HOST GROUPS: PUBLIC MEETS PRIVATE

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper explores some social and institutional arrangements which underlie successful operation and continuation of the **Host Programme**: a programme designed to assist those refugees arriving in Canada under auspices of the federal government.

In 1985, the federal government jointly planned with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to establish a pilot "Host" programme for refugee resettlement initially in seven cities across Canada.[1] The programme had three overall objectives:

A. Dollar cost-reduction in assistance outlay to refugees;
B. Reducing government counsellors' workloads;
C. More rapid adaptation to community life in Canada[2].

Operationally, the programme involves matching government-assisted refugees[3] with host families or groups (usually) affiliated with an NGO (often a faith-group or ethnocultural organization). A key rôle in the programme is a coordinator in the local community who arranges "matches" among Canadian

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[1] Québec City; Kitchener, Ontario; London, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Regina, Saskatchewan; Calgary, Alberta; and Vancouver, British Columbia. Since the initial period, several other communities have joined in the programme.

[2] Immigration Canada, Host Family program: Summary report. Ottawa, Unpublished report, 1987.

[3] Two major forms of sponsorship have become firmly established in Canada: **government-assistance** and **private sponsorship**.

> For **government assistance**, the federal government assumes responsibility for resettlement activity: financial assistance, counselling, material services, while contracting with local community agencies for provision of certain goods and services to refugees for a period up to 12 months after arrival.
> By contrast, **private sponsorship** allocates responsibility for a refugee (family) to an individual family or group, usually affiliated with an NGO. The sponsor is responsible for all aspects of resettlement (orientation, material welfare, moral support) of the refugee for the (same) period of 12 months. Sponsors may allocate certain tasks (e.g., language instruction) to the same set of service providers used for government-assisted refugees.

host groups for new arrivals. This matching attempts to select families or groups in the community who express an interest in hosting a refugee group similar to the prospective arrival.

Host groups undertake their rôle, which includes the following specifics, for a year:

> to meet frequently with their respective refugee (often a family) arrivals and to assist them in adapting to the local community. They are encouraged to emphasize their rôles as friends and helpers. Although a wide variety of help may be offered, host groups, in contrast with sponsors under the private sponsorship arrangements in Canada, are urged not to spend their own funds on consumer purchases; these are the responsibility of the federal government's financial assistance to all government-assisted refugees.

Overall, then, the host programme is an attempt to bring the advantages of informal contact with Canadians to those refugees arriving in Canada as government-assisted.

II. THE ARGUMENT: PRINCIPLES OF EXCHANGE

A. Public participation as part of a general participation in refugee-related activity by interested parties

It is convenient to portray the federal government, NGO agencies in a local community and refugees as **interested parties in a game of exchange of valued goods and services.**[4] The immediate project or endeavour finds the several parties **interdependent;** each member's many interests intersect those of the other parties to greater or less degree. This interdependence becomes obvious to the respective parties in that each party requires the others indispensably as part of its own game-plan: i.e., in order to achieve its own objectives.[5]

The parties in every instance, and this case in particular, differ in terms of power: i.e., the possession of valued resources and the ability to dispense them under conditions largely under that party's control.

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[4] P. Blau, Exchange and power in social life. New York, Free Press, 1964.

[5] N. Long, "The local community as an ecology of games," Am. jnl. soc., 60 (1960)

1. **Constituencies of NGOs**

The constituencies of NGOs are exclusively voluntary members who are either recruited or join as a result of particular interest. Their participation in any programme is contingent upon a delicate motivational balance: their particular interests have to be satisfied while the particular work of the NGO is successfully accomplished.

D. **Refugees**

While there are many overlapping official Canadian classifications of persons who are generally termed "refugees"[4], two major administrative categories include "overseas" refugees, i.e., those in camps or other temporary overseas locations awaiting "third-country" resettlement; and refugee claimants, who claim Convention refugee status inland or at the border.

The federal government's own complement of "government assisted" comprises only "overseas" refugees. They are accepted according to an official intake schedule, the "Annual Refugee Plan", which permits (however short) advance notice to local communities and to the respective NGOs. It is exclusively the population of the "overseas" refugees, therefore, towards whom concern about ameliorating the difficulties of adaptation in the initial year of resettlement has been directed.

