SPONSORSHIP OF REFUGEES

Government and Private

a report prepared by

The Refugee Documentation Project

York University

APPENDICES

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I. INTRODUCTION

Refugee Perspectives, 1983-1984 , published by Employment and Immigration Canada, includes an issue paper entitled, "Sponsorship, Role of the Private Sector" (cf. Appendix I), which deals with a reevaluation of the role of the private sector in refugee sponsorship. The 1978 Refugee Act, while making provision for private sponsorship as a supplement to the government program, did not envision private sponsorship becoming the leading edge in the determination of the number of Indochinese refugees brought to Canada in 1979 and 1980, or in pioneering new benefits from private citizen-refugee involvement and new possibilities in private sector-government co-operation (cf. Appendix II).

This report concentrates on the issue of sponsorship. The private sector is clearly involved in a much broader range of refugee issues: community services to refugees, both general and specialized (language, employment, legal, etc.); advocacy re numbers, distribution, and policies concerning the intake of refugees; and, in some overseas areas, processing, training and even identification of prospective refugee candidates. Though we are only concerned with the sponsorship role, the impact on these other spheres must be taken into consideration.

II. GENERAL OBJECTIVES: GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTORS

The government report clearly states its objectives in involving the private sector in refugee affairs: (1) locally:- to facilitate refugee resettlement and integration into Canada; (2) nationally:- to create a better understanding among the public for refugees and hence facilitate the implementation of refugee policy; (3) internationally:- to work with international voluntary organizations to involve other governments in the assistance of refugees.

This reads as if the government is co-opting the private sector to reach government objectives. The private sector may have a somewhat different perspective. On the local level, they often feel they are the cheap minions of resettlement services with too little input into policy and programs such as language training, and no long-term planning or financial commitment by government to their role in resettlement. On the national level they frequently see themselves as the conscience of the government to ensure refugee policy is as humane and extensive as possible and as sensitive to real needs as they perceive them; that is, instead of seeing themselves as the leading edge in facing the public to minimize backlash, they direct their critical attention to the inadequacies of government policies and programs. Finally, in the international sector, they see themselves as the sensors of refugee needs unencumbered by government diplomatic restrictions or ties to bureaucratic desks and manifold roles which take too little account of the experienced plight of the refugees.

If the government views the private sector as an extension of government in these spheres, with the government providing the officers, whereas the private sector supplies the volunteers in the battle for improving the lot of refugees, the private sector regards itself as the confronter or challenger to the government even when the NGOs are dependent on government grants to carry out local settlement services. Neither description depicts a partnership.

The differences become specific. In local resettlement, the government focuses on an improved milieu and an extension or broadening of government services. The private sector focuses on the inadequacies of specific programs and views itself, not the government, as the prime deliverer of services which the government is there to facilitate. On national questions, the government sees the private sector as increasing <u>public</u> understanding about refugees while the private sector concentrates on increasing <u>government</u> understanding about refugees. The government sees the international voluntary networks as a mode of reaching other governments, while the international networks are seen by the voluntary sector as non-governmental sensors which will feed back information to reach their own government. Neither of these self-perceptions or perceptions of the other adequately depicts the symbiotic growing interdependency and co-operation of the government and private sectors. What is more important, neither sector grasps the gaps and failings in their mutually distorted perceptions and the failure to forge a self-conscious, deliberate and directed

partnership.

For example, the private sector is fragmented and uncoordinated in its delivery of services and the presentation of its needs to government locally, regionally and nationally, though the formation of new umbrella organizations, such as the one in Vancouver, may be a step towards improved co-operation and communication on the local level. There is no national fundraising and public education organization on behalf of refugees; the Canadian Foundation for Refugees as an attempt to fill this gap has been an unmitigated disaster. The international sensors are strong on experience and weak on analysis and research so that we have not developed the widely reported need for early warning systems and modes of taking an objective census of refugee numbers and needs.

In sum, the potential of a government/private sector partnership in the service of refugees needs to be fulfilled not only to overcome misperceptions of one another but so that the two sectors can work side by side to better service the needs of refugees.

III. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES: GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP

Ironically, in the specific area of sponsorship both sectors seem to be much closer in the perception of their mutual roles. Both sectors agree that the federal government has the prime responsibility for determining the quantity and distribution of the refugee intake and financing the resettlement costs of that commitment, but the private sector has a role not simply in advising the government on the degree of commitment to be undertaken but in enhancing that commitment through sharing costs, using volunteers and means to decrease costs per refugee resettled, while improving the quality of resettlement services and even, by the degree of private sector commitment, shaping the size and character of Canada's refugee intake.

In the area of sponsorship, the real question is how to enhance the leading edge of the new emerging partnership of the public and private sectors in a way that will increase the intake of refugees, enhance the quality of resettlement and act as a catalyst to increase trust and co-operation between the government and the private sectors.

IV. PROGRAMS

Before dealing with the sponsorship issue itself, it is helpful if we first discuss the resettlement programs available to government and privately sponsored refugees. The details of those programs are included in Appendix III.

Several points must be noted. First, there has been a trend to equalize program availability for government and privately sponsored refugees, though in that development, family sponsored refugees seemed to be lagging behind in obtaining equal accessibility. Second, some of the programs related to adaptation, language training, orientation and integration are designed to enhance government/private sector partnership. Third, there remain areas of inequality. For example, one of the most onerous of costs to fall on private sponsors has been the dental expenses of the refugees. Health and Welfare Canada assists in paying for those services for government sponsored refugees. Second, privately sponsored refugees are not eligible for the adjustment assistance program which locates employment and pays wages to refugees in new employment expansion areas. Third, within the private sector, family sponsored refugees suffer the added disadvantage of lacking the same degree of awareness of the availability of these programs as those of the private sponsorship organizations.

V. COSTS

> Private sponsorship has been a positive benefit to refugees (as compared with their government sponsored counterparts)...it keeps initial costs low, allowed key family members to gain language training and frequently led to greater ease in finding employment.
>
> -Doreen Indra, "Social Science Research on Refugee Settlement in Canada."

Government sponsored refugees had better access to a wider variety of government programs (though the gap is diminishing), but privately sponsored refugees cost much less per capita to resettle in Canada and in general received more help in the process of adaptation (see Appendix IV). Based on expenditure data collected from five sponsorship organizations and on government figures for the period 1979 to 1983, private sponsorship on average costs 55.4% less than government sponsorship, in contrast to early estimates of one-third savings. The donation of clothing and furniture and savings in accommodation costs are the major factors in the decreased costs. In addition, in some cases the length of dependency on the sponsor is shorter as privately sponsored refugees enter the work force earlier.

Several factors must be considered in assessing this difference. If J.I.A.S., which operates its own paid bureaucracy in the settlement of refugees, is excluded, the differential is even greater. Second, the government sponsored proportionately more single individuals and the cost per capita of government sponsorship of single individuals was higher than that of families particularly in the expenditure for rent. But if one

does a hypothetical redistribution, the gap in expenditures i still very large. Third, in the period reported training cost were much higher for the private sector since in that perio private sponsors did not have equal access to language and othe training programs and had to pay the fees for those programs Given equal access, the cost differential in basic needs would b even greater between private and government sponsored refugees Finally, one could assume the private sector could sponsor singl individuals at an even greater economy than families, sinc single individuals could be more easily provided with free room in houses than families.

In summary, considerable savings could be made and used t sponsor more refugees and/or provide better programs if a rea partnership could develop between the public and private sector in the settlement of refugees.

Key References

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VI. THE HUMAN BENEFITS OF PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT

Appendix V analyzes the consequences of using the government versus the private sponsorship to examine the premise that private sponsorship not only increased refugee intake and cost much less, but that it provided a more adequate psychological and cultural adaptation mode for resettling refugees.

It is not that simple. Sponsors varied greatly. Success was directly correlated with the organization, resources and social cohesion of the sponsors. Further, there was tension between the emotional/supportive role and the financial benefactor role.

What is clear is that there is a direct correlation between private sponsorship and the number of refugees taken into Canada. This is not simply because the private sponsorship declined, but government sponsorships declined as well, not simply from the higher figures of 1979 and 1980 but from a 16,000 quota in 1981 (actual intake 14,700) to 14,000 in 1982 and a funded allotment of only 10,000 in 1983.

The cliche that private sponsorhip is an attempt by the government to dump its responsibilities on the private sector proves fallacious. Rather, one could more justly conclude that the more the private sector assumes responsibility in the refugee area, the more the government is involved.

Further, government and privately sponsored refugees need

VII. BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT-PRIVATE SECTOR SPONSORSHIP PARTNERSHIP

A partnership between the private and government sectors might help reduce antagonisms and create grounds for more common perceptions on more general refugee issues. More co-ordination, co-operation and communication within the private sector could be encouraged, especially if some of the savings in costs could be used for this purpose. Funds could be made available to provide access to the few programs where equality has yet to be achieved and to improve programs, especially retraining programs, for all refugees. Further, if cohesive experienced groups were properly funded so as to separate the supportive role from the financial refugees, the process of refugee adaptation would be greatly enhanced. Finally, the numbers of refugees taken into Canada could again increase and perhaps set a model of sponsorship for other countries to emulate.

VIII. MODELS OF PARTNERSHIP

Partnership involves some sort of sharing--funds provided by the government and human volunteer support by the private sector. The present system is a parallel model and not a partnership model.

The present system of government sponsorship which, in a small number of cases, attracted private support groups to the refugees could be utilized, either where the private sponsors focused on special needs cases or where they acted as friendship families to government sponsored refugees. The problem in either case is that there are no financial savings. Further, the costs of attracting, training and co-ordinating the friendship families in fact increases the costs and, except in smaller centres, proved to be extremely difficult to implement in large cities like Toronto.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are ways to reduce costs without engaging in a partnership model. Direct loans to refugees or to sponsorship groups could be provided but this is not likely to prove attractive to induce Canadians to assist in the resettlement effort.

There are only two viable models of partnership--a cost-sharing system or a per capita grant system. If the costs of government sponsorship are 60% higher than private sponsorship, a 50-50 cost-sharing based on normal amounts expended by government would

IX. ALTERNATIVE MODELS

Model A

Any private group (not agencies) or local church that has previously signed a contract to sponsor a refugee be eligible to apply for a grant of $500(1983) for each new refugee they commit themselves to sponsor if they wish to choose the refugee (there are much larger costs involved in searching out a particular refugee) and $1,000(1983) for each new refugee they sponsor who is assigned by the government (though they would, of course, be able to express preferences. Families sponsoring relatives would be eligible for loans of $1,000 per individual to cover settlement costs.

This program would involve the following benefits:

1. An experienced cadre of private sponsors could be built up;
2. Many of the 50% of those who were willing to responsor according to surveys if the cost factor were taken out could be induced to sponsor again;
3. Sponsors would have to prove their commitment before receiving a grant;
4. For every 1,000 government sponsored refugees co-sponsored by the private sector under this plan, there would be an effective saving of $1,500,000 which might be redistributed according to a commitment to the private sector along the following lines:

(a) 50% for increasing the intake of refugees or support for refugees abroad;

(b) 10% for a national coordinating and educational agency run by the private sector;

(c) 10% for research into refugee issues;

(d) 10% for improved programs for resettlement;

(e) 10% for reserves for grants to supplement the $1,000 for sponsors whose expenses exceed the $1,000 grant;

(f) 10% return to government coffers to cover general increased costs.

If 10,000 government sponsored refugees were co-sponsored by the private sector, this would make possible a saving of $1,500,000 of which $7,500,000 could be used to co-sponsor up to 7,500 more refugees, $1,500,000 could be available to properly fund a national co-ordination and educational agency to stimulate private co-sponsorship, $1,500,000 would be available for refugee research, $1,500,000 for improved resettlement programs and $1,500,000 to supplement those sponsors who legitimately exceeded the $1,000 expenditure grant.

The refugees would be better off and Canada could take more refugees in. The government would realize a net saving while developing a proper educational and research program for refugees. Finally, the process of adaptation would be improved.

Model B:

Model C:

etc.

APPENDIX I

Issue Paper, "Sponsorship: Role of the Private Sector" from Refugee Perspectives, 1983-84, CEIC

ISSUES PAPER - SPONSORSHIP

ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

ISSUE

Over the past year, there has been a growing feeling on the part of many of those in the voluntary sector who assist refugees, that their role in refugee sponsorship and assistance is in need of re-evaluation. At the same time, government has an interest in encouraging a voluntary role and providing incentives for this. A process of consultation is currently underway, therefore this paper is intended to expose some of the background to the issue, rather than recommend a specific course of action.

BACKGROUND

At the same time when sponsorship was being considered for inclusion in the 1976 Immigration Act, the objective of this provision was straightforward: to enable private sponsors to bring to Canada a few hundred cases of special interest to them, without reference to the government-funded Annual Plan. This program was to be separate and distinct from that of government and was not expected to have any impact on government policy or procedures for selection and processing. Underlying this assumption was the understanding that government would take the lead role in refugee policy.

This original objective very quickly became a little blurred, with the onset of the Indochinese movement and the very large public response, which gave rise to the "one for one" matching promise by government. Thus, to a large extent there was public determination of the final number to be selected. The public program was affecting policy and as the numbers of refugees requested by private sponsors swelled the overall total intake, government services were rapidly put in place to bolster community response. The "partnership" theme used by government became more than rhetoric, it was a reality at the community level, in a great many places.

As the Indochinese movement diminished, there has been a gradual shift of government/public activity in refugee resettlement. The original objective of the sponsorship program has been considerably enlarged through the experience with the Indochinese movement, and as the shape of the current refugee program has altered, so too has the shape of the sponsorship program. (see attached graph indicating sponsorship trends.)

In beginning to re-evaluate the private role in refugee sponsorship and resettlement, churches and voluntary groups are now assessing their own objectives, and how they can fit these to those of the government. A clear set of government objectives is necessary for the upcoming consultation on this issue.

Before defining an objective, it is important to recognize the full range of private sector involvement in refugee resettlement, because sponsorship is in fact, only one facet of a broader participation. Church and other voluntary organizations now are involved in assisting in the identification of prospective refugee candidates in places such as Africa and Central America; in Europe, and in South East Asia there is some overseas involvement in pre-selection processing and training; in Canada, the private sector is consulted about refugee levels, and any major shifts in policy, or program criteria. As well, NGOs play a crucial role in providing services at the community level, both for basic needs as well as more inter-personal needs. NGO services contribute to the refugee's effective adaptation to a new society, and assist in providing linkages needed to secure jobs and opportunities.

In looking at the private sector role in refugee resettlement, it must also be recognized that there are many different approaches and perspectives involved within the NGO constituency. Those who take an interest in refugees may belong to religious

organizations, ethnic associations, particular interest groups, service agencies or simply be family or friends. Membership in each group often means a different perspective on the role they play and their reasons for being involved. Through sponsorship of refugees, however, all groups have access to a positive outlet for their energies and activities and this may indirectly deflect pressure which otherwise would be concentrated on government.

If the government objective in resettling refugees is clear, it will be easier for the private sector to complement that role. The Annual Plan provides a framework for this. Sponsorship is generated, to some extent, in relation to the Annual Plan, but the motivation for sponsorship is also linked to public perception of our efforts in providing services for refugees, in coordinating programs with provincial authorities, and in the level of assistance for government sponsored refugees and the effectiveness of services such as job placement, language training and our willingness to listen to their concerns and priorities. As well, private sector participation in sponsorship is generated in proportion to the acuteness of a refugee's need, as perceived by the groups and organizations doing the sponsoring. This fact can lead to some conflict between government and NGO, as government policy may not define "need" in the same way as a specific NGO or advocacy group.

