A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

by

Howard Adelman

1. Violence, Modernity, the Nation-State and Intervention
2. Globalization and States in Crisis
3. Global Governance
4. Conflict Dynamics: Bifurcation versus Turning Points
5. The Dynamics of Third Party Interventions
6. Justifying Humanitarian Intervention - The Case of Zaire

November 21, 1996.

1. Violence, Modernity, the Nation-State and Intervention

If modernity is characterized by the rational organization of life, how do we explain the relativity of values, the rivalries entailed in power politics, and the recourse to violence despite the advance of reason and civilization? Since the end of the Cold War and its initial promise of a breakthrough in establishing greater peace, intra-state crises appear to have mushroomed. We have witnessed genocides on a scale not seen since World War II, with over a million being slaughtered in Rwanda alone in just four months in 1964. Modernity theory says we should have a rational order and peace. So did the end of superpower rivalry with the terminus of the Cold War. There is a gap between our expectations and what has been promised by both theory and major historical disjunctures of the twentieth century, whether it was the end of the two world wars or the end of the Cold War. We get the promises, but there is no delivery.

In the political arena, modernity is characterized by the development of the nation-state. That development achieved its apogee with the division of the whole globe among territorially-based nation-states and the dissolution of the last empire, the Soviet Union, in the beginning of this decade. In a global nation state system, there is a compact among the states that each has exclusive jurisdiction over the land and peoples within their respective territories. States assume responsibility for the security and well-being of their own people. But a state only exists as a fully developed state if there is effective control and power exercised over the body politic, and that polity is capable of surviving on its own. As a body politic, there has to be both centralized coercive control and an economy in place that will ensure survival.

The compact among states does not make the arrangement into a mechanical system of billiard balls or atoms, but into a club. For in order to be a state, the states as a collectivity must recognize individual states as a member of the club. State autonomy and recognition together made up the bookends of the club of states. (Held 1995, 36; Krasner 1983, 18; Weber 1995, 1) The rule of non-intervention arises from this arrangement.

Since it is a mutual pact, there is by definition no higher authority to determine who is a member or to police whether a state behaves like a member. In fact, the club of nation-states emerged in Western Europe to obtain a single rather than divided authority in a polity[1] and in opposition to one source of that divided authority, Rome, which claimed universal jurisdiction over the behaviour of states because

that higher authority claimed to be the embodiment of universal values on earth.[2] This why the arrangements between and among states is said to be anarchic.

The emergence of the nation-state system was originally unique to Western Europe. Elsewhere, the modern era resulted in the development of gunpowder empires in India, in China, in Turkey. In Europe, this unique and novel political development was facilitated by the synergy of a number of diverse factors: the invention and application of the printing press, which took the monopoly of the control over knowledge away from the church; the thronging of aristocrats to the universities in the fifteen hundreds where, housed traditionally in nations, they developed a camaraderie and sense of community among the fraternity members who spoke the same language developing parochial loyalties in contrast to the universal values and loyalties to Rome that was the intent of their education; the diversity of centres controlling mining to make cannons so no monopoly developed to control the manufacture of armaments; at the same time, larger entities were needed than city-states to afford the costs of the new armaments; the distance of Western Europe from the threat of raids from the nomads on the eastern steppes, so Western Europeans lived in relative security; the very long coast line of what was in reality a peninsula of a huge Asian land mass which (along with the printing press) made this a society open to discovery and change rather than fixed and permanent landmarks; in comparison to other areas, the relative immunity to new diseases possessed by the voyagers from Europe following the Black Death. These and other factors combined to facilitate the development of the nation state as a combination of three classes, merchant capital in the city, the bureaucracy and legal systems of towns based primarily on contract law, and the military capacity of the countryside. (Gledhill 1994)

The only class marginalized by this development were the scholars, the preservers of knowledge and inculcators of values in the university who opposed the sense of openness and new discovery.[3] Though not overtly intended to do so, the new nation-state freed itself from the moral reins and the intellectual straight jacket of the scholastics in the university with their relatively petty quarrels and the equally narrow foundations in either a sceptical defence of tradition or a sceptical overthrow of tradition for faith. But capitalism freed men from the fetters of the moralists.[4] Thus, Henry Robinson argued that the denial of the liberty of conscience, not Luther's conscience that resulted in absolute faith, but the denial of the **liberty** of conscience was a restraint upon trade.[5]

The nation-state arose at the very same time as a

scientific conceptual foundations for reconciling change with
stability in a radically new way was discovered. Such a
solution was found in the Newtonian schema. One could have
development and stability at the same time. Aristotle had
defined motion in terms of rest. The circularity of the
seasons and of the heavenly bodies was perfect motion in
itself because one always returned to the same starting point.
Rest defined motion. Stasis defined mobility. This was the
perfect rationale for a permanently settled agricultural
society.
Stability was inherent, natural, and represented perfection.

But Newton defined rest in terms of motion; a home base
is merely a respite from movement; movement, not stasis, is
the norm. Change is prior in both experience and logic. Stasis
is merely an equilibrium point in a dynamic, changing system.
A state is merely a place of equilibrium in an otherwise
chaotic globe.

Thus, was born the club of nation-states based on
municipal property and contract law (Palan 1994, 48; McNeill
1992, 113) rather than a hierarchical moral law. Each of those
states, which became dedicated to the growth of capitalism,
was consolidated as a state by the "nations", the fraternity
of land-owning aristocrats who borrowed from the merchants to
consolidate the hegemonic rule of a dominant language group
over a territory.[6] The identity and boundaries of that people
had to be determined based on historically and culturally
inherited patterns of behaviour and national character traits
of a dominant ethnic group in relation to the difficulties of
assimilating minorities into the dominant culture, and in
conflicts and wars with proximate rivals.

Consolidation of the character of each state meant
conflict from within and from without. It meant intervention
in each other's affairs to consolidate one's own status. The
foundations for intervention were forged in the multicultural
heritage of every nation-state. (Weber 1995, 20) It also meant
indifference to the workings of other states as long as that
other state was not a threat to the security and economic
well-being of one's own.

Thus, ironically, the rules of this club meant that a
number of semi-functioning and even a few non-functioning
states remain members of the club. Why? Because nothing is to
be gained from kicking them out of the club. However, if a
state is deemed to misbehave such that it is perceived as a
threat to another powerful state or group of states - that is,
to their security or key economic interests - or to the club
as a whole, intervention in the affairs of that state is
justified. The club has always had minimal rules of behaviour

for states. Disobey these minimal rules and reprisals could be expected, including at the very extreme, intervention.