Typically, the reception of a government-assisted refugee involves a government counsellor and interpreter who together with the refugee attempt to organize arrangements for resettling. As refugees occupy only a portion of the counsellor's disposable time during business hours, not all problems of refugees may be addressed effectively in that manner. Of particular concern

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[4] Canada is a signatory to the 1951 UNHCR Convention and the 1967 Protocol. It therefore accepts the Convention definition: i.e., those fleeing a "well founded fear of persecution". Additionally, it also accepts cases who individually may not meet the test of individual persecution but whose circumstances as entire groups involve widespread general persecution or other forms of political oppression. These latter cases are termed "Designated Class" refugees and are not required to fulfill the letter of the Convention requirement. From time to time the government determines that certain groups, including those having fled the Southeast Asian states of Viet Nam, Cambodia or Laos, qualify as Designated Class. Cf. Julius Grey, "Legal Status/Refugee Status in Canada," this volume.

is isolation and difficulty in establishing friendships with Canadians. Such community contacts so necessary to successful adaptation cannot be an integral part of the government counsellor's service.

E. Incentives and disincentives for participation in host programme

1. PUBLIC SECTOR: Political and Bureaucracy

The ongoing programmes of refugee assistance have resulted in significant preoccupations both for Canadian politicians and several departments of the government especially since the wave of Southeast Asian refugees in the late 70s. Over the past decade Canada has received about 200,000 refugees from a wide variety of origins.[7] The volume and diversity of arrivals, together with the selection process would suggest that public pressures regarding intake policy and practice are considerable. Administrative procedures require extensive complements of civil service personnel as well as collaboration with groups outside the government. A variety of motives would be relevant for the government to involve the assistance of groups from the voluntary sector (NGO). A satisfactory explanation of the interest of politicians and civil servants rests upon an interactional model with the following features.

a. **Incentives**

Reduction in expenses of resettlement.

Integration of refugees more quickly into community, re: jobs, social networks

Reduction of dependence upon welfare as source of income.

Public relations: co-operative image.

b. **Disincentives**

Loss of administrative control over refugee resettlement.

Possible higher expenses than originally anticipated.

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[7] Cf. Tanya Basok and Alan Simons, "Refugees in Canada: a review of the politics of refugee selection," this volume.

2. **Private sector: Two groups: NGO and Constituencies**

a. **Incentives for NGO**

Financial support

Sharing of expertise to reaffirm the dominance of NGOs as resettlement experts

Widening of experience with various types of refugee resettlement.

b. **Disincentives**

Assumption of burden of resettlement which appears rightly to "belong" to federal government

c. **Incentives for Constituencies**

Interpersonal obligation

Service as part of overall commitment to organization (NGO)

Involvement with political cause

Interest in particular culture

d. **Disincentives**

Value foregone: Disposable time for other interests

Failure of NGO or Federal bureaucracy to co-operate, including unfavourable publicity about programme.

This combination of incentives and disincentives for collaboration provides the context for the collaboration between the private and public sectors with respect to assistance for newly arrived refugees. Each party obviously attempts to maximize the outcomes initially perceived as incentives. Yet the important feature of **interdependence** in this exchange remains in the **simultaneity of successful outcomes for all parties.** Without joint collaboration, the incentives listed above are illusory. Therefore it is in the interest of all parties to assure a favourable outcome not only for themselves but all others in the exchange.

F. **Agenda: involvement of members as part of their overall mission/mandate.**

The agenda for a host resettlement programme conveniently fits the interests and plans of the major parties. Certain inadequacies in the govern-

ment counselling activity were identified and widely acknowledged. The federal government would willingly search for an alternative to existing practice of resettlement, provided that it met organizational budgetary and resource constraints.

For its part, NGOs could join with the federal government in another common endeavour to improve resettlement experiences of refugees. Such cooperation would enhance the status of the organization vis-à-vis the federa government. They held important reservations, however, in that resources should not be unduly depleted. Such a danger would exist not in the budgetary sense, but in the possible threat to its own organization of resettlement work, including recruitment of sponsors for the private sponsorship programme and overlapping jurisdiction among sister NGOs.

Refugees, as well, had been informally consulted about such a plan. Approval in principle was widespread, subject to an "opting out" provision for any given refugee: i.e., participation in the host programme was entirtely voluntary.