OPTIONS

In looking at the alternative models for refugee sponsorship/assistance there are some basic options which the private sector will be examining over the next few months. Briefly, these are:

Status Quo:

- sponsorship as supplement to government Joint Assistance program for special needs (government covers costs associated with first and second year)

- possible addition of 4,000 refugees with little direct cost to government

Cost Sharing:

- government agrees to share costs of settlement for each refugee sponsored, with sponsor providing services, caring networking benefits

Per Capita Grants:

- government pays sponsors to assist refugees based on assumption that sponsors can provide for resettlement needs at lower costs

Loans:

- government could provide loans directly to refugees or could condone sponsoring organizations providing interest-free loans

Friendship Families

- private groups contract to provide community based services without overall sponsorship responsibility. Government pays costs associated with all refugees

Need - Specific Sponsorship:

- private sponsors assist only when they are satisfied that special needs exist which must be met through community involvement.

The process of re-evaluation of sponsorship was pushed along by the CEIC recognition that there was a need for greater equality of accessibility to government services for both government and privately

sponsored refugee alike. The Minister has received thanks and appreciation for his move to allow equal access to government language training allowances and for other inititatives designed to acknowledge and assist with the burden which private sponsors carry. At the same time, ministerial announcements concerning consideration of "joint sponsorship" have increased anticipation for even greater government assistance.

Preliminary feedback from the current consultation process on sponsorship undertaken in the regions indicates that there are some very different interest levels in the issue. An Ontario "steering group" has proposed a national consultation-symposium on the issue of government/private roles in sponsorship while British Columbia, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island have found very little interest on sponsorship. It is expected that, in the final analysis, Ontario and Quebec views will be the most substantive, and more time will be needed to discuss options with these groups. It will be necessary to proceed carefully, in order that we do not seal off the option of securing a truly satisfactory working partnership with the private sector, by "buying in" in response to cries for more government money. This is not the only option, and many community people will continue to provide valuable efforts to assist refugees if government is sincere in working with them to achieve common objectives.

In evaluating the various options, it may be of assistance to review them keeping in mind the suggested objectives outlined below, that apply to both the broad area of private sector involvement in refugee policy matters and the more specific participation of voluntary groups in sponsorship of refugees.

OBJECTIVE: VOLUNTARY SECTOR INVOLVEMENT WITH REFUGEES

1. Objectives - why we seek private sector involvement in refugee affairs

   - To increase public understanding about refugee needs thereby reinforcing their commitment to refugee assistance

   - To provide refugees being resettled with a broader and more creative milieu to allow a more complete and a faster integration into a Canadian community

   - To increase Canada's international participation in seeking solutions to refugee problems through voluntary organizations use of their international contacts to encourage other governments to increase their participation

2. Objectives - why we encourage private group sponsorship of refugees

   - To provide a means for voluntary organizations and groups to move beyond the views they might express during the consultative process with government by enabling them to become directly involved with refugee assistance

   - To allow the public to directly shape the size and character of Canada's refugee intake

   - To improve the quality of settlement and community assistance by direct involvement of the public at the neighbourhood level

   - To increase Canada's overall assistance to refugees through sharing of the costs of resettlement by the private sector and government

PRESENTATIONS BY NGOS

Bob Mykytiuk - Presented a written brief from the Canadian Ukrainian Immigrant Aid Society (Appendix D). At the meeting, he stated that most Ukrainians coming to Canada are privately sponsored and for this reason he would be very interested in the cost sharing or per capita grants options outlined in the documents. This approach he felt had several advantages; it would be less expensive for the Government, would increase the number of sponsorships and achieve a faster integration rate.

Harindar Aulach - Presented a written brief from World University Service of Canada (Appendix E). In summary, Mr. Aulach recommended a combination of public and private sector funds in any sponsorship activity; that contributions should be made tax deductible; and that public funds should be utilized to deal with unforeseeable expenses in cases involving the sponsorship of special needs refugees. In general, he felt co-sponsorship should replace private sponsorship. He also complimented the Refugee Perspectives Document and stated that WUSC was in agreement with the section on selection, and the concept of establishing upper and lower levels as this challenged the private sector to recruit sponsors. He thought it would be beneficial to have specially trained officers overseas who dealt only with refugees and that they could be assisted in the selection process by visiting NGOs. In terms of regional selection priorities, he placed Latin America first, followed by Indo-China, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. While WUSC recognized that resettlement was not the solution for all Afghan refugees, it was felt that considering the number of urban Afghan refugees who would benefit, a separate quota was warranted. In conclusion, WUSC is pleased to see the improvement in reaching the determined levels.

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July 25th, 1983

David Conn,
Director General, Immigration,
Ontario Region,
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Dear Mr. Conn: Subject: "Refugee Perspectives 1983 - 1984"
Issued by Refugee Affairs June 1983

In evaluating the recommendations and options presented in the above-mentioned document, our organization is of the opinion that either one of the two options mentioned on page 31 would facilitate the work of sponsoring groups, the options being:

Cost Sharing:

- government agrees to share costs of settlement for each refugee sponsored, with sponsor providing services, caring networking benefits.

Per Capita Grants:

- government pays sponsors to assist refugees based on assumption that sponsors can provide for resettlement needs at lower costs.

... Canada today many groups willing to look after refugees if the onerous task of fundraising can be lightened. It should be kept in mind that an exhaustive government evaluation showed private sponsorship superior to government sponsorships in the following respects:

1. Private sponsorship is arguably more effective than the government mode in assisting refugees to become self-supporting members of Canadian society.
2. Private sponsorship is a less expensive means of refugee settlement than the government mode. The average cost of settling a privately sponsored Indo-Chinese refugee was $753 less. (Because of the efforts of the private sponsors, the government saved $74 million it would otherwise have had to spend on resettlement).
3. Private sponsorship is a positive force in helping refugees find jobs. The lesser qualified privately sponsored refugees found jobs sooner than did the government sponsored ones.
4. Privately sponsored refugees adjusted better to Canadian life than did government sponsored refugees because of the presence of supportive groups, with whom they developed relations of friendship.

But the question is not of superiority of one model over the other. What is needed are new sponsorship models which would combine public funds with private efforts to provide a more effective way of settling refugees in Canada. Assistance needs to be provided by the government both with a view to providing incentives and, as the Hon. Robert Kaplan put it, taking "some of the risk out of private sponsorship".

The following are some of the forms this assistance can take:

1. A group that sponsors a refugee in any one year will be provided by the government with the funding to sponsor a refugee in the subsequent year. Such sponsorship will be known as private sponsorship.
2. Any group which raises one-half of the amount necessary to support a refugee will be entitled to receive the balance from the government. Such sponsorship will be known as co-sponsorship.
3. In calculating this financial assistance the government should accept the fair market value of any services the sponsor may provide (food, shelter, clothing). The market value of such services should also

be considered tax deductible.

4. An emergency fund should be set up for those refugees who are sponsored as "special needs" refugees under the Joint Assistance Programmes. This fund would also provide emergency loans to sponsoring organizations who encounter unforseeable situations while looking after a particular refugee.

What is thus proposed is that the concept of government sponsorship be replaced by the concept of co-sponsorship. The concept of private sponsorship would be retained. Though in both cases the final authority respecting entry will remain with the Minister, in the case of co-sponsorship refugees will be selected by Immigration officials and matched with pre-determined Canadian groups. Instead of a fixed annual intake, the government would establish upper and lower limits and provide the private sector a continuous challenge to come up every year with a sufficient number of interested groups.

APPENDIX II

An Historical Sketch
of
Government/Private Cooperation re Refugees, 1933-1983

(Canada's Refugee Policy:
From Elite Negativism to Public Private Partnership)

by

Howard Adelman

I. INTRODUCTION

Canada's refugee policy from 1933 to 1983 went through radical alterations affecting who chose to admit, how many we admitted, how we decided to take those numbers from those sources, and the primary motive for the decision. The answers to the questions of who we took in and how many, and who decided why results in a division of the history of Canadian refugee policy into three distinct stages each having two phases.

Stage	Designation	Period	Immigration Act Changes		Phases
I	Self-interest	1933-56	1952	a) 33-45	Negativism
				b) 45-50	Positivism
II	Ideological	1956-73	1967	a) 56-78	Anti-Communism
				b) 68-73	Anti-fascism
III	Humanitarian	1973-83	1978	a) 73-80	Anti-anti Communism
				b) 80-83	Humanitarianism

II. SELF-INTEREST

Refugee policy in the pre-war and World War II periods was subsumed under a very selective and narrow immigration policy. The restrictiveness had twin foundations: (1) Canada's labour and development needs and (2) Canada's ethnocentrism which

discriminated against non-white Anglo-Saxons and non-North Europeans. Irving Abella and Harold Troper demonstrate clearly in their book, None is Too Many that politicians and civil servants worked hand in hand to construct a negative, bigoted and racist policy in which Jews were the victims. The private sector in the form of the Canadian Jewish Congress (established in March of 1919) and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS, formed in 1921) were almost totally ineffectual in their backroom attempts to get the Canadian government to help their persecuted brethren in Europe. Prominent church leaders and delegations were no more effective in counteracting the blatant racism of some politicians and civil servants and the political realism of Prime Minister Mackenzie King who did not want to antagonize the anti-semitic sentiments prevalent in parts of the country, particularly Quebec.

The immediate post-war years marked a turning point. Instead of a post-war depression, a shortage of manpower prevailed as the industrializing momentum set off by the war continued to build steam. In effect, our labour and development needs combined with public pressure groups such as the Canadian National Committee for Refugees, church groups and progressive political elements to reduce the role of bigotry especially as it affected the intake of Jews. At the same time, Canada had assumed international obligations and became a signatory of the International Refugee Organization in 1946; we committed ourselves to providing funding and accepting refugees for resettlement.

Our new international status as well as our need for labour reinforced by heretofore ineffectual humanitarian church or ethnic organizations managed to shunt aside our racist ethnocentrism and, in a short period of years, we took in 300,000 immigrants, most of whom would now be designated as refugees.

In the 1952 Immigration Act recognition was formally given to refugees as a special group of immigrants.

III. IDEOLOGY

With the official recognition of refugees as a special class of immmigrants, Canada had its first large opportunity to express its concern when the Hungarian uprising took place in 1956. The intake of 37,000 refugees in a ten-month period was directly linked with our cold war anti-communist foreign policy. Though enjoying public support, the private sector did not influence the policy or the numbers and played a secondary role in the resettlement of the Hungarian refugees.

The ideological phase hit its peak with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which put an end to the Prague Spring. In the meantime, however, Canada changed its immigration act in 1967 establishing clear principles, guidelines and standards for the selection and processing of immigrants. The racial biases of the old act were eliminated.

The end of ideological anti-communism as the foundation stone of

our refugee intake follwed the Pinochet coup in Chile in which the first elected Marxist led government was overthrown and Allende was killed. Many of the initial group of refugees resulting from the coup were Marxists, socialists or those who willingly worked with the regime. Canada's initial steps to assist the refugees were half-hearted at best. Canadian hypocrisy was displayed for all to see. The churches and humanitarian organizations were outraged. The professional civil servants, no longer directed by racism or anti-communism, had to bear the scars of that battle even though the policy was corrected. Canada ended up taking over 7,000 Chilean refugees and refugee policy emerged from its cold war cocoon.

However, the cold war anti-communism did have some positive points. The lid was closed on our previous racism. Following China's takeover of Tibet we ended up taking in a significant number of Tibetan refugees, our first refugees from Asia. We went on to take in thousands of Ugandan Asians. The 1970s began to emerge as the golden age of Canada's humanitarian approach to refugee questions. Anti-communism became the nail in the coffin of our racism.

IV. HUMANITARIANISM

The golden age of refugee policy was characterized by a non-partisan, non-racist and non-ideological approach to refugee issues in which the public sector not only began to play a significant role in the input to refugee policy but took a lead, in the case of the Indochinese refugees, in the implementation of

refugee resettlement. Though Canada tended to ignore the plight of the Indochinese from 1975 to 1978 restricting its intake to 8,000 refugees in 1975 and very small numbers subsequently lest we be too closely associated with American policy in Southeast Asia, by 1978 we began to take a leading role. In the period 1979-81, Canada had the highest per capita intake of Southeast Asian refugees and the largest percentage of these were sponsored by private groups out of their own funds.

But the private sector input began to wane with the decline of sustained media attention to the plight of the refugees. Differences began to emerge between the churches with their anti-American focus particularly in Central America in which humanitarianism was clearly influenced by anti-Americanism. Some church bureaucrats were passionately dedicated to the cause of the refugees from Central America but played an equivocal role vis-a-vis the large intake of 80,000 Indochinese refugees.

Private sector sponsorship fell from 25,000 per year to 2,500. The government began to look critically at a never-ending flow of refugees from Southeast Asia and began to re-examine repatriation and settlement in countries of first asylum as preferable strategies. Illegal immigration increased as many attempted to come in as refugee claimants. The government had to reconsider its priorities for preferring one group of refugees to another as the world refugee count continued to grow.

The very success followed by the slackening of effort by both the private and public sectors combined with an increasing input by academics brought into focus a need for far more refined and subtle policies, early warning systems, quantitative measures to prioritize the intake of refugees. The success of humanitarianism followed by its exhaustion led to a need for increasing rationalization and sophistication in the creation of refugee policy.

However, that same need for rationalization accompanied by in-depth academic studies demonstrated overall the greater efficaciousness of private sector sponsorship both in the cost per refugee settled (less than half the cost of government sponsored refugees) and in the success of that settlement. To implement a more rational and less costly approach the government will be thrust into joining the private sector in a co-sponsorship program for the benefit of the refugees. As policy formation becomes more sophisticated, requiring academic tools for analysis and prioritization, the resettlement process will likely become more specialized.

Thus, we find a number of processes proceeding hand in hand. First, the principle of humanitarianism as the foundation stone for refugee intake has been universalized. When the international definitions are too narrow to satisfy this principle, we amend our own regulations to go beyond international definitions. For example, on November 5, 1982, a

new Designated Class Regulation came into effect to cover political prisoners and oppressed persons within their own countries. Thus, we can take prisoners into Canada, say from Argentina, even though they do not fit UN definitions which require that persecuted individuals be outside their own country. A second piece of evidence is the Canadian lead and initiative in helping in the resettlement of Salvadorean refugees in contrast to the Americans who refuse to consider Salvadoreans as refugees.

The second factor is the declining numbers. The total of government sponsored refugees fell to about 11,000 in 1981 and 1982 and privately sponsored refugees fell to about 3,400. While our ethical principles grow more noble, our ethical practices become more limited and seem to have levelled off to a plateau. If not for increased family sponsored individuals under family reunification programs, the intake of refugees would have shown an absolute decline in 1982 compared to 1981.

The third factor is the increasing role of the private sector in the determination of refugee policy. The widespread use of the private sponsorship provision set the pace for the government, since the government had to sponsor one refugee for every one privately sponsored. This increased involvement resulted in equal access to programs for government and privately sponsored refugees, although privately sponsored refugees still seem to gain quicker access to jobs.

