Military Finance and the Earl of Essex's Regular Army: 1642-1644

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~ **Abstract** ~

The purpose of this dissertation is to accurately identify, categorize, and describe a large and previously unexplored portion of the Long Parliament's military spending during the period before the creation of the New Model Army. Specifically, it focuses on the money and the administrative machinery that was used to construct and support the central government's first regular army, a force that was placed under the immediate command of the third earl of Essex.

A collection of important works have shown us how the English civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century were, in many ways, a decentralized series of phenomena in which local communities armed and waged war against both themselves and outsiders. However, from the outset the revolutionary central government at Westminster played a crucial role by legitimizing and facilitating a concerted, nationwide struggle against the king and his friends. It accomplished this by issuing parliamentary ordinances concerning taxation and strategy, and by providing a centralized hub for money and other military resources. This dissertation integrates a new financial and administrative history of Essex's army into this broader picture by developing and deploying a new organizational taxonomy of civil war armies. Furthermore, it shows how this taxonomy can be used to help shed new light on the messy evolution of what Michael Braddick and others have termed the 'fiscal-military state' in the British context.

For my parents,

George and Diane

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All of the photographs included in this document were taken by me at either the National Archives of the United Kingdom or the Parliamentary Archives at Westminster. Both organizations have given me their kind permission to include these images in my finished dissertation.

T. Crawshaw
Ottawa, Ontario
June 2013

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Introduction: The English Fiscal-Military State, 1625-1642

~ State Formation and Military Organization in Civil-War England ~

The purpose of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of English military organization and finance during the civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century. Specifically, its function is to provide a comprehensive analysis of both the administrative machinery and the sums of money that were used to create and support the parliamentarian army that fought under the direct command of the third earl of Essex from 1642 to 1644. Why is this desirable? On the most basic level it is because the conflicts that tore through the islands of Britain and Ireland during the 1640s and 50s led to a dramatic increase in the military capabilities of the English government, capabilities that were later unleashed to devastating effect in a variety of international contexts. During the civil wars, however, these capabilities – such as they then existed in all three Stuart kingdoms – were relatively weak and severely fragmented. In the most practical sense this fragmentation manifested itself in the successive creation and destruction of many different armies on all sides. Significantly, most of these armies remained organizationally and administratively distinct, even when they existed concurrently and fought alongside one another. This is because the powerful men who created them frequently used very different means to construct and maintain them. Some, such as the Irish and Scottish forces commanded by the marquess of Montrose, were composed of men bound closely together by familial interests and quasi-feudal loyalty. Others, such as

the English forces that fought under Sir William Waller, were disordered and unreliable agglomerations of unrelated military units fused together for expediency's sake – armies designed to respond to a particular crisis, or to fill a strategic vacuum. As a result of this confused situation, none of these organizations can, properly speaking, be thought of as the 'national' army of any one of the three Stuart kingdoms. What's more, on an individual level most of them had a very limited impact on the broader shape of politics and government after the wars were over. Nevertheless, I contend that the inner mechanics of each of them can tell us something useful about the practical machinery of the civil wars, the changing nature of organized violence in Britain and Ireland during the mid-seventeenth century, and/or the evolution of English military power during that period. Essex's army, I argue, is especially interesting in all three regards.

Again, the profusion of British and Irish armies during the 1640s and 50s tells us that the most practical and coercive powers of early-Stuart government were easily shattered when subjected to the stresses of full-blown civil war. But crucially, it is important to understand that this fundamental brittleness was not only a product of the chaos produced by the wars themselves; rather, it was also caused by the type of political, social, and financial authority that existed within the Stuart multiple monarchy before 1642. Understanding the basic patterns of this pre-war authority is therefore a primary concern of anyone wishing to know how and why the wars manifested themselves as they did, and how exactly the practice of war-making changed as a result these conflicts. But how best might we explore these various patterns of authority in this context?

Recently, the examination of the changing nature of European government during the early-modern period has often taken place within a wider academic discussion concerning 'state formation' – an intriguing and useful term that usually implies a steady accretion and formalization of elite power in fewer and more centralized hands. In the English context, one of the most interesting and accessible works pertaining to 'state formation' is a book written by Michael Braddick, a scholar who has concerned himself with the changing manifestations of governance during the 'long' seventeenth century.[1] Ultimately, Braddick's ideas are of tremendous use to those of us interested in military organization during the civil wars. This is because he employs a useful toolbox of concepts and terms that allows us to discuss the development of English finance and warfare in a broader thematic context, and in a coherent and transparent fashion. Specifically, his work reintroduces an historical 'grand narrative' – a conceptual tool that allows us to situate the convulsions of the period within a wider chronological framework that describes and explains the growing power and sophistication of government in general.

Unlike older, academically obsolete 'grand narratives' such as the Whig and Marxist models, however, Braddick's overarching framework does not founder because of an assumed teleology of historical development. Rather, it allows for the importance of play and contingency in the historical process by emphasizing the formative role of the intense, ever-present negotiation that took place between the various categories of the

[1] Michael J. Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England c.1550-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

governors and the governed. The ever-increasing reach and grasp of government was, in this model, the product of improvised, collective responses by interested parties to a specific series of very different challenges and crises. For example, according to Braddick, the civil wars that destroyed Charles I were a major cause of the vastly increased financial and military capabilities of the English government at the end of the seventeenth century. However, this entire discussion is to be understood within the context of a larger process of state formation – a notion that for Braddick encompasses four 'crystallizations'[2] of political power, only one of which pertains to 'fiscal-military' matters. Indeed, the English government developed other, non-military powers of equal importance in response to additional problems and threats to the existing order. These powers included the capacity to regulate and direct social, confessional, and mercantile behavior. Ultimately, then, the appeal of Braddick's 'grand narrative' resides in its promise to reintegrate social, cultural, economic, and military history by providing the practitioners of each with a common frame of reference: the evolution and growth of the state and its manifold capabilities. But how exactly are we to define such an amorphous and multi-capable entity? What, exactly, was this thing called 'the state'?

For Braddick, the early-modern incarnation of the English state was, in the simplest of terms, the thing produced by the country's various social and economic elites whenever they acted in a political capacity.[3] More precisely, it appeared and exerted itself

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[2] *Ibid.*, 428.

[3] *Ibid.* Braddick's given definition of the state first appears on page 6, and is as follows: ". . . a coordinated and territorially bounded network of agents exercising political power . . .".

whenever and wherever these men exercised certain enhanced authority that was typically granted to them via the possession of a public office. These offices offered their bearers enhanced authority because the powers they conveyed were considered prescribed, familiar, or acceptable by the majority of the bearers' superiors, peers, and subordinates. They also served to coordinate the political behavior of these otherwise disconnected actors. This was because the enhanced authority they conveyed – again, delivered via a greater, more widely-recognized sense of legitimacy – typically restricted certain political behaviors that might otherwise have advanced the personal interests of the office-holder, narrowly defined.[4] Regardless, however, this kind of office-holding should not be taken as evidence for 'bureaucracy' – a system that situates all political power in offices. This is because the powers that were conveyed by the offices of state in early-modern England were not entirely 'differentiated' from the personal powers that were wielded by those who might occupy them.[5] What this means, of course, is that not just anyone could occupy (and acquire the powers of) any office. In fact, there was often a very narrow range of socially-acceptable candidates.

Naturally, this is a very broad and nebulous definition of the state, and the adoption of it has certain important conceptual ramifications that concern us here. In the first place, this definition does not rely on the appearance or ongoing existence of specific or narrowly-defined offices or institutions. Neither does it depend on a predetermined

[4] It was in this sense that the developing state acquired 'autonomy', or the *appearance* of independent agency: i.e., it began to 'want' and 'do' things that were not necessarily beneficial to individual office-holders in certain contexts. *Ibid.*, 90-95.
[5] *Ibid.*, 21, 25-27.

formula pertaining to the relative importance of 'central' versus 'local' political power, though – as we shall soon see – it is often useful to disentangle and juxtapose central and local manifestations of state power in early-modern England. Instead, 'the state' is understood to be the term used to refer to coherent but nevertheless protean networks of political office-holders whose enhanced legitimacy could be harnessed and deployed to meet certain objectives or respond – in some capacity – to certain challenges. Again, during the 1640s most of these challenges were military in nature.

Here I shall argue that Essex's rebel army – as one of the most important of the variously composed armies that fought for the Long Parliament during the first civil war in England – should be viewed as an interesting and important case study in the evolutionary history of the English 'fiscal-military state'. Specifically, I will demonstrate how and why the army occupied the position that it did within the Long Parliament's totally unprecedented fiscal-military arrangement, an arrangement that was riven by political disagreements, and by the profusion of parochial military organizations in southeastern England before the rise of the New Model Army. Additionally, I will argue that an intense study of its finances proves that it enjoyed a closer administrative relationship to the sovereign centre of power than any of its contemporaries, although the practical benefits of this privileged position deteriorated over time. Ultimately, I contend that coming to a full understanding of the nature of this special relationship, which can be described by a relatively simple taxonomical term, is important for those interested in the changing manifestations of state power during this time. This is because it anticipated the

sort of direct relationship that (imperfectly) bound the New Model to the parliamentary sovereign after 1645 – a type of relationship that many readers will recognize as 'modern' in appearance. But before we can begin our exploration of all of that it is necessary to describe the basic contours of the fiscal-military arrangement that prevailed before the wars.

~ The Caroline Fiscal-Military Arrangement in England: The State at Peace ~

During the reign of Charles I the heart of the English government was essentially royal. That is to say the king controlled all of the major organs of the state through the appointment of a small handful of extremely powerful men to offices of supreme political and administrative importance. In this sense the Crown was truly sovereign, for these offices were the only legitimate vehicle for the exercise of executive power, and no man came to them (or retained them) except by royal approval and favor. Nevertheless, the nature of English society at that time made it impossible for the king to govern effectively with complete freedom of political action. That society was, of course, profoundly hierarchical, and the men who inhabited its upper strata wielded enormous influence that was neither born of the king's immediate gift, nor safe for him to ignore and subsequently alienate. Similarly, below the lofty heights of the king's Privy Council and the great peers who jockeyed for a spot within the inner executive were the classes of men whose social and economic powers were much more limited, but whose cooperation was nevertheless vital to the smooth operation of the state in its widest geographic sense. This was because the king's central government – though byzantine, arcane, and

expensive[6] – employed no paid agents who were capable of independently executing the royal will at the local level throughout the king's English territories. Instead, local elites, like the great peers at Court and/or on the Privy Council, exercised state power via lesser offices of state that enhanced their own preexisting social and economic authority by making them part of the 'king's government', a participatory act that 'embodied' the state in practice via a hybridization of 'public' and 'private' authority operating simultaneously within each of the upper levels of England's social and economic hierarchy.[7]

And yet despite the Crown's need to rely on the willing, mutually-advantageous cooperation of the lesser elites throughout England, it would be wrong to downplay or underestimate its enormous intrinsic powers. Some of these powers existed in the mind of the subject, notions that comprised the bedrock of seventeenth-century thinking. These included the ideological, moral, and religious concepts that both relied upon and perpetuated the importance and unimpeachable centrality of the monarch in English government and public life. Others, however, were very much based in cold, hard, measurable reality. Arguably, the most important of these included the powers Braddick ascribes to the evolving state apparatus in its 'fiscal-military' capacities. Let us now briefly tour the 'fiscal' side of things by considering the amounts of money – the

[6] G.E. Aylmer, *The King's Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), chapters 2 and 4 generally.
[7] Braddick, *State Formation*, 16-46.

indispensable lifeblood of war – that were drawn into the king's own coffers at the political centre during the pre-war years.

In Charles I's time the Crown had access to several different sources of revenue. Naturally, of course, both the precise roster and relative value of these sources were subject to great changes over the course of his reign. In general, however, it is possible to create a reasonably accurate and useful abstraction of the king's pre-war revenues using several broad but taxonomically significant categories. To begin with, some of the Crown's revenues were 'private' in the sense that they were tied to things like the sale of Crown assets and the income derived from the king's own landed estates – estates that he held as an individual member of the nation's highest social elite. Other sources were ostensibly 'public' in the sense that they were derived from the king's particular 'state office' as the crowned sovereign head. Broadly speaking, the king's 'public' revenues can be thought of as falling into two sub-categories based on the type and breadth of the authority that was used to raise them. The first of these sub-categories comprised monies that were levied and provided to the sovereign by lesser office-holders after the king had consulted with the wider political nation via a parliament. The second were monies that were often levied in the same cooperative manner as parliamentary revenues (that is to say, by lesser office-holders), but which were exacted solely on the king's own 'public' – or 'prerogative' – authority.

Functionally speaking, it is accurate to refer to both sorts of 'public' revenue as 'taxes', although from a political point of view some scholars (and indeed some

contemporaries) would not be comfortable using this word when referring to the 'prerogative' revenues.[8] Also, it is important to understand that both types of tax revenues can be further subdivided into two additional sub-categories. These sub-categories identify the taxpayer's relationship to the revenue streams in question. In the first place, those taxes that were levied on individuals as a result of certain predetermined criteria are referred to as 'direct' taxes. Examples of direct taxation during the reign of Charles I include the parliamentary subsidy and the king's Ship Money scheme. The first of these was, of course, parliamentary in nature, while the second was levied solely (and controversially) on the king's prerogative authority. On the other hand, those taxes which were levied on economic transactions – regardless of who participated in them – are known as 'indirect taxes'. The kingdom's various customs duties are the most important example of indirect taxation during the early seventeenth century. Significantly, some of these duties were levied on the basis of parliamentary consent, and some were levied on the king's authority alone.[9]

Figure 0.1 uses all of these categories to provide a graphic depiction of the Crown's annualized income during the pre-war years. Here the relative power of the king's own authority in the matter of public state revenues can be readily seen and appreciated. Specifically, the chart demonstrates the relatively small amount of money that was raised with the consent of an English parliament during Charles's effective rule.

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[8] Michael J. Braddick, *The nerves of state: Taxation and the financing of the English state, 1558-1714* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 14.
[9] *Ibid.*, chapter three, passim.

Here these monies are presented as white slices of the pie. On the surface this breakdown may not appear surprising, considering the fact that the king chose to rule without parliaments for more than a decade during the period in question. However, the financial impact of the personal rule appears to be minimal in this regard. We know this because parliamentary taxation – both direct and indirect – amounted to less than a third of Crown revenues under both Elizabeth and James as well.[10]

Figure 0.1
Annualized Crown Revenues, 1626-1640 (£)
(Source: Braddick, *Nerves of State*, Tables 1.1 and 1.3)



[10] *Ibid.*,Table 1.3.

Altogether, then, the Crown's various sources of income yielded approximately £800,000 per annum, 75 per cent of which was levied by the immediate authority of the king, and 80 per cent of which can be considered, for all practical purposes, the fruits of various forms of taxation. This is a formidable sum indeed. Unfortunately, the king's various liabilities were equally mountainous, and not all of these monies were available to him in these amounts during each and every one of these years. To begin with, it should be noted that the fruits of direct parliamentary taxation were not supposed to be used to support the 'ordinary' operation of the king's government; instead, they were typically seen as special or 'extraordinary' grants that were supposed to meet some specific and pressing financial need, typically the cost of a foreign war.[11] During periods of peace the Crown had to do without such monies. That being said, Charles did manage to successfully (and again controversially) collect the fruits of indirect parliamentary taxation – monies derived from a specific part of the customs revenues known as 'tonnage and poundage' – throughout the 'personal rule' of the 1630s.[12] But all told, the king's annual income averaged just £618,000 during the first half of that decade, a period of peace that predated the introduction of Ship Money. Unfortunately, his expenditure averaged about £636,000 per annum during the same period.[13]Where did all of this money go? In the first place, we need to remember that the Crown did not succeed in balancing its books every year. Huge debts accrued as a result, and many of the king's

[11] *Ibid.*, 4-5.
[12] *Ibid.*, 51-53.
[13] Aylmer, *King's Servants*, 64 and 248.

'ordinary' revenues (i.e. – both his 'private' and ever-evolving 'prerogative' income) were heavily mortgaged and/or directly assigned to a myriad of creditors.[14] The single largest drain, however, was probably the 'standing' cost of the royal government itself.

Again, the nature of the English state – an organism that relied heavily on the combined 'public'/'private' authority of a large number of central and parochial elites – meant that the king could not govern alone, even at the political centre, and even if he was largely (or indeed totally) free of parliamentary interference in matters of revenue. In his exhaustive survey of Charles I's 'civil service' Gerald Aylmer has estimated that the king's central government cost the Crown approximately £350,000 per annum during the 1630s, a sum that represents roughly 50 per cent of the Crown's annual expenses as described above. Significantly, more than one half of this total was consumed by annuities, pensions, and 'diet' – that is to say, money that the Crown spent on daily meals for its great and lesser officers and their many personal clients.[15] More than anything else, perhaps, this sobering statistic illustrates the overriding importance – by laying out the real and relative monetary cost to the Crown – of the highly ritualized social interactions that allowed the early-modern English state to function at the highest and most

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[14] Aylmer, *King's Servants*, 67. Aylmer informs us that in July 1635 the king's debts amounted to almost two full years' gross revenue. For a detailed survey of the Crown's outstanding liabilities at that time consult Frederick C. Dietz, *English Public Finance, 1485-1641*, vol.2 (London: Franck Cass and Co., 1964), 270-271. For a closer look at the king's 'private' revenues in relation to the nation's rapidly evolving indirect tax revenues in December 1641 consult Conrad Russell, *Unrevolutionary England, 1603-1642* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1990), 165-176.

[15] Aylmer, *King's Servants*, Table 12, p.249. On the eyebrow-raising logistics of feeding the court consult pp.168-172.

centralized levels. Unfortunately for the taxpayer, however, even this huge sum was not enough to make the central government work.

Most of the Crown's office-holders received a stipendiary Fee[16] from the king (sums which are included in the £350,000-per-annum figure quoted above); however, a major part of the appeal of office-holding was the additional personal income that could be had via 'user fees' and gratuities – sums that, when combined with the Crown's stipendiary Fees, made such offices very valuable in both a social and a monetary sense.[17] Although these fees were clearly of vital importance to the smooth operation of the state at the political centre, it is notoriously difficult to accurately measure their combined annual value. This is, of course, because no part of this 'dark figure'[18] appears on either side of the Crown's own ledgers. Nevertheless, one of Aylmer's great achievements was his work in doing just this.[19] According to his calculations, the fees and gratuities that made Charles I's central government work cost the subject between £250,000 and £400,000 per annum during the 1630s, sums that, even by the most conservative estimates, would have been impossible for the Crown to replace with additional stipendiary Fees derived from its 'ordinary' revenues. As a result, even the Crown's most central organs of government remained deeply cooperative ventures on the most practical of levels. In short, even though the king commanded the majority of the state's very

[16] *Ibid.*, 160. For the sake of clarity, Aylmer always refers to 'Fees' paid by the Crown with a capital 'F'. Those 'fees' that the subject paid directly to office holders he always identifies with a lower-case 'f'.
[17] This naturally meant that there was a brisk traffic in offices. However, the Crown itself never became systematically dependent on the proceeds of such sales. See *ibid.*, 226.
[18] The term 'dark figure' in this context is Braddick's. See Braddick, *Nerves of state*, 24.
[19] Aylmer, *King's Servants*, Table 11, p.246.

considerable revenues via his own enormous 'prerogative' powers, these were only just barely enough to fuel the most central elements of the English state during peacetime. What's more, even then the system could only be maintained via a system of financially 'decentralized' fees and gratuities – transactions that took place beyond the financial reach or control of the Crown. How, on the most practical level, could this state wage war?

~ The Caroline Fiscal-Military Arrangement in England: The State at War ~

In practice, the war-making capabilities of the English state manifested themselves in three institutional capacities before the civil wars. In the first place military power resided within the English militia and its subset, the so-called 'Trained Bands' that were supposed to represent the best elements of it. Secondly, it existed in the agglomeration of Crown-owned warships and privately-controlled armed merchantmen that the monarch could assemble to wage war and enforce his will at sea. And finally, it could find expression – however briefly – in the king's own expensive and ephemeral expeditionary armies. Again, from a constitutional perspective all three of these institutional instruments of English state power were under the undisputed control of the Crown. However, the statutory and customary basis of these institutions, as well as the administrative and fiscal pathways that fueled them, often limited or mitigated the amount of practical, direct control that the Crown could wield when using or deploying them. In this sense, the military system that existed before the wars was, at its apex, royal; however, as was the case with the royal government itself, the nature of the fiscal

machinery that gave the system life made it impossible for the king to establish a monopoly of military power at the political centre. Once again, the active cooperation of many hundreds of powerful, often geographically dispersed elites was necessary to make the whole of that system work, something that Charles I failed to fully appreciate during his disastrous attempt to cow the Scottish Covenanters during the Bishops' Wars. A brief exploration of all three of these military institutions demonstrates how and why all of this was so.

The English militia was, without question, the single most important part of the Crown's land forces during the period between the ascension of Elizabeth I and the outbreak of civil war in 1642. However it is important to understand the form and character of these forces, for they were neither designed nor able to serve as a royal standing army. Rather, the Stuart militia was an outgrowth of the traditional obligation that each and every propertied Englishman had to defend his homeland, an obligation that was in Charles I's time formally merged with the faded remnants of the 'quasi-feudal' practice of mobilizing the retainers of the elite.[20] By the end of the sixteenth century the statutory framework of the English militia system was national, and it was based, in theory, on a cluster of parliamentary legislation that pertained largely to the procurement and maintenance of essentially medieval weaponry.[21] The responsibility to account for

[20] Braddick, *State Formation*, 182. I take the term 'quasi-feudal' from Braddick, although Fissel also uses it in this context. See Mark Charles Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars: Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 185.

[21] The most prominent of these included the Assize of Arms (1181), the Statute of Winchester (1285), and the much more recent Marian Statutes of 1558. See Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638*

and control these weapons, and to provide for the men employed to use them, rested on the shoulders of a combination of wealthy private individuals and local governments, a responsibility that was supervised by the high and petty constables, and other parish-level office-holders.[22] In short, the Crown did not muster or arm the country's militiamen using central revenues; rather, these men armed and organized themselves and their poorer neighbors using their own money and resources according to rates that were defined by proscriptive parliamentary laws of various vintages.

The overarching management of this evolving military institution was therefore decentralized in the sense that the entire system – from resource procurement to unit organization – operated at the level of the counties and boroughs. It is true that the catalyst in the process of mustering and deploying the regional militias was the Privy Council operating on the authority of the monarch, but in the absence of a salaried bureaucracy the Crown was forced to once again rely on the cooperation and initiative of the local elites who served as its principal military agents in the provinces. This was, of course, an inefficient method of central control, but it should be noted that the upper echelons of the machinery were subject to ongoing evolution during our period. The most important Elizabethan innovation in this area was the introduction and widespread

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(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 7-12; Braddick, *State Formation*, 183. Most of this legislation is readily accessible in print. Consult John Raithby, ed., *The Statutes of the Realm 1235-1377*, vol.1 (London, 1800), 96-98; and John Raithby, ed., *The Statutes of the Realm 1547-1624*, vol.4 (London, 1819), 320-322.

[22] Boynton, *Elizabethan Militia*, 16, 21ff; Henrik Langelüddecke, "'The chiefest strength and glory of this kingdom': Arming and Training the 'Perfect Militia' in the 1630s," *English Historical Review* 118 (2003): 1264-1303.

acceptance of the Lords Lieutenant in most English counties. These were powerful men who, in conjunction with their Deputy Lieutenants, eventually replaced the sheriffs as the Crown's most important military agents in the provinces.[23] It was these men who became the 'contact point' between the Stuart Crown and those individuals and groups who raised and maintained the defensive military resources of the localities on its behalf.

In theory, the whole of a county or borough's militia was subject to review at the large and usually infrequent general muster, but it became increasingly clear during the century preceding the civil wars that the resulting formations were unequal to the task of confronting an invading army equipped with the weapons and employing the tactics of contemporary warfare. As a result, Elizabeth introduced the idea that a certain proportion of the counties' militiamen should be selected and trained to use the new and increasingly expensive types of firearms that were being used on the continent. Once again, the Crown chose to 'download' the cost of this training (provided by professional muster-masters), as well as the requisite weaponry, onto the military rate-payers in the counties and boroughs.[24] Although this additional cost was sometimes met by allowing those who were not selected for enhanced training to commute their standard militia obligations to a cash payment, it is nevertheless clear that the Trained Band programs pursued by Elizabeth and the early Stuart monarchs cost the localities far more than could ever be justified by the existing militia statutes. Indeed, this was a situation that was only

[23] Boynton, *Elizabethan Militia*, 13-18. The sheriffs were still a vital link in the administrative pathway the fueled the Caroline navy. See below for more.
[24] Braddick, *State Formation*, 185ff.

exacerbated when James repealed but did not replace the Marian Statutes of 1558.[25] Instead of reestablishing the legal foundations of the militia using parliamentary authority, he and his son chose to rely on the prerogative (and a much more amorphous and customary sense of 'duty') when it came to the subject's standing military obligations, obligations that Charles I was inclined to view as subject to royal direction and summary alteration from the political centre.[26]

In the end, then, we can summarize the administrative and constitutional status of the Caroline militia, as an institutional component of the English fiscal-military state, in the following manner. Although it was undoubtedly national in scope, the militia apparatus that Charles I inherited operated entirely within the boundaries of local jurisdictions. Furthermore, although it was theoretically his to command, its increasingly questionable legal basis was essentially statutory. Money, men, and weapons were all acquired, arrayed, and spent at the local level. The call for increased musters, better weapons, and specialized training, though prescribed by the king and his Privy Council, amounted to yet more 'dark figure' costs that were ultimately borne by the subject, this time in an entirely parochial context. The Crown, in other words, assumed virtually no administrative responsibility for the maintenance and development of the English militia or its Trained Band contingents. Instead, Lords Lieutenants were issued orders, and the king simply expected them to be obeyed by parish-level office-holders. What this meant

[25] Boynton, *Elizabethan Militia*, 209-210.
[26] That being said, in 1642 Charles I did try to claim that the Statutes of 1558 were still in effect. See *Ibid.*, 255-257.

is that neither the Tudors nor the early Stuarts succeeded in transforming the English militia into an instrument of centralized royal power, despite their many attempts to reform, standardize, and perfect it. This, as we shall see, had serious consequences for the Crown during the Bishops' Wars, and it profoundly influenced the evolution of the fiscal-military state-entity during the early years of the English civil wars.

Although royal power was little enhanced by the Crown's administrative approach to militia reform during the early seventeenth century, the same cannot be said of its handling of naval matters. This is largely because Charles I's notorious attempt to develop and employ a new direct prerogative tax scheme designed to supply and support his own warships met with at least some measure of practical success. More to the point, the revenues in question were successfully centralized in the form of payments made by county-level sheriffs to the Crown's navy treasury – a development that provided the sovereign with a degree of independent power that was altogether lacking in its relationship with the English militia. Regardless of all this, however, it remains indisputably true that the English monarchy had a rich and storied history of successful cooperation with the other, private brokers of naval power in the pre-war English state. In this, the Crown's historical relationship with the nation's naval forces was not unlike its relationship with the county militias. During the reign of Elizabeth, for example, the English ability to wage war at sea was the product of a successful institutional alliance that saw the warships of the Crown regularly paired with privately-own and armed merchantmen; this was an alliance that was used for both offensive and defensive

purposes during that time. This relationship, which was so fondly remembered in the English historical imagination, was itself a product of two factors which dovetailed nicely during the late sixteenth century. The first was a convergence of the financial and geopolitical interests of the Crown and the nation's other ship-owners, and the second was a technological philosophy of shipbuilding that drew no sharp distinctions between cargo vessels and men-of-war.[27] Ultimately, it was the disappearance of these two factors that precipitated the collapse of the Crown's military alliance with the nation's private ship-owners, and the need for a new approach to naval organization under the direct auspices of the Crown.

Although the Crown had no significant land forces 'of its own' in England during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, it did maintain a 'standing navy' of sorts throughout the period. Funded directly by the Crown's ordinary revenues, this 'standing navy' was, in reality, a relatively small group of ships that had to be supplemented with additional, privately-owned vessels in times of war or other emergencies.[28] As was the case with the militia, the Crown could and did rely on the subject's traditional and customary duty to render military aid and assistance to the monarch when it was required for ostensibly defensive purposes. Unlike the case of the militia, however, there was no universal statutory basis for this obligation, and the Crown had a history of providing

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[27] The essential features of this narrative are outlined in Braddick, *State Formation*, pp.202-213, and Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), the introduction and chapter 6, passim.

[28] Braddick, *State Formation*, Table 5.1, p.220; Ada Haeseler Lewis, "A Study of Elizabethan Ship Money, 1588-1603" (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1928), 11-18.

limited financial compensation, when necessary, to those ship-owners who provided vessels and crews.[29] Nevertheless, by the end of Elizabeth's reign this practice had evolved into a system whereby the Crown periodically made demands for the uncompensated use of the nation's privately-held ships in times of crisis. As with the militia, local governments were expected to bear the costs and handle the logistics. Port towns and coastal counties were ordered to hire and outfit the vessels in question, and, over time, the queen's Privy Council gradually widened the geographic scope of these levies – spreading the financial burden out by ordering the coastal counties' inland boroughs to share in the burden.[30] In all this we see the administrative origins of Charles I's Ship Money program.

Indeed, Elizabeth's last attempt to levy funds for the hiring of private warships occurred in 1603, just before her death, and in many ways it foreshadowed the introduction of Charles I's naval policies. There were important differences, however. In the first place, unlike Charles I's Ship Money writs of the late 1630s, the scope of the 1603 plan was far from national; rather, it was confined to the southwestern portions of England and Wales.[31] Furthermore, the language associated with this levy was very carefully chosen. The Crown insisted that it be referred to as a voluntary contribution, not a tax. And finally, Elizabeth made it plain that she would not regard the resulting fleet as part of her own, royal one. Instead, she clearly viewed the whole enterprise as an

[29] Lewis, "Elizabethan Ship Money," 7-8.
[30] *Ibid.*, chapter 4, passim.
[31] *Ibid.*, map on page 35.

extension of the royal/private partnerships that so characterized the organization of English naval power during her reign.[32] Other aspects of the 1603 levy, however, do seem more akin to the Caroline innovations. For example, in order to streamline the hiring process it was determined that a central committee should be established in London to collect all of the cash generated by this levy, and to oversee the logistics of payment.[33] Additionally, this committee and its treasury apparatus were to be kept totally separate from the sprawling machinery of the Crown's main financial office, the Exchequer. Again, this was an administrative strategy later deployed by Charles I when he insisted that all of the Ship Money collected in the counties was to be paid directly to the treasurer of his navy.[34]

To begin with the annual writs of 1635, then, the Caroline approach to Ship Money can be seen as an outgrowth of Elizabethan solutions to the problem of naval defense in the late sixteenth century. However, it was innovative in the sense that Charles I never actually hoped or expected that the counties of England – all of them, from then on – would provide him with hired merchantmen. Rather, the entire scheme was envisioned as a money-making endeavor from the beginning, albeit one that was honestly and wholly supposed to support his royal warships at sea. Together with the Privy Council, Charles determined the rate that would be levied on all of the counties and boroughs of England. Following this, the sheriffs of each county were to liaise with the

[32] Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, 141-142.
[33] Lewis, "Elizabethan Ship Money," 60.
[34] Henrik Langelüddecke, "'I finde all men & my officers all soe unwillinge': The Collection of Ship Money, 1635-1640," *Journal of British Studies* 46 (2007): 513.

constables and other agents of local government in order to arrange payment. The money, once it was secured locally by the sheriffs, was to be transferred directly to the king's navy treasury as soon as possible.[35] Again, it is important to note that this form of direct, quota-based taxation (for that's what it amounted to) was completely extra-parliamentary in nature. Based on a nebulous and ever-evolving history of royal practice, it enjoyed no statutory support, and its execution severely tested the subject's patience with regard to the Crown's prerogative powers. Interestingly enough, however, it is an indisputable fact that vast amounts of Ship Money were eventually transferred to Westminster before the outbreak of civil war.[36] Therefore, despite its constitutional weaknesses, the Caroline Ship Money experiment succeeded in doing something the 'Perfect Militia' reforms did not: it transformed the Crown's royal navy into a centralized institution that delivered a key element of the state's wider fiscal-military resources into the hands of the monarch, a success that admittedly came at an enormous political cost.

This transformation of the type and quantity of money that was available to the sovereign for naval purposes was innovative in the mid 1630s, but the principle that waging foreign war was the Crown's financial responsibility was not. By the time of Elizabeth, the monarch was aided in this task by the Ordnance Office, a permanent entity that received annual funding from the Exchequer. Operating from the Tower of London,

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[35] *Ibid.*, 512-513.

[36] See M.D. Gordon, "The Collection of Ship-Money in the Reign of Charles I," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3rd series, 4 (1910): 141-162. Langelüddecke, however, goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the amounts ultimately received sometimes took a great deal of time to arrive at the political centre. See Langelüddecke, "The Collection of Ship Money," passim.

this organization was tasked with acquiring, storing, and providing a wide range of munitions for the use of the royal navy, as well as the king's small number of permanent forts and garrisons. It also shared in the responsibility of arming and supplying the Crown's expeditionary armies when and where these were summoned into existence.[37] Again, it is vital to note that such armies were the direct financial responsibility of the monarch, but it was also ordinarily the case that the wider political nation would provide the Crown with at least some of the liquid capital it needed to create and fuel them. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth century this was achieved via the authorization (by a parliament) and collection (by the Exchequer) of the two 'standard' forms of direct parliamentary taxation, the 'subsidy' and the so-called 'fifteenth and tenth'.[38] Again, although the yields of these taxes were tiny compared to the Crown's other sources of funds at this time,[39] they were nevertheless crucial considering the king's peacetime financial situation. Indeed, such was the importance of this financial help that it was (and still is) generally considered an integral part of the English mobilization process during the early-modern period.[40] And so obtaining the consent and support of state's lesser office-holders was of vital importance if the English Crown was to secure

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[37] D.E. Lewis, "The Office of Ordnance and the Parliamentarian Land Forces, 1642-1648" (Unpublished PhD thesis, Loughborough University of Technology, 1976), chapter 2, passim; Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 90-110.

[38] Braddick, *Nerves of state*, 91-95.

[39] See Figure 0.1 above.

[40] Roger Lockyer, *Tudor and Stuart Britain, 1471-1714*, 2nd Edition (Harlow, 1985 and 1995), 12-13, 191-192, and 222-223; Dietz, *English Public Finance*, vol.2, chapters 9, 10, and 11, passim. In addition to providing the supplementary funds, parliaments could also lend an air of increased legitimacy to the Crown's demands for unpaid military service according to custom or feudal tenure. G.L. Harriss, *King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), chapter four, passim.

enough money through taxation to help fund its foreign wars. The same was true when it came to raising its soldiers.

Historically, it was considered normal for the Crown to levy soldiers for foreign service in the towns and shires of England. In many cases this practice was simply considered an extension of the subject's military obligation to both his community and his sovereign. This was a principle and a policy that the Crown found particularly useful during times of military crisis, such as the dangerous and threatening Armada years of the late sixteenth century.[41] Nevertheless, the evolution and development of the militia and the Trained Bands under Elizabeth, James, and Charles complicated this process. In order to understand why this was so, we must first understand the administrative and legal mechanisms that the Crown used to procure troops for its expeditionary armies during this period. There were basically two options open to these three monarchs. In the first place, the Crown could grant its power of demanding the fulfillment of the military obligation to specially-appointed representatives or agents in the provinces. Armed with this power via a commission, these agents would then summon and 'array' all those capable bearing arms and transport them to the king's army.[42] Alternatively, the monarch could simply inform their Lords Lieutenant that such service was required, and insist that they and their deputies procure the necessary soldiers. In either case, it was understood that the troops so raised would eventually enter into the king's own pay (via the

[41] Boynton, *Elizabethan Militia*, chapters 5 and 6, passim; Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 219-220.
[42] Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 133-4.

Exchequer).[43] From the point of view of these soldiers, this was of tremendous importance because it shaped and determined the terms of their service, as well as their legal status within the English machinery of war.

As we have seen, English militiamen were required to arm and muster themselves by virtue of parliamentary statute. Although the legal basis of this obligation was increasingly unclear during the early seventeenth century, the early Stuarts did what they could to build on Elizabeth's accomplishments by further encouraging the county communities to improve the arms and develop the capabilities of their Trained Bands – the elite formations drawn from their wider pool of untrained men. Significantly, however, they failed to transform these formations into a royal standing army because they continued to insist that local governments were responsible for their costs, as well as their administrative and logistical requirements. They were able to do this, in part, because the militia was seen as a vital part of county defense. Soldiers levied for foreign service were a different matter, however. Although the counties were usually asked to 'front' the money associated with equipping and transporting the king's recruits to his army ('coat and conduct' money), these troops 'took the king's shilling' when they were conscripted by the Lieutenants or the Commissioners of Array – something that legally bound them to the monarch's person because it usually took on the trappings of

[43] The monarch's duty to pay for his own soldiers in the field was established by law during the reign of Edward III. Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 216; C.G. Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, 2nd Edition (1966: repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 5.

indentured service.[44] Since this was the case, it was only natural that Tudor and Stuart monarchs would try to recruit and mobilize the elite militiamen the counties had trained and equipped at their own expense. Unfortunately for them, this proved next to impossible for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons were undoubtedly political – in that the Crown's wars were sometimes unpopular with lesser office-holders – but others were clearly financial and constitutional.

In the event, it turned out that the idea that the English militia should be reformed and 'perfected' in order to defend the shires cut both ways. Although the Crown managed to 'download' the cost of these reforms onto the shoulders of the county communities, the upshot was a universal reluctance to see the final product deployed for 'offensive' purposes outside the county. This was certainly the case whenever the Crown tried to mobilize the Trained Bands in a wholesale fashion by attempting to incorporate them into its expeditionary armies directly.[45] But it was also true when the monarch tried to conscript militiamen on an individual or piecemeal basis. Indeed, although Elizabeth was sometimes able to impress militiamen for service in Ireland or on the continent, this practice met with increased political and legal resistance during the reigns of James and Charles.[46] This was partly because the Trained Bands were an important local resource. They were usually men of substance (or at least the clients of them), and their training and weaponry represented an enormous investment of time and money on the part of the

[44] Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 175, n.1; T[he] N[ational] A[chives] S[tate] P[apers] 16/419.
[45] Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 195-199.
[46] Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 188, 220-221, and 249-252; John S. Nolan, "The Militarization of the Elizabethan State," *The Journal of Military History* 58 (1994): 399-400 especially.

community. Consequently, when these communities were confronted with a royal demand for conscripts via the Deputy Lieutenants or the Commissioners of Array the constables and other parish-level officers were loath to see them pressed into the royal service. Instead, the press was typically seen as an opportunity to rid the localities of their most undesirable elements. The unemployed, the landless, the criminal, and the otherwise marginalized were all viewed as ideal candidates for service in the king's expeditionary armies.[47] Although the county communities grudgingly accepted the costs associated with outfitting and transporting these men, they were generally loath to part with their 'parish arms' – weaponry that had been purchased and maintained with communal funds levied on the militia rates. Consequently, the poor souls who found themselves consigned to the king's service were often given the worst or cheapest arms and equipment that was available, something the Ordnance Office (and ultimately the Exchequer) was forced to cope with in the field.[48]

During the Bishops' Wars, king Charles I hoped to deploy the military resources of England to destroy the forces of the Scottish rebels that were flouting his royal power and ecclesiastical program. Unfortunately, his attempts were hobbled by the fact that his own royal revenues, though steadily increasing,[49] remained precariously balanced. Furthermore, he was unable – for political reasons – to tap into the privately-held

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[47] Victor L. Stater, "The Lord Lieutenancy on the Eve of the Civil Wars: The Impressment of George Plowright," *Historical Journal* 29 (1986): 279-296.
[48] Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 252-253; Stephen Jerold Stearns, "The Caroline Military System, 1625-1627: The Expeditions to Cadiz and Ré" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1967), 241.
[49] Dietz, *English Public Finance*, vol.2, 284-288.

resources of his southern kingdom via direct parliamentary taxation. Undeterred, Charles resolved to assemble an army by asking the nobility and others to contribute extraordinary funds, and by mobilizing elements of the English militia and Trained Bands under the pretense of waging a 'defensive' war against those who threatened the sovereignty of his Crown. The results of this strategy were disastrous for the Stuart monarchy. Although the king managed to both create and sustain a very large royal army of 25,000 men in the short term, he was only able to do so with the ongoing financial and organizational assistance of others. Unfortunately, much of this assistance was rendered only grudgingly. For example, although the king could insist that his subjects fulfill their military obligation to him and their country, he was powerless to stop the locally-funded militiamen from evading the press or paying someone else to take their place in the ranks of an army that was summoned into being for reasons that were either misunderstood or deeply unpopular. Indeed, as we have repeatedly seen here, the nature of the English fiscal-military arrangement during the period before the civil wars simply made it impossible for the monarch to wage war effectively without the active cooperation of a very large segment of the nation's elite office-holders. Although Charles had made great strides in centralizing the nation's naval resources during his Personal Rule, he was never fully capable of producing well-paid expeditionary armies that were entirely 'his own'.[50]

[50] This structural failure in army finance was not simply a product of the financial deprivations of the personal rule. In the autumn of 1627, during Buckingham's siege of Ré, Sir Robert Pye, Auditor of the Exchequer of Receipt, provided a dark and sobering evaluation of the Caroline regime's faltering attempts to finance foreign war *with* the help of parliament. For more on this consult Stearns, "The Caroline Military System", 206-207; for more on Pye himself consult Mary Frear Keeler, *The Long Parliament,*

~ **Parliament and the Growth of the Fiscal-Military State at the Political Centre** ~

This dissertation began by describing the desirability of establishing financial and organizational taxonomies of the various and varied civil war armies that existed during the early 1640s. It is hoped that the preceding sections have done something to frame this issue by providing an introductory overview of the Caroline 'fiscal-military state' in England using some of the concepts and terminology deployed by Braddick in his treatise on state formation. In short, it has been shown that much can be learned about the nature and extent of the sovereign's power within the pre-war state, broadly defined, by considering the absolute and relative amount of tax monies that it collected, and the extent to which it relied on other, lesser state office-holders when it came to exercising its coercive powers in the context of war. In this section we will explore the expansion and transformation of the fiscal-military state at the political centre during 1640-1642. In doing this we will mobilize John Adamson's new and very useful interpretation of the political groupings that dominated this process. Our purpose here will be to demonstrate how the Long Parliament acquired sovereign power within the English state, and how this led, in the most practical sense, to the outbreak of an English civil war. Finally, we will identify and define an altogether new layer of army organization that will, I hope, prove useful in defining and understanding the precise nature Essex's army, and its place within

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1640-1641: A Biographical Study of its Members (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1954), 317. For Pye's time in office as Auditor of the Receipt see G.E. Aylmer, "The Officers of the Exchequer, 1625-1642", in *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England*, edited by F.J. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 176.

the Long Parliament's rapidly-evolving fiscal-military arrangement during the first years of the civil war.

Ultimately, Charles I's most serious problem in 1639 was that he had managed to alienate and anger a significant number of his English subjects via the sustained pursuit of unpopular political, financial, and religious policies during the first fourteen years of his reign. Although oceans of ink have been spilt in the attempt to determine the precise nature, scale, and scope of the discord that by then existed between the king and his political enemies, as well as in the attempt to evaluate the degree to which the gulf of disagreement was unbridgeable, none of that need detain us here. What is important to note is that on the eve of the Bishops' Wars the opponents of the king's government in England included a 'knot'[51] of extremely powerful peers of the realm. Together, these men and their lesser-born friends, dependants, and allies formed a coherent cluster of elites whose combined social and political powers were by then sufficient to challenge the loftiest and most central structures of the Caroline regime.[52] Crucially, these men were prepared to do whatever it took to secure the levers of executive power in England by harnessing and mobilizing the anger and disillusionment that existed throughout the

[51] The term, in this context, is Adamson's. See John Adamson, *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2007), 13.

[52] For an introductory discussion of the 'Court'/'Country' divide that existed during James's reign see Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution 1625-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 22-24. This factional division metastasized into a much more malignant form of unrest within the political classes during the early part of Charles's reign. See Richard Cust, *The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626-1628* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), chapter one, passim; for a useful overview see Ian Gentles, *The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638-1652* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2007), 66-69.

wider network of office-holders who comprised the Stuart state at the regional and local levels. The key to their earliest successes, as it happened, was found in Scotland.

During the summer of 1640, in the aftermath of both the First Bishops' War and the aptly-named Short Parliament, the most powerful of the king's opponents included the earls of Bedford and Essex, the viscounts Mandeville and Saye, as well as Lord Brooke. The most influential and determined member of this group, however, was doubtlessly the earl of Warwick, whose estate in Essex county served as the rallying point for all manner of disaffected persons during the 1620s and 30s.[53] What all of these men wanted – in the most general sense – was the destruction of the king's system of prerogative government, a government that eschewed consultation with the wider members of the social and political elite in favor of authoritarian behavior encouraged by pro-Spanish and crypto-Catholic favorites.[54] Naturally, the inner members and looser allies of the 'Warwick circle' felt that the best way to achieve this goal was to oust these favorites and better position themselves within the traditional, pre-existing framework of royal government. Unfortunately, however, this was impossible to accomplish in the face of the king's intransigence and his determination to both rule and wage war without English parliaments. Stonewalled, these elites found themselves unable to raise their own rebel armies from scratch; nevertheless, they were quick to realize the potential for change that could be found in Charles's decision to renew hostilities with the Scots. Resolving to venture all in the cause of reform, by June 1640 they were in secret

[53] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 25-32.
[54] For examples from 1640 consult Gentles, *English Revolution*, 74-75.

correspondence with the Scots, inviting them to invade England in order to overthrow the government of their sovereign.[55]

Encouraged by their friends in the south, the Covenanters sent their army into England in mid-August. Within two weeks, they had smashed the vanguard of Charles's own forces at Newburn, near Newcastle. Then, during the early part of September, the 'Warwick circle' made their full intentions known to the king: they presented him with a petition, signed by twelve of the peers within their ranks, demanding that the king call an English parliament to redress their manifold grievances with the personal rule. They also informed Charles that they were prepared to call such a parliament on their own collective authority if he refused! This was no toothless threat, for at that very moment they were in communication with the Scots, promising their allies that they could and would cobble together an English army of their own if need be. This prospective rebel army was to be composed of disaffected units drawn from the king's own royal army, supplemented, as one might expect, by friendly Trained Bands in certain counties. Significantly, the Warwick circle chose to refer to their projected forces as 'the Armies for the Commonwealth'.[56]

In the end the conspirators did not have to launch a politically dangerous (and unquestionably illegal) military revolt against their sovereign in autumn of 1640. In the weeks and months that followed they successfully dominated the king's 'Great Council' of peers at York, the lordly commission appointed to negotiate a lasting peace with the

[55] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 45-50.
[56] *Ibid.*, 55-62.

Scots, and, finally, the Long Parliament – a body that the king was strong-armed into summoning at the inauguration of the Great Council on 24 September.[57] During the first year of the Long Parliament's sitting the rebellious 'Junto' – a convenient label for the powerful bicameral interest group that soon seized control of the revived legislature[58] – succeeded in placing a whole host of unprecedented restraints on the king's ability to govern. From a constitutional perspective, the most important of these was probably the Triennial Act,[59] a law that was (very grudgingly!) given royal assent on 16 February 1641. The passage of this Act provided the Junto with a vital layer of political insulation by ensuring that the king could never again choose to rule for extended periods without calling an English parliament, and by enshrining the legality of the Junto's provocative September petition. It accomplished all this by requiring a parliament to convene every three years, regardless of the will or actions of the sovereign. Should the Crown refuse or simply neglect to issue writs, a panel of twelve peers was authorized to issue them instead.[60] As Adamson has said, the Triennial Act was possibly the single most important constitutional limitation on the sovereign's power since the days of Magna Carta, but its immediate ramifications were nothing compared to the very real and practical fiscal-military powers that were then being assumed by the Junto.

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[57] *Ibid.*, 82.
[58] For an introduction to the modern historiographic meaning and usage of this term consult David Scott, *Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, 1637-49* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 25-29.
[59] *Statutes of the Realm*, vol.5, 54-57.
[60] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 191-192.

According to the Treaty of Ripon – the preliminary agreement that was struck by the Scots and the Junto-men on the English commission in late October 1640 – the king was obliged to pay the Covenanters £850 per day to support their now-idle army.[61] This, combined with the king's need to pay off his own land forces, utterly destroyed the Crown's financial independence. Vast sums were needed to meet the needs of the two armies that occupied the north of England, and there was no hope that the king could supply them without the help of the Junto-controlled Parliament. But in the event, he didn't have to. In December the rebels used the Long Parliament's power of the purse to acquire direct financial (but not sovereign political) control of the king's government by taking over the most important parts of its revenues, and by assuming immediate responsibility for its military debts. In the first place these debts were to be met with a portion of the customs revenues, revenues which had grown to a jaw-dropping £500,000 per annum by 1641.[62] They were also to be met with the fruits of direct parliamentary taxation; specifically, part of the money was to come from four fresh subsidies granted by the authority of a new Act. Significantly, however, none of this subsidy money was to be paid into the king's own Exchequer. Rather, it was to be collected and managed in the first place by the allies of the Junto operating out of the Chamber of London, the City's municipal treasury.[63] What's more, sometime before 01 January 1641 the Parliament

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[61] *Ibid.*, 85.

[62] Robert Ashton, *The Crown and the Money Market, 1603-1640* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), p.97, Table III and p.109, Table IV; see also Russell, *Unrevolutionary England*, 172.

[63] *Statutes of the Realm*, vol.5, 58-78. The Act was made given royal assent on 16 February 1641. The reader should note that another Act authorizing the collection of two additional subsidies was passed on 13

authorized the earl of Warwick to control and manage *all* of the monies that were to be paid to the Scots. As a result of this, hundreds of thousands of pounds were physically channeled into Warwick House in Holborn during the course of the next six months. All this was, as Adamson remarks, an astonishing transfer of the most raw and material element of state power.[64] But by the summer of 1641 the question remained: was there enough money of all sorts to go around?

On 17 June 1641 Sir John Hotham delivered a sobering financial report to the House of Commons. In it, he laid out the total revenues and liabilities of the Junto's parliamentary 'Commonwealth' as they pertained to the existing English and Scottish land forces.[65] The picture was bleak indeed. According to Hotham, the military debts of the rapidly-evolving regime amounted to nearly one million pounds sterling. Unfortunately, the projected, unassigned tax revenues from existing sources amounted to less than one half of this! Table 0.1 lays out all of this information for the benefit of the reader. Here we can see that was never going to be enough money – even after Hotham penciled-in a hypothetical injection of an additional £400,000 in unspecified tax

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May 1641. See *Statutes of the Realm*, vol.5, 79-101. Like the previous Act, this new law ordered the resulting money to be paid into the Chamber of London. See also Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1981), 22-23. For an introductory discussion of the Chamber and its historical role in royal/central government finance see Ashton, *The Crown and the Money Market*, 28-30.

[64] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 147-150.

[65] The maintenance of the English navy was another matter altogether. Russell tells us that the Junto managed to support it using £129,914 of the customs revenues spent between 25 May 1641 and 29 June 1642. Indeed, the administration and payment of the navy was wholly under the control of Parliament after 6 September 1641. See Russell, *Unrevolutionary England*, pp.167-168, n.6; see also Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 364.

revenues, at least a portion of which was eventually raised via a one-off poll tax.[66] In order to come to a better understanding of these figures – and, therefore, to better appreciate the fiscal-military position of the emerging parliamentary regime – it makes sense to briefly discuss how the Parliament managed each of these debts during the summer and autumn of 1641.

Table 0.1 – The Fiscal-Military Situation at the Political Centre: 17 June 1641
(Sources: Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 323; and *C[ommons] J[ournal]*, ii, 177-178)[67]

Army Liabilities	£		Available Revenues	£
Total Owing to the King's Army:	462,050		Total Available from Old Customs:	150,000
Total Owing to the Scots' Army:	220,750		Total Available from New Customs:	15,000
Total Owing to the Scots: ('Brotherly Assistance')	300,000[68]		Total Expected from Six Subsidies:	300,000
			Total Hypothetical New Taxes (Poll Tax):	400,000
TOTAL LIABILITIES:	982,800		TOTAL REVENUES:	865,000

In the first place, the king's army – once so vital to the Junto's plans – needed to be properly maintained until it could be disbanded in an orderly fashion. This was

[66] *Statutes of the Realm*, vol.5, 105-110. For an introductory discussion of English poll taxes – including this one – see Braddick, *Nerves of state*, 103-104.
[67] This table is, in fact, a simplified abstraction of Hotham's report. As of 17 June a portion of the state's liabilities had already been met, presumably from the listed revenues. Because of this, it is both easier and less confusing to simply lay out both sides of the balance sheet in their entirety.
[68] This was basically a special gift that the Junto agreed to provide to the Scots as a reward for their help in overthrowing Charles I's prerogative regime. It was not then (and should not now be) considered part of the practical cost of maintaining the Covenanters' army in England. David Stevenson, "The financing of the cause of the Covenants, 1638-1651," *The Scottish Historical Review* 51 (1972): 94-95. See below for more.

especially important considering the increasingly hostile political views of many of its officers and soldiers. By the middle of May 1641 the indomitable earl of Strafford – the army's Lieutenant-General – was dead, destroyed by the most radical wing of the Junto. In the weeks before his death, however, Strafford's high-profile predicament helped inspire a series of shadowy, pro-Caroline plots that were formulated by certain disaffected army officers and supported by the king himself. One of the more hair-raising of these involved a plan to bring elements of the royal army south in order to forcibly restore the king's control over the central government.[69] Clearly, then, it was important for the Junto to provide the king's English troops with enough money to keep them quiescent, if not happy. Indeed, the Parliament's decision to prioritize the pay of the Scots during the months of February and March 1641 had been a key catalyzing agent in the history of these plots.[70]

By 17 June – the date of Hotham's report – the Parliament had delivered just £150,000 of the £462,050 that was owed to the royal army, a total debt that included the entirety of its pay from 10 November 1640 to 29 June 1641, as well as an additional lump sum of £50,000 necessary for its proper disbandment.[71] Although it is possible that additional funds were supplied to the army by the king himself from his own 'private' resources, it is highly significant, as Adamson says, that all of the Parliament's money was transferred directly to Sir William Uvedale, the king's Treasurer at War. Indeed, it

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[69] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 212.
[70] Conrad Russell, "The First Army Plot of 1641," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, 38 (1988): 88-89 especially.
[71] Again, *CJ*, ii, 177-178.

would seem that Uvedale himself was always careful to distinguish between these two very different sources of government money, ensuring that the Parliament's money was always used to pay down the army's outstanding arrears. As a result of these efforts, the king's army ceased to be a pressing political or financial concern after the autumn of 1641. This is because the Parliament evidently managed to provide the soldiers with enough money to steadily and finally disband their units during the months of August and September.[72]

As we know, the Scots' role in the destruction of the king's prerogative government in England was a central one. The Junto recognized this by agreeing, in the first place, to shoulder the burden of maintaining the Covenanting army during its stay in England – an agreement that, as we have already seen, had the added benefit of completely swamping the king's Exchequer. All told, Hotham calculated the maintenance cost of this army to be £216,750, with an additional £4,000 needed to both pack and transport the specie. In addition to this haul, by June 1641 the Scots had managed to convince the Parliament to supply an *additional* payment of £300,000 in 'brotherly assistance'. This money was supposed to help reimburse them the initial and ongoing costs associated with their wider war effort both at home and abroad. By 17 June Hotham was able to report that the earl of Warwick had supplied the Scots with some £105,000, a figure that can be confirmed by consulting Warwick's own account of his disbursements

[72] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 367. Adamson is here relying on D'Ewes for this information.

at that time.[73] Although this sum did much to reduce the arrears of the army in the field, it in no way addressed the enormous extra burden of the 'brotherly assistance' – a fresh debt that had to be met if the Scots were to be kept happy.

Fortunately for the English Junto, the Scots proved to be flexible creditors. For example, they readily agreed to remove their army from England upon the receipt of just £80,000 of the 'brotherly assistance'.[74] This advance payment (on this particular line item) was immediately forthcoming, for the Covenanting army quickly left England just before the ratification of the so-called Treaty of Union on 28 August 1641 – an agreement that formally bound together the revolutionary governments of both England and Scotland.[75] In fact, we can be certain that payments (of both kinds) continued apace during the weeks and months that followed Hotham's report. Warwick's own account, for instance, indicates that no less an additional £150,000 was transferred to the Scots during the months of July and August. When combined with the amounts already paid out (the £105,000 described in Hotham's report of 17 June), this exceeded the £220,750 army salary debt listed in Table 0.1 above, although this total clearly includes the £80,000 down payment on the 'brotherly assistance'. More payments were eventually forthcoming. All told, Laura Stewart tells us that the Covenanting regime received some £416,050 (£266,050 in army salary money, and £150,000 of the 'brotherly assistance')

[73] See *CJ*, ii, 177-178; and TNA SP16/483, ff.90v-91r. Again, I derived both references from Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 323-325.
[74] Again, Stevenson, "The financing of the cause," 95.
[75] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 352-361; Stevenson, "The financing of the cause," 95.

from the Junto's parliamentary regime in England before the all-important winter of 1643-1644.[76]

This, then, was the state of the Parliament's extraordinary fiscal-military liabilities during the pivotal summer and autumn of 1641. And again, the available revenues were wholly insufficient. And yet, as we have seen, the new regime somehow made do. Unfortunately, however, by the spring of 1642 the Long Parliament's financial resources were stretched even further. Two additional armies were responsible for the added strain: one that had only recently been disbanded, and another that was only slowly coming together. The first was the 'new army' that the earl of Strafford had assembled in Ireland during the spring and summer of 1640. Commissioned by the king in March of that year, and intended for use against the Scottish rebels, this pro-Caroline army was both large and ephemeral, and it is not to be confused with the smaller and more permanent 'standing army' that already existed on that island. The second army was made up of fresh English forces raised on the joint authority of the king and the Long Parliament to put down the Irish rebellion of October 1641. This army was placed under the immediate

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[76] Laura A.M. Stewart, "English funding of the Scottish armies in England and Ireland, 1640-1648," *Historical Journal* 52 (2009): 578. Both Stevenson and Stewart cite a document found in the National Archives of Scotland when describing the amounts received from the Commonwealth regime in England (NAS PA16/3/5/3, pp.3-4: a document that I have *not* personally inspected). Stevenson gives the impression that the whole of the £266,050 in salary money was received – in *addition* to the first £80,000 installment of 'brotherly assistance' money – during the month of August 1641. Stewart, on the other hand, tells us that the document describes transactions that took place 'before the autumn of 1643'. I am inclined – for the moment – to dismiss Stevenson's interpretation because the amounts described in Warwick's account (again, TNA SP16/483 ff.90v-91r, a manuscript I *have* consulted) are not sufficient to support it. Regardless, however, the sums described by NAS PA16/3/5/3, pp.3-4 and TNA SP16/483, ff.90v-91r cast doubt on Adamson's claim that Warwick had transferred no less than *£500,000* to the Scots by 4 August 1641! Adamson's source here is a single sentence found in the *Commons Journal* entry for that day. See Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, p.324, n.121; and *CJ*, ii, 235.

command of the earl of Leicester (the king's Lord Lieutenant of Ireland at that time), and it was even larger than Strafford's. Like both the king's and the Covenanters' expeditionary armies in England, these two armies relied almost entirely on monies that were produced by the most central elements of the fiscal-military state in England. One of the main reasons for this was that the English government (be it royal or parliamentary) could expect no military assistance from locally-constructed militias in Ireland.

In 1640-41 Ireland had no network of English-style militias or Trained Bands. The ethnic and confessional divisions that existed there had prohibited the evolution of such structures.[77] Instead, the English regime in Dublin had long relied on a small 'standing army' composed of Protestant soldiers deployed in long-term garrisons, a force that was occasionally augmented with crown-levied foreign-service troops from England. The purpose of this army was twofold: it served as a vital prop to the Dublin government, and it served as a guarantor of geopolitical security for the other two Stuart kingdoms. But during the reign of Elizabeth the English Exchequer had paid dearly for its services. Although there were a number of native Irish revenues that the Queen could and did rely on to support her Irish government during peacetime, these funds were entirely inadequate to the task of waging war. In the last years of her reign, during the Nine Years' War, the Crown spent upwards of a quarter-million pounds sterling *per annum* on

[77] Aiden Clarke, "Selling royal favours, 1624-32", in *A New History of Ireland*, vol.III, edited by T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 233-242.

its Irish forces.[78] These were English revenues that subsequently vanished into the Irish morass, a situation that both shocked and horrified James, who aggressively and successfully pursued a policy that included a reduction in military spending and an increase in native Irish revenues. As a result of all this, when Charles I came to the throne he inherited a very healthy Irish portfolio. Indeed, by the 1630s Ireland was generating between £5,000 and £10,000 sterling per annum for the English Exchequer![79] Evidently, this was money that was successfully transferred to England after the Dublin government had met the needs (however inadequately) of its small but necessary standing army of roughly 2,000-2,500 Protestant troops.[80]

Unfortunately for Charles, the Irish standing army of 1639-40 was neither designed nor able to address military problems in foreign lands. Nevertheless, the royal viceroy at the time – the staunchly-loyal Sir Thomas Wentworth (elevated to the earldom of Strafford on 12 January 1640[81]) – was determined to mobilize Irish troops to combat the king's enemies in Britain. On 3 March 1640 Charles issued a warrant to Strafford authorizing him to raise an entirely new expeditionary army of 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry for this purpose.[82] Initially, it was hoped that these forces would receive significant domestic funding from subsidies granted by the Irish Parliament; and indeed,

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[78] Dietz, *English Public Finance*, vol.2, 432-433.
[79] *Ibid.*, 435-436.
[80] Aiden Clarke tells us that the strength of the standing army was set at 5,000 in 1628, but that this was later halved in 1629. Aiden Clarke, "Selling royal favours", 239 and 241 especially.
[81] "Wentworth, Thomas, first earl of Strafford (1593-1641)," Ronald G. Asch in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/article/29056, accessed 06 Sep 2012].
[82] Kevin Forkan, "Strafford's Irish Army, 1640-41" (unpublished MA thesis, National University of Ireland, 1999), 9.

four such subsidies were granted by 26 March, a mere ten days into the session.[83] However, Strafford left for England in early April, and shortly thereafter the disgruntled members of the Irish Parliament began their attack on his regime. The aforementioned subsidies were among their targets. As Kevin Forkan tells us, the on-paper value of these grants was quickly reduced, and collection did not commence in practice until the summer of 1641. But in addition to the subsidies, Strafford wanted to support the army with rents collected on the crown-managed plantation of Londonderry. Unfortunately, although the king agreed to this, his assent came in August 1640 – too late for the rents to help build the 'new army' that spring. As a result of these complications, the startup costs associated with the 'new army' had to be met with funds drawn from the English Exchequer. Two days before the Irish Parliament granted the four subsidies, Strafford wrote to the marquess of Hamilton demanding material and logistical support from Britain, as well as £50,000 of the Crown's English revenues. The king agreed to these demands also, but the money was slow in coming. This, of course, was because the costs associated with the First Bishops' War had emptied the central government's coffers. Nevertheless, by 24 July 1640 some £33,850 of English money had been transferred to the 'new army', the single most important set of receipts in the brief history of that force.[84]

During the summer of 1640 Strafford's subordinates in Ireland spent £21,888 8s 8d levying troops for the 'new army'. By 25 June eight regiments of infantry, each

[83] *Ibid.*
[84] *Ibid.*, 11-13.

containing 1,000 men – were successfully assembled at Carrickfergus in Ulster, although the cavalry arm does not seem to have ever come into existence. Training began shortly thereafter, and by mid-August Strafford's 8,000-man army of foot soldiers was ready for service in Britain.[85] But there were two very serious problems. In the first place, although the rendezvous at Carrickfergus was a success, the Scots' victory at Newburn on 28 August 1640 came before the 'new army' left Ireland; and as a result, it never did. Instead, it lingered on in Ulster for another nine months before being officially disbanded on 25 May 1641.[86] During that time it accomplished only two things: it accrued arrears, and it hung – like the sword of Damocles – over the heads of the king's enemies in Britain. Unfortunately, the terror it produced in no way helped either the king or Strafford, whose execution in May 1641 was directly linked to the creation and ongoing existence of the 'new army'. Ultimately, the army was especially feared because of its composition. Although many of the officers and NCOs who staffed Strafford's regiments were Protestants – around a 1,000 of whom had been drawn from existing formations in the old Irish standing army – most of the rank and file soldiers were Irish Catholics.

Despite a chronic shortage of funds, the initial disbandment of the 'new army' proceeded smoothly during the month of June 1641 because the common soldiers (if not the officers) were given a respectable down-payment on their outstanding arrears. Troops drawn from the old standing army were sent back to their garrisons, and the soldiers' weapons were returned into the government's stores. The single largest problem was the

[85] *Ibid.*, 40-45.
[86] *Ibid.*, 76.

mere existence of 7,000 well-trained and unemployed Irish Catholic troops. For the government in Dublin the solution to this problem was obvious: the soldiers would be recruited for continental service under the Habsburgs by the agents of the Spanish Crown, a plan that proved wholly unacceptable to a wide range of people on both sides of the Irish Sea. For example, neither the Protestants in Ireland nor the king's enemies in Britain wanted to help the Army of Flanders by supplying it with troops drawn from any of the three Stuart kingdoms. And as a result, by early September the Long Parliament – which was by now used to exercising pseudo-executive power – closed all Irish ports and ordered a halt to Spanish recruiting efforts in Ireland.[87] Ironically, however, this decision was of tremendous assistance to the disaffected Catholic factions in Ireland, who subsequently used these troops to help launch an armed rebellion against both the government in Dublin and, by extension, the new parliamentary regime in London during the month of October 1641.[88]

News of the Irish rebellion reached England during the first week of November, and the Long Parliament – then entering its second year of continuous sitting – took immediate action. Efforts were made to secure fresh funds for a new expeditionary army of Englishmen, and to further consolidate the Parliament's own executive powers within the wider matrix of the English military system. At this early stage, at least, the king was perfectly content to allow his enemies in Parliament to manage the 'nuts and bolts' of the

[87] *Ibid.*, 81; Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 366-367. As Adamson says, this parliamentary ordinance flew in the face of the royal will. The king had already granted a license to the Spanish ambassadors authorizing their recruiting drive.
[88] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 374-382.

new war. On 1 November the Parliament decided to ask the City of London for a loan of £50,000 for the purpose of putting down the Irish uprising, and on the second the houses appointed a bicameral Committee for Irish Affairs. Seven days later, the Lords also appointed their very own 'Council of War', a body composed of twelve army veterans, to help the Parliament frame its military response.[89] The earl of Leicester, as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, was given charge of the forces that were to be immediately assembled and transported into the fray, and a bill for the impressment of foreign-service troops was quickly introduced into both houses. The king's remaining friends in the Lords held this bill up in early December, though, because it denied his prerogative power to raise Englishmen in one county and transport them into another (or, indeed, abroad).[90]

There were three phases of recruitment for Leicester's army,[91] two of which took place before the legality of impressment was resolved in favor of the Junto in mid-February.[92] The first batch of 1,100 volunteer troops was raised by the Dutch veteran Sir Simon Harcourt at Cheshire using £2,000 of the Parliament's money. This first wave of men was reported to be in Dublin by 30 December. The second group of soldiers was raised by commissions granted to Leicester's regimental commanders. During the month

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[89] Robert Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war: the Irish campaigns, 1641-3," *Historical Research* 80, (Feb., 2007): 76.
[90] Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642*, vol.10 (London: Longmans, 1904), 95.
[91] Most of the information found in this paragraph was derived from Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to was", 77-78.
[92] Gardiner, *History of England*, vol.10, 166. For a modern analysis of the Junto's attempt to strip the king of his right to raise and deploy troops as he pleased consult Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 453-462.

of December 4,600 Englishmen were levied in this fashion using the proceeds of the £50,000 City loan.[93] Musters were held in Chester – the embarkation point – in January 1642. Finally, an additional six infantry regiments, each slated to contain 1,000 men, were also added to the roster in December, although financial problems stymied their creation at that time, and prevented the immediate transportation of the aforementioned 4,600 troops. An additional loan of £30,000 from the Merchant Adventurers on 31 December 1641 helped prevent a complete collapse in operations, but larger and more regular sources of funding were needed if the rebellion was to be well and truly quashed.

Ireland, as we have seen, had a history of emptying the Crown's English Exchequer in wartime, and there is no question that the Junto understood the magnitude of the problem in 1641. As before, part of their solution involved the employment of a Scottish expeditionary army. On 11 November the Commons resolved to accept the 'assistance' of 10,000 Scottish troops, but due to royal intransigence, a formal treaty was not signed until July 1642.[94] This new Scottish army – like the previous one deployed in England – was to be paid for with the Long Parliament's money, and when its demands were eventually combined with those of Leicester's troops, the cost was staggering. To begin with, on 14 December 1641 the houses pledged no less than £400,000 to crush the Catholic insurgents, an enormous sum that could not, of course, be pulled out of thin air.

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[93] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 80. Armstrong tells us that £44,977 of the City's money was actually delivered into the Parliament's hands by the end of December.

[94] For the initial mention of Scottish troops in November see Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 456; and *CJ*, ii, 312. For a discussion of the treaty of July 1642 in its financial context consult Stewart, "English funding of the Scottish armies", 583-584.

The answer, once again, was another dramatic surge in parliamentary taxation, this time taking the form of a new and portentous Act that was eventually given royal assent on 26 March 1642. This new Act was designed to levy the money via a direct tax that assigned specific quotas to particular localities throughout England.[95] More immediately, however, it was useful as a new and powerful credit instrument at the political centre. And at the same time, additional sums of borrowed money were made available in other, more traditional ways.

On 19 March 1642 the king assented to a 'monstrous'[96] new Act that authorized the confiscation and redistribution of vast stretches of Irish land. A brand new organization of private investors was also created – the so-called 'Irish Adventurers' – who agreed to lend money and raise their own troops in exchange for parcels of this land. Sadly, this was a scheme that was, as Armstrong says, deeply rooted in the long and horrible tradition of Protestant plantation on that island.[97] Although the creation of the Adventurers' own military formations eventually proved abortive, the money that they fronted to the Long Parliament – when combined with the credit generated by the £400,000 Act – was of pivotal importance to the Protestant war effort. For example, in June the companies of the City agreed to loan the Parliament an additional £100,000 for

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[95] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 77; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, 249; *Statutes of the Realm*, vol.5, 145-167.

[96] Gardiner twice used this term to describe the so-called 'Adventurers' Act'. The plan called for confiscation and redistribution of 2,500,000 acres of Irish land. See Gardiner, *History of England*, vol.10, 173 and 176.

[97] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 82-83. The date of royal assent for the 'Adventurers' Act' is to be found in J.R. MacCormack, "The Irish Adventurers and the English Civil War," *Irish Historical Studies* 10 (1956): 33.

the Irish service, £60,000 of which was actually delivered before 01 August. Crucially, it is important to note that none of this money was diverted to the emerging war effort in England.[98] This was mainly because there was by then a substantial army to support in Ireland. Indeed, the final six of Leicester's 1,000-man infantry regiments had left Britain by 24 May.[99] Once there, these men joined their comrades in the Lord Lieutenant's other recently-raised units, as well as the loyal elements of the Dublin government's pre-existing standing army. Within three months, the Scots' contingent of 10,000 hireling troops – deployed under the immediate command of Robert Monro – were also there. This brought the total number of Protestant troops of all sorts up to at least 30,000, all of which were nominally on the payroll of the Long Parliament.[100] Significantly, however, this patchwork quilt of military formations contained no units or members drawn from the English militia or Trained Bands.[101]

As we know, the king's army of 1640 was partially composed of men drawn from the English Trained Bands. This was a necessity, given the precarious state of the Exchequer at that time. But the king's attempt to use the militia as a part of a royal expeditionary army was deeply offensive to many men, especially in the wake of the anger and frustration that Charles's militia reforms had produced at the local level during

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[98] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 90.
[99] *Ibid.*, 83-84.
[100] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 85-86; Scott Wheeler, "Four armies in Ireland", in *Ireland from Independence to Occupation, 1641-1660*, edited by Jane H. Ohlmeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 45.
[101] Armstrong takes a moment to highlight this when discussing troop strengths. See Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 85.

the 1620s and 30s.[102] During the winter of 1641/2, even as the Junto was successfully managing the central government's fiscal-military response to the Irish rebellion, this anger evolved into the single most important and divisive constitutional debate of the pre-war period. The central flashpoint in this matter was the king's attempt on the 'five members' on 4 January 1642. Until that time, the wider membership of the Long Parliament was primarily focused on paying for the ever-growing laundry-list of expeditionary armies both at home and abroad, and on securing for themselves a friendly and reliable armed guard with which to protect their meeting place. In the wake of the king's provocative intrusion, the Lords and MPs were willing to follow the Junto on their march toward complete parliamentary sovereignty, something that was achieved in practice (if not truly in theory) when the Parliament seized control of the English militia at the county level by appointing its own Lords and Deputies Lieutenant in March.

Regarding the now-shifted centre of sovereignty, it is crucial to note that the Parliament's takeover of the militia was achieved via a parliamentary ordinance, an executive instrument that, unlike a true parliamentary act, was proclaimed without receiving royal assent. Because of this, all of the ordinances of the civil war and interregnum are artifacts of kingless government: the product of the Long Parliament and its successors acting solely on their own authority. Significantly, the Militia Ordinance of 5 March 1642 is the very first of these revolutionary instruments to appear in Firth and

[102] Lois G. Schwoerer, "'The Fittest Subject for a King's Quarrel': An Essay on the Militia Controversy 1641-1642," *Journal of British Studies* 11 (1971): 58.

Rait's *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum.*[103] As such, it marks the pivotal moment when the Junto finally succeeded in fully marshalling the authority of the Parliament itself – a powerful and unquestioned locus of legitimacy within the Stuart state – to the service of their rebellion against the Caroline regime. Crucially, however, it also marked the moment when the Parliament acquired (contested) control over the largest and most permanent element of the English fiscal-military system. Indeed, by March 1642 the Parliament had been in the business of managing taxes and expeditionary armies for more than a year, but with the passage of the Militia Ordinance the Lords and MPs provided themselves with the ability to raise the localities for the Junto's service at home. A domestic conflict with the king and his remaining friends was not only now possible, it was inevitable.[104]

And so civil war came to England in 1642. How are we to label and understand the confusing myriad of forces that the Parliament subsequently raised to fight it? In the first place, we need to understand that the contemporary meaning of military terminology was in flux at this time. Naturally, of course, this was because the natures of the things being labelled were undergoing rapid changes. Let us begin with the word 'militia'.[105] Thus far, I have used this term in a way that should be (or would be) familiar and

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[103] C.H. Firth and R.S. Rait , eds., *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum.* 3 vols. (London, 1911), 1-5.

[104] According to Gardiner, the earl of Pembroke asked the king if he would not, for the sake of compromise, assent to the Militia bill for a time. The king purportedly barked his reply: "By God . . . not for an hour. You have asked that of me in this, was never asked of a king, and with which I will not trust my wife and children". See Gardiner, *History of England*, vol.10, 172.

[105] A full discussion of the changing meaning of this word at this time is found in the complete text of the Oxford English Dictionary. See "militia, n.". OED Online. September 2012. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/Entry/118431?result=1&rskey=onE2le& (accessed September 13, 2012).

comfortable to both the pre-1642 and post-1945 Anglo-Saxon mind. That is, I have used it to describe defensively-oriented formations of part-time soldiers operating in an entirely parochial context, a definition that is in no way wrong. However, seventeenth-century Englishmen also used the term to describe: (1) the sum total of the nation's armed forces (real or potential); and/or (2) the legal or legitimate authority to command and deploy those forces. That they did this is not altogether surprising, of course, given what we know about the nature of the English fiscal-military arrangement before the civil war. After all, the aforementioned units of part-time, locally-paid troops were the backbone of the system, and to use this one word to refer the whole of it makes perfect sense. Nevertheless, it can be quite confusing to the modern student. Generally speaking, the reader can rest easy in the knowledge that I typically deploy the term in the first and more limited (and more modern) sense. This is because my dissertation deals with the flow of financial resources within a rapidly-changing administrative landscape, and to use the term 'militia' in its wider, more abstract sense would be to obscure a great many things.

But what about the other types of forces that could and did exist within the system? What about king's English army of 1640, or the earl of Strafford's 'new army' in Ireland? What categorical term(s) might we deploy to accurately and efficiently refer to forces such as these? Thus far I have employed the place-holder term 'expeditionary armies' – a phrase that makes sense in the context of the Crown's foreign wars, and in the case of Leicester's army of 1641. But this label is wholly inadequate when it comes to

describing and defining the armies that ranged across England during the first civil war. Neither will 'standing armies' do, for it implies a permanence that no civil war army enjoyed – save perhaps the New Model after 1645.[106] And so we are left with one final, widely-recognized option: 'regular armies'. But how exactly do we define military 'regularity' in a seventeenth-century context?

To begin with, there is no official definition of the term 'regular army' in the Oxford English Dictionary. All that we have are passing, wholly negative uses of the phrase found in the entry for 'militia'.[107] A modern 'regular army', it would seem, is what a part-time, modern militia is not: i.e., it is a full-time, non-parochial military organization (centrally) managed by a sovereign state. But the seventeenth-century state, as we well know from the work of Braddick, was a very different animal than its modern equivalent. State power was, in part, personal rather than 'bureaucratic', and as a result its manifestations were plural, heterogeneous, and often geographically decentralized. Because of all this, if we are to employ the modern word 'regular' to describe certain civil war armies, then we must recognize the complications that necessarily arise. Ultimately, I believe that English military 'regularity' existed in degrees during the civil wars, and that the resulting spectrum of organization was a mirror-reflection of the

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[106] See "army, n.". OED Online. September 2012. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/Entry/10896?rskey=RO94rd&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed September 13, 2012). Tellingly, the official definition of the phrase 'standing army', which is found within this entry, is: ". . . an army of professional soldiers kept permanently on foot, as distinguished from one raised on a special occasion and again disbanded, as were the English armies before the 17th century".

[107] Again, "militia, n.". OED Online. September 2012. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/Entry/118431?result=1&rskey=onE2le& (accessed September 13, 2012).

fragmented and hierarchical authorities that embodied the seventeenth-century state at peace. At one pole were the county-level militias and Trained Bands, and at the other were entirely new types of civil-wartime armies – those raised, equipped, staffed, and funded mostly or only by the most central and sovereign elements of the rapidly-evolving fiscal-military state. In the end, there were many important and noteworthy forces that came into existence and evolved in the administrative space between these two poles, but I believe that Essex's army was the first true (and perhaps the only pure) example of the latter on the Parliament's side.

~ **The Regular Army under the Earl of Essex: Sources and Methodologies** ~

Again, the most important tenet of my work is that Essex's army of 1642-1644 should be understood as having been a true regular army, a body of full-time soldiers that enjoyed both a direct relationship with the shifted (and shifting) centre of state sovereignty, and a unique (though seldom used) nation-wide operational mandate. The most important evidence for this is that Essex's army – from the moment of its creation until its eventual absorption into the New Model – relied almost entirely on the most centralized financial and organizational resources of the shifting factions that successively controlled and directed the Long Parliament and, by extension, the other residual elements of the Caroline central government in London. Unlike Charles's army of 1640, however, Essex's army of 1642 was fully and successfully divorced from the parochialism of the militia system thanks to the efficient management of these centralized resources; this was so despite the fact that the rebels did not have access to the

Exchequer. But what can and do we already know about this army and its institutional machinery?

Although there are a few academic works that deal specifically with Essex's army and its place in the revolutionary process, the most important of these are, in turn, very old,[108] problematic,[109] or excellent but otherwise limited by their scope and mandate.[110] The ultimate goal of my work has been to build on these contributions by providing a synthetic, contextualized guide to the copious financial records that were generated by this army and its administrative support structures during the period before the New Model Army. Anyone who wishes to understand the history of the army that fought under Essex has open to them a number of research avenues. Most obviously, there are the journals of the two Houses, as well as reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and the newsbooks and pamphlets preserved in the British Library's Thomason collection. Most of this material is currently available online, much of it in a word-searchable format.[111] More difficult to access are the various manuscript collections found in the British and Bodleian Libraries, as well as the United Kingdom's various

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[108] Godfrey Davies, "The Parliamentary Army under the Earl of Essex, 1642-5," *English Historical Review* 49, no.193 (Jan., 1934): 32-54.

[109] Aaron Graham, "Finance, localism, and military representation in the army of the earl of Essex (June – December 1642)," *Historical Journal* 52 (2009): 879-898; Aaron Graham, "The Earl of Essex and the Parliament's Army at the Battle of Edgehill: A Reassessment," *War in History* 17 (2010): 276-293.

[110] Gavin Robinson, "Horse Supply in the English Civil War, 1642-1646" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Reading, 2001); Gavin Robinson, "Horse Supply and the Development of the New Model Army, 1642-1646," *War in History* 15 (2008): 121-140.

[111] The Lords' and Commons' Journals can be accessed, free of charge, at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/. The Thomason Tracts have been digitized – along with other collections of early-modern books – by Early English books Online (http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home). Unfortunately, access to the latter requires an institutional subscription.

county record offices. Since Essex's army was an army of regulars, however, the materials found in the National Archives at Kew are of unparalleled importance. This is because the N.A. is the institution that houses the official records of the nation's central government. Fortunately, many of their seventeenth-century collections have been calendared, microfilmed, or recently made available online,[112] but some of the most important materials remain unsorted.[113] For historians of the civil wars, the most (in)famous example of this disorder can be found in the surviving financial records that were compiled by the Parliament's Committee for Taking the Accounts of the Kingdom,[114] records which are traditionally if inaccurately known as the 'Commonwealth Exchequer Papers'.

Preserved as State Papers 28, this vast sea of paper has never been extensively microfilmed or digitized.[115] It has no comprehensive calendar or index, and the existing guide – found both online[116] and on site – is painfully crude. Yet despite their disordered state, the records that make up SP28 are a treasure-trove of information pertaining to the

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[112] Many of The National Archives' State Papers manuscripts – as well as their attendant calendars – can be viewed over the internet at http://gale.cengate.co.uk/state-papers-online-15091714.aspx. As is the case with Early English Books Online, however, the user requires access to an institution that has paid for a subscription to this service.

[113] Robinson has pointed out, for example, that not all of the assessment cases found in TNA SP19 have been calendared. Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), 25. The calendar, such as it is, has of course been published: M.A.E. Green, ed., *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Advance of Money, 1642-56*, 3 vol. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1888).

[114] John Morrill, *Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630-1650* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), 69. See also D.H. Pennington, "The Accounts of the Kingdom, 1642-1649", in *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England*, edited by F.J. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 182-203.

[115] For more on the following consult Robinson, "Horse supply" (thesis), Appendix B, pp.243-254.

[116] http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/

Long Parliament's machinery of government and its ever-shifting fiscal-military arrangement. In addition to the internal records of the Committee for Taking the Accounts of Kingdom, the class contains a plethora of financial paperwork that was submitted to it during the course of its history. For our purposes, the most important parts of this paperwork are the many thousands of military pay orders – known as warrants – that make up the bulk of the first 119 volumes of the collection. These warrants, along with a host of ancillary materials such as individual officers' accounts, were supposed to help the Committee gauge and understand both the history of the Parliament's military expenditures, and the scope of its outstanding liabilities. Although it is hard to know just how comprehensively these papers were used for this purpose at the time, it is obvious that they can be so used today. This, in brief, is what I have done in the following chapters with much of the paperwork pertaining to Essex's army.

The core of my work deals with the central government's *real outlay* to Essex's army. This discussion rests on two interrelated parts of TNA SP28. The first of these parts is the main run of pay warrants that were issued by the Lord General himself between 01 August 1642 and 31 December 1644. Today, these documents can be found in TNA SP28/1A-21. Secondly, there are the warrants issued by the Committee of Safety – the Parliament's first executive body – which sat at Westminster during the earliest days of the war. Its warrants are currently preserved in TNA SP28/261-264. Taken together, I have used, measured, and analyzed more than 4,500 individual warrants from these two sub-sections of SP28. Finally, I have been able to use three separate accounts

kept by two very important government agencies to contextualize and enhance the information derived from these warrants. These accounts were compiled by Sir Gilbert Gerrard (TNA E101/676/52), Captain Francis Vernon (TNA SP28/143), and the 'Proposition' treasurers at Guildhall (TNA SP28/170). But who were these people? And what, exactly, was the 'Proposition treasury'?

By its very nature, Essex's regular army required a steady supply of real money – in specie – supplied by the central government. As it happened, the vast majority of this money was managed by two treasury apparatuses. The first of these apparatuses – the so-called Proposition treasury which operated out of Guildhall in London – can be thought of as a repository and collection depot for several of the Parliament's earliest and most successful wartime revenue schemes, schemes that will be introduced in context in the following chapters.[117] The second was the regular army's own treasury office, an office that was responsible for actually distributing the government's money to the army for a litany of authorized reasons. This army treasury was staffed by three important men. The first was Sir Gilbert Gerrard, the senior treasurer. Fifty-five years old at the outbreak of the war, Gerrard was an MP for Middlesex with a history of defying the Court during the 1620s and 30s. He was also a close ally of John Pym.[118] According to the parliamentary ordinance that officially created the army treasury on 10 August 1642, Gerrard was authorized to receive the state's money and to pay all warrants and bills subscribed by

[117] A contextual discussion of the 'Propositions' revenue scheme, for example, can be found in chapter one below.
[118] Keeler, *Long Parliament*, 185-186.

either the Houses of Parliament or the Captain General of their newly-raised regular army. Furthermore, he was authorized to deputize an unspecified number of subordinate officers who were to help him fulfill his responsibilities.[119]

In the event, Gerrard quickly appointed two deputies, one of whom was to stay with him in London while the other travelled with Essex's army in the field. The deputy who stayed behind in London was William Jessop, an experienced and well-connected administrator who had served as both a faithful personal assistant to the earl of Warwick, and as the Secretary of the Providence Island Company. Significantly, during his time at this company both Gerrard and Pym had been his close colleagues.[120] During the first civil war, Jessop's primary responsibilities included receiving large amounts of money from the Parliament's various creditors in the City on behalf of the army treasury, paying the warrants that were drafted by the Parliament through its new Committee of Safety, and supplying large amounts of money to Gerrard's other deputy, a man named Francis Vernon.

Vernon took up his duties on 1 August – even before the army treasury itself came into legal existence. Given the titular military rank of captain, Vernon immediately began receiving and distributing huge amounts of money with practiced ease. Even more

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[119] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 20-22.

[120] "Providence Island Company (*act.* 1630-1641)," Karen Ordahl Kupperman in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2012 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/theme/95346, accessed 31 Jul 2012]; and "Jessop, William (*bap.* 1603, *d.* 1675)," G.E. Aylmer in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/article/37603, accessed 31 July 2012].

than Jessop, Vernon was probably chosen because of his professional experience. For example, we know that he served as paymaster to Hamilton's amphibious expeditionary army during the First Bishops' War, when one of his most important colleagues was Sir William Uvedale, then-treasurer of the entire royal army.[121] The Junto must have regarded Vernon's skills very highly indeed, for it was none other than Uvedale who may very well have cuckolded Essex for the second time with his second wife during the 1630s![122] For whatever reason, the sordid personal history that linked Essex and Uvedale seems to have had no adverse effect whatsoever on the subsequent wartime relationship between Essex and Vernon, who was unquestionably the Lord General's most important staff officer in the field.

Taken together, the separate accounts of the Proposition treasury, Sir Gilbert Gerrard, and Captain Francis Vernon allow us to quickly and efficiently map out the majority of the revenues that were made available to Essex's army with extraordinary precision and clarity. Unfortunately, however, there are some serious limitations to these three documents that must be considered before we begin. In the first place, the reader should understand that the Parliament's reliance on the Proposition treasury to supply its regular army treasury with money gradually abated during the course of the first war, a

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[121] Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, 144-145. There is no DNB entry for Vernon, but there is every reason to believe that he was the son of Christopher Vernon, a minor cog in the vast machinery of the pre-war Exchequer. During the 1620s and 30s Christopher had made a name for himself with the king by '. . . discovering [the Crown's] concealed revenues and lost titles . . .' By the time of the personal rule, Christopher was joined in his work at the Exchequer by his son, Francis, who qualified as a barrister in 1634. See Aylmer, *King's Servants*, 314-316.

[122] Vernon Snow, *Essex the Rebel: The Life of Robert Devereux, the Third Earl of Essex 1591-1646* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 192-194. Indeed, Snow tells us that Essex had great fears that his only son – who died of the plague as an infant – was in fact *fathered* by Vernon's one-time colleague!

development that renders the accounts of the former less useful for the later phases of the army's history. This was the result of several factors, including the rise of sophisticated fiscal-military edifices in the provinces, the subsequent decentralization of certain tax revenues, and the creation of other innovative tax schemes that utilized their own internal administrative machinery. Again, all of this will be discussed in context below.

Secondly, I have been unable to unearth a separate account of Jessop's activities. This, as we shall soon see, has created a significant lacuna in my reconstructed account of the regular army's administrative and financial history, a lacuna that is only partially filled by ancillary information recovered from both Gerrard's and Vernon's paperwork. Thirdly, Gerrard and Vernon submitted their accounts to the Committee for Taking the Accounts of Kingdom on the explicit orders of the latter. Unfortunately, the order to do so was issued by that Committee on 9 March 1644, well before the end of the first civil war.[123] As a result, both documents end abruptly on 25 March 1644. All three army treasury officials remained active after this period, however, and it seems probable that Vernon kept a record of all of his subsequent payments in a second account book. Sadly, I have been unable to locate any further supplementary records composed by any of these men. As a result, my understanding of Vernon's financial activity after March 1644 – like my understanding of Jessop's activity for the entire war – is based solely on the information contained in the surviving warrants that he paid. Finally, the reader should note that I have elected to end my chronological examination of the army's pay warrants

[123] TNA SP28/252, pt.1, Order book of the Committee for Taking the Accounts of the Kingdom, f.3v.

on 31 December 1644. Although Essex's army continued to exist for a few weeks into 1645, its effective history, from an operational point of view, was over. That being said, I do recognize the importance of developing an understanding of Essex's administrative infrastructure in the moments before it was destroyed by the creation of the New Model. Ultimately, however, I decided so defer such an examination for the time being.

Again, although most of my detailed work in the following chapters focuses on spending, it is also possible to use all three of the aforementioned accounts to explore the majority of the army treasury's wartime revenues, although the recoverable information in these matters is far from systematic or uniform. Nevertheless, this information is precious because it provides us with a better understanding of the precise role of William Jessop in these matters. In addition to the revenues originally collected and managed by the Propositions treasurers, Essex's army treasury relied on a host of ever-evolving parliamentary tax schemes during the first war. As we shall soon see, it was often the case that these schemes involved accessing the indispensable networks of credit that were available to the rebels in London. In the most immediate sense, however, Gerrard's revenues – in the period before 25 March 1644, at least – can be surveyed and measured by comparing, contrasting, and reconciling his own report, Vernon's account book, and the surviving records of the Propositions treasurers. Let us proceed with this survey now.