G. Congruency of programme with overall Multiculturalism policy

The particular provisions of the host programme derive implicitly from Multiculturalism policy as developed to that time (1985). Dual currents of multiculturalism, which are not altogether compatible in many policy implementation exercises, fed into federal governmental policy:

1. Multiculturalism as a **means of delivering the goods and services to which every Canadian resident is entitled**; i.e., provision of services in particular cultural forms and in various languages so as to enable newcomers to participate more fully and quickly in ongoing social services activities; and
2. Multiculturalism as an **ideal of the concurrent expansion of every ethnocultural group tradition once established in Canada.**[8]

[8] J. Burnet with H. Palmer, "Coming Canadians": an introduction to a history of Canada's peoples. Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1988, Ch. 12.

The host programme serves those twin objectives in a particularly congruent way through recruitment of individuals and groups from "established organizations". The type of services: friendship, introduction to local community living, bridges the two cultures: Canada and that of the homeland.

H. Linkages

Two important linkages in the exchange process are evident:

1. Financial support to agency

The local community receives financial and official support for the establishment of a coordinator for a host programme. The activities of NGOs in the community are thereby augmented at no additional direct cost to themselves.

2. Popular support from agency membership to governmental department

The complementary part of the exchange implicitly commits the NGOs in the local community to support the activities of the federal department. As such support is implicit, it may be diffused to any or all ongoing activity of the federal government in refugee affairs of the day. The participating NGOs and the government are interdependently linked in a project to ameliorate the process of adaptation of new arrivals. Both have a stake in the success of the endeavour.

I. Hypotheses:

1. Assuming: increase or stable flow of refugees,

   a. The host programme will grow as long as community agencies are rewarded for activity, both in budget compensation and by status bestowal;

   b. Participation will increase as the host programme agenda becomes more firmly incorporated in the existing mandate/mission of the respective agencies;

   c. The Government will continue support of the programme as long as overall Canadian policy fosters attention to intake of and services directed toward multicultural populations.

2. With respect to refugee resettlement

a. Refugees selected for host programme resettlement will show faster adaptation to life in Canada than will those refugees not so treated;

Effects will be more apparent in higher degrees of interpersonal and cultural, in contrast to economic, adaptation.

III. Programme operation

A. Selection of sites

Current sites have been selected for the pilot programme with some attention to distribution across regions of Canada and population sizes. The consideration of population size reflects, of course, the concern over whether a "critical mass", either of recent refugee arrivals or of NGO organizational infrastructure, is required for successful operation. Correspondingly, it was necessary for communities themselves to demonstrate not only a quantitatively adequate infrastructure but also a capacity if not preparedness to coordinate activities for a unitary host programme delivery

B. Attractiveness to communities

Community reaction of NGOs to proposals of a host programme has varied from highly positive to sceptical. Advantages to the NGOs, including the addition of a new programme at little additional direct cost, have already been discussed. On the other hand, scepticism was aroused in two related areas. First, the timing of the initial proposal (1984) coincided with a period when rates of private sponsorship had fallen to their lowest level since the influx of Southeast Asian refugees in 1979. Prospective sponsors might be attracted to providing assistance to refugees who already have support (as government-assisted). If so, the already flagging support for private sponsorship would be further undercut. Secondly, NGOs questioned the principle of whether they should assist a programme which is already funded. In this perspective, scarce human resources would best be allocated to programme initiatives of the NGOs themselves. These issues have remained points of negotiation as the implementation of the pilot programme progressed from 1985 onwards. To date neither party has hardened its bargaining position irreversibly.

Systematic information on attitudes of members in the wider community has not been gathered. Anecdotal reports from the seven communities which have participated in the pilot programme to date have appeared uniformly positive. The programme has appeared both as a much-needed type of assistance to newcomers as well as a "natural" and easily accessible opportunity to become acquainted with people from other cultures. Nevertheless, some public resistance has been felt in recent years by community organizers to "refugees" in general. The pervasiveness and extent of such resistance has not been systematically investigated to date.[9]

C. **Selection of agency**

Agencies were selected for their ability to provide a coordinator to serve a sufficiently large number of refugees while coordinating activities of several NGOs in the whole community. To date, one agency per community has typically been selected for coordination. Whether larger metropolitan areas require a more elaborate form of inter-agency collaboration is a matter presently under consideration.

D. **Recruitment**

While the coordinator is based in a (single) local agency, the work of publicity and recruitment of host groups is effected through a somewhat elaborate network or "chain" of connections between the coordinator, NGOs, and other benevolent organizations in the local community. Often the organizations are faith groups with long-standing memberships. These groups are invited to include the host programme as another in the range of activities offered for their membership.

