whole was attacked for permitting behaviour that seemed unCanadian. As the stories about the behaviour of the Airborne became more complicated, figures up the chain of command all the way to the Minister of Defence became targets for cartoonists.

Some readers took issue with their family members' being portrayed as Klansmen or neo-Nazis. But newspapers supported the freedom of their cartoonists to comment upon the events in Somalia in whatever ways they saw fit. Similar to those of 1967, these images seemed to resonate more because they were in agreement with other critical opinions that were appearing in newspapers and the political rhetoric of the time. These voices continued to dispute Canada's suitability for the role of the world's leading peacekeeper, which had been so prevalent one year prior.

The Somalia Inquiry, 1 June to 15 July 1997

Unlike previous instances described in this chapter, cartoonists' criticisms of peacekeeping in the 1990s were more sustained because of the Inquiry into the conduct of the Airborne, the Canadian Forces leadership, and top government officials regarding Somalia. When the Inquiry's report was released in July 1997, Jean Chretien, Art Eggleton, and the head Judge of the Inquiry, Gilles Letourneau, were depicted more than any other figures. The female figure of Justice was also included in these images to remind viewers that Canada was a law-abiding country whose leaders were failing its people. Visual depictions of peacekeepers appeared less frequently, but their presence in these cartoons remained unsympathetic. In all these cases, cartoonists tried to make sense of the damning report about the conduct of the Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia, the subsequent withholding of evidence by the military, and what this meant for Canada's future peacekeeping efforts. They continued to employ imagery that had

been associated with the Airborne since 1993. But when newspapers shifted their attention elsewhere soon after the report was released, cartoonists moved on as well.

Many cartoonists followed the testimonies given at the Somalia Inquiry with considerable interest in 1995 and 1996. General Jean Boyle, as the Chief of Defence Staff starting in December 1995, was a particularly popular figure to depict during these years.[581] Boyle appeared for nine days at the Inquiry, and adamantly defended his actions after news of the Somalia killings became known. Many images had Boyle deflecting attention elsewhere. His excuses were not accepted, and cartoonists wondered how the Canadian Forces would be able to purge those responsible for the tragedy in Somalia.

The week immediately following the release of the Inquiry's report saw numerous cartoonists across the country weigh in on the Somalia Affair. The most common figures to appear in these images were Jean Chrétien and Art Eggleton. As Prime Minister, Chrétien was singled out for his role in calling what many felt was a premature end to the Inquiry. Eggleton, then-Minister of Defence, was considered equally culpable in preventing the Inquiry report from having its maximum impact.[582] Cartoons, similar to the newspapers from this time period, found these individuals, rather than Canadian society as whole, easy targets for criticism. Visually, Chrétien was a leader with distinctive features that

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[581] See, for example, Michel Garneau, "General Boyle, comment allez-vous convaincre le tiers de vos généraux de se retirer?," *Le Devoir*, 16 July 1996; John Larter, "Somalia Inquiry," *Calgary Sun*, Wednesday 14 August 1996.
[582] Garnotte, "Affaire Somalienne," *Le Devoir*, Friday 4 July 1997.

cartoonists exaggerated, including large ears, a wrinkled face and throat, and a mouth twisted to one side of his face, as a result of the Prime Minister's facial muscle restriction from a childhood bout of Bell's palsy. The cartoons that appeared in 1997 normally gave Chrétien an overly large head and a disproportionately small body. These body proportions often made him smaller than the other figures in these cartoons, which intimated that he was a figure to be derided for his handling of the Inquiry.

While all the cartoons examined during this period believed the government mishandled the Somalia Inquiry, some played with the idea that there was a larger cover-up taking place.[583] Chrétien often appeared in cartoons alongside the figure of Justice, as her foible.[584] Blindfolded and with scales in one hand, Justice was normally larger in stature than Chrétien. A cartoon from the *Leader- Post* on 3 July showed Chrétien, who was half the size of the other characters, whistling while walking past both Justice and a Canadian soldier. [585] Chrétien pinned a medal on the chest of the member of the Armed Forces labelled "Somalia." Justice, on the other hand, had the medal pinned to her mouth, implying that the government's premature ending of the Somalia Inquiry was unjust. In order for Canada to move on as country from the Somalia Affair, cartoonists argued that the government needed to provide people with all of the facts. This echoed the statements by the Inquiry heads which derided the Canadian Forces' destroying

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[583] Terry Mosher, "Duh.. No cover up," *Montreal Gazette*, Saturday 5 July 1997.
[584] "Emergency ward," *Globe and Mail*, 19 June 1997, A18.
[585] "Cartoon," *Regina Leader- Post*, 3 July 1997, A8.

documents and intentionally obstructing their work, and attacked the government for prematurely ending the Inquiry.

While Chrétien and Eggleton remained cartoonists' primary targets, they also employed well-known interpretations of the Canadian Forces and their leadership. Depictions of Canadian peacekeepers remained unsympathetic, as they had been in 1993. These large men were normally drawn stern-faced. They often had moustaches, thick necks, and visually evident muscles.[586] The peacekeepers were also not anchored "Canada," and no cartoonists tried to metonymically link Canada and its peacekeepers in these cartoons.

