Love as a Remedy to the Malaise of the Soul in Modernity

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis project is to both diagnose the current malaise of the soul, and offer a potential remedy to this malaise. By attending to Hannah Arendt's notion of "worldlessness" drawn from her book *The Human Condition*, I will argue that the condition of worldlessness and subsequent feelings of loneliness result in a "malaise of the soul". The remedy to this malaise may be found, I will argue, in the proper type of love. When viewed within the canon of literature on philosophy of education, this project addresses a significant lack of philosophical depth when considering love as central to education and pedagogies of love. While numerous scholars have argued for the importance of love in education, these works fall short in offering a complete philosophical understanding of love itself. This project draws on ancient philosophy, specifically Socrates' arguments as presented by Plato in *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, to address this lacuna. By bringing a robust understanding of love to Arendt's work, it aims to offer love as a remedy to the current malaise of the soul.

To my sister Nell, my first teacher in philosophy;
thank you for showing me the way

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Introduction

Love, arguably the most fundamental human sentiment and often the motivation behind many of our actions, is not only the topic of this thesis, but also the inspiration for it. It is out of my love for philosophy, education, people, and the world that this project was born. And it is this love which I hope permeates every word of this work. The project I am undertaking here is to offer up love as a remedy for the "malaise of the soul," which I diagnose as a result of our current state of worldlessness. This task is founded upon Hannah Arendt's notions of the world and worldlessness as presented in her foundational work of political thought, *The Human Condition* (2018). To bring a deeply philosophical understanding of love into the project I rely on the arguments of Socrates as they are presented in Plato's *magnum opus* on love, *Symposium* (1998).

In making the ancient philosophy of Plato's Socrates central to my project I am engaging with a deep and complex philosophical basis for understanding love, something which I have found to be lacking in the current scholarship concerning the relationship of love and education. Within modern scholarship, we have seen a distinct rise in thought around the important role love plays in education, with leading scholarship from Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Antonia Darder, and Keguro Macharia to only name a few. Despite the abundance of discussion of pedagogies of love and how love is or should be present in education, I have found that there is a lacuna in the literature. Or more specifically, a lack in the current theories of love and education to deal fulsomely with the topic of love *itself*. Love is a complex notion to grasp. Scholars and laymen alike may find ourselves asking at some point in our life: What is love? How do we love properly? How do we know if we truly love this person or thing? How do we know if we are truly loved by those who tell us they love us? Furthermore, there are many distinct ancient

notions of love, that today, at least in the English language, are all encompassed under the single term "love" without distinction: included here we may consider, *eros*, *philia*, *agape*, *storge*, *ludus*, and *philautia*. Hence, in English, when we evoke the word "love," we do not distinguish between romantic love, friendly love, familial love, patriotic love, or any differing love for a person or thing. My purpose in making this issue explicit is to underscore that love is a complex philosophical notion. Hence, one of my purposes in this project is to provide a more fulsome and exegetical engagement with the philosophical exploration of love, thus contributing to our appreciation for and its significance for educational studies and theorizing. And so, in putting forward a clear philosophical understanding of love in this project, I hope to not only clearly ground my project in a particular form of love, but also perhaps present a notion of love, or way of thinking about love, upon which future philosophy of education concerning love could draw on.

I would now like to outline the body of my project and the logical steps I will take to define love as a remedy to the "malaise of the soul." Chapter one provides a discussion of a philosophical understanding of love and the soul. This chapter exegetically covers three main topics, first an articulation of *eros* put forward by Socrates (and Diotima) in Plato's *Symposium* (1998). Next, a definition of the soul drawn from Socrates in Plato's *Phaedrus* (2009). And finally, a discussion of how love and the soul are connected. Engaging in this exegetical analysis of these texts establishes a foundational conceptual framework and vocabulary on "love" and the "soul," which will inform the remainder of the project. Chapter two introduces the "malaise of the soul." Here we begin with Arendt's concept of the world and follow this with an articulation of "worldlessness"—specifically tracing two current attitudes that result in worldlessness, the rise of the social realm, and the isolation of humans. Chapter two ends with my own analysis of

how the current trend toward worldlessness results in a malaise of the soul within individuals. Chapter three connects the first two chapters by offering the love that is articulated in chapter one as a remedy to the malaise of the soul of chapter two. In addition to my own argument on this connection, I explore solutions to worldlessness as they are found in Arendt's political notion of *amor mundi*. Here in particular I consider Arendt's notion of forgiveness, and the work of two other scholars, Lucy Tatman's considering of gratitude (2013), and Shin Chiba's notion of a public *vinculum* (1995), as integral to Arendt's *amor mundi*. The final step in my project is to briefly consider the role that love and *amor mundi* might play in teaching and education. In concluding this project, I will have explored how worldlessness effects humans, leading to the weakening or sickening of their souls, and how this ailment can be remedied or overcome through love. Additionally, I will have embarked on a consideration of Arendt's notion of *amor mundi*. Therefore, this project can be seen as the starting point of a larger philosophical undertaking, in which the love inherent in *amor mundi* is brought to the fore and understood in conjunction with the world.

I now would like to make note of two distinct ontological issues with my bridging Arendt's political thought with Plato's philosophy of love: first, Arendt's clear articulation of love as unworldly and inherently unpolitical; and second, Arendt's dispute with philosophy, and hence much of Plato's work. I will address the issue of my connecting Arendt's political thought on the world with love first. Within *The Human Condition* Arendt makes clear that love has no place in the public realm and the world as she writes, "love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical human forces."[1] The love that Arendt is discussing here is a "sentimental love"[2] —a love between two people that is passionate and exclusionary. We see this

in Arendt's writing that "love, by reason of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates us from others."[3] Here love is world destroying. This sentimental, emotional love evicts the lovers from the world, as their entire focus is on themselves. It is well noted that "Arendt kept a certain distance from love, because she thought that love, since it is a sentiment or an emotion, tends to form an inner circle of lovers by love's inherently private, closely knit, and homogeneous features. Love is basically regarded by her as an *unpolitical* entity because of its inherent inclination to exclude the outside world which for Arendt constitutes the essence of the political."[4] Love, in its sentimental or emotional form, is then distinctly unpolitical and unworldly for Arendt, in so far as it isolates some from the world and can be clearly argued to belong to the private realm. Despite this critique of love, Arendt still discusses love in her political thought: "the whole body of her political thought preaches the sort of love of the world which bids us to exert care to keep nature reaped but not raped, to keep our cities liable and not decayed, to keep out politics open and inviting and not elitist or repressive."[5] Throughout her works, especially in *The Human Condition*, there is a love that underlines and flows through her thought. This love is a love of the world, or as Arendt called it *amor mundi*.[6] This is not a sentimental love, but rather a love the brings humans together in the public, that relates and separates them at once. While we cannot know exactly what Arendt meant by *amor mundi* as she sparsely spoke of it, and almost never wrote about it in any sustained or systematic manner, I believe we can tie together a sort of "non-sentimental" worldly love to Arendt's thought, and it is exactly this sort of love that I hope to articulate in this project.

The second issue, my utilizing the ancient philosophy of Plato in conjunction with Arendt's political thought, stems from, what seems to be, her general weariness of and antipathy towards philosophy. As Joseph Betz notes, "[Arendt] thinks that ancient philosophy, beginning

with Plato, turned its back on our home in this world and gave philosophy [an] otherworldly and alienating cast."[7] Moreover, beyond her concern that the tradition of Western philosophy takes humans out of the world, Arendt takes issue with philosophy in its unrestricted pursuit of establishing logical systems, meta principles, and its concern with "humans in the singular," rather than involving itself in the reality of human affairs.[8] Despite her critical regard of philosophy, today, Arendt's works are often times thought of in terms of political philosophy, and are present in philosophy classes and modern philosophical debate. More specific to my project than the general bridging of Arendt's thought and philosophy, are the works of Plato which may certainly be understood as producing a philosophy that alienates humans from the world. The issue here though with Plato, I would argue, is his political philosophy (specifically the *Republic*). The works that I engage with, while written by Plato, can be understood as presenting the arguments and philosophical thought of Socrates. And while Arendt may dislike the philosophy of Plato and his "tyranny of truth,"[9] she is seemingly sympathetic to Socrates who "did not claim to be a *sophos*, a wise man."[10] It is with this spirit of Socrates, not as a wise man, but rather as a midwife who "wanted to help others give birth to what they themselves thought anyhow, to find the truth in their *doxa*,"[11] that we will engage with. This Socrates, as he engages with others, coaxing out the truth from their *doxa*, is a Socrates of the political realm, and so it is his philosophy, written by Plato in *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, that can contend with Arendt's political thought.

Having addressed these issues to the best of my ability, I will now begin my project of diagnosing the "malaise of the soul," and offering love as its remedy.

CHAPTER ONE

Uncovering Love and the Soul

The notions of love and soul have always been inextricably linked for me. For if the soul is divine, how could we think of love, our most cherished gift, as anything but connected? This first chapter will engage in a philosophical exhibition of the concepts of love and the soul, their individual character, development, and how they function together.

1.1. Introducing *Eros*: Love as Defined by Socrates in *Symposium*

Gathered in the home of Agathon and imbibing in the vine, Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, and Socrates, after noting how little attention had been paid to the "venerable and important god"[12] *Eros*, took upon themselves the task of speaking eulogies of Love. These speeches delivered by the men present, and their object, Love, are the subject of Plato's *Symposium*. In this section I will put forward an exegesis and perfunctory analysis of the speech made by Socrates at the symposium in order to provide a solid base understanding of Love upon which subsequent sections will build.

Socrates, in his own particular fashion, begins his speech not as the others do by praising Love but first by asking questions of Agathon who had just spoken.[13] Socrates asks first "whether or not it's one of Love's characteristics to stand in relation to something."[14] This is not, he clarifies, to ask if "Love is related to some mother or father,"[15] but rather if Love itself is relational, that is does Love stand in relation to some-one or some-thing? Or, as he rephrases his question, "does Love love nothing or something?"[16] When answered in the affirmative that Love does indeed love something, Socrates goes on to confirm that when you love something you desire it, and that "desire is *necessarily* desire for something which is lacking."[17] As desire is

necessarily born out of lack, Socrates goes on to assert that one cannot desire what they already possess, but rather what they desire "is to have it in the future as well."[18] That is, the wealthy man, who desires to be wealthy, is saying that he desires what he already possesses, but what is really meant is that he desires to maintain his wealth, for what he currently has to continue into the future. Socrates wraps up this argument by summarizing that "any case of desire is desire for something which is inaccessible and absent. If there's something you need, miss, or lack, then that's the kind of thing you can desire and love."[19] In other words, first, Love loves something; second, to love something is to desire it; and third, to desire something it must be something one currently lacks. Having established this argument, Socrates then moves from his discussion with Agathon to deliver his account of Love.[20]

Socrates begins by stating that the following speech, and all he has learned of Love, he heard from Diotima of Mantinea[21] who "was an expert in love."[22] Socrates continues, speaking both parts, by narrating to us the discussion he had with Diotima on Love. Starting with a description of Love's nature and characteristics, Socrates, like Agathon had in the previous speech, claims "that Love is an important god and must be accounted attractive."[23] Diotima, using the same argument that Socrates had just applied with Agathon, leads Socrates to understand that it in fact "followed from [his] own ideas that Love wasn't attractive or good."[24] That is, as it is true that Love desires beautiful and good things, he himself must experience a lack of beauty and goodness.[25] Socrates responds by exclaiming "Do you mean to tell me, Diotima, that Love is repulsive and bad?"[26] The fault in this conclusion, Diotima points out, is a false dichotomy. She asks Socrates, "Do you also think that lack of knowledge is the same as ignorance? Haven't you noticed that there's middle ground between knowledge and ignorance? [...] True belief."[27] With this line of questioning and argumentation, Diotima points Socrates

toward an intermediate area, or middle ground between two things. In applying this argument to Love she states;

> Stop insisting, then, that 'not attractive' is the same as 'repulsive', or that 'not good' is the same as 'bad'. And then you'll also stop thinking that, just because—as you yourself have conceded—Love isn't good or attractive, he therefore has to be repulsive and bad. He might fall between these extremes.[28]

Diotima then points to Socrates' previous claim that Love is a god asking, "Don't you think that good fortune and beauty are attributes which belong to every single god?"[29] Socrates confirms this, and the conclusion is drawn that as it has been established that Love desires goodness and attractiveness, and hence must lack these qualities himself, he cannot possibly be conceived of as a god. Diotima then suggests to Socrates that "[Love] lies between mortality and immortality"[30] as a spirit that occupies the middle ground between humans and gods. Diotima tells Socrates that these spirits that occupy the middle ground between humans and gods are "mediators between the two, they fill the remaining space, and so make the universe an interconnected whole."[31] Having adequately described the nature of Love—himself being a lover and not the beloved—Diotima and Socrates, within the context of Socrates' speech, move to the question of why Love loves beauty and/or goodness.

