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Temporary protection in Turkey and Colombia: state interests, entangled migration realities, policy diffusion and the global erosion of refugee protection standards

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Abstract

Over the last decade, Turkey and Colombia have emerged as major hosts of displaced populations, responding to the Syrian and Venezuelan displacement crises through the adoption of Temporary Protection (TP) regimes. This article offers an exploratory comparative analysis of the political and policy rationales underpinning their adoption. Analysing both cases in parallel reveals three key insights. First, TP serves state interests by supporting internal and external legitimacy, enabling governments to balance border control, public opinion, and policymaking while managing pressures from the Global North and projecting a positive international image. Second, the study highlights the role of policy diffusion: Colombia's adoption of TP was indirectly shaped by Turkey's model, reflecting a broader trend in which the circulation of displacement policies has normalized less protective approaches and has eroded refugee protection standards. Third, both states framed their engagement with displaced populations as rooted in "special" relationships, illustrating how borders intersect with social, cultural, and economic ties. Collectively, these findings challenge conventional understandings of migration policy by foregrounding the political centrality of interconnectedness and by showing how TP functions primarily as tool of state interest for entangled migration states, rather than as a mechanism designed around the needs of displaced communities.

Keywords Temporary protection, Displacement, Refugees, Entangled, Governance, Control, Policy diffusion

Introduction

In recent years, Turkey and Colombia have emerged as leading hosts of displaced populations. Between 2017 and 2022, Turkey hosted more than 3.5 million Syrians, while Colombia hosted 2.9 million Venezuelans in 2023 (UNHCR, 2024). While both states have prior histories with mass displacement, the scale and nature of Syrian and Venezuelan crises constituted a novel and unexpected development. In response, both states

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adopted Temporary Protection (TP) as the primary legal status for these displaced populations.

Following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and subsequent Syrian conflicts, Turkey became a primary recipient of displaced Syrians, peaking at 3.7 million in 2021. Initially, the Turkish government adopted an open-door policy and built numerous camps along the Syrian border. By autumn 2011, Turkey started to grant “temporary protection” (*geçici koruma*) to Syrians, later formalized with the Temporary Protection Regulation in 2014 (Çorabatır, 2016). Over time, Turkey’s response shifted: the government began discussing integration and naturalization (with limited implementation), built a border wall with Syria, restricted territorial access, and limited Syrian movements within the country (Batalla & Tolay, 2018). By 2019, the government promoted and facilitated the return of Syrians (Tunaboğlu, 2024). Despite these changes, Syrians continue to hold TP status, now in existence for over a decade.

The Venezuelan exodus began around 2015 due to economic and political turmoil, with Colombia emerging as a key host and transit country. By 2022, around 7.1 million Venezuelans had left their country, with over 30% (about 2.8 million) residing in Colombia (UNHCR, 2024). Initially, Colombia enacted an open-door policy by issuing a series of Special Stay Permits (PEP) that allowed certain categories of migrants to remain and work legally (Selee & Bolter, 2022). In February 2021, during the Duque administration, the *Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos* (ETPV, “statute of temporary protection for Venezuelan migrants”) was announced, aiming to transition migrants with other permits and reduce irregular migration (Cancillería Colombia, 2021). This TP status functioned primarily as a large-scale regularization program and has reached more than 2.2 million Venezuelans, with 1.9 million becoming approved TP holders (Migración Colombia, 2024). Despite President Petro’s subsequent replacement of Duque as the head of state and the ensuing relative “de-prioritization” of the Venezuelan displacement issue in the government priorities, TP has remained the most common status for Venezuelans in Colombia.

This article proposes a comparative case study of the adoption of TP statuses in Colombia and Turkey. We ask why TP was adopted and preferred over pre-existing alternatives (such as the refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention or more restrictive measures). Methodologically, the article adopts a qualitative approach to examine the political, legal, and institutional dynamics through which TP statuses emerged in each context. This approach allowed us to reconstruct decision-making processes, situate policy choices within broader governance environments, and identify the meanings and rationales attached to TP by relevant actors. Building on this exploratory and heuristic approach, we identify key similarities and differences across the two cases and consider their implications for future research and theory-building on displacement governance.

The article is organized as follows. We first present our methodological and theoretical approach. We then review the literature on TP, situating TP historically and comparatively, and discussing similarities and differences between the Turkish and Colombian regimes, including their relationship to refugee status. The third section presents our empirical findings, unpacking the political functions, processes and motivations underlying TP adoption in both cases. We highlight TP as a mechanism of state control, its diffusion and evolving role as a tool of external legitimacy, and its function as a means to leverage the complex nature of entangled migration states. The conclusion synthesizes

these findings and highlights the article's contributions to debates on the political roles of TP, of the ways through which policy norms travel globally, and of the prevalence and saliency of entanglements.

Methods and theoretical positioning: bringing Turkey and Colombia together

This manuscript is the product of an iterative and exploratory comparative case study. At its outset, we sought to explain why two apparently different and disconnected contexts (Turkey and Colombia) converged on a similar outcome, namely the adoption of TP frameworks, which pointed to a most-different-cases heuristic (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). However, we did not initially set out to explain a specific policy outcome or to test a particular theoretical framework; instead, to fully take advantage of the exploratory approach, we remained open to see where our comparative findings would take us. The research evolved through successive engagements with literature, media materials, and fieldwork, allowing the empirical puzzles, comparative logic, and theoretical contributions to emerge progressively. This approach aligns with interpretive and inductive traditions in migration and policy studies that emphasize the contingent production of policy categories and governance instruments (Bloemraad, 2013).

The project began with a review of scholarship on temporary protection, asylum governance, and migration politics in the Global South. This review revealed both the relative scarcity of cross-regional comparisons and the tendency to analyze Turkey and Colombia within separate regional and epistemic frames (Chimni, 1998; Natter & Thioillet, 2022; Fernández-Rodríguez & Freier, 2024).

Empirically, the research unfolded in stages. Following the literature review, we conducted a qualitative media analysis to examine how state responses to large-scale displacement were publicly framed in international media outlets. Analysing international media allowed us to trace these policies as tools of legitimation and global signaling, and their positioning within dominant global discourses on refugees and asylum. For Turkey, the analysis focused on media coverage of government policies toward Syrians since 2011; for Colombia, it examined coverage of policies toward Venezuelans since 2015. Eight major international newspapers were identified in each case, and news articles were selected based on their relevance to government policy responses, legal framing, and public justification of protection measures. From this corpus, particularly salient news items in each context were selected for close qualitative comparison. The aim was not representativeness but analytical leverage, allowing for comparison of how TP policies were narrated, legitimized, or downplayed in public discourse (see appendix A, listing the two 2 articles per news outlet and per country).

