

RESETTLEMENT AS MASS MOVEMENT:
GOVERNMENTAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
UNITED STATES, CANADA, FRANCE

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Introduction

Refugee movements occur in waves of large and sometimes unpredictable magnitude. In the case of the exodus from Southeast Asia since 1975, the world has witnessed about 1.5 million persons fleeing their homelands in hopes of reaching safety in a receiving country. Few could have anticipated the arduous process which would land the lucky survivors of flight into camps and later in a "third (Western) country" for permanent resettlement. This paper treats two major effects of refugee flight as mass movement as experienced by Canada, United States and France as receiving countries: policies of intake flow and certain aspects of initial stages of resettlement resulting from the types of flow.

Intake Flow

The three countries, United States, Canada and France, all had delegated government officers in the field to establish intake of Southeast Asian refugees according to quotas established by the government of the day from time to time. Because of increasingly massive numbers of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos filling an increasing number of camps in neighbouring countries, Western nations felt considerable pressure to accept ever larger numbers within short periods of time. Accordingly, central government operations and their field staffs encountered formidable difficulties in translating policy into operations sufficiently quickly to adapt to immediate pressures of the plight of Southeast Asian refugees.

In the case of the United States, the annual intake devolved into a monthly quota administered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This result reflected not only administrative convenience, but also the shifting decisions of escalation on the part of the office of the President. The field recruitment of refugees was assumed by members of voluntary agencies (VOLAGS), who were instructed to assure that the monthly quotas were met, regardless of personnel or costs involved. Their task was clearly one of movement of large numbers of people, whose importance in the first instance was one of numbers. (It is to be observed that these workers were very sensitive to the needs of

individual cases. It was common, therefore, for workers from VOLAGS to move people along into a U.S. quota stream as quickly as possible, considering that if special attention were needed, the refugee would be in the best position to receive it by a quick removal to the United States.) Nonetheless, a great deal of individual interviewing did take place, so that backlogs of refugees did occur, while the VOLAG workers could not understand why all their best efforts were not coming to fruition in terms of quota.

For the Canadian cases, two important differences are outstanding: one political, the other operational. As for the political, the government of Canada decided to reinterpret a clause in the new Immigration Act enacted in 1978 so that it would be possible to assign refugee status to persons on a categorical, rather than individual basis. Accordingly, a "Designated Class" category was employed to permit this type of collective, rather than individual determination of status eligibility. This political move was innovative and operationally efficient. As for its innovativeness, the new legislation provided for the definition of designated classes to vary according to circumstances. In the particular case of Indochinese, criteria related to birthplace or most recent origin were sufficient for eligibility to be accepted as refugees in Canada.

With respect to operational efficiency, the "designated class" definition simplified interview procedures in camps. Although the decision relating to admissibility of any particular refugee remained a prerogative of the officer, it was remarkably easier to fill quotas, given this categorical definition. An important difference between the criteria of admission of Indochinese refugees to the United States from those to Canada related to the basis of the eligibility criteria. In the U.S. case, although the criteria and priorities changed three times during the Indochinese refugee intake wave, they all required evidence of some prior (historical) connection of the refugee (family) with the United States such as, former employee, military service, relatives already established in the U.S. No such criteria applied in Canada, which filtered refugees through a modification of the "point qualification" system in effect for immigrants to Canada. Even this "point system" was suggested as useful only as a guide.

In the case of France, the criteria for determination of eligibility were not explicit, although they appeared to be a mixture of the U.S. (historical) and the Canadian (categorical). The Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees of the post-1975 wave were actually a third wave of Indochinese refugees to France. Therefore, historical ties as well as relatives living in France could not be neglected in determining the process of eligibility. Nonetheless, the sheer number of cases requesting acceptance by France forced the government into criteria resembling the categorical definition used explicitly by Canada.

Qualification of the refugee movement as a mass movement in the United States rests to a large extent on the sheer volume of

refugees received, as indicated in Table 1. The case in Canada, and to a lesser extent, France, depends more upon the criteria for admission of refugees. Volumes of refugee intake fluctuated remarkably in Canada from month to month, especially from mid-1979 onward. Those of France remained stable, with the exception of 1981. In all cases, however, it is clear that refugees constituted a mass movement, although the basis for such a phenomenon differed by country.