In answer to Diotima's question of why the lover loves good things Socrates responds that it is because he desires to possess them.[32] And what he gains from the possession of good things is happiness: "[the] point being that it's the possession of good things that makes people happy […] and there's no need for a further question about a person's reasons for wanting to be happy."[33] Along with the truth that people love and desire goodness, two qualifiers must be added: firstly, "[people] want to *get* the goodness for themselves," that is people want to possess goodness for themselves as an individual; and secondly, "they want goodness to be theirs *for*

ever,"[34] that is they want to possess this goodness into the future. In sum, "the object of love is the permanent possession of goodness for oneself."[35]

Having adequately elucidated as far as is currently possible the object of Love, Socrates and Diotima turn to the purpose of Love, namely, "physical and mental procreation in an attractive medium."[36] Of this, Diotima says,

> every human being is both physically and mentally pregnant. Once we reach a certain point in the prime of our lives, we instinctively desire to give birth, but we find it possible only in an attractive medium, not a repulsive one—and yes, sex between a man and a woman is a kind of birth. It's a divine business; it is immortality in a mortal creature, this matter of pregnancy and birth. But it can't take place where there's incompatibility, and whereas repulsiveness is incompatible with anything divine, beauty is compatible with it. So Beauty plays the parts of both Fate and Eileithyia at childbirth. That's why proximity to beauty makes a pregnant person obliging, happy, and relaxed, and so we procreate and give birth. Proximity to repulsiveness, however, makes us frown, shrink in pain, back off, and withdraw; no birth takes place, but we retain our children unborn and suffer badly. So the reason why, when pregnant and swollen, ready to burst, we get so excited in the presence of beauty is that the bearer of beauty releases us from our agony.[37]

This pregnancy or procreation that Diotima discusses is common to both men and women, and as such is not limited to the common understanding of biological pregnancy and birth, but stands for the pregnancy and birth of creation (creativity) in general.[38] Proximity to beauty allows us to become pregnant and birth our creations, while proximity to repulsiveness causes us to withdraw. The object of Love is then understood not to be beauty itself but pro*creation* in a beautiful medium, "because procreation is as close as a mortal can get to being immortal and undying."[39] And, as we have established earlier that the aim of Love "is the *permanent* possession of goodness for oneself, it necessarily follows that we desire immortality along with goodness, and consequently the aim of love has to be immortality as well."[40] That is, the aim of Love being the permanent possession of goodness for oneself requires that the aim of love also be immortality, and procreation in a beautiful medium is the closest mortals can get.

Having now fully elucidated the nature, purpose, and aim of Love, Socrates' speech offers us one further consideration put forward by Diotima: that is, the ways of love and how to love properly. The description of how to love properly put forward in *Symposium* is often referred to as the Socratic ladder and has six steps. Briefly summarized, these steps are: first, to love and recognize the beauty of one body; second, to love multiple bodies, recognizing the beauty in all bodies; third, to love the beauty of an individual's mind;[41] forth, love of activities, institutions, or laws; fifth, love of knowledge or philosophy itself; and finally sixth, to love the truth and Form of Beauty itself. Further discussion and analysis of the Socratic ladder will follow in the next section of this chapter. What has been essentially established here is that Love is not a god, but a spirit that joins together humans and the divine, and a lover's aim is immortality in so far as it is his desire to possess for himself goodness forever. Having drawn a solid foundational knowledge of Love upon which we can build, I will now move to the next section of this chapter that will delve deeper into an explanation and analysis of the Socratic ladder.

1.2. Climbing the Ladder of Love

In modernity it is easy enough for us to grasp the idea that there are different types of love, though we use the same word to denote them all: love for a mother, the love for a child, the love of a friend, for a significant other, for siblings, for a country, or for a pet. Although each individual is different, we may, generally, consider ourselves able to rank the depth of these loves. The Socratic ladder, or Socrates' *scala amoris* ("ladder of love"), is the depiction of the different levels of love that Diotima puts forward in *Symposium* and offers us a sort of ranking of love. However, it is not a consideration of motherly love over brotherly love or a ranking of this sort. But rather, it is the steps on a ladder ascending toward true love: that is love in its purest

form, love in *itself*. Here, I will draw on Richard Foley's work "The Order Question: Climbing the Ladder of Love in Plato's *Symposium*" (2010) in order to further elucidate the rungs on this ladder of love and explore its importance in a Socratic understanding of love.

Foley, like I have above, explains the ascent of the ladder of love as containing six steps. Foley suggests there are two sets of three steps involved here, "the first set comprising an ascent among physical objects […] the second set an ascent among spiritual objects."[42] The first set, comprising of physical objects, or bodies, is explicit in the first part of Diotima's speech:

> The proper way to go about this business […] is for someone to start as a young man by focusing on physical beauty and initially—this depends on whether his guide is giving him proper guidance—to love just one person's body and to give birth in that medium to beautiful reasoning. He should realize next that the beauty of any one body hardly differs from that of any other body, and that if it's physical beauty he's after, it's very foolish of him not to regard the beauty of all bodies as absolutely identical. Once he's realized this and so become capable of loving every single beautiful body in the world, his obsession with just one body grows less intense and strikes his as ridiculous and petty.[43]

Here, it is explained that "the assent [sic] begins with bodies, where the first step is to love a single body, then to recognize that bodies are 'brothers', and finally to love all beautiful bodies."[44] That is, the first step is to love *one* singular body, the second is to love *two* bodies, and the third is to love *all* beautiful bodies. The reason being that, in recognizing beauty through our love of one body, we soon find the beauty of all bodies absolutely identical "and so become capable of loving every single beautiful body in the world."[45] The ascent from one body, to two, to all bodies, comprises the ascent among physical objects, and the first set of three in the ladder of love.

The second set, the ascent among spiritual objects, also containing three steps, begins with the switch from the physical domain, the love of bodies, to the love of souls, found in the second half of Diotima's speech:

> The next stage is for him to value mental beauty so much more than physical beauty that even if someone is almost entirely lacking the bloom of youth, but still has an attractive mind, that's enough to kindle his love and affection, and that's all he needs to give birth to and enquire after the kinds of reasoning which help young men's moral progress. And this in turn leaves him no choice but to look at what makes people's activities and institutions attractive and to see that here too any form of beauty is much the same as any other, so that he comes to regard physical beauty as unimportant. Then, after activities, he must press on towards the things people know, until he can see the beauty there too. Now he has beauty before his eyes in abundance, no longer a single instance of it; now the slavish love of isolated cases of youthful beauty or human beauty of any kind is a thing of the past, as is his love of some single activity. No longer a paltry and small-minded slave, he faces instead the vast sea of beauty, and in gazing upon it his boundless love of knowledge becomes the medium in which he gives birth to plenty of beautiful, expansive reasoning and thinking, until he gains enough energy and bulk there to catch sight of a unique kind of knowledge whose natural object is […] beauty.[46]

Of this Foley writes, "we recapitulate a progression similar to the one governing the physical steps, moving from one, to many, to all: from loving one individual soul, to loving the activities, laws, and customs that govern collections of souls, to the 'great sea of beauty'."[47] That is, the ascent among souls mirrors the ascent among bodies as we move from loving *one* soul, to the love of activities and laws that govern *many* souls, to love of *all* souls. Here we see in both the physical and metaphysical or spiritual sets the ascent from the specific (one), to the category or type (many, though still specified), to the general (all). Foley is quick to specify though that there is "one anomaly, since the three steps in the psychic or normative domain culminate in a fourth step, the knowledge of the Form of Beauty itself, the single object through which all beautiful objects are beautiful."[48] This is to say that there exists a fourth step in the second or spiritual set, though it is the culmination of all the previous steps: knowledge of the Form of Beauty itself.[49] Here the lover will "perceive [Beauty] in itself and by itself, constant and eternal, and he'll see that every other beautiful object somehow partakes of it, but in such a way that their coming to be and ceasing to be don't increase or diminish it at all, and it remains entirely unaffected."[50] We may now summarize the steps of the ladder of love as Foley does,

1. One body
2. Two bodies
3. All bodies
4. One soul
5. Activities, laws, customs
6. Knowledge, philosophy
7. Form of Beauty/[The] Good[51]

Here we can clearly see the breakdown of the two sets Foley outlined as the first three steps are concerned with bodies or the physical realm, and the second set of three—steps four, five, and six—the spiritual. Finally, the ascension of these six steps culminate in knowledge of the Form of Beauty itself, which, as Foley states, is "the single object through which all beautiful objects are beautiful."[52]

It seems at this point that the first, physical, set is clear in its ascent, although the second, spiritual ascent, could use some clarity. Between my own and Foley's understanding of the second half of the ladder of love we have flipflopped somewhat in our terminology between "soul," "philosophy," and "the great sea of beauty." I refer here specifically to the sixth step. This being the case, I would like to try and offer further clarity on steps four, five, and six by returning to the original speech of Socrates from which this ladder of love is drawn.

Step four marks the transition from the physical to the spiritual: "The next stage is for him to value [psyche] mental beauty so much more than physical beauty."[53] Foley and I have both noted this as being love of one soul. For the utmost clarity, we may look to the original Greek used in this passage which transitions from *σῶμα* (*soma*), meaning body, to the *ψυχή* (*psyche*), meaning soul, hence, from the physical to the spiritual. The ascent to step five is due to

the enquiry into "the kinds of reasoning which help young men's moral progress."[54] This enquiry "in turn leaves him no choice but to look at what makes people's activities and institutions attractive."[55] That is, step five moves from the love of one soul, to the love of many souls which are ordered the same. This is the love of laws, activities, and institutions. In properly loving one soul, one comes to love the laws and activities that make this good, and so, in turn, loves souls that are ordered this way. Thus, step five is the love of activities and laws of souls. Step six follows that "after activities, he must press towards the things people know."[56] This sixth step is most clearly understood as love of knowledge or *philein sophian*, "to love wisdom." The sixth step, Foley writes, is "finally attaining psychic universality: knowing the truth by studying philosophy."[57] From this, we can understand clearly why in the ordering of the ladder of love above step six is "knowledge and philosophy." Step seven remains separate because, as Foley notes, "there is a suggestion that knowing the Form [of Beauty] is perhaps itself an additional step, the culmination of one's life-long study of philosophy."[58] That is, to reach step seven requires—though none of the ascent is easy, and requires immense practice, effort, and thought throughout—a life-long dedication to philosophy.

Having now elucidated as best as I am able the Socratic ladder of love, I would like to clarify one further element of Socrates' ladder of love: specifically, its application to the betterment of the beloved. In Diotima's speech that Socrates presents it is said that when someone is pregnant with virtue, and he finds "a mind which is attractive, upright, and gifted at the same time […] he immediately finds he can talk fluently to [him] about virtue and about what qualities and practices it takes for a man to be good. In short, he takes on this person's education."[59] It is clear that the lover who climbs the Socratic ladder is in pursuit of the Good.

Though this passage from *Symposium* allows us the understanding that the beloved may engage in this pursuit as well if instructed properly. As Foley notes,

> to love correctly according to Socrates would just require picking the right universal, the Good, and identifying the individual [the beloved] with the correct relation to this property. Being the consummate educator, Socrates does not actually require that the beloved possess this property, merely that the love be guided by a recognition that the beloved can be brought to share in the Good.[60]

This is to say that it is not necessary that the beloved, embody or possess the Good (or be on the final step of the ladder) but simply that they are able to develop and better themselves so that they may be brought to share in the Good—*that the education and bettering of the beloved is possible*. Put simply, Socratic love is based on the single merit of the beloved's *potential*, that they possess within themselves the potential for good.

1.3. The Right Kind of Love: Reintroducing *Eros*

Thus far we have seen, at length, what is in play in the Socratic notion of love. What I would like to turn to now is a brief discussion of the term love, or, more accurately, '*Eros*' as it is written in *Symposium*. We may begin by noting that within this dialogue *Eros*, and its English translation "Love," is often capitalized as a proper noun. It is clear enough that this is because the task that the symposium-goers set before themselves is to deliver eulogies of the god Eros.[61] The speeches given before Socrates' discuss Eros/Love as well as the lover and the beloved. It is not until Socrates delivers his speech that Eros is reversed from the object of love, the beloved, to the actor, the lover: "you saw Love as an object of love, rather than as a lover."[62] This reversal is an essential move in the dialogue as it is not only necessary for the depiction of Eros that Socrates puts forward, but also underpins the notion of love as a guiding principle.

The term *eros* as one of the three main ancient concepts of love, along with *philia* and *agape*, in English are all translated simply as love. In order for a reader to know which form or concept of love one is dealing with in an English translation of an ancient text, they must turn to the text in its original language. In *Symposium*, as I have noted, it is *eros* that is being dealt with. It is generally understood that Plato's *Symposium* is the primary text in which the ancient account of *eros* is formulated, and more specifically, as Alan Soble gestures to in his introductory essay to *Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love* (1989), "we might even say that the exemplar of Platonic love is Socrates."[63] Despite this understanding, *eros* is often thought of today as a romantic, passionate, sentimental, and sexual love. Perhaps this is due to the fame of some of the speeches proceeding Socrates' speech; I cannot possibly recount the number of times I have heard praise of Aristophanes' fantastical speech in which humans have been split down the middle and spend our lives looking for our perfect other half.

As per my reading of Socrates' eulogy on love, presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this chapter, the concept of *eros* that is truly born out of *Symposium* is not one of romance, unbridled passion, and sexuality, but rather dependent of the *condition of potentiality*, specifically, one's potential for education, development, and general betterment. As Soble notes, "*eros* is a love that responds to the merit or value of its object,"[64] that is, when *eros* is the concept of love that is at play, x loves y because of some quality that y possesses. Soble clarifies, using his coined term "erosic" love, that "x loves y because y has attractive or valuable qualities."[65] Thus, Soble has neatly made it clear for us that *eros*, as it is dependent on merit (the merit of y, its object), is dependent on reason. Hence it is not simply a sexual, passionate, or sentimental love but one founded on reason. By reason, I do not mean that *eros* is founded on logic, or logical reasoning, but simply that *eros* is spurred on by reason.