Insights generated through the media analysis informed the design of subsequent fieldwork. We conducted 13 semi-structured interviews in Bogotá in 2023 with policymakers, migration experts, international organization staff, and civil society actors involved in the design, implementation, or interpretation of Colombia's TP framework. These interviews were complemented by online interviews with actors involved in exchanges and interactions between Turkey and Colombia. Following the fieldwork, we remained engaged through online meetings with policymakers, civil society actors, and researchers involved in Colombia's migration policy framework. This material builds on earlier fieldwork in Turkey, including 23 interviews with policymakers and experts conducted

in 2018 (see appendix B), as well as more than two decades of research and participant observation within migration policy and expert circles in Turkey.

Theoretically, this approach enables the manuscript to engage multiple bodies of scholarship: these literatures are mobilized as analytical resources rather than deductive templates, allowing empirical comparison to inform conceptual refinement. More specifically, the analysis is contributing to debates on the governmentality of migration (Biehl, 2015; Walters, 2015; Natter, 2023), the migration state and the entangled migration state (Hollifield, 2004; Adamson & Tsourapas, 2020; Adamson, 2023, 2024), the global governance of asylum (Betts, 2011), and migration politics in the Global South (Natter, 2018; Freier et al., 2021).

Finally, the analysis is shaped by our long-term engagement with migration governance in both contexts. As Turkish and Venezuelan nationals, we combine personal experiences of displacement, professional work with displaced populations, extensive research on refugee and migration policy, and fieldwork in Turkey and Colombia. Drawing on reflexive approaches in qualitative political science, this hybrid positionality is treated as an analytical resource that sharpens sensitivity to power relations, silences, and the contingent nature of policy-making. At the same time, we remain attentive to how our academic training, institutional affiliations, and partial embedding in Global North research and policy networks shape access and interpretation. Accordingly, particular attention was paid to engaging a wide range of local actors and perspectives, and to systematically reflecting on divergences between prior expectations and empirical findings. Throughout the analysis, we make explicit where initial assumptions were unsettled or revised through field engagement.

Literature review: temporary protection in Turkey and Colombia compared

The ambivalent formalization of TP over time

Temporary protection is a status provided to displaced populations in vulnerable situations who cannot return to their country of origin. This status has long been part of the range of tools available to states for offering international protection. TP has been employed in various situations, with different degrees of formalization (if any) within official administrative or legal frameworks. In the 1990s, Kuwaiti refugees received informal TP in the Gulf, while Bosnian refugees received formal TP in Germany (Bastaki, 2018). Before the 1990s, TP practices can be seen: in several African states (with TP being codified in the OAU Refugee Convention), in response to mass flows of displaced populations from Southeast Asia around 1980, and in the context of flight from Central American civil wars in the 1980s (Edwards, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2000). Even earlier, Austria granted temporary refuge to Hungarian and Czech refugees in the 1960s; England and France granted temporary refuge to Spanish people in the 1930s (Ineli-Ciger, 2016) and Turkey extended “temporary protection” to Russian citizens fleeing the civil war in the newly formed Soviet Union in the 1920s (Kirişçi & Yildiz, 2023). Accordingly, TP is *de facto*, an old form of state response to displacement that can be found in a wide range of geographical and historical contexts.

Over time however, “temporary protection” has evolved to take on a more precise and defined meaning. The UNHCR defines TP as a form of international protection provided in cases of mass influx, offering a blanket status without the need for individual status determination and providing safeguards against refoulement (UNHCR, 2014). The

modalities can vary, but TP should serve as a complementary mechanism to the granting of refugee status, helping to fill protection gaps and serving as an interim practice until more durable solutions can be found (UNHCR, 2014). These formalized forms of TP are typically embedded in national laws or regulations and tied to explicit regulatory implementation practices. Although these formalized forms have been relatively rare, they have become more common in recent years, prompting some to identify a “trend” or a “temporary turn” (Schultz, 2020; Tunaboylu, 2024). Contemporary examples of TP regimes include the United States’ Temporary Protected Status (TPS), Australia’s Temporary Protection Visa, the European Union’s Directive on Temporary Protection (adopted in 2001 and activated for the first time in 2022 for Ukrainians), Turkey’s Regulation of Temporary Protection for Syrians, and Colombia’s Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelans (EPTV). Given that such statuses are meant to be exceptional, their generalization raises concerns (Biorklund Belliveau & Ferguson, 2023).

Accordingly, the academic, policy, and media discourse on TP often diverge into two distinct normative interpretations. Some view TP positively, emphasizing its ability to provide protection and associated rights to large numbers of people simultaneously. This perspective sees TP as a significant and beneficial development, especially in contexts where asylum rights are restricted. Most proponents nevertheless emphasize the need for specific parameters to ensure TP functions properly, often including time limits and the existence of regional responsibility-sharing mechanisms (Hathaway, 2001; Selee et al., 2024). Conversely, others are more critical of TP, arguing that it represents an erosion or downgrading of international asylum law (Fitzpatrick, 2000). From this viewpoint, asylum seekers no longer receive permanent protection based on national and international law, but rather a form of transient protection that is often arbitrarily dependent on a state’s administrative decisions. This critical stance highlights concerns about the impermanence and variability of TP compared to traditional asylum protections (Biorklund and Ferguson, 2023; Buxton, 2023).

TP, an alternative to refugee status in Turkey and Colombia

Within this ambivalent context, TP in Turkey and Colombia was adopted as a new response to large-scale displacement and an alternative to refugee status, developed outside of their pre-existing legal frameworks (Selee et al., 2024; Freier & García, 2022; Çorabatir, 2016). Although both countries are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, they did not extend conventional refugee status to incoming Syrians and Venezuelans. Instead, they introduced TP as a distinct policy instrument.