According to Gerrard, he and his two officers received and handled a grand total of £956,429.89 during the first twenty months of the English civil war, the majority of which came from the Proposition treasury at Guildhall during 1642 and 1643. Table 0.2

demonstrates two things of high importance, while masking a third equally important point. In the first place, it demonstrates that Gerrard's own involvement in the handling of the treasury's money was insignificant. All of his receipts were collected in and around Westminster and Middlesex on the authority of just two pieces of tax legislation.[124]

Table 0.2 – Central Army Treasury Receipts: 01 Aug 1642 – 25 Mar 1644 (Sources: TNA E101/676/52 and TNA SP28/170)

Officer	Total *External* Receipts (£)	% of External Total		Total from Guildhall (£)	Guildhall receipts as % of External Total
Gerrard	3,763.41	0.39%		N/A	N/A
Jessop	743,152.90	77.70%		404,611.53	54.45%
Vernon	209,513.58	21.91%		192,259.7	91.76%
Total:	956,429.89	100.00%		596,871.23	62.41%

Secondly, it proves beyond question that Jessop's role in the receipt of the army treasury's capital was a central one. Indeed, discovering this fact only magnified my frustration at the apparent absence of his personal accounts! Finally, Table 0.2 belies the more immediate importance – from the soldiers' point of view, anyway – of Vernon. Although Vernon was the 'first recipient' of just 22 per cent of the treasury's receipts, the majority of the £956,429.89 in question passed through his hands before leaving the treasury on warrant.

[124] Collection took place in St. Margaret's, St. Martin-in-the-Fields, St. Clement Danes, and the Savoy. The taxes in question were both incarnations of the Weekly Assessment. The first was the original piece of legislation passed on 24 February 1643, and the second was the revamped and reformed Assessment of 3 August 1643. See chapters two and three below for a contextual discussion of these taxes.

One of the reasons why Vernon's account book is of such use is because he used the first four pages of it to record his own various receipts. According to Vernon, he came into the possession of no less than £601,064.44 during the 01 Aug 1642 – 25 Mar 1644 window, all of which, the reader must note, is to be accounted part of the grand total of £956,429.89 reported in Table 0.2. In addition to the aforementioned £209,513.58 in 'new-money receipts,' Vernon received £378,550.86 – in crated specie – from Jessop in London. The residuum of his income, which amounted to precisely £13,000, came from a returned quartering payment, the repayment of a loan Vernon made to the naval treasury, and a known and corrected accounting error relating to Jessop's cash transfers. Figure 0.2 illustrates all of this by graphically depicting Vernon's declared receipts by both date and immediate source. Above all, it demonstrates that Vernon – and by extension the regular army in the field – came to rely almost entirely on payments from Jessop in the period following the battle of Edgehill. Unfortunately, it is seemingly impossible to be this clear when it comes to any of these men's receipts in the period following the submission of their first batches of paperwork at the end of March 1644.


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Returns
Guildhall

These, then, were the basic mechanics and contours of the army treasury's revenues. When it comes to understanding expenditure – the expansive province of the following chapters – the three aforementioned accounts are of nearly equal use, providing us with additional information regarding otherwise undocumented payments that were made to soldiers and military suppliers. But why would such undocumented payments have taken place? In the first place, as I indicated in my 2010 article, not all of the regular soldiers' first receipts came from Gerrard's office on the authority of the thousands of surviving army-treasury warrants. During the months of July and August 1642 significant amounts of money were provided to them by the Proposition treasury directly, a process recorded only in the treasurers' account. But after Gerrard's army treasury came on stream in August the main responsibility of the Guildhall treasury became supplying this new office with funds, a process neatly mapped out above.

When it comes to later periods, it is possible to derive additional information regarding expenditure from Captain Vernon's account because he made a fairly detailed entry in his book every time he made a payment. This is important because Vernon, as an officer of the army treasury, could issue money only on warrant from either Essex or the Committee of Safety. Consequently, it is possible to recover data from his 'lost warrants' by chronicling his discharge entries for which there are no corresponding warrants in the appropriate, abovementioned sections of SP28. Sadly, although a tremendous amount of money was paid out by Jessop – again, mostly on the authority of warrants issued by the

Committee of Safety in London – it is not possible to reconstruct his 'lost warrants' without consulting his own elusive accounts.

The army treasury's pay warrants found in TNA SP28/1A-21 and 261-264, then, are *the* category of documentation that allows us to fully understand military expenditure at the political center. Let us therefore consider the basic features of these documents. Because of their uniform nature, nearly all of them record information pertaining to the following measurable variables. Today, they are (1) arranged chronologically by their date of creation. (2) Each of them also explicitly names the individual or group that was to receive money. They also record (3) why they were to receive this money, (4) and how much they were supposed to receive. They also record (5) who ordered the payment of the money in question via the authorizing signature(s), and (6) who was to pay this money. Finally, and most authoritatively, they provide (7) information about the amount of money that was actually received, and (8) when and (9) from whom it was received. I say 'most authoritatively' because the receipts that appear on most of the warrants are usually signed and dated by the recipient.

Naturally, acquiring a working understanding of *all* of these warrants (and the other relevant materials in SP28) is an extremely demanding, time-consuming, and labor-intensive exercise. Nevertheless, I resolved early on to prioritize this part of the project for the reasons listed above. How could one ever hope to understand and contextualize the reports in the newsbooks and the information found in public and private correspondence without a solid grasp of the army's financial history and administrative

evolution? I reasoned, in short, that given our currently limited understanding of Essex's army it would be better to explore and survey the most important material in SP28 than to acquire and deploy a broader but more general understanding of everything else that might be of importance. To that end, I have utilized the following methodology. To begin with, I photographed all of the material that I could, creating a collection of more than 40,000 digital images. Again, the vast majority of these photographs are of materials found in SP28. Next, focusing on the warrants, I conducted a series of organizational experiments to determine how best to sort and analyze the nine key variables mentioned above. It was at this stage that I discovered and recorded the basic administrative, organizational, and financial contours of Essex's army. Finally, after settling on an approach that would allow me to deal with the most amount of useful information in the most comprehensive and transparent manner, I proceeded to build a single database that has allowed me to view and analyze the evolving institutional machinery of Essex's army in a complete and holistic fashion.

When considering the authority and utility of this database it is important to understand the central importance of variables seven, eight, and nine. For when (10) the 'lost warrants' recovered from Vernon's account book are added into the mix, they transform my multi-variable pay-warrant database into a powerful instrument that has recorded, and can manipulate for analysis, the majority of the Parliament's *real outlay* of centralized military resources to its regular army over 29 months. Indeed, this record of outlay has been validated by many thousands of individual receipt signatures that

discharge the state from financial liability. This makes it far more potent and weighty than any politically-motivated or otherwise polemical estimate of spending.[125] But aside from carefully considering, recording, and measuring the ten aforementioned 'pre-existing' variables, how can we further categorize these documents for more in-depth analysis?

In order to perfect and clarify the army treasury's record of spending my database has been designed to slot each and every one of the 5,300 pay warrants that I have identified (both lost and surviving) into one of three 'artificial' categories. These categories are: (1) 'infantry'; (2) 'cavalry'; (3) and 'other'. Although there is no such formal division within the paperwork in an a priori sense, I contend that categorizing a warrant designed to pay a cavalry troop as a 'cavalry warrant' is a rather uncontroversial step. Indeed, the vast majority of the warrants fall rather easily and nicely into one of these three slots. Nevertheless, there are cases where the situation gets fairly complicated.

Most of the time, when ambiguity has cropped up it has done so among the warrants I have classified as 'other'. This catch-all category contains not only all of the warrants aimed at remunerating Essex's artillery train, but also a plethora of other types of payments. In order to clarify the situation, I have further subdivided all of the 'other' warrants into one of five sub-categories. These are: (1) 'artillery'; (2) 'support'; (3) 'transportation'; (4) 'arms' (meaning weapons purchases); and (5) 'local forces'.

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[125] For an interesting and relevant example of contemporary military spending totals being compiled and deployed for such political/polemical purposes consult Stewart, "English funding of the Scottish armies", 573-593.

Although it is true that a certain amount of ambiguity remains (mostly in the 'support' sub-category, which, in effect, acts as a repository for miscellaneous and administrative payments), executing this categorical division and subdivision of the warrants has allowed me to proceed with a mechanical form of analysis that operates with a very high degree of cross-variable precision. For example, I can tell the reader just how many 'cavalry' warrants were issued by Essex and paid by Vernon during any given month. Furthermore, I can measure their total and relative worth, and I can usually comment on their survival rate in the archives. I have, in short, developed the ability to measure the real performance of the fiscal-military machinery of Essex's regular army with a high degree of both precision and authority. Ultimately, the following chapters can perhaps best be understood as a contextualized report of this sophisticated measuring process. Now, let us get on with it.

Chapter One: August – October 1642

~ Introduction ~

The purpose of this chapter is to lay bare the administrative and financial history of the Parliament's first regular army and the centralized treasury that created and sustained it during the first three months of the civil war. More to the point, it will explain how that army dominated the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement during this critical period, and demonstrate that the whole of it enjoyed full payment throughout. In order to accomplish all this, the chapter's empirical core has been designed to follow the contours of army treasury's pay warrants, using the three categories (and five sub-categories) that I have introduced to make sense of them. Like the data found in the three chapters that follow it, the data presented here concern themselves only with those warrants that were paid – as opposed to issued – during the period under consideration. What this means – on a practical level – is that the very small number of warrants that were issued during the months of August, September, and October 1642, but paid during later periods, are excluded from the following analyses. In order to promote clarity and facilitate easy reference, the information presented in this chapter has been compartmentalized for the benefit of the reader. The chapter consists of four sections.

The first section provides the reader with a brief political and operational narrative designed to contextualize the large amounts of data and the extensive analyses found in the other three sections. It provides a brief introduction of Essex himself, and describes certain key events and decisions that led to the creation of the regular army. It

also charts both the army's movements and its major activities during the period in question. The second section of the chapter deals in detail with the financial and logistical data pertaining to the creation of the Lord General's infantry regiments. These formations quickly became (and remained) the core of the regular army, and the warrants that were issued and paid (or filled, in the case of supply warrants) on their behalf provide the data that are examined here. Again, although this section deals with both the raising and equipping of these units, it does not discuss their pay history during this period in any detail. Readers interested in discovering more about this interesting and important subject are encouraged to consult my 2010 article.[126]

The third section of the chapter discusses the administrative processes that lay behind the creation, outfitting, and remuneration of Essex's various cavalry formations; it deals more thoroughly with the subject of the horsemen's pay because I did not have the opportunity to deal with this topic in my aforementioned article. Once again, data derived from the cavalry's pay and supply warrants sit at the centre of this discussion. Finally, the last section surveys and contextualizes the many warrants that were issued and paid for 'other' reasons during the Edgehill campaign. Framed by a key table that provides the reader with a very clear contextual understanding of the relative importance of each of the five sub-categories that fall under this heading, it utilizes a host of supplementary material from the National Archives to introduce the army's artillery train and the logistical processes that underpinned its transportation network. In addition to this, it

[126] Tom Crawshaw, "Military finance and the earl of Essex's infantry in 1642 – a reinterpretation," *Historical Journal* 53 (2010): 1037-1048.

demonstrates the importance of Gerrard's treasury to some of the earliest and most important the Parliament's newly-raised county-level military formations – 'quasi-regular' forces that existed between the poles of the wartime 'spectrum' of regularity that was introduced and discussed above.

~ I ~

As we know, by the summer of 1642 relations between King Charles I and the revolutionary Junto that controlled the Long Parliament had long since reached an irresolvable crisis point. Civil war in England was by then inevitable, and securing widespread control of nation's militia apparatus was no longer enough. On 9 June the Houses passed the 'Propositions' Ordinance, calling on the well-affected people of England to lend as many or as much horses, arms, money, and plate as they were willing to provide, and a new London-based treasury was established to act as a repository for all of the plate and specie subsequently collected.[127] Commissaries were to be appointed to both value and register the horses and weapons proffered. Although an interest rate of eight percent was promised, the proposed loan was an unsecured one; all lenders were asked to accept the Parliament's credit on the 'Public Faith' alone. Significantly, although the Parliament appointed four London Aldermen to act as the Treasurers of this borrowed money,[128] the scope of the request was nation-wide. Everyone within eighty miles of

[127] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 6-9.
[128] Alderman Sir John Wallaston, along with Aldermen [John] Towes, [John] Warner, and [Thomas] Andrewes. See *Ibid.* See also Valerie Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City*

London was asked to deliver their contributions into the central treasury within two weeks, while everyone dwelling further afield was given three weeks to comply. Fittingly, the rebels' Militia Committee of London was tasked with handling all of the donations received in the City,[129] while the Parliament was to approve the appointment of local collectors nominated by the elite in each of the counties. Although the Ordinance itself does not say so, we know that two men – John Smith and Thomas Richardson – were put in charge of registering and valuing the horses that soon began to collect at Moorefields.[130]

On 4 July, less than one month after the passage of the Propositions Ordinance, the Junto established a parliamentary 'Committee of Safety' – an amorphous and ad hoc executive body designed to monitor and coordinate the Parliament's military affairs throughout England.[131] Composed of important members from both houses, this new Committee was similar in form and function to the Long Parliament's Committee for Irish Affairs, a body that was, as we know, created with royal approval on 2 November 1641.[132] Like the Committee of Safety created nine months later, the Irish Committee was a bicameral body of lords and MPs employed to direct the creation and deployment of armed forces, namely the expeditionary army raised by the earl of Leicester during the

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Government and National Politics, 1625-43 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 309-311, and 325-331.

[129] All of the aforementioned Aldermen-treasurers had already been appointed to the City's own Militia Committee. See Pearl, *London*, passim.

[130] Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), Appendix C.

[131] *CJ*, ii, 651; Lotte Glow, "The Committee of Safety," *English Historical Review* 80 (1965): 289-313; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, 342; Wallace Notestein, "The Establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms," *The American Historical Review* 17 (1912): 477-478.

[132] *CJ*, ii, 301-302. See also Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 453-457.

winter of 1641/2. There were important differences between the two bodies, however. During the final weeks of 1641 both the Committee for Irish Affairs and the earl of Leicester were operating under the auspices of the Crown.[133] The passage of the Militia Ordinance destroyed this arrangement, of course, pressing the hilt of the nation's sword firmly into the palms of the Junto. Henceforth the new Committee of Safety would make war at the behest of the new sovereign authority as embodied in the two Houses of Parliament.

Following the passage of the Propositions Ordinance, and the creation of a de facto executive arm of government, the rebels resolved to arm themselves for a nationwide conflict with the king. Almost two weeks after the creation of the new Committee of Safety the two Houses passed another ordinance appointing Robert Devereux, the third earl of Essex, Captain General of an all-new army of regular soldiers that was to be raised on, and maintained by, the Propositions.[134] Subordinating him only to the Houses themselves, this new ordinance gave Essex an enormous amount of military power on a truly national scale.

> The said Lords and Commons do constitute and ordain him . . . to be the Captain-General and Chief Commander of the Army appointed to be raised, and of all other Forces of the Kingdom, for the Ends and Purposes aforementioned; and that he the said Earl shall have and enjoy all Power, Titles, Preheminence, Authority, Jurisdiction, and Liberties, incident and belonging to the Said Office of Captain General, throughout the whole Kingdom of England and Dominion of Wales, in

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[133] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 76; *L[ords] J[ournal]*, iv, 424-425, and 429. Although royal control over the English sword was increasingly tenuous during these heady weeks, the Crown was naturally viewed as an important source of legitimacy for some. For example, on 9 November 1641 Leicester wrote to the House of Lords expressing his concern that his commission did not emanate directly from the king. They reassured him that the king had personally authorized their military preparations when it came to Ireland.

[134] 15 July 1642. Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 14-16; *LJ*, v, 186.

> as large and ample a Manner as any other General of an Army in this Kingdom hath lawfully used exercised, and enjoyed; to have, hold, and execute the Office of Captain-General, in such Manner, and according to such Instructions, as he shall from Time to Time, receive from both Houses of Parliament.

In addition to these sweeping powers, Essex was given the authority to command or appropriate all of the king's erstwhile ships, forts, and castles, as well as the right to establish a framework for the command and control of his new army, and to appoint its officers. Although this development did not replace or displace the country's ever-evolving network of pro-Parliamentarian Lord Lieutenants and Trained Bands, it did situate Essex and his new army at the apex of the rebels' fiscal-military hierarchy. But why did the Junto choose Essex for such an important position?

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The third earl of Essex was the scion of a very powerful and respected noble family.[135] However, his famous and flamboyant father – the second earl – was executed as a traitor to the Crown in 1601 when his son was just ten years old. Fortunately, the old earl had been a friend to the Stuart king of Scotland, and all of his father's titles were restored to young Robert by the new King James I upon the latter's ascension. Tellingly, however, the young earl failed to solidify what could have been a close and rewarding relationship with the new royal family during his teenage years. His first marriage to Frances Howard, that disagreeable coquette, ended miserably when her family successfully petitioned James to arrange an annulment on the grounds of Essex's

[135] For a scholarly overview of the man's life see "Devereux, Robert, third earl of Essex (1591-1646)," John Morrill in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/article/7566, accessed 22 Feb 2012].

supposed impotency.[136] And a personal – if turbulent – relationship with Prince Henry, a young man his own age, proved fruitless when the latter died of typhoid fever at the age of eighteen.[137] Socially isolated, Essex quickly became something of a pariah at court, and his relations with the Crown and its political dependants did not improve during the new reign.

Throughout the early 1620s Essex lived the life of a peripatetic soldier. During the final years of King James's reign he spent several summers – and at least one winter – on the continent, serving as a regimental commander in a series of quasi-independent 'armies' of privately-raised Englishmen. James was not a bellicose king, however, and he proved reluctant to commit the English Crown to an open war with Spain and the Empire, despite the fact that Essex and his comrades went overseas to defend the interests of the king's son-in-law and the cause of international Protestantism.[138] Because of this, these expeditionary armies – including Essex's own regiment – were constructed by aristocratic volunteers: powerful elites who, operating with the approval of their sovereign, fielded soldiers levied largely on the basis of their own authorities and reputations.[139] By 1624, however, James was compelled to enter into a defensive alliance

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[136] Edward Le Comte, *The Notorious Lady Essex* (New York: The Dial Press, 1969), chapter five especially. Vernon Snow has claimed that in her youth her political and social rivals viewed her as ". . . a mischievous, changeable minx capable of much inquiry". Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 27.

[137] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 48; Micheal J. Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars* (London: The Penguin Group, 2008), 478.

[138] *Ibid.*, 98-100. Hoping to keep his costs down and his foreign policy options open, James declared that the first of these actions constituted only an 'auxiliary war'.

[139] *Ibid.*, 95, 111, and 118-121. During the summer of 1624, for example, the king asked the lord lieutenants to help his appointed colonels raise volunteers for a new expedition to aid the Dutch. Essex,

with the Dutch, and as a result Essex found himself personally bound by a three-year contract to foreign paymasters at The Hague.[140] Present throughout the following winter during the failed attempt to relieve the besieged city of Breda, Essex watched his men and his colleagues succumb to the ever-present pestilence.[141]

Perhaps mercifully, Essex's pseudo-mercenary employment was put on hiatus by the new king in the spring of 1625. Charles I, unlike his father, was resolved to commit both his Crown and the Kingdom of England to an aggressive and open conflict with the Habsburgs, with or without the assistance of a parliament. Upon assuming the throne he quickly decided to mobilize a massive armada for an assault on Spain itself. Essex was soon ordered by the Privy Council to impress soldiers as the Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire;[142] he was also summoned to personally command both ships and troops in this royal venture. Although Charles and his creatures had developed no love of the taciturn Essex, they decided to exploit his nation-wide popularity and military reputation on this important occasion. Essex was unable to refuse a direct order from the king, of course, and so he found himself serving under the much-hated duke of Buckingham during the ill-fated raid on Cádiz. Buckingham himself was not physically present during the raid, but his deputy – Sir Edward Cecil – was widely criticized for his role in botching this high-profile operation. In the wake of this failure Cecil's colonels and subordinates

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who was Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire at the time, seems to have secured at least some of his private soldiers in that county by way of the press. See also TNA SP14/174 f.114.

[140] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, p.158, n.16.

[141] *Ibid.*, 121-121.

[142] *Ibid.*, 126.

turned on him, but the king insulated him from the worst of the fallout and elevated him to the peerage.[143] Thoroughly disgusted, Essex restored his regiment with Staffordshire levies, returned to his Dutch employers to complete his military contract, and resolved never to serve under Buckingham again. He never did. When his contract with the Dutch expired on 4 November 1626 Charles ordered him to participate in a new Crown-sponsored military adventure in Denmark. Essex, again passed over for supreme command, resigned his regimental commission and returned to England.[144]

Mistrusted and disliked by Charles and Buckingham, Essex found powerful friends and allies among his peers and relatives in the Parliaments of the 1620s. Whenever the Houses sat, Essex was in attendance, defending these colleagues whenever they found themselves under political or legal attack by the king and his cronies.[145] Nearly every action Essex took seemed calculated to increase the king's displeasure. After the dissolution of Parliament in 1626 Essex was briefly removed from the Lieutenancy and quite literally black-listed by the king's Privy Councilors because of his high-profile refusal to comply with Charles's contentious demand for an extra-parliamentary 'Forced Loan'.[146] When the king was forced to call a new parliament in 1628 he met with a renewed attack on his policies, and Essex was again conspicuous within the 'knot' of parliamentary belligerents. After playing a supporting role in both the

[143] *Ibid.*, 144-147.
[144] *Ibid.*, 147, 158-162.
[145] Morrill, "Devereux, Robert, third earl of Essex (1591-1646)". Morrill notes that Essex was rarely absent from the parliament, whenever it was called. For specific examples of Essex's eagerness to defend the power and autonomy of the 'opposition' peers see also Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, pp.152-158.
[146] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 162-167; Cust, *Forced Loan*, 108-109.

impeachment of Dr. Roger Manwaring and the passage of the Petition of Right, Essex was even briefly implicated in the murder of his most hated rival, the duke of Buckingham.[147]

If Essex's military and political activities during the 1620s made him the enemy of the king's often inept and autocratically-inclined toadies, they also solidified his reputation within his own increasingly important circle of friends and allies. As we know, by the time of the Bishops' Wars this circle included extremely wealthy peers, such as the earl of Bedford, as well as relatively poor commoners, such as his employee John Pym. Again, all were then loosely organized around the earl of Warwick.[148] Although others within this circle may have been wealthier, or more Machiavellian, Essex alone possessed the potent combination of continental military experience, high birth, and near-legendary parentage. Taken together, these attributes made Essex both a national figure and a very dangerous man to alienate.[149] In 1638 Charles, still harboring a personal dislike of Essex, recognized the need to harness both his abilities and his reputation for the Crown's upcoming war with the Scottish rebels.

Essex acquitted himself well during the first of the two Bishops' Wars, serving as one of the Crown's generals. However, he continued to suffer abuse and humiliation at the hands of his royal master. He was demoted during the opening weeks of the war to

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[147] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 167-178; for a discussion of Manwarring's absolutist beliefs and sermons – which Charles much loved – see Cust, *Forced Loan*, chapter one: passim.
[148] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, prologue and chapter one, passim. For a comparison of Bedford's income to Pym's, see p.139.
[149] *Ibid.*, 13-14.

make room for the Queen's candidate, and then wrongly suspected of inviting treasonous correspondence from the Scots during the height of the army's deployment in 1639.[150] Discarded and ignored in the aftermath of the pacification of Berwick, the arrival of the earl of Strafford from Ireland, and the subsequent collapse of the Short Parliament, Essex threw his lot in with the English rebels – the disaffected Lords and MPs who were by then conspiring with the Scots.[151] He did not serve as a soldier in the Second Bishops' War, the Scottish invasion of England that he and six other treasonous peers helped instigate.[152] But due to the ever-growing power of the Warwick-Bedford circle Essex was appointed to the English commission created to negotiate a peace accord with the Covenanters.[153]

During 1641 Essex emerged as one of the most radical and hard-line members of the pre-war Junto. For example, he played a central role in the death of Strafford.[154] But despite perpetrating this unforgiveable offense, the king resolved to promote Essex in a clumsy and misguided ploy to appease his most dedicated opponents. As a result, during that summer he was appointed both Lord Chamberlain and Captain General of all English

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[150] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 214-220.
[151] Again, Scott, *Politics and War*, 26-29.
[152] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 230; Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 45-50. The seven traitors were the earls of Warwick, Bedford, and Essex, as well as Lords Mandeville, Saye, Savile, and Brooke.
[153] Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 83.
[154] During the last week of April 1641 the earl of Bedford – one of the Junto's more moderate members – tried to broker a deal to save Strafford's life (and bridge the gulf between the king and the Junto). Essex famously insisted upon a death sentence with the words: "Stone-dead hath no fellow". Essex, Adamson explains, understood that any lesser punishment could easily be undone by Charles in the future. See Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 264-265.

forces south of the river Trent.[155] Naturally, this ploy failed. Essex used his new military authority to establish a temporary guard around the Parliament buildings during the month of October. This small force was initially composed of militiamen drawn from the Westminster Trained Bands, and in November it was argued that the proceeds of the Poll tax should be used to support them.[156] As the constitutional crisis escalated, Essex's allies went on to propose that he mobilize other Trained Bands without consulting the king.[157] By the end of 1641 Essex sat at the very centre of the Junto's military affairs in England. This remained so despite the king's decision to dismiss him as Captain General South of the Trent on 26 November.[158] After the passage of the Militia Ordinance Essex resigned his royal commissions as Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire and Yorkshire, and promptly accepted new ones issued by the Long Parliament.[159] Four months later, he was given the power and the money to raise a regular army for service in England on its behalf.

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Both the creation of the Committee of Safety (of which Essex was a member) and the issuing of Essex's army commission were revolutionary developments in the sense that they represent the Long Parliament's first unambiguous attempt at organizing and managing warfare as the sovereign political centre of the state. Indeed, as the civil war

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[155] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 268-269. Essex was made Lord Chamberlain in July 1641. He was appointed Captain General by the king on 9 August.
[156] Lawson Chase Nagel, "The Militia of London, 1641-1649" (Unpublished PhD thesis, King's College, London, 1982), 28..
[157] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 277-283; Schwoerer, "Fittest Subject," 50-52.
[158] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 284-285.
[159] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 1-5; Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 296.

unfolded both Essex (as Lord General) and the Committee of Safety (as the Parliament's executive arm) periodically attempted to exert their nominal authority over the country's Trained Bands and quasi-regular regional forces. But during the final weeks of July 1642 both were consumed by the enormous task of creating and deploying the new military formations that would soon form the core of their regular army. Aside from the money, equipment, and horses that were then beginning to pour in on the Propositions, Essex and his political masters needed personnel. Procuring the first of these men proved easy enough, however, thanks to the rebels' control of London. In May the City – by then firmly under the control of its own pro-Junto Committee of Safety[160] – had responded to the Militia Ordinance by staging a carefully orchestrated demonstration of both its military preparedness and its readiness to support the Parliament. About eight thousand of the City's newly-regimented Trained Bandsmen mustered at Finsbury Fields on tenth of that month. There they were reviewed by many members of the Commons, as well as several of the most important rebel peers. Essex himself decided to attend in a newly-purchased gilt coach.[161] With the local Trained Bands firmly on their side, Essex and the Parliamentary Committee of Safety were free to harness a groundswell of popular enthusiasm and recruit large numbers of soldiers for their new army within the City.

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[160] This body was also known as the London Militia Committee. Recall that it was the body entrusted with the collection of Proposition money in the City. It is not to be confused with the Parliament's own executive body of the same name, the body with which Essex shared his nation-wide military powers. See Nagel, "Militia of London", 36-47; Pearl, *London*, 147-154.

[161] Fletcher, *Outbreak*, 334.

Preparations for the coming campaign began in earnest on 9 July when the Commons officially put out the call for ten thousand volunteers. Over the course of the following three weeks, the Proposition treasury at Guildhall laid out thousands of pounds for the purchase of weapons, equipment, and additional horses to add to the hundreds that had already been lent.[162] Officers and soldiers – some of whom were originally slated to serve in the 'Irish Adventurers'' semi-private expedition to Ireland, and a few of whom were already officers in the London Trained Bands[163] – were organized into new troops and regiments as they signed up for regular service in England under Essex. By the end of July, no fewer than three fully-mustered infantry regiments and thirty five partially-constituted troops of horse had been raised.[164] Some of these men, particularly the cavalrymen, were clearly raised and organized outside the metropolis, but the vast majority of them were undoubtedly Londoners. All were regulars in the sense that they now served both Essex and the parliamentary government directly, receiving large amounts of equipment, horses, and *advance* salary money from the central government's Proposition treasury at Guildhall.

During the second and third weeks of August some of the largest and most important of these first units – the nucleus of the much larger army to come – were

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[162] Fletcher, *Outbreak*, 338-339; TNA SP28/170; Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), Table 5, pp.51-52. Robinson tells us that 658 cavalry horses were registered by the Proposition commissioners before 1 August 1642. Still more were purchased by the Propositions treasurers at Guildhall.

[163] For more on this proposed Irish expedition see sections II and III below; for a discussion of the militia officers who sought a better commission (i.e. a higher rank) in Essex's new regular army see Nagel, "Militia of London", 66.

[164] For the number of horse troops in service as of 1 August see Table 1.12 below. It would seem that most of these troops had only their officers enrolled by that date.

dispatched from the capital for service in the localities. Although the process of recruitment, supply, and organization within Essex's army was as yet incomplete, there was then no time to lose, for the Houses of Parliament had identified two immediate military priorities. The first of these priorities was the recovery of Portsmouth. Originally held for the rebels by the mercurial Colonel George Goring, this important seaport was lost to the Parliament during the final days of July when Goring decided to declare for the king. Resolved to reacquire the town, the Committee of Safety committed £1,000 of the regular army's centralized resources to the task, sending the money by caravan to Sir William Lewis, one of the Parliament's Deputy Lieutenants in Hampshire.[165] To protect this sizable investment the Committee also dispatched two of its newly-levied regular cavalry troops, one under the command of Colonel Sir William Waller, and the other under Captain John Urry.[166] Both Waller's horsemen and the money arrived safely on 5 August, and thanks to the support provided by the earl of Warwick's Parliamentarian navy, Goring soon found himself effectively besieged by both land and sea. On the 16 August even more help arrived from London. This came in the form of an additional £2,000 of central treasury money protected by Sir John Merrick's infantry regiment, one of the complete and fully-paid formations originally levied from the mass of eager Londoners during the final days of July. Goring was forced to surrender on 5 September,

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[165] John Adair, *Roundhead General: A Military Biography of Sir William Waller* (London: MacDonald and Company, 1969), 45; TNA SP28/129/8; TNA SP28/261 f.6. Confirmation that Lewis was then serving as a Deputy Lieutenant of Hampshire can be found in a letter he and his colleagues sent to the House of Lords on 23 June 1642; see *LJ*, v, 156.
[166] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 45.

and Merrick's regiment – originally raised as a regular unit by the Proposition treasury in London – spent the remainder of the Edgehill campaign serving Lewis as a garrison formation, drawing pay from the new governor's (centrally-subsidized) coffers.[167]

Securing Portsmouth was important, but so too was preventing the royalists from establishing military dominance in the county of Warwickshire. Situated near the geographic centre of the kingdom, Warwickshire was then crisscrossed by several strategically-important roadways. During the summer of 1642, both the king and the Parliament had powerful friends in the county, and both factions made numerous attempts to raise significant local forces via the execution of the Commission of Array and the Militia Ordinance. Crucially, however, neither camp succeeded in quashing the activities of the other. This was not from a lack of trying. On 5 July Lord Brooke – the Parliament's appointed Lord Lieutenant – removed the militia's arsenal from Coventry to his own seat of Warwick Castle.[168] Soon afterward, the Parliament resolved to send him a supply of cannon and other munitions from London, and these weapons duly arrived at Banbury on 29 July.[169] The next day, Brooke tried to convey these weapons to Warwick, but he was blocked by the earl of Northampton, who had mustered local forces equal to Brooke's. Stalemated, Brooke raced to London to secure further military support from the

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[167] Crawshaw, "Military finance," p.1040, n.15. For a narrative of the siege see Adair, *Roundhead General*, 46-47.
[168] Tennant, Philip, *Edgehill and Beyond: The People's War in the South Midlands, 1642-1645* (Stroud: Alan Sutton Publishing, 1992), 26,
[169] *Ibid.*, 27.

central government. In his absence the local royalists seized the initiative, capturing the Banbury arsenal, and laying siege to Warwick castle itself within a week.

Enraged both by the loss of the Banbury magazine and Northampton's attack on his castle, Brooke sought and obtained Parliamentary approval to mobilize a relief force consisting of some of the new formations of regular soldiers then assembling at staging points around London.[170] Although Essex himself had not yet taken the field, he sent one of his most trusted lieutenants – Sir John Merrick[171] – to assume command of these regulars on 20 August. Though Merrick's own regiment was then engaged at Portsmouth, he marshaled all of the available units then stationed in and around Buckingham and marched for Warwickshire the very next day.[172] By the twenty-second they were there; and, in short order, they lifted the siege of Warwick and scattered the cavaliers under Northampton.[173] A day later, they occupied Coventry. Here they stayed for a week, overawing the local royalists, and providing by their presence a visceral demonstration of the Parliament's reach and power. Ultimately, the march to Coventry was an impressive

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[170] *CJ*, ii, 720. On 15 August the Committee of Safety reported to the Commons' that this force, consisting of eleven troops of cavalry and 4,800 infantrymen, had already been dispatched. See also Ann Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 148; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, 339.

[171] For an overview of the close relationship between Essex and Merrick, as well as some of the reasons for Essex's faith in the man see Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 47.

[172] We know that Merrick was assigned to command these forces because Sgt. Nehemiah Wharton tells us that "This day [20 August] our Sergeant-Major General came unto us and declared the command given him over our regiments". Although Merrick is not mentioned by name, the pay warrants tell us that he was serving in this role at this time. Furthermore, although it is true that his infantry regiment was dispatched to Portsmouth around this time, there is no record of him being physically present with that unit when Lewis assumed financial responsibility for it. TNA SP28/1A f.256; TNA SP28/129/8 f.5; William Douglas Hamilton, ed. *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I 1641-43*. Vol.18. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887), 379. It should be noted that Hamilton's transcription of the Wharton letter is in error here. The quote I provide is taken from the manuscript: TNA SP16/491 f.309.

[173] Tennant, *Edgehill and Beyond*, 44-45; *CSPD*, vol.18, 380.

military display that took little more than a week to organize and execute. But it would not have been possible without the centralized resources managed by the Proposition treasurers in London, a fact never far from the minds of the regulars themselves. On 30 August, Sgt. Nehemiah Wharton, a London apprentice then serving with Colonel Denzil Holles's red-coats, took the time to inform his master that the horse and horseman he had lent were alive and well, both having survived the first significant clash of the English civil war.[174]

On 1 September Merrick's command departed Coventry. A day later, they arrived at Northampton, where they were soon joined by both Essex himself and other elements of his new army. During the following week Sgt. Wharton reported the steady arrival of more and more regular formations[175] – units composed of soldiers who needed both standardized training and regular infusions of pay. Both needs were readily met, although the administrative machinery that provided the latter had evolved significantly since the creation and deployment of Merrick's command. On 10 August the Houses had passed an ordinance that created a new treasury apparatus dedicated to the maintenance and support of the regular army.[176] This new layer of the Parliament's centralized military bureaucracy was designed to operate in the administrative space between the Proposition treasury that continued to provide nearly all of the army's funds, and the officers and units that comprised the army itself. According to this ordinance, Sir Gilbert Gerrard

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[174] *CSPD*, vol.18, 382.
[175] *Ibid.*, 384-385.
[176] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 20-22.

would henceforth be responsible for providing the regular army with the money it needed to survive. But in at least one important regard the passage of this ordinance was largely a formality. For ever since 1 August Captain Francis Vernon – one of Gerrard's two appointed deputies – had been receiving enormous sums from the Proposition treasury in London, and distributing the same on warrant from both the Committee of Safety and the earl of Essex.

All told, Vernon received exactly £100,000 from the Proposition treasurers during the month of August 1642.[177] And although it may be impossible to confirm, it seems highly likely that a great deal of this specie was 'borrowed' from the Irish Adventurers, who had originally fronted the money to support a largely abortive semi-private military venture designed to crush the Irish Catholic rebels and secure lands on that island. In late July, even as they were in the process of snatching up some of the officers and horsemen recently levied and retained by this group, the Committee of Safety formally asked the Adventurers to lend them precisely £100,000 for use in England. And though it seems that at least some of this money was soon repaid by the Parliament, it is very likely that the regular army could not have come into being so readily or so forcefully without this loan.[178] The liberal application of this money during August meant that by 9 September

[177] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.4v.

[178] Robert Armstrong has reviewed the manuscript accounts of the Adventurers now preserved in the British Library, and he tells us that as of January 1643 these documents record a credit of £73,346 2s 10 lent for service in England. I have not had the chance to review these records, but it seems possible to me that this sum represents the *residual outstanding* amount, rather than the *untouched principal* amount. In either case, however, this means that that the Propositions money itself provided (either at the time, or retrospectively) the additional £26,000 transferred to Vernon during the month of August 1642. Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 90.

the remaining bulk of the regular army was finally ready to take the field. On that day Essex departed London to assume command, sent on his way by the cheering ranks of the



Figure 1.1 - P[arliamentary] A[rchives] HL/PO/JO/10/1/130, 28 July 1642: A signed copy of the letter the Committee of Safety sent to the Irish Adventurers requesting the loan of £100,000.

London Trained Bands. A day later he was in Northampton – the assigned rendezvous point – where he received a similar display from his own troops.[179]

Unfortunately, however, all was not well at Northampton during the second week of September. Despite the excitement and enthusiasm which must surely have erupted upon Essex's arrival, many of the Lord General's soldiers were quite disgruntled by the time he appeared in the field. In fact, Sgt. Wharton was apparently so moved by his comrades' unruly behavior that he wrote a special letter to his old master to describe what was happening.[180] According to Wharton, part of the army threatened to abandon the colours when led into the field to drill on 7 September. The issue was money; and while some historians have interpreted this event as a symptom of the Parliament's inability to provide their new army with wages, I have elsewhere demonstrated that this was not the case.[181] Instead, it would appear that the disturbances Wharton reported were the result of a change in policy that took effect around the time of the treasury ordinance of 10 August. At that time Gerrard's deputies began paying Essex's infantry colonels 'levy money' – a lump sum worth 10s per private soldier – *in addition* to their soldiers' wages. The idea was to 'encourage' (read: 'purchase') voluntary enlistment in the second wave of units then being brought into existence. The problem with this new policy, it would seem, was that the London levies raised in July – the soldiers who had raced to Coventry

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[179] Nagel, "Militia of London", 69-70; B[ritish] L[ibrary] Thomason [Tracts] E.202[44], Matthew Walbancke, *Remarkable passages, or, A perfect diurnall of the weekly proceedings in both Houses of Parliament collected for the satisfaction of al [sic] those that desire true information* (London: Mathew Walband and J.W., 1642); *CSPD*, vol.18, 88.
[180] *CSPD*, vol.18, 385-386; TNA SP16/492 f.9.
[181] Graham, "Military Representation", 895; Crawshaw, "Military finance", 1042.

under Merrick – were never given this money, although they, like all their comrades, always received their wages in advance of service. This, however, was no longer enough. Although their pockets were then bulging with a fresh installment of the Parliament's coin, Wharton's comrades were evidently outraged when they heard of the even sweeter deal the men in the newer regiments were getting. Wharton's disgust at this attitude is still palpable, as is his anger at the well-paid cavalrymen who were prone to steal from the foot soldiers. In the autumn of 1642 Essex's men sometimes behaved like the army of the righteous that some wanted, but they were just as inclined to act like the mercenaries so many of them truly were.[182]

So long as there was money, there was a large and powerful regular army that was available for service anywhere. After spending more than a week at Northampton Essex resolved to march to the relief of Worcester, which was occupied by Lord Byron's cavaliers on 16 September. His goal in this was probably to disrupt the king's recruiting efforts in Worcestershire and Herefordshire.[183] On 23 September advance units of both armies made contact at Powick Bridge, near Alcester in Warwickshire. The resulting skirmish, though dramatic in the retelling, was relatively minor and inconclusive, and

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[182] This is not simply an interpretation I have adopted *ex post facto*. After reviewing his troops at Northampton, Essex expressed great concern about the quality of soldier the Proposition money has purchased. Crawshaw, "Military finance", 1043; BL Thomason E.118[12], S.R., *Good news from Banbury in Oxfordshire: relating how two troops of horse, under the command of my Lord Says two sons, pursued divers cavalleers as they fled from Oxford toward Worchester, and tooke eight of them prisoners . . .* (London: J. Wright, 1642); and BL Thomason 669.f.5[77], Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, *A letter sent from His Excellency, Robert Earle of Essex, &c. to the Lord Mayor of London* (London: William Gay, 1642). The royalists too believed that Essex's men were generally mutinous and unruly at this time. Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War 1642-1649*, vol.1 (London: Longmans, 1888), 30.

[183] David Sidney Evans, "The Civil War Career of Major-General Edward Massey (1642-1647)" (Unpublished PhD thesis, King's College London, 1995), 16-17.

Essex subsequently moved into Worcester itself, displacing the royalists by the end of the month. Essex was now resolved to secure Gloucestershire, and cut off the king's lifeline to southern Wales. To these ends he detached one of his new infantry regiments – the earl of Stamford's – to occupy the newly-captured city of Hereford during the first week of October.[184] Once this was accomplished Essex sat back and waited, secure in the knowledge that his army was both fully paid and in a good position to watch over the king, who was then at Shrewsbury to the north. Too late did Essex realize that Charles's royal army – newly-bolstered by Welsh levies from the north – was on the move toward London. Departing Worcester on 19 October, Essex chased the cavaliers back into Warwickshire, where both armies clashed in a dramatic, if inconclusive, pitched battle outside the town of Kineton on the twenty third.

~ II ~

As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the regular foot soldiers raised to fight Charles I during the Edgehill campaign enjoyed full payment throughout the first three months of the first English civil war.[185] However, there is much that can be said about the administration of the Lord General's infantry regiments that does not appear in that publication. The purpose of this section is to further explore the early history of Essex's infantry in order to understand the full lengths that the Long Parliament's central military administrators went to in their efforts to raise and equip this arm. As will also be the case

[184] Evans, "Edward Massey", 18-21; Malcolm Wanklyn and Frank Jones, *A Military History of the English Civil War, 1642-1646: Strategy and Tactics* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2005), 43-48.
[185] Crawshaw, "Military finance".

for the cavalry, this will mean exploring several collections of documents in an effort to be both comprehensive and precise. Again, one of the central goals of this discussion will be to prove that Essex's soldiers wanted for nothing during this first phase of the war – a situation that stands in sharp contrast to the general impression we have about the material conditions within other armies at other times during the British wars.

Again, although some of Essex's foot soldiers received a portion of their salary money from the Proposition treasurers directly,[186] their single most important source of money was the army treasury managed by Sir Gilbert Gerrard and his two deputies. It therefore makes sense to begin this discussion with a description of the total amounts spent by these men on the Lord General's foot soldiers. In the end, this amounted to £94,687.29 over three months, a total that can be readily broken down by both month and sub-treasurer. Figure 1.2 is a visual representation of this process. Although his spending declined slightly in September, Vernon's contribution to this total was by far the most significant, representing no less than 84 per cent of the army treasury's contribution. Let us therefore proceed by laying out what percentage of his spending had to be reconstructed from his account book. This information can be found in Table 1.1 below. Here we can see that even though 16 per cent of Vernon's infantry warrants for this period are missing, we are fortunate in the sense that the missing paperwork tends to be much less valuable than the surviving documentation. Although there may very well be systemic reasons for this, I am at a loss to explain the phenomenon at the moment.

[186] *Ibid.*, 1045-1046.

Furthermore, this breakdown tells us nothing about the document loss rate within William Jessop's paperwork, the surviving components of which account for around 16 per cent of our infantry total.



There were no fewer than 263 salary warrants issued on behalf of Essex's infantry commanders during the Edgehill campaign.[187] Again, these documents were worth

[187] *Ibid.*, passim. Indeed, there were in fact more. Some of these documents had to be removed from my calculations for the purposes of the argument I was constructing there. For example, warrants issued on behalf of Colonel William Bamfield's and Sir John Merrick's regiments were omitted from this total.

£58,569.74. Because this subtotal includes documents paid by both Vernon and Jessop, it would be handy to begin our discussion here with a clear sense of just how many Jessop-paid warrants made up the £94,687.29 total mentioned above. We know from Table 1.1 that 84 per cent of this was paid by Vernon on the authority of 274 lost and surviving warrants.

Table 1.1 – Vernon's Infantry Spending: the Edgehill Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
Aug 1642	No.	59	11	70	15.71%
	Value	29391.80	525.13	29916.93	1.76%
Sep 1642	No.	86	22	108	20.37%
	Value	23577.26	2634.37	26211.63	10.05%
Oct 1642	No.	85	11	96	11.46%
	Value	22799.09	999.35	23798.44	4.20%
Total	No.	230	44	274	16.06%
	Value	75768.14	4158.85	79926.99	5.20%

Table 1.2 – Jessop's <u>Known</u> Infantry Spending: the Edgehill Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
Aug 1642	No.	0
	Value	0
Sep 1642	No.	86
	Value	11356.20
Oct 1642	No.	45
	Value	3404.10
Total	No.	131
	Value	14760.30

Table 1.2 provides a breakdown of Jessop's infantry warrants for this period. Together, these first two tables tell us that there were *at least* 405 (274 + 131) infantry-related warrants that were paid by Gerrard's army treasury during the first three months of the English civil war. Again, because I have already explored the topic of salary payments elsewhere, we know that a little more than 65 per cent of these documents (worth roughly 62 per cent of the infantry total[188]) had to do with the remuneration of actually-existent combat personnel during this time. Therefore, the central mandate of this section of the chapter is clear: we need to explore and explain the rest of this spending.

Before we begin, we must again recall that Essex's army treasurers did not start entirely from scratch when it came to the creation of the Lord General's army of regulars. In the first place, Aaron Graham has reminded us that at least some of Essex's officers were slated for service in Ireland as early as May or June 1642.[189] Indeed, Graham tells us that no fewer than four full infantry regiments were created at that time, only to be transferred to Essex's army during the autumn. In fact, he has made much of the inter-regimental mobility of the junior officers who were slated to serve in these units; he has done this by charting these officers' enrollment histories, and recording how many of them wound up serving in different units by the time the Edgehill campaign was launched in August. Although there is no doubt that the Irish Adventurers committed relatively

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[188] 263 ÷ 405 = 65% (£58,569.74 ÷ £94,687.29 = 62%).

[189] Graham, "Military Representation," 890-1; P[arliamentary] A[rchives] HL/PO/JO/10/1/125, 21 June, 1642, "List of the officers of all grades chosen by the adventurers for Ireland, to serve under Philip Lord Wharton as Colonel General, with the alterations since the return of the list, names of other officers listed, and of the Reformado officers, and also a calculation of the charge per diem for horse and foot".

large amounts of money to the creation of Lord Wharton's forces during the summer months, there are problems with the assumptions that underpin Graham's analysis of this 'army' and its relationship to the forces raised by the earl of Essex to fight the king in England. Naturally, these problems must be dealt with if we are to truly understand the role the Irish Adventurers played in the creation of the Long Parliament's regular army.

Secondly, as I explained in both my article and in section I above, three of the infantry regiments raised at the very end of July to fight the king under Essex received their first salary payments from the Proposition treasury directly. As we already know, this initial outlay created a serious discipline problem for Essex's commanders during the second week of September. For although the private soldiers of these three regiments benefitted from the ubiquitous policy of providing salary money in advance of service, they were excluded from the more recently-adopted army-treasury policy of providing each infantryman with a 10s signing bonus at the time of their first muster.[190] Naturally, this deeply perturbed the hireling soldiers who, it was said, ". . . cannot be kept together one day without pay".[191] Again, charting the history of the sums paid over by Gerrard's deputies to cover this signing bonus – or 'levy money', as it was referred to – is a central part of our mandate here. In the end, however, this analysis must be deferred until we have completed a survey of the documentation pertaining to the creation of the Irish Adventurers' 'army' in June and July.

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[190] Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1042.

[191] *Ibid.*, 1043, n.27 contains the most recent historiographic context of this quote, which is attributed to Essex himself in at least two documents now preserved in the Thomason collection.

As we know, by the summer of 1642 Ireland was already a boiling cauldron of military activity, and the Long Parliament was financially involved in the maintenance and support of the pro-government forces that were operating there.[192] Attrition rates in Ireland were severe, however, and it was never enough to simply pay and maintain the existing forces on the ground. It was for this reason that the newly-constituted Irish Adventurers were approached by the newly-appointed commissioners for the affairs in Ireland in April to pay for the creation of a new, private army that was to be deployed in Munster. This army was to consist of at least five thousand soldiers, and it was to be commanded by Philip, Lord Wharton.[193] Significantly, this proposed force of semi-private military units was made administratively distinct from the rest of the English expeditionary forces already raised to fight the rebels in Ireland. Those older forces – again, under the earl of Leicester – were paid and supplied by Nicholas Loftus, the deputy treasurer of war for Ireland.[194] Wharton's new army, however, was to be paid by Nicholas Bond, the new treasurer employed especially for this purpose.[195] Although there do not appear to be any surviving warrants pertaining to the creation or maintenance of Wharton's 'army' during the summer, the general accounts of Nicholas Bond from that period have survived as a part of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers.[196]

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[192] A useful history of this process can be found in Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war". Additionally, many of the warrants pertaining to the pre-existing Irish forces receiving English support at this time can also be found in TNA SP28/1B and elsewhere in the early volumes of this collection.
[193] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 82 and 87.
[194] Again, consult Leicester's warrants generally. See TNA SP28/1B, passim.
[195] Again, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/125, 21 June, 1642, "List of the officers".
[196] TNA, SP28/1D ff. 481-482; TNA, SP28/144/10, ff. 1-4 and 77-84; and TNA, SP28/146 ff. 427-453.

The idea that Wharton's army was created by the Adventurers in the summer and transferred – in a wholesale fashion – to fight the king as part of Essex's field army in the autumn has become a matter of historiographic orthodoxy over the years.[197] Indeed, this assumption is integral to Graham's analysis of the relative strength of the interpersonal connections that existed among the officer corps of the parliament's infantry regiments before Edgehill. He tells us, for example, that less than 60 per cent of the officers who transferred to Essex's army from Wharton's remained in the same regiment, while only about 16 per cent stayed with the same company.[198] For Graham, this meant that dedication to the parliamentary cause clearly trumped any of the regional or interpersonal loyalties that must surely have played at least some small part in the creation of Wharton's army.[199] In short, these experienced officers all tended to know each other, but when push came to shove in August they went where they were needed, and they were accepted wherever they went. This broader point is both important and true, but the form of his argument is predicated on the idea that Wharton's units did indeed come into existence as real formations during the summer. This is simply not the case, at least where the infantry is concerned.

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[197] Indeed, Armstrong also seems certain that this is what happened to the bulk of Wharton's army. See Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war", 90-91.

[198] There are potential problems with the percentages as presented by Graham. He is using the list of Wharton's officers as published on 11 June: BL Thomason 669.f.6[31], Anon., *A list of the field-officers chosen and appointed for the Irish expedition, by the Committee at Guild-Hall London, for the regiments of 5000. foot and 500. horse, under the command of Philip Lord Wharton, Baron of Scarborough, Lord Generall for Ireland* (London: Edward Paxton, 1642), whereas I am using the Lords' own manuscript list from 21 June. The latter quite explicitly tells the reader that changes had recently been made, and I have noted several small differences that distinguish the two lists. Graham, "Military Representation," 890.

[199] Graham, "Military Representation," 890-891.

Although portions of Bond's paperwork are scattered across several volumes of SP28, the core documents – the summaries of his expenses during July – can be found in one place.[200] These records were used quite effectively by Gavin Robinson in his work dealing with state-purchased cavalry horses, and they will be revisited in that context in section three of this chapter. For now, however, let's focus on what they can tell us about Bond's infantry spending. A survey of these papers reveals that a total of £11,364.45 was paid to Wharton's 'army' in salary payments ostensibly covering various periods during the month of July. There is no indication that levy money was distributed to infantry officers. Roughly 10 per cent of the amount in question went to 'reformado' officers who were apparently connected to the planned expedition, while a hefty 64 per cent was devoted to the purchasing of all required horses for six full and one partially-constituted troop of cavalry.[201] The residual amount – or just over a quarter of the money expended – went to all infantry, artillery, and support staff payments. Most of these men received a month's pay in advance, and the list of infantry 'units' receiving such payment – when compared to the most up-to-date manuscript list of regimented officers found in the Parliamentary Archives – is complete. For our purposes, the most interesting and striking thing about these documents is the fact that although the infantry's drummers and NCOs were provided for, not a single penny changed hands in the name of private soldiers.

Of course, one might suggest that this documentation simply predates the levying of ordinary soldiers, but interestingly enough, the Irish Adventurers settled Bond's

[200] TNA SP28/144/10.
[201] See section three below.

account in early September, well after the pay periods in question had elapsed and Essex's army was under construction. How do we explain this? Ultimately, it is my contention that the oft-cited evidence for the transfer of Lord Wharton's army as a fully-mustered force has been misread.[202] Aside from the fact that there is an ordinance dated 5 July clearly indicating that none of Wharton's units had yet been raised,[203] there is an abundance of material demonstrating that the one unit which eventually did make the journey to Ireland – Lord Kerry's – still lacked private soldiers as late as 5 October. Indeed, a systematic survey of the parliamentary journals demonstrates that Kerry's regiment was never on foot during the summer.[204] Wharton's infantry regiments, I argue, never existed anywhere but on paper. And as we shall soon see, this interpretation is also supported by an analysis of Essex's infantry's levy money. But I am convinced that even without this other evidence the preceding should be enough to put paid to the idea that Lord Wharton had an army of five thousand regimented infantrymen loitering around southern England in July. Again, this complicates matters for Graham because his

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[202] Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war," 89; Graham, "Military Representation," 890-891. In the end, both Armstrong and Graham rely on a passage printed in *CJ*, ii, 698 from 30 July 1642 that states ". . . the Committee for Adventurers shall propound to the Officers of the Five thousand Foot, and Five hundred Horse, intended to be sent to *Munster*, that they do attend the Lord General, for his Commands, to serve here in this Kingdom . . ." I believe the most important words here are 'officers' and 'intended'.

[203] *LJ*, v, 181

[204] *CJ*, ii, 682, 729, 736, 742, 758, 788 and 795-6; *LJ*, v, 228, 329, 334, 336, 347, 381 and 387. Armstrong cites evidence showing that elements of the unit did eventually make their way to Ireland, but he does not tell his reader that this evidence comes from January 1642/3 – Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war," 91, n.108; and James Hogan, ed., *Letters and Papers Relating to the Irish Rebellion between 1642-6* (Dublin: Irish Manuscript Commission, 1936), 172-173. Oddly enough, another, earlier letter from Inchiquin dated 5 September 1642 would seem to suggest that an unknown number of men from Kerry's proposed expedition had already made their way into Ireland. This is very odd, considering the fact that the parliamentary order for the issuing of his levy money is dated just three days before. Again, *LJ*, v, 336 and Hogan, *Letters and Papers*, 124-5. I would hazard a guess that it was only his officers who arrived in the early fall.

observation that there was little unit cohesion when Wharton's 'regiments' were 'transferred' to Essex's army is less important and interesting if those units were entirely hypothetical before August. On the other hand, these findings provide a neat and clean explanation for his conclusion that Wharton's officers – as listed in the printed pamphlet of 11 June – ". . . existed within a loose and fluid matrix of association".[205]

Although the Proposition treasurers were able to ensure that the first wave of around thirty-five hundred pro-parliamentary volunteers were regimented and given advance salary money in the first week of August, the army treasury's own warrants, which were issued soon afterward, clearly demonstrate that the successful creation of any additional infantry units required a substantially larger commitment of money. Yet sadly, even then a positive response on the scale envisioned was far from certain. This uncertainty, however, was decidedly not born of a lack of resources or administrative ineptitude. Between 9 August and 1 September Vernon cashed nineteen warrants worth a jaw-dropping £19,733.87 aimed at levying the officers and soldiers of sixteen infantry regiments that did not yet exist at the time most of the warrants were written. Understood by all as a signing bonus, none of this counted toward the wages of the personnel in question. All of the money warranted by these documents was paid in full within days of the warrants' creation. Indeed, many of them were fully paid within just twenty four hours – long enough, perhaps, to allow the ink of the authorizing signatures to dry. For

[205] Graham, "Military Representation," 890.

the sake of clarity, I have tabulated this information and included it in Appendix A below.[206]

First of all, it should be again reiterated that none of this money has been included in the salary money totals I have described in my 2010 article.[207] Second, it should be noted that one of these units did not, in fact, come into existence.[208] Although Table 1.3 describes the payment of very significant amounts of money, it should also be remembered that not all of this was destined for pockets of ordinary soldiers. As Graham has rightly indicated, much of it was supposed to provide the officers of the projected regiments with a full 'month's pay', as well as supply the colonels with certain vital peripherals.[209] It is absolutely crucial to remember, however, that none of the officers' 'salary' money paid over as part of the nineteen warrants listed in Table 1.3 counted toward active service. In other words, this 'month's pay' was indeed a pure bonus: something the officers could enjoy pocketing before receiving money for time served. The ordinary soldiers were not quite so fortunate. Their portion of the money in Table 1.3 amounted to just one half of a month's pay, or ten shillings per man.

Though much less, to be sure, than their officers' portion in terms of both rate and chronological measure, fluctuating amounts of this 'levy money' for anticipated private soldiers largely explain the differences we see in the subtotals described in Table 1.3.

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[206] **Table 1.3, Appendix A.**
[207] Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1046-1047, Appendices A and B.
[208] *Ibid.*, 1040, n.14. William Bamfield's regiment received just one substantial salary warrant for the pay of its officers. Again, I believe that all of this was money wasted, and, naturally, I have excluded the salary payment from the totals I present in my article.
[209] Graham, "Military Representation," 885.

Those regiments that were supposed to raise 1,200 private soldiers received £1,244.80, a sum that included £600 worth of levy money for the ordinary men. Three colonels received this money in two installments (Lords Brooke, Say, and St. John); but another three received different amounts altogether. One of the regiments in this latter trio was Lord Essex's own – his unit received a higher sum largely because it was supposed to eventually contain 1,500 men. The other two aberrant regiments were Lord Stamford's and Lord Peterborough's. Although Peterborough's regiment – a late administrative addition, it would seem – received less because it was slated to contain just 800 privates, it is more difficult to explain why Lord Stamford received just £1,044.80.[210]

In any case, these sixteen regiments (fifteen, if we exclude Bamfield's)[211] were created to supplement the three already-existent regiments paid advance salary money by the Proposition treasurers in early August (Denzill Holles's, Sir Henry Cholmley's, and Sir John Merrick's). That makes for a total of eighteen infantry regiments in operation by 1 September. However, there was one additional regiment – John Hampden's – that I believe was created sometime between the advance payment of the first three units and the issuing of levy money to the other sixteen colonels. It seems likely that Colonel John Hampden's regiment was in existence by the second week of August. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to know this for certain. This is because Hampden's regiment was administered differently from the rest of the infantry during these first weeks of the

[210] Again, TNA SP28/1A ff.29 and 286. It may simply be the case that Stamford was supposed to get his other £200 in a separate payment – like Brooke, Say, and St. John – but didn't because it was soon clear that he was never going to reach his enrollment targets.
[211] Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1040, n.14.

campaign.[212] In all, I have been able to identify £6,408.09 that was received by officers attached to Hampden's regiment during the first three months of the war. Of this, some £4,920.30 was paid to Hampden directly – often with very little explanation.[213] The first £2,000 of this money was paid on 9 August by Vernon on a Committee of Safety warrant,[214] and I am certain that all of this money was supposed to help support Hampden's infantry regiment. Although it is certainly possible that some of the £4,920.30 that was paid to Hampden directly was supposed to cover his soldiers' levy money, I have found no direct evidence in the documentation to support this idea. Consequently, it should be here noted that all £6,408.09 of this has been considered salary money by me, and it is therefore included in the £58,569.74 total presented in my 2010 article.

In addition to the levy and salary money described above, both the army's establishment document – preserved as TNA SP28/140/17 – and the army treasury's warrants make it clear that every infantry regiment was supposed to be provided with £440 to supply them with eleven state-purchased wagons for transportation purposes, something that was accomplished in September.[215] Table 1.4 demonstrates that every single one of Essex's infantry regiments – even the pre- and non-existing ones – received a full allotment of wagon money in September. Each regiment received its money in a single, discrete payment. This makes it relatively easy to reconstruct the distribution of

[212] *Ibid.*, 1042, n.25.
[213] *Ibid.*
[214] TNA SP28/261 f.19.
[215] **Table 1.4, Appendix A.**

this money. Nevertheless, there are some complications with these records. Consider, for example, that just one of these payments was made by Jessop;[216] this despite the fact that they were all made in September. Additionally, two of the nineteen payments made by Vernon had to be recovered from his account book – the warrants authorizing them having been lost in the intervening centuries. Finally, there is the odd case of Lord Stamford's wagon money. As I indicated in the table itself, this payment was clearly made on 19 September, but the receipt was signed on a separate document. This document had to be located in volume 298 of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers in order to prove that the money was in fact delivered. This is because the payment does not appear in Vernon's account book in the appropriate spot. In fact, it does not appear in the list of payments for the month of September at all. Ultimately, this means that the £440 in question does not figure into Vernon's totals as reported in Figure 1.2. This is because I used the totals found in Vernon's account to order and balance the information from his surviving warrants.

So far, we have accounted for £28,173.87 of non-salary infantry spending.[217] This means that there is still around £7,943.68 of outstanding infantry spending that we have not explored.[218] This amounts to roughly 8.4 per cent of the total outlined in Figure 1.2. In the end, this money was spent on a number of miscellaneous things. The most

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[216] TNA SP28/261 f.121 – Constable's regiment.

[217] The sum of Tables 1.3 and 1.4, minus the £440 Stamford received for his eleven regimental wagons. (£19,733.87 + [£8,880 - £440] = £28,173.87).

[218] The sum of Figure 1.2 minus the amounts found here and in my 2010 article. (£94,687.29 – [£58,569.74 + £28,173.87] = £7,943.68).

important sub-categories of documents falling into this category include: warrants authorizing the monthly pay of the infantry's regimental chaplains, the pay of the provost corps and Essex's private foot guard of halberdiers, as well as warrants authorizing the pay of independent reformados – mostly Scottish – by the Committee of Safety. Rather than proceeding with a detailed examination of this spending, however, I have decided to take this opportunity to focus on the supply warrants that provided the infantry colonels with 'uniforms' for their newly-recruited soldiers.

Aside from the levy money that most of them received, as well as the advance salary payments that they all enjoyed, new recruits to Essex's nascent infantry regiments were also provided with an entirely new set of clothes – minus a pair of britches and a new hat, which, it would seem, the Long Parliament expected them to bring into the service themselves. In the first place it must be said that these items seem to have been provided to the men free of charge, and, like the levy money, they tended to be distributed at the regimental level. Over the years a few historians and antiquarians have commented on the various and varied hues of the coats that were distributed at this time, but it is perhaps more important to comment on the *source* of these garments. As we shall soon see, the Long Parliament's military administrators managed to find a supplier able to provide nearly eighteen thousand army coats – along with similar numbers of the other necessary items – within a very short period of time. As it happened, that supplier was Stephen Estwick, an Alderman of London and a member of the City's all-important

Militia Committee.[219] And, as Peter Edwards suggests, Estwick seems to have had access to this volume of clothing partly because some of it was pre-made – having been originally ordered and manufactured to supply the forces fighting the rebels in Ireland.[220]

There are at least two important sources of information concerning the provision of this clothing to Essex's infantrymen. In the first place we have Estwick's own account and record of the clothing disbursements he made. Again, these disbursements were made at the regimental level, and the army treasury paid Estwick directly on warrants which I have subsequently categorized as 'other' ('support') spending. Once again, this is a category (and sub-category) of spending that will be described and examined in the fourth section of this chapter. What this means, for our purposes here, is there is no evidence to suggest that any of the infantry's combat officers were expected to use money they had received from Gerrard's deputies to remunerate Estwick. Instead, Estwick was issued army warrants – just like Gerrard's deputies – to provide batches of pre-paid clothing to specific units. Most of these warrants have survived, and because this is how it happened we are able to compare Estwick's account to these supply warrants in an effort to gauge the relative completeness of the latter. I have completed this process using the same methodology that was employed to measure the survival rate of Francis

[219] TNA SP28/144/2, unfol.; Pearl, *London*, 156; Peter Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638-52* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000), p. ix; and Lewis, "Office of Ordnance," 213.

[220] For evidence supporting the assertion that this equipment was originally destined for Ireland see Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, 133. Additional evidence can be found in TNA SP28/4 f.64ff, which is an examination of the accounts pertaining to the delivery of this clothing.

Vernon's pay warrants, and the results have been tabulated here for easy reference.[221] Table 1.5 demonstrates that the vast majority of the supply warrants authorizing the release of clothing to Essex's infantry colonels have survived. Additionally, it shows that during the Edgehill campaign Estwick provided more than £13,000 worth of clothing to the army. Again, although I have categorized Estwick's receipts from the army treasurers as 'other' ('support') spending – and therefore excluded them from the totals reported in Figure 1.2 above – it might be useful to examine his receipts to 1 November in an effort to understand whether or not these garments truly were 'pre-paid' by the time they reached the infantry colonels.

According to the statements found in his own account, Estwick received just £6,798.5 worth of cash and clothing by 1 November. Almost two thousand pounds of this was received from the Long Parliament's Irish Committee, and some of it came in the form of the clothing distributed – without army supply warrants – to the three regiments first paid by the Proposition treasurers during the first week of August.[222] This represents a shortfall of almost fifty percent. However, it should be noted that by the end of October Estwick was clearly considered a long-term contractor. Indeed, as we shall see, he was responsible for outfitting a host of units raised after the completion of the Edgehill campaign. I would suggest that all this means that both he and his employer – the army treasury – were either explicitly or tacitly entering into a system of credit that was meant

[221] **Table 1.5, Appendix A.**

[222] TNA SP28/146, Estwick's account, ff.128r-v. At least some of this grand total can be verified using the surviving army pay warrants found in the 'other' section of my database. TNA SP28/1A f.93; TNA SP28/261 ff.38 and 430.

to ensure the flow of expensive resources from a single source. Evidence for this interpretation of Estwick's situation can be found in the kind of payments he received during the month of October. Instead of single payments designed to meet the costs associated with specific needs, the funds authorized by TNA SP28/261 f.430 were intended to provide Estwick with weekly payments of £600 to meet the costs of providing the army with clothing on a continuing basis. Nevertheless, this interpretation should not detract from the obvious conclusion here: the records pertaining to the provision of infantry clothing clearly demonstrate that there were indeed bottoms to the Long Parliament's deep pockets in 1642.

~ III ~

By now it should go without saying that huge sums were spent on Essex's mounted arm during the first three months of the first civil war. This section will focus on this spending in an attempt to understand the flow of the money, and the nature of the regular cavalry forces created by this process. Before we begin, however, it should be noted that the documentation pertaining to the creation and sustenance of Essex's cavalry arm during the Edgehill campaign has proven to be among the most challenging of the materials I have encountered during my research. This is partly because of the many disparate things the central government was willing to pay for during the mounting process. Unlike the case of the infantry, where the vast majority of Vernon's and Jessop's spending can be easily broken down into the categories of levy and salary money, when it came to raising the cavalry troops Gerrard's deputies frequently spent money on things

like horses, saddles, bits, scarves, and other 'furniture' during the first few formative weeks of the army's existence. Furthermore, as we shall see, the administrative practices that governed the distribution of money for these items were maddeningly heterogeneous, a reality that has made document categorization and quantitative analysis exceptionally difficult at times.[223] Adding to the general confusion, it must be remembered that during this period the Proposition treasurers bypassed the army treasury by spending a great deal of money on the nascent cavalry formations directly, a process that also must be explored and contextualized. Finally, one must also keep in mind the fact that Essex 'inherited' a handful of preexisting cavalry troops from the Irish Adventurers, troops that seem to have come to the army in some state of preassembly. Understanding how all of these factors meshed together on paper and on the ground is necessary if a usable picture of Essex's Edgehill cavalry is to be drawn.

In the first place, let us begin by laying out the total amounts of money spent by Gerrard's treasury on the cavalry during this period. Although the other factors mentioned above (the Proposition treasury's direct spending, and the creation of the pre-existing Irish-Adventurer troops) often came into play before Gerrard's deputies began cashing army warrants, the money coming out of their hands during this period was by far the most voluminous and therefore the most significant. In all, I have identified

[223] For example it seems that most individual cavalry troop commanders received a special warrant authorizing the £30 they needed to provide a troop of 60 harquebusiers with the orange scarves they used for identification on the battlefield: see TNA SP28/1A ff.74-9. Some captains, however, received this money as part of larger payment authorized by a more general warrant. For examples of this see TNA SP28/1A ff.170, 192 and 194.

£110,594.83 in army treasury spending that can be understood as having had something to do with the army's mounted arm during the first three months of the war. It should be noted that this figure (and all subsequent references to 'cavalry' spending by the army treasurers) includes money spent on the mounted infantrymen known as dragoons. Obviously, then, the heterogeneous nature of this spending and the administration of this money preclude a more precise discussion at this broader level of analysis. Nevertheless, this grand total can be readily broken down by both treasurer and month, a function rendered graphically in Figure 1.3.



Figure 1.3 makes it clear that Vernon spent the majority of the money I have categorized as cavalry payments during the Edgehill campaign. It is therefore important to begin with an understanding of how complete Vernon's cavalry warrants are by describing what percentage of his spending has been recovered from his account book. Table 1.6 provides this information in detail via a comparison of the lost warrants' number and value. By way of comparison, Table 1.7 describes the data pertaining to Jessop's surviving documentation.

Table 1.6 – Vernon's Cavalry Spending: the Edgehill Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
Aug 1642	No.	177	34	211	16.11%
	Value	33964.425	6126.66	40091.09	15.28%
Sep 1642	No.	84	17	101	16.83%
	Value	18035.725	6809.25	24844.98	27.41%
Oct 1642	No.	119	29	148	19.59%
	Value	20907.4875	3365.59	24273.08	13.87%
Total	No.	380	80	460	17.39%
	Value	72907.64	16301.50	89209.14	18.27%

When compared to the same kind of data for the infantry from the same period it seems that the survival rate of Vernon's cavalry warrants, both in number and value, is much more consistent. There are, of course, limitations that need to be acknowledged. Naturally, as was the case with the infantry, it is impossible to know how much of Jessop's cavalry paperwork is missing.

Table 1.7 – Jessop's Cavalry Spending: the Edgehill Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
Aug 1642	No.	0
	Value	0.00
Sep 1642	No.	120
	Value	15486.99
Oct 1642	No.	41
	Value	5898.70
Total	No.	161
	Value	21385.69

Additionally, this broad survey tells us nothing about what all of this army treasury money was spent on; only a series of deep analyses of the known documents can provide this information.

The single most important goal of the following analyses will be to determine whether or not Essex's regular cavalry units benefited from the same high rate of pay that his infantry formations enjoyed. Again, in order to answer this question all of the many idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of the cavalry's administrative history will have to be described, evaluated, and dealt with. At this point it should be recalled that in order to prove that Essex's infantry regiments were fully paid during the Edgehill campaign it was necessary for me to understand and measure certain determining variables. Among these were the size and composition of that arm's constituent formations, and the duration of their existence during the three-month period in question. In other words, while it would be possible to simply tally up the total amounts spent by the central treasury and compare the resulting figure to a crude estimate of the cavalry's size and service history, I shall

argue that SP28 again allows us to be more precise. Unfortunately, this precision necessarily comes at the cost of some verbosity.

At this point it should be remembered that Essex's cavalry was administered and paid almost entirely at the troop level. Like infantry companies, cavalry troops were commanded by a captain, but cavalry regiments – the umbrella organizations that grouped together several troops under a colonel – were never as administratively important as their infantry counterparts. The one notable exception to this rule, at least in part, were the units of dragoons created to provide mobile fire support for the army, both on the march and in the field. Again, I have chosen to group these soldiers together with the rest of the army's mounted troops for the purposes of large, structural discussions of the army's pay history, but it is important to note that they will be distinguished from the cuirassiers (a rare and expensive sort of heavy cavalry) and the harquebusiers (the much more common kind of medium cavalry used throughout the wars) for the purposes of the following analyses.

In terms of usage, cuirassiers and harquebusiers were similar kinds of cavalrymen in the sense that both were meant to ride forward and engage in mounted hand-to-hand combat with their counterparts in the royalist army, and, if possible, capture artillery pieces or supplies and disrupt the enemy's infantry formations during pitched battles. The main difference between the two resided in the equipment that they required. Cuirassiers can be thought of as the early-modern equivalent of medieval knights because they were encased from head to knee in a three-quarter suit of (mostly) bulletproof armour.

Harquebusiers, on the other hand, were usually protected only by a breast- and back-plate, a buff coat of leather, and, where possible, a helmet (known as a 'pot'), and at least one armored gauntlet. As one might expect, there were always many more harquebusiers than cuirassiers in civil war armies, and Essex's Edgehill army was no exception to this rule. One of the main reasons for this was the cost involved not only in raising and equipping troops of cuirassiers, but in maintaining them as well. The records found in SP28 indicate that the army's administrators expected cuirassiers to be more expensive to keep than harquebusiers. This was partly because cuirassier troops were supposed to be larger (80 troopers instead of the 60 that made up a typical harquebusier troop), but it was also because the horses they used needed to be larger and of a higher quality than those used by the harquebusiers. Table 1.8 illustrates this point by outlining the anticipated salary cost of both kinds of cavalry troops on a per-diem basis.[224]

Naturally, cavalry troops needed to be created before they required the salary money described above, and the creation of a cavalry formation of any kind was an expensive and complicated affair that required a whole range of material and animal resources. Although Robinson has made it clear that the state was incapable of providing the money to purchase all of the horses needed to raise a cavalry force of any size,[225] it is also clear that the Long Parliament and its various treasury apparatuses provided a sizable percentage of the money needed to buy the regular cavalry's horses and equipment. Once again, the challenge here is to make sense of these non-salary monetary commitments, a

[224] **Table 1.8, Appendix A.**
[225] Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) 51.

challenge made formidable by the apparent lack of any uniformity in the process as it happened on the ground. Nevertheless, we have been provided with an obvious point of departure for this discussion because even the briefest examination of the document entitled "The Officers and Pay of My Lord General's Army" reveals that the army's administrators clearly privileged – at least retrospectively – the provision of 'advance' or 'mounting' money for each of its proposed troops of harquebusiers.[226] Again, Robinson has already made it clear that this money – a not insignificant sum of £354 per troop – was aimed at supplying the officers, non-commissioned officers, and support personnel of each troop with enough money to buy their horses. Excluding a surprisingly high number of exceptions, the ordinary troopers of most units were to be mounted on horses donated on the Propositions.[227] Again, large amounts of money (from all sources) were also spent on saddles, scarves, and other necessities, but for now let us focus our discussion on this 'core' need of £354 per proposed harquebusier troop; a rough analogue, I would argue, of the levy money distributed to the vast majority of the infantry regiments.

Sadly, it is not always easy to distinguish a troop's mounting money – whatever its final amount – from advance salary payments or other initial incurred costs. The early

[226] Again, TNA SP28/140/17, f.401v. It is significant, I think, that the authors of this document chose to ignore other needs like saddles, scarves and 'furniture' in general. Oddly enough, there is no indication that the army established similar 'rules' for the mounting of the very limited number of cuirassier troops. Finally, it should always be remembered that this document was written well after the fact in 1645.
[227] See Robinson, "Horse Supply" (article), 123. Arguably, Robinson's most important contribution has come in the form of his discussion of the documents pertaining to the listing of horses on the Propositions. For example see Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), 51-60 and Appendix C.

history of the army's five oldest cavalry troops provides an excellent example of this. Sometime during the early part of July 1642 Nicholas Bond, Paymaster General of the proposed forces to be sent into Ireland under the command of Lord Wharton, started handing over large sums of the Irish Adventurer's money to officers who were supposed to raise cavalry troops for that group's expedition.[228] Seven troops were envisioned during this process; Lord Wharton's own was to consist of ninety one troopers, Lord Broughall's just forty-one, and the other five troops were to have eighty-one horsemen apiece.[229] In all, Bond forwarded £7,322.60 to these commanders before 19 July 1642. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain the exact purpose of this money, but as Robinson says, it probably would have been insufficient to provide all of these units with purchased horses.[230] Furthermore, it is also unclear what kind of cavalry troops these were supposed to have become. What we can know for certain, however, is that some of these units did indeed come into existence as a result of this money. We know this because of the specific ways in which five of these commanders appear in the subsequent records. In the end, only Lord Broughall's and John Trenchard's names do not come up in the material covered by the following analyses. Nevertheless, in order to understand the long-term impact the Irish Adventurers' money it is necessary to compare both the mounting and salary money that was subsequently received by these five commanders to the receipts of their more recently-raised comrades.

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[228] TNA SP28/144/10 f.1r

[229] These troops were to be commanded by: Sir Faithful Fortescue, John Urry, Alexander Nairne, John Trenchard, and William St Leger.

[230] Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) 48.

In order to produce a discussion that is as logical and linear as possible, my research into the cavalry records for the Edgehill campaign was predicated on information gleaned from the famous and useful pamphlet entitled *A catalogue of the names of the dukes, marquesses, earles and Lords, that have absented themselves from the Parliament, and are now with His Majesty*, which was printed sometime during the autumn of 1642.[231] Despite the royalist-sounding first part of the title, the pamphlet also contains in it a list of all of the officers and units that were supposed to have made up the Lord General's parliamentary army at the time. This is particularly helpful when it comes to the cavalry because, as we know, there is no convenient way of grouping that arm's financial records together by regiment for easy reference. In the end, the pamphlet suggests that Essex's cavalry arm was to be composed of no fewer than seventy five specifically-named troops of (mostly) harquebusiers. In the absence of clearly-defined regimentation, I have used this list to structure my analysis of those Proposition-treasury payments and army pay warrants that clearly deal with non-dragoon mounted soldiers.

Proceeding chronologically, the first records that needed to be dealt with were the Irish-Adventurer payments described above. Again, I have been able to correlate these records with the Proposition treasurers' report and the larger series of army pay warrants

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[231] BL Thomason E.64[4], Anon., *A catalogue of the names of the dukes, marquesses, earles and lords, that have absented themselves from the Parliament, and are now with His Majesty. And the names of the lords that subscribed to levie horse to assist His Majestie with. A copie of all the cavaliers of his Majesty's marching army, with the number of captaines in each severall regiment, each regiment containing a thousand soldiers . . .* (London: S.N., 1642); see also BL Thomason E.117[3], Army., *The list of the army raised under the command of his Excellency, Robert Earle of Essex and Ewe, Viscout Hereford, Lord Ferrers of Chartley, Bourcheir and Lovaine: appointed captaine generall of the army, imployed for the defence of the Protestant religion . . .* (London: John Partridge, 1642), for a different edition of the same list.

in the case of no fewer than five of the seven troops mentioned. When it comes to the Thomason pamphlet, however, only two of the captains who appear in Bond's report appear in print.[232] Why is this so? The answer probably has to do with the transference of command within Wharton's pre-existing troops. But before this explanation can be fleshed out it is important to push forward in our chronological survey of the documents. Whereas Nicholas Bond claimed in his report that he made his payments between the fifth and the nineteenth of July 1642, the Proposition treasurers clearly began issuing mounting money to cavalry commanders on 15 July.[233] Like the Thomason pamphlet, the Proposition treasurers were inclined to refer to cavalry troops by the name of their captains, and I have therefore been able to map their payments onto a list of potentially-existent troops that has been derived from the printed sources. This process has been rendered graphically in Table 1.9. For the sake of clarity, I have assumed that all Proposition-treasurer payments were aimed at supplying mounting money. It should be remembered that this may not have been the case in certain instances. Furthermore, it should be noted that some of the troop totals found here represent more than one payment, but that all payments were made before the second week of September.[234]

Four things are immediately apparent from the information presented in Table 1.9. In the first place, it's clear that not all of the seventy five troops described in the Thomason tract received money from the Proposition treasury to get their units up and

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[232] Lord Wharton and Sir Faithful Fortescue.
[233] TNA SP28/170, Propositions treasurers' account, unfol.
[234] **Table 1.9, Appendix A.**

running; in fact, only thirty two of them did. Secondly, it is also true that none of the troops originally paid by Bond received such money. Thirdly, there appear two troops in these records which are not mentioned in the Thomason pamphlet, namely, Thomas Sheffield's and Captain Withers's. Finally, it is clear that none of the payments made by the Proposition treasurers exactly equal the sum of £354 laid out for mounting money by the establishment document preserved as TNA SP28/140/17, although some payments clearly exceeded this total. Nevertheless, despite this final point it is clear that a great many of the Proposition treasurers' payments were designed to meet part of the need covered by the apportioned £354 mentioned above. The most obvious examples of this are the relatively large number of payments totaling £280 – the cost of mounting the commissioned officers and quartermaster of a troop.[235]

Of course it is fascinating to note the fact that many of these payments exceeded the £354 pounds that I wish to focus on here. Again, this is a testament to the essentially heterogeneous nature of military administration in Essex's regular army, especially when it comes to the cavalry. Consider, for example, that many of these larger sums are either partially or entirely constituted by a payment of £1,030, a sum that, as Robinson reminds us, included money for bridles and saddles (£150) in addition to the money needed to mount commissioned officers, the quartermaster (£280), and sixty ordinary troopers (£600).[236] Although it is important to understand the total amounts paid by each treasury

[235] Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), Table 4, pp. 46-7.
[236] Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), 50 – the £280 mentioned here forms the major part of a 'normal' troop's allotment of £354 worth of mounting money.

authority during the course of the war, the specific analysis here is not concerned with the purchase of equipment or the mounting of ordinary troopers. For this reason, I have decided to artificially reduce each and every single payment of £1,030 found in the Proposition treasurer's account to £280 before integrating any information from the army treasury warrants. This procedure effectively removes £6,750 from the Proposition treasurer's spending as described in Table 1.9 - reducing their total mounting contribution to £11,389.45 over and above whatever monies were paid over by Gerrard's deputies. Significantly, it also adds a very large amount of money (£5,400) to a hypothetical pool that could have been drawn upon to mount all of the existent troops' officers and NCOs – or, indeed, to pay salaries – if it was it not committed to the purchasing of horses for ordinary troopers. To illustrate my meaning here I have constructed Table 1.10 which describes this hypothetical pool. It is here assumed that all of the affected troops would have required the £150 for saddles at some point, and so this number has not been added to the pool.[237]

As we know, by the second week of August Francis Vernon had begun to make payments on centrally-issued army treasury warrants. Again, the vast bulk of this money originated – in the most immediate sense – from the Proposition treasury that had also been directly funding the creation of regular military units during the preceding weeks. The grand total of Vernon's and Jessop's spending on cavalry matters during the Edgehill campaign can be found by referencing Figure 1.3 above, but for the moment we are

[237] **Table 1.10, Appendix A.**

concerned only with their contributions toward the 'standard' amount of £354 for mounting money per each regular troop of harquebusiers. Once again, I have found it possible to map this information onto the spreadsheet created to correlate the Proposition treasurers' accounts with the Thomason pamphlet discussed above. Unfortunately, however, this was not a straightforward task. This is because it was rare for the authors of the warrants – be they from the Committee of Safety, or from Essex himself – to authorize the £354 of mounting money in a single document. More often than not, the money was broken up into two or three segments. The £280 needed to mount the commissioned officers and the quartermaster was often authorized as a single payment in a single document, but the remaining £74 was sometimes broken up into two sub-categories of authorization; one worth £42 to mount the troop's three corporals, and another worth £32 to mount the trumpeters, saddler, and farrier. Were that the end of it, the matter would still be straightforward in the sense that one would simply have an increased number of warrants to tabulate, but unfortunately the authors of the warrants sometimes took the opportunity to append the authorization of funds for other matters to warrants designed to meet one or more of these needs. A list of examples from August alone will suffice. TNA SP28/1A ff.170, 184, 192, 194, 195, 196, 238, 248, 271, and the first entry on SP28/143 (Vernon's account), f.13v are all warrants authorizing the payment of £104: enough money to mount their troops' corporals, trumpeters, saddlers, and farriers, and to provide them with £30 for allegiance-identifying scarves. All of these warrants – and all of the others like them – had to be artificially reduced in value by the

appropriate amount before the payments could be integrated into my database concerning mounting money.

Ultimately, my goal in all of this was to create a table of systematically-modified variables that could be used to evaluate the process and history of mounting money distribution – regardless of is varied sources – to the troops of cuirassiers and harquebusiers raised during the Edgehill campaign. The idea was to see just how many of these troops received the 'standard' allotment of £354 (or, indeed, more). Again, it needs to be remembered that the above-mentioned modifications to the variables have been implemented, and all confirmed salary payments have been excluded. The full results of these evolutions can be observed in Table 1.11 below.[238]

This rather extensive register indicates that a grand total of seventy six cavalry captains received some amount of mounting money from one or more of the three sources of money described above. Ten of these captains do not appear in the Thomason pamphlet originally used to order this data. It should be noted that I say 'captains' and not 'troops' because it is probable that some of the troops that appear in Table 1.11 appear there more than once because of a change in the chain of command. This, I would argue, is one of the reasons why some of the captains/troops in this tally appear to have received less than the 'standard' amount of mounting money. In the end, however, this is a discussion that needs to be deferred until we have a clearer picture of the salary receipts.

[238] **Table 1.11, Appendix A.**

Regardless of these initial complications, it is indeed remarkable to take a tally of the payments as presented in Table 1.11 and to consider what the numbers suggest. No fewer than forty-four of the captains who appear in this table – some 58 per cent of them in all – received *exactly* £354. Indeed, some appear to have received more than this. The average receipt – even *before* the above-mentioned problem of multiple listings is resolved – was an eyebrow-raising £359.27. There are several identifiable reasons for this. In the first instance, at least two of the captains that appear in Table 1.11 were the recipients of ambiguous overpayments. Consider, for example, the entries for Captains Edward Berry and [George] Withers. Both captains received the majority (or all) of their mounting money from the Proposition treasurers, but the notes appended to these payments are frustratingly cryptic.[239] The second obvious reason for presence of higher-than-expected payments rests in the nature of the units being raised: put simply, some of them were cuirassier troops.

Although the establishment document preserved as TNA SP28/140/17 does not provide us with a rubric for understanding the mounting requirements of Essex's heavy cavalry units, it is clear that they could receive more than the £354 in practice. The most obvious example of this was the troop of Essex's personal guard that was under the command of Sir Philip Stapilton. Other examples of troops that were identifiably listed as

[239] George Withers's payment is accompanied by the following note: "Paid S^{r} Richard Onslow, knight & Nicholas Stoughly, Esq. ffor Raysing & paying Capt. Withers Troupe p Or^{dr}". Edward Berry's is as follows: "Paid Capt. Edward Berry for Completing his troup P ord^{r} of 3rd September". See TNA SP28/170 (Propositions treasurers' account), unfol. It should be remembered that I have reduced Captain Withers's payment as per the methodology described above.

cuirassiers include Sir William Balfour's and William Anselm's. Oddly enough, however, only one of these commanders received enough to cover the £354 minimum. On the other hand, Arthur Goodwin, who happened to be a colonel of horse, received much more than his share. The reason for this, in turns out, is because one of his payments from Vernon during the month of August was designed to mount the officers and quartermasters of four troops (including his own) which were part of his regiment.[240] Significantly, I have been able to identify some of the troops that were assigned to Goodwin's regiment at this time, and they include Richard Grenville's, Thomas Tyrell's and Thomas Saunders – all three of which received just £74 of mounting money on their own!

There are, of course, other things that could be said about the mounting-money database I have constructed, but I feel that further discussion is unnecessary at this point. It is unquestionably clear that the Long Parliament's two treasury offices experienced no serious problems mustering the resources necessary to mount all of the Lord General's existent cavalry troops according to the rubric found in TNA SP28/140/17. Furthermore, it should be remembered that, collectively, they spent up to £6,000 more than was necessary in these matters because of their decision to purchase horses for all of the ordinary troopers in no fewer than ten troops. With this matter now settled, it is time to move on to the history of salary payments in Essex's cavalry.

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[240] TNA SP28/143 (Vernon's account), f.6r – Incidentally, this is the only case I have found of cavalry resources being distributed at the regimental level.

The mounting-money database presented above provides us with a fairly clear understanding of the roster of cavalry troops that actually came into existence during the autumn of 1642. Nevertheless, there is at least one serious problem that still has to be dealt with before we can move on. Put simply, we need a roughly accurate sense of when Essex's troops were mustered for the first time – information that can only be gleaned from records dealing with salary payments. Recall that understanding this variable was an important part of the calculus used to evaluate the pay history of the infantry, and it is no less important when it comes to the cavalry. Again, as was the case with the levy money issued to infantry colonels, the cavalry's mounting-money table is of no use here because such money could be issued to officers days or even weeks before soldiers actually gathered beneath the colours. Sadly, however, the salary warrants that I have used to rebuild the cavalry's pay history for August only infrequently mention specific pay periods; most of these documents simply state that the payments were to be made 'in advance', 'by way of imprest', or 'upon account'. Fortunately, the percentage of salary warrants listing specific pay periods increases sharply for the warrants paid during the months of September and October, and this allows us to identify and track at least some of the cavalry's salary spending quite accurately, despite the plethora of shifting individual commands.

At this point it should be noted that throughout the Edgehill campaign the troops of horse in Essex's army tended to receive salary money for their officers and ordinary troopers by way of 'blended' warrants designed to pay everyone in the sixty- or eighty-

man units. These documents sometimes authorized the payment of an entire month's salary, but they just as frequently dealt with half-month blocs. There were important exceptions to this rule, however. During the first few weeks of the campaign it is clear that many otherwise active troop captains had yet to raise any ordinary troopers. We know this because a great many of the period-specific salary warrants issued during and after August were designed to cover the arrears of officers who had been in service since late July. Ordinary troopers, it would seem, had their salary covered adequately by the much more ubiquitous 'blended' warrants that were issued throughout the campaign. In order to start with some idea of how many troops were in existence as of 1 August – even if they lacked ordinary troopers – I have chosen to begin by noting those units which received these period-specific officers' arrears for late July and early August, regardless of when they were issued or paid. Ultimately, this analysis indicates that just thirty six commands – only one of which may have had any ordinary troopers[241] – were in services as of 30 July.

Again, although many of the 'blended' salary warrants issued to Vernon in August lack pay period information, there are in fact ways of getting around this in order to better understand the recruitment history of ordinary troopers. If, for example, we substitute the receipt dates of these otherwise vague documents for their missing pay period start dates, and then integrate the information derived from this process into the data gathered from the wider pool of later, period-specific 'blended' warrants, then we

[241] Interestingly enough, this was John Bird's Watford troop. Consult TNA SP28/1A f.143, Vernon's account, f.8v.

can come to some general understanding of when Essex's cavalry formations started paying private troopers. After performing this operation on all of the relevant warrants, and then carefully identifying when each troop received its first allotment of 'blended' money or began its first period of remunerated service for private troopers, I have discovered that no more than twenty six troop captains were paid salary money for ordinary troopers in service before 15 August 1642. Again, just one of these troops (John Bird's) appears in the records before 1 August. Table 1.12 describes this admittedly convoluted approach in detail on a captain-by-captain basis.[242] Unfortunately, I do not believe that there is a more straightforward way of understanding or explaining the recruitment of Essex's cavalry using SP28. Again, as I have already indicated, this is entirely a function of the nightmarish irregularities that plague the cavalry's records generally. Indeed, only the sheer authority and otherwise untapped potential of these documents justifies, in my mind, the amount of work and manipulation that was necessary to produce these results, results that should now be briefly explored.