We can contrast this understanding of *eros* with the concept of *agape* that Soble puts forth. He writes, "*agape* creates value in its object as a result of loving it, and exists independently of, or regardless of, any merit or lack of merit in its object."[66] In this sense, *agape* loves regardless of any qualities present in the beloved, as Soble further clarifies; in *agape* style love, "x loves y independent of y's merit, and any merit of y's that plays a role in x's love is value that x attributes to or creates in y as a result of x's love."[67] This *agape* concept of love comes to us from the New Testament in which "Jesus is the exemplar."[68] From his analysis of both *eros* and *agape* style love, Soble is able to offer us the clarity that "*eros* is an ascending love, the human's route to God; [while] *agape* is a descending love, God's route to humans."[69] As such, we may assert as Soble does that "*eros* is the manner in which humans necessarily love, by human nature itself, while *agape* is the way God necessarily by His nature loves humans."[70]

Regarding traits associated with *eros*, while Soble notes that *eros* is often understood as "acquisitive, egocentric or even selfish,"[71] I would argue that despite this it is not a love that is incapable of giving. As we extracted from the Socratic ladder of love, and the depiction of Socratic love in general, the lover and beloved share in an education and—though perhaps at different paces—ascend the ladder of love together. I say "together" because the lover becomes a sort of teacher and mentor for the beloved in the ways of love. Furthermore, he helps him along his journey, while the lover could not begin even the first step of the ladder if he had not loved but one individual, and as he ascends the ladder himself his love only expands—from one, to many, to all. As Soble points out while he suggests we need to clarify what features are essential to *eros* and *agape*, "from the fact that x loves y in response to y's merit [eros style love], it does not follow that y is only a set of properties or that x's motive in loving y is egocentric."[72] Moreover, as I have suggested that the merit, quality, or property that x, the lover, loves in y, the

beloved, is capacity for betterment, the assumption that *eros* is egocentric or selfish because its love is founded upon the beloved's possession of this quality becomes quite the logical leap. From my reading, rather, I hold the position that all human beings have the potential/capacity for betterment, although some individuals may be further along in their education, or some may be better primed to undertake such an education, it still stands that everyone possesses that potential, and as such it is a universal human quality upon which this love is founded. To clarify, this is not to suggest that love is founded on the achievement or possession of the Good, nor am I even suggesting that to be possible, but rather that the *capacity* for betterment, for growth, development, and education in general is the universal principle upon which love is founded. We all inherently have this capacity, and this is the foundation for love. It is this form of *eros*, often translated simply as love, that I will be applying throughout this project, and which should be kept in mind as we begin upon our discussions of love as a remedy to the malaise of the soul.[73]

1.4. The Soul and its Journey as told in *Phaedrus*

Having so far presented a philosophically in-depth articulation of love, I will now turn to a discussion of the soul. The notion of the soul put forward here will be drawn from the dialogue of Socrates and Phaedrus from Plato's *Phaedrus* (2009). This section, similar in structure to my section 2.1. on love above, will largely be an exegesis of Socrates' depiction of the soul, the purpose of which is to present as clearly as possible the foundation for the concept of the soul that will be drawn on as we navigate the problematic in later chapters of this project. The ancient Greek word used in *Phaedrus* for soul is again *psyche*. But *psyche*, as we saw in *Symposium*, can similarly be translated as mind. Nevertheless, what these translations both have in common is

their relation to something beyond the physical or indicating something metaphysical about human beings.

The discussion of the soul that Socrates brings forth in *Phaedrus* can be broken down in three sections: first is the argument for the immortality of the soul; second is the analogy of the chariot; and finally, the depiction of the winged soul and its fall to earth. I will extrapolate a clear articulation of the soul by proceeding through these sections in order.

Socrates begins his discussion of the soul within his palinode of love, in which he endeavors to demonstrate the power that divinely gifted madness has for achieving the greatest happiness. Socrates begins by asserting that "every soul is immortal, because anything that is ever-moving is immortal."[74] And whatever is ever-moving is moved internally, and hence ungenerated. And so, "it is a self-mover that is a source of motion, and a self-mover can neither perish nor be generated."[75] There is no argument here for why the soul must be immortal, and not mortal, and hence perishable or otherwise, merely the statement that it is, and the explanation that this immortality is due to it being ungenerated, a source, and ever-moving. We need not concern ourselves with the "lack" of an explicit argument for why the soul must be immortal though, as one would be hard pressed to find an argument for a mortal soul.[76] Taking it to be self-evident that the soul is immortal, Socrates describes this immortality as owing to the generative power of the soul as a mover. This is to say that the soul is a source of power and movement. One that is not generated by an outside source: "for if a source were generated from anything, it would stop being a source."[77] And since the soul is a source, and a source is necessarily ungenerated, "it is also necessarily imperishable."[78] For that which is ungenerated is self-moving and ever-moving: "it is only something which moves itself that never stops moving, because it never abandons itself."[79] As such, Socrates avers that "self-movement is the essence

and principle of soul."[80] This is to say that, the self-movement, and hence perpetual movement, is the essence of the soul. We may also note that Socrates says that "such a thing is also the original source of motion for everything else that moves,"[81] and hence are able to perhaps better conceptualize the soul as an unmoved mover.

Having clarified the immortality of the soul we can move now to Socrates' depiction of the character of the soul with his chariot analogy. A soul, according to Socrates, "is like an organic whole made up of a charioteer and his team of horses."[82] Of this he states, "while the horses and charioteers of gods are always thoroughly good, those of everyone else are a mixture."[83] That is, while the charioteer and the horses of the gods are always in perfect balance and good, the charioteers and horses of others—daemons' or more importantly, humans'—are not so. Rather, they are a mixture of good and bad, ruly and unruly, tame and difficult, "only one of his horses is thoroughly noble and good, while the other is thoroughly the opposite."[84] The characters that make up this chariot team is a single charioteer and two horses. For the gods, all three are good and well-ordered, in others there is a good horse and a bad horse, and the charioteer "our inner ruler drives [the] pair of horses."[85] In the good horse, which Socrates describes as white with dark eyes and an "upright appearance," "his determination to succeed is tempered by self-control and respect for others."[86] He is tame and easily controlled. The bad horse on the other hand, black with grey blood-shot eyes, and over-large, is "an ally of excess and affectation…scarcely to be controlled with a combination of whip and goad."[87] The charioteer drives and attempts to control these two horses, although because of their dueling natures, "this inevitably makes driving, in our case, difficult and disagreeable."[88] It is this tripart division of reasoning charioteer, self-controlled good horse, and hedonistic bad horse that make up the character of the human soul.

Finally, we proceed to an account of the movement of the soul in the heavens and its fall to earth. Socrates speaks of a "complete soul" which is "one that is winged."[89] By this, he seems to be depicting the soul as a winged thing which flies among the gods, covered in feathers. He contrasts this vision of the perfectly winged soul with one that has lost its wings. Of this he says, "[a soul] that has lost its wings is carried along until it seizes upon something solid, and it takes up residence there. The earthly body of which it takes control seems to move itself, but that is the effect of the soul, and the whole unit of soul and body conjoined is called a 'living creature', and also 'mortal'."[90] What is present here is the clear articulation that, firstly, the souls of humans have somehow lost their wings; secondly, the soul is the source of generation and movement in the human; and thirdly, that the combination of a physical body and a metaphysical soul make up mortals, or humans. What we now must uncover is why the human soul is without its wings.

To Phaedrus, Socrates tells a fanciful story about the journey of souls, existing with the gods in the heavenly realm. Though I do not wish to take this story literally, but rather as a metaphor for the connection the soul has to divinity and the possibility of the growth and remedy of the soul on earth. Socrates tells us that the gods and their company, souls, "journey skyward to the rim of the heavenly vault. Although the way is steep, the gods' chariots make light of the journey, since they are well balanced and easy to handle, but the other chariots find it hard, because the troublesome horse weighs them down."[91] The gods and their perfectly balanced chariots, as they "reach the rim they make their way to the outside and stand on the outer edge of heaven […] while they gaze outward from the heaven […] this region is filled with true being."[92] The gods and their chariots, having easily reached the rim of the heavens, look outward and feast on true being: that is, "everything that counts as true knowledge," the truth of justice, beauty and so on. True being is divine, and "anything divine is good, wise, virtuous, and so on, and so these

qualities are the best source of nourishment and growth for the soul's wings."[93] While the gods feast, souls, whose chariots are not perfectly balanced like a gods', follow closely and try to reach the rim and feast upon true being as well. But, "they are disturbed by their horses and their view of things as they really are is uncertain."[94] These souls, though they may see true being, cannot properly feast upon it as they must constantly manage their horses, and so, become distracted. "Others poke their heads through from time to time, but sink back down in between, and so they see some things, but miss others, depending on the resistance offered by their horse."[95] Other souls' chariots are so unruly and unordered that they may only be able to catch glimpses or parts of true being and are constantly pulled down below the rim. As the souls rush to control their chariots and feast upon true being, "trampling and bumping into one another as one tries to overtake another," they damage their wings.[96] With injured wings, the souls fall behind "and lose their vision of truth, and are for some unfortunate reason or another weighed down by being filled with forgetfulness and weakness, lose their wings thanks to this burden and fall to earth."[97] And so, from the scramble in the heights of heaven to feast upon true being, souls with damaged wings fall below the rim of heaven and lose their view of truth. As a result of this loss, they lose their wings and fall to earth. Here "the souls which have seen the most are to enter the seeds of men."[98] At this point, Socrates presents a sort of hierarchy where the souls that have seen the most enter people who will become philosophers, souls who have seen the second most, civic leaders, and so on.[99] This ordering of the souls of humans is not relevant to this project and so will not be considered further. What is important to note is that *only* souls that have caught at least a glimpse of true being may be planted into human bodies— "for a soul which has never seen the truth cannot enter into human form."[100] This, Socrates argues, is "because a man must understand the impressions he receives by reference to classes: he draws on the plurality of

perceptions to combine them by reasoning into a single class. This is recollection of the things which our souls once saw during their journey as companions to a god, when they saw beyond the things we now say 'exist' and poked their heads up into true reality."[101] By this what is meant is that humans order the world and classifie all that we know according to shadowy remembrances that our souls retain from their glimpsing of true bring. Hence, one "sees beauty here on earth and is reminded of true beauty."[102] This recollection is what allows the soul to begin to regrow its wings: a process guided by love, as we will see in the following section.

1.5. *Eros* and *Psyche*: The Soul-leading Quality of Love

Socrates himself makes the argument in *Phaedrus* that love, or, more specifically, the love that appears in the recognition of beauty, excites the soul and starts upon the process of the regeneration of the soul's wings. Socrates argues that beauty on earth is best suited for this as "by means of the clearest of our senses, it sparkles with particular clarity" and "it is only beauty which has the property of being especially visible and especially loveable."[103] That is, beauty, as it is perceived by sight, the strongest of our senses, most easily causes our soul to remember the glimpses of true beauty that it had seen in its flight with the gods. Socrates continues,

> Following this sight, the kind of change comes over him that you would expect after a shivering fit, and he begins to sweat and to run an unusually high fever, because the reception through his eyes of the effusion of beauty causes him to get hot. Now, this effusion is also the natural means of irrigating his wings. His heat softens the coat covering the feathers' buds, which had been too hard and closed up for wings to grow. As further nourishment pours in, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots upwards and to spread all over the underside of the soul.[104]

In recognition of sight of the beautiful one, one's soul sweats and heats, irrigating the soul and causing the buds where the feathers of its wings once were to open and the beginnings of new feathers to sprout. Hence, it is the love that results from the recognition of beauty that begins this

process within the soul. From this we may suggest that love itself may lead, or develop, the soul. This is exactly the theme, love as soul-leading, that Ryan Brown works with in his essay "The Lovers' Formation in Plato's *Phaedrus*" (2022). Here Brown purses the thesis that "[love] not only leads those who are well-suited toward truth and well-being but also is able to *make* us into the kinds of people whom love can successfully lead to the divine."[105] The argument present here is that love is soul-leading not only for those souls that are already well orientated for this journey to truth but all souls. As Brown writes of *Phaedrus*, "the great promise of the dialogue is that rightly-ordered love…can lead the soul into a vision of the true structure of reality, upon which it can 'feast' and be wholly nourished."[106] Stated otherwise, "in a word, love can, at least in principle, *make us* into the kinds of beings that love can lead to truth; love doesn't need to presuppose that we are already suited to being led."[107] The soul of any human can be led, regardless of its position or predisposition, by love toward truth. This love though must be a proper love, similar to that which we discovered in *Symposium,* although here Socrates discusses madness in love as divinely given.[108] This "divinely-mad love, given by the gods, as we shall see, helps restore the proper order of the soul."[109] On the other hand, humanly-sick love "results when the desire for pleasure (the black [bad] horse), becomes hegemonic within the soul."[110] And so, the proper soul-leading love is not just any mad love, but must be divinely given, lest it be humanly-mad love which corrupts the soul as the hedonistic horse takes control of the entire chariot of the soul. In contrast, this proper love "[seeks] to liberate the soul by liberating reason to be itself and play its proper role of internally harmonizing the soul and directing it toward the right ends (Beauty/Truth)."[111]

