THE OPEN CITY:

A GRAMMATOLOGY OF MIGRANT-RIGHTS MOVEMENTS AND THE LOGIC OF SOVEREIGNTY

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (SPTH) PROGRAM

YORK UNIVERSITY

TORONTO, ONTARIO

DATE: 15 AUGUST, 2022

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ABSTRACT:

In the following work I apply a grammatological method of analysis to the concomitant objects of a logic of sovereignty and migrant-rights politics. Drawing on the analytical tools of genealogy, etymology and pragmatics outlined by Jacques Derrida, I argue that a *portable grammar of emplaced possibility* generated by migrant-rights movements situated in cities (sanctuary politics in Toronto, Canada, the *sans-papier* in Paris, and Sheffield UK's "Cities of Sanctuary" movement) give rise to novel and significant changes in political discourse, generating articulations of a democracy of strangers, common right, solidarity beyond citizenship, and an unprecedented notion of freedom. Using this unorthodox method, I find that a history of Western logocentrism is constituted by an economy of translations not exclusive to its privileged subject or territorial boundary—especially involving circuits of meaning and tracing encounters with pre-Hellenic and Arabic cultures. In turn, the *traditio* or 'official tradition' of an interiorized 'West' passed down from Greece to Rome to the vernacular present is the product of a logic of sovereignty through which the repetition of questions that already imply internally homogeneous community against their 'exteriors' also generate assumptions around the author and authority of that community from Plato onward. From this vantage point, an international system of nation-states is understood to compulsively give rise to emergent technologies of border enforcement and extra-territorialization, detention, deportation and encampment. In departure from this logic, and signaling the *possibilia* of radically new institutional frameworks, attention to migrant-rights movements supports a distinct grammar of cosmopolitan democracy not yet captured by scholars, including a research project uncovering genealogies of cities as already plural and interdependent, etymologies of sanctuary, hospitality and civic refuge, and prefiguring institutions of welcome within a globalized world (in particular, parliaments of unrepresented subjects, universities as everyday critical sites of public engagement, and technological networks of vigilant anticipation of the arrival of newcomers). The amalgam of these theoretical and practical elements I refer to as *the open city*.

This work is dedicated to my partner, Lidiya Tsegaye, our dog Loki, and to all others who wander/wonder amongst infinite starlight

Acknowledgements

This work would not have been conceivable without the tireless guidance and support of my supervisor, Dr. Ratiba Hadj-Moussa, who sometimes singlehandedly shepherded it from the longest strike in Anglophone Canada's academic history to the end of a global pandemic. It would not have represented the depth proper to an interdisciplinary field without the consistent and thoughtful engagements of my committee members Drs. Harald Bauder and Jay Goulding. For having so curiously engaged with the work of this project I am so grateful. This dissertation would also not have achieved the state it currently is in without the advice of Agnes Czajka, Radhika Mongia and Cynthia Wright, all of whom remain crucial intellectual precedents (as I hope the work attests to), as well as patient and generous interlocutors.

I would also like to acknowledge the loving support of my partner, Lidiya Tsegaye—who listens to the ramblings of an obsessive with eternal patience—and the unfailing care of my family, Wanda, Emanuel, and Samantha Correia.

This work benefited greatly from the faculty and students of the Social and Political Thought Program at York University; truly the most wonderfully eccentric people I have had the pleasure to befriend. My special gratitude to Judith Hawley, a tireless Graduate Program Assistant. This work has also benefited from the institutional support and vibrant academic communities of the *Centre for Refugee Studies* and the *Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security*. I would like to extend a final, and infinite thanks (without the right, without being able to express) to the folks at the *FCJ Refugee Centre* in downtown Toronto. It is because of the collaborative work I was privileged to take part in, in this space, that an exploration of issues pertaining to migrant-rights and justice was possible.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction and Overview

In this dissertation I develop a framework, following Jacques Derrida (1997 [1967], 2002a), to uncover the conditions that underpin contemporary displacement on a global scale as a product of a historical and now globalized *logic of sovereignty*. This begins with the articulation of the ground of such a framework both critically analytical and preparatory (chapter 1), its conditions and methods (chapter 2), and the long history of its critical object (chapter 3). The *logic of sovereignty* designates the global iterability of a 'Western' political structure characterized by the separation of interiority and exteriority. It is also one that is in tension due to this characteristic iterability. Because of this, there remains an opening through which such a logic can be resisted or refused. If this critical object can be exhausted in its limitations (its enclosures, its foreclosures), then it is not merely by a *thought* but by a *politics* of migrant-rights that resists, refuses, and withdraws from it (chapter 4), which clears space for the possibility of new political institutions. In doing so, we open a point of departure upon the wholesale reconsideration of community in global and inexhaustible possibility: the *open city* (chapter 5).

The open city is not necessarily a geographical or physical space but instead relies on what I call a *portable grammar of emplaced possibility*. This refers to the ways that contemporary migrant-rights politics in cities (sanctuary politics in Toronto, Canada, the *sans-papier* in Paris, Sheffield UK's "Cities of Sanctuary" movement, and the *Comité d'Action des Sans-Statuts* [CASS] in Montréal) give rise to novel and significant changes in political discourse, generating concepts of a democracy of strangers, common rights, justice and solidarity beyond citizenship, and an unprecedented notion of freedom. These concepts are often formed under the backdrop of urban spaces, and just as often generate *texts* on what those spaces *are* or *can be*. There is no

'city' without meaning-generation. Foregrounding these particular movements opens analysis to a twofold necessity, then, to firstly reflect upon how some of the most well-documented cases demonstrate the possibility to disseminate languages of ethical and political significance as a strange, powerful, and deconstructible *locus* of concern, whilst secondly, they remain vulnerable to violent response by state and popular forces. Migrant-rights movements are distinguishable by the underlying *unavailability* of retrenchment within a formulation of static identity as its ground—there is no 'citizenship,' no 'community,' and no assertion that 'we are all…' available to such a movement, except perhaps that *we are all foreigners* (Anderson et al. 2012).

In this way, the effects of movements like the *sans papier*—ones that foreground the conditions and experiences of migrants with no structural securities to rely on from within a framework of the logic of sovereignty, but instead making a counter-claim reliant on a discourse of common rights and the very existence of marginalized people who already live, work, learn, love and take part in the communities they are part of—cannot be understood without accounting for the assumption of a radical absence, and a formulation of 'immunity' projected by a logic of sovereignty in their light. This logic asserts that "it is not possible for those marked as outside of the sovereign territory, who 'do not exist,' to initiate meaningful change to it." Yet, what should otherwise be *impossible* becomes demonstrable in its enactment. The way that the *sans papier* movement has shifted the French language seemingly 'from outside,' away from the derogatory use of the competing term '*clandestin*'—with its connotation of cynical secrecy or conspiracy—demonstrates what is marked as an 'impossible' possibility already at play. Such an action initiated 'from outside-inside' must be analyzed with great care.

Accordingly, the choice to foreground the *sans papier* movement alongside other well-documented cases within what is too easily called the 'West' also undermines its reductive

borders and challenge a declared sovereignty over representation implied in national states' projections that not only assume *normatively* but *descriptively* that such movements are 'impossible' or 'ineffectual,' by demonstrating *otherwise*. In their own ways, these movements speak to the possibility of amalgamating approaches, strategies and discourses generated *in situ* and in conversation with adjacent institutions (universities and the critical scholars attentive to their impacts in particular) for the further elaboration of wider theoretical projects whose effects cannot be easily delimited in time or space. It is not yet clear how far-reaching their effects can be. We will consider how the "Cities of Sanctuary" movement in Sheffield provides a site for reappraisal of the implications of everyday encounters beyond citizenship status, and for the generation of a minor politic of welcome that expresses them. We will consider, too, how the CASS stands in opposition to the decision of the Canadian state to deport vulnerable people, and how their responsibility is responded to in turn by supporting organizations and scholars. We will consider, finally, how urgent response to the hardships correlative to the illegalization of migration has compelled the Toronto DADT campaign to generate a framework for anonymous city-residence both as it extends to all city-dwellers in recognition of the existence of people already present within the cityscape *and* in its opening upon an administrative schema reflective of this state of affairs in tension with sovereignty.

Thus, as matters signaling the *possibilia* (Bauder 2016b, 2017) of radically new institutional frameworks, attention to migrant-rights movements supports research dedicated to uncovering genealogies of cities as already plural and interdependent, etymologies of sanctuary, hospitality and civic refuge, and prefiguring institutions of welcome within a globalized world (in particular, parliaments of unrepresented subjects, universities as sanctuaries and critical sites of public engagement, and technological networks of vigilant anticipation of the arrival of

newcomers). We might ask ourselves, *where did the strategies deployed in these movements come from* and *what influences have they drawn from* while still treating these movements as unique and unprecedented. We might also ask *where might they lead*? In an attempt to answer, the *open city* is proposed as the consolidation of a grammar that can ground novel institutional frameworks for dwelling together, in communion, in difference, and an impetus for retreatment of their historical and theoretical traces to articulate a connection between these movements with critical scholarship on citizenship that focuses on the city (Sassen 2000, 2001, 2012; Isin 2002; Balibar 2004; Nyers 2010; Anderson, Sharma and Wright 2012; Darling and Squire 2013; Bauder 2017, 2021; Darling and Bauder eds 2019). I do so by treating the 'city' as a *text* and as the conceptual ground for rethinking politics in relation to migration in dialogue with this theoretical framework. In response to the logic of sovereignty, the open city stands as a counter-institution, an *extitution*. Its 'institutionalization' is characterized by the ways it institutionalizes relations with its exterior and cultivates a structure of welcome. In this way, the open city is proposed to be neither dialectical nor non-dialectical but a problematic concerned with the fundamental question of being-together across borders and beyond citizenship against the interrogation of conditions that obfuscate this togetherness.

For this reason, we must follow two trajectories simultaneously. On one hand, the path we traverse demands that we must *respond* to a concrete situation. The open city is *first* a response to the conditions of displacement and the phenomena of expulsion and exclusion within a global system of sovereign nation-states. To comprehend this, I explore an empirico-practical line of questioning to answer for the global displacement of peoples as its observable, and yet obfuscated, basis. On the other hand, such a project rejects the presumption that this situation *dictates* our contemporary reality and constrains possibility. Accordingly, I propose a theoretico-

practical line of questioning to attend to both what is *lost* and what *remains* beyond this structure, to provide another ground from which to re-envision a global politics, its community, its practice. I draw upon practices that demonstrate a latent—secret—democratic tradition of thinking about cities founded upon unconditional ('impossible') hospitality, bearing their own contestations and hazards.[1] This tradition includes the Homeric law of hospitality, Biblical cities of refuge and traditions of urban civic freedom ("City air makes free") as sites for historicizing emergent solidarities and articulations of common rights.

Context

In this chapter, I forward a grammatological framework arising from—and in the best position to critique—the former half of this problematic, insofar as it also opens the possibility to explore the latter. The historical, conceptual and textual positioning of Jacques Derrida's work as 'post-phenomenological,' parallels a political trajectory that departs from the construction of interiority specific to Western thought (what is defined as *metaphysics*) as generalized globally through a logic of sovereignty (I focus on Edmund Husserl's 'subject' and 'world'). I move into a discussion of the encounter (Emmanuel Levinas' contributions, which lay the groundwork for a critique of this structure), culminating in a grammatological method that can both attend to this structure, and attest to the possibility of departing from it. In every instance, I attempt to draw out how this body of work is both member to a system of political decisions that render it not merely 'philosophical,' and for this reason also bears implications for—as a method of analysis—the exploration of a political problematic. Between theory and observation, between theory and practice, there is not the rigorous boundary we often assume (see: Derrida 2019).

[1] Nicole Loraux (2002, 2006) develops a similar approach that treats 'the city' as the subject of texts, utterances and reflections, whilst accounting for how the context of those utterances harken to *the city* as a physical space.

This is at least in part because a philosophical discourse allows us to capture not only what appears as observable fact, but also how its conditions and implications, often less apparent, relate to it. The fundamental question of politics arises from the encounter between strangers; those who do not yet bear a relation but navigate the question of how to communicate, how to create community. However, at present it would seem that increasingly this question is avoided. There are 89.5 million forcibly displaced people in the world today (McAuliffe, and Triandafyllidou 2021), and thus nearly 90 million times in which the fundamental question of the founding of politics does not seem to be posed at all by a planetary system of nation-state citizens. In place of a question that increasingly seems forgotten, there is the presumption of an answer that otherwise needs not be reckoned with: sovereignty, the citizen-subject, the nation-state, are such readily available answers to the question of this encounter, that they emerge within view, now, before the question can be posed. Consequently, one must excavate what seems palpably *not* to be there, to rely upon a method capable of attending to this *absence*.

The conditions that give rise to this occlusion—to the displacement of 89.5 million people—are member to a singular structure of the globalization of the nation-state, the hegemonic structure of politics manifested today, which is also the product of a certain historical genealogy of the 'West,' a lineage of thinking under the heading of sovereignty (Mongia 2018; Hall 2019; Sharma 2020). This is not an anomaly of politics but the very aspiration of the diffusion of a global logic of sovereignty. These conditions themselves are compounded by a dearth of confidence in the United Nations' (UN) three 'durable solutions,' the re-emergence of xenophobic right-wing populism, and—in the wake of Donald Trump's presidency in the United States—divestment from international institutions supporting refugees (in particular the UNHCR and UNRWA) (Cohen and van Hear 2020). However, these phenomena are themselves effects of

the global iterability of the nation-state. The 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and its 1967 protocol, for example, are powerful moral documents without enforceability, which rely on an appeal to nation-states to take on this moral and legal duty. Instead of taking on such a duty, it would seem that an increasingly xenophobic public opinion—one that is not containable to a single nation-state—coincides today with the innovations of more, not less, violently efficient technologies of territorial enforcement. Borders, deportation, illegalization and detention of migrants does not exhaust the technical operations of this violence (De Genova 2002, 2010 ed., 2013, 2017 ed.; Nyers 2003, 2006; Nyers and Rygiel eds. 2012; Bauder 2014b; Jones 2017; Walia 2020). Rather, the extra-territorialization of borders—their 'displacement' beyond the 'borderscape'[2]—entails that the fundamental question can be effectively pre-empted by nation-states' technological capacities to guard the spatial territory of national-selfhood, as if no 'other' exists (see: Pugliese 2013; Franklin 2018; Shachar 2020).

In Canada, a country that cultivates a reputation for 'welcome,' this increasingly means welcoming refugees and displaced persons. As of 2020, the Liberal government under Justin Trudeau has projected to admit a growing number of refugees, protected persons, and those appealing on humanitarian and compassionate grounds from between 43 500-68 000 persons in 2021, to 49 000-79 500 by 2023 (IRCC 2020). Still, it would seem that the question is not posed, *here*. The rationale for this increase—contributing to an overall increase in refugee admission by about 10 000 entries year-by-year—is declared to be the support that immigration offers both Canadian demographic and economic growth through entrepreneurship, education, economic donation, and labour. Not the question of a relation to-be-conceived, but the economy of a national selfhood underpins the motivation to expand immigration to Canada. Likewise, an

[2] 'Borderscape' is a term used by Rajaram and Grundy-Warr and others (2007) to denote the space of contestation, of utopian, dystopian and heterotopic visions of community situated on and around borders.

official multiculturalism discourse underpins exceptionalist notions of the ease of integration into Canadian society which accounts for Canadian identity as an 'international leader' on migration and international protection with or without a concrete basis to support such a claim (see: Mackey 1999; Trebilcock 2019). As such, it would seem that immigration is posed by the governing body of Canada as a regulatory question of national self-construction, rather than an opportunity to rethink the foundations of relationality in the encounter—'Canada' does not *change* meaningfully in light of its regulatory increases or decreases in reception of incoming migrants. How do we reconcile this as both a condition and a problem for political thought?

On one hand, the current structure of politics is predominantly that of the politic of sovereignty, a fundamental right to refuse this problematization.[3] It is intuitive enough *not* to contend with the fundamental question of such an encounter if a structure of power might remain—the decision implies that the one who decides does not relinquish control. The maintenance of a *text* of sovereignty seems to underpin a planetary system of nation-states that might conceal the radical demand to rethink in every instance the way one relates to a world in general in terms of their changing specific relations. As such, we must contend not merely with this structuring which occludes, but how it passes over into 'reality,' much like the architecture of a city is first schematized and then *takes on* the materiality of something we would say is inarguable: it *exists*. How might we attend to a language both of the construction of the text *and* its presumption of reality, of a "natural order" and its *duplicities*? The sovereign who hides in wait behind these constructions speaks twice—they *construct* and then they *assert* as if no construction had taken place, as if there is a natural order to the politic of structure. Then, it would seem easy to overlook 89.5 million times this fundamental question. Sovereignty looms as

[3] The Canadian Government increasingly relies on private sponsorship to settle refugees, for example (Macklin et al 2018; Hynie et al. 2019; Labman and Cameron eds. 2020; vol 35 no. 2 of *Refuge: Canadian Journal for Refugees*).

that which presumes the originary question to be *answered* and can thus be *circumscribed*.

However, on the other hand, the current structure of politics is threatened by the remainder of the question, a question that remains even under condition of the most violent foreclosures. At the moment that they declare ‘victory’ in the sphere of German politics, Martin Heidegger gave perhaps the most infamous declaration of his relationship with National Socialism, his rectorship address gathered under the title *Introduction to Metaphysics* (2014 [1953]), wherein he poses also the ‘fundamental question’—of metaphysics: “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” (p. 1). This question is vertiginous. Looking upon it entails in some sense gazing into an abyss from which one’s existence is threatened. But even for a philosopher bearing ties with Nazism—and the many attempts to contend with this in further scholarship (see: Wyschogrod 1985; Derrida 1989, 2020; Wolin 1992)—the question that threatens everything remains; "why do we exist rather than not exist?” The possibility that ‘we’ might not exist at all looms, an *intolerable* possibility for which the ‘stranger’ seems to be marked *a priori*; as the arrival of the non-being of being, of a community for whom there is no natural, no assured, necessity (see: Blanchot 2006; Nancy 1990, 1993, 2016; Honig 2001). A redoubled need to think this most basic question after the beginning is akin to risking the comfort of the world in its familiarity.

This is where we locate the renewed question of politics—the encounter that cannot be reduced to representatives, where a ‘self’ bears well-defined characteristics but for a stranger to disrupt them as much as becoming disruptive ‘in’ themselves. If, instead of this rupture there are a great many artifices disguised as having posed such a question *always-already*, then also this occlusion is not an annihilation. The question *remains*. Beneath the structure of a representative (sovereign, citizen or stranger), the re-presentations that maintain sovereign order and its boundaries, there is the unrepresented—perhaps unrepresentable—ground from which such a

structure arises. A formulation of the *city*, I argue, lends itself as this very site within which the encounter takes place, where the totalizing image of a 'self-same' is upended in the more real than real encounter with another, and where the insular interiority of representation must face its absent exterior. Explorations of this dynamic of the fundamental question and its occlusion are held within an ambiguous topography, the ethical ground of the question of politics, an ungrounded relational experience of disruptive difference. Under the logic of sovereignty, this fundamental encounter with difference becomes the font from which a single self is iterated *as if* the same and applies itself everywhere the 'same.' From another absent place, *elsewhere*, we find an encounter with difference *remains*, irreducible to sameness and to the 'self.'

The admittedly strange spatiality of this tension is crucial for understanding how we might think critically a logic of exclusions underlying claims of sovereignty, and how we might depart from them. As discussed in the following section, an understanding of radical possibility—one that could in theory ground an altogether different set of social arrangements and institutions—begins with the spatialization of temporality implied by a theoretical framework foregrounding the *text* as a general play of *differences*. But reliant on the text as we are, we might also find it difficult to 'excavate' a non-neutral ground for an encounter between strangers that takes place 'before' meaning. As Jacques Derrida notes, "there is no 'outside-text' [hors-texte]" (Derrida 1997 [1967], p. 158). In light of this, what we might understand by 'encounter' concerns less the undecidability of a pre-originary position and more so the *decisions* made in light of their precedent and possible meanings. For example, the *sans-papier* movement in France (discussed in chapter 4) initiated a crucial shift in the French language when the 'conventional' term for a precarious migrant before 1996 ('*clandestin*' implying one hand broken the law secretively by existing without documentation) was overtaken by *sans-papier* (one who is literally 'without

papers'). This shift *in time* becomes notable in particular because we can hold the pre-protest epithet *alongside* a novel grammar of precarity and concern. This shift is both the *result* of encounter—the public protests of migrants vulnerable to deportation—and has radiating effects for future migrants, future encounters, conditions of citizenship and resultant imaginaries.

For this reason, migration speaks to, and will remain, the radical theme upon which the possibility of politics as such is founded—whether it is acknowledged as such or not. The *decision* upon these question correspond to the *institution* of community as such—or to its abstention, its dissolution in the politic of sovereignty. Further, the persistence of human movement demonstrates that an encounter between the self and diverse strangers that invigorates the question of politics is always available. Navigating a world of strangers—of a repetition of encounter, decision, and relation—is the condition upon which politics not only emerges, but also the font from which politics as such is sustained. It is in this way that the concrete site of the city emerges as definitively the privileged textual space (*topos*) in which those who have not yet met encounter one another. Against the abstract identity of the nation and the apparatuses of state to construct national subjecthood, it is the city as member to a world beyond itself, and the city as an originary formation of concrete political community, that facilitates the interactions of subjects and motivates the fundamental question. By virtue of the harbour, the airport, the highway, the city acts as a nodal point within a world of ethical possibilities over and against the nation-state and the construction of borders (Sassen 2001 [1991]; Castells 2010 [1996]; Bauder 2021b). It is the city inside of a vastly larger *cosmos* that compels thought.

Grammatology as a Framework for Critical Citizenship and Migration Studies

Contextualizing Grammatology

If it is the case that a logic of sovereignty is effectively disseminated across the globe in various forms, where there is no place in the world *not* claimed by *a* sovereign nation-state, then there seems also no hope for articulating a response to this condition from a site outside of such a claim. The possibility to gesture toward the fundamental encounter as remnant (that which remains), and to disrupt the selfsame character of national identity, is effectively displaced alongside the displacement of peoples around the globe. But it should also be understood that such a globalization articulates a *specific* claim within the imagined topography of the world: the nation-state as the iteration of sovereignty globally is also member to a specifically 'Western' logic of imperialism and national protectionism in the order of interiority-exteriority (Correia 2021). The 'worldwidization'[4] of a specific triad of techno-capitalist, Euro-Christian and Anglo-Latin cultural formations—as well as the construction of a non-Western 'enemy' against which a 'universal community' of 'Western' thought might *auto-immunize* itself—concerned Jacques Derrida in 1996. What he called, then, a "general logic of auto-immunization" (Derrida 2002a, p. 80) establishes the character for a set of practical and intellectual postures that do not require a subject bearing any specific traits, even though their *manner* is indicative of a specific structure of linguistic, socio-cultural, political and economic thought. The nation-state is a decidedly Western logocentric construct. Its globalization entails that it can be displaced in a way that strengthens its reach beyond the self-described limits of the 'West' (see further: Hall 2019).

A critical response to this state of affairs must account both for how the globalization of the nation-state is possible—that is, how critique might uncover its conditions of possibility—as

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[4] This term is an unwieldy attempt to translate the French "mundialization" as it arises in the writings of Jacques Derrida (see: Derrida 2002a, 2002e; Li 2007).

well as how those conditions themselves demonstrate a betrayal of the logic of sovereignty—its admissions to the existence of some *excess* beyond itself, an 'other' *inside* its privileged space, even in attempt to erase them. Thus, our analysis begins with a method that *attends to textual authorizations*—both authority and author—through which an activity of *structuring* authorizes the right to *decide* the boundary between interior and exterior. But it also reveals the complex workings of an *economy* regulating the play between interior-exterior. Such an analysis bears real stakes; the decision upon textual authority underlies the globalization of displacement in tandem with the nation-state. It is for this reason that I rely on a grammatological framework, which can maintain this dynamic of conditional possibility and its disruption. It is also one that articulates a possibility latent within the erasures of this economy; traces of an absent *otherwise* and *elsewhere*. If we are not capable of radically transcending this state of affairs (that there is no view from nowhere), we should not also lose hope that a gesture made *inside* toward a radical *outside* is impossible. Such a gesture is directed not only toward some 'other,' but also to a different *world,* elsewhere. Or, if we lament that such a gesture is impossible, then "it is necessary to do the impossible. If there is hospitality, the impossible must be done" (Derrida 2000, p. 14).

From this vantage point flows a critical science that foregrounds the "possibility of possibility" as its object—what is most commonly explored in the variegated discipline of phenomenology from which Derrida's grammatology was largely derived. Such a science would attend to an encounter made impossible, but also the conditions that *de-authorize it*, *not* its descriptive, but its prescriptive impossibility. Understandably, the decision to foreground such a discussion as one that draws on a 'grammatology' may be deemed suspect. How do we respond to the real violence faced by migrants through bordering technologies and practices, or enforced

by states under the heading of a 'sovereign right?' One answer is that a field of view that contends exclusively with 'real' conditions of the dissemination of *non-real* constructs (the logic of sovereignty as an *aspiration* of order, rather than order itself) also forecloses the possibility to think outside of them as an entirely different, but no less concrete, project of political emancipation. I contend that grammatology is a framework pertinent for critical analysis of migration and its obstructions insofar as it observes a diffuse and generalizable logic of sovereignty in the iterable reference to borders, territories, subjects and laws as *textual elements* rather than bolstering their 'real existence' even in their use of technical violence.

The diffusion of the logic of sovereignty as a text is member to a political economy that demands we attend to it, not narrowly as a discourse, but in the widest sense possible. In Derrida's words, "*there is no 'outside-text'*" (Derrida 1997 [1967], p. 158). The text is often a point of contention, and grammatology is too often treated as a form of linguistic philosophizing. However, grammatology is not merely a linguistic philosophy. The depth of its field must not be narrowed, as the *text* is not reducible to either semantic or syntactical object. On the contrary, a grammatology foregrounds an ethical compulsion to consider what remains absent as marked in a text broadly defined, a responsibility to the other banished by authority, the other who does *not* appear in view. The 'object' of a grammatology operates through such an *absence*, its 'sign' posited as a *trace*, and thus its terms redefined beyond the scope of linguistics. The text, then, is the site of a *decision*—a decision to efface the other in the desire to-make-self-present, as well as the failure to do so. What I am calling the *text* speaks to a politic of decision on the boundary between presence and absence which cannot be closed. It is in this way that a critical appraisal of sovereignty that foregrounds the real displacement of peoples benefits most from a grammatological framework. Such a framework observes how a logic of sovereignty wants-to-

speak itself into existence (in Derrida's words, of a *vouloir-dire*, the 'wanting-to-say' of *meaning* as the desire for self-presence [see: Derrida 2011 [1967]). But we will attend to this desire from a vantage of uncompromising refusal. In all cases, the logic of sovereignty remains *possible*, but in its actualization—in its embeddedness in a myriad of institutions and texts organized around the 'West'—it remains *merely one possibility haunted by an excess of others*.[5]

Thus, a grammatological method opens a practice of reading that follows a double-movement in the texts it analyzes. Firstly, the discreteness of a text—as a 'unit'—is determined only by its relation to others, through *difference*. The 'borders' of texts are traced by the repetition of signs within an economy that presents declaratively their interior *as* interior, and what they exclude *as* exterior. Secondly, an attempt to conceptualize the interiority of the text puts into play *within* what is declaratively 'without.' The other is necessary for the text—even the sovereign text which keeps vigil over its interior—as one that is marked for exclusion, or as if it does not exist. Within the tradition of Western metaphysics interiority becomes both necessary and self-defeating, maintained by the simultaneous declaration to be without 'other' from an absolute singular origin alongside the descriptive admission of that excluded 'other.'

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[5] This expansive ground has yet to be realized in current scholarship, at least in part because the conception of a 'method' of deconstruction more so than the framework of grammatology has heretofore been predominant in post-Derridean literature (see, for example: Culler 1982; Norris 1983; Royle 2000; McQuillan 2007; Lüdemann 2014; Gasché 2016). In contrast to the ubiquitous use of 'deconstruction,' grammatology has been constrained as a theory and method exclusively amenable to 'writing about writing,' specific mainly to print and book cultures. Juliet Fleming's (2016) recent proposal of a framework of 'cultural graphology' explores the possibilities opened specifically by a Derridean grammatology for book history. Otherwise, commentary upon the possibilities of grammatology itself are supplanted by two trajectories of scholarship, either those that focus on Derrida's work directly (see: Cunningham 2015), or apply it to writing systems (see: Rizza 2014; Ertürk 2014; Zhong 2019).

Certainly, such a method which has produced new and incisive readings, but deconstruction is too often posed as the entirety of a project of which it comprises only a part. Derrida himself seemed reluctant to subsume his work under the heading of 'deconstruction,' which was offered only within a narrow context of scholarship. He notes "When I chose this word, or when it imposed itself upon me—I think it was in *Of Grammatology*—I little thought it would be credited with such a central role in the discourse that interested me at the time. Among other things I wished to translate and adapt to my own ends the Heideggerian words *Destruktion* or *Abbau*. Both words signified in this context an operation bearing on the *structure* or traditional *architecture* of the fundamental concepts of ontology or of Western metaphysics" (Derrida 2008, pp. 1-2, italics in original). 'Deconstruction' was proposed to attend to a specific object that had arisen as part of a wider study.

This is where the very choice of terms 'grammato-logos' is placed in Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (1997 [1967]). It would seem that *grammē* and *logos* both refer to the same thing, the 'word.' Nonetheless, a science of the *grammē*, the written or abstracted 'word-unit,' is distinguished from the 'word' of *logos* because the latter bears a declared relation to the voice, or *phonē*, which gives it 'life.' Focus on the historical debasement of writing as secondary to speech, Derrida terms the tradition of *writings* (texts) that praise the spoken word as a 'living' and 'self-present' truth against the 'parasitic,' 'deathly' or 'supplementary' practice of writing 'Western logocentrism.' But he also finds that speech—even as a posited element—is member to a structure of *difference* that relies upon writing as its doppelganger. Importantly, the language-communities that comprise a 'tradition' of the West, because of their phonetic-linguistic bases—that the meaning of terms is derived from vocal sounds, rather than direct representation of objects in the world (like ideographic writing)—are also beholden to the need to situate their thought within a system of truth that erases the space between phonic locution and linguistic reference. The overt and declarative 'function' of grammatology as a study of writing is not a science of the study of *books*, then, but rather a practice of observing *this* differential structuring and its infinitely deferred satisfaction, what he calls arche-writing, the economy of *différance* (Derrida 1997 [1967], 1984 [1972]).

Derrida continues that the phonological languages that organize the 'West,' and their privileging of the 'living voice,' convey the *desire* for Being-as-presence. They posit a truth that is self-evidently present in the same way as the living subject who utters it. However, such a desire ultimately attests to its own *lack.* The privileging of speech which *desires* to present an immediate truth is also undone by the fact that, were such a truth already *to be*, it would be compelled by no such desire in the first place. What exists in the absence of truth is the

possibility of asserting a differential structure of hierarchicalized dualities, the borders of which constitute the 'West' itself (human vs nature, self vs other, speech vs writing). Even in the self-presence of the voice of a speaker, an utterance is bound to a differential structure of signification wherein it is understood—and, whether posited or negated, how it is judged—as *being-not-others*; the claim is *traced*, its borders drawn so as to distinguish itself from others. But because of this, the traced-sign is also *haunted* by what it is not *but remains possible to be*. There remains an *absent trace* of another. Accordingly, all communication begins to look like the 'accursed' structure of (arche-)writing haunting the 'living voice.'

Western logocentrism has direct implications for thinking about migration, sovereignty, and the city in contention with the state. In proposing a *grammatology*, I draw attention to a logic in which the borders between terms are made possible through a politic that orders an 'inside' through the banishment of an 'outside.' A grammatology of sovereignty bears before itself the iterable logic of an interior banishing its exterior which demands it puts even a subsequently generated 'empirical reality' into question. It is also one that articulates a possibility latent within such a 'structure's' erasures; traces of an absent *otherwise* and *elsewhere*. Keeping the possibility of possibility in view, I recount in the following section the movements from phenomenological to post-phenomenological possibility. This is to establish a thought of the 'subject' and their 'world' illustrative of a metaphysics of presence, so as to ground a critical grammatological project attentive to their unraveling, paralleled in nation-states, citizens and their traceable borders. Such a movement is directed *from the interiorization to the exteriorization of possibility*, from presence to absence.

This takes place in three stages. The first is the Husserlian moment characterized by a final attempt in European modernity to theorize the 'Ego Cogito' of Descartes as a transcendental

subjectivity. The second is the Levinasian moment, in which the clear delineation of the 'self' and their world as the 'Same' is ruptured by the face-to-face encounter with another (Levinas 2011 [1961], 2016 [1981]). The third is the Derridean moment, in which the borders of the subject continues to disincorporate, not only because of a fundamental vulnerability of the self to the other, but furthermore, because of the forms of estrangement brought about by a language that is not 'one's own.'[6] For our purposes, these considerations are the point of departure for further exploration of political formations within a globalized world in the following chapters.

Globalization and Possibility: From Phenomenology to Post-Phenomenology

Possibility, Self and World

As a science, phenomenology distinguishes itself by focusing on the relation between a subject and the world. Its founding thinker, Edmund Husserl, presented phenomenology as a *logos*—a science or rigorous body of thought—of *phainomena*—appearances translated into experience—to capture how structures of thought can be extracted from the ways in which a subject encounters their world. The notion of a 'world' emerges as that privileged space of the 'I' of phenomenology as the space within which one asserts a sovereign structure of the Same, defined as *metaphysics* (Levinas 2011 [1961]; Derrida 1997 [1967]). The world is always, in this way, 'for-me.' That is, the world that a phenomenological subject encounters is conditioned by how such an encounter speaks less to the constitution of the world itself, and instead demonstrates that the world is conditioned by the subject. The world is discovered to be a framework of *noema* (the object of subjective intentionality) and *noesis* (the lawlike structures that condition thought, perception, memory, etc.) (Husserl 2002 [1911], 2017 [1913]).

[6] Derrida, like Levinas, took Husserl's phenomenology as a key point of departure (see: Derrida 1978 [1967], 2003 [1990], 2011 [1967]).

In proposing to consider the movement from phenomenology to a post-phenomenological grammatology, we are also asking after the globalization of the 'world': what is a 'world' and why might we insist that it is global? The world, today, seems specifically characterized by processes of technological, economic, and cultural integration into a single structure of otherwise disparate localities and regions. As such, the 'world,' having reached a global scale, is decidedly outside of the control of any particular subject. Nevertheless, the globalized world retains its character as 'for-me' insofar as, firstly, the 'seeming' of these characteristic processes of globalization are presented to us as subjects by organizing our lived experiences. In this way, even processes of differential globalization, the maintenance of global structures of inequality (see: Wallerstein 2004; Appadurai 1990; Sassen 1998, 2001; Balibar 2004; Bauman 2013 [1998]), speak to a singularizing process that subsumes different experiences within itself. The difference of experience and the sameness by which this difference is brought under a single heading speak to this phenomenological perspective. Secondly, the globalized world remains a matter of *decision* by which subjects affirm or reject the existence of certain of these processes as meaningfully conditioning their experience in general—and their articulations of self—which bears two further implications; that the desire or capacity to *identify* ones existence within a globalized world, even if *negated*—the unwillingness to recognize one's part in a globalized world does not render that world 'non-global' but it does impact the world-as-globe; and that globalization itself remains a contingent process and the actualization of one possibility amongst others, *demonstrated by* the existence of global inequality and violence.

This second rendering of the question of decision, how our subjective responses to globalization entail a responsibility to expound its *specific* character, is exceptionally important. One might ask of a contemporary interpretation of the globalization of the world, is the world,

for example, a *globe* or a *cosmos*? The decision upon this question is, in a sense, *undecidable* (Derrida 2002a, 2005c). Globalization—the globalization of 'my' world—is not inevitable and bears no necessary characteristics. This undecidability in which a phenomenon demands a form of response on the part of a subject is a condition of open possibility that extends to globalization as it does to any feature of the world. This is so even if the tensions between these two poles—the globe, the *cosmos*—make *demands*, imply *investments*, and forces one to forego one for the other. This, Derrida (1993, 2002a) terms an *aporia*—the undecidable condition of decision, and it will remain undecidable insofar as the justification of one or the other decision is only available after the decision has been made, even once it has been made. One world haunts the other. It is also the site, then, of a *responsibility*—does one respond to one possibility or another?

The answer to this question is not a 'given,' but it would seem that the decision has been made: an age of globalization is one that relinquishes the question of the *cosmos* for the more finite 'planetary world'—of 'worldwidization' (*mondialisation*). This is the achievement of an expansive appropriation of the planetary globe under the political structure of a Western paradigm expressed by the nation-state as representative of a logic of sovereignty. We should be as clear as possible what it is that we may have forfeited. The world of globalization also entails the enumeration of a finite set of possibilities dictated by its structure, and by the practical iteration of a logic of sovereignty grounded in the concrete formation of the nation-state on a planetary scale. What has been *foreclosed* in the dynamics of such a decision is difficult to say. However, insofar as cosmopolitanism exists, the declaration of this totality is incomplete, even if this does not preclude such a declaration from organizing extant possibilities into ready-made categories of possible against impossible.

In *Migration Borders Freedom* (2017), Harald Bauder draws upon Ernst Bloch to elaborate

the notion of *possibilia* as a concrete project of migration freedom that institutes a space to think through open and no borders movements. He notes that *possibilia* is distinguishable from 'utopia' insofar as it constitutes a wholesale negation of existing social and spatial relations in order to assert an entirely separate social order. *Possibilia* is marked by *difference* from the current structure of the world. Such a concept effectively *actualizes* the other-worldly possibilities that haunt a logic of sovereignty—ones otherwise deemed 'unimaginable,' which the sovereign negates or absents. Yet, *possibilia* is also a temporal concept that authorizes the possibility of an alternative future. In this sense, it bridges a current state of affairs and an otherwise impossible future, marking 'impossibly' the place of a radically different world.

But *possibilia* also retains in secret a collection of conditions that its very existence speaks to insofar as it bridges a dialectical play between possibility and actuality *as possibility and impossibility* within an age of globalization. In advance of the concept, I argue that these further resonances can be drawn out through a reading that begins with Edmund Husserl. That is, we can propose the spatialization of possibility alongside a spatialization of time, no longer reliant on the distinction between 'present' and 'future,' but as a relation maintained (for the moment) within the world of a phenomenological subject. Alongside Bauder's conception of *possibilia* in which a *future* becomes *thinkable* even though it does not yet exist, Husserl's works initiate a displacement of the privileged space of *reality as presence* which marks *possibilia* as unimaginable. We've said that Husserl's subject is one for whom their world is rendered as 'for-me.' He proposes the 'transcendental ego,' as one for whom the world exists as a privileged structure of the Same. But further, what comprises the most apparent and concrete elements of a sensible reality, for Husserl, *themselves* must be bracketed to place this reality in non-hierarchical and equitable relations with an infinity of *real* possibilities—of many composite

subjects *in the process of traversing their worlds*. Although he places emphasis on intentionality (where the *appearance* or presence of objects in the world as *noema* prompts the extrapolation of principles characterizing the subject), intentionality is possible insofar as *other* real states of affairs are also 'thinkable.' What is 'present' has no more precedent than what is 'possible' *if the possible is also thinkable*. Not only a 'future' possibility but concrete reality is a self-presenting presence of potentially infinite interior *topoi* (Husserl 2017 [1913]).

This conceptualization spatializes a temporal concept like *possibilia* insofar as possibility can be argued as equally present as the current state of affairs at the same time—possibility haunts actuality, and both present and future are held within the same topography of possibilities. I *can think* just as easily a world in which migration is not structured by the distinction between legality and illegality as I can that it is. I can *think* a world radically without borders and the practical conditions to be met in order to bring them into existence as much as I can think the concrete violence of borders, detention and deportation. This is because, as Bauder notes, "the term "real," in this context, does not refer to the actual world in which we live, but rather a possible world that is not reducible to particular aspects, such as specific political systems" (p. 59). In his exploration, 'actuality' takes on the only attenuated marker of a modal difference between 'real' and 'possible,' or 'real' and 'not real'—the 'actual world' is one amongst an infinite multiplicity of equally possible, equally *real* worlds, in proximity to what is currently imaginable. In a similar way, Husserl (1982 [1960]) relies on a topography of the transcendental ego as a *non-finite* subject-world, where *exploration of the world* is metonymically entangled to an *exploration of the self*.

Because this self is under condition of consistent *flux*—where new intentional objects are attended to by matrices of new phenomenological states—Husserl finds that the extraction of

structurally stable principles for the ego to be essentially incomplete. This is further exacerbated by the fundamental condition of possibility, which demands that both the transcendental ego and their world are interpreted as *modalities* in varying states of possibility, rather than in hierarchical order between a dominant actuality and subordinate possibilities (Husserl 1982 [1960], pp. 45-46). Because the transcendental ego makes room for the non-totalizing introduction of new objects to which its intentionality is directed and new horizons of intentionality themselves as possibilities, Husserl finds in the notion of 'horizon' a powerful analogue for thinking a determinate structure of consciousness which must also make room for indeterminateness. A horizon bears certain features that bind it universally to all horizons as such. O*ne walks and the horizon is bound also to change*—it is *bound* or tied to its world, but it is also *bound* in transit from what constitutes its position within a *topos* wider than its own vision.

Accounting for this, the institution of a principle of the ego is tantamount to rendering as a lawlike principle the fact of indeterminacy in relation to determination. Husserl notes, "constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego, a pure possibility variant of my *de facto* ego" (p. 71). This entails, even within the interior space of the ego and their world, that they are conditioned by a form of exteriority inside of themselves. This further demands that the ego is expressed not only in terms of their horizon, but in light of the inconceivable number of possible horizons it *can be*: "The universal *a priori* pertaining to a transcendental ego as such is an eidetic form, which contains an infinity of forms, an infinity of *a priori* types of actualities and potentialities of life, along with the objects constitutable in a life as objects actually existing. But in a unitarily possible ego." (p. 74). What is called the 'transcendental ego,' becomes the humble marker for this determinate

infinity that cannot refer to the totality of what it is meant to designate.

This expression of *possibilia* opens for us the ability to re-spatialize a manner of thinking about possibility not merely as an as-yet unachieved future, but a topography of modalities of the subject's world. No doubt there are actualized possibilities too intimately present to be ignored, and also unrealized possibilities more closely connected to a present actuality within the world's *topos* than others—what Bauder refers to as "contingent possibilities" (Bauder 2017, p. 59, 60-63). The process of globalization—of a specific globalization of the political economy of nation-states and the logic of sovereignty as a Western text iterated worldwide—is undeniably more 'present' to the subject than other horizons. And yet, innumerable other possibilities haunt this state of affairs *as if* from outside, but already inside. The contingent possibility of open borders, and the radical *possibilia* of a no borders world are both marked as '*is-not*,' but they *are marked*, in some way, that makes them indexable possibilities. For this reason, although we might propose a Husserlian language that will at least help to organize an interior topography of multiple possibilities, we are still not sure what might overcome the separation between possibility and actuality. It is not yet clear how the boundaries between these possibilities might be ruptured by the interior existence of outside elements, of only possible worlds with real implications for an 'actual' world of globalization. Is the world of our revised understanding of *possibilia* 'purely' subjective, and furthermore, exclusively 'mine?'

Levinas and Disruptive Alterity

Emmanuel Levinas outlines the primacy of ethics—"ethics as first philosophy"—in which the totality of the transcendental subject-world experiences just such a disruption. Departing from Husserl, he notes a rupture of the transcendental ego as a total structure of the Same, where

the Same does not denote that two things are identical or equivalent (where I=I) but refers to a process of appropriation of the exterior of a subject's world as fundamental to their self-making and sense-making. Levinas finds a need to refuse this process that holds two beings within an interior landscape, through which their negation, conflict and sublation (*aufheben*) is a process of the interiority of 'History' as much as of the indexical order of the phenomenological subject. This process operates in parallel to Husserl's phenomenological subject, the "I," who holds even the *topos* of their world within themself. In this way, from the critique of phenomenology as an exemplar of a metaphysical violence toward the exterior, Levinas also finds in the very activity of philosophy, the entirety of a 'Western' tradition, a tradition of violence against its 'outside.'

Even the notion of *disclosure*—an experience of discovery in which one presumes to be presented with that which is new and therefore 'other'—seems to be an act of sublation of another through the assertion of 'knowledge.' It is in the sense of fixing that which is exterior within a world-structure (of the Same) that allows this other to be knowable in the first place:

> The identification of the same in the I is not produced as a monotonous tautology: "I am I." The originality of identification, irreducible to the A is A formalism, would thus escape attention. It is not to be fixed by reflecting on the abstract representation of self by self; it is necessary to begin with the concrete relationship between an I and a world. But the true and primordial relation between them, and that in which the I is revealed precisely as pre-eminently the same, is produced as a *sojourn* [*séjour*] in the world. The way of the I against the "other" of the world consists in *sojourning*, in *identifying oneself* by existing here *at home with oneself* [*chez soi*]. (Levinas 2011 [1961], p. 37, italics added)

This 'sojourn' of the "I" finding itself as reflected in their world—in their dwelling place where they are comfortable and familiar already—is a fiction that flattens the otherwise irreconcilable *exteriority* of the other, when the other *emerges* within the "I's" field-of-view. In contrast, Levinas posits the Other to be the one who escapes such appropriative restriction even when they come into view. The Other, for Levinas, is not only 'other' to the 'self' or the "I," but is, in fact,

Other to Being itself, inappropriably outside of the world of being (Levinas 2016 [1981]).[7]

Levinas distinguishes between infinity and totality as a distinction between the self and their world as a structure of the Same, posed against the infinite exteriority of the Other. Thus, he effectively repositions the notion of infinity *outside* of Husserl's transcendental subject. For Husserl (1982 [1960]), this problem between self and other is only broached such that 'others' are reintroduced into the world of the self, as iterations on the unitary totality of the ego: as monads. From inside of Husserl's transcendental ego he posits the existence of the other as interior to the world of that ego, as an intentional object, but further as a presumed reflection of its own structure, as pure possibility outside of itself in the same way it is possible inside; all other egos are, outside of oneself, the Same. In contrast, Levinas identifies the face-to-face encounter with the Other as the disruption of interiority fundamentally, the introduction of an Other-exteriority inappropriable by this structure; not an exteriority of possible selves, but of the Other as such, whose 'structure' remains unknowable for the ego within their self-same world.

What we might extrapolate from this exploration of the wholly Other is twofold. First, we must contextualize what is called "ethics as first philosophy." On the one hand, Ethics arises as an implication of the disparity between totality and infinity. Insofar as the structure of the Same is organized around the known and knowable, it need not pose itself the question of ethics, nor any question. It does not place itself in question even if it is *in flux*. In fact, *flux* is rendered familiar through its maintenance exclusively inside—the receptacle of the transcendental ego proposed by Husserl. Consequently, an *ethos* within which all further structures exist—politics, law, economics, culture—as 'institutions,' *do not change when they change*, from the vantage

[7] Levinas' typology of otherness is complex, relying on at least four technical instances of 'other' in a French idiom: *autre/Autre*, *autrui/Autrui*. This has plagued translators for some time, who often collapse these distinctions into a twofold division between other and Other (see: Lingis's introduction to Levinas 2011 [1961]; Bernasconi 2019).

point of the structure of the Same, but become part of its totality through the appropriative process. On the other hand, the encounter between the 'selfsame' and Levinas' Other is *compelled* by a desire to attend to the Other as such, and thus places itself in question *at the beginning of thought*. Insofar as this desire *compels* one to think for the other, it also compels the 'thinking Self' (*cogito*) as such to begin thinking. In the distance between myself (my world) and You, I find an insuperable lack, and thus a need to be once again in communion, to become unsettled, not to dwell alone but together. In the desire for communion, to be able to call and respond (responsibility) I reach toward you in the possibility that we may communicate.

Second, this dynamic maintains the possibility of revisiting the fundamental question of politics as the encounter between two as a possibility that is always open; it remains both always available and a project of maintaining openness. The face-to-face encounter also contributes to our understanding of *possibilia* insofar as it situates Bauder's claim that, "*possibilia* projects an open future that does not rely on an existing blueprint. Rather, *possibilia* is based on conditions and practices that do not yet exist and that we cannot yet imagine with today's concepts and ways of making sense of the world" (Bauder 2017, p. 60). Tt does so primarily by putting into question the political economy that precedes it; the encounter is less an 'event' of note for the subject than it is the event of a disruption of their familiarity with themselves. Such a questioning that remains possible even from within what was presumed a 'transcendental' subject risks the stable and fixed structure comprised of already-elaborated and knowable beings (for example, as citizens and foreigners). Asserting that one can meaningfully oppose an appropriative totality with a robust and uncompromising infinite responsibility toward the other puts into practice the possibility of collapse as its institution; of a responsibility to maintain the opening.

But the re-appropriative possibility between interiority and exteriority does not yet subside

in recognizing ethics as first philosophy nor the disruptive possibility marked by the remains of the encounter. Language—what we have called and will explore further as arche-writing—stands as the ambiguous monument for the question of ethics as the *topos* (place) of all activity insofar as it opens the indecisive ground for these two entangled possibilities: a language is *both* the totalizing *and* the open communicative possibility (Buber 1996 [1923]). The difference is found between a classificatory regime and the desire to speak-with another. It is, then, the difference between a grammar predicated on the *nominative/instrumental* or the *vocative* case. The former outlines a descriptive presumption of the structure of a language: that language is fundamentally the product of a single being categorizing their world, that the substance of language is comprised of signs that name their referents. The latter finds that, at the site where language itself exists and at the moment one is said to be speaking a language, they are already 'speaking-with,' already addressing another; that language is fundamentally the situation of the Self in relation to another, as dialogue. The combination of these characteristics is called the text.

So, too, *possibilia* marks the possibility for concrete conditions to give rise to a world entirely different from them and the concomitant political action *bound to* it as a disruption of presence, a topography in which the other has to be attended to in an age of globalization. It marks the disruption of sovereign authority over the dividing line between possibility and impossibility, presence and absence, exemplified in the bare possibility of the face-to-face encounter. But Levinas' Other is not yet an expression of the wholly otherwise that *possibilia* is *because it has not complicated the porous boundaries that constitute the 'self' in opposition to an 'other.'* Helpful but not yet reaching the extent of a radical need, the other is rendered as *another person* who disrupts the field of view of the self. They are not yet the introduction of an active being contributing to a *world between two*. What of this other world? As a future that is

not-yet, this *otherwise* demands the exploration of institutions of migratory justice through which the one who arrives is radically *inside and outside*. Expanding the notion of *possibilia*, we might attempt to *think the outside* in order to allow for the deconstructive possibility of change in light of the trace of the other, the non-representability of a world that haunts this one.

Derrida and the Question of a World To-Come (A-Venir)

Husserl's phenomenology foregrounds the relationship between a subject—rendered transcendental through the act of reduction—and the world, which follows after them. From this starting point, he draws out a meaningful topography of a subject *in flux*, the horizon of which is a potentially infinite interiority, he proposes is also a *transcendental ego*. This ego gathers the immanent subject within an infinite *topos* of other possible egos. He then attempts, from this point, to extrapolate the existence of others as other self-contained transcendental egos, *monads*, of whom one might infer are comparable to oneself in these ways—the possibility of *flux* contained within an interior, and potentially infinite, *topos*. Levinas' response to this is to introduce the non-inferential Other—of whom not only can 'I' *not* imply bears certain selfsame qualities as myself, but further, whose existence disrupts my comfortable interiority, my familiarity in the structure of the Same, through the face-to-face encounter. For this reason, Levinas also displaces the interiority of 'infinity.' His subject is not merely subject to spontaneous internal change. Instead, he replaces infinity outside of this subject, within the realm of the non-Being of the Other, beyond 'my' world. The subject, then, is subject to an infinite *responsibility* toward the other as another subject.

Yet, both seem to encounter a problem when we consider the fundamental question of the encounter itself. Both Husserl and Levinas' phenomenologies maintain the internal

singularization of a subject; in the former, the transcendental ego and immanent expressions of possible subjecthood, and in the latter the subject of responsibility for an infinitely unknowable other. However, it is not a subject themselves, but the *encounter* which becomes constitutive of both subject and other, and thus there must be some framework in which *both* might be conceptualized together, within a world of their negotiated construction, and the possibilities irreducible to their singular intentions. Not only this, but it is also the entanglement of self and other—the otherness inhering within the Husserlian self *in flux*, the disruptive excess of alterity for Levinas—that provides the opening for self-articulation. It is the opening of the *question* rather than what consists of its answer that maintains the dynamism of thought, whether prompted spontaneously by the interior self-world relation, or externally as responsibility in a self-other relation. There is, in a sense, an outside to the outside when accounting for the encounter. Exteriority accounts for the traces of another otherness, an otherwise and elsewhere.

We might move toward a Derridean account of the text as a trace, one that not only delineates but draws the connecting thread between presence an absent possibility not-yet delineated, which most closely parallels *possibilia*. In his first essay on Levinas, “Violence and Metaphysics” (in Derrida 1978 [1967]), Derrida prepares a reading of Levinas’ work through which he can express admiration for a problematic they seem to share in common, while attending to a multiplicity of issues that arise along the way. A new problematic emerges where the ambiguity of a relation to the other retains the need for their interpellation into ‘my’ world (to *appear* as an object in ‘my’ field of view), something already recognized as a violence, but is also the basis of (non-violent) relation of hospitality. Foremost in an encounter with another, one is most likely to *ask them their name*, through which both ethical recognition and a dynamic of power are established. Thus, a ‘pure’ movement toward the exteriority of the Levinasian Other,

which would not only disrupt the interiority of the subject but would also threaten their capacity to relate, looks apocalyptically like the end of all relation as such, to a deathly non-responsiveness or pure immobility; *aporetically* responsibility and irresponsibility are intertwined. Further, a structure of existence remains necessary for the *practice* of any meaningful ethical position. Ethics requires a politic *as* its practice. Yet, politics relies on an ontology of recognizing otherness, something that Levinas rejects given that the *polis* seems a structure of power [*archia*] *over* the Other. He reasserts instead the importance of responsibility.

A relation to non-Being—to the Levinasian Other in their radical alterity from myself and my selfsame world—seems like a non-relation and the end of relatability. In departure from this problem, Derrida (2008b [1995]) explores the radical indeterminacy of a relation to the radically unknowable other that aporetically fluctuates between responsibility and irresponsibility. This begins with the seemingly circular phrase "Every other (one) is every (bit) other" ["Tout autre est tout autre"] (p. 82), and moves toward the Gospel of Matthew, describing an asymmetrical relationship between God and humanity: "But when thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth: That thine alms may be in secret: *and thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall reward thee openly*" (Matthew 6:3-4, italics added). The ethical imperative to which this passage attests seems to reverse the assumption that greater presence and closer proximity over absence and distance (the face-to-face encounter), should also positively correlate to greater responsibility toward the other. Derrida expands responsibility into a sphere of indecision by presenting the one for whom a sacrifice is made as radically unknowable—God, who is not present but absent, not reducible to traits (traces) of a knowable being but who "sees you in secret." The other is estranged doubly. They cannot be interpreted narrowly as another person, a humanistic interpretability that Levinas ultimately accepts (see: Levinas 2003 [1972]).

The other might be *any* other if they are radically unknowable.

This problematic seems doubly insurmountable as the 'wholly unknowable other' also exists *within* the subject of responsibility. Derrida notes that, as in the account of Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac, Abraham's silence on the trek up Mount Moriah indicates that he is unsure of his own actions, he is unable to respond. Because God is radically unknowable, Abraham holds a secret inside himself which is also outside of himself—he does not know what he holds inside, the imperative demanded by God to commit infanticide. But further, he argues, "Because… he does not speak, Abraham transgresses the ethical order… the highest expression of the ethical is in terms of what binds us to our own and to our fellows (that can be the family but also the actual community of friends or the nation). By keeping secret, Abraham betrays ethics" (Derrida 2008b [1995], p. 60). Abraham is unresponsive in two registers; he does not speak, and he does not abide by the interdict not to kill (one's own children). His actions are inscrutable to those closest to him, and so he is presented as decisively *irresponsible*.

Abraham has traded one ethic for an other-ethic: "Abraham's decision is absolutely responsible because it answers for itself before the absolute other. Paradoxically it is also irresponsible because it is guided neither by reason nor by an ethics justifiable before men or before the law of some universal tribunal." (Derrida 2008b [1995], p. 78). An other-ethic—Abraham's unresponsiveness *here* seems also to coincide with his decision to take up an inscrutable ethic *elsewhere* (somehow in his 'heart-of-hearts' but also in a relation radically outside of his community). Such a decision ruptures a logic whereby it becomes intuitive to extend priority toward more immediate others—as family, friends, fellows, compatriots (see: Nussbaum, Cohen ed. 1996; D. Miller 2005). In objection to this, an indecisive principle of radical alterity remains: "every other is wholly other." But the other-person (in a Levinasian

sense) does not capture the *altogether* other which also gives rise to radically other others: to this other-ethic, an other-world, an other-text.