In the first place, it should be noted that this new list – like the table describing mounting money distribution – contains seventy six names. However, six of the names that appear in this new table do not appear in the other. Conversely, of course, this means that six captains who received some amount of mounting money never received salary money. Again, this is the product, I would argue, of changes in the command structure of those units that came into existence throughout the campaign. Furthermore, one must of

[242] **Table 1.12, Appendix A.**

course also remember the pre-existence of at least some of Wharton's Irish-bound troopers. I would suggest that all of this means that it is almost certain that there were never seventy six troops in service at any one point in time. This is a reality that must be kept in mind as we proceed with the task of constructing a hypothetical model of the cavalry's needs during the first three months of the war. But for now, at least, let us ignore these complications and proceed with the construction of that model.

First, to be liberal, let's assume that there were indeed a total of seventy six existent troops that needed to be paid throughout the entire Edgehill campaign. Next, let's acknowledge that three of these were cuirassier troops.[243] That leaves seventy three troops of harquebusiers that needed to have been paid according to the establishment outlined in Table 1.8 below. Because we know from the salary warrants described above that some officers began active service on 30 July or earlier, we shall say that all the officers of all seventy three troops – minus the 60 ordinary troopers – required three full month's pay. Furthermore, we shall put forward the demonstrably erroneous but generally reasonable assumption that none of these units had ordinary troopers in service until 15 August, and calculate their needs accordingly. Finally, we shall make the same broad assumptions about the three troops of cuirassiers. Table 1.13 describes the results of these hypothetical calculations.[244] And so, assuming seventy six fully mounted, fully staffed troops of the kinds described above, the Lord General's cavalry should have cost

[243] Sir Philip Stapilton's, Sir William Balfour's, and William Anselme's.

[244] **Table 1.13, Appendix A.**

the nascent parliamentary state £73,208.10 during the Edgehill campaign. The actual total, as verified by a meticulous survey of all salary warrants paid during the first three months of the war, was £67,791.57 paid out in the name of seventy six cavalry captains, seventy three of whom received some amount of mounting money. All told, this represents a shortfall of £5,416.53, or 7.4 per cent - a shortfall, I would argue, that is largely the product of the liberties taken during the construction of the model generated to evaluate the documents. In short, I believe that it is safe to conclude from the analyses presented above that Essex's cuirassier and harquebusier troops – like his infantry regiments – enjoyed unfettered access to funds as they were needed on the ground throughout the campaign.

Finally, before we move on to a discussion of the transportation and ordnance records, let us consider the administrative history of the army's first two regiments of dragoons. The first and most obvious thing to note about the pay of Essex's dragoons is that they, like everyone else it would seem, were the recipients of very large sums during this three-month period. Again, for the purposes of broad discussion I have lumped these soldiers' records together with the material dealing with the rest of the mounted arm, but it should be noted that there were important differences in the way these men and their units were created and administered. In the first place, it would seem that Gerrard's treasury was determined to purchase horses for all of the personnel who served in the first two of the regular army's dragoon regiments. This meant committing a breathtaking amount of money to the creation of these units. Two warrants, only one of which has

survived,[245] bear this out. Authorizing the payment of no less than £7,488, these documents were designed to provide the two initial dragoon colonels, John Browne and James Wardlaw, with enough money to completely mount two full regiments of six hundred dragoons plus officers – that's twelve fully staffed companies in all.[246] Colonel Browne's warrant was paid in full on 20 August, and Colonel Wardlaw's money was delivered by Vernon on 1 September. In addition to this haul, both colonels also received further outfitting money amounting to £2,536.10. These funds were aimed at providing both regiments with levy money, wagons, and other gear.[247] Although the establishment document preserved as TNA SP28/140/17 does contain information on the hypothetical mounting requirements of dragoons units raised to fight in Essex's army, I feel that a meticulous examination of this information is unnecessary given that these two regiments – accounting for no more than 1,200 troopers plus officers – received more than £10,000 of army treasury money just to bring them into existence!

The first unit to come into actual existence was Colonel John Browne's regiment. During the first week of September Vernon paid company-level salary warrants designed

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[245] Robinson made mention of the surviving document in his discussion of the purchasing of army horses in 1642; he would undoubtedly be intrigued by the discovery of another such warrant. See Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), 50.

[246] TNA SP28/1A f.164, and TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.17r. What's more, the surviving document clearly states that some of this money – at least in the case of Colonel Browne's regiment – was to be used for flags and drums.

[247] TNA SP28/2A ff.54 and 105; TNA SP28/261 ff.43, 73, 139, and 191. It should be noted that this includes money for things that were otherwise excluded from our analyses of the cuirassiers and harquebusiers for the reasons discussed above.

to remunerate all six of Browne's companies.[248] At the same time, he also paid the arrears of the regiment's officers dating from 30 July. By 01 September Browne's regiment was up to 90 per cent of its projected strength, numbering 537 private soldiers, all of whom received their first month's pay in advance less than one week after they joined the colours.[249] Oddly enough, these numbers remained completely static during the second monthly pay cycle, and the practice of providing advance pay was continued without alteration.[250] However the officers of this regiment were *never* paid in advance. Like most of their comrades in the infantry regiments, Browne's officers received their first two months' pay at the regimental level. And like many of their comrades in the harquebusier and cuirassier troops, Browne's officers clearly began service long before their men. Again, their first period of remunerated service began on 30 July. Unlike their men, however, these officers had to wait until the *end* of their monthly pay periods before receiving any money for the time they had served.[251] Ultimately, the records dealing with Browne's dragoons in August and September suggest that ordinary dragoons and ordinary infantrymen were treated very similarly by the army's administrators. Neither group was trusted to adhere to the colours without advance pay. The officers, on the other

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[248] Interestingly enough, the sub-regimental units of dragoons commanded by captains were sometimes indifferently referred to as 'troops' and/or 'companies' by the authors of the pay warrants. This was doubtlessly due to the dragoons' hybrid role as mounted infantrymen.

[249] TNA SP28/1A ff.276, 277,288, 289, and 312; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.17v.

[250] TNA SP28/2A ff.253-256; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.26v. All of this maps beautifully onto my findings for the infantry regiments – Browne's privates received their first and second months' pay roughly three weeks before the end of the period in question.

[251] TNA SP28/2A ff.43 and 268. Incidentally, this distinguishes Browne's officers from many of the infantry officers who, it is clear, were benefitting from advance pay at the time. Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1044, n.32.

hand, were treated much like their comrades in the cavalry troops: they were expected to 'tough it out' and wait for their pay, which, of course, they ultimately received in full. Interestingly enough, however, Colonel Wardlaw's regiment was administered very differently, and this probably has to do with the fact that it seems to have come into existence much later.

October was clearly a time of expansion for Essex's dragoon corps, although their organizational nature was becoming somewhat confused. For example, Colonel Wardlaw received his first installment of salary money on 12 October. Authorized by a 'blended' warrant meant to cover the costs of both officers and men to the fourteenth of that month, the document suggests that Wardlaw experienced some trouble finding enough soldiers for the hundreds of horses he undoubtedly could have bought by then.[252] But complicating the picture is the fact that Lord Brooke was then involved in the creation of a third regiment of dragoons. Although Brooke received £250 to purchase saddles and transport horses to Worcester,[253] it still isn't clear whether or not his regiment was an entirely new command, or if he simply inherited parts of another (quasi-regular?) unit. What is clear, however, is that by mid-October yet another regiment under the command of Colonel John Middleton was in existence. Middleton's captains appear for the first time in the records from that period, and both his officers and his men – unlike Browne's

[252] TNA SP28/2B f.318.
[253] TNA SP28/2B ff.328 and 339.

private soldiers – were clearly paid to the end of October.[254] However, there is no indication that Middleton was provided with any advance or mounting money.

All told, the dragoons cost the army treasury £15,420.61 during the first three months of the war. This number includes all the money spent to raise, mount, and pay all officers and men in these various units. Although it is difficult to be certain about the precise regimentation of these forces in October, I would suggest that we are on safe ground if we conclude that none of the mounted infantrymen actually raised to fight with the Lord General were underpaid or undersupplied during the Edgehill campaign. Hopefully, the above analyses demonstrate that the same can be said for the cuirassiers and harquebusiers. Indeed, the only thing missing from the discussion so far is an analysis of the monies spent on the saddles, scarves, medical officers' supplies and other 'furniture' for the regular troops of cavalry. Again, these things can be considered a peripheral – if nevertheless vital – sort of miscellanea, and a detailed discussion concerning them has been omitted for the sake of clarity and brevity.[255] Nevertheless, it is possible, by way of conclusion, to construct an admittedly rough picture of how much money was spent on these things by Vernon and Jessop during these first three months. This rough picture can then be compared to a hypothetical model designed to provide us with some general idea of how much this equipment *should* have cost. Again, the goal

[254] TNA SP28/2B ff.415, 424, 425,460, 461, and 462; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, ff.32r and 33v.
[255] Those interested in the provision of these things would be well-advised to consult the fifth chapter of Dr. Gavin Robinson's 2001 dissertation.

here is to demonstrate the treasury's overall successes in meeting the army's needs without a lengthy exposition dealing with many hundreds of warrants.

Recall from the beginning of this section that Gerrard's deputies spent some £110,594.83 on the cavalry during the Edgehill campaign. Remember also that this total excludes all money spent by the Proposition treasurers directly. Now, based on a quick, impressionistic survey of the cavalry's warrants, let's assume that each of Essex's troops of harquebusiers required some £180 in addition to all of the costs discussed above.[256] This amount is the sum of the money required for saddles (£150) and enough orange, allegiance-identifying scarves for every trooper in the unit (£30). Let's again assume, again problematically, that there were seventy three troops of harquebusiers. Let's also assume that both of these numbers would have been proportionally higher for the three troops of 80 cuirassiers - £250 in all for them. Next, we can compare the hypothetical total derived from this process to the amount that remains when we subtract the relevant sums from Tables 1.11, 1.12, and the £15,420.61 spent on the dragoons from the £110,594.83 grand total. Finally, we must remember that a portion of the cavalry's saddle money was delivered by the Proposition treasurers. Again, this situation has been explained in Table 1.10, and the subtotal here must be added to whatever remains of the army treasury receipts after the preceding subtraction has been completed. All of these evolutions are described visually in Table 1.14 below.[257]

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[256] See, for examples, TNA SP28/1A f.303; TNA SP28/2A ff.127, 172, and 173.
[257] **Table 1.14, Appendix A.**

As was the case with the hypothetical salary calculations performed above, it would seem here that the amounts actually spent were insufficient to the task. But again, I would argue that this is at least partly the product of the erroneous and problematic assumption that there were indeed seventy six full troops in existence during the Edgehill campaign. Furthermore, and conversely, it must be noted that Table 1.14 should never be regarded as anything more than a rough picture of 'miscellaneous' spending. This is because the final sum in the left-hand column includes spending in a much wider variety of categories than the two basic ones found in the table's title. This caveat aside, however, I still believe that the table helps demonstrate the essential point that the treasurers administering Essex's army should have had no serious trouble meeting some of the other basic requirements of the cavalry, in addition to those 'core' needs outlined in TNA SP28/140/17.

~ IV ~

The final section of this chapter will cover the large portions of army treasury spending that I have categorized as 'other'. Some of this spending, namely the amounts paid over to Stephen Estwick for clothing, has already been factored into our discussion at an earlier point. Other parts of it must be dealt with in detail here. Some activity, however, will be glossed over quite quickly. Why is this so? Recall from this chapter's introduction that my purpose here is to plumb the administrative machinery that was established to create and sustain a centralized army of regulars during the first English civil war. Note also that although Essex's army was completely reliant on Gerrard's

treasury for its sustenance, the mandate of Gerrard's office extended to forces and fortifications beyond the immediate jurisdiction of the regular army's units and commanders. Because of this, it is important to remember that I have elected to further subdivide all of the warrants I have labelled 'other' by placing each of them into one of five sub-categories that I have created to contextualize Gerrard's wider commitments. While at least three of these sub-categories include money that was clearly used to maintain Essex's regular army, two of them include payments that were quite obviously meant to support other bodies of parliamentarian forces, or the wider administrative apparatus itself. Regardless of the complications created by the heterogeneous nature of this spending, it again makes sense to begin this section by laying out the army treasury totals that fall into the parent category. This information can be found here in Figure 1.4.

In all, the army treasurers spent some £66,612.61 for 'other' reasons during the first three months of the war. Vernon was once again responsible for the majority of this spending, but here we see that Jessop adopted a steadily-increasing role in these matters. Ultimately this shouldn't come as much of a surprise considering that, once again, a portion of the money in question was used to meet commitments not directly related to Essex's regular army. The current state of Vernon's surviving paperwork in these matters is described here in Table 1.15. A summary of Jessop's follows in Table 1.16



Table 1.15 – Vernon's 'Other' Spending: the Edgehill Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
Aug 1642	No.	22	11	33	33.33%
	Value	12887.69	13493.25	26380.94	51.15%
Sep 1642	No.	26	22	48	45.83%
	Value	7268.20	2184.35	9452.55	23.11%
Oct 1642	No.	21	12	33	36.36%
	Value	4409.56	740.70	5150.26	14.38%
Total	No.	69	45	114	39.47%
	Value	24565.45	16418.30	40983.75	40.06%

Table 1.16 – Jessop's 'Other' Spending: the Edgehill Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
Aug 1642	No.	0
	Value	0.00
Sep 1642	No.	23
	Value	8155.29
Oct 1642	No.	32
	Value	17473.58
Total	No.	55
	Value	25628.87

The first thing to note about the 'other' warrants – as far as Vernon's records are concerned, anyway – is that a relatively high number of these documents have been 'lost'. Indeed, around forty percent of the material seems to be missing in this case. Interestingly enough, however, this may be partly explained by the nature of some of these payments. Consider, for example, a very large payment of £8,000 that was made by Vernon toward the end of August. This huge amount of money was supposed to secure quarters for the regular army in or around Coventry at the time.[258] The money was paid over by Vernon to several of the army's officers, who were then supposed to find a way to make good use of it. Although there seems to be no surviving warrant for this payment, I would argue that it is at least possible that no such warrant ever existed. This is because one can envision a scenario in which Vernon provided his comrades with resources that were hitherto unconnected with a need warranting (literally, in this case) documentation. This is especially the case when it comes to the £8,000 payment used as an example here.

[258] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.16v.

It would seem that the officers involved were unable to spend the money, and they subsequently returned it in total to Vernon within a couple of weeks![259]

Regardless of these interesting findings and speculations, our central purpose here is to focus on the immediate needs of the regular army on the march – at least those that could be successfully met with silver. For this reason let us now proceed with a careful examination of the five separate sub-categories mentioned above. Table 1.17 introduces them to the reader, allowing her or him to easily compare this breakdown to the totals described in Figure 1.4 above.[260] Before we begin it is important to remember at all times that these five sub-categories – like their parent, and the other two larger categories – are entirely of my own creation. What this means, of course, is that there is an inescapable element of subjectivity underpinning the presentation of this data. Nevertheless, I contend that this is perhaps the best way to make sense of the essentially miscellaneous payments that comprise much of this third overarching category of spending. The remarkable case of the £8,000 which was eventually returned to Vernon by the army's officers, for example, appears here as the major part of Vernon's 'support' payments for the month of August. Although we will deal with each of these sub-categories in turn, let us begin our analysis with a look at the army treasury's 'artillery' spending, spending that was clearly central to the creation and ongoing viability of the rebels' regular army.

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[259] *Ibid.*, f.4v. I have no explanation for this astounding situation. It would seem that – *quite literally* – Vernon had more money in August than he or the regulars could spend!

[260] **Table 1.17, Appendix A.**

Aside from personnel (who had to be paid) and a large number of horses (which had to be acquired and maintained somehow), the most important commodity for Essex's gunners was the ordnance itself. All three of these needs will be dealt with briefly in turn. In the first place, as we shall see, the surviving pay records for the train are about as numerous as those left behind by a single, typical infantry regiment. Secondly, when it comes to horses, this discussion will lean heavily on Robinson's indispensable foot-work, arguing that short-term contracts with private owners were the primary means of providing Lieutenant-General Philibert Emanuel de Bois and his subordinates with mobility. Finally, when it comes to the guns and ammunition itself, the pioneering insights of both Lewis and Edwards will be deployed to help structure a discussion of the process of arms procurement and the nature of the important warrants that were issued to the Tower in the fall of 1642.

By consulting the same records used to reconstruct the infantry and cavalry payment schedules described above it has been determined that no fewer than seventeen fully-paid warrants directly relating to the artillery were issued to Gerrard's deputies during the pre-Edgehill period. Worth a combined total of £12,700.10, these warrants account for a little more than nineteen per cent of the 'other' spending that appears in Figure 1.4.[261] Interestingly enough, however, it seems that only seven of these pay orders had anything to do with the salaries of the gunners and related personnel. Once again, for the sake of clarity this subset of the data has been tabulated for inclusion in Appendix

[261] See Table 1.17 below.

A.[262] Since Table 1.18 shows that the train's central personnel were paid promptly and without interruption from the end of July, it seems reasonable to conclude that our records on this matter are complete. Indeed, only two of the Vernon-paid warrants issued on behalf of the gunners and their support personnel seem to have been lost in the intervening centuries. According to this documentation de Bois and his successor as Lt. General, Sir Edward Peyto, received a grand total of £8,015.10 for the artillery's wages in the weeks preceding 1 November. In addition to this haul, a further eleven payments were made to the artillery covering the cost of equipment and logistics. Although one of the warrants dealing with these issues seems to have gone unpaid,[263] a total of £4,685.00 came out of Gerrard's treasury to pay for things like tools, equipment, the levying and paying of pioneers and firelocks, and the costs associated with fortifying Worcester at the beginning of October.

Again, one of the recurring themes of this chapter has been the large amount of ready money that was clearly demanded by – and provided to – Essex's regular army during the Edgehill campaign. Unfortunately, as Robinson has demonstrated, the Propositions were far less of a success when it came to the listing of draught horses for the use of the state, at least before 1 November. By the end of October, the commissaries working in London had recorded the enrolment of just 289 such animals – a number that

[262] **Table 1.18, Appendix A.**
[263] TNA SP28/2B f.430; I do not know why this warrant was unpaid. It has obviously been excluded from the table presented above.

included all serviceable dragoon horses as well.[264] Robinson says that this was an extremely serious problem because, he argues, Essex's artillery probably needed around a thousand horses to get around. As was the case with the cavalry as a whole, it was simply not possible to purchase all of the horses that would be needed, and it seems that in this instance there was even less of an attempt to do so. Consider, for example, the brief mention of 80 state-owned draught horses cited by Robinson.[265] It seems entirely plausible to suggest that these animals – which left London in the last few days of September – were originally purchased by Edward West (see below) earlier in the month at the price of just £7 10s per horse.[266] If this is so, then the transaction is illustrative. As we know, the £600 involved amounted to more than ten percent of the total amount expended on the ancillary costs associated with the train; but if Robinson is right, this bought less than ten percent of the total number of required horses. Although de Bois undoubtedly had access to a number of army-owned wagons,[267] the treasurers could never have bought enough horses to pull them and everything else that was required. If Essex's guns and the well-paid gunners who operated them were to move, then it seems inevitable that the army would have had to rely partly on contracts with civilian teams

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[264] Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), Table 7, p. 75. Considering how much money the dragoons received to buy horses, however, I doubt they needed very many donated animals.
[265] *Ibid.*
[266] *Ibid.*, 75, n.169; TNA SP28/262 ff.438-439 and TNA SP28/261 f.62. The reader should note that TNA SP28/261 f.62 does not appear in any of my primary databases because Vernon neglected to enter the amount (£600) into his account book for the month of September 1642.
[267] TNA SP28/2A f.215; TNA SP28/131/2 ff.28v-29v.

and wagon owners. Indeed, as we shall soon see, this approach became standard practice both before and after Edgehill.[268]

So just how many guns were there? For the historian who prefers to rely on quantitative and official administrative sources, it is necessary to consult the surviving records of the Ordnance Office if we are to hazard a guess. But unfortunately, as David Lewis tells us, this is not a straightforward task. The administration of the seventeenth-century Office was byzantine, and he explains that the surviving materials fall into five categories, only two of which deal with the issuing of ordnance and supplies to armies, ships, and fortifications. Sadly, when it comes to army supply during the fall of 1642, material from just one of these categories – the books of warrants and deliveries – has survived.[269] Furthermore, as Lewis cautioned, there is a large amount of repetition in these books. All four of the bound volumes of warrants I have consulted seem, for the most part, to be fair copies of the same original list of documents.[270] Additionally, only one of these – TNA WO55/1937 – contains delivery notices, and even then there are no signed receipts to reassure us that the materiel actually found its way into the right soldiers' hands. Nevertheless, as Lewis has indicated, these records suggest that the train took delivery of the bulk of its allotted stores on 2 September, 1642.[271]

According to the delivery notice in question, Essex's artillery train was very briefly composed of: four 'short' twelve-pounders, one drake-bored demi-culverin, four

[268] TNA SP28/2B f.368 and TNA SP28/140/4, generally.
[269] Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", p. 9, Table 1.
[270] TNA W[ar] O[ffice] 55/387; TNA WO55/457; TNA WO55/1937; TNA WO55/1754.
[271] Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 249-250; TNA WO55/1937, unfol.

six-pounders (or 'sakers'), eleven three-pounders and two each of mortars and petards. All of this ordnance was made of brass. Additionally, a substantial amount of round shot was provided; although, as Lewis noted, there seems to have been a shortfall in the amount of case shot that was available.[272] A large number of accoutrements such as ladles and sponges were also provided, along with – if Peter Edwards and I are reading the manifest of 30 August correctly – every last grain of powder in the Tower![273] In the final analysis, de Bois seems to have made off with most of the serviceable guns, an amount which included all of the three and six pounders then available. Indeed, it would seem that this made some members of the City's Militia Committee uncomfortable. On 8 September Essex issued a warrant to the officers of the Tower asking them to provide additional light ordnance to the Committee for the defense of the City – the members of which having already confiscated all eleven of de Bois's light, three-pound cannon.[274]

Naturally, this situation would have dramatically reduced the train's ability to provide mobile battlefield fire support, a point that is seemingly lost on Stephen Bull.[275] However, it would seem that this loss was made up for in part by a consignment of cannon delivered to, oddly enough, Colonel Cholmley via his Lt. Colonel, Lancelot

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[272] Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 250; TNA WO55/1937, unfol.
[273] Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, p.110, n.160; TNA WO55/1937, unfol. The total amounted to no more than 10 lasts, or 240 barrels. This is a relatively tiny amount – the equivalent of just one month's production in pre-war terms. See Ronald Edward Zupko, *A Dictionary of English Weights and Measures: From Anglo-Saxon Times to the Nineteenth Century* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1968), 96; Ian Roy, ed., *The Royalist Ordnance Papers, 1642-1646*, vol.1 (Oxfordshire Record Society, vol.43, 1962), p.11, n.7.
[274] TNA WO55/387, f.8; TNA WO55/1937, unfol.
[275] Stephen Bull, *"The Furie of the Ordnance": Artillery in the English civil wars* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2008), 60.

Alured, at the end of the month.[276] I currently have no explanation for this remarkable situation. However, assuming that de Bois was able to acquire this ordnance and keep the rest of his initial train intact before Edgehill, he would have faced the problem of hauling around many tons of government-issued brass in the autumn muck – as well as all of the accessories and ammunition that went along with the pieces in question. A full table of this ordnance – minus the requisite powder and other miscellaneous equipment – is included here as Table 1.19 for the sake of clarity.[277] Finally, it must be remembered that these pieces, and the equipment that went with them, represent only that ordnance formally issued by the Tower on two occasions, and that the surviving records here are admittedly incomplete. As Young told us long ago, there were probably more guns under Essex's command by 23 October; it is little wonder, then, that historians have frequently found anecdotal evidence hinting at the cumbersome nature of the army's train.[278]

As Robinson indicated in Appendix D of his dissertation, the wider records pertaining to the provision of military transportation for the whole of Essex's army in the last quarter of 1642 are fragmentary and disorganized.[279] For example, although the pay and supply warrant series contain a number of documents authorizing relatively large payments for those officers tasked with ensuring the mobility of the army, it is very

[276] In all, Cholmley received two demi-culverins, two six-pounders, and two additional sakers, along with an allotment of powder and shot. TNA WO55/1937 unfol. – The second two sakers apparently belonged to Lord Cottington at one point. Delivery occurred on 31 September 1642.

[277] **Table 1.19, Appendix A.**

[278] Scott, Turton and von Arni cite Clarendon during their very brief discussion of Essex's train. See Christopher L. Scott, Alan Turton, and Eric Gruber von Arni, *Edgehill: The Battle Reinterpreted* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2005), 5; for anecdotal reports concerning the size of Essex's train, see Peter Young, *Edgehill 1642: The Campaign and the Battle* (The Windrush Press, 1995), 100.

[279] Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) Appendix D.

difficult to draw clear conclusions about the precise jurisdiction and mandate of these officers – especially during the Edgehill campaign. Regardless, the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers make it clear that the clerical activities of at least three of these men are worthy of further comment and analysis. In the first place there was Edward West, the officer who received the aforementioned £600 of army treasury money on 11 September. Again, he likely used this sum to purchase the 80 draught horses which arrived in the army's camp at Worcester on 3 October.[280] According to the publisher of a contemporary tract West was 'a Commissary of the Train of Artillery for the draught horses' during the first few weeks of the war.[281] Secondly, there was Anthony Fastolfe, another of the artillery train's staff officers who actively recruited and personally paid some of the army's wagoners in 1642. And finally, there was Thomas Richardson. Robinson's work has demonstrated just how heavily involved Richardson was in the listing of horses on the Propositions during the early weeks of the war effort,[282] but there is more that can be said about his role as the army's Wagon-Master General during the Edgehill campaign[283] – a post he seems to have held throughout the first civil war. The following sub-section

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[280] Again, TNA SP28/261 f.62 – the warrant which has been excluded from Figure 1.4 and all related tables. See also TNA SP28/262 ff.438-439 and Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) 75.

[281] See BL Thomason E.64[4], Anon., *A catalogue of the names of the dukes, marquesses, earles and lords, that have absented themselves from the Parliament, and are now with His Majesty. And the names of the lords that subscribed to levie horse to assist His Majestie with. A copie of all the cavaliers of his Majesty's marching army, with the number of captaines in each severall regiment, each regiment containing a thousand soldiers . . .* (London: S.N., 1642).

[282] Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) chapter 1; TNA SP28/131, passim.

[283] BL Thomason E.64[4] , Anon., *A catalogue of the names of the dukes, marquesses, earles and lords, that have absented themselves from the Parliament, and are now with His Majesty. And the names of the lords that subscribed to levie horse to assist His Majestie with. A copie of all the cavaliers of his Majesty's marching army, with the number of captaines in each severall regiment, each regiment containing a thousand soldiers . . .* (London: S.N., 1642); TNA SP28/140/4 f.1r.

will attempt to examine and contextualize the administrative and logistical roles played by all three of these officers during the first three months of the war.

In the first place, Table 1.17 tells us that only around two per cent of all 'other' spending during the Edgehill campaign was aimed at meeting the costs associated with military transportation. Despite the relative insignificance of this sub-category, the money changing hands for this purpose was clearly of vital importance to the regular army in the field. Chronologically speaking, the first two of the nine warrants in question (worth a total, as the reader can see, of £1,396.33) were issued on behalf of Thomas Richardson. Both of these were worth £21, enough to cover his personal salary as Wagon Master for precisely one month each. Similarly, the last of the nine was also issued on Richardson's behalf. This document authorized his receipt of £300 – an amount that he subsequently used to remunerate the private contractors he employed to transport small arms and equipment to the army in the weeks and months after Edgehill.[284] However, the majority of this 'transportation' money was transferred directly to the Lord General's train of artillery. In all, £1,031 was forwarded to the train on the authority of four warrants, and it is important to note that all of this money was used to remunerate wagoners and other ancillary staff who were directly employed by the regular army to provide transportation and other services in situ.[285] The remaining two of these nine 'transportation' warrants were worth a comparatively inconsequential amount of money. Nevertheless, they are

[284] TNA SP28/261 f.317. See also TNA SP28/140/4 for a detailed record of Richardson's spending in these matters. It is important to note that Richardson does not seem to have played an important role in the remuneration of private contractors until the end of the period covered by this chapter.
[285] TNA SP28/2A f.215; TNA SP28/2B f.368; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, ff.24v and 29r.

important for our purposes because they hint at the activities of both West and Fastolfe during the period before the battle of Edgehill.[286]

Let us begin with West. Robinson tells us that there are many surviving documents indicating that Edward West was responsible for authorizing the payment of a host of civilian contractors in the period just before Edgehill.[287] These contractors were paid for providing the army with horses and/or wagons for given periods of time. Their pay came directly from the army's central treasury (William Jessop) on West's orders, and it should be noted that there is no record of West paying his charges directly (as both Richardson and Fastolfe clearly did). Significantly, it must also be noted that West's warrants were issued by himself, not by either the Committee of Safety or the Lord General, and as a result the sums they deal with have *not* been included in the army treasury totals reported at the beginning of this section.[288] Again, the one exception to this rule is TNA SP28/261 f.1, a stray warrant from this set that has somehow found its way into the collection of Committee of Safety warrants. All of the warrants composed by West were issued before the end of September (i.e. before the 80 state-owned horses that he likely bought arrived at Worcester), and all were paid by Jessop before the end of October 1642. Ultimately, it seems probable that the contractors managed by West in this fashion fulfilled a range of ancillary transportation and logistical needs. Indeed, considering West's title, it would seem plausible to argue that these contractors and their

[286] TNA SP28/2B f.371; TNA SP28/261 f.1. Together, these warrants were worth a paltry £23 6s 6d.
[287] Again, see Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) Appendix D; see also SP28/2B ff.581-643.
[288] Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1045, n.33.

horses were involved largely in the transportation of equipment belonging to the artillery train. If this was the case, then the teams and drivers contracted by West must have been involved in the artillery 'transportation' activities that were otherwise paid for via the four warrants mentioned in the previous paragraph. Indeed, as Robinson noted, a great many of the documents in SP28/2B state that West's wagoners were hired to 'drawe His Majesty and the Parliament's carriages', a phrase that implies state ownership of at least some of the vehicles in question. Unfortunately, it is not possible to easily confirm this hypothesis. This is because West's own separate accounts and disbursements – if they were ever recorded and kept – seem to have been lost. We are therefore limited in our analysis to this unknown percentage of surviving warrants authorized by West, sent to the central treasury, and paid for by Jessop.

Anthony Fastolfe was another important staff officer who was also responsible for the remuneration of some of the army's wagon drivers during the fall of 1642. In the first place, it would seem that Fastolfe joined West as one of the artillery's commissaries in October,[289] and happily, more of Fastolfe's paperwork seems to have been preserved. Unlike West, for example, Fastolfe sometimes paid the army's private transportation contractors himself using money he received from Gerrard's office. We know this because fragments of his own accounts, like Vernon's, have survived as part of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers.[290] Additionally, there were a plethora of pay warrants

[289] Fastolfe was called 'deputy to the wagon-master general' on 13 October 1642 - TNA SP28/2B f.371.
[290] See TNA SP28/143 ff.1-46; and TNA SP28/146 ff.178-210. See also Robinson, "Horse supply," (thesis) Appendix D, p.265, n.9.

that were issued by either Essex or the Committee of Safety to the army treasury ordering the direct payment of civilian drivers who rendered privately-contracted service to either Fastolfe or West.[291] Naturally, all of these warrants *have* been included in my warrant database, where they appear as 'transportation' warrants within the 'other' category. Sadly, however, all of these 'private wagoner warrants'[292] were paid by either Vernon or Jessop after the end of October, and so cannot have had a bearing on the financial profile of the Edgehill campaign. But regardless of all this, two broad observations can be made of Fastolfe's activities when it comes to the first three months of the army's existence. In the first place it would seem that Fastolfe assumed more and more responsibility for moving the artillery train as the autumn wore on. Again, Fastolfe began personally paying the private contractors – as wells as various support personnel – during the middle of October.[293] Secondly, as Robinson indicated, almost none of the drivers/contractors managed by West in September appear in the 'private wagoner warrants' that can be associated with the later activities of both West and Fastolfe.[294] Like Robinson, I have no immediate explanation for this. Interestingly enough, however, two of five contractors who do appear in both West's warrants and the later 'private wagoner warrants' also

[291] I would like to once again thank Dr. Robinson for providing me with the databases he originally compiled on this topic. They have formed the basis for my analysis of the army's transportation requirements during 1642, and throughout the first years of the war.
[292] These 'PWWs' were first identified by Robinson as a separate category of administrative documentation in his 2001 thesis. Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) Appendix D, p.264. The term 'private wagoner warrant' is my own.
[293] The first of Fastolfe's own account books, for example, begins with payments made on 14 October. See SP28/143, Fastolfe's account.
[294] Again, see Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) Appendix D. Only five contractors who appeared in West's warrants show up again in later 'transportation' warrants and/or Fastolfe's own accounts.

appear in the personal account and disbursement book of Thomas Richardson, Wagon Master General of the Army.

Thomas Richardson was a man who wore at least two administrative hats during the second half of 1642. And although Robinson's detailed analysis of his role in the listing of Proposition horses is both unprecedented and unparalleled, there is more to be said about Richardson's role as a direct provider of civilian-contracted transportation services during the late autumn and early winter of that year. Again, Richardson's role in these matters is recorded in his own personal account book which has survived, like Vernon's and Fastolfe's paperwork, as a part of SP28.[295] The vast majority of the expense entries in this book – especially those from the first year of the war – deal with the remuneration of wagoners and drivers; nevertheless, Robinson argued that these wagoners ". . . were not part of the artillery train and so must be treated separately. Richardson was based in London and operated independently of the Lord General's army, having general responsibilities for transport of convoys to any armies or garrisons which were to receive supplies or money from London".[296] Be that as it may, I cannot see any reason why this account book should not be included in a broader survey of the army's transportation apparatus. For despite what Robinson has argued, Richardson was indisputably a member of the regular army's staff – as evidenced both by the printed tract

[295] Again, see TNA SP28/140/4.
[296] Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) Appendix D, p.265

of 14 September, and by the very title of his own account.[297] In addition to this, many of the teams that were initially hired by Richardson were sent to Essex's army in the field. Crucially, it would appear that many of these teams were subsequently managed by the other two men, and (partially) paid on the centrally-issued 'private wagoner warrants' that were cashed after the conclusion of the Edgehill campaign. Again, although some of the wagoners and teams hired and paid in this fashion rendered service during the final days of October, the vast majority of the resulting paperwork post-dates the period covered by this chapter. As a result, this is a subject that will have to be deferred for now.

Regardless of the weaknesses of the inherently incomplete records and analyses presented thus far, a few broad conclusions may be drawn about the provision of military transportation in the autumn of 1642. Although a paltry few state-owned draught horses were probably purchased by West in September, these did not arrive in the field until 3 October. What's more, it is certain that they would not have been enough to move Essex's artillery train on their own. During September, as the regular army was in the final stages of assembly, West met the train's immediate needs by hiring 73 civilian contractors who were all subsequently paid by Jessop during October. Although most of these men were never hired by the army again, West seems to have proven that contracting civilians could work. Unfortunately, however, it would seem that the first of

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[297] BL Thomason E.64[4] , Anon., *A catalogue of the names of the dukes, marquesses, earles and lords, that have absented themselves from the Parliament, and are now with His Majesty. And the names of the lords that subscribed to levie horse to assist His Majestie with. A copie of all the cavaliers of his Majesty's marching army, with the number of captaines in each severall regiment, each regiment containing a thousand soldiers . . .* (London: S.N., 1642); TNA SP28/140/4, f.1r

the army's long-term civilian contractors were not hired until the middle of October. Again, this process – once it got underway – was managed by all three of the officers discussed above. Richardson contracted their services in the capital, and West and Fastolfe eventually assumed financial responsibility for all of these men and their animals during their service with the regular army. While the nine 'transportation' warrants found in my database suggests that a respectable amount of money was expended to keep the regular army mobile during these three months, Robinson was doubtlessly right to conclude that the patchiness of the documentation makes greater precision impossible. Nevertheless, the preceding analysis makes it clear that it is possible to know something useful about the regular army's transportation infrastructure in the period before the first great battle of the civil war.

Although the Parliament's new regular army needed both an effective artillery train as well as adequate and timely transportation services in order to make it battle-worthy, Table 1.17 indicates that these things consumed just £14,096.43 – or 21 per cent – of the total amount spent for 'other' reasons during the Edgehill campaign.[298] What this means, of course, is that the central army treasury clearly had other important responsibilities during this period. Indeed, the amounts spent on 'local forces' exceeded this combined subtotal by more than ten thousand pounds, a reality that will undoubtedly surprise those who have imagined London to be insensitive to the financial needs of the

[298] £12,700.10 ('artillery') + £1,396.33 ('transportation') = £14,096.43.

peripheral parts of the kingdom during the early stages of the civil wars.[299] In all, the army treasury cashed forty 'local forces' warrants. However, more than ninety percent of the resulting £27,807.20 in payments changed hands on the authority of just seventeen of these documents. The single most valuable 'local forces' warrant issued during the Edgehill campaign was made out for Sir John Hotham, then governor of the northern city of Hull.[300] Worth no less than £4,000, it was written on 3 October by the Committee of Safety and paid in full by Jessop just two days later. Sir John's son – Durand – personally signed the receipt. Significantly, this very large amount of money was preceded by a similar payment of £2,000 made by Vernon on 26 August.[301] If we add an additional sum of £2,000 – paid to the firebrand MP Henry Marten to support, in part, the 1,000 men he purportedly sent to Hull sometime before 10 August,[302] then it would appear that the army treasury devoted no less than £8,000 to the defense of Hull during the first three months of the war. This was a handsome sum indeed, especially if Jennifer Jones is right in her assertion that, taken together, the Hothams and the Fairfaxes could muster no more than 1,000 men in late October.[303]

Although Hull received the most financial support, other localities also benefitted from the munificence of the central authorities during this period. At the top of the list of beneficiaries was the newly-established garrison at Portsmouth, operating under the

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[299] Jennifer Jones, "The War in the North: The Northern Parliamentarian Army in the English Civil War 1642-1645" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, York University, 1991), chapter 5, passim.
[300] TNA SP28/261 f.288.
[301] TNA SP28/1A f.239. This was also received by Durand Hotham.
[302] TNA SP28/261 f.22.
[303] Jones, "The War in the North", 31.

command of Sir William Lewis after the surrender of Goring's cavaliers. As I have already indicated, the payments that Lewis received were important to the history of the regular army's infantry corps because one of Essex's regiments received much of its pay from him.[304] All told, Lewis received £3,500 of army treasury money on the warrants that I cited in my article, some of which was used to remunerate Sir John Merrick's regiment. Despite the fact that no other area or garrison received more than Hull or Portsmouth, the aggregate worth of all forty 'local forces' warrants clearly demonstrates that the regular army's administrators were comfortable distributing large amounts of money to the regional forces when it was deemed necessary or expedient. Furthermore, it demonstrates that while some of this money was used to support detachments of the regular army when they were consigned to garrison duty, a great deal of it was also sent to truly parochial commands that were very far afield.

A cursory examination of Table 1.17 reveals that a comparatively small amount of 'other' money was distributed for the purchase and maintenance of 'arms'. Although this might seem to indicate that the army treasury played a relatively modest role in the arming of the Parliament's troops, nothing could be further from the truth. As Peter Edwards has shown, the rebels relied very heavily on imported weaponry during the first year or so of the war.[305] Significantly, most of this weaponry was purchased outside the purview of the Ordnance Office and stored in the Committee of Safety's own 'private' magazine. For the Edgehill campaign, the single most important document pertaining to

[304] Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1040, n.15.
[305] Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, pp.199-200, Table 8.

this process has been preserved as TNA SP28/261 f.284. Although it has been interfiled with the Committee of Safety's pay orders, this document is not a warrant. Rather, it is a note addressed to Gerrard and his deputies informing them that a very large amount of weaponry has been contracted for private purchase on the continent by Stephen Estwick and Thomas Andrewes. While some of these weapons had been delivered by the date of the note's composition (4 October 1642), more were expected. Furthermore, the note informed the army treasury officials that they were to pay all of the costs associated with these purchases, provided the total did not exceed £15,000.

Although it is difficult to prove, it is possible that some of the payments that make up the £5,810.37 'arms' subtotal found in Table 1.17 were aimed at meeting some of the costs associated with the foreign orders placed by Estwick and Andrewes. This is because a number of the twelve warrants that authorized this spending make mention of Owen Rowe and/or John Bradley – the men who were tasked with keeping the 'private' magazine maintained by the Committee of Safety.[306] Although some of these warrants were aimed at meeting the costs incurred by these men in their efforts to make old weapons and armour – especially those brought south from the magazine at Hull – serviceable again, some of them may have been written to cover the costs associated with the overseas procurement process outlined in Table 1.20 below.[307] Unfortunately, we may never know just how much of the preauthorized amount of £15,000 of army treasury money was spent on foreign arms. This is because William Jessop was heavily involved

[306] *Ibid.*, 32.
[307] Consult TNA SP28/261 f.380, for example.

in the process of paying Rowe, Bradley, and the other private arms dealers, and, as the reader well knows, we have no way of knowing the total amount that he spent.[308]

I have labelled the final of my 'other' sub-categories 'support', and, as I indicated in the introduction to this dissertation, the warrants that authorized these payments are best understood as a miscellaneous collection of documents that were written to meet a wide range of administrative and ancillary costs associated with creating and maintaining a standing army of regulars. That said, there are at least two important types of payments found in this subset that are worthy of further comment here. Significantly, both of these have already been examined or alluded to above. The single most valuable 'support' payment made during this period was the £8,000 that Vernon disbursed on 30 August to cover the cost of quartering the army on its march through Coventry.[309] Again, it is very important for the reader to recall that the officers to whom Vernon gave this money were unable to spend it and subsequently returned it to him in full. As I said above, this is nothing short of astounding; however, as a result of these evolutions the money's appearance in my register of the treasury's disbursements is not without its problems. These problems are, however, entirely the product of Vernon's simplistic, single-entry bookkeeping system.[310] Finally, as I indicated above, the army treasury was responsible

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[308] **Table 1.20, Appendix A.**

[309] Again, TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, ff.4v and 16v.

[310] Consider, for example, that because it 'went out' and 'came back in again' this £8,000 appears *twice* on both sides of Vernon's ledger. The account still balances out over time, of course, but this process does have the effect of artificially inflating the volume of money Vernon appears to have handled. It is important for the reader to note that there is *only one other instance* of this phenomenon in Vernon's account book. During the month of August Vernon lent £2,000 to the Parliament's navy (TNA SP28/143, Vernon's

for remunerating Stephen Estwick for the clothing and 'uniform' components he supplied to the army.[311] Again, the total combined value of these two types of payments was £12,800, or 68 per cent of the entire 'support' sub-category as reported in Table 1.17.

~ Conclusion ~

Essex's army – the Long Parliament's first attempt to construct an administratively-centralized army of regular soldiers in England – was exceptionally well-funded and well-supplied during the Edgehill campaign. This was because the 'Propositions' scheme proved wildly successful, at least in London and its environs. Again, surviving records indicate that thousands of horses were listed by Smith and Richardson during the period covered by this chapter, a great many of which appear to have come from the county of Essex and the City of London.[312] Additionally, hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of coin and plate were handled by the Proposition treasurers during this period. And although upwards of £100,000 of this money was probably 'lent' by the so-called Irish Adventurers at the end of July,[313] it is certain that vast, additional sums were also collected and distributed by the officers at Guildhall in the weeks before 1 November 1642.[314] Crucially, *all* of these military resources were successfully concentrated in the nation's capital by this entirely new and *fully centralized* financial

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account, f.7r). The money was returned to him in early September (TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.4v). Again, this £2,000 'disbursement' appears here in Table 1.17 as a 'local forces' payment.

[311] TNA SP28/1A f.93; TNA SP28/2A f.38; TNA SP28/261 f.430.

[312] Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), Table 5.

[313] Again, see Armstrong, "The Long Parliament goes to war," 90. See also Fletcher, *Outbreak*, 343-344; Vernon F. Snow and Anne Steele Young, eds., *The Private Journals of the Long Parliament: 2 June to 17 September 1642* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 301, 331-332.

[314] TNA SP28/170.

and logistical apparatus, an apparatus created by the Junto for the express purpose of constructing a regular army to fight for the Long Parliament as a sovereign national entity.

This chapter has attempted to showcase the administrative machinery that underpinned this development with as much precision as the surviving government records permit. Ultimately, it has shown that although the regular army's administrators enjoyed access to an enormous amount of money and pre-existing supplies, the many twists and turns that characterized the administrative networks they established and utilized make it difficult to quickly or easily discuss the manner in which this money and equipment was distributed and spent. Furthermore, as Section III demonstrates, it is often just as hard to determine the precise composition of the army at any given point in time, let alone whether or not its particular formations were always fully paid at the unit level. Nevertheless, the above analyses clearly demonstrate the power and utility of a full, systematic survey of the Commonwealth Exchequer papers. In particular, it highlights the importance of the many hundreds of surviving (and lost) pay warrants that were issued to the army's treasurers during the first three months of the war.

In terms of the sheer volume of documentation, the Edgehill campaign marks the high-water point in the administrative history of Essex's regular army. Although this chapter has aimed at covering only three of the twenty-nine months dealt with by this dissertation (or just 10 per cent of the chronology), the surviving records from this period account for no less than 23 per cent (1,196) of the nearly 5,300 army treasury payments

that are compiled in my warrant database. This, more than any other factor, accounts for both the length and complexity of the analyses presented here. It also hints at the volume of materiel and financial resources in play at that time. What of the other twenty-six months of the army's operational existence? How much did the Lord General's regular army change in the weeks and months following Edgehill? How much did it shrink in size? Was it still well paid? If it wasn't, then what parts of it suffered the most? How badly did they suffer? To what degree are the answers to these questions dependent on the shifting nature of the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement with provincial forces? The following chapters provide some of the answers to these crucial questions.

Chapter Two: November 1642 – April 1643

~ Introduction ~

This chapter will chart the fluctuating nature of the Long Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement at the political centre during the six months that followed the battle of Edgehill. As we shall soon see, Essex's regular army continued to form the core of this arrangement throughout this period. However, there were a number of important legislative and administrative changes that formalized and entrenched the Parliament's decentralized war effort in the localities. Further, these changes affected the pay of Essex's regular army by depriving it of certain innovative revenue streams, even as these came into existence. Like chapter one above, this chapter has been arranged so as to provide both a contextual understanding of these developments, as well as a methodical survey of the army treasury's pay warrants. The overarching goal is to provide an accurate, detailed, and useful understanding of the financial achievements and failures of the central government apparatus that managed the regular army during this period. As before, this chapter consists of four sections.

Section I begins by describing the situation in London during the final week of October. Panicked by the king's rapid march from Shrewsbury, the Parliament attempted to raise a second mobile army to help the Trained Bands defend London in the event of a military emergency. This section will describe the organizational nature of this 'second army' in relation to Essex's regular army, and chronicle the former's eventual fate in the aftermath of the confrontation at Turnham Green. Next, the section will describe some of

the pertinent political, legislative, and financial evolutions that distinguish this period, as well as certain events leading up to the siege of Reading. Finally, the regular army's central role in that operation will be briefly considered, as will the assistance it received from certain newly-created 'quasi-regular' forces. Section II will provide a detailed overview of the financial and logistical data pertaining to the army's gradually-shifting roster of active infantry regiments. Like all seventeenth-century military formations, these regiments were prone to varying degrees of attrition for a number of reasons. This makes it difficult to ascertain the exact size of Essex's infantry corps at any given point in time. As a result, it is also difficult to measure the rate at which arrears were generated. Section II introduces and explores an important set of calculations that I have developed and deployed to address this issue.

Section III explores the evolution of the regular army's mounted arm during this period. Again, because both the size and composition of the cavalry corps fluctuated considerably during these six months, I have found it necessary to develop and deploy another series of calculations designed to address this reality, and to provide the reader with a broad but generally accurate sense of the horsemen's steadily-accruing arrears. Lastly, Section IV discusses the army treasury's 'other' payments during this period. Again, this discussion has been compartmentalized according to the five sub-categories introduced and deployed above. Significantly, it demonstrates that the majority of the army treasury money disbursed for these reasons during this period was paid out by Jessop. This is important because the databases that I have constructed and used to

analyze Jessop's payments are less exacting than the ones dealing with Vernon's payments. The reasons for this – as well as the practical ramifications of it – are all explored here. As the war dragged on into the spring of 1643, Essex's army treasury was forced to provide a significant level of financial assistance to a number of the Parliament's local, quasi-regular forces. In the end, these sums were considerable, and they demonstrate that the central government was more than capable of influencing events in the distant provincial conflicts that were otherwise effecting a decentralization of the Parliament's revenue streams. Taken together, Sections II to IV are important because they demonstrate the degree to which this allocation of centralized resources affected the financial health of the regular army at this time.

~ I ~

There is no doubt that the Lord General's army of regulars was ruinously expensive. Unfortunately, however, it was also the case that the rapidly-unfolding civil war of 1642 was an uncontained phenomenon. Tasked with finding, engaging, and destroying the king's field army, there was no guarantee that the Lord General would be successful in this mission; and even if he was, there was no telling what other forces might arise to threaten the Parliament and the City while their centrally-funded regular army was in the field. Therefore during the final days of October 1642, even as Essex's army maneuvered to face the king, the Parliament resolved to raise a 'second army' to

defend themselves and the City in the event of a royalist breakthrough.[315] This new army was placed under the immediate command of none other than the earl of Warwick, the Parliament's admiral,[316] and one of the key members of the pre-war Junto.

Warwick's new commission was issued by the Lords on 22 October.[317] According to this commission, Warwick was to have all of the powers held by any legal commander of English armed forces, so long as they did not infringe upon the commission already granted to Essex. Crucially, one of these powers was the authority to issue pay warrants to Gerrard's central army treasury.[318] Today, there are 96 of Warwick's surviving military warrants preserved in the Commonwealth Exchequer papers, excluding misfiled strays, warrants without receipts, and heavily damaged documents. All but two of these warrants can be found in SP28/3A.[319] Fourteen of these documents authorize the payment of cavalry units or officers, nine were issued on behalf of the artillery and staff officers, and the remaining seventy three warrants were paid to elements of the infantry. All of these warrants were paid in full by William Jessop well within two weeks.[320] Despite this centralized arrangement, however, there is reason to doubt the 'regularity' of Warwick's formations at the time of their creation. After surveying the CSPV, the journals of both

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[315] Christopher Thompson, *The Earl of Warwick's "Running Army", the County of Essex and the Eastern Association, 1642-1643* (Wivenhoe: Orchard Press, 1999), chapter 3, passim.
[316] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 12.
[317] *LJ*, v, 416-417.
[318] *Ibid.*, 434-435. Sir Gilbert Gerrard was not ordered to pay Warwick's warrants until 6 November.
[319] The others are preserved as SP28/3B ff.347-8.
[320] The average number of days between the issue date and the full and final receipt of the money was just 3.4. Only one warrant, SP28/3A f.33, took 14 days; quite an achievement for a treasury suffering through a 'financial crisis'.

houses of parliament, and other sources, Christopher Thompson tells us that this was an army composed of volunteers brought up from the regional militias in and around the City. And the seventy three surviving infantry warrants generally support this conclusion. Unlike the majority of the infantry regiments raised in August and September, none of the three new regiments first mentioned in Warwick's warrants appear to have received levy money on a warrant issued by their new general.[321] In fact, only one of these – Henry Barclay's – would seem to have ever received money at the regimental level on Warwick's authority.[322] The reasons for this probably have something to do with the inherently parochial origins of the units that made up this new army.

Because Warwick's new army was a distinct organizational entity, conceived and created after the formation of Essex's regular formations, and because it nevertheless had access to centralized funding, it makes sense to take a moment here to deal separately with the data that can be derived from Warwick's army treasury warrants. Figure 2.1 compares the total value of all centralized military spending that took place on Warwick's authority to the absolute totals for the six months that are covered by this chapter. It is included here to provide the reader with a sense of scale and proportion – demonstrating the very limited impact that this new army had on the central army treasury during its brief, separate existence. Care here must be taken when drawing conclusions, of course, given the unverifiable number of lost warrants authorized by Warwick. But if one were to suggest that a key measure of his command autonomy was

[321] The four regiments were Warwick's/Holborne's, William Oagleby's, and Henry Barclay's.
[322] See SP28/3A f.95.

his ability to independently control the disbursements of the rebels' centralized army treasury, then the above graph is a sharp indication of his army's administrative insignificance at the fiscal-military centre. But then again, this may not be entirely surprising.

Figure 2.1 – The Value of Warwick's Warrants during the Reading Campaign (£)



Again, historians have been at pains to argue that this army was, in essence, a regional force cobbled together from a variety of militia units whose commanders were motivated by a sense of personal loyalty to Warwick, as well as a desire to protect their

homes.[323] Indeed, it may very well have been – as Graham suggests in another context – an army whose officers demanded 'military representation' because of its partial reliance on local sources of funding and administration. But regardless, the findings presented above would seem to suggest that this entire discussion was of peripheral importance as far as the Lord General's paymasters were concerned. Of course it is true – as we shall soon see – that some of the units created and paid on Warwick's authority in November eventually became important elements of Essex's own post-Edgehill army. But this is largely beside the point when it comes to any discussion of 'Warwick's army' that autumn. This is because Warwick's units ceased to be 'his' (or the 'localities'') in any meaningful sense once they began receiving money and support from the central treasury on Essex's and/or the Committee's authority. As an autonomous sub-section of the Long Parliament's centralized war effort, Warwick's 'second army' was short-lived indeed.[324]

Warwick's quasi-regular army vanished during the winter of 1642/3, but of course the Lord General's regular units did not. Essex and his army retired to the city of Warwick in the immediate aftermath of Edgehill. But soon, when it became clear that the king's army was again heading in the direction of London, Essex's forces marched for the capital via Northampton and Aylesbury, travelling along the very same route they had taken a month before.[325] Both Essex and his rapidly-melting army arrived in London on 7

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[323] Again, see Thompson, *"Running army"*, chapter 3, passim; Clive Holmes, *The Eastern Association in the English civil war* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 36-40.
[324] Warwick signed his last (surviving) central army treasury warrant on 21 November 1642. He resigned his army commission the next day. TNA SP28/3A f.118; Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 73.
[325] Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 56-59.

November.[326] And though they beat the cavaliers in this race, their arrival came not a moment too soon. For that very day Colonel John Venn, the Parliament's newly-appointed commander of the garrison at Windsor castle, succeeded in repelling a royalist attack.[327] Thankful though many Londoners must have been for the additional protection, it is clear that the City suffered in the wake of Essex's arrival. Warwick's new army was by then under construction, and the sudden appearance of so many additional soldiers in the capital – some of whom had clearly abandoned their units – was evidently so disruptive that on 9 November the Houses were moved to pass an ordinance calling for the strict enforcement of military discipline.[328] But not all of Essex's soldiers were to be found within the City's limits. Upon their arrival in the vicinity of the capital, two of the regular army's infantry regiments – Lord Brooke's and Denzil Holles's[329] – were assigned to guard the town of Brentford, then seven miles distant from London.

On 12 November, just a day after their arrival, Brooke's and Holles's men were attacked by Prince Rupert's advance column of royalist cavalrymen. Badly mauled, the survivors of these two units only managed to escape thanks to the help they received from their comrades in Hampden's regiment, a third unit of regulars that had recently

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[326] BL Thomason E.242[10], Stephen Bowtell, *England's memorable accidents, From the 7th of Novemb. to the 14th of the same, 1642* (London: Stephen Bowtell, 1642); *LJ*, v, 436; Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 340. The Venetian ambassador believed that Essex had just 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse left when he arrived in London on the seventh.

[327] Nagel, "Militia of London", 71-72.

[328] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 37.

[329] These units saw action at Edgehill, being then assigned to the brigade of foot commanded by Colonel Thomas Ballard. Turton and von Arni, *Edgehill*, 71 and 168; Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 60.

been posted to Uxbridge.[330] After driving out the rebel troops, Rupert's men proceeded to sack the town. The Parliament's response to this terrifying outrage was both swift and decisive. The next morning, Essex led elements of his army into the field at Turnham Green, just to the east of Brentford. Joining them were many thousands of London Trained Bandsmen, commanded on this occasion by Philip Skippon, one of the most trusted military figures in the City. Together, the militiamen and the regulars numbered perhaps 24,000 men. Faced with this sea of armed humanity, the king and his army withdrew without giving battle. Soon afterward, Charles and his army fell back to Oxford, where they went into winter quarters. But before they did this, the cavaliers took the opportunity to occupy and garrison the town of Reading. This was probably done with the intention of using the town as a staging point for a renewed attack on London in the spring.[331] Essex, for his part, removed his troops to Windsor, where he established a base from which he could control and administer his now-stationary forces during the winter.[332]

The Lord General's military behavior in the weeks following the battle of Edgehill would seem to suggest that he then preferred to wage a static, largely defensive war, an approach that was deeply unpopular in certain circles at the time. For example, his decision to keep what was left of the regular army in quarters at Windsor drew sharp

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[330] Turton and von Arni, *Edgehill*, 168; Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 65-66; *LJ*, v, 443.
[331] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 66; Bulstrode Whitlocke, *Memorials of the English affairs* (London: Nathaniel Ponder, 1682), 62-63; Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 60-62.
[332] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 346-347.

criticism from the likes of Henry Marten, the firebrand MP for Berkshire.[333] On 5 December Marten attacked Essex's perceived sloth in a speech he delivered in the Commons. In it, Marten suggested that the warmth fostered by the military activity in the provinces was offset by the chill of indolence at Windsor.[334] Why didn't Essex simply march on Oxford and be done with it? Some historians have suggested that Essex's attitude and approach may have been partly the result of his experiences on the continent during the 1620s. This interpretation is, of course, entirely reasonable given what we know about the nature of siege warfare in the Netherlands at that time.[335] But there was clearly more to it than this.

In the first place, Essex's regular army was staffed by officers and men who had to this point been the recipients of full and regular pay. As we know, this remarkable situation had encouraged a certain mercenary attitude during the Edgehill campaign that clearly lingered on into the winter. In short, being 'paid by the hour' made some of the Lord General's officers and common soldiers quite comfortable with military inactivity, so long as there was no immediate threat. As the king settled in for the winter at Oxford, this attitude fostered a lethargic and expensive approach to war-making that both frustrated and angered the people who were footing the bill in London. On at least one occasion this anger boiled over into the streets. During a meeting of the Common Council

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[333] Keeler, *Long Parliament*, 267-268.
[334] This is a paraphrase of the imagery used by Marten in the speech, which was recorded and preserved by D'Ewes. Marten's exact words can be found in Gentles, *English Revolution*, 159.
[335] Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 61; Malcolm Wanklyn, *The Warrior Generals: Winning the British Civil Wars 1642-1652* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 40-41.

on 12 December the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City found themselves virtually besieged by a crowd of protestors who demanded that the City fathers make peace at any cost. Flooding into Guildhall itself, some of these protestors assaulted a few of the soldiers who were on hand ". . . wounded some of them, and snatched away their swords, bidding them to go to the tavern. 'Spend your money you received from the State,' they told the soldiers jeeringly, 'for you shall have no more!'"[336]

At the end of the day, however, it was Essex himself and the Committee of Safety – not junior officers and common soldiers on the make – who determined the army's movements. And compounding Essex's natural caution during this period was the overriding need to protect the City, the seat of the Parliament's power. While the 'cause' could withstand a setback or two in Devonshire and Yorkshire, the destruction of the ever-shrinking regular army in an ill-considered winter assault would leave London and its militia vulnerable to a royalist counterattack. Furthermore, Essex was bound to obey the wishes of his new sovereign, the Parliament. But unfortunately, there was little agreement on the proper direction of the war effort within that body at this time. With so much at stake, Essex decided to preserve as much of his army as possible while waiting for both clear direction from his paymasters, and enough money to rebuild and mobilize his depleted and cash-hungry formations.

At this point it is important to remember that the rebels who both comprised and controlled the Long Parliament after the outbreak of the war were a heterogeneous crew.

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[336] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 87; Wanklyn, *Warrior Generals*, 41.

Some, like the aforementioned Henry Marten,[337] were future regicides. Others, such as Sir Simonds D'Ewes,[338] were far more moderate in their beliefs and their approach to armed rebellion. Broadly speaking, it is both useful and accurate to imagine that there were now *two* 'bicameral interest groups' vying for control over the Long Parliament's war effort.[339] One of these groups – the 'Saye-Pym group' – was controlled by members of the pre-war Junto, men who were deeply committed to a thoroughgoing reformation of the Caroline church and state. The other – the 'Northumberland-Holles group' – contained disaffected peers and MPs who had chosen to remain in the Parliamentary camp in order to chasten the king and advance and protect their own personal and political interests. Both groups were composed of both lords and commoners, but it is nevertheless true that the Northumberland-Holles group was more strongly represented in the House of Lords.[340]

All of the Long Parliament's members were generally united in their opposition to Charles's pre-war government, but many of the men who adhered to the Northumberland-Holles group were genuinely shocked and appalled by what Austin

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[337] "Marten, Henry (1601/2-1680)," Sara Barber in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/article/18168 accessed 10 Mar 2012].
[338] "D'Ewes, Sir Simonds (1602-1650)," J.M. Blatchly in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/article/7577 accessed 10 Mar 2012].
[339] Scott, *Politics and War*, 40-43. Here Scott, whose interpretation has been heavily influenced by the work of John Adamson, first deploys and uses the terms 'bicameral 'interests'', 'Saye-Pym group', and 'Northumberland-Holles group'.
[340] *Ibid.*, 41.

Woolrych has termed 'the blast of war'.[341] By 29 October, less than a week after Edgehill, some of them were already agitating for a negotiated settlement. And even though the preparations for an ongoing war did not abate, the collective voice of the Northumberland-Holles group was loud enough to spark immediate action. Five days later, both Houses had resolved to initiate peace talks, and an envoy was dispatched to reestablish contact with the king's person. Charles met with this envoy – Sir Peter Killigrew – at Reading, but the king had no intention of expediting such talks. On 7 November the Houses learned that Sir John Eveyln, one of the Parliament's proposed commissioners, had just been declared a traitor and would not be granted safe passage.[342] In reality, Charles was playing for time. Both he and his army were then rapidly approaching London, and the king did not want to squander his chances for an outright military victory.[343]

Rebuffed, the proponents of peace in both Westminster and the City did not give up. The disorders that accompanied both the recruiting of Warwick's 'second army' and the return of the Lord General's regulars only increased their desire to be rid of the expense and the disruption that accompanied mobilization. On 9 November, the very day that the ordinance imposing martial law on the soldiery was passed by the Lords', the Parliament sent their petition for peace to the king via their appointed commissioners. The king had by then granted safe passage to all except Sir John Evelyn, who was given

[341] Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, chapter eight, passim.
[342] *LJ*, v, 435-436.
[343] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 61-63; Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, 240.

permission to stay behind.[344] Three days later, however, Prince Rupert's forces slammed into Holles's and Brooke's men at Brentford, initiating the rapid chain of events that led to the dramatic confrontation at Turnham Green. In the aftermath of these maneuvers, the king offered up the lame excuse that Rupert's attack was launched for defensive reasons, and in a letter dated 18 November he insisted that he really was interested in pursuing a negotiated peace. The receipt of this letter sparked two full days' worth of debate in the Commons, a remarkable outcome that, as Gardiner has said, illustrates the ongoing strength of the pacific faction at this time.[345]

During the month of December the Northumberland-Holles group found increasingly vocal allies in the City. On 7 December the Houses felt compelled to pass an ordinance reassuring the citizens of London and the suburbs that those who lent horses, money, and/or plate on the Propositions would be freed from the compulsory assessment associated with the new [Fifth and] Twentieth Part (see below), so long as their contribution was commensurate with the value of their estates.[346] A day later, the new parliamentary committee responsible for the management of the [Fifth and] Twentieth Part – the Committee for the Advance of Money – was assailed at their meeting place in Haberdasher's Hall by a crowd demanding peace. And as we already know, the government of the City itself was also the target of further quasi-royalist demonstrations

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[344] The full text of the petition they carried can be found in *LJ*, v, 431-432 (3 November, 1642). The roster of commissioners appointed to present it can be found in *LJ*, v, 434 (5 November, 1642). On the decision to allow Sir John Evelyn to stay behind see both *LJ*, v, 439 and *CJ*, ii, 841 (9 November 1642).
[345] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 65 and 70-73; *LJ*, v, 451-452.
[346] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 38-41 and 46.

on the twelfth.[347] The demonstrators' call for peace at any price did not carry the day in this instance, but these protests were vociferous enough to convince the City's Common Council to draft their own petitions for peace, addressing one of these to the Parliament and another to the king. A day later, the House of Lords appointed a committee to draft new propositions to be sent to the king.[348] Naturally, the most bellicose of the MPs in the Commons' interpreted all of these proceedings as useless and dangerous diversions. But nevertheless, the call for peace in the City was so strong that on 26 December the Lower House agreed to once again reopen negotiations with Charles.[349] For the second time since the battle of Edgehill, the regular army's sovereign masters were about to initiate peace talks with its military opponent.

Meanwhile, even as the Houses were preparing their latest round of peace proposals for Charles's inspection, the petition drawn up by the City – the most important source of men and money for the regular army – was delivered into the king's hands. His response, when it finally came on 13 January, was delivered in public at a meeting of the City's Common Hall assembly. The king's representative took this opportunity not to engage in meaningful and productive discussion with the municipal authorities, but to harangue and chastise them for following the lead of traitors. He ended this speech by asking Londoners to rise up and arrest the Lord Mayor, as well as four other persons of

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[347] For a discussion of the persons involved in the London peace protests at this time consult Ian Gentles, "'This Confused, Divided and Wretched City': The Struggle for London in 1642-43." *Canadian Journal of History* 38 (2003): 470-471 especially.
[348] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 86-87 and 90-91.
[349] *Ibid.*, 92-94.

note.[350] The faint but persistent hope for peace within the rebel camp now depended on the success of the Parliament's new propositions, for it was clear that there could be no separate accord between the cavaliers and the government of London.

By 30 January the Houses had agreed that ongoing talks should be predicated on the complete disbandment of all armed forces on both sides, the king's readiness to prosecute the Parliament's enemies in his midst, and the abolition of Episcopacy. On 1 February these terms were presented to Charles at Oxford by the Parliament's appointed commissioners.[351] Of course the king immediately rejected them, but he did suggest that negotiations continue upon the condition of a cessation of hostilities. Initially, the Saye-Pym group was against this idea because it was felt that this might allow the king to consolidate his military position without the threat of attack. However, the Northumberland-Holles group fought back against this view, and by 28 February both Houses had grudgingly agreed to the notion of an armed cessation as the precondition of peace talks.[352] Negotiations regarding the conditions of the proposed cessation were ongoing during the months of March and April 1643; however, it soon became clear that Charles still had no real intention of compromising. On 6 March he insisted upon reacquiring total control over the navy before negotiations could commence. Additionally, he insisted that the Parliament give up the autonomous power to imprison

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[350] *Ibid.*, 95-96.
[351] *Ibid.*, 97-98 and 103-105.
[352] *Ibid.*, 106-107; See also Violet A. Rowe, *Sir Henry Vane the Younger: A Study in Political and Administrative History* (London: Athlone Press, University of London, 1970), 20-21.

its foes.[353] By the third week of April it was finally clear to even the most committed advocate of peace that there were no realistic grounds for continued talks between the two parties.

In all its futility, 'the cry for peace'[354] on the Parliament's side during this period contributed to an overarching aura of indecision at the political centre of the rebels' gradually evolving fiscal-military machine. And the largely sedentary behavior of Essex's regular army – the most obvious administrative manifestation of that machine – seems to reflect this indecision. But during the six months covered by this chapter the Parliament's war effort in the English provinces evolved dramatically. New county-level and multi-county 'armies' emerged as a result of legislation enacted by the central government, as well as the zealous actions of committed parochial actors, some of whom had experienced battle within the ranks of the regular army at Edgehill. Crucially, as we shall soon see, some of these armies relied at least partly on the centralized army treasury to help subsidize their local war efforts. All of them represented a diminution of Essex's direct and practical military authority, and a hindrance to the effective centralization of fiscal-military resources in the most literal sense.

It was often the case that these quasi-regular armies were organized under the banner of sub-national 'associations', administrative relationships that were originally

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[353] The publication of an intercepted letter from Charles to his queen on 10 March did not help matters. The letter makes it clear that Charles was simply spinning out the negotiations as long as he could so as to gain military advantage. *Ibid.*, 110 and 114. See also M.A.E. Green, ed, *Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria, Including Her Private Correspondence with Charles the First* (London: Richard Bentley, 1857), 174-175.
[354] The phrase is Gardiner's title for the fourth chapter of his history of the war. See Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, chapter iv, passim.

authorized and promoted by the central government in order to foster the coordinated deployment of local military resources within several adjacent counties. But as Professor Holmes has reminded us, during the wars of the seventeenth century the notion of a public 'association' within and among the county communities could have deeper implications. On a more abstract and ideological level, the term could signify something akin to the Scottish National Covenant – a communal commitment to social and religious harmony, and a singular vision of Godly Reformation. And although this sort of thing may have been the ultimate goal for certain 'fiery spirits' within the rebels' camp, during the weeks and months following the battle of Edgehill it was the much more limited, military-administrative notion of 'association' that most appealed to the Parliament's friends in certain important provinces.[355] Significantly, by the time the regular army went into winter quarters at Windsor the central government was no longer presenting these decentralized defensive pacts as optional courses of action.

For example, on 18 November the central government ordered the Lords and Deputies Lieutenant of twelve northern counties to associate themselves and their forces, and to raise additional forces in the name of this association. Unlike the forces already raised in these areas, the resulting army was to have the power to march wherever it was needed. Overall command was to be handed over to Lord Ferdinando Fairfax. Already the Parliament's general in Yorkshire,[356] Fairfax was to be issued a fresh commission by

[355] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 62-67.
[356] Jones, "The War in the North", 29; *LJ*, v, 373-374.

the earl of Essex for this new and wider purpose.[357] By the end of December, at least three other multi-county associations had been created by the Houses.[358] The second of these was the famous union of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge, and Hertfordshire. On 20 December – the very day their association ordinance was passed – the House of Lords issued detailed instructions to the Lords and Deputies Lieutenant in those counties.[359] In these, the Houses reiterated the need to enforce the Militia Ordinance. They also authorized the Lieutenancy to reorganize and discipline the command structure of the Trained Bands. But more importantly, the Houses commanded the Lieutenancy to raise and maintain additional forces for quasi-regular service under the Association's new Major-General, Lord Grey of Warke.

As envisioned by these parliamentary orders, provincial forces like Lord Fairfax's and Lord Grey's were to occupy a new and intermediary spot within the Parliament's rapidly-evolving fiscal-military hierarchy. In terms of their relationship to the centralized sovereign (the Parliament), they were to be something less than a part of the regular army, but something more than the Trained Bands. According to the Parliament's orders, they were to be composed of county-level units raised separately by the Lieutenancy of

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[357] Jones, "The War in the North", 41-42. The final text of the Parliamentary order for this association can be found in *LJ*, v, 451. According to Fairfax himself, the commission was delivered into his hands on 3 December. See also *LJ*, v, 494-495.

[358] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 89-90. The first of these was the association of Leicester, Derby, Nottingham, Rutland, Northampton, Buckingham, Bedford, and Huntingdon, the combined forces of which were to be commanded by the Lord Grey of Groby (15 December). The second was the association of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge, and Hertfordshire, placed under the command of Lord Grey of Warke (20 December). And the final of these three associations bound together Staffordshire and Warwickshire under the command of Lord Brooke (31 December). See also *Acts and Ordinances*, 49-55.

[359] *LJ*, v, 505-507.

each county. These units were to be equipped with privately-held arms and equipment collected by the Proposition commissioners within their respective counties, and their pay was to be provided by county-level officers operating within an entirely parochial setting. However, the money needed to pay and supply these new formations was not to be raised on the militia rates. Instead, the Parliament commanded the Lieutenancy of the Eastern Association to raise a new tax for this purpose using the March 1642 Act for the raising of £400,000 for Ireland as a model. Now, as the slowly-rotting regular army sat idle near London, the Parliament resolved to use this Act as a pattern to fund the new quasi-regular army of the Eastern Association in a fundamentally decentralized manner. To this end, they commanded the Lieutenancy in each of the five counties to raise and spend sums equal to one quarter of the quotas assigned to their respective localities by the £400,000 Act.

Interestingly enough, however, not all of the Parliament's increasingly sophisticated bodies of local forces were the product of such careful and deliberate legislation. Indeed, the early history of the army under the command of Sir William Waller provides an excellent example of just how *ad hoc* these arrangements and administrative evolutions could be.[360] During the months of November and December 1642 Waller commanded several semi-autonomous military expeditions into south-central England. His forces on these occasions were composed purely of detached elements of Essex's regular army, with his own regiment of cavalry serving as the

[360] The substance of the following paragraph has been taken from Adair, *Roundhead General*, 50-53.

nucleus of an army of perhaps 2,000 – 3,000 men. As we know, Waller had acquired experience in this sort of independent operation thanks to his activities in and around Portsmouth during the Edgehill campaign, and he and his men quickly succeeded in taking the Farnham Castle, the town of Marlborough, the city of Winchester, Arundel Castle, and the city of Chichester – all before mid-January 1643. Significantly, however, Waller was forced to rely on decentralized sources of revenue in order to perform these feats. At Winchester, Waller accepted a 'composition' of £1,000 from the mayor before deciding to turn his soldiers loose on the town anyway. Soon afterward, the Parliament ordered the town of Southampton to provide his forces with an additional £2,000 directly. But of course this was not enough. When Waller's forces seized Chichester in January he and his men accepted yet another 'donative' amounting to one month's pay from the local MP before once again pillaging the captured city. Unfortunately, in the absence of ready access to Gerrard's central army treasury, this was the only way for erstwhile regulars to make war in England during the winter of 1642/3.

During the early weeks of 1643 Waller's command was permanently severed from the administrative network that both defined and supported the regular army. On 11 February the Parliament created him Major-General of Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Somersetshire, Worcestershire, and Shropshire. Like the other association commanders, Waller was to be issued a special commission from Essex for the purpose of commanding and controlling the assembled forces of this new association. Ten regiments were to be raised locally, although Adair tells us that Waller took some of his regulars with him into

the west.[361] As was becoming usual, the pay of these quasi-regular troops was to be covered by whatever extraordinary resources could be obtained locally. For example, the Lieutenancy within the new association was authorized to enforce the collection of the new [Fifth and] Twentieth Part within their respective jurisdictions.[362]

The rapid creation of regional forces like the ones outlined above had a profound effect on the Parliament's overall fiscal-military profile during the period covered by this chapter. In the broadest sense, these evolutions can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that it was much easier, simpler, and more 'natural' to construct and maintain English forces using the administrative framework that supported the Caroline militia – that is to say, the Lieutenancy – at the county level. The results of this rather messy process were predictable: although the precise layout of the Parliament's network of multi-county associations was subject to constant change, using this method of recruitment and finance created a roster of local 'armies' whose commanders had direct and unmediated access to the fiscal-military resources of specific geographic areas. Unfortunately, however, the regular army was of course excluded from all this. Increasingly alienated from the parochial machinery that defined the fiscal-military state in the provinces, Essex's army continued to rely on a direct and unmediated relationship with the now-sovereign centre of that entity – the Houses of Parliament and their various centralized committees. These administrative organs would have to find a way to deliver

[361] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 55.
[362] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 79-80. This, to the best of my knowledge, is the first piece of civil-war tax legislation that incorporates a rating system based on the fifth part of a man's yearly income, as well as the twentieth part of his personal estate.

resources if the regular army was to survive in a fiscal-military environment increasingly dominated by local military initiative and multi-county defensive associations.

Geographically, the regular army's most important source of resources during this period continued to be the City of London and its environs. And although the City's resolve wavered slightly during the period following the confrontation at Turnham Green, its citizens – both rich and poor – remained the most ardent and important defenders of the rebellion at this time.[363] The most tangible evidence of this could be found in their decision to expand and reinforce London's physical defenses during the months of February and March 1643. Work on these fortifications demanded an enormous amount of labor, and, once complete, they required a large number of men simply to guard and defend them. During the winter of 1642/3 the City government resolved to meet these challenges without the help of the central government or its regular army. Citizens of all ages and of both sexes contributed time and labor to the defensive works, and an entirely new administrative layer was eventually added to the City's militia system in order to produce formations of volunteer citizen-soldiers – the so-called 'Auxiliaries' – to man them.[364] Physically, it was the City and its military infrastructure that protected the Houses of Parliament in the most direct and literal sense. But strategically, the City still relied on the Parliament and the regular army to keep the king's forces at bay, and to take the war to the enemy. And when it came to the ongoing needs of the central

[363] Recall the discussion of the 'cry for peace' found above. See also Nagel, "Militia of London", 75-77.
[364] Nagel, "Militia of London", 80ff. For a history of the works themselves, see Victor Smith and Peter Kelsey, "The Lines of Communication: The Civil War Defences of London" in *London and the Civil War*, ed. Stephen Porter (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996), 117-148.

government's regular army, the City's most valuable resource was its abundant stock of cold, hard cash. From Essex's point of view, the most pressing question in the aftermath of Edgehill was how to access this money on a regular and sustained basis.

In the most general sense, the answer to this question involved the passage of new ordinances authorizing the collection of additional revenues. Initially, these new revenue schemes were ad hoc evolutions of the Propositions – a design which by the early days of 1643 had largely run its course in London. On 26 November the Parliament passed an ordinance empowering the Lord Mayor of London, as well as a select body of the City's Aldermen, to appoint assessors in every ward in the City. And similar powers were granted to the Burgesses of Westminster and Southwark to do the same in their districts. The goal was to determine who had not contributed all that they could to the Propositions, and to force these individuals to contribute money, plate, horse, horsemen, and arms to a value of one twentieth of their estates. The ordinance authorized the use of the Trained Bands to enforce the compliance of the people, and all monies were supposed to be deposited in the central Proposition treasury at Guildhall.[365] But as we know, during the first week of December this plan proved so unpopular that the Parliament was forced to promise exemption for those who, even at this late hour, chose to voluntarily participate in the Propositions scheme. And although a special parliamentary committee was established at Haberdasher's Hall to help enforce this new [Fifth and] Twentieth

[365] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 38-41. The administrative machinery of this new tax was further explained in an additional ordinance passed on 29 November.

Part,[366] collection rates within the City were agonizingly slow.[367] In the beginning the central government was able to borrow a sizable amount of money on the credit of the [Fifth and] Twentieth, but by 1 February time had seemingly run out for the regular army: the Proposition treasurers at Guildhall had nothing left to send to Gerrard, Jessop, and Vernon.[368]

In the event, the solution to this stark reality involved the introduction of an entirely new quota-based direct tax patterned on both the £400,000 Act and, ironically enough, the king's old Ship Money scheme from the 1630s.[369] On 24 February the Houses passed an Ordinance introducing such a tax in all of the counties and cities of England and Wales.[370] Revenue committees were appointed at the county level. These committees were supposed to arrange for both assessment and collection of the assigned sums within their jurisdictions every week for a period of three months. All of the resulting money was supposed to go directly into the coffers of Gerrard's army treasury in London. On paper, the projected yield was astronomical, even if one only considers the amounts assigned to the territories that Parliament controlled at the time. If the rebels had

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[366] Later incarnations of the tax specified that all persons were liable to contribute one twentieth of their personal estate *and/or one fifth of their yearly income*. Again, see the Ordinance that created Sir William Waller's Western Association on 11 February 1643. Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 79-80. See also *CCAM*, p.vii.

[367] The assessment and collection mechanism underpinning the Twentieth Part in London during the period covered by this chapter can be reviewed by consulting TNA SP19/49, Accounts for London of the raising of monies on the Ordinance of Parliament of 29 Nov 1642. In all, an additional £72,006.65 of 'Proposition money' was raised in this fashion, although collection dragged on well into 1643.

[368] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 105. For government borrowing on the City's Twentieth Part see Ben Coates, *The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 59-60.

[369] Wheeler, "English Army Finance", 67.

[370] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 85-100.

(1) managed to collect all of these sums and (2) succeeded in forwarding the money to Gerrard's treasury, the regular army would have had access to some £97,370 per month – roughly the same volume of money that was consumed by the central army treasury during the first four weeks of the war.[371]

Unfortunately, however, there were three serious obstacles that either prevented or hindered both the collection and centralization of these resources during the period covered by this chapter.[372] In the first place, the pre-existence of so many multi-county defensive associations provided the county-level agents of the parliamentary war machine with an enormous incentive to retain and spend the fruits of all new centrally-authorized military taxes. Indeed, as Wheeler reminds us, the authors of the 24 February Ordinance realized this was the case when they inserted a clause that allowed the county-level committees to use Weekly Assessment money to pay local forces directly.[373] Secondly, the original Ordinance that introduced the Weekly Assessment did not provide taxpayers with a clear method of appealing the amount of their individual assessments, a problem that was not resolved until a second explanatory ordinance was passed on 4 March. And finally, the Parliament's allies in the City of London – that indispensable centerpiece of the central government's fiscal-military network – clearly felt that they were overrated in this scheme.[374]

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[371] Wheeler, "English Army Finance", p.68, Figure 1; Crawshaw, "Miliary finance," p.1044, Figure 1.
[372] The substance of this paragraph comes from Wheeler, "English Army Finance", 69-75.
[373] Wheeler, "English Army Finance", 70-71.
[374] No less than £44,200 of the projected monthly revenue of £97,370 – a full 45% of the total – was supposed to be collected in London and Westminster. Wheeler, "English Army Finance", p.68, Figure 1.

During this period, the Weekly Assessment scheme was important for Essex army not as an unmitigated source of direct revenue from the provinces, but as a specific and expensive source of credit for the central government in London. Four days after the passage of the Weekly Assessment Ordinance on 24 February the government of the City was asked to lend the Parliament £60,000 on the credit generated by the new tax scheme.[375] The majority of this money was eventually realized by the end of the six months covered by this chapter, but the municipal authorities drove an extremely hard bargain in this case. In the first place, in addition to the promise that money collected on the Weekly Assessment would be used to repay the City loan, the Parliament was forced to reroute the receipt of London's Weekly Assessment money to the Proposition treasurers operating out of Guildhall.[376] What's more, the central government was compelled to regard no less than 60 per cent of all Weekly Assessment money collected in the City as a *loan* – a sum that was to be repaid to the municipal taxpayers who supplied it.[377] On 4 April 1643, a week before these concessions to the City were finalized, the House of Commons ordered that thanks be given to the Aldermen of

[375] *LJ*, v, 628.

[376] The Propositions treasurers were, as we know, very powerful members of the City's own government. Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 6-9.

[377] Wheeler, "English Army Finance", 74-76; Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 128-129; L[ondon] M[etropolitan] A[rchives] *J[ournal of the] Co[mmo]n Co[uncil of London]*, Vol.40, ff.56-57; *CJ*, ii, 985-986. By 1 March it was agreed that £6,000 of the City's Monthly Assessment of £40,000 (15%) was supposed to be earmarked for the municipality's own militia forces, not the regular army. By 11 April no less than £24,000 of this money (60%) was supposed to be repaid to the taxpayers over time.

London for providing an immediate injection of £40,000 to support the centralized war effort.[378]

And so the regular army would have the money it needed to take the field in the spring. But the City – ever conscious of the money its citizens were continually sinking into forces that were not their own – insisted that six additional conditions be met by the army itself. These conditions appeared in a pamphlet published by the Common Council on 21 February; and although it is unclear just how many of them were actually met during this six-month period, they neatly demonstrate the City's attitude toward Essex's forces at this time.[379] Items two, three, four, and five pertain to the pay and fidelity of the soldiery. These items recognize the inherent link between the two, and while they insist that the officers, who ". . . have already received great pay . . .", take a pay cut, they also acknowledge the inherently mercenary nature of the common soldiers who volunteered for paid service. After insisting that these men be ". . . duly paid from time to time . . .", the City fathers argued that all of the regulars, both officers and men, should take an oath ". . . to be faithfull to those that imploy them, and from whom they receive their pay". Item five even makes provision for the employment of captured royalist soldiers who, it was (probably rightly) assumed, would gladly take up the sword for the Parliament in exchange for silver.

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[378] Wheeler, "English Army Finance", p.76, n.41; *CJ*, iii, 29; *LJ*, v, 693-694; LMA *JCoCo*, vol.40, f.58.
[379] BL Thomason E.90[14], London, Court of Common Council, *Propositions agreed upon at a Court of Common Councell, in Guild Hall London, Feb 21, 1642* (London: Richard Cotes, 1643).

On 9 April 1643 Captain Francis Vernon reported receiving £20,000 in cash from his masters in London; an additional £16,000 arrived just two days later.[380] This money – almost certainly drawn from the £40,000 loan delivered by the City on the fourth of that month – enabled the bulk of Essex's army to move out of winter quarters in and around Windsor and advance on the strategically-important city of Reading. Reading, as we know, was then garrisoned by royalist soldiers who had taken up residence in the autumn, and Essex and his political masters believed that no assault on the king's primary base at Oxford could be launched so long as the Cavaliers controlled the town. By 15 April Essex had managed to maneuver the greater part of his regular army into position on the western side of Reading. Here these forces quickly entrenched themselves, and the artillery train began pounding Sir Arthur Aston's defensive works with its superior firepower. Though the Lord General's army was larger than Aston's garrison, it was not big enough to encircle the town or to carry it by assault. But this situation changed on the nineteenth with the arrival of a sizable detachment of quasi-regular soldiers from Lord Grey of Warke's Army of the Eastern Association. The appearance of these provincial forces enabled Essex to occupy the eastern and southern approaches to the city. Although a royalist relief force appeared on the north bank of the Thames on the twenty-fifth, their

[380] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.3v. The final £4,000 installment of the City loan arrived on 21 April.

subsequent attack was not enough to prevent the fall of Reading to Essex's composite army the next day.[381]

The Lord General's capture of Reading during the spring of 1643 was an impressive accomplishment. Aston's cavaliers surrendered in the face of overwhelming force less than three weeks after Vernon received the first installment of the City's £40,000 loan. This was quite an achievement for a commander who had been criticized by the likes of Henry Marten for his lethargy. Of course it is true that the regulars received timely assistance from elements of the new provincial army then being built by the Lieutenancy in the five eastern counties, but the majority of the soldiers involved were true regulars – troops who obeyed only the Lord General, and who received the Parliament's pay directly. Their victory was only possible because the central government had overcome political uncertainty regarding the war, and made a concerted effort to secure funding for them on the basis of a new direct tax designed to generate revenue throughout the entire country. Although the creation of the multi-county defensive associations had complicated the rebels' fiscal-military infrastructure by precluding the centralization of all of these funds, the mechanism was sufficiently robust to generate a large amount of short-term credit in the City – the most important source of military resources for both the central government and its regular army. The remainder of this chapter will provide the reader with a detailed analysis of the army treasury's

[381] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 150-151; Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 69-70. See also Malcolm Barrès-Baker's lively account of the siege – M.C. Barrès-Baker, *The Siege of Reading: The Failure of the Earl of Essex's 1643 Spring Offensive* (Ottawa: eBooksLib, 2004), chapters 8-16 especially.

expenditures during the six months following the battle of Edgehill. It will lay bare the inner workings of the offices that continued to manage the Parliament's centralized war effort, and measure the relative efficacy of their efforts during this second phase of the first civil war.

~ II ~

If we begin our analysis of the army treasury's infantry spending with the assumption that Gerrard's primary responsibility was to ensure the timely delivery of money to Essex's regular field units, then we might reasonably expect to find that most of the spending described in Figure 2.2 went to meet the ongoing financial needs of the nineteen foot regiments described in chapter one above. Moreover, we might also expect to discover something about the effect the battle of Edgehill had on the demand for wages within those units that had seen hard action. In all, Vernon and Jessop spent a hefty £108,237.92 on the Parliament's foot soldiers during the six months that followed Edgehill, most of which was indeed aimed at the remuneration of new and preexisting regular regiments.

In the first place, it must be acknowledged that Figure 2.2 points to a dramatic reduction in infantry spending during the period covered by this chapter. Although more money changed hands here than on the warrants measured by Figure 1.2 above, Figure 2.2 covers twice the amount of time.



It is true that this situation can be partly explained by the fact that Figure 1.2 includes money that was designed to meet the many costs associated with levying an army of infantrymen from scratch; however, it is just as certain that the two figures also chronicle a significant collapse in infantry spending during the winter of 1642/3. Why did this occur? The most obvious explanation involves the dramatic collapse of the Propositions scheme that supported Essex's regular army until 1 February 1643. Less obvious is the very real possibility that the demand for money within the infantry corps fell off before this date. If this is indeed part of the explanation, then it would probably be explained by

a dramatic reduction in the size and/or number of the Lord General's foot regiments during the winter. The following discussion attempts to shed some light on these matters.

Naturally, the totals described in Figure 2.2 are entirely dependent on the state of the paperwork that has survived from this period. Table 2.1 provides the reader with a clear and precise breakdown of Vernon's infantry-related disbursements during these six months. As was the case in chapter one, it is here paired with a similar table that describes the state of Jessop's known infantry warrants. Again, the final totals can be readily compared to the visual representation found in Figure 2.2.

Table 2.1 – Vernon's Infantry Spending: the Reading Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
Nov 1642	No.	50	23	73	31.51%
	Value	11749.58	3794.18	15543.76	24.41%
Dec 1642	No.	90	10	100	10.00%
	Value	16435.01	571.04	17006.05	3.36%
Jan 1643	No.	65	8	73	10.96%
	Value	15901.91	520.83	16422.74	3.17%
Feb 1643	No.	3	0	3	0.00%
	Value	883.48	0.00	883.48	0.00%
Mar 1643	No.	42	9	51	17.65%
	Value	17075.54	611.27	17686.82	3.46%
Apr 1643	No.	49	1	50	2.00%
	Value	19483.41	50.00	19533.41	0.26%
Total	No.	299	51	350	14.57%
	Value	81528.93	5547.32	87076.26	6.37%

As was the case with the documents examined in chapter one above, it is clear that while around a sixth of Vernon's infantry warrants are missing from the archives, these documents authorized only a little more than five per cent of the total amount of infantry money he disbursed during these six months. It is also clear from a cursory comparison of Tables 1.2 and 2.2 that Jessop's role in these matters remained significant during the winter and spring of the new year.

Table 2.2 – Jessop's Infantry Spending: the Reading Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
Nov 1642	No.	158
	Value	12191.86
Dec 1642	No.	55
	Value	3797.83
Jan 1643	No.	8
	Value	1392.18
Feb 1643	No.	8
	Value	2489.07
Mar 1643	No.	11
	Value	338.48
Apr 1643	No.	5
	Value	952.25
Total	No.	245
	Value	21161.67

What isn't clear at this point is how all of this money was disbursed and used at the unit level. In order to examine and understand this process we must first understand some of

the most basic ways in which Essex's infantry corps changed and evolved on an administrative level during the six months under examination here.