The character of this love, though certainly interpersonal, "is not *merely* interpersonal but is always, by nature, if not always in practice, directed toward reality itself, particularly

Beauty."[112] This is to say that although the relationship spurred on by love may seem at first glance exclusively interpersonal, between the lover and beloved, it is also always directed toward true reality, specifically true beauty. This is the case, Brown points out, because "when we yearn for another, our yearning cannot be fulfilled by the other simply, for it recognizes in the other's beauty a foretaste, or, more Platonically, a reminiscence, of Beauty, without which it cannot truly be satisfied (for the soul's charioteer seeks above all to 'feed' on Being; 247c–e)."[113] And so, it is due to this recognition and remembrance of true beauty in the earthly beauty of the beloved that this love cannot be merely satisfied by the interpersonal relationship, but seeks true beauty, and true being in general, upon which it desires to feast and nourish itself. This is its soul-leading quality in the lover—that the experience of beauty, that which love loves, reminds the lover of true beauty, its being in the heavens amongst the gods, and begins the process of the regeneration of its wings. On love's effect on the lover's soul, Brown suggests that "the charioteer's contact with Beauty through memory allows the soul to be harmonized, the wanton horse to be tamed, and the lover to follow the beloved 'with awe and a sense of shame' (254e)."[114] Through the taming of the bad horse the charioteer is able to proceed to pursue the beloved in the proper way, that which is the character of the good horse and reason (the charioteer). Accordingly, in understanding the character of love as not simply interpersonal, but also oriented toward reality itself, we find that Brown is right in asserting that "the soul finds its true self by going out beyond itself to the thing it loves and, in the process, finds that the ultimate beloved object, the true beings in the superheavenly place, are not simply external to the soul (transcendent), but are also *in* the soul in memory (immanent)."[115] Thus, in the soul's journey from loving one singular being, to the remembrance of true being—the ultimate beloved object—the soul finds its true self and may once again sprout its wings.

At this point we have concluded our discussion of love and the soul as found in Plato's noted texts above. In gleaning that love is pursuant of immortality by way of the Socratic ladder of love, and that the soul, having lost its wings in its fall from the heavens, desires to once again feast upon immortal true being with the gods, we have found that well-ordered proper love is the path to the restoration of the soul. In summation, we found love and the soul sharing in the pursuit of the good and immortality. Love develops within the individual, while the soul begins this process by recognizing the beauty of a single body, which is the first step in the Socratic ladder of love. Our efforts will now shift toward chapter two, in which we will explore the world and the subsequent experience of wordlessness.

CHAPTER TWO

The Loss of the World and the Malaise of the Soul

The concept of the world that Hannah Arendt develops throughout one of her most famous works, *The Human Condition* (2018), both shares in and differs from how we commonly conceptualize the notion of world. Today we might define the world as the earth, or a collection of countries, or perhaps as the totality of the people who exist today. Arendt's concept of the world is intrinsically tied up with humans, their actions, creations, the fact of their natality, and their plurality. There is a distinction here between the world Arendt is discussing and the natural world, though of course it is maintained that humans are a natural being who inhabit the earth. This world is created and maintained by humans existing together in public, as Arendt writes: "human life in so far as it is actively engaged in doing something, is always rooted in a world of men and of man-made things which it never leaves or altogether transcends."[116] This is the world that is lost to humans in their current condition of worldlessness, and which in turn causes the malaise of the soul. In order to discuss this, we begin with a discussion of Arendt's notion of the world.

2.1. The Making of the World: Labor, Work, and Action

To begin our account of the world we might start with Arendt's tripart conception of labor, work, and action. These three concepts are the fundamental human activities that make up the *vita activa* the active life.[117] Arendt clarifies that they are fundamental activities as "each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man."[118] In this sense, labor "is the activity that corresponds to the biological life process of the human body" thus "the human condition of labor is life itself."[119] This is to say that labor denotes the

human activities that are required to maintain the human body and its survival. It is human as animal. Work, on the other hand, "is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence…[and] provides an 'artificial' world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings."[120] Hence, "the human condition of work is worldliness."[121] Work is then the condition under which artificial or human-made things are made. These things are not a part of nature but are a product of the work of humans. Lastly, action "corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world."[122] As such, action is born out of humans living together, and is a fact of their given plurality. Arendt asserts that "while all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically *the* condition…of all political life."[123] That is, while labor and work play roles in the political, action, exclusively, is necessary to maintain political life. Furthermore, concerning action, Arendt contends that "plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live."[124] Here we see that it is through action that the plurality of humans is brought forth. Arendt affirms that we are all the same, being that we are human, but all human in individual ways, no one person will ever be exactly like another. This plurality is brought forward when humans exist and act together. Arendt writes,

> All human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men. The activity of labor does not need the presence of others, though a being laboring in complete solitude would not be human but an *animal laborans* in the word's most literal significance. Man working and fabricating and building a world inhabited only by himself would still be a fabricator, though not *homo faber:* he would have lost his specifically human quality and, rather, be a god—not, to be sure, the Creator, but a divine demiurge as Plato described him in one of his myths. Action alone is the exclusive prerogative of man.[125]

This passage from Arendt drives home the fact that it is action exclusively that is the domain of humans, and essential to action is the fact of plurality, of humans living together in the world.

The second element that is essential for understanding Arendt's notion of the world is the fact of natality. Of this, Arendt writes,

> All three activities [labor, work, and action] and their corresponding conditions are intimately connected with the most general condition of human existence: birth and death, natality and mortality. Labor assures not only individual survival, but the life of the species. Work and its product, the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time. Action, in so far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies, creates the condition for remembrance, that is, history.[126]

Here, Arendt brings to the fore the most basic human condition of birth (and subsequently death), or as she writes, "natality." All three activities are connected to natality and preserving life in their own proper regard. Moreover, all three activities must also contend with, in creating and preserving the world, "the constant stream of newcomers who are born into the world as strangers"[127] —not themselves knowing the world but soon inhabiting it and becoming its care takers. Action here is once again specifically important as the newcomers to the world possess the potential for action, of being able to begin anew, and, as we will see, this is what allows the world to endure.

These human activities culminate in the existence of the world. This world is not, as we have said the natural world, but

> is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.[128]

The world is then that which both holds humans in common and separates us. As Arendt notes further, "only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their

identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear."[129] This ability to gather around the same thing and understand that it is a same, shared, thing which is perceived through the diversity of the plurality of our situatedness, is the basis of the world. Our sense of reality is based on the fact that we share in common our experiences with others, but understand, relate to, and experience them differently. And so, in existing in this world together it relates us as we hold it in common, while, at the same time, separates us in that it does not belong to any individual—the world belongs at once to all and none of us. It is held "in between" us.

To better understand what makes up this world I want to turn to Stephanie Mackler's essay "And Worldlessness, Alas, Is Always a Kind of Barbarism: Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Educating in Worldless Times" (2010). In this work, Mackler makes clear for us that "at its most basic level, Arendt describes the world as the collection of artifacts that humans create, like cups, sculptures, and ideas that transcend each of us both during and after our individual lives."[130] Adding that, moreover, it is characterised by "the ideas, interpretations, and knowledge that humans have agreed upon at any given time and place."[131] Finally, we must remember the essential nature of the world in its relation to human plurality— "the world in this sense consists of the *interactions* among people."[132] It is then that there are three major categories which make up the world: physical objects, those that are human-made, like a table; metaphysical things *qua* things beyond the physical, such as ideas, interpretations, and knowledge; and its fact of plurality, as in the dynamic diverse nature of the interactions among humans who inhabit the world together. While we may be able to distinguish between these three categories, all three are necessary in the creation and maintenance of the world; one alone cannot make up the world as we may glean from Arendt's words cited above.

Finally, we must take note of the permanence of the world. This permanence is not one that is naturally indicative of the world, but rather, is a permeance only in appearance. Although our coming together through shared ideas, knowledge, and the creation physical objects helps in creating durability in the world, none of these things are immortal or permanent. The world needs maintaining, creating anew, in order for it to be enduring. As Arendt makes explicitly clear, "if the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of mortal men."[133] It must be enduring and depends on permanence in this respect. Despite this dependence, permanence is not natural to the world, as it is a world created by humans who are themselves impermanent mortal beings. The world must then be maintained by those who already inhabit it, and furthermore be consistently made anew by newcomers to the world. Of this survival of the world Arendt writes,

> the common world is what we enter when we are born and what we leave behind when we die. It transcends our life-span into past and future alike; it was there before we came and will outlast our brief sojourn in it. It is what we have in common not only with those who live with us, but also with those who were here before and with those who will come after us. But such a common world can survive the coming and going of the generations only to the extent that it appears in public.[134]

Here, Arendt attaches the survival of the world to its ability to appear in public. As such we will now move to explore Arendt's notion of the public realm, its companion the private realm, and their significance for the duration of the world.

Arendt's notions of the public and the private take influence from these realms and their conceptualizations in Greco-Roman antiquity, such as we can observe within the Greek *polis*, roughly meaning "city-state," and the Roman *res publica*, literally meaning "public thing" (but most often referring to the Roman Republic). Arendt writes that for the ancients, this public space was "their guarantee against the futility of individual life, the space protected against this futility and reserved for the relative permanence, if not immortality, of mortals."[135] This space,

which offers refuge from the "toil and trouble" of the labor necessary of surviving, from mortality, and enables humans a sort of permanence or even immortality, is the space which within the world exists. For the term "public" signifies two things for Arendt: "it means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity";[136] and "second, the term 'public' signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it."[137] This means, firstly that the public realm does not hide away aspects that belong within it, but rather that everything that appears within it is open, heard and seen by all. Secondly, it signifies that the public denotes the world; it is the space in which the world exists in so far as it is a shared space between humans.

The public realm may be contrasted with the private in order to be better understood. We may first note, as Arendt does, that "the distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state."[138] The private realm is that of the *oikos* or household, and "the distinctive trait of the household sphere was that in it men lived together because they were driven by their wants and needs,"[139] that is by necessity and nature.[140] "The realm of the *polis* [the public] on the contrary, was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship between these two spheres, it was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the household was the condition for freedom of the *polis*."[141] In contrast the public is the realm of freedom, where we are freed from the necessities of life which have been quelled in the private realm. Furthermore, we may add that the public "was distinguished from the household in that it knew only 'equals', whereas the household was the center of the strictest inequality."[142] That is, in public individuals are free, and amongst only free individuals, equals.

In the private, where people are subjugated to the necessities of life, inequalities exist, where they might be ruler or ruled. The public realm is dependent on plurality as Arendt notes that "the reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself."[143] Hence, the essential aspect of the public of "being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position,"[144] that no human will see and hear exactly the same.

An essential final piece of the public is that "of all the activities necessary and present in human communities, only two were deemed to be political [belonging to the public realm] namely action *(praxis)* and speech *(lexis),* out of which rises the realm of human affairs."[145] Here we have the reaffirmation of the importance of action as a part of the world and thus the public, as well as an introduction to another integral aspect, namely speech. Action and speech are significant for each other in their importance in the public, as it is the case that "action can be recognized and rendered meaningful only because we are capable of telling a story about it."[146] Hence action is only made meaningful insofar as it can be rendered into speech to be shared in the public realm.[147] At this point, we need to explicate the twofold quality of action insofar as it disrupts the world by the fact of its natality, while simultaneously creating the world. It destroys the static world, as it was known, and creates the dynamic world in which the world must always be made anew. Of this, Mackler writes,

> Action disrupts shared understanding; that is, that which is unpredictable falls outside the purview of whatever we already think is the case. This radical quality of action means that it is temporarily world-destroying if we think of the world as a set of tried-and-true understandings—that is, if we think of the world in its more static sense. But action is also world-creating if we think of the world in its dynamic sense because action provokes a response from others [it forces others to react].[148]

Speech is what renders this doubled effect of action meaningful within the world— "the meaning of actions is translated into a tangible artifact via speech."[149] And this artifact of speech can be shared and viewed and heard through our human plurality. This fact of speech is drawn from Arendt's writing that "thinking, because it can be remembered, can crystallize into thought, and thoughts, like all things that owe their existence to remembrance, can be transformed into tangible objects which, like the written page or the printed book, become part of the human artifice."[150] This somewhat foggy connection between thought, speech, and action can be clarified by simply understanding that thinking is the individual meaning-making of action, and speech is to explain and bring this meaning-making into the shared world, which enables people to experience meaningfulness "because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves."[151] And so, it is *speech* which allows for the private individual thought about action to become a public artifact that can help the world to meaningfully endure beyond the comings and goings of the life-cycle. Thought and thinking here is characterized as private because Arendt argues that "we cannot think about the meaning of things that happen without withdrawing into our minds"[152] —into the private solitude of the self. Despite this private quality of thinking, thought remains connected to the public as the source material for our thinking comes from the public world.[153] Hence thought is private insomuch as it is a process contained within the confines of one's own mind, while maintaining a connection to the public world as the contents of our thoughts are drawn from the world. Further, "Arendt suggests that we have an urge to translate our private thoughts into the public world through speech."[154] And so, private thought always retains the *potential* to become public artifact, and hence worldly, through speech.