Turkey has been a member of the Refugee convention since 1951 but retained the geographical limitation that excludes non-Europeans from refugee protection. By the 1990s, in order to address the issue of non-European displaced people in Turkey, a new Regulation (No. 6169) allowed non-Europeans to apply for asylum with the UNHCR in Turkey with the expectation of resettlement to a third country. However, in 2011, Turkey clarified that Syrians would not be able to apply for asylum, but would rather be admitted with a TP status. The 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) revamped the 1994 regulation by creating the status of “conditional refugees” for non-European refugees expected to resettle in a third country (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2013). The LFIP also embedded TP in law. The implementing Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014 explicitly stated that Syrian nationals arriving in Turkey after April 28, 2011,

should be *exclusively* processed under TP status and could not seek international protection as “conditional refugees” (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı 2014). So not only can Syrians in Turkey not be recognized as refugees in Turkey (given the geographical limitation), but their status as temporary protection holders prevents them from seeking refugee status in view of eventual resettlement in a third country (like other nationalities do) (Inel-Ciger, 2017).

Conversely, Colombia has both international and regional commitments on refugee protection that should have allowed Venezuelans to access refugee status: the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Cartagena Declaration, whose expanded refugee definition is applicable to Venezuelan migrants (Freier & Doña-Reveco, 2022; Freier & García, 2022; Freier et al., 2022). However, Colombia has responded to mass displacements with an *ad hoc* approach similar to Turkey’s, distinct and separate from its international, regional, and domestic refugee law commitments. The Colombian government has made TP and refugee determination mutually exclusive, forcing Venezuelans to either pursue refugee status through the asylum process or apply for TP separately (Trompetero, 2022, 81). Given the lengthy and uncertain asylum-seeking processes, most Venezuelans have opted for TP. While presented by Colombian authorities as a complementary mechanism to conventional refugee status, in practice, the TP status has limited the ability of Venezuelans to apply for refugee status, possibly intentionally (interviews 26 & 32). Between 2017 and 2022, Colombia had granted refugee status to only 1,289 Venezuelan asylum seekers (Rossiasco et al., 2023).

In both instances, albeit stemming from different contexts and employing distinct mechanisms, TP had effectively limited, if not entirely excluded, migrants from accessing refugee status based on the 1951 Refugee Convention.

TP in Turkey and Colombia: comparison

Turkey and Colombia’s TP statuses share several key similarities. Both involve group recognition (*prima facie* recognition) for individuals from a specific country (Syria and Venezuela) and permit access to the host country with the right to stay for the duration specified by TP regulations. Mandatory registration and ID cards are essential components. Both policies provide access to specific rights, such as health, education, social services, and employment (with restrictions in Turkey) (Castro, 2023; Trompetero, 2022).

Nevertheless, key differences set the TP statuses apart as highlighted in the existing comparative literature (Trompetero, 2022; Castro, 2023; Selee et al., 2024). Concerning temporality, the Turkish program offers beneficiaries an indeterminate duration, whereas Colombia provides a fixed 10-year period. Despite some limits regarding the timeframe for applying for TP, Colombia’s 10-year protection is notably generous compared to other temporary statuses that typically last only a few months or years. Although an indeterminate duration like Turkey’s can also be seen as generous (especially given that it had already exceeded 10 years for many Syrians under TP), the uncertainty about when protection might end creates precarious situations as well as risk of protracted temporariness (Selee et al., 2024).

Regarding durable solutions, Turkey’s TP program falls short. Syrians under TP cannot seek permanent residence, refugee status, or other permanent statuses. While some have been offered access to Turkish nationality, the naturalization process is notably

arbitrary, with only a limited number benefiting from it (Baban et al., 2021). In contrast, Colombia's ETPV program provides Venezuelan migrants with a path to permanent residence, allowing them to accrue residency time while living in Colombia under this program (Trompetero, 2022).

Access to the labor market also differs. Turkey did not issue work permits to TP holders until January 2016. Since, TP beneficiaries can obtain work permits, but with substantial restrictions: employers must apply for the permit, only up to 10% of a company's workforce can be foreign, and employment must be in the same province where the TP holder is registered. Consequently, most Syrians work informally, facing lower wages, poor working conditions, and a higher risk of exploitation (Batalla & Tolay, 2018). In contrast, Colombia's ETPV allows unrestricted access to the labor market, even though it does not completely protect from precarity (Trompetero, 2022).

The TP status in Colombia supports both internal and external mobility. Venezuelans under ETPV can reside anywhere in Colombia and travel abroad for up to six months, acknowledging the need for pendular migration (interview 33). In contrast, Syrians in Turkey are restricted to their registered province, for access to health, educational and social services. Around 2015, Turkish authorities started to implement monitoring of internal movements and by 2019 engaged in large scale relocations (Çorabatir, 2016). With some exceptions such as religious holidays, Syrians who travel abroad are also considered to have forfeited their TP status and cannot reapply upon reentry (Ineli-Ciger, 2017).

Finally, Colombia's ETPV does not mention *non-refoulement*. In contrast, the principle of *non-refoulement* is officially grounded in the Turkish TP, which theoretically provides access to legal mechanisms to protect against deportation. In practice, however, the Turkish government has emphasized the need for Syrians to return and initiated large-scale campaigns of "voluntary repatriations," which, in many cases, have been documented as being forced returns, in violation of the principle of *non-refoulement* (Tunaboylu, 2024).

Compared to Turkey, Colombia's TP framework generally offers a more accommodating approach to mass displacement. Despite a shorter registration period and fewer formal guarantees regarding refoulement, Colombia's more flexible access to the labor market, mobility and durable solutions distinguish it from the Turkish model.

Findings: policy diffusion and the many functions of Temporary protection

To address our overall question regarding why TP was adopted in both Turkey and Colombia, we focused on the political functions of TP, explaining why Turkey and Colombia chose this status over other policy options. Various responses to Syrian and Venezuelan displacement illustrate the range of available policies. In the case of Venezuelan displacement, Selee et al. describe a "patchwork of temporary protection programs, ordinary work visas, and regional mobility agreements" (2024, 13). Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and initially Ecuador used temporary residency permits for Venezuelans, while Chile issued humanitarian visas (Freier & Parent, 2019). Lebanon and Jordan initially welcomed Syrians but did not provide clear statuses, leading to precarious situations (Turner, 2015). The US and EU offered some protection to displaced Venezuelan and Syrians respectively, but increased border restrictions, showing an ambivalent approach (Carrera et al., 2022).

From our interviews, several political advantages emerged as central to the decision to adopt TP: concerns over internal legitimacy and the need for control, concerns over external legitimacy and the imperative to meet international expectations, and the constraints and opportunities arising from being an entangled migration state. Before turning to these functions in detail, we first present how a process of partial policy diffusion connected the Turkish TP to the Colombian ETPV, further highlighting how similar considerations may explain their respective adoptions.