Thus, the Concert of Europe of 1815 was used as an opportunity by the club to have the revolutionary activities of internal dissidents repressed.[7] By the end of the first World War, one hundred years later, the grotian idealists rather than the realists were in charge. Rather than intervention being justified to put down revolutionaries, intervention was justified in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to protect the rights of national minorities within states. These latter rules of intervention proved to be totally unworkable.

The Montevideo Convention of 1933 may have formalized the legal criteria for the attainment of sovereign statehood in terms of land (the existence of a defined territory), people (a permanent population in that territory), and an effective government for the state which could demonstrate its capability in enforcing its authority over the territory and the people, and it may have endorsed the principle of autonomy and non-intervention - the power of each state to exercise exclusive control over its own domestic affairs, with the right to take ultimate decisions and actions concerning the lives of its citizens within the territorial boundaries of the state without interference by other states. But that rule was always subject to the very important qualifier, that a member of the club had to be willing to abide by the rules of the club of states.[8] The protection given to the Kurds in northern Iraq[9] determined that large flows of refugees were threats to peace and security and justified intervention. This was also true in Haiti whatever the rationale used. Certainly, Rwanda demonstrated that states are unwilling to intervene in spite of prior knowledge, military presence and the legal right, if there seems to be no threat to peace and security for the powerful members of the club or the club itself. (Adelman & Suhrke 1996)

2. Globalization and States in Crisis

Is this conclusion valid? In fact, are states still the significant players which determine when and when not to intervene? Has not globalization both weakened the nation-state as well as provided new opportunities for a global legal and enforcement order of some kind? Are forces not at work to allow the resurrection of a new international higher source of authority than the nation-state to impose minimalist moral criteria on heinous crimes recognized world-wide to be illegal? Has globalization brought into existence a world civilization?[10]

Some would impose stiff criteria on membership in the
nation-state club. (Bonante 1995, 30; Stern 1995, 218) These,
and other reformist formulations aiming towards global
governance or a higher legal authority than the nation-state,
are the dreams of grotians and idealists. They want to
eliminate the basic premise of the Westphalian system – that
such tests would be minimal. The only test was to be whether a
state's behaviour, or even the internal conflicts within that
state, were deemed by the other states to threaten the
preservation of the state system itself and the security and
peace in the relations between states.

But isn't globalization changing the rules of the game?
Look at the radical changes that have taken place in just the
last century as modernistic globalization seems to be on the
verge of completing its task: the internationalization of
capital[11] which makes the international economy very volatile
and states subject to the whims of the market because of the
high proportion of debt held by foreigners; internationalized
production making states compete for jobs; radical changes in
transportation, communication, and an international culture of
consumerism; new forms of collective decision-making;
transnational pressure groups; environmental challenges that
defy national solutions (Held 1995, viii; Haas & Haas 1995,
257); enormous refugee movements (Adelman 1992a). An
agriculturally based society has been transformed into an
urban one. The human population has grown from one billion at
the beginning of the century and is now approaching six
billion in spite of the large die offs from wars, politically
induced famine, and genocidal slaughter.

As a result of these and other changes, both centripetal
and centrifugal forces are seriously undermining the strength
and autonomy of the nation-state.[12] Some even contend that the
state is an obsolete institution. (Kennedy 1993, 131)
Modernity set out to establish a single source of authority
based in the congruity between the legal polity, a
territorial, and an economic unit. Now there is a lack of
congruity between the territorial organization of political
authority and the subterritorial and transterritorial
mobilization of social forces.[13] Neoliberalism aims for greater
and greater integration within a global economy. States are
then less able to control trade and monetary policy. As the
market expands, the state as the primary political unit
becomes weaker. (Mittelman 1996, 191)

These globalization forces affect the ability of
developed states to respond to crises and exacerbate the
problems of nation-state consolidation in developing
situations.[14] With rapid urbanization in the developed world,
there is a loss of identity for new arrivals and also a sense

of invisibility and a freedom from traditional norms which previously boundaried the actions of the individual. One of the by-products is a decline in the sense of common purpose.

Yet developed states are still involved in providing assistance to Third World states. But at declining levels in terms of both the size of their own economies and the multiplication of needs elsewhere. Further, an increasing proportion of development aid has shifted to dealing with complex emergencies.[15] Further, developed states are economically as well as socially less committed to providing overseas assistance. At the same time, multinationals grow in strength and power, but 70% of international trade is intracompany trade, and states are less able to tax global companies since the way they earn their profits are less and less under the control of states.[16]. Global corporations contribute a declining proportion of national income to state coffers, and significantly less when measured against their wealth and power in the economy. The ability of any single state to tax them in relationship to their real earnings further weakens under the pressure of international competition to attract multinationals to different countries and locales. The combination of political, social and economic weakness of developed states means that they are less able to play a role as providers of development aid, especially given the greater need. The result is a weakening of international law and the tools for its enforcement in all but the commercial field, at the same time as those laws themselves and the areas of international concern are multiplying.

In such a context, it is not surprising that the idea of a global consensus for acting in response to complex emergencies is more myth than reality. The situation is not helped when the sources of threat to developed states themselves have shifted from other states to internal dissident and desperate factions and cults, and externally to emerging real and imagined imported medical threats, illegal migration, the globalization of crime and the age-old threat that has always haunted nation-states, revolutionaries and terrorists who believe they are dedicated and sacrificing their lives for a higher moral purpose. When you add to this environmental problems (global warming, ozone depletion, etc.), large population increases exacerbating already high migratory flows, the possibility that we are coming to the end and the limits of the agricultural revolution wherein population increases will once again increase at a faster rate than the ability of the world to feed itself, then the ability of the Westphalian state system to handle these pressures seems questionable. As fish stocks are depleted, as forests are cut down, as fresh water becomes scarce in most countries, won't these problems produce greater social and political

instability with no governmental institutions able to deal with them? States are forced to be more competitive than ever with less ability to meet the needs of its own citizens.[17]

What about the Third World? Look at Africa. In the 1990s we have witnessed the famine and aborted humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda, the resumption of the civil war in Angola, the civil war between the Christians in the south and the Muslims in the north in the Sudan, the enormous bloodletting in Liberia, the chronic massacres in Burundi, the collapse in Sierre Leone and the current crisis in Zaire. Given the earlier legacies of Uganda, Mozambique, South Africa and Chad, and the immanent disasters to which large African states such as Kenya and Nigeria are now prone, Africa accounts for a very disproportionate share of genocides, famines, coup d'états, civil wars, and plagues. Almost half of the civil wars being waged in the world today (16 of 35) with battle deaths exceeding 1,000 per year, and, therefore, half the complex emergencies, are to found in Africa. In addition to Zaire and Rwanda, the UN Security Council has on its current agenda five other African states – Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Western Sahara, and Rwanda's fraternal twin to the south, Burundi.[18]

Largely dependent on the exports of commodities which are subject to sizable market fluctuations with disastrous consequences when prices decline, with political leaders and a civil society disproportionately dependent on overseas aid making the control of the political levers of power critical for economic success, with most countries segmented and fractured by different ethnic groups, clans, tribes and even religions, often with one group on both sides of a border, and with violence becoming endemic in many countries as modes of dealing with conflict, the risk of any of these countries collapsing into civil war are significant.