TABLE

SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEE INTAKE: FRANCE, CANADA, U.S., 1975-1981

	<u>75-76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>Total</u>
France	21,779	,468	12,402	5,378	2,00	2,290	85,318
percent	26%	3%	5%	8%	4%	4%	00%
Canada	7,706	450	724	24,819	35,274	8,774	77,747
percent	10%	* ³	7%	32%	46%	11%	100%
U.S.	74,500 ²	6,000 ²	30,500 ²	2, 26	154,405	150,532	598,063
percent	29%	1%	5%	9%	26%	25%	100%

Sources: France: France Terre d'Asile; Canada: Employment and Immigration Canada; U.S.: Office of Refugee Resettlement, U.S. Department Health and Human Services.

Notes ¹Extrapolations from data often based on fiscal years
²Approximations
³Less than one percent

An important effect of mass movement is the mobilization of public opinion reacting to the influx. Not only were Indochinese refugees members of visible minorities who spoke foreign tongues, their arrival in large numbers created enough public sensation to arouse interests of churches and service organizations in receiving communities, sustain photographic and journalistic attention from the print and electronic news media, as well as sustain attention from governments.

Mass arrivals required no less massive systems for distribution of goods and services to refugees. Not only were the public involved in provision of immediate accommodation for the refugees, they were required to take refugees into account in continuing obligations of school enrolment, social welfare, including cash assistance, adult language classes, and orientation centres for new arrivals. The scale of these activities was sufficient to sustain public attention for several years.

While refugees require deliveries of services immediately in massive proportion, it was necessary to adapt public opinion to the realization that this same population would continue to depend on services and would continue to take part in local community activities for the foreseeable future. In effect, it was necessary for the public to redefine refugees as immigrants, with rights and obligations similar to those of other immigrants in their community. While the term "refugee" remained, for all functional purposes, refugees require from public attention the same accommodation as do other immigrants.

Outcomes

As refugee intake has been cast as a mass movement, it remains during the resettlement process to provide means for individualization for refugees. Eligibility for services for any program delivered by a governmental agency to the refugees is framed on criteria which are standard and universal. Delivery of services often occurs through non-governmental organizations - NGO/VOLAGS - who are then charged with ensuring that the service is delivered in some satisfactory manner. This delivery process requires translation of impersonal, bureaucratic and categorical criteria into a delivery with some degree of adaptability and accommodation to individual cases. Therefore, the role of NGO/VOLAGS can be critical in providing the individual aspect through service delivery. (This statement of principle has been often laid aside or ignored in the face of volumes of requests for services. Levels of services have at times been so heavy that NGO/VOLAGS have themselves turned into referral services, so that the service delivery to refugees becomes as impersonal a task as any other in a mass movement.)

In the face of formidable obstacles to providing the services adaptable to circumstances of individual families, other forms of assistance have been adopted, particularly in the United States in the form of mutual assistance associations. These associations are composed of people of similar ethnic origin, usually refugees

from earlier waves. Concomitant with the development of such associations is the implicit acknowledgement that duly constituted governmental agencies and other representatives of conventional society have been unsuccessful in providing linkages sufficient to change mass movements into individual resocialization experiences. Rather, it appears that governmental organizations and agencies funded by them are more successful in continuing delivery of services on a mass basis.

No less apparent is the implication that the public will continue to view the reception of refugees as a mass movement, rather than as a series of individual experiences of each refugee family. The public response represents a reaction to the most visible aspect of refugee resettlement: service deliveries by government and NGO.

With the increasing escalation of cost of service deliveries, combined with the celebration of unfavourable incidents in the media, public reaction has mounted for the retrenchment of intake and a severe cutback of programs of assistance. In the United States in particular, public resistance has taken the form of legislative action which has progressively curtailed the delivery of services, while stemming the massive influx of refugees, notably those from Southeast Asia.

Public reaction has also redefined the question of refugee intake and resettlement, particularly in the United States but likewise in Canada and, to a lesser extent, France. Questions of "burden sharing", alternative solutions to third country resettlement, repatriation, and temporary asylum have become political watchwords with increasing frequency and political implication. The ascendancy of this type of inquiry into refugee resettlement represents one of the most important developments in government policy. Although each of the three nations has articulated a policy of refugee intake and resettlement, these policies have been juxtaposed to alternatives which emphasize the importance of that particular country divesting itself of certain responsibilities. That these questions should arise at this particular time is not a matter of chance. Rather, they arise as a direct response to the varied pattern of intake and resettlement which has characterized the post-1975 wave of refugee resettlement: the development of refugee resettlement as a mass movement.