The coordinator launches a publicity campaign which emphasizes volunteer commitment for a year to assist a refugee group arriving in the community. The "host" composition may range from a couple to a small group of persons and families already formed, usually in connection with ongoing programme activity of an NGO. Exact arrival dates cannot be fixed, as overseas arrangements are

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[9]The issue of "refugee backlog" was raised in the recent federal electoral campaign. Candidates openly declared their concerns over lack of fairness in the "system" and that certain people were "queue-jumping" or arriving in Canada without proper authorization. Cf. Globe and Mail, November 18, 1988, p. A3.

subject to delays. Consequently, the commitment of a given host may be impaired by the intervention of conflicting events between initial agreement and arrival date.

The pre- and post-arrival training for host groups varies from informal counselling to a more elaborate series of instructional sessions designed by the NGO. Usually the training sessions include information on the cultural background of the (prospective) refugee as well as operational details on community services (medical, language training, orientation classes). Emphasis falls upon serving as a friend to acquaint the refugee with the local community as well as wider Canadian society. They are reminded that the refugees continue as "government-assisted". In effect, the host is intended to serve as a "cultural adjunct" to the government counsellor, to whom the refugee remains attached. The counsellor continues to give the refugee access to a range of services, including a monthly allowance, provision of consumer goods and furnishings for their accommodation, again usually found by the government counsellor.

E. Operation since 1985

1. Sample selection; pilot programme

In each of six cities, Kitchener, London, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary and Vancouver the CEC (Canada Employment Commission) created sample groups of 35 host-group refugee and 35 "control" group refugee units (individuals or families) from the whole of the matched host groups (see Table 1). The seventh city, **Québec City, did not include a matched sample group, however.** Refugees in the "control" group portion of the sample were selected from government-assisted refugees who arrived during the same time period as those in the host group. Both sample groups were eligible to receive all the services normally provided government-assisted refugees in the community.

The two sample groups (host and "control") were matched as far as possible in each community by age range, gender of household head, and mix of geographic origin so that comparisons could be made of two groups from roughly equivalent backgrounds. No attempt was made to balance the sample by gender: overall, more than 80 per cent of the refugees in the study are male.

Origins are predominantly Central American and Southeast Asian background, with those from European region ranking third. In three cities, Lon-

don, Winnipeg and Vancouver, disproportionately more Central Americans were assigned to the host-group refugee, while Southeast Asians predominated in the "control" group (See Table 2). Family size is larger in the hosted group, with the "control" group representing single-person and smaller size families disproportionately (see Table 3).[10]

F. **Effect on refugees: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL ADAPTATION:**

1. **ACCOMMODATION**

Most refugees, whether host group or "control" group, moved into permanent accommodation within the first week in several communities. In Québec City, Vancouver, and especially Kitchener, the process of finding permanent accommodation took somewhat longer, with half of all Kitchener refugees not finding permanent accommodation until well after a month had elapsed. Only in Vancouver were host groups effective in finding accommodation for their refugees. In all other communities, either CEC or a mix of other agencies assisted in finding suitable housing.

Few differences between host-group refugees and "control" group refugees are apparent after one year's residence, other than the host groups were able to establish contacts for housing in some instances. Importantly for refugees in stressful circumstances, host groups were able to intervene in case of disputes between landlord and refugee, a common occurrence.

2. **Language learning**

Not all government-assisted refugees receive language training in English Canada, only those who facility is judged to be insufficient for employability (approximately 80 per cent of both host group and "control" group samples.) In Québec City, the French-language programme is open to all adults. In principle, it is assumed that host groups would reinforce language training through informal conversation and practical experience. Such assistance is particularly an asset as the interval between arrival of the refugee and entry into a language training programme could run as long as several months.

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[10] A serious problem in retrieving questionnaires among Québec City host-group refugees impairs the comparability of results from the that project with the others. Only 11 of 35 questionnaires were returned. No follow-up information was gathered. Thus there are many areas in the narrative to follow where it is impossible to include information for the Québec City project.

Data on anguage acquisition show three benefits of the host group gramme. First, etention n the anguage programme was higher among host group refugees. Only 4 per cent of the host group dropped out of language training, as compared with 12 per cent of the "control" group refugees. Mo "dropouts" did so because they landed a job.[11] In the short run, then, some "control" group refugees were more successful in landing employment early. Such success invariably occurs, however, at the expense of longer-term job chances which are usually predicated upon certain level of competence in English or French

Secondly, somewhat more change in language ability occurred among host group refugees. As indicated in Table 4, about 60 per cent of the host group refugees across five English-speaking communities showed marked improvement (2 levels or greater), compared with 56 per cent among the "control" group refugees over a 12 month period. In Québec City, fully 80 per cent of the host-group refugees rose at least 2 levels in French-language proficiency, according to reports of CEC counsellors.