The key root causes are present in most African countries – economies subject to sudden acute pressure because of the collapse of commodity prices, a weakened state sector, particularly as pressures for democratization and human rights protection grow, ethnic segmentation, and a culture of violence that is on the increase.[19]

All of the above are but indicators of the weakening role of the individual nation-states to handle crises in the Third World. Is global governance the solution?

3. Global Governance

Given the enormity of the problems and the increasing

weakness of states to play a positive role, is the time not ripe for the UN to evolve into a true form of global governance? The leaders of the UN see the role of the UN going beyond even this goal of creating a legal global authority with coercive clout to make the inter-state system more effective. They are not just grotians; they are utopians. They envision the UN as a moral leader, envisioning the UN imparting and upholding universal moral values.

Javier Pérez de Cuellar in April of 1991 claimed that there was a "shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents." (UN Press Release, SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991) Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that the UN's coercive role was intended "to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression." Boutros-Ghali's key document continued: "It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing to the work of this Organization." (*Agenda for Peace* para 15)

In other words, the UN was not simply hoping to be a grotian legal system but claiming to be a moral teacher. International law merely reflected that morality. But unlike the Pope in the sixteenth century, the source of authentic authority did not come from God, but from a shared set of values held by the people in the world. The UN was, in fact, a modernist institution that obtained its claimed quasi-sovereign authority from the will of the masses.

This suggests that the real source of reform is to be found in the consciousness and values of people themselves and their assumption of responsibility. "(D)evelopment in international norms and practice appear to be shifting the focus of sovereignty from the government to the people of a state, from the Westphalian precepts to popular sovereignty." (Makinda 1996, 151) The people acting directly through NGOs and new transnational organizations that bypass governments will bring about the new world order.

But these organizations lack both economic clout and coercive power. Each special group represents a small segment of humanity and a very particular pressure group. In the global scheme, it appears as if an army of ants is being sent to do the job of an elephant. Only the metaphor is totally misleading. The multiplicity of groups do not constitute an army. There is no central direction or sense of common purpose. And there is absolutely no evidence for a global system of values being in place as claimed by the last two

Secretary-Generals of the UN. In Hobbes' phrase, empty rhetoric has replaced objective analysis.

And if there is no global consciousness, the claims of the UN to have a public constituency is simply self-advertisement. Further, it is false advertising. Given the UN performance in Rwanda (Adelman & Suhrke 1996), these words sound not merely empty, but hypocritical.

Gramscians also believe that there been a change in consciousness among the people of the world that will demand a system of global governance?[20] But the evidence is weak. Certainly, with television coverage, there has been a dramatic increase in the politics of sentiment, the CNN effect in which bleeding hearts are induced to pour out dollars and, more importantly, put pressures on their governments to act when humanitarian disasters are portrayed, even, as in the case of Goma in both 1994 and 1996, when large numbers of those fleeing Rwanda or already ensconced in refugee camps in zaire as "refugees" were the genocidal killers.

The politics of sentiment does exist. However, offsetting the unthinking bleeding hearts are the fearful guts of all the polities in the world; virtually no developed country is willing to place its citizens at significant risk for the purpose of a cause, even one as lofty as preventing the genocide of civilians, even when the task was relatively easy, far less expensive than the clean-up costs, and the risks were relatively minimal. There is indeed a global consciousness that has developed, but insofar as it has been developed by the visual media, it simply means we are ready to cry and reach deep into our pockets as each successive disaster of the week is portrayed. But the diachronic, unconscious lessons of the Cold War and the MAD doctrine of deterrence have gone much deeper. We have been conditioned to be risk averse.

Neither a global consciousness, nor the UN, nor a new global agency expressing that consciousness rather than the will of the weakened states that constitute the membership of the UN, can be relied on to guide us in these hazardous times. The state continues to be the major political institution mediating between local cultures and the emerging global civilization, between past
and future. The state may indeed be weaker, but there is no other real game in town.[21]

4. Conflict Dynamics: Bifurcation versus Turning Points

We have enormous problems. We have a weakening state sector to deal with these problems. And instead of a global

consciousness to provide political will for nation states to act together, we have only its hysterical sibling on the one hand, the politics of sentiment, and, on the other hand, developed societies largely conditioned to believe that no cause is worth any self sacrifice.

Before we surrender to pessimism, let us turn to the crises themselves. Not to their turning points. "Turning point" is part of the rhetoric of progress and optimism. The end of the Cold War was one of these recurring illusionary turning points within theories of progress - stages of development, or stages of a crisis - as if there were inevitable set patterns all conflicts went through. I prefer the more neutral language of bifurcation points.

A bifurcation point is the position that is most distant from a state of relative equilibrium where there is maximum chaos in a system, but also where there are the greatest opportunities for innovation and change. Such points of chaos are subject to very unpredictable patterns. In these situations, what often counts most is not the underlying or root causes or even intervening variables, but the triggers themselves. It takes very little to shift a situation in one direction rather than another.

Thus, although Brown generalizes from the very specific conclusion we drew in our own report (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) to emphasize the common root causes underlying state collapse - "(S)tates are especially prone to violence if state structures are collapsing due to external developments (such as sharp reductions in international financial assistance or sharp declines in commodity prices), internal problems (new, incompetent leaders or rampant corruption)." (Brown 1996b, 576) - he, in contrast to most theorists concerned with underlying and proximate causes, recognizes the importance of identifying contingent factors. As he noted, there is not enough data on the role of elites and leaders in instigating violence or on the roles of neighbouring states as triggers. This was perhaps the greatest strength of the Adelman and Suhrke report on Rwanda; it identified and characterized the importance of both those factors. Deep description is needed to identify these contingent factors.[22]

More significantly, at bifurcation points, what is most needed is a knowledge of triggers more than root or underlying causes. To neutralize the effects of specific leaders, knowledge is needed which goes beyond general causes to identify what George (1993) calls actor-centred and situational analysis. This is because different nations and groups have different propensities. The classical realism of Thucydides recognized this. For example, it was important to

recognize the national character of Athens with its propensity to be bold, innovative and relatively magnanimous while Sparta was conservative, calculating and sometimes vicious. (Johnson 1993, 28) The idiosyncrasies of individual leaders can be even more important.