APPENDIX III

PROGRAMS AND SERVICES AVAILABLE TO REFUGEES

The objective of this report is to provide a brief description of the programs, both federal and provincial, designed to assist refugees and members of a designated class to settle in Ontario. The eleven programs, include: Transportation Loans, Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation, Adjustment Assistance, Refugee Liason Officers, English as a Second Language, Medical Assistance, Program for Employment Disadvantaged, New Employment Expansion and Development, Grants for Newcomer Language and Orientation Classes, Grants for Newcomer Integration, and Grants for Indochinese Refugee Settlement programs. With the exception of the Refugee Liaison Officers and the Indochinese Refugee Settlement programs, none of the others is specifically designed to serve refugees and members of a designated class. They are open to immigrants of various categories, and some are available to Canadian citizens. A few of them, like the Refugee Liason Officer, Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program, Grants for Newcomer Language and Orientation Classes, and Grants for Newcomer Integration Classes, aim at promoting the partnership between the private and public sectors.

The present report will outline the goals of these programs. The eligibility criteria for the programs will be indicated. Emphasis will be placed on the eligibility criteria for refugees and members of the designated class. The difference between

privately and publicly sponsored refugees with respect to access to government programs will be highlighted.

FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Transportation Loan - TL

The objective of the Transportation Loan program is to resettle Convention refugees and members of the designated class, as well as to bring to Canada independent immigrants whose skills are in high demand and who lack funds for transportation purposes. Only convention refugees (both publicly and privately sponsored) and members of a designated class are eligible for interest-free loans. Borrowers are expected to begin repayment as soon as they become self-sufficient, but repayment may be deferred where circumstances warrant.

Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program - ISAP

The objective of the ISAP is to facilitate the economic, social, and cultural adaptation of recently arrived immigrants. Assistance is implemented via non-profit organizations. The commission enters into legally binding fee-for-service contract with eligible non-governmental, non-profit organizations for the provision and/or development of essential, direct services to recently arrived newcomers. These services are of an economic and social nature, and complement sevices available through CECs and CICs. The services most commonly required by the immigrants include: reception and assistance at ports of entry and at communities of destination, information and assistance on

employment, interpretation, translation and escort services, assistance in finding accomodation, in-depth counselling, community orientation, assistance in the completion of applications or other documents, referral to authorized sources for specialized assistance and many other related services. Refugees, as well as immigrants, can benefit from the ISAP. No distinction is made between privately and publicly sponsored refugees in the access to this program.

Adjustment Assistance Program - AAP

The objective of the AAP is to provide financial assistance to a newcomer until any deficit between a refugee's needs and income no longer exists. A person legally admitted to Canada for permanent residence or a person who seeks permanent residence in Canada and has been allowed to enter or remain in Canada pending completion of landing formalities can be a recipient of the AAP. Assistance may be refused, discontinued or reduced for sponsored members of the family class, assisted relatives, and sponsored refugees, unless evidence is produced to show a breakdown of sponsorship or assistance by the assisting relatives or organization.

The assistance may be provided in the form of a contribution (non-recoverable payment made to a newcomer) or a loan (a payment made to a newcomer which is recoverable by monthly installments). A contribution may be authorized to:

(1) all eligible persons for basic needs of life in those cases where it is clearly indicated they will not have available for

transfer to Canada adequate assets to cover their establishment;
(2) indigent refugees and designated persons for basic household needs where there are clear indications that they will not have any assets available for transfer to Canada.

Loans may be authorized to:

(1) all eligible persons for basic needs of life;
(2) all eligible persons for basic household needs;
(3) all eligible persons including refugees and designated class persons for labour market access needs.

Refugee Liaison Officer -RLO

RLO was a special program introduced in 1980 in order to deal with the problem of settlement of Indochinese refugees at the time when their influx reached its peak. As the flow of immigrants reduced, the need for this program, as well as the program itself, ceased to exist. The objective of the RLO was to assist, as far as possible, in the successful social and economic integration of the Indochinese refugees into the Canadian society. The following key areas were identified within the RLO:

(1) Volunteer Sponsorship Development: assisting the sponsoring groups in maximizing their effectiveness in carrying out their responsibilities on behalf of refugees:

(2) Community Awareness Development: generation of support for refugees among provincial, local, or municipal agencies within the community, community groups, service clubs, etc. by ensuring a factual understanding of the Indochinese refugee situation and the means by which local efforts could assist refugees (this

area can be viewed as a response to the racism existing among the Canadian population);

(3) Refugee Awareness Development: identifying and stimulating those means which assist refugees to develop a positive attitude toward and involvement in their new community;

(4) Refugee Awareness Development: identifying and stimulating action with respect to local programs and services which, if adjusted, could assist in achieving objectives 1, 2, and 3 above;

(5) Information Exchange Network: maintenance of an integrated communication network among RLOs across the country.

No separate RLO body was created within the commission. Instead, people from various posts were temporarily assigned to the program. In Ontario, the major function of the RLO was orientation of sponsoring and ethnic groups. While the sponsoring organizations provided services primarily to the refugees they sponsored, ethnic groups catered to both categories of refugees - privately and publicly sponsored.

English as a Second Language - ESL

Starting in 1982, federal ESL courses became available free of charge to all refugees and members of a designated class. All types of refugees and members of a designated class who are one year older than high school leaving age and require language skills for their jobs are eligible to receive the training allowance.

The length of ESL programs varies from province to province as it is within the jurisdiction of the ministry of education of

each province to determine the duration of the course. In Ontario, the maximum length of an ESL course is six months.

Medical Assistance

Health and Welfare Canada is responsible for the payment of non-insured health costs incurred by government-sponsored refugees (also immigrants in transit from Canadian ports of entry to their destination in Canada and indigent immigrants). Medical surveillance procedure is implemented for those government-sponsored Indochinese refugees who have had a contagious disease which has been treated but which might become active again in the future. Basically, these immigrants agree to report to and have their condition monitored by provincial health authorities.

Health and Welfare Canada does not pay the medical expenses of sponsored refugees unless it is clearly established that the sponsorship has broken down and the refugee is not in a financial position to pay the costs. In the case of a non-sponsored refugee, Health and Welfare Canada pays for uninsured costs if they cannot be paid by the refugee or the provincial or municipal welfare plan. Dental costs for government sponsored refugees in excess of $80 per person required authorization from Health and Welfare Canada Regional Dental Officers. In Ontario, OHIP provides premium assistance to all refugees whose income falls under the established criteria, including privately sponsored refugees. There is no government financial assistance available for dental costs of privately sponsored refugees.

Program for the Employment Disadvantaged - PED

PED is a program designed to stimulate continuing employment in the private sector for persons who experience serious difficulties in securing such employment. People who have been unable to obtain employment due to a mental or physical disability or some other severe employment disadvantage (social, cultural, etc.) are eligible for this program. A person who has completed a language training course under the National Training Program and who, in the opinion of an employment counsellor is unlikely to obtain continuing employment within the next twenty weeks without the assistance of the program, is eligible under Phase 2. Starting March 17, 1983 this criterion was extended to include refugees, landed immigrants and other persons who have completed a language training course under the National Institutional Training Program. Many such people have viable skills, but marginal ability in the appropriate official language at the completion of language training. If these persons are not integrated rapidly into the work force, they lose their recently acquired language ability through non-use, which reduces their employment opportunities and leaves them on government support.

New Employment and Development Program -NEED

Through the NEED, employers may be able to hire the kind of skilled workers required to make improvements which they have had to delay because of the downturn in the economy. The NEED program contributes toward the wages of eligible workers up to an average of $200 per week. Eligible workers must 1) be legally entitled to

work in Canada, 2) be unemployed, 3) have the skills required for the project, and 4) have exhausted all entitlement to Unemployment Insurance benefits or be in receipt of social assistance.

In May, 1983, a new program, called Adjustment Assistance Need Program, was introduced. It was first implemented on June 30, 1983. Government-sponsored refugees receiving Adjustment Assistance are eligible to participate in the Need Program.The commission finds employment for an eligible refugee and contributes toward wages for a period of 26 weeks.

PROVINCIAL PROGRAMS AND SERVICES

Newcomer Services Branch

The Newcomer Services Branch functions to contribute to the cultural, social, and linguistic integration of immigrants. It:

(a) provides and supports settlement services by:

-providing multilingual settlement information services at Ontario Welcome House

-publishing and distributing orientation materials and publication

-supporting settlement services through consultation and library loan service

-funding community projects under the Newcomer Integration grants program

(b) provides and supports language/orienation/citizenship training by

-providing adult English classes and accompanying nursery at Ontario Welcome House
-funding community classes under the Newcomer Language/orientation classes grants program
-supporting ESL through consultation, teacher training and library loan service
-developing and distributing ESL publication and materials.

People who are not eligible for the Federal ESL courses, can benefit from the language training subsidized by the Provincial level of government. Government-sponsored refugees and members of a designated class benefit from the orientation program at Welcome House. Orientation for privately-sponsored refugees as well as members of the family class is mainly a responsibility of a sponsor.

The Branch has three grant programs:

(1) Grants for Newcomer Language and Orientation Classes -NLOC

NLOC provides funds for the operation of community-based classes relating to language, orientation, citizenship preparation, literacy, and special needs, held in cooperation with boards of education, libraries, churches, etc. Client groups may include community colleges, libraries, churches, immigrant aid agencies, settlement houses, and voluntary organizations.

(2) Grants for Newcomer Integration - NI

The NI grants assist voluntary organizations in developing and implementing projects which facilitate newcomer integration. It funds volunteer development/coordination, community outreach, coordination of settlement services and special projects. Client

COOPERATION BETWEEN PROVINCIAL MINISTRIES AND PROVINCIAL AN FEDERAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

The Province of Ontario has no over-all policy concernin resettlement and no comprehensive federal/provincial agreement Ministries and boards implement individual policies with littl collaboration between them. The Indochinese Refugee Settlemen Union (IRS) was created at the provincial level to facilitat collaboration between the ministries. Several meetings attende by representatives from the Ministry of Culture and Recreation Education, Health, and Community and Social Services were conducted. However, the Ministry of Education created its ow refugee unit with a primary focus on the needs of refuge children. Ministry of Health served refugees separately, an Ministry of Community and Social Services assigned staff to th Unaccompanied Minors program.

The creation of the Settlement Program Planning Committe (SPPC) can be cited as another example of an ineffective attempt at collaboration. The SPPC amalgalmated the representatives o Employment and Immigration Canada, Ministry of Culture an Recreation, Secretary of State, as well as Metro Toronto and community agency and association members.

TABLE

FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL PROGRAMS AVAILABLE TO REFUGEES IN ONTARIO

NAME OF PROGRAM	PROGRAM'S OBJECTIVES	ELIGIBILITY	
		GOVERNMENT SPONSORED REFUGEES	PRIVATELY SPONSORED REFUGEES
Transportation Loan - TL	Provides loans to refugees to cover their transportation	yes	yes
Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program - ISAP	Facilitates economic, social, and cultural adaptation via non-governmental non-profit organizations	yes	yes
Adjustment Assistance Program - AAP	Provides financial assistance until the deficit between the needs and the income no longer exists	yes	no*
Refugee Liaison Officer - RLO	Settled Indochinese refugees	yes	yes
English as a Second Language- - ESL	Provides language training and allowance while the course lasts	yes	yes
Medical Assistance (Federal)	Pays non-insured health costs	yes	no**
Ontario Health Insurance Plan- - OHIP	Provides a premium assistance to refugees while in financial need	yes	yes
Program for Employment Disadvantaged- - PED	Stimulates continuing employment for disadvantaged people	yes	yes
Adjustment Assistance New Employment Expansion and Development Program - NEED	Locates employment and pays wages to refugees	yes	no**

Newcomer Service Branch Orientation	Provides language, orientation, and information classes	yes	yes***
Grants for Newcomer Language and Orientation Classes - NLOC	Provides funds for operation of community-based classes	yes	yes
Grants for Newcomer Integration - - NI	Facilitates newcomer integration by funding volantary agencies	yes	yes
Grants for Indochinese Refugee Settlement - - IRS	The same as NI and NLOC for Indochinese refugees	yes	yes

* If breakdown occurs before term of sponsorship of family has ended, family sponsored refugees are referred to Welfare. In the case of the refugees sponsored by private organizations, if breakdown occurs before one year, and if a refugee is indigent, he becomes the responsibility of the Federal government; if it occurs after one year or after a refugee has been placed in 'continuing employment', he is then referred to Welfare.

** unless evidence is produced to show a breakdown of sponsorship

*** the assumption, however, is that sponsors are responsible for orientation of a refugee

In sum, discrepancy between privately and publicly sponsored refugees exists in their eligibility to the Adjustment Assistance, Federal Medical Assistance, and the Adjustment Assistance New Employment Expansion and Development programs. Within the category of privately sponsored refugees, those sponsored by private organizations are in a slightly advantageous position when compared to those sponsored by families or relatives. While the eligibility criteria vis-a-vis these two categories of refugees are identical, private organizations are usually more aware of the existing programs that refugees could benefit from.

APPENDIX IV

A Comparison of Government and Private Refugee Sponsorship: Costs

by

Shirra Freeman and Shannon Bell
Refugee Documentation Project

I. MODES OF PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP

There are four modes of private sponsorship:

1. Agency Sponsorship
2. Centralized Volunteer Sponsorship
3. Decentralized Volunteer Sponsorship
4. Local Group Sponsorship

1. Agency Sponsorship

Individual agencies directly enter into sponsorship agreements (contracts) with the government. JIAS exemplifies this type of sponsorship. There is little voluntary input in this model.

2. Centralized Volunteer Sponsorship

The national organization enters into a sponsorship agreement with the government and directly sponsors refugees. The Baha'i National Assembly adheres to this model. The National Assembly then assigns the refugees to local spiritual assemblies or to local Baha'i groups. The National Assembly administers all funds; local assemblies and groups donate funds to and receive funds from the central relief fund. The local assemblies are

responsible for actual settlement. Costs are totally equalized in this mode and government/private sector contact is simple and direct.

3. Decentralized Volunteer Sponsorship

National organizations sign umbrella agreements with the government on behalf of their membership; the national organization acts as a guarantor for the sponsorship programs undertaken by their local groups. Of the five groups examined in this study, the Mennonite Central Committee and the Christian Reformed Church entered into umbrella agreements with the federal government. The refugees are sponsored and funded by local groups. Costs to local groups vary and a much greater degree of private sector/government contact is required.

4. Local Group Sponsorship

A local group directly arranges with the government to sponsor refugee(s). They may funnel funds through a church, synagogue or coordinating agency, such as Operation Lifeline, in order to obtain the benefits of a charitable donation but the administration, costs and responsibility are solely that of the local group.

II. COSTS OF PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP

Per capita expenditures are available for five private sponsorship groups: Operation Lifeline's 1979-83 expenditure figures for the groups incorporated under its trust fund; the Baha'i National Spiritual Assembly's estimated sponsorship costs

from the inception of its refugee sponsorship program in 1981 to 1983; the Mennonite Central Committee's expenditures from the 1979-83 period in the Bethal Mennonite community; the Christian Reformed Church's refugee expenditure for 1979-80; and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Service's (JIAS) refugee expenditures for 1979-80 (Appendix 10). The Polish National Congress and the Solidarnosc Refugee Committee do not have available statistics or settlement expenditures.