By implication, public opinion, reflected through legislative action, informal representations, editorial opinion, and administrative changes has been oriented toward the search for alternatives which heretofore had remained hypothetical.

While all three countries have experienced reaction on the part of the public to refugee intake, the massiveness of the reaction has reached its highest proportion in the United States, most notably through federal legislative inquiry and representation. Yet a similar reaction has been apparent in Canada. Reaction in Canada has been indirect and less formal. Most obviously there has been a withdrawal of public participation

in such forms of activity as offers of sponsorship and various support to refugee work which was forthcoming in 1980 and 1981. Likewise, offers of employment have been extremely slow and couched in terms of "Canadian experience".

Reception Practices: Canada and United States

Not only the recurrent waves of refugee intake but also the complexity and extended duration of problems experienced by refugees in their resettlement process lead to the inescapable conclusion that refugee resettlement will remain as a problem commanding sustained attention by federal governments. Not only are "front loaded" services required for refugees immediately upon arrival, but need for these services is protracted over several years, as evident in the case of Indochinese refugees in the three countries.

Yet with the continuing influx of new waves of refugees, both of Indochinese and, more recently, varied other geographic origins, it is characteristic for governments to regularize the status of refugees to something which guarantees eligibility to certain goods and services, if not the same mix as those available immediately upon arrival. This regularization of status occurs officially through the conferral of citizenship, which is available to refugees within the three-year period in Canada and the United States, and almost immediately in France (for refugees of Indochinese origin only). In the case of the United States and Canada, an intermediate step of "immigrant" intervenes. This step represents a shift in both status of the refugee as well as eligibility for delivery of various services: immigrants are entitled to services awarded to newly-arrived persons in the receiving country but are no longer entitled to special services, e.g., cash assistance, intensive counselling (to which the same people were entitled when occupying the status of "refugee").

Characteristically, the services to which immigrants are entitled are those which are distributed by a variety of governmental agencies, rather than one single, central agency, more characteristic of delivery of services to refugees. In the case of the United States, assistance is funnelled indirectly through assistance programs administered by a variety of departments (Labor, Education, Health and Human Services). In Canada, immigrants are entitled to enriched counselling services and are eligible through various CEIC programs for job training. Yet eligibility for specific financial assistance awarded to newly arrived refugees expires after a maximum of 12 months. In the case of the United States and Canada, eligibility for immigrant assistance programs expires coterminously with the eligibility for application for citizenship.

Reception Practices: France

In contrast to experience in North America, the intake pattern of Southeast Asian refugees in France has occurred rather evenly, with about 12,000 arrivals each year, as indicated in Table 1. It has thus been possible to establish a resettlement scheme which was not forced to alter because of increased influx. Rather, the national government has set a co-ordination of NGO and local governmental services which has resulted in a standardized pattern of service delivery upon arrival.

Accordingly, refugee resettlement is considered a government responsibility which is assumed unless a refugee specifically "opts out" by making alternative arrangements immediately upon arrival (e.g., by living with a relative already established in France). Otherwise, refugees are placed in residential centres (centre d'hébergement) for a period of four to six months. While there, refugees receive orientation and sometimes a rudimentary skills training supplied by permanent staff at the local centre with French language training provided throughout France by a single NGO (CIMADE).

The local community plays specific roles in adaptation from the outset. First, in a continuing series of consultations with the coordinating NGO (France Terre d'Asile), the local préfecture allocates the number of refugees it wishes to receive from time to time. This negotiated decision is based upon the prospective situation for employment and the degree of receptivity which is judged to exist in the local community. Likewise, the mayor's office judges whether the local community services, especially the schools, can absorb within their existing resources the number of refugees proposed by the NGO.

During initial months, refugees are only peripherally involved in the activities in the local communities: their school-age children attend local schools, and refugees shop and move about in the community, although the centre provides meals and furnished quarters for all families. Their involvement increases during the fourth month after arrival, as counsellors attempt to place the refugees in jobs nearby. Once employed with income sufficient to provide for household necessities, refugees move out of the local centre into private housing.