Although this has been a rather lengthy exegesis of Arendt's concept of the world, it is necessary that we grasp all that we can of its essential aspects before we turn to the issue of worldlessness. For how could we discuss worldlessness without first understanding the world? I will now turn to a discussion of the collapse of certain aspects of the world into worldlessness. As Mackler notes, in a footnote to her essay, "it is possible to read the entire book, *The Human Condition*, as an analysis of the causes and aspects of world alienation,"[155] however for my purposes here I will focus only on the rise of "the social," and as Mackler does, on "[Arendt's] discussion of the rise of a certain type of scientific, technological type of thinking"[156] that culminates in our alienation from the world.

2.2. Worldlessness: The Rise of the Social Realm

As we learned from the previous section, according to Arendt, the distinction between the public and private realms has existed since antiquity. In this section I introduce a third realm also included by Arendt: this is, "the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, [and] is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-state."[157] The social realm, a modern phenomenon, is neither strictly public or private, but rather bridges the gap between the two, itself becoming a murky mess. As Arendt notes,

> In the modern world, the social and the political realms are much less distinct. [Here] politics is nothing but a function of society, [and] action, speech, and thought are primarily superstructures upon social interest […]. This functionalization makes it impossible to perceive any serious gulf between the two realms; and this is not a matter of a theory or an ideology, since with the rise of society, that is, the rise of the 'household' *(oikia)* or of economic activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the private sphere of the family have become a 'collective' concern. In the modern world, the two realms indeed constantly flow into each other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life process itself.[158]

The rise of the social realm appears politically in the nation-state, which is defined by its homogeneity. This homogeneity cripples plurality, thereby foreclosing the possibility for action and speech, which are both indicative and representational of plurality. They all become, as Arendt notes, mere supports for the advancement of social interest. In the section cited it is also made clear that the social realm encompasses the previously separated private and public realms by bringing what were once strictly private matters of the household into public domain. Moreover, the social realm blurs the distinction between the private and the public as "whether a nation consists of equals or non-equals is of no great importance […], for society always demands that its members act as though they were members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest."[159] Consequently, the public realm, which once consisted exclusively of equally free individuals, is consumed by the social. It is no longer a space of freedom entered when the necessities of the private life were mastered. In the social realm, individuals lose their distinctiveness. Treated as a "homogenous family" sharing the same opinion and interest, they become susceptible to despotic rule and becoming a despot themselves. This is detrimental to human freedom, as equality and freedom from rulership are hallmarks of the inherent liberty within the public realm.

Arendt continues that "it is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement."[160] Here we see once more that homogeneity is of the essential nature of the social realm, insofar as members are expected to conform to certain uniform behaviours and rules which normalize and regulate them. Action, by its very nature is directly opposed to

homogeneity, as it depends on human plurality. Consequently, the possibility of action within the social realm is excluded, if not entirely eliminated. As such, Arendt notes that "deeds will have less and less chance to stem the tide of behavior, and events will more and more lose their significance, that is, their capacity to illuminate historical time."[161] That is, as this uniformity continues and the homogeneity of society is strengthened throughout time, action will have less of an effect, and overall lose its significance in the world.

Thus far, we have illuminated the effect that the eclipsing of the public and private by the social has had on action. But what can now be said of work and labor? Of these activities, Arendt writes: "perhaps the clearest indication that society constitutes the public organization of the life process itself may be found in the fact that in a relatively short time the new social realm transformed all modern communities into societies of laborers and jobholders; in other words, they became at once centered around the one activity necessary to sustain life."[162] (46). Hence, it is that with the rise of the social, action, as we saw, is neutered of its power, speech is banished to the intimate private household, and work becomes the mere production of commodities so that labor and work, the only activities of the social realm, are both made into activates of necessity whose purpose is to sustain life. And so, the human in the social realm is reduced to *animal laborans*, literally the "working animal." Consequently, "society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public" What once existed as a realm of freedom, in which equals existed together, acting and preserving the world by maintaining it and making anew, has now been transformed. In this new realm we find ourselves amongst equals and non-equals, action and speech have been quelled, and activities necessary for the sustaining of life have left the private sphere. They now come under the harsh light of the

public, assuming public significance. In a final note on the modern rise of the social realm, I would like to leave us with the remark by Arendt that "what makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them."[163] The world, in this respect, has lost its ability to bring people together through their shared experience of things, and at the same time separate them in their individual experiences of said thing. It is no longer what simultaneously holds us in common and separates us, as there is no longer an in-between.

2.3. Worldlessness: The Isolation of Humans

I will now explain a second form or point of wordlessness: the isolation of individuals through their alienation from the world. Here, we will once again turn to Mackler's essay to extrapolate the current human trend toward alienation. Along with Mackler, I will be particularly reliant for my own analysis on the final chapter in *The Human Condition*: "The *Vita Activa* and the Modern Age." We begin with "modern doubt toward sensory perception."[164] That is, doubt of our senses, and the turn toward the belief that our senses are limited and fallible and so should not be trusted as a universal standpoint from which we observe objective truth. Arendt makes clear throughout her work that humans desire, or need, an objective universal standpoint to reliably arrive at objective truth. If there is doubt in the ability of our senses to provide this for us, the physical world we observe can no longer fulfill this desire. We may then follow Mackler in asserting that this doubt in the senses "results in doubt in reason."[165] This is the case as we find in Arendt that thinking is born from the experience of physical things through the senses in conjunction with concepts *qua* reason. Thus, in losing the sensory world, which is physically

manifest and perceived through our senses, we lose the transcendent world as well, the world that "appears to us as true in our minds."[166] Through the use of reason "with the disappearance of the sensually given world, the transcendent world disappears as well, and with it the possibility of transcending the material world in concept and thought."[167]

This leads us to, as Mackler writes, a "deplorable and frantic search to create knowledge."[168] That is, the search for a new and stable objective universal standpoint. According to Arendt, Mackler notes that "this search was grounded in two assumptions: (1) truth can only be arrived at within the context of a controlled human-made environment, and (2) truth can only be arrived at through doing."[169] This implies that the "modern" search for knowledge is based on two premises: firstly, the assumption that truth can only be attained through human-made tools and instruments in controlled environments or conditions. Secondly, as Mackler notes "the human senses cannot be trusted to know the world accurately in a passive manner,"[170] and so, to know something, we necessitate active verification through controlled scientific interventions. Moreover, as the world, perceived by our senses, is no longer trusted as an objective universal standpoint, instead this point of reference moves inward "into man himself":[171] "though one cannot know truth as something given and disclosed, man can at least know what he makes himself."[172] This shift of the objective universal standpoint from the observable physical or sensual world, into "man himself"—otherwise articulated by Arendt as the movement of the Archimedean point into humans themselves—results in the alienation of humans from the world (in all its senses). As Arendt states, "instead of objective qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature or the universe […] man encounters only himself."[173]

Mackler introduces this shift as a theoretical universal standpoint. It is "to choose as ultimate point of reference the pattern of the human mind itself, which assures itself of reality

and certainty."[174] Hence, contained to itself and alienated from the sensual world, the mind plays with itself "shut off from all reality and 'senses' only itself."[175] We can therefore find, as Arendt does, that "what men now have in common is not the world but the structure of their minds."[176] This modern shift toward a theoretical universal standpoint entails a turning away from reason and a centering of cognition and its computational processes. Reason as it searches for and is instrumental in the process of making meaning sharply contrasts with cognition. For reason "responds to things that happen in the world but that lack inherent meaning,"[177] explaining the conceptual significance of worldly happenings, and hence is responsive to action. Cognition on the other hand, "searches for knowledge."[178] Its aim is to "reckon with consequences,"[179] and in doing so, it negates the unexpected, "since it would be unreasonable or irrational to expect what is no more than an 'infinite improbability'."[180] And thus, cognition, operating "from the premise that whatever is thought must be able to be thought again,"[181] negates the possibility of the unexpected. Since the unexpected is foundational to action, this negation ultimately undermines action itself. Thus, we have found once again that the movement and progress of modernity, in this case the shift of the objective universal standpoint into "man himself" (the theoretical universal standpoint), has resulted in the destruction of the possibility of and accounting for action. It is these forms of worldlessness in modernity that result in a "malaise of the soul."

2.4. The Malaise of the Soul

The current diagnosis of worldlessness results, I suggest, in a malaise of the soul. By malaise of the soul, I mean explicitly a sickness of the soul which hinders its ability to regrow its wings and flourish, as noted above in my discussion in chapter one. My terminology here of the "malaise of the soul" is gratefully borrowed from the lectures of Dr. Mario Di Paolantonio as

well as my reading of his work "The Malaise of the Soul at Work: The Drive for Creativity, Self-Actualization, and Curiosity in Education" (2019). In this work Di Paolantonio draws on the definition of soul as given by Franco "Bifo" Berardi in *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy* (2009), which is defined as "the vital breath that converts biological matter into an animated body."[182] In this sense, when Di Paolantonio discusses the "malaise of the soul" in his work it is with an understanding of the soul in a materialistic sense, as deeply and innately connected to the body. Although this understanding of soul may at first seem disconnected or even perhaps contrary to the definition I have put forward in chapter one, we find that they are not so different when we reflect that central to our definition of the soul is that it is the source of generation and movement within the human body, and hence brings to life the biological clump of matter we otherwise are: "the earthly body of which it takes control seems to move itself, but that is the effect of the soul, and the whole unit of soul and body conjoined is called a 'living creature', and also 'mortal'."[183] In his work Di Paolantonio discusses the "malaise of the soul" as brought about by the economic expansion of Berardi's notion of semiocapitalism: "this is an expansion that does not simply stretch outward, rendering and exploiting nature and the world around us as a resource, but also reaches inward usurping, mining and reaping our interiority (our 'soul'), drawing out our passions, desires and creative impulses as a resource itself to be exploited."[184] While I have not discussed semiocapitalism as a form of worldlessness, the forms of worldlessness presented above similarly contribute to the malaise of the soul.

Whereas Di Paolantonio discusses the mining and exploitation of the soul as causing its malaise, here worldlessness strangles the soul, blinds it, and cages it, ultimately debilitating it. To understand what is implied here, we must first make the connection between the soul and action. The soul as generating movement in the human does not simply mean that it is what

allows the limbs to move, the heart to pump, and the body to function. It is also what allows humans to be human. We are made up of body, mind, and soul; the soul, being a source, is what *animates* the body and mind, or breathes life into us. All three are necessary in order for one to be called human. The soul, in generating movement in humans, is then intimately connected to all fundamental human activities, one of which is Arendtian action. I would like to suggest that there is a deeper connection between the soul and action in comparison with the other fundamental human activities that we have discussed (labor and work), as action is the medium through which our uniqueness as individuals is expressed and manifested. The soul is inextricably tied to the body and mind of each individual, and while everyone is the same in the fact that we are all human, made up of body, mind, and soul, there is distinct and irreducible singular uniqueness in each human being. This uniqueness as it is manifested through action, which as movement must be generated by the soul, must then be, at least in part, connected to the soul of each individual.

In exploring the connection between the soul and action, we discover that the malaise of the soul results from the negation or hindering of action. When the possibility for action is negated, the uniqueness and singularity of the individual is negated as well, and the movement generated by the soul is hindered. This stifles the soul, depriving it of its ability to manifest in the uniqueness of being human, caging the soul and the individual. Moreover, the soul is blinded as the fact of worldlessness isolates and entraps us in our own mind. As we saw in chapter one, the development and health of the soul is reliant upon its ability to recognize and love beauty. Under the conditions of worldlessness as they have been outlined above, the singularity of oneself and others remains unmanifested and unseen, and so the soul is left with nothing to latch onto, nothing to love. And subsequently it cannot regenerate its wings.[185] The effect of this is a malaise

of the soul. A state in which the soul is sickened, weakened, and cannot function properly. This need not be the case though; the current fact of worldlessness is not hopeless, there is yet still time for humans to recover the world. Likewise, the current malaise of the soul is not a terminal diagnosis, there is still hope for its recovery: this hope is love.

CHAPTER THREE

Love: The Remedy

Overcoming a malaise of the soul, like healing any wound, requires the proper treatment or remedy. It is in this third and final chapter that I will put forward my own articulation of love, as the remedy to this malaise of the soul. I will follow this discussion with considerations of other possible remedies to the malaise of the soul: Arendt's notion of forgiveness, and two considerations of Arendt's political theory of *amor mundi* ("love of the world"). Finally, I will consider the role that love takes up in education.

3.1. Love as the Remedy to this Malaise of the Soul

Love, for all its power, I believe, can remedy our current diagnosis of the malaise of the soul. The form of love that I am evoking here is specifically the *eros* that I elucidated in chapter one. This *eros*, we may recall, is not the common erotic sentimental love, but rather proper love, which springs from the soul upon seeing beauty. Further, it is a love that is concerned with earthly or worldly immortality, and ascends the Socratic ladder of love as it develops in its proper fashion. What we can assert of this love is, as I have learned from many of my teachers in philosophy, that *love is the activity of the soul*. Love is what the soul is meant to do, it is its natural activity, the action which it necessarily produces. This malaise of the soul, in all the ways that it cripples the soul, cannot change this irrevocable nature of the soul—its ability to love. And so, humans, suffering this malaise of the soul under the conditions of worldlessness, still have the innate ability within to see beauty and love. In seeing and acknowledging beauty the soul is necessarily set alight, and loves such beauty. The task at hand then for humans is to venture out, to seek beauty, in hopes of sparking love and awakening their soul. This is not an easy task set

before us. The fact of wordlessness has isolated us, and deprived us of the world from which we might customarily find such beauty. We are not, though, without hope: as long as we are human, on this earth, we have the ability to love as it is the natural inalienable activity of the soul, and all human beings, in the fact of their being human, must have body, mind, and soul.