Thus, departing from the other-person, we continue to find other others. What we confront is the play between an *economy* of sacrifice—one that operates by a predictable regulatory logic (*nomos*) of the interiority of an ethical order (the dwelling, the *oikos*)—in relation to an *aneconomy* of self-sacrificial responsibility and the deferment of reward instructive for a problematic of absence and possibility—*possibilia*. On the one hand, an ethical *order* bears an internal logic that need only be *justified* within the circular interiority of its ordering. It can remain morally pure, based on its own decisive structure, if it *sacrifices the correct other*; the one who is estranged rather than familiar, outside of the structure of the Same:

> The smooth functioning of a society, the monotonous complacency of its discourses on morality, politics, and the law, and the exercise of its rights (whether public, private, national or international), are in no way impaired by the fact that… that same "society" puts to death or… allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children (those neighbors or fellow humans that ethics or the discourse of the rights of man refer to) without any moral or legal tribunal ever being considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself. Not only is it true that such a society participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually organizes it. The smooth functioning of its economic, political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral discourse and good conscience presupposes the permanent operation of this sacrifice. And such a sacrifice is not even invisible, for from time to time television shows us, while keeping them at a distance, a series of intolerable images, and a few voices are raised to bring it all to our attention. But those images and voices are completely powerless to induce the slightest effective change in the situation, to assign the least responsibility, to furnish anything more than a convenient alibi. (Derrida 2008b [1995], pp. 85-86)

It is *this* society for whom an act of self-sacrifice—of one's most intimate loved-ones—becomes inscrutable; the society whereby an economy of sacrifice is justified only as sacrifice of *foreign* others rather than *intimate* ones, as an *alibi*. In contrast, an *aneconomy* of responsibility looks like both *death* and a *gift*—it is not *taken* but *given*, it does not preserve life but relinquishes it:

> It is finally in renouncing life, the life of his son that one has every reason to think is as precious as his own, that Abraham gains or wins. He risks winning; more precisely, having renounced winning, expecting neither response nor recompense, expecting nothing that can be given back to him, nothing that will come back to him… It is given back to him because he renounced calculation. Demystifiers of this superior or sovereign calculation that consists in no more calculating might say that he played his cards well. Through the law of the father economy reappropriates the aneconomy of the gift as a gift of life or, what amounts to the same thing, a gift of death. (Derrida 2008b [1995], p. 96)

From an encounter with radical alterity, an aneconomic gift—without recompense, expectation, calculation, or reciprocation, and thus illogically—brings this exterior back into the economy of the selfsame. Importantly, this *encounter* is unconditional, through which God, as radically 'other,' for whom there exists no preceding framework of understanding, also becomes the most demanding incitement of responsibility from *outside* of the ethical order. In this way, the 'other' of an encounter is neither 'citizen' nor 'non-citizen' and neither 'host' nor 'guest' but the introduction of a 'secret' of interpersonal responsibility—the entrance of aneconomic possibility *as responsibility* too intimate to reappropriate by the economy of an ethical order. The importance of the secret *as* a secret is its indeterminacy *inside*, as the sheltering of what is decidedly and inappropriably *outside*, and from which meaningful action must follow.

There is a passage, then, between the interiority of Husserlian phenomenology—and even the Levinasian exteriority that (re-)organizes the subject of responsibility from outside in—that we bear witness to in the movement to a Derridean post-phenomenology critical for understanding the open city in opposition to a globalized logic of sovereignty, as *possibilia*. Simply put, *possibilia* outgrows the interior. Conceptualizations of horizon, infinity, encounter, which emerge in a context relating to the phenomenological subject have been crucial, but that subject and *their* world seems to miss something; possibility is a text that attests to what is beyond it, marks *inside* its economy what is *aneconomic* and *exterior*. This is because the *text*—

having left behind the phenomenological subject—must be redefined as an economy of *différance*, difference and deferral (Derrida 1997 [1967], p. 22), which *already* includes one's responsibility toward even radical others. It is the trace that delineates, *but also connects*, different beings. But further, it is because the text (of *arche-writing*) stands as a passage or *hinge* [brisure] connecting presence and absence, that it announces the possibility of possibility prepared for critical appraisal of the globalization of a logic of sovereignty.

Possibility is the Text

The text, the product of an arche-writing, is an economy of difference that exists beyond the subject, while also organizing the conditions of their possibility, their interiority. This is rendered dramatically in the phrase, "I only have one language; it is not mine" (Derrida 1998, p. 1). I exist meaningfully because of a process of meaning; I exist possibly because of what conditions my possibility. Speaking to the radical detachment of a system of language, Derrida notes, "From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs. Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign at the very moment when… its exigency is recognized in the absoluteness of its right." (Derrida 1997 [1967], p. 50). Rather that a reality we inhabit, we are member to the differential structure of signs whose system of reference is detached from the things they intend to refer to. Rather than a substantive Being, we inhabit a linguistic system predicated on form. The differential system of signs is the system of an addition of non-real components to reality, but thus also to the replacement of that reality, to both a trace which delineates (which separates the presence of one world from others), and the trace which binds a free-floating language to some absent trace of the substance from which it is abstracted.

The text, then, is not a substance capable of re-grounding our understanding of the world

and reality. Rather, it is the site of entangled temporalities as matters within an ethical *topos* of possibility that traces itself in relation to what is outside of itself. Because of this, the *text*, and not the subject, is the site from which *possibilia* may be reconsidered in its infinite extension. This is to say that the text is not the same as the 'book,' and further that the text should not be presumed to invoke a purely linguistic practice (Derrida 1997 [1967]). Instead, it is the name for the site of possibility granted a concrete materiality (it renders sensible, thinkable, meaningful what it adds itself to and departs from), and the outlining of a plethora of trajectories of which actuality is only one. In this way, the text will always operate as an *institution*, but not one that exclusively delineates and organizes an inner space. It institutes a *call* and a *response* to what is outside of itself. It is a lighthouse, not a household; it is a radiating star more than a planet bound an insuperable gravity. For this reason, the text marks the place of a certain kind of event variously termed death, the encounter of the other, the uncanny, absence, trace, and it continues to be viewed as dangerous, parasitic, supplementary. What is present within the text is a signpost to something outside of itself—its significations are references to an elsewhere.

The text that gains authority from the immediate presence of its truth—the text of law, commandment, constitution, the decisions of a judge, the legislations and the governance of the state—effaces its own mediation which is the mediation of all texts as such, of texts *as* mediation and the medium of the text. It substitutes itself for its referent. The text of the sovereign presumes the existence of the citizen's presence in its world as its privileged subject, and the sovereign as the structuring of presence. Because the text is a *topos*, of possibility, this too—the possibility of the assertion of a singular authority, the possibility of declaring an insurmountable delimiting of interior from exterior, the possibility of a structuring of the Same as the politic of sovereignty—is available. However, because the text is what it is, one can always bear such a

witness to its frailty. The declaration is *possible* as much as it remains *deconstructible*.

The presence of sovereignty—a globalized politic today— demands that we must also attend to the possibility of hospitality, the ever-present existence of the 'impossible' question of the encounter as entangled within a frayed fabric woven (Latin, *textili* from *texere*, where the 'web' is a *textus*) so as to be marked by what is *declared to be*, what is *described* and what is *left unsaid*—between presence, possibility and absence (impossibility). The text itself holds these things together—it traces, it *binds*—as much as it constitutes one or another in relation or non-relation—it traces, it *delineates*. A tradition of hospitality—though marginal—exists *at all times*, in all tenses, within a *topos* over which a logic of sovereignty dominates, the secret tradition beneath a unitary presence, often noticeable only by the trace of a fleeting encounter.

Our work is to demonstrate how the city, as a text, is the space for this encounter, the instituting not of a collection of facts within a singular structure, but the instance of such a possibility for exteriority. This is not merely metaphorical nor metonymic. The city as a concrete site is a text. Within the 'history' of 'Western logocentrism,' its 'tradition,' its assertions or declarations, its authorities, decisions, violences, the city-text stands *both* as the originating point from which the logic of sovereignty emerges and maintains many of its strongest declaratory claims (its textual authorizations), and where sovereignty is essentially threatened to be unmasked as a shadow. We must also outline *this* history, from the apotheosis of a *thematization* of the city—the *polis* the *civitas* (Isin 2002)—which strays from an other-city, against the setting of this thematization which conditions its possibility and maintains the equal possibility of an 'otherwise'; a *cosmo-politan* possibility that inheres within the city as the text.[8]

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[8] In chapters 4 and 5, this opens a *portable grammar of emplaced possibility* in migrant-rights movements.

Elaborating the Grammatology

Preceding this, however, we must be able to place the text within its own field, from the position of its own science, a task we've already begun. Rather than finding the interiority of selfsame subjectivity, we've found *an economy of difference*. This difference is, in one sense, a separation—the text signifies what is absent, its addition to lived experience renders meaningful a substance it also replaces. This is because writing lends itself to an economy of the trace, the play of différance. This is, on one hand, because writing, not merely scribbling signs on paper (which would be a *graphical* activity and not a *grammatical* activity), is *historically* characterized through this play, which also excludes it from the body of genuine language; the *Grammatology* (1997 [1967]) itself is a study of this exteriorization of writing, a "maleficent technique" and a violent foreign presence, from Plato's *Phaedrus* to Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralist linguistics. It is also, on the other hand, the way in which this apprehensive declaration that writing is invasive, parasitic, and a corrupting external influence on the moral purity of spoken language that opens the possibility of the play of *différance*, and to name arche-writing: "Writing as the intrusion of an artful technique, a forced entry of a totally original sort, an archetypal violence: eruption of the outside within the inside, breaching into the interiority of the soul, the living self-presence of the soul within the true logos, the help that speech lends to itself" (Derrida 1997 [1967], p. 34).

What Saussure describes of writing, what Plato already identifies as an evil from without, is the obsessive need to excise writing from the body of language, as that which merely 'represents' a true (phonic) presence.[9] The phonological foundation of Western thought—

[9] References are found as early as the second chapter, where Saussure states, "Our ability to identify elements of linguistic structure is what makes it possible for dictionaries and grammars to give us a faithful representation of a language. A language is a repository of sound patterns, and writing is their tangible form" (Saussure 2009 [1916], p.

particularly that *writing* is intended to mimic *speech* through the designation of grammatical units *as* vocal sounds, the written alphabet a representation of a spoken language—attempts to authorize the notion of fixed reference (that a 'sign' points to a concrete 'reality' outside of itself) with that of the *locutor* of reference (where the voice grounds this reality). This phonocentrism underlies what Derrida terms a *logocentrism* specific to the notion of the 'West' as a particular construction upon 'truth,' what he terms the 'metaphysics of presence.' Representation of the *phonē* of a speaking subject grants *authority* to the *logos* as the authoritative scene of truth. However, Derrida finds that this primal scene is disrupted by the fundamental structure of speech, and of language generally, which is more definitively a *writing* than an act of vocal expression—that which is 'debased' rather than 'praised. There is something curious about Saussure's characterizations of writing and speech. In the sixth chapter of the *Course in General Linguistics* (2011 [1916]), writing is deemed both a representation and a usurpation of the spoken word. However, his thesis on the relationship between vocalic and spoken words (*parole*, speech) and the structure of language in general (*langue*, language) motivates the position that one can meaningfully separate speech from language in order to study the latter as a structure on its own. *Langue*, as an abstract structure of signification—one predicated on the *differences* between signifiers rather than their relation to signifieds—seems already to be re-presented by *parole*, what is earlier described of the accursed writing.

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15). However, mention of writing not only as secondary but *deficient* intensify throughout the work: "A language is a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence comparable to writing, the deaf-and-dumb alphabet, symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on. It is simply the most important of such systems" (ibid.). In introduction to the sixth chapter, Saussure claims, "Although writing is in itself not part of the internal system of the language, it is impossible to ignore this way in which the language is constantly represented. We must be aware of its utility, its defects and its dangers" (ibid, p. 24) What is this danger Saussure references? Soon after, he mentions, "A language and its written form constitute two separate systems of signs. The sole reason for the existence of the latter is to represent the former. The object of study in linguistics is not a combination of the written word and the spoken word. The spoken word alone constitutes that object. But the written word is so intimately connected with the spoken word it represents that it manages to usurp the principal role" (Saussure 2009 [1916], pp. 24-25).

This derisory definition given to writing seems to be the condition of possibility for all language and all communication as such. The text, and its component parts (*grammē*, *grammata*, units) are defined, in their radical separation to a ground, and thus their *iterability*. A 'text' is not merely linguistic but any extant thing that may bear the *mark* of a possible communication (its *communicability*). For this reason, it must also be generalizable, neither bound to a subject of utterance and their voice, nor to a specific content. The word "tree" might be repeatable in a multitude of contexts by numerous 'authors,' whether speaking, writing or otherwise. As such, Derrida draws out the unaddressed tenuousness of notions of 'subject' and 'intent' in relation to all forms of communication, themselves asserted to be central also to its very possibility—where signification is mapped onto a framework of communication that takes place between a sender and receiver of signs. Instead, iterability as the condition of communication continues to operate in light of the death of both sender and receiver (Derrida 1988).[10]

Accordingly, rather than attempt a moral 'rehabilitation' of writing, Derrida finds in the characteristics of representation, difference, supplementarity, exteriority—which he describes in the trace and its economy—a sort of anti-foundation for a science. This science would no longer be merely about writing in the vulgar sense of graphical presence but of arche-writing which seems to replace the foundations of an interiorized Western logocentrism and historical ethnocentrism, with *difference*. He locates grammatology as a 'science' of writing as follows:

> It is not a question of rehabilitating writing in the narrow sense, nor of reversing the order of dependence when it is evident… I would wish rather to suggest that the alleged derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, was possible only on one condition: that the "original," "natural," etc. language had never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a writing. An arche-writing… which I

[10] For this reason, many communications technologies become important sites for the analysis of miscommunication as a proper possibility of communication; letters and postcards remain legible when delivered to the wrong address, telephone conversations take place between subjects unaware that they are speaking with an unintended interlocutor, and increasingly, can be recorded and preserved.

> continue to call writing only because it essentially communicates with the vulgar concept of writing. The latter could not have imposed itself historically except by the dissimulation of the arche-writing, by the desire for a speech displacing its other and its double and working to reduce its difference. If I persist in calling that difference writing, it is because, within the work of historical repression, writing was, by its situation, destined to signify the most formidable difference. It threatened the desire for the living speech from the closest proximity, it breached living speech from within and from the very beginning. (Derrida 1997 [1967], pp. 56-57)

Writing, not speech (even if speech is also separated from the body of language as the voice from the idea) is the name that marks a radical separation through which all heretofore language, communication, experience, all that is grouped under the structure of Being-as-Presence, is made possible. All that *appears* (the *phainomenon* itself) appears through the translational activity of a language that is separate and supplementary to what it intends to represent 'in the beginning'; presence becomes the presence of the sign, but the sign marks the *absence* of what it represents—as a supplement. Arche-writing, the new heading for all language, is *supplementary*, both an addition and replacement of that which it is added to. Just what it is added to remains a mystery insofar as the text of this arche-writing renders this 'thing' legible through this additive replacement; the best it can do is duplicate and reflect.

Thus, we are prepared to respond to phenomenology, in this way, by asserting the supplementary structure of language which must be added to an experience—as an *imprint* or *impression* that *reflects* an unknown (pre-)origin—to make such an experience understandable. The very proximity that thinking shares with its own sense must pass through this process (Derrida 1997 [1967], pp. 23-24). A differential structure of meaning, arche-writing, is more originary even than the most intimate sensible or intelligible experiences, which themselves are *rendered sensible or intelligible with the addition of signs*. This does not mean that one confronts radically the impossibility of any relation to the world beyond themselves. Rather, it is because

these aneconomic pre-impressions are *illegible* before they enter the economy of difference, that the entire 'structure' of language projects an origin. But this 'origin' is no longer singular and originary, as it is the site of a separation—a *scission* or cut—through which a de-cision produces a constellation of dualisms that cannot be settled. The *de-cision* which collapses the structure of difference into a play of the Same against its exterior, is made on this indecisive ground, this anti-foundation from which there already exists *two* not one, and an economy in which elements are *in play*. The decision is not settled but haunted by its other: "One realizes that what was chased off limits, the wandering outcast of linguistics, has indeed never ceased to haunt language as its primary and most intimate possibility" (Derrida 1997 [1967], p. 43).

This problematic does not also cease from infiltrating the 'world' which exists—as in Husserl's phenomenology—as member to a transcendental or metaphysical interiority, an interiority defined by decision and the effacement of difference. What Derrida calls the *instituted trace* entails that the world of lived experience is the expression of an economy of meaning:

> It should be recognized that it is in the specific zone of this imprint and this trace, in the temporalization of a lived experience which is neither in the world nor in "another world," which is not more sonorous than luminous, not more in time than in space, that differences appear among the elements or rather produce them, make them emerge as such and constitute the texts, the chains, and the systems of traces…The unheard difference between the appearing and the appearance [l'apparaissant et l'apparaitre] (between the "world" and "lived experience") is the condition of all other differences, of all other traces, and it is already a trace… The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. (Derrida 1997 [1967], p. 65)

The fact that the trace becomes necessary for any sensibility of the world at all, as its condition of possibility, entails that the reality of the world does not collapse the question of difference, but entails the haunting of one 'world' by another. This is not exclusive to phenomenology but qualifies the entire history of a Western metaphysics that presents its 'worlds' within a structure

of arche-writing while also aspiring toward the living self-presence of speech, effacing an originary difference for an asserted Sameness:

> If the trace, arche-phenomenon of "memory," which must be thought before the opposition of nature and culture, animality and humanity, etc., belongs to the very movement of signification, then signification is *a priori* written, whether inscribed or not, in one form or another, in a "sensible" and "spatial" element that is called "exterior." Arche-writing… is the opening of the first exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living to its other and of an inside to an outside: spacing… The presence-absence of the trace, which one should not even call its ambiguity but rather its play (for the word "ambiguity" requires the logic of presence, even when it begins to disobey that logic), carries in itself the problems of the letter and the spirit, of body and soul, and of all the problems whose primary affinity I have recalled. All dualisms… are the unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was compelled to strive toward the reduction of the trace. (Derrida 1997 [1967], pp. 70-71)

All attempts at positive construction of the world within this tradition of Western logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence must negate another that haunts them, to reduce the trace which leads outside of themselves that are equally possible. All such systems predicated on an effaced difference are made possible by the existence of the trace which opens the space for *both* elements even under condition that one is decided upon over and against its (absented) other.

Therefore, the key aspects of a grammatological framework focus on how the desire to fix the notion of ‘presence’ through phonological signification organizes a Western logocentrism that declares itself as totalizing—where a ‘world’ of identifiably Western characteristics of a logic of sovereignty aspires to be global—whilst descriptively admitting an other necessary for its delineation. Because of this, they attempt to appropriate (interpellate) the other as a negative element, as threatening, invasive, parasitic—as exterior-interior. Thus, a metaphysics of presence is a *political* activity of decision, of the way that representation operates upon the border that demarcates the inside from the outside as presence or absence. Nevertheless, the texts grouped within this tradition are members of an economy of arche-writing, of the play of *différance*.

What seems both to ground, and to 'unground,' the metaphysics of presence is its expression from within a wider sphere of arche-writing which speaks to a *desire* and a *lack* of what it aspires to. First, language as the play of *différance* operates not structurally but *iterably*. All grammatical units—*grammē*—invoke the possibility of both their ability to become part of the structuring of a text and in their dismantling and repurposing elsewhere, as an economy of the general circulation of grammatical units. Second, this iterability, and the economy of language as a play of differences, traces that which is *absent* from the scene of reference in the *desire* to ground meaning. The trace operates *as a trace*, when (because) it is necessary to *represent* what is *absent.* Thus, *the trace institutes the possibility of possibility*, *possibilia*, where what is consistently marked as 'absent' and 'impossible' corresponds to just this political decision and its logic undermined by its own conditions of possibility.

Dissemination

I have attempted to elaborate the framework of a grammatology in itself, in view of questions of possibility and the globalization of the logic of sovereignty. This was motivated, originally, by a two-fold problematic that places in tandem the question of a fundamental encounter, and its occlusion by a globalized Western logocentrism organized around the iteration of the unit of the nation-state. I would like, to conclude this preliminary chapter, to turn to two key features drawn out of a grammatology that will be of particular importance for what is to follow; dissemination and institution. I have said that, in place of the stable notion of 'structure,' we have found at the most fundamental level a play of differences more accurately described as an economy. This *economy of the trace* (of delineation and binding grammatical elements) entails that relations between 'signs' must continue to circulate if they are to project the

comfortable presence of what they are supposed to represent—they are temporal and temporary as textual elements. This does not entail that a 'structure' may not rise and remain, but that scholarship must attend to how it is maintained as embedded within and exterior set of conditions that delineate it. What I call *re-presentation* entails that the text is re-iterated in order to be sustained—it is repeated. But because of this, it is possible to iterate differently—to be substituted. Representation, particularly in light of a logic of sovereignty, *attempts to constrain significatory difference through the 'pure' representation of the Same*. Through repetitive iteration the text is effaced—its character as a text is dissolved into a 'pure' analog for what it represents, as if it existed as a pure equality (I=I) to what it represents.

But the trace's iterability—whether repetitive, substitutive or some admixture of both—implies further consequences. What Derrida (1981a) terms *dissemination* is the fact that the *grammē*, the unit of language, can be radically displaced. Dissemination captures this displacement in three registers. First, dissemination refers, etymologically, to the scattering of seeds. Within the metaphorical scene of agricultural production, dissemination evokes the image of a farmer who disperses seeds in a field, some of which taking root and others withering. Second, dissemination calls into question the '*seme*' or the kernel of meaning (where, for example, semantics is the discipline concerned with linguistic meaning). *Dis*semination speaks to a process whereby the decontextualization of terms renders them incomprehensible, ultimately doing the same to the world itself: "“The casting aside of being defines itself and literally (im)prints itself in dissemination, as dissemination” (Derrida 1981a, p. 216).

Third, dissemination is critically juxtaposed with the metaphorical system whereby a metaphysics of presence connects what it deems 'good' with the masculine-centric language of procreation of a 'singular origin'—a lineage traced to the father. For example, scholars today

refer to ‘seminal’ works and thinkers in their field as those who have given rise to further study, an act of *genesis*, the very fact of which seems a demonstration of iterability itself—of the repetition of a term outside of its ‘own’ context but meaningful as metaphor. Thus, dissemination again calls into question the uncomplicated and uncritical reference to meaning as a decision, a politic, and often a violence toward a neglected other—in this case as a matter of origin:

> A difference: the cause is radically that. It is not a positive difference, nor is it one included within the subject. It is what the subject is essentially lacking; numerical multiplicity does not sneak up like a death threat upon a germ cell previously one with itself. On the contrary, it serves as a pathbreaker for “the” seed, which therefore produces (itself) and advances only in the plural. It is a singular plural, which no single origin will ever have preceded… The primal insemination is a dissemination. A trace, a graft whose trace has been lost. Derrida 1981a, p. 304)

It is the dissemination of texts, traces and terms in play from which we might establish a site for resistance to the metaphysics of presence, a structure of the Same. One observes this in the economy of traces that move within and between texts, as a rigorous form of textual analysis.

To do so, we should understand that the establishment of boundaries, of the interior divisions or classifications—and the borders—of the ‘West,’ do not themselves assure what constitutes rigor. Such boundary-work also does not extend only to those texts marked as ‘political.’ In what might be the most unexpected of places, Derrida finds the dissemination of a logic of the ‘parasitic’—the ‘para-site,’ the one that is somehow *within* the privileged space of the text, and yet is *marked out, for banishment*. He finds, for example, in J.L. Austin’s speech act theory, a division that cannot rigorously hold between ‘real’ and ‘parasitic’ speech acts; the former being reserved for the privileged category of speech acts that, as ‘exemplars,’ illustrate what Austin ‘intends’ by a speech act, the latter seemingly presenting problems for this theory. Austin says, “A performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a

similar manner to any and every utterance—a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways—intelligibly—used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use—ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language" (Austin 1962, p. 22). In this way, what 'parasitic' speech acts 'do' is nothing. They are 'workless,' *they don't 'work.'* But this is a limited interpretation. In this example, the speech act made by an actor during a performance does not 'do nothing,' it does something; in fact, not only does the act blend with the 'scene' of a play, it also performatively recalls, and also prefigures, what 'real' speech acts *look like* outside of itself—it cannot be sterilized, displaced, or 'auto-immunized' against. That is to say, it remains in some sense a 'para-site,' but in the sense that such an act cannot be 'purely' localized. It becomes a member to the dissemination of the act in question in general, its *iterability*.

This negation of the other of 'real' speech (acts) bears consequences. The language itself, of the 'parasitic,' is evocative insofar as the very term cannot be contained within a single genre. This 'parasitic' discourse presents a model of the 'exemplary' ideal through the negation of other examples on the grounds of ordering them into included or excluded categories, as posited or negated elements. This is so *even though both are, in fact, described*—one to be *declared* exemplary, and thus a privileged member of the interior, the other to be *declared* parasitic, authorizing its banishment at the very moment that *both* are interior members to a text. If this logic is understood—if it is understandable—it is because it already relates to similar such discourses of which Austin does not need to specifically refer; the logic of a reordering sanitization, separating elements that belong from those that don't, is readily understandable to his readership. It would seem that Austin's use is 'intended' to be 'purely' expository within a well-defined genre of 'linguistic philosophy.' And yet, he *describes* an act of *political decision*

which is not incomparable to that of contemporaneous forms of deportation, and a discursive regime that will mark bodies as themselves ‘parasitic’—whose very existence is already ‘wrong’ being at the ‘wrong’ site, and thus ‘essentially’ damaging, not ‘real’ because they are ‘in the wrong place’—so as to be *deportable* (De Genova 2002). He does so *not* in commentary upon migration politics—or of any politic of demographic organization and marginalization—but in a seemingly further removed milieu of philosophy, *outside* its privileged realm.

In this way, dissemination speaks to the wandering of traces no longer held within the interiority of a structure, but part of a general economy of the trace—even when interiority, boundaries, borders *are its theme*. This is so for three reasons. First, the economy of the trace places what is interior, always, in relation to what is exterior from it—a relation that decides upon the division between the two, and a division that allows for the interior to be *demarcated as interior* through its liminal framing. The interior becomes what it is through its distinction from its outside, what it is not. Second, the deferral of stability in this arrangement demands, in contradiction to the intension of the interior, that the relationship constituted in this way—through demarcation—is perpetuated by play, here defined as the circulation of signs as interior or exterior. If a boundary is asserted as such through distinction, it is maintained by virtue of the passage of signs across the boundary between what is inside and what is outside. Finally, rather than a new *topos* of interiority’ at play, the exterior, the outside, is not constituted. The outside is not only that which is negated but is that which remains undifferentiated and thus incapable of grounding a territory of the inside.

Institution, Extitution

We have proposed to account for a shift in terminology, from the structure of signs to the

economy of the trace, such that we might account for the 'essence' of language as the iterability of the grammatical unit, as well as attendant forms of dissemination. Language seems to operate *without* the specificity of context—a stable site of presence—but by a differential structure that produces a text. As such, we've discussed both the possibility for representation to supplement the loss of an essential relation to the world and the fact that the trace marks a rupture in the text that demonstrates the loss of this essential relation. Language seems to be an economy of play, of the multifarious forms of difference that take place, as well as those that don't, such that what is traced in the necessity for self-delineation marks the introduction of an 'other' in the text and the radical possibility of an otherwise that haunts 'presence.' This takes on the most ubiquitous form when one considers what Derrida terms 'Western logocentrism,' the continuous reinvocation of the scene of speech as the grounding of reference—both in terms of the 'truth' of the content of that speech and in the invocation of a self-present speaker 'hearing-themselves-speak,' the voice of the subject. Further, it would seem, the 'West' *itself* is that very notion which constitutes 'representation' as the continual declaration of limits, even when its own 'frontiers' expand toward a planetary world, a world of globalization (see chapter 3). This remains *possible* as a matter of textuality and yet it is *undone* by it, a rupture that underlies presence as arche-writing.

We have already accounted for how a certain authoritative structuring of politics as a privileged interiority—the logic of sovereignty—repetitively declares its 'structure' in order to reassert the tracing of its privileged limits *as if* they were fixed. That is, instead of difference, the logic of sovereignty aspires to overcome the precarity of an economy of the trace by reducing iteration to repetition, foreclosing the possibility of difference by the violent restatement of the Same. Rather than the language of structure, I propose that *institution* captures this iterative disseminatory process insofar as it marks the place of a relatively durable 'interior' space—on

that remains recognizable even in light of an economy of iterability—and also organizes diffuse traces in proximity to one another. We might consider this shift as well—from 'structure' and its presumptions of presence, to 'institution,' because we can then render this notion in light of its polysemic instantiation of the very question of interiority. Is the institution that which gathers things inside itself? Or is the institution that which, itself, is inside of something else?

Sociological scholarship has generally captured a formulation of both aspects of institutions, whilst privileging the former. Émile Durkheim (2013 [1895]) defined 'the institution' in terms of the ways they concretize values and behaviours amongst a relatively static collectivity (p. 15). Institutions, for Durkheim, are *outside* of individuals as they are the product of encounters, negotiations and 'crystallizations,' but they hold individuals within themselves—institutions are posited without 'outsides' definitively. In a similar way, Talcott Parsons (2005 [1951], 1966 [1937]) defined a practice of institutionalization as embedding normative status and social order into (the structure of) social action.[11] Nevertheless, institutions are also decidedly more nebulous than their structural counterparts. Although an organization may be considered a simple pair with the notion of an institution or as a system of organizations within a particular 'sphere' (Walzer 1983), an 'institution' might also refer to the amorphous boundaries of a language as foundational to societies (Searle 1995).

Anthony Giddens' (1984) theory of 'structuration' paradoxically helps us best to replace the question of concrete institutions within an economy of the trace. He offers two explanations for a notion of 'institution' that operate *like* structure—insofar as it entails a certain durability of repetition, that the trace might be repeated as the of iteration of the Same—but does not presume

[11] This has been carried also into discussion about refugee resettlement as the institutionalization of principles, techniques and practices within the interior of a political order and creating predictable outcomes. This remains even when what is 'instituted' is the condition of precarity (see: Goldring et al 2009; Parada et al 2020).

to aspire toward totalization. He notes, “Structure refers, in social analysis, to the structuring properties allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space which lend them ‘systemic’ form… The most deeply embedded structural properties, implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities, I call *structural principles*. Those practices which have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities can be referred to as *institutions*.” (Giddens 1984, p. 17). Institutions as durable features of a society’s structure lend it force.

Giddens continues, “The most important aspects of structure are rules and resources recursively involved in institutions. Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life. In speaking of the structural properties of social systems I mean their institutionalized features, giving ‘solidity’ across time and space” (ibid, p. 24). In this way, the institution operates as a *site* for the iteration of elements (of rules) that will constitute what is referred to as a ‘structure.’ But there is no way to understand which ‘rules’ might exist within a society outside of their institutionalization. Giddens proposes a notion of ‘structural principles’ to denote these rules but they cannot exist without the site that binds them to something more concrete. The ‘rules’ denoted have no bearing unless embedded within this site—what we have been calling the text, the institution (and the city)—to authorize their iterations. If iteration takes place as a matter of repetition, constraining difference, then it is working ‘properly’ because it signifies durability. In so doing, institution gives structure to structure.

Beyond this, one must abstract from the institution what sort of ‘totality’ it belongs to. Giddens captures also that the institution is itself embedded within a wider structure, but understanding that it is their institutionalization that gives them reality, then reference to structure is tautological: the institution grounds a rule that structures a social ‘totality,’ and yet

that totality is asserted to provide the 'background' for the practice of institutionalization. Unless what constitutes the 'rule' exists as member to a sphere of possibility—unless it bears an origin and a pre-history—the rule is inarticulable before it is institutionalized. Rather than a structural totality the institution is member to an economy that plays at re-instituting this pre-institutional origin—of the circulation and iteration of traces. This is in particular because their fixedness is not achieved *a priori*. Prior to institutionalization, a trace is subject to diffuse iteration, to *dissemination* (Derrida 1981a). That traces might be institutionalized entails that they are—and the institution is—regulated by an economy that seems fixed, but only in reference to what exceeds them. In this way, the term itself, 'institution,' seems particularly apt; the Latin etymology of *in-stituĕre* derives from *statuere* and, bearing a similar root to the *statue*, constitutes an image (representation) embedded within a place *(topos)*. The institution *can* admit to its outside because it is finite and concrete, situated within a space wider than itself. It further institutes a finite gathering of possibilities as the fact of its institution. That is, what we are concerned with here is a *verb* and not a *noun* of institution. The practice of institution allows for the enumeration of possibilities as *institutable possibilities*. Here, institution is the foundation of a theory of *possibilia*; the presence of possibility as instituted in the space of a text of contemporaneous past-present-future (its topography) opens onto radical possibility.

Nevertheless, we must make room for, and keep vigilant watch over, an understanding of the boundary-work of institution, even theoretically. The 'reality' of the institution is formed by a structuring matrix of descriptive and declarative traces in relation to inclusive and exclusive markers—as we've noted of the diminution of writing, and the logic of the 'parasite.' If a trace is declaratively included, it takes the primary place of the structure of that institution. If a trace is declaratively excluded, it is marked for banishment from that institution, admitted into the

descriptive space of the text so as to be deemed 'other.' If a trace is descriptively included, it is member to the general structure of the text as a compilation of traces, a latent possibility. If a trace is descriptively excluded, it is not marked but remains absent. It's emergence in view of the institution will likely be deemed 'impossible' at the very moment of its appearance if it appears at all. Often these categories are not mutually exclusive but entangled. Particularly, the declarative-excluded appears as an other to the text, their very presence deemed 'impossible' and as such declaratively excluded at the moment they are descriptively included.

Furthermore, although we have focused on the binding of presence and futurity as a re-spatialization of possibility, reference to the 'past' also must be accounted for. Particularly, the institution of *history*—and particularly history as reference to *origins*—emerges in light of a general outline of the place of the institution within a grammatological framework. Derrida's phrase, the 'metaphysics of presence,' invokes how a logic of history is represented as a totality that spans from an 'origin' to the 'present' as a matter of interiority. A metaphysics of history is one that holds inside itself, as a totalizing structure of the Same, what is authorized to take place within. Because the institution of history also takes place after the origin, the act of institution marks the inaugural site of a decision—that is an act of politics within a *topos* of ethical possibility over an 'ontological reality.' It's 'metaphysics' makes reference to this political boundary that the practice of institution marks, the authorization of an interior textual space whose inscription is a claim upon reality itself; the text of the sovereign. As such, this act of institution proceeds by opening the pre-emptive possibility of foreclosure, constraining what will be representable in the concomitant enumeration of a finite array of possibilities insofar as some possibilities will exist—those that repeat it as a structure of the same and draw directly from the political institution of a certain notion of history, from inside the space authorized by its

decision—while others will be categorically disregarded as impossible.

Scholarship engaging critically with a notion of institution have instead found use in active categories of resistance, of *counter*-institution, focusing especially on the site of the university and of literature (see: Derrida 1992a, 2004; Wortham 2006). Particularly, in our case, the question of literature as a *strange* institution makes it an important model for the possibility of others to refuse, and to confuse, the question of their interiority. Literature seems exemplary in this regard as the *other* privileged institution that, "allows one to *say everything*, in *every way*… It is an institution which tends to overflow the institution" (Derrida 1992a, p. 36, italics in original). Opposing what he calls the "law of genre" with another "law," of *contamination*, Derrida notes that institutional *rupture* remains possible, "always waiting to be effected" (Derrida 1992a, pp.53-54, 227). It is in this way that he situates what he calls the *counter-institution*. He describes the "subject of literature in general" as "A place at once institutional and wild, an institutional place in which it is in principle to put in question, at any rate to suspend, the whole institution. A counter-institutional institution can be both subversive and conservative. It can be conservative in that it is institutional, but it can also be conservative in that it is anti-institutional, in that it is "anarchist," and to the extent that a certain kind of anarchism can be conservative" (Derrida 1992a, p. 58). He continues to provide for us the requisite language to situate the question of the institution within its own *topos*:

> A work takes place just once, and far from going against history, this uniqueness of the institution, which is in no way natural and will never be replaced, seems to me historical through and through. It must be referred to as a proper name and whatever irreplaceable reference a proper name bears within it. Attention to history, context, and genre is necessitated, and not contradicted, by this singularity, by the date and the signature of the work: not the date and signature which might be inscribed on the external border of the work or around it, but the ones which constitute or institute the very body of the work, on the edge between the "inside" and the "outside." This edge, the place of reference, is both unique and divisible… [Because] while there is always singularization, absolute singularity

> is never given as a fact, an object or existing thing [etant] in itself, it is announced in a paradoxical experience. An absolute, absolutely pure singularity, if there were one, would not even show up, or at least would not be available for reading. To become readable, it has to be divided, to participate and belong. (Derrida 1992a, pp. 67-68).

So we are perhaps *already* dealing with the counter-institution when we are dealing with the institution insofar as we refuse to ascribe to a pure interiority coincident with a logic of sovereignty. Institutability—iterability—also entails even that interior elements must exceed themselves in some way, remain portable and provide a site for other possibilities elsewhere.

What might this kind of excessive portability 'conserve' in Derrida's words? Prefiguratively, I would like to distinguish between institution and *extitution*, which not only derives its interiority from a hidden exterior but from a secret play or economy (Abraham's heart-of-hearts) and a corresponding institutional activity which *opens onto* its outside. Because of its outward-facing posture, the *ex-titution* seems an apt title. By *extitution*, I am referring to the possibility of establishing a concrete institutional site whose principles do not merely organize an 'interior' space but engage instead in an intertextual act of call-and-response with what is exterior. Insofar as this is also how we might define a *cosmopolitan* vision—as having declared a relation with the *cosmos beyond* the globe, a world of known *and unknown* character—it would seem primarily that the extitution is that institution which abides by a cosmopolitan principle of an exteriorized possibility, the possibility of an encounter with the unknowable absent other—the *text*. This extitution operates *specifically* so as to shelter within its interior the one who is deemed 'without,' whose appropriation into the interior is also met with the declaration of their banishment, as the instituting principle of the impossible possibility of hospitality—a possibility that cannot be accounted for from inside, cannot be pre-figured as member to the sphere of the sovereign referent, but takes place in a liminal encounter. The extitution is the name given to the specific practice of 'instituting' the site of a difference that

will remain radically open in the sheltering of others inside itself.

Conclusion

In this opening chapter I have elaborated a grammatological framework of a critique of sovereignty (chapter 3) that opens discussion of migrant-rights politics as generating a portable grammar of emplaced possibility (chapters 4 and 5). Grammatology draws from two contexts. The first is the contemporary context of global displacement as a result of globalization *specifically* of the Western nation-state. Understanding this backdrop, I initiated an exploration of the 'globe' through a discussion of *world* and *possibility*. Where Edmund Husserl emphasizes the world as 'for-me' for a transcendental subject and extrapolates from them similar subjects equally *inside* themselves, Emmanuel Levinas proposes that the Other (*autrui*) is irreducible to the subject *and their world*—they exist radically outside. Here, grammatology responds by disrupting the uncontested division between interiority and exteriority, offering complex statements on 'text,' 'writing,' '*différance*,' 'iterability' and '(an)economy' as a new *topos* for exploring subject and world. From this framework, new concepts of *dissemination* and *institution* emerge as key sites in a critique that foregrounds the constructive and deconstructive possibilities of complex linguistic economies that cannot be comfortably 'fixed' in time or space, neither 'interior' nor 'exterior' to their proposed structures.

Two trajectories are outlined as part of a problematic of a grammatological framework. *On the one hand*, sovereignty, the nation-state, and what I call the *logic of sovereignty*, within a globalized world, *limit* the realm of possibility to a singular actualized state of affairs organized according to its own principles. As the text is a *topos* of possibility, this remains possible, but it does so by limiting other possibilities. It generates the fatalistic presumption that exclusively

'real' include a singular and united 'nation,' its privileged subject (the citizen), the *iteration* of a structure of the Same in politics globally (the nation-state as a planetary paradigm of political community) and the re-appropriation of an outside/other. *On the other hand*, the refusal of this 'real' state of affairs—within a dynamic of *possibilia*—opens the ability to resituate politics of resistance (citizenship-based activisms that rely on a rejection of the citizen-stranger dialectic [Nyers 2003; Balibar 2004, 2015; Isin 2008; Anderson, Sharma and Wright 2013]; Bauder 2017), and new possibilities for reimagining political community as a cosmopolitan ideal. The existence of non-citizens within a territory seems an affront to the nation-state insofar as such real others can introduce *real-other possible states of affairs* not sanctioned by the sovereign. Thinking the 'open city,' I argue, can be viewed as just this sort of possibility, available because of a 'rift' in the reality of the logic of sovereignty demonstrated by migrant-rights politics.

Attempting to apply a grammatological method, we might venture to further give shape to this vision as a haunting of radically other worlds upon this globalized system of nation-states. In the next chapter, I expound a method consistent with this grammatological framework drawing on the instruments of genealogy, etymology and pragmatics. I develop a method that can be taken up drawing from these tools, in particular as a retreatment of a grammatological method of *reading*. Because what I am calling a 'text' concerns an economy of presence and absence, interior and exterior, same and different, what I call reading is a rigorous attempt to observe this economy. Having provided for ourselves the widest possible base upon which to begin a historical and empirical analysis, I explore three sites; the logic of sovereignty as an expression of Western logocentrism (chapter 3); a language coinciding with a democracy of strangers predicated on migrant-rights movements (chapter 4); and the open city as a portable grammar of emplaced possibility generated by these movements (chapter 5).

Chapter 2: Method and Application

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I expounded the context and framework for a grammatology focusing on the tension between the globalization of a Western logic of sovereignty against the encounter with another. It is in this way that the analysis to follow is grounded in a need to contend with contemporary trends in global human displacement—not only its increasingly extensive reach (where 89.5 million people are recognized to be displaced today [McAuliffe, and Triandafyllidou 2021]), but how this is conditioned by the dissemination of the Western nation-state globally, the diverse and yet logically consistent retrenchment of a politic of sovereignty worldwide in nationalist and xenophobic campaigns, divestment from international institutions themselves incapable of contending with these conditions, and the violences of detention, deportation, borders and extra-territorial border enforcement (Sharma 2020; Cohen and van Hear 2020; Walia 2021). It is also how these factors constrain, but are also subverted by, a formulation of possibility that demonstrates them to be as much self-defeating as they are self-declarative.

In order to situate these phenomena I've outlined a parallel problematic that extends from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, through that of Emmanuel Levinas, and leading to the grammatology of Jacques Derrida, whom I argue situates this tension at the center of his work. Grammatology is a framework that can expand a notion of *possibilia* recently articulated in critical scholarship of migration, borders and citizenship (Bauder 2017)—as both concretely present and yet marked as 'impossible'—through the development of expansive concepts of *différance*, text, trace and Western logocentrism. As it is defined in Derrida's work, the *text* is a configuration of differences held within a political and ethical space of meaning. It is not an internally coherent structure but a composite of decisions upon presence and absence, defined as

much by what is unstated as what is openly declared—by exteriority as much as interiority. I concluded by reconsidering the places of dissemination and institution, while conceptualizing the practice of *extitution* as that which locates itself in relation to an outside rather than an inside.

However, neither a notion of institution—the manner by which certain practices establish internally to themselves the conceptual principles that render a world thinkable or possible, as *texts*—nor dissemination—how the 'logics' of those texts can be deconstructed, their elements displaced 'elsewhere' within an economy of traces—provide for us a method for exploring this problematic. In this chapter, I focus on three tools that perform this work; genealogy, etymology and pragmatics. First, genealogy allows us to contend with institutions as texts—as forms of contestation rather than fixed and posited interiorities. Moreover, in terms of the spatio-temporal possibilities they declare or repress, a genealogy uncovers, without yet traversing, a constellation of traces that lead outside of itself. As such, second, etymology helps to account for the interior construction of an institution as a matter of elements that are themselves outside of it *originally*. Although etymology can be a linguistic tool that reinforces the dynamics of an insular 'tradition,' it can also bring to light a linguistic economy of incorporation and repression of *exterior* grammatical units made into interior ones. Third, a pragmatics, which advances a similar reading outside of linguistic analysis, opens the possibility of situating a textual institution within a context of possibilities or constraints of usage, the maintenance of boundaries, incorporation or absence of elements, and the moments of a text that exceed these conditions.

This chapter is dedicated to a method that relies on the tools of genealogy, etymology and pragmatics to open a reading that can elaborate the historical and contemporary expressions of a logic of sovereignty (chapter 3), the politics that have resisted them (chapter 4), and glimpses of an altogether different conception of politico-historical institutions (chapter 5). Preceding this

exploration of possibilities, grounded in a redefinition of the notion of *reading* in tandem with 'writing' and 'text,' this method must contend with its own context. A grammatological framework is crucial for critical scholarship on sovereignty and migration even though its focus, the *grammē* (the *unit* or the *word*), demands we understand its two most apparent objects, the text and the trace, in a broad sense—not only linguistic but, more so, political and ethical. Nevertheless, it is understandable that their specific applicability might be called into question by a critical scholarship that seeks practicality; what can a purportedly linguistic-philosophical framework *do* for critical scholarship on borders, migration and citizenship? Firstly, in answer, it is important to remember that we opened this work with a discussion of ethics and politics, and *not* linguistics, even if we presume that the former two will always implicate the latter.[12] The emphasis Derrida (1997 [1967]) places on logocentrism as it arises within a Western linguistic structure as old as ancient Greece—a phonology of languages (that 'truth' emerges from the translation of vocal sound into units of meaning, not representations of objects)—finds languages to be engaged in a *fundamentally political activity of communication within an ethical topography* centered around the authorization of a boundary between interior and exterior that prefigures contemporary practices of immigration control and border enforcement today.

We now turn to expositing this framework's method and application. An attempt to apply a grammatology to the objects of critical migration scholarship, citizenship, sovereignty, must confront the—perhaps rightfully—privileged place of empirical research, and how this placement organizes scholarship itself, whilst attending to meaningful (or seemingly meaning*less*) absences, silences and spaces. Current migration scholarship in general has been beholden to those elements of the structuring of power that can be rendered present—those that

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[12] We need, for example, to reckon with how the 'sharing in common' of a community, is inextricable from *communication*—a language with an authorial structure, and sanctions upon possibility or impossibility.

appear as privileged and material elements within a structure of representability or understandability, what I've referred to as the 'structure of the Same.' The fact that such objects *can be* represented also entails that research can be performed in observation of them. This is at once a boon for their capacity to meaningfully attend to technologies of state violence, but also a hindrance for their critical and emancipatory potential if they constrain themselves exclusively to an exploration of 'what is.' Critical scholarship has confronted a need for analysis of the presence of structures of power as well as their capacities to (re)produce the presence of 'objects.' Nicholas De Genova's (2013) crucial work, for example, uncovers how *spectacles* of migrant 'illegality' are reproduced through the dissemination of a *scene* of state representations of their borders and those who cross them. These scenes are reproducible images disseminated widely within a territory amongst those who encounter them—citizens and non-citizens alike.

But there is not yet a 'counter-scene' we might propose, following De Genova. Within the body of this scholarship emphasis on empirical research has helped to ground scholarship critically analyzing practices of violent separation (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr eds. 2007; De Genova and Peutz eds. 2010; Bauder 2014b; Agier 2016; De Genova ed. 2017; Jones 2017; Mongia 2018; Walia 2020; Sharma 2020). It has also opened the possibility for public calls for resistance, and the construction of counter-institutional forms of representation to oppose them (Balibar 2002, 2004; Nyers 2003, 2010; Young 2011; Ridgley 2008; Nyers and Rygiel eds. 2012; Lippert and Rehaag eds. 2013; Mignolo 2013; Bosniak 2020). Nevertheless, this dynamic concedes to the structuring of power a right to authorize the space of 'reality' to which researchers apply an empirical method if they do not prefigure alternatives directly. Thus, for example, the incredulity toward a No Borders approach, such that one can *only* do research on borders and that it is impossible to conceptualize a world without them, has hindered the

possibility of *thinking-difference* as a meaningful—if not reductively empirical—project.[13] In this way, preceding the elaboration of a No Borders politic, it is common amongst scholars to pre-emptively justify the very possibility of forwarding such a claim.[14]

As such, a grammatological analysis sets itself to work on the meaningful possibilities left unstated. This takes place in light of the normative de-authorization of those possibilities by structures of power; where empirical verification does not challenge the level of reality and privileged access the sovereign bears to the descriptive assertion of possibility or impossibility. A globalized logic of sovereignty, for example, projects a world in which borders gain ontologically irrefutable status, and thus forecloses the very idea that a world without borders is possible. This takes place even in light of rigorous and accurate scholarship observing the historical contingency (and very recent emergence) of border technologies that (re)produce the contemporary map, their heterogeneity and internal ambiguity, and the critical possibility of placing them in question (see: Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Anderson 2016 [1983]; Torpey 2018; Sharma 2020). This is how we have defined the notion of *possibilia* itself—a concept marked both as possible and as 'impossible' by sovereignty. A grammatological analysis attends to how the applications of power hold authority over this line, the division between both presence and absence, and between the interiority of the text and its outsides. Furthermore, because the text is consistently 'haunted' or confronted by difference, and by the absent possibilities it passes over in silence, it is also liable to deconstruction. What holds the structure

[13] Anderson, Sharma and Wright (2012), Carens (2015), Bauder (2017), and Cohen and van Hear (2020) have all offered meaningful justifications of political projects that directly and imaginatively challenge borders.

[14] Anderson, Sharma and Wright (2012) rebuff the dismissive position that a No Borders approach is utopian, or that it would undermine equality and erode national identity such that the sovereign nation-state becomes a necessary evil (p. 83). In response, they argue that such an approach, firstly, is already demonstrable in grassroots activisms which often figure prominently the claims of migrants of varying 'status,' and also that it reflects a perspective shift that we might liken to Edward Said's (2000) famous statement on exile which does not presuppose the hegemonic viewpoint of nation-states and their citizens, the presumption of sovereignty as 'settlement,' as an essential 'good.'

of a text in place is the repetition of a claim with no ground (the imperfect practice of dissemination), by the declaration of a decision that can only be justified *post hoc*, and the regulatory externalization of an 'other' who might always *arrive* to proclaim the possibility of its ruin. In following, a method of reading can neither focus exclusively on the privileged texts of a literary-philosophical canon, nor can it refrain from applying itself to communications either within or beyond the borders of empirical application.

A critical method accompanying this framework responds to the following conditions: first, that the representability of an object is a hindrance to any method that cannot meaningfully contend with a notion of *absence* due to its antecedent conditional authorization by a structure of power; particularly in migration scholarship where a key tension is the unrepresentability, the displacement, of the migrant-as-other. A dialectic of representability and unrepresentability is inextricable from dynamics of power. Second, that the claim that an alternative practice, logic, or concept is both pre-emptively unauthorizable and unrealistic at the very moment that they are being proposed—where they *already* bear a concrete possibility—demands that we attend critically to a historical ontology of power insofar as the 'sovereign's right' to decide exception is operationalized through the distinction between the interiority of what is present in a text against what is exteriorized. Third, scholarship that bows to the seeming 'impossibility' to propose a critical project beyond sovereignty, borders, and the conceptual constraints of sovereignty's projected 'outsides' has too easily conceded *over the very field of reality*. Fourth, that a grammatological method must contend with other methods—even other critical methods—if they acquiesce to these dynamics, and even if the thread that binds such a grammatology is loose, fragmentary, and tenuous. Rather than proposing *a priori* that these conditions imply a 'non-rigorous' approach to scholarship, I assert to the contrary that this tenuousness responds

seriously and critically to these conditions, in demonstrable refusal of their 'necessary' presence.

The Reader's Journey

If empiricism is a constraint upon possibility inflected by the textual structure of authority over reality itself, this does not mean we ought merely to discard the possibility of grounded observation. The text and its traversal remains *something* upon which we might bind a method, even if that thing, at its origin, operates through duplicity; even if our 'object' is best expressed as a *problem*, we can begin an analytic from the starting point of that problem. If the text seems to offer us a site from which what is left unsaid becomes as interesting as what is said, this disruptive fact does not preclude a reading. The text, as the site of difference, is always at least two things—what it authorizes and what it de-authorizes, what possibilities it conditions and those it negates, what is present or absent, what is traced and what leaves only faint traces. It is the work, then, of an expansive conception of *reading* that a grammatological framework might build a method from, which bears an articulable site, but also 'self-authorizes' the possibility to oppose the text, or even to radically depart from it.

Reading is the practice whereby the matters of the text are observed and participated in from the position of an outsider. Because we have attempted to demonstrate the possibility of redefining notions of 'text' and 'writing' beyond the restrictive image of scribbling marks on paper and in favour of an expansive expression of the play of differences, traces, etc., consequently *reading* becomes the name for a methodological centerpiece that attempts to observe this play. Foremost for such an approach, however, we are confronted with a twofold problem. We have found phonetic language to be self-referential, where terms refer to other terms bound within a system of indeterminate signs rather than depicting what they represent. As

a result, a novel constraint bears upon writing in its expansiveness (that it cannot make reference to a 'transcendental signified,' to a *thing* outside of textuality). But this problem also pervades a method of reading, that the reader themselves is also interpellated into the sphere of writing, and even attempts to supplement a text with con-textual information take place as textual practice. In the following, we will explore the implications of this problematic to open the possibility to characterize a rigorous method of reading as the recognition of possibilities. Accordingly, I also argue that exploring a method of reading as a problematic—rather than a posited tool—is fruitful for its elaborations, and the explorations that follow in the chapters below.

First Absence: The Reader

A problematic of the interpellation of reading is central to its definition, which can no longer be approached as a straightforward process but the traversal of unstable ground. Jacques Derrida variously outlines this process—as much historical as it is literary or philosophical—as both constrained and emancipated by this problematic that constitutes its condition. The reader *as* reader is member to a sphere of textuality, but that sphere is without ground. Can the reader, then, say whatever they like about what they read? Not exactly; if we are capable of saying that all forms of meaning, as arche-writing, take place in the absence of stable reference we have *not* 'authorized' ourselves (as readers) to offer 'commentary' on anything as anything (else):

> Without recognizing and respecting all its classical exigencies, which is not easy and requires all the instruments of traditional criticism, critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and would authorize itself to say almost anything. But this indispensable guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading. Yet if reading must not be content with doubling the text, it cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of the language [langue], that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in general. That is why the

> methodological considerations that we risk applying here to an example are closely dependent on… the absence of the referent or the transcendental signified. There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n'y a pas de hors-texte]. (Derrida 1997 [1967], pp. 158-159)

The act of reading does not authorize an approach in which 'anything goes,' just as the text is constrained still by factors that remain textual but are often unstated—historical, metaphysical, psychobiographical or otherwise. Rather, the practice of reading is bound to what is rendered present or negated as absent within the text. From this, reading affords itself the possibility to 'contextualize' through textual supplementation—to make additions (or promote replacements) of what has not been said. In this way, reading becomes a practice most accurately fashioned to take place both *with* and *against* a text, not necessarily 'outside' of it.

The dissonant place of a reader in relation to the text—somehow outside of any particular work but not outside of the sphere of textuality—offers a power of its own, of a critical separation between the two, which is important for the reader's identification of instances of textual authorization declared by the author. In this way, the reader's exteriority to a text becomes the first marker of a form of absence in general that the traversal of a text compels. As a reader, I realize that the 'world' I inhabit, as a text, is *not my own* even when its textuality is familiar to me. The reader is cast outside of the sphere of the text even as they participate within it, as if as a viewpoint from nowhere, or one that will have 'transcended' the text it crosses. But the reader is not 'nowhere'—they are inside of the text as they read, they are inside of a generalized sphere of textuality (of language in general) through which they bring themselves into the text in search of what is familiar. For this reason, Derrida states that, "You are not settled outside, since the absolute outside is not outside and cannot be inhabited as such; but you are forever being expelled, always involved in a process of expulsion, projected outside the column of light through its force of rotation, yet also pulled in by it" (Derrida 1981a, p. 358).

The reader is in a position to identify themselves as absent from the text, even when they are not necessarily outside of textuality. This uncomfortable position, rather than authorizing the possibility to 'say anything about anything,' is the experience of a fundamental constraint on such a possibility—one can affirm or reject the text, but they are not yet, as a reader, in a position to propose an alternative. In light of this, the separation of a reader and the work they encounter is experienced as a process of alienation (and often of relative powerlessness, but for the authority of judgment bestowed upon the reader as such). They traverse as a stranger in an unfamiliar world. Their response is likely to draw upon what is familiar—outside of a particular text—in order to render sensible that text as a meaningful home. Yet, their estranged residence renders this possibility difficult; the reader is a witness at the mercy of what is presented by the text, not what they 'will' themselves. The first absence the text marks is their own. From there, they might read *with* or *against* the text, but they will still be—and must remain cognizant of how they are—within this estranged textual *topos*. In fact, having inhabited a world that is not their own—and remembering that the relationship between a (phenomenological) world and the self is fundamental for their self-expression—the very identity of the reader seems to be called into question, as radically absent. To inhabit a world that is not one's own is also to lose oneself.

Second Absence: Of Authority in Contention

In following, the strange residence within a text and at once being forever expelled by it evokes the recognition of difference as a play of presence and absence specific to the act of reading—one that is not necessarily apparent to the writer in the same way. Given such a position, it is also the reader who is prepared to challenge the very foundations of the text not only in terms of an internal coherence or structure, but in terms of what the text has not (or

cannot) say. Such a method maintains itself as a critical *praxis* that, even if beholden to a text under interpretation (not to read into it what is not declared or described itself), also opens a contrapuntal reading (Said 1994) which takes that text as its point of departure without return. The reader retains a certain unstated right to respond to the text with a 'no' as much as a 'yes.' If the reader is powerless to what is presented by the textual *topos* that they traverse they retain the position of judgment over it through their intimacy or conflict. Reading is implicated in this play of intimacy and conflict, something that was apparent to Maurice Blanchot (1989 [1955]) when he wrote, "The reader, without knowing it, is engaged in a profound struggle with the author" (p. 193). This struggle will ultimately demand the reader do the work of 'freeing' the text from the grasp of authorship and authority.[15] Its resolution is not met with the retrenchment of a text within a newly stable *topos*. Rather, the 'relief' of the text initiates an antagonistic movement of attraction and repulsion between the reader and the work toward the loss of a stable formation of the 'reader' themselves, to which Blanchot states:

> We should not so simply represent this antagonism as that of fixed poles opposing each other like two powers determined once and for all, called reading and writing… Although, in the end, the work seems to have become a dialogue between two persons in whom two stabilized demands have been incarnated, this "dialogue" is primarily the more original combat of more indistinct demands, the torn intimacy of irreconcilable and inseparable moments which we call measure and measurelessness, form and infinitude, resolution and indecision. Beneath their successive oppositions, these moments steadily give reality to the same violence. To the violence, that is, of what tends to open and tends to close, tends to cohere in the contours of a clear figure that limits, and yet tends to err without end, to lose itself in an ever restless migration. (Blanchot 1989 [1955], pp. 198-199)

Blanchot finds, in a method of reading, the ever-present possibility of the risk of forfeiture of the position of the reader themselves wherein they are no longer in conflict with—and thus

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[15] Blanchot theorizes the notion of a 'work' rather than 'text'—*oeuvre* implies 'work,' a 'work' and an opening. For discussion of his relationship to Derrida, see: Blanchot and Derrida 2000; Derrida 1992a, 2011 [1986].

delineable from—the author. *Instead they are in motion*. The reader, as a problematic, is not only liable to identify a uncomfortable absence in the texts they read, but to risk their own annihilation at the hands of the work. Rather than shrink from this annihilatory possibility, Blanchot instead laments the idea that such a methodological object as 'the reader' will overtake this fluctuation: "What most threatens reading is this: the reader's reality, his personality, his immodesty, his stubborn insistence upon remaining himself in the face of what he reads" (ibid, p. 198). Rather than finding the loss of identity an occasion for mourning—for the many 'selves' that have perished—it is the condition for a robust formulation of *possibilia* to be grounded.