Mode 1:	JIAS	1978-79	$1542	(Appendix a)
Mode 2.	Baha'is	1981-83	750	(Appendix b)
Mode 3:	Christian Reformed Church	1980	651	(Appendix c)
	Mennonite Central Committee	1979-83	922	(Appendix d)
Mode 4:	Operation Lifeline	1979-83	975	(Appendix e)

The average per capita cost of the Agency Model is over 50% higher than the cost of the next highest mode of sponsorship ($567 more than the $975 costs to local group sponsorships). As can be seen in Appendix (a), this is almost totally attributable to operating expenditures of JIAS which make up one-third of the total costs. This suggests that any private/government partnership should avoid this model which would follow the American pattern of creating a private agency bureaucracy to carry out governmental responsibilities.

The other modes of sponsorship are closer in costs. In the case of the Christian Reformed Church, their low costs may be attributed to several factors -- costs indicated were for 1980 alone and not later years. Secondly, as a rural farm community, refugees were frequently housed in their own homes. As well, cash payments for food costs were lower. The low figure of the Baha'is is partly attributable to the fact that many of the initial group of refugees had their own resources.

Note that actual costs were much less than those provided for in budget guidelines (cf. Appendices (b) and (f).

III. GOVERNMENT COSTS

Primary settlement needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc.) are financed under government sponsorship by the Adjustment Assistance Program (AAP) until the recipient has become self-sufficient up to a maximum of one year. The fund covers four categories of expenses:

(a) temporary accommodation - usually in a hotel until permanen housing is secured

(b) permanent accommodation - rent and food

(c) furniture

(d) clothing - initial and seasonal wardrobe

(a), (c) and (d) are one-time provisions which are usually assigned to the refugee soon after he or she arrives in Canada. Rent and other recurring expenses such as the purchase of food are covered by AAP on an ongoing basis until

the refugee is able to cover them his/herself.

AAP coverage is set at the local welfare rates and therefore will vary from region to region. When searching for rental accommodation, the refugees are directed by the regional CIC's ruling on a maximum monthly rate in accordance with the welfare level. Similarly, there is usually a budget figure for the initial purchase of furniture and clothing as well as a list of stores which provide the goods within a suitable price range.

Refugees may also be eligible for the Training Allowance if they have been referred to CEC's National Training Program for second language and other retraining which is considered necessary for the recipients' participation in the job market. The allowance is now available to privately as well as government sponsored refugees but not to family class or assisted relatives. However, the cost analysis predates equal access to the Training Allowance. During the training period, a government sponsored refugee receiving the allowance does not receive the full allowance provided under AAP.

Three sources of costs are used (Appendix (g):

1. The 1979-80 figures for government sponsorship costs are found in Evaluation of the 1979-80 Indochinese Refugee Program, CEIC Program Evaluation;
2. 1982 government figures are quoted in Howard Adelman's article "Equalization to Integration - Private Sponsorship and Government Sponsorship of Refugees", Refuge, Vol. 2, No.

5, June 1983;

3. the CEIC summary of Adjustment Assistance Program (AAP) costs for the period of April 1, 1982 to March 31, 1983 are published in Refugee Perspectives 1983-1984, CEIC publication.

The per capita expenditures for government sponsored refugees are: 1979-80, $2100; 1981-82, $2250; 1982-83, $2513. These expenditures are based on AAP figures; prior to 1982-83, AAP expenditures were not itemized.

IV. COMPARISON OF PRIVATE/GOVERNMENT COSTS

The comparison of private and government models of sponsorship from the standpoint of costs incurred by the sponsoring group is most clear in the area of basic living expenses. The respective cash outlays associated with each element of the living expenses have been the most consistently and clearly recorded of all the resettlement costs and consitute the major proportion of such costs. In addition, government and private sector responsibilities and jurisdictions are well established in this area.

The comparative cost of Operation Lifeline (averaging 1981-82 and 1982-83 expenditures) was $996 per refugee or approximately 60% less than government costs.

Using employment as a partial indicator of self-sufficiency, for

the 1979-80 period the Indochinese refugees sponsored by Operation Lifeline found employment on an average of four weeks sooner than did government sponsored refugees; the respective time periods before employment was found were 15.9 weeks and 19.9 weeks. For the 1982-83 period, government sponsored refugees required an average of 6.9 months before they were totally self-supporting. Corresponding data are not available for Operation Lifeline.

Since the inception of their sponsorship program in 1981, the Baha'i National Spiritual Assembly has estimated their per capita settlement costs from $500 to $1000, an average of $750. Comparing this figure to the 1981-82 government figure of $2250, this represents a saving of $1500 or 66.6%. The average length of sponsorship has been between three and six months.

Based on the costs incurred by the Bethal Mennonite Community in Winnipeg, the Mennonite Central Committee estimates their refugee per capita settlement costs as $922; this is for the period from 1979 to 1983. Comparing this figure to the 81-82 government figure of $2250, $922 represents a saving of $1328 or 59.1%. The average length of sponsorship is estimated at 8.27 months.

The Christian Reformed Church's 1979-80 per capita figure of $651 is $1449 or 69% less than the $2100 government expenditure for the same period.

Jewish Immigrant Aid Services' per capita cost figure of $1542

for 1978-79 represents a saving of $558 or 26.6% compared to the government's cost figure of $2100 for the 1979-80 period.

Group	Years	Average Per Capita Costs
Christian Reformed Church	1980	$651
Baha'i National Assembly	1981-83	750
Mennonite Central Cttee.	1979-83	922
Operation Lifeline	1979-83	975
JIAS	1978-79	1542
Total Average		$968

The variance between government and private costs for the overall period from 1979-83 indicates that private expenditure was on the average 55.4% less than government expenditure, even taking into consideration the much higher costs of JIAS sponsorship.

The CEIC's report, Evaluation of the Indochinese Refugee Program, offers two explanations for the fact that the per capita costs for private sponsorship are substantially less than for government sponsorship. The report states:

> [First]...many items such as donations of food, clothing, furniture, appliances, etc. were not itemized as tangible costs by (private) sponsors in the figures they provided on expenditures....the differential between the two modes of sponsorship becomes less marked when account is taken of the fact that under the government mode of settlement, all such items (e.g., food, clothing, furniture, appliances, etc.) had to be funded and recorded as dollar expenditures under the adjustment. [Second]...a significantly larger proportion of government-assisted refugees were single (i.e., unattached individuals) - 66.8% of government-assisted were unattached as compared to 42.7% of those

privately sponsored and it is likely per capita costs for single refugees were higher than for those belonging to a family or group as there are economies of scale for the latter when purchasing furniture and appliances and renting accommodation. (pp. 26-27)

The breakdown in costs of Operation Lifeline and government sponsored refugees should indicate whether this explanation is substantiated.

COST COMPARISONS

Accommodation, Food, Furnishings, Clothing, Training

	Accommodation	Food	Furnishings	Clothing	Training Allowance	Total
Government (1982-83)	(375 + 1428) $1,803		$344	$144	$179	
Operation Lifeline						
(1981-82)	275	325		56	534	
(1980-81)	245	239	53	44	308	
(1979-80)	291	292	95	88	318	

In the training allowances for privately sponsored refugees, medical costs and education fees are included which have no equivalent for government sponsored refugees Further, it would appear that privately sponsored refugees received more funds for miscellaneous expenses, pocket money and in-city transportation. This makes the discrepancies even larger than 60% between government and privately sponsored refugees. Clothing costs were about 50% less for privately sponsored refugees; furnishings considerably less; but the largest saving was clearly in accommodation.

The explanation for the cost saving is partially due to the shorter dependency period in the case of refugees sponsored through Operation Lifeline since they found employment four weeks or 20% earlier than government sponsored refugees (15.9 weeks versus 19.9 weeks). But this aspect may be even smaller since the refugees sponsored by the Mennonite Central Committee took an average of 70% longer to become self-sufficient; that is, 8 1/4 months versus 5 months.

Clearly, the biggest factor is the lower expenses for shelter, clothing and furnishings, even though out-of-pocket expenses are higher. The primary savings are in cash costs of goods and housing.

Other general costs to the private sector are included in Appendix (h), Operation Lifeline's Emergency Fund. Appendix (i)

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APPENDIX (a)

JEWISH IMMIGRANT AID SERVICES (JIAS), SERVICES, SETTLEMENT COSTS AND EXPENDITURES

mode of sponsorship: Local Agency Sponsorship time period: 1979 to 1980

JIAS, unlike the four other organizations, has included its operating and administrative costs in its per capita expenditures

A/*

SERVICES OFFERED :
- "welcoming"
- initial accommodation
- initial food
- supplementary and emergency medical and dental care expenses
- shipping and customs
- furniture ($1500 loan or supply of specific items of)
- allowance until employed
- income supplements based on need
- supplementary for aged dependents

1978-1979 Sponsorship survey, expenditures:

.average per family unit	$1894
.range	$300-$4242
.average hours spent per case	32
.average per individual	$1542
.average per family of 5	$2686

*source: JIAS Information Bulletin, March 28, 1980 (no. 469)

B/*

EXPENDITURES FOR YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 3], 1980 :

		1979	1980
Operating expenditures			
	immigration, documentation and general expenses	$ 40 998	$ 51 103
	location services	2 742	2 708
	naturalization and legal aid	7 165	8 609
	general administration	96 505	124 210
		147 410	186 630
Other Expenditures Relief Costs			
	transportation and reception	$ 42 492	$101 368
	immigrant aid	178 678	204 840
	clothing centre	3 074	2 350
	counselling, social and adjustment services	43 771	46 195
		268 015	354 753
Special Projects			
	South East Asian Refugee Expenses	--	$ 10 000
	Russian Information Booklet	3 600	- --
	TOTAL EXPENDITURES	$419 025	$551 383

*source: Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada, Central Region, Annual Meeting May 10, 1981

APPENDIX (b)

Baha'i National Spiritual Assembly:
Sponsorship Model and Settlement Costs

mode of sponsorship:

National Direct Sponsorship

Time Period: 1980 to 1983

Baha'i refugees are convention class refugees.

The National Assembly signed a sponsorship agreement with the government in October 1980. The first refugees arrived in the spring of 1981; the peak period of arrivals was the winter of 1982/83.

Baha'i refugees are Iranian who are outside Iran in the Philippines, India, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

Three hundred and fifty refugees have been sponsored since 1980. 30 of these have completed one-year sponsorship contracts; 320 are presently in the one-year sponsorship contract. Approximately 500 refugees are abroad waiting for admittance to Canada as convention class refugees.

The Baha'i National Assembly estimated the total costs for the sponsorship program to be a maximum of $1,000,000: this estimate was based on the sponsorship of 1,000 refugees at $10,000 per year. The $10,000-per-year figure was derived from the Private Sponsorship Guide budget estimate of $10,000 per refugee for the one-year period of sponsorship.

Thus far, the average cost per refugee has been between $500 and $1,000. This is in the form of a loan which is paid back to the National Assembly; the loan is interest free.

It is felt that the cost for the incoming 500 refugees will be higher than the cost for the 350 now in Canada. The cost of the refugees in Canada was low due to the fact refugees had their own finances; the finances of the incoming refugees are being spent while they wait for clearance to enter Canada.

Funds are administered centrally and distributed to local groups from the centrally located relief fund. Local Baha'i groups are responsible for settlement.

Approximately half the refugees are individuals and half are families. Refugees have been young -- under 35; well-educated and have a proficiency in English.

APPENDIX (c)

Christian Reformed Church Settlement Costs

mode of sponsorship: National Umbrella Group

Time period: 1979 to 1980

In 1980, a total of 1,229 individuals in 242 families were sponsored. In 1981, a total of 185 individuals in 53 family units were sponsored. In 1982 the numbers were 168 corresponding to 72 families. Cost figures are only available for 1979-80; as follows:

Total Costs	$723,413.00	
Costs per Family	3,259.99	(average family size:5)
Costs per capita	651.00	

Results at sponsorship period end 1980:

Rate of employment	58%
Rate of self-sufficiency per family unit	55%
Rate of support still required	35%
Lost contact with	10%

A CRWRC survey of refugee sponsorship and resettlement by the Christian Reformed Churches in Canada up to December 31, 1980 was complted in February, 1981. It shows some interesting statistics:

Refugees Sponsored

Total church responses to the survey	63%
Total number refugees sponsored	1,229
Total number of families sponsored	242
Refugees obtained through government	50%
Refugees obtained through CRWRC	49%
Refugees through other channels	1%

Finances

Total funds spent for resettlement	$723,413
Total funds per refugee family (over period)	3,259
Total funds per refugee family (over month)	369

Time

Total members contributing time (over period)	18,459 hours
Total members contributing time (per month)	158 hours
Total members contributing time (per refugee family)	15 hours

APPENDIX (d)

Mennonite Central Committee Settlement Costs

mode of sponsorship:

National Umbrella Group

Time Period: 1979 to 1983

The information provided is on the Bethal Mennonite Church in Manitoba, the largest of the local Mennonite sponsorship groups.

Between 1979 and 1983, a total of 60 individuals were sponsored in a group composed of 11 units or family groups.

Total Costs:	1979-1982	$54,331.09	
	1983	3,000.00	(This is for one family of 7 people)
		57,331.09	
Cost per family		5,211.00	
Cost per capita		922.00	(average family size is 6)

Amount of time taken to achieve self-sufficiency:

Number of people constituting a family unit	Period of Support (mos)
6	5
2	5
5	11
4	11
5	10
14	3
7	10
3	5
4	12
3	7
7	12
Total 60	Average Period 8.27

Cost Break-Down

Rent $250.00 to $325.00 per month
$3,000 to $3900 per year
Furniture - donation
Clothing - donation
Food, Pocket Money, etc., Allowance
- same as the Winnipeg Welfare rates
Transportation - public transit passes provided

APPENDIX (e)

Operation Lifeline Settlement Costs

mode of sponsorship: Local Funnelling Group

Time Period: 1979 to 1983

Of the 93 cases on file, statistics are available for 89 cases.

Total families sponsored 89; number of individuals 329. Average family size 5 to 6 people.

1979 - 1980

35 Families 127 individuals

Rent			
Total cost -	$36,974.56	Per capita cost -	$291.14
Food			
Total Costs -	$37,034.84	Per capita cost -	$291.61
Furnishings	- $12,108.77		- $ 95.34
Clothing	- $11,212.58		- $ 88.29
OHIP	- $ 1,792.16		- $ 14.11
Dental	- $ 1,782.00		- $ 14.03
Medical Aides	- $ 1,348.49		- $ 10.62
Misc.	- $11,201.00		- $ 88.20
Pocket Money	- $23,362.64		- $183.96
Transport	- $ 395		- $ 3.11
Education	- $ 455.00		- $ 3.58
Total	$137,667.04		$1083.99

318.01

APPENDIX (f)

Operation Lifeline Sample Budget

EXPENSES

Rent: Use provincial welfare or government sponsorship levels as a guideline, while checking that accommodation is in fact available at those levels. Do not maintain the newcomers in a situation which they will not be able to afford.

$300/month x 12 = $3,600/yea

Food: Cultural preferences are not likely to alter the food budget from that of an average Canadian family that must spend carefully.

$200/month x 12 = $2,400/yea

Clothing: To some extent, expenditures can be lessened through donations, but some purchases of new clothing will be necessary.

$100/month x 12 = $1,200/yea

Transportation: It is not the sponsor's responsibility to furnish a car. If the newcomers' place of work or study is not accessible by existing public transit, and relocation is not desirable, this may be an option worh considering.