We begin by seeking out just one thing that is beautiful, that sets our soul alight and begins the activity of loving in the soul. This sight may indeed be frightening, and the soul, weakened by its malaise, may indeed find it difficult to continue on properly. But this is what we must do. The soul, once it has properly come to recognize and grasp the thing of beauty which it loves, finds that it must share this thing with others, to put it out into the world, so that it might, hopefully, gain some sense of worldly immortality. By doing so we bring this thing forward to others, so that others may take it up as well. This process brings something new into the world, and establishes something which we can gather around that holds us together and separates us simultaneously. In this way, we can begin to re-establish the world.

Love then, proper love, not only has the ability to remedy the malaise of the soul, but can also be the place from which we begin to restore the world. Perhaps Arendt's little studied concept of *amor mundi* could literally be a love of the world. By this I mean that the theory of *amor mundi* is the understanding that the world is made up of things which are loved by some individual, or many, and it is held together by this love of the world and the things that make it up, consistently renewed as newcomers find meaning in the world, and learn to love the things within it as those before them did.

3.2. Forgiveness

I would now like to consider some alternatives or perhaps additions to my theory on love as the remedy to this malaise of the soul. I will begin with a consideration of "forgiveness" as Arendt herself puts it forward in *The Human Condition* as a remedy.[186] Although here forgiveness is presented as a "remedy against the irreversibility and unpredictability of the process started by acting,"[187] it is prudent that we consider whether forgiveness can remedy the larger issue of worldlessness. Arendt asserts that "without being forgiven, released form the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever."[188] Forgiveness is what allows our ability to "act" in the world to continue. For without it, our fate would be condemned by a single act. As the consequences or effects of an act are always unknown, and continuous, in order to be released from its consequences, or, move on as it were, we must be able to forgive. Without this remedy to the unchecked power of action, it "inevitably begins to overpower and destroy not man himself but the conditions under which life was given to him,"[189] hence destroying our ability to engage in fundamental human activities, namely, action. We must be released from the consequences of our acting, in order to continue to go about acting and creating anew. Arendt continues by affirming that "only through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something anew."[190] Thus, it is only by our willingness to forgive, to release ourselves and others, that we may act anew and continue to live freely.

The final aspect of forgiveness that we must touch on is that it itself is an action. Arendt writes that, "forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts

anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven."[191] Here we see that forgiving is an act itself and not merely a reaction or effect of the preceding act. It acts anew, and is itself unexpected and unconditioned, as is the nature of all action. This act of forgiving frees both the original actor and the one who is forgiving from the effects of the original act and enables new action to come about and subsequently for the world to be maintained and continuously renewed.

And so, we must find forgiveness as a necessary action to maintain the world. In this sense, forgiveness does prevent worldlessness, although once worldlessness has taken hold, isolating people and preventing acting, the act of forgiveness itself cannot bring back the world. Nor, to consider the effects of worldlessness as a malaise of the soul, can it (only) alleviate the pain the soul suffers as a result of worldlessness. This does not, however, mean that forgiveness has no role in combating the current state of worldlessness. This is merely to say that it alone cannot be the remedy, nor is it the foundation from which we must begin to repair the soul. Further consideration of the potential power of the act of forgiveness is unfortunately beyond the purview of this project, although it would be an avenue well worth exploring, specifically, in connection to the arguments made by Arendt in her doctoral dissertation *Love and Saint Augustine* (1996). We will now turn to two different scholars' interpretations of Arendt's under-studied concept of *amor mundi*: first, we will consider it as gratitude for the world, and in the second instance, as a public *vinculum* or "bond."

3.3. *Amor Mundi* as Gratitude

We must begin by noting that Arendt did address the topic of love early in her scholarly career. Specifically, in her doctoral dissertation completed in 1929, titled *Love and Saint Augustine* (1996). Here she writes about two central Augustinian forms of love: *caritas,* which is closely associated with the Greek *agape* and "whose object is eternity";[192] and *cupiditas,* which can be equated with the passionate Geek *eros*, and is an earthly love that "clings to… the world,"[193] although both, as forms of love, are defined as *appetitus* or "craving." To keep within the parameters of this project I will refrain from offering my own interpretation of Arendt's arguments in *Love and Saint Augustine*. Instead, Lucy Tatman's "Arendt and Augustine: More Than One Kind of Love" (2013), will be a focal point of this section, alongside Shin Chiba's essay "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship, and Citizenship" (1995), which will be discussed in section 3.4. Both works delve into Arendt's concept of *amor mundi,* informed by her dissertation.

Tatman begins her consideration of Arendt's *amor mundi* by first bringing forward a passage from a 1955 correspondence Arendt had with existentialist Karl Jaspers, in which she states her recent love of the world and her desire to name her book "*Amor Mundi*" out of gratitude for this world.[194] From here Tatman suggests that "love of the world somehow inspires some to assist, during their lives, in the ongoing co-creation of the world, and that the world offers or provides something to human lives for which gratitude is an appropriate response."[195] The connection here is that Arendt's writing to Jaspers is a specific individual example of the general concept, in so far as human beings, in existing in the world, come to love it, and feel gratitude for the existence of the world, and that this love and gratitude inspires action and the ongoing co-creation of the world. Thus far we have connected "love of the world" and "gratitude

for the world," although the connection between the two is murky. This connection becomes clearer as we find that in Arendt's work gratitude is connected to natality. To illuminate this connection, as Tatman does, we may turn to Arendt's writings, in particular when she notes that:

> the decisive fact determining man as a conscious, remembering being is birth or 'natality', that is, the fact that we have entered the world through birth. The decisive fact determining man as a desiring being was death or mortality, the fact that we shall leave the world in death. Fear of death and inadequacy of life are the springs of desire. In contrast, gratitude for life having been given at all is the spring of remembrance.[196]

Here, we see that meaningfulness is only possible because of memory, specifically, memory of that which proceeds us, the fact of our natality and the world. In considering this, Tatman proposes that, for Arendt, "it is a *gratitude that leads her to love the world as the source of meaningful human life*."[197] To put this more clearly, Tatman notes "for Arendt, we remember that the world has given our lives meaning, and out of loving gratitude we help to renew the world so that it might continue to give meaning even to those who are yet to be born."[198] This is to say that, in remembering that it is the world that has given our lives meaning, we come to love the world and properly express this love in gratitude for the world by helping in the constant renewal of the world so that it may continue to provide a source of meaning for those who currently inhabit it and those who will come to inhabit it in the future. Tatman continues, "it is the newcomers who, out of loving gratitude for their own meaningful lives in the world, take up the task of remembering and building in their turn, thereby extending the 'potential immortality' of the world for a little while longer."[199] And so, the cycle repeats, as newcomers come into the world, they find meaning in the world, and out of loving gratitude for having found their own meaningful lives, they in turn act and make the world anew, preserving it for the next generation to come and extending the perceived immortality of the world. In concluding our understanding of gratitude, we must remember that for Arendt, memory is possibly only through natality, and

moreover that this remembrance "produces gratitude for life having been given to us in a meaningful way,"[200] that is, for the world.

Finally, having been able to clearly articulate what gratitude is and how it is connected to humans and the world, Tatman offers a conception of Arendt's *amor mundi* in which she states:

> This Arendtian love of the world is the grateful emotional response to the fact that meaningful life has been given unto us. It is through our natality that we know we were born into a world that preceded our arrival and will endure our departure, and it is because we are natal creatures that 'the spring of remembrance' gives rise to loving gratitude to the world for having bestowed our lives with meaning.[201]

And so, for Tatman, *amor mundi* ("love of the world") is found in the gratitude we experience in relation to our understanding that our life is made meaningful from our experience of the world. This is a beautiful understanding of *amor mundi*, and one I believe that is in line with Arendt's overarching philosophy. Despite this, it cannot directly speak to our issue of the malaise of the soul that results from worldlessness, though I do believe it can enlarge our understanding of how love can remedy the soul, and perhaps facilitate in the development of the soul as the world is re-established. The fact of worldlessness strips us of our ability to find meaning in the world. In this articulation of *amor mundi* one is grateful *as a result* of the meaningful life they have derived from the world. But, if the world has been stripped of its meaning, or if the power to relate and separate has been foreclosed, we must reverse the process. We must first find something meaningful and bring it into the world. This, as we saw, is the power that love has, and it, as we will see later in this chapter, is the role of education.

3.4. *Amor Mundi* as a Public *Vinculum*

We turn to now a second conception of Arendt's *amor mundi* put forward by Shin Chiba in his work "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship, and Citizenship" (1995). Here we will explore *amor mundi* as a possible foundation for a new public *vinculum* or "bond" based on *philia* ("friendship"). Chiba begins in pointing to Arendt's seeming preoccupation with love, whether it be through her doctoral dissertation or her condemning of certain types of love in *The Human Condition*. Chiba suggests a possible reason for this concern with love is due to her need of and search for a "public *vinculum*" that can bring people together without defaulting to naturalistic ties like family, religion, or nationality: "Arendt's concern for love is essentially dictated by her persistent search for a new public *vinculum*—or bond. A new public *vinculum* should bring people into a common mode of living without any recourse to more-or-less *naturalistic* bonds."[202] That this public *vinculum* be one not dictated by naturalistic sentiments is clear from our reading of Arendt's notions of the world and the public as she clearly establishes that these areas are not established by natural bonds but belong to the world produced by humans living together, or "the *artificial* dimension of life."[203] Chiba goes on to establish that, as love plays a role in this public *vinculum*, "we are witnessing Arendt's attempt to uphold the notion of love as an *objective* philosophical concept which establishes a relationship between people, on the one hand, and between people and objects, on the other."[204] This is that, here love is established as an objective concept, as opposed to a sentimental one, that can establish a bond between people, as well as between people and objects. This conception of love, as non-sentimental, is not grounded in the religious or ethical context in which we commonly find theories of love, but rather is grounded in political theory, and so, "from this point of view, the notion of love can be seen as a principle for constituting a community, that is, a principle of

coexistence—or life together—with whatever is outside and heterogeneous."[205] Love, in this sense, is then able to provide a foundation from which a "principle of coexistence" or the living together of humans can be established—one that is able to accommodate and account for various and diverse peoples.

It is not any love, or even love broadly understood, that can establish this sort of bond among individuals. Arendt has clearly defined certain forms of love, specifically sentimental love or private emotional love, as unpolitical or even world destroying in *The Human Condition*. The love that is of interest here, which is an objective understanding of love, is specifically founded upon *philia* or "friendship," and "the ancient Greek's love for earthly immortality" called *eros*.[206] It is then that, as Chiba asserts, Arendt's "political theory of *amor mundi* is distinctly based on the notion of friendship."[207] To further clarify the conception of love that can establish a public bond (*vinculum*) and hold political relevance for Arendt, Chiba outlines three views of Arendt's on love:

> First, Arendt holds that since all kinds of love are, for reason of their character as sentiment, prone to emotional bias and passionate outburst, they are harmful to the political world. For this reason they cannot be the basis of a form of solidarity with the outside world. Second, since friendship and the ancient love for the immortality of the earth are not necessarily *sentimental*, they do not have to be regarded as forms of love as such; and thus they are compatible with a principle of solidarity. Third, the criterion by which an inner attitude of human being can be judged as political resides in its compatibility with a principle of solidarity, as well as a capacity to 'partake of reason, and hence of generality' and thus to deal 'dispassionately' with what is common and public.[208]

This is to say that, Arendt, when dealing with love, has three specific views: first, that love, as sentimental, private, and emotional, is harmful to the world and innately unpolitical, and for these reasons cannot inspire solidarity among humans; second, *philia* ("friendship") and the specific *eros* of antiquity (being love for worldly immortality), are not sentimental forms of love,

and so can potentially be political in nature and can form solidarity among humans; and third, for an "inner attitude" of a human being, something that resides inside us, to be deemed political it must be compatible with or contribute to solidarity among humans.

Concerning a public *vinculum* as based on love as friendship and *eros*, it is more or less clear the role that *eros* plays as the love for worldly immortality. This *eros* directly corresponds to the potential immortality of the world, and in its quest to establish this worldly immortality it aids in the establishment of the world. The implications and understanding of friendship in this regard though is not yet clear. When we invoke the notion of friendship here, we are discussing it within the ancient Greek tradition of *philia* which has political significance.[209] For Arendt, this friendship "signifies a companionship with others as equal partners in a community common to them."[210] Friendship is indicative of the relations between people who are equals within the world, or the realm of the public. There is a distinction here, Chiba notes, between the ancient concept of *philia* and Arendt's use of it as she broadens and elevates "it to a more genuinely political form, so that it may cope with differences, diversities, and heterogeneities among friends."[211] That is, the conception of *philia* with which Arendt engages is more truly political as it engages all participants in the world, and is not restricted, as in the Aristotelian conception to kinship in "'like to like' and 'birds of a feather'."[212] Despite this enlargement of *philia*, "the conceptual merit of the notion of political friendship for Arendt resides, as it originally did for Aristotle, in its capacity to mold a collective identity or a community among peers. In this we can see her concern for the building and maintaining of community."[213] The merit or power of *philia* lies in ability to tie people together, to form a bond between them, and create and maintain community, or the world.