In addition to the nineteen regiments created during the Edgehill campaign, Essex's infantry corps eventually came to include some of the formations that were originally raised to fight as part of the earl of Warwick's 'second army' during the month of November 1642. As I indicated in section I of this chapter, Warwick's 'army' had only a very brief independent existence, and yet they were clearly given access to Gerrard's army treasury during their formative period. Again, Jessop was responsible for cashing all of the warrants that were sent to the treasury by Warwick in November, and a number of new infantry regiments were subsequently created with centralized resources in this fashion. Other new formations were also created during this period. In all, a survey of the warrants in the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers reveals that no fewer than eight new regiments were added to the regular army's pay roster during the six months covered here. Significantly, it would appear that there was no concerted or universal attempt to provide all of the soldiers raised to fight in these 'new' regiments with the 10s bounty that was clearly so important to the troops in the period before Edgehill. Neither is there evidence that other ancillary start-up costs were uniformly met. Although there are isolated examples of some regiments receiving both levy and wagon money, it seems probable that the cost of providing these funds to all of the new units was prohibitive at

this time.[382] However, it is also possible that the documentation pertaining to these payments (where they were made by Jessop) has simply been lost.

Table 2.3 provides the reader with an overview of all of the money that is known to have been provided to Essex's infantry regiments during the six months covered by this chapter.[383] Again, although the vast majority of the money that changed hands via these payments can and should be considered 'salary' money, a few isolated examples of levy- and wagon-money payments to the 'new' regiments – including the money described in the preceding footnote – are also included in these totals. Additionally, many of the 'old' regiments also received additional supplementary payments at this time as well. Indeed, as Graham indicates,[384] in November the army treasury provided many of the infantry's Edgehill regiments with a one-time payment of 30d per man as 'gift money'.[385] This money was supposed to help keep the fickle soldiers from abandoning their colours in the aftermath of the fighting at Edgehill and Brentford, and because it was paid on warrant by the central treasury I have again chosen to include it here. Finally, Table 2.3 also includes salary payments made to regimental chaplains, as well as a few

[382] An example of this is the £1,040 that was received by Colonel John Holmstead's regiment from William Jessop in December (TNA SP28/3B ff.485 and 488; TNA SP28/4 f.278). Four hundred and forty-four pounds of this was supposed to be used to purchase regimental wagons, while the remaining six hundred pounds was to be distributed as levy money for private soldiers.
[383] **Table 2.3, Appendix B.**
[384] Graham, "Battle of Edgehill," 291.
[385] TNA SP28/3A ff.177, 179, for example.

miscellaneous payments to regimental colonels for a number of reasons, such as the levy of replacement soldiers for preexisting units.[386]

Aside from providing useful information regarding the appearance and disappearance of particular units from the administrative record, Table 2.3 also demonstrates that not all of the £108,237.92 of 'infantry' spending described in Figure 2.2 can be readily assigned to a particular line unit. The residuum, a significant sum of £14,950.73, was again used to remunerate a range of other personnel who either fought on foot on their own (Essex's foot guard of halberdiers) or provided support services to the infantry regiments in some other capacity (the provost corps).[387] Additionally, some of this money went to ordinary foot officers and/or small units that cannot be readily slotted into one of the discreet regimental categories outlined in Table 2.3.[388] Finally, there are a few important examples of 'infantry' warrants that cannot be assigned to just one unit. The most dramatic and interesting instances of this type of multi-unit spending occurred in April, and they largely explain the relatively low percentage of 'regimental' spending that month.[389]

Though very useful, Table 2.3 cannot tell us anything about three important, additional vectors of analyses. These are: (1) the relative importance of both Vernon and

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[386] This type of warrant is actually quite rare for these regiments at this time. See TNA SP28/3B f.508, Peterborough's regiment, for an example of this.

[387] Examples from November and December can be observed by consulting TNA SP28/3A f.271; TNA SP28/3B ff.322, 413, and 497; and TNA SP28/4 f.286.

[388] Again, examples from the first two of these six months include TNA SP28/3B f.340; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.36v (three Scots officers); and TNA SP28/4 ff.173 and 236.

[389] TNA SP28/6 ff.334 and 348. These two warrants are of pivotal importance, and will be dealt with in greater detail below.

Jessop in the remunerative history of these regiments; (2) the administrative differences that distinguish the 'old' and 'new' regiments of foot; (3) and, most crucially, the ever-fluctuating composition and numerical strength of these formations. Although all three of these factors are important, the third one is especially so. Again, this is because it is impossible to determine whether or not the army treasury successfully met the infantry regiments' needs by relying only on a survey of its total disbursements to them. Indeed, this information must be fleshed-out with a dynamic, fluid understanding of their changing monetary requirements. Although there are several ways in which this information can be either estimated or reconstructed, I will here employ a process whereby only those strengths that are specifically mentioned in the pay warrants themselves are used in my unit-level calculations. The justification for this approach will be dealt with more thoroughly below, but for now it may suffice to say that this choice has been made because of the many complications that are introduced by the differences in the pay scales that were used to remunerate the officers and the men, and the very different ways in which attrition affected these two groups of soldiers over time. Naturally, these were problems that were keenly understood at the time.

In the first place, let us continue our analysis of the infantry's pay history by comparing the amounts that were disbursed to the 'old' and 'new' infantry regiments in the period following the Edgehill campaign. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 accomplish this by

separating the payments that were made to both regimental subsets.[390] Additionally, they successfully disentangle the payments that were made by both Vernon and Jessop on both a regimental and month-to-month basis. Again, this allows the reader to appreciate not only the relative importance of Vernon's and Jessop's payments in an overarching sense, but their relative importance during the creation of the 'new' regiments in November, and the in-field sustenance of the 'old' ones during the same period of time. Even the briefest examination of Tables 2.4 and 2.5 reveals that Vernon was much more actively involved than Jessop in the remuneration of the 'old' regiments during the month of November. Conversely, it would appear that Jessop played the most important role during the initial formation of the 'new' regiments. As I have already indicated, this was largely a function of the fact that Jessop was responsible for paying those units first raised to fight under Warwick during that month. Additionally, it is also a function of the fact that Jessop was operating out of London, while Vernon remained stationed in the field (or at Windsor) with the bulk of the army. Nevertheless, Vernon assumed an ever-more important role in the payment of these troops as time went on, a function, undoubtedly, of their eventual and complete integration into the administrative machinery of the regular army.

We now have a very clear and precise account of the pay history and administrative profile of all twenty-seven infantry regiments that appear in the many hundreds of 'infantry' warrants that were paid during these six months. Since this is the case, it is now possible to begin our investigation into their changing strengths. As I

[390] **Tables 2.4 and 2.5, Appendix B.**

indicated above, I have resolved to avoid unit-level reconstructions in these matters. Again, the reasons for this have to do with the many differences that distinguish the service histories of the officers and men in active units at the time. Ultimately, these differences make perilous any attempt at such reconstruction. Consider, for example, Aaron Graham's recent attempt to reconstruct the size of Essex's army both before and immediately after the battle of Edgehill.[391] Here Graham attempts to use the pay warrants to do exactly what I am about to, and he quite rightly begins by referring his reader to Robinson's warnings about the lack of uniformity in the information contained in these documents.[392] Indeed, he correctly observes the decline in the quantity and quality of documents pertaining to the pay of the infantry in the period following the battle.[393] Unfortunately, his analysis contains a number of problems which render its more specific conclusions unreliable.

In the first place, Graham's attempt at reconstructing the infantry's size is hampered by the fact that he does not have an adequate grasp of the basic administrative structures and pathways that shaped and channeled the pay warrants he is using. For instance, instead of using Vernon's account book as a comprehensive reference point that allows for a contextual understanding of the surviving warrants, he uses it sporadically and superficially – occasionally noting when he happens to find an entry matching a particular warrant of interest. Since this is the case, Graham is in no position to make

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[391] Graham, "Battle of Edgehill," passim.
[392] *Ibid.*, p.279, n.17.
[393] *Ibid.*, 291.

some of the broad claims that appear in the article.[394] Indeed, some of the statements, references, and citations found in the article are quite simply wrong – a problem that is compounded in places by the use of dubious calculations. A brief but relevant example of the latter will suffice here.

Although, for the reasons just mentioned, Graham has no real way of knowing how many of Vernon's warrants are missing (or, for that matter, how many of the total number of warrants were paid by him), on page 285 he initiates a methodology whereby the reported strengths on the company warrants he is familiar with are averaged and applied to those 'missing' companies in the regiments he is trying to reconstruct. Several pages on, he performs similar calculations using some of the warrants that were meant to pay entire units after the battle on 23 October. Let us consider TNA SP28/3A f.218, a warrant Graham uses as a template in his attempt to ascertain the strengths of those units whose post-Edgehill documentation lack the pertinent information. This warrant was issued to the treasury to pay Lord Rochford's regiment on 8 November. It was paid in full within twenty four hours. Two of the other variables that can be derived from this document are: (1) the strength of the unit at the time (in this case 710 private soldiers), and (2) the amount that paid out (£602.70). Graham uses these two variables to arrive at the conclusion that the warrant was worth approximately 17 shillings per man; a rate that he then applies to a battery of similar documents issued on behalf of other units. There are several problems with this, but they all stem from the fact that there are other

[394] *Ibid.*, 280.

complicating variables that must be measured when considering TNA SP28/3A f.218. For example, the warrant makes it clear that a certain small percentage of the money in question was aimed at elements of the regimental staff, not the private soldiers. More importantly, however, the warrant also makes it clear that the money in question was supposed to provide remuneration for just 14 days (beginning on 5 November). Those with an understanding of the army's establishment documents will recall that Essex's ordinary infantrymen were supposed to received 8d per diem, a rate that does not equal 16.98 shillings during a fourteen-day period. In fact, it seems unquestionable that this document is what I have termed a 'blended' warrant – a pay order designed to remunerate both the officers and the (710) men. Overlooking this key point distorts Graham's subsequent discussion of unit strengths.

The central problem with Graham's reconstructive methodology flows from his decision to homogenize the various payments authorized by TNA SP28/3A f.218 into a single value that is assigned to the reported number of private soldiers. A simple series of mathematical operations bears this out. The monthly cost of an infantry regiment containing (1) a full complement of officers and support personnel as well as (2) eight hundred private soldiers was £1,289.47.[395] Crucially, it is important to understand that this cost was liable to change depending on the number of private soldiers as well as the number of officers in service. According to Graham, the cost of Rochford's 710 private soldiers can be boiled down to 17s per man because that is how much you get if you

[395] Crawshaw, "Miliary finance," 1048, Appendix D.

divide the amount received by 710. However, if we then multiply this amount by 800 (the number of men in the regiment, assuming full strength), and then again by two (because this is only enough money to cover fourteen days), we arrive at £1,358.40, a number that is more than sixty pounds greater than the hypothetical cost I computed in my article.[396] Why is this so? I argue that it is because although Rochford was missing some 90 private soldiers, he probably retained a full complement of officers. Since this was likely the case, it is impossible to generalize the rate of pay derived from Rochford's warrant in November because the relationship between the attrition rates of Essex's officers and his men was most certainly not constant or consistent for all of the infantry regiments. Indeed, as contemporaries understood only too well, these regiments became proportionally more expensive as the ratio of private soldiers to officers decreased through a predictable but doubtlessly uneven pattern of attrition.

Ultimately, I argue that such attempts at unit-level reconstruction are both unacceptable and dangerous given the complexity of both the documents and the army's pay schedule. As a direct result, the following analyses of infantry strengths will begin with what can be know for certain about the size of Essex's infantry regiments. Once again, this will mean scouring the warrants used to construct Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 for explicit information about unit strengths. Even though this approach should bypass or preclude some of the problems that appear in Graham's article, I cannot overemphasize the importance of the caveats associated with this process. The first and most important

[396] 16.98 x 800 x 2 = 27,168 shillings = £1,358.40.

of these is the fact that although most of the warrants used to construct Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 are indeed 'salary' warrants, some are not. Additionally, many of the 'salary' warrants do not explicitly state the number of private soldiers being remunerated. Secondly, it must again be remembered that some of the warrants used in these tables were aimed at paying the ancillary staff of the regiments in question – people like the regimental surgeon and/or the chaplain. Finally, the reader should also take note of the organizational framework I have used to construct these tables, and consider how it impacts the accuracy of the information contained in the following presentation. Specifically, it must be remembered that the month-to-month totals contained in all of these tables are – like all of my datasets – based on the receipt dates of the warrants/account-book entries in question, not their issue dates. Again, this is because measuring the information in the warrants using their receipt dates as the key variable is the most accurate way of analyzing the actual flow of money over any given period of time. Unfortunately, it is not necessarily the best way of understanding the strengths of the units in question. This, of course, is because strengths were most often current at the time of a warrant's creation, and substantial changes could take place between the issue and pay dates.

Table 2.6 provides the reader with an overview of all of the reported strengths of Essex's regular infantry regiments.[397] Specifically, it reports the number of private soldiers that are mentioned in the surviving pay warrants that contain this information

[397] **Table 2.6, Appendix B.**

(such as TNA SP28/3A f.218). Again, as Graham rightly indicates, not all of the relevant warrants provide this information. And crucially, I have elected to leave the table's cells blank in the instances where 'salary' money was paid without mentioning the specific number of private soldiers 'in play' at the time. What this means, in the most basic sense, is that the total number of private soldiers that appear in Table 2.6 must be too low. That said, this methodology does guarantee that the numbers reported here reflect an accurate minimum. As the reader can see, the infantry's regimental pay warrants are, in the end, a poor source of direct information when it comes to the number of soldiers in Essex's infantry corps at any given time. Mirroring Table 2.3, Table 2.6 lists a regiment as having received "No Payment" when the corresponding cell in Table 2.3 reads "0". On the other hand, a result of "0" here indicates that no strength information was reported, despite the archival presence of warrants proving that some form of payment was received by the units in question.

The final four rows of Table 2.6 deal with information from all of the cells that do not report "No Payment". The fourth-to-last row indicates the sum of all preceding rows – a total that cannot be considered accurate, even for those units for which there are reported strengths. This is because I cannot guarantee that the individual totals represent the full strength of the corresponding regiment for the month in question, a problem which is the product of the fact that some cells represent information cobbled together

from a potentially incomplete battery of company-level warrants.[398] What I can guarantee, however, is that there are no instances of private soldiers being 'double-counted' because the regiment (or company) they belonged to was paid more than once during a particular month; examples of this sort of thing have been weeded out of my databases.[399] The final three rows provide the reader with a very clear understanding of just how patchy this information is. Although Vernon and Jessop paid an average of eighteen infantry regiments during each of these six months, (some limited amount of) strength information was reported, on average, for only 55 per cent of these units.[400] Unfortunately, this is a reality that makes it very difficult to use this information to determine the army's overall rate of pay.

Despite all of this, there is another way of deriving reliable strength information for the entire infantry corps for at least one of the months in question. During the last few days of April 1643 Essex authorized the payment of exactly £5,600 to 'reward' the foot soldiers of the infantry regiments that had participated in the siege of Reading.[401] In the

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[398] An excellent example of this problematic phenomenon can be found in the cell representing Holborne's regiment for the month of January 1643. The 196 soldiers reported here appear in just three of the six Vernon-paid warrants used to arrive at the £1,361.87 found in the corresponding cell of Table 2.3. Consult TNA SP28/5 ff.1, 17, 53, 93, 103, and 161. The reported-strength subtotal has been derived from TNA SP28/5 ff.1 (59 privates), f.17, (68 privates), and f.53 (69 privates).

[399] Compare TNA SP28/3A f.281 and TNA SP28/3B f.410 – company-level warrants for Robarts' regiment that were paid in November 1642. Both of these warrants were issued on behalf of Captain John Warburton, and both mention his 30 private soldiers. These 30 men appear only *once* in the calculations that were used to derive Robarts' reported strength total of 110 private soldiers for that month.

[400] The 55% statistic comes by dividing the mean of the second-to-last row by the mean of the third-to-last (A mean of 10 regiments with reported strengths divided by a mean of 18 regiments on the books each month = 54.55%).

[401] These payments were made on the two important multi-regiment warrants that appear in Figure 2.2, but that are omitted from Tables 2.3-2.6 for the reasons discussed above. Again, see TNA SP28/6 ff.334 and 348.

event, this 'reward' amounted to 12s per soldier – a rate that was clearly intended to apply *only* to the private soldiers. Since this is the case, it is possible to use these receipts to determine the number of privates in service at that time. Obviously, this number is 9,333 infantrymen in an unspecified number of regiments.[402] Unfortunately, because Essex's regulars were at that time being reinforced by soldiers from the nascent army of the Eastern Association it is impossible to know for certain whether or not all of these men were indeed part of the centralized marching army. What is certain, however, is that this figure is almost double the amount of private soldiers that were specifically reported for April in Table 2.6. Since this is the case, it would appear impossible to determine the precise number of soldiers in service at any given time. What we need, in the end, is a reliable and unimpeachable method of determining just how many private soldiers *could* have been supported with the amount of money appearing in Table 2.3. Furthermore, we need to devise a way of accounting for the number of regiments that appear in that and subsequent tables. This is important because, again, the officer corps of the infantry regiments were far more expensive than the soldiers they commanded.

Though admittedly speculative in nature, the following calculations should provide the reader with a rough idea of the relative value and utility of the monthly spending totals appearing at the end of Table 2.3. (1) In the first place, let us assume that the number of infantry regiments in the regular army was subject to constant change. (2) Let us address this point by further assuming that the number of regiments in the army

[402] £5,600 x 20 = 112,000 shillings ÷ 12s per man = 9,333.33 private soldiers.

each month equals the number of formations that appear on the payroll as it has been rebuilt in Tables 2.3 and 2.6. (3) Next, let's assume that each and every one of these 'regimental structures' contained – at all times – a full complement of officers and support personnel. Were that the case, then a significant percentage of the monthly totals appearing in Table 2.3 would have been consumed in the remuneration of these individuals. Additionally, (4) let us assume, not without problems, that the number of reported privates in the army each month (Table 2.6) can be averaged among the number of regiments that reported them. Furthermore, (5) let's assume that this average number of privates can be assigned to each of the (wider pool of) regiments that received even a small amount of pay. Finally, (6) let us assume that the cost of a single private infantryman was £0.93 per month.[403] Taken together, these assumptions allow us to proceed with a hypothetical reconstruction of the army treasury's relative achievement during the period in question. Table 2.7 performs these operations in a transparent, step-by-step fashion for the benefit of the reader.[404]

As is the case with the reported strength totals appearing in Table 2.6, the hypothetical pay levels appearing in row 10 of Table 2.7 must be considered with caution. Again, the most important reason for this is because the calculations that generated these rates assume that the army was composed only of those units receiving some measure of pay each month. This is, of course, almost certainly wrong at times, especially during the month of February 1642/3. Since this is the case it seems likely that

[403] £746.67 ÷ 800 = £0.933 – see Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1048, Appendix D.
[404] **Table 2.7, Appendix B.**

the actual level of pay for active units was considerably lower, and that it was deteriorating over time. That said, however, the picture looks very different if we perform an additional, final hypothetical calculation using the data presented above. This calculation should prove, beyond doubt, that the sums 'in play' during this time were more than adequate to the task of fully-remunerating a very respectable infantry corps.

As we know from Table 2.3, the total amount of money that was consumed by Essex's infantry regiments during this six-month period was £93,287.19. Furthermore, we know that the monthly cost of an 'ideal' regiment of 800 private soldiers, plus officers, was £1,289.47. What this means, in the end, is that the amount of money that Vernon and Jessop spent on the infantry regiments was enough to fully support no less than twelve 'ideal' regiments during the entire six-month period.[405] Significantly, this is precisely the number of parliamentarian foot regiments that were engaged at Edgehill on 23 October 1642. Although it is undoubtedly true that Essex's real, messily-constituted formations accrued an uncertain volume of arrears during this period, it is just as certain that the army treasury's achievement was nonetheless impressive. The former reality, I would argue, was at least partly the product of the increased costs associated with the maintenance of decayed units, rather than a catastrophic failure on the part of Gerrard's office. This is so despite the dramatic collapse in spending that occurred when the Propositions scheme failed at the outset of February 1643.

[405] £93,287 ÷ 6 months = £15,547.83 ÷ £1,289.47 per regiment = 12.06 regiments.

~ III ~

As was the case with our analysis of the infantry regiments above, it makes sense to begin our discussion of the cavalry with the assumption that the army treasury's primary responsibility was to the active combat units serving under the immediate command of the Lord General during the period covered by this chapter. Recall from the previous chapter the data concerning the mounting and paying of cavalry troops for the Edgehill campaign. Remember that during that period the administrators who paid Essex's mounted soldiers tended to compose warrants aimed at the troop level, and that cavalry regiments served virtually no administrative purpose. It must be noted here that this practice continued without alteration during the next six months of the first civil war. Because of this, it is possible to map the treasury's payments to Essex's original body of cavalry troops from this second period onto the databases constructed to evaluate their receipts during the first three months of the war. Before we attempt this, however, it is important to begin with an overview of all 'cavalry' spending during this period. Figure 2.3 presents the reader with this information in the now customary fashion.

In all, Figure 2.3 maps out £103,549.09 in 'cavalry' spending. Once again, it is clear that spending collapsed during the month of February. As might be expected, though, Vernon continued to play the central role in these matters, and the hard data pertaining to his and Jessop's paperwork for the cavalry during these six months is presented in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 below.



As was the case with the data used in chapter one, it would seem that around twenty percent of Vernon's cavalry warrants are missing, and that the overall value of these documents was more or less representative. Remarkably, the amounts in question here are also very similar to those presented in Table 1.6 above. As was true for the infantry above, however, this represents a rather dramatic decline in spending given the amount of time involved. But was it equal to the task of supporting the Lord General's ever-shifting roster of mounted troops?

Table 2.8 – Vernon's Cavalry Spending: the Reading Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
Nov 1642	No.	99	24	123	19.51%
	Value	17220.26	4307.57	21527.83	20.01%
Dec 1642	No.	114	33	147	22.45%
	Value	20955.74	4255.74	25211.48	16.88%
Jan 1643	No.	73	23	96	23.96%
	Value	16035.65	3784.05	19819.70	19.09%
Feb 1643	No.	4	3	7	42.86%
	Value	1040.00	602.75	1642.75	36.69%
Mar 1643	No.	43	19	62	30.65%
	Value	9855.87	1880.50	11736.37	16.02%
Apr 1643	No.	90	20	110	18.18%
	Value	11396.05	3783.40	15179.45	24.92%
Total	No.	423	122	545	22.39%
	Value	76503.57	18614.01	95117.58	19.57%

As might be expected, the cavalry's records for the Reading campaign are exceedingly complex. Naturally, not all of the money outlined in Figure 2.3 was used to remunerate the regular troops of cuirassiers and harquebusiers, and again the active roster of those troops was subject to constant change during this period. Tables 2.10 and 2.11, like Table 1.12 below, describe the total amount of *salary* money that was received by this shifting group of horse troops during the six months in question.[406]

[406] **Tables 2.10 and 2.11, Appendix B.**

Table 2.9 – Jessop's Cavalry Spending: the Reading Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
Nov 1642	No.	52
	Value	3452.13
Dec 1642	No.	26
	Value	2985.35
Jan 1643	No.	3
	Value	391.18
Feb 1643	No.	4
	Value	973.90
Mar 1643	No.	1
	Value	209.65
Apr 1643	No.	1
	Value	419.30
Total	No.	87
	Value	8431.51

They are akin to Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in form, however, because they distinguish the pay histories of the 'old' and 'new' formations, and because they present this data on a month-to-month basis. Several things are apparent from an examination of these databases. In the first place, it is clear that all but thirty-two of the army's old troop commanders vanished from the payroll over the course of these six months. However, this development was partially offset by the appearance of seventeen new names in the cavalry's records (Table 2.11 below).

By and large, this change in the cavalry's roster reflected a real turnover in the arm's organizational makeup. We know this because although troops were always known by the name of their current commanding officer, I have taken pains to keep track of

changes in the chain of command within the cavalry's constituent formations in the months after Edgehill. Consider, for example, troop number 37, an 'old' formation originally levied for service under Captain Edward Berry. During the winter of 1642/3 Captain Berry was promoted to Sgt. Major, and his troop fell under the immediate command of his erstwhile Lieutenant, Edward Saunders.[407] Rather than creating a new entry in my databases every time something like this happened, I have elected to always refer to the regular army's horse troops by the name of their original captain. Therefore, we find reference in my databases to 'Berry's troop' long after Major Berry ceded control of the unit to his immediate subordinate.

Of course if it is true that the seventeen new names found in Table 2.11 represent new troop-level units, then we are faced with an obvious question: did they receive any amount of 'mounting money' in addition to the salary payments recorded in that table? As was the case for the new infantry regiments discussed above, it would appear that the answer is 'only sporadically'. Interestingly enough, however, all of the instances of these payments – which, it should be noted, have been excluded from Table 2.11 – seem to have come from Jessop, and so it is of course impossible to know how many of the records pertaining to these payments may have been lost.[408] Although Vernon paid out considerable amounts of money to cavalry captains so that they could purchase new

[407] The following warrants chronicle this change in command: TNA SP28/3B f.417; TNA SP28/4 f.127; and TNA SP28/5 f.50.

[408] See, for example, the relevant records for Captain John Boswell (troop #100), Captain William Carr (troop #99), and Captain Allen Cox (troop #91) – TNA SP28/3A ff.33 and 115; TNA SP28/3B f.347. All of these payments are from November 1642, and they were all authorized by the earl of Warwick in his capacity as the putative commander of the Parliament's new 'running' army.

saddles,[409] there is no evidence that he transferred mounting money – defined here as the £354 described and discussed in chapter one above – to *any* of the army's cavalry troops during this six-month period.

In chapter one I devoted a considerable amount of time, effort, and space to the issue of the cavalry troops' initial pay-period start dates. As was the case in my 2010 article, this was important because it allowed me to construct a hypothetical cost model for that service branch during the period in question. Although many of the cavalry warrants that were issued and paid during the Reading campaign include information on pay-period start dates, this information is not nearly so important here. The reason for this is because we no longer need to worry about the logistical peculiarities of troop-level payments for the sixty-five 'old troops' that appear on the reconstructed roster outlined in Table 2.10. These units were 'on the books' as of 01 November 1642, and their hypothetical cost for the period in question is therefore much easier to compute. The only complicating variables in this case are their potentially-shifting size and their various and varied 'end dates' – the moments in time when they disappeared from the payroll. Table 2.10 reflects my attempt to deal with the second of these variables in an overarching and holistic fashion. It allows the reader to follow the pay histories of the 'old troops' as they vanished from the records. Similarly, Table 2.11 chronicles the gradual appearance of the seventeen new troops. Like Table 2.10, it has been arranged by the amounts that were

[409] Again, all of these payments are excluded from Tables 2.10 and 2.11. See, for example, TNA SP28/1A f.212; TNA SP28/3B ff.300, 407, and 408. Interestingly enough, a lot of this money was distributed to the army's 'old' troops.

received in April so as to illustrate this point. Significantly, only fifteen of these new troops received pay during that final month.

As I indicated above, the warrants used to construct Tables 2.10 and 2.11 are heterogeneous documents that can be very complicated when considered together. For example, the fact that a unit received payment during the course of a particular month does not necessarily indicate that it was an active and current member of the regular army at that time. Consider Captain John Bird's 'Watford troop' (troop number 21). The pay history of this unit at this time provides an excellent example of the ambiguity that sometimes surrounds these payments. Bird's troop received salary money on just one pay warrant during these six months.[410] This document authorized the remuneration of everyone in the 60-man troop for a period of seven days. The warrant was issued on 26 November, and it was paid in full by Vernon on 10 December. Unfortunately, the document does not indicate a specific pay-period. Since this is so, it is not necessarily the case that the week in question fell in December. What this means is that although they are truly comprehensive and informative databases, Tables 2.10 and 2.11 cannot be considered an absolutely perfect guide to the size and composition of Essex's cavalry arm during each of the six months covered by this chapter. Furthermore, although it is indeed possible to use the warrants to build very complex and opaque databases that would do a better job of charting these things, I have decided to refrain from constructing such databases. Instead, I have decided to use the information found in the above tables to

[410] TNA SP28/3B f.477.

conduct a series of conjectural calculations that are similar to the ones I performed for the infantry above.

Like the infantry regiments, the cavalry troops were living organizational entities that were liable to expand and contract over time. Again, this is an important point because their shifting size was affected by (and in turn affected) the amount of salary money that these units received (and required) from month to month. Rather than attempting to deal with all of the complexities associated with this, Table 2.12 represents my attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the army treasury's cavalry spending in a more hypothetical, homogenous, and, consequently, more transparent and comprehensible fashion.[411] It does this by making the same series of assumptions regarding the data presented in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 that were made regarding the infantry data discussed above. Again, although these assumptions are not universally true, they are designed to produce a decidedly conservative interpretation of the army treasury's actual performance when it comes to the cavalry troops that actually received pay on a month-to-month basis.

Again, (1) in the first place let's assume that the number of cavalry troops in the army was subject to constant change. (2) Let's again address this point by assuming that the number of troops in the army each month equals the number of formations that appear on the payroll as it has been rebuilt in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. (3) Next, let's assume that each and every one of these troops contained – *at all times* – a full, Edgehill-style

[411] **Table 2.12, Appendix B.**

complement of sixty harquebusiers, plus officers.[412] (4) Additionally, let's assume that three of the 'old' troops (Stapilton's, Sir William Balfour's, and Anselme's) were cuirassier troops consisting of eighty men, plus officers, and that this affected their requirements during this period. Finally, (5) let's then assume that the amount of money that was received by each troop each month can therefore be expressed as a percentage of their 'full pay' as described in Table 1.8 in Appendix A. Again, Table 2.12 describes the results of the practical, step-by-step application of these assumptions. Naturally, the most serious problem with Table 2.12 again stems from the second of the assumptions mentioned above. It is of course not true that there were only three troops of cavalry in the army during the month of February 1643. Regardless, the table is useful because it can be understood as a reasonable estimate of the treasury's ability (or willingness) to fully remunerate the troops that were fortunate enough to be issued pay warrants during each of the six months in question. But again, this assumes that these troops were *always* operating at the indicated strength.

Finally, before we move on to a brief discussion of Essex's dragoons I think it is important to say one last thing about the cuirassiers' and harquebusiers' salary receipts for this period. Recall from the concluding paragraph of section II above that the army

[412] As Malcolm Wanklyn has recently said, there is every indication that the City of London – the regional government that represented the army's most important financial backers – wanted to see the number of ordinary harquebusiers per troop increased to 80 during the month of February. This, as they well knew, would cut costs. However, it is also clear that the actual implementation of this 'reformation' was sporadic at best during the period before 01 May 1643. Wanklyn, *Warrior Generals*, p.42, n.11. See also BL Thomason E.90[14], London, Court of Common Council. *Propositions agreed upon at a Court of Common Councell, in Guild Hall London, Feb 21, 1642* (London: Richard Cotes, 1643) and section I above.

treasury's inability to fully pay Essex's infantry regiments was largely a product of the administrative inefficiencies produced by the uneven way in which attrition affected that arm's officers and private soldiers. Ultimately, I would argue that a different but related phenomenon prevailed within the ranks of the cavalry troops. A cursory examination of Table 2.12 reveals that Gerrard's deputies expended no less than £79,127.09 in their efforts to remunerate the Lord General's cuirassiers and harquebusiers during the six months that followed Edgehill. Although this was clearly not enough to fully pay all of the troops that were floating on to and off of the payroll during this time, it is indeed a tremendous amount of money. In fact, it is enough to fully pay no less than thirty six troops of horse (including three troops of cuirassiers) for the entire period.[413] Again, like the calculation deployed at the end of the section dealing with the infantry regiments, this estimate uses a total that is the product of the collapse in spending that occurred in February. The situation would have been even better had the treasurers been able to make additional payments during that month.

During the six months covered by this chapter the army treasury spent a grand total of £15,535.88 on Essex's mounted infantrymen, all of which is included in the data presented in Figure 2.3 above. Once again, this is roughly the same amount of money that was spent on soldiers of this kind by both sub-treasurers during the first three months of the war. Unsurprisingly, virtually none of this money was spent on mounting or other

[413] This is according to the Edgehill establishment, of course: ([79,127.09 - {551.6 x 3 x 6}] ÷ [349.6 x 6]) = 33.02 harquebusier troops consisting of sixty troopers plus officers.

initial start-up costs.[414] Instead, the vast majority of it was aimed at providing salary money for the officers and soldiers in a gradually-shifting roster of regiments and companies. Indeed, the state of the surviving documentation makes it very difficult to determine just how many dragoon units (and soldiers) the Lord General had at his disposal during the six months in question. This is largely because the authors of the warrants seem to have followed no overarching schema when composing the relevant documentation. Consider, for example, the fact that individual units and commanders seem to have received money for both officers and private soldiers at both the regimental and company levels throughout the period, and although it is usually possible to identify the colonel and/or regiment receiving the money, this is not always the case. Table 2.13 describes this situation in some detail.[415] This table demonstrates that the vast majority of the money Vernon paid to the dragoons can be readily identified by regiment or colonel.[416] The amounts that cannot be so identified were paid mostly to captains whose regimental affiliation either changed or remain otherwise unclear.[417]

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to determine the rate at which arrears were generated within the dragoon units. This is largely because the precise number of units in service at any given point remains uncertain. Consider, for example, the cases of Colonels John and Richard Brown. The documents used to build Table 2.13 refer to both

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[414] There are exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are *included* in Table 2.13 below. See TNA SP28/5 f.271, for example.

[415] **Table 2.13, Appendix B.**

[416] £13,590.90 ÷ £15,535.88 = 87%

[417] Examples include: Thomas Moore (TNA SP28/262 ff.234 and 260), John Inwood (TNA SP28/4 f.209), and Edward Freeman (TNA SP28/5 f.296).

of these men as regimental commanders, but I suspect they may have simply commanded the same unit at different points in time. But again, it is very difficult to prove that this was the case because of the ambiguities that exist within the relevant records. Nevertheless, it is possible to contextualize the information presented in Table 2.13 by determining how many fully-staffed, pre-existent dragoon regiments could have been supported by the total amount of money the army treasury laid out during this time. In order to do this, however, we first need to understand the cost of such a unit on a monthly basis, something that was not dealt with explicitly in chapter one. Table 2.14 provides the reader with this information in detail.[418]

According to the army's establishment document, a full regiment of six companies cost £1,750 per month. Since we are dealing here with a six month period, it is clear that the same regiment would have cost the treasury £10,500 to maintain from 1 November 1642 to 1 May 1643. What this means, of course, is that Gerrard's office would have been unable to support any more than one full regiment of dragoons with the money that was actually spent on the mounted infantrymen during the period covered by this chapter. Since we know that there were no fewer than seven or eight regimental colonels in circulation during this time – all of whom received significant amounts of money during the months covered here – we are left with a rather stark choice. Either all of these colonels were actually the rotating commanders of a very limited pool of two or three poorly-paid, loosely-organized dragoon regiments, or they commanded – each of

[418] **Table 2.14, Appendix B.**

them – a unit suffering from a truly disastrous rate of pay. In either scenario attrition would surely have been severe,[419] and arrears must have accrued very quickly regardless. The only other possibility is that Jessop met some of these needs on warrants which are now lost, something that is of course impossible to prove at this time.

So far we have accounted for approximately 91 per cent of the total amount of 'cavalry' spending presented in Figure 2.3 above.[420] Again, the remaining nine percent of this money was issued for a number of miscellaneous reasons, most of which have already been mentioned. Aside from the very limited amount of mounting money that was provided to the 'new' troops of harquebusiers, and the more substantial sums that were distributed to the horse captains for the purchase of saddles and other pieces of equipment, a host of relatively low-value warrants were issued to Essex's cavalry colonels to remunerate senior officers and other members of their regimental staff.[421] Again, this was necessary because most of the army's cavalrymen were not administered at that organizational level. Although it is not immediately clear just how far this money went, it seems likely that it too was generally inadequate. It remains to be seen, however, whether the monies distributed for 'other' reasons were sufficient.

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[419] Consult TNA SP28/4 f.189 – a regiment-level pay warrant for Colonel Wardlaw's regiment. The regiment contained just 210 private troopers by early December.
[420] (£79,127.09 [harq/cuir salary] + £15,535.88 [dragoons]) ÷ £103,549.09 (Figure 2.3) = 91.42%.
[421] Examples from November include: TNA SP28/3A ff.277, 284-5, and 287; and TNA SP28/3B ff.332-333.

~ IV ~

Between 01 November 1642 and 30 April 1643 William Jessop and Francis Vernon disbursed at least £68,671.26 to meet the salary and transportation needs of the Lord General's artillery train, satisfy the London-based arms and equipment dealers, and placate the representatives of the Parliament's quasi-regular local forces then engaged in various parts of the country. I say 'at least' because the majority of this money was paid out by Jessop, the deputy whose own accounts seem to have been lost. Figure 2.4, Table 2.15, and Table 2.16 describe this situation in detail. While Jessop was responsible for just 38 per cent of all of the 'other' payments made during the Edgehill campaign, he was responsible for 67 per cent of the money disbursed for these reasons during the next six months of the war. This is a dramatic development, and it means that we must now pay particularly close attention to the way that my databases deal with this sub-treasurer's spending activities.

During the first three months of the war there was enough money to go around. Sections II and III of this chapter demonstrate how this enviable situation gradually deteriorated during the subsequent campaign. Aside from the fact that a lack of money meant the generation of a variable amount of arrears for individual units in the regular army, it also led to a degree of administrative stress within the clerical machinery that kept that army fighting. Aside from the fact that a lack of money meant the generation of a variable amount of arrears for individual units in the regular army, it also led to a degree of administrative stress within the clerical machinery that kept that army fighting.



The most important evidence of this comes from the warrants that were paid by William Jessop. By and large, the warrants issued to both Vernon and Jessop during the Edgehill campaign were promptly paid in full via a single payment. We know this because each payment required a signed receipt and, again, these were generally written on the warrants themselves.

Table 2.15 – Vernon's 'Other' Spending: the Reading Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
Nov 1642	No.	28	23	51	45.10%
	Value	2671.63	2899.23	5570.86	52.04%
Dec 1642	No.	19	17	36	47.22%
	Value	2621.27	971.42	3592.69	27.04%
Jan 1643	No.	13	6	19	31.58%
	Value	1236.88	708.83	1945.71	36.43%
Feb 1643	No.	7	2	9	22.22%
	Value	2896.15	512.00	3408.15	15.02%
Mar 1643	No.	12	11	23	47.83%
	Value	2260.73	1772.91	4033.64	43.95%
Apr 1643	No.	20	9	29	31.03%
	Value	3480.94	740.60	4221.54	17.54%
Total	No.	99	68	167	40.72%
	Value	15167.59	7604.99	22772.58	33.40%

Although this practice of delivering money via prompt, single payments continued to be the case for the majority of the Vernon-paid warrants during these six months,[422] there was a growing tendency for Jessop to make multiple payments on individual warrants over an increasingly long period of time. Again, this was undoubtedly the product of the increasingly hand-to-mouth financial situation that was developing in the capital as the Propositions scheme failed.

[422] This is so despite the fact that a great many of the warrants Vernon paid in March 1643 were NOT paid in full. Naturally, the tables and graphs found in the first two sections of this chapter only record the actual (reduced) payments.

Table 2.16 – Jessop's 'Other' Spending: the Reading Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
Nov 1642	No.	70
	Value	13555.83
Dec 1642	No.	61
	Value	10022.57
Jan 1643	No.	16
	Value	10954.51
Feb 1643	No.	49
	Value	5965.35
Mar 1643	No.	17
	Value	1323.13
Apr 1643	No.	27
	Value	4077.28
Total	No.	240
	Value	45898.68

Unfortunately, however, this development also created a serious analytical problem for me during the course of this project. In the end, all of my databases contain a single entry for each of the 5,300 warrants (lost and surviving) I have examined. Each of these entries measures the important variables that buttress all of my calculations and conclusions. As the reader knows, three of these variables are (1) the warrants' issue dates, (2) their ultimate value, and (3) their pay dates. In order to expedite the research process, simplify my databases, and maximize the flexibility of my various calculations, I decided to deal with Jessop's 'multiple-payment warrants' in the following manner: the ultimate value of these warrants has been assumed to equal the total value of all existent

and/or indicated receipts, and the 'pay date' has been reckoned as the date on which the final payment was received. Of course there are several consequences to this approach.

In the first place, it means that the reported totals for Jessop's spending cannot be considered absolutely accurate on a month-to-month basis. This is because there are important instances where some of the money he paid on 'multiple-payment warrants' during the course of one month has been reported later, when the warrants in question received their last payment. Salient examples of this problem will be discussed as they appear in context below. Without question this must be considered a distortion in my databases – the inevitable product of the above-mentioned research strategy I decided to use. However, the reader should also note that this does not mean that my discussions of Jessop's payments are wrong in an overarching sense. Indeed, the sum totals of all of Jessop's payments up to the end of any given month are increasingly accurate as time goes on. And in fact even the earliest sums reflect an underestimate – the payments then being made on otherwise incomplete 'multiple-payment warrants' being omitted. Furthermore, it should be noted that no such distortion exists in my account of Vernon's payments, especially before 25 March 1644. This is not only because he tended to pay warrants in one installment, but because I have endeavored to 'balance' his own reported totals for each month with the sums found in my record of the surviving warrants.

And so Jessop assumed an increasingly important role in payment of warrants issued for 'other' reasons during these six months. What were he and Vernon doing with this money? Table 2.17, like Table 1.17, describes how the treasury's 'other' spending

can be broken down into the five sub-categories introduced above.[423] As was the case during the Edgehill campaign, the sums recorded in the rows marked 'artillery' and 'transportation' were the most important for the regular army. This is so despite the fact that more than a third of this money was used to support the Parliament's quasi-regular 'local forces'. How well paid was Essex's train during this increasingly difficult time? Again, not all of the 'artillery' warrants used to construct Figure 2.4 and Table 2.17 were aimed at remunerating the gunners. Because of this, it is again important to dissect these payments in order to illustrate this point.

Like Table 1.18, Table 2.18 divides all of the 'artillery' warrants into two categories.[424] And again it should be noted that there is a degree of arbitrariness to this division. For example, many of the warrants that I have placed in the 'ancillary costs' column were issued to provide salary money for the units of firelocks and pioneers that were created to guard the train and allow it to move through difficult terrain; others were issued to remunerate the train's most senior officers. These payments have been excluded from the first column largely because these personnel were not paid with the other members of the train on the warrants that do appear in the 'salary' column. Those who were paid by the warrants listed there – the 'officers and artificers' of the train – presumably included the skilled gunners who were responsible for actually firing the cannon during an engagement, and a brief examination of their warrants is useful. Unsurprisingly, all seven of these warrants were paid by Vernon, and the majority of

[423] **Table 2.17, Appendix B.**
[424] **Table 2.18, Appendix B.**

them were aimed at providing two weeks' pay. Altogether, they provided 4.47 months' pay for the 'officers and artificers' at the implied rate of £1,449.57 per month. Assuming that there are no lost, Jessop-paid warrants for these men, this equals a pay rate of 75 per cent during the six months covered by this chapter.[425] This is interesting because it seems entirely compatible with some of the speculative, month-to-month pay levels presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.12 below.

When it comes to centrally-issued guns and munitions, the delivery notices found in WO55/1937 indicate that Essex's regular army was the recipient of a significant amount of materiel from the Ordnance Office during this period. Although a small amount of this materiel was issued to the infantry regiments during the winter of 1642/3, most of it was issued to the train of artillery on warrants directed to the Office by either Essex or the Committee of Safety.[426] Altogether, the army received 5 new cannon, 153 barrels of powder, 31.1 tons of match, 36 cwt of musket shot, and 4744 cannon balls of various sizes from the Office during these six months.[427] Much of these munitions were

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[425] £6,473.08 ÷ £1,449.57 = 4.47 months. 4.47 ÷ 6 = 75%.

[426] Colonel Bulstrode's regiment, for example, received 4 light cannon (2 sakers and 2 minions), 3 cwt of 'corn' powder, and a consignment of shot and other ancillary equipment from the Ordnance Office on 7 December 1642. Additionally, Sir John Meldrum – the new commander of Lord Say and Sele's regiment – received 400 muskets from the Tower in January. See TNA WO55/1937, unfol.

[427] Again, this report assumes that 1 last of gunpowder = 24 bbls = 24 cwt = 2400 avdp lbs, and that 1 ton of the same = 2,000 avdp lbs = 20 cwt = 80q. The reader should bear in mind that the volume or mass of many English weights and measures at this time depended on the goods being measured. A hundredweight of either match or musket shot, for instance, weighted 112 avdp lbs, with 'quarters' and tons being recalculated appropriately. *Ibid.*; see also Zupko, *Dictionary*, passim. Additionally, the reader should note that my reckoning of these items is similar but not identical to Lewis's broader picture of Essex's receipts for the whole of 1643. Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", Appendix 9, p.333. This point will be discussed further in chapter three below.

undoubtedly consumed during the siege of Reading.[428] Because it was issued from the Tower, there is of course no record of Gerrard's office paying for any of this materiel, and all of it should be considered distinct from the weapons and equipment that were then being 'privately' purchased by the keepers of the Committee of Safety's own magazine – equipment that was the financial responsibility of the army treasury. As was the case in chapter one, this second category of materiel will be dealt with below.

What of military transportation? Table 2.17 demonstrates that a considerable amount of centralized money was devoted to the task of moving military equipment around during the six months following Edgehill. Indeed, more than ten percent of the money expended for 'other' reasons was used for this purpose – a sharp (if only relative) increase from the two percent of these funds that were used during the autumn of 1642. Part of the reason for this stems from the fact that in November 1642 the army treasury began making direct, substantial payments to privately-contracted civilian wagoners via the aforementioned 'private wagoner warrants'. Again, although these were true, centralized army warrants (being issued by either Essex or the Committee of Safety), they were often written on the recommendation of Edward West or Anthony Fastolfe (see chapter one above). Either sub-treasurer was of course liable to pay these warrants, but most of them were paid by Jessop in London. As Robinson discovered, these 'private wagoner warrants' are an important source of information that tell us a great deal about

[428] It should also be noted that Lord Grey of Warke received an additional three light cannon from the Tower on 13 April. These weapons were issued with an allotment of shot. It seems likely that they were employed by those forces assigned to operate alongside the regular army at this time. Again, TNA WO55/1937, unfol.

the men who were contracted to provide the regular army with additional mobility in the field.[429] Indeed, Robinson used them to construct a database demonstrating that the regular army was employing around 70 privately-owned draught horses at any time during these six months, though the records pertaining to the tail end of 1642 are patchy.[430] As I suggested above, however, I believe that Robinson underestimated the role that was played by Thomas Richardson in the initial hiring of these men. As I indicated in chapter one, I believe this because I have discovered evidence that some of the private wagoners (and their teams) eventually paid by the Gerrard's sub-treasurers on the 'private wagoner warrants' appear first in Thomas Richardson's account book.[431]

Richardson was therefore a key player in the machinery that kept Essex's regular army mobile during the period covered by this chapter. Since this was so, it is not surprising to discover that he was the recipient of a great deal of the 'transportation' money outlined in Table 2.17.[432] The most important document associated with Richardson during this period is TNA SP28/262 f.451, a Committee of Safety warrant aimed at providing him with enough money to remunerate the contractors in his employ. As it happens, this document is also an excellent example of the kind of 'multiple-payment warrants' I discussed above. In the first place this is because it – like so many of

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[429] Robinson, "Horse supply," (thesis) Appendix D.
[430] *Ibid*, Table 9, pp.78-80 and Appendix D, pp.266-267.
[431] It must be said that I was only able to discover this because of the generosity of Dr. Robinson. He was kind enough to provide me with his private databases during the earlier stages of my research. Again, Richardson's account book can be found in TNA SP28/140/4.
[432] Richardson's share was £1,317.87 – or 16.51% of the £7,982.53 of 'transportation' money described in Table 2.17. All of Richardson's receipts came from Jessop.

the 'transportation' warrants first identified by Robinson – was paid by Jessop. Again, by November Jessop was clearly having a hard time cashing all of the warrants then appearing on his desk. This is evidenced by the nature of receipts found on the back of this document. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 are images of the warrant in question. They are from my private collection of 40,000 digital photographs of civil war manuscripts. Here the reader can see how Jessop was forced to make many payments in order to 'pay off' this warrant. Again, because it has always been my policy to assign a single receipt date and value to each warrant, and because I have elected to use the final pay date in cases of multiple payments, TNA SP28/262 f.451 appears in my databases as a warrant with a value of £1,000 paid out by Jessop on 29 November 1642. Interestingly enough, the reader should note that this is not actually much of a problem in this case. This is because all of my databases are designed to produce calculations based on monthly activity, and all of these payments occurred in just one month. Again, the situation would be more complicated if the final payment of £200 had been made on, say, 3 December.

In any case, a quick reading of Figure 2.5 makes it clear that Richardson was supposed to use this money to meet the commitments he had as the army's Wagon Master General, a position which was distinct from his other job as one of the commissioners of the Propositions.[433] Again, Richardson kept an account book that chronicles his activities as Wagon Master, and the payments appearing in Figure 2.6 are recorded in the list of his official receipts. Interestingly enough, this money appears as one lump sum in

[433] Robinson, "Horse supply," (thesis) 51ff.

Richardson's records as well, there being only vague marginal notes indicating that it was received in installments. This perhaps testifies to Richardson's own inability or unwillingness to deal with the complexities associated with multiple payments on centralized warrants!

But how did Richardson dispose of this money, and how does it relate to the money that was distributed directly to individual wagoners via the 'private wagoner warrants'? A couple of brief examples may suffice. On 26 November 1642 Richardson hired a wagoner named Bartholomew Garnett and his team of five horses. This man was provided with the equivalent of two days' pay, and sent on his way to the army in the field.[434] Although Richardson's account book does not say where Garnett's team was headed, we know he was destined for the army because his name appears in the text of a 'private wagoner warrant' issued by Essex in the field on 12 January 1642/3.[435] This warrant was issued to pay four wagoners (including Garnett) for the total amount of time that they and their teams had served with the Lord General's artillery train. In all, Garnett and his five horses were reported to have served for thirty-five days, service that warranted him a payment of £21 17s 6d. Garnett authorized his friend George Younger to collect this money, and he (and the representatives of the other two wagoners) received these dues in full from Jessop on 9 February 1642/3.

[434] TNA SP28/140/4 f.12v. The precise amount (including 2s given to him to shoe his horses) was £1 17s.
[435] TNA SP28/5 f.97.



Figure 2.5 – TNA SP28/262 f.451r: The Committee of Safety's warrant to the army treasury to pay Richardson (as Wagon-Master General) £1,000. This document was written on 2 November 1642.



Figure 2.6 – TNA SP28/262 f.451v: The (multiple) payments made on the order found in Figure 2.5. All of these payments were made by William Jessop.



Figure 2.7 – TNA SP28/140/4 f.80r: An excerpt from Richardson's account book.
This page records (second-to-last entry) his receipt of the £1,000 described in TNA SP28/262 f.451.

Now, it is important to understand that Garnett and the other three wagoners were reported to have received part of their dues before the composition of this warrant. For Garnett, this pre-payment equaled £6 5s, part of which, I contend, might have been the £1

17s given to him by Richardson on 26 November.[436] Similar examples of this type of logistical organization can be found in the pay histories of other wagoners who served with the train during this period. Indeed, the records pertaining to wagoners Robert Austin,[437] Thomas Bird,[438] and Edward Butcher[439] all seem to indicate a hiring and remuneration system of this kind, and there are still other examples of this from later periods in the army's history.

Of course, even the most cursory examination of Table 2.17 proves that Jessop was not the only one providing cash for military transportation during this period. In fact, Vernon managed to disburse £4,082.03 for 'transportation' purposes during these six months. Significantly, some 91.62 per cent of this money was transferred directly into the pockets of Anthony Fastolfe, who was supposed to use it to coordinate and support the various personnel who kept the army and its artillery train mobile in the field. Again, it would appear that Fastolfe's job was threefold: he maintained the army's 500 newly-acquired state-owned draught horses,[440] met the financial needs of the regular army's wider transportation apparatus in the field, and he provided some measure of remuneration to the short- and long-term private contractors who often arrived in the army's camp from Richardson's staging point(s) in London. However, the amounts he

[436] The reader should note that I have been able to identify two payments (totaling £4) that Anthony Fastolfe made to Garnett *without* (a) centralized warrant(s). These payments were made on 20 December and 9 January 1642/3. TNA SP28/143, Fastolfe's account, ff.25r and 26v.
[437] TNA SP28/140/4 f.12r; and TNA SP28/4 f.317.
[438] TNA SP28/140/4 f.11v; and TNA SP28/4 f.317.
[439] TNA SP28/140/4 f.12r; and TNA SP28/5 f.120.
[440] There were 524 of these animals during the winter of 1642/3. Robinson tells us that they were likely donated on the Propositions, but that they only began arriving into Fastolfe's care during the month of November 1642. See Robinson, "Horse supply," (thesis) Table 7 and pp.75-76.

received were not enough to enable Fastolfe to provide these private contractors with their full due. The result, of course, was the creation of the 'private wagoner warrants', which, again, were typically authorized in the field by Essex and (oftentimes partially) paid by Jessop in the capital.

In summary, then, Vernon and Jessop disbursed £7,982.53 on the authority of 106 'transportation' warrants during this six-month period. Fastolfe got around 47 per cent of this money (all of it from Vernon), and the private contractors got some 32 per cent of it (almost all of which came from Jessop) on the authority of the 'private wagoner warrants'. A further 16.5 per cent went to Richardson in London, and the remainder – less than five percent of the 'transportation' subtotal – was used to meet a host of miscellaneous needs, including the payment of a host of other private wagoners whose service histories Robinson could not adequately reconstruct. Ultimately, nothing about this distribution of the army treasury's 'transportation' money during these six months should come as a surprise. By November 1642 Fastolfe had become the most important transportation officer in the army – having jurisdiction over both the 500 state-owned (Propositions) horses that were now part of the train, as well as the use and deployment of the (approximately) 70 privately-contracted civilian animals that were in service at any given moment. Although the army's financial position deteriorated significantly during the period covered by this chapter, there was still enough money in Jessop's coffers to help pay those contractors who were not fully remunerated by Richardson in London or Fastolfe in the field. As a result, more than a third of the 'transportation' subtotal went to

these contractors on the 'private wagoner warrants' – the documents that proved so valuable to Robinson in his quest to determine the size of the train in the field.

Without question, Jessop spent an enormous amount of money on the Parliament's 'local forces' during the six months covered by this chapter. In fact, Table 2.17 tells us that his disbursements for this reason were the single most valuable kind of 'other' spending during this period. Although significant amounts changed hands during each of the months in question, two of them – November 1642 and January 1642/3 – are truly exceptional. As it happened, the £8,646.07 that Jessop provided to the local forces in November was paid out on the authority of twenty individual warrants. However, exactly £7,000 of this changed hands on the authority of just five of these documents, each of which was worth at least one thousand pounds.[441] Two thousand pounds was used to supply the militia of London with equipment and weapons, two thousand was given to Durand Hotham for the use of his father's garrison at Hull, and two thousand was provided to Mr. White for the use of the Fairfaxes' nascent Northern Army. The final £1,000 was paid over to Colonels Elias Jordan and Peter Andrewes so that the Thames might be safeguarded. Interestingly enough, despite the fact that all five of these warrants were exceptionally valuable, only three of them were 'multiple-payment warrants', and even these were fully paid during the course of just one month (again, November 1642).[442]

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[441] TNA SP28/261 f.357; TNA SP28/262 ff.447, 458, 464, and 468.

[442] Nevertheless, TNA SP28/261 f.357 – a warrant authorizing the payment of £1,000 for the use of the London Militia – was composed on 15 October.

The situation in January 1642/3 was altogether different. The £10,130 pounds that Jessop transferred to the local forces that month were paid over on the authority of just two warrants. Virtually all of it (£10,000) was given to Mr. White for the use of the Army of the Northern Association. Although the warrant in question was written in December, it was paid in full in one installment on 7 January.[443] And while Jennifer Jones may rightly claim that this (along with the other amounts that were provided to White during this period) was not enough to adequately fund the northern army during the winter of 1642/3, it was nevertheless a substantial commitment on the part of the central army treasury, a treasury which was then finding it more and more difficult to meet the needs of the regular army in the south.[444]

More than half of the money that Jessop paid out for 'arms' during this period was spent during the month of December 1642. Again, although these transactions are recorded in seventeen different documents, the vast majority of this money appears in just four of them.[445] Two of these were 'multiple-payment warrants', with some of the money in question having been received during the month of November.[446] It is important for the reader to understand that these documents cannot all be considered warrants. Indeed, several of them are simply receipts; the record of a payment made on the authority of a

[443] TNA SP28/262 f.143.
[444] Jones, "The War in the North", chapter 5, 140 and passim. Dr. Jones rightly points out that £2,000 of the £10,000 paid out on TNA SP28/262 f.143 was quickly borrowed by Lord Say and Sele. Additionally, she tells us that White did not receive this money 'back again' until May 1643 (TNA SP28/263 f.116). However, it is important to note that the £2,000 paid over on the authority of TNA SP28/263 f.116 again came from Jessop, not lord Say. Regardless of the fact that White did not have the money to send to his masters in January, the fact remains that Jessop paid out a total of £12,000 on these two warrants.
[445] TNA SP28/262 ff.51, 157, 165, and 203.
[446] Again, TNA SP28/262 f.51 and 157.

standing agreement or a preexisting order. Furthermore, it is also important to understand that certain payments for 'arms' have been omitted from this list and included in the 'local forces' sub-category discussed above. This is a function of two related factors: (1) the first is that these sub-categories – being my own creations – are inherently subjective in nature, and secondly (2) it is because the sums in question were used to buy weapons especially for the Parliament's quasi-regular 'local forces'.[447] Regardless of all this, the single most important of the four 'arms' documents mentioned above is TNA SP28/262 f.165, a receipt for the payment of £1,398.80 for a batch of arms purchased in France. Significantly, this receipt can be directly linked to the very important document introduced and described in chapter one above, and Table 1.20 below. At this point it is important for the reader to recall that not all of the regular army's weapons and equipment came from the Ordnance Office in the White Tower. Although it is very difficult to calculate what percentage of the weapons being purchased by the likes of Rowe and Bradley with the 'arms' money found in Tables 1.17 and 2.17 were provided to Essex's regular army, it seems very likely that the former were vital to the latter.[448]

The relative value of the army treasury's miscellaneous spending declined significantly during the six months after Edgehill. A comparison of Tables 1.17 and 2.17 demonstrates this. The payments I have labelled 'support' were worth just 19.46 per cent of the 'other' subtotal during the winter and spring of 1642/3, a burden that Vernon and

[447] For example, see TNA SP28/262 f.256, a warrant aimed at providing £1,000 for the purchase of musket for the service of the county of Lancashire. Again, I have categorized this fully-paid document as a 'local forces' warrant.
[448] Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, p.32, n.117; Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 210-211, 218, and 253-254.

Jessop appear to have shouldered evenly. Unfortunately, there is no indication that an event like Vernon's earlier £8,000 attempt to secure quarters occurred during this period, and it seems very likely that a shortage of money was at least part of the reason for this. But again, much of the money that did change hands was used to remunerate the ancillary personnel who provided necessary services to the regular army in the field. Let us consider three brief examples of this sort of thing. As we know, Stephen Estwick played a vital role in the provision of clothing to Essex's army during the Edgehill campaign. Although he received a considerable amount of money from the army treasury during those three months, he was not fully remunerated for all of the items he delivered to the army at that time. Despite this, Eswick continued to provide articles of clothing for the army during the six months covered by this chapter. Specifically, he and his suppliers clothed not only the preexisting formations, but several of the 'new' infantry regiments that were introduced and discussed in context above. Table 2.19 chronicles this activity in the same manner as Table 1.5 below.[449]

And so, the existing documentation demonstrates that Estwick provided almost £10,000 worth of clothing to the regular army during this six-month period. Unfortunately for him, however, it would appear that the central treasury was even less capable of meeting these costs than the ones chronicled in chapter one above. Indeed, the same documentation indicates that Estwick received just £4,097.35 via three warrants during these six months, some of which was meant to cover the amounts still owing on

[449] **Table 2.19, Appendix B.**

previous deliveries.[450] Although all of these payments certainly qualify as 'support' payments, the reader should note that not all of this money can be found in my databases for this period. Again, this is because some of the payments were made by Jessop on a warrant that received additional payments during later periods.[451]

Aside from the increasingly inadequate sums that were provided to Estwick for clothing, the 'support' sub-category found in Table 2.17 includes payments that were made to two men on behalf of the 'scouts' who provided Essex's regulars with military intelligence in the field. The first of these men was Anthony Allen, and the second was Sir Samuel Luke, the famous correspondent who would eventually assume command of the quasi-regular garrison at Newport Pagnell.[452] Both served, in turn, as Scoutmasters General of the army. During the months of November and December 1642 Allen received £589.48 from Vernon to meet the costs associated with his office.[453] Luke received more during the next four months, and we are fortunate in this case because the accounts that he submitted to the Committee for Taking the Accounts of the Kingdom have survived as part of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers.[454] This, of course, allows us to compare Luke's own record of his receipts with the surviving warrants, as well as Vernon's

[450] TNA SP28/261 f.430; and TNA SP28/262 ff.304 and 317.
[451] The warrant in question is TNA SP28/261 f.430. The total (final) value of this order was £5,861.79, some £1,800 of which was paid before 01 Nov 1642. The residuum was paid out slowly, with the last payment being received on 24 March 1645. According to my adopted methodology, this means that *none* of this money should appear in my databases. However, it should be noted that the £1,800 paid out before 01 Nov 1642 *does* appear there. The reason for this is because it was originally input during the preparation of my 2010 article (Crawshaw, op. cit.), where I wanted my figures to be as accurate as possible.
[452] Consult H.G. Tibbutt, ed., *The Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke, 1644-45: Parliamentary Governor of Newport Pagnell* (London, 1963), 7-9 and passim.
[453] TNA SP28/3B f.409; TNA SP28/4 f.129; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, ff.35v and 45v.
[454] TNA SP28/127/3 especially.

account book. All told, Luke reported receiving £700 from both Jessop and Vernon during this period, and all of these transactions correspond perfectly to the warrants and pay entries found in my databases.[455]

Finally, approximately sixteen per cent of the 'support' subtotal went to Nicholas Bond, the one-time paymaster of Wharton's abortive Irish expedition. Bond, it would seem, was now serving as Essex's commissary of the victuals, and the relevant entries in Vernon's account book (there are no surviving Vernon- or Jessop-paid warrants to Bond) seem to suggest that he was tasked with arranging the supply of provisions for the soldiers of the regular army – a job that was ever more important because of the treasury's increasing inability to provide the troops with specie.[456] That said, a survey of these documents indicates that whatever resources Bond himself collected were not supposed to be provided to the soldiers free of charge. Instead, it would seem that Bond was supposed to purchase a certain amount of victuals using the money Vernon paid him, and then have the cost of these goods deducted out of the soldiers' pay. How this was supposed to be accomplished is somewhat of a mystery, however, because there is no indication that Vernon tracked this process when cashing subsequent warrants. In any case, the amounts of money in question would only have purchased enough food to feed

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[455] **Table 2.20, Appendix B.**

[456] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, ff.34v, 36r, 41r, 46v, 49v, 51v, 53r, and 58r. The total value of these payments – which included money to pay Bond's own salary – was £2,105.50. One of the two payments appearing on f.58v makes mention of the fact that the cost of the victuals was to be deducted from the soldiers' pay. A smattering of delivery notices pertaining to some of these centrally-purchased victuals has survived as part of TNA SP28/7. These delivery notices refer to food provided to several of Essex's regular infantry regiments after the capture of Reading. TNA SP28/7 ff.160-200, passim.

the whole army for a few weeks.[457] It therefore seems likely that most of the food that was consumed by the regular army at this time was either purchased by individual soldiers using whatever (increasingly inadequate) amount of salary money they had on their person, or taken from the locals via the much-hated mechanism of 'free quarter'.[458]

~ Conclusion ~

During the six months that followed the battle of Edgehill the regular army experienced a steady decline in both the absolute and relative value of its cash receipts, a problem that became acute during the month of February. As we have seen, this was largely the result of the rather sudden collapse of the Propositions scheme that had worked so brilliantly during the summer and autumn of 1642. Unfortunately for Essex's regulars, this collapse occurred during a period of fundamental change in the Parliament's war effort. In the first place, the nasty realization that the war was not going to end as a result of Edgehill sparked a limited but nonetheless persistent demand for a negotiated peace at the political centre of the rebels' nascent state-entity. But at the same time, the scope of their military operations in the provinces was both expanding and becoming ever more organizationally sophisticated. These complex phenomena, when combined with the regular army's relentless thirst for money and Essex's own sense of

[457] This estimate is based on my reading of Gentles's work on the formation of the New Model Army, and on the cost of victuals in both 1643 and 1644. See Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992 and 1994), 45; and my own discussion of pre-paid military victuals in chapter four below. Professor Gentles has generously provided me the notes he took on the state of the New Model's supply warrants from the 1645-6 period. It would seem that these records are far more detailed than the paperwork dealing with the support of Essex's army during the first two years of the war.

[458] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 152-157.

strategic caution, led to a certain degree of military inactivity in and around London during the winter of 1642/3.

Once it became clear that the central government needed to find a new way of funding Essex army, as well as the new quasi-regular forces then emerging in the provinces, the Parliament began experimenting with various innovative revenue streams. In the early weeks of this period these experiments focused on expanding and reinvigorating the Propositions scheme. But despite these ad hoc efforts – the most notable of which was the introduction of the so-called [Fifth and] Twentieth Part – by early February 1643 the treasury set up to manage the Propositions at Guildhall had nothing left to send to Gerrard's deputies. One of the reasons for this was undoubtedly the centrifugal effect that the new county- and association-level quasi-regular forces were then having on the flow of military resources collected in the provinces. From a centralized point of view, the solution to all this involved the introduction of an entirely new quota-based direct tax, envisioned and implemented on a nation-wide scale. And although the activities of the royalists and the existence of the Parliament's own regional forces precluded the possibility of drawing all of the potential or resulting revenues into the government's coffers in London, the ambitious scope of the Weekly Assessment scheme generated a large amount of credit in the capital. This credit was quickly translated into the sacks of coin that were needed to fuel the Lord General's regular army during the successful attack on Reading. By April, the central government had found an *ad hoc* way of maintaining its own forces despite the fiscal-military entropy that came

with the provincial associations; however, the disgust that many in the City now felt toward both the war and the insatiable appetites of the regular soldiery was undeniably palpable.

Although it is relatively easy to determine the amounts of centralized money that were received by the army's constituent formations during this period, it is either difficult or impossible to know just how large those formations were at any given point in time. However, the analyses conducted in sections II – IV above have demonstrated that the army's arrears were clearly mounting over time. Aside from the gradual depletion of Propositions money, another key variable related to the growth of these arrears was attrition – a phenomenon that did not affect infantry and cavalry units, or the army's officers and men, in the same way. It is important to realize this because while the private soldiers were the most likely to vanish, they were the least expensive part of any given formation. What this means, of course, is that a decayed unit was a more expensive unit – there being more officers commanding fewer men. Naturally, the effects of this phenomenon were only exacerbated by an absolute decline in the available amount of centralized funds during the course of the winter.

In the end, however, sections II – IV of this chapter have demonstrated something else of importance. Despite the fact that the regular army was no longer enjoying full payment during these months, it is indisputably true that the amounts of centralized money that it was receiving were more than enough to fully support a hypothetical army of a respectable size. Once again, there seem to have been at least two overarching

reasons why these sums were not enough in practice. One of these reasons had to do with increased per capita demand for cash by the top-heavy units that made up the regular army – a phenomenon associated with the uneven process of attrition discussed above. The other had to do with the rise of the regional armies and the Parliament's decision to offer some of them financial assistance from the centre. Although most of the new, quasi-regular forces raised by the Lieutenancy in the counties during this period were fueled by resources that were collected and spent locally – often on the orders or with the approval of the central government – some of them relied partly on subsidies provided by Gerrard's central army treasury. Again, more than £27,000 of the Parliament's centralized money was consumed in this fashion over the course of these six months, enough to fully fund three and a half Edgehill-style infantry regiments for the same period of time.[459] Although it may be reasonable to conclude that distributing this money to the cash-strapped forces in the North made more sense than funneling it into the decaying units then loitering about Windsor, the choice to do so nevertheless ensured that the regular army – the Parliament's most immediate and important source of military strength – would go further into arrears.

[459] (£27,307.56 ['local forces' spending – Table 2.17] ÷ £1,289.47 [monthly cost of an infantry regiment]) ÷ 6 months = 3.53 regiments.

Chapter Three: May – October 1643

~ Introduction ~

The following chapter will consider the organizational history of the regular army within the context of the Parliament's rapidly-evolving fiscal-military system during the six months that followed the Lord General's capture of Reading. A period of considerable importance and complexity, these six months were distinguished by a string of terrifying royalist victories in England, a failed attempt to reorganize the Parliament's centralized forces along partisan lines, the reconstruction of the quasi-regular armies in the Parliament's provincial heartlands, the introduction of a completely unprecedented form of indirect taxation, and a sweeping socio-fiscal-military alliance with the Covenanters in Scotland. And yet despite these seismic changes, the basic operation of Gerrard's centralized army treasury remained the same as it was during the Edgehill campaign. Like the previous two, this chapter consists of four sections that have been designed and constructed to provide a systematic and contextual evaluation of the administrative machinery that supported the regular army during the period in question.

The first section provides the reader with a narrative history of the period leading up to the relief of Gloucester. This narrative concerns itself not only with the movements and activities of the regular army itself, but with the evolution of the political environment in London. Additionally, it charts the ongoing evolution of the Parliament's wider fiscal-military arrangement by considering the origins and effects of several very important pieces of legislation. As we shall soon see, this legislation was influenced by –

and in turn affected – the ever-increasing sophistication of the Parliament's decentralized network of multi-county military associations, a network that still relied heavily on the initiative of the Lieutenancy. Meanwhile, the regular army continued to require large amounts of centralized resources in order to sustain itself, resources that were becoming ever-harder to find in sufficient quantities. During the month of May the Lord General addressed part of this problem by erecting a special money-gathering committee to secure decentralized funds in the field. Naturally, this was an important development that had the potential to affect the army's administrative position within the Parliament's fiscal-military hierarchy, a theme that is introduced here. Finally, the first section concludes with a brief overview of the relief of Gloucester and the battle of Newbury. As was the case during the attack on Reading, the regular army received significant assistance from certain local forces during these operations. And again, the reasons for this – as well as the ramifications of it – are briefly considered here.

As was the case in chapters one and two, sections II, III, and IV of this chapter are primarily concerned with the empirical data pertaining to the size, composition, and cost of the regular army during the period in question. As usual, all of these data have been derived from the many hundreds of lost and surviving pay and supply warrants that were cashed or filled during this time, and the calculations that are here used to estimate the army's monthly arrears are functionally identical to the ones used in chapter two. Again, the central pillars supporting all of this information are the monthly spending totals that I have assigned to the seven categories and sub-categories that appear in use above.

However, the picture here has been complicated by Essex's decision to set up that new committee in May to collect decentralized money in situ. As it happened, this money was managed for the committee by a Captain John Fenton,[460] who distributed it on warrant from Essex in exactly the same fashion as Vernon and Jessop. Fortunately, Fenton, like Vernon, kept a record of both his receipts and disbursements in an account book which has survived as a part of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers.[461] Because of this, it has been possible to reconstruct Fenton's spending using the same methodology that I have applied to Vernon's paperwork. For the purposes of comparison and analyses, the resulting information has been integrated into the data pertaining to Vernon and Jessop's disbursements in the final three sections of this chapter. Once again, achieving a precise and seamless understanding of all this information is vital if we are to fully understand the fiscal-military priorities that were set and pursued by the central government, gauge their success in maintaining their regular army during a period of intense change and confusion, and measure the relative importance of the decentralized money that was for a time used to supplement that army's centralized pay.

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There are several ways of reconstructing the movements of the regular army during the months that preceded the first battle of Newbury. For the purposes of this

[460] TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, f.4r. Although it impossible to know for certain, it seems likely that this was the very same Captain John Fenton who was serving as a company commander in Colonel Barclay's regiment at the time. Consult TNA SP28/262 f.448.
[461] Again, TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account.

narrative, I have elected to rely on the account book that was kept by Captain John Fenton, the freshly-appointed treasury agent responsible for managing the decentralized money collected and spent in the field on Essex's personal authority. Like Vernon, Fenton recorded his receipts as they entered his possession. Unlike Vernon, however, Fenton also made note of where he was at the time of receipt. Beginning (conveniently enough) on 1 May, Fenton's record of receipt indicates that he began operation in Reading. This is in no way surprising, of course, considering the army had secured the city less than a week before. According to Fenton, the army spent the entire month of May there, where he collected more than £7,600 in decentralized 'contributions' to help support the regular army's operations.[462] This is a substantial sum – the largest monthly receipt total in Fenton's account – and the people of Reading undoubtedly considered the burden onerous. But during the same month Vernon distributed exactly £38,547.98 of fully-centralized army treasury money – roughly five times the amount collected by Fenton's *ad hoc* committee in Reading. Although the amount of money Essex extracted from the locals after capturing Reading was considerable, it would be wrong to conclude that the Lord General's resort to this fiscal mechanism stripped his army of one element of its 'regular' status. The hard data make it clear that the majority of the army's financial resources were still being provided by the central government directly. Because this was so, it is important for us to both understand and evaluate the legislative machinery that

[462] TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, ff.4r-14v.

the Parliament was then building and using to fuel the forces that continued to fight only in its name.

As of 1 May, aside from the Propositions scheme which, as we know, was by then a dead letter, the central army treasury could, in theory, count on at least three relatively stable sources of funds and/or credit. But only two of these were designed to operate on a national scale. The first of these 'national' revenue streams was the Weekly Assessment of 24 February 1643, an ambitious quota-based direct tax that had generated the credit necessary to bankroll the attack on Reading in April. The second was brought into being by the Sequestration Ordinance of 27 March, by which the rebels hoped to transform the appropriated estates of their enemies into a source of income. Like the Weekly Assessment, the Sequestrations scheme was designed to operate on a national scale, often using the very same county-level committees that had been appointed by the Ordinance of 24 February. And once again, these committees were *supposed* to transfer the proceeds of their labors to the Guildhall/Propositions treasury in London.[463] The final revenue stream was the so-called [Fifth and] Twentieth Part, which had been introduced in London toward the end of November 1642. Again, this 'forced loan' was originally designed to extract a fixed-rate, one-time contribution from those in the capital who had not voluntarily lent resources on the Propositions.

[463] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 106-117.

On 7 May the Parliament passed an ordinance that greatly expanded the geographic scope of the [Fifth and] Twentieth Part.[464] As we know, this scheme was originally rooted in a pair of ordinances that were passed on 26 and 29 November 1642. These bills had limited the extent of the compulsory loan to the metropolitan area, calling for a mandatory contribution based only on the twentieth part of a man's personal estate. While at least one additional ordinance passed in February introduced the requirement for an additional contribution based on the fifth part of a man's yearly income, this legislation was primarily concerned with parochial military funding – supporting, as it did, the creation of Sir William Waller's quasi-regular forces in the nascent Western Association.[465] From a more centralized point of view, the first and most important 'wave' of [Fifth and] Twentieth Part money was clearly drawn from the capital.[466] But all of this was supposed to be changed by the ordinance of 7 May, when the Parliament decided to impose both the fifth and the twentieth rates in an additional seventy one towns and counties. Unsurprisingly, the local committees appointed to oversee the assessment and collection process in these places were to be populated by the same individuals appointed to manage both the Weekly Assessment and the Sequestrations. And as was the case with these designs, the newly invigorated scheme for the [Fifth and] Twentieth Part was clearly designed to support regular forces; for all of the resulting money was again supposed to be paid into the central Proposition treasury at Guildhall.

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[464] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 145-155.
[465] Again, see Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 79-80.
[466] TNA SP19/49, Accounts for London of the raising of monies on the Ordinance of Parliament of 29 Nov 1642.

Unfortunately, however, it was soon admitted that centralizing all of the provincially-raised revenues on the [Fifth and] Twentieth Part was impossible. Like the Weekly Assessment and Sequestrations, as well as the Propositions scheme itself, the newly-expanded [Fifth and] Twentieth Part quickly fell prey to the centrifugal forces that were inherent to the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement in the provinces.[467] In fact, as early as 18 May the Parliament formalized this entropic process within the Eastern Association when it passed an additional ordinance that allowed the local Lieutenancy to distribute the proceeds of the [Fifth and] Twentieth Part to the quasi-regular forces that had been raised to defend their Association at the county level.[468] Although the central government was seemingly unable to draw significant amounts of provincial tax money into its own coffers, it retained the unique ability to impose all of these taxes in the first place. Again, this was the mark of sovereignty, and as was the case in April, this power allowed the Parliament to continue *borrowing* just enough money to keep Essex's regular army on foot. On 11 and 20 May Vernon reported receiving money from the Guildhall treasurers. Worth a total of £35,000, it would seem that at least £15,000 of this money was originally borrowed from the City on the security of these tax measures.[469]

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[467] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 80-81; Wheeler, "English Army Finance", 105; John Morrill, *Cheshire 1630-1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 95-98; Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War*, 184-190; Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion, 1640-60* (Bristol: Leicester University Press, 1966), 162.
[468] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 160; Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 80.
[469] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.3v; Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 156; Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 365.

Essex's reasons for loitering in and around Reading during the month of May were not limited to his need to extract supplementary money from the locals. Disease struck the army during the siege, and by May an ever-increasing number of its soldiers were either sick or dying.[470] What's more, the surrender of Reading had prompted a new wave of desertions. On 18 May – the very day the Parliament officially diverted the Eastern Association's portion of the [Fifth and] Twentieth Part 'downward' to the local Lieutenancy – Essex issued a proclamation, printed in London, calling for the regular soldiers who had abandoned the colours to return to their units.[471] Additional horses were also now needed. In an attempt to normalize the acquisition of these animals the Parliament passed two ordinances in May. These ordinances were supposed to remedy the abuses associated with previous seizures by army officers, while at the same time giving Essex the legal authority he needed to appropriate horses in the field. But unfortunately for the regular army, they wound up giving the local committees and county-level Lieutenancy the power to manage the Lord General's access to these animals. Ultimately, the problem of adequate horse supply would continue to dog Essex's troops for the remainder of this period.[472]

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[470] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 156; Snow, *Essex the* Rebel, 363; BL Thomason E.358[7], Robert Codrington, *The life and death, of the illustrious Robert Earle of Essex, &c. Containing at large the wars he managed, and the commands he had in Holland, the Palatine, and in England. Together with some wonderful observations both of himself, and his predecessors, and many most remarkable passages from his infancie, unto the day of his death* (London: F. Leach, 1646), p.28.

[471] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 365.

[472] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 155-156 and 162-163; Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), 65-68 especially.

Despite all these difficulties the army was on the move again by 6 June, marching northward in the general direction of Oxford.[473] On 12 June Fenton began collecting money in Thame – the Lord General's new base of operations. Here the army stayed for the rest of that month, collecting an additional £2,400 in local 'contributions'.[474] Once again, this money was used to supplement the much larger – but still inadequate – sum of £21,000 that Vernon received from London in one installment on the sixteenth.[475] In Thame, the army continued to suffer from the spread of disease. Several historians seem to agree that this sickness was probably typhus, an illness that is caused by either *Rickettsia typhi* or *Rickettsia prowazekii*, two types of bacteria that are transmitted by rats and the fleas that they carry.[476] The resulting infection causes high fever and debilitating pain in the subject. During the seventeenth century, in the insanitary conditions that surely existed in an army camp, it was very often fatal.

In order to relieve his men of this illness, and to goad the marauding royalist cavalry troops into an ill-advised attack on his much stronger infantry formations,[477] Essex spread his army out around Thame. On the seventeenth Prince Rupert took the bait. He left Oxford with some 1,700 soldiers of the king's Oxford Army, most of them cavalry; his objective on this occasion was the convoy of £21,000 of centralized money

[473] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 366.
[474] TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, ff.15r-19v.
[475] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.3v.
[476] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 363; Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 87;Ian Roy, "England Turned Germany? The Aftermath of the Civil War in Its European Context." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fifth Series, 28 (1978): 142; *MedlinePlus Encyclopedia*, U.S. National Library of Medicine and the National Institutes of Health, s.v. "typhus," accessed April 2, 2012 www.nlm.nih.gov.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/medlineplus/ency/article/001363.htm.
[477] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 175.

that Vernon had by then already received. Pushing as far east as Chinnor, some four miles to the south of Thame, Rupert's cavaliers soon lost the element of surprise, finding themselves surrounded by an ever-increasing number of the Parliament's regular soldiers. Acting quickly, Rupert resolved to fight his way out of rebel territory while he still had a numerical advantage. After sending his advance units westward to secure the bridge at Chiselhampton, Rupert launched an attack on the gathering body of roundheads at Charlgrove Field on the eighteenth. Commanding the ad hoc formations of Essex's army on that day was Colonel John Hampden, who famously received a mortal wound during the resulting engagement. A week later, the royalists mounted yet another raid that culminated in the plunder of West Wycombe, a town just thirty miles east of London itself. Essex's army – still suffering from inadequate mobility, financial privation, and pestilence – seemed increasingly incapable of shielding the capital from direct attack. [478]

A large part of the problem, at least from Essex's point of view, was the insubordinate behavior of the Parliament's quasi-regular forces, especially those under the command of Sir William Waller in the Western Association. During the siege of Reading, Essex had issued orders to Waller commanding him to bring his regional army into Berkshire, the idea being to more quickly overawe and overwhelm Aston's garrison. Waller chose to ignore this order, however, and Essex had to make do with help only from Lord Grey's Eastern Association brigade. He did so quite nicely, as we know, but after the fall of Reading Waller continued to spurn Essex's directives. Things came to a

[478] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 176-178 and 182; Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 90-91.

head as a result of Waller's decision to tarry at Worcester and Gloucester in late May. This allowed the two halves of the king's western army to unite at Chard on 4 June.[479] Waller now faced a dangerous foe with a strong army composed of experienced soldiers. Marching northward to Wells, the cavaliers spent the remainder of June eyeing Waller's own army, which took up position some twenty miles to the north at Bath on the eighth.

Over the course of the next three weeks Waller tried desperately to reinforce himself. Most of the men and money that he needed had to be acquired locally, of course, and there is every reason to believe that he did what he could to extract troops from the garrison at Bristol.[480] However, Sir William also relied on the cooperation and direct support of the central government and the treasury that had been set up to supply Essex's regular army. On 25 April the Parliament had pledged the 'Public Faith' as collateral in an attempt to encourage new loans to support Waller's army. And as we shall soon see, Waller received a very timely injection of £2,000 of centralized army treasury money on 9 June.[481] But in the event, none of these efforts were enough to prevent the destruction of the Western Army, which was effectively wiped out by the cavaliers at Lansdown and Roundway Down on 5 and 13 July 1643. In the aftermath of these traumas Waller and his

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[479] Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 88-90; Adair, *Roundhead General*, 68-72; BL Thomason E.71[7], Anon., *A remonstrance to vindicate His Excellence Robert Earle of Essex from some false aspersions cast upon his proceedings. To the 17. of August. 1643* (London: S.L., 1643). One half of this cavalier army was commanded by the marquess of Hertford and Prince Maurice; their cavalry was drawn from the king's own army, and their infantry were newly-raised levies. The other half of this combined army had been raised in Cornwall by Sir Ralph Hopton. Hopton's men were both zealous volunteers and victorious veterans, having recently defeated the provincial forces of the earl of Stamford at the battle of Stratton on 16 May 1643.

[480] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 74.

[481] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 135; TNA SP28/264 f.292. The £2,000 was paid over by Jessop on the orders of the Committee of Safety. Naturally, I have categorized this as an 'other' payment that falls into the sub-category 'local forces'. See section IV below for more.

newfound allies in the City – the most radical and bellicose of the Parliament's supporters – tried to pin the blame on Essex, claiming that his regular army should have prevented the king's Oxford Army from reinforcing Hopton's Cornishmen in the days following Lansdown.[482] Essex, for his part, had already reached the point of despair.

The loss of the Western Army came hard on the heels of the defection of the Hothams at Hull, and the near-total destruction of the Northern Army at the disastrous battle of Adwalton Moor on 30 June.[483] One by one, it must have seemed, the most important of the Parliament's regional forces were being snuffed out by the king's armies, which were apparently growing ever stronger. For example, the collapse of the Parliament's forces in the north allowed the queen to transport a very large cache of imported arms, money, and equipment from York to Oxford in mid July.[484] These weapons undoubtedly helped the royalists mount a successful assault on the city of Bristol toward the end of the month. Abandoned by their Association's Major-General, who had removed himself to London in the wake of his defeat at Roundway Down, Governor Fiennes and the other 1,800 defenders of Bristol faced an army that was nearly ten times their number. Predictably, the town fell to Prince Rupert on 26 July.[485] And once again, Essex was unable to provide assistance.

The royalist raid on West Wycomb in late June had convinced the Lord General that his sick and broken army was incapable of significant military action without major

[482] Gentles, *English Revolution*, 178-180.
[483] Jones, "The War in the North", chapter four, passim.
[484] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 109 and 194.
[485] Gentles, *English Revolution*, 180-183.

reform. On 29 June he wrote to his political masters in Parliament, begging them to remember the needs of his men, and offering to resign in the face of the radicals' mounting criticism of his generalship. A day later, he suggested that a parliamentary committee be appointed to visit his billets and see the condition of the army for themselves. After touring the camps on 2 July this committee returned to the Parliament, and Essex and his army withdrew to Aylesbury, ten miles to the northeast of Thame.[486] By 18 July the army was at Stony Stratford, in the north of Buckinghamshire. Here it stayed for the remainder of that month, its condition still deteriorating. On the eighth Vernon received the only installment of centralized money he was to get during July. Amounting to just £19,150, it was even less than he got during June.[487] Fortunately Fenton was able to raise proportionally more, collecting almost £6,400 in local 'contributions' before 1 August.[488] Although this may have been just barely enough to keep the army together for the time being, it didn't resolve the fundamental problem of adequate supply over the long term. This, of course, could only be accomplished by one or more of the various political factions within the Parliament itself.

Unfortunately for Essex's soldiers, the state of the Parliament's fiscal-military organization at the political centre was in flux during the summer of 1643. Although finding enough money for the war effort was always a problem, the larger issue at this time was the ongoing political volatility in the capital. As we know, a substantial number

[486] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 370-371.
[487] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.3v.
[488] TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, ff.20r-27v.

of people in London desired peace during the winter and spring of 1642/3 – a desire that was backed by the Northumberland-Holles group of Parliamentary 'grandees'.[489] We also know that the set of negotiations known as the 'Treaty of Oxford' had proven futile, and that there was virtually no hope of reconciling the king and his party with the uneasy alliance of rebels who now controlled the Long Parliament and its ever-growing laundry-list of centralized and decentralized forces. The collapse of negotiations in April did not end the calls for peace in London, but the Saye-Pym group's revelation on 31 May that one of the Parliament's own peace commissioners – Edmund Waller, MP for St. Ives in Cornwall[490] – sat at the centre of a royalist plot to seize the City by force made them deeply unpopular.[491] This political sea change quickly became a serious problem for Essex's soldiers because both they and their commander – a one-time Junto hardliner – were becoming increasingly associated with political moderation in the capital.

By early July the most zealous of the king's enemies in London had capitalized on the aftereffects of the Saye-Pym group's revelation of the Waller Plot and seized the political initiative. On the seventh, just two days before an exasperated Essex publicly

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[489] Once again, Scott provides a useful and modern definition of this term. A 'grandee' was, in essence, one of the powerful 'political operators' who exerted meaningful influence within one of the Long Parliament's two 'bicameral interest groups'. Scott, *Politics and War*, 43-46.

[490] Keeler, *Long Parliament*, 376.

[491] BL Thomason E.105[21], John Pym, *A discovery of the great plot for the utter ruine of the city of London, and the Parliament. As it was large made known by John Pym, Esq; on Thursday being the eighth of June, 1643. at a Common-Hall: and afterwards corrected by his own hand for the presse* (London: Peter Cole, 1643); Gardiner, *Great Civil* War, vol.1, 128 and 168-173; Ian Gentles, "Parliamentary Politics and the Politics of the Street: The London Peace Campaigns of 1642-3," *Parliamentary History*, 26 (2007): 149-150.

suggested that the Houses sue for an honourable peace,[492] these men proposed a wholesale re-imagination of the Parliamentary war effort in London. Calling for an entirely 'New Army' of politically-motivated volunteers, by 20 July they had promulgated a petition that called on the Parliament to appoint a new committee of thirteen of the most radical MPs who were to oversee the creation and management of these new forces.[493] Ostensibly, this 'New Army' – which was to operate under the direct authority of the proposed parliamentary "Committee for the General Rising"[494] – was to be brought into existence by the authority of Essex as the Parliament's Lord General. In reality, however, it was clearly an attempt by the most radical rebel faction to gain independent control of military resources using the sovereign authority of the central government. Significantly, this was only their most recent and boldest attempt to lay hold of the sword.

In the months following the inconclusive encounter at Turnham Green the 'fiery spirits' in the City had devoted themselves to the defense of the metropolis. For example, they were instrumental in the creation of the aforementioned 'auxiliary' regiments of the

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[492] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 371-372; Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 90. On this occasion Essex, in an inopportune display of melodramatic flare, suggested that he and the king's generals agree to meet with their armies on the field of battle to settle matters once and for all.

[493] Gentles, "Parliamentary Politics," 150; BL Thomason E.59[15], Anon., *Instructions and propositions drawne up and agreed on by divers well affected persons in the city of London, and by them referred to the consideration of all the well affected persons of the Kingdome . . .* (London: T. Bates and G. Tomlinson, 1643); and BL Thomason 669.f.8[15], Anon., *To the Right Honourable the knights, citizens, and burgesses in Parliament assembled. The humble petition of thousands of well affected inhabitants of the cities of London and Westminster, and the suburbs thereof, with the borough of Southwarke, and places adjacent, in behalf of themselves and other well-affected persons in the kingdome of England . . .* (London: Peter Cole and John Sweeting, 1643).

[494] Pearl, *London*, 269.

London militia – the volunteer units raised to help construct and man the extensive new fortifications that were then under construction around the City. In those early days the radicals' enthusiasm was much appreciated by the Common Council, who made them an official Subcommittee of their own Militia Committee.[495] On 12 April the Parliament itself confirmed this arrangement in an ordinance that gave both the Militia Committee and its new Subcommittee ". . . full power and authority . . ." to raise new voluntary subscriptions of money, horses, and equipment to support these new auxiliaries, and to appoint officers to command them.[496] What the new ordinance did not do, however, was give the radicals at Salters' Hall the power to organize or employ these forces without the express approval of either the Militia Committee or the Parliament itself.

This limitation became a point of dispute in May, when the radicals proclaimed that they intended to appoint officers to the auxiliary regiments themselves, and when they attempted to standardize donations by suggesting that these should amount to the value of a single meal per week, payable to treasurers working out of Salters' Hall.[497] Naturally, the Militia Committee itself viewed all of this as an encroachment on their

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[495] Nagel, "Militia of London", 80; LMA *JCoCo*, vol.40, f.56. This new Subcommittee of the City's Militia Committee was formed in the wake of the radicals' promise to raise an army of 10,000 volunteers who would not need pay except ". . . when they are in actual service . . .". This rather optimistic promise was made on 15 March, and the Common Council subsequently authorized the new Subcommittee to meet at Salters' Hall to conduct their business. By 27 (vicesimo septimo) April this Subcommittee was authorized to receive weapons confiscated from the companies and wards of the City. See LMA *JCoCo*, vol.40, f.59.

[496] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 130-131.