$30/month x 12 = $360/yea

Furniture: In addition to the regular expenses involved in household maintenance, there will be some expenses incurred in establishing the household. The greatest of these will be for furniture, and will vary widely depending on the size of the household and the amount of furniture donated. $300

Utilities and other household expenses: Do not forget telephone, laundry, utilities, etc.

$50/month x 12 = $600/yea

Health and Dental: The newcomers may incur medical expenses which may not be covered by provincial health insurance plans, such as the cost of glasses, prescriptions, and dental care.

$300 x 3 persons = $900

APPENDIX (f) (cont'd)

Education: This includes possible tuition fees, the costs of any tools that might be required, and such items as school supplies for children.

Reserve Back-up: Allow about 5% for any unforeseen expenses. $500

Note: Pocket Money: In addition to the above, there is a large gray area for non-essentials such as wardrobe additions, household extras, entertainment, or cigarettes for which you may wish to furnish some disposable income. It is often tempting to be quite liberal in this regard, and of course that is the prerogative of each sponsorship group. However, bear in mind that expectations that might be difficult for the newcomers to satisfy when they achieve independence should not be cultivated.

TOTAL $9,860

INCOME

Family Allowance: Refugees are eligible for family allowance payments for each child under 18 years of age. Although applications for Family Allowance will not be accepted without Social Insurance Numbers, payment when received will be retroactive to the month after the newcomers' arrival in Canada.

$21/month x 12 = $252

Salaries: This figure can only be estimated when it has been determined which of the newcomers will be working, when they will begin, and what wage they can reasonably expect to earn. Do not assume they will have a full-time income in the short-term, since full-time language training for the first few months is a possibility. Assume instead that the newcomers will earn no income for the first six months and that from then on, one wage-earner will be earning minimum wage.

$600/month x 6 = $3,600

Once a full-time job is secured, you might consider a plan for the gradual cessation of your support. For example, for the first month or two of employment, earnings could be deducted from the support payment at a 50% rate. This will help orient the newcomers to the idea of independence while avoiding any sense that the sponsors are deserting them. The details will, of course, depend on the particular situation.

TOTAL $3,852

The difference between anticipated expenses and income is the amount the sponsorship group should be prepared to pay for the refugees' support during the one-year period; in this case:

Expenses	$9,860
Less Income	3,852
	$6,008

Government Settlement Costs for April 1982 to May 1983*

APPENDIX (g)

Employment and Immigration Canada / Emploi et Immigration Canada

ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
PROGRAMME D'AIDE À L'ADAPTATION
QUARTERLY REPORT
RAPPORT STATISTIQUE TRIMESTRIEL

Region – *Région*: National

Report Period – *Période visée par le rapport*: April 1 '82 - March 31 '83

SETTLEMENT COSTS -SUMMARY

Categories of Expenses / *Catégories de dépenses*	Recipients / *Bénéficiaires*	Expenses – *Dépenses*			Average Cost per Recipients / *Coût moyen par bénéficiaire*
		Planned / *Prévus*	Actual / *Réelles*	Variance / *Écart*	
In Transit / *En cours de route*	5061	144,045	219,994		43
In Temporary Accommodation / *En logement temporaire*	8859	3,668,474	3,318,871		375
In Permanent Accommodation / *A domicile*	71909	12,019,952	14,891958		*(3) 6.9 x 207 1428
Furniture / *Meubles*	*(1) 10,352	3,881,524	3,559,139		344
Clothing / *Vêtements*	*(1) 10,352	2,843,211	1,488,850		144
Training Allowance Subsidy / *Supplément aux allocations de formation*	33,426	2,062,580	1,284,592		*(3) 4.7 x 38 179
TOTALS / TOTAUX		24,619,786	24,763,404		2513

Arrivals / *Immigrants*	Planned / *Nombre prévu*	Actual / *Nombre réel*	Variance / *Écart*
Government Sponsored / *Parrainés par le gouvernement*		*(1) 10352	
Private Sponsored / *Parrainés par des organismes privés*			

*Average Length of Time on Receipt of Adjustment Assistance / *Durée moyenne du versement de l'aide à l'adaptation* *(3) 6.9

*Average Length of Time on Training Allowance Subsidy / *Durée moyenne du versement des suppléments aux allocations* *(3) 4.7

Observations

*Transit and Training allowance are covered by T.L. and National Training Program respectively, not AAP.

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* Prior to 1982, expenditures on refugees by AAP were not itemized; consequently, settlement cost date is not available.

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Equalization to Integration

Private and Government Sponsorship of Refugees

Private sponsorship was introduced as a mode of augmenting the intake of refugees into Canada above and beyond those brought in under direct government sponsorship. The model has been a tremendous success, but there have been numerous proposals to equalize and/or integrate the two schemes because of the differential successes as well as the inequities of the two models. The Minister of Employment and Immigration has already introduced a number of measures to reduce inequities through changes in the eligibility criteria for training and in benefits for privately sponsored refugees, and has pledged to establish a program of joint sponsorship.[1]

Before an integrated model is implemented as a third stage in partnership of the public and private sectors, several steps would be helpful. First, a careful review of the objectives of such a model would be necessary. Also, an assessment of existing data relevant to such integration and an examination of what policies would need to be altered and what short and long term consequences might be anticipated for each model of integration could then follow.

A refugee resettlement policy relevant to the creation of an integrated model would need to take several factors into account.

1. Limiting Parameters

— There should be no mandatory private sponsorship of government sponsored refugees.

— The policy should not exclude private sponsorship of refugees.

2. Selection

(a) *Numbers* — The number of refugees taken in should not decrease, and, if possible, should be increased.

(b) *Choice* — The refugees selected should be those most in need. At the same time, the refugees selected should reflect those desired by sponsors in Canada. (These two objectives are not inherently compatible but they are not inherently irreconcilable either.)

(c) *Speed* — The new model should not inhibit the requirement of an emergency response to crisis situations.

3. Adaptation

(a) The model should ensure all refugees resettled in Canada have equal access to services, programs and allowances.

(b) The model should ensure that no private sponsorship group carries an unanticipated totally disproportionate share of the burdens of sponsorship. (Among Indochinese sponsorship groups, 16% of the refugees required support beyond one year and 60% of these were supported by their sponsors.)

(c) The model should be consistent, if possible, in giving priority either to language and cultural adaptation or to economic self-sufficiency.

(d) The model should attempt to give government sponsored refugees the same advantages provided by the personal private networks for privately sponsored refugees that enabled them to obtain jobs four weeks earlier than government sponsored refugees and, perhaps (as in Quebec), achieve a higher participation rate in employment.

(e) The model should attempt to provide as many refugees as possible with a personal volunteer support system which has shown to be so effective and beneficial in the resettlement of refugees, a benefit which most government sponsored refugees do not now presently enjoy.

4. Costs

The new model should not cost any more in total costs or in the cost per government sponsored refugee and, if possible, should utilize the savings, through the use of private sponsorship, to augment the whole refugee intake program since, "the voluntary sector, properly supported, can provide the needed services more adequately than the Government directly, and at considerably less cost."[2]

5. Co-operation

Any model proposed should be one which enhances and affirms real co-operation between the government and the private sector so that private sponsors do not feel as if they are merely being used. They should be given opportunities to participate in the formulation of policies affecting refugees. Second, any model proposed should facilitate the development of a *three*-way partnership which includes the refugees themselves as well as the government and private sectors.

Comparative Data

Comparative studies of cost and adjustment factors related to private and government sponsorship reveal that, for example, in the case of the Indochinese refugees, the settlement costs of private sponsorship were $753 less per refugee (a 33 1/3% saving) than the costs of government sponsored refugees, after deduction of the base costs of transport, overseas costs, etc., for all refugees. The savings result from shorter support periods on average, donated chattels (clothing, furniture, and appliances), and some donated professional services (legal, dental and accounting).

Privately sponsored refugees obtained employment on an average of 4 weeks earlier than government sponsored refugees in spite of the fact that government sponsored refugees had better language skills and higher educational qualifications.

Also, the satisfaction with the personal support system contrasted with the disappointment refugees experienced in obtaining attention from overworked government counsellors.[3]

Alternative Sponsorship Models

Simple cost sharing and per capita grants would significantly increase the costs to the government and would not provide private support for government sponsored refugees. A combination loan/grant scheme might solve the cost problem but not the human support one. The friendship family model for government sponsored refugees has worked well in some areas but has had difficulty in larger urban areas.

An incentive scheme (which continues the principle of the government matching proposal initiated with the Indochinese Refugee Sponsorship Program but applied to the economics of individual sponsorship) might be tried. There are at least two variations.

Scheme A

For every government sponsored refugee co-sponsored by the private sec-

TABLE 1 (In 1981 dollars)	Costs per Refugee (1)	(2)	Grant Available for Priv. Sponsor
Estimated cost sponsorship per refugee	2100	2100	
33⅓% savings of private sponsorship	-700	-700	1400
Estimated Cost of Government-Private Co-sponsorship	1400	1400	

TABLE 2 (In 1982 dollars)	Costs Per Refugee (1)	(2)	(3)	Grant For Priv. Sponsor	Available For Base Costs
Estimated cost of gov't sponsorship	2250	2250	2250		
One-third Saving	-750	-750	-750	1500	750
Estimated Cost of Gov't-Private Co-sponsorship	1500	1500	1500		

tor, the government would pay one-half of the estimated costs of a refugee sponsored by the private sector. In *1981* dollars, after deduction of $1400 base cost for all refugees, the calculation would be as illustrated in Table 1 above.

As is the case now, church groups or collectives of individuals would sign up to co-sponsor refugees selected by the government. If they did so under an umbrella agreement, the umbrella organization would receive $1400 for the expenses of the co-sponsored refugee plus a grant of $700 towards an additional privately sponsored refugee. Individual groups could accumulate credits towards a future sponsorship or assign their credit.

If fully utilized for 14,000 government sponsored refugees, it could result in 7,000 privately sponsored refugees. Since the normal number of anticipated privately sponsored refugees might be about half that number, there would be an additional base cost of $1400 per refugee or about an extra $4,000,000 cost to the government.

Scheme B

For every three government sponsored refugees co-sponsored by the private sector, the government would pay the estimated costs of a refugee sponsored by the private sector. In *1982* dollars, after deduction of $1500 for base costs, the calculation would be as illustrated in Table 2 above.

If there are now an estimated 3,000 private sponors per year and the program above were fully utilized to increase private sponsorships to 4,000, Scheme B would produce enough revenues to contribute towards the base costs of 2,000 such sponsorships. Since the government now pays the base costs of all 3,000 privately sponsored refugees, there would be a new saving of $1500 for 1,000 refugees or $1,500,000. These funds could be used as a contingency fund:

(a) to pay for improved back-up services to refugees;

(b) to subsidize any private sponsorship that ran into extraordinary costs above the average.

TABLE 3

Objective	Scheme A	Scheme B
Selection		
(a) Numbers	Would increase 20%	Would increase 6.6%
(b) Choice - need - sponsors	Responds to both but even more sensitive to sponsors	Responds to both
(c) Speed	No inhibitions to emergency response	No inhibitions to emergency response
Adaptation		
(a) Equal access to Services	As at present but there would be extra costs for the additional refugees	Would increase services slightly for all refugees
(b) Equity to Sponsors	No contingency for special cases	Contingency fund for special cases
(c) Priority language or economic adaptation	Both schemes increase the bias to economic self-sufficiency over language acquisition in the initial phases as this is a bias of private sponsorship	
(d) Network for Economic Adaptation	Greater burden on fewer people	Decreased burden per person but more people needed
(e) Personal Contact for Gov't sponsored refugees	There would be a greater incentive for the private sector to co-sponsor gov't refugees and fewer people would need to be involved: therefore, there would be a greater probability for more gov't sponsored refugees to be co-sponsored	Lesser probability that as as many gov't sponsored refugees would be co-sponsored
Costs	More cost to gov't.	Less cost to gov't so more left for improvements & contingencies

Comparison of Scheme A and Scheme B — See Table 3 Above

If both schemes are compared in relation to the objectives outlined above, Scheme B is clearly better from the government perspective except for the fact that there is a decreased possibility that all government sponsored refugees would be supported by private networks. From the private perspective, Scheme A seems better since more refugees would be brought in and a higher proportion would be responsive to private priorities, but it would not have the advantage of Scheme B in offsetting inequities in private sponsorship or in improving back-up services.

Conclusion

Whatever plan is utilized, it is imperative that the process for developing a new model exemplify the process of co operation of the private and government sectors. It should not emerge by fiat. The present process of federal/private sector consultations hopefully will not only result in a new, more effective model, but will also build a base for more systematic co-operation of the public and private sectors.

[1]Speech to TESL, CANADA, Edmonton, Alberta. Nov. 11, 1982. p. 14 -15. "I have also initiated . . . a proposal to undertake joint sponsorship between the federal government and private sponsors for refugees." cf. also the Minister's speech to the Canadian Polish Congress, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Nov. 12, 1982, p. 11.

[2]"Evaluation of the Indochinese Refugee Group Sponsorship Program." Canada Employment and Immigration, 1982.

[3]cf. Lawrence Lam, "Vietnamese-Chinese Refugees in Montreal," Ph.D Thesis, York University, April, 1983, pp. 229-234. See also, N. Lanphier, "Sponsorship of Refugees in Canada" *Migration News*, 1982.

A further $58.7 million was expended by the CEIC on the Adjustment Assistance Program and Language Training Allowances - costs that can be directly related to the settlement of government-assisted refugees only during fiscal years 1979-80 and 1980-81. Pro-rating this total of $58.7 million to government-assisted refugees indicates an additional per capita expenditure of $2,100 to give a total per capita expenditure of $3,416 for each government-assisted refugee.

Table 13

Canada Employment & Immigration Commission
Expenditures on Indochinese Refugee Program
Fiscal Years 1979-1981

	1979-80 Fiscal Yr.	1980-81 Fiscal Yr.	1979-81 Fiscal Years		Total
	$ (000's)	$ (000's)	$ (000's)	$ (000's)	$ (000's)
Staging Areas	$ 2,466	$ 1,177	$ 3,643		3,643
Resettlement					
. Adjustment Assistance Program (AAP)	14,943	27,521		42,464*	42,464
. Immigrant Settlement & Adaptation Program (ISAP)	807	1,118	1,925		1,925
. Indochinese Refugee Settlement Grants Program	410	300	710		710
Language Training					
. Course Purchases	16,291	31,291	47,582		47,582
. Allowances	4,992	11,248		16,240*	16,240
Transportation	10,012	12,953	22,965		22,965**
Refugee Task Force Activities	320	308	628		628
Overseas Operations	766	754	1,520		1,520
Finance and Administration	280	570	850		850
Refugee Liaison Officers	565	1,593	2,158		2,158
Public Affairs	183	23	206		206
Evaluation	--	135	135		135
Canadian Foundation for Refugees	500	110	610		610
Grand Total	52,535	89,101	82,932	58,704	141,636

* Costs that can be directly associated with the settlement of the 27,955 government-assisted refugees who arrived in Canada between January 1979 and March 1981.