Refugees encounter several types of obstacles during the course of their transition from residential centre to adaptation in the local community. For the first time after a period of more than four months residence in France, they are expected to participate as individuals or as members of family units, rather than as a member of a refugee group, for whom services are routinely delivered.

During the early years of the Southeast Asian influx (1977-1980), refugees encountered an openness during their adaptation process in the communities. Their adaptation was facilitated by relatively easy job placement. More recently, however, in the transition from collective to private life, job placements have

been more difficult to locate, resulting in "unemployment shock". Refugees have been required to develop, yet a second time since their homeland departure, a set of "survival tactics" during this transition (Simon-Barouh, 1981).

Limited means are available for these tactics: one-time allocation allowances are available for initial household expenditures. Both the quantity and quality of resources have failed to meet the needs of most refugees, so that they often seek the assistance of social service centres for supplementary material assistance.

Ethnically homogeneous groups have spontaneously formed in local communities among earlier-arrived refugees in order to assist their counterparts who are currently making the transition. Until 1981, such groups could have no officially recognized status, as statutory law (Loi-Association, 1901) forbade the establishment of any groups unless French nationals made up more than half the membership, and all of the group's executive. This law has now been repealed. Currently, such groups range from informal friendship groups through more formally constituted mutual assistance associations which provide an alternate information and resource network. These are the only groups to offer language instruction for children in order to preserve homeland cultural heritage (Simon-Barouh, 1981). They receive no funding from government sources.

In order to provide a wider set of linkages, several communities established a system of host families (groupes d'accueil). Each host family is to be assigned to one specific refugee family. Ordinarily, the host family would provide a personalized welcome, assistance in establishment of household, furnishings and financial supplement. Collectively, the local group provides French language instruction, especially for women unable to attend formal class instruction because of family responsibilities. Supported by media publicity, these groups flourished initially, especially in regions north of Paris.

More recently, because of organizational problems of matching and the disappearance of attention from the media, these community initiatives have withered (Robineau, 1981). Consequently, the adaptation process has been considerably slowed. Refugees have remained at the residential centres for longer periods (often more than six months instead of the conventional limit of four). Upon eventual departure they have resorted in greater number and more frequently to established social services for assistance (Lanphier, 1983).

For young people, the educational system has provided both challenges and resolutions for adaptation problems. On the positive side, the school provides both an organizational link to the community as well as an occasion for inter-cultural interaction. Yet the degree of intervention of the school in adaptation is blunted by an important difference in expectations of psychological orientation of the students. Whereas the Western school system is predicated upon expressiveness and openness of

exchange of personal desires and ambitions, the Southeast Asian adolescent finds such expressiveness foreign to his or her own socialization.

Rather, ideals inspired by Confucian orientation enforce an internalization of self-control which blocks overt expression of emotions and even of aspirations. Moreover, many young refugees feel a sense of guilt for leaving a number of relatives behind in camp or in the homeland. Relief of this guilt is difficult, for the youth cannot directly assist his or her kin; often communication between the youth and kin has been interrupted for long periods. Uncertainty as to the situation of kin exacerbates whatever initial sense of guilt had been internalized (Farache, 1984).

In such circumstances, young refugees do not respond quickly to the school system's conventional teaching methods. Rather, both community and refugees endure a prolongation of transitional adaptation to life in France. Of necessity, the attainment of skills training and higher education has been correspondingly halting.

The plan of collective resettlement centres eases financial outlay both for refugees and private sponsors. It allows recently-arrived refugees a certain period of adjustment to a new country, customs and language without encountering other difficulties entailed in immediate adaptation. In principle, the somewhat elongated period of transition should result in a relatively speedy adaptation upon leaving. Recent experience has indicated contrariwise, owing both to the elevated rate of unemployment as well as to the persistent problems of resocialization and organization of household and family life. Instead of being mitigated, the commencement of resolution appears to be forestalled until community life begins. Attempts to bridge the transition have not realized their intended goals both for organizational reasons and those attributable to a decline of public awareness.