Thirdly, a good command of English (French) is crucial in facilitation of both social and economic goals of refugees. Having an English- (French-) speaking host group sets an implicit level of facility in the language to which host-group refugees aspired. Several "control" group refugees when interviewed expressed frustration at not being able to advance in their job and economic aspirations because of inadequacy in language skills. By contrast, refugees matched with host groups invariably developed language skills rapidly as a means of sustaining their satisfying social relationships with their hosts. Such initial successes motivated refugees to improve their language skills even further. Thus the social benefits of language acquisition appear to have important ramifications in giving newcomers confidence when approaching other Canadians in job-related or other aspects of daily life.

[11] In the case of host-group refugees in Québec City, there was apparently no dropout, although one refugee's language was judged sufficiently high not to enrol.

3. FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENT AND AAP (SOCIAL SUPPORT) CONTRIBUTIONS[12]

At the end of the normal first year's of subsidy on Adjustment Assistance Programme (AAP), almost all clients had exhausted the benefit period. There was only a slight difference in the per-person or per-week contributions according to host group or "control" group. Overall, a higher percentage of the "control" group -- 40% -- received per-person payments in excess of $2600 compared with 32 per cent for the host-group refugees. In Kitchener, Calgary and Vancouver, host-group refugees received AAP for longer periods than did "control" group refugees. But more host-group refugees eventually became employed than did "control" group refugees, so that the net difference in total AAP payments between "control" group and host groups in those three communities cancelled out to virtually nil.

Although host groups were cautioned not to make financial payments to refugees, coordinators report that host group refugees have received a wide array of amenities not usually affordable by recently-arrived refugees: colour TV, kitchen appliances, "extra" furniture and clothing. Adaptation to lifestyle of established Canadians was thereby hastened by host groups.

4. EMPLOYMENT

In Kitchener, Calgary, and Vancouver, some "control" group refugees landed jobs more quickly, but by the end of the 12-month period, somewhat more host group refugees overall had landed a first job -- 57% -- compared with 53 per cent for "control" group refugees, with considerable variation in the rate of employment across the seven local job markets. In Québec City, only four host-group refugees had landed jobs by the end of the year.

Among those employed, there appeared no differences between host-group refugee and "control" group refugees in sources of job referrals. Overall, about half the refugees in both groups used CEC services as the main job source, although those in Kitchener and Calgary were far more self-reliant in finding their first job. While the direct effect of host groups in locating jobs appears minimal, there are important indirect effects. Refugees with

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[12] The Québec equivalent of the Adjustment Assistance Programme are not included in this evaluation.

host groups received more assistance in developing a concrete and realistic orientation to the job market.

In evaluation interviews, refugees with host programme experience expressed higher levels of employment aspirations as well as a certain optimism about their progress. By contrast, refugees in the "control" group situation often expressed downright despair over not being able to land a job or, if once successful, over finding some hope of advancement.

5. **CEC INVOLVEMENT**

A prime objective of the host group programme included relieving CEC counsellors from day-to-day assistance with needs of refugees and conserving their time for instances requiring sustained and professional intervention. The pilot programme overall reveals no clear differences between the host group and "control" group in terms of the number of visits of a refugee to the CEC (Canada Employment Commission) offices. Most counsellors, however, reported a "positive effect" of the host group experience upon refugees: assistance of the host group was usually sought before approaching the CEC counsellor. Yet by the end of the first year of settlement, most refugees visited CEC centres only rarely, so that little information on "progress" in adjustment during the later months was available.

6. **RELOCATION -- SECONDARY MIGRATION**

After the first year, far more "control" group refugees moved away from London, Winnipeg and Regina -- in all nearly 30 per cent of the "control" group refugees -- in comparison with only 6 per cent of those in host groups had moved away, mostly to Toronto. By contrast in Québec City, Kitchener, Calgary and Vancouver, relocation was rare -- about 6 per cent -- for refugees of either group

Movers offered a variety of reasons, about half indicating their interest in joining family or friends. By contrast, refugees matched with host groups indicated that they had formed close friendships in their communities and were getting settled, especially in the job market. Only one refugee mentioned climate as a factor in moving.