To our more specific concerns, the condition this loss presents, this radical opening, does not preclude the possibility of deploying a *technē* or craft of reading, even in light of the *flux* of the reader. Rather, this opening is foremost expressed in terms of the multiplication of possibilities that inhere within the text which must be read. The reader will always inhabit a privileged marginality to the text, the place of a banishment which also compels critique:

> The thickness of the text thus opens upon the beyond of a whole, the nothing or the absolute outside, through which its depth is at once null and infinite—infinite in that each of its layers harbors another layer. *The act of reading is thus analogous to those X rays that uncover, concealed beneath the epidermis of one painting, a second painting: painted by the same painter or by another, it makes little difference, who would himself, for lack of materials or in search of some new effect, have used the substance of an old canvas or preserved the fragment of a first sketch...* (Derrida 1981a, p. 357, italics added)

A practice remains of reading which can be followed or deployed. It is not one, however, that can *merely* be deployed, but also threatens the reader who does so. Derrida continues, "The entire verbal tissue is caught in this, and you along with it. You are painting, you are writing while reading, you are inside the painting" (op. cit.). 'I' am lost, but I am lost *in* the text. Uncovering the many texts beneath it is available in reading given that the reader themselves is changing imperceptibly, but for the time may inhabit a text in which they do not belong, and

which is both in content and in context estranged from them. In following, the critical and political act of reading is uncovered in the recognition of absences, in other texts implied but not described by this one, of a contention that no longer takes place between the reader and the work, but between the work and its many possible iterations.

Third Absence: Of World in Condition or Exorbitancy

The reader has recognized the absence of themselves firstly, and secondly, begins to excavate a work to uncover the fragmentary tissue of the 'rest' of the text in affront to its authority. The contention that began the work of reading—the struggle between reader and author—has metamorphosed into an experience of relational play, of lost-and-found. In this emergent and desubjectivizing contention—the measured vs. measureless text and a reading that uncovers its layers—the reader risks losing themselves in the deployment of a method of reading. Nevertheless, the conditions bearing upon this relationship—between reader and work, between reader and author, between reader and reader, work and work, etc. in their becoming—demands we contend with how it is still bound to the structure of authorship and the historical conditions that give rise to them.

Blanchot has already introduced for us a challenge to this constraint in the iterative practice of a reading which disrupts the presumption of 'pure' constraint. The text *can* become what it is not or speak to what it does not declaratively say. Does this mean it is 'without history?' Not exactly; the polarization of the text need not be conceived as between the 'reader' and the 'author,' certainly, but it remains a play between *constraint* and *exorbitancy*. Another feature of the dissonant experience of the reader is that a reading of any text is constrained by historical, social, cultural, political and economic conditions applied to the author and their work:

> When we speak of the writer and of the overarching power of the language [langue] to which he is subject, we are not only thinking of the writer in literature. The philosopher, the chronicler, the theoretician in general, and at the limit everyone writing, is thus caught unawares. But, in each case, the person writing is inscribed in a determined textual system. Even if there is never a pure signified, there are different relationships to that which, from the signifier, gives itself as the irreducible stratum of the signified… Reading should be aware of these matters, even if, in the last analysis, it makes its failure appear. The entire history of texts, and within it the history of literary forms in the West, should be studied from this point of view. With the exception of a point of resistance which has only been very lately recognized as such, literary writing has, almost always and almost everywhere, according to diverse fashions and across very diverse ages, lent itself to this transcendent reading, to this search for the signified which we here put in question, not to annul it but to understand it within a system to which it is blind. (Derrida 1997 [1967], pp. 159-160)

A non-transcendent reading that attempts to situate a text within the system to which it is 'blind' is prompted by dissonance. But this does not extend only to the text or its author. Much like the question of a 'transcendental signified' *asserted* within the text by the 'author' as an authority, which is undone by the medium of writing as meaning itself (there is no "non-textual referent") the idea that the 'reader' can inhabit a position of 'transcendent reading' is placed in question. This is a contingency that requires a historical reading rather than an ahistorical one; an ahistorical reading which would remain 'blind' to the conditions upon which the construction of a structure also constrains its possible expression—and where Derrida privileges 'philosophy' as "among the most significant" (ibid, p. 160) for attempting to hold those conditions in check so as to assert the text's 'transcendence' through the *effacement* of those conditions; conditions bearing upon textual production *exist* and yet are dismissed as irrelevant or ineffectual.

The claim to transcendence is challenged by the matters of the text which—whether declared or merely described—monumentalize their historical specificity. Yet, this does not mean that the text is a 'purely' historical object; a rigorous reading that 'contextualizes' the text within the pragmatic constraints of a historical epoch is also one that is best placed to identify those aspects of a text which seem *exorbitant* to its time—to be 'timeless' perhaps, but certainly

to be *untimely*. This, we referred to in the first chapter as both the gift, and an *an*economy—that which seems to emerge inside of the frame of possibility, of the world, to the subject, in such a way that it is also still marked as radically *in excess* of it. The subsequent appropriation of the gift, wherein it transitions from an aneconomic element into the economic circulation of the text, constitutes the possibility of such an economy itself. Thus, for example, the phenomenological reliance upon an impression that precedes sense—a content without yet bearing a frame which can make it *sensible*—seems to exist irreducibly outside of the phenomenological subject even when that subject is asserted as 'transcendental.' Similarly, the Other, for Emmanuel Levinas, is located radically outside of the self *and their world*, as infinitely otherwise. If 'history' is marked as a textual economy in the way that other genres of texts are—bearing a form, aspects of regulated possibility and impossibility, authorities and evidences, the presence of its object(s)—this takes place in light of the possibility of an ahistorical other equally possible to be posited, but *within* the text.[16]

For this reason, reading is a practice that implicates an entanglement between what is 'nontranscendent' and what, at least, gestures toward the possibility of 'transcending' its most immediate conditions. This is exemplified, for Derrida (1978 [1967]), by the way that René Descartes invokes the idea of madness in his *Meditations on First Philosophy* as a position that a rational and philosophical subject could adopt themselves. Such a position would risk the stable structure both of their world, and the comfort they bear regarding their own 'reason.' It would also meaningfully prompt a radical philosophical experiment. It would claim that the accessible position of 'madness' is a valid site from which philosophical reasoning is drawn; madness itself conditions the possibility of reason. Descartes' willingness to inhabit 'madness' is not only a

[16] This is the place often ascribed to God as the one who is outside of time and space.

radical claim within a philosophical tradition that espouses the singular grandeur of Reason (with a capital 'R'), but also within the cultural, social and political conditions that render 'madness' a negated—socially marginalized—position. Similarly, in "This Strange Institution Called Literature," (1992a) Derrida finds that a privileged place should be maintained for 'literature,' whose definition is ambiguous by necessity, as an 'institution' which authorizes the ability to "say everything in every way" (Derrida 1992a, p. 36). It is also representable as *counter-institutional* because of this very relationship between exigency and possibility:

> Does not every text, every discourse, of whatever type—literary, philosophical and scientific, journalistic, conversational—lend itself, every time, to this [a 'transcendent'] reading? Depending on the types of discourse I've just named… the form of this lending itself is different. It would have to be analyzed in a way specific to each case. Conversely, in none of these cases is one simply obliged to go in for this reading… A philosophical, or journalistic, or scientific discourse, can be read in "nontranscendent" fashion. "Transcend" here means going beyond interest for the signifier, the form, the language (note that I do not say " text") in the direction of the meaning or referent… One can do a nontranscendent reading of any text whatever. (Derrida 1992a, p. 44)

Every text lends itself to historical localization, to interpretation related to the constraints placed upon its production. But he also continues that such a reading is not exclusively necessary:

> The essence of literature… is produced as a set of objective rules in an original history of the "acts" of inscription and reading. But it is not enough to suspend the transcendent reading to be dealing with literature… A text cannot by itself avoid lending itself to a "transcendent" reading. A literature which forbade that transcendence would annul itself. This moment of " transcendence" is irrepressible, but it can be complicated or folded... Rather than periodize hastily, rather than say, for example, that a modern literature resists more this transcendent reading, one must cross typology with history. There are types of text, moments in a text, which resist this transcendent reading more than others. (ibid, p. 45)

A tension inheres within the practice of reading, which must tease out how a text relates to its own historical conditions, to its context—and how it does not. This is made doubly problematic as the text operates to efface itself in favour of a structure of signification that implies the reality

of its object, a ‘transcendental signified,’ which is *itself a signifier* defined historically and culturally. The belief, for example, of an ever-living God in Medieval Christian Europe, a belief shared by many, is such a claim to a ‘transcendental signified’ which can be uncovered by a historical analysis (a non-transcendent reading). “God” is *at once* a ‘word’ and decidedly *not* a word for those with such religious convictions. Further, it seems also possible to reconstruct this signifying structure outside of its context (to study a Medieval theologian’s text on the subject) in such a way that maintains the claim to transcendental reference, or its belief, today. *On the one hand*, one can construct the ‘context’ of a text, as a reader, which disrupts its reference to a ‘transcendental signified. *On the other hand*, one can reconstruct the textual structure through which an author proposes, and attempts to justify, the ‘transcendental signified,’ *as if* an ahistorical practice; an axiom upon which a philosophical tradition relies, for whom the rehearsal of arguments in profoundly different times and places would otherwise be impossible.

There is, then, a tension between the historicizing and the ahistorical reading of specific texts, between the non-transcendental and the transcendental reading. Furthermore, a self-reflexive practice of reading is one that implicates its own possibilities for historical transcendence or non-transcendence, its authorities or non-authorities, as well. An exhaustive method of reading, impossible in itself due to the historicity of the reader, is one, at least, that attempts to enumerate all possibilities of a text from that position. It also attends to the shifting position of the reader (on a ‘sojourn’ through the text in the way that the ‘transcendental’ subject of Husserl’s phenomenology sojourns through their own world), so as to open other readings—or ‘other others.’ Reading becomes the confrontation of a reader with *possibilia*, the possibility that there are as yet undeciphered ‘ahistorical’ possibilities that inhere within the diffuse (disseminated) institutionality of texts—both for the text, its interpretation, and for themselves.

Such is a possibility marked as a *palpable absence identified by the reader as they traverse the world of the text*. I do not yet know what has been left unsaid.

Fourth Absence: Of the Text in the Opening of Politics as Hospitality

A method of reading is confronted by three absences. The first is the absence of the reader within any particular text. The second is the absence of stable subjective intent in the multifaceted production and interpretation of the text. The third is the absence of declared conditions through which the text is produced, its historical and non-transcendent character, as well as a recognition that aspects of the text cannot be reduced exclusively to a response to those conditions, as exorbitant. The recognition of these absences ultimately conditions the opening upon possibility of other readings, other readers, other texts, *from within*. From these absences there emerges a fourth, the radical absence which provides an opening upon what is not *this* text but another. It is this absence which compels reading as a fundamentally political activity, of the miniscule glimpse of a radically other world which remains prompted by, conditioned by, one's confrontation with a text that fundamentally *cannot and does not fashion such a world to be inhabited*. This, we have also referred to in the second definition of the 'trace'—not what is well-delineated as an object, entity or being whose boundaries are drawn in thick ink, but the nearly imperceptible thread that maintains the trace of something that remains absent, unstated or exterior to the text, as radically otherwise.

The former of these two traces implies a politic, one which delineates presence as the empirical world within which a subject is interpellated into the logic of sovereignty, and further delineates the borders of reality, possibility and the impossible. The politic of this delineation concerns the authority of authorship, the capacity to bring into being through textual practice. So,

too, the other trace—which marks an absence in the text—constitutes a politic for which reading supplies a method. It is a politic that retraces the opening of possibility as a practice of hospitality. Reading, as the observation of differences by one who is a non-member and participant in the text, compels the reader to confront a strange world, its author, and themselves, and ultimately to risk all of these in the possibility of *flux* through which what is 'otherwise' might come to be. The reader is *demanding*. For every student of history, of politics, culture, economy, who laments that "it has always been this way, and will always be this way," we reserve a right to demand infinitely otherwise as a starting point. This reading begins as dialectically antithetical to what it reads. But it develops as a practice whereby it is possible to assert exorbitancy as a method; it locates itself outside of *this* text, and in doing so, it risks self-assurance for the practice of reading.

Whether such an assertion of exorbitancy is claimed or not—whether reading is *made into* a political activity—it would seem that the reader always bears an uncomfortable place in relation to the works they analyze or comment upon. The critical reader is not outside of the interpellation of textuality *in general*. They are also member to a historical locality that has not settled questions of 'justice,' 'right,' 'community' which would otherwise render them ahistorically 'transcendent' to textuality, capable of a transcendental judgment. Nevertheless, their position in relation to each specific text remains one of *exile*. This text I read is not mine; this is not my world that I inhabit. I am here without membership. It is for this very reason—this very problematic—that a grammatological method of reading demands to be read, itself, as a political activity, and where politics is definitively the assertion of exorbitant alterity from within, as a position of exile. The expression of this politic is, for the reader *as* reader, the possibility to welcome the other-text into a *topos* constrained by what is currently being-read.

Such expression demands that the reader-non-member-participant—as the *guest* to the world of the author, the text—extends the first gesture of hospitality rather than a statement of authority.

Tools and Texts Under Consideration

By what means do we actualize this method and its gesture? In what language do we communicate it's openness? From what site? A grammatological method of reading is one that can be compared to empirical methods within a field of critical migration, borders and citizenship-based scholarship in two ways. In the first place, it follows from a problematic of reading—that the reader is interpellated into the overarching space of textuality, while being absent from a specific text—to attend to what is absent or exterior, what is left unsaid, by the text under consideration (broadly defined by any form of communication as the play of *différance*). Such a problematic has demanded that we offer an exploration in four parts of a method of reading. We have identified in consecutive stages an absence of the reader in the text, absence of authority in contention, a play of condition and exorbitancy, and finally the radical possibility of an other-text in a politic of hospitality. Thus, as a method, reading attempts to maintain the possibility of change over time and space, in the traversal of the textual *topos*, rather than to fix an object of study. Instead of implying a non-rigorous scholarship, it is the refusal of otherwise pre-given authorizations, of the stabilization of texts, uncritical appraisal of notions of 'authorship,' and the unproblematized act of reading, that demands we consider such a practice meaningful both as a research method and critical *praxis*.

Our languages themselves are put into question. What they tell us is doubled and often at odds with themselves—what they declare, and what emerges as their subtext, what is described. Our reading method cannot proceed comfortably. This is not merely a problem for a linguistic

philosophy, its ethics or its politics, but coincides with a call articulated by Nina Glick-Schiller and Mathias Wimmer (2002) to overturn a 'methodological nationalism,' the declarative component of a scholarly analysis and the presumptions found underlying even the most foundational of considerations.[17] They state, "That nationalist forms of inclusion and exclusion bind our societies together [serve] as an invisible background even to the most sophisticated theorising about the modern condition. The social sciences were captured by the apparent naturalness and givenness of a world divided into societies along the lines of nation states" (p. 220). Such a foundational premise, they argue, has crept into the disciplines of the social sciences in both their epistemological assertions and empirical frameworks. Methodological nationalism, they argue, is implied, for example, within scholarship of international relations where the globe is defined politically as an anarchic system of nation-states. It is perpetuated in disciplines like economics where nation-states are the paradigmatically meaningful unit of analysis through which one might distinguish domestic activity from the 'secondariness' of trade and capital flows internationally.

Perhaps most impactful, though, is the implication this bears for anthropology's grounding narratives: "Anthropologist now often assumed that the cultures to be studied were unitary and organically related to and fixed within territories, thus reproducing the image of the social world divided into bounded, culturally specific units typical of nationalist thinking" (ibid, p. 222). Although the fairness of such an authoritative statement on an entire field is debatable, Wimmer and Glick-Schiller uncover a crucial dynamic at play. A researcher might rely on the declarative language of a 'nation,' but even if they do not, they may also descriptively reproduce the structure whereby a cultural or ethnic group is fixed, territorially bounded, and characteristically

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[17] See also, Beck's (2007) statement on methodological cosmopolitanism as a grounded approach to respond to the historical character of the 21st century against methodological nationalism.

specific as a 'unit'—so as to have described a 'nation' while analyzing a non-national social organization. It is through this iterative repetition well outside the empirical *topos* of nation-state systems that a methodological nationalism creeps into disparate fields of scholarship as a discursive structure (a *logic*). Anthropologists need not imply their object of study must be a nation-state in the way that contemporary economists or political theorists would. Nonetheless, such a repetition seems to have taken place. The existence of this iteration entails that such a logic is not confined to any discipline, but is disseminated in diverse ways within diverse fields.

Wimmer and Glick-Schiller then draw out the implications for migration research: "Describing immigrants as political security risks, as culturally others, as socially marginal and as an exception to the rule of territorial confinement, migration studies have faithfully mirrored the nationalist image of normal life" (ibid, p. 234). Methodological nationalism implicitly treats people on the move as an affront to the presumption of (nationally cohesive, unitary, fixed) community; as 'destroyers' of the metonymy between a people, sovereign and a citizenry, between a 'people' and a nation, destructive of group solidarity, and as exceptions to a rule of sedentariness. However, they also reject a new conceptual constellation organized around fluidity, unboundedness and cosmopolitanism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002, pp. 235-236). This position they justify through the continued relevance of concrete geographical locations (not necessarily 'national'), and because social actors continue to find national affiliation or identification a powerful signifier. Such a call, then, to upturn methodological nationalism is proposed cautiously—to re-evaluate core assumptions made within many disciplines, but not to attempt to replace them with ones that would hinder the capacity to accurately depict an empirical social reality. One cannot merely replace 'structure' with 'fluidity.' But the example of 'methodological nationalism' exceeds itself as well and explores few conceptual avenues beyond

the call to action. If it remains one of the most important points of departure for a method of reading concerned with situating the research of critical scholarship on migration, it is also harmed by this self-imposed limitation. One can no longer characterize migrant, diaspora or transnational communities simply as 'another kind' of nationhood.[18]

How might we proceed to demonstrate this? What is the site for a reading that attempts radically to reject a methodological nationalism? In anticipation of such an alternative, a second distinction can be drawn regarding the kinds of texts that a grammatological method of reading marks as applicable for meaningful analysis. Treatment of the notion of the 'text' in a broad sense demands also that any particular textual expression can be relevant for analysis, its justification fashioned after the decision has been made. But the framework discussed in chapter one also implies emphasis on exhaustive reading. Hence, exhaustion seems to pull in two directions. First, the generalized definition of a 'text' implies that an exhaustive reading is satisfied by universality—to have collected every text that might be relevant and performed some reading upon them, which now includes not only members of a literary or philosophical cannon, but the declarations of powerful actors, policy documents, ethnographic research, archival records, snippets of everyday conversations, and the myriad forms of textual production. Second, the demand for exhaustive reading implies that each particular text must, in itself, be exhausted—its possibilities and foreclosures enumerated as extensively as possible. Extensive readings of a single work under consideration seems a given for deconstructionist scholarship (see: De Man 1983; Wyschogrod 1985; Kamuf 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 1993; Cixous 1990, 1994; Nancy 1993; J.H. Miller 1995; Kofman 1998). These readings have also been confined to literary and philosophical texts, even when they purport to place in question the

[18] In this contention, I have been invaluably helped by Edward Said's (2000) rendering of 'exile.'

borders between textual 'genre' (Derrida 1992a).

The first response to methodological nationalism is to loosen the generic borders separating texts as fixed and distinct categories. I believe there to be room for expansion of the application of what is often referred to as a 'deconstructive reading' or 'deconstructive criticism' (Atkins 1983; Attridge 2010) as an attempt to do justice to a rejection of methodological nationalism, the presupposition of the nation-state as an empirical object and privileged textual site for analysis. Such an expansion would propose a form of 'reading' that can no longer be reducible to coextension with literary criticism or philosophical critique. The text is *not* defined as an expression within the genre of literature, but the play of differences apparent even in everyday language. Not only are we no longer at liberty simply to dismiss texts (as 'parasitic' in the sense invoked by J.L. Austin [1962]), but we also cannot accept the epochal divisions of 'genre' ('literature' comfortably separated from the 'non-literariness' of recipes, newspapers, or car-engine manuals, or 'empirical' works categorically distinguished from 'theoretical'). The text is coterminous with language itself, and reading is the interpretive practice whereby we attempt to make sense of that near-totalizing sphere in light of what it overlooks. There is a similar gulf implicitly acknowledged between deconstruction as a literary or philosophical method, and forms of empirical analysis—one, I hope, that is becoming increasingly suspect. Just as much as reading cannot be exhaustive if it focuses exclusively on the privileged texts of a literary-philosophical canon, nor can it refrain from applying itself to communications either within or beyond the borders of empirical application.

As such, and in response to the call to reject methodological nationalism rendered in the most expansive manner, in the final three chapters of this study we will attempt to do justice to some negotiated position between both poles of exhaustive reading—between the inclusion of

'all' texts as appropriate sites for a critical grammatology, and to pause within 'each' text under consideration. In all chapters, we will pay specific attention to the research produced within a critical tradition of migration, borders and citizenship studies (variously empirical, qualitative, ethnographic, analytical). In the following chapter (chapter 3), literary, philosophical, cultural and historical texts are relied upon. In the fourth chapter, those texts that perform politics that resist, refuse, or excuse themselves from the logic of sovereignty are examined. In the final chapter, texts of varying genres are considered (literary, philosophical and historical as well contemporary) in hopes that they may ground a loose and alternative tradition of thought that departs, in every historical epoch and each disciplinary-generic category, from what it counterposes in the logic of sovereignty; a tradition of hospitality, the *open city*.

To perform such a reading, as exhaustively as can be achieved, I rely on three methodological tools: genealogy, etymology and pragmatics. In his discussion of Globalization as a European hegemonic process, Derrida (2002a) briefly mentions these tools, which concern the possibility of mapping out a process of what he calls "globalatinization." Through globalatinization the structure of Western thought enacts a 'soft' imperialism of the repetition of a logic beyond its boundaries.[19] This linguistically-oriented neocolonial activity embedded within the discussion of 'globalization' as a 'neutral' technological, socio-economic and political force, requires the tools of a cartography that would recover a hidden thread—a *duplicity*—of a discourse of 'auto-immunization' underlying its processes *as such*. In the case to which he speaks specifically, a globalizing discourse of Christian-Anglophone-Latin influence bears upon 'Islam,' embedded in the coding of 'fundamentalism' without internal characteristics inextricable from a discourse on 'terrorism' and derisory image of Muslim subjecthood. This is

[19] This would be counterposed to a form of 'strong imperialism' that would overtly attempt to dominate, capture and rename—to place under a different heading—a territory or people.

complemented by the construction of a ‘universal’ community—a ‘body,’ the body of Christ translated into an Anglophone-Capitalist-Technological-Secular organism—that produces its own ‘antigens’ to protect from the enemy it constructs; a particularism concealed by a declared universality violently instituted against its declared enemy.

The method of a grammatological reading Derrida outlines must, then, do both the work of witnessing the actualization of this logic, and asserting a politic that refuses it. Such a reading follows a tenuous tracing of texts, broadly defined. To do so, a tripartite method of, etymology, genealogy and pragmatics provides the systematic practice of this deconstructive reading—one that attends to the absence of the reader, the author and deployment of authority, the conditions or exorbitancy of the text, and a politic of open hospitality to the other. It is a method, then, that speaks both to a politics that refuses methodological nationalism, and one that supplements what is ‘lost’ in this refusal by marking the place for, and elaborating on, cosmopolitan possibilities opened by it (see: Beck 2007). Following his remarks as a guide, we might outline how this method is applied, and how it relates to the framework outlined thus far.

i. Genealogy

> The search for historico-semantical filiations or genealogies would determine an immense field, with which the meaning of the word is put to the test of historical transformations and of institutional structures: history and anthropology of religions, in the style of Nietzsche, for example, as well as in that of Benveniste when he holds "Indo-European institutions" as "witnesses" to the history of meaning or of an etymology—which in itself, however, proves nothing about the effective use of a word. (Derrida 2002a, p. 71)

The methodological practice of genealogy is one primarily concerned with the ways in which a word, which bears its own ‘history’ independent of institutional structures present at any given time or under the auspices of any particular history, gains both *usage* and *definition* as member to those institutions. A genealogical method of grammatology follows the institutional

impetus outlined in much of Derrida's critical work, from the institution of the death penalty (Derrida 2014b, 2017) to the role of the university and the teaching of philosophy (see: Derrida 2002d, 2004; see also: Wortham 2006), the 'strange institution of literature' (Derrida 1992a), a politic of instituting global hospitality (Derrida 2001, 2014a) and international institutions of cultural exchange (Derrida 2001, 2002b). However, Derrida did not outline the extent of such a theory of institution—nor his genealogical approach—but in fragments. Furthermore, his rendering of genealogy as "historico-semantical filiations" does not capture what he—and what genealogy—does; namely how it observes contestations in the histories of institutions.

Derrida's definition is offered in particular because of its emphasis on both transformation and institution as historically situated processes of an economy of 'writing.'[20] A genealogical method is one that attends to the contestations of institutionalization, which involves a multiplicity of actors in (as-yet unsituated) power relations. It is also a method which attests to the enduring place of 'the' institution as a site whereby forms of contestation and their outcomes are recorded, as an *archive* (Foucault 2005 [1996], 2010c [1996]; Derrida 1996). From this, the application of a genealogy might diverge in many ways, of which we attend to two; the method of a (Foucauldian) dialectical genealogy and a grammatological genealogy.[21] Relevant to both, Michel Foucault (2010a [1971]) notes that a genealogical method attends primarily to contestations that demonstrate the contingent and slow sedimentary structuring of institutions. This formulation is termed "effective history"—what takes place as a loose collection of

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[20] I have already asserted that a grammatological framework draws from the question of institution in a protean form, discussed in the first chapter; *in-statuere*, metaphorically and etymologically captures both the act of setting into place the 'statue' or 'statute,' and also the practice of authorizing interiorization through institutional principles and enumeration of specific possibilities—the regulatory aspect of 'economy.'

[21] Neither Nietzsche's nor Benveniste's rendering of a genealogical method seem most pertinent to respond to. In current scholarship Foucault's approach is most often developed and applied. See, for example, Mongia's [2018] genealogy of the colonial origin of the nation-state; De Genova [2013] regarding the 'spectacle' of migrant illegality, as well as Lippert (2005) and McDonald's [2009, 2012] analyses in relation to sanctuary politics.

conflicts to which the "forces of history" respond, rather than a *telos*, destiny or regulatory scheme (Foucault 2010a [1971], p. 88). Under genealogical observation, the institution is both the organization and substance of what constitutes a specific materiality of being, at—and primarily instituting—the (notion of) origin. It relates to a 'principle'—and is often comprised of the material technologies that would somehow actualize a collection of principles, a *mandate*, at the origin—insofar as it is the work of the principle to *inaugurate* the possibility of possibility, or the opening of possibility. This process is not neutral. The contentious 'pre-history' of the institution as a 'fully realized' structure (which it cannot be), is constituted by its political unfolding—the variety of contestations that give rise to it, the assertion, negation, achievement or failure to entrench (institute) principles—as well as the (political) implications of this achievement or failure. Thus, the institution is the centerpiece from which we bear witness to power relations historically unfolding, the site of a method of 'reading' which requires its site to be present rather than absent, at least to begin with.

A genealogical analysis can proffer two lines of inquiry. The first is espoused by Foucault through which a dialectical genealogy is deployed *as if alone*, its findings held internally coherent to that method exclusively. The second, grammatological genealogy, asserts an *axiomatic of the trace* whereby the frayed thread of such a scission at the origin is followed within a realm of *possibilia* applied historically, and thus, which demands a multi-methodical approach. I develop the latter approach for this work because of its complication of periodization. A grammatological genealogy attends to, but does not objectify, the historical periodization that a genealogical method asserts exclusive to its internal coherence, its *epoch*—whether teleological or dialectical. This reading method remains attentive to absences and traces that wander outside or go *astray*. Both lines of inquiry are relevant to a grammatology—the first

outlines a genealogy whose internal characteristics and specific deployment should be accounted for, and the second allows for the possibility that those characteristics are not exclusive to their interiority but admit a *hyperbole* or excess. Let us outline both trajectories.

1. The first line of inquiry relies on a dialectical formulation of the genealogical method, attending to contestations of power as relative practices of banishment and resistance. In one such example, Foucault (1988 [1961]) calls for careful attention to the 'silence' of madness as a 'silence that speaks' under condition of a modernity that privileges 'Reason.' He states:

> The constitution of madness as a mental illness, at the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken dialogue, posits the separation as already effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the exchange between madness and reason was made. The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been established only on the basis of such a silence. I have not tried to write the history of that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence. (pp. x-xi)

Foucault proposes to uncover silence rather than produce a history of the discourse of reason. This opens his method to the possibility of accounting for the contingency of the institution—of psychiatry and of reason more broadly. Where silences exist, there could have been—there were—counter-discourses, resistances and alternatives squelched by the will-to-banish consistent with a power relation constituted by the division of subjects along the lines of sovereign authority; whereby the privileged subject of authority, the one who is *instituted* alongside the institution and its principle is counterposed by the silenced other. We witness too, however, resistances to this structuring, marking its sedimentation by virtue of a counter-representational assertion of the *subject-of/in-resistance*. History itself becomes this contention of forces as dominant or marginalized subject-positions.

Although the crucial methodological tool of Foucauldian genealogy provides for us a guide vital for critical analysis, it would seem also rightful to question how closely such a method—on

its own—cleaves to the fact of a structuring of power. In other words, it is not clear how Foucault abides by the archaeology of silence if the descriptions found in his works are constrained by the periodization of its history and the discourse of its archive. In fact, as we've noted in a Derridean response (Derrida 1978 [1967]), the analysis that Foucault produces, intent upon giving voice and listening to the silence that speaks, in practice, becomes a flat analysis of the sedimentation of power-structures whereby critical appraisal of the institution gives too much credence to the dissemination of an exclusive and asymmetrical discourse of the subject-of-authority. Its observations do little to disrupt the extraction of 'Reason' from 'madness' in their already-present *entanglements*. In this way, shedding light on the silence that speaks is either impossible or only contingently available for a genealogy that cannot escape, or provide itself a concept of exorbitancy. What is available is reduced to *traces* of an alterity, another discourse, that the archive cannot attest to lest it proclaims the (rightful) existence of its other. For this reason, to reconstruct such a fragmentary alterity remains only dubiously possible from within a genealogical method exclusively.[22]

What a genealogy can do, instead, is to mark the places of a violence enacted upon the other—not to listen to a silence but to mark a derisory speech that silences—and as such to resist or represent this violence as a *wrong* (see: Rancière 1999 [1995]). The materiality of genealogy—availing itself to the institution and its archive, even if it develops a counter-discourse and a critical frame—leaves the immateriality of silence in place. No counter-narrative can be offered where no counter-speech has been documented; a testament, instead, to the successes of the archival impulse to suppress. Furthermore, the elaboration of a counter-narrative

[22] See Saidiya Hartman's (2008) explorations of the archive of Atlantic Slavery throughout which ambiguous reference is made to the lives, and deaths, of enslaved Black women without proffering description; an index without a corresponding text, and thus a reference, she finds, that speaks to the limits of what can be said or known.

hidden within the archive of the institution does not entirely assuage this problem. The discovery, for example, of both the memoir and documentation of the life of Alexina Herculine Barbin (Foucault 1980) speaks to a necrotic trajectory of biopower upon the other—the inescapable fixation within a structure whose 'other,' as not-belonging, is marked for death. Presuming it were possible, Foucault's deployment of his own method contests itself at the moment that this hyperbolic possibility of silence—that such a silence could say anything else—is occluded for the discourse/counter-discourse or banishment-resistance dialectic to proceed. Thus, it becomes impossible for the subject of Foucault's research—even bearing his sympathies—to offer any utterance beyond its particular structuring. Herculine Barbin may have spent an entire—tragically short—life in which they never contemplated anything *other than* "that difficult game of truth" constituting their sexuality (p. xii). But Barbin's "counter-memory" (Foucault 2010a, p. 93), the very claim of their resistance, remains embedded within a structure through which they can attest to nothing else (ibid, p. 97).[23]

A Foucauldian genealogy, then, encounters obstacles both in terms of its reliance on institution and archive for the production of critical knowledge, and because of its reproduction of a subject contained within the space of its contention—even in resistance, one cannot choose more radically to be outside of the sphere of heteronormative contestation, but either 'is' or 'is not' what such an institution declares them to be. For this reason, genealogy is dialectical. It attests not to the 'pure' interiority of institutions, but to their contestations. It certainly uncovers phenomena that we must recognize, where the assertive representation of institution demonstrates the appropriative tendency to subsume otherness within itself to be banished and

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[23] So too, the meaningful contrapuntal discourse of prison inmates subsumed within the structure of a modern history of disciplinary power, even when gesturing toward the contingency of that structure, even when attending to the other-subject over the subject of power (Foucault 1995 [1975]), cannot escape the thrall of such a structuring which would mark its contingency—one remains totally inside.

silenced. We remain indebted to Foucault for these explorations and accompanying critical method. However, it is not clear if a dialectical process, the unfolding of 'effective history' can attend meaningfully to the silences it proposes. In such a critical appraisal, the dialectic re-binds a Foucauldian genealogy to the structure of power, even if through a reversal of that power. This is something, it would seem, Foucault is cognizant of.[24] A problem inheres within the genealogical method if we are not ourselves careful with it, which *forecloses hyperbole*. From within, a subject cannot but speak with the language of power-relations, cannot but rely on the grammar of this dialectic. If the 'neutral' expression of an institution produces an interior from which it distinguishes itself and authorizes the banishment of an other, what a dialectical genealogy can do does not depart from this *topos* but reverses the primacy of its positionality from self to other. Is there something more radical than this, that is also still thinkable?

2. I would like to situate Foucault's genealogy as member to what I've called a grammatological framework. There is, I think, a hyperbolic and constellatory rendering of genealogy to draw upon that meaningfully attends to the silence that speaks, the other silence before a metaphysics of the institution and its principles. Preceding the presumptions of a dialectic, this genealogy would rely upon a reading method attentive to the non-transcendent exteriority of the institution, its historical limits and thus its pre- and post-histories; the *axiomatic of the trace*. This, I term a grammatological genealogy. What would this approach to genealogy look like?

An analysis that cleaves similarly closely to a critical genealogical method of institution but does not allow for totalization might be modelled in Jacques Rancière's *La nuit des*

[24] It is also, we would say, the "structuralist totalitarianism" too forcefully asserted by Derrida (1978 [1967], p. 57; see also: Spivak 1999).

prolétaires (1981), with emphasis on the subtitle, *Archives du rêve ouvrier*.[25] His emphasis on the dreams of workers provides a metaphor for our problematic. Couched between the operations of the archive, as the site of power and the questioning of power, and the demands of work, as one's interpellation into an economy not protected from the structuring of that power, there emerges differently—exploding onto the scene of this totalizing image—the hyperbolic ambiguity and spectral force of the *dream* [*la rêve*]. Where does the dream of the worker *fit* within this genealogical contest, this dialectic of forces? Is the dream an extension of the worker's lived reality exclusively *as* a worker?

If so, then what Rancière (2018 [2000]) finds in a complex system of aesthetics in relation to politics would be impossible. Instead, he finds ample evidence for such an excessive or exorbitant possibility. He asserts:

> In [*La nuit des prolétaires*], I analysed from this perspective the complex encounter between workers and the engineers of utopia. What the Saint-Simonian engineers proposed was a new, real body for the community where the water and rail routes marked out on the ground would take the place of paper dreams and the illusions of speech. The workers, for their part, did not set practice in contrast with utopia; they conferred upon the latter the characteristic of being 'unreal', of being a montage of words and images appropriate for reconfiguring the territory of the visible, the thinkable, and the possible. The 'fictions' of art and politics are therefore heterotopias rather than utopias. (pp. 36-37)

The heterotopic visions of workers are in contention with the structure of capitalist political economy and the systematic repression of workers, not only *within* a field of institutional contestation but also insofar as this field is bracketed or bounded in its location amongst others—the very field of *this* contest is non-totalizingly member to a wider *topos*.[26] He elaborates the

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[25] In English: *Proletarian Nights: The Worker's Dream in Nineteenth-Century France* (2012).

[26] For Rancière, this demands a revaluation of the role of art as a genre, and modern art specifically. The manner by which aesthetics relates to, and elaborates upon, a sphere of political possibilities that cannot exclusively be defined by the constraints of political structure is crucial. He notes the democratization of art from the novels of Flaubert, to the Romantic, Symbolist, Dadaist and Constructivist movements, traversals of Proust's meticulous novelistic

relatively unbounded nature of this field between politics and aesthetics as follows:

> Political statements and literary locutions produce effects in reality. They define models of speech or action but also regimes of sensible intensity. They draft maps of the visible, trajectories between the visible and the sayable, relationships between modes of being, modes of saying, and modes of doing and making. They define variations of sensible intensities, perceptions, and the abilities of bodies. They thereby take hold of unspecified groups of people, they widen gaps, open up space for deviations, modify the speeds, the trajectories, and the ways in which groups of people adhere to a condition, react to situations, recognize their images. They reconfigure the map of the sensible by interfering with the functionality of gestures and rhythms adapted to the natural cycles of production, reproduction, and submission. (ibid, p. 35)

It is this relation that makes the worker a meaningful political agent, even if the structure of 'locution' is liable to anonymize them. Because a political locution can diverge from the trajectory of otherwise bounded political structure and its total authority over a sphere of sensibility (what Rancière [2012b] calls the *police*) a genealogical method must also attend to an everyday but radical divergence in trajectory. The worker might reconstruct the world differently *as* a worker, but also perhaps *as* something radically irreducible to this subject-position. In the case of *La nuit des* prolétaires, workers of the French *belle époque* remake themselves as *poets*.

Such an understanding of the potentially spontaneous exorbitancy couched in a relationship between politics and aesthetics remains the basis upon which a community is formed specifically—but not reductively—in opposition to such a structure:

> Man is a political animal because he is a literary animal who lets himself be diverted from his 'natural' purpose by the power of words… These locutions take hold of bodies and divert them from their end or purpose insofar as they are not bodies in the sense of organisms, but quasi-bodies, blocks of speech circulating without a legitimate father to accompany them toward their authorized addressee. Therefore, they do not produce collective bodies. Instead, they introduce lines of fracture and disincorporation into

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planning to Mallarmé's poetic fluidity, to Surrealist works that give expression to the unconscious; he traces the relations between these movements with contemporaneous advances in painting and the invention of photography. Ultimately, he argues, "The notion of modernity thus seems to have been deliberately invented to prevent a clear understanding of the transformations of art and its relationships with the other spheres of collective experience" (Rancière 2018 [2000], p. 21). Categorization does little to explain aesthetics within the sphere of human activity.

> imaginary collective bodies. This has always been, as is well known, the phobia of those in power and the theoreticians of good government, worried that the circulation of writing would produce 'disorder in the established system of classification'… It is true that the circulation of these quasi-bodies causes modifications in the sensory perception of what is common to the community, in the relationship between what is common to language and the sensible distribution of spaces and occupations. They form, in this way, uncertain communities that contribute to the formation of enunciative collectives that call into question the distribution of roles, territories, and languages. In short, they contribute to the formation of political subjects that challenge the given distribution of the sensible. (ibid, pp. 35-36).

Perhaps from this vantage point, a 'danger' of dialectical genealogy is not the total foreclosure of possibility, but instead the need for vigilance against reappropriation or collapse into a contestatory framework—a dialectical *topos*—within which even 'counter-subjectivity' finds a reductive place as one category amongst others. It is not just that the 'worker' might oppose the conditions of their work, but that they might remake themselves into something irreducible to 'work' entirely. A grammatological genealogy must navigate this distinction with care. The historical (if not dialectical) *topos* within which the in-stitution is entrenched is one that can be uncovered through a Foucauldian genealogy. It is not exhausted, however, because a genealogy is already in the process of bearing witness to alterity. The worker, *as worker*, might dream in a way incomprehensible to the observer unless they account for this possibility.

Thus, and furthermore, we must attend to how the problematic of a critical scholarship in general (as well as in application on borders, citizenship, migration) also exceeds the delineations of a dialectical genealogy exclusively and extends beyond its own periodization. A genealogy operates so as to offer us part of a rigorous capacity to read the interior possibilities of—the constrained utterance or elocution of—a text situated within its historical (non-transcendental) context. This context remains textual as the *decision* upon a temporal epoch, which must also be placed in question. However, a genealogy allows us to situate texts in terms

of immanent contestations between institution and excess, delineation and departure. If it is so that, in both of these respects—the non-totality of a temporal epoch, and the non-totality of the discursive constraints upon possibility rendered by an instituted structure of power—an excess can be rendered visible, an absence can be accounted for, then through what tool(s) might we produce such an analysis that attends to these excesses themselves?

ii. Etymology

> Assuring oneself of a provenance by etymologies… In addition to the fact that etymology never provides a law and only provides material for thinking on the condition that it allows itself to be thought as well, we shall attempt later to define the implication or tendency common to the two sources of meaning thus distinguished. Beyond a case of simple synonyms, the two semantic sources perhaps overlap. They would even repeat one another not far from what in truth would be the origin of repetition, which is to say, the division of the same. (Derrida 2002a, p. 71)[27]

Etymology is the first tool through which we might begin bracketing the interior practices of institutions—their epochalization and their interior elaboration of possibilities—by virtue of what is present outside of them. A critical etymology is one whereby the constitutive internal elements (the grammatical units) of an institution are found to be accounted for *only* insofar as they are explained in relation to historico-linguistic trajectories that exceed them, the fact that those elements cannot be exhaustively characterized except with reference to another linguistic institution, separate from it in history and in articulable possibilities. In this way, the colloquial definition of etymology as the 'study of the origin of words'[28] provides us with only part of what etymology can do. It is further that the 'origin' of a word—within the sphere of contemporary or

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[27] In this and all the opening quotations of this section, Derrida is making reference to the linguistic history of the term 'religion' in the context of contemporaneous trends in globalization. He finds, in particular, reason to pause on the confusion of the two roots of *religio* as *relegere*, "to harvest," and *religare*, "to bind."

[28] "The facts relating to the origin of a particular word or the historical development of its form and meaning; the origin of a particular word" (OED).

vernacular usage—is found in a language more ancient than itself, derived from a (con)textual ground distinct from this usage, that provides it with critical bite. Etymology might purport to fashion a genealogy of genealogies whereby the internal institution of words is a primary act of appropriation, at the 'origin,' of what is beyond itself. It uncovers this by asserting the relation between linguistic institutions which cannot be held within one space simultaneously—between an 'ancient' and a 'contemporary' language—but *admits an excess*.

But it finds, in this act of appropriation, something else also: "One would thus be tempted to distinguish two economies, or one economy with two systems: incorporation and repression… One must never forget, and precisely for political reasons, that the mystery that is incorporated then repressed is never destroyed. This genealogy has an axiom, namely that history never effaces what it buries; it always keeps within itself the secret of whatever it encrypts, the secret of its secret. This is a secret history of kept secrets. For that reason, genealogy is also an economy" (Derrida 2008 [1995], pp. 22-23). An etymology uncovers, using the site of the *grammē*, an act of appropriation of an exterior that constitutes the interior character of the institution. For all of its rejections, abrogations, derisions of what precedes or exceeds it—its *repressions*—the institution must also maintain the unit (and its exteriorizing resonances) inside of itself. For this reason, the interior structure of a (linguistic) institution is an *economy*, which begins with the importation of the *grammē*, translates it into an object *as if* generated from the interior, and regulates its circulation accordingly.

Such an economy must begin with an aneconomic object. This object, the *grammē*, is outlined as a purely possible unit of a linguistic economy—of textuality—but is as yet without

semantic investment.[29] What we might refer to as the *mark*—the bare, concrete object of communication that itself does not communicate—does not *mean* anything (neither in terms of meaning nor sense).[30] The mark is the 'meaningless' component of the structure of meaning. Because it provides the material ground or *support*, the *grammē* as a unit of meaning built upon it bears a radical indeterminacy that allows for its determination across texts—both within and outside of a language. The simple act of tracing shapes onto a support (a piece of paper, carved into a stone or turtle shell, woven into fabric, etc.) does not by necessity imply this economy (Derrida 1988), yet its investment with a 'meaningful' component—where the 'mark' is translated into a 'sign'—*does*. Etymology attempts to reconstruct this economy, these textual decisions, within a constellatory framework that *must* include a multiplicity of institutions (and their genealogies). The economies established by one institution must also account for how it relies on others, the play of an appropriative activity whereby a unit is incorporated (not destroyed), but denuded (repressed) of a context that would be its 'origin.'

Conventional etymology relies on a logic that allows for this excess of the unit to particular institutions to give rise to the assertion of an "institution of institutions" historically. *A logic is that which remains in language in the absence of an institution, through which the grammē circulates as member to its economy even if it is not fixed*. The thread traced by an etymological analysis speaks to this character of the *logos* insofar as a single word might *remain* when the institution of a language in general no longer organizes a linguistic *topos*. It is the *thread* and not the interiority of an *institution* that etymology attests to. Insofar as we are dealing with the logic

[29] Derrida (1988) states that this axiomatic observation demands a theory of dissemination—the relatively free circulation of grammatical units as iterable in multiple contexts and with exceptionally variable meanings—rather than merely one of polysemy—the finite and enumerable set of meanings applicable to a word as a sign.
[30] A distinction important to the works of Edmund Husserl (see: Husserl 1982 [1960], 2001 [1900/01]), who defined 'sense' (*sinn*) in terms of the experience whereby external objects and events were translated into internal and articulable signs, whereas 'meaning' (*Bedeutung*) referred to the internally originary practice of expression enacted by the transcendental-phenomenological subject (Derrida 1988, 2003 [1990], 2011 [1967]).

of sovereignty in the following section, we ought to remember that the name of sovereignty, the name of the Sovereign, is not limited to *an* institution as a material entity but is a thread that contaminates *institutions*. It is carried over from one context to another as iterable, and in particular, *as a tradition*. Where it arises that our difficulty is the absence of the institution (that is, *before* the origin), we rely on etymology to keep in sight the secret binding of languages and the indeterminacy of their possible meanings.

But such a reconstructive practice delineates two diverging uses of the tool of etymology; the reconstruction of the Same, or of difference. Under the broad heading of a notion of ‘logos’ and translation into a ‘logic,’ etymology has often leant itself to characterization as the reconstruction of a larger interior space within a single institution—where, for example, the institutionalization of a Euro-American vernacular ‘modernity’ is couched within the long history of the ‘West.’ The English language, its words, are member to a history that is said to specifically run from vernacular usage today, through the Latin language of Rome, to find its origin in ancient Greece. Thus, etymology establishes a hegemony from which English (one amongst the European inheritors of this trajectory) can be the privileged member of a history that centers the ‘West.’ The implied history of European languages—Latin or Romance languages, English, German and perhaps also Nordic and Scandanavian—follows a line from Greek ‘origins,’ through Romanizing translation, to terms in their current declensions. It is through a genetic narrative of ‘descent’ that etymology attests to an intergenerational inheritance, but also the slow deterioration of the ‘origin’ in repeated facsimiles grounding an ideological basis predicated on sameness—where ‘difference’ and ‘divergence’ are coded as deviance. Etymology explores a linguistic meta-institution predicated on the structure of the Same, then, by becoming a linguistic family-genealogy. Such an etymology is not the tracing of contestations, of the

elaborations of privileged and banished subject-positions, but the articulation of an insular 'family tree.' The repetition of an etymological narrative contributes to a predominating sameness evidenced by the similarity of markings (from λόγος to *logos*, from *logikē* to *logic*), and where differences are coded as 'accidental,' 'parasitic' or inessential.

The constellatory economy—one that would rely on 'foreign trade' more so than a regionally 'domesticated' circulation—that such an etymology reconstructs is lost in this flattening process. Institutionalization is achieved through the appropriation of its own origin—declaring it as 'appropriate'—and through the incorporation of 'foreign' signs alongside the purposeful oblivion of their excess. Here, the assertion of 'context' available to powerful institutions is useful for maintaining political authority. The mark, as a sign within the textual *topos* of *one* language, is present as inextricable from that language as its context, even if this is demonstrably untrue. In response, we must assert at the outset that both the phonetic resonances and the signifying content of the terms are worth attending to, but they cannot be brought into a cohesive whole, which would imply the observable fixation of their presence (a stable and finite number of meanings attributed to each mark uniquely) and the (fore)closure of their possibilities. We are liberated, in a sense, by the fact that there is nothing that inheres within the term 'etymology' etymologically—neither the *etymon* ('truth,' 'actuality') nor the *logos* ('word,' 'speech,' 'language')—that demands a particular reading.[31] Etymology, by treating each word in a language as an institution in itself—a site or object of study from which analysis can proceed—disrupts the discursive institution of authority as telling the 'Grand History' of one bounded community. This opens the possibility of exploring the alterations of terms within the practice of repetition. The thread of linguistic elements not bounded by the frontiers of internally situated

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[31] As Kristeva (1989 [1981]) notes, the earliest usage of etymology by Varro, as the first branch of grammar, did not qualify a 'history of words,' but rather, it "would search for the connection between words and things" (p. 119).

languages meet, where the traces of linguistic contaminations is observed, where the assertion of a national idiom as a language without an outside is met with suspicion (Correia 2021). The institution of the mark is possible because of its iterability *as other*.

A method of reading that explores this I call a critical etymology *of difference*. This would perhaps begin by rethinking the confusion of origins: it is not ancient *Greek* that provides the origin for contemporary English terminology, but a more nebulous relation to Indo-Sanskrit languages which give it (Greek) its own orientation (Skeat 1985; Kristeva 1989 [1981]).[32] This would imply that we have departed already from the interiority of the 'West,' *in the beginning*, at its origin.[33] From this starting point, the political regulations that secure a 'domestic' institution of language—which relations are declared, which are repressed—are both brought to the foreground, and placed in question. The trajectory of an etymological analysis will have to deal with two politico-historical problems. The first is this problem of origin from which the furthest limit (at the beginning) of a linguistic tradition and its community (from Greece to the 'Western present') is confronted by another origin outside of this historical security. A second would attend to how the assertion of this origin (asserted *late*—not in ancient Greece but modern Europe well after the fact, by Franz Bopp), as a political practice, opens speculation upon others. Perhaps most important would be the repression of Arabic language and culture as constitutive for this history, this body, of the 'West' (Gutas 1988; chapter 3).

It is also, then, because an etymological analysis uncovers a history of contestations of the deployment, meaning and situation of grammatical units across a vast *topos* that cannot be constituted as an 'interior space'—still inextricably bound to specific institutions but not

[32] This relation was first explored by Rasmus Rask (1787-1832) but was situated historically as a rigorous linguistic study by Franz Bopp (1791-1867) (Kristeva 1989 [1981], pp. 197-202).
[33] Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* (1987, 1991, 2006) is also a fascinating testament to similar relational between Indo-European, Egyptian and Semitic, languages as ancestors to classical Greek.

permitting that those institutions be gathered and periodized under the ‘theme’ of their sameness—that it attests to an excess. This *topos* does not constitute an interior space, the space even of an ‘institution of institutions’ such as the ‘West.’[34] It is, rather, how an elaboration of such a contest between agents inhabiting considerably remote or separate spaces and times—which themselves require elaboration in relation to these contestations at a distance—from which we might find that a genealogy exclusively concerned with interiority is inadequate for our purposes. From the historical situation of these differences, which cannot be rendered exclusively as ‘confrontations,’ we must find a tool that can build upon this etymological possibility to recover other conditions and possibilities that would otherwise remain concealed.

iii. Pragmatics

> An analysis above all concerned with pragmatic and functional effects, more structural and also more political, would not hesitate to investigate the usages or applications of the lexical resources, where, in the face of new regularities, of unusual recurrences, of unprecedented contexts, discourse liberates words and meaning from all archaic memory and from all supposed origins. (Derrida 2002a, p. 71)

Pragmatics designates the name for an instrument of reading by which we might draw parallel departures from a genealogical analysis that etymology has provided to the generation of new languages and new institutions. If etymology challenges the exclusive interior composition of a text historically through the excavation of linguistic traces, pragmatics challenges the interior composition of a text *in toto* as an intertextual artifact. As Derrida mentions, such an analytic tool would concern itself with the “functional effects,” usages, applications and lexical resources available to an individual text as conditioned by its situation in history. Such an

[34] This limitations of conventional etymology is particularly important to note in light of what Jay Goulding (2021) evocatively mentions in discussion of intercultural explorations between East and West through which *translation* becomes *transportation*: “Because language is our friend, etymologies are the quickest elevators to the ancient worlds of Greece and China” (p. 374).

analytic would bring forward (textualize) the political and non-declarative conditions bearing upon the declarations, decisions and possibilities of textual production. A pragmatic method must attend to the *conditions* of the text, its constraints and location within, "the grammatical, rhetorical and pragmatic specificity of the utterance" (Derrida 2013, p. 66). It would also, however, attend to how those conditions remain non-totalizing, how the text might attest to its own departure from economic regulations of textuality, to have "[liberated] words and meaning from all archaic memory and from all supposed origins" (Derrida 2002a, p. 71). Following this train of thought, we must outline how a pragmatic exploration operates through the entanglement between *speech* and *action*—and to expand the notion of a 'speech act' as the *act of the text*.

The pragmatic elements of linguistic usage bear a certain mark of conditional *presence*, of an analysis that will allow a historical undertaking to continue to bear—observably, apparently—resonances today. It is in this sense that we take on a discussion of contemporary scholarship on migration and critical of sovereignty insofar as the very principle of such a speech is already an action, is already urgently needed and pressing. A pragmatic like this would elaborate what can or cannot be done, what can or cannot be said, as a vacillating structure of possibility against impossibility, of the opening against the delimitation of the institution. Our question would be twofold. On the one hand we can ask the more specific question: *what do words do*? What does a text *do* in light of—and in *spite* of—the conditions that bear upon it? These conditions may be broadly political, social, cultural, economic, linguistic. They are in whole historical, if we extend to the word the privileged space of a receptacle for the unfolding of these others, but *not* of the maintenance of an interior *topos* to which one might bestow a name like "the West." In this way, for example, Derrida (2004) finds an important site for a pragmatic critique in what seems a non-philosophical comment of Descartes':

> If I write in French which is the language of my country, rather than in Latin which is that of my teachers, that is because I hope that those who avail themselves only of their natural reason in its purity may be better judges of my opinions than those who believe only in the writings of the ancients; and as to those who unite good sense with study, whom alone I crave for my judges, they will not, I feel sure, be so partial to Latin as to refuse to follow my reasoning because I expound it in a vulgar tone. (Descartes 1997, sec. 77-78)

Importantly, this is a semi-autobiographical, but also a political statement on the topic of vernacular against Latin language-use that emerges from within a philosophical text. An analytical framework that purports to study it requires the tools through which these 'generic' conditions can be explored, and certainly, explored simultaneously.[35]

The way it seems this statement has often been received (see: Enrique Chávez-Arvizo in his introduction to Descartes' *Key Philosophical Writings* [1997], pp. xii-xiv) is as a rebellious response to the repression of vernacular speech by the Roman Catholic Church. This repression not only affected the reception of his work but that of a number of thinkers at the time, especially the contemporaneous trial of Galileo following the publication of *The Two Chief Systems of the World* in 1632 referenced by Descartes (see: Santillana 1955). Certainly this is true—both the initial reception of the *Discourse on Method* published in 1637, and the scientific publications of the time, were vulnerable to Church opprobrium, censorship, and even the persecution of the author prompting the philosopher to publish the *Discourse* anonymously. However, the royal decree of Villers-Cotterêts, passed a century earlier in 1539, already laid the groundwork through which the French monarchy, as a burgeoning state, constituted legal authority through the

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[35] On the question of genre, Derrida (1992a) makes the considerable contribution of exploring the problem of literary boundary-maintenance, which seems at odds with often exorbitant contents. We've referenced the text, "Laws of Genre," in the collection *Acts of Literature* (1992a) already, but it is worth noting in this case how the enforcement of genre constitutes a hindrance to scholarship. The sixth part of the *Discourse on Method* is dedicated to an auto-biographical statement—one that revolves around the Roman Catholic Church's contemporaneous persecution of Galileo and dogmatic responses to Descartes' own writings. The student of philosophy most likely to come to this work is liable to pass over this quotation in silence, whereas the student of sociology or history might not approach such a text at all. In this sense, while we uphold that the boundaries of a discipline should be rigorously defined, we should also remain vigilant regarding what interdisciplinary possibilities are occluded by these borders.

enforced usage of vernacular language would allow it to leverage its power against the Church (Derrida 2004, pp. 6-16). In this sense, Descartes' statement still risks the castigation of one power, but it also abides by the authority of another to which it pays homage.

Descartes' statement on the use of vernacular language, then, is more complex than it seems—through which a scholar would be forced to navigate the tenuous relationship he (and others) bore with the Church. This is only made more demanding in light of emergent political assertions instituting the French nation-state coterminous with a common language against the institution of the Church and its authoritative Latin. In this way, a pragmatics of textual analysis, as Derrida deploys, might uncover the threads that constrain or authorize speech, particularly in places or ways that would have been unexpected. In this case, it is both a contention between two institutions within a historical 'present' (the Church and the French State), but also the intersection of historical epochs (of a theological-pastoral Medievalism metonymically represented by the Latin language against a secular Modernity represented by the French vernacular) that constraints Descartes' discourse. That the text is the site from which such an analysis proceeds is crucial for such a method—rather than reconstruct a 'scene' through which the text can be 'fit,' it would seem that Descartes' *Discourse* attests to how a text both monumentalizes and *reconstructs its own* (often unstated) conditions.[36] This recursive and anachronistic condition through which what takes place *after* gathers what has come *before* into an institution through which contestations, disagreements, violences more apparently take place, is one of the ways approach the pragmatic character of texts. Descartes becomes the 'freedom fighter' of a secular modernity against Church authority *and* the harbinger of a new sovereignty

[36] This has often been understood in the works of literary criticism, where, for example, Jorge Luis Borges (2000) had noted (some twenty years before Derrida and the 'invention' of deconstruction) that Franz Kafka's precursors are categorized together in spite of their generic variety *because* of his influence on literature (see: pp. 363-365).

in the French state from within a *philosophical* text that does not declare to perform either role.