** These Transportation expenditures relate to the subsidy portion only of transportation costs.

Source: Finance & Administration, Canada Employment &

APPENDIX (h)

OPERATION LIFELINE EMERGENCY FUND EXPENDITURES

DECEMBER 1979 - FEBRUARY 1983

Number of applications approved 94

Type of Expense	Number of Applications	% of Total	Expenditure	% of Total
Dental	61	64.8	$56,321.00*	60.7
Medicinals	5	5.3	1,569.30	1.7
Death and Funeral Related	2	2.1	1,779.40	1.9
Transportation	1	1.1	408.00	.4
Hardship, Living Expense, Sponsorship Breakdown	18	19.1	16,308.84	17.6
Education and Professional Requalification	4	4.2	11,845.00**	12.8
Other (Loans to Agencies etc)	5	5.3	4,525.50	4.9
TOTALS	94		92,757.04	

* includes $15,000 set aside to pay for dental work to be done on 150 children by the University of Toronto Dental Clinic.

** includes $10,000 allocated for 10 Vietnamese doctors to enroll in a preparatory course for ECFMG qualification examination.

The above are some hidden costs not accommodated by existing provisions incurred by both government and private sponsored refugees.

APPENDIX (i)

Non-Settlement Costs

(a) Overseas

	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
Total	$766,000	$745,000		
Salary	386,000			
Non-Salary	380,000			

Figures are for CEIC and the Indochinese Movement only.
Source: CEIC, Evaluation of the 1979/80 Indochinese Refugee Program April, 1982.
CEIC, Indochinese Refugees, The Canadian Response 1979 and 1980, 1981.

(b) TL

	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
No. of Loans Issued	1,283	16,292	14,875	1,084	7,084
Value of Loans	$1,282,308	22,724,811	18,534,557	1,146,931	11,525,383

(c) One-Time Cost Staging Areas

	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
Total	2,466,000	1,177,000		
Salary	470,000			
Non-Salary	1,534,000			
Interpreters	462,000			

Figures are for CEIC and the Indochinese movement only.
Source: CEIC, Evaluation of the 1979/80 Indochinese Refugee Program April, 1982.
CEIC, Indochinese Refugees, The Canadian Response 1979 and 1980 1981.

(d) Transit

1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
				$219,994

APPENDIX (j)

Breakdown of Services

A source of imprecision is found in the government's system of funding resettlement through a complex network of government transfers. There is also a jurisdictional component in the delivery of services which tends to cloud the figures. Often, resettlement activity is channelled through departments whose mandate is not specific to refugees. It may be related to immigration in general or to services such as health or education. Since the recipients may not be identified as refugees, appropriate cost figures cannot be accessed. There have been some special programs such as the I.R.S. for the Indochinese which have been administered by various departments associated with specific services. In these cases, some measurement of costs can be made. But it is difficult to make distinctions between government and privately sponsored refugees when both use a government or a voluntary agency service, but one group may use a service more than the other.

1. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC)

(a) Direct Services

- provision of basic needs of government sponsored refugees until self-sufficiency is achieved (i.e., refugee is employed and earning enough income to cover basic needs) up to a maximum of one year
- training allowance under the National Training Program to

privately and government sponsored refugees for the duration of language training courses deemed necessary for employment

- job counselling and placement through CECs
- language and occupational training (financed partially through CEIC)
- other settlement services: reception; information, counselling and orientation; translation and interpretation (The above services may also be administered by non-governmental agencies.)
- matching (through regional settlement units in conjunction with the national headquarters): refugees with private sponsors; refugees to geographic regions; screening of potential private sponsors; private sponsor orientation.

(b) Funded Services (cf. Appendix g)

(c) Special Programs

- Handicapped Refugees Program
- Tubercular Refugees Program
- Joint Assistance program (JAP)
- Unaccompanied Minors Program

2. Secretary of State (SOS)/Multiculturalism Directorate

- programs aimed at facilitating integration over the longer term (language and citizenship preparation, grants to voluntary agencies providing refugee support services)
- project-based funding to community agencies
- provincial/federal cost-sharing agreements for language training

Major Program

- Cultural Integration Program (CIP)

3. Department of External Affairs

- overseas operations (embassies, etc., excluding activities of CEIC officials outside of Canada)

4. Health and Welfare Canada

- health screening in camps and other overseas locations
- staging area health services
- family allowance payments
- participation in federal/provincial cost-sharing agreements for health care

5. Provincial Ministries of Health, Education, Citizenship and Culture, and Community and Social Services

- services and programs offered vary from province to province
- many programs and services are administered at the provincial level and financed by transfers, etc. from CEIC and/or SOS as well as other federal departments

6. Municipality Level including Public Health, Boards of Education, etc.

- generally, no legislative responsibility for resettlement, but some grants are given to community groups such as the grants the City of Ottawa gave to Project 4000.

APPENDIX (j)

BREAKDOWN OF SERVICES FOR WHICH REFUGEES ARE ELIGIBLE UNDER TERMS OF SPONSORSHIP

Service Associated with expenditure	Private Sponsorship Group Responsibility	Government Responsibi (fed/prov/mun)
basic living expense budget: rent, food, transportation, furniture & household	.included in 12 month basic budget for sponsors	.CEIC financed AAP direct payments to
health care	.CEIC/Health and Welfare Canada transfers to provincial ministries of health cover the costs of provincially administered medicare premiums	
	.costs exceeding coverage may be referred to municipal social services and private agencies .theoreticlly, they are the responsibility of private sponsors	.costs exceeding coverage may be referred to local CEIC as well as municipal social services and private agencies
dental care	.no public insurance plan	
	.sponsors' responsibility .cases may be referred as above	.cases may be referred as above
	.Municipal Public Health and boards of education provide dental care to all children in school systems	
education: ESL/FSL, job training	.administered by municipal school boards, provincial ministries of education and	

	the Ministry of Colleges and Universities .funded by CEIC seat purchases in community colleges, SOS cost sharing and text book purchases, Provincial level block grants (various ministries and programmes) and CEIC ISAP grants to voluntary agencies .second language training costs are absorbed only for refugees who require it for the Canadian workplace
)ther settlement :elated:	
'oluntary Agencies immigrant refugee ethnic etc	.available to private sponsors & refugees depending on mandate of given agency .services vary with agencies' mandate .funded privately and by gov't programs (fed/prov/mun; with transfers) eg: fee for service grants, set-up/ operation grants, ISAP, AAP, etc...
ıpecial programs u/c minors joint assistance	.special fed/prov/private sponsor cost-sharing agreements
ıon-settlement transportation	.Transportation Loan (CEIC)
overseas staffing & operations	.Department of External Affairs, CEIC and Health Welfare Canada
administration	CEIC

Sources: CEIC, Evaluation of the 1979-80 Indochinese Refugee Program, April 1982

CEIC, Indochinese Refugees: The Canadian Response, 1979 and 1980

Canadian Standing Conference of Organizations Concerned with Refugees, Policy Background Papers "A" Stream, Session 2: Refugee Quotas, Targets and Programs, June 1980 pp 23-35

APPENDIX (k)

Health and Education Costs

All refugees are now eligible for full premium assistance financed through a federal/provincial cost-sharing agreement though this was not the case prior to 1980. The Operation Lifeline figures (Appendix e) show a drop in the allocations to OHIP over the years 1979-80 which corresponds to the change.

Medical care whose costs exceed those prescribed by medicare are theoretically to be covered by the AAP allowance in the case of government sponsorship and by groups in the case of private sponsorship. In fact, there are a number of municipal and voluntary agencies who offer either direct financial aid (see Appendix h, Operation Lifeline Emergency Fund) or health care at a subsidized rate. Government sponsored refugees may also appeal to their CEIC offices for unexpected medical costs.

Local public health units are charged with maintaining medical surveillance on refugees who have entered Canada with a diagnosed non-transmissable disease. The units generally prefer to be notified when a refugee family arrives in the municipality so that they can detect potential health problems and offer advice on general health, nutrition and child care if it is necessary. The public health care system also functions in the schools, screening children for conditions such as lice and scabies before they become hazardous. There are no figures available on the

costs of the above services because the health units generally do not make the distinctions between refugees and the rest of the population except in the case of special programs, for example, the Metropolitan Toronto Southeast Asian Mental Health Project.

No public dental insurance plan exists in any province in Canada. Therefore, most dental needs must be financed in the same manner as medical care which exceeds insurance coverage, through agencies and subsidized clinics. The Operation Lifeline Emergency Fund has documented 60 cases of requests for aid in covering the costs of dental care. The corresponding allocations represent 60% of the total monies spent by the fund in its three years of existence (see Appendix h). School-aged children receive dental care through the departments of public health and boards of education but cost figures are again unavailable because pupils are not designated as refugees.

Second language training is made available to refugees who require it for participation in the work force (cf. Appendix g).

An accurate assessment of the cost associated with language and occupational retraining is difficult to obtain because of the large number of government departments involved and the complexity of the system of transfers.

Courses which are offered in community colleges are administered by provincial ministries of education and the federal Ministry of

APPENDIX L

PROJECT INTER-AMICOS

Why Project Inter-Amicos?

1. Project Inter-Amicos is Ottawa-Carleton Immigrant Services Organization's response to the ongoing need for resettlement assistance for those Indochinese refugees who remain in Southeast Asian camps(Hongkong, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia). After almost 5 years of operation, these refugees camps have become an increasingly unbearable burden for the host countries and refugees alike. They are most definitely not a healthy environment in which to raise children nor for adults to wait endlessly to begin a new life. For this reason, Project Inter-Amicos has been established 1) to find a place for the resettlement of refugees who have spent several years of their lives in the camps, and 2) to mobilize international support in order to finance the costs.

2. History

In May, 1982, Ottawa-Carleton Immigrant Services Organization (OCISO) had the pleasure of meeting with Mr. Karl Stumpf, Vice-president of the Hongkong Council for the Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees. The purpose of Mr. Stumpf's visit was to encourage the Canadian government and the private sector to take more refugees from Hongkong. During talks with our organization and other community representatives, the idea for Inter-Amicos was born. Specifically, this meant the organization of a permanent sponsor group under the aegis of OCISO, a non-profit, charitable social service organization, to take on the task of sponsoring, in a continuous but limited fashion, families from the Hongkong camps. Since we have a limited staff and Board we felt we had to, at present, limit our undertaking to family re-unification cases. Moreover, since Mr. Stumpf had access to some funds and we were penniless, we felt compelled to begin with sponsoring refugees solely from the Hongkong camps as the need was there and the monies to meet that need were available.

Organization of OCISO's Inter-Amicos Project

1) A sponsor group of 5 members (2 OCISO staffers, 2 Board members and a community volunteer).

..2/

2) The staffers, both from the Vietnamese Resettlement Program, identify families who need monetary support to sponsor members of their families who are presently in the Hongkong camps. A clear indication of the money needed to sponsor their relatives is negotiated.

3) A request for a monetary supplement+the name of the family and their camp number in Hongkong is then sent to:

Mr. Karl Stumpf
Vice-President
Hongkong Community Council
for the Resettlement of
Vietnamese Refugees
33 Granville Road,
Knowloon, Hongkong

Note: We also seek monies from community groups--past private sponsor groups, churches etc...

4) At the same time the sponsoring group here makes contact with their local immigration office to begin the process of sponsorship for a one-year commitment.

OCISO's Inter-Amicos project has been successful in utilizing this process. We hope that your organization can assist families in your area in a similar way. We realize that every immigrant-aid service has different priorities and limited staff but community support for such an initiative could be of immense help in such an undertaking. We urge you to consider taking on the task of organizing a continuing sponsorship project as the needs of those thousands of refugees who remain in the camps grow with each passing day. Moreover, we would like to see Inter-Amicos develop to the extent that it has a sufficient financial base to support the sponsoring of families from the Thai and Malaysian camps.

- Camp Liaison Officer His main duty is to maintain a constant contact with various refugee camps (Hongking, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) to obtain the profile of every refugee for placement in North America or Western Europe. Urgent cases such as orphans and mentally-disturbed rape victims, etc must have the first priority. He must be aware of urgent problems of each camp (such as racial riots, human rights violations, ...) to report to the Executive Director who will seek international support to assist the camp-government or the government of the country where the camp is located to solve those problems.

- Finance Officer His duties consist of (1) financial planning and management, (2) maintaining close contacts with international organizations or individuals who can provide financial support to the project, (3) disbursing financial assistance to various sponsors to help their sponsored refugees according their needs.

- Individual Sponsor Officer He is in charge of (1) liaison with private individuals who want to participate in the family-reunification program and who cannot have adequate financial means to do so, (2) screening requests submitted by individuals who want to sponsor refugees, (3) supervising the settlement of refugees and solve problems of conflict between sponsors and refugees.

- Group Sponsor Officer He is in charge of (1) enlisting various religious, regional, professional, or ethnic associations or groups to sponsor refugees, (2) mathching refugees with sponsors, (3) assisting sponsors to settle their refugees.

- The Immigration Liaison Officer and the Press Liaison Officer are well-known or well-experienced individuals in the country of resettlement to help the Center in its relationship with the government (Department of Immigration and Manpower) and the press. Official support of the INTER-AMIC . project and a favourable public opinion towards the project are indispensable factors for the success of the project.

3. Conclusion

With the support of various international agencies and individuals who provide financial means and with the good will of private citizens of North America and Western Europe, we believe that the problem of resettling most if not all refugees now living in the Southeast Asian camps is not an insurmountable one. Where there is good will, there is a solution. We hope that we could provide a meaningful linkage between good will and the solution of this urgent problem.

Prof. N.H. Chi
Dept. of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
CANADA

Immigrant Services Organization

L'Organisation des Services aux Immigrants

SPONSORSHIP GROUP

PROPOSED BUDGET (parents, three young children)

EXPENSES		Monthly	Yearly
RENT	...	$300.00	$3600.00
Telephone	...	10.70	128.00
Food	...	250.00	3000.00
Transportation	...	56.00	672.00
Dental	...		200.00
Clothing	...	to be supplied by the group	
Furniture	...	to be supplied by a church group *	
TOTAL	...		7600.00

INCOME

Cash on hand	...	$2, 500.00	$135 per week (see letter)
Operation Refugee Pledge	...	~~1,000.00~~	
Family Allowance	...	936.00	
TOTAL	...	3,436.00	
+ PROJECT 4000 donation		$2000 or	
		5,436.00	

* Once the date of arrival is known we will make an appeal for furniture. It is impossible to do this ahead of time due to lack of storage space.

As this family has relatives in Ottawa, they will not be totally dependent on the group.

The deficit will be made up by the sponsorship group.

September 27, 1983

Evaluation of Project Inter-Amicos

1) Despite the fact that we advertised fairly extensively on a local basis, the Vietnamese Community offered very few names of persons with relatives in the Hongkong camps. Later, we learned that the Vietnamese community was reticent to support Inter-Amicos as they did not feel refugees from Hongkong were Vietnamese. Recently, we approached the Chinese Community here with a request to take on the resettlement of two families(totalling 21 persons) from the Hongkong camps, who have no relatives in Canada. These were people whose profiles I received last October from Mrs. Goodlet. The Chinese Community's response was positive and we feel optimistic concerning the outcome.

2) The program's voluntary structure works well up to the point where the refugees arrive here. At this point, the two staff people, members of the five-person sponsor group which is Project Inter-Amicos in Ottawa, were totally over-burdened with requests to assist in the resettlement activities and counselling which, for various reasons, the receiving families refused to do. The feeling was that the receiving families felt that since there was money available for assistance in sponsoring their families that Inter-Amicos should take on all the responsibilities of resettlement. This created all sorts of administrative problems despite the fact that the receiving families had agreed to give orientation and emotional support and, if possible, a temporary home upon arrival of their extended family from Hongkong.