With this foundation of *philia* in *amor mundi*, we encounter humanity's commitment to the welfare of each other and the world.[214] Chiba in concluding his discussion writes:

> Thus, 'love of the world' is not simply a willing commitment to the welfare of the world but also a matter of perception of the self and the self's relationship to the surrounding world. For citizens do *not* have to be united by common blood or an organic tie but rather are united by the common world which lies between them. Citizens immediately realize that what unites them is the world which they have in common and which they enter as they are born and leave in due time as they die only to be handed on to their successors.[215]

The basis of friendship in *amor mundi* points us toward the various and diverse peoples inhabiting the world with us; hence, we are united by the world, which at the same time relates and separates us. We are not isolated when we can think of ourselves in relation to not only the world, but others as well. *Amor mundi* serves as the basis that bonds people, functioning as a public *vinculum* and inspiring action for the renewal of the world among humanity. This articulation of *amor mundi* is particularly useful in understanding the human drive to consistently renew the world as it is what holds us in common. It can even be argued that it helps us contend with the current issues of worldlessness and aid in the reestablishment of the public realm and the world. In a future project, these conceptions of *amor mundi* would certainly be a point from which to begin to consider how we might re-establish the world. Nonetheless, I will now turn to the final section of this last chapter in which I will explore the role that education might have in remedying the soul, and more broadly, re-establishing the world.

3.5. Love and *Amor Mundi* in Education

Joris Vlieghe and Piotr Zamojski, in their work "Out of Love for Some-Thing: An Ontological Exploration of the Roots of Teaching in Arendt, Badiou and Scheler" (2019), develop an ontological understanding of teaching which centers love for the world: "the most

important defining element of teaching is unconditional *love for the world*."[216] This love is "a unique educational love,"[217] and it is at the crucial core of education. The love that is at play here must be understood in two ways: first, is the love of the teacher, specifically for her subject matter; and second, it is an Arendtian love of the world: we "define love first and foremost in terms of *love for the world*. The object-side of educational love is not the student (or the teacher seen from the perspective of the student), but the thing that is studied in the classroom. Educational love is love for a thing, not a person."[218] Hence, this love, in loving the world, loves specifically *some-thing* within the world, some object or part of the world. Vlieghe and Zamojski continue that "it is one's falling in love with a particular thing (e.g. a subject matter like cooking, history, classical languages, carpentry, painting) which defines the teacher as teacher. This is not to say that falling in love is a sufficient condition, but it surely is a necessary one."[219] The love for some-thing in the world, some particular subject matter, is then a necessary condition for one to be "teacher" or "educator." Vlieghe and Zamojski stick closely to the Arendtian understanding of the proper educational meaning of teaching in which the teacher takes responsibility for the world, and stands as an example of the world, representing it to their students, the newcomers to the world, saying "this is our world."[220] In line with this view, Vlieghe and Zamojski go on to tell us that "education is thus an intergenerational interaction which is first and foremost concerned with disclosing the world."[221] That is, education is the disclosing of the world, what is important within it, from one generation to the next. Vlieghe and Zamojski continue in writing that,

> for the new generation to start anew with the world it is first required that they come to experience that there is a world, namely that there is something worthwhile to be attentive to and to take care of. And that this thing precedes and exceeds the individual's needs and her immediate life-world. This presupposes that the teacher is in love with the world, and more exactly with a particular thing of this world. In her teaching, she displays that for her a particular subject matter *matters*.[222]

For the world to continue, for it to consistently be made anew, newcomers to the world must first be introduced to the world. They must be shown that this world is worth preserving, worth the effort of action to make it anew. The teacher shows the world to these newcomers and points to what they love, what they have found meaningful and worthy of attention and care. The teacher shows, that what they are teaching about, the subject matter that they love, matters and is worth loving. Accordingly, the teacher not only points to the world, and says "this is our world" to the newcomers, but moreover, she shows these newcomers that there are things in this world worthy of love and that demand care in order to be preserved in the world for future generations: "pointing out to the next generation *that there is something good in the world*, and more exactly the thing she has fallen in love with."[223] This is the love of the world that is necessary and fundamental to the essence of education—the love of a thing in the world, and the subsequent "pointing to" of this thing to the next generation.

Having outlined the love in education as such, Vlieghe and Zamojski then go on to explore the philosophy of love given by French philosopher Alain Badiou. Here they argue that "there is a narrative structure underlying [Badiou's] philosophical project *in toto*."[224] This is a sort of story, which underlines the body of his philosophical thought. This narrative begins with the event "which is something that usually remains unnoticed, but that makes a difference"[225] — something that has an impact, but that is not necessarily noticed or observed. Next is the naming of this event by the "subject" which is "someone or something that gives this unnoticed happening a name […] and that affirms it as an event."[226] And so, this unnoticed event is declared as an "event" as the subject gives it a name. The nature of these events is that although it may first be unnoticed, an "event" does make a difference in, and effect, our lives. Vlieghe and Zamojski continue that

> in order for an event to leave its mark on our lives, we need to be faithful to it. This is what Badiou (2005, pp. 232–239) calls 'fidelity to the event'. By this he means the infinite labour of introducing the consequences of the event into the particularities of our lives. In order to be faithful to the event, one needs to relate the event to the reality of one's own life, i.e. one needs to make it present in the way one lives. But, there is no pre-described way of doing this. It is rather the case that one continuously has to invent and re-invent ways for doing this.[227]

There is much at play here, we must grasp that in order for an event to affect and mark our lives, we need to be true to the event by introducing its effects and consequences, the difference it makes, into our lives. It must be brought into our daily lives. This is called "fidelity to the event." The result of this "fidelity to the event" is "truth." Truth here "is the effect of fidelity in so far as it causes a suspension of a given order of things which was taken for granted before the advent of the event."[228] Truth is the effects of the fidelity to the event as they result is the disruption and ceasing of the previously accepted order of one's life. And so: "the truth is an infinite process of interrupting established ways of knowing and experiencing reality, but also of acting and giving shape to our being in common."[229] This labor of consistently introducing the consequences of an event into your life is a labor of love as love is one of the four possible ways in which this truth is possible.[230]

This love is "the labour of the one who bears witness to the occurrence of the event by introducing its consequences into her own life in a public way."[231] And so, as consequences of the event are introduced into our lives in a public way and are affirmed and named publicly, the labor of this work is declared as love, and one who loves an event in such a way is the "militant of truth." This laboring out of love though is a never-ending process, in which one must consistently stay faithful to the event which "has become an internal necessity"[232] —necessary to the individual's life and being. Vlieghe and Zamojski concede that "naturally, one can be simply immersed in such a love. However, when one acknowledges this love, when one gives it a name

(e.g. 'I love Schubert' or 'I am a mathematician'), then *falling in love with that thing becomes an event to which one can be faithful*."[233] Hence, it is that one can love an event without acknowledging it, naming it, but when they do so and give it a name, affirming the event, it is then that the love of the event is faithfully affirmed and one is a "militant of truth." Furthermore, when one affirms an event out of pure, unconditioned love—and not for some personal gain—what they are affirming is that this thing or event is, in itself, good and worthy of the time and effort of affirmation and fidelity to the event: "it can also be a pure and *unconditional* love for a thing: what one affirms, then, is that there is just something good and beautiful in the world, and that it is worth our effort. It is worthy of being studied, practiced, engaged with, just for the sake of this thing."[234]

Vlieghe and Zamojski contend that "in the case of such an unconditional love for something, there is also the necessity of sharing this love with others, and especially with the new generation."[235] When our love for a thing is this proper unconditioned love, just for the thing as it is good in and of itself, we find that we must share this love with the world. This is the point at which "the lover becomes a teacher,"[236] as one must share their love and express it to the world. The need to share our love of the event with the world is tied to our own sense of mortality as "if one is truly attached to something and deems that it is intrinsically good and worthwhile, one must try and preserve it, and hence share it with the coming generation"[237] so that this event and its significance may obtain a sort of worldly immortality, so that it may continue to impact the world long after the first lover of the event has left the world. This is the renewal of the event in the world by its being taken up by newcomers who may also learn to love the thing.

In the summation of this narrative structure Vlieghe and Zamojski are able to argue that "teaching originates in an experience of falling in love with a thing of study, and as such teaching consists in being faithful to this disruptive event. Teaching *is* essentially the labour of making this event present when working with students—i.e. making continuous attempts at turning the subject matter into something that also starts to matter for students."[238] Here teaching is understood as the labor of love that results from one faithfully falling in love with an event, and the demonstration of the importance of this event to newcomers to the world, so that they may perhaps fall in love with this thing too. I would like to expand this definition of teacher, as I find the wording of "student" in addition to "teacher" narrows our thinking to traditional or institutional forms of education. I would like to suggest that the teaching that results from this desire to see the thing we love taken up by others and achieve worldly immortality can be seen outside traditional educational settings. If we reflect on the lives and figures like Socrates, Jesus and his disciples, or more contemporarily Martin Luther King Junior, we can see that teaching and being a teacher need not be confined to a classroom or formal educational settings. Anyone who labors out of love for an event because of the goodness of the thing itself, and expresses this love publicly, *teaches*. We bring this love out into the light of the world and discuss it with friends, neighbors, anyone who will listen. This love is not only a love that can be shared, but that *must be* shared. This love though, is what Vlieghe and Zamojski call "a pure gift,"[239] as when we share it, we cannot control how it may be received or taken up by the newcomers to the world: "one leaves it to the new generation how to receive the gift and how to go on with this subject matter."[240] What is most important about this love, is that it "is fundamentally *a way of relating to the world, so that the world is disclosed in a particular way*."[241] It is the way in which we access the world, how we come to understand the world, in so far as our fidelity to the event

shapes our life and our fundamental being. This love then is a fundamental way that we establish the world. And if we earnestly take up this labor of love, we may be able to re-establish the world, where we find things that at once bring people together while honoring their individuality.

Conclusion

What has been put forward in this thesis is a possible remedy to the current malaise of the soul. My argument unfolded as follows: in the first chapter I put forward a clear articulation of love, *eros*, as seeking worldly immortality by way of the ascent of the Socratic ladder of love. By conjoining this notion of love with an understanding of the nature of the human soul drawn from *Phaedrus*, I was able to connect love and the soul, demonstrating that love is the activity of the soul. Hence, in chapter two, I shifted focus to present Hannah Arendt's notion of "the world" and its subsequent slip into worldlessness in modernity. I then diagnosed the "malaise of the soul" as stemming from the suffocating effect of worldlessness on humanity and the soul. In the third and final chapter I connected the conclusions drawn from chapters one and two to argue that love, a proper form of *eros*, can be a remedy to the malaise of the soul. Following this discussion, I engaged with Arendt's concept of *amor mundi* and, with the aid of further scholarship, examined what is at stake in this enigmatic notion of "love of the world" and how love plays an integral role in education.

My consideration of *amor mundi* and the role it, or a broader sense of love, plays in education is nowhere complete. The final thoughts of chapter three point toward the need for a larger project that delves deeply in to Arendt's scholarship in order to flesh out what might be meant by *amor mundi* and subsequently consider what this concept means for education and the world. In a future project I may begin with Arendt's *Love and Saint Augustine* in order to develop a more robust understanding of Arendt's position on love, as well as delve deeply into her essay "The Crisis in Education" and other aspects of worldlessness in *The Human Condition* in order to diagnose the effects that worldlessness has on education. This love of the world that

Arendt noted is far from being understood in its complexity, and is deserving of further care, attention, and consideration.

Furthermore, a future project may begin with, and expand upon, the love I have elucidated in this project. As I marked in the introduction to this project, one of my aims here was to provide a philosophical in-depth articulation of love upon which future scholarship considering the connection between love and education can build. I believe that I have done so through my use and analysis of Socrates' speech in *Symposium* in conjunction with my articulation of this love as the activity of the soul. My understanding of what love "truly is" has developed over many years, and owes thanks to many teachers and friends in my life who have discussed love and philosophy with me at length. In particular, my work here is informed by ancient Roman thinker Apuleius and his marvellous tale of *Cupid* and *Psyche* in his *Metamorphoses* (1989). This story was my first reading into the connection between love and soul, and although its story has not made it into the body of my work, it certainly still informed my thought and inspired me in this project.

At last, I would like to express that my undertaking of this project has been a labor of love. It is my attempt to reach out to others and the world and demonstrate to them something which I love and am passionate about. It is the start of my contribution to the world, something that I believe is worthy of attention and consideration so that it may continue in the world for newcomers to pick up and find meaning within.

Notes

[1] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 242.

[2] Shin Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship, and Citizenship," *The Review of Politics* 57, no. 3 (1995): 510.

[3] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 242.

[4] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 506-507, (italics in original).

[5] Joseph Betz, "An Introduction to the Thought of Hannah Arendt," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28, no. 3 (1992): 388.