Like their depictions of the ordinary Canadian soldiers, cartoon renderings of Canada's military leadership were far from sympathetic. Cartoonists did not anchor these men by name, nor did they give them features that resembled those of the actual Canadian military leadership. Instead, cartoonists relied on a cultural knowledge of what a military leader looked like to inform their images. Military dress uniforms and chests full of medals were two visual markers of leadership that were employed often, as were military berets.[587] In *La Presse*, Serge Chapleau depicted the Canadian Forces' reaction to the Inquiry's report as a different, and more offensive, kind of salute.[588] Six generals, who were all identical to one another, were shown giving this salute, implying that the whole leadership held similar views. A cartoon by Aislin, who had been making highly

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[586] Ibid.
[587] "Cartoon," *Globe and Mail*, Friday 4 July 1997; "Somalia Inquiry report," *Toronto Star*, Friday 4 July 1997.
[588] Serge Chapleau, "Les généraux canadiens saluent le rapport de la commission d'enquête sur la Somalie," *La Presse*, 3 July 1997.

regarded cartoons at the *Gazette* since 1972, showed a medal for the Armed Forces as a metaphor for those responsible for wrongdoing in the Somalia Affair.[589] This medal was called the "Bullshooter," a thinly-veiled alteration of the word bullshit. The heads of the military had been public targets since the start of the Inquiry. Cartoonists showed that they, rather than the rank and file members of the Canadian military who had committed the crimes in Somalia, were the ones responsible for the failures there. The whole-scale changes in the military leadership called for in the Inquiry's report encouraged cartoonists to paint them as identically culpable figures. They showed no sympathy in their depictions, and hoped the report's recommendations would be followed.

Figure 5.21 Montreal *Gazette* 4 July 1997

[589] Terry Mosher, "Bullshooter," *Montreal Gazette*, Friday 4 July 1997.

The restraints of having a single panel in which to express an opinion about the Somalia Inquiry made it more likely that individual figures, as opposed to Canada as a whole, would make their way into a cartoon. As a result, Chretien, Eggleton, and the leadership of the Canadian Forces became specific targets for cartoonists' anger. These images were not sustained, however, and cartoonists quickly returned to other pressing issues such as the financial troubles of the Montreal Expos, the logging of British Columbia forests, and education reforms in Ontario. For a brief period though, the Somalia Inquiry was the leading story in newspapers across Canada, and cartoonists visually summarized the story in creative and powerful ways. Cartoonists did not speculate about Canada's peacekeeping future, and commented only on the problems that were taking place in the summer of 1997. Their attacks agreed with those found in editorials across the country, and challenged the utility of Canada's peacekeeping role. Cartoonists were angered at the seeming lack of accountability on the part of the government and military leadership, and found no reason to believe Canada's peacekeeping status would endure.

Conclusion

Editorial cartoons played a role in creating and disseminating images of peacekeeping in Canada that contained elements of the fantastic but that often resonated with their audiences. These depictions commented on the host nations, on Canada as a peacekeeping nation, and on the peacekeepers as identifiable

figures. Cartoonists quickly noted the differences between Canada and the countries where its peacekeepers were sent. The Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus were all portrayed as being different from Canada. The Congo, in particular, offered cartoonists cultural images to borrow. In English Canada, tropes about the backwardness and inferiority of Africans were employed to make decolonization into a dangerous situation. French cartoonists, conversely, saw links between the Congo and Quebec because of the shared use of the French language and an aversion to imperialism. Cartoons about the mission to Somalia, thirty-three years later, used more-tempered versions of Africans, though live Somali figures rarely appeared. These images of the host nations did not permit Canadians to see them as places populated by individuals; instead, stereotypes were often employed to make visual metaphors about the inferiority of non-Canadians. These views existed in Canada and amongst its peacekeepers, and contributed to the attitudes of many towards the Middle East, Cyprus, and Africa over the forty years covered in this chapter. They also make cartoonists' satires ambiguous, and worthy of criticism as well.

Primarily, though, cartoonists focused on the Canadian peacekeeping connection to these countries. Cartoonists across the country depicted peacekeeping in remarkably similar ways. Different cultural allusions were employed in these depictions, and certainly differences between English and French Canadian cartoons existed. Despite this, a near-consensus seemed to exist amongst cartoonists regarding how to portray Canadians as peacekeepers. The

satirical nature of the editorial cartoon genre led to peacekeepers' being depicted as an ineffective police force, or derided because of their differences from traditional soldiers. These depictions remained in use throughout the first decade of peacekeeping's history, though particular missions often led to particular images being employed in favour of others. By the 1990s, Canada's peacekeepers were no longer imagined as policemen, nor were they shown to be weak or ineffective soldiers. Instead, as the public responded to the stories of the Airborne in Somalia, the peacekeepers became unsympathetic members of the Armed Forces. These soldiers were often shown engaged in unCanadian behaviour, acting in ways that led to Canadians' questioning peacekeeping's utility as a Canadian defence policy.