Policy diffusion between Turkey and Colombia

Unexpectedly, our analysis indicates that Colombia partially drew on the Turkish temporary regime in designing its own regulation (a finding suggested in Hydari & Irgil, 2021). Our research and interviews with officials from both Colombia and Turkey revealed an interesting, explicit but partial process of policy diffusion. In 2017, official contacts took place so that Colombian officials could learn from Turkey's experience with Syrians: in May 2017, a mission of three Colombian officials visited Turkey (including Gaziantep and the Turkish Syrian border), and in March 2018 this was followed by a Turkish mission of officials from multiple Turkish agencies, who visited Colombia to discuss specifics of the Turkish TP and its potential applicability in Colombia (interview 36). They addressed many different aspects of TP, such as duration, inter-agency coordination, the role of registration, access to health, education and the job market. Overall, Turkish counterparts appeared eager to share their experience with Colombian colleagues, emphasizing the complex and multifaceted advantages of TP (discussed in the following sections) (interview 36). The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) office in Bogota seems to have played a central role in organizing these trips and discussions (interview 36; Daily Sabah, 2018). Colombia's President then, Juan Manuel Santos, discussed these exchanges in a BBC interview (BBC Turkish, 2018). By November 2018, the Colombian ambassador in Turkey published an article on the lessons to be learned from Turkey regarding migration crises (Pinto, 2018).

However, these early efforts did not directly lead to the 2021 adoption of the ETPV, as a new administration took over in 2018. Then, the situation was not ripe:

But the political conditions did not allow for them [Colombians] to adopt it then. By 2016, Santos had received the Nobel price, he was closing his books, getting ready for elections and did not want to bring the Venezuelan displacement issue to the public and did not go to the press. [...] If he had been staying another year or another term in power, I think it would have happened. It would have been exactly a replica of the Turkish model.
(interview 36)

One of the two main drafters of the ETPV noted no personal contact with Turkish officials in 2021 but acknowledged looking at the Turkish directive and working from a draft that dates from the previous administration (interview 30). One interviewee highlighted that the Turkish contacts may have influenced the incoming President, Ivan Duque, who directed the drafting team to work on a "TP" (interview 33). Another interview said it had an impact on the adoption of the PEPs (interview 26), which in turn framed the discussion regarding the ETPV. Other officials such as Victor Bautista, then Secretary of the Border and International Cooperation in Norte de Santander (at the border with

Venezuela), who hosted the Turkish delegation in 2018, remained influential on migration matters under the Duque government (Daily Sabah, 2018). Beyond direct bilateral interactions, Turkish and Colombian officials have also been in regular contact through broader international cooperation platforms on migration, such as the ILO's South-South and Triangular cooperation program (ILO, 2021).

Overall, this evidence points to an explicit but indirect process of policy diffusion, in which sustained Turkish-Colombian exchanges from 2017 onward shaped ideas, actors, and interim instruments around temporary protection, even if they did not translate linearly into the 2021 ETPV. This also suggests that the Turkish counterparts were keen on promoting the perceived advantages of a Temporary Protection model in the international sphere.

TP as an internal tool of multilayered controls

Looking at the reasons why states adopt TP, the literature suggests that TP is a pragmatic compromise between different values. It can balance practical and normative requirements, control and humanitarian objectives (Gibney, 2000), “the rights of states to determine their membership policies and the claims of refugees to a secure form of protection” (Buxton, 2023, p. 55), and the tension between expanding legal obligations to forced migrants and maintaining discretion and flexibility (Fitzpatrick, 2000, p. 287). While mostly confirming these assessments, our comparative case study of Turkey and Colombia however provides a more elaborate understanding, highlighting how TP's ambivalence provides multi-layered control over displaced populations, the host society, and the political process.

A common starting point for our interviews is the recognition of an aversion to “being overwhelmed” or losing control in a context of mass displacement (interview 8, 24 and 26). Mass displacement, as in the case of Syrians and Venezuelans, happens in a short amount of time, and creates a sense of emergency (Buxton, 2023). The concern for states is to have a “system strained beyond capacity,” especially as the Turkish and Colombian existing administrative and legal frameworks were unable to address the situation. Having been defined mostly as countries of emigration in recent decades, neither country had a comprehensive immigration law and were mostly caught unprepared (interview 24; Grill, 2023; Selee & Bolter, 2022). The concern over scenes of chaos at the border that may delegitimize the state's ability to “govern,” would later be confounded with concerns over failed integration and, especially in the case of Colombia, with the advent of Covid 19, which exacerbated the vulnerabilities and visibility of disadvantaged Venezuelans (interview 29).

Accordingly, most interviewees highlighted that “closing” the border was not feasible, meaning that providing a level of welcome and open-door policy was both generous and necessary:

*The open-door policy is also because the border [between Syria and Turkey] is so long; that is why as soon as they could, they built the wall.
(interview 8)*

There is no real state presence at the [Colombia-Venezuela] border, and control is nearly impossible because there are so many points of entry; as a result, a pragmatic logic emerges that if stopping movement is not feasible, it is better to exert some control by organizing and legalizing these movements.

(interview 25, also interview 24 and 33)

There is therefore a mix of pragmatic and opportunistic motivations in the adoption of TP in order to maintain political control.

This form of political control operates at different levels. TP provides control over *displaced populations* by linking rights to registration and ID cards, encouraging displaced individuals to become known to the state. Turkish and Colombian authorities emphasized registration as a key initial step (interview 8, 29 & 36). In Turkey, registration allows the state to control Syrians' movement and leverage where they live and work: "they had one ID number that was used for everything: aid, hospital, school, so we can know where they are and where they are at" (interview 36, also interview 1). Eventually, it also provided leverage for the Turkish state to engage in "return" campaigns, targeting specific Syrians based on their registration (Tunaboğlu, 2024). In Colombia, TP eligibility was designed to regularize Venezuelans already in the country while excluding future irregular arrivals, preventing an "*appel d'air*" effect (interview 26 & 28).