In light of this, on the other hand, I ask: *what are the effects of words*? Here, beyond the 'action' of a speech act itself, and the subsequent implications of a subject of action beneath them, we find a web of implications in the appearance of words as markers for the possibility of possibility. In this sense, we must attend to how the existence of the word implies the transition from nothingness into being—from oblivion into revelation—and thus the existence of a collection of imaginary referents constructed *after* their supposed origin. The word, as an institution itself, begets the effect of the possibility of thinking, which is not confined to an exclusively forward or backward movement nor to the 'thinker' as their subject (Heidegger 1982 [1959]). Thus, eschewing the structure of intentionality—where *only* what can be effected by words is what is authorized by the author of a text—a pragmatic analysis also asks what the self-standing implications of a text entail, how it has been received unexpectedly or how it reorganizes what precedes it. This is especially important within a tradition of 'deconstructive' reading that has often produced unorthodox readings.[37] But it is also generally a valuable insight through which we might understand a pragmatic analysis to be capable of challenging an authority and a tradition. Rather than contain individual texts within the receptacle of their abeyance to what is authorized we might uncover also an excess through which the text demands a revaluation of tradition. Pragmatics, it would seem, is both rendered as the conditions bearing upon a text, and the conditions the text begets. Most importantly, this provides for us a vantage through which the text becomes conditioned by a historical *topos*—political, social, economic, and *discursive*—but also demonstrates how the text can be engaged in the *genesis of novel*

[37] The works of both James Joyce (Derrida 1992a) and Hélène Cixous (Derrida 2006a/b) also demonstrate a capacity to do something meaningfully new in literature. See also Derrida's (1979) unorthodox reading of Nietzsche's marginal note, "I forgot my umbrella."

linguistic and institutional possibilities.

In sum, pragmatics expands the scope of possible analysis beyond the periodization of a genealogy of institutions through the analysis of a contest of grammatical units within a wider historical *topos* that ultimately cannot be reduced to a receptacle. The historical and discursive conditions bearing upon a text must be attended to as a backdrop. Yet, pragmatics also extends analysis insofar as it demands we attend not only to the historical or temporal unfolding of textual relations (etymology), but in the resonances they bear, the conditions they articulate and themselves constitute, which are also political and social (as in the example discussed), but could also be cultural, linguistic or economic. Understanding that pragmatics provides us with this opening, it also primes us to note exorbitant possibilities and in particular the possibilities of generating new grammatical and institutional forms—what I refer to in the fourth and fifth chapter of this work as a *portable grammar of emplaced possibilities*. It is *because* we can account for these conditions that a reading does not reduce texts merely to responses to them but attests to how they establish conditions themselves as unprecedented institutions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the method and tools of a grammatological project. In keeping with the previous chapter, I began with a discussion of ‘reading’ as the centrepiece for a critical method that draws upon expanded definitions of ‘writing’ and ‘text.’ In this case, the play of *différance* constitutes the text, and reading becomes a method to observe this play critically. But reading unfolds also as a problematic. If not confined to scholarly empiricism, it is still caught within a sphere of textuality whereby the reader, if they are ‘outside’ of any particular text, are not outside of language and its constraints. The first instance of this problematic takes

place when one's position as a reader is identified as outside of *this* text—where one recognizes themselves participating in a textual world that is not their own. The authority of authorship continuously banishes the reader from the text, marked as an outsider. Their attempt to reconcile the text with their 'exile' implies forms of intimacy (to supplement the text with an interpretation drawn the reader's own world) and conflict (refusal to accept the premises of the author).

The result is an unstable subjecthood through which textuality emerges as a play; not of the war waged between reader and author, but the limits and possibilities opened or closed by a text in the act of reading. Following this, the reader reconstructs the text through supplementation and situation—to con-textualize a singular text in light of wider historical constraints, and to mark the places where a text is exorbitant to them. This political and interpretive activity marks the places of the boundary-construction of a text, as well as its flights from this construction. As the first 'guest' within the *topos* of a text, these movements constitute the becoming-reader and challenge their self-cohesion at any time. Their result is to provide a starting point for a politic of hospitality through one's remark upon absent rather than present possibilities, made available by the reader's estrangement from the text. It is the guest, not the host, who authorizes welcome.

A grammatology relies on the tools of genealogy, etymology, and pragmatics. Genealogy allows us to contend with institutions as texts—forms of contestation rather than fixed and posited interiorities. Genealogy is also valuable for disrupting presumptions of historical periodization, diffusing the 'borders' of the institution in light of other times and places. For this reason, genealogy uncovers, without yet traversing, a constellation of traces that lead outside of itself. As such, I've proposed etymology as a second tool that demands one account for the interior construction of an institution through elements that are outside of it *originally*. Although etymology can reinforce the dynamics of an insular 'tradition,' it also provides a critical starting-

point for the deconstruction of insularity (reconceptualizing the 'West' in a 'pre-originary' relation to Sanskrit, and in consistent conversation with Arabic translation). Etymology provides the basis upon which we view a linguistic economy that attempts to incorporate and/or repress even its most intimate elements *as exterior*. This is developed further through a pragmatics beyond linguistics, situating an institution *as text* within a field of possibilities or constraints, the dynamics of power and contest of boundaries, incorporation or absence of elements, and unconditioned exorbitancies—the generation of new languages.

I propose to consider the *logic of sovereignty* in the following chapter, with emphasis on its diverse forms of institutionalization that constitute the 'West' as a regionally and historically situated political category. Such a logic—a *logos*, both as writing, speech, thought, and as a *logical structure*—underpins the contemporary political consolidation of the notion of the 'West' in European 'modernity' from the 14th century and gaining considerable pace in the 19th century, but making a claim to ancient Greece nearly three millennia prior. This is situated in light of the 'tradition' of a heteronomic 'sovereignty' of the 'West' delimiting interior from exterior. Under the contemporary globalization of the nation-state—authorizing the regulation of movement in the detention and deportation of migrants, the enforcement and extra-territorialization of borders, the cultural production of xenophobia—this problematic logic is particularly urgent to grasp. A grammatological framework and its tools uncover how institutional practices are predicated on this logic. The result is to foreclose possibility concomitant with the enclosure of political space.

Chapter 3: The Logic of Sovereignty

Introduction: *Logos*, *Technē* and 'Tradition'

> That which has been is what will be, that which is done is what will be done, and there is nothing new under the sun.
>
> —Ecclesiastes 1:9 [NKJV]

In the previous chapters, I outlined a grammatological framework, its method and application. To follow, I will apply this framework and method to three sites—to the logic of sovereignty, to migrant-rights movements under categories of resistance, refusal and absence, and to the open city. In this chapter, I ask how an economy of sovereign authority—one that manifests textually through declarations and the deployment of a play of interiority against exteriority in an inter-textual economy—is iterated upon in a tradition of Western logocentrism (Derrida 1997 [1967]). In light of the notion of *possibilia*, I ask: how does the iteration of authority historically establish its own textual possibility through the foreclosure of others, and how does this constitute a tradition of political thought we refer to as the 'West?' If Western logocentrism is characterized by the attempts of phonetic languages (Greek, Latin, and European vernaculars) to concoct complex systems for the assertion of truth, then the very need to assert 'truth' betrays its lack. Instead, such a tradition relies on a logical formation of politics—rehearsing its presuppositions, metaphors, questions, and authorities. This establishes the conditions for a globalized political thought *today* predicated on the actualization of the nation-state; the *logic of sovereignty* provides the ground for a consolidated system of nation-states through its iterability, and the generation of technologies of enforcement that demonstrate its correspondence to the political reality it constructs.

Treating language through the lens of arche-writing, the activities that organize an interior space of political ontology demonstrate a decision upon difference from an 'other'—the

boundary claimed by the sovereign—rather than a self-present fact of reality. What we've noted of Derrida's (1997 [1967]) term, 'metaphysics of presence,' bears implications for the interiority of a 'nation,' the criteria constituting citizenship, the sovereign assertion over a rightful territory and populace (the conventional Westphalian definition of sovereignty) insofar as such practices are rendered *possible and self-defeating at once*, as linguistic activities. If the structural assertion of the presence of a 'people' (its representation, the composition of utterances that construct it) is always arbitrarily possible—can be uttered without reference to a grounding 'reality'—it also betrays a temporal deferral (the second of the two definitions of the trace discussed above). Deferral speaks to the manners whereby an other haunts this structure, demonstrates its activity is an economy that could always be radically otherwise, and is thus subject to 'collapse.'

We can, then, as readers, interrogate this economy. In this chapter, I outline a problematic of the logic of sovereignty as co-constitutive with Western logocentrism. Where the notion of the 'West' animates a specific constellation of representations—and an authority over the possibility or impossibility of representation (*representability*)—the logic of sovereignty provides the structural and technical grounding for this expression. The co-constitution of these dimensions is bound within a historical *topos* that occludes its economy—how the images of the 'West' and its 'others' shift over time, how sovereignty is articulated in response to differing spatio-temporal conditions. The logic of sovereignty is the linguistic inheritance of a question that presuppose one does not need to contend with the encounter between strangers but to secure a given community, and where the notion of the stranger can be reincorporated through hostility or comparison—always, ideally, at a distance. Such a practice, although it may seem natural, is

anything but. It is the closely guarded regulation of textual iteration as sameness across a history of asserted ‘absolute powers’ *as if* natural or inevitable.[38]

The notion of ‘sovereignty’ as well as the application of a term like the ‘West’ are as yet unsituated in the work purposefully. I do not wish to give the impression that the notion of ‘sovereignty’ is and remains a ‘purely Western’ concept that travels ‘elsewhere,’ in particular—as discussed in chapter three—because of the key shift undergone in light of the processes of global colonization. Certainly, even before this process is initiated, what constitutes the ‘West’—let alone sovereignty—is in no way a stable geographical signifier but a complicated, and often outright contradictory, political marker in a discourse of authoritative representations. A large part of the argument of the following work is not only to trace this more overt declaratory political activity, but to take note of how what is too easily referenced as the ‘West’ emerges and is drawn from outside of its geography. This takes place in four instances. First, the ‘West’ as a catch-all for vernacular Europe and some of its settler colonies in an unproblematic tradition bound to classical Rome and Greece—as declared in the famous opening of Chrétien de Troyes’ *Cligés* that ‘learning’ was ‘passed down’ from the Greeks to the Romans and the Romans to ‘us’ (in this case, the Franks)—is decidedly rejected in favour of a ‘tradition’ of authoritative assertion over ‘inheritance.’ Second, beyond the horizon of Greece, one finds a multitude of precedent cultures, from Mesopotamia to Persia, Semitic and Egyptian cultures from which they are drawing. If the historical narrative of ‘Greece’ is the privileged inheritance of the ‘West,’ then both are, in fact, already intercultural; their names signify very little inherent or internally cohesive meaning, but rather, gesture toward an economy that always-already flees from its privileged space, subject, themes, and their authorities. Third, in following, a key indicator of the

[38] Bartelson (1996) discusses international political theory (emphasizing the 'realist' anarchic interstate system) as one field presupposing that, from the ubiquity of this logic, one can conclude its naturalness.

'greatness' of the 'West' is often marked by its relation to the 'origin' of Platonic and Aristotelian thought. However, it is also well-documented that the Baghdad school of translation, and the powerful commentaries of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina, constitute key reasons for the 'rediscovery' of Aristotle in the Renaissance, as well as for Aristotle's place of esteem.

But it is the final reason that is the most disorienting. The vast implications of colonialism that condition and continue to affect a contemporary globalized world under discussion here, as Radhika Mongia (2018) notes, entails also that the abstract logic of sovereignty discussed here, when manifested *in situ* in the colonial context, may also seemingly flout its own logic. That is, for example, what she refers to as a logic of facilitation entails that Indian indentured labourers were forced to move amongst the colonial holdings of the British Empire around the world in *greater* numbers, something that a logic of sovereignty reliant upon distinction between 'interior' and 'exterior' is prone to overlook if it focuses only on 'immigration regulation' as implicitly 'migration obstruction.' Certainly, it cannot be said that 'sovereignty' is a conceptual structure that merely emerges in the 'West'—which, again, is a deeply unstable category of political boundary-maintenance and not a stable geographical territory and history—to be 'exported' elsewhere. On the contrary, a model of Derridean dissemination is intended to capture how tools of logical and technical control can emerge in diverse sites, and can travel to other diverse sites in non-reductive patterns, while asserting further that those movements can be traced—and not necessarily linearly. However, it is also crucial, as Mongia notes, that the 'logic of constraint' that constitutes a latter stage of British Imperial rule over its colonies, which organizes the groundwork for the post-colonial international system of nation-states that characterizes our present (see: Sharma 2020), that the regulatory logic of 'interior-exterior' remains, and remains central to nation-state sovereignties worldwide. We might make two further observations from

this point. Firstly, in terms of its 'logic,' usage of terms 'interiority' and 'exteriority' instead of 'insider' and 'outsider' are specifically meant to provide generality to the discussion to follow—they do not speak to subject-positions that are already determined in their relations to others. This is because what constitutes an 'outsider'—as, for example, discussed in the figure of the 'stranger' in Georg Simmel's work (see: chapter 5; Isin 2004)—may also find a great deal of *interiority* to the text. A more tangible example might be made of the Athenian *metoikia* (the system of 'foreigner' status that at once allowed non-citizens to be involved in economic life in Athens and barred them from political representation). In this case, the uncomfortable interior-exterior position felt by the *metic* is generated in the tension between being an economic contributor to Athens (not only paying the *metoikion*, the foreigner-tax, but in taking part more generally in public life) while, especially during and after the Tyranny of the Thirty, being a targeted class without recourse to political redress (D. Whitehead 1977). Analysis of a protean logic of sovereignty, here, would demand that one at once recognize that a *marginalized* group is also the focus of a claim upon belonging to the political community; that xenophobic suspicions against foreigners at once make a claim upon 'exteriorized' agents, bringing them *within* a discourse and logically rendering them 'outside.' I think one might tentatively say something similar of Indian indentured workers, whose treatment as labourers to be moved around the empire at will demonstrates at once a characteristic lack of ethical consideration by a sovereign who cannot recognize another as a meaningful agent and member to a shared political world, while also making a claim upon their body, their work, and the very place that they inhabit.

This leads to a second observation at the outset, that the technical programme consonant with a logic of sovereignty is often one that must, in practice, bend the rules of its own border-logic in order to actualize it. The perennial example discussed here is the increasing prevalence

of extra-territorial border enforcement mechanisms—often diplomatic agreements between countries stipulating that one ensure migrants do not arrive even at the border of the other, but also strategically geo-located immigration agency offices outside of a country's own territory that dissuade migration to that country. These techniques do the work of ensuring migrants cannot set foot on the country's territory. What is referred to as the 'logic of sovereignty' is intended to capture both aspects of this twofold process as it takes place. On one hand, on a declaratory level, the assertion that 'others should not come here' must be understood in the authoritative register of establishing an interior by negating an exterior. On the other hand, the application of techniques that already leave the bordered territory in order to bring about its intended effect, to render truthful the claim that a political 'we' is in fact distinct from others, also betrays its own declared claim. As such, a crucial mechanism for the assertion of a nation-state's sovereignty, in light of the logic of sovereignty, demands we attend to what a state apparatus is doing outside of its own borders in order to generate the imaginary that it is internally coherent and externally distinct. This is to further understand, as Mongia (2018) notes, that the authority held over any subject's—and not merely a privileged 'citizen's'—mobility can also be used to justify a massive bureaucratic apparatus, even one that is intent on overseeing the 'facilitation,' rather than the obstruction, of movements around the world; that is, in legitimating a growing disciplinary power. This appropriative operation—of bringing greater numbers of 'concerns' under the purview of a singular *Raison d'État*—remains an expression of a generalizable logic of sovereignty even (*especially*) where its practice and its underlying textual economy *breaks* the assumed distinction between interiority and exteriority.

One way to enter into a study of the logic of sovereignty is through the entanglement of *logos* and *technē* historically, and in the diffuse constellation of 'tradition.'[39] *Logos* is a term that often refers to speech but, in the ancient Greek sense, also speaks generally to matters of thought, expression and writing, through which a discovery of the world—the generation of knowledge—is not an individual but a collective practice. *Logos*, then, is a term that refers to various activities including memory, imagination, critique and judgment, but also to more concrete and social practices: dialogue, *poiesis*, and the communal production of meaning.[40] *Technē* refers to a knowledge grounded in practical experience, a *craft*, whose demonstration is the presence of a newly constructed object specific to that craft. The contemporary English usage of the term *technology* binds these definitions in a way that seems to operate recursively as 'a practical knowledge of a discovered (spoken) knowledge.' Through the addition of a material component—the presence of an object—these terms are bound together meaningfully. 'A' technology is the object through which an understanding of the world is bound to a craft.

Although the relationship between *logos* and *technē* is shared by the analytical sites of this work—in particular in what grounds the *logic of sovereignty* in this chapter and the conditions of the *open city* in chapter five—I argue that their relationship is constitutively different. Two *traditions* bind *logos* and *technē* from differing sites of, on one hand, a grassroots politic and its aspirations, and, on the other, the dissemination of a logic of sovereignty in contemporary

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[39] I am following, here, a critique of political ontology, and in particular the political implications of the philosophy of Roman *imperium* occluding the Greek *polis* system explored by Martin Heidegger (1997). See also Jay Goulding's (2022) discussion of this text in particularly interesting dialogue with Daoist thought.

[40] As discussed in the following section, the translation of *logos* into a Roman idiom, as *ars logica*, through the addition of *teknē* (where the *discipline* of logic is referenced in early Roman thought as *ē logikē teknē*, or 'the craft of logic') also initiates the process whereby this free-flowing *logos* will be itself translated into the ordered and disciplinary activity of a structured political institution—an activity prefigured in Plato's *Republic* (Heidegger 1998). This corresponds with the classification process of language itself through Latin grammar initiated by Varro (Kristeva 1989 [1981]). It is a trajectory that concludes, for us, with the presumptive use of the term 'logic' as a "science of reasoning correctly" (Skeat 1985 [1879], p. 347).

statecraft. Neither tradition is often acknowledged as such; the secrecy of the trace operates through *absence* as much as *presence*. As a comparable illustration, Başak Ertür (2016) speaks to the forgotten tradition of the barricades in the neighborhood of Gezi in Istanbul in resistance to Turkish government's unlawful demolition of Gezi Park, which gave rise to the establishment of the Gezi commune and a state-free zone for ten days (p. 98). Exploring these events, she finds that the craft of building barricades represents a spontaneous act of resistant counter-monumentalization linked to leftist and grassroots protest in Gezi park from the 1950s to the massive showing of the May 1st protest of 1977, also violently repressed. It does so without showing this linkage overtly. What is further, the pragmatic use of barricades is not only part of an internal passing-down of practical knowledge from elders to children. Ertür quotes the poetry of René Char (2010 [1946]), a member of the French anti-Fascist resistance during the Second World War: "Our inheritance is preceded by no testament" (p. 155).

The craft of building barricades speaks to a common desire for resistance (Traugott 2010). It also speaks to what remains unspoken in the passage of a spontaneous and impossible memory—a memory that is *not mine* even if I hold it within myself. By convention, the notion that such a tradition could exist seems suspect without supplementation—say, a text situating the Gezi uprising in light of the barricades of the French Revolution bound in the biography of one inventive protestor. This has specifically *not* emerged in Ertür's analysis with good reason. The tradition bears no passage, and yet, there *is* a language shared between these popular resistance movements in common across distance. Although it is not bound through the existence of a self-present national community embodying the regulated national language, the barricades represent a diffuse system of cross-cultural expression and understanding. In the tradition of the

barricades, “It is written” not as declared law either in a book or on a wall, but as a textual economy of implicit and absent meanings.

But there is another such example with rather different implications, one that foregrounds a *logical* activity as a tradition—as the iterable ordering of thought—which places a *technē* in its service. Simon Critchley (2012) notes of the logic of the Bush administration that it expressed what he calls a ‘crypto-Schmittian’ politic.[41] That is, politics under Bush’s administration in the United States abided by certain principles and textual elaborations of Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, particularly in the manner of a fantastical construction of enemies (‘Islamists,’ ‘terrorists,’ ‘unlawful enemy combatants’) as well as the use of “shock and awe” violence (the spectacle of carpet bombings on display during the bombing of Baghdad, and claims of ‘weapons of mass destruction’). The categories of friend-enemy as existentially salient (constituted through a possible annihilatory contest [Schmitt 2007 [1932]]) allowed the Bush administration to maintain sovereign authority over a depoliticized sphere of politics and presume primacy over the security of the ‘homeland.’ Rhetorical and technical practices of declaring ‘pre-emptive defense,’ opening the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, ‘collateral damage,’ passing the PATRIOT Act and subsequent erosion of citizens’ rights through surveillance and circumvention of the criminal trial process all co-constituted the logical activity of the friend-enemy distinction in a way that was *not new*. Rather, the capacity of the US government to practice a crypto-Schmittian politics—something that ultimately hurled the United States into the longest war in its history, the ‘War in Afghanistan’ (2001-2021)—does not entail that they had ‘read their Carl Schmitt.’ However, their *logical* (rhetorical) and *technical activities* speak to a translation of Schmitt’s

[41] For Critchley, Bush’s re-election in 2004 implicates a more general ‘logic of the political’ in ‘Bush’s America.’

particular conception of sovereignty. In this sense, such a tradition need not be formalized under a single name but bears a remarkable sameness of expression nonetheless.[42]

This logic of a sovereign authority *without* an institutional passage or perdurance informed Paul Gilroy's (2000) critique of the often intangible threads through which an aesthetic that accompanied Nazism remains iterated upon within Western cultural production *without* a grounding political institution. That is, long after Nazi Germany's formal unconditional surrender in May 1945, a constellation of cultural and technical objects remains as a forgotten legacy. The ways that one event of institution might influence or inform others can be direct—violent nationalist movements, fascisms in other locales, ethnic cleansing and genocide (see: Meiches 2019). However, they may also abide by less tangible logics—cultural homogeneity, the production of an 'enemy-other,' the goal of ethnic or national purity—or speak to more ubiquitous shared preconditions—popular conservatism, patriarchal sexism and misogyny, xenophobia, the reproduction of 'values,' aesthetics, bureaucratic structures, biological racism, distain for marginalized groups, shared fantasies of 'purity' or 'apocalypse,' charismatic leaders, discursive presumptions of belonging. Such relations specific to political forms of rule demand account attentive to the relations between limited empirical observations and the non-empirical threads that bind them. Thus, one must not delimit National Socialism too hastily when its flags and gestures were recently brandished alongside guns and makeshift weapons at the 'Unite the Right' rally in Charlottesville North Carolina in August, 2017 (Tenold 2018). One cannot assume its delimitation when, at a white supremacist conference in Washington DC on 19 November 2016, white nationalist (and so-called originator of the term 'alt-right') Richard

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[42] So too, if specifically a crypto-Schmittian *logic* characterizes the Bush administration as a strange tradition-without-one, it would seem that the same lineage in general captures 'the political' in a Trumpist America. Circumstantially, this is aided by the usage of the term 'crypto-Nazism' as early as 1990 in relation to Trump's admission to having read Hitler's speeches (Brenner 1990).

Spencer concluded a speech with the words, “Hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory!” in response to which audience members performed Nazi salutes (Lombroso and Applebaum 2016).

Because the United States and other Western countries depicted themselves following the Second World War is as essentially already distinct from Nazi Germany, the complicated passage of constitutive elements *without* a name demands constant vigilance (Gilroy 2000, pp. 227-228; Arendt 2006b [1963]).[43] A material analysis of the icons, symbols, aesthetics, and discursive structures between these networks would provide one meaningful way to outline their connections, borrowings, and divergences as members to a non-instituted tradition (Gilroy 2000). Another, to which Gilroy gestures, would find in these networks an *impulse* toward the discovery—or rediscovery—of an underlying textuality in terms of the desires and expressions they manufacture; that connotative features of Western modernity’s ‘flirtations’ with what is called fascism did not begin or end with Nazism (Arendt 1994a). For that, a grammatological analysis proves useful for taking note of the forms of institutionalization at play in a text and how they co-constitute their ‘contexts’ (subjectivities, structures of desire, histories, metaphysics)—how a text might *institutionalize before the institution* (Derrida 1997 [1967], pp. 158-159) an iterative and ungrounded activity of grammatical circulation. This is what I propose in the chapter to follow, which outlines the threads that bind a ‘tradition’ of texts gathered under the ‘West’ as a *logic of sovereignty* and the manner by which that logic is expressed through a *technē* of contemporary immigration regulations.

[43] American politics is also not where this ‘tradition’ ends, since Trump’s presidency binds a rightward swing in the global politics of nation-states from Hungary’s Viktor Orbán (since 2010), India’s Narendra Modi (since 2014), and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro (since 2019). It also propelled ultra-nationalist protests—including monthly demonstrations in downtown Toronto from 2018-2020 by far-right and neo-fascist organizations (see: Perry and Scrivens 2019).

Structure's Empire and the 'West' as Speaking-Order

In the first chapter, I outlined how we might articulate Derrida's (1997 [1967]) concept of 'Western logocentrism.' Through this term, he accounts for a practice of boundary-maintenance whereby a notion of 'truth' as spoken reference takes place through a structure of difference. Because language does not have the capacity to make reference to a 'transcendental signified' beyond the text (beyond the situation of this structuring of differences), then a text is instead thrust into a play of justificatory and self-assertive appropriation, incorporation and repression, deferral and attempts at reiteration—*différance*. Such an economy of textual iteration (rather than a 'structure' *per se*), in the absence of a referential truth, relies instead on the maintenance of hierarchicalized dualities and their borders (human vs nature, self vs other, speech vs writing), which constitute the unstable notion of the 'West' (Derrida 1997 [1967]). The matter of a historical region in both space and time, and the deployment of a logic of difference are not separable. The 'West' *is* this play of borders, always shifting and yet presenting itself as a concrete and stable entity over time—ultimately as the receptacle of the historical epochs that envelopes ancient Greece, Rome, Medieval and the 'modern' vernacular present (Schürmann 2003). How does the representation of these dualisms unfold?

Le dehors et/est le dedans: The Outside and/is the Inside

The textual economy of the West operates as a play of interiority-exteriority—the maintenance of a self through banishment of an 'other' who is 'outside' of the text. In order to perform such a 'banishment,' though, it is necessary for the other to be defined *within* the space of the text, so as to be *marked* for banishment—both inside and outside. In Derrida's (1997

[1967]) case,[44] this takes place in two movements. First, an 'ideal' and a 'non-ideal' figure are proposed; the non-ideal being marked as inferior to the ideal. Second, the ideal is explored without reference of the non-ideal only after this initial figuration; the absence of the other is performed in the text. In this way, a text holds authority over what is and is not represented. But it is essentially incomplete. Derrida notes an entanglement between *declaration* and *description* where the a thesis is declared to be self-standing while it draws necessarily from descriptive introduction of an 'other.' The tracing of a 'self' requires this delineation of what is not oneself *first*, the originary supplementarity (in his words) that renders language an arche-writing.[45] If it is not declarative speech, what constitutes the economy of the *logos* for Western logocentrism?

Etymology uncovers that *logic* bears an unusual history. The original Greek *logos* seems to refer to speaking as such and in its various activities, but a notion of *logic* constitutes the more forceful structure of 'reason.' This takes place when a limited 'technical apparatus' of speech becomes a generalizable logical structure at the moment that—prefigured by Plato's well-ordered ideal city—Marcus Tullius Cicero reduces the art of rhetoric to a science of 'logic'—where λογική (Logikē) no longer operates, as *logos* did, as a rhetorical craft (including the *ethos* and *pathos* of Aristotle) but becomes part and parcel with it. In Cicero's *De Fato* the disciplinary marker of *ή λογικὴ τέχνη* (ē logikē teknē), what in Latin is the *ars logica* (the technique of *thinking*) shifts from a technical science to a self-standing reduction and generalization. For this reason, *oratio* (oration) is subsumed as the technical structuration of thought (*ratio*), and not the reverse—the *ratio*, and later 'reason,' become 'self-standing.' Consequently, *logic* no longer

[44] Considering Rousseau's "Essay on the Origin of Languages."
[45] It is important to remember, then, that a particularly pertinent sort of 'declaration' is the declaration of war which delineates belligerents to which Derrida's (1997 [1967]) discussion of 'declaration' often refers; the ways in which distrust (p. 76), threat (p. 99), fear (p. 188), militancy (p. 106) and struggle (pp. 131-132) contribute to the diffuse logic of declarative warfare to which undeclared element intimates what is traced as self-other/friend-enemy, etc. Derrida's references to declaration and description can be found on pages 217-268. See also Mark Ayyash's (2019) discussion of the complex economies of violence as intimacy amongst enemies.

stands for one discipline amongst others—a *technē*—but gathers under it the entirety of language by establishing a structure of axiomatic first principles, and the 'correct' statements they organize. This corresponds with the linguistic classification process initiated in Latin grammar by Cicero's mentor, Varro (Kristeva 1989 [1981]), concluding in a contemporary 'West' when the term 'logic' becomes a "science of reasoning correctly" (Skeat 1985 [1879], p. 347).[46]

Similarly—almost simultaneously to the writings of Cicero—the notion of the 'West' comes into view as a trace that regulates others, a central element in the disciplining structure of numerous discourses, from literature and philosophy to determinations of 'the political.' Etymologically, the term 'West' bears resonances with the Greek ἕσ-περοσ (es-peros), and later Latin *ues-per* ('evening'). Grammatical reference to 'vespers' (*vesperi*) as the evening-time of monastic post-prandial sleep was likely the product of the regular occurrence of the 'Evening Star' (Venus), referred to as *Vesper*. Thus, the term parallels the 'occident' which also references the evening but, through spatialization, as "the place where the sun sets," against the 'orient' as "the place where the sun rises." The political connotation—as a dualism—though, is a late addition to the history of the term. Roman usage of 'occidere' denoted generally that one 'perishes'—from which the 'West' as a regulatory notion which *sets limits* first gains a metaphorical foothold. The astrology of Manilius, for example, references four quadrants of the sky whose impact for human life is not between 'orient' and 'occident' but between *horoscope*—as the general sphere of life—against occident—which, as his translator G.P. Goold (1977) notes, refers to death as, "the consummation of things (including marriages and the banquet which comes at the end of the day)" (p. lvi).

Perhaps more telling of the political direction undergirding the notion of the 'West' as a

[46] See also Martin Heidegger's (1998) critique of the political ontology of Rome as a play of 'truth' and conquest (pp. 28-54).

regulatory idea of political order is the way it is used in Sallust's reporting on the Third Mithridatic War. He recounts a letter (c. 69/68 BCE) of Mithridates of Pontus—recently deposed—to the Parthian king Phraates, who says:

> For in fact, while few men want freedom, a great many want fair-minded masters; we have fallen under suspicion as rivals to the Romans and as, in due course, avengers to be. But you who possess the magnificent city of Seleucea and the kingdom of Persia with its renowned riches, what do you expect from them other than guile for the present and war in the future? *The Romans have weapons against all men, the sharpest against those from whom conquest yields the greatest spoils; they have grown mighty by audacity and deceit and by sowing wars from wars. In keeping with this custom, they will destroy everything or they will perish* [*occident*] *in the attempt*. (Sallust 2015, p. 369)

In this sense, at least, we might find two resonant colloquial definitions of the term 'occident'—a conjugation of the verb *occidere* (to fall, to go down, to perish). The first signifies the sun's 'falling'; the other speaks to the limitations of mortality, and particularly violent death in battle.

These two definitions are bound, outside of their linguistic context within a Latin idiom under Roman imperialism, in a post-Roman 'West' as both a limited *place* within a wider *topos* of a global geography, and a political-economic-cultural unit which maintains the 'tradition' of Roman *imperium* by maintaining this life-or-death conflict as the force producing its borders. The economy of traces that ground the 'West' institute this notion as the 'limit of all limits,' the unchanging structure within which others can be asserted. Jean-Luc Nancy (1993) notes:

> The epoch of representation is as old as the West. It is not certain that "the West" itself is not a single, unique "epoch," coextensive with humanity ever since "homo" became *homo*… And, consequently, the end of representation is not in sight. There is, perhaps, no humanity (and, perhaps, no animality) that does not include representation—although representation may not exhaust what, in man, passes infinitely beyond man. Yet this also means that the limit of the West is ceaselessly in sight: *"the West" is precisely what designates itself as limit, as demarcation, even when it ceaselessly pushes back the frontiers of its imperium*. By the turn of a singular paradox, the West appears as what has as its planetary, galactic, universal vocation limitlessly to extend its own delimitation. It opens the world to the closure that it is. (Nancy 1993, p. 1, italics added)

The 'West' as the very notion of limits traces boundaries that regulate an interior economy while projecting itself beyond its own frontiers. This grounds all locations within its regulatory topography as pre-emptively depoliticized. Any decision has already been made; a monologue of *logic* already substitutes itself for a concealed dialogue of *logos*.

Accordingly, the periodization of the 'West' also acquiesces to its interiorizing structure as a stable topographical artifice justifying what it includes *and* what it excludes: the indispensable place of an Arabic-Islamic translation culture under the Abbasid Caliphate (Gutas 2005; Al-Khalili 2012), the inextricable relationship between 'Hellenism' and 'Hebraism' (Derrida 2010; Leonard 2010), and the Afro-Asiatic roots of Greek culture (Bernal 1987, 1995). Such border regulation effaces its artificiality, affirming itself over time as a structure of internal history even when it *must* reference an exteriority. The widespread prevalence of 'Averroist Aristotelians'—'Averroes' being the Latinization of Arabic philosopher Ibn Rushd—during the late Medieval Age and European Renaissance, for example, draws from this crucial commentator reanimated interpretive trajectories on the texts of Aristotle. This constituted a key philosophical shift in Renaissance Europe after the works of Aristotle had fallen out of popular favour, no longer receiving the treatment of copyists. It is also in spite of extant Latin translations by Boethius and others—Aristotle *could* be read.[47] It is very possible that Western scholars would not take interest in Aristotle were it not for Averroes' commentaries.

Perhaps the admission of this linkage would also uncover other networks. It would demand, for example, that one admit into a Graeco-Arabic translation movement its own debts to Sanskrit and Persian translation cultures (Gutas 2005, pp. 24-27). A well-maintained boundary that constitutes 'Western' thought would betray these frayed threads that lead well outside of its

[47] Thérèse-Anne Druart (1994) notes of Averroes' reputation in Europe that, "in the thirteenth century he began to replace Alexander of Aphrodisias as the Commentator par excellence" (p. 184).

interior *topos*. The tendency of the 'logic of sovereignty' to aspire toward this structure declaratively projecting an impermeable interiority remains predicated on a circulation of traces, an economy, that cannot satisfy this aspiration. Instead, a thin thread leading *outward* binds the economy of Western textual production in a chain of possible iterative processes the traces of which are preserved in texts *within* the receptacle of the 'West.' How certain Sanskrit texts may have impacted or been introduced into Persian society, how Persian translations, commentaries, or 'self-standing' works impacted Arabic thought, and how Arabic scholarship has influenced the 'West' assures *some* connection that the West could never 'immunize' itself against. *Western culture is already an interculture* (Correia 2021; see also: Goulding 2008).

The West and its History as a Constellation of Institutions

Given this economic basis, the 'West' cannot be treated as a singular institution. A method that proposes only to conceptualize a singular institutional framework is liable to overlook the complex interweaving of time and space that seems to make a claim to the very history of 'human civilization' for a sizeable portion of the globe, whether within or without its regional boundaries (Hall 2019). One response to this attends to the most recent institutionalization of a 'modern West,' as an available site of analysis—one that bears an established archive and can be proposed as an object of study. This approach has remained popular since Edward Said (2003 [1978]) periodized the 'modern invention of the West' as beginning in the 1880s inextricable from the frantic retrenchment of British imperial authority and attempts to construct an ambiguously regionalized quasi-European identity (GoGwilt 1995; Bonnett 2004; Appiah 2018).

The ambiguity is crucial to the political multipurpose of the 'West.' Said pinpoints the origin of an academic study of the 'Orient' to the Church Council of Vienne of 1312, through

which it could institutionalize a process of knowledge-gathering tantamount to asserting authority over the 'object' of its study. This was important as the epistemic containment of *this* 'other' apprehensively prefigures the desire to contain encroaching Muslim-Arabic and later Ottoman empires threatening Christendom (Said 2003 [1978], pp. 50-59). Binding politics and epistemology, the institutions of orientalism allowed for a dualistic self-construction of the 'West' against an 'other'—a mirror bearing all the meaningful deficiencies of this 'self,' corresponding to their singular authority to represent them. Said argues, "This universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space which is beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary… Imaginative geography of the "our-land-barbarian-land" variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction" (Said 2003 [1978], p. 54).

The politico-intellectual historicism of the notion of the 'West' has proceeded, from Said's starting point, with similar emphasis on the representative regulation that the notion gives rise to—but without accounting for the manner by which it also speaks to *absence*. This literature has been attentive to the register in which the *representative* function is stressed as an aesthetic or descriptive dualism (and implicit political aims), even in accounting for the permutations, adaptations and flexibility of the concept over time (Bonnett 2004). Said's own analysis spans from the derisory depiction of the Muslim Prophet in Dante's *Inferno* (1320) as inhabiting a deeper circle of Hell than other 'pagans' for being an 'idolator' of the Christian Jesus (p. 68), to the Napoleonic descriptions of Egypt (1809-29) as a political *coup de théâtre* performing the ability to dominate as a will to know (p. 85. He comments on contemporary caricatures of the 'Arab' as essentially violent and justifiably violable as well (p. 285; see also: Butler 2004). In the West's self-image production, Alastair Bonnett (2004) notes that British subjects of the 1880s-

1930s construct a new identity against the undesirable racialization of 'white solidarity.' Christopher Go Gwilt (1995) notes that the 'West' binds a jingoistic "new imperialism" with contemporaneous tropes depicting an industrious Western Europe against 'Slavic nihilism.'

This periodization allows for a method that remains exhaustive in its study of its object, but it is not necessarily complete insofar as that periodization also coincides with a limited history. Starting in the 19th century demands we gloss over the underlying economy of the concept, as demonstrated in the admission of elements beyond its periodization—that the idea of the 'West' is institutionalized in the 14th century, and is already in circulation preceding this timeframe; that (in GoGwilt's words) the term itself originates from the Great Schism of the Roman Church into east and west in 1053, and the mutual excommunication of the Catholic and Orthodox papacies in the following year. Kwame Anthony Appiah (2018) stresses that the 'West' is entangled with shifting definition of 'Europe,' which seems to arise with Herodotus' geographical distinction of *Europa*, *Asia* and *Libya* (the African continent) in the 5th century BCE, but with only inertly geographical overtones—not yet the politico-cultural tone of a millennium later (pp. 192-193).

Treating the notion of the 'West' as a constellatory body of institutions *across* epochal categories without such an emphasis on periodization, then, bears two key benefits. First, we might continue to attend to how the interiority of political arrangements, economic activities and social practices are matters of *decision* with their own disseminatory history in a longer timeframe. The current hegemony of the 'West' exist as members to a *topos* that exceeds it, but also extends beyond its own proposed and dualistic 'outsides.' The essential and exclusive ties between a contemporary 'West' and its 'heritage' in Rome or Greece is the loose thread of this claim which *itself* requires interrogation. In this way, we can begin to capture how the notion of the 'West,' as a historical and political project more so than a geographical idea institutes its own

'origins' as a textual practice—specifically *as an act of translation*. Reiner Schürmann (2003) defines the 'West' through the instituting of three stages of a 'hegemonic fantasm'—the representative image of a 'fact' which, on one hand, cannot be distinguished from a law or axiom, whilst on the other hand, *authorizing* the common space of a community and its ideas.

These three hegemonies correspond loosely to the historical stages of the 'West' as three distinct linguistic idioms and their epochs; a Greek, Roman and vernacular idiom with their respective times. What these stages, and their hegemonic fantasms *do* is to authorize the space of a repetition of elements within the interior, as a philosophical act of *generalization*—where singular experiences might be translated into universal laws. Demarcating each hegemon is the fantasm figured in each stage as *a sovereign principle*—a concept standing as the 'highest explanatory authority' with no superior be it 'Earth,' 'God,' or 'Man' respectively. This principle is one to which all knowledge refers, and from which an internal economy of indefinite associations are generated in the limited space of their relations; a potentially infinitely reproducible set of indefinite associations between grammatical units or forms of representation drawn from the authority of the sovereign referent, at a textual (rather than temporal) origin. The linguistic antagonism that pits Greeks against 'barbarians' (an epithet most often ascribed to Persians [Harrison 2002]), Romans against their enemies, and the occident against the 'orient' seems to bear out the self-constructive conflict of a longue durée of the Western tradition.

The West, Sovereignty, Globalization: Translations

The notion of the 'West' represents the delineation between interior and exterior elements. This representative structure is variously iterated upon in diverse historical locations, and in claims to diverse discursive contents. However, scholarship has not yet attended to the textual

economy that undergirds the dualistic representations of the 'West' which would demand, rather than an attempt to reproduce the 'receptacle' of historical epochs and set limits through periodization, the discovery of complex constellations of translated ideas—*logics*—bearing upon the presumptions that condition these representations. This economy, what I call the *logic of sovereignty*, binds representations of, and 'within, the 'West' with the constitutive elements of political authority. Its 'principle' would not hold any particular referent, then, but indicates the rehearsal of a finite set of questions in a logical operation that presuppose the interiority and need to secure its privileged object. Doing so, this logic also projects an 'ideal authority' capable of offering this security, the 'Sovereign.' The 'West' is constituted by this logic insofar as it iterates upon a logical formation of politics—its metaphors, references, and authorities—to establish the conditions for a contemporary globalized politic marked by the dissemination of the nation-state.

Such an exploration begins with the Roman imperial conquest of the Greek Mediterranean. Because of the high esteem afforded to Greek culture, the Roman institution of a mass project of translating Greek texts also loosely 'translated' Greek cultural achievements into a Latin idiom. This was likely the first such widespread institutionalization of textual translation in the world (Feeney 2019).[48] This took place through introduction of Greek texts and ideas into a Roman-Latin (elite) cultural sphere—what Denis Feeney describes as a matrix of 'domestication-foreignization' (p. 56); does a Roman interpreter attempt to maintain the distinctiveness of a transmitted work and its idiom, or do they attempt to make it accessible for 'one's own' reading public? The decision upon this question is difficult, although emphasis on *interpretatio* allowed

[48] Denis Feeney (2019) notes of its *strangeness* that the predominantly textual civilization of Egypt did *not* seem to have comparable—and thus precedent—institutions for semantic transmission. Rather, classes of cultural elites (scribes of the Egyptian court) were likely multilingual (pp. 36-38). Other solutions to potential interlinguistic (and even intra-linguistic) transmission are diverse. An Assyrian relief depicts a ruler dictating (presumably in Assyrian) to two scribes taking down their words in Akkadian and Aramaic (p. 36).

for more loosely poetic Latinizations.[49] The effacement of the Greek author for the Latin translator was one result. Friedrich Nietzsche's (1974 [1887]) philological predilections show most provocatively in this milieu when he contends with this as an act of cultural force:

> Translations.— The degree of the historical sense of any age may be inferred from the manner in which this age makes translations and tries to absorb former ages and books. In the age of Corneille and even of the Revolution, the French took possession of Roman antiquity in a way for which we would no longer have courage enough... And Roman antiquity itself: how forcibly and at the same time how naively it took hold of everything good and lofty of Greek antiquity, which was more ancient! … They did not know the delights of the historical sense; what was past and alien was an embarrassment for them; and being Romans, they saw it as an incentive for a Roman conquest. Indeed, translation was a form of conquest. Not only did one omit what was historical; one also added allusions to the present and, above all, struck out the name of the poet and replaced it with one's own—not with any sense of theft but with the very best conscience of the *imperium Romanum*. (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, aph. 83, pp. 136-167)

The *claim* to a Greek achievement by Roman culture, entails also that one is the benefactor and privileged inheritors of *this* tradition as an act of imperial force implied in the specifically political dimensions of translation as an appropriative 'foreign policy' of the Roman empire. The commonplace term 'translation' today bears the resonances of Medieval Latin *translatio studii* (transfer of knowledge) closely linked to the *translatio imperii* or transfer of powers.

An attempt to disentangle this imperial activity might begin by asserting that there is no Graeco-Roman 'Western history,' but a Greek, and then a Roman twofold institutionalization practice; what the former 'creates,' the latter appropriates. It is *this* '*traditio*,' which passes down an appropriative gesture of authority to claim indiscriminately what is 'one's own' through an act of force, that inaugurates a self-standing Latin culture. It is also this *traditio* whose contemporary parallel in the notion of the 'West' *appropriates this practice of translation* perhaps more so than

[49] The later religious context of *interpretatio* as Biblical exegesis reversed this by stressing the unaltered transference of the words of holy scriptures into other languages.

any particular content. In this way, Marsiglio of Padua's rather diminutive pamphlet *De translatione Imperii* (2006 [c. 1330]) takes on expansive meaning. Known predominantly for the proto-sovereigntist treatise *Defensor pacis*, in which he argued for the limitation of papal power over monarchical states (Bartelson 1996), Padua presents this small defense as a supplementary argumentation for the rightful authority of rule (*imperium*) to be vested in monarchical states and not the papacy. This is because of a genealogical discovery of the transmission of authority first conferred by Imperial Rome, (but lost in the transfer of the seat of power from Rome to Greece) to the Frankish and Germanic kings. In this way, beginning with Frankish Carolingian emperor Pepin (child of near-mythic Charles Martel and succeeded by equally legendary Charlemagne), European proto-state monarchies derive authority not from religious approval but instead a lineage of self-standing rulership as a *translational* activity (*translatio imperii*).

Although we might be able to assert that a periodization of the institution of the 'West' is recent, we cannot overlook that this institution is also engaged in a practice of political *translation* which will still concretize its privileged history, its membership to a secret 'tradition'—what Appiah (2018) remarks is the "golden nugget" (p. 195) of the 'West.' He summarizes this translational movement as follows:

> At the end of the twelfth century, Chrétien de Troyes, born a hundred or so miles southwest of Paris, celebrated these earlier roots: "Greece once had the greatest reputation for chivalry and learning," he wrote. "Then chivalry went to Rome, and so did all of learning, which now has come to France." The idea that the best of the culture of Greece was passed by way of Rome into Western Europe in the Middle Ages gradually became a commonplace. In fact, this process had a name. It was called the *translatio studii*, the transfer of learning. And this, too, was an astonishingly persistent idea. More than six centuries later, Hegel, the great German philosopher, told the students of the high school he ran in Nuremberg, "The foundation of higher study must be and remain Greek literature in the first place, Roman in the second. (ibid, pp. 195-196)

Although there is no such interiority to the 'West,' there still remains an *economy* through which

the traces of a Greek and Roman history circulate as markers of its privileged inheritance. This, in fact, binds the *translatio studii*.[50]

The Logic of Sovereignty: Plato and his Sons

From Marsiglio's polemic onward, the transfer of imperial power to vernacular Europe portends more familiar debates around sovereignty. F.H. Hinsley's (1986) classic history of sovereignty begins with the political practice of Roman *auctoritas* alongside *imperium* as key concepts carried forward into Medieval Europe. Jens Bartelson (1996) finds reason to explore what he refers to as 'proto-sovereignty' within the same timeframe as Marsiglio's short treatise, the 14th century. Alongside Marsiglio, he finds in Machiavelli's coining of the term *Io stato* the condition (status) and passive receptacle for a ruler's or republic's *virtù*—their active inventiveness. This marks a decisive moment at which Western political thought resolves the problem of stabilizing a discrete political structure against the cycle of political orders which plagued Plato's republic with dissolution, the one that influenced frantic writings of those who followed—from Cicero to Augustine.

This is the initiation of the logic of sovereignty defined as an iterable structure within which politics is synonymous with interiority. As iterable, this logic is itself *displaced* and *authorizes place*. This decidedly ambiguous ontological character which underpins it and its multifarious formulations, also makes a definition of sovereignty particularly difficult—it would seem that the notion of a ruler beyond whom there is no greater power (the Latin *superānus* grounding the *souveraintée* of Jean Bodin, or the *summa potestas* of Grotius) must presuppose a

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[50] Loren Baritz (1961) also analyzes this translational practice in the inter-generational (inter-millenial) hunt for the 'West' as a 'paradise' first referenced in Homer's *Odyssey*, weaving through Christian Rome (where 'Eden' is presumed to be vaguely 'westward') and the *The Historia Regum Britanniae* of Geogrey of Monmouth, this movement culminates in colonial American mythologies (El Dorado and the riches of the 'New World').

metaphorical ground in which a 'territory' and 'people' already exist. Instead of settling this *aporia*, the logic of sovereignty is the linguistic inheritance of a presupposed justification requiring no interrogation; the encounter between strangers never takes place in favour of the security of a given community. The notion of the stranger is reincorporated through hostility or comparison at a distance, a textual figuration presumed natural while being anything but; it is the closely guarded regulation of textual iteration as sameness. It is the very textuality of sovereignty that allows for this assertion of interiority in various places. As such, the logical operation of sovereignty is neither a community, nor a law, nor a subject, but the iterable construction of a community, authorization of laws, and delineation of subjects through a play of interiority-exteriority. Sovereignty is none of these things, and yet, it appends itself as their *authorization*.

Perhaps attending not only to the logic of sovereignty in name, but in textual practice—and in view of what we have found in the question of Western logocentrism—it would seem useful to consider what the *long* history of a problematic of sovereignty might uncover. Western history, it would seem, by its own admission—with its surrogate figurehead, Plato, at its origin—is a political history of the expression and institution primarily of a logic of politics both as the content of a 'rational' political formation as the structuring of politics regulated and governed by the *logos* and a politics *with reason*(s). This is so not merely because of the presence of the name, but *remains* its constitutive character in its *absence*.

The term 'sovereignty' is derived etymologically from an Anglo-Norman (*sovereyneté*, *soverentee*) and old French (*souveraineté*) root, itself drawn not entirely from a political, but a vernacular usage of the Latin *superānus* (the one "above"). This does not discount other possible resonances, in particular the superrēgnum—the kingdom above others. In this sense—and in its Latin root—the term, sovereignty bears a semantic homology with its greatest early competitor,

Christendom, over the textual right to *imperium* in its *auctoritas* (the right to rule the kingdom) and *dominium* (over a territory). Bartelson (1996) argues that its earliest actuation is found in the tension between the proto-states of Western European and the Roman Catholic Church, "The genealogy of the conceptual antecedents to sovereignty is very complex and conditioned by the perennial contest between ecclesiastical and lay power, between the unresolvable claims to exclusive authority by *sacerdotium* and *imperium* respectively throughout the Middle Ages" (p. 92). Thus, Carl Schmitt (2005 [1934]) offers the famous quotation, "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts" (p. 36).

Schmitt adds to this, noting the secular theology of concepts is, "not only because of their historical development—in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure" (p. 36). Yet, the chain of supplementary borrowing does not stop there. Sovereignty operates on a textual plane by excising divine right but maintaining its claim to unconditional authority over the house as the inheritance of *a* tradition. A history of sovereignty as a *logic* does not begin and end with the *word* without opening it to wide antecedents and resonances as a systematic structure. As just such an antecedent and competing power in a textual *topos*—a contested institutional ground—sovereignty relies on a language of *authority* over the *imperium*. The very possibility of sovereignty is opened by its textual relation to the Latin grammar of dominion—metaphorically, as *dominus* (master) over the *domus* (the house), bearing the right to organize *domicilium* (dwelling). If it does not hold an etymological relationship with any pre-Latin Greek counterpart, this does resemble an etymology of *economy*: οἰκονομία (*oikonomia*)—the law (*nomos*) of dwelling (*oikos*). Further, it is important enough to make reference to the Greeks 'in the beginning' that the stated progenitor of the modern term

'sovereignty,' Jean Bodin (2004), opens his discussion in the *République* of 1576 referring to the Greek *kurion arche* (highest power) and *kurion politeuma* (highest government).

There is also, perhaps, good reason to maintain the place of Plato at the 'head' of this tradition. The Platonic 'origin' of Western philosophy (political philosophy included) admits to the truthfulness of A.N. Whitehead's (1978 [1929]) statement, "That it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato" (p. 39). In what follows, we will explore the grounding dimensions of such a claim as drawn from Plato's *Republic*, a text of considerable importance given that it establishes the character of a *topos* of questions reiterated variously within this tradition. It is a matter of the less apparent authorizations of a text that render it specifically identifiable as a member to this tradition of political philosophy from which an iterable activity of ensuring such authorization, even in repudiation of the author, is derived from the internal structuring of texts which can or cannot make such a claim. A form of *philosophical nationalism* (Derrida 1992b, 1998, 2001, 2007, 2008, 2014, 2020) undergirds the projection of a privileged space of authority from which an author derives legitimacy through reference to this name. This 'nation' gains a content through the dissimulation of an 'other' who is set aside entirely as the inert object of appropriative reinterpretation; as a mysterious economic partner from whom goods are traded (2.370e-371a), or more concretely as an enemy (Bk. 5). There is no such thing as 'immigration policy' in Plato's *Republic*, nor is there any mechanism by which 'foreigners' might be incorporated into the body-politic.[51] Neither are there many such encounters not already coded as potentially hostile in the 'footnotes' to his work—from Cicero to Augustine, Hobbes, Bodin, Grotius or Carl Schmitt. Instead, there is the presumptive usage of conflict 'interior to' as well as 'exterior to' political community as a paradigmatic condition for political thought.

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[51] Plato's Athens *had* a class of foreigners (and freed slaves): the *metioikoi* (D. Whitehead 1977; Kamens 2013).

This does not begin, in the *Republic*, with factional conflict between individuals (*ἐχθρός*, *echtros*) nor with public conflict between official enemies (πολέμιος, *polemios*), but rather, with Socrates taking shelter from the noisy city-festivals of Athens outside (1.327a-b).[52] We are already, in a sense, thrust into a double cityscape. Where the ideal city will be proposed, another is already represented in the text to which this ideal is juxtaposed—soon forgotten within the sheltering of a house. Inside of the inside—within the text within the city, this scene has been set. Socrates shelters himself from the 'real' city (in the home of a foreigner)[53] in order to *think* the ideal city as his theme. This *themis* (θέμις, 5.480a6) is the assertion of a divine law and its sanctions: "It is not sanctioned [θέμις, *themis*] to get upset by the truth [ἀληθεῖ, *alethei*]." Within the space of this theme, the city proper fades from view. In its place, a city sanctioned by the divine law of Truth (ἀληθεῖ, *alethei*) is uncovered.[54] An authority comes into view within the privileged space of the *themis* wherein the bustle of the *polis* outside is properly banished—politics does not happen 'out there' but 'in here.'

The text proceeds through description of exterior contacts with the ideal *polis* to constitute its interiority. The usage of forms of 'interior' conflict mirror 'exterior' threats to the political community: "wherever it arises, in a city, a family, an army or anywhere else, [injustice] makes it firstly incapable of cooperation with itself owing to factions and quarrels, and secondly makes it hostile both to itself and to every opponent, including the man who is just" (1.352a). And again, a *polis* divided for Greeks and for 'barbarians' (βαρβάροις, *barbarois*) is *the* problem:

> Two, of whatever composition they may actually be, are at enmity with each other, the one of the poor and the other of the rich. And there are very many within in each of these. Now if you deal with them as a single unit, you will totally miss the mark, but if you deal with

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[52] Bonnie Honig (2001) notes that the owner of the house in which the dialogue of the *Republic* takes place, Cephalus, is a foreign merchant in Athens.
[53] The rhetorical use of the 'foreigner' is not exclusive to the *Republic*. During his trial in the *Apology* (17d), Socrates says he is foreign to the Athenian court-system (see also: Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000, p. 15).
[54] *Aletheia* etymologically as *a-letheia*, implies an un-concealing (see: Heidegger 1998).

> them as many and give the money and power and even the population itself of one side to the other, you would have the advantage of many allies and few enemies… This means that you will not easily find a single state so great which is a unity, either among the Greeks or among foreign nations [βαρβάροις, *barbarous*], but you will find many, many times larger that are apparently so. (4.423a-b)

The *polis* is defined, ideally, as unity. This city *could be defined under any condition*, but it is not. Rather, Plato invokes the destructive character of change—and particularly of changes that are brought upon by a 'foreign' element:

> [SOCRATES] "What about this then: isn't it essential that if something departs from its own form in some way, the change is made by itself, or it is done by some other agent?"
> [ADEIMANTUS] "That must be so."
> [SOCRATES] "Then are things in the best situation least altered and moved by something else? For example, your body is altered as a result of food, drink and hard work, and every plant by the heat of the sun and the wind and similar influences; isn't the healthiest and strongest least altered?"
> [ADEIMANTUS] "Of course."
> [SOCRATES] "And wouldn't some external event disturb and change the bravest and most intelligent soul least?"
> [ADEIMANTUS] "Yes."
> [SOCRATES] "And I imagine furthermore by the same argument that all manufactured goods, buildings and clothing that are well made and in good condition are least altered by time and other effects?"
> [ADEIMANTUS] "That is indeed so."
> [SOCRATES] "Then everything that is in a good state, naturally, artificially or both, undergoes the least change by an external force." (2.380d-381a)

The foreign is bad because it incites a change in the body(-politic)—but not yet the *foreigner*. First, Socrates draws a conclusion on the depiction of gods and the need for censorship:

> [SOCRATES] Do you think, Adeimantus, any god or human being would deliberately make himself worse in any way at all?"
> [ADEIMANTUS] "That's impossible," he said.
> [SOCRATES] "Then it is impossible even for a god to want to change himself. But every one of them, it seems, being the best and finest possible, always remains simply in their own shape."
> [ADEIMANTUS] "I think that must be absolutely right," he said.

> [SOCRATES] "Good man! Then let none of our poets, say: Gods of all kinds appear like strangers/And haunt our cities. Do not let anyone speak falsely against Proteus or Thetis, or bring Hera into their tragedies or other poems in disguise on the pretext of collecting a sacrificial victim. (2.381c-d)[55]

Regarding censorship, Socrates takes issue with the representation of the Gods as mutable, which would mark them as *outside* of the *polis*, and thus 'bad' or 'threatening.' For this reason, regulatory control over the totality of representations in Plato's ideal *polis* establishes the discussion to follow—the twofold strategy of education and censorship being the *first* substantive issue even before justice makes its way back into the cityscape (433a-d).