Editorial cartoons must therefore be seen as sites of criticism about peacekeeping in Canada since 1956. But the nature of this medium limited the potential impact of these satires. Cartoonists were allowed to operate in editorial spaces that could differ from writers. By complicating Canada's international role with the UN, these cartoons often encouraged critical thinking about peacekeeping as a Canadian activity. The ephemeral nature of editorial cartoons, however, limited their potential impact. Images of the peacekeepers as effeminate men and bumbling policemen in 1956 did not dampen the enthusiasm many Canadians felt for this international action. Yet in 1967, 1993, and 1997, when images about peacekeeping reinforced ideas found elsewhere in Canada, their criticisms were particularly incisive, and offered Canadians alternatives to their

identity as a nation of "Blue Berets." Despite these brief periods, cartoonists ultimately could not overcome the nostalgic and progressive discourses which operated elsewhere, and encouraged Canadians to see peacekeeping primarily as a part of Canada's national symbology.

Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to answer an important question: why did so many Canadians embrace peacekeeping as a symbol of their national identity from 1956 to 1997? Each chapter has highlighted varying ways that messages about peacekeeping were produced for, disseminated to, and received by Canadian audiences. They have also noted clear differences in how peacekeeping was portrayed in English and French Canada based upon conflicting understandings of Canada as a national project. At the same time, politicians, authors, and artists across Canada understood peacekeeping to be an activity in which, as Stompin' Tom wrote, "We're always proud to say," Canadians were actively engaged.[590] He and many other people saw peacekeeping as a Canadian activity in which the whole country should take pride. Yet Canada's identity problems in the latter half of the twentieth century were echoed in the discussions of peacekeeping found in each set of sources used in this dissertation. This meant that when people were uncertain about Canada's domestic policies, it was likely that they would also express such concerns when discussing peacekeeping's value as a policy. It was these domestic foci, despite the fact that peacekeeping was a multilateral undertaking done through the UN, that were primarily responsible for so many Canadians' associating their identities with peacekeeping between 1956 and 1997.

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[590] Connors, *The Blue Berets*.

The vast amount of speeches, textbook contents, documentaries, newspaper articles, and editorial cartoons which focused on Canada's role in UN peacekeeping helped to make it a Canadian symbol. In all these various media, host nations receded into the background of every mission, while the Canadian contributions – whether large or small, logistics units or regular soldiers – became more prominent. This pattern was established during UNEF when the Egyptians were rarely discussed, aside from blanket condemnations of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, while the actions of Lester Pearson and Louis St. Laurent were made to stand as indicators of whether Canada was becoming a more independent nation or betraying Great Britain. Canadian independence was far less pressing an issue in 1960 when ONUC was undertaken, but most Canadians heard about the necessity of Canada's remaining a world leader in peacekeeping more than they did about the particularities of the Congo's federal system. Such understandings continued during UNFICYP, when politicians and media sources connected peacekeeping and Canada's bilingual issues more than they addressed the repercussions of Greeks and Turks battling on that island. UNEF's expulsion from Egypt in 1967 was likewise portrayed as a blow to Canada's internationalist foreign policies, rather than as a threat to international peace. At the end of the Cold War, when international peacekeeping went through its renaissance from 1998 to 1993, Canadians were told that on UNOSOM the murders of three Somalis were less important than what this implied about Canada's ability to serve as the world's leading peacekeeper. Few people, particularly in English

Canada, would have been able to find sources which repositioned peacekeeping as a policy that should serve the needs of the host nations and not Canadian interests. And few politicians, authors, or artists encouraged their audiences to seek out such alternative perspectives.

While these discussions of peacekeeping centred themselves on Canada's role in UN operations, this did not ensure its adoption as a national marker. It was, instead, the penchant of politicians, authors, and artists to employ nostalgic and/or progressive language which permitted peacekeeping to constitute more than simply a governmental policy option, and become a part of the nation's symbology. Many people, particularly outside of Quebec, associated Canada's peacekeeping participation with their conceptions of a better world. This could manifest itself as a fixed vision of Canada's past that was bittersweetly recalled to contrast Canadian shortcomings in the present. These recollections began quite soon after the Liberals became the Opposition party in 1958. Lester Pearson, Paul Martin, and newspaper authors who supported the Liberal Party reminisced about the past Liberal record of success in foreign policy and the decline in Canada's stature during the Diefenbaker years. This belief in a "golden age" of Canadian foreign policy would appear in English high school history textbooks as well. Through the 1990s, it provided a nostalgic focal point for those who wished to justify Canada's participation in a peacekeeping operation or to criticize the government for taking a less active role in this UN duty.

Peacekeeping could also constitute a fluid vision of Canada's future potential to be a more peaceful, tolerant, and internationally active nation. In 1956 this meant portraying Canada as an independent actor who was not the "chore boy" of Great Britain or the United States. Through the 1960s, Canada was framed by its supporters as a nation that was well-positioned to assist peaceful African decolonization because of its historic lack of colonies and its ability to balance two language groups in a single state. In the late 1980s, Canada's peacekeeping acumen was set up as a counterpoint to increasing American bellicosity towards the Soviet Union and the rhetoric of then-president Ronald Reagan, which called for the "evil empire" to be defeated by any means. For most of the years covered by this dissertation, therefore, many Canadians looked at peacekeeping as a progressive policy that could, and should, affect positive change through the UN. They ignored the past failures of peacekeeping operations and focused instead on some of the positive gains that were accomplished on missions like UNEF or UNFICYP as being achievable in the future as well. By employing these symbolic discourses, in addition to discussing peacekeeping in functional language, politicians, authors, and artists all managed to temporally extend peacekeeping's reach. This made the outcomes of each operation less significant than the values commensurate with Canada as a peacekeeper.