Further, an analysis of endogenous factors is insufficient. Even if the primary causes of violence are internal, exogenous factors are critical. At the very least, they play a permissive role. They cannot be left out of any analysis. It is as important to understand the conceptual and practical constraints of outside actors and the conditions, capacities and motivations which can propel them to act effectively as it is to understand the internal dynamics within a state and within the region in which that state exists. For, as the Rwanda study makes clear, the role of neighbouring states is critical to understanding the conflict as well as grasping the best mechanisms for helping to minimize that violence. Understanding the role of permissive conditions and outside actions and their interaction with the triggers which exacerbate the proximate causes of violence is essential to any analysis.

This does **not** mean that the focus shifts from "discrete (ontologically distinct) unities (that is states like Rwanda) to the dynamics of social development within the international system as a whole." (Gills & Palan 1994, 3) In contrast to the neo-structuralist agenda in which the stress is on the primacy of the totality of the international system, my perspective is sceptical of any attempts to assume a god's eye view, to, as it were, analyze a situation *sub specie aeternitatis*. I am wary of creating any distance between theory and history. Theory must be embedded in the details and nuances of history.

Rather than some general cause, such as the inherent dialectic of capitalism for the revolutionary utopians, or the absence of developed and effective global political regimes of authority for most liberal internationalists, or, from the opposite ideological perspective, the inherent conflict between sovereign states, or, in more globalist terms, the clash of civilizations or the clash between civilization itself and nature and, hence the focus on environmental scarcity, this paper does not concentrate on reconciling the various models of general causes that have been offered. Rather than such powerful mechanisms, I note that relatively minor events can start a chain reaction.[23] In the centre of any system where there is relative stability, one may find a degree of predictability. However, at the outer edges of the system, a small change cannot only have a large impact in that arena, but can profoundly affect the system as a whole.[24]

In conventional international studies, large scale elements - environmental scarcity and the consequences on satisfying needs, population explosions, and illicit economic engagements, for example, are isolated and studied as they are found in various cases. The presumption in **all** these theories is that the causes are proportional to the results. International theorists presume that the mechanical model of Newtonian physics means that any situation continues on an entropic trajectory unless disturbed by an external force (realists) or balanced by countervailing values and institutions (internationalists). But the world cannot be reduced to a simple mechanical model. It is a complex, inter-active system characterized by "chaos"[25] at **key** points of perturbation.[26] Newtonian mechanical models may be appropriate to the analysis of areas which are more-or-less in a steady state of equilibrium.[27] Mechanical laws may dominate in apparently relatively stable periods between bifurcation points of great instability even in areas of crises. Choosing Rwanda entails taking up a case where the crises points are of greatest concern.

Therefore, the stress should **not be** on root causes or prevailing intervening factors, though I do not dismiss any of the accounts which attend to them. The stress should be on triggers at critical bifurcation points, the very elements that mechanical modellers of both the realist and idealist schools tend to dismiss as minor contingent variables which are unpredictable and uncontrollable. In contrast, the study we undertook was a demonstration that a system can be characterized by a relatively stable regime dominated by forces (realists) or sufficiently assisted by an adequate set of international agencies (liberal institutionalists). But the key point at issue is the trigger, a bifurcation point where a combination of elements come together. At that critical juncture, choices could have been made, actions could have been taken, without which the system spun into disorder. Serendipity is as important as the "normal" governing forces.

Conflict management is concerned with keeping 'chance' from getting out of hand, and to be prepared, if a crisis occurs, to take advantage of the situation to build a system which is even larger and has a greater degree of order. It is in such crises that we can see the missed opportunities and can set systems in place that can in future effect large changes.

It is not the underlying root causes or the absence of adequate countervailing values and institutions that are so critical, for those causes will persist and institutions will continue to be inadequate, however many reforms and improvements that are made. But those institutions are best

improved, not by an overall design, but by zeroing in on a bifurcation point and taking advantage of an opportunity or a crisis both to mitigate the immanent chaos at that bifurcation point and increase the factors reinforcing stability, not by reinforcing the status quo, but by creating a new situation which reduces the pressure altogether. Bifurcation points are like earthquakes. The tectonic plates covering the surface of the earth are under great stress at the junctures where they meet. The forces will only build up if temporary measures merely postpone the inevitable eruption in the quest for temporary stability.

Readiness and preparation are the key. Complex emergencies are the products of composite systems that evolve to a critical state in which a relatively minor event can start a chain reaction. It is my contention that early warning should be designed to anticipate the bifurcation point, take advantage of that critical event, and introduce novel and more comprehensive systems for increasing order and preventing chaos.

It is, of course, a truism that such crises are also opportunities to reinforce the status quo, to insist on stability in the face of chaos. Realists, in particular, dread chaos and instability. Such policies governed American-Zairian relations in the sixties and seventies. "A critical element of this consensus (maintaining or enhancing US-Zairian ties) was the firm belief that 'chaos' - meaning territorial disintegration, regional instability, and ultimately communist expansion into Central Africa - was the only alternative to Mobutu's continued hold over power." (Schraeder 1994, 80) As one confidential source in the State Department put it so succinctly, "Zaire without Mobutu could entail a Zaire engulfed by chaos."[28]

Reinforcing the forces responsible for the chaos only delays the explosion and multiplies the impact. The classical pattern is to imitate the cosmic serpent, Naga, of Hindu mythology, and try to reestablish stability and solidity out of a very fluid situation.[29] Marx said that "All that is solid melts into air." But when hard core realists are in charge, "All that is liquid turns into a solid sarcophagus," given common current practices in foreign affairs, which, like Chernobyl, merely hides and postpones the turbulence and danger beneath.

However, the reverse can also be the case. The sooner we are able to intervene in a situation of impending chaos, the greater control we will have over that situation. Unpredictability increases with time. The more a situation is allowed to get out of hand because we know so little about it,

the greater the chance that chaos will result with extensive disorder offering the least chance to produce a higher level of order. Concrete contextualized analysis of particular situations is required to enable us to understand what is happening and why it is happening.

In addition to an immediate opportunity for creative action, bifurcation points bring to the fore the contradictions in international regimes, such as the refugee regime. Thus, in addition to allowing us to grasp what is happening and providing opportunities for innovative intervention, such innovations can have the greatest impact on the system as a whole. Order emerges out of disordered systems, not via a central control or via governing laws, natural or man-made. In fact, a lack of central control makes the system more adaptive because of the use of the principle of self-organization. Bifurcation points allow a system to reach a higher level of organization, not by controlling the chaos, but, as part of the system, innovating at the point of chaos to increase the organization and, hence, equilibrium of the system as a whole.[30]

5. The Dynamics of Third Party Interventions

An emphasis on bifurcation points has enormous implications for both analysis and understanding. In the analytical arena, the stress has been on demarcating the constant stages that any crisis goes through in order to predict its progress and anticipate results. This is but the correlate of the emphasis on root causes. But what has been suggested above is that whatever the predictability factors, the most significant point of intervention is at a bifurcation point where the unpredictability is greatest and what is most important are the contingent variables. Whether or not there is a dynamic pattern to conflict in which certain interventionist strategies can be correlated with different points in the crisis dynamic, the contingent knowledge is much more important.