More indirectly, as highlighted in the literature and confirmed in our fieldwork in Turkey, TP also serves as a means of control over displaced populations through its "generous" nature. In Colombia, Del Real has shown that the discourse of generosity associated with TP "might create a resemblance of governmental receptivity and legal durability among Venezuelans" that is deceptive and "conceals the fragility and illegality production features" of the ETPV (2022, 8). In Turkey, Syrians who had initially agreed to meet with us decided against it, letting their fellow interviewees know that they felt indebted to the government for protection, and did not want to discuss hardships with us for fear of losing their status or citizenship opportunities (interviews 20 & 23). The "generosity" embedded in TP mobilizes humanitarianism as a form of control that leverages temporal uncertainty (Roth, 2023; Palma-Gutiérrez, 2021) and inscribes itself in the broader context of the governmentality of asylum (Biehl, 2015).

Beyond displaced populations, TP also serves to manage *public opinion*. Both Turkey and Colombia have systems of government that rely heavily on electoral processes. Accordingly, public opinion and perceptions of the displacement crisis are central concerns for decision-makers. The TP literature has highlighted how TP remains a fragile status that is very dependent on the 'vagaries of public opinion' (UNHCR, 1994, p. 20). However, the cases of Turkey and Colombia show here that TP also serves as a tool for managing and shaping public opinion. Initially, the public response to Syrian and Venezuelan displacement in both countries was relatively positive, especially compared to Europe and the US (interview 8, 25, 29 & 33). This can be partly explained by the nature of TP: not promising long-term integration helps ease public concerns regarding financial and social costs (Fitzpatrick 279). But at a deeper level, the discourse of generosity associated with TP serves to control public opinion by promoting a self-congratulatory narrative of giving and humanitarianism, using specific images of brotherhood, reciprocity and religious solidarity (interview 8; Korkut, 2016; Polat, 2018; Grill, 2023; see also in other contexts Fassin, 2005; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015). It also creates a sense of superiority and implicit inequality between host and displaced populations (interview 8, 27 & 29). This discourse both reassures the public and prevents expressions of concern about hosting displaced populations. The fact that TP is a choice made by Colombian and Turkish authorities, rather than a legal obligation, reinforces the image of a proactive, benevolent, and generous country (interview 8, 33 & 36). Both the restrictive

and generous aspects of TP work together to extend the state's control over its own population.

TP not only facilitates control over public opinion, but, as a result, it also gives state authorities more control over *the political process*. In Colombia, there was surprising consensus among political leaders around the ETPV announcement. President Duque, often criticized, found popularity with the regularization of Venezuelans (interviews 25, 28 & 33). In Turkey, despite political polarization and opposition attempts to criticize the government's policy towards Syrians displacees, TP did not become a major political issue for years: "it was not a political issue during campaigns, like in Europe" (interview 8). Even when the presence of Syrians became politicized by 2019, the focus was on citizenship and returns, not on ending the TP per se (Yanaşmayan et al., 2019). The ambivalence and non-committal nature of TP worked to shield the government from political criticism, at least for some time. As an executive decision, TP also provides significant leverage over the policy-making process (interview 33). TP can be prolonged, renewed, amended, or canceled by the government, hence providing significant flexibility and discretion (Del, 2022) and represents a de-legalization of asylum (Fitzpatrick, 2000), shielding the government from legal obligations. In Colombia, the Petro administration that replaced the Duque administration in 2022 was able to alter the specific provisions of TP and its issuance (now privileging Visa V and PEP tutor alternatives) without going through the legislative process (interview 35).

Another striking finding we were able to observe in the case of Turkey and Colombia is that TP did not only empower states to decide on displacement issues but also allowed them to shape and expand *administrative capabilities* and manage power dynamics within the government. In both countries, the ad-hoc nature of the TP led to the contingent empowerment of new administrative units, closely tied to the high executive (Natter, 2023). In Colombia, the Venezuelan displacement crisis led to the creation of a new agency, La Gerencia de Fronteras, eventually in charge of the implementation of the ETPV (interview 28, 29 & 32; see also Fernández-Rodríguez & Célleri, 2024). It was placed directly under the President, competing with existing bureaucracies like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migración Colombia (interview 33). This unit was seen as ambitious, progressive, and aligned with the President's vision (interviews 29 & 33). However, following the election of President Gustavo Petro in 2022, TP appeared to be accorded lower priority, and La Gerencia was shelved (interviews 4 & 5). In Turkey, administrative changes and the creation of a new migration unit were already underway before the Syrian crisis. The arrival of Syrian refugees and the adoption of TP accelerated the need to expand capacities and further empowered the new agency (interview 13). By 2013, the Directorate General of Migration Management was established (İçduygu, 2015), and later upgraded to a Presidency in 2021. Initially staffed by professionals open to civil society and academia, the unit eventually saw leadership changes that brought in more security-oriented personnel, normalizing the new administrative unit (interview 8 & 11; Batalla & Tolay, 2018). These developments in both countries illustrate how TP can facilitate the emergence and growth of a migration state, adapting to new human mobility needs and transforming the very nature of the state (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2020) in a way convenient for the executive power.

From the perspective of internal legitimacy, as revealed in the comparative case of Turkey and Colombia, TP goes beyond being a pragmatic compromise between

restrictive impulses and humanitarian calls. Instead, it is a policy that skillfully uses adhoc approaches, indeterminacy and the discourse of generosity to gain layered control over both host and displaced populations, as well as over political processes and agencies.

TP's evolving role as tool of managing international expectations

For both Turkey and Colombia, international image is crucial. Both countries have faced negative perceptions and have invested significant political capital to improve their reputations within the international community. Turkey has long aspired to be seen as a Western power, but has suffered from processes of otherization and orientalizing, which contrasts with its perceived glorious past and the expectation that Turkey should be a powerful, leading nation (Zarakol, 2011; Rumelili, 2011). Criticism from the international community on issues such as human rights, military coups, economic instability and democratic backsliding has been a persistent challenge for Turkey. Colombia also struggled with a negative image due to decades-long conflict with insurgent groups like the FARC and related drug trafficking (Palma-Gutierrez & Long, 2022). The 2016 peace agreement with the FARC presented a unique opportunity to change this image and improve its international reputation (interview 25), despite ongoing issues with illicit violent activities.