The existence of these more symbolic associations of peacekeeping blunted the impact of criticisms of its functional value in any medium discussed in this dissertation. Pearson, peacekeeping's leading figure, believed it to be a far-from-

perfect policy,[591] and so a critical discourse about peacekeeping should have developed in turn. While there were numerous occasions when peacekeeping's shortcomings were discussed, flaws were only seen as sufficient to warrant a total rethinking of Canada's peacekeeping role from 1968 to 1970. Even during the Trudeau government's foreign policy review, Canada continued to participate in peacekeeping operations, and volunteered to be a part of every new operation undertaken in the 1970s. Few commentators recognized that Canada's peacekeeping role could have negative effects on a host nation, which partially explains why the events in Somalia came as such a surprise.

The political consensus about peacekeeping was a rare instance of political agreement in an age of considerable enmity. This did not mean peacekeeping's value was not debated regularly, as detailed in Chapter One. In 1956 Canadian participation in UNEF became a means to discuss Canada's independence vis-à-vis Britain and the United States. But neither the Liberals nor the PCs found reason to question Canada's commitment to the UN as an organization. After Pearson won his Nobel Peace Prize in 1957, peacekeeping became firmly entrenched as a Canadian foreign policy for the next forty years. Interestingly, peacekeeping found only intermittent support from the Liberal Party, ranging from perhaps its strongest advocacy while Lester Pearson was Prime Minister, to its lowest point, excluding the present, while Trudeau was in office. The Liberals did, however, encourage Canadians to celebrate Canada's peacekeeping past or

[591] LAC, Lester Pearson Fonds, MG 26 N9, volume 12. "Force For the United Nations," 1957.

opine about the possibilities of its peacekeeping future, which promoted its more symbolic connotations. Yet peacekeeping became a remarkably popular policy with the PC Party as well, and under Brian Mulroney, Canadians were volunteered in ever larger numbers for UN duty. Mulroney and his ministers lauded Pearson at many events, and told audiences that the Liberals' actions were some of the finest ever performed by Canadians in the name of unity and peace. This discursive flexibility was lost when the events of the 1990s forced peacekeeping to be sectioned off as an activity of the past, in contrast to the peace*making* operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. This considerably reduced its value while Jean Chrétien was in office, and encouraged politicians to think of peacekeeping only as an activity to be commemorated.

Textbooks, by contrast, are not sites where critical national narratives emerge, nor do they often challenge young people to question the foundations of their national identity. As seen in Chapter Two, high school history textbooks promoted positive national narratives, which downplayed any domestic divides in favour of discussions of peacekeeping which centred upon its being indicative of Canadian independence. They routinized discussions of peacekeeping for young Canadians, and made them familiar with Canada's "golden age" of foreign policy and Lester Pearson's importance in the creation of peacekeeping, as well as celebrating Canada's sustained efforts to help the UN promote the cessation of conflicts around the globe. Later, peacekeeping found an even larger role in these texts because of the desire of educators in English Canada to have young people

emulate the peacekeeping process in their everyday lives. By contrast, French Canadian educators used textbooks that became more focused on Quebec and had minimal discussions of Canadian foreign policies. These educators could still promote the issue of peace by using resources provided by the Pacijou group, which was more interested in systemic change than in celebrating and promoting Canada's irenic role in peacekeeping.

NFB documentaries chose to stay out of any politically-charged debates, and focused instead on Canada's peacekeepers. Chapter Three demonstrated how early films about these men framed them as a synecdoche for Canada as a whole. Because of some governmental control, as well as an institutional culture which sought to promote a common Canadian citizenship, filmmakers consciously omitted discussions of politicians or any domestic divides back in Canada from their films. After 1980, however, the peacekeepers came to be portrayed as exceptional men who were working on behalf of a Canadian government and public that was often ignorant and dismissive of their accomplishments. These films encouraged viewers to valorize the work being done by the peacekeepers and to chastise the military leadership or those politicians who would unnecessarily restrict the ability of the peacekeepers to perform their duties. Such views could be political in nature, and are indicative of the heated debates about Canada's proper role in peacekeeping in the middle years of the 1990s.

By contrast, at the beginning of most missions and when events went astray for the Canadian Forces overseas, newspaper outlets were willing to offer

prescient and immediate analyses that were far from glowing. Yet in every case identified in Chapter Four, voices which challenged the value of peacekeeping at the time were forgotten in favour of simplified recollections of Canada's peacekeeping past and optimistic wonderings about the possibilities the future might hold because of the Canadian commitment to world peace through UN action. Some newspapers employed discussions of peacekeeping to make arguments about the need for Canada to side with Britain on matters of international importance, or questioned the UN mandate which forbade the peacekeepers from disarming the Cypriots in 1964. But these views normally spared the peacekeepers from direct criticism, and were never recalled when another mission commenced. The availability of Pearson as a totem for Canada's proud peacekeeping past encouraged journalists, editorialists, and letter-writers to forget the criticisms of the past in favour of glowing endorsements for any new operations. When this occurred in conjunction with a strong governmental desire to volunteer Canadians abroad, as was the case with Somalia, a lack of critical thinking about Canada's suitability for such service resulted.