3) Due to the lack of a paid administrator to co-ordinate the program, an extensive recruitment of those willing to sponsor and assist in resettlement as well as to monitor the program's individual effectiveness was not undertaken. Though 150 churches in the Ottawa area were approached to sponsor or fund others to sponsor, the response has been minimal (only 5 asked for additional information and only one has volunteered funds).

4) Though there were no significant or outstanding problems amongst the newcomers vis-a-vis resettlement, our past experience leads us to expect some re-adjustment difficulties after the first six months- one year of life in Canada. Project Inter-Amicos cannot, given its very small base, hope to monitor or assist these people after arrival.

Over all, the program worked well but it has the potential to work much more effectively. The following recommendations attempt to address the findings previously outlined:

1) There is a need for a paid co-ordinator and honoraria for part-time assistance to that co-ordinator to alleviate the pressure of accommodating the newcomers once they arrive.

..2/

APPENDIX V

The Non-Economic Effects of Sponsorship Models

At first glance most of the evidence compiled on the various sponsorship models suggested that private sponsorship not only increased refugee intake, but also decreased costs, facilitated more rapid entry into the work force, and provided a more adequate psychological and cultural cushion of adaptation for refugees. In contrast, interpretations of the government model revealed it was more costly, slower to place refugees in the work force, and less able to provide for the psychological and cultural needs of refugees. But, recent studies reveal that these preliminary impressions may have overstated the strengths and weaknesses of either mode, obscuring the differential successes of each and consequently the objective advantages or inequities which have contributed to those respective strengths and/or weaknesses. Recent appraisals by academics, and both government and private sector analysts, recommend equalization or integration of the two schemes not because one is superior to the other but because each is sufficiently uneven to warrant a partnership model that would eliminate the drawbacks of each, and utilize the strengths of both models. Much of the confusion surrounding the qualities of each model seems to stem from (1) the highly rhetorical and often only partially substantiated suspicion of the private sector that the government is "shifting its responsibilities" and (2) the extremely defensive and historically guarded response of the government to private sector criticism. In an effort to dispel a certain amount of confusion,

the report examines data concerning the role of both government and private sponsorship vis-à-vis (1) effectiveness of the models and effects on sponsors; (2) the numbers of refugees taken in; (3) psychological and cultural adaptation; and (4) procurement of employment. Finally, throughout, we consider the effects of the media upon sponsorship.

PRECIS OF CONCLUSIONS

Section 1

(a) Well established community and church organizations not only provide backup to private sponsors but increasingly provide long-term assistance to refugees after the sponsorship year has ended.

(b) Given the unequal nature of private sponsorship, partnership may increase the chances of responsorship, especially by those sponsors who experienced difficulties.

Section 2

(a) Private sponsorship has augmented refugee intake but is presently waning and seems to be directly influenced by media coverage of refugee crises.

(b) Government allotments are declining.

Section 3

(a) Sponsorship may delay acculturation unless ethnic communities are exploited. As such, ghettoization may not be a problem but a necessary stage in adaptation.

(b) Early job placement may be a mixed blessing.

I. Effectiveness of Sponsorship Models and the Effects on Sponsors

It is generally believed that privately sponsored refugees fare better than government sponsored. Indeed, government reports clearly identify the superiority of this more personal approach.(1) There are, however, certain inequities within the private models that warrant some attention.

There are two major forms of private sponsorship: (1) Constituency (i.e., groups under the auspices of a religious or humanitarian organization) and (2) Ad Hoc community groups. Lynn Clark and Gertrud Neuwirth of Carleton University further differentiate these types by emphasizing the loci or base of group formation. Their work suggests two main types:

(A) members of established organizations with large, yet fairly cohesive organizational structures and a core of active participants, as well as access to human and financial resources. We can further break this type into two models:
(1) national umbrella groups: where a national organization signs agreements on behalf of their membership and acts as guarantors for the sponsorship programs undertaken by local groups; e.g., Mennonite Central Committee, Catholic Church, etc.
(2) National Direct Sponsorship: Sometimes called the Baha'i model, here the national centre directly sponsors all refugees and then assigns them to local communities which the

Centre funds. The local assemblies deal only with settlement. (For a number of organizational and structural reasons this model appears uniquely applicable only to the Baha'i case and its successes, as such, may not be possible to emulate.)

(B) Ad Hoc residential or community-based, small but cohesively organized with adequate resources. This type also has two variations:

(1) local agency sponsorship whereby individual groups hold direct sponsorship agreements (contracts) with the government (e.g., JIAS, The Anglican Church); and

(2) local funnelling sponsorship whereby an administrative body acts as a trust for individual sponsors (e.g., Operation Lifeline). (2)

Neuwirth and Clark's study shows that the greater the level of organization and resources plus the greater the social cohesion of sponsors the greater likelihood of success in fulfilling financial and moral responsibilities. For example, Neuwirth and Clark argue the groups which fared poorly lacked either adequate financial and human resources and/or lacked the networking connections the larger umbrella organizations could provide constituency groups. Conversely, they note satisfaction was greater among those refugees sponsored by church or community groups (due to greater frequency of contact with sponsors -- this was expressed by refugees as a parental or friendship relationship with sponsors as opposed to an acquaintance

relationship between refugees and workplace sponsors). Similarly, the most dissatisfied sponsors were those that lacked financial or community resources. The CEIC report of April, 1982(3) (Evaluation of the 1979-1980 Indochinese Refugee Program) confirms, for example, considerable tensions resulting from excessive disparities and inequalities of treatment occurred not only between government and privately sponsored refugees but also among those privately sponsored. Likewise, they note some contradiction between the emotional/supportive role and the financial benefactor role. Finally, given the short-term nature of all sponsorship models, the existence of on-going backup support systems such as those provided by churches and community organizations has proved crucial to providing for refugees past the first year of settlement. This is a seldom noted long-term benefit of private sponsorship.

In sum, Neuwirth and Clark not only identify a two-tier model of sponsorship based on the different strengths of government versus private sponsorship but also note that all private sponsorship groups are not ipso facto equally effective.(4) One area in which partnership might be immediately effective would be in its ability to provide all sponsors similar financial aid and increased access to already existing government services. While this may not be a factor for first-time sponsors (who are usually highly motivated and aware of obstacles only post facto), it may induce previous sponsors who experienced difficulties to consider sponsoring again. (See, for example, CEIC April 1982 Evaluation

which notes two factors sponsors expressed as crucial to reactivation were (1) an increase in government and agency services; and (2) concern for funds.)(5)

Finally, the implementation of a basic support level determined in concert between government and private sectors could eliminate the unevenness in the system and thus decrease tensions between government and private refugees and among the various private sponsored refugees.

II. Numbers

The private sponsorship model has been extremely successful in augmenting refugee intake levels above government allotments. In 1979 the private sector accounted for 54% of Indochinese refugee intake. In 1980 they accounted for 58%. With the declining media coverage of the problem in Southeast Asia, that figure dropped to 22% in 1981.(6) Two points are clear in reviewing the Southeast Asian statistics in particular and the overall statistics in general. First, since 1981 the number of refugees sponsored by the government is falling below the allocated target number. Second, from the initial peaks of 1979-80 there has been a decline, punctuated by occasional resurgences, in the number of private sponsors. (See overall intake figures attached and graph on private sponsorship participation - Appendix "a".) Finally, peaks and declines appear linked to the waning and waxing of public opinion as it is lulled or stirred into action by media coverage.

(1) While the Refugee Perspectives of June 1983 shows considerable improvement by the government in filling quotas, these successes must be qualified by the continued downward trend in overall admission allotments. In 1981 the quota was 16,000. In 1982 it dropped to 14,000. In 1983 the total allotment, exclusive of an unfunded contingency of 2,000 is only 10,000. Given the advocacy of the private sector, this decline has generated considerable debate as to whether the government is "shifting its responsibilities" onto the private sector. For example, critics of the government argue that in 1981 the government brought in only 63% of its quota of 16,000 refugees.(7) The government offers an alternative analysis of these figures. While agreeing that they failed to meet their commitments, government advocates claim an almost 75% rate of intake.(See figures in attached Appendix.)(8)

Much of this debate over numbers centres around the definition of the contingency fund and whether or not it should be included in the totals. (Curiously, both sides fail to mention the number of refugees admitted on Ministers Permits [estimated at 1,000] in 1981.) In any case, government performance continues well below the allotment and this gives genuine cause for concern.

Regarding the government's reasons for these shortfalls, government spokesmen argue the major shortfalls were in Africa and Latin America where the government experienced

difficulties identifying and filtering the refugees most in need given the large masses of people. As they note: "Canada's approach of accepting spontaneous applications did not work due to Canada's lack of past involvement in these areas".(9)

On the other hand, private sector analysts have noted these problems have arisen from the government's failure to enact a clear resettlement policy which would coordinate bureaucratic influences at the local and national levels with those abroad. The twofold nature of government bureaucracy, divided between bureaucratic and political decision-makers, may account for this difficulty in coordinating resettlement policy at all levels, consequently affecting the ability to process applications in countries of first asylum.

Finally, whereas in the first phase of sponsorship, sponsors accepted "unnamed" refugees, more recent trends indicate a shift towards "named" target groups. And as both private and government sources have emphasized a desire to help refugees most in need and not mere 'economic refugees', the delay in processing appears more objectively founded than manipulative.

(2) Regarding the decline in private sponsorship, evidence shows that fluctuations in sponsorship interest is directly influenced by the media. Recently, private sponsors have

shown considerable support for East European refugees, especially Poles. While undocumented, the considerable sympathetic coverage by the western media of the Polish situation may have played a role similar to that of the media during the Southeast Asian crisis of the boat people (e.g., the now famous Hai Hong incident). In a different vein, government analysts feel the "motivation for sponsorship is linked to public perception of their efforts for providing services, coordinating provincial programs, and in government levels of assistance".(10)

Finally, several encouraging statements support an increased private sector role in selection and identification of refugee problems. Only one note of self interest surfaced when a government commentator expressed the sentiment that "through sponsorship of refugees all groups have access to positive outlets for their energies and activities and this may indirectly deflect pressure which would otherwise be concentrated on government".(11)

III. Cultural and Psychological Adaptation

Cultural and psychological adaptation are closely linked. The private sponsorship model has been the most successful in promoting adaptation, emotional anchorage, and orientation to Canadian society. The following issues have, however, been noted:

(1) Disparities in the level of support between private and government refugees have created tensions. These disparities were particularly evident in ESL funding and have resulted in the general impression that a two-tier sponsorship system is in operation. For example, in 1979, only government sponsored refugees received free ESL and a living allowance while taking courses. Privately sponsored refugees received neither. In 1980 the courses became free to both groups but the privately sponsored were still denied living allowances while studying. This disparity was finally equalized in November of 1982. (At speeches to the National Conference of ESL Teachers and the Canadian Polish Congress, the Minister announced privately sponsored refugees would have access to government allowances and training programs. In addition, he announced provisions under the Need Program which would help sponsor groups fund training sessions for refugees.(12) These advancements seem to have been won through constant pressure from the private sector to equalize programs.

(2) Another obstacle to adaptation was the tendency of some private groups to locate refugees near to them in order to facilitate the personal sponsorship role. Often, however, refugees were located in accommodation which proved too expensive when the refugee became self-sufficient. Seeing as most were employed at minimum wage, there was considerable secondary migration to more reasonable housing. Both Clark and Neuwirth(13) and Nguyen(14) notice this secondary migration in their studies. They liken it to the secondary

exodus now known as the Montero effect which suggests refugees tend to leave private sponsorship to resettle in ethnic enclaves. Clark and Neuwirth suggest sponsorship may just delay centretown ghettoization. But Nguyen feels grouping in ethnic areas may be helpful for emotional anchorage, and a logical step in the assimilation process to the host country (which are the conclusions Montero arrived at in his study of 35,000 Vietnamese in the United States). While Clark and Neuwirth's patterns of settlement are from a small sample (16 families), the pattern suggests the location of refugees in more reasonably priced rental areas near to ethnic enclaves may not be a negative acculturation factor. Indeed, sponsorship may delay acculturation if ethnic networks are not exploited.

For example, Nguyen argues the role of ethnic organizations is crucial to the adaptation of those with psychological problems. The most frequent mental health problems are depression, anxiety, marital conflict, intergenerational conflict, psychosomatic illness and psychosis. The majority of these were exacerbated by long stays in camps. Dr. Nguyen offers two suggestions for prevention in resettlement areas. First, he encourages family reunification programs (CEIC reports in Refugee Perspectives 1983 that family reunification has become a new focus of Canadian interest). Second, Nguyen suggests grouping of refugees of similar background through the formation of ethnic community

organizations.(15) This may prove most crucial in the case of Unaccompanied Minors or other young unattached men and women who lack family organizations.

(3) The CEIC Evaluation of the 1979-80 Indochinese Refugee Program notes 50% of refugees have moved at least once and generally for employment reasons. The report tentatively states that privately sponsored refugees are more mobile than government sponsored. They cite the previously stated rental differences as a cause. They also note migration may be due to their wide dispersal into depressed economic areas of Canada (i.e., Maritimes), or due to their location in small towns with fewer services, ethnic networks, and less chance of employment. Much of this dispersal stems from the geographic heterogeneity of private sponsors who, in accord with sponsorship guidelines, usually compelled the refugee to live near to them in the sponsorship year.

IV. Procurement of Employment

Statistics released in the CEIC April 1982 Evaluation of the 1979-80 Indochinese Refugee Program show unemployment of DC1's at 10.7% to be comparable with privately sponsored DC3's at 10.3%. There were some differences, however, with increased unemployment among DC1's in Quebec and increased unemployment among DC3's in B.C. and the Yukon. Given the superior profiles of DC1's (they were younger, had higher education on average, and spoke more French or English), it was believed they would enjoy an

occupational edge over DC3's. Analysis shows both groups faring comparably. Government authors conclude the private sponsorship model *per se* has been a positive force in equalizing these disadvantages faced by DC3's. This is underscored by evidence that privately sponsored refugees acquired work an average of four weeks earlier than government sponsored DC1's. The networking among private sponsors is cited as the link to employment contacts and earlier placement. Michael Lanphier has noted an additional factor not due to either government or private sponsorship. He has observed that friendship networks among refugees *per se* have provided work contacts and economic survival "where none appeared possible in the eyes of their sponsors or counsellors."(16)

Lanphier reports that most jobs acquired by Southeast Asians represent entry level status (i.e., mechanized assembly and kitchen work for men and sewing and electronics assembly for women). All are at or near minimum wage. Both Lanphier and Neuwirth and Clark characterize these jobs as dead end with little chance for advancement possibilities, non-unionized, temporary and highly susceptible to lay-off. As Lanphier notes, perhaps quick job placement may not be a virtue,

> while initial job placement may appear both to refugee and to sponsors and counsellors to be an impressive and very satisfying achievement, the prospects for the coming year usually indicate a succession of jobs, each interrupted by a period of unemployment of unknown duration.(17)

Clark and Neuwirth's studies underwrite this pessimism. They link employability and occupational mobility with cultural adaptation while testing Stein's hypothesis that cultural adaptation depends on occupational adjustment (i.e., the ability to transfer skills from country of origin to settlement country). Their results show downward mobility in job status and suggest possible ramifications for cultural adaptation. To elaborate, Stein originally studied refugees from Nazism and the Hungarian revolution of 1956. An American test of the Vietnamese entering the U.S. in 1975 showed that they were experiencing greater difficulty in transferring job skills. As the profiles of the 1975 refugees were mainly professional and managerial (i.e., the total was 2/3 white collar), the mainly blue collar profiles of the refugees who came to Canada in 1979/80 suggested they would have greater difficulty transferring skills (they were 1/4 white collar). Because occupational mobility is linked to linguistic skills, at first glance blue collar trades seem easily transferrable because they demand more on-the-job knowledge and less linguistic expertise than management. But Neuwirth and Clark found that the blue collar worker became caught in a double bind. As they write:

> they needed to improve their knowledge of English; yet considering the types of jobs they were holding and the hours they work, the chances of doing so either at work or in night courses were slim. Without qualifying for any retraining or skill upgrading programs, these refugees would not be able to raise their occupational status and would remain in marginal jobs.(18)

The CEIC Evaluation of the 1979/80 Refugee Program confirms this trend. Clark and Neuwirth conclude these refugees will need

additional training above and beyond initial ESL courses to attain occupational adjustment. As we noted in Section 3, the Minister announced such a plan in November 1982.