7. **SOCIAL ADAPTATION**

Refugees indicated in interviews that difficulties in adjusting to life in Canada remained even after a year's residence. Those refugees attached to

host groups, however, expressed much satisfaction having special assistance in a variety of instances: from general support to specific assistance in shipping, preparing correspondence and searching out services in the community. In an emergency, invariably persons in the host group were the principal resources. They would spend many hours in informal counselling or giving direct assistance -- far more time than could be afforded by any agency counsellor.

In contrast, "control" group refugees appeared to have fewer resources for assistance in daily life. There were less willing to call upon their fellow newcomers than were members of host group situations. They ("control" group) felt less well accepted and were less well acquainted with neighbours than were those who had been hosted. Perspectives toward the future likewise contrasted: "control" group refugees saw little promise and sometimes despair. Refugees with host group experience related vivid stories of personal assistance in case of illness as well as pleasant interludes of hospitality which anchored their optimism in a context of friendly and unrestrained assistance.

8. COMMUNITY AWARENESS

Spontaneous comments by hosts and programme coordinators indicate an important unanticipated benefit from the host group operation: a positive impact upon the local community in a wide variety of situations. First, the publicity of the programme heightens awareness of persons and groups at a slight remove from hosts: e.g., members of the same faith or community group; friends and neighbours of host families themselves. Consequently, invitations for presentations to local community functions, in classrooms and on community television programming all result in a much wider community awareness of the situation of refugees in general, as well as of the particular (host group) programme.

Secondly, for members of host groups themselves, assisting refugees becomes a lesson in appreciation of differences in life chances. They witness the sheer difficulties of everyday struggles for existence among people who are considerably poorer and more dependent than they as middle-class, well established Canadians ever were. As a result, members spontaneously reported that their own attitudes toward helping and social amelioration had undergone deeply felt change.

G. METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

Programmatically, teams in London, Regina and Vancouver generally matched refugees with host groups within one week of refugee's arrival in Canada. It was more common for matching in Winnipeg, Calgary and Kitchener to occur after refugees had been in the country for several weeks. In all areas of the study, the impact of the host group could only be diminished, the longer the time period between arrival and matching.

Owing to different times of arrival of refugees and staging of the evaluation, the "after 12 months" evaluation criterion was made more flexible in this report. In Regina and Calgary, the lapse of time between arrival and "year-end" evaluation was far shorter than 52 weeks. In Kitchener and Winnipeg, the period of time between arrival and evaluation was often considerably longer.

No baseline data on the level of education attained by refugees upon arrival in Canada were included in the evaluation. Thus indicators of language or other social achievement cannot take into account any differences between "host" and "control" groups with respect to differences in formal educational attainment of the respective groups.

It is particularly unfortunate that focussed interviews among host groups held in London, Winnipeg and Regina were not also held in other communities in order to shed light on whether the felt-impressions of refugees themselves squared with those expressed by host-group coordinators and CEC counsellors. In the communities without such interviews, information on social adaptation is derived exclusively from service workers, not from refugees.

Thus whatever experiences, impressions and concerns are felt by the refugee clients are filtered through reports either from hosts or from counsellors. Refugees would be reticent to indicate any social pressures to which they reacted adversely. Anecdotal reports of host groups inviting refugee families to social gatherings preceded by religious services might be understood as an implicit and possibly unwelcome invitation to become a member of the particular faith group.

As a result of the various methodological difficulties described above, all areas of the analysis are thereby affected. Refugees in the "control"

group might not have had the same opportunity to show signs of adaptation as would those in the host-group condition. Among the differences are both sample design as well as interpretative considerations. For the first, a sample group that has been in the country longer will receive lower average AAP allocations than would a group with a shorter stay. For the second, . differences between the two conditions cannot be unambiguously attributed, as the case of hosted families having more extensive contacts with established Canadians.



Figure 1SYMBIOTIC RELATION among PARTIES in RESETTLEMENT

IV. SUMMARY: PILOT TEST FINDINGS

The Host-group programme is portrayed in Figure 1 as a symbiotic relationship among the five parties (politicians, civil service administrators, NGOs, their host-group constituents and refugees themselves). The findings focus particularly upon the hosts and refugees in this larger relationship.

Government-assisted refugees host-group experience show a very positive trend in terms of language acquisition and frequency of use of English or French. There is also lower drop-out rate among the host-group refugees. In the longer term, language acquisition is expected to result in higher levels employment faster promotion and generally more thorough adaptation.