Editorial cartoonists offered the most critical views on peacekeeping, but as explained in Chapter Five, their work was also the most ephemeral. The challenges to Canada's peacekeeping role made by cartoonists were rarely sustained or coexistent with those in other media. In 1956, when cartoonists used popular culture images of plodding policemen and effeminate soldiers, they pushed further than other sources were willing to because they targeted the

Canadian contingent itself. In the Congo, by contrast, cartoonists saw decolonization as the folly, and encouraged Canadians to see Africans as backwards and inferior people who needed Canada's help to "civilize." UNFICYP brought renewed attention to Canada's peacekeepers and its bilingual status. Cartoonists challenged the UN's operational mandate, and wondered if Canada should not be addressing the FLQ and language rights issues before engaging in international "do-gooderism." In 1967, UNEF's expulsion provided cartoonists the opportunity to portray Pearson as out of touch, while in French cartoons Canada as a nation could be seen as impotent. Even when multiple media converged to question the military and the government, as was the case with Somalia in 1993, cartoonists were normally alone in their willingness to do more than section off "a few bad apples" in the Airborne and to chastise the Canadian Forces leadership and the Minister of Defence, Kim Campbell. They sought instead to discuss the broader question of whether Canadians were suited to peacekeeping duties, but their single panels made such arguments more difficult.

While these portrayals of peacekeeping were often consistent across large geographic divides, language was a considerable factor in how peacekeeping was framed for audiences. Accordingly, the adoption of peacekeeping into English Canada's national symbology occurred alongside what could be better termed only an affection for it in French Canada. The addresses that politicians gave to French Canadian audiences, Quebec-approved textbooks, French-language newspapers, and French editorial cartoons examined in this dissertation make

clear the differences in how peacekeeping was presented to French-Canadian audiences in comparison to their English equivalents. Unlike audiences elsewhere, Québécois audiences were more likely to hear peacekeeping discussed as a policy that was aiding decolonization or helping developing nations to internally stabilize. Clear in the newspaper coverage of *Le Devoir* and *La Presse* and the cartoons found in those publications, such understandings came from peacekeeping's not becoming symbolically attached to a conception of Canada's past and future. Textbooks, as mentioned, neglected discussing peacekeeping as a Canadian activity in their pages. Such understandings often led to more sober assessments of peacekeeping's potential value as a policy. The Parti Québécois was ready to adopt peacekeeping as one of its primary foreign policies, should it have won either vote on separatism. In these discussions, there was no talk of peacekeeping's being indicative of the Québécois character. It was rather framed as a functional policy that was suited to a middle power, though only when it could benefit the host nation. This afforded peacekeeping considerable support in Quebec between 1956 and 1997, but not of the deep symbolic sort found elsewhere.

The emphasis on Canada's role in peacekeeping, the symbolic attachment to a vision of Canada's past and future, and the blunting of sustained and cross-media criticism provided peacekeeping with the means to become popular from 1956 to 1997. These factors also have explanatory power regarding how peacekeeping has been presented in Canada since 1997. As each chapter has demonstrated, the

utility of the functional and progressive narratives of peacekeeping was considerably diminished by the Inquiry into the Airborne's conduct in Somalia. Nostalgic discussions of Canada's peacekeeping past, therefore, became those with the most cultural purchase.

The Garrison Green community in Calgary, Alberta shows how prevalent the association between peacekeeping and an idealized version of Canada's past has become. The community stands on the site of the former Canadian Forces Base [CFB] Calgary and its living quarters, Currie Barracks. The base was closed in 1996 as part of the austerity measures that the federal Liberal government demanded of the Armed Forces. After the closing of CFB Calgary, the Canada Lands Company [CLC] was given the task of turning the Barracks into an economically viable area.[592] The CLC sold parts of the Garrison Green location to developers, while insisting that the over-arching theme of the brand-new community be a celebration of peacekeeping. Nowhere outside of Canada could such a community exist. Garrison Green marks a synthesis of over four decades of peacekeeping discourse in Canada that encouraged Canadians to associate peacekeeping with a Canadian national identity.[593] In this space, peacekeeping's past is employed as a tool to sell housing.

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[592] The CLC is a unique crown corporation, designated to manage, redevelop and/or sell what they describe as "surplus strategic Government of Canada properties across Canada." These sites, including the CN Tower in Toronto, are designed to bring in revenue to the federal government through the management of the lands or through their sale to the private sector.

[593] This development was also a success by almost all accounts. The developers, the federal government, and local businesses all benefited tremendously from the new community development. As of 2002, the CLC had brought in more than $250 million to its sole shareholder, the Canadian Federal Government. Marty Hope, "It's not just about the money," *Calgary Herald*, 18 May 2002, HS1.

One of Garrison Green's official slogans is "home means an escape to yesteryear in the most modern of urban settings."[594] The CLC sells its peacekeeping community as representing "[a] time when neighbours congregated on front porches, when your morning coffee was savoured at home, not on your long commute, when your family's safety and security extended beyond your front doorstep."[595] Garrison Green employs an unmistakeably nostalgic conception of the past through its creation of an imagined state of mind that generates strong positive meanings in its physical spaces while allowing for the forgetting of unseemly aspects of the past. The commodification of the past to sell housing, therefore, affords peacekeeping a distinctly real present.