[497] Nagel, "Militia of London", 82; Pearl, *London*, 267; BL Thomason 669.f.7[10], Anon., *A declaration and motive of the persons trusted, usually meeting at Salters Hall in Breadstreet to all well affected persons in the severall parishes within London, and the parts adjacent, for contributing the value of a meale weekly, toward the forming of some regiments of voluntiers, to be payd during these times of danger* (London: R.Oulton, G. Dexter, and J. Wright, 1643). A portion of the accounts kept during the raising of the Auxiliaries can be found in TNA SP28/198, ff.4-5 and 8.

power to control the City's military resources, and they subsequently referred the matter to Common Council. By 10 June the Council had ruled in favor of the more moderate members of the Militia Committee.[498] And on 17 July the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, in the name of themselves and the Common Council, laid a petition before the House of Commons requesting the passage of a new parliamentary ordinance confirming the Militia Committee's ultimate authority when it came to *all* of the City's forces.[499] But by then, in the wake of the Waller Plot, the radicals had become even more ambitious, and on the twentieth they presented to the Commons their own petition for the formation of the *parliamentary* "Committee for the General Rising". That very day the lower house authorized the creation of this new committee, to be headed by the thirteen MPs named in the radical petition. Slated to meet at Merchant Tailors' Hall, this new committee was given the power to form volunteers into entirely new military units, to secure voluntary contributions of funds, horses, arms, and equipment for these proposed formations, and to name an overall commander who was to operate under the authority of the Lord General and the Commons itself.[500] Stonewalled in their attempts to build an independent army within the administrative framework of the City's militia apparatus, the radicals now seemed well on their way to doing so under the auspices of the central government itself.

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[498] Although they ruled in favor of the Militia Committee, the Common Council ordered that seven of the Subcommittee at Salters' Hall be added as full members of the aforementioned Committee. LMA *JCoCo*, vol.40, f.63.

[499] Pearl, *London*, 268; *CJ*, iii, 171. The Parliament obliged, passing the requested Ordinance on 29 July. See also Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 221-223; Nagel, "Militia of London", 90.

[500] *CJ*, iii, 175-176.

Meanwhile, even as the municipal authorities were trying to preserve their singular authority over the City's own rapidly-evolving forces, the Parliament was making a separate attempt to increase the number of cavalry formations under their overall command. As we know, the problem of adequate horse supply was then dogging the regular army, and the cavaliers' attacks at Charlgrove Field and West Wycombe seemed to prove that the Lord General's mounted arm was hopelessly deficient. The solution to this problem, it was thought, was an entirely new 'flying army' of 6,500 horsemen raised in and drawn from the City, as well as a select group of sixteen counties within a certain range of London.[501] On 25 July the Houses passed an ordinance designed to levy these forces.[502] Significantly, there was to be nothing 'regular' about either the origins or composition of this new army. Appealing directly to both the Lieutenancy and the new county committees, the ordinance assigned a quota of horses and horsemen to each county ". . . (of which, the Troopes of Trained Horse of each County are to bee accompted as part) . . .". Once raised, these quasi-regular, county-level troops were supposed to be provided with a full month's pay by the Deputy Lieutenants, who were to find this money in ". . . the severall and respective Counties, Cities and places in such manner as . . . shall be thought most indifferent and convenient . . .". The earl of Manchester was made general, and, with the help of five regional sub-commanders, he was slated to assume command of these forces once they were assembled at four staging

[501] Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), 68; Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 93.
[502] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 215-219.

points in and around London, a feat that was supposed to be accomplished by 8 August.[503]

Sir William Waller returned to London on the same day that the Houses passed this 'flying army' ordinance. His arrival delighted the 'fiery spirits' in the City who, as Adair tells us, saw that he was welcomed as a conquering hero. Two days later, the brand new parliamentary committee at Merchant Tailors' Hall offered him the command of the volunteer 'New Army' they were then trying to raise.[504] The radicals were very excited to see Waller, despite his ignominious loss of the Western Army at the battles of Lansdown and Roundway Down, because they hoped to harness both his skill and popularity to promote their own fiscal-military designs. Unfortunately for them, however, the most important grandees within the Saye-Pym group were by then determined to preserve and reinforce the existing military hierarchy in the capital. As a result, on 29 July the Parliament appointed Waller general of the City's own forces – the very same forces that were otherwise firmly under the control of the London Militia Committee thanks to the above-mentioned ordinance that was passed that very day.[505] The City fathers were clearly happy to accept Waller as their new general. And as for the most radical MPs in

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[503] *Ibid.* The four rendezvous points were (1) Tothill Field in London; (2) the town of Bedford; (3) the town of Windsor; and (4) the town of Cambridge. The five regional sub-commanders were (1) Col. de Mazeris in London; (2) Sir John Norrich in Bedford; (3) Sir Miles Hubbard in Norfolk; (4) Col. Oliver Cromwell in Huntingdon; and (5) Col. Richard Norton in Surrey. The contingents of the Trained Horse were expected to reach their rendezvous points first, followed shortly by new levies of quasi-regular cavalry who, taken together, were to make up the grand total of 6,500 men.

[504] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 100-101. Adair, it would seem, confuses and conflates (1) this 'New Army' of radicals/volunteers, (2) Manchester's equally new multi-county, quasi-regular 'flying army' of cavalry, and (3) the City's own militia forces which were, as we know, then undergoing a rapid expansion thanks to the creation of the auxiliary regiments.

[505] Pearl, *London*, 271; *CJ*, iii, 187; Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 221-223.

Parliament, Waller's rebuilt army would still include whatever volunteers the Merchant Tailors' Hall committee managed to raise. But their hopes of establishing a completely autonomous 'New Army' of 'fiery spirits' levied on the sovereign authority of the central government were permanently dashed.

And so thanks to his popularity among the radicals, Waller was to have a new quasi-regular army composed, in part, of fresh volunteers raised in the City, whose militia he now also commanded. But even as these arrangements were being finalized the Parliament learned of yet another military crisis in the north. On 1 August the rebels' local garrison troops were compelled to surrender the newly-won city of Gainsborough to the powerful army that had been assembled by the earl of Newcastle, the very same army that had shattered the Fairfaxes' Northern Army at Adwalton Moor a month earlier.[506] This was a serious problem because the northern royalists now controlled virtually all of Lincolnshire, from where they threatened the northern parts of the Eastern Association. News of the surrender reached Parliament on 4 August and, spurred into action, the central government responded by quickly overhauling both the military and administrative apparatuses of that Association, beginning with the former.

Fortunately for them, the rebels already had several irons in the fire when it came to the creation of new quasi-regular forces in that part of England. In the first place, on 22 July the House of Commons had ordered the six[507] associated counties to raise a new

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[506] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 91-92.

[507] Huntingdon was added to previously-associated counties of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge, and Hertfordshire on 26 May 1643. See *LJ*, vi, 63.

force of 2,000 infantrymen for the protection of their frontiers. What's more, these counties had been made responsible for no fewer than 2,200 of the 6,500 Trained Horse/quasi-regular cavalry that were to be raised on the 'flying army' ordinance of 25 July. Finally, on 4 August the Commons ordered the Lieutenancy of the Association to raise an additional 2,000 infantrymen, this time for service under the direct command of Colonel Oliver Cromwell. By 9 August the Parliament had decided to make the earl of Manchester the new Sergeant-Major General of the Eastern Association, thereby potentially committing the entirety of the new 'flying army' – or whatever portions of it were actually raised – to service in those parts.[508] As for administration, the Parliament passed a new ordinance the very next day that both solidified and clarified the powers of the Cambridge Committee, the multi-county committee that was supposed to direct the war effort at this new, 'intermediary' level between the county-level committees and Westminster.[509] Composed of two representatives from each of the six associated counties (in addition to two representatives from the city of Norwich, and all the MPs from these localities, who were also appointed, *ex officio*), the revamped Cambridge Committee was given the power to coordinate the military resources of the entire

[508] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 93-95. Robinson reminds us that although the regular army was supposed to receive a portion of the cavalry that was to be raised by the 'flying army' Ordinance, it is more likely that these forces went to Manchester instead. Robinson, "Horse supply", (thesis) 71.

[509] As Holmes tells us, the Cambridge Committee was originally created on the authority of the commission that the Lord General had issued to Lord Grey of Warke, the Association's first military commander, on 22 April 1643. Its legitimacy was therefore made suspect when Lord Grey was arrested and dismissed from his command in July. See Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 85-87; "Grey, William, first Baron Grey of Warke (1593/4-1674)," Sean Kelsey in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/view/article/11570 accessed 11 Apr 2012].

Association. Although crucially, the power to both raise and fund all of the Association's quasi-regular units still rested, in the most practical sense, with the county-level committees and the Lieutenancy.[510] Six days later, when the Parliament decided to conscript no less than 20,000 soldiers for service of the Eastern Association, the order to do so was issued to these county-level authorities, not the Cambridge Committee.[511]

A shifting political landscape in London and stark military necessity in the most vulnerable provincial theatres: these were the driving forces behind the Parliament's military reforms in England during the high summer of 1643, and they had a profound impact on the character of the resulting forces. In all cases the 'natural' tendency to rely on parochial administrators – namely the Lieutenancy and the county-level committees established by tax legislation – was reinforced, and the one highly-politicized attempt to establish new forces under the direct control of a radical faction within the central government was derailed by the City's Militia Committee and their powerful allies within the Saye-Pym group. Although Waller was slated to command whatever forces the radicals and the City could eventually muster, it was Essex and his long-suffering army of true regulars who ultimately benefitted the most from this last turn of events.

As we know, the Lord General's army steadily deteriorated during the month of July. Although Fenton's in-the-field treasury provided some measure of relief, the nature

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[510] ". . . And if at any time they [the Cambridge Committee] shall finde occasion of more Forces fit to be raised by the Associated Counties, they shall give notice thereof to the Deputy Lieutenants that fitting supplies be made thereof, *and that every County may see their forces paid*". Italics added. See Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 242-245; Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 94 and 97.
[511] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 248-249.

of the army's relationship with the state meant that the majority of its resources still had to come from the central government, an entity that was then debating the creation of an entirely new army of politically-motivated volunteers that was to operate from the political centre. Finally, in a fit of desperation, a group of the army's officers wrote a letter to the speaker of the House of Lords, begging for remedy. Read in that chamber on 22 July, just two days after it was written in the field, the letter complained about the consideration then being given to the proposed new army, and warned that their army would soon collapse without a sufficient and speedy supply of horses, clothing, and money.[512] Echoing his subordinates, Essex himself wrote to the Lords eight days later. In this report, which is worth reproducing here, he described the reduced size and deteriorated state of his forces, and proposed a series of remedies.

> Considerations to be offered to the Parliament, of the Weakness of the Army, and the Expedients for Remedy thereof.
>
> 1. The Number of Foot Three Thousand marching Men, at least Three Thousand sick, occasioned by the Want of Pay, ill Cloathing, and all other Miseries which attend an unpaid, sickly Army.
>
> 2. The Number of Horse Two Thousand Five Hundred (Three Thousand last Muster) occasioned by Loss of Horses upon hard Duty and Service, Recruits of Horse though often desired not performed; besides, by reason of a new Army, the present Regiments much lessened, listing themselves elsewhere for the new Army, expecting better Pay and Cloathing, and, upon their going hence, are entertained and protected; and great Discouragements and Scandals put upon his Excellency, the Officers, and Army, either through false Suggestions of some amongst us, or the Misunderstanding of others, poisoning the Affections of the People, which hinder Recruits and Contributions.
>
> Remedies for which Mischiefs, offer these Things:
>
> 1. A speedy Pay of Arrears, and a constant Pay settled for the future, which will draw on Recruits, and give Way to more strict Discipline: and that Cloaths may be provided, according to a Thousand for every Regiment, to which Purpose an Ordinance for a Press be immediately passed.

[512] *LJ*, vi, 144. The letter was signed by fourteen officers, the Lord General's own Council of War.

2. That Eight Hundred Horses be sent, and Two Hundred Monthly provided for Recruits.

3. That the Forces to be raised may not be put into a new Army, until the old Regiments be recruited; no Officer or Soldier to be entertained into any other Employment, and that severe Punishment be executed upon such, and those that entertain them.

4. That such as shall be found guilty of any Scandals laid upon his Excellency, any of his Officers, or Army, may be severely punished, whereby the like Offences may be no more committed; and a Declaration of both Houses passed, for the Vindication of his Excellency and them.

5. That, full Power having been given to his Excellency, by an Ordinance of both Houses, for the granting of all Commissions, for the raising or commanding of any Forces, Towns, or Garrisons, it is conceived most requisite for the better Ordering of the Army, that no Commission be granted whatsoever, but from his Excellency; the Want of which breeds Disobedience to his Excellency's Commands, to the Prejudice of the Kingdom.

6. That the Loss of the West is rumoured to be occasioned by his Excellency; desired, it may be thoroughly examined what the Loss was, and the Occasions of it.

July 28, 1643

Essex.[513]

This report was read in the upper chamber on the thirty-first, and the Lords, weary of the radicals in the Commons and at Merchant Tailors' Hall, immediately resolved to support all six of the proposed remedies. The Saye-Pym grandees, however, were more hesitant. Fearful that their recent history of indulging the radicals' desire for a 'New Army' might lead to the political defection of Essex to the Northumberland-Holles group,[514] they quickly agreed that the regular army should be reinforced with four thousand new recruits. Over the course of the next forty-eight hours they also introduced measures to provide the Lord General with clothing,[515] money, and a public display of political

[513] *LJ*, vi, 160; found also in Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 377-378.
[514] Scott, *Politics and War*, 62-64.
[515] On 10 August the Parliament ordered Estwick and his associates to supply the regular army with 10,000 new sets of 'uniform' components, and eighteen days later Thomas Richardson began shipping them into the field. Unfortunately, however, the final delivery totals fell short of the anticipated target. Consult TNA

support. They were not, however, prepared to rehash Waller's defeats at Lansdown and Roundway Down.[516]

During the early part of August 1643 the desire for peace was resurgent, both in Parliament and within the mercurial world of London street politics.[517] And although the grandees within the Saye-Pym group had succeeded in defusing the radicals' attempt to disrupt the war effort via the creation of an autonomous army in London, they still needed to stamp out support for the persistent crypto-royalist call for a negotiated settlement then emanating from the Northumberland-Holles grandees in the House of Lords, and, more ominously, from Essex and his officers.[518] Restoring stability at the political centre in the wake of military disaster depended on the Parliament's ability to strike an effective balance between the zealots' unrealistic faith in their divisive scheme for a 'general rising', and the Northumberland-Holles group's equally untenable and dangerous faith in the king's willingness to compromise. In the event, preserving the central position of Essex and his army of regulars was the key to achieving this balance, and both Essex and the Saye-Pym grandees knew it. On 3 August Pym himself was added to a Commons' delegation appointed to personally inform an increasingly disgruntled Essex of the measures that had been taken to protect his position as supreme commander, and inform him of the reforms then being implemented to refresh his own forces. It was

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SP28/9 f.318; and TNA SP28/140/4, Richardson's account, f.247v. See also Stuart Peachey and Alan Turton, *Old Robin's Foot* (Leighton-on-Sea: Partizan Press, 1987), 9.

[516] *CJ*, iii, 188-191.

[517] Gentles, "Parliamentary Politics," 153-156.

[518] Gentles, *English Revolution*, 185; Scott, *Politics and War*, 64.

still felt necessary to give Sir William Waller – the darling of both the City and the parliamentary radicals – a new army to be built in London, but the commission to raise it was to come, however reluctantly, from Essex's own pen.[519]

As was the case in April, financial salvation for Essex's army came in the form of a £50,000 loan from the City, this time from the livery companies. Once again the collateral for this loan was the Weekly Assessment, newly renewed on the very day Pym and his delegation were authorized to meet with the Lord General. This new incarnation of the Assessment is itself fascinating, because its revised form traces the new contours of the rebels' fiscal-military arrangement at the political centre. The most important difference between the Ordinances of 24 February and 3 August 1643 can be found in their treatment of the City and its taxpayers. Originally assessed at a rate of more than £11,000 per week, the residents of London and its suburbs had balked at the expense, imposing strict conditions on the central government in regard to this tax when the latter came, hat-in-hand, for an advance to pay for the attack on Reading. Now, as the Parliament considered the fate of the embattled city of Gloucester[520] – the most important remaining bastion in the otherwise overwhelmed Western Association – the City and its interests were given their full measure of respect as creditors. In order to mobilize their regular army – the newly reconfirmed apex of the central government's fiscal-military

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[519] *CJ*, iii, 191-193. On 2 August Waller's supporters in Parliament managed to have him and several of his officers appointed to the Commons' new Council of War, a body created "To take the whole State of the War into Consideration . . .".

[520] Arriving at the head of his own Oxford army, the king formally summoned the city on 10 August. Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 233; Evans, "Edward Massey", 79.

hierarchy – the Parliament would levy a new direct tax on the counties, the proceeds of which, it was still overoptimistically declared, would (eventually) be paid into Gerrard's centralized army treasury. As before, the immediate need for cash would come from a huge City loan, the lenders of which would now be absolved from paying anything on the new tax which was to serve as their collateral.[521]

Meanwhile, the City's own newly-consolidated[522] forces were to now receive the same on-the-ground priority that the Parliament's other provincial forces enjoyed thanks to the de facto policy of consuming Propositions, [Fifth and] Twentieth, Weekly Assessment, and Sequestrations money at the sub-national level. Freed from the burdens imposed on them by the Ordinance of 24 February, the taxpayers in the metropolitan area were now expected to do their part to directly fund their own ever-growing body of quasi-regular forces.[523] On 11 August – the same day that the livery companies' £50,000 loan was arranged – the Common Council ordered the citizens of the City to pay a forced loan worth *fifty times* the value of their assessments under the Six Subsidies of 1641! The purpose of this loan was the supply of the City's own forces, which could no longer be

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[521] For the new Assessment Ordinance see Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 223-241. For the livery company loan see LMA *JCoCo*, vol.40, ff.70-72 and Coates, *Impact*, pp.60 and 70. The loan was authorized by the City government on 11 August, and the House of Lords ordered repayment (secured on the Assessment) on the 24th. For this repayment order see *LJ*, vi, 195. According to the *Journal of the Common Council*, the livery companies were to pay the Propositions treasurers at Guildhall, who forwarded the money to the regular army treasury. Since the army treasury was the supposed recipient of the 'national' assessment revenues, it was to use this money to repay the livery companies via the Guildhall treasury.

[522] Recall the passage of the Ordinance of 29 July 1643, Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 221-223.

[523] These were, namely, their trained bands as well as their new auxiliary regiments.

supported by London's exhausted Chamber.[524] What's more, on 5 September the Parliament ordered the Militia Committee to collect a one-time contribution of £14,000 from the rate-payers in the Tower Hamlets, Westminster, and Southwark. Responsibility for arranging individual assessments, collection, and the eventual disbursal of these funds was given to the new militia sub-committees established in these regions.[525] Additional financial and administrative support for the City's forces was bequeathed by the Parliament on 10 August, when Waller was assigned some £10,000 of the City's [Fifth and] Twentieth Part to support his rebuilt army, and on 6 September when the central government reconfirmed the Militia Committee's power to deploy or recall the City's own portion of that army at their pleasure.[526]

By mid-August it seemed as though the places of both the Eastern Association and the City of London within the Parliament's recast fiscal-military hierarchy were settled; but Waller's was not. On 5 August Essex responded to Pym's request to issue Waller a new military commission, but tellingly, it was entirely regional in character. Knowing that the Common Council had only recently made Waller their general, Essex composed a commission that simply confirmed this appointment. It did not provide Waller with the supra-regional mandate that the radicals at Merchant Tailors' Hall had

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[524] LMA *JCoCo*, vol.40, f.71. The proceeds of this loan were directed into the Propositions treasurers' hands at Guildhall, but according to the parliamentary Ordinance that confirmed this new revenue scheme (passed on 18 August) none of the resulting money was to be distributed but on the authority of the Militia Committee and/or the Common Council. For this Ordinance see Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 251-254. I contend that Gardiner was wrong when he implied that the fifty-subsidy forced loan was intended to support the regular army in addition to the City's own forces. See Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 237.
[525] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 267-271.
[526] *LJ*, vi, 175; Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 271-272.

originally envisioned for their 'New Army' of zealous volunteers. Though committed to Essex, and resolved to preserve his authority as supreme commander, the Saye-Pym grandees remained susceptible to the influence of the radical MPs. By 26 August they had managed to secure from Essex a new and more extensive commission for Waller – who was made an 'independent' general with the authority to raise and lead twenty regiments of horse and foot. But Essex, who was always sensitive to the smallest personal or professional slight, refused to fill in Waller's name! This highly symbolic task was left to the members of the Parliament itself, who were, in the end, both Essex's and Waller's true masters.[527]

On 13 August Vernon received the first £10,000 of the new City loan, nine days later (just four days before Waller's new and much more controversial commission was granted) another £20,000 arrived.[528] When combined with the additional sum of £3,100 supplied by Fenton during the month of August, this was enough to get the army moving again. Meanwhile, on the seventeenth the Houses published their promised vindication of Essex's actions, which included a defense of his special relationship with the Parliament and its forces. The next day, the Parliament ordered the City's Militia Committee to retrieve £200 of [Fifth and] Twentieth Part money from Haberdashers' Hall – London's contribution to the coat and conduct money necessary to impress and transport 2,000

[527] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 102-104.
[528] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.3v.

freshly-conscripted regulars to the army's camps.[529] These unwilling soldiers probably arrived in the field with the second installment of the City's money, for by 26 August the army was on the move.[530] The relief of Gloucester was about to be undertaken by the Lord General and his own refurbished regular army, but they were not going alone. Just one day after the Parliament confirmed the imposition of the new fifty-subsidy forced loan the City fathers resolved to send five of their own regiments to Gloucester along with Essex's army – two drawn by lot from the Trained Bands, and three from the new auxiliaries.[531] Waller may have been their general, but the City was obviously still in full control of their militia.

Heavily reinforced by the temporary presence of this City brigade, Essex's composite army[532] quickly marched westward, muscling its way past two separate bodies of royalist horse, the second of which was commanded by Rupert himself. On 5 September the king's army abandoned the siege, and Essex's forces triumphantly entered

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[529] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 381-382; BL Thomason E.71[7], Anon., *A remonstrance to vindicate His Excellence Robert Earle of Essex from some false aspersions cast upon his proceedings. To the 17. of August. 1643* (London: S.L., 1643); LJ, vi, 190. Recall that on 16 August the military leadership within the Eastern Association had also been authorized to conscript troops. The legality of this process had only recently been settled by another parliamentary Ordinance dated 10 August. See Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 241-242 and 248-249.

[530] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 239.

[531] Nagel, "Militia of London", 116-118. These units were, specifically, The London Red Trained Band; the London Blue Trained Band; the London Red Auxiliaries; the London Blue Auxiliaries; the London Orange Auxiliaries; and Colonel Manwarring's 'redcoats' – a unique formation that began its existence as part of Warwick's 'second army' during the autumn of 1642. See also BL Thomason E.69[15], Henry Foster, *A true and exact relation of the marchings of the two regiments of the trained-bands of the city of London, being the red & blew regiments, as also of the three regiments of the auxiliary forces, the blew, red, and orange who marched forth for the reliefe of the city of Gloucester from August 23 to Sept. 28* . . . (London: Benjamin Allen, 1643).

[532] I borrow the term in this context from Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 116.

Gloucester itself on the eighth.[533] They could not stay long, of course, because the regulars soon needed yet more centralized money, and the London militiamen could not be relied upon to render extended service so far from home. The nature of the Lord General's recast army made it powerful yet brittle, and it was imperative that it be returned to the metropolitan area as soon as possible. After tricking the royalists into thinking he was resolved to march north, Essex pushed southeast to Cirencester on the fifteenth. From there on it was a race back to London, with the king and his personal army desperate to destroy Essex's command while it was still in the field. On 20 September the cavaliers got their chance to do so at the crossroads town of Newbury in southern Berkshire. They failed. Forced to withdraw from the fight as their ammunition gave out, the royalists allowed Essex and his battle-weary formations to resume their march to London, where they arrived on the twenty-eighth.[534] Once again, Essex had demonstrated his ability to act decisively and deliver results when the Parliament provided him with sufficient financial and organizational support. As was the case at Reading in April, the addition of provincial forces had made an enormous difference, but the hard core of the earl's army remained the battered but otherwise permanent roster of centrally-funded regular formations, units composed of both hardened veterans and fresh conscripts. They remained the principal arm of the politically-divided central government, and it is to their organizational and logistical history during this period that we now turn.

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[533] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 239-242.
[534] Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 120-124; Nagel, "Militia of London", 129-130.

~ II ~

For the sake of clarity, let's begin this section by laying out the total amount of money that was spent on the regular infantry. As usual, this information is arranged here by both the source of the money and the date of the payments. A detailed examination of each sub-treasurer's contribution follows. The total value of the infantry payments from all three sources was £63,059.83 during the six months covered by this chapter. Despite the additional assistance provided by Fenton's new committee, this was a substantial reduction in such spending relative to the six months covered by chapter two. The degree to which this money was insufficient to the task at hand remains to be seen, however. In order to best understand this, we must first know how many of Essex's ever-fluctuating number of regular infantry regiments were still on the payroll during the summer and autumn of 1643. As was the case in chapter two, this will mean scouring the pay warrants and account books in question for evidence of payments made to specific units. Once this process is complete, we will once again use the additional information recorded in these sources to discuss the ever-fluctuating size of these regiments. This is of course necessary if we are to develop an understanding of the treasury's relative successes and failures during this period of organizational uncertainty in the capital.

Figure 3.1 - Army Treasury Infantry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (£)



	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643
Jessop	1690.00	2023.71	308.29	43.40	102.00	0.00
Fenton	716.55	1926.33	2508.37	1362.65	1616.08	0.00
Vernon	16080.90	8724.73	7709.98	10435.03	0.00	7811.81

Although Figure 3.1 makes it clear that Vernon was, unsurprisingly, the single most important source of the infantry's funding during these six months, the creation of Fenton's committee clearly complicated matters in the field. For the first time in the army's brief history Essex's foot soldiers had two potential sources of money that travelled with them.

Table 3.1 – Vernon's Infantry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
May 1643	No.	30	3	33	9.09%
	Value	15799.70	281.20	16080.90	1.75%
Jun 1643	No.	26	3	29	10.34%
	Value	8393.88	330.85	8724.73	3.79%
Jul 1643	No.	23	4	27	14.81%
	Value	7612.28	97.70	7709.98	1.27%
Aug 1643	No.	54	10	64	15.63%
	Value	10130.58	304.45	10435.03	2.92%
Sep 1643	No.	0	0	0	N/A
	Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Oct 1643	No.	34	3	37	8.11%
	Value	7643.19	168.62	7811.81	2.16%
Total	No.	167	23	190	12.11%
	Value	49579.63	1182.82	50762.45	2.33%

Table 3.4 provides the reader with a regiment-by-regiment breakdown of those funds described in Figure 3.1.[535] As usual, not all of the £63,059.83 in question made it into the hands of foot soldiers directly linked to one of these formal units. However it is interesting to note just how much of it did. In the end, it would seem that around 87 per cent of the transactions I have identified as 'infantry' payments went to the infantry regiments described in Table 3.4.[536]

[535] **Table 3.4, Appendix C.**

[536] (£54,939.33 [Table 3.4] ÷ £63,059.83 [Figure 3.1]) = 87.12%

Table 3.2 – Jessop's Infantry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
May 1643	No.	9
	Value	1690.00
Jun 1643	No.	17
	Value	2023.71
Jul 1643	No.	5
	Value	308.29
Aug 1643	No.	3
	Value	43.40
Sep 1643	No.	1
	Value	102.00
Oct 1643	No.	0
	Value	0.00
Total	No.	35
	Value	4167.40

The remainder of this money went, as usual, to a host of reformados, company commanders whose regiments could not easily be identified, and to non-standard units such as Essex's foot guard of halberdiers.[537] Although some twenty three regiments appear in Table 3.4, it is clear that not all of these can be considered active or usable parts of the Lord General's infantry corps during this period. Finally, it is both interesting and important to note that virtually none of the warrants used to construct Table 3.4 authorized the payment of formalized levy money. Indeed, the vast majority of it was aimed at remunerating officers and soldiers who were, by this point, long-standing members of the army.

[537] For examples of payments made to Essex's halberdiers during this period see TNA SP28/7 ff.128, 437; TNA SP28/8 f.178; TNA SP28/9 f.81; and TNA SP28/10 f.188.

Table 3.3 – Fenton's Infantry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
May 1643	No.	5	0	5	0.00%
	Value	716.55	0.00	716.55	0.00%
Jun 1643	No.	19	4	23	17.39%
	Value	1738.73	187.60	1926.33	9.74%
Jul 1643	No.	31	3	34	8.82%
	Value	2057.87	450.50	2508.37	17.96%
Aug 1643	No.	20	6	26	23.08%
	Value	1000.00	362.65	1362.65	26.61%
Sep 1643	No.	14	4	18	22.22%
	Value	1324.08	292.00	1616.08	18.07%
Oct 1643	No.	0	0	0	N/A
	Value	0.00	0.00	0	N/A
Total	No.	89	17	106	16.04%
	Value	6837.23	1292.75	8129.98	15.90%

In order to come to a better understanding of the pay history of the regular infantry during this period it is necessary to break down the information found in Table 3.4 and present it by month. This will allow the reader to see when specific units received money, and from what source. It will also provide us with a solid contextual basis for the following discussion dealing with the ever-changing strengths of these units. Again, Vernon was the most important source of money during this time. Since this was the case, let us begin with a systematic breakdown of his payments, data which are presented

below as Table 3.5.[538] Three things are immediately apparent from a cursory study of these data. In the first place, it should be noted that Vernon seems to have made absolutely no payments to any of these units during the month of September 1643. Naturally, this shouldn't come as a surprise considering the overview presented above in Figure 3.1. At this point it should be remembered that September was the month that the army was racing home from its relief of Gloucester, and it seems likely that Vernon was simply unable to receive money or make payments during this period due to the frenetic state of the forces at that time. Secondly, it is clear that the vast majority of the money Vernon paid out was consumed by the regular regiments. This, of course, is also not surprising. Finally, it would also seem that Vernon's monthly spending subtotals were in a more or less steady state of decline during these six months. This may suggest that a collapse in demand (due to deaths from typhus) was at least partly responsible for the far lower totals paid over to the foot soldiers and their officers during this third phase of the war. Nevertheless, this tentative suggestion is again complicated by the money that was paid over by Captain Fenton.

Although Vernon was unable to pay Essex's infantrymen during the month of September, John Fenton evidently was. Table 3.6 provides a comprehensive picture of Fenton's financial contribution to the field regiments during the entirety of his committee's brief existence.[539] Interestingly enough, Fenton's relatively high level of spending in September was entirely directed toward the remuneration of the regular

[538] **Table 3.5, Appendix C.**
[539] **Table 3.6, Appendix C.**

regiments – a pattern that was clearly exceptional. Apparently, Fenton's rapidly-dwindling cash reserves were then being used to make ends meet during Vernon's period of inactivity.[540] Despite the fact that Table 3.4 indicates that William Jessop remunerated infantrymen during the period covered by this chapter, there is nothing to suggest that this spending was crucial to the ongoing needs of the field army's active, combat-worthy formations. Indeed, his very limited contributions were largely restricted to regiments that were clearly defunct or absent from the army at the time his payments were made. Naturally this is in no way surprising given the fact that we know he operated from London for the duration of the first civil war. Because all of this is true, I have found it unnecessary to construct a table outlining the month-to-month history of Jessop's spending. Instead, let us move on to a systematic discussion of the shifting strengths of the regiments that were being remunerated by the other two treasury officials.

At this point it would be useful to recall the difficulty that we had in determining the number of private soldiers in Essex's infantry regiments during the six months following the battle of Edgehill. Recall that this difficulty was entirely the result of clerical decisions that were made at the time the pay warrants for that period were written. Although it was relatively easy to reconstruct the total amount of money that was paid over to the army's infantry regiments from November 1642 to April 1643, it proved impossible to fully understand the composition of these units for two reasons. In the first

[540] Many of the infantry pay warrants issued to Fenton's committee during the month of September were designed to provide the regiments in question with a single week's pay for their NCOs and private soldiers only. Examples of these documents have survived as TNA SP28/10 ff.11-17, 20, 23, 25, and 29.

place, the clerks who composed the warrants in question often failed to record the number of officers and soldiers that made up the units to be paid. Secondly, because these personnel were paid at very different rates, and because it cannot be assumed that their attrition rates were identical, it is not possible to use the amounts that were paid on the authority of these warrants to reconstruct the overall size of the regiments in question. Because of all of this, we were forced to utilize a series of speculative calculations to analyze the relative value of the money that was received on a month-to-month basis.[541] Fortunately, however, the warrants that were paid by Vernon and Fenton during the period covered by this chapter contain far more information regarding the number of soldiers that were in service during these six months.

As was the case with the data that were presented in chapter two, the strengths reported in the following database refer *only* to the number of private soldiers who served in the relevant regiments. Furthermore, the reader should recall that it is always my policy to ensure that there is no overlap in the reported regimental monthly totals. In other words, I have taken care to make sure that regiments whose soldiers appear in two or more warrants per month do not appear more than once in Table 3.7 below.[542] Additionally, I have taken this opportunity to present a month-by-month breakdown of the overall spending totals that appear sorted by treasurer in Table 3.4. This is of particular interest here because it allows the reader to see what percentage of the grand total that was reported in that table can be assigned to unreconstructed strength

[541] Again, consult Table 2.7 in Appendix B.
[542] **Table 3.7, Appendix C.**

information taken directly from SP28. Indeed, a comparison of the total (in £) reported in Table 3.7 with the final total found in Table 3.4 above reveals that 96 per cent of the money that was paid over to identifiable infantry regiments went to commands for which some hard data regarding strengths have survived.[543] The only significant omission seems to have been the old regiment under Sir Henry Cholmley; this unit – which had been on the books since the end of July 1642 – received no less than £1,252.12 during five of the six months covered by this chapter.[544] There is, of course, no mention of private soldier strengths in any of the documentation authorizing these payments.

Although there are instances where units received authorization for salary money without any mention of their strengths, the relative completeness of this data makes an analysis of the infantry's theoretical arrears-generation rate far easier than it was in chapter two. Recall from that chapter – and from Table 2.7 in particular – that the cost to the state for a private soldier was £0.93 per month. Recall also that this rate did not include the cost of his officers, and that those officers were much less susceptible to attrition than their privates. Consider, for example, a hypothetical regiment where one hundred percent of the officers remained in service, but the number of private soldiers declined by sixty percent. In this case, the cost of the regiment 'per private soldier' would increase sharply. This, I have argued, is perhaps the single most important consequence of 'regimental proliferation' – the practice of maintaining a greater-than-necessary

[543] (£52,923.07 [Table 3.7] ÷ £54,939.33 [Table 3.4]) = 96%
[544] TNA SP28/7 ff.46, 310, 334, 443; TNA SP28/8 ff.111, 162; TNA SP28/9 ff.112, 165, 229, 290; TNA SP28/10 f.240; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.70v, 71v; and TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, f.97r.

number of expensive units in order to field an infantry corps of sufficient size. Thanks to the detailed information presented in Table 3.7, we have the opportunity to see this principle in effect during the May – October 1643 period.

Table 3.7 lists fifteen regimental structures that were 'in play' and reporting private soldiers during the period dealt with by this chapter. However, not all of these units were in existence during each of the six months in question. Indeed, even a cursory examination of the data reveals that while Lord Rochford's regiment seems to have become defunct by June, it would appear that Francis Thompson's did not come into existence until July. Nevertheless, it is clear that there were more regiments in existence than there needed to be at any given time. A brief but illuminating set of calculations bears out this statement. The second-to-last row in Table 3.7 provides the reader with the sum of all of the private soldiers reported in the pay warrants paid during the months in question. These totals range from a low of 3,410 to a high of 7,440. Properly arrayed, these men should have constituted no more than five to ten regiments during this period.[545] Had they been so arrayed, the amounts they received would have been sufficient to meet their monetary requirements during this phase of the war. However, as was the case during the Reading campaign, there were too many 'regimental structures' on the books at this point in the war. Table 3.8 illustrates this point using the very same speculative calculations deployed in Table 2.7 above.[546] As was the case for Table 2.7, the calculations performed in Table 3.8 are not without their limitations. Aside from

[545] (3,410 ÷ 800 = 4.26) and (7,440 ÷ 800 = 9.3).
[546] **Table 3.8, Appendix C.**

those that are outlined in the previous chapter, the most serious of these for this period has to do with rows 4 and 7 in Table 3.8. As I have already indicated, not all of the regiments receiving pay (Table 3.4) were active members of the army at the time they (or their ex-officers) received the recorded payments. Furthermore, even the most cursory survey of the pay warrants used to construct these databases reveals that Essex's infantry officers were *not* receiving their full allotment of pay during all of these months. Additionally, some regiments were operating with less than a full complement of officers.[547]

The fact that the infantry regiments' officers corps was under strength is an important piece of information. What it means is that the monthly evaluation of pay receipts that appear in Table 3.8 are almost certainly too low. This is not to suggest, of course, that the regiments receiving pay were fully paid during any of the months that make up this period. Such a suggestion would be absurd. However, it does mean that the adequacy of the money *may* have been more akin to the situation outlined in Table 2.7. Regardless of all this, two things are certain. In the first place, the failure to fully pay the regiments during any given month had a cumulative effect; fresh arrears were constantly being added to those generated during previous months. Secondly, a large part of the problem continued to be the fact that there were simply too many regimental structures 'in play' during the Gloucester/Newbury campaign. Again, decayed units were more expensive than their up-to-strength counterparts, and Essex's infantrymen would

[547] Consider, for example, the text of some of the field warrants issued and paid during the months of July and October 1643. See TNA SP28/8, passim and TNA SP28/10, passim.

certainly have enjoyed a better (if not truly adequate) rate of pay if they had been regularly consolidated into formations that numbered no fewer than eight hundred privates each.

~ III ~

Figure 3.2 and Tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 describe the pattern of the cavalry payments that were made by the army treasury during the six months covered by this chapter. All told, the graph and tables report a grand total of £74,560.68 that was disbursed by our three sub-treasurers. Once again, the vast majority of this money came from Vernon, and once again, Vernon made no payments during the month of September 1643. As usual, not all of the money laid out in Figure 3.2 was spent on the remuneration of front-line cavalry troops. Some of it went to the army's cohort of dragoons – a topic that will be dealt with below – and some went to the staff attached to the cavalry's otherwise (administratively) unimportant regimental structures. Most of it, however, was used to pay Essex's ever-shifting body of regular harquebusiers. Table 3.12 provides the reader with a detailed breakdown of the money paid over to these units.[548] Like Tables 2.10 and 2.11 above, it sorts this data by month. Additionally, it records how much of the money in question was provided by Vernon. Again, all of this allows the reader to begin with a basic understanding of the pay history of each troop, and the relative importance of Vernon's contributions.

[548] **Table 3.12, Appendix C.**

Here we see that salary payments to combat troops account for 82 per cent of the cavalry payments described in Figure 3.2;[549] furthermore, we also see that the payments made by Vernon were far more substantial than those made by the other two men. Table 3.12 is also important because it tells us exactly which of the old troops/captains were still receiving payment during the Gloucester/Newbury campaign. In chapter two it was

Figure 3.2 - Army Treasury Cavalry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (£)



	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643
Jessop	2072.52	677.10	359.58	727.92	874.55	159.20
Fenton	100.00	1787.39	1293.43	711.58	320.75	0.00
Vernon	17953.91	10801.33	9377.20	15631.99	0.00	11712.25

[549] (£60,895.13 [Table 3.12] ÷ £74,560.68 [Figure3.2]) = 82%.

shown that no fewer than 65 of the troops receiving payment during that six-month period could trace their existence back to the Edgehill campaign.[550] Here, we find that only 45 of the 87 troops appearing in the books were that old (52 per cent). Indeed, some twenty eight of these troops were entirely new, they having obviously been raised – without significant amounts of mounting money – in the aftermath of Reading.[551]

Table 3.9 – Vernon's Cavalry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
May 1643	No.	59	14	73	19.18%
	Value	15562.66	2391.25	17953.91	13.32%
Jun 1643	No.	53	16	69	23.19%
	Value	8470.99	2330.33	10801.33	21.57%
Jul 1643	No.	53	9	62	14.52%
	Value	8427.70	949.50	9377.20	10.13%
Aug 1643	No.	121	30	151	19.87%
	Value	12599.75	3032.24	15631.99	19.40%
Sep 1643	No.	0	0	0	N/A
	Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Oct 1643	No.	68	14	82	17.07%
	Value	9603.38	2108.87	11712.25	18.01%
Total	No.	354	83	437	18.99%
	Value	54664.48	10812.19	65476.68	16.51%

[550] This is the number from November 1642 – a number that quickly went into decline. See column 1 of Table 2.10 above.

[551] These new troops appear in Table 3.12 with 'troop numbers' equal to or greater than 107.

Table 3.10 – Jessop's Cavalry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
May 1643	No.	10
	Value	2072.52
Jun 1643	No.	10
	Value	677.10
Jul 1643	No.	8
	Value	359.58
Aug 1643	No.	8
	Value	727.92
Sep 1643	No.	7
	Value	874.55
Oct 1643	No.	4
	Value	159.20
Total	No.	47
	Value	4870.86

As was the case in chapter two, however, it is not possible to deal only or simply with these totals. Again, this is because not all of the troops appearing in this table were in existence throughout the entire period in question, and because all of these formations were of course liable to uneven patterns of attrition.

Since all of this is true, we must once again measure the number of units receiving pay each month, and compare this information to the monthly subtotals that are reported in Table 3.12. This will allow us to evaluate the army treasury's month-to-month performance in this period relative to its activities for the previous six months.

Table 3.11 – Fenton's Cavalry Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
May 1643	No.	0	1	1	100.00%
	Value	0	100	100	100.00%
Jun 1643	No.	17	3	20	15.00%
	Value	1512.14	275.25	1787.39	15.40%
Jul 1643	No.	14	6	20	30.00%
	Value	905.50	387.93	1293.43	29.99%
Aug 1643	No.	10	4	14	28.57%
	Value	468.88	242.70	711.58	34.11%
Sep 1643	No.	7	1	8	12.50%
	Value	245.25	75.50	320.75	23.54%
Oct 1643	No.	0	0	0	N/A
	Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Total	No.	48	15	63	23.81%
	Value	3131.77	1081.38	4213.14	25.67%

For the sake of continuity, Table 3.13 rests on all of the same assumptions and uses all of the same calculations that underpin Table 2.12 below.[552] Like that database, Table 3.13 provides a consistent yardstick with which to measure the relative value of the army treasury's disbursements to an ever-shifting cohort of mounted soldiers. Here it is suggested that the month-to-month pay receipts of those formations that received pay continued to deteriorate during this period, despite the rather limited assistance that was rendered by Fenton's new committee/treasury. Although May and September appear

[552] **Table 3.13, Appendix C.**

anomalous, it would seem that Essex's cavalrymen received approximately half of what they should have on a regular basis. But again, it should be noted that this statement rests upon several problematic assumptions. Aside from the limitations discussed above, the calculations performed in Table 3.13 assume that most of the troops in question mustered a full, Edgehill-style roster of 60 ordinary troopers, plus officers. There are, however, plenty of examples of pay warrants indicating that many of them dipped below this original target at times. What's more, as Robinson has indicated, many of these troops actually experienced a permanent increase in their size during this period. In fact, many reached the revised strength target of 80 or more ordinary troopers,[553] a reality that of course affected their salary requirements over the long term. Nevertheless, despite these complications I again contend that Table 3.13 remains a useful comparative guide to the overall pay history of Essex's cavalry arm during the period covered by this chapter.

Recall from our comparison of Figure 3.2 and Table 3.12 that the £60,895.13 paid over to the cuirassier/harquebusier troops during this period represents only 82 per cent of the total amount of money I have categorized as 'cavalry' payments.[554] As I have indicated above, some of the remaining eighteen percent of this money went to the cavalry's regimental staff and support personnel, but a sizable chunk of it went to the

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[553] Consult the majority of the warrants found in the range TNA SP28/7 ff.40-78. These are examples from the month of May alone. Again, the reformed target of 80 ordinary harquebusiers per troop was originally put forward by the City in February 1642 (BL Thomason E.90[14], London, Court of Common Council, *Propositions agreed upon at a Court of Common Councell, in Guild Hall London, Feb 21, 1642* (London: Richard Cotes, 1643) and chapter two above). On the resulting de facto increase in the size of many of Essex's cavalry troops during this period see Robinson, "Horse Supply" (thesis), 48-9.

[554] 60,895.13 ÷ 74,560.68 = 81.67%.

army's contingent of dragoons. As we know, the pay history of Essex's dragoons has proven difficult to reconstruct to this point. Again, this is largely because the remuneration of these units seems to have followed no clear administrative schema during the first nine months of the war. Although the dragoons had sometimes received payment via their regimental colonels, they were also frequently paid through their company/troop commanders during earlier periods. Fortunately, the organizational framework of Essex's dragoons seems to have evolved into something a bit more standardized during the six months covered by this chapter. Although a number of regimental structures remained in existence during the summer and autumn of 1643, it is clear that one of these was far more important than the others. And while the majority of the payments made during these three months went to the company/troop commanders, many of these smaller units can be linked to this regiment, the regiment under the command of Colonel George Melve. Table 3.14 illustrates this situation by laying out the total amounts that were received by Essex's dragoons from all three of the sources identified in Figure 3.2.[555] Here we see that the majority of the dragoons' remuneration came from Vernon, and that almost half of this subtotal was paid out during the first two months covered by this chapter. Altogether, the amounts reported here account for almost half of the outstanding 18 per cent of all cavalry spending during this period.

Despite its utility as a calendar of the dragoons' receipts, Table 3.14 cannot tell us the rate at which the dragoons' arrears were accruing at this time. As was the case with

[555] **Table 3.14, Appendix C.**

Tables 3.12 and 3.13, this is largely because the reported strengths of the companies/troops receiving payment here actually varied quite a bit. However, it can safely be said that most were perpetually below the established strength of 100 private troopers described in Table 2.14 below. Nevertheless, as was the case with the cuirassiers/harquebusiers, it is possible to compare the dragoons' monthly receipts to the hypothetical cost of a fully-manned and fully-officered dragoon regiment, as described in Table 2.14. Since this cost was exactly £1,750 per month, we can see that the known amounts that were spent each month generally fell far below what would have been needed to maintain even a single full regiment.

~ IV ~

As was the case in earlier periods, it would seem that William Jessop was responsible for most of the centralized spending that I have categorized as 'other' during the months covered by this chapter. Since this is the case, it is important to begin this section by reminding the reader of the distortions that exist in all my reconstructions of Jessop's spending. Again, a relatively high percentage of Jessop-paid warrants were paid well after their issue date, and/or in more than one installment. This is partly because Jessop was often tasked with remunerating creditors who were either long-term contractors whose services could be relied upon without immediate or full payment, or individuals whose prompt remuneration was not vital to the ongoing viability of the war effort. As I have already explained, I have elected to organize the total amount of money that was paid on these warrants using the date on which their final payments were

received, and this decision has adversely affected the month-to-month accuracy of Jessop's numbers.[556] Bearing this in mind, we should begin this section by laying out all of the 'other' payments that were made during the six months covered by this chapter. Figure 3.3 and Tables 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17 provide the reader with this information. As usual, the data found in this graph are organized by both treasurer and (final) pay date. All told, these payments were worth a grand total of £64,219.80.

By its very nature this third category of spending is more nebulous than the other two, and as was the case in chapters one and two I have subdivided it further before attempting any detailed analyses. Tables 1.17 and 2.17 above demonstrate that this kind of spending can be broken down into at least five major sub-categories. Furthermore, these tables make it clear that the relative importance of these sub-categories depends heavily on which of the army's two sub-treasurers was making the payments in question. During the Gloucester/Newbury campaign, however, there were no fewer than three men making payments to the Long Parliament's most centralized forces. What this means is that we are dealing with no fewer than ninety individual permutations of data when it comes to the history of 'other' military spending during this period.[557] Despite the complexity of the resulting data, I have again found it possible to build and present a single database that allows the reader to instantly reference any one of these ninety permutations.

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[556] See chapter two, section IV above.

[557] (Six months) x (three treasurers) x (five sub-categories) = ninety permutations of the data.

Figure 3.3 - Army Treasury 'Other' Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (£)



	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643
Jessop	10633.03	11151.78	3669.67	6118.83	5342.41	3594.77
Fenton	4433.58	1111.97	811.15	957.85	937.75	0.00
Vernon	4513.18	1738.02	2026.35	3745.13	0.00	3434.34

Given its comprehensive nature, this database – presented here as Table 3.18 – will, like its counterparts in the previous two chapters, serve as the contextual reference point for the rest of the information and analyses presented in this section.[558]

[558] **Table 3.18, Appendix C.**

Table 3.15 – Vernon's 'Other' Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
May 1643	No.	22	1	23	4.35%
	Value	4313.18	200.00	4513.18	4.43%
Jun 1643	No.	8	5	13	38.46%
	Value	1660.02	78.00	1738.02	4.49%
Jul 1643	No.	8	6	14	42.86%
	Value	1808.53	217.82	2026.35	10.75%
Aug 1643	No.	24	14	38	36.84%
	Value	3413.70	331.43	3745.13	8.85%
Sep 1643	No.	0	0	0	N/A
	Value	0.00	0.00	0.00	N/A
Oct 1643	No.	22	4	26	15.38%
	Value	3275.04	159.30	3434.34	4.64%
Total	No.	84	30	114	26.32%
	Value	14470.47	986.55	15457.01	6.38%

As was the case for the relevant tables that were produced for chapters one and two, I have elected to organize several different kinds of payments under the sub-category 'artillery' in Table 3.18.[559] And again, the most valuable of these payments were those aimed at remunerating the officers and gunners of the train. Unsurprisingly, Vernon was the single most significant source of this money throughout this period.

[559] **Table 3.19, Appendix C.**

Table 3.16 – Jessop's 'Other' spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants
May 1643	No.	32
	Value	10633.03
Jun 1643	No.	36
	Value	11151.78
Jul 1643	No.	17
	Value	3669.67
Aug 1643	No.	16
	Value	6118.83
Sep 1643	No.	16
	Value	5342.41
Oct 1643	No.	12
	Value	3594.77
Total	No.	129
	Value	40510.49

In fact, during the six months covered by this chapter Vernon paid no fewer than eight salary warrants for the officers and gunners.[560] Together, these warrants were worth £5,220.43 – a sum that represents almost 66 per cent of the combined 'artillery' total as reported in Table 3.18.[561] In the end, the single most valuable of these warrants was the first of them to be paid. Worth £1,449 9s 5d, TNA SP28/7 f.130 was issued to Vernon (and paid by him) on 26 May 1643.

[560] TNA SP28/7 ff.28, 130, and 405; TNA SP28/8 f.141; TNA SP28/9 ff.55 and 227; and TNA SP28/10 ff.146 and 275.

[561] £5,220.43 ÷ £7,929.00 = 65.8%. Again, aside from the additional £120 that Fenton paid to the gunners in August (TNA SP28/8 f.84), the other thirty four percent of this money went to the command staff and the support personnel (such as the independent companies of firelocks and pioneers) that were assigned to protect and guide the train.

Table 3.17 – Fenton's 'Other' Spending: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Month		Surviving Warrants	Lost Warrants	Total Warrants	Lost as a percentage of Total
May 1643	No.	3	2	5	40.00%
	Value	441.78	3991.80	4433.58	90.04%
Jun 1643	No.	14	6	20	30.00%
	Value	757.87	354.10	1111.97	31.84%
Jul 1643	No.	8	5	13	38.46%
	Value	531.18	279.97	811.15	34.51%
Aug 1643	No.	16	2	18	11.11%
	Value	804.00	153.85	957.85	16.06%
Sep 1643	No.	10	4	14	28.57%
	Value	613.53	324.23	937.75	34.58%
Oct 1643	No.	0	0	0	N/A
	Value	0	0	0	N/A
Total	No.	51	19	70	27.14%
	Value	3148.35	5103.94	8252.30	61.85%

This amount, which was supposed to provide everyone in the train with a month's pay, was completely in line with the 'reduced' monthly cost of the artillery's most important personnel, as described by the warrants dealt with in Table 2.18 below. Since this is the case, and since the other seven warrants would seem to indicate a consistent demand for money, it is reasonable to conclude that the train's actual requirements during this period were roughly the same as they were during the previous six months. But as we know, Essex's artillerymen received just £6,473.08 during that period; an amount that fell short

of their implied requirements by approximately 25 per cent.[562] Clearly, then, the £5,340.43 received from both Vernon and Fenton by Peyto and his subordinates during the Gloucester/Newbury campaign was even more inadequate to the task at hand. Indeed, it means that the gunners got around 60 per cent of their dues. Not only were Essex's gunners falling further into arrears, but, like the infantry and the cavalry, the rate at which they were doing so increased during this period.

As I said above, the reported deliveries of guns, munitions, and equipment from the Ordnance Office in the Tower demonstrate that a considerable amount of materiel was transferred to Essex's field army from that office during the early part of 1643.[563] In fact, most of the army's receipts for the whole of 1643 appear to predate 01 May. We know this to be the case because the equipment totals I have cited above – totals which have been entirely derived from TNA WO55/1937 – can be readily compared to the totals that appear in the ninth appendix of David Lewis's 1976 thesis. There Lewis tabulated the army's receipts on a yearly basis, and he too relied heavily on the book of warrants preserved as WO55/1937 – the only warrant book from that period which records deliveries. Unfortunately, however, the reader should note that this book contains no reference to warrants written after 10 May 1643. Moreover, although the National Archives contains at least one other book of warrants sent to the Ordnance Office during that year,[564] that book – like the majority of those from earlier periods – appears to be just

[562] Consult Table 2.18 below.
[563] See chapter two, section IV.
[564] TNA WO55/460.

one of many (?) contemporary copies of a master register of original documents. Crucially, it too lacks any specific reference to deliveries. This, in my opinion, severely restricts its utility for those seeking an understanding of Essex's equipment receipts during the period that it covers. This reality, combined with the fact that my own account of the activity recorded in WO55/1937 is similar to Lewis's appendix entries for the whole of 1643, has led me to avoid a systematic analysis of TNA WO55/460.

While Vernon was almost solely responsible for the remuneration of the artillery train during the Gloucester/Newbury campaign, Jessop, it would seem, was entirely responsible for the centralized procurement of arms and munitions outside the auspices of the Ordnance Office. Indeed, Jessop's known contributions account for a hefty 63 per cent of all of the 'other' spending that appears in Table 3.18, and no less than 57 per cent of this subtotal was used to purchase weapons and ammunition.[565] Again, this should come as no real surprise, considering the fact that Jessop was operating out of London throughout the war. What is a bit surprising, however, is the relative cost of these materials during this period. Even though our month-to-month account of Jessop's spending has been distorted by the methodology used to reconstruct his spending, it is still worth noting that the overall value of Jessop's payments to arms dealers seems to have shot up dramatically during the Gloucester/Newbury campaign. Recall from Table 2.17 above that Jessop's arms and munitions subtotal for November 1642 – April 1643 was £9,728.81. After consulting Table 3.18, we see that this grew to £23,180.50 in the

[565] (£23,180.50 [Jessop: 'arms'] ÷ £40,510.49 [Jessop: all 'other']) = 57.22%

next six-month period – an increase of more than 100 per cent! All told, this rather considerable amount of money changed hands on the authority of forty three warrants – only seventeen of which were originally issued during the six months covered by this chapter.[566] Interestingly enough, some of the 'arms' warrants found in my databases are still accompanied by an invoice detailing the materiel that was (or was to be) acquired with the money in question. An excellent example of this sort of transaction is the order and receipt preserved as TNA SP28/263 ff.290-291. Here we find evidence that a man named William Toxtath provided Sir Thomas Middleton with 1,210 proven firearms – as well as enough ancillary arms and equipment to furnish 30 harquebusiers – on 28 April 1643. The cost of this equipment was £1,285, and thanks to the warrant that was immediately issued to Jessop, Toxtall's proxy received the full amount by 6 September. Unfortunately, it is unclear who ultimately received and used these weapons.

As we already know, Owen Rowe and John Bradley were important figures in the Long Parliament's early attempts to procure arms and munitions outside the framework of the Ordnance Office, and this most certainly remained the case during the six months covered by this chapter.

[566]Another two of these warrants have sustained damage that makes it impossible to know for certain when they were issued. As per the methodological distortion discussed above, some of the creditors mentioned in the twenty-four 'old' warrants will have received part of their money during a period covered by a previous chapter.



Figure 3.4 – TNA SP28/263 f.291: The invoice for arms and equipment purchased by Sir Thomas Middleton from William Toxtath. This invoice was forwarded to the Committee of Safety for payment.



Figure 3.5 – TNA SP28/263 f.290r: The warrant that was issued on in response to the invoice in Figure 3.4. A special note found near the bottom of the document indicates that it was to be paid in weekly installments.



Figure 3.6 – TNA SP28/263 f.290v: The payments that were made on the authority of Figure 3.5. My databases reckon this warrant to have been paid on 6 September 1643, the date of the final payment.

For example, on 10 April 1643 (during the period in time otherwise covered by chapter two above) the Committee of Safety issued an 'arms' warrant to Jessop in which they ordered him to pay Rowe £3,000 for 'arms and ammunition for the service of the state'. According to the appended receipt, Rowe received just £2,000 of this, all of which came from Jessop's hands on 6 May (hence the warrant's inclusion here). This is a sizable amount of money, but the most interesting thing about this warrant is the fact that there is a note written on it outlining which of the army treasury's revenue streams was supposed to supply the cash – in this case the £40,000 the Aldermen of London lent the central government in the wake of the first Weekly Assessment legislation![567] Because of this, it seems very likely that these munitions were destined for service with the regular army.

Without a doubt, however, the single most important 'arms' warrant that was issued on Rowe and Bradley's behalf was TNA SP28/264 f.311. This order – worth a total of £4,000 – was aimed at providing Rowe with enough money to purchase four thousand English muskets 'and other ammunition', some of which may have been provided to Essex's infantry regiments. Issued to Gerrard's treasury by the Committee of Safety on 17 June 1643, the warrant was fully paid by Jessop as of 22 August. Aside from its high value and obvious importance, the warrant is of particular interest because it also states the origin of the army-treasury money that was to be used for its payment. This time Jessop was directed to pay the warrant using Weekly Assessment money

[567] TNA SP28/263 f.274. There are other examples of Jessop's 'other' warrants being assigned to this pot of money, not all of which was sent to Vernon in the field. See, for example, TNA SP28/263 f.272 – a 'transportation' warrant that was issued and paid during the month of April 1643 (and therefore factored into the data presented in chapter two above).

collected in Kent – an order that quite obviously reiterates Everitt's point that at least part of this tax money was successfully 'centralized' during this period. Unfortunately, it seems impossible to know in this case where these arms actually went after they entered Rowe and Bradley's magazine.[568]

Of course these muskets – and the large number of other firearms still in service – would have required a reliable, ongoing source of gunpowder. And again, it would seem that Jessop was responsible for much of the powder that was purchased from private contractors during this period. Some of this powder was subsequently delivered into the Ordnance Office's stores in the Tower. In the end, no fewer than nine of the Jessop-paid 'arms' warrants during this period were designed to remunerate such contractors for the purchase of gunpowder.[569] Taken together, these documents were worth £2,604, all of which was paid within the timeframe covered by this chapter. The vast majority of this money – some £2,520 of it – was used to purchase 560 barrels of English powder at the rate of £4 10s per barrel. The residuum was used to buy 20 barrels of Flemish powder at a slightly reduced rate.[570] Although it is not possible to know which of the Parliament's military organizations ultimately consumed any of this powder, it is clear that all of it was paid for by the regular army's centralized treasury.

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[568] Everitt, *The Community of Kent*, 162. A month before this, Jessop was ordered to pay Rowe an additional £2,000 of Kentish Assessment money for the purchase of another 2,000 muskets and rests. The money was paid over in full on 12 June 1643, and so appears in my databases for this chapter. This time the weapons were evidently provided to Sir William Waller '. . . for the defense and service of the Western parts . . .'. See TNA SP28/264 f.366.

[569] TNA SP28/264 ff.27, 30, 33, 42, 56, 59, 224, 243, and 371. Again, Rowe seems to have played a central role in the purchase of much of this powder.

[570] Again, TNA SP28/264 f.371.

Although Jessop's spending on 'arms' seems to have increased dramatically during this period, his spending on 'local forces' would appear to have declined just as sharply. A brief comparison of Tables 2.17 and 3.18 shows that while Jessop spent £24,849.36 between November 1642 and April 1643, his spending in this area fell to just £13,180.55 during the summer and autumn of 1643. The single largest reason for this sharp decline seems to have been the relatively large amount of money that was transferred to Lord Fairfax's northern army during the first few weeks of 1643 – an occurrence that was not repeated on the same scale during the six months covered by this chapter. Indeed, completed payments to Fairfax's Northern Army seem to have amounted to no more than £5,366.89 during the Gloucester/Newbury campaign.[571] Indeed, this reduced amount accounts for less than half the total amount of 'local forces' money that appears in Table 3.18. The rest was largely paid over in smaller amounts to a variety of other regional and/or garrison forces. The only significant exception to this trend seems to have been the original incarnation of the Western Army then serving under Sir William Waller. As we know, on 8 June 1643 – the very day Waller entered Bath with his own brigade – Jessop issued a warrant for the pay of these forces in the amount of £2,000, a warrant which was paid in full by Jessop the very next day.[572]

The Long Parliament's regional forces continued to place a relatively small but nevertheless significant demand on Gerrard's resources during this period. But it is also

[571] TNA SP28/263 ff.55a, 116, and 288; TNA SP28/264 ff.73, 281, 283, 328, 343, 379, and 381. Again, for a contextual discussion of Fairfax's receipts from the central coffers during this period see Jennifer Jones, "The War in the North", 140-143.
[572] TNA SP28/264 f.292.

clear that the army treasury devoted considerable resources to the ancillary needs of regular army during the Gloucester/Newbury campaign. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I have once again organized most of the 'miscellaneous' warrants that dealt with these needs under the sub-category of 'other' payments labelled 'support'. Without question, the most important of these payments was made by John Fenton on 27 May. Although there seems to be no surviving warrant or warrants that flesh out the details of the payment, Fenton transferred £3,604 to an unnamed group of Essex's field regiments on this date. As is stated in Fenton's account book, this money was for the relief of the many sick soldiers that were quite obviously crippling the army's mobility and effectiveness at the time.[573] It should be noted that this was, by a wide margin, the single most valuable payment that was made by Fenton's treasury during the five months of its existence, and I think this is highly significant. This is because all of the money Fenton had received to this point was recorded in his account book as small receipts from individual people residing in the conquered town of Reading. Indeed, the vast majority of these receipts were valued at twenty pounds or less. Although Fenton was not asked to part with all of the money he and his subordinates had painstakingly collected (by whatever means) during the month of May, it is both remarkable and unfortunate that so much of it was spent all at once, remarkable because of the number of small receipts that this payment reflects, and unfortunate because it is impossible to know how or where this money was ultimately spent.

[573] TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, f.97r.

Most of the other 'support' payments that were made during this period were much smaller than the one made by Fenton on 27 May. In fact, the vast majority of these involved less than two hundred pounds, and, interestingly enough, it would seem that all three treasurers were more or less equally responsible for this spending. As was the case in chapter two, much of this money was used to remunerate those individuals who facilitated the operations of the Lord General's army in the field. Let us again consider, for example, the receipts of Sir Samuel Luke in his capacity as the army's Scoutmaster General, and those of Nicholas Bond, the commissary of victuals. As the reader can see, Luke received over a thousand pounds to support himself and his subordinates' activities during the period covered by this chapter.[574] Interestingly enough, however, not all of the entries found in Luke's account can be readily reconciled with my own record of the surviving pay warrants and account book entries. Nevertheless, I contend that these discrepancies can be attributed to entry errors made by Luke when he composed his account. I believe this because the total value of his anomalous entries is equal to that of the warrants he seems to have missed.

Additionally, Nicholas Bond also received a notable proportion of the 'other' money paid out for 'support', although his receipts for this period were nowhere near what they had been during the previous six months. Once again, none of the Vernon-paid warrants authorizing his remuneration seem to have survived from this period.[575] What

[574] **Table 3.20, Appendix C.**

[575] Compare the receipts outlined in chapter two above to the more recent payments that are referred to in both Vernon's and Fenton's account books. TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, ff.65v, 69v, and 75r; and

this reduced amount means, of course, is that it would have been even harder for Bond to secure a meaningful amount of pre-paid victuals for the army's regulars than it was during the previous six months. And although there were other commissaries in the pay of the army treasury during this time, it remains unclear from a survey of the warrants what these men were doing, or who exactly they were provisioning.[576] It seems reasonable to presume, however, that the regulars were becoming increasingly reliant on 'free quarter' given the very small amounts of money passing through the commissaries' hands after the fall of Reading.

A comparison of Tables 2.17 and 3.18 reveals that the amounts spent on military transportation during both of these six-month periods was very similar. However, the average value of the warrants authorizing these payments was considerably higher during the Gloucester-Newbury campaign.[577] The reason for this change is most certainly linked to the ever-increasing importance of Anthony Fastolfe. Although the army treasury continued to make direct payments to civilian contractors via 'private wagoner warrants' in the aftermath of Reading, both the value and number of these documents decreased sharply during these six months. Crucially, this decline was not because the regular army was using fewer civilian horses, but because the army treasury began deferring payment

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TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, f.98r. Together, these entries report that a paltry £645.32 was paid over to Bond during the six months covered by this chapter.

[576] Consider, for example, a sampling of the payments made to Commissaries Lionel Copley, Nicholas Skinner, and Edward Dodsworth; see TNA SP28/7 ff.142, and 308; TNA SP28/9 ff.199 and 272; TNA SP28/10 f.201; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, ff.70v, and 73v; and TNA SP28/143, Fenton's account, f.97r.

[577] The £7.982.53 found in Table 2.17 was paid on the authority of 106 warrants, while the £7,166.21 found in Table 3.18 was paid on just 41.

to their owners. Indeed, Robinson's researches have demonstrated that the regular army kept between 150 and 225 privately-contracted civilian horses in its employ at all times after the conquest of Reading.[578]

In order to sustain (if not fully remunerate the owners of) these animals in the field, as well as the hundreds of state-owned horses that surely remained in service during these six months, Fastolfe received no less than £5,040 – or around 70 per cent of the total 'transportation' money described in Table 3.18.[579] As was the case with the sums chronicled in chapter two, however, the ultimate fate of this very considerable amount of money cannot be readily discovered. This is because the accounts of his that are preserved in TNA SP28/143 and TNA SP28/146 do not cover this six-month period.[580] Nevertheless, the reader should make note of the fact that none of the warrants authorizing the payments to Fastolfe were more than twenty-four hours old at the time of their full payment. Furthermore, none of them were cashed by Jessop. What this means, of course, is that the increase in Fastolfe's receipts was real and not merely the product of database distortions created by my organization of Jessop's 'multiple-payment warrants'. Two thirds of the remaining 30 per cent of the 'transportation' subtotal was divided between Richardson (who received £601.49 or 8.39 per cent) and Robinson's civilian wagon contractors (who received £741.98 or 10.35 per cent via 'private wagon warrants'), while the remainder was composed of the same collection of miscellaneous

[578] Robinson, "Horse supply," (thesis) Table 9.
[579] This was a significant increase from the £3,740 he received during the six months following Edgehill.
[580] The account in TNA SP28/143 record Fastolfe's receipts and disbursements between October 1642 and March 1643, and the one in TNA SP28/146 record those from September 1644 to the spring of 1645.

payments described in chapter two above (£782.75 or 10.92 per cent). The most significant and interesting example of the latter was a warrant that Essex issued to Jessop on behalf of Edward West in March 1643.[581] This document is another classic example of the 'multiple-payment warrants' described above. Worth £337.11 for services West rendered before 10 November 1642, the warrant was fully cleared in five payments, the last of which occurred on 15 September 1643.

~ Conclusion ~

This, then, is how the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement in England evolved during the tumultuous weeks that separated the capture of Reading and the actions leading up to the first battle of Newbury. In the provinces, the system of raising and deploying regional forces still tended to occur at the county level, as the parochial actors who populated the Parliament's new governing committees used centrally-mandated ordinances to levy the funds necessary to field quasi-regular forces with which they combated their royalist counterparts. Significantly, however, at least one of the rebels' multi-county defensive associations was slowly acquiring a much more integrated administrative network. Although the forces of the Eastern Association were still raised and funded by its constituent counties, the newly reconstituted Cambridge Committee represented a supra-regional (but sub-national) locus of command and control. At the centre, however, there was a great deal of confusion.

[581] TNA SP28/6 f.161

In the first section of this chapter we uncovered at least three interest groups who were then working to secure control over the rebels' military resources in the capital and its environs. In the first place there was the old regular army under Essex, the titular commander of all of the rebels' forces throughout England. Beholden to no sub-national committee or regional power bloc, the Lord General and his forces were nevertheless forced to collect a small portion of their inadequate income from an *ad hoc* revenue committee established in the field. Most of their money still came from the political centre, though, and the regulars were therefore still heavily reliant on the financial power of the City and its governors, the second of the interest groups we have discussed. The City, like every other region in England, had its own militia – the Trained Bands – which it was then augmenting with additional regiments that were supposed to help man the newly-built 'lines of communication'. These 'auxiliary' regiments were originally created with the special help of the 'fiery spirits' – the third and final of the interest groups we have here identified. Active both within and beyond the confines of the central government itself, the most radical faction within the parliamentarian camp had originally hoped that the 'auxiliary' regiments could be mobilized as a private army of sorts. When this idea collapsed in the face of resistance from the City and its Militia Committee, the radicals in Parliament attempted to use popular pressure to create a volunteer army using the authority of the central government itself, an approach that was derailed by the Saye-Pym group when the radicals' chosen leader – the freshly-defeated Sir William Waller –

was appointed to command the City's own forces, forces that nevertheless remained beholden to the municipal authorities.

For the Saye-Pym group, their old regular army – an army which was by late July an underpaid, pestilential shadow of its former self – was the short-term solution to the terrifying problems that arose from multiple military defeats and the resulting divisive attitudes that were then crystallizing on both the left and the right. In early August Essex's overall authority as Lord General was reaffirmed and the Parliament reissued the Weekly Assessment tax in an effort to secure yet another enormous loan from the taxpayers in London. Quickly refreshed with conscripted troops and a sizable injection of centralized money, the regular army was dispatched to relieve the city of Gloucester – the last important outpost in the otherwise conquered Western Association. Sir William Waller, erstwhile commander of this Association, was forced to watch from the sidelines as the City dispatched five regiments to serve alongside the Lord General's own formations in this attempt to secure part of his old command. The radicals had by then succeeded in pressuring the Saye-Pym grandees into providing Waller with a new and wide-ranging commission, but their relationship with Sir William was far from settled. Meanwhile, Pym and his allies had managed to secure two additional triumphs during this period: a comprehensive socio-fiscal-military alliance with the Scots, and the implementation of a controversial Excise tax in England. But the impact of both these developments was not to be felt until after the first battle of Newbury.

Chapter Four: November 1643 – December 1644

~ Introduction ~

This chapter will survey the organizational and financial history of Essex's army during the last two months of 1643, and during the entirety of 1644. As usual, the central goal here is to determine the adequacy of the money and materiel that was received by Essex's regular army during its 1644 campaigns, and to explore that army's changing place within the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement in the year before the creation of the New Model Army. In order to accomplish all this, the chapter consists of four sections that are identical in arrangement to those found in the previous three chapters. Section I presents a thematic narrative that describes and contextualizes the importance of the Scottish invasion of the north, as well as the introduction of the Parliament's new Excise tax in the south. This narrative then explores the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms before delving into an important series of ordinances that served to crystallize the Parliament's fragmented military system in the southeast. Here I argue that this new legislation was tremendously important because it served to develop and entrench both the importance and the fiscal-military peculiarities of three organizationally-mature armies: Essex's, Waller's, and Manchester's. Finally, the narrative section concerns itself with both the collapse of the regular army at Lostwithiel, and the reconstruction of it in September and October 1644. Crucially, the reader will note that until October the regular army retained its unique relationship to the central government – now represented by the Committee of Both Kingdoms – because Essex

managed to retain his (increasingly theoretical) command over the entirety of the rebels' English forces, and because his was still the only English army without a significant structural link to the county-level revenue committees and/or the Lieutenancy in the provinces.

As usual, sections II, III, and IV describe the empirical data that I have recovered from the regular army's pay records. There are two things of importance to note regarding this data. In the first place, it would appear that Captain John Fenton's 'Committee for the Raising of Monies for the Supply of the Army' was now defunct, for there is no documentary evidence to suggest that this sort of in-the-field funding was practiced in 1644. Secondly, Captain Vernon's own record of his receipts and disbursements ends abruptly on 25 March 1644. Again, this is because he and the other two men who staffed the regular army's treasury were then ordered to submit their paperwork to the newly-formed Committee for Taking the Accounts of the Kingdom – the body responsible for amassing the mountain of paper that is State Papers 28. As I have already indicated, this is deeply frustrating because although Vernon continued to disburse centralized treasury money to the regular units in the field, I have been unable to locate a second volume of his account. Because of this, all of my data pertaining to Vernon's disbursements has been reconstructed from the surviving pay warrants, documents that have a demonstrated survival rate of less than one hundred percent. It also means that I have no way of knowing precisely where any of the army treasury's money came from during this period. Any and all information on this subject must therefore be

reconstructed from parliamentary orders and ordinances, and this produces an unfortunately crude and inexact understanding of army revenues.

Again, one of the most important differences that distinguished this phase of the civil war from earlier ones was the relative stability of the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement in the southeast, and the comparative sophistication of the quasi-regular armies that were then competing with the regular army for much-needed money and resources. Although the Lord General was still, in theory, the overall commander of all of the Parliament's armed forces, the executive power exercised by the new Committee of Both Kingdoms – which was a far more coherent and potent body than the old Committee of Safety – was real, and this body tended to view Essex's army as simply one of the many instruments of war at its disposal. Furthermore, the institutional evolution of both Waller's and Manchester's armies – a process with its roots in both the English militia system, and the nascent multi-county military associations of 1642-1643 – could only have reinforced this attitude because it had by this point produced forces that were at least as capable as Essex's much-decayed regular army of successfully waging a mobile war.

The largest and most important of the regular army's institutional rivals during this period was the Army of the Eastern Association, which was then operating under the command of the earl of Manchester. Although it was still an unquestionably regional, quasi-regular body of soldiers that looked to a sub-national body (the Cambridge Committee) for both troops and resources, the Army of the Eastern Association had by

February 1644 developed into a sophisticated military entity with a coherent and 'centralized' treasury apparatus.[582] Similar in form and function to Gerrard's central army treasury, this body also produced a large volume of surviving paperwork that Clive Holmes has used to reconstruct the pay history of Manchester's army. Because of all this the final three sections of this chapter, unlike those found in previous chapters, will spend a considerable amount of time comparing the financial organization of Essex's army to the one that sustained and defined another. Ultimately, this comparison is both interesting and important because it allows us to see how the old regular army of 1642 – which could count on no significant or permanent connections to regional sources of supply – fared in a military environment now dominated by large and complex quasi-regular forces.

~ I ~

On 15 October 1643 the earl of Essex, who had only recently returned from his triumphant expedition to relieve Gloucester, attended a sermon delivered by Dr. Thomas Temple at Westminster Abbey. This sermon was written and delivered with the intention of promoting the socio-religious and fiscal-military alliance that the Long Parliament had only recently entered into with the Presbyterian Scots. Afterward, Essex and a host of other rebel peers personally subscribed to the Solemn League and Covenant, thus binding themselves to a very specific pan-archipelagic vision of the Parliamentarian cause that went far beyond simply limiting the king's political authoritarianism and crypto-Catholic

[582] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 129-130.

episcopalism.[583] The fact that they were willing to do this is deeply significant from an ideological perspective, and a reflection of the absolute necessity of doing so from a military point of view.

As I indicated in the first section of chapter two above, Holmes has reminded us that seventeenth-century Britons frequently invested great social and religious meaning in public 'associations'.[584] For the most zealous in times of conflict and uncertainty, this meaning often took the form of a public appeal for everyone to make a deep, personal commitment to very specific political and religious goals. Aside from the text of initial Ordinance that created the Eastern Association during the winter of 1642/3, prominent examples of this phenomenon include the Scottish National Covenant of 1638, the English Protestation of 1641, and the oath of association drawn up by the Catholic clergy of Ireland in the spring of 1642.[585] And during the summer of 1643, even as the Parliament's war effort was reaching its nadir, John Pym was instrumental in devising and implementing yet another 'association' in England – a Covenant of their own that would bind all loyal Englishmen to the Long Parliament, and call upon them to personally defend English Protestantism against the threat posed by Catholicism and the king's wicked adherents.[586] It is clear that the immediate political context of the English Covenant was the Waller Plot, which the Saye-Pym group had only recently exposed in their efforts to undermine their pacific rivals. And, as we know, this revelation unleashed

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[583] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 397; Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 287.
[584] Again, Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 62-67.
[585] Gentles, *English Revolution*, 199; Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, 179-180.
[586] *CJ*, iii, 117-118. This first version of the English Covenant was sworn by the Commons on 6 June 1643.

a political storm in London that very nearly disrupted the fiscal-military arrangement that continued to preserve and fuel the Lord General's regular army. Essex and his army eventually emerged intact from this conflagration, but another royalist plot was revealed in Scotland just days after the MPs in the Commons took John Pym's Covenant. The effects of this new revelation were even more far reaching, for within six months the entire English war effort in the north was radically transformed.

On 9 June 1643, on the eve of fresh elections for a new Convention of Estates, the Covenanters in the Scottish Privy Council revealed a plot formulated by the earl of Antrim to bring Irish Catholic troops into action in Scotland against the Covenanter leadership.[587] This terrorized the Scots, and when their new Convention of Estates met at the end of June its members promptly declared theirs a 'free Convention' – a body with the power to act regardless of the royal will.[588] Shortly thereafter they met with a diplomatic commission dispatched from Westminster, and by 18 August the English commissioners, the Convention, and the General Assembly of the Scottish Kirk had settled on the text of the Solemn League and Covenant. On 25 September both the Commons and the new Westminster Assembly of Divines took the new Covenant, and less than a month later so too did Essex and his fellow peers.

The two basic terms of the Solemn League and Covenant are easy enough to grasp: the Scots were prepared to enter into a new military alliance with the Long

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[587] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 205-208; Gentles, *English Revolution*, 200-201, 205; Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, 269-270.
[588] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 208.

Parliament so long as the English rebels were prepared to accept and enforce the Scots' Presbyterian system of church government. The form of this agreement, of course, was a personally-sworn covenant that every individual was to enter into with God.[589] Although there were many in the Parliament's camp who were very much opposed to the second term, the necessity of ensuring the fulfillment of the first seemed paramount at the time. For crowning the king's recent string of victories in England was the cessation of hostilities that the earl of Ormond successfully arranged on 15 September 1643 between the government at Dublin and the Irish Catholic rebels.[590] The royalists had high hopes (and the parliamentarians great fears) that this cessation would allow government troops serving on that island to fight for the king in England.[591]

Though eager to export their religious doctrines and protect their regime from the effects of the wars in England and Ireland, the Covenanting Scots could not be made to fight the royalists in northern England without regular infusions of English money. An important reason for this was that it would have been impossible for the Scottish regime to support, via domestic credit or taxation, an army the size of the one they agreed to send across the border.[592] According to the terms of the new treaty, the English agreed to supply the Scots with £31,000 per month to support an invading army of 21,000

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[589] Braddick, *God's Fury*, 309-312.
[590] Gentles, *English Revolution*, 201.
[591] CJ, iii, 259; BL Thomason 669.f.7[53], Parliament, *Die Martis, 24 October, 1643. The Lord and Commons in Parliament having received certain notice of a cessation of arms concluded with the rebels in Ireland . . .* (London: Edward Husbands, 1643).
[592] Laura A.M. Stewart, "Fiscal revolution and state formation in mid seventeenth-century Scotland," *Historical Research* 84 (2011): pp.453-454, Figures 2 and 3.

Covenanters. The annual cost of this agreement to the English – some £372,000 – exceeded the combined direct and indirect taxation revenues of the kingdom of Scotland during the entire 1639-1651 period![593] Though the English were clearly more capable of shouldering this burden than the Scots, their decision to commit to such an outlay is still breathtaking. During the first six months of 1643, for example, Francis Vernon disbursed an average of just £29,387.64 per month, the vast majority of which – as we well know – was consumed by the Parliament's struggling regular army in the south. How was this new demand for very substantial amounts of money to be met?

In the beginning, the Scots were supposed to be supplied by yet another English forced loan. On 16 October 1643 the Parliament passed an ordinance calling for a new voluntary loan aimed at realizing £200,000 of new monies.[594] Half of this sum, it would seem, was to be committed to the new Scottish army in the north, and the other half was to go to the Scots' pre-existing (and long-suffering) army in Ulster. As we know, this relatively small army, serving under the command of Robert Monro, had been in Ireland since the summer of 1642. Sent there by the Scots to help put down the Irish rebellion, Monro's forces were supposed to have been receiving ongoing financial support from the Long Parliament since July of that year.[595] Unfortunately for them, the outbreak of war in England largely disrupted this plan, and Monro's men had since received little or nothing from Westminster. The 16 October ordinance also created or formalized both a

[593] £372,000 Sterling = £4,464,000 Scots. See *ibid.*, 454.
[594] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 311-315.
[595] Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, 231; Stewart, "English funding of the Scottish armies," 583-584.

Parliamentary committee – the so-called Goldsmiths' Hall Committee[596] – and a new treasury to manage this loan, and pledged the security of both the Sequestrations and the profits of the Newcastle coal industry to lenders. Dividing the projected yield into three equal parts, the Parliament hoped to realize the full sum of £200,000 in stages.

Time was clearly of the essence, however, and eleven days after the passage of this ordinance the Parliament passed another designed to produce the first third of the Scottish loan by way of yet another compulsory forced loan/assessment apportioned to the metropolis and thirteen southeastern counties. Significantly, London's share of this new burden amounted to precisely 40 per cent of requisite £66,666 13s 6d. Another 33 per cent was to come from the first six counties of the Eastern Association.[597] As per the original legislation, the Goldsmiths' Hall Committee was supposed to receive all of this money, as well as all subsequent payments, and to offer (unwilling) lenders the same security as before.[598] Cumbersome and *ad hoc* as it undoubtedly was, the enactment of this new financial mechanism was apparently enough to get the Scots moving.[599]

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[596] William O. Scroggs, "English Finance Under the Long Parliament," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 21 (1907): 474.

[597] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 322-327. I find it somewhat surprising that Lincolnshire – which was added to the Eastern Association on 20 September 1643 (*LJ*, vi, 224-227) – was not included in the list of assessed counties.

[598] As usual, the wording of the 27 October Ordinance allowed for the 'provincialization' of money collected outside the metropolis. In this case the Goldsmiths' Hall Committee was supposed to nominate representatives to enforce the forced loan/assessment in the thirteen counties. These representatives were given the power to direct the flow of these monies after collection. Again, Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 322-327.

[599] The Parliament was still trying to procure this first third of the projected £200,000 loan more than one year later! Consult *LJ*, vii, 84.

On 19 January 1644 the earl of Leven led the promised army of 21,000 men across the Tweed and into northern England, where it would stay for the next three years.[600] During that time, it consumed around £616,089 of English money, some of which came directly from Goldsmiths' Hall, and some of which was collected and spent in situ with the permission of the rebels' central government.[601] Additional resources were certainly consumed via free quarter. But if we ignore this – as the Long Parliament eventually decided to do[602] – it is possible to annualize the Scots' receipts in order to compare the sums the English spent on their foreign auxiliaries to the amounts they devoted to their own regular army during 1644. For the sake of argument, let's say that the English spent approximately £205,363 on the Army of the Covenant during the entirety of that year.[603] This, the reader will note, was only 55.21 per cent of the £372,000 the English were obliged to pay the Scots according to the treaty of 1643. The Scots, of course, did not overlook this fact when entering into negotiations with a victorious Parliament in 1646, but those talks need not detain us here and now.

It is both interesting and important to note that the Goldsmiths' Hall Committee eventually assumed more and more responsibility for the management of the Sequestrations – the source of revenues originally assigned to secure the Scottish loan it

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[600] Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, 279; Stewart, "English funding," 583.
[601] The figure £616,089 is taken from Stewart's 2009 article. She derived the number from accounts drawn up by Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, the Covenanters' ". . . leading financial officer . . .". Additionally, Jennifer Jones provides a good description how the Scots extracted revenues in the north during the first war. See Stewart, "English funding," 578-580; Jones, "The War in the North", 124-151.
[602] Stewart, "English funding," 582-583.
[603] £616,089 ÷ 3 years = £205,363 per year.

was created to manage. On 13 September 1644 the House of Commons ordered a 'general composition' aimed at releasing the properties of those who had been sequestered in order to raise £15,000 for the immediate supply of Lord Fairfax's Northern [English] Army.[604] Significantly, it was the Goldsmiths' Hall Committee that was empowered to manage and collect 'composition' money from delinquents throughout the entire kingdom. There were no county-level composition committees. Every single delinquent who wished to compound was obliged to travel to London and make their payment at Goldsmiths' Hall in person. Naturally, this high degree of centralization made the Compositions a very efficient and productive source of revenue for the Long Parliament and its successors, but it also tended to anger the county-level Sequestration committees.[605] To the best of my knowledge, there is no indication that Essex's regular army ever received any substantial amount of Composition money during the final months of its operational existence.[606] Rather, it would appear that this semi-innovative revenue stream and the machinery erected to manage it were originally designed to meet the rapidly-changing needs of the war in the north. So what of the war in the south?

Without question, the single most important and valuable source of English tax revenue during the first civil war was the Excise, which was first introduced by

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[604] *CJ*, iii, 627; Scroggs, "English Finance," 475.
[605] Scroggs, "English Finance," 475-478.
[606] As Scroggs tells us, it is possible to survey the pay warrants that were issued to the treasurers at Goldsmiths' Hall by consulting the first volume of Green's *Calendar* of the Committee for Compounding's papers. See Scroggs, "English Finance," p.474 n.4; see also M.A.E. Green, ed., *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Compounding, &c., 1643-1660*, 5 vol. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1889), vol.1, 778-784 for warrants issued during the time of Essex's regular army.

Parliamentary ordinance on 22 July 1643.[607] The Excise was a sales tax – a form of indirect taxation – that was originally levied on tobacco, alcohol, luxury foodstuffs, and a relatively wide range of haberdashery.[608] It is important to note that the tax was collected only from the producers of these goods, or from the first buyers of them in the case of imports.[609] Furthermore, it should also be remembered that the precise schedule of taxable items, as well as the rates imposed upon them, fluctuated as the tax gradually evolved with the passage of additional legislation. What did not evolve much after the passage of the first Ordinance of 22 July was the administrative machinery that ensured the flow of this new revenue stream. At the centre of this machinery sat eight newly-hired Commissioners of the Excise.[610] These men operated out of a central Excise Office that was set up in London, and their activities were originally supervised by the parliamentary Committee for the King's Revenue – a pre-war body that was originally erected in 1626.[611] Tasked with ensuring the collection of the Excise throughout England via a network of subordinates operating out of provincial offices, the eight Commissioners in London were selected and hired because they were willing to lend the central government enormous amounts of money on the security of the anticipated fruits of their labors.

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[607] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 202-214; Wheeler, "English Army Finance", 174.

[608] D'Maris Dalton Coffman, "The Fiscal Revolution of the Interregnum: Excise Taxation in the British Isles, 1643-1663" (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2008), 97.

[609] This made the civil-war Excise much less sophisticated than the Canadian government's contemporary sales tax, which is collected from every seller of goods whose gross sales exceed $30,000 per annum. I would like to thank my mother, Diane Crawshaw, the Secretary/Treasurer of Top Line Rentals Inc., for walking me through the machinery of H.S.T. collection in this country today.

[610] Significantly, one of these Commissioners – Alderman John Towes – was also one of the original Propositions treasurers.

[611] Coffman, "Fiscal Revolution", 95-96 and 107-108. In June 1645 the Parliament saw fit to create a new Committee of MPs especially for the regulating of the Excise.

The most important thing to note about the operation of the Excise under the Long Parliament is that no monies whatsoever could be spent without the express approval of the Parliament itself.[612] What this means is that a specific parliamentary order was required each and every time the government wished to borrow against the Excise, or to divert the direct fruits of it to some particular purpose. This undoubtedly ensured a superior level of government control over expenditure. But in the absence of clear and comprehensive records from the Excise Office it makes the task of reconstructing Excise spending both tedious and confusing. Since 1980, there have been at least two scholars – Wheeler and Coffman – who have attempted to do so by scouring the *Journal* of the House of Commons. Tellingly, they have come up with similar but nevertheless different totals for the fiscal year ending in September 1644.[613] According to them, the Parliament ordered the expenditure of between £250,000 and £300,000 of Excise-related (either derived or backed) monies during the twelve months that separated the relief of Gloucester and the reconstruction of Essex's army following the defeat at Lostwithiel. Around 80 per cent of this highly centralized money was used to fund the rebels' land forces in the southern part of England, and a very large proportion of this went directly into the pockets of Essex's regulars via Gerrard's army treasury.

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[612] Coffman, "Financial Revolution", 133.

[613] Wheeler, "English Army Finance", 146; Coffman, "Financial Revolution", 133-134. The main reason why it is so difficult to settle on a final and indisputable total is that the House of Commons frequently debated specific spending orders on multiple occasions, and it is not always clear whether certain discussions refer to previous orders or calls for new spending and/or borrowing.

So during 1644 the most centralized elements of the rebels' rapidly-evolving war effort were fueled through two entirely new administrative entities: the Committee at Goldsmiths' Hall and the Excise Office. How did these and other developments affect the command structure of the Parliament's regular and quasi-regular forces during this period? More than simply calling for the English to supply their new allies with vast sums of money, the Anglo-Scottish Treaty of 1643 also stipulated that the English Parliament consult with the Scots on all matters of 'difference' that might arise between the two kingdoms. This point, as Notestein once said, soon led to the creation of a new joint committee designed to ensure that the political and military interests of the two revolutionary governments were in harmony.[614] On 30 January 1644 the Scottish commissioners who expected to sit on this new committee arrived in London and discovered that the English were not yet ready for them. In fact, the southerners would not be ready for another two weeks. The reasons for this were entirely political.

The death of John Pym in December precipitated a seismic shift in the political landscape at Westminster. The old Saye-Pym group – which had evolved out of the pre-war Junto – had emerged triumphant from the political and military confusion of mid-1643 with Essex and the regular army at their backs. Essex, irritated though he was about the resurgent position of Waller, had abandoned the Northumberland-Holles group once his army had been reorganized for the relief of Gloucester. As a result, many of the most powerful members of this political circle had fled to the king in August. This left the

[614] Notestein, "Establishment", 481-482.