Very few in the matched group have relocated to other communities since their arrival. Also, most of the matched group indicate having Canadian friends and acquaintances. These factors indicate a higher level of integra-

tion into the community for the host group as compared with the control group

In terms of payments to refugees, differences between hosted and "control" groups are slight: payments to refugees with host-group experience are slightly less overall, even though the duration on AAP benefits may sometimes be longer. Yet in several communities the proportion of refugees who found employment within 12 months after arrival was greater among those with host-group experience.

Reports from the CEC's and host group coordinators illustrate increasing community awareness of the refugee situation. This effect is a longer-range positive impact on the degree of acceptance of all immigrants by Canadians. In turn, increased ability to integrate into and contribute toward the development of Canadian society is an expectable outcome.

V. Prospects for the future

A. Extension to all interested government-assisted refugees:

There is no prima facie reason for all government-assisted refugees not to be eligible for this programme if they so wish. The limit appears to be both organizational (coordination of large numbers, matching) and (to a much lesser extent) budgetary. Several observations on the viability of extension of the programme are included below.

B. Governmental policy and resources

1. Political representatives

Publicity about host programme has been muted to date, mainly confined to NGOs and their immediate constituencies. A higher profile is needed in order to assure support and credibility on the political agenda. If the negative stigma surrounding refugee intake, as has appeared with increasing frequency in the Canadian press, is not reversed, there is little chance that politicians will foster the image of the host programme as the credible and productive programme it has been shown to be.

upon host programme activity. Multiple interests of the several NGOs are reconcilable by the establishment of an advisory board. Efficiency of channelling information about arrivals, their timing, and assignments can also be significantly facilitated through operational coordination.

D. **Services to hosts**

Given the cultural and social diversity of the current and prospective refugee intake, the present services to hosts should be extended and routinized. While individual coordinators have imaginative means of motivating and informing hosts, such efforts appear more as individual initiatives rather than standardized procedure. A certain balance has to be drawn between creative initiative in service provision and assurance that minimal standards are met by all such hosts.

E. **Central community services (e.g., social centres)**

Many services (e.g., translation, information on various government programmes) could render greater assistance by being centralized. Likewise, the social function might be extremely valuable, since many refugees arriving in Canada express feelings of isolation. Such a "host centre" might replace the immediate need for hosts at times when they would be unavailable. The need for sustained interpersonal contact with established Canadians would not be relieved, of course.

F. **Size and heterogeneity of origin of refugees in community**

Large numbers of refugees from particular region already re-established in a given community may render the operation of a host programme less efficacious. The proximity of kin or contacts from home community may provide the personal contact for which the programme was designed. For each refugee group, regardless of size, volunteers have to be found. Neither the supply nor the stock of available language abilities is endless. Greater challenges to finding appropriate "matches" are certain.

G. **Effects on refugees:**

Most indicators of effect of the host programme point to more rapid adaptation to social and family-economic life in Canada, as detailed above. Certain other aspects of adaptation may develop as well, although there is currently only anecdotal information on the extent to which these may increase in importance. Refugees may develop even greater demands for family reunifi-

cation, more quickly, given the orientation of the host programme fostering development of skills in using bureaucratic and instrumental means to greater advantage

H. **Ethnocultural diversity**

Language differences between refugees and host programme volunteers require linguistically capable intermediaries: informal assistance (children, other relatives) has to be provided if specifically trained interpreters not available. While such differences require greater organizational intervention, there is presently little additional systematic information, **except that diversity per se does not appear to affect operational efficacy of the host programme**

I. **Relation to Multiculturalism**

The adoption of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988 symbolically heralded a new entitlement to persons of diverse cultural origin establishing residence in Canada. While not specifically alluded to in the legislation, programmes which provide institutional implementation, such as the host programme, while simultaneously providing the development of closer interpersonal ties between new and established Canadians appear unusually aptly suited. Such accommodation uniquely bridges the outstanding gap between the preservation of cultural identities and integration of groups of new arrivals into mainstream activi-

J. **Symbiotic relation of exchange parties:**

While satisfaction cannot be maintained at equivalent levels at any given time for all constituencies (Political representatives, Government Civil Service, Agencies [NGOs], Host groups, Refugees), it does follow that if the satisfaction of any one constituency remains below threshold sufficiently for communication to other members of the exchange, the ability of the other member constituencies to continue the plan will inhibit its perpetuation. Thus the planning of a social intervention, such as host programme, requires attention to all four.