In any case, the chaos among theoreticians is even greater than the chaos in the nation-state organization of the world itself. There are conflicts between realists and idealists, between structural neo-realists and liberal realists, and built into world systems theory an inherent struggle between states, the focus of the realists, and the globally-oriented economy, the focus of the liberal realist. There are also conflicts between grotians and utopians, between utopians and realists versus gramscian utopian realism, between neo-liberal internationalists and grotian internationalists.

The Rwanda report (Adelman & Suhrke 1996) recommended that one of the greatest problems in intervention was the lack of coherence in policy. Policy formulation tends to mimic the divisions among the theorists. To add to the dilemma, there is gap between theory and practice. Alexander George (1993) has documented the character of that gap very incisively. Between the university and society, the largest chasm probably exists between theory as practised in the university and foreign policy.

Part of the reason is the standard one applied to any need to connect theory and practice - the abstraction of one and the immersion in the concrete of the other, the need for decisions in practice when there is imperfect information and no time to gather more. But the foreign policy field has special problems. First, in the dominant theories, the relations between states are dominated by the pursuit of rational self-interest and the preservation and extension of the power of the state to facilitate such collective pursuits, or, in Wallerstein's world systems theories, the dialectic between the two as economics is globalized while the realization of positions of power are confined largely within state boundaries. In such a context, the study of power becomes the study of domestic politics, while foreign policy becomes a sub-study of economics - how to promote a country's self interest within a global economy. This is particularly true when the study of the strategic uses of power outside the country becomes primarily a study of the best use of coercive power in the effort to advance national self-interest.[31] In that case, the military strategists replace the political scientists per se as the leaders in this area.

One of the results is the relative neglect of whole fields of study which have least relevance to either economic or strategy issues. African studies is a case in point.[32] Secondly, in the policy area, the Rwanda study demonstrated how policy was largely dictated, not by knowledge and analysis, but by ignorance, misleading perceptions carried in the media, and sentiment. When experience was ostensibly used - such as the reference to Somalia -it was based both on a misreading of that experience and an ill-fitting application to Rwanda. And when experience was relevant - such as that from Zaire - it was not utilized.

From the theoretical side, as an example, in the United States, those with knowledge of Rwanda were largely anthropologists and historians, not political scientists (Catherine Newbury at the University of North Carolina is one such exception) let alone foreign policy specialists. There was a simple reason. Rwanda had not heretofore been a primary

foreign policy interest of the United States. It is difficult
to undertake empirical studies on foreign policy areas where
one's own country has little engagement. And where there were
many studies of Zaire because of the American involvement,
they were overwhelmingly critical - analyses of covert and
hegemonic exercises in power politics to advance American
interests and engage in cold war politics through proxy wars.
If intellectuals cannot be the moral guides of a state, they
will almost inevitably play the role of its superego.

This was but a recurring instance of an endemic role of
universities. As the university developed, again and again it
would create groups of intellectuals concerned with the moral
marginality of the university and its failure to resurrect its
original medieval mission to create and set universal moral
standards for society.

There is an additional problem. It is difficult to
generalize from historical studies of the agents and issues in
a particular setting. The gap between politics as history and
politics as social science continues to plague academia so
that theory based on scientific abstractions lacked enough
historical specificity to be relevant, while the historical
details of the events in Rwanda lacked a comparative context
or enough generalization to fit current practices within a
larger context.

In the Rwanda case, the Adelman/Suhrke report (1996)
pointed to the absence of any detailed diagnosis of what was
occurring *at the decision-making levels*. There were analyses.
In the United States, the State Department had scenario
studies. The CIA had undertaken strategic studies. As had
Pentagon advisers.[33] The UN had a plethora of information and
reports which had not be subjected to systematic analyses. In
France, where the best studies had been done, they had
influenced a shift in French policy from unqualified support
for Habyarimana to support for the peace process; the
ambivalence of the shift suffered from both a time lag and the
conflicts over policy. More important than all these gaps in
substantive knowledge or the application of substantive
knowledge even when it was available, was the absence of a
coherent process for obtaining the knowledge and utilizing it.

But there are deeper problems. The conflicts between
various inclinations in foreign policy, as I have repeatedly
tried to point out, are but correlates to the disputes between
different theoretical schools. As long as there is such
confusion in conceptualizing the general problem, it is
difficult for policymakers to take scholars seriously, other
than to use them as rationales for their own propensities.
(Adelman 1996a)

Even George (1993), who, as I indicated, has over the past decades demonstrated the greatest concern with the problem of the gap between theory and practice, and who eschews confining himself to concerns with instrumental (he calls it technical) rationality, but is concerned with the broader realm of normative considerations in what he terms *value rationality*, is still a realist. He begins with the assumption that the essential task of statecraft "is to develop and manage relationships with other states in ways that will protect and enhance one's own security and welfare." (xxiv) Thus, policymakers have to clearly enunciate a state's interests, prioritize them, and assess costs and risks in pursuing them.

Though George's framework was far broader than most realists and included America's normative as well as material interests and the role of knowledge as well as power and interest in explicating and guiding political actions[34], there remained two problems. The material and power interests were given priority. Secondly, the key normative interest, the prevention or mitigation of genocide, arose late in the game. Prior to that stage, the priority of material and power interests meant that the intelligence analysis had not been done or, when undertaken, had not risen to the top of the pile. Committed in one direction, in good part propelled by domestic reactions to the perceptions of the Somalia involvement, it then became very difficult to reverse course, especially when neither the government nor the public were well informed on the issue.

6. Justifying Humanitarian Intervention - The Case of Zaire

States largely avoided the universal predictions of disaster in Zaire. If the situation of the refugee warriors from the interhamwe and ex-FAR army, who indoctrinated and intimidated the refugees against returning to Rwanda, were not attended to, an explosion could be expected. The eruption began when the interhamwe and ex-FAR combined with Zairian army units to undertake ethnic cleansing of the Banyawelenge in the Masisi region of Zaire in the spring of 1996. But by the time those efforts were extended to the Bukavu and Uvira areas in the south, the Banyawalenge, whose citizenship had been taken away by the Zairian government if 1981, had allies and perhaps "volunteers" from Rwanda. They defeated the militant Hutu attacks and began the violent overthrow of the Zairian regime. Though Brian Atkins from USAID tried to make intervention a central goal of US policy in the June 1996 Rwanda Roundtable in Geneva, his initiative was undermined from three sources - lack of ardent support by other states,

professional analysts who pointed out all the hazards, difficulties and risks of intervention, and by his own 'realist' colleagues, especially from the State and Defence Departments.