Saye-Pym group free to pursue their grand design for the complicated and costly Scottish alliance, an alliance that the ever-jealous Essex – commander of the rebels' increasingly marginalized regular army – was never particularly thrilled about. After the hollowing-out of the old Northumberland-Holles group and the death of his old ally Pym, Essex defected to the residuum of peace-minded parliamentarians who had their own reasons for opposing the political and financial consequences of the Scottish alliance. The 'Essex-Holles group' was thus born. The recast 'Saye-St John group', on the other hand, saw the need for close cooperation with the Scots as an opportunity to create a new instrument of executive authority in England, one that could either bypass or override the sweeping powers that the Parliament had given to Essex in 1642. And after an intense series of parliamentary maneuvers they succeeded in doing just that.[615]

On 16 February the Parliament passed an ordinance creating the Committee of Both Kingdoms – a body of seven English lords, fourteen English commoners, and four Scottish commissioners.[616] Although Essex and several of his new friends and allies were among these, it seems clear that the majority of the most active Committeemen were either of or for the more militant Saye-St John group.[617] Crucially, in addition to their job of preserving 'communication' between the two nations, the Englishmen on the new Committee were also given the extraordinary power

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[615] Scott, *Politics and War*, 65 and 68-71; Gentles, *English Revolution*, 209-210; John Adamson, "The Triumph of Oligarchy: the Management of War and the Committee of Both Kingdoms", in *Parliament at Work: Parliamentary Committees, Political Power and Public Access in Early Modern England*, edited by Chris R. Kyle and Jason Peacey (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2002), 101-128.
[616] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 381-382.
[617] Braddick, *God's Fury*, 324.

> . . . to advise, consult, order, and direct, concerning the carrying on and managing of the War for the best Advantage of the Three Kingdoms, and the keeping a good Intelligence between the Three Kingdoms, their Forces, Committees, and Counsels; and likewise with Power to hold good Correspondency [sic] and Intelligence with Foreign States; and further to advise and consult of all Things in Pursuance of the Ends expressed in the late Covenant and Treaty.[618]

They were not, however, to countenance any form of cessation, nor were they to engage in peace talks of any kind without the express approval of the English Parliament. Although this ordinance did limit the Committee's existence to three months, a second piece of legislation – passed in May – extended its sitting indefinitely.[619]

Historians have often rightly claimed that these remarkable new powers – when given to the men who were to wield them – severely attenuated both the authority and the autonomy of the Lord General. Although the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms did not 'demote' Essex by removing him from his central place within the Parliament's military hierarchy, it did place a new and powerful and politically-hostile executive entity between him and the sovereign power of Parliament. Looked at from this angle, the Committee of Both Kingdoms can be understood as a much more coherent and much less friendly evolution of the Parliament's old Committee of Safety, which was of course still chugging along at this time.[620] During the entirety of 1642-1644 the Committee of Safety had and retained certain executive functions – not the least of which was issuing pay warrants to Gerrard's centralized army treasury. But like Essex and his army, the Committee of Safety had come under political fire during the first year of the

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[618] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 381-382.
[619] *Ibid.*, 436-437.
[620] Glow, "The Committee of Safety", 299-300 especially.

war. It had become large, cumbersome, and inefficient; and everyone from Henry Marten to Edmund Waller disliked it.[621] The Committee of Both Kingdoms, by contrast, was specifically designed to allow one highly motivated sub-section of the central government to efficiently ". . . order, and direct . . ." all of the disparate parts of the rebels' fiscal-military machine, a machine that was still ostensibly under the overall command and control of the Lord General. As a consequence of this, the actions of this new body helped define and shape the war effort in the south during the 1644 campaigns.

Before we explore the role played by the Committee of Both Kingdoms in the disastrous tale of Essex's western adventure we must first survey a few key organizational and legislative developments that occurred during the first five months of the period covered by this chapter. Again, this is crucial because the resulting ordinances defined the fiscal-military framework of the Parliament's three most important southern armies in the period before the rise of the New Model Army. Indeed, such a survey allows for an institutional comparison of these armies during this period, something that is of particular interest and importance here because it demonstrates the degree to which each took a different 'evolutionary pathway' in terms of its fiscal-military organization. Let us begin with the most decidedly provincial of the three.

The earl of Manchester's revamped Army of the Eastern Association came into being during the summer of 1643. As we know, the reorganization of this army at that time was facilitated by the various ordinances outlined in the first section of chapter three

[621] *Ibid.*, 306-310.

above. A further ordinance – which was passed on 20 September 1643[622] – accomplished two things, both of which added to the organizational confusion that existed within the eastern counties. In the first place, the ordinance added the disputed county of Lincolnshire to the Association, something that created a great deal of administrative conflict within that county because the existing parliamentary commander – Lord Willoughby of Parnham – refused to acknowledge the overriding authority of his new Association commander. Secondly, the 20 September ordinance imposed an entirely new Weekly Assessment on the seven counties of the Association. On paper, this appeared to strengthen the quasi-regular Army of the Association by authorizing greater direct taxation throughout the region that created and sustained it. Unfortunately, however, the administrative framework of this new Assessment – embodied in freshly-appointed county-level committees – completely ignored the existence of the Cambridge Committee, which, according to the ordinance of 10 August 1643, was supposed to be the military and political centre of the Eastern Association.[623] In short, Manchester's new quasi-regular units were given access to larger amounts of the Association's tax money, but they were still to receive their pay at the county level.

During the autumn of 1643 the continued decentralization of the Association's finances undermined the military effectiveness of Manchester's slowly-coalescing army. Although a special ordinance passed on 11 October authorized Manchester to collect and retain one third of all Sequestration money raised in the Association (the rest being

[622] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 291-298.
[623] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 103.

needed in London, presumably to serve as collateral for the Scottish loan),[624] it was by then clear that the Association's own quasi-regular forces were going to be fueled largely by the Assessment, which was, again, entirely in the hands of the constituent counties. Because of this, some counties' units received better pay than others, and certain county-level committees were either unable or unwilling to send reinforcements into the other counties of the Association when their neighbors were threatened by the royalists.[625] Thankfully, a legislative solution to the problems brought about by the passage of the 20 September ordinance finally appeared on 20 January 1644. On that day the Houses passed a new Ordinance that resolved Manchester's dispute with Lord Willoughby by denying the latter any source of funding, increased the projected Assessment yields throughout the Association by 50 per cent, and, most importantly, facilitated the creation of a 'centralized' treasury apparatus under the immediate control of both Manchester and the Cambridge Committee.[626] These were impressive legislative accomplishments; how did Manchester and his allies manage to see them passed?

In his treatise on the Eastern Association, Holmes persuasively argued that the timely passage of the 20 January Ordinance was the result of the Army of the Eastern Association's unique position within the complex web of national and sub-national political interests that were swirling about Westminster during the winter of 1643/4. After reading D'Ewes, he concluded that within and in addition to 'national' or 'high' political

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[624] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 309-310.
[625] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 99-104.
[626] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 368-371; Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 107.

groupings led by the grandees,[627] there were three other concurrent and overlapping political networks – these roughly corresponding to regional interests. Significantly, the first two of these 'regional' groupings within[628] the central government were sympathetic to the interests of what we now call the Saye-St John group. The first was a group of northern MPs who supported funding for the Scots in an effort to preserve their estates; the second was a group of western MPs who saw in Sir William Waller – the darling of the City radicals – the best way to protect their local interests; and the third was a more amorphous body of pacific members who by then tended to support the Lord General's interests in opposition to the other two. According to Holmes, the rapid passage of the 20 January Ordinance was the product of a fortuitous overlapping of interests within what we now refer to as the Saye-St John group and the two blocs of regionally-minded MPs, a process that was only half-heartedly opposed by the Lord General's allies. In short, those within the orbit of the Saye-St John group – be they supporters of either the Scottish alliance or of Waller – tended to approve of a strong Eastern Association, while the Essex-Holles group were not necessarily supportive of the bill, but were ultimately more interested in using their energies to undermine Waller's position.[629]

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[627] Holmes, working in the early 1970s, still used Professor Hexter's troika of 'peace', 'middle', and 'war parties' to describe national politics in the House of Commons.

[628] More recently, Professor Holmes has refined and reiterated his argument concerning the fundamental interconnection of 'central' and 'regional' political interests during the wars. Clive Holmes, "Centre and Locality in Civil-War England" in *The English Civil War: Conflict and Contexts, 1640-49*, ed. John Adamson (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2009), 153-174. See also Ann Hughes, "The king, the parliament, and the localities during the English civil war" in *The English Civil War*, eds. Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (London: Arnold, 1997), 261-287.

[629] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 112-115.

By 1644 the simmering antipathy that developed between Essex and Waller during the chaotic campaigns of 1643 had evolved into an ". . . outright feud . . .'[630] that overshadowed the Parliament's war effort in the south. Essex – whose ego was always very quick to bruise – had deeply resented both the attention and praise that had been heaped on Waller in the aftermath of his losses in the west and the Saye-Pym group's decision to promote him to an 'independent' command on the eve of the Gloucester adventure. Although Essex's successes in that adventure had given him enough political cachet to demand the re-subordination of Waller in October, the latter retained both his titular command over the London Militia, and his dedicated following in Parliament. He also managed to retain a hodgepodge of detached and depleted quasi-regular military units – the residue of his shattered Western Army, and the partially-formed nucleus of the Merchant Tailors' Hall 'New Army'. In November 1643, during his week-long siege of Basing House, Waller fielded these miscellaneous forces alongside a much larger contingent of Trained Band and Auxiliary regiments that had been 'loaned' to him by the City's Militia Committee – a body that, as we know, had secured the right to deploy or recall their own forces at will.[631] But unfortunately for Waller, the London militia

[630] *Ibid.*, 114.

[631] Again, 6 September 1643. See Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 271-272. A more detailed description of this particular incarnation of Waller's mix-and-match army can be found in Adair's book and Nagel's thesis. There were three metropolitan militia units attending Waller in early November: The Westminster Red Trained Band; the London Green Auxiliaries; and the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries. See Adair, *Roundhead General*, 111-112; Nagel, "Militia of London", 135.

performed poorly on this occasion, and by mid-November he was forced to retire to Farnham Castle as Hopton's royalists advanced toward him.[632]

At Farnham Waller was soon treated to an injection of £10,000 supplied to the central government by the Excise Commissioners. He was also promptly reinforced with fresh quasi-regular troops sent to him by the leadership of the South-Eastern Association of Hampshire, Sussex, Surrey, and Kent, a brand new fiscal-military entity that came into existence by a parliamentary ordinance passed on 4 November.[633] This ordinance appointed new committees for each of the four constituent counties. These committees were given the power to devise, impose, and collect a fresh Weekly Assessment within their respective counties, and to use the resulting revenues to raise and support county-level forces for service under the immediate command of the Association's Major General, Sir William Waller. Most interesting, however, was the provision that called for the creation of a ". . . Select, Standing, and Constant Committee . . .", a body to be composed of any eight of the Association's county-level committeemen (four of whom had to be MPs at Westminster). Analogous to the Cambridge Committee within the Eastern Association before the passage of the 20 January 1644 Ordinance, the 'Standing Committee' of the South-Eastern Association was given the power to collect accounts of receipt and expenditure from the Association's county-level committees, to manage the

[632] Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 136.
[633] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 121; *CJ*, iii, 319 for the resolution concerning Waller's Excise money; *LJ*, vi, 294-296 for the Ordinance creating the South-Eastern Association.

purchase and deployment of war materiel by those committees, and to ". . . order all other Affairs of their several Counties . . .".[634]

The decision to use Parliament's executive power to supply Waller's fragmented army with centralized Excise money, as well as the creation of the South-Eastern Association, were significant infrastructural developments. However, the overarching importance of the City's essentially voluntary and fundamentally transient contribution to Waller's rebuilt army should never be forgotten. Thanks to the ongoing service of his London Brigade, as well as the aforementioned innovations, Waller was able to defeat a detachment of Hopton's army at Alton on 12 December.[635] Although he did manage to retake Arundel Castle without the help of the militiamen during the early part of January 1644, there is reason to suspect that this success was at least partly the result of luck.[636] The Parliament itself understood that there was little chance of Waller's army retaining its effectiveness without the ongoing help of the City's militia.[637] Heavy snows brought an end to Waller's campaign season by the end of January, but not before he was again reinforced by two fresh Trained Band regiments from London.[638]

Perhaps hoping to reduce his ongoing reliance on the City's militia, Waller and his friends and allies in Parliament resolved to reform and refine the fiscal-military

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[634] Again, *LJ*, vi, 294-296.
[635] Nagel, "Militia of London", 148-151.
[636] The water supply within the castle walls was contaminated when an ox fell into one of the wells and died. Adair, *Roundhead General*, 130.
[637] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 359-360.
[638] These were the London White Trained Band and the London Yellow Trained Band, both of which were placed under the immediate command of Colonel Richard Browne. See Adair, *Roundhead General*, 131; Nagel, "Militia of London", 168-169.

machinery of the new South-Eastern Association. On 12 February they introduced a bill designed to accomplish this.[639] The final version of this bill, which ultimately passed both Houses on 30 March 1644, assigned part of the proceeds generated by Sequestration in all four counties to the county-level committees that had been appointed on 4 November.[640] It also assigned a new, fixed-quota Weekly Assessment to each of the four counties. Worth a total of £10,552.30 per month, this new Assessment was designed to last four months. When added to the Association's Sequestration revenues, this sum was supposed to help levy and support a quasi-regular contingent of 4,700 horse and foot, a contingent that came to supplement – not replace – the other forces that made up Waller's composite army.

Interestingly enough, the recast fiscal-military machinery of the South-Eastern Association was designed to be nearly as sophisticated and 'centralized' as that which was created in the Eastern Association by the Ordinance of 20 January. The major differences between the two administrative arrangements can be found in the respective roles of the Associations' two military commanders, and in the scope of the Association-level committees' respective financial powers. A side-by-side comparison of the relevant passages from the two ordinances efficiently demonstrates these differences:

> 20 January 1644 – Eastern Association Ordinance:
>
> . . . And the severall Collectors, shall pay the severall summes by them Collected, at the place or several places where the Earl of Manchester, and the Committee for the Association attending the

[639] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 109.
[640] *LJ*, vi, 493-494. Two thirds of all Sequestration money collected in Kent and Surrey – the counties closest to London – were supposed to be diverted to the Parliament's central coffers. See also Everitt, *The Community of Kent*, 160.

> said Earle shall appoint, and to the Treasurer and Treasurers to be by them named, which Treasurer or Treasurers are to Issue out the Moneys received for the purposes aforementioned, according to the Warrants or directions of the said Earl of Manchester, and of any two of the said Committees for the said Association, which shall be appointed thereunto by the said Earle and a full Committee, consisting of one of every County at least, and of the Commissary Generall for the time being of the said Earle of Manchester: And that no Money be issued out without Order under the hands of the said Earle, such two of the said Committee, and the said Commissary Generall, or yet without a privity of the whole Committee attending the said Earle.
>
> 30 March 1644 – South-Eastern Association Ordinance:
>
> . . . and the several Collectors shall pay the several Weekly Sums by them collected, at the Place or several Places where the Standing Committee nominated by virtue of the said Ordinance of the 4th of November shall order and direct, and to the said Treasurer General of the Association; which said Treasurer General is to issue forth the Monies received for the Purposes aforementioned, according to the Warrants or Directions of the said Standing Committee, or any Five of them: And be it Ordained, That all the Weekly Sums of Money that shall be raised and levied, in the several and respective Counties, shall be applied only to the Service and Maintenance of the respective Forces of those Counties wherein the said Money shall be so raised, the same to be issued forth and employed as abovesaid, according to the Warrant or Warrants of the said Standing Committee, or any five of them . . .

Both ordinances gave the pre-existing Association-level committees control over the newly-assigned Assessment revenues – revenues that in both cases amounted to just under £2.50 pounds per quasi-regular soldier, per month.[641] In the South-Eastern Association, however, the 'Standing Committee' was prohibited from using tax revenues from one constituent county to support the quasi-regular forces of another.[642] What's more, Waller was not given the personal authority to access these (nominally) 'centralized' resources. Confirmed as the Major-General of the new Association (subordinated, as he was, to the authority of the Lord General), Waller nevertheless found

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[641] EA: £33,780 per month ÷ 14,000 soldiers = £2.41 per soldier;
SEA: £10,552.30 per month ÷ 4,700 soldiers = £2.25 per soldier.

[642] This is probably the most important reason why the machinery of the South-Eastern Association is so inconspicuous in Everitt's analysis of Assessment spending in Kent during the first war. Everitt, *The Community of Kent*, 162-167.

himself again dependent on the parochial administrators who were ultimately responsible for the pay and supply of yet another sub-section of his patchwork army.

The key point here is that the hybridized nature of Waller's 1644 army affected not only the strategic and tactical reliability of his command, but its relationship to the central government. At its core, Waller's recast army was made up of units drawn from a relatively sophisticated multi-county Association – a fiscal-military organism similar in form and function to Manchester's revamped Eastern Association. But Waller remained heavily reliant on the agency of both the 'Standing Committee' of his Association, and the Militia Committee of London (and its latticework of suburban sub-committees). Curiously, however, if the nature of the South-Eastern Association made at least part of Waller's army structurally similar to the Army of the Eastern Association, then the Parliament's willingness to provide it with centralized Excise money and the City's willingness to provide it with militia support made it functionally similar to the Lord General's regular army in 1644. The key to understanding this functional – if not structural – similarity can of course be found in the close, mutually-dependent relationship that both Waller's and Essex's armies had with the City of London and its financial and political edifices. This relationship was something these two forces did *not* have in common with Manchester's army before the conclusion of the Lostwithiel campaign, and it may go part of the way toward explaining the particularly intense rivalry that existed between their commanders at that time.

As we know, Essex and his regular army were able to undertake the relief of Gloucester thanks to the powerful, temporary reinforcement they received from the City's Trained Band and Auxiliary regiments.[643] And during the weeks and months that followed this operation the regulars again benefitted from the presence of London's militiamen. The first thing Essex did upon his return to London after the battle of Newbury was to successfully demand the revocation of Waller's 'independent' commission – the much-hated document that Pym had wrestled from his pen before the Gloucester expedition. The second was to prepare both his regulars and a new lineup of City regiments for another expedition to Reading, which the king's forces had retaken in the aftermath of Newbury.[644] The plan to move on Reading was abandoned, though, when it was discovered that Prince Rupert had seized Newport Pagnell on 15 October. The loss of this town – and the establishment of a royalist garrison there under Sir Lewis Dyves – was an even more dangerous development than the fall of Reading; from Newport the royalists could disrupt communication with the north, and threaten the heartlands of the Eastern Association.[645] Three days later the House of Lords responded by giving Essex the authority to deploy his own army, as well as the Trained Bands of

[643] Six infantry regiments went with the regulars to Gloucester and subsequently fought alongside them at Newbury. Again, see Nagel, "Militia of London", 118 for a precise roster of these formations.
[644] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 285; BL Thomason E.71[17], London, Militia Committee, *A declaration of the Committee for the Militia: concerning the penalties that are to be inflicted upon those of the trained-bands that exempt themselves in this present expedition. Together with a declaration of the Commons assembled in Parliament, for the raising of money, plate, and horse, to be employed for the aid and assistance of the Lord Fairfax. Ordered by the Commons in Parliament, that this be forthwith printed and published* (London: Edward Husbands, 1643).
[645] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 285.

Hertfordshire, Middlesex, and Essex County, wherever he saw fit.[646] By 19 October Essex and his regulars were again on the move. Reinforced by four infantry regiments drawn from the metropolitan militia, as well as an impressive body of some 3,000-4,000 Trained Bandsmen from Hertfordshire, Essex's army easily retook Newport Pagnell on the thirtieth.[647]

Essex's regulars spent the remainder of 1643 ensconced at Newport Pagell and at St. Albans, where Essex had only recently established his military headquarters. During this time they continued to benefit from the presence of their comrades in the London Brigade, who were immediately put to work constructing fortifications around Newport Pagnell.[648] Unfortunately, however, the municipal authorities saw this as an inappropriate use of their military resources. On 19 November the Militia Committee made an abortive attempt to reassign these forces to Waller's army, which had recently failed to capture Basing House. Naturally, this provoked a sharp response from Essex, who insisted that his consignment of militiamen continue to serve alongside his regulars. The City relented, but during the course of the next several weeks they complained repeatedly and evermore vociferously about the problems associated with deploying and maintaining two brigades

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[646] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 399; *LJ*, vi, 262.

[647] As usual, Nagel provides us with the roster of municipal forces assigned to Essex's army during this new adventure. They were: the London Green Trained Band; the London Orange Trained Band; the Southwark Yellow Trained Band; Manwarring's 'redcoats'; and the two regiments – Harvey's and Turner's – of the City's cavalry. Hertfordshire's impressive turnout may have been the product of recent legislation designed to give the county-level authorities within that Eastern-Association county the power to raise coherent, quasi-regular forces of their own. These Assessment-fueled forces were to serve under Lord Cranborne so long as they stayed within the boundaries of their home county. Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 399; Nagel, "Militia of London", 153-154; *LJ*, vi, 222-223.

[648] Nagel, "Militia of London", 156.

of militiamen in the field. On the twentieth, for example, they appeared at the bar of the Commons and began lecturing the members about the importance of maintaining a strong regular army, as well as the nature and proper use of the English militia:

> . . . Our Forces, now abroad, want Money . . . Ten thousand Pounds for those with my Lord General; and Four or Five thousand to those with Sir *Wm. Waller:* - They [the militiamen] are Citizens, civilly bred, and cannot make use of those Means for their Supply, as other common Soldiers do, that are used to the War; and now are brought to these necessities, that they must come home: We have used our utmost Endeavours to supply them; but, at present, we cannot help them: We have addressed ourselves to my Lord General, hoping to have had some of the Monies that is going to my Lord General, for the Payment of our Forces: My Lord General declared, he was not able to spare it, unless it be the Three thousand Pounds allotted him for the Recruiting his Army; and what ill Consequences this may produce, I am sorry to mention. That is the Second Difficulty I am to impart to you. You are not ignorant, that, for these many Months past, my Lord General hath wanted recruiting; and so weak, that he hath not been able to do the Service of the Kingdom, or restrain the Enemy from enlarging his Quarters: Consider, our City Forces were raised for the Guard of the City, and are Tradesmen; and when they are abroad, their Plough lieth still at home; and besides, they lose their Employment; and you cannot be ignorant, that , if the Course be continued, it will be a great Wasting of Men: For the preventing whereof, this Remedy is offered; That my Lord General's Army be speedily recruited; and that the City of *London* may be considered of, as a Place that hath much advanced, and is drawn dry . . .[649]

Military necessity ensured that the Lord General managed to retain the services of his London Brigade until early January, notwithstanding these entirely reasonable arguments and observations. By that time the Parliament had resolved to protect Newport by raising yet another new, local contingent of Assessment-fueled quasi-regular troops.[650]

In the aftermath of the Gloucester campaign Essex, like Waller, remained partially reliant on the supplementary strength of the London militia. Unlike either Waller or Manchester, however, the Lord General was not provided with a multi-county Association from which his own forces could be recruited and supplied. Instead, his regular formations – the oldest of which had served during the Edgehill campaign – soon

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[649] *Ibid.*, p.157, n.2; the full text can be found in *CJ*, iii, 315-316.
[650] Nagel, "Militia of London", 158; *LJ*, vi, 344-345.

came to rely primarily on the credit generated by the Excise, the most productive and the most centralized of all the Parliament's various revenue streams at that time. As early as 7 October 1643 the House of Commons began encumbering the Excise for this purpose. On that day the Lower House authorized the borrowing of up to £8,000 for ". . . the present Supply of the Lord General's army . . .", repayable from ". . . the first Monies, that shall come in upon the Ordinance of Excise, in the Three first Months".[651] On 31 October – just one day after the army occupied Newport Pagnell – the Commons assigned a further £23,000 of Excise money to Essex and his regulars, ordering the Excise Commissioners to front the money immediately.[652] The latter quickly delivered, for Vernon reported receiving precisely that amount from them in two installments during the month of November.[653]

During the winter of 1643/4 the regulars' reliance on the Excise was enshrined in law. On 1 February the Parliament passed an ordinance recognizing the ongoing need to recruit and rebuild Essex's army. This ordinance stipulated that the reformed army was to consist of seven regiments of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, and a 'suitable' train of artillery. Besides the requisite number of officers, the infantry arm was to consist of no more than 7,500 ordinary soldiers, the cavalry no more than 3,000 troopers. A single

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[651] *CJ*, iii, 265.
[652] *CJ*, iii, 296. £3,000 of this was supposed to be used to help recruit the army. This is undoubtedly the same £3,000 the Militia Committee of London made reference to during their address to the Commons on 20 November.
[653] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.3v.

payment of £20,000 from the Excise Office was authorized to fund this reorganization.[654] Almost two months later, after a bitter series of political battles with their parliamentary opponents,[655] Essex's supporters secured the passage of a further ordinance that provided the regulars with 'constant pay' for four months.[656] Like the ordinances passed to supply Manchester's and Waller's armies during the 1644 campaign, the Lord General's Ordinance of 26 March 1644 provided his army with around £2.91 per ordinary soldier, per month.[657] But in this case only a quarter of the funds were to be levied by Assessment. The majority of the rest was to come from the Excise Office in London.[658] Again, this was highly significant because it meant that Essex's regulars – the hard core of the Lord General's personal command – were to have no significant financial relationship with any sub-national organization or body during the last phase of their separate existence.

Three pieces of legislation, then, defined the scope and shape of the Parliament's most important regular and quasi-regular military organizations in England during 1644: the Eastern Association Ordinance of 20 January 1644; the Lord General's Ordinance of 26 March 1644; and the South-Eastern-Association Ordinance of 30 March 1644. Before concluding this section with a brief summary of the southern campaigns of 1644, it is important to make note of an important clause that was inserted into all three of these

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[654] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 375-376.
[655] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 109-110.
[656] Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 398-405.
[657] Interestingly, Essex's Ordinance provided for slightly more money, *per capita*, than either Manchester's or Waller's Ordinances. (£30,504 per month ÷ 10,500 soldiers = £2.91 per soldier.)
[658] **Table 4.1, Appendix D.**

ordinances. This clause had to do with a systematic reduction in the pay of the Parliament's army officers, who by 1644 had become far too numerous and far too expensive. As Professor Holmes put it:

> In 1644 Parliament endeavored to limit the immediate costs of the war by paying the officers only a proportion of the sum due to them. A clause in the Ordinance of 20 January instructed that all officers and specialist personnel, with the exception of the regimental ministers, whose pay exceeded 10/- a day were to receive half-pay, and those who received from 5/- to 10/- a day, two-thirds of their established pay; for the remainder they were to accept certificates promising repayment 'on the Publique Faith' after the termination of the war.[659]

As we shall soon see in sections II and III, this modification had a meaningful impact on both the real and hypothetical cost of all the Parliament's forces, including the regular army.

On 4 March, long before the Lord General's own forces were ready to take the field, the new Committee of Both Kingdoms made its first significant command decision regarding the disposition of its southernmost armies. Resolving to immediately confront and destroy Lord Hopton's forces before they could overwhelm the South-Eastern Association, the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered Essex and Waller to assemble a body of 8,600 horse and foot for that purpose.[660] As a result of this decision Waller soon came into the temporary possession of twenty-two cavalry troops drawn from the Lord General's regular army. These horsemen, who were placed under the immediate command of Sir William Balfour during this detached adventure, linked up with Waller's composite forces – including the London White and Yellow Trained Bands under

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[659] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 143.
[660] William Douglas Hamilton, ed. *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I Jan – Sept 1644*. Vol.19. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1888), 33-34.

Browne – in Hampshire during the second half of that month.[661] On the twenty ninth Waller's reinforced army clashed with Hopton's royalists outside the village of Cheriton. Although Waller, Balfour, and Browne managed to sweep the cavaliers off the field that day, they did not succeed in destroying them. By April the king and his generals had managed to reassemble most of the troops that had been scattered at Cheriton, and Waller, who was then forced to accept the reassignment of Balfour's regulars and the departure of Browne's militiamen, was unable to threaten them further.[662]

In the aftermath of Cheriton it was clear that achieving a decisive victory in the south would require the full deployment and close cooperation of the respective regular, quasi-regular, and militia forces of Essex, Waller, and the City of London. Thanks to the army Ordinances of 26 and 30 March, the Committee of Both Kingdoms could count on the services of the first two; the City, however, still needed to be courted and convinced. Thankfully for Waller, on 2 April the Militia Committee quickly agreed to supply him with three fresh infantry regiments to replace Browne's now absent brigade.[663] A day later, the Parliament passed a new ordinance calling for a fresh loan of £20,000 – backed by the Excise – to support the deployment of these forces.[664] But a still greater level of

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[661] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 135; *CSPD*, vol.19, 49. Recall that Browne's London Brigade had been with Waller's own forces since January.

[662] Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 142-150. For the return to London of Browne's Brigade consult Nagel, "Militia of London", 178; for the return to the regular army of Balfour's detachment consult the cavalry warrants preserved in TNA SP28/14.

[663] Nagel, "Militia of London", 179-183. Waller's new City brigade – which was soon placed under the immediate command of Sir James Harrington – consisted of: the Southwark White Auxiliaries; the Tower Hamlets' Red Trained Band; and the Westminster Yellow Auxiliaries.

[664] *LJ*, vi, 546-547. It should be noted that this Ordinance gave the Militia Committee total control over the dispersal of this borrowed money.

commitment was needed if the king's southern armies were to be beaten in the field. On 9 April the Parliament sent a small delegation containing some of its most important figures to deliver a series of rousing speeches before the government of London at Guildhall. Among the delegates was Essex himself, who, after listening to the speeches of the earl of Warwick and Sir Henry Vane, made the following address:

> My Lords and Gentlemen, you have here understood by a noble Lord my Lord Admirall, & this Noble Gentleman of the House of Commons, the desire of both Houses of Parliament, they have acquainted you too, what the Kings intention is, to draw all his Forces together, and what the Parliament doth intend in drawing all their Forces they can Southward, and what great victory God hath given Sir *William Balfore* and Sir *William Waller*, so I am onely to take this opportunitie to give you all acknowledgements and thankes for those great aides that I have had always to goe along with mee; for I must needs acknowledge, and most of the things that have beene done by me, especially the businesse at *Gloucester*, have beene done by your helps; I should desire the like still; and what shall come to mee I shall use with good respects, and venture my life with them; and I should have beene very glad that my Army had beene in that case, that I might not have needed to take any of you from your owne homes, knowing how much expense you have beene at already both in your estates, and blood, in the service of Religion and this cause; But whatsoever Forces you please to draw out, I shall venture my life with them, and bee ready to give a quicke end to this cause: To bee at their Rendezvous the 19 of this month, about Ailesbury.[665]

After listening to all this, the City agreed to send forth another detachment to serve alongside the regular army under Essex. However, they were not prepared to do so until the Parliament passed yet another ordinance guaranteeing the organizational integrity of the municipal militia and reconfirming the Militia Committee's absolute control over the City's forces, an ordinance which the central government duly passed on 9 May.[666] Within the next two and a half weeks Essex and his newly-deployed army were joined at

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[665] BL Thomason E.42[18], Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, *Six speeches spoken in the Guild-Hall, London, upon Tuesday in the afternoon, Aprill 9 1644 printed in the same order they were spoken one after the other. By the Earle of Warwick, Sir Henry Vane, the Earle of Essex, the Earl of Pembroke, Colonell Holles, and Master Recorder* (London: Richard Cotes, 1644). This pamphlet is also cited by Gardiner. Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 400. It was surely with great bitterness and spite that Essex referred to the victors of Cheriton in the order that he did.

[666] *LJ*, vi, 546-547.

Reading by the London Green, Yellow, and Orange Auxiliaries, as well as a contingent of City horse under Harvey.[667]

During the final week of May Essex and Waller successfully coordinated the movements of their reinforced armies and seized the poorly-defended town of Abingdon, which sits just eight miles south of Oxford. After this they immediately began the methodical process of encircling the royalist capital. Shocked and frightened by the speed with which their enemies were moving, the royalists nevertheless managed to extricate the king from Oxford on 3 June. Abandoning the majority of his infantry, Charles and a hand-picked 'flying army' of horse and musketeers escaped westward, arriving at Evesham no later than the fifth. A day later, Essex and Waller held a Council of War at Chipping Norton to discuss the rapidly-changing strategic situation.[668] Bowing to the wishes of the Lord General, the Council decided then and there to separate the two rebel armies in order to address two different military priorities. Waller's army was to pursue and (if possible) destroy the king's army, while the regulars under Essex would fulfill the wishes of the Committee of Both Kingdoms – expressed to both Essex and Waller in two letters dated 30 May[669] – by marching south to the relief of Lyme Regis, a port city in the county of Dorset which was then under the guns of Prince Maurice's royalist army of the West.

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[667] Nagel, "Militia of London", 183-185.
[668] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 411-416; Adair, *Roundhead General*, 151-153; Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 428-431; and Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 162-166. Gardiner is alone among these scholars in his belief that the Council of War took place at Stow-on-the-Wold.
[669] *CSPD*, vol.19, 181-182.

But what was so important about Lyme? Furthermore, why did Essex feel that its relief warranted the full commitment of the regular army and its temporary detachment of City regiments? Recently, Wanklyn and Jones have posited that the ultimate fate of Lyme and its parliamentarian garrison loomed large in the imaginations of both the king's followers and his enemies during the spring and summer of 1644.[670] They suggest that the royalists then hoped that their own Western Association might soon become as productive and important as the rebels' Eastern Association, and that reducing Lyme – which had been reinforced in February 1644 with 500 parliamentarian infantrymen under Colonel Ware – was an important stepping stone on the road to realizing this hope. Additionally, they remind us that on 17 April the pregnant queen had left Oxford for Exeter in order to give birth in relative safety,[671] and that protecting her from marauding rebel armies that might find succor at Lyme was a very high priority for the king, if not his generals.[672] Indeed, Maurice began his seven-week siege of the town on 20 April, just three days after the queen departed Oxford. A month and a half later, as the parliamentary Council of War considered what to do after the king's escape from Oxford, Essex came to believe that only the regular army was capable of destroying Maurice's forces and conquering the royalist heartlands in the peninsular west.[673] As both Gardiner and Gentles have argued, it is possible that this belief was encouraged and reinforced by Field Marshall Lord Robarts, a colonel in the regular infantry corps, and one of Essex's close

[670] Much of the following was derived from Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 158-161.
[671] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 389-390.
[672] See, for example, *CSPD*, vol.19, 314.
[673] *Ibid.*, 211-212.

confidants. Robarts was a landowner in Cornwall, and he argued that the westerners would be quick to flock to Essex's standard once it was raised.[674] Additionally, the Lord General probably relished the idea of capturing the queen and achieving a notable victory so near to Waller's original Western Association.[675]

By 11 June the Committee of Both Kingdoms had become aware of Essex's decision to send Waller after the king while he led his own forces into the west. They were not impressed. After consulting with their allies in the Commons, they issued letters to both Essex and Waller ordering them to redeploy the regular army to central England, and to send Waller's lighter and more mobile army into Dorset. Waller's composite army was sufficient, they conceived, to effect the relief of Lyme, although they did order Essex to once again detach a portion of his cavalry to take up position around the town in advance of Waller's coming.[676] The Lord General received these orders at Blandford on the fourteenth, and he immediately responded with a scathing indictment of the Committee of Both Kingdom's evaluation of the military situation in the west:

> . . . For first, Lyme cannot be relieved by a party, and if it could, that party must principally consist of foot, for horse can do very little service in those narrow passages; yet, contrary to my own opinion and the judgment of the Council of War, I have sent some horse and such as are most likely to do service, but I do not understand how it is possible for my horse to break through Prince Maurice's army of horse and foot. Even if they could, and should succeed in joining with the men of Lyme in pursuit of Prince Maurice, I know not what my army should do without horse the whilst, or how the horse should ever return to my foot again, for if the enemy should break

[674] See also Gentles, *English Revolution*, 227.
[675] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 416. Gardiner also made the interesting argument that the regular army's very nature made it more suitable for extended service in remote areas of the kingdom: ". . . [Essex's] army was more homogeneous, as being composed of men enlisted for general service, whilst that of Waller was mainly composed of men who had been furnished by the Association of Kent, Sussex, and Surrey, and who were therefore likely to be unwilling to be long absent from their homes".
[676] *CSPD*, vol.19, 223, 226, and 228. See also Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 417; Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 434.

> down a pass my horse are shut up forever. I am commanded therefore by the discipline of war and rules of reason to march further with my foot, for fear my horse should receive a blow; I must not retreat, for then the enemy will be encouraged and strengthened . . . Moreover you are misinformed concerning the strength of the enemy, for there is a party of horse and foot gone to them with money from Salisbury within these two days, and they may draw out some [of the garrisons] from Weymouth, Bristol and other places, and make them dragooners, to cut us off in the straight passes, when they perceive we have sent none but horse; the enemy's strength of horse is far beyond that which you speak of, and we hear that Hopton marches towards them with some horse, and 2,000 foot, most of them newly raised . . .[677]

Disobeying his masters in London, Essex pushed deeper into Dorset. On 15 June Maurice abandoned his siege of Lyme, and two days later the coastal town of Weymouth – some thirty miles to the east of Lyme – fell into Essex's hands.[678] Leaving the London Yellow Auxiliaries in garrison there,[679] Essex and the rest of his army marched along the channel coast toward Devonshire. Again, the goal was to break the royalists' hold on the far west, shatter Maurice's army (now at Exeter), and to raise new local forces that might supplement the strength of the Lord General's regular formations.[680] The central government, meanwhile, soon came to accept Essex's disobedience, and to embrace his new strategic plan as a *fait accompli*.[681]

On 3 July Essex entered Tiverton in Devonshire with the bulk of his forces, driving Maurice out of Exeter and north toward Barnstaple. The Lord General stayed at Tiverton for approximately two weeks, where the citizenry only begrudgingly supplied his army with local provisions, and where he received and rejected the queen's request

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[677] *CSPD*, vol.19, 232-233.
[678] *Ibid.*, 244-245.
[679] Nagel, "Militia of London", 203.
[680] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 437; *LJ*, vi, 602-603.
[681] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 421-422; *CJ*, iii, 542. Adair chose to use similar phrasing when describing this development. See Adair, *Roundhead General*, 157.

for safe passage to Bath.[682] Meanwhile, Waller had since chased the king's nimble 'flying army' all over the midlands, only to cross swords with them at the inconclusive and highly demoralizing battle of Cropredy Bridge in northern Oxfordshire on 29 June.[683] By 3 July Waller had effected a juncture with Major-General Richard Browne's hastily-constructed quasi-regular army at Northampton.[684] Browne, who the reader will recall had commanded the City Brigade which was attached to Waller's army during the first three months of 1644, had only recently been made Major-General of the poorly-organized counties of Oxfordshire, Berkshire, and Buckinghamshire.[685] On 18 June Browne's disjointed command was stiffened by a temporary consignment of three regiments of City militia, and on the twenty fifth his three counties were properly – if inefficiently – associated by the central government.[686] Unfortunately for Waller, however, his rendezvous with Browne's ill-disciplined militiamen had a wholly negative effect on his own exhausted brigade of Londoners, many of whom immediately decided that Browne's men were their relief![687] Very soon, both of these composite armies began disintegrating as more and more men deserted. By 20 July Waller was again in Abingdon

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[682] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 438-440.
[683] Adair, *Roundhead General*, chapters 12 and 13, passim.
[684] *Ibid.*, 163-164.
[685] 10 June 1644: *LJ*, vi, 585.
[686] *LJ*, vi, 596 and 605-607. Browne's City Brigade consisted of: the London Red Auxiliaries; the London White Auxiliaries; and the London Blue Auxiliaries. See Nagel, "Militia of London", 193. It is also interesting to note that Browne's three-county Association was *not* provided with a 'centralized' treasury apparatus.
[687] *CSPD*, vol.19, 324-325 and 326-327.

– where the summer campaign had begun – and unable to follow the king, who was now driving west in search of the Parliament's regular army.[688]

What kind of financial relationship did Essex's army have with the Parliament's friends in the west during its time at Tiverton in July? In late June – as Essex was approaching Devonshire, and Waller was rushing eastward toward his encounter with the king at Cropredy Bridge – the Parliament enacted fresh legislation designed to support the unexpected movements of its scattered forces in the south. On the twenty second of that month it passed an ordinance transferring £10,000 of the regular army's monthly Excise receipts to Waller's command. By way of recompense, the ordinance ordered that Essex's army was to henceforth receive the same amount each month from ". . . the Committee of the Western Counties appointed by both Houses of Parliament; that is to say, the County of *Wilts*, *Dorsett*, *Somersett*, *Devon*, and *Cornwall*, together with the Cities of *Bristoll*, *Exeter*, and the Town and County of *Poole* . . .".[689] At first glance, it would appear that this remarkable piece of legislation threatened to strip Essex's wayward army of its unique and direct financial relationship with the central government, transforming it into yet another quasi-regular army fueled by parochial taxation. But if we dig a little deeper it soon becomes apparent that the ordinance's practical effects were probably less dramatic than all that.

In the first place, there was nothing new or innovative about using centralized Excise money to help fund Waller's composite army. As we know, the Parliament had

[688] Adair, *Roundhead General*, 164; Nagel, "Militia of London", 197-199.
[689] *LJ*, vi, 602.

been drawing on this revenue stream to supplement Sir William's Assessment receipts from the South-Eastern Association since November 1643.[690] Secondly, it should be remembered that the counties mentioned in the ordinance of 22 June 1644 were largely in the hands of the royalists after the battle of Stratton in May 1643, and that at the time of the bill's passage there was no effective parliamentarian administration 'on the ground' there. In fact, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the central government was scrambling to create this administrative machinery during the two months that followed the passage of the 22 June ordinance. On 1 July the Parliament passed another ordinance establishing new county-level committees in the four aforementioned counties.[691] These new committees were given the power to administer the rebels' Covenant, and to collect all previously-enacted forms of parliamentary taxation. Significantly, however, it was not until 19 August – just two days before the royalists began their final attack on Essex's completely encircled army at Lostwithiel[692] – that these counties were formally associated by parliamentary ordinance.[693] Furthermore, like Browne's recently-enacted Association Ordinance, this new Western Association Ordinance failed to create a centralized treasury apparatus, or to provide the Lord General with any immediate or specific military authority within the new Association.

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[690] For additional evidence of Waller's forces receiving Excise money during the summer of 1644 consult *CJ*, iii, 543 (27 June 1644) and 600 (20 August 1644).
[691] *LJ*, vi, 612-613.
[692] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 448.
[693] *LJ*, vi, 677-680.

And so, although it is certainly possible that Francis Vernon received money from parochial sources during the month of July 1644, it seems highly unlikely that such monies could have been produced by the formal machinery of parliamentarian government in the western provinces. Finally, it also seems unlikely that the ordinance of 22 June had any immediate impact on the flow of centralized Excise revenues to Essex's army. That very day both Houses ordered the Commissioners of the Excise to pay Sir Gilbert Gerrard the sum of £12,300 – an amount they had recently lent the central government ". . . for and toward the next month's Pay of the Lord General's Army . . .". Crucially, Gerrard was immediately ordered to dispose of this money ". . . for the use aforesaid . . .".[694] All told, this sum amounted to no less than 78 per cent of the total amount distributed by Vernon in the field during the month of July.[695]

As we shall soon see, Essex's army received virtually no money from the agents of the central army treasury during the month of August 1644. Although the provisions of the Lord General's Ordinance of 26 March expired on 20 July, the final monthly installment of this money had yet to be paid, and this was therefore not the reason why no money was forthcoming. Rather, the problem was clearly one of distance and logistics. On 3 August both Houses of Parliament authorized the release of the last £20,000 of Essex's Excise money. One week later, the Committee of Both Kingdoms informed the Lord General that he could expect £2,000 of this money to arrive in the form of victuals,

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[694] *CJ*, iii, 540; *LJ*, vi, 602. See also *CSPD*, vol.19, 268-269, 288, 304, and 350-351. Vernon was clearly disbursing this money on the authority of the Lord General's warrants by 13 July.

[695] £12,300 (Gerrard's Excise receipts, 22 June 1644) ÷ £15,783.54 (Vernon's total spending [surviving paperwork], July 1644) = 77.93%.

and the rest in cash.[696] Unfortunately, however, at least some of these resources were evidently still in transit during the third week of August,[697] by which time the regular army was already doomed to a catastrophic defeat.

Holed up in Cornwall at Lostwithiel for a month following their occupation of the town on 2 August, the regulars and their comrades in several provincial units were eventually surrounded by no fewer than four royalist armies, one of which was commanded by the king himself. But far from abandoning their disobedient Lord General to his fate, the Committee of Both Kingdoms did what it could to organize forces for his relief. As early as 17 July this body was asking Waller to dispatch a portion of his rapidly-melting army to Dorset to protect the Parliament's newly-won influence there.[698] By mid-August, this request had been translated into a 2000-man cavalry detachment that was conducting operations in and around Dorset under the immediate command of Lieutenant-General Sir John Middleton.[699] Unfortunately, however, Middleton's troopers could not push deep enough into the peninsular west to be of much service to Essex,[700] who was forced to admit defeat by the end of the month. Unable to face the royalists in pitched battle, Essex initially hoped to save his army by shipping his infantry regiments east via the port of Fowey, and by ordering his cavalrymen to charge through the royalist lines and make for Devon as quickly as possible. On the morning of 31 August the

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[696] *CJ*, iii, 577-578; *CSPD*, vol.19, 420.
[697] *CSPD*, vol.19, 437-438.
[698] *CSPD*, vol.19, 358, 367, and 371.
[699] *Ibid.*, 413-414.
[700] *Ibid.*, 434-435 and 439-440.

cavalrymen managed to escape to Saltash under the command of Sir William Balfour. The infantry, however, soon learned that there were no ships waiting for them at Fowey. Contrary winds had prevented the earl of Warwick from coming to their rescue. Dreading capture, Essex abandoned his command and escaped to Plymouth via a small fishing boat. Major General Skippon and Colonel Whichcott were left behind to negotiate the best possible terms for, respectively, the regular infantry and the City's militia brigade. On 2 September they surrendered their exhausted forces to the king.[701]

The military collapse at Lostwithiel did not destroy the regular army, but its negative effects are nevertheless hard to exaggerate. Like the battle of Cropredy Bridge, the regulars' surrender in the far west severely crippled one of the Parliament's most important southern armies. Within two weeks of the surrender, elements of the regular cavalry were again serving with some of Waller's men, attempting with them to hold off the king's advance into the southeast.[702] The Lord General, meanwhile, set up shop in Portsmouth, where he endeavored to re-equip his beaten but unbroken infantry regiments, a task that took weeks to complete. Sadly, there was much to do. Although the king

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[701] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 449-453; Nagel, "Militia of London", 203-205; C.E. Long, ed., *Richard Symonds's Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62-68.

[702] *CSPD*, vol.19, 495, 497-498, 499-500, 530, and 534. Willing though he was to order his horsemen to stay in the field, Essex was concerned about their condition after the hard service of the western campaign. On 23 September he wrote to the Committee of Both Kingdoms: "Before I received yours of the 20th I sent for Quartermaster-General Dalbier, and ordered him to be ready upon all occasions to join with any of the Parliament's forces for opposing the enemy's advance, though many of our best men are now on foot . . . Many of them had their horses killed under them, so I hope you will consider how they may be recruited, *other armies having the Associated counties to help them* . . .". Again, *CSPD*, 19, 530 – italics added.

guaranteed the Lord General's disarmed foot soldiers safe passage to Southampton,[703] he and his officers were unable to prevent either their own soldiers or the western citizenry from plundering and abusing the dejected rebels along the way.[704] By the time they arrived in Hampshire, Essex infantry regiments needed not only new weapons and clothing – something that the Committee of Both Kingdoms had recognized as early as 7 September – but a whole new set of drums, partisans, and regimental ensigns. All of this materiel was both highly specialized and relatively expensive, and much of it was not ready for use until the second half of October.[705] Crucially, most of it was to be paid for using a fresh consignment of £15,000 of Excise money provided by the central government.[706]

Meanwhile, the army's artillery train also needed to be rebuilt. Again, although the Lord General had originally hoped to salvage as much of his army as possible, the royalist cavalryman Richard Symonds reported that the rebels lost no fewer than 43 guns

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[703] Wanklyn and Jones, *Military History*, 197.

[704] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 455; *CSPD*, vol.19, 502-503.

[705] For the Committee of Both Kingdom's first notice to Essex that 6,000 arms and 6,000 suits of clothes were to be sent to Portsmouth see *CSPD*, vol.19, 477-478 and 482. Interestingly, on 17 September the Committee of Both Kingdoms sent a special note to Maj. Gen. Whichcott informing him that the Lord General's City Brigade was to be resupplied too; see *CSPD*, vol.19, 513. For the Commons' order to reimburse the Ordnance Office for the provision of drums, ensigns, partisans, and halberds in October see *CJ*, iii, 662. It is possible to review an itemized list of some of this hardware at the point of purchase by consulting the Ordnance Office debentures from this period. See TNA SP28/19 ff.174, 202, 204, and 206. For a shipping manifest confirming the delivery of at least some of this clothing and equipment in early October consult Wagon-Master General Thomas Richardson's account, TNA SP28/140/4 ff.34-39. For a modern overview of this complex logistical operation see also Peachey and Turton, *Old Robin's Foot*, 16-17.

[706] *LJ*, vi, 712. The exceptions were the drums, ensigns, partisans, and halberds to be provided by the Ordnance Office. These were to be purchased using [Fifth &] Twentieth money from Haberdasher's Hall. Again, *CJ*, iii, 662.

in Cornwall.[707] Naturally, such extensive losses were not easy to make up in a short amount of time. However, on 4 October the central government demonstrated its commitment to restoring the Lord General's train by ordering Gerrard's army treasury to pay the Ordnance Office £9,000 for a brand new set of cannon and other heavy equipment. At the same time, the Houses ordered the Ordnance Office to immediately transfer eight artillery pieces from the Tower to the Lord General in the field. Unlike the clothes, small arms, and other accoutrements discussed above, the funds for this new train were not supposed to come from either the Excise Office or Haberdasher's Hall. Rather, it was determined that they should come from the substantial arrears that had accrued on the metropolitan Assessment which had been earmarked for the regular army by the Ordinance of 26 March.[708] Remarkably, by 12 October at least some of these cannon – along with yet another injection of £10,000 of Excise money for pay – had reached Reading, where the earl of Manchester was then deployed.[709]

In the final analysis, the central government's decision to reconstruct Essex's battered army was made in response to sheer military necessity, not because the Committee of Both Kingdoms intended to restore it to its special place within the rebels' fiscal-military arrangement. During the first part of October, Waller's *ad hoc* forces were unable to prevent the victorious king from advancing eastward, and the earl of

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[707] Long, *Symonds's Diary*, 66.
[708] William Douglas Hamilton, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I Oct 1644 – July 1645*, vol.20. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1890), 10-11; *LJ*, vii, 12; Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 193.
[709] *CSPD*, vol.20, 33-34. For the £10,000 see *CSPD*, vol.20, 6-7; *CJ*, iii, 644 and 650.

Manchester was becoming ever more reluctant to deploy his increasingly ragged quasi-regular army beyond the borders of his Association without proper support.[710] Although the Parliament succeeded in assembling the remains of all three of these armies – along with a fresh brigade of City militia[711] – at Basing on 21 October, their combined force of some 22,000 men was no longer under the real or imagined command of the Lord General.[712] On 1 October the Parliament had passed a very short – almost curt – ordinance that unequivocally subordinated *all* of its military commanders to the Committee of Both Kingdoms.[713] Two weeks later, the Committee of Both Kingdoms promulgated a detailed series of instructions for the effective reordering and *confederation*[714] of its three most important southern armies, including the resuscitated regular formations under Essex.[715] Most significantly, these instructions created a standing 'committee of war' of which two senior officers from each army (including Essex, Manchester, and Waller) and certain appointed representatives of the Committee

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[710] For the classic account of Manchester's changing position within the constellation of parliamentary politics at this time consult Holmes, *Eastern Association*, chapter 10, passim. More recently, Malcolm Wanklyn has forcefully argued that Manchester's reasons for not sending forces into Dorset in October were based entirely on military considerations. See Wanklyn, *Warrior Generals*, chapter 11, passim.

[711] The London Red Trained Band; the London Blue Trained Band; the Southwark Yellow Trained Band; the Tower Hamlets Yellow Auxiliaries; and the Westminster Red Trained Band. See Nagel, "Militia of London", 208-214. This new brigade was placed under the immediate command of Colonel Harrington, and its deployment on this occasion was funded by an entirely new one-time Assessment/Excise-backed forced loan. Limited to City-dwellers, the proceeds of this Assessment was naturally placed in the hands of the Common Council. See also *LJ*, vii, 22-23.

[712] Gardiner, *Great Civil War*, vol.1, 498; Gentles, *English Revolution*, 241. Gardiner says the combined army consisted of 19,000 men. Gentles provides the revised total of 22,000, which he derived from a reading of Thomas Juxon's journal.

[713] *LJ*, vii, 6.

[714] The term 'confederated army', like the term 'quasi-regular army', is of my own invention.

[715] *CSPD*, vol.20, 39-40.

of Both Kingdoms were all made *equal* voting members.[716] This new committee was given the power to 'order' all the affairs of the confederated armies at both the strategic and tactical levels. This extraordinary and unprecedented development stripped Essex not only of the vestigial remnants of his nominal command over the Parliament's forces, but also of his very real ability to independently command what was left of the regular army itself.

In terms of overall command and control, the instructions of 14 October were undoubtedly revolutionary, but it would be wrong to believe that they somehow destroyed the organizational integrity of the three armies that had so thoroughly dominated the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement in the south during the preceding campaigns. In believing that they did – and that they therefore completed the most important parts of the 'new-modelling' process before it had truly begun – John Adamson goes too far. The ninth of these seventeen instructions makes it clear that ". . . the forces joined with his Excellency [the Lord General's], being distinct forces, arc [sic] to be commanded by their own respective officers, subordinately under the Lord General, and are to be divided when they shall be ordered by the greater number of the persons aforesaid".[717] Furthermore, the method of voting within the new 'committee of war' was structured so as to preserve a representative balance among the constituent armies. Instruction thirteen states that if one of the two committeemen from any of the three armies should be absent at the time of a vote, and if no other officer from the army in

[716] The phrase 'committee of war' appears to be Adamson's. See Adamson, "Triumph of Oligarchy", 118.
[717] Adamson, "Triumph of Oligarchy", 118; *CSPD*, vol.20, 39.

question (who is *also* a member of the Committee of Both Kingdoms) can be found, then the other two armies' representatives are to have but one vote per army, these two votes to be cast by the commanding generals of the two fully-represented armies.[718] Far from fully amalgamating the Parliament's three southernmost armies, the instructions of 14 October 1644 very deliberately assume and allow for the fact that each of them was to remain a powerful and distinct bloc.

A day after the rendezvous at Basing, Essex marched his partially-restored component of the Parliament's newly-confederated field army to Reading, where his regulars were thereafter encamped between that town and the royalist army now entrenching itself at Newbury. Within days, however, Essex fell seriously ill and was forced to retire from the field and take up lodgings in Reading itself.[719] He was therefore absent during the second battle of Newbury, unable to witness his vengeful troops reclaim some of the artillery they lost at Lostwithiel,[720] and unable to influence the course of a battle and a series of subsequent maneuvers that did not end the war any more than Edgehill did.[721] His army, meanwhile, survived the encounters at Newbury and continued to draw funds from Gerrard's centralized army treasury until the formation of the New Model Army during the following spring. By December 1644, though, the Parliament's first regular army had fought its last battle.

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[718] *CSPD*, vol.20, 40. The language of instruction thirteen is exceptionally tangled. I would like to thank my parents, George and Diane Crawshaw, for the discussion we had regarding its meaning.
[719] Snow, *Essex the Rebel*, 461; *CSPD*, vol.20, 74.
[720] Gentles, *English Revolution*, 244.
[721] On the second and 'third' battles of Newbury, see Wanklyn, *Warrior Generals*, chapter 12, passim.

Figure 4.1 - Total Spending by Arm: 1643/4 (£)



	Nov 1643	Dec 1643	Jan 1644	Feb 1644	Mar 1644	Apr 1644	May 1644	Jun 1644	Jul 1644	Aug 1644	Sep 1644	Oct 1644	Nov 1644	Dec 1644
Other	5466	5785	1072	4336	4743	6525	7700	2921	13790	5243	2622	2117	2646	2011
Infantry	4732	3772	1246	5251	3055	5873	7154	3299	6544	333	5735	3527	3033	3578
Cavalry	1783	8846	20	9399	603	5992	7821	3998	5699	146	7043	1408	3767	853

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In total, Gerrard's two deputies made confirmed payments worth a total of £57,130.20 to the Lord General's foot soldiers during the period covered by this chapter. Considering the fact that this was spread out over a period of fourteen months, it is clear that this reflects a reduction of more than fifty percent when compared to receipts for the

six months covered by chapter three.[722] But again, due to the loss of documentation, it should be remembered that this is a minimum amount. Figure 4.2 provides the reader with a monthly breakdown of this total, arranged by sub-treasurer. In the first place, as the reader can see, the vast majority of this money passed through Vernon's hands. The only notable exception to this trend came in April, when Jessop was involved in providing payments to some of Essex's infantry colonels in the hope of recruiting and/or bolstering the existing regiments of the Lord General's regular army. Doubtless these payments were a product of the important legislation described in section I. Secondly, there were virtually no payments made during the months of January and August 1644. And again, the second of these two periods of administrative inactivity has largely been explained above. Assuming, therefore, that neither of these lulls is simply a reflection of missing paperwork, it can safely be concluded that they could only have increased the rapidity of arrears generation in the regular army's constituent formations.

Useful as an overarching contextual reference point, Figure 4.2 – like its counterparts in the previous chapters – tells us nothing about the changing situation within each of the regular army's specific infantry regiments. In order to learn something about these units we must again determine what percentage of the above-mentioned subtotals can be assigned to these formations, and then determine whether or not the relevant warrants allow us to consider their ever-shifting size at specific moments in time.

[722] Consult Figure 3.1 above.

Figure 4.2 - Army Treasury Infantry Spending: 1643/4 (£)



	Nov 1643	Dec 1643	Jan 1644	Feb 1644	Mar 1644	Apr 1644	May 1644	Jun 1644	Jul 1644	Aug 1644	Sep 1644	Oct 1644	Nov 1644	Dec 1644
Jessop	46	11	32	22	137	1558	195	12	0	274	256	0	110	45
Vernon	4686	3762	1214	5228	2918	4315	6959	3287	6544	58	5479	3527	2923	3533

As was the case in previous chapters, not all of the warrants authorizing the subtotals found in Figure 4.2 were aimed at remunerating active formations, although most of them clearly were. Table 4.2 provides the reader with this information in detail.[723] Here it can be seen that no less than 93 per cent of the total presented in Figure 4.2 went to recognizable formations within the Lord General's field army.[724] Again, the residuum was used to remunerate reformados, unknown officers, and non-standard units that served with the army on foot. Of course the first and most important question that comes to mind when examining these numbers concerns the degree to which these amounts were

[723] **Table 4.2, Appendix D.**
[724] (£52,961.90 [Table 4.2] ÷ £57,130.20 [Figure 4.2]) = 93%.

adequate to their task. As in previous chapters, providing an answer to this question depends largely on our ability to accurately reconstruct the fluctuating size of Essex's regiments. Unlike the case in previous chapters, however, we are fortunate to have an existing study that deals, in part, with this very topic. Because of this, the following calculations differ slightly in form from those found above.

Arguably, his in-depth analysis of military finance was among the most important contributions made by Clive Holmes in his *The Eastern Association in the English civil war.*[725] Focusing in part on the 'centralized' treasury system that was developed at Cambridge during the period covered by this chapter, Holmes's work on military finance lays bare the machinery that was erected to support the quasi-regular, Assessment-fueled army under the command of the earl of Manchester. Because Manchester and the Cambridge Committee were responsible for the administration of a large and important portion of the parliament's territories, there were no fewer than five individuals who played an important role in collecting, managing, and disbursing the treasure of the seven associated counties. And although elements of the financial machinery that they created resembled the straightforward, truly centralized system that was first adopted by Gerrard and his two deputies more than a year earlier, much of it was far more arcane in practice.

As the reader well knows, Gerrard's two deputies worked in tandem on different but related tasks. William Jessop stayed in London, managing a small number of army payments (usually on warrants issued by the increasingly marginalized Committee of

[725] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, chapter 7, passim.

Safety) and participating, it would seem, in some amount of tax collection within the City. Francis Vernon, on the other hand, travelled with the Lord General's army, making payments on warrants that were usually issued by Essex himself using money that was almost always forwarded to him by Jessop and/or the various centralized revenue committees in London. As it happened, a similar system was used by at least two of Manchester's five treasurers during the 1644-5 period. As I indicated above, the 20 January Ordinance centralized the finances of the eastern counties and provided Manchester's army with access to a defined set of regular revenues. And again, these revenues were to be derived from a newly-rated version of the Weekly Assessment that was to be collected in the seven counties for a period of four months. There were three of these Assessments orders passed during 1644, making it legal for the Association's treasurers to collect it for twelve months.[726] Again, one of Holmes most significant contributions was his compilation of the sums finally collected in these counties on the authority of these Assessments.[727] The two most important people associated with the Assessment in the Eastern Association were William Leman and Gregory Gawsell.[728] When it came to the disbursement of funds, Leman's job was akin to Jessop's. After the creation of the Association's central treasury apparatus on 20 January 1644 he established

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[726] Naturally, all three pieces of legislation can be found in Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 368-371, 432-434, and 515-518.

[727] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 136-7.

[728] In 1644 another man named John Weaver was responsible for receiving and disbursing the Eastern Association's [Fifth and] Twentieth Part money. While the Assessment money was used for the soldiers' salaries, most of [Fifth and] Twentieth Part was used to pay for artillery, arms, horses, and other military equipment. See Alan Everitt, ed, *Suffolk and the Great Rebellion, 1640-1660* (Ipswich: W.S. Cowell Ltd., 1961), pp.89-93.

himself as the central treasurer operating in Cambridge, the political 'centre' of the Eastern Association. Gawsell, like Vernon, travelled with Manchester's army, disbursing what monies Gawsell and others provided him with.[729]

Despite these similarities when it came to the disbursement of military funds, there were several important differences that distinguished the operation of Gerrard's central army treasury from the activities of the various treasurers who administered the Eastern Association's finances in 1644. For our purposes, the most important of these was the debenture system that was clearly used by Gawsell and others. As we know, all of the money that I have described, measured, and categorized passed through the hands of Vernon and Jessop (and Fenton) on the authority of warrants written by either the earl of Essex in the field or the Committee of Safety in London. Although a great deal of time sometimes went by between the date these warrants were written and the date of the final payment made on their authority,[730] the vast majority of the warrants written by Essex (and paid by Vernon) were paid within days of their creation. Interestingly enough, these warrants sometimes refer to official certificates that recognized the performance of a service or the creation of a debt. These certificates were known as debentures, and they appear to have served as the catalyst for the creation of at least some of the regular army's warrants. However, it would seem that none of the debentures associated with Essex's army have survived, a situation that is not altogether surprising. This is because

[729] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 134.
[730] Again, this is especially the case when it comes to certain Committee of Safety warrants that were paid by Jessop.

the army's administrators (including Vernon) did not use them as 'living documents' – paperwork that recorded real transactions over time. The record of these transactions was, of course, the province of the warrants themselves.

This is totally unlike the system of disbursement that was adopted by Leman and Gawsell. As Holmes tells us, many of the payments that were made to Manchester's army were made on the sole authority of debentures that were written after a muster. In the Eastern Association, these debentures were generally designed to cover specific periods of service time that were sometimes well into the past. But unlike the regular-army pay warrants I have studied, Manchester's debentures were clearly not designed to serve as immediate pay orders; rather, they, like Essex's now-absent debentures, were official notices describing the monies owed to specific units by the Cambridge Committee. But despite this, they were often used to both demand and record payments from the treasury. Put bluntly in colloquial terms, Manchester's army operated partly on an official system of gradually-diminishing I.O.U.s, whereas Essex's did not. Of course, this is not to say that Gerrard's system was better at getting money into the hands of Essex's soldiers than Leman's was at providing remuneration to Manchester's. This, in the final analysis, was dependent on the absolute amount of money that was available to both offices as the war unfolded. What it does mean, however, is that it is much easier to measure the final amount of money that was paid over to Essex's army. Consider the following: using debentures to manage the debts and receipts of Manchester's officers did not guarantee them timely payment, but it did provide them with a series of official documents that

could be used as collateral for loans and advances, sometimes from the army treasurers themselves![731]

Manchester's surviving debentures sometimes cryptically indicate what transactions took place on the credit that they generated, but overall, it is rarely clear how the individual pay histories of these documents unfolded. Unfortunately, this problem is compounded by the fragmentary state of the Association treasurers' own account books.[732] Naturally, all of this made reconstructing the precise pay histories of individual units (and their relationship to the treasury apparatus at Cambridge) exceptionally difficult for Holmes. Much harder, it should be said, than it has been for me to reconstruct the pay history of Essex's formations. Indeed, as Holmes reminds us, the many disadvantages of this byzantine system were eventually realized by the Association's treasurers, and by September 1644 the use of 'living' debentures had largely been replaced by the same pay-warrant system which had always been uniformly used in the regular army.[733]

Figure 4.3 is an example of a debenture issued on behalf of one of Manchester's infantry companies during the spring of 1644. Here we can see that Manchester and his associates have accepted responsibility for the sums involved, and that the matter has been referred to Leman and Gawsell. Furthermore, we can note that someone, at some point, has indicated that the sum has been 'fully pd'. Unfortunately, it is impossible to

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[731] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 145.
[732] *Ibid.*, Appendix 6.
[733] *Ibid.*, p.146.

know when this document was written and, more importantly, when exactly it was finally paid off. Indeed, it is impossible to know for certain whether or not to trust the note indicating that this debenture was 'fully pd'. This is because there is no signed receipt here. Although Holmes insists that other corroborating evidence exists, there is much the debentures themselves do not tell us. Now compare this document to the one presented in Figure 4.4. This is, of course, one of Essex's 'infantry' warrants from the same period, a document that refers to an otherwise ephemeral and long-gone debenture. Here we are provided with all of the information necessary to reconstruct the vital contours of this transaction. Like all of Essex's warrants, this document is dated (in this case, written on 10 April), the reasons for its issue are clear and contemporary, and there is a receipt which has been both signed and dated within twenty-four hours of the document's creation. The handwriting of the receipt suggests that Vernon was the source of this money – a fact that is virtually certain, if impossible to prove given the unknown whereabouts of his account book from this time. Naturally, the reader will note, the sum mentioned in this receipt is included in the relevant infantry columns in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, as well as the relevant cell in Table 4.2. In the end, Gerrard's system was superior from an accounting point of view; it was simple, clean, efficient, and above all, easily verifiable.



Figure 4.3 - TNA SP28/15 f.257
An E.A. debenture issued to Captain Meridith, a company commander in Manchester's own regiment of foot. This document acknowledges debts incurred during the spring of 1644.



Figure 4.4 - TNA SP28/14 f.307
An 'infantry' warrant, authorized by the Lord General, to pay Colonel Henry Barclay for the remuneration of his regiment during the month of April 1644.

Despite the many challenges he clearly faced, Holmes was somehow able to calculate the total number of days' pay that the army of the Eastern Association received during 1644. Furthermore, he presented this reconstruction alongside corresponding figures for Essex's army during the same period in an effort to demonstrate the superior rate of pay that was enjoyed by the army of the Eastern Association.[734] Because this section of the chapter is concerned with Essex's infantry, let us proceed by testing the validity of Holmes's numbers when it comes to this subject. According to Holmes, the officers serving in Essex's infantry regiments received between 140-147 days' pay during 1644; their men, on the other hand, received pay for 161-175 days. The fact that Holmes was able to disentangle Essex's infantry's officers and men (something he does not seem to have been able to do for the Association's infantry) is in no way surprising. Again, this is largely because of the inherent clarity and transparency of Gerrard's warrant system during this period.[735] Indeed, this clarity and transparency presents us with a series of now-familiar analytical decisions. In the first place, it is possible to painstakingly reconstruct the precise pay history (separating officers, NCOs, and men) of each and every regiment that appears in Vernon's and Jessop's paperwork from this period – a time-consuming and tedious process that would undoubtedly satisfy certain antiquarian curiosities. Secondly, it is possible to use the reported private-soldier strengths that appear in many of these warrants (such as the one depicted in Figure 4.4) to estimate the total theoretical cost of the entire infantry for the twelve months that constituted 1644 – a

[734] *Ibid.*, 147.
[735] One need only review the language found in the warrant captured in Figure 4.4 to understand this.

methodology that is akin to the one deployed in chapters two and three above. For the sake of brevity, uniformity, and clarity I have elected to proceed with the latter.

As we well know, there are three crucial pieces of information that are required to efficiently rebuild the pay history of Essex's infantry. (1) In the first place, we need to establish the chronological boundaries of our analysis. Although this chapter is putatively designed to cover the fourteen months between November 1643 and December 1644, let us eliminate the last two months of 1643 from the following calculations. This will allow us to seamlessly compare our results to Holmes's. (2) Secondly, we need to know the total amount of money that was received by these formations during the period in question. This, of course, is not a problem. This information is available in Table 4.2 below. Finally, (3) we need to have a clear sense of the number of officers and soldiers that were in service during the period covered. Again, although the ordinances of 1 February and 26 March 1644 aimed at establishing the army's strength at a fixed level, only the pay warrants can tell us how this plan manifested itself in reality. Table 4.3 lays out the total number of private soldiers in each regiment according to the warrants that specifically mention such strengths.[736]

As the reader can see, the utility of this new database is limited by the fact that the warrants paid after June 1644 do not indicate the number of private soldiers being remunerated, and again, I have chosen not to attempt a detailed (and dangerous) unit-level reconstruction based on the amounts received. Nevertheless, there are earlier

[736] **Table 4.3, Appendix D.**

periods for which the documentation is quite specific in this regard – namely, the months of February, April, and May 1644. Since our goal here is to construct a realistic (even conservative) model of Essex's infantry corps during 1644, let us proceed with the most liberal generalization possible when it comes to the total number of private infantrymen: let us assume that the regiments contained precisely 4,500 ordinary soldiers during each of the twelve months that made up that year – a total that is, of course, far below the army's mandated strength of 7,500 infantrymen.[737]

As we know, contemporary English military documentation tended to lump the personnel that can be labelled 'NCOs' into the same pay category as commissioned officers.[738] Unfortunately for us, this tendency seems to have been reversed in a certain percentage of the army's infantry warrants from this period. Put simply, while NCOs were usually paid together with the officers when the pay of the latter was separated from the pay of the men, this does not seem to have been universally true during 1644. There are instances where a series of warrants were designed to pay ordinary soldiers, NCOs, and even Lieutenants – while the pay of the regiments' commissioned, company-grade officers was relegated to a separate run of documents.[739] Again, it is certainly possible to construct a labored analysis that successfully disentangles all of these idiosyncrasies; but

[737] Additional evidence for the reduced size of Essex's infantry corps during the month of April 1644 can be found in the records of the Committee of Both Kingdoms. On the twentieth of that month Essex, who was in attendance at the time, reported that he could field no more than three to four thousand infantry if his army was provided with an immediate cash injection of £20,000. Consult *CSPD*, vol.19, 129. Indeed, less than a month later the king's most senior commander was under the impression that Essex's entire army numbered no more than six thousand horse and foot. See *Ibid.*, 163.

[738] This was a pattern established during the Edgehill campaign. See Crawshaw, "Military finance," passim.

[739] For examples of ensigns and lieutenants being paid with NCOs and private soldiers consult the warrants preserved in TNA SP28/13: infantry payments made during the month of March 1643/4.

again, I have found it both easier and more efficient to simply proceed using a generalization that represents the upper end of the realm of possibility when it comes to the size of the infantry's officer corps. After consulting both Tables 4.2 and 4.3, it is clear that there were, on average, nine regimental structures 'in play' during each of the twelve months in 1644. Let us therefore assume that our forty-five hundred hypothetical soldiers were commanded by enough officers to fully-staff nine infantry regiments according to the establishment found in SP28/140/17. The results of calculations based on these assumptions appear here in Table 4.4.[740]

The results of the calculations presented in Table 4.4 appear to vindicate the ballpark figures presented by Holmes above. Nevertheless, there are three important caveats that must be kept in mind when considering these calculations. (1) In the first place, it must be remembered that not all of the payments chronicled in Table 4.2 were made solely for the purposes of remunerating existing troops serving in combat positions within the infantry regiments. For example, as I indicated above, many of the payments made by Jessop were aimed at meeting the costs associated with the new recruiting drive mandated by the aforementioned army ordinances. Additionally, at least one of the army's infantry colonels held an additional rank that entitled him to additional salary money, over and above his due as Colonel. This, of course, was Sgt. Maj. General Skippon, who sometimes received remuneration as Major General via the same warrants

[740] **Table 4.4, Appendix D.**

that were designed to pay his infantry regiment.[741] These two factors distort the amounts presented in Table 4.2 by inflating, slightly, the amount of money that was seemingly paid to Essex's infantry units, a reality that must be taken into consideration by the reader. (2) Nevertheless, against this distortion one must remember that the hypothetical place-holder army presented in Table 4.4 (4,500 men in nine fully-officered regiments) is clearly larger and more demanding than the actual, ever-fluctuating infantry corps that Essex commanded during 1644. When it comes to each regiment's officer corps, for example, the details found in many of the warrants make it clear that many of the army's most active units were missing a certain percentage of their staff at various points in time. In short, the officer corps of these units was clearly susceptible to the same sort of fluctuations that affected the overall number of private soldiers in a more dramatic fashion. Finally, this discussion of the officer corps brings us to the third important caveat to be applied to the calculations found in Table 4.4: (3) the hypothetical cost of Essex's officer corps is exaggerated because it ignores the new, reduced pay scale that was first introduced in Manchester's army via the 20 January Ordinance. Again, this reduced schedule was adopted by Parliament for Essex's army in the ordinance of 26 March.

At this point the reader should recall that the calculations found in Table 4.4 (the results of which are very similar to Holmes's numbers on page 147 of his book) produce the number of days' pay received based on the full remuneration of wages at a rate that was established during halcyon days of the Edgehill campaign. That Gerrard and his

[741] Consult TNA SP28/14 f.308, for example.

deputies began implementing the new scale is evidenced by the pay warrants themselves. In the first place one should recall the peculiar, above-mentioned shift toward paying Lieutenants and NCOs via the same warrants issued for the pay of the private soldiers.[742] This is important because infantry Lieutenants were the highest ranking personnel to receive less than 5/- per day according to the Edgehill rates.[743] Secondly, many of the warrants paid in or after May 1644 refer explicitly to the army's new establishment, which was 'to be settled'.[744] What all of this means, of course, is that Table 4.4 has overestimated the hypothetical cost of the infantry's officers on a structural level.[745] Figure 4.5 provides us with an excellent illustration of how exactly the £542.80 pounds that were necessary to fully remunerate the officers of an infantry regiment for one month during the Edgehill campaign broke down. As the legend indicates, this is an image of TNA SP28/1A f.240 – one of Essex's officer warrants from September 1642. If, however, we apply the new rate as written in the army ordinances discussed above, then the revised 'full' pay of an infantry regiment's full complement of officers would be as it appears in Table 4.5 below.[746] This is, of course, highly significant because if we then plug this revised total into Line 2 of Table 4.4 we arrive at a very different number of

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[742] For quick examples of the progressive shift in this direction consult TNA SP28/11 f.251, and TNA SP28/13 f.118. Both of these examples are warrants ordering the pay of personnel in Colonel Langham's regiment of foot.

[743] Consult TNA SP28/140/17

[744] See, for example, TNA SP28/17 f.311, a pay warrant issued and paid in August on behalf of Captain Sir Anthony St John, a company commander in Essex's own regiment of foot. This warrant was issued only for the personal pay of this officer in his capacity as an infantry captain for fourteen days. According to TNA SP28/140/17, he should have received £10 10s for this service. Instead, Sir Anthony received just £5 5s, indicating that he was on half pay at the time.

[745] Consult Table 4.4, Line 2.

[746] **Table 4.5, Appendix D.**

days' pay provided to the hypothetical representation of Essex's infantry that is found in that table. This number is 161.64 – a result that is even closer to the range provided to us by Holmes.



Figure 4.5 - Evidence from better days: TNA SP28/1A f.240, a warrant authorizing the full, monthly payment of the officers and NCOs serving in the earl of Stamford's infantry regiment during the Edgehill campaign.

Figure 4.6 - Army Treasury Cavalry Spending: 1643/4 (£)



	Nov 1643	Dec 1643	Jan 1644	Feb 1644	Mar 1644	Apr 1644	May 1644	Jun 1644	Jul 1644	Aug 1644	Sep 1644	Oct 1644	Nov 1644	Dec 1644
Jessop	48	324	0	775	53	502	891	216	0	110	0	132	20	86
Vernon	1735	8522	20	8624	551	5490	6930	3782	5699	36	7043	1276	3747	767

As was the case with the infantry, the vast majority of the money that was transferred to Essex's mounted arm during the period covered by this chapter came from Vernon. Naturally, this is in no way surprising. And again, as was the case in all previous chapters, our analysis of this spending will begin by considering, in turn, the two most important types of mounted soldiers that served in the Lord General's army. Figure 4.6 lays out the total amount of money that changed hands on the authority of those warrants authorizing payments on behalf of all of the army's horsemen. The total value of this spending over the indicated period was £57,376.76, a sum that includes all of the money

paid to Essex's cuirassiers, harquebusiers, and dragoons. As we shall soon see, most of this money was aimed at providing some limited amount of remuneration to the regular, pre-existing troops of harquebusiers that constituted the core of Essex's cavalry arm during this last phase of the army's operational existence. As was the case in the previous section, successfully comparing this information to the relevant data and analyses found in Clive Holmes's book will be one of the key goals of this part of the chapter.

For now, let us begin by describing the total amount of money that was transferred to Essex's cuirassiers and harquebusiers during this period. Table 4.6 provides the reader with this information, broken down by treasurer. Before proceeding, the reader should recall that it is my practice to filter out any cavalry payments that were made for reasons other than the direct remuneration of wages to combat personnel.[747] In the first place, this table is interesting and important because it demonstrates what percentage of the army's cavalry units during this period could trace their histories back to the first few formative weeks of the army's existence (in the event, every troop/officer up to and including number 88). Secondly, it tells us that no less than 89 per cent of the money described in Figure 4.6 was used to remunerate the regular army's ordinary cavalry troops, slightly more than the percentage found in the data presented in chapter three.[748] As was the case with many of the warrants issued to remunerate the foot soldiers during this and earlier periods, the warrants that have been used to construct Table 4.6 typically contain a great deal of information regarding the contemporary state of the units to be

[747] **Table 4.6, Appendix D.**
[748] (£50,845.10 [Table 4.6] ÷ £57,376.76 [Figure 4.6]) = 89%.

paid. Furthermore, as was the case with the documents examined in chapter three, it would appear that few of the units appearing in Table 4.6 operated at full strength during any part of this last phase of the army's history. Indeed, the information contained in these new documents clearly indicates that there was nothing uniform about the size or composition of the Lord General's surviving cavalry troops in 1644, despite Parliament's attempts to reform the arm.

Regardless of their heterogonous composition, the pay history of Essex cavalry troops can, of course, be readily examined by month. As usual, this can be accomplished by arranging the payments they received by the dates found on the receipts. As was the case in all previous chapters, this is important because it provides us with a solid working knowledge of the absolute number of formations (whatever their size) that were remunerated each month on the authority of the documentation used to construct Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6. Table 4.7 provides the reader with a month-to-month breakdown of the money that was spent on Essex's regular cavalry troops during the final phase of the army's history.[749] Again, this is important if we are to evaluate the utility of the pay rate presented to us by Professor Holmes.[750] Here we can see that Vernon was, at certain points, providing remuneration to fifty or more individual troops of horse. This was clearly exceptional, however. More commonly, it would appear that there were anywhere between thirty and forty troops in existence at any given point in time. This is certainly true if we exclude months where the small number of reported troops is clearly a function

[749] **Table 4.7, Appendix D.**
[750] Again, see Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 147.

of missed payments. Significantly, this is approximately the number of troops that was envisioned by Parliament in both of the relevant army ordinances of 1644. And as was the case with the infantry regiments discussed above, the fact that we know the amount of money that was spent, and the roughly-accurate number of 'permanent' troops in circulation, means that it is possible to generate a hypothetical analogue of the Lord General's cavalry arm that should allow us to create a reasonable estimate of the number of days' pay that were received by the horsemen during the twelve months that made up 1644.

As I indicated above, many of the troops that are reported at various points in Table 4.7 were clearly well below their maximum strength.[751] Nevertheless, if we imagine, for the sake of argument, that Essex's cavalry arm was composed of 36 fully-manned and fully-staffed troops of harquebusiers during the entirety of 1644, then it is possible to perform for the horse the same sort of speculative calculations that were done for the foot in Table 4.4 above. Of course, assuming that all 36 of these hypothetical formations contained 60 troopers plus their fully-paid complement of officers will tend to distort the demand that the reformed cavalry troops placed on Gerrard's treasury at the time.[752] But given the similarity of the result of Line 6 in Table 4.8 to the data presented by Holmes in his book, the results of these initial calculations are suggestive. However, we must now take a moment to review the other, now-familiar caveats that limit the

[751] This is true regardless of whether or not the 'standard' troop of harquebusiers was supposed to have 60 or 80 ordinary troopers at this time. See Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) 48-49.
[752] **Table 4.8, Appendix D.**

universal validity of these operations. In the first place, Table 4.8 ignores the fact that a certain (relatively small) proportion of the formations appearing in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 can still be considered troops of cuirassiers. This includes, of course, the troop of guard that was still under the immediate command of Sir Philip Stapilton. Naturally, these units required more than the £349.3 per month used in Line 5 – a fact that tends to downplay the demand placed on the treasury. Secondly, the reader should note that there exist within the payments recorded in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 some monies that were aimed at meeting the salary demands of certain regiment-level personnel. As usual, these payments have been allowed into these tables because they were incorporated into warrants that were, by and large, written to authorize the remuneration of otherwise standard troops of horse.[753] Nevertheless, it goes without saying that this also tends to artificially inflate the purported amount that was paid over to the Lord General's front-line cavalry troops.

Finally, and importantly, we must again recall that the army's order of battle and pay schedule were changed by the army ordinances of 1 February and 26 March. What this means, of course, is that we must construct a table that provides us with the revised cost of a troop of 80 harquebusiers that is based on this new, reduced schedule. As was the case in our discussion of the infantry regiments above, this will allow us to better understand the conditions within Essex's cavalry arm by placing their receipts within the

[753] For just a few examples of this from June 1644 consult TNA SP28/16 ff.27, 36, and 43. All three of these warrants include money that was supposed to remunerate the commander of the troop in question for his services as Colonel and/or General of horse.

same contextual framework that was used by Holmes in his analysis of Manchester's army.[754] If we plug this new final figure from Table 4.9 into Line 5 of Table 4.8 we can conclude that the hypothetical model that is being used as a placeholder for Essex's otherwise complex and protean cavalry arm would have received precisely 84.99 days' pay from Gerrard's subordinates during 1644. Although this would appear to be even lower than the number of days' pay received according to Holmes, it should be remembered that this rate is based on the assumption that each and every troop contained its full, revised complement of 80 troopers during each and every month of 1644 – an assertion that is demonstrably false.[755]

Before moving on to a discussion of the 'other' payments that were made by Vernon and Jessop during this period, it is important to say something about Essex's increasingly bedraggled cohort of dragoons during the lean days of 1644. Recall from chapter three that spending on these men declined sharply during the summer and autumn of 1643.[756] Although the amounts that changed hands during those six months were nearly enough to meet the salary requirements of a single dragoon regiment, according to the Edgehill rates, the precise composition of this sub-arm during that period is far from clear. This, as we know, is largely because of the confused and fragmentary state of the relevant pay warrants. Unfortunately, it would appear from the increasingly sparse

[754] **Table 4.9, Appendix D.**
[755] See Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) 73-4; Long, *Symonds's Diary*, 73.
[756] Consult Table 3.14 below.

paperwork that spending on the Lord General's dragoons finally and utterly collapsed during the fourteen months under consideration here.

Table 4.10 illustrates this point by laying out the pitiful amount of money that was paid over to the dragoons – for all reasons – during this phase of the war. Naturally, it was constructed using a tiny subset of the pay warrants used to build Figures 4.1 and 4.6 above. Here we can see that over this fourteen-month period the mounted infantrymen received only slightly more than the amount required to support one regiment for one month.[757] But again, it is impossible to know just how far this small sum went. This is because the thirty eight warrants that have been used to arrive at this total are largely silent on the kind of regimentation that was employed during this period. Indeed, all of these documents were issued at the company/troop level, and even the briefest survey of them reveals the truly heterogeneous state of these formations. This, of course, makes it impossible to know for certain just how large Essex's body of dragoons was at any given time – a situation that precludes any attempt to build a hypothetical model to estimate rates of pay. All that can be said for certain is that this sum cannot possibly have been adequate to the task of supporting these men during this rather extended period. But then again, because the two regular army ordinances of 1 February and 26 March 1644 fail to make provision for any dragoons, none of this should come as a surprise.

[757] **Table 4.10, Appendix D.**

Figure 4.7 - Army Treasury 'Other' Payments: 1643/4 (£)



	Nov 1643	Dec 1643	Jan 1644	Feb 1644	Mar 1644	Apr 1644	May 1644	Jun 1644	Jul 1644	Aug 1644	Sep 1644	Oct 1644	Nov 1644	Dec 1644
Jessop	2827	1196	912	2136	2874	4916	3835	9	10250	4893	675	424	1205	510
Vernon	2639	4588	160	2200	1869	1609	3865	2912	3540	350	1948	1693	1441	1502

Although Jessop's monthly totals are distorted for the reasons described in previous chapters, it is interesting to note just how many of his warrants for 'other' purposes were finally paid off during the months covered by this chapter. Taken together, the 'other' payments that were made by both treasurers during this period were worth a total of £66,978.03, a slim majority of which was paid over by Jessop on warrants of various vintages. Comparable to the amounts paid out during the six months covered by chapter three above, this was clearly a dramatic reduction in spending. As was the case in previous chapters I have endeavored here to produce and deploy a single database

whereby the details of this essentially heterogeneous category of spending can be understood quickly and efficiently in context. Table 4.11 allows the reader to examine this spending in detail by breaking it down by treasurer, and into the five familiar sub-categories.[758] Let us now proceed with a structural overview of these sub-categories.

Roughly one sixth of all the payments described in Table 4.11 went to support the Lord General's artillery train during the fourteen months under consideration here. Again, the majority of the money recorded under this sub-categorical heading was used to remunerate the officers, artificers, and other personnel attached to the regular army's train. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to quickly or easily compare a breakdown of the train's receipts from this period with the amounts and subtotals described in previous chapters. This is because of certain idiosyncrasies that differentiate the relevant warrants from their older counterparts. Again, the creators of Essex's regular army intended its artillery train to consist of a wide variety of ancillary personnel who were to provide support, guidance, protection, and assistance to the officers and gunners who operated the field pieces. Sadly, it would appear that the authors of the army's pay warrants never settled on a standardized method of remunerating all of these people – people who were clearly paid at very different rates.

Consider, for example, the list of 'train salary money warrants' that I have highlighted and discussed in previous chapters.[759] Aimed at providing remuneration to the 'officers and artificers' of the train, these documents were unquestionably the single

[758] **Table 4.11, Appendix D.**
[759] See Tables 1.18, 2.18, and 3.19 below.

most important kind of warrants that were issued to support the regular army's artillery. Nevertheless, they were clearly not intended to meet the needs of the above-mentioned ancillary personnel. For example, we know that it was always the army's policy to issue separate warrants authorizing the remuneration of the artillery's independent companies of pioneers and firelocks.[760] Unfortunately for us, however, it would seem that this policy fell by the wayside as the reforms mandated by the army ordinances of 1644 were implemented. In May 1644 (beginning with the warrant surviving as TNA SP28/15 f.122) the authors of the warrants began authorizing the payment of the artillery's pioneers and firelocks via the same warrants that were aimed at remunerating the other, more central 'officers and artificers' who made up the body of the train. Although this makes it very difficult to compare the train's subsequent receipts to those presented in previous chapters, the difficulties arising from this incongruity are offset to a degree by the survival of comptroller Richard Deane's personal account book from this period, an account book that covers the twelve months before the formation of the New Model Army in April 1645.

Surviving as TNA SP28/140/8, Deane's account book describes all of the money he received and distributed during the final months of the army's existence. Although the majority of this money was clearly used to remunerate the various and varied personnel attached to the Lord General's artillery train, it is also clear that a lesser portion of it was used to construct field emplacements, establish temporary fortifications around batteries,

[760] This 'policy' was established as the norm during the Edgehill campaign. Consult, for example, TNA SP28/2B f.316.

and to purchase and maintain some of the gunners' equipment and stores on the march.[761] Ultimately, this account book – which was clearly preceded by an earlier one that I have not found – is particularly useful because it covers a period of time that postdates Francis Vernon's all-important account book. For this reason, it is interesting and important to consider the list of receipts that were compiled by Deane, and compare it to the list of surviving 'artillery' warrants that I have used to construct Figure 4.7 and Table 4.11. The results of this comparison should shed important light on the survival rate of some of Vernon's most important 'other' warrants from the period following March 1644, the final month covered by his account book preserved in TNA SP28/143. Table 4.12 presents the results of this comparison.[762] As the reader can see, warrants authorizing no less than 99.5 per cent of Deane's 'artillery' receipts can currently be found in the many boxes of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers – an astonishingly high survival rate that should help mute any criticism of the collection's body of Vernon-paid warrants for this period of the army's history. Despite all of this, however, it is clear that Deane's receipts during this period fell far below those registered during the six months covered by chapter three. For this reason, it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that the personnel attached to the train suffered from the same sharply-reduced level of

[761] A fair amount of such money went to the purchase of grease – undoubtedly used to lubricate the field carriages that carried the heavy cannon on their long march into the West. An example of money spent on temporary fortification can be found at the bottom of TNA SP28/140/8 f.315r, where Dean reported that he spent £14 "For stopping up a bridge att Listithiell that went over the river there and casting up dives batteries during the time the King lay before us there".

[762] **Table 4.12, Appendix D.**

remuneration that was endured by the infantry and cavalry during this period – a level that equals approximately 49% of the gunners' full pay.

At this point the reader should recall that powerful though it may be, our complete, holistic understanding of the army's surviving pay warrants and signed receipts can tell us little about the distribution of arms and the rate at which goods, supplies, and munitions were consumed during the 1644 campaigns. Although the Lord General's Ordinance stipulated that Gerrard was to receive all of the money assigned to support Essex's reformed, Excise-fueled regular army, it would seem that the portion of that money was eventually earmarked for Sir Walter Erle at the Ordnance Office.[763] Again, although a significant percentage of the small arms that were issued to Essex's infantrymen and mounted troopers during the course of the army's history probably came from Rowe and Bradley's 'private' magazine, it is clear that the majority of Essex's cannon, as well as an uncertain percentage of his powder, match, and shot, were always sourced from the Ordnance Office's munitions dump in the White Tower. Erle's eventual receipt of Excise money on the 26 March Ordinance simply ensured that it was his organization, rather than Rowe and Bradley's, which would provide the Lord General's army with a large proportion of these necessities during the 1644 campaigns.[764]

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[763] Again, see Table 4.1, Appendix D. Sir Walter Erle was made Lieutenant of the Ordnance at the Tower on 22 February 1644. His immediate predecessor in this office was none other than John Pym himself. Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 33.

[764] Unsurprisingly, there were exceptions to this rule. For example, Lewis tells us that on 6 May 1644 the House of Commons ordered the committee at Haberdashers' Hall to buy and deliver 12 tons of shot to Essex's army, and to provide the funds needed to purchase 5 tons of match. Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 217. According to the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers, a portion of these munitions were delivered to Peter Cannon on 11 May. TNA SP28/15 f.28.