But this totality is grounded in the presumption that there is an extant community to be organized through this institutional *technē*. Of course, this is not the only discussion of *technē*, but rather one of a great many that constitute a key trajectory of the work; the labours and benefits of its members. Beginning early in the *Republic* (1.332c-333a), the discussion of crafts integrates the *polis*—as those who share in the benefits of their diverse forms of *expertise*, and in the regulation of crafts within a rigid (perhaps Plato would say stable) system. Speaking of poets as one such craft, Socrates and Adeimantus have the following exchange:

> [SOCRATES] "Shall we allow into our state all these models, or one of the straightforward ones or the other which contains a mixture of elements?"
> [ADEIMANTUS] "If my view wins the vote," he said, "it will be the one who impersonates decent people without the mixed elements."
> [SOCRATES] "And yet, Adeimantus, the one with the mixed elements is delightful; and by far the most delightful to children and their teachers and to the majority of the common people is the opposite kind to the one you choose."
> [ADEIMANTUS] "Yes, for it is very delightful."

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[55] The quotation is attributed to Homer's *Odyssey* (Bk. 17.485-486). Reference to 'strangers stalking the streets of the *polis* at night' arises a second time (381e) when in response to Aeschylus, Socrates rails, "let not mothers, persuaded by these poets, terrify their children by telling these stories wrongly that there are some gods who go the rounds at night in the guise of all different kinds of stranger [περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις], lest they blaspheme the gods and at the same time make their children cowardly."

> [SOCRATES] "Well perhaps," I said, "you would say that it doesn't fit into our state because we don't have people with double, or even multiple interests since each man does one job."
> [ADEIMANTUS] "Yes, for it certainly won't fit."
> [SOCRATES] "For this reason then, only in such a state as this shall we find that a shoemaker is a shoemaker and not a ship's captain in addition to his shoemaking; and that a farmer is a farmer and not a juryman in addition to his farming; and again that a trained soldier is engaged in warfare and not in commerce in addition to his fighting; and the same sort of thing applies to every one else, doesn't it?"
> [ADEIMANTUS] "True," he said. (3.397d-e)

This, further, entails that the poet who is a master of many styles is exiled from the *polis*.

Socrates concludes:

> Then it would seem that if a man who is able because of his skills to become versatile and impersonate everything were to arrive in our state wishing to show off himself and his poems, we would revere him as inspired, wonderful and delightful, but we would say that we do not have such a man in our state, nor would it be right to have one. In fact we would send him away to another city after anointing his head with oil and wreathing it with woolen bands, while we ourselves would employ a more austere and less pleasing poet and storyteller on account of his usefulness, who could reproduce for us the diction of a decent man and who would express his words in those forms which we laid down from the beginning when we undertook to educate our soldiery. (3.398.a-b)

Increasingly, the technical apparatuses of the Platonic ideal city expand their sphere of control, but only because they re-present correctly the basic divisions of a well-ordered citizenry—something that legitimates their regulatory authority over the existence of citizens.

The decisive distinctions between strict or loose ethnic affiliation are also manufactured through the text. The strict community of the *polis* and assertion of citizenship operates in the *Republic* in a strange relation to the notion of *genos* (race), as determinative of conduct in war: "Greeks fighting foreigners and foreigners fighting Greeks both treat each other as enemies and are naturally enemies, and this kind of hostility is to be termed war [πόλεμον, *polemon*]. But whenever Greeks do this sort of thing to Greeks, although they are naturally friendly, in such a case Greece is sick and in a state of civil conflict, and this kind of hostility is to be termed

faction[ἔχθραν, *ekthran*]" (5.470c-d). It is so much the case that a war with other Greeks is a readily-accepted and sympathetic ill that not only does it deserve a less existentially threatening name—*ekthros* being a private dispute rather than declarative or public hostility—but it also thrusts a city itself into disarray when fighting intimate 'kin.' The very representation of belligerents in conflict shifts depending on whether or not the enemy is a fellow member of the *Hellenikon genos* (Ἑλληνικὸν γένος) (5.470c). Socrates depicts this as follows:

> Then being Greeks they will not ravage Greece, nor set their buildings alight. They will not accept that everyone, men women and children, in every city is an enemy, but that a few who are at any time hostile are responsible for the dispute. And it's for all these reasons they will be unwilling to ravage their land, and destroy their houses, as most of them are friends, but will pursue their dispute to the point where those responsible are compelled to be punished by those who are not, but who are nevertheless suffering (5.471a-b).

Somehow, this does not also entail an end to all wars of proximity. Plato recommended that a city remain small in the *Laws* (Bk. 5.737d-e), where he stipulates that a city should have five-thousand forty citizens. However, in the *Republic*, he notes that a *polis* that includes many different craftspeople would also require a warrior class for fighting the inevitable wars arising between *poleis* to "appropriate part of our neighbors land if we are going to have enough for stock and arable farming" (373d; see: 373d-374b).

Within this dynamic the twofold matter of the "noble lie" ("γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους", "gennaion ti en pseudomenous") is proposed—through which Plato establishes both the grounds for an indivisible unity *and* a strict hierarchy in the ideal *polis* (see also: Dombrowski 1997). Such a lie—attributed to a Phoenician 'tale,'[56]—bears out these two parts. First:

> I shall indeed, although I don't know where I will get the audacity or words to speak and try to persuade first the governors themselves and their troops, then the rest of the state too that in fact our methods of bringing them up and educating them were all, like dreams, happening to them in their imagination, while at that time they themselves, their weapons

[56] Perhaps the tale of Cadmus in Homer's *Odyssey* (see: Henderson in Plato 2013, p. 329 n. 95).

> and the rest of their manufactured equipment were in reality being formed and nurtured down under the ground, and when they had been completely finished, the earth, which was their mother, released them; and now indeed they deliberate about the land they live in as if it were their mother and nurse and defend it themselves if anyone attacks it and take thought for the rest of the citizens as if they are their brothers and children of the earth. (3.414d-e8)

A proto-sovereign nation-building project is proposed through the unified *genesis* of an indivisible *polis* and its *politēs* (citizens). In following, Socrates says:

> 'Now all of you who are in the city are brothers,' as we shall say to them in our storytelling, 'but during the creation the god mixed gold in the production of those of you who are competent to govern, for which reason they are worthy of the greatest respect, and he put silver into those who are auxiliaries, iron and bronze in farmers and other artisans. For the most part you would produce offspring similar to yourselves, but, inasmuch as you are all fellow kinsmen, there are times when silver may be produced in the offspring from gold and gold from silver and all the others from each other in the same way. The god instructs his governors first and foremost that there is nothing of which they will be such good guardians and nothing they will protect so keenly as the mixture of metals in the souls of their offspring. Indeed if one of their offspring is born with a proportion of bronze or iron in him, then they will take no pity on him in any way, but will treat him according to his nature and thrust him out into the midst of the artisans or the farmers. Then again if any of them are born with a proportion of gold or silver in him, they will elevate some to be guardians and others auxiliaries on the grounds that there is an oracle that the city will be destroyed on that day when a guard with iron or bronze in him is on duty.' (3.415a-c9)

The noble lie operates along *two* lines and not merely one. The first asserts that all the members of the *polis* are mythically bound as *kin*. The second establishes how those kin can be hierarchically distinguished without contradiction—something that parallels the contradiction of nationalism as a presumed political unity while justifying class-based hierarchy (Weber 1997).

The declared purpose of the noble lie is not in service merely to the education of the people of the *polis*—it does not only communicate to them their genealogical history. It is, furthermore, an expression of the anxious desire for stability, by which the very notion of 'justice' is defined as the harmonious virtue of three static classes and their independent virtues of wisdom (to rule, exclusively for the guardians), courage (to wage war or maintain order, for the warrior class) and

temperance (for the 'mass' [πλήθους, *plethos*] to be ruled by the guardians) (4.427e, 433a-d4). This harmony is achieved through total regulation of a prospectively singular body-politic through regulation of all forms of contact with 'others.' Even the birth of new citizens is heavily regulated.[57] The harmonious existence of the three classes entails that justice (δικαιοσύνη, *dikaiosune*) renders each their *fit*. How do they fit? Plato informs us—within the political order—that each member of the *polis* performs their specialty and only that. The first *technē*, the specialized crafts of diverse craftspeople, is subsumed under the craft of good governance. At that moment, the declaration that each person stays in place is repeated three times in succession:

> [SOCRATES:] We proposed, I believe, and we repeated it quite a few times, if you recall, that each individual should do the one job, from those that are pursued in the state, for which his natural capabilities were most suited.
> [GLAUCON:] Yes, we did say that.
> [SOCRATES:] Then again, that each man doing his own business and not dabbling in a large number is justice, and we have heard many others and have said so ourselves many times.
> [GLAUCON:] We have indeed.
> [SOCRATES:] Then, my friend," I said, "somehow it turns out that this is in a sense what justice is: doing your own business. (4.433a5-b4)

Understanding of the operations of the text in this way, this internal structure is organized through the regulation of interiority and exteriority.

Primarily, the negotiation of interior and exterior falls under the purview of the subject of justice, the *technē* of the guardians themselves: "Does this then mean that it is truly most correct to refer to these men as guardians in the fullest sense, fighting against our enemies from without and looking after our friends within, so that the latter will not wish and the former will not be able to cause us harm, and the young men whom we are now calling our guardians will be the

[57] The translation of this quotation is particularly forceful: "The same law applies," I said, "if any of those who are still fathering children has intercourse with any of the women of marriageable age without being paired up by the authorities. We shall regard him as imposing on the state an unaccredited, unholy bastard [νόθον, *nothon*]" (461b). The term *nothon* denotes a child born of a citizen-father and a foreign or enslaved mother.

auxiliaries who assist the governors and implement their decrees?" (3.414b). The answer is, of course, yes! From this unchallenged demand the tripartite class-division of the *polis* follows. The rulers think this division, their auxiliaries enforce it, all others obey it. This is the conclusion drawn both from the noble lie, if it is successful, and from the ideal *polis* itself:

> [SOCRATES:] Indeed when these two [the guardians and their auxiliaries as reasoning and spirited parts of the soul] have been nurtured in this way and have truly learned their own business and have been educated, they will take control of the appetitive side where the largest part of the soul is situated in each individual and is naturally most greedy for material things. They will watch in case, by being filled with so-called physical pleasures and becoming large and strong, it won't perform its proper functions and will attempt to enslave and rule the things that this very class should not, and altogether turn everyone's whole life upside down.
> [GLAUCON:] Very much so.
> [SOCRATES:] Then would these two be best," I asked, "to guard against external enemies (ἔξωθεν πολεμίους/exothen polemious) on behalf of the whole soul and body (ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος/psuchē te kai tou aomatos), one by its counsel, the other by its defensive measures, following its ruler and carrying out the ruler's intentions courageously?
> [GLAUCON:] Yes, they would.(4.442a5-b)

It is the 'job' of guardians to manufacture rule—but to do so in light of a system of distinctions that is already intuitively true.

It is not clear why this complex *dia-logos* meditating on the proper construction of borders, their *technē*, and the truthfulness of the division of classes is a primary motive for the ideal *polis* rather than any other. The text does speak—not directly but descriptively—to pragmatic concerns confronting Plato and those of his time. Detlef von Daniels (2014) notes that the comparative positions of the Greek *poleis* and the looming question of Persian encroachment both influenced Plato's political outlook and those of his contemporaries (see also: Waterfield 2018). Certainly this would also help to position the text in light of the exteriorization of non-citizens. Nevertheless, as far as the dialogue speaks at all about non-citizens, they are exclusively figured as enemies—whether more or less so. This would also contribute to a constellation of

deployed metaphors that capture a linkage between 'external causes' almost always rendered negatively, like an illness inflicting the body (8.556e).

Finally, the heretofore delineation of Plato's programme does not imply an anxious cherishing of citizens as meaningful members of the ideal *polis*. The loss of citizens is thinkable, perhaps even imminent. Speaking again to proper conduct in war, Socrates asserts a rightfulness to discard members of the warrior-auxiliary class:

> [SOCRATES] "How should the troops behave toward themselves as well as the enemy? Do you think my ideas are right, or not?"
> [GLAUCON] "Tell me," he said. "What kind of things do you mean?"
> [SOCRATES] "If any of them have deserted the ranks, thrown away their shield, or done anything of this kind through cowardice, shouldn't they be demoted to workman or farmer?"
> [GLAUCON] "Indeed they should."
> [SOCRATES] "Any who fall into enemy hands alive should be given to their captors as a gift for them to use the catch in whatever way they want, shouldn't they?" (5.468a-b)

For the excessive credence given to a justifiable technical capacity to ensure that the number of citizens is properly insulated from its outsides, it seems a matter of indifference that the guardians, and the *polis* at large, is meant to mourn the loss of its 'kin.'

Considerable work has been dedicated either to establish or detract from the *Republic* as an expression of an ideal political system whose purpose is not only to justify that system, but to demonstrate how thinking of a macrocosmic ideal *polis* might also imply the proper 'ordering' of a microcosmic—individual—*psyche* (see: *Republic* 2.368d-69a, 4.435b-441e, 8.543c-9.576b; see also: Blössner 2007). The *Republic* is posed as a manner of thinking through the properly—or improperly—ordered *soul* insofar as it bears a metaphorical relation to the orderly or chaotic *polis*. However, in terms of the metaphorical renderings of the body, it would seem that this elucidation is reversed. The *polis* takes on its own place, and the body becomes an elaboration

upon its machinations. In this way, it becomes easier to imagine the conditions which will render all non-citizens external to this body-politic. Much like one cannot spontaneously incorporate an additional arm or a second ear, or even additional hands, it cannot be fathomed that such a *polis* might present the groundwork for regularizing new citizens outside of the system of endogenous and authorized birth. This is to say that, not only is the micro-macrocosmic relationship reversed, but it is done in service of the foreclosure of the possibility to think of forms of non-appropriative incorporation, an encounter between strangers.

Likewise, the reception of the *Republic* has supported various and far-reaching works; from those who wish to explore its empirical validity (particularly following Aristotle's *Politics* and later the works of Machiavelli), or to draw from the permission to support a political thought not entirely beholden to empirical constraint. Plato's concern for quelling internal strife (but not necessarily abrogating the possibility of inter-communal warfare) motivates many of the works often praised as monumental entries in a Western textual canon. This trace can be followed from Cicero's own *Res publica*, to Augustine's *City of God*, Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Recent interpretations are also still prevalent. Leo Strauss' *The City and Man* (1964) is one such example that attempts to evaluate Plato as a basis for contemporary political thought. Karl Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies* (2020 [1965]) presents not only a sceptical interpretation of Plato but compares him directly with what, for Popper, were contemporaneous totalitarian political structures—amongst the 'enemies' of his title. Martha Nussbaum represents one of the more exciting contemporary interpretations of the *Republic* as she consistently engages the problem of Plato's logically ordered society as a problem—particularly because it constrains desire and the affective intimacies that make citizens vulnerable to their fellows (see: Nussbaum 2001 [1986], 1998) but also how these considerations might lead to a sense of

cosmopolitan community (see: Nussbaum 1996). In any case, the *Republic* shares a diffuse primacy of place within the 'Western' tradition.

This diffusion (dissemination) must also be traced as a displacement. The Roman reception of the *Republic* constitutes a key shift in the trajectory of political thought relevant for a globalized contemporary. The context of the *longue durée* of 'Western' political thought, its tradition, is one in which the *polis*, the city—'rightful' etymological heir to the sphere of politics—enters the stage of its history and is promptly appropriated into other—larger—political units. Telling the story of politics over a 2500-year span is a narrative in which the moment of a Platonic 'origin' gives rise to the *polis*, and no more than three hundred years later Cicero's Romanization of *politics* places the *polis* to rest. Never again will the city retain a preponderance to such a hegemony as when it was the only orderly unit of politics amongst the disorder of *genos*, nomadic communities and small villages, or theocratic and heavily stratified empires (in Mesopotamia, Persia and Egypt) (Waterfield 2018). The beginning of the thematization of the *polis* is the end of its actuality for the West as the moment in which an abstracted *logos* of politics overtakes the concrete site of the city *as* political community.

This begins with a titular translation. As mentioned, the Romans bear no compunction to maintain fidelity to the resonances of the *word* itself, the *polis*, imported from Greece. Instead, an abstracted notion of *politics* outside of its situation in the concrete site of the *polis*, coincides, by the time of Cicero's writings, with a Roman society that has already outgrown its city-limits. In all but name, and preceding the apotheosis of Julius Caesar, Rome already operates in light of military *imperium*—the growth of the Empire being, itself, a cause of the downfall of the

Republic (Shotter 2004, p. 19).[58] Speaking about Rome demands, then, not only an understanding of the specificity of its geography, its politics, its culture, but in fact its placement as an imperial metropole in this 'Western' tradition, the need always to be speaking of the *Orbis* of the *Urbe*—the only city to be referred to as *the* city.[59]

This is to such a degree that the *theme* implies speaking about the city, or projecting what seems like an ideal city, with increasing ambiguity. Plato's work is, in fact, the *Politeia* (*Πολιτεία*) and not the *Republic*. As a Latinized product, though, it is no longer a *politeia* (the political system of the city) but the *res publica* (the political system from which a 'people' becomes applicable to any possible unit or level of political analysis) that comes into focus. The city is displaced, but within the trajectory of a Western history of logocentrism, this displacement bestows it *greater* rather than *lesser* power—the city can become an empire and later a state ('state' being a preferred translation of '*polis*' in English texts), beyond the limited reach of the city itself. Displacement is a key feature of this tradition of sovereignty as the *setting* of the city recedes within the scene of political thought—when Socrates enters the house of the foreigner.

Machiavelli's contribution to this construction of sovereignty is to render the political unit all the more fluid. Hannah Arendt (2006a [1963]) notes that *lo stato* "comes from *status rei publicae*, whose equivalent is 'form of government' in which sense we find it still in Bodin. Characteristic is that the *stato* ceases to mean 'form' or one of the possible 'states' of the political realm, and instead comes to mean that underlying political unity of a people that can

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[58] Schultz et al. (2019) note that *imperium* was already instituted within the early formation of Rome (before 500 BCE) which designated the structure of Roman military command (pp. 49-50) and, in times of crisis, would take over dictatorial rule (as either *imperator* or, after 367 BCE, a *praetor*). David Shotter (2005) finds that even before the fall of the Roman Republic the position of *praetor* was one important step along the Roman *cursus honorum* (the 'course of honors') through which the *dignitas* of male nobles (and their families) was determined, and the end of which was the highly sought-after position of *consul*, vested with military and political power (p. 10).

[59] The history of Titus Livius, often referred to as the 'Early History of Rome,' was entitled *Ab Urbe Condita Libri* ("The Book of the Founding of the City"), where 'the City' as a referent is self-explanatory.

survive the coming and going not only of governments but also forms of government" (pp. 277-278). We might restate this as two contributions rather than one. Firstly the state can be thought of in terms of a *status* underlying—both as a *condition* and as a *form*—whatever government rests atop it. This state remains a form itself at least as a configuration of the space of politics. Following the ancient division of forms of government, Machiavelli seems most to advance a notion of the state such that one might still designate by name that underlying matter which has taken form as either a principality, aristocracy or democracy. [60]

Ultimately, his republic combines all three. Machiavelli, following Plato, finds that each of these three political orders bears both a 'good and just' expression and a duplicate 'pernicious and unjust' expression—for principality, tyranny, for aristocracy oligarchy, and for democracy anarchy. *None*, he argues, are satisfactory forms of government upon which a state might rest because these forms are member to a historical cycle, evolving or devolving into other configurations. He proposes instead an ideal that will carry through the *Discourses*: "Hence prudent legislators [in early Rome], aware of their defects, refrained from adopting as such any one of these forms, and chose instead one that shared in them all, since they thought such a government would be stronger and more stable, for if in one and the same state [città] there was principality, aristocracy and democracy each would keep watch over the others" (ibid, p. 109). This republic aspires already toward the ideal of a state that also extends to all subjects as its legislators—in one way or another—as a normative ideal. Forms of government abides by the condition that constrain their possible configurations—of any particular state as any particular form of government. Machiavelli overcomes the Platonic problem of state-decay by

[60] In book 8 of the *Republic*, Plato depicts the slow decay of aristocracies into timocracies, into oligarchies, into selfish democracies (as 'mob rule'), into civil war, only restabilized under vicious tyranny.

incorporating a new totality, which can be projected as a goal for *all* states. The state *becomes the state* in Machiavelli's republicanism, by appropriating the entire taxonomy.

This is not all that the neologism of the 'state' does. Because of this generality, the state is ambiguous enough to shift in constitutive size. In this way, a taxonomy of forms is incomplete without a taxonomy of political units designated by their expansiveness—where Machiavelli refers to the smallest political units (cities) and equally, ultimately, to the largest (empires) as gathered under the single taxonomy of the 'state.' There is, for this reason—and because Machiavelli's taxonomy is *not static*—two ways of capturing this. The first, which we've already mentioned, would place political units along a continuum in which their 'form' is also constituted by their extension (i.e. how far their authority extends, over whom they hold sovereignty). Secondly, and in accord with this practice, the notion of the 'state,' as the heading under which these widely varying groupings are maintained within one structure, a reassertion of the process of historical *becoming* that once again must articulate itself as—not merely any, but—*all* such units in actuality; an empire that is *also* comprised of cities, regional groupings etc. Much like the republic binds principality, aristocracy and democracy, the state as an ambiguous political unit is actualized through an imperial federalism whose 'frontiers' are not yet settled because it holds all smaller units inside of itself at once. For Machiavelli, this seems a signifier of virtue that such a historical process of expansive colonization take place.

If Plato represents a protean formulation of an anxiously protected community and regulatory state, Machiavelli's *stato* inaugurates a modern age of sovereignty through intent toward imperial appropriation. It is these two poles that constitute the logical practice of sovereignty—not merely the expansion or contraction of a sovereign right over a territory, a populace, etc, but the textual practice of *protection* and *appropriation* which constitutes the play

of delineable boundaries. If this is best represented in terms of *fronts* when that logic is expressed as *imperium*, which mark out future territories of incorporation and expansion, it is best represented in terms of *borders* when that logic is expressed in a system of nation-states. Furthermore, a modern epoch of the 'West'—*even as the originating period of the sovereign nation-state as such*—is variously represented in mixtures of both. Let us turn to this issue now.

Technē of the Logic of Sovereignty

An admixture of a *technē* of sovereignty in a contemporary idiom that expresses a *logic* of sovereignty between protective and appropriative practices is what I would like to discuss in the final section of this chapter. It is my hope to have demonstrated sufficiently how the textual constellation that binds modern with ancient thought is a translation of a diffuse tradition deemed 'Western'—textual translations of a problematic of rule that do not challenge their given presumptions and implicit questions. Nor does it disrupt this tradition's national authorities or, says Schürmann (2003), the hegemonic fantasms of its politico-logical institution. Given the establishment of *this* problematic, one must capture how modern discourses of sovereignty are mutually constitutive with technical apparatuses regulating the movements of peoples as a means to satisfy this logic. I refer to this as their *consequent actualization*; where the claim of an interiorized political community is asserted both *in authorization of* and *in light of the possibility to* organize a political geography that 'proves' this claim. This constitutes the question of *pragmatics*: under what conditions do the things we understand become familiar for us? How might it be that, without having acknowledged *this* tradition, that it still might organize the institutional conditions through which sovereignty becomes a matter of fact? In this section I attempt to capture again the relationship between *logos* and *technē* as condition and expression.

If a disseminatory economy of reference grounds contemporary politics through the expansive presence of nation-states in an international system, it is then a matter of finding how practices of detention, deportation, encampment, the enforcement and extra-territorialization of borders, actualize this logic of sovereignty as practice of institution, as its *technē*.

Logos and Technē in Contemporary Critical Border, Citizenship and Migration Studies

Much like the example of a crypto-Schmittianism guiding the Bush Administrations politics at the opening of this chapter, we ought to consider how this textual tradition generally bears upon the conditional ground for contemporary violences of nation-states, their borders, immigration controls and juridical apparatuses. What we have uncovered in this chapter seems, now, to place us on the familiar ground through which the state, as sovereign, asserts "a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a territory" (Weber 2009, p. 78). Our focus becomes the globalization of the political unit of the nation-state, as we attempt to reckon with the second of two broad categories of globalization. Of the first, the economic implications of globalization, we might address the emergence of networked technologies and infrastructures bearing global reach (Castells 1996). We might also account for how a system of global capital expresses an exceedingly liquid circulation of goods alongside heavier regulations upon labour through unequal processes of production, exploitative colonial histories, and a current world-system of the planetary regionalization of differential capitalist flows (Bauman 2000, 2013 [1998]; Sassen 2001 [1991]; Chang 2003; Wallerstein 2004; Mongia 2018).

Of the second category of globalization's implications, we are attempting to (re-)think the politics of the predominant unit of the nation-state in a post-War era in which it seems globalization and the globalization of this political unit run hand-in-hand. Theories of

globalization in a political register attend to how a process of economic globalization implies the prospective diminution—or the dissolution—of the nation-state (Sassen 1996; Ong 1999; Ohmae 1995). A tradition of scholarship posing the process of globalization against—perhaps beyond—the nation-state already exists (Rosenau 1990; Wallerstein 2004; Held 1995; Appadurai 1990; see also: Beck 2009 [1997]). This includes also the attention paid to post-colonial cultural possibilities of hybridization (Bhabha 2004; Hall 1990), and emergent cosmopolitan visions of transnational citizenships (Ong 1999; Cheah and Robbins eds. 1998). It also includes challenges to the presumptions of nation-state politics to open space for inclusive citizenship (Carens 2010, 2015; Baubock 2002; Magnusson 1996; Bauder 2014a) and Open, or No Borders, approaches that challenge the nation-state directly, cementing such a cosmopolitan vision in a concrete *praxis* of solidarity (Bauder 2017; Anderson, Sharma and Wright 2012).

I argue that the phenomenon of the globalized institution of the nation-state needs to be rethought as the latest stage in a process represented by a 'Western' politic of sovereignty. In following, we must ask how the institution of a logic of sovereignty today—under condition of the production of displacement, the banishment of 'migrants' as 'illegal' or 'irregular'—operates so as to iterate upon the limit between interior and exterior as its most fundamental expression. The globalization of the nation state is the globalization of technologies of exclusion such that they might express *as if* ubiquitously, *as if* totalizingly, the impulse to maintain interiority on a planetary level. How is the globalized institution of politics paradigmatically translated as the institution of sovereignty and the nation-state?

The Technical Expression of the Logic of Sovereignty in the Modern Nation-State

The contemporary *technē* of sovereignty can be classified through three related phenomena—representation, decision and violence—which organize the possible directions and techniques available to the contemporary nation-state *both* as a protective and appropriative practices. These categories are not mutually exclusive but speak to strategies that often cut across presumedly delineable lines—how forms of representation can themselves *be* and *justify* state violence. Nevertheless, they also operate as distinct activities for ontologizing sovereignty—speech acts cannot be rigorously disentangled from migrant detention, but the two do manifest the 'insuperable power' of the Sovereign in different ways and derive from different conditions of possibility. They are also meaningfully distinct from other techniques and situations—contemporary Western curricula might not draw upon the same font of poetry as the teaching proposed in Plato's *Republic*, even if they express familiar nationalist aims.

Genealogies of sovereignty have the unenviable task of drawing together massive amounts of information on modern European statecraft into a cohesive whole. To limit this burden one solution is to situate sovereignty in relation to the emergence of the nation-state. Unfortunately, rather than providing one solution, such an attempt to fix a logic to a concrete institution instead creates two problems—the origin of the nation-state is equally contested. The 'Westphalian' moment of state sovereignties, which assert just such a right over territory and peoples, is criticized for just such an over-valuation (see: Bartelson 1996; Bauder and Mueller 2021). Where much of the literature on sovereignty emphasizes its uniqueness along the line of territory and population in relation to nation-states, I propose we might understand the ontological divisions that a logic of sovereignty implies as a reiterative attempt to contend with a very old (Platonic) 'problem.' For ourselves, not only the separation of spaces 'inside' or 'outside' of the nation-

state, categorizations of ‘citizens’ and ‘others,’ but the textual contestation over *presence* and *absence* itself constitutes sovereignty as a technical apparatus. In this way, any history of a modern articulation of sovereignty or the nation-state unhappily confirms Carl Schmitt’s (2005 [1934]) quotation, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (p. 5), where ‘the exception’ is a conspicuously arbitrary term.

In a *logical* sense, the type of entity to whom de-cision confers authority—the sovereign who determines the *scission* or *cut* between ‘mere’ possibility and actuality—is less important than the ceremonial *post hoc* right to decide and its existential effects (Derrida 2002a). That is, the logic of sovereignty engages a co-constitutive ontological process whereby its effects on the existence of real bodies within geographical space also implies a right of authority. One should capture the recursive character of the Schmittian quotation, then. Decision *generates* the sovereign who only exists after the decision is made; the sovereign *holds authority* over decision which has not yet been decided upon. Rather than present a closed tautology, such a formula speaks to a recursive process of *re-presentation* through which the violence of the scission is reincorporated into the body of sovereign right. [61] As such, the figure of the ‘citizen’ and criteria of citizenship betray an additional import in the right-to-represent, to decide upon the boundary between citizen and non-citizen, and the authority to violently dispose of the non-citizen. These practices generate an ontology; *right*, *sovereign* and *citizen* become as real as the existence of a subject, whose existence it would be difficult to question.

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[61] Importantly, Schmitt’s recursive decisionism relates closely to another etymological Greek equivalent to ‘sovereignty,’ as *exousia* (ἐξουσία). An etymology of the term finds the prefix *ex* (ἐξ)—a “departure from”—added to the root *esti* (ἐστί)—the third-person singular active indicative of *eimi* (εἰμί), meaning “to be” or “I am.” This would further relate the root to the more apparent, *ousia* (οὐσία) discussed in Derrida’s (1997 [1967]) work as *presence*—from which *representation* follows as *parousia*. What is further, *eimi* also constitutes in the Greek context the indication of *possibility*, meaning “it is possible [that…]”. *Ex-ousia* as a translation of political authority bears particularly important ontological resonances for both *presence* and *possibility* as a ‘right’ over both. Dawing from its sense, sovereignty refers to a ritual through which the authority to decide presence also dictates possibility, and thus what future may be opened or closed as further conditional (possible or impossible) presences.

Schmitt argues that sovereign decision is radical in two senses in relation to exception. First, they hold authority to determine whether or that there is an exception at all which would require sovereign or political response. Second, they maintain a right over determination of a general course of action, what response to take. Where the second matter of decision implies a technical practice—what do we *do*, how do we do it and what tools do we need to do it successfully?—the first constitutes the ground of existence itself as a logical practice—what exists, what exists as a norm or exception in the first place? It is important, then, to enumerate the general categories to which sovereignty has been applied by modern nation-states including not only territories and citizens, but friends against enemies (as belligerents, 'terrorists,' etc.) (Schmitt 2007 [1932]), legitimate or illegitimate institutions, crises and norms, acceptable or unacceptable cultural practices, recognized or marginalized cultural and ethnic sub-communities, the existence or non-existence of racial categories, recognized or abrogated religions, approved or dangerous organizations, or the very existence or non-existence of violence.

This precedes a granular analysis of *technical* apparatuses, processes, practices and institutional actualizations of these representative decisions. If a 'logic' finds represented objects to be less important than the structure of representation and decision, a technical apparatus that achieves this end *does* demonstrate the importance of the 'objects' produced by sovereign decision—'citizens' against 'non-citizens,' 'territory,' and the image of the sovereign themselves. This is because of their *consequent actualization*. We should not forget that Plato's *Republic* is not only the representation of an 'ideal city' and conception of 'justice' but also presents a technical program of censorship, eugenics, the manufacture of national solidarities, education, mechanisms of class-division and legitimating both war and colonial conquest.

Through its technical expressions, then, a logic of sovereignty meaningfully influence the worlds of subjects. The right over representation—representability—produces a singular image at the cost of a constellation of others. The technical expression of sovereign authority, when successful, is apparent in the constraint on the possibility of possibility, the regulation of *possibilia*. It's declaration of a singular representable image also forecloses others. This bears implications for the existence or absence of policy (and its 'enforcement'), architectures and infrastructures, modes of legal enforcement (police and military, surveillance, borders), the trajectories of technologies (toward surveillance in particular), the manufacture and circulation of goods.[62] This is all the more starkly recognized in the real violence enacted by states around the globe daily who still hold monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, but also *use* this monopoly—not merely in the symbolism of military personnel, the brandishing of weapons, the symbolic honour of sanctioned violence, but the harm it produces and justifies (Walia 2020).

Historically, three trajectories organize the genealogical unfolding of modern sovereignty. They are the formation of the nation-state as a technical apparatus (focusing on security of territory and population), the bureaucratic regulations of colonialism, and the advancement of a discourse of legitimation predicated on self-standing and underived authority in international law (in particular, in opposition to the church and divine authority, of secularization). These technical advancements respond practically to the (at the time, unattainable) aspiration of order outlined as early as Plato's *Republic*. The actualization of the ideal of sovereignty (where this logic is translated into a practice and an institution) is fundamentally a technique of boundary-formation between interior and exterior, presence and absence.

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[62] In this last instance, the relation between state military and industry which regulates, but also circulates, small arms and other means of violence would be one key example (Mills 1956; Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017).

If the modern nation-state is characterized by the rearticulation of a logic of sovereignty, then its techniques allow for the distinction between legitimate 'insides' and 'insiders' against exteriorized 'others.' Jens Bartelson (1996) finds that a crucial development in this history includes the changing interpretations of piracy in Renaissance Italy as both a public good and foreign policy—the first of its kind for nascent states.[63] Bartelson notes, "What was new about piracy…was the way it was systematically linked to the discursive practices of the early states—notably Genoa, Sicily and Naples—and its gradual 'legalization' with constant reference to the formula of proto-sovereignty, which by the 1330s had become common legal stock" (pp. 102-106). Accompanying this discursive shift toward a language of 'legalization,' the professionalization of royal navy positions passed through piracy as an increasingly formalized system of training. Further, the practices of marque and reprisal—once part of private interpersonal conflict—took on formal character as public goods or wrongs. This coincides with increasingly complex systems of bureaucratic professionalization already attendant in Medieval state-institutions—including record-keeping and diplomatic services in England between the 12th and 13th centuries (Strayer 1970).

The consolidations of European states (for example, in Henry VIII's decisive split with the Roman Catholic Church in the 1534 *Act of Succession*, wherein he declares England an 'empire')

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[63] This parallel also guides Hugo Grotius' (2012) claim that, like the just act of pillaging in a just war, a sovereign bears the independent right to hold power over their subjects. His observation is important:

> Just as private property can be acquired by means of a war that is lawful (*iustum*)… so by the same means public authority, or the right of governing, can be acquired, quite independently of any other source. What has been said, again, must not be understood as limited to the maintenance of the rule of a monarch, when that is the type of government concerned; for the same right and the same course of reasoning hold good in the case of an aristocracy which governs with the exclusion of the common people. What shall I say of this fact, that no republic has ever been found to be so democratic that in it there were not some persons, either very poor people or foreigners, also women and youths, who were excluded from public deliberations? (pp. 52-53)

Where it seems that pillaging constitutes a just act of foreign policy, an anti-democratic assertion of sovereign rule is a just act of domestic policy.

coincides closely with the earliest notions of sovereignty forward by Jean Bodin (2004) as a conception of indivisible political authority (Hinsley 1986, pp. 118-125). That Bodin could imagine an ideal sovereign without lament of the 'impossibility' of this ideal (as in Plato's *Republic* 9.592a-b) is telling of the shifting pragmatic conditions through which it had become easier to envision absolute rule. Yet, his definition of sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth" (p. 1) is equally conditioned by French civil strife,[64] in light of which, both the *possibility* and the *necessity* of absolute sovereignty are represented in the text simultaneously. No longer is the need even to rehearse Marsiglio of Padua's rejection of Church authority required. Instead, one can immediately begin theorizing the absolute power of sovereignty as a *model* of 'divine art' in human institutions; as power over law in both *legislative* and *executive* capacities, and in both the declaration of war *outside* as in passing or rescinding domestic laws, electing officials, granting pardons *inside* (Balibar 2004; Derrida 2009).

In following, a crucial hinge with early proto-state formations include the developments of quintessential dimensions of modern governmentality—apparatuses of territorial and popular security—coterminous with discursive apparatuses of racialization and state racism especially *as the discursive establishment of the notion of a 'population' and reconceptualization of the notion of 'space' in terms of territory* (Foucault 2003, 2007).[65]Alongside interiorizing racial formations, increasingly complex mechanisms for determining (and legitimating) citizenship within territories take shape in what is to become an international system of nation-states. Criteria for citizenship have found certain expression in the institutional apparatuses of states within

[64] In particular as an *apologia* of French state action during the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572. See Miglietti (2014) for an overview and convincing challenge to scholarship that strictly interprets the sequential order of this event and Bodin's text as determinative.

[65] This expression of a racializing discourse also has theological roots, for example, in the Roman Catholic Church's anti-Semitic legislation around *limpeza de sangre* ('purity of blood') in the 15th century (Fredrickson 2002), although it is fully realized in the annihilatory practices of 20th century nation-states during the World Wars and decades hence (Sharma 2020).

territories in the ways early 20th century Western states (re)formalize passports alongside categories of non-citizens (alien, stateless, refugee), and enforce new categories of inadmissibility predicated on health, race and prohibited access for those with "dangerous politics" (Sharma 2020, pp. 91-94; see also: Isin 2002; Torpey 2018 [2000]). Nandita Sharma (2000) stresses practices of population exchange, extermination and expulsion particularly from the First World War and into the interwar period as prefiguring programmes of violence enacted by the Nazis and undergirded by general state-logics of national purity—ones that project a coterminous overlay of nation with state-territory (pp. 98-110).

Importantly, the zenith of state regulation in the post-war period over the movement of peoples (what in Sharma's terms is called the postcolonial global order of nation-states) is part of a wider historical ebb and flow of the regulation of human movement. This includes the historical invention of passports as an indication of the state's technical capacity to regulate human movement (Torpey 2018). Preceding this, Absolutist Europe certainly proposed legal abrogation upon travel—16th century Prussia and England both passed poor laws targeting 'vagabonds,' and idle able-bodied poor (Torpey 2018, pp. 22-23). By the 18th and 19th centuries, statecraft saw the elimination of passport regulations—exemplified by French Revolutionary Constitution (1791) and decriminalization of travel in the short-lived North German Confederation (1867). Nevertheless, the history of the passport would culminate in the re-intensification of controls in the early 20th century and international adoption of the technology as a means of regulation on human movement still practiced globally by states today.

Preceding these interior organizations—which themselves must be contextualized within an *international* system of states—the technical expressions of the logic of states already pass meaningfully through the manner of *exterior* order, which cannot be relegated only to 'foreign

policy' nor prohibitions of 'foreigners' from domestic travel. Contemporary scholars of the post-colonial system of nation states (Anderson 2016 [1983]; Mongia 2018; Hall 2019; Sharma 2020) have stressed how forms of interior nation-building and statecraft in Europe rely upon mechanistic applications of new state-technologies *outside* of their borders historically, and especially within colonial regulatory space. In one such example, Benedict Anderson (2016 [1983]) analyzes British imperial deployments of the census, map and museum in colonial Malaysia in order the (re)present a 'reality' of its territory and population and the totalizing control of the one who represents it (pp. 163-183). But technologies of sovereignty are not always so specific, or representable as *objects*. Technologies of spatial order that maintain colonial power most consistent with the logic of sovereignty are constituted as *practices outside* of the asserted sovereign territory of nation-states *first*, to which they are later imported. In particular, this concerns the regulation and facilitation of human movement within, to and from a territory consistent with asymmetrical discourses of racialization and ethnic classification expressing a "logic of labour exploitation" (Sharma 2020, p. 55; see also: Mongia 2018). Their situation *outside* of the metropole is important to this dynamic as many such technologies would contravene principles that limit sovereign authority as such within the metropolitan territory; the rule of law, treatment of subjects as rights-holding citizens, the individualistic rejection of paternalistic and racist responsibility outlined in the "white man's burden."[66]

Perhaps most closely resonant with the conceptual problematic explored in this work, Radhika Mongia (2018) argues that, following the abolition of African chattel slavery in 1834, the British Empire operated in an early period expressive of a *logic of facilitation*—through

[66] A more extreme and chronologically later case is outlined by Hannah Arendt (1994a), who also finds that early 20th century totalitarianism in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union both relied heavily on technologies of control forged in colonial bureaucracies.

which, she notes that more than 1.3 millions Indians were moved across the globe to various colonial holdings (p. 2). By the 20th century, however, colonial authorities responded through construction of *logics of constraint* developed specifically on the basis of racial ideology, which would ultimately give rise to a global regime of migration control (ibid.). This was in response to eroding authority over colonies, emergent decolonial contestations from colonized peoples' assertions of self-determination, as well as increasing movements of peoples from the Global South to the Global North. The resultant containment of decolonial liberatory demands and its consequences within a post-colonial global order of nation-states is still present. Nandita Sharma (2020) notes that a double-bind for prospective migrants from "Poor World nations" alongside the entrenchment of a new global hierarchy predicated on national citizenship entails that: "At an international level, people are juridically separated by their different nationalities. Within nation-states, people are further separated by different citizenship and immigration categories, each corresponding to very different sets of rights—and, for a growing number, a wholesale absence of rights" (p. 165). Alongside such an observation, Sharma contends that, "This has resulted in a world in which one's national citizenship has become the single most consequential factor in determining how and for how long one will live" (ibid.).

Categories of belonging and non-belonging represented by statist criteria of citizenship closely relate to contemporary practices of border enforcement, detention and deportation in ways that also *prefigure a sovereign right to extend authority beyond their territorial confines*. This is apparent in emergent phenomena of global encampment and border extra-territorialization. Where the concept of a logic of sovereignty becomes most salient in light of the issue of a *technē*, is how, like this diffuse textual logic, *the scope of such a technē should not be presumed to be geographically or historically limited*. In this sense, the logic of sovereignty in

its expression operates already by a twofold logic (of protection and appropriation) at once. The logics of 'facilitation' and 'constraint' that Mongia (2018) provides us with, then, should not be conceived as separable but rather complementary just as the differential play of interiority-exteriority constitutes two aspects of a prospective textual structuring.

Thus, through a process of *techno-logical* iteration, the singular unit of the nation-state has become an international system of states (Bartelson 1996), but the textual expression of this logic entails also that sovereigns make universal, exceptional, or otherwise unlimited claims upon the inside *and outside* of their territories regularly. If such a process, in a modern idiom, relates to a history of colonial domination—and its continuation into a post-colonial global order—it also speaks to the trajectories of contemporary sovereignties to continue to make claims to extraterritorial authority. This is so even if we account also for the conditional (and pragmatic) asymmetrical availability of such claims—that larger imperial states, especially those who benefited from the extraction of resources and exploitation of labour in a modern age of colonial conquest, are also the ones for whom extraterritorial claims are available today (Derrida 2005b). What are some of the techniques they have used to bring this about?

Sovereignty Today: Migration and Stasis of Political Community

i. Regularity and '(Il)legalization, Detention, Deportation

Contemporary expressions of a logic of sovereignty emphasize a representative need to secure their interiors, abiding by a 'logic of constraint' (Mongia 2018) projected into a post-colonial international order. This is further reliant upon criteria constituting citizenship to establish a field through which the exclusion of non-citizens becomes justifiable. Harald Bauder (2014a) argues that a typology of citizenship provides a site for evaluating state criteria as well

as articulating alternative principle that accounts for the contradictory conditions of territoriality alongside the global mobility of peoples. He distinguishes between two predominant, and one latent principle. *Jus sanguinis* criteria concern ways in which citizenship is formally extended through conceptions of ancestry and blood (*sanguinis*). This would apply as a principle whereby one is granted citizenship *if* they can demonstrate that their parents or ancestors bore a claim to an ethnically defined relation to the place of the state. *Jus soli* criteria extend citizenship through reference to birthplace (*soli* being 'soil' in Latin), where one is granted citizenship if they were born on a territory. In contrast, *jus domicili* citizenship would be conferred on any subject who resides within a territory for a designated amount of time. In this way, *jus domicili* links to a criterion of citizenship rarely codified, but present in the limited possibility to attain citizenship through the temporality of residence within a state's territory.

Bauder (2014b) also argues that, "The word 'illegalized' draws attention to the institutional and political processes rendering people illegal." (p. 327). Drawing on the work of Peter Nyers, he finds reason to take issue with state practices of deeming the movement of some as illegal. As Nyers (2010) points out, "The charge of illegality is meant to undermine the moral character of certain types of migrants... The term "illegal" implies a breaking of the legal order, a violation of rule-following norms of behaviours, and an intention to commit a wrong" (p. 135). In this way, discursive formations that legitimate terminology relating the movement of peoples with forms of illegality or moral disrepute, also legitimate concrete practices that actualized them, including processes of refugee claim rejection, detention and deportation of those who enter a territory without 'legal permission,' the discursive condemnation and resource-intensive policing of those who remain within a territory without 'legal permission.'

The securitization of what is an affront to ontological authority of state sovereignties—the fact that human beings move across their borders or exist as non-members within their territories—demonstrates also that processes of punishing “irregularity” indicate wider logics of regularity (Isin 2011p. 219). Alongside discursive iterations upon illegalization, Nyers (2019) also captures their entanglements with practices of regularization, and concomitant technologies of enforcing irregularity—detention and deportation. He finds that processes whereby states expel irregular migrants (deportation) or hold them in confinement (detention) gesture toward the actualization of an ideal of orderly citizenship, but also that these practices are becoming the groundwork for what he calls a “global deportspora” (Nyers 2010, pp. 4,8; see also Nyers 2003, p. 1070; Bauder 2021a). Accordingly, political activity today is organized around whether these practices uphold the sovereign right to confine or expel against those that overtly refuse this state of affairs in granular and everyday practices as much as technical processes—what he calls *abject cosmopolitanism* (see chapters 4 and 5).

ii. Borders and Borderscapes: Towards Encampment

The state holds right over a territory as its final authority, which grounds the geopolitical configuration of the globe in the delineation of borders today. This is in excess to the physical space occupied by borders, which are reproduced as *borderscapes* uncontained by physical topography. Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2007) outline the notion of a borderscape to capture the material ground from which competing or conflictual utopian, dystopian and heterotopian visions take place on and around the site of the border. Arguably, though, borderscapes are not limited to this physical site but are representative of a *textual* topography of borders. Cities in particular are important sites for observing the operations of a border-logic: encounters with legal gatekeepers

(Canadian Border Service Agency [CBSA] adjudicators, judges), law enforcement (CBSA agents and police officers), and service providers in many institutional settings (in schools, hospitals, and government service agencies) represent bordering practices even outside of the site of the border as real instances of a *technē* of enforcement (McDonald 2012).

Excessive borderscapes operate further through processes of subjection, wherein 'border-thinking' as a logic of division between 'rightful' citizens and 'obscene' others is maintained as a psychological topography or border-imaginary (Mignolo 2012; Mezzadra and Nielson 2013; De Genova 2013). Concomitant to the control of territory, sovereignty operates through the organization of subjects—both in terms of aforementioned typologies of citizenship, but also in topographies of belonging or banishment (De Genova 2002; Czajka 2013). Nyers (2006) argues that refugees, within this landscape, are presented by the sovereign as mirrors of 'the citizen,' which for us is reminiscent of the division of the 'West' against the 'rest' and those that underpin orientalist discourses of representative difference (Hall 2019; Said 2003 [1978]). This entails that a delineated 'other' of the 'citizen'—the exemplar of the category of sovereign subjecthood and place—operates as mimetic negation. The non-citizen is included to be excluded, subjected to apparatuses of deportation and detention authorized at the moment they cross the borderline because they are 'similar but not the same,'—but also *no matter where they are* within the interior *topos* of the state.

Then, the logic of the borderscape and enforcement practices cannot be spatially confined. Rather, border enforcements, detention and deportation seem to be reorganizing the contemporary globe. Michel Agier (2016) stresses how a *technē* of sovereignty gathered around diffuse but retrenched logics of borders (protecting the interior space of 'Europe' or 'America,' for example)

also give rise to forms of living characteristic of ‘border-dwelling.’ This framework for experiential reality is organized around two forms of prohibition:

> The wall: in the war of walls against migrants, or against ‘the other’ in general, we find traces of what defines the border, and we also find what it is that negates it. And the expansion of the border: from a spatial, temporal and social point of view borders are more extensive and people spend more time there, in an uncertainty or ignorance of social rules greater than elsewhere, an uncertainty that tends to become the context if not the rule of a life ‘in’ the border. (Agier, 2016, p. 40)

A frame of reference organized around the ‘border,’ which guards what is within from what is without—placed at a distance—remains present even when one moves away from the physical topography of the border-space, as embedded in memory, thought, imaginaries and behaviours. The border *itself* is enacted beyond its own spatio-temporal bounds.

iii. Encampment and Extra-territoriality

In turn, Agier (2016) also stresses how emergent forms of encampment not only slide from ‘temporary’ to ‘permanent’ solutions within a global system of nation-states who refuse to receive refugees, but also become phenomenologically salient points of reference—how, for example, supposedly temporary camps become familiar for those who encounter them often:

> It is a paradox of these non-places that after twelve years of existence the Patras encampment has become a bearing, a fixed point on routes that are many in number but all similar. Patras is known by all who attempt these routes; as well known as Zahedan (on the border between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan) or Calais. These places have become to an extent cosmopolitan crossroads [sic]: they are staging posts on a worldwide journey, one that is always risky and unpredictable, and for them now runs from Afghanistan (or Pakistan, or Iran) to Europe; but the boundaries of exile can change – as they have changed for African exiles who still head for Europe, but also, more recently, for the Middle East, America and the Far East. (Agier 2016, p. 63)

These comments confirm for us a conjecture stated by Étienne Balibar (2004) nearly a decade earlier: “The borders of new sociopolitical entities, in which an attempt is being made to preserve

all the functions of the sovereignty of the state, are no longer entirely situated at the outer limit of territories; they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled—for example, in cosmopolitan cities" (p. 1).

That Balibar finds these practices in *cities* is of particular importance for us (see chapter 5), but it is not all. The iterability of borders entails the powerful *ubiquity* of their displacement. Unlike the lived realities of people, the displacement of borders beyond their physical space *renders borders more, and not less, visible and powerful*. This is not only expressed in terms of vistas of a borderscape, and the manner by which they might reorganize the lived experiences of subjects. In fact, the most powerful technical expression of the logic of sovereignty today seems to be the power for borders themselves to be extra-territorialized. The land-borders of the United States do not contain all that constitutes an American bordering practice insofar as borders are increasingly enforced as a *technē* of administrative offices—not merely in Washington DC, but in South America, in North Africa, and in agreements with a number of other states so as to ensure no migrants make it *to* their soil (see: Walia 2021; A. Miller 2019). Donald Trump's 'Remain in Mexico' asylum policy only recently struck down by President Biden[67]—through which an 'irregular migrant' could be *deported in absentia*—is an important expression of this. Without having, in fact, set foot on American soil, the American government declared pre-emptively the fact of a person's having been 'deported.'

This extension of a single border beyond its own confines, too, is not the only one. As Nicholas De Genova and others (2017) have noted, the dissemination of the 'borders of Europe' is most violent in Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, on the border of Morocco. In this way, emergent techno-political capacities of Western nation-states effectively 'outsource' bordering

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[67] Al Jazeera (1 June, 2021): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/1/us-formally-ends-trumps-remain-in-mexico-asylum-policy.

practices overseas (see: Côté-Boucher 2008), and beyond the confines of their materialities—beyond the *vista of the borderscape*. Such a practice speaks to the not exclusively spatial or demographic concerns of a (Westphalian) sovereignty, but also to their textual underpinnings—iterable in terms of reproducing one image many times (the nation-state as a global paradigm) but also expanding the scope of one technical body through global bordering practices.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to uncover the procedures of a logic of sovereignty constitutive of the notion of the 'West' and the representation of Western logocentrism. Beginning from the diffusion of traditions of *logos* and *technē*, I explored the question of the 'West' as the setting of limits, and its underlying textual economy, as well as the ways in which this economy can be thought of in terms of *translation*. Translation is of particular importance insofar as it also provides the hinge between a cohesive notion of the 'West' and its epochs (Greek, Roman-Latin, European vernacular) with an iterable logical structure of interior-exterior to confer authority. In light of this, I attempted to depict how a logic of sovereignty operates through a reading of Plato's *Republic*, oft considered a 'seminal' text in the 'Western canon' but also expressive of regulatory practices of protection and expansion. The manners by which *this* politic is taken up in subsequent thought—from Machiavelli to a 'modern' age of sovereignty proper—demonstrates a form of philosophical nationalism reliant on the authorization of names and the presupposition of questions: how does one stabilize political community? How does a 'ruler' protect their 'subjects' from exterior elements coded *a priori* as hostile?

If a logic of sovereignty allows the flexibility for both matters of protection and expansion (nationalism and imperialism) as complementary rather than contradictory, one should be able to

observe this in the institutional trajectories of sovereign consolidation. Through a genealogy of sovereignty the technical expression of a logic of sovereignty are observable in the sphere of discursive formation, in apparatuses of security (passports), and in systems of colonial domination, giving rise to a post-colonial global order of nation-states. Consequently, we can better contextualize contemporary citizenship criteria, (ir)regularity, (il)legalization, as well as concomitant practices of detention and deportation, but moreover, we are prepared to understand emergent global phenomena of encampment, and the extra-territorialization of borders.

I propose, in following, to explore the responses we might advance against this logic and its techniques beginning with notions of democracy, cosmopolitanism, solidarity, and an assertion of common rights. Drawing upon a final statement of a logic of sovereignty as the political right to exclude non-citizens from prospective membership in liberal societies, I argue instead in favour of a democracy of strangers that makes no such claim. Although decidedly more difficult to conceptualize, I note that perhaps theorizing such a democracy should begin, instead, with migrant rights movements themselves, in the ways they meaningfully resist the logic of sovereignty. This gives rise to an exploration of contemporary migrant-rights movements as expressions of politics of 'resistance,' 'refusal' and 'absence.' They are movements that initiate meaningful counter-representation in political protest and institute expansive forms of refusal in municipal policy as generated by everyday encounters between strangers. From the grammars generated by these movements, I argue in the final chapter of this work that fragmentary threads of a tradition of hospitality can be excavated to compose an institutionalized expression that refuses this notion of sovereignty, particularly in facilitating forms of cosmopolitan sanctuary and global urban networks of solidarity.

Chapter 4: Migrant-Rights Politics as a Cosmopolitical Democracy of Strangers

> 'Perhaps' gives it with the announcement of a first act or a first scene; but also as the only chance granted to the future. More precisely, the chance of the future as chance itself. Future there is, if there ever is, when chance is no longer barred. There would be no future without chance.
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> (Derrida 2005c, p. 50)

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I opened with reference to the relationship between sovereignty and its institution characterized by the negotiation of *logos* (as representation) and *technē* (as practical expression). Because of the hierarchicalization of this order, *logos* holds sway over enumeration of political possibilities as a limited description of interiority against exteriority. In this chapter, I explore the contrasting possibility of a cosmopolitical democracy. I argue that a notion of democracy that refuses conditional membership is conceivable although it forfeits a clear and forceful claim to community. Not merely theoretically, migrant-rights movements like the *sans-papier* in Paris, Montréal's *Comité d'Action des Sans-Statut*, Toronto-based Don't Ask Don't Tell campaigns and Sheffield UK's "cities of sanctuary" generate a *portable grammar of emplaced possibility*, through which the possibility to envision radically different futures come into view as *possibila*. Establishing cosmopolitan and democratic community hinges on the *encounters* through which this grammar is generated. What I referred to as an *aneconomic* possibility (chapter 1; Derrida 2008b [1995]) attends to such encounters between strangers not yet interpellated into structures of 'citizen-non-citizen' and 'host-guest.' In following, solidarities of difference are forged across textual and geographical borders, their resultant grammars prompting us to challenge the centrality of sovereignty, and to prefigure institutions of welcome.

In order to establish this politic as a *locus* for exploring the open city (chapter 5), I proceed through three stages. First, I offer a critique of what I term a 'democracy of friends.' This conception, which I attribute to Michael Walzer's (1983) work, establishes criteria of

membership predicated on sameness and a right to exclude, even if a theoretical polity is declared heterogeneous or 'plural.' To pre-emptively assert a right for the already-established members of a polity to exclude non-members is to produce a *count of the political*—where 'legitimate' members are distinguished from 'illegitimate' ones.[68] Second, drawing from this critique I explore a democracy of strangers as an open question, suspension of the right to count members, and as a potentially universal chain of inclusion. It relies on a *technē of communication*: of speech acts that trace solidarities of difference. Suspension of a count of membership foregrounds global solidarities and the generation of a global commons by binding subjects in the communication of a shared grammar. As such, third, the practices that coincide with assertions of common rights as migrant rights, refusal of sovereign order in active urban participation, and everyday 'minor' politics of encounter open a ground for a democracy of strangers (albeit, only yet prefiguring its 'institutions'). In this way, contemporary migrant-rights protests that culminate in a politic (and policy) of sanctuary demonstrate that democracy cannot exist without the inclusion of excluded subjects, nor the presence of absented 'others.' What is called democracy faces its greatest 'danger' not in the existence of designated 'others' but the underlying regulatory economy of representation, whenever representation of the *demos* arises out of the monologue of a singular power rather than a dialogical statements of being-together.

Concomitant to an attempt to exclude non-members, then, is an anti-democratic posture through which the possibility of self-representation even by supposedly rightful members is forfeited for the monological expression of a sovereign ruler claimed on the basis of a well-ordered interiority 'protected' from exteriority.[69] This does not entail that the content of these

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[68] Jacques Rancière (1999 [1995]) refers to an originary *wrong* of politics productive of categories of like the 'common,' 'rabble,' 'mass,' alongside the 'foreign' or 'barbarian.'