However, as usual, sentiment overruled the various instrumental rationalists as the media covered the plight of the refugees extensively and in detail. However, because of the conflicting actors in the interventionist initiative and their failure to follow the parameters set out by the African states in the Nairobi summit of 5 November, in particular the obligation to free the refugee camps from the control of the militants and allow the refugees to return to Rwanda, the rebels initiated a preemptive attack against the interhamwe and ex-FAR. And suddenly over 500,000 refugees were moving back to Rwanda. Paradoxically, when the interventionists determined to be strictly humanitarian, the African states in Nairobi believed that the inclusion of France meant that the intervention was certain to be political and one-sided. The camps would be reinforced and the interhamwe strengthened.

With the dramatic decline in the sentiment for intervention and with the political obstacles arising against intervention, the rationale dissolved even though there were still 750,000 internally displaced Zairians and 500,000 Rwandese and Burundian refugees had (at the time of this writing) still not been taken care of. Whether the humanitarian intervention melted into air or was transformed into something radically other, the opportunity for basing intervention on norms and rules and for using the crisis to articulate a consistent rationale was lost.

Without effective rules of the club of nation-states (excluding those rules which are in the books but are not enforced), a government can slaughter thousands, tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands and millions of its own citizens without any intervention or with belated interference by outside powers. States are unwilling to intervene in spite of prior knowledge of a genocide (such as in Rwanda), military presence and the legal right to intervene, if there seems to be no threat to peace and security for the powerful members of the club or the club itself. (Adelman & Suhrke 1996) Alternatively, sentiment can arouse the passion for humanitarian intervention, but one which must be strictly humanitarian and not get at the root of the problem or involve any significant risk to the intervenors.

Does this mean that the club of states lacks any abiding legal rules or moral guides? Not at all. The rules of state security are clear. Even the rules of economic interests are clear. Only those rules which ignore security and economic

interests and attempt to found rules of intervention on a universal moral order are ignored, except as a moral whipping tool.

Does this mean states are able to abuse their own citizens with impunity? Not at all. Because abuse always has consequences for the other members - the most obvious one being the flow of refugees into those countries. The legal norms and the ethical guidelines do exit, but they remain vague, unarticulated and are not adequately embodied in international law because the universalists have fought a rearguard battle on the only turf which they predominated as they were successfully beaten back with the rise of modernity.

It is time for the rules of the club of nation-states justifying intervention to be articulated. When and under what conditions is the abuse of a state of its own citizens, or the tolerance by state authorities of abuse perpetrated by others, to be considered unacceptable to the other members of the club? On the basis that such abuse threatens the security and economic well-being of those other members as well as the continuity of the club in general? In sum, what binds both failing states and states which attempt to prevent such failures and the consequences thereof is the common membership of both types of states in the same club with a set of articulated and unarticulated rules governing intervention by one state in the affairs of the other.

The timing for clarifying the rules of membership and the definition of threats to peace and security is propitious. The currents of globalization are undermining the strength of the individual member states as well as the illusion of the absolute autonomy of each. But, as indicated above, these historical factors are being used as a rallying cry for the universalist forces to reimpose a set of universal moral rules. An articulation of rules which integrate interests and norms is needed. So are readily available instruments of intervention and the logistics for delivering them. What is not needed is policy determined to be ineffectual by the unreason of realism, or an activist policy determined in an ad hoc manner by sentimentalism.

To realize such a policy, it will be necessary to reward risks with honour and glory for the sacrifice. On the other hand, such a rationale must not become an apologetic for a new imperialism on the premise of Machiavelli that a state must be constantly either preparing for war or fighting wars lest the state implode with the domestic turmoil that always arises in times of peace (Sullivan 1996, 177: Klare 1992, 37-54) Humanitarian intervention must be founded on both interests and norms lest it become the excuse for a messianic complex of

sacrifice, salvation and redemption in what the military call low intensity conflicts and what the humanitarians call complex emergencies. This is the only meaningful route to escape the negligence and impotence of 1991-2, a period which set the stage for the radical shifts between indifference or sentiment towards the Third World that followed.

ENDNOTES

1. Jean Bodin saw the singularity of the nation-state as the only answer to divided authority between the local polity and Rome because the "medieval confusion of un-coordinated independent authorities with residual ties to a distant Pope or Emperor was a recipe for chaos and bloodshed." Jean Bodin (1576) *De Republica - Six Books of the Commonwealth (tr. M.J. Tooley) Oxford: Blackwell.* A new system had to replace the old order of dual jurisdictions. Responsibility had to be given a locus. As Bodin wrote, "what was required in each state was a single and ultimate source with 'the power to give the law to all citizens'."(78)

2. Machiavelli was one of the first political thinkers to oppose the idea of a centrally directed religious political authority; he was in favour of political power being transferred to the merchant-led city-state as opposed to a third option, a secular imperial centre. Machiavelli believed that a replication of the pagan Rome of antiquity as the alternative to medieval Rome would be too large and cumbersome to manage human political ambitions just as classical Rome had been. (cf. Sullivan 1996)

3. Establishing this point alone would take a whole book. Simply think of the debate that was at the intellectual foundations of modernity - finding a solid foundation for knowledge in the face of the attack by pyrrhonistic scepticism. Not the recognition that the quest for knowledge could have no certain and fixed foundations. It was only with the latter recognition that we would get the divide between pure fideism - the path of faith - and mitigated or constructive scepticism, basing knowledge on reasonableness. (Popkin 1960, 15) But at the intellectual foundations of modernity, the choice was between truth authorized by Church tradition - the status of which required the scepticism of Erasmus to defend - or the insistence on founding faith on Truth, as in Martin Luther's 1520 volumes, *The Appeal to the German Nobility* and *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*. In those attacks, he established an alternative foundation for certainty - scripture and faith. Truth and the source of faith were to be found in scripture, and in order to read scripture truthfully, one had to have faith. And because it was a foundation in personal conscience and in using reason to attack tradition to provide a foundation in faith, the traditional order was undermined, but the insistence remained that truth be built on some solid foundation. There was either faith or a scepticism that either reinforced traditional institutions or, alternatively, on the Rabelasian path, undermined any basis of knowledge. Contrast the refugee, Bruno, until he was captured and executed for heresy, who fled

Catholicism to Calvinism and then Lutheranism, who insisted on an heroic love for the world soul, the constituent formal principle of the world, and Petrarch, as in his treatise, *On His Ignorance*, where he insists on Christian faith and Platonic wisdom defended by a sceptical Ciceronian eloquence. (Kristeller 1964) The university was mired in scholasticism and organizational chaos, and remained hostile to the currents of change of the Renaissance which were determined to establish more solid foundations by a humanist quest to find deeper foundations in the texts of the classical world in a universe undergoing rapid change. (Renaudet 1969)

4. For an analysis of the development of 16th century capitalist agriculture, cf. Wallerstein 1974. For a discussion of its union with mercantilism to develop capitalist expansion in the seventeenth century, cf. Wallerstein 1980.