Unfortunately for Essex and his gunners, however, it would appear that none of this Excise money reached Erle in time for him to supply the army prior to its western adventure. We know this because on 6 July 1644 the Parliament itself was forced to issue a special directive ordering the payment of two full months' worth of the earmarked funds to Erle, it being noted that none of the money had so far been spent.[765]

Despite the fact that the surviving records of the Ordnance Office from this period are notoriously fragmentary and repetitive, it is possible to use some of them to confirm Erle's receipt of the £3,008 mentioned in the 6 July order. As Lewis noted in the introduction to his thesis, there are a great many of the Ordnance Office's debentures – notices of debts incurred to its own suppliers – that have survived and been preserved as part of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers.[766] Unfortunately, these documents were not collated together by the archivists who assembled this titanic collection. Rather, they can be found today in sporadic, chronologically-sorted chunks – intermingled, as they are, with the pay warrants that make up the early volumes of SP28. Indeed, the first evidence we have that Erle actually received his money directly from the Excise Office for the supply of Essex's army can be found in those debentures made out by the Ordnance Office during the months of July and August 1644 – documents that now make up the first fifty-two folios of TNA SP28/17.

Although many of the debentures scattered throughout TNA SP28/1A-21 pertain to debts incurred by the Ordnance Office in the course of fulfilling its primary

[765] *CSPD*, vol.19, 319.
[766] Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 6.

responsibility – the upkeep and outfitting of the rebels' navy – some of those from TNA SP28/17 describe munitions and equipment procured for 'land service'. All of these, it must be noted, uniformly make mention of £3,008 received by Erle especially for this purpose. Naturally, it is possible to add up the total value of these debentures, an exercise that yields yet more evidence for the unequaled authority and utility (if not the clarity and transparency) of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers. Table 4.13 lists all of the debentures that were issued in July and August on the authority of the initial sum of £3,008 ordered by the Parliament and delivered to the Tower from the Excise Office.[767] Here the reader can see that the surviving debentures account for *precisely* £3,008 worth of equipment.

Significantly, there are other, similar caches of Ordnance Office debentures scattered throughout TNA SP28/18-21. And again, all of these caches are loosely ordered by date of issue, with only some of them pertaining to equipment purchased for 'land service'. Unfortunately, however, the orderliness and completeness of the first run of debentures from July and August has proven exceptional when compared with the subsequent paperwork of this type. All told, these later documents chronicle very nearly £4,100 of additional debts incurred by the Ordnance Office for goods and munitions destined for 'land service', the majority of which were cleared by Erle before January 1645. These documents fall into one of three categories. (1) The first sort record the acquisition of equipment in response to the Parliament's order to rebuild Essex's artillery

[767] **Table 4.13, Appendix D**; see also Lewis, "Ordnance Office", 196.

train after Lostwithiel using £9,000 of metropolitan Assessment money.[768] (2) The second record the purchase of the drums, partisans, halberds, and ensigns that were needed by the regular infantry regiments after the surrender. These, as we know, were to be bought with [Fifth &] Twentieth Part money from Haberdasher's Hall.[769] Finally, (3) the third sort report the purchase of munitions and other equipment using Excise money earmarked for general 'land service'.[770] Of this £4,100 worth of equipment, only £1,883.83 of it fell into the first two categories – a sum which is far smaller than the amounts earmarked for these purposes by the Parliament. Unfortunately, it is seemingly impossible to know whether or not this shortfall in the records is the product of a gap in the archives, or a lack of money at the time.

In addition to this increasing uncertainty over time, the surviving Ordnance Office debentures – as a category of documents – can provide no proof that any of the materiel received by Erle was subsequently delivered to any of the several field armies maintained by the Parliament during this period. And although it is possible to find passing reference to the delivery of some uncertain amount of equipment and weapons by mining the records of the Committee of Both Kingdoms,[771] hard, administrative evidence for the delivery of guns and munitions to Essex's army from this source can only be found in the Ordnance Office's own books of warrants and deliveries. Unfortunately, however, the

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[768] Again, *LJ*, vii, 12.
[769] *CJ*, iii, 662; Lewis, "Ordnance Office", 197.
[770] Lewis, "Ordnance Office", 192-194; Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, 466-468.
[771] Again, consider the fact that Manchester confirmed the receipt of Essex's newly rebuilt artillery train at Reading on 12 October 1644: *CSPD*, vol.20, 33-34; and section I above. There is no way to know from this letter (or the other pertinent state papers) precisely how large this new train was at that time.

surviving examples of these are evidently more fragmentary than the surviving remnants of its debentures.[772] Furthermore, of the several such books of warrants that I have examined, only one contains corresponding notices of delivery, and none of these pertain to the period covered by this chapter.[773] In this way, most of the surviving records of the Ordnance Office from this time are not unlike the army treasury's pay warrants that were written to reimburse Rowe and Bradley's dealers and suppliers – the men who ensured that the Parliament's 'private' magazine was stocked with weapons.

As was the case in chapter three, all of the 'other' warrants that I have labelled 'arms' in Table 4.11 above were paid by William Jessop in London. Furthermore, as the reader will recall, my policy of recording and presenting Jessop's warrants by the date of final payment means that not all of the money listed under this sub-category was intended to pay for weapons procured during these fourteen months. Some of these were undoubtedly received into the state's possession during the preceding weeks and months. Regardless of this, however, it is perhaps most interesting to compare this sub-category of army treasury spending to the amounts disbursed for the same reason during earlier periods. As we know, Jessop dispensed around £33,000 for the purchase of arms and munitions during the twelve months covered by chapters two and three. However, his spending in this area declined substantially during the fourteen months under analysis

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[772] Lewis, "Office of Ordnance", 4-5.

[773] TNA WO55/387, 457, 460, 1754, and 1937. Again, delivery notices from the early days of the war can be found in TNA WO55/1937. A sixth volume of WO55 – TNA WO55/1662 – refers to powder and equipment that was received into the Tower to rebuild Essex's shattered train in the aftermath of Lostwithiel, but again, there are no delivery notices indicating that the materiel was successfully transferred to the army in the field.



Figure 4.8 - TNA SP28/17 f.11: an Ordnance Office debenture for 'land service' issued on 10 July 1644. This is for the receipt of 100 barrels (100 lbs each) of English gunpowder from one of the Parliament's most important suppliers. The debenture was paid in full on 30 July (the receipt is not here, but found on f.12) using Excise money earmarked especially for Essex's regular army.

here. Naturally there may have been a number of reasons for this[774] – including the increased importance of Sir Walter Erle and the Ordnance Office in these matters – but it seems probable that at least one of these was the overall decline in general revenue that was made available to Gerrard's deputies during these months.

Unfortunately, the surviving records make it clear that Gerrard's army treasury was still responsible for making relatively large payments to the Parliament's quasi-regular regional forces during this increasingly difficult period, a situation that undoubtedly made it even more difficult for the army treasury to meet the material needs of the regular army it was created to supply. Table 4.11 describes £16,959.6 worth of payments to 'local forces' during these fourteen months. These payments were made on the authority of no more than eleven warrants. And although exactly £10,000 of this is recorded on just one of these documents – one of Jessop's 'multiple-payment warrants' for Lord Fairfax's Northern Army[775] – more than £3,700 of it was paid out by Vernon on just three other occasions. Interestingly, the most important of these payments was made on 5 December 1643, when Vernon transferred £3,000 to help support those elements of

[774] Indeed, this situation is further complicated by the fact that at least some of the arms and munitions paid for on warrants found in Table 4.11 were clearly meant for organizations outside the purview of the Lord General and his regular army. See TNA SP28/263 f.136 – a warrant issued for a very large amount of gunpowder (339 barrels) that was clearly destined for naval use.

[775] TNA SP28/264 f.160. This warrant was originally composed on 4 August 1643. It took seventeen payments and nearly a full year to pay off this document. One of the reasons for this may have been the proviso stating that the money was to come solely from the army treasury's Sequestration receipts.

the City's militia forces that were then serving under the immediate command of the earl of Essex.[776]

Around 66 per cent of the money that was paid out for 'transportation' purposes during the fourteen months under consideration here was given to Fastolfe. Significantly, just £146.75 was paid over on the authority of nine 'private wagoner warrants'. Interestingly enough, however, it is also clear that another man – Thomas Cooke – briefly assumed Fastolfe's job as the administrator of the artillery train's cadre of state- and privately-owned horses and wagon-drivers during the summer of 1644.[777] Together, Fastolfe and Cook received £8,220 during this fourteen-month period – a paltry sum considering Fastolfe's receipts during the preceding six months. And yet nevertheless, this money accounts for 95 per cent of the 'transportation' subtotal described in Table 4.11. How far did this money go? As Robinson tells us, Fastolfe provided a summary of the monthly cost of transporting the army's artillery train during the 1644 campaign in one of his surviving accounts.[778] Calculating that the train was composed of 613 state-owned horses and 179 privately-contracted ones – plus ancillary personnel – Fastolfe computed that the total monthly cost amounted to £1776.05. Since we know that he and Cooke got just £8220 during these fourteen months, we can easily see that they received just 33 per cent of their total required amount.[779]

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[776] TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.81v.
[777] TNA SP28/16 ff. 48, 83 and 110; and TNA SP28/17 ff.072 and 139.
[778] TNA SP28/146 f.183; and Robinson, "Horse supply", (thesis) Table 8.
[779] (8220 ÷ 14 = 587.14) ÷ 1776.05 = 33.06%.

Of the five sub-categories of army treasury payments appearing in Table 4.11 and its predecessors, the most important for the period covered by this chapter is the nebulous, often miscellaneous collection of payments I have labelled 'support'. The vast majority of these payments were made on warrants that were both issued and paid in the field. Most of these Vernon-paid warrants were designed to meet the costs associated with the usual sort of operational necessities in the field. These necessities included the pay of support personnel like Sir Samuel Luke (the Scoutmaster General), Dr. Isaac Dorisla (the [legal] Advocate of the Army), and a host of physicians and other medical personnel. However, the majority of the money that changed hands on the authority of these warrants came from Jessop in London. For the purposes of our analyses here, I have elected to focus on just two of the more valuable types of 'support' warrants that were paid by Jessop during the course of the fourteen months covered here. The first of these types authorized the large-scale purchase of cavalry horses.

One of the many achievements of Robinson's work on horse supply in Essex's army was his discovery and analysis of the nine warrants that were issued to Jessop in the spring of 1644 for the purchase of nearly 1,000 remounts for the Lord General's cavalry corps.[780] Sadly, without access to William Jessop's own account of his revenues, we may

[780] Robinson, "Horse Supply," (thesis) 72; TNA SP28/13 f.167; TNA SP28/14 ff.243, 292, 327, 362, and 387; TNA SP28/15 ff.110, 139, and 156. In total, these warrants authorized the payment of £8,640, all of which was received by the end of May 1644. This was enough to buy 960 cavalry horses at the rate of £9 per horse. As Robinson says, money for a further 22 cavalry horses was also paid over by Jessop during the months of May and June 1644 (TNA SP28/15 f.183; TNA SP28/16 f.68). However, because these horses were bought for specific units, I have elected to assign these two warrants to the 'cavalry' portion of my database. The reader should note, however, that as 'mounting' warrants, they do NOT contribute to the *salary* totals presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below.

never know where exactly this (or any of his!) money came from, but Robinson, citing Wheeler, believes that it was probably secured as a loan from the powerful City merchants on the indispensable credit generated by the ever-evolving Excise legislation. This is certainly as reasonable a suggestion as any, but it does raise an interesting point. Although the Excise Office and the taxpayers in the City were evidently able to come through for Essex's army treasury in the spring for the purchase of cavalry horses, they were, as we know, far slower in transferring funds to the Ordnance Office for the supply of munitions to the same army.

As usual, there may have been many reasons for this discrepancy in supply. Chief among them may be the fact that cannon, hardware, and munitions do not tire, get sick, or die. Nor do they tend to move about on their own in search of grass and water for hours on end. In other words, munitions, unlike horses, were not a wasting asset subject to attrition outside the rate at which they were used and consumed. What's more, although it was certainly possible for ordnance to be stolen, the motivation for doing so would have been slim because the non-military value of heavy equipment and weaponry was far lower than that of horses. It may very well have been the case that horse supply was prioritized in the drive to get Essex's army ready for the 1644 campaign season simply because there were fewer horses than items of hardware left over from the previous campaign. Indeed, as we know from Holmes, Robinson, and chapter three above, the supply of cavalry horses to Essex's army was both patchy and fraught with contention in 1643. For this reason, Robinson was right to point to the importance and significance of

the nine aforementioned warrants. They demonstrate that whatever financial drought Gerrard's deputies may have been suffering through during this period, they were still able to swiftly and efficiently deploy the resources given to them to meet the most immediate and pressing needs of the Lord General's army as they arose.

Another excellent example of the ongoing competence of the Lord General's army treasurers can be found in the second most important kind of 'support' payment that was made in London during this period. As we know from the analyses above, there was a dramatic decline in the amount of money that left Vernon's hands during the month of August 1644. Indeed, Vernon paid out just £444.96 during this thirty day period, virtually all of which was used to remunerate members of the army's administrative staff during the first week of the month. In fact the only substantial amount of army treasury money that was spent in August appears to have come from Jessop, and the single most valuable of his payments that month was recorded on the document preserved as TNA SP28/17 f.483. This document, it must be noted, is not one of the army's 'standard' pay warrants. Rather, it is a bill of sale for foodstuffs that were to be shipped into the west to feed Essex's forces during their time in that hostile country. It is also unlike many of Jessop's surviving pay warrants in that the majority of the money owing on it was paid to the creditor in a relatively prompt manner. Although it would appear that the debt was never fully cleared, the suppliers involved had nearly 95 per cent of their due in hand within

ninety six hours of the initial pay order that was issued to Gerrard by the Committee of Both Kingdoms on 10 August.[781]

As Professor Gentles has told us, there were at least four ways of feeding a field army during the British wars.[782] In the first place, the state could arrange for the large-scale purchase of victuals from a single supplier or network of suppliers. These pre-purchased goods could then be transported to the army and the soldiers could be made to bear at least part of the cost via a reduction in their wages. Secondly, the state could assume that the individual soldiers were responsible for the procurement of their meals from local sources. This was the easiest of the four methods in terms of logistics, but its success depended both on the regular and prompt payment of the army's wages, and the availability of local goods. Thirdly, a thoughtful and far-sighted commander could arrange to have large-scale magazines ready for the army's use positioned at key junctures along its planned route of travel. These magazines could be stocked either with 'pre-paid' goods supplied on the army administration's coin or credit, or by food that would be paid for 'out of pocket' by the soldiers at the point of purchase.[783] Finally, an army could rely on a totally 'privatized' system of supply and support – relying on a host of private merchants who would follow the forces on the march, supplying them with food that was brought in by the sellers and sold to the soldiers at a profit. The payment

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[781] See also *CSPD*, vol.19, 414ff; TNA SP28/17 f.487.

[782] The substance of this paragraph is taken almost entirely from Gentles, *English Revolution*, 115-116.

[783] On the continent this was known as the *étapes* system, a method that was used extensively by Habsburg armies on their long marches up and down the so-called 'Spanish road'. See Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80-87.

recorded in TNA SP28/17 f.483 would appear to be a textbook example of the first of Gentles's four methods of food supply. This was akin to the system that the regular army had originally erected and deployed under Commissary Nicholas Bond during the first fifteen months of the army's existence, a system that, as we know, had largely collapsed into the messy expedient of 'free quarter' by 1644.

How were these supplies to be delivered to the then-distant regular army? As we know, it is very likely that Vernon stopped delivering money in August because his access to specie from London was cut off. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to be certain of this. Again, a careful examination of the Committee of Both Kingdom's records from this period reveals that the £2,000 paid on the authority of TNA SP28/17 f.483 was considered part of the final payment of £20,000 worth of Excise money that was due to Essex's army on the authority of the 26 March Ordinance, the rest of which was to have been forwarded to Vernon in coin.[784] However, because we lack access to Vernon's ledger from this period we cannot know for sure when (or if) this £18,000 was delivered into his care. Nevertheless, we do know that something arrived in Cornwall for Essex's army during the month of August. Ultimately, we know this for two reasons. In the first place, Essex himself wrote to the Committee of Both Kingdoms on 27 August, thanking them for ". . . sending money and victuals for the soldiers".[785] And secondly, a detailed shipping manifest outlining the army's receipt of victuals in the West Country has survived.

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[784] See *CSPD*, vol.19 ff.414-415, 420, 425, and 437-438 especially.
[785] *Ibid.*, 456.



Figure 4.9 - TNA SP28/17 f.483: a bill for foodstuffs sent or to be sent to Essex's army in the west. The reader will note that although the receipt does not say that it was Jessop who paid this money, it most certainly came out of Gerrard's office. I believe it was therefore paid by Jessop because Francis Vernon was undoubtedly with the army in the west at the time.

Evidently, the supply of imported food to Essex's soldiers during the month of August 1644 was entrusted to a man named Robert Woolsey. Woolsey, it would appear, was deputized by Commissary Nicholas Bond to both receive and distribute the many tons of food that were shipped in to sustain the Lord General's army during their final stages of their western adventure. Woolsey's account of this process – like so many other pieces of vital quantitative information – has survived as a part of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers.[786] Notable for the amount of detail contained within its pages, Woolsey's account records not only when and where he received certain batches of goods, but what exactly became of it all. Broken down by regiment, his lists of disbursements shed important light on the relative size of the various formations that made up Essex's combined army during this time. Indeed, these lists are particularly revealing in the case of the provincial forces that were then serving alongside Essex's regulars. This is, of course, because such units do not typically appear in the pay warrants that were cashed by Vernon. Table 4.14 is aimed at providing the reader with a comprehensive list of the units that were supplied by Woolsey during the month of August 1644.[787] It contains not only the names of the regiments that appear in his ledger, but also the total value of the food that was received by each. Finally, the table records whether or not the units in question can be considered 'regular' formations. Again, this variable has been determined not by any distinction that is found in Woolsey's account, but by the units' appearance in Vernon's pay warrants.

[786] TNA SP28/128/28.
[787] **Table 4.14, Appendix D.**

The first thing to note about Table 4.14 is the total value of the goods that Woolsey reported delivering. As the reader can see, this total falls well short of the £2,000 paid over by Gerrard's treasury via TNA SP28/17 f.483. There are several possible reasons for this. In the first place, it is far from certain that all of the supplies listed in Woolsey's ledgers were originally acquired using the £2,000 in question. For example, some of the delivery notices predate the Committee of Both Kingdom's order of 10 August. Secondly, it is clear that the army treasury was ultimately responsible for the shipping charges that were incurred in this process, regardless of where Woolsey's supplies originally came from. Indeed, no less than £200 was budgeted for this by the authors of the bill that was presented to Gerrard's office on 14 August. Additionally, it is also clear that some of the goods that the army actually received were destroyed or lost in transit before they could be delivered. Woolsey himself attempted to account for the supplies that were lost while they were under his care, but regardless of this it is evident that the victuals he handled were worth much less than those appearing in TNA SP28/17 f.483.[788] Ultimately, although Table 4.14 presents a unit-by-unit summation of the total value of the goods that were delivered by Woolsey, it tells us nothing about the *kinds* of victuals that were delivered, and the total weight or volume of each kind. Again, Woolsey's account book is very detailed, and all of this information can be readily found within its pages. Interestingly, it would seem that the amount and type of food that was

[788] Woolsey summarized his receipts and disbursements on TNA SP28/128/28 f.29 (value: £1,259 17s 7d). His reported losses were worth £137 10s. It should be noted that this second sum appears to be a net figure. It seems likely that some of Woolsey's losses were made up by victuals delivered from local sources. See folio 11 for this.

purchased in London on 14 August was not identical to the victuals received by the soldiers in Cornwall, more evidence that at least some of Woolsey's supplies were sourced elsewhere.

Understanding just how much state-purchased food was delivered to Essex's army during the month of August 1644 is important for at least two reasons. In the first place, it provides us with a tangible example of how effective and efficient the Long Parliament's centralized logistics network could be in the period immediately preceding the creation of the New Model Army. It is important to understand and evaluate this if we are to understand the relative achievements of that new army in these matters.[789] However, when making this kind of comparison we should always remember that Essex's army operated in a very different fiscal-military context than the New Model. The Lord General's regulars had to compete for military resources with at least two other organizationally sophisticated English field armies at this time[790] – both of which represented different geographic, political, and religious factions that were then vying for control of the unfolding revolution. Naturally, this was a reality that severely restricted the amount of these resources that could or would be made available to Gerrard's central treasury apparatus at any given moment in time, especially when it was operating so far from the capital. Secondly, presenting a breakdown of the goods delivered by Woolsey is useful because it allows us to see just how far the Parliament's money went in these

[789] Again, readers interested in the procurement of food for the New Model during its formative period should consult Gentles, *New Model Army*, 45-7.
[790] Manchester's and Waller's.

matters. Indeed, because Woolsey's account is so exceptional in its detail, it may be used as a case study for estimating the amount of 'free quarter' that would have been necessary to sustain Essex's army at this time. For all these reasons, Table 4.15 provides the reader with a concise summary of Woolsey's deliveries by type, weight, volume, and value.[791]

According to Gentles, the Parliament provided the New Model Army with around 90,000 lbs of cheese and 168,336 lbs of biscuit during the first two months of its existence. As Gentles says, this was not supposed to completely fill the soldiers' stomachs during this period. Rather, it was intended to supplement the food they purchased with their wages.[792] Assuming that these foodstuffs were intended only for the consumption of the New Model's newly-raised troops (i.e. – not for the old soldiers brought over from the regular and quasi-regular armies of Essex, Manchester, and Waller), they would have needed to be divided by eleven thousand mouths, an operation that would have provided the troops with just 4.37 ounces of biscuit and 2.34 ounces of cheese per day.[793] By way of comparison, Essex's regular infantrymen received, on average, around 3.57 ounces of biscuit and 0.78 ounces of cheese per day (supplemented by a few crumbs of other foodstuffs) from the central government's logistical apparatus

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[791] **Table 4.15, Appendix D.**

[792] Gentles, *New Model Army*, 45.

[793] *Ibid.*, Table 2.1, p.39 – ([{168,336 lbs of biscuit ÷ 11,000 soldiers} ÷ 56 days] x 16 ounces to a pound = 4.37; [{90,000 lbs of cheese ÷ 11,000 soldiers} ÷56 days] x 16 ounces to a pound = 2.34).

during the month they spent in Lostwithiel.[794] Unlike the New Model soldiers, however, Essex's regulars had no wages delivered to them that month – a situation that must have greatly exacerbated their dependence on the 'voluntary' assistance of the Cornish. This, more than anything else, probably explains the vengeful behavior of the civilian population after the regulars were compelled to surrender on 2 September.

Significantly, this unfortunate situation might have been mitigated, to a degree, if the far-off regular army had truly been converted into a quasi-regular one, something the ordinance of 22 June 1644 ostensibly accomplished in a limited fashion.[795] Aside from receiving their pay – inadequate though it might have been – from specific geographic zones via the Assessment, such armies also tended to have more positive (or at least more normalized) relationships with the communities within those zones. For example, Hughes tells us that in Warwickshire specific, county-level military units – generally smaller in size than a regiment – were typically assigned to a particular group of parishes within the county. These parishes were then made responsible for sustaining their units using the proceeds of the Weekly Assessment for the duration of the first war.[796] A related (though far more sophisticated) model prevailed in the Eastern Association after the passage of the 20 January 1644 Ordinance. During the subsequent campaign Manchester's army was often compelled to demand unpaid 'free quarter' when it was deployed beyond the boundaries of its Association. Things were different when they were stationed within the

[794] Consult Table 4.15 below – ([{28,092 lbs of biscuit ÷ 4,500 soldiers} ÷ 28 days] x 16 ounces to a pound = 3.57; [{6,129 lbs of cheese ÷ 4,500 soldiers} ÷ 28 days] x 16 ounces to a pound = 0.78).
[795] Again, *LJ*, vi, 602.
[796] Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War*, 186-188.

seven counties, however. There the Association's administrative machinery was able to provide recompense to the communities who were forced to house and support Manchester's forces by deducting the amounts the army owed from the Assessment money that was paid by the affected areas.[797]

Essex was of course keenly aware that his regular army was institutionally incapable of relying on such parochial arrangements. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1644 he was prepared to gamble on both the political commitment and logistical capabilities of the central government, as well as the anticipated good will of the western parts. As we already know, on 14 June 1644 Essex explained to the Committee of Both Kingdoms why he had resolved to take the regulars into the west, rather than leaving the task to Waller and his composite army.

> If Sir Wm. Waller go thither he will indeed free them from paying contribution to the enemy, but will command them to pay contribution to himself, though I know he has received large sums already from the western gentlemen, for the paying of two or three regiments, which have done them but little service as yet, the other regiments under his conduct being paid by the City of London or the Associated counties. For my own part, I am resolved not to spoil the western counties because I go to relieve them, and that is, as I conceive, the way to reduce them. I respect not pay, but am ready to serve the State and the west though it cost me dear, yet I am confident they will not suffer us to perish in their service. Sir Wm. Waller is engaged to look to his Associated counties by ordinance of Parliament, and his faith passed to those distressed counties; now there are two considerable garrisons in those counties [viz. at] Basing and Winchester, which are not yet removed; he may do well to perform what he has already undertaken, before he undertake a new business . . . if you think fit to set him at liberty and confine me, be pleased to make him General and me the Major[-General] of some [quasi-regular] brigade, that my soldiers may have free quarter, free plunder, and fair contributions besides, as his have without control.[798]

Naturally, all of this should be taken with a grain of salt, given the bad blood that existed between Essex and Waller. But if we look past the Lord General's venomous and

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[797] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 154.
[798] *CSPD*, vol.19, 232-233.

slanderous attacks on Waller and his grab-bag of forces, we can discern the former's own understanding of the regular army's place within the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement. Lacking a geographic foundation made Essex's army vulnerable to privation, but this arrangement was also to be viewed as a strength – a source of 'liberty' that the Parliament's geographically 'confined' quasi-regular armies lacked. Of course, this 'liberty' came at a price. Essex and his army could accomplish nothing without the active and ongoing financial and material support of the central government (the 'State', in Essex's diatribe). During the final stage of the army's existence this support came in the form of the Excise – which was the most centralized and most productive of the Parliament's revenue streams in 1644. Unfortunately, however, the sums the army received from this source were always woefully inadequate, and the Lord General's plan to move into the west depended on the locals – as well as the (centralized) 'State' – 'not suffering them to perish in their service'. Again, the Lord General chose to gamble. Unfortunately for his men, it was a bet that he lost.

~ Conclusion ~

In 1644 the Parliament's war effort was transformed by three important alterations to its fiscal-military arrangement. The first of these alterations came about as a result of the parliamentarians' new socio-fiscal-military pact with the Scottish Covenanters. For the Scots, this pact was an opportunity to both export their Presbyterian vision of the Reformation, and to 'download' the cost of defending it onto the wealthy southerners who were expected to universally adopt it. For the English, the new Scottish

alliance was born of the careful planning of the Saye-Pym group, and of the terror induced by their losses during the summer of 1643. This sense of terror was only exacerbated by the prospect of a cessation in Ireland that threatened to bring fresh (potentially Catholic) forces into the English conflict. As a result of all this, the Parliament agreed to supply the invading Scottish army with a monthly sum that was comparable to the amounts they had hitherto been providing to their own regular army in the south. This was a very significant new commitment, and the money was ultimately obtained from forced loans raised in the south, and whatever Assessment and Sequestration money could be collected in situ in the north.[799] Finally, the Scottish alliance led to the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, a new and powerful executive body that was largely the preserve of the new Saye-St John group – the recast 'war party' faction that increasingly opposed the military leadership of the 'right-leaning' earl of Essex after the death of John Pym.

The second alteration was more evolutionary in nature than the first. It involved the institutional maturation of the administrative machinery that supported the Eastern Association's quasi-regular forces. Since the early days of 1643 these forces (and other county- and association-level forces) had been maintained largely by the Weekly Assessment – a tax which had originally been introduced to support the regular army, but had quickly been co-opted by the local committees and the Lieutenancy who fought the Parliament's enemies in the provinces. On 20 January 1644 the Parliament formalized

[799] Jones, "The War in the North", 124-136.

and enhanced this arrangement by increasing the value of the Assessment within the seven counties, and by 'centralizing' the proceeds at the level of the Association (rather than at that of the counties). As we have seen, this led to the creation of a sophisticated and relatively successful treasury apparatus that in many ways mimicked the operation of the regulars' own central army treasury. This treasury apparatus succeeded in delivering a very respectable volume of money into the hands of Manchester's troops during their 1644 campaigns, despite the fact that the debenture system its officers used to record disbursements was unnecessarily arcane.

The final and arguably most important alteration came about with the passage of the Parliament's first pieces of Excise legislation. This entirely new and controversial form of indirect taxation was unlike the Assessment for many reasons, not the least of which was the degree to which its proceeds were effectively centralized in London. There it was managed by a collection of eight wealthy financiers operating out of the newly-established Excise Office, an arrangement that allowed the central government to appropriate the proceeds of the tax at its source, and to borrow very large sums from the commissioners against their anticipated receipts. During the 1644 campaigns the fruits of the Excise were used to support a variety of military activities, not the least of which were the marches of Sir William Waller. Like Manchester, Waller was made Major-General of a sophisticated multi-county Association on 4 November 1643. Unlike Manchester, however, Waller was not given independent access to the Assessment revenues of his South-Eastern Association, revenues which were never adequately

'centralized' anyway. Partly as a result of all this, Waller continued to rely heavily on the voluntary cooperation of the City's Militia Committee to help augment the size of his hodge-podge army. He also came to rely on periodic injections of Excise money while in the field.

Ultimately, receipts from the Excise *supplemented* Waller's income from the Assessment returns of the South-Eastern Association; they never *replaced* it.[800] It was a different matter for the Lord General and the old regular army, however. For them the Excise was a godsend – a centralized financial mechanism that allowed them to survive in a fiscal-military environment now dominated by locally-funded regional armies. According to the Lord General's Ordinance of 26 March 1644 the regulars were to receive more than £20,000 of Excise money per month. This represented more than two thirds of their total projected income. And yet even though this Ordinance also reduced the authorized strength of the regular army, the amounts they got were still never enough. Following Holmes, sections II and III have demonstrated that Essex's soldiers received less than half of what they were owed during this period, a state of affairs which was at least partly caused by the decayed state of the Lord General's oldest formations. Moribund as it was, the regular army was incapable of operating effectively on its own. Because of this, Essex, like Waller, found himself relying on the supplementary strength of the London militia during the 1644 campaigns. The need to compete with Waller for

[800] Everitt, *The Community of Kent*, 162-163.

City regiments can only have inflamed the long-standing feud between the two generals – a factor that most historians seem to have overlooked.

The central government resolved to reconstruct the regular army in the wake of its disastrous defeat at Lostwithiel. But this decision was made out of military necessity. On 1 October 1644 the Parliament passed an ordinance subordinating all of its forces to the will of the Committee of Both Kingdoms. Two weeks later that body sent a set of seventeen instructions to its southern generals. These instructions forever destroyed the Lord General's ability to independently command the partially-reformed regular army. That army survived the resulting process of 'confederation', fighting as part of the combined parliamentarian army at the second battle of Newbury. Indeed, the regulars proudly recaptured some of the cannon they lost in the West Country in that engagement. Some of these men would later go on to fight for the parliament in later campaigns, but they did so as part of an entirely new regular army fueled by a truly centralized Assessment scheme.

Conclusion: The Taking of Accounts

~ State Formation and Military Organization in Perspective: 1642-1644 ~

I began this dissertation by arguing for the value and utility of disentangling and understanding the various and varied systems of English military organization during the civil wars of the seventeenth century. Specifically, I suggested that conducting a systematic examination of the administrative and financial history of the earl of Essex's army would shed important light on the historical process that Michael Braddick has labelled 'state formation'. But in order to fully appreciate the structural changes that were wrought by these conflicts – and Essex's army's place in all of that – it was necessary to begin by introducing and explaining the arrangements that prevailed before.

As we well know, the Caroline 'fiscal-military state' was a profoundly hierarchical organism. At its centre was the monarch, the state's sovereign and the single most powerful member of the ruling elite. Before the wars of the 1640s the monarch wielded enormous financial powers in England, despite the fact that he relied heavily on the voluntary cooperation of lesser elites. Indeed, during the 1630s Charles I collected roughly 75 per cent of the central government's annual revenues – a sum that was steadily rising during that period – on the basis of his own 'public' or 'private' authority. And yet it would be wrong to believe that the king was capable of meeting the costs of government on his own. In fact, the Crown was heavily indebted during the pre-war period, a situation that made it extremely difficult for Charles to meet even his 'ordinary' financial commitments during peacetime.

When it came to waging war, the king's government in England relied even more heavily on the voluntary cooperation of the wider elite. And naturally, money was the first and most important need. With ordinary revenues stretched thin at the best of times, the Crown typically required the relatively small but nevertheless significant extraordinary sums that could be had through direct parliamentary taxation, a revenue source that was made unavailable by the very nature of the personal rule. But even during periods when this tax money was available the Crown could not produce well-armed and well-trained soldiers out of thin air. In order to combat his foes, Charles could draw upon English military resources that manifested themselves in three institutional capacities.

The militia apparatus was the first and most important of these capacities. But as we have seen, the English militia was a fundamentally decentralized collection of units that were organized and maintained on a part-time basis at the county and municipal levels. It was also primarily a defensive force, even though previous monarchs had succeeded in deploying elements of it abroad. Although the king and his Privy Council theoretically controlled the entire militia via the machinery of the Lieutenancy, in practice the counties exercised enormous discretionary powers over their militias and Trained Bands. Again, this was largely because they paid for these formations themselves. On the other hand, the king had real and direct power in naval matters because he owned his own warships – warships that were often paired with privately-owned vessels in times of seaborne war. Indeed, the king's powers in these matters were increased significantly after the introduction of the Ship Money scheme of the mid-

1630s. This scheme, a quota-based direct tax that rested entirely on the dubious legality of the king's expanded prerogative, produced both political anger and hundreds of thousands of pounds in new centralized revenues each year, monies that the king used to improve the administration – if not increase the size – of his own fleet.[801] And finally, the king had both the right and the responsibility to raise ephemeral 'expeditionary armies' of centrally-paid soldiers to meet his enemies on battlefields both at home and abroad.

In 1639 Charles decided to raise such an army and go to war with the Scottish Covenanting rebels without the support of an English parliament. Within three years this decision cost him his sovereign authority in England. This remarkable outcome was the product of the king's religious and political policies to that point, policies that had created widespread anger and mistrust throughout the elite networks that actually governed the country. By the time of the Bishops' Wars, these policies had produced a hard core of opposition to the royal government in England. Crucially, this opposition included extraordinarily powerful peers of the realm in addition to gentlemen from much further down the socio-economic hierarchy. And although there were intricate webs of clientage within this opposition, it should not be assumed or imagined that its most powerful members acted as puppet-masters. Together, these men worked tirelessly toward the destruction of the king's government, and when Charles was obliged to summon and retain an English parliament in the wake of his second disastrous campaign against the Scots, they used this body as a vehicle for their devastating political attacks. By the

[801] Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, 152.

spring of 1642 they were unilaterally managing the costs of a new and terrible conflict in Ireland – having only recently paid off the expeditionary armies of both the king and their Scottish allies. What's more, they had by then passed a parliamentary ordinance declaring their right to control and direct the county-level militias via a newly-appointed roster of Lords Lieutenant. With the passage of that bill the hilt of the nation's sword – the most practical manifestation of sovereignty – was grasped firmly by the hands of the parliamentary 'Junto'.

Tragically, the king was not willing to suffer this loss without a fight. Nor did he have to. By the summer of 1642 Charles had a 'faction' of his own in England, and civil war was thus assured. In order to defend their new 'commonwealth' the Junto in the Long Parliament understood that they needed to raise more forces than could be immediately mobilized by friendly elements within the re-staffed county militias. Using the skills they had developed during their financial stewardship of the ephemeral armies of 1640, as well as their management of the Irish war to date, the rebels solicited funds from private individuals, including a group of investors who had hoped to secure Irish land by levying pseudo-private troops for the government's use there. This solicitation – which took the form of the 'Propositions' – was a staggering success, and the mountains of silver that it produced were used to construct a new army for service in England under the earl of Essex, the Junto's chosen Lord General. From an organizational and administrative point of view (if not from that of training or equipment) this new army was unique. Like the Crown's expeditionary armies of the past, the infrastructure of Essex's army was

intended to be distinct from the county-level machinery of the militia. But even more than those royal armies, Essex's was to be created and supported in practice by funds and resources which had come into the immediate possession of the (revolutionary) central government. This, I have argued, was the arrangement that transformed it into a 'regular army', a force composed of full-time soldiers who knew no paymaster other than the new sovereign body at Westminster.

During the first three months of the war the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement was dominated by the Lord General's regular army. The Propositions allowed this army to be summoned into existence very quickly, and the practiced administrators who were recruited and employed to manage its centralized lifeblood ensured that these resources were efficiently deployed to good effect. However, the decentralized machinery of the militia – which had been taken over by parliamentarians in several key regions thanks to the Militia Ordinance – continued to function during this period, and the regular army, of course, could not be everywhere at once. After the battle of Edgehill on 23 October 1642 it became clear that the English civil war was not going to be decided quickly or neatly by a clash of the two sides' principal armies. A much wider and deeper state of mobilization was required, and on the Parliament's side two different but related evolutionary processes were set in motion.

In the first place, new regional forces – sometimes drawn from the militia or Trained Bands, and sometimes freshly raised – began appearing in many counties. And oftentimes these forces were banded together in multi-county military 'associations', an

organizational strategy that was not only approved by the central government, but sometimes insisted upon via parliamentary ordinance. Although these new 'quasi-regular' forces were nominally under the authority of the Lord General, in practice the major-generals who were commissioned to command them were more beholden to the local elite networks that were responsible for their creation. This was an entirely natural evolutionary development, considering the domestic nature of the civil war and the overarching importance of the pre-war militia system. Secondly, the central government (finally) faced a financial crisis in February 1643. Despite the implementation of the [Fifth and] Twentieth Part in London – a mandatory, assessment-based evolution of the Propositions scheme – the initial stock of centralized monies available to Essex's military administrators had by then dried up. What was needed was an entirely new revenue-generating mechanism, and the solution, as it happened, was a form of direct, quota-based parliamentary taxation that was of the same administrative pedigree as the king's old Ship Money scheme, and the £400,000 Act that was intended to put down the Irish rebellion of 1641.

Known as the Weekly Assessment, this new tax did not rely upon preexisting parochial administrative structures. Instead, the Ordinance of 24 February 1643 appointed a new series of pro-Junto committees at the county level. These committees, which sometimes included friendly members of the Lieutenancy, were supposed to assess their neighbors and collect a pre-determined amount of money from them on a weekly basis. Crucially, the proceeds of this process were supposed to be immediately transferred to the

regular army's own treasury office in London. But although the Weekly Assessment was cast as a mechanism to supply the regular army, the rapidly increasing sophistication of the aforementioned quasi-regular forces provided the county committees with an enormous incentive to retain and spend their portions of the Weekly Assessment money at home. In the event, this entropic phenomenon deprived Essex's army of many of the resources raised in the localities. However, there was still the extraordinarily rich population of London, upon whom the Weekly Assessment scheme fell more heavily than most. Large sums were raised for the regular army in London during the spring of 1643, and although this money was linked to the Weekly Assessment, most of it was *not* the product of direct taxation. Londoners had proven very generous donors during the height of the Propositions scheme, and some very powerful people in the City were made unhappy by the rates outlined in the 24 February Ordinance. As a result, the central government was compelled to not only regard much of the City's own Assessment levies as a loan, they were obliged to borrow large amounts of money from prominent Londoners on the security of the wider Weekly Assessment scheme. It was only thanks to this that the regular army received enough money to capture Reading from the royalists at the outset of the 1643 campaign.

But how did these first financial convulsions affect the soldiers' lives in the regular army's camp? In the first place, the pay warrant data make it clear that the army's roster of formations went through significant changes during the six months that followed the battle of Edgehill – the period covered by chapter two above. What's more, it is also

clear that the effects of battle losses and simple attrition were at that time beginning to distort the *per capita* cost of the private soldiery, an ugly phenomenon that exacerbated the central government's cash-strapped condition. As a result of all this, the regulars began to experience a certain degree of financial privation for the first time. And yet it is also clear that the army's principal on-site administrators – men like Francis Vernon and Anthony Fastolfe – successfully rationed the available funds, thereby mitigating the effects of the dearth. What's more, the sums delivered during this period were impressive in an absolute sense, despite the collapse of February 1643. Indeed, the regular army might well have received full pay during these six months – as it had during the Edgehill campaign – if only its organization could have been fully rationalized, an evaluation that will surely raise eyebrows considering the enormous additional sums that the army treasury was forced to devote to 'local forces' at this time.

Unfortunately, the six months beginning on 1 May 1643 were different. That summer was a time of military, political, and organizational crisis for the revolutionary government in London. The Lord General's seizure of Reading was not followed by a knock-out blow to the royalists in southern England. There are several plausible reasons for this, but three structural ones are especially pertinent to our discussion here. To begin with, the special pot of borrowed money that had been provided to Essex's army during the month of April was gone within a month or two. By June, my calculations show that the army's paid formations were receiving approximately half of the money they

needed,[802] sums that included the relatively small amount of decentralized money that was scraped together from local populations by Captain Fenton's ad hoc revenue committee. Secondly, disease – probably typhus – was by then hammering the soldiery, certainly reducing the army's combat effectiveness. And finally, the regular army was experiencing a shortage of horses – an important point that has been made repeatedly by Robinson. All of these problems combined to limit the Lord General's ability to personally confront some of the military disasters that were then being suffered by the Parliament's local forces and garrisons. On 30 June the Northern Army under the Fairfaxes suffered a crushing defeat at Adwalton Moor; and within two weeks of this the Western Army under Waller had been destroyed in two devastating engagements. When these losses were combined with the surrender of the port city of Bristol and the loss of Gainsborough during the later part of July and into early August, the picture looked very bleak indeed. Something had to be done.

During the month of August the soldiers of the regular army experienced a positive change in their fortunes, and tellingly, this occurred within a rapidly-changing political environment in London. During the preceding month the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement at or near the political centre had gone through a complicated series of convulsions that produced a new composite army for Sir William Waller, a disjointed reorganization of the machinery that supported the heterogeneous formations that comprised the Army of the Eastern Association, and a consolidation and rationalization

[802] Consult my speculative calculations for that month as found in Tables 3.8 and 3.13 below.

of the City's various militia units. Again, I have argued that all of these developments are best understood as further refinements of the decentralized network of quasi-regular forces that had quickly evolved out of the English militia system after the initial outbreak of the civil war – a network that had always been at arm's length from the machinery that was created to build and fuel the regular army. And yet even though the Parliament's quasi-regular forces were becoming ever more sophisticated, it was the regular army that benefited most from the confusion that reigned in London during the high summer of 1643.

What the frightened rebels needed most at that time was political and organizational stability at the centre so that the wider military crisis could be addressed, and satisfying Essex and his officers seemed like the best way of achieving this, at least in the short term. A new version of the Weekly Assessment was introduced on 3 August – one that formally removed the City from the 'national' tax rolls. As was the case in the spring, this allowed the central government to borrow large lump sums in the capital – money that was provided to Gerrard's treasury so that the regulars could be deployed to protect Gloucester, the last major parliamentarian bastion in the west. Reinforced with conscripted troops and partnered with units drawn from the recast City militia, the Lord General's army succeeded in relieving Gloucester before fighting the king's forces to a draw at Newbury in September.

The king's enemies in England survived the political and military crises of 1643, but the measures that were introduced to meet them had a profound impact on the shape

of their fiscal-military arrangement in 1644. Four important developments were responsible for these changes, all of which were explained and discussed in chapter four above. The first of these was a new socio-fiscal-military alliance with the Scottish Covenanters, the old allies of the pre-war Junto. Defined by the Solemn League and Covenant, the English authors of this new alliance promised the Scots that the latter's Presbyterian system of church government would be implemented in England. In exchange, the Scots agreed to send yet another army south of the border to combat Charles I and his supporters. As was the case in 1641, this army was to be materially supported by the new English regime. And although it was initially hoped that large sums might be raised via a voluntary loan raised against the Sequestrations scheme at eight per cent interest, the Parliament quickly realized that yet another forced loan was necessary, and London was again rated very highly. In the long run, the earl of Leven's Scottish army received money from both parochial sources in the north and from the new Goldsmiths' Hall Committee in the English capital – a committee that was also made responsible for managing the centralized process of 'composition' with sequestered delinquents in England. Large sums were made available to soldiers in the north (both English and Scottish) as a result of this development, and these were monies that were of course denied to the Parliament's own regular army in the south.[803]

The second major development involved the introduction and development of the Excise tax in the summer and autumn of 1643, a controversial new revenue scheme that,

[803] Consult Green, ed, *Calendar of the Committee for Compounding*, vol.1, 778-784.

like the Weekly Assessment before it, was an important source of credit for the central government in London. The new money that was generated by this process was of vital importance to the rebels' war effort during 1644, but, as we have seen, it is actually quite difficult to reconstruct the flow of it. This is because even though the core machinery of the Excise was composed of a highly centralized eight-man commission working out of a main office in London, the dispersal of funds was controlled by the Parliament directly, an arrangement that has compelled scholars such as Wheeler and Coffman to scour the *Commons Journal* for records of specific pay orders. Significantly, a great deal of the money raised and disbursed in this fashion (indeed, perhaps the majority of it) was used to support the regular army during the final stages of its existence, an important fact considering the ongoing importance of the Assessment to the rapidly-evolving quasi-regular forces in the English provinces at that time.

Indeed, the institutional maturation of the Eastern Association at the outset of 1644, a process that was brilliantly described by Holmes – as well as the reconstitution of Sir William Waller's army at roughly the same time – relied very heavily on revenues produced by direct, quota-based taxation in specific parochial contexts, but the ultimate direction of these administrative evolutions was heavily influenced by the deeply shifting political environment in London: the third of the four developments mentioned above. In the first place, Essex was not enthusiastic about the new Scottish alliance, which he saw as a threat to both the importance and centrality of himself and his regular army. During the final weeks of 1643 he allied himself with the residuum of the now-hollow

Northumberland-Holles 'peace' group (Northumberland himself was by then partnering with the militants). In doing so, Essex soon found himself in opposition to the recast Saye-St John group – men who were by then determined to rebuild the Parliament's executive machinery of government in their own interests. By February 1644 their actions resulted in the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, a partisan Anglo-Scottish body that was given the power to 'order and direct' the Parliament's war effort from the centre. As we have seen, this development had profound implications for the soldiers of the regular army, eventually leading to their absorption into the 'confederated' field army that faced the king at the second battle of Newbury that autumn.

But during the winter of 1643/4 the future shape of parliamentarian fiscal-military organization in southeastern England – the area richest in resources – was far from certain. Three sophisticated rebel armies had by then emerged in this region, each displaying fascinating structural features derived from their unique institutional pedigrees. Between 1 January and 30 March 1644 each of these armies was significantly overhauled via a specific parliamentary ordinance, an important process that amounts to the fourth and final of the developments mentioned above. The first of these ordinances was passed on 20 January 1644. This ordinance transformed the machinery that supported the quasi-regular Army of the Eastern Association, greatly increasing the potency of the same by creating a 'centralized' army treasury that concentrated Assessment monies raised throughout the association into the hands of administrators who were beholden to both the Cambridge Committee and the earl of Manchester, the

association's major-general. The second ordinance of note was passed on 30 March. This introduced into the South-Eastern Association a fiscal-military regimen that was similar in nature to the one introduced into the Eastern Association by the 20 January Ordinance, although there were certain key differences. Both associations now relied primarily on the Assessment to fuel their quasi-regular forces – a situation that was the direct result of the entropic decentralization of the first Weekly Assessment monies levied on the 24 February 1643 Ordinance. However, Sir William Waller – the nominal commander of the quasi-regular forces of the South-Eastern Association – was not given the same direct, 'centralized' fiscal-military control over his association, a situation that was further complicated by the fact that the latest incarnation of his army was composed of other sorts of military units, including an important but ever-shifting contingent of the London militia.

The third ordinance was passed on 26 March 1644. This ordinance – which has been referred to here and elsewhere as the Lord General's Ordinance – reorganized the regular army by making it primarily reliant on the proceeds of the Excise, the most centralized parliamentarian tax scheme to date. Crucially, I have argued that this structural development can be viewed as a 'natural' outgrowth of the regular army's special place in the fiscal-military arrangement during the 1642-1643 period. That said, however, we have also seen that the regular army continued to rely heavily on an operational partnership with structurally-distinct quasi-regular forces, a tradition of sorts that began with the help it received from Lord Grey's nascent Army of the Eastern

Association at Reading in April 1643, and continued during the relief of Gloucester. During the 1644 campaigns Essex's reformed army – like Waller's – was partnered with a shifting roster of militia units drawn from the capital and its environs. Again, these forces were never fully integrated into the regular army in the sense that Vernon was issued unit-level warrants on their behalf, but this fact didn't lessen the military value of the partnership. Indeed, I have here suggested that the Lord General's need to secure auxiliary formations from the City was something that he shared in common with Waller but *not* Manchester: a fact that probably exacerbated the intense friction that existed between the first two men at this time.

In the final analysis the 1644 campaigns were a disaster for the regular soldiers in the field. As we know, their army was nearly destroyed by the Lord General's fateful decision to march into the west that summer; and although the regular army was briefly resuscitated during the months of September and October, the Committee of Both Kingdoms ensured that it would never again resume its unique place in the Parliament's fiscal-military arrangement. But things had become desperate long before the surrender at Lostwithiel. As we have seen, Holmes's estimates regarding the pay levels during the whole of the calendar year are largely correct: despite the reduced pay scale that was introduced by all three of the army ordinances discussed above, Essex's regular infantry received only 48% of their dues, while the cavalry received just 25%. Ultimately, this abysmal situation was the result of two important factors, one of which had been plaguing the army since the spring of 1643. In the first place, there were still too many

unit structures, each of which contained an expensive (and partly redundant) officer corps. Although the Lord General's Ordinance had ostensibly reduced the number of infantry regiments to seven (six of which were to contain 1,000 soldiers each, while Essex's own was to contain 1,500) and limited the cavalry to 36 troops (with a combined strength of 3,000 ordinary troopers), the pay warrants make it clear that these reforms were only partially implemented. In practice, there seem always to have been fewer soldiers in more formations.

Secondly, by 1644 there was simply not enough centralized money to go around. This was not a new problem either, but during the 1643 campaigns the situation had been slightly better. What's more, the Lord General had then succeeded in erecting an ad hoc, in-the-field revenue collection committee that had softened the worst effects of privation. Captain Fenton's committee never came close to matching (let along exceeding) the volume of centralized money that Vernon continued to distribute between the capture of Reading and the relief of Gloucester, but its contributions were significant, especially during the difficult month of September 1643. Interestingly, the failure of the centralized army treasury to meet the needs of the soldiery during 1644 was ironic. For although the amount of money being received in the field was never enough, its ultimate source was in many ways more revolutionary and 'modern' than the machinery that was erected to fuel the New Model Army – the second and more famous of the Long Parliament's regular armies – in successive campaigns. This is because the New Model of 1645 – like Manchester's and Waller's armies before it – continued to be fueled largely

by direct-tax Assessments on particular geographic locations. But whereas the Assessments that had funded those earlier armies were levied and spent at the local (or at best, regional) level, the New Model's initial Assessment scheme succeeded in centralizing the proceeds of direct taxation raised in no fewer than *seventeen* counties![804]

This was an impressive and unprecedented development – a realization of the Assessment scheme as it was originally envisioned in the 24 February 1643 Ordinance – and it succeeded in transforming the New Model into new kind of regular army: one based on direct taxation from a significant proportion of the nation's combined parochial coffers. Sadly, Essex's army was never able to benefit from such a development. Its operational history was inextricably tied to a very specific, very protean phase in the development of the English fiscal-military state – a phase dominated by political division within the elite during an unstable and uncertain shift in sovereignty. Crucially, this division manifested itself at that time in a competing series of quasi-regular armies, all of which evolved out of the pre-war militia system. Structurally speaking, Essex's army was always different from these, retaining a uniquely close relationship with the turbulent centre of revolutionary sovereignty long after the initial wave of voluntary contributions that had created it were gone. By 1644 it had come to rely on an increasingly sophisticated and fully centralized system of short-term state credit that was almost entirely based on the most innovative (and controversial) of the Parliament's wartime tax

[804] Gentles, *New Model Army*, 10, 28-29.

schemes, a scheme that would – a century later – fuel British military operations on a global scale.[805]

~ The Central Government at War: A Final Look at Central Finance, 1642-1644 ~

Figure 5.1 - TNA SP28/140/15 f.380r:
"I find noe surcharge to this Account of Coll Jeames Sheffeild but agrees wth the musters and warrants and acquittances and that he was nine times mustered.
Per Ellis Smyth, Accomp^{nt} to the Comitte of Acco[mpts]."

By way of summation, this final sub-section of the dissertation attempts three things that have not been possible until now. In the first place, it attempts to verify the information found in several of the personal accounts presented to the Committee for taking the Accounts of the Kingdom by a few of Essex's combat officers. These accounts and the information they contain have long been known to historians,[806] but it has never been possible to compare them to the whole mass of surviving pay warrants because until now we lacked a complete understanding of the latter. Performing such a comparison is

[805] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), chapter four, passim.
[806] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 147, for example.

an important exercise – as the compilers of the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers well knew – because it allows us to gauge both the honesty and accuracy of the officers' accounts, many of which were composed in order to secure the payment of arrears, and some of which were written and submitted well after the relevant transactions took place. Secondly, this sub-section will use a selection of the accounts that can be validated in this way as case studies: practical examples that can be juxtaposed to the global view provided by my aggregate database. Using these accounts in this manner is important here because, as the reader knows, many of the pay-level calculations found throughout this dissertation rely on static abstractions and hypothetical size and strength models that serve as place-holders for the very complex and protean collection of units that actually comprised the army during the twenty-nine months examined here. Ultimately, these analyses will demonstrate that the information found in a selection of these accounts – accounts that have been crosschecked against the warrants – tends to vindicate the methodologies I have used to determine the adequacy of the army's pay over time.

Finally, in order to make meaningful the information generated by this comparison of warrants and accounts this final sub-section will compare the results of this twofold process to the army pay data found in the work of both Clive Holmes and Ian Gentles – the preeminent historians of the Army of the Eastern Association and the New Model Army. Doing this is both interesting and important because it allows us to understand the successes and failures of Gerrard's centralized treasury office – as it has been described by my databases – in a wider fiscal-military context. However, because

Essex's army, the Army of the Eastern Association, and the New Model existed and were paid at different stages of the Parliament's revolutionary process, it will be necessary to deal effectively with the problem of chronology. In the end, it will be here suggested that the most important and administratively sophisticated armies raised by the Long Parliament tended to be better paid during the early days of their existence. Again, the main reason for this had to do with unequal battle losses and attrition among officers and private soldiers. It is for this reason, among others, that it is not really fair to compare – as Holmes does – the pay histories of Essex's and Manchester's armies during the twelve months that made up 1644. Instead, this analysis will draw on pay information from an earlier phase of the regular army's history, data that demonstrate just how favorably the performance of Gerrard's office compares to the one managed by Leman, Weaver, and Gawsell during 1644.

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As I have already indicated, the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers contain many different kinds of financial documents created by the rebels during the civil war period; the military pay and supply warrants issued on behalf of the central authorities during the 1640s and 50s are simply one of the largest and most readily-identifiable of these kinds. The accounts of the various officers, officials, and localities that served the Long Parliament during the wars are another. These documents were typically submitted to the Committee for taking the Accounts of the Kingdom by the parties in question in order to show what monies were owed to them by the state. Again, these accounts were often

submitted well after the debts and dues in question were accrued. When it comes to army officers, these accounts most often constitute a claim for personal arrears, and/or the amounts they distributed to their soldiers without reimbursement from their paymasters. In order for these officers to make such a claim, it was necessary for them to outline all of the money they had distributed to their subordinates, their total dues for the various military ranks and positions they held, and to subtract from this subtotal all of the various payments they had received from the state, as well as any free quarter or other goods they had received in kind. It should be noted that the army officers' accounts I have reviewed do *not* make any claim for the arrears that were still owed to their subordinates, although it is generally possible to calculate these sums from these documents.

The accounts of several officers who commanded formations in the regular army of the earl of Essex have survived the intervening centuries as part of SP28. Although these accounts can be found scattered throughout several volumes of this monstrous collection, an interesting lot of them are concentrated in SP28/140. Among these is the account of Richard Dean, one of the officers in charge of Essex's artillery train during 1644. Again, this man's account has already been used to gauge the survival rate of artillery warrants paid during that period.[807] In addition to Dean's account, there have survived multi-page documents that were prepared by (or on behalf of) Colonel James Sheffield,[808] Major Gilbert Blare,[809] Major Richard Cross,[810] Lt. Colonel Robert

[807] Again, TNA SP28/140/8 and Table 4.12 in Appendix D below.
[808] TNA SP28/140/15.
[809] TNA SP28/140/11.

Farrington,[811] Captain Henry Langham,[812] and Captain Thomas Jackson,[813] among others. For the purposes of this discussion I have chosen to focus my analysis on the accounts of these six men for two reasons. In the first place, all six of them were, without question, true regulars in the sense that their military service took place under the immediate command of the earl of Essex, and that all of their acknowledged receipts came directly from Gerrard's treasury. Secondly, these six officers provide an interesting and balanced glimpse into the workings of sub-regimental administration in Essex's army because half of them were cavalry commanders and half were infantry officers.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to quickly or easily compare the accounts of these six officers as they appear in the archive. The main reason for this is because they do not all cover the same period of time. Only two of these men – Sheffield and Farrington – were with the army during its earliest days in August 1642. Indeed, Captain Henry Langham's account does not begin until June 1643, but the other three were receiving pay by January 1643 at the latest. Table 5.1 renders all of this information graphically for the benefit of the reader. It distinguishes these officers by arm, and illustrates the length of time covered by the transactions recorded in their various accounts. Beginning on the left, the three lightly-shaded columns indicate the period of time covered by the first chapter of this dissertation. The other three chapters appear in sequence, each shaded more darkly than the last.

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[810] TNA SP28/140/14.
[811] TNA SP28/140/6.
[812] TNA SP28/140/10.
[813] TNA SP28/140/16.

Arm	
Cavalry	C
Infantry	Lt. C
	Ca
	C

Although three of these accounts terminate during the month of April 1644, I do not believe that this had anything to do with the order that Gerrard (and Vernon) received on 9 March to submit their first batch of paperwork to the Committee for taking the Accounts of the Kingdom.[814] This is because the formations these three men served in and/or commanded vanish from the pay warrant series at this time. On the other hand, Major Cross's account is somewhat of a special case. Although his account terminates during the month of October 1643, there is evidence that his troop was still in existence and receiving pay one month later.[815] Again, all six of these accounts contain detailed information about the history of these officers' receipts and disbursements. Let us now proceed with a review of their receipts, beginning, as usual, with the infantrymen.

As the reader well knows, the central army treasury tended to pay infantrymen (both officers and privates) at the regimental level in the months following the Edgehill campaign. Naturally, the lists of receipts found in the accounts of Farrington, Langham, and Jackson reflect this reality. Although we are here dealing with the accounts of three separate company commanders, it must be noted that two of these men served (with their companies) in the same infantry regiment. While Lt. Colonel Farrington eventually became the deputy commander of Colonel John Hampden's regiment (which was later

[814] Again, TNA SP28/252, pt.1, Order book of the Committee for Taking the Accounts of the Kingdom, f.3v.

[815] TNA SP28/11 f.377 – a warrant that was issued on 27 November 1643 and paid on 04 December 1643. There are no later references to Cross's troop in the pay warrant series.

commanded, in turn, by Colonels Thomas Terrill and Richard Ingoldsby),[816] a position he held even as he commanded one of the companies that made up that regiment, both Captains Henry Langham and Thomas Jackson commanded companies in the regiment of Colonel George Langham, a post-Edgehill formation that appears to have become defunct by May 1644. Again, although the treasury tended to deal with the infantry regiments at a level 'above' the individual companies, Captain Thomas Jackson seems to have played a very special role for his regiment in this regard, a topic we will cover momentarily when we come to the accounts of Colonel Langham's two company commanders.

According to his account, Lt. Colonel Farrington entered service with the regular army as an ordinary infantry captain in Colonel Hampden's regiment on 9 August 1642. On 18 October 1644 he was promoted to the rank of [sergeant] major, a rank and position that he held in the same regiment until 2 April 1645. Ingoldsby's regiment was transferred to the New Model at the time of that army's creation,[817] and it would appear that it was during his regiment's time in that army that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel, the rank he held on the day his account was submitted.[818] This account does not cover any transactions postdating 2 April 1645. In all, Farrington claimed that he was owed more than £1,700 for the period falling between 9 August 1642 and 2 April 1645, an amount that includes both his own pay as captain and major, as well as the

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[816] Farrington's account includes a special note from Essex himself that verifies the information contained therein. This note also informs the Committee of the two changes in command that took place in this regiment over the period in question. See TNA SP28/140/6 f.263r.

[817] Sir Charles Firth and Godfrey Davies, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 1: 373.

[818] That day was 15 July 1646. TNA SP28/140/6 f.272r.

money he distributed to the fluctuating number of officers, NCOs, and private soldiers who served in his company during that time.[819] Against this claim, Farrington reported receiving £1,252 14s 2d from the state during the period in question.[820] Of course, in this case 'the state' means (naturally enough) Sir Gilbert Gerrard's centralized army treasury, although Farrington had little direct contact with either Vernon or Jessop.

As I said in my 2010 article, the administration of Hampden's regiment during the Edgehill campaign was unique.[821] The vast majority of the centralized treasury money that was consumed by this regiment during these three months was paid over at the regimental level. Again, while this type of payment eventually became the norm for all of the regular infantry regiments, it was indisputably odd during the first ninety days of the war. However, that said, there is precisely one pre-Edgehill instance of Captain Farrington receiving money from Francis Vernon directly and at the company level.[822] Surprisingly, it would appear that Farrington overlooked this payment when composing his account, for it appears in neither the receipts nor the disbursements section of this document. Aside from this single instance of company-level payment, Farrington received all of the money he used to pay himself and his subordinates from the men responsible for receiving the treasury's payments to his colonel and on behalf of his

[819] My arithmetic does not agree with Farrington's on this point. He claims to have been owed £1,760 3s 4d (TNA SP28/140/6 f.270r). My own digital version of his disbursements and salary dues totals £1,775.75. It should be noted that if my total is correct then Farrington's account shortchanges the Lt. Colonel!
[820] Our numbers agree on this point. TNA SP28/140/6 f.272r.
[821] Crawshaw, "Military finance," 1042, n.25.
[822] TNA SP28/2A f.259. This warrant was issued on 30 September and paid in full on 01 October 1642. Worth £64 1s 4d, the warrant is an integral part of the calculations I performed in my 2010 article. As a surviving field warrant designed to remunerate only the private soldiers of the company, it appears in Appendices A and B as one of the 263 payments I used to make my central point.

entire regiment.[823] Significantly, a brief comparison of the regiment's warrants and Farrington's stated receipts reveals no other obvious discrepancies or problems. However, it is comparatively difficult to conclusively link these two sets of data. This is because there appears to be no surviving paperwork that chronicles regiment-level bookkeeping within Farrington's regiment. Crucially, the same cannot be said of Colonel Langham's.

Again, both Captains Henry Langham and Thomas Jackson served in Colonel George Langham's infantry regiment, a formation that came into existence after Edgehill. Like Farrington, both men financed their companies using money that was received from the treasury at the regimental level, and neither of their accounts displays obvious signs of intentional fraud. Interestingly enough, however, it would appear that Captain Jackson assumed personal responsibility for receiving from the treasury the whole of his regiment's payments during the month of November 1643. Additionally, he appears to have been charged with distributing these funds to the regiment's other company commanders, as well as the officers, NCOs, and private soldiers of his own company. Jackson served his regiment in this capacity until its dissolution in May 1644. As a result of this arrangement, Jackson's account is made up of four parts instead of the usual two. In addition to providing the Committee of Accounts with a list of his receipts and

[823] There is only one other example of a pay warrant being composed especially for Lt. Colonel Farrington. This document was written on 5 December 1644 and was paid in full by Vernon five days later. Valued at 14 days' of his personal pay as major (£9 9s), this money was received by Farrington's wife, Edeth, on the occasion of her husband being ill – a symptom, it would seem, of wounds he had received in the service. TNA SP28/21 f.137. This payment does appear in Farrington's account.

disbursements as a company commander, he also included a list of his receipts and disbursements as his regiment's liaison to the central treasury. Again, all of this is important because it allows us to see how regiment-level finance worked at the company level – a process that is typically cloaked in mystery because the warrants do not describe company finance. Let us now consider an example of this process for the sake of clarity. On 5 February 1644 the earl of Essex issued a warrant to Francis Vernon authorizing a payment of £268 11s 4d to Colonel Langham's infantry regiment. Aimed at providing 14 days' pay for the officers, NCOs, and the 151 private soldiers of that regiment, all of the money was received by Captain Jackson later that very day.[824] Naturally, Jackson listed this regiment-level receipt in the account he prepared for the Committee during the month of January 1647.[825] Again, because Captain Jackson's own company was a part of this regiment, some of the money in question was due to himself and his men; other amounts, however, were due to the regiment's other company commanders. Since this was the case, Jackson carefully recorded how much he provided to his regimental colleagues, and then described how he used the money he retained for the remuneration of his own command. By cross-referencing the accounts of Captains Thomas Jackson and Henry Langham, we can see how Colonel George Langham's infantry regiment was administered during the early days of 1644. Figures 5.2 to 5.7 illustrate this relatively complicated process for the benefit of the reader.

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[824] TNA SP28/12 f.080 and Figure 5.2. Again, this warrant references a now-vanished debenture originally composed at a muster held at St. Albans. This muster would have determined the strength of the unit and hence the amount of money required for 14 days' pay.
[825] TNA SP28/140/16 f.391r and Figure 5.3.



Figure 5.2 – TNA SP28/12 f.080: The field warrant authorizing the payment of Colonel George Langham's infantry regiment on 05 February 1644. Captain Jackson's signature is clearly visible beneath the receipt.



Figure 5.3 – TNA SP28/140/16 f.391r:
Captain Thomas Jackson's regiment-level receipts from the army treasury for the use of Colonel Langham's infantry regiment.



Figure 5.4 – TNA SP28/140/16 f.394v:
How Captain Jackson disposed of the money he received on the authority of TNA SP28/12 f.080.



Figure 5.5 – TNA SP28/140/16 f.393r:
The breakdown of Captain Jackson's disbursements to his own company after the muster of 30 January 1644.



Figure 5.6 – TNA SP28/140/10 f.331r:
Captain Henry Langham's acknowledgement of the money he received from
Captain Jackson on 5 February 1644 (see Figure 5.4 above).



Figure 5.7 – TNA SP28/140/10 f.333r:
Captain Henry Langham's disbursements to his company on 5 February 1644.

On the other hand, Essex's cavalry formations were almost never administered at the regimental level, and it is therefore much easier to relate the three cavalrymen's accounts presented in Table 5.1 to the warrants found in my aggregate database. Again, this is because all three of these officers received their acknowledged payments from the treasury directly, and on warrant from either Essex or the Committee of Safety. Table 5.2 collates the reported receipts listed in these accounts with all of the lost and surviving warrants. Again, the results are important here because they quickly and neatly demonstrate the essential validity of the former. Significantly, all of the relevant warrants

I have found are listed in the accounts, and it should be noted that I have not found evidence that any of these officers reported receiving money that does not appear in one of the surviving (or lost) central treasury warrants found in my database.

Table 5.2 – Comparison: Pay Warrants and Regular Cavalry Troop Commanders' Reported Receipts
(Sources: TNA SP28/140/11, 14 and 15; TNA SP28/1A–21, and 143)

Reported Date	From	Pounds	Shillings	Pence	Warrant (?)	Pay Date
10 Aug 1642	Vernon	349	16	0	SP28/1A f.030	10-Aug-1642
16 Aug 1642	Vernon	104	9	6	SP28/1A f.059	16-Aug-1642
16 Aug 1642	Vernon	10	0	0	SP28/1A f.111	16-Aug-1642
16 Aug 1642	Vernon	6	0	0	SP28/1A f.115	16-Aug-1642
01 Oct 1642	Vernon	365	14	0	SP28/2A f.271	01-Oct-1642
17 Oct 1642	Vernon	174	13	0	SP28/2B f.404	18-Oct-1642
28 Oct 1642	Vernon	174	13	0	SP28/2B f.473	28-Oct-1642
30 Nov 1642	Vernon	349	6	0	SP28/3B f.351	30-Nov-1642
03 Dec 1642	Vernon	349	6	0	SP28/4 f.170	05-Dec-1642
06 Jan 1643	Vernon	349	6	0	SP28/5 f.015	06-Jan-1643
14 Jan 1643	Vernon	174	13	0	SP28/5 f.183	24-Jan-1643
28 Jan 1643	Vernon	200	0	0	SP28/143 FVA f.53r	05-Sep-1642
02 Mar 1643	Vernon	300	0	0	SP28/5 f.344	03-Mar-1643
12 Apr 1643	Vernon	174	13	0	SP28/6 f.234	12-Apr-1643
29 Apr 1643	Vernon	77	0	0	SP28/6 f.330	29-Apr-1643
25 May 1643	Vernon	352	16	0	SP28/7 f.104	25-May-1643
21 Jun 1643	Vernon	176	8	0	SP28/7 f.440	22-Jun-1643
12 Jul 1643	Vernon	194	18	0	SP28/8 f.151	12-Jul-1643
18 Aug 1643	Vernon	99	11	0	SP28/9 f.154	19-Aug-1643
25 Aug 1643	Vernon	199	3	0	SP28/9 f.245	25-Aug-1643
26 Aug 1643	Vernon	21	0	0	SP28/9 f.264	26-Aug-1643
16 Oct 1643	Vernon	220	3	0	SP28/10 f.225	16-Oct-1643
01 Dec 1643	Vernon	173	12	0	SP28/11 f.414	01-Dec-1643
17 Feb 1644	Vernon	204	15	0	SP28/12 f.105	17-Feb-1644

17 Apr 1644	Vernon	204	15	0	SP28/14 f.274	17-Apr-1644
27 May 1644	Vernon	213	11	2	SP28/15 f.232	27-May-1644
06 Jun 1644	Vernon	106	15	7	SP28/16 f.040	06-Jun-1644
17 Jul 1644	Vernon	225	15	0	SP28/17 f.108	21-Jul-1644
02 Sep 1644	Vernon	225	15	0	SP28/18 f.021	02-Sep-1644
16 Oct 1644	Vernon	225	15	0	SP28/19 f.060	01-Nov-1644
Col. Sheffield's Total (£)		**6,004.11**				
Reported Date	**From**	**Pounds**	**Shillings**	**Pence**	**Warrant (?)**	**Pay Date**
21 Jan 1643	Vernon	200	0	0	SP28/5 f.123	21-Jan-1643
Mar 1643	Vernon	349	6	0	SP28/5 f.301	02-Mar-1643
12 Apr 1643	Vernon	174	13	0	SP28/6 f.192	12-Apr-1643
29 Apr 1643	Vernon	59	10	0	SP28/6 f.310	29-Apr-1643
20 May 1643	Vernon	320	12	0	SP28/7 f.041	23-May-1643
21 Jun 1643	Vernon	160	6	0	SP28/143 FVA f.67v	21-Jun-1643
21 Jun 1643	Vernon	100	0	0	SP28/7 f.423	21-Jun-1643
13 Jul 1643	Vernon	160	6	0	SP28/8 f.117	13-Jul-1643
15 Aug 1643	Vernon	82	1	6	SP28/9 f.064	16-Aug-1643
25 Aug 1643	Vernon	164	3	0	SP28/143 FVA f.75v	25-Aug-1643
16 Oct 1643	Vernon	191	9	0	SP28/10 f.235	19-Oct-1643
01 Dec 1643	Vernon	158	18	0	SP28/143 FVA f.81r	01-Dec-1643
17 Feb 1644	Vernon	155	1	0	SP28/12 f.113	17-Feb-1644
03 Apr 1644	Vernon	141	1	0	SP28/15 f.111	03-May-1644
Maj. Blare's Total (£)		**2,417.33**				
Reported Date	**From**	**Pounds**	**Shillings**	**Pence**	**Warrant (?)**	**Date**
06 Jan 1642	Vernon	100	0	0	SP28/5 f.059	06-Jan-1643
24 Jan 1643	Vernon	249	6	0	SP28/5 f.145	24-Jan-1643
02 Mar 1643	Vernon	349	6	0	SP28/5 f.320	02-Mar-1643
12 Apr 1643	Vernon	209	13	0	SP28/6 f.199	12-Apr-1643
29 Apr 1643	Vernon	80	10	0	SP28/6 f.343	29-Apr-1643
25 May 1643	Vernon	433	6	0	SP28/7 f.077	25-May-1643

02 Jun 1643	Vernon	216	13	0	SP28/7 f.392	20-Jun-1643
05 Jul 1643	Vernon	216	13	0	SP28/8 f.126	12-Jul-1643
16 Aug 1643	Vernon	103	1	6	SP28/9 f.095	17-Aug-1643
26 Aug 1643	Vernon	206	3	0	SP28/9 f.196	26-Aug-1643
14 Oct 1643	Vernon	206	3	0	SP28/10 f.159	14-Oct-1643
Capt. Cross's Total (£)		**2,370.73**				

***

To sum up, there are three challenges to meet when attempting to derive new and meaningful comparative information regarding the adequacy of military pay from both the surviving warrants *and* the officers' accounts preserved in SP28. In the first instance, one needs to compare these two different but related types of sources to ensure the reliability of the latter, something that has been accomplished above. Secondly, one must ensure that the chronology of the accounts overlap sufficiently to allow them to be considered together. Although it would appear to be difficult to find accounts that are perfectly contemporaneous, Table 5.1 demonstrates that there is significant overlap when it comes to the six accounts I have chosen to examine here. Finally, one must take into consideration the long-term effects of uneven attrition, and test the above-forwarded hypothesis that younger civil war armies tended to be paid better than older ones (at least partly) for this reason. Fortunately, the six accounts I have selected will allow us to successfully address and overcome the second and third of these obstacles in this part of the conclusion.

Although only two of the six accounts that appear in Table 5.1 cover the entire twenty-nine month period dealt with by this dissertation, four of them span all twelve months of 1643.[826] This is significant for several reasons. In the first place, 1643 was arguably the most pivotal period in the history of Essex's regular army. Indeed, financial data from this year appear in no fewer than three of the four chapters found above. It was during this year that the army besieged and captured Reading, relieved Gloucester with the help of the London militia, and fought the first battle of Newbury. It was also the year when the army's enviable and completely anomalous early financial condition – a condition that was entirely dependent on the wildly successful Propositions scheme of 1642 – began to erode, and Essex authorized the creation of Captain John Fenton's in-the-field funding committee to supplement the central treasury payments coming from London. It is for all these reasons that I propose to compare the financial profile of Essex's army in 1643 to that of Manchester's in 1644, and the New Model's in 1645.

Before we delve into the information found in the four relevant accounts from 1643 let us begin by assembling, for the very first time, all of the army's aggregate pay data for that year – data that currently appears spread across chapters two, three, and four above. To that end, Table 5.3 contains the same information presented or used in Tables 2.7, 2.12, 3.8, 3.13, 4.2, and 4.7 below. Even more of an abstraction than some of the tables and calculations found throughout the dissertation, Table 5.4 then uses this information to perform a series of hypothetical calculations designed to produce an

[826] Data pertaining to these four accounts are underscored in that table.

admittedly rough but nevertheless workable understanding of the adequacy of the army's pay receipts during the twelve months of 1643.

The most important and uncertain links in the chain of calculations found in Table 5.4 can be found in rows 1 and 7. The reason for this is because, as the reader knows, the size of Essex's army – understood as both the *number* of formations, as well as their cumulative strength – was in constant flux. Adding to the confusion in the quest to estimate the approximate size of the army for this year is the problem of uneven disbursement in the month-to-month pay record. In short, it is not possible to simply use the average (the mean) number of units found in rows 2 and 4 of Table 5.3. This is because the numbers found in the twenty-four cells that make up these two rows are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the size of the army during the months in question. During some months the whole of the army was paid something, and in those instances the number of units receiving pay accurately reflects the size of the forces in the field. In other months, however, only a few units received desultory payments – the treasury being then unable to make significant disbursements to the total number of active formations. In Table 5.4, the applied solution to this confusing situation involves using the *median* number of receiving formations and reported private soldier totals, rather than the *mean* of them. Again, this was done in order to filter out the abnormally low number of formations appearing in aberrant months like February and September 1643.


Month
Cavalry (Size & Re
Infantry (Size & Re

Table 5.4 – Adequacy of Pay for Essex's Cavalry and Infantry in 1643: Hypothetical Calculations Pertaining to the Data Presented in Table 5.3 Above

Arm	Row	Calculations	Result
Cavalry	1	'n' = Median Number of Troops Receiving Pay (Table 5.3, row 2):	48
	2	Monthly Cost of an Edgehill-Style Harquebusier Troop in £:	349.30
	3	Monthly Cost of Cavalry in £ ([{'n'-3}x349.3]+[3x551.6]):	17,373.30
	4	Total Cost of Cavalry during 1643 in £ (row 3 x 12):	208,479.60
	5	Total Receipts in £ (Table 5.3, row 1):	111,792.49
	6	Percentage of Cavalry Pay Received in £ (row 5 ÷ row 4):	54%
Infantry	7	'n1' = Median Number of Regiments (Table 5.3, row 4):	17
	8	'n2' = Median Number of Private Soldiers Per Reporting Regiment (Table 5.3, row 7):	484
	9	Monthly Cost of Infantry Officers in £ ('n1'x542.8):	8,956.20
	10	Monthly Cost of Private Soldiers in £ ('n1'x'n2'x0.93):	7,423.78
	11	Total Cost of Infantry during 1643 in £ ([row 9 + row 10]x12)	196,559.80
	12	Total Receipts in £ (Table 5.3, row 3):	113,062.38
	13	Percentage of Infantry Pay Received in £ (row 12 ÷ row 11):	58%

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrate that payments made to the regular army's cavalry and infantry formations were a little better than half of what they should have been during 1643. How does this rather gloomy situation compare to the disbursement information that appears in the four practical and applicable company- and troop-level examples found in Table 5.1? Moreover, how does this performance compare to the information found in the work of both Holmes and Gentles? In other words, are my hypothetical calculations based on a complete understanding of the warrants similar to the information found in the warrant-validated accounts? If so, are they also comparable to the receipts of other parliamentary field armies at similar stages in their own

developmental histories? Table 5.5 uses all of the information presented thus far to answer these questions.

In the first place, it would appear that my aggregate database and the applicable accounts largely agree on the matter of the army's pay level during 1643. Indeed, the degree of similarity between these numbers is very encouraging! Secondly, it would appear that this level – 56-57 per cent – compares quite favorably to the average level that was enjoyed by soldiers in the Army of the Eastern Association during that army's heyday. Furthermore, it would appear that the cavalrymen who served in the nascent New Model could expect no better during the balance of the first civil war. Indeed, only two major points seem to emerge. First, infantrymen in both of the other armies enjoyed a significantly better level of pay than the men who served on foot with the Lord General in 1643. And secondly, Manchester's cavalrymen were very poorly paid during 1644. While it is true that the Association's cavalry received more days' pay than Essex's horsemen during that year, this was, of course, no great feat. Both of these points are interesting and important, and I believe they may help to explain the abiding perception that all things improved with the creation of the New Model in 1645.

For the veteran infantrymen of 1645, the level of pay they enjoyed in the ranks of the New Model was markedly superior to what they had grown used to in either Essex's army in 1643 or Manchester's army in 1644. Indeed, for those who had been soldiers in Essex's army in 1644, the pay packets would have appeared truly phenomenal! On the other hand, the pay of cavalrymen does not have seemed to have improved much, when

considered from the perspective of one of Essex's regular troops in 1643. If, however, you happened to have been serving on horseback in either Essex's or Manchester's army during 1644, the 'spike' in payments back up to 56 per cent of full pay would have seemed comparatively excellent. But the overall point here is this: there was nothing inherently inferior or primitive about the administrative machinery that fueled Essex's regular army. When money was made available, it was transferred to the front-line units smoothly and with alacrity, and the performance of the army treasury in the field during 1643 seems comparable to the performance of the treasuries that fueled the Army of the Eastern Association and the New Model at similar moments in those armies' histories. This is a point made clearer by the data presented in Figure 5.8. This chart utilizes the same approach and series of calculations that were deployed in Table 5.4 above, applying this methodology to data drawn from all parts of this dissertation while preserving the chronological breakdown that defines all four of my substantive chapters.

The key variable for all of these administratively sophisticated armies, it would seem, was the initial amount of money flowing out of the state's various spigots, and the length of time that the taps were left to run. Ultimately, this appears to have been a more important factor than the precise form of fiscal-military organization that was used. Indeed, it would seem that this produced a chronic rather than an acute problem in the broader history of the parliamentarian military machine, an unsurprising phenomenon associated with the state's first flexing of newly-developed muscles, and the lack of a consolidated national debt.

Table 5.5 – Pay Level Comparison of Essex's Army (1643), Manchester's Army (1644), and New Model Army (1645) (Sources: Holmes, Gentles, and the data presented above)

Total Receipts:		**Officers & NCOs**	**Privates**	**Officers & NCOs**	**Privates**	**Average (All)**
Essex's Army (1643) – Account Samples[827]		Days	Days	% (days ÷ 336)	% (days ÷ 336)	
Cavalry	Sheffield	210	210	63%	63%	63%
	Blare	161	170	48%	51%	49%
	(Average)	185.5	190	55%	57%	56%
Infantry	Farrington	164	164	49%	49%	49%
	Jackson	196	224	58%	67%	63%
	(Average)	180	194	54%	58%	56%
Combined	**(Average)**	**182.75**	**192**	**54%**	**57%**	**56%**
Essex's Army (1643) - Crawshaw[828]						
Cavalry	(Table 5.4, row 6)	-	-	-	-	54%
Infantry	(Table 5.4, row 13)	-	-	-	-	58%
Combined	**(Average)**	-	-	-	-	**57%**
		Officers & NCOs	Privates	Officers & NCOs	Privates	Average (All)
Eastern Association (1644) - Holmes[829]		Days	Days	% (days ÷ 336)	% (days ÷ 336)	
Cavalry	-	126	126	38%	38%	38%
Infantry	-	259	259	77%	77%	77%
Combined	**(Average)**	**192.5**	**192.5**	**57%**	**57%**	**57%**
		Officers & NCOs	Privates	Officers & NCOs	Privates	Average (All)
New Model (1645) – Gentles[830]		Days	Days	% (days ÷ 252)	% (days ÷ 252)	
Cavalry	-	140	140	56%	56%	56%
Infantry	-	203	203	81%	81%	81%
Combined	**(Average)**	**171.5**	**171.5**	**68%**	**68%**	**68%**

[827] TNA SP28/140/6, 11, 15, and 16.
[828] Tables 5.3 and 5.4 above.
[829] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, 147. Where a range is presented, I have used the highest possible number of days' pay received.
[830] Gentles, *New Model Army*, 50-51. Where a range is presented, I have used the highest possible number of days' pay received.

However, to continue the original metaphor: the more spigots that were made available to a particular army, the less likely its soldiers were to suffer privation.[831]

Figure 5.8 - The Regular Army in Financial Decline: 1642-1644



	Edghill Campaign	Reading Campaign	Gloucester Campaign	1644 Campaigns
Infantry	100.00%	76.86%	53.89%	48.11%
Cavalry	100.00%	74.41%	56.16%	25.29%
Artillery	100.00%	74.43%	59.56%	49.24%

While it is true that the New Model Army never experienced the kind of dramatic financial decline that crippled Essex's army in 1644,[832] this was not simply a result of the

[831] Coffman, "Fiscal Revolution", 137.

centralization of Assessment revenues in 1645.As Gentles tells us, there were times when the New Model experiment in centralized army finance was disrupted, but the flow of money to the troops from parochial sources and/or the sale of assets never completely dried up:

> Early in 1648 it was finally acknowledged that the centralization of the army's finances through a monthly assessment had failed, and that the chances of its working again satisfactorily were slim. Parliament consequently empowered the Committee of the Army to issue warrants for regiments to be paid directly from the assessments of specified counties. The result was that many regiments were now paid by the counties in which they were quartered. Army finances were evidently reverting to the more primitive system practiced before 1645, on the parliamentary side, and throughout the civil war on the royalist side.[833]

Gentles's comment on this matter is remarkable and instructive, but requires slight modification: aside from a brief flirtation with in-the-field finance in 1643 – as manifested in the financial committee set up by Essex and managed by Fenton – Essex's regulars were financed entirely from the political center throughout the history of their army's existence. By 1644 that army's finances were in ruins, but in 1642 it was perhaps the best-paid military instrument created by the parliamentarian rebels during their long experiment in sovereign governance. As such, it deserves to be recognized as an important and fascinating element in the messy, haphazard evolution of the English fiscal-military state.

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[832] Consult pay data for the New Model Army from 1645, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1650, and 1651. See Gentles, *New Model Army*, 50-51, 240, and 389.

[833] Ian Gentles, "The Arrears of Pay of the Parliamentary Army at the End of the First Civil War," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 48 (1975): 57. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Gentles for the stimulating telephone conversation that we had regarding this subject during the month of November 2011.

Appendix A:
Tabulated Data derived for Chapter One

Table 1.3 – Levy Money Paid to Infantry Colonels by Francis Vernon: the Edgehill Campaign
(Arranged by receipt date)

Warrant	Regiment	Value (£)	Receipt Date
SP28/261 f.11	Lord St John's	1044.8	09-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.29	Lord Stamford's	1044.8	10-Aug-1642
SP28/261 f.16	Lord Brooke's	1044.8	11-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.41	Lord Essex's	1461.87	11-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.38	Lord Rochford's	1244.8	11-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.39	William Fairfax's	1244.8	11-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.40	Charles Essex's	1244.8	12-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.68	Lord Mandeville's	1244.8	12-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.64	Lord Say and Sele's	1044.8	12-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.66	Thomas Ballard's	1244.8	13-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.67	Thomas Grantham's	1244.8	13-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.69	William Bamfield's	1244.8	13-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.114	Lord St John's	200	15-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.112	Lord Wharton's	1244.8	16-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.117	Lord Say and Sele's	200	18-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.150	William Constable's	1244.8	18-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.118	Lord Brooke's	200	19-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.123	Lord Robarts's	1244.8	20-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.286	Lord Peterborough's	1044.8	01-Sep-1642
Total		**£19,733.87**	

Table 1.4 – Wagon Money Received by Essex's Infantry Colonels: the Edgehill Campaign

Warrant	Regiment	Value (£)	Receipt Date
SP28/1A f.305	Lord St John's	440	01-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.124	Thomas Ballard's	440	03-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.122	Lord Essex's	520	03-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.53	Thomas Grantham's	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.68	Lord Robarts's	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.69	Sir John Merrick's	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.70	Lord Wharton's	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.71	Sir Henry Cholmley's	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.72	Lord Brooke's	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.73	Denzil Holles'	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.93	John Hampden's	440	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.52	Charles Essex's	440	06-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.94	Lord Rochford's	440	06-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.51	William Fairfax's	440	07-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.123	Lord Mandeville's	440	07-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.164	Lord Say and Sele's	440	09-Sep-1642
SP28/261 f.121	William Constable's	440	16-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.214	Lord Stamford's	440[834]	19-Sep-1642
SP28/143 (Vernon's account), f.19r	Lord Peterborough	440	03-Sep-1642
SP28/143 (Vernon's account), f.19v	William Bamfield's	440	05-Sep-1642
Total		**£8,880**	

[834] This payment is an excellent example of just how complex these records can be at times. See above for details.

Table 1.5 – 'Uniform' Components Supplied by Stephen Estwick: the Edgehill Campaign
(Source: Estwick's Account - TNA SP28/146, ff.119-131)

Regiment	coats	shirts	shoes	snapsacks	Delivery date	Cost to the state (£)	Surviving army warrant?
Lord Stamford's	940	940	940	940	22-Aug-1642	720.67	SP28/1A f.177
Lord Stamford's	0	260	260	260	22-Aug-1642	82.32	SP28/1A f.177
Colonel Merrick's	1200	0	1200	1200	22-Aug-1642	760	-
Colonel Cholmley's	1200	0	1200	1200	22-Aug-1642	760	-
Colonel Holles's	1200	0	1200	1200	22-Aug-1642	760	-
Lord Brooke's	850	850	850	850	26-Aug-1642	651.67	SP28/1A ff.178, 273
Lord Wharton's	800	800	800	800	06-Sep-1642	613.3	SP28/1A f.301
Colonel Fairfax's	800	800	800	800	08-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/1A f.179
Colonel Hampden's	1000	1000	1000	1000	09-Sep-1642	766.67	SP28/1A f.161
Captain Anthony Sanderson	100	100	100	100	10-Sep-1642	76.67	SP28/1A f.302
Colonel Charles Essex's	800	800	800	800	10-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/2A f.89
Colonel Ballard's	800	800	800	800	10-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/2A f.90
Lord Robarts's	800	800	800	800	13-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/1A f.298
Lord Rochford's	800	800	800	800	13-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/1A f.299
Lord Mandeville's	800	800	800	800	14-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/2A f.134
Lord Say and Sele's	800	800	800	800	14-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/2A f.154
Colonel Grantham	800	800	800	800	16-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/2A f.88
Lord Brooke's	0	3	24	0	17-Sep-1642	3.6	SP28/261 f.173
Lord Essex's	1500	1500	1500	1500	17-Sep-1642	1150	-

Colonel Constable's	800	800	800	800	24-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/2A f.155
Lord Peterborough's	800	800	800	800	28-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/261 f.44
Lord St. John's	800	800	800	800	30-Sep-1642	613.32	SP28/1A f.300
ARTILLERY TRAIN	100	0	0	0	10-Oct-1642	45	SP28/261 f.408
Lord Say and Sele's	71	71	71	71	11-Oct-1642	54.43	SP28/261 f.395
Captain Smith (Lord Robarts's)	35	35	35	35	13-Oct-1642	26.83	SP28/261 f.396
Colonel Hampden's	100	100	100	100	27-Oct-1642	76.67	SP28/261 f.307
Totals:	**17,896**	**14,459**	**18,080**	**18,056**		**£13,294.35**	

Table 1.8 – Per Diem Cost of Essex's Two Kinds of Cavalry Troops (Source: TNA SP28/140/17)

Harquebusier	Troop	Per	Diem	Cuirassier	Troop	Per	Diem
Personnel	Pounds	Shillings	Pence	Personnel	Pounds	Shillings	Pence
Captain	1	4	0	Captain	1	4	0
(his six horses at 2s 6d)	0	15	0	(his six horses at 3s 6d)	1	1	0
Lieutenant		8	0	Lieutenant	0	8	0
(his four horses at 2s 6d)		10	0	(his four horses at 3s 6d)	0	14	0
Cornet		6	0	Cornet	0	6	0
(his three horses at 2s 6d)		7	6	(his two horses at 3s 6d)	0	10	6
Quarter master		4	0	Quartermaster	0	4	0
(his two horses at 2s 6d)		5	0	(his two horses at 3s 6d)	0	7	0
Three Corporals at 3s each		9	0	Three Corporals[835]	0	2	0
Two Trumpeters at 3s each		6	0	Three Trumpeters at 3s 6d	0	10	6
One Sadler		2	6	One Sadler	0	3	6
One Smith		2	6	One Smith	0	3	6
Harquebusiers (60) at 2s 6d	7	10	0	Cuirassiers (80) at 3s 6d	14	0	0
Harquebusier Daily Total (£):	8	4.4	0.075	Cuirassier Daily Total (£):	16	3.6	0.1
Monthly Total (28 day month)	£349.3			Monthly Total (28 day month)	£551.6		

[835] This listing seems incongruous with the rest of the information provided. Nevertheless, it remains a faithful reproduction of the original list.