[6] See Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, *Correspondence: 1926-1969*, ed. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, trans. Robert and Rite Kimber, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993), 264 to note Arendt's consideration of giving the title *Amor Mundi* to her foundational work *The Human Condition* to Jaspers.

[7] Betz, "Introduction to the Thought of Hannah Arendt," 389.

[8] Mario Di Paolantonio, "Wonder, Guarding Against Thoughtlessness in Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 38, no. 3 (2019): 214.

[9] Hannah Arendt, "Philosophy and Politics," *Social Research* 71, no. 3 (2004): 431.

[10] Arendt, "Philosophy and Politics," 431.

[11] Arendt, "Philosophy and Politics," 434.

[12] Plato, *Symposium*, trans. Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1998), 177a.

[13] Plato, *Symposium*, 199b.

[14] Plato, *Symposium*, 199d.

[15] Plato, *Symposium*, 199d.

[16] Plato, *Symposium*, 199e.

[17] Plato, *Symposium*, 200a, (italics in original).

[18] Plato, *Symposium*, 200d.

[19] Plato, *Symposium*, 200e.

[20] There is a second, brief, part to Socrates' questioning of Agathon, but it is more fully expounded upon within the context of Socrates' own speech, and so I will not confuse myself or the reader by offering the incomplete argument here.

[21] In this context Diotima can be understood as a mentor to Socrates, although her historical existence is often questioned by scholars. For an interesting consideration of Diotima's role in *Symposium* see Arlene Saxonhouse, "Eros and the Female in Greek Political Thought: An Interpretation of Plato's *Symposium*," *Political Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 1 (1984): 5–28.

[22] Plato, *Symposium*, 201d.

[23] Plato, *Symposium*, 201e.

[24] Plato, *Symposium*, 201e.

[25] At this point it is merely accepted that Love loves good and beautiful things. The argument for this point will be put forward later in this section.

[26] Plato, *Symposium*, 201e.

[27] Plato, *Symposium*, 202a.

[28] Plato, *Symposium*, 202b.

[29] Plato, *Symposium*, 202c.

[30] Plato, *Symposium*, 202d.

[31] Plato, *Symposium*, 202e.

[32] Plato, *Symposium*, 204e.

[33] Plato, *Symposium*, 205a. The assertion being that happiness is a good in and of itself. There is no need to argue for why people want to be happy as it is fairly self-evident.

[34] Plato, *Symposium*, 206a, (italics in original).

[35] Plato, *Symposium*, 206a.

[36] Plato, *Symposium*, 206b.

[37] Plato, *Symposium*, 206c-e.

[38] The inclusion of men *and women* here in Diotima/Socrates' speech is important in analysis of the text as this is the only speech that mentions women while all the other speeches exclusively discussed men and homosexual love. For more on this analysis see Arlene Saxonhouse, "Eros and the Female in Greek Political Thought: An Interpretation of Plato's *Symposium*," *Political Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 1 (1984): 5–28.

[39] Plato, *Symposium*, 206e.

[40] Plato, *Symposium*, 207a, (italics in original).

[41] See Plato, *Symposium*, trans. Benjamin Jowett for alternate translation. The Greek word *psyche* in the translation I am using is translated as 'mind', although it is more commonly translated as 'soul', and will be understood as such for my purposes here.

[42] Richard Foley, "The Order Question: Climbing the Ladder of Love in Plato's *Symposium*," *Ancient Philosophy* 30, no. 1 (2010): 58.

[43] Plato, *Symposium*, 210a-b.

[44] Foley, "The Order Question," 60.

[45] Plato, *Symposium*, 210b.

[46] Plato, *Symposium*, 210b-d.

[47] Foley, "The Order Question," 61.

[48] Foley, "The Order Question," 61.

[49] See Plato, "Book VII," in *Republic* trans. Allen Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 193-220 for Plato's theory of the Forms, specifically the allegory of the cave.

[50] Foley, "The Order Question," 61.

[51] Foley, "The Order Question," 61.

[52] Foley, "The Order Question," 61.

[53] Plato, *Symposium*, 210b.

[54] Plato, *Symposium*, 210c. One should note that the words "moral progress" here is translated from the original Greek *βελτίους* (*beltious*), literally meaning "better". In this case, a more direct translation may read: "make young men better".

[55] Plato, *Symposium*, 210c.

[56] Plato, *Symposium*, 210c.

[57] Foley, "The Order Question," 67.

[58] Foley, "The Order Question," 67-68.

[59] Plato, *Symposium*, 209b-c.

[60] Foley, "The Order Question," 69.

[61] Plato, *Symposium*, 177c. Although, as elucidated in section 2.1., Socrates does not consider Eros a god, Eros is still capitalized and understood as an individual being, or daemon.

[62] Plato, *Symposium*, 204c.

[63] Allen Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), xxii.

[64] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiii.

[65] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiv.

[66] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiii.

[67] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiv.

[68] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiii.

[69] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiii.

[70] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiii.

[71] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiii.

[72] Soble, *Eros, Agape, and Philia*, xxiii. For arguments that suggest that the Socratic *eros* rejects the individuality and uniqueness of the beloved see Irving Singer's *The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther* (2009).

[73] It may be noted that I have not discussed the third ancient concept of love—*philia*. *Philia,* as Soble notes "gets caught in the crakes between or among [*eros* and *agape*]" and can be thought of as "a variety of *eros*" (xxiii). Further discussion of *philia* and its potential connection to *eros* will be attended to in chapter three of this project.

[74] Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2009), 245c.

[75] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245d.

[76] Although the existence of the soul is highly contested today, when working from the assumption that the soul does exist, this soul is always thought to be immortal and attached, to some degree, to divinity. For famous depictions of the soul and its connection to both humans and divinity in the Christian tradition see, (Old Testament) Genesis 2:7, Ezekiel 18:4, (New Testament) 1 Thessalonians 5:23, and Acts 3:23 (NKJV).
[77] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245d.

[78] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245d.

[79] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245c.

[80] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245e.

[81] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245c.

[82] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246a.

[83] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246a.

[84] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246b.

[85] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246b.

[86] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 253d.

[87] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 253e.

[88] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246b. See Plato, "Book IV," in *Republic* trans. Allen Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 97-125 for the division of the tripartite soul, which is often understood in combination with this chariot analogy: (reason/charioteer, spirited/the good horse, and appetitive/the bad horse). I will not be exploring this relation as I would like to distance the Socratic arguments of *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* from Plato's political philosophy.

[89] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246b.

[90] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246c.

[91] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247b.

[92] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247b-c.

[93] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246d-e.

[94] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248a.

[95] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248a.

[96] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248a-b.

[97] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248c.

[98] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248d.

[99] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248d.

[100] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 249b.

[101] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 249b-c.

[102] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 249d.

[103] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 250d-e.

[104] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 251a-b.

[105] Ryan Brown, "The Lovers' Formation in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (2022): 20, (italics in original).

[106] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 20-21.

[107] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 29.

[108] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245b.

[109] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 24.

[110] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 24.

[111] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 24. Although the love presented in *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* differ to some extent, the important foundation that love draws us upward toward the good remains the same. Similarly, both are connected to divinity. Moreover, the fact of love in *Phaedrus* as a sort of madness, it seems to me, is derived from how it appears in the physical world between the lover and beloved, how it arises in humans, and not how Love is itself. For these reasons we will not be exploring love as madness save for beyond its connection to love as soul leading. Furthermore, readers should consider this love to be an extension to the erosic love I have defined above, and not as a separate form, type, or function of love.

[112] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 29, (italics in original).

[113] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 29.

[114] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 39.

[115] Brown, "The Lovers' Formation," 37.

[116] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 22.

[117] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7.

[118] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7.

[119] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7.

[120] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7.

[121] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7.

[122] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7.

[123] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 7, (italics in original).

[124] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 8.

[125] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 22.

[126] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 8-9.

[127] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 9.

[128] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 52.

[129] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 57.

[130] Stephanie Mackler, "And Worldlessness, Alas, Is Always a Kind of Barbarism: Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Educating in Worldless Times," *Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education* 112, no. 2 (2010): 513.

[131] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 514.

[132] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 514, (italics in original).

[133] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 55.

[134] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 55.

[135] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 56.

[136] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 50.

[137] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 52.

[138] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 28. I would like to note that the public realm corresponding to the political is not to say that the two are fully interchangeable, but simply that the realm of the political and political life exist as (central) aspects of the public.

[139] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 30.
[140] See Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 50-67 for the relation between the private realm and private property. The private realm and its stability are tied up for Arendt with private property, though exploring the political ramifications of this connection is beyond the preview of this project.

[141] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 30-31.

[142] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 32.

[143] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 57.

[144] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 57.

[145] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 24-25.

[146] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 520.

[147] It is worth noting that for the ancients speech was by far the most effective means for producing action in the public realm of politics. This can be seen in Emily Greenwood's writing, concerning Thucydides' placement of speeches in *History of the Peloponnesian War*: "At the mundane level, the presence of speeches in Thucydides' *History* reflects the fact that deliberation and debate through the contemplation and judgement of competing speeches preceded any significant action in the war" (67). Indeed, in the public realm of politics, for the Greeks, it was necessary for there always to be speech before there could be action.

[148] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 515.

[149] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 520.

[150] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 76.

[151] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 4.

[152] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 525-526.

[153] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 526.

[154] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 526.

[155] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 530n4.

[156] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 530n4.

[157] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 28.

[158] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 33.

[159] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 39.

[160] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 40.

[161] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 43.

[162] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 46.

[163] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 52-53.

[164] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 516.

[165] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 517.

[166] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 518.

[167] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 288.

[168] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 516.

[169] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 516.

[170] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 517.

[171] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 518.

[172] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 282.

[173] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 261.

[174] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 284.

[175] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 284.

[176] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 283.

[177] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 519.

[178] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 518-519.

[179] Mackler, “Worldlessness,” 519.

[180] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 300.

[181] Mackler, "Worldlessness," 519.

[182] Franco Berardi, *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy*, (Los Angeles and Cambridge: Semiotext(e), 2009), 21.

[183] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246c.

[184] Mario Di Paolantonio, "The Malaise of the Soul at Work: The Drive for Creativity, Self-Actualization, and Curiosity in Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 38, no.6 (2019): 605.

[185] This understanding of the uniqueness of individuals remaining unseen under the conditions of worldlessness is owing to my reading of Jennifer Gaffney's "Another Origin of Totalitarianism: Arendt on the Loneliness of Liberal Citizens" (2016) in which she notes: "symptomatic of the feeling of no longer belonging to a world, lonely individuals are unable to see themselves or others as who they are in their singularity" (2).

[186] See Arendt, "Irreversibility and the Power to Forgive," in *The Human Condition*, 236-243.

[187] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 236.

[188] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 237.

[189] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 238.

[190] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 240.

[191] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 241.

[192] Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 18.

[193] Arendt, *Love,* 17.

[194] Lucy Tatman, "Arendt and Augustine: More Than One Kind of Love," *Sophia* 52, no.4 (2013): 626.

[195] Tatman, "Arendt and Augustine," 626.

[196] Arendt, *Love,* 51-52.

[197] Tatman, "Arendt and Augustine," 631, (italics in original).

[198] Tatman, "Arendt and Augustine," 631.

[199] Tatman, "Arendt and Augustine," 631.

[200] Tatman, "Arendt and Augustine," 632-633.

[201] Tatman, "Arendt and Augustine," 635.

[202] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 508, (italics in original).

[203] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 508, (italics in original).

[204] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 509, (italics in original).

[205] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 509.

[206] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 507. This is a specific form of *eros* (predominantly) derived from Plato's *Symposium*, in which love is love for earthly (worldly) immortality.

[207] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 508.

[208] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 511.

[209] See Aristotle, "Book VIII," in *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs, (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Focus Publishing, 2002) for the ancient conception of *philia* and its ties to the political.

[210] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 518.

[211] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 521.

[212] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs, (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Focus Publishing, 2002), 1155a.

[213] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 523.

[214] Within this work Chiba includes a discussion of the political potential of the biblical *agape* as neighborly love. I have decided to exclude this discussion from my project as I believe it stretches beyond my purposes here concerning love as *eros*. For this discussion see Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 524-531.

[215] Chiba, "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political," 533, (italics in original).

[216] Joris Vlieghe and Piotr Zamojski, "Out of Love for Some-Thing: An Ontological Exploration of the Roots of Teaching with Arendt, Badiou and Scheler," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 53, no. 3 (2019): 518, (italics in original).

[217] Vlieghe and Zamojski, "Out of Love," 520.

[218] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 520, (italics in original).

[219] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 521.

[220] Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Education,” In *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 189.

[221] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 522.

[222] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 523, (italics in original).

[223] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 523, (italics in original).

[224] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 524.

[225] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 524.

[226] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 524.

[227] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 524.

[228] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 524.

[229] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 524.

[230] See Alain Badiou, *Being and* Event, tans. Oliver Feltham (Basingstoke: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007) for the three other possible ways: art, science, and politics.

[231] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 525.

[232] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 525.

[233] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 526, (italics in original).

[234] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 526, (italics in original).

[235] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 526.

[236] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 526.

[237] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 526.

[238] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 526, (italics in original).

[239] Vlieghe and Zamojski, “Out of Love,” 527.

[240] Vlieghe and Zamojski, "Out of Love," 527.

[241] Vlieghe and Zamojski, "Out of Love," 527, (italics in original).

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