5. Henry Robinson, *A Short Answer to A.S.* (1645): "nations denying the right to worship could not properly send their agents to other nations so discriminated against." R.L. Colie (1957) *Light and the Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians*, Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 45. Henry More would transform this practical rationale into a matter of principle and human justice.

6. In this interpretation, the development of the state *precedes* the development of a commercial empire and a global economy. Wallerstein argued that the state originated as a by-product of capitalist development. For support for my claim that the state system is created prior to, but facilitated by the development of a consolidated capitalist system, cf. Zolberg (1981).

7. As Australian Chancellor Meternich stated, "States belonging to the European alliance, which have undergone in their internal structure an alteration brought about by revolt, whose consequences may be dangerous to other states, cease automatically to be members of the alliance. [If such states] cause neighbouring states to feel an immediate danger, and if action by the Great powers can be effective and beneficial, the Great Powers will take steps to bring the disturbed area back into the European system, first of all by friendly representations, and secondly by force if force becomes necessary to this end." (quoted in Weber 1995, 12 from Palmer and Colton 1971, 490); Palmer, R.R. and J. Colton (1971) *A History of the Modern World*, 4th ed. New York: Alfred Knopf.)

8. "As enforcement operations always overlook the principle of consent, they are essentially interventionist forces, where intervention is defined as an attempt to get involved, or deploy military force, in a conflict without the approval of all the parties to the conflict. These interventions (Haiti, northern Iraq, Somalia) appear to have set important legal precedents." (Makinda 1996, 149)

9. The intervention in northern Iraq was not undertaken "to protect Kurds from dictatorial rule" (Makinda 1996, 157-8), though that may have been the effect. (Cf. Adelman 1992b and 1992c and the commentary of Laberge in *Ethics and International Affairs*, 1995) Contrary to the wishful thinking of many grotians and utopians, there is no indication that "the UN is probably ready to implement a broader concept of security that, among other things, includes economic development, societal institutions, and good governance." (Makinda 1996, 164)

10. "(T)oday and for the foreseeable future, the only international civilization worthy of the name is the governing economic culture of the world market. Despite the view of some contemporary observers, the forces of globalization have successfully resisted partition into cultural camps." (Rosecrance 1996, 45)

11. "Economic globalization has placed constraints upon the autonomy of states. More and more, national debts are foreign debts so that states have to be attentive to external bond markets and to externally-influenced interest rates in determining their own economic policies. The level of national economic activity also depends upon access to foreign markets. Participation in various international 'regimes' channels the activities of states in developed capitalist countries into conformity with global economy processes, tending toward a stabilization of the world capitalist economy." (Cox 1993b, 262)

12. "We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife.

Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 11, 41-2)

13. "Globalization is generating a more complex multi-level world political system, which implicitly challenges the old Westphalian assumption that a state is a state is a state. Structures of authority comprise not one but at least three levels: the macro-regional level, the old state (or Westphalian) level, and the micro-regional level. All three levels are limited in their possibilities by a global economy which has means of exerting its pressures without formally authoritative political structures." (Cox 1993b, 263)

14. "The rapid growth and maturation of the multicentric world can in good part be traced to the extraordinary dynamism and expansion of the global economy. And so can the weakening of the state, which is no longer the manager of the national economy and has become, instead, an instrument for adjusting the national economy to the exigencies of an expanding world economy." (Rosenau 1992, 27)

15. At the time of the Rwanda genocide, 45% of UN assistance was devoted to humanitarian rather than development purposes. (Cf. UNDP (1994) "Emergencies Consuming Nearly Half of UN Assistance," *Africa Recovery*, 8:1-2.

16. "Restructuring is depriving the state of its ability to regulate economic life, furthering the outflow and internal concentration of wealth." (Mittleman 1996, 209)

17. "As economic interests expand and the domestic economy becomes a derivative of the global economy, the nation-state is placed in a difficult and contradictory position. It must in neoliberal societies...promote the efficiency of global resource exploitation and at the same time meet an expanding array of domestic responsibilities." (Mason 1994, 17) The global market on its own seems merely to exacerbate the problems we apparently face as no substitute appears able to take over the role of the state, and the state's ability to control even its own monetary and fiscal policies is eroded.

18. The first is a point Edmond J. Keller makes in his introduction (p. 11) and Donald Rothchild makes in his conclusion (p. 228) of their edited volume (1996). Ibrahim A. Gambari makes the latter point in his article in that volume, "The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues." (p. 29)

19. Brown (1996b, 573), for example, identifies four main cluster of factors which compare somewhat to and have a large overlap with the four underlying causes I identify: an economic crisis, weak institutions, social segmentation, and proneness to violence. He identifies "structural factors such as weak states, security concerns, and ethnic geography; political factors such as discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics; economic/social factors such as widespread economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic development and modernization; and cultural/perceptual factors such as patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories." Proximate causes are but the acceleration of the underlying causes as can be seen in the comparative chart Brown (1996b, 577 Table 17.1)

20. "(W)e now live in a world which is characterized by the growing global integration of production and financial structures, complex communications grids, the rapid innovation and diffusion of technology *and the possible emergence of associated forms of consciousness* (my italics), as well as changes in security structures and strategic alignments." (Gill 1993, 7)

21. "In a context of a globalized world economy, the *territoriality* of the state is significant not as the source of quasi-ontological needs and desires but because the state is the primary political organizational mechanism of social order and transformation." (Palan 1994, 46)

22. (C)onflict prevention efforts should focus very aggressively on the decisions and actions of domestic elites, who are usually responsible for sparking internal conflicts...Those interested in conflict prevention need to think systematically about ways of neutralizing the ethnic bashing, ethnic skapegoating, hate-mongering, and propagandizing that are often the precursors to violence." (Brown 1996b, 599)

23. Very few international theorists pay attention to what is generally known as "chaos" theory, even though they are preoccupied with crises. One exception is Michael Nicholson (1996) pp. 37-43. "Small changes in the area around the bifurcation point lead to major changes in the system's behaviour." p. 39.