There is evidence that each constituency perceives positive benefits at, arguably, a cost sufficiently small as to warrant continuation of the exchange relation. Benefits are both short- and longer range, somewhat asymmetrically

weighted toward short range for the refugee and host group, longer range for the two other constituencies.

Still, the relation remains a symbiotic one, with each of the parties to the exchange being bound to contribute if the relation is to continue. To date, the viability and growth of this programme indicate a positive outcome. Its dependence upon reciprocal exchange among the interested parties nonetheless remains a permanent feature of this social arrangement.

TABLE

HOST PROGRAMME PILOT PROJECTS: 985-1987

COMMUNITY	Start Date	Host Groups Matched	Refugee Groups Matched	Refugee Individuals Matched	As at
QUEBEC CITY	*10/08/85	74	74	211	01/11/87
KITCHENER	29/09/85	95	95	182	01/05/86
LONDON	15/04/85	86	86	293	31/01/86
WINDSOR	01/11/86	40	40	120	01/03/88
WINNIPEG	15/03/85	155	155	422	31/03/87
REGINA	29/03/85	59	71	181	28/02/87
CALGARY	01/07/85	142	243	650	01/06/87
VANCOUVER	15/08/85	164	209	540	01/06/87
TOTAL		815	973	2599	

Source: Canada, Employment and Immigration

*Québec City did not use a "control group" design

TABLE 2

REGIONAL ORIGINS OF HOST-GROUP AND "CONTROL" REFUGEES

REGION	QUEBEC CITY* HOST G.	KITCHENER HOST G.	KITCHENER CTRL. G.	LONDON HOST G.	LONDON CTRL. G.	WINNIPEG HOST G.	WINNIPEG CTRL. G.	REGINA HOST G.	REGINA CTRL. G.	CALGARY HOST G.	CALGARY CTRL. G.	VANCOUVER HOST G.	VANCOUVER CTRL. G.	TOTAL HOST G.	TOTAL CTRL. G.
Europe	8	4	9	1	2	5	9	10	13	4	14	14	16	46	63
Middle East	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	3	1	5	6
S.E. Asia	15	18	7	6	15	11	17	10	19	12	9	6	6	78	73
C. America	10	11	4	26	12	16	7	4	0	14	6	12	11	93	40
Cuba	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	1
S. America	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	1
Not Stated	2	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	6	6
TOTAL	35	35	25	35	29	35	35	25	35	35	31	35	35	235	190

Source: Canada, Employment and Immigration

TABLE 3

FAMILY SIZE OF HOST-GROUP AND "CONTROL" REFUGEES

FAMILY SIZE	QUEBEC CITY*	KITCHENER		LONDON		WINNIPEG		REGINA		CALGARY		VANCOUVER		TOTAL	
	HOST G.	HOST G.	CTRL. G.	HOST G.	CTRL. G.	HOST G.	CTRL. G.	HOST G.	CTRL. G.	HOST G.	CTRL. G.	HOST G.	CTRL. G.	HOST G.	CTRL. G.
One	15	10	21	2	9	20	22	8	25	10	12	10	9	75	98
Two	0	8	3	5	4	4	2	3	3	4	6	4	4	28	22
Three	8	5	3	8	9	4	6	3	4	7	5	9	3	44	30
Four	5	5	4	3	3	4	3	5	3	4	5	9	15	35	33
Five	1	4	4	12	2	2	2	4	0	6	2	3	2	32	12
Six or more	6	3	0	5	3	1	0	2	0	4	1	0	2	21	6
TOTAL	35	35	35	35	30	35	35	25	35	35	31	35	35	235	201

Source: Canada, Employment and Immigration

*Québec City did not employ a "control group" design.

TABLE 4

LANGUAGE ABILITY CHANGE OF HOST-GROUP and AND "CONTROL" REFUGEES, FIRST 12 MONTHS

CHANGE	HOST GROUP Number	Percent	CONTROL GROUP Number	Percent	TOTAL Number	Percent
No change	15	9%	18	11%	33	10%
1 Level	40	24%	38	23%	78	24%
2 Levels	62	38%	53	32%	115	35%
3 Levels	21	13%	16	10%	37	11%
4 Levels	0	0%	1	1%	1	0%
Unknown	27	16%	39	24%	66	20%
TOTAL	165	100%	165	100%	330	100%

Source: Canada, Employment and Immigration

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