In Garrison Green, thirteen streets named after peacekeepers or peacekeeping give the theme a formal presence throughout the community. Dallaire Avenue, Don Ethell Boulevard, Joseph Marquis Crescent, and Peacekeepers' Way are some of the streets that people now live on. Street names "necessarily express something essential that has to be commemorated by means of an enduring mark. They may be linked to a well-known person or to a forceful abstraction or to the date of an event; the essential value embedded in these names comes through its designation [as] an emblematic sign of the community."[596] Despite this, what remains of the official memory of a street name can very quickly disappear. Don Ethell Boulevard commemorates the head of the Canadian

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[594] Canada Lands Company, "Welcome to Garrison Green," http://www.garrisongreen.com/en/default.php.
[595] Ibid.
[596] Georges Augustins, "Naming, Dedicating: Street Names and Tradition," *History and Anthropology* 15, no. 3 (2004): 289.

Association of Veterans of United Nations Peacekeeping [CAVUNP]. If, however, someone lives on Don Ethell Boulevard, its meaning as a signifier is altered from one of official remembrance to a residential marker. The street name becomes something that is seen and experienced every day, and passes from active memory. In this way, street-naming becomes an act of immediate and political significance but whose meaning is obscured over time. Such processes are indicative of how peacekeeping is being understood across Canada as well. As the government has moved further away from encouraging this role for the Canadian Forces, only memories of Canada's peacekeeping accomplishments remain.

Official commemorations of Canada's peacekeeping past exist on Dallaire Avenue in Peacekeepers' Park. This 1.85-acre green space features a "Wall of Honour" listing the names of all those who died on peacekeeping missions. In a clear instance of what Swift and McKay call the re-branding of Canada into a "Warrior Nation," these names have been joined by those of the soldiers who have died in Afghanistan.[597] As of August 2008, there were 204 names on the wall, 89 of whom died in Afghanistan. The inclusion of their names on the Wall of Honour is an overtly political act that attempts to symbolically link the Afghan mission to the values of Canadian peacekeeping.

Also located there is a bronze statue of a peacekeeper handing a doll to a young girl.[598] The soldier is Corporal Mark Isfeld, whose life and death were

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[597] Swift and McKay have discussed Garrison Green in their text as part of the militarization of Canadian culture drawing upon my research. See Chapter Seven, "Yellow Ribbons and Indian Country: New Warriors on the March," in McKay and Swift, *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*.
[598] Marty Hope, "Peacekeepers Remembered at Garrison Green" *Calgary Herald* 14 August 2004, HS 14

detailed in the NFB documentary *The Price of Duty*.[599] What makes this statue disconcerting is not the doll that is being handed to the girl - it is the large weapon that the soldier carries. The inclusion of the weapon is aggressive and phallic. It suggests an assertive identity for peacekeepers that was often denied in editorial cartoons about effeminate soldiers and editorials about passive policemen. It is, however, entirely consistent with the exceptional status afforded to peacekeepers in the documentaries made by Garth Pritchard. What it also suggests is a nostalgic longing for the male archetype of the 1950s-, a strong provider who could keep a family safe. Despite most of the members of the community never having seen such a large weapon in real life, appealing to the safety of the past through depictions of soldiers and children has proven to be a successful strategy.

Figure 6.1 Peacekeeper and child statue, Garrison Green, Calgary

[599] Garth Pritchard, "The Price of Duty," (Canada: National Film Board, 1995).

Commemorations which speak to the Canadian Forces role in Afghanistan and the commercialization of Canada's peacekeeping past are the new norm. Peacekeeping's transition from a leading and respected Canadian international role to its current state did not occur overnight or without reason. As some Canadians rally in support of their country's being a peacekeeping and not a militant nation, the country's peacekeeping identity is being reconstructed and altered based upon present uncertainties about the direction of Canada's foreign commitments. Those who wish to celebrate or cast off Canada's peacekeeping identity would do well to recall why and how peacekeeping came to be so strongly associated with an English Canadian national identity. And perhaps they would do well to give more attention to the views held by most Quebeckers from 1956 and 1997. Peacekeeping can be, and has been, a constructive policy for a middle power like Canada. But unless we see it from the perspective of the host nation and refuse to dwell entirely in the nostalgic realm, peacekeeping will fail to live up to its potential to promote positive change and bring about a modestly better world.