24. This is often referred to as the *butterfly effect*. "If a butterfly flies from one buttercup to another in June in

England instead of staying put, the minute change in the climate 'causes' a hurricane in the Caribbean in the following year." (Nicholson 1996, 43)

25. For the best introduction to the chaos theory of the Brussels school, cf. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature*, New York: Bantam, 1984, or Prigogine's earlier more mathematical version, *From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences*, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. For a model on how these systems produce greater order instead of chaos, cf. the combined work of the Danish scientist, Per Bak and his Chinese colleague, Kan Chen, and their theory of 'self-organized criticality.' (Cf. their article by that same name in *Scientific American*, January 1991, 46-53, or their earlier short version with Michael Creutz, "Self-Organized Criticality in the 'Game of Life'" in *Nature*, 342:6251, 780-2, December 14, 1989. Whereas environmental realists stress the mechanical sub-state (Homer-Dixon), inter-state (classical realists), and larger macro civilizational factors that need to be kept in equilibrium, and idealists and liberal internationalists stress the values and institutions that ought to be put in place to prevent the system from spinning out of control, this theory essentially argues that the factors for producing a higher level of order are to be found within the complex system itself. What is most important is detecting the critical point at which a system can go from relative stability to catastrophe. Let me illustrate this with a simple childhood model. When we as children were fascinated with building sand castles on the sea shore, we pile the sand and introduce water to create a packing effect so that the sand can be carved. But as we pile the sand higher or introduce water into the moat, the pieces of the wall tend to collapse into the moat. The key trick is to continue building larger and larger. We reinforce falls and avalanches as we go, but not to add too much so that the castle suddenly, and irretrievably collapses in a catastrophic event that children actually delight in because it allows them to vent their furies and totally destroy the product of their own creativity. But the higher stage is reached when we do not destroy the products of our own creativity, but recognize how to preserve the castle in a critical state, at least until we leave the beach to the vagaries of wind and water. Until that point, we need to keep a wary eye on introducing too much sand or water. The trick to maintaining **relative** stability is to maintain a system at a sub-critical state rather than producing a supercritical state where a single gain of sand can destroy everything invested into a situation. As shall become clear, I am not a naturalist who is willing to let

nature take its course to see if order emerges out of chaos spontaneously as it were. Quite the reverse. Humans are imbued with a spirit, a *geist*, which allows them to increase order by countering the downward trend of entropy. In that sense, I share a kinship with the idealists. But like the realists, I do not believe in introducing values and institutions *ab extra*, but instead see the importance of using elements already in a situation to use a bifurcation point to create a higher level order. Humans, like God, are the intervenors in balancing chance and necessity to create greater order. One final point. The use of scientific analogies is not intended to suggest that international relations can be understood in the same way that the nature of the universe is grasped in the laws of physics. The use of the language of physics is only intended to be metaphorical.

26. Though 'chaos" is used here analogically, it also tries to use the analogy accurately in reference to the key elements of chaos theory. Thus, though on the one hand, language is being used metaphorically, hopefully it is not obscurantist and confusing. For a satire on the misuse of chaos theory to posit a relativist world in which reflection is merely an exercise in subjective projection, see the article by Alan D. Sokal (1996) "Transgressing the Boundaries - Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," *Social Text*, Spring/Summer, 217-252, and the commentary by Steven Weinberg (1996) "Sokal's Hoax," *New York Review of Books*, XLIII:13, August 8, 11-15.

27. As Ilya Prigogine put it so succinctly, "Matter at equilibrium is blind. Far from equilibrium it begins to see." (Prigogine 1993, 20) At equilibrium, we see, but we only see what we have brought to the situation in the first place. Thus, for example, Wallerstein, the brilliant creator of worlds system theory, lays stress on an equilibrium model in which the basic units of analysis are geographical: core, semi-peripheral and peripheral zones in the world-economy. There is a dialectic between the global transformative processes of capitalism and the preservation propensities of states to maintain the status quo while the globalization continually undermines that effort to produce a new equilibrium level by altering the character of the sub-state units - classes, peoples, and households. Neo-structuralists may amend the model by allowing us to see power and self interest at work as dynamic and not just passive elements. Idealist utopians may point to the absence of an effective international authority. But the real issue may be to allow the forces in play to see themselves. The key may not be providing explanations for those who are victimized or engaged in victimization, but to set up a process whereby they can

discover themselves what is wrong.

28. (Schraeder 1994, 107) This was even true of the African pro-active Carter administration. "(D)espite a stated commitment to human rights and the need to decrease ties with authoritarian dictatorships, the Carter administration largely failed to follow through on the promise in 1977 in the case of Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire (see Chapter 3). Rather strong rhetoric in the first year of the administration gave way to inaction and acceptance of a consensus within the national security bureaucracies that Mobutu's fall would yield chaos and instability." Ibid, p. 7.

29. Cf. Kaplan (1996) who, in describing the great temple at Angkor Wat, aptly captures this age-old approach. "(D)warfing human beings out of all proportion, were seventy sandstone colossi, about thirty-five demons lining one side of a bridge leading to the entrance of the medieval city, and thirty-five gods on the other side. These turbaned sandstone giants, each blotched with lichen, were pulling on the elongated body of the 'cosmic serpent,' or Naga, which serves as a kind of butter churn - separating out the solid world and is social structures from the mythical 'milk of chaos'." p. 424.

30. Cf. Holland, John H. (1995) *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity*, Reading: Addison-Wesley.

31. It is interesting that in George (1993), the primary gap between theory and practice is between realist theorists and realist practitioners. "(P)ractitioners find it difficult to make much use of academic approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave the same way in given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with actor-specific models...that grasp the different internal structures an behaviourial patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal." (9) On the other hand, for George, what the practitioners need is statecraft since, "the essential task of foreign policy is to develop and manage relationships with other states that will protect and enhance one's own security and welfare. This objective requires that policymakers clearly define their own state's interests, differentiate these interests in terms of relative importance, and make prudent judgements as to acceptable costs and risks of pursuing them." (xxiv) In other words, practitioners (American one's at least) practice realism, but theory based on realism is of no help. What is of help is a model that is

actor specific, instead of assuming one set of motives, and which is relative to the structure and situation within which the actor operates.

32. This also applies to media coverage. On non-reporting on Africa, cf. Mary Anne Fitzgerald, "The News Hole: Reporting Africa," *Africa Report* (July-August 1989):52-54.

33. Part of the reason these studies were not utilized in influencing policy is the very familiar one where the academic gained access to a prescient lower level analyses which were never used and, in retrospect, embarrass the government.

34. For a challenge to realist convictions that knowledge and historical experience are irrelevant compared to power and interest in explaining state actions, cf. Dan Reiter (1996) *Crucibles of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars*. The book is particularly relevant because it explains the different behaviour of Norway and Sweden following World War II.