[69] Again, in Plato's *Republic* this is rehearsed as a *logic* of the *technē* of rule, presuming that not all people are 'fit' to be rulers as not all are fit to be doctors, etc.

claims is geographically 'fixed.' Rather, sovereignty is highly portable ('displaced,' iterable or disseminated) insofar as it constructs a language of the body-politic as no particular 'people' but a *logic* of 'the people.' It finds expression in the international system of sovereign nation-states insofar as members reiterate *this* logic as if 'emplaced' (Sharma 2020). Locally, nationalist projects begin with the question of 'who counts' and 'who does not count' to dissect a mobile multitude of people who already exist within the same geographical space.[70] In the tension between disseminated political concepts and local politics, the question of contemporary forced displacement and technologies of border enforcement entangle themselves with situated practice. A firmly held belief in the existence of the 'pure' interiority of a territory—it's representability—and its clearly demarcated exterior (its border), is crucial for a sovereign to generate distinctly foreign and domestic policies, a "domopolitics" (Bartelson 1996; Darling 2011).

On the other hand, there is the possibility to attend to a textual economy, which intersects with the *aneconomic*, and opens the passage from absence into possibility as *possibilia*. One such formulation of economy would make reference to a *politic of encounter* before 'the political' as a sphere of indeterminate actions in ambiguous space—not necessarily neutral, but also where social arrangements or forms of signification are negotiated rather than settled. Rather than formation of a democratic polity, this economy would announce the manners by which that polity is compelled to exchange or circulate the possibilities of its privileged membership unconditionally, beginning with a radical revision of encounter. The existence of 'strangers' not as 'enemies,' but possible friends on whom the future of the polity depends, delimits the 'power'

[70] Where our terminology is so crucial to understand how people are deemed either to exist or not exist, recognition of the illegalization of migration draws attention to how epistemological issues of scholarship, political practices and the institutional processes of governments operate to purposefully disrupt their lives and render them vulnerable (see: Goldring et al. 2009; Nyers 2010; Goldring 2014; Bauder 2014b; Bauder and Darling 2019). There is said to be 58 000 people who have crossed the Canada-US border at unofficial entry sites from 2017-2020 (Boyd and Ly 2021), and who comprise a portion of the extant populace within the territory of 'Canada.' Such people are said to exist as exterior to a privileged sphere of representation while being interior to a territory simultaneously.

of the Sovereign. A question of hospitality, of the existence and authority of the “host,” is not about a decision upon the ‘proper regulation of immigration,’ then, but rather the extent to which unconditional hospitality can be translated into concrete practice, a solidarity of differences, the ‘impossible’ community formed from the intimacies between two as heterogeneous over homogenizing. What is gathered under the name of ‘democracy,’ if at times it does not live up to its own possibilities, still gestures toward *this* political suspension of de-limitation in favor of difference.

The Question of Democracy

Democracy is perhaps the greatest statement on possibility if what we mean by either term is *the as yet unattained but thinkable structure of communal solidarities, the institutionalization of encounter and solidarity*. Such a statement would be conditioned by a refusal of representation heretofore observed. A contemporary democratic order within a post-colonial international system of nation-states that takes the logic of sovereignty as its reference-point places democracy out of reach by producing a monologue on democracy rather than engaging in dialogue. What the name of democracy designates instead is one declared arrangement of the interior space of a polity amongst others (aristocracies, tyrannies, republics, etc.). This would be a ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Beck 2007) that extends far beyond the contemporary moment, in systems of membership that vivisect a diverse multitude to delineate a body-politic. One finds in light of *this* tradition that *we know not yet what democracy can do*.[71]

It is because such a democracy must yet be conceived in light of the encounter, and in following, by the ways that such an encounter harkens to a cosmopolitan possibility already

[71] Derived from the Spinozian saying repeated by Deleuze (2005 [1968]), ‘we know not yet what a body can do.’

observed but too often passed over for the retrenchment of this logic that it remains overlooked. Any attempt to reconceptualize democracy is conditioned by *a* system of representation posed in light of absence. This absence would be marked, broadly, as a *cosmo-politic to come*, the ever-present possibility of entry into an ever-changing 'body,' through which *arrivants* are already symmetrical and reciprocal actors rather than 'assimilable' or 'non-assimilable' invaders. Such a democracy bears two conditions. In departure from a logic of sovereignty as nationalizing homogenization and its apparatuses, it first enacts the play of a difference whose dimensions are undisclosed. How far or wide it reaches is a question of both the geo-spatial measure of the claim and the facility of an institution to proffer its possibility, its *technē*, its economy. Second, the question of democracy must at least gesture toward the *universal*, by asserting unconditionally and publicly that 'all people' can—should—take part. There is no way to assert exclusion as a right for democracy; there is no rightful exclusion and no exclusive right. All rights are shared in common, where what constitutes this common is not recourse to the representation of a fiction of 'commonality' but the ever-present possibility of *communication* and *encounter*.

A Democracy of Friends

A democracy of friends is one in which, not necessarily interpersonal intimacies, entanglements or concern guide political action, but rather where a monological decision upon membership (me and my 'friends') organizes the legitimation of politics. In this vein, Michael Walzer (1983) proposes the strict separation of 'spheres' of human life organized around institutional categories, the primary good being that of membership and a concomitant right to determine who does or does not belong within a territorial polity.[72] I focus on Walzer's work

[72] This has prompted important critical departures (see: Hidalgo 2014; Carens 2015; Bauder 2014a, 2017).

because he describes the changing context of globalization in political theory while declaratively justifying restrictive membership with appeals to a more common and 'foundational' language—of 'communities' and the 'goods' of their 'self-determinations' as if this pre-empts a logic of sovereignty. In this way, he at once claims that there exists no right through which already-present members of a community could exclude others unproblematically whilst generating a political ideal that does this very thing. The declaration that there is "no right number" (p. 28) to a polity, in his work, seems to expand rather than suspend a regulatory system of membership, a right to exclude admission to the territory itself.[73]

In contrast to the autonomous institutions Walzer (1983) proposes, he finds in the history of Western politics that spheres are often brought under the 'dominion' of a hegemon—where, for example, a Medieval subject's life was intertwined with the Roman Catholic Church, capitalism today subsumes all institutions under global market patterns (p. 10). In order to curtail the detriments of this tendency Walzer proposes pluralism as the maintenance of boundaries 'between spheres' and their characteristic 'good.' Maintaining the boundaries between spheres, he contends, can successfully withstand a specific notion of tyranny this history harkens to, which is predicated on a specific account of domination—the former being the 'violation' of social meaning within one sphere by introducing the characteristic good of another, while the latter more forcefully concerns the subsumption of other spheres by a hegemon (ibid, pp. 17-20).

Walzer, perhaps, overlooks that for each good tied to each institution—each sphere—there is also a concomitant good of membership through which access is regulated.[74] This seems true

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[73] One might read this as an early statement according with neoliberalism. Walzer's discourse aligns with an increasingly violent proliferation of border enforcements essential for increasingly deregulated global markets (Harvey 2005; Mezzadra and Nielsen 2013; Bauder 2017).

[74] Walzer (1983) captures this in analogies of membership, from neighborhoods to clubs and families. Membership is important for other spheres, he argues, because it determines what one owes to others (p. 64). He overlooks the granular problem of *access* though, as in the (non-)accessibility of markets (see: ibid. pp. 112-115).

for all spheres except that of political community in which membership itself is already the primary good. Otherwise, the separation of spheres presented as impersonal semi-spatialized institutions and their respective goods also includes a 'body' of members who access that good. Complex equality is maintained when plurality amongst spheres is also maintained, which is to say, when boundaries are established without transgression. This entails a distributive principle: "No social good *x* should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good *y* merely because they possess *y* and without regard to the meaning of *x*." (ibid, p. 20). The strict and necessary separation of institutional influences (keeping the influence of money from the operations of politics or allowing a powerful actor to appoint family-members to office) is maintained by the equally strict separation of members from non-members on the grounds of their possession of goods in a different sphere.

Yet, membership proceeds differently from other goods within a democratic polity, as it is already the most primary good. His description of separation reveals a slippage in use—not between spheres and goods, but the passage of people across boundaries, as an intolerable affront. In a summative instance, he argues:

> Tyranny is always specific in character: a particular boundary crossing, a particular violation of social meaning. Complex equality requires the defense of boundaries; it works by differentiating goods just as hierarchy works by differentiating people. But we can only talk of a regime of complex equality when there are many boundaries to defend; and what the right number is cannot be specified. There is no right number" (ibid, p. 28).

Boundaries are maintained to stop the crossing of goods internal to their sphere, but in preparation for his argument Walzer offers a metaphor of regulating the movement of goods and people. Speaking of the problem posed by the impossibility to perfectly restrict the circulation of money he states, "For money seeps across all boundaries—this is the primary form of illegal immigration and just where one ought to try to stop it is a question of expediency as well as of

principle. Failure to stop it at some reasonable point has consequences throughout the range of distributions" (ibid, p. 22). The movement of money across borders—an issue of 'illegal immigration'—presumably supersedes the issue that a discourse of 'illegal immigration' demarcates, that of people. As a textual practice, though, even as 'the primary' issue, it is still subsumed under the category 'illegal immigration,' so as to maintain this sphere and its exclusions of people. If 'money' is *the* primary form of illegal immigration, it also *is not*.

Why refer to 'illegal immigration' at all then? As metaphor, 'illegal immigration' resonates with the maintenance of a boundary between spheres, which retains their 'purity' from one another as a principle of non-contamination. But also, Walzer has introduced a metaphorical supplement of one 'ill,' for another. The 'cross-border' circulation of money can become the primary issue of 'illegal immigration' by virtue of the same tyranny that allows one good to predominate over others, to 'invade' their privileged spheres.[75] However, this does not make money the 'primary' issue. Walzer only contends with an attempt to limit the circulation of money (ibid, pp. 97-108) after dealing with spheres of 'membership' (first) and 'security and welfare' (second). In this sense, 'illegal immigration' remains the primary problem of 'illegal immigration' as determined by the ordering of the text. As such, pluralist equality operates through *prohibiting access* to membership applicable in all spheres because it does so primarily in the sphere within which people exist—as bare members. It does so by establishing a discursive structure through which 'illegal immigration' is never placed reflexively into question.

What justifies such a claim 'from the beginning?' Understanding Walzer's argument to be an attempt to justify the strict separation of spheres, it would be surprising to uncover any such statement to the contrary. Nevertheless, it is paradoxically the *suspension* of the rightfulness of

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[75] This is to say nothing of what one carries with them under condition of displacement. What exactly is the 'tyranny' or 'domination,' the 'privilege' exhibited by a person forced to flee their home?

boundary maintenance that resides immediately alongside—and authorizes—the *imperative* to maintain boundaries: "But we can only talk of a regime of complex equality when there are many boundaries to defend; *and what the right number is cannot be specified. There is no right number*" (ibid, p. 28, italics added). From such a claim, we might take note of how Walzer operationalizes this problematic of 'number' in his text, which begins not with an attempt to answer the ambiguity he posits, but by pitting it against what he argues is an inalienable good of being member to a distinct political community (ibid, pp. 28-30). He argues that the count refers to the very existence of subjects within a territory who share in bonds of commonality, offering a conception of democracy that will bear this out.[76]

'Democracy,' for Walzer, concerns the actions of states in execution of the directives of citizens after the decision upon the question of membership has been made. This serves a key purpose; one cannot assume that a sphere of politics is determined by the tyranny of other spheres—oligarchy, timocracy, theocracy, etc. Yet, because the issue of membership is already settled, Walzer's representation of democracy operates in a specifically undemocratic way—to reproduce the division already established between citizens and non-citizens internal to a sovereign body, the latter of whom 'democracy' seems to be inapplicable. Using the example of the Athenian *metic* (ibid, pp. 53-55), he illustrates why the distinction between citizens and non-citizens can be maintained without domination—Athenian *metics* could be categorically 'free,' and practically wealthy non-citizens while holding no right to political representation or office.

Walzer is prepared to recognize that the *metic* system produces a clear problem of inequality inside of the sphere of membership, though, especially as it mirrors contemporary

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[76] The traditional question of political 'number' concerns categories of political order. Because he argues that democracy is the only acceptable order insofar as it does not limit the political rights of some for those of others, he also does not reiterate the question of political order: "monarchy, aristocracy or democracy?"

'guest worker' programs (pp. 56-61)—where the *metoikia* was comprised of non-citizens qualified by their economic interest (wealth or labour) but not political interest in Athenian society even as a political category of semi-membership. A class of non-members existing within a polity finds no redress from the directives of the citizen-exclusive 'democratic' political order. This system renders them beholden to the politics of membership that only 'half-counts' them within a territory, making them vulnerable to the speech of citizens. The *metic* system bears a fundamental flaw in terms of the prohibition of *access* to the good of membership.[77] Accordingly, he ultimately concludes that the existence of any resident ought already to initiate a process of naturalization rather than establishing an intermediary class of members (pp. 60-61).

His reconciliation of a declared right to establish boundaries to membership, though, entails that he completes his discussion in a *more* rather than *less* prohibitive position regarding new members. Because the existence of residents within the territory necessitates a process of naturalization, *it also compels the polity to ensure greater strictures of immigrant admission*, a right to restrain the 'flow' of people to the territory in the first place as a communal right to self-determination (ibid, p. 51, 60-61).[78] This claim, as foundation and conclusion, compels us to outline an alternative democratic trajectory. A theoretical system will be *meaningfully incapable* of accounting for the extension of a discourse of exclusion. It will never settle the question of its

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[77] This example is complicated by the historical situation of the *metic* class as it is established seemingly under *democratic* Athens and, after being targeted by the regime of the Thirty Tyrants (404-403 BCE), continues to decline after the re-establishment of Athenian democracy. The boundary between citizen and non-citizen is cemented over centuries afterward in increasingly dualistic terms—citizen against stranger, where all non-citizens are categorized *a priori* as *xenoi* even if they reside on Athenian soil (D. Whitehead 1977, p. 165-166). In light of its dissolution, it would seem that the *metic* system is a decidedly fragile sub-category of 'membership,' subsumed and administered by the privileged agents of the 'sphere of members' even under a 'democracy.'

[78] Perhaps where Walzer has made a 'false step' then would be to contend with too few instances of territorial enforcement. This would include not merely the racist policy of 'White Australia' (pp. 46-48) and Athenian *metoikia*. It would also attend to a history of population exchange and repatriation programs in relation to genocide (Sharma 2020; Schmitz 2021), and the emergent technologies of extraterritorial border enforcement discussed in the previous chapter—although anachronistic. That states are already involved in violently restricting the flow of immigrants *to* their territory also places significant constraints on a theoretical system that valorizes exclusion.

number, and thus, must *retain the question in suspense*. Contrary to Walzer's assertion that the 'need' for boundaries entails a more forceful regulatory system of admission *to* the territory, a perhaps more consistent response to his own claim that "there is no right number" would proceed in the opposite direction; as a generalizable right to access unconditional membership.

Such a discourse on democracy that departs from Walzer and the logic of sovereignty *in toto* would become less a set of propositions and more an enduring problematic. Firstly, a discursive boundary cannot be maintained such that a language remains internal to one sphere without being tied to, and applicable for, another sphere, neither thematically nor geographically. 'Membership' is not meaningful as a 'good' until it seeks redress for the 'count' of membership against a subject counted as *non*-member. At which point, a limited system of membership must be placed into question. We might ask, "why should this one, who has been counted, also *not count*?" Furthermore, a discursive boundary cannot be situated in its *locus*, but is always exposed to circulations that lead outside. This is the power, *par excellence*, of the logic of sovereignty, which *at the moment that it presumes to fix itself within a stable* topos*, makes its claim iterable anywhere*. The logic of sovereignty, amongst the most restrictive and forcefully territorial discourse, is itself vulnerable to 'flights,' *fugues*, and circulations as a textual economy.

This problem can also be presented temporally. Democratic membership as a good maintained within an exclusive sphere, through which citizens bear a right to membership (their own and the future distribution of membership), is predicated on a monological expression regarding who currently constitutes its members pitted against who in the future might become its members. Representative membership like this relies on counting 'presences' as its 'precedents.' Further complicating this problem, because a system of 'precedents' within a liberal theory of democracy relies upon a representative count of presence it does not only negate

future possibilities but also strategically limits a view of past and current existing subjects. Concretely, deployment of a theoretical language that rehearses the idea of a ‘just origin’ through which the originary distribution of membership is extended to all who exist within a politically and geographically defined space replaces the historical *miscount* it attempts to map onto—that we might today presume that the question of membership is ‘settled’ because we have a *theory* of rightful membership rather than addressing the exclusions that have already taken place.[79]

Secondly, to ask the questions of the extent or number of democracy is to ask both the question of its *possibility* and its *authority*—the rights built atop inclusion pitted against the right to exclude. By what right could we possibly count one whilst we refuse to count the other? to which we must answer: “what the right number is cannot be specified. There is no right number” (ibid, p. 28). The democracy-aristocracy of present friends that these theoretical operations give rise to does not only deploy a generalizable logic of the Same—that membership for newcomers may be determined by how much they are *like us*, either because of extant kinship ties, ethnic and racial categories, or ideological affinities (Walzer 1983, p. 49). It is further that a democracy-aristocracy of friends is *like us to me*, making the decision over valid categories and their applicability double-edged. Such a democracy makes a representational claim to the content of this text, ‘us,’ whereby the community is translated into a good *for possession*, as a piece of inalienable property—the ‘us’ is *mine* from within this monologue.

Instead, any political decision made by more than one individual as members to a polity rather than a single representative of that polity would immediately need to extend consideration

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[79] Walzer (1983) does mention the violences perpetrated against indigenous communities in and by the United States (p. 40) and the “White Australia” policy (pp. 46-48). This does not seem to affect his justification of the rightful limitation of membership nor its enforcement by the same juridical apparatuses that perpetuate that violence at present, beyond sympathizing with, “the Indians who, understanding correctly the dangers of invasion, struggled as best as they could to keep foreigners out of their native lands” (ibid, p. 40).

to ‘friends of friends’ through which a transitive property of ‘likeness’ is diminished in its representative character—that *my* friends might also have friends like them but different from me. This remains forceful in its formal adherence to the rights of members to advocate for the inclusion of newcomers. If the communication of democracy were not monological but dialogical then one of the primary critical tensions would be between the irreducible differences of recognized likeness *amongst* members as much as the differential relations shared with *non-members*. In this way, the subject of membership cannot be represented except as plural, relational, fragmented and contradictory in the same way that the public speech of members of a polity, taken together, is an expression of differences as much as similarities. Membership, under these conditions, would constitute a serial chain of relations that might extend to all people, as friends of friends, or to no one, as radically atomized.

I do not expect that Walzer would be opposed to such a reading on its face, but it would still contradict the conclusions he draws in favour of the right of members to decide which non-members to include or exclude. The right to exclude is in tension with his own apophatic statement, “there is no right number” until Walzer’s political thought makes the leap into political description. It is in description rather than the suspension of decision through which the universally justifiable right to exclude is maintained. What Walzer does in response to his own statement is to conclude that there is no right number and therefore *any* number of exclusions or inclusions is *a priori* justified. In opposition to this, one is confronted by the tension between a theoretical attempt at securing the ‘nation’ as a presupposition against an equally meaningful claim to a cosmopolitanism that both already exists and requires an ‘impossible’ work to bring into existence. The problem presented by membership is the longstanding issue of a repetition of the non-democratic monologue, a *count of the political*, which forecloses the institution of

democracy. On the contrary, *it is democracy's greatest concern to establish democracy through which a unilateral system of members against non-members cannot be pre-emptively assumed*.

Toward the Democracy of Strangers

In awareness of the open question of membership within the space of a polity, I wish to contribute a complementary attempt to uphold the possibility of democracy irreducible even to more inclusive categories of citizenship (Anderson et al. 2012). In doing so, I recognize that this may also confuse a straightforward practice of democracy. For this reason, I proceed for the rest of this chapter to explore what I call a *democracy of strangers* through which the distinction between political and impolitical spheres of membership is challenged by a meaningful articulation of democratic transnational political practice and maintenance of solidarities beyond the categorical and geographical borders of membership, as an expression of what I have called the *trace*—that is, a communicative activity constituted by encounter, address and response. In so doing, I explore political practices of migrant-rights movements as preparing a grammar of institutional possibilities. I argue that these practices gesture toward a language that might help us think about the impossible demand of democracy as an indeterminate common right.

An institutional possibility that does not violate the right of subjects in a democratic polity must create an opening for future members even if they seem like strangers, as a right of hospitality. Such an interpretation would begin with the expression of a *common space* and a *multitude* (of subjects as yet without political identity) in their tensely temporal-serial order to the political, where the assertion of a *common right* is indeterminately extended. Its complication would capture the dynamic through which subjects within a polity exist preceding the space of political representation. This is reflected in the dubious temporality of the *polis* as the sphere of

life conducted by Greek citizens and non-citizens alike around which an indeterminate collective survival, interaction, and cultural expressions take place every day—where the *polis* (city) is a *polos* (axle or central pivot) (Heidegger 1998; Goulding 2022). This is juxtaposed with the *politeia*—the sphere that purports to organize the activity of the *polis* as the beginning of political decision (*arkhē*). Not only a democracy of strangers but its underlying condition expressed as a *trace of democracy* would uncover how the *politeia* is inextricable from the *polis*, the common space, not because of the representative activity of rule but because of the integral co-existence of those who are already present, whether counted or not, *politēs* and *xenoi* indistinguishable, in a mobile commons of those who *arrive* and *depart* and bearing a right to community (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Bauder 2014a).

The relationship between the commons and the political, as an expression of a democracy of traces is not a relationship of representations but of *actions*. In the language introduced in the previous chapter, it is not a logic but a *technē*, even if it operates as a *technē of communication*. The 'holding in common' of communication is often interpreted into membership (and further into the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, friends and enemies, compatriots and strangers). Yet even this can be translated into a language of integration and inclusion bearing distinct resonances for our 'being in common' (Ahmed 2000). Such a *technē* might be better understood in inverse relation to *arkhē*. The opening of possibility relies upon an encounter with others through which the deciding subject at present is rendered *powerless*. Because this subject is without power, they are also prepared to take responsibility for the other, to *respond*, and to institute that response (Levinas 2011 [1961]).

The irresponsibility of 'the count' of power as representation here is drawn out of two entangled registers mentioned above. The first is the object of the count, through which there is

no right of number, of the existence of a number of rightful members and no more. But also the *subject* of the count is 'irresponsibly responsible,' whereby 'I' have no right to count (to perform the activity of counting) nor to count (to participate in the privileged sphere of membership) more than another. This tension—this *aporia* (Derrida 1993)—compels responsible action toward strangers just as much as its ambiguity 'authorizes' a right to dictate exclusions. Membership remains eminently contingent because of the suspension of the possibility of counting members, *oneself amongst others*, and through which *no final authority over a count can be reached*. The question of a democracy of strangers expresses the generative tension of *exteriority* beyond *interiority*—doubly problematic insofar as the very act of *in-stitution*, of democracy no less than any other, seems to be negated by the dissolution of membership.

It seems impossible to anticipate the arrival of others before, and in excess of, a democracy of friends in (Derrida 2005c). This anticipation, it would seem, would place the institution in question and *at risk*. As such, the democracy of strangers looks more like a challenge to institutions than one itself. This, Jacques Rancière (2012b) argues is, "the opposition between an *institution* and a *transcendental horizon*" (p. 59, italics in original). The *aporia* of democracy places its institution in suspense—it cannot work if it does not produce a count, its 'transcendental horizon' brings the institution to a halt. As such, contrary to Derrida's (1993) claim of the productive—or compulsive—tension of indecision, one is instead unable to meaningfully translate democratic ideals into practice. Rancière's response is instructive:

> In my view something gets lost in this opposition between an institution and a transcendental horizon. What disappears is democracy as a practice. What disappears is the political invention of the Other or the *heteron*; that is the political process of subjectivation, which continually creates 'newcomers', new subjects that enact the equal power of anyone and everyone and construct new words about community in the given common world. To ignore the political power of heterology is to trap oneself in a simple opposition, with 'liberal democracy' on the one side – which actually means oligarchy, embodying the law

> of the self – and a 'democracy to come' on the other – conceived as the time and space of an unconditional openness to the event and to otherness. In my view, this amounts to dismissing politics and to a form of substantialization of otherness. (Rancière 2012b, p. 59)

What is otherwise and elsewhere, as a 'transcendental horizon' is not only threatening to an institution of politics as the count—this institution being not particularly political, but rather authoritative in organizing the space of a 'proper' *polis* as its *police*, under the name of 'democracy' or otherwise. Rather, the transcendental horizon also *generally* threatens the possibility of any democracy by shifting its grammar into the sphere of 'utopia' (see: Bauder 2017; chapter 1). Without institutionalization, or at the very least *translation* of a practice that suspends the system of membership, democracy remains *merely* 'to-come.'[80]

Aside from theoretical explorations that rely on descriptions of institutional principles we might reflect on how a democracy of strangers can be confirmed in light of a double movement of political action that bear witness to its possibility. Firstly, they must outline an observable constellation of political practices that harken toward supporting a radically revised notion of democracy and its institution. The movements I discuss in relation to these practices include the *sans-papier* and anti-deportation movements, Don't Ask Don't Tell (DADT) policies in Toronto, and the minor politics of a cosmopolitan everyday life in Sheffield. Secondly, drawing upon these institutionalizing activities, one may tentatively elaborate institutional that announce the possibilities of their grammars, gathered in the *open city*. Such is a movement from the 'minor' politics of hospitality (Squire and Darling 2013) as an amalgam of instances without institution, toward the institutionalization of a *cosmopolitical democracy*, a *democracy of strangers*.

[80] Derrida has argued, against this interpretation, that an 'impossible' ideal of radical hospitality in anticipation of the arrival of an unknown other motivates present practices of democracy. That is, he seems to address this criticism variously in his works (Derrida 2005b, 2005c, 2006c; with Anne Dufourmantelle, 2000). See also, Jonathan Darling's (2019) rendering of Derridean hospitality as a principle motivating concrete political practice.

<u>Cosmopolitical Democracy: Migrant-Rights Politics</u>

In the following section, I follow the grassroots political actions and concomitant reappraisals of membership consistent with a broad definition of 'migrant-rights politics.' I focus on sanctuary practices (in Toronto and Sheffield) in tandem with the legacy of the *sans-papier* and No Borders movements in order to give clarity to a democracy of strangers as a cosmopolitical democracy. [81] By the latter term, I am referring to a politic that advances a grammar gesturing toward cosmopolitan institutions—articulating imperatives of responsibility and hospitality capable of giving rise to global solidarities and challenging exclusionary citizen-membership. Cosmopolitanism seems particularly apt as it emphasizes the relationships and responsibilities one bears to others as an ambiguous 'citizen of the world,' from which various concerns regarding belonging, justice, right, compatriot priority and universality arise (see: Kristeva 1991; Nussbaum 1996, 1997; Heater 1996; Ahmed 2000; Derrida 2001, 2005c; Honig 2001; Fine and Cohen 2002; Appiah 2006). Following the thread of a recent cosmopolitan turn, scholars have offered numerous considerations for international governance as institutionalized cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995; Archibugi and Held eds. 1995; Archibugi 2015).

Contemporary calls in this register have framed cosmopolitanism as a reassertion of the rights of migrants most marginalized by a post-colonial international system of nation-states and its technologies (Derrida 2001; Nyers 2003; Benhabib 2006; Agier 2016). In tandem, theoretical research has advanced the wholesale rearticulation of a methodological groundwork that places presumptive nationalist frameworks into question in light of present conditions recognized to be

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[81] I focus on Toronto's sanctuary history for three reasons. First, scholarly literature on Toronto is amongst the best-documented and animated expressions of sanctuary politics spanning over twenty years. In following, the politics of Toronto sanctuary movements provide an extensive backdrop for theoretical considerations of solidarity, rights and justice as well as a cosmopolitical democracy *in action*. A third reason is that I situate my own work within the Greater Toronto Area.

cosmopolitan (Beck 2007). Emphasis on 'cosmopolitics' (Cheah and Robbins 1998), furthermore, captures two resonances for contemporary scholarship that binds itself to political *praxis*. Firstly, cosmopolitanism articulates a vision for what Bruce Robbins (1998) refers to as "actually existing cosmopolitanism," a vision that emerges specifically from the site of political action. The cosmopolitan imaginary is produced *in situ*, from a political-geographical *locus*; the political activity of welcome provides this *locus*. Secondly, to reiterate, such a politics itself ought to be explored as *necessary* to establish the site for the grammar of a democracy 'to-come' (Derrida 2005b, 2005c, 2006c). As a politics *first*, a cosmo-political action provides the conditions of possibility for what *as yet* is without formal institution. We might thus find that a cosmopolitical practice located *in cities* is the 'site' for re-envisioning networked communities (Cohen and van Hear 2020) and scalar urban solidarities (Bauder 2021b; chapter 5).

An implicit discourse of *genesis*—that is, a rendering of the creative force of *possibilia*—might accompany the exploration that is to follow insofar as the concrete political actions outlined are not merely 'in themselves,' but are *events* from which a new grammar of political community takes shape. The politics and policy of sanctuary, of urban migrant-rights struggles worldwide situated within various cities and camp settlements—and particularly for our purposes in cities like Paris, Montréal, Sheffield and Toronto—generate a language of non-reductive political community, a significant turn in the trajectory of an otherwise nationalist-internationalist political landscape (Czajka 2013). In light of its variegation, one can at best offer a working definition of a notion like 'sanctuary' as a point of departure rather than a strictly delineated idea. Sanctuary politics, "is not only a space of protection from an increasingly anti-immigrant national security agenda, but also a potential line of flight out of which alternative futures can be materialized" (Ridgley 2008, p. 56; see also: Bagelman 2019). Accordingly, terms

like ‘genesis’ capture the broad categories of contemporary urban migrant-rights politics as parts of a fragmentary historical tradition of cosmopolitical hospitality uncovered in the resonances of their *praxes* and scholarly reflections (see chapter 5).[82] Thus, the diverse politics of sanctuary should be understood in terms of their unique dynamics, but also in their indeterminate extension and ambiguous possibilities, as *texts*.

Nevertheless, as a problematic, the creative implications of genesis would be accompanied by a ‘counter-discourse’ of *risk*. In what I discuss under the broad headings of resistance, refusal and absence, an attempt to conceptualize the possibility of the open city even in light of political practices and solidarities will always place *before* itself the tenuousness of a movement away from sovereignty and into vulnerability. In part, what we might record of the politics of urban migrant-rights movements speaks to how this is *already* the case for those who experience forced displacement, and further who are subject to conditions of precarity generated by illegalization (Goldring et al. 2009; Nyers 2010; Goldring 2014; Bauder 2014b). Vulnerability can be extended, though, through solidarities between those who cannot but *respond* to one another, and through which the institutional structures of membership productive of precarity must be universally refused. As Judith Butler (2004) argues, “We're undone by each other. And if we're not, we're missing something” (p. 23). What constitutes this risk will only come into view in its passage and reflection. I do not yet know what I am risking by leaving behind the institution of sovereignty and its assertion of membership in light of this responsibility.

[82] Mentioned in chapter 2, one might draw parallels between the work that derives from migrant-rights politics today as situated analysis of past and future possibilities, with the scholars task of finding linkages between literary figures, their precursors and influences. Jorge Luis Borges’ (2000) essay on Kafka’s *bricolage* of precursors—various and disconnected, including travel literature and gothic horror, poetic and prosaic texts—uncovers how they are brought into conversation. This does not mean that such a varied tradition *does not* exist but that it *did not* exist before the thread of their intertextual kinship found a *locus* and an *axis*. The sanctuary city also provides a site from which distinct traditions and texts, events and political actions, are resituated in unexpected synthesis.

Absence: The Everyday Magic of Politics

Politics as a matter of generation and risk constitutes the conditional possibility of cosmopolitical democracy. Such a politic might be member to (at least) a threefold strategy that begins with recognition of the everydayness of encounter against the hegemony of sovereign alienation, something that is particularly illustrated in grassroots migrant-rights politics. These politics are most often situated in one of two *loci*: cities and camps. Understanding the exceptional importance of the latter as a distinct site of critique as well as resistant emancipatory political community that rejects marginalization (Agamben 1998, 2005; Agier 2008, 2018; Rygiel 2008; Czajka 2013; Cohen and van Hear 2020) we will not be able to focus on camps but for their intersections with urban grassroots movements.[83] Of the former, scholars in agreement that the city is an important strategic site for direct action look especially to revise notions of citizenship such that they are decoupled from the sovereignties of nation-states while opening new horizons for thinking collective belonging (Holston and Appadurai 1999; Holston 1998, 2007; Sassen 1998; Lippert 2005; Isin 2008; McDonald 2012; Bauder 2016b; Hudson 2019).

The urbanism of new articulations of politics might disrupt a logic of sovereignty whilst also preparing a grammar that gestures toward something else. What is called the 'everyday' is a horizon of life in common, and at times an ineffable source for expression. Thus, indeterminacy,

[83] Although perhaps an important strategy might be to refuse to separate 'city' and 'camp' in political practice, it is difficult to approach forms of refugee encampment and those of resistant self-empowerment of inhabitants under excessive precarity without offering their own space for critique and an elaboration of possibilities outside of the scope of the current study. Camp politics is often organized not only around marginalization, but the specific conditions of displaced communities in protracted exile, through which they—and the space of a 'camp'—are securitized and immobilized (Hyndman and Giles 2016). In this way, camp spaces present one of the greatest problems for this work, insofar as they disrupt the conditions of *movement* (arrival, departure), and the diverse presence of those inhabiting a single space that ground the open city (see chapter 5). As an underlying motivation for this and the following chapter, the notion of *extitution* is offered in light of the problem posed by encampment insofar as it expands its institutional scope by insisting upon a responsibility toward those outside of the site of any particular city both in shelter and solidarity. For an attempt to synthesize city politics and camp politics as a network of solidarities, see Cohen and van Hear's (2020) imaginative transnational meta-community, 'Refugia.'

here, designates the as yet undefined possibilities of various subjects traversing shared spaces in a process of *becoming* (Isin 2002, 2008). As Henri Lefebvre (2014) notes, "it is in everyday life and starting from everyday life that creations are achieved, those creations which produce the human and which men produce as part of the process of becoming human: works of creativity" (p. 338). This is in contrast to two forms that the 'everyday' might be depicted as. It might be *non-accumulative* in the sense that cyclical social dynamics give rise to repetition, and where the everyday is marked by routine, familiarity and boredom. Otherwise, an *accumulative* (capitalist) everyday finds a formulation of 'progress' characterized by uneven development and, on a global scale, increasingly violent expression in juridical structures (p. 622). Neither repetition nor accumulation is particularly satisfying and their *iterability* demonstrates how similar they are *as iterations of the same* (Derrida 1988); if repetition depicts a person who anxiously works to replace broken items, accumulation does little different in depicting the same person as adding one more unit of a commodity to "the dustbin" (Lefebvre 2014, pp. 337-338).

What constitutes a 'creative' everyday activity should perhaps be sheltered from an overbearing representation between these antipodes, instead offering an entangled question of its own. Even a dialectic between repetition and creation gestures toward a site of possibility if it can be open-ended instead of member to an enclosed description; through which routine household activities, factory work or quiet moments lose an emancipatory and magical edge (ibid, p. 336). The ways that familiar life provides a source for creative expression allows also for the *iteration of difference*. Lefebvre emphasizes this in the language of *praxis*, saying, "We should not separate repetitive praxis from creative praxis. There are several types of repetition… The stereotyped, mechanical repetition of gestures and signals differs from the rhythmed and periodic starting and restarting which characterizes vital activities" (ibid, p. 533). Because

repetition is not always merely *of the same*, it can be integrated into an iterable system of difference, where rhyme creates music and situated experience informs poetry.

A problematic of the everyday would find in seemingly contradictory terms—repetition and creation—deep entanglements. As such, it may be better to gesture toward an interdiction against representing everyday life if it cannot reproduce this 'magic.' However, a refusal to describe the everydayness of *precarity* would compel a passive and tacit acceptance of a logic of sovereignty and its violences. In light of this double impossibility—where one cannot represent the everyday *and* one cannot refuse to represent the everyday—we should certainly mark out the possible challenges of such an approach from the beginning. The everyday is at once a life that remains mysterious, passed over in silence, or, in attempt to represent it, posed as an ideal vulnerable to sovereign representation.[84] Authorial control over inclusion or non-inclusion of what happens 'simultaneously,' what is representable against what is 'para-sitic'—outside of a privileged textual space—maintains a descriptive basis for the normative community of members 'immune' to others. Invisibility, absence, are powerful tools for projecting the singularity of a nation. Its disruption—rather than a sign of inadequacy—in the very existence of people designated as 'illegal' becomes a source of 'obscenity' (De Genova 2013). What is called the 'everyday' in this case is the repetition of a grammar of national cohesion and its 'violations' that would announce *another* everyday left unexplored, the everyday experience of precarity.

[84] What follows of a discussion of sanctuary politics broadly should also take cautious note of these hazards. Sanctuary politics often find footing in the repetition of a common discourse of religious anti-statism that does little to reflexively criticize notions of 'salvation' and the benignity of a 'host' invoked through loose reference to Biblical passages of "God and Caesar" (Lippert 2005). Further expressions include those in an everyday language where migrant stories are recounted by well-meaning pastors in the American South, for example, as "life or death" and through which their work can be considered "saving lives." General references to "these people" as an ambiguously othered category subjectivizes those who seek sanctuary as indistinguishable from those in need of charity, coalescing in a rhetoric that presents those seeking sanctuary as a dubious category of "the poor" or "the supplicant" (see: Cunningham 1995; Michels and Blaike 2013; Caminero-Santangelo 2013). This is to say nothing of the possible entanglements between migrant protests and nationalist discourses (Bauder 2006).

Within the site of the city, urban migrant solidarities and rearticulations of shared rights give credence to this common *thing* that is passed over in a depersonalizing logic of sovereignty. In response, an important contention of migrant-rights organizers is for a fundamental right of presence for all who already exist within the territory of a state, particularly as an indication of the accomplishment of liberal democratic states—and where falling short would constitute their moral failing. Such states, by virtue of their self-declared principles, bear a responsibility to uphold rightful presence (Bosniak 2007, 2020; Squire and Darling 2013; Darling 2014, 2017, 2019). But such a right also binds levels of analysis otherwise presumed distinct, between legal status and social life. Peter Nyers (2010) argues that rightful presence attains radical realization when a framework of service provision is interpreted as, "a matter of social fact rather than legal status" (p. 137). A social fact, the presence of peoples in a shared geographical space, within the cityscape, is constitutive of everyday life antecedent to political order.

Yet, it is not always clear how we might draw out of the amorphous world of everyday life an object for analysis, certainly not without reducing it again to a product of representation in order to present it to ourselves. I would like to attempt to do so, with reference to the ways that a sanctuary politic has intervened on an everyday 'minor' level into forms of political administration with emphasis on the interpersonal encounters and interactions of city-dwellers (Squire and Darling 2013). What I refer to as the politics of absence is defined as a collection of actions that take place on an everyday level through which institutable possibilities are prefigured by the encounters between people, through which they navigate and produce shared spaces and communicate ideals to one another.[85]

[85] This, I hope, is a claim that can be situated alongside a literature of the 'right to the city.' Very briefly, following Lefebvre, the 'right to the city' is a right to meaningfully take part in the co-creation of urban space (Lefebvre 2000; Purcell 2003; Bauder 2016; Harvey 2019).

It is in this way that an emergent discourse of everyday life is unearthed in the study of a globalized world of diverse city-dwellers. Asef Bayat (2013) argues in favour of a working concept of "everyday cosmopolitanism" to denote the interactions of Coptic and Muslim city-dwellers in Cairo. Moments of everyday refusal to give up socializing with neighbors and friends of differing religions or ethnicities—even in light of sectarian violence—demonstrates a shared subaltern coexistence in Egypt (pp. 217-221). Bayat notes that the, "more common but unnoticed and inaudible processes of human conduct… show how people belonging to different cultural or religious groupings can and do reach out of their immediate selves by intensely interacting in their lifeworlds with members of other cultural or religious collectives" (ibid, pp. 202-203). Under the general conditions of conflict, everyday coexistence entails that neighbors of differing ethnic and religious communities continue to share food, borrow items, attend gatherings, and leave their doors open for casual visitors (ibid, pp. 214-215).

In advancement of this, a scalar approach to city-making denotes how migrants in particular contribute to—often (re)invigorate—city spaces (Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009). Speaking to a sphere of everyday cosmopolitanism, we must be attentive to how informal encounters and the building of interpersonal intimacies resonates with indeterminate creative possibilities. An everyday cosmopolitics of the sort that Bayat outlines similarly characterizes the 'City of Sanctuary' movement in Sheffield UK, through which emphasis on hospitality coincides with public circulation of experiences of migration as a cultural practice distinguishing the city (Squire 2011; Squire and Bagelman 2012; Darling and Squire 2013a/b; Bagelman 2016, see also: Bauder 2019). In so doing, this movement translates everyday practices of shared belonging into 'mobile enclaves' of solidarity (in resistance to alienation from UK immigration policy), emergent politics of "taking not waiting" (in light of the protracted and inhibiting legal

processes of asylum), and a coalescing ‘minor politics’ of situated interpersonal action, collective care and understanding. Jonathan Darling and Vicky Squire (2013a) discuss how everyday enactments of sanctuary are an ambiguous but important ground for a ‘minor politic,’ “…forming relations which are not always-already imbued with traces of domination but are continuously open to challenge” (p. 191).

In the “City of Sanctuary” campaign, Darling and Squire find a basis of informal interactions and networks (in the city and around the UK at large) capable of communicating the difficulties that asylum-seekers, refugees and refugee groups face due to UK immigration policy. As an informal politic, the “City of Sanctuary” movement is described as a patchwork of everyday encounters—taking place spontaneously between those present in the city—and as the conscious generation of everyday encounters in cultural and community events and social evenings. They further promote volunteer opportunities made accessible to refugee claimants while waiting for judicial decision, as well as educating local residents about the challenges of protracted waiting (ibid, p. 193). The quotidian informality of events that designate space for encounter—not a mysterious world-historicism, nor the drama of Greek tragedy—constitute a meaningful politic of absence. Their impact is lost in a misreading of their ‘everydayness.’ At times it seems impossible to convey the significance of familiar moments of belonging, encounter, and the possibilities invested in them. However, fostering everyday possibilities of encounter like these need not necessarily find a representative account of their significance—they do not dramatize what might take place at a social or historical level—as much as they demand attention to what politics they *express*, what confluence of possibilities they open.

Emphasis on ‘possibility’ should not be misconstrued as an essentially positive claim for an optimistic future, though. As informal practice, emphasis on the work migrants already do

also sheds light on the inadequacies of a principle of hospitality that leaves itself open to problematic of institutional appropriations; institutions that are, "wedded to notions of gratitude or indebtedness," (p. 194) as well as "tolerance" (p. 196). In this way, informal practices of hospitality are not without problems, particularly in the limitations of scope and the challenges of translating their 'minor' dynamics into 'major' institutional claims. However, operating in a small 'corner of a corner' of the city can be expanded in connection to the Lefebvrian (2000) 'right to the city' as a right grounded in the everyday production of social space, rather than an impulse toward formalization or mainstreaming. Darling and Squire (2013b) continue to advance what they call a "minor politic" through which the coalescing implications of everyday interactions in Sheffield also actualize recognition of rightful presence. In this way, the everyday operates as the ground from which a discourse of rights, and right to presence specifically, emerge in order to reflectively frame the interpersonal encounters amongst people who take note of others' meaningful contributions to city-life. As such, the authors also find that a right to presence, as a public discourse, takes place in light of the experience of presence migrants already shared in, an intuitive place to call into question the marginalization of residents regardless of 'status.' What they call a 'minor politics' of rightful presence translates these everyday experiences into a constitutive basis from which demands for redress of injustices are articulated beyond a problematic of formalized 'major' politics of sanctuary. That is, presence is situated where, "the "misplaced" or "unexpected" claiming of justice and rights [are] politically significant" (Darling and Squire 2013b, p. 65).

The 'banality' of everyday spaces—kitchen tables, cafés, public squares, subways, universities (or grassroots organizational headquarters)—remain in some sense the open secret that motivates political discourse. If what is overlooked in the text of sovereignty is the absence

of everyday practices of care within the cityscape that traverse categories of citizenship, then a politics of absence focuses on the everyday community-building practices which cannot be reduced to the citizen-stranger dialectic. Thus, a politic that excavates absences, bringing them to 'presence,' like the presence of meaningful redress for injustice, the presence of omitted or obfuscated experience, the unacknowledged lives of refugees, proceeds alongside a more ambiguous place from which life remains unrepresentable. This contradiction, far from negating meaningful assertion of common and migrant rights, is *the* site from which such an assertion emerges, and through which, ultimately, we recognize that the existence of a life within the cityscape is *not* a matter submitted for debate of 'justification' or 'unjustifiability.'

Politic of Resistance: Counter-Representation and Counter-Institution

The minor politics of sanctuary in Sheffield demonstrates how forms of counter-representational resistance can be prefigured by everyday life in shared urban space. As a wellspring for a politic of resistance, everyday experiences of vulnerability and risk informed protests by the *sans-papier* and *Comité d'Action des Sans-Statuts* (CASS). As official procedures of neglect structure the everyday lives of residents, it is in light of absence that counter-representative resistance give voice to calls for justice against injustice. I argue that prominent migrant-rights movements in the last thirty years offer this very counter-representative event of calling to account. Three expressions of a praxis of counter-representation explored below include anti-deportation and self-representative right, local political solidarities and sanctuary. The practices that constitute citizenship reflect the demand to attend to how migrants are legitimate and meaningful political actors within urban spaces beyond the notion of citizenship

conferred by the nation-state (Balibar 2002; Isin 2002, 2008; Nyers 2010; McDonald 2012; Squire and Bagelman 2012; Millner 2013; Darling and Squire 2013; Bauder 2017). [86]

Grassroots movements serving and led by refugees and illegalised migrants demonstrate a politic of resistance by challenging the rigidities of passive citizenship, and often by virtue of a risk of self-representative vulnerability. This is not only a practice of making oneself *count*, but in the act of calling a sovereign to account for marginalization, through which a subject risks being further targeted for violence. The legacy of the *sans-papier* protest bears out such a risk. In 1996 around 300 undocumented migrants occupied St. Bernard Church in opposition to the criminalization of immigration without 'papers' and accompanying deportation measures enforced by the Pasqua Laws passed in 1993. In reaction to their occupation of public space, which lasted for months during the summer of 1996, the French government evacuated the church with the use of riot-gear clad police, bringing the protest to a violent end (Rosello 2001).

The end of the *sans-papier* protest did not bring an end, though, to calls for redress. A politic of resistant solidarity emerged from the tension through which the demand for justice conflicts with state institutions. Their protest initiated a communicative responsibility amongst French society generally; Étienne Balibar (2013 [1997]) famously declared that French society owed a debt to the *sans-papier* movement, "for having recreated citizenship among us, since the latter is not an institution nor a status, but a collective practice" (n.p.). As a collective practice, the declaration of solidarity emerged from a tenuous space 'within' the institution (as a claim to

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[86] This section is also informed by critical revaluations of citizenship broadly. As a general framework placing migration and urban citizenship in conversation, Engin Isin (2008) theorizes acts of citizenship characterized by one's becoming a subject through answerability to justice against injustice, which plays an important part in forging new communal ties against static categories of membership (pp, 38-39). Similarly, Mark Purcell (2003) situates local practices of citizenship in light of the Lefebvrian (2000) formulation of the 'right to the city' within the context of a global capitalist economy and the perdurance of the nation-state. Monica Varsanyi (2006) locates the potential of municipal policies like non-citizen voting, acceptance of Mexican consular identity cards (*matrículas consulares*), issuance of driver's licenses to non-status people and standardized payment of in-state tuition fees.

citizenship that revitalizes citizenship) and also ‘without’ it (launched by ‘non-citizens’).

Traversing this boundary, everyday life fits uncomfortably within institutional delineations:

> We owe them for having broken through the communication barriers, for being seen and heard for what they are: not specters of delinquency and invasion, but workers and families, from here and there at the same time, with their particularisms and the universality of their condition as modern proletarians. They made facts, questions and even oppositions linked to the real problems of immigration circulate in public space, instead of the stereotypes held by dominant information monopolies. Thus, we better understand what democracy is: an institution of collective debate, whose conditions are never imposed from above. People must always conquer the right to speak, their visibility and credibility, running the risk of repression. And they have done this with calm courage, rejecting the use of mediatized violence and sacrifice, even if their situation is often desperate. (ibid.)

Resistance is characterized by a response demanded before and against the institutionalization of domination from above, a life that exists before the law and subject to precarity. What it institutes in this resistance is not necessarily a counter-institution, but a call of public protest and the regeneration of collective debate.

As an act of counter-representation, the possibility of articulating a form of political community irreducible to the membership-distinctions of nation-states is a powerful expression of the dissimulating process that constructs ‘the citizen.’ Through such a process it is claimed that ‘citizens’ descriptively and prescriptively inhabit a privileged category within which a dominant institution applies to ‘non-citizens’ the designation of illegality. Balibar again notes:

> The sans-papiers have demonstrated that the regime of illegality wasn’t reformed by the State, but actually created by it. They have shown that this production of illegality, destined for political manipulation, couldn’t happen without constantly violating civil rights (in particular, the security of persons, ranging from the non-retroactivity of laws to the respect of people’s dignity and physical well-being) and without constantly compromising with neo-fascism and the people who foster it. This is how they shed light on the main mechanisms of extending institutional racism, leading to a kind of European apartheid that combines emergency legislation and the spread of discriminatory ideologies. (ibid.)

The production of illegality is placed into question at the moment it is also brought to public attention through an act of resistance. In opposition to it, forms of resistant counter-representation demonstrate that illegality can be challenged on the plane of a shared everyday dwelling, a call for rightful belonging and redress of injustice. We—regardless of citizenship—already live together.[87] This is true both as an organizing principle from within the cityscape and in understanding that urban migrant-rights politics can be part of larger global movements (Bauder 2017; Hudson 2019).

It is in this way that a *trace* is *disseminated* amongst practices of representation which also aspire to describe a unique or pragmatic identity. This Balibar recognizes in how 'internal' dynamics of the *sans-papier* model further political actions. He states, "They did it for themselves, showing that you don't have to be a French national to responsibly contribute to social life, but also by stimulating new forms of activism and renewing old ones" (ibid.). One risks themselves in order to act for themselves, but their effects are not merely for themselves; in so doing, they announce the possibility of community beyond a citizen-non-citizen binary. The *excess* of the *sans-papier* movement, I would add, reserves neither its language nor that of the representative structure it resisted. Arguably, the movement's accomplishments far exceed the localization of their 'event,' precipitating a shift even in the grammar of everyday French. The epithet, *clandestin*, used to deride those without status, was effectively replaced with *sans-papier*, denoting how people without documentation live, work and build community alongside others in France. But responses to their protest was not uniformly positive. Speaking later the same year in the Théâtre des Amandiers de Nanterre, Jacques Derrida (2002e) notes the incomprehensible and

[87] Although statistical information is absent, Idil Atak (2019) notes it is likely that Toronto holds the largest proportion of undocumented residents, in parallel to having the largest population of immigrants (p. 105). Of 2.7 million residents of Toronto, 47% were not born in Canada (City of Toronto, 2017).

painful emergence of the expression “offense of hospitality” (*délit d'hospitalité*) through which the French government had created, “a law permitting the prosecution, and even the imprisonment, of those who take in and help foreigners whose status is held to be illegal” (p. 133).[88]

Attention paid to migrant-rights movements, particularly around the issue of deportation, have demonstrated how the global expansion of bordering practices requires a counter-force of communicative demand and responsibility that, by the very nature of the conditions they oppose, place one at risk. Peter Nyers (2003) terms such a practice *abject cosmopolitanism* when one refutes an entrenched position of displaced and ‘cast-off’ abject subjecthood, which further renders one speechless, agentless and invisible. As such, a host of questions arise around the risk of a subject, and their vulnerability to others:

> The abject put[s] the question of the speaking subject front and centre, under the limelight of critical scrutiny, and as an object of radical re-taking. [Abject subjects] provoke fundamental questions about politics: Who speaks? Who counts? Who belongs? Who can express themselves politically? In short, who can be political? When speechless victims begin to speak about the politics of protection, this has the effect of putting the political into question” (p. 1089).

Nyers finds that an abject cosmopolitanism is practiced against the Canadian state’s deportation of illegalized migrants by the *Comité d'Action des Sans-Statuts* (CASS) in Montreal. In the vein of the *sans-papier*, the CASS was formed in 1997 after the Canadian government refused the refugee claims of Algerians fleeing the Civil War while it placed a moratorium on their deportation. Those left without an approved refugee claim were forced to continue living in

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[88] See Yukich, (2013), and Michels and Blaike’s (2013) accounts of the New Sanctuary Movements (NSM) for a similar case. The NSM was a response to the failed Sensenbrenner Bill of 2006, which would have made it illegal to aid undocumented immigrants. Discussing the tension in response to this bill, Bauder (2006) elaborates the problematic connection between immigrant rights and nationalism in protests in Chicago. Not least amongst its issues was their reliance on a nationalist discourse “That allows `citizens' to claim moral authority over a territory, facilitating the exclusion and exploitation of `noncitizens…By evoking American nationalism, the protesters affirm the very foundation of the exploitation of immigrants” (p. 1002).

Canada without formal legal status necessary for access to public services (education, health and social services, labour protections) as well as the legal means of living.

In response, the CASS took (or re-took) political voice in Canada in the outspoken refusal to be deported. On 4 April 2002, the formerly titled Department of Foreign Affairs issued a travel advisory to Algeria whilst the following day the Minister of Immigration lifted the moratorium on deportation (Nyers 2003, p. 1082-1083). In what followed, the CASS and allied organizations mounted a campaign of direct action in opposition to the order. Algerian illegalized refugees took speech and took subjectivity in refusal of abjection, bearing responsibility for themselves in opposition to sovereign violence. Other non-governmental organizations also reinforced calls for justice despite the considerable risk of doing so.[89] In his own way, too, Nyers' text presents a testimony of responsibility. It responds to others as interlocutors, and as such, it demonstrates a responsibility to the members of the CASS who spoke on their own behalf and on behalf of all people against the production of subjectivity as purview of sovereignty. For this reason, responsibility is made particular rather than general—member to a relationship of interpersonal entanglements at a distance to legally defined communal belonging, a suspension of the order of communion described as a system of members or 'friends.' Nyers' text bears witness to (responds to) the fact that the CASS is breaking the law ethically, a rupture of the order of acceptable speech, and his use of terms like 'voice,' 'speech,' 'subject,' and 'being political' are apt contributions that communicate this responsibility.

A politic of resistance binds those who are anticipated to be legible as strangers on a plane of representation—'citizens' and 'non-citizens'—by virtue of an excess to the order of

[89] Organizations mentioned by Nyers (2003) include the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), Amnesty International, the faith-based Southern Ontario Sanctuary Coalition, No One is Illegal, the 'Open the Borders!' network and STATUS coalition, as well as the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) (p. 1082).

membership, politico-juridical authority. The *technē* of communication emerges 'underneath' this order, as a practice of grassroots solidarities, but also transversal to it as an announcement of binding traces over delineating ones. In this way, Nyers' emphasis on taking *speech* and taking *space* as practices of resistance shows how the protests of the CASS operate not only 'in themselves' but as forms of counter-representation in public space. In addition, publication furthers the reach of a call issued from one subject and amplified by another, together, in resistance to a technology of deportation. The risks taken remain different, in that one and another subject are identified differently by the state—still as 'citizen' or 'non-citizen'—and in its consequences, as deportable (for *sans-papier*, members of the CASS) or merely censurable (for citizens and allies). This is so even if the 'offense of hospitality' (*délit d'hospitalité*) also prefigures a terrible introduction of terms indicative of the regulation of encounter.

Furthermore, communication itself shifts in relation to this encounter. Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright (2012) cite the radical possibility recording in a slogan from the *sans-papier*, "We are All Foreigners." They argue: "That the slogan was not 'We are all French' is significant and signals a kind of nascent No Borders rejection of having one's subjectivity aligned with the national state by which one is governed" (p. 83). Active and everyday solidarities generate a wider pool of concern by giving rise to new grammars, going so far as to alter the fabric of communication; 'we' are not 'all part,' but are instead 'apart-together.' In this way, they argue that a No Borders approach, both in scholarship and in political practice, "Far from reaffirming the significance of citizenship, calls into question the legitimacy of the global system of national states itself and the related global system of capitalism" (p. 82). Counter-representative activity, a grassroots movement predicated on direct action and protest,

not only resist the structural foundations of marginalization, but opens the possibility to rearticulate community based on that resistance.

Such a claim of estrangement rather than membership, then, might ground a more radical reconfiguration of political community. Anderson et al. (2012) also look toward a process of building common institutions. They base these institutions neither on a citizen's right nor even on a human rights discourse, but on common rights:

> The No Borders demand for the right to move or stay is not framed within a liberal (capitalist) praxis as are the rights of states, citizens, private property owners, or even the ambiguous and largely symbolic arena of human rights. Instead, the rights to move and to stay are understood as a necessary part of a contemporary system of common rights. Thus, while focused on realising their demand for freedom of movement (which includes the freedom to not be moved), a No Borders politics can be seen as part of a broader, reinvigorated struggle for the commons. (p. 85)

The extension of the commons is indeterminate enough that arguably a commons-based approach must also be articulated on a global scale. Neither national, regional nor continental scales are capable of nurturing the ecological, labour-oriented and deliberative practices of rights held in common (Anderson et al. p. 86). A No Borders politic retraces boundaries between citizens and non-citizens so as to bracket them in favour of the linkages of interpersonal encounter, facilitating the possibilities of movement, arrival and presence.

Refusal of Representation

I would like to advance Anderson et al.'s (2012) discussion of a common right as migrants' rights into the articulation of a constellation of concrete practices that orbit the fact of human movement. In so doing, we might tread the ground again that everyday politics of resistance open, to provide the site for meaningful counter-representation but also in preparing for a new grammar of political community grounded in these politics and their expression of common

rights. A politic of refusal captures the first element of a movement into the prefiguration of such a new political community by bringing to light the dialectical extent of *risk* and *vulnerability* that ground the possibility for imagination, and also mark out how *responsibility* works through forms of address (call, demand and response) to generate a new language. In advance of this language, the constellation of sanctuary movements and practices (as well as policies) in the Toronto Don't Ask Don't Tell campaign advance a radical claim of *refusal* opening onto a grammar of novel political institutions.[90] That is, if *resistance* takes place on a shared plane with what it resists—directly opposed to border enforcements, deportation—in order to launch a counter-representative resistance, it is the refusal of representation which supplies the first line of flight (of *fugue*) outside of it. A key dimension of this approach—exemplified by the sanctuary movement—is the withdrawal from construction of a singular subjecthood to trace a pathway that maintains a primary *anonymity* in the tracing of complex interpersonal encounters and further attempts to *institutionalize* this trace as relation over delineation.