Accordingly, decisions regarding displaced Venezuelans and Syrians were influenced by concerns about international image. Turkey used its Syrian displacee policy as soft power, promoting solidarity and humanitarianism to enhance its international reputation (interview 8 & 16; see also Cevik & Sevin, 2017; Tolay, 2021). In Latin America, Hammoud-Gallego and Freier have highlighted the importance of symbolic human and migrant rights discourses for foreign policy (2023). In Colombia, President Duque clearly perceived the political opportunity, both at the national and personal level (interviews 25, 28 & 33). One interviewee stated emphatically that, drawing on his experience in Turkey, he urged his Colombian counterparts to “see the immigration crisis as a major opportunity to strengthen Colombia’s image as a new country, with a new perspective and vision of the region and the world” (interview 36; see also Ozkan, 2018). In both Colombia and Turkey, hospitality towards displaced populations became “a mobilizing force and accumulated political capital in the field [...] of international global politics” (Grill, 2023, p. 94; see also Palma-Gutierrez & Long, 2022).

In doing so, both Turkey and Colombia were successful and indeed praised for their generous approaches to displaced populations, contrasting with more restrictive policies in neighboring countries and the West. In our media analysis, certain terms featured prominently in headlines describing Turkey’s and Colombia’s policy approach towards displaced populations, including terms such as “model,” “unique,” “exceptional,” and “historic,” highlighting their positive evaluation (appendix A; see also Tolay, 2021; Poveda-Clavijo & Mena, 2024). Even academic analyses acknowledged Colombia’s approach as a “noteworthy exception” or “nothing short of exceptional” (Acosta & Freier, 2023, p. 601; Freier & Doña-Reveco, 2022, p. 16). This positive characterization bolstered the foreign policy credentials of both countries (see also Irgil and Tolay forthcoming).

Another key finding apparent in our media analysis concerns the normative perception of TP and the surprising contrast between Turkey and Colombia: even though in Turkey, TP itself was actually not ostentatiously framed as a generous or positive policy

towards displaced populations, a decade later it was portrayed in precisely these terms in the Colombian case. Early on, Turkey enhanced its international reputation with images of “open door policy” and “perfect refugee camps,” but adopted TP quietly in 2011/2014 (Batalla & Tolay, 2018). This approach kept the Turkish TP out of the spotlight: none of the international newspapers we analyzed reported on Turkey’s granting of TP to Syrians until years later, around 2018/2019, when returns became an issue (see appendix A). In contrast, in 2021, Colombian President Duque and UNHCR’s Filippo Grandi announced the ETPV in a well-publicized press conference, earning international praise (appendix A, interviews 24, 29 & 33). Our research highlights that time and evolving normative perceptions explain this contrast between Turkey’s discretion and Colombia’s outward publicization of TP.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey faced criticism for its lack of immigration policy and its retention of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s geographical limitation. In particular in the early 1990s, the international community criticized Turkey’s treatment of Iraqi refugees (interview 16). In 2008, Turkey considered expanding its asylum policy and lifting the geographical limitation while drafting a comprehensive immigration policy in 2008 (interview 11). However, due to various concerns, Turkey retained the limitation and adopted TP for Syrians (interview 11; see also Tolay & Paçacı Elitok, 2012). At the time (2011/2014), however, there were legitimate concerns that such an adoption would be criticized for lowering the 1951 Refugee Convention standards, and Turkey did not publicize this adoption”:

The government, they did not want the bad publicity, like it was in the 1990s, so they remained discreet. The world always complained that Turkey was not lifting the geographical limitation.

(translated from Turkish, interview 11; see also Çorabatir, 2016)

By 2021, the international context had shifted significantly. The 2015 European refugee management crisis exposed the failure of European states to uphold Refugee Convention ideals. U.S. President Trump’s restrictive immigration policies further undermined asylum norms. By then, even the Turkish TP had also been praised by European actors (as a means to justify the EU-Turkey statement) and normalized TP. Thus, Colombia’s adoption of TP was viewed positively, explaining the open announcement. It is also important to note that several interviewees criticized the Duque administration’s adoption of TP as being solely motivated by announcement effects and international recognition rather than effectively helping Venezuelans (interview 26): “He got his medal but then did very little follow-through on those issues” (interview 29).

This analysis of Turkey and Colombia’s approaches to TP highlights three main points. First, welcoming displaced populations can be strategically used for foreign policy to gain both material and symbolic support, enhancing international status and prestige. Second, policy announcements might matter more than their implementation, leading to potential gaps and inconsistencies across different administrations. Third, the international community’s perspective on TP has shifted from viewing it as a lower standard in the early 2010s to a commendable policy by the early 2020s, which has significant implications for the future of the international refugee regime.

TP as a strategic answer to the nature of entangled migration politics

Beyond the general needs of the Turkish and Colombian states (in search of internal legitimacy and external legitimacy), TP can also be understood as a response to a complex and unique web of entanglements associated with Venezuelan and Syrian displacement. Our data shows that TP does not merely function as a policy embedded in entanglements, but as a concrete governance instrument through which entangled migration states actively manage and strategically leverage these relationships.

The adoption of TP in Turkey and Colombia did not occur in a vacuum. Both TP frameworks were created *specifically* for Syrians and Venezuelans. Interviews often highlighted the importance of the broader historical context of societal and political relations with the country of origin, as well as other regional actors. This set of considerations bring forth the view of Turkey and Colombia as *entangled migration states*, whose relations with Venezuelans and Syrians need to be understood within a broader set of considerations tying history, mobility, and politics together. Fiona Adamson introduced the concept of *entangled migration states* “as a means of capturing the relational and historically embedded qualities of contemporary migration regimes, their ongoing connections via migration diplomacy, and their often-transnational character” (Adamson, 2024, p. 599). While the entangled migration state literature emphasizes the relational and historical constitution of migration regimes, our findings specify how particular policy instruments (here TP) translate these entanglements into day-to-day statecraft.

Within this framework, TP can be seen as a particularly suitable tool (due to its flexibility and deliberate ambiguity regarding duration and rights) to address the needs, constraints and opportunities faced by entangled migration states. It also highlights the multiple levels of entanglements at stake, a feature repeatedly emphasized by interviewees when describing why TP, rather than asylum or permanent regularization, was politically viable: not only is Turkey entangled with Syria, and Colombia with Venezuela, but Turkey and Colombia are entangled with other countries in the region and with powerful Western countries. As expressed by De Palma: “Actions over migration from Venezuela were intrinsically related to political bets interwoven into an elaborate scaffolding, which involved getting the approval of a multi-faceted audience that included Colombian citizens and local authorities. It served as a vehicle for communicating with South American governments, powers such as the United States, multilateral and civil society organizations, and of course the Venezuelan government and its opposition” (Palma-Gutiérrez, 2021, p. 47).