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	Title	Year	# Pages on Peacekeeping
McInnis, Edgar	*Canada: A Political and Social History*	1959	4
Filteau, Gerard	*La civilisation catholique et francaise au Canada*	1960	1
Brebner, J. Bartlet	*Canada: A Modern History*	1960	1
Ricker, John C. et al.	*The Modern Era*	1960	2
Lambert, Richard	*The Twentieth Century: Canada, Britain, USA*	1960	5
Hodgetts, A.B.	*Decisive Decades: A History of the Twentieth Century for Canadians*	1960	0
Peart, Hugh and John Schaffter	*The Winds of Change: A History of Canada and Canadians in the Twentieth Century*	1961	4
Nicholson, Gerald W et al.	*Three Nations: Canada, Great Britain and the United States in the Twentieth Century*	1962; 1969	4
McNaught, Kenneth and Ramsay Cook	*Canada and the United States: A Modern Study*	1963	1
Cook, Ramsay, et al	*Canada: A Modern Study*	1963	5
Careless, J.M.S.	*Canada: A Story of Challenge*	1963	3
Morton, W.L.	*The Kingdom of Canada*	1963	2
McInnis, Edgar	*The North American Nations*	1963	2
Farr, D.M.L. et al	*Two Democracies*	1963	3
Brault, Lucien	*Le Canada au Xxie siecle*	1965	1
Bliss, Michael	*Candian History in Documents*	1966	5
Lacour-Gayet, Robert	*Histoire du Canada*	1966	5
Spencer, Robert	*The West and the Wider World*	1966	1
Goodspeed, D.J.	*The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967*	1967	19
Cornell. Paul et al.	*Canada: Unity in Diversity (Unite en Diversite)*	1967	4

Careless, J.M.S.	*The Canadians: 1867-1967*	1967	4
Mackir, Kenneth A. et al	*Changing Perspectives in Canadian History*	1967	2
Johnson, Patricia	*Canada Since 1867*	1968	1
Brown, G.W.	*Building the Canadian Nation*	1968	0
Vaugeois, Denis and Jacques Lacoursiere	*Canada-Quebec: Synthese historique*	1969	2
Moir, John S. and D.M.L Farr	*The Canadian Experience*	1969	4
Granatstein, J.L.	*Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*	1969	54
Bumstead, J.M.	*Documentary Problems in Canadian History Volume Two, Post-Confederation*	1969	1
Cachat, Gerard and Giles Villemure	*Cahier d'exercises en histoire moderne et contemporaine: livre de maitre*	1970	0
Willows, Derald G. and Stewart Richmond	*Canada: Colony to Centennial*	1970	2
Creighton, Donald	*Canada's First Century, 1867-1967*	1970	8
Herstein, H.H., et. Al	*Challenge and Survival: The History of Canada*	1970	5
Moir, John S. and Robert E. Saunders	*Northern Destiny: A History of Canada*	1970	5
Walton, R.J.	*Canada and the USA: A Background Book about Internal Conflict and the New Nationalism*	1972	2
Dobell, P.C.	*Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era*	1972	18
Thordarson, Bruce	*Lester Pearson: Diplomat and Politician*	1974	11
Walsh, Gerald	*A Global History 1870 to the Present*	1975	2
Creighton, Donald	*The Forked Road: Canada, 1939 to 1957*	1976	10
McNaught, Kenneth	*The Pelican History of Canada*	1976	3
Ross, Alexander	*Canada's Illustrated Heritage: The Booming Fifties*	1977	1
Cachat, Gerard	*L'adventure francaise en Amerique: un defi, 1534-1976*	1977	1

Cook, Ramsay	*The Maple Leaf Forever*	1977	0
Morton, W.L. and L.F. Hannon	*This Land, These People: An Illustrated History of Canada*	1977	2
Cuff, R.D. and J.L. Granatstein	*Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime from the Great War to the Cold War*	1977	0
Bothwell, Robert	*Pearson: His Life and World*	1978	7
Lefebvre, Andre	*Une histoire nationale pour l'eleve du secondaire*	1978	0
Edmonds, Alan	*Canada's Illustrated Heritage: The Years of Protest*	1978	Inside Cover
Brunet, Michel	*Histoire du Canada par les textes, tome II (1855-1960)*	1979	7
Finlay, J.L and D.N. Sprague	*The Structure of Canadian History*	1979	1
Hundey, Ian	*Canada: Builders of the Nation*	1980	3
Bondy, Robert J. and William C. Mattys	*Years of Promise: 1945-63*	1980	2
Morton, Desmond	*Canada and War: A Military and Political History*	1981	8
Saywell, John	*Canada Past and Present*	1981	5
Hall, Roger and Gordon Dodds	*Canada: A History in Photographs*	1981	1
Francis, R. Douglas and Donald B. Smith	*Readings in Canadian History Post-Confederation*	1982	9
Granatstein, J.L. et al	*Twentieth Century Canadian History Second Edition*	1983	6
Granatstein, J.L. et al	*Twentieth Century Canadian History*	1983	11
Bartlett, Gilian and Janice Gallivan	*Canada: History in the Making*	1984	6
Campbell, Allan and Derald Fretts	*Canada in the World: Choosing A Role*	1985	11
Charbonneau, Francois et al	*Mon Histoire*	1985	0
Francis, Daniel and Sonia Riddoch	*Our Canada: A Social and Political History*	1985	7