Conclusions:

Many refugees feel the need to work to establish themselves or send money back to relatives but a quickly acquired job in a job ghetto may be counter productive to cultural adaptation and even incur long-term costs to the government after private sponsorship expires.

Equal access to assistance while attending ESL may not be the key issue. "Adopting a short-term, instrumental approach towards refugees may defeat the very purpose of facilitating the refugees social admustment.(19) Neuwirth and Clark suggest providing ESL and on-the-job training as a front-end loaded cost may decrease long-term costs in manpower retraining, UIC and welfare, as well as increasing job upgrading and thus job satisfaction and overall cultural adjustment. Therefore, the four week earlier job placement in the private sponsorship model should be seen as a mixed blessing.

Regarding the role of ESL and job training for female refugees, the lack of day care (except in major cities) during ESL training is a serious obstacle to their finding upgraded employment. This may reflect the overall bias in Canadian society to overlook the needs of women who work not for pin money but must do so for the

1.see for example the Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration Levels,1983.Employment and Immigration.

2.Lynn Clarke and Gertrude Neuwirth,The Role of Private Sponsorship Groups in the Socio-Economic Adjustment of Refugees,Department of Soci Carleton University,Ottawa.Their sample is small(16 families and therefore their conclusions are tentative.Interviews were held with a larger sample of sponsors and refugees involved in Project 4000).

3.CEIC Evaluation of the 1979-1980 Indochinese Refugee Program , April 1982 Immigration Program Division.

4.Clark and Neuwirth,opcit, p.5-6.

5.CEIC,Evaluation of 1979-1980 Indochinese Program,opcit,p.28-30.

6.Immigration Canada

7.see Minutes of Refugee consultation , Ontario Region,July 6,1982. Appendix H-Interchurch Committee on Refugees,and Appendix J-Roman Catholic Diocese of Thunder Bay Refugee Intake Levels

8.Background Paper on Immigration Levels,Companion Report to the Annual Report tp Parliament on Immigration Levels,1983.Employment and Immigration

9.Employment and Immigration,Annual Report 1980/1981,Canada,p.15.

10.Background Papers Refugee Issues Discussion,April 30,1983. section 6.

11.ibid,section 6.

12.Transcript of the Speech by the Honrable Lloyd Axworthy,Minister of Employment and Immigration to the Third National Conference of Teachers of English as a Second Language,Edmonton.See also his speech to the Canadian Polish Congress,Winnepeg,November 12,1982.

13.Clark and Neuwirth,The Occupational Adjustment of Refugees,Carleton University ,p.10.

14.San Duy Nguyen,MD. "The Psycho-social Adjustment and the Mental Health Needs of South East Asian Refugees",Paper presented to the Canadian Council of South Esat Asian Studies,November 6,1980.passim.

15.ibid., and Nguyen,"Mental Health Services for South East Asian Refu Refugee Consultation Conference,Toronto 1980.
See also Libuse Tyhurst,"Psychosocail First Aid for Refugees",Mental Health and Society,4;p.319-343.(1977).

16.Michael Lanphier,"Sponsorship of Refugees in Canada"ICMC Migration News,n.3/4,1982.

17.ibid., p. 3.

18.Clark and Neuwirth,"Indochinese refugees in Canada; IMR V15 nI.

19.ibid., p. 140.

APPENDIX "a"

Table 12. 1981 REFUGEE SUMMARY

	Planned Intake	Actual Gov't Sponsored	Privately Sponsored	Relative Sponsored	
Indochina	8,000	6,723	2,150	1,502*	8,873
Eastern Europe	4,000	4,602	117	606	5,325
	1,000**	-	-	-	-
Latin and Central America	1,000	132	4	1	137
Africa	200	122	27	2	151
	200**	-	-	-	-
Other	300	37	-	9	46
R.S.A.C. ***	-	464	-	-	464
Total	14,700	12,080	2,298	618	14,996
Contingency (unassigned)	1,300				

* 1,502 Indochinese were admitted on the strength of financial undertakings submitted by relatives in Canada. Since resettlement costs were, however, incurred by the federal government (for food, lodging, and clothing at the staging centres), they have been included in the government-assisted totals.

** Allocated from contingency reserve.

*** The Refugee Status Advisory Committee considers claims to Convention refugee status by persons in Canada, and advises the Minister on these claims.

Source: Recruitment and Selection Branch, CEIC.

REFUGEES SPONSORED BY PRIVATE GROUPS

1979 AND 1980



REFUGEES SPONSORED BY PRIVATE GROUPS

1981, 1982, AND 1983



* LANDINGS BY PROGRAM & PROVINCE OF DESTINATION
** IMMIGRANTS REÇUS PAR PROGRAMME ET PAR PROVINCE DE DESTINATION

PROVINCE / PROGRAM/PROGRAMME	B.C. C.-B.	ALTA. ALB.	SASK. SASK.	MAN MAN.	ONT ONT.	QUE. QUE.	N.B. N.-B.	N.S. N.-E.	P.E.I. I.duP.-E.	NFLD. T.-N.	YUKON/NWT YUKON/T. du N.-D.	TOTAL
INDOCHINA INDOCHINE	608 10.82%	985 17.52%	228 4.06%	353 6.28%	1839 32.72%	1507 26.81%	29 0.52%	32 0.57%	16 0.28%	21 0.37%	3 0.05%	5621 100.0%
EASTERN EUROPE EUROPE DE L'EST	958 10.27%	1826 19.58%	324 3.47%	605 6.49%	4349 46.62%	1128 12.09%	13 0.14%	107 1.15%	0 0.00%	12 0.13%	6 0.06%	9328 100.0%
LATIN AMERICA AMERIQUE LATINE	2 0.48%	40 9.69%	19 4.60%	14 3.39%	144 34.87%	170 41.16%	5 1.21%	7 1.69%	12 2.91%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	413 100.0%
AFRICA AFRIQUE	11 2.96%	119 31.99%	41 11.02%	19 5.11%	119 31.99%	59 15.86%	0 0.00%	4 1.08%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	372 100.0%
MIDDLE EAST MOYEN ORIENT	54 19.85%	18 6.62%	2 0.74%	15 5.51%	167 61.40%	16 5.88%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	272 100.0%
OTHER CONVENTION REFUGEES SELECTED ABROAD AUTRES REFUGIES AU SENS DE LA CONVENTION SELECTIONNES A L'ETRANGER	34 17.99%	33 17.47%	6 3.17%	6 3.17%	95 50.26%	10 5.29%	0 0.00%	5 2.65%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	189 100.0%
TOTAL REFUGEES & DESIGNATED CLASS IMMIGRANTS SELECTED ABROAD TOTAL DES REFUGIES ET CATEGORIES DESIGNEES SELECTIONNES A L'ETRANGER	1667 10.29%	3021 18.65%	620 3.83%	1012 6.25%	6713 41.45%	2890 17.85%	47 0.29%	155 0.96%	28 0.17%	33 0.20%	9 0.06%	16195 100.0%
CONVENTION REFUGEES GRANTED PROTECTION IN CANADA REFUGIES AU SENS DE LA CONVENTION AYANT RECU PROTECTION AU CANADA	20 3.19%	54 8.63%	6 0.96%	3 0.48%	275 43.93%	256 40.89%	0 0.00%	5 0.80%	0 0.00%	7 1.12%	0 0.00%	626 100.0%
TOTAL	1687 10.03%	3075 18.28%	626 3.72%	1015 6.03%	6988 41.54%	3146 18.70%	47 0.28%	160 0.95%	28 0.17%	40 0.24%	9 0.05%	16821 100.0%

* These landings represent (i) refugees and designated class members who arrived with immigrant visas during the period shown and (ii) refugees and designated class members who arrived previously with Minister's Permits and who were landed in Canada during the period shown.

** Ces admissions sont (i) celles des réfugiés et des membres des catégories désignées qui sont arrivés en possession de visas d'immigration durant la période indiquée et (ii) celles des réfugiés et des membres des catégories désignées admis au Canada durant la période indiquée mais qui étaient arrivés auparavant, munis de permis du Ministre.

REFUGEE & DESIGNATED CLASS IMMIGRATION
RÉFUGIÉS ET CATÉGORIES DÉSIGNÉES

Preliminary statistics
subject to revision

Statisques préliminaires
sujettes à révision

JANUARY 1, 1981 - DECEMBER 31, 1981 / 1 JANVIER 1981 - 31 DÉCEMBRE 1981

LANDINGS BY PROGRAM & PROVINCE OF DESTINATION
IMMIGRANTS REÇUS PAR PROGRAMME ET PAR PROVINCE DE DESTINATION

PROVINCE / PROGRAM/PROGRAMME	B.C. C.-B.	ALTA. ALB..	SASK. SASK.	MAN. MAN.	ONT. ONT.	QUE. QUÉ.	N.B. N.-B.	N.S. N.-É.	P.E.I. I.du P.-É.	NFLD. T.-N.	YUKON/NWT YUKON/ T.du N.-O	TOTAL
HDOCHINA HDOCHINE	1174 13.39%	1379 15.73%	427 4.87%	558 6.36%	2767 31.56%	2328 26.56%	56 0.64%	45 0.51%	6 0.07%	16 0.18%	9 0.10%	8765 100.0%
ASTERN EUROPE UROPE DE L'EST	471 8.92%	1194 22.62%	159 3.01%	218 4.13%	2504 47.43%	643 12.18%	16 0.30%	61 0.16%	5 0.09%	8 0.15%	0 0.00%	5279 100.0%
ATIN AMERICA MÉRIQUE LATINE	8 4.57%	20 11.47%	9 5.14%	20 11.47%	56 32.00%	60 34.28%	1 0.57%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 0.57%	0 0.00%	175 100.0%
FRICA FRIQUE	8 5.23%	48 31.37%	26 16.99%	5 3.27%	49 32.03%	15 9.80%	1 0.65%	1 0.65%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	153 100.0%
THER CONVENTION REFUGEES ELECTED ABROAD UTRES RÉFUGIÉS AU SENS DE A CONVENTION SÉLECTIONNÉS L'ÉTRANGER	6 13.04%	8 17.39%	5 10.87%	4 8.70%	22 47.83%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 2.17%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	46 100.0%
OTAL REFUGEES & DESIGNATED LASS IMMIGRANTS SELECTED BROAD OTAL DES RÉFUGIÉS ET CATÉGORIES ÉSIGNÉES SÉLECTIONNÉS À 'ÉTRANGER	1667 11.56%	2649 18.37%	626 4.34%	805 5.58%	5398 37.43	3046 21.12%	74 0.51%	108 0.75%	11 0.08%	25 0.17%	9 0.06%	14418 100.0%
CNVENTION REFUGEES ANTED PROTECTION IN CANADA ÉFUGIÉS AU SENS DE LA ONVENTION AYANT REÇU ROTECTION AU CANADA	16 3.85%	26 6.25%	1 0.24%	5 1.20%	237 57.25%	120 28.85%	1 0.24%	6 1.44%	0 0.00%	1 0.24%	1 0.24%	414 100.0%
OTAL	1683 11.35%	2675 18.04%	627 4.23%	810 5.46%	5635 37.99%	3166 21.35%	75 0.51%	114 0.77%	11 0.07%	26 0.18%	10 0.07%	14832 100.0%

REFUGEE & DESIGNATED CLASS IMMIGRATION
REFUGIES ET CATEGORIES DESIGNEES

Preliminary statistics subject to revision

Statisques preliminaires sujettes a revision

1 JANUARY 1980 - 31 DECEMBER 1980 / 1 JANVIER 1980 - 31 DECEMBRE 1980

LANDINGS BY PROGRAM & PROVINCE OF DESTINATION
IMMIGRANTS RECUS PAR PROGRAMME ET PAR PROVINCE DE DESTINATION

PROVINCE / PROGRAM/PROGRAMME	B.C. C.-B.	ALTA. ALB.	SASK. SASK.	MAN. MAN.	ONT. ONT.	QUE. QUE.	N.B. N.-B.	N.S. N.-E.	P.E.I. I.duP.-E.	NFLD. T.-N.	YUKON/NWT. YUKON/ T.du N.-O.	TOTAL
INDOCHINA INDOCHINE	4704 13.36%	4527 12.84%	1877 5.33%	2516 7.15%	12849 36.46%	7506 21.29%	412 1.17%	637 1.81%	40 0.11%	144 0.41%	29 0.08%	35241 100.0%
EASTERN EUROPE EUROPE DE L'EST	354 8.64%	863 21.06%	182 4.44%	262 6.39%	2021 49.32%	396 9.66%	2 0.05%	17 0.41%	0 0.00%	1 0.02%	0 0.00%	4098 100.0%
LATIN AMERICA AMERIQUE LATINE	3 2.10%	13 9.09%	30 20.98%	19 13.29%	48 33.57%	30 20.98%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	143 100.0%
CUBAN SELF-EXILED CUBAINS EXPATRIES	21 8.50%	67 27.13%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	158 63.97%	1 0.40%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	247 100.0%
OTHER CONVENTION REFUGEES SELECTED ABROAD AUTRES REFUGIES AU SENS DE LA CONVENTION SELECTIONNES A L'ETRANGER	6 3.77%	22 13.84%	26 16.35%	10 6.29%	81 50.94%	13 8.18%	0 0.00%	1 0.63%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	159 100.0%
TOTAL REFUGEES & DESIGNATED CLASS IMMIGRANTS SELECTED ABROAD TOTAL REFUGIES ET CATEGORIES DESIGNEES SELECTIONNES A L'ETRANGER	5088 12.76%	5492 13.76%	2115 5.31%	2807 7.04%	15157 38.00%	7946 19.91%	414 1.04%	655 1.64%	40 0.10%	145 0.36%	29 0.07%	39888 100.0%
CONVENTION REFUGEES GRANTED PROTECTION IN CANADA REFUGIES AU SENS DE LA CONVENTION AYANT RECU PROTECTION AU CANADA	23 8.98%	17 6.64%	3 1.17%	4 1.56%	125 48.83%	84 32.81%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	256 100.0%
GRAND TOTAL TOTAL GLOBAL	5111 12.74%	5509 13.72%	2118 5.28%	2811 7.01%	15282 38.07%	8030 19.99%	414 1.03%	655 1.63%	40 0.10%	145 0.36%	29 0.07%	40144 100.0%

Employment & Immigration Canada
Refugee Policy Division
March 2, 1981

Emploi et Immigration Canada
Division de la Politique Relative aux Réfugiés
le 2 mars 1981