Bilateral entanglements

At the bilateral level, one of the first items mentioned by our interviewees in Colombia was the ways in which Colombians and Venezuelans have a close inter-connected relationship that required a special type of solidarity. This was obvious through their depiction of a shared history, a common culture and language, a porous border, and history of emigration. Interestingly, many of these features also characterize Turkey’s entanglement with Syria. These parallels, which emerged consistently across interviews in both cases, suggest that TP becomes attractive precisely in contexts where historical proximity produces both moral obligation and acute concerns over sovereignty and control.

Colombia and Venezuela share a deep historical connection dating back to Spanish colonial times, fostering enduring social, cultural and economic ties that persist despite

periodic tensions (interview 33). Similarly, Turkey and Syria's intertwined histories (from the Ottoman Empire to their modern states) have shaped complex diplomatic and cross-border relations (interview 8 & 13). Both regions have experienced internal conflict and displacement (Colombia's guerillas and Turkey's Kurdish struggle), and illicit cross-border activities, with drug cartels and paramilitary groups in Colombia and human smuggling in Turkey (interview 11 & 25). Past migrations, such as Colombians fleeing to Venezuela in the 1970s, reinforced these enduring ties and informed societal responses to displaced populations.

These backgrounds significantly influenced Turkey and Colombia's reception of Syrians and Venezuelans. First of all, both countries share a strong sense of solidarity and fraternity with their respective displaced populations, rooted in shared history, culture and religion. This sense of kinship facilitated positive societal responses, with Turkey referring to "Syrian brothers" (interview 8; see also Polat, 2018; Korkut, 2016) and Colombia emphasizing how "essentially Venezuelans and Colombians are the same people" (interview 25) or are "united by fraternity" (Duque, quoted in Del Real, 2022, 8).

Second, Colombia's violent history and experience of uprooting created empathy and a sense of duty towards Venezuelans, similar to the solidarity felt by displaced Kurdish communities in Turkey towards Syrians (in particular Syrian Kurds, as illustrated by the Kobane crisis in 2015) (interview 8). Both nations' experiences as emigration countries also fostered an understanding of migrants' challenges, promoting openness and generosity (interview 16 & 29). Colombia's historical emigration to Venezuela often instilled a discourse of reciprocity: "Venezuela received so many Colombians over the years that there was a feeling that it was Colombia's turn to receive Venezuelans" (interview 25). Grill discusses the idea of a "distinctive historically constituted relationship" that creates a powerful sense of historical moral debt and informs Colombia's decision to provide a "generous" status of TP (Grill, 2023).

But third, the close connections and porous borders also raised concerns about control. Past friendship meant the existence of visa-free agreements which initially allowed for easy entries of Venezuelans and Syrians. Long experience of conflict and smuggling, and a relative absence of the state at the borders (interview 28; Palma-Gutiérrez, 2021), also contributed to potential anxiety over the inability to control cross-border movements (highlighted in the earlier section). Temporary protection addressed these by allowing immediate entry and focusing on registration later, while retaining the right to withdraw protection, thus maintaining a sense of state control. This aspect (how TP institutionalizes control while managing relations with neighbors) emerged as a central theme in interviews but is largely absent from normative readings of entanglement.

At the state level, TP also serves as a tool of interstate relations to influence the countries of origin (like asylum policies do more broadly). Our interviews highlighted a wide variety of ways in which TP can be presented differently to different audiences, explaining its resilience across different administrations and policy shifts. Both in Turkey and Colombia, TP was initially used to implicitly criticize the conditions in Syria and Venezuela: i.e. to undermine Assad's regime and to highlight the failings of the Maduro regime (interview 11 & 25, see also Gökalp Aras & Şahin Mencütek, 2015). But the acceptance of displaced populations can also reduce the pressure on the countries of origin by making displacement issues "go away" (interview 25) and be used as a tool for stabilization without regime change, as indicated by Colombia's current approach under

President Petro: “it is obvious in the case of Petro who did not really change the policy but does not really want to talk about it. He is trying to make the issue less rather than more visible.” (interview 28, also interview 35). TP’s flexibility thus enables calibrated signaling: it allows host states to criticize, stabilize, or strategically silence displacement narratives depending on diplomatic needs.

Regional and international entanglements

Beyond bilateral entanglements, TP can also help countries position themselves regionally. Both Colombia and Turkey used TP to enhance their regional leadership. In Latin America, migration has been a source of regional initiatives and cooperation. However, one interviewee noted that Colombia’s TP announcement surprised some Latin American countries, who had not been informed ahead of time, indicating an intentional move to facilitate reception of international aid and to regain autonomy, bypassing the regional Quito process (interview 33). TP also gave Colombia the spotlight as a regional leader and model, promoting responsibility sharing for displacees: “The first year of the ETPV, international public opinion was dazzled by Colombia’s generous policy” (interview 33). Turkey also used this image of being a regional leader regarding its hosting of Syrians to insert itself in political regional negotiations regarding the future of Syria (for the Astana process) and to justify military interventions in Syria (interview 8). This illustrates how TP allows entangled states to claim regional leadership while selectively engaging or disengaging from regional governance constraints (Irgil & Tolay, [forthcoming](#)).

TP also benefits host countries in their relationships with hegemonic powers like the EU for Turkey and the US for Colombia by reaching two goals simultaneously: please and assuage the fears of the hegemon power reinsuring that these displaced populations will stay put, while retaining a positive image and the possibility to counter position toward the West as needed. TP indeed positions Turkey and Colombia as strategic gatekeepers (Biorklund Belliveau & Ferguson, [2023](#); Tolay, [2021](#)). In Colombia most interviewees highlighted the central role played by Colombia’s close relationship and dependence with the US (interview 25 & 26, see also Ewards, [2022](#)). Turkey’s TP for Syrians became central to the EU’s asylum crisis response following the EU-Turkey statement and subsequently gained positive coverage by EU policymakers: “Turkey really gained a lot of strategic value in the midst of the crisis in 2015 and Syrian’s status was convenient to make the case that they had protection in Turkey” (translated from Turkish, interview 8, see also Üstübcici, [2019](#)). TP however does not offer a long-term resolution to the issue of displacement and Turkish President Erdoğan often used strategically Syrians on its territory to extract benefits from the EU, at times through cooperation, and at times through threats (Tsourapas, [2019](#); Tolay, [2021](#)). TP is therefore a way to cozy up to the hegemonic power, while keeping alive (i.e. unresolved) leverage over the powerful actor (interview 11). Fitzpatrick has highlighted how regional TP arrangements can be a means for states in the North to deflect to the South (Fitzpatrick, [2000](#)), but for states in the South, it is also a means to manage the North’s expectations and keep a good relation without fully committing to a long-term policy: TP is not a policy shortcoming but a strategic feature, allowing leverage over hegemonic actors to remain unresolved and therefore usable.