Lagasse, Robert	*Histoire du Quebec et du Canada: Histoire nationale, cahier d'activites*	1986	1
Bouchard, Claude and Robert Lagasse	*Nouvelle-France, Canada Quebec: Histoire du Quebec et du Canada*	1986	5
Hux, Allan and Fred Jarman	*Canada: A Growing Concern Revised Edition*	1987	4
Auger, Christophe	*Cessez le feu! Guide pedagogique*	1987	0
Centrale de l'enseignement du Quebec	*Eduquer a la paix pour desarmer le monde: Guide d'intervention pedagogique*	1987	0
Scully, Angus L. et al	*Canada Today, Second Edition*	1988	13
Evans, Allan S. and I.L. Martinello	*Canada's Century, Second Edition*	1988	6
Baldwin, Douglas et al	*The Rise of the Global Village*	1988	3
Morton, Desmond	*Towards Tomorrow: Canada in a Changing World*	1988	4
Cresswell, Jack	*Towards Tomorrow: Canada in a Changing World: History Teacher's Guide*	1988	2
Clark, Bruce W. and John K. Wallace	*Canada: Land of Diversity, Second Edition*	1989	1
Kerrigan, Joan et al	*Canada in a North American Perspective: A Curriculum Guide*	1990	3
Mcfadden, Fred et al	*Canada: The Twentieth Century*	1990	2
Hundey, Ian and Michael L. Magarrey	*Canada: Understanding Your Past*	1990	6
Marsh, James H.	*The Junior Encyclopedia of Canada*	1990	2
Hundey, Ian	*Canada: Builders of the Nation, Second Edition*	1991	3
Charpentier, Louise and Denise Menotte	*A la decouverte de l'histoire du Quebec et du Canada*	1991	0
Christopher, James R. and George G. Wittlet	*Modern Western Civilization*	1991	2
Cadotte, Robert et al	*Pacijeu: Cahier de jeux pour la paix, les droits humains et l'environement*	1991	0

Dawood, Ishie	*Canada: A History to the Twentieth Century*	1992	0
Lunn, Janet and Christopher Moore	*The Story of Canada*	1992	4
Scott, Marvin	*Of Many Times and Cultures: Fascinating Facts and Stories From World History*	1993	1
Eaton, Diane and Garfield Newman	*Canada: A Nation Unfolding*	1994	7
Saywell, John	*Canada: Pathways to the Present*	1994	4
Tessier, Yves	*Histoire du Quebec: D'hier a l'an 2000*	1994	0
Donaldson, Gordon	*The Prime Ministers of Quebec*	1994	2
Roy, Marcel and Domenic Roy	*Je me souviens: Histoire du Quebec et du Canada*	1995	0
Hundey, Ian and Michael L. Magarrey	*A Map History of the Modern World, Second Canadian Edition*	1995	3

Title	Year	Director	Length	Budget
Blue Vanguard	1957	Ian MacNeill	60 minutes	$ 57,792.27
The Thin Blue Line	1958	A.W. Acland	29 minutes 10 seconds	$ 9,910.00
Overture	1958	G.L. Polidora	9 minutes, 28 seconds	N/A
The Security Council	1963	V.R. Sarma	16 minutes, 6 seconds	N/A
You Are Welcome Sirs, to Cyprus	1964	Richard Gilbert	20 minutes, 28 seconds	$28,573.38
Postmark UNEF	1965	Richard Gilbert	27 minutes, 35 seconds	$ 27,224.27
A Life of Adventure	1965	Graham Parker	14 minutes, 8 seconds	$ 29,488.14
Goodbye War	1983	Donna Dudinsky et al.	56 minutes, 26 seconds	N/A
Harder Than it Looks	1986	Tina Viljoen	28 minutes, 10 seconds	N/A
Keeping the Elephants Away	1986	Tina Viljoen	57 minutes, 8 seconds	N/A
Peacekeeper at War	1994	Martin Duckworth	41 minutes, 54 seconds	$ 858,466.00
Caught in the Crossfire	1995	Garth Pritchard	47 minutes, 50 seconds	$ 319,004.00
In God's Command	1995	Garth Pritchard	47 minutes, 50 seconds	$ 111,353.00
The Price of Duty	1995	Garth Pritchard	47 minutes, 50 seconds	$ 109,954.00

Revenues Generated and Number of Copies Sold Since 1982 (film, video, dvd)*

TITLE	REVENUE	QTY SOLD
The Thin Blue Line	$ 49.55	3
Overture	$ 959.73	136
The Security Council	$ -	0
You Are Welcome Sirs, to Cyprus	$ 168.41	9
Postmark UNEF	$ 128.49	6
A Life of Adventure	$ -	0
Goodbye War	$ 17,666.00	658
Harder Than it Looks	$ 4,420.92	290
Keeping the Elephants Away	$ 13,847.00	594
Peacekeeper at War	$ 11,264.91	265
Caught in the Crossfire	$ 6,717.07	190
In God's Command	$ 16,792.78	88
The Price of Duty	$ 9,188.57	153

* The NFB only has data on revenues and the number of copies sold for its films since 1982.

Newspaper	UNEF and Nobel Prize	ONUC	UNFICYP	End of UNEF	UNOSOM	Somalia Inquiry
Calgary *Herald*	3	1	2			
Halifax *Chronicle-Herald*	11	5	2		1	1
Montreal *Gazette*	6	6	1	3	1	4
La Presse		3		3		1
Le Devoir	2	3			2	3
Ottawa *Citizen*	5	4	7	1	4	
Regina *Leader-Post*	5	3	2	3	1	1
Toronto *Star*	8	1	1	4		1
Globe and Mail	5	3	3		2	2
Vancouver *Sun*	5	2	1			1
Winnipeg *Free Press*	4	3	1	1	1	1
Total	54	34	20	15	12	15