Secondary Migration

As is characteristic of mass migratory movements, settlement has clustered despite attempts on the part of all three governments to distribute Southeast Asian refugees widely throughout their territories. In France, counsellors at the centres d'hébergement search for job opportunities or training programs within the radius circumscribed by the local département. If successful placement does not eventuate from these searches, the refugees seek to join friends or kin in the Paris region, more likely in one particular quartier, Porte d'Italie, which is estimated to be the residence of nearly a third of the most recent wave (Personal communication, social workers, Service social d'aide aux émigrants).

In the U.S., the movement of Southeast Asian refugees fairly early toward California has resulted in some 37 percent of all Southeast Asian refugees living there by current estimates, of

which Orange County alone counts about half that proportion (Refugee Reports, IV, 1983). This concentration has occurred partly as a result of initial placement, in which earlier-arrived refugees sponsored relatives to join them.

Estimates of concentration due to secondary migration are even less firm in Canada. More frequently, Southeast Asian refugees have moved away from rural areas to urban destinations and from the Atlantic provinces to Ontario. Disproportionate concentrations had been reported in Toronto by 1983, with about half again as many as expected proportionally -- 15 percent of the total contrasted with an expected 10 percent. Two possible reasons explain a less retarded secondary migratory movement in Canada. Firstly, with a more recent wave (beginning in 1979 rather than in 1975), fewer earlier arrivals have established roots sufficiently to serve as poles of attraction to date. Secondly, higher rates of unemployment throughout Canada have severely hampered easy entrance into the occupational structure. Chances for recently-arrived refugees finding employment in cities where they have no background or alternative sources of support during a protracted period of job search are known to be extremely narrow. Yet in all likelihood, secondary migration will increase markedly in Canada among Southeast Asian refugees in the very near future, both as economic conditions ameliorate slightly and as kin and friendship ties proliferate.

Ethnic and Class Awareness

In the longer term of refugee resettlement, collective activities of (former) refugees may be directed in two avenues: ethnic identity and activities and class-based activity. While in the first instance, refugees, especially Indochinese, are ethnically distinct from other minorities already established in North America, in France, the distinctiveness relates more to the "vintage" of arrival, as the post-1970 wave of Indochinese refugees represents the third major wave of Indochinese resettlement in France. Yet ethnic distinctiveness remains as a potential type of activity which may be sustained in the receiving country. Correspondingly, a definition of ethnic distinctiveness must emerge as a precondition. This distinctiveness is sustained and reinforced by frequent interaction among members of the homogeneous minority in endeavours of common action.

It is possible for the receiving society to minimize or to encourage this distinctiveness through selective support of programs which permit the diffusion of ethnic culture. By implication, it is possible to feature ethnic identity as a distinctive trait of a particular cohort of refugees through the provision of facilities for the maintenance of cultural identity; such as heritage language classes, folklore groups, physically separate cultural centres, proclamation of holidays, and by support of benevolent or mutual assistance associations. By implication, a diminution or withdrawal of financial and institutional support for these activities minimizes the distinctiveness of the particular ethnic minority in public perception.

An important variant of the support of ethnic identity is the formation of cross-cultural centres which serve as a base for several ethnic minorities simultaneously. Such an option underlines the pluralistic nature of the receiving society; it also underscores to the particular refugee cohort that its members represent only one distinctive minority among several others.

In many instances ethnic distinctiveness is not a central feature of social life, especially in the work-related sector. As employment is primarily based on skill level, the scope for ethnic favouritism or brokerage by ethnic "middle men" is often very narrow. To the extent that employment becomes a key feature of the life of refugees during their longer-term resettlement process, they are required to compete ever more steadfastly with other job applicants in the receiving society who are similar to them in skill level and socio-economic background but whose ethnic origins are varied. As high rates of unemployment and under-employment have characterized lives of Indochinese refugees to an inordinate extent in recent years, it is quite likely that preoccupation of labour force engagement and workforce attachment and mobility become ever more salient features, not only to individual job applicants, but collectively to refugees as a disfranchised minority.

Lacking sufficient employment and opportunities for diversification or mobility, it is likely that refugees may develop a class awareness, as being deprived of the crucial means to acquisition of goods and services. Moreover, lack of training facilities further reinforces the inevitability of unemployment or under-employment in situations where their prior training is either maladaptive, ignored, or wanting. As a result, a refugee cohort can become a component of the overall class structure of a society within a few years after arrival. The situation of a mobile but untrained workforce leads inevitably to the position of this cohort as the lowest class in the social structure.