Table 1.9 – Total Mounting Money Delivered by the Proposition Treasurers: Arranged by Troop Number as Printed in BL Thomason E.64[4]

E.64[4] Troop Number	Cavalry Troop	Total Mounting Money: Proposition Treasurers (£)
1	The Lord General's (Stapilton)	1000
6	Lord Brooke	322
7	Lord Hastings	1030
8	Lord St. John	1030
9	Lord Stanford	1072
13	Lord Grey (of Warke)	280
14	James Sheffield	42
15	Sir William Waller	322
16	John Gunter	322
17	William Pretty	322
18	Robert Burrell (Berghill?)	322
19	Francis Dowett	280
21	John Bird	322
24	Horatio Carey	1030
27	John Hammond	280
28	Edward Ayscough	1030
29	Alexander Pym	280
31	Arthur Evelyn	1030
32	George Thompson	322
33	Edwin Sandys	425
34	Anthony Mildmay	280
35	Edward Knightly	280
36	Nathanial Fiennes	322
37	Edward Berry	746.75
38	Alexander Douglas	1030
39	Thomas Lidcott	280
40	Thomas Hammond	280
42	Francis Finnes	1030
57	Charles Chichester	280
58	Henry Ireton	280
66	William Anselme	322

72	Thomas Temple	280
76	(Thomas Sheffield - not in printed pamphlet)	280
77	(Captain Withers's troop - not in printed pamphlet; includes pay?)	1385.704
TOTAL		**£18,139.45**

Table 1.10 – Hypothetical Cavalry Savings Pool: The Proposition Treasurers and Horse Purchases

Troops Receiving £1,030	Reduced Total: as part of the £354 for Mounting Officers and NCOs (£)	Omitted Amount Spent Mounting Ordinary Troopers (£)
Lord Hastings	280	600
Lord St John	280	600
Lord Stanford	280	600
Horatio Carey	280	600
Edward Ayscough	280	600
Arthur Evelyn	280	600
Alexander Douglas	280	600
Francis Fiennes	280	600
(Captain Withers)←?	635.7	600
Total in Hypothetical Pool:		£5,400

Table 1.11 – Total Mounting Money Issued During the Edgehill Campaign: All Sources (Modified)

E.64[4] number	Cavalry Troop	Total Mounting: P.T.	Total Mounting: Vernon	Total Mounting: Jessop	GRAND TOTAL
1	The Lord General's (Stapilton)	1000	835	0	1835
2	Sir William Balfour	0	354	0	354
3	Lord Grey of Groby	0	42	0	42
4	Earl of Peterborough	0	354[836]	0	354
5	Lord Say & Sele	0	280	74	354
6	Lord Brooke	322	32	0	354
7	Lord Hastings	280	74	0	354
8	Lord St. John	280	32	0	312
9	Lord Stanford	322	32	0	354
10	Lord Fielding	0	354	0	354
11	Lord Wharton	0	140	0	140
12	Lord Willoughby	0	280	0	280
13	Lord Grey (of Warke?)	280	0	0	280
14	James Sheffield	42	0	0	42
15	Sir William Waller	322	0	0	322
16	John Gunter	322	0	0	322
17	William Pretty	322	0	0	322
18	Robert Burrell (Berghill?)	322	0	0	322
19	Francis Dowett	280	42	0	322
21	John Bird	322	0	0	322
22	Mathew Draper	0	354	0	354
24	Horatio Carey	280	74	0	354
25	John Alured	0	354	0	354
26	John Neale	0	280	0	280
27	John Hammond	280	74	0	354
28	Edward Ayscough	280	42	0	322

[836] It is a well-known fact that Lord Peterborough was the only troop commander to received £1,030 of mounting money from the army treasury (TNA SP28/2A f.65). Like the troops paid by the Propositions treasurers, this total has been artificially reduced to £280 for the reasons mentioned above. Moreover, this brings the total in the 'hypothetical pool' of reserve cash to an even £6,000 – again, see Table 1.10 above.

29	Alexander Pym	280	74	0	354
30	John Hotham	0	354	0	354
31	Arthur Evelyn	280	74	0	354
32	George Thompson	322	32	0	354
33	Edwin Sandys	425	74	0	499
34	Anthony Mildmay	280	74	0	354
35	Edward Knightly	280	74	0	354
36	Nathanial Fiennes	322	32	0	354
37	Edward Berry	746.75	74	0	820.75
38	Alexander Douglas	280	354	0	634[837]
39	Thomas Lidcott	280	0	0	280
40	Thomas Hammond	280	74	0	354
41	John Dalbeir	0	354	0	354
42	Francis Finnes	280	74	0	354
43	S.A. Hesilrige	0	354	0	354
45	John Flemming	0	354	0	354
46	Arthur Goodwin	0	1194	0	1194
47	Richard Grenville	0	74	0	74
48	Thomas Terrill	0	74	0	74
49	John Hale	0	354	0	354
50	Henry Mildmay	0	354	0	354
52	George Austin	0	354	0	354
53	Adrian Scroop	0	354	0	354
54	Hercules Langrish	0	354	0	354
56	Edward Wingate	0	354	0	354
57	Charles Chichester	280	74	0	354
58	Henry Ireton	280	74	0	354
59	Walter Long	0	354	0	354
60	John Finnes	0	354	0	354
61	Francis Thompson	0	354	0	354
63	Sir Robert Pie	0	280	0	280

[837] Here we have the only readily-identifiable instance of fraud in this process; a case that was first identified by Robinson when he examined the TNA SP16 series. Unlike my colleagues, I wholeheartedly believe that such instances of fraud (instances which include the case of Captain John Jenkins's infantry company) are the exceptions that prove the rule when it comes to honesty and accountability in these books. See Robinson, "Horse Supply," (article) 124, n.20.

64	Thomas Hatcher	0	280	74	354
65	Robert Vivers	0	354	0	354
66	William Anselme	322	16	0	338
67	Oliver Cromwell	0	354	0	354
68	Robert Kirle	0	280	74	354
72	Thomas Temple	280	42	0	322
73	Valentine Walton	0	280	74	354
74	Sir Faithful Fortescue	0	104	0	104
75	Simon Rugley	0	280	74	354
76	(Thomas Sheffield - not in pamphlet)	280	0	0	280
77	(Captain Withers's troop - not in pamphlet) <-- Includes pay (?)	635.70	0	0	635.70
78	(Edward Clerke - not in pamphlet)	0	354	0	354
79	(Thomas Saunders - not in pamphlet)	0	74	0	74
80	(John Urry/Hurry - not in pamphlet)	0	86	0	86
81	(Sir Sigismund Alexander - not in pamphlet)	0	216	0	216
82	(Christopher Wray - not in pamphlet)	0	354	0	354
83	(Sir Samuel Luke - not in pamphlet)	0	280	72	352
84	(Sir William Brereton - not in pamphlet)	0	0	354	354
85	(George Booth - not in pamphlet)	0	0	354	354
Totals		**£11,389.45**	**£14,765**	**£1,150**	**£27,304.45**

Table 1.12 – Total Cavalry Salary Receipts and Start Dates: the Edgehill Campaign
Note: 'RDR' (Receipt Date Reconstruction)
Indicates the Absence of Explicit Start Dates

E.64[4] number	Cavalry Troop	Total Salary (Both Deputies; Three Months)	First Start Date: Officers	First Start Date: Private Troopers
1	The Lord General's (Stapilton)	3819.00	03-Aug-1642	12-Aug-1642
2	Sir William Balfour	2205.80	30-Jul-1642	13-Aug-1642
3	Lord Grey of Groby	1079.54	15-Jul-1642	08-Aug-1642 (RDR)
4	Earl of Peterborough	835.90	30-Jul-1642	15-Sep-1642
6	Lord Brooke	1147.15	09-Aug-1642 (RDR)	09-Aug-1642 (RDR)
7	Lord Hastings	723.40	12-Aug-1642 (RDR)	12-Aug-1642 (RDR)
8	Lord St. John	937.90	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)
9	Lord Stanford	1110.33	21-Jul-1642	08-Aug-1642 (RDR)
10	Lord Fielding	706.25	07-Sep-1642	07-Sep-1642
11	Lord Wharton	1362.48	06-Aug-1642 (RDR)	06-Aug-1642 (RDR)
12	Lord Willoughby	749.30	30-Jul-1642	14-Sep-1642
14	James Sheffield	1168.98	15-Jul-1642	10-Aug-1642 (RDR)
15	Sir William Waller	793.28	15-Jul-1642	06-Aug-1642 (RDR)
16	John Gunter	1178.48	15-Jul-1642	02-Aug-1642
17	William Pretty	765.66	15-Jul-1642	10-Aug-1642 (RDR)
18	Robert Burrell (Berghill?)	1527.13	15-Jul-1642	10-Aug-1642 (RDR)
19	Francis Dowett	715.76	15-Jul-1642	12-Aug-1642 (RDR)
21	John Bird	723.56	27-Jul-1642	27-Jul-1642
22	Mathew Draper	883.05	30-Jul-1642	03-Sep-1642
24	Horatio Carey	912.08	30-Jul-1642	16-Aug-1642 (RDR)
25	John Alured	349.30	27-Aug-1642	27-Aug-1642
26	John Neale	174.65	19-Oct-1642 (RDR)	19-Oct-1642 (RDR)
27	John Hammond	1262.35	29-Jul-1642	16-Aug-1642 (RDR)
28	Edward Ayscough	634.68	08-Aug-1642 (RDR)	08-Aug-1642 (RDR)
29	Alexander Pym	699.30	25-Aug-1642 (RDR)	25-Aug-1642 (RDR)

30	John Hotham	699.30	27-Aug-1642	27-Aug-1642
31	Arthur Evelyn	1078.53	30-Jul-1642	10-Aug-1642 (RDR)
32	George Thompson	1128.20	21-Jul-1642	11-Aug-1642 (RDR)
33	Edwin Sandys	1194.55	30-Jul-1642	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)
34	Anthony Mildmay	1141.10	30-Jul-1642	20-Aug-1642
35	Edward Knightly	1020.05	30-Jul-1642	16-Aug-1642 (RDR)
36	Nathanial Fiennes	1079.73	30-Jul-1642	10-Aug-1642 (RDR)
37	Edward Berry	878.43	30-Jul-1642	31-Aug-1642
38	Alexander Douglas	653.95	07-Sep-1642 (RDR)	07-Sep-1642 (RDR)
39	Thomas Lidcott	1148.60	19-Aug-1642	19-Aug-1642
40	Thomas Hammond	1112.58	02-Aug-1642	27-Aug-1642 (RDR)
41	John Dalbeir	998.00	19-Aug-1642 (RDR)	19-Aug-1642 (RDR)
42	Francis Finnes	1292.20	22-Jul-1642	08-Aug-1642 (RDR)
43	S.A. Hesilrige	1005.21	30-Jul-1642	18-Aug-1642
45	John Flemming	1092.37	30-Jul-1642	22-Aug-1642 (RDR)
46	Arthur Goodwin	685.53	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)
47	Richard Grenville	734.83	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)
48	Thomas Terrill	832.39	30-Jul-1642	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)
49	John Hale	1309.85	27-Aug-1642	27-Aug-1642
50	Henry Mildmay	1056.30	27-Aug-1642	27-Aug-1642
51	William Balfour (jr.)	174.65	27-Oct-1642 (RDR)	27-Oct-1642 (RDR)
52	George Austin	1349.85	19-Aug-1642	19-Aug-1642
53	Adrian Scroop	653.50	30-Jul-1642	26-Aug-1642 (RDR)
54	Hercules Langrish	1092.68	11-Aug-1642	28-Aug-1642
55	Edward Wingate	1067.78	30-Jul-1642	27-Aug-1642 (RDR)
57	Charles Chichester	698.60	24-Aug-1642	24-Aug-1642
58	Henry Ireton	837.38	23-Jul-1642	01-Oct-1642 (RDR)
59	Walter Long	1032.68	29-Jul-1643	13-Aug-1642
60	John Finnes	788.08	01-Aug-1642	22-Aug-1642

61	Francis Thompson	1140.53	30-Jul-1642	29-Aug-1642 (RDR)
62	Edmond West	349.30	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)	17-Aug-1642 (RDR)
64	Thomas Hatcher	378.13	29-Sep-1642	29-Sep-1642
65	Robert Vivers	387.10	13-Sep-1642 (RDR)	13-Sep-1642 (RDR)
66	William Anselme	600.00	11-Aug-1642 (RDR)	11-Aug-1642 (RDR)
67	Oliver Cromwell	982.73	30-Jul-1642	29-Aug-1642
68	Robert Kirle	833.00	30-Jul-1642	24-Sep-1642
72	Thomas Temple	1259.80	15-Jul-1642	08-Aug-1642 (RDR)
73	Valentine Walton.	846.30	30-Jul-1642	05-Sep-1642
74	Sir Faithful Fortescue	966.60	13-Aug-1642 (RDR)	13-Aug-1642 (RDR)
75	Simon Rugley	748.65	30-Jul-1642	19-Sep-1642
78	(Edward Clerke - not in pamphlet)	781.88	02-Sep-1642	02-Sep-1642
79	(Thomas Saunders - not in pamphlet)	336.23	08-Sep-1642	08-Sep-1642
80	(John Urry/Hurry - not in pamphlet)	929.80	05-Aug-1642 (RDR)	05-Aug-1642 (RDR)
81	(Sir Sigismund Alexander - not in pamphlet)	545.88	27-Aug-1642	27-Aug-1642
82	(Christopher Wray - not in pamphlet)	485.90	01-Sep-1642	20-Sep-1642
83	(Sir Samuel Luke - not in pamphlet)	546.33	15-Sep-1642	15-Sep-1642
85	(George Booth - not in pamphlet)	542.50	30-Jul-1642	21-Sep-1642
86	(William St Leger - not in pamphlet)	388.40	05-Aug-1642 (RDR)	05-Aug-1642 (RDR)
87	(Alexander Nearne - not in pamphlet)	190.40	06-Aug-1642 (RDR)	06-Aug-1642 (RDR)
88	(James Ramsey - not in pamphlet)	50.00	29-Oct-1642 (RDR)	29-Oct-1642 (RDR)
89	(Sir John Merrick - not in pamphlet)	200.00	26-Oct-1642 (RDR)	26-Oct-1642 (RDR)
Total Confirmed Salary Receipts		**£67,791.57**		

Table 1.13 – The Hypothetical Cost of the Cavalry's Salary Payments: Edgehill Campaign

Type of Troop	Daily Cost: Officers (£)	Daily Cost: Troopers (£)	Total Officers (Daily x 84)	Total Troopers (Daily x 70)	Campaign Total (£)	Campaign: Cost Per Troop (£)
Cuirassier (x3 troops)	17.10	42.00	1436.40	2,940.00	4,376.40	1,458.80
Harquebusier (x73 troops)	363.18	547.50	30,506.70	38,325.00	68,831.70	942.90
Total	380.28	589.50	31,943.10	41,265.00	73,208.10	N/A

Table 1.14 – Cavalry Saddle and Scarf Money (Real and Hypothetical): The Edgehill Campaign

Actual Spending History	Sums in £	Hypothetical Costs	Sums in £
Gerrard's Treasury: Total Spent on Cavalry	**£110,594.83**	**Cost: Saddles & Scarves for 73 Harquebusier Troops (£180 x 73)**	**£13,140**
Vernon: Total Spent on Mounting (Table 1.11)	**- £14,765**	**Cost: Saddles & Scarves for 3 Cuirassier Troops (£250 x 3)**	**£750**
Jessop: Total Spent on Mounting (Table 1.11)	**- £1,150**		
Army Treasury: Total Spent on Salary (Table 1.12)	**- £67,791.57**		
Army Treasury: Total Spent on Dragoons	**- £15,420.61**		
Proposition Treasury: Total Spent on Saddles (Table 1.10)	**+ £1,350**		
Total: Potentially Spent on Saddles & Scarves	**£12,817.65**	**Hypothetical Cost: Saddles & Scarves**	**£13,890**
		Shortfall:	**£1,072.35**

Table 1.17 – All 'Other' Spending by Sub-Category: the Edgehill Campaign (Source: the warrants used to construct Figure 1.4)

Type of 'Other' Spending (£)	Treasurer	Aug 1642	Sep 1642	Oct 1642	Totals (£)	Totals (As % of Figure 1.4)
Artillery	Vernon	3280.13	3560.13	3479.83	10320.10	15.49%
	Jessop	0.00	2340.00	40.00	2380.00	3.57%
Support	Vernon	11042.30	2333.20	956.85	14332.35	21.52%
	Jessop	0.00	542.41	4023.85	4566.26	6.85%
Local Forces	Vernon	10465.00	2856.00	95.00	13416.00	20.14%
	Jessop	0.00	5230.88	9160.33	14391.20	21.60%
Trans-portation	Vernon	0.00	531.00	518.58	1049.58	1.58%
	Jessop	0.00	42.00	304.75	346.75	0.52%
Arms	Vernon	1593.50	172.22	100.00	1865.72	2.80%
	Jessop	0.00	0.00	3944.65	3944.65	5.92%
Totals (£)	Artillery	3280.13	5900.13	3519.83	12700.10	19.07%
	Support	11042.30	2875.61	4980.70	18898.62	28.37%
	Local Forces	10465.00	8086.88	9255.33	27807.20	41.74%
	Transportation	0.00	573.00	823.33	1396.33	2.10%
	Arms	1593.50	172.22	4044.65	5810.37	8.72%
	Vernon	26380.94	9452.55	5150.26	40983.75	61.53%
	Jessop	0.00	8155.29	17473.58	25628.87	38.47%
Grand Total (£)	All	26380.94	17607.84	22623.84	66612.61	100.00%

Table 1.18 – 'Artillery' Warrants: the Edgehill Campaign

Warrant	Sub-Treasurer	Train Salary Money	Ancillary Artillery Costs	Total Amount (£)	(Final) Receipt Date
SP28/261 f.10	Vernon		1000	1000	11-Aug-1642
SP28/1A f.151	Vernon	2280.13		2280.13	19-Aug-1642
SP28/143 (FVA) f.20r	Vernon	140		140	05-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.66	Vernon	2420.13		2420.13	07-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.36	Vernon		1000	1000	10-Sep-1642
"	Jessop		2000	2000	22-Sep-1642
SP28/261 f.49	Jessop	140		140	26-Sep-1642
SP28/261 f.233	Jessop		200	200	30-Sep-1642
SP28/2A f.276	Vernon	600	300	900	01-Oct-1642
SP28/2B f.309	Vernon	1710.10		1710.10	07-Oct-1642
SP28/2B f.316	Vernon		50	50	07-Oct-1642
SP28/143 (FVA) f.31r	Vernon		30	30	17-Oct-1642
SP28/261 f.321	Jessop		40	40	22-Oct-1642
SP28/2B f.457	Vernon	724.73		724.73	28-Oct-1642
SP28/2B f.485	Vernon		25	25	29-Oct-1642
SP28/2B f.493	Vernon		20	20	29-Oct-1642
SP28/2B f.494	Vernon		20	20	29-Oct-1642
Totals (£)		8015.10	4685.00	12,700.10	

Table 1.19 - Initial Consignment of Ordnance Issued to Essex's Artillery Train on 2 Sept 1642

(Source: TNA WO55/1937)

(Square brackets indicate modified numbers based on Lancelot Alured's receipt dated 28 September)

Type of Artillery Piece	Quantity	Powder ladles for the same	Round shot for the same	Case Shot for the Same (empty)	Case Shot for the same (pre-loaded with musket shot)	Grenados (Explosive Shot)
Cannon	-	-	-	-	-	19
Demi-Cannon	-	-	-	-	-	79
Culverins	-	-	200	-	141	-
Demi-Culverins	1[3]	2	200 [400]	-	223	100
12 Pounders	4	8	478	-	62	-
6 Pounders (Sakers)	4[8]	8	800 [1000]	180	230	300
3 Pounders	(11)[1]	(22)	(2,200)	(200)	-	-
Brass Mortars	2	-	-	-	-	-
Brass Petards	2	-	-	-	-	-
Totals (as of 1 Oct 1642)	**19**	**18**	**2078**	**180**	**656**	**498**

Table 1.20 – Weapons and Armour Ordered by and Delivered to Estwick and Andrewes: Autumn 1642

(Sources: TNA SP28/261 f.284; Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, p.199)

Continental Weapons & Armour	Amount Ordered	Amount Delivered (as of 4 Oct 1642)		Delivery rate (as of 4 Oct 1642)
Muskets (and rests)	12,000	2,690	(plus 3956 rests)	22%
Carbines	1,200	312	(includes 66 'dragoons')	26%
Pikes	6,000	5,680		95%
Corslets	6,000	2,331		39%
Pistols (pairs)	1,500	980	(plus 237 additional cases)	65%
Harquebusier Armour	600	401		67%
Total (items)	**27,300**	**12,394**		**45%**

Appendix B:
Tabulated Data derived for Chapter Two

Table 2.3 – Combined Receipts of Essex's Infantry Regiments: the Reading Campaign
(Source: the pay warrants and account book entries used to construct Figure 2.2)

Infantry Regiment	Total Nov 1642 (£)	Total Dec 1642 (£)	Total Jan 1643 (£)	Total Feb 1643 (£)	Total Mar 1643 (£)	Total Apr 1643 (£)	Grand Total (£)
Lord St John	1,379.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,379.60
Thomas Ballard	1,220.92	898.60	993.08	0.00	700.00	562.85	4,375.45
Lord Essex	1,410.70	1,385.23	779.58	700.00	2,242.00	1,263.68	7,781.19
Thomas Grantham	619.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	669.23
Lord Robarts	1,079.82	669.60	1,398.58	0.00	962.40	791.28	4,901.68
Sir John Merrick	750.00	74.20	74.20	0.00	214.20	0.00	1,112.60
Lord Wharton	454.30	23.10	24.55	0.00	56.50	52.27	610.72
Sir Henry Cholmley	1,503.00	1,123.25	600.00	150.00	900.00	616.80	4,893.05
Lord Brooke	460.00	434.80	0.00	49.50	0.00	0.00	944.30
Denzil Holles	395.17	56.82	609.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,061.79
John Hampden	2,091.23	1,012.43	1,036.03	0.00	1,000.00	1,273.01	6,412.70
Charles Essex	509.95	42.70	0.00	0.00	40.00	0.00	592.65
Lord Rochford	902.70	718.20	703.16	183.48	374.27	472.39	3,354.20
William Fairfax	300.00	1,270.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,570.80
Lord Mandeville	178.73	744.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	923.18
Lord Say and Sele	574.00	995.17	375.80	0.00	1,015.22	675.43	3,635.62
William Constable	356.25	1,500.00	900.00	0.00	924.27	665.35	4,345.87
Lord Stamford	2,000.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	280.00	366.00	2,646.00

Lord Peter-borough	528.59	619.33	711.85	0.00	1,242.21	764.50	3,866.48
Henry Bulstrode	653.60	982.30	800.00	1,227.00	900.00	605.50	5,168.40
Sir Philip Skippon	556.00	2,046.40	2,230.45	0.00	1,400.00	1,070.50	7,303.35
George Langham	1,675.70	630.97	1,740.00	0.00	1,200.00	887.01	6,133.68
Henry Barclay	1,844.29	1,382.73	1,241.80	0.00	1,382.73	990.07	6,841.62
Warwick/ Holborne	739.92	1,220.66	1,361.87	0.00	1,000.00	781.95	5,104.40
John Holmstead	0.00	1,040.00	1,178.34	825.00	1,464.20	777.82	5,285.36
Randall Man-warring	2,102.74	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,102.74
William Oagleby	230.53	40.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	270.53
Total (£):	24,516.97	18,911.74	16,759.09	3,134.98	17,348.00	12,616.41	93,287.19
Total (£) (Figure 2.2):	27,735.62	20,803.88	17,814.92	3,372.55	18,025.29	20,485.66	108,237.92
Regimental Totals as a % of Figure 2.2 Totals	88.40%	90.90%	94.07%	92.96%	96.24%	61.59%	86.19%

Table 2.4 – Army Treasury Payments to Essex's 'Old' Regiments of Foot: the Reading Campaign

'Old' Infantry Regiment	Sub-treasurer	Nov 1642	Dec 1642	Jan 1643	Feb 1643	Mar 1643	Apr 1643	Subtotals (£)	% Paid by Vernon
Lord St John's	Vernon	1,380	0	0	0	0	0	1,380	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Thomas Ballard's	Vernon	1,221	899	993	0	700	563	4,375	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Lord Essex's	Vernon	1,411	1,385	780	700	2,242	1,264	7,781	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Thomas Grantham's	Vernon	619	0	0	0	50	0	669	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Lord Robarts's	Vernon	1,061	670	1,399	0	962	791	4,883	100%
	Jessop	19	0	0	0	0	0	19	
Sir John Merrick's	Vernon	750	74	74	0	214	0	1,113	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Lord Wharton's	Vernon	454	23	25	0	57	52	611	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Sir Henry Cholmley's	Vernon	1,503	1,123	600	0	900	617	4,743	97%
	Jessop	0	0	0	150	0	0	150	
Lord Brooke's	Vernon	460	235	0	0	0	0	695	74%
	Jessop	0	200	0	50	0	0	250	
Denzil Holles'	Vernon	395	57	610	0	0	0	1,062	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
John Hampden's	Vernon	1,724	1,000	1,036	0	1,000	1,273	6,033	94%
	Jessop	368	12	0	0	0	0	380	
Charles Essex's	Vernon	304	0	0	0	40	0	344	58%
	Jessop	206	43	0	0	0	0	248	
Lord Rochford's	Vernon	903	718	703	183	374	472	3,354	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
William Fairfax's	Vernon	300	0	0	0	0	0	300	19%
	Jessop	0	1,271	0	0	0	0	1,271	

Lord Mandeville's	Vernon	179	744	0	0	0	0	923	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Lord Say and Sele's	Vernon	554	995	376	0	1,015	675	3,616	99%
	Jessop	20	0	0	0	0	0	20	
William Constable's	Vernon	356	1,500	900	0	924	665	4,346	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Lord Stamford's	Vernon	0	0	0	0	280	0	280	11%
	Jessop	2,000	0	0	0	0	366	2,366	
Lord Peter-borough's	Vernon	529	619	712	0	1,242	765	3,866	100%
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Subtotals (£)	Vernon	14,102	10,043	8,207	883	10,001	7,138	50,373	91%
	Jessop	2,612	1,526	0	200	0	366	4,704	
% Paid by Vernon		84%	87%	100%	82%	100%	95%	91%	

Table 2.5 – Army Treasury Payments to Essex's 'New' Regiments of Foot: the Reading Campaign

'New' Infantry Regiment	Sub-treasurer	Nov 1642	Dec 1642	Jan 1643	Feb 1643	Mar 1643	Apr 1643	Subtotals (£)	% Paid by Vernon
Henry Bulstrode's	Vernon	28	300	800	0	900	606	2,633	51%
	Jessop	626	682	0	1,227	0	0	2,535	
Sir Philip Skippon's	Vernon	500	2,046	2,230	0	1,400	1,071	7,247	99%
	Jessop	56	0	0	0	0	0	56	
George Langham's	Vernon	0	571	1,740	0	1,200	887	4,398	72%
	Jessop	1,676	60	0	0	0	0	1,736	
Henry Barclay's	Vernon	0	1,383	1,242	0	1,383	990	4,997	73%
	Jessop	1,844	0	0	0	0	0	1,844	
Warwick's/ Holborne's	Vernon	0	1,221	1,362	0	1,000	782	4,364	86%
	Jessop	740	0	0	0	0	0	740	
John Holmstead's	Vernon	0	0	0	0	1,464	778	2,242	42%
	Jessop	0	1,040	1,178	825	0	0	3,043	
Randall Manwarring's	Vernon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
	Jessop	2,103	0	0	0	0	0	2,103	
William Oagleby	Vernon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
	Jessop	231	40	0	0	0	0	271	
Subtotals (£)	Vernon	528	5,521	7,374	0	7,347	5,113	25,882	68%
	Jessop	7,275	1,822	1,178	2,052	0	0	12,328	
% Paid by Vernon		7%	75%	86%	0%	100%	100%	68%	

Table 2.6 – The Reported Number of Private Soldiers in Essex's Foot: the Reading Campaign
(Source: the warrants used to construct Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5)

Infantry Regiment	Total Nov 1642 (Str.)	Total Dec 1642 (Str.)	Total Jan 1643 (Str.)	Total Feb 1643 (Str.)	Total Mar 1643 (Str.)	Total Apr 1643 (Str.)
Lord St John's	0	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment
Thomas Ballard's	674	455	455	No Payment	423	0
Lord Essex's	700	393	51	0	0	0
Thomas Grantham's	0	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	0	No Payment
Lord Robarts's	110	386	433	No Payment	630	723
Sir John Merrick's	0	0	0	No Payment	0	No Payment
Lord Wharton's	0	0	0	No Payment	0	0
Sir Henry Cholmley's	600	552	0	0	529	0
Lord Brooke's	480	0	No Payment	0	No Payment	No Payment
Denzil Holles'	800	0	0	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment
John Hampden's	60	41	970	No Payment	831	0
Charles Essex's	0	0	No Payment	No Payment	0	No Payment
Lord Rochford's	710	0	316	316	0	316
William Fairfax's	0	0	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment
Lord Mandeville's	178	0	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment
Lord Say and Sele's	768	428	0	No Payment	478	478
William Constable's	450	0	0	No Payment	0	522
Lord Stamford's	0	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	0	0
Lord Peterborough	382	582	390	No Payment	743	91
Henry Bulstrode's	800	537	0	717	0	0

Sir Philip Skippon's	0	946	946	No Payment	1,033	1,033
George Langham's	1,200	800	0	No Payment	908	908
Henry Barclay's	1,008	901	0	No Payment	901	0
Warwick's/Holborne's	403	374	196	No Payment	660	0
John Holmstead's	No Payment	0	140	0	774	774
Randall Manwarring's	1,200	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment
William Oagleby	86	0	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment	No Payment
Reported Total (Str.):	10,609	6,395	3,897	1,033	7,910	4,845
Regiments receiving pay	26	23	18	6	20	17
Regiments with reported strengths	18	12	9	2	11	8
% of paid regiments for which there is strength data	69.23%	52.17%	50.00%	33.33%	55.00%	47.06%

Table 2.7 – Infantry Speculative Pay Level Calculations: the Reading Campaign (Source: the data compiled in Tables 2.3 and 2.6 above)

Row	Speculative Cost Calculations	Nov 1642	Dec 1642	Jan 1643	Feb 1643	Mar 1643	Apr 1643
1	The reported no. of private soldiers (Table 2.6)	10609	6395	3897	1033	7910	4845
2	No. of regiments reporting strengths (Table 2.6)	18	12	9	2	11	8
3	Average no. of reported privates per reporting regiment (row 1 ÷ row 2)	589	533	433	517	719	606
4	No. of paid regiments (Tables 2.3 and 2.6)	26	23	18	6	20	17
5	Hypothetical no. of private soldiers (row 3 x row 4)	15324	12257	7794	3099	14382	10296
6	The cost of these hypothetical soldiers in £ (row 5 x0.93)	14251	11399	7248	2882	13375	9575
7	The cost of the paid regiments' officer corps in £ (row 4 x 542.8)	14113	12484	9770	3257	10856	9228
8	Total hypothetical cost in £ (row 6 + row 7)	28364	23883	17019	6139	24231	18803
9	Total amounts received in £ (Table 2.3)	24517	18912	16759	3135	17348	12616
10	Hypothetical pay level of regiments appearing in Tables 2.3 (row 9 ÷ row 8)	86.44%	79.18%	98.47%	51.07%	71.59%	67.10%

Table 2.10 – The Disappearance of Essex's 'Old' Cavalry Troops During the Reading Campaign (Source: The warrants used to construct Figure 2.3 above)

E64[4] number	Cavalry Troop	Nov 1642	Dec 1642	Jan 1643	Feb 1643	Mar 1643	Apr 1643	Total (£)	Total % paid by Vernon
1	The Lord General's (Stapilton)	844	1392	1392	0	1113	940	5682	100%
11	Lord Wharton	210	629	0	0	629	689	2157	61%
81	(Sir Sigismund Alexander – not in pamphlet)	524	0	349	0	150	463	1487	100%
66	William Anselme	400	322	0	0	400	444	1566	100%
2	Sir William Balfour	440	1393	566	0	616	419	3433	93%
41	John Dalbeir	175	349	0	0	0	349	873	100%
40	Thomas Hammond	174	312	300	0	150	298	1234	100%
83	(Sir Samuel Luke – not in pamphlet)	175	349	524	0	200	289	1537	100%
16	John Gunter	349	349	349	0	300	287	1635	100%
80	(John Urry/Hurry – not in pamphlet)	535	192	535	0	385	252	1898	100%
14	James Sheffield	349	349	724	0	300	252	1974	100%
88	(James Ramsey – not in pamphlet)	175	899	349	0	150	244	1817	100%
37	Edward Berry	175	524	100	0	140	237	1176	100%
49	John Hale	175	175	524	0	150	232	1256	100%
61	Francis Thompson	175	325	349	0	349	232	1429	100%
48	Thomas Terrill	175	364	0	0	349	229	1117	100%
47	Richard Grenville	175	349	349	0	349	229	1451	100%
75	Simon Rugley	349	349	100	0	300	217	1316	100%
31	Arthur Evelyn	349	175	349	0	150	211	1234	100%
22	Mathew Draper	101	329	324	0	344	201	1299	100%
51	William Balfour (jr.)	525	175	699	0	379	192	1969	100%
46	Arthur Goodwin	175	524	349	0	349	175	1572	100%
63	Sir Robert Pie	0	70	454	0	349	175	1048	100%
57	Charles Chichester	0	349	0	0	100	175	624	100%

53	Adrian Scroop	175	200	60	300	0	137	872	100%
52	George Austin	175	209	100	0	190	112	786	100%
17	William Pretty	175	353	353	0	250	108	1238	100%
39	Thomas Lidcott	175	100	60	0	110	100	545	100%
56	Edward Wingate	175	0	0	0	250	100	525	100%
27	John Hammond	235	175	50	0	54	97	610	100%
45	John Flemming	349	100	0	0	40	51	541	100%
4	Earl of Peterborough	105	175	0	0	0	39	318	100%
15	Sir William Waller	349	0	349	600	0	0	1299	87%
60	John Finnes	524	349	349	0	10	0	1233	100%
12	Lord Willoughby	230	461	461	0	0	0	1153	100%
58	Henry Ireton	349	349	449	0	0	0	1148	100%
32	George Thompson	349	349	0	349	0	0	1048	0%
36	Nathanial Fiennes	349	349	349	0	0	0	1048	100%
67	Oliver Cromwell	419	414	215	0	0	0	1048	100%
59	Walter Long	349	349	349	0	0	0	1048	100%
3	Lord Grey of Groby	175	524	200	0	0	0	899	81%
72	Thomas Temple	349	175	349	0	0	0	873	100%
54	Hercules Langrish	349	349	100	0	0	0	799	78%
33	Edwin Sandys	536	252	0	0	0	0	787	100%
28	Edward Ayscough	249	175	349	0	0	0	773	100%
6	Lord Brooke	175	349	200	0	0	0	724	100%
18	Robert Burrell (Berghill?)	175	175	349	0	0	0	699	100%
8	Lord St. John	150	325	175	0	0	0	649	100%
42	Francis Finnes	0	340	225	0	0	0	566	100%
78	(Edward Clerke – not in pamphlet)	175	175	200	0	0	0	549	100%
24	Horatio Carey	425	0	100	0	0	0	525	100%
35	Edward Knightly	175	349	0	0	0	0	524	100%
43	S.A. Hesilrige	349	175	0	0	0	0	524	100%
79	(Thomas Saunders – not in pamphlet)	175	349	0	0	0	0	524	100%
64	Thomas Hatcher	511	0	0	0	0	0	511	0%
73	Valentine Walton	175	207	0	0	0	0	382	100%

19	Francis Dowett	349	0	0	0	0	0	349	100%
26	John Neale	175	175	0	0	0	0	349	100%
68	Robert Kirle	335	0	0	0	0	0	335	100%
85	(George Booth – not in pamphlet)	319	0	0	0	0	0	319	0%
77	(Captain Withers's troop – not in pamphlet)	297	0	0	0	0	0	297	0%
7	Lord Hastings	175	0	30	0	0	0	205	100%
34	Anthony Mildmay	175	0	0	0	0	0	175	100%
10	Lord Fielding	100	0	0	0	0	0	100	100%
21	John Bird	0	87	0	0	0	0	87	100%
Total (£)		17268	18357	14110	1249	8606	8174	67763	94%
Total (% paid by Vernon)		89%	95%	100%	72%	98%	95%	94%	

Table 2.11 – The Appearance of Essex's 'New' Cavalry Troops During the Reading Campaign
(Source: The warrants used to construct Figure 2.3 above)

E64[4] number	Cavalry Troop	Nov 1642	Dec 1642	Jan 1643	Feb 1643	Mar 1643	Apr 1643	Total (£)	Total % paid by Vernon
93	(Sir Philip Skippon - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	449	673	0	400	301	1823	100%
90	(Samuel Bosa - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	96	134	0	0	0	294	524	100%
96	(Richard Crosse - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	349	0	349	290	989	100%
97	(Sir Gilbert Blare - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	200	0	349	234	783	100%
100	(John Boswell - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	151	175	0	0	100	214	640	49%
95	(John Meldrum - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	222	428	0	0	190	840	100%
92	(John Middleton - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	571	560	0	956	187	2275	100%
98	(Lord Mordant - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	699	0	349	175	1223	100%
101	(Richard Brown - not in pamphlet or chap 1	0	0	0	0	200	175	375	100%
106	(Captain J. Bladwell - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	0	0	0	161	161	100%
102	(Francis Ingolsby - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	0	0	0	137	137	100%
103	(Lionel Copley - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	0	0	0	132	132	100%
94	(Sir John Norrich - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	140	449	0	100	84	773	100%
105	(Robert Robotham - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	0	0	0	54	54	100%
104	(Richard Cockyane - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	0	0	0	42	42	100%
91	(Allen Cox - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	393	100	0	20	0	513	100%
99	(William Carr - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	80	0	0	0	80	100%
Total (£)		247	2083	3539	0	2824	2670	11364	97%
Total (% paid by Vernon)		39%	92%	100%	N/A	100%	100%	97%	

Table 2.12 – Cavalry Speculative Pay Level Calculations: the Reading Campaign (Source: the data compiled in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 above)

Speculative cost calculations	Nov 1642	Dec 1642	Jan 1643	Feb 1643	Mar 1643	Apr 1643
Total salary payments (£) (Tables 2.10 and 2.11)	17515	20440	17648	1249	11430	10844
'n' = no. of troops receiving pay (Tables 2.10 and 2.11)	63	60	51	3	39	47
Money required to fully pay these troops ([{'n'-3}x349.3]+[3x551.6]) see Table 1.8 for rates	22613	21565	18421	1655	14230	17024
% of full pay received (receipts in £ ÷ required £)	77.46%	94.78%	95.80%	75.50%	80.33%	63.70%

Table 2.13 – Payments to the Dragoons: the Reading Campaign (Source: the warrants used to construct Figure 2.3)

Parent Unit	Total in £
Col. John/Richard Brown	3461.85
Col. George Melve	2370.25
Col. John Middleton	572.20
Sir John Norrich	1207.00
Sir John Seaton	1725.40
Sir William Waller	500.00
Col. James Wardlaw	3754.20
Independent/unidentified company-level payments	1944.98
Total:	15,535.88

Table 2.14 - The Monthly Cost of a Single Dragoon Regiment (assuming six companies) (Source: TNA SP28/140/17)

Regimental Officers	Pounds	Shillings	Pence	x 6 Companies	Pounds	Shillings	Pence
Colonel	1	10	0		1	10	0
Sgt. Major	0	9	0		0	9	0
Quartermaster	0	5	0		0	5	0
Preacher	0	4	0		0	4	0
Provost Marshall	0	5	0		0	5	0
Surgeon	0	4	0		0	4	0
Surgeon's two mates	0	5	0		0	5	0
Company Officers							
Captain	0	15	0		0	90	0
his five horses	0	5	0		0	30	0
Lieutenant	0	4	0		0	24	0
his three horses	0	3	0		0	18	0
Cornet	0	3	0		0	18	0
his two horses	0	2	0		0	12	0
Two Sergeants	0	3	0		0	18	0
a horse for each	0	2	0		0	12	0
Three Corporals	0	3	0		0	18	0
a horse for each	0	2	0		0	12	0
Two Drummers	0	2	0		0	12	0
a horse for each	0	2	0		0	12	0
100 private dragoons	7	10	0		42	60	0
One Smith	0	1	0		0	6	0
his horse	0	1	0		0	6	0
Subtotals (in pounds)	8	5	0		43	19.5	0
Total (per diem in £)		13				62.5	
Total (per month in £)		364		(x 6 companies =)		1750	

Table 2.17 – All 'Other' Spending by Sub-Category: the Reading Campaign (Source: the warrants used to construct Figure 2.4)

Type of 'Other' spending (£)	Trea-surer	Nov 1642	Dec 1642	Jan 1643	Feb 1643	Mar 1643	Apr 1643	Totals (£)	Totals (As % of Figure 2.4)
Artillery	Vernon	1775	1906	946	1000	1916	1630	9174	13%
	Jessop	513	150	0	20	0	339	1022	1%
Support	Vernon	2371	809	527	1208	536	1511	6962	10%
	Jessop	1740	1976	339	1343	412	589	6398	9%
Local Forces	Vernon	558	200	122	0	1572	0	2452	4%
	Jessop	8646	2373	10130	2706	617	377	24849	36%
Trans-portation	Vernon	847	645	300	1200	10	1080	4082	6%
	Jessop	2095	203	79	910	294	319	3901	6%
Arms	Vernon	20	33	50	0	0	0	103	0%
	Jessop	563	5320	406	986	0	2454	9729	14%
Totals (£)	Artillery	2287	2056	946	1020	1916	1969	10195	15%
	Support	4110	2785	867	2551	948	2100	13361	19%
	Local Forces	9204	2573	10252	2706	2189	377	27302	40%
	Trans-portation	2942	847	379	2110	304	1399	7983	12%
	Arms	583	5353	456	986	0	2454	9831	14%
	Vernon	5571	3593	1946	3408	4034	4222	22773	33%
	Jessop	13556	10023	10955	5965	1323	4077	45899	67%
Grand Total (£)	All	19127	13615	12900	9374	5357	8299	68671	100%

Table 2.18 – 'Artillery' Warrants: the Reading Campaign

Warrant	Sub-Treasurer	Train Salary Money	Ancillary Artillery Costs	Total Amount (£)	(Final) Receipt Date
SP28/262 f.003	Jessop		152.79	152.79	03-Nov-1642
SP28/3A f.132	Jessop		200.00	200.00	08-Nov-1642
SP28/3A f.021	Jessop		40.00	40.00	09-Nov-1642
SP28/3A f.272	Vernon		30.00	30.00	11-Nov-1642
SP28/3B f.303	Vernon		25.00	25.00	11-Nov-1642
SP28/143 fva, f.36v	Vernon		340.00	340.00	11-Nov-1642
SP28/143 fva, f.36v	Vernon		30.00	30.00	11-Nov-1642
SP28/3B f.320	Vernon		55.40	55.40	12-Nov-1642
SP28/3B f.321	Vernon		50.00	50.00	12-Nov-1642
SP28/3B f.308	Vernon	724.38		724.38	14-Nov-1642
SP28/3A f.092	Jessop		20.00	20.00	17-Nov-1642
SP28/3B f.422	Vernon		120.00	120.00	22-Nov-1642
SP28/262 f.261	Jessop		50.00	50.00	28-Nov-1642
SP28/262 f.262	Jessop		50.00	50.00	29-Nov-1642
SP28/3B f.467	Vernon		25.00	25.00	30-Nov-1642
SP28/143 fva, f.40r	Vernon		374.73	374.73	30-Nov-1642
SP28/3B f.437	Vernon		69.07	69.07	03-Dec-1642
SP28/3B f.506	Vernon	724.78		724.78	03-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.240	Vernon		30.00	30.00	10-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.241	Vernon		30.00	30.00	10-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.313	Vernon		34.33	34.33	16-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.247	Jessop		150.00	150.00	19-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.221	Vernon		70.50	70.50	19-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.238	Vernon		44.60	44.60	19-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.217	Vernon	724.78		724.78	21-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.312	Vernon		44.10	44.10	27-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.349	Vernon		50.00	50.00	27-Dec-1642
SP28/143 fva, f.47v	Vernon		84.33	84.33	27-Dec-1642
SP28/4 f.171	Vernon		140.00	140.00	06-Jan-1643

SP28/5 f.025	Vernon		20.90	20.90	06-Jan-1643
SP28/5 f.029	Vernon		27.35	27.35	06-Jan-1643
SP28/5 f.030	Vernon		58.10	58.10	06-Jan-1643
SP28/5 f.049	Vernon	400.00		400.00	06-Jan-1643
SP28/143 fva, f.53r	Vernon		300.00	300.00	23-Oct-1642
SP28/5 f.278	Vernon	1000.00		1000.00	04-Feb-1643
SP28/262 f.096	Jessop		20.00	20.00	08-Feb-1643
SP28/5 f.337	Vernon	1449.57		1449.57	01-Mar-1643
SP28/5 f.176	Vernon		113.17	113.17	03-Mar-1643
SP28/5 f.307	Vernon		17.50	17.50	07-Mar-1643
SP28/5 f.308	Vernon		35.50	35.50	09-Mar-1643
SP28/6 f.127	Vernon		300.00	300.00	09-Mar-1643
SP28/6 f.229	Vernon		56.33	56.33	12-Apr-1643
SP28/262 f.032	Jessop		26.80	26.80	13-Apr-1643
SP28/5 f.280	Vernon		48.75	48.75	13-Apr-1643
SP28/5 f.290	Vernon		28.00	28.00	13-Apr-1643
SP28/5 f.307	Vernon		30.20	30.20	13-Apr-1643
SP28/263 f.034	Jessop		84.00	84.00	14-Apr-1643
SP28/263 f.269	Jessop		156.00	156.00	20-Apr-1643
SP28/263 f.311	Jessop		72.00	72.00	20-Apr-1643
SP28/6 f.227	Vernon	1449.57		1449.57	24-Apr-1643
SP28/6 f.304	Vernon		17.56	17.56	24-Apr-1643
Totals (£)		6473.08	3722.01	10195.09	

Table 2.19 – 'Uniform' Components Supplied by Stephen Estwick: the Reading Campaign
(Source: Estwick's account - TNA SP28/146 ff.119-131)

Regiment	Coats	Shirts	Shoes	Snap-sacks	(Final) Delivery Date	Cost to the State (£)	Surviving Army warrant?
Colonel Manwarring	1200	1200	1200	1200	?	960.00	-
Colonel Langham	1200	1200	1200	1200	10-Dec-1642	960.00	SP28/262 f.316
Captain White (Langham's Regiment)	65	65	65	65	27-Dec-1642	83.33	SP28/262 f.127 (warrant says 112 sets)
Lord Robarts (Capt. Warburton)	100	100	100	100	?	80.00	SP28/3A f.289
Lord Robarts	119	119	119	119	12-Dec-1642	95.20	SP28/4 f.144
Lord Robarts (Capt. Wilkenson)	100	100	100	100	07-Jan-1643	80.00	SP28/262 f.77
Colonel Barclay	1120	1120	1120	1120	26-Dec-1642?	896.00	SP28/3A f.116
Colonel Venn (LOCAL FORCES: Windsor)	1200	1200	1200	1200	23-Nov-1642	960.00	SP28/262 f.306 (warrant says 900 sets)
Lord Essex	400	400	400	400	28-Nov-1642	320.00	SP28/3B f.453 and SP28/4 f.376
Captain Rainborough	600	600	600	600	?	480.00	-
Captain Rainborough (Holborne's Reg.)	300	300	300	300	29-Dec-1642	240.00	SP28/4 f.315
Colonel Morley (LOCAL FORCES: Sussex)	60	60	60	60	01-Dec-1642	48.00	SP28/262 f.374
Colonel Stapley	300	300	300	300	06-Dec-1643	240.00	SP28/3B f.479
Sir Edward Peyto (Artillery?)	115	115	115	115	-	68.00	-

Colonel Bulstrode	800	800	800	800	17-Jan-1643	640.00	SP28/3B f.505
Lord Rochford	200	200	200	200	?	160.00	SP28/3B f.482
Colonel Hampden	311	311	311	311	24-Jan-1643	248.80	SP28/262 f.298 (warrant says 160 sets)
Colonel Hampden	0	60	60	60	?	19.00	?
Sgt. Maj. Gen. Skippon	1500	1500	1500	1500		1200.00	SP28/3B f.412 and SP28/4 f.143
Colonel Holmstead	1200	1200	1200	1200	06-Jan-1643	946.67	SP28/3B f.504 and SP28/4 f.316
Lord Peterborough	800	800	800	800	29-Dec-1642	640.00	SP28/3B f.399 and SP28/4 f.244
Lord Brooke	200	200	200	200	31-Jan-1643	160.00	SP28/262 f.239
Sir William Constable	300	300	300	300	?	240.00	-
Lord Essex	60	60	60	60	14-Apr-1643	0.00	SP28/5 f.284
Captain Fi[t]ch (?)				**120**		**0.00**	
Totals:	**12,250**	**12,310**	**12,310**	**12,430**		**£9,765.00**	

Table 2.20 – Sir Samuel Luke's Receipts as Scoutmaster General: the Reading Campaign[838] (Source: TNA SP28/127/3)

Reason for Issue	Receipt Date	Amount (£)	Sub-Treasurer	Surviving Warrant?
Necessary money for scouts	23-Jan-1643	100	Jessop	SP28/5 f.168-9
	21-Feb-1643	150	Vernon	SP28/5 f.167
	23-Mar-1643	50	Jessop	SP28/6 f.155
Pay for Luke and his 20 scouts	08-Mar-1643	100	Vernon	SP28/6 f.125
	13-Apr-1643	200	Vernon	SP28/6 f.272
	20-Apr-1643	100	Vernon	SP28/6 f.323
Total in £		700		

[838] The reader should note that this tally excludes the money he received as a captain in the cavalry corps. These receipts, naturally, appear in context in the appropriate section above.

Appendix C:
Tabulated Data derived for Chapter Three

Table 3.4 – Combined Receipts of Essex's Infantry Regiments: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (Arranged by source)

Infantry Regiment	Total Vernon (£)	Total Jessop (£)	Total Fenton (£)	Grand Total (£)
Thomas Ballard's	2577.08	0.00	203.93	2781.01
Lord Essex's	5520.08	0.00	1050.99	6571.07
Thomas Grantham's	51.50	0.00	31.50	83.00
Lord Robarts's	3182.78	0.00	236.23	3419.00
Sir John Merrick's	148.75	0.00	0.00	148.75
Lord Wharton's	0.00	122.40	0.00	122.40
Sir Henry Cholmley's	951.85	0.00	300.27	1252.12
Lord Brooke's	0.00	0.00	20.00	20.00
John Hampden's	5139.17	0.00	895.83	6034.99
Charles Essex's	0.00	10.00	20.00	30.00
Lord Rochford's	728.93	0.00	141.75	870.68
Lord Mandeville's	0.00	200.00	0.00	200.00
Lord Say and Sele's	3213.15	0.00	382.42	3595.57
William Constable's	3305.39	0.00	337.59	3642.98
Lord Peterborough	1275.30	22.05	0.00	1297.35
Henry Bulstrode's	3654.92	0.00	286.33	3941.24
Sir Philip Skippon's	4753.05	0.00	382.91	5135.96
George Langham's	3312.30	0.00	209.48	3521.78
Henry Barclay's	3746.15	0.00	441.70	4187.85
Warwick's/Holborne's	2982.22	0.00	252.03	3234.25
John Holmstead's	2769.63	0.00	683.13	3452.77
William Oagleby's	0.00	0.00	160.00	160.00
Francis Thompson's	823.20	30.00	383.38	1236.58
Totals (£)	48135.44	384.45	6419.44	54939.33

Table 3.5 – Vernon's Infantry Payments (by Month and Regiment): Gloucester/Newbury Campaign
(Source: The warrants used to construct Figure 3.1, Table 3.1, and Table 3.4)

Infantry Regiment	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643	Total (£)
Thomas Ballard's	814	402	437	549	0	375	2577
Lord Essex's	1620	891	723	1152	0	1134	5520
Thomas Grantham's	41	0	0	11	0	0	52
Lord Robarts's	1007	487	469	647	0	572	3183
Sir John Merrick's	0	0	32	117	0	0	149
Sir Henry Cholmley's	785	18	71	58	0	21	952
John Hampden's	1463	791	1296	1013	0	577	5139
Lord Rochford's	673	56	0	0	0	0	729
Lord Say and Sele's	778	940	430	649	0	416	3213
William Constable's	1070	616	520	591	0	508	3305
Lord Peterborough	907	206	0	162	0	0	1275
Henry Bulstrode's	1238	593	505	742	0	576	3655
Sir Philip Skippon's	1392	818	860	929	0	753	4753
George Langham's	1147	564	535	641	0	425	3312
Henry Barclay's	1157	650	564	732	0	644	3746
Warwick's/ Holborne's	969	512	445	583	0	473	2982
John Holmstead's	500	529	478	690	0	572	2770
Francis Thompson's	0	0	68	356	0	399	823
Regimental Totals (£)	15562	8074	7432	9622	0	7445	48135
Totals from Table 3.1 (£)	16081	8725	7710	10435	0	7812	50762
% Spent on the Regiments	96.77%	92.54%	96.40%	92.21%	0.00	95.31%	94.82%

Table 3.6 – Fenton's Infantry Payments (by Month and Regiment): Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (Source: The warrants used to construct Figure 3.1, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4)

Infantry Regiment	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643	Total (£)
Thomas Ballard's	0	0	71	49	84	0	204
Lord Essex's	0	95	222	306	429	0	1051
Thomas Grantham's	0	21	11	0	0	0	32
Lord Robarts's	0	44	92	9	91	0	236
Sir Henry Cholmley's	207	38	34	21	0	0	300
Lord Brooke's	0	0	20	0	0	0	20
John Hampden's	0	590	211	0	95	0	896
Charles Essex's	0	0	20	0	0	0	20
Lord Rochford's	89	0	53	0	0	0	142
Lord Say and Sele's	0	40	107	222	14	0	382
William Constable's	0	100	109	27	101	0	338
Henry Bulstrode's	0	0	138	17	132	0	286
Sir Philip Skippon's	0	0	181	50	152	0	383
George Langham's	0	0	128	0	82	0	209
Henry Barclay's	0	142	148	0	151	0	442
Warwick's/ Holborne's	0	0	165	0	87	0	252
John Holmstead's	0	429	146	0	108	0	683
William Oagleby's	0	160	0	0	0	0	160
Francis Thompson's	0	0	183	110	90	0	383
Totals (£)	297	1660	2037	810	1616	0	6419
Totals from Table 3.3 (£)	717	1926	2508	1363	1616	0	8130
% Spent on the Regiments	41.39%	86.15%	81.20%	59.47%	100%	N/A	78.96%

Table 3.7 – The Reported Number of Private Soldiers in Essex's Foot: Gloucester/Newbury Campaign
(Source: the pay warrants used to construct Tables 3.4)

Regular Infantry Regiments	May 1643 Totals	Jun 1643 Totals	Jul 1643 Totals	Aug 1643 Totals	Sep 1643 Totals	Oct 1643 Totals	Total (£ Only)
Thomas Ballard's (privates)	293	320	275	250	0	233	
Thomas Ballard's (£)	814	402	508	598	84	375	2781
Lord Essex's (privates)	959	959	818	1015	814	816	
Lord Essex's (£)	1620	986	944	1458	429	1134	6571
Lord Robarts's (privates)	528	528	393	365	295	310	
Lord Robarts's (£)	1007	532	561	656	91	572	3419
John Hampden's (privates)	849	849	769	451	310	329	
John Hampden's (£)	1463	1380	1507	1013	95	577	6035
Lord Rochford's (privates)	120	0	0	0	0	0	
Lord Rochford's (£)	762	56	53	0	0	0	871
Lord Say and Sele's (privates)	326	318	458	358	0	324	
Lord Say and Sele's (£)	778	980	537	871	14	416	3596
Sir William Constable's (privates)	525	525	467	0	327	308	
Sir William Constable's (£)	1070	716	629	619	101	508	3643
Lord Peterborough (privates)	248	248	0	0	0	0	
Lord Peterborough (£)	907	229	0	162	0	0	1297
Henry Bulstrode's (privates)	562	562	505	448	238	310	
Henry Bulstrode's (£)	1238	593	643	759	132	576	3941
Philip Skippon's (privates)	765	838	657	531	0	512	

Philip Skippon's (£)	1392	818	1041	979	152	753	5136
George Langham's (privates)	634	634	548	431	271	268	
George Langham's (£)	1147	564	663	641	82	425	3522
Henry Barclay's (privates)	645	645	636	496	384	391	
Henry Barclay's (£)	1157	792	713	732	151	644	4188
Warwick's/ Holborne's (privates)	479	473	385	301	165	249	
Warwick's/ Holborne's (£)	969	512	610	583	87	473	3234
John Holmstead's (privates)	507	444	462	416	346	331	
John Holmstead's (£)	500	958	624	690	108	572	3453
Francis Thompson's (privates)	0	0	0	351	260	238	
Francis Thompson's (£)	0	0	281	466	90	399	1237
Total REPORTED no. of privates	7440	7343	6373	5413	3410	4619	
Total Spent on REPORTING Regiments (£)	14825	9519	9313	10226	1616	7424	52923

Table 3.8 – Infantry Speculative Pay Level Calculations: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (Source: the data compiled in Tables 3.4 and 3.7 above)

Row	Speculative cost calculation	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643
1	The reported no. of private soldiers (Table 3.7)	7440	7343	6373	5413	3410	4619
2	No. of regiments reporting strengths (Table 3.7)	14	13	12	12	10	13
3	Average no. of reported privates per reporting regiment (row 1 ÷ row 2)	531	565	531	451	341	355
4	No. of paid regiments (Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6)	16	19	20	18	13	14
5	Hypothetical no. of private soldiers (row 3 x row 4)	8503	10732	10622	8120	4433	4974
6	The cost of these hypothetical soldiers in £ (row 5 x 0.93)	7908	9981	9878	7551	4123	4626
7	The cost of the paid regiments' officer corps in £ (row 4 x 542.8)	8685	10313	10856	9770	7056	7599
8	Total hypothetical cost in £ (row 6 + row 7)	16592	20294	20734	17322	11179	12225
9	Total amount received in £ (Table 3.4)	15858	10055	9522	10443	1616	7445
10	Hypothetical pay rate of all regiments receiving pay (row 9 ÷ row 8)	95.58%	49.55%	45.92%	60.29%	14.46%	60.90%

Table 3.12 – Salary Payments to Essex's Cavalry Troops: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (Source: the pay warrants used to construct Figure 3.2)

E64[4] number	Cavalry Troop	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643	Total (£)	Total % paid by Vernon
1	The Lord General's (Stapilton)	1339	659	640	1029	0	809	4476	100%
2	Sir William Balfour	572	571	277	402	0	231	2052	100%
3	Lord Grey of Groby	0	0	0	0	0	228	228	100%
4	Earl of Peterborough	313	146	0	0	0	0	459	100%
11	Lord Wharton	394	206	209	248	0	161	1218	100%
13	Lord Grey (of Warke?)	0	100	0	47	0	0	147	100%
14	James Sheffield	353	176	195	299	0	220	1243	100%
16	John Gunter	419	210	210	235	0	157	1231	100%
17	William Pretty	0	0	0	50	0	0	50	100%
22	Mathew Draper	392	166	166	246	0	176	1146	100%
24	Horatio Carey	83	0	0	0	0	0	83	0%
29	Alexander Pym	349	0	0	0	349	0	699	0%
31	Arthur Evelyn	265	150	100	235	0	98	849	100%
33	Edwin Sandys	0	0	0	0	20	0	20	0%
37	Edward Berry	302	242	181	134	19	0	879	89%
39	Thomas Lidcott	60	0	0	0	0	0	60	0%
40	Thomas Hammond	508	215	224	321	6	183	1456	96%
41	John Dalbeir	168	281	94	141	0	279	963	100%
45	John Flemming	0	0	25	0	0	0	25	0%
46	Arthur Goodwin	475	274	274	290	0	122	1434	100%
47	Richard Grenville	352	176	176	249	0	166	1119	100%
48	Thomas Terrill	335	229	204	312	0	0	1080	100%
49	John Hale	321	161	160	266	0	138	1046	100%
51	William Balfour (jr.)	394	168	168	171	0	158	1059	100%
52	George Austin	200	24	0	100	70	166	560	83%
53	Adrian Scroop	0	0	55	100	0	27	182	70%
56	Edward Wingate	105	0	0	0	0	0	105	0%
57	Charles Chichester	0	0	0	82	0	0	82	100%
58	Henry Ireton	0	0	0	0	30	0	30	0%
59	Walter Long	0	180	180	293	0	183	837	100%

61	Francis Thompson	349	175	175	246	0	183	1128	91%
63	Sir Robert Pie	382	191	191	281	0	242	1286	100%
64	Thomas Hatcher	0	0	0	5	0	0	5	0%
65	Robert Vivers	0	0	0	100	0	27	127	100%
66	William Anselme	605	271	271	421	0	256	1822	100%
67	Oliver Cromwell	100	0	154	267	0	138	658	100%
72	Thomas Temple	0	242	0	0	0	0	242	100%
73	Valentine Walton	0	0	0	55	0	0	55	100%
75	Simon Rugley	307	153	153	0	0	0	613	100%
77	(Captain Withers's troop – not in pamphlet)	0	0	167	176	0	0	343	51%
78	(Edward Clerke – not in pamphlet)	156	23	182	178	0	143	681	97%
80	(John Urry/Hurry – not in pamphlet)	330	178	165	100	0	181	955	100%
81	(Sir Sigismund Alexander – not in pamphlet)	663	346	330	514	0	174	2026	92%
83	(Sir Samuel Luke - not in pamphlet)	423	211	211	301	0	185	1332	100%
88	(James Ramsey - not in pamphlet)	289	153	171	148	0	225	986	100%
90	(Samuel Bosa – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	347	164	164	246	0	180	1101	100%
92	(John Middleton – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	387	183	184	288	0	231	1274	100%
93	(Sir Philip Skippon - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	449	224	224	292	0	186	1375	100%
95	(John Meldrum – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	345	173	173	407	0	205	1302	100%
96	(Richard Crosse – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	433	217	217	309	0	206	1382	100%
97	(Sir Gilbert Blare – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	321	160	160	246	0	191	1079	100%
99	(William Carr – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	353	176	186	164	0	166	1046	100%
100	(John Boswell – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	363	182	182	273	0	181	1181	100%
101	(Richard Brown – not in pamphlet or chap 1	356	148	148	0	0	0	652	100%
102	(Francis Ingolsby – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	274	137	137	220	0	145	913	100%

103	(Lionel Copley – not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	194	288	283	0	171	936	90%
104	(Richard Cockyane - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	127	40	0	0	0	0	167	76%
105	(Robert Robotham - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	278	175	175	251	0	141	1020	100%
106	(Captain J. Bladwell - not in pamphlet or chap 1)	0	0	0	0	30	0	30	0%
107	(Charles Pym – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	234	152	178	296	0	190	1051	100%
108	(Mathew Scaltick – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	458	215	224	298	0	192	1386	100%
109	(Robert Nelson – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	349	0	0	0	0	349	100%
110	(George Ulrick – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	84	124	176	0	0	383	68%
111	(William Grey – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	200	0	210	0	0	410	100%
112	(Sir Thomas Marten - not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	100	0	0	0	0	100	100%
113	(Captain J. Andrewes - not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	175	175	81	0	141	571	100%
114	(Charles Fleetwood - not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	395	197	465	0	187	1243	52%
115	(Thomas Harrison - not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	349	193	0	131	672	74%
116	(James Eaine – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	153	0	0	0	153	100%
117	(James Innes – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	27	27	220	0	140	414	93%
118	(Carlo Fanthom – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	198	0	146	345	100%
119	(Edward Fiennes – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	246	0	157	403	100%
120	(Robert Jermy – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	235	0	157	392	100%
121	(John Fountaine – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	134	0	0	134	100%
122	(David Melve – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	170	0	153	322	100%

123	(Col. Francis Russell - not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	189	0	164	352	100%
124	(John Carmighal – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	148	148	100%
125	(Thomas Rawlins – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	167	167	100%
126	(Thomas Babbington – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	159	159	100%
127	(Anthony Buller – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	171	171	100%
128	(Richard Bingley – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	167	167	100%
129	(Maj. Robert Hamilton - not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	36	36	71	50%
130	(Colonel Behre – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	187	187	100%
131	(Captain Roper – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	180	180	100%
132	(Captain George Melrum – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	157	157	100%
133	(Captain Burton – not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	117	117	100%
134	(Captain Davies - not in pamphlet or chaps 1-2)	0	0	0	0	0	157	157	100%
Total (£)		16029	10144	9370	14131	560	10661	60895	95%
Total (% paid by Vernon)		96%	95%	90%	98%	0%	100%	95%	

Table 3.13 – Cavalry Speculative Pay Level Calculations: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (Source: the data compiled in Tables 3.12 above)

Speculative cost calculations	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643
Total salary payments in £ (Table 3.12)	16029	10144	9370	14131	560	10661
'n' = no. of troops receiving pay (Table 3.12)	45	51	49	59	8	60
Money required to fully pay these troops ([{'n'-3}x349.3]+[3x551.6])[839]	16313	18407	17709	21199	3400	21548
% of full pay received (receipts in £ ÷ required £)	98.26%	55.11%	52.91%	66.66%	16.47%	49.48%

[839] All three troops of cuirassiers continued to exist throughout this period, and all three retained their special status vis-à-vis the harquebusiers. Examples of documentation from October include TNA SP28/10 ff.150 and 204; TNA SP28/143, Vernon's account, f.79r. The account book entry contains no information on the type of formation Anselme commanded in October. That his troop was still made up of cuirassiers in late August is evidenced by TNA SP28/9 f.179.

Table 3.14 – Payments to the Dragoons: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (All sources)

Dragoon Unit	Treasurer	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643	Totals (£)
George Melve's regiment	Vernon	1320	305	556	528	0	220	2929
	Jessop	0	0	0	0	0	34	34
	Fenton	0	388	32	0	0	0	420
George Melve's regiment	All	1320	693	588	528	0	255	3384
All others	Vernon	726	231	127	671	0	507	2263
	Jessop	0	146	68	0	0	0	214
	Fenton	0	350	100	114	91	0	654
All others	All	726	727	295	785	91	507	3131
Totals (£)	Vernon	2046	536	683	1199	0	728	5192
	Jessop	0	146	68	0	0	34	248
	Fenton	0	738	132	114	91	0	1074
Combined	All	2046	1420	883	1313	91	762	6514

Table 3.18 – All 'Other' Spending by Sub-Category: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (Source: the warrants used to construct Figure 3.3)

Type of 'Other' spending (£)	Trea-surer	May 1643	Jun 1643	Jul 1643	Aug 1643	Sep 1643	Oct 1643	Totals (£)	Totals (As % of Figure 3.3)
Artillery	Vernon	2048	851	892	1473	0	1213	6477	10%
	Jessop	175	200	0	0	0	330	705	1%
	Fenton	320	210	11	200	6	0	747	1%
Support	Vernon	436	97	434	1147	0	864	2979	5%
	Jessop	200	252	421	276	400	450	2000	3%
	Fenton	4092	752	562	603	420	0	6429	10%
Local Forces	Vernon	133	0	0	0	0	347	480	1%
	Jessop	4300	3927	1987	1070	969	928	13181	21%
	Fenton	22	150	238	55	412	0	876	1%
Trans-portation	Vernon	1896	790	700	1125	0	1011	5522	9%
	Jessop	292	154	100	313	495	91	1445	2%
	Fenton	0	0	0	100	100	0	200	0%
Arms	Vernon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
	Jessop	5665	6618	1162	4460	3479	1797	23181	36%
	Fenton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Totals (£)	Artillery	2543	1261	903	1674	6	1543	7929	12%
	Support	4728	1102	1417	2026	820	1314	11408	18%
	Local Forces	4455	4077	2225	1125	1380	1275	14536	23%
	Trans-portation	2188	944	800	1538	595	1101	7166	11%
	Arms	5665	6618	1162	4460	3479	1797	23181	36%
	Vernon	4513	1738	2026	3745	0	3434	15457	24%
	Jessop	10633	11152	3670	6119	5342	3595	40510	63%
	Fenton	4434	1112	811	958	938	0	8252	13%
Grand Total (£)	All	19580	14002	6507	10822	6280	7029	64220	100%

Table 3.19 – 'Artillery' Warrants: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign

Warrant	Sub-Treasurer	Train Salary Money	Ancillary Artillery Costs	Total Amount (£)	(Final) Receipt Date
SP28/7 f.10	Vernon		20.00	20.00	03-May-1643
SP28/264 f.338	Jessop		175.33	175.33	13-May-1643
SP28/7 f.031	Fenton		320.00	320.00	22-May-1643
SP28/7 f.14	Vernon		175.00	175.00	24-May-1643
SP28/7 f.098	Vernon		100.10	100.10	25-May-1643
SP28/7 f.28	Vernon	160.00		160.00	26-May-1643
SP28/7 f.130	Vernon	1449.47		1449.47	26-May-1643
SP28/7 f.133	Vernon		43.40	43.40	26-May-1643
SP28/7 f.98	Vernon		100.10	100.10	28-May-1643
SP28/7 f.360	Fenton		10.00	10.00	08-Jun-1643
SP28/7 f.361	Fenton		20.00	20.00	10-Jun-1643
SP28/7 f.365	Fenton		40.00	40.00	12-Jun-1643
SP28/264 f.340	Jessop		200.00	200.00	13-Jun-1643
SP28/7 f.371	Fenton		140.00	140.00	19-Jun-1643
SP28/7 f.389	Vernon		21.70	21.70	21-Jun-1643
SP28/7 f.405	Vernon	779.00		779.00	21-Jun-1643
SP28/7 f.436	Jessop		50.05	50.05	21-Jun-1643
SP28/8 f.142	Vernon		43.05	43.05	12-Jul-1643
SP28/8 f.140	Vernon		70.00	70.00	13-Jul-1643
SP28/8 f.141	Vernon	724.78		724.78	13-Jul-1643
SP28/8 f.167	Vernon		18.20	18.20	13-Jul-1643
SP28/143 FVA f.71v	Vernon		15.00	15.00	13-Jul-1643
SP28/143 FVA f.72r	Vernon		21.00	21.00	13-Jul-1643
SP28/8 f.240	Fenton		10.50	10.50	31-Jul-1643
SP28/9 f.4	Fenton		9.10	9.10	02-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.13	Fenton		21.35	21.35	03-Aug-1643
SP28/8 f.84	Fenton	120.00		120.00	07-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.55	Vernon	362.39		362.39	16-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.74	Vernon		9.10	9.10	16-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.80	Vernon		21.53	21.53	16-Aug-1643
SP28/143 FVA f.74r	Vernon		10.00	10.00	18-Aug-1643

SP28/9 f.153	Vernon		35.00	35.00	20-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.231	Vernon		43.05	43.05	24-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.209	Vernon		18.20	18.20	25-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.227	Vernon	724.78		724.78	25-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.268	Vernon		14.00	14.00	26-Aug-1643
SP28/143 FVA f.76v	Vernon		11.50	11.50	26-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.279	Vernon		200.00	200.00	29-Aug-1643
SP28/143 FVA f.77v	Vernon		23.85	23.85	29-Aug-1643
SP28/9 f.226	Fenton		50.00	50.00	30-Aug-1643
SP28/10 f.24	Fenton		5.95	5.95	14-Sep-1643
SP28/264 f.107	Jessop		329.72	329.72	11-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.146	Vernon	720.00		720.00	14-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.166	Vernon		15.40	15.40	14-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.207	Vernon		36.52	36.52	14-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.185	Vernon		101.50	101.50	16-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.218	Vernon		4.73	4.73	16-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.275	Vernon	300.00		300.00	24-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.281	Vernon		20.65	20.65	24-Oct-1643
SP28/10 f.290	Vernon		14.00	14.00	26-Oct-1643
		5340.43	2588.57	7929.00	

Table 3.20 – Sir Samuel Luke's Receipts as Scoutmaster General: the Gloucester/Newbury Campaign (Source: TNA SP28/127/3)

Reason for Issue	Receipt Date	Reconciled Amount (£)	Luke's Account (£)	Crawshaw's database (£)	Sub-Treasurer	Surviving warrant?
Necessary money for scouts	25-Aug-1643	154			(Vernon)	SP28/9 f.219
Pay for Luke and his 20 scouts	10-May-1643		100			
	(10-May-1643)			50	(Vernon)	(SP28/7 f.21)
	24-May-1643	50			Vernon	SP28/7 f.55
	27-May-1643		50			
	(27-May-1643)			100	(Fenton)	(SP28/7 f.140)
	06-Jun-1643		50			
	(07-Jun-1643)			50	(Fenton)	(SP28/7 f.359)
	01-Jul-1643	100	100			
	(07-Jul-1643)			100	(Fenton)	(SP28/7 f.302)
	12-Jul-1643	200			Vernon	SP28/8 f.80
	15-Jul-1643	200			Fenton	SP28/143 JFA f.98v
	04-Aug-1643	100			Fenton	SP28/8 f.234
	22-Aug-1643	100			Vernon	SP28/9 f.158
	14-Oct-1643	200			Vernon	SP28/10 f.181
Totals in £		1,104	300	300		

Appendix D:
Tabulated Data derived for Chapter Four

Table 4.1 – Tax Revenues Made Available to Essex's Army: the Army Ordinance of 26 March 1644

Source	Amount to be paid (£ per month)	Recipient	Purpose
Portion of the '[Fifth and] Twentieth Part': available at the office of the Committee for Advance of Money at Haberdasher's Hall.[840]	2,000	Gerrard's Treasury	General/Unknown
Assessed: Cities of London and Westminster, Tower Hamlets, Borough of Southwarke, and all places within the Bills of Mortality and Lines of Communication.	6,962.2	Gerrard's Treasury	General/Unknown
Assessed: The rest of Middlesex.	1,097.55	Gerrard's Treasury	General/Unknown
Excise Office	18,940.25	Gerrard's Treasury	Remuneration of officers and men
Excise Office	1,504	Ordnance Office[841]	For arms and ammunition
Total	£30,504		-

[840] Contextual information about this revenue stream can be found in the preface to Mary Anne Everett Green's *CCAM*, and in the first sections of chapters 1-4 above.

[841] In the event, this money was allocated to the Ordnance Office, not Gerrard's army treasury or, by extension, Rowe and Bradley's 'private' magazine. An exploration of this complicating factor can be found in section IV of chapter 4 above.

Infantry Regiment
Thomas Ballard's
Lord Essex's
Lord Robart's
Lord Wharton's
Sir Henry Cholmley
John Hampden's
Lord Rochford's
Lord Say and Sele's
William Constable's
Lord Peterborough
Henry Bulstrode's
Sir Philip Skippon's
George Langham's
Henry Barclay's
Warwick's/Holborn
John Holmstead's
Francis Thompson's
William Davies'
% Paid by Vernon
Total (Units rec. Pa

Infantry Regi
Thomas Ballard
Lord Essex's
Lord Robart's
John Hampden'
Lord Say and S
William Consta
Henry Bulstrod
Sir Philip Skipp
George Langha
Henry Barclay's
Warwick's/Holl
John Holmsteac
Francis Thomp
William Davies
Total:

Table 4.4 – Infantry Speculative Pay Level Calculations: 1644

Line	Speculative Calculations	Results
1	Cost of 4,500 foot soldiers over a 12-month period (4500 x 0.93 x 12)	£50,220
2	Cost of nine full regiments' worth of officers for the same period (9 x 542.8 x 12)	£58,622.40
3	Total hypothetical cost for this period (Line 1 + Line 2)	£108,842.40
4	Total infantry receipts for 1644 (Table 4.2)	£44,697.37
5	Known receipts as percentage of the hypothetical total (Line 4 ÷ Line 3)	41.07%
6	Receipt percentage expressed as the number of fully-remunerated days (336 x Line 5)	137.98

Table 4.5 – Revised Pay Schedule: Infantry Officers (26 March 1644)

Officers/NCOs	Edgehill Rates (cost per month)	Revised 1644 Rates (cost per month)
Colonel's pay	63	31.5
Lt. Colonel's pay	42	21
Sgt. Major's pay	33.5	16.75
Captains' pay (7)	147	73.5
Lieutenants' pay (10)	56	56
Ensigns' pay (10)	44	44
Sergeants' pay (21)	46.1	46.1
Corporals' pay (30)	46.1	46.1
Drum Major's pay	2.1	2.1
Drummer's pay (20)	28	28
Preacher's pay	5.6	5.6
Quartermaster's pay	7	4.62
Provost's pay	7	4.62
Surgeon's pay	5.6	5.6
Surgeon's mates' pay (2)	5.6	5.6
Wagonmaster's pay	4.2	4.2
Total (£)	542.8	395.29

Table 4.6 – Total Cavalry Receipts by Sub-Treasurer: 1643/4 (Arranged by sub-treasurer)

E64[4] Number (and by order of appearance)	Cavalry Troop/Officer (by original commander)	Vernon Total (£)	Jessop Total (£)	Grand Total (£)
1	The Lord General's (Stapilton)	4457.90	20.00	4477.90
2	Sir William Balfour	2090.61	0.00	2090.61
3	Lord Grey of Groby	500.00	0.00	500.00
11	Lord Wharton	429.88	0.00	429.88
14	James Sheffield	1580.69	0.00	1580.69
15	Sir William Waller	0.00	411.60	411.60
16	John Gunter	371.35	0.00	371.35
17	William Pretty	297.50	0.00	297.50
22	Mathew Draper	1612.08	0.00	1612.08
29	Alexander Pym	0.00	349.30	349.30
31	Arthur Evelyn	749.32	0.00	749.32
40	Thomas Hammond	194.65	10.00	204.65
41	John Dalbeir	1477.97	0.00	1477.97
45	John Flemming	0.00	52.55	52.55
46	Arthur Goodwin	876.93	0.00	876.93
47	Richard Grenville	30.90	0.00	30.90
48	Thomas Terrill	95.65	0.00	95.65
49	John Hale	1125.21	0.00	1125.21
51	William Balfour (jr.)	881.45	0.00	881.45
52	George Austin	162.40	0.00	162.40
53	Adrian Scroop	433.97	0.00	433.97
57	Charles Chichester	565.78	0.00	565.78
59	Walter Long	257.25	6.38	263.63
61	Francis Thompson	746.41	0.00	746.41
63	Sir Robert Pie	593.13	0.00	593.13
65	Robert Vivers	27.30	380.00	407.30
66	William Anselme	571.90	0.00	571.90
67	Oliver Cromwell	300.30	0.00	300.30
76	Thomas Sheffield	801.41	0.00	801.41
78	Edward Clerke	343.70	0.00	343.70

80	John Urry	755.46	0.00	755.46
81	Sir Sigismund Alexander	324.80	0.00	324.80
83	Sir Samuel Luke	1327.13	0.00	1327.13
88	James Ramsey	163.45	0.00	163.45
90	Samuel Bosa	1434.46	0.00	1434.46
92	John Middleton	557.63	0.00	557.63
93	Philip Skippon	1086.14	0.00	1086.14
95	John Meldrum	390.37	0.00	390.37
96	Richard Crosse	183.40	0.00	183.40
97	Sir Gilbert Blare	141.05	0.00	141.05
99	William Carr	108.85	0.00	108.85
100	John Boswell	865.93	0.00	865.93
102	Francis Ingoldsby	322.35	0.00	322.35
103	Lionel Copley	1195.34	4.38	1199.71
105	Robert Robotham	966.09	0.00	966.09
107	Charles Pym	1325.89	0.00	1325.89
108	Mathew Scaltick	1249.06	0.00	1249.06
110	George Ulrick	104.50	0.00	104.50
113	Captain J. Andrewes	143.85	0.00	143.85
114	Charles Fleetwood	397.95	0.00	397.95
115	Thomas Harrison	445.55	0.00	445.55
117	James Innes	544.25	0.00	544.25
118	Carlo Fanthom	99.40	0.00	99.40
119	Edward Fiennes	1228.26	0.00	1228.26
122	David Melve	320.25	0.00	320.25
123	Francis Russell	446.25	0.00	446.25
124	John Carmighal	1321.51	0.00	1321.51
125	Thomas Rawlins	242.55	0.00	242.55
127	Anthony Buller	1207.53	0.00	1207.53
129	Robert Hamilton	1326.59	0.00	1326.59
130	Colonel Behre	376.60	0.00	376.60
135	Seymour Pyle	920.59	0.00	920.59
136	Richard Stevens	421.84	0.00	421.84
137	John Farmer	558.08	0.00	558.08
138	Alexander Ramsey	545.21	0.00	545.21

139	Colonel Bease	244.65	0.00	244.65
140	William Rainsborough	989.36	0.00	989.36
141	Captain Lukeman	118.30	0.00	118.30
142	Christopher Flemming	698.71	0.00	698.71
143	Nicholas Chute	666.28	0.00	666.28
144	Robert Bruce	78.84	0.00	78.84
145	Lt. Colonel Greaves	785.17	0.00	785.17
146	Jeremiah Abercromie	442.05	0.00	442.05
147	Simon Hackett	155.98	0.00	155.98
148	Captain Blackwell	133.23	0.00	133.23
149	Captain Francis	82.25	0.00	82.25
150	Lord Robarts	87.38	0.00	87.38
151	George Walters	132.88	0.00	132.88
152	Archibald Straughan	158.08	0.00	158.08
153	Captain Reynolds	84.70	0.00	84.70
154	Edward Herle	49.23	0.00	49.23
155	William Fry	60.00	0.00	60.00
156	Richard Joylife	20.00	0.00	20.00
Totals (£)		49,610.90	1,234.20	50,845.10


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Table 4.8 – Cavalry Speculative Pay Level Calculations: 1644

Line	Speculative Calculations	Results
1	Hypothetical number of 'perpetual' troop structures (Table 4.7)	36
2	Total amount received during 1644 only (Table 4.7)	£41,119.80
3	Amount received per hypothetical troop (Line 2 ÷ Line 1)	£1,142.22
4	Amount received per hypothetical troop, per month (Line 3 ÷ 12)	£95.18
5	Percent of full pay received per hypothetical troop (Line 4 ÷ 349.3)	27.25%
6	Total number of days' pay received (Line 5 x 336)	91.56

Table 4.9 – Revised Pay Schedule: Cavalry Troops (26 March 1644)

Personnel/Support Cost	Edgehill Rates (cost per month)	Revised 1644 Rates (cost per month)
Captain	33.6	16.8
(Captain's horses)	21	10.5
Lieutenant	11.2	7.39
(Lieutenant's horses)	14	9.24
Cornet	8.4	5.54
(Cornet's horses)	10.5	6.93
Quartermaster	5.6	5.6
(QM's horses)	7	7
Corporals (3)	12.6	12.6
Trumpeters (3)	8.4	8.4
Sadler	3.5	3.5
Smith	3.5	3.5
Harquebusiers (60, then 80)	210	279.3
Total (£)	349.30	376.31

Table 4.10 – Payments to the Dragoons: 1643/4

Month	Vernon	Jessop	Totals (£)
Nov 1643	169.80	0.00	169.80
Dec 1643	504.50	0.00	504.50
Jan 1644	0.00	0.00	0.00
Feb 1644	444.50	0.00	444.50
Mar 1644	0.00	0.00	0.00
Apr 1644	0.00	5.88	5.88
May 1644	239.35	202.25	441.60
Jun 1644	393.01	0.00	393.01
Jul 1644	85.40	0.00	85.40
Aug 1644	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sep 1644	59.15	0.00	59.15
Oct 1644	39.20	0.00	39.20
Nov 1644	30.80	0.00	30.80
Dec 1644	51.10	0.00	51.10
Totals (£)	2016.81	208.13	2224.94


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Table 4.12 – Comptroller Deane's Artillery Receipts: Summer/Autumn 1644 (Source: TNA SP28/140/8 and relevant [Vernon-paid] army warrants)

Date of Receipt	Place of Receipt	Amount (£)	Surviving pay warrant?
04-May-1644	St. Albans	730.00	SP28/15 f.122
17-May-1644	Henly	370.00	SP28/15 f.174
17-May-1644	Henly	40.00	SP28/15 f.179
22-May-1644	Reading	311.48	SP28/15 f.180
05-Jun-1644	Chipping Norton	319.36	SP28/16 f.11
14-Jun-1644	Blandford	320.00	SP28/16 f.74
25-Jun-1644	Chard	250.00	SP28/16 f.99
28-Jun-1644	Chard	50.00	SP28/16 f.111
14-Jul-1644	Tiverton	632.07	SP28/17 f.68
17-Jul-1644	Tiverton	60.00	SP28/17 f.84
30-Jul-1644	Bodman	646.07	SP28/17 f.135
15-Sep-1644	Southampton	646.07	SP28/18 f.55
16-Sep-1644	Southampton	70.00	SP28/17 f.316
16-Oct-1644	Portsmouth	210.00	SP28/19 f.31
23-Oct-1644	Reading	670.00	SP28/19 f.58
21-Nov-1644	Reading	260.00	SP28/20 f.71
26-Nov-1644	Reading	243.47	SP28/20 f.71
14-Dec-1644	Reading	70.00	SP28/21 f.151
26-Dec-1644	Reading	496.50	SP28/21 f.184
26-Dec-1644	Reading	32.38	-
Totals (£)	-	6,427.41	

Table 4.13 – Ordnance Office Debentures: July and August 1644

Catalogue No.	Date of issue	Type of Goods	Value (£)	Date of (final) payment	Paid (£)
SP28/17 f.011	10-Jul-1644	Gunpowder	400.00	30-Jul-1644	400.00
SP28/17 f.013	10-Jul-1644	Gunpowder	800.00	16-Jul-1644	800.00
SP28/17 f.035	19-Jul-1644	Match	137.61	20-Jul-1644	137.61
SP28/17 f.037	19-Jul-1644	Lead shot	133.00	22-Jul-1644	133.00
SP28/17 f.043	23-Jul-1643	Dry fatts	16.55	29-Jul-1644	16.55
SP28/17 f.045	24-Jul-1644	Gunpowder	400.00	20-Aug-1644	400.00
SP28/17 f.047	25-Jul-1644	Match	268.93	26-Jul-1644	268.93
SP28/17 f.049	26-Jul-1644	Match	111.94	27-Jul-1644	111.94
SP28/17 f.425	08-Aug-1644	Shovels, Spades	75.00	10-Aug-1644	75.00
SP28/17 f.427	08-Aug-1644	Match	57.88	09-Aug-1644	57.88
SP28/17 f.431	10-Aug-1644	Round shot & hand grenades	55.13	12-Aug-1644	55.13
SP28/17 f.435	15-Aug-1644	Pickaxes	56.22	02-Sep-1644	56.22
SP28/17 f.437	15-Aug-1644	Pickaxes	11.75	02-Sep-1644	11.75
SP28/17 f.439	19-Aug-1644	Gunpowder	400.00	20-Aug-1644	400.00
SP28/17 f.443	21-Aug-1644	Match	84.00	04-Sep-1644	84.00
Totals (£)			3008.00		3008.00

Table 4.14 – Victuals supplied by Woolsey in the West: by Unit (Source: TNA SP28/128/28)

Regimental Commander	Arm	Regular Army?	Total Value of Goods Received (£)
Earl of Essex's	Cavalry	Yes	6.59
Dalbeir's	Cavalry	Yes	3.92
Sir William Balfour's	Cavalry	Yes	9.06
Behre's	Cavalry	Yes	5.19
Robert Pye's	Cavalry	Yes	5.25
Leighton's	Cavalry	Yes	9.98
Harvey's[842]	Cavalry	Yes	4.93
Earl of Essex's	Infantry	Yes	154.69
Robarts's	Infantry	Yes	97.02
Skippon's	Infantry	Yes	87.03
Barclay's	Infantry	Yes	83.00
Cunningham's	Infantry	Yes	78.08
Terrill's	Infantry	Yes	80.15
Aldrich's	Infantry	Yes	42.53
Davies's	Infantry	Yes	41.89
Train of Artillery	'Other'	Yes	114.02
Reformados	'Other'	Yes	0.63
Ware's Dragoons	Cavalry	No	5.21
London Brigade	Infantry	No	155.83
Ware's	Infantry	No	76.19
Popham's	Infantry	No	49.07
Northamptonshire Company	Infantry	No	4.31
Innes's 'party'	Infantry	No	7.82
Total (£)			1122.38

[842] Although Colonel Harvey's unit was undoubtedly raised in London, it is also doubtless that his regiment had entered into Vernon's pay by this point in the army's history.



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'lbs.' = The avc
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'firkins' = A ca
'bu.' = The size
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'hh.' = A hogsh

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Exchequer 101 (King's Remembrancer: Accounts Various)

- 67/11A – Treasurers at Warre, Accounts Various, Leger of Assessments for the Armie 1645-9
- 67/11B – Second Accompt of the Treasurers at Warr, 1649-52
- 676/52 – Account of receipts and payments by treasurer at war, 1642-1644**

State Papers 14 (State Papers Domestic, James I)

- 174 – Letters and papers (1624 Nov 1-18)**

State Papers 16 (State Papers Domestic, Charles I)

- 419 – Musters: indentures for conveying soldiers from Flints, Herts, Beds, Denb, Worc, Monn, Ches, Salop, Heref, Bucks, Derb, Lancs, Kent, Glam, and Mont, to a rendezvous at Selby upon Ouse, Yorks, for service in the king's army in the north**
- 483, ff.90v-91r – Accounts of the earl of Warwick**

State Papers 19 (Committee for the Advance of Money: Books and Papers)

- 49 – Accounts for London of the raising of monies on the Ordinance of Parliament of 29 Nov 1642**

State Papers 28 (Commonwealth Exchequer Papers)

- Army.
  (Warrants issued by army committees, military commanders, etc.)
  - 1A – 1642 Aug-Sep**
  - 1B – 1642 Aug-Sep**
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  - 1D – 1642 Aug-Sep**
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  - 2B – 1642 Oct**
  - 3A – 1642 Nov**
  - 3B – 1642 Nov**
  - 4 – 1642 Dec, and undated**
  - 5 – 1643 Jan-Mar**
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  - 9 – 1643 Aug**
  - 10 – 1643 Sept-Oct**
  - 11 – 1643 Nov-Dec, and undated**
  - 12 – 1644 Jan-Feb**
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- Army accounts: of military officers, garrisons, etc.
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- Committee for Taking the Accounts of the Whole Kingdom.
  - 252 – Various dates, 1643-1649 Letter books**

- Various Committees.
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- Miscellaneous.
  (Bills and receipts: army, county committees, etc)
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War Office 55 (Ordnance Office and War Office: Miscellaneous Entry Books and Papers)

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- 457**
- 460**
- 1662**
- 1754**
- 1937**

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