Before turning toward sanctuary, we might outline the movements of this politic. In short order, Maurice Blanchot (1997 [1971]) outlines a program for refusal in light the return of General Charles De Gaulle in France for the second time in 1958, and as a companion published in the French periodical *Le 14 Juillet* to what would become the Manifesto of the 121, the "Declaration of the Right to Insubordination in the Algerian War." [91] Maintaining solidarity even at a distance with Algerian liberation—as a French literary and public figure against the colonial French government, 'his own' government—he captures the tension between state apparatuses bifurcating a common right particularly in the technical and strategic activity of war. In light of

[90] The literature on sanctuary is vast and multi-sited. See: Lippert 2005; Ridgley 2008; Squire 2011; Darling and Squire 2013; McDonald 2013; Perla and Bibler- Coutin 2013; Caminero-Santangelo 2013; Mancina 2013; Cunningham 2013; Bagelman 2016; Bauder 2019; Hudson 2019; Atak 2019.
[91] For discussion of Blanchot's role in writing the Manifesto, and concurrent political activities, see: Bident (2018).

state violence against a people whom the state asserts are part of a ‘common membership’—“We are all French”—it becomes clear that such an institution represents neither Algerian nor French subjects. Yet, it is conventionally the state apparatus which bears privilege to construct subjectivity, and thus its rejection leaves one without a subject-position. Accordingly, not for the sake merely of political principle but pragmatic and situated purpose, Blanchot theorizes the uneasy possibilities of absolute refusal:

> At a certain moment, in the face of public events, we know that we must refuse. The refusal is absolute, categorical. It does not argue, nor does it voice its reasons. This is why it is silent and solitary, even when it asserts itself, as it must, in broad daylight. Men who refuse and who are tied by the force of refusal know that they are not yet together. The time of joint affirmation is precisely that of which they have been deprived. What they are left with is the irreducible refusal, the friendship of this certain, unshakable, rigorous No that keeps them unified and bound by solidarity. (Blanchot 1997 [1971], p. 111)

A negative principle motivates a politic of refusal in the place where the positing of membership would otherwise reside. In this way, subjects of refusal are presented not as prepossessing ‘citizens’ and their community but as yet unsure subjects navigating the compelling need to find a shared language. The two who are meant to make a claim of refusal together are left separate—‘French citizens’ and ‘Algerian subjects.’ Nevertheless, deprived of the conventional tracing of common membership, no category and no name prohibit the possibility of their communion:

> When we refuse, we refuse with a movement that is without contempt, without exaltation, and anonymous, as far as possible, for the power to refuse cannot come from us, nor in our name alone, but from a very poor beginning that belongs first to those who cannot speak. One will say that it is easy to refuse today, that the exercise of this power does nor involve much risk. This is no doubt true for most of us. However, I believe that to refuse is never easy, and that we must learn to refuse, and, with a rigor of thought and modesty of expression, to maintain intact the power of refusal, which henceforth each of our assertions should confirm. (Blanchot 1997 [1971], p. 112)

The subject of refusal remains silent in view of another who, by virtue of a conditional violence, *cannot speak*. This is a decidedly ambiguous place to begin a political thought seeking to ground

concretely a cosmopolitical democracy, a democracy of strangers. It seems at once that a politic of resistance takes away the ground for a logic of force, power and authority, but also replaces it with an excessive silence. It is a risk, of anonymity and of the rupture of solidarities in forfeiture of the posited subject, the *locus* of a crisis *in itself* as much as in the order of sovereignty.

What would be the place of radical refusal in a migrant-rights politic? The interpretation of silence should not be left too ambiguous; what I am *not* proposing is withdrawal from a need for public declaration of account. Instead, I understand the silence Blanchot outlines here to bear out two key resonances. On one hand, silence would refuse an order of legibility dictated by the state, that for subjects 'to exist' (or 'to be known') they must be understood *by the sovereign* (J. Scott 1998). That Blanchot exclaims a politic of refusal as silence does not deprive itself of voice. If this were so, then his publication of this statement and concern for Algerian liberation would be incomprehensible. On the contrary, refusal constitutes the rigorous demand to refute the description of oneself as a subject exclusively as member to a national community, and in the desire to understand the existence and the struggles of others beyond bounds of 'illegibility,' to find a means to *translate* their solidarities 'on either shore.' Such a language remains silent in that it refuses dialogue with a state apparatus that interprets its language as tacit acceptance of repression, one that posits all 'legitimate' speech as its own (Correia 2021).

On the other hand, the silence of refusal marks a caution against presuming one can simply understand the experience of others, but instead demands silence as a work of listening. For the time being, it is not clear how a new idea of community might be fashioned in light of this refusal, and by in large because the apparatus of collective subjectivization, the state and production of the 'nation,' are insufficient. What is to be done? Not necessarily effective counter-strategy—what is already achieved by the politic of resistance—but the effective

opening of possibility, a politic of refusal demands a new language of self-understanding as a communicative understanding even if it also begins by declining the conventions of speech.

In such a place, migrant-rights organizers in the city of Toronto were drawn together by the common call for Don't Ask Don't Tell (DADT) policy, a framework that situates a public practice of *anonymity* that intersects with a need and a *right to access* (Nyers 2010; McDonald 2012; Cunningham 2013; Bauder 2019; Humphris 2020). A loose coalition of sanctuary city organizers campaigned for such a framework beginning in March 2004 due to growing demand to address barriers for those with precarious status attempting to access public services (McDonald 2012).[92] Ultimately, they persuaded municipal officials to pass AccessTO policy in 2013, of which a key feature was the criteria familiar to such a framework.[93] DADT policies are most often rendered as an interdiction against compiling and sharing information and withholding public services. City staff are obligated not to perform three such actions. First, they are not to inquire into immigration status when providing services. Second, they must not deny non-status residents access to services. Third, they are not to share identifying information with federal authorities unless required to do so by federal or provincial law (Hudson 2019, p. 77).

Simultaneous to internal reconfiguration of service provision, DADT policies outline a strategy of non-compliance between municipal and federal or provincial agencies. Such a policy—when consistently implemented (see: Perez-Doherty 2015; Hudson et al. 2017; Hudson 2019; Atak 2019)—performs a generalized recognition of residence, an anonymous right

[92] Although the DADT campaign is treated as the *event* of a politic of refusal, the various organizations involved did not come about nor disband, with the campaign. Organizations like No One Is Illegal (NOII), the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), Southern Ontario Sanctuary Coalition (SOSC) and the FCJ Refugee Centre were among those promoting the campaign.
[93] This policy has been reaffirmed in 2015, and in 2017 following the American inauguration of Donald.

extended to all who *already* inhabit the city without qualification or criteria for membership.[94] The strategic interjection of an 'already' into a discussion of residence places it in tension with formal categories of membership that are often *not* generated at the local level, placing them in conflict with other scales and jurisdictions (Bauder 2019; Hudson 2019). Advancing the tension of scale, DADT policies uphold a right to residence that is actualized on grounds that precede the existence of information—where action must be conducted in light of the *absence* of information about particular residents, information strategically useful for state apparatuses to 'see' populations (J. Scott 1998).

Such a refusal to collect and share information with federal law enforcement, as Idil Atak (2019) suggests, is not a straightforward strategy. The same information that ensures the 'efficient' operations of deportation is also often necessary for the sake of provisioning care. The absence of demographic information on undocumented inhabitants of a city does not only obstruct the political function of border enforcement but also limits the effectiveness of public and social services. In particular, a personal health record that refuses citizenship status is crucial, but also presents problems for healthcare provision in determinations regarding *what* information to collect or not—where, for example, one's medical history might require account of their travels as a condition for their present health, a key intersection with citizenship-status. In a very real way, the risk of refusal must continue to be posed in particular against the exposure implied in being outside of an institutional framework—to be without proper access to education, healthcare, dental care, training, work, and sheltering services (Perez-Doherty 2015). However,

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[94] One elaboration is of *jus domicili* citizenship, through which citizenship is granted on the grounds of one's residence within a jurisdiction for a given period of time, is also an important concretization of a principle of accessible common rights (see: Bauböck 1994, 2003; Bauder 2014). It would differ meaningfully from a DADT framework insofar as it extends a posited right of membership rather than an anonymous principle, and so, the two might be placed in tension. Arguably, they may just as easily formulate a complementary practice, a 'hospitality-solidarity nexus,' where DADT assures a right to access public services with or without residence especially for those for whom the city is a temporary stop, whilst *jus domicili* actualizes membership as recognition of residence.

the fault for exposure cannot be charged against a policy like DADT primarily. Jean McDonald (2012) notes, “Everyday forms of marginalisation, exploitation, surveillance and repression have a significant impact on the daily lives of people with precarious forms of immigration status in Canada.” (p. 136). It is already the case that people without status fear the prospect that points of contact with public institutions and organizations may leave them vulnerable targets for deportation, and thus are more likely to avoid accessing services.

Accordingly, DADT policies are one way that a municipality institutionalizes solidarity with migrants and prefigures a common right that reaches beyond the distinctions of membership. In so doing, they intervene into the conditions bearing upon border enforcement—technologies of border enforcement rely upon the Canada Border Service Agency’s ability to identify and target city-dwellers. Such policies operate not only on political, juridical and geographical levels, but organize an excess to the language of sovereignty, disrupting the capacity to generate a straightforward distinction between citizen and stranger, friend and enemy, through concomitant control over a terrain of presence and absence. However, for such a strategy to remain viable—to support the lives of residents—it must limit itself to a refusal of the space of the political as the *locus* of decision upon membership only. If this is achieved, then the city also becomes the site for an opening onto a reinvigorated politics of everyday solidarity that exists before and beneath a level of sovereign exclusions. In covering the city in a veil, the anonymous city presents itself *as a beacon, calling out and beckoning the arrival of others*.

A radical form of refusal looks often like a radical risk, as in Blanchot’s words (1997 [1971]), when it operates on the level of a single subject, who is subjected to the forfeiture of their subjectivity. On the contrary, sanctuary policy does not necessarily relinquish personal identity, but rather resituates the *locus* of risk at the level of the city as a whole against state

apparatuses of violence, taking on responsibility for the anonymity of city-dwellers, and refusing persecution. DADT policy, and the migrant-rights politics discussed in this chapter, are not the only ones of their kind. A fragmentary history of city access policies would include non-exhaustively *jus domicili* citizenship rights (Bauder 2014a), church sanctuary (Shoemaker 2013) and a body of urban juridical and political practices following the German adage '*Stadtluft macht frei*' ('city air makes free') (Pirenne 1952 [1925]; Weber 1966 [1921]; Jacobs 1992 [1961], 2016; Bauder 2017). They certainly also provide a step through which others could follow. Accordingly, situating DADT policies demands we understand them as upholding a protean definition of the municipality through which residence supersedes membership.

Conclusion: Toward the Grammar of Cosmopolitan Democracy

In this chapter, I have outlined the initiation of a movement from the logic of sovereignty into a discussion of the space and language of a radical formulation of cosmopolitan democracy. In order to do so, I offered a critique of Michael Walzer's (1983) claim to the right held by members of a polity to exclude non-members, or even to refuse them entry into a territory. I argue that, contrary to a long tradition that articulates a notion of democracy as a community of 'friends' speaking on their own behalf, membership poses a danger to the practice of democracy. In opposition, I began to outline a democracy of strangers which refuses a logic of exclusion by virtue of suspending the right of members to count themselves and others, something that I argue is best prefigured not as a theoretical account but instead requires attention to empirical instances of migrant-rights campaigns. I considered movements organized around three serial themes; a *politic of absence* that draws out of everyday forms of encounter a 'minor politic' prepared to refute forms of injustice; a *politic of resistance* that attends to how public demand of account

draws from everyday experience as a form of address and response across citizen and non-citizen boundaries; a *politic of refusal* that advances this responsibility into the institutionalization of alternative grammars, collective practices, protections and possibilities against sovereignty.

I wish to attend, in the final chapter of this study, to the language that these politics produce as what we might call a *portable grammar of emplaced possibility*. What has been found in various migrant-rights politics from the "Cities of Sanctuary" campaign in Sheffield and the UK broadly, the *sans-papier* movement and CASS in Montreal, as well as the political campaigns which led to AccessTO policy in Toronto, attest to new vistas for thinking indeterminate political communities and complex formulations of democracy as grounded in the generation of situated but iterable languages. The language of encounter, common rights and participatory citizenship, the language of care and concern for others regardless of citizenship 'status' or membership, all speak to a *technē of communication* that might also allow for retreatments of political traditions and futures. Alongside this grammar, I argue in the following chapter that meaningful (albeit critical and self-complicating) institutions might be imagined to express these possibilities. Both the exploration of this grammar and the open-ended municipal framework it supports I refer to as the *open city*.

Chapter 5: The Open City

> Each word, though weighed down by the centuries, opens up a blank page and posits the future.
>
> (Borges 1999, p. 371)

Introduction

In this closing chapter, I outline a grammatology of the open city, the culmination of which is tasked with uncovering its grammar and, drawing from it, tentative institutions. Such a grammar would perhaps be best characterized as a *portable grammar of emplaced possibility* as it arises from migrant-rights movements. I focus on such a grammar because it advances the ideals of a democracy of strangers and a community predicated on a common right. That is, the open city is a language generated from encounters that take place everyday between those who do not share ‘citizenship,’ who resist detention and deportation, and who prepare the ground for institutions of community without borders. What the languages of migrant-rights protests more specifically uncover, I argue, is a project explored using the three analytical tools of a grammatology. Genealogically, a grammatology situated in light of these movements uncovers the long history of cities as already-open and co-dependent spaces for social life perpetuated by encounter, communication and mobility as much as distinction. It also finds a tradition of sanctuary that follows in tow. Of an etymology, it explores traditions of hospitality, refuge and civic freedom that these migrant-rights movements often reference as models. Of a pragmatics, it indicates contemporary instituting practices as forms of hospitality and responsibility drawing from the grammar of these models, what I define below as *extitution*.

A portable grammar of emplaced possibility shares features with all grammars. It includes a loose collection of elements in iterable arrangements such that they seem 'rule-like’ but also share the marks of their conditions, uses, productions and divergences. A grammar is distinct

from a *langue* or language as the inert pool of possible signs (Saussure 2009 [1916]). It is also distinct from a discourse as a specific composite of signs and the rules that govern their relations. A grammar is determined by the pragmatics of its expression over time. As such, referring to a 'portable grammar of emplaced possibility' may seem redundant. A grammatology already proposes to consider how grammars can be displaced and emplaced—deconstructed, iterated. However, the portability of a grammar, as well as its emplaced possibility require elaboration. The portability of the grammar of a democracy of strangers as a specific sort of political community generated in light of migrant-rights movements is conditioned by the portability of all languages. Languages are deconstructible because their elements can be removed from the context of one statement and situated within another without the loss of meaning or sense. They are iterable, or in this case, portable, because of their radical flexibility, the displacement of elements, texts, and avenues of interpretation which do *not* risk their possible meanings. In this way, any statement is 'haunted' not only by elements it may include in order to exclude, but also in a more radical exteriority constituted by the absences of signs, meanings or relations left unexplored or unsignified. This also entails that the languages, slogans, solidarities and shared meanings generated within one event or movement can be carried on in others as a tradition; ‘we are all foreigners,’ is perhaps a declaration that can *travel*.

The 'emplaced possibility' of a grammar that references the open city, though, would be more specific, as it would begin to express also what is gestured at in the notion of *possibilia*. *Possibilia* was previously distinguished from ‘contingent possibility’ in that the latter can be imagined from within a current context or state of affairs. The former, *possibilia*, would not operate in this way, but rather harkens to an altogether different institutional arrangement in order to also condition its own specific actualization. Where a politic of open borders, for

example, can be imagined from within the current post-colonial international system of nation-states if some or all of those states choose to regulate their borders less strictly, a No Borders politic calls for their abolition in the establishment of political community on entirely separate principles of common, and migrant rights, which also demands meaningful response to forms of racialization, patriarchy and global capitalist exploitation (Anderson et al. 2012; Bauder 2017).

A grammatology of the open city gathers the languages of these movements *first* rather than demanding that a society needs to change unprompted. It may attend to how they arise from one site, travel to others, and continue to motivated further emplaced utterances worldwide—as is demonstrated by their continued importance for myself in this text, and for other scholars. In this way, such a grammar also might be referred to as part of a *minor tradition*, which does not (and does not attempt to) establish hegemony but opens itself to diverse expressions. The emplaced possibility of the open city is not the expression of a 'utopian' social formation, in this sense, nor a hypothesis one must await. It is the emplacement within a *textual* space that demonstrates that a grammar of political possibility can exist because it *already* exists.

I elaborate a grammatology of the open city in three movements. Firstly, I explore how we may understand what is called ‘the city’ itself *already* as a cosmopolitan formation (where the insular existence of a single city, and its citizens, is not rigorously sustainable). This is because cities historically already have been sites for profound—albeit fragmentary—constellatory traditions of (migrant) city-making grounded in forms of encounter, communication and the building of relations along lines of difference (solidarities). The city is not merely an imagined community. It is also the site of a play of representations, its theatre. Cities, are important *loci* and *objects* of a grammatological analysis; I read them, I write them, I traverse and inhabit cities all at once. In other words, the city remains for us a text whereby a method of reading might be

applied in light of the economy of differences they represent, whilst also remaining the subterranean source of this representative activity; an economy of traces. These two trajectories need to be born out. A genealogical method within a grammatological analysis would set itself the task of traversing the history of cities as difference machines (Isin 2002) through which the tensions of producing distinctions, margins and forms of exteriority take place. But crucially, cities are already spaces that harken to relations irreducible to these distinctions because of their reliance and facilitation of networks, flows and mobilities. The very existence of the 'difference machine' also describes the important place that a mobile multitude of 'others' of the city hold in the undeclared textual economy of its orders, where everyday dialogical possibilities are translated into a monologue of the interiority of power held against a marginalized other.

For this reason, second, I traverse an etymology of the open city in three historical expressions that can give shape to the grammar and institutionalization of practices of urban community. In this light, I argue, historical instances of sanctuary take on a new importance—the Homeric tradition of hospitality, Biblical cities of refuge, and the civic principle that "city air makes free," articulate political possibilities opened for study because of our attention to the traces of cities as cosmopolitan formations as much as difference-machines. It is also because we are attending to migrant-rights movements today that such traditions are revealed to us to be traversable at all. From this position, it is because we might attempt to recover the grammars of hospitality, refuge and civic freedom that we are provided with an extensive field to weave together a minor tradition of sanctuary and solidarity that also demonstrate the possibility of a democracy of strangers today.

In its final movement, then, I elaborate how the grammar of the open city brings into view a pragmatic possibility for new institutions. This possibility is conditioned by the precedent

movements discussed in the previous chapter, as well as in light of this fragmentary tradition as the aspiration of this thread. They entail that cities are possible sites for the institutionalization of calling out and responding to the needs of strangers. Drawing upon the genealogical analysis of this chapter, I argue that latent possibilities within the globalization of the unit of the nation-state and systematic global exploitation that also create the present conditions for the global city (Sassen 2001 [1991]) and the global network society (Castells 2010 [1996]), opens upon the *possibilia* of the open city. I envision, here, the open city beyond its grammar, as an amalgam of institutions distinguishable in the ways they call or gesture toward others beyond themselves. Having considered city-based solidarities in the previous chapter, I argue that a politic of common rights provides a meaningful—if disruptive—institutional framework facilitating practices of movement, sheltering, and solidarity in the city. What I call *extitution*, in this way, is the counter-point to institutions that project exclusively interiorized ideals set against exterior elements or agents; extitutions instead institute gestures of solidarity beyond their boundaries.

Grammatological Genealogy of the Open City

There are two reasons for resituating our focus on cities in a grammatological analysis. The first captures the relations between urban space and wider contexts; *cities already operate both ‘inside’ themselves and ‘outside’ themselves as textual sites*. They are productive of grammars that cannot be internally contained but often demand situation amongst other cities and scales. Cities interact with one another on regional and global levels (Sassen 2001 [1991]; Soja 2003) and as grounds for inter-urban solidarities, the circulations of meaning from one site to another (Bauder 2021b). Such an approach also outlines the dynamics of cities amongst regional, national and global institutions. Scalar approaches in scholarship of urban grassroots and

sanctuary movements foreground questions through which city-politics intersect or conflict with the administrations of states (Varsanyi 2008; Coleman 2012; de Graauw 2014; Hudson 2019; Atak 2019). Questions of scale illuminate how the cityscape becomes a site for interpersonal and everyday city-making and counter-hegemonic community in conflict with manifestations of detention and deportation (Nyers 2003; Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009; Young 2011; Squire and Darling 2013a/b). At the same time, municipal policies become motivators of national and global dynamics of political activity, prompting scholars to find in them a kind of "foreign policy" (Hobbs 1994; Magnusson 1996; McDonald 2012; Hannan and Bauder 2015; Bauder 2017).

It is for these reasons, secondly, that cities continue to capture the imaginations of scholars, activists and organizers as a foundational site for radically re-envisioning global political futures (Derrida 2001; Ridgley 2008). Scalar considerations illuminate the importance cities have often held amongst other categories of community. Alongside the re-spatialization of cities within a political geography of globality, there is also a need to re-temporalize the city as the site of possibility of both order and imagination as it arises from the negotiations of space and subjecthood, of *encounter*. The *polis* as a *polos* (the axle of a wheel) entails that the city is viewed as a composite of agents within a [semi-]built environment (Heidegger 1998; Goulding 2022). The city *gathers* and *arranges* city-dwellers into polyphonic texts.

As the *locus* of a grammatological genealogy, the *open city* institutes a twofold study of political, social and economic life. Firstly, the open city is not *a* city, but the recognition that the formation of settlements is all but interior; 'a' city is member to a dynamic of settlement and movement which allows also for classificatory and exclusionary identification, but also facilitates an economy of encounters, cultural exchanges, and ultimately the circulation of languages. Urban scholars have captured this long trajectory of cities often by noting how they

may have originated before even the invention of agricultural practices. As Jane Jacobs (1970) argues, "It was the fact of sustained, interdependent, creative city economies that made possible many new kinds of work, agriculture among them" (Jacobs 1970, p. 36). Jacobs stresses sustainability, interdependence and creativity as key reasons for this inversion, all of which, we might add, does not rely on an interiorizing process, but relations between consolidating city-forms amongst one another in early human history. The hypothesis that 'cities come first' also allows us to imagine that processes that would otherwise interiorize them (where agricultural labour would produce enough food for the community negating any need to look beyond themselves) exist *in light of* inter-communal exchanges. What Jacobs describes is not 'the city' but *the already interdependent network of settlements*, the economies of *cities* (always plural), through which 'the city' is the paradigmatic social form of life and death, even 'from the origin.' At the origin, there is always *at least two* rather than one—two subjects, two cities, two origins. Their 'economies' characterize a textual circulation of meanings, encounters with difference, traces. The city is not an *institution* but an *extitution*; it is situated within a *topos* beyond itself.

In its farthest reaches, the experiment of settlement predated the agricultural revolution, even if it would seem intuitive to argue that "the first revolution that transformed human economy gave man control over his own food supply" (Childe 2003 [1936], p. 66). Further, presuming the starting-point of the agricultural revolution, a logically serial order is already constructed through which early humans invent the requisite tools and practices so that they can sustainably live together in place. In following, humans constitute their situated and insular activities through a division of labour and simultaneously, hierarchical class structure. However, the seriality leading to the urban revolution does not produce necessary conditions. The earliest city on record, Çatal Hüyük, predated the periodization of the urban revolution *and* the invention

of agriculture proposed in the early work of V. Gordon Childe, sustaining a population of 10 000 through a mixture of hunting and trade. This was a crucial discovery reversing the seriality of Childe's revolutions—wherein the impetus toward urban agglomeration, or *synekism* (synoecism), also provides the motivating force for agricultural-technical development, of "putting the city first" (Soja 2003).[95]

We should not assume that is it agriculture which satisfies the amassing of a food surplus that conditions sedentary community when it could have also been the continuous *movement* of people. Jacobs (1970) outlines an alternative pathway born out by the need to incorporate the discovery of early settlements (predating agriculture) into a literature of anthropological history. In her recounting of 'New Obsidian,' a community that loosely resembles Çatal Hüyük, she reconstructs a possible trajectory of development through which the specific location of a settlement—near a deposit of obsidian sought after by locals and non-locals alike—prompts an expanding and integrated import-export economy whose recursive consequences compel the unintended conditions through which a complex system of agricultural production and social distinction arises. That is, there exists a mutually perpetuating expansion and diversification of economic activities 'internal' to the settlement alongside the advancement and diversification of trade activities beyond it that *include* the 'invention' of complex agricultural practices as much as other technical processes of craft-based and artistic production.

For the grammar it generates regarding foundationally mobile economies and exterior relations that constitute cities, we should attend to the narrative Jacobs outlines. It can be

[95] Childe also describes this possibility, noting that the origin of 'the city' attests to the necessity of agriculture, but also the circulation of craftlore and other forms of communication—that 'sedentary' communities are in fact characterized by lively migratory and circulatory activities (Childe 2003 [1936], p. 114). Even internally to itself, 'the city' becomes a 'distinct' entity only insofar as it sacrifices the independence of social institutions, technical and shareable knowledges, and the very fact of people dwelling in one site sharing in a constellation of others.

synthesized into four stages.[96] Firstly, a loosely settled community establishes themselves near (but not at the site of) an obsidian deposit, in this case a volcano range on the Anatolian plateau. This deposit is presided over by local hunters who bar access to outsiders, constituting an originary moment of encounter. Close enough to provide a key *locus* for the bartering of the desirable material amongst proximate communities, the settlement becomes an early agglomerative site—there are already *two* 'local communities' present, those who are members to the original hunters who enforce exclusive claim to the outcrop, and the original trading community established nearby whom they live with, a sort of *pragmatic solidarity* through which intercommunal ties are born from mutual reliance. Other groups in the region begin traveling to the settlement in hopes of obtaining the precious material. Traders who arrive do not primarily intend to sell goods they have gathered but to buy obsidian, carrying with them anything that may be desirable enough to trade—predominantly food or goods specific to their locale; baskets and wooden boxes, oyster shells, animal pelts and horns. In this way, the desire for a precious resource prompts the continuous recurrence of encounter and development of communication.

In the second stage, proximate communities of hunter gatherers, defined loosely by their violently guarded hunting grounds, establish peaceful passage along trade routes as a formulation of a *juridical solidarity*—a solidarity ultimately maintained amongst those who hold power over their respective territories, of which a protean inter-communally maintained system of sovereignties is not difficult to notice. Trade routes are enforced by way of proto-collective security pacts in which tribes that target passing traders are sanctioned by contiguous communities who rely on this safe passage themselves. Passage is relatively peaceful, if not easy, made only slightly more so by the establishment of sanctuary along trade routes—natural resting

[96] From: Jacobs (1970), pp. 18-31.

and watering points, rather than artificial structures, that are protected by local religious institutions. Jacobs says, “They are spots of total sanctuary protected powerfully under the city’s religious code. These places always have a spring or other source of water and it is under the same protection” (p. 22). This second stage of New Obsidian’s development, for Jacobs, has little to do with its internal dynamics so much as the ways that such a meeting-point also motivates changes in social, economic and political activity beyond it through recurrent possibilities to encounter others, build networks of communication and uphold solidarities.

In the third, and fourth stages, Jacobs accounts for the recursive implications of these conditions in New Obsidian. ‘Forgery’ practices radiate throughout local regions so that once exclusive craftworks are reproduced amongst recipient trade partners, a possibility opened by the fact that the technical knowledge of fabrication is as iterable as communication.[97] Most importantly, though, non-perishable foodstuffs are valued both because they are likely to remain edible during travel and because they can be stored afterward—hard seeds and living animals are best. Of the latter, those most likely to be ‘stored’ longest are the most docile amongst livestock imported to the city. Some of these, under condition of climactic stability, live long enough to reproduce. Of the former, seed variants are either stored or dispersed in uncultivated patches near the open market space. In neither case is a ‘rational’ process undertaken, but instead, the twofold conditions of diverse foodstuffs concentrated in a single locale alongside a spontaneous process of experimentation and experiential knowledges ground the fourth stage: complex agriculture.

This fourth stage emerges by virtue of interactive practices predicated on encounter and nurturing the cumulative efforts of that interaction—with the addition of chance, in extraneous

[97] Early on, hide bags made in New Obsidian become a popular commodity enough that non-local traders request both the obsidian and its pouch, whilst another community produces desirable baskets from nearby trees. This persists until the two begin producing the other’s once exclusive good. (Jacobs 1970, pp. 21-22).

climactic conditions remaining hospitable. Although agriculture seems like a critical condition underlying the existence of large enough communities of people in an insular location, complex agricultural systems themselves undergo a social process of mobile experimentation and development before they are recognized to viably support 'a' community. The haphazard and creative dynamics of recognizing seed strains, variations, growing conditions, and cultivation practices, as much as the generations-long experimentation required for livestock domestication *themselves* rely upon relatively stable localization alongside diverse networks that introduce foodstuffs into a locale from abroad. Food is not just a source of nourishment, but the diverse concentration of foods are materials for a *technē* of food production that allows for agriculture. Such a *technē* would look much like an artistic practice—painters have their paints and farmers have their seeds. Preceding the invention of agriculture proper, communities rely on increasingly far-reaching trade networks for supplying goods, crafts and cultural practices. The history of settlement, then, is perhaps not predicated on the spontaneous generation of a purely interiorized technical achievement that sustains a community 'from within.' Rather, the history of settlement would *remain* a history of movements and encounters—of people, goods, knowledges, meanings—across space and time that also give rise to seemingly 'local' accomplishments. An *open city* is the ground for what is gestured toward as the 'origin of human civilization.'[98]

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[98] The desire to settle might also be intertwined with practices of burial, intimacy with deceased ancestors and divinities, and the sense of place that is established in the bonds of mourning as another expression of exteriorization. Such practices would attest to relations that are deeply immobile but liminal. Death halts the migratory activities of communities when they can no longer depart from the site of inhumed loved ones. The possible intersections between a fundamental desire to live amongst others, then, might also 'fundamentally' intersect with mourning. Edward Soja's (2003) words on the cities of Egypt are evocative: "The most prominent and permanent city in ancient Egypt was the necropolis, the city of the dead, where tombs and temples, pyramids and sphinxes, monopolized the attention and labour of the city-builders" (p. 53). The existence of a spiritual relation to place as *mourning*—the interpersonal connections that endure beyond death—provides one basis for a desire to stay in place although this is not necessarily so. Undoubtedly, nomadic communities deal in great complexity with the sustained memory of deceased loved ones on their continued travels (see also: Mumford 1989; Ruin 2018).

This ground prepares the urban and spatial conditions through which the fundamental sociability of people might also give rise to relatively stable geographical sites within which people settle and live amongst those who move. One cannot but reiterate the importance of movement for processes of 'settlement' and 'stabilization' in this way. However, with such a groundwork, it would also be pertinent to capture how systems of hierarchical government that often describe the arrangements of 'complex societies' or 'civilizations' emerge—either in relation to circuits of movement or not. The implications of Jacobs' observations are far-reaching; what is loosely gestured toward in the archaic city would also precede the formation of socio-political hierarchy, although it does not 'negate' it. Her descriptive constitution of the city is grounded in the declaration of its relations, rather than its distinctions, from its exterior, the possibility of a radical grammar of solidarities and institution of hospitality—drawing from trade, safe passage, forgery, cultural exchange and craftwork. The multi-scalar implications of the history of cities—through which a city might come in contact with communities of all scales, economic powers, empires, and nation-states—demands the gathering of possibilities that lead one outside of the physical or administrative boundaries of the cityscape.

Edward Soja (2003) advances this early image of a pre-recorded (first) urban revolution drawing from Jacobs—maintaining the crucial insight that people have always meaningfully migrated across space—by re-interpellating the processes that comprised a *second* urban revolution more closely aligned with Childe's description. This revolution includes the technical advancement of complex agricultural and irrigation systems as well as the emergence of relatively 'complete' writing systems in ancient Sumeria and Mesopotamia through which accounting, record keeping and calendrical order corresponded to increasingly powerful proto-states. Underlying proto-state formation, writing is a manifestation and condition of *both* urban

social hierarchicalization processes—what Soja (2003) calls "societal governmentality" (p. 55)—and the circuits of goods (including cultural products) and peoples (migration) as a form of record-keeping. Writing bears an uneasy place within this history insofar as such a technology might also either export systems of control *or* displace and disrupt them. In practice writing would likely have done both. In ancient Sumeria, the construction of new urban social categories are situated within emergent urban spaces and induced by forms of travel closely linked to the emergence of a complex writing system.[99]

Nevertheless, an economy of cities as reliant upon the existence of others, not an organism of 'the' city but an ecosystem of cities, provides us with a point of departure that bears out two trajectories both entangled and contested historically. The first of these trajectories would account for how the historical city is displaced at the moment that it emerges for the first time under a written scrutiny. We have discussed how one might situate Plato's *Republic* at the head of a tradition of writing about the city translated into discussion around the more abstract conception of the state (following Machiavelli's response to the Platonic issue of regime change [chapter 3]). This would stand for us as the first text to center the city as its analytical focus. Such a discourse proceeds not as the observation of a 'concrete' site but as the possibility of an ideal—from which, at the opening of the dialogue Plato dramatizes his interlocutors in their flight from the city of the text, its noises, festivities, and prayers, into the sheltered home of a *metic* city-dweller in order to propose this ideal city. The 'ideal' of the city projected by this tradition is always as a relatively stable authorial arrangement rather than a site of mobility.

[99] New urban classes include entrepreneurial merchant-financiers, an organized military force doubling as an urban police and an increasingly complex institutionalized civic bureaucracy. The fourth class, bearing the least mobility, is, "an impoverished urban "underclass"" (Soja 2003, p. 57). Such a class-division bears similarities to the critique of globalization advanced by Zygmunt Bauman (2013 [1998]) as establishing disparate circuits (liquidity) of capital and labour—'cosmopolitan' jet-setting members of the business class demonstrate high geographical as well as social mobility whereas common peoples are forced to remain in place.

One might find, from this point, greater relevance for the Machiavellian *state* as an amorphous indicator of any political unit characterizing this history in relation to the multi-scalar analysis of the city. A genealogical analysis of *states* would include a list not exclusively of cities (*poleis*, city-states), but also empires, kingdoms and nation-states. It is also for this reason that a history of the 'city' is situated in light of a scalar and jurisdictional concern—where not one generation after Plato, the famous pupil of his fellow, Aristotle, Alexander the Great establishes an empire by means to the appropriation of cities.[100] We are also not speaking merely of an issue of method, but a set of historical conditions:

> In the first Urban Revolution, synekism—the stimulus of urban agglomeration—worked primarily in the realm of revolutionizing social production through the invention of agriculture (farming and animal husbandry), the creation of specialized forms of craft production, and the development of associated trading and exchange networks. In the second Urban Revolution, synekism continued to be involved with technological innovation in agriculture (the creation of much larger-scale irrigation systems, for example), but became most potently focused on the realm of societal reproduction, generating an essentially political revolution that revolved around extraordinary innovations in geographical governmentality, making possible the maintenance and administration of cohesive societies and cultures of unprecedented population size and territorial scope. The crystallizing moment of this synekism *was the urban invention of the imperial state* and all its ancillary apparatuses, including those that would permit the exceptional expansion in societal scale and scope associated with the formation of city-centered empires. (Soja 2003, pp. 59-60, italics in original)

For Edward Soja, the urban invention of the imperial state originates, well before Plato, in the ancient Sumerian city-state of Ur (ibid, pp. 60-66). From what follows, the concretization of *this* trajectory provided by writing, constitutes a site for analysis of the *displacement* of the city; its indefinite extension beyond itself, couched within the territoriality of empires, kingdoms and nation-states. It is not surprising that print culture spurs the nationalism outlined by Anderson so much later (2016 [1983]) as it is not the first time that an urban space prepares the conditions of

[100] As aptly as it may be, his legacy remains monumentalized in a city bearing his namesake, Alexandria.

the text through which everything outside of the city becomes its sphere of dominion, where the author sets before themselves the world at large for interpellation *as if* no longer in a city.

A written history of cities in-themselves would be rather short-lived, then, in favour of the city as a motor for political consolidation while also being subsumed by other scales and articulations of power (Isin 2002). At this moment, we might consider rehearsing a historical trajectory that would be closely aligned with a western logocentrism and logic of sovereignty (discussed in chapter 3). Such a trajectory is entangled with the 'occidental city' posed as distinct—and distinctly fraternal, associative or agglomerative—from an 'oriental' city characterized by insurmountable cleavages, religious superstition and politico-bureaucratic oppression (Weber 1966 [1921]). As a critique of Weber's theory of synoecism reliant on the distinction between 'Oriental' and 'Occidental' cities, Engin Isin (2002) argues that cities in global history should instead be understood as 'difference machines.' The production of specific differences as the translational activity of citizenship is often also a translation of relations with the 'others' of citizenship. This includes firstly forms of solidarity understood as a desire amongst powerful actors to find commonality with strangers, predominantly merchant classes. Secondly, it would capture agonism as the tensions and the intimacies that may arise from them, conflict and construction of enemies who are 'kept close.' It may finally propose a form of alienation, an abject estrangement akin to the insurmountable foreignness of the *barbaroi* for Greeks—a people with whom one could not even communicate, who (mockingly) 'bar-bar' or babble. It is also a dialectic, then, that presents power as a public activity of contention, one that specifies the 'stranger,' the 'outsider' or the 'alien' in distinct ways over time.

As member to this trajectory from urban beginnings to a global distribution of political power, the globalized and post-colonial history of cities bears out a tension that is constitutive of

their repressive (as much as I would like to argue their emancipatory) possibilities (Sassen 2001 [1991]; Yeoh 2001; Beswick et al. 2015; King 2016). A genealogy contends with readings of social association bound to citizenship as essentially positive or democratic, and that assert the 'occidental city' as grounded in fraternity and association. Instead, what Isin (2002) finds is a coalescing ideal of citizenship in internal tension amongst aristocrats, warriors and wealthy labouring (or later bourgeois) classes. They set themselves against internal others—peasant classes, workers, women and dwellers who do not have the same access to public institutions—as well as external others—migrants, exiles, barbarians, enemies, slaves, vagrants and refugees. They do so in ways that construct citizenship not only at the 'border' of a *topos* of political identification, but often at a foreshortened border through which their aristocracy can also be articulated as co-citizenship, co-rulership, co-lordship and co-nationality in distinction from the undifferentiated 'masses' of others even as fellow inhabitants of their claimed jurisdictions.

Weber's emphasis on association, though, remains important particularly if it can be found to draw the associative structure of the city outside of itself, into circuits of wider sociabilities from the beginning. It would also be a crucial contribution to a portable grammar of emplaced possibility in this way to define association as unbounded, as gesturing toward a common right and a democracy of strangers. Contrary to the production and reproduction of distinction exclusively, the manners by which these ambiguous 'exterior' dimensions continuously shape cities as forms of association lead outside of the cityscape itself as an open formation—where those presumed 'outside' the city's citizenry are co-contributors and dwellers. This is not only so for how other cities, other political scales, or economic structures bear upon cities, but how both as an analytic of 'internal' dimensions and 'external' dimensions, cities are made in light of 'others.' Negotiating the traces of regional circuits of trade and cultural exchange, other cities,

other scales of political activity, other subjects, and even death, the cityspace becomes both a site for generating a grammar of encounters with difference and a locus for understanding what takes place beyond itself; synoecism, association, interdependence, craftlore, forgery, as exteriorizing terms against the interior production of the city's own distinctions.

For this reason, if, "The development of society can only be conceived in urban life, by the realization of urban society" (Lefebvre 2000, p. 177), then the *sanctuary*—the formation of cityspace as a site of sheltering people on the move, dwelling-together, and refusal of estrangement *in light of* processes of exteriority—becomes a latent but quintessential expression of the city. In tandem to the city, sanctuary instances have been of crucial importance for contemporary sanctuary city movements and migrant-rights protests. The rearticulation of sanctuary as an urban phenomenon, though, is a rather new amalgamation of two spatial relations—the sanctuary as a juridically enclosed and inviolable space on one hand, and the city as a site of gathering, dwelling and communication on the other. How, then, does a genealogy of the open city rely upon the trajectory of sanctuary instances historically?

Roman and Medieval Sanctuary Customs: Establishment and Dissolution

In attempting to outline a history of urban sanctuary as a fragmentary genealogy, the extension of sanctuary practices might follow many possible courses. Sanctuary practices exist variously in global historical space and time. In tenuously 'Western' and just as often non-Western *loci* from Greece to Rome and Medieval Europe, Byzantine, Arabic, Ottoman and Islamic cultures, there exist long-standing traditions of hospitality (see: Stastny 1987; Macrides 1988; Lippert 2005; Shoemaker 2013). Contemporary practices of sanctuary draw from diverse religious traditions as well including Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism and

Hinduism (Bagelman 2016; Bauder 2019). A genealogy of urban sanctuary attends to how these traditions vacillate between two motivations, of sheltering newcomers while also asserting a political authority to do so. They remain 'non-neutral.' Akin to the dual trajectories of cities, limitations placed upon authority embodied by the existence of strangers rightfully seeking refuge opens a hyperbolic and excessive possibility to the dialectical tensions of authority that Isin (2002) brings to light in the city as difference-machine.

A discussion of Roman and Medieval sanctuary, which inform contemporary sanctuary city movements, would have to account for two processes in light of this. The first would capture how sanctuary is established as an always dubiously religious practice. A trajectory of Roman-Medieval sanctuary was not always the expression of a religious, but also a civic tradition. Slaves without representation could flee to sanctuary as a matter of tenuous 'privilege,' the only one afforded them under Roman law (Cunningham 1995, p. 221). Early legal codification of religious sanctuary is closely linked with the legitimation of Christianity as Rome's official religion: "The state first recognized church sanctuary in the Theodosian Code in AD 392 and sought to limit those to whom it could be applied based on the nature of their crimes. Although at the outset sanctuary was limited to the church altar, its territory gradually expanded to include bishops' residences and even cemeteries" (Lippert 2005, p. 3). In this way, the establishment of sanctuary as exceptional space—'outside' of the law—is interpellated into legal code (brought back into law) as expression of the expanding influence of the Roman Catholic Church.

The extension of Church power after the fall of Rome is maintained in the assertion of the inviolability of church spaces, which were legally not to be defiled, and (indirectly) in the importance of protecting those unjustly persecuted. Religious interdiction binds the *traditio* of sanctuary from Greece, through Rome and into the Medieval Ages, as early Greek political

thought around the sanctuary (ἱερὸν, *hieron*) emphasized the non-pollution of the precinct (τέμενος, *temenos*), its temple (νᾱός, *naos*) which is both sacred (ἱερὸς, *hieros*) and inviolable (ἄσυλος, asylos, from which the term *asylum* derives) (see also: Parker 1996 [1983]). In this way, a sanctuary tradition is carried forward as the assertion of religious sovereign space when the church system is in power, or counter-sovereign space when church power, and with it the formalized traditions of sanctuary, erode. Under these conditions, even minor sanctuary traditions contest political order but certainly are not 'innocent' of claims to greater power.

In light of its contentious development, the second process would capture how sanctuary becomes a proxy for conflict between religious and political agents. The Medieval tradition of sanctuary is challenged by the rise of the nation-state in Europe. Lippert (2005) argues that, "By the Middle Ages in Europe, sanctuary as a space and as a set of discourses and practices gradually receded in the face of the growing power of states. In Britain, where sanctuary had been intensively regulated for centuries, it was formally abolished under James I by statute in 1624" (p. 3). Karl Shoemaker (2013) outlines how as early as the 12th century, British kings criticized Church power by challenging the right of sanctuary, especially as they projected hypotheses of criminals perpetrating wrongs without punishment (Shoemaker 2013, pp. 22-25).[101] This increasingly common strategy eroding the image of the innocent asylum seeker also conveniently necessitated a strong state capable of breaking with the Church—as consolidated under Henry VIII. Ultimately, Shoemaker notes: "Under James I, there were several attempts to draft legislation that abolished the privilege entirely, and the legislation passed in 1623 seems to have accomplished this aim. At that point in seventeenth-century England, the promiscuous availability of sanctuary for murder and theft was all but gone" (ibid. p. 25). By 1917, even the

[101] Overlap between this and the early modern history of sexuality from the confessional to the Victorian subject outlined by Michel Foucault (1990) are difficult to overlook.

Catholic Church's *Codex Juris Canonici* left out formal sanctuary procedures (ibid. p. 26).

The end of a formal tradition of sanctuary demands we also situate such a tradition as the expression of a political pragmatics of religious worship—as an attempt to articulate sacred and thus prohibitive spaces as a means through which the Roman Catholic Church might constitute its divinely ordained power "on Earth." This entails that sanctuary in Roman and Medieval history is a 'major politic' concerned with establishing hegemonic authority over other institutions. Unequivocally, in conceptualizing the *open city*, I would likely find compelling ground to oppose the Church's assertion of a right over the existence—and production of non-existence—of subjects within Christendom; particularly the violence of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic Church practices that institutionalize discourses of racialization crucial for a colonial ('Western') history into the present (see: chapter 3; Fredrickson 2002; Appiah 2018; Hall 2019). The challenge to sanctuary by consolidating state-actors speaks to a similar kind of contention, not to establish, but to dispute Church power in advancement of its own. The nation-state, in the age of the international system of nation-states, has all but won this contest.

The formal end of sanctuary did not entail the end of claims of sanctuary that carry forward this tradition; in particular as a thread persisted in Central American liberation theologies (Cunningham 1995). Importantly, neither in their articulations nor in their oppositions are contemporary sanctuary movements preparing the ground for a 'major' claim of authority like the Holy Roman Empire. Rather, it seems that this protean expression of a contemporary sanctuary policy is the progenitor of increasingly impactful municipal activities against states and on behalf of diverse actors. In the American context, the designation of sanctuary intersects with religious sanctuary politics, beginning in the 1980s with the US-Central American sanctuary movement in its response to the conflict in El Salvador (Perla Jr. and Bibler-Coutin

2013). Such sanctuary instances continued in support of Central American undocumented migrants in general, which framed also the prominent New Sanctuary Movement [NSM] initiated in 2007 (Caminero-Santangelo 2013; Yukich 2013).

As a genealogical object within a gramamtological framework, though, the history of Roman and Medieval sanctuary presents a particularly interesting example of the manners by which the interdiction against violating spaces—either in the sovereign claim that no person may tread sacred ground or, more conventionally, that one might seek shelter without persecution—is entangled with political and jurisdictional claims upon spaces, often bringing their movements to a halt. Nevertheless, it is sanctuary in this capacity to shelter a fugitive from harm which has provided the framework for contemporary civic—and certainly religious—claims to shelter migrants of precarious statuses. By in large the variety of such contemporary statements speaks to the power as much as the ambiguity of a term like sanctuary. The ways that such a term is used for political purposes demonstrates how it produces a powerfully iterable grammar. The refusal of violation—to set limits on the persecution of those who flee *and* to assert the sacred space of a sovereign—points toward an authority who takes responsibility for those most vulnerable to that authority. Nevertheless, sanctuary is part of a grammar that gestures toward this opening instead as the open city, even with the ambiguous weight of this history in view.

Ethical and Political Situation of the Open City in Etymological Context: Precedents

A genealogical analysis prepares us with a foundational grammar drawing from a narrative of cities and sanctuaries. Their implications demonstrate how these formations are entangled with processes of distinction and authorities who oversee them, while generating languages of mobility and sheltering their challenge to authority. In light of this overarching framework, I

focus on instances of an etymology of urban migrant-rights; that establish a minor tradition of the open city. I cannot claim to be exhaustive, but to provide examples of a tradition that historically follow away from the announced arrival of the city as a difference-machine. Such examples, I hope, would stand as gestures toward the organization of a rupture within the economy of ordered forces that cities have given rise to—class distinction, empire, nation-states. This would demonstrate at least that *such an opening exists*. From the instituting existence of such a minor tradition, contemporary possibilities might be articulated as a point of departure.

It is in these examples *as a point of departure*, though, that we might also consider how to depart from them in their own entanglements with the politic of sovereignty; there is no 'neutral' example. With this in mind, the trajectory of the open city finds in cities a site for the various articulations of a possibility to refuse sovereign power within the cityscape and in favour of sheltering residents. A concurrent marginal tradition of cities weaves through a loose collection of momentary—and iterable—forms of solidaristic empowerment predicated on a diffuse *economy of hospitality*. Understanding their seeming marginality, the contemporary politics of sanctuary cities in practice uncover such a tradition. The examples discussed are the Homeric Law of Hospitality, Jewish Cities of Refuge, Medieval sanctuary and civic refuge, and contemporary sanctuary as an expression of cosmopolitical urban life.

Hospitality: The Odyssey's 'Foreigner Question'

One might be surprised to find that at the beginning of the 'Western canon' is a text that repeats a ritual of hospitality *from the position of the traveller*, the hero Odysseus. What we find in the *Odyssey* is the rehearsal of a question of hospitality issued from the position of a foreigner and bearing upon the goodness of a ruler to give hospitality generously. In this way, the *Odyssey*,

supposed to be at the origin of a 'Western' literary tradition, places the goodness of a ruler into question specifically in the way that they *do* or *do not* provide hospitality to strangers. This is formally due to the structure of a rhapsodic epic, where a fixating repetition performs the awe of the speaker.[102] It is also contextually explained by the fact that repetition sustains the possibility that Homer, the 'wandering bard,' could eat—stretching the length of poetic telling over multiple days. With or without reason, the repetition of a ritual of hospitality and the question regarding the 'goodness' of a ruler are articulated by a plurality of voices throughout the text.

The 'foreigner question' is posed as the question of whether—under the eyes of Zeus, the patron god of hospitality and of strangers (*Odyssey* Bk. 14.389)—the host will offer hospitality to the guest and *not* whether the host has a 'use' for them. Because of the conditions bearing upon the wanderer, the *Odyssey* rehearses the law of hospitality. In one such scene, Odysseus recounts his misadventures leading him from the Trojan War to the island of Ogygia as hostage of the nymph Calypso. Fleeing from her, he washes up on the Phaeacian shores at the feet of Nausicaa, the daughter of rulers Alcinous and Arete. Recounting his perils to the Phaeacians, he tells of his encounter with the Cyclopes before which he poses the question of hospitality:

> When early born Dawn with her rosy fingers appeared/then I called an assembly and addressed everyone:/"My trusty companions; the rest of you now stay here/while I go in my ship, together with my companions/*and find out about these men, to see who they are/if they are violent and uncivilized, and given to wrongdoing/or are hospitable, and there is in them a god-fearing disposition*." (*Odyssey* Bk. 9. 170-176, italics added)

It is the migrant-subject who ventures the foreigner question: 'will these people extend the rite of hospitality?' It is specifically *not* the question of whether the 'foreigner' is themselves 'civilized' enough to receive refuge. Odysseus presents hospitality as part of a triad of a ruler's good character; the possessor bears all three if they bear one—just, hospitable and pious inextricably.

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[102] The *Odyssey* is understood to be the textual transcription of an oral tradition.

Meetings between strangers entail a repetition of the ritual of hospitality that asymmetrically favours near-unconditional generosity to the foreigner as a suppliant—further valorized by the tradition of Greek *mythos* where it is possible that the wanderer could be a god in disguise. In return, the wanderer might offer a *promise* of the gods' blessings. Thus, Odysseus, encountering Nausicaa after having shipwrecked on the Phaeacian shore, states:

> I beg you princess, have pity on me; after many travails/you are the first person I have met, and I don't know a/single one among the people who dwell in this land and city. Direct me to the city and give me some rags to cover myself/perhaps a wrapping-cloth you brought when you came here. *Then may the gods grant you all that you desire in your heart/and may they bestow on you a husband, a house, and good/harmony of minds*. (*Odyssey* Bk. 6.175-185, italics added)

Nausicaa provides Odysseus with more than he asks and directs him toward her father's house. Once he arrives, repeating his prayer for hospitality, it is the advice of wise counsellors and kin, that upholding the law of hospitality is a necessary good. In following, the *Odyssey* depicts the extravagant hospitality given to guests from good rulers—being bathed with oils and perfumes, showered with food, gifts of fine garments, wools, horses, ships and crewmen, to obsessive acts of giving even of the best chair a ruler has (*Odyssey* Bk. 1.130-135; Bk. 7.161-170.). This culminates in the bestowal of a final gift upon the traveller's departure amongst the most prized possession of a kingdom. On the other hand, the refusal or failed act of hospitality is met with metaphysical punishment by the gods, and a mark of one's inability to rule well. Metaphysical punishment is translated in political terms as the tarnished reputation and stoked resentments between *polis*-dwellers and rulers.

In its iterations, 'Western' interpretation displaces the performance of hospitality through the effacement of the text itself. No longer is the *Odyssey* read in its content, but as a monolithic symbol where it is best that it says nothing, lest it betrays the hiddenness of its originary wandering its originary estrangement, and its originary hospitality. This cannot merely happen

once but is *repeated* in order to maintain the 'West' as a stable institution—where the book as a 'statue' (*in-statuere*) metonymically takes the place of the 'stasis' of the structure it represents. Upon reading it, Homer comes into view as a vehemently proponent of hospitality. When one claims the greatness of the 'West' because of its literary prowess 'from Homer" they occlude the practice of hospitality that frames this narrative (see: Searle 1990). The *Odyssey* is instead at the head of a dissimulated 'West' that no longer deigns to provide it, its institution forfeited for the sake of a logic of 'origin.'[103] As such, the *Odyssey* exists (*ek-sistere*, stands out) as the exorbitant element of the institution of 'Western' literature. Its very text reflects and is reflected most in the living (auto)biography of exiles, refugees and stateless persons *at the very moment* when it is heralded from within the privileged interior of a 'Western' literary and academic canon; where the grounding work of the 'West' as a sovereign structure is—in its actual reading—the text most profusely to repeat the law of hospitality toward a vulnerable traveller.

Refuge: Biblical Cities of Refuge

The Biblical tradition of cities of refuge in the book of Numbers is amongst the most consistently referenced for contemporary sanctuary instances (Bagelman 2016; Lewis 2016; Bauder 2019), and has motivated new directions in recent theoretical scholarship (Payot 1992; Levinas 1994; Derrida 2001). What it reveals is a complex statement that authorizes one of the most ambitious projects of city-building in favour of unconditionally sheltering those fleeing violence elsewhere, whilst also bearing the tensions of juridical establishment as both a violent and colonial process. The Biblical cities of refuge presents at once a hyperbolic subject to whom

[103] Perhaps another way of saying this, rejecting the borders of a distinction making it impossible to practice the law of hospitality, would be to recognize that they were much more amenable to find *relationships* between themselves and precedent civilizations (in the 'Orient') (Bernal 1987, 1991, 2006; Isin 2002). Critical additions are uncovered by this reading. For example, the first 'civilization' mentioned in the *Odyssey* is not *Greek* but *Ethiopian* (Bk. 1.22).

refuge is extended unconditionally while also establishing an authority who presides over them as sovereign. Such a tradition is invoked within a contentious backdrop even today from which, on one hand, the fragmentary and marginal possibility of instituting a site for vulnerable people to flee as a cosmopolitical aspiration is contrasted, on the other hand, with the exceptional violence of contemporary policies of settlement, blockade, and apartheid in the historical location they were initially undertaken. The declaration of an authority to 'establish a city' is never neutral, even if it proposes to also institute 'refuge.' In this sense, a contemporary network of cities of refuge was outlined recently not at the Biblical sites declared, but as initiated in the city of Strasbourg (Derrida 2001; discussed below).

If it has led us toward a disseminated, displaced and mobile minor tradition rather than the assertion of a 'major' one, then, it may still be important to outline what was described in this text. The cities of refuge mentioned in the book of Numbers were presented as sacred urban spaces within which any refugee, even those pursued for unintentional murder, might escape persecution as the fulfillment of a promise between Moses and Yahweh: "He who strikes a man so that he dies shall surely be put to death. However, if he did not lie in wait, but God delivered him into his hand, then I will appoint for you a place where he may flee" (Exodus 21:12-13). In this way, these cities became the promise extended to an ambiguous subject who must always have a place to flee to, as well as toward the fugitive from unjust vengeance. A question surrounding who might live in such cities motivates the possibility of a hyperbolic assertion of the *non*-legibility of possible inhabitants, alongside the excessive work of establishing cities around the land. To the question, "who is allowed to seek refuge?" its answer is tautological, "anyone who is seeking refuge."

These cities were organized around Israel as a command from Yahweh to the Jewish

people: “Now among the cities which you will give to the Levites you shall appoint six cities of refuge, to which a manslayer may flee. And to these you shall add forty-two cities” (Numbers 35: 6). The seriality of their order is quite striking; the commandment prescribes *first* that six cities of refuge are appointed, and to them forty-two are *added*. It would seem that six cities constitute an *excessive* work prescribed not for stable settlement of specific members amongst the twelve tribes, but as accessible spaces for sheltering—sanctuary not on a liminal but an urban scale: “You shall appoint three cities on this side of the Jordan, and three cities you shall appoint in the land of Canaan, which will be cities of refuge. These six cities shall be for refuge for the children of Israel, for the stranger, and for the sojourner among them, that anyone who kills a person accidentally may flee there” (Numbers 35: 14-15). An open city instituting a principle that refuses to turn away those who flee demands a stable form, “always,” not merely in the specific instances of an invitation to the stranger, sojourner or accidental murderer.

The reason and implications for establishing the cities of refuge on the grounds of accidental murder—and not merely fleeing a conditional displacement—returns in the text in such a way that is particularly important for critical appraisal, though. It would seem that the extremity of this sheltering places a check upon the authority of a ruler who must adjudicate the Commandments, one of which being an unqualified prohibition of murder (Exodus 20: 13). What is stated as a universal and absolute principle, in this passage, is qualified in the establishment of cities of refuge—there are conditions whereby even the most ‘heinous’ of crimes are contextualized as unpunishable, and where punishment wrought upon the accidental murderer is unjust. Instead of outlining further these cities’ functions, the book of Numbers elaborates on the justification against retributive murder and its consequences, reordering the thresholds of severity for which one might be forced to flee; from the stranger and resident

sojourner as generally seeking refuge, to the accidental murderer as fugitive (although in their distinction the passage also places them into a shared textual space). The possibility for accidental death demands consideration for one otherwise marked as beyond community. As such, a supposed limit on hospitality is in excess to the conditions of bare movement so as to say, "*even* a person who has committed murder (unintentionally), bears a right to refuge."