It is too early to characterize the degree of class awareness, or indeed ethnic awareness, among refugees from the post-1975 wave in any receiving country. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate upon possible pressures toward the development of ethnic awareness and class awareness in the three countries under discussion. In this sense, the following typology is speculative and relates to longer-term prospects, rather than to the inevitability of delayed development of one particular type of awareness or another.

For the United States, the pressures for the development of class awareness are considerably greater than corresponding pressures of ethnic awareness.

As rates of unemployment reach higher-than-average proportions and training facilities are available only in limited number and array, there are no mitigating factors to withstand the development of class consciousness among refugees. This consciousness is reinforced by friendship and more formally, if

potentially, by mutual assistance associations, all of which are ethnically homogeneous while representing compatriots who are in similar difficulties of unemployment or under-employment. Present indicators suggest that refugees have no particular advantage over any other recently arrived persons of similar skill level. Job creation initiatives are directed more towards the incorporation of additional numbers of workers in an ongoing labour market, rather than specifically to accommodate needs of refugees who require substantial amounts of instruction both in the English language and in certain skills. If refugees develop a collective awareness of their economic difficulties, the assumption of a position in the class structure as being systematically deprived of access to the means of gaining a livelihood would follow almost inevitably.

In Canada, Indochinese refugees confront a labour market with similarly narrow job openings, insufficient to satisfy the needs of large numbers of refugees who are seeking livelihood. Reasons offered for their lack of quick adaptability, and consequently eligibility, for employment are quite similar to those in the United States: lack of facility in the language of work and insufficient or inappropriate skills. Canada has, like the United States, job-creation programs to adapt employment opportunities to workers whose qualifications may otherwise be insufficient. Yet eligibility for employment in these programs rests on general qualifications quite independent of ethnic background. From this perspective, the employment chances are similarly bleak.

The Canadian policy of multiculturalism stands as a counterweight, formally at least, in the development of exclusive class awareness. Rather, the multiculturalism policy, which fosters the development of heritage language classes and folkloric activities, including publication of materials in the native language, can serve as a conduit for the development of an ethnic awareness which may exist alongside an awareness of class and restrained life chances. As these activities have not surfaced to date in remarkable degree among cohorts of refugees, it is too early to determine whether these policies will result in a formation of ethnic consciousness which may either compete with class consciousness as a basis of social solidarity or indeed dampen the exclusivity of class consciousness as a basis of such solidarity. In any event, ethnic awareness remains as a potential development alongside the development of class awareness among refugees in Canadian society as a whole.

In Quebec, a special case may be advanced for the greater emphasis of ethnic awareness. Shortly after the arrival of Indochinese refugees in 1979 in Quebec, their activities were incorporated in pluri-ethnic centres as an important feature (holidays, religious activities). These activities have gained a certain degree of public-visibility and have been supported actively both by federal and, more particularly, provincial government sources. Although the problems of unemployment and lack of training facilities in Quebec leave refugees with a higher-than-average incidence of serious problems in the workworld, as grave as those elsewhere in North America, the

length of support for the development of ethnic awareness appears to be greater in Quebec than elsewhere. Given the opportunities for sustained interaction among Indochinese during language instruction, the opportunities are available for the institutionalization of cultural patterns alongside those of other cultural groups in Quebec.

Indochinese refugees in France have experienced similar problems of under- and unemployment as they have in other nations. Moreover, the reasons for this situation resemble those in North America: severe limitations in the language of work and insufficient or maladaptive prior training. Similarly, France has instituted language training programs especially for refugees (whose duration is shorter than those available in Canada). Training programs for refugees follow an elaborate system for all untrained workers, which involves a two-step staging: "preformation" and "formation". In principle, these soundly planned educational programs would provide an excellent means for adaptability for refugees to the French labour market. To date, however, these educational programs have been offered only in the region of Paris, and then only partially. Effectively, refugees in France face the same difficulties in securing training for eligibility to compete for remunerative and career-oriented jobs as do their counterparts in North America.