Finally, TP allows countries to portray themselves as cooperative partners while stressing moral superiority. Turkey has used this to assert moral strength over Western countries (interview 8, see also Korkut, [2016](#); Tolay, [2021](#); Kaşlı, [2023](#)), while Colombia’s more

discreet approach reflected its dependence on the US but was affirmed more subtly through rhetoric in public discourses (interview 31).

The institution of TP in Colombia and Turkey operates on multiple levels, recognizing and shaping the entanglements between the host country, the country of origin, regional neighbors, and broader hegemonic powers. These entanglements are expressed through people, state institutions, policies, discourse, and symbolic positioning. They create affective connections, including feelings of solidarity, rivalry, pride, anxiety, and resentment, within a hierarchical international space (Grill, 2023; İşleyen, 2023). TP highlights the liminal status of states like Turkey and Colombia, allowing them to challenge and navigate power hierarchies (Schulz, 2021; Rumelili & Suleymanoglu-Kurum, 2017). These findings therefore allow us to see TP as a tool of entangled statehood: a policy instrument that both responds to and actively reproduces entanglement while enabling strategic navigation of international hierarchies.

Conclusion

TP statuses emerged in Turkey and Colombia in the 21st century as a similar response to situations of mass displacement in Syria and Venezuela. A comparative analysis of Turkish and Colombian policies and entanglements permitted us to analyze more broadly the national and international dynamics of displacement politics today and identify a number of novel insights of value for different literatures. It also allows us to come back to the discussion on the normative assessment of TP, as a positive or negative development in the realm of global asylum policies and on the value of TP's normative ambivalence.

The first set of contributions highlights TP's appeal for states seeking to manage displaced populations while balancing domestic and foreign policy concerns. TP offers flexibility and pragmatism, enabling states such as Colombia and Turkey to retain layered forms of control over borders, public opinion, and policymaking, while also projecting a positive international image. In particular, TP has allowed both countries to manage pressure from the Global North by keeping protection levels under their own control (appeasing international actors and domestic audiences alike) while preserving a moral high ground at home and in the region through a discourse of generosity. More than simply a pragmatic compromise between restrictive impulses and humanitarian calls as illustrated in existing literature, TP exemplifies how states mobilize humanitarian discourse as a resource in migration diplomacy and symbolic politics. As such, our analysis also contributes to the discussion of entangled migration states, and highlights how TP is a particularly valuable policy tool to skillfully navigate existing entanglements and international hierarchies. Our research also shows that these political functions of TP rely more on announcement effects than on the actual provision of protection. Although assessing the realities of protection in Turkey and Colombia was beyond this study's scope, the evidence from numerous policy reports suggests a gap between how TP is perceived domestically and internationally (positively) and how it is experienced by Syrians and Venezuelans on the ground (more negatively) (Trompetero, 2022; Tunaboylu, 2024). The attractiveness of TP for states thus lies in this very ambivalence: governments maintain the ability to adjust protection levels up or down according to their interests. Ultimately, state interests prevail over those of displaced populations, and the quality of protection offered is constrained by how much generosity serves the state's political objectives.

The second set of contributions relates to how policies and asylum regulations travel across countries. Colombia's adoption of TP was influenced by Turkey's model, and we documented an unexpected and indirect form of direct policy diffusion. Colombia was open to evaluating other states' displacement responses, and Turkish actors were actively promoting their TP model. Reciprocal missions were organized, but Colombia did not adopt TP immediately. Instead, a later team, only indirectly influenced by the Turkish model, adopted TP in Colombia. Given how salient migration has become in many countries around the world, states observing and learning from one another's migration policies is a key feature of the international system (Freier et al., 2021). But our study also showed how broader global developments in asylum policy between 2014 and 2021, including the European refugee management crisis, restrictive US immigration policies and increasing militarized restrictions on human movement, normalized TP as a positive development, decentered conventional refugee status and lowered asylum standards. This explains how Turkey remained discreet on its adoption of TP in 2011/2014 while Colombia made their TP announcement central to their international image. One state's attitude and behavior towards displaced populations do not simply affect the displaced populations in that locale, but also how other states socialize with one another, and impact displacement politics globally (see also Brumat & Freier, 2023; Freier et al., 2021). From a state perspective, these forms of policy diffusion are often seen as a positive development, providing avenues for learning, adaptation, and the refinement of policy tools. From the perspective of the protection of displaced populations, however, diffusion at both bilateral and global levels signals a negative trend, as it enables states to shift protective responsibilities by entrenching less committed practices. And it normalizes more instrumental approaches to displacement and lower standards within the international system.

Our study reveals a third set of contributions concerning the perceived uniqueness of Turkey's and Colombia's responses to displacement. Discursively, both countries presented their protective engagement as rooted in "special" relationships with Syria and Venezuela, respectively, suggesting that ordinary patterns of state behavior toward displacement did not apply in their cases given their shared history and unique connections. In doing so, they defined themselves against a Western reference point, distinguishing their approaches from the presumed norm of nation-states with fixed borders and bounded national communities. This framing highlights a broader dynamic emphasized in migration studies: that borders are not natural demarcations but intersect with long-standing social, cultural, and economic ties. As research on borderlands shows, these entanglements shape local politics and national policy in both the Global South and the Global North (İşleyen & Qadim, 2023). Understood this way, the similarities between Turkey and Colombia are not anomalies but evidence of a wider global reality of entangled migration states. Their cases thus challenge conventional understandings of migration policies as products of discrete, sovereign units, revealing instead that migration entanglement is not an exception but the very condition of states in the contemporary international system.

Supplementary Information

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Supplementary Material 1

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Author contributions

Marcos Gonzalez and Juliette Tolay both contributed to the design, research and writing of this manuscript.

Data availability

No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

Declarations

Competing interest

The authors declare no competing interests.

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