This 'even' must be placed into question since the interdiction against retribution for accidental murder is itself spatialized ambiguously in light of the cities of refuge. A right to refuge is presented to bear spatial limits where it is in tension with the presumptive retribution sought by the victim's loved ones. If, for any reason, they leave the city, they become vulnerable:

> So the congregation shall deliver the manslayer from the hand of the avenger of blood, and the congregation shall return him to the city of refuge where he had fled, and he shall remain there until the death of the high priest who was anointed with the holy oil. But if the manslayer at any time goes outside the limits of the city of refuge where he fled, and the avenger of blood finds him outside the limits of his city of refuge, and the avenger of blood kills the manslayer, he shall not be guilty of blood, because he should have remained in his city of refuge until the death of the high priest. (Numbers 35: 25-27)

A spatial limitation—the exterior of the city walls—limits the unjustifiability of retribution. Stepping outside of the city dissolves the responsibility for protection. Furthermore, temporal limitations of refuge are established. Distinctly, they are not asserted on behalf of the hosts of a city, instead setting a statute of limitations whereby the accidental murderer might be absolved of their crime. At that moment, they might return whence they came, a result that is repeated after its first declaration with the addition of a refusal to request payment: "And you shall take no ransom for him who has fled to his city of refuge, that he may return to dwell in the land before the death of the priest." (Numbers 35: 33).

In light of the question of accidental murder, it seems that at least one possible interpretation of the general condition (for the stranger and the sojourner) is that *refuge is*

already (a) given. The need to contend with accidental murder rather than outlining conditions upon a general refuge speak to the possibility that it can be presented as an uncontroversial and unconditional principle—as long as the city exists it must be a refuge. Focus on murder and the justifiability of a space in which retribution is abrogated under its conditions is reflective of how *this* would be a pre-emptive controversy amongst the 'congregation' in a way that other criteria would not. Accordingly, the limitations of a refuge for the stranger in general seem also to be left unconditional temporally—there is no foreseeable or justifiable limit upon the right of a refugee to stay if they do not wish to return to the land they once inhabited. Because the stranger, unlike the accidental murderer, is not anxiously awaiting the moment of absolution for a crime—which they have not committed—their residence is potentially indefinite. By virtue of the silence of the law, the text describes a hyperbolic possibility of unconditional refuge, the grounds of which established entire cities for the possibly indefinite dwelling of strangers.

With this in mind, the *command* of an unconditional refuge may still be placed into question. The Biblical cities of refuge present a striking early example of a formulation of authority channelled seemingly into the limitation—rather than the exception—of that authority. As distinct from the Homeric tradition of hospitality issued from the position of the traveller, and only tenuously upheld in the promise of blessings or punishments (the didactic work of the bard himself), a principle of refuge is instituted as a law in the latter example. I have up to this point interpreted the invocation of "murder" to imply that cities of refuge are established as both a limitation on power and a hyperbolic statement of rightful sheltering. It is an asylum that one can seek *before the law*, preceding legal trial.

Nevertheless, a refuge before the law, must also be noted for the prefigurative dimensions that might also give rise to claims of sovereignty as first and final authority. A dialectical tension

inheres within the tradition of cities of refuge through which the spilling of blood defiles the land. In the passage on the book of Numbers, it is said, "So you shall not pollute the land where you are; for blood defiles the land, and no atonement can be made for the land, for the blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of him who shed it. Therefore do not defile the land which you inhabit, in the midst of which I dwell; for I the Lord dwell among the children of Israel" (Numbers 35: 33-34). The interdiction against spilling blood reasserts the prohibition against murder, whilst supplementing it with a logic. Initially, the divinity of the commandment is maintained as derived from Yahweh directly; no further elaboration, no interpretive action, is declared necessary. In this instance, however, the interdiction bears a specificity of purpose—the spilling of blood defiles the land, a land which Yahweh inhabits, *and thus* cannot take place. Furthermore, the land on which blood is spilled is no longer simply the sanctified space of a city of refuge, but the entirety of Israel, upon which no blood must be shed.

Consequently, the purposive assertion of the interdiction demands a reciprocal correction—one that will interpret the additive spilling of blood as the expungement of blood, through which *another* murder places the world in order rather than throwing it further into disjoint. An exception is marked out even within a tradition of cities of refuge which places into question the extent of hospitality, of the "even" of one who has committed murder; "and no atonement can be made for the land, for the blood that is shed on it, *except by the blood of him who shed it*." This, too, is a statement of exception through which one who intentionally spills blood is marked as violable. If it marks a clear delineation around ones who have not spilled blood but still seek refuge as inviolable, it also mobilizes a collection of politico-legal apparatuses through which its logic might be expressed; a 'limitation' is set upon the congregation who do not commit murder themselves but authorize such an act to be committed;

through the delimitation of retribution *as justifiable*, retributive murder is authorized.[104]

Such an authority exists amongst the entire territory. In the book of Joshua, the names of the cities of refuge are revealed—and presumably completed in their administered construction:

> So they appointed Kedesh in Galilee, in the mountains of Naphtali, Shechem in the mountains of Ephraim, and Kirjath Arba (which is Hebron) in the mountains of Judah. And on the other side of the Jordan, by Jericho eastward, they assigned Bezer in the wilderness on the plain, from the tribe of Reuben, Ramoth in Gilead, from the tribe of Gad, and Golan in Bashan, from the tribe of Manasseh. These were the cities appointed for all the children of Israel and for the stranger who dwelt among them, that whoever killed a person accidentally might flee there, and not die by the hand of the avenger of blood until he stood before the congregation. (Joshua 20: 7-9)

As noted optimistically by Michael J. Lewis (2016), "A glance at the map shows that they are spaced across ancient Israel with remarkable evenness, according not to population but geography, thereby reducing as much as possible the longest potential flight of a fugitive" (p. 11). Such a spatial network aspires to make refuge accessible across geographical space. Unfortunately, discursively moving away from the establishment of refuge and into a controversy of accidental murder—what is promised to Moses earlier—places refuge under the auspice of a form of adjudication familiar to scholars of sovereignty, its territorial claims, and its exceptions. The equal spacing of cities of refuge across the territory also establishes the claim of the authority who presides over them.[105]

Nevertheless, entangled with the claim of authority is the unconditional assertion of a right to refuge *as given*, which authorizes the excessive work of preparing space for one who has not yet arrived, and through which such a promise may be fulfilled. This is even if such fulfilment

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[104] See Agamben's (1998) crucial discussion of *homo sacer*.

[105] I would be remiss not to mention the decolonial analysis of settler states in a contemporary sense, who find that the regulatory apparatus over immigration in Canada and the United States is also a means by which sovereignty is legitimized through the erasure of settler coloniality (Dauvergne 2016). Disentangling the establishment of even a site for refuge from sovereignty is a mammoth task.

requires establishing cities not merely for a people themselves to dwell in, but the purposes of which are instead to shelter those who flee other places. It also grounds a hyperbolic description of illegible subjects—the opening upon *anyone* who might seek sanctuary, through which "even" the accidental murderer is invited. This establishes a limit that itself is decidedly ambiguous in practice, a limit delineating processes concerning murder and its correctives, remaining silent to the given unconditionality of hospitality otherwise. The hope that such an unconditional claim might ground a network of open possibilities, though, must be consistently placed into question by the 'spectre' of sovereignty through which the command, judgment, and work of building a city of refuge also legitimates the erasure of others.

City Air Makes Free

In view of the open city, we might consider a radical shift toward a minor politics in a right to common shelter, a minor politics of presence (Darling and Squire 2013b) diverging from two of the most widely recognized traditions for contemporary sanctuary politics. Both, however, harken to the religious trajectory of sanctuary interwoven with political forms. What of civic traditions which purport to offer similar shelter for those fleeing persecution? The Medieval adage 'city air makes free' establishes one such model. I argue that the assertion of 'freedom' is multi-valent. That is, the fact that the city *gives* freedom in particular to the stranger seeking shelter within is also what allows the city to receive freedom as a would-be host—and thus in the becoming-community which establishes as its principle the rightful dwelling of new members. It is in the ambiguity of the subject of municipal freedom that gives rise to a discussion of institutional conditions and possibilities in the final section.

At times, contemporary claims to sanctuary include the articulation of an ethical response

to unethical state policies targeting migrants that discursively maintain the *traditio* of this major politic, where sanctuary instances are motivated by the 'right' derived from faith in a higher power (Lippert 2005; Michels and Blaike 2013; Caminero-Santangelo 2013). However, in other instances, moral outrage, ethical assertion and a common right *can* motivate sanctuary practices as a direct intervention into the marginalization of vulnerable people. Such instances are member to a polyphonic contemporary tradition of sanctuary as a common right. As Jennifer Ridgley (2013) notes, one of the earliest contemporary sanctuary city designations was passed by municipality of Berkley, California, in 1971 in order to protect the crew of the *USS Coral Sea*. This was prompted by the likelihood that the crew would be submitted to military tribunal and accompanying punishment for refusing to return to conflict in the Vietnam War.

What scholars have called "municipal foreign policy" (Hobbs 1994; Magnusson 1996; McDonald 2012; Bauder 2017) is also a pilot demonstration of the increasingly important place that cities have in global political and economic life which has not coalesced into a challenge to state sovereignty on the grounds of a more powerful monopolizing force, and as civic instances of refuge. Harald Bauder (2017) explains the Medieval adage "city air makes free" ("Stadtluft macht frei") as follows: "As loathsome as the city air was, it had one redeeming quality: those who breathed it could become free. Serfs were able to shed their feudal bonds by moving from the countryside to these cities. After breathing "city air" for a year and a day, they could obtain freedom and become citizens" (p. 93). The adage is perhaps remembered for how powerfully it asserts a generalized idea of urban freedom, but as Bauder notes, it is further tied to a political-institutional practice that emerges in the 12th century German Kingdom under the Holy Roman Empire when Freiburg im Breisgau received formal legal autonomy. Following this, the adage also coincides with the extension of emancipatory autonomy for city-dwellers themselves who

are *not* originally from the city—a policy that seems also to have been present (and spurred the economic and political growth) of Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg, Luneburg, and Zurich (ibid.).

The adage is repeated variously amongst urban scholars, either as an all-too optimistic reading of the return of trade and tendency toward capitalism (Pirenne 1952 [1925]) or as a guidepost for contemporary urban ethical consideration (Jacobs 1992 [1961], 2016). In the way it is represented by Max Weber (1966 [1921]), "city air makes free" bears a striking resemblance to the access-anonymity approach of sanctuary movements:

> In Central and North European cities the principle appeared: "City air makes man free." The time period varied, but always after a relatively short time, the lord of a slave or bondsman lost the right to subordinate him to his power. The principle was carried out in varying degrees. Very often, in fact, cities were forced to promise not to admit unfree men and when there was a restriction of economic opportunities such barriers were also often welcomed by the cities. However, despite such exceptions, as a rule the principle of freedom prevailed. Thus estate-based differences vanished in the city at least so far as they rested on a differentiation between freedom and bondage. (p. 94)

As a complication to the straightforward enforcement of such a principle, through which hospitality intersects with the assertion of freedom—particularly 'autonomy'—we should reiterate that the adage's institutional practice varies by degree, and with the caveat that cities were "forced to promise not to admit unfree men," in the first place. This is to say nothing of the applicability of 'men' in the English translation, where the original "Stadtluft macht frei" in fact bears no grammatical object: "city air makes free." Makes who or what free? It is not clear if the air of a city simply 'makes freedom' as if it were an object for industrial (or craft-based) production. Certainly, Henri Pirenne (1952 [1925]) argues that the adage bears a direct relationship not with the political administration of cities but the emergence of a merchant middle-class—it makes a new middle class of ownership over property 'free' (pp. 193-194). However, perhaps more convincing in his limited interpretation, Weber argues that the adage

coincides at least with the urban challenge to feudal bondage, and ultimately the dissolution of clear-cut distinctions of bondsman and serf classes forged in new forms of association. That is, not 'men,' nor 'economic subjects,' but *serfs*—a class of labourers who suffer the perils of that classification—are made free. Further, serfs are made free by *no longer being held as members to serfdom*, a process of anonymization consistent with their having dwelled within the city rendered into instituted policy. *Who* one becomes after this anonymization is, as yet, undecided.

Within its own context, "city air makes free" referred to the Medieval serfdom casting off bondage *in name* which also entails their emancipation assured in their flight to the city. However, if one is no longer a serf, what do they become? It seems that one 'becomes a man.'[106] This is a less than satisfying conclusion when one does not become a 'man' at all, but a *city-dweller*, and do so not because of the enclosure of a new delineable subject (the 'freeman') who happens to live in the city, but by virtue of an *open auto-nomy*. The city *becomes free* insofar as it institutes the extension of freedom to city-dwellers *specifically who did not previously dwell in the city* as a law; city-dwellers, in turn, become free by *refusing to reserve freedom for themselves*—rather, extending the same principle to present and future city-dwellers alike. As in the case of Freiburg im Breisgau and others, the freedom of the city is *performed* each time it demonstrates its right to extend freedom to serfs. Were this right not to be upheld, the cities themselves would no longer bear autonomy *over themselves*.

One becomes free by instituting a principle through which they share freedom unreservedly with others.[107] One can think of this process as a dual reading of autonomy, as both

[106] That is, in Martindale and Neuwirth's translation of Weber.

[107] I am taking cues from Harald Bauder's (2014a) discussion of domicile citizenship, as illustrated in the French Constitution of 1793, through which any non-French subject living in France for one year, and having either work or a spouse, was granted citizenship. Domicile citizenship is also pragmatically adopted by the fragmented German states and cities of the 19th century to ensure against statelessness (pp. 94-95; see also: Bauböck 1994, p. 32).

the *auto-nomos* (the self-given law), as well as the *auto-onomos* (the self-given name) which facilitates a passage from being held under the law of a power, and of the name that derives from it—the designation, in this case, of the 'serf.' However, for a principle of autonomy to remain forceful, for it to be 'in force' as an extant and material principle, it must also include a certain heteronomic tension. Here, we once again cross paths with Jacques Derrida (2008b [1995]) who notes the *aporia* of autonomy and heteronomy in the economy of the gift—that is, a circulatory relationship that could not reserve (freedom) for itself. Such a relationship compels me to assert freedom as a form of responsibility for others, as a gift. He says:

> Thus is instituted or revealed the "it concerns me" or "it's my lookout" [ça me regarde] that leads me to say "it is my business, my affair, my responsibility." But not in the sense of a (Kantian) autonomy by means of which I see myself acting in total liberty or according to a law that I make for myself, rather in the heteronomy of an "it's my lookout" even when I can't see anything and can take no initiative, there where I cannot pre-empt by my own initiative whatever is commanding me to make decisions, decisions that will nevertheless be mine and which I alone will have to answer for. (Derrida 2008b [1995], p. 91)

The institution of an unreserved (*o*)*nomos* asserts freedom *not for* oneself, but shelters a secret on behalf of others: "For the other my secret will no longer be a secret" (ibid.). It erects a decidedly strange law and a secret name that might bind one to responsibility that at once comes from beyond oneself and finds its *locus* in the self: "I alone will have to answer for" this freedom. For ourselves, then, what is left is to articulate possible institutions that facilitate that freedom.

Pragmatics of the Open City in the Age of Global Cities: Extitution

To propose that the open city might exist as a conglomeration of institutions drawing from the traditions explored here would also advance the open city not only as a grammar. In the final section, I explore current and possible models for institutional arrangements that aspire to stabilize traditions of hospitality and the techniques that actualize them; the International

Parliament of Writers and other spaces of direct representation for refugees, universities as critical institutions, and the technical network established by the European Non-Governmental Organization, WatchTheMed. I focus on these cases because they aspire toward an overarching model of sanctuary as the distribution of belonging and responsibility as gifts of freedom. They also demonstrate the radical possibility—*possibilia*—of such a framework drawn from contemporary conditions. Understanding that global city networks are currently exploitative and potentially violent also uncovers diverging forms of complex and associative life. They ground unexpected possibilities of global intimacies, imaginaries and resistances as a portable grammar of emplaced possibilities (see also: Bagelman 2019).

Even if we are to cleave closely to the language of 'texts,' we should also outline the pragmatic conditions that contribute to these institutions—to remember that our definition of 'text' is meant to encompass meaningful activities in the broadest sense, including the meanings iterated upon by contemporary conditions of global capitalism and the international system of nation-states. The 'intentional' demand met by systems of global capital and financialization which also maintain the international system of nation-states (as useful regimes of labour regulation [Walia 2020]) also betrays this 'intent' in the iterable possibilities of alter-globalizing imaginaries. Under the backdrop of the post-colonial entrenchment of global markets as sites for inter-regional power and dependence between the Global North and Global South as a capitalist world system (Wallerstein 2004), the increasing financialization of formerly manufacture-dominant global markets precipitate the agglomeration of capital in specific cities (Sassen 2001 [1991]). This contributes also to emergent articulations of networks of hybridity and contestation (Hall 1990; Castells 1996). As yet achieving only the *internationalization* of a world-order—and not yet the genuine 'globalization' of a common right to global social space, an integrated

macro-relationship with the planet and its ecologies—does not entail that such a horizon does not exist. On the contrary, a divergent horizon is prefigured by these conditions.

Not only as an outgrowth of a logic of sovereignty but grounded in contemporary cities as dialectical 'machines' producing forms of difference, we ought to understand that our own situation of the open city cannot be neutral. In Saskia Sassen's (2001 [1991]) classic statement on global cities, she outlines the characteristics and implications of these novel city-forms in four ways. First, global cities operate as points of command organizing global economic activity. Second, they constitute important sites for the amalgam of finance and specialized services specific to global capitalism (for example, business consulting or marketing services). Third, global cities remain a site of conventional industrial production, but also of the production of innovations. Finally, global cities roles as market-places expand in light of systems of financialization (pp. 3-4). Both the motivating force and implications of global cities is the reorganization of space, as Sassen argues, to emphasize the central role—as a command-center of economic decision—played by non-neutral urban agents in a global economy.

Sassen offers an important qualification to thinking about global cities as irreducible to 'nodes' within a chain of global production (ibid, p. 4), but global cities are not simply 'in themselves' either. This is especially so as the dispersal of global economic activity gives rise to networks of production and new sociabilities. The 'rise of the network society' (Castells 2010 [1996]) is characterized by the reorganization of goods and people around cities—particularly those engaged in a global market. For Manuel Castells, to predict that a networked age predicated on the global circulation of information might spell the 'end' of cities would be misguided, and yet, it is also clear that cities are not sites for which internal processes predominantly constitute their activities. Instead, city-based micro-networks of regional activity

remain important sites for observation of global information flows. "Flow," here, characterizes how presumed boundaries and passages are in fact *loci* for observing movement.

This would also abstract from the situated importance of cities within a contemporary global age, which still construct the *infrastructures* for flow. The micro-network of global cities are not only grounded in 'communication flows' but communications infrastructures through which a managerial class decides to locate its activities in order to take advantage of the sites of their movements. Infrastructural improvement would continue to displace the fragile equilibrium between cities (metropolis and its others) as well as between cities and wider regions insofar as metropolitan or global cities are most likely to receive improvements in that infrastructure first. For example, high-density and high-traffic fibre optic cable lines facilitating faster and larger volumes of internet activity are likely to be adopted by metropolitan cities first, making them preferable headquarters for managerial capitalists.

My focus on a networked global city formulation relies on how this relationship might contextualize a reimagining of city-spaces as less than comfortably interiorized configurations. Rather, cities—contemporary global cities integrated into global circuits of capital, their markets and financializations, as well as the technological infrastructure representative of those circuits—are already sites of concentrated and porous movement, something that an exclusive discussion of space cannot achieve. The emphasis I've placed on *locus* might be challenged by Castell's important addition of the "space of flows" formulation, then, if space no longer remains static but rather facilitates movement. This is particularly so, for him, as a "managerial elite" attempts to displace and alienate a workforce comprised of increasingly polarized labouring classes of 'hyper-skilled' specialists against a deskilling of other types of work (Castells 2010 [1996]; Sassen 2001 [1991]). Facilitation of flows under conditions of global capitalism and the

international system of nation-states does not ground the mobility of either group, but instead precarizes work in general by unsettling the foothold of labourers. This is in contrast to the global standardization of (managerial) 'elite culture' and its habitual experience, recognizable in the eerily mimetic sameness of hotel chains around the globe (Bauman 2013 [1998]).

We might in some way refuse these 'contextual' elements of global capitalism and the global city as absolute causes underlying *encounter*. Instead, these conditions can be situated within a wider sphere of relationality, where hegemonic global economic structures are limited expressions amongst numerous social relations because economic systems (re)organize the agglomerative activities that are *already in play*. There are other resonances of synoecism, association and mobility that contribute to the trajectory of the open city even in a contemporary space of global cities. Synoecism, at base, implies that people hold a compelling desire to live together, amongst one another—not necessarily as a 'unified' people, but in indefinite proximity. Secondly, synoecism—as we've discussed in early urbanization—entails that non-imperialist inter-urban regional forms are not only possible, but an early basis for the all-too-abstract notion of 'the city' as a self-standing hierarchical community *in the first place*. Inter-urban agglomeration as a decentered phenomenon pre-exist imperialist subsumption, and the practices of empires to purposively establish settlements radiating out of their metropoles. Global cities and global networks, if they have emerged out of the decidedly non-neutral practice of managing labour for efficient exploitation, they do so duplicitously. Their novel gathering-spaces, integrated within global networks, provide the launching-point for alter-globalizing imaginaries, or as discussed here, institutionalizations of a portable grammar of emplaced possibilities.

Not only marking the forms of resistance amenable to a dialectical-genealogical analysis, but also the forms of *rupture* through which the bare conditions of existing in proximate physical

space might precipitate—the absent and everyday politics of migration rather than a retrenchment of power relations—synoecism returns in two forms. The first would galvanize the significance of a cosmopolitan existence amongst others through which an active and participatory citizenship is forged (Balibar 2013 [1997]; Isin 2008). This formulation still relies on people existing in shared social space—increasingly virtual if not always physical—in ways less amenable to cutting up that space into districts, and separating out people into categories, but of tracing threads of possible encounter. The condition of this possibility will remain tied to the existence of people amongst one another.

In following, synoecism might also institutionalize the tradition we have outlined above, of establishing the repeated and relatively stable groundwork for facilitating the arrival and sheltering of others, the *extitution* of the open city as an outgrowth of this non-neutral basis by using emergent global city networks. Interpreting the institutional tendency of synoecism as one almost invariably slouching toward the entrenchment of aristocratic distinction, the forms of violence that preserve and repeat it, the privileges that derive from it, would be to overlook at least one other possible line of flight that still begins from this *locus*. Institutional sites within a cityscape become crucial for the emplacement of flow, facilitating the possibility of arrival and sheltering. In the following section, I outline how a model of municipal-international parliamentarianism might constitute the centerpiece of the open city.

Extitution: Instituting Cosmopolitical Democratic Publics

A crucial condition of possibility for the open city as an institutional structure is met by the existence of global cities and networks; the infrastructural and technical basis upon which both flows and emplacements must be accounted for as global processes. From a genealogy of the

open city, I concluded that cities, which might 'come first' in relation to agricultural processes, do so because cities exist in light of other communities, and in forms of inter-communal exchange as well as continuous mobilities. I've also discussed how traditions of hospitality, refuge and civic welcome already lay a groundwork for the principled claims of institutions aspiring toward encounter, communication and solidarity-building. Now, today, this is a decidedly global phenomenon. Where traditions of hospitality, refuge, and civic freedom have variously developed processes of sheltering strangers, how we might outline a holistic institutional framework for calling and responding to the needs of migrants in a globalized age. What extitutional arrangements best respond to these conditions today?

Extending a dynamic of a hetero-autonomy discussed in light of the adage 'city air makes free,' Jacques Derrida (2001) invokes the term *ville franche* and its resonances. He mentions this during his inaugural speech for the International Parliament of Writers in Strasbourg in 1996:

> If the name and the identity of something like the city still has a meaning, could it, when dealing with the related questions of hospitality and refuge, elevate itself above nation-states or at least free itself from them (s'affranchir), in order to become, to coin a phrase in a new and novel way, a free city (une ville franche)? Under the exemption itself (en général), the statutes of immunity or exemption occasionally had attached to them, as in the case of the right to asylum, certain places (diplomatic or religious) to which one could retreat in order to escape from the threat of injustice. (p. 6)

What Derrida is referring to here seems particularly important in light of its context. Earlier in the same paragraph he refers to Hannah Arendt's critique of assertions of human rights without political—instituted—assurance. The rights of human-beings *as such* find historical articulation only as the rights of *citizens*, not as an ethical compulsion, but a pragmatic reduction generated by the limiting conditions of nation-states. Citizens' rights are assured because they have an institution capable of doing so; humans do not. At least some humans' rights will not be upheld—the stateless (Arendt 1994a/b). *If the city is still meaningful* under these conditions, it is

because it might free itself from *these* conditions, to assert a right beyond itself, specifically in extending a space of escape or retreat for those cast aside by this international arrangement. The free city is one that is not simply free to assert an economic, social or political 'selfhood' but is *free to respond*, to take on responsibility before others, for those whom the nation-state system banishes or neglects. It is a responsibility, then, that is not selfishly 'unlimited,' as in 'do what you will,' but on the contrary, one that *demands* of the city-form that it materialize an unconditional hospitality—an 'unconditional' condition upon its actions, a hetero-auto-nomos.

This, in practice, is still an act of *freeing oneself* from constraint, even if the free city does so by virtue of a responsibility and a demand. The *ville franche*, having given itself a vote—in its enfranchisement [affranchisement]—looks very much like an institution which *threatens* institution as it asserts for itself a right to say everything in every way. This right, though, is not to 'say what it wants,' *but to say anything else*, outside the law and the law of the self through which 'it is written' that one must (only) speak for oneself. It does so without reserve, even if this also *risks* its privilege rather than protecting it. Such an institution *works* when it refuses sovereignty as holding in reserve its authority, instead sharing out freedom. Veritably, the free city is freed *from protection*, it is *exposed*, having freed itself from the 'security' of the nation-state, the apparatus of security, its border enforcements, its deportations, its 'immunizations' from 'others' whom, extra-territorially, sovereignty projects the aspiration to never have encountered. The free city, on the other hand, is exposed to affectation, to influence, is never unscathed but instead free to respond to the other, and to take responsibility for itself before the other (Derrida 2008b [1995]).

Extitution—the responsibility of hetero-autonomy translated into institutional principles—provides a strange legal basis upon which the open city is structured. This is in large part because

rather than the law, it is the movements—everyday and political—that constitute this city. It's legal establishment is predicated on an interpretation of hetero-autonomy as hospitality beyond major politics. I imagine that public institutions would be open to non-citizens of all currently presumed designations as exemplified in the enactment of Don't Ask Don't Tell and other access policies, in refusal of citizenship-based marginalization. Other contemporary models might advance this institutional basis as it takes upon itself the meaningful claims of political actors, assertion of common rights as migrant rights, and attempts to translate these into stable beacons through which the city responds to a world of facilitated movement and dwelling-together.

As a literary rather than legal institution, the open city begins with the ambitious model of the International Parliament of Writers (IPW). The IPW was established in the early 1990s in response to the assassination of Tahar Djaout at the purported hands of Islamic extremists in 1993—during the early years of the Algerian Civil War. This was a decision also made in response to the *fatwa* issued against Salman Rushdie by Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989.[108] However, its vision encompassed an overarching attempt to institutionalize more rigorously the everyday experience of cosmopolitan life. The over 300 signatories of the International Parliament of Writers declared that the continued targeting of writers was also something that states and presumed 'national communities' could not effectively respond to, requiring that they look toward cities to perform the necessary task of sheltering targeted and displaced writers in a globalized world. As such, organized by prominent figures of French philosophy Jacques Derrida, Jean Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, as well as a member of Strasbourg's city council, Christian Salmon this new international body of writers would proceed in two ways.

[108] Rushdie shared his experience *Joseph Anton: a Memoir* (2012) so titled after the alias he took on while in hiding.

The first way the IPW would intervene into the system of nation-states that rendered writers vulnerable was to establish a network of cities of asylum comprised of global literary figures and public intellectuals lobbying their municipalities for the declaration and resources to shelter other writers seeking refuge. As Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe often relied on the hub of their home university in Strasbourg to launch academic events, they determined to house this new Parliament in Strasbourg as the first such honorary city of refuge. Rushdie would later be named President of the IPW in 1994 and would give one of his most famous pieces as a public address, a "Declaration of Independence."[109] So too, Derrida would contribute one of his most widely read pieces as a statement of intent for the IPW and cities of asylum network, entitled "Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!"[110] Second, the members of the IPW launched a literary journal of loosely collected pieces—from poetry and prose, essays, autobiography, statements by prominent literary figures—under the title *Autodafé*, with contributions from Wole Soyinka, Mahmoud Darwish, Hélène Cixous, Naguib Mahfouz, Svetlana Alexievitch, Mary Gaitskill, Assia Djebar and Russell Banks amongst others.

Such a movement toward the possibility of parliament is not exclusive to such a project as the IPW. Between 2017 and 2018, there were three instances indicated by Robin Cohen and Nicholas van Hear (2020) also resonant of the possibilities of translating migrant-rights protest and articulations of common rights into an institutional form *as a parliament*. In 2017, a student parliament convened under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency representing the over 500 000 students in its five fields of operation (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank). In June 2018, a Global Summit of Refugees met in Geneva,

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[109] This declaration can only be found in physical copies of *Autodafe* volume 1 (spring 2001), although it may have also been reprinted in the *New Yorker* issue of June 23, 1997.

[110] This statement, from which I quoted above, was translated in *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (2001).

Switzerland, in advancing the importance claim "nothing about us without us." A third "Refugee and Migrant Parliament" was self-organized in coordination with the European Parliament (EP), involving representatives of over one hundred refugee and migrant organizations.

Parle-ment becomes an act of speech, but also as Derrida (2014a) indicates, the resonances of lying (parler/mentir), which must be called to account. Even if its aspirations are intriguing, the parliament as a site of power that centers certain voices and subject-positions against others, remains a deeply seated problem. We might understand the parliaments discussed here also as attempts to correct such a wrong. Critically, their calls for change do not amount to claims for a more 'consistent' politic of rights—not issued from *within* the UNRWA or the EP—but as the self-assertion of those made vulnerable by decisions *in* those bodies. Cohen and van Hear (2020) relay such a claim in the Refugee and Migrant Parliament of the EP, "We demand to be included in policy making when it concerns our lives" (p. 63). Preceding this declaration, policy has already been made about those who were left unrepresented by a previous parliamentarianism. A newfound parliament corrects this not as an oversight but a structural feature of the dissimulation of power—where political space is treated as neutral even when it foregrounds the decisions of some amongst others as a monological policy. A newfound parliament for refugees and migrants would do so inherently if it also centers the voices and lives of unrepresented subjects.

This, I think, is a moment at which it seems the formalization—the institutionalization—of even more 'inclusive' political spaces are at once necessary and incomplete. Foregrounding the problem of voice against silence must be a *responsible* activity—one that responds to others—before it is a *representative* one—willing to propose that one can speak on behalf of others. Even in Cohen and van Hear's (2020) work, such a possibility of responsibility before representation is in unexpected tension, in danger of collapsing into something familiar or 'known':

> Engagement in public life or the public sphere involves engagement in what we have called the 'known community'… Engagement in the known community takes place in spaces where one lives or has lived, among people one knows or knows of. It is the sphere of relations, interactions, and encounters between people, past and present – in schools, neighbourhoods, workplaces, marketplaces and shops, places of religious observance, associations and clubs, sports and leisure venues, and during cultural activity. It is the realm of associational life. The known community has some affinity with the ancient Greek notion of the agora, the open place, the gathering place, the assembly, where people meet to shop, market, buy and sell, socialize, and exchange ideas. (pp. 81-82)

Without vigilance, parliament, or even more widely a democratic politic proposing dialogical and direct public space continues to project a 'known community' of members who—comprised of those who essentially already 'belong'—continue to project a value through which members are distinguished from non-members. The publicity of such a structure, where 'presence' is attached somehow to the possibility of 'public' life, continues to retrench distinctions with those who are made 'private' and thus *absent*, from their processes. This displaces absented subjects from public space, those who may very well be present within a territory but outside of a formalized public space as the *locus* that represents that territory and its subject.

As a particularly potent controversy, the 'Sesame Pass' system Cohen and van Hear (2020) propose—drawing both from the Nansen passport and various instances of issuance of local identification documents as a means to oppose the national regulations of movement (Varsanyi 2006; Bauder 2017)—seems to propose also that one form of regulatory documentation is replaced with another. Emphasis on associational identity as the issue for their imagined transnational community seems also to invoke a familiar reductive logic of compatriot national community that intersects with precarity. What they do not interpret precarity as includes uncertainty over livelihood, mobility, work, or even the assured life of loved ones. Instead, they propose these concerns as ancillary to the existence of specific fellows over others as comprising confidence against precarity. They argue that, "In short, a good society for Refugians would

mean an assured life, rather than its antonym, a precarious life… By an assured life is meant a life that one can lead with confidence – in oneself, for one's family, one's community, and the wider collectivity, and for the future" (Cohen and Van Hear 2020, p. 82).

Having collapsed a transnational polity and its direct mechanisms of democratic engagement into a re-elaboration of interiorized community, as 'one's own,' emphasis on parliamentarianism cannot be taken lightly. The choice to foreground a literary and marginal over legal parliament, in this way, intervenes into a logic of retrenchment regarding 'who' comprises the privileged community. But conventional parliamentarianism is not enough to combat the possible retrenchment of community at the expense of the displacement of others. What if, as ventured in Derrida's (2001) discussion of the IPW, the publicity of a life—for example, the life of a writer as a public figure as possessor of cultural knowledge—constitutes a privilege that should be placed in question even if that life is consistently targeted by authoritarian regimes? Furthermore, from what site might one propose the possibility of placing such a community radically into question as its practice *and on an everyday level without exclusion*? For their part, the vision of the IPW projected by Derrida, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe was also made possible by previous projects similarly ambitious, of attempting to establish a site not for (counter-)representative democracy, but also of a critique that would place accepted practices into question. This may be less amenable to an institutionalization of parliament if it attempts to arrange a body for the articulation of political decision and its actions. Instead, it is the *university* which expresses how an institution might remain open insofar as it allows itself a right to place itself and everything else into question *as an open public activity*.

Universities seem to bear a responsibility as well, to tell the truth. However, what truth there is to tell is not always clear. Perhaps more provocatively, it is decidedly unclear *whose*

truth a university must be responsible for. Beginning almost immediately after publication of the writings that he would be best known for, and in the wake of their involvements in the May ‘68 protests in France, Derrida co-organized the *Groupe de recherche sur l’enseignement philosophique* (GREPH) in 1975 with Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe alongside friend and fellow scholar Sarah Kofman. GREPH was an attempt to draw together a ‘non-denominational’ association of scholars who would advance a critical curriculum of philosophy and provide space for those scholars to publish outside of the strictures of the academy of Gaullist France. This group was amongst the most outspoken against the reforms of French education proposed by René Haby under then president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that would severely limit the scope of philosophical education. This culminated in the 1979 Estates General of Philosophy—an open colloquium of over one-thousand philosophers from across the country deliberating on the collective direction of the discipline in resistance to these reforms. Following this, in 1983, François Mitterand’s Education Ministry requested establishment of the *Collège international de philosophie* (Ciph), of which Derrida was a co-founder. It still operates today.[111]

These projects are ambitious not only for their scope, but their attempt also to maintain the possibilities of the question, and subsequently the opening upon community, that also introduces an uncomfortable measure of ambiguity into structured and otherwise formalized institutions. It is important to note, then, that many of these projects—GREPH and the IPW in its original state—were not ‘successes’ so much as failures with interesting implications. Although the organizing intent and work of establishing GREPH is often discussed, it was also deemed a failure in the sense that the more radical reform it vied for did not materialize—and ultimately because the group would quietly disband some time around the establishment of *Ciph* (see:

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[111] The documents produced during these time periods was collected in two volumes on the *Right to Philosophy* (Derrida 2002d, 2004).

Peeters 2013; Wortham 2006). So too, the properly *parliamentary* activity of the IPW is no longer in effect—dissolved in 2005—and its literary wing, *Autodafé* would produce only four volumes in its short lifespan. However, the refugee network still exists, now under the name of the International Cities of Refuge Network (ICORN), and under a new structure of individual membership periodically brought together in general assembly. They continue to house writers—as well as musicians and artists—in more than 70 declared cities of refuge in three continents around the world—mostly in Europe and North America (ICORN n.d.).

An international parliament established within global cities that declare themselves *free specifically in the sense of designating themselves cities of refuge* is further advanced by concomitant emphasis on universities in their critical capacities to place even their own communal presumptions into question, then, in particular when this critical activity is made unreservedly public, attempting to engage openly all possible residents of a 'public sphere' in dialogue. From this point, a final requirement of a framework of open cities is the demand to call out to those not yet proximate enough to engage in that public—non-residents. In this regard, a final ambitious attempt to institute more stable networks of hospitality is apparent in the work of the NGO *WatchTheMed-AlarmPhone* (Stierl 2016, 2019; Topak 2019). Expanding upon a need to institutionalize refugee passage across the Mediterranean—ensuring that one could reach or make their way *within reach* of a space of asylum to make possible the assertion of a right to presence in the first place—they demonstrate a constant *vigilance* for the possibility of hospitality. This is taken up in particular by grassroots movements—and not state-based or public institutions—exemplified by networks of social media technologies. These movements rely on these technologies so to be notified of emergent global conflicts, emergencies, crises to which they must respond—to have an *institutional structure capable of response* beforehand. On

this point, *WatchTheMed-AlarmPhone* serves as a crucial response network holding accountable the organization tasked with sending out a call of distress for boats in peril in the Mediterranean, especially where EU and state-actors refuse to do so.

Although their capacities are limited—they don't have the boats necessary to patrol the Mediterranean themselves—the work of WatchTheMed is technically impressive. Their mandate outlines a technologically robust network of cooperation:

> Through the transnational cooperation with migrants' rights organisations, activists, researchers, migrants, seafarers active in, around and beyond the Mediterranean and the use of new mapping technologies, WatchTheMed aims to document the deaths and violations that are the structural product of the militarized Southern European border regime. The online map allows to spatialise incidents across the complex legal and political geography of the Mediterranean Sea. Through the accounts of survivors and witnesses, but also the analysis of ocean currents, winds, mobile phone data and satellite imagery, it is possible to determine in which Search and Rescue zone, jurisdictions and operational areas an incident occurred – as well as showing other boats who were in the vicinity of those in distress. (WatchTheMed, n.d.)

With their mapping capabilities, WatchTheMed maintains a hotline for people in distress to relay ('signal-boost') SOS calls: *AlarmPhone*. They maintain a watch over vessels, and the authorities that attempt to halt their reaching land in Europe (not only Frontex, but Greek, Turkish, Maltese and Italian state enforcement agencies), through which they might assert a right to asylum, or to presence. If these vessels are halted, or if they are shipwrecked then a call issues forth.

Drawing upon traditions of hospitality, refuge and civic freedom, as well as a portable grammar of emplaced possibility that asserts the associative and mobile trajectories of complex communities, the need to respond meaningfully to the distress of others no matter how close or distant, similar or different, these contemporary practices outline an institutional arrangement that I refer to as the *open city*. Emphasis on the decision-making structure of a diffuse parliamentarianism attentive to those left unrepresented by other political units, to the critical

potential of universities as open public fora, and to the technical networks capable of facilitating their advancement. Even in light of the damaging conditions of the post-colonial international system of nation-states and global capitalist exploitation, one can glimpse a horizon of common belonging and assertion of a common right in these counter-institutional possibilities.

Conclusion

I've concluded this chapter on the open city by modeling tentative institutions—parliaments, universities and technical networks—maintaining a responsibility of hospitality. I have chosen to explore these institutional models because they were proposed in response to migrant-rights movements globally and to the global conditions within which they reside. Following serially from an international parliament proposed by Jacques Derrida, I found space to interpret global conditions as giving rise to a novel institutional framework of refuge that also institutes a global form of democratic representation. Yet, for its representative claims, 'parliamentarianism' itself cannot fashion direct pathways for political engagement especially for those experiencing marginalization. As such, two further institutional possibilities are explored. The first entails reconceiving universities as capable of cultivating public spaces for critique. The second captures how current non-governmental organizations like WatchTheMed utilize technological networks to extend beyond the jurisdictions of state and regional authorities in order to notify others of imperiled migrants—in particular, those crossing the Mediterranean. The integration of these institutional possibilities into a single framework gives shape to the open city most concretely as a framework drawing from a portable grammar of emplaced possibility.

In terms of political decision beyond this, including the directions that complex communities take so as to maintain their opening upon possibility, perhaps such a question

should not be answered by the author, but the community. No prefigurative gesture could aspire to refuse prescription enough. Ultimately, it is a decision made by those dwelling and travelling amongst one another, and the networks that they take part in as an act of democracy, the assertion of a common right. With this in mind, it would also perhaps be important to 'place into brackets' (*epoché*) the institutional proposals here—from Don't Ask Don't Tell policies as institutionalized assurance of access to essential services, the parliament of a democracy of strangers as a gathering point for those unrepresented, the university as a site of radical critique, technologies of notification for migrants in distress. There remains a near-infinite constellation of other such possibilities to which these are non-exclusive additions.[112]

In this chapter I have attempted to synthesize a political project focusing on a grammatology of the open city by outlining its grammar and tentative institutionalization. Following the three analytical tools of such a method, this chapter has proceeded through a genealogical exploration of cities as already interdependent and non-interiorized political formations, an etymological elaboration of traditions of hospitality, refuge and civic freedom, and finally a pragmatics of the global conditions and possible institutional dimensions of the open city. I cannot claim the current study to be conclusive. What I hope is that with the grammar, institutional frameworks and textual expressions this work speaks to, further research will be conducted in response to the violences of a logic of sovereignty. I hope also that this work provides another port of call for deeply moving traditions of urban migrant-rights activisms as they continue to generate a rich language for scholarly and political reflection.

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[112] Cohen and van Hear (2020), for example, highlight a mobile commons, care and homemaking, and autonomous neighborhood associations to generate meaningful publics across boundaries of citizenship.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have laid the groundwork for a critique of the logic of sovereignty and prepared an analysis of the open city. I was prompted by a need to better understand sovereignty as a condition for the marginalization of its 'others'—where global conditions leave upwards of 90 million people forcibly displaced today (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021). My aim was to generate novel and unexpected implications for democracy, justice, the commonality and communication of rights, and emergent solidarities. I asked what motivates a logic of sovereignty specific to Western nation-states reiterated on a global scale, characterizing a contemporary political structure as a global arrangement of nation-states. How does this consistently bring about forms of displacement and the violences of detention, deportation, encampment and extra-territorialization? In following, I also ask, what is to be done? How might we not only reconsider fundamentally our understanding of democracy, common rights and solidarity as expressions of an emergent cosmopolitanism, but also, how do contemporary urban migrant-rights movements responding to these conditions provide the grounds to do so?

In answer to these questions, I proposed an unorthodox path that I believe had not yet been tried. By proposing a grammatology, I aimed to uncover how the threads of certain questions specific to the long history of political thought, under the umbrella of the 'West,' seem to reiterate assertions of sovereignty as a logical operation, that is as a *text*. This method relies on a careful re-evaluation of language through Jacques Derrida's (1997 [1967]) concept of the *text*, which attempts to construct differences that are *incomplete*, assert the rightful place of one concept above others *without* success, and thus to defer the exploration of equally meaningful possibilities through the production of *absence*. The text *traces* in the sense of delineating boundaries, asserting borders, but the text also *traces* its relation to other possibilities

declaratively negated or surreptitiously neglected. For this reason, the trace of the text sets in motion an *economy* of iterable signs rather than establishing a structure of 'truth' and its 'right.'

In following, a grammatology becomes a political and ethical framework poised to tackle anew the problematic of a contemporary global system of nation-states, the logical construction of their sovereignties as a play of interiority set against what (or who) is exteriorized, and the technical apparatuses that reiterate their violences globally today. More importantly, it is because a grammatology *brackets* this economy in light of radically distinct possibilities that depart from it—following the concept of *possibilia*—that we might galvanize this approach. Grammatology, importantly, works in tandem with *possibilia* insofar as both the critical exploration of current conditions and the radical attempt to depart from them are shared between theory and empirical analysis. *Possibilia* marks the attempt to think as yet 'impossible' institutional frameworks exemplified in a *No Borders* politic characterized by a wholesale rejection of state sovereignties, territories, and citizens as privileged terms, as well as the ways they intersect with other traces of power—patriarchy and misogyny, racism, ethnic marginalization. Institutionalization is a process that draws and departs from a framework of structuration (Giddens 1984) to denote how *possibilities* may be instituted alongside already established structures, and in particular, how possibilities leading outside of an institution might demand response by it, what I call *extitution*.

I drew upon the methodological tools of *genealogy*—critical historical analysis of institutions in light of their conflicts, and relations to *others* in time and space—*etymology*—analysis of grammatical elements bearing resonances within a linguistic economy that leads *outside* of their present language—and *pragmatics*—consideration of conditions of possibility both bearing upon a text, and those the text gives rise to (Derrida 2002a). I found that the long history of the 'West' is predominantly a *tradition* of *translations of authority*—a *translatio*

imperii. This is particularly evident in the ways that questions outlined by Plato (in the *Republic*) are iterated upon by future thinkers presuming the rightfulness of a singular 'political community' whose interior is left unproblematized due to the figuration of 'hostile' exterior agents. This interior is then divided into classes of rulers and ruled—especially in terms of 'guardians' and those they protect—through which (and by whom) a 'sovereign' as rightful ruler over the figurative whole emerges, its *author* as much as its final *authority*. This demands also that the changing composition of the community and the possibilities opened by encounters with others irreducible to categories of 'enemy' or 'foreigner' *are not staged* insofar as they might effect change to the presumptions of 'a' community, citizenry, territory or representative system of rule. In a culminating moment, Machiavelli's invention of *lo stato* as the unit most adaptable to decisive political shifts seems to answer an age-old Platonic fear of 'regime change' by holding diverse communities *in flux* within a construction of 'the Same.' A community might change fundamentally, but it is still referenced by the same name, the 'state.' This allows for both an imperialist impulse toward conquest *and* a nationalist protectionism to be brought together as complementary parts of a single conceptual framework.

The introduction of 'the state' into this logic constitutes a crucial moment of abstraction from the political conditions to which it purports to respond. A trajectory toward increasing abstractness is consistent both in the movement from the city (*polis*) to the state and from the limited form of ancient rulership to the 'sovereign' as 'he who decides the exception' (Schmitt 2005 [1934]). Rather than weakening them, abstraction strengthens these concepts by facilitating their mobility; the displacement of the 'state' and 'sovereignty' makes them *more* powerful and far-reaching insofar as they apply to more diverse and complex political organizations. What they lack is the techniques through which this logic achieves *consequent actualization*. I argue

that the modern age of nation-states 'finally' fashions these tools from the early reinterpretation of piracy as a 'good' of 'foreign policy' in the interest of burgeoning sovereignties in the Italian Renaissance (Bartelson 1996), to the technology of the passport (Torpey 2018), to political dynamics forged in the transition from colonial to post-colonial world orders. This includes internal population controls (Foucault 2007), as well as maps, censuses and museums (Anderson 2016 [1983]), ethnic exchange programmes and genocide (Sharma 2020). Under contemporary conditions, immigration regulations reliant *in extremis* upon detention and deportation, the intensifying prevalence of refugee camps, and expansion of extra-territorial boundaries against 'unwanted' migration *produce* the grounds for the logic of sovereignty to assert its ideal; presumptive questions regarding an internally coherent community are uttered within a political space conditioned by these techniques insofar as they produce forms of 'otherness' and 'distance.' A grammatology captures the development of these techniques as they attempt to satisfy the logic of homogeneous, and thus governable, community.

There is something *more* to the logic of sovereignty, then, not only as a xenophobic logical and technical organization, but also a diminutive translation of a genuine democracy into forms of 'representation.' A contemporary statement on the logic of sovereignty is forwarded, I argue, by Michael Walzer (1983), challenged by more radical visions of Open- or No Borders approaches because of his attempt to retrench the assumed 'right' of members of a political community to exclude non-members. Walzer contends that the strict separation of 'spheres' of human life (political community, security, economics, family and religion) produces a pluralist and egalitarian form of justice. However, their separation hinges primarily upon the declared separation of members and non-members in geographical space as a depoliticized 'right' to exclude. In response, I argue that critical appraisal bears two fruitful problems leading *away*

from the logic of sovereignty altogether. Firstly, the ‘democracy of friends’ that Walzer advances logically runs into the issue of ‘friends of friends,’ of the disputed and potentially indefinite acceptance of non-members in their relations to members (that is, in their solidarities *across* borders). This is consistent with Walzer’s own claim that *there is no right number* of members to a community. Secondly, I contest that a ‘rightful’ conceptual boundary upon the reception of non-members can be established—there is *no right* to include or exclude under conditions of encounter, the moment that two strangers meet as *as-yet* uninterpretable subjects (not yet citizen or non-citizen, guest or host). Instead, I follow the ambivalent path of a ‘democracy of strangers’ through which encounters within political space become the basis for a cosmopolitan vision of global mobilities, common rights, emergent solidarities, and a democratic understanding that cannot be reduced to privileged membership.

A cosmopolitical democracy like this emerges as a form of *possibilia* understandable in its relation to the struggles over migrant rights. I proposed first to consider the extant literature documenting certain migrant-rights movements that manifest *in* the ‘West,’ through which there already exists a pragmatic possibility to think a departure from the logic of sovereignty and its tradition. What I found was a constellation of inexhaustible possibilities for rethinking cosmopolitan and democratic community, which demonstrates that the predominant tradition of political philosophy organized around the authoritative notion of the ‘West’ has succeeded only in setting limits upon its exploration. Rather, resistant, avoidant, even ‘secretive’ traditions of welcome give rise to new pathways for further exploration of everyday political encounters, grammars of resistance, and strategies of anonymity—all of which openly contest or demonstratively contradict a logic of sovereignty. Movements like the *sans-papier* in Paris, Montréal’s *Comité d’Action des Sans-Statut*, Toronto-based Don’t Ask Don’t Tell campaigns

and Sheffield UK's "cities of sanctuary" movement generate a *portable grammar of emplaced possibility*; a language through which everyday interaction beyond citizenship status, the galvanization of practices of estrangement and anonymization, and articulation of common rights also prepares a rich emergent field for study.

Consequently, this grammar provides the basis upon which to explore the *open city*. What I've called the open city is not a utopian model of interiorized municipal institutions or a new constitution, but rather *this grammar and its study*. I've explored three such trajectories as an application of the grammatological tools of genealogy, etymology and pragmatics. First, such a grammar provides a language on which the very histories of cities are reconsidered as already co-dependent on exterior actors, communities and mobilities. Second, an etymology of sanctuary, welcome, refuge and hospitality expand the scope of municipal possibility as a civic practice of responsibility and a gift of freedom—where "city air makes free." Third, the prefiguration of institutions responsive to pragmatic conditions begotten by globalization can be rethought without reproducing the nationalist claims of citizen, politician or sovereign, nor the statist impulse toward empire or protectionism. Rather, the open city harkens to an arrangement of municipal institutions that embody the excessive possibilities of welcome through which displaced persons are not illegalized or securitized, but rather, members to a democratic commons of mobile subjects. Here I focus on the ambitious attempt to establish an international parliament of writers and network of cities of refuge (Derrida 2001). I also expound both universities as critical institutions contributing to this arrangement and the technological networks of announcement established by the grassroots organization WatchTheMed.

Such an analysis has only begun, and I must reiterate what I had written in the fourth chapter of this work: *we know not yet what (cosmopolitan) democracy can do*. Predominantly,

the trace of democracy is not delineated like an enclosed geometric shape just as the open city is not a 'utopian model.' It is, instead, the tracing of a thread from one subject to another, from world to world, in their encounter as a text. It is the tracing of a possibility itself irreducible to the boundedness of *a* community. This trace which emphasizes the former impulse—as a binding—rather than the latter—as delineation—is decidedly more ambiguous, I understand. An implication of this work attests to how difficult it is to conceive of a cosmopolitan democracy even as a theoretical project. However, a theoretical work can be motivated not by the 'spirit' of the *logos* and its self-perpetuating self-discovery but rather the meaningful attention given to the staging of encounter, how such a democracy is *already* practiced between two as 'others' in common, in difference, in solidarity.

For this reason, I continue to feel need to contest the distinction between theoretical and empirical research (chapter 2), which perhaps are *different* but also can be brought into dialogue. In fact, a scholarship that proposes itself as 'theoretical' without attention to the grounded and everyday practices of cosmopolitical democracy (interpersonal interactions, political commitments, campaigns, events and grassroots protests) is sorely without a language prepared to place into question the authorities and hierarchies that issue from sovereignty while speaking the 'name' of democracy. Its *demos* bears the uncanny marks of a proto-nationalism prepared for its 'guardians.' The *traces* of such a scholarship delineate the conceptual borders between things. Similarly, empirical research cannot stand entirely on its own. A scholarship proposed as 'purely' empirical' confiscates the lived potential of imagination and implication both from itself and from those who contribute to that work, who experience the precarity of migration firsthand. The term 'sanctuary,' in practice, as Jennifer Bagelman (2019) reminds us, is the name given to various heterogeneous activities from which shared imaginaries, cultural works, and political

demands as yet unattained are launched. This takes place *not* from the site of the researcher, but from the lived realities of those who encounter the everyday borders of sovereignty. It is the tracing of the threads of an undisclosed imaginary, of a future as yet unachieved, to which we may be *bound* (as travellers) and *bound* (as hostages).

Another implication, then, greets us on the other shore of this project. What awaits our arrival, I think, is *more work*, and even more importantly, *an infinitely longer conversation.* In critique of the logic of sovereignty, there is always space for genealogies of authority and homogenizing community-formation asserted *across* cultural boundaries; their economies and self-betrayals. Readings that can draw out deconstructive implications, but also critically situate the traditions and influences of thinkers of sovereignty, from Marsiglio of Padua, Jean Bodin, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, or Schmitt remain necessary. These hidden threads of an economy of power and its authorities extending well beyond their institution would demand the consistent application of a method that refuses to re-enact the presumptuous questions Plato outlines on the ideal homogeneity of community, the 'catastrophe' of change, and a *technē* of rule. Perhaps we might place these questions in brackets as already the wrong starting point, even in light of how they have been repeated, and even practiced, *ad nauseum* for two millennia.

What if we began, then, with radically different questions? They would be questions that do not presume the danger of 'foreigners' but the possibilities of encounter, that do not evoke the idea that a community that changes is also a community facing apocalypse. If so, then the attention we pay to migrant-rights movements, and the ways we refuse sovereignty's limits upon them, must be reasserted everywhere. Crucially, we should not presume that movements are *terminal*—that a movement disrupted by police violence, as in the *sans papiers*' case, also brings an end to its *impact*. We should not presume that a movement has *failed*—that the successful

institutionalization of a policy like Don't Ask Don't Tell in Toronto has 'failed' to live up to the loftiness of its goals even *in light of* problems with its implementation (see: Perez-Doherty 2015; Hudson et al. 2017; Atak 2019). To rely on a phrase, *one must keep the spirit of movements like these alive*, to convey their importance and to share in their events as the geneses of new pathways for exploration, even if this is to walk the uncertain path of theoretical implication, of 'speculation.' This is not a 'moral' precept, not at all. It is because our return to migrant-rights movements also sets into motion the other *work*—of scholarship and counter-archive—that its 'fires' continue to burn. I have only begun to explore how forms of welcome, including traditions of hospitality, institutionalized refuge, civic-migrant freedom, begin with a critical vantage that foregrounds these movements. There are more, especially non-Western traditions of welcome and movement, to explore.

In light of this demand, the conversations to follow should also be methodological, interdisciplinary and take place between movements and actors. As such, I think it imperative to note that on two occasions, I have found reason to consider North American Indigenous creation stories while researching this project. The first is the Tohono O'odham genesis story retold in Teju Cole's article, "A Piece of the Wall" (2016), through which the figure of "Big Brother," *I'ito*, guides the first people across the Sonoran Desert, offering safe passage. The second is Scott Richard Lyons' (2010) account of the Ojibwe "legend of the Great Migration" (p. 3), where the *anishinaabeg*[113] of the Eastern seaboard come into the plains of the Great Lakes. What distinguishes these origin stories from those of, say, their Roman counterparts—in Virgil's *Aeneid* and Livy's *Early History of Rome*—is that ultimately the 'peoples' of these accounts *continue moving* rather than settling, and in Lyons' account, *become many*—the Potawatomi,

[113] The name is left without capitalization in Lyons' original text.

Odawa and Ojibwe people's respectively. Nevertheless, amongst all, a singular thread binds the fact that 'in the beginning' people are *already* on the move.

In order to address these and further questions, questions drawn directly from the source of migrant-rights movements and their emergent portable grammars, one would still need to find some small refuge as a point of departure. This place would, itself, require formulation, a sanctuary of and for scholarship as much as for the sheltering of those displaced by conflict, threat of violence, and increasingly, environmental catastrophe. These are not distinct projects because a 'sanctuary of scholarship' must be nourished by the contributions of those who experience this all-too-common hardship today. Yet, what new vistas open under a framework of hospitality remain as yet under-explored. In a final word, we should remember that the grammatological notions of 'putting a structure into play,' 'deconstruction,' the 'trembling' of a structure that initiates an 'economy without reserve,' *if they mean anything* (Derrida 2001), do not simply imply that 'anything goes.' On the contrary, it is because for so long our questions regarding community, authority, the right to rule a territory and a population have been assumed, forfeiting all other possibilities, that this call demands we re-trace *responsibility*, *justice*, *freedom* and a *democracy to-come* never heretofore attempted. Radical reflection in departure from this current is exactly what we must *infinitely demand* of the 'anything' that 'goes' in our everyday and institutional politics.

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