Culturally, refugees, as well as members of all ethnic minorities, have only recently gained the potential for the formation of ethnically distinct benevolent or mutual assistance associations. Until 1981, provisions of "Loi 1901" have disallowed the formation of any groups, the majority of whom were not French nationals. Thus, until very recently, it has been impossible for members of any ethnic origin to form a group with self-determination and a corporate life of its own. Publications and literature in the several Indochinese languages have likewise been slow to appear. Materials in Vietnamese and Cambodian are available from one centre in Paris. Its resources are severely strained due to insufficient funding, so that it can respond to the needs only of those who assiduously seek out such materials. In balance, the pressures for the development of class consciousness are not counterweighed by any strong forces toward ethnic awareness. While such forces may develop in the future, there appears to be no active policy on the part of the government of the day to initiate or animate such activities. Rather, they will have to be forthcoming from the ranks of small numbers of intellectuals and popularizers whose capacity to sustain cultural activities is obviously limited.

Summary

Refugee resettlement has increasingly taken the form of mass movements in the major receiving countries. In an analysis of policies and practices in the United States, Canada, and France, the mass movement has been handled somewhat differently. The United States has developed practices for extremely large volumes of refugees which perforce have to be processed through

standardized procedures. Canada and France have more moderate volume, so that resettlement practices are more individualized, following upon determination of eligibility for selection by categoric means.

Public opinion exerts considerable force upon the determination of refugee policy in the United States, especially with considerable input from the legislative branch -- House of Representatives and Senate. Canada's sources of public input are less numerous and focussed on specific questions, e.g., consultation on levels of refugee acceptance and resettlement strategy with provincial and NGO delegates. By contrast, public opinion in France is funnelled narrowly through a single coordinating committee, with all decisions being taken centrally. Given the variety in degree of public opinion stridency, differences occur with respect to effects: while it appears that all public opinion is urging for a cutback in service deliveries, these have been most notably and keenly felt and acted upon in the United States. While cutbacks have also occurred in Canada and France, the effects have been less dramatic and slower in implementation. Nowhere are the differences more sharply witnessed than in changes in level of intake, where the U.S. has undertaken the sharpest reduction, followed by a notable but less severe reduction of intake in Canada. As for France, the level of intake has barely been disturbed over a period of eight years.

With respect to outcomes, the United States has searched for alternate solutions to resettlement, insisting upon "burden sharing" among other resettlement countries. Resettlement has been phased over a longer period, with a protracted reprocessing experience prior to entry in the United States. Moreover, the United States has lobbied in the United Nations and elsewhere for alternate solutions to allow the United States to divest itself of its formerly extremely large volume. While Canada has followed a similar path, it has differed in that it has been sensitive more to domestic considerations than the policies of other nations with respect to resettlement. France, similarly has focussed on domestic concerns in the resolution of resettlement problems, with the intake pattern of other nations having little bearing upon France's own conduct.

outcomes are salient in the medium term:

1. Refugee resettlement as a continuing problem for government. The Indochinese case has demonstrated a protracted course of resettlement, with the status "refugee" being transformed to that of "immigrant" and finally to that of "citizen". In the process, rights and obligations are redefined, with the gradual tapering of front-loaded delivery of goods and services. While Canada's redefinition closely resembles that of the United States, France avoids the intermediate step, with citizenship being made available immediately. It has been necessary to channel funds indirectly to persons formerly occupying "refugee" status through a variety of government departments under schemes which are available to

immigrants or to the public at large. Yet (former refugees continue to receive disproportionate amounts of these services.

2. Ethnic and class awareness. It is hypothesized that in the longer term, refugees resettled in the United States and to a lesser extent in France will develop a sense of class consciousness, owing to unusually high levels of unemployment and the absence of training facilities. The sense of lack of access to goods and services leaves refugees with a sense of deprivation which is easily translatable into class consciousness.

While in Canada, refugees face similar barriers to full employment and training, the sense of class awareness is mitigated and juxtaposed to ethnic consciousness, which is fostered through policies of multiculturalism and the provision of heritage language classes and materials in the native language. In Quebec, pluri-ethnic centres have incorporated cultural activities for Indochinese refugee groups since arrival. There, the ethnic awareness forces are especially strong. Thus, ethnic awareness may emerge as strong as class awareness in Canada, especially in Quebec.

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